

The Truth About Vietnam- China Relations Over the Last 30 Years

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam**

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SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

1979

Part One

VIET NAM IN CHINA'S STRATEGY

The Chinese leaders' acts of open hostility against Viet Nam, culminating in their war of aggression started on February 17, 1979, have astonished world public opinion by the sudden shift of China's policy towards Viet Nam. Yet, this policy shift was to be expected. It was in fact, a logical development of the big nation expansionist and great power hegemonist strategy pursued by the Chinese leaders over the past three decades.

The world has offered no other example of leaders of a country, claiming to be "ultra-revolutionary" rhetoric, while carrying out a counter-revolutionary, extremely reactionary strategy, as the Chinese leaders have been doing.

No other leaders in the world have, on the strategic plane, reversed their policy of alliances, turning friends into foes and reversely, so quickly and thoroughly as has been the case in China.

The Soviet Union which was considered by the Chinese leaders their major ally is now regarded as their most dangerous enemy.

U.S. imperialism, formerly considered as the most dangerous enemy "whose character would never

change", is now regarded as a reliable ally, and the Chinese who are colluding with it have brazenly declared that China is an "Eastern NATO". Those who formerly called the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America a "revolutionary storm" striking directly at imperialism, and affirmed that the revolutionary cause of the international proletariat in the end depended on the revolutionary struggle of the peoples in these regions¹, have now joined hands with the imperialists in trying to oppose and wreck the national liberation movement, supporting reactionary forces, such as dictator Pinochet of Chile, the CIA-backed FNLA and UNITA in Angola, Shah Pahlevi of Iran, fostering the genocidal Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique, etc. . . They have brazenly distorted the origin and character of the national liberation struggle in the world today, presenting them as the results of the struggles among the major powers for world hegemony and not as the results of the revolutionary undertaking of nations.

Parallel to the reversal of China's international alliances were ruthless and bloody purges at home, repression of the opposition which caused repeated upheavals in the ranks of China's leaders. Those who are considered today as genuine revolutionary leaders, tomorrow may be treated as enemies and traitors to the Chinese revolution. Some have been overthrown and reinstated two or three times within a few years.

The strategy of the Chinese leaders has changed greatly. One thing, however, remains unchanged:

¹ It is worth recalling that at the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in November 1960, the Delegation of the Chinese Communist Party also agreed that the world socialist system was a determining factor in the development of human society.

the strategic objective of quickly making China a first-rate world power and carrying out big nation expansionist and greatpower hegemonist designs. At the Congress of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee in 1956, Chairman Mao Zedong said:

"China must become the most highly developed country in the cultural, scientific, technologic and industrial fields. It is unacceptable that after a few decades China will not become the number one power in the world."

Later, in September 1959, Chairman Mao Zedong also said at the Conference of the Army Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

"We must conquer the earth, this is our objective."

Immediately after the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, the Peking rulers have stepped up the realization of their strategic objective. Though China's economy was still backward, they have done their utmost to build a strategic nuclear force since the late 1950's, and are now speeding up the "modernization" of the armed forces, the manufacturing and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. In the economic field, both the "Great Leap Forward" of 1958 and the recently announced "Four Modernizations" pursue the same strategic objective of expansion and hegemony.

I-VIET NAM IN CHINA'S GLOBAL STRATEGY

If the Chinese leaders in their global strategy consider the Soviet Union and the U.S. as major rivals to be defeated, they regard Viet Nam as an important opponent to be subdued and conquered so that their strategic interest may be secured.

In the early 1950's, when the Chinese leaders started reconstruction to rapidly transform China into a world power, they had to cope with the U.S. war of aggression against Korea in the North, and the threat to China's security in the South by the French colonialist war of aggression in Viet Nam. At the same time, the United States, the ring-leader of the imperialist forces, acting as an international gendarme, was pursuing a hostile policy towards China, making great efforts to encircle and isolate that country.

The victorious resistance war waged by the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea against the French colonialists led to the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina. The French were afraid that a total victory of the Vietnamese people could lead to the collapse of their colonial empire. China was the main supplier of arms to Viet Nam by the end of the resistance war against the French colonialists. And it took advantage of this situation to act as the principal negotiator with the French imperialists, and colluding with the latter, to work out a solution advantageous to China and France, but not to the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea. They sacrificed the interests of the Indochinese peoples to ensure China's security in the South, to carry out the design of controlling Viet Nam and Indochina, and at the same time to secure the role of a great power in settling international affairs, particularly in Asia. At the Geneva Conference, the first part of which dealt with the Korean problem, the People's Republic of China for the first time was on an equal footing with the four big powers which are permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.

This was a good opportunity for the Chinese leaders to expand their influence in Asia and Africa.

At the same time, they sought contact with the U.S. imperialists through the direct negotiations begun in Geneva and later continued in Warsaw.

After the 1954 Geneva Agreements were signed, the U.S. imperialists sought to interfere more and more in Viet Nam in an attempt to turn South Viet Nam into a new-type colony and a U.S. military base in South-East Asia. The Chinese rulers wanted a prolonged partition of Viet Nam. But the Vietnamese people heroically stood up to fight against U.S. imperialism, for national salvation and gained more and more victories.

In the late 1960's the U.S. imperialists got bogged down in their war of aggression against Viet Nam, a war which aggravated the economic, political and social crisis in the United States and weakened the position of U.S. imperialism in the world. This brought about favourable conditions for a powerful development of the socialist countries and of the world revolutionary movement and made it possible for West European countries and Japan to become strong economic rivals of the United States. In face of a desperate situation, President Nixon had to resort to "Vietnamization of the war", and learning from the experience of the French imperialists in 1954, used the Chinese in an attempt to settle the Viet Nam problem to the advantage of U.S. imperialism, that is, by withdrawing U.S. troops from Viet Nam while maintaining the puppet regime of Nguyen Van Thieu. The Nixon administration also played the Chinese card to exert pressure on the Soviet Union and to oppose the world revolutionary movement.

The Chinese leaders took advantage of the weakening of the United States and the trend of Nixon's policy to pursue an anti-Soviet policy, compromise with the Americans and help them settle

the Viet Nam problem, with a view to creating a world with three major powers as envisaged in Kissinger's formula of a "multipolar world", one of the three poles being China, and to abolishing the "bi-polar" world, with the United States and the Soviet Union, which came into being after World War II. At the same time, the Chinese leaders used the Viet Nam problem to obtain U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan. Thus reversing their policy of alliance, they, in the first place, came to consider the Soviet Union as the main enemy, provoked a border conflict with the Soviet Union in March 1969, and subsequently betrayed Viet Nam a second time in making a deal with the U.S. to prevent a total victory of the Vietnamese people. In 1971, they practised "pingpong diplomacy", then received Kissinger in Peking. This was followed by the restoration of China's status in the United Nations and the People's Republic of China becoming one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. This process culminated in U.S. President Nixon's visit to China and the Shanghai communiqué in February, 1972. For the Peking rulers, collusion with the U.S. imperialists was a crucial step in carrying out their global strategy.

As after the signing of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina, the Chinese leaders, after the January 1973 Paris Agreement on Viet Nam was signed, wanted to maintain the status quo in South Viet Nam. Therefore, the Vietnamese people's victory in 1975, which completely destroyed the U.S. puppet regime, liberated South Viet Nam and reunified the country, was a heavy defeat not only of the U.S. imperialists but also of the Peking rulers in the implementation of their global strategy and their expansionist and hegemonist designs. Since then they have practised a policy of open hostility

towards Viet Nam, even resorting to armed attacks.

Thus, over the past 30 years, Viet Nam has been one of the most important factors in China's global strategy. Because Viet Nam held a crucial position in French strategy in the mid-1950's and U.S. strategy in the early 1970's, the Chinese leaders have been playing the Vietnamese "card", colluding with the imperialists in order to realize their big nation expansionist and hegemonist designs. At the same time, they wanted to secure for China sole control of Viet Nam's resistance war against U.S. imperialism, then the focus of international political life, so as to be able to hold high the "anti-imperialism" signboard, assume "the leadership of world revolution", and diminish the influence of the Soviet Union.

II-VIET NAM IN CHINA'S POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH-EAST ASIA

South-East Asia, which has been a traditional target for Chinese expansionism through the centuries, is a region which the leaders of the People's Republic of China for a long time have dreamt of conquering.

In 1936, speaking of his youth to American journalist Edgar Snow in Yenan, Mao Zedong told him how he felt after reading a pamphlet about Japan's conquest of Korea and Taiwan, and the loss of Chinese sovereignty over Indochina, Burma and many other places.

"After I read this, I felt depressed about the future of my country and began to realize that it was the duty of all the people to help save it¹."

¹ E. Snow, *Red Star Over China*, Penguin Books, London, 1972, p. 159.

A document of the Chinese Communist Party entitled: "The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China", published in 1939 reads: *"Having defeated China, the imperialist powers occupied Korea, Taiwan, Ryukyu, Pescadores islands and Port Arthur; Britain occupied Burma, Bhutan and Hongkong; and France occupied Annam..."*

A handbook, "Sketch of Modern Chinese History" published in Peking in 1954, included a map showing Chinese territory to comprise several surrounding countries including those in South-East Asia and the Eastern (South China) Sea area.

The expansionist designs of Chinese leaders are particularly clearly expressed by Chairman Mao Zedong during the 1963 talks with the Vietnamese Workers' Party delegation in Wu Han:

"I will be the Chairman of 500 million poor peasants sending the troops to South-East Asia."

Also on this occasion, making a comparison between Thailand and Szechuan province of China, Chairman Mao Zedong said that they were of the same size but the Thai population was only half of Szechuan's. So Chinese must be sent to Thailand to settle there. With regard to Laos, a large but thinly-populated country, Mao Zedong also thought China should do the same thing. He reaffirmed in a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee in August 1965:

"We must by all means seize South-East Asia including South Viet Nam, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia and Singapore... This region is rich in raw materials it is worth the costs involved. After seizing South-East Asia, we can increase our strength in this region. And we shall be strong enough to confront the Soviet-East European bloc, the East wind will prevail over the West wind."

In comparison with other parts of the world, South-East Asia is a region where China enjoys the most favourable objective conditions and have the most means and facilities (over 20 million overseas Chinese, political parties dependent on the Chinese Communist Party, roads leading from China to many South-East Asian countries...) to carry out her expansionist and hegemonist policies. It is for this reason that over the past 30 years, the leaders of the People's Republic of China have resorted to numerous manoeuvres to achieve expansion in this region and create conditions for carrying out their counter-revolutionary global strategy.

They have built up a strategic nuclear force, developed their economic might, and from a big-nation position, will try to use military threats or promises of economic aid, to exert pressure on or buy over countries in this region and drag them into their orbit. They have encroached on the territories of other countries, provoked border conflicts, used their agents or directly sent their troops in an attempt to weaken and subdue countries in the region. Ready to apply most barbarous methods, they used the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique to carry out a genocidal policy in Kampuchea. To further their expansionist and hegemonist policy, they have made use of their numerous tools in South-East Asia, including the "fifth column" constituted by the overseas Chinese, the so-called "communist" organizations under Peking's orders and the ethnic minorities some of whom are of Chinese descent.

Regarding the use of the overseas Chinese, Peking's intention was most clearly shown in these words of Foreign Minister Chen Yi:

"More than 90 per cent of Singapore population are Chinese; there are more than 900,000 Chinese in a population of over one million. So Singapore

*is a nation built up by the Chinese in the region*¹."

The Chinese leaders have been exploiting contradictions among various South-East Asian nations ; they have sought to drive a wedge between the ASEAN countries and the three countries of the Indochinese peninsula, to sow division between Malaysia and Indonesia, between Burma and Thailand, etc. . . In particular, they have tried to use for their own expansionist ends the fact that South-East Asia is one of those regions in the world seething with revolution, where the movement of national liberation is developing and colonialism and imperialism are fast declining. When the French were defeated in Viet Nam in 1954, the Chinese leaders still hoped to maintain the presence of France, a weakened colonialist power, in South Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea, in order to prevent the United States, ringleader of world imperialism, from setting foot on Indochina, and to prevent a total victory of the three Indochinese countries. When the Americans have been weakened and defeated in this region, Peking wanted the U.S. presence to be maintained in order to establish a Sino-American condominium over the countries of this area. In so doing, they were banking on the imperialists to check the progress of revolution, to gradually fill the so-called "power vacuum" in South-East Asia and, later on, to remove their imperialist allies and secure sole control of the region. To cover their dark designs, they deceitfully alleged that Soviet influence had to be contained.

¹ In a talk with representatives of the Hoa in Viet Nam who came to present greetings to the Party and Government Delegation of the People's Republic of China headed by Premier Zhou Enlai on a visit to Viet Nam in May, 1960.

Viet Nam occupies a strategic position in South-East Asia. The Chinese feudal expansionists have repeatedly invaded Viet Nam, seeking to annex this country and use it as a springboard for aggression against other South-East Asian countries. After World War II, the Communist Party of Viet Nam was the only Communist Party in this region which succeeded in seizing political power and establishing a worker-peasant state, the first one in this region. The Vietnamese Revolution exerted great influence in this area by its victory over the French colonialists and the U.S. imperialists. The Chinese leaders attempted to get hold of Viet Nam and then of the whole Indochinese peninsula to open the way to South-East Asia. In the September 1963 meeting, in Canton, between the four Communist Parties of Viet Nam, China, Indonesia and Laos, Premier Zhou Enlai said :

"Our country is a big one, but we have no way out. Therefore we hope that the Viet Nam Workers' Party will help blaze the trail to South-East Asia."

In order to weaken and get hold of Viet Nam, the Chinese leaders try their best to undermine the solidarity between the three countries on the Indochinese peninsula, to sow division among them, particularly between Laos and Kampuchea on the one hand and Viet Nam on the other. At the same time, they try to set other South-East Asian countries against Viet Nam, to slander and vilify Viet Nam in an attempt to isolate it. The Peking rulers have been clamouring about their "sovereignty" over Hoang Sa (Paracels) and Truong Sa (Spratley) archipelagoes. Early in 1974, with U.S. approval, China attacked and occupied Hoang Sa (Paracels) archipelago, which is part of Viet Nam's territory, in order to gradually establish control over the Eastern (South China) Sea, to subjugate Viet Nam

and the whole of South-East Asia, and exploit the abundant natural resources in the Eastern Sea region.

The Chinese leaders hope to rally forces, first in South-East Asia and eventually all over the world, in order to further their global strategy. In the 1960's, they made great efforts to rally forces in Asia, Africa and Latin America in order to seize "leadership of the world revolution" and to oppose the Soviet Union. To these ends, from 1963, they did their utmost to convene a conference of eleven Communist Parties (including eight from South-East Asia) in an attempt to establish a "Communist International" controlled by them and to create a "Peking-Jakarta-Phnom Penh-Pyongyang-Hanoi axis". Together with Indonesia, they tried to convene a "Conference of Newly Emerging Forces" (CONEFO) with a view to setting up an organization in opposition to the United Nations. At the same time, they worked for the holding of a second Asian-African conference (to be held in Algiers in 1965). But the Chinese leaders failed to achieve their dark schemes because these ran counter to the interests of the peoples of the world, which consist in uniting the anti-imperialist forces, and to the interests of the world revolution, which consist in strengthening the socialist system and the movement of national independence and democracy. They failed also because they tumbled against Viet Nam's unswerving line of independence and sovereignty.

Over the past 30 years, the Chinese leaders have considered Viet Nam one of the most important factors in their strategy. They have sought by all possible means to gain control over Viet Nam. This required that Viet Nam should not be allowed to become strong: it should be divided, not independent,

but it should be dependent on China. On the contrary, an independent, unified, prosperous and strong Viet Nam, with a political line of independence and sovereignty and a correct line in international politics would constitute a major obstacle to the Chinese leaders' global strategy, first of all, to their expansionist policy towards South-East Asia. That is the reason why the Chinese leadership has pursued a double policy of helping, but also hampering the Vietnamese revolution. Each time Viet Nam won victory over the imperialists, they dealt and compromised with the latter against the interests of Viet Nam. It is also the reason why they have shifted from covert opposition to open hostility to Viet Nam, then brazenly launched a war of aggression against Viet Nam.

The Chinese leaders' policy aimed at conquering Viet Nam first into the general framework of Chinese policy towards other countries in South-East Asia and other neighbouring countries. They want to occupy part of Indian territory, and in fact have done it in the Sino-Indian war of 1962. They do not like the prospect of a strong India capable of disputing with them a "leading role" in Asia and Africa. They are still seeking to seize Mongolia, though they have recognized the Mongolian People's Republic as an independent state. They want to occupy a part of U.S.S.R. territory; they do not want a powerful Soviet Union at China's side. They have tried to lower the prestige of the Soviet Union, even to incite imperialist countries to wage war against the Soviet Union, and to set countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America against her. The Chinese leaders have made great efforts to organize an international anti-Soviet "crusade" with the participation of imperialist and reactionary forces under the banner of "opposing hegemonism", in ac-

cordance with Mao Zedong's formula of *"sitting on the top of the mountain to watch tigers fight"*.

As many West European politicians and journalists have remarked, China is resolved "to fight the Soviet Union to the last West European", as she had been ready "to fight the United States to the last Vietnamese".

The present international strategy of the Chinese leaders, though well disguised, has revealed its thoroughly counter-revolutionary character. The Chinese leaders have appeared in their true colors as big-nation chauvinists and bourgeois nationalists!

The Chinese rulers' present policy towards Viet Nam, although well camouflaged, remains the same as that pursued by rulers of the "Celestial Empire" during the past milleniums—a policy aimed at annexing Viet Nam, subduing the Vietnamese people and turning Viet Nam into a satellite of China.

Part Two

CHINA AND THE TERMINATION OF THE INDOCHINA WAR IN 1954

I—AFTER DIEN BIEN PHU, THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WERE CAPABLE OF LIBERATING THE ENTIRE COUNTRY

In 1945, the Vietnamese people, guided by the spirit of undaunted struggle and self-reliance, successfully carried out their August Revolution and founded the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. Some months later, the French colonialists reoccupied the Southern provinces, and from December 1946 the Vietnamese people had to wage a protracted nation-wide resistance war against the French aggressors to safeguard the independence, unity and territorial integrity of their country.

The Vietnamese people's resistance war, which was extremely arduous and valiant, gained greater and greater victories. The victories won by the peoples of Viet Nam, of Laos (under the leadership of the Lao Resistance Government) and of Kampuchea (under the leadership of the Kampuchean Resistance Government), especially the historic Dien

Bien Phu victory won by the Vietnamese army and people, greatly changed the balance of force on the battlefield in favour of the resistance forces of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea, placing the French imperialists in an extremely difficult situation.

French Defence Minister R. Pleven, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General P. Ely, Chief of Staff of the Army, General Blanc, Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Fay, after inspecting the Indochina battlefield in February 1954, came to a pessimistic conclusion:

*"A reinforcement of the Expeditionary Corps, however strong, cannot bring about any change. Moreover, the military efforts by the Metropolitan country have reached the last limit. All that we can hope for now is to create the most favourable military conditions for a political solution to the conflict."*¹

Anticipating a general offensive of the Viet Nam People's Army in the Northern delta, French Premier Laniel on May 18, 1954, sent General Ely to Indochina to convey instructions to General Navarre, commander-in-chief of the French Expeditionary Corps: At present, the foremost objective is to save the Expeditionary Corps.

Ambassador Chauvel, deputy head of the French delegation at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina, wrote in one of his reports to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

*"We can hardly defend Ha Noi. The command has informed us that even with the dispatch of two more divisions it would not be possible to keep the capital of Tonkin..."*²

¹ J. Lacouture et Ph. Devillers, *La Fin d'une guerre*, Editions du Seuil, 1960, p. 62.

² Pierre Rouanet, *Mendès France au pouvoir*, Editions Laffont, Paris, 1965, p. 146.

The Laniel Government had previously sought to negotiate from a position of military strength so as to keep Laos and Kampuchea intact and to preserve whatever interests they could in Viet Nam, considering this an "honourable" solution for France. After the Dien Bien Phu defeat, that Government was eager to start negotiations in order, first of all, to save the French Expeditionary Corps from the danger of annihilation.

The French people's movement, the core of which was the French Communist Party, against "the dirty war" in Indochina was growing vigorously. The French administration, already divided over many questions, became more divided in face of serious economic, political and social difficulties. It was expected that France's defeat in Indochina would lead to the collapse of the entire colonial system of the French imperialists, particularly in North Africa. In such a situation France entered the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina with the participation of the Soviet Union, China, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the belligerent parties in Indochina.

II-CHINA'S POSITION IN GENEVA WAS TOTALLY DIFFERENT FROM VIET NAM'S, BUT CONCORDANT WITH FRANCE'S

The People's Republic of China came into being in 1949 when the world was divided into two politically, economically and militarily opposing systems.

In Europe, the cold war was expanding and in Asia there were two hot wars in Korea and in Indochina. The leadership of the new China wanted to take advantage of peaceful conditions to rehabi-

litate and develop rapidly their economy, strengthen their military potential and rapidly turn China into a world power, in order to realize their ambition of big-nation expansionism and big-power hegemonism, directed mainly towards South-East Asia.

Though the Chinese army had suffered about a million casualties in the Korean war, the Chinese leadership, to secure a buffer zone in the North-East, in 1953 accepted a cease-fire in Korea: to maintain the status quo, and prolong the partition of Korea.

Viet Nam and China are two immediate neighbours. The two peoples had always supported, inspired and helped each other, since an independent Viet Nam meant that China would not be threatened by imperialism from the South and, in turn, a liberated China meant that Viet Nam would not be threatened by imperialism from the North. In 1950 the People's Republic of China recognized and established diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

China was the main supplier of military hardware to Viet Nam in the last years of the latter's resistance war against France.

At the 1954 Geneva Conference, Viet Nam proposed a comprehensive solution: cessation of hostilities in the whole Indochina peninsula, along with a political solution to the questions of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea on the basis of respect for the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of each country.

For the Chinese leaders, the 1954 Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina was an opportunity to discuss and settle with the big powers important international issues, in spite of the fact that the United States was then hostile to China and the latter had no diplomatic relations with France, while

the Chiang Kai Shek regime remained one of the five permanent members of the U. N. Security Council.

The Chinese leaders advocated a Korean-type solution to bring the Indochina war to an end, i.e., cessation of hostilities without any political solution. It was Premier Zhou Enlai who stated on August 24, 1953 that the Korean truce could be taken as a model for other conflicts. With such a solution they hoped to create a buffer zone in South-East Asia, prevent a replacement of the French by the Americans in Indochina, avoid a direct confrontation with the Americans, ensure security for their southern border, and at the same time to limit Viet Nam's victory and to divide the peoples of the three Indochinese countries in an attempt to weaken and eventually annex these countries and turn them into a springboard for expansion to South-East Asia.

At the Geneva Conference, the French also advocated a Korean-type truce to save their expeditionary corps in Indochina, to partition Viet Nam and maintain French colonialism in Indochina.

Clearly China's stand was entirely different from Viet Nam's, but in concordance with that of France.

III-THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENTS ON INDOCHINA AND THE CHINESE LEADERS' BETRAYAL

At a meeting of the Vietnamese, Soviet and Chinese delegations in April 1954 in preparation for the Geneva Conference on Indochina the Chinese delegate said: "The People's Republic of China cannot openly assist Viet Nam in case of expansion of the conflict there".

Taking advantage of their position as the main military supplier and the country in control of the only aid supply route to Viet Nam, and of French reluctance to talk with Viet Nam from a weak position, the Chinese leaders allowed themselves to negotiate directly with the French on fundamental points in a solution to the Indochina question.

The negotiations at the Geneva Conference were, in effect, conducted in two phases.

The first phase: From May 8 to June 23, 1954, the head of the French delegation, while avoiding meeting with the Vietnamese, conducted direct negotiations with the head of the Chinese delegation on four occasions. They reached agreement on fundamental points of a cease-fire accord for Indochina.

It should be noted that at the third meeting on June 17, 1954 between the French and the Chinese, Premier Zhou Enlai met G. Bidault, head of the French delegation, and made fundamental political concessions which were detrimental to the interests of the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea: China would accept the existence of two administrations in Viet Nam (the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and the Bao Dai puppet government), recognize the Royal Lao Government and the Royal Government of Kampuchea, withdraw their demand for the participation of the delegations of the Lao Resistance Government and the Kampuchea Resistance Government in the Geneva Conference and raise the question of withdrawal of foreign troops, including the Vietnamese volunteers, from Laos and Kampuchea.

At the fourth meeting on June 23, 1954 Premier Zhou Enlai saw the new French Premier Mendès France and made further concessions: partition of Viet Nam into two zones co-existing peacefully, the military questions to be settled first, separate solu-

tions for the questions of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea; China would recognize these three countries as members of the French Union and wanted to see Laos and Kampuchea with a new face in South-East Asia, like India and Indonesia; in return China only required the absence of U.S. military bases in Indochina. Consequently, China and France reached agreement on the framework of a solution to the Indochinese question.

The understanding between the Chinese and the French was in full agreement with the 7-point solution proposed by the U.S.A. and Britain on June 29, 1954, six days after the meeting between Zhou Enlai and Mendès France.

The second phase: Between June 23 and July 20, 1954 the French delegation directly negotiated with the Vietnamese delegation to solve concrete problems. For her part, China kept on urging Viet Nam to make concessions. By July 10, 1954 Viet Nam still persistently held on to its views regarding the questions of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea, demanding that representatives of the Lao Resistance Government and those of the Kampuchean Resistance Government participate in the conference on an equal footing with other parties and proposing the establishment of a temporary military demarcation line in Viet Nam at the 13th parallel and the holding of free elections within six months for national reunification. In Viet Nam's view, solution to the Lao and Kampuchean questions should include the creation of two regrouping zones for the resistance forces, one in the North near the Chinese and Vietnamese borders and the other in Central and Southern Laos; and in Kampuchea, of two regrouping zones for the Resistance forces: one situated East and North-East of the Mekong River, and the other, South-West of this river, and there would

be free general elections within six months in Laos and Kampuchea.

As early as May 1954, the Chinese delegation proposed the 16th parallel as the demarcation line between the two zones of Viet Nam, and even wanted Viet Nam to make further concessions to the extent of abandoning Ha Noi, Hai Phong and National Highway No. 5 (connecting Ha Noi with Hai Phong):

*"As the plan (of the 16th parallel) is not likely to be accepted, it should be envisaged that Hai Phong can be made a free port with a fixed number of French troops stationed nearby. If this, too, is not accepted, Highway No. 5, Ha Noi and Hai Phong can be made a demilitarized zone under joint control..."*¹

Later on, especially from July 10, 1954—ten days before the conclusion of the Geneva Conference, China exerted even greater pressure to obtain concessions from Viet Nam: *"There should be fair and reasonable conditions acceptable to the French Government, so that an agreement may be reached within ten days. The conditions must be plain and clear to facilitate negotiations. We should avoid complicating matters and engaging in time-consuming discussions and prolonged negotiations, so as not to allow the U.S. to sabotage the Conference."*²

China was then worried about the possibility of an American military intervention in Indochina, which would threaten China's security. But it should be pointed out that China did make use of the U.S.

¹ Zhou Enlai's message dated May 30, 1954 to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (a copy of which was forwarded to the Central Committee of the Viet Nam Workers' Party).

² Zhou Enlai's message dated July 10, 1954 to the Central Committee of Viet Nam Workers' Party.

threat of an expanded war of aggression to exert pressure on Viet Nam.

As a matter of fact, after the Korean war, the United States was not capable of making a direct military intervention in Indochina. The hard line adopted by the U.S. at the Geneva Conference reflected its suspicion that the French, defeated on the battlefield and confronted with difficulties on the political, economic and financial planes, might accept a settlement unfavourable to an eventual American intervention in Indochina. After France and China had agreed on a framework for a solution to the Indochina question and the U.S. stooge Ngo Dinh Diem had become Prime Minister of the Sai Gon puppet government (June 13, 1954) the United States decided it could accept an agreement as worked out by France and China to settle the three questions of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea. Nevertheless, the United States did not sign the final communique of the conference, because it wanted to have a free hand to violate the Geneva Agreements later on, through the Ngo Dinh Diem administration, and to compel the French to leave Indochina and make place for the Americans.

It is obvious that after Dien Bien Phu, with the assistance of the socialist camp, especially of China, the army and people of Viet Nam were capable of liberating their entire country, but the solution agreed upon by the delegations of China and France in Geneva neither reflected the balance of force on the battlefield, nor did it fully meet the political requirement put forth by the Vietnamese delegation.

In keeping with its peace-loving tradition, and the general trend of settling disputes through negotiations, and under Chinese pressure, Viet Nam accepted a solution with the following points: respect for the fundamental national rights of the peoples of

Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea; ceasefire in Viet Nam and on the whole Indochinese battlefield; withdrawal of French troops; creation of a temporary military demarcation line at the 17th parallel partitioning Viet Nam into two zones; nation-wide free general elections within two years for national reunification.

In Laos was created a regrouping zone for the Lao resistance forces. In Kampuchea resistance forces were demobilized on the spot without any regrouping zone being created for them.

The Dien Bien Phu victory and the 1954 Geneva Agreements marked a great victory of the revolutionary forces in Indochina and greatly contributed to bringing about the disintegration of the French colonial empire and announced the irreversible process of collapse of colonialism and world imperialism. On the other hand, the Geneva solution, prevented the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea from winning complete victory in their war of resistance against French colonialism which was clearly a practical possibility, considering the balance of force on the battlefield.

All that, the Chinese leaders knew better than anyone else.

That was the first time the Chinese leaders betrayed the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea.

Part Three

CHINA AND THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIET NAM AND THE REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY (1954-1975)

Disregarding the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam, the U.S. imperialists entered South Viet Nam with the design of liquidating the Vietnamese people's patriotic movement, annexing South Viet Nam, perpetually dividing Viet Nam, thus turning South Viet Nam into a U.S. new-type colony and military base and setting up a defence line to prevent socialism from advancing to South-East Asia, at the same time using South Viet Nam as a base to attack North Viet Nam, an outpost of the socialist system in South-East Asia, repressing and staving off socialism in this region in order to encircle and intimidate other socialist countries. Failing in their attempt to use the Ngo Dinh Diem administration as an instrument, and defeated in their "special war" in South Viet Nam, the U.S. imperialists embarked on a military adventure, the biggest, longest, fiercest and most brutal war of aggression since

the Second World War against the Vietnamese people.

Responding to the sacred appeal of President Ho Chi Minh: *"Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom"*, the Vietnamese people rose up, like a single man, against the U.S. imperialists. In this fight they held high the banner of national independence and socialism, combined the strength of our nation with that of our era, the strength of our own country with that of the world, in so doing they were able to create a great general strength to fight and defeat the aggressor. In this war, the Vietnamese people adopted an offensive strategy and conducted a vigorous struggle on three fronts—military, political, and diplomatic; at the same time they succeeded in compelling the enemy to de-escalate the war step by step, won partial victories, then total victory.

For 20 years and more, even as the Vietnamese people were fighting the U.S. policy of interference and aggression, they had to carry out a persevering and extremely complex struggle against the designs and acts, overt and covert, of the Chinese rulers who compromised and colluded with the U.S. imperialists to contain and to undermine the Vietnamese revolution, to subdue Viet Nam and realize step by step their expansionist policy in Indochina and South-East Asia.

I-1954-1964 PERIOD: THE CHINESE RULERS HAMPERED THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL REUNIFICATION

After reaching a compromise with the imperialists in the 1954 Geneva settlement and creating a safe buffer zone south of their country, the Chinese

leaders could devote themselves to speeding up the fulfilment of their first 5-year plan (1953-1957) and from 1958 they started their "great leap forward" plan, in an attempt to catch up with and overtake economic super-powers within a short time, and they strove to build a nuclear force.

In foreign affairs, they sought detente with the U.S. imperialists, holding talks with the U.S.A. in Geneva as early as August 1955 and at the same time, tried to expand their influence in Asia, especially in South-East Asia and South Asia.

Proceeding from these domestic and foreign policies, the Peking rulers acted contrary to the interests of the Vietnamese people and in accordance with those of the U.S. imperialists in Indochina, and particularly in Viet Nam.

1. Exerting pressure to force Viet Nam to accept the policy of "prolonged ambush".

The U.S. imperialists and their henchmen odorately rejected the holding of general elections for the reunification of Viet Nam within 2 years as provided for in the 1954 Geneva Agreements; at the same time they repressed the patriotic movement in South Viet Nam with extreme barbarity.

The Chinese rulers kept trying to convince Viet Nam that the reunification of the country was a "long struggle" and could not be achieved by using armed forces.

In November, 1956, Chairman Mao Zedong told Vietnamese leaders:

"The partition of Viet Nam cannot be solved in a short time, it may take a long time. . . If 10 years is not enough, we should be prepared for 100 years."

The resistance waged by the Vietnamese people against U.S. aggression was long indeed, but not indefinitely long as Chairman Mao Zedong had anticipated.

In July 1955, Deng Xiaoping, Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party, warned:

"Two possibilities will ensue from the use of armed forces to reunify the country: either victory or loss of North Viet Nam itself."

In July 1957, Chairman Mao Zedong again said:

"The question is to defend the existing frontier, to defend the 17th parallel... It may take a long time, but I hope a long time will bring good results."

This statement was at variance with the Geneva Agreements which stipulated that the 17th parallel was not a frontier between two states, but a *provisional military demarcation line* between the two zones of Viet Nam. The Chinese leaders repeatedly preached that for South Viet Nam *"the only appropriate line is a prolonged ambush to muster strength, to keep close contact with the people and to wait for an opportunity"*. What does it really mean?

In a talk with Vietnamese leaders, a member of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Tchang Wentian said that a guerrilla war could be carried out in South Viet Nam. But later on, the Chinese ambassador in Ha Noi, on Peking's order, informed the Viet Nam side that the idea was not of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, but only an individual's.

Thus, "prolonged ambush", in fact, meant that the Vietnamese people should give up their revolutionary struggle, let the U.S.-Diem clique freely repress the South Vietnamese people.

"To defend the 17th parallel", "prolonged ambush", "to muster strength" and "to wait for an opportunity" ... were nothing but a devious way of covering up Peking's design of maintaining the political status quo in Viet Nam, recognizing both the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and the Saigon puppet administration. On July 22, 1954, in Geneva, at a dinner with Ngo Dinh Luyen, Ngo Dinh Diem's younger brother, Premier Zhou Enlai suggested the establishment of a Saigon legation in Peking. Though Ngo Dinh Diem rejected the idea, this was an irrefutable evidence that the Chinese leaders, only 24 hours after the signing of the Geneva Agreements, revealed their desire to perpetuate the partition of Viet Nam.

During the 1954-1959 period, with their policy of fascist repression, the U.S.-Diem clique massacred hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese patriots, drove hundreds of thousands of others into disguised concentration camps, causing unprecedented losses to the Vietnamese people in their struggle for national salvation. If we let them continue the slaughtering of Vietnamese patriots at this rate, how could we "muster" our strength, have enough people left "to remain in close contact with", and what "opportunity" could we expect"? If this state of things had been allowed to go on, Viet Nam would have lost its independence and would be permanently divided.

A matter of strategic significance to the South Vietnamese revolution was to decide whether to continue the political struggle or to combine political struggle with armed struggle.

The Vietnamese people were resolved to follow the line of independence and sovereignty. In late 1959 and early 1960, the people in large areas of

the Southern delta and the South of Central Viet Nam simultaneously rose up, combining political and armed struggle and shaking the puppet Ngo Dinh Diem regime by its roots.

2. Preventing the Vietnamese people from stepping up armed struggle in South Viet Nam.

The "simultaneous uprisings" which were, in fact, partial insurrections, quickly developed into a revolutionary war, combining political and armed struggle, against the "special war" of the U.S. imperialists. But the Chinese rulers did not agree with such a policy of Viet Nam.

In May 1960, during talks with the Vietnamese side, they said:

"We should not try to decide which is essential, political struggle or armed struggle. Neither form of struggle means an immediate seizure of power; anyway, the struggle remains a long one... Even with the collapse of the Diem regime, the reunification of the country cannot be achieved at once, because the U.S. imperialists would not allow it."

"... North Viet Nam may give South Viet Nam political support, helping it to work out policies, but the most important thing is to encourage the spirit of self-reliance of the South Vietnamese... When it is sure of success, the North may give the South military aid; that is, when it is quite certain that nothing bad can happen, a quantity of weapons may be supplied secretly. But, in general, no aid should be given."

Thus, failing in their attempt to prevent the South Vietnamese people's "simultaneous uprisings", the Chinese leaders wanted the North Vietnamese people to forsake their obligation to their

South Vietnamese compatriots, leaving the latter alone in the struggle.

They refused to help the Vietnamese people to build their regular army, and only agreed to give Viet Nam some light weapons and logistical supplies. When they failed to prevent the simultaneous uprising of the South Vietnamese people, they said that South Viet Nam should conduct only guerrilla warfare, fighting small battles, using small units like platoons and companies.

Being master of their own destiny, the Vietnamese people intensified their revolutionary struggle in South Viet Nam. Late in 1963, the fascist dictatorial Ngo Dinh Diem regime was overthrown and the U.S. "special war" went bankrupt.

3. To induce Viet Nam to oppose the Soviet Union.

In the early 1960s, while preventing the Vietnamese people from stepping up the struggle against the U.S. imperialists, the Peking leaders held high both the anti-U.S. and anti-Soviet signboards, but in fact they continued the policy of detente with the U.S. imperialists in Asia, to side-track the world people's struggle against the U.S. imperialists in order to carry out their scheme of opposing the Soviet Union, wrecking the socialist camp, taking over the "leadership of world revolution" and actively making preparations for detente and collusion with U.S. imperialism.

In their talks with the Vietnamese side in 1963, they tried to persuade Viet Nam to accept their view-points, that is to deny the existence of the socialist camp, and "blaze a trail" for Chinese expansion in South-East Asia. Also in 1963, the Chinese leaders put forward the so-called 25-point programme on the general line of the world commun-

ist movement and proposed to convene a conference of eleven Communist Parties in an attempt to seize "the leadership of world revolution" and to form a new Communist International dominated by Peking. They were eager to get Viet Nam's support to the idea, trying to use Viet Nam's prestige and role in the world communist and national liberation movements. To this end, they even sought to buy over Viet Nam by offering massive aid. Deng Xiaoping, Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party, informed the Vietnamese leaders of the Chinese leaders' intention to give Viet Nam one billion Chinese Yuan in aid if Viet Nam refused all aid from the Soviet Union.

The Viet Nam side reaffirmed its determination to safeguard the socialist camp, disapproved the idea of convening an 11-party conference and did not allow the Chinese leaders to use Viet Nam as a spring-board for their expansionist designs. Due to the resolute attitude of the Vietnamese side, the 25-point programme did not have any repercussions and the design of forming a new Communist International did not materialize.

During this period, as regards the revolution of Laos, the Chinese rulers applied the same policies as towards Viet Nam. They exerted pressure on the Lao revolutionary forces to compel them to practice "prolonged ambush". When the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen overthrew the coalition government and waged a "special war", they prevented the Lao revolution from staging armed struggle combined with political struggle, and attempted to pressure the Revolutionary People's Party of Laos into "reestablishing the coalition government soon", *lest the fire started by the spark in Samnua, Phong*

Saly, should spread to Viet Nam and Southern China.

In a talk on the question of Laos with the Vietnamese side in August 1961, the Chinese side said:

"The greatest care must be taken to avoid getting directly involved in the war. If the U.S. jumps into Laos, what will happen to the North Viet Nam, Yunnan and Kwang Si? We should think of the possibility of a U.S. adventure."

Concerning a solution to the Laos question at the Geneva conference in 1961-1962, the Chinese leaders advocated partitioning Laos horizontally into two zones: one controlled by the liberation forces in the North and the other controlled by the puppet Vientian administration in the South. This was a wicked design aimed at securing Lao revolutionary forces' dependence on China and isolating the South Vietnamese revolution.

However, the leaders of the Laos revolution were determined to pursue their own line, the Lao resistance forces won one victory after another, thus forcing the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen to sign the 1962 Geneva Agreements which recognized the neutrality of Laos and accepted the presence of Lao patriotic front's representatives in the second coalition government of Laos.

II-1965-1969 PERIOD: UNDERMINING AND PROLONGING THE RESISTANCE WAR OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE

During this period, the so-called "great proletarian cultural revolution" took place in China. It was, in fact, a ferocious, bloody internal struggle, which ripped up the whole Chinese society. Its aim was to do away with Marxism-Leninism, to break up the Chinese Communist Party and the State appa-

ratus, to restore in the country the undivided leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong and the Maoist policy, to oppose the Soviet Union, to undermine the world revolution, to collude with the U.S. imperialists in external affairs, and to step up the implementation of the policy of great power hegemonism and big-nation expansionism. The Chinese leaders, for their strategic interests, during this period committed themselves to a course of betraying the Vietnamese people.

1. Turning on the green light for the U.S. to directly invade Viet Nam.

With the Korean war, the U.S. imperialists learnt the lesson that they should not wage a war on the Asian continent, especially in the countries adjacent to China, lest a direct military confrontation with China should take place. But over ten years later, the U.S. imperialists recklessly embarked on a military venture in Viet Nam after causing the so-called "Tonkin Gulf incident" in August 1964. One of the main reasons was that the U.S. imperialists were no longer worried about the Chinese rulers' reaction. In January 1965, through U.S. journalist E. Snow, Chairman Mao Zedong informed Washington:

*"China's armies will not go beyond her border to fight. That was clear enough. Only if the United States attacked China, would the Chinese fight. Wasn't that clear? The Chinese are very busy with their internal affairs. Fighting beyond one's own border was criminal. Why should the Chinese do so? The South Vietnamese could cope with their situation".*¹

¹ E. Snow, *The Long Revolution*, Hutchinson Ed., London, 1973, p. 216.

Subsequently, in various ways, including the ambassadorial-level Sino-American talks in Warsaw, the Chinese side made Mao's words clear to the U.S., reassuring the latter that *"If you do no harm to us, we will do no harm to you"*.

Thus, from February 1965, the Johnson administration freely deployed its huge military machine on the Viet Nam battle-field, sending U.S. troops to South Viet Nam to fight a regional war, at the same time, waging an air war of destruction against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, causing untold sufferings and losses to the entire Vietnamese people.

The Chinese rulers thus revealed their wily calculations and evil designs. They caused the U.S. to get bogged down in the war of aggression against Viet Nam so that they may devote themselves to their "cultural revolution" unworried. With the U.S. involved in a military venture in Viet Nam, they hoped both the U.S. and Viet Nam would be weakened.

The following words of Premier Zhou Enlai in his talk with Egyptian President A. Nasser on June 23, 1965 and retold by Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, Nasser's close friend and personal adviser, constituted an eloquent evidence:

*"The more troops the U.S. sends to Viet Nam, the more delighted we are, for we know that we have them in our hands and we can bleed them. If you want to help Viet Nam, you should encourage the U.S. to send more troops to that country, the more the better."*¹

With the Vietnamese people, the Chinese rulers kept insisting: protracted war, guerrilla warfare,

¹ Mohammed H. Heikal, *Documents du Caire*, Flammarion Ed., Paris, 1972, p. 238.

small battles. They helped the Vietnamese people mainly with light weapons, ammunition and logistic supplies. They did not want an early end to the Viet Nam war, because they wanted not only to weaken the Vietnamese revolutionary forces, but also to avail, the longer the better, of the publicity obtained by "aiding Viet Nam" to hold high the banner of "thorough revolution", to muster forces in Asia, Africa and Latin America and to intensify their anti-Soviet campaign.

No wonder they refused to implement a secret military agreement between Viet Nam and China. According to the agreement, the Chinese side, in principle, had to send pilots to Viet Nam by June, 1965. But on July 16, 1965, the General Staff of the Chinese Liberation Army sent a message to the General Staff of the Viet Nam People's Army, saying that the Chinese side could not send pilots to Viet Nam because *"the time is not appropriate"* and *"by doing so we could not prevent the enemy from intensifying their air raids"*. During talks with the Vietnamese side in August 1966, they also said: *"China has not enough air power to help defend Ha Noi."*

2. Undermining every united action in support of Viet Nam's struggle against U.S. aggression.

In order to make Viet Nam dependent on China, the Chinese rulers did their utmost to prevent every united action by revolutionary and progressive forces in the world in support of Viet Nam's struggle against U.S. aggression.

On February 28, 1965, they rejected the Vietnamese draft of February 22, 1965 for a joint statement by the socialist countries condemning the United States for intensifying its war of aggression

in South Viet Nam and for unleashing a war against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

In March 1965, they rejected the Soviet proposal that the Parties of the Soviet Union, China and Viet Nam meet to discuss joint action in support of the Vietnamese people's struggle against the U.S. aggressors.

In April 1965, on two occasions, they rejected the Soviet proposal for united action to ensure the security of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. This explained why they rejected the Soviet proposal to set up an airlift via China and build airfields on Chinese territory to defend the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

In February 1966, Chairman Mao Zedong rejected the idea of creating a united international front in support of Viet Nam as suggested in the course of the high-level Sino-Vietnamese talk.

In March 1966, Chairman Mao Zedong again rejected the suggestion for the founding of a united international front in support of Viet Nam against the U.S. imperialists made by the Japanese Communist Party at a high-level talk with the Chinese Communist Party. Later Peking's agents brazenly manhandled the Japanese Communist Party's representative in China.

Instead, the Chinese authorities wanted to set up what they called the World People's Front under their control.

*"It is necessary to set up a broad united international front against the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen. . . Of course such a front should not include them (the Soviet Union)."*¹

Along with their sabotage of every united action

¹ Resolution of the 11th plenum (8th session) of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, August 1966.

in support of Viet Nam, they created tremendous difficulties for the transportation of aid supplies from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries via China, and tried by all means to reschedule those supplies in an attempt to limit the Vietnamese people's ability to launch large-scale operations, particularly in the dry season.

In their struggles against the common enemy, namely colonialism and imperialism, the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea have closely united with one another. That is a fine tradition and a factor determining the victory of the three countries. Following the intensification of the U.S. war against Viet Nam and in face of the threat to the independence, peace, neutrality of Laos and Kampuchea, an Indochinese people's conference was held in Phnom Penh in March 1965, and subsequently the Indochinese Peoples' United Front against U.S. aggression took shape. But, the Chinese rulers, though compelled to welcome the results of the conference in public, made many attempts to sabotage the three Indochinese Peoples' United Front. Applying the traditional "divide and rule" policy of imperialist and reactionary forces, they sowed discord among the three Indochinese countries in an attempt to weaken them and to isolate Viet Nam, so that they could easily subdue these countries one after another.

In 1966, in the liberated areas of Laos controlled by the Lao Patriotic Front, Chinese nationals, implementing a plan of Peking, tried to bring about discord between the Lao and the Vietnamese, carried out a campaign of distortion propaganda and instigated bad elements to oppose the Lao People's Revolutionary Party. On the other hand, Peking tried to win over the Royal Government of Laos by stepping up its aid programme for building a road network in the 5 provinces of Northern Laos leading to

the Yunnan high-plateau in China and branching off to Viet Nam and Thailand. This would facilitate China's interference in the internal affairs of Laos and Chinese preparations for future expansionist plans.

In Kampuchea, before 1965, the Chinese rulers had been slanderously clamouring that Viet Nam had sold out the interests of the Kampuchean revolution at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina, in spite of the obvious fact that it was China who had sold out Kampuchea. In 1965, after securing control over Pol Pot, they enjoined the latter to wage an armed struggle against the Sihanouk administration, then allied with the resistance forces of Viet Nam and Laos. In the second half of 1969 after Lon Nol became Prime Minister, the Chinese rulers supported his demand that the South Vietnamese liberation armed forces withdraw from their Kampuchean bases and refrain from using the port of Sihanoukville as a supply base. During that same period, the Pol Pot - Ieng Sary clique too demanded that the South Vietnamese liberation armed forces withdraw from their Kampuchean bases.

Contrary to Peking's wish, the world people's front in support of Viet Nam became a reality, the solidarity among the Indochinese peoples was increasingly consolidated and the Vietnamese people grew even stronger and won even more victories in their struggle.

3. Preventing Viet Nam from negotiating with the U.S. for a U.S. de-escalation of the war.

Right from the start of its war of resistance against U.S. aggression, Viet Nam decided to wage a struggle on three fronts—military, political and diplomatic.

Early in 1968, when the U.S. war of aggression came to its climax, the Vietnamese people won a great victory in their Mau Than Lunar New Year general offensive and uprising, inflicting on the enemy a decisive blow which upset its strategy, thereby compelling the U.S. administration to de-escalate the war and hold talks with the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam in Paris.

In the course of the talks with the Vietnamese side in April 1968, the Chinese side recognized that the January 28, 1967 statement of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam on negotiations with the United States had a good effect, saying: *"Even allies of the United States, including de Gaulle, also demanded an unconditional end to the bombardment"*. But they also added: *"The time has not come and a favourable position has not been secured for Viet Nam's entering into negotiations with the United States. We have been making concessions too hastily."*

From May 13, 1968, when the Paris conference began, to mid-October, 1968, the Peking media did not carry any report about the negotiations between Viet Nam and the United States, but kept on stressing that the Vietnamese people should decide the outcome of their struggle *"not at the conference table, but on the battlefield"*. They even threatened that *"failure to secure South Viet Nam would ultimately lead to the loss of the whole of Viet Nam"*.

When the possibility of an end to the U.S. bombing of North Viet Nam emerged more clearly, Peking's reaction became stronger.

On October 9, 1968, a Chinese leader met a Vietnamese Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade in Peking and asked him to convey to the Vietnamese leadership a message to the effect that China considered the ending of U.S. bombing of North Viet Nam as

"a Vietnamese compromise with the United States" and "a major setback and a great loss for the Vietnamese people, just like the negotiations for the 1954 Geneva Agreements which were a mistake". He suggested that Viet Nam *"should let the U.S. resume bombing and shelling all over North Viet Nam. Thus the United States would be forced to scatter its bombing raids and a lessening of difficulties for the South could be achieved"*.

Preventing the Vietnamese people from negotiating with the United States and encouraging the latter to intensify bombing of North Viet Nam showed, as U.S. General M. Taylor put it, the determination of the Chinese leadership *"to fight the United States to the last Vietnamese"* so as to weaken Viet Nam in the interest of their expansionist policy.

At the above-mentioned talk with the Vietnamese Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade, the Chinese side made a fallacious statement that in its decision to hold negotiations with the United States Viet Nam had taken *"Soviet advice"* and they asked the Vietnamese to make a choice:

"If Viet Nam wants to defeat the United States, it should cut off relations with the Soviet Union; if Viet Nam wants to reach a compromise with the United States, using Chinese aid for the fight against the Americans with a view to negotiating with them, Chinese aid would then lose all its significance."

On October 17, 1968, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi met a Vietnamese representative to convey the Chinese leadership's view of the negotiations between Viet Nam and the United States:

"Your agreement to hold four-party negotiations will help Johnson and Humphrey to win the elections, leave the South Vietnamese people under the domination of the U.S. imperialists and their puppets. South Viet Nam will not be liberated and its people

may suffer still greater losses. So is there anything for our two Parties and States to talk about?"

The threat to cut off relations between the two Parties was a cynical trick to exert the strongest pressure on Viet Nam.

Threats by coarse words were accompanied with threats by deeds. In 1968, when planning the aid programme for 1969, the Chinese reduced the amount of aid by 20% as compared with 1968. Furthermore, in August 1969, they brazenly said:

"You want to continue fighting or to make peace? China must know the answer when considering the question of aid."

In practice, they reduced the amount of aid for 1970 by more than 50% as compared with 1968.

As a matter of fact, the Peking leadership did not wait until 1968 to use aid to exert pressure on Viet Nam. As early as April, 1966, Deng Xiaoping, Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party, told a Vietnamese leader: *"In 1964, comrade Mao Zedong criticized us for showing too great a zeal in the Viet Nam question. Now we have clearly seen that he is very far-sighted."*

The Vietnamese side replied:

"The zeal of one socialist country for another is in keeping with proletarian internationalism. We never think that such a zeal could ever do any harm. With your zeal the lives of 2 or 3 million people in our country may be spared."

"The South Vietnamese people will fight the U.S. aggressors to the end, and we will continue to uphold proletarian internationalism."

In an attempt to exert greater pressure on Viet Nam, the Chinese leadership instructed their embassy in Ha Noi to instigate Chinese nationals in Viet Nam to make trouble and oppose the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. Together

with tens of thousands of people belonging to the Chinese "logistics troops" who came to Viet Nam to help build roads in the Northern provinces from 1965 to 1968, reactionary Chinese nationals propagated "Mao Zedong thought" and "the cultural revolution", distorted the political line of Viet Nam and organized a network of intelligence. "Victims of the cultural revolution" infiltrated into the Northern border provinces of Viet Nam to spy and organize "under-ground armies"¹.

But the Vietnamese people were determined to persist in their immutable line of independence and sovereignty. Peking's crude attempts to exert pressure and its political manoeuvres had been frustrated. The U.S. was compelled to put an unconditional end to the bombing of North Viet Nam early in November 1968 and to take part in the quadripartite talks in Paris, with the participation of the National Front for Liberation of South Viet Nam from early 1969.

III-1969-1973 PERIOD: NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES BEHIND VIET NAM'S BACK

In 1969, as the "cultural revolution" in China had been completed in the main, the Peking rulers, internally, made every effort to consolidate the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong, stabilize the domestic situation and step up production and, externally, used all possible means to accelerate the

¹ During the Viet Nam-China top-level talks in September 1970 and November 1977, Chairman Mao Zedong and Chairman Hua Guo Feng have admitted China's responsibility for those unfriendly acts.

process of rapprochement with the United States in an attempt to raise China to the rank of a big power, normalize relations with the United States and settle the problem of Taiwan. They attempted to use the Viet Nam problem to achieve such objectives in external affairs.

1969 was Nixon's first year in the White House. He advanced the "Nixon doctrine" with a view to restoring the international position of the United States seriously weakened by the Viet Nam war, and adopted the strategy of "Vietnamization of the war" with a view to withdrawing U.S. troops from South Viet Nam while maintaining the Nguyen Van Thieu puppet administration.

During the period from 1969 to 1973, the Vietnamese people stepped up their offensive on the battlefield as well as at the Paris quadripartite conference and achieved ever greater successes. This was also the period when Peking and Washington increased contacts, openly collaborated with each other and discussed not only bilateral matters, but also matters relating to the sovereignty of the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples.

1. Brazenly betraying the Vietnamese People.

Early in November, 1968, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China issued a statement expressing its desire to resume the Sino-U.S. talks in Warsaw and to sign with the United States an agreement of peaceful co-existence. Subsequently, China responded positively to the signals from the U.S. side. After becoming President, Nixon informed the Chinese Government that discussions between the United States and China could be held in China. China replied that "Nixon might come personally

to Peking or send an envoy to discuss the Taiwan problem."¹

In June 1970, China and the United States agreed that Chinese ambassador Huang Chen and Kissinger would hold secret talks each time Kissinger came to Paris for the negotiations with Viet Nam.²

On December 10, 1970, through his close friend E. Snow, Chairman Mao Zedong extended an invitation to Nixon to visit China:

*"He (the President) should be welcome because at present the problems between China and the U.S.A. must be solved with Nixon."*³

This was Peking's turn-about decisively bearing on Sino-U.S. relations, at the same time it was a turning point on Peking's path of overt betrayal to the Vietnamese revolution, the Indochinese revolution and the world revolution. Peking increased its public contacts with the United States:

In March 1971, China invited a team of U.S. ping-pong players to visit China, starting what public opinion called "ping-pong diplomacy".

In July and in October 1971, Kissinger came to Peking as Nixon's special envoy.

In February 1972, Nixon himself visited China.

Briefing the Vietnamese side on Kissinger's first visit to Peking, a high-level delegation of China on July 13, 1971, said:

"Indochina was the most important question in our meeting with Kissinger. Kissinger said the United States linked the settlement of the Indochina problem with the settlement of the Taiwan problem."

¹ E. Snow, *The Long Revolution*, Hutchinson Ed., London, 1973, pp. 11 and 172.

² V. A. Walters, *Silent Missions*, Doubleday Ed., New York, 1978, pp. 530-531.

³ E. Snow, *The Long Revolution*, Hutchinson Ed., London, 1973, p. 172.

The Americans said they would withdraw their troops from Taiwan only if they could withdraw troops from Indochina. As far as China is concerned, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Viet Nam is problem No. 1, and the question of China joining the United Nations comes second".

When Nixon ended his visit to China the two sides signed the Shanghai communiqué which reads in part:

"The United States confirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in this area diminishes."

Early in March 1972, on a mission to Viet Nam for briefing about the talks with Nixon, the representative of the Chinese leadership elaborated on the above-mentioned part of the communiqué as follows:

"In order to normalize the relations between China and the United States and to ease tension in the Far East, first and foremost, the Viet Nam and Indochina problems must be settled. We do not demand that the Taiwan problem be settled first. Taiwan is for a later stage."

Peking at heart wanted to make use of the Viet Nam question for the settlement of the Taiwan issue first. But Viet Nam was determined to pursue a policy of independence and sovereignty. Consequently, the Chinese leaders and Nixon came to an agreement: *"In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations as tension in this area diminishes."*

That means that if China wanted the withdrawal of U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan to be accelerated, she had to press Ha Noi

to accept a compromise solution with the United States.

Accordingly, China used the "carrot" of aid: if in 1968 she reduced the aid volume to Viet Nam because she opposed Viet Nam's decision to negotiate with the United States, in 1971 and 1972 in order to draw Viet Nam into Peking's scheme of compromising with the United States China gave Viet Nam the greatest ever amount of aid. This was merely an attempt to cover up their betrayal and to appease the Vietnamese people's indignation.

Alongside with the increase of aid, China exerted an unrelenting pressure to make Viet Nam accept a U.S. solution. On July 18, 1971 the Chinese side communicated to the Vietnamese side a four-point programme of the United States: withdrawal of U.S. troops and release of U.S. POWs within 12 months as from August 1, 1971; ceasefire throughout Indochina and a Geneva-type solution as in 1954. Regarding the withdrawal of U.S. troops for "face-saving" purpose the United States wanted to retain a number of technical personnel. Concerning political questions, *"the United States did not want to abandon Nguyen Van Thieu nor did it want to abandon Sirik Matak"*.

In the talks with the Vietnamese side in November 1971, the Chinese side said: *"Viet Nam should take advantage of the opportunity to settle the question of withdrawal of U.S. troops first and should consider the settlement of the POW problem. The overthrow of the Saigon puppet administration is a long-term issue."*

Also on this occasion, after referring to a U.S. proposition that *"the United States has many old friends that it could not afford to forsake"*, Chairman Mao Zedong said:

"The Taiwan question is a long-term one. Probably it cannot be solved in a few years. Between a quick solution and a delayed one, I'm inclined to choose the latter. At present Chiang Kaishek has 650,000 troops, and there is a strait in between that we cannot cross. Chiang Kaishek will remain on the island. Where the broom cannot reach, the dust is not swept away."

After Nixon's visit to China, Kissinger told reporters on March 1, 1972 that he and the President "now began to look toward Moscow—and the crunch on Viet Nam".¹

From April 1972, the United States resumed bombing and mined all ports of North Viet Nam and intensified attacks in South Viet Nam in an attempt to cope with the 1972-Spring strategic offensive of the South Vietnamese people and save the Nguyen Van Thieu regime from collapse. This new U.S. military venture was precisely the result of the complicity between the Chinese rulers and Nixon.

It is common knowledge that the failure to initial the Paris Agreements by the end of October 1972 was due to the Nixon-Kissinger volte-face. But the Chinese rulers again took the U.S. viewpoint and brought pressure to bear upon Viet Nam. On November 1, 1972, through a Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, they told the Vietnamese leadership that Viet Nam should make concessions on the question of withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops and the question of North Viet Nam renouncing military aid, so that the agreement can be signed.

On December 5, 1972, Chinese ambassador Huang Chen conveyed to the Vietnamese side a warning from Kissinger:

"The negotiations have come to a critical point. North Viet Nam is demanding that the United States return to the old agreement or accept a worse one. Both things are unacceptable to the United States. Should Viet Nam hold on to this stand, the negotiations would be suspended and the United States would take any necessary action to safeguard its principles."

That was precisely a preparatory step for the strategic strike with B.52 bombers against Ha Noi and Hai Phong at the end of 1972 in an attempt to subdue the Vietnamese people and force them to accept a solution imposed by the U.S. imperialists.

In face of Peking's collusion with Washington against Viet Nam, the Vietnamese people were still determined to intensify their patriotic struggle against U.S. aggression, confident of final victory.

When the Chinese side informed Viet Nam that during his visit to China Nixon would also hold discussions with the Chinese leaders on the question of Viet Nam, the Vietnamese leaders answered straightforwardly:

"Viet Nam is our country, you have no right to discuss with the United States the question of Viet Nam. You have already admitted your 1954 mistake, so you should not commit another one."

When the Chinese side informed Viet Nam of Nixon's visit to China, the Vietnamese leaders said:

"In their struggle against U.S. aggression, the Vietnamese people must win. The U.S. imperialists may soon resume and even intensify their air war against North Viet Nam, but the Vietnamese people

¹ M. Kalb and B. Kalb, *Kissinger*, Little, Brown and Co., Ed. Boston-Toronto, 1974, p. 283.

are not afraid and they will certainly be victorious."

In spite of all kinds of pressure from Peking and Washington, the Vietnamese made no concessions on matters of principle. They instead gave the U.S. imperialists due punishment and eventually forced the latter to sign the Paris Agreements on Viet Nam on January 27, 1973.

2. Complete control of the Kampuchean problem.

Implementing their policy of détente and collusion with the U.S. imperialists, trying to pave the way for their future expansion to South-East Asia and at the same time attempting to undermine the Indochinese Peoples' Front of solidarity and bringing more pressure to bear upon Viet Nam, Peking, since 1970, had sought to control Kampuchean forces, applying a very complex policy towards Kampuchea aimed at nothing else but the satisfaction of their selfish interest.

It may be recalled that imperialist and reactionary forces staged the March 18, 1970 coup d'état to overthrow Prince Sihanouk's Government and bring Lon Nol to power. As Lon Nol was a Kampuchean of Chinese origin and an American agent, the Chinese leaders wanted to use him rather than Sihanouk. In Peking, a representative of the Chinese Foreign Ministry told the Vietnamese ambassador:

"Sihanouk has no forces, Viet Nam should support Lon Nol. China welcomes Sihanouk (¹), but still maintains good relations with the Phnom Penh Embassy."

¹ Sihanouk was then on the way to Peking from Moscow.

In Phnom Penh, the Chinese Ambassador told the Vietnamese Ambassador the same thing. The Chinese Foreign Ministry even told the Vietnamese Ambassador that China disapproved of the demonstrations against Lon Nol by Vietnamese students in China.

Soon after the coup d'état in Phnom Penh and Sihanouk's arrival in Peking Prime Minister Pham Van Dong made a visit to China to persuade the Chinese leaders to support Sihanouk and demonstrate Viet Nam's strong support for Sihanouk and the Khmer resistance forces.

On March 23, 1970, Sihanouk issued a five-point statement condemning the coup d'état staged by Lon Nol and calling on the Kampuchean people to unite in a struggle against the U.S. imperialists and the Lon Nol clique.

In its March 25, 1970 statement, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam expressed its full support for Sihanouk's statement.

Not until April 7, 1970, did the Chinese Government declare in a statement its support for Sihanouk. However, it continued to hold secret discussions with the Lon Nol administration. In the meantime, with the assistance from the Vietnamese armed forces, the Khmer resistance forces won new victories, liberating one fourth of the country. Only when Nixon ordered an invasion of Kampuchea, provoking a strong movement of protest throughout the world and even in the United States, did the Chinese Government cut off its relations with the Lon Nol administration (May 5, 1970).

Evidently, it was due to Viet Nam's strong support for the Kampuchean resistance government and to the developments on the battlefield favourable to the resistance forces that the Peking rulers felt compelled to support Sihanouk, President of

the Khmer National United Front against U.S. aggression. Since then, they had been trying to hold Sihanouk in their grip and monopolize this Sihanouk card for bargaining with the United States. Though extending support for Sihanouk and the Kampuchean resistance government, they, on the one hand, still maintained secret relations with the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique, and on the other hand, actively made use of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique so as to gradually turn the Khmer Party into a Party dependent on China, like other Maoist parties and groups in South-East Asia and in the world.

The Chinese leaders sought to exploit the first Summit Conference of the Indochinese peoples held in April 1970, and deliberately tried to make believe that they had made big contributions to this conference. They wanted to show the United States that they were in a position to help finding a solution to the Indochina question, and it was they who could "represent" Viet Nam and other Indochinese countries in negotiations with the United States.

At a time when the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea repeatedly dealt strong blows on Nixon's new military adventures, Sihanouk proposed the convening of a second summit conference of the Indochinese peoples by the end of 1971 to step up, on the wake of the victories won, the struggle against U.S. aggression in the whole of Indochina. Outwardly, the Chinese leaders welcomed this proposal, but actually they instigated the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary group to oppose it. Moreover, on a visit to Viet Nam in March 1971, Chinese representatives suggested the holding in China of a Conference of five countries with six parties (North and South Viet Nam, Laos, Kampuchea, China, and

the People's Democratic Republic of Korea) to oppose Japan. This originated from their dark design to undermine the solidarity among the Indochinese peoples, sidetrack the latter's struggle and at the same time to rally more forces under Peking's leadership so that the Chinese could secure a better position to enter into negotiations with the United States. The Vietnamese side supported Sihanouk's proposal and rejected the convening of a conference of five countries with six parties as suggested by China. We also took exception to the view that the threat came from Japan since the U.S. imperialist aggressors remained the principal enemy of the Indochinese peoples. That was why China's scheme of convening a conference of five countries with six parties was thwarted.

While seeking every possible means to manipulate the Kampuchean problem, the Chinese leaders also attempted to control the military supply route in the three Indochinese countries. In several consecutive years up to 1972, the Chinese offered their help in building roads and transporting military supplies from North Viet Nam to the front in South Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and promised to provide Viet Nam with enough trucks and drivers and about 200,000 Chinese troops to ensure the fulfilment of this task. They hoped that the project would give them complete control over the situation in Indochina and allow them to deal with the United States, and provide them with a springboard for expansion to South-East Asia. Of course, Viet Nam rejected this proposal.

If in the past the Chinese leaders covertly undermined the Vietnamese people's resistance, in the

1969-1973 period, particularly from 1971, they overtly collaborated with the U.S. imperialist aggressors trying to come to the rescue of the latter in face of the Vietnamese people's new strategic offensive and they used the Viet Nam card in dealing with the Americans. If in the past, they secretly tried to create dissension among the three Indochinese peoples in an attempt to isolate Viet Nam, in this period they began to use the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique to sabotage the revolution in the three Indochinese countries, actively made preparations to turn Kampuchea into a spring-board for attacks against Viet Nam with a view to securing China's control over the Indochinese peninsula and later on her expansion to South-East Asia.

Thus, they cast off their mask and appeared as traitors to the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea.

IV-1973-1975 PERIOD: PREVENTING THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE FROM COMPLETELY LIBERATING SOUTH VIET NAM

Under the Paris Agreements, the United States had to withdraw all its troops from South Viet Nam, undertook to respect the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people and recognized that in South Viet Nam there were two zones of control, two administrations, two armies and three political forces and that the parties concerned in South Viet Nam will form a three-component coalition Government. This was a victory of the political line of independence and sovereignty of the valiant struggle of the Vietnamese people and a victory of the world people's movement of solidarity with Viet Nam. This was the failure of the dirty

deal behind the back of the Vietnamese people between the Nixon administration and the Chinese leaders as expressed in the Shanghai communiqué.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam always pursued a policy of scrupulous implementation of the Paris Agreements and demanded that the United States and the Thieu regime do likewise.

But the United States and the Thieu regime sought to sabotage the implementation of the Agreements. They only carried out what served U.S. interests. As for the other provisions, they violated them right from the start. As soon as the Agreements came into effect, the United States and the Thieu administration used ten of thousands of troops supported by aircraft, heavy guns and tanks in an operation against Cua Viet, hoping to reoccupy the liberated zone north of Quang Tri province. Later on, the Thieu troops launched continuous attacks all over South Viet Nam seizing many liberated areas under the control of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam. With this scheme, the United States and the U.S. puppet regime, denying the existence in South Viet Nam of two zones of control with two different administrations, tried to reestablish the neo-colonialist rule all over South Viet Nam and perpetuate the partition of Viet Nam.

The Chinese leaders pretended to welcome the Paris Agreements on Viet Nam. In fact, to carry out the understanding with the United States and to further collude with it on the one hand and to weaken and subjugate Viet Nam on the other, they made every effort to hinder the Vietnamese people's struggle to thwart the scheme of the United States and the Thieu administration to sabotage

the Paris Agreements, to liberate South Viet Nam entirely and reunify the country.

1. Hampering the Vietnamese people's struggle against the sabotage of the Paris Agreements by the United States and the Thieu administration.

During talks with Secretary General Le Duan and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong in Peking in 1973, Chairman Mao Zedong said:

"In South Viet Nam, it is necessary to stop (fighting) for half a year or a year, or a year and a half and better still, two years." The revolution in South Viet Nam should be "carried out in two stages. If you combine into one, the United States won't just look on. The problem is that the Nguyen Van Thieu administration still has tens of thousands of troops".

He again referred to the "broom" already mentioned in one of his previous talks with Vietnamese leaders.

For his part, Premier Zhou Enlai said:

"It would be best for Viet Nam and the whole of Indochina to relax for some time, five or ten years, we cannot yet say precisely. In these circumstances the peoples of South Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea will carry out a policy of peace and neutrality for sometime".

To show their "good-will" the Chinese promised to continue for five years to give Viet Nam annually an amount of aid equal to that of 1973. In reality, they had already stopped all military aid. As for economic aid, they only undertook to restore the factories and installations built with Chinese aid and damaged by U.S. bombardments but they delayed the reconstruction task and in some places they did not do it at all.

At heart the Chinese rulers did not want Viet Nam to do anything even when the Saigon administration launched land-grabbing operations against the liberated areas.

In face of the increasing land-grabbing activities by the Sai Gon puppet troops, in October 1973, the High Command of the Liberation Armed Forces of South Viet Nam was compelled to order a resolute counter-attack. About one month later, when Kissinger was in Peking for a visit, the two sides issued a statement which said: *"In the particularly serious situation at present"* it is necessary for China and the United States to hold frequent contacts at competent level to exchange views on matters of mutual interest. In fact, these were common efforts made by the Chinese rulers and the United States to hinder the struggle of the armed forces in South Viet Nam.

The Peking rulers even advised the United States *"not to allow yourselves to be defeated in Viet Nam, and not to pull out your forces from South-East Asia"*.¹

More wicked still, they tried to entice a number of generals and officials of the Saigon puppet administration to collaborate with them; they even sent a messenger to persuade General Duong Van Minh, President of the Saigon regime in its last days, to continue, with Peking's support, to resist the general offensive and uprising of the people in South Viet Nam.

2. Encroaching on Vietnamese territory and creating tension at the border.

From 1973, the Chinese authorities were increasing their acts of provocation and territorial en-

¹ *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 20, 1979, p. 23.

croachment in the northern border provinces, in an attempt to weaken our efforts for the total liberation of South Viet Nam.

On the one hand, they prevented Viet Nam from exploring and exploiting its natural resources to accelerate its economic rehabilitation and development programme. On December 26, 1973, the Vietnamese side proposed the holding of talks to officially demarcate the Sino-Vietnamese boundary in the Bac Bo (Tonkin) Gulf, so that Viet Nam could use its part for national reconstruction. On January 18, 1974, the Chinese side replied that it accepted the proposal, but demanded that in Bac Bo Gulf no prospecting be carried out on an area of 20,000 square kilometres marked out by the Chinese themselves. They even demanded that *"no third country be allowed to conduct prospecting in the Bac Bo Gulf"*, as that *"would not be beneficial to the economic development and military security of the two countries"*. But that was a pretext to cover up China's dark design. That was why the negotiations from August to November 1974 on the Sino-Vietnamese boundary in the Bac Bo Gulf did not lead to any positive result. The same big-nation attitude of the Chinese authorities brought to an impasse the negotiations on the boundaries on land and in the Bac Bo Gulf begun in October 1977. This served their purposes of violating the frontier and encroaching upon and occupying Vietnamese territory and maintaining a tense situation in the Sino-Vietnamese border area.

Furthermore, on January 19, 1974, only one day after the Chinese side agreed to negotiate on the Bac Bo Gulf problem, they used naval and air forces to attack and seize the Hoang Sa (Paracels) archipelago which has for a long time been a part of Vietnamese territory and was then occupied by the Sai

Gon puppet troops. The occupation of the archipelago was not a self-defence act as the Chinese claimed, but an act of aggression, an encroachment on Vietnamese territory, designed to put Viet Nam under Chinese control from the sea, and an attempt to monopolize step by step the Eastern Sea (South China Sea). This calculated act had the United States' approval. Thus, U.S. Ambassador in Sai Gon G. Matin had rejected a request for help from the Nguyen Van Thieu administration, and the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Pacific was ordered to keep away from the Hoang Sa archipelago.

At his talks with Vietnamese leaders in 1975, Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping admitted that both Viet Nam and China had claimed the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagoes, therefore, it was necessary to hold talks to solve this problem. This further demonstrated that the Chinese invasion of the Hoang Sa archipelago was an aggressive act in defiance of international law and aimed at bringing about a *"fait accompli"*.¹

3. Turning Kampuchea into a spring-board for attacking Viet Nam.

After the Paris Agreements on Viet Nam, on Peking's order, the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique pursued a double-faced policy: relying on Viet Nam on the one hand and opposing Viet Nam on the other.

They pretended to be *"friendly"* and *"united"* with Viet Nam in order to win support from the

¹ For further information on the border question, the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagoes, read the March 15, 1979 Memorandum, the statements dated August 7, 1979 and September 27, 1979 of the Foreign Ministry of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the *"White Book"* issued on September 28, 1979 by the same Ministry.

latter, especially when they were about to attack Phnom Penh. In accordance with the Sino-American understanding, the Chinese authorities ceased the supply of military aid for the three Indochinese peoples' revolution. They turned down a request from the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique for more offensive weapons. Instead, they asked Viet Nam to loan weapons to Kampuchea for which they promised compensation to Viet Nam at a later date. This was a trick of Peking's: while trying to satisfy their Kampuchean agents' demand and avoid trouble with the United States, they created more difficulties for Viet Nam at a time when the latter was engaged in a general offensive and uprising in Spring 1975.

On the other hand, the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique exerted great efforts to oppose Viet Nam. They slanderously clamoured that Viet Nam, in signing the Paris Agreements, had betrayed Kampuchea for a second time. In so doing they hoped to stir up national hatred and to arouse anti-Viet Nam feelings thus having a pretext to purge those Kampuchians who disagreed with their policy. On many occasions they attacked and plundered arms depots, hospitals and encampments of the South Viet Nam Liberation Army in Kampuchea.

Resorting to extremely vicious means, including assassination of true revolutionary cadres, the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique sought to control as many important positions in the Party as they could and take all powers into their hands in order to make the Kampuchean Communist Party dependent on Peking.

Clearly, the Chinese leaders had made a step further in their scheme of getting a complete hold of Kampuchea under the rule of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique and turning it into a spring-board for

attacking Viet Nam from the South West after the complete liberation of South Viet Nam.

Though the Chinese leaders spared no efforts to prevent the Vietnamese people from liberating their entire country, the latter still persisted in their struggle on the three fronts, military, political and diplomatic, against the violations of the Paris Agreements by the United States and the Thieu administration, and won final victory. With the success of the Spring 1975 general offensive and uprising, the Vietnamese people destroyed the Nguyen Van Thieu administration, completely liberated South Viet Nam and reunified their country.

Previously, the Chinese rulers intervened in our resistance war against the French colonialists only when it was about to end, seeking to impose a solution to their liking on the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea.

But in our resistance war against U.S. aggression, they interfered right from its beginning, creating conditions for the United States to intensify and expand the war to all parts of Viet Nam and to carry out extremely barbarous bombardment against North Viet Nam, and using the Vietnam question in their deal with the United States while unceasingly clamouring about "thorough revolution" and "active support" for Viet Nam.

This was the second time the Chinese leaders betrayed the people of Viet Nam.

Part Four

CHINA'S POLICY TOWARD LIBERATED AND REUNIFIED VIET NAM

(from May 1975 up to the present time)

I-CHINA AFTER THE U.S. DEFEAT IN VIET NAM

World public opinion agrees that the U.S. defeat in Viet Nam had a visible impact on the world situation.

If the Vietnamese people's victory in the August Revolution and in the resistance war against the French has started the disintegration of old-type colonialism, their victory in the resistance war against the Americans proved to the world that the complete bankruptcy of neo-colonialism is inevitable. Today the revolutionary forces have grown up and are in the most favourable conditions. Nowhere can U.S. imperialism continue to play the role of an international gendarme with impunity. Neither can it seize a single inch of territory of any socialist country or drive back the national liberation movement, check the advance of other countries towards socialism. Imperialism is sinking deeper and deeper

into an irremediable and all-round crisis. It is faced with many difficulties in various fields, having to cope with the extensive and powerful offensive of the three revolutionary currents in the world and even in its apparently secure strongholds in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Although the U.S. imperialists had dispatched to Viet Nam an expeditionary corps of 600,000 men as a backbone for the more than one-million strong puppet army, dropped on Vietnamese soil 7,850,000 tons of bombs and spent 352 billion U.S. dollars, they failed to subdue the Vietnamese people. This is the heaviest defeat in the history of the United States which severely affects all aspects of life in the United States. Therefore, after Viet Nam the U.S. imperialists had to readjust their global strategy, particularly their strategy in Asia in general and South-East Asia in particular to suit the new conditions. They have stepped up collaboration with other reactionaries, especially those who betray the international communist and worker movement, particularly the Peking reactionary clique, in an attempt to sow discord and to sabotage the socialist system and the world revolutionary movement.

So far as the Chinese authorities are concerned, it was in their national interests that they have assisted Viet Nam during the latter's war against the Americans, but it was also in their national interests that they have sought to prevent Viet Nam from defeating the United States and becoming strong. They wanted Viet Nam to be weakened and dependent on China.

They wanted to see a perpetually partitioned Viet Nam. But the Vietnamese people fought on until "the Americans quit and their puppets are toppled", and the South was liberated and the country reunified.

They used the Vietnamese people's blood in dealing with the Americans, but their collusion with the United States could not prevent the Vietnamese people from gaining total victory and founding the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.

They tried to cause a rift between Viet Nam and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, but the Vietnamese people persisted in their policy of independence and sovereignty and strengthened their solidarity with the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries.

The agreement reached between them and Nixon, and their strategic designs could not materialize. An independent, unified and socialist Viet Nam, following a genuine Marxist-Leninist line of independence and sovereignty and enjoying great political prestige in the world constitutes a serious obstacle to their expansionist and hegemonist schemes in Indochina and in South-East Asia. The Vietnamese people's historic victory is a heavy defeat not only for the U.S. imperialist aggressors, but also for the Peking expansionists.

During Mao Zedong's last years and after his death, in a scramble for power, the internal struggle in China went on fiercely, with ruthless purges. China's economy, political situation and society which, for twenty years, had been upset and set back as a result of the "Great Leap" and the "Great Cultural Revolution", now required quick stabilization and improvement. Besides, the economic and military weakness of China does not allow the Peking authorities to carry out their schemes as they wish. That is why, at home they have made use of big-nation chauvinism to rally different factions and to mobilize the Chinese people to carry out the "four modernizations" plan. In external policy they have followed an increasingly reactionary line. They took

advantage of imperialism's critical economic and political crisis and the United States being forced to readjust its global strategy to collude with imperialism and further intensify their campaign against the Soviet Union and the world revolutionary movement, and to acquire Western capital and technical knowhow for their "four modernizations" plan. Their "anti-hegemonism" banner is just a mask to cover their counter-revolutionary strategy and their expansionist, big-nation hegemonist policy.

They begrudge the Vietnamese people their victory; therefore, after the Vietnamese people had won complete victory, the Chinese rulers have more and more openly and frantically carried out a systematic hostile policy toward the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.

II-FRENZIED BUT STILL COVERT ANTI-VIET NAM ACTIVITIES

1. Waging a border war through the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique in the South-West of Viet Nam.

From the mid-1960s, the Chinese leaders sought to manipulate the Kampuchea question, in the first place to undermine the Indochinese People's United Front, weaken the Vietnamese people's resistance war, secure a vantage position to negotiate with the Americans, and in the long run, to hold Kampuchea in bondage and turn it into a spring-board for Chinese expansion to Indochina and South-East Asia. Following the liberation of Kampuchea, on April 17, 1975, from the rule of the Lon Nol clique, stooges of the Americans, they helped their henchmen Pol Pot-Ieng Sary to seize the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, discard Siha-

nouk and his men, and set up a genocidal fascist regime never seen before in human history. Through this regime the Chinese sought to control the whole of Kampuchea and turn it into a new-type satellite and a military base to attack Viet Nam from the South West.

The Chinese poured money, weapons and other military hardware and brought tens of thousands of Chinese advisers into Kampuchea to set up scores of army divisions including infantry, armoured units and artillery, built or enlarged several naval and air bases and logistics installations.

Under Peking's direction, the Phnom Penh reactionary ruling clique conducted a wide propaganda campaign, alleging that Viet Nam "attacked Kampuchea", "attempted to compel Kampuchea to join a Vietnamese-controlled Indochinese Federation", and clamoured for war against Viet Nam. They sabotaged the border negotiations between the two countries in order to create increasing tension in the Viet Nam-Kampuchea border area. From April, 1975 they used their troops in land grabbing operations and shelled many places on Vietnamese territory. They provoked more and more clashes in the border area and attacked many Vietnamese border posts and villages, making the border area insecure and hampering Viet Nam's economic rehabilitation and development. Then in April, 1977, they started an all-out war against Viet Nam along the border of more than 1,000 km, launching large-scale offensives with tens of thousands of troops supported by tanks and artillery, sometimes 30 km deep into Vietnamese territory, savagely massacring civilians, destroying houses and crops, thus committing countless unforgivable crimes against the Vietnamese people.

2. Using the Hoa (Chinese) nationals issue to undermine Viet Nam from inside.

There were about 1,200,000 Hoa nationals in Viet Nam: nearly one million of them in the South, more than 200,000 in the North. The Workers' Party of Viet Nam and the Communist Party of China agreed in 1955 that the Hoa residents in North Viet Nam should be placed under the leadership of the Workers' Party of Viet Nam and gradually naturalized as Vietnamese citizens. In fact, in the past twenty years, the Hoa people in the North enjoyed the same rights and had the same obligations as Vietnamese citizens. In the South, under the Ngo Dinh Diem administration, they had taken since 1956 Vietnamese citizenship so as to enjoy more favourable conditions in their life and work.

After the complete liberation of the South, the Government and people of Viet Nam continued to strictly abide by the 1955 agreement between the two parties on the Hoa people in the North, and at the same time have duly taken into account the historical reality of Vietnamese of Chinese origin in the South, considering the Hoa people in both zones as part of the Vietnamese community. A small number of people with Taiwan, Hongkong or other foreign passports and the Hoa people expelled by the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique and taking refuge in Viet Nam, are considered as foreign nationals.

However, the Chinese leaders have distorted the 1955 agreement between the two Parties, denied the historical reality of Vietnamese of Chinese origin in the South, and they consider all the Hoa people in both zones as Chinese nationals and claim leadership of these people. Indeed, they have set up reactionary organizations and a spy network composed of Hoa residents in Viet Nam. Organizations

such as "Chinese Residents' Union for Peace", "Progressive Chinese Union", "Chinese Residents Association for National Salvation", "Marxist-Leninist Youth League", "Association of Patriotic Chinese School Pupils", "United Front of Chinese Residents" etc..., set up and commanded by Peking, have been opposing the Vietnamese Government's policies, military service, participation in the building of new economic zones, arousing racial feelings among the Hoa and instigating a movement for demanding the restoration of Chinese nationality. They made counterfeit money, practised speculation and raised prices of goods in order to undermine the Government's plan for stabilization and development of the economy in South Viet Nam. With those manoeuvres, the Peking rulers created more difficulties to the people of South Viet Nam, who had already numerous difficulties left by 30 years of imperialist war of aggression. This led a number of people to leave the country in the hope of finding a better place to live. Peking used the Hoa people as a tool to create unrest in Viet Nam, politically, economically and socially, as they had done in other countries of South-East Asia and South Asia.

In 1973, the Chinese leaders solemnly promised to give aid to Viet Nam at least for five more years, with the same annual amount as in 1973.

3. Using aid to increase pressure.

In 1975, when congratulating the Vietnamese people on the complete liberation of South Viet Nam, again the Chinese leaders said: *"China will continue to fulfil her international obligations, resolutely support the Vietnamese people's just cause of consolidating the fruits of their victory, reunifying and building up their fatherland."* This was in fact

only a fallacious statement to cover up their grudge against the Vietnamese people's historic victory which had elated all the revolutionary and progressive forces in the world, and to conceal their dark designs against the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.

In reality, they did not support the Vietnamese people in the reconstruction of their country in the new stage.

In the period from 1969 to 1970, the Chinese leaders cut down aid to Viet Nam because they disapproved of Viet Nam's negotiations with the United States to get the latter to de-escalate the war, in the 1971-1972 period they increased aid to Viet Nam to an unprecedented level because they wanted to take advantage of the Viet Nam problem to negotiate with the United States. But in 1975, because of their setback in South Viet Nam they again used aid to exert pressure on Viet Nam. They rejected Viet Nam's requests for further aid. As to the aid already agreed upon during the war and not yet fully delivered, they delayed it under various pretexts. This included unfinished projects some of which were of great importance to the peaceful reconstruction of Viet Nam. Obviously, the aid given by the Chinese leaders was not "selfless" as they have often boasted of, but a means to achieve big-nation hegemony and expansion. Peking's aid is nothing more than an aspect of the policy of "the stick and the carrot".

The above-mentioned Peking's manoeuvres against Viet Nam which are so wicked and ruthless have all been frustrated. The fascist and genocidal crimes committed by the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique have been condemned by the Kampuchean people

and the whole progressive mankind. The scheme to use the Hoa people to undermine Viet Nam from within has gone bankrupt. The attempt to exert pressure through aid and other measures cannot make Viet Nam waver in her policy of independence and sovereignty or bring the Vietnamese people into submission.

III-SYSTEMATICALLY AND OPENLY OPPOSING VIET NAM

Failing to obtain any desired results by covertly opposing Viet Nam, the Chinese rulers resorted to an open course of action against Viet Nam, using all possible means, including threats to use force and the use of force.

1. The so-called problem of "victimized residents".

Early in 1978, the Chinese rulers fabricated the so-called problem of "victimized residents" to openly start a large-scale campaign against the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.

The activities of the secret Hoa organizations and the intelligence network of the Chinese Embassy in Ha Noi, closely guided by the Peking propaganda machine, the brazen allegations accusing Viet Nam of "expelling, ostracizing and persecuting the Hoa people", together with deception, bribes, enticement and threats, created a feeling of anxiety and fear of an imminent war and instigated suspicions, even enmity towards the Vietnamese and caused the Hoa people who were living peacefully in Viet Nam to leave for China en masse. Chinese agents helped the Hoa to cross the border illegally and then held

them up at the Viet Nam-China border, and incited the stranded people to oppose and to assault Vietnamese local officials. When the exodus of the Hoa to China began, Peking sent two ships to Viet Nam to take "the victimized residents" although they had not yet raised this question with the Government of Viet Nam. Within only a few months, 170,000 Hoa people left Viet Nam for China. The so-called question of "victimized residents" was only a coercion of the Hoa in Viet Nam to leave en masse for China. The culprit here was the reactionary group in the Peking leadership who practised deception and betrayal in an attempt to provoke political, social and economic unrest in Viet Nam, to subjugate the Vietnamese people and at the same time, to arouse public opinion in China and to prepare a "fifth column" for an eventual aggression against Viet Nam.

Being long-time settlers in Viet Nam familiar with the local terrain, customs, and habits, and capable of gathering a good deal of information through numerous acquaintances, the Hoa from Viet Nam were enlisted by the Peking expansionists into "mountaineer divisions" specialized in fighting in mountainous regions and launching deep-thrust operations in the rear areas, other Hoa were enlisted in scout units, reconnaissance groups or other units for spying, kidnapping, assassination, destruction of bridges and warehouses in Viet Nam. Many of them were captured during the aggression against Viet Nam started on February 17, 1979.

Faced with the Vietnamese people's determination to safeguard their sovereignty, the Peking rulers had to withdraw the two ships sent to take the "victimized Hoa residents" home, and to hold talks with the Vietnamese side on the Hoa question. But in the talks they continued to show a big-nation at-

titude, arrogantly sought to impose their absurd view-points on the Vietnamese side, in disregard of the sovereignty of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and of international law. It was they who deliberately undermined the talks in order to continue using the question of Hoa people against Viet Nam.

2. Cutting off aid and withdrawing experts.

While using every possible means, from honeyed words to measures of coercion, to entice or force the Hoa people in Viet Nam to leave for China, the Peking expansionists used "the stick" of cutting off aid to hit Viet Nam economically. Within a little more than one month, they unilaterally announced the discontinuation of all economic and technical aid to Viet Nam and recalled all the Chinese experts and technical personnel working in Viet Nam, in disregard of international law and practice. This was an extremely wicked act at a time when the Vietnamese people had to heal the war wounds and at the same time cope with the border war in the South-West of their country, overcome the economic difficulties caused by the sudden departure of nearly 200,000 Hoa people from the fields and factories and repair the heavy damage caused by the most disastrous floods and typhoons in several decades.

Alongside with the discontinuation of aid and withdrawal of experts, the reactionary group among the Chinese leaders openly persuaded other countries and international organizations to stop aid for the reconstruction of Viet Nam. It was so wicked, so perfidious!

They stepped up their slander campaign against Viet Nam in an attempt to cover up their expansionist manoeuvres in South-East Asia, and at the same time, to hinder the normalization of relations bet-

ween Viet Nam and the ASEAN countries and call on the latter to form a "common front with China" against Viet Nam. They hoped that with this campaign they could carry out a policy of economic encirclement, political isolation and military attack against Viet Nam as the imperialists and colonialists have been doing with some countries. This brazen act constitutes not only an encroachment upon the independence and sovereignty of Viet Nam, but also an interference in the internal affairs of other countries and of international organizations.

3. Maintaining a tense situation at the Viet Nam-China border.

Together with economic and political sabotage, the Chinese rulers frenziedly increased military pressure on the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam from all directions.

In the North, they sent more troops to the Sino-Vietnam border area, increased armed provocations and nibbling operations on Vietnamese territory, encroaching upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Viet Nam and creating a constantly tense situation in the border area. The number of provocations and land-nibbling operations rose to 234 in 1975 – one and a half time as many as in 1974 – and in 1978 this figure rocketed to 2,175, nearly ten times over.

In the South-West: By order of Peking, the genocidal Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique rejected the Vietnamese proposal that the two sides establish a demilitarized zone along the border area, disengage the two armies and sign a treaty of friendship, non-aggression and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other. They wanted to find a pre-

text for continuing the border war against Viet Nam while preparing for more important military ventures later on.

In the West, in disregard of international law, the Chinese rulers by every possible means intensified pressure on the People's Democratic Republic of Laos, a country smaller than China, a country which has always pursued a policy of peace and friendship with neighbouring countries. They fostered the remnants of the Meo special force, formerly organized and commanded by the CIA, used their road building troops to intervene in the provinces of northern Laos, accused Viet Nam of "annexing" Laos, sowed discord between Viet Nam and Laos and deployed several divisions close to the Sino-Lao border. Their objective was to increase the military threat against Viet Nam from the West while gradually weakening and gaining control of Laos.

4. Attacking Viet Nam from two directions.

All the above-mentioned perfidious manoeuvres were foiled although they did cause difficulties to the Vietnamese people. This explained why late in 1978 and early in 1979, the Chinese rulers had to resort to a military offensive against the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam from two directions.

In the South-West, carrying out Peking's plan, the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique, after concentrating 19 infantry divisions (out of a total of 23 divisions) close to the border with Viet Nam, on December 22, 1978 used their elite divisions powerfully supported by tanks and artillery, to attack Ben Soi, Tay Ninh province, (over 100 kms from Saigon) in an attempt to swiftly capture the provincial capital of Tay Ninh, thus paving the way for a deep thrust into South Viet Nam. This offensive was also aimed

at weakening Viet Nam so that China could easily attack it from the North.

Exercising their legitimate right of self-defence, the Vietnamese people completely smashed that military plan. At the same time, the Kampuchean army and people, under the leadership of the Kampuchea National United Front for Salvation and with the support of the Vietnamese people, fought fiercely and smashed the genocidal Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime and the so-called Government of Democratic Kampuchea and set up, on January 10, 1979, the Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, the genuine representative of the Kampuchean people.

In the North, the Chinese rulers mobilized 600,000 troops including several army corps and independent divisions, technical weapon units with nearly 800 tanks and armoured vehicles, about one thousand artillery pieces and hundreds of aircraft of various types, from nearly all military zones of China to *launch a war of aggression against Viet Nam on February 17, 1979 all along the border of over 1,000 km.* Wherever the troops of the Chinese reactionaries came, they massacred civilians including women, newborn babies and old folk, destroyed villages, churches, pagodas, schools, creches, hospitals, farms and afforestation areas. They killed, pillaged and burnt with the savagery of medieval hordes combined with sophisticated methods of modern imperialist armies.

In order to mislead public opinion in China and the world over, the Peking rulers declared that this was only a "counter-attack for self-defence" with the use of only border-guard units. In reality, it was a war of aggression waged by regular forces taken from nearly all the principal military zones

in China, a war which was well prepared in all aspects, from the building of military installations, roads, trenches, airfields along the Sino-Viet Nam border, to the slander campaign against Viet Nam, the undermining of Viet Nam-China friendship and arousing of big-nation chauvinist feelings among the Chinese people, in an attempt to justify and cover up their aggression. Careful preparations had also been made in the diplomatic field. China launched its war of aggression after Vice-premier Deng Xiaoping returned from his visit to the United States and Japan; in fact, after he had won the approval of the U.S. and Japan. The Chinese rulers' ambitious objective was to annihilate part of the Vietnamese armed forces, to destroy Vietnam's military and economic potential, to occupy Viet Nam territory, and to incite revolts.

The two wars of aggression that the Chinese rulers waged from two directions were the culmination of a policy directed against the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Viet Nam in an attempt to weaken, subjugate and annex Viet Nam. Contrary to Peking's calculations, its war of aggression was pitifully defeated, condemned by the whole world and also opposed by a section of the Chinese people. On March 5, 1979 they were compelled to announce the withdrawal of their troops and after that, to accept talks with Viet Nam.

5. Continuing to oppose Viet Nam by all means.

The Chinese rulers have declared the withdrawal of their troops to the other side of the border, but in fact, their troops are still occupying more than ten places on Vietnamese territory, building up more fortifications there, brazenly violating the his-

torical border line which both sides have pledged to respect.

All along the Sino-Viet Nam border, they continue to deploy many army corps supported by artillery and armoured vehicles, to bring more war equipment, to build up military installations, to frequently carry out military manoeuvres and to send scouts and commandos to several localities in Viet Nam. Every day they engaged in armed provocation, shooting, mining and firing at the local people. In some places, they carried out shellings with heavy mortars all day long. They once sent a battalion of regular troops 4 km deep into Vietnamese territory, killing civilians, burning houses and destroying crops. Sometimes Chinese Air Force planes violated Viet Nam's air space, flew over localities 8 to 10 km from the border. They surreptitiously sent back to Viet Nam the Hoa who had been forced to leave for China. These premeditated acts, and other manoeuvres were aimed at maintaining tension in the border region, violating the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Viet Nam and jeopardizing the security of Viet Nam. The Chinese rulers have repeatedly threatened "*to give Viet Nam a second lesson*", even "*many more lessons*". In what name and by what law have the Chinese rulers the right to teach Viet Nam a lesson? Like China, Viet Nam is an independent and sovereign country. The United Nations Charter, international law and practice do not allow China to do anything detrimental to the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity of Viet Nam or of any other country. Is it because China is a big country with a large population, that the Chinese expansionists allow themselves to take the law into their own hands to intimidate and to subjugate other countries, smaller in size and population?

The Chinese authorities have agreed to negotiate with the Vietnamese side on urgent solutions to ensure peace and security in the border region and to discuss other problems relating to the two countries. But in the first round of talks in Ha Noi and in the second round in Peking, the Chinese side has been evading the reasonable and logical proposals of the Vietnamese side and rejected Vietnamese proposals on urgent measures to end acts of armed provocation and to ensure peace and stability in the border region, a pre-requisite for the settlement of other matters concerning the relations between the two countries. What is more, they have demanded that Viet Nam give up its line of independence and sovereignty and its sovereignty over Hoang Sa (Paracels) and Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelagoes as a pre-condition for the discussion of other issues. This is an attitude of big-nation hegemonists. They have come to the negotiation table not to discuss on an equal footing and constructively solutions for the problems, but to force the other side to accept their stand. The Chinese rulers' demand for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea and Laos, and their mentioning of the "anti-hegemony principle" are nothing but attempts to conceal their own aggression against Viet Nam, intimidation of the People's Democratic Republic of Laos, interference in the internal affairs of the People's Republic of Kampuchea and to cover up their heinous hegemonistic designs to subjugate the three Indochinese countries and to use them as a springboard for expansion to South-East Asia.

Recently, the Chinese rulers raised President Carter's "human rights" signboard and used the problem of Vietnamese emigrants as a new weapon against Viet Nam. Most of the Vietnamese emigrants were rich businessmen, officers who had lived on the

U.S. imperialists and Saigon puppet regime, the Hoa who had been enticed or coerced into leaving the country and others who had got habits of the U.S.-style consumer society and could not endure the difficulties caused by the imperialist war of aggression and the sabotage work by the Chinese expansionists.

With its tradition of humanitarianism and respect for human rights, the Vietnamese Government has not only treated humanely those Vietnamese who had collaborated with the enemy during the war, but also shown leniency towards soldiers of the armies of aggression captured during the last 30 years. The Vietnamese Government is well aware of the causes and consequences of the problem of Vietnamese emigrants, and at the same time, of the difficulties caused by Vietnamese emigrants to the neighbouring countries. That is why, in January 1979, the Vietnamese Government declared its readiness to permit those who want to go abroad, for reunion with their families or for living, to leave the country legally, after the necessary formalities. Besides, the Vietnamese responsible services have agreed with the U.N. High Commission for Refugees on a 7-point programme, announced on May 30, 1979, with a view to facilitating an orderly and safe departure of those people and at the same time reducing the difficulties of the South-East Asian countries.

However, Peking and Washington have both mobilized their huge propaganda machinery and all their political, economic and financial means, exploited the humanitarian aspect of the matter and resorted to manoeuvres of deception, slander and incitement to distort the truth about the problem of Vietnamese emigrants and to conduct a large-scale heinous campaign against Viet Nam.

But who are responsible for this exodus?

No one has forgotten that it is the U.S. imperialists who had carried out an extermination war of aggression against Viet Nam, and when they had to withdraw their expeditionary army, they left behind in South Viet Nam a devastated country, a paralysed economy with more than 3 million unemployed, over one million handicapped persons, 800,000 orphans, 600,000 prostitutes and more than one million young drug-addicts, etc. . .

As for the Chinese rulers, it is they who have brazenly fabricated the so-called "victimized residents" problem, coerced or enticed the Hoa to leave their homes, land and factories for China, it is they who have used the various organisations of the Hua Nan (South China) Intelligence Agency to stir up political unrest, to engage in speculations and hoarding, raise prices and issue counterfeit money, in an attempt to undermine Viet Nam's economy, thus piling up difficulties for the people of South Viet Nam. While the responsible authorities of Viet Nam were working together with the UNHCR for the orderly and safe departure of those who wished to leave, Peking agents organized illegal departure, then raised a hullabaloo about Viet Nam "exporting refugees". In the meantime, every day thousands of Chinese were allowed by their government to leave their country for Hongkong, in transit to various countries in South-East Asia, and Peking paid no attention to the 26,000 Hoa people who had been expelled from Kampuchea by the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique. It is regrettable that some governments and organizations which failed to understand the situation in Viet Nam or sought to please the Chinese rulers for the sake of their business deals have joined the Chinese in a chorus of slander and incitement.

The thieves themselves have been crying "stop thief"; those who trampled upon human rights and international law have put up the signboard of "humanitarianism" to realize their dark political schemes. Peking's purpose was to whitewash its monstrous crimes in Kampuchea and in the war of aggression against Viet Nam, to cover up the incitement of Hoa people to leave Viet Nam and the exportation of tens of thousands of Chinese to foreign countries, to create difficulties for the ASEAN countries, to drive a wedge between the ASEAN countries and Viet Nam and to lull people's vigilance as to the danger of Chinese expansionism and the role of the fifth column of Hoa residents in South-East Asia.

However, for men of conscience, the truth cannot be covered. At present, more and more people are seeing through the odious design of the Peking reactionary rulers, and showing their sympathy for the difficulties of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and approving the latter's correct stand.

The imperialist and reactionary forces, particularly Peking and Washington, have failed in their attempt to turn the international conference on the problem of Indochinese emigrants last July in Geneva into a forum to slander Viet Nam. The proposals made by the delegation of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, which clearly showed a constructive and cooperative attitude in efforts to settle the problem of emigrants were approved by the representatives of many countries which respected truth and justice. These proposals were an important contribution to the success of the conference in laying the foundation for a solution to the problem, as the U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim has concluded. But in fact, the situation remains very difficult and complex on account of the

sabotage activities by the imperialists and reactionaries, especially by Washington and Peking. At this moment, while Peking vociferously threatens to launch another war and cynically lays "claims" on the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagoes, the U.S. imperialists have their 7th fleet warships cruising off Vietnamese coasts, not only to encourage illegal emigration, but also to coordinate their activities with Peking's dark designs in the Eastern Sea region and in South-East Asia.

During the past five years, by all possible means, military, political, diplomatic and economic, direct and indirect, subtle and crude, covert and overt, the Chinese rulers have been unceasingly seeking to sabotage national construction work in the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. The more they are frustrated, the more frenziedly they engage in anti-Viet Nam activities, in the hope of bringing the Vietnamese people into submission.

This is the third time the Chinese leaders betray the Vietnamese people.

Part Five

PEKING'S EXPANSIONIST POLICY, A THREAT TO NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

I

Viet Nam and China are two close neighbour countries whose peoples have always been bound together, have encouraged and helped each other in the struggle against imperialism, in the interests of the revolution in each country. The Vietnamese people have given political and moral support to the Chinese people and once fought in coordination with them in the struggle for national liberation. The Chinese people, though facing many difficulties, particularly in the first years of the People's Republic of China, have given great assistance to the Vietnamese people in their two wars of resistance.

The Vietnamese people treasure the friendship between the peoples of Viet Nam and China and have always preserved and fostered it, to make it

everlasting. Never have the Vietnamese people infringed upon the independence, sovereignty and territory of the Chinese people, nor interfered in China's internal affairs. With regard to divergence of views or the Chinese leaders' wrong-doings towards Viet Nam, the Vietnamese side has painstakingly tried to settle them through private discussions between the two sides.

Even though Chinese leaders have deliberately sabotaged the traditional friendship between the peoples of the two countries, the Vietnamese people never forget the great assistance reserved for them by the Chinese people, and eagerly wish for an early restoration of that friendship. At the negotiations to settle problems in the relations between the two countries, the Vietnamese side has always proceeded from this ardent desire of the Vietnamese people. The Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam consistently stands for an early restoration of normal relations between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the People's Republic of China, on the principles of respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual respect, in the interests of each country, and of peace and stability in South-East Asia and in the world.

II

Thus, over the past 30 years, the Chinese rulers have three times betrayed the people of Viet Nam:

1. At the 1954 Geneva Conference, they sold out the Vietnamese people's national interests so as not only to ensure for their country a security belt in

the South, but also to prepare the terrain for the realization of their expansionist schemes in Indo-China and South-East Asia. They wanted to keep Viet Nam partitioned for a long time, thereby weakening it and making it dependent on China.

2. In the Vietnamese people's struggle against U.S. aggression, for national salvation, when the Ngo Dinh Diem regime collapsed, Peking flashed the green light for the U.S. to bomb North Viet Nam, and bring American troops to invade South Viet Nam. When Viet Nam wanted to sit down for talks with the United States in an effort to coordinate their struggle on three fronts—military, political and diplomatic—the Chinese rulers tried to prevent it. When the Vietnamese people were smashing their way toward total victory, the Peking rulers joined hands with the Nixon administration, using the Vietnamese people's blood to raise the People's Republic of China to the position of the world's third super-power, and barter for the settlement of the Taiwan issue.

3. After the Vietnamese people had completely liberated South Viet Nam from the neo-colonialist rule of U.S. imperialism and reunified their country, the Peking rulers sought by all means—political, military, economic and diplomatic—to weaken the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, subjugate the Vietnamese people and finally used military forces of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary gang to invade Viet Nam in the South-West and used China's own military forces to invade Viet Nam in the North, massacring civilians, heavily destroying economic and cultural establishments of Viet Nam in the areas of hostilities.

Three times the Chinese rulers betrayed Viet Nam, each time more cruelly and vilely than the previous one.

They have also cruelly and vilely betrayed the people of Laos and Kampuchea. They sacrificed the national interests of the Lao and Kampuchean peoples at the 1954 Geneva Conference. After the Geneva Conference, they hindered the Lao and Kampuchean peoples' struggle for national independence, peace and neutrality. When the Kampuchean people completely liberated their homeland on April 17, 1975, the Peking rulers used their flunkies, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, to carry out a genocidal policy, to turn this country into a new-type satellite, and a military base for attack on the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam from the South-West. Regarding the People's Democratic Republic of Laos, they have undermined the Lao people's peaceful construction, armed and aided reactionary forces in their efforts to cause disturbances and deployed many divisions at the Sino-Laotian border in an attempt to force Laos into Peking's orbit. They have tried to sow division among the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea with the aim of weakening them and conquering one country after another.

To cover up its treacherous face, the Peking leadership often recalled Chinese aid to Viet Nam, and even boasted that Chinese troops *"had fought at Dien Bien Phu"*, etc. The Chinese people have reserved part of the fruits of their labour for helping the Vietnamese people in their resistance wars against the French colonialists and U.S. imperialists, and in their national construction. This the Vietnamese people will never forget under any circumstances. For the Vietnamese people, this is a fine manifestation of the militant solidarity among peoples sharing the same destiny. For the Peking reactionary rulers, however, this is but a political means for realising their expansionist policy in Viet Nam

and in the whole Indochinese peninsula. Reality has shown that they have used this aid now as "a carrot", now as "a stick", depending on their political aim at each moment.

Besides, there is not only the problem of Chinese assistance to Viet Nam. Chinese leaders, on many occasions, said that, if one were to speak of thanks, it was the Chinese people who had to thank the Vietnamese people, who have made many sacrifices and contributions in the interests of the Chinese people, that it was the Chinese people's duty to assist and support the Vietnamese people and that the peoples of the two countries must help each other.

In connection with President Nixon's visit to China in 1972, Chairman Mao Zedong told Vietnamese leaders in June 1973:

"Frankly speaking, the Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party and the world people must thank the Vietnamese people for having defeated the U.S. aggressors. It was your victory, comrades, that forced Nixon to come to China."

Regarding China's admission to the United Nations Organization in 1971, Premier Zhou Enlai said during talks with Vietnamese leaders in November 1971:

"Viet Nam's contribution is very great. Our two countries are bound to each other."

Concerning the question: who fought and won victory at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, history and first of all, the French expeditionary corps, have given a clear answer. It should be added that during the resistance war against the French colonialists' aggression, the Chinese Government sent a number of advisers to Viet Nam and in the 1960's it sent to

Viet Nam what it called "logistic troops," to help repair railway and road sections close to the Chinese border and damaged by U.S. bombs, and to build some new roads in the border areas. But their main task was to gather information in various fields, infiltrate into areas inhabited by ethnic minorities, and engage in propaganda for the "cultural revolution". Most of the spies and "mountain troops" captured by the Vietnamese last February and March turned out to be former members of these Chinese "road-building" army units.

All the actions taken by Peking rulers, from their betrayal of Viet Nam at the 1954 Geneva Conference and their taking advantage of the Vietnamese people's resistance against the U.S. aggressors to their setting up of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary genocidal regime, their armed invasion of Viet Nam and their threats of aggression against Laos sprang from:

- One guiding thought: big-nation chauvinism;
- One policy: national selfishness;
- One strategic objective: big-nation expansionism and great power hegemonism.

In a word, their design was to conquer Viet Nam and the whole of Indochina, using it as a spring-board for advancing towards South-East Asia and gradually realizing their global strategy.

To realize their expansionist and hegemonist designs, the Peking rulers *have made deception and fraud a national policy and a strategical manoeuvre*. In this field, as disciples of Goebbels, they have by far surpassed him in the art. They attributed to others what they themselves wanted to do. They shifted the blame on others for what they themselves had done. They fabricated facts, falsified documents and distorted history. They called black

white, reversed right and wrong and used their huge mass media and other means for the purpose. They held high the banner of socialism while, in fact, opposing socialism. They clamoured about fighting imperialism, but joined hands with the U.S. imperialists. They noisily advocated opposition to the two super-powers, but colluded with the U.S. imperialists against the Soviet Union. They spoke of fighting hegemonism while attempting to realize hegemonism in Indochina and South-East Asia. They sent troops to invade the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, but claimed that it was Viet Nam which had "invaded" China. They did as if they were anxious "to protect human rights", and were worried about the plight of the "Indochinese refugees" while they themselves had slaughtered millions of their own countrymen in the "great cultural revolution" and incited over two hundred thousand Hoa people to leave Viet Nam for China. For the Peking rulers, their words are the truth and their interests are the ethics. "The mandarins may light their lamps but the men-in-the-street are not allowed to make a fire!" This saying formerly used by Chinese peasants to denounce oppression by the cruel feudal lords has become the guide-line for the Peking rulers in their attempt to realize their expansionist and hegemonist ambitions.

Chinese leaders are now striving to hold aloft the big-nation banner in order to rally the various factions and carry out their "four modernizations" plan. Externally, they are making all-out efforts to carry out their expansionist policy in Indochina and South-East Asia, colluding with imperialist and other reactionary forces, first of all the United States, to oppose the Soviet Union and the world revolution, in the hope of obtaining as much Western capital and technology as possible for the reali-

sation of their "four modernizations" plan and expansionist hegemonist schemes.

A China intoxicated by the big-nation mentality and by the expansionist and hegemonist policy of her rulers, whatever trend of development she may follow, poses a threat not only to the national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each country in Indochina, South-East Asia and South Asia and a threat to peace and stability in this region, but also to the diverse interests of other countries including those of countries which, going by immediate benefits, are chiming in with Chinese leaders in opposing Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea. Some clear-sighted Western politicians and businessmen have just warned their governments of the possible heavy consequences should China fall into yet another internal political crisis, but they failed to mention the much heavier consequences for the interests of the countries of the world brought about by the Chinese leaders' expansionist policy.

Over several thousand years in the past, Viet Nam had been invaded scores of times by Chinese emperors. The Vietnamese people clearly see the Chinese leaders' dark designs and they never slacken their vigilance. Even when the U.S. imperialists escalated their war of aggression to its peak, the Vietnamese people, though facing innumerable difficulties, resolutely turned down the Chinese leaders' offer to send to Viet Nam 200,000 troops and enough trucks to ensure military transport from the North to the South of Viet Nam. The Vietnamese people have firmly maintained their line of independence and sovereignty, despite all pressure, covert or overt, direct or indirect, by the Chinese rulers.

III

Although their war of aggression against Viet Nam in February 1979 was a pitiful military and political defeat, the Chinese leaders are still frantically carrying out their anti-Viet Nam policy. At the negotiations on problems in the relations between the two countries, the Chinese side kept showing a big-nation attitude, and arrogantly threatened "*to teach Viet Nam another lesson*". At the same time, they have been trying by every possible means to restore the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary genocidal regime which has been overthrown by the Kampuchean people, and threatening to invade the People's Democratic Republic of Laos, with the aim of keeping pressure on Viet Nam from all sides.

"Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom". The Vietnamese people are determined to defend their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, to maintain their correct line of independence, sovereignty and international solidarity, to smash all acts of aggression of any reactionary force and to foil all expansionist schemes aimed at subjugating Viet Nam.

The Vietnamese people, struggling for a just cause, have the invincible strength of national unity, combined with the great strength of the three revolutionary currents which have been foiling step by step all schemes of intervention, enslavement and aggression of imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, expansionism and hegemonism, and changing the map of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Chinese expansionists will certainly invite upon themselves still heavier defeats if they do not draw timely and necessary conclusions from the recent failure of their anti-Viet Nam policy. In the present era, any country, big or small, is part of a whole

of human society. The Peking expansionists cannot lay their hands on Viet Nam without provoking mankind as a whole, without challenging the whole socialist system, the national liberation movement and the world people's front for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress. The peoples of the socialist countries, countries of national independence and peace- and justice-loving people throughout the world have been and will be on the Vietnamese people's side.

By using the former Chinese emperors' deceptive policy of "making friends with those far away to attack those nearby", coupled with many other crafty manoeuvres, Chinese rulers may still cover up their expansionist face for some time. But sooner or later, the peoples of South-East Asia will realize that Peking's hostile policy toward Viet Nam is a threat to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity not only of Viet Nam, but also of other countries in the region. It must still be fresh in everybody's mind that Peking had used its fifth column—the Hoa—to stir up political and economic disturbances in many countries in South-East Asia before using these tactics in Viet Nam.

Is it not clear enough that while concentrating their efforts to oppose Viet Nam, they are also crudely interfering in the internal affairs of many other countries in Asia?

Genuine Chinese communists, and the Chinese people, who have constantly been misled by the Peking ruling clique over the past 30 years, since the People's Republic of China came into being, will sooner or later see the truth and will stand on the Vietnamese people's side, and support the just struggle of the Vietnamese people.

The Vietnamese people's just struggle against big-nation expansionism and great power hegemon-

ism practised by the reactionaries in the Peking ruling circles, for the defence of their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and for contributing to the defence of peace and stability in South-East Asia and in the world, is a long and arduous struggle, but it will surely be crowned with glorious victory.

Viet Nam today will stand firm and continue to develop, in spite of all the devilish schemes of the Peking rulers, as it has stood firm and continued to develop over the past 4,000 years in the face of continual invasions by Chinese emperors.

The peoples of Viet Nam and China will certainly live in peace, friendship and cooperation in keeping with the aspirations of the people of the two countries and the interests of peace in South-East Asia and in the world.

October 1979

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