

**J.V. STALIN
V.M. MOLOTOV**

**LETTERS TO THE
COMMUNIST
PARTY OF
YUGOSLAVIA
AND OTHER DOCUMENTS**



SAVA PRESS

“Stalin’s letters to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia were and are of remarkably valuable assistance to the communist parties. They saved us from grave disaster.”

VALKO CHERVENKOV

“With the letters of J.V. Stalin and the Cominform Resolution, the Titoite betrayal was unmasked. Armed with these documents, our Party denounced the enslaving treaties, cast off Belgrade’s chains and defended the independence of socialist Albania.”

ENVER HOXHA



J.V. STALIN



V.M. MOLOTOV

Publisher's Note

This edition of *Letters to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and Other Documents*, a joint project of Sava Press and the November 8th Publishing House, is expanded and includes other important documents. In addition to J.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov, resolutions, reports and speeches are presented from the Cominform, and by Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej and P.A. Yudin.

ISBN: 978-1-997536-13-0

SAVA PRESS
TORONTO 2025

CONTENTS

CONVERSATION WITH THE LEADERS OF BULGARIA AND YUGOSLAVIA ON QUESTIONS OF FEDERATION AND ALBANIA (Meeting at the Krem- lin) (February 10, 1948)	1
REGARDING FALSE CLAIMS ABOUT SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS YUGO- SLAVIA (Telegram from V.M. Molotov to J. Broz Tito) (March 13, 1948).....	14
UNFRIENDLY ACTIONS OF THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT TO- WARDS SOVIET SPECIALISTS (Telegram from V.M. Molotov to J. Broz Tito or E. Kardelj) (March 18, 1948)	16
ON THE RECALL OF SOVIET ADVISERS AND THE ANTI-SOVIET TENDEN- CIES OF THE YUGOSLAV LEADER- SHIP (Letter from J.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov to J. Broz Tito and others) (March 27, 1948)	18
ON THE FUNDAMENTAL ERRORS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YU- GOSLAVIA (Letter from J.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov to J. Broz Tito, E. Kardelj and the Central Committee of the Com- munist Party of Yugoslavia) (May 4, 1948) ..	28
ON THE REFUSAL OF THE YUGOSLAV	

LEADERS TO SUBMIT TO CRITICISM (Letter from J.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia) (May 22, 1948)	66
AGAINST THE CRIMINAL PERSECUTION OF HEBRANG AND ŽUJOVIĆ (Telegram from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) to J. Broz Tito) (June 9, 1948)	72
DUPLICITY OF THE YUGOSLAV LEADERS IN THE AFFAIR OF HEBRANG AND ŽUJOVIĆ (Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia) (June 19, 1948)	73
WHERE THE NATIONALISM OF THE TITO GROUP IS LEADING YUGOSLAVIA (Article by J.V. Stalin published in "Pravda") (September 8, 1948)	76
ON THE SITUATION IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA (Resolution of the Cominform) (June 29, 1948) ..	87
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA IN THE GRIP OF MURDERERS AND SPIES (Resolution of the Cominform) (November 29, 1949)	101
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGO-	

SLAVIA IN THE GRIP OF MURDERERS AND SPIES (Report by Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej at the November 1949 Meeting of the Cominform) (November 29, 1949) ..	110
THE TITO CLIQUE HAS BEEN EXPOSED AS A GANG OF FASCISTS, MURDERERS AND SPIES (Report by P.A. Yudin at the November 1949 Meeting of the Cominform) (November 29, 1949) .	137

CONVERSATION WITH THE LEADERS OF BULGARIA AND YUGOSLAVIA ON QUESTIONS OF FEDERATION AND ALBANIA

Meeting at the Kremlin

February 10, 1948

From the Soviet side: J.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, A.A. Zhdanov, G.M. Malenkov, V.A. Zorin.

From the Bulgarian side: Georgi Dimitrov, Vasil Kolarov, Traicho Kostov.

From the Yugoslav side: Edvard Kardelj, Milovan Đilas, Vladimir Bakarić.

Molotov: Between the Soviet government, on the one hand, and the Bulgarian and Yugoslav governments, on the other, there exist serious differences, which became evident over three key questions: the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty, Comrade Dimitrov's interview and the entry of Yugoslav troops into Albania.

1. With regard to the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty signed at Bled, we had several observations, which were communicated in due time to comrades Dimitrov and Tito. The Soviet government believes that concluding such a treaty — particularly one of unlimited duration — before the peace treaty had even come into force was a grave mistake. By acting

hastily, both governments played into the hands of reactionary forces in England and America, providing them with a pretext to intensify their intervention in Greece against Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The Soviet government must make it clear that it cannot assume responsibility for treaties of major political importance that are entered into without prior consultation with the USSR.

Previously you had agreed with us, yet later acted differently without informing us. Relations between our two states and parties should not proceed along such an improper and intolerable path. It became necessary to correct this mistake after the fact.

2. It appears to us that Comrade Dimitrov has overstepped in his press conferences and interviews, exposing himself to questioning on matters that ought not to be publicly discussed. We consider such conduct improper. In his interview, he advanced a plan that went far beyond acceptable limits, without the slightest effort to coordinate it with anyone. He raised questions of federation or confederation, as well as a customs union, proposing that Poland, Czechoslovakia and Greece be included. In doing so, Comrade Dimitrov spoke on behalf of these parties, though he had received no official mandate to do so. This is fundamentally wrong and tactically most damaging. Such statements only make easier the work of the architects of the Western bloc. We could not disregard this. Comrade Dimitrov had already been cautioned in advance by Comrade

Stalin through party channels: "Your statement at the press conference regarding the establishment of a federation or confederation is considered harmful. It does damage to the people's democracies and benefits the Anglo-Americans. Your remarks on the customs union are reckless, for they may give the impression that the Soviet Union — soon to conclude treaties of mutual assistance with these countries — would also be involved. It is difficult to understand what could have led you to make such ill-judged declarations at the press conference."

When we spoke with the Polish comrades, they remarked: "We thought this represented your position." That is how everyone perceives it: if Dimitrov or Tito makes pronouncements about other countries, it is assumed they speak for the USSR. The Polish comrades added that they are fundamentally opposed to Comrade Dimitrov's proposal and regard it as incorrect.

We were compelled to take a stand, since both enemies and friends alike believed that this was our position. We consider such conduct absolutely incorrect and inadmissible in the future. Comrade Dimitrov's subsequent explanation only deepened the confusion. The impression created was that if earlier it had been Germany which blocked the federation with Serbia, now it was the USSR.

Dimitrov: We never had such an intention.

Stalin: You are a politician, and you must consider not only your intentions but also the possible consequences of your words. We do not oppose a

customs union between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia — on the contrary.

Molotov: Yet Beneš's newspaper in Czechoslovakia immediately reported: "Dimitrov has revealed the communist plans — now let the Czech communists respond."

Moreover, Comrade Dimitrov's statements run counter to the declaration adopted by the nine communist parties.

Stalin: Your interview, differing in message from the resolution of the conference of nine parties, diverts attention from urgent internal questions.

Molotov: We hold that such incidents must not be repeated in the future.

3. At the same time, we learned only by accident that at the end of January a Yugoslav division was to be deployed into Albania, toward the Greek-Albanian frontier, ostensibly to prevent an Anglo-American-backed attack from the Greek side. The Yugoslav comrades did not inform us in advance. When questioned, Tito confirmed that a Yugoslav military base was to be established in Albania for joint defence of the border. The Albanians themselves said they had been assured this was done with our consent.

From this it follows that we assess the situation in Albania differently. This is once again a disagreement that cannot be overlooked. We must speak openly on such matters, to see how you yourselves evaluate the situation. We believe such actions must

not occur in the future. Disagreements should be brought to light; if there are differing views, they should be stated and discussed. For the sake of our cause and of unity, no steps should be taken without proper consultation.

In the future Comrade Dimitrov must spare both himself and us the risk of making such statements.

Dimitrov: As regards Bled, I explained earlier that no treaty was signed; rather, we agreed on the draft text of a future treaty between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. At the Congress of the Fatherland Front, I made a statement acknowledging that the criticism of the Politburo was correct. To strengthen the economic and defensive capacity of our country, we require cooperation with the other friendly people's democracies.

Stalin: You wished to announce something new. But the Poles and the Czechs only laughed at your idea of federation. Why do you not ask them whether they want it?

Dimitrov: It was harmful and wrong in essence. My clarification was aimed at those who sought to use my words against us and against the USSR. At present there are no disagreements between us. Such statements will not be repeated.

Stalin: We do not understand one another; therefore, there are disagreements. And you are trying to conceal them.

Molotov: These are serious disagreements, not trifles.

Stalin: You are an experienced politician. What are the mistakes we are pointing to? You have certain assumptions — perhaps even unrecognized ones — that lead you astray. You should not give interviews so often. You wish to say something new, to impress the world. But you speak as though you were still General Secretary of the Comintern, granting interviews to the communist press. In doing so, you hand ammunition to the reactionaries in America. They can argue to their public that America is justified in creating a Western bloc, since in the Balkans there already exists not only a bloc but also a customs union. At this very moment a great electoral struggle is unfolding in America. The outcome matters greatly to us, for America is powerful, heavily armed, and ruled not by intellectuals but by financiers who hate us bitterly and seize every pretext to harm us. If by our own actions we provide arguments against the progressive forces, we will share the blame for their defeat. Should the same financial magnates remain in power, it will be in part our responsibility. They will say: “You are not only forming a bloc, but uniting a whole group of countries — against whom?” Why then the noise about such unification? If unity is your aim, why parade it so loudly? Either you are inexperienced, or else you are swept up like young Komsomol activists who fly straight into the fire. Why do you do this? Why make matters easier for your enemies in England, America and France?

As for Albania — the Yugoslav comrades have

approached this far too simply. During the war, the three Allied powers recognized Albania’s independence and supported it. Yet of all the knots in the contest between reaction and democracy, Albania is our weakest. It is still excluded from the UN; Britain and America refuse recognition. The question remains unsettled. No other country is so unprotected in international law. If Tito sends a division — or even a regiment — into Albania, this cannot escape the notice of England and America. They will at once declare that Albania has been occupied. Has Albania formally requested Yugoslav assistance? No. And then the English and Americans will pose as champions of Albanian independence. Only the most reckless would attempt to form such a front, which is doomed from the start. Instead, the task is to strengthen the Albanian army — improve its organization, provide it with instructors and weapons. Then, if Albania is attacked, it can formally call for Yugoslav aid. Otherwise Yugoslavia will be accused of occupying a sovereign state, and military intervention would become entirely possible. American ships and bases are close at hand. They would seize upon such a situation as the most convenient and “noble” pretext to intervene. When preparing for war, one must construct the front to one’s advantage. In this case, you would only expose your rear to an American blow.

Consider the scale of the war in China: it assumed enormous proportions, yet not a single one of our soldiers is there.

Are the Albanians any less capable than the Chinese? You could train them, arm them, and then they would be able to defend their own independence. It is far better that they defend it themselves. In that case, the Americans would scarcely dare to attack first. Otherwise, you make their task far easier. You present these problems as simple, but in truth they are much more complex.

If the Greek partisans were to be defeated, would you go to war?

Kardelj: No.

Stalin: My conclusions rest on an analysis of the real possibilities open to both the partisans and their opponents. Lately, I have begun to doubt that the partisans can achieve victory. If you are uncertain of their chances, then the partisan movement should be limited. The Americans and the English have immense interest in the Mediterranean. They desire bases in Greece, and will employ every means to sustain a government that obeys them. This is an international question of the first importance.

If the partisan struggle is curtailed, the enemy will lose the excuse to attack you. At present it is not so simple to begin a war, when they lack the pretext that you are directing civil war in Greece.

If, however, you are confident that the partisans stand a strong chance of victory, then the matter takes on a different aspect. Yet I have serious doubts on this score.

Dimitrov: We too receive little information.

Stalin: You have the right to request informa-

tion from us. Let us therefore conclude an agreement on obligatory consultations regarding all major international questions.

Dimitrov: We shall adhere to such an agreement.

Stalin: The treaty with Bulgaria will not be delayed for long. On the 15th the Hungarians will come, then the Finns, and after that, you.

Molotov: In one of the treaties it is written that all "hotbeds of aggression" must be destroyed. These are mere phrases that hand our enemies free ammunition. Why speak words that appear in none of the other treaties? Are you proposing a preventive war?

Stalin: Such are leftist infatuations.

Molotov: Not every UN initiative "against aggression" should be supported; they may well be directed against us. Was it not the League of Nations that branded us as aggressors over Finland?

The Yugoslav comrades even blocked Albania from purchasing five thousand tons of oats from us, sending it instead to Argentina.

Stalin: Clearly, the Yugoslavs fear we might take Albania away from them. You should indeed take Albania — but do so prudently.

The decree coordinating economic plans restricts both your sovereignty and that of Romania.

Only three federations seem natural and possible: 1) Yugoslavia with Bulgaria; 2) Romania with Hungary; and 3) Poland with Czechoslovakia. Beyond these, confederations are mere inventions.

Kostov: May we then direct our efforts toward

accelerating the federation between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia?

Stalin: You may establish it tomorrow if you wish. It is a natural process, and we oppose it only when pursued by Komsomol methods. The people of these countries, and world opinion, must first be prepared to accept the idea.

Kardelj: Our opinion is that even with Bulgaria, one should not rush — above all because of the international repercussions. Any undue acceleration could place you in a difficult position.

Stalin: I believe you are mistaken here. The unification of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania must not be postponed. The National Assemblies of these countries should resolve the question and instruct their governments to begin negotiations for unification. It is better to commence with political unification, and only afterward send troops into Albania; then it would not serve as a pretext for attack. To have established a federation before the peace treaty with Bulgaria came into force would have been premature. But now Bulgaria is a normal state, possessing full international rights. In my view, you should no longer delay — on the contrary, you must accelerate. If unification is enacted through the National Assemblies, there will be no obstacle. The federation itself resolves all questions. Bulgarians and Yugoslavs are very close, in race and in way of life, and the reasons for their unification will be readily understood. The Albanians too would benefit: a new, united Albania would be formed, with

nearly twice the population.

All efforts should be directed toward creating such a natural federation: strengthen its economy, develop its national culture, build up its army. Otherwise, Poland will wait for you to act, and you will wait for Poland, and nothing will come of it. There is no reason to deviate from the decisions of the nine communist parties.

Molotov: If the hotbeds of aggression, of which Comrade Dimitrov spoke, must be eliminated — then eliminate them. But why make such a spectacle of it? Today, every word is seized upon and dissected.

Kostov: We believe that if the partisan movement in Greece fails, it will create a very difficult situation for the rest of the Balkan countries.

Stalin: Naturally, the partisans should be supported. But if their prospects for success in a given country are diminishing, it is better to postpone the struggle until conditions are more favourable. You cannot compensate for an unfavourable balance of forces with mere declarations or anxieties. What is required is a sober analysis. If the balance shows that, at a certain moment, things are not going well, we must have the courage to acknowledge this. In the past, partisan movements have been suspended when circumstances were unfavourable. What cannot be done today can be done tomorrow. You are hesitant to state the issue plainly, bound as you are by a sense of “moral responsibility.” But if you cannot bear a burden you once hoped to carry, you

must admit this to yourself. You should not be intimidated by any “categorical imperative” of moral obligation. We are bound only by the balance of forces. If you are strong — strike. If not — hold back. We choose to fight not when the enemy demands it, but when it serves our own interests.

Kardelj: Within a few months it will become clear what the chances of the partisans truly are.

Stalin: Good — then wait. Perhaps you are right.

I myself doubted whether the Chinese could prevail. I advised them to reach a temporary arrangement with Chiang Kai-shek. Officially they assented, but in practice they continued to mobilize the people. Then they asked directly: Shall we continue the fight? We have the people’s support. We answered: Very well — what do you need? The conditions proved highly favourable. In the end, the Chinese were right, and we were wrong. Perhaps in this case too we are mistaken. But we must be certain of our course.

Kostov: Will the Americans permit the partisans to triumph?

Stalin: No one will ask their permission. If there are sufficient forces to win, and if there are leaders capable of mobilizing them, then the struggle should continue. But one must not think that if nothing develops in Greece, everything else is thereby lost.

As for recognition of General Markos’ government — the neighbouring countries should be the

last to recognize it. First, let others do so.

Molotov: Comrade Dimitrov’s statement against the Lulchev opposition was also incorrect, and is now being widely exploited by our enemies. Was it necessary to make it?

Dimitrov: The motive was internal necessity — to discourage them from again causing disturbances.

Stalin: Let Yugov negotiate with the opposition; he knows how to handle such matters.

Kardelj: We believe there are no essential disagreements between us — only certain errors.

Stalin: These are not isolated errors, but a system.

In the treaty with Czechoslovakia you may employ the Czech formula: in the event of an attack from Germany or its allies, mutual defence applies; if the threat comes from another country, then only the article on consultations is invoked.

Kostov: Matters are difficult in a small, backward country. Our insistence on economic cooperation and coordinated planning among the Balkan states is meant to hasten our common development.

Stalin: You may conclude a customs agreement with Yugoslavia — even form a common state. But I see little purpose in a customs pact or coordinated plans with Romania. The Romanians will sell their goods wherever they can fetch the highest price.

REGARDING FALSE CLAIMS ABOUT SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS YUGOSLAVIA

Telegram from V.M. Molotov to J. Broz Tito

March 13, 1948

Lavrentyev has arrived and provided information on current matters.

1. Regarding Gagarinov's toast in Albania, an investigation was carried out at my instruction. It was determined that the information received by Kardelj, whereby Gagarinov allegedly raised a toast to Tito but with the caveat, "if he is working to strengthen the forces and unity of the democratic bloc," was incorrect, as Gagarinov made no offensive remarks. It appears we are dealing either with a misunderstanding or slander.

2. The claim that the Soviet representative Kru-tikov refused to sign a trade agreement with Yugoslavia for 1948 is not true. As is known, a Soviet-Yugoslav trade agreement for 1947-48 exists and is currently in effect. This agreement expires on May 31 of this year. It is clear that a new agreement for 1948-49 will need to be signed by then, and again, it seems we are dealing with either a misunderstanding or slander.

3. The issue of the ruble-to-dinar exchange rate, as with all other foreign currencies, has been settled based on the ruble-to-dollar ratio. We have received

no objections from any foreign states in this matter. Only Yugoslavia has objected. If we now make an exception for the dinar, we would undermine the ruble's exchange rate — something we absolutely cannot allow.

4. On the matter of developing the navy and military industry in Yugoslavia, it will be necessary to arrange several more meetings between Yugoslav and Soviet representatives. We have never refused to provide Yugoslavia with assistance in this matter to the extent that we are able. The key issue here is for Yugoslavia to present a realistic and actionable development plan that takes into account both our and your capacities for the near future. Otherwise, there is a risk of ending up with a paper plan of no practical value in terms of actual development.

UNFRIENDLY ACTIONS OF THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT TOWARDS SOVIET SPECIALISTS

*Telegram from V.M. Molotov to
J. Broz Tito or E. Kardelj*

March 18, 1948

A report has been received that Kidrič's aide, Srzentić, informed the Soviet trade representative Lebedev that, in accordance with a decision by the Yugoslav government, it is forbidden to provide Soviet bodies with information on economic matters. This report has shocked us, as there is an existing agreement allowing Soviet government bodies to receive such information without hindrance. What is even more surprising is that Yugoslav government bodies are enforcing this measure unilaterally, without any prior warning or explanation of the reasons. The Soviet government regards such actions by the Yugoslav government as an expression of distrust towards Soviet personnel in Yugoslavia and as a display of unfriendliness towards the USSR.

It is clear that with such distrust towards Soviet personnel in Yugoslavia, the latter cannot consider themselves protected from similar unfriendly acts by Yugoslav authorities.

In view of this, the Soviet government has issued orders to the ministries of ferrous metallurgy, non-ferrous metallurgy, chemical industry, power

stations, communications and public health to immediately recall to the USSR all of their specialists and other personnel.

ON THE RECALL OF SOVIET ADVISERS AND THE ANTI-SOVIET TENDENCIES OF THE YUGOSLAV LEADERSHIP

*Letter from J.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov to
J. Broz Tito and others*

March 27, 1948

To Comrade Tito and the other members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

Your reply letters of March 18 and 20 have been received. We consider your reply untruthful and therefore completely unsatisfactory.

1. The question concerning Gagarinov may be considered closed, since you have withdrawn any accusations against Gagarinov, although we continue to believe that slander against Gagarinov took place in this matter. The statement attributed to Comrade Krutikov — allegedly that the Soviet government had refused to conduct trade negotiations this year — clearly does not correspond to reality, since Comrade Krutikov categorically denies what has been attributed to him.

2. Regarding the recall of military advisers, the source of our information is statements from the organs of the Ministry of Armed Forces and reports from the advisers themselves. As is known, our military advisers were sent to Yugoslavia at the

urgent request of the Yugoslav government, and the number of Soviet military advisers assigned to Yugoslavia was much smaller than what the Yugoslav government had requested. Therefore, the Soviet government had no intention of imposing its advisers on Yugoslavia.

However, later the Yugoslav military leadership, including Koča Popović, deemed it possible to declare the need to reduce the number of Soviet military advisers by 60 per cent. This statement was justified in various ways: some claimed that Soviet military advisers were too costly for Yugoslavia; others asserted that the Yugoslav Army had no need to adopt the experience of the Soviet Army; still others argued that the Soviet Army's regulations were formulaic and held no value for the Yugoslav Army; and, finally, some hinted quite openly that Soviet military advisers were receiving salaries for no apparent reason, since they were of no use.

In light of these facts, it becomes entirely clear why Đilas made his now well-known and insulting remark — for the Soviet Army — at one of the meetings of the CC of the CPY, saying that Soviet officers were, in moral terms, lower than the officers of the British army. As is known, this anti-Soviet statement by Đilas met with no rebuttal from the other members of the CC of the CPY.

Thus, instead of coming to a comradely agreement with the Soviet authorities and settling the matter of the Soviet military advisers, the Yugoslav military leadership set about insulting the Soviet

military advisers and discrediting the Soviet Army. Naturally, such a situation was bound to create a hostile atmosphere around the Soviet military advisers.

Under these circumstances, it would have been laughable to expect the Soviet authorities to agree to leave their military advisers in Yugoslavia. Since the Yugoslav government failed to counter attempts to discredit the Soviet Army, it bears full responsibility for the situation that has arisen.

3. As for the recall of Soviet civilian specialists, the main sources of our information are the reports of the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade, Comrade Lavrentyev, as well as statements from the specialists themselves. Your claim that Srzentić allegedly told the trade representative, Comrade Lebedev, that Soviet citizens wishing to obtain economic information must apply to the top — that is, to the CC of the CPY and to the government of Yugoslavia — in no way corresponds to reality. Here are Lavrentyev's reports of March 9.

"Srzentić, deputy to Kidrič in the Economic Council, told the trade representative Lebedev that there is a government decision prohibiting the provision of any economic materials to anyone. Therefore, despite the previously existing agreement, he cannot give Lebedev the relevant materials. The state security organs have been instructed to exercise control over this matter. Srzentić also said that Kidrič intends to speak to Lebedev about it."

From Lavrentyev's report it is clear, first, that

Srzentić did not say a single word about the possibility of obtaining economic information from the CC or from the Yugoslav government. And in general, it would be laughable to think that in order to obtain any economic information one must apply to the CC or the government — that is precisely what the normal economic bodies of Yugoslavia exist for, from which Soviet people previously received the necessary economic information.

Lavrentyev's report also makes something else clear. It shows not what you write about, but the exact opposite — namely, that Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia are subject to surveillance and control by the Yugoslav security organs.

It is worth noting that such a practice of monitoring Soviet representatives is something we find only in bourgeois countries, and not even in all of them.

It should also be noted that the Yugoslav security organs monitor not only the representatives of the Soviet government, but also the representative of the CPSU(B) in the Cominform body — Comrade Yudin.

It would be absurd to think that the Soviet government could agree to leave its civilian specialists under such a regime as has been created for them.

As is evident, here too the responsibility for the situation lies with the Yugoslav government.

Such are the reasons that compelled the Soviet government to recall its military and civilian specialists from Yugoslavia.

4. In your letter you requested that we also inform you of other facts which cause dissatisfaction in the USSR and which are aimed at worsening relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia. Such facts do indeed exist, and although they are not connected with the recall of civilian and military advisers, we consider it necessary to inform you about them.

First. We know that among the leading comrades in Yugoslavia there circulate various anti-Soviet remarks — for example, that the CPSU(B) is degenerating, that “great-power chauvinism reigns in the USSR,” that “the USSR seeks to enslave Yugoslavia economically,” that “the Cominform is a tool of the CPSU(B) for subordinating other parties” and similar statements. These anti-Soviet claims are usually cloaked in leftist phraseology such as “socialism in the USSR has ceased to be revolutionary” or “only Yugoslavia is the true bearer of revolutionary socialism.” Of course, it is laughable to hear such tales about the CPSU(B) from dubious Marxists like Đilas, Vukmanović, Kidrič, Ranković and others. But the fact is that such statements have long circulated among many of Yugoslavia’s leading figures, continue to occur even now, and create an atmosphere of anti-Sovietism that worsens relations between the CPSU(B) and the CPY.

We, of course, recognize the right of every Communist Party, including the Yugoslav Party, to criticize the CPSU(B), just as we recognize the CPSU(B)’s right to criticize any other communist

party. But Marxism demands that criticism be open and honest, not behind-the-scenes and slanderous, because in the latter case the party being criticized has no chance to respond. Meanwhile, the criticism of the Yugoslav leadership is not open and honest but behind-the-scenes and dishonest, and at the same time two-faced — because while discrediting the CPSU(B) behind its back with their “criticism,” they officially and hypocritically praise it to the skies. That is why such criticism turns into slander, into an attempt to discredit the CPSU(B) — into an attempt to undermine the Soviet system.

We have no doubt that if the Yugoslav Party masses knew of such criticism, they would indignantly reject it as alien and hostile. We believe it is precisely for this reason that the above-mentioned Yugoslav leaders seek to conduct such criticism secretly, behind the scenes and behind the backs of the masses.

It is worth recalling that Trotsky, when he decided to declare war on the CPSU(B), also began by accusing the CPSU(B) of degeneration, of national narrowness, of great-power chauvinism. He, of course, cloaked all this in leftist phrases about world revolution. And still, as is well known, Trotsky was a degenerate, and later, after being exposed, he openly moved into the camp of the sworn enemies of the CPSU(B) and the Soviet Union.

We consider Trotsky’s political career to be quite instructive.

Second. The current situation in the Commu-

nist Party of Yugoslavia causes us concern. It is unusual, to say the least, that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, while being the ruling party, has not fully legalized itself and still remains in a semi-legal position. Party decisions generally do not appear in print. Reports on Party meetings are not published.

In the life of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia there is no sense of inner-Party democracy. The Party's Central Committee is, for the most part, not elected but co-opted. There is no criticism or self-criticism in the Party, or almost none. Another telling fact is that the Party secretary in charge of personnel matters is at the same time the Minister of State Security. In other words, Party cadres are under the control of the Minister of State Security. According to Marxist theory, the Party must control all the state organs of the country, including the Ministry of State Security, but in Yugoslavia the reverse is the case — essentially, the Ministry of State Security controls the Party. This, probably, is the reason why the self-initiative of the Party masses is not at the necessary level.

It is clear that we cannot regard such an organization of the work of a communist party as Marxist-Leninist or Bolshevik.

In the Communist Party of Yugoslavia there is no sense of the spirit of class struggle. The strengthening of capitalist elements in the countryside and in the cities is proceeding at full speed, and at the same time the Party leadership is taking no measures to limit these capitalist elements. The Com-

munist Party of Yugoslavia lulls itself with a rotten opportunist theory of the peaceful transformation of capitalist elements into socialism, borrowed from Bernstein, Vollmar and Bukharin.

According to the theory of Marxism-Leninism, the Party is considered the principal leading force in the country; it has its own program and does not dissolve itself in a non-Party mass. In Yugoslavia, on the contrary, the People's Front is regarded as the principal leading force, and the Party is being dissolved into the People's Front. In his speech at the 2nd Congress of the People's Front of Yugoslavia, Comrade Tito said:

"Does the Communist Party have any program other than that of the People's Front? No! The Communist Party has no other program. The program of the People's Front is its program."

It turns out that in Yugoslavia this unusual theory of the Party is considered a new theory. In fact, there is nothing new here. In Russia, as far back as forty years ago, one group of Mensheviks proposed that the Marxist Party dissolve itself into a non-Party workers' mass organization and that the former be replaced by the latter. Another group of Mensheviks proposed that the Marxist Party be dissolved into a non-Party mass workers-and-peasants' organization and that the former be replaced by the latter. As is well known, Comrade Lenin at that time already characterized these Mensheviks as harmful opportunists and liquidators of the Party.

Third. We do not understand why the British

spy Velebit continues to remain in the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the First Deputy Minister. The Yugoslav comrades know that Velebit is a British spy. They also know that representatives of the Soviet government likewise consider Velebit a spy. And yet, despite this, Velebit remains the First Deputy of the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is possible that the Yugoslav government intends to make use of Velebit precisely as a spy for Britain. As is well known, bourgeois governments consider it entirely acceptable to have within their ranks spies of the imperialist powers whose favour they wish to secure, and thus agree to place themselves under the control of those powers. We regard such a practice as absolutely inadmissible for Marxists. In any case, the Soviet government cannot place its correspondence with the Yugoslav government under the control of a British spy. It is clear that since Velebit still remains in the leadership of Yugoslavia's foreign affairs, the Soviet government considers itself placed in a difficult position and deprived of the possibility of conducting frank correspondence with the Yugoslav government through the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Such are the facts that cause dissatisfaction on the part of the Soviet government and the CC of the CPSU(B), and that lead to a deterioration of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia.

These facts, as stated above, are not connected with the question of recalling the military and civilian specialists, yet they nonetheless play a con-

siderable role in worsening relations between our countries.

On behalf of the CC of the CPSU(B)

V. Molotov

J. Stalin

ON THE FUNDAMENTAL ERRORS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA

*Letter from J.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov to J. Broz
Tito, E. Kardelj and the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia*

May 4, 1948

We have received your reply and the report on the decision of the Plenum of the CC of the CPY of April 13, 1948, signed by comrades Tito and Kardelj.

Unfortunately, these documents — particularly the one signed by comrades Tito and Kardelj — not only fail to show any progress compared with the previous Yugoslav documents, but on the contrary, further confuse matters and intensify the conflict.

Special attention is drawn to the tone of the document, which can only be described as ambitious. The documents show no desire to ascertain the truth, to honestly admit mistakes, or to recognize the necessity of eliminating those mistakes. The Yugoslav comrades accept criticism directed at them not in a Marxist manner, but in a petty-bourgeois way — that is, they perceive it as an insult that harms the prestige of the CC of the CPY and strikes at the ambitions of the Yugoslav leaders.

In order to escape from the unenviable position

in which they have placed themselves, they resort to a “new” method — the method of baselessly denying all their mistakes in defiance of their obviousness. Well-known facts and documents, which were set out in the letter of the CC of the CPSU(B) of March 27, 1948, are denied. Comrades Tito and Kardelj clearly do not understand that such a childish method of unfounded denial of facts and documents cannot convince anyone and can only provoke a smile.

1. On the recall of Soviet military advisers from Yugoslavia. In its letter of March 27, the CC of the CPSU(B) explained the reasons for recalling the Soviet military advisers, stating that the information of the CC of the CPSU(B) was based on complaints from these advisers about the hostile attitude of Yugoslav officials towards the Soviet Army and its representatives in Yugoslavia. Comrades Tito and Kardelj completely deny the truthfulness of these complaints. The question arises: why should the CC of the CPSU(B) place more trust in the unfounded assertions of comrades Tito and Kardelj than in the repeated complaints of the USSR’s military advisers? On what grounds? The USSR has military advisers in almost all the people’s democracies. It should be emphasized that until now we have not received any complaints from our military advisers in those countries. This precisely explains why in those countries we have had no misunderstandings regarding the work of Soviet military advisers there. But we do have complaints

and misunderstandings of this nature only in Yugoslavia. Is it not clear that this situation can only be explained by the special hostile environment in which Soviet military advisers are surrounded in Yugoslavia?

Comrades Tito and Kardelj refer to the high expenses associated with maintaining Soviet military advisers in Yugoslavia, pointing out that Soviet generals receive in dinars three to four times more than Yugoslav generals, and that, in their view, this circumstance could have caused discontent among Yugoslav military personnel. But, firstly, Yugoslav generals, in addition to dinars, are also provided in kind with a number of other material benefits — housing, supplies, food and so on. Secondly, the monetary salary received by Soviet generals in Yugoslavia fully corresponded to the salaries of Soviet generals in the USSR. It is clear that the Soviet government could not agree to reduce the salaries of Soviet generals assigned to Yugoslavia.

Perhaps the expenses for Soviet generals in Yugoslavia are heavy for the Yugoslav budget, but in that case the Yugoslav government could have approached the Soviet government in advance with a proposal that it assume part of the expenses. There is no doubt that the Soviet government would have agreed to this. Meanwhile, the Yugoslavs took another path: instead of resolving this matter in a comradely way, they began insulting our military advisers, calling them parasites, and started discrediting the Soviet Army — and the Yugoslav gov-

ernment only turned to the Soviet government after a hostile atmosphere had been created around the Soviet military advisers.

It is entirely clear that the Soviet government could not reconcile itself to such a situation.

2. On Soviet civilian specialists in Yugoslavia. In its letter of March 27, the CC of the CPSU(B) explained the reasons for recalling civilian specialists from Yugoslavia. In this case, the CC of the CPSU(B) relied on complaints from Soviet civilian specialists and on reports from the Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia. From these reports it is evident that the Soviet civilian specialists, as well as Comrade Yudin, the representative of the CPSU(B) in the Cominform, were essentially placed under the surveillance of Yugoslav state security organs. Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny in their letter the validity of these complaints and reports, asserting that the Yugoslav state security organs do not monitor Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia. But why should the CC of the CPSU(B) believe more in the unfounded assertions of comrades Tito and Kardelj than in the concrete complaints of Soviet citizens — including, incidentally, the reports of Comrade Yudin? The Soviet government has many civilian specialists in all the people's democracies, has received no complaints from its specialists there, and has had no misunderstandings with the governments of those countries. The question arises: why have such misunderstandings and conflicts arisen only in Yugoslavia? Could it be precisely because

the Yugoslav government has created a special regime in Yugoslavia for Soviet citizens, including Comrade Yudin?

It is clear that the Soviet government could not reconcile itself to such a situation and was compelled to recall its civilian specialists from Yugoslavia.

3. On Velebit and other spies in the apparatus of the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The statement by comrades Tito and Kardelj is inaccurate when they say that in their meeting with Comrade Molotov they limited their doubts "about Velebit only to the remark that not everything was clear to them regarding him." In reality, during the conversation between these comrades and Comrade Molotov, it was a matter of suspecting Velebit of being a British spy. It seems very strange that comrades Tito and Kardelj identify the removal of Velebit from the apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with his ruin. Why can Velebit not be removed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs without being "ruined"? Equally strange is the statement by comrades Tito and Kardelj about the reason for retaining Velebit in the post of First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs: it turns out that Velebit has not been removed from this position precisely because he is being investigated. Would it not be more correct to remove Velebit from the above-mentioned post precisely because he is being investigated? Where has such a morbid goodwill towards a British spy come from — a spy who, more-

over, is implacably hostile to the Soviet Union?

But Velebit is not the only spy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs apparatus. Soviet representatives have repeatedly told the Yugoslav leaders about the Yugoslav envoy in London, Leontić, as a British spy. It is incomprehensible why this hardened British spy still remains in the apparatus of the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Soviet government knows that, in addition to Leontić, three other employees of the Yugoslav embassy in London are working for British intelligence, although their names have not yet been established. The Soviet government assumes full responsibility for this statement. It is also incomprehensible why the U.S. ambassador in Belgrade behaves as if he were the master of the country, and why his "informers," whose number is growing, are walking about freely.

It is also incomprehensible that the friends and relatives of Nedić — the executioner of the Yugoslav peoples — have so easily and comfortably found places within the state and Party apparatus of Yugoslavia.

It should be clear that the Soviet government — if the Yugoslav government stubbornly continues to show unwillingness to cleanse the Ministry of Foreign Affairs apparatus of spies — will refrain from conducting open correspondence with the Yugoslav government through the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

4. On the Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia

and the Soviet state. In their letter of April 13, 1948, comrades Tito and Kardelj write: “We believe that he (the Soviet ambassador), as an ambassador, has no right to ask anyone for information about the activities of our Party. This is not his job.” We consider this statement by comrades Tito and Kardelj to be essentially incorrect and anti-Soviet. Apparently, they equate the Soviet ambassador — a responsible communist who in Yugoslavia represents the communist government of the USSR to the Yugoslav communist government — with ordinary bourgeois ambassadors, with ordinary officials of a bourgeois state whose task is to undermine the foundations of the Yugoslav state. It is difficult to understand how comrades Tito and Kardelj could have descended to such absurdity. Do they understand that such an attitude towards the Soviet ambassador amounts to a denial of friendly relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia? Do they understand that the Soviet ambassador, a responsible communist, a representative of a friendly country which liberated Yugoslavia from the German occupiers, has not only the right but the duty from time to time to speak with the communists of Yugoslavia about any questions that may interest them? How can such simple and elementary matters be called into question — unless, of course, one does not stand on the basis of friendly relations with the Soviet Union?

For comrades Tito and Kardelj to understand, it is necessary to say that we — in complete con-

trast to the Yugoslav approach — do not regard the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow as a mere official, we do not equate him with bourgeois ambassadors, and we do not deny his “right to request information from anyone about the activities of our Party.” Upon becoming an ambassador, he has not ceased to be a communist. We treat him as a comrade and a communist figure. He has acquaintances and friends among Soviet people. Does he “gather” information about the activities of our Party? Probably he does. So what? Let him “gather” it. We have no reason to hide shortcomings in our work from comrades. We ourselves disclose our shortcomings for the purpose of eliminating them.

We believe that such an attitude of the Yugoslav comrades towards the Soviet ambassador cannot be considered accidental. It flows from the general position of the Yugoslav government, on the basis of which the Yugoslav leaders often fail to see the difference between the foreign policy of the USSR and that of the Anglo-Americans. They identify Soviet foreign policy with the foreign policy of the British and the Americans, and they believe that Yugoslavia should conduct the same policy towards the Soviet Union as it conducts towards the imperialist states — Great Britain and the United States.

In this respect, a very characteristic example is Comrade Tito’s speech in Ljubljana at the end of May 1945, in which he said:

“It has been said that this war was a just war, and we regarded it as such. But we do not demand

that it have a just conclusion; we demand that everyone be master in his own house; we do not want to pay someone else's bills; we do not wish to be small change; we do not want to be drawn into some policy connected with the division of spheres of influence."

This was said in connection with the question of Trieste. As is known, after a series of territorial concessions that the Soviet Union wrested from the Anglo-Americans, they, together with the French, rejected the USSR's proposal to transfer Trieste to Yugoslavia and occupied Trieste with their troops, which were stationed in Italy. And since all other means of transferring Trieste to Yugoslavia had been exhausted, the Soviet Union had no choice but to start a war against the Anglo-Americans over Trieste and seize it by force. The Yugoslav comrades should have understood that, after just having concluded a bloody war, the USSR could not embark on a new war. Nevertheless, this incident caused dissatisfaction among the Yugoslav comrades, which was reflected in Comrade Tito's speech. Comrade Tito's statement in Ljubljana that Yugoslavia "will not pay someone else's bills," that it "will not be small change," and that Yugoslavia does not want to be "drawn into some policy connected with the division of spheres of influence" was directed not only against the imperialist states but also against the USSR. Moreover, Comrade Tito's attitude towards the USSR in this case was no different from his attitude towards the imperialist states, since he

did not stress the distinction between the USSR and the imperialist states.

In this anti-Soviet statement by Comrade Tito — which, moreover, met with no rebuttal from the Politburo of the CC of the CPY — we see the basis for the slanderous propaganda of the CPY leadership (conducted in a narrow circle of Yugoslav Party cadres) about the degeneration of the USSR into an imperialist state seeking to subordinate Yugoslavia economically, as well as the basis for the CPY leadership's slanderous campaign about the "degeneration" of the CPSU(B), which allegedly seeks "through the Cominform" to dominate other parties, and about "the socialism of the USSR having ceased to be revolutionary."

At the time, the Soviet government was compelled to draw the attention of the Yugoslav government to the inadmissibility of such a statement by Comrade Tito. In view of the fact that the explanations subsequently given by comrades Tito and Kardelj were unsatisfactory, the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade, Comrade Sadchikov, received instructions from the Soviet government to make a statement to the Yugoslav government, which Comrade Sadchikov delivered on June 5, 1945:

"We regard Comrade Tito's speech as a hostile attack against the Soviet Union, and Comrade Kardelj's explanations as unsatisfactory. Our readers can only understand Comrade Tito's speech in this way, for it cannot be interpreted otherwise. Tell Comrade Tito that if he makes such an attack

against the Soviet Union again, we will be forced to reply with criticism in the press and will disavow him.”

And it is precisely from this anti-Soviet position of Comrade Tito towards the Soviet state that the Yugoslav leaders’ attitude towards the Soviet ambassador flows — an attitude in which they compare the Soviet ambassador to bourgeois ambassadors.

The Yugoslav leaders apparently intend to remain on these anti-Soviet positions. But in doing so, the Yugoslav comrades must understand that to remain on these positions means to move along the path of denying friendly relations with the Soviet Union, to move along the path of betraying the united socialist front of the Soviet Union and the people’s democratic republics. They must also take into account that, by remaining on such positions, they forfeit the right to demand material and other assistance from the Soviet Union, for the Soviet Union can provide assistance only to friends.

For the reference of comrades Tito and Kardelj, we are compelled to emphasize that such an anti-Soviet position towards the Soviet ambassador and the Soviet state is encountered only in Yugoslavia, whereas relations with the other people’s democracies have been and remain friendly and flawless.

It is worth recalling that Comrade Kardelj, who now fully supports Comrade Tito, looked quite differently upon the above-mentioned statement by Tito in Ljubljana three years ago. Here is what the

Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia, Comrade Sadchikov, reported to us at the time about his conversation with Comrade Kardelj on June 5, 1945:

“Today, June 5, I conveyed to Kardelj what you instructed me to. (Tito had not yet returned.) The message made a heavy impression on Kardelj. After thinking for a moment, he said that he considered the assessment of Tito’s speech correct. He also agreed that the Soviet Union could no longer tolerate such statements. In all probability, said Kardelj, in the present difficult time for Yugoslavia, open criticism of Tito’s statements would have serious consequences for them, and therefore they would try to ensure that such statements did not occur. But the Soviet Union would have full right to speak out with open criticism if this were to be repeated. Such criticism would be useful to them. Kardelj asked me to convey his thanks to you for this timely criticism. According to what Kardelj said, this criticism would help improve their work. The criticism of the political mistakes made in the government declaration in March was very useful. Kardelj was convinced that this criticism, too, would only help improve the work of the political leadership.

“Trying (very cautiously) to analyse the reasons for the mistakes, Kardelj said that Tito, of course, had great merits in eliminating the factionalism that had existed in the Party and in organizing the National Liberation War, but he sometimes allowed himself to regard Yugoslavia as something self-sufficient, outside the general framework of the devel-

opment of the proletarian revolution and socialism. Secondly, a situation had arisen in the Party such that the CC, as an organizing and political centre, in fact did not exist. We meet, said Kardelj, from time to time and make ad hoc decisions. In essence, each of us is left to himself. The style of work is very poor; there is no collective approach to work. We would like, continued Kardelj, for the Soviet Union to look upon us as representatives of one of the future Soviet republics, and not as representatives of another state capable of independently resolving questions — and to look upon the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as part of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. That is to say, we would like our relations to be based on the perspective that Yugoslavia will in the future become part of the USSR. Therefore, we would like you to criticize us directly and openly, to give advice, to help guide the internal and foreign policy of Yugoslavia in the proper direction.

“I replied to Kardelj that it is necessary to proceed from the actual situation in reality — namely, from the fact that Yugoslavia is an independent state and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is an independent party. You are obliged and able to raise and resolve questions independently, and we will always give you the necessary advice if you turn to us for help. We have certain treaties with Yugoslavia and, all the more, moral obligations, and we have never refused you advice, providing all possible assistance whenever, on any issue, you approached us.

Whenever I conveyed to Moscow requests from the Marshal, I always received prompt positive replies. But such advice is possible and useful only if it is requested in advance, before any decisions have been taken or any statements have been made.”

We will not dwell on Comrade Kardelj’s primitive and incorrect reasoning about Yugoslavia as a future component part of the USSR and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as part of the CPSU(B). But we would like to draw attention only to Comrade Kardelj’s critical remarks about Comrade Tito’s anti-Soviet statements in Ljubljana and about the poor situation in the CC of the CPY.

5. On Comrade Đilas’ anti-Soviet statement, on the intelligence service, and on trade negotiations. In our letter of March 27, we set out Comrade Đilas’ anti-Soviet statement at one of the meetings of the CC of the CPY, where he declared that Soviet officers were allegedly, in terms of moral standards, lower than officers of the British army. This statement by Comrade Đilas was made in connection with the fact that several officers of the Soviet Army had committed acts of an immoral nature in Yugoslavia. We qualified this statement by Comrade Đilas as anti-Soviet precisely because the pseudo-Marxist Comrade Đilas, on account of the misconduct of two or three officers, overlooked the fundamental difference between the socialist Soviet Army, which liberated the peoples of Europe, and the bourgeois British army, whose task is to oppress, not to liberate, the peoples of the world.

In their letter of April 13, 1948, Tito and Kardelj state that Đilas never said this in such a form, that "Tito explained this both in a letter and orally back in 1945, and that this explanation was then accepted by Comrade Stalin as well as by the other members of the Politburo of the CC of the CP-SU(B)."

We consider it necessary to remind them that this statement by Comrades Tito and Kardelj does not correspond to reality.

Here is how Comrade Stalin at the time responded to Comrade Đilas' statement in his telegram to Comrade Tito:

"I understand the difficulties of your situation after the liberation of Belgrade. You must know that the Soviet government, regardless of the colossal sacrifices and losses, is doing everything possible and even impossible to help you. But I am struck by the fact that isolated incidents and mistakes of individual officers and soldiers of the Red Army are generalized by you and transferred to the entire Red Army. It is unacceptable to insult the army that is helping you to drive out the Germans and that is bleeding in battles with the German invaders. It is easy to understand that there is no family without its black sheep, but it would be strange to insult the whole family because of one black sheep. If the Red Army men learned that Comrade Đilas and those who did not stop him believe that British officers are superior to Soviet officers in moral terms, they would feel indignation and pain at such an unjust

accusation."

In this anti-Soviet statement, which met with no rebuttal from the other members of the Politburo of the CC of the CPY, we see the basis upon which the slanderous propaganda of the CPY leadership against the Soviet Army and its representatives in Yugoslavia rests — which was precisely the reason for the recall of our military advisers.

How did the matter with Comrade Đilas end at that time? It ended with Comrade Đilas arriving in Moscow together with the Yugoslav delegation, apologizing to Comrade Stalin, and asking that the unpleasant mistake he made at the meeting of the CC of the CPY be forgotten.

It is clear that the matter was in no way as comrades Tito and Kardelj now portray it.

Unfortunately, it turned out that Comrade Đilas' mistake was not accidental.

* * *

Comrades Tito and Kardelj accuse Soviet citizens of allegedly recruiting Yugoslav citizens into their intelligence service. They write:

"We consider it wrong that the organs of the Soviet intelligence service recruit our people in a country that is building socialism; we cannot regard this otherwise than as an activity directed against the interests of our country. This is done despite the fact that our leading cadres and state security organs have protested against it and warned that we

cannot permit it. Our officers are being recruited, our various leaders are being recruited, and those are also being recruited who are hostile towards the new Yugoslavia.”

We state that this assertion by comrades Tito and Kardelj — which, moreover, is filled with hostile attacks against Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia — does not in any way correspond to reality.

It would be strange to demand that Soviet citizens working in Yugoslavia remain silent all the time, as if they had water in their mouths and never speak or converse with anyone. Soviet representatives are politically developed people, not merely business employees hired for a certain salary with no right to take an interest in what is happening in Yugoslavia. Naturally, they start conversations with Yugoslav citizens, ask questions, and would like to receive explanations, and so forth. One would have to be an incorrigible Sovietophobe to regard such conversations as attempts to recruit people into the intelligence service — and to recruit, moreover, people who are “hostile towards” the new Yugoslavia. Only anti-Soviet people can think that the leaders of the Soviet Union are less concerned about the unity and inviolability of the new Yugoslavia than the members of the Politburo of the CC of the CPY.

It is noteworthy that we encounter such senseless accusations against Soviet citizens only in Yugoslavia. It seems to us that these unbecoming accusations against Soviet citizens were invented in

order to justify the activities of the Yugoslav state security organs, which have organized surveillance over Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia.

It is necessary to recall that Yugoslav comrades who come to Moscow usually travel quite freely around the cities of the USSR, meet with our people and communicate with them freely. There has not been a single case in which the Soviet government has placed any restrictions on them. During his most recent visit to the USSR, Comrade Đilas, after being in Moscow, went to Leningrad for several days to talk with Soviet comrades. According to the Yugoslav pattern of conduct, information about Party and state work can be obtained only from the leading bodies of the CC of the Party and the government. And yet Comrade Đilas collected information not in the central organs of the USSR, but in the local bodies of the Leningrad organizations. What Comrade Đilas did there, what information he gathered — we did not consider it necessary to concern ourselves with these questions. We think that he was gathering information not for the Anglo-American or French intelligence services, but for the leadership bodies of Yugoslavia. And if that is the case, we see nothing reprehensible in it, for in such information the Yugoslav comrades may find much that is useful to them. Comrade Đilas cannot claim that he was restricted in any way.

The question arises: why should Soviet communists in Yugoslavia have fewer rights than Yugoslav communists in the USSR?

* * *

In their letter of April 13, comrades Tito and Kardelj again raise the question of trade relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, alleging that Comrade Krutikov refused to continue trade negotiations with the Yugoslav comrades. We have explained to the Yugoslav comrades several times that Comrade Krutikov denies the statement attributed to him. We have also explained that the Soviet government has not raised the question of terminating trade negotiations and trade operations with Yugoslavia. Therefore, we consider this issue closed and have no intention of returning to it.

6. On the incorrect political line of the Politburo of the CC of the CPY regarding questions of class struggle in Yugoslavia. In our letter we stated that in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia there is no sense of the spirit of a policy of class struggle, that in the countryside as well as in the city capitalist elements are growing, and that the Party leadership is taking no measures to limit the capitalist elements.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny all this without foundation and take our assertions — which are of a principled nature — as insults to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, avoiding discussion of the substance. Their “evidence” amounts only to statements about the thoroughness and consistency of the social changes taking place in Yugoslavia. But this is completely insufficient. The fact that

they deny the strengthening of capitalist elements and, in connection with this, the intensification of class struggle in the countryside under present-day Yugoslav conditions stems from an opportunist position — namely, that class struggle in the transitional period from capitalism to socialism supposedly does not intensify, as Marxism-Leninism asserts, but fades away, as was claimed by opportunists of the Bukharin type, who preached the rotten theory of the peaceful transformation of capitalist elements into socialism.

No one can deny the depth and thoroughness of the social transformations which in the USSR are the result of the October Socialist Revolution. And yet the CPSU(B) has never drawn from this fact the conclusion that class struggle in our country has weakened, or that there is no danger of a strengthening of capitalist elements. Lenin stressed in 1920-21 that “so long as we live in a small-peasant country, capitalism in Russia has a more solid economic base than communism,” for “small-scale production engenders capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale.” It is well known that for fifteen years after the October Revolution the question remained on our Party’s agenda — first of measures to restrict capitalist elements in the countryside, and then of the liquidation of the kulaks as the last capitalist class. Underestimating the experience of the CPSU(B) in ensuring the basic conditions for building socialism in Yugoslavia carries great po-

litical dangers and is inadmissible for Marxists, for socialism cannot be built only in the city, only in industry — it must also be built in the countryside and in agriculture.

It is no accident that the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia evade the question of class struggle and the restriction of capitalist elements in the countryside. Moreover, in the speeches of Yugoslav leaders, the question of class differentiation in the countryside is almost always passed over in silence, the peasantry is regarded as a single whole, and the Party is not mobilized to overcome the difficulties associated with the growth of exploitative elements in the countryside. Meanwhile, the political situation in the Yugoslav countryside gives no right to indulge in frivolous complacency and good-naturedness. Under conditions in which there is no nationalization of land in Yugoslavia, where there is private ownership of land, the buying and selling of land, hired labour and so forth — the Party must not be educated in the spirit of glossing over class struggle and reconciling class contradictions, for in this way it disarms itself in the face of the fundamental difficulties of building socialism. This means that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is being lulled by the rotten opportunist theory of the peaceful transformation of capitalist elements into socialism, borrowed from Bernstein, Vollmar and Bukharin.

It is also no accident that certain prominent leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia stray

from the Marxist-Leninist path on the question of the leading role of the working class. Whereas Marxism-Leninism proceeds from recognition of the leading role of the working class in liquidating capitalism and building a socialist society, the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia preach entirely different views. It is enough to point to the following statement by Comrade Tito in Zagreb in November 1946 (*Borba*, November 2, 1946):

“We do not tell the peasants that they are the strongest support of our state in order, if necessary, to get their votes, but because that is what they truly are.”

This position is in complete contradiction to Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism holds that in Europe, and therefore in the countries of people’s democracy, the advanced and thoroughly revolutionary class is the working class, not the peasantry. As for the peasantry, its majority — that is, the poor peasants and the middle peasants — can be, or already are, in alliance with the working class, but in this alliance the leading role belongs to the working class. Meanwhile, the above-quoted statement by Comrade Tito not only denies the leading role of the working class, but also proclaims the entire peasantry — and thus also the kulaks — to be the strongest support of the new Yugoslavia. Therefore, this statement expresses views that are fitting in the milieu of petty-bourgeois politicians, but not of Marxist-Leninists.

7. On the incorrect policy of the Politburo

of the CC of the CPY regarding the relationship between the Party and the People's Front.

In our previous letter we wrote that in Yugoslavia the main leading force is considered to be not the Communist Party, but the People's Front, and that the Yugoslav leaders diminish the role of the Party, effectively submerging it in the non-Party People's Front, thereby making the same fundamental mistake that the Mensheviks made forty years ago in Russia.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny this, claiming that all decisions of the People's Front are Party decisions, yet at the same time they do not consider it necessary to stress that a given decision was taken by a particular Party conference.

But it is precisely here that the Yugoslav comrades' fundamental error lies — they do not wish to show the Party and its decisions openly before the entire people, so that the people would know that the leading force is the Party, that the Party leads the people, and not the other way around.

According to the theory of Marxism-Leninism, the Communist Party is the highest form of organization of the working people; it stands above all other organizations, including the soviets in the USSR and the People's Front in Yugoslavia. The Party stands above all these organizations of working people not only because it gathers into its ranks the very best elements of the working masses, but also because it has its own separate program and its own separate policy, on the basis of which it leads

all the other organizations of the working people. Meanwhile, the Politburo of the CC of the CPY is afraid to speak about this to the working class and the entire Yugoslav people openly and directly, in a full voice. The Politburo of the CC of the CPY thinks that if it does not stress this point, then other parties will have no reason to demonstrate their strength and begin to act. Comrades Tito and Kardelj apparently believe that by this cheap trick they can abolish the law of historical development, deceive the class and deceive history. But all this is illusion and self-deception. If antagonistic classes exist, there will also exist struggle between them; and if there is struggle, there will be reflection of this struggle in the activity of various groups and parties, both legal and illegal.

Lenin said that the Party is the most important weapon in the hands of the working class. The task of the leaders is to keep this weapon in fighting readiness. Since the Yugoslav comrades hide the Party's banner and avoid putting forward before the people the leading role of the Party, they blunt this weapon of the working class, diminish the Party's role and disarm the working class. It is laughable to think that because of this cheap cunning by the Yugoslav comrades the enemy will abandon the struggle. That is precisely why the Party must always be kept ready to fight the enemy — not lulled to sleep, not having its banner hidden, not being soothed with the notion that if no pretext is given, the enemy will stop fighting and will cease organizing his

forces in legal and illegal forms.

We consider that the diminution of the role of the Communist Party in Yugoslavia has gone too far. This is a matter of a fundamentally incorrect relationship between the Communist Party and the People's Front in Yugoslavia. One must not lose sight of the fact that the People's Front of Yugoslavia includes very different elements in class terms — kulaks, merchants, small factory owners, the bourgeois intelligentsia, as well as disparate political groups, including some bourgeois parties. The fact that in Yugoslavia only the People's Front appears on the political scene, and the Party and its organizations do not appear openly before the people in their own name, not only diminishes the Party's role in the political life of the country, but also undermines the Party as an independent political force — one that is obliged to win ever greater confidence from the people and to extend its influence over the broad working masses through open political activity and open propaganda of its views and program.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj forget that the Party grows, and can only grow, in open struggle with the enemy; that the cheap cunning and manoeuvres of the Politburo of the CC of the CPY cannot substitute for this struggle, which is the school for the education of Party cadres. Their stubborn refusal to acknowledge the erroneousness of the statement that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has no program other than the program of the People's

Front indicates how far the Yugoslav leaders have departed from the Marxist-Leninist view of the Party. In this we see the danger of the development of liquidationist tendencies towards the Communist Party of Yugoslavia — which in turn threatens the very existence of the Party and ultimately carries within itself the hidden danger of the degeneration of the Yugoslav People's Republic. Comrades Tito and Kardelj claim that the Mensheviks' mistakes in dissolving the Marxist Party into a non-Party mass organization were made forty years ago, and that therefore there can be no connection between those mistakes and the mistakes of the Politburo of the CC of the CPY. Comrades Tito and Kardelj are deeply mistaken. The theoretical and political link between these two phenomena is beyond doubt, for just as the Mensheviks in 1907, so too comrades Tito and Kardelj after forty years diminish the role of the Marxist Party, deny the role of the Party as the highest form of organization that stands above all other mass organizations of working people and dissolve the Marxist Party in a non-Party mass organization. The only difference is that the Mensheviks made their mistakes in 1906-07, and since the Marxist Party condemned them at its London Congress, they did not resurface — whereas the Politburo of the CC of the CPY, contrary to this vivid lesson, after forty years is dragging from the grave old Menshevik mistakes and presenting them as its new theory of the Party. This circumstance does not lessen but, on the contrary, aggravates the

errors of the Yugoslav comrades.

8. On the alarming situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. In our first letter we stated that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia continues to remain in a semi-legal position, even though it came to power a full three years ago. We said that there is no inner-Party democracy in the Party, no election of leadership, no criticism or self-criticism, and that the CC of the CPY consists for the most part of co-opted rather than elected members.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny all this without foundation. They write that “in the CC of the CPY co-opted members are not the majority, that at the 5th Conference, which was held in December 1940 deep in the underground... and which, by decision of the Comintern, had all the authority of a congress, the CC of the CPY was elected in the number of 31 members and 10 candidates... that of this number 10 CC members and 6 candidates were killed in the war, that in addition two members of the CC were expelled, and that today there are 19 members of the CC of the CPY elected at the conference and seven co-opted members, so that at present the CC of the CPY consists of 26 members.”

This report is completely inconsistent with the facts. As can be seen from the archives of the Comintern, at the 5th Conference, which was held in October, not December 1940, 22 members of the CC and 16 candidates were elected, not 31 CC members and 10 candidates. Here is what Comrade Walter (Tito himself) reported at the end of Octo-

ber 1940 from Belgrade:

“To Comrade Dimitrov. From October 19 to 23 the 5th Conference of the CPY was held. One hundred and one elected delegates from all regions of the country participated. A CC of 22 people was elected, among them two women, and 16 candidates. Complete unity of views was demonstrated — Walter.”

If out of the 22 elected CC members 10 were killed, then 12 elected members remained; and if, out of these 12 members, two more were expelled, then 10 elected members of the CC remained. Comrades Tito and Kardelj say that there are currently 26 members in the CC — according to this, if 10 elected CC members are subtracted from this number, it means that in the current CC there are 16 co-opted members.

It follows that the majority of the current CC members are co-opted. The same situation exists not only with members of the CC but also with local leaders, who are appointed rather than elected from below.

We consider that such a method of forming the Party's leading organs, under conditions where the Party is in power and has the opportunity to function with full legality, can only be called a semi-legal position of the Party, and the very type of organization sectarian-bureaucratic.

It is absolutely inadmissible for meetings not to be held or to be held secretly, for this inevitably undermines the Party's influence over the masses. It is

also inadmissible that admission to the Party is kept hidden from the workers, for admission should play a major educational role, linking the Party with the working class and all working people.

If the Politburo of the CC of the CPY had sufficient respect for its Party, it would not have allowed such a situation to arise, and immediately after taking power — that is, three years ago — it would have proposed that the Party convene a congress so that it could reorganize itself on the basis of democratic centralism and begin to function as a fully legal Party.

It is perfectly clear that in such a state of affairs in the Party, under conditions where there is no election of leading organs and where instead there are only appointments from above, there can be no question of inner-Party democracy — and even less of criticism and self-criticism. We know that Party members are afraid to express their opinions, afraid to speak critically about the state of the Party, and therefore mostly keep silent so as not to expose themselves to repression. Nor can it be considered accidental that the Minister of State Security is simultaneously the CC secretary for personnel matters, or, as comrades Tito and Kardelj call it, the organizational secretary of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. It is obvious that Party members and Party cadres are placed under the supervision of the Minister of State Security — which is absolutely inadmissible and unacceptable. For example, it was enough for Comrade Žujović, at a meeting of the

CC of the CPY, to express his disagreement with the draft reply of the CC of the CPY to the letter from the CC of the CPSU(B), and he was immediately expelled from the CC. Clearly, the Politburo of the CC of the CPY does not view the Party as an independent organism with the right to express its opinion, but instead sees it as a partisan detachment whose members have no right to consider any questions and must carry out without objection whatever orders their commander gives them. We call this the introduction of military methods into the Party, which in no way corresponds to the principles of inner-Party democracy in a Marxist Party.

As is well known, Trotsky at one time also tried to introduce the military method of leadership into the CPSU(B), but the Party, led by Lenin, condemned and crushed him; the military methods were discarded, and inner-Party democracy was restored as a very important principle of Party building.

We believe that such an abnormal state in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia represents the most serious danger to the life and further development of the Party. The sooner such a sectarian-bureaucratic regime in the Party is ended, the better it will be for both the CPY and the Yugoslav People's Democratic Republic.

9. On the conceit of the leaders of the CC of the CPY and their incorrect attitude towards their mistakes. As is evident from the letters of comrades Tito and Kardelj, they completely deny

both the existence of any mistakes in the activity of the Politburo of the CC of the CPY and the existence of slanderous propaganda — which takes place in a narrow circle of Party cadres in Yugoslavia — about the “degeneration” of the USSR into an imperialist state, and so forth. They believe that the entire matter is one of inaccurate information in the CC of the CPSU(B) about the situation in Yugoslavia. They believe that the CC of the CPSU(B) has fallen victim to inaccurate and slanderous information spread by comrades Žujović and Hebrang, and that if there had been no such inaccurate information about the situation in Yugoslavia, there would have been no misunderstandings between the USSR and Yugoslavia. Thus they have concluded that the issue lies not in the mistakes of the CC of the CPY and not in the criticism of these mistakes by the CC of the CPSU(B), but in inaccurate information from comrades Žujović and Hebrang, who by such information misled the CPSU(B). They think that if they punish comrades Hebrang and Žujović (Hebrang was arrested and killed in prison in 1948, and Žujović was arrested in 1948 and spent ten years in Tito’s dungeons — *Ed.*) then everything will be fine. The culprits, so to speak, have been found.

We do not believe that comrades Tito and Kardelj themselves truly believe in the truth of this version, and the fact that they cling to it as though it were true shows that they consider it the easiest way out of the unenviable situation into which the

Politburo of the CC of the CPY has landed itself through its own fault. By constructing this false — and at first glance, naive — version, they seek not only to shift responsibility for the deterioration of Soviet-Yugoslav relations away from themselves and onto the USSR, but also, in passing, to slander the CC of the CPSU(B) by portraying it as gullible towards any “tendentious” and “anti-Party” information.

We believe that such an attitude on the part of comrades Tito and Kardelj towards the CC of the CPSU(B) and its critical comments on the mistakes of the Yugoslav comrades is not only frivolous and false, but deeply anti-Party.

If comrades Tito and Kardelj were truly interested in uncovering the truth — and if that truth were not so unpalatable to them — they would have seriously considered the following:

a) Why is the information of the CC of the CPSU(B) about the situation in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania accurate and causing no misunderstandings with the communist parties of those countries, whereas the information about the situation in Yugoslavia, according to the Yugoslav comrades, is tendentious and anti-Party, provoking anti-Soviet outbursts and hostile attitudes towards the CC of the CPSU(B)?

b) Why are friendly relations between the USSR and the people’s democratic countries developing and strengthening, while Soviet-Yugoslav relations have soured and continue to deteriorate further?

c) Why have the communist parties of the people's democratic countries expressed solidarity with the letter of the CC of the CPSU(B) of March 27 and condemned the mistakes of the Yugoslav comrades, whereas the Politburo of the CC of the CPY stubbornly persists in its errors and has ended up in a state of isolation?

Is all of this accidental?

To expose the mistakes of the Politburo of the CC of the CPY, there is no need to rely on information from individual comrades, such as comrades Žujović and Hebrang. For this, it is more than enough for a person to become acquainted with the official statements of the leaders of the CPY — for example, statements by comrades Tito, Đilas, Kardelj and others published in the press.

We state that Soviet people received no reports from Comrade Hebrang. We state that the conversation between Comrade Žujović and the Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia, Comrade Lavrentyev, did not yield even a tenth of what is contained in the erroneous and anti-Soviet pronouncements of the Yugoslav leaders. The repression of these comrades not only represents an impermissible reprisal incompatible with the principles of inner-Party democracy, but also attests to the anti-Soviet stance of the Yugoslav leaders, who regard a conversation between Yugoslav communists and the Soviet ambassador as a crime.

We believe that behind the Yugoslav comrades' attempts to shift responsibility for the deterioration

of Soviet-Yugoslav relations lies the fact that these comrades do not wish to acknowledge their mistakes and intend, in the future, to continue their hostile policy towards the USSR.

Lenin said:

“A political party's attitude towards its own mistakes is one of the most important and most reliable criteria of the party's seriousness and of its fulfilment in practice of its obligations to its class and to the working masses. To openly admit its mistake, to uncover its roots, to analyse the situation that gave rise to it, to carefully study the means for correcting the mistake — this is the characteristic sign of a serious party; this is the fulfilment of its obligations; this is the education and training of the class, and subsequently of the masses.”

We are, unfortunately, compelled to state that the leaders of the CPY, by refusing to acknowledge and correct their mistakes, have most crudely violated this principled Leninist injunction.

At the same time, we must point out that the leaders of the French and Italian communist parties, unlike the Yugoslav leaders, have in this regard proven equal to the task: they honestly admitted their mistakes at the Conference of the Nine Communist Parties, conscientiously corrected them, and in so doing helped their parties strengthen their ranks and educate their cadres.

We believe that at the root of the Politburo of

the CC of the CPY's unwillingness to honestly admit its mistakes and conscientiously correct them lies the excessive conceit of the Yugoslav leaders. Success has gone to their heads; they have begun to act as if the world were at their feet. They have not only grown conceited but also preach conceit, failing to understand that conceit could ruin the Yugoslav leadership.

Lenin said:

"All revolutionary parties that have perished, have perished because they became conceited, failed to see where their strength lay and were afraid to speak of their weaknesses. We shall not perish, because we are not afraid to speak of our weaknesses, and we will learn to overcome them."

We are, regrettably, forced to state that the Yugoslav leaders, who are not known for their modesty and continue to grow conceited from their successes (which are not so great in any case), have consigned this Leninist counsel to oblivion.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj state in their letter that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has merits and achievements, that the CC of the CPSU(B) previously acknowledged these merits and achievements, but now supposedly ignores them. This is, of course, untrue. No one can deny the merits and achievements of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. That is indisputable. But it must be said that the merits and achievements of, for example, the communist parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia,

Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania are in no way less than those of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. And yet, the leaders of these parties conduct themselves modestly; they do not boast of their successes — unlike the Yugoslav leaders, who have all but deafened everyone with their excessive self-praise.

It must also be noted that the French and Italian communist parties have no fewer, and indeed more, merits before the revolution than the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The fact that the French and Italian communist parties today have fewer successes than the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is explained not by any special qualities of the Yugoslav Party, but primarily by the fact that, after the German paratroopers smashed the headquarters of the Yugoslav partisans — at the very moment when the people's liberation movement in Yugoslavia was in deep crisis — the Soviet Army came to the aid of the Yugoslav people, crushed the German occupiers, liberated Belgrade, and thus created the necessary conditions for the Communist Party to come to power. Unfortunately, the Soviet Army was not able, and could not have been able, to provide such assistance to the French and Italian communist parties. If comrades Tito and Kardelj had taken this circumstance into account as an undeniable fact, they would make less noise about their merits and would conduct themselves more decently and with more modesty.

The immodesty of the Yugoslav leaders is such

that they even attribute to themselves achievements that cannot possibly be credited to them. Take, for example, questions of military science. The Yugoslav leaders claim that they have supplemented Marxist military science with a new theory, according to which war is regarded as a combination of actions by the regular army, partisan detachments and popular uprisings. In reality, this so-called theory is as old as the hills and therefore contains nothing new for Marxist military science. It is well known that the Bolsheviks employed the combination of actions by the regular army, partisan detachments and popular uprisings throughout the Civil War (1917-20), and did so on a much greater scale than was done in Yugoslavia. And yet, the Bolsheviks never claimed that by using this method they had contributed something new to the science of war. They made no such claims because this method had already been successfully applied long before the Bolsheviks — in 1812, by Field Marshal Kutuzov in Russia in the war against Napoleon. And even Field Marshal Kutuzov, employing this method, did not pretend to be an innovator, for the Spaniards had used this very method earlier than Kutuzov — in 1808, in their war against Napoleon (“guerrillas”). It follows that what the Yugoslav leaders consider new in the science of war is, in fact, more than 140 years old, and what they claim as their own achievement is in reality the achievement of the Spaniards.

Moreover, it must be remembered that the past merits of this or that leader do not preclude the pos-

sibility of present-day mistakes. Trotsky, too, once had revolutionary merits, but this in no way meant that the CPSU(B) could close its eyes to his grossly opportunist errors, which later drove him into the camp of the enemies of the Soviet Union.

* * *

Comrades Tito and Kardelj propose in their letter that a representative of the CC of the CPSU(B) be sent to Yugoslavia to study the questions of Soviet-Yugoslav disagreements. We consider this course incorrect, for the matter is not one of verifying specific facts but of fundamental disagreements.

As is well known, the problem of Soviet-Yugoslav disagreements has already been brought to the attention of the central committees of the nine communist parties that have their own Cominform. It would be wrong to exclude the other communist parties from this issue. Therefore, we propose that this matter be considered at the next session of the Cominform.

On behalf of the CC of the CPSU(B)

V. Molotov

J. Stalin

ON THE REFUSAL OF THE YUGOSLAV LEADERS TO SUBMIT TO CRITICISM

*Letter from J.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov to the
Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Yugoslavia*

May 22, 1948

We have received your letters of May 17, 1948 and May 20, 1948, signed by comrades Tito and Kardelj. The CC of the CPSU(B) considers that with these letters the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia are taking yet another step along the path of aggravating the gravest fundamental errors — errors whose harm and danger the CC of the CPSU(B) pointed out in its letter to the CC of the CPY dated May 4, 1948.

1. Comrades Tito and Kardelj write that they feel “so unequal that we cannot agree to have this question discussed at a meeting of the Cominform,” and then hint that it was allegedly the CC of the CPSU(B) which placed the Yugoslav leaders in such an unequal position.

The CC of the CPSU(B) considers that there is not a single word of truth in this statement. Within the Cominform of the nine communist parties there is, and can be, no inequality whatsoever for the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

When the Cominform of the nine communist

parties was organized, all the communist parties, as is well known, proceeded from the indisputable principle that each party must present reports to the Cominform on its work, and that each party has the right to criticize other parties. It was on this basis that the conference of the nine communist parties, at its meetings in September 1947, heard reports from the CCs of all parties without exception. The conference of the nine communist parties proceeded from the equal right of all parties to criticize one another — and it was at that time that the work of the Italian and French Communist Parties was subjected to sharp Bolshevik criticism.

It is known that at that time the Italian and French comrades not only did not dispute the right of other parties to criticize them for their mistakes, but, on the contrary, in a Bolshevik manner accepted this criticism and drew the necessary conclusions from it. It is also known that the Yugoslav comrades, along with everyone else, made use of the opportunity to criticize the erroneous activity of the Italian and French comrades and, like the rest, did not consider that, in criticizing the Italians and French, the other communist parties were infringing upon the equality of the Italian and French communist parties.

Why, then, are the Yugoslav comrades now making such a radical turn, demanding the abolition of the established procedure in the Cominform? Precisely because, it seems, they believe that the Yugoslav Party and its leaders should be in a

privileged position; that the existing status of the Cominform does not suit them; that they have the right to criticize other parties, but should not themselves be subjected to criticism from other parties. But such "morality," if it can be called that, has nothing whatsoever in common with equality. It is nothing other than a demand by the Yugoslav comrades to obtain for the CPY privileges which no other communist party has, nor can have. We have upheld and continue to uphold the principle without which the existence and activity of the Cominform is impossible: every party must present a report on its activities to the Cominform; every party has the right to criticize any other party. The refusal of the Yugoslavs to present a report to the Cominform on their work, and their refusal to hear the criticism of other parties, constitutes a violation of the equality of communist parties.

2. In their letter of May 17, comrades Tito and Kardelj repeat, as in their previous letter, that the criticism of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia leadership's mistakes by the CC of the CPSU(B) is allegedly based on incorrect information.

However, in support of their claim, the Yugoslav comrades present no evidence whatsoever. Thus their statement remains an empty phrase; we receive no concrete answer to the CC of the CP-SU(B)'s criticism, even though comrades Tito and Kardelj write in their letter that they do not shy away from criticism on matters of principle. Perhaps the Yugoslav comrades simply do not know what to

68

say in their own defence?

One of two things: either the Politburo of the CC of the CPY is aware of the seriousness of the mistakes it has committed, but, wishing to conceal this from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and to mislead it, fabricates versions denying the existence of these mistakes and shifts its guilt onto honest people who allegedly misinformed the CC of the CPSU(B); or the Politburo of the CC of the CPY genuinely does not understand that, through its mistakes, it is moving away from Marxism-Leninism. In that case, it must be acknowledged that the members of the Politburo of the CC of the CPY possess an excessively poor understanding of Marxism-Leninism.

3. By refusing to answer the CC of the CP-SU(B)'s direct questions, by compounding their mistakes through stubbornness, and by refusing to acknowledge and correct them, comrades Tito and Kardelj verbally assure us that they will in practice prove that they will remain loyal to the Soviet Union, to the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. After all that has happened, we have no reason to believe such verbal assurances. Comrades Tito and Kardelj have already made many promises to the CC of the CPSU(B) which they later failed to keep. The content of their letters, especially the most recent one, has only reinforced this conclusion for us. The Politburo of the CC of the CPY, and Comrade Tito in particular, must know that, through their anti-Soviet and anti-Russian policy

— which in recent times has been carried out in day-to-day practice — they have done everything possible to undermine the trust of the Communist Party and the government of the USSR in them.

4. Comrades Tito and Kardelj complain that they have found themselves in a difficult position and that the consequences of all this are very serious for Yugoslavia. This is, of course, true — but comrades Tito and Kardelj, together with the other members of the Politburo of the CC of the CPY, bear full responsibility for having placed their prestige and ambitions above the interests of the Yugoslav people. Instead of recognizing and correcting their mistakes in the interests of their own people, they stubbornly deny those mistakes, which are dangerous to the people of Yugoslavia.

5. Comrades Tito and Kardelj declare that the CC of the CPY refuses to attend a meeting of the Cominform to consider the question of the situation within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. If this is their final decision, then it means that they do not know what to say in their own defence at a meeting of the Cominform. In so doing, they silently acknowledge their guilt and show that they fear facing the fraternal parties. And the refusal to come to a meeting of the Cominform means that the CC of the CPY has embarked on a path of undermining the united socialist front of the people's democracies with the Soviet Union, and that at present the CC of the CPY is preparing its party and the Yugoslav people for the betrayal of the united front of

people's democracy and the USSR. Since the Cominform is the party foundation of the united front, such a policy leads to the betrayal of the cause of the international solidarity of the working people and to a shift towards the positions of nationalism, which is hostile to the cause of the working class.

Regardless of whether or not representatives of the CC of the CPY come, the CC of the CPSU(B) insists that the question of the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia be considered at the next meeting of the Cominform.

In response to the request of the Czechoslovak and Hungarian comrades to postpone the Cominform meeting to the second half of June, the CC of the CPSU(B) states that it agrees with this proposal.

On behalf of the CC of the CPSU(B)

V. Molotov

J. Stalin

AGAINST THE CRIMINAL PERSECUTION OF HEBRANG AND ŽUJOVIĆ

*Telegram from the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)
to J. Broz Tito*

June 9, 1948

The CC of the CPSU(B) has learned that the Yugoslav government has declared Hebrang and Žujović to be traitors and betrayers of the motherland. We understand this to mean that the Politburo of the CC of the CPY intends to physically eliminate them. The CC of the CPSU(B) declares that if the Politburo of the CC of the CPY carries out this plan, the CC of the CPSU(B) will regard the Politburo of the CC of the CPY as criminal murderers. The CC of the CPSU(B) demands that the investigation into the case of Hebrang and Žujović, concerning the so-called false information to the CC of the CPSU(B), be conducted with the participation of representatives from the CC of the CPSU(B). We await an immediate reply.

DUPLICITY OF THE YUGOSLAV LEADERS IN THE AFFAIR OF HEBRANG AND ŽUJOVIĆ

*Letter from the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) to
the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Yugoslavia*

June 19, 1948

In response to the letter from the CC of the CPSU(B), the CC of the CPY, in its resolution of April 13, stated that comrades Žujović and Hebrang were expelled from the CC of the CPY and subjected to party investigation for having provided Soviet bodies with false and slanderous information about the situation in Yugoslavia with the aim of worsening relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR.

Some time after this, comrades Žujović and Hebrang were arrested and later declared enemies of the working class.

From this, the CC of the CPSU(B) concluded that the Yugoslav authorities intended to sentence Žujović and Hebrang to death as enemies of the working class. In connection with this, the CC of the CPSU(B) sent a statement on June 9 to the CC of the CPY, in which the CC of the CPSU(B) insisted on the participation of its representatives in the investigation regarding the allegedly false information provided to Soviet bodies by Žujović and

Hebrang. The CC of the CPSU(B) also stated that, in the event of rejection of its proposal to participate in the investigation and if reprisals were carried out against Žujović and Hebrang, the CC of the CP-SU(B) would consider the members of the Politburo of the CC of the CPY to be criminal murderers.

In response, Comrade Kardelj, after consulting with Comrade Tito, stated in Ljubljana on June 10 as follows:

“We are surprised by such a request from the CC of the CPSU(B). Please be informed that the Politburo of the CC of the CPY does not intend to physically liquidate Hebrang and Žujović, and that regarding the matter of information allegedly given by Hebrang and Žujović to Soviet representatives, no investigation is being conducted.”

This was the second reply from the CC of the CPY on the fate of comrades Žujović and Hebrang, which is in complete contradiction to the first reply given by the CC of the CPY on April 13.

On June 17 of this year, the CC of the CP-SU(B) received from the CC of the CPY a new reply — by count, the third — regarding the case of Žujović and Hebrang. It stated that Hebrang and Žujović are under investigation by the state authorities, expressed indignation at the inquiry from the CC of the CPSU(B), and rejected the proposal of the CC of the CPSU(B) to have its representatives take part in the investigation into the case of Žujović and Hebrang.

It is clear that this reply cannot be considered

an honest answer; rather, it should be recognized as an evasion.

It is also clear that this reply is in complete contradiction to the two previous replies.

Undoubtedly, the Yugoslav leadership has become entangled in the matter of Žujović and Hebrang and, at different times, puts forward different explanations depending on the political circumstances of the moment — anything to conceal the true situation in the hastily concocted case against Žujović and Hebrang.

Only this circumstance can explain why the CC of the CPY rejects the proposal for representatives of the CC of the CPSU(B) to participate in the investigation into the case of Žujović and Hebrang.

From this reply it follows further that, since the case of Hebrang and Žujović has been handed over to the state authorities, full responsibility for the fate of Žujović and Hebrang now rests with the chief representative of state power in Yugoslavia — Prime Minister Tito.

WHERE THE NATIONALISM OF THE TITO GROUP IS LEADING YUGOSLAVIA

Article by J.V. Stalin published in "Pravda"

September 8, 1948

In the well-known resolution of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties, adopted in June 1948, *On the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia*, it was stated that in the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia over the past months, nationalist elements — previously present in a concealed form — had come to dominate, that the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had broken with the internationalist traditions of the party and had embarked on the path of nationalism.

All communist parties, the entire camp of people's democracy and socialism, unanimously approved the resolution of the Cominform *On the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia*. All the communist parties of the world recognized that, through its nationalist policy, the current Yugoslav leadership — that is, the Tito group — was playing into the hands of the imperialists, isolating Yugoslavia and weakening it.

Has the Tito group drawn the necessary lessons from these facts?

Has the Tito group understood that nationalist

policy leads to the loss of Yugoslavia's most loyal allies in the communist parties of the world, that this circumstance has already led to the isolation of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and to the weakening of the party both abroad and within the country?

Has the Tito group understood that the only way out of this grave situation, into which it has driven the party and the country, is to recognize its mistakes, break with nationalism, and return to the family of communist parties?

No — the Tito group has not drawn the necessary lessons, nor is there any sign that it understands these simple and obvious truths.

On the contrary, to the just, comradely criticism of the errors of the Tito group from the fraternal communist parties and from the entire camp of people's democracy and socialism, it responds — through the mouth of the Belgrade press — with coarse abuse, the incitement of national hatred towards the peoples of neighbouring democratic countries, and with widespread repressions, arrests, and killings of both communists and non-communists who dare to express doubt about the correctness of the nationalist policy of the Tito group. Most recently, agents of Tito's deputy, the notorious Ranković, murdered Colonel-General of the Yugoslav Army Arso Jovanović — a hero of Yugoslavia's war of liberation, former Chief of the General Staff during the liberation movement and head of Yugoslavia's military school. He was killed for doubting

the correctness of the nationalist and terrorist policies of the Tito group. In connection with this, it is openly said in Yugoslavia that “the Tito group is degenerating into a clique of political murderers.”

Clearly, the Tito group does not intend to admit and correct its mistakes. More precisely, it is afraid — lacking the courage to admit them — because to recognize and correct one’s mistakes requires courage. Worse still, “out of fright,” it seizes and represses anyone who dares to mention its errors.

Lenin says:

“A political party’s attitude towards its own mistakes is one of the most important and most reliable criteria of the party’s seriousness and of its fulfilment in practice of its obligations to its class and to the working masses. To openly admit its mistake, to uncover its roots, to analyse the situation that gave rise to it, to carefully study the means for correcting the mistake — this is the characteristic sign of a serious party; this is the fulfilment of its obligations; this is the education and training of the class, and subsequently of the masses.”

It is obvious that the Tito group cannot in any way be counted among those courageous and honest leaders, devoted to their party, of whom Lenin spoke.

The main nationalist backsliding of the Tito group occurred in the period leading up to the convening of the Information Bureau of Communist Parties in the spring of 1948. The open nationalist stance of the group began when it refused to par-

ticipate in the meeting of the Information Bureau of Communist Parties and to discuss, together with fraternal parties, the question of the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Despite repeated proposals to send a delegation of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the meeting and present its viewpoint there — just as had been done at the previous meeting in relation to other communist parties — the Tito group flatly refused to take part in the work of the meeting. It became clear that the Tito group did not value friendship with the communist parties, including the Communist Party of the USSR. This was an open break with the internationalist united front of communist parties. It was a break with internationalism and a shift onto the tracks of nationalism.

The Belgrade newspaper *Borba* assures readers that Tito and his associates support a united anti-imperialist front. This, of course, is untrue, intended to deceive “ordinary people.” Indeed, what sort of anti-imperialist stance can we speak of when this group cannot even coexist within the same family with the communist parties of countries neighbouring Yugoslavia?

The second major fact demonstrating the nationalist backsliding of the Tito group must be considered its unworthy, hypocritical, anti-Leninist conduct at the 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Naive people expected that the congress would operate under the banner of friendship with the communist parties, under the ban-

ner of strengthening the anti-imperialist front of the people's democracies and the USSR. In reality, however, something entirely opposite occurred. In practice, the Tito group turned the congress into an arena for struggle against the communist parties of neighbouring countries, into an arena for struggle against the united anti-imperialist front of the people's democracies. This was a congress of a campaign against the people's democracies and their communist parties, against the USSR and its Communist Party.

Of course, in Yugoslavia it is not entirely safe to speak openly about a campaign against the USSR and the people's democratic countries, because the Yugoslav peoples stand firmly for an alliance with the USSR and the people's democracies. Therefore, the Tito group resorted to a cheap trick and decided to disguise this reactionary campaign with grand phrases about love for the USSR, friendship with the USSR, the great role of the USSR in the liberation movement and so on. It even went so far that Tito's associates proposed that Stalin join this dishonourable campaign and take upon himself the defence of Tito's nationalist group from the criticism of the communist parties of the USSR and other democratic countries. The staff of the Belgrade press employed every possible trick and manipulation, performing the most unexpected and ridiculous acrobatic leaps and somersaults to convince the Yugoslav people that black is white and white is black, that the campaign of the Tito

group against socialism and democracy was a minor matter, while the "alliance" with the USSR and the "united front" with it were the most important concern of the group. In reality, however, the Tito group in those days joined the same camp as the imperialists, slandering the communist parties of the people's democracies and the USSR — to the delight of imperialists everywhere. Instead of a united front with the communist parties, there emerged a united front with the imperialists. The 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia approved and entrenched the nationalist policy of the Tito group.

The political acrobats from *Borba* demand that the communist parties cease exposing the errors of the Tito group, that the communist parties extend trust and support to this group — arguing that otherwise such a "campaign" against the Tito group could cause serious harm to Yugoslavia.

No, gentlemen! The communist parties cannot give either trust or support to the nationalist policy of the Tito group. It is entirely possible that this circumstance will harm Yugoslavia. But the blame for this lies not with the communist parties, but with the nationalist Tito group, which has broken with the communist parties and declared war on them.

The political acrobats from *Borba* must recognize that Marxism and nationalism are incompatible, that nationalism, as the ideology of the bourgeoisie, is the enemy of Marxism. They must understand that Marxism-Leninism cannot tolerate

nationalism or a drift towards nationalism within communist parties, and that it is obliged to destroy nationalism — whatever form it takes — in the name of the interests of the working people, in the name of the freedom and friendship of peoples, in the name of the victorious construction of socialism.

Lenin says:

“Bourgeois nationalism and proletarian internationalism — these are two irreconcilably hostile slogans corresponding to the two great class camps of the entire capitalist world and expressing two policies (indeed: two worldviews).”

Under conditions where bourgeois power has been overthrown, the exploiting classes and their agents attempt to use the poisoned weapon of nationalism to restore the old order.

In this connection, Stalin says:

“A drift towards nationalism is the adaptation of the internationalist policy of the working class to the nationalist policy of the bourgeoisie... A drift towards nationalism reflects the attempts of ‘one’s own’ national bourgeoisie... to restore capitalism.”

Nationalism within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia strikes a blow not only against the common anti-imperialist front, but — above all — against the interests of Yugoslavia itself, both in for-

eign policy and in domestic policy.

The nationalism of the Tito group in foreign policy leads to a rupture with the united front of the world revolutionary movement of the working people, to Yugoslavia’s loss of its most loyal allies and to the country’s self-isolation. The nationalism of the Tito group disarms Yugoslavia in the face of its external enemies.

The nationalism of the Tito group in domestic policy leads to a policy of peace between exploiters and the exploited, to a policy of “uniting” exploiters and exploited in a single “national” front, to a policy of retreat from class struggle, to the notion of the peaceful integration of exploiters into socialism — to the demobilization of the fighting spirit of Yugoslavia’s working people. The nationalism of the Tito group disarms the working people of Yugoslavia in the face of their internal enemies.

A year ago, when the Tito group had not yet displayed nationalist tendencies and cooperated with fraternal parties, Yugoslavia felt confident and advanced boldly, relying on its closest allies in the form of foreign communist parties. Such was the situation in the recent past. However, after the Tito group shifted onto the tracks of nationalism, the picture changed sharply. Once the Tito group broke with the united front of communist parties and began to take an arrogant attitude towards the people’s democracies, Yugoslavia began losing its most faithful allies, and it found itself isolated before both its external and internal enemies.

Such are the sad results of the nationalist policy of the Tito group.

The Tito group has failed to understand what is perfectly clear and obvious to every communist. It has failed to grasp the simple truth that, in the present international situation, fraternal solidarity among communist parties, mutual cooperation and friendship among the people's democracies, and co-operation and friendship with the USSR are the chief conditions for the rise and flourishing of the people's democracies in the cause of socialist construction, and the main guarantee of their national freedom and independence from the encroachments of imperialism.

The political acrobats of *Borba* go so far as to claim that criticism of the errors of the Tito group has turned into a campaign against the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and a campaign against the peoples of Yugoslavia.

This, of course, is untrue. No campaign has been or is being conducted against the peoples of Yugoslavia. It would be outright criminal to wage any campaign against the Yugoslav peoples, whose heroic feats are well known to all. It is also well known that the peoples of Yugoslavia firmly support a united front with the people's democracies and the USSR. They bear no responsibility whatsoever for the nationalist policy of the Tito group. We regard the Yugoslav peoples as our loyal allies.

Nor has there been, or is there, any campaign against the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as a

whole. We know full well that the majority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia firmly stands for friendship with the communists of other countries, for friendship with the USSR and its Communist Party. The existence of internationalist traditions within the ranks of the majority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is beyond doubt. We also know that the majority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia does not approve of the nationalist policy of the Tito group. We know that it is precisely for this reason that they are subjected to brutal repression by the Tito group and its agents.

The "campaign" is not being conducted against the peoples of Yugoslavia or against the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as a whole, but against the nationalist Tito group. It is being conducted in order to help the Communist Party of Yugoslavia understand the errors of the Tito group and to eliminate the nationalist policy of the Yugoslav leadership.

The political acrobats of *Borba* finally claim that the Tito group is inseparable from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, that it represents the majority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

This too is untrue. A year ago, the Tito group may indeed have represented the majority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. But that was a year ago. Now, after the break with the communist parties, after it has clashed with all its neighbouring republics, after it has crossed over into the camp of nationalism — the Tito group no longer represents the majority of the party. Now the Tito group is

the Tito faction, enjoying the confidence of only a minority of the party, and using the state apparatus to suppress the will of the party's internationalist majority. The Tito faction has itself separated from the party, since it has placed the party under the supervision of the executioner Ranković and has established in the party a cruel terrorist regime with its repressions, mass arrests and killings. In practice, the Tito faction is now at war with its own party. Only the blind can fail to see this. If the Tito faction has proven incapable of maintaining order in the party by normal democratic methods and has been forced to resort to mass repression, this means that it long ago lost the confidence of the majority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

The Tito faction represents only a minority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, relying not on the party's trust but on the administrative-police apparatus of Yugoslavia.

ON THE SITUATION IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA

Resolution of the Cominform

June 29, 1948

The Cominform, consisting of representatives of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists), the Romanian Workers' Party, the Hungarian Workers' Party, the Polish Workers' Party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), the Communist Party of France, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Communist Party of Italy, having discussed the question of the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and noting that representatives of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia refused to appear at the session of the Cominform, unanimously agreed on the following conclusions:

1. The Cominform notes that the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has recently been pursuing, on fundamental questions of foreign and domestic policy, an incorrect line representing a departure from Marxism-Leninism. In this regard, the Cominform approves the actions of the CC of the CPSU(B), which took the initiative in exposing the incorrect policy of comrades Tito, Kardelj, Đilas and Ranković.

2. The Cominform notes that the leadership of

the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is pursuing an unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union and the CPSU(B). In Yugoslavia, there has been an unworthy policy of vilifying Soviet military specialists and discrediting the Soviet Army. For Soviet civilian specialists in Yugoslavia, a special regime was established, under which they were placed under the supervision of Yugoslav state security organs and subjected to surveillance. Similar surveillance and supervision by the Yugoslav state security organs were carried out against the CPSU(B)'s representative to the Cominform, Comrade Yudin, and several official representatives of the USSR in Yugoslavia. All these and similar facts testify that the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia have taken a position unworthy of communists, whereby the Yugoslav leaders have come to equate the foreign policy of the USSR with the foreign policy of the imperialist powers and behave towards the USSR in the same way as they behave towards bourgeois states. It is precisely because of this anti-Soviet stance that slanderous propaganda, borrowed from the arsenal of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism, about the "degeneration" of the CPSU(B), the "degeneration" of the USSR and so forth, has spread within the CC of the CPY. The Cominform condemns these anti-Soviet positions of the CPY leadership, which are incompatible with Marxism-Leninism and are befitting only nationalists.

3. In their domestic policy, the leaders of the CPY are departing from the positions of the work-

ing class and breaking with the Marxist theory of classes and class struggle. They deny the fact of the growth of capitalist elements in their country and the associated intensification of class struggle in the Yugoslav countryside. This denial stems from the opportunist premise that, in the transitional period from capitalism to socialism, class struggle does not intensify — as Marxism-Leninism teaches — but rather subsides, as was claimed by opportunists like Bukharin, who preached the theory of the peaceful growth of capitalism into socialism. The Yugoslav leaders are pursuing an incorrect policy in the countryside, ignoring class differentiation there and treating the individual peasantry as a single whole — contrary to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of classes and class struggle, and contrary to Lenin's well-known statement that small-scale individual farming produces capitalism and the bourgeoisie "constantly, daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale." Meanwhile, the political situation in the Yugoslav countryside gives no grounds for complacency or benevolent optimism. In conditions where individual peasant farming predominates, where there is no nationalization of land and land purchase and sale is allowed, where large tracts are concentrated in the hands of the kulaks, wage labour is employed, etc., one cannot educate the party in the spirit of obscuring class struggle and reconciling class contradictions — thereby disarming the party in the face of the difficulties of socialist construction. The leaders of the Communist Par-

ty of Yugoslavia are straying from the Marxist-Leninist path onto the path of a populist-kulak party in the question of the leading role of the working class, asserting that the peasants are “the most solid foundation of the Yugoslav state.” Lenin teaches that the proletariat, “as the only thoroughly revolutionary class of modern society... must be the leader, the hegemon in the struggle of the whole people for a complete democratic transformation, in the struggle of all working and exploited people against the oppressors and exploiters.” The Yugoslav leaders are violating this tenet of Marxism-Leninism. As for the peasantry, its majority — that is, the poor peasants and middle peasants — may be, or already are, in alliance with the working class, with the leading role in this alliance belonging to the working class. The above-mentioned position of the Yugoslav leaders contradicts these Marxist-Leninist principles. Clearly, this position reflects views appropriate for petty-bourgeois nationalists, not for Marxist-Leninists.

4. The Cominform considers that the leadership of the CPY is revising the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the party. According to the theory of Marxism-Leninism, the party is the main leading and guiding force in the country, with its own specific program, and does not dissolve itself into a non-Party mass. The party is the highest form of organization and the most important weapon of the working class. Meanwhile, in Yugoslavia the main leading force in the country is considered not to be

the Communist Party, but the People's Front. The Yugoslav leaders belittle the role of the Communist Party, in effect dissolving it into the non-Party People's Front, which includes very diverse elements in class terms (workers, working peasants operating individual farms, kulaks, traders, small manufacturers, the bourgeois intelligentsia, etc.), as well as a motley assortment of political groups, including some bourgeois parties. The Yugoslav leaders stubbornly refuse to acknowledge the erroneousness of their position that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia supposedly cannot and should not have its own specific program, and must be content with the program of the People's Front. The fact that in Yugoslavia it is only the People's Front that appears openly on the political stage, while the party and its organization do not appear openly in their own name before the people, not only diminishes the role of the party in the political life of the country but also undermines the party as an independent political force — one that must win ever greater trust of the people and extend its influence over ever broader masses of working people through open political activity and open propaganda of its views and program. The leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia are repeating the mistakes of the Russian Mensheviks regarding the dissolution of the Marxist party into a non-Party mass organization. All this testifies to the existence of liquidationist tendencies towards the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The Cominform considers that such

a policy of the CC of the CPY threatens the very existence of the Communist Party and, ultimately, carries with it the danger of the degeneration of the Yugoslav People's Republic.

5. The Cominform considers that the bureaucratic regime created by the Yugoslav leaders within the party is destructive to the life and development of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. There is no inner-party democracy, no elections, no criticism or self-criticism. Contrary to the unsubstantiated assurances of comrades Tito and Kardelj, the majority of the CC of the CPY consists not of elected but of co-opted members. The Communist Party is in fact in a semi-legal position. Party meetings are not convened, or are held in secret, which cannot but undermine the party's influence among the masses. This type of organization of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia can only be described as sectarian-bureaucratic. It leads to the liquidation of the party as an active, self-reliant body, and cultivates within the party military methods of leadership similar to those once imposed by Trotsky. It is utterly intolerable that the most elementary rights of party members are trampled in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and that even the slightest criticism of the party's wrongful practices results in severe reprisals. The Cominform regards as disgraceful such facts as the expulsion from the party and arrest of CC of the CPY members comrades Žujović and Hebrang for daring to criticize the anti-Soviet positions of the Yugoslav party leaders and to speak in favour of

friendship between Yugoslavia and the USSR. The Cominform considers that such a shameful, purely "Turkish" terrorist regime cannot be tolerated in the communist party. The interests of the very existence and development of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia require that this regime be ended.

6. The Cominform considers that criticism from the CC of the CPSU(B) and the CCs of other communist parties of the errors of the CC of the CPY — being fraternal assistance to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia — creates all the necessary conditions for the CPY leadership to correct its mistakes as quickly as possible. However, instead of honestly accepting this criticism and taking the Bolshevik road to correcting its mistakes, the CPY leaders, infected with excessive ambition, arrogance and conceit, met the criticism with hostility, adopted an anti-party stance of blanket denial of their mistakes, violated the Marxist-Leninist teaching on a political party's attitude towards its errors, and thereby deepened their anti-party mistakes. Finding themselves unable to withstand the criticism from the CC of the CPSU(B) and the central committees of other fraternal parties, the Yugoslav leaders embarked on a course of outright deception of their party and people, concealing from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia the criticism of the CC of the CPY's wrongful policy, and also concealing from the party and people the real reasons for the reprisals against comrades Žujović and Hebrang. In recent times, after the criticism from the CC of

the CPSU(B) and the fraternal parties of the Yugoslav leaders' mistakes, the Yugoslav leaders have attempted to decree a number of new ultra-left measures — laws. They hurriedly issued a new decree on the nationalization of small industry and trade, the implementation of which has been completely unprepared and which, due to this haste, can only hinder the supply of the Yugoslav population. They just as hastily issued a new law on a bread tax on the peasantry, which was likewise unprepared and which, for this reason, can only disrupt the supply of bread to the urban population. Finally, the Yugoslav leaders suddenly, in noisy declarations, recently proclaimed their love and devotion to the Soviet Union, although it is reliably known that to this day they are pursuing in practice an unfriendly policy towards the USSR. But that is not all. The leaders of the CPY have lately, with great pomp, declared a policy of eliminating the capitalist elements in Yugoslavia. In their letter to the CC of the CPSU(B) of April 13, comrades Tito and Kardelj wrote that "the plenum" of the CC had approved the measures proposed by the Politburo of the CC for the elimination of the remnants of capitalism in the country. In line with this position, Kardelj stated in his speech to the People's Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia on April 25: "In our country, only a few days remain for all remnants of the exploitation of man by man." Such a position of the leaders of the CPY on eliminating the capitalist elements under the current conditions in Yugosla-

via, and consequently the kulaks as a class, can only be described as adventurist and non-Marxist. This task cannot be accomplished so long as individual peasant farming predominates in the country, inevitably producing capitalism; so long as conditions for the mass collectivization of agriculture have not been prepared; and so long as the majority of the working peasantry have not been convinced of the advantages of collective farming. The experience of the CPSU(B) shows that only on the basis of mass collectivization of agriculture is it possible to eliminate the last and most numerous exploiting class — the kulaks; and that the elimination of the kulaks as a class is an organic component of the collectivization of agriculture. To successfully carry out the liquidation of the kulaks as a class, and therefore the elimination of capitalist elements in the countryside, the party must first undertake lengthy preparatory work to limit the capitalist elements in the countryside, to strengthen the alliance between the working class and the peasantry under the leadership of the working class, and to develop socialist industry capable of producing machinery for collective farming. Haste in this matter can cause irreparable harm. Only on the basis of these measures, carefully prepared and consistently implemented, is it possible to move from limiting capitalist elements in the countryside to their elimination. Any attempt by the Yugoslav leaders to resolve this task hastily and by bureaucratic decree means either an adventure doomed to failure in advance or an emp-

ty boastful demagogic declaration. The Cominform considers that with such false and demagogic tactics the Yugoslav leaders aim to show that they not only stand on the ground of class struggle but even go beyond the demands that might be made of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in limiting capitalist elements — judged from the standpoint of real possibilities. The Cominform considers that since these ultra-left decrees and declarations of the Yugoslav leadership are demagogic and unachievable at the present time, they can only discredit the banner of socialist construction in Yugoslavia. Therefore, the Cominform regards such adventurist tactics as an unworthy manoeuvre and an impermissible political game. Clearly, the above-mentioned ultra-left demagogic measures and declarations of the Yugoslav leaders are designed to mask their refusal to acknowledge their mistakes and honestly correct them.

7. Taking into account the situation that has arisen in the CPY, and seeking to offer the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia a way out, the CC of the CPSU(B) and the CCs of other fraternal parties proposed that the question of the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia be considered at a meeting of the Cominform on the same normal party basis as the activities of other communist parties had been considered at the first meeting of the Cominform. However, in response to repeated proposals from the fraternal parties to discuss the situation in the Communist Party of Yu-

goslavia at the Cominform, the Yugoslav leaders refused. Seeking to avoid the just criticism of the fraternal parties at the Cominform, the Yugoslav leaders invented the claim of their supposedly “unequal status.” It must be said that there is not a word of truth in this claim. It is well known that when the Cominform was organized, the communist parties proceeded from the indisputable principle that any party must report to the Cominform, just as any party has the right to criticize other parties. At the first meeting of the nine parties, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia made wide use of this right. The refusal of the Yugoslavs to report on their activities to the Cominform and to hear critical remarks from other communist parties constitutes an actual violation of the equality of communist parties and is tantamount to demanding that a privileged position be created in the Cominform for the CPY.

8. Taking all the above into account, the Cominform agrees with the assessment of the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the criticism of the CC of the CPY’s mistakes, and the political analysis of those mistakes set out in the letters of the CC of the CPSU(B) to the CC of the CPY from March to May 1948. The Cominform unanimously concludes that, with their anti-party and anti-Soviet views — views incompatible with Marxism-Leninism — through their entire conduct and their refusal to appear at the meeting of the Cominform, the leaders of the CPY have set themselves in opposition to the communist parties within the Com-

inform, have taken the path of splitting from the united socialist front against imperialism, the path of betraying the cause of the international solidarity of the working people, and the path of moving to nationalist positions. The Cominform condemns this anti-party policy and conduct of the CC of the CPY. The Cominform recognizes that, by virtue of all this, the CC of the CPY places itself and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia outside the family of fraternal parties, outside the united communist front, and therefore outside the ranks of the Cominform.

* * *

The Cominform considers that at the root of all these mistakes by the CPY leadership lies the indisputable fact that, over the past five to six months, nationalist elements — previously present in concealed form — have openly gained the upper hand in the leadership of the CPY, that the CPY leadership has broken with the internationalist traditions of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and has embarked on the road of nationalism.

The Yugoslav leaders, greatly overestimating the internal national forces and capabilities of Yugoslavia, believe that they can preserve the independence of Yugoslavia and build socialism without the support of the communist parties of other countries, without the support of the countries of people's democracy, without the support of the USSR. They

think that the new Yugoslavia can do without the assistance of these revolutionary forces.

Poorly understanding the international situation and intimidated by the blackmailing threats of the imperialists, the Yugoslav leaders assume that, by making a series of concessions to the imperialist states, they can win the favour of these states, come to an agreement with them about Yugoslavia's independence and gradually cultivate among the Yugoslav peoples an orientation towards these states — that is, towards capitalism. In doing so, they tacitly proceed from the familiar bourgeois-nationalist thesis that "capitalist states pose less of a threat to the independence of Yugoslavia than does the USSR."

The Yugoslav leaders apparently do not understand — or perhaps pretend not to understand — that such a nationalist course can only lead to Yugoslavia's degeneration into an ordinary bourgeois republic, to the loss of Yugoslavia's independence, and to its transformation into a colony of the imperialist countries.

The Cominform has no doubt that within the ranks of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia there are enough healthy elements — faithful to Marxism-Leninism, to the internationalist traditions of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and to the united socialist front.

The task of these healthy forces in the CPY is to compel their present leaders to openly and honestly admit their mistakes and correct them, to break

with nationalism, to return to internationalism, and to strengthen by every means the united socialist front against imperialism — or, if the current leaders of the CPY prove incapable of this, to replace them and put forward a new, internationalist leadership of the CPY.

The Cominform has no doubt that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia will be able to fulfil this honorable task.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA IN THE GRIP OF MURDERERS AND SPIES

Resolution of the Cominform

November 29, 1949

The Cominform, composed of representatives of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, the Romanian Workers' Party, the Hungarian Working People's Party, the Polish United Workers' Party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), the French Communist Party, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Italian Communist Party, having discussed the question "The Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Grip of Murderers and Spies," unanimously agreed on the following conclusions:

If the June 1948 meeting of the Information Bureau of Communist Parties noted the transition of the Tito-Ranković clique from democracy and socialism to bourgeois nationalism, then during the time that has passed since that meeting, this clique has completed its transition from bourgeois nationalism to fascism and outright betrayal of the national interests of Yugoslavia.

Recent events have shown that the Yugoslav government is in complete dependence on foreign imperialist circles and has turned into an instrument of their aggressive policy, which has led to the

liquidation of the autonomy and independence of the Yugoslav republic. The CC of the Communist Party and the government of Yugoslavia have completely aligned themselves with imperialist circles against the entire camp of socialism and democracy, against the communist parties of the whole world, against the countries of people's democracy and the USSR.

The clique of Belgrade's hired spies and murderers has openly entered into collusion with imperialist reaction and gone into its service, as was fully revealed by the Budapest trial of Rajk and Brankov.

This trial demonstrated that the current Yugoslav rulers have defected from the camp of democracy and socialism to the camp of capitalism and reaction, have become direct accomplices of the instigators of a new war, and through their treacherous acts seek to win the praise of the imperialists and curry favour with them.

The transition of the Tito clique to fascism is not accidental; it was carried out at the instruction of their masters — the Anglo-American imperialists — whose hirelings, as has now become clear, this clique has long been.

Carrying out the will of the imperialists, the Yugoslav traitors set themselves the task of creating, in the countries of people's democracy, political bands composed of reactionary, nationalist, clerical and fascist elements, so that, relying on them, they could carry out counter-revolutionary coups in these countries, sever them from the Soviet Union

and the entire socialist camp, and subordinate them to the forces of imperialism. The Tito clique has turned Belgrade into an American centre for espionage and anti-communist propaganda.

While all true friends of peace, democracy and socialism see in the USSR a mighty stronghold of socialism, a loyal and unwavering defender of the freedom and independence of nations, and the main bulwark of peace, the Tito-Ranković clique, having wormed its way into power under the guise of being friends of the USSR, has, on the instructions of the Anglo-American imperialists, conducted a slanderous and provocative campaign against the Soviet Union, using the vilest fabrications borrowed from the arsenal of the Hitlerites.

The transformation of the Tito-Ranković clique into a direct agency of imperialism and an accomplice of the warmongers was completed with the open alignment of the Yugoslav government with the imperialist bloc in the United Nations, where the Kardeljs, Đilases and Beblers speak with one voice alongside American reactionaries on the most important issues of international politics.

In the sphere of domestic policy, the main result of the treacherous Tito-Ranković clique's activity is the actual liquidation of the people's democratic system in Yugoslavia.

As a result of the counter-revolutionary policies of the Tito-Ranković clique, which has usurped power in both party and state, an anti-communist, fascist-type police state regime has been established

in Yugoslavia. The social base of this regime is the kulaks in the countryside and capitalist elements in the cities. Power in Yugoslavia is effectively in the hands of anti-people, reactionary elements. In both central and local organs, active figures of the old bourgeois parties, kulak elements and other enemies of people's democracy are operating. The ruling fascist elite relies on an enormously inflated military-police apparatus, with which it oppresses the peoples of Yugoslavia, has turned the country into an armed camp, destroyed the democratic rights of working people and tramples on any free expression of thought.

The Yugoslav rulers demagogically and brazenly deceive the people, claiming that they are building socialism in Yugoslavia. In reality, every Marxist understands that there can be no talk of building socialism in Yugoslavia under conditions where the Tito clique has broken with the Soviet Union and with the entire camp of socialism and democracy, thereby depriving Yugoslavia of its main support for socialist construction, and has subordinated the country economically and politically to the Anglo-American imperialists.

The state sector of the Yugoslav economy has ceased to be the property of the people since state power is in the hands of the enemies of the people. The Tito-Ranković clique has opened wide the doors for foreign capital to penetrate the country's economy, placing it under the control of capitalist monopolies. Anglo-American industrial and finan-

cial circles, investing their capital in the Yugoslav economy, are turning Yugoslavia into an agrarian raw-material appendage of foreign capital. Yugoslavia's growing bondage and dependence on imperialism is leading to increased exploitation of the working class and a sharp deterioration in its material conditions.

The policy of the Yugoslav rulers in the countryside is of a kulak-capitalist character. The forcibly imposed pseudo-cooperatives in the villages are in the hands of the kulaks and their agents, and serve as tools for exploiting the broad masses of working peasants.

The Yugoslav hirelings of imperialism, having seized leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, have launched a campaign of terror against genuine communists who are loyal to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and who fight for Yugoslavia's independence from the imperialists. Thousands of devoted Yugoslav patriots committed to communism have been expelled from the party, thrown into prisons and concentration camps, and many of them have been tortured or murdered in prison or assassinated, like the well-known Yugoslav communist Arso Jovanović. The brutality with which the steadfast fighters for communism are being exterminated in Yugoslavia can only be compared to the atrocities of the Hitlerite fascists or the executioners of Tsaldaris in Greece and Franco in Spain.

By expelling from the party communists faith-

ful to proletarian internationalism and exterminating them, the Yugoslav fascists have flung wide open the doors of the party to bourgeois and kulak elements.

As a result of the fascist terror by the Tito gang against the healthy forces of the CPY, leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has ended up entirely in the hands of spies and murderers, hirelings of imperialism. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia has been seized by counter-revolutionary forces who arbitrarily speak in the name of the party. It is well known that the bourgeoisie has long used the old method of recruiting spies and provocateurs within the ranks of the workers' party. In this way, the imperialists try to undermine these parties from within and subordinate them to themselves. In Yugoslavia, they have succeeded in achieving this goal.

The fascist ideology, the fascist domestic policy, as well as the treacherous foreign policy of the Tito clique — entirely subordinated to foreign imperialist circles — have created a gulf between the Tito-Ranković spy-fascist clique and the vital interests of the freedom-loving peoples of Yugoslavia. Therefore, the anti-people and treacherous activity of the Tito clique is encountering increasing resistance both from communists who have remained loyal to Marxism-Leninism and from the working class and working peasantry of Yugoslavia.

* * *

Basing itself on irrefutable facts showing the

completed transition of the Tito clique to fascism and its desertion to the camp of international imperialism, the Cominform of Communist and Workers' Parties considers that:

1. The spy group of Tito, Ranković, Kardelj, Đilas, Pijade, Gošnjak, Maslarić, Bebler, Mrazović, Vukmanović, Koča Popović, Kidrič, Nešković, Zlatić, Velebit, Koliševski and others is an enemy of the working class and peasantry, an enemy of the peoples of Yugoslavia.

2. This spy group does not reflect the will of the peoples of Yugoslavia, but the will of the Anglo-American imperialists, and for this reason it has betrayed the interests of the country and destroyed the political independence and economic self-sufficiency of Yugoslavia.

3. The "Communist Party of Yugoslavia" in its present composition, having fallen into the hands of the enemies of the people, murderers and spies, has lost the right to call itself a communist party and is merely an apparatus carrying out the espionage assignments of the Tito-Kardelj-Ranković-Đilas clique.

The Cominform of Communist and Workers' Parties therefore considers that the struggle against the Tito clique — hiring spies and murderers — is an international duty of all communist and workers' parties.

It is the obligation of the communist and workers' parties to give every possible assistance to the Yugoslav working class and peasantry in their

struggle to return Yugoslavia to the camp of democracy and socialism.

A necessary condition for Yugoslavia's return to the socialist camp is the active struggle of the revolutionary elements, both inside and outside the CPY, for the rebirth of a revolutionary, genuinely communist party of Yugoslavia — faithful to Marxism-Leninism, to the principles of proletarian internationalism, and committed to the struggle for Yugoslavia's independence from imperialism.

The forces in Yugoslavia that are faithful to communism, being unable under conditions of the harshest fascist terror to speak out openly against the Tito-Ranković clique, have been forced to take the same path in the struggle for the cause of communism as the communists in those countries where they are barred from legal work.

The Cominform expresses firm confidence that among the workers and peasants of Yugoslavia there will be forces capable of ensuring victory over the bourgeois-restorationist spy clique of Tito-Ranković, that the working people of Yugoslavia, under the leadership of the working class, will be able to restore the historic gains of people's democracy — won at the cost of heavy sacrifices and the heroic struggle of the peoples of Yugoslavia — and will follow the path of building socialism.

The Cominform considers that one of the most important tasks of the communist and workers' parties is to raise revolutionary vigilance in their ranks in every possible way, to expose and root out

bourgeois-nationalist elements and agents of imperialism, whatever banner they may hide behind.

The Cominform deems it necessary to strengthen ideological work in the communist and workers' parties — work to educate communists in the spirit of loyalty to proletarian internationalism, intransigence towards any deviation from the principles of Marxism-Leninism and loyalty to people's democracy and socialism.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA IN THE GRIP OF MURDERERS AND SPIES

*Report by Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej at the November 1949
Meeting of the Cominform*

November 29, 1949

I

Comrades! More than a year has passed since the appearance of the historic resolution of the Cominform on the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The development of events in Yugoslavia during this period, the trial in Budapest and the provocative activity of the Tito delegation at the United Nations have fully confirmed the correctness of the resolution — its entire value as an historic theoretical and practical document for the world revolutionary movement.

With exceptional force and depth, this resolution exposed the anti-Soviet and anti-communist nature of the Yugoslav leaders and irrefutably proved that they had nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism and the principles of proletarian internationalism. With a genius for foresight, it predicted the subsequent course of events in Yugoslavia, stating that “such a nationalist course can only lead to Yugoslavia’s degeneration into an ordinary bourgeois republic, to the loss of Yugoslavia’s

independence, and to its transformation into a colony of the imperialist countries.” The same scientific acuity can be found in the resolution’s treatment of the economic consequences of the Tito clique’s demagogic and adventurist measures, undertaken with the aim of discrediting socialism. The resolution became a powerful support for the healthy, revolutionary, internationalist elements within the CPY in their struggle against the fascist dictatorship of Tito and Ranković. The masses of the Yugoslav people have deeply absorbed — and continue to absorb — the spirit of the resolution, feeling through their own experience the correctness of its assessment of the bloodthirsty executioners who have seized control of the state.

The resolution of the Cominform has provided tremendous assistance in the orientation and practical activity of the entire world revolutionary movement. Thanks to its Marxist-Leninist ideological clarity and deep analysis of the issues of class struggle in the situation that arose after the Second World War — especially in the people’s democracies — the communist and workers’ parties have been able to successfully combat nationalist deviations within their own ranks and strengthen their ideological unity. The world revolutionary movement has been guided with greater determination along the path of proletarian internationalism. The communists and working class have been further imbued with the ideology of proletarian internationalism and with the understanding that loyalty

to the homeland of socialism — the Soviet Union — is the touchstone and criterion of internationalism. The Cominform's resolution on the situation in the CPY served as the basis for numerous victories of communist and workers' parties. With its help, communist and workers' parties have found the correct orientation in the struggle against nationalist deviations, for the strengthening of proletarian internationalism, and have determined a decisive and clear position on the questions of war and peace.

Comrade Stalin has rendered immense assistance to the international communist movement. With brilliant insight, he warned us of a series of ideological deviations and confusions and helped us to successfully combat them. This assistance from Comrade Stalin has been invaluable for the Marxist parties. Thanks to this help, numerous errors in the practical and theoretical work of the communist parties have been avoided.

Outstanding leaders of the international workers' movement — Maurice Thorez, Palmiro Togliatti, William Z. Foster and others — in their statements on the position of communist parties in the event of imperialist aggression against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, expressed the readiness and determination of the working masses of their countries to fight alongside the liberating Soviet Army against the imperialist aggressors. This resolute stand against the Anglo-American warmongers has found broad resonance throughout the

world and has been an important stimulus in the masses' struggle for peace.

The resolution of the Cominform rang out as a powerful call to revolutionary vigilance. It reminded us of the danger that leads those who slip into the mire of anti-Sovietism onto the path of bourgeois nationalism — a danger about which Comrade Stalin had warned 22 years earlier:

"An internationalist," says Comrade Stalin, "is one who is unconditionally, without hesitation, without reservation, ready to defend the USSR because the USSR is the base of the world revolutionary movement, and it is impossible to defend and advance this revolutionary movement without defending the USSR. For whoever thinks of defending the world revolutionary movement apart from and against the USSR goes against the revolution and will inevitably slip into the camp of the enemies of the revolution." (J. Stalin, *Works*, vol. 10, p. 51).

How profoundly relevant today sound the words of our great teacher! The dialectic of class struggle is merciless. The shameless and hypocritical attempt by the Tito clique to conceal its anti-Soviet and anti-communist stance from the revolutionary movement of the whole world, and from the working class and toilers of Yugoslavia, with phrases about building socialism and about a so-called "independent line" with respect to the two camps into which the world is now divided, has suffered complete collapse and has provoked deep

revulsion. The Tito clique has openly moved into the imperialist camp of warmongers and now serves the American imperialists. The logical outcome of its anti-communist and anti-Soviet policy has been its transition to fascism. This clique has sold Yugoslavia and its peoples to the American monopolists, liquidated the country's state sovereignty, national independence and the last remnants of freedom, and has established in the country a regime of the harshest Gestapo-type terror.

The facts revealed in the trials in Budapest, in the People's Republic of Bulgaria, in the People's Republic of Romania and in other people's democracies have fully shown that Tito, Ranković, Kardelj, Đilas, Pijade, Gošnjak, Maslarić, Bebler, Mrazović, Vukmanović, Koča Popović, Kidrič, Nešković, Zlatić, Velebit and others, along with Rajk, Brankov, Traicho Kostov, Patrascanu and their associates, are agents of Anglo-American imperialist intelligence services. These contemptible spies and traitors, even during the Second World War, were helping the Anglo-American imperialists prepare footholds for implementing their plan for world domination. This gang of spies and traitors was introduced — like a Trojan horse — into the ranks of the communist and workers' parties. Following the orders of their masters, the Tito gang pursued the criminal goal of seizing leadership of the party and state power in countries where the working class had come to power, crushing the revolutionary movement and ensuring the restoration

of bourgeois rule.

In the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe liberated by the Soviet Army, bourgeois parties and politicians emerged from the war heavily compromised. The popular revolutionary forces had exposed and politically smashed them. World reaction fiercely defended its bourgeois agents in these countries — but did not stop there. Since the bourgeois parties and right-wing social democrats were no longer able themselves to fight the popular forces led by communist and workers' parties, the imperialists began to look for new reserves to restore the capitalist regime, to split the workers' and democratic movement and to sow confusion in its ranks.

Lenin pointed out that the bourgeoisie, with its great political experience, tries to find — even in the most difficult moments, when it seems exhausted — ever new and unexpected reserves in order to save itself from destruction.

The Tito clique's turn to fascism is no accident; it was carried out on the instructions of its masters — the Anglo-American imperialists — whose hirelings, as has now been revealed, the clique had long been.

The Yugoslav traitors, carrying out the will of the imperialists, set themselves the task of creating in the people's democracies political gangs from reactionary, nationalist, clerical and fascist elements, so that, relying on them, they could carry out a coup d'état in those countries, sever them from

the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp, and subordinate them to the ruling forces of imperialism. The Tito clique turned Belgrade into a centre of American intelligence espionage and anti-communist propaganda.

Even during the war, in 1943, *Radio London*, which had been supporting Mihailović and the émigré government of ex-King Petar, sharply changed its tone in favour of Tito. It later became known that a British military mission was stationed at Tito's headquarters, after which he appointed as his representative in London Colonel (now General) Velebit — an agent of British intelligence. Imperialist intrigues began to surface. At that time, the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia issued a political declaration — nationalist in essence — regarding Macedonia, calling on Macedonian patriots, in the very midst of the struggle, to desert from the EAM and place themselves at Tito's disposal. Tito's emissaries, including Vukmanović, immediately began subversive work in the communist parties of Greece and Macedonia.

Churchill sent his son Randolph on a special mission to Tito. Later, the old reactionary and mortal enemy of the USSR personally met with Tito. Already then, Tito and his clique enjoyed special attention and trust from the imperialists.

On the other hand, the exposés by Yugoslav General Popivoda revealed in their true light the conciliatory position of Tito, Ranković, and others towards the Hitlerite occupiers and the Gestapo, as

well as their vile betrayal of Yugoslav partisans in the most difficult moments of the war. All this fully explains the subsequent course adopted by the Tito clique. For the experience of the workers' movement teaches us that people once recruited by the bourgeois police remain at its disposal for life.

The Anglo-American imperialists popularize the vile stance of the Tito gang, recommending it as an anti-communist recipe of international scope. They sought to bring communists of other countries under Tito's influence. But the imperialists' plan failed — the ears of the spy of international capital were sticking out from under the "Marshal's" cap.

While all true friends of peace, democracy and socialism see in the USSR a mighty fortress of socialism, a faithful and steadfast defender of the freedom and independence of nations, the main bulwark of peace, the Tito-Ranković clique, having wormed its way into power under the mask of friends of the USSR, has — at the prompting of the Anglo-American imperialists — waged a slanderous, provocative campaign against the Soviet Union, using the vilest fabrications borrowed from the arsenal of the Hitlerites.

All the attempts of the imperialist bourgeoisie to spread Tito's anti-Soviet, anti-communist, subversive policy beyond Yugoslavia have been smashed against the iron unity of the world revolutionary proletarian movement.

After the publication of the Cominform's resolution, the Belgrade fascist butchers began to

complain that they were supposedly the victims of injustice. But their only thought was how to hide for as long as possible their dark past and their ties with Anglo-American imperialism. The trial in Budapest struck like a thunderbolt at the Tito clique.

The facts have proven that what was at issue was not any sort of “errors,” but a consciously counter-revolutionary, anti-Soviet and anti-communist policy carried out by a gang of spies, professional informers and agent-provocateurs with long years of service in the police and bourgeois intelligence apparatus. The majority of the current Yugoslav leaders were sent to Yugoslavia by the Gestapo from concentration camps in France as early as 1941.

The exposure of the Rajk-Brankov gang, their trial and sentencing must be regarded as a major success for the front of socialism and democracy against the designs of imperialism. The facts revealed at the Budapest trial finally tore the mask from the face of Tito and his clique, showing them before the peoples of Yugoslavia and the entire world in their true guise: old spies and agent-provocateurs who had infiltrated the workers’ movement as paid agents of the American and British imperialists.

The plans of the American imperialists — aimed at intimidating and undermining the people’s democracies, at creating an anti-Soviet bloc in Central and Southeastern Europe in which the Tito clique would play the role of a stormtroop detachment — are part of the overall strategic plan of imperialism directed towards provoking a new world

war. The exposure of this plan was therefore a major defeat for the warmongers and a victory for peace.

The transformation of the Tito-Ranković clique into a direct agency of imperialism and an accomplice of the warmongers has reached its culmination in the Yugoslav government’s open alignment with the imperialist bloc in the United Nations, where the Kardeljs, Đilases and Beblers act as a united front with American reactionaries on the most important issues of international politics.

The foreign policy of the Tito clique is anti-Sovietism of the most vile sort. The Belgrade counter-revolutionary agency carries out the tasks of the imperialist aggressors and the instigators of a new world war.

The fascist monsters are trying to hide from the peoples of Yugoslavia the nature of the Atlantic Pact, which they would like to join. Their actions, exposed at the Budapest trial, are irrefutable proof of their active participation in carrying out the military plans of the Anglo-American imperialists. Analysing the tendencies of the Tito clique’s foreign policy, the communist and workers’ parties have long pointed out that one should not be surprised if, before long, in order to ingratiate themselves with their masters, Tito were to invent a new “theory” according to which it is not capitalism and its contradictions, not imperialism, that is the cause of wars in our era, but socialism.

And indeed, this has now become the main slogan of the Yugoslav government’s foreign policy.

In all the foreign policy speeches of the Belgrade fascist gang, there is a single aim: the attempt to slander and blacken the USSR and the people's democracies. For the Tito clique, imperialists do not exist in the world. Every foray by the Tito clique breathes hatred and malice towards the USSR and the people's democracies.

The Anglo-American masters have demanded of their agent Tito that he be more active at the current UN session. The enormous prestige won by the Soviet Union troubles the imperialists. The role assigned by the imperialists to the Tito emissaries at the UN is to try to discredit the main force for peace — the Soviet Union — and to throw up a smokescreen so that it is not seen that the Anglo-American imperialists are the instigators of war.

Tito's emissaries are straining every nerve to compromise the new type of relations — the socialist relations between the USSR and the people's democracies, based on equality and a community of interests. These relations are becoming attractive to all peoples who yearn for peace and freedom, to the peoples of countries in vassal subjugation to American imperialism. The raging Tito clique is powerless in the face of the facts. It is only thanks to the socialist assistance of the USSR that "the people's democratic republics have entered that stage of development in which the people, having come to know the joy of free and independent life, feel themselves the masters of the country and devote all their strength to the task of strengthening and

120

raising their homeland" (G.M. Malenkov — report of November 6, 1949). At the same time, the U.S. economy is facing a catastrophic crisis, which will drag down with it all the countries that have tied their fate to the United States — including Yugoslavia.

At the current UN session, the Tito clique has fully exposed itself: it has become especially clear who stands behind it and whom it serves.

Tito zealously carries out all the orders of his masters. There are no national interests he would not betray when acting on instructions from Washington. In June, the Belgrade correspondent of the *New York Herald Tribune*, in an article entitled "The United States Will Demand Political Concessions from Tito," stated that the position of the Yugoslav government would change with regard to demands made to Austria, with regard to Trieste and with regard to the Greek partisans. The lackey of the imperialists, Judas Tito, carried out his masters' orders to the letter. He abandoned Slovenian Carinthia and obstructed the just settlement of Yugoslav claims in Trieste. As for Greece, Acheson himself, in his speech at the opening of the UN General Assembly, emphasized the change in position of the treacherous Yugoslav government.

All this prompted *The Times* to state: "In foreign policy, Tito has removed certain obstacles that were hindering the establishment of economic relations with the Western powers." In the language of the capitalists, this means that their agent Tito can

now be sent the dollars he requested.

In domestic policy, the main result of the treacherous Tito-Ranković clique's activity is the actual liquidation of the people's democratic system in Yugoslavia.

As a result of the counter-revolutionary policy of the Tito-Ranković clique, which has usurped power in the party and the state, an anti-communist, police-state regime of a fascist type has been established in Yugoslavia. The social base of this regime is the kulaks in the countryside and the capitalist elements in the cities. Power in Yugoslavia is in fact in the hands of anti-people, reactionary elements. Active members of old bourgeois parties, kulaks and other elements hostile to people's democracy operate in central and local organs. The ruling fascist elite rests upon an excessively inflated military-police apparatus, with whose help it oppresses the peoples of Yugoslavia, has turned the country into a military camp, destroyed the democratic rights of working people and tramples on every form of free expression.

The Yugoslav rulers, with demagogy and brazenness, deceive the people by claiming they are building socialism in Yugoslavia. In reality, it is clear to every Marxist that there can be no talk of building socialism in Yugoslavia when the Tito clique has broken with the Soviet Union, with the entire camp of socialism and democracy — thus depriving Yugoslavia of the main support for socialist construction — and when it has subordinated

the country economically and politically to the Anglo-American imperialists.

Recent events have shown that the Yugoslav government is in complete dependence on foreign imperialist circles and has turned into an instrument of their aggressive policy, which has led to the elimination of the autonomy and independence of the Yugoslav Republic.

The CC of the Communist Party and the Yugoslav government have completely aligned themselves with the imperialist circles against the entire camp of socialism and democracy, against the communist parties of the whole world, against the people's democracies and against the USSR.

Tito and Ranković are carrying out frenzied terror in the country. Any free expression of progressive, democratic thought endangers one's freedom and life; all human rights are brutally trampled. The prisons are full of communists, striking workers, peasants refusing forced "voluntary" labour. Torture chambers, beatings and assaults, blinding and starvation regimes in the prisons spread horror throughout the country. Murders and executions have no end. Yugoslavia today is a land of bloody extermination and a prison of nations.

The Yugoslav hirelings of imperialism, having seized the leadership of the CPY into their own hands, have launched a terrorist campaign against genuine communists — those faithful to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and fighting for Yugoslavia's independence from the imperialists. Thou-

sands of Yugoslav patriots devoted to communism have been expelled from the party, thrown into prisons and concentration camps, and many of them tortured to death or murdered in prison or from ambush — like the well-known Yugoslav communist Arso Jovanović. The brutality with which the steadfast fighters for communism are being exterminated in Yugoslavia can be compared only to the atrocities of the Hitlerite fascists or the executioners of Tsaldaris in Greece and Franco in Spain.

Comrades Žujović and Hebrang, and many other communist leaders in Yugoslavia, many generals, colonels and other officers — heroes of the anti-Hitler struggle — outstanding party workers, university professors, representatives of the progressive intelligentsia, workers and working peasants who love their country and wish to see it freed from the claws of the imperialists, who love the Soviet Union and socialism — have been thrown into prisons and subjected to extermination.

By expelling from the party those communists loyal to proletarian internationalism and exterminating them, the Yugoslav fascists have thrown the doors of the party wide open to bourgeois and kulak elements.

As a result of the Tito gang's destruction of the healthy forces of the CPY, the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has ended up entirely in the hands of spies and murderers — hirelings of imperialism. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia has been seized by counter-revolutionary

forces acting on their own authority in the party's name. It is well known that the bourgeoisie has long used the old method of recruiting spies and provocateurs from within the ranks of the working-class parties. In this way, the imperialists strive to undermine these parties from within and subordinate them to their will. In Yugoslavia, they have succeeded in achieving this goal.

The fascist ideology and fascist domestic policy, as well as the treacherous foreign policy of the Tito clique, entirely subordinated to foreign imperialist circles, have created a gulf between the spy-fascist Tito-Ranković clique and the vital interests of the freedom-loving peoples of Yugoslavia. Therefore, the anti-popular and treacherous activity of the Tito clique meets with growing resistance both from communists loyal to Marxism-Leninism and among the Yugoslav working class and labouring peasantry.

We send our militant communist greetings to all Yugoslav comrades bravely enduring the bloody terror in the torture chambers and concentration camps of the executioner Ranković!

The economic situation in Yugoslavia is becoming increasingly difficult for working people. The state sector is not the property of the people; it is a sector of state capitalism placed at the service of foreign capital.

The Yugoslav worker does not work for himself, for his people. The surplus value he produces is being appropriated to an ever greater extent by foreign

banks and trusts. Strikes that have broken out at various enterprises — such as the Stura foundry, the railway car repair workshops near Maribor and the Trbovlje mines — have been drowned in blood by Ranković's janissaries.

The fascist terrorist dictatorship of the Tito clique against the working masses is carried out in favour of foreign capital and its own bourgeoisie — both rural and urban. Alongside the strengthening of the kulaks, there is a growth of the urban bourgeoisie. The Belgrade fascist demagogues attempt to conceal measures aimed at the restoration of capitalism with chatter about the “elimination of exploitation” or the “triumphal march of socialism.” A year and a half ago, the traitor Kardelj declared: “In our country, only a few days remain for all remnants of the exploitation of man by man.” In reality, capitalist exploitation in the cities and countryside has intensified; the kulaks and other exploiters bless their benefactor — Judas Tito.

As a result of the hostile policy towards the USSR and the people's democracies, the Tito clique, having deprived Yugoslavia of the support of these countries, has completely failed in its five-year plan. The working people of Yugoslavia are increasingly realizing what a low deceit Tito's talk of “building socialism” in Yugoslavia without the USSR and the people's democracies — and against them — really is.

In the countryside, the condition of the labouring peasants is worse than ever. They are sub-

jected to brutal exploitation by the kulaks and are burdened with heavy taxes and forced labour. The “production cooperatives,” forcibly created and run by the kulaks, represent a new form of exploitation of the working peasantry. The kulaks, possessing the equipment, exploit the labour of poor peasants in these so-called “cooperatives” even more harshly than in their own private farms.

Lately, Tito has increasingly resorted to one of the most brutal forms of exploitation — unpaid forced labour for the benefit of foreign capital. This labour is called “voluntary work” in logging operations, road construction and so forth. Tens upon tens of thousands of people are forcibly taken to the forests.

Typical in this regard are the “voluntary works” in the forests of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where timber is cut for export to England and America. Recruitment for “voluntary works” is carried out without any prior notice. Representatives of the state authorities come at lunchtime or at night and forcibly take away people whose names are on pre-prepared lists. Often these people do not meet the conditions specified in the statute — that is, they are either too old (over 55) or too young (under 14), and many are sick and unable to work. The number of sick and elderly reaches 20 per cent of all those mobilized for work. Even medical certificates granting exemption from “voluntary work” are not accepted. The workday lasts 10-14 hours. The food is poor, consisting of bean soup, 200

grams of bread and 200 grams of cornmeal. People receive no clothing and sleep on the ground in the forest, often in mud under the rain, as there are not even barracks. Along with the people, working animals — horses, oxen — are also “voluntarily” taken away. This forced labour is meeting with ever fiercer resistance from the masses.

The national policy of the gang of spies and murderers in power in Yugoslavia is a national-chauvinist racial policy of the fascist type, a policy of brutal oppression of national minorities and the deprivation of their every right to free development.

Organizations of national minorities have been dissolved. Their honest leaders have been arrested and exterminated in the prisons of Yugoslav fascist executioners.

Since the press of the national minorities, like all the press in Yugoslavia, is in the hands of fascist elements, the national minorities cannot freely express their views in their native language.

The Yugoslav press has been placed entirely at the service of American imperialism and its agents — the Titoite spies and murderers.

Yugoslavia has become a Marshallized country. If, at first, Tito and his clique proclaimed that they would manage without loans and swore that American dollars would not sully their “own forces” and their “specific path,” today these political adventurers openly appeal for the help of American banks. It is well known, however, that American bankers are not content with interest alone. The American

Hoare, head of the commission sent to Yugoslavia by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, has installed himself in Belgrade like a master and announced at a press conference he convened for journalists that he would be checking how the bank’s loans were being used. Yugoslav economic plans are submitted for approval to these monopolists. All this is accompanied, for the people, by a whole series of calamities associated with Marshallization.

Foreign capital is penetrating Yugoslavia through numerous channels and the country’s economic independence has been eliminated.

The most vile role assumed by the counter-revolutionary agent Tito was to strike a blow against the Democratic Army of Greece. The executioners of the Greek and Yugoslav peoples — Tito and Tsaldaris — came to full agreement, secretly conspiring to destroy the heroic Greek partisans. While Tito was instructing his troops on how to stab the Democratic Army of Greece in the back, his henchman Vukmanović was writing in *Borba* about the “mistakes” allegedly made by the Communist Party of Greece. In those difficult days for the Greek patriots, he, with unparalleled treachery, viciously attacked the party leadership and Comrade Zachariadis. Knowing the sympathy and solidarity the Yugoslav peoples felt for the Greek partisans, the Tito clique prepared a monstrous “justification” for its deed.

The old provocateur Vukmanović wrote that

the battle “was lost as a result of an absolutely mistaken line by the leadership on the most important questions (armed struggle, organization and training of troops, the question of power, relations with the imperialists, etc.).”

Such articles cannot conceal the baseness of the Tito clique, for of all the crimes it has committed, the aid given to the monarcho-fascists against the Greek partisans is one of the most heinous.

All these facts give a complete picture of the Gestapo-like regime and fascist policy of the Tito clique.

But the day is not far off when the peoples of Yugoslavia will settle accounts with this gang of spies, provocateurs and murderers.

II

What conclusions should be drawn from the analysis of the situation in Yugoslavia?

1. The Tito spy group represents not the will of the peoples of Yugoslavia, but the will of the Anglo-American imperialists; therefore, it has betrayed the interests of the country and liquidated Yugoslavia's political independence and economic self-sufficiency.

The struggle against the instigators of a new world war is unthinkable without a struggle against the Tito clique. Consequently, the international significance of this struggle is clear.

2. The “Communist Party of Yugoslavia” in its

present form, having fallen into the hands of the enemies of the people, has lost the right to call itself a communist party and is merely an apparatus carrying out the espionage assignments of the Tito-Kardelj-Ranković-Đilas clique.

The struggle against the Tito clique — these hired spies and murderers — is an international duty of all communist and workers' parties.

3. The main responsibility for the struggle against the fascist dictatorship of Tito lies with the working class and the peoples of Yugoslavia, led by the revolutionary communists.

The peoples of Yugoslavia cherish sincere feelings of love for the Soviet Union, which liberated them, and wholeheartedly wish to return to the great family of socialism and democracy. The peoples of Yugoslavia deeply hate the Tito spy clique and its masters — the Anglo-American imperialists. The struggle of the Yugoslav working people to overthrow the fascist usurpers is growing.

It is the duty of the communist and workers' parties to give every possible assistance to the Yugoslav working class and labouring peasantry in their fight to bring Yugoslavia back into the camp of democracy and socialism.

4. The struggle against the fascist regime of the Tito clique in Yugoslavia is taking ever sharper forms: strikes; passive resistance, mainly against forced labour mobilization; the distribution of underground leaflets; obstruction of the production program in factories; resistance to state procure-

ments, and so forth. Yugoslav workers are increasingly realizing that the growth of production serves the interests of the imperialists and they are beginning passive sabotage.

An essential condition for Yugoslavia's return to the socialist camp is the active struggle of revolutionary elements, both inside and outside the CPY, for the revival of a revolutionary, genuinely communist party of Yugoslavia, loyal to Marxism-Leninism, to the principles of proletarian internationalism, and fighting for the independence of Yugoslavia from imperialism.

5. The working class of Yugoslavia and the communists leading it must enjoy the fullest solidarity of the international working class in building their party. The work of Yugoslav communists is beginning to take on an increasingly active and more coordinated form.

It is necessary to continue the political and ideological campaign to expose the Tito clique with even greater intensity. The anti-popular policy of this agency of imperialism must be unanimously condemned by world public opinion. The Titoites are shouting from every street corner that they are being excluded from all international democratic organizations. In doing so, they reveal their fear that they will not be able to continue their espionage work successfully and will be dismissed by their American masters.

We must be merciless and intolerant towards this vile agency! Let them find not the slightest

foothold anywhere!

6. Every communist and workers' party must fulfil the crucial task of increasing vigilance. This concerns not only party members but also the masses of working people, who must be educated in the spirit of revolutionary vigilance. The vigilance of the masses must take organized forms. It is necessary to expose and eradicate bourgeois-nationalist elements and all agents of imperialism within one's ranks, whatever banner they may hide behind.

In the countries of people's democracy, state vigilance — that is, the vigilance of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat — acquires special importance.

It is known that in the countries of people's democracy, the old state apparatus was not destroyed at once, as happened as a result of the Great October Socialist Revolution. This means that the vigilance of communists in these countries must be especially sharp. The communist and workers' parties are obliged to draw all the conclusions that follow from the Budapest trial of the spies Rajk and Brankov.

It must be kept in mind that despite the heavy defeat suffered by the Anglo-American imperialists in the Budapest trial, they have not abandoned their espionage and conspiratorial work in the countries of people's democracy. The recent conference of American ambassadors to the countries of Eastern Europe, held in London, had precisely the goal of reviewing the work of American agents in this part of Europe in light of the Budapest trial. According

to the admission of the Western press — which no longer hides what American diplomats are doing — a decision was made in London to establish a spy centre in Belgrade. At the same time, a State Department commission headed by the notorious chief of U.S. intelligence, Allen Dulles, developed an “activity program” for the countries of Eastern Europe, containing “new methods.”

There is no doubt that the leading role in this vile affair will be assigned to the old spies and agent-provocateurs from the Tito clique. They will attempt to use people like Rajk, as well as any weaknesses and cracks in the ranks of the parties and in the state apparatus, discontented and nationalist elements, and people with a questionable past.

It is necessary to constantly remember — as Bolshevism teaches us — that we must put an end to the opportunist complacency arising from the mistaken assumption that, as our forces grow, the enemy supposedly becomes more tame and harmless. We must remember that the more desperate the enemy’s position, the more readily they will resort to “extreme measures.”

The foundation for strengthening vigilance must be intensified educational work. The organ *For a Lasting Peace, For a People’s Democracy!* in the article “Raise Revolutionary Vigilance!” summarized, in this regard, the tasks of the communist and workers’ parties:

“Marxism-Leninism teaches that the party of the working class can successfully detect and strike

the enemy everywhere and anywhere, whatever mask he may wear, only if it systematically raises the political and ideological level of its cadres, educates them in the spirit of implacability towards any deviations from the line of Marxism-Leninism, strengthens its ranks organizationally, mercilessly cuts off alien elements from the party, promptly exposes and crushes any nationalist and revisionist deviations, and raises the level of class consciousness of the working class and all working people.”

The most important lesson drawn from the experience of the great Bolshevik Party is that, in order to increase vigilance, it is necessary to establish Bolshevik order in our own party house. The main means for this is the verification of party members. This has been carried out in a number of parties in the people’s democracies and has produced the most positive results. In our party, for example, as a result of the ongoing verification, hostile and alien elements that penetrated the party during the period of open admissions are being expelled from its ranks. There is no doubt that this measure will significantly complicate the enemy’s attempts to find footholds within our party.

Communist and workers’ parties must strengthen the ideological vigilance of their members. They must display true Bolshevik intransigence towards any deviations from proletarian internationalism, intensify ideological work to educate communists in the spirit of loyalty to proletarian internationalism, of implacability towards any departures from

the principles of Marxism-Leninism, in the spirit of fidelity to people's democracy and socialism, and to the international socialist front led by the USSR.

In science, literature, painting, music and cinema, sharpened vigilance is necessary, as well as an uncompromising attitude towards any tendency alien to the working class, towards the propagation of cosmopolitanism.

Let us raise still higher the victorious banner of proletarian internationalism, developing love for the Soviet Union — the first country of socialism, the foundation of the world revolutionary movement, the main bulwark in the struggle for peace and the freedom of peoples — for the great Bolshevik Party, the leading force of the world revolutionary movement, and for the great teacher of working mankind and leader of the peoples' struggle for peace and socialism, Comrade Stalin.

THE TITO CLIQUE HAS BEEN EXPOSED AS A GANG OF FASCISTS, MURDERERS AND SPIES

*Speech by P.A. Yudin at the November 1949
Meeting of the Cominform*

November 29, 1949

The delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), said Comrade Yudin, fully agrees with Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej's report on the treacherous clique of Tito and supports the proposals he has put forward.

Continuing his speech, Comrade Yudin reminded the participants of the meeting how, on September 26 of this year, the radio station *Voice of America* broadcast a statement by Moša Pijade, in which he said that "the Cominform has in fact been liquidated and continues to exist only on paper..." that the Cominform had allegedly ceased to exist and that nothing remained of it except its printed organ.

Contrary to the wishes of Pijade and his ilk, Comrade Yudin said, the Cominform exists and continues to function.

Political betrayal in the bourgeois camp is commonplace, Comrade Yudin continued. It is no surprise that bourgeois statesmen and political leaders are in the service of various foreign intelligence agencies; that is their custom. It is equally common

for the leaders of right-socialist parties to commit political treason and serve in foreign intelligence.

Political betrayal within proletarian, Marxist parties is relatively rare and, as a rule, amounts to the treachery of individual persons or small groups.

The betrayal by the clique of Tito, Kardelj, Đilas and Ranković, Comrade Yudin went on, is a special case, given that this clique headed the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and, on behalf of the Communist Party, was part of the government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Everyone knows that Tito and company came to power in the name of the CPY under the mask of friends of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) and the Soviet Union. Otherwise, the Yugoslav people would not have let them cross the threshold of democratic Yugoslavia.

The Budapest trial showed why The Tito clique so hastily moved from democracy and socialism to fascism and defected to the camp of imperialism. This clique has long been a spy and hireling of the British and American imperialists. The Tito clique made the transition to fascism on the direct orders of its masters.

In the bowels of the U.S. State Department, a diabolical plan was drawn up to use the "communist" government of Yugoslavia as the principal tool for overthrowing the people's democratic system in the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe, severing these countries from the USSR and preparing a war against the Soviet Union.

The resolution of the Cominform exposed the bourgeois, anti-Soviet, anti-socialist nature of the foreign and domestic policy of the Tito clique, and this gang of spies could no longer operate under the mask of friends of the USSR and "friends" of the people's democracies. That is why the Cominform resolution is so hated by the Tito clique and its imperialist masters. The Cominform resolution is a truly historic Marxist-Leninist document: it not only exposed the bourgeois and treacherous nature of Tito's policies but also further united the international communist front and the entire camp of peace, democracy and socialism.

From the imperialists' hands, the "communist" weapon against the front of communism was knocked out. How valuable this weapon was to the American imperialists is shown by the fact that, even now, the leaders of American imperialism strive to present the Tito clique's government as "communist." For example, on October 20 of this year, U.S. Secretary of State Acheson declared that Yugoslavia was a "communist state."

After the Second World War, the Anglo-American imperialists lost their dominance in the Balkans, and the Balkans ceased to be the "powder keg" of Europe. This did not suit the Anglo-American imperialists. Therefore, in order to regain their dominance in the Balkans and turn it into a hotbed of war, the imperialists decided to use their agents — the Tito clique.

One stage of the counter-revolutionary activi-

ty of the Yugoslav agents of imperialism was the treacherous betrayal of the heroic revolutionary struggle of the Greek people, carried out under direct directives from the Anglo-American imperialists. If the Greek people's liberation movement suffered a certain defeat this autumn, the cause of this was the direct aid given by the Tito clique to the Greek monarcho-fascists. What the Anglo-American imperialists could not achieve in Greece over four years, despite their open armed intervention, they succeeded in doing with the help of the Yugoslav scoundrels.

The Yugoslav government opened its border to the monarcho-fascist Greek forces so that they could strike the Democratic Army of Greece from the rear. Such are the shameful facts from which the Yugoslav *bashibazouks* of the Tito clique cannot escape, just as they cannot escape responsibility before the international proletariat.

After all this, it is not hard to understand why the leaders of American imperialism so zealously, in violation of the UN Charter and traditions, pushed Yugoslavia into the Security Council.

The final external confirmation of the Tito-Ranković clique as a direct agency of imperialism and as accomplices of the warmongers was its open joining of the imperialist bloc within the United Nations.

It is well known that at the latest UN Assembly, the imperialist powers were represented by the most notorious reactionaries — sworn enemies of

communism, stranglers of the international proletarian movement and malicious warmongers. The Tito-Ranković clique chose this composition of the UN Assembly precisely in order to direct slanderous attacks against the USSR and the people's democracies. Even the political opponents of the Tito clique could not have devised more damning evidence than the position it took at the UN General Assembly on relations with the Soviet Union, or its slanders from the rostrum of the UN against the people's democracies. The Yugoslav delegation — made up of the certified American spies Kardelj, Đilas and Bebler — could find nothing better to do than join in these slanders alongside the Anglo-American colonizers, the South African slave traders and the Chinese compradors.

And after all this, the Yugoslav servants of international imperialism still have the gall to claim that they are supposedly "arguing" with the USSR about the "equality" of "socialist" countries. What "equality" can there be between communists and fascists? No, gentlemen Tito and Kardelj, go and seek "equality" from the British and American imperialists! They will show you what "equality" means in the imperialist camp!

As a result of the policies pursued by the Tito-Ranković clique, Yugoslavia has fallen under the complete political control of the United States. Belgrade has now become an open centre for the Anglo-American imperialists — a hub of espionage, anti-communist propaganda, underground

organizations and conspiracies against the people's democracies. The U.S. Embassy in Belgrade directs this centre. The "independent" Tito can now make no step in foreign policy without the knowledge of the U.S. State Department.

Comrade Yudin further stated that after the Cominform's exposure of the Tito clique, the hirelings of Anglo-American imperialism launched a terrorist campaign against the healthy forces of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, exterminating all honest communist cadres. Many thousands of Yugoslav patriots loyal to communism have been expelled from the party, imprisoned, sent to concentration camps and killed. The Tito clique subjected tens of thousands of communists to police repression.

The crackdown on communists has taken on a truly gangster-fascist character — murder from around the corner. Here is what Ranković's henchman, Penezić, said at a meeting of the UDBA: "Vigilance and control must be strengthened after the Cominform resolution came out. Any person detained at the border must be checked and, if the detainee turns out to be a party member, they must be killed on the spot, regardless of their identity — be it a CC member, a minister or anyone else — but without noise."

The leader of the Yugoslav fascists, Tito, openly declared to all supporters of the Cominform resolution: "We must get rid of them, and we will get rid of them." The cruelty with which the steadfast

fighters for communism and for Yugoslavia's independence from Anglo-American imperialism are being exterminated can only be compared to the atrocities of Himmler, in whose service Ranković once was.

On orders from foreign imperialists, the Tito-Ranković clique set a course for the destruction of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and carried out that destruction.

By expelling from the party communists faithful to proletarian internationalism and exterminating them, the Yugoslav fascists have thrown the party's doors wide open to bourgeois and kulak elements. The principles by which they admit new members were explained by Nešković: "So that we can successfully lead all strata of society, we must have in the party people from all strata in proportionate numbers. For example, among middle and rich peasants, and in the same proportion among poor peasants and workers, artisans, lawyers and doctors, as well as among the clergy and pensioners."

The leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia ended up entirely in the hands of spies and murderers, hirelings of Anglo-American imperialism. Anglo-American spies in Belgrade, having destroyed the core communist nucleus of the CPY and usurped power in the party, carried out a counter-revolutionary coup in the country. Having committed an act of treason and betrayal unprecedented in history, the Yugoslav bourgeois national-

ists rapidly completed the liquidation of the people's democratic system in Yugoslavia and established an anti-democratic, anti-communist regime of the fascist type.

The main support of the Yugoslav fascists is the military-police and anti-popular bureaucratic apparatus. The Yugoslav army currently numbers over 600,000 men, and Ranković's police, border troops and special military units comprise no fewer than 300,000 men. Thus, there are over 900,000 men under arms in Yugoslavia — three times as many as during the war against the fascist invaders. The country has in fact been turned into a military camp. In the state apparatus, bribery, embezzlement, favouritism and all kinds of abuses flourish. These abuses have grown to such proportions that even the utterly mendacious *Borba* has sounded the alarm. On July 13 of this year, *Borba* wrote: "The circle of wreckers is growing wider, theft is taking on an organized, systematic character and considerable scale. The value of the loot reaches millions."

All democratic institutions in Yugoslavia have been eliminated, elementary freedoms destroyed, the free expression of democratic thought is strictly persecuted, and all human rights are trampled underfoot. The Tito-Ranković dictatorship is a typical fascist dictatorship!

Comrade Yudin then said that, hiding behind demagoguery about building socialism, the Tito clique is in reality pursuing, in every sphere, a policy that promotes the development of capitalism in both

town and countryside.

The "theoretical" conjectures and practical actions of the Yugoslav fascists show that they seek by every means to develop capitalism and perpetuate class relations in Yugoslavia. The restoration of capitalism in Yugoslavia's industry is manifested above all in the fact that the state sector, being in the hands of an anti-popular government, has ceased to be the people's property. The Tito-Ranković clique, having usurped power, is intensifying state capitalism in industry, which is becoming increasingly dependent on foreign capitalist monopolies, and is using it to exploit the working class and develop capitalism in the country. The Tito clique has opened wide the doors for the penetration of foreign capital into Yugoslavia's economy.

The counter-revolutionary, anti-popular domestic policy and Yugoslavia's dependence on Anglo-American imperialism have led to the destruction of the financial and material base of the previously existing system of people's democracy. A telling indicator of this is inflation, which has reached catastrophic proportions. The amount of paper money in circulation rose from 17,811 million dinars in 1945 to 39,230 million in 1948.

However much the Yugoslav fascists may make noise about the "blossoming" and "rise" of Yugoslavia's economy, they cannot hide the fact that the Yugoslav economy has reached an impasse.

While Yugoslavia's economy is bursting at the seams, economic life in the people's democracies

— Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania — is experiencing an unprecedented flourishing.

The main conditions for the successful economic upturn in the people's democracies are the creative enthusiasm of the working people, who work not for the bourgeoisie, not for foreign imperialists, but for themselves, for the good of their own country; the selfless assistance provided and continuing to be provided by the Soviet Union; and the close friendship and mutual assistance between the people's democracies and the Soviet Union.

The police-fascist regime of the Tito clique kills all creative initiative among the people and all desire among the working people to increase production.

Even their press publishes reports of the enormous turnover of labour. The newspaper *Rad* of July 29, 1949, wrote that in the first 15 days of July, 4,306 new workers had been sent to the Bor mines, while 5,070 workers had left during the same period.

Yugoslavia's Minister of Labour Ljupčo Arsov complained in *Borba* of October 26 this year that most peasants forcibly mobilized to work in the mines run away back to the countryside. "We have still not managed," he writes, "to ensure that the majority of them become permanent workers." If a minister, and even the ever-glossing and distorting *Borba*, are forced to speak in such terms, one can imagine what is really happening in Yugoslavia's

industry.

The present rulers of Yugoslavia are attempting to solve the labour problem by military-police methods. In a special directive of the CC of the CPY on this issue, sent to local organizations in April 1949, it says: "Do not admit poor peasants and part of the middle peasants into agricultural cooperatives, but force them, together with their families, to go into production, into the mines and into construction." Local people's committees take land away from poor peasants in order to force them to work in industry.

The entire criminal Tito clique passes this off as "socialist labour." Never before has the Yugoslav working class been subjected to such exploitation as it is now.

At many enterprises and mines in Yugoslavia, the working day is in fact set at 10 hours or more.

The living standard of Yugoslav workers is declining. It has reached the point where even functionaries of the Tito clique are sometimes forced to blurt out certain facts about the dire situation of the working class. For example, M. Neoričić, Secretary of the People's Youth Organization, stated at the 3rd Congress of the People's Youth of Serbia that every fourth young man or woman is ill with tuberculosis.

The Yugoslav press's noise about "building socialism" is intended to cover up the growing exploitation of the working class and the Tito clique's attempt to politically corrupt and deceive it.

Speaking about the policy of the Yugoslav fascists in the countryside, Comrade Yudin pointed out that it is aimed at the ruin of the poor and middle peasantry and at the enslavement of the peasantry by the kulaks. The kulak-capitalist policy of the Tito clique is openly justified by the "theory" of the "peaceful growth of the kulaks into socialism."

One of the seasoned American spies operating in Yugoslavia as Deputy Foreign Minister, A. Bebler, said at a meeting in his ministry on April 29, 1949: "We do not have kulaks like those in the USSR. Our rich peasants took part *en masse* in the National Liberation War, so they are politically mature. Moreover, our kulaks, considering the existence of the USSR, have read quite a lot about the fate of the kulaks there. Based on this, they have become wiser and have capitulated... Should we destroy the kulaks just to satisfy the petrified remnants of dogma? Is it a mistake if we manage to bring the kulak over to socialism without class struggle?" That Bebler's statements express the position of the entire Tito ruling clique towards the kulaks is confirmed by the words of the notorious Nešković. At a meeting in Belgrade on February 28, 1949, Nešković said: "We should not sharpen the fiction of some kind of class struggle here. Our kulaks are not like those in the USSR; they helped us in the war. Therefore, they should be counted as part of the working peasantry. We must involve the kulaks in the people's power committees, in the People's Front, in the cooperatives and so on."

Tito, speaking in early August this year in Skopje, asserted that "we cannot say where the boundary is between the middle peasant and the kulak." "It is impossible to classify someone as a kulak based on the number of hectares of land in their farm," and so on.

This kind of "philosophy" of the Yugoslav fascists is nothing new. It is like two drops of water compared to the philosophy of the well-known kulak "philosopher" Bukharin. From him, Tito borrowed his "wisdom."

The so-called "production" cooperatives in the countryside, created by force and labelled "socialist," are in reality ordinary bourgeois-type cooperatives, run by kulaks and their agents. Such cooperatives serve as a form of exploitation of the poor and middle peasants by the kulaks.

The working peasantry resists the kulak plundering policy in every way. For example, it fails to fulfil sowing plans. Grain procurements, meat procurements and other exactions in the Yugoslav countryside are carried out only by the police. The peasants of the village of Kovačevci (Pančevo district) openly say: "The newspapers write that deliveries are made voluntarily. This is untrue. An entire detachment of about 45 policemen was sent to our village; they eat and drink all day, and at night they beat people and collect the deliveries. The same thing is happening in the village of Opovo, where five people have been arrested."

Despite the police's draconian measures, peas-

ants stubbornly resist the authorities and do not voluntarily surrender either grain or meat.

The Yugoslav working peasantry is experiencing one of the hardest periods in its history since the Turkish yoke.

There is no doubt that the peasantry will be a reliable ally of the working class in the struggle against the Tito clique, which is plundering Yugoslavia's national wealth in the interests of foreign capital.

The Yugoslav rulers, to the detriment of the country's national interests, are rapaciously destroying its wealth, sending to the USA, Britain and other countries almost all the output of the forestry and mining industries. Thus, for example, timber exports in 1948 were four times the average level of 1935-1939. The value of exports of mineral resources (excluding ores) rose from an average annual level of 83,123 thousand dinars in 1935-1939 to 260,688 thousand in 1948. Exports of ores and metals during the same period rose from 850,093 thousand dinars to 2,279,204 thousand dinars.

Yugoslavia has already been turned into an agrarian-raw material appendage of foreign capital.

Comrade Yudin noted that, having secured the support of the Anglo-American imperialists, the Tito clique now comes out with monstrous and slanderous fabrications against the people's democracies and the Soviet Union. It tries by every means to prove that it is not the imperialists who are the warmongers against the USSR, but allegedly the

USSR that is preparing a new war.

On this subject, Đilas recently spoke at the UN. The Yugoslav agents of Wall Street try to argue that capitalism in all European countries has consolidated and currently "has no need for war." Tito and his associates accuse the Soviet Union of "imperialism," of "exploiting other peoples," and the CPSU(B) of "revisionism," and so on.

There is no need to refute the counter-revolutionary fabrications of Tito and his associates. However, in connection with the slanderous assertions of Tito and his clique that the USSR "seeks to take economic control of Yugoslavia," "to impose unequal relations on Yugoslavia" and even "to stop it on the path of building socialism," it is necessary to recall some well-known facts.

Immediately after the end of the war, the Soviet Union took all possible measures to assist Yugoslavia in restoring and developing its national economy. On the basis of trade agreements concluded with Yugoslavia in April 1945, June 1946 and July 1947, the Soviet Union supplied Yugoslavia in 1945-1948 with goods worth a total of 541.6 million rubles, while Yugoslav deliveries to the Soviet Union during this period generally lagged behind Soviet deliveries.

Wishing to help Yugoslavia restore its national economy more quickly and ensure its further development, the Soviet Union, at the request of the Yugoslav government, at various times granted Yugoslavia commodity credits totaling 795 million

rubles. Under these credits, Yugoslavia received ferrous metals, wool, rubber and other goods worth 43 million rubles, as well as 85 locomotives and about 5,700 railroad cars worth a total of 32 million rubles. In addition, in July 1947, the Soviet state undertook to supply Yugoslavia on credit with industrial equipment for a metallurgical plant with an annual capacity of 400,000 tons of pig iron, 500,000 tons of steel, 300,000 tons of rolled products and 600,000 tons of coke; equipment for an oil refinery with a capacity of 300,000 tons per year, as well as equipment for oil extraction and mining enterprises, nonferrous metallurgy and sulfuric acid plants.

These are just some of the facts about the Soviet Union's economic assistance to the peoples of Yugoslavia — facts that fully expose the slanderers and provocateurs, Tito and company.

Not only have the communist parties of all countries understood that the Tito clique is an agency of Anglo-American imperialism, marching in the front ranks of the warmongers against the entire democratic and socialist camp led by the USSR, but this is now also understood by the mass non-Party democratic organizations, both national and international.

Recently, the Yugoslav agents of imperialism have been expelled from such international organizations as the World Congress of Peace Supporters, the International Women's Organization, the Executive Committee of the International Organization

of Journalists and the International Organization of Jurists.

The Yugoslav agents were not admitted to the International Festival and the International Youth Congress; other international democratic organizations are also expelling the Yugoslav warmongers.

And it could not be otherwise. The position of governments, parties, public organizations and political figures is judged not by their words and declarations, but by their concrete deeds. And the concrete deeds of the Tito-Ranković clique convince all honest people, all supporters of peace, democracy and socialism, that this clique is an agency of the imperialist warmongers. All of the Tito clique's domestic and foreign policy testifies that it is a gang of fascists, no different from the Hitlerites, no different from fascists of the Tsaldaris or Franco type.

Now, when the Tito-Ranković clique has been exposed and nailed to the pillory as a gang of hired spies of Anglo-American imperialism, the movement of revolutionary democratic forces in Yugoslavia will undoubtedly grow stronger.

The activities of the revolutionary forces within Yugoslavia, and of the Yugoslav revolutionary émigrés fighting against the counter-revolutionary clique of traitors and renegades, are deeply progressive in character and form part of the overall struggle of the communist front for peace, democracy and socialism.

An important role in this struggle is played by the newspapers of Yugoslav revolutionary émigrés

published in the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. The Yugoslav revolutionary émigrés have organized radio broadcasts to Yugoslavia from a special radio station.

The interests of the international workers' movement, the interests of socialism, and the interests of proletarian solidarity demand from the communist parties and the entire camp of democracy and socialism every possible support and assistance to the revolutionary forces of the working class and all the working people of Yugoslavia in their struggle against the Anglo-American hirelings, spies and murderers who have reduced Yugoslavia to a semi-colonial dependence on foreign imperialism.

In conclusion, Comrade Yudin said that from all the facts known to the communist parties, both those in and those outside the Cominform, about the criminal actions of the hired spies and killers of Anglo-American imperialism, it follows with absolute certainty that the Tito clique in Yugoslavia is a fascist gang of spies and murderers that has dragged Yugoslavia into the camp of imperialism. Therefore, the Cominform and all the communist parties of the world cannot but consider this gang the enemies of the working class and peasantry, the enemies of the peoples of Yugoslavia. This spy group does not represent the will of the peoples of Yugoslavia, acting instead under the orders of the Anglo-American imperialists. The current CPY, having fallen into the hands of the enemies of the people, has lost the right to call itself a communist party. It has become

merely an apparatus carrying out the espionage assignments of the Tito-Ranković clique.

The revolutionary forces within Yugoslavia, with the active support of Yugoslav communist political émigrés, have set themselves their first and most important task: to create, in the country and under conditions of terror and persecution, illegal organizations, with the aim of using them as a basis to revive the Communist Party of Yugoslavia faithful to Marxism-Leninism and the traditions of proletarian internationalism.

It can be said with confidence that no amount of bloody terror or persecution of communists by the Tito-Ranković police apparatus will be able to destroy the communist movement in Yugoslavia. In the fire of struggle, the communist patriots will lead the Yugoslav working class, rally its forces, smash the ruling clique of imperialist hirelings and lead the working people of their country on a sure path to socialism.

For the successful exposure of the Tito-Ranković clique as spies and agents of the imperialist powers, as well as for the elimination of their subversive activities, it is important to ensure coordinated actions by our press and radio. The publication and transfer into Yugoslavia of propaganda materials exposing the Tito-Ranković clique must be intensified.


The fight against the subversive activity of the Tito-Ranković clique on the international stage must be stepped up. To this end, all counter-revo-

lutionary sallies by Tito's agents in international democratic organizations and at events held by these organizations must be firmly suppressed. At the same time, all possible channels used by agents of the Tito clique to distribute their literature in democratic countries must be securely closed. The Yugoslav fascists, under the protection of bourgeois states, are carrying out active counter-revolutionary work in Italy, France and other countries. The communists of these countries must expose the Yugoslav agents of American imperialism at every step and obstruct their provocative activities.

The communist parties are called upon to devote special attention to further educating communists in the spirit of loyalty to proletarian internationalism, of intransigence towards all manifestations of nationalism and of loyalty to the revolutionary theory of Marxism-Leninism.

The treacherous plans of the Anglo-American imperialists in their struggle against communism and the democratic camp have once again suffered a crushing defeat. The treacherous spy clique of Tito, Kardelj, Đilas and Ranković has been fully exposed as the hired agency of Anglo-American imperialism. Now no one will succeed in passing off this clique as a "communist party" or present today's Yugoslavia as a "communist state," no matter how much the American imperialists and their Yugoslav lackeys may wish to do so. By fully exposing the Yugoslav fascists masquerading as communists, the forces of the camp of democracy and socialism have

grown even stronger. The communist parties have closed their ranks still more tightly in a single front under the great and invincible banner of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.



Proof