


the communist invasion road





Tea is always ready for prisoners at a camp at Pleiku.

HANOI AND THE VIET CONG

On March 13, 1959, the Central Committee of North Viet-Nam's ruling Lao Dong (Communist) Party issued orders for an immediate beginning of the task of «liberating the South» by «destroying the southern regime.»

The Committee formulated three phases leading to the goal of «national liberation,» the first of which was already in force:

- **Political subversion and proselytizing**
- **Guerrilla warfare, sabotage and terrorism**
- **Conventional warfare, to eliminate the South's armed forces.**

Phase Two began with attacks upon the prime «terror» targets: local officials, civil servants, village and hamlet chiefs and policemen

Those attacks had started even earlier. Between 1957 and 1967, the North Vietnamese and the Communist auxiliary military units in the South (Viet Cong) killed more than 15,000 civilians, by conservative estimate, wounded twice that number and kidnapped more than 44,000.

North Viet-Nam's Deputy Premier Vo Nguyen Giap is quoted as having said: Every minute hundreds of thousands of people die all over the world. The life or death... of thousands of human beings, even if they are our own compatriots, represents really very little.

The task of overthrowing the southern regime was said to be the task of the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) which Hanoi claimed was entirely independent. However, the Viet-Nam Communist Party itself had launched the organization in September 1960. Radio Hanoi, on December 20, 1960, announced the founding of the Front, complete with program.

The International Control Commission, with an office in Hanoi as well as in Saigon, was well placed to record, study and analyze the true face of the Front. On February 13, 1962, the Legal Committee of the International Control Commission concluded:

The aim and function of the Front for Liberation of the South, the Forces for Liberation of the South and the People's Self-Defense Armed Forces are to carry out, under the leadership of the Viet-Nam Lao Dong Party, hostile activities against the armed forces and administration of the South by violent means aimed at overthrowing the administration of the South.

The Front's guerrilla war and terrorism did not, however, accomplish North Viet-Nam's objectives. Accordingly, since early this year, the North Vietnamese have more and more massed forces in the open, carrying the war into South Vietnamese urban centers.

Communist units of substantial size have been encircled and destroyed in those centers.

Viet Cong units have been joined by North Vietnamese military forces to harrass the land, including the capital city of Saigon. Large areas of the city have been destroyed and many of its residents killed.

ngày 24.9.66
 Thanh Hoa
 Nơi đây ghi lại
 kỷ niệm của cuộc đời anh
 lính - nơi đây là nơi anh
 làm chủ mỗi 2 tuần quân thời
 kháng chiến bảo vệ quê hương
 và đất nước. Nơi đây anh quen
 biết với "chôn rau cắt rốn"
 của ông già và bà đi làm
 ruộng.

The diary's first page reads,
 in part: Thanhhoa. « The place
 where many souvenirs of my life
 as a soldier have taken place. »

A HOMESICK SOLDIER WRITES HIS DIARY

One of the more than 55,000 North Vietnamese troops
 fighting in South Viet-Nam in late 1967 was young draftee
 Mai Van Hung. After his training in August 1965 he left
 with his unit for the South.

Excerpts from his captured diary tell of the troops' pro-
 blems: hunger, disease, homesickness and fear or death.

2 September 1965

Nghe An

The holiday (North Vietnam's national day) was not
 celebrated... Instead, we continued on our way. We will
 keep going until we achieve reunification. Then we will
 be entitled to days of happiness.

4 September, 1965

Ha Tinh

We are not the first contingent to reach this place. Rather
 we are the 30th.

Undated

Quang Binh

How happy I was to meet a comrade from my place of
 birth while on my way to combat duty... But the sacred
 moments we spent together went by quickly. Again we
 set off on our way to duty. The last wishes and the last
 looks back — then we melted away into the jungle.

I wonder when we will be able to see each other again!
 Not until the country's reunification. That day is too long
 in coming... I feel pessimistic and downhearted.

27 September 1965

Quang Tri

Today is my last day in the North. We will reach our
 destination in a few hours... Away from the North, I will
 miss my family and and my loved ones. When can I return?
 Not until reunification. How remote that day is! All my

hopes have been shattered. My only hope lies in reunification
 when I shall be able to go home. Farewell, O North.

16 November, 1965 Rear Base (South Viet-Nam)

We had hoped for a few days' leave when we reached
 this place but it did not materialize... Our hard lives are
 deprived of happiness.

24-25 November, 1965

The war has taken the lives of so many North Vietnamese
 youths. The Party (Lao Dong — Communist Party of North
 Viet-Nam) and the country have lost so many beloved
 sons who sacrificed their lives for the cause of the Party.

This is only the initial phase. Yet many men are demora-
 lized. More than 50 percent have been sick. How dark life
 is! When can we return to the North!

(There follow unsent letters to his mother and his brother,
 lamenting his four month absence. He wrote his brother:
 I cannot say how much I miss you. I remember with sadness
 the good old days in the North.)

Undated, 1966

Gia Lai (Viet Cong
name for Pleiku province)

The barren land of Gia Lai Province does not appeal
 to me. There is nothing that endears me to this place which
 they call the second home land.


29 January, 1967

My heart is filled with bitterness. How miserable I feel.

24-25 November


Time keeps going its steady course. Life remains un-
 changed...

NORTH VIET-NAM



- MAI VAN HUNG'S ROUTE
- COMMUNIST BASE CAMPS
- MAIN INFILTRATION ROUTES

On the map are shown the main centers, Communist base camps, and main infiltration routes from North Viet-Nam to the Republic of Viet-Nam. Mai Van Hung's route is shown from Nghe An in the North through his various stops before reaching Gia Lai (Pleiku).



LIEUTENANT COLONEL

PHAN VIET DUNG

Since autumn of 1964 more than 200,000 North Vietnamese troops have been sent to South Viet-Nam. Most of them have since become casualties of combat or fallen prey to disease or other mishaps. As of April this year, it was estimated that there were more than 70,000 North Vietnamese soldiers in North Vietnamese Army units in the South and well over 15,000 who were serving in Communist auxiliary military units (Viet Cong).

One of the officers in these forces was Lieutenant Colonel Phan Viet Dung, commander of the North Vietnamese 165th Regiment. Dung was born in Saigon in 1930, served with the Viet Minh beginning in 1946, joined the Communist Party the next year and went to North Viet-Nam in 1954. He infiltrated to South Viet-Nam in February 1964. On May 31, 1968, Dung defected to the Republic of Viet-Nam.

In a press conference held in Saigon on May 31, 1968, Colonel Dung was asked what he thought about the declaration of the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris, denying the presence of North Vietnamese troops in the South. He replied that to him, the denial was a political maneuver aimed at avoiding the creation of an obstacle which may interfere with sending of still more troops into South Vietnam «If» he said, «the North Vietnamese admit having sent troops to the South, then they must recognize the reasons which make the United States and the Allies bomb North Viet-Nam. Now, if they ask the Allies to reduce the bombing of North Viet-Nam, then they must also reduce the introduction of their troops into South Viet-Nam. They want to avoid this. This is why they deceive the people: to force the US to unilaterally stop all the bombing. But realistically speaking, this denial engenders many disadvantages. First, the presence of North Vietnamese troops in the South is so obvious. I don't know who in the world does not know this fact, and in Viet-Nam nobody is ignorant of it. Everyone knows it.»

He was also asked what his duty was in the first days of May. He replied that C-Group I of the 7th Division, whose main activity was in Lai Thieu Binh Duong Province, had as its main target the 5th Infantry Division and that when the situation became favorable he and his men were to proceed to Saigon.

The Colonel was also asked why only southern-born officers have come to the Republic side, none of them northern born. Colonel Dung replied that the real problem was the officer's own thinking, determination, but that there was more difficulty for a northern-born officer to come to the government side, considering families left behind in the north and other affairs.

A portion of the first page of the captured report described below.

A REPORT FROM A NORTH VIETNAMESE DIVISION

The North Vietnamese Army's Third Division, in South Viet-Nam since 1964, was caught in 1966 between the mountains and the sea. An observer in the autumn of 1967 said: «Since the battle, what is left of the Division lurks in the mountains.»

A report on the problems the Division's soldiers encountered in the South, dated November 19, 1967 was captured January 10, 1968. The period covered was September to November during which the Third Division battalions fought «six large and six small battles.»

In an effort to improve fighting efficiency, indoctrination and study courses were encouraged.

The report said some progress was seen as a result of indoctrination efforts. Organization and discipline were said to be tightened, treatment of the sick and wounded improved, and malingering, theft and begging greatly reduced.

However, the problems of the troops from North Viet-Nam were not overcome. The soldiers wavered in their determination to fight, showed lack of conviction in their mission and about their leaders' determination, executed orders poorly and did not comply with discipline. There was poor internal unity, and fear of hardships and

difficulties, poor relations between the old timers and the new arrivals and between the upper and lower levels.

Specific examples of cowardice are cited. When the enemy swept their areas, Platoon Commanders Tan and Giau abandoned their weapons and fled with their troops. In another action, Platoon Deputy Commander Hiep fled with his men. Company 93 lay in an ambush for an enemy platoon, but retreated as soon as the enemy appeared at the scene.

Of the waverers in general, the report says: «Specifically, these people fear enemy air and artillery actions and fierceness of combat. They are enthusiastic in shouting slogans, such as «shoot enemy aircraft from all corners of the sky, attack the enemy on all corners of the earth,» but when the time comes to put these slogans into practice, they do their job carelessly.

The end of the report says that the Third North Vietnamese Divisions has not been «keen in our political and ideological tasks.» «Our shortcomings have not been detected promptly. Our classification of people according to their ideology does not reflect reality.» and «The role of Party leadership has not been vigorously developed in each Party member.»



**LIEUTENANT COLONEL
TRAN VAN DAC**

From October 1967 to just recently, Lt. Col. Tran Van Dac was a political officer in a North Vietnamese Army unit in South Viet-Nam.

Born July 6, 1924 in the South, he regrouped to North Viet-Nam in 1954 and infiltrated into South Viet-Nam with regular North Vietnamese Army units in March, 1962. He commanded some of the units which attacked Saigon during the first Tet offensive.

Colonel Dac rallied to the government of South Viet-Nam on April 19, 1968.

In conferences following his return to the government, he discussed North Vietnamese participation in the war in the South, what could be expected from negotiations, and other subjects.

With regard to the Tet offensive of January 1968, he said the North expected both military victories and the support of the people in the South. They achieved neither.

Col. Dac said that in the unit he later commanded, fighters from South Viet-Nam on the side of the North were gradually lost. They were replaced almost entirely by recruits made up of native North Vietnamese. By the time he was placed in command, fully 80 percent of the troops were fresh replacements from North Viet-Nam.

In a press conference, the Colonel was asked about negotiations. He said, «Fighting while negotiating is a long-accepted strategy. The North agrees to talk because it knows total victory is impossible. But while at the conference table, it seeks to secure a more advantageous position through continued fighting.»

INFILTRATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY REGIMENTS INTO SOUTH VIET-NAM

Sept 1964 — June 1967

Based on 90 prisoner testimonies
and 38 captured documents

Regiment	Departed North Viet-Nam	Arrived South Viet-Nam	Strength
95th	Oct 64	Dec 64	2,000
32nd	Sep Oct 64	Jan-Mar 65	1,800
101st	Dec 64	Feb 65	2,000
18th	Feb 65	Apr 65	2,000
22nd	Jul 65	Sept 65	2,000
33rd	Jul 65	Oct 65	2,000
250th	Jul 65	Oct 65	1,000
6th	Unknown	Oct 65	1,500
21st	Aug 65	Oct 65	2,000
66th	Aug 65	Nov 65	1,500
18B	Dec 65	Feb 66	2,000
24th	Jan 66	Feb 66	2,000
95B	Dec 65	Mar 66	2,000
141st	Jan 66	Mar 66	1,500
88th	Jan 66	Mar 66	2,000
3rd	Feb 66	Mar 66	1,500
812th	Jun 66	Jun 66	1,500
90th	Jun 66	Jun 66	1,500
803rd	Jun 66	Jun 66	1,500
165th	Feb 66	Jul 66	2,000
52nd	Mar 66	Jul 66	1,600
84th (Arty)	Mar 66	Aug 66	1,200
5th	Activated in SVN	Feb 67	1,800
95C	Aug 66	Mar 67	1,550
29th	Unknown	Apr 67	2,200
368B (Arty)	Unknown	May 67	1,400
174th	Jan 67	Jun 67	2,000

INFILTRATION OF PERSONNEL FROM N. VIET-NAM 1959-1967 (first half)

YEAR	Confirmed (1)	Probable (2)	Possible (3)	Total (4)
1959-60	4,556	26		4,582
1961	4,118	2,177		6,295
1962	5,362	7,495		12,857
1963	4,726	3,180		7,906
1964	9,316	3,108		12,424
1965	23,770	1,910	8,050	33,730
1966	44,300	10,500	30,000	84,800
1967 (1st half)	20,700	5,100	14,100	39,900
TOTAL	116,848	33,496	52,150	202,494

- (4) Determined on basis of direct information from a minimum of two prisoners, returnees or captured documents, plus indirect evidence.
- (2) On basis of direct information from one captive, returnee or captured document, plus indirect evidence.
- (3) On basis of indirect evidence. This category not listed separately before 1965.
- (4) The total does not represent all infiltration data on hand.