HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS OF THE POPULAR FRONT

A COLLECTION FOR CRITICAL ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY




The Palestinian Resistance

Historical Documents of the Popular Front

The Palestinian Resistance

Historical Documents of the Popular Front

A Collection for Critical Organizational Study



ISKRA BOOKS
US | ENGLAND | IRELAND

Published by *Iskra Books* © 2025

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

All rights reserved.
The moral rights of the authors and editors have been asserted.

Iskra Books
www.iskrabooks.org
U.S. | England | Ireland

Iskra Books is an independent scholarly publisher—publishing original works of revolutionary theory, history, education, and art, as well as edited collections, new translations, and critical republications of older works.

ISBN-13: 979-8-2957-4968-1 (*Softcover*)
ISBN-13: 979-8-2957-4970-4 (*Jacketed Hardcover*)

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress

Cover Art by Ben Stahnke
Editing and Typesetting by David Peat

CONTENTS



Publisher's Note
"Unite all the Tributaries of the Struggle within an All-embracing Struggle" / **x**

Historical Documents of the Popular Front
Founding Statement of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (1967) / **19**
Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine (1969) / **24**
On People's War (1969) / **101**
The Military Strategy of the P.F.L.P. (1970) / **105**
Hands off the Militia! (1971) / **142**
The Popular Front and External Operations (1971) / **154**
Third Congress: Tasks of the New Stage (1972) / **175**
Fourth Congress: Political Report (1986) / **263**
Third Congress: Tasks of the New Stage: Preface to Third Arabic Edition (1989) / **514**
Fifth Congress: Political Program (1993) / **522**
Sixth Conference: Toward a New Political Vision (2000) / **551**
Eighth Conference: Political Program (2022) / **635**

Editor's Note

The documents contained in this collection are presented as an archival record for the academic field of critical organizational studies, and for those interested in critical studies of revolutionary organizations more generally. Documents are presented in chronological order. While all attempts have been made to source documents, the inclusions are not exhaustive, but we hope the collection provides a broad historical overview of the development of the Popular Front's theoretical, practical, and organizational development. All documents were sourced at pflp-documents.org unless otherwise stipulated.

The historical documents present in the text have been lightly edited for clarity, readability, and accessibility. The content and structure of the original documents has been preserved, with only the vicissitudes of translation and editing impacting the originals. Extra contextual information is provided throughout by footnotes beginning "**Ed. Note:**", or by square brackets "[ ]" inserted into the text. All other footnotes are from the originals.





A Critical Organizational Theory of Resistance: Armed units of the Palestinian resistance stand together beneath a single banner. The Popular Front's history demonstrates that revolutionary praxis is sustained not by isolated action but through processes of organizational unity, coalition-building, and collective capacity. Such forma-



tions reveal how resistance movements construct durable structures of solidarity, weaving together disparate forces into a coherent struggle for liberation. In this, organizational strength becomes inseparable from political possibility. It is in these collective alignments that resistance transforms into a vision for an emancipated future.

"Unite all the Tributaries of the Struggle within an All-embracing Struggle"[1]

Publisher's Note

On October 7, 2023, a coordinated action by a united front of Palestinian fighters that breached the barriers around the Israeli-imposed ghetto of Gaza marked a moment of profound significance. At present, a military-level united front exists between Palestinian resistance groups—such as Hamas—and organizations like the subject of this book, the Marxist-Leninist *Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine* (PFLP).These groups have temporarily set aside their differences, coming together under the shared goal of national liberation and the removal of Zionist structures from Palestine

As we will later see, the usage of a united front is not unique in history, and while it can lead to successes in national liberation, it can also lead to danger if the left is not strong enough. A perfect example of this can be seen after the Iranian Revolution, when the left in Iran was completely devastated, either through exile or state executions.[2] Another example is of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist Party of China (CPC), whose alternating strategic partnerships and intense conflicts included KMT-led massacres of CPC members, notably the Shanghai Massacre of 1927. Despite this, as will be discussed below, circumstances meant they still (re)joined forces less than 10 years later.[3]

It is important to distinguish between true, military united fronts—which combat occupation and eradication—and the pseudo-united

1 This quote taken from the 'Sixth National Conference', see p. 569 of this volume.

2 Nikki R.Keddie and Yann Richard, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution* (Yale University Press, 2006), p. 254.

3 Rostislav Aleksandrovich Ulyanovsky, *The Comintern and the East a Critique of the Critique: The Falsifiers of Leninist Strategy and Tactics in the National Liberation Movement Exposed* (Progress Publishers, 1981), p. 272.

fronts we see in Western "social democracies," which are fetishized as peaceful. These, on their face, are formed to block the far-right from gaining power, but really, they prevent the left from gaining legislative power. The most recent example of this is the June 2024 French parliamentary elections where the French left joined a "united front" with Macron's group to block Le Pen's fascists from leading the elections, only for Macron to ally with Le Pen afterwards to prevent the left (the largest parliamentary block) from gaining any significant legislative seats.

From a Marxist-Leninist perspective, we call this a united front. This would be a group of organizations, who differ on core ideological principles, like the question of capitalism, but have set those differences aside to come together and achieve the main goal of either defeating fascism or gaining national liberation. In times where a united front is deemed necessary, fascism or colonial domination is recognized by the communist party, through material analysis, as the primary, but not the only, barrier to socialist revolution. In April 1922, the Executive Committee of the Communist International stated that the united front "means the association of all workers, whether communist, anarchist, social-democrat, independent or non-party or even Christian workers, against the bourgeoisie. With the leaders, if they want it so, without the leaders if they remain indifferently aside, and in defiance of the leaders and against the leaders if they sabotage the workers' united front. And this genuine united front in the common struggle is bound to come. It must come if the working class wants to defend its most fundamental and elementary interests against the capitalist offensive."[4] Lenin then approved of the idea of a broad coalition of groups in June 1922, stating that the strategy of a united front proposed in an open letter by the United Communist Party of Germany to other German organizations was "a model because it is the first act of a practical method of winning over the majority of the working class."[5]

Historical Usage

Since the early twentieth century, the united front was used as a tactic. While the term, "united front," was not used at the time, one could describe what happened during the 1916 Easter Rising in Ireland as the

4 Jane Degras, *The Communist International 1919-1943: Documents. Volume 1, 1919-1922* (Frank Cass, 1971), p. 341.

5 Vladimir Lenin, *Collected Works: Volume 23 December 1920-August 1921* (Progress Publishers, 1973), p. 470.

coming together of the socialist Irish Citizen Army, the Irish Volunteers, the all-women Cumann na mBan, and Hibernian Rifles, with the shared, common goal of national liberation of Ireland from the British. This large cross-section of different communities in Ireland helped gain the masses' support, especially after the executions of the Rising leaders, leading to the War of Independence. However, the main goal of the Irish Citizen Army—that of a 32 county united socialist Ireland—is still being fought for by Irish Republicans, even after the failure of the War of Independence, which led to the six counties in the north of Ireland still being occupied by the British to the present day.

Historically, united fronts have effectively been used to fight fascism, as in the case of the USSR and the western front of World War II. Georgi Dimitrov wrote extensively on the importance of the united front against fascism. In 1935, during the rise of fascism in Spain, Italy, Japan, and Germany, Dimitrov insisted on military internationalism as fascism was already quickly spreading in Spain. He said that "the most urgent, though, of these tasks, the very first at the present moment, is that of organizing international aid to the Spanish people for their victory over fascism."[6]

He saw that if one group of people were being oppressed, this would lead to others being oppressed. The rise of fascism would necessarily lead to a worldwide fight against it. Even now, we should take heed of his words from 1935, that "it must be understood that it is not a case now of some far distant menace of fascism, but that fascism, which has already set up its terroristic dictatorship in such big countries as Germany and Italy, and is seeking to do the same in Spain, is preparing to crush the working class movement and to destroy democracy in other countries, and that it kindles the flames of world imperialist war."[7] As we can see now, the drums of war that imperialist countries are beating, the pure impunity of the war crimes that Israel is committing, and the minorities that the United States are oppressing are nothing but a push towards another world war.

Returning to World War II, through the anti-Japanese united front, China was able to fight off both Japan, and set the stage for the Communist Party of China to later achieve national liberation. Mao wrote in 1937 that the aim of the "united front must be resistance to Japan, and

6 Georgi Dimitrov, *Dimitrov: Selected Works Volume 2* (Sofia Press, 1978), p. 156.

7 Ibid., p. 158.

not simultaneous opposition to all the imperialist powers."[8] The focus should be on uniting against fascism first, and setting aside any differences that the Chinese people had with one another. Mao stated that "the Communist Party issued its call, 'Stop the civil war and unite against Japan'... and thereby created the primary prerequisite for the actual establishment of an anti-Japanese national united front."[9]

Setting aside their armed civil war, the CPC united with their previously mentioned enemies, the KMT, to resist Japanese fascism. Mao explained that the KMT "is a heterogeneous party which includes die-hards, middle elements and progressives; taken as a whole, it must not be equated with the die-hards."[10] He did not throw out the entire organization based on the "die-hards" of the organization, recognizing that there were more people to be won over than not. This was to benefit the CPC after gaining liberation from Japanese imperialism, as it won over many KMT members.

Mao further explained the united front must include a cross-class character element, and it "should include the bourgeoisie and all who agree to the defence of the motherland, it should represent national solidarity against the foreign foe."[11] The invasion of Japan helped unite the classes even more, "strengthening the camp of national revolution and weakening that of counter-revolution," as Mao pointed out.[12] However to further cement the cross-class united front against Japan, Mao said that "the tactics required for this purpose are to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces and combat the die-hard forces; these are three inseparable links, and the means to be used to unite all the anti-Japanese forces is struggle."[13] He found "struggle is the means to unity and unity is the aim of struggle."[14]

Being inspired by Mao's example, in 1973, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), created the National Democratic Front of the

8 Mao Zedong, *Selected Works of Mao Zedong: Volume I* (Foreign Languages Press, 2021), p. 240.

9 Ibid., p. 241.

10 Mao Zedong, *Selected Works of Mao Zedong: Volume II* (Foreign Languages Press, 2021), p. 403.

11 Zedong, *Selected Works of Mao Zedong: Volume I*, p. 240.

12 Ibid., p. 140.

13 Zedong, *Selected Works of Mao Zedong: Volume II*, p. 398.

14 Ibid.

Philippines (NDFP) which in essence is a united front. Currently, the "NDFP has 18 allied organizations... [a] comprehensive united front of patriotic and progressive organizations."[15] These include groups representing fisher-folk, workers, peasants, students, women, the Moro people and other minority peoples, and Christians.

Specifically, there is one organization called the Christians for National Liberation (CNL) who are a part of the NDFP. Having the CNL a part of the united front is essential, according to the former leader of the CPP, Jose Maria Sison: "They persistently worked to arouse the common church people, the nuns, priests, pastors and bishops to defend human rights and defeat the purpose of the reactionaries to use the institution of the church as an instrument of imperialism and the exploiting classes against the working people."[16] He goes on to explain that the CNL are effective because they are "spreading the movement for national and social liberation in the cities and countryside."[17]

Palestine

In the Palestinian context, the united front is critical to achieving national liberation from the entity. There are at least ten different organizations in this united front. They provide not only political power, but also fighters on the ground. There are multiple armed wings of these political groups in the united front. The PFLP characterizes the situation this way:

> Everything remains dependent upon the capacity of the factions of the national movement to understand this complex process, so that they might enhance their roles, functions, structures, performances, and thinking to a level that provides them with dynamics, a vision capable of managing the struggle, and effectively dealing with peculiarities. In a word, this means the capacity to make use of the diversity of the situation, employ it to serve the grand aims against the main contradiction.[18]

While it may seem to some communists as counterintuitive to have religious organizations as part of a united front, as we can observe in the Philippines context, it is important to have them, as they are connected to the religious masses. As Sison stated while discussing the NDFP, "Muslims and Christians pursue a common revolutionary struggle and

15 Jose Maria Sison, *On the United Front* (International Network for Philippine Studies, 2022), p. 642.

16 Ibid., p. 428.

17 Ibid., p. 429.

18 See 'Sixth National Conference', p. 589 of this volume.

support each other. They must arrive at a common agreement of unity, cooperation and coordination in the struggle for national freedom and democracy against fascist, foreign and feudal domination."[19] We are seeing how important it is in this current siege to have religious groups as part of this front. They have the masses' full support in the fight for freedom from Israeli oppression and occupation.

As early as 1969, the PFLP recognized that they should not only be organizing within their own territory, as it would take more than organizing across class to achieve liberation. They saw the monumental task of defeating Zionism as part of the much larger issue of world imperialism and domination. In their strategy, they wrote that it "requires the mobilization and concentration of all the forces of revolution in the Arab countries in general and the Arab regions surrounding Israel in particular. This is the reason why the Popular Front lays so much stress on the interconnection between the Palestinian question and the Arab question and on the necessity of coalescence between the Palestine liberation movement and the Arab liberation movement."[20]

Over two years into the war, we can see how effective this strategy of a united front is at combatting two of the most militarized countries in the world, the United States and Israel. With the assistance of the Yemeni, Iranian, Iraqi, and Lebanese masses, Palestine has continued to fight back, and has retained Gaza for the Palestinians. While the war has been long, it is clear the Palestinian united front will not give up, and will continue to fight for its national liberation from Zionist imperialism. It must be remembered that in 1935, Mao wrote that "the overthrow of Japanese imperialism and the counter-revolutionary forces in China cannot be accomplished in a day, and we must be prepared to devote a long time to it; it cannot be accomplished by small forces, and we must therefore accumulate great forces."[21]

As for this book's reader, take note of Dimitrov's warning that even while the fight continues against Zionism and imperialism, "the fascist beast must be muzzled. It must be confronted by the mighty organized fist of the People's Front. It must be muzzled in iron so as to prevent it from biting. It must be struck at and finished once and for all, in order to

19 Ibid., p. 142.

20 See 'Strategy of the Liberation of Palestine', p. 24 of this volume.

21 Zedong, *Selected Works of Mao Zedong: Volume I*, p. 143.

save the democratic gains won by the people and safeguard peace."[22] We can see the Palestinian united front is doing this, and we must support them in their fight. Our freedom is tied to their freedom; our liberation is linked with theirs.

Free Palestine.

References

Degras, Jane. *The Communist International 1919-1943 : Documents. Volume 1, 1919-1922*. Frank Cass, 1971.

Dimitrov, Georgi. *Dimitrov: Selected Works Volume 2*. Sofia Press, 1978.

Keddie, Nikki R., and Yann Richard. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. Yale University Press, 2006.

Lenin, Vladimir. *Collected Works: Volume 23 December 1920-August 1921*. Progress Publishers, 1973.

Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine. *Strategy of the Liberation of Palestine*. Foreign Languages Press, 2017.

Sison, Jose Maria. *On the United Front*. International Network for Philippine Studies, 2022.

Ulyanovsky, Rostislav Aleksandrovich. *The Comintern and the East a Critique of the Critique: The Falsifiers of Leninist Strategy and Tactics in the National Liberation Movement Exposed*. Progress Publishers, 1981.

Zedong, Mao. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong: Volume I*. Foreign Languages Press, 2021.

Zedong, Mao. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong: Volume II*. Foreign Languages Press, 2021.

22 Georgi Dimitrov, *Dimitrov: Selected Works Volume 2* (Sofia Press, 1978), p. 162.

Historical Documents of the Popular Front

Founding Statement of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine[1]

[1967]

People of the Arab nation...

People of Palestine...

Fifty years ago, the masses of our people faced a continuing series of assaults by Zionism and by colonialism—upon the people of this nation, and our right to liberty and life. Fifty years later and the global forces of Zionism and imperialism continue concocting plots, attacks, and wars in order to establish the idea of an entity—the State of Israel. On each day of this historic era, the masses of people are struggling against each of these schemes. We have seen throughout the years, in the life of our Palestinian people, a continuation of this struggle through upheavals and uprisings, crystallizing in the last period in commando work practiced by the vanguards of the people on the ground with full refusal of submission, surrender and compromise, and other serious forms and methods of political action. This advance has also represented the determination of the masses of the Palestinian people to take the initiative to pave a road to full emancipation, which is simultaneously the responsibility of the entire Arab masses: our struggling people.

The military defeat suffered by the Arab armies served as the beginning of a new phase of work in which the revolutionary masses must take their responsible leadership role in confronting the forces and weapons of imperialism and Zionism, which history has proved is the most effective weapon to crush all forms of colonial aggression and to give the initiative to the popular masses to formulate the future according to their

1 December 11, 1967

will and interests. The only weapon left to the masses in order to restore history and progress and truly defeat enemies and potential enemies in the long run is revolutionary violence in confronting Zionist violence and reaction. There is no other option in front of the masses of the Arab nation—they face a fierce enemy who wants them to surrender unconditionally. The hopes and anticipation of the Arab masses have reached a qualitatively new level from before the fifth of June; they are aware of the nature of the stage and the objective conditions have matured to the extent that allows us to raise the slogan of the popular armed struggle and put it into practice until victory in a long and protracted battle, a victory that must be achieved through the will and aspirations of the masses.

The entire masses of our Palestinian people live today for the first time since the catastrophe of 1948 on a completely occupied Palestinian territory, confronting a rapacious enemy face to face, and we now must take up this challenge to its conclusion or we must accept or surrender to the ambitions of the enemy and the daily humiliation of our people and absorbed fortunes of our lives. The displacement and dispersion of the last twenty years have created a circumstance in which we must confront the Zionist invaders; the fate of our people and our cause and every human being in Palestine relies upon our Palestinian determination to fight the invaders in order to preserve our dignity, and our lands and our rights.

Palestinian people displaced in the camps of displacement and isolation...

Tillers of our inflamed land...

Oh poor, steadfast in our cities and villages, in the camps of misery...

Through your valor and resistance in confronting the enemy, one slogan is paramount and repeated daily—only armed resistance—and there is no life for us on our occupied land except the life of popular armed struggle in the service of our objectives and the daily battle. Armed resistance is the only effective method that can be used by the popular masses in dealing with the Zionist enemy and all of its interests and its presence. The masses are the authority, the guide, and the resistance leadership from which victory will be achieved in the end. It is necessary to recruit the popular masses and mobilize them as active participants and leaders, something that can only be achieved through systematic organization addressing the armed struggle of the forces of the masses, creating a heightened awareness of the full dimensions of the battle and the stages,

and continuous recruitment of manpower for the armed organization, building the revolutionary leadership in order to become more able to exercise resistance and continue despite all the difficulties and obstacles. Therefore, in order to unite the forces and energies of the Palestinian masses in the occupied land, we have held a full meeting between the following Palestinian organizations: The Heroes of the Return, the Palestinian Liberation Front squads (Organization of martyr Abdul Latif Shrour; Organization of the martyr Qassam; Organization of the martyr Abdul-Qader Al-Husseini), the National Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Youth Organization for Vengeance), and several other Palestinian groups on the homeland. These organizations have agreed among themselves to unite under the banner of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, achieving a fateful unity among these forces, realizing that the nature and dimensions of the battle and the hostile forces requires us to cluster all efforts and revolutionary ranks for our long and bitter struggle against our enemies.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, initiated and directed by a core group of revolutionaries, is at the same time open to all forces and Palestinian groups, to meet in a broad national revolutionary front in order to achieve a national unity established between all factions engaged in armed struggle. The unity of all the freedom fighters is real demand for our people, as the battle is long and cruel and rupture is intolerable in the ranks of the national movement, and therefore the Popular Front is dedicated entirely to this requirement, because it has formed on this basis. Today our masses are marching through the doors of armed struggle and we believe that the masses' leadership in the armed struggle, bearing its standard as the only guarantee for the steadfastness of this struggle and its escalation up to the level of the Palestinian revolution, with all of its dimensions and content.

Our fighting people...

The only language that the enemy understands is the language of revolutionary violence. The armed struggle is the main curriculum for our protracted conflict that we are waging against occupation and against attempts to liquidate our struggle through attempts at settlement, which have begun again in some areas of the Arab homeland and impose a totally unacceptable occupation upon some parts of our Arab land. We are fighting against the enemy in every land where the feet of his soldiers march. This is our historical approach—where we are going until we reach the stage where we open a wider front against the enemy and

turn our land into a burning hell for the invaders. The crossfire of armed struggle is not known to have limits and the armed resistance should not be confined to the militants, but also embrace all parts and sectors of the Palestinian resistance against the enemy at every level, dealing with the enemy militarily, but also a total boycott of all economic, civil and political institutions of the enemy and a rejection of all ties.

The slogan of our masses must be resistance until victory, rooted in the heart with our feet planted on the ground in deep commitment to our land. Today, the Popular Front is hailing our masses with this call. This is the appeal. We must repeat it every day, through every breakthrough bullet and the fall of each martyr, that the land of Palestine today belongs to all the masses. Every area of our land belongs to our masses who have defended it against the presence of the usurper, every piece of land, every rock and stone, our masses will not abandon one inch of them because they belong to the legions of the poor and hungry and displaced persons. In order to liberate this land, and for our steadfast people, our fighters today fall with their heads lifted. The masses—Oh sons of our heroic people—are the life-breath of the fighters, and it is the involvement of the masses in the battle that ensures victory in the long run. The popular support for the militants at all levels in every land form the basis for genuine, firm, and escalating struggle and steadfastness, rising until we crush the enemy.

In this war for our occupied land, and the fate of collaborators and traitors and enemies of the people will be the fate of the occupying enemy, crushed in full. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is determined to reject delay and hesitation in engaging in the struggle in our occupied land and declares its determination to reject humility and humiliation and settlements. We stand today before our masses, our people, promising to provide them with the truth, the whole truth in every respect, regarding our struggles, achievements and obstacles facing our armed action. The truth must be the property of the masses because there is no other force more committed to their own interests. The masses must be fully aware of the achievements and problems of the armed struggle without exaggeration or hype because they are the custodians of the objectives of this struggle and their aspirations, which will be given to this struggle, including every possession, up to their blood. The active members, the fighters on the Palestinian land today pursue a new path of political action and deal with the masses with full openness and truth.

People of the Arab nation…

This battle is long and harsh, and the armed resistance today is the vanguard of fighting along the steadfast Arab front. Every Arab demands today to provide full support for the march of the armed combat corps at all levels. The Palestinian fighting masses on the occupied land are actors of the Arab revolutionary march against imperialism and its proxy forces. In our response to the Zionist alliance and colonialism, we must make the organic link between the struggle of the Palestinian people and the struggle of the masses of the Arab people, facing the same risks and the same schemes. Therefore the work of the Palestinian armed struggle determines the position of the Arabs who stand by the struggle, against those who stand against it. The struggle of the Palestinian people is linked with the struggle of the forces of revolution and progress in the world. The format of the coalition that we face requires a corresponding governing coalition including all the forces of anti-imperialism in every part of the world.

Our struggling masses everywhere on Palestinian land...

Fellow workers and peasants...

Oh poor people and refugees...

Fellow students...

Clerks and traders...

This is the beginning of a movement of the people flying the flags of sacrifice, steadfastness and challenge. We are on the ground and we promise that armed struggle is not a rosy dream, but more fighting, led by the political mobilization of the masses to defend the defenseless against reprisal and persecution. We are marching each fighting step today, preparing to fight a long, harsh and bitter battle with your leadership and commitment as the true owners of the cause. That battle is not easy nor quick, but it is the battle of destiny and its presence requires our deep commitment, ability to continue, and steadfastness.

Glory to the steadfastness of our Arab nation.

Glory to the struggle of our people.

Long live the unity of our fighters on the land of Palestine.

We will surely win.

Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine

[1969]

Introduction

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, in spite of the short time that has elapsed since its foundation—its political age is barely one and a half years old—has come to constitute, from the objective viewpoint, a politico-military manifestation which attracts the interest of wide circles of the Palestinian people, while, at the same time, daily attraction increased interest on both Arab and world levels. This manifestation, inasmuch as it bears the factors of revolutionary growth through which it is endeavoring to attain the level of historical revolution, is also facing a combination of real dangers, both subjective and objective, which threaten its existence and attempt to impede its growth and progress.

In the light of this general evaluation of the Front's existence which demands alertness, a deep sense of historical responsibility and conscious understanding of the importance of scientific precision in viewing the struggle and in facing the problems of operation, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine held its Congress in February 1969. It studied the strategy of Palestinian revolutionary action and defined the general political, organizational and military steps which should be taken to ensure the Front's consistent growth so as to enable it to rise to the level of the liberation challenge which it has undertaken.

I. Importance of Political Thought

One of the basic conditions of success is a clear perspective of things: a clear perspective of the enemy and a clear perspective of the revolutionary forces. It is in this light that the strategy of the struggle is determined, and without this perspective, national action becomes an impetuous gamble which soon ends in failure. Thus, after decades of fighting and sacrifice, it has become imperative for the Palestinian people to assure

themselves that their armed struggle this time has the required conditions for success. Our people have waged a long fight against Zionist and colonialist plans. Since 1917 (the Balfour Declaration), the masses of our people have been fighting to keep their soil, to obtain freedom, to free their country from colonialists, to assert their right to self-determination and to exploit their country's resources for their own benefit. Their struggle against Zionism and colonialism has taken every form and method. In 1936 our people took up arms in defense of their lands, homes, freedom and the right to build their future, offering thousands of martyrs and bearing all sorts of sacrifices. During that period of history the armed struggle of our people created a state of mass consciousness not less than that in which our masses are rallying around commando action today. Nevertheless, in spite of all the sacrifices, of the long line of martyrs whose number exceeded that of today's martyrs in commando action, of the taking up of arms and of the masses' enthusiasm, our people even until this day, have not triumphed. Most of them are still living in the wretched conditions of the camps and under the yoke of occupation. Consequently, to assure ourselves of the success of the struggle, it is not sufficient for us to take up arms. Some armed revolutions in history have ended in victory, but others have ended in failure. It is incumbent upon us to face the facts with a frank, courageous and revolutionary scientific mentality. A clear perspective of things and of the real forces taking part in the struggle leads to success, while impetuosity and spontaneity lead to failure.

This shows clearly the importance of scientific political thought which guides the revolution and plans its strategy. Revolutionary political thought is not an abstract idea hanging in a vacuum, or a mental luxury, or an intellectual hobby for the educated, which we can, if we wish, lay aside as an unnecessary luxury. Scientific revolutionary thought is clear thought whereby the masses are able to understand their enemy, his points of weakness or strength and the forces which support and ally themselves to the enemy. Likewise, the masses should understand their own forces, the forces of revolution, how to mobilize, how to overcome the enemy's points of strength and take advantage of the weakness of the enemy, and through what organization, mobilization and political and military programs, they can escalate their forces until they can crush the enemy and achieve victory.

It is this revolutionary political thought which explains to the masses of our people the reasons for their failure hitherto in their confrontation with the enemy: why their armed revolt of 1936 and their attempts before

1936 failed, what led to the 1967 defeat, the truth about the hostile alliance against which they are waging war, and with what counter-alliance they can face it, and by what method. All of this should be put in clear language which the masses can understand. Through this understanding they get a clear perspective of the battle and its dimensions, forces and weapons, so that their thinking emerges as a force around which they are united with one perspective of the battle and one strategy.

To us, political thought means a clear vision of the battle before us, and this is why we stress the importance and seriousness of this matter. What does it mean to fight without political thought? It means to fight in a manner that lacks planning, to fall into errors without realizing how serious they are or how to deal with them, to improvise political positions not based on a clear view. When political positions are improvised, there is usually a multiplicity of positions which means dispersed forces with the result that the revolutionary forces of our people are dispersed along many paths instead of all converging on one path as one solid force.

We want to warn against the danger of taking this matter lightly. There is among our combatants and in our bases a trend which confuses revolutionary political thought with political debauchery as represented by certain "political forces" and "political leaders." This trend confuses revolutionary political thought with the outworn political methods used by the Palestinian national movement before the armed struggle strategy. Also, this trend confuses political thought and the complicated sophistry of certain intellectuals in discussing matters pertaining to the revolution. Thus the trend in question tries to disdain or make light of political thought, and it is therefore necessary for us here to perform a radical corrective operation. It is revolutionary political thought which exposes "political debauchery," strengthens our conviction in the armed struggle and unveils before the public the stupid sophistry which complicates the problems of the revolution instead of serving its cause.

To perform this revolutionary role, political thought must (1) be scientific, (2) be so clear as to be within the reach of the masses and (3) go beyond generalities and penetrate as deeply as possible into the strategy and tactics of the battle to guide the combatants in facing their problems. When revolutionary thought fulfills these requirements it becomes the most effective weapon in the hands of the masses, enabling them to consolidate their forces and have a perfectly clear view of the battle with all the forces in action and of the position of each of these forces from the beginning of the revolution to its conclusive end.

II. Who Are Our Enemies?

In his article, "Analysis of the Classes of Chinese Society" (March 1926), Mao Zedong wrote:

> Who are our enemies? Who are our friends?
>
> This is a question of the first importance for the revolution. The basic reason why all previous revolutionary struggles in China achieved so little is their failure to unite with real friends in order to attack real enemies. A revolutionary party is the guide of the masses, and no revolution ever succeeds when the revolutionary party leads them astray. To ensure that we will definitely achieve success in our revolution and will not lead the masses astray, we must pay attention to unification with our real friends in order to attack our real enemies.. We must make a general analysis of the economic status of the various classes in Chinese society and of their respective attitudes toward the revolution.[1]

Who, then, are our enemies?

Political thinking behind any revolution commences by posing this question and replying to it. Admittedly, the masses of our Palestinian people have not yet answered this in a clear, specific and conclusive manner. Without a clear definition of the enemy, a clear view of the battle becomes impossible.

The evaluation of the adversary by our masses has been an emotional process until now. When we achieve a few partial victories, there prevails among the masses a general atmosphere which belittles the enemy's power, imagining the battle to be a quick and easy one in which it is possible for us to triumph within a short period. On the other hand, when the enemy deals us severe blows, we sometimes go to the other extreme and imagine our enemy as an invincible force.

It is evident that with such emotional vacillation, it is impossible for us to have a scientific view of the battle or to plan intelligently and with perseverance for winning it.

The time has come for our masses to understand the true nature of the enemy because it is through such understanding that the picture of the battle becomes clear to them.

1. Israel

In our battle for liberation we first face Israel as a political, military, and economic entity which is trying to effect the maximum military mobi-

1 Mao Zedong, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1. Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1965. p. 13.

lization of its two and a half million nationals to defend its aggressive expansionist racial structure and prevent us from regaining our land, our freedom, and our rights.

This enemy enjoys a marked technological superiority which is clearly reflected by the standard of its armament and training and by the dynamism of its movement. It also enjoys a great ability to mobilize resulting from its feeling that it is waging a life-or-death battle and that consequently it has no alternative but to defend itself until its last breath.

This ability to mobilize and this technological superiority must be kept in our minds at all times throughout our confrontation with the enemy. It is not by chance that we hitherto lost all our battles with this enemy, and it would be a big mistake to give partial or haphazard explanation to our defeats. Understanding the true nature of the enemy is the first step to strategic planning for victory. But is Israel the only enemy that we are facing in the battle? It would be a gross error to confine our view of the enemy to Israel alone, for then we should be like one who imagines that he is in conflict with one man, only to find himself face to face with ten men for whom he is not prepared.

2. World Zionist Movement

Israel is in reality an integral part of the world Zionist movement—indeed, it is an offshoot of this movement. Thus, in our battle with Israel, we are facing not the State of Israel alone but an Israel whose structure is founded on the strength of the Zionist movement. Zionism as a racial religious movement is trying to organize and recruit 14 million Jews in all parts of the world to support Israel, protect its aggressive existence, and consolidate and expand this existence. This support is not confined to moral backing: it is really and basically a material support which provides Israel with more people, money, arms, technical know-how, and alliances offered by the movement by virtue of its influence, in addition to its support through publicity and propaganda in every part of the world. Thus, when we say that our enemy is Israel plus the Zionist movement, we do not add to our enemy a mere string of words, but a material force of a certain size which we must take into account in making our calculations for the battle.

In the present report we confine ourselves to this general view of Israel and the world Zionist movement, but we must refer to the necessity of making a precise and detailed study of Israel and the world Zionist

movement. Far from obstructing the general view, such a study would confirm this view and make it more palpable, thus enabling us to get rid of any superficial imagination about our enemy.

Some interest has been displayed in recent years in the study of Israel and the world Zionist movement. Such studies place before us the facts about this enemy and the political, military, economic and social aspects of its life. Our political and military cadres are expected to read these studies regardless of the political trend governing the writers' lines of thinking because, from particular data and facts, and through detailed information, we will have a true, concrete picture of the enemy whom we are fighting.

It must be pointed out that the enemy facing us, represented by Israel and Zionism, is naturally governed by a number of conflicts both inside Israel, as in any other society, and between Israel and the world Zionist movement.

These conflicts must be for us a subject of constant study and research. The growth of the resistance movement will undoubtedly increase the acuity of these conflicts so that we may be able to channel them to serve the interest of the liberation battle. As far as the coming battle is concerned these contradictions have not reached a degree which hampers the full concentration and consolidation taking place inside Israel and the world Zionist movement. For us the picture of the enemy must remain that of a camp which is being strongly and efficiently concentrated and consolidated with technical skill and precise organization with the object of fully mobilizing the inhabitants of Israel and world Jewry to face us in this battle.

Now, does our perspective of the enemy stop at this limit?

Is this the picture of "all the enemy" we are facing?

We repeat that we would be committing a big mistake if we fail to make scientific calculations for the battle if we allow our perspective to stop at this limit.

In the battle for the liberation of Palestine, we are facing a third force, that of world imperialism led by the United States of America.

3. World Imperialism

World imperialism has its interests which it fights fiercely to defend and keep. These interests consist in robbing the riches of the underdeveloped

countries by purchasing them at the lowest prices and then processing these riches and re-selling them at the highest prices in the markets of these same countries. By this operation, they accumulate immense profits enabling them to increase their capital at the expense of the people's poverty, deprivation, and wretchedness. The Arab world possesses many resources (mainly petroleum) and constitutes a big consumer market for manufactured goods. Imperialism wants to maintain this situation to allow the process of accumulation of imperialist wealth to continue on the one hand and our poverty to increase on the other. To this end, it is genuinely determined to crush any revolutionary movement which aims at freeing our country and people from this exploitation.

The revolutionary movement of the masses in the Arab World naturally aims at destroying Israel because Israel is a force which has usurped a portion of this world and is a great danger threatening other portions of it. Consequently, Israel cannot but fight to the end any Palestinian or Arab revolutionary movement. Here imperialism finds itself in the best position in this part of the world, because through Israel, it is able to fight the Arab revolutionary movement which aims at eliminating it from our homeland with Israel becoming the force and the base used by imperialism to protect its presence and defend its interests in our land. Such a situation creates an organic unity between Israel and the Zionist movement on the one hand and world imperialism on the other, because they are both interested in fighting the Palestinian and Arab national liberation movement. Thus the protection, reinforcement and support of Israel and the maintenance of its existence are fundamental matters for the interests of world imperialism. This gives us a coherent picture of the enemy which clearly embraces Israel, the world Zionist movement, and world imperialism.

Here also we want to stress that the addition of imperialism to our image of the enemy camp should not be regarded as an addition of mere words to our definition of the enemy, for it enters into the concrete picture we have of the enemy against whom we are waging this battle. Imperialism here means more arms, more support and more money for Israel. It means Phantom jets, atomic bomb secrets, and the building of an economy capable of facing the permanent blockade and state of war which we try to impose.

Here, millions upon millions of West German marks and American dollars are converted into a concrete force which increases Israeli strength and should therefore be taken into account in our calculations

for the battle.

Our enemy then is not Israel alone. It is Israel, Zionism, imperialism, and, unless we have a clear scientific knowledge of our enemy, we cannot hope to triumph over it. The opinion which attempts to "neutralize" the Palestinian question on the international level by contending "Why not try to win America to our side in the battle instead of allowing it to remain on Israel's side?" is erroneous and dangerous because it is unscientific, unrealistic, and far from accurate. It is dangerous because it camouflages the truth about the enemy facing us and leads to erroneous calculations during the battle.

Does our definition of the enemy stop at this limit? Are these all the forces which we are facing in the Palestine liberation battle?

Are these all the enemies facing us?

There is a fourth force which substantially stands on the side of the enemy camp and which we must view and define clearly.

4. Arab Reaction Represented by Feudalism and Capitalism

Arab capitalism, whose interests are represented and defended by reactionary regimes in the Arab world, does not constitute an independent capitalist unit and is consequently unable to assume independent political positions. In point of fact, this capitalism represents weak branches of world capitalism which are interconnected with, and form an integral part of, the latter. The millionaires of the Arab world, including merchants, bankers, feudal lords, owners of large estates, kings, emirs, and sheikhs, have in fact acquired their millions by virtue of their cooperation with world capitalism. They have amassed this wealth because they are commercial agents for goods produced by foreign capital, or secondary shareholders in foreign banking establishments or insurance companies, or they are sheikhs, emirs and kings at the head of regimes which defend and protect colonial interests and strike at any mass movement aiming at freeing our economy from this exploiting influence. Consequently, they cannot keep their millions unless our land remains a market for foreign goods and foreign investments and colonialists continue to plunder our oil and other resources, because this is the only way they are able to acquire and keep their millions.

This means that in a real liberation battle waged by the masses to destroy imperialist influence in our homeland, Arab reaction cannot but

be on the side of its own interests—the continuation of which depends on the persistence of imperialism—and consequently cannot side with the masses.

These Arab reactionary forces—particularly the intelligent ones—may outwardly support superficial national movements with the object of using them to settle, to their own advantage, some of their side conflicts with Israel or with world imperialism, but in the end they are inevitably against any national liberation movement which aims at uprooting colonialism from our soil and building an independent economy which will serve the interests of the masses instead of going into the pickets of the few representing these reactionary forces.

The growth of the revolutionary mass movement in relation to these forces means the growth of the people's authority which acts to destroy the authority of these forces. Therefore, whatever degree their conflicts with Israel and imperialism attain, they are at all times conscious of the fact that their main conflict is with the movement of the masses, which seeks the complete destruction of their interests and authority.

The classification of Arab reaction as one of the forces of the enemy is of the utmost importance, because failure to recognize this fact means failure to have a clear view before us. In actual practice it means failure to take account of real bases and forces for the enemy camp living among us and are capable of playing a diversionary role that disguises the facts of the battle before the masses and which, when the opportunity arises, will take the revolution unawares and deal it a blow leading to defeat.

This, then, is the enemy camp that we are really facing in our battle for the liberation of Palestine. We cannot win this battle without a clear sight of all parties in this camp. In the light of the definition of these parties and our perception of the connections which bind them together, it becomes clear that our strongest enemy, the real and main enemy, is world imperialism, and that Arab reaction is but one of its offshoots, and that Israel's power lies in it being one of the bases of world imperialism. This provides it with all sources of power, and converts it into a big military force possessing the technological superiority and the economy which enables it to survive in spite of the conditions under which it lives.

Thus the struggle for the liberation of Palestine, like any other liberation struggle in the world, becomes a struggle against world imperialism, which is intent on plundering the wealth of the underdeveloped world and on keeping it as a market for its goods. Naturally Israel—and the Zionist

movement as well—have their own characteristics, but these characteristics must be viewed in the light of Israel's organic link with imperialism.

Following the end of the First World War, the Palestinian feudal forces and bourgeoisie tried to picture the struggle as if the enemy was only the Zionist movement and the Jews in Palestine, and on the basis that British colonialism would act as a neutral force in this conflict. It was only later that the masses, through the national contingents that formed their vanguard, became aware that their real enemy was British colonialism, which wanted to strengthen and support the Zionist movement in our country as a means of striking at the ambitions of the progressive masses.

Our people today are no longer in need of new experiments and improvised actions. In our struggle for the liberation of Palestine, we face primarily world imperialism, our battle is directed basically against it, against Israel which acts as its base and against the reactionary forces which are allied to it. We will not win the battle unless we have a clear knowledge of our enemy to ensure that our calculations for the battle are correct.

Any deficiency or lack of clarity in our view of the enemy camp with all its parties, contingents and alliances means a deficiency or lack of clarity in our imagination of the level of revolutionary mobilization which we must undertake to be able to confront such a camp and attain superiority over it in our battle.

In light of all this, the main features of the enemy facing us become clear:

1. Our enemy in the battle is Israel, Zionism, world imperialism and Arab reaction.

2. This enemy possesses technological superiority and definite superiority in production which naturally develops into military superiority and greater fighting power.

3. In addition to all this, the enemy has long experience in facing the masses' movement toward economic and political liberation and has the power to defeat such a movement unless the masses possess that high degree of political consciousness which enables them to counteract all methods used by the neo-colonialists in trying to defeat revolutionary movements.

4. The nature of the battle in relation to this enemy's principal mil-

itary base represented by Israel is a life-or-death struggle which the political and military leadership inside Israel will endeavor to put up until its last breath.

This clear view of the enemy camp puts matters in the right perspective and eliminates any superficial view of the battle. It is this clear perspective which determines the time and place of the battle and the nature of the fight. In other words, it is this perspective which determines:

1. The importance of revolutionary theory and revolutionary political thinking, which is capable of mobilizing all revolutionary forces to confront the enemy, to stand firm in this confrontation and to counteract all enemy measures to thwart and undermine revolutionary action.

2. The powerful political organization which is the vanguard of the forces of revolution in the struggle, armed with a stronger determination to win than the enemy's determination to defend its existence and interests to the last breath.

3. The nature and size of the revolutionary alliances which must be recruited to confront the entire enemy camp.

4. The course of armed struggle taking the form of guerrilla warfare at first and developing in the direction of the protracted people's liberation war which will ensure ultimate triumph over the enemy's technological and military superiority.

It is the nature of the enemy which determines the nature of the confrontation, and here lies the danger of any superficial or unscientific look at the enemy camp and its main characteristics.

III. The Forces of the Revolution

Who are our friends—the forces of revolution? What are the forces of revolution on the Palestinian level?

It is essential to define the forces of revolution on the Palestinian level from a class angle. To say that the Palestinian people with all their classes are in the same revolutionary position with regard to Israel and that all classes of the Palestinian people have the same revolutionary capacity because they find themselves without a territory and live outside their country would be unrealistic and unscientific. Such a statement would be correct had the entire Palestinian people been experiencing the same material living conditions. As it is, the Palestinian people do not all

live under these same conditions but rather under different conditions, a fact which we cannot scientifically ignore. Therefore, it is necessary to look at these different conditions and the different positions to which they give rise.

It is true that large numbers of the Palestinian people were driven outside of their country in 1948 and found themselves in almost identical conditions of homelessness. It is also true that the remainder of the Palestinian people who stayed on were at all times threatened with the same fate. However, during the last twenty years, the Palestinian people have settled down into certain well-marked class conditions so that it would be wrong to say that the entire Palestinian people are without a territory, or that they are entirely revolutionary. In the course of the last twenty years, certain well-defined class interests have arisen and have become the basis for defining positions. The bourgeoisie has come to have its own interests and is consequently concerned with stability and the continuation of its preferential class conditions.

Therefore, in our definition of the forces of revolution on the Palestinian level, we must begin from a class angle.

Rightist thought in the Palestinian and Arab field tries to eliminate or dilute the class view of things, and it is therefore necessary to defeat all these attempts.

There is, for instance, the allegation that the class picture in the Palestinian field as well as in the underdeveloped countries is not as crystallized as it is in the advanced capitalist communities, and that consequently it is wrong to treat the class question in such communities in the same manner as in other countries.

Another opinion states that since we are in the stage of national liberation, we cannot envisage a class struggle that is only justified in the stage of socialist revolution; consequently, in the stage of national liberation, a class struggle would mean that the conflict among the classes of the people takes precedence over the conflict between the entire people and the foreign colonialists. Rightist thinking adds here that Israel represents a specific type of colonialism threatening the existence of all classes of the Palestinian people. Thus the question here is not one of class but of the struggle between the Zionist presence and the Arab Palestinian presence, which means that all classes of the Palestinian and Arab people find themselves in the midst of a major conflict.

To allow this trend of political thought to follow its course without

facing it scientifically and refuting it would lead to total loss to the obscurity of the view of the real revolutionary class forces which constitute the pivot of the revolution. There would also be the possibility of the revolution falling under a class leadership which cannot bring it to the end of its destined course and is incapable of planning the radical revolutionary programs which alone can help it to win the battle.

The class structure in an underdeveloped community naturally differs from that of industrial communities. In an industrial community, there is a strong capitalist class opposite a numerous working class, and the basic struggle in such communities is a sharp clash between these classes.

Such a picture is suggested to apply to underdeveloped communities. This is true, but underdeveloped communities are also class communities in which there are exploiting upper classes represented by colonialism, feudalism and the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the exploited classes are represented by the workers and peasants. Each class has its own position with regard to the course of history and vis-a-vis the revolution. The upper classes are conservative, rejecting change and opposing the course of history, while the lower classes are revolutionary, seeking change and pushing history along its upward dialectical course. Consequently, discussion of the special nature of the underdeveloped communities is scientific to the extent that it stops scientifically before the special nature of the class situation in these communities and its differentiation from the class situation in the advanced communities. On the other hand, it becomes prejudiced and unscientific if it dismisses the class question in these communities or minimizes the importance of the difference in these classes' position with regard to the revolution.

Here, for instance, we live in an underdeveloped non-industrial community, but all the same, the masses of our people do not have the same living conditions. Thus, in Amman, to state only one example, there are people living in *Jebel-Luwaibdeh*,[2] others in *Jebel-Nazif*,[3] and still others in camps. All these people cannot have the same attitude toward the revolution.

As for the contention that we are now passing through a stage of national liberation and not of socialist revolution, this relates to the subject of which classes are engaged in the struggle, which of them are with

2 A bourgeois residential quarter in Amman.

3 A poor residential quarter in Amman.

and which are against the revolution at each of its stages, but it does not eliminate the class question or the question of class struggle.

National liberation battles are also class battles. They are battles between colonialism and the feudal and capitalist class whose interests are linked with those of the colonialist on the one hand, and other classes of the people representing the greater part of the nation on the other. If the saying that national liberation battles are national battles is intended to mean that they are battles waged by the overwhelming majority of the nation's masses, then this saying is true, but if it is intended to mean that these battles are different from the class struggle between the exploiters and the exploited, then the saying is untrue.

It is also from this angle that we must consider the statement that the Zionist Israeli peril threatens the entire Palestinian and Arab existence, and that this struggle is one between the Zionist axis and the Arab axis. If this statement is intended to mean that the Zionist peril threatens the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian and Arab masses, then it is true and certain, but if it is intended deny the convergence of interests between Israel and Arab reactionaries (in spite of their numerical inferiority to the masses of the people) or to deny the difference in the revolutionary roles of the other classes—considering the revolutionary role of the petit bourgeoisie living in urban areas to be on the same level as that of the rural or camp population—then this is untrue.

To sum up, our class view of the forces of the Palestinian revolution must take into account the special nature of the class situation in underdeveloped communities and the fact that our battle is one of national liberation, as well as the special nature of the Zionist peril. This, however, means that we must adopt a scientific definition of the revolutionary classes and their roles in light of these special features, and should not at all lead to the dismissal of the class view in the definition of the forces of revolution.

Rightist thought is trying to dismiss the class view in the definition of the forces of revolution to enable the bourgeoisie to infiltrate into positions of leadership and obstruct the revolution at the limits imposed by its interests.

We must forcefully face all ideas attempting to conceal the objective facts of the class question under a veil of vagueness and ambiguity. Are all classes represented on the actual field of battle today, or does the overwhelming majority of combatants belong to the class of workers and peasants? If the overwhelming majority of combatants are the children

of workers and peasants, then why should the political thinking of the Palestinian revolution not concur with the obvious objective facts?

Workers and peasants are the mainstay of the revolution, its basic class material and its leadership.

In the light of scientific socialist thinking, the experiences of world revolutions and the facts in evidence on the Palestinian field, we must clearly define and identify the revolutionary classes that are capable of shouldering the entire burden.

The revolutionary classes on the Palestinian field are the workers and peasants because it is these classes which are daily suffering the oppressive exploitation process exercised by world imperialism and its allies in our homeland.

It is the workers and peasants who today fill the miserable camps in which most Palestinians live. When we refer to the camps, we refer in reality to a class situation representing the workers, peasants and destitute sections of the petit bourgeoisie of the Palestinian people. On the other hand, the Palestinian bourgeoisie class does not live in camps, nor does the greater portion of the petit bourgeoisie. The camps are the workers, peasants and downtrodden portions of the petit bourgeoisie whose living conditions do not differ much from those of the workers and peasants.

It is essential to have a clear view of things and a clear political thinking which concurs with this view. It is also essential to define the forces and classes of the revolution and to determine which classes shall lead the revolution while we are at the start of this new stage of Palestinian national action. This being done, we must act in accordance with this definition, for otherwise we would in fact be repeating the impulsive fight undertaken by the masses of our people during the past fifty years without conclusive results.

The material of the Palestinian revolution, its mainstay and its basic forces are the workers and peasants. These classes form the majority of the Palestinian people and physically fill all camps, villages and poor urban districts.

Here lie the forces of revolution—the forces of change. Here we find real preparation for long years of fighting. Here are the particular daily living conditions which drive people onward to fight and die because the difference between death and life under such conditions is insignificant.

It is by starting from this objectivity that we are able to define the

distinguishing mark between our people's unsuccessful struggle during the past fifty years and this new stage of our struggle, to draw a line of demarcation between clarity and vagueness, and to determine the great difference between a revolutionary march ending in victory and a hesitant, unsteady march ending in failure.

When we have addressed ourselves to the workers and peasants—the inhabitants of camps, villages and poor urban districts—and armed them with political awareness, organization and fighting means, we shall have created the firm material foundation for a revolution of historical liberation. It is the rise of such a solid revolutionary backbone that will enable us to conclude class alliances to benefit the revolution without exposing it to vacillation, deviation or defeat.

IV. The Palestinian Petit Bourgeoisie

What is this class? What is its size? What is its position regarding the revolution? What are the relations existing between it and the workers and peasants, the basic material for the revolution?

The petit bourgeoisie comprises the craftsmen, the educated groups such as students, teachers, junior employees, small shopkeepers, lawyers, engineers and medical men.

In the underdeveloped countries, the petit bourgeoisie is very numerous and may constitute a large proportion of its inhabitants. Consequently, in discussing this class, we must realize that we are discussing a large number of our people and that it is necessary to give the position of this numerous class a sound, clear, scientific definition because it would be a gross error affecting the progress of the revolution if we assigned to this class a role greater than that which it is really capable of performing. On the other hand, it would be a gross error if any mistaken view of this class should lead the revolution to lose one of its forces.

When discussing the petit bourgeoisie, we must take into account the fact that it is not possible to view it and to define our position with regard to it as a clearly-delineated class. A portion of this class enjoys comfortable living conditions, assuring it of the basic necessities with some surplus, which makes it always look up to rising to the level of the upper bourgeoisie, while another portion of this class is barely capable of ensuring its basic living requirements and is consequently closer to the revolution and more desirous of change. This shows the need to make a thorough study of the conditions prevailing among this class and the

position of each of its groups in light of each stage of the revolution.

Unlike the working class, the petit bourgeoisie does not live within specific class conditions, and here lies the reason for its habit of shifting from one position to another according to the progress of the revolution and the particular stage it has reached.

However, during the stage of democratic national liberation, it is generally possible for us to say that this class may be an ally to the force of the revolution and to its basic material represented by the workers and peasants, but alliance with this class must be so alert as to prevent it from infiltrating into the position of command, because that would expose the revolution to vacillation and deviation or slack.

Therefore, the revolutionary position regarding this class is defined on the basis of two main points:

1. That this class is an ally to the revolution.

2. That this ally is not the basic material for the revolution and it is consequently not permissible for the leadership to be placed under its command or the command of its programs and strategy. In view of this, the law which governs our relations with this class is one which impels us to take this class as an ally to stand with us in our main conflict with the enemy camp and at the same time to fight any attempts by this class to assume leadership of the revolution through its programs and strategy.

The application of this law to our relations with this class is a matter of extreme delicacy, and at times, of extreme difficulty, because in addition to its numerically large size, this class possesses consciousness and knowledge by use of its class conditions. Therefore, it has the intelligence to take advantage of this alliance and infiltrate into the position of leadership of the revolution, unless the basic classes of the revolution represented by the workers and peasants have the necessary consciousness, organization and efficiency.

To be able to triumph over this class in our struggle with it around the leadership—that is, around the strategy of the revolution, its programs and organizational frames—without allowing this struggle to affect our main battle against the enemy, we must know when and how to accept it as an ally or fight against it. Unless we know these things, it is feared that this struggle may lead to two fatal dangers:

1. That this struggle may be at the expense of our main struggle.

2. That the petit bourgeoisie may win this struggle and assume lead-

ership of the revolution by virtue of the concrete power that it enjoys.

The criterion for the soundness of our position in this connection is to strike an alliance when such a course is demanded to serve the interest of the revolution and the masses and to fight when the masses are capable of feeling and understanding the reasons for this fight. The important thing is that we should be with the masses and the masses with us in both cases. During the periods when commando action faces dangers threatening its existence or periods when enemy forces try to liquidate the issue, we must raise the standard of alliance, work for it and stand before the masses as the forces calling for such alliance. In the event of struggle, the fight should be based on a specific position or specific issue felt by the masses. Our analysis of this class is that by virtue of its class structure, it sometimes adopts vague, compromising or vacillating positions. This analysis means that specific occasions will arise when the organizations of this class will adopt such positions. On such occasions, it would be possible for the masses to justify the fight and even to demand it, and to side with us in the course of prosecuting it. We have before us as an example the events of 4 November 1968 in Jordan, when the reactionary authority in that country attempted by an intelligent scheme to undermine commando action under the guise of striking at one of the commando organizations. The Popular Front here took a firm stand, led the fight and unveiled the vacillating positions adopted by the middle-of-the road organizations. The masses rallied around the Front which, in spite of certain gaps in its position, achieved victory in foiling the reactionary plan. In the long revolutionary march which lies before us in the Palestinian field, we are bound to face such situations from time to time, and there are occasions for taking over the reins of command from this class and its political expressions.

The settlement of the class leadership issue in the Palestinian field will not be an easy matter and will not occur within a short period, nor can it be permitted to take the form of a permanent struggle for leadership with or without occasion. It would be wrong to view this matter in an unrealistic manner. The settlement of the class leadership issue in the Palestinian field for the benefit of the workers, peasants and poor classes will take a long time and should occur without affecting our position regarding the main conflict and at a time when the masses are capable of justifying and understanding the bases and reasons for this struggle.

As for the purely theoretical struggle occurring with or without occasion in a form which the masses cannot justify and which makes it

prevalent over the main conflict or makes us forget that this class is our ally in the revolution, such a struggle could very well deviate the course of the battle and make us lose our position of leadership.

The basic consideration in our view of the revolutionary forces on the Palestinian level is the understanding that the workers and peasants are the basic tool for the revolution, and that the strategy, positions, theory and nature of organizing the revolution should be those of the working class. When we attain a deep and clear realization of this fact and act on this basis, then an efficient political leadership can, during the national liberation stage, win over the petit bourgeoisie as a genuine ally according to the program laid down by the working class and not the petit bourgeoisie.

Alliance at the appropriate time on the basis of a program, and conflict at the appropriate time around a palpable position or issue is the way to settle the question of leadership in the Palestinian field for the benefit of the camp dwellers, with the necessity for a realistic, dialectical, non-idealistic view of the time and method required for this settlement.

The existence of the petit bourgeoisie at the head of the Palestinian national movement today should be understood objectively, for without such understanding, it would be difficult for the working class to rise successfully to the top of the leadership. The reason for the existence of the petit bourgeoisie at the head of the Palestinian national movement is that during the stages of national liberation, this class is one of the classes of the revolution, in addition to the fact that its numerical size is relatively great and that, by virtue of its class conditions, it possesses knowledge and power. Consequently, in a situation where the conditions of the working class from the viewpoint of political awareness and organization are not developed enough, it is natural that the petit bourgeoisie should be at the head of the alliance of the classes opposing Israel, imperialism and Arab reaction. To all of this we must add the special character of the Palestinian petit bourgeoisie and the difference in position between it and the Arab petit bourgeoisie which stands at the head of Arab national regimes. The Palestinian petit bourgeoisie has raised the banner of armed struggle and is leading it today, and the fact that it is not in power makes it more revolutionary than the Arab petit bourgeoisie which is determined to preserve its interests and remain in power by avoiding the long and conclusive struggle with the opposing camp.

If we take all these points into consideration we find that the rise of the working class with its strategy and programs to the head of the

alliance and its leadership is contingent upon the growth achieved by this class in the development of its political awareness and organization and also upon the escalation of the armed struggle and the growth of the revolution so that the Palestinian petit bourgeoisie is no longer capable of maintaining its leading role except at the expense of its own interests and conflict with its class conditions and consequently with its thought, programs and strategy.

What then in summary is the picture hitherto as regards the forces of revolution on the Palestinian level?

The basic revolutionary forces are the workers and peasants who alone, by virtue of their living conditions, are capable of leading the revolution to its end. The workers' radical and conclusive thought and strategy alone are capable of confronting the enemy camp, and it is efficient leadership of the workers that is able, through its scientific tactics, to lead along with it in this struggle the petit bourgeois class without this class being in the position of leadership and without allowing it to dilute revolutionary thought, strategy and programs through its vacillating and inconclusive thought and strategy.

V. The Palestinian Bourgeoisie

The Palestinian bourgeoisie is essentially a business and banking bourgeoisie whose interests are interconnected among its members and are linked with the business and banking interests of imperialism. The wealth of this class is derived from brokerage transactions in foreign goods, insurance operations and banking business. Therefore, in the strategic field, this class is against the revolution, which aims at putting an end to the existence of imperialism and its interests in our homeland, which means the destruction of its sources of wealth. Since our battle against Israel is at the same time a battle against imperialism, this class will stand by its own interests, that is, with imperialism and against the revolution.

Naturally, this strategic analysis is not perfectly clear to all. It is also natural that it should be pervaded by tactical and temporary positions as well as by some exceptions, but this should not prevent us at any time from having a long-range strategic view of things and of the general picture.

On what scientific basis can it be said that all classes of the Palestinian people are among the forces of the revolution? Our revolution today is an armed one. Are all classes of the Palestinian people among the forces

of this armed revolution?

After 5 June 1967 the young men of the camps and villages took up arms, hid in the mountains and fortified themselves in the cities. They directed their bullets against Israel and faced Israeli bullets with their bodies. At exactly the same time, the traditional bourgeois leaderships were receiving Sassoon, Dayan and other Israeli leaders to discuss with them the Palestinian set-up which Israel had planned for the purpose of liquidating the Palestine question, thus achieving political triumph after having attained military victory. Three attempts would have been successful had they not been foiled by the escalation of commando action. During that period the young men of the camps were giving death to, and receiving death from Israel, while the merchants on the West Bank were seeking to link their interests anew with the enemy state.

In view of all this, is it permissible for us to hear such slogans as "We are all commandos", or "The Palestinian people with all its classes are taking part in the armed struggle" or "No rich and no poor so long as we remain homeless," without evaluating and critiquing them and preventing their spread?

The revolution is science and scientific thought looks for tangible facts. We will not be misled by deceptive mottoes and slogans which are at odds with the facts and which are launched by certain class forces in defense of their interests.

The Palestinian bourgeoisie which now lives in Palestine under Zionist occupation is not among the forces of the revolution, although it has not manifestly associated itself with Israel and will in reality remain the class force through which the enemies will always try to defeat the revolution and stop it in the middle of the road.

The Palestinian bourgeoisie now living outside of Palestine has at present no conflict of interests with commando action so long as this action at the present stage lives generally within certain specific theoretical, political and fighting horizons. Therefore, it sometimes supports commando action by giving a small portion of its surplus wealth, but we must expect that the revolutionary growth of the Palestinian national movement to the level in which it manifestly clashes with imperialism will lead this bourgeoisie to take the stance that conforms to its class interests.

Of course we admit that certain sections of this bourgeoisie may be an exception to this rule and that, by virtue of the special character of the Palestine question, they may remain on the side of the revolution and abstain from working against it, but such exceptions should not make us

lose sight of the general law which will govern the position of this class vis-à-vis the revolution in general.

The principle which advocates the necessity of taking advantage of any force that may assist the revolution temporarily is a sound one, as is the principle that qualified leadership is that which mobilizes the widest possible front to stand in the face of the main conflict and we should act accordingly provided that we do not do so at the expense of the clarity of our political thought. Clear political thought is the only road leading to the recruitment and mobilization of the true forces of the revolution. The recruitment and mobilization of the true forces of the revolution in the light of clear scientific, political thought is the fundamental condition for success. For the success of the revolution, it is more important than all financial assistance if the price of this assistance is the dilution of our clear view of things.

In the light of this we may now visualize the forces of revolution on the Palestinian level as a whole.

The forces of the revolution are the workers and peasants—the inhabitants of the camps, villages and poor districts—in alliance with the Palestinian petit bourgeoisie, which also constitutes a revolutionary force, in spite of the fact that such alliance carries with it an intellectual and strategic conflict that must be settled in favor of the workers' leadership, thought and strategy, taking advantage, at least temporarily, of any sector of the Palestinian bourgeoisie without allowing such alliance any advantage to lead to any ambiguity in our view of the revolutionary forces and the clarity of their strategy and programs.

The bourgeoisie numerically constitutes only a very small section of the community. It is a well-known fact that the bourgeoisie is one-half percent or one percent of the community. Moreover, this is not the class which takes up arms or is ready to fight and die in defense of the freedom of the country and the people. Consequently, any attempt to picture this class analysis of the forces of the revolution as leading to the dissipation of the nation's forces and driving these forces into an internal conflict would be scientifically untrue. In the light of this analysis, the revolution does not lose any effective fighting force: on the contrary, it gains clarity of view and a sound definition of the positions of the forces and places the poor classes face to face with their responsibilities in the leadership of the revolution, thus giving rise to a national battle in which the overwhelming majority of the masses of our people will stand in the face of Israel, imperialism and reaction under the leadership of the poor whom

Israel , imperialism and reaction have reduced to a state of misery and poverty that they experience daily and that deprives them of their human character and life value.

VI. Organization and Mobilization of Palestinian Revolutionary Forces

What is the form of organization for the mobilization of the forces of the revolution on the basis of this analysis? What is the form of the relations among these forces in the light of the existing Palestinian situation? What is our concept of Palestinian national unity in the light of all this?

Political organization armed with the theory of scientific socialism is the highest form for the organization and mobilization of the working class forces on the greatest scale. This is a fact that has been made perfectly clear by all revolutionary experiences in this century. The experiences of China, Vietnam and Cuba, as well as the experience of the October Revolution, all point to and confirm this fact. By clarifying and scientifically explaining the state of misery suffered by the working class, by revealing the process of exploitation of this class by imperialism and capitalism, by indicating the nature of the major conflict in which the communities of the present age are living on international and local levels, by explaining the motion of history and its trend, by defining the role of the working class and the importance of this role and by indicating the weapons possessed by this class, scientific socialist theory renders the working class conscious of its existence, conditions and future, thus permitting the mobilization of the forces of this class on the greatest scale.

Scientific socialist ideology and world revolutionary experiences have indicated clearly how revolutionary political organization armed with a revolutionary theory—the theory of the working class—is the way to self-organization by the working class, the concentration of its forces, the consolidation of its potentialities and the definition of its strategy in its battle. If the experiences of the Palestinian and Arab national movements have not hitherto achieved success in confronting and triumphing over imperialism, Zionism, Israel and the forces of reaction, it is because they have not adopted this organization theory. The failure of political organizations in the Palestinian and Arab field does not constitute a condemnation of the political organization of parties in general, but rather a condemnation of a line of political organizations that have not been set up from the ideological class and organizational viewpoints on the

basis of this theory and these experiences. The revolutionary promotion of the Palestinian national movement cannot rest on the condemnation of the idea of revolutionary political organization as a principle, and the only way before it, is to adopt the political organization the nature of which has been defined in the light of scientific socialist theory and past experiences.

This organizational form is the organizational framework for the concentration of the basic revolutionary force: the working class. Moreover, it is this form that is capable during the stages of national liberation, as the major revolutionary experiences have proved, of mobilizing the peasant forces and concentrating them on the greatest scale.

Consequently, by adopting this form, we would have created the framework for the organization and mobilization of the basic revolutionary classes represented by the workers and peasants.

But what about the petit bourgeoisie? According to our analysis, the petit bourgeoisie is also one of the forces of revolution. Can we mobilize it within this framework? If not, what is the organizational framework that would enable us to mobilize and concentrate all the revolutionary forces?

The Palestinian petit bourgeoisie will not, in its majority, enter into the organizational framework that rests on the basis of a political party organization armed with scientific socialist theory. The socialist thought of the revolution is not the thought of this class, and the strong, binding and disciplined party organization is not the organizational form in which it finds satisfaction. The petit bourgeoisie prefers to be bound by a general loose thought that does not go beyond general liberation slogans and by a political organization that does not impose on its demands beyond its capacity. Therefore it will not align itself within this frame but will address itself to other Palestinian organizations that do not clearly adopt scientific socialist theory and the revolutionary political party organization adhering to this theory. In light of this, the complete organizational form which is capable of containing all the revolutionary forces, is the political party organization form adopting scientific socialism which is capable of mobilizing the workers and peasants on the greatest scale, and which at the same time calls for the rise of a national front to achieve alliance between the workers and peasants -the basic classes and mainstay of the revolution—and the petit bourgeoisie as one of the forces of revolution.

This completes our picture of the revolutionary forces on the Pales-

tinian level and the organizational form capable of mobilizing them.

In our opinion, this is the form that is fully consistent with the scientific analysis of things and objectively concurs with the interest of the revolution. This form provides a clear view of the battle on the one hand and permits the greatest scale of mobilization of the basic revolutionary forces on the other, at the same time ensuring the widest possible front to stand in the face of the enemy camp.

The wide national front proposed in the light of this picture is, in our opinion, the revolutionary realization of Palestinian national unity. If Palestinian national unity is intended to mean the concentration of all revolutionary forces at the stage of democratic national liberation to stand in the face of the basic conflict with Israel, imperialism and reaction, then this is the form which serves this end. These three classes which meet within the frame of the front represent, even numerically, the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian people. The national unity which is advocated by some and which is intended to enable the traditional leaderships, the bourgeoisie, and the forces of reaction to infiltrate into the ranks of the revolution, and is also intended to undermine the ideas of revolutionary political party organization and to obscure any clarity in the political thought of the revolution, is clearly against the interest of the revolution.

The foregoing clearly indicates the basic lines of our position with regard to the subject of relations among the Palestinian forces. These lines enable us to define our position with regard to all subjects and problems arising on this level and serve to clarify our position with regard to the existing picture of the Palestinian field and the direction in which we must exercise our efforts to establish objective relations among the forces and organizations of the Palestinian revolution.

1. We regard Palestinian national unity as a basic factor for the mobilization of all forces of the revolution to confront the enemy camp, and on this basis we must take an effective position to achieve it.

2. The form of national unity is the rise of a front in which all classes of the revolution—workers, peasants and petit bourgeoisie—will be represented.

3. We must take action to mobilize the workers and peasants in one single revolutionary political organization armed with scientific socialist theory. On this basis, we must effectively endeavor to unite all Palestinian leftist organizations which through contact and experi-

ence can be persuaded to adopt this analysis.

4. The petit bourgeoisie will not join this form of organization, which adheres to scientific socialism and strong political organization, but will join those Palestinian organizations that content themselves with general liberation slogans, avoiding clarity in thinking and class view and leading an organizational life which does not demand of it anything beyond its capacity. In other words, this class will fill "Fateh" and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the first place.

5. On this basis, and on the basis of our view of the main conflict and the nature of the stage, as well as the necessity of achieving that national unity that will group together all the forces of the revolution to stand in the face of Israel, we must work for the establishment of a national front with "Fateh" and the Palestine Liberation Organization which will provide the battle with the necessary class alliance on the one hand, and preserve that right of each to view and plan for the battle according to its class horizon on the other.

This is our view of the forces of the Palestinian revolution and the form of their mobilization and concentration.

The form that we propose here for the relations among the basic Palestinian forces draws the general strategic line that will govern our course. It is obvious that in following the course indicated by this line we will meet many obstacles and complications which will require us tactically to define in each period, with as much detail as possible, a picture consistent with the nature of that period and the nature of the conditions of the various Palestinian forces existing and active at any one time. However, it is this line that will govern such a definition in general.

Now, does our strategic thought about the Palestine liberation struggle stop at the frontiers of the Palestinian people and the Palestinian field?

If we remember the enemy camp and recall its size and nature, we will immediately realize that any strategic thinking about the Palestinian liberation struggle must cover the mobilization of all forces of the revolution on the Arab and world levels, because it is only through such mobilization and concentration that we can create the power capable of confronting Israel, Zionism, world imperialism and Arab reaction. The Palestinian revolution which is fused together with the Arab revolution and in alliance with the world revolution is alone capable of achieving

victory. To confine the Palestinian revolution within the limits of the Palestinian people would mean failure if we remember the nature of the enemy alliance that we are facing.

VII. Forces of the Revolution on the Arab Level

What are the forces of revolution on the Arab level?

How shall we mobilize them? What is the form of relations between the Palestinian national liberation movement and the Arab forces?

The mobilization and concentration of the revolutionary forces on the Palestinian level, even through a political organization adhering to and guided by scientific socialism, mobilizing the downtrodden classes on the greatest scale and forming with the petit bourgeoisie a united front, will not suffice to create a revolutionary camp capable of gaining superiority over the enemy camp consisting of a strong and wide front which includes Israel, the Zionist movement, imperialism, and Arab reaction.

The strategy of the Palestine liberation struggle requires the mobilization and concentration of all the forces of revolution in the Arab countries in general and the Arab regions surrounding Israel in particular. This is the reason why the Popular Front lays so much stress on the interconnection between the Palestinian question and the Arab question and on the necessity of coalescence between the Palestine liberation movement and the Arab liberation movement. It is also the reason for the necessity of laying strategic emphasis on the "Arab Hanoi" motto as a revolutionary principle creating coalescence between the Palestinian revolution and the Arab revolution and forming a firm foundation for the Palestinian and Arab national liberation movement which would enable it to stand in the face of the enemy camp and gain superiority over it.

Although we do not say that the mobilization of the revolution in the Arab field is one of the immediate tasks of the Palestinian revolution, we may say that the fate of the Palestinian revolution and the armed struggle—commando action—now being carried out by Palestinian people depends on the extent of their coalescence with a revolutionary strategy which aims at mobilizing the forces of revolution in Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq and the rest of the Arab countries. The crisis that Palestinian resistance is undergoing is not only from its failure to fulfill all the ideological, strategic, and organizational conditions that must be fulfilled by any victorious national liberation movement in our age.

This crisis, which will continue to constitute the Achilles' heel of Palestinian resistance, is due to the fact that this resistance exists under conditions in Arab lands that hamper it and threaten to liquidate the question through the implementation of the Security Council's resolution [of 22 November 1967] instead of constituting revolutionary support to reinforce it, widen its field of authority, and give it additional power.

In this light, the Palestine liberation strategy is a battle against Israel. Zionism, imperialism and Arab reaction require a revolutionary Palestinian strategy in coalescence with a revolutionary Arab strategy.

The armed struggle against Israel and all imperialist interests in our homeland, the expansion of the armed struggle front which stands in the face of Arab reaction and all imperialist interests and bases in the Arab homeland, and the encirclement of Israel with the strategy of the people's liberation war from every side—from Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and inside the territory occupied before and after 5 June 1967—is the only path that leads to victory. It is not important that the Palestinian people should register a heroic stand through commando action: the important thing is liberation and victory. In light of our definition of the enemy camp, the way to liberation is a revolutionary Palestinian and Arab front which will bring maturity, protection and support to commando action and pave the way to its expansion so that it will encircle Israel on every side and involve all the enemy forces which furnish Israel with support and protection.

The strategy of revolutionary Arab action coincides with its broad lines with that of Palestinian revolutionary action. The basis of this coincidence is that the nature of the stage now being traversed by the Arab countries is identical for all of them. In the light of Israel's occupation of Sinai and the Golan Heights, its very existence and its persistence as a base from which imperialism prepares to attack any move toward Arab liberation—in the light of this concrete picture—the stage which the Arab peoples are now traversing is that of national liberation, of democratic national revolution, notwithstanding the class and economic changes which have taken place in Egypt, Syria, Algeria and Iraq in the direction of socialist transformation.

The strategy of the democratic national revolution in this age has become clear through the Vietnamese experience and before it the Cuban and Chinese experience.

The main lines of this strategy are the mobilization and concentra-

tion of the forces of the poor workers and peasants on the greatest scale, the leadership of the revolution by these classes through a political organization that adheres to and is guided by the ideology of scientific socialism in alliance with the forces of the petit bourgeoisie whose interests do not conflict with the nature of the democratic national revolution; and reliance on armed struggle to overcome the enemy's technological superiority through a protracted war commencing with guerrilla warfare and developing into a popular liberation war which the people are determined to win.

The national liberation movement in the Arab countries has not yet crystallized along these lines.

In the nature of the clash between Israel and the surrounding Arab countries, all this will create the objective circumstances that will pave the way for and assist the birth and growth of a national liberation movement that will adopt this strategy under the leadership of the workers and peasants. This alliance, and later the coalescence of the Palestinian national liberation movement with the Arab national liberation movement will give rise to, the Palestinian-Arab force and the Palestinian-Arab strategy which is capable of triumphing in a long and hard battle imposed by the nature of the enemy we are facing.

It remains for the Palestinian national liberation movement to define its Arab relations in the light of the circumstances now prevailing in the Arab field.

Arab capitalism and feudalism are still the ruling class in some Arab countries. The rule of these classes is at present represented by the reactionary regimes in Jordan, Lebanon and certain other Arab countries. The regimes are linked in interest with world imperialism led by the United States. In spite of the partial, and sometimes purely outward conflict between these regimes and Israel, this partial conflict exists in the shadow of an objective concurrence with world capitalism. Thus the relation of the armed struggle—now Palestinian and later Arab—is on the strategic level, one of conflict with these regimes notwithstanding any tactical positions imposed on both sides by temporary considerations.

This is as regards the national liberation movement's relation with the capitalist and reactionary regimes. However, the delicate situation facing the Palestinian armed struggle and the Palestine national liberation movement is the definition of relations with the national regimes in the Arab field, particularly the national regimes surrounding Israel or in

the vicinity of the field of battle, namely Egypt, Syria and Iraq.

Any fearless revolutionary evaluation of these regimes must be essentially based on the June defeat and on its consequences and meanings, as well as on the strategy, programs and positions subsequent to that defeat. Any attempt at diluting or confusing the clear view of the defeat and its meanings and lessons cannot but be the result of a subjective and biased interest or an idealistic and sentimental view that is remote from science, objectivity and fearless frankness in viewing things.

The June defeat led to the occupation of the whole of Palestine as well as of the Golan Heights and Sinai, the dispersion of hundreds of thousands of citizens and the humiliation of an entire nation. Consequently, the revolutionary position is one which cannot temporize or bargain or dilute the clear view which alone enables us to analyze and understand the June defeat and eventually to see the political and military strategy which will assure us of perseverance and victory in our battle.

The Palestinian and Arab masses, as well as the Arab national parties and organizations, viewed these regimes as revolutionary, progressive regimes capable of leading to the liberation of Palestine and the realization of the aims and objectives of the masses.

At the time when indications of the June war began to appear, neither the masses nor the forces concerned expected a defeat of the type that occurred in June. The June defeat confirmed the gross error in our perspective of things. There was an error in the knowledge and clear definition of the enemy, the evaluation of its plans and the of its contingents and the determination of its contingents and the potentialities of each of these contingents. There was an error in the definition of the stage and a greater error in the evaluation of the entire revolutionary existence that these national regimes, organizations and Arab national institutions had curbed.

What is the sound scientific evaluation of these regimes?

Following the First World War, the occupation by France and Britain of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan and the entrenchment of these colonial powers in Egypt and other parts of the Arab homeland, the national liberation movement waged by the masses against colonialism was led by feudalists, aristocrats and members of the bourgeoisie. Such leaders were Haj Amin Al-Husseini and the Arab Party in Palestine, and Shukri Al-Kuwatli and the Nationalist Party in Syria, and there was a similar type of leadership in the other Arab countries. Even the armed revolts

that the masses of our people directed against the forces of occupation were under the political leadership of the bourgeoisie. The masses saw from the course of events that this class, in its struggle with colonialism, aimed at nothing more than obtaining an outward form of independence that would place it at the top of the power pyramid. This made it a partner to the colonialists in their exploitation of the masses' toil and gave it a share in profits from capitalist investments in our homeland, without any regard for the liberation and unification slogans for which the masses had paid their blood. When the masses saw all this, the conflict began between these feudal, aristocratic and bourgeois leaders and their political parties on the one hand and the movement of the masses on the other. At this new stage in the struggle, the masses were led by groups of educated young men, professionals and free army officers who mainly belonged to and acted through the petit bourgeoisie. The petit bourgeoisie was a growing class and it was this class that led the masses in their struggle with the bourgeoisie and the feudalists who were directly or indirectly in alliance with colonialist capitalism. In the late thirties and early forties, these attempts took the form of political and military parties and organizations, both Pan-Arab and local. In 1948 Israel was set up and the disaster took place. This revealed to the masses the truth about the puppet independent regimes established by the bourgeoisie, their impotence in the face of Israel and their radical opposition to the masses' objectives. Thus the 1948 disaster paved the way for the fall of some of these regimes and the assumption of power by political and military national organizations led by national elements belonging to the petit bourgeoisie. Such organizations generally consisted of members of this class and worked among the workers and peasants who rallied around these new organizations and conditions because they stood in the face of the reactionary alliance among colonialism, feudalism and capitalism.

Undoubtedly the international situation resulting from the Second World War represented by the Soviet victory and the rise of a number of European socialist powers was a basic factor in the rise and survival of these new Arab regimes.

Thus the basic conflict in the area crystallized in the following manner:

The alliance of the workers, peasants and petit bourgeoisie under the leadership of the petit bourgeoisie against colonialism, Arab reaction and Israel.

The first national regime to appear in the Arab world on the basis of

this picture was the Nasser regime in Egypt, and then the picture extended to include Syria, Iraq, Algeria and South Yemen.

The Nasser regime was and still is the clearest and most crystallized example of this picture.

In any historical evaluation of these regimes and what they represented in the Arab field in the fifties and until June 1967, we must not lose sight of the major revolutionary achievements realized by these regimes, particularly the Nasser regime. This regime was able to get rid of the British occupation forces stationed in the Suez Canal Zone, wage war against all the colonialist military pacts through which colonialism tried to get back into the area under the pretext of defense pacts against the Soviet peril and do away with the colonialist-reactionary alliance which controlled the destiny of Egypt and its masses.

Moreover, it broke the blockade imposed by colonialism on the area and established military, political and economic relations with the socialist camp. Furthermore, it placed Egyptian national action within its Arab national horizon and framework and accomplished the first achievement of union in modern Arab history. It also established a link between political liberation and the social issue, laid down an agrarian reform that involved land ownership and relations between farmers and land-owners, nationalized the major industries and commercial enterprises and raised development projects based on public ownership. It set Egypt on the road of socialist transformation and accompanied these transformations with similar ones in the field of revolutionary thought. By this, it lifted revolutionary thought from the level of general liberation, unionist and socialist slogans to the beginnings of a class view of the revolutionary forces and the beginnings of the adoption of the general socialist course in viewing and analyzing the movement of progress.

These are the headings of the major achievements accomplished by the Nasser regime on the basis of which the other national regimes in Syria and Iraq have tried to proceed.

These achievements created a state of alarm in the opposing camp led by the U.S. for the purpose of thwarting this march through various means including the overthrow of these regimes by force. Such a state of alarm called for a similar state of alarm with which these regimes could rise to a new revolutionary level by politically and economically mobilizing the forces of the masses to a degree that ensures steadfastness, perseverance and victory.

However, these regimes continued to move within programs and plans imposed on them by their class nature. At this point, the problem of the structure of these regimes and the problems of their plans began to emerge. In the middle sixties, the Nasser regime began to live through this problem without being able to overcome it until the June defeat which came to reveal clearly the problem relating to the structure of this regime and its inability within this class nature to triumph over the imperialist-reactionary—Zionist—Israeli camp.

The nature of these national regimes was formed as a result of the organizations which they had set up, their view of things and of the extent to which they had gone in their socialist transformations and the new class conditions which they had produced. These regimes struck at the interests of feudalism and capitalism and their exploitation of the masses, but they preserved the petit bourgeoisie and its interests in the industrial, agricultural and commercial sectors, at the same time producing a new class of military men, politicians and administrative personnel whose interests became interlocked with those of the petit bourgeoisie, thus forming with it, the upper class in these communities. The interests of this upper class required the maintenance of the experiment within limits which do not conflict with its interests or with its thinking and view of the battle. This class is antagonistic to colonialism and reaction but at the same time wants to keep the privileges that it enjoys. It is this state of affairs that has defined the nature of the political, economic, military and ideological programs of these regimes.

It is on this basis that this class has formulated its view of confrontation with colonialism and Israel through the military institution. For it realizes that the popular liberation war means that its right to the position of leadership is contingent upon its willingness to sacrifice all its privileges and follow the same living pattern as the commandos of today. On this basis also a loose form for the political mobilization of the masses has been put forth because the truly revolutionary mobilization of the masses through a political party organization in connection with the armed struggle, means the rise of new leadership from among the workers and peasants, as it means the ability of the masses to supervise this class and call it to account. Accordingly, this class has laid down its economic programs which make the socialist transformation stop the existing limits. Eventually, this class produced political thought which dilutes the view of the true nature of the struggle, the true nature of the stage and the true nature of the programs which are capable of persisting and enduring, as well as diluting the view of the process still existing

in these regimes, of exploiting the labour of the workers and peasants.

Thus the June defeat does not constitute a mere military defeat for us. It is in reality a defeat for these regimes and their programs and their inability to effect military, economic and ideological mobilization which is capable of resisting and triumphing over imperialism and its alliances and plans in our homeland.

Even after the June defeat these regimes have continued to move within these same military programs. Through their alliance with the Soviet Union they aim to wage a tactical military battle ending with the removal of all traces of the aggression if it should prove impossible to implement the Security Council's resolution through means other than war, it being understood that purports at the same time to obtain recognition of Israel's right to exist within new safe frontiers.

These regimes support commando action but only as a revolutionary tactic to exert pressure on imperialism and Israel to push them toward the implementation of the Security Council's resolution on the basis of a settlement that might be acceptable to these regimes.

The national regimes are still moving within this strategy against the radical revolutionary strategy which seeks a long-term popular liberation war waged by the masses under the leadership of the working class and the peasants on the basis of radical political, military and economic programs represented before us today by the Vietnamese liberation movement which has proved that it is only with such a formula that we are able to face imperialism and its technological, economic and military superiority.

When we present the Vietnamese liberation movement, which is waging a triumphant struggle against the U.S. and Vietnamese reaction, as an example of successful liberation movements in this age, we do not at all ignore the special nature of our battle both in respect to the nature of imperialist presence, represented by Israel, in our homeland, and in respect of the special nature of the land.

We always mean in fact the main strategic lines of the Vietnam War—represented by the strong political organization that adheres to scientific socialism and mobilizes the forces of the masses on the greatest scale under the leadership of the working class and the national front slogan, using the course of guerrilla warfare, the popular liberation war, the political, economic and military mobilization resulting from all this, the protracted war, the determination to win—that determination which

is embodied by the poor classes of the community, the classes that cannot continue to live under the burden of the ugly and dirty exploitation exercised by imperialism and Vietnamese reactionary. We also mean the world revolutionary alliance established by the Vietnamese liberation movement to enable it to face imperialism with all its weight, forces and plans.

In light of all this, we are able to make a scientific evaluation of the regimes and their role in the Palestinian and Arab national liberation movement, and eventually, the form of relations between them and the revolutionary Palestinian national liberation movement:

1. These regimes are antagonistic to imperialism, Zionism, Israel, and Arab reaction, represented by feudalism and capitalism.

2. These regimes have accomplished a number of revolutionary achievements on the way to democratic national revolution which has interlocked—as is the case in Egypt—with the commencement of the shift in the structure of the economic community in a socialist direction.

3. These regimes, by reason of the class structure resulting from their experience, are no longer capable of continuing their progress on the revolutionary road and of raising it to the level that would enable them to face the state of alarm that has arisen in the camp of imperialism, Israel and Arab reaction.

4. The programs of these regimes in facing the battle are those of the petit bourgeoisie which occupies the top of the power pyramid and the position of leadership in those regimes, although the June war and subsequent developments have revealed the inability of this class to effect the ideological, political, military and economic mobilization capable of holding out and harassing the enemy and of achieving victory. These regimes still adopt traditional war strategies and reform programs in an attempt to fill the wide gaps in their experiments without causing a completely radical change in their general structure.

5. In light of the fact that these regimes are antagonistic to imperialism and Israel on the one hand, and the fact that they adopt compromising non-radical programs in the face of the enemy on the other, relations with these regimes must be both of alliance and conflict at the same time: alliance because they are antagonistic to Israel, and conflict over their strategy in the struggle.

6. There will be two strategies in the face of Israeli occupation and the prosecution of the Palestinian and Arab national liberation war: the strategy of the petit bourgeoisie which adopts in theory or moves in practice toward a traditional war strategy through the reconstruction of the military institution if a peaceful solution proves to be impossible; and the strategy of the working class, which adopts in theory and moves in practice toward guerrilla warfare and popular liberation war, waged by the masses under the leadership of the working class on the widest national front, opposed to imperialism and with revolutionary programs of mobilization which will raise the ideological, political, economic and military mobilization of the masses to the highest level.

7. These two strategies and the forces which they represent will move together for some time under relations of alliance and conflict until in the end, the working class strategy prevails on the Palestinian and Arab levels. It will face the enemy with a wide class alliance comprising the workers, peasants and the petit bourgeoisie and working-class leadership with a working-class ideology at programs and a popular liberation war which is determined and able to win.

This defines the form of relations between the Palestinian national revolution and all Arab forces.

The Palestinian revolution on the strategic level will clash with the Arab reactionary forces and the regimes representing them and will be governed by relations of alliance and conflict with the national regimes where the petit bourgeoisie occupies the top of the power pyramid. It will establish relations of alliance in the direction of coalescence with the Arab revolutionary forces represented by the workers and peasants and their political institutions.

These forces will be generated in the Arab field in general and the Arab countries surrounding Israel in particular by reason of the nature of the struggle and the nature of the revolutionary strategy which it will produce.

Through this picture—the picture of the Palestinian and Arab revolution led by the working class and comprising all anti-imperialist forces which adopt the course of guerrilla warfare, ideologically, politically, militarily and economically to the highest level—we have a complete strategic view of the Palestine liberation battle, first on the Palestinian level and then on the Arab level.

VIII. Forces of the Revolution on the World Level

World imperialism at this time has circumstances and conditions which distinguish it from what it was in previous times, and is exercising the process of exploitation of peoples by new methods which differ from its old ones. On the other hand, the camp of the anti-imperialist forces has in respect of size and power, a new position and level which differ from those before the Second World War. The liberation movements of the world should realize the basic international facts which govern this period of history. The Palestine and Arab liberation movement does not move in a vacuum. It lives and fights in the midst of specific world circumstances that affect and react with it, and all this will determine our fate. The international ground on which national liberation movements move has always been, and will remain, a basic factor in determining peoples' destinies.

The First World War was a war among the imperialist capitalist powers themselves, and its object was to redistribute world markets among these powers. That war was an armed explosion of conflicts among world capitalist blocs in their race for the exploitation and plunder of peoples' wealth and for monopolizing their markets. That war was not a revolutionary war waged by the working class in the progressive countries and by the enslaved peoples against the exploiting capitalists. The same applies to some degree to the Second World War. Consequently, conflicts among the colonialist capitalist powers were the principal manifestation on the world stage. The forces of revolution represented by the working class in the advanced countries and by the enslaved peoples were not in a position to transform these wars into revolutionary wars which could place the basic conflict on the world level in its natural position between the exploiters and the exploited. However, the consequences of the Second World War and the events that followed in its wake crystallized the world situation in a new form. The forces of colonialism concentrated and crystallized into one camp: the imperialist camp led by the United States in opposition to the camp of the socialist forces and persecuted peoples as the opposite pole in this struggle.

The Soviet Union came out victorious in this war, and the socialist camp expanded to include a number of East European countries. The enslaved peoples rose up in vindication of their right to freedom and progress, and the great Chinese Revolution led by Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party triumphed. This series of events and developments was the concrete factor that led to the coalescence of all capitalist and imperialist forces during the few years following the Second World

War. The traditional colonialist powers represented by Britain, France, Holland and Belgium labored heavily under the war burdens, while Germany, Italy and Japan labored heavily under the burdens of defeat, a situation which enabled U.S. capital to extend and penetrate into all these countries through the reconstruction process witnessed by Europe immediately after the Second World War.

All this had the effect of crystallizing the imperialist picture and its basic features:

1. All colonialist capitalist forces gathered together in one camp, that of world imperialism, under the leadership of the United States.

2. The immense size of U.S. capital, its wide field of activity and its interconnection with European capital is the concrete basis for the unity of this camp and the unity of its interests, as it is also the concrete basis for the United States' leadership of this camp.

3. Conflicts among the partners in this camp which have from time to time taken the form of a conflict between colonialism represented by Britain and France and neo-colonialism represented by the United States, have remained only partial in the face of the main conflict which all these colonialist forces have begun to confront in their struggle against the socialist camp and national liberation movements. Although this partial conflict between the United States on the one hand and Britain and France on the other has taken a prominent form—as was the case during the Tripartite Aggression (1956), or during the Algerian revolution, or in certain areas of Africa—yet it has generally continued to be governed by the more important and more serious conflict between imperialism and the forces of revolution.

4. The attempts of de Gaulle's France to break out of this U.S. imperialist ring have not until now made any radical change in this picture.

5. The technical development and immense growth in the means of production and in the war industry have led to the strengthening of this camp's positions as regards both its control of the world market and its ability to defend its own existence and interests.

We are naturally aware of the major conflicts and problems faced by the United States today in its internal conditions which are fraught with real crises from time to time, or in its inability to face a people's movement as in the case of Vietnam, or in the aggravation from time to time of the conflicts existing between it and its allies. However,

this side of the picture is complementary to the side of technical advancement and production growth, and the picture is not complete unless the situation is viewed from both sides.

6. The U.S. today is endeavoring to maintain and defend its interests and to face the revolutionary camp with new techniques that differ from those used by colonialism in defending its interests by force and armies of occupation. This new technique is the basic feature of neo-colonialism.

The U.S. has established a series of pacts and defense treaties to face the socialist camp to encircle it and limit its expansion, and also to neutralize national liberation movements. However, in addition to this policy of pacts, it follows an economic policy calculated to have local social forces participate in the profits derived from the exploitation of the people's efforts so that these social forces, by benefiting from the existence of neo-colonialism, may become a bulwark behind which the U.S. can take refuge in defending its influence and interests. Moreover, By its neo-colonialist technique, the U.S. endeavors to contain national liberation movements through co-existence with these movements and the conditions created by them, and also through concessions that satisfy their national pride and assure them of some benefits, provided that its basic interests remain assured and protected. In addition to all this, it is attempting, through the threat of nuclear war, to force the Soviet Union to cease its support and backing of these peoples in their wars against colonialism so that it may defeat these peoples through local wars.

Neo-colonialism is making full use of its intelligence and colonialist experience in its long and continuous effort to maintain its existence, influence and interests.

7. Experience in Vietnam, Cuba and the Dominican Republic has shown that, in the event of failure of modern techniques in the colonization of peoples, the U.S. will revert to armed force invasion and the landing of armies to preserve its influence, markets and interests.

In its liberation march to recover its land and freedom, the Palestinian people today face this unified imperialist camp with its technological superiority, its skill in fighting and neutralizing revolutions, its ability to take over behind other forces, its readiness for direct confrontation whenever it feels that the forces behind which it takes cover are

no longer capable of striking at peoples' movements, and its endeavors to isolate national movements from the world revolutionary camp and neutralize the Soviet Union's efforts through the threat of nuclear war.

The June war and what came before and after it are in reality nothing but a concrete manifestation of all this.

The U.S. tried to contain the Arab liberation movement, to bargain with it and to keep it from organic fusion with the world revolutionary camp. It then tried to undermine and destroy this movement through Israel and its military power, and later tried again to contain it while it was in a state of weakness. Today it is still trying through Israel, by providing it with all requisites of power, to keep this movement at its mercy in order to contain or destroy it.

To face this situation, the Palestinian and Arab liberation movement must: (1) have clarity of perspective; (2) mobilize all its forces; (3) produce political, economic and military programs to ensure such mobilization; (4) adopt the course of popular liberation war to overcome the enemy's technological superiority; and (5) enter into full alliance with all revolutionary forces on the world level.

It is this effective alliance that ensures the creation of the camp whereby we and all enslaved and anti-imperialist forces will be able to find the force which is capable of defeating imperialism in spite of its points of strength at this stage.

Our first friends are the enslaved peoples who are suffering from imperialism and imperialist exploitation of their efforts and wealth, or who are living in the same danger represented by the U.S. today in attempting to impose its influence on rising peoples. The peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America are daily suffering the life of wretchedness, poverty, ignorance and backwardness which is a result of colonialism and imperialism in their lives. The major conflict experienced by the world today is the conflict between exploiting world imperialism on the one hand and these peoples and the socialist camp on the other. The alliance of the Palestinian and Arab national liberation movement with the liberation movement in Vietnam. The revolutionary situation in Cuba and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America is the only way to create the camp that is capable of facing and triumphing over the imperialist camp.

The Palestinian and Arab liberation movement in alliance with national liberation movements in all undeveloped and poor countries will,

in facing world imperialism led by the U.S., find a strong ally to back its forces and augment its power of resistance. This ally is the People's Republic of China which in reality is still facing the same U.S. peril that is attempting to encircle and isolate it and impede its growth.

The great People's Republic of China, which is still experiencing the effects of underdevelopment caused by colonialism and imperialism, and still facing the same peril and the same contradictions, adopts this analysis of the basic international contradiction that governs the march of history at this stage, and consequently adopts the same revolutionary strategy of liberation followed by these peoples in facing colonialism. This strategic congruence creates the concrete ground for a revolutionary alliance that will place us in a better position to face and triumph over the enemy. The People's Republic of China adopts the Palestinian Arab view in its analysis of Israel as an imperialist base that must be destroyed.

In spite of all the United States' efforts to prevent the Soviet Union and the East European powers from coalescing with our liberation march, and although those powers adopt a position that is confined to preventing Israel from expanding its territory and extending its aggression but does not involve the roots and foundation of Israel's aggressive existence, yet there is a contradiction between this position of the socialist camp and the Zionist and imperialist presence in our homeland. This contradiction creates a ground for alliance between us and these socialist powers and it is our duty to extend this ground through the extension of the Palestinian and Arab liberation movement and through its decisive clash with its enemies so that these powers will stand with our liberation movement until its conclusive end.

Imperialism and reactionary forces are today attempting to create a breach in the relations between the Palestinian and Arab national liberation movements and the Soviet Union and the powers of the socialist camp, and it is our duty through our vigilance to prevent imperialism from achieving this aim. Throughout the last period, the Soviet Union has been a major supporter of the Arab masses in their fight against imperialism and all its projects and plans for our homeland.

Through all of these alliances, we create the camp that will stand with us in our battle and will enable us to face the enemy camp.

Along with this series of basic revolutionary alliances, we must also, through our fighting and political effort and the clear nature of our struggle as one of national liberation, draw to our side all liberation forces in

Europe, America and every part of the world.

With such a strategy on the international level, we can encircle Israel, Zionism and imperialism and mobilize revolutionary forces on the world level to stand with us in the struggle.

This picture may seem imaginary in the light of the Palestinian and Arab liberation movement's actual circumstances at the present stage, but persistent revolutionary action and the promotion of the liberation movement to the level of a true, steadfast and long-range revolution will ensure its crystallization and actual materialization. The translation of all these alliances will constitute not only sympathy but also the true, effective support from which we create the ability to stand firm and triumph.

This completes the chart of enemies and friends on the Palestinian, Arab and world levels. A clear view of this chart will eliminate from our minds any superficial views of the battle and will determine the dimensions, forces and general frame of the battle and its position in respect of the historical dialectical movement which governs this period of human history.

IX. Facing Imperialist Technological Superiority

How can weak peoples face imperialist technological superiority?

Our confrontation with the enemy camp represented by Israel, Zionism, imperialism and Arab reaction will be through a strategy aiming at the concentration of the forces of the Palestinian revolution on the Palestinian, Arab and world levels so as to face this enemy with a revolutionary camp that is superior to it in size and numbers, but this alone is not sufficient for victory. One of the enemy's basic points of strength is its scientific and technological superiority, and this superiority is reflected strongly in its military capabilities which we will face in our revolutionary war. How can we face and overcome this superiority?

The enemy's scientific, technological and military-strategic superiority is not a light matter nor is it of a secondary nature. On the military level, this superiority means quick mobilization for the enemy, the volume of this mobilization, the standard of training, the high quality of military leadership, surprises in arms and plans during the fighting, overall superiority in arms and modern warfare and the ability to control and use them with shock-speed.

Any thorough scientific study of the 1948, 1956 and 1967 wars

would clearly bring out the role played by the enemy's technological and military-strategic superiority and the reflection of this role in the military field in the enemy's triumph and our loss of these battles. It would be foolish to give our military defeats in three major confrontations an arbitrary superficial explanation that would mislead us into the belief that we could have won these battles had it not been for certain coincidences or certain errors. Our failure in facing Zionism and Israel during the past fifty years cannot be explained except on the basis of our weak and meager political, economic, social and military structure in the face of a movement and a society that are scientifically, technologically and strategically superior to us, and our erroneous view of the battle and the confrontation strategy adopted by us until now. Our confrontation with Israel and imperialism cannot lead positively to victory if it consists of a classical military confrontation taking the form of a conventional war between the enemy's army and forces and our regular troops. Such a war would be won by Israel and imperialism because of their superiority in arms and quality, their ability to use the modern war machine and move it with shock speed and flexibility, and their economic capabilities which sustain such a war, would enable them to triumph over us in such battles. Three experiences are a sufficient lesson for us. Conventional warfare which today takes an extremely speedy form is the manner in which the enemy exercises its overwhelming technological superiority, and is also the manner whereby all the points of weakness in an underdeveloped society are revealed. Our reliance on the Soviet Union does not suffice to close this gap at the scientific, technological and military-strategic level. It is not a matter of "modern arms and the procurement thereof." The basic requirement is the human element capable of thoroughly understanding the power of controlling them and using them in the most efficient manner and utilizing the modern war machine. This in turn depends on the technological and scientific standards of the humans carrying such arms.

This is a factor that at present is not in our favor, with the result that we are not in a position to face Israel (and behind it the United States which would throw its own forces into the battle if the tide would turn in our favor) through a conventional military confrontation. The weapons of weak peoples in facing imperialist forces and their superiority have become well-known as a result of the experiences of peoples who have waged liberation wars in this age and achieved victory over imperialism. The technological and military superiority of imperialism is faced by weak peoples with guerrilla warfare and popular liberation wars. Through guerrilla warfare, we avoid direct confrontation with the

enemy and consequently prevent it from exercising its full technological superiority against our forces and from crushing them with lightning speed. Guerrilla warfare aiming at attacking the enemy's weak points, quick withdrawal and avoidance of direct clashes can cause the enemy small losses which accumulate daily without allowing it to face our entire forces and crush them quickly with its extremely mobile and deadly war machine. In this way, the enemy is made to feel that it has begun to lose its basic advantage, and the balance of power begins to shift—slowly at first but accelerating with time—in favor of the armed revolutionary forces. While the guerrilla war against the enemy is going on, our forces increase, gaining experience, strength and skill in the art of war, and attaining such numbers and quality as to render them capable of waging battles against units of the enemy forces. The cycle begins with a combination of guerrilla war and the beginnings of the popular liberation war. With the escalation of the revolution, the growing harassment of enemy forces and the enemy's need to distribute its forces in every town and village and along the borders of all fronts, the image begins to shift toward large-scale and effective war.

We cannot completely eliminate the forces of the enemy or achieve full liberation through guerrilla war, but guerrilla war is the first stage in a protracted war. The revolutionary army will be able to triumph over the enemy's superiority through the following conditions: be politically aware and coalesce with the organized masses that support it and supply it with its human and material requirements; ally itself with world revolutionary forces who will furnish it with support and reinforcements; gain experience and efficiency through its struggle and coalesce with the revolutionary party which provides it with a clear view and an organic connection with all revolutionary forces at all levels. And with heroic determination engendered in it by years of oppression, humiliation, wretchedness and exploitation exercised by Israel and imperialism on our land; the revolutionary army will be able to triumph over the enemy's superiority.

We do not propose here to draw up a military plan for a long, extremely complicated war, but only refer in a general manner to the general form which this war will assume in the light of the fact that we are an underdeveloped people facing Israel, Zionism and world imperialism with all their capabilities and their scientific and technological superiority.

We propose the popular liberation war formula against the conventional war formula with which we faced the enemy in 1948, 1956, and

1967 and which led to our defeat in each of these rounds.

In his book *People's War, People's Army* General Giap says:

> The balance of forces decidedly showed our weaknesses against the enemy's power. The Vietnamese people's war of liberation had, therefore, to be hard and long-lasting in order to succeed in creating conditions for victory. All the conceptions born of impatience and aimed at obtaining speedy victory could only be gross errors. It was necessary to firmly grasp the strategy of a long-term resistance, and to exalt the will to be self-supporting in order to maintain and gradually augment our forces, while nibbling at and progressively destroying those of the enemy; it was necessary to accumulate thousands of small victories to turn them into great success, thus gradually altering the balance of forces, in transforming our weakness into power and carrying off final victory.

In other passages of the same book General Giap says:

> From the point of view of directing operations, our strategy and tactics had to be those of a People's War and of a long-term resistance.
>
> The Vietnamese People's War of Liberation proved that an insufficiently equipped people's army, but an army fighting for a just cause, can, with appropriate strategy and tactics, combine the conditions needed to conquer a modern army of aggressive imperialism.
>
> The War of Liberation of the Vietnamese people proves that, in the face of an enemy as powerful as he is cruel, victory is possible only by uniting the whole people within the bosom of a firm and wide national united front based on the worker-peasant alliance.[4]

In an article entitled "People's Democratic Dictatorship", Mao Zedong says:

> A well-disciplined Party armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, using the method of self-criticism and linked with the masses of the people; an army under the leadership of such a Party; a united front of all revolutionary classes and all revolutionary groups under the leadership of such a Party.[5]

We have cited these passages because they indicate the basic features of the political thought that today directs all the democratic national liberation revolutions that have stood or can stand firmly in the face of world imperialism.

"Revolutionary theory," "strongly-organized party," "leadership of the revolution by the workers and peasants," "wide, determined, united national front," and "people's liberation war and long-term resistance," are the political strategic headlines of national liberation movements and

---

4 Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Hanoi, 1961.

5 Mao Zedong, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" in *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, p. 422.

democratic national revolution in the present age of imperialism.

X. The Aims and Significance of the Palestinian War of Liberation

That Israel constitutes an aggressive presence against our people from the outset is an indisputable fact. For our people, the rise of Israel has meant the expulsion of this people from its home and lands, the usurpation of all that our people had built through its labor and effort, the dispersal of our people throughout the Arab world and the world at large, and the concentration of the greater portion of it in the camps of misery and poverty scattered in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon without hope and without future.

That Israel constitutes a colonialist expansionist presence at the expense of Arab land and its owners is not a matter for discussion. For us, it is the tangible experience before which all spurious claims and allegations fade away. The "National Home" for the Jews in Palestine became the "State of Israel" within the boundaries of the Partition resolutions adopted by the United Nations in 1947. It then expanded to include Israel with its pre-June boundaries which are far more extensive than those established by the United Nations' resolutions of 1947, and finally expanded once again to include the whole of Palestine as well as Sinai and the Golan Heights.

That Israel is an imperialist and colonialist base on our land and is being used to stem the tide of revolution, to ensure our continued subjection and to maintain the process of pillage and exploitation of our wealth and efforts, is a self-evident fact that does not need discussion. For us, this is not merely a theoretical conclusion but represents our actual experience during the Tripartite Aggression of 1956, during the June 1967 war and throughout the existence of Israel on our soil.

However, the truth about our war of liberation has been distorted as a result of several factors. First of all, there was the connection between the rise of the Zionist movement and the persecution of the Jews in Europe. Then there was the association made between the rise of Israel and the Nazis' treatment of the Jews in the Second World War. In addition to these there was the dominating Imperialist and Zionist influence over large sections of world opinion, the existence in Israel of forces which claim to be progressive and socialist and the Soviet Union's and some socialist countries' support for the establishment of Israel. All these to-

gether with the error of certain Palestinian and Arab leaderships in the manner of their presentation of the struggle against Israel have distorted the truth about our liberation war and still threaten to distort the proper view of the true nature of this war in the eyes of many people.

The Palestinian liberation movement is not a racial movement with aggressive intentions against the Jews. It is not directed against the Jews. Its object is to destroy the state of Israel as a military, political and economic establishment that rests on aggression, expansion and organic connection with imperialist interests in our homeland. It is against Zionism as an aggressive racial movement connected with imperialism that has exploited the sufferings of the Jews as a stepping stone for the promotion of its interests and the interests of imperialism in this part of the world which possesses rich resources and provides a bridgehead into the countries of Africa and Asia. The aim of the Palestinian liberation movement is to establish a democratic national state in Palestine in which both Arabs and Jews will live as citizens with equal rights and obligations and which will constitute an integral part of the progressive democratic Arab national presence living peacefully with all forces of progress in the world.

Israel has insisted on portraying our war against it as a racial war aiming at eliminating every Jewish citizen and throwing him into the sea. The purpose behind this is to mobilize all Jews for a life-or-death struggle. Consequently, a basic strategic line in our war with Israel must aim at unveiling this misrepresentation, addressing the exploited and misled Jewish masses and revealing the conflict between these masses' interest in living peacefully and the interests of the Zionist movement and the forces controlling the state of Israel. It is this strategic line that will ensure for us the isolation of the fascist clique in Israel from all the forces of progress in the world. It will also ensure for us, with the growth of the armed struggle for liberation and clarification of its identity, the widening of the conflict existing objectively between Israel and the Zionist movement on the one hand and the millions of misled and exploited Jews on the other.

The Palestinian liberation movement is a progressive national movement against the forces of aggression and imperialism. The fact that imperialist interests are linked with the existence of Israel will make of our struggle against Israel a struggle against imperialism, and the linking of the Palestinian liberation movement with the Arab liberation movement will make our struggle against Israel the struggle of one hundred million Arabs in their united national effort for liberation. The struggle for Palestine today, and all the objective circumstances attendant upon it, will

make of this struggle an introduction for the realization of all the aims of the Arab revolution which are linked together. It is a wide and vast historical-movement launched by one hundred million Arabs in a large area of the world against the forces of evil, aggression and exploitation represented by neo-colonialism and imperialism in this epoch of human history.

Finally, the struggle for Palestine will, as regards the Palestinian and Arab masses, be a gateway toward the culture of the age and a transition from a state of under-development to the requirements of modern life. Through the struggle, we shall acquire political awareness of the facts of the age, throw away illusions and learn the value of facts. The habits of underdevelopment represented by submission, dependence, individualism, tribalism, laziness, anarchy and impulsiveness will change through the struggle into recognition of the value of time, order, accuracy, objective thought, collective action, planning, comprehensive mobilization, the pursuit of learning and the acquisition of all its weapons, the value of man, the emancipation of woman—which constitute half of our society—from the servitude of outworn customs and traditions, the fundamental importance of the national bond in facing danger and the supremacy of this bond over clan, tribal and regional bonds.

Our national, long-term liberation struggle will mean our fusion into a new way of life which will be our gateway toward progress and advancement.

XI. General Remarks

This in general is our strategic view of the liberation of Palestine. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine adopts this strategy as a general guide of action. We must stress, however, that the correctness of any theoretical analysis is contingent upon its success in the field of practical application. It is only by revolutionary experience that the scientific answer to the correctness or incorrectness of any political theoretical analysis is given, and no theoretical analytical attempt can provide fully from the outset a comprehensive view of things. The relation between thought and revolutionary action is a dialectical one. Thought directs revolutionary action which in turn produces results, situations and reactions that influence the theoretical view of things.

On this basis, to the extent we stress these strategic lines as a guide to our action, we at the same time assert that we will not understand them

in fixed static forms. The experience itself will deepen and crystallize this view, enrich it and complete it in some of its aspects. It will also develop this view and may modify some of its aspects. Such a view of this strategy is the scientific dialectical view which rejects immobility and rigidity, undertakes criticism and self-criticism from time to time, benefits from experience and establishes between thought and revolutionary action an organic and reactive link that enlarges and deepens thought so that it will come to guide action more properly and correctly. Any other view is, in point of fact, idealistic and rigid, leading to failure.

Looking at it from another angle, this strategy represents a general view of the battle and its main trends and consequently does not stop at many of the details, inter-links and sinuosities that will fill every phase of the battle and accompany each of its lines. For instance, in our definition of the main line of conflict, we have not stopped at the lines of conflict that will exist and react among the enemy forces themselves, or within the ranks of the revolutionary forces. Thus our definition of Israel as one of the enemy forces is not intended to convey a static picture of this force. Israel does not represent a homogeneous unity within which there is no room for conflict. There will be within Israel more than one politico-social force and there will be conflict among these forces. The intensity of these conflicts may at times rise or fall according to the progress and phase of the battle. Although the conflict now existing within Israel between the so-called "hawks" and "doves" does not leave any appreciable effect on the image of the battle, yet the more radical conflicts within Israel which are now dormant, may come out and gain in intensity during coming periods. Similarly, when we say that there is an organic connection between Israel and imperialism we do not mean that there are no latent partial conflicts between them. Moreover, we witness at this time a conflict between Israel and the reactionary regime in Jordan which sometimes considers its conflict with the resistance to be less significant with regard to it than its conflict with Israel. Also, we witness at this time the willingness of the Palestinian bourgeoisie outside the occupied areas to financially support the resistance movement.

On the other side of the picture, there will also be a group of conflicts. The picture of the conflicts existing among the Palestinian armed organizations is clear at this time. Besides, the alliance between the Palestinian liberation movement and regional and Arab revolutionary action will not be entirely smooth and devoid of any conflict. Furthermore, in our presentation of the popular liberation war formula as the revolutionary formula for confrontation with the enemy, we must not fail to

remember the fact that the conventional Arab armies of the national regimes will, in defending themselves as well as in their tactical attacks, play for a long time a military role which may at times appear as the leading role on the stage of events although in the long-run, strategically, it is the revolutionary force which will remain behind Israel and world imperialism until radical national liberation is completed.

The main line of conflict defined by this strategy is not a straight geometric line with two conflicting forces standing on either side. It is in reality a crooked dialectical line on each side of which stands a group of allied forces co-existing under the shadow of this alliance. At times this alliance grows stronger and at other times the conflicts among them grow more pronounced so that the picture sometimes becomes a mixed and interwoven image moving along the two sides of the main line of conflict. Inasmuch as it is fundamental to see at every stage of the struggle the accurate and detailed picture that will enable us to determine our tactical step in a scientific manner, it is equally fundamental that our detailed tactical view at each stage be guided by our long-term strategic view. It is this strategic view that will enable us to lead and direct the struggle and to avoid falling into the error of experimentation, impulsiveness, drifting behind events or reacting to events instead of acting to direct them.

In light of this understanding, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine adopts this politico-strategic analysis as a guide for its action in the liberation war that the Front is facing and for which it is preparing.

XII. Organizational Strategy

The people's liberation war against imperialism with its technological superiority, its production and economic capabilities, its long experience in colonizing and exploiting peoples, suppressing their movement and neutralizing their revolution with new techniques which are developed and adapted according to the circumstances of the age cannot be brought into existence nor can it continue and finally triumph in an automatic or spontaneous manner. The revolutionary party which works for the generation of such wars and leads them to victory is a condition sine qua non for any true radical revolution in our time. It is the party that provides a proper view of the battle and determines its strategy and tactics in the light of its objective study of the forces involved in the battle and the points of weakness or strength in these forces. It is the party that provides the battle with its leadership and furnishes the frame within which all the

potentialities of the masses will be mobilized and directed to the winning of the war and the attainment of the objective. In light of this, party matters (our understanding of the party, the bases of its construction, its class structure, its working technique, its institutions, the relations governing its bases and leadership and relations between the party and the masses) no longer remain of secondary importance. Organizational strategy here becomes an integral part of the strategy of the battle and its view thereof. The theoretical discussion which has for some time been taking place between the revolutionary forces of Latin America (the Castroist parties) and the pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese communist parties revolves primarily around matters pertaining to the structure of the revolutionary party which will lead the revolution.

The failure of leftist national parties and communist parties in the Arab world is the failure of these parties themselves and of their structure, formation and adopted strategies, and not of the principle of the party's existence as a condition for the revolutionary presence. The proof is that no revolution in this century has succeeded and continued in triumph, nor has any such revolution achieved radical change in the structure of society and given new life to the masses without a party to lead it and provide it with the ideological and social class basis on which it rests and supports itself so that it is able to continue to exist by virtue of its objective connection with it.

XIII. No Revolutionary Party Without Revolutionary Theory

The basis in the structure of the revolutionary party is the revolutionary theory to which it adheres. Without this theory, the party becomes a mere group moving spontaneously or empirically and cannot be that force that is capable of controlling events. Revolutionary theory means a clear vision and scientific approach in the understanding and analysis of events and manifestations, and consequently, the ability to lead.

The revolutionary theory which presents all questions relating to humanity and the age in a scientific and revolutionary manner is Marxism. In the history of human endeavor to acquire knowledge, Marxism represents a unique attempt to understand nature, life, society and history. Marxism has presented a theory (dialectical materialism) that analyzes and explains nature and its motion and the laws governing this motion through a tangible scientific material approach that is devoid of illusion,

superstition, subjective meditation, and imagination and mere verbal or logical inferences. It has then applied this same tangible scientific material approach to the study of society, the movement of society and the march of history (historical materialism), stopping particularly before the formation, structure, conflicts and movement of modern capitalist society (theory of surplus value and scientific socialism). Through all this, Marxism has presented a dialectical scientific approach which has elevated the study of history, society and political manifestations to the level of science. As the natural sciences are man's means for controlling the phenomena of nature and using them for his benefit, so is Marxism the science that enables man to understand the progress of societies and history and to direct and influence them. Lenin completed Marx's scientific efforts by applying the same Marxist method to the study of capitalism in its evolution toward the stage of centralization, monopoly and colonization, thus explaining all political manifestations and events that attended the beginning of the 20th century. On the basis of Marxism and the socialist scientific approach, he was able to lead with success the first socialist revolution in history, draw up its strategy, face its problems and define the features of the top of the revolutionary organization which led it on the way to victory. In this way, Lenin gave Marxist theory its revolutionary modern applications so that Marxism-Leninism has become the standard of revolution in this period of human history. Like all other scientific theories, this theory has passed its validity test on the experimental ground of actuality and practice and has consequently acquired during this century all its requisites as a science. The final test of any theory or law is the compatibility of the test with that theory or law, and this is exactly what happened in the case of Marxism. The October Revolution, the revolutions in China, Cuba, and Vietnam and all revolutionary experiences throughout the world have arisen originally on the strength of this theory. This picture contrasts with the stumbling confusion and collapse of all revolutionary attempts that have not been based on this vision, this theory and this guide. It is not a mere coincidence that the October Revolution and the revolutions in China, Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam and the socialist countries of Europe have succeeded and stood firm in the face of imperialism and in overcoming or beginning to overcome their state of underdevelopment, against the quasi paralysis or infirmity characterizing the countries of the Third World which are not committed scientifically to scientific socialist theory as their guideline for planning all their policies and defining their programs.

The tangible materialist scientific pursuit of the events and revolu-

tions of this century is concrete proof of the validity of Marxist theory.

Marxism as a revolutionary theoretical weapon depends on the manner in which it is understood on the one hand and its correct application to a particular circumstance or particular stage on the other. The essence of Marxism is the method that it represents in viewing and analyzing things and determining the direction of their motion. Consequently, the revolutionary understanding of Marxism is the understanding of it as a working guide and not as a fixed, rigid, doctrine. Lenin and Mao Zedong and before them, Marx and Engels, have recorded on more than one occasion the need for the Marxist view as a working guide and not as a rigid doctrine.

The essence of the Marxist view of human society is that it is in continuous motion and continuous change, and consequently, any analysis presented by Marxism in respect of any stage or any actuality arising constantly from the old actuality. The invariable factor in Marxism is its dialectical scientific approach to viewing things in their state of continuous motion and change. This method is Marxism in its essence. It is the revolutionary theoretical weapon that enables us to view things scientifically in their state of continuous motion, development and change. Contemporary capitalism is not the same capitalism of Marx's time without alteration or change, and the class structure of a backward society is not the same class structure as that of an industrial society. The nationalist manifestation that the European bourgeoisie tried to exploit to serve its interests is not the same nationalist manifestation appearing in backward countries where nationalism acquires a revolutionary concept as the framework for the mobilization of enslaved peoples against imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism.

Understanding Marxism in a manner which enables us to take in all these differences and to benefit from the revolutionary theory provided by the revolutions of this century and from all the theoretical efforts that have emanated from and enriched Marxism instead of stopping and becoming fossilized at its frontiers is, in fact, the scientific Marxist understanding of this theory. The contrary is true of any attitude toward Marxism as a fixed doctrine.

Theory in the Marxist concept is constantly in continuous dialectical relation with actuality and practice. The fact that it is in dialectical relation with practice means that it is in a state of growth, progress and modification and not in a fixed state.

The most dangerous thing that confronts us in our adherence to Marxist theory is understanding it in a mechanical, idealistic manner which deprives it of its ability to explain the living actuality. The benefit that we obtain from reading and understanding the writings of Marx and Lenin is confined to the limits of the knowledge presented by these writings, whereas the true benefit is that which we get when, through our deep assimilation of these writings, we acquire the method presented by Marxism-Leninism in understanding, explaining and confronting the problems of society, history and revolutionary action. Marxism as a tool for analysis and as a working guide is the weapon that we seek by acquiring this theory. On this basis, adherence to Marxism-Leninism will not produce any effect unless such adherence results in using this theory arid applying it in understanding actual conditions and formulating the working strategy that determines the nature of the stage, the nature of the battle, the definition of the conflicting forces and our view of the movement of this conflict, as well as the thorough comprehension of the concrete circumstances through which we move. By this alone—that is, the application of Marxism-Leninism to our actual living circumstances and the battle that we are fighting: our adherence to the Marxist-Leninist theory becomes meaningful and capable of being translated into results. It would be a gross error to imagine that our mere declaration of adherence to Marxism-Leninism is a fairy wand that will open before us the road to victory. If there are examples of what Marxism-Leninism has represented with respect to certain revolutions, such as those of China and Vietnam, there are corresponding examples where adherence to Marxism-Leninism has not led to anything. The Arab communist parties which are formally and verbally committed to Marxism-Leninism have not been able to lead the revolution in our homeland because their commitment has been verbal, because they have understood the theory in a rigid and fossilized manner, or because they have not been able to apply this theoretical weapon to our actual living circumstances in such a way as to deduce from it a clear view of the battle and a sound strategy for its leadership.

Our commitment to scientific socialist theory would be mere verbiage, mere illusion and escapism unless this commitment means a mature comprehension of this theory by our leading members in the first place and our party bases in general. Such comprehension cannot be achieved without a great study effort which must be exerted over a long period. On the other hand, the value of this commitment depends on the nature of our understanding of this theory as a tool of analysis, as

a method for handling questions of revolutionary action as a working guide, and not as a rigid theory. The acquisition of the Marxist-Leninist approach should be the purpose of this effort and study. Furthermore, the value of our commitment to Marxism-Leninism lies eventually in the application of this approach to the conditions of our struggle for the purpose of formulating revolutionary strategy and tactics. Unless we raise our commitment to Marxism-Leninism to this level, it will remain a commitment of intellectuals to a theory that serves them in discussion and not the commitment of a revolutionary party to a theory that opens before it a clear view of the battle. Finally, the definitive usefulness of this all depends on the great efforts that must be displayed for the sound application of this strategy, for otherwise, it would remain a mere plan that will not see the light of day.

Such commitment to these meanings and results will prepare for the spread of leftist revolutionary thought among the masses of our people and will enable this thought to overcome the obstacles laid in its way. The masses of our people will not define their position with regard to scientific socialist thought in the light of, a purely theoretical judgment of this thought. Their position will be defined in the light of the tangible results produced by this thought with regard to their fight against their enemies and exploiters. When this thought succeeds in converting the Palestinian and Arab field into a rising popular liberation war arena which will shake the Israeli-Zionist-imperialist-reactionary presence in our homeland, as is taking place in Vietnam, these masses will realize that this theory was the most powerful weapon in their fight against their enemies. In this way, all obstacles both real and imaginary, which stand in the face of this theory today will disappear.

The thought which now prevails among our masses is the rightist thought because of the preponderance of reaction and colonialism. Moreover, the failure of the communist parties and their attitude toward the issues of the masses, such as those of unity, nationalism and Israel, has produced in the minds of the masses a confusion between Marxist thought and these attitudes. To all this must be added the constant attempts by the reactionary and colonialist elements to distort this thought and present it as inimical to their national feeling and heritage. Finally, there is the distorted picture of this thought presented to the masses by the immature, infantile leftism which speaks of this thought in a manner that is not understood by the masses, a manner that appears strange to them and to the handling of their urgent problems. However, the positive results produced by the sound understanding and application of

Marxism-Leninism will ensure this thought finds its way into our homeland so that we may be able on its basis to build our new life, our scientific understanding of life and our new modern values.

Within this context, the Popular Front adopts Marxist-Leninist theory as a basic strategic line for the building of the revolutionary party on a solid theoretical basis which will unify its thinking and view of the battle and will enable it to mobilize the masses to exert their efforts in one direction which will make of them a solid force capable of achieving victory.

XIV. Class Structure of the Revolutionary Party

It is not sufficient to ensure the revolutionary theoretical structure of the party; this structure must conform to the class structure. The revolutionary party in the Palestinian field is the party of the classes of the revolution, the workers and peasants in the first place. When the party structure is actually based on these classes, then we are assured of the steadfastness, endurance and revolutionary capabilities of the party and the soundness of its positions. However, if the structure of the party and its basic leadership is of the petit bourgeois class, then this party, regardless of its commitment to scientific socialism will reflect the properties of this class as represented by its vacillation and hesitancy, its indecisive positions and the possibility of its slackening and failure to stand firm in the face of challenges.

True assurance as to revolutionary organization is based on the deep understanding of and commitment to scientific socialism in the first place, and the essentially labor and peasant structure of the party in the second place.

Such a class structure of the party cannot come about spontaneously, it requires a clear view and an effort directed in accordance with this view. Spontaneity in organization leads in practice to the preponderance of the petit bourgeoisie by virtue of the effectiveness of this class and its active interest in political action at this stage, against the weakness and ineffectiveness of the workers and peasants and the non-crystallisation of their political and class consciousness.

The Popular Front as a political organization does not at present conform totally with the toiling and proletarian class structure which constitutes the material and concrete guarantee for the revolutionary character of the organization, its steadfastness and its ability to go on

with the revolution.

The political organization of the Front constitutes in general a spontaneous extension of the organization of the Arab Nationalist Movement, so that the petit bourgeois structure prevails in it. The continuation of spontaneous growth without planned effort will result in confining our organization mainly to Amman and the towns, with some subsidiary extensions to the rural areas and camps.

Our organizational programs must aim at placing our most efficient leading elements in the camps and villages, and it is, therefore, necessary to carry out a comprehensive survey of the rural areas and camps and then concentrate heavily on these areas. Also, it is necessary to pick up the rising young elements in these places and to build them solidly in theory and organization so that most of our leading members will have a revolutionary class allegiance. The presence of hundreds of members and leaders in the towns while we have no connection with many villages or with some camps and labor concentrations, however, few these concentrations may be, indicates that our organizational growth continues to be spontaneous, that our revolutionary view of things is not clear and that there are no effectively directed revolutionary plans emanating from this view. These hundreds of members and leaders must be deployed effectively in accordance with an organized plan to penetrate the truly revolutionary concentrations so that after a time we will find ourselves before a solid political organization based on the poor, the toilers, and the downtrodden who are determined to revolt, to main in their revolution and to stand firm in the face of every challenge. In this way we are assured of the revolutionary character of our: organization, our political organization becoming a real support for the fighting cadres, providing them with the required revolutionary combatants, furnishing real protection, and effecting complete fusion with them. Political organizations based on the petit bourgeoisie and the intellectuals whose roots do not extend to the villages and the poor urban districts cannot provide the fighting cadres with the required combatants or constitute protective support for the fighters. Furthermore, it may in fact become a burden on the fighting cadres, aiming through its connection with the armed struggle at obtaining moral privileges, formalities and superior positions of leadership, besides forcing upon the armed struggle the manifestation of personal and tactical conflicts and disputes which are sometimes concealed behind verbal conflicts having no connection with actual fighting problems.

Naturally, it is not our intention to have a political organization that

is closed in the face of the petit bourgeoisie, but to have an organization whose basic material comes from the workers, the peasants and the poor to ensure the organization's strength, steadfastness, discipline and conscious practical direction toward the battle and fighting problems. In this case, such an organization is capable of mobilizing arid recruiting within its ranks the revolutionary sectors of the petit bourgeoisie without falling victim to its hesitancy, vacillation, indecisiveness and lack of application.

The revolutionary intellectuals are a basic and necessary material for the building of the party and the revolution. In defining revolutionary forces in underdeveloped countries, modern socialist thought cites the workers, peasants, soldiers and revolutionary intellectuals. The intellectuals provide the revolution with a clear view, and they are naturally the material through which political consciousness passes to the working classes as well as the capacity for administration, the organization of things and planning for all aspects of action. Consequently, the presence of revolutionary intellectuals and their fusion into the structure of the party is a basic matter. However, the intellectuals' role in the building of the party and in the service of the revolution is contingent upon their true coalescence with the masses, combatants and revolutionary action and their acquisition, through practice, of the ability to stand firm and of the education connected with the problems of action. The intellectuals' presence in the party outside the range of practice and apart from the masses and the fighting may expose the party to the manifestation of verbiage that is in conflict with the real problems of action. The intellectuals' living among the downtrodden masses and combatants, their willingness to learn from them as much as they teach them, their ability to share with them the same living circumstances, their intellectual modesty, their establishment of comradely relations with the combatants and the poor and their avoidance of superior relations and of material and moral privileges constitute the way whereby the intellectuals can perform their part in the revolution, and the non-observance or non-exercise of these matters will deprive the intellectuals of all capacity for revolutionary action. The revolutionary combatant refuses to establish superior relations with anybody. The aims of the revolution include equality, human dignity, cooperation and human comradely relations, and the organization which prepares itself for the leadership of the revolution is expected to embody this picture.

Our second strategic line in the building of the revolutionary party is to have the party material from the class of workers, peasants, toilers and revolutionary intellectuals. Naturally, the adoption of this line is not

sufficient to ensure this picture. A long period of hard effort lies before us in this direction. When our organization actually becomes an organization of workers, poor peasants and toilers; when it actually becomes an organization of camps, villages and poor urban districts, then we may rest assured that we have created the solid organization that supplies the revolution with its requirements and provides it with protection and ability to continue and take a firm stand.

XV. The Party and the Masses

The party is the leadership of the masses. Consequently, the members and leaders of the party must come from conscious elements that are imbued with enthusiasm for action and are willing to accept sacrifice, observe discipline and act in accordance with regulations and organization policy. The party must see to it that its members in general constitute an example and a vanguard in consciousness, activity, sacrifice and discipline. If the party and its members lose these qualities, it naturally loses its role as a revolutionary political organization. However, inasmuch as the revolutionary party must maintain itself as an organization of conscious, active, loyal and disciplined elements, it must at the same time be an organization for the masses, emanating from them, living in their midst, fighting for their causes, relying on them and realizing its aims through and with them and in their interest.

Mao Zedong says:

> However active the leading group may be, its activity will amount to fruitless effort by a handful of people unless combined with the activity of the masses. On the other hand, if the masses alone are active without a strong leading group to organize their activity properly, such activity cannot be sustained for long, or carried forward in the right direction, or raised to a high level.[6]

It would be very useful for us to always remember this in our actions. By understanding the dialectical relation between the party and the masses we can understand in a sound manner the party's role on the one hand and the masses' role on the other.

The mass line is our third strategic line in the building of the Popular Front.

To succeed in the building of the Popular Front for the organization of the masses, the purpose of each revolutionary political action must

6 Mao Zedong, "Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership" in *Selected Works*, Vol. III, p. 118.

be deeply rooted in the heads of the organization members. The final purpose behind our action is the masses: the freedom of the masses, the dignity of the masses, the life of the masses, the fulfillment of their needs, the guarantee of their future.

Keeping this purpose in our mind, making the members increasingly conscious of it and constantly reminding them of its importance will help us always to follow the right direction in our work, will determine the measure of evaluation of our work, organizations, leaderships and branches of action, will protect us from the dangers of seclusion, isolation, bureaucracy, superiority, opportunism and preoccupation with petty internal matters, and will determine the nature of our activities and the direction of our operation. Sometimes our organization or some of its branches confine themselves to purely internal activities: meetings, education, discussions, criticism, etc. In the absence of a mass cause toward which the organization is directed, and in the light of the organization's isolation from the masses and their problems and causes, the organization's life becomes closed and isolated and will soon be swamped by the organization's problems and side issues, so that the organization will lose all capacity for revolutionary action.

To look always to the masses, to handle the masses' problems, to work for the masses, to help the masses to understand and analyze their problems and to adopt a position in respect thereof, to assist them in organizing themselves and to lead them in action to face their problems—this is our main task, the purpose of our existence, and it is our only way to muster the revolutionary strength that will enable us to achieve our aims.

The mass line and our success in following it constitute a basic measure of the revolutionary character of the members, the organization's branches and the political organization as a whole.

Without this climate, this consciousness, this direction, we fall into the circle of seclusion and isolation. This would mean, first, the preponderance of side issues pertaining to the organization itself and, second, the ability of the opposing forces to encircle and strike us.

The member who establishes the best relations with the masses around him looks for any service which he can perform for them and is for those around him a factor of awakening and assistance is the revolutionary member. There are no grounds for claiming any revolutionary quality in respect of the member who does harm to the masses or isolates himself from them. The organization branch which sets up political

forums, reacts with the masses in the problems and issues facing them and looks for any service that it can perform for them, such as opening a school to combat illiteracy, or helping people in collecting the harvest, or advising them in the establishment of a co-operative, or leading them in demanding an electricity or water supply project or the opening of a road, is a successful branch in giving the mass line a concrete form. Conversely, no organization branch can claim success or revolutionary action if it is enclosed within itself, confining all its time and effort to its internal organizational life, not feeling with the masses so that they do not feel its existence.

The party which mobilizes for the revolution of every man, woman and worker, every peasant, every student and every youth, orients constantly toward the battle and the revolution and leads them in their various political and mass activities, and the party whose basic organization is surrounded by student, labor and peasant unions and organizations for women, youth and cubs (pioneers) is the revolutionary political organization for the masses. There is no ground for claiming any revolutionary quality in respect of an organization that lives in seclusion away from the masses.

Naturally, such a picture does not occur in a short time. The mobilization of the masses must take place at a speed that enables the organization to make this mobilization a conscious and disciplined operation, neither spontaneous nor disorderly. However, the important thing is that we move in this direction, following it with firm continuous and sure steps, deeply realizing that the basic and final purpose of our existence is the masses, that we are all right as long as the masses are with us and as long as many positive bridges link us with the masses, and that any isolation or any movement of the masses away from us must constitute a warning or alarm signal requiring a critical review of our positions and procedures.

The party's leadership of the masses is not an easy process. It is not sufficient to have the intention, nor is it sufficient for the party to stress the importance of the mass line to ensure its leadership of the masses. The party's ability to analyze the situation, the mottoes that it presents, the nature of the mass problems that it intercepts, the manner in which it presents all these questions, the pattern of the relations which it establishes with people and the mobilization and organization formulas which it adopts—these are the factors which determine the party's success or failure in the leadership of the masses. The party will not be able

to lead the masses if it presents issues that do not spring from their midst, if it presents them in a manner that is not understood by the masses, or if it fails or hesitates to present some of the issues.

Mao Zedong says:

> To link oneself with the masses, one must act in accordance with the needs and wishes of the masses. All work done for the masses must start from their needs and not from the desire of any individual, however well-intentioned. It often happens that objectively the masses need a certain change, but subjectively they are not yet conscious of the need, not yet willing or determined to make the change. In such cases, we should wait patiently. We should not make the change until, through our work, most of the masses have become conscious of the need and are willing and determined to carry it out. Otherwise, we shall isolate ourselves from the masses. Unless they are conscious and willing, any kind of work that requires their participation will fail. There are two principles here: one is the actual needs of the masses rather than what we fancy they need, and the other is the wishes of the masses, who must make up their own minds instead of our making up their minds for them.[7]

Inasmuch as we must avoid the disease of rashness or leftist opportunism in the leadership of the masses, we must likewise avoid the disease of inaction or rightist opportunism.

Here Mao Zedong goes on to say:

> If we tried to go on the offensive when the masses are not yet awakened, that would be adventurism. If we insisted on leading the masses to do anything against their will, we would certainly fail. If we did not advance when the masses demand advance, that would be right opportunism.[8]

Our emphasis on the mass line and the basic character of the masses should not be understood in an erroneous idealistic manner creating among the masses a sentimental mystic view that would conceal from them the objective view of things and result in spontaneously trailing behind the masses instead of coalescing with them with the object of leading them.

Our masses, like the masses in underdeveloped countries, are the victim of many outworn concepts, tribal, clan and communal connections and bad, anarchical customs and traditions that are remote from the spirit of the age. Under this situation, our masses cannot be that force which is capable of achieving victory over the enemy that we have defined. The rallying of these masses around the party without such rallying being ac-

---

7 Mao Zedong, "The United Front in Cultural Work" in *Selected Works*, Vol. III, pp. 236-37.

8 Mao Zedong, "A Talk to the Editorial Staff of the *Shansi-Suiyuan Daily*" in *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, p. 243.

companied by efforts toward revolutionary political consciousness and organizational disciplinary consciousness would result in transferring to the organization all the diseases of the prevailing conditions, and this would be a gross error. The revolutionary party is the school in which the masses learn and change many of their habits, traditions and concepts, substituting everything modern, new and revolutionary for all that is old and outworn.

On the other hand, our toiling masses, by reason of their material living conditions and of the fact that they suffer in practice the exploitation and subjection exercised by the anti-revolutionary forces, undoubtedly constitute in the strategic field real protection for the revolution from any vacillation, weakness or slackening, but this would not mean that the masses are always right in assessing tactical political positions and determining their programs.

In their positions, the masses sometimes represent sentimental and impulsive reactions that are unscientific in their calculations and unobjective in the evaluation of all circumstances. Consequently, it is wrong for the party to always go along with the state of the masses without action or effect. The party must always remember the danger of compulsiveness in political action, and that its role is to lead the masses and not to straggle behind them, for otherwise, it would lose the justifications for its existence as a revolutionary political organization.

The relationship between the party and the masses is a dialectical one. It teaches them and is taught by them. It affects them and is affected by them. They provide it with the facts and in the light of its comprehension and analysis of these facts, it provides them with a sound assessment of the situation and eventually with the working programs.

XVI. Building the Combatant Party

The strategy of armed struggle must naturally affect the strategy of the party structure so that this structure is based on the interests and requirements of the struggle in a manner that affects the structure of the party and the relations within the organization, the nature of its leading formations, its educational material and its internal regulation.

The basic aim of the Palestinian national movement is the liberation of Palestine. This aim cannot be achieved except through armed struggle and a protracted popular liberation war. If we lose sight of this fact a great deviation will occur in our party and political action. There is no way of

building a Palestinian national movement for the masses except through fighting and the masses' awareness that the demand for organization, mobilization and political activity aims at escalation of the fighting—their only road to victory. Conversely, there will be no continued escalation of the fighting except through the mobilization of the masses with the object of furnishing the requirements of the struggle, protecting it and supplying it with successive ranks of citizens to ensure its persistence, continuity and the escalation of its effectiveness. This dialectical relation of coalescence between fighting and political action constitutes the right criterion for our work.

Putting into effect this concept of the Palestinian national movement in its two interrelated and fused aspects—fighting and political action—means on the organizational level confirmation of the following points:

(1) The military organization which does the fighting must have a mature political structure. Confining our interest to the building of the military structure in a mechanical manner bears many risks. The combatant who takes up arms must know why, against whom, and for whom he has taken to arms. A sound political view of the relations with the masses protects the combatants from any errors that might lead to their isolation from the forces of revolution and imbues them with the capacity to stand firm, enables them to avoid short-term policies, provides them with protection from any acts of political sabotage which may be launched by the enemy, defines their line of relations with any force carrying arms and mobilizes them at stated intervals for political mass action which will be useful to them in the fight and will strengthen their position. The politicized combatant alone is capable of standing firm in a long, hard battle like the one that is being fought by our people today.

The acquisition by the fighting cadres of the revolutionary political view of things makes these cadres the vanguard of the Palestinian national movement and ensures the firmness, continuity and non-deviation of the fight.

(2) The political organization must have a military structure. However, we must keep in mind that this organization is auxiliary to the fighting cadres. It constantly provides us with successive numbers joining the military cadres and going into the battle. The greatest deviation that could occur is the building of the political organization in a haphazard manner without such an objective being completely clear, with the result that we would find ourselves with an organization that wanted to take

moral or political advantage of its formal connection with the struggle without this organization being an integral part of the fighting cadres. Such a deviation would create a great conflict between the fighting cadres and the political organization which would adversely affect the march of the revolution and make the political organization a burden on the struggle instead of a support to it. The political organization whose aim is to link itself with the combat in order to obtain the identity of affiliation to commando action, the battledress and all other insignia without being truly prepared to join the fighting would constitute an obstacle in the way of revolutionary growth and would force the party to live under circumstances of constant conflict between the fighting cadres and the political organization.

The political organization must be built for continuous efflux to the battle and its task must be to provide military protection for the struggle (i.e. popular resistance). It must live in the same conditions as the fighting cadres, and its constant daily task must be to exert continuous and exhausting efforts in the service of the struggle and the fighting cadres. In this way, we can build a unified fighting party and avoid any serious conflict between fighting and political action.

(3) The party's leadership must eventually be politico-military leadership possessing political consciousness on the one hand and the capacity to lead the fight on the other. From time to time the leading positions must be re-shuffled to enable the political organization to become appreciably familiar with all the questions and conditions of the fighters and the struggle so that its judgments will be sound and to understand all working problems in the military sector. Conversely, the military organization must be made familiar with all working problems in the political field.

(4) The internal education of the party must aim at building the political and military structure at the same time. Military education in relation to the political organization must be as basic as political education. Similarly, political education in relation to the fighting cadres must have the same importance as military education. Leadership cadre training must at the same time be military and political training.

(5) The basic effort of the leadership must be directed toward the issues of the combat, the solution to its problems and the fulfillment of the requirements for its escalation, steadfastness and continued growth. All organizational, political, information and financial efforts must be linked with the interests of the combat and for the combat, and not at

the expense of the combat, and all this is expected to be reflected in the distribution of the leadership and in all party programs, budgets and patterns of action.

(6) The party's internal regulation must be laid down on the basis of the fusion and unity of the fighting and political organization and on the basis of the existence of the fighters and the issues of the combat in the very life of the party and its basic leading group.

The organizational picture toward which we are looking is that of the single fighting party, some of whose members take actual part in the fighting, others prepare for the combat while a third group forms the popular resistance which protects and supports the fighting. A fourth group works among the masses, explaining to them the fighting issues and moving the masses toward serving the combat, and a fifth group performs the financial, administrative and information tasks that serve the fighting. All these groups—and branches are one and the same organization led by the same ranks of leadership which are at the same time responsible for fighting, organization and political action in a unified interlocked system.

The motto which says that "every combatant is a party member and every party member is a combatant" traces before us a basic strategic line for the building of the fighting party in conformity with our view of the Palestinian national movement and the liberation struggle.

XVII. Democratic Centralism—Basis of Relations Within the Revolutionary Party

The revolutionaries who meet around a revolutionary theory and a working strategy and combine together in a political organization to fight for these principles need to define the manner in which they must organize their work. For example: How shall the leadership of the organization be determined? How shall it be changed in the event of such change being necessary? How shall relations be established among the various ranks of the leadership? What are the relations between the leadership and the members of the organization? How shall the organization face its problems and contradictions? How shall it settle its political positions where there is more than one point of view concerning the position at issue? How shall the organization keep discipline and preserve the unity of the party? How can it make the party relations the basic relations among the members of the organization to which all personal, family, regional or

other relations shall be subservient? How can the organization discover qualifications among its ranks and open before the qualified elements opportunities to shoulder responsibilities that are commensurate with their qualifications? How can the organization maintain that strong discipline which is indispensable for the success of the party in the execution of its policy and programs without this discipline being at the expense of the member's dignity or rights or the development of his personality?

The determination of the organizational method with which the party must face all these questions is a basic condition for the building of the revolutionary party, the regulation of its affairs, the preservation of its unity and mobility and the increase of its effectiveness and cohesion. Unless this method is clarified, defined, understood and adhered to by all the members of the organization, the party will, in facing its problems and issues, experience a series of complications, contradictions and haphazard or individual actions which paralyze it and prevent it from facing in a revolutionary manner the revolutionary cause of the masses for which it was originally established.

Democratic centralism is the basic principle on which all revolutionary parties that have led the revolutions of this age have been established. Consequently, the validity of this principle of organization does not rest on its soundness from the theoretical point of view alone, but basically on its validity as established by practice and the experiences of revolutionary action.

Democracy inside the party means the right of every member to know the party's strategy, political positions and main plans, and the right to discuss and express opinions on all these matters and to present his opinion in full freedom on all matters, even though his opinion may be wrong. The right of every member to know everything within the limits of the party's security, his right to discuss party strategy and positions without any restriction and his right to criticize and stand in the face of error must be a protected legitimate right, and this is the foremost meaning of democracy.

It is the duty of the leaders to listen to the combatants and members, to think well of what they say, to acknowledge the validity of any sound scientific criticism of the work, to benefit humbly from every sound opinion and endeavor to correct any faulty opinion among the members through dialogue, discussion and persuasion.

The revolution needs the enthusiasm and exuberant vitality of all and needs to benefit from their qualifications. This cannot be achieved unless the members feel that the revolution is theirs and that they are its

protectors from any deviation. The way to this is the member's freedom of discussion, dialogue and criticism.

Collective leadership is another aspect of democracy within the organization. Collective leadership ensures the prevention of any individual authoritarianism or deviation, guarantees a certain measure of self-control over the members of the leadership and a certain measure of dialogue, discussion and viewing things from more than one angle so that the party's positions may be as sound as possible. Whatever the gaps in the collective leadership may be, the treatment of these gaps takes place through the distribution of responsibilities and obligations on clear lines and not by doing away with the principle of collective leadership. The party's reliance on a leadership backbone consisting of graded groups of policy-making and executive collective leadership ranks will provide the party structure that is capable of standing firm, facing hardships and preventing deviation to the greatest possible extent from every angle, and reaching the soundest possible positions and plans.

The third aspect of democracy within the revolutionary organization is the members' right to express their opinion of their leadership and its responsibilities and to grant or withhold their confidence in this leadership, and eventually the members' power to change the party's leadership in the event of their proved failure, incapacity, deviation and erroneous concept of responsibility where this erroneous concept is reflected in the pattern of their relations with the membership. The leadership that does not enjoy the members' confidence cannot be capable of mobilizing them and at the same time maintaining strong discipline and creating an atmosphere of activity and enthusiasm. The members' right to change their leadership is the objective control over the leaders' actions, their sense of responsibility in every position taken or action performed by them and their assiduity in developing their qualifications so that they may rise to the level of the leading functions shouldered by them.

The attempt to define democracy in terms of these three aspects in spite of their importance, does not, as a matter of fact, suffice to provide full and thorough clarification of the essence of democracy and all its values, meanings and translations, nor does it suffice to produce full clarification of the effect and positive influences of democracy on the structure of the organization and the increase of its effectiveness.

Continuous revolutionary democratic education is the only way which ensures the realization of the essence of democracy, all its translations and even all its positive influences. It must be emphasized that

the understanding by the responsible leaders themselves of the meaning and importance of democracy and their endeavor to give it a concrete form is even more important than its understanding and practice by the members. Here democracy becomes a collection of values, criteria and working traditions that are reflected in the pattern of relations within the organization. Here democracy becomes a genuine desire to know the members' opinions, to live among them and to avoid isolation from them and their problems, by holding open forums and collective meetings, establishing comradely relations among all, and avoiding superior relations. It will shy away from bureaucratic relations, prevent responsibility from being converted into any material or moral privilege, and avoid exercising responsibility in a manner that is not compatible with the members' dignity. Also, we must extricate ourselves from all customs and traditions inherited from the class society in which we were brought up and establish relations of mutual respect and objective appreciation of qualifications instead of formal courtesies, adulation and servility. There must be open-mindedness among the responsible leaders so that, instead of being impatient with criticism, they will encourage it and endeavor to enhance the members' moral courage and develop their manliness and revolutionary attitude.

Thus democracy becomes a revolutionary human life pattern within the organization before it assumes the form of a collection of regulations and internal rules.

Democracy is only one of the aspects of the basic principle that is at the root of relations within the organization: the principle of democratic centralism. Understanding this principle from only one angle leads to the greatest dangers, and it must be clearly understood that democracy without centralization will result in complete anarchy, digression and lack of discipline, and consequently paralyzing the party and rendering it incapable of uniform motion toward the execution of its plans.

The party needs to adopt political positions in the light of developments. It needs to lay down plans that it must follow and draw up rules and regulations to control its conduct. In the course of discussing these matters, it is natural that there should be more than one point of view, position or opinion. The party cannot continue forever to argue around these matters until everybody is satisfied with the soundness of a particular position. After a reasonable period of discussion about its problems, positions and programs within the frame of its collective leadership the party needs to take a position, adopt programs, to confirm a decision.

This normally takes place according to the majority view, and the position or decision taken may not obtain the agreement of all without exception.

What, then, is the solution? Must the organization remain paralyzed without taking any position while the discussion goes on? Must each member go out to speak his own opinion according to his understanding of things? This would mean anarchy or paralysis. Democratic centralism provides the solution. The solution is the minority's submission to the opinion of the majority, and in this way, the organization maintains its unity and ability to move. Every point of view inside the party is entitled to be presented in full freedom within organizational channels. However, after this point of view is discussed and the party (the majority) takes a definite position concerning it, then it is the duty of every element in the party to sponsor this position and to defend and be fully committed to it until another organizational occasion arises for discussing anew the matters of work in the party congresses and planning bodies.

This is the first aspect of the centralization concept. The second aspect is the subsidiary leadership ranks' submission to the higher leadership ranks and the consideration of the central leadership of the organization to be the decisive authority in all basic matters and to be entitled to criticize all positions or decisions taken by any leading group below it. The party's action in any field, area, or department may affect the conduct of the party as a whole, and any mistake committed by a particular leadership rank may affect the party's fate or future. Consequently, the way to control the party matters, preserve the unity and harmony of all party plans and activities and prevent any gross error or deviation by the party's branches or departments is the central leadership's right to criticize any decision taken by any subsidiary leadership rank. Naturally, this does not mean the central leadership's intervention in every act undertaken by the party. It only means that it has the right to intervene when, in its judgment, such intervention is necessary to protect the workers' interest.

The third aspect of the centralization concept is the leadership's absolute power during execution and the shouldering of full responsibility for the execution of what the party has democratically decided. When execution begins democracy ends, and so do discussion and debate, to give way to obedience, discipline, commitment and full submission to instructions. Without this, we cannot build a highly disciplined revolutionary party that is capable of prosecuting the hard and long liberation war.

The principle of democratic centralization lays the sound foundation for all relations within the organization. It is the principle that combines the member's rights and duties, between freedom and order.

The understanding of this principle by all members, their comprehension of all its meanings, their constant endeavor, to view it from both its opposite, yet united sides at the same time, and an honest and responsible effort by the leadership and members to apply this principle provides the biggest guarantee for the building of the revolutionary party which is capable of leading an armed revolution and a hard protracted liberation war.

This principle provides the basis for the collection of other organizational principles that govern the organization's life: collective leadership, leadership among the ranks of the members, interaction between leadership and rank and file, and submission by the minority to the majority, no ideological contradictions and factions within the revolutionary party, individuals' submission to the Organization, submission by all party branches to the central committee. This basic principle and the principles emanating from it serve to determine the internal regulation and the collection of basic rules that define relations, powers, responsibilities, penalties and rewards. All this completes the general picture of the party's internal life as a disciplined democratic revolutionary organization.

XVIII. Criticism and Self-Criticism

The practice of self-criticism and education of the party's leadership, cadres and members in this practice in a sound manner provides the party with a big guarantee for the discovery and correction of errors, and consequently for the continued growth of the party instead of allowing it to end in failure or incapacity resulting from these errors. Since no party or individual can avoid mistakes in work, the practice of self-criticism converts errors into benefits and negative attitudes into positive ones.

Stopping to evaluate our work from time to time, placing the party and its policies and activities on the dissection table once in a while and following up scientifically on all the positive and negative attitudes reflected in the revolutionary cause by the party's policies, programs and positions are matters that furnish the scientific revolutionary mentality with which the party can overcome errors and develop work programs in the light of practical experience and eventually lead the work on to success.

Accordingly, the party's leadership and members must accustom themselves to listening to, thinking of and benefiting from criticism, and, instead of trying to cover up the error upon its discovery, admitting it and deciding to correct it.

However, sensitivity or emotion in confronting criticism leveled at the party by the members and the masses will lead to isolationism, persistence of error and failure to benefit from the remarks made by members and sympathizers and will raise a wall between the party and masses. The leadership that is confident in itself and its honesty is that which welcomes criticism and listens to, thinks of and benefits from it, admits error when it occurs, tries to correct it and is always ready for development and renovation in the light of practical experience. The practice of criticism as it regards the revolutionary party is the method whereby the party breathes in new air, breathes out unhealthy air and eventually renews its vitality and capacities in a continuous manner.

Mao Zedong says:

> Conscientious practice of self-criticism is still another hallmark distinguishing our party from all other political parties. As we say, dust will accumulate if a room is not cleaned regularly. Our comrades' minds and our party's work may also collect dust and also need sweeping and washing. The proverb 'Running water is never stale and a door-hinge is never worm-eaten' means that constant motion prevents the inroads of germs and other organisms. To check up regularly on our work and in the process develop a democratic style of work, to fear neither criticism nor self-criticism: and to apply such good popular Chinese maxims as 'Say all you know and say it without reserve', 'Blame not the speaker but be warned by his words' and 'Correct mistakes if you have committed them and guard against them if you have not'.[9]

Our emphasis on the practice of criticism must be accompanied by our emphasis on the group of criteria that make criticism a weapon to strengthen and not weaken the party. There are three basic criteria which must be taken into account: (1) the objectivity of criticism, (2) the orientation of criticism toward correction and not toward demolition and destruction, and (3) its dealing with basic matters so that the party's life may not be drowned in petty subjective issues.

In fact, we deem it very important to point out—that these criteria are found clearly in the organizational revolutionary thought that has directed the greatest revolutions. Consequently, they are not criteria laid down by the leadership of the Popular Front to put criticism into effect or to brandish it in the face of its critics.

---

9 Mao Zedong, "On Coalition Government" in *Selected Works*, Vol. III, pp. 316-17.

Concerning the criterion of objectivity in the practice of criticism Mao Zedong says:

> In inner-party criticism, guard against subjectivism, arbitrariness and the vulgarization of criticism—statements should be based on facts and criticism should center on politics.[10]

Regarding the orientation of criticism toward correction and not toward destruction, Mao Zedong also says :

> ...But our aim in exposing errors and criticizing shortcomings, like that of a doctor curing a sickness, is solely to -save- the patient and not to—doctor him to death. A person with appendicitis is saved when the surgeon removes his appendix.
>
> So long as a person who has made mistakes does not hide his sickness for fear of treatment or persist in his mistakes until he is beyond cure. So long as he honestly and sincerely wishes to be cured and to mend his ways, we should welcome him and cure his sickness so that he can become a good comrade. We can never succeed if we just let ourselves go, and lash out at him. In treating an ideological or a political malady, one must never be rough and rash but must adopt the approach of 'curing the sickness to save the patient', which is the only correct and effective method.[11]

Concerning the necessity for criticism to deal with basic issues he adds:

> Another point that should be mentioned in connection with inner-party criticism is that some comrades ignore the major issues and confine their attention to minor points when they make their criticism. They do not understand that the main task of criticism is to point out political and organizational mistakes. As to personal shortcomings, unless they are related to political and organizational mistakes, there is no need to be over-critical and to embarrass the comrades concerned. Moreover, once such criticism develops, there is the great danger that the Party members will concentrate entirely on minor faults, and everyone will become timid and overcautious and forget the Party's political tasks.[12]

The practice of criticism within these criteria must constantly be a manifestation accompanying the life of the disciplined, democratic party.

This is the Front's organizational strategy. Through these lines, our thorough comprehension of them and our adoption of them as a guide in the building of the organization, we can make the Front a revolution-

---

10 Mao Zedong, "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party" in *Selected Works*, Vol. I, pp. 111-12.

11 Mao Zedong, "Rectify the Party's Style of Work" in *Selected Works*, Vol. III, p. 50.

12 Mao Zedong, "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party" in *Selected Works*, Vol. I, pp. 111-12.

ary party, the proletarian party that acts in close contact with the masses and directs their movement, the party that is capable of practicing armed struggle, the ever-revitalized, disciplined, democratic party.

Undoubtedly many of our organizational difficulties at this time are because the Front was not originally built in the light and under the guidance of this strategy. We should be grossly mistaken if, in our analysis of our existing organizational diseases, we remain bound to partial and personal interpretations. Complete clarity of our organizational strategy and the long and painful efforts that we display within the organization to drive our organizational problems which in reality are general and common in varying degrees to all the political organizations that now rally around commando action.

This does not mean that there may come a time when the revolutionary party will live without problems: Such thinking is unrealistic- and unscientific. Our ambition is to outgrow the problems of this stage of the organization's life to face the problems of a more advanced and more revolutionary stage.

XIX. The Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) and the PFLP

At its inception, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was formed of the Arab Nationalist Movement's branch in the Palestinian field, the "Heroes of the Return," the "Palestine Liberation Front" and independent elements which soon took the form of a fourth group within the Front. On this basis and in the light of this formation it was not designed that the Front at the first stage of its life should present a completely leftist political view of the liberation battle proceeding from and based on scientific socialist theory; what was implicitly understood actually was that the Front should present a general liberation thought bearing progressive features which would crystallize more and more with the crystallization of the experiment. This is as regards the Front's political thought. As regards organization, it likewise was not designed that the Front should at that stage of its formation be a unified party organization based on the same revolutionary organizational strategic lines which we have discussed. What was also understood was that the Front would for some time continue to consist of a group of organizations, each of which would maintain its independent existence. However, there would be a beginning made to planning for coordination among these organizations

and an attempt to unify the educational material given to them in preparation for the realization of a climate that would pave the way for the unification of these organizations in the strategic planning in the light of practice and experience.

In light of this picture, it is evident that there is a definite objective distinction between the organization of the Palestinian branch of the Movement (ANM) on the one hand and the Front on the other. The Movement, in the light of what was designed by its Central Committee during the July 1967 session, possesses a socialist revolutionary concept through which it views the strategy of the Palestine liberation struggle, while the Front presents a liberation thought with progressive features. Moreover, the Movement represents a unified party organization preparing to rebuild itself according to a revolutionary organizational strategy, while the Front represents a group of organizations that differ in their organizational structure. Consequently; the nature of the picture and the nature of relations at the time of the formation of the Front was that of an organization possessing a scientific revolutionary view and entering into a front relation with other organizations within a front which presented a progressive liberation thought and was formed of a group of independent organizations tending toward unification. It was natural, such being the case, that the Movement should have its distinctive existence and its distinctive role within this front. This is the gist of the picture at the time of the formation of the Popular Front. However, the developments and schisms that have occurred within the Popular Front place us now before a totally different picture and consequently present a new picture of the subject of the Movement and the Popular Front and the relation between them.

The "Palestine Liberation Front" has separated from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and with it a group of independents. The Front continued to exist between the Palestinian branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement and the "Heroes of the Return". On the other hand, the new situation has enabled the ANM to present through the Front its revolutionary analysis of the Palestinian situation and its full political view of the struggle for liberation, that is, its complete political thought, so that the new picture is one of almost complete identity between the ANM and the Popular Front. The Popular Front's political thought is that of the ANM in full and its structure is to a great extent the same as that of the Movement. The ANM's organization constitutes a high proportion of the Popular Front's organization. If we take into account also the nature of the origin of the "Heroes of the Return", the rules which govern the organization of their first leading cadre, their

general intellectual atmosphere and the nature of comradely relations between the ANM and the "Heroes of the Return"—if we take all these points into account, then we may say that to a large extent the formation of the Popular Front is largely identical with that of the Movement. If there is identity in thinking and formation, any specific strategic distinction between the ANM and the Popular Front no longer applies. Any insistence on maintaining the Palestine branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement independent and distinct so that one may actually feel that the ANM is one thing and the Popular Front another, should be based on a well-defined, objective and tangible distinction. What is this thing on which the Movement's distinctive existence rests? Is it the political view? The Popular Front's political view of the battle is now that of the Movement. Is it an organizational distinction? It is true that the presence of the "Heroes of the Return" within the Popular Front constitutes a special organizational issue and it is also true that the speed with which the Popular Front was organized has made this organization, as regards certain organizational characteristics, less solid and less disciplined than that of the Movement, but is this sufficient to direct our strategy toward maintaining the Movement's special and distinctive organization within that of the Front? In light of this analysis, the February Congress drew the organizational strategic line to direct and guide future relations between the ANM and the Popular Front. This line consists in working for the fusion of the Palestinian branch of the ANM within the organization of the Front and at the same time working for the fusion of the "Heroes of the Return" within the Front as well, and in planning and working for raising the Front's organizational life to the level of the conscious, disciplined, revolutionary, committed party life.

On this basis, the conception of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine ceases to be that which prevailed at the time of its foundation—that is a front in the usual political sense with regard to thought and organizational relations—and our understanding of the Popular Front and the direction which we take in building it have become something different.

According to our present understanding of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the direction we take in its building up, it is the revolutionary party based on the political strategy and organizational strategy set forth in this report.

During the process of complete fusion of the Movement and the Popular Front, the sound motto that guides us is:

"The Movement in the service of the Front, and not the Front in the service of the Movement."



On People's War
[1969]

1. Conventional War Is the War of the Bourgeoisie. Revolutionary War Is People's War

The Arab bourgeoisie has developed armies that are not prepared to sacrifice their own interests or risk their privileges. Arab militarism has become an apparatus for oppressing revolutionary socialist movements within the Arab states, while at the same time, it claims to be staunchly anti-imperialist. Under the guise of the national question, the bourgeoisie used its armies to strengthen its bureaucratic power over the masses and to prevent the workers and peasants from acquiring political power. So far, it has demanded the help of the workers and peasants without organizing them or without developing a proletarian ideology. The national bourgeoisie usually comes to power through military coups and without any activity on the part of the masses; as soon as it has captured power it reinforces its bureaucratic position. Through the widespread application of terror, it is able to talk about revolution while at the same time, it suppresses all the revolutionary movements and arrests everyone who tries to advocate revolutionary action. The Arab bourgeoisie has used the question of Palestine to divert the Arab masses from realizing their own interests and their domestic problems. The bourgeoisie always concentrated hopes on a victory outside the state's boundaries, in Palestine, and in this way, they were able to preserve their class interests and their bureaucratic positions.

The war of June 1967 disproved the bourgeois theory of conventional war. The best strategy for Israel is to strike rapidly. The enemy is not able to mobilize its armies for a long period of time because this would intensify its economic crisis. It gets complete support from U.S. imperialism and for these reasons, it needs quick wars. Therefore for our poor people, the best strategy in the long run is a people's war. Our people must overcome their weaknesses and exploit the weaknesses of the enemy by mobilizing the Palestinian and Arab peoples. The weakening of impe-

rialism and Zionism in the Arab world demands revolutionary war as the means to confront them.

2. Guerrilla Struggle as a Form of Pressure for the "Peaceful Solution"

The Palestinian struggle is a part of the whole Arab liberation movement and of the world liberation movement. The Arab bourgeoisie and world imperialism are trying to impose a peaceful solution to this Palestinian problem, but this suggestion merely promotes the interests of imperialism and Zionism, creates doubts in the efficacy of people's war as a means of liberation and preserves the relations of the Arab bourgeoisie with the imperialist world market.

The Arab bourgeoisie is afraid of being isolated from this market and of losing its role as a mediator of world capitalism. That is why the Arab oil-producing countries broke off the boycott against the West (instituted during the June war) and, for this reason, McNamara, as head of the World Bank, was ready to offer credits to them. When the Arab bourgeoisie strives for a peaceful solution, they are in fact striving for the profit that they can get from their role as mediator between the imperialist market and the internal market. The Arab bourgeoisie is not yet opposed to the activity of the guerrillas, and sometimes they even help them, but this is because the presence of the guerrillas is a means of pressure for a peaceful solution. As long as the guerrillas don't have a clear class affiliation and a clear political stand they are unable to resist the implication of such a peaceful solution, but the conflict between the guerrillas and those who strive for a peaceful solution is unavoidable. Therefore the guerrillas must take steps to transform their actions into a people's war with clear goals.

3. No Revolutionary War Without a Revolutionary Theory

The basic weakness of the guerrilla movement is the absence of a revolutionary ideology, which could illuminate the horizons of the Palestinian fighters and incarnate the stages of a militant political program. Without a revolutionary ideology, the national struggle will remain imprisoned within its immediate practical and material needs. The Arab bourgeoisie is quite prepared for a limited satisfaction of the needs of the national struggle, as long as it respects the limits that the bourgeoisie sets. A

clear illustration of this is the material help that Saudi Arabia offers Fatah while Fatah declares that it will not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab countries. Since most of the guerrilla movements have no ideological weapons, the Arab bourgeoisie can decide their fate. Therefore, the struggle of the Palestinian people must be supported by the workers and peasants, who will fight against any form of domination by imperialism, Zionism, or the Arab bourgeoisie.

4. The War of Liberation Is a Class War Guided by a Revolutionary Ideology

We must not be satisfied with ignoring the problems of our struggle, saying that our struggle is a national one and not a class struggle. The national struggle reflects the class struggle. The national struggle is a struggle for land and those who struggle for it are the peasants who were driven away from their land. The bourgeoisie is always ready to lead such a movement, hoping to gain control of the internal market. If the bourgeoisie succeeds in bringing the national movement under its control, which strengthens its position, it can lead the movement under the guise of a peaceful solution into compromises with imperialism and Zionism. Therefore, the fact that the liberation struggle is mainly a class struggle emphasizes the necessity for the workers and peasants to play a leading role in the national liberation movement. If the petty bourgeoisie takes the leading role, the national revolution will fall as a victim of the class interests of this leadership. It is a great mistake to start by saying that the Zionist challenge demands national unity, for this shows that one does not understand the real class structure of Zionism. The struggle against Israel is first of all a class struggle. Therefore the oppressed class is the only class that can face a confrontation with Zionism.

5. The Main Field of Our Revolutionary Struggle is Palestine

The decisive battle must be in Palestine. The armed people's struggle for Palestine can help itself with the simplest weapons to ruin the economies and the war machinery of their Zionist enemy. The movement of the people's struggles into Palestine depends upon agitating and organizing the masses, more than depending upon border actions in the Jordan Valley, although these actions are of importance in the struggle in Palestine.

When guerrilla organizations began their actions in the occupied ar-

eas, they were faced with brutal military repression by the armed forces of Zionism. Because these organizations had no revolutionary ideology and no program, they gave in to demands of self-preservation and retreated into eastern Jordan. All their activity turned into border actions. This presence of the guerrilla organizations in Jordan enables the Jordanian bourgeoisie and their secret agents to crush these organizations when they are no longer useful as pressure for a peaceful solution.

6. Revolution in Both Banks of the Jordan

We must not neglect the struggle in east Jordan for this land is connected with Palestine more than with the other Arab countries. The problem of the revolution in Palestine is dialectically connected with the problem of the revolution in Jordan. A chain of plots between the Jordanian monarchy, imperialism, and Zionism have proved this connection.

The struggle in East Jordan must take the correct path, that of class struggle. The Palestinian struggle must not be used as a means of propping up the Jordanian monarchy. Under the mask of national unity, the main problem in Jordan is the creation of a Marxist-Leninist party with a clear action program according to which it can organize the masses and enable them to carry out the national and class struggle. The harmony of the struggle in the two regions must be realized through coordinating organs whose tasks will be to guarantee reserves inside Palestine and to mobilize the peasants and soldiers in the border territories.

This is the only way in which Amman can become an Arab Hanoi base for the revolutionaries fighting inside Palestine.



The Military Strategy of the P. F. L. P.[1]
[1970]

Preface

With this book, the P.F.L.P. Information Department began publication of a series dealing with significant topics related to Palestinian resistance thought and the problems of the resistance.

It is of concern to us to put it on record that this booklet on the Military Thought of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine ought to be considered as a continuation of the report issued in 1969 by the Popular Front regarding its political and organizational strategy, which has been published in book form under the title *Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine*. This is because the military thought of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine proceeds directly from the ideological, class, and organizational undertaking which forms the foundation of the commitment of the Popular Front as expressed in its above-mentioned political and organizational report.

Of course, this contribution made possible by the initiative of *Al-Hadaf*[2] is aimed primarily at deepening, and enlarging upon, progressive resistance thought and strategy. It is intended to be submitted to the masses and the fighters as part of the intense revolutionary discussion which is taking place in many circles. This discussion aims at enriching revolutionary thinking, establishing it firmly, and ensuring the continuation of the struggle until victory is achieved over the oppressors of the people.

1 Information Department, P.F.L.P., Beirut, 1970.

2 *Al-Hadaf*: official organ of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, published in Beirut since July 1969.

Effectiveness of the Resistance Movement

Al-Hadaf: How do you rate the effectiveness of present commando action from the military point of view, concerning its tasks at this stage and its future possibilities?

Answer: Commando action began in its present form and dimensions after June 1967 as a direct response to the aggression, as a popular expression—both Palestinian and Arab—of the rejection of that defeat. Nevertheless, we cannot but mention with esteem the fact that al-Fath, Abtal al-'Awda, Shabab al-Tha'r and the Palestine Liberation Front had already established themselves on the Arab-Israeli front before the defeat. However, the basic beginnings and organizational structures developed after the defeat. Even those which had arisen before June 5th had not taken on their broad form or dimensions until after June 5th.

This means that the resistance movement began as a reaction. But were conditions ready for the start of this movement or not? The answer to this question delineates the development of the movement or, rather, the road on which it presently proceeds.

Conditions were not completely ripe for starting an organized, deep-rooted, far-reaching resistance movement. Only one of those conditions was present, i.e., the existence of aggression. However, at the time, it wasn't possible to speak of postponing the resistance until the objective conditions had ripened in the traditional sense, and only then began to resist. Not at all. That was impossible and indeed would have been a crime. For the principle of legitimate defense prescribes reacting to aggression promptly and with all possible means whatever the circumstances.

But this also means that the resistance movement itself, from its beginnings and until now, has molded the evolution of those pre-conditions and has even created conditions favorable to the development of action, transforming the struggle from a nationalist reaction into a comprehensive war of liberation.

We mean, when we speak of pre-conditions, the standard of political maturity of the Palestinian and Arab masses, the level of the formation of cadres within the resistance movement, the level of the formation of fighters, the situation of the party, and the political and the mass organizational formations which underlie this form of resistance and which are its supporters and the soil from which its material and spiritual vigor is drawn. The preparation of these organizational formations

is one type of development in this sort of resistance.

If we consider the Palestinian resistance movement based on the assumption that its existence and continuation is a form of victory in this sort of war, when we look upon the deepening of the roots of the resistance within the ranks of the masses, the development of its cadres and its fighters, and their armament, preparation and training, we find that the resistance movement has taken extensive steps forward and that it has proceeded on the essential path toward forming the appropriate instrument capable of governing those conditions favorable to the creation of a genuine popular war of liberation.

Some say that the war of liberation has already begun and that we have begun advancing within the war of liberation from one phase to another. Were we to consider the resistance movement from this angle, we would see it in a way totally different from our previous view which sees it as a revolutionary nucleus that fosters a climate leading to the creation of a revolutionary force to undertake the advancement of revolutionary action and the launching of a popular war of liberation.

The Resistance Movement and its Effect Upon the Enemy. (I)

Al-Hadaf: The preceding refers to the present status of the resistance movement, its tasks and its horizons. We will return to this subject later in greater detail. But what about the resistance movement at its current level, concerning its effect upon the enemy? And what is the scope of its present form of confrontation?

Answer: We can divide the effects of the resistance movement on the enemy into its psychological, material and military aspects.

On the psychological level, the Israeli military always aims at reassuring the Israeli citizen that it is capable of protecting him, his life, his survival, and his economic advancement, through the suppression of any enemy.

After June 5th and the quick victory that Israel effected, various long-range aims of the war were supposed to materialize, aims which may be summarized as the implementation of security and stability for the Israeli citizen. However, the resistance movement has prevented Israel from realizing that aim and from benefiting from its victory. It deprived it of the fruit of victory—peace of mind within Israel, whether in terms

of military expenditures or of the disruption of development programs, etc. The resistance movement, through its blows at economic and civil targets within the territories occupied in the 1948 and 1967 wars, has been able to render that peace of mind and security absolutely non-existent. Consequently, it has put the Israeli military in a constantly difficult position before its citizens. Of course, the resistance has not reached the point of rendering it impotent, as it sometimes reacts to commando activities with sudden operations largely against the borders of the Arab states which claim to support the commandos in "infiltrating" and training. But the truth of the matter is that Israel has not been able to direct any blows at the commandos themselves because as small, mobile forces, they work in secret in dispersed areas, carry out their attacks after having gathered together, and then immediately scatter. Thus they do not provide the enemy with a target large enough to enable him to concentrate to hit it. Moreover, the fact that the resistance movement is not concentrated in a given place and does not assume defensive positions (in fact, it has not yet reached the stage that would allow it to maintain defensive positions) prevents the enemy from delivering a crushing blow. This, in turn, compels the enemy to direct retaliatory blows at Arab borders to show its citizens that it is responding. But the truth of the matter is that it is not responding to the commandos as much as it is "responding" to those peaceful citizens who are in the border areas adjacent to where commandos move their bases outside the occupied territories to bases inside. Israel calls this movement infiltration. It is, in fact, the return of citizens who left their land due to overpowering force, to the land which is legitimately theirs, across illegitimate borders which divide the Arab people. This concludes the discussion of the psychological aspects of the effect of the resistance movement on Israel.

As for the material and military aspects, there is the matter of the defense line, or the warning line, which Israel has extended along the borders to prevent the commandos from entering, from barbed wire to simple electrical installations to various forms of entrenchments. A very small part is electronic. Contrary to what the Israelis claim regarding their having installed electronic devices on a wide scale, these devices are in fact limited, with electrical warning devices forming the largest part. All these devices, of whatever type, cost those states which install them large amounts of money. The Maurice line, the McNamara line and the other defense lines of this type are acknowledged as being financially exorbitant burdens.

Moreover, from the standpoint of guarding lines, continuous motorized patrols and planned ambushes throughout the night and long peri-

ods of the day also increase the Israeli military expenditures, which were not necessary before the growth of commando action.

In the past, the border guards and farmers of the settlements were capable of giving suitable warning to Israeli units concentrated in the rear, at an operational and tactical distance sufficient to strike at any infiltrators when necessary. At present, however, the residents of the settlements are no longer able to undertake this task. Due to this situation, Israel has been compelled to give up one aspect of its former tactics, which was to assemble striking forces at fixed spots, and has been forced to detail a part of those forces. It has not detailed all its forces, of course, for it still has mobile and motorized forces in the rear to carry out counterstrikes. But it has been forced to use at least part of its troops as motorized patrols in setting widespread ambushes, in the long run, a wearing operation, Israel would not have had to resort to this were it not for its fear of the establishment of contacts between the interior and the exterior.

Add to this the fact that Israel, to dominate all the areas lying within the occupied territories, and especially those occupied after the June war, is compelled to distribute its forces in a superficial occupation through the use of the "quadrangle" tactic. This tactic is based on motorized units separated at fixed distances and covering all intervening ground with a network of landposts. These posts are in touch with airborne troops or aircraft that are capable of responding immediately and swiftly to any infiltration into the occupied territories. This counters the guerrilla practice of achieving a tactical superiority of 5 to 1 despite an overall strategic inferiority of 1 to 5. This is done so that once a guerrilla force has entered and been observed at a given site, that "quadrangle" zeros in to overcome the local supremacy of the commandos who had intended to use that supremacy against a fixed target. The combat ratio thus becomes reversed in favor of the forces opposing the guerrillas. And in this way, Israel tries to counter local guerrilla supremacy in given locations.

This form of fanning out, or superficial occupation, wears down the enemy and causes the over-extension of its forces, impedes training and prevents the existence of a basic assembled striking force. Until the present time, however, the enemy continues to maintain striking forces and can carry out counter-attacks on the state level. The resistance movement has not, until now, been able to disperse all the Israeli forces throughout Palestine in the "quadrangular" form, nor has it been able to engage the Israeli army in its entirety. This, of course, is one of the future aims of the resistance movement.

It is well known that guerrilla warfare derives benefit from the dilemma that the enemy faces:

> —either to occupy the entire area with a quadrangular network, disperse its forces and destroy every guerrilla group that penetrates within this area, thereby weakening himself in a way that enables guerrilla forces to strike at any of its dispersed units
>
> —or to adopt another solution, which would be to concentrate in order to respond to the blows of the revolutionary army, thereby leaving some areas vacant. This, however, provides the guerrillas with the opportunity to occupy and dominate these areas and thus to harass the enemy and strike at its rear.

This anxiety and contradiction with which every army trying to resist guerrilla warfare lives, this wavering between dispersion in a "quadrangular" network and concentrating in the form of striking forces for a counterattack, has clearly not yet seized the Israeli army. This is because the guerrillas have not yet grown sufficiently, either materially or numerically within the interior (although they certainly will eventually) to necessitate such sweeping dispersion. Nor has the Israeli army yet found itself endangered by an offensive aimed at its weak points, which would force it to concentrate and thereby leave scope for the guerrillas to work freely in some locales.

In the coming development of the guerrillas, after their expansion and the broadening of their assaults in the interior, they will undoubtedly coerce the Israeli army into such over-extension. At that point, any organized revolutionary force (in the sense that it is molded and trained in systematic form, has revolutionary cadres and leadership, or springs from the guerrillas and is joined to the revolutionary army) would be capable of striking at the enemy in any locale. Thus, whenever the enemy concentrates on dealing the revolutionary forces a blow, the guerrillas would work from behind with ease, cutting off its lines of communication. At that point, the enemy would fall into the dilemma which would ultimately annihilate it, and we would finally enter into the final phase of guerrilla warfare.

It is possible to summarize all this by saying that the Arab resistance movement harasses the enemy and adds a great deal of bitterness to the taste of its victory, thereby depriving it of much of what it aims to achieve.

However, the continued growth of the movement, the development of its methods, the gradual increase of its cadres, and the expansion of

its range of operations will enable it to create the necessary climate for a popular war of liberation. This war has not yet started, but it inevitably will, with the cooperation of the guerrillas from whom the revolutionary army will develop under the guidance of their cadres.

Guerrilla Warfare and the Enemy

Al-Hadaf: The general concept raised by this topic leads to the question: from what we see of the activities of the resistance movement and of regular military activity, it appears at first glance that the enemy's army employs something resembling guerrilla warfare more than regular armies ordinarily do. This is not true of regular Arab military activity. Indeed, the enemy sometimes appears in touch with the principles of guerrilla warfare even more than do the operations of the resistance movement itself. For example, the enemy attacks isolated positions with large forces, it carries out operations of kidnapping and assault which resemble the tactic of "infiltration" counseled by the principles of guerrilla warfare, and indeed carries out such operations more often than classical assaults. Is this conception of the enemy's activity sound? And, if so, how is it to be interpreted?

Answer: The truth of the matter is that the enemy does not follow the methods of guerrilla warfare, but rather, follows the tactic of special units, which resembles guerrilla activity. The difference between these tactics and the methods of guerrilla warfare is like the difference between a just and an unjust war—the difference being that guerrilla activity is bound to the masses, while operations of suppression are directed against the masses. The distinctive factor is psychological and a matter of morale, and not specifically technical. Like the difference between military activity that threatens and that which liberates, although both are, in fact, suppressive operations, their fundamental roots differ. Ambushing, attacking forward positions, patrolling, assaulting isolated posts with airborne troops, kidnapping people, etc., all these operations are the same from the tactical standpoint. But either guerrillas utilize such tactics while relying on the masses in the execution of a strategy of liberation, or suppressive armies or special forces prepared to fight the guerrillas use them. And in this situation, those tactics are tantamount to a special operation in the service of a strategy of aggression.

The Israeli forces are presently reacting against the Arab countries using specialized operations. In the past, these operations had been those

of the military units, with those doing the fighting having been chosen from among the best elements. Later they became a detachment or squad of troops chosen from the armored corps or amphibious troops, to undertake assigned assaults. All these types of troops, now joined by helicopter-borne troops, consist of very highly trained forces, chosen from among the physically strongest soldiers, longest-prepared psychologically, and highly trained technically, specialized in shooting and hand-to-hand combat to carry out such operations as those at the Beirut Airport, southern Lebanon, south of the Dead Sea, etc.

Al-Hadaf: But why are we not capable of carrying out such operations, either on the commando or regular army levels?

Answer: On the commando level, we may notice that all operations which the enemy undertakes spring from the same spirit. The spirit of the specialized operation. The spirit of the raid or the ambush. Or a fixed force assembling against a small objective to strike at it swiftly and then withdraw. However, the existing capabilities of the Arab guerrillas presently active are at variance with those of the Israeli army from the standpoint of training, the existence of air and helicopter means of transport, or the number of armored vehicles undertaking strikes at a small target and then returning. But from the tactical standpoint, they are on the same level. So that when a group of commandos undertakes to enter the occupied territories from the outside or assembles from within and carries out an assault on a guard post or sets up an ambush for a group of vehicles, within the limits of its capabilities, it undertakes to apply the principles of small specialized operations. When the standards of the Arab guerrillas are raised—numerically, in training and arms—they will, of course, move to a stage higher than that of merely setting up ambushes for moving vehicles. That is to say, they will set up the ambush and will also capture some of those vehicles, utilizing their weapons, taking their men prisoner, or destroying what had not previously been destroyed. And rather than assaulting a small post, they will attack an airport. At that point, these operations will take on an expanded and larger form.

The reason that the Arab armies do not carry out such operations is because they, in their basic formation and until the present, have been defensive armies. Throughout all phases from 1948 till the present, they have consisted of forces concentrated on the borders to guard against aggression. Whereas the Israelis were always carrying out acts of aggression, the Arab armies—if they were able—would simply carry out acts of pre-

vention.

Arab strategy has been static and defensive to the extreme. Even its defense has been a non-dynamic one, a stationary defense anticipating a blow without knowing when it would come. And when it did come, this defense would respond to it with gunfire and not with mobility!

All the hostilities which Israel has carried out against the Arab borders have been of this kind: a swift attacking operation, carrying out its assignment then withdrawing, and met only with defensive fire from the Arabs. The Arab armies would be called up for a period but after a time would return to their normal defensive status without responding to Israel's aggressive act with a deterring one.

This follows from the fact that the Arab military apparatus, throughout this period, has been unable to put into effect the policy required to fit: a policy of liberation. It has not been predisposed toward escalation and achievement for a confrontation of wide scope—and is incapable of acknowledging that before the masses.

The justification for its existence, its coming to power, its overthrow of the old systems, and its accusation against those systems of their inability to liberate or to show a bold front, is that it is capable of liberating. In fact, it is not. This fear of confronting the enemy and of being frank with the masses has always caused its position to be one oriented toward covering up matters, preventing the expansion of any entanglement, and non-escalation. As long as the enemy would merely strike and not advance, the matter would stop there. And if the enemy withdrew, this would be deemed as tantamount to having wrapped up the issue!

The Arab armies have not advanced offensively at all. They have not trained for far-ranging offensive operations. Rather, their training and spirit have been defensive. And due to the danger of the overthrow of governments, one eye has always been directed inward and the other outwards. Their eye directed inwards aims to maintain power, while the other attempts to halt the enemy.

Contrary to this, the Israeli army, ever since its inception has been an offensive one, relying on the surprise blow and the concept that if it does not strike first, it will be struck. Thus, it strikes according to the principle that the best method of defense is a good offense.

This type of offensive attitude takes root with time within the fighters, and training evolves based on offense. The enemy knows that Arab circumstances do not permit Arab armies to undertake offensive action.

Consequently, it strikes at a suitable site, aiming its blows and raising the morale of its army and population, knowing full well that there will be no response or counterblow. Were it expecting the contrary, it would not have undertaken that sort of adventure which it mounts whenever it sees that it is propitious—quick forays aimed at raising the level of morale of its soldiers and people, carried out in full confidence that the Arab military apparatus will not move against it.

If we consider the ratio of paratroopers and commandos in proportion to the number of soldiers in the Israeli army in comparison with that in the Arab armies, we would find that the ratio in the Arab armies is very small, whereas it is very high within the Israeli army.

At present, even after some inroads have been made in paratrooper and commando tactics, now that there are helicopter-borne commandos and amphibious or similar units, we see that the number of helicopters and the degree of training in their use within the Arab armies is still meager when compared to that of the Israeli army.

On the other hand, Israel is presently making an effort to obtain a quantity of large aircraft and helicopters for the transport of airborne and helicopter-borne troops, especially after having considered the incorporation of the infantry within the paratroopers or helicopter-borne troops, thus having the entire army carried either by vehicles or helicopters.

All these matters regarding the Israeli army proceed, of course, from the basic Israeli tenet, the basic Israeli strategic conviction founded on maneuver along internal lines, as practiced by every state encircled from several directions by various powers, and whose terrain is small. It is compelled to respond to and to strike at several fronts. Consequently, its forces must be capable of mobility from one front to another before the latter has become active. Thus, Israel moves against and strikes at the first front, usually the strongest one, then returns to settle accounts with the other fronts, having already pinned them down before striking at the first.

In order to enable any state to carry out such a plan, as did Germany in World Wars I and II, and as did Israel in the 1948 war and even more clearly in 1967, its forces must all be highly mobile.

After the 1967 war, it became clear to the Israeli military that the expansion that it managed to achieve of the occupied territories necessitated more than troops merely carried by land, or armored or borne by half-tracks. Rather it was also necessary to have large, helicopter-borne striking forces on a wide scale.

The problem of transport from the Syrian to the Egyptian fronts has now been exacerbated, since the distances have been multiplied and the desert land of Sinai is unsuitable for transport operations by armored cars or vehicles. As transporting these troops from the Egyptian front to the Syrian one and vice versa has become more difficult, the airborne forces in Israel have undergone development from special forces to support land offensives into those forces undertaking the offensive itself.

This is the fundamental reason which has enabled the Israeli army to carry out this form of warfare. As for the Arab armies, by their psychological and material formation, their structure, the quantity of their aircraft, their vehicles and their special forces, they are incapable of undertaking such military operations. The Arab tenet of offense is unclear, whereas the tenet of aggression is the basis of the structure of the Israeli army.

We must at this point mention a development that has occurred within the Egyptian special forces after the June war of 1967, a development which has enabled various Egyptian units to carry out special amphibious, airborne or land operations against isolated Israeli outposts in Sinai. However, we must here consider these units realistically and objectively, and include in our appraisal and assessments the difference between units that have previously achieved numerous victories over twenty years and those belonging to an army exposed to two large, consecutive defeats within a short period.

The Forms of Technology in the Confrontation

Al-Hadaf: Is this simply a technological matter? Or is it a matter bound to and emanating from a clear, existing political notion or ideology? That is, have the Arab armies, and to a lesser degree the guerrillas, been incapable of advancing this spirit of systematic offense in their actual circumstances? Is this current military difference merely a technical matter, or does it proceed from far-reaching political and social causes?

Answer: The spirit of daring, offensive sacrifice latent within the commandos, the psychological and mental roots from which commando action stems, their categorical rejection of the defeat, their rush to plunge into the battle of liberation, the operations of confrontation carried out by the commandos despite their being small—all this has confirmed that they enjoy that creative spirit of offense. I am certain that what prevents the commandos from undertaking operations resembling the specialized ones of the Israelis is merely a material impediment, as represented in

weaponry, equipment, and the standards of training and command. All the commando organizations will attempt to overcome these material impediments in the course of their development.

As for the Arab armies, the tenet of defense, of reaction, of preventing the widening of entanglements, the absence of a comprehensive plan for a full-scale war of liberation, the loss of the spirit of enterprise and daring of the Arab establishments—all this prevents the existence of such operations. For Israel, the spirit of aggressive expansionism and the basic political concept, as represented by a clear ideology, has been transmitted to the armed forces which were constructed on an offensive, aggressive, and daring basis. All this was before June 5th. After this date, it is clear that the Egyptian army in particular began to embrace this offensive spirit well. It is true that it was defeated. It is also true that to enable the army to make the transition from defeat to standing firm, to victory, it must have small successive victories at the beginning, in order to regain self-confidence and to rebuild its cadres. During the period from June 1967 until the present, the Egyptian army has been able, with the aid of Soviet experts as well as other experts from the socialist countries, to rebuild the army. They have also been able to move to undertake daring operations unheard of before June 5th; crossing and landing operations have begun, as well as specialized operations which the army carried out in the unoccupied areas between the two armies, in order to obtain information or to effect quick strikes and occupy significant positions. All these things the Egyptian army has attained and has been able to effectuate in a way different from the rest of the Arab armies. Although this development is undoubtedly taking place within the other Arab armies as well, what has occurred within the Egyptian army is more visible.

With regard to the other Arab armies, this is taking place on a relatively lower level. And all that, of course, follows from the strength of the impetus coming from behind. The army acts in accordance with political conviction. And the boldness of that political conviction, or its introversion, flows from its confidence in whether the masses are behind it or not, whether they can stand firm no matter what, the extent of the struggle, or whether the internal front is unfirm. From these beginnings, the tenet of offense and daring are created. This is present on the Egyptian front in a new form. Thus, we see that the Israelis carry out an amphibious operation, while the Egyptians undertake the occupation of a control post; then the Israelis undertake a strike, and the Egyptians respond with a raid.

That is, the blows are successive. The Israelis, of course, would not permit the Egyptians to have the last blow or word. Rather, there is always a blow and a counterblow. Continuous engagements. There is never a strike, then general silence and non-response. In other words, from a purely tactical standpoint, the Arab armies are not deficient in that type of training. This sort of warfare does not require a technical level higher than that of some of the officers in the Arab countries, whether in the Syrian army which includes instructors trained in both Eastern and Western countries, or in the Jordanian army which has been trained according to the British doctrine. For the British were among the first masters of commando action in World War II. That is to say, it is assumed that all armies possess the technical knowledge necessary to undertake such operations. There remains the long-range view of that army, the creation of special forces within it, the proportion of those forces, and the starting of daring operations, in the knowledge that all those Arab armies based upon the Soviet doctrine are not supposed to follow the principle of defense, believing only in the principle of offense as the sole means of war. For the Soviet doctrine, according to which the cadres in the Syrian, Egyptian, and other Arab armies were trained in the socialist countries, maintains that the principle of offense is fundamental, while that of defense is a temporary phase from which the army might benefit from to upset the enemy's equilibrium while anticipating the offensive. It is the phase that precedes the offense, and thus it is not considered as a defensive one. The offense is basic, while the defense must be a dynamic and daring one, where raids and reconnaissance activities go on so that there is no silence. For silence gives the fighter the impression of the lessening of tension which, in turn, develops into a static defense. And static defense, according to military principles, yields nothing but more defeats. It is presupposed, from the standpoint of Soviet military doctrine as adopted by the Arab armies, that those armies are both offensive and daring. The ability of these armies to assimilate and implement that doctrine, however, is another matter. Likewise, the entire political mentality and circumstances at the back of these armies are the factors that determine whether and when it is possible to utilize that doctrine.

The fact that these armies do not undertake such activities does not necessarily conceal a weakness in technology or training. Rather, this weakness emanates from the contradiction between the power of the apparatus (the army) and the spirit which sets that apparatus in motion (politics).

The Confrontation, the Armies, and the Organizations

Al-Hadaf: This would mean, then, that as long as there exists the technological ability and doctrine of the offense with which the Arab armies are supposed to be injected, the problem will come to the point of being solved. Throughout the past twenty years, however, the situation has ultimately wound up in a state of impotence, failure, and collapse. This is clear from what is happening now on the borders and has led us to conclude that there exist other factors besides the technological one, or the vision of an officer or a leader; i.e., the matter of organization. We certainly don't mean to say that the organization of the Israeli state is what provides her with its military prowess, for, in our conception, there exist in Israel, expansionist incentives that every militarist, imperialist, and fascist organization of the past century has had. But with regard to the Arab systems, there is no such connection between the nature of those systems and the competence of their plans for liberation or their orientation or conceptions. So, is military competence dependent upon ideological and political factors, and the orientation of a system of the underdeveloped world vis-a-vis the challenges of a developed and superior state? What are the problems in this connection?

Answer: The problems are not technological. If the struggle was between the Arab states as part of the developing world and Israel as a base and bridgehead of the advanced, imperialist world within the "third world", we could say that the difference might be technological. But the truth of the matter is that Israel does not fight with Israeli weapons, nor do the Arabs fight with Arab weapons. The struggle is not between Arab and Israeli industry, as it was, for example, between German and French industry, a matter in which the one that equips its army with better weaponry has an advantage over the other.

There are the Arab weapons coming from the socialist countries which are likewise industrially advanced. The weapons from both sides are at a corresponding level of excellence. Israel indeed manufactures some light weapons, improves upon some heavy equipment, and is now diligently trying to attain independence in weapons manufacture. The possibilities of using weaponry, patrolling, and of training are not impossible tasks, however, but rather, are quite possible. The Arab establishments have implemented these for a period of time, while Israel has always done so.

But the issue here, as we have already said, is the political thought

that exists behind the use of those weapons. We have noted that the Israeli political notion is one of expansionism and the creation of a Zionist state, but we do not see that the Arab states likewise possess a political strategy upon which to build long-range military planning. Rather, there are only "plans" which are always no more than reactions to the situation. Moreover, the organization of these Arab establishments from 1948 until the present has not been along the only lines that would allow them to coalesce with the masses: they request everything from the masses and the masses grant everything to them while having the utmost confidence in them, to the point where they participate in a protracted war which might escalate to an unlimited extent, and which may necessitate great sacrifices and agonies. All the while, the internal front remains firmly cohesive and continues to support combat action, etc. On the contrary, we note that there is a system, an army and a people, sometimes interlocking and sometimes not, consulting it sometimes and sometimes not.

Further, if we wanted to look upon the battle as a struggle between underdeveloped countries as part of the "third world" against a spearhead implanted by the advanced imperialist world, then it is incumbent upon the Arab states and the "third world" to practice some form of fighting which corresponds to their underdevelopment. This is so because their technological ability is not sufficient to confront American technology, knowing, as we have said, the fact that we have access to Soviet weaponry and technology, equal in quality and quantity to that which they possess.

Whenever the underdeveloped countries of the "third world" confront advanced states, they use the strategy of a protracted war. Such a strategy requires a people ready to bear all its stipulations and imbued with a deep-rooted and radical doctrine that makes them believe that this war is in their interest and that the leadership in power is part of them, acts on their behalf, and does not constitute a petrified class above them. At that point, it is within their capacity to conduct a long-term war in which they might exhaust their more advanced foe, while simultaneously upsetting the balance of power, with they themselves undertaking the counterattack.

Throughout this period, which might last for tens of years, if there is not absolute coalescence between the leadership and the masses, it is impossible to hold out. If there did exist absolute coalescence, the ability to hold out would thereby continue throughout that period until the enemy was exhausted. And after the exhaustion of the enemy, it would be possible to upset the balance of power. Until such exhaustion has been

completed, however, in the first phases, there will be many losses, agonies, and sacrifices which the people must bear.

The existence of the ideology of a given class, that of the proletarian masses, is in the possession of the people and the establishment. The existence of the fateful bond between the masses and the state, as represented by class unity, is the factor that permits the continuation of the struggle for a long period of time: the period of a protracted war, carried on until such time when the enemy is exhausted and the balance of power is upset.

On the other hand, as long as it doesn't exist in the countries surrounding Israel, this type of state, in which the masses coalesce with their leadership, and where the leadership throws itself into the struggle with all its power because of its knowledge that the masses are fully behind it: countries whose leadership is prepared to hold out before a rough way of life and to carry out continuous assaults, to expose itself to an unsettled life and to killing for tens of years; and as long as what does exist consists of establishments and armies that are neutralized by simply being defeated, then the issue will remain one of building up the army. Once again Israel will advance and annihilate each army separately. That will be followed by a period of stagnation and then a period of rebuilding along the same lines. Then another strike, another period of stagnation, and so on.

What is needed is a people completely mobilized and armed, so that when Israel strikes at the army, there will be a gun in each home and a grenade in the pocket of each citizen. The Israeli army, at that point, would be unable to enter any city, or at least not until having paid the price. Even an attempt to occupy a village, could not be achieved without sustaining grave losses. Over a period of time, this would make it possible to exhaust the enemy in preparation for the counterattack.

At present, however, it is sufficient for the enemy army to strike and occupy as it will, and there is nothing to wear it out in the long run. It has no borders at which it must halt, except for those drawn for it by its allies, the imperialists, in their plans, or the borders of "the furthermost administrative extent", at which every army is compelled to stop by virtue of administrative requirements.

The solution is neither in technology nor is it in training, but exists rather within the basic structure of Arab society. Is it prepared for war? Is it a cohesive class formation in which each individual senses that he is not subject to any exploitation, that he is bound to the soil and thus defends it, fighting while confident that struggle is in his interests, and that

there is no one covertly conspiring against him? A long-term war cannot continue and triumph as long as a class exists that benefits from ruling and another class exists that is subjected to exploitation. Nor can it do so as long as the class which so benefits acquires all gains during peacetime, and then obliges the exploited class to pay the price with its blood amid the hell of the struggle.

Necessity of Marxism-Leninism for the Fighter

Al-Hadaf: Let us return to the subject of the resistance movement and guerrilla warfare. There appears to be a missing link here, which would pull all the parts of this picture together. It seems possible to us to point that link out by asking the limited question: is it necessary, even from the purely military standpoint, that the fighter in a guerrilla war be a Marxist-Leninist within the framework of the present confrontation and its historical circumstances? Militarily speaking, what is the relationship between Marxism-Leninism and liberation wars?

Answer: The Popular Front does what is within its capability to develop its role in the resistance movement and to proceed from its present role to a more evolved phase in the guerrilla war. However much the issue develops, within guerrilla warfare, we must bear in mind that reaching the point of a popular war of liberation requires the following: guerrilla warfare plus psychological warfare. For a popular war of liberation consists of a revolutionary war that utilizes an indirect revolutionary strategy that depends, according to Lenin, upon "postponing activities until such time as the demoralization of the enemy is permitted by directing the decisive blow against it with ease."

The answer here is directed toward psychological warfare, which aims at the following:

1. to demoralize the enemy and to fragment it materially, while draining it in the long run until it is ready for the decisive blow, and

2. preserving our state of morale throughout the long operation of exhausting the enemy, since that operation, materially and morale-wise, as is well known, is a reciprocal one. Thus, to demoralize the enemy, it is necessary to begin with a psychological war, capable of creating internal contradictions within it, in order to call up one of its classes, that of the proletariat, against the state of exploitation exercised against it and the Arabs.

In order for our morale to hold out despite the length of time it takes to drain the enemy, so that there is no decline of morale which contradicts the successive setbacks, the agonies, and the difficulties, and so that the fighter does not reach the point of losing hope, there must be a theory. A theory is necessary to enervate the enemy, while at the same time preventing discouragement during the psychological war, itself a basic component in transforming guerrilla warfare into a popular war of liberation.

But why Marxism-Leninism specifically? Why must the fighter necessarily be a Marxist-Leninist? And why does the Popular Front assume a Marxist-Leninist stance, in the sense that it induces all its rank and file and its cadres to embrace Marxist theory?

The answer is that the Popular Front proceeds along this definitive course based on a socio-political evaluation. The Popular Front considers the proletariat class—workers, peasants, residents of the refugee camps and the impoverished—as the substance of the revolution, its instrument, its fuel and its objective. It is thus incumbent upon us to adopt that theory which makes the interests of that class its own in the revolution. Likewise, class unity and the coalescence of the leadership with the rank and file, of which we have spoken in the previous section, as two basic pre-conditions for a long-term war and for its continuation, can be accomplished only after having reached a high degree of class awareness and understanding of the class theory which advocates revolution—i.e. that of Marxism-Leninism. This does not mean that Marxism-Leninism is no more than a tool with which to achieve victory. Rather, it is simultaneously the tool and the objective. A tool to achieve victory to restructure a society after the victory based on Marxism-Leninism, itself an objective.

In short, if we want to keep the spark of revolution burning despite all difficulties and setbacks, if we do not want our revolution to be simply a spontaneous outburst without a range of vision, and if we want to be prepared for a revolutionary war of long duration which is based on psychological warfare, then the guerrilla must embrace a theory. Thus, because the proletariat class is the substance of our revolution, then our theory is inevitably the theory of the proletariat: Marxism-Leninism.

Al-Hadaf: You mentioned previously that the present stage is one of building the fighting apparatus of the revolution and of creating a rev-

olutionary climate. In your estimation, what are the tasks that will present themselves during the coming period, with regard to the relationship of the resistance movement to the present social-political reality, and to those areas which are nominated to become the revolutionary centers in the near future, such as the East Bank and south Lebanon? How will the Popular Front approach those tasks? And how will it attempt to perform them with regard to its relationship with the villagers and the masses, and with regard to the existing socio-economic reality?

Answer: The Popular Front considers the creation of a revolutionary climate to mean the preparation and the cultivation of a proper groundwork for the revolution. In view of the fact that the Popular Front considers the workers, the peasants and the residents of the refugee camps as the basic implement and the genuine fuel of the revolution, it takes it upon itself to construct its political and military organizations, to the widest extent possible, in the midst of this class. It simultaneously attempts to attract whatever sections possible of the petit bourgeoisie and to induce revolutionary intellectuals to leave their class positions and join the struggle along with the dispossessed classes.

This is on the level of the rank and file. As for the political and military cadres, the groundwork has already been laid among them, so that they might take up their duties within the popular war of liberation.

It is true that the creation of a revolutionary climate will be accomplished using organization. However, it will also be accomplished using political education campaigns and the political stimulation of all the people. All the people will not come to enter the organizational setup automatically, but, rather, there will remain sectors that merely endorse it. Making the masses aware and arming them for the purpose of creating a revolutionary climate in this area is a basic part of the program of the Popular Front. During this time, it will be necessary to conclude alliances with groups of the progressive petit bourgeoisie, in addition to deep-rooted alliances with those leftist groups within the resistance movement, as well as those within the entire Arab area, for the sake of producing a leftist nucleus around which the masses can rally to create that climate. As for the scope of activity of the Popular Front and whether it will limit itself to the occupied territories and the East Bank or whether it will expand to south Lebanon and other areas, it is possible to say without breaching security, that the Popular Front is already active within the occupied territories, as well as within some surrounding Arab areas. Moreover, the range of its activity will expand to comprise all the

territory surrounding Palestine, and that area that may become part of the "Arab Hanoi" in the future.

In this fashion, with the continuation of the battle within the occupied territories, and the continuation of assaults on the Imperialist-Israeli enemy everywhere, and by mobilizing the revolutionary masses all over the Arab world to become the support of the resistance movement, its propagators and its backbone, the movement will not be depleted of its capacities, activity and political backing.

Using all this, the Popular Front will ignite the fire of revolution, protect it, and induce the popular masses to reject the defeat and the fact, whether of occupation or of the Arab reality that had led to the occupation. For the occupation would not have been possible were it not for that Arab reality. Thus, the rejection is threefold: the rejection of the occupation, as well as its roots; the rejection of that system which caused the defeat; and the rejection of that class structure which has obstructed the development of a popular war of liberation.

The Resistance Movement and its Effect Upon the Enemy (II)

Al-Hadaf: With regard to the dialectical relationship between the resistance movement and the enemy in the process of the struggle, has the resistance movement, during the period between June 1967 and the present, produced a political effect upon Israeli society, has it deepened the contradictions within it, and what are the possibilities for the future?

Answer: The relationship between the enemy and the liberation movement exists within the framework of the Arab-Israeli issue, as was clearly manifested after the June 5th war in particular. It has now been tangibly confirmed that Israel is a military and economic center, whose basis is a chauvinistic, reactionary mentality and which uses fascism and aggression as a basic doctrine to achieve expansionist objectives on Arab soil. On the other hand, the Arabs are the owners of the land and seek peace with honor. Israel, however, is an aggressive nucleus that rejects this and, as one would expect, obstructs any genuine opportunities for peace.

This issue has become clear to the socialist countries and to the countries of the "third world" which have not been exposed to Zionist deception; likewise, revolutionary intellectuals in the West have begun to sense that in fact an enmity exists, and that the June war was an escalation of that enmity. Accordingly, those intellectuals have begun to sense the

meaning of the Arab national liberation movement and its horizons.

This movement of change has only slowly been transmitted to the West but is being transmitted even more slowly within Israeli society.

If Western societies consist of a climate that is of only average receptivity to notions related to the Arab-Israeli struggle, this is so by force of their origins, their interests and the antecedent notions that they have inherited. Israeli society consists of a soil unreceptive to quick results. This is not because it is fundamentally unreceptive to such cultivation only, but because of the effects of Israeli propaganda which has gone on unopposed for a long period and which has been reinforced by deceptions and confessional, chauvinist matters. All this has contributed to the emergence of an Israeli inferiority complex, to fear, and to a feeling of danger.

Then the 5th of June came along to upset their conceptions, and to fill them with feelings of arrogance and insolence.

These things have rendered even the Israeli proletariat, that class whose interest lies in the termination of the Israeli entity, of little efficacy. It thus engages only in passive resistance, and plays a two-fold role: it exploits the Arabs and oppresses them, while it, itself, is exploited by imperialism, capitalism, and Zionism, even more severely. It is like the German working and peasant classes during World War II who served expansionist German capitalism while grinding underfoot members of their classes belonging to other nationalities.

It may be that this Israeli class, in the last analysis, has no intention of resisting Zionism. This does not mean, however, that it is a hopeless case. For through the continuation of the resistance movement, its escalation and its presentation of a draft for a democratic Palestinian state, meaning the mutual co-existence of the members of all creeds in a socialist, democratic state, then hopes in this sphere will grow.

Even though the continued presentation of this plan has not yet led to fruitful results, nevertheless, after the progressive nature of the resistance movement has seeped in, and after having convinced certain sectors that it is not at all fascist or chauvinistic, it is possible for it to reach deep pockets within Israeli society, not to mention the Arab pockets in those territories occupied before June 5, 1967. Some of those sectors will then act positively, while some others will continue to wait it out. And when the time comes for the counter-offensive of the revolutionary forces to begin, these pockets will go into action and work behind enemy lines,

helping to fragment this hostile society, thereby dissipating its power. The formation of those pockets is proceeding satisfactorily. Moreover, the counter-offensive has not yet begun, which thus makes them appear to be smaller than their actual size.

Arab Horizons of the Palestinian Resistance Movement

Al-Hadaf: As long as the question has been raised regarding the controversial relationship between the resistance forces and the enemy, there is another question, actually previously raised, regarding a similarly controversial relationship between the Palestinian resistance movement and the Arab national movement. The relationship between the solution to the problem of the liberation of Palestine and the destruction of that old, defeated society, makes it seem that the bond between the Palestinian resistance movement and the Arab national movement is unavoidable. In the first place, what is the military conception of that relationship and secondly, what is its political conception?

Answer: With respect to the Palestinian resistance movement, there exist a number of tendencies that present the Arab-Israeli struggle as one between the Palestinians and the Israelis in the area. These tendencies assert that this struggle bears no relation to the Arab situation, or that the Arab situation is independent of the issue, at least at present. We must consider the matter to be a Palestinian one and fight the enemy within the occupied territories. The error here is clearly two-fold:

1. It renders the issue an exclusively Palestinian one, and the struggle a Palestinian-Israeli one, and

2. It ignores the fact that the cause of this present reality is the Arab reality in its entirety, and does not visualize the essential underlying causes of that Palestinian reality.

The truth of the matter is that it is impossible to isolate the Arab-Israeli struggle from Arab circumstances as a whole. Any attempt to render the battle simply a Palestinian one aids those dissonant voices that appear from time to time in some Arab countries to make their territory off-limits to resistance activity. In addition, it renders the battle incapable of producing long-range results. Likewise, the battle, on the part of Israel, is not against the Palestinian people alone. It is true that the Palestinian people are those who lost their land. But there are territories belonging to other Arab countries which are also occupied. And there are plans to occupy other lands as well.

Seen in this light, the battle becomes a comprehensively Arab one, and is thus related to the presently existing Arab systems, as is seen from the viewpoint which raises the following inquiries: "Do these systems, by their existence and practices, aid the cause of liberation or not? Do they aid the prospect of holding out or not? Are they part of the battle or part of those forces that are carrying out the struggle or not? Do they attract to themselves part of the battle or part of those forces that are carrying out the struggle or not? Do they draw to themselves part of the Israeli War effort and the Israeli army or not?"

It is from this angle that we must consider the issue.

The Popular Front does not consider the battle as an exclusively Palestinian one. Rather it sees it as an Arab one. It also discerns the horizons of this battle. If it is made to be an Arab one in which the masses participate and which the entire Arab region pushes itself into, with the Arab people putting into it all its potentialities—human, psychological, economic and the capacity for guerrilla warfare, if there was a "Hanoi" in a state adjacent to occupied Palestine which would permit an Arab "Viet Cong" to arise and engage in daily clashes with the enemy in the entire Arab area—at that point, it would be possible to enter a war of long duration.

Without this range of vision, victory would not be possible.

As for the form of the states surrounding Israel or rather, one surrounding state which could participate in this form of battle and which could, by its nature, be an "Arab Hanoi", it must necessarily and inevitably be a socialist one, as we said earlier. It must be a state that relies on the masses, which emanates from them, which believes in their ideology, and which fights for their sake effectively and in a way enables them to back it and to make sacrifices for a long period, while confident of a final victory for that class which carries on the struggle.

Viewing the surrounding states and evaluating them by this measure, that is, as to whether they are fit to be the "Arab Hanoi", provides the horizons for the Palestinian resistance movement and the vision toward which the Popular Front aims.

Were we to find that one of those states was unfit to be the "Arab Hanoi", should the Palestinian resistance movement change it; is such a change the role of the Arab masses? It is necessarily the role of the Arab masses. The Arab struggle, the Palestinian resistance movement presently existing, creates a revolutionary climate by showing that it is possible to

confront an oppressive power, that technological superiority is not everything, and that the tank and airplane are weapons that can be opposed. In short, its role in this sphere is tantamount to being the yeast of the revolution and a school for the masses in all the Arab countries, displaying before them that an army is, in fact, a power that can be overcome by the masses, even poorly armed masses. The lesson here is that the Palestinian resistance movement, despite its numerical smallness, has seriously affected the largest and most powerful army in the region—the Israeli army—which was capable of defeating the Arab armies within a matter of hours and of inflicting substantial damage. In this sense, it constitutes an example for those masses qualified to carry out a revolution and for every force which desires a "Hanoi", measures each Arab state in order to determine whether that state is capable of being a "Hanoi", and then takes action toward that end.

The continued existence of the Popular Front, its relationship with the masses and its continuing to hold out from day to day against all enemies, is an objective in itself. Consequently, there is a controversial relationship with the Arab states neighboring Israel, and also a sort of "secret debate" which is now in practice taking place between the Palestinian resistance movement and the Arab masses—that of providing an example on the one hand and anticipating a reaction by the Arab states on the other.

In this connection, I would like to stress here the matter of "continued existence"; the continued existence of the Popular Front is deemed to be an aim in itself. This is so, because continued existence in this sort of war, i.e., a war of long duration, is in itself a victory. The aim in such a war is not to be in a hurry for victory, but rather, to postpone the decisive victory until the exhaustion of the enemy has been accomplished, and it has become incapable of warding off the final blow. As long as the resistance movement, its flame and its escalation continue to exist, this signifies that victory is approaching. For its existence is a form of victory, a step along the road.

Going on to answer the rest of the question, it is necessary to speak about cooperation between the guerrillas and the regular armies. On the strategic level, as we observe from Arab military writings in general, there is a considerable and grave distortion regarding this matter which many have slipped into. I, myself, was among those who were thus deluded and who, after the defeat of June 1967, did not know how to distinguish between their broad hopes and what part of those hopes the regular Arab

armies were in fact able to realize. They tried to deceive themselves with unrealistic notions simply in order to cradle those hopes that were all that they had left. There may be in the writing of these words an element of self-criticism which I have directed inward after having found sufficient time and the atmosphere to read up on these matters more deeply. Those who call for the cooperation of the guerrillas with the regular armies, or at least with some of them, ordinarily use as their basis—as I have done more than once—the teachings of Mao Zedong, Guevara, and other revolutionary theorists who call for the cooperation of the guerrillas with the regular armies. Most of them use as their basis Mao Zedong's teaching that it is impossible to strangle the enemy with one hand, but rather, that will only be accomplished with both hands—the guerrillas on the one hand, and the regular armies on the other.

The distortion here is the result of isolating this teaching from tangible reality and considering it abstractly. It is certain that Mao when he said this, did not have in mind an army whose nature and make-up was that of those presently existing around the occupied territories. Rather, he was speaking of an army descended from the people and whose cadres are constituted of guerrillas who have developed with time and who have grown numerically and in weaponry, to the point of becoming a regular force in size and tactics. By its nature, its relationships, its class roots and the defense of its own class, it is a revolutionary army that has preserved its revolutionary nature.

At present, cooperation does take place between the guerrillas and some of the Arab armies on the tactical level. As for strategic cooperation, however, this is subject to the nature of those armies, their range of vision, the class which they serve, the nature of their cadres and their strategy. Is it the strategy of a quick war, or one of long duration? Are they qualified for such a war? All these questions must be answered before presenting the subject of cooperation between the guerrillas and the regular armies. As for true and deep-rooted cooperation which needs no discussion, it is that which will exist between the guerrillas, or what will be left of them, and those of them who will develop into an army in the long run. If they continue to exist, that is—for continued existence means that it is accompanied by the development culminating in the stage of the revolutionary army which undertakes regular operations.

"The Military Base": Its Meaning and Reality

Al-Hadaf: The resistance movement, in the communiques which it has issued for the past two years, has used conventional expressions which have a purely technical meaning. Here we feel that it is necessary to examine all the connotations of these technical terms. We have in mind here such terms as "commando bases", "shelling with rockets", and "large operations". What are the true meanings of these expressions and their necessary elements?

Answer: We will begin with the word "bases". The "base" in the sense which it has for the Popular Front in particular, and for all the commando organizations in general, is constituted of a group of fighters located at some site inside or outside the occupied territories who are actively striking at the enemy. It may be a single base aiming those blows or the concentration of several bases striking at one target, to effectuate their temporary and local superiority and then to disappear. In its daily life, it pursues a program of military or political preparation, keeping in contact with the masses, and maintaining its own continued existence. For the continuation of its existence is part of the process of creating a revolutionary climate.

We do not require of every base or, more exactly, it is not required of it to carry out a specific number of military tasks during a given period of time, since it does not simply constitute an assault position for special units located on the borders, or what in combat is called an 'advanced outpost' from which raids or reconnaissance operations are sent out. Rather, it is a revolutionary nucleus. What it does in combat is to perform one of its tasks and take part in destroying the enemy and creating a revolutionary climate. Should circumstances require it to remain stationary and to continue to educate its members politically, to prepare them and to raise their military standards, that too is a continuation of the process of creating a revolutionary climate. Likewise, if it deepens, expands and enriches its contacts with the masses, then this is a revolutionary nucleus—a shifting nucleus, for the bases of the Popular Front move around most of the time for reasons related to security and danger from the air. The activities of these bases include maintaining their own existence, preparation on the military level and political education. Their very contact with the masses constitutes the maintenance of the spark, the flame of the revolution and its continuation. Their existence is thus an objective in itself. And the ends which they attain in striking at the enemy are likewise objectives in themselves.

This applies to both those bases within and without the occupied territories. It goes without saying that the bases without are more numerous, while those within are fewer. The makeup of those inside is more precisely secret. Their methods are likewise tactically distinct from those of the external bases, which practice the methods of guerrilla warfare, while the internal ones apply the methods of "secret warfare". It goes without saying that we do not consider that there is an "interior" or an "exterior", for we consider that the land is one and that there is only an imaginary line demarcating the borders, no more and no less, and that half the people are on this side, while the other half is on the other. The land of this people is half occupied and the other half free. They move from their own land to their own land, without delineating what is internal and what is external. Thus, we can say that some of those bases are within the occupied bridgehead, while some are without. There exist bases within the occupied territory, and those within the territory exposed to the risk of occupation.

These bases are not precedent-setting in the Palestinian arena. All resistance movements, historically speaking, have had their bases, whether within the area under occupation, behind the lines of the enemy, or, at times, on the borders between two states. It is inconceivable, however, to contemplate the notion of borders in the Arab area, for it is a single Arab territory. But examples of bases on the borders between two states in international revolutionary experience may be furnished by the bases in China for entering North Vietnam, in North Vietnam to enter South Vietnam, in France to enter Spain, in states surrounding Greece to enter it, etc.

The issue of the states surrounding the local area of the revolution taking the position of mere spectators, especially when they are states belonging to the same nation as the people revolting and exposed to the same danger, is a theoretical issue to be rejected from the beginning.

Al-Hadaf: By this sense of the word "bases", a meaning is thus made clear which differs from what the masses are given to understand through most military communiques. In this context, 'bases' takes on the meaning of purely military barracks which carry out military operations exclusively, and have no other task. Our question relates to this sort of general definition. What is the proper definition, or its necessary elements?

Answer: The meaning of the word "bases" differs with the make-up

of each organization. If some organization believes that present activity should be purely military activity, then the bases in this case will be military or semi-military ones which represent outposts that perform special tasks on a given level. But if the make-up of a resistance organization is political and military, and it deems itself to be a revolutionary nucleus more than anything else, and in a phase of preparing for a popular war of liberation, then the role of the fighters in that organization would be simultaneously political and military. The Popular Front considers its bases to be of this type, and it is possible to apply the same assertion to those of comrades in some of the other organizations.

Guerrilla activity, in its relation to the masses, in providing them with an example and in respecting their property presents a pattern for the masses of the distinction between the guerrillas and the armies which they have previously witnessed. This is especially true in that the bases in the vicinity of the borders surround themselves at all times with armed peasants. They arm and train them and offer medical services to them. With the existence of these bases, we are now able to witness an ordinary armed peasant open fire on an Israeli patrol, fighting because he is committed to the land that he defends, to the weapon that he carries, and also to the framework of the organization which provides him with training and, in doses, gives him an ideological awareness. Indeed, we have come to witness the participation of some of the peasants in combat patrols in ways such as guiding the fighters to trails and giving them assistance and first aid when necessary.

These bases, in this political-military form, constitute a part, a basic part, of the process of creating a revolutionary climate.

"Large Operations" and "Shelling"

Al-Hadaf: This takes care of the term "bases". Now, what about such terms as "large battles" and "shelling with rockets"?

Answer*:* With regard to "large operations", the size of the operation is a question that corresponds to the strategic evaluation of the phase through which the resistance movement is passing. If one of the resistance organizations considers itself in the phase of making ready, or of beginning the first stage, or in the heart of the first stage, its basic concern, then, would be to be economical and wary in carrying out all operations, concentrating on one point, striking, and then disappearing. Only when this stage develops will it move to the second stage—the stage of consol-

idation, and then to the third stage—the stage of the counter-offensive. At that point, strategic thrift will be transformed into strategic striking. For the purpose of achieving strategic aims in this situation, large operations will be undertaken, even if it costs us sacrifices, since the bases will already have been formed in the first phase and will have acquired a revolutionary impetus, and small successive victories will have created self-confidence. On the other hand, if successive or large defeats were to take place in the first stage, this might lead to extinguishing the spark at a time when the first priority is to intensify that spark. Thus, the resistance movement does not take those large operations upon itself in the first stage but, rather, undertakes small operations that are one hundred percent certain to be successful.

The large operations that some organizations undertake, therefore, are due to the estimation of those organizations of the stage through which we are currently passing. Whoever estimates that we are still in the first stage, preparing ourselves to begin, are those organizations that are carrying out ordinary activities.

The organizations that announce that they are undertaking large operations on a wide scale and are "going for broke" with large numbers of commandos are those that undoubtedly evaluate the situation as having finished with the first stage and started the second. The significance here is not the issue of undertaking large operations or not, for these operations constitute a tactic that serves a given strategy. Rather, the significance lies in the use of a tactic of one given stage in another one. Using the tactic of the small operation in the second stage of guerrilla warfare is a form of hesitating, while the use of the large operation in the stage of making ready is rash and wasteful.

The basic issue here is not a matter of the large or the small operation but is the definition of the stage that we are passing through. The Popular Front is not of the opinion that we have already moved on to the second stage, which requires a large operation. If others do see it that way, it is their point of view.

We come now to the third expression, "shelling the enemy with long-range weapons", whether with rockets or mortars. This is one technique in striking at the enemy, when that enemy has taken measures to prevent getting near him, or when the terrain does not permit infiltrating to a spot near enemy positions except at night, or when hostile military targets are surrounded by unfriendly inhabitants—a special situation which markedly appears and imposes itself in the Arab-Israeli war. In view of

this, reaching a military target becomes a dilemma in itself, since every one of the Israeli inhabitants constitutes, in this situation, a warning element against the resistance movement.

Striking at long distances, then, is one method. However, its use imposes one condition of the three that we have previously mentioned, or more than one of them at the same time.

Striking at the enemy with rockets or mortars constitutes one form of harassing the enemy, which inflicts losses upon him and exposes him to be on constant alert, with all the material and psychological discomforts of that state of alert.

This type of striking is in keeping with the principle which advocates "striking at the enemy wherever you can, and at a time of your own desire and choosing." The important point is to inflict damage upon him, to drain his blood drop after drop until they accumulate to form a hemorrhage which will lead to anemia and, consequently, to alter the balance of power in favor of the weak over the strong.

There is one small reservation here. When we strike at the enemy with long-range weapons, he will respond. This response will be directed toward the bases carrying out the strike. Thus, these bases must be mobile. In addition, however, the enemy will also take that shelling as a justification to occupy more land. To this, we say that the enemy has no need for justifications to occupy more land. Thus, it is necessary for us to have forces to prevent deterrent activity. These are the Arab forces. So if shelling with rockets leads to aggression against Arab territory, this requires participation from Arab territories and their armies in responding to and deterring it.

However, this type of shelling carries with it a grave negative aspect. If the organization that carries it out is not endowed with an offensive and daring attitude and disposition, this may become the easiest means by which to strike at and inflict damages on the enemy, while subsequently sapping the spirit of engagement of the fighters. This situation would lead to the neutralization of their daring spirit.

But if the organization or its psychological make-up gives it an outstandingly daring spirit, the act of shelling with rockets would then be a positive factor, enabling it to help in inflicting losses on the enemy by itself, or in covering hit-and-run operations.

"Operations Abroad" from the Military Standpoint

Al-Hadaf: In the exposition of your discourse on combat, you cited the principle "strike at the enemy wherever you can, and at a time of your own desire and choosing." This principle calls for a look, from the military standpoint, at the operations outside occupied Palestine carried out by the Popular Front. How do you view this?

Answer: The external operations of the Popular Front proceed from the basic political policy which the Front uses in appraising the enemy and its camp. There are economic and psychological reasons for striking at external targets.

From the military standpoint, however, there is a principle of guerrilla warfare that at all times confirms and demands the necessity of striking at the enemy everywhere possible, with the greatest degree of violence possible. For violence is the basic principle of war.

Striking external targets, and specifically interdicting aviation and maritime routes, is not seen to be striking at civilian targets as much as at purely military ones. This is so because Israeli society as presently constituted, its use of all civilian facilities for military purposes, renders every such facility a military target. This was confirmed after the June war, as was the military character of El Al Airlines. As for the pilots of the airline, as part of the military reserves of Israel, they support its military effort. For this reason, we are able to say that these external operations do not cause harm to civilians, but rather to military personnel, in spite of their being in civilian clothing. For the difference between the civilian and the military man is the difference between those who use armed force and those who do not.

Why strike outside the occupied territories all over the world? Why don't the Palestinian people exercise their right to strike within their occupied territories, but not the rest of the world? The reason is that the Palestinian people, unlike other peoples, were ousted from their land after the occupation, and so they no longer possess a land. And they were evicted by a conspiracy against them on the part of a large number of states. The world, therefore, is responsible for their condition. It is unnatural for the world to commit a crime, and then not have to bear its consequences.

These states, due to the indifference of their people, decided to eject the Palestinian people from their land; it is, therefore, the responsibility of the resistance movement to keep this matter before the attention of

those people and to keep alive in their minds the fact that our external operations are the inevitable result of their hostility toward the Palestinians, manifested through the continued support of Israel.

Also from the military standpoint, the effect of these activities is a psychological one. The Israeli soldier on the borders who is sometimes able to succeed in halting the entry of supply, reconnaissance, or combat patrols, therefore increases his conviction that he can continue to do so. And so he is victorious. But when he finds that blows are falling upon him from every direction—not necessarily affecting him directly, but affecting his compatriots and his own interests—then he questions whether his presence on the borders is, in fact, the final deliverance and whether his military victory is solving the problem.

Undoubtedly, the escalation of these operations and their encompassing all Israeli transportation facilities exposes the enemy to losses and to its relative severance from the world, especially when it has no link by land with the world. Thus, continuous and exacting exposure of the whole of its lines of communication to danger is seen as one way of impairing its war effort in the long run. This is in addition to the negative effects on the morale of the soldiers which accumulate as they perceive that they are impotent in warding off that danger.

When people tell the Popular Front to strike only within the occupied territories, it is as if they were saying, "Come on and fight your enemy. But first, give him the chance to determine the place and the weapon. Come on and take the bull by the horns!" No. Guerrilla warfare does not accept this logic. Nor does it accept exposing itself to enemy strong points. It only accepts exposure to the weakest points, striking at them with maximum strength, and then disappearing.

From this point of departure, external operations achieve this goal. For they face an isolated objective and a sensitive one which is susceptible to the jolt. They strike swiftly, and the blow causes losses to the enemy.

All these reasons make the Popular Front determined to persist in this line of action and to escalate it. And it calls upon the other organizations to participate in this method—the method of violence which liberates—in order to respond to Zionist violence, which grinds the Arab masses underfoot and subjugates them.

This type of activity is also a reply to imperialism and its support of Israel and constitutes a threat to its interests. So far, the results have not been great. But if these operations are escalated, and all Zionist and

imperialist interests are exposed to serious danger, then considerable advantages will accrue, and significant setbacks for the enemy will result in the long run.

Propaganda Consequences of Striking at Civilians

Al-Hadaf: The Israeli enemy sometimes claims that the resistance movement places charges and explosives in buildings, public places or parking lots which injure innocent civilians, and considers this as sabotage. Their statements sometimes find an echo in some circles of world public opinion. How does the Popular Front feel about this?

Answer: There is a great deal of falsification in such claims. The makeup of Israel, the form of colonialist imperialism which it practices, its form of mobilization and its methods make the entire Israeli population a tool of aggression. If the soldiers practice active and direct suppression, then the civilians who make up the military reserves, have already practiced suppression when they were in active service. Likewise, they support aggression by their presence in the area, and they profit from the results of aggression and the ejection of the original population.

The families of fighters in unjust wars ordinarily constitute a factor opposing the aggression, especially when the war drags on for a long period. The citizens discover that they are losing their wealth and their sons in an unjustified war and that any gains that are won benefit only a small class. The situation in Israel, however, is totally different. If the American soldier in Vietnam receives incessant letters from his family appealing to him to renounce the war, those families in the United States thereby constitute a factor totally opposing the aggression. But in the case of Israel, the overwhelming majority of the families constitute one of the forces that supports the Israeli military. They form part of the hostile activity and are the basic justification for driving out the Arab population from the occupied territories. They are thus directly responsible for the conditions under which the Palestinian people have lived for more than twenty years. In addition to this, the mere existence of this population structure constitutes a powerful factor in their morale, and makes the Israeli soldier, while fighting, not think of retreating as much as of protecting the family which he brought and settled there. Thus the colonialists came to the country, drove its people out and began to profit from it. For this reason, they are all equally exposed to the danger of the reaction of the original possessors of the land.

There is a point which we must treat here. Why don't we at the same time inquire how Israeli planes, during their raids on cities, are able to distinguish the civilian from the soldier? Doesn't the entire world know that the casualties of air raids in all wars include more civilians than soldiers? And that the number of soldiers in general and commandos in particular injured or killed as a result of Israeli raids is negligible as compared to the number of civilians? And this to be sure, notwithstanding the distinction between Arab civilians wounded and killed by Israeli air raids of revenge while in their own country, not attacking anyone and Israeli civilians wounded and killed by commando activity, while they are aggressors, share in the aggression and support its existence.

The P.F.L.P. and the Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC)

Al-Hadaf: From the military standpoint, how do you feel about the lack of participation on the part of the Popular Front in the Palestine Armed Struggle Command? We know the political position that the Popular Front has announced, of course. But what about the details, militarily speaking?

Answer: If we look at this issue as a subject by itself, then it would appear as if it were negligence on the part of the Popular Front and non-participation in the unity of the resistance movement.

But this is not the case. It must be looked at in terms of its political and military implications.

Military participation in the Palestine Armed Struggle Command should follow only upon the achievement of a political agreement. This is because, if military action is the implementation, then political policy is the soul. Only after the achievement of a political agreement, therefore, can military participation follow.

The question should not be why the Popular Front does not join the Palestine Armed Struggle Command, but why it does not participate in the Palestine Liberation Organization. This is a question that the Popular Front has answered more than once. It has presented its ideological line and has demanded a minimum program. When these things are achieved, there will be created for the resistance movement a military general staff, a single operations room, or a single military command for matters of execution and technique.

The basic course of action at present is to study the possibilities for

cooperation and unity of commando action and the forces of the resistance movement—Palestinian or Arab—within a minimum program and agreement upon both short-range and long-range points. After agreement is reached by the political leadership on these matters, creating the formula for military cooperation will require little effort.

Concerning what the Palestine Armed Struggle Command has accomplished from the military standpoint, it is not yet possible to consider it as constituting a general staff for the organizations that have joined it, in spite of all the effort expended. There will be no operations command that gives strategic direction to participating organizations as long as the guerrilla war permits decentralized action.

The Palestine Armed Struggle Command up to the present has not taken this line. It now consists of a command which restricts itself to creating military discipline. It also contains an arrangement to solve differences among the commando organizations, attempts to get rid of discrepancies in the various communiques, and includes an information body that issues those communiques after the execution of operations. However, it does not plan those operations, nor does it gather them within the framework of a unified strategy.

Many devoted and aware people within the Palestine Armed Struggle Command have attempted to obtain the formation of an operations room, military planning and other systematic and scientifically planned steps. Until now, however, they have not achieved the results requested. We hope that they will be successful in the immediate future, since it would be a beneficial step toward improving and developing commando activity.

The Israeli Military and the Future

Al-Hadaf: Now that we have covered nearly all aspects of the resistance, can we lay out a basic idea of the future probabilities on the practical level? What do you think the next step of the Israeli military will be? What would be its consequences?

Answer: The Israeli army has achieved a military victory. But it has not yet attained the object of the war, i.e., the creation of a situation of permanent peace in which it could devote itself to economic construction and penetration within the area without danger. However, it does not want to lose those military gains as happened in 1956; rather it wants to preserve them as security in maintaining their position of power.

The non-capitulation of the Arabs, however, and their newly-acquired tenacious stand, in part due to the material and moral support extended by the Soviet Union, China, and all other socialist and peace-loving nations, means that there exists the possibility of raising the standard of Arab military preparedness and moving to the stage of reversing the June defeat. And the beginning of small, successful offensive operations may lead to the raising of the people's and the army's morale.

The expansion of commando action and its profound impression upon the masses forced Israel to contemplate steps toward achieving the following strategic objectives:

—to maintain the morale of the residents and army in Israel, a state of tension, and the spirit of the offense.

—to prevent the Arab armies from regaining self-confidence.

—to put the Arab people in a defensive position so that they do not advance to an offensive posture.

—to prevent the commando movement from spreading, especially in Jordan.

—to prevent the commandos from operating in Lebanon and Syria.

—to prevent the commandos from penetrating deeply within the occupied territories.

—to prevent the people from aiding the commandos, and to isolate them from each other.

—to heighten the contradiction between what is promised and what is achieved by the commandos and the Arab governments.

—and, finally, to set the commandos and their leadership on the one hand, and the leadership of the Arab armies and Arab rulers on the other, at odds, and to force them either to assume a negative position (not to react) or a positive one (striking at the commandos on the part of the system). Israel has in fact succeeded in heightening these last two contradictions and has created a wide gap among the fighters, which lessens their ability to hold out and brings closer the possibility of surrender.

The strategic objectives which serve the object of the war may be translated into the following types of tactical missions:

1. to carry out small, powerful strikes in designated places by means of air-borne troops.

2. to occupy parts of neighboring territories in order to "purge" them of the commandos, and then to withdraw immediately.

3. to occupy isolated areas, in order not to arouse world reaction, and then to withdraw immediately afterward.

4. to continue offensive operations, and not to move into a defensive position.

5. to threaten the neighboring Arab countries with deterrent air strikes, in order to prevent commando activity from developing roots amongst the masses.

6. to fragment morale, and to attempt to sow dissension among the various commando organizations, or between the organizations and the Arab states.

7. to increase the blowing up of homes and forced emigration, along with increased rewarding of collaborators.

For these missions, Israel uses troops of special units, such as airborne commandos, frogmen, and armored forces to the level of the brigade, in addition to the air force which enters without opposition the air space of Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and, with some difficulty, Egypt.

However, it would not be feasible for Israel to occupy territory and remain there, at least not as long as the Big Four continue to meet, and as long as there exist possibilities for a peaceful solution, or, more aptly, a capitulationist solution.

On the other hand, should all these possibilities disappear—that being due to the pressure of a mass movement—and the meetings of the Big Four be suspended, then Israel would be compelled to plunge into another war and to occupy new objectives, in order to attain the security which it has not achieved. And will not!



Hands Off The Militia![1]

[1971]

"The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people."
—Mao Zedong, "On Protracted War," *Selected Works,* Vol. II, p. 186.

The resistance movement started long before the defeat of 1967. It never found the suitable circumstances necessary for its rapid growth either inside or outside the occupied territory. The reasons for this were:

1. The occupied area of 1948 was small and densely populated with Israelis.

2. The proportion of the Arab inhabitants inside this area was small in comparison to the large Israeli population. These factors prevented the establishment of different forms of guerrilla activities other than the formation of underground bases.

3. The maintenance of external guerrilla bases (underground or otherwise) in the surrounding Arab countries was extremely difficult and risky. These countries were speaking loudly about liberation and beating the drums of war (strictly for local consumption). It was even more difficult in the West Bank because the Jordanian authorities had disarmed the people and deprived them of training; suppressed any militant or semi-militant activity; and they even outlawed any form of reconnaissance to the occupied territories.

Then came the June 1967 defeat, shifting the conditions in favor of the resistance movement in several important ways: the occupied area became larger; the number of Arabs in the occupied territory increased; huge numbers of heroic Gaza Strip inhabitants (who were well-trained and armed long before the occupation) had joined the movement; the people of the Hebron mountain region (who are known for their endurance and familiarity with guerrilla warfare) also joined the movement.

1 Information Department, Beirut, 1971.

Furthermore, the people of all the other areas had joined the movement as a vast moral and physical reserve force. This shift also affected the surrounding Arab countries, which for quite some time during the war, acted as if they were disarmed while the enemy was expanding. A cease-fire, which was in effect everywhere, silenced all guns except those of the resistance movement, which stood facing the enemy. Amid defeat, on one hand, and with the active challenge on the other, the resistance movement proved to be the only dynamic and largely effective Arab movement in the region. It gained vast popular support (Palestine and Arab) which helped it grow remarkably inside and outside the occupied territory. It also found a suitable opportunity to create its bases on the surrounding Arab land, especially on Jordanian soil. The majority of Palestinian masses who immigrated in 1967 from the West Bank and Gaza Strip now inhabit Jordan, adding thousands and thousands of impoverished people to the camp's populace. The process of forming the guerrilla bases in Jordan had suffered partial difficulties and obstacles imposed by the defeated army which was retreating from the West Bank accompanied by sections of the Royal Guard and of the Bedouins. Obstacles were also imposed by police forces who originally were not involved in the battle. Despite their fears of the growth, and expanding influence of the resistance movement among the people, the Jordanian authorities did not have the power, physically or morally, to confront the commando's power and influence. At the time they could not present any concrete excuse to deprive the commandos of dealing heavy blows to the enemy who had captured the West Bank and Jerusalem and had destroyed the pride and morale of the Jordanian military. Hence, the Jordanian authorities had no alternative but to go along with the resistance on a short, compulsory honeymoon. Amid this atmosphere, a lot of slogans, such as "the army is the shield of the resistance" and "we are all commandos," etc. were perpetuated.

The trick was relatively successful with some of the commando groups and the ideology of unprincipled coexistence found fertile soil in which to grow. Those who perpetuated this liberal ideology also began speaking of the concept of Arab national brotherhood as being a weapon against the Zionist enemy. The more progressive groups among the commandos were aware of the trick and the true nature of such a joining of all forces and the benefits to be gained by those people from this. These progressive groups had learned, through experience with the Jordanian government, how to expose the true nature of this regime, and the intentions of the classes that benefit from it. They were also enabled to estimate the

period that the regime could be expected to silently tolerate the rising revolutionary tide. The progressive groups could also foresee and observe how the reactionary Jordanian government was fortifying and rearming itself to protect the throne, not the masses. After these groups had firmly established their guerrilla bases and strengthened their ties with the vast population, they realized the necessity of protecting themselves from expected stabs in the back. This could only be done by arming the people who are the origin of their power, the source of their inspiration and the real shield of the commandos against the claws and fangs of the reactionary regime. This is how the militia came into being as a potential force that would stand firm, protecting the revolution. So it became to the Jordanian authorities like the sword of Damocles.

Despite this, the Jordanian regime did not move to crush the movement before it got out of hand. Many took this to be proof of wisdom on the part of the regime, of a genuine desire to avoid Arab bloodshed, and of an intention to prepare instead for the decisive battle with the Zionist enemy. Those with the bourgeois mentality of brotherhood and compromise were satisfied by tickling themselves with this dream. These are the ones who failed to see the total material and moral emptiness hidden behind this so-called wisdom. The PFLP and other progressive groups understood that the enemy (the regime) would not eat from the dish of revenge before it got cold and that the current preparations inside the army among the loyal classes and clans were definitely not in preparation for a liberation war. Consequently, the backstabbing was coming for sure and the reactionary regime was only waiting for the right time. Thus PFLP and other progressive groups strengthened their ties with the people, widened their militia bases, and intensified training and arming of the militia so that they would be prepared to carry their responsibility of facing the enemy. They proved their ability to carry this responsibility in September.

The Jordanian army was rearmed; the loyalties of certain people were paid for; and the contradictions exploded with the help of the liquidationists who had been prepared both morally and financially. With these preparations being completed, the first target that the army moved against was the residential areas and the refugee camps where the real strength of the resistance existed—where the militia was. When the fighting stopped, the primary demand of the lackey's authorities was that the commandos should get out of the cities, knowing very well that there were no commandos in the cities. They pushed this demand as an excuse to rid themselves of the militia before escalating the struggle against the

resistance outside the cities. This stand of the Jordanian authorities is compatible and homogeneous with the ideological and class structure of the regime. After all, all oligarchies and exploiting ruling classes have always and everywhere been opposed to the idea of forming militia which is the starting point of people's control and freedom. The history of revolutions assures us that the existence of the militia is a fundamental phenomenon of the people's democratic rule serving the masses. And every "Brumaire" of every revolution starts by dealing a blow to the militia (the armed masses). It's true, then, that the Jordanian oligarchic reactionary regime was in harmony with its role, and therefore, the resistance had to harmoniously stand by its historical role whose banner it carried. It had to resist the suspicious plan and not give up its shield (the militia) and be trapped.

More than one Plekhanov stood repeating "We should not have fought." These were the people who were shocked by the partial success of the authorities and forgot—or maybe they never knew—two principal revolutionary rules: one recognizes the inability of the militia to stand in defense for a long period against forces superior in number, arms, and experience; the other recognizes the inevitability of the ebb and flow in any long term revolution. The shock was so great that they accepted many concessions, the main one being the disarmament of the militia in a way that would change the partial practical successes of the authorities to strategic ones. These concessions would also change the nature of the resistance from a political and military force existing everywhere, welded together with the oppressed masses wherever they may be, into a semi-military force isolated in the countryside. This would also change the strategic distribution of the resistance. Instead of it being a net spread out all over the country with the attention of the fighting units of the commandos being focused on the struggle against the Israeli enemy and with its militia groups standing ready to strangle any attempt to deal a blow to these fighting units, the resistance became a point in space, moving to deal a blow to the Israeli enemy without knowing when it would be hit from the rear. The PFLP rejected all such concessions because it wanted the hands of the fighting units to remain unchained to be able to operate inside the occupied territory and because it knew that their freedom of activity was extremely dependent upon the militia's existence to crush the intentions of the counter-revolutionaries. The Front refused to surrender the arms of the militia because it refused to be a partner in pushing the resistance toward a graveyard.

Surely this refusal was not accidental and did not arise out of a desire

to take an individualistic stand (as some are claiming). Instead, it sprang from a thorough scientific analysis of the nature of the situation—an analysis of the revolutionary maturity among the ranks of the masses, the nature of the Jordanian system and its internal contradictions, the contradiction between the Jordanian system as a whole and the existence of the resistance, the residential and class structure of the East Bank of the Jordan River, and a good number of other social, political and military elements. This rejection was a fundamental stand based on a clear vision of the tangible circumstances, precise aims, and a complete evaluation of the balance of all forces, not just of the military. The PFLP had built the militia units (the Red Guards) and prepared them politically and militarily because it refused to be just a semi-military fighting organization isolated from the masses. It will never allow anyone whoever he is to prevent it from exercising its historic role as one of the vanguards leading the masses to their overall revolution and as a spearhead directed at all enemies of the people, regardless of who these enemies might be.

The PFLP clearly understands the limited abilities of the Red Guards, its role in preparing and mobilizing the masses and its various obligations and roles at every stage of the battle. It also knows very well that the Red Guards are subject to the largest part of repression in the cities when the counter-revolutionaries start their attack. The Front created the militia amid the revolutionary atmosphere of the circumstances that developed after the June 1967 defeat and without which this creation would never have been possible. The PFLP insists on the existence of such a revolutionary force as long as a revolutionary atmosphere exists. The liquidation of the militia is the beginning of the liquidation of the revolution and the liquidation of the revolution means the end of the militia. How odd it is that we have the rules and laws of revolutions right in front of our eyes—and we don't even bother to look at them! And yet we label ourselves REVOLUTIONARIES! Since the matter is so clear, how would those who advocate the disarming of the resistance from its shield justify their position? Although there are also differences in motives and aims, what are the justifications given by these advocates (among the authorities and the bourgeoisie and some also among the resistance)? What is our answer to these justifications?

The First Justification

They do not want to give the government any excuse for confronting the resistance—as if the oligarchic government, which is in contradiction

with the resistance from the beginning, needs an excuse to clash with it. One look at history teaches us that neither the external forces of aggression (imperialists) nor the internal apparatus of repression (lackey governments) need excuses to begin their work. Their job rests upon a suitable moment for starting the attack, the balance of forces favorable for the attack, the limitations of their ensuing aims, and the expected reaction of external (local and world) opinion. But the excuse itself is there at all times and all places. Is it realistic for us to imagine that the authorities did not have any excuse, throughout 1969 and the first half of 1970, to deal a blow to the resistance? The existence of two forces, diametrically opposed in aim and structure, in the same theatre, forms the first impetus for any confrontation. The existence of these forces is present today and has always been. It has existed since the day the resistance picked up the first gun, since it built the first base, and since the day it conducted its first raid on the Israeli enemy who retaliated with a large-scale operation against the Jordanian army and against the Arab villages on the East Bank! The existence of this justification (not giving the government any excuse for confrontation) grows out of the failure of many people to clearly see the switch of the Jordanian reactionaries from being probable Arab allies in the struggle against colonialist Israel to being a first-degree enemy of the Arabs. The Jordanian reactionaries, by their aggressive stands, had inverted the order of priorities of the enemies oppressing the Arab masses. It placed itself in the camp of the main enemy; furthermore, it placed itself in the front of this camp. These reactionaries (historically the conspirators against the people) deceived the national armed forces by dragging them into an anti-national and dangerous path. They also fed upon the regional loyalties in an attempt similar to those of the princes of the Middle Ages and became the most dangerous obstacle to the course of the revolution.

Therefore, we see that the lackey regime does not search for excuses wherever it looks and finds a starting gun, a head held high and boiling blood prepared to flow on the soil of home, it finds those excuses in front of it. The excuses necessary to secure the success of worldwide propaganda and political maneuvers are available and if not, the reactionaries will create them. Didn't Hitler and the chain of exploiters teach the reactionaries this lesson? Didn't the thousands of Israeli aggressions, big and small, teach us this fact? It's true that there are those who are difficult to teach!

The Second Justification

More than one Svechin[2] is attacking the militia today, but their arguments are more vulgar and less sincere than those of Svechin. They claim that the armed militia inside the cities creates a kind of chaos, fear and confusion and an atmosphere of aggression, etc. Why? Why is it that the weapons in the hands of the Red Guards arouse a fear of these atrocities and why is it viewed as not when these weapons are in the hands of the police, army or any other armed organization? If the "gentlemen"(!), the officers of the armed forces, can impose a strict upper hand which is based on mechanical obedience, then our comrades, the cadres of the Red Guards, have the ability to ensure even stricter disciplinary obedience voluntarily. This is so because our obedience grows out of a deep consciousness of the gravity of our historical duty and an awareness of the role of the vanguard revolutionary class. If the soldiers of the armed forces are subject to the rules and regulations of their barracks, then the men of the Red Guards are subject to the rules of the party which constitutes their disciplinary, ideological and military school. If the troops of the armed forces are willing to maintain security, then our comrades in the militia are also conscious of maintaining security.

The difference here is, what security are you talking about? Your police forces want to protect and provide security for a handful of exploiters standing in the counter-revolutionary camp which is a holy, and untouchable apparatus. They must be reinforced with more and more trucks armed with 500mm guns. You bring back more and more soldiers from the borders with the enemy, remove their military clothes and give them police uniforms to face the masses with their spears. The militia, the men of the proletarian Red Guards, who want to assure the security of the people and the revolution are a dangerous apparatus that should be liquidated and disarmed. It's true that our dialogue is meaningless and that we don't speak the same language, our security is different from yours, our enemy is different from yours, the color of our "skin" is different from yours, the nature of our "blood" is different than the nature of yours. Even the vocabulary of our children who play with the empty bullet shells and pick up the fragments of the bombs of your USA-imported guns from the thick mud of the streets and who are sinking in misery up to their eyelashes is different from the vocabulary of your children for

2 **Ed. Note:** Alexander Svechin (17 August 1878—28 July 1938) was a Russian and Soviet military leader, writer, educator, and theorist. He wrote articles in *Voyennoye Dyelo*, No.40-41 (1919), arguing for the liquidation of the militias during the Civil War era.

whom you have to measure the temperature of their honey-sweetened milk every morning before they drink it!

The Third Justification

They say that since we are now camping in the mountains since our future war will be directed toward the Israeli enemy, and since the main theater for guerrilla warfare is in the mountains, we can wage guerrilla warfare against the Jordanian authorities whenever they want to put obstacles in front of our efforts. Therefore, why do we need to keep the Red Guards in the cities? Despite the sincerity of those who advocate this justification, in spite of the fact that some of our revolutionary comrades are among them, one should not hesitate to draw attention to the error in this justification. These are the advocates of focusing the revolution in the countryside and their ideas come from an attempt to apply the Cuban experience or the Chinese experience at some stages in a mechanical form. It is enough for us to take a close look at the conditions of the East Bank: the distribution of the inhabitants in the East Bank and the centralization of the majority of these inhabitants in the cities; the existence of the impoverished masses (the aim of the revolution, its tool and its fuel) piled in the poor districts close to the districts of the comprador bourgeoisie or in the refugee camps neighboring the cities; the domination of the clanish tribal ties in the south and the sparsity of the population in the mountains or in the wilderness; the non-existence of rear support (borders) on which the guerrillas of the mountains may depend during fighting; the centralization of peasant aggregates or big villages which are loosely called cities just because they lie on the main roads; the poverty of the countryside in general and the sparsity of water and supply resources in particular; the passivity of the peasants caused by their historical fear of the authorities; the negligence of the resistance and the progressive parties to create a revolutionary atmosphere among them; the success of the reactionary authorities in taking advantage of the incorrect common opinion that the resistance is just a movement of Palestinians, thus feeding the sectarian allegiances in some of the regions; the capital (Amman) being the center of the authorities' political and economic forces for the entire country; etc. These circumstances in the East Bank prevent us from applying the Cuban experience. On the contrary, they assure the necessity of the existence of two revolutionary integrated forces able to operate together when necessary, and to cooperate closely to provide security for the coordinated rebellion against all

who want to deal a blow to the revolution from the rear. This is with the condition that the primary force is from the fighting units operating in the countryside and the mountains and that the secondary force is from the armed militia groupings in the cities. In this way, the fighting units in the mountains will not be operating separately and isolated from the masses or the sensitive positions of the authorities nor will the militia face the repressive forces alone in the cities except during the first period until the fighting units move in support of the militia with guerrilla warfare. Given the current circumstances, this is the most objective solution and it is the solution that is adopted by the Popular Front as opposed to the mechanical literal application of the experiences of other revolutions which is being adopted by some of our comrades and which was adopted by Che (one of the greatest contemporary revolutionaries) who paid for it with his life in the jungles of Bolivia.

The Fourth Justification

They say that the militia does not necessarily form a revolutionary force. They also say that the reactionary authorities also have a militia that works at their service against the interests of the masses. THIS IS NONSENSE! and an old trick that no one buys anymore. All the self-righteous governing classes are able to take advantage of the ideological, racial and clan contradictions. They are also able to benefit from the decaying sectarian mentality and from the financial and moral bribes made to create such "militia" organizations containing several fascist volunteers such as sons of the governing classes and in addition, several deceived proletarians and half-proletarians, and a large section of lumpenproletariat. As far as the nature of these associations is concerned, it makes no difference whether they are labeled "The Militia," "The Popular Militia," "The National or State Guards" or any other name. The name of a military or semi-military association will never change its structure or its role; the only guide to its nature is the direction of its spearheads. Since the spears of the National Guards are directed toward the chests of the masses, it is one of the counter-revolutionary forces.

The Fifth Justification

Some comrades point out that the resistance and the whole region are passing through a stage of the ebb tide in the revolution and hence it must, under the shadow of the circumstances, make flexible tactical re-

treats, among which is the disarming of the militia.

HOLD IT!

Here, the Central Committee (of the Resistance Movement) must stand up and evaluate the status and nature of the situation. It alone is able to precisely calculate the ebb and flow and the extent of the tactical retreats. Only the Central Committee has the right to make such decisions and furthermore, it is its duty to do so.

But even if we are to suppose, for the sake of argument, that the evaluation of the comrades is correct, the extent of the tactical retreats during the tidal ebb of the revolution is a precisely calculated matter, and should not be extended, in time or place, beyond its planned tactical limits. Otherwise, it will be turned into a defeat. Furthermore, the stage of the tidal ebb of the revolution itself demands, more than any other stage, the existence of a strongly armed militia inside the cities, to protect the overall revolutionary status by waging a fierce and firm battle of strategic retreat. We all know that to attack and to carry out a vanguard operation necessitates tremendous daring and determination, but we also know that the rear to which the battle of retreat is assigned forms a commando force that must entertain an even more tremendous daring and even stronger determination.

The Sixth Justification

The Jordanian authorities do not intend to withdraw the arms of the militia, but their collection and deposition in depots would be supervised by the Resistance Movement.

The recurrence of this justification shows complete ignorance of the meaning of the Red Guards and its operational tactics in the cities. The importance of the existence of the Red Guards, its ability to stand firm in the face of the regime's repressive apparatus as well as its being a deterrent against it, all are not only the result of the Red Guards' material strength, but also a result of the inability of the repressive regime's forces to locate this force ahead of time, and in depriving the enemy of knowing its operational mechanism at all places and all times.

It is certain that the withdrawal of the arms and depositing them in depots makes it easier for the regime's forces to control these arms. This means depriving the militia of its weapons before putting it into the cage, and depriving it of the tactic of surprise—in time and place—if it intends

to wage an offensive. By this, it is endangering all its strength and subjecting it to a single surprise attack in case the royal troops decided to wage the offensive. This, in short, means depriving the militia of the freedom of action.

The resistance has had numerous showdowns with the authorities and the September showdown must teach us to be more cohesive with the masses, to carry the weapons with greater solemnity, to be more cautious than before, and to reinforce the militia instead of depriving it of its arms, so that it won't be taken by surprise.

It is the duty of the leadership of the resistance to stand bravely before its historical role, to intensify the direction toward arming the militia, to create from the Proletarian Red Guards a whole army with no camps, living under the same conditions as the working class. At the same time, it will protect the mountain fighting units. (The militia is not a substitute for the fighting units but is, instead, their second arm).

The Popular Front which refused and still refuses to surrender the arms of the Militia never forgets the saying of the revolutionary José Martí: "It is a crime to perpetuate a war which could be avoided in a country." The Front realizes that it is not adequate to quote only this part of the saying of the Cuban revolutionary but it also remembers the second part, which states that it is also criminal "to stay away from an unavoidable war."

The Chinese proletariat paid a great deal of blood in the first Shanghai uprising of October 1926 and in the second Shanghai uprising of February 1927 until they learned deep lessons by which they were enabled to win the victory of the third Shanghai uprising of March 1927. But the ignorance of the Party's leadership to the development and shift of the Kuomintang from the camp of the allies of the revolution against the imperialists and the super reactionaries to the camp of the counter-revolutionaries, pushed the leadership to issue orders to surrender the arms of the Red Guards to the army of Chiang Kai-shek. When this was done, the Kuomintang crushed the forces of the Red Guards and killed thousands of its best elements and cadres. But history did not allow this leadership to escape punishment. It was condemned by an emergency convention which was held by the Communist Party of China in August

1927 as being opportunist and revisionist and was deprived of any leadership position. So that the Jordanian regime and the existence of the imperialist Israeli enemy which signed a ceasefire treaty with Hussein[3] will not deceive you, so that the Jordanian Kuomintang can not repeat the Shanghai tragedy, and so that history will not issue its cruel judgment on you, GET RID OF THE ILLUSIONS OF THE BOURGEOISIE AND TAKE YOUR HANDS OFF THE MILITIA!

3 **Ed Note:** Hussein of Jordan, full name: Hussein bin Talal (14 November 1935—7 February 1999), was King of Jordan from 11 August 1952 until his death.

The Popular Front and External Operations[1]

[1971]

This is the second in the series of books issued by *Al-Hadaf*. The first book, which was released in early April, delineates the Popular Front's military thought.

This volume deals with an important topic, the External Operations adopted by the Popular Front as part of its strategy to confront and pursue the enemy everywhere. This activity has triggered controversy among those interested in the affairs of the Palestinian resistance. It also extends beyond the framework of the "External Operations," discussing operations that target imperialist interests in the Arab world.

This book addresses these topics from different angles and constitutes a totality of our point of view and a coherent background to the decision by the Popular Front in this regard, its commitment to it, and its intention to proceed with the implementation.

Introduction

From July 23, 1968, the day of the first military operation of the Popular Front against the targets of the Israeli enemy outside the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories; to taking control of the El Al Boeing 707 plane from the Rome airport and its diversion to Algiers; to the attacks on El Al planes in airports in Athens and Zurich; to the explosive operations at Marks and Spencer[2] and Zionist businesses and the placing of an explosive device in the office of ZIM Israeli shipping in London; to the seizure of the American TWA plane and forcing it to land in Damascus; and the bombing of Israeli embassies in Bonn and the Hague;and the attack on the El Al office in Brussels, these operations raised and continue

1 *Al-Hadaf,* 1971.

2 **Ed Note:** This refers to a PFLP bombing operation which targeted British retailer Marks and Spencer in London, on 8 July 1969.

to raise many questions and generate mixed reactions from many people.

These operations filled the headlines of the news in the local, Arab and international press, and following each operation, the assessment varied from full support to conservative support, to understanding the motives of these operations but fearing their results.

To answer these questions, we must first determine the nature of the enemy that we face and its composition. First and foremost, it is necessary to define the enemy that we are fighting; it is through knowledge of the enemy that we can strike blows at its positions in any location, regardless of where this site is located geographically.

It is natural in a war of liberation to hit areas of vital strategic importance to the enemy, and it is important to hit the areas that created the enemy in this location and that serve as an inexhaustible resource that provides it with all it needs in order to remain and grow.

Who Are Our Enemies?

It is essential for any successful revolution to be armed with a clear revolutionary vision, assessing its priorities, determining its dimensions and knowing the full scope of the truth. The nature of the enemy determines the nature of the confrontation; thus this requires a profound scientific outlook on the enemy camp and its properties.

The enemy camp is not only Israel: it is Israel, and the Zionist movement, and global imperialism, and Arab reaction.

Israel, in fact, is only the concrete presence of Zionism and the fruit of its efforts, and it is based on the strength and enjoys the benefits of its presence in different parts of the world and its financial, political and media influence, all of which are exploited in support of Israel. The energies of Zionism in all fields are directed toward providing Israel with all it needs.

The world Zionist movement has overlapping relationships and interests intertwined with world imperialism, and the latter benefits from the Zionist entity, Israel, sitting in the heart of the Arab world, playing, by virtue of these mutual relations, the useful role of the gendarmerie of the interests of imperialism in the Arab world.

Global imperialist support and protection for Israel and maintaining its presence is essential for the major interests of global imperialism in the Arab world for exploitation and plunder of wealth. These interests re-

quire that it maintains this presence of Israel, through which it can fight any revolutionary movement that could threaten the fate of its monopolistic presence in the region. This means that there is an organic cohesion between Israel and the Zionist movement on the one hand and between both of them and world imperialism on the other hand. Imperialism means more guns and money and support for Israel, it means "Phantom" aircraft and the secrets of the atomic bomb for Israel, and supporting Israel's economy as a result of the flow of billions of dollars to Israel.

On the other hand, Arab reaction, confronted by any real liberation struggle waged by the masses to eliminate the influence of imperialism in the Arab world, recognizes that its interests depend on the continued survival of imperialism. Regardless of the contradictions of the Arab reactionaries with Israel and imperialism, they are always aware that the essential contradiction is with the mass movement aimed at the total elimination of their interests and authority.

Joint Efforts of International Zionism and Imperialism for the Establishment of Israel

Here we address the role of the World Zionist Organization, which collaborated with the colonialists and global imperialists to implant Israel in Palestine and to provide all assistance and support for its survival, for it to play the role of custodian of the interests of imperialism in the exploitation of the wealth of the Arab region, in particular the Arab oil lifeline, and the reinvestment of capital accumulated from huge profits earned from such exploitation. This was done not by creating industries and productive projects, but by making the region a consumer market for their products and goods to achieve the accumulation of new capital through dividends and re-investment.

To delve into details may divert us from the heart of the matter we are dealing with; we must begin with some facts that are basic axioms of the Palestinian cause:

1 . The British government, through its mandate over Palestine without a legitimate right, facilitated the establishment of the Zionist entity at the expense of the people of Palestine, the owners of the land, who were deprived of their rights and expelled from their homeland.

2. The U.S. government played a key role in the mid-forties and beyond in the establishment of the Zionist entity, represented by the creation of Israel. Both Britain and the United States have collab-

orated with other Western countries to install Israel and have supported it in absolute terms since 1948 until now and will not end this support.

3. The creation of Israel and its regional expansion in the years 1948, 1956, and 1967 displaced more than a million and a half Palestinian Arabs. All this was the result of efforts made by the World Zionist Organization in its branches all over the world and through the continued support of the governments of the imperialist countries: the United States, Britain, West Germany, and others.

4. The World Zionist Organization and all its institutions in various areas and all parts of the world, are an extension of the State of Israel, which is at the same time a point of intersection between the interests of imperialism on the one hand and Israeli interests on the other hand. The Zionist Organization provides human, military, financial, and political aid and new blood for the arteries of the Israeli entity in Palestine.

In light of the previous points, our identification of the enemy and review of a summary of facts regarding the role of international Zionism and world imperialism, despite the complexity of the common interests of all of these forces, the confluence of these forces and interests come together with the common goal of the existence of Israel at the expense of the interests of the Arab Palestinian people in their homeland. So long as the Zionist movement, with the assistance of world imperialism, still declares war against the Arabs of Palestine, in many cases unannounced war in geographic areas all over the world, and through aid in all areas to maintain Israel and support its ongoing injustice and violence against the people of Palestine—the Palestinian people have the right to confront this war of aggression with a military strategy which ensures their strength and hits the enemy and its natural extensions wherever they are, to achieve victory.

It is very normal for the fighters of the Palestinian people inside the occupied homeland to focus their strikes on enemy targets and fight the Israeli occupiers. And it is normal to move the Palestinian people and their combat units from outside these territories to enter their occupied homeland, confront their enemies and strike them. The Palestinian people are not responsible for their dispersion and presence outside their homeland. And it is very natural for those of the Palestinian people who are in struggle to go to any country where they can confront the extensions of Israel outside occupied Palestine, and wage war abroad to re-

spond to the war launched against them by the Zionist institutions from their multiple sites abroad. It is natural as well for the Palestinian resistance movement to embody its slogan of fighting imperialism and strike its interests within the Arab world, represented mainly by the petroleum corporations that produce massive financial profits at the expense of the hard-working Arab people to benefit the exploiters who then return a large part of these profits to make napalm to burn children, elders and women of the Palestinian people and the Arab world.

Just as the issue of geography is important in the overall war waged by colonialism and Israel and Zionism against the people of Palestine and the Arab nation, geography should be an important issue in the global war carried out by the people of Palestine to confront the war of aggression against them. The issue is not limited to the occupied territories or outside.

Suez or Port Said are not areas "inside the occupied territories," neither are Maysaloon or Damascus "inside the occupied territories," and also Beirut airport or Rashayya or Aytaroun villages in Lebanon are not "areas within the occupied territories."

There is no doubt, and thus it cannot be avoided or ignored, that these operations generated mixed reactions and sparked lengthy and intense debate that one can still sense and hear, and follow its give and take.

As well as those who announced their full and absolute support for these operations and demanded more of them, and those who stated their conservative support, there were those who understood first the motives of these operations but rejected some of the results secondarily. There is a difference between those who understand the motives and reject the method and those who do not understand and do not wish to understand the motives, and therefore reject these operations, demand to stop them, and even punish the guerrillas that carry them out.

In fact, this disparity in reactions is a normal variation and therefore expected. If there are no such responses, it would be strange, not normal, and unexpected.

In any case, where is the international consensus wholly in favor of or in opposition to any important or marginally important issue that occurs on the world stage?

And more than that, where is the international consensus wholly in favor of or in opposition to the entire method of armed struggle that was adopted by the people of Palestine or any other oppressed people? And

where is the international consensus in favor or in opposition to Palestinian fedayeen operations inside the occupied lands?

As for what is being said, that such strikes would lead to an Israeli reaction, and will lead to blows directed against Arab aircraft, Arab travel offices, or Arab embassies, this requires discussion. Is there any Arab aircraft, travel desk or embassy that is more important than the people of Port Said or Maysaloon or Salt or Aytaroun hit with bombs and napalm?

And what travel agency or embassy is more important than the Israeli shelling and bombing of civilian and economic infrastructure in the United Arab Republic, Lebanon, Jordan, or Syria?

And as for what is said about these strikes, that they hurt the reputation of the Palestinian revolution and antagonize European or American public opinion, this has no value. Why this concern for the opinion of the Western world, which for years and years turned a deaf ear to the international resolutions that have been taken to uphold Arab rights in Palestine? Since when has the Western world looked to the Palestinian revolution with respect and admiration?

The blows, like these strikes of the Popular Front, are revolutionary methods that have succeeded in removing the wax from the Western ears that did not hear in the past and wiping the dirt from the European eyes that were unable to see the truth in the past.

This is the only explanation behind the emergence of articles such as those of British global historian Arnold Toynbee, or committees spontaneously and voluntarily formed to support the Popular Front and the cause of the Arabs in Palestine, as has happened in Italy, Switzerland, Sweden and Pakistan, letters and telegrams of support received from North America and Latin America and elsewhere. That part of world public opinion which was covered by the imperialist and Zionist propaganda cloak of ignorance for a long period, has begun to ask questions of this type:

Why die young like Abdul Mohsen Hassan Ali in the snow of Zurich Airport? Why does a young woman like Amina Dahbour expose herself to death or detention in the prisons of Switzerland? Why do Maher Yamani and Mahmoud Issa expose themselves to death or imprisonment in detention in Greece? Why do Leila Khaled and Salim Issawi risk their lives in a daring operation to seize the American Trans World Airways plane? And last but not least, why would a youth like Khaled or Talaat or Wael or Adel face death or imprisonment in more than one European

city?

Things are usually measured in their results. The blow of one of these strikes is more far-reaching than any media offices or cultural or journalistic attaches, who spend money and efforts that could be utilized in the service of the Palestinian revolution, could be, and in fact, escalated the level of media coverage even more.

The argument that such strikes have led or will lead to antagonizing America or Germany or Britain or others is a mockery. It is a position that erases with simple naivete the entire history of the suffering of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation at the hands of these states. This is an "argument" that is similar to a husband crying and reading poetry over his wife's grave when she is still alive and has not yet been buried!

The discussion about the relationship between a people and their oppressors, the imperialists, has buried the dreams of the people for some time, and they are now on the path of revolution and freedom.

The question we must ask is: What have these colonial states not offered to Israel? What is the evidence that some people need to prove the hostility to our issues of these colonial powers who colonized us?

The argument that the Palestinian experience is unique in charting for itself this path of resistance in striking the hands of the enemy outside his area is not true, and even if it were, presumably, it is consistent with the logic and nature of the Zionist enemy fused with imperialism and responding to those. However, the nature of armed resistance and liberation revolutions is full of this type of activity, borne out through long experience.

The Algerian revolution struck more than once within Paris itself, but to say that the world did not hear about the Revolution operating outside its soil, as has been said, is misleading; the world also did not hear about the state founded out of the ground through colonizing and expelling its people and replacing them with invaders.

If Israel is the physical embodiment of Zionism, why not hit the Zionist institutions which are another type of extension of Israel? Every question about the feasibility of external operations fails when it becomes the case that Israeli institutions around the world may be struck at any moment, when each Zionist institution is in daily danger, and when the interests of imperialism and its institutions are vulnerable to constant punishment.

There was a war taken up first by Israel, Zionism, world imperialism and reaction, and second and in response by the people of Palestine, the Arab nation, and the progressives of the world. Just as the aggression against the people of Palestine does not stem from a specific geographic location but comes from multiple global sites, the confrontation carried out by the Palestinian people does not need to be limited to a specific geographic area. These are the parties to the conflict and that is the logic of the revolutionary confrontation.

External Operations: Discussions

In the wake of the accident in the Swiss plane in the air in February 1970, a new discussion broke out around the different aspects of external operations, and of course, in these discussions, some sought to "condemn" the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and its strategy rather than to objectively assess this important aspect of armed Palestinian resistance activity.

In one week, we have seen two articles on this subject, the first in *Al-Musawar* of Cairo, and the second in *Al-Hurriya* of Beirut.

Note that the facts must be confirmed before proceeding to examine the totality of the views put forward by the enemies of a strategy to pursue the enemy everywhere:

- During 1969, external operations accounted for only about 3% of the total armed operations of the PFLP. This fact is very important because it disproves the simplistic and opportunistic claims that the Popular Front is fighting the enemy only "outside of Palestine and the occupied Arab lands." Such statements are false, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hits the enemy at home and outside, but it hits the enemy inside one hundred times more than those who are most extreme in their criticism of the Popular Front. It is fair to note that while the Democratic Front was responsible for less than 2% of total operations inside occupied Palestine, on the Jordan Valley line or the 1948 armistice line in Southern Lebanon, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is the Palestinian organization with the highest percentage of military operations deep inside occupied Palestine (Tel Aviv, Haifa, Tantura, Jerusalem, Ramallah, Al-Khalil, etc.) and is leading, almost alone, the revolutionary struggle in the heated Gaza Strip.

- This fact must be taken into account when talking about the external special operations of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine because the opportunists seek to overturn reality. Before entering into a discussion of these views, there is an urgent need to determine principled positions:
- First, the burning of the homeless elderly Jewish man in Munich, which was used by some as a "gateway" to discuss the external operations. It is true that most articles written in the Arab press do not go to the extent of blaming this event on "terrorists," but they make use of the negative publicity surrounding this incident to promote defeatist attitudes. The only proof that remains about the burning of this homeless elderly Jewish man is (per *Der Spiegel*, September 1970) the "Aral" gasoline cans; the cans of this type had been stolen a week before the fire from the American barracks in Munich. This alone is enough to point the finger at non-Palestinians and non-Arabs because these would be interested in blowing up the base itself, not stealing gasoline cans from it!
- Second, the explosion and plane crash in the Swissair flight is still surrounded by mystery, and despite the fact that all Palestinian organizations have declared that they are not responsible for this, unfortunately, some "Arabs" have fallen into this conspiracy theory.
- Third, the explosion of grenades at Munich airport. The primary responsibility for this is borne by the Israeli pilot who attacked a guerrilla as he was carrying a grenade with the trigger open, which led to the explosion in the passenger car that was heading to the airplane. The Fedayeen's goal was to access and hijack the plane. The order of the events in question must always be told in the account when it is examined.
- Fourth, apart from all these details, the principle of the acceptance of the strategy of guerrilla action abroad is like any other principle, not subject to generalization. The word "External Operation" is not a magic word that can subsume any action that takes place "outside" geographically. It is clear that an external operation can be excellent and that another operation could be problematic. The factors include the type of operation, the timing and location, efficient planning and operation, the cause that they serve, and the impact of legal factors, media, agitation, and

logistics, and the last of these issues do not only have intrinsic importance in external operations but in fact in any military operation.

If it is wrong to justify and glorify "all" external operations, the parallel naïve error is a denunciation of "all" external operations (as some quarters have done irresponsibly). There is nothing absolutely right in all cases and nothing absolutely wrong.

The Point of View of *Al-Musawar*

After this introduction, we will examine two commentaries of the many which appeared in the last week. The first was written by Ahmed Bahaa Eddin in *Al-Musawar* (February 27) and the second appeared in *Al-Hurriya* (March 2).

Mr. Ahmed Bahaa Eddin correctly notes that the operations abroad "began in a calculated manner," but he errs when he says that the difficulties that have arisen have "made these operations take a different turn." It was assumed from the beginning that the first operations would lead to difficulties, these difficulties were not supposed to be met spontaneously. And what Mr. Bahaa Eddin calls "taking a different turn" was actually a "plan B."

Mr. Bahaa Eddin is perhaps correct to criticize improvisation or spontaneity in external operations, and perhaps this improvisation which has emerged recently is worth researching, tracking, and understanding, but this issue is different from that of external operations in the first place.

Perhaps Mr. Bahaa Eddin's belief that the "relative ease of some foreign operations will be a constant temptation for small organizations" has made him fearful, and thus he combines errors resulting from improvisation with the "easy" principle itself.

What is certain is that the external operations are not easy nor relatively easy. In fact, they are more difficult and complex—they take effort and time from other operations. If a party thinks it is "easy" and mistakenly believes this, it is not a condemnation of the principle. Some parties believe that moving a commando group inside the occupied territories is an easy action; how many costly losses have resulted from such errors—but this is a difference between a principle and a conviction of some alternate belief.

Mr. Bahaa Eddin suggests a correct proposal when he ends by saying

that the key questions are: "What is the Palestinian action abroad? What is permissible and where? What are the new ideas that can be innovative?" These questions are important and for the Popular Front, at least, were raised before the adoption of this principle. The principle is based on the strategic value of external operations to serve its goals, and it has explained this strategy on multiple occasions and sometimes, in the actual location of the fedayeen operation itself.

Al-Hurriya: Wrong Presentation

If Mr. Bahaa Eddin perhaps addressed this issue somewhat objectively and put forward his point of view in constructive terms aimed at advancing the feasibility and reducing most of the errors of these operations, *Al-Hurriya* magazine has done the opposite and uses descriptions and conventions that either indicate either ignorance of their meanings or conscious disregard for the reader.

In the past, *Al-Hurriya* has intentionally misrepresented an excerpt from the writings of Lenin and sought to hide behind it, taking from his positions regarding certain events that were entirely different from the subject of external operations, and using this to describe the alleged Marxist stance on the issue of external action.

The method *Al-Hurriya* uses to do this is the same as its usual "analysis": it puts forward a wrong assumption and goes on to prove, by quoting from books, that which supports the position of the assumption. It was decided that external operations are "individual terror operations," then Lenin is quoted to condemn "individual terrorism." Between assumption and quotation, they compose a repetitive theoretical lecture, fundamentally empty, about "mass work"!

The argument of *Al-Hurriya* circumvents the meanings of these terms. At best it calls things other than by their correct names, as in the relationship between "external operations" and "individual terrorism":

- "Terrorism" is the word used to describe repressive actions in the interest of the exploitative or occupying power. The difference between "terrorism" and "revolutionary action" is the same as the difference between the violence that enslaves and the violence that liberates, violence that serves a just cause and violence that prevents the victory of a just cause, and it is a shameful thing and a narrow-minded logic, to the extent that leads a "revolutionary" to call revolutionary violence "terrorism"!

- "Individual," scientifically, means the individual action aimed at the interests of an individual, or a group of individuals taking action against an individual as a person, with the belief that the liquidation of an individual will defeat what he represents as a class. In this sense, the term "individual" signifies a lack of strategy, rather than a collective decision as part of the battle. If an individual carries out orders that were organized collectively on strategic principles and include hitting the enemy's targets as part of overall objectives, this is not "individual" action. If this were the case, the historic revolutions would be reduced in their achievements by half. If this is true, we would have also considered that the seven Vietnamese revolutionaries who attacked the US Embassy in Saigon were carrying out "individual acts," and also that "individual" that the DFLP claimed was killed inside the Nablus prison by another "individual" when he was placed in the prison to spy on behalf of the enemy!
- Now, if we connect the word "terrorism" to the word "individual," in the scientific sense, is it the same as "external operations"? We agree completely with the obvious logic of *Al-Hurriya* condemning "individual terrorism" with great ceremony, denouncing its lack of usefulness, but what is clear is that *Al-Hurriya* has no scientific, objective, or intellectual basis to describe external operations as "individual terrorism."

Misleading Citations of Lenin

Even more serious is that after *Al-Hurriya* used the wrong meaning of the word terrorism, and the wrong meaning of the word individual, and their wrong meaning together, it devoted an editorial to condemning "individual terrorism," and meaning "external action," then used excerpts from Lenin to condemn "individual terrorism," with the full knowledge that Lenin intended this in the scientific sense and not this fraudulent sense.

Lenin condemned "individual" actions as opposed to "organizational discipline," and condemned "spontaneous" operations as opposed to "planned revolutionary violence," and when he discussed "individual terrorism" he was condemning the principle of political assassination of individuals as a substitute or a solution for fighting the class or colonial enemy.

It is clear that this is one thing, and that external operations are

something else entirely!

The Example and Lessons of Vietnam

A large part of the *Al-Hurriya* essay is a lengthy sermon on the principles adopted by the Vietnamese revolutionaries in their struggle; it uses this to produce a false and "naïve equation": Whatever the Vietnamese revolutionaries did not do is presumed to be wrong—and this precisely is "terrorism" in the ideological sense!

This equation also assumes that what the Vietnamese revolutionaries are doing is law for all, and thus on this basis, that what is required of the Palestinian revolution is to use bamboo as has been widely done by the Vietnamese revolutionaries! This example is not as naïve as it seems at first glance, because if we adopted the logic of *Al-Hurriya* we would have to commit ourselves to many such things, but we would have to give up a lot of things (such as shelling Israeli forces with mortars from northern Jordan valley in Jordan!).

And then, *Al-Hurriya*, while citing similarities to the Vietnamese, ignores, for example, that Che Guevara warmly defended the "individuals" who hijacked American planes from the heart of the United States to Cuba, and he did so on the platform of the United Nations.

Al-Hurriya is doing exactly what Mao Zedong warned of when he condemned those traitors who "cutting their feet to fit the shoes"![3] Otherwise, what is the meaning of this statement: "The example of Vietnam is very clear, the Vietnamese revolutionary movement has been able to pursue U.S. interests outside the borders of Vietnam but it rejected this approach from the beginning." Because the Vietnamese people were not expelled "outside" the borders of their country, because the entity that is in Saigon and its population did not come from "outside," and because U.S. imperialism is not the Zionist movement; however, it is strange that *Al-Hurriya* does not label the actions of Vietnamese revolutionaries in Laos against the U.S. enemy to be "external pursuit."

Bertrand Russell one day declared that he would not see any fault in their revolutionary conduct if the Vietnamese revolutionaries exploded

3 **Ed. Note:** This quote is taken from 'Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War' and refers to those erroneously arguing that the CPC military forces should forego guerrilla tactics and merely copy the "military manuals published by the reactionary Chinese government". (Zedong, Mao, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Beijing: Foreign Language Press).

houses in San Francisco, and Arnold Toynbee went so far as to justify the killing of members of a third party in external operations. In terms of outlook, apart from the philosophical perspective of Russell and the historical perspective of Toynbee; the Algerian revolutionaries launched a large number of attacks in Paris itself.

If it is necessary to imitate the Vietnamese revolution, the first lesson then is an actual, realistic study to embrace the principle of adaptation to the objective conditions of the battle, the nature of the enemy and its weapons. If Israel was actually limited in its geographical scope this is an issue worth exploring, but if it is agreed that the Israeli entity is part of the scope of the Zionist movement and its extensions, then we must rise to confront the challenge and precision to hit a military target with strategic and moral principles, aside from the question of the location where this occurs.

Let us provide a small example of the Vietnamese revolution to *Al-Hurriya*, which presents a revolutionary act as inherently a terrorist action (!). It in fact has a tendency to praise individual heroism and looks with great admiration to the Fedayeen. One of the more famous publications of the Vietnamese National Liberation Movement is a postcard depicting the individual, Nguyen Van Lem at the moment of his execution. Is this support for a tendency of individualism? Or do we instead see a model for revolutionary struggle?

External Operations and Revolutionary Activity

In addition to these fraudulent definitions, *Al-Hurriya* attempts to suggest that "external operations" (according to the concept that it insists on falsely defining) constitute the total activity and strategic framework carried out by organizations that adopt it as a principle.

This is an audacious attempt to mislead, as the external operations of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine constitute about three percent of its total armed operations, which are part of a planned strategy. The revolutionary struggle waged daily by the Popular Front throughout Gaza, for example, and the enthusiastic battles and confrontations inside occupied Palestine, are far from any reference to "individual terrorist" activity, and when *Al-Hurriya* says: "The individual violence [which is used falsely to mean external action] does not support public participation, which is the basis for popular war," they are attempting to suggest that their false concept of external action is the only action being taken.

If the word "individual" means a numerical issue only, any small commando patrol is now described as such, numerically! This "mathematical interpretation" of revolution and revolutionary action is contrary to the most basic rules of revolutionary logic, which indicates how superficial this understanding is, not only in the meaning of the word "individual" but also in the meaning of armed struggle!

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which practiced and will continue to engage in external action as an integral part of its strategy to pursue the enemy in the largest possible number of areas, organizes the masses, depends on revolutionary ideology and relations, and conducts its revolutionary action by the strategy of protracted people's war. The activity of the Front emerged and gained strength and breadth to avail itself of the capacities of its growth, amid the masses, and through awareness and organization; this theory and practice of struggle and its relations with the people is far from "leaving the masses prey to spontaneity." The first principle required objectively is to recognize this, and not to cover up these facts with misleading and manipulative statements based on false purposes, irrelevant quotations, and fraudulent labeling, and above all, generalizing from selective opportunist arguments rooted in creating justifications.

Targeting Imperial Interests

Al-Hurriya moves from "criticism" of external operations (which, as we have seen, is to label the Front's revolutionary work as individual terrorism) to criticizing the principle of striking imperial interests. It uses a complex and fake theoretical definition, "imperialist interests are the sum of economic and political relations, based on these interests in the Arab world."

What does this mean under close review? Does it mean that hitting the interests of imperialism (which is the relation underlying the interests of imperialism!) is, as *Al-Hurriya* says, "falsification of the meaning of the battle against the interests of imperialism"?

To look at how *Al-Hurriya* resolved this issue:

"The mission of guerrilla action in the struggle against Israel is to be associated with, theoretically and politically, a fighting revolutionary mass struggle in every Arab country [...] and this alone will effectively impact the interests of imperialism."

But *Al-Hurriya*, despite all this, did not tell us how!

The desire to theorize here goes beyond feeling the need to determine the position that "linking theoretical and political struggle with the mass revolutionary struggle in every Arab country" is a necessary and crucial principle that must not be underestimated. But is this somehow inconsistent with striking the interests of imperialism? If this "mass revolutionary movement in every Arab country" targets and strikes imperialist interests directly, will it be defeated, because "violence against the individual interests of imperialism" only targets "individual material interests?" Is it forbidden for Palestinian actions to strike the interests of imperialism? Does not imperialism through its interests in the Arab homeland serve as the spearhead of the enemy camp?

Then what is the meaning of the statement, "The battlefield is not the individual material interests of imperialism?" The phrase "individual interests of imperialism" cannot be part of the vocabulary of a Marxist, as what is imperialism that is individual or not individual? Relationships? This is not abstract theory, imperialism is embodied in its interests!

Let us go back to the Vietnamese example: should the revolutionaries in their struggle not strike imperialist interests? What do you see them doing now? Why are they attacking the oil depots of the corporations of Saigon? Is it not part of resisting the American war effort? So what about Shell, owned by Rothschild (the individual) and the American monopolies controlled by their members, and striking the recently constructed oil pipeline between Eilat and Asqelan? What about Aramco and others?

It is certain to hit an oil pipeline which, according to *Al-Hurriya*, belongs to the so-called "individual imperialism" (!). It does not eliminate the presence of imperialism, but it is part of a battle against those interests (and the total relations that underpin those interests) and has a provocative and tactical role. Military and political struggle are integral parts of the methods of revolutionary struggle as all Marxists undoubtedly know, to the extent that workers sabotage the machinery of the factory in which they work (unless to sabotage such machines is to maintain the relationships these machines depend upon!).

We agree with Ahmed Bahaa Eddin that "the subject of the Palestinian action abroad should not be left to individual or semi-individual initiatives, or a lack of coordination," and we agree with him as well that "revolutionary violence is not an abstract expression, it is not angry violence, but violence that serves the revolution and its goals." We also agree

with *Al-Hurriya* that "individual terrorism is a dead end for a mass movement;" so too is narrow-mindedness and opportunism!

Imperialism and External Operations

Since the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine began striking the interests and targets of imperialism on May 29, 1970, the bourgeois Arab press has engaged in continuous analysis of these strikes, criticizing them, and stirring up skepticism around them. This is normal due to the sequence of events, and the interdependence of the diseases afflicting us. In the following, we shed some light on the causes and aspects of these strikes and their expected results:

Why strike the targets of U.S. imperialism, and why return to hit again the sensitive points and nerve centers of the imperialist enemy? This is the question of the hour. We must answer the masses so as to not fall into the trap of those who say that our work leads to unrest, or drags the revolution from its positions against the enemy into sectarian side battles, and to clear the illusions of those who are wrong in the best case, that our goal is to educate the masses and unmask our true enemies. As Mouin Bseiso wrote in *Al-Ahram* (January 4, 1970):

> The United States of America is the first enemy of the Palestinian people and the Arab revolution, the first ally of the occupation, the first funder and architect of both schemes of aggression, and this fact is known even to Arab children in nurseries.

No! Our goal is much larger. To understand this objective, it is necessary to know the nature and origin, and have an in-depth awareness of the dialectical relationship that governs our behavior and guides our steps. The basic contradiction that exists in the region is the contradiction between imperialism and revolution, which Mouin Bseiso describes as Palestinian, and which the Popular Front insists is Arab. But imperialism is smart enough that all of their forces confronting the revolution do not stand before us openly, nor attack us directly, but are used in the struggle against us, fighting through "a third party."

It does not matter who is the third party. It is important for them to implement their plan carefully; they seek to pay a lesser price than they know they must pay in reputation and in blood if they clashed with the revolution openly along the lines of the Vietnamese or Korean conflicts.

However, the presence of a third party does not negate the basic contradiction, but it creates contradictions as a subset, essentially a manifes-

tation of the exercise of the primary contradiction. It remains our first goal to confront the enemy without it being able to use new tools to hide its identity or drag us into secondary side battles.

The imperialist head is ready to struggle against us and block our revolutionary path as long as the conflict does not cost him anything, as long as he can pay for sectarian poisons, or regional or personal interests to stand guard for him, especially if the revolution is afflicted with a strategic blindness that makes it unable to differentiate between the force that leads to paralysis of the enemy and that which does not, but leads us to underestimate the power of the enemy and its effectiveness.

The head of imperialism wants the revolution to fight in many small battles in order so that it cannot see clearly. The reason for the ability of the imperialist to sustain lengthy conflict in such circumstances is that it knows that the victory is determined strategically, whatever the result of successive tactical battles. The imperialist knows that the victory of its local tools against the revolution is what it wishes to achieve.

Feudal and bourgeois capitalist ruling classes have been throughout the ages able to mobilize one part of the working class to hit the other part, without the trouble of their own engagement in battle and paying the price of their own blood. They engage in this role unreservedly and rush to the maximum extent of violence so long as the blood of the two parties does not begin to impact their blood. But when the working class realizes this and begins to strike them, they begin to think before engaging in any conflict. The role of US imperialism in the capitalist world today, is to use the batons of its collaborators to securely crush the heads of the revolutionary masses, or to be crushed. This is not important as long as the head of imperialism remains safe, and so long as American interests are kept safe from any threat. But once this interest is endangered, and when we see the side battles taking their real nature, the main enemy knows that their tactic has been exposed and that their sectarian or regional weapons are chained, and it will be forced to think twice before using its local pawns. This in fact reduces the likelihood of a side battle rather than increasing it, and it serves the interest of the revolution to do so.

In addition to all of this, we are involved in the mobilization of the masses and creating a revolutionary climate. The knowledge of the masses of the nature of the enemy and its dimensions, methods, and schemes is essential. Our knowledge remains useless if we do not translate this vanguard knowledge into practice. What is the benefit for us to know

the enemy, despite its importance, if the masses do not see the interests of imperialism, as they silently drain our blood? What is the role of the revolutionary vanguard, if not to embody the ideas and ideals they uphold?

The Bible says: "In the beginning was the word." Faust disputes that by saying: "No! In the beginning was the deed." The strikes of the Popular Front against imperialist interests on the land of the whole Arab nation only translate our knowledge into action.

But do things stand at this point? Will U.S. imperialism fall as soon as some of its interests are at stake? Will it stop pulling the strings after the first shock, regardless of its violence? Is it not possible to use new strings if the first is cut? No, the conflict by its nature inevitably continues, and if the enemy side refrains from the use of open fighting (for lack of utility), it requires it to find another means of engagement, and we see the dialectical relationship between the will of the opponent and the will of the revolution, until victory. To understand the prospects for the future and its possibilities, we must know that the dialectical relationship of wills is governed by two factors: the balance of power and the determination of both. Here, we can imagine how the enemy will look for new alliances and new local powers to attempt to break up our forces in order to turn the balance of power in its favor. And how we will work hard to thwart its plans in the ranks of the revolutionaries, and attempt to create a contradiction with these new allied local powers. Tactical skill and judgment will be essential in this area. The goal of each remains the axis of their movement. The goal of the enemy is to secure its interests that we threaten to strike. The goal for us is our existence, which is threatened by the main tool of imperialism, Israel, and its secondary tools. A comparison between these goals—interests and existence—is to our advantage, because the fight to win profits and defend interests is less ferocious than a fight to defend one's existence.

These are the prospects for the future ahead of us. This is the logic that governs our behavior and illuminates our path when we strike the interests of the U.S. imperialists. The tactic serves a specific strategy. It is not an automatic response to an electric shock! It is a rational logic, not taken up for whims or emotions. It is the logic of cutting the head of the snake and not its tail, especially since the existing contradiction is with the head, and the tail will only move in the service of the head.

Notes

In its January 9, 1969 issue, the French publication *Le Monde* ran an article by Israeli Moshe Machover (university professor and one of the key elements of leadership in the Israeli Matzpen organization.) The following excerpt from this article:

> The attack by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine on December 26, 1968, on an Israeli El Al plane at Athens airport is a blow to Israel, not only because it highlighted the fragility of the international transportation lines, but also because it demonstrated to the world the Palestinian resistance, equipped with boldness and bravery [...]. The men who carried out the attack knew exactly what was waiting for them: a prison term or possibly the death penalty, with either the final arbiter. Whether justified practically and morally, the public opinion inside and outside of Israel can only be influenced by the amount of persistence and sacrifice of the Palestinian resistance.
>
> Is it not right for the 'Viet Cong' to strike the strongholds of American aggression; they direct their strikes to the U.S. Seventh Fleet, but could to San Francisco and New York also [...].
>
> Bertrand Russell, *Al-Hadaf*, November 15, 1970
>
> [...] On the Palestinian issue in particular, the blood of any innocent victims of Palestinian Arab guerrillas lies not with the fedayeen fighters, but is also the responsibility of the institutions of the world, because, without the acquiescence and subordination of the various parts of the entire world, this situation was able to prevail [...]. When a victim of persecution has nothing to lose but their lives, they can take the lives of enemies en masse and at an acceptable price [...]. The Palestinian Arabs have an understandable grievance against the Israelis, but they also have a grievance against all the rest of us [...]. The Palestinians today are in the mood for sacrificing their lives if by wrecking the pillar they can bring the roof down on their Israeli enemies' heads; and if the crashing masonry were incidentally to stave in the skulls of the rest of the human race, why should the Palestinian Arabs care? What have the rest of us done to deserve consideration from them? ... This is a threat that drives the world, finally, after such a long period, to give serious consideration to the injustices suffered by the Palestinian Arab people.
>
> Arnold Toynbee, the *Los Angeles Times Magazine*, March 30, 1969
>
> [A]nd when this party or that conduct terrorism individually against colonial tools that oppress and surveil the people, therefore, they do not commit a 'fascist' sin (and this charge does not evidence understanding of the meaning of fascism and its circumstances and class roots in Western societies), but has taken an action against imperialism... It shows the beginning of consciousness, but in all cases, such descriptions are far away from class consciousness and are infected with revolutionary 'itching,' and only present when those do not see reality correctly. Those who call it 'fascism' do not understand Lenin at all, that is if they read him at all, and if they did, they would know Lenin's position on

> the issue of 'forms of struggle' in general, and the issue of terrorism, including individual, and he did not reject any forms as an absolute prerequisite.
>
> Yasin Al-Hafez, *Al-Hadaf*, April 18, 1970

To those who have permitted themselves to fall into the Israeli trap deliberately set, and to use the mysterious crash of the civilian Swiss plane to undermine the principle of "external operations," recall some observations that remain in recent memory of the world:

> In November 1940, the British Mandate authority in Palestine decided to return the ship Patria to Cyprus, after it was determined that it was carrying a number of Jewish immigrants illegally, but the ship suddenly exploded in Haifa port before returning to Cyprus, killing over 250 Jewish men, women, and children, who drowned on board. Weisman says in his book, *Trial and Error*, page 371: "The Commission of Inquiry into the incident formed by the British courts have proven that the ship sank due to explosive charges placed in the ship by a 'Jewish terrorist group!'"
>
> In February 1942, the ship Struma, carrying 769 Jewish immigrants to Palestine illegally, sailed across the Black Sea and was hit by a mysterious explosion. The investigation was unable to reveal who committed this crime, but the author, Christopher Sacks, in his book, *Survey of Palestine* (p. 24), commented on the incident, saying, "The Jewish Agency was determined not to compromise one inch on the basic principle: the flow of migrants should continue to Palestine alone and should not turn to any other place [...] it is better to die by design than to weaken the Zionist cause."!

In the *New York Times* Magazine of February 8, 1970, a lengthy article by Paul Jacobs discussed another kind of Israeli operation, and said the following:

> After the Swiss police once arrested Joseph Bengal, one of the officials of the Israeli Ministry of Education, on charges of threatening the life of a German scientist working in missile development in Egypt, it kicked off exciting news stories in European newspapers covering the activity of Israeli intelligence: How they sent a parcel bomb to German scientists and injured their assistants, and the kidnapping of another German by the Israelis who were detained illegally in Vienna... and how the private jet carrying people associated with Egyptian military programs exploded mysteriously in mid-air, and all of the passengers died in the explosion!

Third Congress: Tasks of the New Stage[1]

[1972]

Introduction

The Third National Congress of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was held between March 6 and 9, 1972.[2] The Congress was held amid very complex and difficult objective and subjective conditions. Since the events of September 1970, and the series of battles that followed between the resistance movement on the one hand, and the reactionary and imperialist agent regime of Jordan on the other, it has become very clear that the revolution waged by our people falls in a new stage which is more strenuous and difficult than the previous one. This picture became clear to the masses following the results of the battles in Jerash and Ajlun in July 1971.

The task of the revolution in this situation is to undertake a critical view of the previous stage and to combine this with a scientific analysis of the new reality together with a complete understanding of the present stage. It is in the light of this analysis and understanding that the tasks and programmes of the revolution for dealing with the coming stage must be defined.

As a left-wing organization, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has become aware that its primary task lies in formulating a clear vision of its future development. A complex situation like the one facing our people now cannot be dealt with through spontaneous and off-hand action or by hasty adventurist undertakings. We view the Palestinian liberation struggle as a long-term people's war extending over tens of years. It cannot achieve victory except through a people's revolutionary struggle. Such a struggle must be led by a revolutionary organiza-

1 Published by the Foreign Relations Committee PFLP Beirut 1973 . This is a translation of the PFLP's Political Report of its Third National Congress held in March 1972. The original program was published in Arabic in 1972, under the title *Muhimmat al-Marhalah al-Jadidah*. No other translation is considered official.

2 The First Congress was held in August 1968, the second in February 1969.

tion, itself built through struggle, and must be based on a revolutionary, theoretical perspective together with a proletarian determination which knows no despair.

Therefore, the energies of the organization were devoted, during the months that preceded the congress, to the study of the political report and organizational programmes that were presented by the political leadership to deal with the coming phase.

The political program together with the proposal relating to the internal organization of the Front, were the subjects of democratic discussion among the cadres and the bases of the Front. This was in preparation for the Third National Congress so that it would be able to develop and sanction these programmes in the light of the issues and matters raised by the discussion.

It is this which gives a special importance to the Congress, the political report that emerged from it, the organizational programme on transformation and the internal regulations of the Front. For all these form a comprehensive guide for action in the coming phase for which the Front is preparing itself. This new situation is more difficult and arduous than the one we faced during the period between mid-1967 to mid-1970.

This report, which was crystallized at the Third National Congress of the Front, and which was officially approved as a guide for action complementing the political and organizational programme issued by the February Congress of 1969[3] should form the basis for observing and analyzing the coming events and for defining scientific positions on these. Its program should also form the basis for the direction of all our military and political effectiveness. In this we must, naturally, benefit from our experience and all the lessons revealed by dynamic practice.

PFLP—CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMITTEE

I. A View of the Experience in the Previous Stage

The defeat of June 1967 created new objective conditions which helped to accelerate the growth of Palestinian armed resistance. In the previous period, the resistance was confronted with the political reality by the Arab Nationalist regimes and their leaders at a time when they had reached the peak of their growth. In addition the resistance was subjected to harass-

3 Published in English under the title, *Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine*, see pp. 24-100 of this volume.

ment and repression at the hands of the reactionary Arab regimes.

The collapse of the nationalist regimes' plans and programmes, and the destruction of their power in the June 1967 war, coupled with the collapse of the reactionary regime's total hegemony in Jordan and the dislocation of its military establishment and its instruments of repression led to a rapid growth of the resistance movement. Other objective consequences of the June defeat, taken into account provide the Palestinian and Arab masses with the direction that would facilitate the resolution of their contradictions with their enemies, hence to realize their aims.

The resistance movement created a revolutionary situation among the Palestinian masses and the beginnings of a feeling of agitation among the Arab masses as a whole, which had an impact on the Arab Liberation Movement. It attracted the attention of international revolutionary forces. It also formed, to some extent, a source of anxiety to the Zionist and imperialist enemy and a serious threat to the reactionary regime in Jordan. This regime constituted, historically speaking, the safety-valve of the plans of imperialism in Palestine and more generally in the whole area. The Palestinian resistance movement has also come to constitute a serious threat to the plans of imperialism in the latter's attempt to solve the Palestinian problem so as to ensure the continuation of its interests in the area. Through all this the resistance movement became a force capable of exerting pressure on and exposing the impotence of the Arab regimes. Hence it was accelerating the process of terminating the stage represented by the regimes and thus prepared the way for the consolidation and the ascendancy of a new revolutionary stage led by a new class, capable, this time, of putting an end totally and radically to the contradictions between the masses and the imperialist presence in the area.

The resistance movement continued, increasingly, to express all this up to the battles of September 1970 and July 1971. It became obvious to the Palestinian and Arab masses—following these two battles—that the resistance was in a difficult predicament. This predicament was creating doubts about the future and the actual capabilities of the resistance to represent the hope that the masses previously attached to it.

The hasty analysis preferred by some following the battle of September 1970 and of Jerash (July 1971) and which predicted the temporary, partial, and passing nature of the situation of retreat and weakness that the resistance experienced, were merely deductions based on wishful thinking and lacked the minimum level of bold scientific analysis. Such analysis should delve into the real causes, both objective and subjective,

which led to the deepening and prolongation of the debility of the resistance, and the resulting wave of despair among the ranks of the Palestinian and other Arab masses who had given the resistance, before September 1970, their unconditional confidence. Our responsibility lies in taking a precise look at the new conditions, comprehending them fully, and perceiving the factors which brought them about. This should be in preparation for the formulation of a program of action which can lead the resistance movement out of the resentful morass and towards its revitalization so that once again it can represent the hopes around which the masses gather and mobilize, and for the realization of which they fight resolutely.

The starting point lies in having a new situation. This can be classified scientifically under two main headings:

—The new objective conditions which were formed lately and more clearly than ever before.

—The subjective conditions of the resistance movement.

II. The Objective Conditions

a) The Reactionary Regime of Jordan

The Jordanian reactionary regime found itself after the June defeat, at the weakest point in its history. A history founded on the suppression of the masses and on a complete reliance on imperialism externally, and exploiting forces internally.

The June defeat crushed and fragmented the Jordanian military establishment. This was due not only to the strong military blow of the Israeli army but also to the fact that the Jordanian military establishment was formed from the beginning, not as a nationalist army, but as a repressive police-like instrument experienced in assaulting the unarmed masses. This explains the enormity of its collapse, despite the very light losses, which it sustained in the few battles it was forced into in the West Bank.

As a result of the situation to which the military establishment was reduced (its smashed equipment, fleeing cadres, broken morale) the Jordanian reactionary regime was forced to advertise in the newspapers its readiness to pay the amount of two months' salary to soldiers who rejoined the armed forces. This step provided new evidence of the determination of the ruling class to rebuild the military establishment on the same mercenary principles as those established by British imperialism

when the latter created the emirate of Trans-Jordan. This was meant to ensure the allegiance of this institution as an instrument of repression against the masses.

The defeat, the loss of the West Bank, and the long, bloody repressive history which forms the essence of the Jordanian regime, have destroyed all hopes the regime had of winning support. It had clung to such hopes since it announced its intention to wage the June battle of 1967. The new situation resulted in the regime's mental and moral weakness. This spread to such an extent that some of the social forces which the regime used to depend on in facing the mass movement were not prepared, at the time, to support an early battle against the resistance movement. The latter was quickly moving towards filling the vacuum resulting from the semi-total collapse on the two banks of the Jordan.

The reactionary Jordanian regime, which we consider as part of the enemy camp, attempted several times, on different occasions, to undermine the resistance: its subjective strength, the degree of popular support it enjoyed, and its Arab national extensions. Each time it was forced to retreat out of fear that the consequences might turn out the opposite of what it planned.

The reactionary regime in Jordan guided directly by imperialism and its experts in counter-revolution and as a result of a large number of studies, worked continually for the whole three years on changing the balance of power. In this it derived the maximum benefit from the serious weakness in the structure of the resistance movement and the bourgeois and petit-bourgeois nature of its leadership. It also benefited from the accelerating revival of the reactionary together with the reconciliatory Arab forces.

The reactionary regime in Jordan was not only able, during the September battles of 1970, to defend itself, but was also able to pursue the resistance movement, and to disrupt the reconciliatory tactics of its leadership. Thus it was able to achieve a sense of victory which stretched from September 1970 to July 1971 and ended in the elimination of the open existence of the resistance movement in Jordan and the renewed domination of the machinery of repression over the Palestinian and Jordanian masses.

The reactionary regime depends now on a military institution which numbers around 70 thousand. These are equipped with the latest American weapons. Some of them have been specially trained to fight guerrilla

movements. They have also been mobilized psychologically and politically to develop a deep hatred for the resistance. They were also given material incentives so that the salary of a soldier increased from 9 Jordanian dinars prior to June 1967 to 19 dinars. This military machine was tested by the campaigns conducted against the resistance before September 1970. Furthermore, all nationalist and even hesitant elements were dismissed from the ranks of the army. This ensured the readiness of the military establishment to strike at the masses without any consideration.

Furthermore, the reactionary regime in Jordan was able, through its material capabilities and its utilization of the mistakes of the resistance, to mobilize and recruit the majority of Jordanians in the East Bank, so as to enlist their support against the resistance. All available means were used for this purpose. For instance it recruited mercenary groups of intellectuals, journalists, and artists to manufacture a historical and intellectual basis for the Jordanian structure, and to establish regionalist feelings supported by privilege. It also set about building up regionalist traditions giving the royal family a pivotal place. All this was supported by a campaign of plays, songs, and poems which were produced and popularized specifically for this purpose.

To this must be added the political and military experience in its dealings with and deception of the resistance movement. This experience is provided by imperialism whose own experience is gained from its fight against struggling peoples.

The most prominent characteristics of the new political situation which we now face are as follows. The recovery by the reactionary regimes of its military, oppressive, and investigatory powers, its reliance on all the power capabilities and experiences of imperialism. In addition there is the regime's dependence on regionalist sentiments which it succeeded in mobilizing and its consequent success in regaining the initiative in its battle against the resistance. All these characteristics must be appreciated fully. This will enable us to find the way out of existing predicaments in a correct and scientific manner.

b) The Designs of Imperialism

It is natural that imperialism from the beginning viewed the resistance phenomenon as a danger to be watched. It is natural too for imperialism to view the danger of the resistance initially, in terms of the latter's size and effectiveness at that period. That is a cautious, watchful view, based

as a whole on that of Israel's at the time. At the time Israel thought that it would be able to finish off the resistance movement in a few months or at least to live with it for a number of years without it having an effect on the Israeli Zionist presence in the area.

It is obvious that this outlook springs from the basis according to which imperialism views the movement of the masses. It thought that the devastating defeat inflicted upon the Arab regular armies would be sufficient to curb the masses and that the resistance movement would not be capable of forming a real or serious threat to the status quo which was established through the use of force in June 1967.

The resistance movement, especially during the second half of 1969 and the beginning of 1970, proved that it is not as limited as imperialism believed. Objectively speaking, the resistance constituted the beginning of an Arab mass movement on a wide scale. Nothing which could be considered as a large obstacle appeared then to stand between the resistance and its ability to achieve more polarization of the Arab masses.

The resistance movement had become a model emphasizing revolutionary violence as the method by which the masses confront their enemies. It had also come to exert pressure on the nationalist regimes thus preparing the way for the emergence of a nationalist movement surpassing these regimes, and constituting a real threat to imperialist interests and bases in the area, especially those represented by the reactionary regime in Jordan. Similarly the left-wing forces within the resistance movement had begun to exert pressure on the whole political perspective, examples of this are: their position regarding the plans for settlement, in particular their emphasis on the organic link between the Israeli presence, imperialist interests, and the reactionary regimes in the area; and the question of surpassing the leadership of the nationalist regimes and their refusal to submit to the tutelage of these regimes.

American interests in the Arab area are basic and have both material and strategic value. They also form an indispensable source to the dominant imperialist power, and an essential link in the chain of its economical domination in other parts of the world. For example, although American investments in Arab oil constitute only 2.5 per cent of the total American investment abroad, they, nevertheless, provide the US with 45 per cent of the total revenue it receives from its foreign investments. The American companies reaped in 1968 from their exploitation of Arab oil a new profit of 2, 418 million dollars. Furthermore, American trade with the Arab world achieved in 1969 a surplus in its trade balance of 545

million dollars. This figure represents 34.2% of the total foreign trade balance of the U.S.

These passing examples about American companies alone are mere indicators regarding the way in which the Arab world is being pillaged by imperialism. Nevertheless, profits of non-American Western companies from Arab oil in the extracting stage alone, totalled one thousand million dollars in 1968. This accordingly returns to the pockets of dominant American monopolies in Western Europe. Western monopolies achieve a profit on invested capital that reaches nearly 65%. This is the highest in the world. In addition, there is a strategic value to this pillage. It is symbolized glaringly by the fact that most of the fuel used by American forces in its aggressive war in Indochina is derived directly from the oil refineries in the Saudi part of "Ras Tannura" which is controlled by American oil companies. This exploitative reality briefly exemplified above is reflected in serious American designs to crush any national liberation movement which has the potential to carry out a struggle to put an end to this situation.

The accelerating developments of the resistance, its ability to attract the masses, its growing effectiveness on the Arab national liberation movement, its increasing call to link the Israeli presence with American imperialist domination of Arab wealth, and the conclusions reached by many studies carried out by American institutions linked with the Department of Defense (such as "Rand Corporation" and "Ford") all these hastened in pushing the American leadership towards exerting its pressure and all its capabilities in order to supervise directly the crushing of the resistance and its actual and potential danger, thus blocking the road to another Vietnam in the area.

The Middle East has become "area number one" for imperialism according to Nixon himself. This explains the announcement made by Nixon during the September events that the period was the most critical period in his life. It also explains the existence of an operations' room in the White House during September which supervised the battle and which issued hourly reports about its progress to president Nixon.

Thus imperialism moved from being the observer simply encouraging Israel and Jordan to attack the resistance, to that of the major power responsible for crushing and eliminating the resistance.

If we ignore the fact of the non-employment of American troops directly in the battle we find, nevertheless, that the U.S. did all it could

to strike at the resistance: all its capabilities were put on the alert, it was concealed behind a Jordanian reactionary front, helped and directed it from the wealth of its experience in its attack on the resistance.

The intervention of U.S. imperialism was total. It included the supervision of Jordanian propaganda abroad. As a result of instructions given by the CIA to American information centers, U.S. imperialism was equipped to help in deepening the regionalist struggles and division between "Jordanian" and "Palestinian." This became clear from documents that were published later.

In June 1970, to be exact, Washington began, through the chief of the "Agency for International Development" (general security branch) in Amman, to establish a direct link with the Jordanian forces for training and giving advice as a consultant. The "security branch" of the Agency for International Development is well-known in Latin America where it is associated with a wide experience of repression. The task of this center is to provide various forms of aid to the systems of repressions of reactionary governments.

Later, sixty-five Jordanian officers, who received training in the International Police Academy in Washington were put into responsible positions in Jordan in preparation for the September campaign.

Washington, together with Jordan and Israel prepared what was known as the emergency plan for September 1970. The responsibility for this was in the hands of Henry Kissinger, Richard Helms from the CIA, David Packard from the Defence Department, and Admiral Thomas Mooser from the general staff. The ambassadors of Israel and Jordan also participated in this plan.

The basis of this emergency plan depended upon Israel attacking Syria should the latter move to help the resistance, and on parading the Sixth Fleet. It also depended on mobilization of the 8th Airborne Division in readiness for its landing at Amman Airport for operations there, to prepare the way for the arrival of American troops stationed in West Germany. After September 1970, the United States allocated 120 million dollars to Jordan to be paid for the next three years as a reward for the part played in smashing the resistance. The American Senate considered Israel, South Korea, and Jordan to be the three countries of the world to have proved the success and effectiveness of American foreign aid.

These examples show the importance that Washington attached to the role of Jordan before September 1970 and afterwards.

The transition of imperialism, headed by America, to a position of direct supervision of the clash with the resistance and the mobilization of all its capabilities for this, constitutes one of the major characteristics of the current stage. This must be taken into consideration when discussing the new objective conditions which the resistance movement has had to confront since September 1970.

c) The Position of the Nationalist Regimes

During the early period of the resistance (1967-1969), when the defeated nationalist regimes were unable either to wage a war against Israel or enter into acceptable process of negotiations with it, they saw in the resistance a trump card capable of helping to pressurize Israel into withdrawing from the occupied territories in return for their recognition of Israel and of its rights to secure borders and free movement in water passages of the area. Hence, these regimes stood, generally speaking, in alliance with the resistance, at least they declared so in public.

These regimes, whose promises had been believed by a large number of people, were unable to stand against the resistance. The "vacuum" which was created as a result of the collapse of the Jordanian military establishment corresponds to a political collapse in the nationalist regimes. It was impossible, therefore, for these regimes to view the resistance as a negative phenomenon, as was the case before the defeat.

It was still in the interests of these regimes to hold the resistance as a trump card with which to pressurize Israel. However, conditions for the initial stage of implementing the Security Council Resolution No. 242 of 1967 became favourable in mid-1970. The U.S. then introduced the Rogers Plan and this was accepted by Egypt which began to think seriously about creating the conditions suitable for its implementation.[4]

Egypt's acceptance of the Rogers Plan came as the logical step in the retreatist direction which the petit-bourgeois military regime had found itself forced to follow since the defeat, this, despite its verbal and propagandist war. Such regimes, in their behaviour towards and their fear of organizing the masses, their truce with reactionary forces, their dependence on the latter's so-called aid, and their reliance on the same class forces that led to the defeat were moving, in reality, towards the acceptance of

4 **Ed. Note**: The Rogers Plan was a proposal aimed at ending hostilities between all parties following the Six-Day War put forward by U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers.

more defeatist plans. No other road was open to them.

The development in the positions of the "nationalist regimes" could not take place without it having direct and indirect consequences on the resistance movement. For the acceptance of surrender is implicitly, an acceptance to liquidate the resistance.

The resistance generally rejected plans for this elimination and for a political settlement. Indeed, at the time it had achieved a level of military and political effectiveness capable of being a real obstacle in the face of the implementation of these plans. Furthermore, the left-wing forces within the resistance were capable—through their popular revolutionary and political stands—of imposing their position on the whole of the resistance movement. And these facts made it in the interest of the regimes to subjugate the resistance, incapacitate it, and absorb it into their own strategic framework. Hence, they moved into a position of conflict with the resistance and prepared to clip its wings.

This also constitutes an important element in understanding the new objective conditions of the resistance. It means the transition of a specific force from a position of support to one of antagonism. The transition forms an essential and radical change in the balance of forces. These regimes now stand objectively, with forces whose aims are the emasculation and eventual elimination of the resistance movement as a revolutionary phenomenon. This does not necessarily mean the slaughter of the resistance. But it definitely means attempts at its contents and paralysis of its independent and revolutionary political effectiveness, hence, transforming it into accepting a policy for capitulation.

d) The International Position and the Resistance

National liberation movements in this age are intimately linked to each other, to the socialist countries, and to the struggle of the proletariat in the capitalist and imperialist countries. No doubt, these three forces have both positive and negative effects upon each other, which are reflected in the development of their struggle.

Any view of the Palestinian or Arab national liberation movement which sees this in isolation from the international struggle against imperialism (which is international in scope) is utopian in outlook, and is incapable of understanding the nature of the struggle in our age or its dimensions and dialectical relations.

The following phenomena are bound to influence the movement of the Palestinian and Arab struggle: the inactivity of labour movements in the Western bourgeois democracies, the rift in the unity of the socialist countries, and the revival of petit-bourgeois, reformist, and military regimes which have offered themselves and an alternative to mass movements.

On the other hand, there is the inability of the Palestinian Resistance Movement to understand the international dimensions of its struggle against imperialism and consequently its future to establish serious and intimate alliances with other liberation movements in the world, the socialist countries, and with proletarian parties in the capitalist countries. This weakness led, generally speaking, to the support by many of the progressive forces in the world of the Security Council Resolution No. 242 of November 1967 as a framework for political action on the international level, it also was the reason for their inability to undermine this support for the benefit of the resistance movement and the Arab national liberation movement.

The leadership of the resistance movement is partly responsible for this, but it by no means bears the total responsibility. The following factors all have their part in explaining this failure: a) the general conditions through which the national liberation struggle is passing; b) the disunity of the socialist countries; c) the conditions of the proletariat of the capitalist world; d) the present situation of the total imperialist attack; e) and the "Vietnamization" policy adopted by imperialism (not only in Vietnam but also in other parts of the world.)

Furthermore, the submission of the Arab nationalist and petit-bourgeois regimes to the will of the reactionary regimes and their repression of progressive movements, i.e., communist parties, labour movements, and youth uprisings have all contributed, in the present situation, towards the creation of obstacles to a more advanced international alliance.

In addition, the left-wing in the resistance movement, despite all efforts made in this sphere, did not give this basic dimension of the struggle adequate attention.

III. The Subjective Conditions of the Resistance

Objective conditions are not sufficient as an explanation for all the aspects of the crisis of the resistance.

The picture remains incomplete without a look at the resistance movement itself, its class, its attributes and programs. All these played and continue to play a basic role in clarifying matters.

The resistance movement in its present state does not possess the necessary conditions to enable it to defy imperialism. The resistance, because it is not led by a revolutionary party representing the working class, has no such theory when facing the difficulties of the battle and their solution for the benefit of the revolution and the provision of the subjective conditions necessary for victory. These are:

—a revolutionary theory to provide a clear vision of the battle.

—a solid party to lead the battle.

—a wide national front led by this party which mobilizes all class and political forces under the leadership of the working class and its revolutionary party.

—an organizational structure which creates in the consciousness of the revolutionary individual discipline, efficiency and honourable conduct toward the masses. In this way he becomes both an example to and a leader for the people.

The resistance movement did not seem to be aware of these things.

It was and remains led by a group which represents on the whole an alliance between the bourgeoisie and the petit-bourgeoisie, with all that these classes represents in the way of intellectual and political oscillation, and organizational instability, together with the negative consequences of these on the revolutionary movement.

The left-wing forces within the resistance were:

—immature and had not completed their development into real Marxist-Leninist organizations on the intellectual, organizational, and combative level.

—disunited in their position, in fact, in most cases they were opposing and fighting each other.

—unable, in terms of size and effectiveness, to impose their theoretical, political, and military stands on the arena.

The fact that the resistance movement was led by a bourgeois class led to certain attitudes and mistakes which must be taken into consideration in explaining its predicament.

a) The Attitude towards the Reactionary Regimes

The structure of the resistance as a whole and its bourgeois leadership made it a dangerous mistake; i.e. the non-specification of a correct attitude and outlook with regards to the reactionary regime in Jordan.

The concentration of the main forces of the resistance in Jordan, and its vague position with regard to the existing powers there, meant its submergence in idealism and the absence of a clear definition of political attitudes toward basic and concrete issues. It is clear that all this was bound to have fateful consequences.

The Jordanian regime was established originally as a base from which imperialism and Zionism could fulfill their plans in Palestine. And its history is witness to this fact: it is totally and organically linked to American imperialism. Consequently, it constitutes a force for oppressing the masses. It is part of the enemy's camp as far as the revolution is concerned. Despite all this the leadership of the resistance—because of its class and ideological structure and its lack of a clear vision—thought that the Jordanian regime (because of its ability to attack it after the June defeat and because of the deceptive slogans it used) could be a friend or at least a neutral force. Its occasional clashes with the resistance were explained away as partial conflicts or else the result of mistakes made by the resistance itself, and therefore they could be avoided.

It was on the basis of this mistaken evaluation that the resistance movement formed itself openly to Jordan. Its military bases, organization, cadres, and locations were all exposed. It behaved as if it were working in a liberated area.

This evaluation was not the result of a partial error, or that of good or bad intentions. It was essentially the result of its inability to comprehend the dialectical link between imperialism and reaction at this stage of history, and its failure to see the mechanics of imperialist activity. This needs an outlook based on revolutionary theory—a working class theory—with its analysis of reality and its consequent manifestations.

The consequences of these manifestations were not merely military; they were also political and moral. Thus the degree of mobilization and readiness and the determination of the resistance to fight the reactionary enemy were not equal to the mobilization and determination of the or-

gans of repression to crush the resistance. This became very clear during the September battle: the resistance was not only forced to fight in the open—which contradicts the principles of guerrilla warfare in its early stages—but leaders of some of the resistance organizations were victims of surprise. This stage of affairs continued during the battle and even afterwards (between September 1970 in Amman and July 1971 in Jerash) i.e. that it was possible to change the mind of the regime and to co-exist with it.

Had the resistance movement adopted, on the basis of a scientific revolutionary outlook, a correct political position toward the Jordanian authority (considering the part of the enemy camp) and consequently built itself underground, the result would certainly have been different.

The resistance would have been able to inflict heavy blows on the regime instead of vice versa.

b) The View of the Resistance to the Jordanian Masses

The main error committed by the resistance is not confined to its inability to adopt a scientific and revolutionary position toward the masses in Jordan.

It was necessary that the resistance, having come to depend for its existence mainly on Jordan, to clearly define its position in this area: a) who is the main enemy there? b) who is the friend capable of enhancing its power?

The leadership of the resistance did not undertake this basic theoretical and analytical process. It continued, therefore, to work on the principles of the "Palestinian people's revolution" against Israel and Zionism as though its relationship with all the forces in Jordan was of no concern and as though those forces had nothing to do with the battle.

The resistance considered itself as a purely "Palestinian revolution." That is, it did not interfere in the internal affairs of Arab countries, including Jordan where the revolution was located and upon which its continuity depended.

If the resistance movement had a clear scientific and revolutionary outlook it would have realized that the regime in Jordan was its enemy and that the people of Jordan, who suffer from exploitation and repression, were its allies—with whom it could unify its struggle so as to change the balance of forces in Jordan in its favour.

The lack of a clear and comprehensive political outlook made the resistance neglect this central issue. This led the Jordanian masses to support the resistance at the beginning of its development, emotionally only. This was the result of the patriotic and nationalist feelings of the Jordanian masses. But emotional support is one thing and conscious revolutionary mobilization is another.

The nationalist feelings of the Jordanian masses did not withstand the mistakes of the resistance, which in turn reflected themselves negatively on their daily lives. The Jordanian regime capitalized on these errors by stirring up regional jingoism which was to undermine the resistance movement's ability in mobilizing the masses. In fact, the Jordanian masses ultimately turned against the revolution.

The Jordanian masses did not feel as if they were part of the revolution, in spite of the fact that the revolution was against Zionism, imperialism, and reaction, the simultaneous enemy of both the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples. The precise conceptualization of the effect of these two political errors (i.e., inattentiveness to an internal enemy and negligence of a main friend both existing in the same area as the resistance itself) shows the role of these mistakes in the emergence of the difficult situation in which the resistance finds itself now.

There is a great difference between a situation in which the resistance faces the reactionary enemy in Jordan supported by the people in Jordan, and the existing situation where it faces a regime capable of mobilizing these masses against the resistance.

The leadership of the resistance behaved as if it were an alternative to the national Jordanian government and as if it had, in its programs, a real alternative capable of fulfilling the tasks of the Jordanian national movement.

Moreover, if the leadership of the resistance—for one reason or another—attempted to address itself to the Jordanian masses, it would do this through their leaders who are a traditional symbol representing to the masses an organic part of the ruling class (and one of its instruments.)

The leadership of the resistance movement, because of its lack of an analytical scientific outlook, has contributed to deepening the direction which was considered by American intelligence services (through its instructions to American information offices) as the main factor by which to end the resistance movement. That is the division between Palestinian and Jordanian. Thus the establishment of trade unions (labour, profes-

sional, and student) for Palestinians only helped—regardless of intention—to serve the policy of the reactionary regime.

The outlook of the leadership of the resistance was very limited. This manifested itself in several ways: a) its class analysis; b) its attitude towards the military establishment; c) towards the possibility of polarizing and encircling the offices; d) its attitude towards political action among the rural population and bedouins; e) its relationship with the feudal and tribal dignitaries whom the leadership of the resistance treated as if they represented or even constituted an alternative to the masses. All this helped imperialism to act and move freely.

c) The Resistance and the National Regimes

The relationship of the resistance with the Arab nationalist regimes was not based on a clear scientific and revolutionary perspective which would define correctly its tactical and strategic positions. The class basis of these regimes—which are antagonistic to imperialism and Zionism—makes them an ally, tactically speaking with the resistance in the battle against Israel and reaction. But, because of their inability to face imperialism and Israel using the method of long-term popular war they stand strategically speaking in contradiction to the resistance movement. There are further contradictions over the political and fateful situation currently being faced by the Palestinian people.

The law governing these relationships with the regimes is not a straightforward one. It is simultaneously one of conflict and alliance—alliance in the battle against Israel, imperialism, and reaction, and conflict with these regimes with regard to the development of a strategy of a people's war of liberation and to the capitulationist solution of the issue.

The materialization of this law of conflict and alliance with these regimes—which in turn move in accordance with changes in the class forces on which they are based—needs tactical capacities of the kind that the resistance generally speaking lacked. The resistance—in an opportunistic way, objectively speaking—gave dominance to the alliance with these regimes. This was, in its overall result, in the interest of the regimes and their policy of domination.

As a result of the general situation of military truce with the enemy, these regimes succeeded in playing an increasingly effective role within the resistance and among its groups. Wearing a nationalist guise they were able, for three years, to establish for themselves a representative pres-

ence inside the resistance movement. Thus the resistance fell prisoner to the positions and policies of these regimes, despite all the slogans which rejected their guardianship and their attempts to contain it.

This tactical alliance resulted, in addition to the things we mentioned, in helping—in a major way and unconsciously—to delay the process of crystallizing new class and political forces in these countries. Thus it facilitated oppression by these forces, a process being continually carried out by the "nationalist" regimes. Undoubtedly the results of such behaviour are exceedingly dangerous to the resistance movement as an integral part of the general Arab liberation movement.

This point—as we shall see later—is related to a basic and essential issue that is the immature outlook of the leaders of the resistance movement on the nature of the relationship between the struggle of the Palestinian masses with the total progress of the Arab national liberation movement, and the degree of their mutual influence. This outlook also viewed the resistance as a separate phenomenon unconnected with the Arab national democratic revolution.

d) The Resistance and the Arab Masses

The view of the leadership of the resistance movement with regard to the Arab masses and the Arab national liberation movement was not based on a clear revolutionary vision of all the dimensions of the battle.

The resistance movement, because of its objective and subjective conditions, cannot be but part of the whole Arab liberation movement. Outside this movement, it could only fail to achieve its objectives.

The relationship between the Palestinian resistance with the Arab national democratic revolution in the Arab world and the struggle for socialism is not merely one of support and help; it is a strategic relationship in a single battle, practically speaking.

It was from the viewpoint of material and moral support that the resistance movement viewed the masses and the Arab national liberation movement, and not from the viewpoint of the strategic and commensurate alliance between the resistance and the national movement in the Arab countries. Nor was this movement considered—on the strategic level—as the genuine Arab ally without which the resistance would be unable to solve its strategic difficulties.

Such an acknowledgement helps in understanding what is happen-

ing and the way out of the predicament. It is ridiculous to think of the crisis of the resistance movement independently of the crisis of the Arab national movement, which remains generally speaking, under the leadership of the petit-bourgeoisie. Despite this, the Arab national movement has been subjected on the one hand to the oppression of the reactionary regimes, and on the other hand to liquidation attempts by the military regimes.

It is also clear, and from the same perspective, that the forward movement of the Arab liberation movement and its success in polarizing the new and rising class forces and their mobilization and organization reflects itself, dialectically speaking, on the Palestinian resistance and contributes in solving an essential part of its problems.

e) The Relationship with the Palestinian Masses

The relation between the resistance movement and the Palestinian masses was not based on a revolutionary perspective which depends first of all on the masses and aims at their mobilization through political consciousness and organization, thus confronting it with its historical responsibilities:

—mobilization was propagandistic and demagogic.

—the relationship with the masses was elitist.

—military action was considered as an alternative to the struggle of the masses instead of being the most advanced form of such a struggle.

—the Palestinian masses on the whole supported the resistance movement, but the resistance did not take complete advantage of this support so as to increase it.

f) The Question of National Unity

National unity constitutes one of the main factors in the confrontation with the enemy. Of course, the existence of a revolutionary party which adopts the theory of the proletarian revolution is one of the main conditions for the victory of the masses in its war against the imperialist, Zionist, reactionary, and superior enemy. Another main condition is the achievement of a national unity which comprises in a wide form all the forces which have an interest in defeating the common enemy. This con-

dition cannot be ignored or dispensed with. The leadership of the resistance has completely failed to realize the importance of national unity. All the forms which were presented to achieve what was called national unity were aimed at preserving a domination imposed from above and was able to enable it to contain and dissolve the various forces which do not agree with it politically. These forms were presented without them having any clear program acceptable to these forces.

Such behaviour does not originate in a vacuum but is the result of the bourgeois and petit-bourgeois mode of thought. These classes view the issue of national unity in non-class terms. That is, as an issue which floats above classes and is seen as a way of achieving its domination and dictatorship.

The move towards "national unity" was, for the leadership of the resistance, always based on emotional appeals and vague slogans: these avoid defining clear political and organizational lines which can form the basis of the combative program representing the content of national unity and the foundation of the organizational programs which govern its internal relationships.

Many factors hindered the development of a minimum political and organizational program for the realization of one form of national unity. The most important of these factors was the role played by the Arab regimes in fragmenting and splitting Palestinian groups and the incitements (using various forms of lures, threats, and corruption) of these groups against each other.

At the same time the fragmentation of the left within the resistance movement played a large part in obstructing the emergence of a form of national unity. This is so because some left groups—for tactical reasons related to their own plans—supported the appeals of the right and rejected the alliance with other left-wing forces, so as to impose on the whole movement a minimum shared program.

The inability of the resistance movement to establish a minimum shared program (capable of development) for national unity obstructed in turn the rapid mobilization and organization of the Palestinian masses. It also hindered the acceleration of the revolutionary situation and popular alliances at the Arab and international level. Furthermore, the superficiality and facetiousness of all the forms which were developed for national unity led to the preservation of the fragmentary state among the patriotic and progressive Palestinian forces. This lowered

the political and fighting effectiveness which the resistance could have achieved against the Israelis, the imperialist and reactionary enemy.

g) Backwardness in Military Science

The importance of adopting revolutionary violence in solving the contradiction between the masses and its imperialist, Zionist, and reactionary enemy dictates the importance and necessity of acquiring military thought and sciences together with the principles of using revolutionary violence in dealing with an enemy advanced militarily and technologically.

The revolution in order to protect itself and to deal with the enemy, needs to follow a number of military principles. These principles are what protects the revolution in its early stages from annihilation by the enemy.

The resistance movement was not based militarily on such a foundation (secrecy, proficient use of weapons and tactics, avoidance of confrontations, adequate standards of training, right types of weapons).

Furthermore, the resistance depended, in its propaganda, on traditional attitudes to armed action, e.g., glorification of martyrdom and of suicidal heroics, the encouragement of a spirit of adventure, etc. This was done in spite of the fact that popular armed struggle is a political science which depends on accurate and studied principles and on the development of a collective sense of struggle, disruptive, combative intelligence and on the accumulation of a very large number of small victories which can be used to achieve a strategic victory.

This lack of a revolutionary military science led to serious mistakes: a) these were reflected in the failure of most of the resistance groups to achieve armed organization inside the occupied territories; b) they were also reflected in the attempts of the leadership to hide this failure by issuing a large number of false reports.

Apart from the Gaza strip, the leadership of the resistance has proved, in its combative experience inside the occupied territories, its inability to absorb the military technology of people's war as well as its incompetence to learn from the political science that is based on the experience of victorious national revolutions in the world.

h) Nature of the Organizational Structure of the Resistance

The absence of a clear political perspective has also manifested itself in the lack of interest by the leadership in organized action. This is so despite the fact that the organizational weapon is the most effective weapon against a superior enemy.

Thus the internal relations which predominated within some of the resistance groups did not differ greatly from those found in any of the regular Arab armies except that they were less disciplined in the former. This led to the emergence of the problem of salaries and ranking.

The absence of organizational consciousness (which is probably a result of the ideological consciousness) was accompanied by a weakness in the political development of the fighters which resulted in:

—weak discipline.

—weak military and political effectiveness.

—a superabundance of privileges and formalities.

Our discussion about the resistance, its class structure and what this entails from mistaken attitudes and practices shows the importance of the subject. It is the basis which explains the reality of the resistance with its negativisms, mistakes, and deviations. This in turn plays a part in explaining the present condition of the resistance.

There are a large number of examples which show the mistaken practices of the resistance: a) bureaucratic leadership; b) opulence and extravagance; c) lack of frankness towards the masses; d) empty and loud propaganda; e) political mistakes; f) lack of initiative or quick action; g) sectarianism (which was reflected in the national unity); h) misuse of weapons; i) inadequate training; j) dependence on military formalities; k) mistaken methods of fighting; l) laziness in the guerrilla bases; m) time wasting for the fighters; n) the abuse of the citizens by some of the fighters, who spoiled their crops or showed disrespect for their traditions, etc. All of this can be explained in terms of the ideological and class structure of the leadership of the resistance.

The resistance movement represents, objectively speaking, a force against imperialism, Zionism, and reaction. Thus it earned the support of the Arab and Palestinian masses. It remains to this day a vanguard of the Arab liberation movement. However, the nature of the formation of its leadership and the consequences of this contributes towards explaining the nature of its present crisis.

IV. The Left-wing of the Resistance Movement

Why was the left-wing of the resistance movement unable to change the subjective conditions of the movement?

There was, relatively speaking, a left-wing in the resistance movement which had a clearer political vision and a more scientific and revolutionary stand towards the regime in Jordan, and towards the relationship between the resistance and the Jordanian people together with the Arab masses and the Arab national movement. Furthermore, it presented a more scientific and revolutionary picture of national unity and a wide national front to be realized between all the sectors of the resistance.

But this left-wing sector had the following characteristics:

1) It was not the actual leader of the resistance. On the contrary, other sectors of the resistance, because of the nature of their structure, received support from all the Arab regimes, including the nationalist ones. Moreover, the level of political consciousness among the Palestinian and Arab masses enabled the non-left to address the emotions of these masses in a democratic way. Thus it transformed all this support into a manifest force which enabled it, at the time, to claim to be the main body of the resistance.

2) It was not unified in its attitudes towards the right-wing of the movement. Thus some of the left groups trailed behind the right in some of their attitudes instead of finding their way to the leadership of the resistance movement and imposing their understanding on it with reference to the attitudes toward the agent regime in Jordan and the subject of national unity.

3) The left-wing of the resistance remains underdeveloped on the level of practice. It suffers from an inability to raise its practice to the level of its theoretical standards. This gap between theory and practice remains great. Thus it has been unable to develop a clear alternative in an organizational, combative, military, and political way for the masses.

As a result of this situation, mention must be made of major mistakes made by the left and which are its responsibility:

1) In its relations with the Jordanian masses it failed to put an advanced alternative to the practices of the right-wing of the resistance. It is true that it launched: a) labour, peasant, and student struggles in Jordan; b) it did attack on different occasions, the regionalist and

rightist policies of the resistance leadership. However, these struggles were on the whole, partial, and did not take place according to a strategic line practiced regularly and at all levels.

2) Theoretical and political consciousness which the left-wing articulated concerning the reactionary regime in Jordan, i.e. its position on the imperialist attack, and its being one of the main enemy forces, was not translated organizationally. Thus it is possible to say that this consciousness did not advance beyond the "evangelization stage," a stage which cannot fulfill the tasks of a real revolutionary left-wing movement. This political "evangelism" did not reflect itself, as it should, in the organizational structure of the movement, nor in its knowledge and practice of the principles of underground war and popular struggle which are aware of the consequences of the combative contradictions between the existence of the resistance and that of the reactionary regime in Jordan.

3) The left-wing did not devote the necessary and sufficient effort towards hastening the process of building the party or towards forming its political and fighting cadres. It often found itself forced to give priority to activities which were not of the same level of importance as the building of a Marxist-Leninist party.

4) It also fell victim to theoretical, political, military, and organizational infantilism. The following are examples and illustrations of this infantilism:

a) It failed to combine the necessities of the strategic position and the urgencies of the tactical position with regard to Egypt's acceptance of the Rogers plan. Despite the absolute necessity which led to the rejection of the Rogers Plan and the importance of this, the way this rejection was expressed ignored the whole spectrum of possibilities that existed at the time.

b) It failed in its evaluation of the balance of forces with regard to the battle with the reactionary regime. It led to the taking up of incorrect positions and plans, tactically speaking.

c) Some of the left-wing contributed to misguiding the masses. It went along with the rightist propaganda campaigns when it began to issue military reports concerning what were then called big military operations and other forms of deceptive military demonstrations.

d) Various left groups committed infantile mistakes which gave

the authorities material with which to create confusion and publicize their claims locally, in the Arab world and internationally. Some of these were mistakes in the types of slogans that were used and in the type of practices resulting from them (such as the slogan of "all power to the resistance" which isolated the resistance from the Jordanian masses). Some were mistaken in practice and in the evaluation of the consequences of these; such as the antagonistic and provocative challenge of the traditions and customs of the masses; and also the consequences—especially in terms of propaganda—that resulted from the hijacking of airplanes in September 1970. This allowed Jordanian reaction and imperialism to use this event to justify the massacre of September. Thus it attempted to cover up the real reason behind the reactionary regime's move, i.e. the contradiction between the reactionary Jordanian regime and the resistance movement which was leading to inevitable collision. This was manifested when the resistance specified the 17th of September as the date for civil disobedience and for the convening of the Palestinian-Jordanian popular meeting. Zaid Bin Shakir admitted this in a well-known official memorandum which explained, from the official point of view, the immediate motives behind the massacre.

e) The left-wing failed to establish during its activity in Jordan organic and deep relations with sectors of the national liberation and democratic movements in the Arab world. It remained in its relationship with these a prisoner of the immediate considerations dictated by the battle.

V. The Battle of September 1970—July 1971

This then was the objective and subjective situation (of both the right and the left) on the eve of the September battle. It explained fully the nature and the consequences of what happened, not only during the September battle, but also during the decisive period which extended from that date until the July 1971 battle in the mountains of Ajlun.

The dual power—as the situation in Jordan from the middle of 1969 to September 1970—was decisively resolved in favour of the reactionary regime and the class forces on which it depends.

Objectively speaking, dual power expresses a social crisis, which is mainly a form of class struggle, existing on the eve of the uprising which

substitutes a new class for the old one and proceeds to give it power.

History shows that dual power leads to a situation of disintegration in the state system which cannot continue for very long. If, in such a case, the revolution does not act to resolve this situation to its benefit, then no doubt counter-revolution will.

The problem of dual power cannot, in any form, be solved through the sharing of power. Society comes increasingly to feel the growing need for resolving this dualism. Hence people begin to gather and center around the new class tones. If these let them down they will be forced to adopt a "neutral" position.

Should this new rising force not contemplate resolving this dual power by revolutionary violence (including civil war) to its benefit, then this means that it is willing to hold open the door for the victory of the counter-revolution (through civil war also).

The leadership of the resistance faced the situation of dual power without a plan. Thus it abandoned the Jordanian masses. It continued to speak about the possibility of coexistence (i.e. the sharing of power) with the reactionary regime in Jordan. Such a coexistence is impossible both scientifically and practically. At the same time the Jordanian regime was convinced of the impossibility of such a coexistence. In short, the resistance created a situation of dual power and then stood idly by.

Thus the situation in Jordan, as expressed by the violent contradiction between the resistance and its masses on the one hand, and the Jordanian regime and traditional forces on the other hand, led to the September massacre. It was clear, after September, that the Jordanian regime would not stop until it liquidated the known body of the resistance both physically and politically. Because of its middle class nature and in the absence of a scientific understanding of the battle it is engaged in, the leadership of the resistance was unable to understand this reality and the direction of its movement. Thus its own policies led to its defeat. The inability of the right-wing of the resistance—which held the position of leadership—to understand or to transform these conditions was accompanied by the inability of the left-wing of the resistance to analyze the phenomenon of dual power in a Marxist way and to act accordingly. In addition, the size of the left-wing and its subjective situation prevented it from exercising sufficient pressure towards a revolutionary understanding of the problem of power and towards the struggle for its resolution in favour of the resistance. We cannot, of course, be completely certain that

if the resistance movement had a clear left-wing structure it would have been able, given the prevailing Arab and international conditions, to resolve completely in its favour the dual power situation present in Jordan before September 1970. But we can say that if the resistance differed in its structure its losses would have been less, its blows against the regime would have been more painful, the strength and support given to it by the masses would have been clearer, and given popular Palestinian, Jordanian and Arab support, it would have more easily continued its battle against the regime, eventually putting an end to it.

VI. The Post-September Stage

It is necessary for the resistance movement to review critically and from a revolutionary point of view, the whole of its past growth. From this it should deduce its major mistakes and reach a deeper understanding of the new situation so as to begin its resolute struggle—organizationally, popularly, politically and militarily—to find a way out of its existing crisis.

However, the structure of the resistance did not enable it to take the above path; consequently a sector of its right-wing leadership considered the September battle a final defeat for the resistance movement. This group began, therefore, to think of succumbing to capitulatory schemes, especially those related to the establishment of a stooge Palestinian political structure which came as an expected expression of the political degeneration that arises from the bourgeois nature of such leadership.

A second group of the traditional leadership of the resistance movement reacted to the battle of September in a somewhat different way from the first group; while this group did not reach the same level of degeneration achieved by the first, neither did it seem to learn from the September events and in fact turned toward conciliatory policies without learning anything from this. This group continued to retreat in the face of the attacks of the Jordanian regime, justifying this sometimes in the name of tactics and at other times under the pretext of temporary submission to the status quo with its unequal balance of forces.

As far as the left is concerned, one group began to express its indignation in irritable and grumbling forms without any analysis of what happened. It refused to take any responsibility and was satisfied with pouring rage on everything.

The picture that emerged after the September events has shown

clearly the readiness of the right-wing leadership to deviate and retreat, and showed itself at the first obstacle, either in retreatism or in a state of loss and in some cases deviation.

This readiness was potentially there right from the start. It simply waited for the first obstacle so as to manifest itself either in retreatism or else in a state of loss and in some cases manifested itself in deviation.

The Jordanian authorities were able to take the initiative and to plan these tactics: thus they directed their tactics on the resistance blow by blow. They then controlled the situation after which they snatched one gain after the other from the resistance, (the events of Jerash, Ajlun, the events in Amman, and finally the battle of Jerash in July 1971.)

It cannot be claimed that following the September events the resistance was capable of preserving its open existence in Jordan. However, had the resistance leadership been structured differently then it would have been possible for it, in a defensive strategic position, to take the initiative in concealing itself. It would also have been possible for it to deal a tactical blow to the regime, to explain the new situation and its own programmes to the masses so as to win their support. It could have continued its fight against the regime—defensively and in tactical attacks—keeping a clear vision of what lay ahead with its fighters and organization in high morale. In this way it would have retained the support of the Arab masses and would have altered its present image.

However, the behaviour of the resistance leadership (especially between September 1970 and July 1971) led to the lessening of alertness against the reactionary regime. Their insistence on preserving conciliatory coexistence contradicted and opposed the developments of the situation. This policy led to a series of retreats which ended the open existence of the resistance in Jordan.

VII. The New Political Battles Facing the Resistance in the New Reality

The new situation with its new objective and subjective conditions, leads, naturally, to essential changes in the plans of all the forces involved. Consequently this applies to the nature of the political battles facing the resistance movement. In this it finds itself confronted by a number of interlinked and varying battles, where it no longer has the initiative.

The first political consequence of this new situation is an increase in

the opportunities for peaceful settlement in the area. Such a "solution"—because of the inequality in the balance of forces and the domination of the reactionary forces—gives the Israeli and imperialist enemies more than at any time before, new opportunities to double their conditions for a total official Arab surrender.

All the effective political forces in the area—imperialism, Zionism, reaction, Israel, nationalist regimes—are oriented towards preventing fighting and towards political settlement. This is so despite the existing partial contradictions within this camp.

The resistance movement was the main obstacle against the settlement plans. It put forward the necessity for continuing the fight and it was against capitulation. It possessed, besides its correct political line which enjoyed the support of the Arab masses, an effectiveness which made it an obstacle to the realization of the aim sought by all other effective forces in the area.

These new objective conditions coupled with the blows received by the resistance, and its third subjective situation lead us to force an important political battle. That is, the serious intention of all these forces to impose a political settlement, i.e. total political surrender.

We are aware of all the obstacles which still stand in the way of a settlement. These are represented first of all by the Israeli position. We are also aware of all the contradictions existing among the parties of the peaceful settlement camp. Similarly we are aware that the period for imposing a peaceful settlement is not over. It is in fact very clear that opportunities for a settlement have increased enormously and that the tendency to follow such a line is more serious than at any other time. The plans of all the forces are now devoted to working seriously for its new conditions, which might counteract the possibility of finally demolishing the revolutionary situation which developed after June.

Connected intimately with all this is another political battle confronting the resistance movement, and which is a more serious problem now than it was before September, that is the "Palestinian State."

The new situation and the weak state of the resistance have created conditions which are congenial to thoughts about a solution to the cause of the Palestinian people. Such a solution will erect a Palestinian political structure to put an end—historically speaking—to the whole Palestine problem and all that it created and continues to create in the way of difficulties for imperialism and its interests.

Because of its complexity and the number of parties involved and the contradiction between these, the "Palestinian battle" is bound to take various and complex forms. It is a mistake, therefore, to assume that it will take a simple form with a direct formula.

The victories of the reactionary regime in the September and Jerash battles have renewed the regard that imperialist circles have of the role that this regime can play in serving imperialism and Zionism. Nevertheless, a new reality has been created which imperialism could not totally ignore. Thus, and after a long period of hesitation, Nixon was obliged at the beginning of 1972 to admit that "stability" in the Middle East would not be achieved without providing a solution to the problem of the Palestinian people: not as a refugee problem—as America used to say—but as a "people searching for a homeland."

This new American formulation was immediately linked with an appropriate explanation: the American interest in this problem is the result, as Nixon said in the same address, of fear that "extreme elements" may exploit the feelings of the Palestinian people with regard to the search for a homeland.

American policy acknowledged, then, the Palestinian people, not in order to solve their problem, but to abort their cause. It chose this time precisely not only because some of the traditional Palestinian leadership has begun to move openly towards suspect solutions but also because the political indecisiveness and conciliatory mode of large sectors of the leadership of the resistance movement helps, in one way or another, towards the realization of the plans.

The United States, as the leader of the imperialist attack on the area is careful not to have the suspect Palestinian entity at the expense of the existence of the stooge regime in Jordan and the part it plays in its plans. Hence we have King Hussein's plan which speaks about a "United Arab Kingdom." This represents a middle solution which agrees with imperialism and coordinates between its need to liquidate the cause of the Palestinian people and its need to maintain the Jordanian revolutionary regime.

The following events constitute links in one chain: the municipal election which Israel staged in the West Bank and for which it made sure in advance of winning King Hussein's support; the "United Arab Kingdom" project; the Allon Plan[5]; Nixon's address on the necessity of

5 **Ed. Note:** The Allon Plan was put forward by "Israeli" politician Yigal Allon

solving the problem of the Palestinian people; and also the major role played by the United States in the conspiracy against the resistance, and in conducting its propaganda campaign to split Jordan down the middle. All these then constitute links in the chain of liquidating the Palestinian cause. This is to be carried out by creating a suspect entity to be dominated at the same time by Israel, reaction and imperialism. It is intended to form an instrument for enforcing foreign exploitative domination over the Arab area.

There are still difficulties and contradictions facing the realization of this conspiracy against the revolution of the people. Nevertheless, this battle has become after September 1970, one of the real political battles of the people and the resistance movement.

For the political settlement to be implemented, and for the scheme for the "Palestinian State" to be accepted, a final adaptation of the resistance movement is required. The resistance will then be faced with specific battles aimed at either annihilating it or rendering it void of its revolutionary content and potential development, so that it will merely have a formal existence presenting no obstacles.

As for the reactionary-Zionist-imperialism camp, this final solution means the indubitable and utter destruction of the whole resistance movement. The camp of imperialism, reaction, and Israel realizes that the new conditions may be the last big favourable opportunity for the implementation of the complete and decisive destruction of the resistance's revolutionary existence (and its manifestations of violence), which previously threatened imperialist interests and came near to demolishing all its schemes in the area. It is natural then, for this camp, after regaining the initiative, to continue its attempts to finish off the resistance completely. This is designed to uproot the whole phenomenon of violence from the minds of the masses, and to convince them of the futility of this path, so as to block any return to it in the foreseeable future.

This should lead us to expect new and continuous campaigns of elimination wherever the resistance has a military presence. This means new Israeli attempts to destroy any presence of the resistance in the West Bank and in Gaza, especially in view of the encouragement it received after the September events. It also means serious attempts by various powers—Arab and international—to remove the political revolutionary presence of the movement, so as to force it into complete submission to

and proposed annexation by the entity of further Palestinian, Syrian, Jordanian and Egyptian territory.

the will of the Arab right which has itself completely accepted capitulation.

All the partners of the counter-revolutionary camp, together with all the interested reactionary forces, will be in a state of battle against the resistance, up to its final destruction. The continuation of the ceasefire on all fronts is favourable to the implementation of these schemes.

Some tactical considerations will, no doubt, decide the nature and timing of confrontation in any given Arab country, as the reactionaries will be careful not to rock their economy and not to make a great display which might expose them to isolation on the Arab and international level. But that should not make us forget for a moment that the counter-revolutionary camp is bent on rooting out the resistance and the revolutionary violence it represents.

As for the petit-bourgeois military Arab regimes, their conceptualization of the limits within which the resistance should stay might differ from that of the reactionary regimes. But in the final analysis it does not go beyond the drive for political settlement. These regimes want a settlement which frees them from all their declared commitments to the Palestinian people. Therefore, they realize the necessity for the resistance to participate in the settlement as a representative of the Palestinian people, in alliance with the regimes and tied to their leaders and programmes.

These regimes are anxious to domesticate the resistance and subordinate it to their tactical needs; their behaviour towards the resistance stems always from their class nature, hence their fear of the organized masses, and of guiding the masses along the path of revolutionary violence. As the class contradiction grows within these regimes, their actions become increasingly reactionary, and the methods and the extent of their oppression of the rising class forces escalate. Inevitably this leads to the widening of the gap between them and the resistance.

These regimes support the idea of a Palestinian entity, regarding it as fitting in with their schemes for a peaceful solution. In spite of partial differences between their conception of such an entity and the reactionary imperialist conception, the former is continually evolving towards coinciding with the latter; this is because their pursuit of peaceful settlement requires that they constantly give way which increasingly brings them nearer to the imperialist conception of this entity.

The pursuit of peaceful settlement requires time, many changes and diversions which are not possible to forecast easily. Moreover, the condi-

tions of the resistance have not crystallized yet in accordance with this conception. We should prepare ourselves for attempts in the direction of settlement. It is clear that these attempts will be aimed at weakening the left-wing forces inside the resistance and strengthening those forces which are able to fit in with the required picture. Consequently, the pressure will be directed towards national unity under the hegemony of these forces which support such schemes. Some anti-imperialist regimes will, in varying degrees, play roles in this direction by creating an alliance between the various forces which accept the scheme, thus minimizing their internal contradictions, and strengthening them militarily; their fighting forces will be transformed into a semi-classical army under whose banner all other organizations will unite.

Such is the picture of the new situation. We see the new objective conditions, the subjective state of the resistance movement, and the initiative taken by the counter-revolutionary camp. We have seen the transformation of the resistance into a position of defence and weakness and the new political battles it will have to face and which are sharper and more difficult than at any time before. In addition, we can predict the agreement between the Zionist-imperialist-reactionary camp and the "nationalist" Arab regimes under the banner of "peaceful solution" and "Palestinian state," even though at the same time they have conflicting interpretations of these slogans.

The question now is: How is the resistance going to face this new situation?

VIII. Tasks of the New Stage

It is necessary, before defining concretely our organizational, military, and political lines in this new stage, to emphasize a number of premises which are deeply rooted in our minds and the minds of the masses of the revolution. These premises and their subsequent application form the basic background to the programme of confrontation.

Firstly, ours is a difficult, complex, and ruthless struggle. In addition to those general aspects of liberation struggle (wherever imperialism mobilizes its military, economic, and material forces, trying with all its alliances and experience to keep and forcibly expand its interests), there is the specificity of our own struggle, where Zionist settler-imperialism defends its existence in a life or death battle. Besides this, the nature of imperialism's interests (mainly oil) determines its outlook on the area,

i.e., its resolve to use all its resources to keep those interests. There is also the fragmentation of the Arab nation and problem of political entities (states) which have been maintaining their independent existence for decades, forming a real barrier to the revolutionary mobilization of the whole of the Arab nation's potentialities for its battle of destiny.

Secondly, this picture is mentioned here so as to emphasize the necessity for having the revolutionary proletarian strength to face these difficulties. Ours is a protracted struggle—and this should be deeply understood—and our tasks and deeds should be based on this understanding. There is no easy solution to a difficult problem.

A prime task of ours is to fight the petit-bourgeois mentality which sinks into pessimism in the face of difficulties, and wants an immediate solution, a ready-cooked victory.

Also to the fore of our tasks is to root out other petty-bourgeois diseases, mainly that of grumbling, which gradually replace responsible revolutionary criticism and lead to defection, exhaustion, and erosion of responsibility.

The resistance, in order to break out of the predicament it is now living through, requires long, persistent, patient effort with a clear programme based on a clear vision of the struggle. All the current petit-bourgeois "wailing" and all its adventurist solutions will not get us out of the predicament.

Thirdly, in the same way that we pinpointed the difficult objective conditions of this stage and the difficult subjective conditions of the resistance, we should see, clearly and scientifically, the other side of the picture represented by the left-wing of the resistance and by its (the resistance's) defiance until now in the face of all intrigue and conspiracy. Local, Arab, and international conditions for guaranteeing the victory of revolution strategically.

On the Palestinian level: the conditions in which the Palestinian masses are living form a favourable objective background for the revolution. On the Arab level: the manifest impotence of the petit-bourgeois leadership which presides over the Arab national liberation movement paves the way, scientifically, for a new stage of the Arab revolution, under the leadership of the working class.

On the International level: the present imperialist onslaught is, in the meantime, a reaction to the degree of growth of the world revolutionary movement, and it will help the maturing of conditions favourable to

our revolution.

We have a crying need, at this stage, for the deep assimilation of history's lesson and of the meaning of the wider international struggle between people and imperialism, the great victories the people have achieved on that path (China, Cuba, Vietnam, Korea, the socialist countries in Europe, national liberation movements in Cambodia, Laos, and Latin America). We are also in need of the deep assimilation of the theoretical, moral, mobilizational and military methods through which these victories were achieved, and which are stronger—in practice—than the enemy's technological superiority, its military might and its economic powers.

It is by deep understanding of the totality of this picture that we can put the movement of our masses in the historical current of our era, the era of the victory of revolution. When the movement of our masses becomes an integral part of the current of history, its victory will be inevitable.

It is by our adherence to these facts and historical premises and by basing our actions on them, that our faith in victory is generated, hence, the power to engage in a protracted complex battle which requires a high degree of patience, sacrifice, toughness and hard work.

Headlines of the Programme for the Present Stage

1) The building of the revolutionary party which leads the revolution.

2) The new United National Front required by the new conditions.

3) Mass mobilization—the masses are the only force capable of changing the present balance of power. Violence should be a culmination of the mass movement, not an alternative to it.

4) Revolutionary violence in a new way. This should grasp the past experience, and is based on the principles of clandestine warfare and guerrilla warfare, strongly bound to a clear political vision. This is the main method of confrontation in the coming period. We have to answer the important question: how to comprehend the dialectics between revolutionary violence, party building, the national front and mass mobilization.

5) New perspective on revolutionary Arab action as the strategic solution to the crisis of the resistance.

6) Alliance between Arab and other revolutionary movements.

7) The resistance in occupied Palestine.

8) The resistance's battle against the regime in Jordan.

9) The resistance's battle against peaceful settlement, the plan for a Palestinian state and the attempts at making the resistance a part of this process of settlement.

10) The resistance outside the occupied territories and outside Jordan.

IX. The Building of the Revolutionary Party

The preceding review of the experience of the resistance and of its progress in the past years, points directly to the central importance of the thesis of building a revolutionary party which leads the revolution, and to the (dangerous) consequences of the absence of such a party.

The major revolutionary experience in history emphasizes, without any doubt, the basic importance of the existence of a revolutionary party which leads the masses to victory. The responsibility of such a party is to organize and direct the unlimited powers of the masses, and to raise them to a level of ability which can defeat the technological superiority of the enemy camp.

The organizational structure of the resistance movement has been, generally speaking, a mixture of liberalism and chaos on one hand, and the classical military discipline of the regular armies on the other. These two forms of organization, undoubtedly, are not up to the revolutionary tasks of the movement.

Bureaucratism, tribalism, and sectarianism are dominant organizational diseases of the resistance movement. As a reflection of the right-wing nature of most of the leadership of the resistance, and their underestimation of the importance of organization, these defects served as a guarantee for the maintenance and immunity of these leaderships and to keep the organizations open to their moods, individualities, and the fluctuations of their unprincipled policies.

On the other hand, the left of the resistance movement, organizationally, could not rise to the level of its political and ideological theses, being unable to differentiate itself from the right-wing in a decisive way. The fragmentation of the movement was one factor which led to the

spread of the organizational mistakes from the right to the left organizations.

As for the PFLP, the political and theoretical distinction which was reflected on different occasions and in different attitudes, and borne out in militant action, was not accompanied by any organizational distinction which could have presented an advanced model of the harmony of political and theoretical stands with the organizational instrument capable of carrying these out. The organizational question, i.e. the task of building the revolutionary party, must be one of the first tasks of the present stage. However, it is necessary here to emphasize the following points:

A) The process of building the party is accomplished through practice; the practice of leading the masses in the national and class struggle. It cannot be accomplished outside the present condition of the masses and the struggle without adopting the necessary positions and plans to deal with all the dangers and the battles imposed on us, apart from the struggle for the deepening and widening of the revolution. Any other scholastic and idealistic vision of the building of the party has nothing to do with Marxism-Leninism.

B) The process of building the party requires a clear guideline which presents the revolutionary scientific answer to all the questions and problems the process puts forward. Without such a guideline, the building of the party remains a mere wish and an empty slogan. Hence, the PFLP regards the "Organizational Programme" approved by the Third Congress of the Front a basic document providing such a guideline. This contains the programme of "transformation" which looks at the present reality of the Front, provides a scientific analysis of its structure and contradictions, and draws the lines of action to transform the front into a Marxist-Leninist party.

In addition to that, the process of building a party requires the availability of revolutionary theory which directs scientific action and which gives it strength and faith. This is represented by the following documents:

—Our theoretical guidelines for building the party, based on the organizational strategy of PFLP (Report to the February Congress 1969)

—The internal constitution and the circular attached concerning the methods of practice.

—The programme of military building which prepares the party for underground resistance and guerrilla warfare, and which provides for military effectiveness in spite of the present balance of forces, and which guarantees self-preservation, the major task now, in light of the preceding analysis.

The theoretical thesis of those studies presents clear guidelines for the process of building the party. What remains is to truly comprehend and execute them to the best of our ability and with resolution; then we will see a concrete advance in the building of the party; in the meantime, however we should avoid hasty and idealistic judgement.

These theoretical programmes and organizational indices should harmonize the process of the building of the party. This will be achieved by a dialectical relationship between theory and practice, because the Front believes that practice is a mainspring of knowledge.

X. The New National Front

If it is scientifically acknowledged that there is no revolution without a revolutionary party, and that the question of the party is the central question in Marxism-Leninism, then historical experience has also shown, and as strongly, that the patriotic front is a basic, necessary, and strategic tool for the fulfillment of the tasks of the national democratic revolution.

This basic strategic line guarantees the mobilization and the organization of the largest section of the masses and of the progressive classes at any given state, providing the possibility for the recruitment of the largest possible number of people in the liberation struggle. It prevents the isolation of the party from the masses, which could result in its inability to play its historical role in the stage of national democratic revolution.

The national front, however, is not a mere numerical accumulation subject to the programme of a bourgeoisie mobilizing the various classes for its own goes and interests, and serving as an instrument of oppression, and containment of the masses, seeking to eradicate their programmes. The national front is the platform of the mass struggle for the establishment of the correct line of the national democratic revolution. These lines are deeply and clearly represented by the programmes of workers and peasants. This is especially true of the present era, when the bourgeoisie of the underdeveloped countries is increasingly attaching itself to the imperialist orbit, which makes its vision of the national democratic revolution an incompetent one, and one a long way from the achieve-

ment of real liberation.

The objective and subjective conditions of the forces of the resistance made the right-wing the main force in the leadership of the resistance movement. All the left-wing could do was differentiate itself, to guarantee its growth, and to influence the resistance movement in such a way as to ensure its own march, and to prepare itself for the responsibilities of leadership in the future.

The dominance of the right was not due merely to its potentialities and the support of the Arab regimes, but also stemmed from the fragmentation of the left and the carrying out by some left groups of the task of theorization for and justification of the right, especially on the question of "national unity," which was aimed at strengthening the grip of the right over the leadership of the resistance movement.

The new objective conditions, since September, have proved the inability of the right to lead the new stage. The new stage requires ideological, political, and organizational clarity, with its concomitant practice, and these conditions are unobtainable from the right-wing.

The central point, then, as regards the national front in the present stage, is that the left sees itself responsible for confronting this new situation. It is on this basis that it must start to prepare the way for the unification of all patriotic Jordanian and Palestinian forces and elements.

This change in the structure of the leadership of the resistance cannot, however, be accomplished without struggle. This struggle must be waged, bearing in mind the following factors:

a) The struggle should be waged around organizational, military and political problems that are clearly linked to the battle;

b) It has to aim at unifying all the forces of the left, the masses, and all the rank and file of the resistance groups in order to consolidate a strong pole of attraction which can effectively challenge the right-wing and seize the leadership from it without dispersing the forces of revolution. The struggle, however, must be followed by unity.

The right-wing of the resistance movement is nationalistic; consequently we should aim at containing it within the national front. Seizing the leadership from the right-wing of the resistance must not lead to the loss of a national force, which although incapable of leading the liberation struggle, still has a part to play in the national democratic revolution.

Naturally, we must disregard those elements whose behaviour sym-

bolized hesitation, indecisiveness, and fear, as well as those who were pushed into the camp of "peaceful solution" and "Palestinian state" by the difficulties of the new struggle. Similarly we must disregard all those who conspired with the reactionary Jordanian regime, and those who, on account of their present position, seem likely to do so. But all other patriotic forces should be included in the new national front, including the patriotic right-wing.

The new stage necessitates a more complicated organizational force for the national-patriotic front than was required previously. The resistance now faces two separate yet interlined tasks; the first is to carry on the fight against Israel under the slogan of the liberation of Palestine; the second task is the fight against the reactionary regime in Jordan under the slogan of overthrowing the regime and liberating Jordan from reaction.

We cannot deal with these two tasks through one organizational form alone. The first task requires a front which includes the resistance groups but with the aim of changing the nature of their programmes and structure in the light of what has been said before. The second task requires a patriotic front comprising the Jordanian national-patriotic movement together with the resistance groups which consider the overthrowing of the regime in Jordan a central task.

The first organizational form exists today in the shape of the Palestine Liberation Organization. We know that this organization does not and cannot represent our ambition. Nevertheless, we consider that the minimum programme, on the basis of which we have participated in the Executive Committee since the 9th Conference of the Palestinian National Council held in July 1971 provides a strictly delimited possibility for the struggle towards a partial and gradual evolution. This programme is necessary in this form.

Our experience within the Executive Committee furnishes us with a partial example which can be considered as an indicator of the possibilities that the above organizational form allows. This concerns the struggle that was waged when most of the leadership of the resistance accepted negotiations with the reactionary enemy in Jeddah. The Popular Front was able to distinguish itself with its revolutionary stance which rejected this indecisiveness and conciliatory attitude. It did this both within the Executive Committee itself and outside it (i.e. among the masses, inside refugee camps, etc.). There is no doubt that the struggle of the Front against the Jeddah conference contributed to the foiling of the negotiations that took place there. At the same time it deepened among the

masses the combative line of the Front and its (i.e. the Front's) understanding of the role of Jordanian reaction as an organic part of the Israeli-imperialist enemy.

Our continued representation on the Executive Committee does not constitute all our understanding on the issue of the patriotic front. This is so because we aim at grouping the left-wing forces around any agreement on a revolutionary, political, and organizational programme which we can then struggle to impose on the right of the resistance. We also aim to continue the struggle to overthrow the hesitant and deviating elements which have played a part in the retreat of the resistance before the regime and which have practically become a part of the political settlement and the Palestinian state camp.

We aspire to represent the correct political line inside the Executive Committee, the National Council, and those organizations which have grown out of then. We realize, at the same time, that the new patriotic front, which is capable of coping with the tasks of the new stage, requires more revolutionary programmes capable of attracting the forces of the left. The struggle for the leadership of such a front is a popular struggle, and the legitimacy of such a struggle derives from the masses. Such a front must be established outside the framework within which the Palestine Liberation Organization originated and developed, as well as outside the links and mentalities of the organization.

The second task requires a different organizational form; i.e. a Palestinian-Jordanian patriotic front composed of the revolutionary and patriotic Jordanian groups that aim at overthrowing the reactionary regime which exploits the majority of the people; i.e. workers, peasants, and petit-bourgeoisie. This regime prevents their economic, social, and cultural development. Included in this front are the resistance movement groups which believe that the liberation of Palestine requires the liberation of Jordan, and believe also in the unity of the Arab revolution.

There is obviously a link between the two organizational forms. Such a relationship is, initially, one of coordination. Strategically the relationship is based on the unity of the instrument of the Palestinian-Jordanian revolution. Naturally there are a number of issues which need to be dealt with. Among these are: the position of the small resistance groups, the Palestine Liberation Army, and the Yarmouk forces in the above organizational forms. Also the position of the Palestinian and Jordanian middle forces which have no consolidated political line or attitude.

It is difficult here to deal thoroughly with all these issues. The important thing is to specify our outlook in the light of these political lines and practical experience. The central issue of the national front, as we envisage it, is its new structure, programme, and form. This is based on the scientific analysis of the present situation of the resistance, the role of Jordanian reaction and its organic link with the totality of Arab reaction, the role of the latter in the mechanism of the imperialist-Israeli attack, the emergence of new class forces in the Arab homeland which are increasingly giving a more progressive attribute to the Arab democratic national movement, the fall of the petit-bourgeois leaderships after their domination over a national democratic movement lasting more than twenty years, and finally the result of all this on the designs of the Israeli enemy, the way they are carried out in the West Bank and Gaza, and the manufacture of a stooge Palestinian entity, together with the readiness of some of the right-wing Palestinian and Arab leadership to accept this capitulationist line.

All this must be reflected in our understanding of the national front in the new stage. It is necessary, however, to deal with two mistaken political lines that are represented by right-wing deviation and by left-wing opportunism; hence the importance and necessity of the party's struggle to consolidate its position with regard to the scientific left-wing view.

We are required to struggle ideologically during our activities and contacts in order to push towards consolidating an effective left-wing axis. But having a correct theoretical position is not sufficient in itself. Undoubtedly, our scientific definition of a patriotic front in the new stage is the beginning of our ability to contribute effectively to this front. This, however, is not sufficient. The new patriotic front with all that it implies in terms of new structure and programmes, cannot be realized without changing the balance of forces within the resistance groups. Although our scientific understanding is the beginning of this change, the growth of a revolutionary and popular situation is what helps in the realization of this new front.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is required, therefore, to engage in popular political and military struggle in accordance with the tasks of this stage. This should prepare the way for the creation of conditions conducive to the emergence of the new front. These activities should be tied to the necessity of creating the national front. Any independent actions at this stage should aim at facilitating the establishment of the Front, and not at strengthening and affirming our indepen-

dent activities.

XI. The Mobilization of the Masses

The balance of forces existing at the present time between the resistance movement and the enemy camp, together with the various existing objective conditions, make the masses the only force capable of challenging this for the benefit of the revolution. The mobilization of the masses and the release of their combative potential is a basic necessity for confronting this difficult situation.

Mobilization that is based on emotions and radio propaganda does not and cannot turn the masses into a solid revolutionary force which knows no despair. On the contrary, a mobilization based on verbalism and emotionalism leads, in most cases, to the creation of illusions about our capabilities, to the dissipation of emotional promises (based on unfounded enthusiasm which itself gives the illusion of a quick and easy victory.)

What are required now are the mobilization of the masses through revolutionary political consciousness and the organization of their vanguard in the party. The broad bases of the masses must also be grouped into various mass organizations and trade unions. This should enable each citizen, man and woman, young and old, to contribute daily and effectively to the battle. This will increase the strength of the revolution, deepen and consolidate it. The organized masses will then be able to fight the enemy forces, weaken them and demolish their support.

Revolutionary violence—military action—should not appear in our confrontation with the enemy and its plans as an alternative to the mass movement. Such an alternative would lead us to conceive, analyze, and plan the battle in purely military terms, i.e. to evaluate all the problems and possibilities (including the balance of forces) militarily. Revolutionary violence and military activity must be the crowning of the mass movement and not an alternative to it.

As much as it is very important to affirm the line of revolutionary violence as the main method of confronting the enemy (an enemy whose domination and exploitation of our country and people cannot be eliminated except by military force), it is also basic, at the same time, not to give this violence an adventurist form which can easily be terminated. Violence must have to sustain it, the mobilized masses which form the solid base and the main support for a long-term popular war of liberation. It is

through this, and through this alone, that enemy forces can be weakened and the unconquerable power of the masses consolidated.

The practice of violence must emerge from the subjective picture which complements the basic requirements of victory (as has been proved by the experience of peoples and by popular wars of liberation of this century); for the revolutionary party leads a broad patriotic-national front surrounded by popular organizations through which the masses are mobilized in such a way that revolution becomes a huge historical enterprise in which millions of people engage through their daily effort. Such efforts are expanded continuously for the building and development of strength and for the increase of the combative and fighting abilities. This, simultaneously weakens, fragments, and annihilates the main pillars of the enemy forces.

The mobilization of the masses, in this sense (and with the aim of creating the strength necessary for changing the existing balance of forces to enable the resistance to find a way out of its crisis) requires a transformation in the style of our work and practice. What is required is not simply the repetition of the word "masses" and verbal emphasis on the popular line of the party, but a change in the way we behave which aims at translating such words into action. We should make it a central tradition in our work to be always among the masses, to think with them and to subject our programmes to their interests, capabilities, and energies.

This means providing the masses with the facts about the new political situation, explaining to them our analysis of it, the reasons that led to it, and finally how we see the way out of this crisis. We should listen to their views and understanding of things. We should also ask their opinion about the programme of action. This should make it clear that this battle is the battle of the masses and that the cause is their own. It will also become clear that all the designs of the enemy which we talk about are designs that aim at keeping their situation as it is and, therefore, at continuing the injustice, exploitation, and dispersion in which our people live. Thus they are required to think responsibly about this situation and its solution. The following should become an essential tradition of our work; we cannot think or plan or fight without this creative dialectical relationship between us and the masses.

The mobilization of the masses, as explained above, does not depend on the use of the mass media (radio and press). The basic means of propaganda are those members of the political organization who work deep among the masses and hold diverse group meetings which explain to the

people their responsibilities and demand from them fulfillment of these. They also demonstrate to the people how to transform their spontaneous patriotic and class feelings into revolutionary struggle which is the only method capable of realizing their ambitions and aims.

The main key to the mobilization of wide sections of the masses so as to deal violently with their national and class enemy, is by pointing out the relationship between the problems of their daily life, and the political struggle which aims at liberation and the establishment of a democratic power working for the interests of the classes of the revolution. It is through the clarification of this relationship that an objective link is established between the people's daily struggle to solve their problems—a struggle which they are especially prepared to wage—and their struggle within the strategic framework of a popular war of liberation which aims at finding the radical solution to all these problems. This affirms the importance of mass organizations and trade unions, and also the importance of the political programme that the revolution puts before the masses. It is through this programme that these masses see clearly the link between their daily struggle and the political struggle which aims at liberation, democracy, and Arab unity.

It is natural for these political programmes, through which the masses are mobilized, to be, on the one hand inter-linked because the camp of the enemy is one, and on the other hand separate because of the specificity of the political structure within which the Arab masses live in each of the Arab states or political structures.

XII. Revolutionary Violence

The three previous prescriptions (i.e. the building of the party, the patriotic front, the mobilization of the masses) must not be understood or practiced at the expense of revolutionary violence and its necessary continuation against the Israeli enemy and the reactionary Jordanian enemy. On the contrary, these prescriptions should aim at increasing the capacity and effectiveness of armed struggle against these enemies. Moreover, the practice of violence should aim at the creation of conditions that facilitate the process of building the party and the patriotic front, and mobilization of the masses, on the other, must always remain clear in our minds.

This is not due to an emotional attitude based on a romantic attachment to weapons, nor to any adventurism. It is due, firstly to the strategy

of people's popular war of liberation which is the only road to liberation, and it is necessary secondly because of the serious historical consequences that might result should the existing phenomenon of armed struggle come to an end with its subsequent reflection on the mass movement. It is due, thirdly, to the position that the enemy would be in if it were to succeed in totally crushing the armed struggle and take complete control of any mass political and unarmed action. For in such a situation any activity of this kind will remain at the enemy's mercy and confined to the limits set by it. Such activity can never accomplish liberation. Finally, the process of building a party in such a situation will become simply a traditional one. The masses will not support anything of this kind and will only be attracted to revolutionary violence where it feels that its struggle may be worthwhile and where it feels that it is able to reply to the violence practiced by the enemy.

The practice of revolutionary violence drives the adversary into using the cruelest forms of force and oppression. Given the existing military balance of forces, the acquisition of advanced knowledge regarding the rules, methods, and experiences related to the practice of violence in such a situation, become a basic issue. Apart from emphasizing the importance of revolutionary violence as a political line in the new situation, it is equally important to affirm the necessity of acquiring the fundamentals of revolutionary violence as a military science to be practiced with the highest degree of ability, experience, and competence. These fundamentals can be summarized as follows:

a) The avoidance of major military confrontation.

b) The use of quick and sudden attack followed by complete disappearance.

c) Selection of enemy targets which receive the support of most of the people and which do not create conflicting interpretations about their legitimacy and the appropriateness of their selection.

d) Proficiency in issues pertaining to the security of the revolution. This is in order to protect the revolution, its members, cadres, leaders, and weapons from an oppressive police apparatus which is well advanced in the arts of repression, terrorism, and infiltration into revolutionary organizations.

e) Raising the political, fighting, and psychological level of the fighters.

f) Deep familiarity of all principles and tactics of the art of guerrilla

warfare. We must also acquaint ourselves with the huge wealth of experience that has been provided by people struggling in the rural areas and those working clandestinely in the cities, and which is relevant to the nature of our struggle.

g) The minimization of ostentatious display in armed struggle and a higher level of understanding of weapons and collective fighting linking this with genuine appreciation of the people and their aims and preparing to sacrifice for these, instead of glorifying death in itself.

The resistance movement remains weak in its knowledge and practice of the principles, methods, and necessary fundamentals of revolutionary violence in the early stage of revolution. Therefore, the study of this subject, as a science and an art, should become a principal concern to the leadership, cadres and fighters of the resistance at this stage.

The revolution today is in a strategic defensive stage. Its main aim is to build and preserve its existence. Consequently, the practice of violence in this stage, is not directed at liberation through major military battle by which the forces of the enemy are eliminated within a short period of time; the aims of this violence is the establishment of an iron-strong party, the patriotic front, and mass mobilization which can, gradually, change the balance of forces towards the strategic interests of the revolution. We shall, therefore, continue limited to the practice of violence until we are able to utilize this process in the building of the mass revolutionary situation capable of achieving victory.

Revolutionary violence at this stage plays a very important role. This is so despite the fact that this violence cannot realize a strategic victory over the enemy. Its importance stems from its establishment as the only line capable of solving the antagonistic contradiction between our masses and imperialism along with its agents. It also, at this stage, prevents the enemy from achieving victory. This is so in accordance with the equation that imperialism discovered from their defeat in Indo-China, and which says that the inability to defeat the revolution, at a certain stage, is in itself a victory for the revolution.

This fact consolidated the line of revolutionary violence as a popular tradition. It also accelerates and deepens the process of building the revolutionary fighting party and its leadership of the patriotic-national front and develops gradually to the level of achieving total victory over the enemy.

Finally, the resistance movement established itself in reactionary Arab states on the assumption that it was on neutral or friendly territory. Its open establishment obliged it to engage in overt confrontation with these regimes when they showed their teeth. The resistance, therefore, needs to quickly rebuild itself so as to avoid direct confrontation and large-scale attacks. It needs to go underground so that the reactionary enemy cannot control it or force it into battle, which would ensure that the resistance could not win at this stage of its development.

XIII. Arab Revolutionary Action

Any view which sees the Palestinian resistance as a liberation movement existing on its own, lacks understanding and the strategic outlook necessary for the victory of the liberation struggle. Consequently such a view remains incapable of providing any real solution.

It is essential to realize that the struggle, in its totality, is the struggle of the Arab national liberation movement against imperialism. It is from this perspective that we should view the resistance movement and its problems.

It is clear that any view of the Palestinian problem must take into serious consideration the essential role that imperialism and reaction plays in the totality of the Arab world. It must also consider the basic role of the Arab masses in fighting these enemies. Any view which does not do this remains incapable of understanding the mechanism of imperialist domination and its methods of control and its horizons in the Middle East.

It is essential to see the resistance movement as an organic part of the Arab Liberation Movement. This is so not only in order to now the possibilities of the future and to deal with these, but also in order to analyze and explain what happened in the previous period which dates from June 1967 until July 1971.

Should we consider the failure of the resistance leadership to understand the essential role of the Jordanian masses in the Palestinian revolution as one of the main reasons which have led the resistance to its present degree of retreat, then the failure of the leadership to understand the role of the Arab masses and the relationship of the resistance with the Arab liberation movement is no less serious a reason.

If these mistakes have led to the results which the resistance have

arrived at in the preceding stage, then being aware of these and making a start at stepping over them and dealing with them in a revolutionary manner become the most urgent task in the coming stage. This stage will, undoubtedly, be harder and more complex.

The resistance movement will remain in a difficult situation if it faces alone the camp of Zionism, imperialism, and reaction. It is not logical, realistic, or scientific to demand from the Palestinian people to achieve, alone, final victory over Israel and its military establishment, also the agent regime in Jordan with its military establishment; behind these stand Zionism and imperialism with all their power and potential.

The existing situation defines the limits of the revolution of the Palestinian people alone: Here we find that half the Palestinians—about one million and a half—face Israel with all its capabilities and potential while the other half of the Palestinians face the reactionary regime in Jordan which imperialism, together with Israel, is prepared to do their utmost to defend. The preliminary exit out of the crisis that faces the resistance movement can be found then in the directives mentioned above and which aim, in their totality, at correcting the subjective situation of the resistance movement and the mobilization of the Palestinian masses to the utmost. But this is not sufficient by itself.

The real and historical way out of the crisis of the resistance depends on the growth of the Arab national liberation movement. This would enable the resistance movement to become a part of the side movement of the Arab masses which possesses the human and geographic depth necessary for victory.

The resistance movement will remain in a difficult position as long as the Arab national liberation movement stays within its present limits. As such the latter's moral and material support to the resistance is limited.

This, however, is not sufficient to ensure victory. Similarly the inability of the Arab national liberation movement, with its present content, to confront the imperialist, Zionist, reactionary enemy by force, fighting and popular armed struggle and thus its paralysis, threatens the revolution of the Palestinian people for the liberation of their land, and increases the complexity of the situation for the revolution and adds to its troubles and problems.

The bourgeois Arab national liberation movement is no longer capable of continuing the national democratic revolution. Consequently, this movement needs radicalization to renew its bases so as to continue

its development and realize the tasks of the national democratic stage. These tasks cannot be fulfilled without a strategy for a popular war of liberation which aims at uprooting imperialism, Zionism, Israel, and reaction from our homeland. It is only by such a movement that millions of people can be mobilized so that the resistance movement becomes a part of the Arab mass movement which is rebelling against all forms of existence of imperialism and reaction. The destruction of such an existence provides undoubtedly an essential contribution to the tottering of the Israeli existence.

Any conceptions that our struggle with Israel will remain confined within a limited geographic area, or with one form only of the Israeli usurpation, fail to understand the reality of imperialist and Zionist aspirations and their methods of operation. In reality Israel is not—literally speaking—a Palestinian problem only. It is a great mistake to continue the arbitrary separation between the Palestinian resistance and the Arab national liberation movement as it is done by the leadership of the resistance whose right-wing often manifests excessive regionalism. It is a mistake because Israel and imperialism are directly involving more and more of the Arab masses in the battle.

Nevertheless, we must realize at the same time that the radicalization of the Arab national liberation struggle and its re-establishment, is a huge historical operation. The basis of this involves a radical change in the structure of this ideological and class movement together with its method of confronting the national and class enemy.

The leadership of the Arab national liberation movement must be based on a proletarian party which can mobilize the Arab working class in order to aid the alliance of the workers, peasants and the petit-bourgeoisie. This is to be accomplished by a wide national front which mobilizes all the revolutionary masses in the light of a political programme derived from a scientific study of the political, economical, social and regional reality. Such a front must be oriented towards the movement of the Arab masses; must use revolutionary violence within the strategy of popular war in its struggle with imperialism, Zionism, Israel, reaction, and all the forces that obstruct the practice of this programme.

The resistance movement, by correcting its subjective conditions, can become one of the factors for such a movement. At this time when the resistance movement cannot represent the Arab national liberation movement not consider itself directly responsible for its radicalization or establishment, it has, nevertheless, the right and the duty to aspire to

facilitate the birth of such a movement and to coalesce with it as soon as it emerges. This would be the embodiment of the principles of the unity of the instrument of Arab revolution; the revolution of the one nation.

The fact that the resistance movement has a vanguard role, in this respect, must not be understood in terms of putting up a fence between it and the Arab national liberation movement. On the contrary its vanguard role obliges it the basic task of setting in motion its dialectical relation with this movement and the affirming and deepening of this relationship.

The left-wing of the resistance and the Popular Front in particular, is required to play an essential role in this sphere. This is based on the understanding that the Arab national liberation movement is derived from: the fact that this movement aims at realizing the unity of the Arab working class and the dominance of its leadership and programme against its class and national enemies.

XIV. The Alliances of the New Stage on the Arab and International Levels

The picture of the new situation outlined above defines clearly the relationships of the resistance movement: it is struggling against Israel, the reactionary regime in Jordan and against imperialism which supports them and which wages through them its battle against the Arab national liberation movement. It is on the vanguard of the movement (i.e. the Palestinian resistance and all it represents) that imperialism concentrates the battle.

The resistance movement depends, in this struggle, on the revolutionary Palestinian and Arab masses, and on the revolutionary forces on the international level, which, in the all-engulfing internationalist struggle, supports the Arab national liberation movement and the Palestinian resistance in its struggle for liberation.

The correct position, with regard to the reactionary Arab regimes, is the one which considers them, objectively speaking, as an organic part of the enemy camp. However, the position in reference to the so-called nationalist Arab regimes (or more precisely the military, petit-bourgeoisie regimes) is more complex. This is so because of the general nationalist character of this stage of the Arab revolution and also because of the role that these regimes, in varying degrees, can play in

the stage of the democratic revolution, and in conditions where the masses are waging a ferocious battle against the imperialist reactionary forces in the area.

Hence the urgent necessity of taking a clear position with regard to the relations with these regimes. At the same time it is necessary to review these relations continuously, at every stage, because of the changing role of the petit-bourgeoisie and its oscillating position in society.

a) The Position with Regard to the Arab Petit-Bourgeois Regimes

The PFLP defined its position toward the petit-bourgeois regimes in its second national congress (February 1969) and it was recorded in "The Political and Organizational Strategy" which was issued by the congress. This basic document studied in detail the nature and role of these regimes in this stage. It affirmed that, "Given that these regimes are, on the one hand, anti-imperialist and are against Israel, and do, on the other hand, put forward compromising and non-radical programmes in their confrontation with the enemy; the relationship with these regimes must be at the same time one of alliance and conflict. Alliance because of its antagonism to imperialism and Israel, and in contradiction with it because of its strategy in the battle."

As was expected by the above document, the series of events that followed touched upon the factors that have formed the basis of the PFLP position. The document says, under the heading of "general observations," the following:

> The basic contradiction that has been defined by this strategy does not constitute a straight mathematical line on whose sides stand two contradicting forces. It is, in reality, a dialectical winding line on each of its sides stand a group of allied forces which retain: despite its alliance, contradictions. Sometimes their alliance grows stronger, at other times it is their contradictions that deepen. Thus at certain periods the picture becomes interlocked, interrelated and dynamic on each of the two sides of the line.[6]

This demands from us another look at this position in the light of recent developments. These developments which have occurred in recent years are important. They were the result of the breaking out of conflicts, at all levels, in the area and the gradual, but quick, consolidation of the process of class polarization in the Arab homeland.

6 See "The main line of conflict defined by this strategy is not a straight geometric line with two conflicting forces standing on either side." on p. 73.

The petit-bourgeois position as a class which is not directly engaged in the process of production is characterized by oscillation and instability. When this class reaches power, especially through its military wing, it adds new elements to its characteristics: The most important of these is antagonism towards the masses and fear of them; a tendency towards elitist bureaucratic forms which lays the foundation for bureaucracy and the privileges of a technocratic strata.

Some Marxist thinkers go as far as to affirm that the petit-bourgeoisie has never been in power at any historical period and is incapable of doing so. This is so because it stands on the margin of the production process. Consequently as soon as its representatives achieve power it has to depend on class forces which participate directly in production and has stable and firm social and material roots.

These forces are often those of the middle bourgeoisie, the rural bourgeoisie, and sometimes those of the big bourgeoisie. All there find enough loopholes in the reformist laws that the petit-bourgeoisie legislates to renew their rise as dominant class forces.

This then is what lies behind the failure of the "nationalist" regimes and their inability to complete their national and democratic tasks. This failure and inability becomes increasingly clear with the deepening of (the situation of) national and class crisis. It is these that reveal the enormity of the failure in such a way as to make it seem surprising.

It was expected that the defeat of June 1967 would reveal the extent of the weakness reached by these regimes, and disclose their inability to continue their tasks, and their gradual transformation into reactionary forces.

In fact, the defeat of June 1967 not only revealed the national predicament of these regimes, but also the class crisis with which they live. They were successful in covering up this crisis claiming that they were utilizing their full strength to fight the Zionist imperialist enemy. This is the reason they claim for the absence of fully-developed class solutions. This is the background to the concept of class reconciliation which these regimes like to put forward frequently.

The exposure of these regimes will, no doubt, become increasingly obvious as time goes on, and their worn-out slogans such as: "The elimination of the track of aggression," "No voice above that of the battle," "what has been taken by force will not be regained except by force," and "The year of decision," lose their credibility.

The weak position of the petit-bourgeois Arab regimes, resulting from the June defeat and its consequences, explains their hypocrisy and flattery toward the masses, in particular towards the resistance movement; it also explains their attitude towards the resistance movement during the period 1967-1970, which then gave the impression that it was supporting armed resistance. These regimes, having prepared themselves by rebuilding the machinery of repression, and having recovered some of their prestige through on intensive campaign of premises and demagogic claims (capitalizing on the absence of revolutionary Arab party capable of consolidating the spontaneous stand of the masses in 1967), began to show their intentions towards the masses and in particular towards the armed resistance movement.

These could be noted at the Tripoli conference; from their silence during the massacre: of September 1970 and those of July 1971; from their wish to take part in liquidating the resistance through attacks on its left-wing; from the encouragement they gave to the mediators during the Jeddah negotiations; and from their opportunist policy towards the stooge Palestinian State...etc.

He cannot separate these positions, which the petit-bourgeois regimes carefully adopted towards the resistance, from the whole situation of class and national surrender that these regimes are subject to internally and externally. In addition to their appeasement and the mortgaging of itself to reactionary Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia, and their war against national and democratic liberation movements in the Arab World, they were internally retaking gradually the gains made by the working class and peasants. It also began to increase, more and more, the opportunities for the development of an economy based on consumption and for the growth of urban, rural and estate bourgeoisie so that this might increase its social domination. All this took place at a time when those regimes were moving determinedly towards reconciliation with American and West German imperialism. This was accompanied by a propaganda campaign which tried to suggest that it is possible to neutralize imperialism in our battle with Israel.

This new situation created a sharp conflict between this class—whose privileges began to acquire a solid basis because of the total retreat of the petit-bourgeois military regimes, and the new class forces emerging in society. This was consolidated in proletarian movements which could neither be ignored nor contained.

This conflict which has been raging continuously as a result of the

class alliance made by the ruling class to protect its interests and because of its acceleration of oppression against workers, peasants, youth, and the progressive sections of the petit-bourgeois class, is reflected in the ruling class itself. This is clearly manifested in the struggle between the right-wing sections within the "nationalist" regimes—which are usually the strongest—and the left-wing and revolutionary sections. This struggle leads the right-wing elements to ally themselves with the old remaining state machinery and with reactionary class forces which in turn leads to alliance with or appeasement of the reactionary forces and the imperialist camp, and to total isolation from the (positions of the) masses; they develop into a force antagonistic towards the demands of the masses and practiced in oppression of any revolutionary activity.

This general fact in clearly expressed in the series of developments that the Arab world has witnessed since 1968. The most important of these can be summarized in the following:

1) The petit-bourgeois regimes have been able to rebuild their instruments of oppression which were dislocated as a result of the Israeli attack. They were also able to turn the Arab armies into an instrument for the preservation of their own power and to use them in solving its conflicts and contradictions with the opposing patriotic sections. Thus the process of rebuilding the Arab armies has been transformed by the petit-bourgeois regimes into a process of building all instruments of oppression for use against the masses.

2) The petit-bourgeois regimes have also succeeded in regaining their political awe which was weakened by the defeat of 1967. This was accomplished by a concentrated demagogic propaganda campaign which utilized its nationalist past and the absence of a revolutionary party which could have articulated the results of the June defeat in such a way as to foil the designs of these regimes in their attempts to mislead the masses.

3) The right-wing in the petit-bourgeois regimes was able to ally itself with reactionary class forces together with the old machinery of the state so as to get rid of the national-patriotic opposition represented by some wings within the petit-bourgeois regimes.

This enabled them, especially after the attacks on the resistance from September 1970 till July 1971, to practice their policy of surrender and liquidation.

4) These regimes played an antagonistic role toward the left-wing of

the resistance. This reached the level of a conspiracy at the famous Tripoli conference, accompanied a propaganda campaign to which some of the leaders of these regimes took upon themselves for the benefit of King Faisal and Jordanian reaction.

The antagonistic role was due not only to these regimes' fear of an increasing left-wing influence upon the resistance as a whole, but also because of the organic link between such an influence and the quick rise of an Arab National Liberation Movement and its democratic and socialist forces.

5) All this took place in a situation of total retreat at the political and economic level. National surrender was accompanied by an accelerating class surrender. Thus, in addition to its peaceful appeasement of reaction and tie sacrifice of gains that reaction never dreamed about before 1967 (North Yemen—conspiring against Democratic Yemen—the encirclement of the revolution in the Gulf—the surrender of the Arab islands to Iran—the manufacture of the federation of the Gulf States...etc.), it conducted a series of meetings with the representatives of imperialism (the visits of Rogers, Sisco and the representatives of Western bourgeois countries to some Arab capitals, the restoration of relations with West Germany...).

The retreatist policy of these regimes included, on the national level, the appeasement of the right-wing and reactionary forces within each of the petit-bourgeois regimes. Thus under the slogan of "national unity" all the reactionary and right-wing forces were brought back to political life: Moslem brothers were let out of jail, and state custody over the property of the feudalists and bourgeoisie in Egypt was lifted. Furthermore the ban was lifted from 200 members of the Syrian bourgeoisie and big merchant class. On the economical level, the policy of retreatism was embodied in a series of economic decisions which sought to encourage imperialist and Arab reactionary investment, and in the creation of wide opportunities for the development of the private sector at the expense of the public sector. It was also manifested in reversing many of the progressive economic measures and in their substitution by right-wing and reactionary measures and policies.

This retreatist policy on both the national-patriotic level and the economic level, which was the result of the weakness and bankruptcy of the petit-bourgeois regimes, demanded the crushing of all forces opposed to it. Hence we find the retreatist policy accompanied by an oppressive policy.

This began in the conspiracy against the resistance movement at the Tripoli conference and culminated in the bloody liquidationist campaigns against the people, against the patriotic movement, and against the communist party and democratic forces in Sudan. Also in the crushing of the movements of workers, peasants, and youth in Egypt and elsewhere.

The transformation of some petit-bourgeois regimes into a force of repression against the masses and their revolutionary activities so as to proceed with the retreatist policy imposed on them by their inability to face up to the task of this phase, is the most important factor in the struggle that is taking place between the Arab masses on the one hand, and imperialism, Israel, and Arab reaction on the other. The danger of this role comes from the use of these regimes of their nationalist patriotic political past to mislead the masses, benefiting in this from the absence of a revolutionary Arab national movement.

This situation should not blind us from seeing the other side of the picture, i.e. the emergence of new class forces composed of vanguard workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals, and a wide progressive sector of youth. These forces have on various occasions expressed their awareness of the dynamics of the on-going struggle and of their primary role in this struggle. There is no doubt that these manifestations, measured by the amount of repression which they have been subjected to, are important indicators of a new birth.

This fact is very important for our understanding of the retreatist position of the petit-bourgeois regimes. This retreat does not occur in a vacuum and in isolation from a historical process of class polarization. Thus we have to realize that the new class forces; and the consolidation of their role require time and struggle. But we must be aware simultaneously of the part that we must play in this situation and must reaffirm the primacy of alliances with progressive popular forces. This must take place according to our understanding of the process of class struggle in these countries.

We face today in some of the petit-bourgeois regimes, a new reality. This reality differs radically from that which existed in 1968, 1969, and at the beginning of 1970. It requires a new stand.

This position must not be understood as requiring a continuous battle with these regimes on the subject of the Palestinian resistance movement. For the objective and subjective conditions now existing requires

a certain (style of) tactical relationship with these regimes which reflect the predominant objective and subjective conditions.

The state of retreat in which the Palestinian revolutionary movement finds itself because of the heavy blows at it, especially in Jordan—together with the stagnation of the Arab national revolutionary movement which could provide support for the resistance movement in its battle against all curtailing and liquidationist schemes summarize the dominant objective and subjective conditions at both the Palestinian and Arab levels. These conditions demand tactical consideration when we define our position towards these regimes.

Daily attempts are made by these regimes to interfere with the resistance. This interference aims at dominating the resistance in such a way that the latter becomes objectively and practically unable to rebel against the plans and policies of these regimes. This demands that the resistance wage a legitimate struggle against such plans so as to protect the independence of its struggle and political line. This legitimate struggle will lead the resistance into unequal battles (which will make its success in such battles doubtful) unless this struggle takes into consideration the tactics that are demanded by the existing objective and subjective situation.

Thus, while it is important and necessary to review the positions and previous methods of dealing with these regimes, it is important and necessary to consider, in our review, the tactics that are necessitated by the existing objective and subjective conditions at both the Palestinian and Arab level.

We must, in the coming stage take into consideration the following aspects:

—The contradiction between Israel and the Arab petit-bourgeois regimes, despite the impotence and surrender of these regimes (in the light of Israeli ambitions to annex the land it has occupied, and with reference to the freedom of economic dealings after the settlement) on effective contradiction that cannot be resolved easily or quickly. Consequently, there is a period during which the resistance can benefit tactically, especially when arranging its priorities in the coming battles. During this period the resistance can avoid exposing itself to all the enemies simultaneously without sacrificing or ignoring the interests of the rising patriotic and democratic movement inside these Arab countries.

—The relationship of the resistance with these regimes will be dy-

namic and not static. The resistance movement has to define this relationship in such a way as to serve simultaneously, its tactics and strategy.

At this stage, the resistance must avoid confrontation except in defending its cause and the freedom of its political and military movement. This tactic must not be followed at the expense of the relationship of the resistance with the Arab national movement which is more revolutionary and radical than these regimes.

b) International Alliances

The resistance movement, in general, has been mistaken during the previous stage in its understanding of the problem of alliances, whether these were with the regimes or with the Arab masses. This mistake led to the loss of one of the most important of its dimensions (i.e. its mass Arab dimension). Consequently, it committed a strategic mistake. However, the resistance committed another basic mistake when its leadership failed to realize the importance of the internationalist arena for its battle, and the objective necessity for alliance with the forces of revolution and progress in the world. These forces are represented under three main headings:

a) Movements of national liberation in the Third world.

b) The Socialist countries.

c) The progressive movements of the proletariat in the capitalist countries in the West.

An understanding of the question of alliance seen from this perspective places the resistance movement in its correct position on the map of internationalist struggle against imperialism. This is the struggle against which the Palestinian and Arab masses wage one of its most prominent battles and which constitutes one of the most dangerous and powerful imperialist links.

The left of the resistance movement is required to put its general theoretical positions into material political and organizational forms. It is also required to translate into a realistic language its understanding of the international struggle and the international features of the imperialist attack. It is required to do the same with respect to its awareness of the unity of the struggle against imperialism, its links, and its interactions.

The key points for such a strategy must be based on the following:

1) The belief in the necessity and inevitability of the unity of the socialist camp, and of the establishment of relationships with the socialist countries by realistic commitment to this belief. The contemporary importance of this line reflects itself directly in the rejection of opportunism in international relations and internationalist alliances.

2) Awareness of the primary role that national liberation movements play in the 'Third World' today, and the central importance of these movements in the process of confronting imperialism and defeating it. Similarly, we must be aware of the degree to which the armed struggle of these movements is becoming closer to each other and influencing each other effectively and positively. It is, however, necessary to realize at the same time that national liberation movements of the 'Third World' cannot, today, be bourgeois movements or under bourgeois leadership, or expressed by petit-bourgeois reformist military regimes. This is so because of the objective conditions and because of the international nature of imperialism. We must try to find out whether and to what degree it is possible to utilize, tactically speaking, such conditions to push the revolution forward. However, the basic criterion remains in use by the national liberation movements the method of armed struggle led by the working class and its allies to solve the contradiction with its class and rational enemies.

3) A deep belief in the historical role that the proletariat in the capitalist industrial countries will play. This part can temporarily be delayed through an increase by the capitalist class of the process of the pillage of the 'Third World'. However, such a historic role cannot be abolished, nor can its natural and conscious development into a revolutionary role be arrested. We must be aware of the relationship between this role with the continuity of struggle in the world, and the increasing support of the socialist countries for this struggle.

The left of the resistance movement in particular is required to build the strongest of links with the international progressive, labour, and student forces in the West, and to strengthen its international solidarity with them. It must be realized also that such solidarity does not express itself in the form of material, moral, and other support given to the resistance, but also through strengthening and raising the level of the struggle against the ruling classes inside their countries.

XV. Resistance Inside Occupied Palestine

We should not be distracted by our awareness of the strategic dimension according to which the battle of the liberation of Palestine is waged by the fact that resistance in occupied Palestine (in the sense of confronting the enemy daily with armed violence and other means) must have priority in our thinking.

However, this orientation cannot produce positive results if it is not based on the following:

a) A continuous critical review of our experience, so as to benefit from its lessons, constantly feeding it with new elements and tactics which are as elastic and changeable as the Israeli and reactionary plans in their battle against our people in the occupied territories.

b) Keeping abreast with the plans and programmes of the enemy and its political, economic, social, and cultural measures, in addition to its military movements. These must be studied scientifically and their aims uncovered early so as to take the necessary steps to foil them.

c) Care must be taken not to break the link between the combatants inside the occupied areas and those outside. These links must not be relaxed because of the problems faced by the leadership, most of which is found outside. Such a relaxation can only lead to the lessening of the importance and priority which must be given to the fighters inside the occupied territories in terms of political and military support in all its forms and in terms of giving this area the appropriate size when drawing plans of action for each stage of the struggle.

The leadership of the central resistance movement (most of which is found outside occupied Palestine) must be careful not to let its existence outside lead to an inadequate interaction with the struggles of the masses inside the occupied area. The degree to which this leadership is occupied in the struggle against the stooge regime in Jordan and in other resistance battles in the Arab area must remain balanced with its duty as the leader of a revolution of more than a million of our people under Israeli occupation. These masses cannot contribute directly now in the fateful battle between the resistance and the reactionary regime in Jordan. Consequently, its task remains to resist the Israeli enemy and to support the resistance against the Jordanian regime through its struggle against Israel.

These three basic principles must remain in our minds whenever we discuss the resistance movement and its tasks.

We must realize that raising the level of armed struggle against Israel, together with increasing its effectiveness and building it on secure historical bases odds strength to the resistance movement in its battle against Jordanian reaction. It also strengthens the resistance movement in all its other political battles and contributes in pushing the Arab national liberation struggle forward.

The continuity of the fight against Israel and the serious work to raise the effectiveness of this fight has a special importance in this period. This is so because such a struggle retains the national-patriotic aspect of the revolution and gives the resistance the general support of the widest sections of the Arab masses. Such a wide support helps the resistance in its various other battles in Jordan and in the Arab arena generally.

With reference to our experience in armed struggle in the past period, we can record, briefly, the following points:

1) The resistance movement tended, on the whole, towards emphasizing military action in itself. This was done by training armed groups and sending them from outside instead a working among the people in the occupied territories according to organized revolutionary methods, and through establishing the secret bases, cells and leadership which can continue the battle amid the organization and mobilization of the masses.

2) This method led to neglect of the political side of the struggle. Yet this is the basic aspect of the struggle according to which the masses can be organized and a general revolutionary atmosphere can be created; and according to which the conspiracies of the occupiers and their agents, together with their domination of the morale and direction of the masses, can be foiled.

3) The vacuum that resulted from the political absence of the resistance in the occupied territories has opened a wide sphere for the emergence of three forms of activity:

a) patriotic activities based on emotional reactions. These would become inflamed on certain occasions and go through heroic but temporary phases and could easily be contained. The vicissitudes of this form of patriotic activity were subject mainly to emotional criteria.

b) the activities of the nationalists and reactionaries, old and new. This initially took a form opposed to occupation; however, it gradually converged to meet with the occupation as the mutu-

al class interests coincided.

c) political activities initiated under the direction of the Israeli occupation, and whose aims were defined right from the beginning, by the occupation. This aim was to create a suitable atmosphere for the consolidation of the occupation either directly or in the form of a puppet Palestinian state, amid all this the resistance was, as a whole, lacking in effective political work among the masses.

4) The Israelis exploited this situation to the full. Thus their programme was based right from the start on driving the resistance gradually to the East so that fighting it would take a purely militarily form away from the daily life of the masses. They also aimed at preventing the introduction of revolutionary violence into the daily political life of Israeli civilians and Arabs of the West Bank. Except for their failure in Gaza, in this sphere, they did achieve their aims in the West Bank and the Golan Heights.

5) The central point concerning the aim of the Israelis in the occupied land was based on the creation of ordinary life conditions for the majority of the masses so that the people would direct their attention to their daily problems, leaving the resistance as a vanguard force only, without it becoming a mass movement. As such, the secret police and the instruments of oppression can deal with it; hence, the policy of 'open bridges' with East Jordan and the policy of employing Arab labour in Israel, together with various other similar policies.

All these policies benefit the Israeli economy, and at the same time serve to abort the resistance.

These five points constitute the main five general observations which can be mentioned generally concerning the situation in the occupied territories. However, it is important to be aware of the differences in the situation between the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the territories occupied since 1948.

a) The Gaza Strip

The conspicuous state of poverty in Gaza led to the consequent growth of class consciousness there in comparison with the west Bank. This together with the high population density (under Arab-Egyptian administration during a period of the latter's nationalist expansion) and the

familiarity of the people of Gaza with arms (before 1956 and during the Israeli occupation in 1956 and afterwards) plus the fact that over half the population in Gaza are 1948 refugees, all established a strong base for struggle that the occupation forces could not use for its own benefit. On the contrary this has created a suitable atmosphere for the launching of armed resistance among the masses who have strongly embraced it.

The resistance experience in Gaza constitutes one of the most prominent historical experiences concerning the capacity of a small, poor, unarmed, and geographically isolated people to continue, given its conditions a heroic and almost unknown struggle.

It is no secret, nor is it historically false to say that the organization of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine played in Gaza an essential role in leading the struggle of the people of the Gaza Strip. This has proved in the admission of the enemy itself, not only its organizational strength, but also the depth of its patriotic roots.

Despite these heroic deeds which our people in the Gaza Strip continue to perform, it has had to pay a price—martyrs and prisoners—and faces dangers and obstacles from within and without. In other words, than are a number of factors each of which has had its influence on the organization, both materially and morally. These factors—objective and subjective—cannot all be listed here; but the subjective factors relate to the insufficiency of the political-military cadre after the continuous blows it received (group arrests of the first line of command which happened several times, the martyrdom of a number of leading cadres). However, because of the organization's popular base, it partially succeeded in compensating for the loss of these cadres; however, this was achieved in such a way that requires the organization to give this aspect greater attention. The silence prevailing on the other front lines allowed the Israeli enemy to concentrate on suppressing and crushing the resistance in the Strip. Thus it sent into the Strip its most barbaric and ruthless section (i.e. Blue Berets). It also carried out a series of operations of forceful emigration, banishment, collective imprisonment, the destruction of houses, building of wide roads through refugee camps, and the establishment of permanent and mobile guard and check points almost everywhere.

The enemy finds in the conditions of recession and their Arab reflections its best aid. This is so because the September events have encouraged the activities of some of the traditional and reactionary stooge leaderships outside and inside the Strip. This was done under the supervision of an Arab intelligence service in preparation for the "inheritance" of the

Israeli occupation in case of a peaceful settlement according to which the Israelis would withdraw from the occupied Strip.

The basis for the coming phase in which the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine undertakes to play a major role is composed of the following factors: Israel's attaching of the Strip to its command of the middle area; the constant activity towards lessening the population density of the Strip; the encouragement of the activity of the stooge traditional leadership by an Arab intelligence service; the establishment of collective security camps in Sinai; and the acceleration of the campaign of terror and pursuit; all this amid the situation of retreat through which the Arab national liberation movement and the resistance in particular is living.

The Popular Front is required to continue to accelerate and deepen its leadership role in the armed struggle of Gaza amid all these complex difficulties. This must be done through its complete programme for the struggle, and through increasing the interests of its cadres and leaders in their responsibility to accelerate the process of building the party, of deepening the consciousness of its bases, providing the party with the necessary combative capabilities, and through the establishment of a national-patriotic front that is capable of benefiting from mass mobilization and its direction according to the principle of revolutionary violence.

b) The West Bank

When the Hashemite army retreated from the West Bank it left it to the Israelis shattered and torn. This was so because the reactionary and stooge Jordanian authorities undertook in successive and total campaigns to crush and liquidate the patriotic and progressive movements and individuals, especially in the regime's campaigns at April 1957 and November 1966.

Following the Israeli occupation there was an outburst of armed resistance. This launched attacks against the enemy most of which were organized and sent from outside. There is no doubt that a large part of these were undertaken at the expense of the quiet and patient work among the people of the West Bank to renew the building of their cadres and their vanguard bases as a foundation for revolutionary action.

This activity was accompanied by noisy propaganda. This was facilitated by the petit-bourgeois regimes which were interested in lessening the enormity of their defeat in the eyes of the masses. It was also facili-

tated by the petit-bourgeois mentality of the leadership in most of the resistance organizations.

At the same time the Israelis had their own well-prepared and long-term plans concerning the future of the West Bank. Thus, while the resistance was acting as if liberation were a question of two or three years, the Israelis were planning to keep the occupied territories for a long period; that is, until they have been successfully transformed into a structure or structures that are, practically speaking, under its political, military, economic and cultural domination.

This, then, is what explains the policy of open bridges, the building of numerous colonies, the "unification" of Jerusalem, the utilization of Arab labour, the creation of a fake and deceptive atmosphere of prosperity, the lessening of direct military appearances suggestive of the occupation, the attention given to reactionary municipality, leaders in reparation for transforming them into political leaders when necessary, the expansion of imports and transport between Israel and the West Bank and between the latter and the East Bank and other Arab markets.

It has become very clear now that the Israelis are planning to keep their domination in various forms over the occupied territories. Regardless of whether this domination takes the form of "Israel establishing its little empire over the West Bank as a first stage" or the form of "Israel considering itself as the permanent government in the West Bank" as [Moshe] Dayan said, it is a fact that Israel has gone a long way towards achieving this transfer from settler-colonialism to imperialist expansionism. This will take various forms according to the situation, and to the demographic, geographic and economic map.

Thus we find so far that, apart from the settlements established by it in the West Bank, imports from Israel have come to form 85% of the total imports of the West Bank. More than 10% of the exports of Israel go to the occupied territories. More than 1/5 of labour forces of the West Bank work in Israel in what is called "material work."

Since the Israeli plans (which are in total harmony with those of imperialism) are designing this future for the occupied territories and for the West Bank in particular, it has become imperative for the resistance movement to confront this plan and to use all possible revolutionary methods to hinder its execution, and to create the combative atmosphere to foil it.

The project of the United Arab Kingdom was put forward to serve

towards consolidating an acceptable form of Israeli imperialism in the West Bank. With this project—taking into consideration the time span necessary for its realization and the necessary amendment which must be applied to it—Israel should be able to consolidate with Arab reactionary forces and under the supervision of American imperialism, the plans it has drawn following June 1967.

This reality has, however, another side to it: This is the clarity that the position has gained generally especially the Hashemite-Israeli convergence. Consequently, a specific aim has crystallized during this period in the West Bank. This is the thwarting of the Hashemite plan and, at the same time, failing the Israeli support given to it and which is reflected in the series of procedures such as municipal elections, the expansion of what are called opportunities for Arab labour in Israel as together with the various attempts designed to minimize the direct feeling of the burden of occupation.

The recent experience of the resistance compared to Israeli plans, and the lessons derived from practice together with the developments since September 1970 make any vision of future action in the West Bank (and the occupied territories in general) related to the following points:

1) Any attentive observation of the situation and changes in the West Bank and the viewing of events through a total analysis of imperialist, Zionist, and reactionary plans in the area, cancels immediately any arbitrary separation between the struggle inside the occupied territories and the totality of struggle outside against the various forms taken by the conspiracy.

The relationship between the struggle inside the West Bank and that of the patriotic democratic movement in the East Bank must be viewed dialectically. It is necessary to increasingly unify the two at both the level of planning and execution.

2) Serious work must be undertaken to create and expand the leadership cadre which is capable of taking the political and organizational responsibility inside the West Bank. It is also necessary to develop and expand the rear leadership responsible outside the occupied territories. All this must be undertaken with a deep understanding of the importance of the party, its central role, and the priority it takes in this fateful battle. The party is not only capable of understanding the complex map and the interconnected and intertwined forces waging the battle, but also capable of drawing its counter tactical and

strategic plans and their realization on the road to victory.

3) Revolutionary violence must continue and accelerate. It must be understood that in this period it plays a central role in the process of realizing the remainder of the conditions for victory. These armed activities must, however, he governed by military science which in dictated by guerrilla warfare, together with the consideration it is subject to at specific periods and places.

Armed struggle leads, in this period, not only to the wrecking of the status quo that Israel wants to impose and more, but also to an acceleration of the ripening objective conditions and helps the subjective conditions to grow.

The natural introduction to the demolition of all the conspiracies surrounding our people in the West Bank and the rest of occupied territories is to be found in the scientific practice of the tactics of secret war in the cities, guerrilla warfare in the countryside and other aspects of revolutionary violence that have to be practiced in the first stages of a long-term popular war of liberation.

4) A view of armed struggle which looks at it in isolation from the total battle (especially if it is understood in a mechanical accumulative process of military operations launched from the outside or simply as armed patrols which carry out specific tasks) such a view cannot fulfill the required revolutionary tasks.

Such tasks cannot be fulfilled without awareness of the necessity to develop the struggle in its various forms (military, political, cultural) through the understanding of the strategy of the enemy and its plans in the occupied territories together with the methods it uses to carry out these plans.

The mobilization of the masses, and their organization into associations, unions, and societies and so on together with waging the battles which express their daily needs, national hopes, and future ambitions is what is required to create the combative mass political climate which can hinder the plans of the enemy and expose them. It can also isolate the collaborators and traitors who are being prepared to play a stooge and collaborationist role. Such a mood also creates the shield of the revolutionary liberationist action, its major weapon, and solid ground for victory. All this has to be achieved by participating in the various forms of struggle which have been developed by revolutionaries in history (revolutionary violence, demonstrations,

strikes, partial and total boycott, bulletins, national celebrations and the revival of national events which express the combative conscience of the masses, the punishment of collaborators, the development of progressive national culture... etc., etc.).

5) In the occupied territories especially in the West Bank, we must be oriented towards creating the widest national front which includes all the forces that are against the occupation. The programme of this front must be based on a scientific understanding of all the existing contradictions. This front, led by a progressive force aware of the dynamics and dimensions of the struggle, must lead the masses in their daily battles, and must realize a policy of self-dependence by providing the necessary military requirements and various other needs. This policy must have priority and cannot be achieved without moving among the masses and without its will.

Our task in the coming phase in the West Bank must be decisively limited by these five major points. They must be developed into a detailed programme and subjected to daily leadership capable of acting quickly through scientific awareness of the dimensions of the enemy's plans. Such leadership must also be aware of the inter-related nature of its front and of the necessity of polarization in the coming phase. There is, on the one side, the front which includes the Hashemite regime and the class forces which are shared with the Israelis and American imperialism, and the front composed of the Palestinian and Jordanian masses together with the other Arab revolutionary forces on the other side.

c) The Territories Occupied since 1948

The national and class oppression which the Zionist enemy has practiced in various forms against our people living under the burden of occupation since 1948 was reflected mainly in the open racial discrimination practiced by the oppressors and occupiers against the owners of land and right. This enemy kept a portion of our people under tough military administration. The most important of its manifestations was the expropriation of the land, collective expulsion, psychological warfare, the deprivation of the right of movement and work, together with the deprivation of political rights and their total isolation from their Palestinian and Arab nation. This is in addition to the ruin the enemy inflicted on our people's national heritage especially its progressive aspects. This is apart from various other forms of national and class oppression.

All this, however, has failed to erase the patriotic feelings of our people in occupied Palestine: Naturally these masses were able to express in various forms bitterness during the period between 1948 and 1967. These received the most repugnant farm of political, cultural, and bloody oppression. However, the emergence of the armed resistance and its growth provided these masses with a method of struggle which it was quick to support.

The policy of 'open borders' between the new and old occupied territories which the Israelis have used in varying degrees since the 1967 occupation, has not served the Israeli plan as was intended. On the contrary it led to the creation of important contacts between the Arab people of the occupied territories, old and new, after an isolation that had lasted 20 years. This renewed the natural relatedness, relatively speaking, between our people in the occupied territories of l948 and the remainder of the Palestinian people. Thus the same political expressions were established between them within the projected horizons. This provided a fertile ground for the resistance movement to spread its roots to the previously 'forbidden' territories. However, because of its class, ideological, and organizational structure, the resistance did not devote sufficient energy and effort to this. Nonetheless, the Popular Front was relatively conscious of this important problem, and undertook, despite its delay in the matter, the formulation of plans intended to draw our people in that area and seriously oriented itself towards mobilizing and organizing them and creating the core of a revolutionary organization.

However, it is delusive to think that such a precious core can grow spontaneously, or to imagine that the difficulties that relate to its work, connections, and the channels that tie it to the central command are transitory difficulties. Similarly it is a delusion to think that the plans of the Zionist enemy which are designed to contain and crush such a revolutionary core are easily confronted.

The Popular Front is required in the coming phase to devote special effort concerning the future of such a core, and must provide the tactics that fit the strategic tasks that we expect from our organization in the occupied Palestine of 1948 to fulfill.

It is important that we should work according to a scientific plan for the benefit of the revolution. This must be done through the understanding and activation of the class contradictions inside Israel itself.

We are aware that the class contradictions in any colonialist-settler

society move slowly and are slow in playing a basic role for the benefit of the national liberation movement. But this should not mean that Israel is a classless society or a society existing above classes.

The left-wing movements in Israel which are still in the early stages of growth and which are still so far both numerically and politically very weak, provide a symbolic indicator of the direction towards which the struggle inside Israel may develop strategically speaking. These then are the broad outlines of the conditions of our people in the occupied territories, the nature of the objective and subjective conditions through which we face the enemy, and our general expectations of the coming period.

We must, however, realize that there are no easy solutions to complex and difficult problems and we must remain aware of this fact when we deal with these difficulties.

The failing of the American-Zionist-reactionary conspiracy in the occupied territories (the establishment of a stooge, client entity on the dead body of the patriotic movement and its future) cannot be achieved in isolation from the total situation of confrontation between the imperialist attack on the one side and the Arab national liberation movement on the other.

The historical answer resides in the consolidation of the broad strategic outlines of the Popular Front: i.e. the building of the revolutionary party; the building of the patriotic front; the mobilization of the masses and the intensification of revolutionary violence.

The historical answer must at the same time give the utmost importance to the preservation of our revolution inside the occupied territory and its support with all the means of force, growth and defiance. The occupied territories must be given priority in terms of material and planned propaganda and by considering our work inside Palestine as of the utmost importance. The Popular Front, because of its special situation inside Palestine, and because it is considered the most aware and alert vanguard of the Palestinian resistance movement, is required, before all others, to put forward these programmes and to translate them into practice so as to be in harmony with, and organizationally inter-linked with the struggle of our masses in the East Bank of the Jordan so as to establish Popular Liberation war as a method of total liberation of Palestinian and other Arab land.

The application of the four principles mentioned in this programme

(the building of the party, the national front, mass mobilization, the practice of revolutionary violence) and in the sense that has been mentioned is the way towards a higher standard of our war against the Israeli enemy that suits the nature of the phase.

Our people must orient itself towards establishing a revolutionary organization which can confront the enemy and its plans, and can deal with the situation of our people in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the occupied territories since l948 (especially the Jaleel area). This revolutionary organization must evolve a suitable political and military programme in the light of which it can proceed towards mobilizing the exploited, oppressed, and deprived masses which must take their cause in their own hands and start a long, historical, and difficult struggle. This struggle must be based on revolutionary violence against the enemy that occupies our land, exploits its resources and the fruits of its labour.

Through such a detailed translation of the four main principles—mentioned above—our work inside can be transformed from its present standard to the standard of revolutionary historical work.

XVI. The Battle of the Resistance Against the Reactionary Regime in Jordan

Events have decisively resolved the subject of the relationship between the resistance movement and the reactionary regime in Jordan. The resistance has paid the price of its huge error in its reluctance, wavering, and indecisiveness towards the subject. What is required now is for the resistance or at least the revolutionary sections of it, to resolve this subject in a final and decisive manner and not in the manner of temporary reaction that can be aborted by the maneuvers of the regime and its long experience in crushing the movement of the masses.

The translation of the decisive resolution can be performed first through open, clear, and scientific criticism of the previous stand of the resistance, and a deep scientific conviction of the impossibility of coexistence between the revolution and the reactionary regime. It can be accomplished also by declaring to our people this conviction and by moving from a position of defense, appeasement, and wavering to one of attack and clarity which aims at overthrowing the regime through revolutionary violence—the only method capable of accomplishing this task.

We have discussed elsewhere in this programme the subject of the experience of the armed Palestinian resistance with the reactionary regime

in Jordan, and we also provided a quick evaluation of this experience and its strategic mistakes. It is not necessary, therefore, to repeat the main critical points that were recorded. However, these points lead us to the following preliminary inferences:

The battle of the resistance against the reactionary stooge regime in Jordan is, in the coming phase, a central battle for the resistance. It represents objectively and historically, the main link in the foiling of the liquidationist plans in all their form, and in the establishment and development of armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.

The Jordanian regime plays now more than at any time before, its historical role as a police station for imperialism and as a guard for its interests. As a policeman it executes its plans that are, at the same time, the plans of Israel. Than the destruction of the regime is a basic task in the battle against Israel and imperialism in the area.

It has become clearer now than at any time before, that the Jordanian reactionary regime is an indivisible part of the mechanics of imperialism in its activity in the Middle East. The obvious reaction to this objective fact lies in placing on top of agenda of the revolutionary movement a revolutionary programme for overthrowing the regime.

This fact has an important consequence whose neglect in the previous stage formed a deadly error in the programmes of the resistance.

Since the battle has become aimed at overthrowing the regime, and not merely at acquiring the right of existence, the freedom of action and the ordering of the relations between the regime and the resistance, it cannot be restricted to the resistance alone. It becomes the task of the masses of this regime, i.e. the task of the national-patriotic and revolutionary movement. Consequently, the complete form of the instrument to achieve this task is a "National Jordanian-Palestinian Front" which includes the revolutionary and patriotic Jordanian forces together with the forces of the resistance movement which has come to consider the overthrowing of the regime as one of its central tasks.

It is obvious that this position assumes the emergence of a Jordanian revolutionary force which can mobilize the masses of the Jordanian people around a programme that concerns its daily struggles for the building of its future. The resistance must not consider itself, with its programme for the liberation of Palestine, an alternative to this revolutionary movement which has to deal with the tasks of the national democratic revolution in Jordan.

A revolutionary Jordanian party with a programme of political, military, and organisational action, forms a central issue in the coming stage.

The Palestinian resistance, especially its left-wing, are required to support this question.

This process of building a foundation must be based on a clear vision and this must come as a consequence of a scientific study of a group of issues, the most important of which are the following:

a) The regime and the nature of its past and present connections with imperialist forces. This must be demonstrated in tangible economic, political, and military terms and in the way these links are reflected in the attitude of the regime towards the masses, beginning with the establishment of the regime until today. This includes the events of 1936, 1948, 1957, 1963, 1966, September 1970, July 1971 and the project of March 1971.

—The class forces on which the regime depends must also be clarified; their numerical size, economic role, political weight, the nature of their connections with the regime on their secondary contradictions with it.

—The military establishment on which the regime depends; the economic foundation of its loyalty to the regime; its numerical size; its political and military weight and the nature of contradictions within it.

—How does the regime benefit from the conditions of underdevelopment to mobilize other forces to support it in its battle against the masses (e.g. the tribes, national and religious minorities.)

—All the plans (political, economic, social, and cultural) during this period.

b) The class forces that are harmed by the regime:

—The working class: size, distribution, nature, its history of struggle the trade union movement of workers in Jordan, the labour laws... etc.

—The peasantry: number, nature of relations of production, the peasant movement; agricultural workers, etc.

—The petit-bourgeoisie: its various sectors.

c) The Jordanian society: economically and socially.

d) The national Jordanian movement in its various stages: The various political parties; their experience and reality.

In light of this study a revolutionary Jordanian party can established which is to mobilize the masses in Jordan (East-bankers and Palestinians) for the national democratic revolution i.e. the overthrow of the reactionary authority (feudal and comprador) and for the establishment of the authority of the new democracy (the alliance of workers, peasants, and the petit-bourgeoisie under the leadership of the working class).

As for the tasks of the national democratic forces in Jordan they can be summarized under the following headings:

1) The overthrow of the royal regime which represents the alliance between agricultural and tribal feudalism and the comprador under the hegemony of American imperialism. This has transformed Jordan into a police station for the protection of Israel and Zionism and into a major obstacle in the face of the popular movement in Jordan and its open relationships with the Arab national liberation movement.

2) The erection of a national democratic regime that relies on the alliance of all the national democratic forces and that releases the freedom of the masses and restores to Jordan its national and patriotic face. Such is the necessary atmosphere for making Jordan a major launching ground for the liberation forces. It should also provide the opportunity for the realization of the following:

a) The release of the Jordanian economy from the domination of imperialism through the impotent feudal-comprador structure; and the creation of a national economy that depends basically on Jordan's own resources, on its complementary nature to other independent sectors of Arab economy, and on the dominance of the public sector.

b) The erection of an agricultural economy that liberates the land and the man working on it. This should guarantee the full utilization of the land, secure for the peasants the ownership of their efforts, the establishment of irrigation projects that protect against the danger of drought (such as dams, installations, and pumps that utilize the water of streams and underground water) the mechanization of agriculture and the adoption of modern agricultural techniques.

Such an agrarian reform can resolve the existing rural problem

which expresses itself in poverty, emigration, and semi-total dependence on the bureaucracy that enslaves the will of the peasant and Bedouin masses.

c) The resolution of the rural problem in the way mentioned above establishes the material foundation for the resolution of the nomadic problem and lays down the economic base for the sedentarization of the bedouins. This should transform them gradually into a productive sector which will consequently liberate them from the domination of the bureaucracy and reaction that builds its power through forcing them to depend on it.

d) The realization of full democracy in education by providing it free for all and by giving it a progressive patriotic content.

e) The provision of social and health services in the rural and desert areas.

f) The provision of basic freedoms for the masses without distinction, and the securing of collective and personal freedoms (freedom of political organization, of trade unions, of peasant societies and collectives, the freedom of the press, publication and speech, and the right to strike and work for all, and equality and freedom for women.)

3) The full liberation of the political relations of Jordan from all forms of dependence and the establishment of an external policy based on the following principles:

a) The central position of the Palestinian cause.

b) A progressive, patriotic, Arab policy antagonistic to imperialism, Zionism, and reaction and totally open to the Arab national liberation movement.

c) The establishment of the widest net of relationships with the socialist world and dependence on fair aid from the socialist countries in realizing the national democratic development programme.

It must be clear, however, that the instruments that can realize the tasks of the national democratic revolution in Jordan can only be the "Jordanian-Palestinian national front." The basis of this stage is the armed struggle against the Israeli occupation and against the reactionary stooge regime in Jordan.

This means the existence of a Jordanian front which includes all

the patriotic and democratic forces in Jordan and is linked to a Palestinian national front, which, in turn, includes the Palestinian resistance groups.

This formulation requires three programmes: the programme of the Jordanian national front, the programme of the Palestinian national front, and the programme of the Jordanian-Palestinian national front. The diversity, difficulties, and multiplicity of the arenas of the battle, together with the interconnectedness of the enemy camp, makes the above formulation the most objective and effective.

This means that the political programme of the Jordanian-Palestinian national front cannot be confined to the affirmation that the reactionary stooge regime in Jordan is now the instrument of imperialism for striking at the resistance, nor to the necessity of overthrowing it to protect the revolution. The political programme of this front must present to the Jordanian and Palestinian masses in Jordan on analysis of the nature of the regime, its class structure, the way it exploits the masses and its positions as an obstacle to social progress. Thus the classes of the revolution—workers, peasants, petit-bourgeoisie, and sections of the national bourgeoisie—come to feel that the eradication of this regime is the only way to remove poverty, misery, and underdevelopment on the one hand and to confront oppression and the Israeli-imperialist danger on the other hand.

Given the reality of the revolutionary and patriotic Jordanian movement, a big theoretical and organizational effort is required so that the revolutionary and patriotic movement becomes capable of mobilizing the masses in Jordan and consequently the main force in the Jordanian-Palestinian front which aims at overthrowing the regime.

Our battle against the reactionary regime in Jordan requires a special consideration of the precise and detailed translation of the major points mentioned in this programme: The building of the party; the patriotic-national front, mass mobilization, violence and alliances (a detailed study will be published by the front on this subject).

The main point that we want to emphasize here is that at a time when we are seriously moving towards the building of the party, the national front, and the mobilization of the masses—according to our political programme which aims at the mobilization of all the forces of the revolution—the practice of violence against the regime is the line that enables us to succeed along these lines. The regime, given the big difference in the

balance of forces that exists now, will adopt the practice of violence as a basis for hitting very hard and for imposing a black and terrible police state to choke any free movement among the masses. Our main weapon here will be the way we practice violence without allowing the enemy to crush us totally: The requirement for secret activity, for concealment, for depriving the enemy of control of our forces; the nature of targets, secret resistance in the city; the aim of mobilizing the masses through our practice of violence; the mobilizing institution and its interest in us, and before anything else determination and patience together with all the subjective traits necessary for a hard battle of this kind.

Our understanding of the sources of the strength of the reactionary regime (internal and external) and our scientific analysis of it is our best aid in directing our blows to weaknesses of the regime in order strategically to overthrow it.

Our awareness of revolutionary method in dealing with soldiers inside the repressive institution in Jordan comprises a basic element in determining the future of the battle.

It is similarly determined by our success in understanding and dealing with the Bedouin question, the position of the bedouins in the process of production and the reasons for the success of the regime in exploiting them.

We realize that the overthrow of the regime in Jordan might be followed by an Israeli and American occupation of East Jordan and other parts of the homeland. But we must realize too that when the bottle reaches such a level, the confrontation will have reached an advanced stage, and imperialism will be on the way to losing its position to the masses. Thus the strategic ebb of the enemy camp would have begun. This means an acceleration of the process of the ripening of the objective conditions through which the contradictions can be resolved in the interests of the people.

To reach such a stage in the battle, in a difficult period, requires continuous revolutionary effort (intellectual, political and organizational) that remains steadfast in front of obstacles.

XVII. The Battle of the Resistance Against the Liquidationist Plans

The danger of liquidating the Palestinian problem has been in existence since June 1967 as a probable result of the big military defeat of

the Arab regimes in that war. This danger has become clearer since the Security Council resolution of November 1967 and the acceptance by Egypt of this resolution. The danger of liquidating the problem during the present period is clearer and more immediate because of the weak situation of the resistance movement since September 1970; before that date the resistance movement formed an obstacle in the face of political development. Another reason is found in the changes witnessed by the nationalist regimes—which have generally hit at the left-wing of these regimes. Furthermore, the concentration of international efforts, especially American, to enforce settlement constitutes another reason for the immediacy of the danger. American imperialism realizes—as it has officially announced several times—that new is the best time to enforce a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Indeed these liquidationist schemes were consolidated gradually. The project of King Hussein came in March 1972 as the most obvious of conspiratorial forms.

However, before arriving at such consolidation (and perhaps in preparation for a more capitulationist plan) American imperialism has—with the help of reactionary regimes in the area—continued to upset the balance of forces for the benefit of Israel so as to achieve the conditions necessary for its absolute domination over the area and for a total Arab surrender.

The policy of American imperialism has counted on winning time; time which Arab reaction has used primarily to attack the resistance and to instigate attacks on all the Arab national liberation movements wherever they might be found. This is because of the influence enjoyed by Arab reaction since the Khartoum conference in 1967.

It is also the time that was used by the military petit-bourgeois regimes to strengthen their position of power and to gradually stabilize their retreatist and capitulationist positions hiding behind the slogans that they used in order to keep the masses busy. It is furthermore the time that was used by Israel to deepen its domination (geographically, militarily, economically, and politically) over the occupied territories and to strengthen the status quo together with its military superiority over all existing Arab forces.

Israel and American imperialism have found others to help them carry out their plan to gain time and to strengthen the status quo. These were represented by the United Nations, the Western bourgeois states,

the international balance of forces, in addition to the client regimes in the area and the increasing impotence of the other regimes.

It is clear that despite the seriousness of the capitulations offered by the Arab regimes surrounding Israel—in their eagerness for what is termed peaceful settlement—imperialism and Israel still believe that they can (because of the great disparity in the balance of forces and because of the retreat of the Arab regimes) achieve more domination over the area and strengthen their control.

The plan put forward by King Hussein to establish a United Arab Kingdom forms a more treacherous step than any step towards a peaceful settlement. This step—as we explained previously—represents the beginning of a solution in which American imperialism, Israel, and Jordanian reaction are on a common ground: This common ground involves finding a "solution" for the problem of the Palestinian people (that is absorbing it in a stooge entity) and the securing of Israeli domination reflecting the size of the conquest. It also involves the continuing development of Jordanian reaction that has proved to the White House its qualification as a police station for counter-revolution.

This formulation suggests an urgent political issue which is going to develop more and more and which can be used by the enemy camp: That is, the issue of the representation of the Palestinian people.

XVIII. Who Represents the Palestinian People and their National Rights

What makes this question more urgent now than at any time before is the angle from which the imperialist and reactionary enemy suggests its "innovations" for the liquidation of the cause of the Palestinian people: Whether this is King Hussein's plan or any other plans that might be put forward in the future and from the same angle.

Despite the problems which define the special position of the Palestinian problem, the Palestinian people, because they have been dispersed from their land, forced to live in exile and consequently subjected to national oppression, must naturally have a political movement that (if it is to be representative) works for the liberation of its land from occupation and for the eradication of the national injustice to which it has been subjected. Therefore, that which represents the Palestinian people is the Palestinian National Liberation movement which aims at destroying the Zionist structure as represented in Israel. It also aims at liberating all the

Palestinian land, the return of the Palestinian people to its land and the establishment of a democratic society in Palestine. All this assume the rejection of all the conspiracy and liquidationist solutions headed by the Palestinian state plan.

However, the practice of the Palestinian people of their legitimate struggle to regain their land has created a complicated situation which stipulates special tasks that require fulfilling. The first of these tasks is the right of the Palestinian people to work for organizing the movement of their national struggle and all that is related to it. Such a right is natural for a people that have been subjected to national oppression and whose land has become occupied. As far as the Palestinians are concerned, the practice of such a right is not an easy task because a large part of their people has been forced to live on a land that is not under direct occupation.

Consequently, the primary task facing the Palestinian people is that of winning their right to act for the regaining of their land.

Since a large percentage of the Palestinian people are found today on the East Bank (about 70% of the population) and since the West Bank (a piece of Palestine) was part of Jordan before 1967 and forms with the East Bank one political entity, then this special relationship (represented in the unity of the two banks) and the nature of the links between Jordanians and Palestinians makes Jordan the main arena for realizing this task.

Since Jordan in subjected to a reactionary puppet regime that is tied to imperialism and consequently to Zionism and Israel, the fulfillment of the above task depends on the struggle for the overthrowing of the reactionary regime that is allied to imperialism and Israel and for the establishment of a patriotic democratic regime.

The struggle to create an armed popular revolution (which comprises both Jordanians and Palestinians) to overthrow the reactionary regime and to establish a patriotic-democratic regime must be based on a programme that guarantees the national rights of the Palestinian people represented in the right to armed action. It must also prepare the Palestinian passes politically, militarily, and organizationally and must put an end to the process of oppression and slaughter. It must also work to strengthen its integration with the people of trans-Jordan. Finally, it must be based on the programme for the patriotic-democratic revolution in Jordan.

XIX. The Future of the West Bank and its Relationship with the East Bank of Jordan

The relationship of the now-occupied West bank to the East Bank is subject to three possibilities.

a. The First Possibility

This concerns the continuation of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the continuation of the struggle against the occupation until the destruction of the Israeli structure by revolutionary armed struggle.

The continuation of armed struggle and the achievement of its final aim—the destruction of the Zionist structure—is impossible without overthrowing the stooge regime in Jordan and without the erection of a patriotic democratic regime together with the liberation of the West Bank and all the Palestinian land that falls now under occupation, the unity of the two peoples (the Palestinian and Jordanian) becomes—apart from the unity between the two banks—an urgent need. In this case the unity is to be accomplished on the basis of the historical relationship between the two people and their common membership of the Arab nation.

b. The Second Possibility

Here the West Bank or part of it in returned to the domination of the Jordanian regime. This might be accomplished by a joint conspiracy between Jordan and Israel as part of a peaceful settlement. In fact the stooge regime tries to exploit the consequences of the September 1970 attack on the resistance movement to announce that it is the only representative of the Palestinian people. Thus the king is trying to utilize the unity of the two peoples and the historical relationship between them to secure once again, should a peaceful settlement be reached, his domination over the West Bank.

The Palestinian people cannot, given the revolutionary tools at his disposal at the movement, prevent the return of the West Bank to the domination of the puppet regime in Jordan as part of a peaceful settlement. But the Palestinian people will not halt their struggle until they have overthrown this regime in order to continue their struggle for the liberation of all their land. Thus the claim by the Jordanian regime that it represents the Palestinian people at a time when it is preventing Palestinians from struggling to liberate their homeland and is in fact

slaughtering them, is an impertinent, incorrect, and groundless claim.

The struggle of the Palestinian people against the reactionary regime will continue until they seize their legitimate right to struggle for the return of their homeland and the liberation of their country. This struggle will continue even if the West Bank is returned, under a capitulationist settlement, to the Jordanian regime as was the case before 1967. As long as this regime forms an obstacle to the struggle of the Palestinian people for the liberation of their country so it is necessary to overthrow it and build the unity of the two banks of the Jordan on the basis of the historical unity between the two peoples (Palestinian and Jordanian) and on the basis of joint belongingness to the Arab nation. This should foil the attempts made to exploit the animosity and the rejection that the Palestinians feel toward the regime in order to make acceptable the idea of the Palestinian state. This idea is equally as dangerous as the repressive situation that the regime will impose should the West Bank return to its domination.

c. The Third Possibility

This consists in the creation of a Palestinian state comprising the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This would take place as part of a general settlement to what is called the problem of the Middle East.

The third possibility is something that the Arab petit-bourgeois military regimes tend to favour. It was also favoured by the U.S. Department of State before September 1970. However, Israel rejects this for private considerations concerning its strategic interests. Similarly it is also rejected by the Jordanian regime as well as other Arab reactionary regimes.

Nevertheless, the question of creating a client entity for the Palestinians remains on the agenda of imperialism and it is likely to find different expressions.

What needs to be emphasized is the fact that what imperialism puts forward now in the plan of King Hussein is no more than integration between the idea of the "Palestinian state" and that of "the return of Hashemite rule in the West Bank." Thus this plan contains what is worst in both these ideas which constitute its basis and backbone.

The resistance movement is required now:

a) To stand firmly in the face of every attempt to contain the resistance and to use it as an instrument in its plans for a peaceful solution and the

creation of a Palestinian state. b) The resistance movement must expose and isolate all the forces and elements within its ranks that find in the difficult situation a chance to push the resistance movement towards surrender; or else those forces which have been overtaken by the new situation and which have begun, therefore, to contemplate surrender, instead of thinking about the programme that will make the resistance movement capable of survival despite all the difficulties. c) Continual mobilization against liquidationist solutions and the plan for a Palestinian State so that these become associated, in the minds of ordinary people, with treason. d) To seek to form the widest possible Arab patriotic front to support the resistance and its right to continue until liberation.

Finally, the vital point for the resistance in its fight against capitulationist solutions is for it to regain its military and political effectiveness in the occupied territory and in Jordan. For there will be no political solution with a revolutionary Jordan, and the continuation of the resistance's effectiveness in the occupied territories will prevent Israel from finding an advantage in a settlement.

The difficulty of the resistance's battle against peaceful settlement, and the existence of a wide front of forces working for a peaceful settlement and its imposition on the Palestinian people, together with the weak situation in which the liberation movement now finds itself in the Arab world; all this must mean—as far as the resistance is concerned—planning seriously to foil these projects. For in no event must we believe that capitulationist solutions are on the way and that it is no good fighting against them.

Our outlook concerning the liberation movement must be historical and long-term. Consequently, the struggle of our people for liberation must be a continuous one against every conspiracy. For it is through continuous struggle that the issue of liberation remains alive and the struggle towards it remains active under all conditions. Similarly, the petit-bourgeois mentality imagines in its examination of the difficult present day situation, the peaceful settlement on its way, and that the struggle has totally finished.

It is important, historically speaking, for the armed resistance of the Palestinian people to continue. It is important that it should remain in existence in Gaza, the West Bank, in the 1948 territory, and in Jordan. Armed revolution must continue; this is so regardless of whether arms are carried against the Israeli occupation or against any other traitor authority (Palestinian or Jordanian) that may be imposed on the masses as

a result of conspiracies to liquidate the revolution.

If it follows this line the resistance movement will continue to lead the masses.

In wars of liberation the balance of forces define the tactics of the battle; but this should not question whether the battle should or should not be waged.

XX. The Resistance Outside Palestine and Jordan

The new objective conditions together with the new phase we discussed above cannot remain without influencing the resistance movement outside Palestine and Jordan. Similarly, these cannot be translated by the resistance movement into new plans.

It is natural for imperialism to plan the elimination of all branches of resistance, so that these will not provide the soil for the return of a strong resistance to Palestine and Jordan and will not be a source of hope, even a weak one, for the masses, or remain as evidence of the survival of the resistance.

The resistance movement should expect to be hit and finished in Lebanon. The resistance movement in Lebanon must, therefore, watch the situation carefully and learn all it can from the Jordan experience. It should rebuild itself in light of this programme and formulate a clear confrontation plan according to which it can fight for survival and continuity. In as much as the resistance must avoid confronting the Lebanese authorities and opening a new front for the resistance in this difficult situation, so it must be careful to take all the necessary organizational procedures and political positions that will ensure for it continuity and steadfastness.

This cannot be achieved just by controlling the revolutionary behaviour of the members of the resistance and by going underground and planning its tactic precisely, but also through an intimate alliance with the patriotic and progressive movement in Lebanon which is the natural ally of the resistance.

These conditions may, in Syria, lead to an attempt to contain the resistance movement and transform it into a mere traditional military institution whose political horizon does not exceed that of the Syrian regime. It is the duty of the resistance movement to preserve its independence and liberationist revolutionary strategy.

It is the duty of the branches of the resistance outside Jordan and Palestine to exceed plans for survival and self-defence. It is the duty of these branches to formulate the necessary plans to consolidate the resistance's revolutionary character, and to benefit from the lessons of the previous process. Thus it will increase its effectiveness and strength and compensate, relatively speaking, for the losses that have been inflicted on the body of the resistance in the previous period and actually support the central movement of the Palestinian masses in occupied Palestine and Jordan.

A real and deep understanding of the relationship between the resistance movement and the Arab national liberation movement is what constitutes the primary guarantee for achieving these tasks. It is difficult to imagine that the resistance is able, outside Palestine and Jordan, to achieve these aims without such an understanding.

The resistance movement is also required to initiate political and organizational activities among young Palestinians who migrate to Western Europe for work in the black market of labour there or who emigrate to North and South America.

The revolution must begin to utilize these precious potentialities in all possible ways.

Such a task can be accomplished with less difficulty through international alliances with progressive movements and organizations, and through contributing to the ideological, political and organizational struggle among the ranks of the impoverished Palestinians and other Arabs in the Western countries, America, and elsewhere.

XXI. Conclusion

In confronting the new phase, "the previous phase must be completely liquidated."

This liquidation does not only take place through scientific criticism and objective review of our previous experience, but also and simultaneously, through putting forward the programmes and appropriate lines for work in the new phase.

The Third National Conference of the Popular Front (March 1972)—that studied, discussed and approved the above report—has emphasized in the report the following main headlines as guidelines for action in the new phase.

1) The consideration of the organizational issue as a central issue:

The new phase requires the transformation of the organizational structure of the Front into a revolutionary organizational structure (both ideologically and in class terms). The new situation cannot be confronted except through a revolutionary tool based on a Marxist-Leninist theory and its theses on organization. The subject of building a Marxist-Leninist Party is a central issue for the Palestinian revolution now.

The Third National Conference of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has given the organizational programme the same degree of importance as the political programme.

2) The wide national Palestinian Front, together with the national Jordanian-Palestinian Front: The Front is fully ready and fully prepared to act in order to establish a wide national Palestinian Front that can lead the movement of the masses in the coming phase.

This must take place within the framework of an agreement on a political programme that takes a clear and radical position from the reactionary regime in Jordan; from the liquidationist and surrenderist plans which much be exposed; from the plan of the Palestinian State which must be clearly and decisively rejected.

3) The masses are the force that is capable of leading the resistance out of its current crisis. Therefore, the mobilization of these masses through political and military struggle is one of our most important orientations in the coming phase. The Front will review all its methods so as to remain always among the masses; to struggle with them; through them and for their aims.

4) The line of revolutionary violence will remain the basic line in facing the enemy camp, and our practice of revolutionary violence will be the crowning of a total struggle of the masses and not an alternative to it. Similarly our practice of violence will benefit from all previous experience and lessons.

5) The future of the Palestinian revolution is dependent on its integration with the political movement of the Arab masses and the Arab national liberation movement. The contribution in building a wide Arab national front antagonistic to imperialism will be one of our main interests in the coming phase.

6) The strengthening of our alliances at the international level, with all the East European countries, national liberation movements, and international labour movements will enable us to confront the inter-

national imperialist camp and all its plans to smash the movement of the people.

The above are then the themes of the subjects that the Third Conference of the Popular Front paid attention to. These themes will provide the foundation for the organization's and people's educational process that the Front will practice through its publications and the activities of its cadres and members.

The Popular Front of Palestine has never suggested that the battle for the liberation of Palestine is one, two, or several years' project. The political report issued by the February Conference (1969), together with the other publications of the Front, and the Front's relations with the Palestinian and Arab masses were established on the basis of an awareness that the battle of liberation requires a popular people's war that stretches for tens of years. With such a vision and with the determination it produces in us, we will face the new phase with all its difficulties and complexities.

The Third National Conference of the Front greets the struggle of our brave Palestinian masses in occupied Palestine and in Jordan. It also greets our steadfast comrades in the prisons of the Israeli and reactionary enemy. Furthermore, it also greets our comrades, cadres, and steadfast leadership in the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and the occupied territory of 1948; also in Jordan and in the various other areas where the Front is active.

The Third National Conference of the Front greets all sections of the Arab revolution in every part of our large homeland.

We greet the struggle of the heroic people of North Vietnam and the struggle of the peoples in South East Asia and in every country of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

We greet and appreciate the support that the Palestinian revolution and the PFLP receives from all the patriotic and revolutionary forces especially the support of the great socialist countries which have applied in its relations with us—as a Front—the revolutionary principles of internationalist support.

The PFLP—through its Third National Conference—promises our Palestinian people and the people of the Arab nation, together with the Arab revolutionary and international forces, that it will live up to their expectations as a left-wing force supporting all the forces of revolution—at the Arab and world level—and continuing its struggle till victory.

Fourth Congress: Political Report[1]

[1986]

Foreword

In the spring of 1981, the PFLP held its Fourth National Congress where the political report contained in this book was adopted. While the document was soon published in Arabic, work on the English translation was disrupted by the subsequent Israeli invasion of Lebanon. This led to the Palestinian revolution's evacuation from Beirut, and the reestablishment of the PFLP's headquarters in Damascus. It also created a new situation and overturned some of the predictions made in the congress report. This applies in particular to the expectation that the Lebanese Army would play the main role in the efforts to liquidate the Palestinian revolution. In fact, "Israel" itself shouldered this task, waging a genocidal war against the Palestinian and Lebanese people.

The other prediction in question was that Jordan would be the second Arab regime to enter into the Camp David negotiations.[2] Indeed, one of the aims of the 1982 Israeli invasion and subsequent US intervention was to force Lebanon to join the imperialist-Zionist 'peace' plan. For a while, this appeared to succeed with the signing of the May 17th, 1983 agreement, between Lebanon and 'Israel'. Then this was in turn reversed due to the heroic struggle of the Lebanese nationalist forces, supported by the Palestinian revolution. Today, in 1986, we are again faced with a situation where Jordan appears to be the most likely candidate to enter negotiations with 'Israel' under US auspices. Thus, the analysis contained in this report provides a good background for the current situation, if updated by knowledge of developments that have occurred in the interim.

1 Political Report of the PFLP's Fourth Congress, Published by the PFLP's Central Information Committee, 1986. PFLP Central Information Committee, Box 12144, Damascus, Syria.

2 **Ed. Note:** For details on the 'Camp David Accords' see Part Two of this document, pp. 319-374.

Comrade George Habash, General Secretary of the PFLP, dealt specifically with these two points in an interview in autumn 1982, which we print below in excerpt.

On Lebanon

A review of the Fourth Congress political report shows that we did not expect the Zionist offensive to be of such size and extent. We foresaw that 'Israel' would attempt to deal a blow to the Palestinian revolution in Lebanon, yet we thought that the basic arena of the offensive would be in South Lebanon. While carrying out the attack, 'Israel' would be paving the way for the Lebanese Army, which was being prepared in terms of armament and training by US imperialist support, so that it would be able to eliminate the Palestinian revolution in Lebanon.

More specifically, we believed that had 'Israel' expanded the occupied border strip and driven the revolution northwards, a question would have arisen in the mind of the Lebanese citizen: Why are the Palestinians in Beirut? Why are they outside the circle of confrontation with 'Israel'? Afterwards, the Lebanese authorities would take advantage of such a blow to complete the elimination of the Palestinian armed revolution... We admit that our expectations were not accurate, and we do not feel any embarrassment as a result of this admission. On the contrary, we feel the necessity and significance of objective self-criticism.

I know that many forces say that they foresaw all these developments, but I think it is my right, as is the right of every citizen, to ask: What was the military plan adopted by those forces that anticipated the invasion? Where was the military plan of the Joint Forces that were positioned to protect the military presence in the positions invaded?

I mention this issue, for we find some forces claiming to have anticipated everything, but they did not prepare themselves for the confrontation. Analysis and prophecies are one thing, and programmatic positions are something else. One of the issues that must be reviewed by the Palestinian revolution is relations with the Lebanese National Movement. Did the Palestinian revolution deal with it as the leadership of the Lebanese masses and the basic force concerned with confronting the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary offensive against Lebanon? Did the Palestinian revolution consider itself a supporting force to the Lebanese National Movement in Lebanon? The PFLP continuously stressed the

significance of the Lebanese National Movement's role and its leadership of the masses. We also stressed good revolutionary behavior and applied the necessary restrictions in order to, at least, set a minimal example to other revolutionaries in dealing with the masses.

Our stands during the war were also discussed by the Central Committee, and some mistakes were pointed out. Yet in general, the military and political stands taken during the fighting were highly estimated.

On Jordan

[Question:] The PFLP's political report states that Jordan will be the second link (after Egypt) in the Camp David process, while vents have shown that Lebanon is targeted as the second link. What is your comment on this?

First we have a tradition that we have practiced for many years: Between every two successive PFLP congresses, we have critically reevaluated all our political positions taken in the interim. If we find that we have made a mistake in one position or another, we never feel hesitant or embarrassed to announce this. Reading through our Fourth Congress political report, one would find more than one misjudgment.

Second, we have to distinguish between three things: the general analysis in light of which the PFLP proceeds in every stage, political predictions and expectations, and specific political positions. There are analysis, expectations, and stands. Concerning the basic analysis dealt with by our Fourth Congress in the section of the political report entitled, "The Stage of Camp David," we feel proud that our analysis has proven correct.

Concerning expectations, we were of the opinion, but not definitely, that Jordan would be the second link in the Camp David process. At the time, we said that the plot aims at eliminating the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon, and that weakening the Palestinians militarily would facilitate the Jordanian regime's moves toward joining the political settlement. For this reason we thought that Jordan would be the second link. Now in light of the present facts, I accept the self-criticism implied in the question, since the situation looks as if Lebanon will be the second link...

Preface

In an atmosphere brimming with confidence in the revolution and the masses, and with unshakable faith in the inevitability of victory, the Pop-

ular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) held its Fourth National Congress in late April, 1981. The theme of the congress was expressed in the following slogan: "The Fourth National Congress is an important step toward completing the PFLP's transformation into a Marxist-Leninist party; establishing a united Palestinian national front; stepping up the armed struggle; defending the revolution and reinforcing its militant positions; aborting capitulationist settlement efforts; and strengthening militant inter-Arab and international relations."

The congress convened at a time when the organic connection between Arab reaction on the one hand, and imperialism and Zionism on the other, had become more fully exposed through the conclusion of the Camp David accords, the establishment of military bases for the imperialists on Arab territory, and affording them naval facilities. This was concurrent with increased encroachment on liberties, repression on the masses, and crackdowns on nationalist and progressive elements.

The congress convened at a time when the Zionist enemy, supported by imperialism and Arab reaction, had become adamant about liquidating the Palestinian cause and revolution. This was primarily manifested in the abortive attempts to impose the "autonomy" plan in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip; in the stepped-up military operations against the forces of the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese National Movement in Lebanon; in the heightened hostility and aggressiveness of the Phalangists,[3] their collaboration to impose the Israeli-Phalangist scheme for Lebanon.

The convening of the congress was in full compliance with the principles of democratic centralism: The Central Committee had finished the drafts for the political, organizational, military and financial reports. In due course, these had been circulated to the party rank and file, where they were seriously and extensively discussed; many additions, and amendments were proposed. The party's organizational units then held conferences to discuss and finalize their proposals, and elect delegates to the congress. Thus, the final reports were a compilation of the contributions of all units and, consequently, a true expression of their views and convictions. All in all, the congress, in its preparations, proceedings and outcome, reflected deep awareness and creative application of Marxist-Leninist principles in the life of the party. It was carried out in

3 **Ed. Note**: The Phalangists, also known as the Kataeb Party, are a right wing Christian political party which was founded in 1936. During the Lebanese civil war, they collaborated with Zionist forces, and opposed Palestinian activities in Lebanon.

an atmosphere of democracy, comradeship, responsibility and constructive criticism.

Over the past years, the PFLP, guided by the documents and resolutions of the Third National Congress, has waged an arduous and consistent struggle to accomplish its tasks on both the Palestinian and Arab levels.

In the organizational sphere, the Fourth National Congress was a major juncture where the PFLP paused to consider the progress made in transforming into a Marxist-Leninist party. Transformation is the main organizational task. Without this, we will never be to lay a sound basis for developing our national struggle and leading it to victory. Having reviewed the course of the Palestinian revolution over the past years, we see more clearly than ever the primacy of this task above all others. It is the main prerequisite for insuring that we and the revolution are set on the right course, to achieve the goals for which our people have been struggling for the last 33 years.

We firmly believe the Fourth National Congress has contributed to the crystallization of a number of ideological, political, organizational and military matters, which will increase our capabilities to advance and devote our struggle on both the Palestinian and Arab levels.

The fact that the Fourth National Congress adopted all the reports and several important resolutions, concerning the various aspects of our struggle testifies to the solid ideological, political and organizational unity of the PFLP.

The congress discussed profoundly and in detail the theses and tasks posed by the revolution since its beginning. It dealt at length with the special significance and primacy of the Jordanian arena. The congress gave particular attention to the capitulationist settlement trend which has ominously permeated the Arab region; it stressed the necessity of struggling to remove the harmful effects this trend has on the Palestinian and Arab masses.

In appraising the PFLP's political stands concerning Palestinian affairs, the congress discussed in detail the role played by the PFLP between 1972 and 1981. The congress stressed that the PFLP was the main Palestinian force opposing the capitulationist settlement trend, the main force in the revolutionary democratic trend that is radically confronting Zionism, imperialism and reaction; and the organization which tirelessly strives to have inter-Palestinian organizational relations regulated on sound democratic foundations within the framework of the PLO.

The great success realized by the Fourth National Congress is an embodiment of our faithfulness to the memory of the comrades who have sacrificed their lives for our cause. It is a strong testimony to our confidence in the inevitable victory of the revolution, however great the difficulties and sacrifices may be.

The congress paid homage to all the comrades who had been martyred in the period between the 3rd and Fourth Congresses, while fighting the enemy in the occupied homeland or defending the revolution outside its borders. Particular mention was made of the late members of PFLP's Politburo: Ghassan Kanafani and Mohammad Al Aswad (Guevara Gaza), and the late members of PFLP's Central Committee: Abdul Karim Al Khateeb (Abu Amal) and Abdul Wahab Al Taiyeb. The congress greatly valued the sacrifices made by our masses in Palestine and Lebanon in the heroic struggle for the victory of our just cause.

Let us march on, consolidating the positions of our revolution and our people's struggle for liberation, democracy, socialism and unity.

Victory to our revolution!

Glory and immortality to our martyrs, noblest and most dutiful of men!

PART ONE

The International Situation

The Realities of the International Situation—The Nature of this Epoch—The General Course of History

Introduction

Despite setbacks in one part of the world or another: the forces of liberation, progress, peace and socialism are steadily scoring successes and victories in the worldwide struggle against imperialism and reaction. This confirms that the course of history in this epoch is that of transition from capitalism to socialism.

This crucial political thesis, the most effective weapon in the hands of revolutionaries, no longer derives its validity solely from the objective laws of social change. It is now being confirmed by the realities of the present historical process and the truths deduced therefrom. Thus, the purpose of this report is not to repeat the scientific analysis which Lenin made, concluding that imperialism is capitalism in the stage of monopoly, decay, and downfall; that it bears within itself the seeds of the socialist revolution and its inevitable triumph, as well as the alliance of oppressed peoples of the world with the international working class movement. Rather the purpose of this report is to confirm with facts that the course of history in this epoch is actually moving in that direction. The period between our 3rd and Fourth Congresses provided plenty of facts events that confirm the validity of this thesis.



Chapter One

The General Crisis of the International Capitalist System

There is no need here to reaffirm that capitalism is suffering a structural crisis, one that is rooted in the capitalist system itself. It is common knowledge that imperialism undergoes constant aggravation of its general crisis, affecting all fields of the capitalist system—economic, social,political and ideological. Though the capitalist countries are suffering crises of differing degrees, these crises have a ripple effect and are all interlinked. Consequently, the trend is toward aggravation of the general crisis.

On the economic level, the capitalist system has undergone a series of crises which caused the outbreak of two world wars. The most severe was the international economic crisis in 1929-33. Here we are not undertaking a historical review of this phenomenon which is part and parcel of the capitalist mode of production. The capitalist crisis stems from the contradiction between the social character of production and the private form of ownership of the means of production. This contradiction affects the distribution of the fruits of production. What is of critical importance to us here is to trace the escalation of the crisis over the past few years, and the emergence of its new, qualitative character.

It is now evident that there is a decrease in the growth rate and an in-

crease in the unemployment rate. The inflation rate is ever soaring. These symptoms worry the imperialists, for the prospects of growth are dim. The phenomenon of escalating economic crisis is coupled with occasional, sudden, temporary revivals. Such revivals are attributable to short-term increases in consumer demand as result of incentives to industry and selling on credit, as means of expanding the market. The stockpiling of products, in the hope of selling them, also plays a role in the sporadic growth of production and temporary artificial booms. Recession is not an anticipated danger, but an existing fact. William Miller, chairman of the board of governors of the US Federal Reserve Bank and Secretary of the Treasury, acknowledged that recession is not only a potential danger, but an actual reality. The gross national product in capitalist countries declined on an average of 3.3% in the first half of 1979, as compared to the previous year.

The current crisis of the capitalist economy stands out from previous ones in terms of inflation. Inflation has acquired a new, qualitative character that exerts a great influence on the overall economy, leading toward recession. Although inflation is an inherent characteristic of the capitalist system, it used to run at 3-4%. Though such an inflation rate has a negative impact on the masses' standard of living, capitalist experts consider it a normal phenomenon. However, when the inflation rate jumped to 15% in 1977, this aroused anguish in capitalist circles, because a crisis of this dimension has devastating repercussions on the international capitalist system. The inflation problem worsened throughout the capitalist countries in 1978 and the first half of 1979. US newspapers reported that the inflation rate rose higher than any time in the past 28 years.

The crisis of the capitalist system is also manifest in rising unemployment. At the time of the Tokyo Summit, held by the greatest industrial powers to find solutions for the energy crisis, newspapers reported that the number of unemployed in these countries was more than 18.5 million workers in 1979.

The crisis also plays a role in aggravating relations between the imperialist countries on the one hand, and the developing countries that remain dependent on the international capitalist system on the other. The crisis in the developed capitalist countries led to a decline in the demand for the raw materials exported by the developing countries, and a decline in the prices of these materials, except for oil.

The escalation of contradictions among the major industrial capitalist countries is another characteristic of the crisis of the capitalist system.

This crisis is no longer manifest in the kindling of global war, as was the case in World War I and II, because the development of the socialist community's economic and military power acts as a restraint on the aggressive tendencies of the capitalist system. The developed capitalist countries are forced to inhibit their mutual contradictions for the sake of a united position in the face of the socialist system. Nonetheless, the internal mechanisms of the capitalist system give rise to such contradictions and consolidate them. The cessation of war among these countries has not automatically ended the economic wars which today assume various forms: The tariff war (the Nixon Administration's decisions concerning Japanese imports), the financial war (cancellation of the Bretton-Woods accord),[4] the permanent monetary crisis and currency devaluation are some forms of the ongoing, undeclared economic war. Another form of economic war is fluctuation in the prices of basic resources. An example of this was the US role in the 1973 oil price increase, to gain the upper hand in competition with Japan and western Europe. All these phenomena reflect the persistent attempts of the stronger capitalist circles to develop and insure their interests at the expense of the weaker capitalists countries on the one hand, and the 'third world' countries linked to the imperialist market on the other.

Obviously, this crisis is closely linked to the intensification of contradictions in the respective capitalist countries, between the bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the working class and other harmed strata on the other. In the midst of the current crisis of the capitalist economy, the capitalists step up their fierce attacks on the interests of the working class in the capitalist countries. The standard of living of the working class is deteriorating. Parallel to this, there is a rise in the struggle of the working class on the political and economic levels. Statistics point to the mounting class struggle between labor and the capitalists. The number who take part in strikes rises annually. Statistics show that 50 million workers went on strike in the capitalist countries in 1977. Of course, the level of strike militancy is not the same in all these countries, as shown by the data of the

4 The Bretton-Woods accord bears the name of the place where it was signed in July 1944. The accord conferred upon the US dollar the value of gold, for the purpose of determining the exchange rate of the currencies of other countries. Thus, the international monetary system transcended the gold standard and became a combined dollar and gold standard. The US has thus far breached this accord on two essential issues. First, the US has drastically depreciated the value of its currency more than once. Second, it rejected the principle that the dollar can be exchanged for gold at is nominal value, and refused to pay its foreign debts in gold. This state of affairs led to the so-called Eurodollar problem, i.e., the European paper dollar.

European Common Market's statistics bureau. One of the distinguishing features of the current labor movement in the capitalist countries is the long duration of strikes. Strikers are often forced to wage a protracted struggle in order to achieve their legitimate demands. There were many prolonged labor conflicts in 1977, such as the strike declared by 160,000 coal mine workers in 22 states of the US in January, which lasted several months.

This is the picture of the international capitalist system during the period covered by this political report, as confirmed by facts and figures. It shows a continuing and deepening crisis that contributes in an unprecedented manner to decline and instability in production, which is both deep and enduring. The international capitalist system is also characterized by a low level of investment, chronic partial use of industrial capacity, inflation of a qualitatively new character, chronic unemployment and the escalation of internal and external contradictions. In view of the dialectical relation between the economic base and the superstructure, it is natural that the economic crisis of the capitalist system is reflected in the political, social, cultural and ideological domains of the society. The capitalist system is facing a general, comprehensive and aggravated crisis.

Next we must stress a fundamental and critical subject: The current, acute crisis has a qualitative and particular character. It is not caused by coincidental or superficial factors as portrayed in the various analyses of bourgeois ideologues who attribute the cause of the crisis to the energy crisis and soaring oil prices. The real cause of the crisis is to be found in a set of factors inherent in the capitalist economic system and the laws that govern its functioning. The crisis is also caused by the growing might of the socialist system, the victories of the national liberation movements and the consequent liberation of new countries from dependency on imperialism.

The mechanisms which govern the course of the capitalist system lead to increased concentration and monopolization of the means of production. This intensifies the root cause of capitalism's crisis, i.e., the structural contradiction between the social character of production and the private form of ownership of the means and fruits of production. These mechanisms remain in effect despite all the reforms and anesthetic measures taken by the bourgeoisie. There is an ongoing concentration of the means of production and growth of monopolies in every single capitalist state and internationally.

On the national level, the power of the monopoly capitalist state

is steadily increasing. State intervention in the economy is broadening, whereby the state purchases industrial and agricultural products from the capitalists and grants them loans and credits. The government thereby aims to increase production, control the devastating factors inherent in the capitalist system, and put a lid on the economic crisis. However, the ultimate effect of this intervention is to serve the interests of the monopolies and continuing the process of concentrating property and the means of production. This process severely damages or destroys small and medium-sized enterprises. In 1977, more than 18,000 firms declared bankruptcy in Japan—20% more than in the previous year. In West Germany, Britain, and other West European countries, the number of firms that went out of business rose by 10-15% in 1977, as compared to 1976. Hence the process of concentration and monopolization continues on the national level and plays an increasing role in aggravating the contradiction between the social character of production and the private form of ownership. This is the fundamental contradiction that underlies the crisis of overproduction in the capitalist system.

On the international level, the activities of multinational monopolies are ever increasing in the imperialist countries. This marks a new stage in the concentration of production and capital, which plays a special role in the escalation of the current crisis of the capitalist economy. This concentration is the main characteristic of the imperialist system at this stage. In the early seventies, 40% of the industrial production and 60% of foreign trade were subordinated to the selfish interests and control of a few hundred multinational companies. The activities of this network of multinational companies, which extends throughout the capitalist world in the fields of production and marketing, intensified the capitalist system's contradictions and were an important factor in rapidly expanding the crisis which acquired an unprecedented dimension. The crisis of capitalism can only be explained in terms of the structural crisis of the capitalist system itself. All the attempts of the bourgeois economists will not succeed in obliterating this fact.

However, this fundamental factor is no longer the only factor that lies behind capitalism's crisis. There are other fundamental objective factors that contribute to deepening and aggravating the capitalist system's crisis. These consist of the triumph of the 1917 socialist revolution, the construction of socialism in 17% of the globe and the achievements of this system, the victory of socialism in a number of other countries, the consolidation of the socialist system on international level, and the growing role of the socialist economy in the international production and

market. The importance of this factor in destabilizing the capitalist system will become clearer when we consider the nature and extent of the economic achievements realized by the socialist system.

In addition to capitalism's structural contradiction and the growth of socialism, the national liberation movements and their victories play an important role in intensifying the crisis of capitalism, putting the entire capitalist system at a dead end. The factor is leading the entire capitalist system at a dead end. This factor is leading the entire capitalist system to its inevitable collapse in the face of the growth of the revolution's forces. The national democratic revolution triumphed in more than one country and opted for socialism and relations of mutual support with the socialist countries. This has narrowed the international geographical field where imperialism can plunder the wealth and resources of the peoples. By the same token, it has restricted the imperialist market and compounded its difficulties.

Hence, it becomes evident that the general crisis which the capitalist system is experiencing is not transitory. It is deep-rooted and headed toward far more complications and eventually explosion, despite all the panaceas prescribed by the bourgeois economists. These can only mitigate the symptoms. The capitalists cannot find any real remedy for this enduring crisis.



Chapter Two

The Successes of the World Socialist System

The aggravation of the general crisis of capitalism is the first parameter of the course of history, marking the transition from capitalism to socialism. The successes achieved by the socialist countries in every sphere, particularly economics, constitute the second parameter.

The world capitalist system is heading for decay and collapse in accordance with its own objective laws. In contrast, the economic system of world socialism is developing by virtue of its objective laws. Despite the difficulties encountered, it is advancing the development of the productive forces and the various material and spiritual aspects of life. Here we will leave it to factual data to make the contrast between the two different social systems.

Between 1971 and 1976, the rate of economic growth in the developed capitalist countries averaged 3.2% annually, while in the socialist countries it was 8%. The industrial production of the COMECON countries, whose population is only half that of developed capitalist countries, became equal to three quarters of the latter's industrial production. The socialist community accounts for one-third of world industrial production; thirty years earlier, this percentage was only 18%. The national income of the COMECON countries increased sevenfold between 1950 and 1976; whereas it increased only threefold in the countries of the EEC. In the same period, investment in the COMECON countries rose tenfold, while it rose only by 3.5 times in the EEC countries. Per capita output rose by 5.1 times in the Soviet Union between 1951 and 1976; it rose only three times in the EEC countries.

Moreover, it must be remembered that the per capita share of the national product differs in character in socialist and capitalist countries. In the former, it is a genuine expression of the extent of improvement in the standard of living of the toiling masses and the society in general. In the latter, it essentially reflects greater enrichment of the more affluent sector of capitalists. Indeed, the average per capita share of the national product in capitalist countries disguises the great disparity between the share going to the respective classes and the vast differences in people's living standards.

Kosygin, in his report to the 2Fourth Congress of the CPSU, said: "The steady march of our country manifests itself first and foremost in higher rates of economic growth and faster growth of production capacity. Consider the following data on the latest period including 1970: To double its national income, the USA needed 20 years, Britain more than 30, and Federal Germany about 15; the Soviet Union, on the other hand, needed only 10 years. Whereas it took the USA 18 years, Britain 22, and West Germany more than 11 years, to double their industrial production, it took the USSR only 8.5 years to achieve the same. The USA managed to double basic capital assets within 22 years, Britain 19, and West Germany 10, but the USSR succeeded in achieving the same in only 8 years. Such is the pace of the socialist economy. This is convincing proof of the systematic development and dynamic quality of our national economy, which is without par in the economies of the aforementioned capitalist countries.

"The real per capita income approximately doubles once every 15 years", said Kosygin in his report to the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the

CPSU. "In other words, within the life span of a single generation, the socialist society rises to a qualitatively new standard of consumption several times."

In his report to the Twenty-Sixth Congress of the CPSU, held this year, Prime Minister Tichonov said: "Increasing labor productivity is the primary factor of economic growth. The productivity of social labor should be increased by 17-20% during the eleventh five-year plan. In this way, 85-90% of the increase in the national income must be obtained. It is proposed that a big increase in the growth rate of labor productivity be secured in industry, construction, railway transport and agriculture, compared with the tenth five-year plan."

These are some of the general facts about the economy of the socialist community as regards production capacity, whereby 10% of the world's population accounts for one-third of world industrial production, and as regards its growth rates compared with those of the advanced capitalist countries. The significance of these facts becomes clear when they are viewed in terms of the relative youth of the socialist system: Only 64 years have passed since the October Revolution, and only about 35 since the emergence of the socialist community. This is a brief period in historical terms and in comparison with the several centuries of the capitalist system. Moreover, in the majority of cases, the building of socialism took place in underdeveloped capitalist countries. Even tsarist Russia was only a weak link in the world capitalist system, further weakened by World War I. The socialist revolution had to establish the material and technical base for building socialism. When we take these facts into consideration, we can with full confidence and clarity perceive the result of the economic contest between the two mutually opposed social systems over the next few decades.

Having focused on the overall picture, we should point out that we are fully aware that the socialist mode of production has its difficulties and problems. To this day, the total production of the capitalist system is still greater than that of the socialist countries. The measures taken by capitalism to alleviate its crisis are delaying its total defeat and collapse. All this, however, raises no doubt as to the final outcome of the ongoing economic contest between the two systems.

The fact that we stress the economic aspect of the ongoing conflict between socialism and capitalism should not be construed to mean that the successes of the socialist system are restricted solely to this aspect. Naturally, the economic successes of socialism constitute a solid founda-

tion for successes in the political, social, cultural, scientific, and ideological fields. They also constitute a base for building the military might required to deter imperialism and its aggressive tendencies and plans which aim at destroying socialism and perpetuating imperialist hegemony over the peoples of the world and the plunder of their wealth.

The economic development of the socialist countries is not the result of the exploitation of the workers and other toilers in these countries, or of the domination of other peoples and the plunder of their resources, as is the case with the capitalist system. Rather it is the result of resolving the contradiction between the forces of production and the relations of production, whereby the producing masses become the proprietors of the fruits of production. Thus the process of progress and development favors the interests of its makers; socialism's economic successes are converted into social, scientific, cultural, and spiritual advances that benefit the people of the socialist countries and all the forces of progress and liberation in the world.

For the people in the countries of the socialist community, every five-year plan implemented means a multitude of achievements in terms of education, culture, medical care, housing, clothing, welfare and the satisfaction of various other material and spiritual needs. It is not our purpose here to enumerate and evaluate all the achievements of the countries of the socialist community in every field; we will only pint out some main ones:

—Socialism provided a democratic, Leninist solution for the problem of national minorities within one state.

—There is social and economic equality between the socialist states on the basis of economic integration; the slight difference between the standards of living in the respective socialist countries attests to this equality.

—According to the principle of proletarian internationalism, socialist countries extend strong and unselfish support to the oppressed peoples' struggle against imperialism. All these achievements revolutionize relations among the people of the same country, among socialist countries themselves, and between them and other peoples. In this way, democracy, equality, justice, and solidarity are deepened and consolidated as a basis for such relations.

As for the military defense capabilities of the socialist countries, the USSR in particular, global evidence indicates great progress and growth.

It is no longer possible for imperialist and reactionary circles to stop the deterioration of their own conditions. This is thanks to the victories scored by the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America with the support of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The growing military defensive might of the socialist community is one of the main elements checking the world imperialist forces and their constant inclination to wage war in order to overcome their difficulties and successive, periodic crises. This frustrates imperialism's incessant efforts to dominate other peoples and control their markets and resources. Thus, the socialist community's defense capacity complements the liberation and revolutionary process, accelerating the demise of the capitalist system in its highest form, personified in the imperialist forces of the world.



Chapter Three

The Victories of the National Liberation Movements

The third parameter that confirms the character of the epoch, as being that of transition from capitalism to socialism, is the victories scored via the national liberation movements and the qualitative change in their nature. In the period between the 3rd and Fourth Congresses, national liberation movements achieved victory in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Afghanistan in Asia, as well as in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe in Africa. In addition, there was the triumph of the revolution in Nicaragua and Grenada in Latin America. Thus we have before us more than ten victories won in a period of nine years.

This series of victories won by the oppressed peoples, despite imperialism's might and potentials, is not due to coincidental factors. Common to all these victories is the current international situation, and the growing role of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community in supporting the peoples' anti-imperialist struggle.

What distinguishes the national liberation movements is not only the increase in the number of victories won, and the ability to inflict military defeat on imperialism, despite its military superiority. There is also the change that has taken place in the structure of these movements and the class character of their leadership. The national liberation movements

referred to above are marching toward a genuine national democratic revolution with a socialist orientation, in order to solve the economic and social problems confronting them. What is the explanation for this change that has taken place in the nature of the national liberation movements? What has introduced a social element into their national content, and weakened the leading role of the national bourgeoisie, to be replaced by the working class and its allies?

Imperialism confronted the bourgeois-led national liberation movements with neocolonialism, whereby colonies were granted formal political independence on the condition that imperialism's economic interests be preserved. On this basis, the majority of independent nations of Asia and Africa came into being, particularly after World War II. This increased the UN's membership to over 150 nations as compared to the 50 constituents of 1945.

The majority of these nations are still economically dependent on imperialism, regardless of the degree of their political independence and the position of most in the so-called non-aligned movement. This dependency may not be formalized in legal agreements binding these countries to the imperialist camp. Yet it exists implicitly due to the international division of labor and imperialism's domination of the world market. The bourgeoisie of these countries, owing to their dependency on the bourgeoisie of the imperialist nations, and being the weakest link in the chain, is rendered incapable of accomplishing the economic liberation of their countries. They are content with crumbs from the profits reaped by the imperialist bourgeoisie through plundering the resources of the peoples and the fruits of their labor. The contradictions that sometimes arise between the bourgeoisie of the three continents and imperialism are internal ones, within the same camp. They arise when the local ruling class tries to increase its share of the plunder of the people of these countries.

Under these circumstances, such countries and their peoples are trapped in a vicious cycle in terms of development and economic growth, despite their formal political independence. In many of these countries, the rate of growth in production is scarcely ever higher than that of population increase. The gap between developed and underdeveloped countries widens year after year; the dependence of the three continents on the capitalist countries, even for food products, increases with time.

With this in view, the only solution is a national democratic revolution that shakes off the domination of imperialism and the dependent bourgeoisie. This paves the way to economic liberation that can be

achieved only by an alliance between the working class and the peasantry, together with other toilers and certain sectors of the national bourgeoisie. In the battle against imperialism, this alliance will find itself allied with the countries of the socialist community. This latter alliance is the second essential condition for the process of development, growth and genuine economic independence from the fetters of the capitalist system.

This explains what happened in Angola and Afghanistan; it is the path of development open to all countries of the three continents. These objective conditions play a role in the people's movements which acquire a national democratic content, placing them at the beginning of the road to socialism. The course followed by Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Democratic Yemen meets the aspirations of the peoples of the three continents, for it is the only way to initiate and sustain the process of growth and development.

The new worldwide objective conditions pave the way for the victories won by the national liberation movements over imperialism. Yet this does not mean that such victories are automatically realized; subjective conditions also play an essential role in this process.

These are the three main parameters determining the progress of history as seen in the facts and events of the period covered by this report. This overall view does not deal in detail with the contradictions within the imperialist camp and the future repercussions thereof or with the difficulties of the international communist movement and the secondary contradictions between the socialist countries; nor does it deal with the so-called non-aligned countries and their prospects. Nevertheless, it sketches the conflict currently going on in the world and pinpoints its main parameters with facts.

Armed with these scientific facts that are constantly being proved correct in practice, we shall be more confident that our revolution is bound to triumph, we feel assured as to the future of our just struggle against imperialism, Zionism, and reaction.



Chapter Four

The Course of the Political Conflict in the International Arena in the Objective Perspective of the Epoch

The following developments compelled imperialism to reconcile itself to

the existence of the socialist system and its own inability to destroy this system through war without risking total destruction. The firm stand of the glorious October Revolution in the face of all attempts to destroy it; the triumph of socialism in a number of other countries in the wake of World War II; the alliance and solidarity between these countries as a socialist community; the great successes of these countries in the economic and other fields; the consequent increase in their defense capacities and their beginning to achieve military superiority over the imperialist camp; the socialist community, first and foremost the Soviet Union, acquiring nuclear weapons with which to face those of the imperialist camp; the stockpiling of such weapons by the opposing systems to an extent that humanity with destruction.

War has been the means to which imperialism resorts to overcome its crises, to resolve contradictions among its component powers in the interest of the strongest, and to preserve full domination of the world. In today's circumstances, not even the strongest imperialist power can resort to global war to preserve imperialist hegemony and interests. If the imperialist powers resort to war against the socialist system, they themselves will be threatened with total destruction. Recourse to war as a means of resolving contradictions among the imperialist powers has become out of the question in view of the increasing development and consolidation of the socialist system, which threatens the future of the imperialist powers as a whole.

In contrast, the laws governing the growth of the socialist economy do not lead to war. Rather, peaceful coexistence provides the most favorable conditions for such growth. Moreover, the ideological and political line of the socialist system conceives of the world anti-imperialist revolution as based on the struggle of the working class together with the peoples dominated by imperialism; it does not envision a global war to be won by the socialist system over the imperialist system. This is why the October Revolution proclaimed a policy of peaceful coexistence. Lenin formulated this policy, putting forth its theoretical, economic and political principles. The Soviet Union has constantly followed and promoted this policy, defining its positions on this basis. Thus, the cause of socialism is now linked to the question of peaceful coexistence as much as imperialism has been linked to war. Imperialism conceded and reconciled itself to this policy only after new, concrete facts crystallized in the international arena, making global war equivalent to its own utter destruction.

No sooner had the October Revolution triumphed than imperialist military attempts began, to strangle the first socialist state. These continued until around the end of the twenties. During World War II, imperialist Nazi Germany tried invading the Soviet Union to destroy the first socialist experiment. Soon after the end of World War II, Churchill and other imperialist leaders began beating the drums of war against "the communist threat". Thus, the cold war started, threatening to turn hot at any moment, and continuing throughout the fifties. The SALT I agreement was not concluded until 1971, i.e., as a consequence of the socialist system's having become strong enough to destroy the entire imperialist system, should imperialism resort to war.[5] Ultra-reactionary imperialist circles still cry war now and then, calling for unchecked nuclear armament and employing tactical nuclear weaponry in the conflict against socialism, but peaceful coexistence depends on the balance of nuclear power and on the fact that it benefits the economic interests of both systems (technology for the Soviet Union, markets in the socialist countries for certain products of the imperialist countries, and the general expansion of trade between the two systems). However, within the bounds of the barrier erected by peaceful coexistence, imperialism, especially the USA, conducts aggressive policies and schemes that sometimes threaten a relapse to the cold war and place the world on the brink of the abyss.

1. The Policy of Peaceful Coexistence

After it was formulated by Lenin, the policy of peaceful coexistence was debated at length within the CPSU itself. This led Lenin to wage a serious ideological struggle against the opponents of this policy, elaborating its principles and explaining its benefits for socialism. Later, detente was restored on the international level; SALT I was concluded; trade increased between the two systems as did relations in other fields. The policy of peaceful coexistence again became the subject of debate among the anti-imperialist forces of the world revolution, particularly in the three continents.

At one time, the PFLP was among those who feared that this polity might have adverse repercussions on the national liberation movements. We admitted that peaceful coexistence was a Leninist thesis, providing

5 **Ed. Note**: SALT I, signed in 1972, was the first strategic arms limitation treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It aimed to reduce tensions by limiting the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and other strategic nuclear weapons.

the most favorable conditions for the development of socialist construction. We did not demand that the Soviet Union undertake direct military confrontation of the capitalist system, or export revolution. However, we warned against this policy leading the socialist countries to reduce support to national liberation movements, or to pressure them to give up the policy of violence against imperialism, and moderate their political stances, so as to avoid international tension. The Soviet Union's attitude toward our national cause, at that time, called for a political settlement of the Arab-Zionist and Palestinian-Zionist conflict on the basis of preserving 'Israel' and recognizing the legitimacy of its existence. This was a basic factor sustaining our apprehension and determining our attitude toward the policy of detente. However, actual developments have dispelled our fears, and led us to reconsider our attitude and adopt a sounder stand. It is now evident that the policy of peaceful coexistence led to the steady growth of the socialist economy: it also led to deepening capitalism's crisis and intensifying contradictions among the imperialist powers and among the monopolies within individual imperialist countries. Above all, while this policy was in force, several victories have been won by the national liberation movements, with the support of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.

It was in a climate of peaceful coexistence and detente that the great victory of the heroic Vietnamese people over US imperialism was won; the support rendered by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries was among the factors that contributed to that victory. Then we witnessed the political, moral and military support they afforded the revolutions in Angola and Ethiopia. Then came Soviet support to the Afghani revolution. This provided decisive evidence that the policy of peaceful coexistence neither bars nor diminishes the internationalist solidarity of the socialist community with national liberation movements, when the subjective factor is not lacking in these revolutions. Imperialism will no doubt always attempt to exploit the policy of peaceful coexistence; it will constantly pressure the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community to abandon their internationalist duty toward national liberation movements, as a price for this policy. Imperialism will also keep trying to harness this policy so as to impede the world process of revolutionary change and undermine the alliance between the forces of socialism and liberation in their common struggle against imperialism and reaction. The imperialist powers will, moreover, keep trying to present the policy of peaceful coexistence as a bargain between imperialism and socialism at the expense of the oppressed peoples. However, facts and events have

proved the fruitlessness of all these attempts.

The PFLP is an organization that believes in the principle of criticism and self-criticism, and their role in setting things right. We now admit the unsoundness of our former stand on the thesis of peaceful coexistence. We see the necessity of boldly reconsidering that stand and crystallizing a sounder and more appropriate view. The policy of peaceful coexistence does not impede the national liberation movements, provided the movement in question does not lack the subjective factor, i.e., the revolutionary tool, to lead the struggle against imperialism. Regarding the difference between us and the socialist countries on the political settlement based on the preservation of 'Israel' and recognizing its legitimacy, we believe that this difference will be resolved by a combination of factors. Chief among these is the perseverance and growth of the Palestinian revolution in general, the crystallization and growth of its leftist element in particular, and the radical deepening of its antagonism to imperialism and reaction. To this will be added the continuous exposure of 'Israel' as an embodiment of the world Zionist movement which the socialist community considers reactionary, fascist, racist, and a tool of imperialism in the entire region. In addition, there is the comradely dialogue which will accompany principled militant solidarity, in a protracted battle such as the one we are waging to eradicate the existence of imperialism, Zionism, and reaction in our region.

2. Imperialism's Aggressive Schemes During Peaceful Coexistence

Unlike the socialist countries, imperialism does not pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence due to faith in its ability to win the economic contest between the two systems, or on the basis of an ideological stand. The imperialists observe this policy only because they cannot resort to global war, owing to the balance of nuclear power. Apart from this, the policy of imperialism retains the aggressive character inherent in its exploitative economy, which is imposed by force on the exploited, dependent and oppressed nations. With the victories accomplished by the forces of socialism and liberation, it is only natural that imperialist aggressiveness escalates. This impacts on the international political situation, despite the difficulties that prevent imperialism from waging a third world war. This explains the recent increase in international tension and the reemergence of the cold war refrain.

What, then, is the gist of the aggressive master plan through which

imperialism strives to stop, or even reverse, the march of history and the process of revolutionary change currently in effect on a worldwide scale?

Before addressing this matter, it must be pointed out that imperialism, unlike the socialist community led by the Soviet Union, does not constitute a harmonious and unified whole. Contradictions exist among the imperialist powers and within each of them (such as the differences between the military-industrial complex and other industries in the US). This presents us with a variety of conflicting programs, though they may have much in common. However, with the victories won during the last few years by the forces of socialism and progress, the hawks have moved to a position of confrontation; it is now their programs that are put forth for implementation. Reagan's success in the 1980 US elections is an indicator of this. In the light of international developments in the interest of the forces of liberation, progress and socialism, we expect such imperialist programs to continue.

The plans of the hawks in the US and other imperialist countries can be traced to the writings of President Carter's national security adviser, Brzezinski, and to the documents of the Trilateral Commission which includes Carter. This commission represents the awareness of the main imperialist countries (the USA, capitalist Europe and Japan) that their common interests are imperiled by recent international developments.

The Trilateral Commission began functioning in 1973. It represents a fresh attempt by world imperialism to find solutions for its economic and political crisis. The significance of the commission lies not merely in its being a think tank. Rather, it represents a marriage between the ideologues of imperialism, the proprietors of capital, and the politicians; it includes in its ranks men representing the acme of power. It is best described as an attempt to become a federation for the unions of the international monopolies, an advanced form of the cartels about which Lenin wrote. Hence it can be maintained that the programs and propositions of this commission represent, in general terms, the main orientation of the influential economic circles of the US and other major imperialist countries.

The Plans and Aims of the Trilateral Commission:

First: To strive to control the contradictions among the imperialist countries; to organize their mutual relations, so that the imperialist camp stands united in the face of the challenge resulting from the

great, continuous change in the balance of forces between capitalism and socialism. In this context, US imperialism plays a leading role, whereby it imagines it can stem the growing international role of the socialist community.

The contradictions among the imperialist centers have played a major role in international politics. They were behind World War I which provided the objective conditions for the triumph of the October Revolution and the emergence of the world's first socialist state. They were also behind World War II which provided the objective conditions for the triumph of socialism in a number of European and Asian countries and the emergence of the socialist community. In other words, these contradictions constantly lead the capitalist system into crisis; the capitalist system seeks to resolve the crisis through war. Objectively speaking, this weakens capitalism and strengthens socialism.

After World War II, owing to the defeat of Japan and the vast destruction suffered by capitalist Europe, the USA became the leading imperialist power, occupying the central position among the capitalist countries. The US dollar became the most powerful currency of the capitalist world. Japan and the imperialist centers of Europe became economically, politically, and militarily dependent on the USA, as seen in the Marshall Plan, NATO, etc. This state of affairs continued for some time. Yet things never remain static; they are in constant motion. In the imperialist system, this motion is governed by the very laws of the capitalist system. The economy of Europe and Japan began to recover; the US was interested in initiating this recovery so that capitalist Europe could stand up to the growth and development of the socialist community. Besides, it was the US economy that was shouldering the main burden of defending the capitalist system.

Then came the US war in Vietnam and the burdens this placed on the US economy. This contributed to changing the constellation of relations among the imperialist centers. Capitalist Europe and Japan had become serious economic competitors to the USA by the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies. Japanese and European products began to limit the opportunities open to the US economy. Some began to invade the US market itself. An increasing deficit began in the US's balance of payments. All this aggravated the contradictions among the imperialist countries. The socialist community's policy of peaceful coexistence, by concentrating on the question of Europe's security, played a part in deepening these contradictions.

The new realities of the international situation ruled out resorting to global war, in the traditional sense, as a means for resolving these contradictions. Prime among the new realities was that the socialist community had grown strong enough to menace the entire capitalist system. However, the new international realities have not prevented these contradictions from expressing themselves as a virtual economic war waged by the USA against the other imperialist centers, aimed at subjugating them and perpetuating its own domination of the entire capitalist system. In this respect, one can cite the Nixon Administration's cancellation of the Bretton Woods accord of 1945; the devaluation of the US dollar as a means of encouraging the export of US products; the imposition of customs duties on specific imported commodities, particularly Japanese; the benefits reaped by the US in 1973, as a result of the oil embargo and the increase in oil prices; the US demand that Europe and Japan increase their share of the burden of defending the capitalist system; the US generating international tension to compel Europe and Japan to follow its economic, political, and military policies.

With these measures US capitalist circles succeeded in regaining their position of relative superiority in the imperialist camp. A major concern for the Trilateral Commission, and the monopoly interests it represents, is preserving the unity of the capitalist camp, controlling its contradictions and unifying its policies in every sphere, in the face of the socialist system. The concentrated effort to unite the three main centers of capitalism under US leadership is the central link in the chain of policies advocated by the Trilateral Commission. This line was pursued by the Carter Administration as we shall see later.

Second: To shift to the offensive vis-a-vis the socialist community, adopting policies that would put the socialist community on the defense.

The Trilateral Commission and the monopolies it represents, believe that the Soviet Union and the socialist community have benefitted from the policy of peaceful coexistence, thanks to the policies of the Nixon Administration. They believe this must be changed, so that peaceful coexistence is made to operate in favor of the capitalist countries, with the socialist countries kept on the defensive.

The commission speaks of alleged repression and coercion in the countries of the socialist community, thus the necessity of focusing on the question of liberties and human rights. The commission also speaks

of the Soviet Union's alleged domination and hegemony over the other socialist countries; from this follows the necessity of making use of this question, determining the weak links, and breaking these links in order to disintegrate the socialist community and flirt with some of its members.

Last year, 1980, when the disturbances erupted in Poland, imperialism thought its opportunity had come. It exploited the situation ruthlessly in order to promote the aims stated above, sparing no effort to break this link in the socialist community. Facts, however, indicate that it is the United Workers Party of Poland that is responsible for the situation having deteriorated to this level. The current acute crisis in Poland is being further aggravated by imperialist-reactionary circles. We believe that to solve this crisis, the United Workers Party should devote all efforts to rebuilding and fortifying itself, purging bourgeois and opportunist elements that have infiltrated its ranks. The party must devote serious attention to the Polish working class with a view toward mobilizing and organizing it to defend Poland's gains and oppose the real enemies. Moreover, there must be serious attention to rectifying the economic errors which have been committed in the past years, for these underly the emergence of the crisis.

To return to the plans of the Trilateral Commission: Imperialist circles also speak of alleged Russian chauvinism and oppression of other nationalities in the Soviet Union, thus the necessity of making use of these contradictions. In addition, they speak of Islam in certain Soviet republics and the necessity of making use of this factor. Thus, imperialist circles advocate putting the Soviet Union on the defensive so that its "true face" as they assert, will be exposed to all, i.e., to the people of the socialist countries and of the oppressed countries, who consider the Soviet Union and other socialist countries as the main supporters of their struggle for liberation and development.

From a military point of view, imperialist circles declared that they must free themselves of the Vietnam Syndrome, achieve military superiority and confront any threats to the imperialist system by military means.

Third: To consolidate relations with China, benefiting from the Chinese leadership's deviation.

This aims at establishing an imperialist-Chinese alliance in the face

of the Soviet Union and the rest of the socialist community. This line is not a result of the recent cooperation between the US and China, particularly in Afghanistan. It has been part of the commission's documents from the start, long before US-Chinese relations reached their present level.

Fourth: To consolidate relations with the countries of the three continents in order to keep them dependent on the capitalist system, and so that the capitalist system remains the ideal which they strive to emulate.

The commission's documents pay lip service to the freedom of the peoples of the three continents. They speak of the necessity of abandoning fascist and dictatorial regimes, of supporting liberal, democratic tendencies, of offering economic aid and other such myths. In reality, we find that imperialist policy results in greater dependency and backwardness; greater repression to ensure the continuation of this dependency; the use of all means and the instigation of religious, communal and ethnic strife to keep these countries weak; and undermining any mass movement to keep them in the orbit of imperialism.

In our area, the Camp David policy and the related fascist-imperialist- Zionist sectarian scheme in Lebanon, the sectarian scheme concocted for Syria and other similar designs, constitute the real translation of all the lofty ideals espoused by the Trilateral Commission. Similarly, the feverish imperialist moves in the Caribbean, Latin America, Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Gulf, Africa, and elsewhere are concrete instances that reveal the real stances of imperialism toward the three continents.

Such are the main features of the plans of the imperialist circles represented in the Trilateral Commission and the US Pentagon. The Carter Administration exemplified this policy in action. Carter began his term by raising the issue of human rights, receiving dissidents in the White House and visiting Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia. There followed a series of capitalist summit meetings. There were talks about the need for strengthening NATO; a resolution was adopted in May 1978 to increase its budget. The Carter Administration also began talks to conclude the SALT II agreement, while declaring the neutron bomb and budgets for the production of new missiles and aircraft capable of delivering nuclear warheads and bombs. As for the price for US ratification of SALT II, the Carter Administration enacted various maneuvers to extort concessions

from the Soviet Union, such as Soviet collusion with the Camp David accords. This was followed by the NATO decision to install the Pershing II and cruise missiles network in Europe, which directly jeopardizes the security of the Soviet Union and the socialist community and, consequently, world peace.

The people's victories in Iran and Afghanistan dealt a painful blow to imperialism and its stooges and plans. This impelled imperialism to exercise its aggressive policies in the region in a flagrant, unrestrained manner. Thus, after the triumph of the Iranian revolution and the collapse of the Shah's regime, Carter visited the region, and the Camp David accords were concluded. US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown also toured the area, and there was talk of establishing the Fifth Fleet and the Rapid Deployment Force, and reinforcing US military bases on Diego Garcia and Masirah (Oman), as well as other political and military maneuvers.

After the events in Afghanistan, the policies of the Carter Administration, the Trilateral Commission and the Pentagon generals became crystal clear, expressing the interests of the mightiest monopolies. Carter announced a number of anti-Soviet measures. He put off submitting the SALT II agreement to the Congress for ratification. He tried to mobilize the entire imperialist camp and to distort the image of the Soviet Union. He tried to use Islam to serve imperialist designs, and sought new bases in Kenya and Somalia. He sent Brown to visit China, after which Sino-American cooperation became more evident. These policies strained the international situation and brought the world to the verge of a new cold war, thus seriously jeopardizing peaceful coexistence and international detente.

Imperialist circles have tried to blame the strained international situation on the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Some liberal circles try to explain that the US administration's attitude was dictated by the presidential election campaign. However, careful examination of the course of political events in the international arena reveals that such imperialist policies are really a logical consequence of imperialism's impasse and the victories won by the socialist camp and liberation forces during the last few years. The imperialist policies are the implementation of the line adopted by Carter and his adviser Brzezinski, which has advocated for some time by the Trilateral Commission and other imperialist circles. Indeed Carter's State of the Union address, particularly the introduction, provides the explanation for the factors underlying the imperialist policies. The address reads in part: "Three main developments have contrib-

uted to the emergence of the challenges now confronting us. They are: The steady growth of Soviet military forces stationed outside the Soviet Union; the overwhelming dependence of industrial democracies on Middle East oil supplies; and the pressure for social, religious, economic, and political change in many developing countries, such as exemplified by the revolution in Iran."

Careful examination of the thoughts entertained in these phrases, voiced by Carter himself, reveals the real causes behind the aggressive preparations being made by US imperialism. The social, economic and political change in the developing countries, which Carter speaks of, is what we view as the successes scored by the national liberation movements. The overwhelming dependence on oil supplies from the Middle East refers to a factor in the economic crisis afflicting the international capitalist system; this system is based on the exploitation and plunder of the resources of other peoples who have now become conscious and are struggling for their right to control these resources. The US is totally dependent on imports for 26 of the 36 basic raw materials needed for its industry. In the present international political situation, the US can only escalate its war preparations and aggressive policy to retain control of these raw materials. Concerning the stationing of Soviet troops on foreign soil, this simply means that the military might of the Soviet Union and the socialist community has grown to an extent that enables them to exercise international solidarity; this ended the era when imperialism could bully the people of the world without restraint.

In this State of the Union address, Carter was compelled to admit, in his own terms of course, the main factors underlying the general crisis of imperialism, which impel it to adopt aggressive schemes that endanger civilization as a whole. Soviet military support to the Afghani revolution provided the US with the pretext for unveiling all the plans which had been accumulating as a result of the historical process and the steady aggravation of imperialism's general crisis. Events in Afghanistan unmasked the reality of the policies and plans whereby imperialism would confront the socialist community with increasing aggressiveness.

A national democratic revolution took place in Afghanistan in April 1978. It is common knowledge that this was the work of indigenous forces, not exported by the Soviet Union. Imperialism, together with reactionaries at Afghanistan's borders and counterrevolutionary forces inside the country, was quick to start hostile activities in order to abort the revolution. Soviet support was forthcoming to enable the Afghani

revolution to put an end to the imperialist-reactionary intervention. Foreign intervention was initiated by the imperialist and reactionary forces. Soviet support came later to counter this intervention and help the Afghani revolution face the counter-revolutionary forces motivated by imperialism and reaction.

Military support to the Afghani revolution is a clear indication of the policy adopted by the Soviet Union and socialist community in response to imperialism's aggressive schemes. The countries of the socialist community adhere tenaciously to peaceful coexistence, but they will by no means allow imperialism a free hand to carry out hostile activities against the people of the world, or arrest the worldwide process of revolutionary changes. Nor will they allow imperialism to exploit the socialist community's desire for peace. Their existence on peaceful coexistence will never mean readiness to compromise with imperialism at the expense of the people. Nor will it prevent the Soviet Union, or other countries of the socialist community, from carrying out their internationalist duties in full.

For the countries of the socialist community, peaceful coexistence means that they will not resort to war as a means of solving their contradiction with the capitalist system; they will not export revolution. At the same time, it means letting the worldwide process of revolutionary change proceed unrestricted; it means standing firm in the face of imperialist schemes to impede this process. The Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community will spare no effort to make necessary compromises in order to sustain peaceful coexistence. They do so for the sake of humanity and progress, to expose the totally reactionary, aggressive nature of imperialism and to aggravate contradictions within the imperialist camp. However, such compromises will be limited, not affecting the line that has materialized over the past years. This line is characterized by firm confrontation, no submission to blackmail, and mutual support between all the forces of liberation and socialism in the common struggle against imperialism.

In the light of the above, we can make the following statements:

—The policy of peaceful coexistence will remain imposed on the imperialist camp because of the destructive consequences entailed by nuclear war.

—There will continue to be conflict within the framework of peaceful coexistence; there will be upsurges of conflict; and imperialism will resort to every available means short of global nuclear war.

—The realities of the international situation will lead to the heightening of this conflict, resulting in limited wars, military threats, international tension and cold war, etc.

-—he international balance of forces will enable the camp of socialism and liberation to achieve more successes which imperialism will be forced to swallow, despite its war cries.

—During the coming years, the curve showing the course of history will continue upwards; there may be downward turns at certain junctures, but they will not affect the general trend.

—Our epoch is that of transition from capitalism to socialism. This has been affirmed in the past years and will be further and more distinctly confirmed in the coming years.



Chapter Five

The International Communist Movement

A historical review of the international communist movement shows that at various stages it was, naturally enough, subject to contradictions. These sometimes grew quite acute, causing the movement to split for a time, then reorganize in the light of new developments and the lessons derived. The First International came to an end after the Paris Commune. It was replaced by the Second International which failed to survive the circumstances brought about by World War I. Then came the Third International which had to dissolve its central organization in 1943.

Using scientific socialist thought, this phenomenon was analyzed. It was attributed partly to the infiltration of petit bourgeois elements, which resulted in leftist and rightist tendencies. It was also attributed to an inability to master dialectics; there was an inability to apply dialectics to the concrete, objective conditions facing the working-class movement, or to conflicting points of view elicited by new developments. There was an inability to apply dialectics for understanding the dynamics of the conflict, the phenomena issuing therefrom, and the positions to be determined. Dialectics were moreover needed to formulate the lessons to be derived from this phenomenon of internal contradictions, and to determine the correct way to handle it.

We deem it beneficial to introduce this chapter in this way, to provide an objective view of the current conflict within the international working class movement. Otherwise, this phenomenon might throw us into a state of confusion, doubt, or despair about the future of the conflict between socialism and capitalism. Contradictions and disputes within the international communist movement are a natural phenomenon, accompanying its development. They have never halted the ever advancing march, nor will they ever do so.

1. The Chinese Leadership's Retrogression

When the Chinese revolution triumphed under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), this was regarded as a great victory for socialism and the international working class movement. China's geographic and demographic size gave that triumph special significance: Socialism then encompassed one-third of the world population.

In the first years after the victory of the revolution, China maintained an alliance and solidarity with the Soviet Union and the communist movement in general. Then, in the latter half of the fifties, differences began to appear between the Soviet Union and China on a number of ideological and political questions. At that time, these differences were considered natural ones, attributable to the differing conditions and experiences of the two countries. Even when China began to speak publicly of these differences, publishing the memoranda sent by the CPC to the CPSU, this was not regarded as acting contrary to the rules that govern relations between two socialist countries. On the contrary, many among the national liberation movements, ourselves included, considered China's action as a sound embodiment of relations between socialist countries. These should be based on independence and mutual respect, in accordance with the principles of proletarian internationalism. Open ideological dialogue was seen as an important means of developing the international communist movement and preserving its unity on sound foundations.

At that time, China's political position called for intensification of struggle against imperialism and Zionism; this influenced our position, causing us to strongly sympathize with China in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

However, this dispute took a new turn when the Chinese leadership began to speak of social imperialism and the Soviet Union's deserting the revolutionary camp. We did not support this view of the Chinese leader-

ship, as can be confirmed by the publications of our central bodies. Yet we did not anticipate the serious, adverse repercussions it would have on the unity of the communist movement. Nor did we realize that it was inconsistent with the rules that should govern the handling of contradictions between socialist countries.

Unable to foresee the consequences of the Chinese view, we kept calling for the unity of the socialist camp. We remained attached to China's attitude vis-a-vis imperialism, the more so on account of imperialism's refusal, until the beginning of the seventies, to recognize the People's Republic of China.

Then the Chinese leadership declared the thesis of "the three worlds". This depicted the international conflict not as a class struggle between capitalism and socialism, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, but as a struggle between countries with different levels of economic development. At first, this thesis put the Soviet Union in the same camp as US imperialism. It later began to consider the Soviet Union as constituting an even greater danger to the peoples of the world than US imperialism. This led to the slogan for a worldwide front against the Soviet Union. During his visit to Washington, Deng Xiaoping explicitly called for such a front. This explains the current alliance between China and imperialism against the Soviet Union.

The Chinese leadership's propositions were applied to foreign policy. This helped us to pinpoint China's new position as regards the international conflict, as well as the conflict in our region. We cite China's positions toward the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, Mobuto in Zaire, the Shah of Iran, Numeiri in Sudan, and Sadat of Egypt, who was regarded as a national hero who had liberated his country from Soviet influence. On the other hand, there was the Chinese position against the MPLA in Angola. At last came China's premeditated aggression against Vietnam. At that time, the PFLP adopted a firm position and declared its condemnation of this aggression. These political stances culminated in open Sino-American cooperation in supporting the counterrevolution in Afghanistan. This definitively determined the Chinese leadership's position in the international conflict as one of retrogression and cooperation with imperialism.

Naturally, there are a number of factors that explain the Chinese leadership's retrogression and deviation. Prime among these is the petit bourgeois character of the Chinese leadership itself. This class structure paved the way for the deviation and contributed to its assuming such

proportions. Other factors contributing to the deviation are: the class structure of the Chinese society on the eve of the revolution's triumph, the great difficulties that faced socialist construction, and the setbacks suffered in the course of development. The deviation expressed itself in erroneous political and theoretical positions, resulting in this particularly Chinese way of handling contradictions within the Chinese revolution and the CPC on the one hand, and between China and the countries of the socialist community on the other.

The structure of the Chinese society naturally affected the class structure of the CPC whose membership consequently included large numbers of peasant and petit bourgeois elements. Such a class structure provides fertile soil for the growth of idealist, subjective, adventurist, and chauvinist tendencies.

There are three factors involved: the policies of the Chinese leadership, the nature of the Chinese society on the eve of the revolution's triumph, and the class structure of the CPC leadership. These factors combined explain the Chinese revolution's deviation, its leadership's retrogression and the opportunist tendencies that led to a series of adventurist ideological, political, organization, and economic positions which it is not our purpose to discuss here.

On the eve of the victory of the revolution, the Chinese society was primarily an agricultural one. In contrast, Russia was not exclusively an agricultural industrial society in which capitalism had developed to a degree which provided only the minimal material base for building socialism. On this foundation, the October Revolution managed to begin the process of socialist construction, thanks to sound economic policies worked out by Lenin after bitter ideological struggles within the party. The CPSU later completed the process under the leadership of Stalin, with great efforts and sacrifices.

In contrast, socialist construction in China started at an extremely low level, dictated by the conditions of the Chinese society itself. Influenced by a subjective, idealist desire to surmount this situation, Mao formulated his policy of "The Great Leap Forward". This aimed at accelerating the process of development and eliminating certain stages. This policy resulted in failure, which in turn accentuated tensions within the CPC and with the Soviet Union which opposed such policies.

The failure of Mao's program for socialist construction weakened his position in the party. His response was "The Cultural Revolution" and the conflicts that followed within the CPC. The setbacks suffered in

the process of socialist construction complicated China's relations with the Soviet Union, for the Chinese leadership began to accuse the Soviet Union of failing to perform its proletarian internationalist duty, by not providing China with what was needed to manage the objective obstacles. The Soviet model was achieving more and more successes, while that of China was suffering failures.

It was under these contrasting conditions of the two countries that China's hostility to the Soviet Union developed; the theory of social imperialism was elaborated. This was followed by the theory of "the three worlds," which was undoubtedly connected with China's failures on the economic front, in contrast to both the US's developed capitalist economy and the Soviet's successful socialist construction. The theory of "the three worlds" is a subjective expression of China's economic condition, as compared to the US on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other. It totally disregards the qualitative differences between the two systems that are similar in terms of industrial development and production in general, yet totally different in terms of their structural nature, the laws governing each, and their social and political objectives.

In view of the theories of "the three worlds", social imperialism and the two super powers' struggle to redistribute spheres of influence, and the total disregard for the qualitative difference between capitalist US and socialist USSR, China's shift to alliance with US imperialism is foreseeable and explicable. Based on the above outlook, it was sufficient for the US to pursue a policy of rapprochement with China, to make China respond positively on the basis of mutual hostility to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Thus the theory of the "two imperialisms", capitalist and socialist, turned into a theory of old imperialism and new imperialism; the latter was considered more youthful and dangerous, and applied to the Soviet Union. From this view sprang China's call for a worldwide front to check the alleged newly emerging, advancing and, hence, more dangerous imperialism.

The increasing clarity of China's explicit alliance with US imperialism today fills the hearts of revolutionaries with deep sorrow and pain. So does the Chinese leadership's hostile campaign against the Soviet Union, and the unmistakable reflections of this position in befriending the forces of reaction, and antagonizing the forces of liberation in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. At the same time, this clarity puts an end to the state of confusion and division which some revolutionary forces experienced at the beginning of the Sino-Soviet dispute. At that time, China's firm

opposition to imperialism, and related ideological and political theses made it possible to create confusion and in the ranks of the anti-imperialist camp. For a time, Maoist parties mushroomed in various parts of the world. Some contingents of the national liberation movements, ourselves included, viewed China as a supporter and ally that exceeded the Soviet Union in hostility to imperialism. Now, when China's position as an ally of imperialism has become evident, the picture is no longer blurred: increasingly, it shows the Soviet Union as consistently and in principle hostile to imperialism, continuously attaining achievements in socialist construction and excelling in the economic contest with the capitalist system. This further consolidates the international communist movement and the anti-imperialist front. This is perhaps best evidenced by the fact that none of the recently liberated countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have suffered splits along pro-Soviet/pro-Chinese lines. They are carrying on with their national democratic-socialist revolution, finding in the countries of the socialist community their principle allies. The same applies to national liberation movements that are still struggling for victory. In a word, the world revolutionary movement is marching on and winning victories despite the Chinese leadership's retrogression.

This reappraisal of China's place in the international revolutionary process naturally includes reconsideration and criticism of our earlier position, dating back to the time China began to speak of social imperialism. For a time, we were preoccupied with only one side of the picture: China as a socialist country led by a communist party, adopting a strong anti-imperialist position, supporting the Vietnamese and Cambodian peoples' struggle against imperialism, and refusing to recognize the Zionist entity. We were unable to foresee the repercussions of China's views and position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, on the world socialist system. We can point to a number of factors that led us to adopt our position; one of them was Vietnam's appeal for the unity of the socialist camp. Yet this will only explain, not justify, our inability to perceive the dangers of the line China pursued in relation to the Soviet Union and the socialist community, from the time it began to consider contradictions with the Soviet Union as antagonistic, as contradictions with the enemy.

Such reconsideration is now a basic necessity for us in order to remove any confusion or ambiguity as to the world revolutionary process in the present era and our position in this. The socialist community, led by the Soviet Union, is the pole representing socialism as opposed to capitalism; it is the pole where the national liberation movements find support in the struggle against imperialism. With this reconsideration,

we place ourselves in the framework that today represents the unity of the communist movement. On the basis of profound understanding of Marxism-Leninism and commitment to proletarian internationalism, we consider ourselves responsible for making political decisions concerning the Palestinian and Arab cause. At the same time, we are fully aware that alliance with the countries of the socialist community, led by the Soviet Union, links the Palestinian and Arab revolution to the world revolution; it interconnects the national democratic and the socialist revolution; it realizes the slogan "Workers of All Countries and Oppressed Peoples, Unite!" Ideologically and politically, we consider this reconsideration a decisive end to a situation which was for a time dominated by confusion.

Does this mean we no longer consider China a socialist country? The character of any country's regime is primarily determined by the mode of production. This in turn is determined by the forces and relations of production prevailing in the given society and constituting the base of its socioeconomic formation. Yet this is not enough, for the superstructure is an inseparable reflection of the economic base. The dialectical relationship between the economic base and the superstructure must be in full harmony if the superstructure is to fulfill its role in furthering the development of the economic base. In the light of the disharmony between the socialist economic base and the superstructure, we can say that today China is socialist in terms of its economic base, but non-socialist in terms of the leadership's ideological and political line. Thus China stands at a crossroads: Either socialism will triumph completely in the superstructure, which requires drastic changes almost amounting to a revolution; or the non-revolutionary line will persist; this will be reflected on the economic, level, gradually removing the socialist content.

2. Eurocommunism

It is not our purpose here to present a comprehensive study of Eurocommunism. We will not cover all its tenets, supporting arguments or their impact on the European communist parties' positions on central political issues, as currently being debated in Europe and globally. Here, we are interested in only the most important questions of Eurocommunism.

As expressed by Santiago Carrillo, Secretary General of the Spanish Communist Party, in his book *Eurocommunism and the State*, the essence of Eurocommunism is that it is no longer necessary that the European communist parties employ force to seize state power; concurrently, the

dictatorship of the proletariat is no longer necessary to keep the proletariat in power and complete the socialist revolution.

To support such propositions, Eurocommunism points to the change that has taken place in the nature of the contemporary capitalist state. Eurocommunism maintains that the emergence of the monopoly state means that several classes oppose the state. Thus, revolution is the demand not only of the proletariat, but of the majority of the masses. This "makes accession to power possible through the ballot boxes, by winning the majority of votes." Eurocommunism maintains that once state power is seized, there is no need for the dictatorship of the proletariat, or smashing the old state machinery. They say it is not possible in the modern state to destroy the army in the traditional manner. They assert that it is possible "to transform the military mentality democratically" by reforming the military system. According to Eurocommunism, this is feasible because the underprivileged classes predominate in the army.

Eurocommunism also argues that the international situation and the balance of nuclear power no longer permit any substantial disequilibrium in the international balance of forces. Hence, Eurocommunism counsels caution lest national liberation struggles develop into nuclear world war. Similarly, it preaches that the transition from capitalism to socialism should be made gradually, by peaceful means, to avoid upsetting the balance of forces and unleashing a universal nuclear disaster.

Eurocommunism's arguments have been reflected in its political attitude toward the conflict between the forces of socialism and liberation on the one hand, and the forces of imperialism and reaction on the other. Thus, some European communist parties justify their country's remaining in NATO after their coming to power. They even speak of the necessity of a European military organization established on a purely national, not class, basis. Such arguments were behind opposition to the Soviet Union's "intervention" in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Such arguments were behind the Italian and Spanish communist parties' opposition to the Soviet Union's support for Afghanistan's revolution, to enable it to face the counterrevolution manipulated by imperialism and the reactionaries. Eurocommunism does not stop here. Carrillo goes even farther, declaring that the next stage will be neither socialism nor capitalism, but "a stage of long-lasting coexistence between the two forms of property, private and public."

Now we are entitled to ask: What is left of Marxism, Leninism, and communism? In the light of these arguments and their political applica-

tion, where does Eurocommunism stand vis-a-vis the world revolutionary movement? These arguments discount all the lessons derived by the working class in the long and strenuous struggle against capitalism and all forms of revisionism. Where are the lessons of the Paris Commune? Where are those deduced by Lenin, without which the October Revolution would not have triumphed and survived the countless attempts to destroy it? Without those lessons, working class struggles would have remained trapped in the bog of reformism.

Marx's contribution, says Lenin, is not discovering the class struggle; writers had spoken of this struggle hundreds of years before. His contribution lies in deducing from the class struggle the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat: "Only he is a Marxist who extends the recognition of the class struggle to the recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat" (*The State and Revolution*). Lenin also says, "The proletarian revolution is impossible without the forcible destruction of the bourgeois state machine and the substitution for it of a new one" (*The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*). Lenin says, "The dictatorship of the proletariat is precisely the essence of Marx's doctrine...(it) is of the utmost importance for all countries, especially for the advanced, especially for countries at war, and especially at the present time." (*Ibid).*

Eurocommunism discounts the foundation on which the proletarian revolution stands; it scraps all the lessons the working class has accumulated through long and arduous struggle. However, neither our arguments nor the lessons derived by Lenin will convince Eurocommunists, for they see themselves as attempting to develop Marxism, to bring it in line with new conditions. Eurocommunists correctly postulate that Marxism is not a rigid doctrine; hence, it should always be reconsidered and criticized in order to be further developed. It is true that reconsideration and criticism are essential ingredients of Marxist theory, but there is great difference between developing Marxism and revising it.

If Lenin's conclusions are too old and too theoretical a response to Eurocommunism, the example of Chile, which occurred at the same time Eurocommunism was making its views public, is certainly an up-to-date and practical retort. The Chilean example did show the possibility of the revolutionary forces coming to power through the ballot box without resorting to violence. Nevertheless, it proved the impossibility of retaining power and effecting socialist transformation without destroying the old state machinery and imposing proletarian dictatorship on the forces of counterrevolution, who will never be reconciled to their defeat.

"The transition from capitalism to communism constitutes an entire historical epoch. As long as it is not complete, the exploiters will inevitably retain the hope of returning—a hope which turns into attempts to return... and they will rush to fight... drawing behind them the largest part of the petit bourgeoisie" (Lenin).[6] History has not recorded a single incident where the exploiters stood by, calmly watching a revolution being carried out and established. Exploiters will defend their class privileges and power to the last breath. If they are ousted from power, they will again and again attempt a counterrevolution. This happened in Russia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Cuba and elsewhere: it is now happening in Afghanistan.

Eurocommunists do say that the bourgeoisie will probably resort to war if the democratic solution proves unsuccessful. To Eurocommunism, the resort to war remains a probability, whereas in reality it is an inevitability. The bourgeoisie will remain strong for a long time, even after the triumph of the proletariat. It will draw strength from international capital, and from the financial, organizational, managerial, and military capabilities it can muster. It will derive strength from its knowledge of the state's secrets and from the mentality it cultivated in the society during the generations of its power. It will draw strength from its ability to make use of the economic difficulties faced by the revolution in the initial period following its triumph. It is impossible for the bourgeoisie to lay down its arms after the first defeat. Rather it will wield all weapons in order to regain state power and recover its former positions and privileges. The only force capable of facing all such attempts is the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Our view on Eurocommunism is related to our analysis of the infiltration of petit bourgeois elements, influences and thoughts into the working class and its parties. It does not differ from earlier analyses of this phenomenon. Moreover, the bribes paid by the bourgeoisie to certain influential working class circles, together with certain reformist policies adopted by the state, provide favorable objective conditions for the emergence of such trends.

Our appraisal of Eurocommunism does not, however, mean that we regard these communist parties as having totally deserted the anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist camp. Thus, it is only natural for us to seek relations of cooperation and alliance with these parties in the interest of our na-

6 **Ed. Note**: Original translation preserved, this is from *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*.

tional cause, notwithstanding the reservations stated above.

Chinese revisionism, Eurocommunism, the New Left and the various trends bred by the struggle within the world communist movement in earlier stages do not radically change the overall picture of the ongoing struggle between capitalism on the one hand, and the working class and the oppressed peoples on the other. The substantial successes, achieved by the countries of the socialist community, keep the constellation of the struggle crystal clear: imperialism and the forces of reaction are aligned against the forces of world revolution represented by the countries of the socialist community, the national liberation movements and all the working class and democratic forces in the capitalist countries.

The phenomenon of differences, dissent and splits within the world communist movement is concurrent with the growth and development of the working class movement in its struggle against capitalism, in order to create a new society: socialism.



Chapter Six

The Countries of the So-called "Third World" in Asia, Africa, and Latin America

Our reading of the international political situation and its horizons is not complete without considering the state of affairs in the countries of the so-called "third world". We will try to chart their future course in the light of the realities of the epoch and their experience over the last thirty years.

These countries account for more than half the globe, and more than half its population. Extrapolations, based on rates of population increase, indicate that the population of these countries will be more than two-thirds of the world population by the end of this century. It is, therefore, natural for these countries to play a special role in determining the future of humanity and the global struggle we dealt with in earlier chapters.

The term "third world" is really an expression of certain political, economic, and social conditions common to most countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, despite the relatively insignificant differences between one country and another. In the time of colonialism, these were directly colonized by the capitalist countries, which resulted in the total

destruction of their national economies. In many colonies, agricultural production was reduced to a single crop, such as cotton, for the purposes of industry in the capitalist countries. Their economies were totally subordinated to those of the advanced capitalist countries. They were opened to foreign capital which plundered their natural wealth and controlled their agricultural and industrial production in a manner suited to the interests of capitalist production. Under such conditions, it was unavoidable that the process of economic development in the colonies be arrested. This adversely affected all aspects of life: social, cultural, and scientific. Thus these countries were placed in a state of backwardness, colonialism having sealed off all prospects of development and progress.

In this situation, it was natural that the people's struggle in these countries focused on this overt colonialism and its military presence. Similarly, it was natural that the bourgeoisie in the colonies was among the classes fighting the colonialists. Due to its greater capabilities and shrewdness, as compared with other classes, this bourgeoisie often occupied the leading positions in the struggle against colonialism. To these anti-colonial people's struggles were added the conflicts in the form of World War I and II between the capitalist nations, as well as the triumph of the October Revolution, and later the emergence of the socialist system on an international scale. The combination of these developments forced the colonialists to pull out of most colonies and grant them formal political independence. Scores of newly independent countries joined the UN. At this juncture, generally speaking, traditional colonialism was practically ended: most colonies had become formally independent nations with its own national flag, anthem and seat in the UN.

But how did things go in these countries after they attained formal independence?

Generally speaking, the national bourgeoisie held political power, while the country remained subordinate and economically dependent on the metropolis. The bourgeoisie of the "third world" was unable to compete with the bourgeoisie of the metropolis; their economies were controlled by the laws of the world capitalist market. Thus, the "third world" bourgeoisie was unable to create an industrial revolution as had the bourgeois classes of Europe, North America, and Japan. Instead, this bourgeoisie reconciled itself to its second-rate status, dependent on the metropolis; it contented itself with a share of the imperialist bourgeoisie's exploitation and plunder of the peoples of the "third world".

Owing to the chains binding the countries of the three continents

to neocolonialism, their economic development process has hardly been proceeding better than before. While a small bourgeois class has become increasingly more affluent and extravagant, the majority of the masses have sunk deeper and deeper into poverty and backwardness. The gap between capitalist and dependent countries has been widening year after year; the majority of the masses in the latter countries are unable to get enough nourishment. It has become increasingly evident that unleashing the development process in these countries is largely contingent on a national democratic revolution against neocolonialism and the parasitic, local bourgeoisie. This bourgeoisie is the lackey of imperialism, oppressing the people and continuing their exploitation and subjugation on behalf of the imperialists.

By the fifties, it had become evident that the parasitic, dependent bourgeoisie was unable to lead the development process, that its interests were interwoven with those of imperialism, and that it oppressed the people on behalf of imperialism. At this time, other strata of the bourgeoisie, namely the petit and middle bourgeoisie, undertook to lead the development process. The readiness of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, to support the peoples in any battle against imperialism, was an objective factor that contributed to this tendency. The middle and petit bourgeoisie tried to pursue an independent course of their own. Politically this was based on non-alignment. Economically, it was based on development plans, planned economy, agrarian reform, the public sector, and, in some cases, attempts at industrialization. In this, they relied on tactical alliance with the Soviet Union. These sectors of the bourgeoisie regarded their course as "non-capitalist development", allegedly neither dependent on imperialism nor requiring strategic alliance with the socialist community. The actual process, however, soon revealed the laws that governed this course and the results to which it would lead.

At first, the political and economic battles fought by the petit and middle bourgeoisie gave the impression that there really was a third course of development open to "third world" countries. Representative leaders of this course include Nasser, Nehru, Sukarno, and Nkrumah. Time, however, soon showed the people of these countries, in practice, the limits of such independence and its ability to solve the problems of development, and the results to which it would lead. For a time, these countries managed to wrench some concessions from imperialism, though the latter continued to wield the baton. However, as their power was prolonged, the petit and middle bourgeois promoted their own private and class interests. As these interests grew, they gradually intertwined with

those of the big bourgeoisie and ultimately imperialism. Gradually, the policy of these strata began to divert accordingly. Even if they had opted to carry on the anti-imperialist line, these strata would not have mounted a real assault on imperialism, because they lacked the necessary weapons, namely, organized, mobilized masses and a principled, strategic—not tactical—alliance with the socialist community.

This, of course, does not mean that the petit bourgeoisie, which now leads the masses' revolutionary struggle against imperialism, is ultimately bound to reverse and identify itself with imperialism. Far from it; there are revolutionary democratic forces in the petit bourgeoisie who possess certain subjective conditions, mainly unreserved commitment to Marxism-Leninism. These elements do have the ability to carry on with the struggle against imperialism and its local, reactionary allies, and to press ahead in the direction of radical, socialist transformation of the society. This happened in Democratic Yemen, Angola, and Mozambique. There, the progressive forces managed to withstand the onslaughts of imperialism and reaction; they mobilized and organized the masses, and developed a strategic alliance with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. They are now pressing ahead to complete the national democratic revolution as a prerequisite for socialism, providing its material and technical base.

Moreover, the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America admire the stand of the pro-socialist democratic revolutions of Vietnam, Cuba, and others. These revolutions are in possession of the subjective conditions, namely revolutionary theory and a vanguard party. The peoples see their progress toward genuine political and economic liberation and development. They thereby discern the only course open to them for development and advancement: This is the course of the working class and its party in alliance with the socialist community; the course of national democratic revolution that provides the material and technical basis for the socialist revolution.

In the context of the realities of the times, the national democratic revolution has become an integral part of the socialist revolution. There is no longer any perspective for a bourgeois democratic revolution such as occurred earlier in some countries. We consider this an essential thesis in connection with the struggle currently going on in various parts of the globe between the forces of socialism and liberation on the one hand, and imperialism and reaction on the other. Today the course of development has been defined for the peoples of these countries which account

for half of the world, in terms of both area and population. In the context of the worldwide struggle and the pressing need for development, the road to the future becomes crystal clear before the peoples. Their choosing the right option is of utmost importance, since these countries' liberation from economic dependence on imperialism will further aggravate the crisis of imperialism; it will provide the objective conditions for the working class in capitalist countries to accomplish the revolutionary task it is assigned: smashing the capitalist system and building socialism.

Now it remains to underline the magnitude of the difficulties met by a democratic revolution in the course of accomplishing its tasks and paving the way for the socialist revolution. Recently, some such revolutions occurred in the vicinity of the Arab homeland (in Afghanistan and Ethiopia). This created an atmosphere of optimism among the Arab masses. It is important for us to be sure that this optimism is based on a realistic view of what these revolutions stand for and the difficulties they have to overcome. First, they face a state of extreme underdevelopment owing to long years of economic dependence on imperialism. They have inherited a dependent, backward economy; there is hardly any industry of substance; agriculture is distorted and no less backward. Naturally enough, this economic backwardness is further complicated by social backwardness and widespread ignorance. In Afghanistan, for example, illiteracy afflicts 90% of the population. The societies of the "third world" are dominated by backward, feudal, and bourgeois ideologies, by mystical notions and backward social customs. All these factors combine to make revolution an extremely difficult and complicated task.

In addition, the subjective conditions for the revolution are not fully developed or mature. For instance, the takeover in Afghanistan in 1978, was effected chiefly through a coup d'etat by the national armed forces; it did not come about as the culmination of a long struggle by organized, mobilized masses, led by a people's revolutionary party. This does not mean that we disapprove of revolutionaries seeking the help of the armed forces to accomplish a revolutionary takeover; we only want to draw attention to the difficulties that await the revolution after the takeover.

One such difficulty for the Ethiopian leadership is the national question; it has not yet proposed a solution based on the right to self-determination. For the past twenty years, the Eritrean people have been waging a struggle for this right, using all means. With the overthrow of the Haile Selassie regime, it was expected that the revolutionary regime would find ample scope for a democratic solution to the Eritrean question. However,

nothing of the kind seems forthcoming so far, despite the efforts that have been made in this connection. The PFLP believes in the right of a people to self-determination, and that it is necessary to find a peaceful solution for the Eritrean problem. Such a solution should be based on self-determination and on the necessity of uniting all democratic forces in the African Horn to face the imperialist and reactionary plots which aim to destroy them all.

In Iran, the revolution has adopted a political line that is hostile to both imperialism and the socialist community. Yet it persecutes the leftist forces that fought the Shah's regime; it has not proposed a democratic solution to the question of national minorities in Iran; it does not seem to be contemplating a united national front or a program for economic and social development. These matters entail serious consequences which affect the entire future of the situation in Iran.

In the light of the above analysis, accomplishing the national democratic revolution in such countries is an arduous task, fraught with dangers and vulnerable to setbacks. The main tools accessible to the revolution in such countries, that will to a great extent decide their future, are as follows: the unity of the national democratic and revolutionary forces; reliance on the masses, releasing their potentials and stimulating their initiative; establishing close relations with the socialist community; adopting a development program capable of securing equality and liberation from the imperialist market.

This, in broad outline, is the constellation of the current worldwide struggle between the forces of liberation, peace, progress, and socialism on the one hand, and the forces of imperialism and reaction on the other. Obviously, it is only a sketch; it does not cover all details or particularities involved. Yet it does pinpoint the main forces in the field and the parameters which shape the future of the struggle. Within this framework, details and particularities can be added. This would make the picture richer, without making us lose the orientation that guides our steps along the road of humanity's future in the coming decades.



PART TWO

On the Arab Level

Introduction

During the period covered by our political report, numerous important events and developments occurred, including the 1973 October War, the Geneva Conference, Kissinger's shuttles,[7] the war of attrition in the Golan Heights, the disengagement on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts, the Arab summits in Algiers and Rabat, and the civil war in Lebanon.

Of all these, the most decisive event was the conclusion of the Camp David accords following Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, and the treacherous peace treaty between the Sadat regime and the Zionist entity.[8] This particular event was the result of accumulated concessions on the part of the Arab regimes in the seventies. It placed the Arab national liberation movement at the threshold of a new stage with a drastic change in the character of the conflict and the alignment of forces involved. This accelerated the national struggle's merger with the social, class struggle. In the process, the true position of the reactionary forces and the bourgeoisie vis-a-vis the struggle is revealed; the classes siding with the revolution, and the special role of the working class, is more clearly defined, as is the nature of the next stage of the revolution and its prospects. All this makes the Camp David accords stand as the title of a new stage in the history of the Arab struggle. Therefore, to understand, analyze and define the tasks of this stage, will be our guide to action for a long time to come. Hence, it is natural that these accords are the focus of our political report on the Arab level.

Camp David, with the treacherous peace treaty entailed, is not a transitory political incident. It is more than an important event in the history of the Arab nation's struggle against its enemies. It is comparable to the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1918, which substituted British and French colonial rule for Ottoman oppression. It is comparable to the

7 **Ed. Note:** This refers to Henry Kissinger acting as a 'shuttle' (go-between) in the diplomatic negotiations between various parties in the conflicts in West Asia of the period.

8 **Ed. Note:** Anwar Sadat, leader of Egypt 1970-1981.

[obscured][9] Arab defeat in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967. At the [obscured] of these events had a decisive effect on the entire constellatio [obscured] of the struggle, on the nature of class alliance within th [obscured] national liberation movement, and on the quality of its tasks. [obscured] Camp David accords will affect the Arab national liberation moveme [obscured] placing it at the beginning of a new stage.

The Camp David accords are closely connected with the Zionist aggression of June 5 1967. They are largel [obscured]..., though belated, of the Arab defeat in that war. This wa [obscured] ... imperialism and Zionism wished to achieve. Though the [obscured] ... to achieve this immediately, the seeds of Camp David [obscured] conceived in the womb of the 1967 war, only to be born i [obscured].

Our ability to analyze this stage [obscured] determine our tasks, forms the point of departure for effo [obscured] our role in leading the Palestinian mass movement and [obscured] and class aims: liberation, democracy, socialism [obscured] this reason the stage of Camp David is the focus and [obscured] report. Thus, comprehensive discussion of events in [obscured] will not obscure the constellation of the struggle [obscured] main forces and parameters, and the program for grappli [obscured].

Chapter One

The Stage of Camp David—What is It and What are the Factors that Led to It?

The novelty of the Camp David accords lies not only in the fact that an Arab regime, that of Egypt, admitted its inability to confront the Zionist entity and concluded a truce. The Egyptian regime went so far as to accept what for all practical purposes amounts to unconditional surrender. The Egyptian regime explicitly and officially recognized the Zionist entity's right to existence and security in the land of Palestine. It normalized relations, concluded cultural, tourism, and commercial agreements and

9 **Ed. Note:** In the surviving English translation of the Fourth Congress, a small number of sections of the scan are obscured. The editors have attempted to find a complete text, and also to attempt to translate from the equivalent Arabic text. However, none of the former could be found, and the latter was not like-for-like so couldn't be used to find the small instances of missing text. Any such instances of missing text is indicated by [obscured].

even talked of possible political and military alliance with the Zionist entity. We can compare this with the official Arab stand which professes non-recognition and economic boycott of the Zionist entity, regarding any relations as tantamount to treason. Even compared to what Sadat himself used to say before his visit to Jerusalem, that normalization would take generations, we realize the enormous change introduced by the Camp David accords. Truly it ushers in a new, qualitatively different stage in the history of the struggle against Zionism, the Zionist state and the imperialist forces that created and sustain this state.

The Palestinian and Arab masses have persistently opposed the imperialist-Zionist invasion. Their opposition has grown more intense as Zionism's aims and ambitions have become more evident. Until the conclusion of the Camp David accords, the masses' attitude had prevented any Arab regime or representative body from recognizing or dealing with the invaders. This is the reason why the Hashemite rulers of Jordan have always attempted to disclaim Feisal's meetings with the Zionist leader Weizman. Similarly in 1948, due to the crimes committed by Zionism against the Palestinian people, all Arab states, regardless of political inclination, had to send their armies to Palestine, to fight the establishment of the Zionist state. When this state came into existence, the Arab states were faced by the monstrosity of the Zionist invasion and the great agitation of the Arab masses. Accordingly, they not only refrained from recognizing 'Israel', but also decided to boycott it, as well as the companies that deal with it. King Abdullah of Jordan was at the time collaborating with Britain and other imperialist powers, to facilitate the establishment of the Zionist State. He had to make his contacts with the Zionists in secret. These contacts remained unknown to the masses until a Jordanian army officer, Abdullah al Tel, revealed them in his memoirs.

We recall the three famous *no's* of the Arab summit held Khartoum, Sudan, despite the defeat in June 1967. We can compare this with the implications of the Camp David accords: negotiations, formal recognition, normalization of relations and raising the Israeli flag in Cairo. Through this comparison, one realizes that the Camp David accords really mark a qualitatively new stage. This explains why our masses were initially stunned by these accords. It motivates us and the entire Arab national movement to present our masses with our analysis of this phenomenon, its implications for the future of the struggle, and the revolutionary program needed to confront it.

There have been explanations for the Camp David accords, that fail

to trace this change back to the bourgeois tendencies that began after the defeat of 1967. These tendencies were accentuated after the death of Nasser, as petrodollars strengthened the positions of the bourgeoisie and reaction in Egypt and the region. Yet there are explanations that do not relate Camp David to the economic, class, and political developments and changes of the two preceding decades. Instead, these explanations attribute the change entirely to the personality of Sadat, or to other marginal factors. This is why we find it necessary to point out and discuss the main factors that led to the stage of Camp David.

First: *The class, social and economic effects of petrodollars on the oil-producing countries themselves, on neighboring Arab countries and the region generally.* Particularly after 1973 and the rise of oil prices, petrodollars began to pour into the region. The Arab countries now produce about twenty million barrels of oil daily. Saudi Arabia alone produces more than ten million barrels daily. Knowing that crude oil now sells at $30-35 a barrel, we can easily calculate that Saudi revenue from crude oil is over $300 million; that of the entire Arab area is roughly double that amount. This means an annual income exceeding $200 billion. Is it possible for such a flood of petrodollars not to have consequences on the economic, social and class conditions in the region?

It is true that part of this flood turns into deposits in the banks of the imperialists. Here it is used to rejuvenate and develop the world capitalist system. Another part goes to the purchase of arms for the purpose of repressing the masses, at the same time promoting the military industries of the capitalist countries, as a means to alleviate their economic crisis. Yet a portion of this revenue remains in the oil-producing countries. From there, a part seeps to neighboring countries and the region generally. This creates economic, social, and class transformations that are no longer difficult to discern and study.

The economies of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, etc., are dependent on the world capitalist system. This makes the bourgeoisie of these countries subservient. They are unable to invest this revenue so as to create the capital accumulation and infrastructure needed to build a developed capitalist economy. They are hence incapable of creating a strong capitalist state. All that such a bourgeoisie can do is to buy imperialist countries' products and undertake service enterprises or other economic activities that serve or complement imperialist production, but do not replace or even compete with it. This

accounts for the increasing number of millionaires, compradors, middlemen, and contractors. This phenomenon has become obvious in the oil-producing countries in particular and the entire Arab area in general.

This class has multiplied in size, wealth, power, and influence over the past years. Where do the interests of such a class lie? Do they flourish with the continuation of the Arab-Zionist conflict, the spread of armed struggle, the growth of the Palestinian revolution and its cohesion with the Arab mass movement? No, the interests of this class lie in putting an end to this conflict. As King Hassan II of Morocco eloquently put it: "The combination of Arab riches, Western technology and Jewish genius is certain to make this region a paradise on earth." For whom would this paradise be? Certainty not for the dispersed Palestinian masses; nor for the millions of Yemeni, Palestinian, Jordanian, and Lebanese workers selling their labor power in the worst of living conditions in the Gulf. It would be a paradise for the capitulationist bourgeoisie and reactionary classes.

Petrodollars and the social changes they brought about were certainly among the factors that led to Camp David and the new situation. Yet one may argue that the Arab states. Including the reactionary and oil-producing ones, rejected Camp David. How then can one indiscriminately lump their positions with that of Sadat? It can also be argued that Egypt is hardly an oil-exporting country, and that the social class phenomenon in question is not so prevalent in Egypt as in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or the United Arab Emirates. How then can we explain that it was Sadat who took the lead to Camp David rather than other seemingly more likely Arab regimes? Similarly, one may ask how can we explain Syria's objection to Camp David, since Syria's ruling class was also subject to the effects of the petrodollar phenomenon?

In answer we say: Are the reactionary Arab regimes really opposed to Camp David and what it stands for? Didn't the first meeting between Egypt, represented by Hassan al Tuhami, and 'Israel', represented by Moshe Dayan, take place in Rabat under the auspices of King Hassan II? Didn't Hussein of Jordan describe Sadat's visit to Jerusalem as a courageous step? Haven't the Jordanian monarch's secret contacts and meetings with Zionist leaders become common knowledge? Don't Numeiri, Qabus, and Barre still maintain diplomatic, political, economic and military relations with Sadat's regime, notwithstanding that the Zionist enemy's flag is raised in Cairo? Wasn't Saudi Arabia pushing Sadat in this direction, persuading him to expel the Soviet advisors and sever relations

with the Soviet Union? Didn't this mean that Sadat would be left with only one alternative: substituting alliance with imperialism for alliance with the Soviet Union? Saudi Arabia was the mastermind that planned the crime and, once it was accomplished, denounced it. It was Saudi Arabia that encouraged many of the economic and social retreats that Sadat made when he came to power after Nasser's death. On many occasions, Saudi aid to Egypt was granted on the implicit condition that such retreats be made.

The trail blazed by Sadat is the course which these regimes, and the social forces they represent, see as expressing their own orientation and securing their interests. Their turn to follow suit will come when it becomes opportune for them to declare their true stance.

As for the argument that Egypt does not rank as an oil-rich country, this is true. However, it does not disprove the fact that, for a number of reasons, Egypt was the Arab country whose class structure was most affected by the petrodollar flow. Posing as the biggest Arab state confronting 'Israel', Sadat's Egypt became an alluring place for petrodollar investors, thanks to the regime's policy of liberalization, the economic legislation passed for this purpose, and the ample opportunities for investment in tourism, services and other fields. Any investigation of the rightist economic changes effected under Sadat will indicate the extent to which the class of millionaires has grown in terms of its interests, number and influence, in recent years. There is no doubt that this class was one of the factors that led to Camp David and the beginning of a new era of full alliance with imperialism and its Zionist base in the region, 'Israel'.

As to why it was this class in Egypt that took the lead, and not its wealthier counterparts in Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich countries: Egypt was a confrontation state with territory occupied by the Zionist enemy. Thus, Egypt was called upon to redefine relations with the Zionist entity. The others, oil-rich or otherwise, were not called upon to initiate such a move.

As for Jordan, the Zionist entity was less willing to withdraw from the West Bank than from the Sinai. This made the Jordanian regime reluctant to be the first to take such a step; it prefers to wait for the appropriate moment to join in.

Syria presents still more complications for imperialism's plan to crush any nationalist opposition in the countries surrounding the Zionist entity. This complication is due to several factors which essentially stem from

the new turn the settlement has taken: Imperialism and Zionism accept nothing less than complete Arab consent to their conditions. This leaves no margin for even the semblance of patriotism on the part of the Arab regimes. Moreover, the proposed settlement does not provide for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories; nor does it offer a genuine solution for the Palestinian question. Concurrently, developments during the last two years have been characterized by intensified activities on the part of the traditional Arab bourgeoisie and reactionary religious groups. These aim to overthrow the national bourgeois regimes, seize power and proceed toward capitulation, in alliance with the ultra-right sections of the bourgeoisie in Egypt and other Arab countries.

Thus the Syrian regime is required to confront these challenges with a careful reassessment of all its economic, social, and military policies. Decisive blows must be dealt to the strongholds of the traditional bourgeoisie and the reactionary religious groups that seek closer ties with the imperialist market. Syria is also required to expand mass participation and institutionalize democratic principles for mobilizing the masses, so that they may effectively combat the internal reactionary forces, and take an active part in opposing the Zionist enemy and capitulationist policies throughout the region. Moreover, further consolidation of relations with the socialist community, especially the USSR, will make Syria better prepared to confront the plans of the overt and covert proponents of the Camp David accords.

We should point out that the flow of petrodollars and their impact on the region, would not have caused such a retrogression in Egypt if not for the bourgeois nature of the regime, and the inability of the state bourgeoisie to complete the tasks of the national democratic revolution. Its deviation from the revolution began to manifest itself gradually in the wake of the 1967 defeat. Millions of Egyptians poured into the streets after this defeat, refusing Nasser's resignation and demanding that he carry on with the revolution. In so doing, they pointed to the tasks of the revolution option which they were urging Nasser to carry out: the line of the masses, demanding to be organized and mobilized, and that their class enemies be smashed; the line of steadfastness and preparation, of mobilization and not yielding; the line of violence and people's war. However, Nasser's state institutions and bourgeoisie were incapable of pursuing such a line. Regardless of our assessment of Nasser as a progressive, patriotic and nationalist leader, with achievements on both the national and pan-Arab level, it was the bourgeois character of the state he headed that decided the nature of the reaction to the defeat. In this light,

one can explain Nasser's compromise with Saudi Arabia and domestic reaction, his acceptance of UN Security Council resolution 242[10], the Rogers plan, etc. These concessions served as a springboard for Sadat to move to total alliance with imperialism and its Zionist base, 'Israel', and to reverse all that the July 23rd, 1953 revolution stood for.

The class-oriented approach spares us many pitfalls in evaluating events. The Egyptian-Israeli negotiations reached a deadlock shortly after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem; the Camp David summit talks lingered, and the press began to speak of the difficulties of success. When there were obstacles to concluding the peace treaty, opinions were expressed to the effect that Sadat would discover the futility of his chosen course and return to the option of the Geneva Conference and Arab solidarity. However, our sound understanding of the class forces behind the Camp David option enabled us to penetrate the events without illusions; we could correctly assess the friction which was impeding the talks and how it would be overcome. This class approach also enables us to see through the professed opposition of the reactionary Arab regimes to Camp David. It enables us to foresee the course of action that the Jordanian regime will pursue vis-a-vis Camp David, when the right moment comes for it to express its real attitude.

The impact of the petrodollar flow into the Arab region in general and Egypt in particular, and the bourgeois nature of Sadat's regime, were not the only material factors and objective developments that led to Camp David. Another factor was recent economic developments in the Zionist entity.

Second: *The requirements of Israeli economic growth.* Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as a consequence of the 1967 aggression, provided favorable conditions for 'Israel' to develop its economy to a new, qualitative level. From the beginning, the Israeli economy was superior to that of the dependent, underdeveloped countries. This superiority was due to several factors. First and foremost was imperialist and Zionist aid

10 **Ed. Note:** UN Security Council Resolution 242, which was adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council following the 1967 Zionist aggression against several Arab nations. Following its adoption, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) rejected it as "fundamentally and gravely inconsistent with the Arab character of Palestine, the essence of the Palestine cause and the right of the Palestinian people to their homeland." and "disappoints the hopes of the Arab nation and ignores its national aspirations [... and] ignores the existence of the Palestinian people and their right of self-determination.".

and investment at strengthening 'Israel' as an aggressive military base. Naturally, military strength required a relatively strong economic base. The aid provided by Federal Germany, under the guise of reparations, played a special role in financing the Israeli industrialization program implemented from 1951 to 1966. As a result, Israeli industry expanded greatly, but the qualitative turn in the Israeli economy came only after the 1967 aggression. In 1966, the Israeli economy was in crisis; there were 100,000 unemployed, i.e., 10% of the labor force.

The June 1967 aggression provided favorable conditions for the Israeli economy. For one, US aid increased in recognition of the role 'Israel' had played in undermining Nasser's leadership. The more pronounced the role of the Zionist entity becomes, the more US military and economic aid it gets. Statements of Nixon and Carter, on the level of US assistance to 'Israel' during their respective terms in office, bear witness to this. 'Israel' receives a bigger share of US foreign aid than all other friends of the US in the world.

Moreover, after the 1967 aggression, Zionists in various countries became more willing to invest in the Zionist entity. Zionist millionaires from Europe and America held a conference in Jerusalem after the aggression, to discuss how to boost their investment in our occupied homeland. More important still are the opportunities that the new occupation afforded the Zionists to exploit cheap and vulnerable Arab labor. In addition, the 1967 occupied territories became new markets for Israeli products. Now 20% of Israeli industrial exports go to the 1967 occupied territories; in 'Israel', 50% of the agricultural labor force and 36% of the industrial labor force are Palestinian Arabs (including Palestinians from the land seized in 1948). In addition, 'Israel' acquired the Sinai oil fields and the water resources of the West Bank and confiscated more than one million dunums of land.[11]

As a result of all this, the Israeli economy experienced greater growth after the 1967 aggression than it ever had before. The Israeli economy differs substantially from the economies of the dependent "third world" countries. In 'Israel', the annual per capita income is $4,000; industrial output is 30% of the gross national product; industry accounts for 86% of exports. Imports consist of 7% consumer goods, 13% capital goods, and 80% raw materials. Substantial industrial concentration occurred during the 1970s. With all this, 'Israel' is today close to being a bourgeois industrial state. The labor force and markets provided by the occupied

11 **Ed. Note:** One dunum equals approximately equals 1,000 square meters.

Arab territories contributed to the attainment of this level of growth. This being the case, how can one imagine that 'Israel' would give up all these privileges, especially when its capitalist development has reached a stage that requires still more Arab markets and labor?

This state of affairs explains Israeli insistence on normalisation of relations. Tracing the complicated talks conducted between the Zionist entity and the Sadat regime, one sees clearly that 'Israel' was in no way prepared to discuss any settlement that did not guarantee prompt and complete normalisation. 'Israel' was not satisfied with direct negotiations, implicit recognition, guarantees for its borders, or simple political recognition. 'Israel' insisted on complete normalisation with Egypt. Today it is even speaking of using the Nile to irrigate the Naqab (Negev) desert, joint investment projects in the Sinai, etc. The Israeli economy can no longer tolerate the Arab economic boycott, or any restrictions impeding it from sharing in the Arab bourgeoisie's and reactionaries' exploitation of Arab labour, markets, oil, and water resources. Thus, the requirements of Israeli economic growth constituted another factor leading to Camp David.

Third: *The increased importance of the Arab region for imperialism, especially the US, in the 1970s* Until the middle of this century, the Middle East owed its importance primarily to its strategic geographical location and international water-ways: the Arab Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Sea of Oman, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal. The area became much more important after the discovery of abundant oil reserves. Now, owing to the energy crisis and the great dependence of the world capitalist economy on oil, the Arab region has assumed vital importance for imperialism.

The US was self-sufficient in oil in the 1950s. During the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression on Egypt in 1956, following the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) pipeline was blown up, and Europe suffered an oil shortage. The US, however, was not affected; it was able to partially replace Europe's Middle East oil supplies. Today, the picture is totally different. The US now consumes about 2 million barrels of oil a day. Domestic production satisfies only 50% of this need, so the US now imports about 50% of its oil needs. This percentage is rising despite all the counter measures taken by the administration. A large part of this oil import comes from the Arab region. Hence, if the flow of oil supplies to the US is blocked or jeopardized,

the US economy will be shaken to an intolerable degree. This explains the passage in Carter's State of the Union address where he considered the US's increasing dependence on imported oil as one of the most important factors affecting the US economy. The importance of oil is still greater, for the exporting countries' oil revenues have become a significant factor in the financial and commercial sectors of the imperialist countries, particularly the US. Thus, the US considers the region to be within the bounds of its security sphere. A region so vital to US security cannot be left alone, without Camp David, without an imperialist-Zionist-reactionary alliance to secure these interests.

In a speech delivered at a conference on the Middle East, held in the State of Missouri in 1979, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Harold Sanders, said, "For many years, the Middle East has been considered a strategic crossroads and a sort of bridge connecting Europe with Asia and Africa. It used to be the lifeline of the British. During the fifties and sixties, the region assumed new significance, because it became the chief oil supplier of our NATO allies and Japan, and owing to the importance of Turkey and Iran in preventing Soviet expansion southward to control that oil. Even at that time, the Middle East did not seem to have any immediate, overwhelming significance for the US itself. We could at that time choose to stand back and not get directly involved in Middle East problems. This situation, however, has changed remarkably in the seventies." Elsewhere in his speech, Saunders said, "From the economic point of view, the Middle East is regarded as one of the fastest growing world markets, and we have an obvious interest in developing commerce to help offset oil costs. Besides, the Middle East nations, with their enormous financial resources, can influence the stability of the world economy."

In his June 1, 1978 report to the Congress on US Middle East policy, Saunders, one of the foremost US experts on the Middle East, portrays with figures the magnitude of US interests in the region. He says that imports accounted for 22% of total oil consumption in 1977, and that the figures are rising year by year. He also mentions that the Arab governments then possessed a surplus of $140 billion that could be invested; that US exports to the region in 1973 amounted to a value of $3,500 million, i.e., 5% of total US exports; and that by 1977, US sales to the Middle East has risen to $12.3 billion, representing 10% of total exports. In addition, there are over 90,000 US nationals working in the region.

Such is the development of US imperialist interests in the region

over the past years. It is only natural that such developments have an impact on imperialist policies and the means for their implementation.

We have outlined three changes in the Arab region in recent years: the class changes in the nature of the regime and bourgeoisie in Egypt, economic developments in the Zionist entity and the growth of imperialist, particularly US, interests in the region. It was natural for these three changes to converge in a new policy, that of Camp David and the tripartite alliance, in order to secure and further the economic interests of the parties concerned. The policy of a state is not formulated in accordance with subjective tendencies. It is the concentrated expression of that state's economy. Naturally, this thesis also applies in our region, in the light of these developments and changes.

The persistence of the Arab-Israeli conflict threatens the interests of imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction. For 'Israel', the conflict is a barrier to economic expansion; it prevents 'Israel' from participating in plundering the wealth and taking advantage of the markets in the region. For Arab reaction, the persistence of the conflict undermines its natural alliance with imperialism; it continuously fuels the masses' consciousness and alliance with the forces of socialism and liberation. For imperialism, the persisting conflict is between its allies, Zionism and Arab reaction, whereas US interests lie in these allies joining hands against their common enemy: the masses and their progressive organizations, and the socialist forces backing them.

The Camp David accords are the political expression of the convergence of interests between imperialism, Zionism, and Arab reaction, the latter represented at this stage by the Sadat regime. Of course, the accords are a preliminary step toward military cooperation and alliance to protect the common interests of these three from the mass movement and the forces of change in the region. It is possible that minor antagonisms will persist for some time between the Zionist entity and Arab reaction, represented by the Sadat regime. This would not refute our basic argument, for such antagonism exists between Greece and Turkey, although both are members of NATO; many other examples can be cited of such antagonism. An alliance denotes convergence of interests, not total identity.

The Zionist entity strives to remain imperialism's primary ally in the region, its share of the plunder being proportionate with its services. For its part, imperialism recognizes the particular characteristics and abilities of this ally, but it is also aware that Arab reaction has a role of its own

which the Zionist entity cannot perform US imperialism realizes that 'Israel', as a settler-colonial society allied with the US, is not vulnerable to internal revolutionary change in the foreseeable future, as happened in Iran and might happen in Egypt or Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the US knows that the Egyptian regime can play a role in protecting reactionary Arab or "Islamic" regimes. The US knows that this role cannot always be directly performed by the Zionist entity.

Thus the Zionist entity and the Egyptian regime vie for the US's favor. For this reason, Begin[12] favors deployment of US forces in 'Israel' and protests US arms deliveries to Egypt above certain limits. This explains why there is less than full accord between Zionist and Arab reactionary interests. It explains the US attitude toward their differences. The US arbitrates these disputes, solving them in the interest of the joint alliance, but always favoring the Zionist entity, for it is the most secure strategic base, thanks to its settler-colonial nature and organic links to imperialism.

In general, this is the analytical background for the new course represented by the Camp David accords and the new era it heralds. This qualitatively new phenomenon is unprecedented in the history of the Arab-Zionist conflict. It is not a chance occurrence when an Arab regime moves to openly recognize, reconcile and ally with the Zionist entity. There have been Arab rulers who, at times, were no less defiant of their people's feelings than Sadat. Yet, aside from Bourgiba's 1966 statement about the Arab "mistake" of not accepting the partition of Palestine (sic), no Arab ruler has called for or acted on the basis of openly recognizing or accepting the Zionist entity, cooperating, making peace or allying with it. Arab reaction did prove unable to confront Zionism in 1948. Moreover, some Arab reactionaries secretly collaborated with imperialism and sometime Zionism, against the Palestinian people. King Hussein requested Zionist help via the US, in his fight against the Palestinian resistance in 1970. Nevertheless, these acts and attitudes amount to nothing compared to the Camp David accords which went to the point of direct negotiations, official and open recognition, documented peace, alliance and cooperation with the Zionist entity.

It is the material and economic conditions and developments mentioned above that explain this phenomenon and the stage it ushers in.

12 **Ed. Note:** Menachem Begin (1913 - 1992) was a politician, founder of the Likud party, and prime minister of the Zionist entity from 21 June 1977 – 10 October 1983.

These three factors constituted a force acting in the direction of Camp David. Economic developments and interests are always a major force functioning to secure and promote these same interests.

In addition, the revolutionary changes on the international level, the continued victories and successes scored by the forces of socialism and liberation, constituted yet another factor. These impelled the forces of imperialism, Zionism, and reaction to adopt the course of Camp David, hoping to protect their interests from the winds of change blowing throughout the world. It was clear to all that the collapse of the Shah regime, and the triumph of the Iranian revolution, stimulated and accelerated the conclusion of the Camp David accords. Carter himself rushed to the region, shuttling between Cairo and Tel Aviv for several days, to convince their leaders of the dangers threatening their interests in the region. Carter convinced them to overcome the differences that were blocking the conclusion of the peace treaty.

US aggressiveness has generally intensified in recent years, as discussed in Part I of this report. Imperialism's aggressive activities concentrated on the region of the Gulf and Indian Ocean, following the Shah's fall. The Camp David accords is one implementation of this aggressive policy in the Arab region.

Having dealt with the material, objective factors responsible for Camp David, let us examine the subjective factors: The main subjective factor contributing to the birth of Camp David is the crisis experienced by the Arab national liberation movement, including the Egyptian revolutionary movement. Objective conditions in the world are conducive to the triumph of popular movements, if the movement in question has the class leadership, ideology, political program, and means of struggle capable of mobilizing the masses' vast energies and militant potentials. This question will be dealt with elsewhere in this report. Suffice it to mention one essential point: The option of a negotiated settlement with the Zionist entity, which was adopted by sections of the Arab national liberation movement, especially the PLO leadership, contributed to Camp David. This made it easier for Sadat and the class he represents to move to negotiate, recognize, make peace and ally with the Zionist enemy.

Prior to the Camp David accords, unequivocal mass rejection of the Zionist enemy had prevented Arab reaction from taking its natural position alongside the Arabs' national enemy. Then, after the 1973 October War, the "Arab solidarity" countries, then the PLO leadership, adopted the idea of the proposed political settlement with the Zionist enemy,

based implicitly or explicitly on negotiations with and recognizing 'Israel'. This paved the way for Sadat to complete his plan. It provided him with the argument which he repeated on several occasions to justify his policy: If everybody, the PLO included, is prepared to negotiate with Israel, then why should I not take the initiative?

In Part III of this report, we will discuss the question of revolutionary forces having at times to make compromises with the enemy, the importance of tactics and the imperatives of the respective stages of struggle. Regardless of debate on these questions, advocating a negotiated settlement under the balance of forces then prevailing, when the revolutionary forces were unable to control such a course and its consequences, helped the capitulationist, reactionary forces. Once the idea of a negotiated settlement, recognizing the Zionist entity, had become acceptable in principle, it was easier for Sadat to pursue his own interpretation of relations with the Zionist entity.

Such is our view and analysis of the Camp David era.



Chapter Two

Objectives and Plans of the Camp David Pact

Certain forces and most Arab countries think that the Camp David policy pertains solely to the Arab-Zionist and Palestinian-Zionist conflict. They regard Camp David as only aiming to provide a solution to this conflict, favoring the Zionist entity. This view is too narrow; it lacks political insight as to the scope of Camp David. Hence, it fails to provide the basis for a sound anti-Camp David policy.

Our preceding analysis of Camp David presents a scientific, comprehensive view of all the interrelated objectives sought by the parties to Camp David. This analysis shows that the Camp David pact seeks not only to liquidate the Palestinian cause and secure Arab recognition of the Zionist entity as a legitimate, integral part of the region. It also seeks to secure imperialist, particularly US, domination of the entire region, including the oil sources. Camp David is intended to guarantee all imperialism's oil, financial, and commercial interests, for these have become so vital that their loss could shake the imperialist system and plunge it into a complex economic crisis.

The Camp David pact also aims to insure 'Israel' a lasting, legitimate existence in the Arab region, eliminating every objection to its existence and getting the Arab countries to normalize relations with it. This should open the region for 'Israel' as the strong, secure military base on which imperialism can rely for protecting its interests from the winds of change in the region. The Camp David era is required to strengthen this base, rewarding 'Israel' with its share of wealth, resources and markets of the region.

Furthermore, Camp David aims at securing the domination of the ruling reactionary and bourgeois forces in Egypt and other Arab countries. It aims at providing them with expertise, arms and other aid, enabling them to remain in power and repress any resistance by the masses who are exploited by the alliance of imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction.

Of course, Camp David is also related to the objective of destroying the Arab regimes and forces that oppose this pact, especially the Palestinian revolution, the Lebanese National Movement, Syria, Democratic Yemen, Libya, and Algeria. Camp. David aims to destroy the forces threatening the reactionary Arab regimes, especially those forces waging armed struggle. Imperialism's objective in the Camp David era is to liquidate not only the Palestinian revolution and cause, but every one of the aforesaid forces without exception. This means to liquidate them militarily if possible, or politically if their structure allows for political abortion, or both.

Finally, Camp David fits into US global strategy which seeks to contain the world socialist system by surrounding it with pro-imperialist pacts, as a preliminary step to neutralizing some of its countries, and thereafter attacking the whole system and defeating it.

The PFLP prides itself on having formulated a comprehensive, scientific perception of the dangers of the proposed negotiated settlement. This settlement aims at securing imperialist domination, legitimizing and perpetuating the Zionist entity, bolstering the reactionary forces in the Arab region. Our view may sound axiomatic now, but earlier we had to exert great propaganda efforts to establish its validity, as opposed to other views which approached the settlement question only from the viewpoint of the conflict over the occupied Arab territories and the Palestinian cause. We have always viewed the proposed negotiated settlement as a comprehensive scheme aimed at establishing a new order in the region in the light of developments on the international, Arab, and Palestinian levels.

Imperialism's plans for realizing the objectives of the Camp David pact

First: *Intensifying direct imperialist military presence in the region*. US imperialism stepped up its direct military presence in our region, motivated by a number of considerations. One is the increased importance of imperialist interests in the region which has become part of the US's vital security sphere. Another consideration was the collapse of one of imperialism's main outposts in the region: the Shah's Iran. Imperialism derived certain lessons from the inability of a local reactionary military establishment to prevent the victory of a people's revolution. This lesson was reinforced by the Qaba Incident in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, where the regime was unable to put down the insurrection for several days. Finally, the recent revolutionary changes and developments on the international level prompted increased US military presence. This is not to say that the US had abandoned the Vietnamization policy derived from the lessons of Vietnam. Rather, while continuing that policy, the US will also rely on its own military forces.

The steps already taken by the US in this direction have become evident and well-known: establishing the Rapid Deployment Force and the Fifth Fleet, stepping up military presence on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, expanding the base at Masirah, Oman, and concluding agreements with Kenya, Somalia, Oman, and Egypt for leasing bases to be used by the US armed forces.

By concentrating on US military presence, we do not intend to exclude other imperialist forces. France, for one, does not seem to be in full agreement with US imperialism in all its global policies. Yet France has deployed its armed forces in certain parts of the word, including the Arab homeland, and can be expected to do so again. The French intervention in support of Mauritania against POLISARIO, and in Tunisia, against the Gafsa uprising, are cases in point.

Second: *Bolstering the military capacity of subservient states as outposts for imperialism*. First and foremost among these states is the Zionist entity, a settler-colonial society sharing a common fate with imperialism; the Zionist entity is prepared to fight on the conviction that if imperialism is ousted from the region, its own existence will be imperiled. The Zionist

entity is handsomely rewarded for this role, which fosters its enthusiasm. US military aid to the Zionist entity is not only massive; the equipment given is of a quality sometimes denied NATO countries; it sometimes even rivals that of the US armed forces. During President Nixon's term, the General Chief of Staff of the US Armed Forces resigned in protest over this state of affairs. These facts put in perspective the significance attached to the role of the Zionist entity in this part of the world.

Any survey of the Israeli military establishment (the qualitative and quantitative growth of armament capacity and the progress made in military industries) confirms the real weight of this imperialist base with facts and figures. Such a survey shows that the level of Israeli armament far exceeds defense needs. Imperialism does not give all this assistance to the Zionist entity out of sentimental attachment, but rather as a part of its global preparations and regional military schemes.

For the foreseeable future, 'Israel' will continue to be imperialism's most important base in this part of the world. Needless to say, the Zionist entity does not dedicate itself to such a role only to win the applause of the US, or the so-called free world, but rather for the share of the bounty it receives in return for its services. The Camp David accords are now making the Zionists' wildest dreams come true: 'Israel' now plans to accomplish economic growth and expansion of its political and military role, exceeding its previous accomplishments by several times.

Next to the Zionist entity, Egypt now emerges as a base that is being prepared by US imperialism for a special military role on the regional level. Imperialism scored a great success during Sadat's term: Egypt shifted from a position of patriotism, allied with the Soviet Union, in Nasser's days, to a position of reaction, allied with imperialism. This was one of the US's greatest triumphs in the seventies. It was a qualitative, strategic gain on the regional level. Viewed from the other perspective, it was a great loss for Egypt's patriotic forces and the forces of socialism and liberation internationally. Egypt is an ideal base for imperialism in this part of the world due to its geographic position, population (42 million), relative scientific and technological superiority (compared with Saudi Arabia or Sudan) and its historical influence in the Arab region, Africa, and West Asia. Except for the potential threat of developments in the class struggle unfavorable to Sadat's regime, Egypt offers numerous, important advantages, providing increased strategic, economic and political support to the main imperialist base in the region, 'Israel'.

Egypt is second only to 'Israel' in imperialism's regional plans, and

its military capacity is bolstered accordingly. US military assistance to Egypt this year amounts to $1.5 billion, compared to about $2 billion for 'Israel'. It is expected that imperialism will continue to reinforce Egypt's military capacity. The role which imperialism and the reactionary Arab bourgeoisie require Egypt to play in the region is revealed in Sadat's continuous declarations on regional strategic questions and the "Soviet threat," his willingness to put more Egyptian bases at the disposal of the US, and to support any Arab regime that is threatened, particularly in the Gulf area. The deployment of Egyptian forces in Oman and Sudan, and Sadat's assistance to the regimes in Zaire and Morocco, are clear indications that these declarations are being put into effect.

It has now become evident that the treacherous peace treaty Sadat concluded with the Zionist entity was not, as professed, meant to alleviate Egypt's military burdens so that it could turn to development. Rather, it aimed to increase these burdens and turn them in another direction, to preserve the interests of the tripartite alliance to which Arab reaction and the capitulationist bourgeoisie are party.

Saudi Arabia ranks third, after the Zionist entity and Sadat's regime, in imperialism's plan to bolster and develop the military capacity of the countries that constitute its military bases in the region. Owing to the nature and relatively small population of the Saudi society, Saudi Arabia is far below the Zionist entity and Egypt in terms of military power. All the same, it ranks third in the US plan, owing to its financial resources. The aim of the US plan for bolstering military capacity is related to another aim: recovering as much as possible of the revenues paid to Saudi Arabia for oil.

Through these three bases, US imperialism maps out its regional military strategy. Through the flow of US military hardware, and stepping up the military capacity of these bases, US imperialism militarizes its industrial production as a means of overcoming its economic crisis. At the same time, it insures the suppression of the people's movement and the forces of change in the region, and completes the chain of its global military strategy.

By concentrating on these three bases, we do not mean that the other reactionary Arab regimes are excluded from US plans. Their military capacity is also being bolstered, in North Yemen, the Gulf States, Sudan, Morocco, etc., but on a smaller scale.

Third: *Drawing Other Arab forces into Camp David*. So far in this chapter, we have focused on the military aspect of the Camp David plans, but this does not necessarily mean that the imperialist plans will be implemented by launching more wars in the region. Imperialism is making all these military preparations to face emergencies and revolutionary situations, to be able to achieve its political ends by the mere threat of resort to military means. This is also part of US imperialism's global plans to increase international tension, whereby it seeks to overcome its general crisis and solve its economic problems through militarizing production.

Alongside these military preparations, imperialism has political plans for continuing the Camp David process and accomplishing the objectives noted earlier. Naturally, political efforts will be accompanied by military pressures and carefully weighed, limited military action calculated to draw other Arab forces into the Camp David process.

US imperialism knows only too well that the settlement concluded on the Egyptian front, though a great breakthrough, is nevertheless insufficient to fully reverse the course of the struggle in the region. Alone, it cannot tum the tide against the people, the progressive forces and their alliance with the forces of socialism and liberation internationally. Apart from the Egyptian front, there are the Syrian, Jordanian, and Lebanese fronts. If the situation on these fronts remains as it is, this will impede realization of US imperialism's aims and the securing of its interests in the region. The Arab-Zionist and Palestinian-Zionist conflict will remain unresolved, despite the fact that one of the main belligerents, Egypt, deserted to the enemy camp. Persistence of the conflict will prevent bringing the other reactionary forces into full, open alliance with Zionism and imperialism. There will continue to be favorable objective conditions for the growth of the Palestinian and Arab revolutionary movement, and for the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to continue to have influence in the region, strengthening their relations with the contingents of the Arab national liberation movement. Imperialism will, therefore, spare no efforts to expand the Camp David settlement to include the remaining links on the northeastern front (Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinians).

It is, of course, difficult for us to foretell precisely how imperialism will proceed in carrying out its scheme in terms of timing and sequence. It is equally difficult to determine for certain which Arab country will join Camp David next, and in what order the other candidates will follow, bringing in all the other fronts. Nevertheless, we postulate that the

Camp David alliance will generally pursue the following tactics:

a) intensified deceptive maneuvers and political traps, billed as amending the Camp David accords, a new framework linked to them, or a new settlement formula for the other fronts. This is all for the purpose of keeping the settlement alive and obscuring political differences, thereby preventing political polarization and alignment into patriotic and revolutionary forces on the one hand, and reactionary forces, pretending to be opposed to Camp David, on the other. These maneuvers aim to win over the national bourgeoisie, and isolate the revolutionary forces, with a view to undermining the opposition to Camp David on those fronts.

It is not a coincidence that the mass opposition to the treacherous peace treaty has been countered by a number of such deceptive maneuvers. We have encountered a proposal for amending the UN Security Council resolution 242, a so-called European initiative, a round of intensive activities by the Socialist International, and a revival of the Jordanian-Palestinian state proposal. This is aside from 'full autonomy' and the proposal to implement this immediately in the Gaza Strip, etc.

The big gain realized by imperialism and Zionism, through the Camp David formula, leaves them a fair margin to make some concessions without significantly lessening their gain. The proposals being offered by imperialist and related forces are only meant to test reactions, for US imperialism has perceived that Camp David cannot be sold to the Palestinians, and that the reactionary Arab regimes find it awkward to accept this formula: in view of this, US imperialism will be willing, with Zionism's consent; to turn some of these exploratory proposals into genuine, negotiable ones when it finds that conditions have matured for their implementation and that there is a new Arab or Palestinian party that is willing to negotiate. This presupposes that such proposals take the long-term interests of Zionism and 'Israel' into account.

b) To sap the military strength of the Palestinian revolution, Lebanese National Movement and Syrian regime, while at the same time following the aforesaid tactic of maneuvers to erode the opposing forces' political position. Imperialism is well aware that, under the existing conditions, neither Syria nor the Palestinian revolution will accept any of the formulas now being offered. Hence the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary alliance will go on dealing military blows to these forces with

a view to destroying them, or weakening them to the point that they are compelled to discuss the proposed formulas. It is within this framework that one should view the incessant Zionist-Phalangist attacks on the Palestinian revolution and Lebanese National Movement in South Lebanon, as well as the attempts of the traditional bourgeoisie and reactionary religious forces to undermine Syria and influence its political decisions.

It is natural for these two tactics to be closely interconnected with a view to attaining one and the same objective, for while political maneuvers dampen the urge for opposition, military attrition promotes the tendency to accept such maneuvers.

c) Driving the Arab masses to despair by making it steadily costlier to sustain their patriotic stand; undermining their morale through psychological warfare; and offering the capitulationist forces more arguments to justify their capitulation. An illustrative example is the current Israeli air strikes against civilian targets in South Lebanon, to destroy the people together with their homes and land. This is intended to drive the masses to despair, especially when it is constantly being suggested that all these sufferings are due to the Palestinian revolution.

A similar situation prevails in the occupied territories, where the Zionist authorities exercise all forms of aggression, persecution, humiliation and torture against our people. The Zionists spare no means to impress upon our masses the image of 'Israel' as an "unconquerable power," aiming at driving them to despair.

By pursuing these three major tactics, the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary alliance seeks to create new conditions on the northeastern front, enabling it to draw a second Arab party into Camp David, so that others might follow suit, one after the other. It is difficult to foretell for certain who will be the next after the Sadat regime, but most likely it will be the "Jordanian-Palestinian link."

With this as a likelihood, together with other, internal factors, an intense struggle arose in the Zionist entity between Likud and the Labor Alignment over whether to have early elections. It was finally agreed to hold elections at the end of June 1981. In this context, it is the Labor Alignment that would enable the alliance of imperialism, Zionism, and Arab reaction to win a second Arab party over to the imperialist-Zionist settlement scheme. The Labor Alignment's policy on the Palestinian

territories occupied in 1967, is that their fate should be decided through negotiations with the Jordanian regime; part of the territories will eventually be returned to this regime; and the Palestine question must be solved via a Jordanian-Palestinian state. The Labor Alignment opposes the 'autonomy' plan, because it believes that this would either pave the way for an independent Palestinian entity, or jeopardize the Jewish character of 'Israel' through the incorporation of so many Palestinian Arabs.

If the Labor Alignment wins the upcoming elections, it will propose a plan to this effect. This would appeal to the Jordanian regime, providing it with a justification for joining the settlement. This regime praised Sadat's visit to Jerusalem at the time; it has waited to see what this would produce, but saw nothing in the 'autonomy' plan to justify joining at that stage. The 'autonomy' plan does not promise Jordan the return of any occupied territory. All along the Jordanian regime has been required to be a partner in the liquidation of the Palestinian cause. Yet it has not been allotted anything by which to justify this treacherous move. Unlike Sadat, to whom the Sinai was returned under the Camp David accords, Hussein is offered nothing with the 'autonomy' plan. A Labor Alignment victory in the next elections, and the consequent offer of its plan for the liquidationist settlement, would motivate and provide justification for Jordan to join in. As is known, Jordan's main objection to the Camp David accords is due to its not getting a share; it is not founded on hostility to imperialism or rejection of the Zionist entity on Palestinian territory. Nor does the Jordanian regime really believe in the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, or the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

In the early seventies, the Jordanian regime presented its plan for establishing the "United Arab Kingdom," including "the Jordanian entity and the Palestinian entity." Here the Jordanian regime finds common ground with the Labor Alignment, despite persisting differences on boundaries, Jerusalem and other questions related to more recent developments.

The Jordanian regime has grown bolder due to its relations with the PLO leadership, and the official relations established with it by a number of nationalist regimes on the basis of opposition to Camp David. These provide a partial cover for the regime to take steps toward Camp David. In his speech at the UN General Assembly last year, King Hussein made no mention of a Palestinian state under PLO leadership, despite his pretended recognition of the PLO as the sole, legitimate

representative of the Palestinian people. Rather, he spoke in general terms about the rights of the Palestinian people and a Palestinian entity.

If the Labor Alignment wins the elections, the Jordanian regime will use the thesis of "regaining the land," which the Labor plan provides for, as a weapon in the face of Arab regimes opposed to this plan. Hussein will taunt them for being unable to regain any occupied Arab territory, yet objecting to his taking the opportunity to do so. There is no doubt that the reactionary Arab regimes will support this line of reasoning. The schemes, including the Jordanian regime, wager that the tactics mentioned above will succeed in undermining opposition from the Palestinian revolution, Syria and the Arab nationalist forces, by the time the plan is ready for implementation.

Of course, nobody can predict that the Labor Alignment will win the next Knesset election. Nevertheless, the "Jordanian-Palestinian link" remains the most likely to follow Egypt into the Camp David pact. Should Likud win the elections, attempts to draw the Jordanian regime in would waver temporarily, owing to Likud's rigid line; refusing to return any occupied territory and insisting on a solution based on "autonomy for the inhabitants, not the land."

Should Likud win, attempts to incorporate Lebanon into the Camp David accords can be expected to continue as before. This means more military attacks on the Palestinian revolution and Lebanese National Movement. It means more support to the Lebanese fascist forces led by the Phalangists, so that they can play a bigger role in preparing and participating in the elimination of Palestinian and Lebanese nationalist armed presence, and weakening Syria's position so that it cannot prevent Lebanon from joining the Camp David alliance. We expect that Begin will continue the efforts to minimize, if not eliminate, Palestinian and Lebanese nationalist armed presence, and weaken Syria's influence on the situation in Lebanon. The US imperialist-Zionist plan will continue this policy and press for the Jordanian regime to join the settlement. The weakening or liquidation of the Palestinian resistance and Lebanese National Movement, combined with a weakened Syrian position, would facilitate Jordan's entry. The Jordanian regime is awaiting the removal of these impediments to reveal its real intentions.

This is the outline of the enemy plan for drawing new parties into the enclosure of the imperialist settlement. The planners realize that every party drawn in will pull another after it, until all have joined: Jordanian, Palestinian, Syrian, and Lebanese. We are not, however, saying that this

plan will be realized. There is a vast difference between conceiving a plan and putting it into effect. The Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese National Movement oppose this scheme and possess all the prerequisites for frustrating it.

Fourth: *Undermining the Arab nationalist regimes opposed to the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary pact*. The imperialist plan is primarily concerned with the northeastern front bordering on the Zionist entity, and with the Gulf area. Yet this does not mean that the plan excludes other Arab regimes that oppose Camp David and alliance with imperialism, Zionism and traditional reaction. On the contrary, the Camp David alliance knows the connection between these regimes and the forces opposed to the plan on the northeastern front and in the Gulf area. Thus, the Camp David pact intends to strike the nationalist regimes. The coming years will witness an imperialist plan in action for undermining these regimes.

In the light of the bourgeois nature of some of these regimes, imperialism will first wager on the gradual class transformation that will aggrandize the state bourgeoisie and link its interests with those of the traditional bourgeoisie and reaction. Such a transformation would pave the way for the transition from opposing imperialism to alliance with it, by providing the economic base for this alliance. Meanwhile, the planners will reactivate the traditional reactionary forces to set up their opposition to the nationalist regimes. They will arouse and fuel a variety of ethnic, tribal, religious, and sectarian contradictions, to exhaust and disintegrate these regimes.

If the methods of containment and attrition prove ineffective, war by proxy will be employed, using imperialism's lackeys in neighboring countries to attack the nationalist regimes Democratic Yemen is a case in point. Being the first Arab workers' and peasants' state to emerge in proximity to the oil fields, it is viewed by US imperialism as a threat to be neutralized by all means, including military force. Similarly, owing to the major oil reserves in Libya and oil's increasing importance, imperialism will spare no efforts, including military aggression, to restore traditional reaction to power in Libya, if the methods of assassinations, conspiracy, and containment fail. Saudi Arabia and Egypt will not hesitate to carry out this mission on behalf of US imperialism, once international, Arab, and domestic conditions are auspicious.

Fifth: *Striking all Arab nationalist, democratic and communist forces*. The Camp David alliance objectively constitutes a new level of challenges for the Arab masses. As a result, the masses will increasingly rally around the nationalist, democratic, and communist forces to defend their interests and their future. The interactions of this process will be intensified by imperialism's worldwide economic crisis, for its repercussions are felt daily by the Arab masses in rapid, continuous price rises. This is an important phenomenon; it will affect the course of the struggle along with the national threat which the Camp David accords pose to the Arab nation as a whole.

There are already many concrete indications of the direction which the mass movement will take due to the new objective conditions brought about by Camp David. These accords mean a ferocious imperialist-Zionist-reactionary onslaught on the region, the masses, and the nationalist, progressive, and revolutionary forces. The following developments indicate the mass response to this challenge: the escalating movement and widespread social struggle in Morocco; the Gafsa uprising in Tunisia; the advances of POLISARIO against the reactionary Moroccan regime; the deterioration of the regime in Sudan, with the growth of mass, political, social, and trade union struggles, and of the democratic and communist movement; the escalation of the Egyptian masses' opposition, the aggravation of the Sadat regime's crisis, and the mass reaction to the raising of the Israeli flag in Cairo; the heightening of the mass movement in Bahrain, Kuwait, and the Gulf generally; the steadfastness of the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO); the heightened struggle of the National Democratic Front of North Yemen; and the Qaba uprising in Mecca. Last, yet most important, is the steadfastness of the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese National Movement, despite the incessant plots of imperialism, Zionism, reaction, and the Lebanese fascists. Equal to this is the heroic stand of our masses in occupied Palestine; they brought the Camp David accords to a deadlock on the Palestinian level. No Palestinian has so far dared to get involved in the 'autonomy' plan.

Under such circumstances, repression will intensify against the mass movement. Fascist tendencies will multiply, backed by the repressive apparatus which the reactionary Arab regimes have continually sought to build and consolidate. Retrogressive and divisive sectarian, tribal, and ethnic tendencies will be promoted to secure these regimes a semblance of popular support and enable them to confront the mounting mass

movement.

Sixth: *Diverting the mass struggle from the national class enemy to an imaginary one, and to side issues.* Imperialism will keep warning of the alleged ambitions of the Soviet Union in the region, and the "communist threat," with a view to arousing all retrogressive nationalist and religious tendencies, thus diverting the mass movement from the real enemies. Such imperialist efforts were conspicuous after the Soviet Union's internationalist support to the Afghani revolution, which intended to help it face the counterrevolution and imperialist-reactionary intervention. The Islamic Conference Organization held an extraordinary session in Islamabad, especially to discuss the "Soviet intervention." This was attended by most Arab and many Islamic countries. The conference and the resolutions it passed are a concrete example of the means to be used by the enemy forces against the popular movement.

By brandishing the "communist threat," imperialism hopes to effect a major change in the constellation of contradictions in the region. It hopes to divert the course of the mass movement into a direction that serves imperialist strategy. Following the Camp David accords and the imperialist threats to the Iranian revolution, mass resentment against imperialism escalated in the region. Imperialism soon availed itself of the opportunity afforded by events in Afghanistan, to deflect this resentment. Since then, the reactionary forces have been striving to divert the struggle into other directions imperialism tries to portray every victory won by the popular movement as portending the threat of "Soviet communist infiltration" into the region; it is using this weapon to the utmost to combat the progressive and revolutionary forces.

Moreover, imperialism will endeavor to fan ethnic, religious and communal contradictions in the Arab region generally, and in certain Arab countries in particular. This aims to divide the mass movement and fragment the countries opposed to imperialist policy. Also, Zionism will strive to accentuate and sustain all internal conflicts, particularly sectarian ones. The growth of sectarianism in the region, and the emergence of one or more states on a sectarian basis, would render Zionism a great service. The Zionist entity would thereby cease to be the only state in the region with a socio-political system based on sectarianism. Zionist propaganda never speaks of the Palestinian Arabs in 'Israel' as Arabs. It constantly refers to three distinct minorities: Muslims, Druze (incidentally, a Muslim sect), and Christians. Now Zionist

propaganda presents Israeli atrocities in Lebanon as "supporting and protecting" the Christians in Lebanon. The aggravation of sectarianism in Syria and several other countries, the recent sharpening of the Coptic question in Egypt, and the stirrings of the Berber question in Algeria, are instances of the increasing imperialist and Zionist activity in this field.

Such are the main tactics by which imperialism seeks to realize its strategic objective of dominating the region.



Chapter Three

The Nature and Salient Features of the Post-Camp David Era, and the Condition of the Arab National Liberation Movement

We said earlier that the Camp David accords placed the Arab struggle and national liberation movement at the threshold of a new era. What is this era like?

First, it must be pointed out that following World War I, the Arab reality was characterized by fragmentation, backwardness and colonialism, including Zionist colonization. Hence, the Arab revolutionaries raised the slogans of unity, liberation, and progress. During the period from World War I up to the present, the Arab struggle has passed through several stages, each having its own distinctive features. After the stage of liberation struggle, whereby some Arab countries achieved political independence, the Arab struggle suffered a defeat in 1948 with the establishment of the Zionist entity, which ushered in a new stage. This was followed by Nasser's era with achievements on the domestic level and their impact throughout the Arab world. Then came the defeat of June 1967, and the ensuing new political stage which paved the way for the present stage: the Camp David era. What characterizes this era?

First: The expansion of the Zionist invasion, the increasing strength of the Zionist entity, the growing evidence of its being the primary imperialist tool for striking the mass revolution throughout the Arab homeland, its readiness to take further steps toward the full realization of the Zionist venture, and its beginning to participate with imperialism in ex-

ploiting Arab wealth, markets and labor.

With this, the reality of the Zionist invasion becomes more evident than ever before. Today, Zionism represents a danger not only to Palestine and the Palestinian people. It is the major counterrevolutionary force which must be confronted and fought, if the Arab masses, particularly in the Arab East, are to achieve liberation and a socialist-oriented, national democratic revolution. The national democratic liberation movement in the region can no longer plot the course of its struggle, or define its tasks, without taking this fact into account.

Statements about the Zionist dreams and aims in the region have been made since the Zionist invasion began. Yet never has the Zionist threat appeared so imminent, portentous, and necessary to combat. The June 1967 aggression accentuated this fact, but it is now that it assumes absolute reality in the eyes of the masses and revolutionary forces. Objectively speaking, it is natural for this to lead the contingents of the liberation movement to join forces in confronting the common enemy which is entrenched in the heart of the Arab homeland.

Second: The intensified organic connection between imperialism and Zionism through more direct imperialist military presence in the region.

The interconnection between Zionism and imperialism dates back to the beginnings of the word Zionist movement. Until World War II, Zionism was mainly connected to British imperialism. After that, the US became the center of world imperialism; Zionism has been mainly connected to US imperialism ever since. This interconnection manifested itself before and after the Balfour declaration of 1917, during the British colonization of Palestine and other Arab countries, after the establishment of the Zionist entity, throughout the 1950s, and before and after the 1967 Israeli aggression. The novelty of the Camp David era is how deep and how dangerous to the entire region this interconnection has grown.

The British colonialists used to pretend to be unbiased arbiters between the Zionists and the Arabs in Palestine. The US, in the 1950s, was keen for its aid to the Zionist entity to be granted through Federal Germany and the old colonialist European states, in order not to betray its own bias toward the Zionist entity. There were also Kennedy's attempts to mediate between the Zionist entity and Nasser's leadership in the early sixties. When a political settlement for the Arab-Zionist conflict was first

proposed via the Geneva conference, the US agreed to the proposal, pretending to be a neutral arbitrator in the conflict between the Arabs and a Mideastern state called 'Israel.'

In contrast to these appearances, the Camp David era has crystallized the reality of the imperialist-Zionist relationship. It has shown the Zionist state as it really is, a settler-colonial society planted in our homeland by imperialism and Zionism to preserve their interests, not to find a solution for the Jewish question. Any study of Jewish immigration to Palestine, particularly after the establishment of the Zionist state, shows that this has not been a spontaneous movement of a people seeking self-determination in the "Land of Israel," as imperialism and Zionism allege. Rather, it has been a premeditated scheme aimed at the creation of a settler-colonial society on which imperialism can rely to strengthen its positions in the region, and secure its domination and exploitation. Imperialism has moreover intensified its direct military presence in the region. Though we do not regard this as a revival of direct, traditional colonialism, it nevertheless constitutes a distinctive feature of this era.

Third: The most significant and distinctive feature of the Camp David era is the Egyptian regime's shift to official, open alliance with the Zionist entity and US imperialism—the first move of its kind in the history of the Arab-Zionist conflict. The theoretical and political implications of this constitute the basis for understanding the nature of this era and how to approach it.

The Arab defeat of 1948 exposed the inability of the traditional reactionary and newly independent regimes to confront Zionism, because of their subservience to imperialism as well as their class nature (feudalist or parasitic, dependent capitalist). Prior to the defeat, these regimes had proven equally incapable of developing their countries, or making any progress toward unification.

To confront the defeat and eliminate dependence and backwardness, a revolution broke out in Egypt in 1952. It removed these classes from power and embarked on the tasks of liberation and development. Though the July 23rd revolution was not led by the working class and its party, its leadership had a different class character than the prevailing Arab regimes. It represented certain strata of the national bourgeoisie. It initiated programs that represented the interests of these strata and of broad sectors of the masses. Under the new class leadership, there was

a great upsurge in the Arab national liberation movement. Significant achievements were realized in terms of the general slogans of the Arab revolution: unity, liberation, and progress. In Egypt, social change occurred: Feudalism was smashed; a ceiling was put on the size of private property; land was distributed to peasants, and cooperatives were encouraged. Banks, big businesses and foreign trade were nationalized; the public sector grew and development plans were formulated and implemented with a degree of success. Close relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries were developed; an anti-imperialist line was adopted and pursued: Egypt established itself as one of the leading nonaligned countries.

On the Arab level, there was the merger of Egypt and Syria. The July 23rd revolution served as a supportive base for a number of revolutionary victories in the Arab homeland, such as the Algerian revolution, the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq, the crushing of the feudalist-capitalist alliance in Syria, the overthrow of the Hamideddun dynasty in Yemen, the liberation of South Yemen, the rise of the Omani revolution and the overthrow of the monarchy in Libya.

However, following this class in power, we discover its limitations. This class was incapable of continuing the national democratic revolution, due to the gradual growth of its interests while it was in power, and their eventual merger with the interests of the classes it had deposed. Consequently, this leadership began to suppress the masses; the revolutionary process faltered, then came to a halt. Later, the ruling class made an about face; it reversed the march of Egypt, to land in alliance with imperialism and Zionism. Thus the Sadat regime proceeded, and such is the result.

From this, we conclude a number of basic political-theoretical facts. First and foremost is that the bourgeoisie, including all its strata, is incapable of leading the Arab revolution or accomplishing the tasks of the national democratic revolution in the context of the realities of the times. Concurrently, only the working class, in alliance with the peasantry and all the toilers and unprivileged of the society, is qualified to do so. Consequently, the national democratic revolution is linked to the socialist revolution; the slogans of Arab unity and liberation must be linked with those of democracy and socialism.

This thesis has been confirmed by ensuing events and the nature of the struggle in our homeland. This enables our masses to assimilate and act on this thesis, for they learn much more from life than from books:

this thesis will be imprinted on the masses consciousness, for the end to which the July 23rd revolution has come in Egypt, will be more or less the end of the course followed by the petit and middle bourgeoisie in other Arab countries. The symptoms of faltering and impotence are already there, and the Sadat-style reversal has begun.

The bourgeoisie has proved in practice its inability to realize the slogans of progress, liberation and unity, which it raised upon coming to power. The communal and ethnic conflicts now raging in more than one Arab country are evidence that the bourgeoisie cannot preserve national unity within the boundaries of each country.

These three characteristics of the Camp David era, particularly the reversion of the extreme right of the Egyptian bourgeoisie to official alliance with Zionism and imperialism, define the Arab national framework and the class content of the coming stage. The fact that the Camp David scheme covers the entire region gives the struggle its pan-Arab character; that the bourgeoisie is party to the Camp David alliance determines its class content.

So much for the characteristics of the Camp David era from the standpoint of the enemy camp. As for the main characteristics of the masses and forces opposed to Camp David, we can briefly indicate the following points:

1) Some reactionary Arab regimes and forces are in collusion with imperialism and Zionism, without having yet made a formal alliance as Sadat did. This enables them to feign opposition to Camp David. Obviously, this will delay the process of polarization in the new era; such delay will adversely affect the mass struggle.

2) Following Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the bourgeois Arab nationalist regimes adopted a patriotic stance, opposing the visit. They condemned and called for struggle against the Camp David accords. The nationalist regimes' antagonism to the Camp David accords allowed the revolutionary class forces to rise up and crystallize potentials for opposing the Camp David line. This attitude of the nationalist regimes was not, however, translated into practical action capable of thwarting the Camp David plans. Therefore, the revolutionary forces must shoulder the responsibility for struggling to radicalize the opposition. They must activate the nationalist, democratic and revolutionary forces, and carry the battle to the end.

3) Both the progressive Arab nationalist and the communist cur-

rents of the Arab national liberation movement are afflicted by a crisis which we will discuss later on. This crisis precludes the crystallization of a new class leadership for the mass movement with a new political and military line. Neither current has stepped forward to lead. This does not, however, mean that the forces of these two currents no longer exist or that it is impossible for them to play such a role. In the radical section of the anti-Camp David alliance, the past period is now being reviewed; lessons are being derived, and attempts to overcome the crisis are underway. Hence, there are revolutionary nuclei for the mass movement to rally around in the coming stage, though these have certain limitations.

4) Repression has been exercised against the Arab masses in the name of unity, liberation, and socialism. This has brought the masses to the verge of desperation and apathy; it has rendered them politically vulnerable to certain as yet unpredictable ideologies, such as the renewed influence of religious ideology and political trends, particularly after the triumph of the Iranian revolution led by the clergy. On the other hand, the masses are demonstrating militant preparation and potentials in occupied Palestine, Lebanon, and elsewhere in the Arab homeland. If crystallized, these militant potentials could be effectively employed in the coming stage of our struggle, provided that it is based on a program that sums up the masses experience and conforms to their aspirations. The challenges posed by the Camp David alliance, and the adverse effects of the crisis of the world capitalist system on the masses' daily life, provide the objective conditions for crystallizing these potentials. For its part, the Arab national liberation movement must overcome the crisis of its class structure, and draw up a political program based on a correct diagnosis of its difficulties.

5) The growth of the forces of socialism, liberation, and progress in both magnitude and might, and their firm opposition to imperialism and its efforts to hamper the process of change all over the world, as in Afghanistan and elsewhere, will constitute objective internationalist support to the Arab mass movement. This factor will help the masses confront the Camp David alliance, formidable as it is, and defeat it.

International conditions exist for such victory, and objective conditions in the Arab homeland are ripe for change, thanks to the economic, social, and political developments.

Chapter Four

The Arab Scene: Forms of Counteraction to the Camp David Accords

In the light of the above analysis of the Camp David alliance and its main objectives, there arises a Herculean historic task: radical, strategic confrontation of this enemy alliance. This requires us to determine the classes with interests in and capabilities for such confrontation. We must determine the nature of the class alliance to lead this effort, and the role of the working class in this alliance. We must determine the program of action through which this alliance can defeat the enemy alliance and achieve the goals of the Arab nation in this stage of struggle.

While addressing these topics, we will deal with the situation of the Arab national liberation movement and the nature of its crisis. Concentration on the program for radical, strategic confrontation should not be at the expense of discussing how the confrontation is faring in the context of the conditions of the nationalist and revolutionary forces. We must also assess the forms generated by this situation, and determine the current tasks appropriate for the situation, whereby we can link the tactical tasks to the radical, strategic ones. Our long, rich experience in struggle has taught us that strategic vision and programs alone are not sufficient for leading the masses. They must be combined with the correct tactics in order to fulfill the strategic tasks. The interconnection between strategic and tactical tasks is the main prerequisite for ascending to the level of strategic confrontation.

We will deal first with the anti-Camp David action that has been generated by the Arab reality and the balance of forces between the nationalist and revolutionary forces. Then we will assess the forms of counteraction. In opposition to Camp David, there emerged the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, the Arab People's Conference, the national accord proposed by Baghdad for the unification of Syria and Iraq, and the Baghdad Summit. The Arab mass movement opposed Camp David in occupied Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, and other Arab countries. Will such confrontation be able to defeat the Camp David line and cancel its results?

1. The Steadfastness and Confrontation Front

Before Sadat's Jerusalem visit, Egypt, Syria, and the PLO, encouraged by Saudi Arabia, were working together for an Arab-Zionist settlement on the basis of the Geneva conference, though the three parties were not in full accord on details. The diplomatic and political moves of this Egyptian-Syrian-Palestinian alliance had the approval of the Arab countries in general, as was manifested at the Algiers and Rabat summits. The Palestinian Rejection Front and the few Arab states rejecting the settlement line were unable to curb this official Arab position which continued from the October War, 1973, up to Sadat's Jerusalem visit.

Then the visit occurred, and no doubts remained as to the imperialist-Zionist nature of the settlement Sadat had embarked upon; the Arab masses' hostility to the visit became clear. Then, the Egyptian-Syrian-Palestinian alliance broke up: Syria and the PLO adopted a stance opposed to Sadat's move, while Egypt continued toward full capitulation. Libya convened a conference in Tripoli, which was attended by Syria, Algeria, Democratic Yemen, Iraq, the PLO, and the Palestinian Rejection Front. The conference resulted in forming the Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. All the participating parties joined with the exception of Iraq which made some unconvincing excuses. Later political developments exposed Iraq's real position.

The Steadfastness and Confrontation Front held its second conference in Algiers at the beginning of 1978, its third in Damascus in September 1978, and its fourth in Tripoli, Libya, in April 1980. Almost three years have lapsed since this front came into existence. What is our evaluation of it, and what stance do we adopt in the light of this evaluation?

The Steadfastness and Confrontation Front has not categorically rejected a political settlement. It rejected the particular settlement Sadat accepted, but continued to speak of a just, comprehensive settlement based on Israeli withdrawal from the land occupied in 1967, and the fulfillment of the Palestinian people's legitimate rights. It kept silent on the imperialist-Zionist entity's existence on Arab territory, whereas there can be no peace or justice so long as that entity exists.

Even in its latest statement, the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front did not make a clear distinction between the enemy camp, comprising imperialism and Arab reaction in addition to Zionism, and the camp of friends composed of the socialist countries with the USSR at the forefront, together with liberation forces all over the world. Such a distinction is necessary for knowing exactly who are the enemies to be fought, and who are the friendly forces with whom to establish princi-

pled, strategic alliances, to help us counteract the enemy alliance. Some parties to this front have left the line open to the Arab reactionary forces and regimes. Some are wagering on a role to be played by Europe. These two policies indicate that the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front has not made a decisive break with all parties of the enemy camp. Hence, it does not offer a new confrontation strategy that is qualitatively distinct from the official Arab strategy that prevailed before Sadat's Jerusalem visit.

The failure of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front to radicalize its political position and clearly distinguish between enemies and friends is primarily due to the class nature of the majority of its members it is the bourgeois nature of these nationalist forces that is responsible for producing such a compromising attitude toward the imperialist and reactionary forces. Moreover, the bourgeois nature of most of this front's member states is responsible for its lack of effectiveness, as well as for the contradiction between its position in theory and its ability to enact this in practice. The national bourgeoisie theoretically aspires to liberation, independence, national unity, and other ambitions, proportionate with its political weight and material interests. Yet it is unable to fulfill these aspirations and fight the decisive battle against imperialism.

This weakness has been manifested in the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front's failure to take any radical economic measures against imperialism. It has failed to effect any genuine mobilization or to pool its members' forces and potentials for use on the various fronts of the battle with the enemy. It has failed to put into effect its resolutions on establishing unified institutions, mobilizing unified capabilities, and entering the actual confrontation with the Zionist entity. None of this has been done, despite all the theoretical and practical resolutions stressing the necessity of an offensive policy for such confrontation.

The Steadfastness and Confrontation Front has not only failed to realize the unity of its member states; it has not even set up institutions for real coordination that could gradually lead to such unity. Lacking such institutions, it has restricted itself to conferences held under pressing political circumstances and resulting in political communiques and resolutions that find no institutions to implement them. Because of the lack of institutions to coordinate and unity their efforts, the member states have not been in agreement on several crucial political issues, such as at the extraordinary Islamic Conference in Islamabad, and concerning the Baghdad accord and the Soviet aid to the Afghani revolution.

Having pursued an indecisive political line, having a discrepancy between words and deeds, and having failed to unify or coordinate member states' positions and efforts, the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front has fallen short of the expectations of the Arab masses and vanguards. It has not proven to be a counterforce equal to the Camp David alliance, capable of leading and mobilizing the masses and their potentials in a revolutionary struggle to confront and defeat the enemy alliance.

This evaluation of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front proceeds from a strategic point of view, assessing it as the opposite pole to the Camp David alliance, However, we must also assess it as a part of the current confrontation of Camp David, at a time when the Arab revolutionary forces are unable to lead the masses on an alternative revolutionary line: from this angle, the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front has actually represented a political stance opposed to Camp David. It pressured Iraq into proposing unification with Syria. It was behind the convocation of the Baghdad Summit and its resolutions for boycotting and relatively isolating Sadat, thus depriving the Camp David accords of official Arab and international validity. It prevented the other Arab fronts from crumbling as fast as imperialism wished.

In this perspective we can pinpoint our position on the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. We take part in this front and struggle to create a mass situation which will press for radicalizing its political line, implementing its resolutions, setting up institutions, and integrating the efforts and potentials of its members. Yet we must clearly state that this front falls short of the minimum required for the tasks posed by current developments.

Our position on the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front is not dictated solely by the current situation, the developments based on alliance with the patriotic forces, and the need to radicalize this front's position and end its wavering. More importantly, our position is dictated by the state of the revolutionary forces and their need for such alliances in order to build their own capabilities, popularize their program among the masses, and mobilize the masses' potentials on the basis of this program. Thus, allying with the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front should not obscure the radical confrontation program or lessen the struggle for it, for only this program can offer the historic, class, ideological and political alternative to the Camp David alliance.

2. The Arab People's Conference

At the same time as the Tripoli conference which produced the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, Libya called a large number of Arab revolutionary, progressive, and nationalist forces, parties, and organizations to another conference. This was of a different nature: it would voice the mass response to Sadat's Jerusalem visit and the treasonous line it symbolized. This was called the Arab People's Conference. It created a permanent secretariat responsible for following up the conference resolutions and coordinating the efforts of the participants. The secretariat has been active since then: it has held a number of sessions, each time adopting resolutions on the basis of which steps were taken on the Arab and international levels. How do we assess the Arab People's Conference, and what is our position in the light of this assessment?

In terms of political line, the Arab People's Conference represented an advanced step in comparison with the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. The political statement issued by the Conference took a decisive position against the Zionist entity and the line of settlement based on coexistence with it. Similarly, the political statements issued by the secretariat are an advanced step toward polarization and distinguishing between friend and enemy. The charter currently proposed as its political program addresses a number of theoretical questions, including the stand of the bourgeoisie in the confrontation and the limitations of its role. Still, can we be satisfied with programs in isolation from the structure of the forces involved in the Arab People's Conference, and the lack of harmony between this structure and the programs it proposes?

By highlighting the political program, we do not mean, however, that the Arab People's Conference and secretariat documents provide a comprehensive analysis of the crisis of the Arab national liberation movement or of the program for ending this crisis. Rather, the Arab People's Conference's main weakness is its class structure in general, and the contradiction this produces between its programs and its ability to carry them out. Some of the many forces and parties in the Conference are linked to Arab regimes, and have the same class structure. By virtue of the Conference's origin, these same forces and parties are the most influential constituents; mainly they control its programs and activities. This explains many of the obstacles impeding the Arab People's Conference. These obstacles stem from the aforementioned contradictions and the attempts by each of the various constituent forces to dominate the Conference and have it serve the interests of the state they represent.

For example, the Arab People's Conference was faced by the Iraqi Baath Party's position against the communist parties and their representation in the secretariat. It faced the Iraqi Baath's opposition to POLISARIO. Such situations are logical reflections of the heterogeneous class composition of the Arab People's Conference, which plays a part in impairing its effectiveness. Other forces and parties have not been the decisive force. Moreover, they themselves are to various degrees burdened by the symptoms of the Arab national liberation movement's crisis; this limits their effectiveness among their masses for the time being.

Thus, the Arab People's Conference has not so far proved to be a pan-Arab front progressive enough to mobilize all the capabilities of the nationalist, progressive, and revolutionary forces to counteract Camp David. It does not constitute a force that can pressure the Arab regimes opposed to Camp David into translating their opposition into practical programs and policies. Therefore, while we adopt a positive attitude of support and cooperation with the Arab People's Conference, we will continue to struggle to make it more effective. We will work to coordinate the efforts of its advanced and effectual forces, so that it might be the prelude to the required progressive Arab front capable of mobilizing the masses to face the challenges.

3. The National Accord for the Unification of Iraq and Syria

Iraq's refusal to join the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front resulted in some isolation for the Iraqi regime. Iraq's excuse—that the front did not reject [UN Security Council resolution] 242—was not acceptable to the Arab masses or their patriotic, progressive and revolutionary organizations. The masses really wanted the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front to take a decisive stance on UN Security Council resolution 242 and the line of negotiated settlement in general. However, they found no sense in a stance that for all practical purposes put Iraq and its potentials outside the battlefield, when Iraq by itself was unable to constitute a counterforce against Camp David, superior to the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. Also, there were possibilities open for developing this front's political line. On the other hand, there was no possibility for the proposal of a settlement formula other than Camp David, which might have given the Syrian regime an opportunity to drift back into the trend of negotiated settlement under the cover of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, as the Iraqi regime allegedly feared.

The Steadfastness and Confrontation Front carried on, holding its second and third conferences during 1978. Sadat, for his part, was going further and further in his treacherous enterprise with the danger this line represented for the Arab nation's future and liberation cause. In this context, Iraq's position became more isolated and awkward. When the Camp David accords were concluded, Iraq proposed the unification of Syria and Iraq, and called for an Arab summit to counter the accords and adopt a unified stance against Sadat's regime.

This time Iraq did not require that Syria renounce resolution 242, as it had done at the Tripoli conference. It was evident that Iraq's proposal for unification with Syria was intended to replace the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, rather than complementing it by becoming its backbone. The unity proposal was combined with a call for returning to the confines of 'Arab solidarity' which ignores and hampers the polarization of progressive and reactionary forces. Moreover, there were indications that Iraq was going to use the unity step to strike the revolutionary forces and minimize the role of the Palestinian revolution. Despite all this, the Arab masses and the patriotic, progressive, and revolutionary forces hailed the Iraqi move. Some even began to pin their hopes on it, rather than on the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, for countering the Camp David line. This was because of Iraq's economic, demographic, and military weight, its adjacency to Syria—a confrontation state with the Zionist entity, and the qualitative superiority of the unity of Syria and Iraq, as compared to the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front's type of unity.

Regular meetings between the Syrian and Iraqi regimes to realize this unity began. However, the emotional appeal of the proposal soon faded as obstacles brought about by the conflicting interests of these two bourgeois regimes began to surface. Then differences within the Iraqi Baath Party emerged and were used as justification for the Iraqi regime to back out of its own proposal and absolve itself from the responsibilities of the common struggle.

In our opinion, the failure to materialize of the Iraqi proposal, for unifying Syria and Iraq, is a great lesson. All earlier national bourgeois attempts to realize a merger or other form of unity between Arab countries had also failed. However, their failure did not kill the hope that some unifying steps might yet be achieved by the national bourgeoisie. This was demonstrated by the hopes most Arab patriotic, progressive, and revolutionary forces pinned on Iraq's move. This attempt at unity occurred

in the context of the great challenges that the Camp David alliance poses for all Arab national forces, and the dangers it poses to the entire future of the Arab nation, particularly the consolidation and spread of the Zionist cancer. Seen in this context, the failure is a final, decisive indication of the Arab bourgeoisie's inability to rise above its narrow class interests for the sake of accomplishing a genuine unifying step. This is especially true in view of the fact that the Iraqi and Syrian regimes raise the slogan of unity, and regard this as the *raison d'etre* for their stay in power. Moreover, the Iraqi regime always boasts about pan-Arab nationalism and the immortal mission of the Arab nation.

We stress this thesis so that the Arab working class, its parties and other organizations, see that the task of realizing Arab unity now falls exclusively on their shoulders. The working class is the only force capable of leading the national movement to achieve Arab unity. Such unity will provide the best conditions for socialist construction, besides satisfying social and cultural aspirations for pan-Arab unity. That does not mean that we will oppose unity efforts initiated by national bourgeois regimes and forces. However, our support to such efforts should be closely combined with a firm demand for freedom of mass action, a democratic climate for all parties and forces of the working class and other toilers, and progressive, national democratic policies in all spheres: economic, social, cultural, and political. The bourgeoisie will not be able to carry on with the national democratic revolution unless it allies, in a democratic form, with the toiling classes, the workers and peasantry. In this way, the latter classes will be able to heighten their activities and expand their role in the revolutionary process. With time they will rise to the leadership of the mass movement. By adopting such a patriotic position, the bourgeoisie will be a bridge for the masses to go on to achieve their aims. This took place in Angola, Mozambique, Democratic Yemen, and other countries. There, certain sectors of the bourgeoisie played a progressive nationalist role. This paved the way for restructuring the class alliance so that the working class ascended to the position of effectiveness, influence, and leadership. With the expanded role of the workers and other toilers, and the shrinking of the bourgeoisie's role, this alliance was able to accomplish the tasks of the national democratic revolution, on the way to socialist transformation.

4. The Baghdad Summit

Most Arab countries are dominated by reactionary forces (the alliance of

parasitic big capital with the remnants of the landed aristocracy). Only in a limited number of Arab countries is the national bourgeoisie in power. Moreover, the ability of the national regimes to radically confront imperialism and Zionism is limited. In view of these factors, it is easy to predict the outcome of the official 'Arab solidarity' policy. Indeed, over a long period of Arab mass struggle, this policy has produced hard facts which render theoretical analysis redundant; our masses are able to determine a correct position on this policy.

In 1936, official 'Arab solidarity' played a role in aborting the Palestinian revolt. In 1948, this same 'solidarity' curbed the Arab mass movement that was burning with enthusiasm to struggle against the founding of the Zionist entity in Palestine. The outcome of such 'solidarity' was hardly any different after the national bourgeois revolution in Egypt and other Arab countries. The first Arab summit, called by President Nasser to thwart the Israeli project for diverting the Jordan River, not only failed to do the job. It also served as a cover for the Arab nationalist regimes, enabling each to put the blame for the common failure on others. Ever since, the outcome has been more or less the same. Arab summits have been a cover for the reactionary Arab regimes to feign hostility to Zionism, while hiding their real collaboration and alliance with imperialism, Zionism's chief supporter. For the nationalist regimes, the summits have been a cover for hiding their impotence. For example, economic measures, such as using the oil weapon against the US, are subject to Arab unanimity. In some cases, Arab summits have been used as a cover for suppressing the mass movement. Following Black September in Jordan, 1970, the committee formed by the Arab summit facilitated the Jordanian regime's job of eliminating the Palestinian resistance (under the guise of mediation).

Despite this history, the Iraqi regime called for holding yet another summit in Baghdad in 1978, to deal with Sadat's treason and draw up a program to counter the Camp David accords. Iraq's concurrent proposal for unity with Syria provided the justification for calling the summit. Iraq's main argument was that Syrian-Iraqi unity would be the primary force for countering Camp David. The call for a summit was presented as a secondary move, not to be viewed in isolation from the unity proposals. It was claimed that the prospect of Syria and Iraq's unity would serve as a pressure within the summit, compelling all Arab states to commit themselves to the minimum requirements for countering Sadat's treason.

Mass agitation against the Camp David accords, and Sadat's flagrant

treason, had placed his reactionary allies in an awkward position. The Steadfastness and Confrontation Front had been created and adopted resolutions against Sadat's regime. The Syrian-Iraqi convergence was in its prime at the time. Due to these three factors, the Baghdad Summit was compelled to condemn Sadat's line. Later, in the Arab Foreign Ministers' Conference, held in Baghdad in March 1979, after the conclusion of the treasonous peace treaty, it was decided to suspend diplomatic and, to some extent, economic relations with the Egyptian regime.

It is true that the summit resolutions have been effective in isolating Sadat's regime, creating difficulties and depriving it of official Arab legitimacy. Official Arab condemnation of Sadat's treasonous line reinforced the mass condemnation. To this extent, the resolutions are positive; consequently, we demand that they be implemented. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that these resolutions are a mere formality for some regimes. Somalia, Sudan, and Oman still maintain diplomatic, political, economic and military relations with the Egyptian regime. Other Arab regimes maintain such relations secretly. Saudi Arabia and others have not taken seriously the resolution on boycotting the Egyptian regime economically. Moreover, the level of official confrontation has dropped. This was particularly manifest at the Tunis Summit which did not discuss how opposition to Sadat's regime was to be continued.

Finally, we will reiterate our overall assessment of Arab summits and official 'Arab solidarity' as being the solidarity of the reactionaries and the impotent. We will reiterate our position on furthering the struggle for polarization between progressive and reactionary regimes.

It was clear that by calling an Arab summit, Iraq intended to prevent the process of polarization required by the objective conditions prevailing in the region following the conclusion of the Camp David accords. The reasons put forth by Iraq failed to disguise its real intentions. This move harmonized to a great extent with the Iraqi regime's policies over the two years preceding the Camp David accords. It is in harmony with Iraq's later policies. The Iraqi regime has been developing the closest of relations with the Arab reactionary axis led by Saudi Arabia, thus trying to align with the side opposed to the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. For its part, this front has been steadily proposing that the Iraqi regime relinquish its policies and join. Yet all attempts to persuade the Iraqi regime to join this front have failed. Instead, Iraq continues to strengthen its ties with reactionary Saudi Arabia and Jordan, after having exploited party differences with the Syrian Baathists to back out of its unity pro-

posal.

In addition, the Iraqi regime has fostered reactionaries and lackeys, such as Abdul Kawi Mikkawi and his ilk, to operate against Democratic Yemen. Iraq has resumed collaboration with reactionary forces in Syria, with a view to overthrowing the regime. It has strengthened its relations with Arab reaction and pursued a rightist policy within the Iraqi-Saudi-Jordanian axis. It has persecuted the communist and democratic forces in Iraq, persisted in its chauvinist approach to the Kurdish question, and aligned with imperialism and reaction on Afghanistan. Finally, it proposed the National Charter, aiming to direct Arab struggle against an alleged communist and Soviet threat, instead of concentrating against imperialism, Zionism, and reaction. This initiative was hailed with enthusiasm by Somalia, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and other reactionary Arab countries. All this testifies to the fact that Iraq has been reverting to a rightist position. This reversion is attributable to the bourgeois class nature of the regime, which has been further consolidated by the increase of revenues. A regime with this class nature is capable of initiating a national struggle against imperialism, but proves unable to continue; thus it begins to retreat, covering its impotence by invoking the communist and Soviet 'threat'.

A nationalist regime really concerned with confronting the Camp David alliance, with preparing to battle the Zionist entity to liberate all the national soil—without ceding a single inch, as the Iraqi regime says—would never pursue such policies. Genuine confrontation policies have become easily identifiable. Many years of struggle have shown in practice which policies are conducive and which obstruct liberation. The Iraqi regime is unable to actually fight against the Zionist entity, for fear of risking the interests of the ruling elite. This explains the side-battles it contrives to the detriment of pooling all efforts for the main battle. Its position on the Iranian revolution manifests the process of deviation to a rightist position allied with reaction. No sooner had the Iranian revolution overthrown the Shah than the Iraqi regime raised contrived 'Arab' claims to the three islands and Arabistan (Ahvaz), whereas it had kept silent on this question in the time of the Shah. The Iraqi regime began policies that ultimately prepared the climate for the war with the Iranian revolution, which is still raging.

The Camp David intrigues against the Palestinian revolution, and all the contingents of the Arab national liberation movement, aim to liquidate the Palestinian cause once and for all, to legitimize and consolidate

Zionist settler-colonialism in Palestine, and secure imperialist domination over the wealth and fate of the Arab region. In this context, the Iraqi regime's contrived war against the Iranian revolution can serve no other end than diverting the struggle from its proper class context and from the correct, urgent objective of countering the Camp David accords and their consequences. The Iraqi-Iranian war can only serve the aims of the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary alliance.

We condemn Iraq's going to war against the Iranian revolution which overthrew the Shah's regime and dealt a severe blow to imperialism and Zionism in the region. We advocate efforts to end this war, so that imperialism, Zionism, and reaction cannot take advantage of it; so that Iraq may devote its material, human, and military potentials to the Arabs' main struggle against the Camp David accords; and so that the Iranian revolution may contribute to the struggle against the Zionist enemy in occupied Palestine, and reinforce the Arab struggle against the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary plans, as it declared it would do the moment it triumphed.

Even if the Iraqi regime retains some trace of patriotism, the only way to sustain and kindle this is to struggle against the regime's rightist policies and to support Iraq's nationalist, democratic and progressive forces.

These are the formulas produced by the Arab reality in confronting Camp David. We have tried to assess these in a scientific and realistic manner, taking into consideration the necessity of making use of contradictions in the enemy camp, strengthening the stance adopted by the patriotic regimes, and taking into account the balance of forces, the state of the national liberation movement, and the role of the revolutionary forces. At the same time, we deem it equally or even more important to evaluate these formulas in terms of ability to confront Camp David, thwart the line of treason and accomplish the tasks of the unitarian, national democratic revolution. By asserting this, we intend to confront the Arab revolutionary forces, ourselves included, with the pending tasks of radical, strategic confrontation. In class, ideological and political terms, such confrontation constitutes the qualitative, historic alternative to all existing formulas. It is the task of other classes, i.e., the workers and peasants, not the bourgeoisie.

Finally, it must be noted that the mass movement in certain Arab countries has gone far beyond these insufficient formulas in opposing the enemy alliance and its schemes. The mass uprising in occupied Palestine, and the steadfastness of the Palestinian revolution, allied with the na-

tional movement in Lebanon, have upset the Camp David designs and brought them to a deadlock on the Palestinian level. So far, the Palestinian mass movement has prevented any Palestinian figure, traditional leadership, or reactionary group from accepting the 'autonomy' fraud proposed by the Camp David alliance to solve the Palestinian problem and end the Palestinian-Zionist conflict. Such an obstacle to the enemy scheme is certainly more effective than all the formulas discussed above.

Palestinian mass action, confronting the new era, constitutes the most significant mass action in the Arab arena. Yet it was not an isolated instance. In Saudi Arabia, the Qaba uprising in Mecca revealed the helplessness of the repressive forces despite massive armament budgets. It exposed the regime's vulnerability, creating much anxiety in imperialist circles regarding the prospects of their oil interests. This added to the Camp David alliance's concern about defending their interests and carrying out their schemes. Such mass action reflects the vast, militant potentials of the masses; it shows they are bound and able to confront their enemies. This places all Arab revolutionary forces face-to-face with the great, historic task of leading the masses in this confrontation and providing the subjective conditions (the tool and the program) for their victory. Failing that, the mass movement will remain exposed to the dangers it has faced in the earlier stages of its struggle. Chief among these is the danger of their struggles being aborted if led by the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie will divert the struggle to serve its own selfish class interests, and then turn against the mass movement to repress and abort it.



Chapter Five

The Program of Current Tasks for Confronting Camp David

Here, we deal with the program of tasks currently facing the Arab national liberation movement in its present state: the nationalist regimes and the nationalist, progressive, and revolutionary parties, forces, organizations, and institutions. These tasks can be realised in the foreseeable future, if these forces are really determined to confront the traitorous line, to stick to the patriotic position and action, and defend themselves against the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary onslaught that seeks their destruction once and for all.

The nature of these tasks means that the vast majority of the masses will rally around them, regardless of ideological or political affiliation at this stage. The extent to which each Arab nationalist regime, and each nationalist, progressive, or revolutionary Arab force, commits itself to accomplishing these tasks will determine the extent of its mass support. In as much as these tasks constitute a framework for consolidating the nationalist, progressive, and revolutionary forces, they will enable the revolutionary forces to acquire leading influence and, finally, to assume the leadership of this broad alliance. They will rise with this profound, all-inclusive mass movement to the level of accomplishing the objectives of the Arab democratic revolution, heading toward building the Arab socialist society.

What then are the tasks?

First: To act seriously to isolate Sadat's regime diplomatically, politically, economically, and in all other spheres, in the Arab, African, and Islamic arenas, among the non-aligned countries and internationally; to struggle hard to blockade the regime's traitorous line and halt it as a prelude to eliminating it.

Together with the PLO, the Arab nationalist regimes have a special responsibility. As participants in Arab summits, they can call to task the reactionary Arab regimes that fail to comply or comply only partially with the boycott resolutions. Furthermore, their presence in other political forums assigns them responsibility for isolating Sadat's regime there.

The task of isolating Sadat's regime should be coupled with full political, informational, financial, and material (including arms) support to the Egyptian mass movement and nationalist, progressive, and revolutionary forces, for overthrowing the regime together with its treasonous line. The Camp David scheme seeks to transform Egypt into a principal, internally stable base, capable of policing the region for imperialism. The more the Arab liberation movement succeeds in opposing the Egyptian regime, the less will be the regime's ability to perform the tasks it is assigned.

Second: To confront US imperialism together with all its policies, plans and interests in the region.

The nationalist regimes are emphatically called upon to use oil as a

weapon against the US, to withdraw their funds from its banks, bar it from their markets, and to stop all relations with it. All Arab nationalist, progressive, and revolutionary forces are required to expose the policy of imperialism, oppose all its activities and strike at all forms of its presence in the Arab homeland.

The US was a full partner in concluding the Camp David accords. This exposed the fraudulence of Arab policies allegedly seeking to neutralize the US and win it over to a less biased position toward 'Israel' in settling the Arab-Zionist conflict. Never has US imperialism's hostility toward our just cause been so clear to the Arab masses. They now demand that we strike at the snake's head—US imperialism, and not be satisfied by hitting its tail—Sadat. Arab nationalism can no longer be separated from taking a stance against US imperialism. Nationalism rules out cooperation and alliance with the US; nationalism means opposition to all US policies, plans, and interests in the region. After the conclusion of the Camp David accords, one cannot profess hostility to Zionism yet persist in alliance with imperialism. Revolutionary progressive forces should make use of this situation to radicalize the nationalist position. By adopting concrete positions of hostility toward imperialism and its interests, the nationalist regimes make the reactionary regimes' position more awkward. Thus it is easier for the mass movement to step up its struggle against these regimes.

Oil's importance is vital and growing; imperialism's dependence on Arab oil in particular is increasing; Arab deposits in imperialist banks are assuming increased importance, as is the Arab market. In view of these factors, and the strategic importance of the Arab homeland generally, we can imagine the harm we can inflict on the imperialist enemy once the nationalist, progressive, and revolutionary forces begin a serious and continuous struggle against its interests. The task of these forces is to show, with facts and figures, the volume of imperialist interests in our region, and consequently the degree of harm we can cause them. Mass awareness of such facts will stimulate the struggle to strike at these interests. We can thereby bring pressure to bear on the Arab regimes which secure these interests for the imperialist enemy.

Third: To secure earnest support to the Palestinian revolution from all the nationalist regimes and nationalist, progressive, and revolutionary forces in all spheres: political, informational, financial and material, including arms.

Backing the Palestinian revolution is the task of all forces without exception. Concrete support to the Palestinian revolution should become the criterion for judging the seriousness of every force in confronting the Camp David alliance. The continuous mass struggle waged by our people under occupation constitutes an almost total mass uprising. Together with the revolution's steadfastness in the face of the March 1978 Israeli invasion of South Lebanon and ensuing aggressions and plots, this indicates what an obstacle the Palestinian revolution poses for the Camp David designs. Hence, the task of all nationalist regimes and nationalist, progressive, and revolutionary forces is to support the Palestinian revolution; to provide all the requirements of steadfastness for the Palestinian masses under occupation, and for the Palestinian and Lebanese masses in Lebanon; to demand that all fronts, particularly the Jordanian, be opened for Palestinian operations against the Zionists in occupied Palestine; and to struggle against all reactionary pressures and maneuvers aimed at undermining or diverting the Palestinian revolution.

Fourth: To earnestly support the Lebanese National Movement and the Lebanese masses, enabling them to withstand the dangerous imperialist-Zionist-reactionary plot.

Through the conflict raging in Lebanon, this plot aims at striking the Palestinian revolution, the Lebanese. National Movement and Syria, as well as establishing a fascist, isolationist, sectarian regime. After securing its domination over Lebanon, this regime would join the Camp David alliance and subject Lebanon to the same imperialist-Zionist conditions as were imposed on Egypt.

The main force to confront this plot is the Lebanese masses led by the National Movement. They are allied in particular with the Palestinian revolution and Syria, and with all the Arab nationalist regimes and forces, and the forces of liberation, progress and socialism in the world. In this light, supporting the Lebanese National Movement becomes a central task of the entire Arab national liberation movement.

The enemy camp is striving hard to make the Lebanese masses break with the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese National Movement. One of their main weapons is the destruction, killing, and eviction practiced for years by the Zionist enemy and Saad Haddad's forces against the Lebanese masses.[13] The Lebanese National Movement's inability to

13 **Ed. Note:** Saad Haddad (1936 - 1984) was a Lebanese military officer who

secure the minimal conditions for the masses to hold out, particularly in the South, makes it easier for the enemy camp to achieve this end. We do not mean that this is the only reason for the gaps in the mass situation in Lebanon today; rather it is one of the reasons.

In this light, providing material support and especially arms to the Lebanese National Movement, in addition to political, moral, and informational support, is one of the tasks of the nationalist regimes. The Lebanese arena should not be considered important solely because the Palestinian revolution maintains open presence there.

Fifth: To support Syria's stand in the face of internal and external imperialist-Zionist-reactionary schemes that aim at bringing Syria to its knees and drawing it to the course of the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary settlement.

Geographically, Syria faces 'Israel' that occupies the Syrian Golan Heights. The Syrian regime is unequivocally opposed to Camp David, a stand which constitutes a great help to both the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese National Movement. The Camp David alliance aims at weakening Syria to facilitate the subjugation of the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese nationalist forces. Taken together, this means that all Arab nationalist regimes and nationalist, progressive, and revolutionary forces are duty-bound to rigorously back Syria and reinforce its steadfastness.

Syria's stand against the Camp David accords has further radicalized its positions on both Arab and international affairs. This has manifested itself in many ways: a more positive position in the Lebanese arena, a changed stance toward the Lebanese National Movement, more enthusiasm for the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, support to the Iranian and Afghani revolutions, and more eagerness for closer relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, culminating in a friendship treaty with the USSR. This has made Syria a major target of the enemy scheme. The disturbances created by the forces of reaction in Syria are no doubt linked in one way or another with the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary plots.

The nationalist regimes are required to extend material and military support to Syria. The nationalist, progressive, and revolutionary forces

collaborated with the Zionist entity and attacked the Lebanese and Palestinian forces fighting for self-determination.

are required to reinforce their relations with the Syrian regime with a view to strengthening its progressive, nationalist, political position. Syria must translate these positions into actions and grant democratic freedom to all nationalist, progressive, and revolutionary forces.

Sixth: To strive to strengthen the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, promote its effectiveness, deepen relations of solidarity between its members and settle differences between them. This should be done through democratic dialogue, explaining the real dangers threatening all, and stressing the importance of cooperation to face these dangers.

The effort to strengthen the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front should aim at deciding its political line and deepening its progressive, nationalist content. Clear-cut distinction between the enemy and friendly camps must be made, as this is imperative for every growing struggle. Moreover, it should aim at seriously implementing this line together with the adopted resolutions. Finally, this front should build effective institutions to deepen solidarity and coordination between its members.

In this respect the PLO has a special responsibility for promoting the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. In the light of the rapid, successive developments in the Arab region, the PLO must cooperate with the other members to eliminate the obstacles to holding a new Steadfastness and Confrontation Front summit. This summit should discuss current developments with a view to adopting a unified position on them. Furthermore, the PLO has a special role to play in effecting a real polarization between nationalists and reactionaries in the Arab arena. New steps by the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front would constitute a basic beginning for such polarization.

The PLO should abandon its unremitting efforts for convening an Arab summit to restore official 'Arab solidarity'. Experience has proved that such 'solidarity', in the final analysis, serves only Arab reaction. Rather, the PLO should move to adopt an unequivocal policy that makes a clear distinction between friends and foes. This is the course that serves our national cause as well as our anti-Camp David struggle. As an opponent of imperialism, Zionism, and reaction, the PLO should strive in every way for implementation of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front's resolutions for setting up and developing joint institutions. Without this, the confrontation in the region will merely be marking time.

The Steadfastness and Confrontation Front's current state of stag-

nation should be transitory. The schemes of imperialism, Zionism, and reaction ought to stimulate all members to act promptly to stop the deterioration of the situation in the region. We believe that while the PLO bears a special responsibility, the other Steadfastness and Confrontation Front members bear an equal one.

Seventh: To strive earnestly to strengthen the Arab People's Conference and augment its effectiveness and ability to unity the positions and activities of the member parties, forces and organizations.

The present inability of the Arab revolutionary forces to establish and lead a progressive, pan-Arab front, makes the Arab People's Conference a necessity for coordinating the pan-Arab mass movement with a view to accomplishing the tasks of the current stage. The presence in the Arab People's Conference of a substantial number of progressive and revolutionary forces makes it possible to promote it, develop its political line and deepen its progressive nationalist nature. Democratic dialogue can be practiced for handling contradiction between members. Militant relations can be strengthened to invigorate the Conference, implement its resolutions and increase its mass orientation.

The progressive and revolutionary forces must attend the meetings of the Arab People's Conference and its permanent secretariat; they must participate in prior preparation of such meetings, and coordinate to ensure that resolutions get implemented and all duties carried out. This must result in improving the Conference's effectiveness as the existing framework for coordinating the positions and activities of the nationalist, democratic, and revolutionary forces of the Arab national liberation movement, regardless of whether they are in power or not.

Eighth: To strive tirelessly for democratic freedoms for the toiling masses and their political parties, trade unions and mass organizations.

The only forces capable of confronting the Camp David designs are the masses and the progressive and revolutionary organizations. The masses, generally speaking, now suffer from extreme frustration as a result of having been suppressed and having their slogans misused by leaders that claim to be acting to realize these same slogans. The persistence of this state of affairs threatens the masses and hence the nation's ability to withstand and confront the Camp David schemes.

In the fifties, the mass movement played an effective role, confronting the Baghdad Pact and other imperialist plans. In Syria in particular, the mass movement was able to thwart numerous enemy designs. However, the undemocratic attitude of the national bourgeois regimes later weakened the mass movement and paralyzed its initiative. Hence, the nationalist, progressive, and revolutionary forces that are not in power must struggle for democratic freedoms for the toiling masses. Also, the nationalist and progressive press and revolutionary writers and intellectuals should focus on this task. Democratic rights must assume the status of a patriotic, progressive, and revolutionary value, a moral and political value equal to patriotism itself. Genuine patriotism should be measured by the attitude toward democratic freedoms.

We do not demand that the nationalist regimes provide the liberal bourgeois freedoms of capitalist societies. We demand democratic freedoms for the broad masses, not for their enemies. Democratic freedom for all patriotic, progressive, and revolutionary forces, regardless of ideological or party affiliation, should be linked in principle with: 1) the position on imperialism, Zionism, and reaction; and 2) controlling antagonism between different ideological, class, and political trends within the framework of cooperation against the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary enemy. Should secondary contradictions override the main contradiction with the enemy camp, the mass movement would be divided and weakened. This would pave the way for crackdowns on democratic freedoms.

Belief in the masses, in democracy and in the masses' right to choose a position and act on it, are necessary conditions in the period of unified, national democratic liberation struggle. One of imperialism's and reaction's main weapons for dividing the mass movement is brandishing the "communist danger" and the threat it allegedly poses to religion, traditions, nationalism, and beliefs. On occasion, patriotic forces have fallen in this trap. Thus imperialism, Zionism, and reaction succeed in dividing the mass movement and fomenting ideological antagonisms within its ranks.

In confronting Camp David, the nationalist, progressive, and revolutionary forces should be aware of this danger; they must immunize the masses against it. Political unity on the basis of opposing imperialism, Zionism, and reaction must prevail over any ideological differences. The nationalist forces should realize that those who have responded to the tune of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism have in practice landed in the enemy camp. The communists, for their part, should concentrate

primarily on their political program for opposing imperialism, Zionism, and reaction; they should respect all ideological trends that follow a political program opposed to the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary enemy.

Ninth: To reinforce solidarity and mutual support among the Arab liberation forces in order to back the nationalist, democratic, and revolutionary forces of each and every Arab country, so that they may protect themselves against the Camp David plan, augment their own capabilities, and overcome the imperialist-backed reactionary forces in their respective countries.

We have earlier stressed the necessity of supporting the Palestinian revolution, the Lebanese National Movement, and the Egyptian mass movement in particular. This support should also be extended to Democratic Yemen which has been threatened by military aggression as well as plots concocted by Saudi, Yemeni, and Iraqi reaction in collaboration with local counterrevolutionary forces. Democratic Yemen should also be helped to overcome its current economic difficulties. Moreover, support should be given to the National Democratic Front of North Yemen; the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO); the nationalist, progressive, and revolutionary forces in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq; and the Sudanese people and their nationalist, progressive, and revolutionary forces. Support should also be extended to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya which faces Sadat's military threats and the intrigues of the Camp David alliance. POLISARIO and Algeria should also be supported against the activities of the reactionary Moroccan regime and the plots of hostile forces aiming at undermining the revolution. Support should also be given to the struggles of the Tunisian and Moroccan masses against reaction.

Strengthening militant solidarity among the contingents of the Arab national liberation movement is the way to reinforce their confrontation of the enemy alliance. This is also the way to create a progressive, pan-Arab front to lead the Arab national democratic revolution oriented toward socialism.

Tenth: To struggle seriously for strengthening international solidarity between the Arab national liberation movement, the forces of socialism and national liberation movements of the world, and the democratic and working class forces in the capitalist countries.

The current changes in many a country in the region will, thanks to their proximity to the Arab homeland, contribute to consolidating the

Arab national liberation movement. These will consequently turn into points of support for our mass movement against imperialism, Zionism, and reaction. The same applies to mutual support with the patriotic, progressive and revolutionary regimes and forces in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It is equally necessary to strengthen the cooperation and the mutual support between the Arab national liberation movement and the progressive and democratic parties and forces of the advanced capitalist countries. The central link in this effort to enlist solidarity is to consolidate relations with the countries of the socialist community, particularly the Soviet Union.

The need to consolidate cooperation and mutual support between the Arab national liberation movement and the Soviet Union arises from national rather than class considerations. In the Camp David era, US imperialism is exercising all its weight to impose its domination and schemes on the Arab region. To confront this, we must enlist the support of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community. They are the polar opposite of imperialism, capable of standing up to its attempt at world domination.

These are the ten tasks lying ahead for the Arab national liberation movement, nationalist regimes and all the nationalist, progressive, and revolutionary parties and forces. As a contingent of the Arab liberation movement, it is our duty to pose and agitate for these tasks in our work with the masses, and to struggle tirelessly for their fulfillment. These tasks are the basis for dialogue and agreement with other forces, and for mobilizing our masses.

These tasks are designed to multiply the masses' capabilities for confronting the Camp David threat. As such, they are certain to be understandable and acceptable to the broadest masses, regardless of ideological affiliation. At the same time, these tasks can be realized if there is real national resolve. These tasks will become tangible criteria for checking the nationalism of each and every Arab regime, party, or organization. This provides a great opportunity for the more democratic and revolutionary groups to earn increased mass support, enabling them to embark on the tasks of their radical strategic program.



Chapter 6

Program of Strategic Tasks

The strategic tasks are not limited to withstanding, containing, and counteracting the Camp David alliance and its schemes. They aim at defeating the treasonous line and the Camp David alliance; liberating Palestine from Zionism; eliminating all of imperialism's military, economic, and cultural presence and influence on Arab soil; ending the authority of Arab reaction and the impotent, capitulationist bourgeoisie; and ultimately realizing the aims of the Arab nation: liberation, democracy, socialism, and unity.

Therefore, these tasks are primarily posed for the revolutionary forces within the Arab national liberation movement, particularly working class regimes and organizations. These tasks require a prolonged, arduous struggle and must be maintained despite the numerous political developments that will take place in the period. Naturally, our discussion of these tasks will be combined with a review and analysis of the Arab liberation struggle since the beginning of the present century. This includes an evaluation of the stages this struggle has undergone and the lessons it has yielded, the role of each class at every stage and what prevented the working class from playing the leading role that could be expected in the light of the objective developments on the world level. The current crisis of the Arab national liberation movement must be assessed, together with the program to pull it out of this crisis. Although the report does not deal with these topics as separate subjects, their essence will be clarified while discussing the program of strategic tasks, as follows.

First: To wage an unremitting revolutionary struggle to consolidate the role of the working class within the broad class alliance opposed to imperialism, Zionism, reaction and the capitulationist right-wing bourgeoisie, so that the working class may eventually assume the leadership.

This task is the central link which connects all the other strategic tasks for accomplishing the Arab national democratic revolution that will proceed toward socialism. A critical review of the Arab national liberation movement, from the beginning of the century until Sadat's shift to the enemy camp proves the validity of this thesis. Our masses have

waged serious and prolonged struggles against Zionism and colonialism, then against Zionism and neocolonialism. Their failure to be liberated from imperialism and Zionism is in no way due to their own helplessness or abandonment of the struggle. This failure is rather due to the bourgeois-feudal character of the leadership of these struggles.

In the period following World War II and culminating in the emergence of the Zionist state in Palestine in 1948, our masses struggled. At times, they took up arms against colonialism and Zionism. However, the subservient big bourgeoisie, allied with the remnants of feudalism, led the struggle at that time. They were satisfied with the formal independence that had been won by the masses' struggle. They stopped at that, content with the benefits and the privileges they had accrued, thanks to being in power, and their ties with foreign capital and their role as comprador in the continuing imperialist plunder. Economically, this class is a mere appendage to imperialism. It was unable to effect any significant social change or economic development. Consequently, this class resorted to coercion against the masses, striving to arrest their struggle. This class proved unable to face Zionism; its impotence culminated in the defeat of 1948. Yet the Arab masses did not stop their struggle against Zionism and imperialism. They carried on, but this time by struggling against this impotent class that had allied itself with imperialism.

In the 1950s, a new stage of struggle began with the July 23rd revolution in Egypt as the center, led by strata representing the petit and middle bourgeoisie. These new class forces overthrew the subservient big bourgeoisie which was allied with the feudalists. There were political, economic, social, and cultural achievements at this stage in Egypt and throughout the Arab homeland; several progressive, nationalist Arab regimes emerged, unlike the pre-1948 regimes. Yet these achievements remained governed by the nature, interests, and abilities of the petit and middle bourgeois strata. Production remained generally capitalist in character, and relations of economic dependence continued, attaching these regimes to the imperialist world market. Under these conditions, the interests of the ruling class grew and intertwined with the interests of the old bourgeoisie and world capital, despite all claims to a 'third course' of development, and despite tactical relations with the socialist community. This economic and class structure formed the base for these regimes' programs in the ideological, political, and cultural spheres.

In politics, these regimes vacillated between antagonizing imperialism and reconciling with it. At one point, relations with the socialist

community were promoted; then came talk of problems involved in these relations. There was opposition to Arab reaction, and then compromise with it in the forum of 'Arab solidarity'. On the social level, these regimes realized some benefits for the masses, but under the banner of leveling class differences. On the ideological front, their 'scientific' socialism was an eclectic hodgepodge. These regimes mobilized the masses when they were in contradiction with imperialism, then coerced and suppressed the mass movement when it surpassed their own programs. This vacillation applied in all fields, resulting in hypocritical practices known only too well to all of us, since we have lived with the symptoms and consequences.

This class secured its interests through controlling state power; it made use of the mass struggles to improve its own position in the world capitalist system and market; its interests grew and interlinked with those of the old bourgeoisie which it had overthrown without changing the mode of production. No sooner had this occurred than this class slowed down its progressive march, then stopped and began to retreat to a position of alliance with world capitalism, abandoning the masses and their interests. The transition of Sadat's regime to its current position of treason provides concrete proof of the course of this class. This shows clearly that the crisis of the Arab national liberation movement over the past decades lies in the class nature of the leadership that used the masses' sacrifices to promote its own selfish interests. Hence, we see the importance of striving to consolidate the role of the working class so that it may assume the leadership of the mass movement in the coming stage.

Obviously, the Camp David alliance intends to attain full control of the Arab region. This harms all the Arab masses, only benefiting the capitulationist bourgeoisie whose interests are totally intertwined with imperialism. Thus, the class forces antagonistic to the Camp David alliance are not only the working class, but also the peasantry, the petit bourgeoisie and certain strata of the national middle bourgeoisie. We are keen to build and maintain a broad class alliance comprising all the classes harmed by Camp David. However we should insist on working class leadership for such an alliance. Only then can we ensure that the alliance will withstand the confrontation, that the victory will be for the toiling masses and not usurped by the bourgeois component of the alliance. Only then can we achieve full liberation from economic dependence, by setting up a new mode of production that is independent and antagonistic to the capitalist mode of production and the imperialist camp founded on it.

This is the lesson yielded by the experience of the Arab national liberation movement in the 1950s, in response to the 1948 defeat suffered under the leadership of the big bourgeoisie and feudal remnants. The Camp David era requires the same kind of class alliance, but with one essential difference. In Nasser's era, the alliance was led by the national bourgeoisie, but we should now make use of the lessons of that era. We must strive to change the nature of the class relations within this alliance, so that the working class assumes the leadership, and a retrogressive march like Sadat's is avoided. The difference is a qualitative one. Other peoples' experiences, as well as our own, teach that the ability of the working class and its vanguard contingents to assume the leadership of the broad class alliance depends primarily on understanding the reasons that have so far precluded the ascent of the working class, despite decades of struggle. Some Arab communist parties have been in existence for more than fifty years. This justifies the question as to why the working class has not ascended to the leadership. The more courageously and objectively Arab communists can face this question and analyze it, the greater their chances of ascending to the leadership with the working class they represent.

First of all, it must be taken into account that the role of the working class has been limited, qualitatively and quantitatively, by certain objective factors. In most Arab societies, the bourgeoisie is chiefly mercantile; the industrial bourgeoisie is very small in size; the petit bourgeoisie, the peasantry and marginal groups comprise the bulk of the society. In these societies, the working class can only be small in size and low in concentration in accordance with economic backwardness and dependence.

These objective factors should be taken into account in order to evaluate the role of the Arab working class and communist parties. However, in the light of the international developments that have taken place in this century, these objective factors are no longer the decisive ones. The victory of the October Revolution and the emergence of the world's first workers' and peasants' state had far-reaching repercussions. This revolution consolidated itself; socialist revolutions occurred in several other countries; and a world socialist system came into being. After this, the role of the working class in the underdeveloped countries is not to be judged by size or concentration, or by the membership of the parties representing it, but by the revolutionary program it adopts to lead the people's anti-imperialist struggle, backed by the socialist community. Today, there is ample evidence attesting to the truth of this thesis. In Vietnam, for example, the economic development was not qualitatively different from that of the Arab homeland. There the Vietnamese Com-

munist Party led the working class and the popular movement to victory by consistently pursuing the revolutionary program it had formulated. Vietnam is not an isolated example of the world revolutionary situation affecting the role of the working class in extremely backward countries. Before Vietnam, there was the case of Mongolia; since, there has been Laos, Afghanistan, etc. All this shows that the Arab communist parties should responsibly face up to the subjective factors that have so far barred them from assuming the leadership of the broad class alliance of the Arab national liberation movement.

What are the most important of these subjective factors?

A. The traditional view of the nature of the stage of the revolution in the Arab homeland and the role of the working class in this stage.

European communist parties came into being as working class parties, responsible for effecting and leading the socialist revolution. The process of change in European societies was assumed to go through two distinct phases: the bourgeois democratic revolution led by the bourgeoisie, followed by the socialist revolution led by the working class. The leading role of the communist party was considered to relate only to the socialist revolution.

However, the Bolsheviks led by Lenin developed this view. Lenin stressed the necessity of the working class leading the democratic revolution. He emphasized the bourgeois democratic nature of the Russian revolution, but opposed handing the leading role over to the bourgeoisie, leaving only a subordinate role for the working class. Lenin says, "The proletariat must carry to completion the democratic revolution, by allying to itself the mass of the peasantry in order to crush by force the resistance of the autocracy and to paralyze the instability of the bourgeoisie. The proletariat must accomplish the socialist revolution, by allying to itself the mass of the semi-proletarian elements of the population in order to crush by force the resistance of the bourgeoisie and to paralyze the instability of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. Such are the tasks of the proletariat..."[14] Thus the Russian working class and its party became responsible for effecting the democratic upheaval, namely, the bourgeois democratic revolution, instead of waiting for the bourgeoisie to accomplish this task and then taking over to effect the socialist revolution. "Our

14 **Ed. Note:** From Lenin's 'Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution', *Collected Works*, Progress Publishers, 1962, Moscow, Vol. 9, pp. 15-140.

party sticks to the view that the role of the proletariat is that of leading the bourgeois democratic revolution" (Lenin).[15]

After the triumph of the October revolution, the Leninist view of the national liberation movements also developed. Lenin began to view them as part of the socialist revolution and not the democratic revolution led by the bourgeoisie with the aim of establishing a capitalist system. This considered, the national liberation movements acquired a social content in addition to their national character. This is why the working class in the countries of these movements should assume the leadership of the democratic revolution as well.

By clinging to the traditional view of the role of the working class and its vanguard party, the Arab communist parties missed the opportunity of having a growing role in leading the mass struggle at the earlier stages. The traditional view reduces most activities of these parties to the trade unionist and reformist demands of the working class. The Arab communist parties did play a role in the struggle against colonialism, but they conceded the leading part to the bourgeoisie. This made their own struggles only secondary, subordinate to those of the bourgeoisies. Since the Arab communist parties do not consider themselves responsible for leading the struggle at such a stage, it is only natural that they not strive to assume leadership. Consequently, they have not so far attained the leading position within the class alliance required by the stage of national liberation.

B. With the rise of the nationalist petit bourgeoisie in the fifties and sixties, the Arab communist parties were dazzled by the political, economic, social, and cultural achievements of this bourgeoisie. This led them to consider the progressive nationalist regimes of that time as leading a special stage of 'non-capitalist' economic development, preliminary to socialist transformation.

This provided justification for the Egyptian communist party to dissolve itself. Other Arab communist parties were content to support these regimes. They exempted themselves from the major revolutionary role of leading the working class and the whole society to accomplish all the tasks of the national democratic revolution, and carry on to effect the socialist transformation of society, a task only the work-

15 **Ed. Note:** Original translation, from Lenin's 'The Aim of the Proletarian Struggle in Our Revolution', *Sotsial-Demokrat*, Nos. 3 and 4 , *Collected Works*, Progress Publishers, 1973, Moscow, Vol. 15, pp. 360-379.

ing class and its vanguard party can shoulder. Limiting themselves to a subsidiary role as they have so far done, how could the Arab communist parties be expected to ascend to the top of the alliance that links them with the other classes of the national democratic revolution?

The thesis of non-capitalist development is both scientific and feasible. Yet proclaiming non-capitalist development, without securing the conditions that make it possible and socialist oriented, allows the bourgeoisie to mislead the masses; it encourages the communists to be complacent. To be conducive to socialism, non-capitalist development must be based on a set of conditions:

—firm antagonism to imperialism;

—economic independence from imperialism;

—combining the development process with establishing the closest political and economic relations with the socialist countries;

—ranting full democratic freedoms to the masses, so that they may fully exercise their right to political and trade-union association; popularising scientific socialist thought;

—last, but not least, securing the subjective conditions for carrying out this revolutionary task, namely, the leading role of the working class and its vanguard party.

Unless the thesis of non-capitalist development is judged on this basis, we should not be surprised to hear Siad Barre of Somalia, and his kind of bourgeoisie, speak of their own 'non-capitalist road' to socialism.

Understanding why the Arab working class has been unable to approach the leading position in the Arab national liberation movement is the first step toward attaining that position. It is the first step toward extricating the Arab national liberation movement from its crisis. We regard this task as the central link in the problems facing Arab revolutionaries today. Yet our analysis of the Arab national liberation movement's crisis, and of the program to overcome this, is not complete unless undertaken in connection with the other tasks.

Second: To wage a serious, tireless revolutionary struggle to wrench power from Arab reaction and the capitulationist bourgeoisie, and establish a new class power: people's democracy, led by an alliance of all toilers with the working class as leader and guide.

In the light of our review and analysis of the earlier stages of struggle, only people's democracy is capable of accomplishing all the tasks of the national democratic revolution and linking it to socialist revolution. If Arab communists do not work to seize power, they allow the bourgeoisie to do so. After all, the bourgeoisie is able to find alternative candidates among its various strata to hold political power on its behalf. In the light of experience, the seizure of state power is most likely to occur country by country, rather than on an Arab national scale. Yet the results will not be restricted to the country where the takeover is effected. Shouldering the pan-Arab tasks of Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine, such a regime will create an overwhelming upsurge in the Arab mass movement. A case in point is the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). Shouldering the pan-Arab tasks of Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine, such a Regime will create an overwhelming upsurge in the Arab mass movement. A case in point is the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). Despite limited resources, PDRY is playing a valuable role in connection with the national liberation movement in North Yemen and Oman, indeed, in the whole Gulf region and Arabian Peninsula. Hence, we can imagine the great revolutionary effects created by a people's democratic power emerging under the leadership of the working class in Sudan, Iraq, or some other Arab country. A similar role was played by Nasser's Egypt; it created a great upsurge throughout the Arab world. Among other things, this swept away Iraq's reactionary regime, overthrew the monarchies of Yemen and Libya, and liberated Algeria and South Yemen from colonialism. This gives an idea of the greater and different role to be played by Egypt, once an alliance of workers, peasants, other toilers and the patriotic bourgeoisie, led by the working class, comes to power.

We realize how crucial and intricate this task is. Consequently, we are aware of the harm an adventurist course could inflict on the working class and mass movement. We realize as well the necessity of securing both the objective conditions needed to bring about revolutionary change. At the same time, we stress that addressing this task should always be the focus of attention for the Arab working class and all Arab communists. By concentrating on accomplishing this task, the working class will release its full potentials, channel them properly and daily multiply its activities and efficacy. Shouldering this task on a consistent basis should be part and parcel of the Arab communists' action, directing their efforts toward understanding the nature and contradictions of the power to be over-thrown; how to make use of these contradictions, and

what tactical slogans and programs are needed to aggravate the existing regime's crisis; the importance of broad alliances and the programs that will make these possible, as well as the principles that should govern the relations between the parties to these alliances; the programs and activities that rally the masses; and the kind of organizational structure and principles which would enable the working class party to seize power and effect revolutionary change.

Linked to the thesis on seizing power is another basic and central thesis that constitutes a task in itself. This is the thesis on the militant methods by which political power is seized and maintained. We are referring to revolutionary violence and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Any serious effort to seize power from Arab reaction and the capitulationist bourgeoisie should rely on preparation for armed class war (insurrection) as the only way to accomplish this task. The particular manner in which revolutionary violence manifests itself will differ from one Arab country to another. It will probably assume various forms: armed insurrection, armed insurgency—military coups carried out by soldiers connected with the working class party and the mass movement—protracted people's liberation war, etc. However, in all cases, the essence is the same, namely, that the "Major questions in the life of nations are settled only by force" (Lenin).[16]

Our emphasis on the thesis of armed struggle and revolutionary violence should not be construed as underrating the necessity of other forms of struggle, political and otherwise, by trade unions and other mass organizations, including parliamentary struggle. However, important as they are, these forms of struggle only contribute to ripening the objective and subjective conditions needed to effect change; only by revolutionary violence can the change itself be effected, and the new power maintained. The most probable error of the working class party is not failing to stress these methods, but rather failing to understand the primacy of revolutionary violence.

This section of our report, through outlining the tasks for the new stage and the role of the revolutionary forces, attempts to look into the current crisis of the Arab national liberation movement and why the role of the Arab working class and communist parties has been less than leading or effective. In line with this, we must glance back at the history of

16 **Ed. Note:** From Lenin's 'A Contribution To The History Of The Question Of The Dictatorship', *Collected Works*, 4th English Edition, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, Vol. 31, pp. 340-361.

the Arab communist parties over the past decades to see to what extent they have been oriented toward the task of seizing power, and whether they have used all forms of struggle, political and otherwise, to this end. Apart from Hashem Al 'Ata's coup in Sudan, in which the Sudanese Communist Party was involved, is there a single serious attempt by any Arab communist party to seize power? Were not the objective and subjective conditions ripe for the communist party to seize power in Iraq at the time of Abdulkarim Qasem? Did not Democratic Yemen's experience concretely indicate that the presence of the forces of the United Arab Republic (Egypt) in Sana'a created favorable conditions for armed struggle in South Yemen? This task was then shouldered by the Arab Nationalist Movement in South Yemen. Did the Moroccan Communist Party undertake the task of armed struggle against the Spanish colonialists in the Sahara? Yet today the party believes the Sahara to be part of the national soil, thereby justifying siding in practice with King Hassan's regime against POLISARIO. Did the Algerian Communist Party perceptibly contribute to, let alone lead, the Algerian people's struggle against French colonialism? Did it have any real role in Algeria's revolution of one million martyrs, that was the focus of the Arab masses for seven years?

In the eyes of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, of communist parties and liberation forces worldwide, the Palestinian armed struggle ranks in the forefront of the word national liberation movement. Yet has the Jordanian Communist Party / Palestinian Organization[17] played any leading or contributing role in igniting this struggle which was initiated by some bourgeois forces, revolutionary democratic forces and forces identifying themselves with the working class? Didn't the Arab communists' failure to take part in these armed revolts against colonialism, revolts now lauded by all Arab communist parties, result in weakening the role of the working class, leading to the current crisis of the Arab national liberation movement?

What is our point here? As a contingent of the Arab national liberation movement, we ought to review and analyze the history of this movement to understand its current crisis. Moreover, we must sincerely address ourselves to establishing the strongest relations with the Arab communist parties with a view to setting the Arab national democratic revolution on the course to socialist revolution. Therefore, we humbly submit our contribution to drawing up the program of the tasks of this stage, to be carried out primarily by the revolutionary forces.

17 Until 1982, Palestinian communists were still a group in the Communist Party of Jordan. In that year, they formed the Palestinian Communist Party.

Third: To wage firm, revolutionary struggle against Zionism and its political entity, 'Israel', with a view to removing this racist, imperialist, colonialist entity from Arab soil; liberating Palestine through a protracted Arab-Palestinian people's war; rejecting any settlement with this entity; creating an overwhelming revolutionary mass upsurge for the long struggle.

The Israeli state is the local point of the collision between the Arab masses and imperialism. Moreover, the struggle against 'Israel' will expose the betrayal of Arab reaction and the capitulationist bourgeoisie, while integrating the struggles of the Arab masses in the entire region.

The starting point in shouldering this task is to define one's political and ideological position toward the Zionist movement and its polity, the state of 'Israel', and toward any settlement with this entity based on recognition and coexistence. Before 1948, the international communist movement, including the Arab communist movement, and the Arab national liberation movement had a definite position. The international communist movement, including the Arab communists, had a firm ideological position on Zionism, viewing it as a racist, colonialist movement linked with imperialism. The international communist movement and the Arab communists had a decided position on the thesis of the Jewish 'people' and the Jewish 'nation'. They maintained that the Jews did not constitute a nation, and hence called on Jewish proletarians to integrate their struggle with that of the people where they lived. However, after 1948, when the USSR and other countries of the socialist community recognized the state of Israel, this position underwent a major change, affecting the entire Arab communist movement, Thus, the starting point should be to determine a scientific, political-ideological position on the Zionist movement and its polity, 'Israel'.

In order to avoid sounding chauvinist or immature in our dialogue with the communist parties of the world, we must scientifically discuss a whole list of topics, including:

—the origin of the Zionist movement and the nature of its ideology;

—the class forces that established this movement, drew up its program and defined its objectives;

—the origin of the relation between Zionism, colonialism, and imperialism;

—the number of Jews in Palestine at the turn of the century and the factors that stimulated Jewish immigration; whether this immigra-

tion was really an expression of a people's aspirations or whether it was artificially perpetrated to mask a colonial invasion;

—the level of this immigration before 1948, and what percentage of all Jews live in Palestine;

—the scientific definition of a nation and whether Jews constitute a nation; how can one explain that 75% of this 'nation', granted it exists, is outside the polity it has created?

—the nature of the class struggle going on within this entity; the dimensions and prospects of this struggle in the light of the fact that the entire Zionist society (all classes) benefits from the schemes of settlement and domination, and from the imperialist aid extended to this entity in return for its policing the region in the interests of imperialism;

—whether one can separate Zionism, which world communism vehemently denounces, from 'Israel'; whether it is realistic to think of the existence of a non-Zionist Israel.

As for Arab communist parties, we are entitled to say that these topics were not dealt with. Zionism and its polity 'Israel', have shown in practice, over a long period, what this society really is and what objectives were behind its creation. This indicates the correct political and ideological position on Zionism and the Zionist state. So, does 'Israel' represent all people that aspires to self-determination and is entitled to this right and to opt for secession if it so wishes, according to the Leninist thesis? Or is it just another Rhodesia, an imperialist, colonialist, fascist, and racist society that constitutes direct colonialist military presence on Arab soil, intended to impose imperialist domination?

The point of departure for undertaking this task is to delineate a firm political position on Zionism and the Zionist entity. Moreover, it is equally necessary to take a firm position on the line of political settlement that has prevailed since the October War of 1973. Before that war, only the Arab communist parties, of all the contingents of the Arab Liberation movement, were reconciled to the existence of 'Israel'. All other contingents, the Palestinian revolution in particular, struggled on the basis of liberating all of Palestine. After October '73, the picture changed; some contingents of the Palestinian revolution and the Arab liberation movement began to falter, proposing an interim program for settlement with the Zionist entity. This necessitates a decisive political-ideological position on the part of the Arab revolutionary forces. Besides repudiat-

ing the settlement line, which we shall take up in the Palestinian section of this report, we are confronted today with the concrete consequences of this line which Sadat used to justify his visit to Jerusalem and later the treasonous treaty. Here it suffices to stress the necessity of making a clear distinction between charting phases in the process of liberating the whole of Palestine, and replacing that goal with a Palestinian state in part of Palestine as a result of a settlement concluded at the price of accepting the permanent existence of the Zionist entity.

In conclusion, the adoption of a definite political-ideological position of no coexistence with Zionism is the basis on which Arab revolutionary forces should approach the task of liberating Palestine, as one of the tasks of the strategic confrontation of the Camp David process.

Some warn of the adverse consequences that such a position could have on the Arab communist movement's relations with the USSR and other socialist countries, and with the international communist movement generally. We reply to this from the theoretical point of view by referring to the set of principles laid down by the international communist movement as a basis for inter-party relations. These principles provide, among other things, for every communist party's right to independence, for mutual respect of points of view and for the need to apply Marxism-Leninism creatively and solve differences of opinion through democratic dialogue.

On the practical level, our reply is as follows: Before the October War, the Arab national liberation movement had fairly good relations of cooperation with the USSR and the international communist movement. The more radical and serious we are in opposing imperialism in practice, the closer such relations will be. Moreover, 'Israel' exhibited its arrogance after 1967, and was exposed as an outrightly aggressive imperialist base;

Zionism's subversive activities against and within the countries of the socialist community have become known. As a result, we can now, more than ever, see a worldwide ideological trend that views Zionism as an outright reactionary and racist movement, and not at all one of the national liberation for the 'Jewish people'.

This situation provides firm common ground for dialogue on the position to be taken toward 'Israel' as a political, economic and military entity that embodies Zionism in reality. It is the duty of the Arab communists to bring home to the world communist movement the grim reality of Zionism and the Zionist state as we have experienced it in practice.

The task of liberating Palestine is one of the main strategic tasks of the confrontation program for defeating the Camp David alliance—the program of the Arab revolution in its national democratic stage, leading to socialism. To complete our view of this task, it is necessary to stress that the liberation of Palestine, particularly in the Camp David era, is no longer solely a Palestinian national task. Like the task of realizing Arab unity, the task of liberating Palestine has historically been a pan-Arab task for the Arab national liberation movement to accomplish, despite the special role assigned to the Palestinians. Previously, this task owed its pan-Arab character mainly to the thesis of Arab unity. It used to be discussed, and positions determined, with reference to that thesis. Now it is confirmed as a task of the entire Arab national liberation movement on the grounds of an analysis of the Camp David era, as set out in this report.

The Zionist state is now US imperialism's No. 1 base for the suppression of the national movement in any Arab country. The Zionist enemy now occupies parts of Syria and Lebanon; it still occupies part of the Sinai. 'Israel' is the base that daily offers its services to imperialism for securing the oil and other interests in the region. The future of the peoples of the entire region hangs on the destruction of this Zionist polity.

The pan-Arab character of the battle against the Zionist state requires that all the contingents of the Arab national liberation movement shoulder their responsibilities. They must confront the activities of imperialism and its local allies on one hand, and seriously take part in fighting the Zionist enemy over the length of the borders with occupied Palestine on the other. A position against Zionism and 'Israel' must become an item on the programs of the nationalist, democratic, and revolutionary forces of every Arab country. This position must be converted into full support to the Palestinian revolution. It must be turned into action to initiate the national democratic revolution in every Arab country for the purpose of mobilizing all the country's potentials for the liberation battle. In this, the initiative should be taken by the revolutionary elements of the Arab national liberation movement, particularly the communists.

The fact that armed struggle has been going on for quite a while makes this strategic task immediately applicable, as has been the case in Lebanon. Once the revolutionary forces seriously set out to implement this task, then the struggle for the liberation of Palestine will reveal the potential of the Palestinian cause for creating an overwhelming revolutionary mass upsurge. The Zionist entity represents the focal point of collision between us and imperialism; the reactionary and defeatist

bourgeois forces' impotence will be revealed; armed struggle will spread to other Arab countries, thanks to this struggle's unifying effect. This will lead to accomplishing the tasks of national liberation in some Arab countries, national democratic tasks in others, and even tasks of the national democratic revolution verging on socialist transformation in certain others.

Thus, the task of liberating Palestine will be linked with and, indeed, the key to realizing the objectives of the Arab national democratic revolution on the road to the socialist revolution.

The position adopted by the Arab communist parties toward the Zionist state on its proclamation in 1948, had extremely detrimental effects on their popularity amongst the Arab masses and, consequently, on their ability to lead the mass movement. This constitutes another basic factor in understanding the crisis of the Arab national liberation movement and its bourgeois leadership, as well as the limited role of the Arab communist parties in the uprisings of the 1950s and 1960s. In the wake of the 1948 defeat, the emergence of the Zionist state, the usurpation of Arab land and eviction of the Palestinian people, the Arab masses were full of resentment and rage at the reactionary regimes. These regimes had proved unequal to the confrontation; some had even plotted against the Palestinian people's struggle and cause. The Arab masses expected the leadership to mobilize their potentials and convert their anger in a decisive struggle against imperialism, the Zionist enemy and the comprador capitalist class that had aborted earlier struggles. The masses considered Arab fragmentation to be one of the causes of the defeat. At this very time, the Arab communist parties, blind to all the perils the Zionist invasion spelled for the Arabs' destiny, advocated recognition and peace with 'Israel'. They paid no attention to the question of Arab unity or to eliminating fragmentation which was the material base created by colonialism to control the region. Instead, they restricted their struggle to reformist demands, and raised the slogan of "bread and peace." In this way, the Arab communist parties left ample scope for the petit and national bourgeoisie to ride the mass movement and lead the new stage of struggle which Sadat and his defeatist bourgeoisie so ignominiously ended. Moreover, the position of the Arab communist parties toward the Zionist entity was used by reactionary and bourgeois forces as a justification for suppressing them as traitors to the sacred cause of Palestine. In addition, this position alienated vast sectors of the masses from these parties (as well as from communism).

After the 1967 aggression, the same attitude was reflected in these parties' stance on UN Security Council resolution no. 242, on Palestinian armed struggle which acquired much strength after the 1967 defeat, and on the question of a negotiated settlement. We reiterate that by pointing out all this, we only intend to make our modest, dutiful contribution to analyzing the Arab national liberation movement's crisis, in order to determine the causes that have so far allowed the bourgeoisie to assume the leadership and pushed the Arab working class and communist parties into the background. This stems from our sincere desire to see the Arab working class and communist parties reconsider their past experience and make use of its lessons in order to ascend to the position they should occupy, leading the revolutionary national democratic class alliance in the confrontation of Camp David. We are particularly pleased that some of these parties are making such a reassessment already. This will certainly advance their leading the mass movement in their respective countries, and the Arab national movement in the stage of the national democratic revolution on the road to the socialist revolution.

Fourth: To strive tirelessly to realize Arab unity and a united pan-Arab people's democratic state; to posit Arab unity as a central slogan of the national democratic revolution on the road to socialist revolution.

The existence of a united Arab nation is an established historical fact, dating back to the epoch of the Islamic-Arab renaissance and continuing for many centuries thereafter. The factors of common language, history, and psychological and cultural traits, on which the unity of the Arab nation rests, could only have evolved through a long historical process. Otherwise, we cannot explain the existing unity of language, the feelings of identity, belonging and common destiny, the oneness of psychological and cultural traits and aspirations. The concept of the Arab nation and its unity has become controversial at this period of history due to political fragmentation, with the Arab people having been divided into a number of political entities, and the resulting lack of economic unity. This fragmentation is, however, only transient. It is the result of the colonialist Sykes-Picot agreement which aimed at redistributing imperialist interests after World War I, and providing the material base for suppressing the movement of the Arab masses, dividing and emasculating their struggle. It is inadmissible that this transient reality be used to dispute the existence of the nation. Several examples can be cited of nations lacking economic unity, such as Germany, Korea, and Vietnam prior to the liber-

ation of the south. These nations, however, never ceased seeking unity. It is a fact that when such nations succeed in liberating their occupied land, they unify their societies on a socialist basis.

Regardless of theoretical controversy as to whether the Arabs constitute a single nation or multiple ones, any scientific review of the political movement in this region, from the beginning of the last century up to the present, shows the existence of a single, all-comprising Arab nation, constantly propelled toward unity by virtue of its historical and objective existence. The political slogans raised by vanguard forces at various historical stages, to mobilize and rally the masses, are not the expression of chauvinist or subjective tendencies. They really reflect the needs, conditions and implications of the society's evolutionary process, as well as the maturation of the objective conditions that render such slogans realizable.

The slogan of Arab unity and independence was raised in the struggle against Ottoman oppression and the 'turkicisation' scheme. Again, unity was the masses' slogan in various Arab countries in the struggle against British and French colonialism which caused the state of fragmentation. The Arab masses saw the lack of Arab unity, as well as the impotence and collaboration of the ruling class, as one of the main causes of the 1948 defeat. Then the slogan of Arab unity was rejuvenated and crystallized after 1948, when the petit and national bourgeoisie rode the tide of unity to enlist the masses' support against imperialism and the traditional classes. Last, but not least, one recalls the incredible surging force the mass movement acquired when Syria and Egypt merged to form the United Arab Republic. All this expresses how strongly the Arab masses long for national unity in order to achieve national self-fulfillment based on common language, history, land, and psychological and cultural traits.

The struggle to realize Arab unity is not only based on the people's right to self-determination and national unity; it is also vital for firm struggle against imperialism, Zionism, reaction, and the defeatist bourgeoisie. Arab fragmentation was the material basis for imperialist domination over the region. It was one of the factors that made Zionism's early victories possible. Today, fragmentation provides the optimal framework for reaction and the bourgeoisie to control the mass movement. Hence, contrary to fragmentation, the workers, peasants and all the toiling masses in the Arab homeland should adhere to the line of Arab unity.

The Arab nation today accounts for more than 150 million people, ranking fifth among the world's nations in terms of population. In area,

the Arab homeland is about 4 million square miles, which puts it among the world's three largest countries. It abounds in natural resources, particularly oil, of which it has more than half the world's reserves. Nevertheless, despite all these potentials, this nation stands helpless and defeated before the Zionists who occupy a small part of its territory, thanks to its fragmentation into statelets and the class character of its regimes. Arab unity will release, mobilize, and pool these potentials, once the toiling masses take power. This would provide the objective conditions needed to utterly defeat the Camp David alliance. Arab unity would also bring the material conditions for building the base of the socialist revolution. As a single united polity, the Arab nation would certainly build socialism more easily and securely than would Bahrain, the UAE, Djibouti, or any other Arab country going it alone.

The history of Arab struggle has shown the traditional reactionary classes to be unable to realize Arab unity after having taken power in the formally independent Arab states. In practice, they became a force antagonistic to such unity. After 1948, the petit and middle bourgeoisie proved similarly unable to accomplish Arab unity, aside from the 1958 merger of Syria and Egypt, which was abrogated in 1961, due to the bourgeoisie and its programs. The prospects of Arab unity posed a threat to their class interests which had developed under fragmentation. Thus, for all its 'nationalist' bragging, this class, too, became unable to realize Arab unity; some strata of the class even turned against it.

"The Arab rulers are unwilling to realize Arab unity due to fear for their chairs," as the man in the street plainly puts it. By 'chairs' he means the class privileges their power affords them. Thus it is the working class and the new alliance of the toiling classes that must undertake the task of accomplishing Arab national unity. Herein lies the qualitative difference between the European and the Arab nationalist movement. In Europe, national unity was the task of the bourgeois democratic revolution, carried out by the bourgeoisie with the aim of removing the (feudal) barriers to their trade, and unifying the national market. In contrast, owing to the incompetence of the dependent Arab bourgeoisie, Arab unity will be the task of the working class and other toilers, as part of aims of the national democratic revolution with a view to providing the best possible framework for building a socialist society. All the tasks of the Arab national democratic revolution today rest with the working class and revolutionary vanguard parties.

In Europe, national unity was a must for capitalist development,

but in the Arab homeland, the prospects of independent capitalist development are sealed off due to the Arab bourgeoisie's dependence on world capitalism. Thus, Arab national unity is a vital necessity for the only mode of development possible at present, i.e., socialism. National unity in Europe was necessary for the bourgeoisie to build the capitalist society. Today, national unity is needed by the Arab working class to lay the ground for building a socialist society. Thus we delineate the kind of Arab national unity which the revolutionary forces strive to realize, as distinct from the unity called for by Arab reaction and defeatist, dependent bourgeoisie. The Arab national unity sought by revolutionaries is radically opposed to imperialism, Zionism, reaction, and the defeatist bourgeoisie. It is to be realized by the toiling masses in order to free them to carry on the struggle for all the objectives of the Arab national democratic, socialist-oriented revolution.

As long as political fragmentation prevails, the task of struggling to realize Arab national unity will remain within the limits of propaganda, mobilization, agitation, and mutual support and solidarity with the struggle of the Arab masses in each country. As soon as the revolutionary forces seize power in a given Arab country, this task shall assume the form of active, daily, and programmed struggle for realizing concrete unitarian steps with neighbouring Arab countries in accordance with the revolutionary regime's program for the Arab masses in those countries. Thus, such a unitarian program becomes a weapon in the hands of the revolutionary, progressive and patriotic forces against the power of the ruling class which, by virtue of its class interests, is opposed to Arab national unity. The unitarian program is a weapon for establishing the political power of the working class and the revolutionary democratic alliance of the toiling classes with which the cause of Arab unity has become attached. Then the task of Arab national unity will rise above propaganda, to become a factor escalating the mass movement and interlinking the various tasks comprising this program. The struggle for unity will then be a patriotic struggle in one aspect, a class struggle in another and a pan-Arab national struggle in yet another. Thus, the struggle of the masses in each and every Arab country will comprise an Arab national democratic revolution linked with the socialist revolution.

We review the Arab communist parties' past policies and practices on the premise that they had primary responsibility for crystallizing and consolidating the role of the working class in leading the Arab national liberation movement. Such a review reveals erroneous theoretical and political positions that contributed to minimizing the role of the working

class and its parties in the Arab national liberation movement. This constitutes one of the factors underlying the movement's current crisis. The correction of these positions is thus part of the program for the coming stage, aiming at overcoming this crisis and placing the movement on the threshold of a new stage. In this new stage, the Arab working class should lead the movement of the toiling masses of the Arab nation toward liberation, democracy, socialism and unity. This means accomplishing all the tasks of the Arab national democratic, socialist-oriented revolution in the light of the realities of the time: the national democratic revolution's integration with the socialist revolution, and the dependent bourgeoisie's inability to effect national unity.

The Arab communist parties should have undertaken struggle to realize Arab national unity, adopting it as one of their primary objectives and slogans. They should have mobilized the masses and their vanguards, theoretically and politically, to struggle for Arab national unity in accordance with programs that were congruous with the political situation as well as with these parties' stands. Instead, the Arab communist parties long contended that the Arabs do not satisfy the conditions for constituting a single nation. They were blind to the need for struggle for Arab unity in order to confront the enemy camp and schemes. Some of these parties viewed Arab national unity through the European model, i.e., as the task of the bourgeoisie, not the working class. Moreover, when the petit and democratic bourgeoisie raised the slogan of Arab unity at the time of their ascent, some Arab communist parties raised the slogan of democracy as opposed to unity, instead of struggling for consolidating the unity (of Egypt and Syria). Such stances weakened the Arab communist parties' appeal to the masses.

Now is the time for the Arab working class to wrench the slogans of Arab nationalism, unity and the liberation of Palestine, out of the hands of the bourgeoisie which uses them to serve its own selfish interests. This will enable the working class to lead a broad class alliance and the broadest sectors of the masses that spontaneously felt how badly they need Arab unity to accomplish national self-fulfillment and provide the prerequisites of liberation and socialist construction.

One of the most significant positive developments of the present period is that some Arab communist parties are critically reviewing their past positions and adopting new ones on essential issues such as the Palestinian question and Arab national unity, seizing political power, revolutionary violence, and the leading role of the working class in the stage of

national liberation. Such review, coupled with practice accordingly, will lead to the rise of the working class, advance its leading role and help provide the revolutionary alternative for the leadership crisis in the Arab national liberation movement.

Fifth: To carry out serious, uninterrupted struggle to consolidate the Arab revolutionary movement's solidarity with all revolutionary forces in the world: the socialist countries and the Soviet Union in particular, the national liberation movements of the three continents, and the democratic and working class forces of the advanced capitalist countries.

Today the world is divided into two mutually antagonistic camps: the camp of socialism, liberation and progress on the one hand, and the camp of imperialism and reaction on the other. The battle is going on between the two camps on all levels with the involvement of all parties. The results of this global confrontation affect the progress of the revolution everywhere. Thus, it is necessary to reinforce proletarian internationalism in the face of imperialism and reaction. With capitalism having evolved into imperialism on the one hand, and socialism's triumph and establishment in several countries on the other, the liberation struggle against imperialism came to be associated with the forces of socialism; the national liberation movement became part of the socialist revolution. In the light of the realities of the times, the national liberation movement would jeopardize an essential factor for victory if it detached itself from socialism. Hence, this task (proletarian internationalism) is part and parcel of the program of the Arab democratic, socialist-oriented revolution. Firm opposition to imperialism, Zionism, and reaction necessitates closer relations of solidarity with the socialist countries and all contingents of the world revolution. It is no longer possible to separate firm opposition to imperialism from proletarian internationalism.

Certain bourgeois groups are trying to contrive contradictions between nationalist and internationalist struggle. They claim that the conflict between imperialism and the socialist camp stems from mutually exclusive hegemonic motivations on both sides, thus putting the Soviet Union in the same position as the USA. They attribute the instability of the region to the two superpowers rivalry, and so on and so forth, to the end of the harangue we know only too well. Such a line is currently being promoted by the Iraqi regime and applauded by Arab reaction. Such misrepresentation leads to confusing friend and foe, and depriving the national struggle of the components of its future triumph. Moreover, with

time, it will become the cover under which the bourgeoisie will move to ally with imperialism and counter the revolution.

It is part and parcel of the tasks of the revolutionary forces in the Arab national liberation movement to counteract this dangerous misrepresentation, expose its fallacy and the class motives lurking behind it. Our practice of the principle of international solidarity should begin with stepping up the role of the revolutionary forces in the pan-Arab struggle. Our ability to contribute to international solidarity depends on how effective we are in each Arab country and on the pan-Arab level. The more we adhere to the cause of the Arab masses and contribute to the struggle for their triumph, the more internationalist we will become.

The prevailing world situation constitutes the objective factor for defeating imperialism, Zionism, and reaction. This must be supplemented by the subjective factor, i.e., a revolutionary program and practice. For us, the subjective factor is the most important one.

The slogan of proletarian internationalism should not be a decoration whereby we parade as progressive and hide our inability to act and take part in leading the Arab national struggle. Neither should we use it passively, contenting ourselves with applauding the victories of other peoples and the forces of socialism; and waiting for the revolutionary tide to reach our region. Apart from promoting the revolutionary forces' role in each country and on the pan-Arab level, there is our duty of reciprocal solidarity with all the forces of world revolution in their ferocious battle against imperialism and reaction. Our solidarity with the socialist countries should not be merely expedient, to secure arms and aid. This is a side issue. The main point is to strive for greater solidarity, interdependence and unity within the ranks of the world communist movement; to promote an objective view of the special role of the Soviet Communist Party in this movement; and to work for greater cohesion between the three main components of world revolution: the socialist countries with the Soviet Union at the forefront, the national liberation movements, and the democratic and working class forces of the advanced capitalist countries.

Our role in promoting international solidarity should be based on the set of principles for inter-party relations, established by the world communist movement through long and rich experience. These principles provide for mutual respect between communist parties, and the right of each to apply Marxist-Leninist theory in accordance with the particular conditions of their nation and country. By fully grasping and

actually practicing these principles, we can step up our internationalist role and appropriately interrelate our patriotic, nationalist and internationalist struggle.

Such are the main central tasks of the strategic program for confronting the Camp David era. Clearly, they are the tasks of the national democratic stage. These tasks are naturally interconnected with the strategic tasks of the socialist stage.



Chapter Seven

The Central Strategic Organizational Tasks

First: *Earnest struggle to unity the communist movement in each country.* Colonialism's division of the Arab homeland into separate polities is an established reality that the revolutionary forces can neither ignore nor automatically surpass. The unity of the Arab revolution implies that its instrument be united, i.e., the united Arab communist party. National struggle in the general sense is not enough; nor is agitating the Arab masses by means of purely nationalist slogans. The new class alliance of the toilers, under working class leadership, cannot be built by a mere call for Arab unity. It can be built by confronting the ruling bourgeois-reactionary alliance in each and every Arab country and by confronting the oppression, persecution and exploitation whereby this alliance controls and suppresses the masses on the backdrop of fragmentation. Hence, the unity of the Arab revolutionary instrument will be effected through the development of the revolutionary forces in the separate states to the extent that they become able to smash the bourgeois-reactionary state power with a view to uniting these states in one polity.

The process of unifying the instrument for a unitarian Arab revolution will go hand in hand with the growth and development of the revolutionary forces in the separate states. Hence, the importance of a sound relationship between the struggle in each country and the pan-Arab nationalist struggle, each country's struggle being carried out with a unitarian pan-Arab nationalist perspective. This is needed to ensure the growth and crystallization of the patriotic, progressive, and revolutionary forces in every country on the one hand, and their unitarian Arab nationalist orientation on the other. This does not mean that the formulas and in-

struments of unified Arab revolutionary action (the Arab communist party and the progressive Arab nationalist front) will be excluded from the program of the revolutionary forces in each Arab country at the beginning. Rather, it means that building the instruments and formulas of revolutionary action in each Arab country determines the revolutionary forces' ability to contribute to the building of the unified instrument of the Arab revolution.

Thus, it is natural to begin with the organizational tasks and the unity of the communist movement in each country. These items should be high on the agenda of communists in the individual countries. It is incumbent on us to tackle these items due to the phenomenon of transformation in the national liberation movements, whereby parties, forces and organizations develop from a revolutionary democratic, petit bourgeois line to a Marxist-Leninist, working class line of scientific socialism.

What took place in Democratic Yemen substantiates the thesis of transforming the course of struggle. At the beginning, the revolution in South Yemen was led by a petit bourgeois organization, committed to national liberation. In the course of the struggle, this organization changed its orientation. It developed a revolutionary democratic character committed to adopting Marxist-Leninist theory and, finally, it did so. The transformation process was combined with struggle for the unity of the communists in the country, culminating in the foundation of the Yemeni Socialist Party, as the realization of the above-mentioned goals. The experience of Democratic Yemen substantiates not only the thesis of transformation, but also the thesis on the necessity of the unity of the communists in each country. Revolutionary Democratic Yemen scored an unprecedented victory by founding the first Arab workers' and peasants' state. All the forces of liberation and socialism, including the Arab communist parties, have a common assessment of what occurred in that corner of the world. These facts make clear the validity and importance of the theme under discussion. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that the Arab communist parties and all Arab communists closely study Democratic Yemen's experience, for it is not an ordinary phenomenon. It is closely connected with our convictions about the future Arab communist movement in each country and on the pan-Arab level.

The phenomenon of transformation is one of the specific characteristics of the current era. It is connected with the objective international developments of this century, which made it feasible. It is also related to other phenomena, namely imperialism and capitalism's penetration

of the backward countries and its control of their development process—arresting, distorting, and restricting their growth. This blocked these countries' independent capitalist development and possibilities for progress. Meanwhile, the triumph of the October Revolution and the construction of socialism on a global scale prompted a broad spectrum of social forces, besides the working class, to believe that cooperation with the forces of socialism was the sole available route for developing toward scientific socialism. In other words, the transformation phenomenon is closely linked to the original Leninist thesis that the national liberation movement shifts from being part of a bourgeois democratic revolution, to being part of the socialist revolution.

The dual nature of the petit bourgeoisie enables the transformation process. The petit bourgeoisie has something in common with the bourgeoisie, i.e., ownership of means of production, and something in common with the, working class, i.e., manual work. The petit bourgeoisie owns small means of production and is self-employed. This constitutes material attachment to the bourgeoisie. Yet the petit bourgeoisie is equally attached to the working class due to the damage the big bourgeoisie inflicts on small-scale production. The pendulum of the petit bourgeoisie can swing either way. The very same fact explains the possibilities of transformation on a global level under the objective conditions. We have witnessed the transformation phenomenon on a global scale: in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Transformation not only applies to a few individuals or trends, but involves entire organizations and parties. The existence of objective factors does not make the transformation process automatic or inevitable. It is not an absolute law which applies to all petit bourgeois parties, organizations, and forces. The transformation process comes about as a result of bitter, protracted struggle. It requires a set of subjective factors within the organization concerned. Transformation is a long process of struggle within the organization which remains prone to setbacks and dissolution. It may be accompanied by many members leaving the organization. During the process, we also witness disillusionment and opportunist trends, in addition to shallow, mechanical and or purely verbal understanding of Marxist theory. Although transformation is not a smooth process, it has succeeded in more than one instance and country. In the Arab homeland, the first real national democratic revolution, linked with the socialist revolution, took place in Democratic Yemen. In the light of these facts, which clarified the characteristics of the previous stages, the course of the Arab national liberation movement has reinforced and crys-

tallized the transformation phenomenon. It is a mistake to ignore this phenomenon or fail to give it serious consideration and due analysis.

Arab communist parties should carefully analyze the previous phases of struggle in each country and on the pan-Arab level. This struggle prompted a broad spectrum of the toiling classes to rally around the petit bourgeoisie when it carried the torch of confrontation against imperialism, Zionism, and reaction in the fifties and sixties. Nasserism represented not only the national bourgeois and petit bourgeois movement, but was a broad-based class coalition, including workers, peasants and downtrodden petit bourgeois strata. The parties representing these strata stood by the petit bourgeoisie and national movement. Nasserism led that phase of struggle, and raised and fought for slogans responsive to the needs of these strata. The first signs of the petit bourgeoisie's impotence emerged with the 1967 defeat. In the aftermath of this defeat, some trends, organizations and parties of the downtrodden classes washed their hands of the bourgeoisie. Some began to leave the petit bourgeois camp in favor of the positions of the working class. We earlier referred to Democratic Yemen as a vivid example of transformation, but it is not the only country where this phenomenon emerged. Transformation also began in parties and organizations of North Yemen, the Gulf and Arab Peninsula, and in some other countries of the Arab East (Mashreq); today we witness Marxist-Leninist contingents in the Lebanese, Jordanian and Palestinian arenas.

Concerning the other Arab countries, we take Egypt as an example: The Egyptian Communist Party dissolved itself due to its analysis that the regime was pursuing non-capitalist development which would lead to building socialism. This led to the foundation of new Marxist-Leninist parties. It is erroneous to overlook the existence of these parties which presently exist alongside the reestablished Communist Party of Egypt. Rather, all Marxist parties in Egypt and other Arab countries are faced with the task of unifying the communist movement. This does not mean that all revolutionary forces in the Arab countries are faced with this task, but it does apply to the vast majority.

Conviction in this task is the point of departure for accomplishing it. Based on such conviction, Arab revolutionary forces must engage in objective, comradely dialogue, cooperation, solidarity and mutual support in each country. Later, other steps can be taken toward unification. Organizational and coordinating links must be forged and constantly developed, aimed at unification of the communist movement in each coun-

try. Organizational rigidness is a bourgeois characteristic which must be abandoned by any communist organization wishing to prove its sincerity.

Second: *Serious struggle to form a progressive national front in each country*. We stress that the working class and the communists must assume a leading role in the current phase of struggle, and tackle its tasks. We do not underestimate the importance of a class coalition as the objective basis for forming an alliance capable of inflicting defeat on imperialism and achieving the other tasks of the stage. However, it is imperative that the working class assume leadership in the stage of national democratic liberation in the developing countries.

The ability of the working class to lead the phase of national democratic liberation in the backward countries is not dependent on its size, degree of concentration, or the number organized in its party. Rather, it depends on the ability of the working class and its party to form a broad-based coalition capable of mobilizing the potentials of the toiling masses. Without such a coalition and mobilization, any effort to lead the masses will isolate the party and lead to failure. Thus, such coalition is essential for achieving the tactical and strategic political tasks of the struggle.

Forming a broad national front is the organizational application of building a broad-based class coalition of workers, peasants, toilers, petit bourgeoisie, and some sectors of the national bourgeoisie. This front would encompass all forces, parties and organizations representative of these classes. Such an alliance would be instrumental in bringing about change in each country. We should vigorously strive to build a progressive national front to muster the potentials of the class alliance which is hostile to Camp David, to imperialism, Zionism, reaction, and the capitulating bourgeoisie.

Proceeding to establish such a front does not only depend on carrying out the tasks of the previously mentioned stage, namely, unification of the communists and the working class assuming leadership of the front. Establishing a progressive national front should be an integral part of the communists working program, regardless of the balance of forces between them and the other parties, organizations and forces.

Serious communist efforts to form a broad front and contribute to its success will result in drawing the people closer to the communists, since the formation of such a front is an objective mass need. Increased mass attachment to the front would gradually increase the communists'

effectiveness in the ranks of the masses. Ultimately, the communists would occupy leading positions in the front.

The success of the revolutionary forces in establishing the broad-based alliance, advancing toward taking power and becoming leaders, will depend on their ability to understand the nature of the front's program and how to regulate relations between the different forces in the front. It also depends on the extent to which the revolutionary forces play an exemplary role and rally the masses around the front and its program.

As for the orientation of the front's political program, it need not adopt scientific socialism and socialist revolution, nor assign the leading role to the working class. The program should simply identify the friends and enemies in the stage of national democratic revolution. The minimum platform is a political line which rises to the challenge of imperialism, Zionism, and reaction. Then, it is the communists' task to clarity and radicalize the program to the utmost, taking into account the realities of the forces which make up the front.

Democracy is the basic principle for governing relations among the different forces in the front. There is no room for any one force to monopolize power. Democratic, comradely dialogue is the means for resolving disagreements. The power delegated to each force would depend on its resources and effectiveness. Acknowledging the principle of democracy benefits the front as such, as well as the interests of the revolutionary forces. It is assumed that, as time goes by, these forces will play a growing role.

The principle of democracy, for regulating internal relations in the front, means the right of each party to ideological, organizational and political independence. Abiding by the minimum program does not rule out the revolutionary forces having their own political program, while abiding by the common program. Exercising this right lays the foundation for the gradually evolving process of aligning the masses with the most progressive and revolutionary forces.

Along with this alignment process, communists can set an example before the other political forces and the masses, in terms of discipline, effectiveness, activity, self-denial, perseverance and other revolutionary, proletarian virtues. For the communists to be able to assume a leading role, their deeds must speak louder than their words. Practicing revolutionary positions, slogans and programs is the only way to solidity the communists' leading role. It is incumbent on the communists to mobilize

the masses around the front's positions and programs, and to consolidate their role in constantly supervising, disciplining and assessing its role. In this sense, the masses constitute an enormous pressure group on which communists can rely to face any contradictions arising within the front. Depending on the masses power helps the communists consolidate the front's positions and effectiveness.

Third: *Launching a serious, diligent, protracted struggle for building one united Arab communist party, capable of leading the Arab national democratic revolution and staging the socialist revolution.* The unity of the Arab communist movement and the thesis of an Arab communist party are related theoretically to the thesis of the Arab nation and the objective basis for its unity. These theses are also linked with the thesis of the working class and its leading role in the current, national democratic stage. These are the theoretical premises for the Arab communist party. The feasibility and importance of uniting the Arab communist movement is based on their veracity.

Defining the tasks of the struggle for Arab unity falls in line with our strategical political program. Next, it is of critical importance to define the framework for an Arab communist party in line with our strategic organizational tasks. Our view of the nature, slogans, objectives, and tasks of the revolution determines the nature of the revolutionary methods to be used in leading it. This is common sense, but we present these facts to unveil any contradictions which might arise between Arab revolutionary forces. Some forces speak of the existence of the Arab nation; they raise the slogan of unity and recognize the importance of the linkage between national and pan-Arab struggle. Yet they do not focus sufficient attention on creating the organizational prerequisites for this.

We have so far underlined the importance of struggling for the unity of the Arab communist movement and building a single, united Arab communist party. This task is valid and necessary. Achieving it requires a set of sound political and theoretical premises. It is crucial to dwell on the objective and subjective conditions involved in achieving this task, in order to foresee the many complexities of the different stages ahead. This task requires arduous, protracted struggle, and clarifying these complexities will enable us to bring it about. Our ability to achieve this task is not dependent on enthusiasm or rhetoric, but rather on our ability to envision the long complex path, with its many diverse directions, which will lead us to our goal. A simplistic and idealistic route is inconceivable,

for this would not help us achieve successive, tangible steps toward realizing this task.

Foremost among the subjective and objective conditions, governing the struggle for this task, is the reality of division. It is crucial to draw up a clear, concise program for dealing with the reality of multiple regional and political entities. Today, there are more than twenty independent Arab states. Here we will not cover all the efforts of the ruling class in these states to deepen and consecrate division and regionalism. Nor will we discuss how far the regimes have come in solidifying the material, class, ideological, and educational pillars of independence. Instead we will focus on the disparity between the level of development in the existing political entities, which has led to disparity in the development of the revolutionary process. While the Palestinian people are waging a battle against direct colonial presence, the masses of other Arab countries are struggling against traditional reaction (the alliance of the dependent big bourgeoisie and the feudalists), as in Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, the Arab Peninsula, and Gulf countries, etc. The Egyptian and Sudanese people are waging a battle against a bourgeoisie which has capitulated. Other Arab forces in still other countries have been endeavoring to find a way to deal with national bourgeois regimes which raise the banner of confronting imperialism, Zionism, and reaction, but whose programs and policies have proven ineffective in providing the prerequisites for confrontation. At the same time, Democratic Yemen is heading toward socialist revolution.

This diverse reality does not negate the political or theoretical validity of the theses which underly the necessity of united Arab revolutionary struggle. It does, however, reveal the magnitude of the odds. It also reveals the dire need for pooling resources to find sound solutions for these problems. Otherwise, the united Arab revolutionary struggle will suffer setbacks and falter.

There are other objective and subjective conditions which influence how we approach and realize our task. Among these is the reality of the Arab communist movement, which cannot be overlooked in any attempt to build a single Arab communist party. All Arab communists must address this problem, regardless of their current positions. The current reality of the working class movement shows that all communist parties and trends have concretely failed to extricate the Arab liberation movement from its crisis. This failure applies both to those parties which were the first to espouse scientific socialism, and those which were founded in

the shadow of existing communist parties, aiming to bypass them. It is therefore incumbent on all Arab communists to engage in an extensive dialogue about the predicament of revolutionary action, prior to any one contingent claiming that it alone represents the working class party and that the others are opportunists.

The struggle for building one, united Arab communist party does not start in a void, but by dealing with the reality of the Arab communist movement. In the light of this reality, there are a set of obstacles besetting the task of building an Arab communist party. Currently, relations among the Arab communist parties are limited to periodical meetings, political communiques and sharing a set of common positions. Due to the theoretical position of the majority of Arab communist parties with regard to the thesis of the Arab nation and pan-Arabism, their agenda does not include the task of finding revolutionary solutions for the crisis of the Arab liberation movement or for building a united Arab communist movement.

We acknowledge and give serious consideration to the sound theoretical positions recently adopted by some Arab communist parties. These are highly significant and could greatly influence the future course of the Arab communist movement, but first we will deal with the existing reality: the Arab communist parties' cooperation has so far been confined to periodical meetings and issuing political communiques.

Concerning the parties and organizations that transformed to the position of scientific socialism, some of them have suffered confusion in analyzing the reasons for the failure of the Arab national movement, led by the petit bourgeoisie, from which they originated. Instead of pinpointing the class factors that kept the Arab national movement from achieving its goals, they attributed its failure to its theses such as: the Arab nation, Arab unity, and having a unified instrument for the Arab revolution. This caused them to neglect the link between the struggle in each country and the pan-Arab struggle. In practice, they confined their struggle to the framework of the respective countries.

In the light of these factors, we would like to draw up a working program in order to contribute to achieving this task in the foreseeable future:

a. Conveying our views to all Arab communist forces, parties and organizations, and holding a dialogue on the subject. Listening responsibly and attentively to all points of view, and asking all communists

to state their positions on the problem and means of solution.

b. Solidifying our relations with all forces, parties, and organizations of the communist movement, and attempting to put such relations into action through militant solidarity.

c. Attempting to develop these bilateral relations into ongoing relations of coordination. Such relations should ensure the stability and continuity of the dialogue, turning its theme into concrete political, informational, and military programs. No matter how modest these programs might be in the beginning, such coordination ultimately aims at the crystallization of a formula for joint action on the basis of democratic centralism.

d. Endeavoring to find an organizational formula for coordination among the communist forces which already have militant ties by virtue of their geographic location or other factors.

Communist forces in the Arab Peninsula and Gulf are required to draw up an organizational formula for coordination which transcends bilateral relations. Constant efforts should be made to consolidate such a formula for united action.

In the Arab East, Lebanon, and Palestine in particular, efforts should be continued and concentrated on drawing up an organizational formula for regular and effective coordination. Once the formula is developed, it should be given to other communist parties for their approval. The unification of two or more communist organizations, in one Arab country or more, into a single party on the basis of democratic centralism, depends on the existence of certain prerequisites. These are ideological, political, and organizational unity, reflected in a political program and an internal platform.

A political program is needed as a prerequisite step to address the Arab revolution and the pan-Arab issue, and to lay the groundwork for closer cooperation among communist forces. This program should spell out the nature of the relationship between national and pan-Arab struggle for the united parties. The internal platform would address all issues concerning the nature of the relationship between the organizational bodies for each country and on the pan-Arab level, and how to instate the principle of democratic centralism in the branches of the party. Once answers are found to the set of theoretical, political, and organizational issues, the ideological groundwork will be laid for establishing a united approach. Then, we should resolutely embark on the unification process.

The task of developing the theoretical groundwork is not only for other communist parties; we should also do our share of the work. There is no doubt that the task is difficult and complicated. Nevertheless, we should not shy away from struggling to realize it. Despite all these odds, the march toward achieving this task should not remain at the slow pace witnessed so far.

The unity and triumph of the communist forces in Democratic Yemen prompted the communist forces in the Arab Peninsula to place the unification process on their agenda. Without a doubt, the victory of the communist movement in any Arab state would influence the pace of building a united Arab communist party.

Fourth: *The serious struggle to establish a pan-Arab progressive national front.* A progressive national front would be instrumental in attaining the above-mentioned strategic political tasks. The proposed Arab communist party would be an organizational framework for the unification and mobilization of the forces and resources of the working class on a pan-Arab basis, and the crystallization of the party's leading role in the revolution. The progressive national front would be an organizational framework for unifying and mobilizing the classes which suffer at the hands of the alliance of imperialism, Zionism, reaction, and the bourgeoisie. These classes are the working class, peasants, toilers, the petit-bourgeoisie, and some sections of the national bourgeoisie. Such a broad-based class alliance aims at assembling all national, democratic and revolutionary parties, forces and organizations within a single national front across the Arab homeland. Such a front would mobilize and lead the Arab masses toward their common goals. In the process of achieving these goals, the national front would lend its support to the Arab masses struggling in each country and to national regimes antagonistic to the enemy camp. It would direct the Arab masses struggle toward spheres of joint struggle.

The present inability to form such a front stems from the balance of forces between the nationalist forces and the revolutionary, progressive forces. The existence of more than one revolutionary Arab regime would provide the progressive national front with a base on which to rely. This would facilitate putting into action the organizational task, although the conditions for forming such a front are not yet available. For the time being, it is our militant duty to educate and raise the level of consciousness of the masses and the revolutionary and progressive forces. This would prove the validity and indispensability of such a task, so that these forces

would be prepared to participate when favorable conditions occur.

The proposed progressive national front shares common denominators with the national fronts (in the respective countries), in terms of tasks and prerequisites for success. Common theses are applicable to both types of fronts, such as the program, the basis of internal relations, the exemplary role of the revolutionary forces, and rallying the masses.

These four strategic organizational tasks are interlinked, but not in a mechanical way. Uniting the communists in each country serves the task of establishing a national front, but it is not a prerequisite for forming the national front. The same applies on the pan-Arab level. Moreover, it is possible to establish the Arab national progressive front before completing the task of forming a united national front in each and every country. We are faced with the necessity of having a dialectic view of these tasks due to the reality of the division, disparity and differences between the level of the revolutionary work in the different Arab countries, and due to the link between the national and pan-Arab struggle.



Chapter Eight

General Evaluation of Our Political Work and Positions on the Arab Level

Before ending this section of our political report on the Arab level, we ought to take time to daringly and responsibly review our political programs and positions for the period between the 3rd and Fourth National congresses. We do so for the purpose of identifying our mistakes, learning from them, and exercising the process of criticism. We strongly believe in the importance of this process in rectifying the course of the Front. Therefore, it is necessary to exercise it daringly and faithfully, as we are faithful toward our masses and martyrs, and to the destiny of our homeland, nation and future generations.

As to the subject at hand, the party base and cadres of the Front shoulder a special responsibility, exceeding that which they bear for the rest of this report. Leadership committees are mainly in charge of mapping out programs and defining positions, due to their presumably advanced political and theoretical level. The rank and file play a somewhat minor role in this phase. However, the rank and file are more capable of

evaluating and criticizing our programs and positions, since practice provides them with tangible evidence of their validity or invalidity. At this stage, theories and theses which are substantiated by tangible facts will be retained; those not substantiated can be modified or discarded. Here the rank and file can supplement the leadership's role by thoroughly and daringly completing the process of review and criticism. Otherwise, the leadership might consciously or unconsciously rationalize shortcomings and mistakes, or drift into subjectivity.

It is assumed that our cadres and rank and file recall the party's positions on the issues under review, from the Front's central magazine, internal publications, communiques, and seminars. If necessary, they must refer back to these documents in order to fulfill their responsibilities in the process of review, criticism and extracting lessons. Through our first hand experience in the Front, we are all of the opinion that there is a vast difference between practicing criticism in a responsible, objective, scientific way (within party channels, in accordance with organizational traditions) and criticizing by loose talk in an emotional manner (outside the customary revolutionary party struggle).

Our fourth congress offered everyone the opportunity to engage in the process of criticism, assessment, and review. This is the real guarantee for ensuring the Front's steady progress, deepening its unity and solidifying its structures. The nature of this report does not permit reviewing every single detail pertaining to every political point of view or position taken in the past. This is the task of the Front's leadership committees, cadres, and rank and file in their daily militant activity. The agenda of the congress includes a general, but thorough reevaluation process, without getting bogged down in details. Citing any piece of evidence is aimed at substantiating general conclusions and lessons. In light of this principle, we record the following:

First: The validity of our basic political theses, as recorded in *The Tasks of the New Stage* (document of the Third National Congress)[18] and *The Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine* (document of the Second Congress),[19] generally constituted the basis for sound political programs and stances on the Arab level.

In *The Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine*, we identified Arab re-

18 **Ed. Note:** See pp. 175-262 of this volume.

19 **Ed. Note:** See pp. 24-100 of this volume.

action's position with the enemy camp, at a time when Palestinian and Arab national forces limited their programs to the pan-Arab nature of the battle, and called for pointing all guns against the Zionist enemy. Some progressive and left-wing forces drew the line between the basic contradiction with the Zionist enemy and the contradiction with Arab reaction, which they considered as secondary.

Theoretical theses in turn affected political programs and positions. In view of these theses, our positions were determined on Arab summits and on relations with the Arab reactionary regimes. Thus it was possible to expose the conspiracies, maneuvers, aggressive plans, and attempts at containment enacted by Arab reaction. This is not a secondary matter, but an essential guide in determining positions within the framework of the official Arab situation.

Our analysis of the nationalist regimes and the principle of alliance and conflict, as the basis for relations with these regimes, were recorded in *The Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine*: *The Tasks of the New Stage* developed this analysis, clarifying that the problem with these regimes is not only their programs which are incapable of achieving liberation, and end in failure and defeat. The problem is, also the process of regression which most of these regimes will undergo, gradually moving to the right and taking reactionary positions. In the light of this analysis, we adopted our positions on the Steadfastness Front, the charter for unifying Syria and Iraq, and other issues, without infantilism or illusions.

In its main documents; the PFLP has presented central theoretical theses on the following: a radical position against Zionism and imperialism; the pan-Arab nature of the battle and its class content; and the position of the revolution in the international conflict. The impact and validity of these themes is clearly seen on our political stances and programs, regardless of tactical blunders and the need for further development of these theses, which we cover later.

Second: In addition to the validity of our basic political theses and their expression in the validity of our political programs and positions, we positively evaluate the PFLP's ability and initiative in discovering the phenomena, transformations, and new complex stages through which the conflict passes on the Arab level within the framework of the overall stage. In the middle of 1973, even before the increase of oil prices, the PFLP predicted the far-reaching effect of the oil wealth on the imperial-

ist plans, and on the political, social, and class transformation in the Arab world. Actual developments have substantiated the essential nature of such phenomena and transformation. By the same token, the PFLP presented a thesis, prior to the cessation of the October War, that it would be followed by an intense drive to settle the Arab-Zionist conflict, and that this drive stood a reasonably good chance, better than ever before, of materializing. We predicted that there would be a single formula for settlement, i.e., imperialism's formula. Since then, the PFLP has been capable of exposing the essence of the settlement drive in spite of the disarray which marked the period, as seen in the positions of various progressive and national forces.

The drive to settle the Israeli-Arab conflict concealed the true motive of the imperialists. The real aim is to settle all the problems of the area in accordance with a malicious scheme designed to liquidate all the revolutionary, progressive and nationalist forces, in order to entrench imperialist domination in this strategic, oil-rich area. In fact, the settlement drive, whose essence we exposed, constituted the headline for the entire period under review. Hence, we are entitled to record general satisfaction with the validity of the rationale behind our programs and political positions.

It is worthwhile to bear in mind that we have cited only a few examples to make our point, not attempted a thorough review to clarity the whole picture.

Third: We fault ourselves in the evaluation process, because we took positions, raised slogans, and embarked on tasks without sufficient elaboration, clarification, and accuracy, and without specifying all the necessary guidelines for achieving them. For example, we set the task of struggling to establish an Arab front including all the forces antagonistic to the enemy scheme. Yet we did not specify whether the proposed front was intended for immediate implementation, or a task requiring a set of conditions to be achieved. Did that mean that we had to concentrate our efforts for some time to come, on creating these conditions? Was this front to be composed of forces with common political positions or was it to be a front with a political program for the entire stage of struggle? Did we have in mind a national front against imperialism and Zionism? A progressive democratic front against imperialism, Zionism, reaction, and the capitulating bourgeoisie? Or a revolutionary front, led by the working class and the alliance of the democratic masses against imperialism, Zionism, and the classes linked with imperialism? Sometimes we

were inclined to think that this front would only include non-official and non-governmental parties and organizations. At other times, we underscored the role of the forces waging armed struggle, to the extent that we entertained the idea of forming a special front-type framework for these forces regardless of their ideological and class structure.

Another example pertains to the particularity of the Palestinian revolution within the Arab national liberation movement. What exactly is this particularity? How do we understand it and translate it into programs and militant tasks? In addition, there were controversial subjects having to do with our understanding of the reality of the Arab communist movement, Arab revolutionary action, and revolutionary Palestinian alliances on the Arab level, etc. Although our positions have on the whole acquired more clarity and depth in the course of our march, the basic lesson to be learned is the necessity of developing our theoretical and political theses. We must make more efforts to examine and discuss these without getting absorbed in daily duties, specially due to the reality of the resistance, and the traditions and habits that govern the method of work of its leadership.

Fourth: We committed a handful of tactical blunders involving analysis, predictions, and the resulting positions. For instance, when Sadat's regime began to move to the right, we ruled out entirely any armed conflict between his regime and the Zionist entity. Thus, the October War came as a surprise to us. The masses that rallied around us found difficulties in explaining it within the framework of our analysis.

When the Syrian troops moved into Lebanon and clashed with the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese National Movement in 1976, we acted—in positions and analysis—as if the Syrian regime had totally shifted to the reactionary camp. For some time we treated the Syrian-Egyptian-Saudi alliance as if would continue until the final phase of an overall settlement. Hence, we thought that the settlement would go forward at a more rapid pace; involving all the fronts in a package deal, including settlement of the Palestinian cause. In some instances, we presented specific predictions about the sequence of steps of the settlement.

The theoretical root of these blunders lies in the extent to which we grasped the process of the bourgeoisie's shift to the enemy camp. The road of reality is very complex; it does not follow the straight path implied by our general strategic analysis. As the Arab bourgeoisie shifts to

the right, obstacles arise to hinder its direction, as a result of unresolved contradictions with Zionism. It takes a relatively long time to dissolve these obstacles. Moreover, when the Arab bourgeoisie takes a generally nationalist position, it wages occasional battles against the masses and revolutionary forces. The course of the bourgeoisie vacillates between two contradictory positions. This vacillation may continue, be repeated and take new turns before ending in a definite, position which leaves no room for speculation.

We assert the validity of our general analysis about the bourgeoisie and the national regimes, and the validity of our strategic stances. However, we should make our strategic stances more precise and thorough, so that we can accurately interpret political events, develop sound political tactics, and avoid unequivocal predictions on the tactical level. The lesson to be drawn is the necessity of taking more careful positions not only vis-a-vis the process of strategic conflict but also concerning secondary contradictions within the enemy ranks, differences in the nationalist ranks and the development of these contradictions, both secondary and primary. In this way tactical positions will complement strategic positions.

After Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the signing of the Camp David agreements, the PFLP took a number of sound tactical political positions which were dialectically linked with the strategic analysis. Overall, the PFLP's dedication to the strategic position during the period under evaluation, had a very positive effect, but that does not rule out the necessity of stressing this lesson. We need to stress the tactical principles that have been proven valid through practice and the people's revolutionary experience: the principle of benefiting from the differences within the enemy ranks, the principle of the vacillation of the centrist forces, etc. As the PFLP's role becomes greater, we will be more able to practice these principles and prove their validity through experience.



PART THREE

The Palestinian Situation

Introduction

The Camp David process faced the Palestinian national struggle with a

stage more complicated than any previous one. This stage is characterized by the development of the military and economic power of the Zionist entity, increasing its influence and domination in the Arab region. This stage is conducive for the Zionist enemy to expand its economic and military capabilities, for the imperialists consider the Zionist enemy as the main power on which they can rely to carry out their schemes in the region.

On the military level, the enemy's forces increased quantitatively and qualitatively. Today, 'Israel' produces fighter planes and tanks, and more arms than England. The military industry accounts for approximately 8% of the Israeli gross national product. Arms and military hardware comprise more than 10% of total Israeli exports. These figures are mere references to the Zionist entity's quantitative and qualitative leaps in the military sphere. The same is true in the economic sphere.

The picture is not all that rosy, however, for the Zionist entity suffers from a set of cumbersome economic woes such as a high inflation rate, trade deficit, the accumulation of foreign debts, a high drop-out rate among immigrants and increased emigration abroad, particularly to Canada and the USA. In addition, there are acute social contradictions, relative political unrest, widespread corruption, and political isolation in the international arena. Nonetheless, the main characteristic in the current stage is that Israeli capabilities and resources are thriving; new opportunities are opening for continued growth, particularly after the establishment of relations with the Egyptian regime.

The Camp David stage heralded tremendous complications for the Palestinian struggle, because of its special feature, i.e., that factions of Arab reaction have allied directly with the Zionist enemy. It is not a secondary matter when the Arab country with the greatest capacity, Egypt, switches to the enemy camp. It is a serious matter when the Palestinian revolution in Lebanon is confronting forces that overtly collaborate with the enemy, further complicating the battle. The struggle of our Palestinian people has always been difficult and complicated due to the nature of the Zionist movement and its organic link to imperialism. Today, the struggle encounters a new, added twist in the already complicated reality.

Due to these factors, added to the reality of the Arab liberation movement and the impotence of Arab officialdom, the title of the enemy plan is liquidating the Palestinian cause, not solving it. The plan is to liquidate the Palestinian revolution rather than taming it by striking a deal with the leadership of the revolution.

These are the special features of the current stage of struggle in the Palestinian arena.

What is the enemy plan for liquidating the Palestinian cause?



Chapter One

The Enemy Plan for Liquidating the Palestinian Cause and Revolution

First: *Liquidating the Palestinian Armed Struggle in Lebanon—the Central Link in the Enemy Plan to Liquidate the Palestinian Cause.* Preserving the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon symbolizes the continuation of the revolution. Through this symbol, the Palestinian revolution can maintain its international recognition as a national liberation movement. Broad international support rules out liquidation of the cause. The revolution enables the Palestinians to rally a broad international front of socialist, progressive and democratic forces supporting the Palestinian cause. Unless the enemy forces silence the Palestinian gun, they cannot claim to have resolved the Palestinian cause whose legitimacy even imperialist countries, enemy forces, and public opinion in these countries have been forced to recognize. Thus, in the enemy's eyes, the revolution's presence in Lebanon constitutes an obstacle to liquidating the Palestinian cause, which must be eliminated.

On the other hand, preserving the Palestinian armed presence constitutes the optimal moral, political, military, and financial support to the struggle of our people in occupied Palestine. The past few years have evidenced the dialectical relation between the struggle of our people in occupied Palestine and the ongoing Palestinian revolution in Lebanon. The enemy has spared no efforts to liquidate the struggle of our masses in Palestine, through a special scheme designed for this purpose. Still, the enemy is well aware that eliminating Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon is a prerequisite for hitting the struggle in Palestine and liquidating it once and for all.

The presence of the Palestinian armed revolution in Lebanon, and its political influence in the Arab arena, constitute an obstacle to the reactionary regimes, Jordan in particular. It makes it difficult for them to ascend the Camp David train and take their natural position alongside the

Camp David alliance. This fact has become clear to the enemy camp. Furthermore, the reactionary regimes fear that the torch of the Palestinian revolution will revolutionize the whole area in the long run. As a result of the continuation of the Palestinian armed revolution and its attachment to the Lebanese masses and National Movement, the Lebanese masses, through the National Movement, took up arms against the common enemy. This is an example of the role which the Palestinian revolution can play vis-a-vis the Palestinian masses everywhere, the Arab masses and the Arab national and progressive forces. In this way, the particularity of the Palestinian revolution, its role and position within the Arab national liberation movement, is transformed into a concrete model in Lebanon.

By the same token, the mutual relationship between the Palestinian revolution and liberation movements around the world finds expression in a process of interaction and solidarity in Lebanon. This special relationship bolstered both the Palestinian revolution and the other liberation movements. Also, in view of the existing relations of support and solidarity between the Palestinian revolution and the socialist countries, particularly the USSR, the imperialists deem that the survival of the overt Palestinian revolution in Lebanon constitutes a foothold for the Soviets in the area.

For all these reasons, liquidating the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon is a top priority in the scheme of the enemy alliance for eliminating the Palestinian cause and its influence. In these circumstances, the imperialist-Zionist reactionary plan aims not only at eliminating the Palestinian armed presence, but targets all Lebanon as well, due to the following factors: the organic relationship that has developed between the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese National Movement in common struggle; the eruption of the Lebanese regime's crisis because of this relationship; and the attempts to advance the Camp David stage and its plans throughout the area. Those who benefit from the Lebanese system aim at preserving the exploitative regime which is imposed on the masses. To this end, they collaborate with imperialism and the Zionist entity on the basis of overlapping interests. Imperialism and Zionism support these reactionary forces in Lebanon in return for their boarding the Camp David train. The Lebanese regime could thereby keep exploiting the masses, while imperialism and Zionism would achieve a new chapter in the comprehensive Camp David schemes for the area. Consequently, the essence of the plan drawn up for Lebanon is to impose fascist hegemony whereby Lebanon would enter the Camp David alliance. Naturally, the Palestinian revolution in Lebanon would be liquidated in the process.

This scheme takes on crucial importance in view of the deployment of Syrian troops in Lebanon. Among other things, the enemy plans to exhaust the Syrian forces in Lebanon, in order to pressure and eventually defeat Syria as a force antagonistic to Camp David. Hence, Lebanon became an arena for intense confrontation between the parties to Camp David and the forces antagonistic to it. It is the Lebanese National Movement's duty to assume a practical role in the confrontation, since the enemy scheme aims to impose fascist hegemony on the Lebanese masses. It is also incumbent on Arab national, revolutionary, and progressive forces to realize that the battle in Lebanon is their battle against the Camp David schemes.

It is imperative to grasp the course whereby the enemy intends to carry out this scheme. Various forces are involved, having been assigned different, but coordinated roles, despite occasional diversionary tactical changes in the role of some forces. What is the Zionist role? What is the role of Saad Haddad's militias? What is the role of the fascist Lebanese Front? Where does the Lebanese regime stand in this scheme? What is the role of the reactionary forces in the nationalist areas? How are the roles of these forces interlinked? Which is the major force assigned the fundamental role? What is the magnitude of the military and political factors involved in carrying out the scheme?

The Lebanese civil war, which aimed at dealing a blow to the Lebanese mass movement and the Palestinian armed presence, has gone through several phases. At each phase, one of the enemy forces led the onslaught, backed in one way or another by the others. It is not our intention, in this report, to review the details of these phases, draw the lessons and identity the interlocking roles of the respective forces at each stage. It is our goal to unveil the basic features of the next stage through analysis, past experience and following the events in Lebanon.

A. The Role of the Zionist Enemy

The Zionist enemy played a role in carrying out the scheme during the various phases of the civil war. In March 1978, this amounted to an outright military invasion of South Lebanon, against the forces of the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese National Movement. The Israeli role was then distinguished by air raids in particular. For six months in 1979, the Zionist entity scored consecutive military strikes against the forces of the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese National Movement, and

the Palestinian and Lebanese masses, in South Lebanon. Consequently, there was a massive influx of displaced people driven to the Sidon and Beirut areas. The Lebanese authorities seized on this state of affairs and called for an Arab summit which was held in Tunisia. On this pretext, they called for a united strategy and the evacuation of the revolution's forces from South Lebanon. Meanwhile, the Zionist entity continued its sea, land, and air raids on Lebanon, under the pretext of protecting its borders and/or "the Christians."

Do we expect the Zionist entity to play the major role in this scheme? What precisely is its role? What are its objectives? Should 'Israel' contemplate assuming the major role in eliminating the Palestinian and Lebanese armed presence, it must occupy all Lebanon and wage a battle against the people as a whole. This could be very costly in political and military terms. The 1978 Israeli invasion of Lebanon backfired politically, when a broad spectrum of forces, including the Lebanese National Movement, rallied around the Palestinian revolution.

The goal of certain forces in Lebanon converges with that of the Zionist entity. This absolves the enemy from directly undertaking such a role. The Zionist entity will continue playing a military role in Lebanon, but within the bounds of supporting the militias of Saad Haddad and the fascist Lebanese Front (the Phalangists). This would engage the Palestinian revolution and Lebanese National Movement in a war of attrition, and deal blows to the masses in order to make them despair, paralyze their effectiveness and create a spirit of resentment against the armed nationalist forces. This in turn would give the Lebanese authorities and reactionary forces justifications for implementing their political and military schemes against the revolution and the Lebanese National Movement. These schemes are underway. Of course, we expect that the Israeli role will wax and wane in accordance with the charted course, paving the way for the reactionary forces in Lebanon to assume a surrogate role and undertake the final liquidation of the armed nationalist presence in Lebanon.

The elimination of the Palestinian armed presence in Jordan was not carried out by the Zionist entity. The Zionists' semi-daily raids and military strikes on the revolution's bases in Jordan did not terminate the revolution. Rather, the Zionist enemy set the conditions for the Jordanian regime to undertake the liquidation of the Palestinian armed presence.

B. The Role of Saad Haddad's Militias

While the Palestinian revolution and Lebanese National Movement were preoccupied with defending their existence against the fascist Lebanese Front's militias in Beirut, the mountains, the north and the rest of Lebanon, the Zionist enemy succeeded in gradually infiltrating the southern border villages under the pretext of offering humanitarian aid to the population. Thus, the Zionist enemy was able to establish a gateway for supplying the fascist forces with weapons, creating the objective basis for building a fascist military force under the leadership of Saad Haddad. This force assumed the practical role of carrying out the Zionist scheme under the banner of "defending" and "liberating" Lebanon from the Palestinian and Syrian forces. Subsequently, Saad Haddad proclaimed the so-called state of "Free Lebanon" in the South, as a miniature model for Lebanon as a whole. Today, this force patrols the borders of the Zionist enemy. Alongside the Zionist enemy, it works to wear down the morale of the masses and make them despair. The aim is to gradually spread the influence of Saad Haddad's militias in order to connect the fascist area in the South with other fascist-dominated areas of Lebanon.

Haddad's military potential is limited. Even some bourgeois sectors in the patriotic areas reject the hegemony of this fascist secessionist. As a result, Haddad's forces alone are not capable of carrying out the scheme charted for Lebanon, but they can play a supplementary role.

C. The Lebanese Front and Forces

The fascist Lebanese Front precipitated the civil war in Lebanon. At the outset, it played a major role and took advantage of the state of war to impose its control in certain areas, through tactical political moves. Today, it insists on retaining power in these areas. By collaborating with the Zionist enemy, the Lebanese fascists succeeded in increasing their military power.

Due to political and military reasons, the Lebanese Front is not assigned the role of finally liquidating the Palestinian revolution and Lebanese National Movement. Today, its role is that of providing bridgeheads for the Lebanese authorities to implement their basic role of liquidating the nationalist presence on the pretext of preserving the unity of Lebanon. The Lebanese Front practices political tactics entitled "either a unified fascist Lebanon or the partition of Lebanon." Based on this blackmail, the Lebanese state is trying to wrest all the concessions it can from

the national forces, and win the maximum Arab and international official support under the pretext of Lebanon's unity.

D. The Role of the Lebanese Regime

Reviewing the roles of the Zionist entity. Haddad's militias and the Lebanese Front, leads us to the conclusion that the Lebanese regime is the major force assigned the role of liquidating the Palestinian and Lebanese revolutions, and carrying out the whole scheme charted for Lebanon. It relies, of course, on the supporting roles assumed by the other enemy forces. The Lebanese regime possesses a set of political and military cards which quality it to carry out this scheme. Its daily practices are a living testimony to its role. Since there is still not overt, declared cooperation between the Lebanese authorities and the Zionist entity, the regime can play a set of subversive roles against the Palestinian revolution and Lebanese National Movement, which cannot be assumed by the other antagonistic forces.

In addition, the Lebanese regime, as the official authority of all Lebanon, can build up a military force through alliance with imperialism and reaction. The same degree of leverage is not available to the puppet Saad Haddad or the Lebanese Front. The Lebanese regime has more room to maneuver politically, and is today feverishly endeavoring to rebuild its military force to greatly exceed the might it had before the outbreak of the civil war. Today, all the arrangements have been made for an army of 40,000 soldiers. There is obvious US enthusiasm to supply the Lebanese Army with the necessary military equipment. Behind this enthusiasm lurks the role charted for the army: imposing the hegemony of the exploitative regime on the Lebanese masses and liquidating the Palestinian revolution.

In addition to the Lebanese Army, arrangements are underway to expand the internal Security Forces to 20,000 policemen, to equip this force and prepare it psychologically to protect the exploitative regime and hit the revolutionary forces. Moreover, the regime has been strengthening the Deuxieme Bureau (military intelligence), increasing its budgets and authority, to enable it to demoralize the masses in the nationalist areas. This is to prepare the Deuxieme Bureau to exercise the repressive role it had in the past, and expand its role for the future.

While preparing its personnel to play their assigned roles when the time is right, the Lebanese regime is working politically to create the opti-

mal atmosphere for cracking down on the revolutionary forces. These political roles are by no means less dangerous than the forthcoming military roles. They constitute the objective requirements for assuming the military role. The state's most dangerous political activity is preparing public opinion for the forthcoming military battle. The Lebanese regime is taking advantage of the agony of the masses caused by the Zionist and fascist forces, to give the impression that only the state can relieve this agony.

The political and propaganda line adopted by the regime is a clear attempt to disorient the masses and prevent them from knowing the real causes of the current Lebanese crisis. The authorities attribute the crisis to the presence of the Palestinian revolution, not to the Zionist-imperialist-fascist scheme for Lebanon. To them, Zionist encroachments, the fascists' implacability and the lack of law and order, are all caused by the revolution. The Lebanese state's facade of 'neutrality' enables it to divert the masses' attention away from the national and class enemy, and blame the current unrest on the Palestinian revolution and Lebanese National Movement. Hence, we see the dangerous role which the state plays. The fascist forces cannot play such a role with equal success, due to their blatant relations with the Zionist enemy.

The Lebanese masses are vulnerable to the regime's brainwashing due to their harsh living conditions, the wrong practices of some factions of the Palestinian resistance, and the shortcomings of the Lebanese National Movement, its inability to rally the masses around a sound analysis of the events, and agree on an effective program for national salvation. The regime is counting on the reactionary and bourgeois forces in the nationalist areas to lead the masses in asking the army to step in and impose law and order, on the mistaken assumption that the return of the exploitative regime's control is the only remedy for the situation.

Before the outbreak of the civil war, the regime began to crack as a result of the Lebanese masses' escalating struggle which threatened the domination of the regime of the 4%.[20] This regime, which ignited the civil war under the cover of fighting the Palestinian revolution that allegedly threatened "Lebanese sovereignty", has managed to stage a temporary comeback, imposing its hegemony on the Lebanese masses. The Lebanese regime is also attempting to divide the masses in the nationalist areas and drive them to desperation, by escalating contradictions and sectarianism. The regime is concentrating on the Shiite community, aiming

20 In 1962, government statistics indicated that 4% of the population received one-third of the national income.

at fomenting hostility between them and the Palestinian revolution and Lebanese National Movement. The authorities might succeed in their efforts by virtue of the Shiite community's being located in the South, and the level of destruction and suffering to which they are subjected.

Here the role of the reactionary figures in the Shiite sect comes into play. The activities of the Deuxieme Bureau further complicate the matter, for it has developed a scheme for infiltrating agents into the Amal movement which was originally established to fight for the rights of the Shiites as an underprivileged sect. The mission of the Deuxieme Bureau agents is to instigate clashes between Amal and the Palestinian revolution and Lebanese National Movement, that appear to be clashes with the Shiites as such. Since the outbreak of the civil war, the fascist forces have worked to incite the Shiites against the national forces. The role of the Lebanese regime increases the dangers of this scheme.

The Shiites, especially in the South, are the most persecuted, exploited, and oppressed citizens of Lebanon. By virtue of this reality, they have been very enthusiastic about the Palestinian revolution; they were the sector of the masses most supportive and attached to the revolution. They fought alongside the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese National Movement in the South, and in Shiyah and Nabaa (sites of intense civil war battles in Beirut). Today, the Lebanese authorities are slyly and cleverly working to deprive the Palestinian revolution and Lebanese National Movement of this mass support on which the revolution has relied from the beginning of its presence in Lebanon.

In previous phases of the civil war, reactionary and bourgeois forces in the nationalist areas were unable to take a blatantly hostile position against the Palestinian revolution and Lebanese National Movement. Today, with the Lebanese regime's return to the fore, such forces have started to express their longstanding enmity toward the revolution and the masses, under the cover of calling for the state to extend its sovereignty and assume security tasks. The subversive operations carried out by the Deuxieme Bureau provide the proper atmosphere for the Lebanese authorities to assume all these roles. The regime and reactionary forces can take advantage of the reluctance of the National Movement to assume the task of regulating security in the nationalist areas, and the fact that some factions of the Palestinian revolution have undertaken these tasks which rightfully belong to the Lebanese National Movement. Although the Lebanese regime tries to pose as the 'arbitrator' between the belligerent forces, it actually works to pacify the masses, disorient the pa-

triotic forces and sow discord among them. It does so through harping on the theme of 'harmony' and compromise solutions, in an attempt to gain time for completing its political schemes and building its repressive apparatus.

In the Arab arena, the Lebanese state can play a particular role in carrying out the scheme, of which the Lebanese Front is no longer capable. The Lebanese government does not have overt relations with the Zionist entity. Rather, it maintains very close, direct relations with US imperialism and its embassy in Beirut. By speaking of "security" and "sovereignty", the Lebanese regime can win over most of the Arab regimes. This would facilitate its task in carrying out the charted scheme for Lebanon.

This is the essence of the imperialist-Zionist-fascist scheme for Lebanon, and these are the landmarks of the course to be followed for implementing it. Within the general picture, there are various contradictions, details, and possibilities for relative changes in the role of each force. Moreover, the enemy forces have ample opportunity for political maneuvers and tactics which may impair clear political vision as to the essence of the scheme and the path of implementation. Thus, it is necessary to keep the essence of the scheme permanently in mind, despite all contradictions, relative changes, and tactics. For example, Zionism and some of the fascist forces are endeavoring to establish a sectarian state in Lebanon, so that the Zionist state would not remain the only state established on a religious basis. Meanwhile, the regime and some fascist forces are trying to impose their domination on Lebanon as a whole. Some of these forces would strive to set up a military dictatorship, while others would be keen to give the dictatorship a democratic facade. As for tactics, some attempt to emphasize the Palestinian "threat". On other occasions, the Syrian "threat" is stressed. These antagonistic forces are in complete agreement that, ultimately, armed Palestinian presence should be brought to an end. They also agree that the exploitative system should be restored. Their natural alliance is with US imperialism, the common denominator which directly or indirectly joins Arab reaction and Zionism, to hit the mass movement.

Due to the nature of the scheme and its major objective of imposing reactionary domination on the Lebanese masses and linking Lebanon with Camp David, the Lebanese National Movement is basically responsible for mapping out a confrontation program. Such a program should incorporate the minute details of the political, military and organizational aspects of the confrontation. This program should identi-

fy the contradictions within the enemy ranks, and how to exploit these. It should define those forces who stand on middle ground, and how to neutralize or win them over. The program should aim at developing a national democratic trend in the fascist-controlled areas, capitalizing on the conflicts generated by the Phalangists' inclination to monopolize power in these areas. Efforts should be made to take advantage of Franjieh's particular position within the Maronite community, and to show how the Maronite sect monopolizes power and claims to represent all the Christians of Lebanon. The program should specify how to defeat the regime's plans for the Shiites, and how to regulate life in the nationalist areas. It should determine the magnitude of social struggles within the confrontation program. The Lebanese National Movement should specify how to work within the state's military institution and put forth its own programs for preparing military forces. The confrontation program should be based on the legitimacy of the struggle against Saad Haddad's so-called state. It should determine how to rally the broadest sectors of the masses and increase the nationalists' military forces. The program should address issues such as regulating relations between the contingents of the National Movement and finding solutions for the forces which remain outside its framework. The program should define the frame of reference for alliances on the Arab and international level.

The concern of the Palestinian revolution centers on one crucial issue regarding the essence of the analysis and political line. Our analysis revealed the nature of the fascist, Zionist, and imperialist scheme for Lebanon, and the prevailing state of dual power. These circumstances do not permit any halfway solution or extended lull in the conflict. It is the armed nationalists against the armed fascists. Such an antagonistic contradiction cannot be solved without the defeat of one of the protagonists. All positions and tactics should be formulated and practiced on this basis.

The experience of the Lebanese National Movement since 1975, should have illuminated and consolidated this fact as the basis for developing all positions and tactics, regardless of theoretical and political analysis of the nature of the conflict in Lebanon. Any defeat for the Lebanese National Movement means a defeat for the Palestinian revolution, and the success of the central provision of the imperialist-Zionist scheme for liquidating the Palestinian cause. It is our duty, also from the angle of solidarity within the Lebanese National Movement, to struggle and engage in dialogue to entrench this fact. We are not in the process of reviewing all the phases of struggle in Lebanon, or drawing the lessons of

each phase. Nevertheless, our conclusion is that the Lebanese National Movement did not program its struggle at the outset of the civil war. It thus overlooked the fact that the conflict cannot end without the defeat and liquidation of one of the opposing sides.

Today, the National Movement raises slogans for Lebanon's unity, Arab identity, independence and democratic development, and takes certain tactical stances. These slogans and stances may be very sound in the light of the current balance of forces and the mass situation, as long as there is an overall practice and national liberation program based on the premise that the contradictions are antagonistic; there are no halfway solutions or extended lulls. Otherwise these slogans, tactics and stances constitute a fatal blunder, resulting in deluding the people, and creating passivity and a state of waiting in the ranks of the National Movement and the masses.

These slogans and tactics are not incompatible with regulating the life of the masses in the nationalist areas. The National Movement's undertaking such a task would be the concrete link between its tactical moves and the basic fact of the nature of the ongoing antagonistic contradictions.

Our program for counteracting the enemy scheme is as follows:

1. A firm political decision to defend the Palestinian armed presence at all costs, without relinquishing any revolutionary achievements.

2. Mobilizing, training and arming all the Palestinian masses to defend the revolution.

3. Achieving maximum military coordination between the Palestinian contingents on the basis of united leadership and planning.

4. Taking firm disciplinary action against blunders, shortcomings, and misconduct that damage the Palestinian revolution's relations with the Lebanese masses.

5. Promoting our military capabilities in terms of personnel, training, and armament to the highest possible level.

6. Fighting against Saad Haddad's forces which constitute a buffer zone, preventing the Palestinian revolution from exercising its legitimate right to fight the Zionist enemy on all fronts.

7. Fighting the Zionist enemy from across the Lebanese border,

despite the barriers and difficulties entailed.

8. Strengthening our relations with the Lebanese National Movement, devoting all possible resources to consolidate its capabilities, so that it assumes the leading role in the conflict. This would clarity the conflict as being basically inter-Lebanese. We could achieve this goal through totally linking our militant struggle with the Lebanese National Movement, supporting the Lebanese masses through supporting the movement, not exceeding its authority, but supporting it to fully exercise its authority and duties.

9. Forging and deepening the Lebanese national-Palestinian alliance with Syria, since Syria is directly concerned and its destiny is linked with the conflict.

10. Working to have all Arab progressive and nationalist forces support the Lebanese National Movement, providing the requirements of steadfastness; confronting these forces with their duties toward the Lebanese National Movement and masses, particularly in South Lebanon. In supporting the Lebanese National Movement, these forces would be indirectly supporting the Palestinian revolution.

Second: *Imposing the 'Autonomy' Project by Liquidating our Masses' Resistance in Palestine.* Attempts to carry out the next provision in the enemy's scheme, to liquidate the Palestinian cause and revolution, are underway on more than one front. While the top priority is liquidating the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon, the second item on the agenda is imposing the 'autonomy' project, claiming that it provides a solution to the Palestinian cause. The theme of 'self-administration' is evident from the title itself. This project does not go beyond giving the West Bank population autonomy in managing their daily affairs. The Israeli interpretation of 'autonomy' was revealed in a clause of the Egyptian-Zionist treaty, stating that the current Zionist government insists on retaining sovereignty over the land. Regardless of contradictions between Sadat's regime and the Zionist government over interpretation and implementation of the treaty, its ceiling remains crystal clear, as the title shows. Moreover, 'Israel' remains capable of imposing its own interpretation, as it is doing in practice. The Zionist interpretation is full Israeli sovereignty over every inch of Palestine; anything less is considered a betrayal of the Zionist doctrine. Accordingly, Jerusalem is the eternal capital of the Zionist entity, and the Zionist entity has an indelible right to establish

settlements, as has been repeatedly stressed by Begin.

Our masses have heroically resisted the 'autonomy' conspiracy in Palestine; no Palestinian has dared to declare readiness to be an accomplice to this conspiracy. Nonetheless, all evidence attests that Begin, and the Zionist trend he represents, are endeavoring to impose this solution, capitalizing on the Zionists' prevailing superior power and the historic opportunity afforded by Sadat's capitulation. The Begin government's policies for imposing 'autonomy' are as follows:

A) The Zionist Settlement Policy

Currently, the Zionist entity is feverishly expanding existing settlements and building new ones, in order to impose new realities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The policy of creating facts is rooted in the history of the Zionist movement and its invasion of Palestine. The Zionist enemy has always put such a policy into force on the ground. The Likud boasts that in terms of building settlements, it has achieved much more in a few years than the Labor Party accomplished over the many years it was in power. Settlement-building accelerated following the conclusion of the Camp David accords. Settlement projects targeted Palestinian population centers. More funds have been appropriated for settlement budgets; new programs have been mapped out. Any keen observer of the current settlement policy can grasp the magnitude of the Likud government's determination to impose new realities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

B) Economic Subordination

Surveying the economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, year by year, shows that the trend is toward complete dependency on the Israeli economy. The Zionists have a systematic policy aimed at destroying the semi-independent economic infrastructure of these areas, for this is one of the components of the Palestinian national identity. Economic subordination is part and parcel of Zionism's settler colonialist policy which aims not only at plundering the resources and manpower of the occupied territories, but also at expelling our masses from their homeland. Ultimately this aims to fulfill the Zionist project of establishing "Greater Israel" on the ruins of our people's national existence.

The Zionist enemy is also escalating its systematic policy to destroy the essential conditions for agriculture in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The basic features of this policy are as follows:

1. Confiscating Palestinian land under various pretexts and by various means: the enemy consistently confiscates land that is termed "absentee property" or designated for security and military purposes. Very often, the Zionist enemy prohibits Palestinian peasants from tilling their land under the pretext that it is located in a military zone, in order to get access to this land and then confiscate it.

2. Rationing water for Palestinian peasants: in addition to confiscating vast water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and diverting them for use in the Zionist entity and its institutions, the enemy also rations the amount of water available to Palestinian peasants, per tree or acre. Usually, the amount falls short of meeting the peasants' needs. The shortage of water causes tremendous damage to crops, hence discouraging the peasants from agricultural work and investment. Often, income from agriculture does not meet the peasants' basic needs.

3. Controlling the market: the Zionists in effect impose an embargo on the traditional agricultural products, whether by controlling marketing or by unfair competition with Zionist agricultural products. This aims to force the Palestinian peasants to grow crops which provide raw material for Israeli industries. This increases the enemy's control over Palestinian agriculture, subordinating it to the needs of Zionist production. Faced with these conditions, plus spiralling inflation, the Palestinian peasant cannot make ends meet. Ultimately, he is forced to leave farming and join the wage labor market, working in Zionist institutions, factories, or farms.

Industry in the West Bank and Gaza Strip suffers from the most adverse conditions: inflation, soaring prices, rising production fees, and taxes of all sorts. The industry there does not receive any support or subsidy from the government. Since these industries were not strong in the first place, they cannot compete with Israeli industry. Israeli products have invaded the West Bank and Gaza Strip markets, destroying national industrial firms. The Zionist enemy sometimes encounters difficulties in destroying or subordinating firms to its own institutions through the gradual effect of the economic laws which control the process of annexing the West Bank and Gaza Strip markets, destroying national industrial firms. The Zionist enemy sometimes encounters difficulties in subordinating firms to its own institutions through the gradual effect of the economic laws which control the process of annexing the West Bank and

Gaza Strip economy. In such cases, the Israeli authorities do not hesitate to try to directly Judaize these firms as happened with the Jerusalem Electric Company.

Due to the expulsionist nature of Zionist colonialism, the Zionists shy away from investing capital in the West Bank and Gaza Strip economy. Zionist colonialism has no intention of establishing its own institutions on the wreckage of the Arab firms. Thus, the first direct outcome of devastating our national industry is the destruction of the Palestinian working class as well. The working class is put in a double bind. Workers can either emigrate which plays into the enemy's hands, or they have to work in Zionist firms, without union protection, under the worst kind of class exploitations.

In the sphere of commerce, the Zionist enemy aims at gradually taking full control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip markets. Statistics show that 90% of imports to the West Bank and Gaza Strip come from 'Israel', making them the biggest importer of Israeli goods. The value of these imports surpasses the value of Israeli exports to any other country in the world. For instance, the value of Israeli exports to the West Bank and Gaza Strip reached $366 million in 1975, whereas those to the USA were valued at $308 million, and those to the United Kingdom, $171 million. Thus we see the core of the subordination policy adopted by the Zionist entity toward the West Bank and Gaza Strip in all spheres.

C) Obliterating the Palestinian National Identity, History and Culture

From the start, the existence and future of the Zionist enemy hinged on eliminating the national identity of our people. Based on this concept, the Zionist authorities enact their daily racist policies. A close look at the policies of the Labor Alignment[21] or the Likud, since the establishment of the racist Zionist entity, clearly reveals this concrete, consistent political course. The Zionist authorities have constantly worked to obliterate the national heritage of our people, falsifying and altering our cultural history. In line with this, they revised the entire educational curriculum. The Zionists also forcibly replaced the historical names of our cities and villages with Hebrew names.

Following the 1967 occupation, the Zionist authorities imposed

21 **Ed. Note:** An electoral pact between separate Zionist entity political groups, the 'Alignment' merged into the Labor Party in 1968.

their curriculum on all Palestinian Arab schools in occupied Jerusalem. During the Likud's years in power, the occupation authorities stepped up measures against Palestinian educational institutions. They restricted the activities of the Higher Education Council, closed down the Abu Dees College of Science, amended the education law, and granted the military government emergency powers to interfere in educational affairs, including the administrative affairs of educational institutions.

In the same policy framework, the occupation authorities are launching a fierce onslaught against all national cultural expression. They put restrictions on the distribution and sale of educational and literary books, on art exhibitions, or any national cultural activities. Historical and religious sites in Jerusalem and Hebron have been subjected to Judaization. These concrete acts attest to the racist, colonial nature of Zionist policies.

D) Zionist Policies of Terror, Oppression, and Collective Punishment

Since the very first day of its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Zionist enemy has made a mockery of all humanitarian traditions and laws. It has practiced the cruelest form of mass arrests, rounding up residents of one quarter or village, detaining them for long hours under the worst of weather conditions. Women and children are not exempt from all sorts of persecution and torture. This policy has persisted throughout the years of occupation, taking the form of collective annihilation, thus expressing Zionism's fascist character. The fascist entity stepped up its inhuman practices after the signing of the Camp David accords and the ensuing 'autonomy' talks. The escalating repression took new forms, such as besieging entire cities and villages for days and weeks at a time, with economic blockades and day-long curfews. At the same time, these cities and villages are subjected to attacks by semi-official Zionist groups with official complicity.

In an attempt to paralyze the militant spirit of our people and bring them to their knees, the enemy put into effect the policy of detention, putting people away in the Zionist, Nazi-like jails under the worst conditions and the cruelest sort of civilized torture. Those arrested are not only persons charged with affiliation to resistance organizations. Anyone who expresses opinions against the occupation might be detained. Very often, families, neighbors, and acquaintances of wanted individuals have been arrested in an attempt to terrorize and paralyze the masses. This

policy finds its parallel in the dreadful Nazi concentration camps. Over the years of occupation, 100,000 individuals have been detained. At any given time, there have been 4,000 political prisoners behind the Zionist bars. Some of them have been subject to administrative arrest, without trial or specified charges, and held for as long as six years, as in the case of the militant Ali al Jamal. More than sixty militants have been martyred under the savage torture in Zionist jails. Some detainees have spent more than thirteen years in detention centers, and are still subject to all sorts of psychological and physical torture, carried out in accordance with a systematic policy for destroying Palestinian militants, physically and morally. The enemy still refuses to treat militant detainees as prisoners of war, according to international laws.

The systematic policy of expelling nationalists, from all walks of life, continues; the number of those expelled exceeds 1,600. This policy is designed to empty the occupied territories of any nationalist leadership.

The current form of this policy is deportation without any legal proceedings, as was the case with Mayors Milhem and Qawasmeh, and Sheikh Tamimi.[22] Often expulsion has involved entire families. It has been imposed in various forms, such as full expulsion from the homeland, or evacuation of families from their birthplace and usual residence, to far away places. This is an attempt to distance the family from its original social environment, and deprive it of its former means of subsistence, thus deliberately breaking down the social structure and relations.

Vis-a-vis militant Palestinians who launch heroic operations in the occupied homeland, the Zionist enemy resorts to the worst forms of fascist repression. In addition to demolishing militants' houses, the Zionists often demolish nearby houses or even entire quarters. More than 150,000 houses have been demolished in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, including three entire villages west of Ramallah, razed to the ground.

Besides the policy of creating facts as a means of imposing the 'autonomy' project according to the Zionist formula, the authorities recently escalated their repressive measures against the Palestinian masses. The aim is to force them to yield to a *fait accompli*, facilitating the emergence of a reactionary Palestinian trend, willing to be an accomplice. Arrests, repression, deportations, curfews, and all sorts of pressures have mounted recently, aimed at imposing the 'autonomy' conspiracy by force. Nonetheless, our masses in Palestine took a heroic stance against the Camp

22 **Ed. Note:** Mayors of Hebron and Halhoul, and the religious judge of Hebron respectively, were exiled from the West Bank by the entity's forces.

David accords, making it difficult for any Palestinian party to collaborate.

Despite that, the 'autonomy' project is still alive; a number of measures are underway to force it on our masses. It constitutes a central link in the enemy's schemes for liquidating the Palestinian cause. Thus, foiling this scheme constitutes a major task for the revolution at this stage.

While following the 'autonomy' conspiracy and the efforts to impose it, we should watch for the activities of US imperialism and Sadat's regime. US envoys and embassy staff in 'Israel' have tried to talk some Palestinian figures into dealing with this project rather than rejecting it altogether. They tried to make the project look like a first step toward resolving the Palestinian cause, and asked Palestinian figures to wait until the outcome of the negotiations was clear. Lately, these attempts abated, but they can be reactivated at any time. Sadat's regime has made attempts along the same lines. Sadat's proposition to enforce the project in the Gaza Strip first, is a dangerous attempt to find a way out of the predicament for 'autonomy'.

The Egyptian regime sees application of 'autonomy' as a first step to imposing it in the West Bank. The regime is betting on the Strip, because it knows the reactionary figures there; it is counting on an active reactionary trend, the restoration of relations between Egypt and Gaza, and Egypt's relative ability to maneuver via its embassy in 'Israel'.

Occasionally, it seems that there are contradictions between the points of view of Sadat, Begin, and the US, about how to apply the 'autonomy' project. However, all these parties agree on the essence of the Camp David accords which is a major threat to the Palestinian cause. Developments might occur in the stances of these parties, but they would merge in carrying out the scheme which is designed to liquidate the Palestinian cause. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the nature of the existing contradictions between Sadat and Begin on how to apply 'autonomy' resemble the contradictions which led Dayan, and later Weizman, to leave the Likud government.

Thus, a major task of the Palestinian revolution at this stage is serious, constant struggle for foiling the 'autonomy' conspiracy, based on the following guidelines:

1. Adopting a firm political line against all versions of 'autonomy' to prevent any Palestinian force from finding a pretext for dealing with this conspiracy.

The Palestinian revolution rejected the 'autonomy' project and called for foiling it. We must constantly reaffirm this position. We must oppose all attempts at amending and decorating 'autonomy' to make it palatable for some reactionary Palestinian figures. In fact, some figures were lured into dealing with the project indirectly, through their contacts with US emissaries, and their efforts to keep abreast of developments in case a project for 'full autonomy' emerged. The stance of the revolution must be firm and decisive so as to prevent any reactionaries from sneaking into treachery, relying on vague, 'flexible' stances to cover their gradual move toward being accomplices.

2. Escalating the struggle of our people in Palestine against the conspiracy, through military action and all forms of militant and mass struggle.

It is crucial that 'autonomy' be rejected by the Palestinian revolution; by the Arab states and masses and internationally. Yet the decisive factor in foiling the conspiracy is that the masses reject and fight 'autonomy' and prevent any party from participating in it. The Palestinian masses' all-out confrontation will direct a heavy blow to the enemy scheme and expose the falsity of the claim that it will resolve the Palestinian cause.

We are proud of the way our masses have assumed their role in resisting the Camp David accords and the 'autonomy' conspiracy. Our masses have risen to the challenge of various enemy schemes and scored victories, despite the arrogance and ruthlessness of the occupation authorities.

In order to counteract the confiscation and settlement policies, committees for defending the land were formed, though as yet these have not incorporated broad sectors of the masses. Nevertheless, forming the committees provided a suitable framework for mobilizing the broad social forces ready to join the struggle against the enemy and its policies in this respect. It is the responsibility of all national trends and forces to join in this struggle and widen the scope of activities to include all the occupied territories. Our masses' uprisings forced the enemy to back down from its decision to set up Alon Moreh settlement on the site which was originally selected. The plan was not cancelled, but the enemy opted to transfer the settlement to a nearby site. This heralds the possibility of scoring victory over the enemy with regard to the current link in the conspiracy against Palestinian land.

A prominent example of struggle against the policy of annexation,

subordination and destroying Palestinian national institutions, was the resistance to the Zionist decision to take over the concession of the Jerusalem Electric Company. An important role in this struggle was assumed by the Arab Trade Union of the company, despite the hesitation of some right-wing figures in the company's administration. This resistance was a militant landmark in the struggle against the Zionist policy of creating facts as part of the overall Zionist colonial settlement policy in Palestine. To counteract the heroic resistance of the Arab Trade Union, the Zionist enemy attempted to divide the company's concession and restrict the areas of its operation. Despite this, our masses, led by the workers of the company, scored a moral and political victory in this battle.

The enemy's policy is to obliterate the Palestinian national identity, and empty the occupied territories of the national figures who have played an important role in leading the mass movement. However, mass uprisings succeeded in forcing the Zionist enemy to withdraw its decision to expel the militant mayor, Bassam Shakaa. Then the enemy resorted to an assassination attempt to get rid of him, revealing Zionism's inherent racism, fascism and aggressiveness. The defeat of the Zionists special decree to expel Shakaa, and their subsequent failure to assassinate the nationalist mayors, generated a rise in the mass movement. The enemy then resorted to sneaky, cowardly means, expelling the mayors of Hebron and Halhoul, and the religious judge of Hebron. In our estimate, the masses and national leaders are capable of confronting and challenging this cowardly method in the future.

Despite the Zionists' fascist 'anti-terrorist' law which aims to obliterate the Palestinian national identity and dispel Palestine's history and national heritage, the national action confronting this policy widened in scope. Despite the enemy's ban on art exhibitions to revitalize our national heritage, our masses have managed to organize more than one, even if for only a day. Despite being banned, the national theatre movement in Palestine is still very active. Our masses have succeeded in finding ways of getting around the enemy's iron fist measures. For instance, Bir Zeit students organized a wedding festival where there was more than one theatrical performance showing the national identity of our masses and their struggle. Our masses festivals have turned into open theatres where plays are presented. The enemy attempted to halt these cultural activities. The enemy has forbidden the hoisting of the Palestinian flag and prosecutes anyone who does so on charges of threatening the "security of Israel". Yet Palestinian flags continue to fly throughout Palestine including over the land which the Zionists usurped in 1948. Furthermore, our masses man-

aged to defy the enemy's measures in simple, yet creative ways. For instance, they turned displays of fruits and vegetables into Palestinian flags by the way they arranged them.

Our militants in Israeli jails are challenging the enemy's policy of trying to destroy them physically and break their nationalist spirit. Employing all forms of struggle, these militants set an outstanding example of the steadfastness of our people in the face of Zionist ruthlessness. The strike staged by inmates of Nafha prison, and those which followed in other jails were a blow to the enemy and its schemes. The militants of Nafha transformed the jail, which was designed to be their graveyard, into a shining militant focus for our masses and all the forces of peace and progress around the world. The militants exposed the enemy's spurious claims to democracy and civilization. The committees for defending the prisoners should receive support from all nationalists in the occupied homeland so that they become a mainstay for national action.

The PFLP was at the heart of the mass movement. It has had a prominent role in tackling the Zionist settler gangs. When Kahane's gangs tried to raid our towns in the West Bank, our comrades were among the first to intercept them. The PFLP also had a prominent role in heading off the enemy's attempts to confiscate the concession of the Jerusalem Electric Company. Alongside other nationalist forces, the PFLP played a distinctive role in the popular uprising which foiled the Zionist attempt to expel the militant mayor, Shakaa. The PFLP, along with other nationalist forces, worked to stop the vacillation of rightist and bourgeois circles in Palestine and abroad. Collective resignation of the municipal councils was a national necessity to counter the Zionist enemy's attempt to expel the militant mayor.

The PFLP's organization inside and outside the jails played a pioneering role in the battle fought by militant prisoners. The Zionist prison administration could not deny the PFLP's leading role in this battle.

When Al Khazendar (prominent reactionary figure in Gaza) raised his voice against our masses' rejection of Camp David and the 'autonomy' conspiracy, the PFLP silenced him once and for all. This was one of the ways the PFLP practiced its firm position to discourage capitulationists.

The recent escalation of mass resistance in the occupied territories attests to our masses' ability to combat the enemy's policies, relying on the experience they have gained in their constant confrontation with the enemy and its repressive policies. The recent escalation is also based on

our masses' strong belief that their cause is just, and that they have a responsibility for the continuation of the Palestinian and Arab struggle. In this, they draw strength from the steadfastness of the revolution in Lebanon, and their belief in the inevitability of victory.

In view of this, it is required of our mass organizations in the occupied territories to consolidate the struggle against the enemy and its liquidationist plans. Also, it is the responsibility of the leadership of the revolution to provide our masses with unconditional support, to enable them to foil the 'autonomy' conspiracy.

The experience of the struggle in Palestine indicates the necessity of intertwining all forms of struggle in facing the enemy, and linking armed struggle with other forms: leaflets and manifestos; demonstrations, marches and rallies; sit-ins, protests and civil disobedience; blocking roads, throwing stones and hitting the Zionist forces. These forms of struggle created a state of popular rejection which the enemy, as well as Arab and international public opinion, were forced to acknowledge. This surge of popular rejection silenced capitulationist voices in Palestine; it pushed hesitant forces to oppose the conspiracy, and firmed up the position of the revolution.

The role played by the National Guidance Committee, by student councils, societies, clubs, trade unions, land defense committees and municipalities is a living testimony to the ability of our masses to improvise fresh means of organizing and mobilizing. It also shows the importance of these associations.

3. Working to develop the National Front in Palestine, increasing its militant effectiveness, regarding it as responsible for leading the mass movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, directing other forces to rally behind it and providing all possible support.

The Palestinian National Front was formed in the occupied homeland in 1973, grouping the major progressive and nationalist forces and some leading, independent national personalities. Since its inception, this front has encountered a set of problems pertaining to its political line and national program. Because of subsequent political disputes, the front continued to face difficulties in the course of its struggle. For instance, at the height of the national struggle against the racist, Zionist occupation policies and the 'autonomy' conspiracy, the Palestinian right wing attempted to impose ill-reputed elements on the front's

leadership. The rightists aimed to dominate the front's policies and relations. When the front turned down these ill-reputed elements, the Palestinian right started to question its legitimacy; following the 14th session of the Palestinian National Council [PNC], the leadership of the front in Palestine sent a political memorandum to the PLO Executive Committee, expressing their view on a number of issues, based on abiding by the Palestinian National Council's organizational and political program. The memo angered the right wing which regarded it as running counter to the PLO's organizational and political program. Ultimately, the Executive Committee, dominated by the Palestinian right, decided to withdraw recognition of the National Front as one of the PLO's main arms in Palestine. Although the front has continued to lead the mass movement in the occupied homeland against the conspiracy of 'autonomy' and the Zionist policies generally, it suffered from the PLO's decision. Had the PLO acted in a sound and unifying way, the front could have played a more influential, positive and growing role.

The continuation and escalation of our people's struggle in Palestine requires the crystallization of an organizational formula that facilitates united stances and mobilization of resources, and prevents the traditional forces from using the masses as a means to achieve their own ends. This formula should halt the advance of those who are working for the Jordanian regime's scheme, taking advantage of the regime's ostensible rejection of Camp David and its present relations with the PLO.

The revolutionary, progressive and nationalist forces rejected Camp David as the settlement formula which the enemy alliance was trying to impose. This provided common political ground for establishing a national front that includes all these forces. The front has to be based on a common political program and function according to the principles for front work. It is thus imperative to honor the decision of the 14th PNC in 1979, and to struggle on this basis. The decision specified that establishing a united national front in Palestine is a must. The leadership of the revolution in exile should lend support to the Palestinian National Front, try to develop it, and adopt the front as the leading framework for the struggle of our masses in the homeland, so long as the front abides by the revolution's stances and programs, and is organizationally linked with it.

4. Working to support our masses' struggle in the homeland with the widest possible network of militant Arab and international solidar-

ity, to provide sorely needed moral, informational, economic, and military support.

The heroism of our masses' struggle in the homeland is a concrete fact on which the leadership of the revolution can rely to make all progressive and nationalist forces, Arab or international, feel responsible for the future of the struggle. The universal acknowledgement that Zionism is a reactionary and fascist movement lays the ground for exposing the practices of the Zionist leadership against our people. It also means that the forces of socialism, progress, and liberation are required to render more effective support to our masses. This would enable us to consolidate our struggle for discrediting Zionist policy and exposing its fascist nature before international public opinion.

Third: *Liquidating the Palestinian Cause through the Jordanian-Palestinian State Project.* 'Autonomy' is not the only Zionist formula for liquidating the Palestinian cause. There is also the Zionist Labor Party's formula. The essence of this formula is the liquidation of the Palestinian cause. Consequently, it is our task to expose this formula and prepare for foiling it, through mapping out a program to counter it.

It is now known that the Labor Party was not originally enthusiastic about the Palestinian section of the Camp David accords. During the Knesset session held to vote on the accords, Labor tried to separate the section involving the settlement with Egypt, from the section pertaining to the 'autonomy' project, because it agrees with the first, but opposes the second. The Labor Party opposes the 'autonomy' project on the grounds that it does not best serve Zionist interests in the long run. The party fears that 'autonomy' would be the nucleus for a future Palestinian state. On the other hand, it fears the consequences of retaining the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for massive Palestinian presence in the Zionist state would threaten its demographic structure. The Palestinians would constitute a high percentage of the total population, and could become the majority in the near future. This would distort the Zionist character of the enemy's state. In addition, it is believed that retaining all of the Gaza Strip and West Bank would touch off official opposition from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab countries. This would impede a comprehensive settlement on all the fronts, and, consequently, affect the US-Zionist relations, whereas the Labor Party believes that it is in Zionism's interests that this relation be at the optimal level of harmony and coordination.

For all these reasons, the Zionist Labor Party puts forward a formula for confining 'autonomy' to the Gaza Strip. This formula also entails Israeli withdrawal from 70-80% of the West Bank, which would be turned over to Jordan. Then a Palestinian entity could be established within the framework of the Jordanian Kingdom, thereby 'solving' the Palestinian cause. The Labor Party thinks this formula would entice the Jordanian regime to enter into the settlement fold, with relative support from some Arab reactionary regimes who would justify their support under the cover of retrieving Arab land. This formula would also mitigate contradictions between the US and the Zionist entity. It would keep the settlement momentum going. Economic benefits would continue to accrue to 'Israel' in the form of markets and manpower, through normalizing relations with Jordan. In addition, the formula would divide the official Arab rejection of the Camp David accords, and save 'Israel' from a set of problems that might emerge in the future.

Today the Labor Party finds support for its view from the events which followed the signing of the Camp David accords: the Palestinian and Arab refusal, and the faltering of the negotiations. Labor uses the events to promote its program for territorial compromise. In the light of Labor's possible return to power in the 1981 elections, confronting the Zionist scheme put forward by this party is a revolutionary task alongside protecting the revolution in Lebanon and foiling the project. This is particularly so, because the Labor Party's project receives tacit support from the reactionary Jordanian regime. Actually, this project is generally compatible with the United Arab Kingdom plan put forward by King Hussein in 1972, with some amendments in the latter to meet the Israeli territorial demands.

The Confrontation Program:

1. Adopting a firm political line against the formula for liquidating the Palestinian cause (through the Palestinian-Jordanian state project) in whatever form or interpretation. Although the formula is now the most prominent, this other formula has been put forward. It is feasible that it will be activated in the near future. This requires taking a firm, decisive stand against it now, by mobilizing all the militant potentials for foiling it.

2. Confronting all the stances and moves of the Jordanian agents in occupied Palestine, who are working to promote this formula. Foil-

ing the 'autonomy' conspiracy requires the concentration of efforts, seizing on every voice of opposition. However, the objection of the Jordanian agents to 'autonomy' must not serve as a cover for their promoting the "Jordanian-Palestinian Kingdom".

3. Confronting all the moves and positions of the Jordanian regime to gradually lay the ground for enacting this liquidationist project. Although the Jordanian regime, under the circumstances, is not publicly expressing its real stands, there are many clues that point to its real intentions vis-a-vis the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Among these clues are the regime's summoning the West Bank mayors, putting 3,000 passports at Gaza Mayor Rashad Shawwa's disposal, and scores of other moves. We are required to expose all the regime's activities and discredit its goals.

4. Through relations with the PLO, the Jordanian regime achieved a set of gains which are compatible with the Labor Party's project, despite existing discrepancies. Through these ties, the Jordanian regime took charge of the Palestinians in Jordan as Jordanian citizens. It acquired the right to deal with the affairs of the Palestinians in the occupied homeland and their self-determination. Through coordination with the PLO leadership, the regime strengthened its Arab and international position. Thus, the Jordanian regime is trying to intimate that its moves, stances and projects enjoy the tacit support of the PLO leadership. It is therefore crucial to struggle to halt this relationship and retrieve the revolution's rights in the Jordanian arena.

5. The central point in confronting the Jordanian-Palestinian confederation conspiracy is improving the state of the Jordanian national movement and the Palestinian revolution in Jordan, through political, organizational and military programs. These programs must insure the mobilization and crystallization of the masses' militant potentials, so that they can prevent the regime from enacting the conspiracy.

In the political sphere, we see the importance of defining the tactical slogans and interim programs, on the national and class level, for national democratic work in Jordan. The strategical goal of the nationalist and revolutionary-democratic forces in Jordan is crystal clear. It is the establishment of a national democratic regime on which the Palestinian revolution could rely in starting the process of actually liberating Palestinian land. However, defining the strategic goal, theoretically and practically,

is not sufficient. This must be coupled with defining the tactical slogans and local programs which would in time produce a change in the balance of forces, with the aim of realizing the strategic goal.

Advocating revolutionary change in Jordan, as a sound strategical slogan, is a safeguard against rightist and reformist deviation. Yet the process of revolutionary change will collide with the balance of forces which exists between the regime and the revolutionary forces. This balance of forces is not conducive to immediate realization of the strategic goal. Thus, the immediate function of tactical slogans is mobilizing broad sections of the masses and recruiting their potentials, hence destabilizing the pillars of the regime and dissolving its forces, as a prelude to the process of radical change. Failing to define the correct tactical slogans at the right time would lead the revolutionary work into a stalemate, by uttering a strategic slogan without having the capabilities to realize it. There is a big gap between the existing balance of forces and that needed for inducing change. In order to narrow this gap, the masses must wage a set of battles to pave the way for the decisive battle for revolutionary change in Jordan. Defining these battles and involving the masses is the sole route for creating the revolutionary conditions conducive to the process of change.

Along this line of reasoning, the national work program in the Jordanian arena is centered around the struggle for imposing the right of the Palestinian revolution to be present in Jordan, to mobilize the masses in accordance with the revolution's program and to fight the Zionist enemy across the Jordanian-Palestinian border. Such a program seems to be sound and acceptable to our masses in Jordan, and to some Arab regimes. As a result, it enjoys wide support from numerous forces. This program is in line with the existing balance of forces in the Jordanian arena and constitutes a prelude to mobilizing the masses for more advanced revolutionary tasks.

The second part of the program focuses on political freedoms: freedom of the press, forming political parties, union work, no regime interference in union affairs, freedom to demonstrate and defend human rights, release of political detainees, demanding that women's rights be equal to men's, and free popular elections to elect municipal and assembly councils without pressure or interference, etc. The program also involves the struggle for economic demands related to wages, prices, taxes, work laws, social security for laborers and civil servants, educational programs, cooperatives, rents, the demands of poor peasants and agricultural laborers, and health services, among other issues that affect the welfare of

the toiling masses. These issues touch upon the life of many sectors of the population. The masses should be mobilized to defend their rights and interests.

Struggling for militant economic demands is an indispensable means whereby the masses can be encouraged to wage a political struggle. Through these militant battles, the masses will discover the inability of the regime to meet their needs and interests. The masses, through experience, will reach the conclusion that it is necessary to change the regime. Marxism-Leninism substantiates the idea of economic struggle as a channel alongside the ideological and political struggle.

Aside from political freedoms and militant economic demands, there is another focus: the struggle against the overall policies of the regime in the Arab and international arena. The Jordanian regime has historically been involved in plotting against the Arab national liberation movement and implementing imperialist schemes in the area. The Jordanian national movement should come forward to discredit such policies, demand their cessation, and express the will of the masses to fight their enemies and forge better relations with friendly forces.

If conditions in Jordan were ripe for change, these slogans would be reformist and rightist. However, in the light of the existing circumstances and concrete practice, these slogans are sound tactical ones for mobilizing the masses in order to improve the state of the national movement so that it will become capable of inducing change. Needless to say, we do not raise these slogans in anticipation that the existing regime will be ready to accept or realize them. These slogans are designed as a means for revolutionizing the conditions on the mass level, as a step toward creating the subjective and objective conditions for the process of change.

The experience of the Palestinian revolution in Jordan from 1967 to 1971, exposed the fallacy of depending on a strictly Palestinian formula for the national work, without a formula for the Jordanian national movement. By the same token, our experience in the years before 1967, and the three years after 1972, showed the fallacy of working in accordance with a Jordanian formula, without a Palestinian formula. The particularity of the Jordanian arena dictates a formula for a united organization and program, so that the militant national process is undertaken by a united national front with a joint program. Such a program would be instrumental in mobilizing the Jordanian masses to bring about the interrelated national and class goals of the program. The revolutionary forces that potentially constitute the core for such a front in the Jorda-

nian arena, should provide the united leadership committees for the revolutionary work. This is so in the light of the interrelated tasks in this arena, the size of the Palestinian community in Jordan and its integration in the Jordanian society. As a result, the particular role of the Palestinian community in the process of change in Jordan is a step toward the unity of Palestinian-Jordanian revolutionary work.

The danger of the 'Palestinian-Jordanian state', as a formula for liquidating the Palestinian cause and revolution, does not stem from its having been put forward by the Zionist Labor Party. It is natural that the enemy has projects and schemes for liquidating our revolution and cause. The danger stems from the readiness of the Jordanian regime to deal with this formula, particularly following the deterioration of the official Arab state of affairs as a result of Sadat's treachery. Moreover, the Jordanian regime rejected 'autonomy', since this project did not offer it any special advantages. Thus there is the danger of the Jordanian regime's using its rejection as a cover and defending the 'Palestinian-Jordanian state' formula as better than the 'autonomy' formula. Hence, it was natural to confront such a formula by confronting the Jordanian regime, exposing the essence of its policies and schemes, and promoting the conditions of the national struggle to a level whereby the scheme can be foiled.

Fourth: *The European Role in the Schemes to Liquidate the Palestinian Cause.* Besides the scheme of liquidating the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon, and its connection with 'autonomy' and the other Zionist formula for a Palestinian-Jordanian state, the capitalist states of Europe are putting forth a formula in line with the same framework and goals. All these formulas share the goal of aborting the Palestinian revolution, liquidating our cause and imposing the hegemony of imperialism, Zionism, and reaction, through the most suitable formula for stabilizing their interests in the Arab homeland. It is necessary to grasp the motives of the ongoing political activity of the West European countries vis-a-vis the Middle East and Palestinian problem, and adopt a position on this.

Following the signing of the Camp David accords, the 'autonomy' formula was the most visible one for liquidating the Palestinian cause. Obviously, the revolution concentrated its efforts on thwarting this formula, through protecting its presence in Lebanon and our masses' struggle against the 'autonomy' conspiracy, and all the activities and struggles connected with this task. The great concern about this task was manifest in the political program of the PNC's 14th session (January 1979). However,

things do not remain static. Besides the attempts to impose the 'autonomy' project, new efforts and formulas are clearly emerging today, and cannot be ignored by the revolution. Thus, in addition to the task of foiling the 'autonomy' conspiracy, we must confront all the other projects at hand. We should not ignore these projects, or try to bypass them. It is important to assess the chances of success of each project at each phase.

The features of the European role, as crystallized in the Venice Declaration of June 1980, constitute another version of the liquidation formula. This version does not differ in essence from the Camp David formula or Peres project, except that it recognizes the PLO as a party in negotiations. The capitalist states of Europe did not initially object to the Camp David accords. Thus it is necessary to link their motives with the situation generated on the Palestinian and Arab level as a result of these accords. The following factors prompted the European role: the obvious predicament of the 'autonomy' project, because of the unwillingness of any Palestinian party to participate; the exclusion of the PLO from the settlement and its relatively firm position; the rejection of the Camp David accords by all Arab states, and the embarrassment of Arab reaction when Camp David failed to provide them with a minimum of cover for their position; the strengthening of relations with the socialist countries.

In this context, the European formula aimed to salvage the Camp David accords, making amendments in the formula to enable the Arab reactionaries to cover their role, so that they could move into line with the imperialist and Zionist conditions. The initiative which might result from the European efforts will not be an alternative to Camp David, as the leaders of the capitalist countries have declared, but a supplement to it.

Obviously, any such initiative would be motivated by Western Europe's imperialist interests. These countries want to strengthen relations with the reactionary Arab regimes and insure their own imperialist interests. They aim to insure that the reactionary Arab states remain in the imperialist orbit, by pretending that some imperialist parties support the 'Arab cause'—in the reactionary sense of course. Western Europe wishes to achieve these goals by alleging that it offers a better formula for a settlement. To this end, there is indeed ongoing flirtation between European imperialism and the reactionary Arab governments including some bourgeois regimes. The flurry of Western European political and diplomatic activities was initiated in order to hinder the process of polarization which ensued after the signing of the Camp David accords. The

essence of the Western European role was conveyed in a statement by the French foreign minister during a visit to the US. He said that the Middle East is today heading toward extremism, and that the European initiative is designed to curb such extremism which serves neither European nor US interests.

Of course, we can see that there are contradictions between the European capitalist states and the parties to Camp David. The Egyptian regime, for instance, welcomed the initiative with some reservations, while US imperialism currently opposes it. The Likud government is bitterly resisting the initiative, endeavoring to halt it. However, long experience with the contradictions that arise among parties of the same camp, shows that these parties iron out their differences in the face of the revolution, the masses, and the alliance with the socialist countries.

The European line of thinking, whether articulated by the Common Market countries or by Kreisky and Brandt of the 'Socialist International', is not currently applicable due to the Likud's objection and US support to the Zionist position. The Zionist entity is the major base on which the US now relies, rather than the reactionary Arab regimes. As a result, the US wants to satisfy 'Israel' and maintain it at a high level of strength. Yet the European initiative's lack of applicability does not mean we should overlook the dangers of this trend in the short or long run.

In the short run, Western Europe is reviving the illusion of settlement in the Palestinian arena. This would have negative effects on Palestinian unity, deepening contradictions in the revolution's ranks and spreading confusion among the masses. On the Arab level, the European initiative could deepen contradictions in the ranks of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, weaken the Palestinian-Syrian alliance, and constitute a bridge linking Arab reaction as a whole with Sadat's course; this would abort the minimal position taken at the Baghdad Summit. On the international level, the initiative could negatively affect the alliance between the Palestinian revolution and the socialist community, first and foremost the Soviet Union.

Some of these adverse consequences are already emerging. They will deepen over time unless the PLO leadership takes a decisive position against such misleading settlement formulas. Capitalist Europe's motive in causing such confusion is to facilitate the liquidation of the Palestinian cause and revolution, regardless of the formula whereby this finally occurs.

In the long run, the European formula will be advanced for actual application in case of the failure of the 'autonomy' and 'Palestinian-Jordanian state' formulas. When the time comes to activate the European formula, the Palestinian revolution will no doubt face a more complicated and dangerous situation. The possibility of capitalist Europe's formula being presented for actual application is not hypothetical. Today the 'autonomy' formula faces a veritable impasse, as broad sections of the Zionists admit. The 'United Arab Kingdom' confederation formula is more dangerous and more likely to materialize than the 'autonomy' formula. Yet the Palestinian revolution's achievements on the international level provide the conditions for defeating it.

Furthermore, the Palestinian sector involved in the 'autonomy' formula will remain relatively limited in size and unable to present itself as representative of the Palestinian majority. Hence, the success of the Palestinian revolution in foiling 'autonomy' and later the confederation formula, would quickly bring the European formula to the fore as more than just a maneuver. It is important to bear in mind that the official US position is not based on categorical refusal to recognize the PLO; rather US recognition of the PLO is hinged on the latter recognizing the Zionist entity. Thus the battle we assume is not hypothetical. Rather we define all the settlement formulas which our revolution will face in the next few years.

The great disparity in the balance of forces, resulting from Sadat's treachery, encouraged the Zionist entity and US imperialism to adhere to direct, all-out formulas for liquidating the Palestinian cause. Imperialism and the Zionist entity will keep trying to impose these formulas, yet things will not remain static. If the balance of forces shifts in favor of the Palestinian revolution and the national liberation movement, US imperialism will find the European formula appropriate and preferable for aborting Palestinian and Arab steadfastness. In this case, we will face a more dangerous and complicated situation, for the Palestinian bourgeoisie still holds an influential position in the PLO leadership. Scientific analysis and the experience of the revolution show that such a bourgeois leadership will be ready to strike a deal with Arab reaction and imperialism whenever it finds the opportunity to insure its interests.

Numerous international examples show that imperialism will try at the outset to hit any national liberation movement and liquidate it once and for all. In the case imperialism fails, it resorts to bargaining with the bourgeois forces within the national liberation movement, in order to

strike a deal that insures the interests of imperialism and the (local) bourgeoisie, at the expense of the masses.

Obviously, this law also applies to the Palestinian revolution if the democratic and revolutionary forces are not in a position to foil such deals. Certainly, the Palestinian bourgeoisie differs from the bourgeoisie which holds power in some Arab countries. Due to the nature of the settler colonialism which took control of Palestine and intends to make its control permanent, the Palestinian national bourgeoisie will find it very difficult to bargain and reach a settlement. Furthermore, the fact that the Palestinian bourgeoisie does not hold state power in this phase makes it less susceptible to deviating from the national struggle than the ruling bourgeoisie. More important, the armed Palestinian masses compound the difficulties of the bargaining process, as do the democratic and revolutionary forces that can act to influence the overall course of the struggle. All these factors make bargaining and entering a settlement, at the expense of the national cause, a very complicated and difficult affair for the Palestinian bourgeoisie. This does not preclude the above-mentioned law, but makes its application on the Palestinian cause more complicated and difficult than has been the case with some other national liberation movements.

The Rejection Front waged a battle against the settlement trend and the settlement line which was pursued by the PLO leadership after the October War, and supported by some revolutionary democratic forces. A similar battle was waged by the Rejection Front and other Palestinian organizations against the PLO leadership's policies following Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. To us, these battles were not fabricated or imaginary. They were designed to prevent the Palestinian bourgeoisie from striking a deal with imperialism and reaction, at the expense of the just, strategic goals of the Palestinian revolution. Undoubtedly, the Western European activities present a fresh temptation for the Palestinian bourgeoisie, since they offer some gains to insure bourgeois interests.

Obviously, the Palestinian bourgeoisie rejects Camp David because it does not offer any gains. It is more likely that this bourgeoisie will deal with the 'Jordanian-Palestinian Kingdom', since it offers the bourgeoisie a share of the power and market. This would converge with the European initiative which tempts the bourgeoisie to strike a deal with imperialism, Zionism, and reaction. This makes the battle very difficult and complicated. Our battle against 'autonomy' was against a handful of agents whose interests are linked to the continuation of the occupation. Our

battle against the 'United Kingdom' will be against a broad section of the Palestinian bourgeoisie who will find in this formula an offer on which they can rely in accepting such a deal.

Of course, we do not expect the Palestinian bourgeoisie to acknowledge the real motives and interests that encourage it to strike such a deal. The bourgeoisie will mask its bargaining with slogans such as: struggle in stages, the importance of diplomatic flexibility, winning the broadest possible support for the Palestinian cause, the need to stop verbal rejection, the negative effects of always saying 'no' in the history of the Palestinian national struggle, etc.

Our position on confronting this formula:

1) Firmly and clearly rejecting the European initiatives. Exposing their essence, ulterior motives, goals and negative effects. Mobilizing the masses to reject and challenge these attempts. Generating mass pressure on the Palestinian right, in order to hinder it from pursuing this line.

2) Engaging in highly effective activity with Arab nationalist, progressive, and democratic forces in order to articulate our position on the European initiative, and warn them from giving space for the return of the settlement illusion to the Palestinian arena. Asking these forces to take a clear position on these attempts.

3) Engaging in activities with our international allies along the same lines.

4) The central link in foiling the European formula for a settlement is strengthening the position of the democratic and revolutionary forces in the revolution and the PLO, so that the bourgeoisie will be in no position to deal with this formula.

The danger of this formula does not stem from the fact that it was advanced by imperialist European states that intend to play a role in imposing imperialist, Zionist and reactionary hegemony. The real danger is if the PLO or any Palestinian party deals with such a formula. Here lies the importance of the democratic and revolutionary forces, confronting this formula by struggling for implementation of the program of the 14th PNC. Such confrontation will be a decisive factor in foiling this formula. The political program of this PNC was put forward at the time when all illusions of a settlement had evaporated and its danger had become clear.

This enabled the revolutionary forces to put an end to the attempts to tamper with the interim goal. The Palestinian bourgeoisie wanted to take advantage of this goal to strike a deal at the expense of the Palestinian masses. In contrast, the democratic forces regard the interim goal as a basis for not negotiating, recognizing or reconciliating (with the Zionist enemy). This constituted the basis for establishing national unity, since settling the Palestinian cause (through such negotiations, recognition and reconciliation) would lead to the repartition of our people and national soil, and squander the national cause.

The organizational program of the 14th PNC established principles for collective decision-making, ensuring the participation of all the organizations of the Palestinian revolution. This will allow the democratic forces, in their struggle, to observe the articles of the program and put them into action to the full. As a result, the PLO leadership will have to reject and challenge the European role.

In general, the political and organizational program of the 14th PNC constituted a clear gain for the democratic forces in the Palestinian arena. This is particularly so, because this session was held at a time when those who were betting on a settlement were in desperate shape, while there was a relative growth in the weight of the democratic forces within the PLO. This situation insured the mobilization of the Palestinian revolution's forces for meeting the requirements of the political situation which followed the signing of the Camp David accords. The struggle for observing and implementing the political and organizational program of the 14th PNC will not only insure the revolution's ability to foil the European role. It will also insure the revolution's ability to achieve the current political tasks. It is natural for us to struggle for developing the political program of the PNC, to articulate a decisive position against the 'Jordanian-Palestinian Kingdom' and any formula prepared by the Western European countries. However, if we fail to have the PLO leadership take an explicit position on these two formulas, we will face the task of enforcing the principles and parameters of the political program related to interim goals. These goals have to be tied to the goal of liberating all of Palestine, and establishing a popular democratic state.

Following are the clauses of the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary scheme for liquidating the Palestinian cause after Sadat's treachery created helpful conditions for achieving this:

(1) liquidating Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon;

(2) imposing the 'autonomy' project;

(3) liquidating the Palestinian national cause through the 'Jordanian-Palestinian Kingdom';

(4) capitalist Europe's projects for liquidating the Palestinian cause.

Though the European activities do not yet include an explicit formula, this does not nullity the general title of the stage that ensued the signing of the Camp David accords, as that of liquidating the Palestinian cause and revolution.

Our tasks in confronting this scheme are defined as follows: (1) protecting the revolution in Lebanon and defending all its accomplishments at all costs; (2) struggling to foil the 'autonomy' conspiracy; (3) striving to foil the 'Jordanian-Palestinian Kingdom' project; (4) striving to foil the European imperialists' projects for liquidating the Palestinian cause and revolution; (5) struggling for implementation of the political and organizational program of the 14th session of the PNC, in order to create a framework for Palestinian national unity.[23] This framework has to be suitable for the nature of the stage of struggle, unifying all the revolution's forces to accomplish the current political tasks.

Obviously, our ability to achieve these tasks hinges on the extent to which we succeed in living up to our ideological, organizational, mass organizational, and military programs. This will enable us to elevate our own subjective forces to such a level that we can effectively and successfully achieve our political tasks. The revolution's steadfastness in Lebanon, in spite of six years of constant, complicated intrigues to wipe it out, and the impasse which the 'autonomy' conspiracy encountered as a result of our people's struggle, tangibly prove that we possess the quality of steadfastness. This makes us even more responsible for maintaining the state of steadfastness.

Relying on this steadfastness, we will be able to work on a fresh set of tasks that will provide the objective and subjective conditions for liberating our land. Then, we will rely on the liberated territory to continue the process of purging Palestine of Zionism and its aggressive entity. The final goal will be the establishment of a popular democratic Palestinian state in the whole of Palestine.

---

23 **Ed. Note:** The 'National Unity Programme' adopted at the 14th Session of the Palestinian National Council in Damascus in January 1979 can be viewed online at https://www.palquest.org/en/overallchronology?sideid=5230.

Chapter Two

Issues and Tasks Crystallized by the Course of the Revolution

First: *The necessity of creating supportive operational bases for the Palestinian revolution.* More than sixteen years have elapsed since the launching of the armed Palestinian revolution against the Zionist entity, for liberating Palestine. During this period, our Palestinian masses have offered tremendous sacrifices. Certainly, during this period, the revolution made a set of fundamental accomplishments. Today, the Palestinian cause is among the vanguard national liberation movements internationally. Thanks to the revolution, the uprooted and dispersed Palestinian people, living on ration cards, have changed into a revolutionary people. They have asserted their national identity, just cause and right to life and independence before the international community and public opinion that had almost forgotten their existence as a result of Zionist propaganda, the Jordanian regime's annexation and absorption, and the official Arab policy of surrender.

Today, the Palestinian cause constitutes the core of the conflict in the area. Almost all acknowledge this fact. The Palestinian question causes the Zionist enemy worry and confusion, and inflicts a certain level of casualties. The Palestinian revolution constitutes a real stumbling block for the imperialist plans for the area. The presence of the Palestinian revolution on territory adjoining Palestine exposes the treachery and impotence of Arab reaction, and revolutionizes the mass movement in these countries and throughout the Arab region. Palestinian armed struggle, sacrifices and martyrdom are a primary cause of all these accomplishments.

Yet until now, the revolution did not liberate any Palestinian land. This impels us to take a retrospective look, carefully and incisively studying the course of the revolution in order to find out how to improve its conditions. This aims at enabling the revolution to move into a broader, all-out military confrontation with the Zionist entity, and start the actual process of liberating Palestinian land.

Currently, the Palestinian revolution combats the Zionist enemy along two fundamental lines. First is the political and military struggle of our people inside Palestine. Second is the military action against the Zi-

onist entity carried out by the forces of the Palestinian revolution across the Arab frontiers. The latter is currently limited to fighting across the Lebanese frontier.

This is the current picture of the nature and level of the military confrontation between the Palestinian revolution and the Zionist enemy. It is common sense that scoring any political victory is connected with the military conflict and its outcome. With the current level of military confrontation, is it possible to liberate a portion of Palestinian land and force the enemy to pull out unconditionally, so that we can trigger the process of liberating all of Palestine? It is now clear that the past few years' military confrontation has not reached a level whereby Palestinian land can be liberated. This does not diminish the positive results obtained from this confrontation. Nonetheless, it is incumbent on the revolution's leadership to map out a new strategy, to break the cycle in which the revolution has remained in the past few years.

How can we get out of this cycle? How can we resolve this problem that is clearly seen by our masses? How can we open new horizons for the revolution? How can we raise the level of military confrontation in order to begin the process of actually liberating Palestinian land? Is that feasible solely through qualitatively improving the conditions of the Palestinian revolution, i.e., by initiating a serious, persevering struggle that focuses on the Palestinian subjective factor?

Doubtlessly, there are tremendous opportunities and much to be done to substantially improve the revolution's subjective conditions. Also, it is incumbent on the revolution to map out and practice a set of ideological, organizational, mass, and political programs to consolidate the structure of the revolution's organizations, and the cooperation and unity among them. This would be conducive to enhancing the mobilization of the Palestinian people's potentials. There is also no doubt that enhancing the revolution's conditions on all these levels will increase our military effectiveness against the Zionist enemy inside Palestine and across the Arab frontiers. These are necessary duties to be implemented resolutely, but still the question remains: assuming that the objective conditions remain the same on the Arab level, can the Palestinian revolution engage in broader, more effective military confrontation, solely through enhancing its subjective conditions, as a prerequisite for embarking on the process of liberating Palestinian land?

Having enhanced the subjective conditions of the Palestinian revolution outside Palestine, to induce more comprehensive mobilization

and increase our combative efficacy across the Arab borders, we will encounter a set of difficulties. We will encounter the enemy's complicated and extensive preventive measures to protect its border. We will run into the Arab regimes' measures to prevent the revolution from practicing its right to fight across their borders, on the pretext of not giving the enemy any excuse to attack their countries. The revolution collides with the Arab regimes who aim at completely wiping out the revolution. This occurred in Jordan and is currently underway in Lebanon. As the Palestinian revolution fights the Zionist enemy, it gets stabbed from the rear and is forced to wage a battle to defend its very existence; this reduces its capacity for confronting the Zionist enemy. It is known that the Palestinian revolution has offered more martyrs and sacrifices defending itself against the Arab regimes than on the land of Palestine. Is this a secondary factor in assessing the course of the revolution and its accomplishments, in understanding the current level of military confrontation and mapping out a strategy for escalating the confrontation to a degree that enables the process of liberating Palestinian land?

As for fighting the Zionist enemy and escalating the military confrontation inside Palestine, there is doubtlessly plenty of room for enhancing the revolution's subjective conditions, taking advantage of the lessons gleaned from our rich experience in the security, organizational, political, and military fields. Learning from all these lessons, in addition to waging an ideological, organizational, and political struggle for enhancing the Palestinian revolution's subjective conditions inside Palestine, will certainly have important positive implications. Among other things, this will lead to reinforcing the revolution's accomplishments and further crystallizing the Palestinian people's national identity in the international arena; it will confuse and inflict losses on the enemy, and foil its liquidationist projects. Yet, can we in this way force the Zionist enemy to withdraw from portions of Palestinian land, liberating them in the real sense of the word?

With the conditions prevailing on the Arab level, can we set the goal of liberating a portion of Palestinian land through the struggle inside Palestine? In attempting to achieve this goal today, we will encounter the advanced state of the Zionist settler-colonial process: the number of Zionist settlers surpasses three million; the Zionists have full control of all Palestine; they possess a military machine designed as imperialism's primary military base for entrenching its hegemony not only in Palestine, but in the whole of the Arab region.

The Palestinian revolution's predicament, as substantiated by sixteen years of concrete experience, is objectively connected to the status quo on the Arab level and the Arab regimes surrounding Palestine in particular. In other words, the Palestinian revolution is connected with the Arab national liberation movement and its status in the countries surrounding Palestine in particular. It is here that we must begin looking for a solution to the cycle the Palestinian revolution has been caught in for the past few years. We must enhance the revolution's accomplishments, from enforcing the Palestinian national identity and cause on the international level, to rallying the Palestinian masses around their just cause and restoring their sense of their own existence, dignity and right to a homeland and sovereignty. Yet we must still move to the point of being able to begin the liberation of Palestinian land. In the light of the scope and nature of Zionist colonial policy, the Palestinian revolution needs supportive operational bases surrounding Palestine. These bases would provide the revolution with the geographic and demographic depth needed in a protracted people's war against the enemy.

The Palestinian revolution should be aware of its particular role in liberating Palestinian land. To the same extent, it has to combine all its resources with the Arab masses' potentials, especially in the countries surrounding Palestine. By so doing, we will eliminate a colony and imperialist base built up to secure the enemy's control in the whole region. We do not make these assertions solely on the basis of theoretical analysis. Rather the Palestinian revolution's experience, over the past sixteen years, has shown the wretchedness of the slogan of non-interference in the internal affairs of the Arab countries; it has shown the limitations of the Palestinian national struggle in isolation of a pan-Arab framework.

While the experience of the Palestinian national struggle, especially in the post-1948 period, showed the fallacy of completely merging into the pan-Arab framework, the experience of the armed Palestinian revolution over the past few years has demonstrated the fallacy of isolation from the Arab nationalist struggle. The accumulation of militant experience has further clarified the interrelation between our national struggle and the pan-Arab struggle, and the nature of the organizational and political formulas which match this interrelation.

After 1948, the majority of the Palestinian people were relegated to the Jordanian entity; the Arab regimes were held responsible for the loss of Palestine. At that time, the Palestinian people generally devoted their efforts to fighting the Jordanian regime and the prevailing conditions in

the Arab arena, in order to induce change that would pave the way for liberating Palestine. Some groups worked to resist attempts at resettlement and dissolving the Palestinian national identity, but the struggle of the majority of the Palestinian people was devoted to raising slogans for Arab unity and waging a general pan-Arab struggle in order to pave the way for liberation. Nasserism was on the rise; high hopes were attached to pan-Arab causes, especially the Palestinian cause; our people were oriented toward totally merging the Palestinian national movement with the Arab national movement.

This state of affairs continued until 1961. Then, under the impact of Syria's withdrawal from the United Arab Republic, and the triumph of the Algerian revolution based on the Algerian people's armed struggle, Palestinian vanguards began to reassert their particular role in resisting the Zionist occupation of Palestine. This was the precursor of a new Palestinian national orientation, though it remained closely connected with the strategy of the United Arab Republic (Egypt) and its readiness to wage the liberation battle. Following the 1967 defeat and the dashing of the hopes and illusions attached to Nasserism's role in liberating Palestine, the Palestinian struggle was strongly reoriented toward Palestinian nationalism and generally confined itself to this framework. Consequently, the predicament of the Palestinian national struggle began to emerge, namely, its impotence to launch the liberation process alone. This fact has been substantiated by the revolution's experience ever since 1967.

The course of the Palestinian struggle, as we have briefly reviewed in the light of our experience, points to a set of basic principles governing the relationship between the Palestinian national struggle and the pan-Arab struggle:

1) Entrenching the Palestinian national identity is an inevitable necessity. We must preserve the Palestinian national movement as a contingent in its own right within the Arab national liberation movement. Under no circumstances should it be absent or absorbed into the general pan-Arab work.

2) The central role of the Palestinian national liberation movement is fighting the Zionist enemy and its settler entity. In this sphere, the Palestinian liberation movement plays a special vanguard role.

3) At the same time, the task of liberating Palestine is a pan-Arab task which falls to all Arab revolutionary contingents.

4) It is necessary to forge militant organizational relations between

the Palestinian revolution and the Arab liberation movement's contingents; particularly in the countries surrounding Palestine.

5) This organizational relation will provide the framework through which the Palestinian revolution can participate in reviving the Arab national liberation movement and create the objective conditions needed on the Arab level as a prelude to liberating Palestine. By the same token, the Arab national liberation movement will have the chance to contribute to the battle of liberating Palestine. The organizational framework and resulting militant tasks will reflect the pan-Arab aspect of the liberation battle as well as the special vanguard role of the Palestinian revolution.

6) What was written in the Arab section of this report, on the thesis of united Arab revolutionary work and a progressive Arab nationalist front, will determine this relationship and its horizons in the light of the conditions of the revolutionary, progressive and nationalist forces at each phase of their struggle.

It is essential to define the relationship between the Palestinian revolution and the Arab national liberation movement, since supportive operational bases are direly needed and cannot be postponed indefinitely. The Palestinian revolution cannot adopt a wait-and-see attitude. It must bring about such bases itself.

If the Palestinian revolution is to be capable of finding such supportive operational bases, it should not become a substitute for the national liberation movement in Egypt or Lebanon, for instance. It is incumbent on the Palestinian revolution to contribute to the revolutionary process which would make all the countries surrounding Palestine become supportive operational bases. This is the only way to begin the liberation process. The revolution can contribute to this by virtue of its political positions, by building relations with the Arab revolutionary contingents, developing common militant programs with them and being serious in practicing cooperation and solidarity.

The revolution's ability to remain steadfast, and to move to the level of starting the liberation process, is contingent upon having such supportive operational bases. They will provide the Palestinian revolution and Arab national liberation movement with geographic and demographic depth, conducive to escalating the military confrontation against the Zionist entity to a qualitatively new level, from guerrilla warfare to a popular liberation war.

The particularity of the PFLP's viewpoint is that liberating any portion of Palestinian land, as a step toward liberating all of Palestine, presupposes the availability of supportive operational bases to enable the revolution to seize portions of Palestinian land from the clutches of the Zionist military establishment. This will be the starting point for the liberation of all Palestinian land.

The transformation of any Arab state surrounding Palestine into a supportive operational base for the liberation of Palestine, requires radical change in the nature of the regime. When reactionary or bourgeois forces hold the reins of power, they will be hostile to the revolution and put restrictions on it, due to their alliance with the enemy or their impotence to confront it. Such a bourgeois-dominated government will restrain the revolution's growth. Often, this sort of government paralyzes the revolution's ability to fight the Zionist enemy, and works to liquidate the revolution. In order to reverse this situation, the revolutionary classes (the workers and their allies in the middle and petit bourgeoisie) should induce a change in the regime. In other words, in order to turn the surrounding countries into supportive operational bases for the Palestinian revolution, popular, democratic regimes should be established, oriented toward bringing about the tasks of the national democratic revolution.

Toppling the reactionary and bourgeois regimes is the task of the masses of the country involved in the process of change. Clearly, the role of the Palestinian revolution should be supplementary. This general principle applies unequivocally to a country such as Egypt where there are only some thousands of Palestinians among 40 million Egyptians. It applies, with minor modifications, to the rest of the countries adjacent to Palestine, except Jordan which has its own special features.

Second: *The particular importance of Jordan as a supportive operational base for the Palestinian revolution.* Transforming Jordan into a supportive operational base for liberating Palestine requires that the masses of Jordan initiate the process of revolutionary change. Who are the masses of Jordan? The answer to this question determines the particularity of the Jordanian arena for the Palestinian revolution, the particularity of the revolution's role in the process of change, and the particularity of such a base in providing the prerequisites for the Palestinians' vanguard role in liberating Palestine, within the pan-Arab framework of the battle.

The masses of Jordan should primarily be active in carrying out their

rational tasks by fighting against the Zionist enemy. Consequently, the Jordanian regime's aggressive measures should not paralyze them. On the contrary, this should serve as an incentive for stepping up activities in order to take the advanced position in the conflict with the enemy.

Jordan stands out from other Arab countries. The Palestinian community has considerable weight in Jordan. Palestinians are well integrated, politically and economically, in the mainstream of society; certain sections of the right-wing bourgeoisie are Palestinian. There are also the workers, peasants, soldiers, and revolutionary intellectuals. Nevertheless, the main particularity of the Jordanian arena is that the Palestinians have lived side by side with the Jordanian people throughout the past thirty years; there is thus a unity of social relations. As long as the Jordanian regime is preserved, it will continue to function as an imperialist servant in dissipating the national identity of the Palestinian people and threatening the class and national interests of the masses. Therefore, all workers, peasants, toilers, the national petit and middle bourgeoisie, bear responsibility for waging a common militant struggle to create a front and common program for the sake of inducing national democratic change.

Hence, inducing such a change is incumbent on the masses, Palestinian and Jordanian, with real interests in the revolution. The next question is who is responsible for organizing and mobilizing all the Palestinians, including those in Jordan. Is this not a Palestinian undertaking? The Jordanian regime acts on the basis of its claim that the Palestinians residing in Jordan became Jordanian citizens; that the Palestinian revolution is in charge of the other Palestinian communities, not the one in Jordan. Is the Palestinian revolution to accept the Jordanian regime's line of reasoning? The Palestinians in Jordan constitute the bulk of the Palestinian people. Is the Palestinian revolution willing to let such a big portion of our people be isolated from participating in our national cause?

The Palestinian revolution is in charge of organizing and mobilizing all the Palestinian masses, regardless of their whereabouts. It is crucial to mobilize the Palestinian masses in Jordan, due to their position in the social and economic system. The Palestinian and Jordanian masses are responsible for the process of change. Establishing a national democratic regime is a joint militant task for the Palestinian revolution and the Jordanian national movement, on the basis of a united national front and an advanced organizational and militant formula.

This is the particularity of Jordan for the Palestinian revolution, as compared to all other arenas, including the other Arab states surround-

ing Palestine. The Palestinian revolution has a supplementary role in inducing the process of revolutionary change in these countries, but in Jordan it has to be a major partner.

Revolutionary change in Jordan, through the Palestinian revolution's alliance with the Jordanian national movement, means realizing a set of major goals, placing the Palestinian revolution at the threshold of a new era in its struggle against the Zionist enemy. A reactionary regime will have been eliminated, the regime which played a major role in aborting the Palestinian struggle in 1936, 1948-9, 1970-1, and up to the present. On the other hand, revolutionary change in Jordan will lead to mobilizing the potentials of a broad section of our people in Jordan for the national struggle. It will also provide the Palestinian revolution with a supportive operational base on which it can rely to consolidate its steadfastness, as a prerequisite for embarking on the liberation of Palestinian land. The importance of such a base is not only seen in the long border between Jordan and Palestine, enabling extensive contact with our masses in Palestine. Such a base will also provide the revolution with material pan-Arab depth, whereby the revolution can assume its vanguard role in liberating Palestine.

Stressing the importance of the Jordanian arena does not stem from the fact that it has the best geographical and demographic conditions. Obviously, Egypt and Syria have an edge over Jordan in this respect; Egypt has the potential for playing an important role, should a popular democratic regime be established, and liberating Palestine become top priority in its Arab nationalist program. Nor does our emphasis mean that Jordan is the most vulnerable link, where the Arab revolutionary forces can take power first. It is not possible to accurately predict the sequence of the revolutionary process in the Arab countries surrounding Palestine; nor can we predict the magnitude of the role which future popular democratic regimes would play in the liberation war, or how roles would be assigned to each country within the framework of the pan-Arab war.

Our emphasis on the Jordanian link stems from the Palestinian revolution's direct involvement in establishing a popular democratic regime there. This would have a direct impact on the liberation process, provided that the new regime does not take a position of waiting for the other Arab countries to achieve liberation. The newly established popular regime should not limit itself to the local struggle, since this would not open up new horizons for liberation, due to the complication of the battle and the size of the enemy camp.

The inability of the Palestinian revolution to liberate any portion Palestinian land after sixteen years of armed struggle, and the inordinate sacrifices made, obligates the revolution to study this predicament, analyze it and recommend remedies. Otherwise, the revolution will continue in a vicious cycle which fuels capitulation and despair, seeking any kind of settlement and falling prey to illusions, traps and political maneuvers.

The solution proposed by the PFLP calls for steadfastness in confronting the liquidationist schemes, and transforming Jordan into a supportive operational base. This base will in turn serve to consolidate steadfastness and create objective conditions in the Arab arena for escalating the military confrontation against the Zionist enemy, moving from defensive, guerrilla warfare to a popular liberation war, as the starting point in the liberation process.

Third: *The thesis of liberating Palestine in stages; the interim goal of the Palestinian struggle.* In this report, we are conducting a general review of the course of the armed Palestinian revolution, in order to draw lessons and accurately pinpoint the current tasks. These tasks are closely connected with the short-term goals of the struggle, along the path of liberating all of Palestine. During this course, various theses have evolved: the thesis of liberating Palestine in stages, and the interim goal of the Palestinian revolution; the necessity of creating new objective conditions in the countries surrounding Palestine, and the particularity of Jordan as a supportive operational base.

Serious confusion accompanied the thesis of interim stages in the struggle. There were clear tangible signs that the Arab and Palestinian bourgeoisie might exploit such a thesis as a cover-up for finding a formula for permanent peaceful coexistence with the Zionist entity. Thus, the bourgeoisie would absolve itself of responsibility for liberating all of Palestine and instead arrange its alliance with international capitalism. Hence, it was essential for us to take a clear position on this thesis in order to prevent the Arab and Palestinian bourgeoisie from veering toward capitulation under the cover of interim goals. At the same time, we have to scientifically define the thesis of interim stages and goals for ourselves and the masses, so that this concept guides us in leading the struggle. This concept will help us to understand the various stages of the conflict, the prerequisites for each stage and how each should complement, not abort, the one to follow.

Before the defeat of the Palestinian resistance in Jordan, the thesis of the interim goal was not advocated by any of the Palestinian revolution's contingents. In the 11th session of the PNC, the thesis of the "Palestinian state," on which some enemy circles were betting, was termed an imperialist conspiracy to be fought and defeated. After the October War, some Arab and Palestinian parties concretely asserted this formula in the Palestinian arena. Why, then, did the PFLP object to this proposition and what was the nature of our objection? Did we object to the principle of interim stages and goals in the struggle? What is our conception of interim stages and goals? What is our interim slogan? What are the prerequisites for achieving this slogan? What are the conditions on which the revolutionary forces can rely for making this slogan further the liberation process rather than being used as a cover-up for the capitulationist bourgeois forces to abort the strategic goal?

The PFLP rejected the political program of the 12th session of the PNC.[24] It was the first official Palestinian document that dropped the phrase of "no negotiations" with the Zionist enemy. What were the reasons for our position?

1. The timing of the program: The political program was put forward when there was a serious, ongoing attempt to settle the Arab-Zionist conflict on the basis of Security Council resolution 242, entrenching the legitimacy of the Zionist entity. It was evident that Arab reaction and a section of the Palestinian bourgeoisie were ready to settle the conflict on this basis. It was also clear that the "peace" referred to was a serious one with a good chance of being implemented, unlike the periods preceding the October War. At the same time, it was evident that the balance of forces was highly conducive to an imperialist-Zionist-reactionary settlement. This settlement posed a threat to the Arab nation. The "nationalist interim settlement," which some parties talked about, is no more than an illusion and wishful bourgeois thinking.

2. We refused the ten-point program about which the Palestinian bourgeoisie got so enthusiastic in the 12th session of the PNC. In the talks that preceded the convening of the 12th PNC, the PFLP supported the idea of an interim political program for the national cause. Thus, we would avoid being internationally isolated and de-

24 **Ed. Note:** The details of the 'PLO Interim Program (Ten-Point Program) can be seen online at https://www.palquest.org/en/historictext/9637/plo-interim-program-ten-point-program.

feated at the hands of the Arab bourgeoisie and reaction. However, following these preliminary talks, the discussions during the PNC session and the program adopted at the end showed that the Palestinian bourgeoisie was ready to make strategic concessions. These concessions were intended to be a foothold whereby the Palestinian bourgeoisie might negotiate with the Zionist enemy and gradually recognize its existence in return for establishing a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. The Palestinian bourgeoisie, along with some leftist elements, dropped the phrase of "no negotiations" with the enemy from their program, intending to leave the door open for negotiations. They insisted that the reason for rejecting Resolution 242 is that it treats the Palestinian cause as one of refugees. They showed readiness to accept the resolution if it was amended or replaced by a resolution recognizing the Palestinian cause as the cause of a people with the right to self-determination. Such amendment, however, would preserve the essence of the resolution which confirms the legitimacy of the Zionist entity. The main reason for the PFLP's rejection of the ten-point program was that it contained such concessions.

3. It became evident, soon after the PNC ended its session, that the Palestinian right and some leftist elements intended to employ the program as an approach for entering the settlement. They were deluding themselves that they could get their share in the settlement, and gain mass acceptance for the program. The statements made, and the flurry of political activities following the PNC session, were clear indications of the goal of the program and the reason behind the enthusiasm of its advocates.

It was clear from the start that the PFLP's rejection of the ten-point program was not a rejection of the idea of interim stages and goals in liberating all of Palestine. Nor was it a rejection of the Leninist principles of tactics and compromise in which working class parties should be versed in order to attain their final revolutionary ends. The PFLP rejected a program of clearly articulated clauses, which was accompanied by well-defined activities. The Palestinian right tried to take advantage of the program's loopholes in order to legitimize its own activities. The PFLP's particular conception of interim stages and goals, tactics and compromise following the October War and during 1974-5, can be confirmed by reviewing our positions, declarations, internal documents, the subjects of our central organ, and the statements made by our leaders, and their speeches in PNC sessions.

Events have substantiated the validity and soundness of our conception as opposed to the conception of those who intended to employ "interim goals," "tactics" and "compromises" as a cover-up for striking a deal with imperialism, reaction, and Zionism, based on recognizing the Zionist entity in return for a Palestinian state on a portion of the Palestinian land.

The unifying clauses of the Tripoli Document are unequivocal evidence, decisively refuting any debate in the Palestinian arena and among the revolution's contingents, about the real position of the PFLP on the theses of that period. The document showed the true nature of the former dispute concerning the subject of stages and interim goals. The Tripoli Document provided a fresh opportunity for the unification of the resistance contingents after their political division into two opposing fronts, which lasted from 1973 to 1977.

The clauses of the unifying Tripoli Document were crystal clear. They provided remedies for the disputes which had prevailed at the 12th and 13th sessions of the PNC. This led to unification of the Palestinian position after four years of bitter disputes and the existence of two opposing lines. In light of the importance of the Tripoli Document, we repeat its main points:

1) We struggle for establishing a progressive Arab front which is antagonistic to all the capitulationist solutions of imperialism, Zionism, and reaction, including its Arab agents.

2) We reaffirm our rejection of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

3) We stress our rejection of all international conferences which are based on the two aforementioned UN Security Council resolutions.

4) We reaffirm our right to struggle for attaining the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people: their right to return and exercise self-determination in their homeland, including the establishment of their own Palestinian state on any portion of Palestinian land liberated in this phase. The document categorically rejected the idea of recognition, reconciliation or negotiations with the Zionist enemy.

The unifying Tripoli Document was accepted by all the Palestinian revolution's contingents during the first conference of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. This was regarded as a victory for the position that rejected an imperialist settlement in general and the PFLP's position in particular. This is the general evaluation of the document shared by

the rank and file of the PFLP and other contingents that rejected the imperialist settlement, and by Arab nationalist, progressive, and revolutionary forces as well. What political position did the document stand for? The document stood for rejection of any settlement line. Within this framework, the Palestinian revolution reserved the right to establish a Palestinian state on any liberated portion of Palestine, without engaging, In negotiations, reconciliation, or recognition (of the Zionist entity).

What is the significance of the Tripoli Document and what is to be deduced from it? The document clearly signifies that the PFLP struggles for compatibility between any interim program and the line of rejecting settlement, providing the parameters that prevent the transformation of interim goals into a substitute for liberating all of Palestine. The PFLP does not reject *per se* the idea of interim goals or tactics in the revolutionary work. The PFLP accepted having interim goals only when the document provided guarantees and parameters for the unity of the Palestinian position. This does not mean that the PFLP backed down from its original position as some Palestinian circles claimed.

The magnitude of the conflict which went on in the Palestinian arena after the 12th session of the PNC and before the unifying Tripoli Document, obviously prevents the Palestinian right and some leftist elements from simply acknowledging the dangers that then beset the future of the Palestinian struggle. These dangers were related to the possibility of slipping into the illusion of political settlement and including basic concessions in the political program. Though the Tripoli Document resolved the dispute in the Palestinian arena, there is no doubt that basic points of difference were at the core of this dispute. It is worth mentioning that in the light of the ongoing developments, the Palestinian right felt it was dangerous for the split in the Palestinian arena to continue. The position taken by the Palestinian contingents that rejected the line of settlement and, consequently, the PLO program, not only had an impact in the international and Arab arenas. It also affected the internal affairs of all the resistance organizations; various political trends started to emerge and gained influence within these organizations and in the Palestinian institutions generally. In spite of the tremendous support which the PLO received, it could not ignore the influence and echoes of the positions taken by some organizations against political settlement and the programs which were put forward.

Of course, the thesis put forward by some leftist circles about the possibility of achieving a nationalist political settlement, served the ends

of the Palestinian right in instating the ten-point program at the 12th session of the PNC and the fifteen-point program at the 13th session. This thesis provided a theoretical cover for the programs, positions and political moves of the Palestinian right on the Palestinian, Arab and international level. It was mistakenly believed that the October War had created a new balance of forces that would enable the Palestinian revolution to conclude a nationalist settlement, depending on the international balance of forces and the great efforts of the Soviet Union to achieve a political settlement. Some leftists mistakenly thought that they could constitute the PLO's chief of staff, able to control political decisions. Events concretely demonstrated that the Palestinian right succeeded in capitalizing on some leftist positions, policies and moves, to the advantage of its own programs and orientation: thus, these leftists seemed to be subordinated to the political position of the Palestinian right, with no serious influence on the core of the right's positions, policies, orientation and plans.

This is the truth about the positions and facts which existed prior to the signing of the Tripoli Document. Thus, it is obvious that not all the Palestinian contingents acknowledged the triumph scored by the rejectionist position at the Steadfastness Conference in Tripoli. Nevertheless, it is our prerogative to consider the Tripoli Document as a frame of reference for judging the different viewpoints then prevailing in the Palestinian arena, and the basis on which these differences were ironed out. After the document was signed, it became the basis for the program of the 14th session of the PNC in 1979.

It is by now clear that a political conflict of great magnitude went on between the Palestinian bourgeoisie and some of the Palestinian left on the one hand, and the PFLP on the other, about the issue of interim goals. It is vital that our political report clarity this issue, since the revolution needs a more precise conception of the liberation process, i.e., the stages which the revolution will go through, the conditions needed for each stage, and the parameters that govern any interim goal, so that achieving any interim goal will lay the ground for achieving the next one. At the outset, it is indispensable to confirm two points that determine our understanding of the interim goal.

1. The national democratic revolution, including the national liberation stage, is in general a single stage, followed by the stage of socialist revolution. Therefore, any interim goal set by the Palestinian revolution falls within the framework of this single stage. Though

the national democratic revolution as a whole constitutes a single stage, it goes through phases; interim goals can be set in line with the nature of the stage as a whole.

2. Liberating any portion of Palestinian land requires objective conditions in the Arab arena, which do not presently exist. The ability of the Palestinian revolution to begin the actual liberation of Palestinian land depends on achieving revolutionary change in Jordan, in which the Palestinian revolution would play a vital role. Then, Jordan and the new popular democratic government would provide the Palestinian revolution with a supportive operational base on which to rely in the overall military confrontation with the Zionist enemy, for liberating Palestinian land.

Thus, charting the phases which the revolution will go through does not mean that we are at the point of undertaking the first interim goal. The goal of the present phase is protecting the revolution from being liquidated. Our program for countering such attempts is called the steadfastness program, with the fundamental tasks we defined in the previous chapter. We will be concentrating our efforts on these tasks for some time to come.

Our contemplation of the goals of the next phase, as discussed in the first chapter of the Palestinian section, did not absolve us from contemplating the process of change in Jordan as a goal and task. In the same way, our contemplation of the goals and tasks of the current stage, and the needed objective conditions for the liberation process, does not absolve us from defining our conception of the subsequent stages which the Palestinian revolution will go through. The fight for liberating Palestine will be long, difficult and complicated, both politically and militarily. It is not in the interest of the revolution to ignore or belittle this fact. The vanguard revolutionary organization which wants to embark on liberation has to absorb this fact in all its dimensions and be prepared accordingly, so that the people will not be plagued by frustration and despair.

The battle to liberate all the Palestinian land and destroy the Zionist entity is militarily complicated since the colonization process has come a long way. (Three million settlers today constitute the majority in Palestine.) In addition, the Zionist entity has been fully mobilized to play the role of imperialism's foremost base in the area. At the same time, the struggle is complicated politically, because the Zionist entity has acquired political recognition in the UN. As a result, there is not international support for the Palestinian revolution to achieve its full goals. These facts

have to be taken into consideration in pinpointing the course and phases leading to the achievement of the revolution's strategic goals. When defining a feasible interim goal, the variables of the balance of power should be pinpointed.

A change in the balance of power will, of course, be gradual. It will come about through military confrontation with the Zionist enemy, whereby portions of Palestinian land will be liberated. As stated in our basic documents, our war with the Zionist enemy will be a protracted people's war, not a lightning war. Protracted does not mean a few days or weeks; it means years. In this case, it is natural that the actual liberation of portions of Palestine will be followed by liberating other portions, after the lapse of a few years. The strategy of lightning war is not compatible with the thesis of stages in liberating Palestine. The fight for liberated areas on which the revolution can rely in pursuing the war is part of the overall picture of protracted people's war and a fundamental phase in the liberation process.

What are liberated areas? They are the areas controlled by the revolution. When the revolution takes control of such an area, it will, of course, establish its authority there. Thus, from a military viewpoint and according to the strategy of popular liberation war, the Palestinian revolution will pass through the phase of establishing the revolution's state in the liberated Palestinian land. From this follows the interim slogan of an independent Palestinian state to be established, without conditions, on any liberated portion of Palestinian land. This slogan specifies a definite interim goal that guides the revolution's struggle; it constitutes a link between the current phase of steadfastness, the phase of creating a supportive operational base and the phase of full liberation and establishing a popular democratic state in all of Palestine.

We are, of course, aware that this interim slogan does not present a final, magical solution to the existing discrepancy between the strategic goal of the revolution and the international legitimacy gained by the Zionist entity. We realize also that some international forces will support us in achieving this interim goal, but not based on our own frame of reference. We also realize that while achieving any interim goal, the revolution will come under considerable pressure to recognize the Zionist enemy and coexist with it. Yet the slogan will receive the support of the forces of socialism and liberation, and broad sections of international public opinion, for a long time to come.

During this period, our potentials and resources will grow; devel-

opments will occur in the Arab reality and the Arab national liberation movement; and the true nature of Zionism and the Zionist entity will be further evident. Also, a tremendous change in the balance of forces will occur on the local, Arab, and international level. This situation will enable us to pursue the liberation process for removing a racist, fascist, and imperialist base that rejects the democratic solution put forward by the Palestinian revolution for all inhabitants of Palestine, regardless of their beliefs.

Our fully legitimate right to return will always be acceptable and supported by the international community. This will provide us with an opportunity to continue the struggle against the Zionist enemy, provided that the slogan of establishing an independent Palestinian state on any liberated portion of Palestinian land is connected with the slogan of liberating all of Palestine and establishing a popular, democratic Palestinian state.

This clarifies the PFLP's conception of the thesis of the interim goal, which can be summarized in the following points:

1. Currently, the balance of forces is not conducive to achieving this goal. Achieving this goal requires achieving the tasks of the current stage as defined in the first chapter of this section; it requires supportive operational bases for the Palestinian revolution, especially in Jordan. In addition, achieving the interim goal will primarily depend on expanding the military confrontation and beginning the liberation of Palestinian land, supported by progressive forces around the world. Accordingly, this slogan is not presented for application in the present political situation. It has been recorded as part of the general vision and conception of the liberation process, to give practical answers to the questions raised in the Palestinian arena, and to rally the progressive forces of the world around the Palestinian cause.

2. Presenting this goal must always be coupled with the parameters and conditions that make it a step toward full liberation, not a substitute for this.

3. The existing political situation, on the Palestinian and Arab level, requires the continuation of the ideological and propaganda struggle against the line of settlement. The proponents of this line arm themselves with "stages-and-interim goals" as a cover for the course of settlement. We will be able to confront such a course by putting forward the revolutionary concept of stages and interim goals, thus

preventing the capitulationists from using such slogans for deceiving others. This is what the PFLP has been saying since 1973.

These three points clearly distinguish the PFLP's position on this issue from that of the Palestinian bourgeoisie and some Palestinian leftist forces.

Fourth: *The settlement trend, the dangers of its spreading, and the necessity of struggle for eradicating its influence on the masses.* On the Arab level, the settlement trend means solving the major discrepancies between imperialism and Zionism on the one hand, and the Arab reactionary and bourgeois forces on the other, for the purpose of tightening the grip of a capitalist class alliance on the toiling masses throughout the Arab homeland. On the Palestinian level, the settlement line aims at dissipating the Palestinian people's cause, resolving it in accordance with the principle of preserving the Zionist entity and its legitimacy.

Such a course did not exist before the emergence of the Palestinian revolution. Today, the situation is very different. This necessitates taking a very serious look at the line of settlement, the threats it poses, and the struggle for eliminating it, in order to protect the masses from its adverse impact.

Today, the course of settlement has been actively promoted on the Palestinian and Arab level. The proclamations of the Saudi, Jordanian, Moroccan, and other Arab rulers, are clear indications that the official Arab position vis-a-vis 'Israel' has significantly changed. These proclamations, made without embarrassment, indicate that these rulers recognize Israel; they think that the key to the solution lies in Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, and resolving the Palestinian cause on the basis of yielding to the existence of the Zionist entity.

Today, the Zionists officially report that they have held secret negotiations with King Hussein. This news causes no embarrassment for the king; he no longer feels that there is any need to deny these reports. The Arab regimes that maintain cooperative relations with the Jordanian regime do not even verbally object to these contacts. Thus, Arab reaction and some capitulationist bourgeois regimes expose their true position in the camp of imperialism and Zionism. The economic and class developments induced by the petrodollar wealth constitute the objective base for this political position. Moreover, under the cover of tactics and interim goals, the Palestinian bourgeoisie took a position expressing the

beginning of its movement toward the capitalist camp to which it belongs. This paved the way for the Arab regimes to officially declare their position and resolve their contradictions with imperialism, which arose from the masses' decisive refusal to recognize the Zionist entity. Obviously, Arab reaction and the capitulationist bourgeoisie were encouraged by the positions and proclamations of the PLO representatives in Bonn, London, Rome, and Paris.

The danger posed by the settlement line is not limited to resolving their discrepancies among Arab reaction, imperialism and Zionism, thus consolidating the Zionist entity and creating the prerequisite for an imperialist-Zionist-Arab reactionary alliance throughout the region. The settlement line also creates disarray and division in the ranks of the Palestinian masses. It creates division among Arab nationalist, progressive, and revolutionary forces, as was the case from after the October War until Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. The same thing is happening today, though on a smaller scale. In the light of this, combatting the settlement course has become a permanent ideological task on our work agenda throughout the liberation struggle, on the Palestinian, Arab and international levels.

What is our strategy for confronting the settlement course?

1) Waging a constant, serious struggle among the masses, the rank and file, and the leadership of the revolution, for rectifying the deviating line pursued after the October War.

This deviation was partially rectified after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, but its vestiges still linger. This calls for struggling to eradicate it. The line of settlement had concrete negative consequences, constituting a cover-up for official Arab capitulation and causing a set of shortcomings. This fact helps us to influence the masses and take action in their ranks, in order to set right the revolution's political line and uproot the settlement trend.

2) Waging a serious struggle for increasing the role of the democratic and revolutionary forces in the revolution's leadership, political decision-making and militant practice.

This is the sole guarantee for rectifying the political line and protecting the revolution from being aborted through the settlement course. In

the ideological and propaganda domain, we must constantly combat all illusions about the real position and role of the Palestinian bourgeoisie and the policies which it will ultimately pursue, if it is the sole force leading the struggle of our people.

There is no doubt that Zionist colonialism, and its aggressive, racist, and fascist program, places a broad section of the Palestinian bourgeoisie in a nationalist position. Ignoring this fact would greatly damage the Palestinian cause, since the unity of the Palestinian people in the face of Zionist usurpation is a scientific, feasible thesis. However, when the Palestinian bourgeoisie has the upper hand in leading the revolution, it will always be susceptible to striking a deal with the enemy. This is so because of the impotency of the bourgeoisie's program, and the interests it might have in such a deal. This would threaten the unity of the Palestinian people. The ability of the Palestinian people to preserve their unity, in the face of usurpation, depends on the influence of the democratic and revolutionary forces in the revolution's leadership.

We should always bear in mind the analysis of the previous stage of the struggle as we contribute to the present and future stages. The inability of our masses to score a victory against the Zionist invasion before 1948, was not because the Palestinian people said no to all proposals as the proponents of the settlement theorize. The leaders of the pre-1948 struggle said more than *yes* in accordance with the advice of Arab reaction and the British colonialists. The explanation for the fate of the Palestinian struggle, in its previous stages, is to be sought in the class nature of the leadership which dominated the masses' struggle. The masses for their part waged a protracted and bitter struggle. The lessons of the previous stages of struggle should always be borne in mind, since our masses have paid dearly, giving their blood and lives for these lessons.

3) Exposing and discrediting the real goals which the Arab reactionary and capitulationist bourgeois regimes have with the settlement.

It is now known that these regimes conceal their national treachery in the cloak of the settlement trend. Hence, it is necessary to mobilize the masses on the basis that yielding to the Zionist entity's existence is treachery, even if initiated in the name of defending the Palestinian people's rights. The masses' categorical rejection of the Zionist entity has precluded Arab reaction from easily instating its natural alliance with Zionism and imperialism. The settlement trend loosened up the masses' solid

convictions about Zionism. The cracks thus opened should be repaired through extensive propaganda work about the nature and magnitude of the crime and treachery committed by yielding to the existence of the Zionist entity.

4) The propaganda and ideological struggle for unifying the positions of all progressive Palestinian and Arab forces for the fight against the settlement trend.

The progressive and communist forces are divided in their positions on the idea of a settlement which secures the right of the Palestinian people on the basis of recognizing the existence of the Zionist entity. This constitutes a weak point for these forces in the struggle against the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary settlement which the enemy camp strives to impose on the region. We have already clearly felt the disadvantages of such division. This provides the Palestinian bourgeoisie in particular with an opportunity to conceal its real positions with progressive window dressing. The common point between the reactionary, capitulationist position and the position of some progressive and communist forces has provided the reactionary and bourgeois forces with an opportunity for deception and downplaying (the imperialist nature of the settlement).

Some communist forces reject certain brands of settlement, and "struggle" for a non-imperialist, non-reactionary settlement based on essentially the same position toward 'Israel'. These forces believe in the right of the Jews in Palestine to self-determination in their own state, and the feasibility of establishing a 'non-Zionist Israel' through class struggle in the Zionist entity. Hence, it will be difficult to unify the positions of the progressive and communist forces on combatting all settlement trends at all times in the course of the Arab liberation movement. The probability of achieving this task in the short run is low. Nevertheless, the overall developments of the past few years have undoubtedly created suitable ground for initiating a serious ideological dialogue on this issue, aimed at reaching united theoretical and political positions, radically antagonistic to the overall settlement line.

Over the past few years, it became tangibly clear that the reactionary and bourgeois Arab forces have picked up the idea of settlement primarily to hide their national treachery from the masses. Simultaneously, it became clear that imperialism was on the move to entrench the settlement idea in principle, in order to surmount the obstacles which have arisen

in resolving the contradictions between its allies in the region: Zionism, and the Arab bourgeoisie, and reaction. Most important is disclosing the nature of the Zionist entity, the extent of its aggressiveness and interests in the area, and the role assigned to it by imperialism. Entering any settlement with such an entity, before inflicting a political and military defeat on it, means full submission to the imperialist and Zionist schemes in the region.

The 1967 war highlighted the Zionist entity's role and goals. In addition, Israeli policies over the past few years have generated a set of fresh positions vis-a-vis the Zionist entity. This enhanced the conditions for rejecting the settlement line by revealing its dangerous, negative repercussions. We can rely on these developments in unifying the position of the communist and progressive forces against the overall settlement trend.

The following factors placed the rejectionist position at the threshold of a new era: international condemnation of Zionism as a racist, aggressive movement: exposure of the Zionist movement's subversive role in the socialist countries; the orientation of scientific circles in these countries to study the Zionist movement; the intimate connection of this movement with the most reactionary circles of international capitalism; and the radical change in the position of the Arab communist parties in general. This new rejectionist trend will align the positions of the progressive and communist forces on a common platform opposed to the alignment of the reactionary, capitulationist forces around the settlement course. This task is not an easy one but, due to its vitality and repercussions, we must persistently tackle it. We are confident that scientific fact will ultimately speak for itself.

We must put forth our viewpoint, relying on facts, figures and studies that determine the scientific nature of our position, in order to distinguish our national, class, and scientific position from a chauvinist position. Otherwise, our position of rejection will be distorted and unacceptable in progressive circles. We must give priority to this task, so that our political position is based on a class and economic analysis that explains the development of the Zionist movement and the aggressiveness of the Zionist entity.

The antagonistic contradiction between Zionism and the Arab and Palestinian liberation movement cannot be resolved without the decisive victory of one party over the other. It is not in essence a conflict between two nations. The conflict is due to the rise and the goals of the Zionist movement as fostered by the Jewish bourgeoisie and imperialism. The

movement's goal was creating a settler society to confront the unity and struggle of the masses for sovereignty and liberation, in an area where international capitalism has vital interests in terms of strategy and natural resources.

The aggressive nature of the Zionist enemy is due to: (a) the services it renders to imperialism; and (b) the interests of the settler society in exploiting Arab labor and land. The settler colonial nature of the Zionist state thwarts the effects of the laws of class struggle. The class struggle is virtually cancelled in the settler population, because all benefit from usurpation and occupation despite the existing inequality. The real struggle is between the settlers and the original owners whose land has been usurped and whose labor power is exploited.

Our ability to unify the positions of all the progressive and communist forces against the settlement trend and to wage the struggle until the final eradication of the Zionist entity, depends on our ability to carry out this ideological task. This ideological struggle should accompany our protracted popular war for liberating all of Palestine.

5) The particularity of the role of the Palestinian Arabs in the 1948 occupied territories; the unity of the Palestinian identity and struggle.

After the start of the armed Palestinian revolution and the 1967 Israeli aggression whereby all Palestine was occupied, the Palestinians of the 1948 occupied territories were able to interact with the Palestinian community in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Before, our people in 1948 occupied Palestine were a small minority, isolated from the main Palestinian community. They were subjected to oppressive, liquidationist, exploitative Zionist plans for dissipating their national identity. These schemes were also designed to consecrate their identity as members of a particular religious sect, so that they would appear as religious minorities within the enemy state.

Following the Ariha (Jericho) conference,[25] the Jordanian regime embarked on a drive of annexation and subordination, in order to obliterate the Palestinian identity. Due to the small percentage of Palestinians remaining in the 1948 occupied territories, they were not able to effectively defend their national identity and right to sovereignty. Then

25 Conference where a group of pro-Jordanian Palestinians approved the annexation of the West Bank to Jordan.

the ascent of Nasserism affected the masses in the 1948 occupied areas; a pan-Arab movement emerged in the Galilee, called *Al Ard* (*The Land*). Conditions were against the survival of this trend, and it therefore dissolved. Today, this section of our masses have begun to join in the militant process as a result of the ongoing Palestinian armed revolution which crystallized the Palestinian identity, and made gains in the international arena, being recognized as one of the vanguard contingents of the worldwide liberation movement. Their participation in the militant process is seen in the rising level of struggle in the 1948 occupied Palestine. From time to time, the enemy hints at the future threat which this poses to the Zionist entity. Developing the struggle of this section of our people is one of the revolution's central tasks.

The uprising of this section of our people on March 30, 1976, demonstrated their potential for threatening the enemy. It showed their attachment to the Palestinian national identity and land, their militant potential and their possibilities for contributing to the revolution's achieving its short-term, tactical goals and long-term, strategic goal.

The well-known Zionist document, the Koenig report, discloses the enemy's view of the dangers of the role of our masses in the 1948 occupied territories. The Koenig report expounds the Zionists' fear of the Arab population's natural procreation rate in the 1948 territories, which reached 5% versus 1.5% for the Jewish population. There are 600,000 Palestinians in the Zionist entity, constituting 15% of the total population, according to Zionist statistics. The majority of them reside in the Galilee where they constitute more than 50% of the population. Obviously, this concentration in a single region greatly increases their militant capability.

The rise of the Palestinian revolution, its steadfastness in the face of liquidation plans, the blows it deals to the enemy and the resulting political and military disarray in the Zionists' ranks, led to an upsurge of nationalist feelings among this section of our masses, as expressed by their militant activities. Their growing sense of national identity and belonging is expressed in the raising of liberation slogans, the increase in demonstrations, festivals and strikes on national occasions, and the refusal of university students to do guard duty. It is also expressed in the demands of Palestinian Druze to be exempt from army service. The setting up of land defense committees, the Sons of the Village and student organizations express the growing sense of national identity among this section of our people.

The Zionist policy of racist discrimination against our people in the

1948 occupied area, affects all aspects of their life (economic, social, education, housing). This policy is an integral part of the plan to eradicate our people's national identity, yet it has led to deepening their readiness to wage a bitter struggle against the enemy.

The masses in the Galilee and the other areas usurped in 1948, can assume a particular role, since they occupy a prominent position in the Zionist entity's agricultural and industrial labor force. In certain sectors and stages of production, the Palestinian Arab labor force plays a fundamental and particular role. As a result, our masses have the potential to cause confusion in the enemy's economy. The Koenig report states that the concentration and predominance of Arab workers in certain economic sectors can cause tremendous political and economic damage, should they decide to go on strike, since they carry significant weight in the functioning of the economy.

The Palestinian working class in the territory usurped in 1948, could assume an even more significant role, should the Palestinian workers from the West Bank and Gaza Strip show solidarity with them. The struggle of the Palestinian working class in the Zionist entity is the core of any radical class struggle in this state.

The struggle of our masses in the 1948 occupied area should, of course, be directed against all forms of national and class exploitation practiced by the racist Zionist enemy. Such struggle should be implemented within the framework of the unified Palestinian national struggle, converging with the Palestinian revolution's overall course and political program.

The emergence of the armed Palestinian revolution, and its steadfastness throughout this period, has entrenched the Palestinian national identity and the unity of representation of all our people. The revolution must keep emphasizing Palestinian national unity and the unity of representation of all our people wherever they may be. We must work toward merging all their struggles in the common struggle waged by the revolution. Though the presence of our people in more than one country imposes on each community particular tasks of struggle as determined by local conditions, all these tasks should be based on the revolution's program and linked with its major tasks.

6) Our position on progressive Jewish forces in the Zionist entity.

Our people's struggle against the Zionist enemy is not a chauvinist or

religious struggle, it is not directed against Judaism as a religious belief. The strategic slogan of the Palestinian revolution is the establishment of a popular democratic Palestinian state where all citizens would enjoy equal rights and duties, regardless of religion, sex, and color. The obvious corollary to this slogan is Arab-Jewish struggle against the Zionist-imperialist-reactionary alliance and its aggressive goals.

This is in principle. While leading the difficult and complicated battle, the Palestinian revolution needs to mobilize all the forces it can to achieve this goal. It needs sound programs and political tactics which secure a broad framework of alliances on all levels, robbing the enemy of some of the weapons it uses against our revolution and people. Thus, it is a top priority for the revolution to mobilize all Jewish forces who oppose the Zionist project, or might do so in the future. The revolution should ally or cooperate with all forces opposing the Zionist project and its fascist, aggressive policy which uses the Jewish masses as cannon fodder for preserving the interests of the imperialists and big Zionist capitalists.

The revolution has to accurately assess and document the reality of the Zionist entity in the light of the historical background which determined the inception and development of the Zionist movement, and the nature of the entity created by imperialism and Zionism on Palestinian land. The revolution has to understand the peculiar nature of the contradictions within the Zionist entity, and the course it has pursued, particularly from 1967 and onward.

The Zionist project was founded on the basis of the Jewish bourgeoisie's drive for profit, and to insure imperialist plunder of the region. Theodor Herzl, the founder of political Zionism and author of *The Jewish State*, greatly admired Cecil Rhodes, the pioneer of white settlement in Africa. From the start, Herzl displayed the class features of the Zionist project. Herzl clearly saw Jewish immigration to Palestine as a class evolution. According to him, the Jews would not lose their assets, but would convert them into cash. Only those who were sure that they would improve their status were expected to immigrate. In fact, things went along this path.

Aaron David Gordon, one of the fathers of Hebrew labor, admits that the Zionist claim of "making the desert bloom" was accomplished through the labor of "Ahmed" and "Mustafa." Along the same lines, Ha'am, a Zionist philosopher, says: "Our rural settlements in Palestine, even if expanded over time to reach their full potential, will always remain settlements belonging to a highly developed civilized minority that

derives its strength from its brains and wealth. The impoverished masses will not belong to us. Actually, this is what has happened, for every settler provides for (i.e. exploits) three Arab families."

These are the features of the Zionist project since its inception. Its exploitative capitalist nature crystallized as agricultural settlement developed into industrial settlement, as the organic link between the Zionist project and the imperialist project evolved, and as imperialism began to confer financial aid in return for the Israeli role in protecting imperialism's interests in the area. Finally, the 1967 aggressive expansion, and the ensuing economic exploitation, left no doubt as to the true nature of Zionism's class features.

The standard of living in the Zionist society is higher than that in Italy, Holland, or Austria. This is due to the economic assistance given to 'Israel' by imperialism in payment for its military role. (The Zionist society produces only 7% of what it consumes.) The high standard of living is also due to the Israeli exploitation of Arab markets and labor. The use of Palestinian Arab labor enables the Jewish laborer to work in advanced industries and specialized work, as opposed to the Palestinians' employment as unskilled, manual workers. In other words, the exploitation of Arab labor enables the Jewish labor force to climb the professional ladder, moving to better positions as technicians, engineers, etc. Thus, the Jewish working class benefits from the exploitation, usurpation and occupation imposed on the Palestinian population.

This fact has to be taken into account when speaking about the progressive Jewish forces opposing the Zionist project, for it explains the growth of right wing positions within the Zionist entity, and the total Zionization of Mapam. Conversely, it explains the limited growth of the Jewish organization, Matzpen, which developed a scientific, progressive concept of the Arab-Zionist conflict. Matzpen's membership is limited to a number of intellectuals who express their individual views, more than a class reality. The same fact explains why Palestinian Arabs constitute 90% of RAKAH's rank and file.

This does not negate the existence of a Jewish working class in the Zionist entity. Nor does it negate struggle between workers and capitalists, or social oppression in the Zionist entity. As stated by an Oriental Jewish Knesset deputy, Oriental Jews constitute 4% of university students, but 98% of Israeli jail inmates.

The escalation of the Zionist entity's fascist and aggressive policies

evokes a counter reaction. The Palestinian revolution must capitalize on these realities by stressing its democratic character and the progressive solution it offers for the Jewish question in Palestine. It must expose the aims of imperialism and Zionism in inciting chauvinist conflict between Arabs and Jews. In order to counter the enemy's policies, the revolution should translate its political line into a line of action, by showing readiness to cooperate with all the elements and organizations opposing and challenging the Zionist project. The Palestinian revolution should support the organizations hostile to Zionism and the Zionist entity. Our position vis-a-vis these organizations is one of political alliance that marks the beginning of practicing the slogan for a Palestinian popular democratic state.

As for RAKAH, the Israeli Communist Party, despite our radical political difference with its position vis-a-vis 'Israel', its hostile position against Zionism and imperialism constitutes common ground that could be developed into practical cooperation against the racist policies of the Zionist entity. Failure to distinguish between Zionist and anti-Zionist forces (even when the latter believe that Zionism can be separated from 'Israel') hurts the revolution. It also means ignoring the tangible reality of the existing conflict between RAKAH and Zionism. It is the revolution's duty to know how to take advantage of this conflict.

Owing to our complicated and difficult battle, it is of utmost importance to firmly adhere to the strategic course and goal. At the same time, it is equally crucial to be flexible in tactics so that the revolution gains a level of strength whereby its strategic goals can be achieved. Such attitudes could become the nucleus for the revolution's future ability to deal with all contingencies which might emerge in the course of its struggle in the Zionist entity, through steadfastness, growth and the crystallization of its democratic and progressive nature.

The Zionist society's particular ideology enables it to draw together all its own forces, social classes and trends against the masses of the region, based on supposed racial superiority. By the same token, the Zionist entity's particular economic and class structure, as a settler society, means that all its forces and classes benefit from the process of usurpation, occupation, and oppression. This greatly limits the possibility of inducing change from within. This does not mean that the Zionist entity is a conflict-free society; nor does it mean that it is exempt from the laws of class struggle. It is the task of the revolution to determine the existing contra-

dictions at each phase and how to deal with them in a way that serves the basic struggle against imperialism and Zionism as incarnated in the Zionist state.

Entering into alliances with Jewish forces opposed to the Zionist enemy should constitute one of the revolution's major tasks. These alliances should be practiced in accordance with the state of these forces at each stage.

7) The unity of the revolutionary democratic forces is the cornerstone for enhancing Palestinian national unity.

Palestinian national unity is the unity of all classes and strata of the Palestinian people that are hurt by the Zionist usurpation: workers, peasants, the toiling masses, and broad sectors of the bourgeoisie. The political and organizational formula for achieving such unity is a broad political front that includes all the forces, parties, trends and public figures who rise to the challenge of Zionist usurpation. In this sense, the PLO constitutes such a front.

The predicament of Palestinian national unity does not lie in the lack of a framework for alliance and mobilization, but in the nature of this framework and the degree of its effectiveness in bringing about mobilization and unification. The sole scientific explanation for the weaknesses in the PLO's unity and mobilization over the past sixteen years, lies in the nature of the leadership. Other explanations might shed light on certain aspects or forms of the predicament, but they fail to explain the enduring phenomenon.

The bourgeoisie, by virtue of its ideological and class nature, cannot let the mobilization and unity process take its natural course. Serious mobilization of the masses' resources is a threat to its political line. The bourgeois leadership wants to leave the line open to bargaining and compromise. Full mobilization would threaten its monopoly on power.

This political leadership played an influential role in the question of national unity. Here we are not undertaking a full review of the revolution's course and all the political issues which have been subjects of controversy, leaving a negative impact on national unity. Political disputes do arise among the various, class forces of the revolution. This is a natural and common matter. However, when these disputes touch upon matters pertaining to the revolution's destiny, i.e., essential matters, national unity will obviously be in jeopardy. This was the case at certain political

moments during the Palestinian resistance's battles with the reactionary Jordanian regime, and after the October War, when the PLO leadership was seeking a place within the settlement project presented at that time. To us, this was an attempt to abort the revolution.

The course of the Palestinian struggle, and the lessons that evolved from it, definitively place Arab reaction in the enemy camp. Nevertheless, the PLO's program still speaks of imperialist "agents" or "tools" without clearly identifying their class nature, or the position of the Arab reactionary forces and regimes in the conflict. Of course, this is not inconsequential. The bourgeoisie's refusal to determine the position of the reactionaries means, in practice, leaving the door open for cooperating with them. This had a negative impact on the struggle process as we have experienced throughout the revolution's march.

The organizational question also had an impact on national unity. Again, it is not our intention here to fully review the revolution's march and the controversial organizational matters which negatively affected national unity. It is sufficient to mention the bourgeoisie's insistence on imposing its own hegemony, its individualism and monopoly on decision-making powers. Also, the bourgeoisie feared the repercussions of the growth of the revolutionary democratic forces within the PLO's organization. This fear and individualism were the reasons behind the failure to fulfill genuine national unity; this also led to tension in the Palestinian arena and resorting to violence instead of democratic dialogue. The bourgeoisie shied away from dialogue since this strengthens the positions of democratic forces in the ranks of the revolution and the masses.

The bourgeoisie is based on the principle of private ownership of the means of production. This material base has various behavioral expressions, including individualism in political decision-making. Is there any other scientific explanation for the predicament of Palestinian national unity throughout the foregoing period? The problem does not lie in the traits of this leader or that. Doubtlessly, there are a set of secondary factors involved, but the main one is the class nature of the domineering leadership which wants to monopolize decision-making and keep the decisions in line with its own orientation.

Only the working class does not fear the consequences of the mobilization and unification process, since such a process consolidates the working class's political decision-making powers. Initiating a unification process on a democratic basis will ensure the legitimate role of the working class in contributing to the decision-making process. This role will

grow in step with the militant role of the working class, Thus, any qualitative change in the reality of the Palestinian national movement and the PLO depends on the growth and unity of the revolutionary democratic forces and their influence within the framework of national unity. Therefore, achieving a qualitative leap in Palestinian national unity constitutes a strategic mission. It requires a protracted militant process whereby the vanguard of the working class demonstrates its eligibility and prerogative to lead.

The leading role of the bourgeoisie in the Palestinian revolution is due to a set of intertwined objective and subjective factors. Among them is the fact that the bourgeoisie took the initiative in launching the Palestinian revolution. Another factor is the state of the revolutionary democratic forces and the Palestinian communist movement. Along with these subjective factors, there was the official Arab reality which supported the Palestinian bourgeoisie. Arab officialdom feared, encircled and incited against the democratic forces. The support of the Arab reactionaries and bourgeoisie to the Palestinian bourgeoisie doubtlessly constitutes one of the main factors in preserving the latter's hegemony in the revolution's leadership. Their support provides the Palestinian bourgeoisie with financial and armament capacities that enable it to move among the masses and influence them.

On the other hand, the factors which favor the democratic forces are gradually growing into a major force. This will enable the democratic forces to increase their action and leading influence in the revolution, especially after it becomes clear that the bourgeoisie's political position has negative effects on the revolution's march. More than once, the PFLP, succeeded in providing leadership for the masses, which set a concrete example of how a progressive political position can serve to advance the role of the progressive forces (during the battles against the Jordanian regime and the settlement trend). Today, the political situation permits progressive Arab and international forces to gradually increase their support and solidarity with the Palestinian democratic forces. By the same token, the mounting role of the revolutionary democratic forces in the main arenas of struggle (the occupied homeland and Jordan) attests to their steadfastness under very complex circumstances. All this shows the gradual change in the balances of forces in the Palestinian arena, in favor of the revolutionary democratic forces.

Increasing the level of coordination, cooperation and solidarity among the revolutionary democratic forces will enhance their role, effec-

tiveness and positive impact on the Palestinian arena. It will enable them to prevent deviation on the part of the Palestinian bourgeoisie and to enhance national unity, which would mean the mobilization and unification of Palestinian resources. Therefore, the task of enhancing Palestinian national unity is linked with the task of crystallizing and unifying the revolutionary democratic trend in the Palestinian arena and increasing its impact and influence within the PLO.

Two clearly defined organizational and political lines have emerged in the Palestinian arena in the course of the revolution: the line of the bourgeoisie, and the line of the toiling masses and the working class, i.e., the revolutionary democratic line. This phenomenon has occurred in all national liberation movements.

On the political level, the revolutionary democratic line stands for a firm policy against the enemy, not only against Zionism, but also against imperialism and reaction. This line links the Palestinian struggle with the ongoing struggle in the Arab and international arenas. The democratic line views the Palestinian revolution as the vanguard for a protracted confrontation against all the bases of imperialism and reaction. The Palestinian masses will wage this struggle, with the democratic forces as the vanguard, as a part of the united Arab revolution heading toward socialist revolution.

On the organizational level, the revolutionary democratic line stands for collective leadership, laying the ground for democratic relations among the contingents of the revolution, and observing the principle of proportional representation according to the advance of each contingent's role in the revolutionary process. The revolutionary democratic line is represented by certain of the revolution's contingents, but it also exists as a trend among the rank and file of the bourgeois contingents.

The most dangerous situation that the Palestinian revolution could face is a split in its ranks, should the bourgeoisie deviate and become party to a settlement formula promoted by the Arab reactionary and bourgeois regimes. This danger stems from the Arab bourgeoisie's attempt to use the PLO as a cover for such deviation, since the PLO represents Palestinian legitimacy and is universally regarded as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Consequently, preventing such deviation and its devastating effects on the Palestinian revolution depends upon the revolutionary democratic forces' ability to become an effective force in official Palestinian decision-making, the PLO and the daily struggle.

In their political and organizational struggle, the revolutionary democratic forces will proceed from the program of the 14th session of the PNC. This is the minimum program around which the Palestinian contingents gather within the framework of the PLO. Under the current conditions, this program constitutes a sound basis for maintaining the struggle to enhance Palestinian national unity.

Proceeding from the minimum program and perceiving the current political developments, the PFLP will intensify its efforts to achieve steady progress toward effective and genuine national unity, by building the most solid relations with the Palestinian resistance's contingents.

We are firmly convinced that the PFLP constitutes the fundamental leftist pole in the dialogue now underway on the Palestinian national work in the occupied homeland and abroad. Thus, we will continue to stress the importance of our role and its development. We will further crystallize the PFLP's leftist identity by escalating our political, organizational, mass, and military activities, and by being aware of all the attempts to dissipate this identity which we have gained through out struggle over the past few years.

Adhering to this role is coupled with equal commitment to the task of crystallizing a revolutionary democratic trend. This constitutes one of our fundamental tasks in building Palestinian national unity under the leadership of the working class and its vanguard party. The task of unifying the Palestinian communist movement will be more complicated than unifying the communist movement in any other Arab country. The division of the Palestinian communist movement over the position to be taken vis-a-vis 'Israel' constitutes an obstacle to the unification process. This obstacle stands in the way of envisioning the process whereby Palestinian communists will be united.

Nonetheless, the unification of the revolutionary democratic forces, within the framework of the Palestinian revolution would constitute a fundamental and tangible step along this path in the foreseeable future. Bringing about this unification process will doubtlessly help to clarity and define the subsequent steps for building the united Palestinian communist party. Practical steps must be mapped out to pursue this task.

This is our path for strengthening national unity; we will thereby hold the Palestinian bourgeoisie to the nationalist position within the framework of an alliance of all social classes and forces, in order to

achieve the national tasks.



Chapter Three

General Assessment of Our Political Positions on the Palestinian Level

Generally, in the period from 1972 to 1980, the PFLP represented the major Palestinian force opposing the settlement trend. It was also a major force within the revolutionary democratic trend, radically hostile to Zionism, imperialism and reaction. The revolutionary democratic trend has been struggling for regulating relations among the contingents of the resistance on sound democratic principles, within the framework of the PLO. Hence, we positively assess our political line in general, which enabled us to increase our political and mass activities, and to expand and consolidate our progressive alliances on the Arab and international levels.

The battle against the settlement has been the major battle facing the Palestinian revolution during this period. The PFLP took what became known as a rejectionist position, based on principles that pertain to the core of our position against Zionism and the Zionist entity. Our position was also based on political analysis of the balance of forces on the Arab and Palestinian arena, i.e., that the prevailing balance of forces did not allow for an interim nationalist settlement. Among other political premises upon which our position was based, was the fact that the proposed settlement formula was an imperialist, Zionist, and reactionary one. Added to this was the fallacious view of those who called for joining in and contributing to the settlement process, in order to extract a "nationalist settlement" on which the revolution could rely to pursue the struggle for achieving its strategic goals. The PFLP explained the illogic of this viewpoint and the danger that it would provide a cover-up for some regimes to justify their capitulation and recognition of the Zionist entity.

Today, in the light of events; we can confidently record the validity and soundness of our position. It is our prerogative to regard the participation of the Rejection Front in the first Steadfastness Conference in Tripoli; and the unifying Palestinian document adopted there, as concrete evidence of the validity of our assessment and the triumph of the rejectionist position. The PFLP's position on the settlement constituted

the most prominent of our battles in this period of the Palestinian revolution, in addition to our role in founding the Palestinian Rejection Front and striving to form an Arab rejection front. These two accomplishments will remain some of the PFLP's major accomplishments.

The PFLP's sound position vis-a-vis the settlement battle was accompanied by a sound position on Palestinian national unity. Then, minute positions had to be determined. It was not easy to take positions in this very dangerous and complicated period. Committing any blunder would have had immense negative repercussions on the revolution in general and on the Front in particular.

The nature of the political conditions required taking a position vis-a-vis the PLO that would deny the PLO's claim to represent all the revolution's contingents, while at the same time avoiding a definitive division in the Palestinian arena. Such division would mean disregarding a set of factors, such as the complications that would accompany the settlement, and their possible consequences; the manner of confronting such complicated conditions, including the conditions prevailing among the Palestinian masses; and the creation of the prerequisites for waging the battles imposed on the revolution, especially in Lebanon.

In such immensely complicated circumstances, the PFLP took a position on national unity that insured waging an effective struggle against the settlement course and keeping it from appearing to represent the Palestinian revolution as a whole. At the same time, the Front kept open the option of returning to the PLO Executive Committee, in case political developments closed the door of settlement in the face of the PLO leadership, or made it discover the true nature of the proposed settlement. When the PFLP pulled out of the PLO Executive Committee and formed the Rejection Front, it remained keen to stay in the Palestinian institutions in the framework of the PLO and to attend PNC sessions. Without going into details, we can say that events also substantiated our minute positions and the extent of the damage we would have caused by committing any mistake on this respect. Our position allowed us to effectively tackle the settlement course. At the same time, it allowed us to quickly and successfully adapt to the developments that followed Sadat's visit to the Zionist entity.

The battle in Lebanon was the second biggest battle that faced the Palestinian revolution during that period. Here events came to prove the validity of the PFLP's general analysis and political positions.

The PFLP identified the fundamental character of the battle in Lebanon as a civil war, despite its connection with the overall regional conflict. In the light of this analysis, the PFLP stressed that it was an inter-Lebanese conflict and demanded that the Lebanese National Movement take the lead in confronting the plan against Lebanon. The PFLP always stressed the antagonistic character of the conflict, and that any lulls were spurious and temporary ones, used by the hostile forces to mislead others and consolidate their own positions. The PFLP always underlined that the phenomenon of dual power in Lebanon would only be solved by the triumph of one of the opposing sides. Therefore the PFLP called for defining positions and mapping out programs that would insure resolving the dual power situation decisively in favor of the masses, i.e., by establishing a national democratic authority throughout Lebanon.

The settlement battle and the Lebanese battle were the major ones waged by the Palestinian revolution during the period under review. In the light of this evaluation, the political course of the PFLP was a sound one, generally representing the progressive revolutionary line in the arena of Palestinian struggle.

In the Jordanian arena, the PFLP stood for a fundamental political line opposing the regime and struggling for the right of the revolution to be present among its masses in Jordan and mobilize them in the battle against the Zionist enemy. The PFLP warned against the dangers of the PLO's forging special relations with the Jordanian regime, since the regime will employ such relations to mislead others, hiding its conspiratorial role in liquidating the Palestinian cause and revolution.

In Palestine, the PFLP stood for a fundamental political line opposing occupation and usurpation. This line reflected the PFLP's central political program and positions. This is our overall evaluation but, of course, we committed some blunders. It is our duty to study these and extract lessons, in the hope of benefiting from our mistakes in the forthcoming stages of our struggle. These mistakes are the following:

First: Our general analysis of the goals and means for achieving the settlement conspiracy was confirmed by events, as recorded in the Arab section of this report. However, we made a specific mistake about the way of overcoming the Palestinian obstacle which blocked a comprehensive settlement on all fronts. The PFLP argued that US imperialism would be ready to accept a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in ex-

change for recognition of the Zionist entity, consolidating its legitimacy, containing the Palestinian revolution and facilitating the inclusion of all the US's Arab allies in the proposed settlement project.

This analysis was not contained in *The Tasks of the New Stage*. Furthermore, this document actually ruled out the possibility that the US would go this far. It ascertained that the US would try to overcome the Palestinian obstacle through a Palestinian entity in confederation with the Jordanian regime. Nevertheless, following the October War, the PFLP entertained such a conception of the US position vis-a-vis the Palestinian problem.

Then, in June 1974, we look the following position: "Pertaining to the US position vis-a-vis Palestinian representation in the Geneva conference, the PFLP believes that the US wants the PLO itself to represent the Palestinian cause. In this way, the revolution will be contained and aborted: the historical existence of 'Israel' will be insured. In addition, the US will satisfy its Arab allies, primarily represented by Sadat and Faisel. It will appear to the Soviets as if the US is making a basic concession, entitling it to extract a price in return in the negotiation process."

The PFLP put forward this conception at a specific political period, but successive events proved its fallacy. Though the quoted paragraph does not explicitly name a Palestinian state to be established on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, we all remember that we thought that the imperialist solution for the Palestinian cause was based on this principle. While noting that such an approach might be used in the future, we hereby criticize this particular political position which we took in that particular political period. The course of events has proved that the obstacles and discrepancies facing the imperialist settlement process are more complicated than we imagined. Surmounting these obstacles requires more time and efforts than we had expected. This is a lesson that can benefit us in our future work.

Second: During the battle in Lebanon, a reformist political line governed the positions and practices of the Lebanese National Movement, especially during 1975 and 1976. As a consequence, the PFLP committed a political blunder by betting on a certain number of Lebanese organizations and parties that, at the time, adopted a fundamental political line vis-a-vis the battle. In terms of its Lebanese alliances, the PFLP acted as if these organizations and parties would constitute the fundamental

axis around which the Lebanese mass movement would eventually rally. The result of this conception was that the Front focused on its alliance with these forces at the expense of consolidating its alliance with the Lebanese National Movement and its major, active parties.

Events proved the fallacy of this position. The civil war played a role in gradually consolidating the positions of the National Movement. Events also proved that certain radical positions can be merely verbal, lacking practical application and incapable of being translated into tactical programs. It is this tactical aspect of the program that determines whether or not any fundamental position can be imposed. The axis, which the Front had for some time counted on, vanished due to its having ignored the importance of tactical moves, and due to the dichotomy between its theory and practice.

Though until now, we have not been completely certain about the consolidation of the Lebanese National Movement's position, the nature of the conflict constitutes an objective factor pushing in that direction. Presumably, this factor will be accompanied by a process of alliance, solidarity and dialogue with the advanced forces of the Lebanese National Movement.

Third: On the Jordanian level, in the first years after our Third Congress (1972-1974), we committed a mistake by concentrating only on Jordanian nationalist work, through the People's Party. Throughout that period, we neglected the branch of the PFLP in the Jordanian arena. We ignored the necessity of rebuilding it and charting the programs that would lead to its renewed growth following the 1970-1971 defeat, helping it to mobilize the Palestinian masses around the Palestinian revolution in Jordan.

The Palestinian resistance made a mistake from 1967 to 1971, in Jordan, by disregarding the Jordanian national movement. The resistance mistakenly acted as if it were a substitute for this movement. This mistake led us to commit the opposite mistake, by confining our concern to the Jordanian national struggle at the expense of the Palestinian struggle in the Jordanian arena. We continued in this mistake until 1974. At that time, a new atmosphere spread among the Palestinian masses in Jordan, prompting them to rally anew around the national cause. Only then did the PFLP consider reviving its organization in Jordan and charting organizational, political, mass and military programs as guidelines for the work of its branch.

Fourth: Also in the Jordanian arena, our work on both the Jordanian and Palestinian levels was for some time solely geared to the strategic goal of toppling the Jordanian regime through revolutionary violence. We were slow to absorb the big upset in the balance of forces in the Jordanian arena following the 1971 defeat. This defeat should have prompted the definition of new tasks and tactical slogans in line with the new balance of forces and the prevailing mass atmosphere. By concentrating only on the strategic slogan, we were not in a position to induce a gradually escalating process of mass mobilization capable of generating revolutionary change.

This state of affairs lasted until the beginning of 1975. Then, we defined a set of tactical slogans for Palestinian work in the Jordanian arena. These slogans were in line with the balance of forces and the mass climate. They focused on enforcing the right of the Palestinian resistance to mobilize the Palestinian masses in Jordan, and to fight the Zionist enemy from across the Jordanian frontier. The PFLP also defined its viewpoints regarding the Jordanian struggle and how crucial it is to focus on political freedoms and the struggle for immediate social demands. The Front identified the national policy which Jordan ought to pursue in national, pan-Arab and international affairs. As a result of rectifying its previous mistakes, the PFLP again became relatively active in the Jordanian arena.

Fifth: In Palestine, the PFLP opposed the 1976 elections for mayors in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, calling on the masses to boycott them. Events proved the fallacy of the PFLP's position, since the boycott was ineffective, and the newly elected mayors played a role in fighting the occupation and the Camp David conspiracy.

The principle rationale behind our position was not recognizing the legitimacy of occupation, and not letting the enemy cloak its aggressive policies in a semblance of democracy, by dealing with the institutions it makes accessible to regulate the daily affairs of the masses. Our position on these elections was also based on a political rationale related to the settlement trend prevailing in that period. We feared that the enemy would use these mayors in the plan to liquidate the Palestinian cause, capitalizing on the fact that they had been elected by the Palestinian masses.

Our first rationale was sound and principled. However, events demonstrated that the revolutionary value of this rationale depends upon ability to impose not dealing with the occupation, even concerning daily

affairs, as was the case in the Gaza Strip in the early part of the seventies. If the masses fail to reject the institutions provided by the occupation and do not create their own social institutions, the nationalist forces can benefit from the social institutions provided by the occupation in the fight against the enemy. The nationalist forces can link everyday life struggle with the national cause, as a prelude to imposing their own institutions and regulating social affairs on their own. It is worth mentioning in this connection that the Bolsheviks, under Lenin's leadership, condemned all dealings with the tsarist Duma when there was a revolutionary upsurge in 1905. Later on, when the revolutionary tide was receding, Lenin condemned those who continued to call for boycotting the Duma. This analogy is, of course, not very precise, since there is a difference between social institutions and the masses' relations to them under occupation, and a political assembly such as the Duma, which was not imposed by a foreign occupier. Nevertheless, the example shows the necessity of revolutionary parties adjusting their positions in line with changes in the balance of forces and the state of the masses.

As for the political rationale behind our position, events proved that resolving the Palestinian obstacle, within the framework of a comprehensive settlement for the conflict in the area, takes a long time, since serious problems have to be surmounted. The concrete course of events eventually shows the soundness or fallacy of any political position.

Sixth: In the PNC's 12th session, the PFLP had reservations on certain issues in the program. Yet we did not categorically reject the entire program. This gave the PLO leadership the opportunity to claim, for some time, that the program represented the position of all the resistance contingents. The program adopted by the 12th session marked the beginning of the PLO leadership's readiness to deal with the settlement trend, irregardless of any analysis as to whether or not imperialism and Zionism would agree to PLO participation in the framework of a settlement. Nonetheless, the PLO leadership has made certain concrete moves and taken positions and orientations showing readiness to join the settlement process if given the opportunity to do so. Events have also proved that the PLO's pursuing such a course has had negative repercussions, including negative positions and alliances.

In the history of the Palestinian revolution, the program of the 12th session was the precursor of the settlement trend. It was the PFLP's burning duty to assume the role of forcefully tackling this problem from the

outset. A clear-cut line had to be drawn between the two basically different political lines in the Palestinian arena vis-a-vis the thesis of a settlement. Merely registering reservations on the program of the 12th PNC session meant that the PFLP did not present a clear-cut position to the masses. This caused confusion on the Arab and Palestinian levels. The PFLP's position allowed the settlement trend to appear as the only one in the Palestinian arena for some time.

However, our ability to pinpoint and admit our mistakes enabled us to alleviate these repercussions within a very short period of time. Then the PFLP regained its leading revolutionary position in rejecting the settlement trend. We have already commended ourselves for this position in this evaluation, regarding it as one of the major revolutionary positions taken by the PFLP in the course of the revolution.

These are the mistakes we committed over the course of the past eight years which were full of events, developments and contingencies. These mistakes were committed in the context of an overall course whereby the PFLP was the main Palestinian pole, after the October War, to put forward an analysis and program whose soundness and validity were substantiated by events. It is our duty to pinpoint our mistakes. This attitude is a measure of our ability to practice self-criticism with a real revolutionary spirit, far removed from bourgeois selfishness and arrogance.

The PFLP demands that the rank and file perform their duty of daringly reviewing our course and being sure that this political report has recorded all our previous mistakes. This is the only way to learn from experience. This is the path of steady progress.



Chapter Four

The Political Tasks of the PFLP

The previous sections of this report defined all the current political tasks which the PFLP has to undertake on the international, Arab, and Palestinian levels. The report substantiated these tasks through political analysis of the conditions on the international, Arab, and Palestinian levels at the time of the congress. The report attempted to explain the current political tasks necessitated by the present political circumstances of the Camp David offensive to liquidate the revolution. The

task of tackling the Camp David accords should be linked with the task of creating the prerequisites for liberating Palestinian land. This task, in turn, has to be linked with the task of liberating all of Palestine and establishing a popular democratic Palestinian state as part of an Arab national democratic revolution oriented toward building a united socialist state throughout the Arab homeland. Achieving these tasks is part of the global struggle to defeat the imperialist system and create socialism and peace on earth.

In the light of this, this chapter will formulate the titles of the tasks designated in the previous sections and chapters. Our rank and file, branch leadership, committees, and central leadership bodies should bear in mind the main tasks defined. These constitute the cornerstone of our mass agitation, and our informational, military, and political activity. They constitute the basis for formulating our central and branch programs, in addition to joint programs with our Palestinian, Arab, and international allies. The tasks we set for ourselves are indeed the tasks of the Palestinian revolution and its progressive and revolutionary forces. These tasks, for the process of liberating Palestine, are interrelated with the tasks of progressive and revolutionary forces on the Arab and international levels. For revolutionaries, the value of theoretical work lies in its being a guide for action and struggle. Therefore, it is natural that our political report concludes by reviewing all the tasks we will struggle to achieve.

Our Tasks

Current Tasks in the Palestinian Arena:

1. Struggling to defeat the Camp David accords and the 'autonomy' conspiracy.

2. Escalating the military struggle against the Zionist entity.

3. Escalating political and mass struggle against the Zionist entity.

4. Struggling to consolidate the Palestinian National Front inside Palestine on the basis of the political and organizational program of the PNC's 14th session; increasing its militant efficiency in leading the masses inside Palestine:

5. Struggling against the conspiracy of the Palestinian-Jordanian state.

6. Struggling against all forms of settlement proposed by imperialism

including the West European states and the Socialist International.

7. Struggling to apply the organizational program of the PLO, adopted by the PNC in its 14th session.

8. Building and consolidating relations among all Palestinian revolutionary and democratic forces to enhance national unity, as a step toward building progressive, democratic Palestinian national unity.

9. Escalating the economic, political, and military struggle in the 1948 occupied territories and forging relations with the active and new progressive forces there.

10. Consolidating our alliance and cooperation with all progressive Jewish forces opposing Zionism and the Zionist entity.

11. Waging a firm propaganda battle against the settlement trend.

12. Struggling to preserve the gains of the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Current Tasks on the Palestinian-Lebanese Level:

1. Courageously defending Palestinian armed presence and all the revolution's gains in Lebanon.

2. Mobilizing, training and arming the Palestinian masses in Lebanon to defend the revolution.

3. Improving military coordination between the revolution's contingents in Lebanon on the basis of a united leadership and plan.

4. Dealing firmly with mistakes, transgressions and wrong behavior that harm relations between the revolution and the Palestinian masses, and especially between the revolution and the Lebanese masses.

5. Enhancing our military capabilities to the maximum in terms of armament, training and personnel.

6. Escalating the fight against Saad Haddad's troops.

7. Escalating the fight against the Zionist enemy over the Lebanese border.

8. Consolidating relations with the Lebanese National Movement by all means so as to strengthen its capabilities for foiling the imperialist-Zionist-fascist scheme for Lebanon.

9. Concentrating the revolution's relations on the Lebanese National

Movement and supporting the Lebanese masses through this movement.

The revolution has no right to transcend the Lebanese National Movement's authority. On the contrary, we must support the LM's authority so that it can execute its responsibilities and achieve its tasks as the leadership of the Lebanese nationalist struggle.

10. Deepening and consolidating the Lebanese-Palestinian-Syrian alliance as being directly concerned and linked with the outcome of the conflict in Lebanon.

11. Working to enlist nationalist and progressive Arab and international forces to support the steadfastness of the Lebanese National Movement and the masses of the South. This support is a measure of solidarity with the Palestinian revolution and contributes to defending its existence.

12. Working to deepen cooperation between the progressive Lebanese and Palestinian forces in order to consolidate their role in leading the joint Lebanese-Palestinian struggle against Camp David schemes in Lebanon.

The Tasks on the Palestinian-Jordanian Level:

1. Struggling to abrogate the existing special political relationship between the PLO and the Jordanian regime.

2. Confronting the activities of the Jordanian regime and its agents in Palestine.

3. Confronting the positions, activities, and moves initiated by the Jordanian regime to create conditions whereby it can eventually join the settlement process.

4. Struggling to impose the Palestinian resistance's right to political and military presence among our masses in Jordan.

5. Fighting the Zionist enemy across the Jordanian-Palestinian border.

6. Supporting the Jordanian national movement in its national democratic struggle for political liberties, defending the oppressed classes and confronting the reactionary policy of the regime on the Arab and international levels.

7. Working for the establishment of a united national front to include all nationalist, progressive, and revolutionary forces in the Jordanian arena.

Our Tasks on the Arab Level in the Context of the Arab National Liberation Movement:

1. Struggling to isolate Sadat's regime diplomatically, politically, and economically. Supporting the Egyptian national movement's struggle to topple the regime.

2. Confronting US imperialism and all its policies, projects and interests in the region.

3. Sustaining the demand for using Arab oil as a weapon against US imperialism.

4. Calling upon the nationalist regimes and all nationalist, progressive, and revolutionary Arab forces to provide the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese nationalist forces with all means of support.

5. Struggling to develop the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front.

6. Struggling to develop the Arab People's Conference and increase its activities.

7. Struggling to gain democratic liberties for the Arab masses.

8. Working for solidarity and mutual support among the forces of the Arab liberation movement on the Arab nationalist level.

9. Working to deepen the alliance among the democratic and revolutionary forces within the Arab national liberation movement in particular.

10. Struggling for the right of the revolution to mobilize the Palestinian masses in all Arab countries without exception. Struggling for the right of the Palestinian resistance to fight the Zionist enemy from all Arab fronts. Struggling for the Palestinians' right to independent national decision-making.

The Tasks on the International Level:

1. Consolidating relations of friendship and cooperation between the Palestinian revolution and the socialist community, especially the Soviet Union, in the interests of the struggle against imperialism,

Zionism, and the policy of capitulation, and for our people's victory.

2. Contributing actively, side by side with the forces of liberation, progress, peace, and socialism, to the international struggle against imperialism, fascism, and reaction.

3. Cultivating and consolidating relations with the national liberation movements in the 'third world' in order to score a complete victory over colonialism and backwardness.

4. Consolidating the Palestinian revolution's cooperation with the progressive and democratic forces, and the working class parties in the capitalist countries.

5. Working to broaden international solidarity with the Arab national liberation movement, particularly with the Lebanese National Movement and the Palestinian revolution under the leadership of the PLO, the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

6. Bolstering the Palestinian revolution's position and the Palestinian struggle by the largest possible solidarity campaign in all the international forums opposing imperialism and Zionism. This solidarity campaign is designed to serve our people's struggle and to liberate their land.

7. Consolidating the relations and solidarity between the Palestinian revolution and the national liberation regimes, particularly in the countries adjacent to the Arab region.

Achieving these current tasks for consolidating the revolution's positions and policies, would gradually lead to the following tasks:

1. Uprooting Zionism and the Zionist entity from the Arab homeland, liberating all of Palestine and establishing a popular democratic Palestinian state.

2. Struggling to achieve Arab unity under the leadership of the working class forces and a progressive national front.

3. Struggling to achieve all the tasks of the national democratic revolution oriented toward socialist revolution.

4. Building the deepest relations of international solidarity with the socialist community.

In the introduction to the international section of the political report, we stated the following: The forces of liberation, progress, peace and socialism are steadily scoring successes and victories in the world-wide struggle against imperialism and reaction. This confirms that the course of history in this epoch is that of transition from capitalism to socialism.

In the light of our determination, this report is intended, among other things, to consolidate the truth of this fact among ourselves. These tasks—revolutionary dreams—will be achieved on the ground of reality. By virtue of our determination, struggle and sacrifices, the PFLP will be a contributing force in a glorious and historical revolutionary process aimed at liberating the land, the human being and the society from injustice, oppression and exploitation. Let the banner of liberation, democracy, socialism and unity be raised high.

Political Resolutions of the Fourth National Congress

On the International Level:

1. The congress reaffirms that the Palestinian revolution is part of the international revolutionary front hostile to imperialism. It calls for consolidating the relations of solidarity and joint struggle among all forces in this front against international imperialism and its allies. This front is made up of the socialist community, first and foremost the Soviet Union, the national liberation movements, and the working class and democratic forces in the capitalist countries.

2. We convey our greetings and thanks to the Soviet Union and its great communist party, and to the rest of the socialist community, for their fraternal support to all the struggling people in the world, based on the principle of proletarian internationalism. We thank them in particular for the support rendered to the Palestinian revolution in all forms and on all levels. The congress reaffirms its high estimation of the economic, political, social, and military accomplishments of the socialist community, which serve to further consolidate the international socialist system and to confront imperialism, the international capitalist economic system and its aggressive policies. The congress registers utmost satisfaction at the development of the relations between the PFLP and the Soviet Union and other socialist community countries. It reasserts its sincere desire to further develop

these relations, governed by a firm conviction in the strategic alliance between the Palestinian revolution and the socialist countries under the leadership of the true friend of the struggling people, the Soviet Union.

3. The congress salutes the struggles and achievements of the national liberation movements. Their victories constitute a fundamental part of the international revolutionary struggle against imperialism. The congress notes the development in the class structure and social content of the national liberation movements, and the legitimacy of their goals. It reaffirms that interlinking their struggle with the rest of the forces of the international revolutionary process, the Soviet Union in particular, is the second fundamental factor in their ability to be victorious.

4. The congress salutes the working class and the democratic forces in the capitalist countries in their struggle against capitalist exploitation and monopolies. It salutes their solidarity with the national liberation movements, particularly the struggle of the Palestinian people for their inalienable national rights.

5. The congress conveys a militant salute to the nations which have triumphed over the forces of reaction and backwardness, and embraced the national democratic line of development—the line of opposing imperialism and its allies. Such a line has been pursued in Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Grenada, and Afghanistan. The congress expresses appreciation of the internationalist support rendered by the Soviet Union to the Afghani people, to help them to confront the interference of imperialist, reactionary and counterrevolutionary forces.

6. The congress sends a special salute of militant solidarity to all national liberation movements in the world, particularly to the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front in El Salvador, the African National Congress in South Africa, and SWAPO in Namibia.

7. The congress conveys a glorious and appreciative salute to the steadfastness of socialist Cuba for its advanced position confronting US Imperialism, and for its internationalist support to the struggling people. We salute Cuba's achievements toward constructing a socialist society and propagating the revolutionary ideals which enriched its revolutionary experience and enabled the foundation of a communist party during the liberation battle. Among the factors

which were conducive to this development were the prevailing spirit of militancy in the struggle against imperialism, and the presence of a creative revolutionary leadership.

8. The congress warmly salutes the victory of the great Vietnamese people, and the unification of the two parts of the country. The congress expresses full solidarity with the Vietnamese people in their struggle to reconstruct and develop their country, and against the encroachments of the renegade Chinese leadership.

9. The congress roundly condemns the policy of military build-up and destroying the international political climate, which is being pursued by international imperialism led by the US. This policy threatens to return the world to the cold war atmosphere. The policy of military build-up clearly manifests itself in imperialism's procrastination about nuclear disarmament and the US's failure to ratify the Salt II treaty. The imperialist policy of military build-up is also manifested in the deployment of nuclear missiles in a number of West European countries, the deployment of imperialism's aggressive fleets in the Indian Ocean, the Arab Sea, the Gulf, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Caribbean, and the installment of military bases in Diego Garcia, Egypt, Kenya, Somalia, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. International imperialism, under the leadership of the US, bears full responsibility for menacing international peace and the security of the peoples.

On the Arab Level:

1. The Fourth National Congress of the PFLP, held in Lebanon under the auspices of the patriotic masses, sincerely records its feelings of love and gratitude to the great Lebanese masses and their national movement. The congress reaffirms the militant bond between the Lebanese masses, led by their national movement, and the Palestinian masses, led by their armed revolution, in confronting the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary conspiracy which aims to liquidate the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese National Movement in order to impose the Zionist-fascist project in Lebanon. The congress stresses the leading role of the Lebanese National Movement in confronting this project in order to defeat it, and preserve Lebanon's unity, Arab identity and democratic development. The conference takes pride in the militant bond between the Lebanese National Movement and

the Palestinian revolution, which sets a concrete example for Arab solidarity. By Arab solidarity, we mean the Arab masses' solidarity in the battlefield against the enemy, as opposed to Arab reaction's solidarity aimed at halting the mass movement.

2. The congress stresses the necessity of consolidating the Syrian-Palestinian-Lebanese nationalist alliance in confronting the imperialist Zionist-reactionary conspiracy which aims at striking Syria's steadfastness, liquidating the Palestinian revolution and imposing the Zionist-fascist project on Lebanon.

3. The congress salutes Syria for confronting the Camp David conspiracy. We confirm our solidarity with Syria's confrontation of the moves of internal and external forces to weaken its steadfastness.

4. The congress hails the Arab masses in Egypt under the leadership of the national and progressive forces. We stress our solidarity and total support to their struggle against the treacherous policies of Sadat, in order to defeat the Camp David conspiracy, preserve Egypt's sovereignty and restore it to its natural position as the vanguard of the Arab struggle against the Zionist enemy.

5. The congress sends a warm greeting to the masses in our beloved Jordan, stressing the militant bond between the Jordanian and Palestinian masses struggling for a national democratic regime in Jordan. Such a government would free the masses from exploitation and backwardness, opening before them the path of democratic and social development, and permitting their mobilization in the struggle against the Zionist enemy.

6. The congress sends comradely salutes to the toiling masses and their vanguard party in Democratic Yemen for their confrontation of the reactionary conspiracies aimed at liquidating the progressive rule of the Yemeni Socialist Party. We hail this party in its victorious struggle to preserve and consolidate its national democratic and social achievements.

7. The congress sends greetings to the struggling masses and their nationalist and progressive leadership in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf. We assert our solidarity and support to them in their struggle against the reactionary regimes in the region. We confirm our absolute condemnation of the establishment of imperialist military bases and the escalation of imperialist military presence there. We call on all Arab democratic and progressive forces to struggle firmly

to liquidate these bases and all forms of imperialist military presence in the area. The congress welcomed the proposal of Comrade Ali Nasser Mohammed and the initiative of Comrade Brezhnev, calling for peace and security in the region, insuring the people's freedom and sovereignty, removed from military intervention and threats. On the occasion of the congress, the PFLP sends militant greetings to our comrades in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, the National Democratic Front in North Yemen, the Popular Front and the National Liberation Front in Bahrain, and to all the forces in the Arab Peninsula, struggling against the Saudi regime.

8. We send our greetings to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. We confirm our solidarity with its confrontation of the conspiracies of reactionary forces, and the attempts of the Egyptian regime to invade Libya. The PFLP salutes the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya's principled fraternal assistance to the people of Chad in their just struggle against the reactionary and colonial forces. This struggle has contributed to dealing a blow to the forces of Camp David in the area.

9. We send our greetings to the fraternal Arab people in Algeria and their party and government. We appreciate their adherence to the national line against Camp David, and their anti-imperialist activities in the North African Arab states.

10. We convey our greetings to the Polisario Front and its militants. We support their struggle against the Moroccan regime for liberating the people of the Sahara from Moroccan domination and exploitation, and for their right to self-determination.

11. We stress the PFLP's position within the Arab national liberation movement, following and participating in its struggle to achieve the goals of the Arab nation: liberation, democracy, socialism and unity.

12. The congress hails the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front and calls for the development of its program and organizational structure. We also call for practical implementation of this front's decisions in the battlefield.

13. We stress the importance of the role assumed by the Arab People's Conference, and the criticality of working to develop its experience and content in order to consolidate its role.

14. We condemn the war waged by Iraq against the revolution of the Iranian masses. This war falls in the pattern of the Iraqi regime's retreat (from the nationalist policy), especially since the Iranian masses

toppled the Shah's regime and moved Iran to an anti-imperialist position supportive to the struggle of the Palestinian people.

15. We salute the struggle waged by the Iraqi masses against the Iraqi regime's policies of retreat. We welcome the foundation of the National and Patriotic Front in Iraq; we support its program and appreciate its role. We also support all other progressive and democratic forces struggling for a national democratic Iraq.

16. The congress condemns the reactionary Arab regimes' oil policy which totally serves the imperialist plans, and the greed and exploitation of the monopolies. The congress also condemns the Arab reactionary regimes investment policy which returns the oil revenues to the coffers of imperialism and its monopolies in the form of investments, accounts and deals. Ultimately, this policy helps the international capitalist system, serving imperialism and its goals, and shores up the Zionist enemy's aggressive military capacity. In the Arab countries, such policies lead to the flourishing of brokers and the comprador class whose interests are intimately connected with international imperialism, and who therefore constitute an obedient tool for carrying out imperialism's schemes.

On the Palestinian Level:

1. The congress sends a glorious, exalted greeting to our people in occupied Palestine and to those detained in the prisons of the Zionist occupation authority. The congress highly appreciates their heroic steadfastness and renews our pledge that the PFLP will continue to be faithful to their struggle, sacrifices, goals, loyalty, and national aspirations. The PFLP will always adhere to the armed struggle until the fulfillment of all the national aims of the Palestinian people.

2. We send an exalted and appreciative greeting to the fighters of the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese National Movement who are steadfast in South Lebanon. They are defending the Lebanese masses, the Palestinian revolution, and the honor and dignity of the Arab nation.

3. The congress stresses that the PLO is the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people everywhere, and that all its accomplishments must be preserved. We will struggle against all attempts to undermine the PLO's sole representation of the Palestinian people. We call for consolidating Palestinian unity within the frame-

work of the PLO, on the basis of the political and organizational program of the 14th PNC.

4. We stress the necessity of exerting efforts, along with the other Palestinian national forces, to revitalize the Palestinian National Front in the occupied territories, increase its effectiveness and develop its experience and relations: such efforts proceed from the principle that the PNF is the PLO's fundamental operative arm in the occupied homeland.

5. Efforts should be doubled to crystallize the role of the Palestinian revolutionary democratic forces, for the sake of founding a united Palestinian communist party.

6. We greet the Jewish progressive and democratic forces who are hostile to the ideology and practices of the Zionist state, and supportive of the Palestinian people's national goals and struggle under the PLO's leadership. In contrast, the congress vehemently condemns the contacts with Zionist forces and elements. It also condemns any attempt to conceal these contacts. We call for exposing and discrediting these contacts, and holding accountable those responsible for them.

7. We stress the importance of the PFLP's continued confrontation, by all means of the capitulationist course in all its forms, whether the European 'initiative', the Jordanian 'option', etc.

8. We consider the Arab homeland and its borders with Palestine as legitimate territory from which to wage our struggle against the Zionist-imperialist enemy. We reject any interference, restraints or terror against our people wherever they may be. We have the right to struggle for preserving our people's militant identity from being dissipated. We consider the continuation of our people's struggle as part of the struggle of the Arab masses and their revolutionary movement.

Long Live the Revolution!

We will be Victorious!

PART FOUR

Consolidating the Role of Our Military Forces and Developing Our Combat Efficiency

Through protracted historical struggle, the Palestinian people have accumulated a monumental heritage which constitutes a fundamental foothold for our current struggle. Due to a number of factors, Palestine was the scene of successive invasions. These aimed at taking control of this historically strategic location. Palestine has always been very rich in cultural and educational heritage. By virtue of persistent adherence to their homeland, our people succeeded in defeating the invaders and restoring the sovereignty of their homeland, relying on their own resources and the support of their brothers, neighbors and allies. In ancient and medieval history, our people succeeded in driving out the Hebrews, Romans, Crusaders, Mongols, and Turks, though the domination and colonization of some of these invaders lasted for centuries.

In modern history, the Palestinian people forcefully and bravely confronted British colonialism and the Zionist settlers' invasion. The Palestinian struggle escalated, and played a major role in ending the British colonial presence. Still, the withdrawal of the British colonialists did not result in the restoration of our people's national sovereignty in their homeland. Instead, it led to the emergence of the Zionist entity as one of the cruelest forms of colonialism.

This accumulation of militant heritage constitutes an inexhaustible source of strength for our people and contemporary revolution. Throughout the past historical periods, the general character of the Palestinian struggle has been that of confronting oppression and aggression—and defeating the exploiters—giving this militant heritage added historical and contemporary value.

In particular, the Palestinian people's struggle was directed against the alliance of British colonialism and the Zionist invasion. The Zionist movement, by virtue of its organic link with international capitalism, received all kinds of support from the British Mandate authorities. Thus, the Palestinian people confronted both the British colonial troops and the successive waves of Zionist immigration which aimed to seize the land and expel the rightful owners. Moreover, the patriotic strata of our people suffered from the alliance of the reactionary and feudal strata whose economic interests were linked with colonialism. The reactionary-feudal alliance was the accomplice of the colonial power in striking our people's

aspirations and weakening their capacity to confront.

Despite the might of this tripartite alliance, our people succeeded in mobilizing their fundamental forces to confront the onslaught for over a quarter of a century. This mobilization was possible due to our people's readiness to place all their fighting resources and organizational capacities at the service of the cause. It was also due to the justice of our people's cause, their awareness and adherence to their rights to their land. The forms of our people's confrontation ranged from political opposition to taking up arms and total insurrection. The most prominent example was the six-month general strike, the first of its kind in Palestine. The entire country was in chaos for a full six months. This indicated our people's readiness to sacrifice and the degree of their militancy. This was accompanied by an advanced level of armed struggle in all areas of Palestine, against the British Mandate and the Zionist settlers. The heroic martyrdom of Sheikh Ez Al Din Al Qassam, while leading armed cells, stands as a shining example of the development of the struggle. Yet our people's struggle and sacrifices did not lead to victory. Rather the outcome was defeat and the establishment of the Zionist entity on the biggest part of Palestine. This outcome was due to:

—The weakness of the political leadership and its inclination to compromise with the enemy, due to its class nature. The political leadership was composed of feudal elements and some comprador strata whose interests were linked with those of British colonialism.

—The weakness of the organizational structure of the fighting groups due to the absence of a progressive leadership with clear aims. The fighting groups often worked without coordination or common goals.

—The shortage of qualified military cadres, lack of combat experience and inadequate military capacity.

—The deterioration that plagued the Arab situation, and the feudal leadership's links to colonialism and its plans

This last factor played a fundamental role in striking the revolution following the establishment of the Zionist entity and the annexation of the remaining portions of Palestine to Jordan and Egypt. The Palestinian mass movement entered a period of relative stagnation. It joined the Arab political movement in order to change the Arab situation first, since the Palestinian leaders—the new ones in particular—believed that creating a new Arab reality was the only way to liberate Palestine. With few excep-

tions, such as the commandos basically initiated by Egypt, there was no Palestinian political-military effort directed against the Zionist enemy until the first half of the sixties. Then, vanguard military contingents began to direct blows against the Zionist enemy. The pioneers of this were the Youth of Revenge and the Heroes of Return, born out of the Arab Nationalist Movement, and Al Asifa-Fatah, with Fatah's declaration of the beginning of its operations early in 1965.

These operations marked the beginning of a new era in the Palestinian armed struggle which is daily being consolidated, politically and militarily. The course of struggle has been charted, adopting the theory of popular warfare to exhaust the enemy through a long-term war waged in the economic, military and political spheres. All the masses will take part in this war. They will be mobilized in a people's liberation army under the political leadership of a united national front, aiming to gradually change the balance of forces between the revolution and the enemy until reaching the stage of strategic superiority conducive to scoring victory.

The process of change depends primarily on drawing all the masses into the battle. This will compensate for the shortage of advanced arms, and the organizational and administrative capacities possessed by the enemy. The experience of all previous revolutions adhered to that principle, while taking into consideration the particular conditions of their battle, i.e., the nature, capacity and alliances of the enemy on the one hand, and the abilities, alliances, and characteristics of the popular revolutionary forces (their history of struggle, the terrain, etc.) on the other.

The revolution will have to make unnecessary sacrifices if it lacks clear knowledge of the enemy and the revolutionary forces. With such knowledge, the revolution will be more able to move, enabling it to direct successful blows against the enemy with minimal losses to its own forces. Utilizing forces efficiently is vital for the revolution, particularly in the early stages, and in stages of reorganization and setbacks, when it may not be able to rally the majority of the masses and therefore cannot recover quickly from losses.

The Particularities of the Palestinian Liberation War

The fundamental characteristics of any war stem from the nature of the opposing forces, their respective alliances and the nature of the territory where the war takes place. Our war is a just one carried out by our

people whose land was occupied by the Zionist movement with the total support of international imperialism. This is the essence of our just war.

The Particularity of the Enemy

We face a settler-colonial enemy that was able in the last decades to transport a human force to Palestine, composed of nearly three million settlers armed with a theory of historical right to the land based on their religion. These settlers are organized, militarily and economically, on the basis of living in a hostile environment where they might be attacked at any moment. They brought with them a heritage of oppression from the countries where they previously lived, especially Nazi Germany. For this reason, they consider the defense of their presence in Palestine as a matter of life and death.

This lessens the possibility of penetrating their society from within in the foreseeable future, despite the appearance of division and internal conflict in this society. These divisions and conflicts are a result of the society being a gathering of immigrants from different ethnic and national origins, with different customs, traditions, and cultures. This gathering lives in fear of the external enemy which is greater in numbers and is struggling to restore stolen rights. In addition, there is the culture emanating from Zionism, which is continually being reinforced in the minds and culture of the settler society. This intensifies the racist, fascist tendencies in the Zionist entity.

With unlimited help from the world Zionist movement and international imperialism, the Zionist entity was able to build a superior, professional army, as seen in its organization, mobilization, and armament. This army can constantly acquire the most developed western military technology. Moreover, it can continuously mobilize the Israeli society against the external danger. There has been steady development of the infrastructure and industry, and particularly the military industry, all of which improves military capacity.

This financial, military, and organizational capacity is utilized by the expansionist leadership and settler society. There is continuous planning to increase the area under occupation and to bring more immigrants. The expansionist aims of the enemy causes it to attack and destroy any Arab military power in order to be able to expand when the time is right, without serious obstacles. This course followed by the Zionist enemy is com-

pletely in line with imperialism's aims to continue exploiting the resources of the region and to strike any force that acts to disrupt this plunder.

Particularities of the Palestinian Land

The land of Palestine is not geographically suited to guerrilla warfare. Palestine has no high, inaccessible mountains or big rivers to delay large troop movements. There are no thick jungles to help hide military groups and their secret movement. At the same time, Palestine is small in area, no more than 27,000 square kilometers. This requires a mode of military activity and a form of organization suitable for these geographical conditions. These conditions do not allow for assembling large forces and concealing them with the aim of carrying out big attacks against the enemy in the early stages of our war. Urban guerrilla warfare is a better form for our work against the Zionist enemy. Urban guerrilla groups would strike the enemy forces, while continuing their daily life among the people. Our masses are our jungles and mountain refuges.

These characteristics of the Palestinian land make it easy for the enemy to control it, especially since the Israeli army is highly developed, technically speaking. Moreover, there are three million settlers spread throughout Palestine in a military system, where the settlements play an efficient role in hindering the revolutionary forces from effectively attacking. The settlements serve as early warning posts and forward positions for confronting the revolutionary forces.

Particularities of the Revolutionary Forces

The first characteristic of the Palestinian people and revolutionary forces is their number. There are nearly four million Palestinians. Nearly half of them live in Palestine. The other half are dispersed in different places. Even if we were to mobilize our people's full potentials, their number is not enough, according to the laws of people's war, to effect a strategic change in the balance of forces. This is due to the enemy's ability to mobilize three million, in addition to its technical, organizational, and military superiority. Thus, we must inject a new factor in order to reverse the balance of forces. This factor is the capacity of the Arab masses. Without utilizing their abilities in the battle against the enemy, it is hard to imagine the destruction of the Zionist entity and the establishment of a democratic Palestine. Our war plays a fundamental role in creating the conditions for increased Arab mass involvement.

The second characteristic is that not all our people are in Palestine. Nearly half are dispersed in different parts of the world. This weakens the possibility of involving them in the direct confrontation of the enemy.

The third characteristic is that the fundamental force of the revolution—its armed forces and leadership—are outside Palestine and mainly in unfriendly territory. This forces the revolution to engage in big battles and offer great sacrifices to defend its existence. The revolution has given many times more sacrifices in its fight against reactionaries, allied with imperialism and Zionism, than it has in direct battles with the Zionist enemy. A major part of its forces, institutions, and leadership are preoccupied with thinking and working to defend the revolution's existence. This is a legitimate task. It is a heavy burden on the revolution that cannot be avoided; it keeps us from mobilizing all our forces directly against the Zionist enemy and improving our confrontation abilities. This burden is a result of the fact that the revolution's major forces operate from non-liberated territory which is ruled by regimes that are allied to imperialism or incapable of confronting the Arab nation's enemy. It is chiefly this particularity of the position of the revolution and masses, that imposes relying on mobilization of the Arab masses through alliance with their progressive forces. This alliance has two basic aims:

1. Jointly carrying out the task of liberating Palestine, by political and military mobilization of the masses. Liberating Palestine is the task of all Arab nationalists and progressives, not the duty of the Palestinians alone.

2. Jointly confronting the plots of the reactionary forces in order to establish national progressive, supportive bases, at least in the Arab land surrounding Palestine. This will enable the Palestinian revolution to function on friendly grounds and to rely on these positions to effectively and directly engage in the liberation process.

The Main Military Battles of the Resistance

The Palestinian resistance has been involved in a long chain of battles over the past seventeen years. In that relatively short period, it went through important experiences. It is hard to deal in detail with all the lessons gleaned, but it is important to focus on the basic points:

In Palestine

The resistance has used two basic methods for confronting the Zionist enemy in Palestine:

1. Explosive charges: This was the most prominent method used by the resistance in the previous period. It relies on secret groups operating inside Palestine. Such groups are able to carry out their tasks successfully, inflicting heavy human and material losses on the enemy, while avoiding heavy losses themselves. In the light of the unequal balance of forces, this will remain a basic method in the resistance activities for a long period. Continuing this method with great effectiveness requires a set of conditions, the most important of which are:

   a. Continuous improvement of the organization and activities of the secret groups, to help them avoid being hit by the enemy. In the past, the enemy was able to observe the organization and methods of these groups, by making arrests and attacking them. The enemy allocated great resources for this work.

   b. Improving the combat and technical capabilities of these groups. Experience shows that they suffered losses due to weak combat and technical capacities.

   c. The continuous supply of combat and technical capabilities for these groups, so that they can fulfill their duties more efficiently. These groups should increase their self-reliance in obtaining their needs from the enemy or local manufacture in the light of the obstacles to continuously supplying combat materials from outside Palestine.

2. Small combat groups: The activities of the resistance have been based on the functions of small combat groups, using the methods of guerrilla warfare to carry out their duties by specific strikes on enemy patrols and centers. The sphere of activity for these groups concentrated on areas in Palestine that the enemy could not easily reach. This method was effective in the past. Its highpoint was the revolutionary experience in the Gaza Strip, led by PFLP comrades. This was an advanced situation that prevented the enemy forces from being actively present at night. They were only present in the daytime, in main centers. Our leading comrade, Mohammed Mahmoud Al Aswad (Guevara Gaza) played a prominent role in organizing and leading these secret groups. In the West Bank, there were groups that

remained in the mountains of Al Khalil (Hebron), attacking cities and vital centers. This was a development of the methods used.

The resistance has used another method—that of groups entering Palestine and attacking, then returning to bases outside. The sphere of this method was first Jordan and then Lebanon. Several difficulties have limited the effectiveness of this method. One of these is the obstacles placed by the reactionary regimes and their armies that strike against these groups. Another obstacle is the development of the Zionists' methods for confronting these groups. In addition to the two basic methods, several other methods were used, such as assassinations and mass initiatives to attack the enemy's economic institutions and vital facilities, etc.

In the light of the objective conditions, our work will continue to rely on mobilizing the masses to carry out activities against the occupation by all means. Relying on explosive charges and urban cells, in addition to small mobile units, are the most appropriate methods, considering the conditions of the resistance and its capacities.

The Resistance Outside Palestine

The struggle of the resistance outside Palestine has two basic roles:

1. *Defending the open presence of the resistance from Zionist attacks.* This was seen in the battle of Al Karameh in March 1968 in Jordan, the September 1970 battle in Lebanon, the March 1978 invasion of Lebanon, and the daily confrontation of land, sea, and air strikes. In more than one battle, the resistance was able to accomplish a fundamental military victory over the enemy in the sense of foiling the aims of the attack and inflicting heavy losses in the enemy ranks.

The battle of Karameh took place after the Israeli army defeated several Arab armies in 1967. This battle will remain a source of pride, for the resistance registered a great victory despite the limited number of fighters and their youthfulness.

In March 1978, the resistance was able to confront the enemy for eight consecutive days. We prevented the enemy from accomplishing the victory it had wanted. The fighters of the PFLP played a prominent role in the battle, especially with their steadfastness in Tyre, that prevented enemy occupation of the city.

2. *Defending the resistance's presence from being liquidated by reactionary forces.* The resistance gave big sacrifices to preserve its physical

presence. In the final analysis, the resistance was able to enhance its military and political position in spite of these plots. It engaged in battles for the defense of its presence in Jordan in November 1968, February 1970, June 1970, September 1970 and July 1971. In spite of the final results of the battle, which caused the expulsion of the resistance from Jordan, the real reason for the defeat was not a military one. The defeat was basically the result of the wrong political compromises made by the leadership of the resistance, and its inability to fulfill its responsibility as a nationalist force present in a country controlled by a reactionary enemy power. The resistance should have resolved the situation in Jordan in its favor, but the leadership's political behavior and management of the battle after it began caused the painful result of leaving Jordan. Thus, the resistance lost a main arena, one that is indispensable for continuing the struggle and achieving victory. The PFLP had a different political and military view about resolving the situation in Jordan, but lacked the capacity to enforce its programs.

Before and after the resistance moved its headquarters to Lebanon, it faced liquidation attempts by the reactionary Lebanese regime, and the rightist and fascist forces in particular. The resistance and its masses, along with the Lebanese nationalist masses and movement, had to confront the reactionaries militarily in 1969 and 1973. The resistance was able to accomplish clear military and political gains after these battles. The most important gain was the recognition of the legitimacy of its presence and its right to organize and administer Palestinian affairs in Lebanon. It also gained the right of acting against the Zionist enemy from Lebanon.

The situation in Lebanon developed. The economic, social, and political crisis intensified, as did Lebanon's linkage to the imperialist plans in the area, aiming to strike the nationalist forces and impose the Zionist presence. This led the fascist forces to ignite the civil war against the Lebanese progressive and national forces and masses and the Palestinian resistance. The war started in early 1975 and is still going on. Important battles took place in the mountains, Damour, the commercial district of Beirut, Tel Al Zaatar, Shiyah, etc. The resistance was able to achieve important military victories in spite of the shift in the balance of power after the Syrian involvement in 1976. The PFLP fighters played a prominent role in all these battles and particularly in the heroic defense of Tel Al Zaatar.

The resistance gained military experience from the battles in which

it was involved. This added to its self-confidence, because many of these battles were crowned with victory.

Guidelines for the Revolution's Military Work

Based on accurate analysis of the reality of the combatant forces, it is the duty of the Palestinian revolution and its allies to pursue their military work according to the following guidelines:

1) Developing and organizing the work of the underground groups inside Palestine, and consolidating their military potentials, since they shoulder the direct confrontation of the enemy on a long-term basis.

2) Developing the capabilities of the military forces outside Palestine, and improving their efficiency through sound mobilization policies, since it is their main task to protect the revolution from the reactionaries' conspiracies.

3) Continuing to deal blows to the Zionist enemy with highly efficient military groups that are capable of crossing the borders into Palestine from any point.

4) Improving military leadership on the battlefield, by achieving unified military leadership and planning in the field, and by drawing lessons from past experience in order to make wise decisions.

5) Continuing to deal blows to basic military and economic centers of the enemy, to inflict the greatest damage possible and demoralize the enemy.

6) Continuing to deal special blows to the enemy outside, to its leadership and military cadres.

The distinguished role of the PFLP's military forces, within the forces of the Palestinian revolution and the Palestinian-Lebanese Joint Forces, is the best evidence of the validity of our policy of long-term people's warfare. The Joint Forces were at the forefront of the battle for defending the revolution and the integrity of the Arab nation. This confrontation, and the blood of the martyrs in Tyre, Nabatiyeh, Tel Al Zaatar, and Shiyah, unites with the blood of our martyrs in the Galilee, Gaza Strip, the Hebron mountains, and Nablus, and with the blood of our martyrs in the Jordan Valley and Widat camp. This attests to the unity of the cause and motivates us to prepare for the long battle to come. We are confident of our ultimate victory.

PART FIVE

The Urgent Tasks for Continuing the Transformation Process and the Development of Our Organization

It is obvious that the objective international conditions are ready for the revolutionary democratic forces to fully commit themselves to scientific socialism, in theory and practice, in order to achieve victory. International capitalism has developed into its most advanced stage—monopoly capitalism. This monopoly capitalism has imposed itself on the 'third world', hindering the bourgeoisie in these countries from achieving a democratic national revolution as the European bourgeoisie did. The bourgeoisie in the 'third world' has become a part of imperialism's mechanism of exploitation, assigned the role of imperialism's agent for facilitating the exploitation of their own people.

This state of the bourgeoisie requires the revolutionary movements in the 'third world' countries to carry out a new task. Besides achieving the socialist revolution, they must also achieve the national democratic revolution. This development sets new tasks for the communist forces and the revolutionary democratic forces. The national democratic forces, and especially the radical factions, were left with one choice, i.e., to transform to scientific socialism and commit themselves to Marxist-Leninist theory, if they wish to consummate the process of liberating the land and achieving the national democratic revolution. The nationalist, revolutionary, and radical forces have to make this choice. Otherwise, they will retreat, give in to imperialism and participate in exploiting the people.

Internationally, we are today witnessing the transformation of many revolutionary democratic contingents to Marxist-Leninist positions. These increasing transformations were determined by the international revolutionary process and the increasing influence of Marxism-Leninism. The only forces that were able to achieve the national democratic revolution were those who committed themselves to Marxism-Leninism in theory and practice. They were able to surmount all the difficulties posed by the existing economic structure and the local bourgeoisie's conspiring with imperialism to strike the revolutionary achievements.

Living examples of these national democratic forces that built their revolutionary instrument based on Marxism-Leninism are Cuba, Mozambique, Angola, and Democratic Yemen. The revolutionary forces in

these countries were able to achieve the national democratic revolution and advance toward building socialism. The essence of the subjective conditions for these revolutionary democratic forces was their conviction in the necessity of total commitment to Marxism-Leninism. The objective conditions, without this conviction, cannot alone enforce the transformation process.

Two main factors contributed to the transformation of the revolutionary democratic forces to Marxism-Leninism. First is the achievements of the socialist countries, first and foremost the Soviet Union, and the many victories achieved by the national liberation movements because of their commitment to Marxist-Leninist theory. Second is the determination of the revolutionary democratic forces, and the awareness of their leadership and cadres, to achieve victory for their revolution and free their people from subordination to imperialism.

In general, the class nature of the revolutionary and democratic forces in these countries inclines them toward scientific socialism, rather than toward any other ideology. Under these conditions, the subjective factor remains the most important one. The process of transformation is impossible without waging an internal party struggle. This may take the form of a battle between the forces strongly committed to transformation, and the old thoughts and habits on which the organization was built, as well as against elements that do not believe in transformation, i.e., right opportunists and infantile leftists. Through the process of internal struggle, the concepts of scientific socialism will be more firmly implanted, and those elements who try to impede the transformation process will be eliminated. Experience has taught us that the completion of transformation will be faced by many threats if we do not undergo this internal struggle to rid ourselves of bourgeois concepts and habits in theory and practice.

In the past, the PFLP was faced with right opportunists who accepted transformation verbally, but obstructed it in practice. We were also faced with left opportunists who wanted to leap through the process, which in practice also obstructs transformation.

We can now confidently say that the elements that strongly believe in the transformation process represent the majority of our organization, now that we have engaged in organizational and ideological struggle. Thus we acquired a new status, as seen in the Fourth National Congress; that of being close to a communist party.

The internal rules and regulations, with its main principles, first and foremost democratic centralism, have become the backbone of our party's internal life. We will no longer accept any ideas such as that the internal rules and regulations are made for a communist party and are thus difficult to implement in our internal party life, since we are in the process of transformation, in spite of some mistakes. Due to ideological weakness, the concept of total commitment to the internal rules and regulations has been completely absorbed. We were also able to firmly combat right and left opportunism through abiding by the internal rules and regulations.

Today we are confident that we have achieved organizational and ideological unity. We have established the basis for resolving differences in a comradely manner, whereby the minority abides by the majority's decision, the lower bodies submit to the higher ones, and criticism and self-criticism is practiced. The main feature of our party life right before the convening of the Fourth Congress was unity in organization and thinking and collective work. The unanimous votes at the congress served to emphasize this unity. The congress emphasized the importance of combating selfishness, individualism, and anarchy within the party, lest we deviate from the basis for a communist party. The congress also emphasized the importance of abiding by the programs of the different party organizations, and of judging them by their correspondence to our reality and their harmony with the general development of the party, through accurate scientific analysis. Then we were called on to carry out these programs. This was the process of our work in the past few years. To avoid individual evaluations of things, we will continue to work the same way in the future.

In the past, we had two faults. The first was inaccuracy in mapping out the details of each party organization's program in accordance with the main program. The second was that the process of following up implementation of these programs was not properly carried out by the leadership bodies. Therefore, it is the main concern of all leadership bodies to rid their party organizations of these faults.

It is important that the party organizations put detailed programs for the various aspects of their work, to be able to combat useless concepts that could harm the party. This process will also help to combat the trend within the party which looks down on union work and daily struggle for social and economic demands. Now all PFLP party members have become members in one or more union. This is to consolidate their

conviction in the importance of our organizational work. Each comrade is accountable organizationally if they do not enroll in a mass organization. At the same time, there are daily educational programs for the comrades to emphasize the importance of being involved in the general mass struggle through mass organizations, associations, clubs, etc. Such involvement enables our comrades to raise the level of the masses and mobilize their potentials for achieving their political and economic demands.

The resolutions of the Fourth National Congress stress the necessity of not falling victim to withdrawing from reality and working as an isolated party organization. It behooves us to function as a mass party that mobilizes all resources and puts them to use in the various battles, eliminating all manifestations of isolation in the militant and party work. It is vital that the party organization and comrades join forces with the broad tasks of the masses. This is the way to achieve the masses' goals. The masses play a fundamental role in the process of transformation to the positions of Marxism-Leninism, pursued by the PFLP over the past several years.

The regular work of the PFLP's leading bodies has to be stabilized on the central and party organization levels. These bodies are collectively responsible for extracting lessons, drawing conclusions and determining the methods suitable to the charted tasks. The party organizations have advanced by stabilizing their work in accordance with the internal rules and regulations, and the internal organizational charters for each body. This is the result of persistently developing the struggle methods and organization that corresponds to the nature of the work of each party organization.

The nature of our party organization in the occupied homeland differs from that of our party organizations outside, in terms of mode of struggle and organization. This compels the leadership bodies concerned to constantly scrutinize the methods used by each party organization for attaining their goals in their respective fields. It is vital to eliminate any method or form that hampers the development of the party organizations and their work. Regulating the work of leadership bodies and the implementation of their tasks will always advance the flow of party work and permit the early detection and rectification of any shortcomings or mistakes. By the same token, it will provide the leadership with collective thinking, capable of anticipating the future turn of events and charting the course to be taken.

Our daily struggle faces us with diversified tasks. This requires that the leadership bodies act with utmost vitality and consistency. The struggle waged by our party assumes various forms, and particularly the most [obscured] form, armed struggle. Our party organizations are located in [obscured]. Some of them exist under savage repression as in [obscured] homeland, Jordan and elsewhere. Other party organizations [obscured] freedom of movement. We function in close proximity with [obscured] organizations and forces on the Palestinian and Arab level, [obscured]. The PFLP has many strong political and militant [obscured] front alliance.[26] In addition, we are not an organization of small caliber whose organizational bodies can easily be controlled. The PFLP is an organization of a fair size and it is constantly growing. Its responsibilities are numerous. Thus, it is crucial to constantly regulate the work of its leading bodies and increase their efficiency, so that they can live up to their tasks and lead the organization in its various battles. In this way, the PFLP will be able to achieve the aspirations of the masses.

The fundamental task shouldered by the PFLP is transforming into a Marxist-Leninist party and building a mass vanguard party. This requires that top priority be assigned to the PFLP leadership and cadres' mastering Marxist-Leninist theory. We have come a long way in this endeavor. Fourteen years have elapsed since the PFLP decisively adopted Marxism-Leninism as its ideology. Since then, internal education has been carried out along the lines of Marxist theory and its fundamental principles. Review of the documents published by the PFLP, as well as the political platform and internal charter, leaves no doubt that these have been formulated relying on Marxist-Leninist theory, and taking into consideration the reality in which we function.

Along the same lines, we witness a high level of enthusiasm in the ranks of the party organization to get a firm grasp on the fundamentals of Marxist theory. This is coupled with serious interest on the part of the leadership committees in prompting the advanced cadres in particular to enroll in theoretical courses and workshops in socialist countries and the PFLP's Special Cadre School. Developing qualified cadres, who have mastered the basic concepts of theory, has become an urgent and fundamental task in advancing the transformation process and increasing our cadres' ability to resolve the problems they encounter in the struggle. In addition to the courses offered abroad and at the PFLP's Cadre School, the internal education program, based on careful study of the party's fun-

26 **Ed. Note:** As mentioned above, the scan of the surviving English translation is obscured here, missing a small number of words.

damental documents, program and internal charter, is important in having our cadres master theoretical fundamentals. A similar role is played by the party's internal bulletin.

We can proudly say that we have accomplished much toward mastering theory and educating the majority of our rank and file. Nevertheless, we still need to deepen our leadership's theoretical understanding. More efforts have to be made to instill the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism among the various ranks of our cadres. Marxism is not a static theory. It is an ever-developing one that can be enriched through daily life. Such enrichment can be achieved by grasping the fundamentals of Marxism and applying them to the special features of the given reality. It is incumbent upon us to constantly and systematically raise the theoretical level of the leading cadres, instilling in them Marxism's basic concepts.

The task of completing the transformation process calls for paying great attention to the intermediary ranks and cadres, and the cadres at the base of the party structure, improving their theoretical and political education, and developing their organizational, militant, and leadership abilities. We have to assist the cadres to carry out their daily tasks with utmost efficiency and adopt sound party standards. This can be done by selecting cadres in accordance with their class background, the genuineness of their revolutionary commitment to the party, their sense of initiative, their attachment to the masses and their ability to organize and lead the masses. Rhetoric, bourgeois lecturing, and arrogance are not the qualities of real revolutionary cadres. Those who posses these traits must be subjected to the process of criticism, education and new party upbringing. To advance in the party's ranks, they have to rid themselves of these abhorrent, detrimental traits.

The 4th party congress recognizes that the PFLP is a vanguard contingent of the Palestinian and Arab working class. This means that we have to recruit the vanguard elements of the working class. Through them, we can lead the working class, and mobilize the progressive elements of the revolutionary democratic forces. This orientation presupposes constant improvement of the class structure of the organization, and an increase in the percentage of workers and progressive elements committed to the party and its platform. The fundamental line for our organizational expansion is constant concentration on recruiting vanguard elements of the working class and toilers. This will provide our party organizations with the staunchest militant elements for the working class and national cause. This reduces the chances of organizational diseases such as paralysis, fac-

tionalism, and opportunism that are brought into working class parties by bourgeois elements. On this level, our party organizations have not yet truly attained the standard of a Marxist-Leninist party. Despite the systematic progress made over the past few years, the proportion of the membership who descend from the working class still falls short of the desired level. Branch party organizations in particular increased the percentage of worker members. More efforts and programs must be devoted to constantly increasing this ratio. As of now, the PFLP has to gear itself toward taking additional steps to increase the percentage of workers in the leading bodies of the party, parallel to the increase of workers which has already occurred in the rank and file of the party.

Considerable progress has been made in this respect as a result of the decisions adopted at the Fourth National Congress. As a result, a number of young and working class elements were injected into the leadership bodies, but we have still not reached the level to which we aspire. Requiring the base and party branch organizations to annually increase the percentage of workers in their membership is one of the methods for improving the class structure of the party. This aims to prevent any upset in the internal balance of the party, flooding it with bourgeois elements. Though these elements may show willingness to be organized, they are unwilling to be committed. The PFLP stresses that party organizations which fail to live up to this policy will be held accountable.

The policy of recruiting more workers, in order to improve the class composition of the party, does not inhibit the acceptance of elements from the other strata: of which the revolution is composed. It simply means directing optimal attention to the workers who possess revolutionary qualities, principled endurance and inordinate readiness to sacrifice.

Another task, which goes hand in hand with the improvement of the class structure of the organization, is increasing the percentage of women in the party's ranks. It is no secret that women in our society suffer from dual oppression, class and national, as well as from social oppression at home and work. At the same time, women constitute half of the society. This injustice behooves us, as a party for the vanguard of the exploited and oppressed, to responsibly and enthusiastically devote attention to this fundamental force in the society. Our efforts should be orientated toward recruiting women, so that they will be in a position to defend their rights and mobilize their potentials. The prevailing social norms and attitudes impede women from joining the revolution on a large scale. Through accurate understanding of the reality in which women live, we

can constantly increase their participation in party work; our experience attests to the validity of this fact. Moreover, suitable forms of organization can be found for organizing and educating women, and for recruiting the vanguard cadres—women and men—to carry out these fundamental tasks. Through this organization, women vanguards can be recruited to assume the role of combatting the erroneous ideas and practices concerning women and their role. The role of women in the leadership bodies of the revolution and our party must be advanced so that they occupy their natural position, in accordance with their number and role.

Our Fourth National Congress was convened under the following slogan: "The Fourth National Congress is an important step toward completing the PFLP's transformation into a Marxist-Leninist party; establishing a united Palestinian national front; stepping up the armed struggle; defending the revolution and reinforcing its militant positions; aborting capitulationist settlement efforts; and strengthening militant inter-Arab and international relations."

This sums up the overall tasks incumbent on the party in the forthcoming period, until the next congress which we plan to hold after four years. Then, the fundamental task, embodied in the slogan, will be completion of the party's transformation into a Marxist-Leninist party, a vanguard and leadership for the masses.

The Urgent Tasks to Develop Our Organization

1) Deepening the theoretical background of the party, particularly of the leaders and advanced cadres, through careful study of Marxism-Leninism. This theory must be studied and applied as a science, by acquiring the scientific concepts in party workshops, and studying and applying party literature.

2) Improving the class composition of the party by admitting more workers and toilers. We must constantly increase working class membership so that we attain a party composition whereby the vanguard elements constitute the backbone and decisive force in the party.

3) Improving the party's status among the masses through attachment to them, expressing their aspirations and being constantly involved in the fields of mass affairs. In this way, the PFLP will achieve the goal to which we aspire and become a vanguard party of the masses, that takes roots and broadens its base and influence, and enjoys respectability among other political parties.

4) Paying serious attention to women in various domains, acknowledging that they are fundamental and indispensable in contributing to and strengthening the impetus of the struggle in all fields. We must focus in particular on those women who work in productive facilities, in order to organize and mobilize them, and orient them toward agitating among the inactive sections of women.

5) Improving the efficiency and militancy of party members and organizations, monitoring their enforcement of the general and detailed programs, directing their activities, and reinforcing the energetic and creative ones.

6) In order to be able to carry out these tasks creatively, it is essential to constantly improve and regulate the methods of the leadership bodies. The magnitude of the upcoming developments and our tasks in the political, organizational, military and mass fields, presupposes continued improvement of the methods of the various leadership bodies, particularly the central leadership.

Thanks to your persistent struggle with our people, wherever they may be, our revolution is making headway. We are all confident of the inevitability of the victory of our revolution. This is so because our revolution occupies the advanced trench in the struggle against imperialism, Zionism, and the forces of reaction, backwardness, and hegemony. Our people are fully resolved to be victorious in their just cause through their sacrifices and the support of all forces of progress and liberation. We appreciate the heavy sacrifices of our people, under the leadership of the PLO, their sole, legitimate representative.

—Let us advance to complete the transformation process and the building of our organization.

—Let us solidify our victories and the support to our people in occupied Palestine.

—Let us maintain the struggle for establishing a united Palestinian national front.

—Let us upgrade our struggle for foiling the course of reconciliation and capitulation.

—Let us gear our struggle to escalate the armed struggle and develop our fighting efficiency.

—Let us protect the revolution and consolidate its position.

—Let us support the struggle of the Arab liberation movement and

unify its efforts.

—Let us deepen our militant international relations.

—Glory and immortality to our martyrs!

—The revolution will be victorious!



Third Congress: Tasks of the New Stage: Preface to Third Arabic Edition[1]

[1989]

Preface to the Third Edition

This political-theoretical document was adopted by the PFLP's Third National Congress in March 1972. Together with other documents, it began to constitute an integrated guide to militant action for the PFLP leadership and rank-and-file, in facing the new stage of struggle embarked upon by the Palestinian revolution and the PFLP following the termination of the revolution's open armed presence in Jordan, in 1971.

In the period that elapsed between the PFLP's 3rd and Fourth Congresses, the PFLP underwent enormous qualitative changes in terms of internal structure, as well as ideological, political and organizational positions, in the process of transforming from a petit-bourgeois, revolutionary democratic organization into a modern Marxist-Leninist party. Moreover, the document at hand is considered essential material for internal party education. In addition, the PFLP's Fourth Congress adopted resolutions and directives about the necessity of undertaking a critical review of certain erroneous ideas, positions, and expressions that have occurred in our basic documents, with a view to rectifying them. Taking these three considerations into account, the PFLP Central Committee, in its 4th session in January 1983, passed a resolution to the effect that such a review of this document be made and included in the preface of the new edition, without making any alterations in the original text. This would preserve its character as a historical document which reflects the level of development and maturity of the PFLP's thinking and positions in a specific historical period.

1 Published by the PFLP's Central Information Department, 1989. This was the second edition of the English translation of the Political Report of the PFLP's Third National Congress which was held in March 1972. This edition also included the preface written for the third Arabic edition of the report, which amends some erroneous ideas contained in the original document.

Before reviewing the points in question in *Tasks of the New Stage*, however, we think it is worthwhile to draw attention to two remarks: (1) Rectifying certain mistaken ideas and positions is not the same as conducting an all-round, through-going critical evaluation. That is beyond the scope of this preface and should be carried out in the PFLP's literature which will continue uninterrupted as long as the PFLP exists. (2) There are certain erroneous ideas which have been corrected in this preface without indicating their exact position in the original text, because they occur in various places on more than one page and under different titles.

The Amended Ideas and Positions

I. On the Arab Nationalist Regimes

It must be pointed out at the beginning that the class character of the Arab nationalist regimes is referred to in several places in *Tasks of the New Stage*, as petit-bourgeois. Thus, in the passage entitled "The International Position and the Resistance," it speaks of "the submission of the Arab nationalist and petit-bourgeois regimes to the will of the reactionary regimes..." In the chapter entitled "The Alliances of the New Stage on the Arab and International Levels," it states that: "The correct position, with regards to the reactionary Arab regimes, is the one which considers them, objectively speaking, as an organic part of the enemy camp. However, the position in reference to the so-called nationalist Arab regimes (or more precisely the military, petit-bourgeois regimes) is more complex."

Discussing the Arab nationalist regimes with respect to their class character and the trends of their motion and development, the Fourth National Congress pointed out the following theoretical and material facts:

> 1. Despite being of petit-bourgeois origins, these regimes have a national bourgeois, not petit-bourgeois, class character, for by dint of its position in the production process, its nature and internal structure, as well as the particular laws governing its development, the petit bourgeoisie is incapable of setting up a social system of its own, i.e., a petit-bourgeois system, even if certain of its sectors (or parties) manage to gain state power under certain historical conditions.
>
> The fact of certain sectors of the petit bourgeoisie being in power does not mean that these regimes have become the representatives of the class interests of the petit bourgeoisie. Rather, they mainly reflect

and represent the general class interests of the national bourgeoisie. Besides, these sectors of the petit bourgeoisie that are in power, do not remain unchanged. The growth of their economic and social interests will gradually move them to the positions of the bourgeoisie (which is, more often than not, bureaucratic). This shift severs their ties with their former petit-bourgeois origins.

2. The Arab nationalist regimes are not rigid or immutable. They move and change continuously according to the particular laws governing their development, as well as the general laws of social and historical development. Hence, the correct, scientific attitude toward these regimes is to view them in the context of their objective motion, position, and concrete role in the Arab struggle for liberation.

"In the 1950s, a new stage of struggle began with the July 23rd revolution in Egypt as the center, led by strata representing the petit and middle bourgeoisie. These new class forces overthrew the subservient big bourgeoisie which was allied with the feudalists. There were political, economic, social, and cultural achievements at this stage in Egypt and throughout the Arab homeland; several progressive, nationalist Arab regimes emerged, unlike the pre-1948 regimes. Yet these achievements remained governed by the nature, interests, and abilities of the petit and middle bourgeois strata. Production remained generally capitalist in character, and relations of economic dependence continued, attaching these regimes to the imperialist world market. Under these conditions, the interests of the ruling class grew and intertwined with the interests of the old bourgeoisie and world capital, despite all claims to a 'third course' of development, and despite tactical relations with the socialist community. This economic and class structure formed the base for these regimes' programs in the ideological, political and cultural spheres" (*Political Report of the PFLP's Fourth Congress*, English edition, 1986, pp. 111-112 [see p. 365 of this volume]).

"This class secured its interests through controlling state power; it made use of the mass struggles to improve its own position in the world capitalist system and market; its interests grew and interlinked with those of the old bourgeoisie which it had overthrown without changing the mode of production. No sooner had this occurred than this class slowed down its progressive march, then stopped and began to retreat to a position of alliance with world capitalism, abandoning the masses and their interests. The transition of Sadat's regime to its current position of trea-

son provides concrete proof of the course of this class" (ibid., p. 112, [p. 366 of this volume]).

"This, of course, does not mean that the petit bourgeoisie, which now leads the masses' revolutionary struggle against imperialism, is ultimately bound to reverse and identify with imperialism. Far from it; there are revolutionary democratic forces in the petit bourgeoisie who possess certain subjective conditions, mainly unreserved commitment to Marxism- Leninism. These elements do have the ability to carry on with the struggle against imperialism and its local, reactionary allies, and to press ahead in the direction of radical, socialist transformation of the society. This happened in Democratic Yemen, Angola and Mozambique. There, the progressive forces managed to withstand the onslaughts of imperialism and reaction; they mobilized and organized the masses, and developed a strategic alliance with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. They are now pressing ahead to complete the national democratic revolution as a prerequisite for socialism, providing its material and technical base" (ibid., pp. 47-48, [see p. 306 of this volume]).

II. On the Petit Bourgeoisie

In the passage entitled "a) The Position with Regard to the Arab Petit-Bourgeois Regimes" in *Tasks of the New Stage*, it says: "The position of the petit bourgeoisie, as a class which is not directly engaged in the process of production, is characterized by oscillation and instability..."

The above statement contains two clear-cut errors: The one lies in declaring the petit bourgeoisie to be a class that is not directly involved in production; the other lies in the assertion that the oscillation and instability of the positions of the petit bourgeoisie are due to its not being directly involved in the process of production.

The fact is, however, that despite its particular class nature, the petit bourgeoisie, like other classes, has its place in the system of social production; it has a relation to the means of production; it has a role in the social organization of labor; and it has ways of acquiring wealth and its share therein. This does not, however, imply that there must be uniformity, homogeneity and harmony among the various sections comprising the petit bourgeoisie, or among their positions and roles in the material production process. The petit bourgeoisie as a class indeed lacks homogeneity and internal harmony; for besides including sections that are not directly involved in production (such as teachers, doctors, etc.), it includes other

sections that *are* involved (such as peasants, artisans, etc.).

As for the properties of oscillation and instability, these have their roots in the duality of the petit bourgeoisie's economic position, rather than being determined by whether or not this class is directly involved in the process of production. The petit bourgeoisie, generally speaking, owns lesser means of production. This is the factor it has in common with the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, however, the petit bourgeoisie works, produces and is a victim of the capitalist relations of production on the social level. This is the factor it has in common with the proletariat.

"The duality of the petit bourgeoisie's economic position is the primary and most profound underlying cause of his contradictory beliefs. On the one hand, he is a small proprietor; on the other, he is a worker. The masses of the petit bourgeoisie cannot but vacillate between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This has always been the case everywhere. The petit bourgeoisie, under capitalism, is always and apart from everything an object of class conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The situation and form of this conflict varies in different times and countries, but the internal dichotomy of the petit bourgeoisie, together with the opposing tractions exercised on him by the conflicting bourgeoisie and proletariat, force him to vacillate continuously. His past draws him toward the bourgeoisie, his future toward the proletariat" (Alexei Levkovsky, *The Petit Bourgeoisie and its Characteristics*, p. 22).

III. On the Zionist Enemy's Scheme for the Future of the 1967 Occupied Territories

When enumerating and analyzing the forms of activities in the 1967 occupied territories, as a result of the vacuum which ensued upon the political absence of the resistance there at that time, *Tasks of the New Stage*, in the chapter entitled "The Resistance inside Occupied Palestine," refers to "political activities initiated under the direction of the Israeli occupation...to create a suitable atmosphere for the consolidation of the occupation, either directly or in the form of a puppet Palestinian state..."

It is clear that *Tasks of the New Stage* here assumes the likelihood of the Zionist enemy creating a subservient Palestinian puppet state in the 1967 occupied territories, with a view to perpetuating the occupation. This assumption is erroneous and out of tune with reality. It is at loggerheads with scientific and objective understanding of the Zionist

settler-colonial plan in Palestine: On the one hand, this plan aims at imposing Zionist colonial domination over the whole of Palestine, by liquidating the material and spiritual existence of the Palestinian people; and on the other hand, our practical experience with the Zionist enemy's policies in the occupied territories over the years is totally contrary to any such assumption.

The Zionist enemy's plan for the future of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip is obviously not unrelated to the Zionist settler-colonial plan for Palestine as a whole. On the contrary, the first is a link in the second and is designed to serve the Zionists' expansionist aims. The aggressive policies pursued by the Zionist enemy in the occupied territories since 1967 include economic subordination, settlement-building, and obliterating the Palestinian national identity, culture and history. Added to this are the programs of the Likud and Labor Alignment, the two major Zionist blocs, for settling the so-called problem of the 1967 occupied territories: autonomy, the Palestinian-Jordanian state project, etc. Taken all together, these quite certainly conform to the Zionist objection to any form of Palestinian state, or any material Palestinian entity at all, even in the form of a subservient Palestinian statelet, as was referred to in *Tasks of the New Stage*. This is due to the threat which such an entity might represent to the Zionist colonialist presence in Palestine in the future.

IV. On the Character of the Current Stage in the Arab Homeland

In several places in *Tasks of the New Stage*, the historical period which our Arab homeland is passing through is inaccurately referred to as being a stage of national democratic liberation.

The development of capitalism into imperialism on the one hand, and the emergence of the socialist system on the other, have had a qualitative effect on the characteristics of the historical development of the countries which entered into the capitalist stage at a later date. The effect is such that the national democratic tasks can no longer be thoroughly and radically fulfilled unless they are combined in one revolutionary process with the socialist tasks, through effective proletarian leadership of the revolutionary movement.

Imperialism controls the economic structure of the so-called third world so that it may serve the interests of world capitalism which has evolved into imperialism. This control has distorted and impeded the growth of both the bourgeoisie and the capitalist system in these coun-

tries. Accordingly, the third world bourgeoisie did not become a revolutionary industrial bourgeoisie, interested in establishing its own national market by removing the declining feudal relations of production and defending its internal market from the onslaught of foreign capital. Instead, this bourgeoisie has generally evolved into a parasitic comprador class bound to foreign capital with numerous ties. This culminated in its forming an unholy alliance with the feudal class and the imperialist forces, to combat revolution in the underdeveloped countries. Thus, the bourgeoisie in these countries has not evolved into a motive and leading force of the revolution (as was historically assumed and as was the case in Europe), but into a counterrevolutionary force whose overthrow ranks high on the agenda of the revolution in underdeveloped countries today.

With the bourgeoisie having proved incompetent, there remains only the proletariat to lead and fulfill the tasks of the democratic revolution in the underdeveloped countries. Once the working class takes power in these countries, the democratic and socialist revolutions are combined and interconnected. As Lenin said:

> Kautsky, Hilferding, Martov, Chernov, Hallicup, Longuet, MacDonald and their likes of the champions of Marxism have not been able to understand the connection between the bourgeois national democratic revolution and the proletarian socialist revolution, for the former changes into the latter; the latter, while in progress, solves the problems of the former; and the latter reinforces the cause of the former. It is the struggle, and only the struggle, that decides to what extent the latter will succeed in outstripping the former.[2]

The experience of the revolution in Asian, African, and Latin American countries testifies to the correctness of this thesis. Wherever national democratic revolutions were rigidly contained within a narrow framework, these failed to carry out their tasks and achieve their aims. Rather, they retreated from their previous achievements (as was the case in Egypt and Iraq). If the revolution, however, succeeded in overstepping its boundaries by embarking on the socialist revolution, it would be able to carry out these tasks and achieve its aims (as was the case in Vietnam and Cuba).

The overall character of the historical period our Arab homeland is passing through, despite differences in the level of economic and political development of the various Arab countries, is one of national democratic

---

2 **Ed. Note:** Original translation into English has been left here. The paragraph being discussed can be found in 'Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution' from Lenin's *Collected Works*, 2nd English Edition, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, Vol. 33, pp. 51-59.

revolution interconnected with socialist revolution.



Fifth Congress: Political Program[1]

[1993]

Introduction

In short, the program is a general determination which reflects the general aspirations and interests of the people, as well as the needs of each stratum. In as much as it sets out clear aims that are in harmony with the general interests of the people, an exact evaluation of the stage and a convincing prediction of the development of the struggle, this will broaden the circle of those who adopt and defend the program.

Hence, the program in its capacity as a "general affirmation" must be carried out, and it is considered an extremely important document. It defines the thinking on which the party is based. It pinpoints the general aims which have been set and the relation between the present and strategic struggle. It defines the nature of the stage, and its contradictions, forces, and methods of struggle, the nature of the enemy and the alliances which make it possible to achieve victory.

Proceeding from these points, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) draws up its program and introduces itself as a militant political party. It aims to mobilize and lead the struggle of the Palestinian masses for repatriation, self-determination, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. These are steps toward defeating the Zionist entity, liberating all the Palestinian national soil and establishing a democratic state where all citizens enjoy equal rights without discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, or creed. This, in turn, would be a step toward establishing a democratic socialist society which is the PFLP's final aim.

The PFLP is guided by historical and dialectical materialism; the progressive aspects of the intellectual and cultural heritage of the Palestinian people and their glorious traditions of struggle; and the progressive aspects of the intellectual and cultural heritage of the Arab nation and all humanity.

1 February 1993.

The PFLP is considered a progressive vanguard organization of the Palestinian working class. It struggles along with the other leftist Palestinian organizations to build a working class party which recruits this class to shoulder its historical role in liberating the Palestinian masses from national and class enslavement. Included in its ranks are the elements of the peasants, toilers, intellectuals, and national bourgeois who are most progressive, determined and ready to give sacrifices, as well as all who aspire to national independence, progress, democracy, and socialism.

The PFLP struggles to accomplish the transitional aims of repatriation, self-determination, and an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. It adheres to its strategic aim of establishing a democratic state on all the Palestinian soil. Its final aim is to establish democratic socialism in Palestine.

The PFLP's organizational unity is based on democratic centralism, collective leadership, criticism, and self-criticism. Democratic centralism guarantees channeling all organizational energies and potentials in a single, united, active direction, after leadership, cadre, and base organizational bodies have participated in a truly democratic way in charting the policy of the party and its positions and program of struggle.

The PFLP considers Palestinian national unity a necessary condition for accomplishing the Palestinian people's aims in the national liberation stage. Thus, it struggles continuously for firm and deeply-rooted unity among the forces of the revolution within the framework of the PLO. It struggles for consolidating unity on a democratic basis to guarantee a position for the working class that is commensurate with its size, weight, and role in the struggle. It also strives to unify the energies of all classes, strata, and ideological trends of the Palestinian people in a strong, deeply rooted national unity, regardless of any conflicts in their ranks. Our people are confronting Zionist settler-colonialism, expansionism, and terrorism which aims to eliminate their very existence. It is impossible to defeat Zionism and achieve victory unless we mobilize all the energies and potentials of all our people and involve them in the liberation battle.

The PFLP wages armed struggle against the Zionist enemy as the main method of struggle. It also wages all forms of political, ideological, and economic struggle which are enshrined in international charters and traditions, in order to enforce the legitimate, inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. The PFLP believes that the Palestinian people are an inseparable part of the Arab nation and the Palestinian national liberation is an inseparable part of the Arab national liberation movement.

Thus, the PFLP struggles alongside other Arab progressive, nationalist, and working class parties and forces, for freedom, democracy, unity, and socialism, in order to liberate Palestine and occupied Arab territories.

The PFLP also confirms its deep conviction in international solidarity. It considers the Palestinian people's struggle an inseparable part of the struggle of the forces of peace, democracy, socialism, progress, and liberation, for a world free of all forms of domination, oppression, and hostility—a world governed by peace, brotherhood, cooperation, equality, justice, and the human values humanity has dreamed of and struggled for since the dawn of history.



Chapter One

The National Liberation Stage—Its nature, contradictions, aims, tasks, and driving forces—The PLO

A. The Nature of the Stage

The present stage of the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people, since it began in the early part of the 20th century, is designated as the national liberation stage. The Palestinian cause is distinct from others because of the settler-colonial, expulsionist nature of Zionism, supported by imperialism and many reactionary forces, which sought to occupy Palestinian land, expel the Palestinian Arab people and eliminate their existence, meanwhile bringing Jews from all corners of the earth to establish a national homeland for them in Palestine.

This resulted in the greatest conspiracy witnessed by modern history. Not only was a hostile, racist, Zionist state established at the expense of the Palestinian Arab people and their legitimate, inalienable national rights. Also, the Palestinian national struggle was placed in a uniquely complicated framework as compared to the conditions under which other colonized and subordinated people struggled for freedom and independence.

While roughly half the Palestinian Arab people fell under the yoke of the racist, settler-colonial Zionist occupation, the other half was dispossessed, dispersed in Arab and foreign places of exile, and subjected to Arab regimes of varying orientations. In addition, the Jordanian regime annexed the Palestinian [West] Bank and many Palestinians were

exiled to the East Bank [Jordan]. All this created severe conditions for the struggle. Yet despite difficult subjective and objective conditions, the Palestinian people did not stop struggling to defend their existence, their independent national identity and their historical, legitimate, inalienable national rights.

Proceeding from this reality and the nature of the stage, the PFLP emphasizes the prime importance of recruiting, mobilizing, and organizing all Palestinian national classes and strata who are harmed by Zionism's colonial presence, in order to accomplish the aims of national liberation and save the Palestinian people from the yoke of settler-colonial Zionism. The PFLP also confirms that the national liberation nature of the current stage of struggle does not nullify its solid linkage and overlap with the tasks of the national democratic revolution.

B. Contradictions

The basic contradiction governing the Palestinian national liberation stage is the antagonistic contradiction between the Palestinian people, whether living in Palestine or in exile, and the Zionist entity which usurped and occupied our homeland. Meanwhile, the basic contradiction in the Arab region is between the Arab nation, supported by the forces of socialism, peace, progress, and liberation in the world, on the one hand, and the Zionist entity and movement, imperialism, and reactionary forces on the other. However, at this stage, the main contradiction to be resolved is that between the Palestinian Arab people and the Zionist occupation of the Gaza Strip and Palestinian [West] Bank, including Jerusalem.

C. Aims

The strategic aim. The strategic aim of the PFLP's struggle alongside the other forces of the Palestinian revolution is to liberate Palestine from Zionist colonial occupation. The PFLP aims for the establishment of a democratic state on the entire Palestinian national land, with its capital in Jerusalem. This state would guarantee legal rights and equality of opportunity to all citizens, without discrimination on the grounds of religion, sex, belief, or color. It would oppose Zionism and imperialism and be oriented toward democratic unity with other Arab countries.

Achieving this aim presupposes a radical solution for the Palestinian

national cause and readiness to wage a prolonged, complicated, and difficult struggle. The Palestinian people would spearhead this struggle, with the participation of the Arab masses led by their vanguard forces aimed at inflicting a decisive defeat on the Zionist entity in Palestine. The Zionist entity is a racist, aggressive, expansionist, settler-colonial entity which aims at elimination [of our people]. It constitutes bridgehead for the imperialist forces to further their strategy of imposing total domination on the whole Arab region. This situation requires the creation of qualitatively new conditions in the international Arab and Palestinian arenas, which would ultimately generate a decisive and radical change and the balance of forces in favor of the revolutionary forces. This entails a fierce, prolonged, complicated struggle and great sacrifices.

The transitional aim. The transitional aim of the struggle waged by the PFLP alongside the other forces of the Palestinian revolution, is to regain the Palestinians' rights to repatriation, self-determination, and an independent state on their national soil, with Jerusalem as its capital. The option of confrontation, whereby the Palestinian people can achieve their strategic aims, requires the realistic political view, in order to see reality as it is and draw up a practical, scientific conception for dealing with this reality and changing what can be changed. The present disequilibrium in the balance of forces is basically due to the great complexity of the environment surrounding the Palestinian national cause. In view of the current Arab and international status quo, it would be extremely difficult and complicated to establish a democratic Palestinian state on all the Palestinian national soil at once. We must therefore rely on a transitional policy on the way to achieving our people's strategic aims.

The difficulties faced by the Zionist enemy in its attempts to absorb Jerusalem, the Palestinian [West] Bank, and Gaza Strip into its racist entity, makes definition of the transitional aim and the struggle for that aim an extremely important issue. There are strong factors to support the national struggle and Palestinian revolution in pursuing the transitional aim; namely increased Palestinian population density in the 1967 occupied territories; legal international resolutions supporting the Palestinian people's struggle and program of repatriation; self-determination and an independent state; and our people's continuous struggle against the occupation, crowned by the glorious intifada of 1987.

The particularity of the situation surrounding the Palestinian national cause after the 1948 disaster and the completion of the occupation of Palestine in 1967, serves to highlight the prime importance of

preserving the independent Palestinian national identity and confronting all attempts to eliminate, disperse, or absorb it. The particularity of the situation also makes a struggle for achieving our people's transitional aims—repatriation, self-determination, and an independent state—a central link in the Palestinian national struggle, which is related to the other links of the struggle for the Palestinian masses' strategic aims.

Through the years of their contemporary struggle, the Palestinian people were able to establish and adhere to their independent national identity. Through their struggle for repatriation, self-determination, and independent state, they were also able to accumulate many gains in this direction. The specified transitional aim of the revolution is distinguished by being a realistic aim which can be accomplished. It elicits the approval and support of the largest sector of public opinion and the international community. It recruits our whole people for the current battle with the enemy. It will also be able to recruit sectors of Israeli public opinion. Therefore, the transitional aim is the organizing principle of the Palestinian people's struggles in the present situation.

While waging different forms of struggle to accomplish our people's aims of repatriation, self-determination, and an independent state, the PFLP confirms that there is a dialectical relation between the people's transitional and strategic aims. Any effort by any Palestinian force to replace the strategic aims with the transitional aims will face strong resistance and insistence on continuing the struggle for establishing a democratic state on all the Palestinian national soil.

D. Tasks

While struggling in all fields and on all levels in order to accomplish our people's transitional aims, the PFLP views that the tasks of the Palestinian people everywhere toward accomplishing these aims are as follows:

(1) To work to consolidate the role and status of the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of our people everywhere. It is the political framework embodying their independent national identity and encompassing all the national classes and strata with true interests in accomplishing the Palestinian revolution's program and aims.

(2) To work to consolidate and develop Palestinian national unity in the framework of the PLO and in the ranks of the Palestinian people, because it is the sharpest weapon in the struggle for accomplishing the Palestinian national tasks in the present situation. It is

an essential condition for achieving victory against the enemy forces. Yet, working to consolidate unity does not abrogate conflict and differences between the organizations and the PLO, aiming to solidify national unity and establish a democratic, front-type basis for its work.

(3) To resist all liquidations, political projects, plans, and separate deals proposed by the imperialist, Zionist, and reactionary forces in order to liquidate the Palestinian national cause and encircle our people's struggle for their national aims.

(4) To consolidate and develop the struggle of our people inside the occupied homeland, to provide for their ongoing needs and to raise their struggle to a higher phase in harmony with the view that the interior is the field of the basic conflict and the focus of the work of the PLO leadership and its various administrative, financial, military, informational, and political institutions and bodies until the occupation is expelled, and freedom and independence is achieved.

(5) To develop the relation between the pillars of the revolution inside and outside [Palestine], in order to crystallize the means for increasing the weight and role of the interior in formulating Palestinian national decisions, in view of the interior's role in our people's struggle.

(6) To struggle against the Israeli occupation policies which aim to destroy the national economy. To participate in the efforts to develop productive national institutions and protect them from Israeli attempts to destroy or bankrupt them, or to compete with them in order to deprive them of reasonable grounds for existence. To foil the Zionist attempts to annex and merge the economies of Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip to the Israeli economy.

(7) To consolidate the struggle against the policy of confiscating the land and stealing the water. To confront by all possible means the dangers of settlement-building and changing Palestine demographic nature.

(8) To protect the popular heritage and Palestinian national culture from the Zionist enemy's attempts to confiscate, distort, and destroy them. To work for preserving and developing them by increasing the role of intellectuals in the Palestinian national struggle, and supporting and developing their unions and cultural, research and professional institutions.

(9) To struggle against Jewish immigration to occupied Palestine. To expose its dangerous consequences, most important of which is the renewal of the Zionist project and what this portends in terms of carrying out aggressive and expansionist plans and accomplishing the dream of Greater Israel. This struggle entails organizing Arab and Palestinian informational and political campaigns to create international public opinion reflecting that freedom of immigration for Jews occur at the expense of the Palestinian Arab people's freedom and rights.

(10) To exert efforts to stop Palestinians from emigrating from Palestine in search of their daily bread and relief from Zionism's tyrannical, oppressive, and terrorist policies, by providing for their needs, so they can remain steadfast and adhere to the land of their country.

(11) To convince Palestinians working abroad to return to their homeland if they are able to, by persuading them of the importance of returning and settling down permanently, and providing them with job opportunities to replace their work abroad.

(12) To link the different forms of struggle in a creative way. To avoid committing the mistake of using only one form of struggle for confronting the Zionist enemy. The comprehensive nature of the long and complicated confrontation which we are waging requires skillful administration of the conflict with the enemy and all fronts—military, political, informational, economic, diplomatic, and cultural. However, the task of propaganda against Zionism remains to be a central task for us and all Palestinian nationalist and progressive forces.

(13) To adhere constantly to the revolution's strategic aims, linking them closely to the transitional aims and exposing tendencies that seek to lose them in a frantic search for immediate aims. To confront adventures and militant tendencies.

(14) To draw up a comprehensive plan for escalating and developing the different forms of revolutionary violence against the Zionist enemy from inside occupied Palestine and from across the surrounding Arab borders. To increase the struggle for opening these borders for military activities, even if this might entail delaying some other form of struggle at some stages.

(15) To carry out activities for mobilizing the potentials and capacities of the masses of the Palestinian people inside and outside [Pal-

estine], involving them in different fields of conflict with the Zionist enemy, in order to ensure the greatest possible popular participation for accomplishing our people's aims.

(16) Our people in 1948 occupied Palestine are a part of the Palestinian Arab people and national struggle. They therefore shoulder tasks to confront the plans of the Zionist enemy as follows:

a. Struggling to consolidate the Palestinian national identity, and resisting all efforts to disperse it.

b. Confronting all forms of discrimination and oppression; escalating struggle in all fields of life.

c. Increasing the struggle against the policies of land expropriation, Judaization, and expelling the original population.

d. Protecting the national culture from efforts to erase, distort, or disperse it; exposing Zionist activities which attempt to confiscate the Palestinian people's heritage.

e. Developing the forms of struggle waged by the Palestinian masses in the 1948 occupied territories, so that they move gradually from a supportive role to total participation in the struggle of our people to exercise their rights to repatriation, self-determination, and establishing an independent Palestinian state.

f. Working for the establishment of a broad national front to accomplish the above-mentioned tasks; working to reinforce daily political and militant relations with progressive and democratic Jewish forces who support our people's rights to repatriation, self-determination, and an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.

(17) To devote more attention to working among the masses by varying and expanding the structures for mass work inside and outside [Palestine], and by unifying the trade unions and mass and profession organizations, overcoming their current state of division. To struggle for democratic relations, democratic elections, and proportional representation in the unions in order to make them more democratic and thus more active.

(18) To increase Palestinian women's militant role and participation in Palestinian national activities in different frameworks and at different levels. To work for developing and unifying the women's organizations and the framework of the General Union of Palestinian

Women. To exert efforts to free Palestinian women from social restrictions which repress their participation in the battle for national liberation.

(19) To work to mobilize, organize, and unify the Palestinian working class; to provide all forms of support in order that it may fulfill its historical role.

(20) To work to increase the revolution's concern for Palestinian students and youth. To increase their participation in the struggle waged by our people inside and outside [Palestine], by supporting and developing student and youth committees and unions. To increase the number of cultural clubs and institutions. To make education democratic and nationalist, and give broader opportunities to our youth. To provide the highest level of ideological and political mobilization; to mobilize the majority of the youth in the ranks of the revolution.

(21) To defend human rights and struggle for the release of Arab and Palestinian political prisoners and detainees, as well as internationalists who work in the framework of the Palestinian revolution.

(22) To mobilize concern for the cause of the Palestinian children since they are the generation of the future.

(23) To devote attention to establishing and developing various institutions inside and outside [Palestine]. To consolidate and unite all the national institutions of different orientations.

(24) To struggle to build a sound and healthy relation between the Palestinian and Arab nationalist factors in the formula for conflict with the Zionist enemy. It is true that the Palestinian national factor is the basic one, but this should not blind us to the Arab nationalist dimension of the Palestinian cause. If we wish to develop the achievements of our revolution and accomplish victory for our people, there is no alternative to developing the interaction, mutual assistance and integration between the particular and the general. Reality shows the firm relation between the Palestinian and Arab nationalist struggle, which is dictated by the particularity of the Palestinian cause, the nationalist conflict against the Zionist enemy, and the severity of the dangers which the Zionist entity poses to all Arab countries.

(25) To work to consolidate and develop efforts to mobilize the Palestinian and Arab masses against Camp David. To expose the great dangers posed by the immediate and ultimate aims of the imperial-

ist-Zionist-reactionary course.

(26) To increase concern for mobilizing the broadest possible sector of international public opinion, the international community, and all the forces of socialism, liberation, democracy, progress, peace, and equality in our battle with the Zionist enemy, in a way which will facilitate the accomplishment of our people's transitional aims.

(27) To work to establish and develop various forms of cooperation with democratic and progressive Jewish forces opposed to Zionism, regardless of their size, weight, and role in the current battle, in order to defeat Israeli policies and practices, and accomplish the Palestinian people's aims.

(28) To work to establish supportive relations and joint struggle with the Jordanian national democratic movement, based on the special relations between the Jordanian and Palestinian people, for the sake of a national democratic Jordan and accomplishing the Palestinian rights to repatriation, self-determination, and an independent state.

(29) To work to ensure the civil and political rights of Palestinian refugees in all Arab host countries, as well as their right to struggle. To end all forms of discrimination in work, residence, freedom of movement, and security. To confront all efforts at resettlement, creating alternative homelands and emigration. To work to ensure the rights of the Palestinian human being and community in all countries of exile.

(30) To work to confront the attempts at Zionist-Palestinian normalization.

E. The driving forces of the revolution

Zionist occupation by nature means annexation, racism, elimination, and settler-colonialism. It severely harms the interests of all classes and strata of the Palestinian people, except for a handful of big property owners, capitalists, and collaborators who are linked to the occupation.

Therefore, at this stage of the Palestinian people struggle—the stage of national liberation—the driving forces of the revolution are all classes and strata, because they have genuine interest in getting rid of the occupation and its destructive, usurping, aggressive, and terrorist policies. But, naturally, there are differences in the degree of participation of the respective classes and strata of our people and the national liberation bat-

tle.

The working class is considered to have the broadest social base. It is distinguished by its determination, steadiness, patience, and ability to shoulder the burden of struggle against the occupiers, because it faces the most national and class oppression. Its interests are linked to the higher interest of the Palestinian people as a whole. Therefore, it is the most stable, persistent, and decisive force in continuing the struggle. However, the Palestinian peasants are facing oppression, subjugation, and repression because their land, which forms the basis of their livelihood, is confiscated by the occupation. They therefore constitute the main force among the forces of the revolution. The majority of peasants, especially the small and poor peasants, have genuine interest in the revolution and are in a strong alliance with the working class. This alliance forms the base of the broad national class alliance which can decide the battle in the interests of the people and carry the revolution to its final aims.

Also, the various strata of the petite bourgeoisie are considered to be among the main driving class forces of the revolution. Reality attests to the active and dynamic role they play in the revolution's leadership and in the ranks of its base and cadre, in view of their large number.

The national bourgeoisie has interests in participating in the revolution to get rid of the hated occupation, which deprives it of power and markets by striving to destroy the Palestinian national economy and annex it to the Israeli economy. This gives the various strata of the national bourgeoisie interest in expelling the occupation and gaining national independence, with the exception of a limited comprador strata whose interests are tied to the occupation. The bourgeoisie vacillates; it fears the mobilized organized revolutionary mass movement. Still, the particularities of the Zionist enemy and its destructive economic policies against the Palestinian national economy and bourgeoisie, make this bourgeoisie one of the driving forces of the revolution and the national liberation stage.

Revolutionary and democratic intellectuals form a social strata with dissimilar class origins. They have genuine interest in national liberation. They are distinguished by virtue of their reality, which enables them to undertake an important role in the service of the contemporary revolution. They are useful in the fields of political struggle, information, and ideology. Due to their theoretical education and knowledge of the experience of other people struggling for freedom and independence, they are able to play an important role in rectifying the revolution's course and

spreading humanist, progressive and revolutionary thinking and culture. They play an important role in confronting the various forms of destroying thought and imperialist cultural invasion. They help the working class to assume its real position in the revolution.

Finally, there is a particular role of the Palestinian camps inside and outside the occupied homeland, where the Palestinian communities are characterized by poverty, toil, and suffering. They are also distinguished by a great capacity for struggle and provide the revolution with strength and the means to continue.

The PLO

The PLO is considered the moral and political entity which represents the will of the Palestinian people, and the framework which embodies their national identity and independent character.

It is based on this fact that the PFLP views the preservation of the framework of the Palestinian entity, as embodied in the PLO, which has attained official Arab and international recognition and the broadest mass following, making it the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It got to the point of occupying an important position in confronting the Zionist and imperialist enemy under the present conditions. The nature of the enemy plans and the particularities of the Palestinian cause make it essential to emphasize the Palestinian entity, to manifest an independent national identity and to insist on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. These are the fundamental principles of the PFLP's strategy and struggle to accomplish the strategic and transitional aims of our people. The PLO and its armed organizations have encountered a series of Israeli and Arab reactionary assaults, aimed at eliminating it and depriving the Palestinian people of a sole legitimate representative and an independent national identity. However, the difficult, bitter struggle waged by the revolution, and the great sacrifices it made to defend its existence and accomplish its aims, enabled the PLO to protect and develop its achievements. It increased its political weight and activities, and acquired greater support on the international and Arab levels.

Therefore, the PFLP considered the PLO as a front-type alliance framework which includes representatives of all Palestinian national classes and strata who have genuine interests in the struggle against occupation. The PFLP emphasizes continuation of the struggle to consolidate

the unity of all nationalist forces, organizations, parties, trends, and personalities in the framework of the PLO. That is the way to consecrate the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, which embodies their political entity and expresses their national will for liberation and national independence. The PLO constitutes a strong barrier against the conspiracies to liquidate the Palestinian national cause.

In this framework, the PFLP strives with all its potentials to ripen the suitable objective conditions for uniting all revolutionary democratic forces, trends, and personalities in the framework of the PLO. In the PFLP's view, this requires consolidating relations among the revolutionary democratic forces and increasing cooperation and coordination among them, in order to bring their points-of-view closer together and create a suitable atmosphere for uniting their efforts.

There is no doubt that consolidating cooperation and coordination between the revolutionary democratic forces will contribute to solidifying Palestinian national unity. It meets the demands for consolidating and developing the national course against the Zionist-imperialist-reactionary alliance and their policy of denying the Palestinian people's legitimate rights. It will safeguard and consolidate the PLO's achievements, and help to reorganize its bodies and institutions on a democratic basis.

Palestinian national unity is the sharpest weapon for confronting the efforts to liquidate the Palestinian national cause and negate the PLO. However, unity cannot be established and strengthened without democratic reform of the PLO's bodies and political, military, administrative, financial, informational, and mass institutions and unions. Proceeding from this reality, the PFLP emphasizes continuing the struggle for the following:

(1) To consolidate Palestinian national unity and work to develop it to a level commensurate with the demands of the national struggle. To form the leading and lower bodies and institutions of the PLO on a democratic front-like basis. To form a committed, collective leadership capable of taking and implementing decisions. This would put an end to the monopoly of power and ensure decisive commitment to the national program.

(2) To establish democratic relations among the different forces that are allied in the framework of the PLO. To solve any disagreements arising among them via democratic dialogue, avoiding that they become antagonistic contradictions that lead to a violent revolution.

To adopt the law of "unity–conflict–unity" for regulating relations among the forces of the revolution. Unity is the governing principle, but conflict is necessary when the bourgeoisie violates the common program.

(3) To work for the advent of real democratic reform in the PLO's institutions and bodies, so as to guarantee the participation of the democratic forces and make the PLO equal to its charted tasks. To end hierarchical and bureaucratic forms of work, monopoly of power and organizational sectarianism, in favor of collective work.

(4) To consecrate the PLO's legitimacy and sole representation of the Palestinian people on the Arab and international levels. To resist all efforts to contain or besiege the PLO by strengthening Palestinian national alertness. To preserve the unity of the Palestinian people and their struggle everywhere to accomplish their aims of repatriation, self-determination, and an independent national state on their national soil.

(5) To continue working to reinforce and develop the PLO's achievements on the Palestinian Arab and international levels. To increase recognition of the legitimacy and justice of the Palestinian national struggle. To confront the Zionist-imperialist projects which aim to liquidate the Palestinian national cause and strike at the achievements it has made over the past years.

(6) To consolidate efforts to preserve the PLO status and its role in the Arab-Zionist conflict. To solidify the political line in order to preserve its nature as a liberation movement opposed to imperialism and Zionism. To confront any violation of the common national program.

(7) To consecrate the independence of Palestinian national decision-making as part of the struggle for reinforcing the independent Palestinian national identity. To safeguard the right of each organization to preserve its ideological, organizational and political independence, as long as this does not hinder forming the broadest and most solid Palestinian national unity in the framework of the PLO. To develop the habit of putting the higher national interests above personal and tribalist interests.



Chapter Two

The Enemy Forces Opposing the Palestinian Revolution—The Zionist entity and movement—International imperialism and social forces linked to it

The Zionist movement was born in the womb of the international capitalist system as the latter was transforming into its imperialist stage. By the end of the 19th century, this movement had begun working to establish its racial settler-colonial identity in Palestine, as a strategic base for protecting the growing Zionist and imperialist interests in the Arab region. Zionism exerted intense, multifaceted efforts to accomplish this aim, which took decades and culminated in the establishment of the "State of Israel" in 1948. The Zionist movement concentrated on the Jewish communities in Europe. It perpetrated crimes against Jews themselves in order to drive them to immigrate [to Palestine] and to stir up international public opinion in a way that would serve the Zionist idea. It took advantage of the tragedies which resulted from anti-Semitism and Nazi crimes in order to achieve its own political projects and execute its own criminal plans. It used racist and reactionary ideas to mobilize Jews all over the world, propagating such concepts as "the Jewish Nation," "the national homeland," "the promised land," and "God's chosen people."

The thinking of the Zionist movement is in essence reactionary and serves the monopolistic interests of imperialist and Zionist circles. Thus, since its establishment, it has been met by condemnation and denunciation. At different times, socialist and progressive literature fiercely attacked the idea of "the Jewish nation," considering it to be both reactionary and totally erroneous.

The Zionist movement attempted to disguise the essence of its project and the service it rendered to imperialism by demagogically claiming that Zionism was the only solution for the "Jewish question." But experience has proven concretely that this claim is false. The Zionist movement is not a national liberation movement; and the Zionist entity, established with the support of British colonialism and the US administration, did not solve the Jewish question. Jews gathered from different parts of the world and settled in occupied Palestine cannot form a homogeneous nation where harmony prevails. They have not enjoyed stability and peace. This confirms the invalidity of trying to falsify history by contending that a Jewish nation existed or was in formation. The Jewish question can only be solved by Jews integrating in the society where they live, as has been stressed by leading progressive international thinkers.

Material events have shown that the Zionist entity was not established in Palestine to solve the Jewish question. Rather, it was intended to serve as a forward base for imperialism, to confront the rise of the Arab national liberation movement and its struggle for Independence and unity against Western European attempts to impose colonial domination and hegemony on the area in the wake of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

The British government's adoption of the Zionist project disclosed the real nature of this project and its service to imperialism in the Arab region. With the Balfour Declaration of 1917, the British government promoted the Zionist movement's efforts to establish a state in the territory under British mandate—encouraging Jewish immigration, facilitating confiscation of Palestinian peasants' land and offering all forms of aid to the terrorist settler-colonial Zionist movement. These acts disclose the ugly nature of British colonialism's plans.

The US administration also embraced the Zionist entity immediately after its establishment, giving political, economic, military and human support. This attests to the exceptional importance of the Zionist state and serving imperialist plans in the Arab region.

The exceptional importance of the Zionist state has been highlighted over the past four decades by the services it has rendered for imperialism. It has waged a series of aggressive, expansionist wars against the Arab countries surrounding Palestine. It has carried out a series of terrorist activities in different forms in many Arab countries, aiming to strike and weaken the Arab national liberation movement. It has contributed substantially to keeping the Arab region fragmented, preventing development and social progress, and generally reinforcing imperialist hegemony in the area. The scope of the Zionist state's conspiratorial and terrorist role was expanded to include many African, Latin American, and Asian countries. It struck against many national liberation movements and progressive, democratic forces. Even the socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, did not escape Zionist terrorist activities.

As a consequence of the Zionist entity's obvious service to imperialism, its repeated rejection of the international will and unanimous UN resolutions, and further disclosures about its racist and terrorist nature, campaigns increased denouncing the ideology and practices of the Zionist movement. This was crowned by UN General Assembly resolution #3771, adopted in 1975, which states that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.

Since the adoption of this resolution, the US Administration spared no efforts to cancel it from the UN record, at times employing pressure and at times threatening various forms of blackmail. This is an expression of the US administration's support for the Zionist movement and racist entity, and a manifestation of the special relationship and strategic alliance that exists between the two. The US administration succeeded in having the resolution rescinded after the collapse of the socialist camp, having imposed its hegemony as the leading force in the world.

The US Administration has entered into strategic security, military, and political agreements with "Israel," highlighting the strategic importance of Zionism's increased international and regional role. The two states engage in various forms of technical and scientific cooperation. The US continues to give "Israel" virtually unlimited military, economic and political support.

US imperialism has no qualms about frankly announcing that the Zionist entity is a "strategic asset" and an essential forward base for ensuring its "vital interests" in the region. Nor does the Zionist entity hesitate to manifest its close link to imperialist strategy in the region and internationally.

Thus, the particularities and duties of the racist Zionist entity place it in a radical, antagonistic contradiction with the Palestinian and Arab people from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf. Its duty toward imperialism means that it should be ever ready to strike at any upsurge of the Arab national liberation movement, in order to protect imperialism's strategic interests in the region. Its expansionist and settler-colonial characteristics require it to stick to the strategy of denying the existence of the Palestinian people, considering them to be the antithesis of its existence and fabricated entity.

The duties and particularities of the Zionist entity make coexistence with it unrealistic, even possible. In practice, its nature and function generate violent contradictions and continuous conflict which cannot be halted without removing the objective cause.

The leaders of the Zionist movement understand that the Zionist entity's existence is conditional on performance of its imperialist-Zionist role and duties. Retreating from this role would endanger its stability and internal cohesion; With the passing of time, it would lose its reason for being. The Zionist entity is an artificial and alien phenomenon and cannot survive without infusions from Zionist and imperialist circles.

The main problem for the Zionist entity is its failure to wipe out the Palestinian people and their independent national identity. Thus, the Zionist entity's crisis will continue. It cannot be solved because of the political and militant presence of the Palestinian people and the dynamic continuation of their struggle, which generated the revolution and a series of uprisings in the occupied territories, crowned by the all-encompassing uprising that broke out in December 1987.

Confronting the Zionist entity's policies aiming to defeat them, consolidating the steadfastness of the Palestinian people, and developing the forms of struggle will remain decisive factors for depriving the Zionist project of the feeling of stability and permanency, and fueling its irresolvable historical crisis.

The PFLP views that the nature of the Zionist entity is expansionist, aggressive, racist, and settler-colonial; it carries out joint Zionist-imperialist tasks. Proceeding from this view, the PFLP believes in the necessity of practicing all forms of struggle to destroy this forward base of imperialism. The PFLP emphasizes that the current conflict, which began over 100 years ago, is not a conflict between two nations. Rather, it is between the Arab and Palestinian national movement on one hand and the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary alliance on the other. Whereas the former are defending their existence, rights, and future, the enemy alliance is trying to bolster the Zionist entity as the point of departure for liquidating the national liberation movement, imposing hegemony, and plundering the wealth of the Arab region. Those who believed that "Israel" could be separated from Zionism and live as one of the states in the region, free of Zionist dreams and aims, or that it could cease carrying out its duties for imperialism in the Arab region, have found out that this was a delusion. "Israel," by virtue of its nature, structure and aims, is the living material embodiment of the Zionist project. Because "Israel" has joint interests and strong ties to imperialist and Zionist circles, it remains linked to imperialist and Zionist tasks in the Arab region and internationally. It has developed from being an instrument to being imperialism's junior partner, dividing the spoils with imperialism and bearing responsibility for executing joint plans.

The relationship that exists between the Zionist movement and imperialism is structural, based on mutual interests; it is a solid, historical relationship. This strategic relationship, based on joint interests, evolved due to objective necessity at the time when capitalism entered its imperialist stage.

In summary, there is no breaking the strategic bond between the Zionist and imperialist enemies. They need each other. Concrete experience has proven the importance of imperialism for "Israel" and vice versa. The best evidence of this is the political, military and economic cooperation between the two. Israel has proven its military effectiveness in accomplishing imperialist aims. American economic, military and political support has proven the US's capacity for stabilizing and sustaining the Zionist enemy.

Attempts to separate US imperialism and the Zionist enemy are futile, misleading and dogmatic, ignoring the basic elements of reality. The Zionist entity has become an active element in the global strategy of White House leaders. Experience has proven that disagreements that emerge between the two parties are minor and secondary; they are quickly resolved in the framework of understanding and consensus on basic issues that exist between the two.

The course of the conflict waged by the Palestinian people against the Zionist enemy, its aggressive and expansionist plans and terrorist and repressive policies, has revealed the existence of progressive and democratic Jewish forces opposed to Zionism. It has also revealed the existence of Jewish forces who oppose Zionism's policies on more than one level. Regardless of their size, weight, and role in the current battle to defeat Israeli practices and policies, and accomplish the Palestinian people's aims of repatriation, self-determination, and an independent state, the principle of cooperation with democratic and progressive Jewish forces should not be underestimated for accomplishing the Palestinian revolution's transitional and strategic aims.

Developing and escalating the Palestinian and Arab national struggling against the Zionist entity, its plans and policies, and accumulating gains will serve to aggravate the contradictions of the Zionist entity. This will demonstrate the sterility and fragility of the solution which the Zionist projects offers for the Jewish question.

Confronting the Zionist entity requires establishing different forms of cooperation with democratic and progressive Jewish forces who oppose the ideology and practices of Zionism, and with forces who support our people's rights to repatriation, self-determination, and an independent state... as well as with those who condemn repression and terrorism against the Palestinians.

It is correct to emphasize constantly that the Zionist enemy's main

characteristics are settler-colonialism, racism, expansionism, and terrorism. Yet, despite these characteristics, it contains a set of contradictions which the leaders of the revolution should take advantage of in order to serve the Palestinian people's struggle and legitimate rights.

Alongside the Zionist movement and international imperialism, there are also the reactionary and bourgeois Arab forces and regimes that are allied with imperialism. They are part of the enemy camp opposing the Palestinian revolution and the Arab national liberation movement, despite differences between them.

There are differences between the Arab regimes related to the degree of their subordination and linkage to imperialism, and their degree of agreement or disagreement with the enemy plans for the region. However, this does not negate the general feature of the Arab regimes as subordinated.

The ideological and class nature of the reactionary forces and capitulationist bourgeoisie, and the intertwining of their interests with those of imperialism, turn them into repressive authorities which aim to prevent the masses from continuing the struggle for their national aims. The basic contradiction for the reactionaries and bourgeoisie is with the Arab and Palestinian masses, not with the Zionist and imperialist enemy. Experience has proven that there is an alliance between Arab reaction, Tel Aviv, and Washington, for confronting the revolution, aiming to eliminate it and to abrogate Palestinian national rights and disperse the independent Palestinian entity. Consequently, the roles of the Zionist enemy and the Arab reactionary forces and subordinated bourgeoisie are complementary.

Based on these proven and tangible givens, the PFLP regards the subordinated and reactionary Arab regimes and forces as being objectively part and parcel of the enemy camp opposing the revolution. Proceeding from this reality, the PFLP calls upon the organizations of the Arab national liberation movement to intensify the struggle to unmask these regimes and confront their liquidations policies against the Palestinian cause. The PFLP also calls upon these organizations to coordinate in order to confront the Zionist danger threatening their people, and liberate their homeland from imperialist domination and exploitation.

In this context, it is worth mentioning that the PFLP is aware that there are non-antagonistic contradictions among the regimes and the social forces that are subordinated to imperialism and Zionism. The exis-

tence of these contradictions does not alter the correctness of our analysis on the essential nature of the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary alliance, but they can be taken advantage of. It is possible to struggle for Arab solidarity, and the Palestinian revolution and national liberation movement should do so, aiming to pressure imperialism and the Zionist entity to recognize the Palestinian people's rights to repatriation, self-determination and an independent state.

In the PFLP's view, the Palestinian revolution's relations with Arab regimes should be determined in accordance with their support to the Palestinian people's struggle for their national rights. Such support should be embodied in the following:

1. recognition of the State of Palestine;

2. recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, without any form of intervention, guardianship, containment, or efforts at dissolving or confiscating [its status];

3. offering all forms of political, material, and moral support to the Palestinian people's struggle against the Zionist entity and US imperialism;

4. guaranteeing the Palestinian people's civil and political rights; and

5. non-recognition of the Zionist entity, "Israel."

Chapter Three

Forms and Methods of Struggle

Accomplishing victory in our conflict with the Zionist enemy requires that we use all the main forms and methods of struggle—ideological, political, and economic. By virtue of its nature, characteristics, and network of relations and alliances, the enemy enjoys overwhelming superiority in all fields. This imposes on us to excel in all forms of struggle and to work to develop them constantly in order to create a high-level revolutionary impetus. This will ensure continuation of the struggle and mobilization of the broadest mass potentials around different forms of struggle in order to accumulate achievements and victories as steps toward our people's transitional and strategic aims. However, the necessity of waging different forms of struggle does not abrogate the importance of demarcating

the main form of struggle to be the lever and motive power of the other forms.

Proceeding from this point, the PFLP regards the armed struggle as the main method of the contemporary Palestinian national struggle.

The class and ideological nature of the Zionist enemy, and its aggressive, racist, and settler-colonial practices, make the armed struggle the main method of struggle. Tangible experience has proven that armed struggle played a major role in arousing our people's national alertness and crystallizing their independent national identity. It enabled important national achievements, the most prominent of which is international recognition of the Palestinian people's legitimate national rights and sole, legitimate representative, the PLO. Armed struggle constitutes the basic lever for embarking on other forms of struggle and giving our national cause its important position on the Palestinian, Arab, and international levels. Tangible, material events show that the contradictions between the Palestinian people and the Zionist entity are basic and antagonistic ones which cannot be resolved without violence.

Revolutionary violence is dictated by objective necessity as we mentioned above. It contains the noble human aims and demands of putting an end to Zionism's aggressive policies and the suffering of the Palestinian people; accomplishing the Palestinian people's legitimate national aspirations; and rescuing the Israelis from the tragedy of the deadly wars which have continued for successive decades.

Revolutionary violence and armed struggle are the legitimate right of people's confronting occupation, usurpation, and settler-colonialism, as has been enshrined in international charters.

However, demarcating armed struggle as the main method does not prevent the other forms of struggle from advancing at a certain stage. Different forms of struggle are demarcated at each stage in accordance with the existing conditions, the degree of their suitableness, and the masses' response to them. The glorious intifada, which erupted in December 1987 as the logical result of an accumulation of experience in struggle, presented a new method of violent, but unarmed struggle, which came to dominate other forms of struggle. In addition, the uprising was distinguished by being able to combine simultaneously more than one form of struggle in a unique, creative way. It enriched international revolutionary experience by adding theoretical and practical innovations in the art and forms of uprising.

The principle of combining different forms of struggle is necessary because it enables moving from one form to another at the right time and in the appropriate situation, according to the demands of the stage of the struggle.

The nature of the Zionist enemy dictates that our battle be as comprehensive and multifaceted as possible. The main form of struggle cannot accomplish its aims unless it is related to the other forms of struggle. Experience has proven the dialectical relationship between the forms of struggle, and the successfulness of linking them together. This makes it possible to deprive the enemy of its assets and superiority, and to reinforce its isolation on the regional and international levels. The broad, varied and comprehensive struggle, waged by the masses against the Zionist occupiers and their allies, limits the enemy forces' ability to maneuver and deceive.

Over the years, the Palestinian people have been able to broaden the mass, political, and diplomatic struggles. They have also broadened the struggle in the fields of information and solidarity, and entered into new fields of struggle. The long militant experience of our people enables them constantly to create, change and develop the forms of struggle.

If now, the different forms of political struggle have taken priority on the agenda of the Palestinian national struggle and revolution, the economic and ideological fields of struggle should be no less important.



Chapter Four

The Palestinian National Liberation Movement is an Inseparable Part of the Arab National Liberation Movement

In light of the disclosure of the class, ideological, and settler-colonial nature of the Zionist entity and its racism in occupied Palestine, its imperialist-Zionist duties and its aggressive practices throughout the Arab region, the Palestinian and Arab masses and national liberation forces embarked directly on their present struggle against it.

The PFLP believes in the necessity of joint work between the Palestinian and Arab national liberation movements based on the following considerations:

—Palestine is an inseparable part of the Arab homeland; the Palestinian people are part of the Arab nation; and the Palestinian liberation movement is part of the Arab national liberation movement.

—Great qualitative changes have taken place in the regional and international order, especially after the collapse of the bipolar order and the emergence of a multi-polar world under the leadership of the United States. Added to this was the Gulf War and its consequences for the Arab nation and the new situation facing the Arab nation.

—There is an organic relationship linking the people of the Arab nation and their nationalist and progressive organizations, parties and forces, based on the national ties of language, history, culture, common interests, and territory; and due to the serious challenges posed to their present and future by the imperialist and Zionist plans.

Based on the above, the aims of joint Palestinian-Arab work are as follows:

(1) To establish a correct relation between the local and [pan-Arab] national dimension, the specific and the general, and the struggles of the different Arab national liberation movements.

(2) The PFLP believes in the [pan-Arab] national dimension of the Palestinian cause. While confirming the particular role of the Palestinian people in the act of liberation, it considers the liberation of Palestine and the expulsion of Zionism as a [pan-Arab] national duty.

(3) To struggle jointly for ending the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian and Arab territories occupied in 1967, on the basis of international Palestinian national identity and entity as embodied in the PLO; for defending independent Palestinian national decision-making; and for accomplishing the right to repatriation, self-determination, and establishing an independent state.

(4) To work to correct the PLO's relations on the Arab level, by putting relations with the Arab masses and their vanguard organizations first and confirming the responsibility of the Palestinian revolution for bringing about an upswing in the Arab mass movement, which does not mean being a substitute for the masses or their organizations.

(5) To work for reviving the Arab liberation movement in view of the structural crisis in its bourgeois and working class wings. This

requires broad, serious discussion among different organizations and the largest possible number of democratic intellectuals.

(6) To exert efforts to establish a democratic and progressive Arab front and a political and organizational formula for joint work among the Arab liberation movement organizations in the countries surrounding Palestine; and to regard the struggle for the democratic rights of the Arab human being as a basic duty.

(7) To work to establish a united Arab working class party as a strategic duty.

(8) To struggle against all regionalist, sectarian, and confessionalist tendencies.

(9) To work for establishing Arab solidarity based on opposition to Zionism and imperialism.

(10) To struggle side by side with all Arab democratic and progressive forces to mobilize the Palestinian and Arab masses for achieving Arab unity.

(11) To work jointly to achieve the Arab national civilization project; this entails constructing a democratic civil society and promoting economic development in order to solve the problems of poverty, starvation, desertification, and all forms of economic, political, military, and cultural subordination.

(12) To work to ensure comprehensive national security; to use Arab wealth for growth, economic wholeness and a common market. To confront the challenges of the new stage of world development on the way to establishing a united, democratic, socialist Arab society.



Chapter Five

The Palestinian National Liberation Movement is an Inseparable Part of the International Forces for Liberation, Progress, Democracy, Socialism, and Peace

Despite the great progress made by human beings during their long history, they have not been able to establish a world order in which all people, nations, and individuals enjoy equal rights to self-determination, control

over their own potentials and choice of their own path of development, free of all forms of hegemony, oppression, exploitation, terror, aggression, and occupation.

The issue has become even more complicated in the new world situation, especially after the end of the Cold War and the replacement of the bipolar order with a multi-polar world. The United States is striving to entrench its leadership and impose its domination on the world. Capitalism has made a global advance after the collapse of the socialist camp. All this requires increased cooperation among all forces struggling against repression and for freedom, justice and equality in the world and especially in the Third World.

In their concrete experience, the Palestinian people have suffered from various kinds of oppression, aggression, dispersal, uprooting, and attempts at annihilation at the hands of the Zionist settler-colonialism, with the support of imperialism and reaction. They persist in struggling for their inalienable, legitimate national rights. Therefore, the Palestinian national liberation movement is an inseparable part of the international camp struggling for freedom, justice, and equality. In conditions where imperialism is freed of its shackles and increases its aggressiveness, escalating direct and indirect intervention to strike the forces of liberation, progress, peace, and socialism, international solidarity becomes imperative. It is an indispensable weapon for confronting imperialism's arrogance and continuous efforts to reinforce its position, liquidate its enemies and rearrange the world in a way which guarantees continued plunder of the people's wealth.

The immense qualitative changes on the international level dictate increased national self-reliance, without at all underestimating the support of allies and friends in our national struggle. The PFLP does not think that differing points of view among the international revolutionary forces should impact negatively on the principle of international solidarity, which is based on independence and equal relations.

As one of the revolutionary forces on the international level, the PFLP confirms its adherence to the principle of international solidarity. It works continuously to reinforce the Palestinian revolution's alliance with nationalist and progressive forces, parties, and governments in the Third World, and the forces of democracy and peace in the world, with the socialist countries and with working class parties in the capitalist countries. It strives to establish different forms of cooperation with all forces who support the Palestinian national cause and just struggle, and

who defend freedom, democracy, and social justice. All this is grounded in the goals of the common struggle, namely:

(1) To struggle against imperialist aggression, especially US imperialism, for a new world order based on respect for people's rights to self-determination and choice of their own independent path of development. Such a new world order would direct its efforts against the dangers of nuclear war, ecological disasters and pollution. It would strive for a world where freedom, justice, and equality among people prevail.

(2) To struggle to solve the debt problem in the interests of the people of the Third World, which has been plundered by the imperial system and institutional monopolies. To resolve all forms of subordination which make the people of the Third World suffer due to the unequal political and economic relations on the international level.

(3) To struggle together with all progressive forces and organizations to prevent the dangers of nuclear war and to protect international peace. To struggle against all forms of coercion, repression and racial discrimination. To intensify the isolation of the Zionist entity and its aggressive methods. To unmask Zionism as a racist, reactionary movement politically, ideologically, and in practice.

(4) The necessity of coordinating the efforts of different international forces in order to increase the role of the United Nations and all international organizations and institutions in establishing the basis for justice and equality in the world. To confront all forms of oppression, aggression, and other acts which violate international traditions, charters, and agreements. To defend freedom and human rights, which are being violated in occupied Palestine and other places in the world.

(5) From its position in the PLO, the PFLP calls for elevating the role of the non-aligned states, the African and Islamic countries in support of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people. The PFLP expresses its solidarity with the people [struggling] for self-determination, choice of their own social system and demarcating their path to development and progress, free of all forms of direct or indirect pressure and terror.

(6) To develop the efforts aiming to influence international public opinion to support Palestinian rights. To put pressure on the imperialist-Zionist alliance to accept the international resolutions which

recognize the rights of our people to repatriation, self-determination, and establishing an independent state in our homeland.



Sixth National Conference: Toward a New Political Vision[1]

[2000]

Introduction

The objectives of this document, which sums up the dialogue and the interactions going on inside the organizations of The Popular Front for the Liberation Palestine (PFLP) in homeland and diaspora locales before culminating at the Sixth National Conference of the PFLP—which took place in the form of three integral cycles in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and within the diaspora—include: 1. reaching toward a methodological reading of the Palestinian political developments taking place since the First National Conference in 1994; 2. formulating a political vision to deal efficiently and clearly with the problems [which have ensued], and to point out work directions in accordance with the rights and interests of our people on the basis of the continuity of the struggle and resistance until our inalienable rights have been achieved; and 3. to uncover the dangers and deviations taking place in the national arena at a time when the American-Israeli liquidationist plans have not [yet] disappeared.

In this context, this document tries to distance itself from [the] minor details [in order] to focus on the main direction of developments and essential aspects of the struggle in conformity with our deep understanding that the function of the national conference is an essential station at which it would be possible to reconsider our conception of the struggle and the way to manage it, on one hand, the contents and dimensions of that struggle, on the other. Thus, it would be possible for us to manipulate our capacities in a long term policy and secure that party bodies would be able to evolve in form and content and to be suitable for the conditions and objectives of the national project at present and in the future.

Within this perspective, it would be recommended to pay attention

1 July 2000, English Translation by Hamad Said Al-Mowed.

to the following points while dealing with this document.

Firstly: This is a scientific document reading the developments depending on our vision, role, national function, and our leftist democratic and progressive thinking. However, it still remains a subject for debate, criticism, and enrichment in agreement with the dynamics of the situation and the struggle process. Within this meaning, it remains relative in terms of evaluation.

Secondly: This document should be looked at and dealt with as an integral part of PFLP positions and vision embodied in other documents issued by previous conferences and other leading central committees. Reference should be particularly made to the document of the First National Conference in June 1994,[2] which is considered the foundation of what was included in the document to the sixth National Conference which adds to and enriches the vision, rather than abolish it. Consequently, the document of the conference referred to above remains politically and ideologically in agreement with this present one.

Thirdly: Since the Sixth National Conference, the Palestinian arena and the national problem have both witnessed very remarkable developments, most important of which is the uprising (Intifada) continuing since 28 September 2000, which broke out to defend the rights and aspirations of our people. Thousands of martyrs fell and tens of thousands were wounded on the road of freedom and independence and in the confrontation with the endless terrorist war launched by the occupant army against our besieged people in order to break their will and impose political solutions on them.

Accordingly, there are many subjects and political as well as social questions which need to be dealt with and formulated. This is the task of the leading central bodies of PFLP (The General Central Committee (GCC) and the Politburo) in order to further promote the PFLP vision and positions and enhance its national role continuously. So, it is necessary to remember that this document is limited by the period it covers

2 **Ed. Note**: At time of writing, no English translation of the proceedings of the First National Conference in 1994 could be found. As stated, this document "remains politically and ideologically in agreement" with the positions in that document.

and deals with when dealing with it.

Fourthly: When dealing with this document, which has condensed the general vision, the party and the tendencies of its political analysis, it should be always remembered that a considerable attention has to be paid to the peculiarities of the different party bodies at the socio-economic political levels, and that flexibility as well as creativity will no doubt be indispensable while drawing work programs and means of struggle for every Palestinian community in consistence with its own priorities and characteristics, provided that nothing should cross the boundaries drawn in the central document of the party.

Finally: Any document, regardless of how strong it is, remains unable to include all the details and dynamics of situation. It would be enough if it were able to envisage the right course governed by the national, liberational, socio-economic, and democratic determinants.

The will and comprehensive awareness of all party members and bodies are required to change this vision into an effective practice, cadre, and institutions, on one hand, and to change the vision and the policy into accumulated national achievements. These are the factors that give or justify the role and function of any party and guarantee its position among the people and help it gain their respect.

Chapter One:

No Dreams Beyond Reality, No Future Without Present and Past

Firstly: *We don't begin from Zero point.*

When we say that the Palestinian problem is in a unique stage, this does not mean that we jump over everything in the past as if history and the Palestinian national work began with Oslo.[3] One simple reason makes us say the above mentioned fact, namely, that the Oslo process and its repercussions are absolutely and completely engrossed by the results

3 **Ed. Note:** The Oslo Accords were a series of agreements signed between the entity and the PLO in 1993-1995.

of the struggle in the previous decades. This does not refer to the Palestinian dimension only, but certainly the Arab, Israeli, and international dimensions, as well.

That is the reason why PFLP has taken this systemic step while analyzing the crisis of the Palestinian National Movement, including the crisis in PFLP, because we believe that the phenomena and results should be linked with their historical socio-economic and ideological reasons. Furthermore, such a step reflects a firm belief that should the mentality of treating consequences apart from the reasons continue, it would mean we should go indefinitely round ourselves in a vacant circle. Besides, it threatens to distort awareness, spread illusions, accumulate mistakes and consequently waste much more time and other components of struggle in the future.

What was mentioned above represents workable methodology in socio-political and organizational practice—especially because it emphasizes the continuity between history and reality. It is necessary to understand very well that insistence on a link with reality does not mean having it fragmented or being separated from it. Similar to history and the present, reality, with all its components, should be present. An absolute separation from reality and history embodies an absolute extinction.

In the same context, the present should not be regarded as an automatic continuity of history. It is a conclusion or summary of the historical interaction of the struggle, which resembles, to a very large extent, a chemical interaction, which begins with certain qualitatively and qualitatively definite elements and compounds. At a certain minute, and in certain conditions, the elements and compounds are changed into a qualitatively new material which consists of the very same elements with new characteristics bound together by new relations.

Naturally, the socio-historical interaction is more intricate than it is believed to be, because the dynamics appearing in the reality we live within would interfere and thus draw and determine the courses of history. It is a process whose results are governed by the form and content of the management of the struggle resorted to by individuals as well as socio-political forces. It is a process which has historical characteristics, is governed by socio-economic development, and affected, to some extent, by human consciousness.

Accordingly, it is necessary to be aware of and recognize the dimension, and intricacy of the process, because that would help keep the trans-

parency and efficiency necessary for a scientific and quiet reading of our experience, preserve the remarkably rich experience of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation, maintain historical and spiritual value of the great sacrifices, and turn them into a material power complementing the power they have already possessed. Such a power, which can never, at any rate, be little, helps maintain the internal balance in the collective as well as the individual psyche.

It should always be kept in mind, while we are trying to read the present situation, that retreat has a potentiality of a revival and that it has valuable lessons which have to be analyzed and highlighted so that they might be transformed into constructive factors. Otherwise, retreat might become a destructive spiritual and material factor of exhaustion. The best proof of the above-mentioned assessment is what we, as a party and a national movement, have felt and lived. We have found out that the problem is not limited to the defeat in the battle field, but goes beyond that to the state of incapacity to reach a political and intellectual vision capable of transgressing defeatism engulfing all the currents and factions of the Palestinian national movement whose work and discourse continued as though nothing had happened.

Defeatism has led to the frustration, motionlessness, and the deterioration of confidence between the organized political movement, on one hand, and between the parties and their popular grassroots [on the other]. Confusion, complaints, and inefficiency spread everywhere. We believe that the atmosphere of disappointment has neither rational nor scientific grounds, once we are able to form a comprehensive and clear vision of the conflict with its premises and continuously open dimensions whose keys are not in the pocket of any one if even if he wanted or imagined. Are we exaggerating or merely projecting our desires? Let's carefully, prudently, and openly examine the situation in order that we might find correct answers to our questions.

Secondly: *An historically open-ended struggle.*

The historical evolution of events was deeply contrary to the illusions of those who imagined that the American-Israeli project would easily dig its way through Palestine and the Arab World. The peace process has revealed that the more the characteristics of the enemy project got clear and its dimensions became concrete the more socio-economic and popular strata were involved in it.

We should point, in this context, to the intensifying resistance and popular opposition all over Palestine, they are gaining much momentum at the popular level and the levels of the forms and means of confrontation. There were times when the struggle looked as though it had been at its embryonic beginnings, but later an uprising broke out, for example the uprising which followed the opening of the tunnel beneath Al-Aqsa Mosque and the confrontations with settlement expansion policies.

Besides, there is qualitatively and quantitatively developing resistance in south Lebanon which has led to a change in the political positions of the majority of political, social, and official powers toward embracing this phenomenon, regardless of the serious pressure exerted by the enemy alliance to break this stand. That resistance to the normalization of relations with the Zionist regime has acquired a really popular and organized dimension. Prior to that, it was limited to the form of imposed political resolutions. Currently, resistance to normalization takes the form of initiatives by [civil] society activists and trade unions.

There is a remarkably noteworthy phenomenon which is growing and spreading everywhere across the Arab World from the east to the west. Such a phenomenon is represented by intellectual activity which has deep and far-reaching significations. It has already crossed the borders of the regional ghetto and begun discussing the concerns of the Arab nations, the conditions of its awakening at both the regional and national levels. The level of this intellectual activity is high enough and capable of preserving the unity and integrity of both mind and dream.

In addition to what has been mentioned above, there is a symptom of a return of the pan Arab co-ordination and an attempt to control the tempo at the national level. The value and significance lie in the fact that the initiative and the cooperation related to it are among the centers of official resolution in the Arab World nowadays. The examples and phenomena mentioned above represent a flagrant announcement of an effective and deeply rooted interaction in the collective memory and conscience of the Arabs whose content is so huge and constitutes and essential push force for the natural oppositions which are fed up continuously, spiritually, and materially by the objective factors which cause the historical struggle with the Zionist enemy.

The various forms of the comprehensive and growing resistance and opposition reveal that the objectivity of the conflict is neither limited to nor released by the wishes of individuals or leaders, or the good or bad wishes. It is a process with an endless action and reaction, latency though

it sometimes experiences stages of retreat, stagnation, or curvature, there is always capacity to create means to face the new challenges of the conflict through limitless manifestations, which would connect things to their roots or references.

The creativity of any party or political movement appears in the ability to be in harmony and interaction with the course of action, to have this movement consciously and scientifically managed, and help it move from spontaneous reaction, to a comprehensive process and vision.

Being aware of the historicity of and objectivity of the struggle helps keep the debate within its right and logical course, and will inevitably lead everyone to deal with it as a socio-historical confrontation between the Arab nation, particularly the Palestinian people on one hand, and the Zionist imperialist project on the other. Such a radical socio-historical struggle of the Arab nation for existence is directed against the infinite attempts to distort, derail, or subject it to an opponent project. Within this meaning, the struggle has a variety of forms including the armed one.

An insightful reading of the practices of the Zionist project one hundred years after the first Zionist Conference in Basel in 1897, would reveal that, in spite of the great victories of this project, it has been constantly reviewing and reconsidering its strategies and tactics to guarantee preserving the successes achieved, on one hand, and secure the required conditions for an offensive assault to achieve more targets. Such a fact suggests that it is essential for the enemy project to consolidate its ideological, political, and cultural bases and have them continuously developed in order that they create a firm and renewable impetus to mobilize more powers and capacities to be at the service of expansionism and aggression. An awareness of this fact would enhance the quality of dealing with the current situation, explain the qualitative deflections witnessed by the Zionist imperialist project in each and every stage of the socio-historical development of the struggle to complete the accomplishment of the objectives it has reached in accordance with an accumulation process taking place, and indicate the revision in strategies and tactics which reflect dynamically as well as flexibly the balance of power or both sides of the conflict.

The struggle over existence does not necessarily signify an absolute physical liquidation of one party to the conflict, but an accumulation of power to expose the Arab party to bitter historical defeatism, compel it to capitulate through various forms of socio-political and military pressure and violence, forcibly make the Arabs in a stage of an almost complete

submission and surrender to the Zionist-imperial project. Here, we believe, is the place of the opinion which stresses the historicity of defeats, demands that the situation we live in be referred to the total consequences which have been accumulating since Sykes-Picot. Such consequences have an accumulative nature and become heavier with the passage of time.

Furthermore, there are the symptoms of backwardness engulfing the Arab peoples, which, with the passage of time, have generated their own internal dynamism and rules. Unless such symptoms have been broken and removed, they would always feed up the state of underdevelopment and, according to this imbalance, pave the way for further defeats. A deep understanding of this fact necessitates the awareness that the removal of these symptoms is a far-reaching socio-historical process, which is independent of the volition of one party to conflict because the factors and dynamics of the conflict are more comprehensive and intricate than those possessed by each of the two parties. It is a combined, historical, and dynamic summary of the historical struggle process as a whole.

Due to progress and retreat, along with their own complexities and social consequences, the struggle acquires a historic as well as dynamic character. The state of latency and motionlessness are temporary and transient because they are the result of either a temporary defeat or victory, on one hand; or the unavailability of the required conditions for a rise to a higher level. As long as the requirements of struggle are renewable and accomplished, it is possible that the struggle will break out at each of the many historical curvatures.

The assessment mentioned above would necessitate more insight and accuracy while reading the current Palestinian situation, bearing in mind the facts which have been created since the signing of the Oslo Accords. These facts show beyond any doubt the depth and continuity of the conflict reasons. They also provide everyone with a framework to protect any analysis and save it from falling into the lethal traps of haste, impatience, subjectivity or the illusions that it is possible to put an end to the struggle, which comes to an end once its reasons have disappeared. Here we move to another title.

Thirdly: *Oslo: The Reproduction of the Struggle in Other Forms.*

It is not necessary, we believe, to repeat the debate about the dangers and grave accumulated damage befalling the Palestinian cause as a

consequence of Oslo and its aftermath, because the political document approved by the First National Conference in 1994, in addition to other documents issued by PFLP, are more than enough. What we would like to discuss now goes beyond this aspect and aims at deepening our vision and analysis on the basis of the variables and data which have come into being during the last few years.

The Oslo Accords and the agreements that followed it, along with the threats they embodied and carried, are no more than a transient stage in the struggle regardless of how long it might continue. This does not mean an underestimate of the detrimental consequences of those agreements and difficulties they have brought about, nor does it mean minimizing the agreements as though they had not existed. Contrary to such an assessment, we would like to reiterate that the agreements embody a qualitative stage in the struggle which led to the disappearance of factors, components, constructions, structures, and patterns and usher in other components, factors, means, and new patterns, some of which have already been active while others will soon be activated.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, the change in the structure of international alliances, the domination of the United States, the changes in the Arab world since the second Gulf War, the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority, the change in the internal balance of powers, the crisis of the democratic powers, the opposition [to] the normalization with Israel are no more than examples.

The movement from one stage into another is not so easy as some people believe. It is very similar to giving birth to a baby, with all the suffering, bleeding, and spiritual as well as psychological transformations. This means at the final stage giving birth and the start of the cycle of a new stage of life, with all its determinants and factors. Accordingly, the current situation, along with the transgression of previous stages it includes, remains tied, through thousands of secret cords, with the previous stages which have their own impact and their shadows on the current situation.

After the collapse of the second Gulf war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Palestinian leadership has put the majority of the Palestinian cards, including the most important ones, at stake when it trusted [the] U.S.A. and the claims of the Zionist regime's readiness for peace. The dangers of such a policy, and the ensuring options for limited agreements, stem from that fact that they do not have a correct vision of the struggle and its roots to depend on, and uncovers a terrorized and super-

ficial conception of the current balance of powers as wells as the nature of the Israeli-American peace project and its objectives.

It has responded to the requirements of the American-Israeli strategy, and allowed the dynamics of that strategy to control it and its options. Correspondingly, it has been expropriated of all the factors of legal, historical, and material power. The political practices of the leaders looked as though what happened had been the sole possible potentiality or the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict and at its heart—the Palestinian-Zionist conflict.

This policy is a result of a miserable understanding and management of the conflict with the enemy which is the other face of another miserable policy toward inter-Palestinian relations, which took the form of disabled mentality, growing with the passage of time to take from a destructive bureaucracy armed with corruption. This, in turn, led to the depletion of a lot of the constituents of power, the absence of a far reaching and comprehensive vision aiming at the consolidation of the structure of the Palestinian society everywhere, through the consolidation of the structure of the organizational and administrative institutions of this society, etc.

The most remarkable example of what was said above is the fragmentation and dismantling of the most important national framework in our contemporary history, namely, the P.L.O., which was being dealt with in a sorrowful manner. If ever this signified anything, it would be a proof of the short-sighted policy which had been practiced and the foolhardiness of the treatment with this significant framework which was supposed to remain an all-embracing national framework and a real representative of the Palestinian people dispersed and diasporized geographically, economically, and socially.

Besides, there is an incapacity or unwillingness to make use of the national capacities and abilities in order to enhance the social structure and strengthen the pillars of national confrontation. Such a policy has constantly been self-revealing and acquired the form of hegemony, unilateralism, corruption of the institutions of the Palestinian society in the occupied homeland, and disrespect of the rights of citizens. So, a Palestinian citizen finds himself between two jaws of pincers: the brutal oppressive and expansionist practices of the occupation on the one hand, and the practices of the authority and its apparatuses, on the other. Consequently, the crisis of the Palestinian masses, the national problem in homeland and the Diaspora has been aggravated.

Along with what was mentioned above, attention should be paid to other practices which are equally dangerous and short-sighted, namely, the manipulative approach to the Palestinian popular movement. The gap between this movement and the political authority got wider and wider. There is no confidence in the authority which has not preserved nor protected the minimum level of national rights. In the meantime, the policies of the authority have not pointed to any respect for Palestinian society. These policies have taken three forms.

1. Pursuit and detention of activists upon orders dictated by the occupation.

2. Opportunism and temporariness in dealing with the popular movement.

3. An attempt to have the opposition adapted to the ceiling of the authority and its policies.

The impact of this policy on the Palestinian national movement has been grave, because it contributed to the state of dissidence and fragmentation, preserved the causes of depletion and implosion, emptied the policies of the authority as well as the concept of national dialogue of their contents. The problem of national unity, therefore, became a means for maneuvering, not a stable and fixed political line governing the actions of the Palestinian national movement with all its different colors, currents, and organizations.

The political and intellectual mentality which led to this hasty and disabled betting on the American-Israeli peace project is the very same mentality which led to the dramatic state of submission availing itself of the state of exhaustion of the Palestinian people as well as the Arab nation because of the pressure of the enemy alliance as well as the internal incapacity which was caused by this mentality, which was excellent at depleting resources instead of accumulating them.

Since the Madrid conference, the enemy has pushed to the political stage all Arab defeats when he deemed it was high time they had had to take a remarkable step embodying the forcible imposition of defeatist policies and having them officially legalized at both the Arab and international levels. This is a movement from direct to indirect war leaning on an imbalance of powers to the benefit of the American-Israeli alliance.

What happened in Madrid and the other stations, agreements and attractions which followed did not go beyond the political offensive led by the USA, in full coordination with Israel. The American peace proj-

ect for a settlement, as it appeared in Oslo, is no more than a project to impose, by force, political, and economic capitulation on the region. The dimensions of this project have become unreasonable according to the minimum level of dignity.

The American role has thus been explained, because, once it has made all parties engaged in negotiations, on the basis of general principles, taking into consideration, even partially, the resolutions of the international legitimacy, it began to exert various forms of pressure and blackmail to help Israel dictate its vision for a settlement which, in essence, is not different from its American equivalent. In other words, it aimed at imposing submission on the Arabs, not achieving a peace process as they hypocritically claimed. The logic of this policy is applying the philosophy of power as a basis for international relations. The foundation of this philosophy is the right of the triumphant to dictate his conditions on the defeated.

This, and nothing else, explains the continuously and flagrantly biased American policy toward Israel. It is high time to put an end to the naïve belief that the American administration, which possesses lots of information and expertise in the management of international conflicts, is not aware of the fact that a speech about peace in the Middle East would be merely meaningless and deceitful, unless it included the minimum amount of Palestinian and Arab national rights.

The United States is more conscious of this fact than anyone else. No one is able to defend the lie concerning the intention of the USA to reach a real peace in accordance with the simplest bases and principles of international law and the concepts of freedom, justice, and balanced relations instead of the philosophy of power to impose what is in conformity with its interests.

Therefore, the problem is not with this or that administration as some people would like to say, but it is basically with the American-Israeli project for peace which is really and logically identical. Otherwise, the United States would have submitted a clear and precise text containing its own project for peace in the Middle East which would be a part of a comprehensive reassessment which will result in making its policy consistent with the minimum level of justice, equilibrium, and respect of the inalienable rights.

Hadn't the United States continued its antagonistic policy, it would have put an end to the ambiguous and floating language while talking about peace, stopped exerting the greatest possible spiritual and material

pressure on the Arab parties, stopped providing the Zionist regime with all the components of power, and ceased pledging to guarantee the continuation of the Israeli qualitative superiority to all the Arab countries. Yet, the United States insists on securing an umbrella for Israeli practices at the international institutions or building military and security alliances which are secretly or openly antagonistic to the Arab world and besiege the Arab world and its interests.

The developments of the recent years have disclosed the objectives, targets, and manifestations of the American Israeli peace project which are limited to launching an intensive campaign to achieve the very same targets which have accompanied it ever since its beginnings namely, hegemony, political domination, the annexation of the Arab world economically, the liquidation of the Palestinian problem through a political war, mixed if necessary, with political and economic violence and organized military pressure.

This is the fact which the successive American administrations and Israeli governments have been trying to conceal through a propaganda campaign claiming that the Arab parties are those who always refuse to reach a peace settlement for the conflict. The military operations of the American-Israeli alliance have completely uncovered these targets, because the alliance's war has been going on through political means to make the Arabs surrender instead of making peace with them.

This is the situation that causes the increasing Palestinian and Arab reactions, which have moved from the state of betting, during the Madrid conference and immediately after that, on the peace options, to a state of opposition and widely-spread rejection of the American Israeli projects.

The value of the opposition and rejection referred to above, stems from the fact that they have been assuming a popular character which is growing and constantly expanding and has taken the form of popular initiatives, attracting greater strata of the Arab popular masses who are moving into a state of action. An advantage like this has not been available previously, because the conflict took the form of confrontation between states and commando activity later.

The Arab popular opposition in this stage is characterized by comprehensiveness and expansion, and is based on a conviction that American and Israeli proposals aim at nothing except for attempting to make the Arabs give in by political pressure or threats of war.

This opposition, we believe, is heading toward growing and crystal-

lizing, absorbing new Arab social strata. It is noteworthy here to remember the opposition to the cultural normalization, the rejection of the economic hegemony, the insistence on the principle of a comprehensive peace which should meet the minimum level of the national rights and targets, at the head of which are; the rights of the Palestinian people to return, self -determination and national statehood with Jerusalem as the capital. Some of the manifestations of the opposition appear in the form of intellectual activities in the Arab world, taking the form of debate, criticism, raising essential and crucial questions, trying always to link problems to their basic elements, which, sometimes, include a state of incapacity, backwardness, and defeat. Others try to rediscover or reiterate the nature of the struggle which expresses itself through a comprehensive and historical struggle.

The dynamics of settlement according to the American-Israeli criteria have revealed another fact, namely that an Arab citizen has to choose either a humiliating surrender or confrontation and engagement. This is what provides the struggle with new dynamics and a constant new impetus in such a way that a hopeful observer might conclude that the struggle has just begun.

According to the facts mentioned above, we would like to emphasize that the displacements that have taken place represented in signed agreements are no more than temporary and transient displacements of the ground of the struggle itself and can never lead to stability nor to peace. Consequently, any betting on this process expresses a short-sightedness, tragic disappointment, and a capitulation to a fate predestined by the American-Israeli project.

Such a discourse does not intend to belittle the dangers of what has been happening, and consequently to deal with the process as if nothing had happened.

Contrary to that, what has happened is weighing heavily on everyone. It should be seen and dealt with in order to change according to revolutionary criteria, considering it as an additional dimension of the struggle.

The Palestinian people, as well as the Palestinian national movement, according to what has been said above, should be accustomed, psychologically and mentally, to the required changeability and flexibility, to feel and absorb any movement or variable in the situation, to reduce the noise and shouting, to extensively read the situation and to act according

to a comprehensive and integrating vision of the struggle. It is no more a secret that it is a struggle over existence itself, taking place in a tangible reality and governed by the law of the balance of powers.

Fourthly: *Achieve the Required Depending on the Available.*

To start with, let's emphasize that the speech about new facts does not necessarily mean the annulment of the historical reasons of the struggle. Rather, this would refer to a vision of the new facts, data ,and reasons which have been added to the stage and which no one is allowed to ignore, either positively or negatively, because of their quantitative and qualitative nature which practically necessitates a reconsideration of the main aspects of the struggle including its management.

The remarkable events that took place in the international arena and the Arab world as well: such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the second Gulf war, and the dynamics released by the American peace project, have led to a group of serious breakthroughs followed by signing agreements with the Zionist regime, most important of all of which happened on the Palestinian side and culminated in Oslo and the agreements which followed it. These events were accompanied by loosening the Arab boycott front, establishing relations at different levels and in different ways between Arab countries and the Zionist state.

The losses caused by this process vary. The historical basics of the struggle, especially Palestinian national problems, were being played with, when the official Palestinian leadership unilaterally signed an agreement with Israel. It dealt a grave blow to the Arab dimension of the Palestinian problem, and threatened the national and historical fixed dimensions, threatened the unity of the Palestinian people, the role of the P.L.O. as an all embracing national framework, and threatened the charter of P.L.O. itself. The Palestinian national movement was also divided, as some Palestinian factions began dealing with Israel as a partner in the peace process with all the results that came out of that.

The above-mentioned review condenses the difficult aspect of the Oslo process, whereas the other aspect is represented by being more and more exposed to the aims of the Zionist regime. Furthermore, the resistance to the Zionist regime and opposition to Oslo were being exposed to threats. These are some of the grave fundamental variables created by Oslo. The details of these dangers have become well-known and have been extensively dealt with by our different documents, especially the

document of the First National Conference.

The following question sums up the new facts in this field: is it enough to handle Oslo and its consequences with more analysis, diagnosis to uncover the dangers coming out of it? Is there another duty, namely, to push by means of mind and practice toward new fields, which neither ignore Oslo nor jump over it, but at the same time, do not confine themselves to it and become its hostage. Here lie the roots of a methodological dispute over intellectual and practical politics. To confine oneself to diagnosis and uncovering of threats would leave the party at the mercy of the eddy of the dynamics released by the Oslo project. In other words, should we remain within the circle of reactions, the enemy would be also able to take the initiative, and so, be able to manage the conflict in such a way that helps him achieve more targets, and would be relieved of the painstaking effort to face united and organized opposition armed with a clear and comprehensive vision and positive practice. Such an opposition is supposed to know exactly what is needed under the new circumstances, and facts, which have become among the forcible determinants of the ongoing struggle and its management.

It is required to raise the level of vision and practice from the level of propaganda opposition or sporadic reactions to the level of actual confrontation. To put in other words, a comprehensive historical alternative should be made available, i.e. to have the Oslo project faced by an absolutely contrary one, which could secure a chance for taking the initiative and exploit all the components of power, including the active and latent ones, on the basis of both the simultaneous continuity and discontinuity of the struggle. This means the continuity of the objectives as well as the historical and national facts of the past, on one hand, and the discontinuity of the gaps, misconceptions, intellectual, practical, and political mistakes.

In consequence to the above-stated facts, the only way is to pile up the factors of the program and to bridge the gap between us and the enemy as a step toward achieving victories or imposing them. This depends, *inter alia*, on the ability to positively adapt ourselves to the facts of the situation, and the determination to refuse to take them as accomplished or eternal facts—that is, to avoid being alienated or passively adapted, which would mean surrender and becoming dependent on circumstances. It is necessary to deal with the situation with its dynamism and limitation in time and place. At the same time, it is necessary to keep all the circles of actions open to all directions in accordance with the temporar-

iness and historicity of the struggle and its objectivity. In one word, it is not necessary for us to indefinitely read the past, formulate a program for an infinite period. Our place and status can not be determined by escaping forward or backward. Rather, our place and status are at the heart of the action.

Within this meaning, we are in front of a limited process which requires formulating a socio-political, intellectual, and organizational vision on the basis of the historical experience piled up so far, in addition to the details of the stage distributed at all levels. Bearing the above-mentioned consideration in mind would pave the way for the continuity of the struggle, or more precisely establish and vindicate practical steps to approach the higher national objectives. Furthermore, it would also secure a suitable level of flexibility and ability to curve in the difficult paths as an indispensable condition to avoid making the party as well as the people suffer unjustified losses.

In conclusion, bearing in mind the systemic points mentioned above, it is necessary to consider qualitative change and to remember always that it is an essential fact to be dealt with. Unless we did that, we would lose the requirements for possessing a scientific vision and ability to endorse the suitable programs depending upon what really exists to achieve what is required.

Here are some of the basic considerations and determinants which should be kept in mind as the main characteristics of this stage.

The First Consideration

The main characteristic of this stage is retreat and recession/defensive whereas the opposite project is in a state of offense. The content of the concept/defense used here is not negative as some people would believe, rather, it is positive and provides us with an ability to continue to employ, in the best possible ways, the factors and components of subjective power, provided that it is not uselessly wasted and that losses are being reduced to the minimum level. Such things can be secured by possessing a political vision and mentality to decide on the direct and medium-range targets on the basis of a defensive strategy, or in other words, to dissociate ourselves from the current mentality characterized by arrogance, haughtiness, and roaring discourses. We should also dissociate ourselves with the unnecessary confrontation which we can not afford.

In this context, it is necessary that we enhance the levels of our own

performance to meet the same levels used by the enemy, because the outcome of the confrontation with the enemy is under all circumstances governed by the condition of the confrontation with this historical enemy. We should go beyond the egoist-whimsical inefficient criteria, according to which a ruler or leader is being evaluated or estimated in the light of the performance of another Palestinian leader or organization and adopt another practical criterion, i.e. the very same criterion adopted by the enemy.

So, it would be necessary to draw attention to a theoretical and methodological aspect, to block the road in the face of all those who would try to obstruct such an analysis by resorting to revolutionary slogans. The nature, material, and social content of each stage should determine the ceiling of the revolutionary work which should be in accordance with it. What is revolutionary in a certain stage will not be suitable for another which has different facts, rules, and social forces. Accordingly, defense is the revolutionary ceiling for a stage whose general characteristic is defensive. Another ceiling will no doubt be suitable for a stage of offensive and uprising.

The armed struggle was the main feature of the struggle against the enemy in the sixties and seventies. Then, it was replaced by the uprising as a suitable ceiling. Currently, the struggle takes a social form to prevent the enemy from making new achievements, and to stand against the concession process and the wasting of Palestinian national rights by the autonomy authority. This diagnosis of the main feature in this way does not drop out the intermingling of the different forms and symptoms of struggle which happens naturally.

A heavy price was being paid before we could realize the consequences of the mistake, or the sin, of innovating clashes and divisions among different forms of confrontation. Although it was clear from the very beginning that it is a social struggle, the factions of the Palestinian national movement committed one of their gravest and most catastrophic mistakes when they jumped over the essence and reality of the historical struggle. This has resulted in disabled policy which believed that the armed struggle, for instance, might substitute societal engagement, whereas the enemy has never, even for a single minute, dropped out of this fact. So the Israeli management of the struggle was as precise and comprehensive as possible.

What we should like to highlight here is that in the all-embracing struggle there is no contradiction between the means and forms of strug-

gle regardless of how many they are. Each form is important in as much as it is in agreement with its definite function because it occupies the space required by time and place which are irreplaceable except by that certain form, besides the definite social factor.

Thus, the factors of conflict could react and continue their impact on the social dynamics at various levels and would try to express themselves in form and style according to the position they occupy on the stage of events. A process like this has an absolutely objective course. This raises the importance of the subjective factor and its capacity to read the objective conditions of the conflict, to direct and unite all the tributaries of the struggle within an all-embracing struggle.

The Second Consideration

Defeatism has revealed the extent of the structural crisis shaking the Palestinian National Movement. This is a historically accumulative crisis which led to two fundamental consequences:

1. That the official leadership has surrendered to the Israeli-American settlement process, which led to a state of functional engagement between the Palestinian National Authority and Israel to the advantage of the latter. The result is to jump over the basic Palestinian national rights which should be guaranteed in order to be able to speak about national liberation and independence, achieve the peace of the brave, reach a just solution or achieve the program of the right to return and national statehood with Jerusalem as its capital.

2. The inefficiency of the opposition powers, and aggravation of their own crisis substantiated in their inability to formulate and play the role of a national substitute capable, through uniting its forces on the basis of a common national program taking the form of political and organizational frames, of being legally a substitute of the leadership which quit the national program. Such a situation has led to a state of confusion influencing the practice and performance of the opposition forces vis a vis the popular masses who are still waiting to have such a program implemented.

The consequences of the incapacity and weakness of the Palestinian opposition powers have resulted in creating a group of factors, including, the ability of the occupation to exert pressures and erode the Palestinian rights without being faced by an all-embracing and organized resistance.

The incapacity of the opposition powers paved the way for Oslo, gave the authority team a chance to manage the Palestinian situation and decide on the fate of the Palestinian people without being exposed to any united opposition, consequently that team made its own decisions as though there had been no one else to oppose it.

The confidence of the Palestinian popular masses in themselves, and their own ability to unite their forces, was shaken. The results were more fragmentation, dissent, ambiguity, and the use of general slogans. The opposition powers have lost confidence, reliability, and efficiency. Such a description of the opposition does not invalidate its role as a part of the opposition to the occupation and the liquidation projects. Still, this role is much below what is required when compared with the size of the national project, the nature of the stage , and the claims of the opposition that it represents a national democratic substitute.

The Third Consideration

The main and secondary contradictions. The main contradiction was and is still with the occupation and the strata connected to it. According to the nature of the stage which is a democratic national liberation one, and because the aims and the basic rights of the Palestinian people have not yet been achieved, the occupation has to be resisted.

The post-Oslo events proved this historical and objective fact. Yet, the consequences of Oslo, and the state of engagement between the self rule authority and the occupation, a new dimension of the complexity of the struggle has been added though it had not changed its nature. The acceptance of this fact means that the contradiction with the Palestinian national authority which fluctuates to and fro every now and then because of its relation with the main contradiction remains a secondary one. This contradiction has to be dealt with through democratic struggle including popular and democratic movements and confronting corruption and its representatives with all possible means.

Because the enemy project and its concept of peace go much beyond what is anticipated or imagined by the Palestinian Oslo team, this fact has gained much credibility. The topics of the final status solution cover the basic issues of the Palestinian problem. Besides, the results of Oslo have become substantial facts according to which policy got mingled with different social problems, including civil institutions, services, education, law, etc.

The Palestinian National Authority, which has an Arab and international legitimacy, and has its institutions on matters related to security, institutions, finance, and popular masses, is currently administering the affairs of the society. So any social or political activity within the Palestinian community in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would lead to being in contact with the authority. Within this context, and on the basis of respecting the determinants, as well as the requirements, of the main contradiction, besides the interplay and dynamics of the social situation, the relations with the Palestinian National Authority is neither fixed nor static. It is dynamic and its main characteristic is democratic confrontation and political struggle which governs the stance on the national cause and the fixed and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. In-fighting is prohibited.

As the situation of the masses in the occupied territories is getting more aggravated, the suitable equation of the struggle is becoming more complicated. This demands that all efforts be united in the confrontation with the occupation, but at the same time the struggle against the political options of the Palestinian National Authority and its concessions should continue.

The social democratic struggle aims at putting an end to the socio-political, economic, and administrative performances of the Palestinian National Authority, particularly after experience has shown that corruption has been functionally used as a basis of the political entity.

Monopolies, making money at the expense of citizens, the emergence of strata whose interests are closely integrated with those of the occupation with which they have been working as agents, commissions, and subcontractors without any moral or national consideration because their selfish interests have become top priority, all these are only examples. Besides, there are violations of liberties and basic human rights, chaos in security apparatuses which have become octopuses threatening the political level itself; weakness of the administration, widespread bribery, nepotism, and the exploitation of the capacities of the society to the benefit of opportunity and self-seekers.

All the things mentioned above prove that the democratic confrontation with the authority, and what it represents politically and socially, is a special case of war and a main field of a multifaceted confrontation. We are not the only party whose duty is to mobilize the popular movement, enhance its performance and help it move along the right path. No doubt, the depth, maturity and extension of this process would lead

to many consequences which would influence the struggle against the occupation.

The Fourth Consideration

The Arab Dimension: the Rough Track of the American-Israeli Project. After the smooth flow of events in the aftermath of the Madrid conference, the Arab world, it appears, has begun witnessing a state of struggle between the forces pushing the American-Israeli project, on one hand, and the forces opposing that project and materializing that natural state of opposition which has been spreading widely in the Arab world. Once the real purposes and essence of this enemy project have been revealed, the opposition spread extensively because such a project deprives the Arabs of the least amount of dignity and political and economic independence.

The different levels of interaction in the Arab world are:

The first level. There is an increasing contradiction between the politics of the official Arab regime which favors submissive and swinging stances as far as the American-Israeli alliance is concerned, on one hand, and the aspirations of the Arab popular masses which sense and feel the dangers of such political projects which threaten their national interests and rights.

This contradiction reflects the social dimensions in the current national and social struggle. The aggravation of this contradiction comes as a result of the appearance of the essence of the American-Israeli settlement which tries to avail of the potentiality of settlement to dictate the rules and restructure the region in order to place it under American hegemony at the expense of the national rights and resources of the Arab nation.

As the settlement process continues, it becomes very clear that the concept of putting an end to the conflict in the Middle East is no more than a tool to tightly control the region, steal its resources, and deal a blow to the aspiration of the Arab nation to be united and liberated.

An Arab citizen realizes well these days that a settlement is only an instrument to impose a state of socio-political and cultural normalization due to the state of imbalance of powers, threat of war, and liquidation of Arab national rights to the benefit of the Zionist project in Palestine and the Arab countries.

This is why the resistance to the normalization is growing stronger

in the Arab countries, Egypt, Jordan, etc. because it is the direct Arab response to the accelerating confrontation with the strife and unseriousness of such regimes which are wasting national rights.

Experience has shown the Arab masses the value and importance of aspirations and the components of power in their possession, once they continue to be actively and effectively directed and organized because they would secure a real protection against the politics of concession and surrender to the American-Israeli dictation of rules.

The second level. The contradiction is between the objectives of the American-Israeli settlement project and the minimum level of the rights and interests of Arab peoples proved by the facts and events which have happened since the Madrid conference. The antagonistic project manipulates all components of its power to dictate the rules of the settlement with the least possible concessions. The Oslo Accords, Arave Valley Agreement, the pressure exerted on Syria to accept the Israeli terms and resume the negotiations have also proved this fact.

The economic conferences in the region, starting from the Casablanca conference, through the conferences in Cairo, Amman, and Doha disillusioned everyone and proved that the political objectives of such conferences do not exceed sowing illusions and wishes among Arabs as regards economic development and well-being if they kept silent and accepted the political settlement envisaged by USA and Israel.

The third level. It has been really realized that the American role in the purpose-built settlement process intends to tame the stance of the Arab regime, as well as the Palestinian party and expose them to pressure purposely so that they endorse the Israeli political terms. This role has also been reflected by the containment policy and the use of veto against all the resolutions condemning the Zionist regime.

There is also the American insistence to jump over the resolutions of international legitimacy, on one hand, and the deprivation of Europe and Russia of any role in the peace process, and the commitment to impose terms of reference of the negotiations on the basis of American-Israeli unilateralism.

Such a role was apparent when the USA pressured Syria to compel it to subdue to the Israeli conditions, and to have the security and political understandings, and deals on the Palestinian path endorsed.

Thus the concept of the disinterested sponsor and mediator has collapsed due to the political practices which have built an alliance with the

Zionist regime opposing the Palestinian Arab rights and interests defined by international legitimacy.

In light of these facts, the Arab popular masses have become aware of the political practices and projects whose intention is to perpetuate the imperialist hegemony in the region through imposing a political settlement which is opposite and contradictory to the least level of Arab and Palestinian rights. In addition to this political dimension, there is the social crisis which is deepening more and more. Poverty, unemployment, absence of liberties, economic dependence, spread of consumption culture, political, cultural, and economic alienation are common phenomena. Because of these and other contradictions, the Arab popular masses are getting involved in the resistance and popular opposition more than ever. While the phenomena of official normalization is spreading more widely, the phenomena of resistance is spreading and is being shown in a way reflecting the real position and national feelings of the masses while confronting the adamancy and terrorism of the Zionist regime.

The Arab popular masses have shown a huge energy which could be transformed into a serious power in confronting the American Israeli settlement projects.

The remarkable Syrian position reflects the refusal to subdue to the enemy alliance, and the Egyptian stance appeared after the Egyptians had realized the heavy price they had had to pay which includes annulment of the Egyptian national and regional role and transforming it into a tool of the American-Zionist project in the region. The interaction taking place in the Arab world has compelled Saudi Arabia to cautiously reconsider its policies and come closer to both Egypt and Syria, because of the annoyance caused by the adamancy of Israel and the humiliating rush of some Arabs toward Israel.

Once the Likud had assumed power in Israel, and openly revealed the essential Israeli stance, the crisis became sharper, the pro-American Arab regimes were deeply embarrassed. The biased and extremely provocative American policies helped reign in the Arab rush toward Israel and obliged many Arab regimes either to reconsider their stances or to adopt the approach of wait and see.

These developments have pushed the doctrine of new world order—the new Middle East order—into a critical corner. The local, regional, and international situation and conflict have grown so complicated that the deceptive simplified view which spread when these two doctrines were

announced collapsed. The aim of the two doctrines included spreading illusions and mixing papers to facilitate the passage of the American-Israeli project under camouflaged and deceitful slogans hiding the essence of this project through dreams about development and progress in the region if the peoples of the region responded to the American-Israeli appeals to reach a settlement for the conflict. These developments played a role in the attempts to reconstruct inter-Arab relations, the Arab-Iranian relations and the Arab-European relations.

The Fifth Consideration

The difference between the American and European visions to solve the struggle. Though such a difference, for a variety of reasons, has not reached a state of confrontation between them, it really exists. In spite of the fact that Europeans are committed to guarantee the security and interests of Israel in general, such a commitment has reached a state to view Israel alone as guarantor of European interests in the region. The European commitment remains within the limits of guaranteeing Israel's security and right to live at peace within recognized borders.

On the other hand, the Europeans, generally speaking, recognize the Arab and Palestinian rights, and believe that through this way it is only possible to put an end to the struggle in the Middle East and lead the area to stability and a climate suitable for economic and political relations suitable for European interests. In the meantime, hegemony and unilateralism are the main determinants of the American policy and project according to which Israel has been made a strategic ally and an effective indicator of the American power-based mentality.

The Zionist regime has managed to manipulate the bases of American policy, its ideological and practical prompts, to serve the Zionist interests and mentality.

The results of the second Gulf War strengthened the American domination and control of the region, particularly the Arab oil sea, consolidated the Israeli refusal of any active European role in the peace proposals because that role should be confined to an observer status whose duty is confined to be dependent on and a supporter of American Israeli policies and projects.

Within this context, we can interpret some European initiatives, especially those ones supported by Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and to a lower extent, Germany. Possibly, this course of action will continue as

the European march toward unity continues, on one hand, and as the east European countries, particularly Russia, manage to retain a suitable level of power, coherence, and effectiveness and regain their international role. Needless to say, the more the Arab resistance to the American-Israeli projects rises and blocks the way of those projects, the more powerful the European role will be. These factors and others have helped and are helping regain some sort of balance on the international level against American unilateralism and create an equilibrium between the economic and historical European influence in the region and its political role. This objective tendency governed by contradictory interests enhances the cultural debate currently taking place in European societies threatened by American global domination. Everything is being challenged by Americanization; once America has ceased to be only a geographical and a demographic concept and becomes a concept with ideological dimensions expressing power politics, the negation and crushing of others to the benefit of tyrant power.

It is important to stop here and study carefully globalization which is invading the world politically, economically, and culturally. The world is certainly witnessing immense and qualitative developments in science, technology, and communications, which, in turn, influence the relations among peoples, states, and even Man himself and change views, conceptions, and values. The fundamental contradiction here lies between the forces and philosophy trying to exploit these changes to strengthen the control of colonial powers on the resources, and peoples of the world, and accordingly widen the gap between industrialized and underdeveloped peoples, on one hand, and the forces and culture which consider the scientific revolution with all its dimensions an evolutionary social process which should be formulated and guided in accordance with the interests of humanity to combat poverty, famines, and natural disasters on the basis of justice and mutual respect.

In this field, American monopolies assume a leading position attempting to make the peoples of the world surrender and adapt themselves to the politico-economic and cultural domination of monopolies and their political tools which control the American and the capitalist world.

There is another, contradictory conception which believes that globalization, along with all its political, cultural, and economic interpretations should be rejected and replaced by a substitute vision based on the interaction of peoples, cultures, and civilization, and the integrity of hu-

man kind experience, historically speaking. This conception contradicts the conception of hegemony, exploitation, and policies of plunder and looting, which, due to technological progress, take an infinite number of forms.

We believe that globalization as a conception should be centered on interaction, continuity, and respect of the peculiarities of cultures, civilizations, and various experiences of humanity. Scientific developments, the telecommunication revolution, media and information, turn into tools at the service of humanity regardless of color, race, or sex. Peoples should unite to confront imperialist globalization which is employed as a tool for oppression, plunder, and attempts to impose certain types of civilization on peoples regardless of the peculiarities and interests stemming from their peculiar historical evolution.

Fifthly: *On the Concept of Stage and Struggle Management.*

The central systemic subjects which have been so far discussed on the previous pages, constitute the frame of the struggle taking place in the region with its different political and social dimensions. Consequently the primary requisite of the management of the struggle effectively and actively lies in the capacity to envisage the frame of the struggle or the terrain of operations, so to speak, completely and precisely.

The ability to possess such a vision, in such a complicated, intermingled, dynamic, and movable situation requires the capacity to guarantee the necessary conditions and criteria, at the head of which is the necessity to have an intellectual, political, and organizational basis capable of providing the required conditions, including intellectual, mental, and scientific methods, besides, a safe and continued epistemological feed which covers the historical and current aspects of the struggle at the political, social, cultural, and economic levels.

It is a conviction of ours that the struggle is open to all directions. This is because of its natural and historical foundations. This also means that it is a continuous and objective struggle reflected historically in all fields, in the conflict between the objectives and interests of the American-Zionist project, and the aims and interests of the Arab nation, at the head of which is the Palestinian people.

The continuity or the cessation of the struggle is irrelevant to the volition of either party, as long as contradictions continue to feed the struggle, as historical and everyday life experience has proved. The curva-

tures of the struggle stem from this basis, and are continuous and mobile as much as the balance of powers permits, and bases/contradictions on which it stands continue.

Since the Madrid conference, practical experience has revealed that the enemy project is consistent with its objectives, and historical stimuli, which include occupation, domination, control, annexation, and perpetuation of the dynamics of backwardness and fragmentation. The contents of the American-Israeli proposal show that the purpose was to exploit the imbalance of powers to dictate the terms of the solution which leads to a new political and comprehensive defeat of the Arab nation and the Palestinian people.

The American-Israeli alliance has so far succeeded in piling up achievements, especially at the Palestinian level and thus pushed the Palestinian problem into a critical corner where it experiences a real crisis. However, the Arab and Palestinian dimensions of the struggle are becoming richer, acquiring a growing popular nature, and this is consistent with the axiom mentioned above, namely, the objectivity and comprehensibility of the struggle and historical engagement.

The interactions have made the political and social contradictions so complicated that a more advanced management is required in order that it might be able to deal with those contradictions. A successful management of the crisis required that it should be efficient, enhanced, and aware of the conditions and criteria of the struggle, on one hand, and is always guided by the higher national and patriotic interests and aspirations, not the desires and preferences of this individual or organization, on the other.

A realization of these various dimensions and interactions of the situation is considered a starter when it is recognized that it is necessary to deal with the struggle comprehensively, within the dialectics of continuity and accumulation and to open new dimensions in such way that it is possible to guarantee the best methods to invest the components of potential power at the national and international levels. To understand and deal with the struggle as a historical one signifies that it embraces all.

To understand and deal with the struggle as a historical one signifies that it embraces all aspects of life, beginning from the liberation of land, moving to the issues of Jerusalem and settlements, education, economy, pedagogy, arts, literature and finally the ability to fight the enemy for every piece of ruins stolen to falsify the history and facts of the region. This

is what gives the struggle its different connotations and manifestations as an objectively historical one.

To accept this view requires that we should go beyond the incapable and limited visions which confine the struggle in one aspect, believing that this is everything. Such a belief leads to an indication to prefer easy work, namely general political discourse, which thinks that it says everything while it says nothing, in fact. This necessitates that the Palestinian political discourse should be developed and matured through relieving it from spontaneity, demagogy and improvisation. It is high time to lower voice and intensify action. When we say this, bearing in mind one hundred years of struggle, we have to remind everyone that the loud voice of the Arabs was trying to make up for same time lack of action. At the same time, the Zionist regime, and the Zionist gangs before that conducted all their wars and achieved all their victories using only the language of defense. With a little shouting and lots of work, they managed to avail themselves of all the opportunities to boost their social, political, scientific and military might, including possessing 200 nuclear war heads. Yet they still call their army the defense army. To further develop the political discourse and performance and endorse a quieter tone will indicate much self-confidence and an intellectual and scientific evolution. The above mentioned facts require a qualitative enhancement in our performance in such a way that it is raised to suit the level and requests of struggle. This is only possible once the criteria used are based on cognition, science, labor, and time, and the will to exploit all the potentialities available in or societies

These are the conditions required to enhance our political intellectual, performances, and to enable us move from negative spontaneous reactions to positive reactions. The way leading to it is the possession of a positive political vision. So, we can go across the dangerous whirlpool because of which the Zionist occupation has continuously been holder of the initiative, and consequently, ahead of us. It is time that our political and social performance went beyond the state of confusion, incapacity and perplexity which is possible once we possessed our own vision of the struggle and the balance of powers, and began, accordingly delineating the lines of confrontation in accordance with the components of power we possess. Thus, we can deprive the enemy alliance of the freedom of maneuvering, and start the confrontation at the time and place needed. On the basis of such an understanding, formulation of programs and performances becomes a positive process, highly effective, and not merely a rejection of the proposals of the of other party, that is, the op-

position, however important it might be. It is time the opposition were turned into struggle.

To deal with the struggle comprehensively is not volitional because it has its own conditions, logic, determinants, including deciding on targets and missions in combined and intermingled ways which allow the attraction of all political and social capacities and powers to the field of confrontation. It is high time we realized that confrontation would either be comprehensive or would never be at all.

The fundamental condition for that is the realization of the uniqueness and diversity of the capacities in the Palestinian mass society. As long as the Zionist projects threaten all aspects of Palestinian social life, the confrontation takes place everywhere. The wide space of the conflict covers: the right to return, the state, Jerusalem, sovereignty, dismantling of settlements, water, economic, independence, agriculture, protection of national civil institutions, education, health, sports, development, industry, heritage, archeology, liberties, environment, law, music, cinema, theater, literature, labor, culture, history, rectitude, women's freedom, the rights of children... etc.

Each of these titles needs mechanisms, programs and capacities necessary for and relevant to them, in the light of the plurality of the Palestinian communities. The basis should be that each title is so important that it can not be ignored nor underestimated whatever the reasons might be; once it happens, it will lead to mutual usurpation between the general and particular, the main and subsidiary, and the result of such a situation is the loss of everything.

This vision of ours, along with its pillars, reveals more and more the temporariness of the Oslo Accords, because the content of the Declaration of Principles and its supplements all appear incapable of resolving the conflict. Real experience has proved that the conflict is expanding more and more. This has to do with the disclosure of the targets of the American-Israeli proposal for settlements. So, new dynamics have been added to the field of operations, these dynamics have become an integral part of the situation from which it cannot be dropped out nor separated. There are several options for an approach to the situation, including:

1) Negative adaptation, which is submission and capitulation to what really exists, therefore, work does not go beyond the limits of skirmishes, to introduce some improvements in the situation itself.

2) To reject the situation and continue working as though nothing

happened, this leads to inefficiency and inability to realize what is happening, so the result will be escapism from the requirements of confrontation in accordance with the requirements of the new era toward, 'revolutionary' phraseology and slogans which remain limited within general rejectionism and recording position for history.

3) Confusion, marking time and improvisation the results of which is a hazardous diversity of works fluctuating between general rejections, on one hand, and compressing obstinate facts on the other. Such a situation signifies an absence of any program or vision which governs confrontation, hesitation, fluctuation, hegemony, and ambiguity will prevail.

4) Positive adaptation which is based on the historicity and comprehensiveness of the struggle, and starts from the actual facts as the compulsory determinants of dealing with the situation, which is a new stage with its own dimensions and operations. These facts must have their impaction on formulating political performance, organizational structural and the struggle in a way that is consistent with the facts and objectives, that is to implement the principle of continuity and discontinuity within the frame of the struggle.

5) It is very necessary to determine the available options very clearly and precisely so that it might be possible that each option is suitable for the requirements and conditions of the stage. We state the above mentioned things because we believe that a safe option is objectively determined, not by volitions, illusions, subjective projections, or consequences of mistakes, or incapacity to read the situation. The most popular or emotional slogans can give is that they can satisfy gaudiness or personal aspirations. Sooner or later, they would be disproved by reality and lead to further disappointment and failure.

Compliance with the conditions of struggle will protect the party and the national movement in general against wrong performance or to be distorted by inefficient awareness of the struggle which triggers more defeats and bitterness. So, the suitable option for the stage and its facts is that which is able to conceive it as a comprehensive and inevitable cycle of the struggle and contributes to the enhancement of political and social performance on the road to magnify the capacities and thus transform theoretical purposes into achievable targets.

Through this way it is possible to determine possible objectives which have to be achieved at every level of the struggle in a certain stage,

and can be differentiated as political or social, current, medium term, strategic, or temporary targets. Thus, it is possible to move to activity and begin the required accumulation process to effect historically concrete and continuous displacements towards securing the required basis to achieve the desired aims.

This option is possible, provided that the political vision is able to creatively mix between the constraints of the current situation and the absolutely infinite higher aims.

This is a comprehensive and conscious process which should take place concurrently everywhere and at every time as the struggle continues. And in the context of conceiving the struggle as a socio-historical process, and the management of this struggle is an art and precise counting not merely jumps in no more.

The administration of such a complex historical process takes place under many influential pressures. It never happens behind closed doors where every thing is under control. It is open to all options. On one hand, the occupation establishes and releases various dynamics, there are also the performances of those who believe in the fait accompli option as it was drafted at Oslo talks.

At the heart of everything lie the dynamics and activities of natural society, which are rich, diverse, and reflect the diversity of the social classes and strata, besides the diversity resulting from the diasporization of Palestinians. The positive and negative operators of the national and international dimensions of the struggle, will also appear.

In conclusion, we stand in front of a contradictory, active, mobile [situation] and completely open toward the future picture. Our share in this picture is equal to our burden. So it is not possible to successfully and dynamically deal with it without possessing a competent awareness of it, acquiring a mind and vision able to absorb fully the dynamics, contradiction, and activity in the struggle with all its time, place, consciousness, connotations, bearing in mind that it is a normal democratic and social liberation movement.



Chapter Two

Firstly: *A war to build and building up for a war.*

The determinants, guidelines and facts mentioned above are to be considered as the landmarks delineating the general frame according to which political performance is estimated and controlled within a scientific method. So, policies, programs, and positions can't be determined spontaneously or hazardously. It is a scientific process whose reference is the current situation entirely, and whose objective is to achieve the higher national and patriotic interests.

Some problems may appear here. How to deal with these controversies is considered a test for the vision and methods upon which we depended while reading the dimensions of the stage. This test is not merely mental sport; it has its own scientific and practical value represented in the ability to suitably deal with the challenges and problems the reality throws at our faces. These include the various aspects of national work. To deal successfully with these problems and challenges determines to what extent a party or national movement has succeeded in the management of the crisis, in such a way that is suitable to serve, with the utmost capacity, the national struggle, and helps us achieve the current an long term national aims.

Political Struggle and Social Construction

The first problem facing the Palestinian national movement lies in the relation between the liberational and the social aspects of the national program. The document of the First National Conference has already dealt with this problem. The Palestinian performance, it is noted, has separated the political level from the social one which is the carrier of the political liberation project. So, this led to the appearance of an increasingly deepening state of imbalance, between the two bases of the national program, namely, the liberation and social dimensions.

Because the leadership of the Palestinian national work has been all the past decades living and working outside the occupied homeland has resulted in widening this deficiency which was accompanied by some negative symptoms witnessed as regards the relation between the factions of national work and Palestinian communities. The rise of the resistance movement in the sixties and seventies of the last century alleviated the deficiency. But the signs of an internal crisis appeared and were aggravated to such an extent that the vision of the factions of the Palestinian

national movement appeared shallow and superficial.

After the Oslo accords and the establishment of the Palestinian self-rule authority in the occupied territories, the state of deficiency assumed tragic dimensions. It became very clear that a social program with a clear vision and definite aim was missing. The result was an additional social aggravation in all fields. So, the doors were thrown open to overtime the society and get it drowned in a whirlpool of internal attrition. The enemy manipulated this critical situation to exert as much pressure as possible and escalate the exhaustive war to break the willingness of the Palestinian society to resist.

The situation referred to above reflects the misery of the Palestinian performance at this level, which took the form of a mentality and political performance believing that it is possible to launch a liberation struggle against the occupation, achieve victories, apart from securing the suitable social conditions. Thus, the two bases of the national program were unjust and arbitrarily separated, the liberation basis and the social basis. There is no need to pay much attention to what was included in the discourses and documents in respect of the social aspect because what matters is practice and the consequences.

In the light of experience, and what really exists, that retention of balance becomes very crucial. In accordance with this vision, the increasing capacity to struggle to attain the national aims: the right of return, self-determination and national statehood with Jerusalem as the capital, besides the struggle against settlements and terrorist activities—is related to the progress achieved at the social, economic, cultural, educational and health levels, in addition to the enhancement of democracy in the internal relations. In this context, social objectives are an indispensable requirement for national liberation.

The titles/headlines of the liberational program constitute significant demarcation lines with the occupation and are considered to form the historical dimension of the struggle. Similarly, the titles and headlines of the social field constitute demarcation lines which are equally important. The occupation policies are not limited to chiefly politicized victories and the annulment of the Palestinian national rights, because they aim at the depletion of the capacities of the Palestinian society, deepening the dynamics of social backwardness and ignorance and blocking the road for economic and scientific progress. All this would naturally in turn lead to entrenching the mechanism of dependence, weakness, deficiency and inability to invest in the capacities of the society. This policy is manifest-

ed in the consumption of greater part of the Palestinian labor force in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the Israeli economy, encouragement of pupils to drop out, control of water, marginalization of industry, abandonment of land and the complete Israeli control of the input and output of Palestinian society. The second aspect of this complicated process appears in the capacity to manage the confrontation with the policies of the Palestinian Authority in the social field. Wide sectors of popular masses are showing unease with those policies based on nepotism and unilateralism, which harm their interests.

The social democratic struggle, thus, is considered an essential approach to rehabilitate the alternative national democratic program. The differences, at the political level, among opposition forces are very minor, but the serious difference lies in the social field. Therefore, should the democratic current be able to formulate a social program of its own on a progressive democratic basis, and according to the facts of situation, this would enhance the ability to retain its social role and would represent a serious test of its seriousness and efficiency. This is not possible without a radical review of performances and discourse.

Within this conception we wonder: where are the democratic current's social programs in respect of women, youth, workers, doctors, arts... etc? We don't mean slogan nor general titles here, we are talking about a vision and a social program, at the level of the society and the different Palestinian communities. In another word, what is meant by a social program are not sporadic ideas nor general slogans but programs carefully prepared by specialists, based on the facts of the current situation and take into consideration the available potentialities while selecting the objectives and drawing the programs.

Such programs should attract wider sectors to active social labor, and be able to consider every social field as very important. Thus, no one of the dimensions of national or social work might be usurped by another one. This vision is the one which guarantees that all the aspects, of the struggle process, including the two dimensions the liberational and the social democratic, are dialectically brought together.

Thus the subordinate, social activities are integrated in the general objectives of the grand strategy, temporary and direct are integrated with the long term and the particular with the general. Democratic social activity becomes an organic part of a wider political project. This is the condition of protecting the party and the national movement against two dangers:

1) To be isolated within the direct, particular, and temporary issues.

2) To aimlessly float around strategic, abstract or general political issues.

In this perspective, it is probable to establish a wide popular mass movement with an organized social democratic content, capable of creatively differentiating things. This also will help political as well as social powers which constitute the infrastructure for any political or social program for a real change regain the lost confidence. In the same context, the conception of the vanguard could be reviewed because it acquired the meaning of deputizing or abducting the will of the society.

On the basis of the concept of the vanguard, and that it is possible to bestow it on any political party completely obsessed by the freedom of society, capable of playing its role, selecting its aims democratically, the function of political parties is reflected in the capacity to heighten the natural social dynamics to become more mature and integrated in an all-inclusive strategy capable of preserving national aims and interests and functions appropriately at every level.

Secondly: *Diverse peculiarities of one people.*

The second controversy which we face in this stage is the dispersion which governs the life of the Palestinian people, and the consequent objective peculiarities, which, unless realized, understood and dealt with nationally, efficiently, and objectively, the party, the people, and the national problem will fall in a real dilemma.

The dispersion of Palestinians is an objective reality which, with the passage of time, has resulted in social and economic changes and transformations and the consequent variety of peculiarities in the socio-economic sense. Besides, the great complexities of the Palestinian national struggle are much more diverse than some could imagine because they have created an imbalanced development of Palestinian communities and adversity of structures and types of thinking, socio-economic life and social hierarchy. In as much as this diversity is complicated, it is a source of wealth once it is properly dealt with.

The speech about the impact of diaspora on the formation of Palestinian communities (Palestinians in 1948 territories, the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria....etc) does not invalidate, in spite of all the setbacks and the attempts to liquidate or deplete the Palestinian prob-

lem, the unity of the Palestinian people which was galvanized by the pressures of the continuity of the Palestinian problem. Inasmuch as we witness the continuity of dispersion, in the geographical demographic and economic senses, we also witness, and to the same extent, a rise in the collective Palestinian consciousness, uniqueness, similarity of sufferings, and adherence to national aims.

The necessity to realize this process as an objective stage means that it is not governed by individual or group volitions, because it is a natural product of the struggle which feeds it up every day and every minute with hundreds of thousand simple or grand facts. So, it refers any Palestinian, continuously, regardless of his place, to the historical prejudice he has been exposed to, only because of his being a Palestinian, because a mere presence of a Palestinian is the best proof of the illegality of Israel. Due to this and other reasons, the war against the Palestinian existence continues, everywhere, in every field and almost all levels by the enemy and his followers.

Although the daily and strategic politics and performances of the Zionist project relations between the particular aims and realities relevant to each Palestinian community with the grand aims and realities governing the life of the Palestinian people, because the general, in the Palestinian case, doses not mean a mechanic gathering of peculiarities, such a process would lead to the creation of fragile and unstable structure.

The unity of the Palestinian people is a product of a similarity of the practical situation and a historical struggle interaction, so to speak. Here the particular and general would get tied to each other by thousands of visible and invisible ropes. This is because the achievement of the grand national aims of the Palestinian people is not possible without the complete contribution of all the different communities to the struggle. Similarly, the particular interests of any community can not be achieved apart from the attainment of the grand interests. This does not rule out the possibility of a relative improvement at the level of a particular Palestinian community.

Within this meaning, a safe connection between the general and particular in socio-political performance becomes, absolutely vital. So, the general acquires superiority to the particular in as much as it satisfies the needs of all peculiarities, the particular acquires superiority to the general in as much as it secures its presence and supports the continuous lines of the mentioned general. Thus we face a very intricate and interwoven complexity whose objective nature continues from the beginning to

the end. Here we would like to refer to several conditions.

The First Condition

Should the vision and performance be straight forward, follow a safe course and achieve continuous progress at the level of interaction of the process referred to above, we should be obliged to admit that the situation is governed by a definite condition, without compliance with it, the whole process would plunge into chaos, spontaneity, and slogans; both the general and the particular would have to pay the price in cash. So the practicability of the vision necessitates that we deal with the particular as an objective fact, as it expresses a certain peculiarity, it reflects the general in its essence.

This actual fact means that we have to recognize the scientific and practicable independence of the particular, which possessed a high flexibility and freedom to accomplish its own missions. Any Palestinian community capable of deciding on and defining its own political, social, economic and cultural programs can not be dealt with through orders. The party should behave within each Palestinian community considering itself as the son of that community, not an immigrant, nor a commanding parent.

The Second Condition

The success of the party in performing its duty and socio-political function as a real child of community is dependent on its capacity to fully realize the conditions under which that community is living, and to envisage the role that community as an integral part of a system for a more inclusive national work. This function or performance is not projective. It would satisfy the need of a particular community to possess a sense of belonging to a more inclusive general.

The Third Condition

It is necessary to deal with the contradictions among different peculiarities as natural and reflect the different conditions, and priorities of each community and thus avoid any struggle over priorities, because the outcome of such a struggle is that everyone will certainly be a loser. Suppose that the priority for the Palestinians in Lebanon were the social problem, because it is a real rather than an artificial or fabricated one. In the

territories occupied in 1948, cultural independence, equality... etc. are priorities. But in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the topmost priority is to sweep the occupation.

The application of this condition would lead to releasing the activities of every Palestinian community and spare the political forces the danger of putting the priorities of a certain Palestinian community in opposition to those of another, and protect the party from becoming haughty in its relations with the community. A productive work that reflects the peculiar interests, of communities, we believe, ensures the material and moral basis to achieve the inclusive national tasks.

So, the various inclusive and integral aspects of the struggle process get intermingled.

Everything remains dependent upon the capacity of the factions of the national movement to understand this complex process, so that they might enhance their roles, functions, structures, performances, and thinking to a level that provides them with dynamics, a vision capable of managing the struggle, and effectively dealing with peculiarities. In a word, this means the capacity to make use of the diversity of the situation, employ it to serve the grand aims against the main contradiction.

Otherwise, we would face a stage of confusion and waste our power miserably. The results are failing to meet the demands of the peculiar, and pushing the general so that it becomes abstract. What we have just said becomes very important, should we bear it in mind the impact of the enemy policies and projects which threaten the unity of the Palestinian people through such projects as resettlement, compensation, immigration, the disappearance of the PLO and its convention as a national legal, organizational and spiritual representative of the Palestinian people everywhere.

Within the context of the same methodology, and the same intellectual determinants, we should deal with the general Palestinian situation in its connection to a more general Arab one. This cycle is sacred, so to speak, in the light of the separate attempts to the crime which was and is being committed and materialized by the disengagement the Palestinian problem and the Palestinian people from their Arab depth politically, and socio-economically.

Though such attempts do not frighten us in the far future, because they are contrary to history, geography, and Arab cultural interests, they surely would increase the difficulties and obstacles on our road, strength-

en regional sectarian values which have assumed a much lower position in the last two decades. Frustration factors facing the Arab unity and national Arab awakening will no doubt increase accordingly. Finally, it is necessary to refer to an axiom which has been proved by historical Arab and Palestinian experience, be it bitter or sweet, that it is impossible to defeat the imperialist-Zionist project by a regional project be it Syrian, Palestinian, Lebanese, or Egyptian. This means any regional struggle should be an organic part of an inclusive national one.

Thirdly: *The Palestine Liberation Organisation. Where to? Options and solutions.*

One of the most controversial and critical issues is the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). So, it should be dealt with carefully, prudently, responsibly, and scientifically if the discussion were to raise to a level equal to the subject of concern. Thus discussion should avoid being superficial or reckless, and should be based on a solid ground if it were to reach suitable stances.

A very necessary and indispensable basis in this case, without which discussion turns into meaningless emulation or empty competition, is reflected by a real situation, neither the desired nor the imagined one. Consequently, the situation should be scientifically, practically, and inclusively read including all the factors and effective forces in this respect. Otherwise, the result will be more confusion and more losses which reflect an ignorance of the simplest facts.

To have this basis vindicated by political performance and thinking, and to protect it against becoming aimless, it should be centered upon realizing and respecting two essential factors, which act as two compulsory determinants.

1) The balance of powers governing the internal Palestinian situation.

2) The criterion of all the process and its terms of reference are the interests and aims of the Palestinian people related to the facts, of the current situations, its potentialities and main contradiction which was and is still, with the Zionist enemy.

The value of these two determinants stems from the fact that they save the dispute from slipping into an intellectual chaos becoming a general discourse floating like haze, dissociated from reality. To those wor-

ried by our emphasis on reality, we would like to make it clear that we mean concrete reality which reflects all the aspects of the conflict: the aspect of repression including its elements and power, besides the aspect of confrontation revolutionary action with its forces, on the basis of the socio-historical evolutionary process and according to the objective conditions which controlled and are controlling the struggle.

This rectification aims at saving some people from misinterpreting the real situation in such away that leads to selectivity and justifies submission to the current situation, or jumps over it, chasing empty desires. There are many serious difficulties resulting essentially from the inability to easily dissociate ourselves from wrong performance and discourse which have accumulated and crystallized during the Palestinian experience relevant to the PLO

This reality requires a mental power, straightforward thinking and moral values which transgress the current thinking, which, because of the frequent repetition has become an axiomatic fact. It is necessary, therefore, to reconsider and reexamine these axioms, courageously to tell which is which—to point out the wrong one's or those contrary to the requirements of struggle or the balance of powers, in inclusion to interests and aims of the Palestinian people.

The first task is: How do we understand the PLO? What does it mean to the Palestinian people? There is almost consensus that the PLO is one the most important achievements of the Palestinian contemporary revolution. It appeared as a response to the attempt to wipe out the identity, unity, and national rights of the Palestinian people. So, it is a national achievement which appeared and evolved in the context of a historical struggle process. This fact reflects the established realities of the Palestinian national struggle, regardless of all the mistakes which accompanied PLO

Here it is important to remember more of the principles highlighted by the PFLP in respect of this issue in the document of the First National Conference in June 1994. The PFLP differentiated between four ways in dealing with PLO

1) The dominating leadership of PLO

2) PLO's institutions: the Executive Committee, the Central Council, the National Council, the secretariat of the National Council.

3) the PLO as a convention, and national liberation program, and a wide national front.

4) the PLO as an entity, an identity and a sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The aim of this differentiation is to point out how things intermingle in respect of the PLO. So, a strategy should be drawn in connection with each of the above mentioned points.

We realize, as we say this, the transformation witnessed by the PLO at different levels. Included are the weakness of the institutions and how these institutions were employed to serve the policies and plans of the dominant leadership.

In accordance with what has been mentioned above, and to sum up our point of view, we would like to say, that the PLO with the convention and national consensus program are the inclusive Palestinian national framework which through the struggle of the Palestinian people and its organised forces, managed to enforce itself as a political, legal, organisational representative of the unity the entity and identity of the people. Thus, it acquired an Arab and international legitimacy and recognition, which go beyond the contents of the previous summary: the limited meaning of the PLO as a framework for the unity of the main socio-political forces in the Palestinian arena, or to what is more limited than that.

The concept of the PLO as national framework, role core function is more inclusive when compared to national unity, though the latter has been always absorbed by the PLO during all the stages of struggle, when concepts like authority, statehood, and society intermixed with the PLO and decided its own picture. The greatest problem with the PLO is that it was being dealt with as a framework for the unity of the political forces by everyone from his own perspective, rather than as a material and spiritual expression of the grand national interests of the Palestinian people.

The problem is really substantiated by the whole way in which the factions of the Palestinian national movement had dealt with the PLO. Fatah for example, dealt with the PLO from an early date as a carrier for its own organisational political program. This led to the deterioration of its status from an inclusively national one representing the unity of the people to a functional means to be employed for narrow organisational purposes because it believed that it had a natural right to dominate all the resources and institutions of the PLO.

So, instead of becoming a framework to attract material capacities and spiritual skills of all the Palestinian people, instead of being led according to a national vision which is enhanced and proportionate to the

open struggle with the occupation and instead of improving the efficiency of the Palestinian people and deepening the socio-political foundations according to democratic bases and values, instead of all that, the PLO was transformed by short-sighted policies to a mere framework to be exploited by the dominant force to ensure legitimacy for its own options and programs.

To get rid of this short-sighted and vocal manipulation of the PLO, has always required possessing a safe vision of the PLO which can help the PLO to raise its status to the level of the real representation of the best capacities of the Palestinian people. This, in turn, demands that every one be disciplined to respect democracy which constitutes an infallible guarantor of reigning in chaos or reigning in the national option, chosen democratically by the majority, to reflect the opinion, interests, rights, and will of the Palestinian people.

The opposition forces, including all the components, have not gone beyond this methodological shortcoming regardless of the relative progress reflected by political discourse and performance when compared with those of the dominant force. The thinking and performance of the opposition forces had been mainly characterized by a conscious or unconscious compliance with the terms of the game stipulated and run by the dominant force which employed the PLO as a framework for its relations with the opposition forces. While the struggle over the quota consumed the capacities of the opposition whose function and turn should have constituted a historical, democratic, all-inclusive and real alternative, the dominant leadership did not spare any chance to make use of the weakness and fragmentation of the opposition to deepen the state of depletion.

It is possible in the light of what has been mentioned, to reiterate a very important fact which explains the hesitation and fluctuation which govern the positions and performances of the opposition forces in respect of the PLO. This fact is reflected in the contradiction between the role and function of the PLO as an all-embracing framework expressing the unity of the Palestinian people, on one hand, and the state to which the PLO has deteriorated due to the dominance, hegemony, and factionalism, in addition to the inefficiency of the opposition forces which are unable to transgress, the imposed ceiling and consequently subdue to the rules, of the game according to the traditions and determinants set up by factionalism, hegemony, and individualism. The contradiction mentioned above expressed itself through two tendencies. The first one em-

phasizes the importance of the continuous adherence to the PLO. The second one pushes toward quitting the PLO. Between the push and pull powers, and in a state characterized by the absence of an inclusive vision and a safe management of the contradictions governing the real situation and experience of the PLO, spontaneity, improvisation, emotions and fluctuation of positions from one end to another prevailed.

To stop all the attempts aiming at diverting the debate through having it enshrouded by details such as who bears responsibility most, we should like to emphasize that the problem does not lie here, because we have already lost a battle, and a heavy price has already been paid by the Palestinian people. The turbulent crisis, furthermore, is befalling the Palestinian national movement, at core of which is the PLO. There are questions to be answered. The core of the problem or the crucial issue now is: How can we ensure that the tragedy will never be repeated?

To begin with, we have to emphasize the necessity of the movement forward toward the future, and to seriously and whole-heartedly work to avoid the repetition of the tragedy. So, it is necessary to storm one's mind to formulate a safe and practicable vision of such a deep and sensitive problem as this. It should be remembered that it has been and is still an Israeli plan to wipe out the PLO, destroy the symbolic and spiritual state it has been representing, tear out the national liberation convention, disfigure the framework which embodies the unity of the Palestinian people and waste the Arab and international legitimacy it has so far acquired.

This explains the American and Israeli insistence to alter the convention of the PLO as a preliminary step towards wiping it out materially and spiritually forever. Though the dominant leadership of the PLO realizes the seriousness of such dangers, it rushes to meet the Israeli demands and conditions which concentrated on the necessity to strip the PLO of its contents and to destroy its institutions as an introduction to erase its national function.

The rapid and even hasty response to the Israeli condition to alter the convention of the PLO, put an end to its jurisdiction, gradually replace its national and historical, Palestinian, Arab and international legitimacy by the jurisdiction of Palestinian Legislative Council (P.L.C.) in the areas of the limited self-rule and its authority governed by the terms of the Declaration of Principles legally and politically, and finally to belittle the national program to become suitable for the low ceiling of Oslo, all these things prove the fact mentioned in the previous paragraph. However, that leadership has not heeded the dangers of the Israeli plan which

broke out in two integral directions; to impose that Israeli existence is officially recognized by the PLO before altering the national convention and simultaneously to deprive the Palestinian party of anything that refers to or emphasizes the national and historical rights of the Palestinian people. This background explains why the Zionist entity rejoiced once the amendments of the Palestinian National Convention were declared at the session of the Palestinian National Council in Gaza in spring in 1996, which was described as the most important ideological victory of Zionism in one hundred years.

The continued demolition of this historical, strategic, national achievement by the Oslo group shows that it is still determined to go on and has not learned anything. This is represented by the same individualist mentality and politics of factional domination accompanied by the gradual marginalization of the role and institutions of the PLO which are to be activated only to be functionally used for short-sighted purposes.

The opposition forces proved themselves unable to formulate an inclusive and unified policy to protect the PLO. In practice, their policies fluctuated between imposing a complete boycott and washing their hands of the PLO and its institution once and for all. The political Islamic forces' factions, on the other hand, do not recognize the PLO as framework representing the unity, entity, and identity of the Palestinian people. They consider themselves as an alternative. The democratic current forces suffer from confusion and a crisis situation; their role does not cross the borders of appealing, offering some initiatives under the title to reconstruct the PLO while the problem remains without any tangible definite dimension.

The question, in the light of what has been mentioned above is: which is the correct policy to deal with the PLO? Here, the distinction between politics and stance is not in vain, because we are dealing with a comprehensive process.

To correct the current situation needs a required length of time to pile up the causes and conditions of change. This can not take place apart from the struggle process as a whole, and the internal and external balance of powers in order to effect a gradual displacement in positions that lead to achieving serious and radical formulations of the position of the PLO Here we have the following options:

1) To consider the PLO a framework with a certain temporary

function, and that the function has expired, and that the PLO has reached a stage of decaying and vanishing, to endorse such an option means to accept the aim of the occupation to wipe out the PLO. Besides, it completely destroys the content of the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian people and its legal statehood.

2) To work so as to set up an alternative national framework instead of the PLO This remains dependent upon the capacity to set up the alternative structure and to make sure that it will be of the same level, if not higher than that of the PLO in the consciousness of the Palestinian people. Concrete facts reveal that such conditions are not available materially, socio-politically, and legally. Still regardless of all that has befallen the PLO, it still enjoys an Arab and international recognition and legitimacy.

One should add to what has been mentioned above that the Palestinian balance of powers, and the current fragmentation of the national movement and society obstruct the road to implement such an option which, in case it really happens, will lead to the deepening of the fragmentation and divisions so as to engulf the last national collective Palestinian frameworks. So, any attempt in this direction, and under these circumstances, would not produce more than an ingathering of forces of the same political color, and in conclusion this option will never gain a chance to be representative of the unity of the Palestinian people. Rather, it will represent some of its political forces only.

3) The continuity of the status quo, that is to leave everything at the mercy of the current situation. The result will be that the Israeli project will have a proportionate chance to remove the PLO without any resistance, on one hand, or to leave the PLO at the mercy of the dominant party, on the other.

To avoid discussing unnecessary details to adopt this option, we believe, would mean the evacuation of one of the fields of national work without confrontation.

4) The fourth option envisages that, regardless of all that has happened, the PLO still, legally and popularly, represents a collective national framework expressing, materially, spiritually, and structurally the unity of the Palestinian people, that is to view and deal with it as an entity of the Palestinian people. This signifies that the PLO remains as a expression of the meanings and contents of the Political

unity of the people.

The consequence is that it is, besides its connotations, a field of conflict among political forces, provided that this conflict should not damage its legal status and general institutional framework.

This option provides us with multifaceted dynamics, because it keeps the PLO as a field of struggle with the enemy and its policies aiming at wiping out the PLO It also preserves the continued association with the PLO as a national achievement, a national liberation convention, and a representative of the unity of the Palestinian people institutionally and legally, so that it is possible to employ the Arab and international legitimacy it has acquired to serve the Palestinian people, its national project and grand interests.

With such an option, the possibility to strengthen the combat against concessions, the usurpation of the will of the people and the monopoly of making decisions on behalf of the people increases. It also ensures a front to continuously combat the legitimacy of the Oslo Accords and the institutions it triggered which try to confiscate the legitimacy and jurisdiction of the PLO Such a process has not come to an end yet, although the convention was amended.

This option is in conformity with the natural and objective tendency justified by all the communities of the Palestinian people which would disapprove any step, policy or performance that might contribute to damage the Palestinian unity, regarded as a red line which no one can go beyond regardless of the pretext. Further, this vision permits us to partly influence the social and organizational grass root bases supporting the leadership of the authority which declare their support to the PLO in spite of the contradictions between the two things.

Given the above mentioned data, we have to bear in mind the variables in the process of struggle, the contradictions they trigger, including those that might arise between the authority and the occupation in accordance with the various points of conflict, especially on the ground. This compels all forces to mobilize and unite their capacities. It would be absolutely wrong to dissociate oneself with the requirements of this process. It is this fact that makes us take part in the national dialogue and attempt to rearrange the Palestinian affairs in collaboration with the basic opposition forces. Such a policy is correct in general.

The data, determinants, and vision mentioned above demand that

we deal with the subject of the PLO on the basis of the answers of the following question: Where do the interests of Palestinian people lie? The answer of the question determines the appropriate option including all the relevant intricacies and complexities. The answers here is not of course an arbitrary one. We have already tried to reveal the different factors and aspects that would lead us to the suitable answer to the controversies and contradictions related to the situation we are dealing with.

In the light of what has been mentioned, it is easy to decide on the possible option and the suitable policy in respect of the PLO. It should be based on the principle of preserving the PLO as representative of all the people, an entity and role which are independent of the authority. This would demand hard and effective work to guarantee its independence and to prevent its being annexed, or that its jurisdiction and legitimacy are being usurped by the institutions of the limited self-rule, for one simple reason, namely, that the ceiling and role of the authority do not go beyond the self-rule areas, while the PLO's role and function are all embracing, and include all the communities of the Palestinian people.

Then, it is compulsory to be take part in the confrontation aiming at regaining the role and function of the PLO, to the benefit of the main aim, namely, to protect and solidify the unity of the Palestinian people and its national project, starting from a scientific belief in the continuity of the historically open struggle according to subjective and objective considerations. This means that the current situation can not be perpetuated.

The way to deal with the PLO is one of the several aspects of struggle, and within the context of the axiom that the solution of its problem can not be separated from the progress in the solution of the Palestinian problem as a whole.

This signifies that it becomes a part of an entity in continuous formation. This demands that the PLO issue be transformed into a field for confrontation against the procedure that has been wasting the PLO role and function and employing it functionally to serve the Oslo option. This is advantageous to the Zionist state's attempts to wipe out and put an end to the PLO. Then it has to be dealt with as a dynamic issue, the criterion being its commitment to and defense of the national constants.

Anyhow, to confine the confrontation within the bases and methods used previously, namely, the lofty political debate, will never lead to the desired purposes. This suggests that it is necessary that the Palestinian

opposition forces should do away with the previous thinking, methodologies and performances, and resort to more effective procedures capable of transforming the PLO to a force in the concrete confrontation in which socio-political force from all the gatherings of Palestinian people take part.

This interpretation means that there is no justification for withdrawal from confrontation, once we have understood it as a fundamental struggle process. The contradictions can not be solved by appeals, political pressure, statements, and meetings. If it were so, the solution would have been very easy and did not need all this presentation and analysis. To understand the problem and resort to recessionary policies is contrary to the current situation which reflects, a certain balance of powers, and contradicts the realization that any change is the consequence of a struggle between socio-politicalforces.

The Palestinian Authority, and its Chairman, in particular, will try to invest all their powers, to the utmost extent, including the PLO as a cover for their policies. Anyone who expects something different is absolutely deceived.

The beneficiary stratum really wants this and will be very pleased if it were left in the field without any political confrontation and relieved of pressure and socio-political confrontations.

Though what has been said previously represents a background of how to deal with the PLO, the foundation stone remains: What do we want? As forces claiming to be an inclusive substitute of the policies and methodology of the authority: What shall we do? It is very crucial to proceed by crystallizing a national democratic alternative, depending on the potentialities available now, so that it might be possible to push the confrontation, at this level, a few steps forward.

An effective and productive policy is that which is helpful in mobilizing forces to achieve a direct national task: the PLO with its convention which represents a national liberation program, is a sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This slogan/target constitutes the scientific and practicable ground to attract real socio-political forces to the field of confrontation, consequently it will open new horizons to practicably manage and launch the struggle at more than one level and place.

In this way, the confrontation will be transferred from the political to the inclusively social level of all the Palestinian people. The Oslo team will have to face a continuous and comprehensive process, and will be

prevented from easily wasting the PLO's potentialities, once it has become an every day habit to be in a state of confrontation with social forces which are growing more extensive and efficient all over the gatherings of the Palestinian people. These forces will be defending the PLO, trying to protect it and preserving its function as a collective framework materializing the unity and entity of the Palestinian people.

It is high time now, more than anytime before, that we had this process put within a framework with an organizational structure. The engaging organization will have the name: "Defend the PLO". The dominant force in the PLO will be demanded to clearly keep up its commitment to respect the rights and duties of other Palestinian forces according to the discipline and constitution of PLO.

Such rights, can not be usurped or abused by any forces regardless of its size. So, it is wrong to give up these rights under the pretext of fears of misinterpretation or confusion because national and realistic politics, position and performances, whose aim is to really protect the Palestinian people should not arouse worries of misinterpretation. Those who try to jump over the constants should be worried.

Thus, we have convincingly decided the direction in a way that relates to requirements and long-term targets, on one hand, and the available potentialities in the current situation. In conclusion it should be clear that such an extensive explanation of the important and controversial subject substantiates, to a large extent, a ganglion of all Palestinians situation, and sums up, in this way or that, all the internal contradictions.

Fourthly: *National unity and dialogue: form or content?*

The accuracy of facts and methodological basis of thinking on which the political vision is based, in addition to the position vis a vis the problems of the situation, all these things would ensure a correct system which determines and governs the required policies in respect of the different problems facing the Palestinian national movement.

This means that the vision governing our intellectual and political performances has already had its own logic whose strength is related to its being scientific, stems from the situation and is based on the dynamics of the situation besides the determinants of the struggle which are more inclusive. Here are the main constituents:

The objectivity of the struggle, because the stage is that of nation-

al and democratic liberation. So, the main contradiction remains and continues to be against the project and policies of the occupation. The characteristics of the stage include defense and retreat. The Palestinian national struggle takes the form and content of a socio-political and historical struggle as an organic part of more embracing, Arab-Zionist and imperialist one.

The situation is complicated, interlinked, diverse and mobile, the Palestinian society is diverse, divided geographically into a variety of peculiar communities. This leads to an interaction between the national liberation struggle and the socio-democratic one. In the light of what has been said, every situation or socio-political project is governed by dynamics which reflect, in a complicated way, the dynamic relations between the main contradiction, the all-embracing governor, and the secondary contradiction, on the basis of accumulation, continuity, and integrity of factors.

Consequently, this situation demands a clear and objective pluralism of political opinions and interpretation. To deal with and manage the situation correctly is a requirement of a successful political leadership. We preferred to reiterate what has been said because we have proceeded handling the two more controversial and crucial issues, which raised continuous dispute over the politics and performance of the Palestinian national movement.

It is not optional to deal with these two issues. Rather it is a practical and political necessity because they would sum up the vision of the party, its coherence, practicability, and seriousness, as regards the rearrangement of internal Palestinian affairs. Unless this task has been safely and realistically accomplished, the confrontation and struggle against the occupation will lose one of the main conditions of a successful political work.

To combat the occupation successfully demands an ability to unite the Palestinian capacities, employ all the components of power the Palestinian people have as much efficiently and intensively as possible. In this regard, there is a crucial question to be answered: Is there any other target more crucial and important than preserving the unity of the Palestinian people in view of the dangers threatening its very existence? Is it possible to accomplish this mission without a clear vision backed by a suitable framework and performance to unify the national movement?

Theoretically speaking, the answer is very easy and axiomatic, but

it will soon turn into a real problem once we have moved to reality. The problem here is neither fabricated nor invented, it is the result of the diversity of methodologies and political options proposed by every faction of the Palestinian national movement. This will have to do with the diversity of these factions, the class and ideological dimensions they represent, the standard of development of each one, besides the real power it has among the Palestinian people.

The problem gets more critical once we bear in mind the geographical dimension, that is the objective influences each Palestinian community is exposed to and which reflect the role played by geography in the formulation of policies. Things get so complicated that they would lead to complete division, under the conditions created by the Oslo Accords and the agreement, that followed. The dispute/contradiction includes the basics of the Palestinian national problem, and its socio-political and liberation project.

The concept of national unity has become deeply rooted in the Palestinian consciousness. Unity means strength, contact, self-confidence, and self-respect which reflect a social and psychological state supporting unity as an instinctive as well as rational defensive reaction to the uprootedness, and fragmentation to which the Palestinian character, the Palestinians, as individuals, families and society have been exposed. Further, there are the battles and wars launched against Palestinian communities and the consequent tendency to self-protection and the preservation of collective memory and the enhancement of its function and role in the fight against the threats of dispersion and wiping out of identity.

The inclination for unity has had its very intensive psychological, social, political, and intellectual illustrations, in the attempt to make up for the instability of the material and social grounds and the interruption of the courses of natural development of the Palestinian society. The concept of national unity in the performances of the factions of the Palestinian movement took the form of political coalition of these factions on the basis of the national consensus. This means that national unity has had a finite political and organizational interpretation in the light of the differences between Palestinian organizations, the power and role of each of them according to the internal and external balance of powers.

Here is the essence of the controversy about the problem of national unity; i.e., the confusion of the concept of national unity as an expression of a deeply-rooted psychological, sentimental, and social situation, on one hand, and national unity which is confidence, a framework of the

political forces at a definite historical and political moment to achieve a definite purpose, or to confront a danger or a project threatening the interests of the Palestinian people.

This problem becomes more widely-spread and raises much confusion under the circumstances of confusion between the concept of national unity and the PLO as we said earlier in the topic entitled the PLO.

The PLO has been treated, to some extent, as though it were the organizational and political framework and the practical interpretation of the concept of national unity. Accordingly, the first mission we have to accomplish is to disengage these concepts, dimensions and framework from each other so that the concept, role and status of both the PLO and national unity become clear.

Once this definition and clarity have been achieved, it will no more be perplexing if such confusion takes place in practice because the boundaries between them have become so clearly defined that there will be no room for a serious mistake. The importance of such a process stems from the fact that it makes designing policies easier and determining the directives of work less troublesome. Long term vision could be kept safe from being blurred because the clearer a vision is the more apparent the aims are, the more they can protect themselves by themselves.

This proposed process is not merely a mental one, but it is a decisive step bestowing upon the political vision a real dynamic and applicable power, which can pressure and strengthen what unifies the Palestinian people, and responds to the natural inclination which the Palestinians have, due to the social, psychological, and sentimental interactions mentioned above, and which occupy a large place in his body as a natural consequence of dispersion, fragmentation, and wiping out

On the other hand, the political movement faces direct aims and a situation in which policies are determined, and struggle in the field is launched. Besides, there are also the daily challenges, direct, aims, in addition to field unity.

Thus policies are determined by very cool heads. Emotions are being reigned in willingly sometimes, and unwillingly very frequently. Standing face to face with a situation, the party or national movement has to deal with these events and incidents, as much effectively and flexibly as possible. Otherwise, there will be great losses, in accordance with this vision, the meaning within which we dealt with the PLO in this document has become clear.

To sum up, we reiterate, the PLO, having acquired a convention and national liberation program, being considered a national and historical achievement of the Palestinian people, having been recognized by the Arabs and the international community as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in all its gatherings, having symbolically and materially substantiated the Palestinian unity and identity constitutes the national framework representing the unity of the Palestinian people. Within this meaning, and regardless of all of its shortcomings, it remains a framework and an expression of the grand national aims. It materializes the conscience, grand values, and the natural inclination of the Palestinian people toward unity.

National unity as a concept of power should be materialized through a relatively stable political and organizational framework to unify the work of the all or the majority of the Palestinian political forces in each stage on the basis of a definite and common program, or to face certain threats. Thus, it is a dynamic ad mobile framework which is binding as long as the participant forces are committee to the definite program.

As the position of the political forces reflect the mobility of their position, their class, political, and intellectual options, and the degree of the developments of these forces themselves, the framework for national unity should be logically, motioning up and down. Similarly, as the struggle continues, so do the engagement with the occupation, its policies and project, national unity at each of the stages of the struggle will become a central national purpose, because the defense of the interests and rights of the Palestinian people in general or one of its gatherings logically requires the unity of all the forces on the basis of common ground constituting the minimum level of the common program.

In principle and theory, national unity reaches the level of a national aim. Practically, to successfully preserve its status as a national aim, in as much as it succeeds in transforming it to a political and organizational tool to manage the struggle against the occupation to mobilize the capacities of the Palestinian people and to organize its forces, the concept of national unity takes theoretical and practical interlaced and dynamic dimensions. It becomes simultaneously a means and an end, a cause and an effect, as well.

Understanding national unity according to these dimensions, transfers it from the level of limited organizational or factional understanding to a more inclusive and sublime level because it is considered a national determinant of the struggle. In this way, national unity becomes the con-

tinued title of the struggle against deviation politics, or the attempt to degrade it to such an extent that it might be used in a bargain or a cover for untrue policies. In other words, there should be a continuous and practical confrontation to preserve national unity as a national and organizational necessity though it might be viewed by the dominant groups differently; also, it should be protected against attempts to distort, empty or destroy it.

Given these facts, we would like to stress the need of the concurrence of an enhanced understanding of national unity, as a governor of national struggle and the availability of a democratic climate and performance, which would ensure that national unity can play its role and do it, function with as much efficiency and dynamism as possible. Otherwise, it will sink deeper and deeper, in the mud of minor authoritarian factional policies which might strip it of its main function, namely to unite all forces and invest all available capacities to help achieve the national aims. The subject of national unity should be debated within this context.

The achievement of national unity requires national dialogue, should national unity be the end, national dialogue then had to be the means to achieve it. Otherwise, how can we reach the political and organizational basics and determinants on which national unity can be established? The position on national unity can not be decided arbitrarily. It should be considered as the required condition and the natural framework which govern and control the performances of political forces confronting the occupation and bear the heavy burden of the socio-political and intellectual issues which raise controversies and debate, on one hand, and lead to position of national unity on the road to confront the common problems, on the other.

The effectiveness of dialogue is dependent upon understanding it as an objective necessity in the current situation in which the political forces and Palestinian society are living, on one hand, and the clarity of the problems, subjects and aims the forces are trying to achieve in each stage on the basis of the question: where does the national interest lie in each stage of the conflict? In this meaning, there are several options for a dialogue which might be all-embracing to reconsider all the policies and options, or limited to certain issues imposed by the flow of events, such as confronting occupation plans in Jerusalem, settlements, economic blockade. Sometimes it might be limited to one subject only such as avoiding the threat of in-fighting.

So, bearing in mind that dialogue is governed by the problems and aims to be dealt with and achieved, the problem does not lie in whether one should participate, or not. Rather, it lies in the realization of the aims each political force tries to achieve through dialogue. Thus dialogue becomes an integral part of a common policy responding to the requirements of national work within a realistic balance of powers and threats, and a means to reach common national denominators.

In other words, it is a new field of struggle and confrontation to raise the ceiling of the performances of the Palestinian political forces as much as possible and to reign in, even to some extent, the politics of concessions. Accordingly, it becomes a very vital problem to decide the issues, because it is very difficult to reach common denominators about some issues. The position on such issues has to be decided beyond the boundaries of debate and dialogue. Similarly, there are problems which are possible to reach common denominators for. The crucial questions can be summed up as follows:

What do we need dialogue for? What are the aims and program to be raised at dialogue sessions in order to be achieved? To start from this point, the party will find itself relieved from being conditioned upon what the other party thinks of. Thus, it provides its own options with a wide margin for positive mobility in all directions. The formulation of a positive vision in respect of certain subjects demands that good attention be paid to the possibility of mixing things together and distorting the borders and conjunctions.

The crucial issue raised above stems from the political and intellectual method governing the performances of the authority team whose mentality is confined to the manipulative use of the frameworks of national work beginning with the PLO, going through national unity and ending by national dialogue. Given the heavy burden of the fact referred to above, one would like to insist that it reflects some concrete aspects of the situation. This makes it one of the factors of the struggle and internal confrontation, so it can not be cancelled by merely refusing to deal with it.

The politics of confusing issues, distorting the boundaries, the manipulative use of national frameworks, and providing the political performances of the official dominant leadership with a political cover cannot pass off unless the policies of alternative are essentially vague, open to manipulation and unable to stand as a socio-political, practicable and intellectual force of confrontation.

Once the requirements of national, clear and safe policy were ensured, it would be able to guarantee self-protection and clarification of its positions.

We emphasize this fact because we are in front of a situation governed by the ceiling of the struggle against occupation i.e. the main contradiction. This means that the internal Palestinian situation could always carry what could be agreed on and coordinated about; consequently, problems could no more be related to projective resolutions. As long as the struggle and engagement are so inclusive and deep, dialogue and collective work will remain a wide field of attraction. Therefore, the problem can no longer be a matter of dissociation or participation, but it is dependent on deciding on the aim and interest which can be achieved through each option. Here it is necessary to pay attention to two dangerous deviations which are:

1) To surrender to the situation and be conditioned by it, this leads to an emotional short-sighted policy governed by temporariness which transforms it into sporadic practices and tactics which are the closest to reactions and improvisation, while one of the functions of a scientific policy is to be an inclusive means of managing the struggle according to a comprehensive vision, a system of multidimensional political, intellectual and social work and performance practically and intellectually leading to a separation between current politics and the governing strategic vision and aims.

2) To jump over the situation and work on the basis of grand slogans or a political discourse which would satisfy some psychological inclinations more than it could reflect the situation. It would be convenient to psyches and sentiments but the controversy rises because it lacks anything leading to an understanding of the struggle. The process will no more be concrete because it will be turned into "point counter point" or a duel between slogans.

The long experience of the Palestinian people, so did the experience of other peoples, proved that the problem has never been at any time how to select national aims but how to achieve those aims. The concept of achievement here can not be limited to the narrow meaning of work/performance, that is the process of action itself. But it should combine work and performance which are considered a socio-political and intellectual process with all the needed requirements. Consequently, the rearrangement of internal Palestinian affairs in principle or in the light of the practical requisites becomes one of the remarkable priorities in this stage.

Such a problem has become a subject of internal conflict between a unionist policy based on the principle of preserving the multidimensional national interests at different levels—the current, medium term and long term ones—and the opposite one which could lead, through unilateralism, to a more weakening and exhaustion of these interests. The result will of course be an increased aggravation of internal crises and widening of the divisions. Within this meaning, the subject of national unity and the management of internal dialogue will remain a hot issue whose extremely political, intellectual, and practical importance demands that it be managed and dealt with in accordance with the above mentioned determinants.

To deal with this issue frivolously will result in deepening the imbalance in the management of internal contradictions, whose consequence will be more exhaustion and erosion of internal powers.

Objectively, this means the perpetuation of the state of weakness and making a free service to the enemy. The process mentioned above acquires a dangerous dimension in the current Palestinian circumstances, at a time when occupation efforts to penetrate the Palestinian body and impose more political concessions have increased.

The situation will become more critical once we have recalled the requirements of the final status negotiations. This thing makes it necessary that the factions of political Palestinian opposition movement should decide on clear directions for confrontation which should go beyond general rejections to a more active and effective level. This is conditioned by the availability of a political vision and performance capable of lunching a field struggle at various levels as an organic part of a popular resistance.

The current situation is characterized by a great amount of objective interaction and interlinks which have impact on the contradictions inside the Palestinian arena. This requires dynamic politics and practices which respond to the motion of the situation and the consequent influence on the national missions and interests within the context of fighting the occupation which is, no doubt, the main contradiction we have to face in this stage.

What proves the ideas mentioned above is a wide ranging network of subjects constituting the aspects of the struggle against occupation some of which are relevant to every day and current politics, (repression, detainees, economic field,... etc.). This means, *inter alia* a great chance to mobilize powers and capacities to meet the demands whether through

bilateral limited work programs or general national missions including everyone.

This requirement is accompanied by another one which is equally important and is represented in the fight against the policies and practices of the authority both at the level of standing against the concession process and its policies in administering the Palestinian internal affairs.

A dialogue with the authority does not, for objective reasons, drop out a conflict with it, except in the minds of some people. Both the struggle and dialogue, according to the objectivity of the positive and negative contact with authority, constitutes an aspect of the confrontation.

A very clear management of this process by the opposition forces within the conditions and vision referred to above can transform these slogans and programs into a material power for work and change them from being abstract to concrete.

As long as the national determinant is governing the management of the whole process and the realization that it is a socio-political struggle reflecting the national program besides both of its aspects the social and liberational ones, the process will be in control of the conditions of its progress and this will ensure a social and popular attraction and move forward to influence even the socio-political forces, supporting for one reason or another the Oslo option.

The national dialogue at any level should remain related to the national constants and interests in the political sense, on one hand, and committed to definite mechanisms for execution, supervision, and revisions.

We refer to what has been mentioned above, to state that this option is essentially contradictory to the interests of these forces which are included in the grand interests of the Palestinian people except for the very narrow strata and chieftains who view Oslo as a personal fate or a means for wealth and privileges.

This is the suitable and objective approach to make gradual displacement in the internal balance of powers as a prerequisite to create a democratic national alternative which is considered a comprehensive socio-political and intellectual process.

Fifthly: *On the So-Called Final Status Negotiations.*

Now that ten years have passed since the Madrid Conference, and

the consequent agreements and understandings which followed that conference, including the Cairo, Paris Economic, Herbron, Sharm El-Sheikh I, Wye Plantations, Sharm El-Sheikh II agreements, besides the Arava Valley Accords between Jordan and Israel, the features of the settlement envisaged by the American-Israeli alliance have become very clear. The alliance viewed these interim agreements and understandings just as a means to liquidate the Arab-Israeli conflict and its essence, the Palestinian problem. The prelude to this aim was the forcible imposition of Israeli status quo policies as regards sovereignty, settlements, Jerusalem, refugees and the economy, besides the distortion of the concepts of struggle and degrading them to concepts about a dispute or strife. The resolutions of the international legitimacy, which constitute a reference in international law received a blow once they had been replaced by the negotiations terms of reference which reflect the balance of powers and the consequent Israeli hegemony. Within the same context, the enemy alliance tried to dissociate the Palestinian party to compel it to surrender and forcibly accept the settlement and the final status resolution of the Palestinian problem in such a way that the Palestinian negotiating team cannot but accept the Israeli demands and conditions.

Through the last ten years the occupation has persistently been depleting the Palestinian situation and constantly pushing it toward the point of conceding the national Palestinian rights until the time comes when the Palestinian negotiating party accepts the Israeli demands and conditions.

Thus, it is possible to say that the Oslo Agreement has accomplished its definite mission. The Zionist entity (be it led by a Likud or a Labour Government) is trying, through an all-embracing American support, to dictate the terms of a final status settlement by striking a blow against the fundamental components of the Palestinian problem: the right of return, self- determination, Jerusalem, and a Palestinian state with full sovereignty.

This means that Zionist entity has been employing all its capacities and the achievements piled up through the past decades to consolidate the occupation and its related projects. Having strengthened its occupation of Palestine in 1948, Israel, through all-inclusive pressure, is trying to grab more land, imprison the Palestinian people in the West Bank, and Gaza Strip to strip the concept of Palestinian statehood of the elements of sovereignty and independence, legalize settlements and a strike a blow against the right of refugees to return. In case it succeeded, it would have

liquidated all the constants of the Palestinian problem as a case related to historical rights, national liberation and independence.

A vision and policy like this could lead to the consolidation of the Zionist project which is a project of hegemony and domination at the heart of the Arab World.

In the light of the successes achieved by the Zionist project through the Oslo Accords, the consequent imbalance of powers and the new fait accompli on the ground, the occupation believed that it was high time a final status of the struggle and the Palestinian problem had been dictated.

Thus, negotiations between the occupation and the dominant Palestinian party which signed the Oslo Accords began. The Israeli negotiation strategy was designed in such a way that it would make the Palestinian party accept the results of the interim agreement and transform these agreements and their contents into the foundation of the final status resolution. The Zionist entity had illusions that suitable conditions had come to impose a final resolution according the notorious red lines or taboos

1) No to the return of Palestinian refugees.

2) No to the dismantling of big settlement clusters; yes to the annexation of these settlements to Israel.

3) No to the partition of Jerusalem.

4) No to the withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 lines.

5) No to the presence of any foreign army to the West of Jordan River.

These lines clearly sum up the aims of Zionist entity on which both the Likud and Labour agree, with a relative difference in compromise and flexibility.

In this perspective, we see that the Palestinian problem, as a result of the politics of concessions, have reached a decisive crossroads really threatening the national rights and opening the way so that the Zionist project can achieve more achievements and victories at the expense of the Palestinian people and its grand national interests.

Although the Palestinian people had had some anticipations during the interim stage, it realized that the whole national problem is at a critical crossroads. So, once negotiations were renewed, the resistance operations and rejection of any concessions that might harm national con-

stants were enhanced. The P.FL.P. believes, in the light of what has been mentioned, that the negotiations of the so-called final status resolution will surely be based on the combination between the Oslo Accords and the final resolution, and that the negotiation process will continue to based on the American-Israeli unilateralism as terms of reference instead of the resolutions of international legitimacy, the resolutions of the Palestinian National Council, and the program of national consensus. So, the negotiations will never lead to the attainment of our inalienable national rights, apart from the dangers of compromises carried by them.

Accordingly, we call for:

First. To consider the Oslo Accords and the interpretations triggered by it as outdated. So, there is nothing in common between Oslo and the concept of the final resolution. This requires that a new national Palestinian policy be formulated on the basis of quitting the Oslo process and its institutions, that the institutions of the PLO be activated and reconstructed on comprehensive and democratic bases and that the Palestinian National Convention and program be committed to.

Second. The terms of reference of the transitional resolution of the Palestinian problem should be built on the basis of the resolutions of international legitimacy which should be implemented completely by the Zionist entity.

Politics of power and hegemony which USA and the Zionist entity try to impose upon the Palestinian people should be dismissed. The international terms of reference in the framework of the United Nations and its institutions should be insisted upon.

Third. The declaration of sovereignty of the Palestinian State on the territories occupied since 1967, because such a position is considered a means of struggle to continue the resistance against the occupation and its policies. This is a transitional resolution on the road to achieve the strategic aim which is to establish the democratic state of Palestine.

Fourth. The adherence to resolution 194 as a legal basis for the resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem which is the essential part of the national problem. Without a just, and serious resolution, the struggle will continue. There is no force or law which allows a political leadership to concede or wipe out the right of a Palestinian citizen to return to his home, land or village of origin from which he was expelled forcibly, by massacres and terror. This right does not cease by passage of time or the

imbalance of powers

Fifth. As we understand it the final resolution should guarantee the rights of our people to return, national independence and sovereignty completely. Any harm to the right of return, the Arabism of Jerusalem, the preservation of settlements, on one hand, or to grant Zionist entity the freedom of movement and the right to use the territories of the Palestinian state for security or military purposes, on the other, harms the criteria of sovereignty and liberation and consequently triggers resistance and various forms of struggle.

Sixth. In view of current imbalance of powers, on one hand, and the insistence of some Palestinian forces to continue the negotiations on the basis of the former policy, on the other, there might be conditions leading to a so-called final status resolution or a framework agreement. In this respect, we would like to reiterate that any final agreement, or anything else, which harms the constant and just rights of our people will not be binding to our people and its militant forces which are called upon to continue the struggle until the interests of out people have been achieved according to international legitimacy.

Bearing in mind the above mentioned positions and practices by the occupation, the declared aims of the current negotiations between Zionist entity and the P.A., sponsored by U.S.A., we conceive that all the forces of the Palestinian people will continue the resistance and struggle. This requires that all the forces and currents of opposition should meet the demands of mobilizing the capacities, organising the activities and finding a framework for the practices to defend the national rights. Special emphasis should be put in this stage on the right of the Palestinian refugees to return, the Jerusalem issue as central subjects of the struggle. Accordingly, there should be popular struggle in the Palestinian communities at homeland and in diaspora. Creative forms suitable for the activation of the masses in the camps should be found in order that refugees might defend their constant right to return to their homes in Palestine from which they had been expelled.

Sixthly: *Forms of Struggle, Nature of the Conflict and the Characteristics of the Stage.*

The vision as well as the determinants included in this document have narrowed the margins of dealing lightly with the major issues. Now, any discussion has had a ceiling and criteria which no one can easily jump

over or violate without pushing everything back to the starting point-the crisis zone. So, dealing successfully with the forms and methods of struggle is governed by the requirements of the situation. To what extent this responds to the requirement conditioned by its being effective and consistent with the mobility of the situation, and with the objective and subjective conditions this mobility is based on.

Otherwise, freedom will lose its meaning and turn into a miserable chaos and inability in front of the factual situation which will transcend those who might deal with it lightly or with ignorance whether they are individuals, a party or even by a people. To view the current situation with all its dimensions and contents will simply point to or even impose the suitable forms and methods of struggle.

This means that it is compulsory to determine the forms and methods of the struggle in conformity with the conditions and requirements of the situation.

The result will be that the struggle will be no more in the circle of spontaneity and improvisation, but in the circle of the objective necessity, consciousness, and a political and intellectual vision. Then, it will be possible to design policies that will be able to function properly, and do their functions naturally, and with the utmost coherence and conformity with one another, on one hand, and with the situation, and its conditions, plus the objective dynamics of the struggle, on the other.

The peculiarities of the forms of struggle stem from their ability to do certain functions within the context of a comprehensive vision, not without or against it. Otherwise, these forms will be no more than merely special desires. The objective nature of the struggle is substantiated by its being an inclusively historical one between the Arab nation and the Palestinian people, on one hand, and the Zionist project, on the other.

The implication of this reality is that the struggle and confrontation will include various forms of confrontation on an objective basis and to the utmost extent. Due to this reason, the forms of political, economic, intellectual and military struggle, under the circumstances of the Palestinian case, remain open-ended and include all the forms without any exception, as long as they can effectively defend the Palestinian and Arab rights and regain them. The reality, referred to , objectively and concretely reflects the determinants, contents and dimensions of the struggle at this level. They can be briefly enumerated as follows:

First: The nature of the enemy is governed by colonial, ideological, racial, and settler aims and interpreted through political and security practices based on the sanctification of power and piling up its components, including mass destruction weapons and viewing the military superiority of the Zionist entity as a constant foundation of the common Israeli-American strategy. The continued aggressive and offensive policy against the Palestinian people and the Arab nation illustrates what has been mentioned above.

The aim of this policy, as it is well-known, the perpetuation of the status quo, the destruction of the components of Arab power, and the abortion of the Arab attempts to obtain what the Zionist or imperialist project in the region consider a real or a potential threat against them. The use of violence, force, limited or comprehensive warfare directly or indirectly, has become a permanent subject in the social and intellectual indoctrination in Israel, and Israeli political practices.

This concrete policy has led and is leading to a state of constant and forcibly imposed confrontation because of the aggressive occupation policies and practices. So, it is natural to react spontaneously or organizationally, in the form of a popular resistance or regular war. To neglect this declared or secret, actual or potential aggression, reflects a state of internal conflict. Neglecting these facts, dealing with them lightly, oversimplification of them, or attempting to escape them, reflects a phobia, a capitulationism and short- sighted mentality.

The reality we should never miss is that the violent confrontation is imposed by the nature of the Zionist-imperialist project, due to its flagrant contradiction with the logic of the natural evolution of the Arab people and nation. Such an evolution is viewed as a future threat, so all efforts are employed, and all the components of power are manipulated to trap this evolution, whether by political or economic repression, or, should that be insufficient, by armed aggression.

Second: The occupation of Palestine, the uprootedness, and the dispersion of the majority of the Palestinian people in diaspora, the rejection of recognizing the basic national rights, represented by the right of return, self-determination, the establishment of a national and independent state with Jerusalem as its capital, the strengthening of the occupation settlement and terrorist practices, the resort to material/body violence (expulsion, detention, land grab, killing, destruction and psychological

and moral violence) the distortion of Palestinian economy and annexing of it to the Israeli besides many other things, all these things would bestow upon the stage its characteristic and content as the stage of the national liberation movement of the Palestinian people.

This means that it is a natural right, and duty, that the Palestinian people should defend itself, resist the occupation through various means of struggle, including armed struggle. This is in accordance with international law, the resolutions of the United Nations, which give peoples the right to use force to attain their rights and to defend themselves.

Any practical or intellectual attempt to transcend or neglect this fact under any pretext, be it in the name of peace, coexistence or reality... etc., is condemned to failure because it does not objectively possess the requirements to life. Simply, it is contrary to the actual situation, the nature of the struggle and its objectivity. The question which should always be present is: what is expected from a people crucified on the wall in front of the peoples of the world for more than half a century other than self-defense and the retention of its rights.

Third: The two headlines mentioned above, with their own objectivity, and practical dynamism, grant the struggle its comprehensive historical characteristics and expressions which we find in a network of features and subjects around which the struggle has been going on. In such a situation, the nature and features of the struggle will go beyond the particular determinants of each party. This means that the struggle has become a socio-historical phenomenon which has acquired its own objective dynamics which no party alone can control. Even the two parties cannot control it, in the light of the ramifications of the struggle, the material and historical consequences related it, and the dynamics it generates due to the continuity of the struggle and its regeneration.

Due to this reason, and in the light of objective reasons, besides a scientific reading, we believe that it is an objective historical struggle. In conjunction with what we said that the objective forms of struggle constitute a natural result of this objective conflict which the enemy tries to cancel without ever trying to remove its causes. Thus, we are in front of an open-ended struggle in all directions, including all levels required and imposed by the nature of the struggle and aggression which were not historically started by the Arabs nor the Palestinians.

Accordingly, the slogans raised by the Zionist entity and the con-

ferences organised by it, the campaigns it has been launching under the title "Combating terrorism" will not solve any problem, because they are targeting objectively the Palestinian and Arab existence.

The Zionist entity, more than any one else, realizes what has been said above, particularly as experience has revealed that it was unable to end the struggle and confrontation in all its forms. Rather, it is growing larger and more varied. Had the Zionist entity had the power to achieve this aim, it would not have hesitated one minute. The truth is that the Zionist entity, for the long decades of confrontation, has not spared any effort, to end the struggle in the way suitable to its aims. However, the results were not proportionate to the desires.

The aims the Zionist state tries achieve through these slogans are:

1) To pay lip service to the world public opinion to create an atmosphere antagonistic to the Arab and Palestinian resistance, to manipulate that atmosphere to mobilize material and political support and to justify its aggressive policy and put it within the limit of the right to self-defense.

2) To extort and threaten Arab regimes, to push them to adopt policies antagonistic to popular resistance and to defend the security of the Zionist entity to avoid reprisals.

3) To feed the factors of Palestinian in-fighting, and push the Palestinian people toward the circle of internal erosion through exhaustion and self-depletion.

The Oslo Agreement, and the conditions it included, came to increase this danger, due to the acceptance of the self-rule authority to perform the job of defending Israeli security, under the illusion that it would ensure the peace process and to get some concessions from the Zionist entity. This is what the Zionist entity is trying to do in the context of securing the utmost security for the settler society. Yet, regardless of the success achieved every now and then at this level, nothing has changed in respect of the essence of the struggle which is still remaining within its objective determinants. Events have proved this fact and have continuously renewed it, apart from regression and latency experienced through history of the struggle.

Through the above mentioned ideas, we can transcend the aggravated or defeated thinking which views that the armed struggle has come to an end and has been buried, and as a consequence the national liberation movement has expired. This supposes that we are in a completely

new stage which is the democratic social construction era, and the rest of the national rights were to be achieved only within the framework of diplomacy, peaceful negotiation and the legal framework coined by the agreements which have been so far signed.

This policy has revealed the absence of a correct vision of the struggle according to its objective factors and conditions, instead of illusions related to a concept that the struggle is based on the smartness of individuals or chieftains. On the other hand, there is also an absence of a correct understanding of the enemy as well as its political projects. This has resulted in positioning the national rights and interests of the Palestinian people below a ceiling designed and imposed by the occupation.

This policy has degraded the struggle from the concept of an all-embracing historical one which includes the different forms of struggle to the concept of tactics and maneuvers, as if the result of the struggle might be determined by negotiations between just men, not by the impact of the balance of powers, and according to the ability of each party to manage the struggle, including the negotiations through employing all the components of power smartly, and the ability to neutralize, as much as possible, the components of enemy power.

Due to this reason, the policy referred to above has yielded options and consequences that are contrary to the determinants of the struggle and the terms of its management, that is, the rights and interests of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation.

In conclusion, the nature of the struggle goes beyond the minor politics governed by pale and improvised political vision to one which is capable of reading well the portrait of the struggle and consciously managing the process on the basis of piling up, integrating, and continuously activating all the latent powers.

We have, according to what has been said, to completely manipulate all the capacities of the society, face the occupation in all fields and at all corners, defend every meter of land threatened by settlements, refuse paying taxes to the occupation, defend every well of water, resist the demolition of every house, confront the be smirching of any holy place, resort to comprehensive or limited forms of uprisings to confront the enemy and to use different forms armed struggle.

To adopt this vision does not mean chaos nor improvisation, because the decision on the suitable form and means of struggle requires envisaging the political moment and conditions surrounding it and this

demands that there is a safe and national management of the capacities available to us. What has been mentioned above is the condition to possess the capacity to take the suitable step at the suitable moment, with flexibility of thinking and working and readiness to move forward, backward, to be latent or to rush as required.

The things mentioned above should be understood on the basis of an essential axiom which states that the sacredness of any of the forms of the struggle is dependent upon its ability to serve the national project at the suitable time and place.

This means that the form of armed struggle should be dealt with at each stage as a means to serve the inclusive political vision which is responsible for determining the function to be done at each stage of the struggle, in conformity with each one of the peculiarities of the Palestinian people-that is its function is continuously mobile according to the mobility of the struggle.

Seventhly: *The National Alternative: An Inclusive Democratic Project or a political Declaration For History.*

It is apparent, in the light of the vision this document contains that we are in front of gigantic momentum, and an all-embracing struggle extending to the furthest and smallest corners. Though the struggle is being densely centered in Palestine which was chosen as an area for the "landing" of the Zionist-Imperialist project at the heart of the Arab World, this colonialist historical landing goes much further beyond that. Such a fact like this would transfer the struggle to highly interlaced levels, and attract tremendous forces to the scene whether that be at the level of the Arab nation or the level of the forces supporting the Zionist project.

Within this meaning, though the subject of the struggle is the liberation of Palestine, it becomes a struggle to liberate the Arab nation and ensure the material and cultural factors of its revival. Because the consequences of the struggle are determined in the light of the ability of each party to concentrate and pile up the components of comprehensive power, to effect the suitable displacement in the balance of powers, it becomes scientifically axiomatic to consider that the internal factor is the decisive one in the struggle. The content of this factor can be determined by the capacity of the political powers of the society to effectively, intensively, efficiently, for a period of time, ensure the conditions and components of the material and moral confrontation and revive all the latent

capacities and have them activated.

The nature of the enemy, and consequently the nature of the struggle do not give us the luxury to waste even some of our possessions, because the cost of any depletion is very high and will be directly paid in the form of more imbalances of powers, and more defeats. Any imbalance of powers will take the form of a multiple geometric progression, because its effects will go into various directions and reach all the social structures. A century-old experience in the struggle against the imperialist-Zionist project has an abundance of hard lessons. Our defeats are not successive coincidences nor are the victories of the other party a predestined fate.

This historical process with both national/liberational and social and awakening dimensions constitute one process taking place at the same time. It is practically impossible to separate one dimension from the other even if we wanted. The enemy will not stand with folded arms because the struggle against it is open-ended and inclusive, and has acquired its own dynamism and rules. Thus, the subjective and objective, the current and the historical, the liberational and the democratic social factors have got interwoven together.

The state of interweaving referred to above through its manifestations, interactions, and mobility requires a sublime level of practice, management, leadership, a commanding mentality which possesses elements of knowledge and efficiency to deal with the developments and requirements of the struggle. In this perspective, we can understand that the document tries to further promote the debate and intellectual activities to meet the level of this inclusive socio-political process and guarantee a mature vision capable of reading the era with all its dimensions in relation to the higher national interests.

We don't miss the truth if we said that the struggle against the Zionist project has reached a stage of unprecedented aggravation on one hand, and popular Arab and Palestinian activism, which grows towards becoming enhanced, organised, wide, and extended through out the Arab World, on the other. This enhancement gives us good news of a real, popular, and conscious movement in which both mind and the cultural dimension occupy an advanced position, when compared to previous stages. Such a movement should be correctly and carefully dealt with and manipulated.

Such a movement is considered a significant turning point which has many qualitative significations. It reflects that the nature of the struggle

which was almost confined within the limits of armed struggle, which changed the society from a field and a carrier of the struggle at different levels into what resembles reserves to be mobilized when needed and to be demobilized after a time. More dangerous still, it helped hollow out and forge the popular will, get a variety of minor and incapable policies passed under the name of popular legitimacies, which later were abused and became the jurisdiction of the authority or semi-authority. The situation referred to above highlights more than a phenomenon and lesson whose expensive price has been paid through out our contemporary history.

The first and the most dangerous phenomenon is the absence of or the usurpation of socio-political democracy which resulted in the reigning in of the development of society and the destruction of creativity and initiative. With the passage of time, this created alienation, dynamism, the loss of confidence in the regimes, their slogans and wars, social inactivity, the absence of the environment, the mechanisms, values criteria, and institutional legal structures capable of advancing the socio-political performance to a level suitable for the requirements of the struggle and the standards governing the performance of the other party, to transfer society from being negatively recipient to become an initiative, active social carrier and governor of the political performances at the official and popular levels.

The second phenomenon is the loss and distortion of a socio-political and intellectual vision, which leads from time to time to an eruption of debates and intellectual activities in an attempt to search for the reasons of the defeats and the conditions of revival. The third phenomenon to be recorded is the popular Palestinian uprisings in the occupied territories in the eighties. Among the lessons to be taken from these uprisings one can mention that the wide-spread and inclusive popular work has regained its signification.

The experience of these uprisings, including the sacrifices and innovations, is considered a successful attempt to reform the equations of the struggle, and to work according to a general fact: namely, that the Palestinian people possesses a renewable stockpile of capacity enough to sustain the struggle, enhance it from being a political, military, superior and limited struggle, to a social struggle which can be as much tiring and exhausting for the enemy as possible. The enemy has so far been accustomed to easily-gained victories and limited clashes to be run and governed in accordance with his designated strategies.

The Intifada has obliged the occupation to stand face to face, for years, with a new pattern of struggle, which is open-ended and continuous and in which the Zionist state cannot hold the initiative and be the decision-maker. For the first time, it will assume a defensive position, because it has to face the flagrant dimensions of the struggle: all the demons, symbols, myths, and components have been brought, besides the forces of the current resistance fed by the popular opposition/resistance at all levels.

Exactly here one can observe signs of the fear felt by the Zionist entity, which discovered it was not fighting against a regular army, or a group of commando fighters, with due respect of their importance. But it was engaged in a war with an active, energetic, people showing initiative who can attack, defend, build, and chase. A people who realize the importance of a workshop, an olive tree, labor force, school, university, media, the danger of a settlement, the value of Jerusalem, a Molotov cocktail bottle, the rejection of paying taxes. etc. To sum up, it is a people that act as an equal to the enemy, are always ready for confrontation and engagement at each and every corner, crossroads or on each meter of the area of struggle.

The fourth phenomenon we would like to refer to is the degradation of criteria and the lightness in dealing with minds and the consequent intellectual chaos and the loss of vision. The result is a widely-spread populism and vulgar pragmatism in the form of endless attempts to justify the policies and failures of the leadership. The crisis has been aggravated and deepened by the absence of a democratic climate and performance, the spread of factional thinking at the expense of national thinking, the degradation of scientific criticism criteria, effectiveness, moral and intellectual disinterestedness.

The facts referred to above explain the phenomenon of the glorification of people vocally, where as the practical performance shows that it is being dealt with as though it were a herd. This is a mentality that shows disregard and frivolity no more or less.

The essence of the idea we would like to convey through the enumeration of phenomena/patterns referred to above is related to the result of the negative dynamism produced by the minor socio-political and emotional performance that led to a complete internal exhaustion, and the incredible material and moral, political, intellectual depletion of powers. The result is a continuous degradation of the standard of the political, liberational, social, and intellectual performance. The result is also a further deepening of the imbalance of powers between the two parties of

the conflict. This in turn paved the way for the enemy to manipulate the imbalance as political, intellectual, and field victories.

The accumulative imbalance of powers at the Palestinian level has appeared in the form of an overwhelmingly inclusive structural crisis in every direction. Thus, the different factions of the Palestinian national movement "suddenly" found themselves face to face in front of a crushing structural crisis, in spite of the clarity of the premises of the crisis and its preliminary symptoms. The crisis has expressed itself through essential facts which are:

1) The surrender of the Palestinian official leadership which has tied its political options with the American-Israeli project, and entered the political negotiations with a spirit and mentality of defeat. The result is agreements which can be at least described as opposite and contrary to lowest minimum of the national interests and rights of the Palestinian people.

Experience has proved that this mentality is not qualified and possesses a minor and instantaneous vision, not only of the dimensions and essence of the enemy project but also of the subjective capacities, as well.

Those who have adopted this option found themselves in a state of confrontation with reality substantiated through history, and comprehensive material facts, both at the level of the aims and interests of the continued Zionist occupation, or at the level of the effectiveness of the Palestinian people to continue to struggle and to hold fast at the lines of national duty. It is no more useful to be conditioned by the illusion that it is possible to jump over the reasons and huge contradictions of the struggle and consequently reach a resolution through negotiations, not about how to remove the causes of the struggle but about how to legalize the occupation and to make the victim willingly and officially accept it.

The crisis of those who support this option lies in that they are vulgarly violating one of the bases of the struggle, namely, that negotiations should be based upon the whole area of the struggle, including all the historical and material factors, reactions, developments, components.

Any underestimation or negligence of this or that factor would necessarily lead to much imbalance and more wrong political decisions.

There is no need here to remind them of the cost of this policy which has been being paid in the form of the blood, rights and interests of Palestinian people and the Arab nation.

2) The crisis of the opposition forces, which could not reign in the official Palestinian leadership, although seven years have passed since Oslo Accords were signed, is that these forces are still unable to reconstruct their opposition according to a new vision including the intellectual, political and organisational foundations of the performance in relation to the variables of the struggle. So, the opposition has remained fluctuating, disorganised and disunited, which badly affected its credibility and respect, and created a climate suitable for the Oslo team to achieve its political option without any serious resistance.

It is true that the crisis of the first team is based on the contradiction between its political option and performance with the interests and rights of the Palestinian people, whereas the second team, in spite of its adherence to those rights and interests, is still living its crisis. In principle, there is, no doubt, an essential difference, though the decisive criterion in the judgment and the most valuable one is the ability to manage the struggle against the enemy and its projects in such a way that would lead to protecting the national rights and interests of the Palestinian people against depletion, and to move forward to achieve them. Otherwise, everything will be limited to the arena of general slogans and rejectionism, which lead to no practical results.

What has been mentioned above suggests that the national democratic alternative must compulsorily acquire the conditions and requirements of its resurrection. We say "compulsorily" because in the light of the facts, data, and governing determinants of the political vision mentioned above, we have become close to premises whose results should be formulated—namely the requirements, according to the standards of the framework of the struggle with its as much different and inclusive dimensions as possible, whose significant illustrative details should be reviewed rapidly.

We are in front of a framework governed by the current and historical contradictions, some of which are still in the womb of the future. This framework expresses the comprehensiveness and historicity of the struggle, which have been being managed by the other party as much smartly and powerfully as possible, availing itself of the latest achievements of mankind in science, technology and management at various levels. The material actualities of, and the proportions of power of the struggle are continuously changing while the historical roots are being preserved.

However, the framework of the struggle, besides the features of recession and withdrawals it carries in this stage, there are features of pre-

paredness, aggravation and resistance both in the Palestinian and Arab arenas. This means that the current crisis the Palestinian national factions are living is temporary, because the Palestinian people, within the perspective of its consciousness of the nature of the struggle, and its national rights and interests is objectively renewing the struggle to defend its identity and existence as a people. As long as the struggle is open-ended as much as possible, any agreements that would jump over this reality would become closer to being comedy or tragedy, regardless of the difficulties and bitterness.

Such a situation like this necessarily means that a society, within the course of dynamic resistance, will create its own tools and powers which will be able to satisfy the subjective and objective demands of the struggle, but not the imagined nor the illusory ones which usually do not go beyond the dimensions of individuals or organizations that reduce the people to themselves, and reduce the struggle to their own minor views and projections. This makes them slaves of their low ceiling and renewed crisis.

The objective nature of the struggle illustrates that the crisis of the Palestinian national movement, which is reflected through the continuity of the features of the struggle and the aggravations of contradictions with the enemy, is an expression of the incapacity of the subjective factors to enhance their vision political and intellectual performances to meet the requirements and conditions of the struggle. This demands, at least, that the latent capacities be emanated. This fact will naturally raise a controversy about the democratic national alternative.

This is because an objectively very extensive area and a very objectively big role are waiting for a qualified subjective factor to fill in the huge emptiness in the arena of the social history of the Palestinian people in the current stage. It is a socially and historically determined role, namely to promote the historical opposition so that it changes from an objective stage into a historical struggle which is waiting a new vision to speak on behalf of it, and a hero to get engaged in, in accordance with the conditions mentioned above and extracted from the situation itself which determined the area, function, role besides the qualifications of the required new: vision and role.

Here lies the status of the democratic option in the Palestinian arena and the historical role waiting it at this critical time which will decide more than a fateful issue. The role and status are related to the option, which possesses more than anything else, though relatively, factors and

reasons enough to form a new start to open the road before the required steps, perform its historically required role, fill in the empty space which is still waiting its historical framework, and is capable of introducing the vision, assessing the instant, role, and status it is qualified to express.

In the light of the precise meaning mentioned above, we can read the grand challenges and questions confronting the national democratic option, and conclude that we are in front of a deep and inclusive process requiring a serious dissociation with the currently dominant thinking, according to which the concept of a national democratic option is confined to some Palestinian democratic organisations. The problem with this thinking stems from the fact that it does not connect problems to their roots, but reproduces the crisis, because it is produced by the same mentality and political concepts which caused the crisis.

We have stated this because we believe that the concept of the "democratic national option", and before it, the concept of "national unity" and "national dialogue", as it has been revealed through this inclusive document, must go beyond the narrow and minor understanding which has created the crisis because it limited the problem within the level of organisational unity from above accompanied by some superior administrative features considered very necessary for it. The transcendence required should be toward an inclusive socio-historical option, which is qualitatively similar to the conditions and requirements of the struggle.

Bearing this understanding in mind, it becomes possible to review the experience of the democratic current in the Palestinian arena, and determine the roots of the shortcomings and failures which, essentially, are relevant to an accumulative recession and inability to do its role and function as a national democratic option representing socio-political and intellectual vision. It has dropped so low that it has become identical to its opposite counterpart, though it is supposed that the national democratic option has appeared as an objective response to confront it—we mean the pragmatic current or what has been customarily called the Palestinian right.

Thus, through a historical process, the rightist current has been able to dominate the Palestinian arena through its own vision, practice, criteria, and behavior. This finally enabled it to contain the democratic current and to deal a strike at its role and function as a historical substitute.

The political discourse and propaganda of the democratic current do not change this concrete actuality because the results which have been achieved thirty years after the establishment of the PLO refer to a state of

failure and inclusive crisis getting deeper and deeper in this current and dragging it lower and lower to a similar level of its original low opposite.

The cost of the failure of the democratic current to perform its role and function as a historical national democratic alternative to the Palestinian right goes beyond the boundaries of the this current, and finally befalls the Palestinian people who because of the failures and incapacity of the democratic current to perform its role and function as a historical substitute, had lost a factor to achieve the required balance in the political life. Thus it gave a chance to the mentality notorious for its unilateralism, domination, and degradation of the standards of performance, besides the absence of the competitive, alternative observer. etc.

The danger of the problem we have just discussed cannot be limited within its consequences which have been accumulating up all through the previous years, because the actual state of some Palestinian democratic forces reveals that they have not realized how deep the tragedy is. Therefore, they would, at the internal and external levels, resort to the same values, traditions, practice, behavior and criteria to cover their accumulative crisis which might explode once and for all one day. Then, the losses will be multiplied. We wish that this would never happen, because there would then be national losses not only factional ones.

The most remarkable example of this reality is represented by the mentality and policy used by these forces to administer the struggle at the external level, namely against the Palestinian right and its political options. Through out the hot debate and arguments over the Oslo option, concepts have become interwoven, intellectual chaos prevailed and it was necessary to combine the concept of opposing the Oslo Accords with the concept of the national democratic alternative. Borders and boundaries got lost, so that it appeared that an opposition to Oslo equals the establishment of the alternative.

The result of this confusion and interlacing is the degradation of the concept of the national democratic alternative from being an inclusive socio-political and intellectual process an option confronting an opposite socio-political and intellectual process which has led to a national defeat, to a merely a political practice centered only on the opposition to the Oslo Agreements. Consequently, the concept of the alternative dropped to the level of current politics without any determinant because the national democratic option is basically an option and a socio-political historical and inclusive reaction to confront the requirements of an all-embracing struggle.

This means that it is a continuous historical option, which is previous to Oslo. Had it come into existence proportionately and at the right time, the Oslo Accords wouldn't have happened. As an option, it goes beyond Oslo toward the future in relation to the conditions of the struggle against the Zionist project which was previous to Oslo and will follow it, and the conditions of a social democratic resurrection of the Palestinian people. "It is a dynamic inclusive historical, current and futuristic process at the same time, taking the form of compiled and intermingled processes of growth depending on an inclusive socio-political vision, in conformity with the actualities and conditions of the struggle against the Zionist project."

The national alternative is a historical project for the future, based on an inclusive self- conception as a vision, structure, practice at all levels, and moves according to the determinants of the strategic struggle. At the same time, it envisages the situation along with its law- governed determinants. According to what has been said, the talk about the national democratic option would lose it logic and scientific essence when it is so hackneyed that it becomes a perspective through which one might look at the Oslo tragedy and deal with it as though it were a final result or the sole possibility for the mobility of Zionist-Palestinian conflict, and consequently use it as a starting point for any new mission.

The question usually raised by the followers of the Oslo option is what is the alternative? Such a question really aims at embarrassing everyone and oblige them through the pressure of inability to surrender to the rules and dynamics of Oslo.

The answer to the question raised by this group should be practical, that is a practical alternative vision, policy, thinking and practice which are more persuasive, advanced and productive when compared to the Oslo option.

The required alternative should not come from Oslo. Otherwise it would exhaust the Palestinian national struggle through very dangerous socio-political dynamics, because of the constraints and domination Israel imposed through the signed agreements and the material and field consequences it has imposed. Thus, Israel was able to consolidate its interests as terms of reference to enable it to manipulate the conditions of its superiority to strengthen its achievements, on one hand, and to obstruct the road of any Palestinian national awakening, on the other. This does not mean closing our eyes to new changes which should be positioned accurately and proportionally in the arena of the inclusive struggle.

On the basis of what has been mentioned, the concept of the national democratic alternative means to view the real situation, variables and dynamics, and to take them always into consideration for the purpose of employing them to serve the inclusive vision of the national, liberational social and democratic struggle. This means that the idea of dissociation with Oslo as a method and an option and to deal with it as a fact has become clear.

Thus, the equation will be balanced, because the option gets materialized as a socio-political, economic, cultural and struggle process which is opposite to the enemy project, and the minor everyday thinking of the Palestinian right. This process, has its historical depth, field activity and stimulating dynamism and is built on the basis of the association of the national aims of the Palestinian people as a governing criterion, and socio-political activity which inevitably must contain the new variables and get them exploited to serve the historical engagement.

Such a process is conditional upon the ensuring of systemic vision of the struggle which is a capable of attaining the required balance at each stage, and at every level of the struggle, so that there might be an association between the strategic and tactic bases and dimensions of the struggle, history, present, and future, defensive and offensive, the current and long-term policies, the Palestinian people as a unified collectivity on one hand, and Palestinian people with its diversity of peculiarities. What is accepted as correct in the relation between the general and particular is viewed as a basis of the debate between the patriotic and the national.

The crystallization of the national democratic alternative according to these regulators guarantees an opportunity to deal with the variable actuality. This will include an ability to bridge the distance between the elements of the struggle, its various discordant and concordant elements simultaneously. Through this way, it is possible to get rid of the system of destructive dissociation, whether that takes the form of an attachment to the past and the general, or to sink down in the politics of the current and partial reality which cannot see from reality except the loose junctions. This makes it necessary for the force which believes it is the carrier of the alternative project to bear serious responsibilities where it will be of no use to preserve the mentality of reference or to charge others with the responsibility.

The circumstances are objectively suitable, to set up the national democratic alternative which is a capable of holding fast and doing the historical national duties imposed by the struggle. Now that the ques-

tions have been raised, and it is out of question to send them back to the bugling long-necked bottle. The practice and performances of the democratic forces, as it is apparent, have not yet been so enhanced as to meet the requirements of the stage, regardless of the exerted efforts and the wishful thinking.

It is necessary in such a situation to improve the imbalance which has characterized the performance of these forces and to enhance their roles from that related to the opposition to the role of the leverage and carrier of national democratic alternative project which is considered a national liberational, social, democratic project, which is positive both in essence and appearance. This is the way to walk out of the crisis which made the alternative project identical with the concept of opposition and reaction to the initiatives and policies of other parties.

To overcome the crisis the Palestinian democratic forces has been experiencing, it is necessary for these forces to prove themselves capable of self-construction, in accordance with the requirements of the national democratic alternative, and to move the process from the narrow factional level to the inclusively national one, and from the organisational limited level to the level of understanding it as a process of construction, through which the democratic forces, or the democratic current, are able to move from the level of limited action by some political and social forces and personalities, to the level of an inclusive democratic state including all the Palestinian people. Without such a process, it will be impossible to interpret the concept of the national democratic alternative.

Through this way, it will be possible to decide on the regulators of the national democratic option, that is to meet the demands and conditions of the struggle against the Zionist project, on one hand, and the conditions of social democratic construction, besides combating the politics of socio-political depletion practiced by the Palestinian Authority Oslo team, on the other. Thus we will be in front of a national social democratic awakening and open-ended state to the almost extent. Also, we can assume control of the condition of managing the struggle in accordance with a vision enabling us to manipulate the powers and capacities of the people at as much high level as possible and to manage the struggle in a way helping the process to escape from being controlled by the enemy, and to relieve it from the constraints of actions and reactions.

Unless the socio-historical process were dealt with in conformity with its conditions and regulators, the democratic forces would remain

captured by their incapacity, hanging around the tail of the socio-political movement of the Palestinian people who will continue the hunt for protagonist capable of doing his objective and historical job. The democratic forces are required to the recover from their crisis and incapacity. To get this done, it will be necessary to enhance its role and function and raise them to a level suitable for the demands of a national democratic alternative which will be materialized as a socio-political, intellectual, practical and inclusive project, besides possessing a program containing the conditions and qualifications of the national democratic alternative.

Only through this, it will be possible to avoid being trapped by the defeatist thinking which avails itself of the absence or incapacity of the national democratic alternative to justify its inefficiency, philosophy and performance through claiming that the proposals of the national democratic alternative, representing a socio-political, organisational and intellectual vision will strip the other party of its most important cards it possesses, namely "no peace... no war option" and the absence of a pure alternative. This does not necessarily mean that new powers are holders of the socio-political and intellectual initiative in the administration of the struggle and the command of its historical processes, which will really mean that a movement into a qualitatively new era characterized by awakening and positive significations.

Being a conflict between two visions does not rule out the possibility of interlacing, because the historical process throughout the era is interlaced, including interactions and transformations which remain tightly attracted to the criteria and standard of the main confrontation against the occupation.

Thus, the process should not forcibly go beyond its realistic and historical conditions. Otherwise, it will become something similar to an internal socio-political massacre. That is why we insist that it should be understood as a historical process, which should be managed and directed by the democratic forces, on the basis of the role and function which govern the option of the national democratic alternative, nationally and socially.

Paralleled with the democratic alternative, the PFLP should always take the initiative and play a pioneering role in creating a framework for the democratic forces within an accumulative context to crystallize the democratic pole, as a carrier of the national democratic alternative in the historical as well as the strategic sense.

Eighthly: *The Political Islamic Forces.*

In the document of the First National Conference the PFLP has clarified the features of its position in respect of the political Islamic forces. Such a vision is still preserving its correctness, because the political Islamic forces constitute a natural component of the Palestinian national movement, regardless of any other peculiarity they have.

The role and activity of these forces have been growing ever since the grand Intifada in Palestine late 1987; also their role and political influence in the struggle have been growing among the Palestinian people.

What the PFLP really wants to emphasize in this respect is that it views these forces as one of the circles of national action and interaction on the basis of unity and conflict, the law that must regulate the relations among the national forces of the Palestinian people.

This should mean unity as regards the position and programs responding to the aims of national struggle and strengthens the unity on the basis of the national program. The conflict here is governed by practice and democratic values, so that it might be possible to regulate the equations of the more extensive struggle against the occupation, and the programs to wipe out the national Palestinian problem.

Here it is impermissible to put a sign of equality between the political Islamic forces, the forces, parties, and organisations with their own positions and definite performances, and Islam as a religion, doctrine, and intellectual civilization space of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation.

Within this meaning we represent a part of this space where the Islamic culture and heritage have become an organic component of our cultural peculiarities. We are required to deal with the controversies related to this culture for the purpose of using as a firm ground to stand on, to develop and manipulate in our national struggle and cultural development.

The relations with the political Islamic forces are dynamic and dialectical according to the contradictions with the socio-political situation. However, the characteristic of these relations in this stage is that there are intersections at the highest point of the political levels because together with the political Islamic forces we are in the opposition of and confrontation to the American-Israeli settlement programs which aim at devastating the constants and rights of the Palestinian people, besides some minor differences and distinctions as regards po-

sition and vision.

At the social level, however, differences are more common, either at the level of understanding democracy as values, criteria, mechanisms and practices to build the social institutions, or in respect of major social problems such as freedom of women, belief, expression, jurisprudence, cultural innovation, and the problems of social and economic justice of various manifestations.

In the light of what has been said, the relations with Islamic forces are based on mutual respect, mobilization of forces and capacities to face the main contradiction, namely, the confrontation with the enemy and the strata allying with it, on one hand, and the democratic struggle as regards the social and cultural contradictions, and the consequent programs, practices and values, on the other.

These facts demand that dialogue with these forces be enhanced continuously, that relations be pushed forward toward national coalition if possible so that it might not remain subject to arbitrariness, improvisation and reactions. This bestows upon the relations a practical, political and long- term nature, and saves it being influenced by hegemony, and narrow-minded factional manipulation. Such a relation is consistent with the national interests and responds to the challenges and the problems of the stage.

These realization and vision are not contradictory to the PFLP's option to establish a national democratic alternative and to strengthen the democratic forces as a strategic option in the national and social struggle.

It is the contrary, because clarity and openness in the relations with the different forces in the Palestinian arena including the political Islamic forces are among the continuous requirements according to which the democratic forces should behave, and creatively respond to the problem and controversies. Otherwise coalition policies will be deprived of their elements of success and influence.



Conclusion

This document, which is a part of comprehensive reports presented to the Sixth National Conference and the grass root conferences prior to that, reflects clearly the PFLP reading of the Palestinian political situa-

tion, without ignoring the significations and meanings of the situation at both the Arab and international levels, which include very important and valuable facts, covered by documents issued by the PFLP and its central bodies in time (at the time the event happened).

The PFLP does not view this report as a traditional political one, but rather a deep political vision which clarifies the features of the crisis and how to get out of it. All this is conditioned by a tight relation between theory and practice.



Eighth National Conference: Political Program[1]

[2022]

Introduction

The political program, in short, is the general will of the masses, and in this sense it reflects the aspirations and general interests of the people. Therefore, the greater the clarity of the objectives set forth in the program and the greater the accuracy of evaluation of the stage of the struggle and the precise understanding of its course and development, the greater the circle of adopters and defenders of such a program.

As such, the political program is a vital document particularly because: it defines and articulates the ideas on which the party is based, the general goals drawn for itself, the nature of the current stage, its contradictions, forces, methods of struggle, the nature of the enemy and our alliances.

Based on all of this, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), while formulating its program, presents itself as a resisting leftist political party that aims to mobilize and lead the Palestinian masses in the struggle for the restoration and liberation of the entire Palestinian national territory.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, while defining its political program for the Eighth General Conference, proceeds from the major lessons and basic logical conclusions that have emerged from the course of the past decades. After the 5th of June defeat (1967) and the October war (1973), the idea of a political settlement approach emerged on the Arab frontier. From there it seeped into the fragmented Palestinian arena, which has witnessed and experienced a severe political conflict and debates lasting for years. This has led to the infiltration of the mindset and the mentality of compromise and bargaining among many Palestinian leaders, without this debate ever taking place with the Zionist en-

1 May 2022.

emy who occupies the land and has remained committed to its strategic project of controlling the whole of Palestine. Thus, disputes and conflicts took place within the Palestinian and Arab body without the Zionist occupier ever offering anything in return as a result of its occupation and tyranny.

The course of events, the historical knowledge, and the bitter experience faced by the Palestinian national struggle, during the past decades, have resulted in grave questions that deserve contemplation, reflection, and review, at the forefront of which is the great fundamental question:

Is there a possibility of political solutions with the Zionist project and its material entity, embodied in "Israel," which unequivocally declares and practices its program in a Zionist-Jewish state in the entire Palestinian territory, with the exception of perhaps the besieged Gaza Strip.

The answer to this question is quite clear. The facts and realities imposed by the enemy on the ground, mainly its policy of settlement and Judaization, have radically eradicated any elements toward the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital.

Therefore, it has become tangible that we are facing an American-Zionist project aimed at a comprehensive liquidation of the Palestinian cause in all of its dimensions. With regard to the territories occupied in 1948, through the adoption of the racist national law, which emphasizes the Jewish character of the Zionist state and targets the existence and future of our people there. Or through the scheme to liquidate the right of return for Palestinian refugees, in countries of asylum, whose features have become tangible through the policy of displacement to distant exiles and the striking of the UNRWA or for the occupied lands in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem, and destroying any elements of building an independent Palestinian state.

Thus, the comprehensive liquidation plan, which culminated in the so-called Deal of the Century, economic peace, normalization with Arab States, administrative autonomy of the West Bank and asserting full control over Jerusalem, all confirm the state of crisis that the Palestinian issue has reached. The political choice founded on the program of settlement, its repercussions and its destructive political consequences, have divided the Palestinian people and fragmented their cause even more. All of that requires the rehabilitation of the concepts at the roots of the conflict with the colonial Zionist settlement project. To actually recognize it as a

historical, intractable conflict through failed political choices that keep falling short of seeing the essence of the Zionist project which is based on the exile and uprooting of the other.

The Palestinian people, torn apart by betting on political solutions that have proven to be unsuccessful, urgently need to unite around a central and collective goal to preserve their national identity, unity of goals, destiny and future. This is because the plan to liquidate the Palestinian issue is aimed at transforming the Palestinian people into scattered population groups and dismantling the bonds of Palestinian society.

The march of struggle that our people waged after the Nakba (1948), confirmed that the resistance in all its forms united the people and preserved their unifying national identity through the framework of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), with its charter which has gathered all the masses of our people inside and outside the occupied homeland.

Preserving the unity of the Palestinian society in all its places of existence, consolidating its national identity and protecting its historical rights, as well as preserving the Arabism of the Palestinian cause and the continued rallying of the Arab masses around it, especially after it has receded as the central issue in the nation's consciousness as a result of policies of abandonment and concession, requires a firm adherence to the historical rights of the Palestinian people.

Based on all of the above, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine affirms its belief and commitment to achieving the strategic goal of recovering and liberating all of Palestinian soil, and building a democratic State of Palestine in which all its citizens enjoy equal rights without discrimination on the grounds of race, gender, or religious belief.

Chapter One

Stage of National Liberation

A. The Nature of the Stage

The current stage of the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people is characterized as a period of national liberation and as a democratic one since its inception in the early twentieth century. The Palestinian cause is distin-

guished from others by the nature of the Zionist settler-depopulating colonialism, supported by imperialist and reactionary parties. All of these forces have aimed for the occupation of Palestinian land, the displacement of the Palestinian Arab people, their squandering and the abolition of their existence, in order to gather Jews from all parts of the world to establish a national home for them in Palestine. The largest and most extensive conspiracy in modern history has resulted not only in the unique rise of aggressive racism at the expense of the Palestinian Arab people and their legitimate rights, but also in the framing of the Palestinian national struggle.

The Palestinian national struggle has framed a unique complication of its kind if compared to the normal condition of the struggles of the colonial and dependent peoples for their freedom and independence.

While about half of the Palestinian people are living under the yoke of racist Zionist occupation, half of them are displaced in Arab and foreign exile, and their control is distributed among Arab regimes with different tendencies and orientations. Despite the harsh conditions of struggle and the difficult subjective and objective conditions surrounding them, the struggle of the Palestinian people has not stopped in defense of their existence and identity, their independent national personality, and their firm and legitimate national historical rights.

Proceeding from this reality and the nature of the struggle's phase, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine stresses the paramount importance of mobilizing and organizing all Palestinian classes and national groups affected by the Zionist colonial presence in order to achieve national and liberational goals and to rid the Palestinian people of the domination of Zionist settler-colonialism. It also stresses that the national and liberational nature of the current struggle's phase does not negate its interdependence and its close intersection with the tasks of the democratic national revolution to achieve social justice, freedom of belief and expression, human rights, transparency and accountability.

B. Contradictions

1. The fundamental contradiction that governs the stage is manifested in the antagonistic contradiction that exists between the colonial powers represented by US imperialism and world capitalism and between the powers of liberation, justice, and freedom at the public level.

2. The other main contradiction is between the Palestinian national liberation project and the Zionist colonization project in the historical land of Palestine. All the Palestinian people in the diaspora and inside the country are involved in the struggle process, as spearheads, and they are linked to the forces of liberation with the same interest of liberation from colonialism and dependency.

3. Secondary contradictions:

   a) In light of the increasing state of security and economic dependence enshrined by political elites in the West Bank self-rule authority (Palestinian Authority), it has become an objective to see the emergence of a secondary contradiction between the forces of dependence and economic and security ties, and between the forces of liberation, independence and freedom. This contradiction carries a struggle dimension on the social and economic levels, making it a popular struggle with specific and clear tasks.

   b) In light of the political divide, we face two hurdles. The first is closely linked to political élites who are directly related to the comprador authority (PA) and the second is general sectoral elites. Both of these worked while at the helm of power on accumulating their narrow factional interests at the expense of the vast national interest. There has now become a secondary contradiction between the forces of division and the forces of unity and the inclusive national program sought by our party, many national and leftist forces, and large segments of the Palestinian people. Thus, we challenge these subordinate political elites through sustained popular democratic struggle.

   c) There is a secondary contradiction between reactionary forces that cling to dark and destructive ideas (e.g. patriarchy and the oppression of women) and progressive forces seeking equality, justice, and freedom that are based on civil rights, and that unleash the energies of all sectors and segments of our people toward the basic goal of national and democratic liberation. These subversive ideas are tackled through awareness, education and the dissemination of progressive values.

C. Objectives

The Strategic Objective. The strategic objective of the struggle waged by

the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is the right to recover and liberate Palestine from the Zionist colonial occupation, and to establish democracy on the entire Palestinian national territory with Jerusalem as its capital. Unitary legitimacy for all its citizens, on the basis of equality and equal opportunities, without distinction as to religion, sex, creed, or color, is anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist, and has a unifying democratic horizon with all other Arab countries.

The achievement of this goal and the finding of a radical solution to the Palestinian national question requires the aim of establishing a preparation for a difficult, complex, and long-term struggle in which the Palestinian people are the head and in which the Arab masses participate under the leadership of their national and democratic vanguard forces.

The decisive defeat of the Zionist entity on the Palestinian territory, as an aggressive, settler, racist, expansionist, and depopulating entity, which constitutes an advanced base for the imperialist circles that serves their strategy and their complete hegemony over the Arab region as a whole, requires the provision of new and qualitative Palestinian, Arab, and international conditions that lead to a radical and decisive change in the existing balance of power in favor of the revolutionary forces. It requires a fierce, complex, long struggle and great sacrifices.

D. Missions

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, as it engages in the struggle at all levels and dimensions in order to achieve the goals of our people and liberate our land, believes that the tasks of the Palestinian people, in all their places of existence, in order to achieve this are:

1. Working to restore the status and role of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole representative of legitimate rights of our people in all their places of existence, and the political framework that embodies the independent national personality, which includes all national classes and groups with a real interest in achieving the program and goals of the Palestinian revolution. Work to rebuild the organization on solid democratic foundations and restore consideration for its programme and its charter.

2. Work to promote, develop, and consolidate the Palestinian national unity within the framework of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Seeking the ranks of the Palestinian people as the most effective and sustainable weapon in the struggle to achieve the Pales-

tinian national tasks in the current circumstance and the necessary condition for achieving victory over the hostile forces and resisting any manifestations of internal division in the Palestinian arena.

3. Resisting all liquidationist political plans and projects that have been proposed by imperialist, Zionist, and reactionary circles to liquidate the Palestinian national cause and circumvent the struggle of our people in order to achieve their national goals. The Oslo Accords and the agreements that followed constituted a coup against the common denominators program of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and a submission to American and Zionist dictates.

4. Preserving the unity of our people internally and externally, developing and strengthening their struggle from various locations, providing the requirements and necessities for their continuation and elevating them to higher stages of struggle. All of which is necessary to defeat the occupation.

5. The struggle against the policies of the Zionist enemy aimed at destroying the national economy by contributing to efforts to develop national productive institutions and to protect them from the enemy's attempts to crowd them out, bankrupt them, and deprive them of their raison d'être. It also aims to thwart Zionist objectives by integrating and merging the economy of Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip into the Zionist economy and working to build a resistant economy that enhances the resilience of our people, confronts comprador incursions, achieves social justice and protects the poor.

6. Protecting the Palestinian folklore and national culture from the attempts of the Zionist enemy aimed at confiscating and destroying them. Working on their maintenance and development, promoting the role of intellectuals in the Palestinian national struggle, and supporting and developing all their unions and institutions, cultural, research, and technical.

7. Strengthen the struggle against the policy of land grab, water theft, settlement threats, and changing the demographic character of Palestine by all forms and means available.

8. The struggle against Jewish immigration to occupied Palestine, and exposing the dangers resulting from it, the most important of which is the renewal of the Zionist project to enable it to implement

its aggressive expansionist plans and realize its "biblical" dreams. By working to organize Palestinian and Arab political and media campaigns, with the aim of forming a global public opinion that rejects the freedom of immigration for Jews at the expense of the freedom and rights of the Palestinian Arab people, as well as working to uncover and expose diversion operations of Palestinian lands to settlers and stating its seriousness and the relentless struggle against this dangerous phenomenon and its perpetrators.

9. Exerting more efforts to stop the internal and external emigration of Palestinians in search of a living, and to get rid of the Zionist policy of oppression, terrorism, and abuse, by working to provide the requirements for the steadfastness of our people and their adherence to their homeland.

10. Considering the main humanitarian task toward prisoners in occupation prisons is to liberate them, and no duties or tasks directed toward them are above it, as it is a qualitative and class-first struggle task. Our party must provide the necessary conditions for its realization and completion at a high level of accuracy and speed. As such, and until the mission of liberation is achieved permanently, we must work to achieve better humane conditions of safety and provide the necessary requirements and needs for the prisoners, which will enhance their steadfastness and their ability to endure difficult conditions inside prisons.

11. Confronting the imminent dangers surrounding the city of Jerusalem and its Arab citizens. The direct dangers aimed at targeting the Arab history, character, and identity of the city and its people through occupation practices that seek to Judaize the Holy City, expel its inhabitants, and replace them with Zionist settlers, which requires working with all forces and actors to assume their responsibilities, as well as enhancing the foundations of Jerusalemites' steadfastness through:

    a. Unifying the multiple national references within one universal reference.

    b. Supporting the Jerusalemite national institutions to preserve the Arab identity of Jerusalemites.

    c. Work to secure sources of support and material support for the people of Jerusalem.

12. Paying attention to the generation of Palestinian youth on the

intellectual and political level, and empowering them to be able to defend the Palestinian cause against all the dangers it is exposed to, both political and cultural.

13. Care and interest in the cause of the Palestinian child as the future generation, and submit the necessary needs for this generation and the provision of a social and democratic structure for its upbringing and preparation.

14. Work to establish and develop various forms of cooperation with democratic and progressive Jewish anti-Zionist forces, elites, and individuals outside the land of historical Palestine, regardless of their size, political weight, and role in the ongoing battle to defeat Zionist policies and practices and achieve the goals of the Palestinian people.

15. Work to guarantee the civil, political, and the right to struggle for Palestinian refugees in all Arab countries of asylum. To eliminate all forms of discrimination and guarantee the right to work, residence and freedom of movement and safe living. Confronting all attempts at resettlement, alternative homelands and displacement, defending the right of return and protecting it from the dangers threatening it, and attempts to cancel Resolution 194 and work to preserve the human rights of the Palestinians and the Palestinian communities in all countries of the diaspora and activate their role in the national struggle.

16. Working to confront the policies of security, political, and economic subordination to the authority, through a program of popular pressure groups, and by strengthening coordination with the national forces that also reject and seek secession and independence, and reject the policy of privatization that has contaminated a number of basic sectors for our people, including education and health.

17. Working to confront attempts at Palestinian and Arab normalization with the Zionist entity by participating in various Arab and international boycott campaigns and exposing those who promote, encourage, and sponsor normalization in all its forms.

18. In the context of national liberation, the task of democratic and social struggle becomes an urgent one, including the freedom and equality of women and the achievement of their rights; freedom of opinion; the promotion of a democratic climate; the fight against the muzzling of voices, political detention, and torture; the commit-

ment to human rights and freedom of creativity; the holding of elections at all levels; the fight against outdated customs and traditions; the restriction of freedom from clan and regional affiliation; and the spread of division and disunity among our people.

Our Missions in Terms of Work Relating to Our Occupied Land in 1948. The masses of our people in the areas occupied in 1948 are facing major plans aimed at uprooting and deporting them. Therefore, the talk of the Zionist circles about the Jewishness of the state, the demographic danger, and the population bomb as a dagger in the heart of "Israel" confirm the size of the strategic risks faced by our people and the amount of work required to confront and thwart these risks

Our occupied people from Palestine in 1948 are an integral part of the Palestinian Arab people and their national struggle. A pattern of tasks in confronting the plans of the Zionist enemy is shouldered by the masses of our occupied people from Palestine in 1948 and our people in general, through:

1. Struggle to consolidate the Palestinian national identity and personality and resist all forms of attempts to dissipate it.

2. Fighting the plans of the Zionist entity regarding the Jewishness of the state, especially after the adoption of the racist nation-state law, and exposing the racist goals of these plans, which ultimately aim at deporting our steadfast people from their land, historical Palestine, and liquidating the right of return for Palestinian refugees.

3. Addressing all forms of discrimination and persecution and escalating the struggle in all areas of life.

4. Strengthening and developing the struggle against the policy of plundering the land and Judaizing and displacing its original inhabitants.

5. Protecting the national culture from attempts to obliterate, squander, and distort it, and expose the operations of robbery carried out by the Zionist occupation authorities on the heritage of the Palestinian people, and the preservation and protection of the Arabic language.

6. Developing the forms of struggle waged by the Palestinian masses in the occupied territories in 1948, in a way that ensures active participation in the liberation battle.

7. Seeking to unite the ranks of the national forces in the areas occupied in 1948, by working to build a broad national front to carry out the aforementioned tasks.

8. Working on national awareness of refusing to participate in Zionist institutions, especially the enemy's parliament (the Knesset), and strengthening the daily struggle to extract living rights as part of our people's resistance against the occupation.

9. Confronting the Zionist plan to spread organized crime among the masses of our people in the lands of 1948.

Our Missions in Terms of Work in Refugee and Diaspora Sites Outside Palestine. More than half of the Palestinian people live forcibly outside historical Palestine as refugees or displaced persons, and most of them are in the Arab countries neighboring Palestine, especially Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, whose percentage exceeds 40% of the total number of Palestinians.

The Palestinian cause is primarily an issue of national liberation, and the tasks of democratic and social struggle intersect with it. While we cannot turn a blind eye to some specificities, we do not see that there is a priority over the tasks of the national struggle, which come at its forefront:

1. Preserving the national unity of the people, the unity of their cause, the unity of their land and their goals over the area of historical Palestine.

2. Preserving the role and status of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people on a political basis based on the Palestinian National Charter and a clear, resistant, and democratic political platform based on institutional action at all legislative and executive levels and based on an electoral basis based on full proportional representation.

3. The Palestinians outside Palestine are an integral part of the Palestinian people and the revolution. This requires raising the ceiling of the tasks entrusted to them to the level of general and specific struggle tasks, which requires permanent rehabilitation, preparation, and finding appropriate formulas for what is necessary.

4. Struggling against all political projects that undermine the right of return of Palestinian refugees to their homes and property from

which they were expelled. In this sense, all attempts at resettlement, displacement, or compensation—as alternative to the right of our people to return—must be confronted.

5. Defending the interests of the Palestinian refugees and their right to a decent life. Their right to struggle in their various places of residence, and ensuring their civil and social rights.

6. Sticking to the strategic goals of the Palestinian people, which are the recovery and liberation of Palestine, the return of refugees, and the establishment of democratic Palestine on the entire Palestinian land. If the option of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as the capital and right to return is an interim goal, it is a project of struggle on the way to achieve the main strategic goal, not an end on the basis of two states for two peoples.

7. Working on global public opinion to gain support for our cause at the political, moral, and material levels and expose the falsity of the Zionist claims about peace and the establishment of closer relations with the forces of liberation and progress in the world.

8. Resisting the projects and plans of displacement and resettlement of our people in the diaspora.

E. The Driving Forces

The Zionist occupation, by its settler, racist, evicting, and annexational nature, inflicts the most severe damage on the interests of all classes, groups, and segments of the Palestinian people, with the exception of a few large owners, capitalists and agents associated with it.

Therefore, the driving forces of the Palestinian revolution at this stage of the struggle of our Palestinian people, as a stage of national liberation, are all its classes, groups, and segments. This is because it has a real interest to get rid of the occupation and its destructive, uprooting, aggressive, and terrorist policies, but there is, of course, a difference in the degree of participation of each class, group, and segment of our people in the national liberation battle.

The working class is firm, steadfast, long-standing and able to shoulder the burdens of the struggle against the invading occupiers, as it is more exposed to injustice and national and class oppression. It is governed by the fact that its interests are linked to the supreme interest of the entire Palestinian people. We find it more steadfast, cohesive, and

determined to continue the struggle. Palestinian peasants, who have been subjected to oppression and injustice as a result of the occupation of the land that is their source of strength and livelihood, especially the young, are a major force of the revolution.

The majority of the peasants, especially the small ones and the poor, have a real interest in the revolution and a close alliance with the working class, and this alliance forms the basis of a broad national alliance that is capable of resolving the battle in favor of the people and bringing the revolution to its final goals.

The different groups of the petty bourgeoisie are also considered among the main class forces driving the revolution, and the objective reality refers to the effective and active role played by the leadership of the revolution and its cadre and grassroots ranks in view of its large and wide size.

As for the national bourgeoisie, it has the interest of participating in the revolution in order to get rid of the hateful occupation that deprives it of power and the market. The occupation works to destroy the Palestinian national economy and annex it to its own, which made the various segments of the national bourgeoisie have an interest in national independence and defeating the occupation, with the exception of the limited comprador segment whose interests were linked to the occupation and despite the bourgeoisie's fluctuations and its fear of the movement of the mobilized, organized, and revolutionary masses. The specificity of the Zionist enemy and its economic policies, its destructiveness of the Palestinian national economy and its effects on the Palestinian bourgeoisie makes it one of the driving forces in the revolutionary stage of national liberation.

With regard to democratic intellectuals and revolutionaries who constitute a social group with different class origins, they have a real interest in national liberation, and they are distinguished by their ability to play an increasingly important role that serves the contemporary revolution and benefits it in the fields of political, media, and ideological struggle. Thanks to their theoretical culture and familiarity with the experiences of struggling peoples for their freedom and independence, they can play an important role in correcting the course of the revolution and spreading revolutionary, progressive, humane thought and culture, confronting various forms of intellectual subversion and confronting the cultural imperialist invasion and helping the working class to occupy its real positions in the revolution.

Finally, the reference remains to the characteristic of the Palestinian camps within the occupied homeland and in countries of diaspora and asylum in terms of being Palestinian communities characterized by poverty, toil ,and suffering, and a high fighting energy that provides the revolution with all the reasons for strength and continuity.

F. Palestine Liberation Organization

The Palestine Liberation Organization is the political and moral entity that represents the will of the Palestinian people and the framework that embodies its national identity and independent personality.

The Popular Front believes that the preservation of the Palestinian entity framework, embodied in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which has received official recognition at the Arab and international levels and has enjoyed the widest popular support as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, has come to occupy an important position in the confrontation with the imperialist-Zionist enemy.

The nature of the hostile scheme and the specificity of the Palestinian cause make the emphasis on the Palestinian entity and the endeavor to highlight and consolidate the independent national identity and personality, basic constants of the Front's strategy and its struggle to achieve the goals of our people.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, as it considers the Palestine Liberation Organization a frontal alliance framework that includes representatives of all Palestinian national classes and groups with a real interest in the struggle against the occupation, affirms that it will continue the struggle to strengthen the unity of all forces, factions, parties, currents, and national personalities within the framework of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Further, the path of dedicating it as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, embodying its political entity and expressing its national will for liberation and national independence, and forming an impregnable barrier in the face of conspiracies' liquidation of the Palestinian national cause.

In this framework, the Popular Front strives with all its might to ripen the appropriate conditions for the unity of forces, currents, and revolutionary democratic personalities (the framework of the Palestine Liberation Organization). It believes that the way to achieve this goal requires strengthening relations and to raise the level of coordination and

cooperation between the leftist forces and the revolutionary democratic forces to further bring their viewpoints closer together and create the appropriate climate to unite their efforts.

There is no doubt that strengthening the various forms of cooperation and coordination between the revolutionary democratic forces contributes to strengthening and consolidating Palestinian national unity and provides the necessary requirements for deepening and developing the resolutely hostile national approach to the reactionary imperialist-Zionist alliance and its policies that deny the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and protect, preserve, and promote the achievements of the PLO.

Palestinian national unity, as it is the sharpest weapon in the face of attempts to liquidate the Palestinian national cause and to terminate the Palestine Liberation Organization, cannot be established and consolidated without the achievement of comprehensive democratic reform of the organs of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the rebuilding of its political, military, administrative, financial, media, trade union, and mass institutions. Based on these events and facts, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine affirms that it will continue to struggle for:

First: Reconstructing and forming the institution's bodies, leadership and infrastructure based on democratic frontal foundations, and the establishment of a committed collective leadership that guarantees decision-making and implementation in a way that secures the end of the process of exclusivity, domination, and monopoly, and also that guarantees firm commitment to the national program to strengthen and consolidate Palestinian national unity and work to raise its level in line with requirements of the national struggle.

Second: The consolidation of democratic relations between the various coalition forces within the framework of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and resolving the conflicts arising between all of them through democratic dialogue and excluding the conversion of any form of conflicts into contradictions that are resolved by violence. Also by applying the law of "Unity-Struggle-Unity," in relation to the forces of the national movement. Unity is the organizing line, while struggle is necessary when the bourgeoisie deviates from the program of common denominators.

Third: Continuing to work to consolidate and develop the PLO's gains on the Palestinian, Arab, and international levels, and to ex-

pand recognition of the legitimacy and justice of the Palestinian national struggle, by confronting the imperialist-Zionist projects aimed at liquidating the Palestinian cause, and striking at the achievements made over the past decades. Strengthening the efforts exerted to preserve the status and role of the PLO in the Arab-Zionist conflict, and hardening its political line by preserving its liberatory anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist character, and by confronting any departure from the program's common national denominators.



Chapter Two

The Forces Against the Palestinian Revolution

The Zionist Entity, the Zionist movement, global imperialism, and the system and social forces associated with imperialism. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Zionist movement, which was born in the womb of the global capitalist system that transformed into the stage of imperialism, began working to establish its racist settlement entity in Palestine, to be a basic strategic pillar that protects the growing imperialist and Zionist interests in the Arab region. Extensive efforts were exerted on various levels to achieve this goal, which extended for decades and resulted in the establishment of the "State of Israel" in 1948. The Zionist movement paid attention and concentrated its main efforts among the Jewish communities in European countries. It even committed crimes against the Jews themselves to push them to emigrate and to incite world public opinion in a way that served Zionist thought. It exploited the tragedies resulting from Nazi crimes and the hostility toward Jews to make its political project a success and to implement its criminal scheme. It also adopted an approach whose essence is based on mobilizing world Jewry with reactionary and racist ideas by promoting the "Jewish nation," the "national homeland," the "promised land," and the "chosen people."

And because the thought of the Zionist movement is reactionary in its nature and essence and serves the monopolistic interests of the imperialist and Zionist circles, it has been subjected to condemnation and denunciation since its inception. Socialist and progressive literature and free human thought launched violent attacks at different times against the idea of the "Jewish nation" and considered it reactionary and completely wrong.

The Zionist movement's attempt to camouflage the essence of the Zionist project and its imperial function by claiming that it is the only solution to the "Jewish question" is demagogic and misleading. Reality has concretely proven the falsity of these propositions. The Zionist movement is not a national liberation movement and the Zionist entity, established with the support of British and American colonial circles, does not solve the Jewish question. The Jews who gathered in occupied Palestine from various parts of the world cannot form a nationality or a homogeneous nation and they do not enjoy stability or peace; this confirms the falsity of the myths that attempt to distort history and the invalidity of the propositions that claim the existence of a Jewish nationality or nation in the process of emergence and formation. The Jewish question, as the world's progressive thinkers had emphasized, can only be resolved through the integration of the Jews with the people among whom they live.

The material facts have revealed that the establishment of the Zionist entity in Palestine was not intended to find solutions to the Jewish question, as much as it is aimed at transforming this entity into an advanced imperialist base that would be employed in the face of the rise of the national liberation movement and Arab nationalism which is struggling for independence and unity, and fighting against attempts to impose western European colonial hegemony and control over the region as an alternative to the decaying Ottoman Empire. The British government's embrace and adoption of the Zionist project came to reveal the truth of this project, its nature, and its imperial function in the Arab region. The British government, by announcing the "Balfour Declaration" in 1917, and its relentless endeavor throughout its mandate over Palestine to enable the Zionist movement to establish its state, by encouraging Jewish immigration and facilitating the process of seizing the lands of Palestinian farmers, and providing the terrorist Zionist settlement movement with all forms of support and backing revealed the nature of its ugly colonialist plans.

The fact that the US administration embraced the Zionist entity immediately with its political, economic, military, and human support also indicates the exceptional importance of the Zionist state in serving the imperialist plans drawn for the Arab region.

The exceptional importance of the Zionist state has been confirmed during the past seven decades, by carrying out its imperial functions. It launched a series of aggressive expansionist wars against the Arab coun-

tries surrounding Palestine. In addition, it carried out a series of multiform disruptive activities, in many Arab countries, intending to strike and weaken the Arab national liberation movement. It seriously contributed to keeping the Arab region fragmented, preventing its development and social progress, and strengthening its imperial control and hegemony. Its conspiratorial and disruptive role has also expanded to include many African, Latin American, and Asian countries. It affected many national liberation movements and democratic and progressive forces, and the former socialist countries did not escape, including the former Soviet Union, from the Zionist acts of sabotage.

As a result of the clarification of the nature of the imperialist functions of the Zionist entity, the exposure of its racist and terrorist nature, and its persistence in refusing to obey the international will and the decisions of the international consensus, campaigns of condemnation and denunciation of the Zionist movement in thought, belief and practice escalated and culminated in United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 3779 issued in 1975 calling for considering Zionism as a form of racism and racial discrimination. The resolution called for resisting the Zionist ideology, which threatens international peace and security. US imperialism sought to abolish this decision in 1991, where it succeeded in issuing a United Nations resolution annulling Resolution No. 3379, which considers Zionism a form of racism. A struggle is required to mobilize public opinion to resist the apartheid regime and restore the United Nations resolution considering Zionism as a racist movement.

Confronting, defeating, and thwarting the policies of the Zionist enemy, and pursuing the struggle to strengthen the steadfastness of the Palestinian people and develop their forms of struggle will remain the decisive factor in depriving the Zionist project of a sense of stability, in generating its intractable historical crises, and in making them exacerbating crises to which it is impossible to find solutions.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, based on its vision of the nature of the Zionist entity as a racist, aggressive, expansionist settler entity that performs a shared Zionist-imperial function, believes in the necessity of practicing all forms of struggle to end this advanced imperialist base, and it affirms that the conflict that has been going on for more than a hundred years is not a struggle between two nationalities. Rather, it is a struggle between the Palestinian and Arab national liberation movement on the one hand and the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary

alliance on the other hand. While the former defends its existence, its rights, and its future, the hostile alliance seeks to consolidate the foundations of the Zionist entity as the platform from which it launches to liquidate the national liberation movement and to maintain its control, domination, and plunder of the goods and wealth of the Arab region.

Those who believed that "Israel" could separate from Zionism and exist as one of the countries in the region far from Zionist dreams and goals, and that it could stop carrying out its imperialist function in the Arab world, discovered that this belief was an illusion and a mirage. "Israel," by its nature, composition, and objectives, has remained the living material embodiment of the Zionist project. And "Israel" by its common interests and close ties with the imperialist circles and Zionism remained intertwined with its imperialist-Zionist role in the region and at the global level. And it turned from a tool into a partner—albeit a small one—of imperialism, with which it shares the spoils and bears the consequences of implementing common plans.

Any attempt to separate the two enemies, US imperialism and Zionism, is a futile, misleading and dogmatic attempt aimed at ignoring reality and its constituent elements. The Zionist entity has become an active element in the global strategy of the leaders of the White House. Experience has proven that any conflict that arises between the two parties is only a partial and secondary conflict that is quickly resolved based on the two parties' need for understanding and harmony over the basics to prevail.

The development and escalation of the Palestinian and Arab national struggle against the Zionist entity, its plans, policies, as well as its success in achieving victories and accumulating achievements, would exacerbate the contradictions within the Zionist entity, and lead to showing the extent of the futility and fragility of the Zionist project's solutions to the Jewish question.

Confronting the Zionist entity requires the establishment of various forms of cooperation between the democratic and progressive Jewish forces that are against Zionism and its thought, belief and practice against the Palestinians.

And if it is always true to assert that the main aspect of the Zionist entity is the colonial, racist, expansionist and terrorist aspect, then this entity, despite its specificity, involves several contradictions, and the Palestinian national movement must work to benefit from its contradictions

to serve the struggle of the Palestinian people and their legitimate rights.

In addition to the Zionist movement and global imperialism, the reactionary and bourgeois Arab forces and regimes associated with imperialism occupy their place in the camp of the forces hostile to the Palestinian revolution and the Arab national liberation movement, with differences between them, of course.

And by acknowledging the existence of differences between the Arab regimes, related to the level of dependence and connection to the imperialist circles and the level of agreement or disagreement with the hostile schemes drawn for the region, this acknowledgment does not cancel the general appearance of the official Arab regime as a dependent regime.

And by its class and ideological structure and the close connection of its interests with imperial interests, the reactionary and submissive bourgeois forces have turned into a force to suppress the movement of the masses, to prevent them from pursuing their struggle and achieving their national goals. The primary contradiction in [Arab] reaction and the bourgeoisie is with the movement of the Palestinian and Arab masses, and not with the Zionist imperialist enemy. Experience has demonstrated the establishment of an alliance between Arab reaction, Tel Aviv, and Washington in the face of the revolution, to eliminate and liquidate it, and to confiscate national rights and dissolve the independent Palestinian identity and personality. From this standpoint, it can be said that the roles of the Zionist entity, the reactionary forces, and the affiliated Arab bourgeoisie are complementary. And the relationship between many Arab regimes and the Zionist entity has become clear and public as the policy of normalization was practiced without any shame.

Based on material data, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine believes that the reactionary Arab forces and regimes are objectively an integral part of the camp of the counter-revolutionary forces. Based on this, it calls on the factions of the Arab national liberation movement to intensify the struggle to expose these regimes and to confront their liquidation policies of the Palestinian cause. It also calls on these factions to coordinate among themselves to confront the Zionist danger that threatens their peoples and to liberate their countries from domination, dependence, and imperialist exploitation.

The Popular Front must play a vanguard role in leading a democratic, revolutionary Arab front that is built on a national basis in confronting reaction and imperialism and strengthening the sovereignty of the Arab

nation over its resources and its right to self-determination.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine believes that the pace of the Palestinian revolution's relationship with the current Arab regimes must be determined, at a minimum, by support for the struggle of the Palestinian people to obtain their national rights and the embodiment of this support through:

1. Recognition of the inalienable national rights of the people.
2. Recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, far from all forms of interference, tutelage, containment, or attempts at squandering and confiscation.
3. Providing various forms of political, material, and moral support for the struggle of the Palestinian people in the face of the Zionist entity and US imperialism.
4. Guaranteeing the political and civil rights of the Palestinians, including the right to work for those residing in their countries.
5. Non-recognition of the Zionist entity "Israel" and not engaging in normalization with it.



Chapter Three

Forms and Methods of Struggle

Achieving victory in our ongoing struggle against the Zionist enemy requires the use of all major forms and methods of struggle: ideological, political, and economic. The enemy, by virtue of its nature, characteristics, network of relations, and alliances, enjoys a sweeping superiority in various fields, which requires mastering all forms of struggle and working to develop them always, in order to create a level of revolutionary advancement, and in a way that enables the follow-up of the battle and the mobilization of the broadest energies and capabilities of the masses to wage the multi-faceted struggle, to secure the accumulation of gains and victories on the way to achieving the goals of our people. However, the necessities of engaging in struggle in its various forms do not negate the extreme importance of defining the main form of struggle as the lever and driving force for other forms of struggle.

From this point of view, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine believes that armed struggle is the main method of the contemporary Palestinian national struggle.

The popular resistance, and on top of it the armed struggle, is a legitimate right of the people guaranteed by the international agreements to confront the occupation, usurpation, and settlement.

However, defining the armed struggle as the main method does not preclude the domination of another method of struggle at a certain stage, as the different methods of struggle are determined at each stage according to the existing conditions and their suitability and the response of the masses to them.

The glorious people's Intifada in December 1987, as a logical result of accumulating a multi-faceted struggle and experience, introduced a new method of unarmed, fierce struggle, and its new method of struggle dominated all other forms. In addition, the Intifada was distinguished by the fact that it was able to creatively combine more than one method of struggle at the same time, thus enriching the global revolutionary experience with what it added to it of theoretical and practical innovations in the fields of the Intifada. The return marches in the Gaza Strip and abroad are another example added to the multiplicity of forms of struggle, and this mass form is accompanied by individual operations (of stabbing or running over). Likewise, the heroic confrontations of the prisoners with their jailers, and the BDS movement, which is expanding day after day, are added as another form of struggle that depends on the free people of the world who fight against injustice and oppression.

The principle of combining the various forms of struggle should always be associated with having the ability to interchange from one form of struggle to another at the right time under the appropriate circumstances and according to the requirements of the stage of struggle.

The nature of the Zionist enemy necessitates that our battle against it be comprehensive and multi-form. The main form of struggle, without its connection to other methods, remains ineffective and makes it difficult to achieve its goals. Experience has demonstrated the existence of a dialectical relationship between the forms of struggle, and that success in linking these forms is what enables the enemy to be stripped of his strength and superiority and enhances the chances of tightening his isolation at the regional and international levels. The broad, diverse, and integrated struggle fought by the masses against the Zionist occupiers and

their allies makes the ability of the hostile forces to mislead or maneuver very limited.

The Palestinian people, over the past years, have succeeded in expanding the doors of popular, political, diplomatic, media, and solidarity struggle, and opened new doors of struggle. The broad and long-standing struggle experience of our Palestinian people is always capable of new creations and diversifying forms of giving and developing them.



Chapter Four

The Arab-Nationalist Dimension of the Palestinian Cause

The Palestinian national liberation movement is integral to the Arab national liberation movement.

In light of the exposure of the racist, ideological, class nature of the racist Zionist entity in occupied Palestine, its imperialist-Zionist function, and the expansion of its aggressive practices to include the entire Arab region, the conflict between the Palestinian and Arab mass movement and its national liberation forces against the Zionist entity has taken on a direct and antagonistic character.

We proceed from the belief of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine that Palestine is an indivisible part of the Arab world, that the Palestinian Arab people are an integral part of the Arab nation, and that the Palestinian national liberation movement is an integral part of the Arab liberation movement.

In connection with the major and qualitative changes that affected the international and regional system, the results it produced at the level of the Arab region, and the new conditions experienced by the Arab nation, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, in the light of the close organic relationship that binds the peoples of the Arab nation—its factions, parties, and national and progressive forces, on the base of national ties (language, history, culture, aspirations and common interests, land) and the serious challenge to its present and future through Zionist imperialist plans—sees the importance and necessity of joint action among them in order to achieve the following goals:

1. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine believes in the

Arab nationalist dimension of the Palestinian cause, and if it affirms the special role of the Palestinian people in the liberation process, it thereby considers the process of liberating Palestine and defeating Zionism as a national task.

2. The struggle to build a correct and peaceful relationship between national and nationalist workers in the equation of the conflict with the Zionist enemy. It is true that the Palestinian national factor is the spearhead, but this should not cancel out our vision of the Arab national dimension of the Palestinian cause.

3. Working to correct the relations of the PLO in the Arab region, by giving priority to the relationship with the Arab masses and their vanguard forces, and by emphasizing the contribution of the Palestinian revolution to reviving the movement of the Arab masses (but this does not mean that it should represent or constitute an alternative to any faction of the PLO).

4. Working to renew the Arab liberation movement, in light of the structural crisis it is facing, which requires a new and broad dialogue between its various factions and the largest number of democratic intellectuals, exerting more effort to establish a progressive Arab democratic front, focusing on deriving a political and organizational formula for joint action between the factions of the Arab liberation movement in neighboring countries., and considering the battle to obtain the democratic rights of the Arab people a fundamental battle.

5. The struggle against all regional, religious, and sectarian phenomena and disputes.

6. Confronting and fighting all forms of normalization with the Zionist entity.

7. The struggle for Arab unity, and the mobilization of the Palestinian and Arab masses, side by side with other democratic and progressive Arab forces, in order to achieve this unity.

8. Joint work to achieve the modern Arab national project, including the important building of democratic civil societies, and developments to solve the problems of poverty, hunger, resource and human drainage and dependency in all its economic, political, military, and cultural forms.

9. Working to secure comprehensive national security, using the

Arab revolution for development, economic integration and the common market, and confronting the challenges of the new phase of the development of the contemporary world on the path of a united Arab socialist democratic society.



Chapter Five

The Palestinian National Liberation Movement Cannot Be Separated From the Global Progressive, Liberationist, Democratic, Socialist, and Peaceful Powers in the World

Despite the great advancements of humanity in its long history of existence, it has not been able to present a global system in which all peoples, nations, and individuals enjoy equal rights toward self-determination, control over their own fates, and their ability to choose their own paths toward advancement, away from all forms of control, oppression, exploitation, terrorism, aggression, and occupation.

This situation becomes even more complicated today in light of the recent developments, particularly after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar system, which has resulted in the beginning of a multipolar world in which the United States attempts to cement its hegemony and control. Moreover, capitalism has cosmically advanced due to the end of the socialist camp, a situation which demands even greater unity from all the powers that fight against injustice and oppression in service of freedom, justice, and equality on a global scale, particularly so for "Third World" countries.

The Palestinian people have suffered throughout their own personal experiences with all kinds of oppression, aggression, dispersal, displacement, obliteration, and dissipation at the hands of settler-colonial Zionism, allied with imperialism, and all of the nations and powers linked with imperialism. The Palestinians have also continuously fought in order to attain their right to a legitimate and stable national project. Therefore, the Palestinian National Movement cannot be separated from the camp that fights in service of freedom, justice, and equality on a global scale. In the conditions we currently face of uncontrollable imperialism, where its most violent tendencies of direct and indirect intervention against any liberationist, progressive, peaceful and socialist powers have

only been exacerbated, the principle of national solidarity with all progressive world forces becomes an objective necessity and an indispensable weapon. This will be necessary in order to face imperialism and its continuous attempts to solidify its positions, destroy its enemies, and reconfigure global conditions in the world in order to continue its operations of stealing all peoples' wealth and abilities to choose.

The flexible changes occurring on a national scale continue to demand a greater dependency on national and nationalist capacities. However, this should not imply minimizing the importance of supporting our allies and friends in our national liberation struggle. The PFLP sees that differences in views between global revolutionary forces should not negatively impact the necessary work of national solidarity that is premised upon the notion of independence, equality, and parity between its different parties.

Considering that the PFLP is a faction among many revolutionary factions on a global scale, the PFLP commits to the principles of national solidarity. The PFLP insists on its renewing faith and constant and diligent search to strengthen the solidarity relationship between the Palestinian revolution and all parties, powers, and progressive national regimes in the Third World, as well as democratic and peaceful forces in the world, socialist nations, and political parties representing the working class in capitalist nations. We insist on creating different kinds of collaboration with all political and social forces that support the Palestinian national question and national Palestinian armed struggle, which remain just defenders of the principles of freedom, democracy and social justice. These alliances will occur on the following grounds for shared struggle:

1. The struggle against imperialist aggression, particularly US imperialism, and in order to create a new world order that relies on the right of peoples to decide their own fates, and picking their independent paths for growth, aiming our efforts against the dangers of nuclear war, ecological disaster, and pollution, and toward a world in which freedom, justice, and equality prevail among all peoples.

2. The struggle to solve the issue of dependency in favor of the robbed and oppressed Third World, against the system of imperialism and global monopoly, and the issues of subordination that all Third World peoples' struggle with due to the nature of unequal political and economic relations between nations.

3. The fight in support of all progressive powers and factions in order

to avoid the dangers of nuclear war and maintain world peace, and against all forms of oppression, repression, and racial discrimination, and to impose isolation onto the Zionist entity and its aggressive mandate, and to expose Zionism as a regressive and racist project in all aspects: politically, practically, and ideologically.

4. The necessity of organizing various efforts from different national interests that strive toward a more balanced United Nations, along with other bodies and institutions, in order to institutionalize justice and equality in the world and defend ourselves against all kinds of oppression and aggression, and to breach and transgress against international customs, conventions, and agreements currently in place in order to defend the violated freedoms and human rights in occupied Palestine and throughout the world.

5. From its own position, the PFLP calls all non-aligned nations, African nations, and Islamic nations to support the Palestinian people's legitimate national rights, and to stand in solidarity with the masses' ability to choose their own fates, choose their own social system, and choose their own path toward advancement, away from all forms of pressure and terrorism, in its direct or indirect forms.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—while demonized and illegalized by much of the Western world—has long stood as one of the most disciplined and uncompromising revolutionary organizations of the modern era. This volume gathers together its founding organizational statements, congress reports, strategic writings, and political programs—documents that map not only the trajectory of Palestinian resistance, but also the evolving organizational form of a movement forged in struggle.

Presented here as a resource for critical organizational study, these texts reveal how revolutionaries theorize structure, unity, and capacity under conditions of siege. The history of the Popular Front is not merely one of armed resistance, but of sustained organizational innovation: coalition-building across factions, developing a praxis rooted in both local struggle and international solidarity, and crafting strategies of survival and advance against imperialism and Zionism alike.

At once archival and urgent, this collection illuminates the intellectual and practical tradition of the Popular Front and affirms the central lesson of its history: liberation demands organization.

Visit ISKRABOOKS.ORG for free digital copies of this and other Iskra publications.

Cover Design by Ben Stahnke

ISBN 979-8-2957-4968-1