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CONTENTS

Grasp the Party's Policy on Improved Distribution and Circulation (pp 1-9, 20).....	1
Some Fundamental Viewpoints and Some Major Questions in Distribution and Circulation (pp 10-20) (To Huu).....	11
Research: Understanding the Art of the General Uprising in the August Revolution (pp 21-25, 38) (Nguyen The Nguyen).....	23
Our Party and the Leninist Revolutionary Method (pp 26-31, 38) (Nguyen Van Phung).....	31
Nguyen Trai's Prose and Poetry (pp 32-38) (Prof Dinh Gia Khanh) [Not translated]	
President Ho Chi Minh, Thinker and Theorist (As Seen Through the Public Opinion of Other Countries) (pp 39-47) (Nguyen Trinh).....	39
To Huu, Poet of the Vietnamese Revolution (pp 48-55) (Le Dinh Ky).....	51
Several Problems Within Agriculture in Vinh Phu Province (pp 56-60) (Hoang Quy).....	64
Ideological Activities: Love (pp 61-64) (Huong Giang).....	72
Book Review: On Mr Nixon's Comments (pp 65-70) (Phan Lang).....	77

GRASP THE PARTY'S POLICY ON IMPROVED DISTRIBUTION AND CIRCULATION

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN [COMMUNIST REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 8, Aug 80
pp 1-9 and 20 BK 030156

[Editorial--passages within slantlines denote boldface in the original]

[Text] During the past 4 years and more our party has led the people throughout the country in persistently struggling to meet the demands for strengthening national defense and security and in fighting and defeating the Chinese aggressors. It has exerted every effort to satisfy the vital needs of the people's life, restored production and further developed production in some fields, and further increased production capacities in a number of sectors. Our party and state have made some improvements in the domain of distribution and circulation, such as increasing prices for the collection and purchase of grain, applying two-way economic contracts in the collection and purchase of grain, improving distribution methods within cooperatives and increasing the percentage of bonuses in the wage fund.

However, the general economic situation is facing /many difficulties;/ production has developed more slowly than the rate of population growth and is not commensurate with the additional capital invested in various economic sectors; and labor productivity and economic efficiency of production and construction are low. This fact has led to difficulties in distribution and circulation.

The striking feature of the present distribution and circulation task is the serious imbalance there is and the presence of many negative factors that adversely affect production and the people's life.

National finance is unstabilized and the revenue and expenditure task leave much to be desired. There is a serious loss of revenue, especially in the private and collective sectors. The distribution and use of capital are irrational and the results obtained are poor. The allocation of spending allowances is characterized by the indiscriminate granting of subsidies. The monetary and credit management is unsatisfactory. The state pricing

system, which was established long ago, is no longer suitable. The directed price no longer faithfully reflects the value of goods. The wage system is characterized by equalitarianism and not by the principle of distribution according to the amount of labor performed.

Market management has been relaxed in a serious manner. The state-run trade sector has limited its activities as a goods supplying organ and has not expanded its business and trade activities. Speculation of goods and smuggling activities are on the upswing, eroding the organized market, robbing the state, workers and civil servants of fairly great sources of income and causing economic and social instability.

The causes of this situation are many. Besides objective causes which have exerted a very strong effect on the economic situation and the distribution task, there are the following main subjective causes:

/First/, the most fundamental and far-reaching cause is the /slow development of production/, because we have not yet satisfactorily organized and utilized the abundant source of manpower in order to exploit natural resources, especially land. This fact is related to our shortcomings and weaknesses in economic management. We do not correctly understand and are not thoroughly imbued with the party's line on economic development. We have not yet translated that line into economic objectives; into accurate steps in each domain, sector and echelon; and into correct plans, policies, organizational forms and measures of action.

/Second/, in economic management the most distinctive shortcoming is to let the /red tape and the practice of indiscriminately granting subsidies/ become serious and drag on in all aspects of the process of production in society. Red tape and the practice of indiscriminately granting subsidies do not encourage or create conditions favorable to the implementation of economic accounting; nor do they stimulate increases in labor productivity or the correct application of the principle of distribution according to the amount of labor performed. Far from encouraging the practice of economy and rational spending, they have fostered reliance on the state and the practice of wasting social wealth, thus creating many irrationalities in the distribution of income among all strata of the people and serving as a good ground for negative activities--such as the abuse of power, collusion, theft and speculation of goods--to develop.

In our managerial institution, the distribution and circulation policies, instead of being flexible, are rigid and are not in line with monetary principles or goods relations as they should be in order to develop all the capabilities of the various economic components, boost production and insure the needs of society.

/Third/, the struggle to resolve the problem of "who defeats whom" between socialism and capitalism,/ especially in the domain of distribution and

circulation, has been neglected, the free market has overridden the organized market with widespread speculation involving the speculative activities of unreformed or nominally reformed bourgeoisie, unscrupulous traders and border-crossing smugglers, and petty speculation by countless small producers. Meanwhile, international reactionary forces in collusion with the reactionaries within our country are trying to sabotage us economically.

In the transitory stage of this struggle, we have not satisfactorily used the integrated strength of the dictatorship of the proletariat and have failed to apply the combined use of administrative, economic and educational measures uniformly and properly. The worst shortcoming is that we have belittled and thus unsatisfactorily carried out the task of developing socialist economic zones in the domain of production as well as in the domain of circulation and distribution. In particular, we have failed to satisfactorily develop the state-run trade and marketing cooperatives; closely inspect, control and manage the private economic sector; transform non-socialist economic sectors well, or to struggle against the negative aspects of small-scale production still prevailing in our society. Moreover, we lack vigilance, determination and consistency in struggling against the international reactionaries who are colluding with the reactionaries and reform-dodging bourgeois in our country to take advantage of our shortcomings and difficulties in order to oppose and sabotage us on the economic front.

According to Karl Marx and Frederic Engels, /production/ is a base on which to decide distribution, circulation and consumption. The production system determines the systems of distribution and circulation and the rates of production determine the rates of distribution and consumption. Simultaneously, /distribution, circulation and consumption/ also in turn /have an impact on production/(they either restrain or promote the development of production). Frederic Engels wrote: "Distribution is not merely a passive result of production and trade. It also in turn has an impact on production and trade." (1)

In formulating and improving the policies and systems of management, it is necessary to correctly apply the correlation between production, distribution and circulation, especially when small-scale production is advanced toward large-scale socialist production. We should use the production system and standard to appropriately determine the policies and systems of distribution and circulation and the rates of distribution. At the same time, through a correct system of distribution and circulation we should /create conditions for promoting the development of production in order to get ever higher productivity and results./

Theoretically as well as practically, it is difficult and complicated to correctly determine and apply the correlation between production, distribution and circulation. The knowledge of our cadres concerning this matter is still limited and superficial. As a result, we have failed to make full use of the tools of distribution and circulation, and have been guilty of serious and prolonged shortcomings.

On the one hand, we should firmly grasp the root that is the development of production--and production must be achieved fruitfully and not at any cost. On the other hand, we should not wait until production has been developed to resolve the problem of distribution and circulation. /In a given situation, distribution and circulation are of decisive significance./ It either restrains the normal development of production or paves the way for and promotes the development of production, the stabilization and improvement of the people's livelihood, the rational readjustment of national income distribution and the establishment of a new balance for the national economy, thus giving the economy favorable conditions in which to develop.

In order to improve the economic situation and overcome economic difficulties, it is therefore /necessary to resolve the fundamental problem of developing production,/ strengthen management in accordance with the method of socialist business, increase labor productivity and economic results, and create a new structure and a new balance for the economy. At the same time, /we should immediately correct the mistakes and shortcomings in various policies of distribution and circulation/ in order to restore and develop production and strengthen management.

Difficulties concerning finances, currency, prices, wages and trade take their roots from production; and they must be promptly resolved through the planning and management of production, especially the production of agricultural and consumer goods. At the same time, these difficulties may stem from problems in the distribution and circulation field, and efforts must be taken immediately to iron them out in order to support and accelerate the development of production and to improve the people's living conditions step by step.

The subject of distribution and circulation involves many economic and social relations vital to the national economy as a whole. To solve distribution and circulation problems we must readjust all economic activities and economic management, push ahead the whole social production process (production, distribution, circulation and consumption) and reorganize social production along the lines of advancing toward large-scale socialist production. We must also take into account the economic, political and social aspects as well as the living conditions of the laboring people, and must bring into play the combined strength of the dictatorship of the proletariat and correctly combine the three categories of interests (of the entire society, of the collective and of the individual worker).

Distribution and circulation must be improved within the framework of bettering the general economic management system--which consists of shifting from administrative and centralized management to socialist business methods, using planning as the main thrust along with the goods-money relation, and correctly combining the three measures (economic, administrative and educational)--in order to meet the /economic targets/ set forth by the Party Central Committee as follows:

1. Accelerate production, first of all agricultural production, by calling for higher labor productivity and economic results, and making workers and peasants feel confident and enthusiastic in developing production and enriching the wealth of society;
2. Stabilize finances, currency circulation and the market by increasing state control over the sources of goods, especially strategic items such as grain, and consolidating and developing the socialist economic sector; and
3. Rationally distribute social products and national income throughout society and stabilize and improve step by step the living conditions of laboring people in the state and collective sectors, first of all workers and state employees and people in areas devastated by war or serious natural calamities.

To achieve these targets it is necessary to satisfactorily carry out the following tasks:

- /1. Plan the distribution of national income and the balancing of finances at various levels./

At present the demands to accumulate capital for industrialization, to improve the people's living conditions and to insure national defense and the discharge of international obligations are great, but our economic and financial capabilities are very limited. This is an extremely serious contradiction in the current revolutionary stage. Our party and state are resolving this contradiction in two ways: striving to develop production; and satisfactorily resolving the problem of distribution. As an immediate step, it is necessary to reassess the distribution problem on a society-wide scale and rebalance capability with demand to avoid distribution and consuming more than we have; and it is also necessary to adjust the means of distribution (finances, credits, prices, wages, social welfare and so forth) in order to satisfactorily meet the above mentioned great demands of society.

It is necessary to firmly grasp the objectives and general tasks of /socialist industrialization/ throughout the transition period. Nowhere can we find other assets than in our /manpower and existing material and technical bases and resources, and a policy of thrift to be strictly implemented/ in order to carry out industrialization and to insure the fulfillment of the three strategic missions set forth in the resolution of the Party Central Committee's 6th Plenum. In order to do so, the state must plan the distribution of national income and balance the finances of all echelons in the direction of correctly distributing and satisfactorily using all the material and financial assets /in order to correctly settle the relationship between accumulation and consumption./ At the same time,

it must rationally redistribute the income of people of all strata in the direction of benefiting the laboring people in cities and rural areas, insure the livelihood of workers and civil servants, and partly regulate the income of people of other walks of life, especially traders and those people whose jobs bring about unreasonably high income. While there still is no capability to improve the livelihood of all the people, it is necessary to seek all possible measures to lessen difficulties and improve the livelihood of workers and civil servants in order to create initial stimuli, increase labor productivity and further create conditions for continually improving the people's livelihood. We must use all the tools of distribution to insure a close combination of three types of interests (social, collective and individual), /strictly implement the principle of distribution according to labor,/ resolutely readjust the irrational sources of income in society and protect the laboring people's interests.

/2. Strengthen state inspection and control/ of business and production activities of all economic sectors and business and production units and of the mobilization and effective use of all production factors. Meanwhile, it is necessary to resolutely struggle against such evil practices as theft, bribery and collusion, to keep the schemes and activities of saboteurs in check and mercilessly punish them and to eliminate speculation, hoarding and smuggling of goods.

/3. Achieve a balance of the state budget and consolidate the national finance/ by increasing the revenue and economizing on spending. This can be achieved on the basis of increasing production, intensively carrying out the collection and purchasing task and controlling all sources of goods, fully collecting taxes and debts, preventing the loss of revenue and re-adjusting irrational prices. The state must immediately revise the taxation policy and accelerate tax collection in a fair, logical and simple manner. It must encourage production, increase commodity circulation and strengthen market management. The allocation of capital construction funds must conform with the principle of practicing thrift, of striving to complete each construction project after it is started, and of insuring that construction work yields satisfactory results.

In the allocation of spending allowance, economic prudence must be strictly adhered to within the scope of the availability of the national income.

/4. Establish and strengthen state control of monetary circulation in all economic sectors, especially the private economic sector/. Money is an extremely sharp instrument not only to develop production, but also to guide and control all production and business activities of all economic sectors in society. To stabilize distribution and circulation and to develop the positive effect of money, the state must have firm control of money and monetary movement in all economic sectors. Meanwhile, it is necessary to improve and expand the method of /depositing savings/, in order to attract

the majority of idle money in society. The receipt and spending of cash must be strictly controlled. /The financial and banking sector/ must scrupulously carry out inspection and control of economic activities of all sectors--state-run, collective and private. On the other hand, it must make every effort to improve its professional operation in order to create necessary advantages and flexibility for the activities of all sectors and production and business establishments.

/5. Improve collection and purchasing systems to stimulate agricultural production and concentrate the flow of agricultural products into state hands.

The state should correctly use economic, administrative and educational measures in order to grasp by all means the flow of staple commodities and to distribute these commodities in a planned manner to meet requirements. It should expand the socialist market, strengthen the relationship between the state and peasants through the organized market, eliminate wholesale traders from the rural market and link the supply of production means and consumer goods to the countryside with the collection and purchase of agricultural products.

With respect to the collective economic sector, in addition to taxation, the state will sign long-term contracts with cooperatives to stabilize the collection and purchase of agricultural products, and will make purchases at agreed prices. As regards individual elements, besides taxation, the state will in the immediate future sell production means and consumer goods to them and will purchase agricultural products from them at agreed prices.

The state will stabilize immediately in 1980 the grain obligations of cooperatives and production collectives. The grain obligations are made up of two parts: the payment of taxes and the selling of products at directed prices in accordance with two-way contracts stabilized for 5 years. As for other agricultural products, the state will adopt correct policies of purchase and pricing and flexible methods of running business (supply of food and production means, application of the system of obligations and purchase of non-obligatory products at agreed prices...) so that it can purchase raw materials /through several ways/ to insure the operation of factories at full capacity, jobs for workers and goods for the state. With respect to industrial goods, the state-run factories should scrupulously fulfill their obligations by delivering all of their products to the state and should not sell them in the market (except those items not consumed by the state-run trade).

To intensify market management is mainly /to establish the state mastery over the market./ It constitutes one of /the most urgent tasks/ to restore order in the economic life, accelerate socialist transformation and consolidate the socialist economic sector. Through various economic,

administrative and educational measures, the socialist state should manage the entire social market and should not neglect the management of the free market. In carrying out this task, we must oppose both tendencies: the leftist tendency of quickly eliminating the free market and the rightist tendency of floating the free market which confuse the circulation of goods and have negative impacts on production and livelihood.

In order to control the market, we must resolutely struggle /against private traders/ who compete with the state in purchasing, disrupt market prices and oppose the state policies of collection, purchase and socialist transformation. We should particularly /expand socialist trade/ and turn it into an effective and decisive tool in transforming and managing the free market. The operation of socialist trade must be expanded in all /the three domains/--collection and purchase, wholesale and retailing--through /both methods/ of supply and business operations either planned or not, and by applying both /directed and agreed prices/. Only by doing so can we manage the market and expand and consolidate the socialist ground.

/6. The price policy must play the role of stimulating production, especially agricultural production./ The state price policy should reflect the costs of production and circulation. Prices must be commensurate with the purchasing power of currency and with due consideration to the prices of imported goods. The policy should eliminate all the irrational compensations for state losses and stop the situation in which various production installations run their business at a loss. As an immediate task, we should change some prices in order to redistribute part of the national income in society, make the living conditions of workers and cadres less difficult and reduce the compensations for losses which the state budget must bear. We must further improve the management of production costs and wholesale prices of factories, thereby contributing to strengthening economic management.

/7. Satisfy the minimum demands for essential consumer goods for the working people in cities and rural areas, especially workers of the state-run and collective sectors./

Due to low production standards and labor productivity, the life of the laboring people, ranging from workers and state personnel to peasants, is still fraught with difficulties. The most acute difficulty at the present time is the hardship of wage earners and peasants in a number of localities repeatedly and seriously affected by natural calamities. Besides the basic measure, which is to develop production, it is necessary to immediately apply some urgent measures to reduce to a certain extent difficulties for wage earners. These measures involve insuring a regular supply of grain, vegetables, fish and other essential commodities, as announced by the state; carrying out policies concerning price, tax and market management to

redistribute part of the national income in the service of the interests of workers and state personnel; giving support allowances to low-salaried people who can hardly make both ends meet; and paying attention to improving the life of workers in important sectors and personnel of such sectors as education and public health. On the other hand, we must fully apply /progressive wage payment and remuneration forms/ to encourage production and increase labor productivity and economic efficiency. This is also designed to increase the income of workers. We must complement and immediately implement a number of systems on recruiting or reducing personnel and workers in order to gradually and rationally reorganize and more satisfactorily employ the social work force.

In order to satisfactorily fulfill the aforementioned tasks, first of all we must firmly grasp the party's fundamental viewpoints on improved distribution and circulation, and create /profound unanimity/ among various sectors and echelons and among cadres, party members and the masses. Our party sets forth and resolves the problem of distribution and circulation /within the general framework of the revolution in our country./ This problem must be resolved in close connection with the /continued socialist transformation,/ and the reorganization and development of production by closely combining the transformation with the establishment, consolidation and development of socialist economic sectors along with correctly using and transforming other economic sectors. We must implement the method of /socialist business management/ mainly by planning. At the same time, we must amply and correctly use the goods-currency relationship, redistribute the national income on the scale of the entire society as required by /the three strategic missions/(to insure the people's livelihood, increase national defense potential and secure capital accumulation for the construction of material and technical bases for socialism), correctly combine /the three interests/(social, collective and individual), implement the principle of distribution according to labor, stabilize the circulation of goods and currency, place the flow of goods into state hands, /control the market, and expand and consolidate the socialist ground./

We must promptly criticize and overcome such erroneous and wrong viewpoints as bureaucratic centralization, red tape, indiscriminate grants of subsidies, doing business without calculating the economic results, conservatism, sluggishness, departmentalism, parochialism, sectarianism, indecision and reluctance in carrying out socialist transformation, tendencies to loosen management, run after the free market and depreciate the role of planning, and egalitarian distribution.

The improvement of distribution and circulation is a fierce and complicated revolutionary struggle in all fields. It requires our party and state to take a combination of well prepared and organized measures which will be systematically implemented according to a scientific order. From the general standpoint of the national economy, it requires all sectors and echelons to

uphold their spirit of collective mastery and sense of responsibility and unite their efforts to scrupulously and uniformly implement all the policies and measures concerning the improvement of distribution and circulation step by step in a steady manner in order to satisfactorily fulfill all the guidelines and policies of the party and state, and to create solidarity, unity and enthusiasm in productive labor among all the people.

FOOTNOTES

1. F. Engels: "Anti-Duhring," Su Thai Publishing House, Hanoi, 1971, p 252.

CSO: 4209

SOME FUNDAMENTAL VIEWPOINTS AND SOME MAJOR QUESTIONS IN DISTRIBUTION AND CIRCULATION

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN [COMMUNIST REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 8, Aug 80 pp 10-20

[Article by To Huu; passages with single and double slantlines denote respectively boldface and italics as published]

[Text] Distribution and circulation are major and complicated problems. We have not had much experience in this field despite many efforts and some definite achievements, and in practical terms we still have a number of rather large shortcomings. The major and relatively comprehensive policies and measures concerning distribution and circulation which the political bureau has recently adopted not only shed more light on the fundamental viewpoints but also hold great practical value, provide guidance for implementation, develop creative experiences and correct some errors in the implementation of the party Central Committee Sixth plenum resolution in the past.

In order to thoroughly understand the policies and measures to improve distribution and circulation, we must firmly grasp the following //fundamental viewpoints//:

//1. First of all, it is necessary to firmly grasp the relationship between production and distribution, circulation and consumption./

Our party has so far correctly appreciated the relationship between production and distribution and circulation, //considering production as a base on which to decide// distribution, circulation and consumption. Distribution and circulation in turn have a great impact on production. This viewpoint has been confirmed by our economic activities. In recent years, production has developed slowly for several reasons, among them poor leadership, loose organization and management of production, improper economic planning, structure and steps forward; inappropriate systems of management still heavily tied with red tape and indiscriminate grants of subsidies; failure to boldly shift to business management; weak production relations; inefficient ideological tasks; neglected organizational and cadre training tasks; loose socialist legislation, and so forth. We should stress here the causes involving //distribution and circulation//. In the present conditions, the causes are conspicuous and of //immediate decisive significance//and must be dealt with at once in order to liberate, //support and stimulate// production. We must therefore improve distribution and circulation quickly since it is //the most urgent task//.

//All sectors, first of all those in charge of distribution and circulation, must fully realize the position and function of distribution and circulation in production// and must not let distribution and circulation hamper production. Any policy which hampers production--whether state-run, collective or individual production--must be scrupulously revised.

Our party's fundamental viewpoint is that //distribution and circulation must serve the people's livelihood//. We all know that difficulties in our livelihood stem not only from some troubles in production--basically because production develops slowly--but also from some troubles in distribution and circulation, and the latter troubles are very serious. Besides their adverse effects on production, troubles in distribution and circulation //have a direct impact on livelihood//. Obviously, at a time when our productive force is still limited. If we better fulfill our tasks of distribution and circulation (better control the flow of goods, manage the market and organize distribution, and so forth), our livelihood will be less difficult. //For example//, at present our volume of grain production is still small, but if we can manage the market well and better collect and purchase rice in those localities where peasants have a surplus, then the grain situation, especially in the cities, would not be severe. Another example: We have not grown enough coconut trees and the central soap factories are still short of coconut, but private soap factories have appeared in several localities to turn out bad quality soap. Cigarette production also faces the same situation. In several cases, the state has seized the sources of goods in hand, but due to poor transportation, unjust and irrational distribution, corruption, illicit transactions and serious authoritarianism in distribution, it is still unable to meet the people's demands for consumer goods.

We must recognize //the close dialectical relations among the four stages of the expanded reproduction process// in order to correctly determine the position and function of distribution and circulation (in the form of goods as well as value); must correctly use the relationship between goods and money; and must thoroughly understand the party's viewpoints in order to satisfactorily carry out distribution and circulation.

/2. Distribution and circulation must be fully patterned after the line of socialist transformation and the struggle between the two paths to insure total victory for socialism./

Talking about distribution and circulation, it is necessary to link it with the issue of building and consolidating socialist production relations. In so doing, we must firmly grasp the party's viewpoints regarding the struggle between the socialist and capitalist paths. It is a big error to separate the issue of distribution and circulation from the issue of transforming production relations. We must carry out transformation in such a way as to support distribution and circulation; and on the other hand, we must carry out distribution and circulation in such a way as to promote and facilitate socialist transformation instead of hindering it.

It is necessary to develop the role of //the proletarian dictatorship state// bring into play the combined strength on the political, economic, social and other fields //to develop the socialist production forces// (state-run enterprises and cooperatives); //appropriately use the private economic sector to promote production// and always strengthen //state control and supervision//. This is a //principled// viewpoint and issue that must be firmly understood.

It is necessary to insure total success for socialist production relations in both //state-run and collective// forms. At present, when the capitalist and private economic sectors continue their objective existence as lesser parts of the national economy, we must direct the development of these economic sectors in such a way as to guarantee total success for socialism. Recently, we have tolerated the "floating" status of the private economic sector, especially small trade, in many localities; and have even tolerated the blatant activities of speculators and smugglers. In carrying out agricultural transformation in the south, not a few cadres, due either to their misunderstanding or to their personal interests, have shown hesitation or a lack of ardor in carrying out cooperativization; and they have even allowed the prolongation of the system of land appropriation and exploitation practiced by landlords and rich peasants.

It is necessary to correctly understand the view expressed in the resolution of the party Central Committee's Sixth plenum that //we must, on the basis of developed socialist production, satisfactorily use the private economic elements// to serve socialist construction. It is necessary to use the combined strength of the proletarian dictatorship state in all fields to guarantee the development of socialism; and proceeding from this, to use the private economic sector and place it under stringent state //control// with the aim of guiding its development in the right direction.

The strength of the proletarian dictatorship state is derived from the development of the right to //collective mastery// of the laboring people with the worker-peasant alliance as the core. Therefore, our party and state are paying great attention to developing production, especially agricultural production. In so doing, our party and state have to resolve various problems concerning collection and purchase, prices and the supply of production materials as well as consumer goods, in order to promote the development of agricultural production. In view of this, all the policies concerning collection and purchase, prices of supplies and so forth must be formulated on the basis of a //rational relationship// concerning income between workers and peasants as well as between the state and the peasants in order to guarantee the uniformity and combination of //the three categories of interests:// those of the entire society, of the collective and of the individual worker.

/J. It is necessary to firmly grasp our party's viewpoint concerning socialist distribution, which is based on the following principles:

A. Maintain a rational relationship between //accumulation and consumption// in each developmental stage of the revolution. At present and in a relatively long period to come, distribution must be designed to support our //three strategic tasks// (namely life, national defense and the building of material-technical bases). In raising the issue of distribution, we must understand who will get the first priority. In the present situation, special attention must be given to our armed forces in general, especially those forces stationed on the border front-lines. We are now daily faced with the threat of the Beijing expansionists, and therefore we cannot slacken our vigilance. Today the enemy is attacking us not only in front but also from behind; and this necessitates the combination of national defense and security. All the necessary expenditures for national defense and security must be met. Only in this way will we be able to smash the enemy's scheme to attack us from both within and without. Great attention must also be

given to insuring the living conditions of workers, cadres and the laboring people in the cities and industrial centers who are now experiencing difficulties, especially concerning grain, food and other daily essential commodities. Moreover, efforts must be taken to appropriately assist the people in areas stricken by natural calamities or lagging in production.

As we are taking the first step in building socialism, we must thoroughly understand and satisfactorily carry out the party's line for the years to come--that is //to concentrate efforts on developing agriculture,// and stepping up the production of grain and food, raw material for industry, consumer goods and agricultural products for export.

B. //Combine and integrate the three categories of interests (of the entire society, of the collective and of the individual worker) and fully understand the principle of to each according to his work.// In economic management, if we do not combine and unify these three categories of interests, we will never be able to mobilize and use manpower with the best results. It can be said that the important point in the art of leadership and management is to be aware of and to unify these interests. All advanced examples more or less show us this lesson. To heighten socialist enlightenment is entirely necessary, but great attention must be paid to giving material incentives. Socialism cannot be built only through idealistic education. If this is so, we all will become idealists. Along with idealistic education we must bring real material interests to the working people, so they understand that socialism actually brings them an increasingly happy life. However, in practice many of our comrades have ignored the principle of each according to his work and have not made any effort to ensure the unification of the three interests. The result is that the working people are not enthusiastic in production, and the three interests are often in contradiction with each other, thus inflicting losses on the state, collectives and even the working people themselves. We must understand and believe that our people, including workers, peasants, intellectuals and other laboring people, love the country and are anxious to devote themselves to the fatherland and socialism. But what they ask for in return is a system of fair distribution--//distribution according to the amount of labor performed.//. Uncle Ho said: "We are not afraid of being poor, but of being unfairly treated." We must resolutely struggle against "equalitarianism" and the practice of distribution and treatment not on the basis of the labor results and the actual contributions of each person. We also oppose the method of carrying out management and distribution according to one's convenience and without scientific norms. It is all the more imperative to resolutely eliminate corruption, illicit transactions and all fraudulent tricks in our life, considering them as the enemies of socialism.

/4. Apply the mode of socialist business/

This mode of business must be based on the systematic application of various principles, first of all //the economic principles of socialism//, on //planning as the main measure// and on the correct handling of //the relationship between goods and money// in planning and managerial work. In distribution and circulation, it is necessary to //apply// and satisfactorily carry out //the mode of socialist business// through financial work, circulation, monetary activities, pricing, wages, trade and market management. Recently, there seemed to be a misunderstanding that "liberalizing the economy also means liberalizing planning work." If we understand

and act this way, our economy will no longer be a socialist economy. It is necessary to assert that a socialist economy is //a planned economy//, and that only by satisfactorily carrying out planning work, //including that in the field of relations between goods and money//, can we constantly develop production. We must rely on planning as the main measure and //on this basis// we must put various economic levers to good use.

In short, only by gaining a thorough understanding of the above-mentioned viewpoints can we correctly assess //the situation//, firmly grasp our //guidelines, tasks// and the policies on improving distribution and circulation and consciously and creatively implement the resolution of the political bureau on distribution and circulation.

Our actual activities have given rise to many specific problems, many creative experiences and not a few mistakes and shortcomings. These are theoretical and practical problems of profound significance in distribution and circulation work.

1. The most pressing problem is how /to control the sources of goods through a rational purchasing system/ so as to restore and develop the state-run agricultural products processing industry; to have goods with which to control the market; to strive for successful management of the market and satisfactory supply of goods to the working people, especially those who depend on wages paid by the state for a living; and to have more goods for export, which will enable us to balance our budget and to cut down on the issuance of banknotes.

With regard to the agricultural sector, in addition to the levying of taxes it is necessary to satisfactorily implement the //two-way obligation// system between the state and cooperatives through the signing of stabilized 5-year contracts. The state will provide the cooperatives and production collectives with the means of production in fixed quantities and at directed prices. The cooperatives and production collectives will sell to the state, at directed prices, an amount of agricultural products which also remains unchanged for 5 years.

Aside from fulfilling two-way obligations under contracts which remain unchanged for 5 years, if the cooperatives have more products to sell to the state, or if the state has more means of production to sell to the cooperatives, the two sides will sign //supplemental contracts// or //buy from and sell to each other at agreed upon prices//.

Selling and buying in accordance with two-way obligations and through contracts can also be applied to //individual peasant households// if they want, and we //should encourage them// to do so.

This is the //best selling and buying method between the state and the cooperatives or individual peasants//. By carrying out their contracts, both sides will be able to actively plan production and exchanges so as to balance production and consumption.

The advantage of the application of this system for the cooperatives and production collectives is obvious: It helps ensure compatibility of the three interests. This is the most logical method for tightening the relations between the socialist state and working class on the one side and the peasantry on the other through

planning, the organized market and the application of reasonable state-directed prices, which ensure the legitimate interests of the working class and peasantry.

However, the problem we should ponder over is //how to successfully carry out the collecting and purchasing tasks while ensuring the interests of both the state and the peasantry// in those regions such as former Nam Bo region, where the //majority of peasants has not been collectivized//, where cooperativization even in the simplest form has not been completed, and where peasants thus far accustomed to the method of "buying and selling irrevocably" are still unfamiliar with planning.

Drawing upon the experiences of those provinces where the collecting and purchasing tasks have been successful, the political bureau has adopted the following resolution: //"With respect to those localities where it will not be able to sign contracts with individual peasant families in the immediate future, in addition to taking them the state will buy agricultural products from them and sell production means and consumer goods to them at agreed-upon prices."//

Using this collecting and purchasing method and the quantity of goods now available, the state will be able to buy more grain and other agricultural products and the individual peasants will have favorable conditions in selling their agricultural products to and buying goods from the state without being restrained by the complicated and bureaucratic procedures of a backward and difficult "barter system" that benefits neither the state nor the peasants. At a time when the village-level organization in the south is still weak, such a method will prevent losses and damages and will relieve the village-level organization of several unnecessary tasks while installations processing agricultural products will get more raw materials. In this connection, the state plan can be better implemented by some sectors and the production of some commodities (such as sugar, coconut and cigarettes...) will not slump as it does now. Since we can collect and purchase large quantities of excess rice in the Mekong River delta, we will earn more foreign exchange to import raw materials and manufacture consumer goods to sell to peasants.

Even though it is not as good as the obligatory collecting and purchasing method achieved through stabilized two-way contracts, the method of //buying and selling at high prices// should be applied now and in the next few years since it will bring about better results for the state and peasants. It can be said that this is //the only remaining essential and beneficial alternative.// The guideline for advancing is to //motivate peasants to join collectivization,// consolidate production collectives and cooperatives and encourage cooperatives and peasants to enthusiastically develop production, and on this basis, to implement the policy of grain obligations and //mainly to carry out stabilized two-way contracts.// This is not designed to maintain for a long time the forms of barter and trade at agreed prices between the state and individuals.

To sum up, using the aforementioned forms of collecting and purchasing, the southern provinces must actively and //satisfactorily fulfill their duties of collecting and purchasing// grain and other agricultural products, and must //collect all the taxes and debts// as soon as possible. Under no pretext can they delay or reduce payments.

/2. Trade accountability/ is applied to factories that use raw agricultural materials purchased at agreed-upon prices.

At present, in addition to those agricultural products obligatorily purchased under the stabilized 5-year two-way contracts, we still have to buy at agreed-upon prices some raw agricultural materials and some agricultural goods which are additionally sold by cooperatives or turned out by the family-based economies (excluding those agricultural products monopolized by the state) and we should continue to buy agricultural products from individual peasants and sell production means and consumer goods to them for some time to come.

As a result, the raw materials in each installation processing agricultural products usually consist of two parts: One part provided by the state at directed prices and the other purchased at agreed-upon prices.

Obviously, //the purchase of raw materials at directed prices must be made in accordance with the state system of profit-and-loss accounting while the purchase at agreed-upon prices must be carried out in accordance with the system of trade accountability prescribed by the state.//

Whether trade accountability is applied or not //is determined by objective principles and not by our subjective desires.// Complications and loopholes will be evidenced in trade accountability if state management is not exercised well. Therefore, //the state will issue specific regulations// to close loopholes and will request responsible agencies to intensify their inspection and control.

In this case, it is necessary to decide whether to shut down the factories or to implement the system of purchasing agricultural products and supplying state goods at agreed-upon prices with the adoption of //trade accountability//.

It is necessary to note that many factories of one or more sectors use the same kind of raw materials. An examples, coconut oil is used as the raw material for many enterprises of the ministry of light industry and the ministry of grain and food while sugarcane is essential for many sugar-producing enterprises. Therefore, with regard to such raw materials which have been preliminarily processed and which can be transported to distant destinations as jute and rush, it is necessary to arrange for //a certain organ (preferably a corporation or association of inter-branch enterprises) to collect and purchase them// for distribution as planned. It is not advisable to allow each enterprise to collect and purchase these raw materials separately as this practice will lead to a competitive situation and increase the market prices.

It is necessary to //zone off areas and assign each factory to collect and purchase on the spot// such freshly consumed raw materials as sugarcane and tea.

In controlling the purchase prices of agricultural products, it is necessary to take note of the following: The yield and output of crops of different localities depend on //the conditions of production in these localities. The conditions provided for the exchange of goods in each locality// are also different and depend on whether or not the enterprises and collecting and purchasing organizations have the goods (production materials) for resale to peasants at directed prices. Therefore, the control of purchasing prices in different localities must be conducted in an //active// manner. It is necessary to fix a (maximum and minimum) price bracket so that enterprises and corporations can apply it to //each locality// and //crop season//.

//The most reasonable method and guideline for advancing the collection and purchase of agricultural products is to zone off the production (specialized cultivation) areas//. The state must go by various policies and measures on cooperativization to provide capital, production materials, grain and credit in order to stabilize the exchange of goods with cooperatives and the peasants at directed prices in an organized manner and in accordance with plans. //However, if these conditions are still not fully provided, trade accountability// should be applied to exchange goods with the peasants. Only in this way will we be able to //quickly eliminate// dishonest traders and speculators--those competing with the state in purchasing agricultural products--from the rural market. To deal effectively with these elements, we cannot simply adopt an administrative measure but must know how to closely combine all three measures--economic, administrative and educational.

/3. Market management and expansion of activities of state-operated trade and marketing cooperatives/.

We have //allowed private traders to control the market// for quite a long time. This is a //serious mistake//. To relax the control of the market means to relax in //the struggle of "what will defeat what" on the trade front// and in the transformation of private traders as well as in the fight against bourgeois remnants and the collusion between the international and domestic reactionaries to undermine our economy, political security and social order.

To relax the control of the market also means to relax the implementation of ideological and organizational tasks, thus affecting the quality of cadres and party members. We have already learned some lessons concerning this matter. It is necessary to thoroughly review all the losses caused by mistakes and shortcomings in market management so that efforts can be made to correct shortcomings in the past and perform this task more satisfactorily in the days ahead. It is also necessary to accurately estimate any strong reaction of dishonest traders and speculators and of the Beijing reactionaries and the imperialists in this respect so that the struggle can be carried out in a decisive and effective manner.

State-operated trade is //the working people's housewife//. Only by considering its role and responsibility as those of the working people's housewife can we perform our work in a correct manner. However, to be able to play the role of the working people's housewife, it is necessary for state-operated trade to employ //correct operational methods// and step up its activities and expand its networks along with struggling against private traders and firmly controlling the market. This is to enable it to //collect and purchase as well as to ensure large quantities of goods for distribution to the working people//. The management of warehouses and transportation of goods must also be conducted in a satisfactory manner to reduce losses and expenditures and ensure cheap selling prices.

To achieve these objectives, state-operated trade should not confine its areas of activities to simply collecting and purchasing agricultural products on the basis of obligation and distributing goods according to ration stamps, thus allowing private traders to disrupt the market and exploit the working people at will with "cut-throat" prices.

Aside from purchasing products according to the state plan, the state-operated trade sector must //make efforts to satisfactorily carry out the task of purchasing

products in excess of the plan norms// so as to struggle against dishonest tradesmen in the "free" market and to supply commodities to the people at lower prices in addition to the commodities sold on ration and at directed prices.

This is the mode of operation of the state-operated trade sector in the current situation and for the next few years.

Along with the state-operated trade sector, we must develop the //cooperative-operated// trade sector. This also is a //socialist trade// organization, but it can do business with greater flexibility and mobility and acts as an agent of the state-operated trade sector in dealing not only in the commodities monopolized by this sector but also in sundry goods necessary for the people's life. The experiences of some marketing and consumer cooperatives in the various precincts and wards of Ho Chi Minh have shown that the cooperative-operated trade system can be expanded and that such an expansion will greatly benefit the people's life. Certainly, we must rectify and correct the remaining illogical aspects and shortcomings; strengthen management, supervision and control; and guard against and overcome the emergence of negative aspects in the collective trade sector as well as the state-operated trade sector. However, we should not constrain the cooperative-operated trade sector, should not hesitate to expand it, and should not abolish it simply because of certain shortcomings.

/4. The problem of money control./

We must achieve the //control of money// (including capital and the circulation of cash) //by controlling goods and the market//. Undoubtedly, financial control is a means of //organizing labor, promoting production and controlling goods and the market//.

In order to //control money//, we must //register businesses, open accounts, inspect and control private business//...but we must also realize that, in order to control money and regulate the circulation of cash in a way beneficial to the management of the socialist state, //the banking sector// itself as well as //the sectors concerned// must //improve a series of policies and measures; carry out the banking services well; satisfactorily serve enterprises, cooperatives and even private business households; guard against impeding production and business//, and put an end to the bureaucratic and authoritarian method of management which has caused inconvenience and delays for some time now. On the other hand, we must know that under certain circumstances and in certain places, //money should be boldly used to promote production and buy products//. Even when we do have goods for exchange, we must //spend money buying goods and must not fear issuing banknotes//, because such spending will enable us //to control raw materials, to develop production, to put goods under state control and to recover money//. In order to overcome "monetary stagnation," the slow circulation of money and the passivity of the banks, we must immediately rectify the shortcomings of those banks which bred this state and should not look only at the shortcomings of organs and enterprises.

/5. The problem of prices./

The most serious mistake we have made recently in the area of pricing was failing to see that //the bases of prices have changed// (the purchasing power of money and the cost of production and circulation have changed, international prices have

increased...)). Consequently, we have been //conservative// in appraising and resolving the problem of prices.

Some comrades hold that we //should not pursue a dual price policy// but //should raise all prices simultaneously// and compensate workers and cadres by increasing their pay. This idea is wrong because such a move is tantamount to //changing the value of money// (devaluation) and increasing the volume of money in circulation. At a time when there still is an imbalance between supply and demand, when the market remains unstable and we cannot yet control it, this measure will only force us into greater passivity.

Under the current circumstances, readjusting prices so as to promote production, to cut down on budgetary losses and to expand the business (buying and selling) of the state-operated trade system is an objective demand. The most pressing task is to readjust the retail prices of industrial goods and the selling prices of some means of production so as to reduce the amount of money the state has to pay in compensation for losses and to provide the basis for improving the living standards of workers and cadres. To retain the present directed price system and to apply only a unified price system is to tie our own hands and to prolong the sluggishness of the national economy.

/6. The problems of wages and welfare./

At a time when there are grave imbalances in the economy, instability in the pricing system and sluggishness in production, we must accept "inflation" in order to have more money if wage scales are to be improved. But in that way, those who are on state payrolls will be the first to suffer from "inflation", and the economy will experience more difficulties in many aspects. Therefore, our current primary concern is to insure the supply of essential goods to workers and cadres in accordance with the quota and the prices established by the state in order to maintain the present wage scales before we can gradually improve them. //We must provide subsidies to those who are in the low income bracket and to key sectors, especially the public health and educational sectors. We must broaden the various forms of// the piece-work pay system and "each according to his work" pay system; assign work to cadres and workers in accordance with their actual qualities and abilities, //and improve management in order to create conditions for everyone to attain higher labor productivity and work efficiency, and to make better contributions// to the cause of socialist construction. This is a practical task aimed at //increasing the benefits of workers to an extent commensurate with their work performance.// At present, there are many irrationalities in the use of cadres, workers and intellectuals. Due to the absence of a clear-cut standard and to erroneous viewpoints and prejudices, parochialism and factionalism, the use of cadres, workers and intellectuals has witnessed numerous shortcomings. The improvement of wage scales notwithstanding, //if we adequately use their capabilities//, we will be able to bring them //a higher income// and thereby will create conditions for them to make better contributions to socialism.

Along with increasing goods supplies and subsidies to workers and cadres, //we will vigorously practice the piece-work pay system--that is to expand the "each according to his work" pay system--in areas where conditions permit.//

We must correctly evaluate the creative experience of various low-level units. Through the experiences obtained by the Con Dao fishing enterprise, the Dong Nai state-owned Rubber Plantation Corporation, and the "Coc 6" coalmine, and so on, we will find that some general principles and vital points in the contractual system are basically correct. We must perfect and effectively apply them. As for those points which are imperfect, we should help the above enterprises improve them. We should not cite only shortcomings without mentioning those successes and creative experiences which need to be disseminated widely.

/7. The problem of delineating responsibilities to localities./

In order to develop the economy and enhance management, we must be fully aware of the party's line toward the local economy, we must boldly develop the local economy by delegating necessary and greater authority to localities and giving them more economic establishments so that they can proceed with developing the economy and serving the people's livelihood. //The improvement of distribution and circulation are aimed at gathering more sources of goods and capital into the hand of the state while correctly distributing the sources of capital, materials and currency between the central government and localities. We must rationally determine the authority and responsibilities between the central government and the localities. //It is necessary to end the relaxation of state discipline. We cannot permit ourselves to cite the need to correct some points in state policies and the law as an excuse to refuse implementation of the policies and systems applied in the localities concerned and to change the prices established by the state.

While criticizing the bureaucratic "management through subsidies" administrative method and upholding the policy to broaden the socialist trade and to eliminate irrational stipulations of the old managerial system, we must //uphold state discipline and socialist legislation// without allowing our system of proletarian dictatorship to fall into a state of relaxation, weakness and powerlessness in the face of negative phenomena in society as well as in the state machinery.

/8. The problem of organizations and cadres./

Our present production, distribution and circulation organizations still suffer severely from bureaucratism and have not yet really become //socialist business// organizations capable of effective and successful operations. The management apparatus is likewise seriously affected by bureaucratism. With such management methods and such production, distribution and circulation apparatuses, it is impossible to create a contingent of cadres capable of carrying out economic work according to the method of socialist business. In order to create a contingent of cadres good at economic work, there must be a //good economic structure// and a //good management method//. This clearly shows us the urgent need //to reform our production, business and management organizations// and //to update our contingent of cadres// in line with the new viewpoint of economy and management.

If we do not strengthen our organizations; do not improve our cadres in terms of //standpoint, ideology and knowledge, especially the knowledge of management// which in this case means //the knowledge of business (in accordance with Lenin's teaching that we must learn trade); and if we do not expel from the party and the state those elements who are degenerate, who are shot through with the love of private property, or, worse still, who exploit others, especially when these elements occupy positions

of leadership, high ranks and power, then it will be impossible satisfactorily to implement the party resolution.

Improving distribution and circulation is a rather complex problem. We should realize all the difficulties facing us, but we should also //see all the favorable conditions//, especially those which our party has created by successfully laying down various //policies consistent with the economic laws and with the aspirations of the working people// and by satisfactorily implementing them so as //to exploit the real aggregate capabilities of our proletarian dictatorial state// and the material and technical bases of our economy which are being stupendously wasted.

We should realize that we have a stable and strong administrative apparatus of proletarian dictatorship and the revolutionary popular masses, and that we control all industry, foreign trade, banking, communications and transportation, the wholesale trade, most of the retailing trade and other sectors. In addition, we enjoy the multiform assistance of the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries. Therefore, we surely can develop production and effectively organize distribution and circulation so as to expand and consolidate the battle position of socialism and stabilize and improve the people's living standards. We are fully capable of defeating dishonest speculative tradesmen, elements engaged in illicit business, saboteurs and reactionaries of all stripes. If we know how to fight them, we can certainly defeat them.

Are we incapable of organizing better distribution and circulation so as to give a new impetus to agricultural production even in the present conditions?

Are we to resign ourselves to the erratic operations of our factories when they are already provided with workers and equipment and may receive sufficient energy and agricultural raw materials?

Are we to allow the people's life to be besieged by immense difficulties when we can acquire more effective control of goods and money, successfully manage the market and organize distribution?

The political bureau resolution on distribution and circulation provided us with a very clear, very positive and realistic guideline for action which totally conforms to the working people's aspirations. Widely explaining this resolution so as to achieve a solid unity of view among the entire party and people; devising sound plans, adopting active measures and formulating concrete policies to organize the implementation of this resolution step by step; and sparing no effort to build a contingent of determined and highly skilled cadres--these are the tasks which we will have to carry out in the near future to ensure the successful implementation of the political bureau resolution on distribution and circulation and to really turn it into a driving force that will help promote the development of production and stabilize and gradually improve the living standards of our people.

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RESEARCH: UNDERSTANDING THE ART OF THE GENERAL UPRISING IN THE AUGUST REVOLUTION

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[Article by Nguyen The Nguyen]

[Text] The August Revolution took place in a short amount of time; in the space of only 2 weeks, all our people seized political power throughout the country. This was because our party and President Ho were extremely talented in the art of organizing, preparing and carrying out the general uprising.

In the work of organizing and preparing for the general uprising, the Party Central Committee and Uncle Ho successfully resolved such important problems as correctly establishing the line of the revolution and the mode by which the revolution would be carried out; correctly determining which forces would carry out the general uprising and taking positive steps to build these forces; correctly determining and carrying out the various stages of development that culminated in the general uprising; and correctly determining and actively creating the conditions needed to carry out the general uprising.

As regards the line of the revolution, President Ho was the first Vietnamese to adopt Leninism and realize: "The only course for saving the country and liberating the nation is the course of the proletarian revolution." (1)

On the basis of the line found by President Ho, the Vietnam Communist Party established at the very outset that our country's revolution would be a national democratic revolution that would evolve into a socialist revolution.

At its 6th Plenum, the Party Central Committee established the task of liberating the nation as its foremost task and, at the 8th Plenum, the party stated: the present revolution is a national liberation revolution. Chiefly as a result of correctly establishing the task of the revolution and

brandishing the two banners of national independence and socialism, primarily the banner of national independence, our party had the conditions needed to mobilize the forces of the entire nation to arise in a general uprising.

The success of the August general uprising originated in President Ho's discovery of the correct path for national salvation, in the birth of the Vietnam Communist Party and in the correct revolutionary line established by the party and Uncle Ho.

As regards the mode by which the revolution would be carried out, the party and Uncle Ho established, at the very outset, the need to carry out a violent revolution, to carry out an armed rebellion (that is, an armed uprising) to seize political power. At the 8th Plenum, the Party Central Committee determined: "The Indochina revolution will conclude in an armed uprising."⁽²⁾ Our party, instead of employing the mode of using primarily the army to wage the war of liberation, advocated an armed uprising by all the people to seize political power. This decision was based on the experience gained in the various uprisings in history and on the realities of the 30 years of revolution of our nation coordinated with the experiences of the general uprising in the great Russian October Revolution.

The August general uprising was successful primarily because our party correctly determined the mode by which the revolution would be carried out.

As regards the forces that would carry out the general uprising, the party stated in its political platform that it was necessary to mobilize "workers, farmers and soldiers" to carry out the armed rebellion.

At the 8th Plenum, the Party Central Committee determined that it was necessary to mobilize all the people, mobilize the entire nation to carry out the general uprising, consequently, it was necessary to establish the broadest possible united national front, the Viet Minh Front, in order to gain the participation of every stratum of the people in the uprising.

In August 1945, primarily as a result of correctly determining which forces would carry out the general uprising and deciding to mobilize all the people, not only workers, farmers and soldiers, for this uprising, we had a strong force to seize political power throughout the country even though we only had 5,000 troops on leave. Expressing confidence in the invincible strength of all the people and mobilizing all the people to stage the uprising--these were important innovations by the party and President Ho.

Our party also correctly determined the various stages of development that would culminate in the general uprising. These stages began with building the political base among the masses and then building the armed forces upon this mass political base; began with political struggle which developed into

political struggle coordinated with armed struggle and then into local uprisings, which developed into the general uprising. It was President Ho who correctly employed these various stages. In 1941, he set forth the slogan "people first, guns second" and began to implement it by building "entire" villages and advancing from there to an "entire" country, an "entire" continent. "Entire" meant the entire population secretly supporting the Viet Minh, just as we say today that all the people exercise ownership. On the basis of the foundation established among the masses, he built self-defense forces, guerrilla teams and guerrilla units. In 1944, when he predicted that the revolution was about to enter a new stage, he issued the directive that called for the establishment of the Vietnam Propaganda Unit for National Liberation and took the position of coordinating political and military activities. "People first, guns second" was also an important innovation by our party and President Ho. This viewpoint was totally contrary to the "government from the barrel of a gun" point of view.

After 9 March 1945, our party and President Ho took the position of carrying out local uprisings, constantly expanding the uprising and establishing the liberated zone.

The birth of the liberated zone and the other combat zones as well as the emergence of the liberation army and the other guerrilla units created boundless confidence throughout the country and made it possible for the Viet Minh Front to rapidly develop. This provided our people with training in how to seize political power, trained the nucleus of a corps of military cadres in order to build up the army after political power had been seized throughout the country, which was something very necessary to a colonial country that had long been stripped of its weapons, caused the conditions needed for the general uprising to develop quickly and encouraged all our people to bravely stage a general uprising once the opportunity emerged. It was the process of local uprisings that created the conditions for the rapid success of the general uprising.

In preparing for the general uprising, our party and President Ho correctly determined which conditions were necessary and actively prepared these conditions in order to carry out the general uprising.

Concerning this point, our party learned very much from the October Revolution. However, the 8th Plenum of the Party Central Committee set forth conditions for the general uprising that were not completely the same as the conditions of the Russian Revolution. These were:

1. The national salvation front has united the entire nation;
2. The people can no longer live under the domination of France and Japan, but stand ready to make sacrifices and embark on the course of uprising;

3. The camp ruling Indochina has fallen into an extreme and widespread economic, political and military crisis..."(3)

The above mentioned points were the conditions needed to carry out a general uprising by all the people. In addition, because our nation's preparations for the general uprising were being made during World War II and the situation was undergoing major changes, the Party Central Committee raised a fourth point: the need for objective conditions favorable to our country's revolution.

The 8th Plenum of the Party Central Committee observed that although the forces of fascist Germany, Italy and Japan were strong at that time and although they were on the momentum of victory, they would surely meet with defeat. Although our people are not yet determined to begin an uprising, "they will soon find death at their feet and be forced to stage an uprising, preferring to fight until the death against the country-robbers. At that time, the entire world will become one boiling cauldron and the revolutionary situation in Indochina will take great strides forward and clear the way for a strong general uprising."(4)

Our party actively prepared for the general uprising on the basis of the conditions that had been determined and, by August 1945, the situation had developed almost exactly as predicted. The brilliant feat of arms recorded by the Soviet Union by defeating the Japanese fascists and forcing them into an unconditional surrender created a once in 1,000 years opportunity for Vietnam to stage a general uprising.

During the period spent preparing for the general uprising, our Party Central Committee attached importance to instructing the cadres on the various levels in how to independently keep abreast of the situation and seize the precise opportunity for an uprising. This was very necessary in view of the fact that we had not seized political power and it was extremely difficult to maintain communications.

In particular, the directive "the Japanese-French conflict and our action" issued on 12 March 1945 by the Standing Committee of the Party Central Committee, which was chaired by Truong Chinh, general secretary, had an extremely large impact in helping the entire party and all our people to promptly seize the opportunity to stage a general uprising. This directive pointed out: we cannot wait for the allies to land before starting the uprising. If the Japanese lose their country, if a Japanese revolution should break out and if the Japanese army becomes demoralized, we can still stage an uprising and win victory.

In August 1945, at the Tan Trao Conference, our party decided to carry out a general uprising; however, this decision was not immediately disseminated throughout the country. It was party cadres who thoroughly understood the

principle of promptly seizing the opportunity for an uprising, a principle set forth by Uncle Ho in his book "The Revolutionary Road," and, in particular, had a thorough understanding of the 12 March 1945 directive of the Standing Committee of the Party Central Committee who took the initiative and launched the uprising in the various localities.

In the actual work of carrying out the general uprising, our party and Uncle Ho correctly resolved the following principal problems:

--They correctly determined the targets that had to be achieved in order for the general uprising to be successful and adopted a correct strategy concerning the enemy.

--They correctly determined which areas had to be occupied by us during the general uprising.

--They constantly adhered to offensive thinking, determined to seize political power throughout the country in a short amount of time.

--They coordinated many modes of struggle. They actively mobilized puppet government officials and military personnel.

--They correctly resolved the necessary problems so that after the success of the uprising we could firmly maintain the revolutionary government.

As regards the goals that had to be achieved in the general uprising, our party determined these goals on the basis of the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy at that time.

The Japanese militarists had about 100,000 troops scattered throughout the country and a puppet government apparatus extending from the central level to the villages with some 30,000 security troops. When Japan surrendered unconditionally to the allies, the morale of the Japanese army and their lackeys fell to its lowest point ever.

Our party only had about 5,000 members and 5,000 very poorly equipped troops; although the Viet Minh Front had developed widely, it did not have a base everywhere.

In view of these conditions, the party set the goals of the general uprising as smashing the puppet government apparatus and putting political power into the hands of the people; however, instead of raising the matter of annihilating and disarming the Japanese army, the party adopted a flexible strategy toward them, one of struggling while engaging in negotiations with a view toward rendering the Japanese army ineffective.

Because they had surrendered unconditionally to the allies, no longer needed to protect their lackey puppet government that had become completely

ineffective and faced the tremendous forces of all our people, the Japanese did not, generally speaking, send troops to fight back when our people began the uprising.

When the uprising was under way, very many places took different measures to test the attitude of the Japanese. These measures were necessary in order to insure that our determination to stage an uprising was well based.

On the other hand, if we decided to attack and annihilate the Japanese army in order to win political power, the Japanese would have surely retaliated and, as a result, we would have encountered many difficulties in seizing political power.

Correctly determining the goals that had to be achieved in the general uprising created favorable conditions for the general uprising to rapidly win victory. This was a very wise decision on the part of our party in its application of the art of the general uprising.

As regards the areas that had to be occupied by us when staging the general uprising, our party determined that we had to simultaneously stage uprisings in both the cities and the countryside; in particular, we had to achieve rapid success in the uprisings in the major political centers and rapidly smash the puppet government apparatus on the central level, as this was the only way we could rapidly seize political power throughout the country. Facts later proved this to be correct.

Because our party attached importance for a long time to building the revolutionary movement in both the countryside and the cities and did not advocate "protracted guerrilla warfare in the cities," we were able to do this in August 1945.

In the general uprising, our party fully adhered to offensive thinking from the start to the finish. President Ho stated that we were determined to win our freedom and independence even if it meant burning the entire Truong Son Mountain Range.

Because we did not have means of communications in order to establish a unified command and provide prompt guidance, it was extremely necessary for the various localities to be imbued with offensive thinking, to take the initiative and launch the uprising, launch a mass uprising or chain-reaction uprisings, and it was this initiative that created the tremendous victory of the general uprising. Faced with a situation in which some 200,000 Chiang Kai-shek troops and the British army were about to enter our country to disarm the Japanese army and occupy our country, our Party Central Committee dispatched cadres to the various localities to quickly guide the uprising to seize political power, promptly established a government and set a date on which we would declare our independence. Under this clear-sighted, timely

policy of the party, our people welcomed the allies with the deportment of persons who were the masters of their country.

Rapidly seizing political power in the space of 2 weeks after the surrender by Japan and while the allies were marching into our country--these also were manifestations of the art of promptly seizing the opportunity for an uprising. The uprising could not, of course, have taken place at an earlier date. However, had it been launched later, we would have missed the opportunity.

Continuously taking the offensive and rapidly seizing political power throughout the country in the space of 2 weeks showed our party's sensitivity in the art of the uprising.

In the August Revolution, our people employed many different modes of struggle.

In Hanoi and at many other places, we progressed from mobilizing the masses to stage political boycotts, hold meetings and stage demonstrations to the pinnacle of motivating the masses to carry out an armed uprising to win political power.

In Thai Nguyen and Tuyen Quang, we coordinated armed uprisings by the masses with combat operations by troops.

The proselyting of the personnel of the puppet government and army had a very important impact in the general uprising. As a result of winning over the majority of the security troops, winning over many persons in the puppet government, including persons holding important positions, and bringing about the abdication of Bao Dai, we won political power rapidly, easily and with little bloodshed.

Thus, in the course of carrying out the August Revolution, there were political boycotts, meetings, demonstrations and uprisings by the masses, combat operations by the revolutionary armed forces, the proselyting of personnel of the puppet government and army and both a struggle and negotiations to render the Japanese army ineffective.

However, it must be realized that the modes which determined whether or not we could win political power were armed uprisings by the political forces of the masses and combat operations by the revolutionary armed forces. Each mode had its own important impact and created the conditions needed for the other; however, armed uprisings by the political forces of the masses was the most universal, the most decisive mode.

The success of the August general uprising not only involved winning political power, but maintaining political power as well. The Party Central Committee

and President Ho correctly resolved various problems after political power had been won: rapidly building and strengthening the government; holding an election to the National Assembly; promulgating the Constitution; rapidly building and developing the political forces of the entire nation; rapidly building and developing the army and the self-defense forces; placing the armed forces under the absolute, direct and comprehensive leadership of the party; promptly resolving the most pressing problems in the daily lives of the people, such as combating hunger and ignorance; adopting correct domestic and foreign policies; adopting a correct strategy concerning the various types of enemies; and determining who our immediate enemy was so that our forces could be concentrated on fighting them.

Even though the destiny of the fatherland at that time was hanging on a thread, as a result of the correct leadership of the party, headed by President Ho, the Vietnamese revolution overcame every challenge and moved forward.

FOOTNOTES

1. Ho Chi Minh: "Tuyen tap," [Selected Works], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1960, p 705.
2. "Van kien Dang 1939-1945" [Party Proceedings, 1939-1945], published by the Department of Research on Party History of the Party Central Committee, Hanoi, 1977, p 214.
3. Ibid., p 214.
4. Ibid., p 216.

7809
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OUR PARTY AND THE LENINIST REVOLUTIONARY METHOD

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN [COMMUNIST REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 8, Aug 80
pp 26-31, 38

[Article by Nguyen Van Phung]

[Text] Over the past half century, the Vietnamese revolution, under the leadership of the Vietnam Communist Party, has won victories of historic significance and an epochal nature. These victories were first and primarily the result of our party's total loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and its ability to creatively apply the science of Marxism-Leninism to the specific conditions of Vietnam in order to establish the correct revolutionary line. These victories were also the result of our party's excellent implementation of the teachings of Lenin--the great father of the world revolution--concerning the method for waging the revolution.

The age in which Lenin lived was an age of great imperialist powers and the proletarian revolution, the age of mankind's transition from capitalism to socialism. It was the age in which the proletarian revolution became the direct task and the dictatorship of the proletariat was recorded in the "agenda" of the entire international communist and worker movement. Abreast of and deeply understanding the requirements of the age, Lenin, through his genius and his outstanding ability to organize practical affairs, firmly grasped and developed upon the revolutionary theory of Marx, successfully resolved a host of theoretical, strategic and tactical problems and led the Russian October Socialist Revolution to victory, thereby ushering in a new era in the history of man and elevating Marxism to Marxism-Leninism.

In the age of Lenin, the problem that was faced was not only that of attaching importance to theory, to clarifying strategic questions, but also to attaching particular importance to organizational questions, to the questions of the form and method required by the revolution in order to achieve the strategic goals of the revolution.

Under the talented leadership of Lenin, the Bolshevik Party, in the course of carrying out the revolution, coordinated legal struggle with quasi-legal

struggle and coordinated clandestine activities with public activities; advanced from economic boycotts to political boycotts and from political boycotts to uprisings; coordinated the struggle in parliament with the struggle outside parliament, shifting from boycotting parliament to turning parliament into a revolutionary forum and trying to win over the masses; learned the science of taking the offensive as well as the science of withdrawing to prepare for a new movement, studied the experiences gained in the activities within the trade unions established by the bourgeoisie and took advantage of every antagonism, even the smallest, within the ranks of the enemy in order to benefit the revolution; and used every form and measure to rally the masses and win one position after another in social life from the hands of the bourgeoisie. All of this was designed to build a political army for the uprising to win political power. Lenin's theory on the revolutionary situation, the conditions needed for an uprising and the art of leading an uprising brought total victory to the great Russian October Socialist Revolution.

In the field of discovering and implementing scientific, effective revolutionary methods, Lenin was the eminent personality. He pointed out that in order for the proletariat to fulfill its task, it must utilize every form and means of social activity, none excluded; at the same time, it must prepare itself to rapidly and promptly replace one form with another. According to him, there is nothing more harmful than placing sole emphasis upon any one mode of struggle and applying it under every set of circumstances and at all times. Revolutionaries who do not learn how to use all types of "weapons," all types of methods and means of struggle are very poor persons, and even commit crimes. When there is not a prompt change to a different form of struggle when the situation changes, the revolution can suffer losses and even meet with defeat.

Lenin maintained that the 2nd International met with bankruptcy because it allowed itself to be "hypnotized" by a single form (the parliamentary form). He criticized the rightist, dogmatic viewpoint of rigidly adhering to old forms and the leftist, dogmatic viewpoint of absolutely denying the usefulness of old forms and failing to realize that new factors are always developing in the course of shifting from one form to another.

It can be said that Lenin crystallized the very best aspects, the achievements of the revolutionary method of the age. These very best aspects have been and are guiding the actions of the Marxist-Leninist parties, of the world revolutionary movement.

The historical experiences of our country's revolution over the past 50 years and of the world revolutionary movement during the past half century show that "the revolutionary movement sometimes stands still and sometimes even meets with defeat, not because of a lack of clear guidelines and objectives, but primarily because of a lack of a suitable revolutionary method." (1) Therefore, as soon as it was born, our party, in addition to

establishing the correct revolutionary line, also gave particular attention to adopting a suitable method for carrying out the revolution.

In his first works, especially in the book "The Revolutionary Road," Nguyen Ai Quoc gave attention to studying the experiences of the Russian October Revolution and Lenin's art of guiding this revolution. Under point 12 of "The History of the Russian Revolution," Nguyen Ai Quoc deeply researched the matter of the opportunity for an uprising and explained why Lenin decided to launch the uprising on 7 November, not on the 6th or the 8th. After Nguyen Ai Quoc, all of the other leaders of the party deeply studied and gained a thorough understanding of many of the important works of Lenin. While imprisoned in Hoa Lo Prison in Hanoi, Ngo Gia Tu wrote a summary of "The Principles of Leninism" to serve as training material for our party in strategy and tactics.

Fully embodying the method of Lenin and based on an initial analysis of the special characteristics of our country's society, the 1930 Political Platform of the party, which was drafted by Tran Phu, confirmed the need to carry out a violent revolution in order to win political power but did not consider a violent revolution to only entail building military forces and waging an armed struggle. In order to advance to an armed uprising, our party attached very much importance at the very outset to teaching, organizing and mobilising the masses and gaining their participation in the political struggle, to building the revolution's "political army of the masses," to relying upon the mass movement and gradually building the armed forces. Before a revolutionary situation existed, suitable forms and methods of struggle for democratic rights and the people's livelihood were employed in order to rally the masses. Once a revolutionary situation had developed, it was necessary to promptly shift to higher forms and methods of struggle in order to seize political power. As a result of following this correct guideline, our party launched, as soon as it was born, an intense revolutionary movement of workers and farmers throughout the country in 1930 and 1931, the pinnacle of which was the Nghe-Tinh Soviet. In this movement, new forms and methods of struggle emerged for the first time in our country: strikes and work stoppages by workers, demonstrations, meetings, displays of power by workers and farmers, boycotts by students, market boycotts by small merchants and the uprising in the Nghe An-Ha Tinh locality.

During the period spent combating the campaign of white terror and restoring and developing the revolutionary movement (1932-1935), especially during the period of the democratic front (1936-1939), our party successfully employed many very diverse forms of organization and methods of operation: legal activities and quasi-legal activities coordinated with clandestine and illegal activities; the struggle of the masses on the streets coordinated with the struggle within the parliament of the enemy; the participation by communist party members and patriots in the activities of the Governing Council and the House of Representatives established by the French colonialists, thereby turning the house and the council into fora for denouncing

the reactionary colonialists, exposing their lackeys, uniting progressive persons, winning over persons who had not yet made up their minds and using legal means to introduce Marxist viewpoints and the line of the party; and the organizing of friendship associations, occupational associations, relief associations and associations to spread the national language in order to rally the masses. The democratic front movement (1936-1939) was truly a training school for our party, not only in strategy, but also in diverse, flexible and suitable revolutionary methods. Nguyen Van Cu's work "Self-Criticism" partially reflected this situation and emphasized Lenin's argument concerning taking advantage of the antagonisms within the ranks of the enemy.

The unparalleled success of the 1945 August Revolution marked extraordinary growth on the part of our party in the science and art of leading an uprising to seize political power. In 1939, when World War II broke out, the French colonialists gave Indochina to the Japanese fascists and our people were bearing two heavy burdens, our party recognized this as a period in which oppression, exploitation and war would make the people increasingly revolutionary, as the period in which the revolution would surely break out. On the basis of this reality, the party decided to establish the Anti-Imperialist United National Front and prepare for an uprising to seize political power; this decision included a major initiative by Nguyen Ai Quoc, namely, founding the Vietnam Independence League (Viet Minh), a form of anti-Japanese fascists-anti-French National United Front suited to the situation at that time. The decision to advance from local uprisings to a general uprising was also made during this period of time. These positions taken by the party were supplemented and developed upon in the process of preparing for the uprising; the party emphasized the role played by all the people in an armed uprising and emphasized the role of the various bases and the armed forces. The 1945 August general uprising was the smooth coordination of the political struggle by the masses with the armed struggle by the guerrilla units; the coordination of the political, military and economic struggle and the proselyting of soldiers and puppet officials; the coordination of taking advantage of the antagonisms between the Japanese fascists and the French imperialists and taking advantage of the antagonisms within the ranks of their lackeys, including agitating for and forcing the abdication of Bao Dai, thereby bringing about the collapse of the state apparatus of the imperialists and their lackeys. The August 1945 general uprising represented the prompt seizing of a "once in 1,000 years" opportunity: the Japanese army, which had been defeated by the Soviet Union, was paralyzed, routed and demoralized; terrible famine killed 2 million persons, with the result that "the lower strata no longer wanted" to live as they once did and the "upper strata could not" live the way they once did.(2) Seizing this opportunity, the party mobilized all the people to stage uprisings to seize political power in both the cities and the countryside, with the decisive blows being the uprisings in Hanoi, Hue and Saigon. All of the very best thinking in the storehouse of Marxist-Leninist theory concerning the art of the uprising was applied in the August

Revolution. The experiences gained by our party in the Nghe Tinh Soviet movement (1930-1931), the Bac Son uprising, the Nam Ky uprising (1940), the Ba To uprising and the local uprisings during the period following the takeover by Japan were flexibly applied in order to win victory for the August general uprising. In the space of slightly more than 10 days, the entire government system of the Japanese fascists and their lackeys collapsed and the people's government was established throughout the country. The party's skill in guiding the uprising was manifested in the "push-button" accuracy with which it selected the moment for the general uprising. The general uprising did not break out too early, that is, when the Japanese army overthrew the government (9 March 1945) nor did it break out too late, that is, when the army of Chiang Kai-shek and the British army had stepped foot in our country.

The realities of the resistance against the French colonialists, the resistance against the U.S. imperialists and the fight against the Beijing expansionists over the past half century and more are brilliant manifestations of the high degree of development of our party's skill in using revolutionary methods in the war of liberation and the war to protect the fatherland.

Under seige by imperialism and the reactionary powers, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had to contend with both domestic and foreign enemies as soon as it was born and faced countless serious difficulties and challenges. With the fate of the country "hanging on a thread," our party, headed by President Ho, led the people in displaying an unshakeable determination to protect their independence and freedom while making flexible use of every form and measure to highly divide the enemy, pick off one soldier at a time and defeat each of their schemes, one after the other. Our party used detente to build and strengthen our forces in every respect: there was detente with Chiang Kai-shek in order to resist the French and then detente with France in order to drive the Chiang Kai-shek army from our country and wipe out the lackey reactionaries of Chiang Kai-shek in an attempt to win time to consolidate our forces and prepare the entire country for the war of resistance against the French colonialist aggressors. These extremely clear-sighted positions and measures have been recorded in the history of the revolution as an unparalleled model of the art of taking advantage of the antagonisms within the ranks of the enemy, of making concessions on the basis of principles and of tapping the combined strength of the revolution.

When we were forced to wage a revolutionary war in order to protect the fatherland and maintain the government, the party adopted the platform of a nationwide, comprehensive and long-range war of resistance based on self-reliance, a platform of waging the war of resistance while building the people's democratic system. The war of resistance broke out at the right time. Our party's talent in the art of knowing when to start the war is seen in the fact that the war did not start too late, that is, after 19 December 1946, nor did it start too early, that is, in March 1946 (the signing of the preliminary treaty).

In the war of resistance against the French colonialist aggressors, we employed all the experiences gained in the 15 years of struggling for political power and elevated them to a new level of development against the background of the entire country fighting the war and the right of ownership belonging to the working people. Under the slogan "each village, each hamlet, each street is a fortress, each citizen is a soldier," every locality in the country was a front and every patriotic Vietnamese fought or supported the fight.

In the war of resistance against the French, armed struggle was the primary form of struggle, but not the only form; rather, we constantly and closely coordinated it with the political struggle by the masses, with the diplomatic struggle demanding an end to the "filthy war" in Vietnam and the withdrawal of French expeditionary troops. The struggle in the free zone was coordinated with the struggle behind enemy lines, including the struggle in the major cities of Hanoi, Hue, Saigon and Haiphong, representative of which was the demonstration by one-half million compatriots in Saigon-Cholon on 19 March 1950 against intervention by the U.S. imperialists, which forced two U.S. warships to withdraw from the port of Saigon in disgrace. The guerrilla war became a conventional war and then the conventional war and guerrilla war were closely, smoothly coordinated. The 1953-1954 strategic offensive and the Dien Bien Phu campaign were model successes in the coordination of the conventional war with the guerrilla war; the coordination of the military struggle and the political struggle with the diplomatic struggle; the coordination between the frontlines and the rear area; the coordination between the struggle by the people in the free zone and the struggle in the area behind enemy lines; and the coordination between the struggle by our people and the struggle by the people of the world.

As soon as the resistance against the French colonialists ended, our nation had to begin a longer and even fiercer fight against the U.S. imperialists, the ringleader of imperialism and the international gendarme. In the face of the country's extremely serious situation and under extremely complicated international conditions, our party clearly displayed the qualities of a wise, firm, independent and autonomous leader. The party set forth the line of simultaneously carrying out the people's democratic revolution in the South and the socialist revolution in the North and closely coordinating the revolutions in both regions of the country to establish a relationship of combat coordination between the great frontlines and the great rear area. At the same time, the party closely linked our people's war of resistance against the United States for national salvation to the revolutionary struggle by the people of the world, achieved increasingly widespread international unity and support and combined the strength of our nation with the strength of the times to form a remarkable combined strength, one large enough to thwart the various attempts by the U.S. imperialists to widen the war, force the enemy to de-escalate the

war and, in the end, win victory over their greatest war efforts while still maintaining world peace.

By elevating the experiences regarding revolutionary methods in the August Revolution and in the war of resistance against the French colonialists to a new level of development, the party led our people in waging the great war of resistance against the United States for national salvation under extremely diverse and creative forms and methods of revolution. These forms and methods were: employing coordinated revolutionary force, consisting of the political forces of the masses and the people's armed forces; staging local uprisings in the countryside and developing from uprisings to revolutionary war; coordinating military struggle with political struggle and, during one period, coordinating the military and political struggles with the diplomatic struggle in order to attack the enemy on three fronts: the political front, the military front and the proselyting front; coordinating uprisings by the masses with revolutionary war, staging uprisings and offensives, offensives and uprisings; fighting the enemy in all three strategic areas: the mountainous jungles, the rural lowlands and the cities; coordinating the three military elements, coordinating large-scale, medium-scale and small-scale attacks and coordinating guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare; and firmly adhering to the guideline of gaining control in order to annihilate the enemy, annihilating the enemy in order to gain control, waging a protracted fight while knowing how to create and seize opportunities, launching strategic offensives to change the war situation and eventually carrying out a general offensive and uprising to win final victory.

All of the forms and methods mentioned above constitute a single entity, are organically linked to one another and create the strategy and remarkable military art of the Vietnamese revolutionary war.

After the South was totally liberated, our entire country became independent and reunified and was at peace. This was a tremendous victory for our people and, at the same time, a major defeat for the U.S. imperialists, imperialism and the international reactionaries. Although defeated, our enemies did not abandon their scheme to undermine and weaken the three countries of Indochina. The reactionary clique within Beijing ruling circles immediately carried out two consecutive wars of aggression against Vietnam on the southwestern border and the northern border.

In the new historic fight against the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, the creative talent of our party was once again clearly shown in the field of revolutionary methods. The party closely, skillfully and promptly coordinated our people's war to protect the fatherland with helping the people of Kampuchea to smash the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary genocidal regime, the lackey of the Beijing reactionaries. As a result of this coordination, the enemy was attacked on the front and in the rear and, unable to contend with

this assault, they ultimately met with total defeat. Through this coordination, our people ended the war of aggression on the southwestern border, maintained the territorial integrity of the country on the northern border and fulfilled their international obligation to the people of Kampuchea, thereby making the revolutionary situation in the three countries of Indochina better and stronger than ever before.

Our nation's 50 year history of revolutionary struggle under the leadership of the party and President Ho is a rich storehouse of experience in the many methods and forms of revolutionary struggle. Our party knew how to grasp and intelligently use every method and form of struggle. The party has not allowed itself to be "hypnotized" by any one method or form. The party has never obstinately adhered to old methods and forms when the situation has changed; at the same time, it has made appropriate use of methods and forms that are old but have new content. Actually, there has never been a period in the social life of our country in which as many profound changes of major importance have occurred with such rapidity and under such a wide variety of revolutionary forms and methods as in the recent past.

The history of our country's revolution over the past half century proves that the revolutionary methods of the Vietnamese revolution always perfectly embody the thinking of an offensive strategy. This strategic thinking reflects the thoroughly revolutionary nature of the working class, the class, as Marx said, that dares to "break new horizons"; at the same time, it reflects the tenacious, unyielding spirit of struggle of the Vietnamese, a people who have a very glorious tradition of resisting foreign aggression.

In all of the periods and stages of the revolution, our party, by means of a correct strategy and scientific, creative revolutionary methods, has led our people to victory after victory and made our nation worthy of standing in the ranks of the vanguard nations in the struggle for the noble ideals of mankind, thereby making a positive contribution to accelerating the world revolution.

FOOTNOTES

1. Le Duan: "Đuoi lá cờ vẻ vang của Đảng, vì độc lập, tự do, vì chủ nghĩa xã hội tiến lên giành những thắng lợi mới" [Advancing Under the Glorious Banner of the Party To Win New Victories for Independence, Freedom and Socialism], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1976, p 34.
2. V.I. Lenin: "Complete Works," Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1963, Volume 21, p 237.

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PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH, THINKER AND THEORIST (AS SEEN THROUGH THE PUBLIC
OPINION OF OTHER COUNTRIES)

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN [COMMUNIST REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 8, Aug 80
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[Article by Nguyen Trinh]

[Text] President Ho Chi Minh, the greatest patriot of the Vietnamese people, correctly learned and very creatively applied and developed Marxism-Leninism under the new historic conditions. He was a thinker of major importance who made very large contributions of theory to the storehouse of thinking of Marxism-Leninism. As Karl Marx wrote, genuine thinkers "...are children of their times, of the people of their country, and all of the most beautiful, most precious and most difficult to see aspects of their times and their people are embodied in philosophical thinking." (1) President Ho Chi Minh incorporated the very best attributes of the people and the times and embodied and developed the revolutionary thinking of the times--national liberation closely coordinated with the liberation of the class, the liberation of society.

In researching and trying to gain an understanding of President Ho Chi Minh as a thinker, as a theorist, it is necessary to adopt a correct perspective, a correct attitude. Everyone knows that the thinking and theory of revolution are primarily a correct reflection of the laws of development of history, are the integration of all the experiences gained in revolutionary struggle; they are embodied in the strategic and tactical line of the revolution and applied to determine the primary moving forces behind the revolution, to rally, build, consolidate and constantly develop the forces of the revolution and so forth with a view toward achieving success in the revolution as rapidly as possible. If we understand the thinking and theory of the revolution in this light, it can be seen that all of the questions raised and resolved by President Ho in the Vietnamese revolution over the past half century have been proven to be both correct and creative in terms of thinking and theory by the historical realities of the Vietnamese revolution.

President Ho had a very special style of expressing his thinking and theory. He wrote no "major" work in the sense of thick books encompassing hundreds or thousands of pages. His books, articles and speeches were always short and concise but extremely moving and profound, always presenting the essence of the question at hand. President Ho's style of speaking and writing clearly reflected a very profound understanding of the social psychology, the level of knowledge, the ability to learn and so forth of his listeners and readers. Concerning this aspect of President Ho, many foreign journalists and scholars have made very correct observations. The newspaper HUNGARIAN NATION wrote: "...Ho Chi Minh never simplified matters that were complex but he had the inherent and unique ability to put all of the essentials of the subject being discussed into the simple language of the masses..."(2) On 5 September 1969 AN-NAT Newspaper (Algeria) also wrote: "'There is nothing more precious than independence and freedom' is a concise, short and seemingly ordinary sentence. However...this sentence fits the style of the person who spoke it. He was a person who spoke the words that had to be said in each stage of history... He spoke simple, appropriate and unaffected words but they were words that became deeply ingrained in the hearts and minds of everyone."(3)

Singo Sibata, the Japanese philosopher and social scientist, made the following observation: "When we read all of the works of Ho Chi Minh, we do not see in them the development of theories of an academic nature, rather, they consist primarily of simple, concise prose. However, as has been pointed out, they embody precious pearls of theory..."(4)

Vin-ly Xan-bao [Vietnamese phonetics], a social activist in the GDR, wrote: "Through his teachings, we see the great truths of our times expressed in simple and moving words."(5)

In fact, although he might be dealing with a very important theoretical question, President Ho, with his profundity and his talent for expressing himself, was able to present the question at hand in a very simple, concise, easily understood and easily remembered but also extremely meaningful and profound manner that encompassed the entire theory regarding the matter. For example, in 1924, when examining colonialism, he generalized it in a very vivid and easily understood manner; however, in one concise sentence, he explained the very essence of colonialism: "Colonialism is like a leech with two suckers, one sucking the blood of the proletariat in the mother country and one sucking the blood of the people in the colonies." To express himself even more clearly, in "Indochina and the Pacific," which was also published in 1924, he wrote: "Today, imperialism has almost developed to the level of a science. It uses the white proletarians to dominate the proletarians in the colonies. Then, it throws the proletarians of one colony against the proletarians of another colony in combat. Finally, it uses the proletarians in the colonies to rule the white proletarians."

Talking about the fight against this imperialism that had developed "almost to the level of a science" and, at the same time, talking about the basic

strategy of the international working class in the age of imperialism, which is also the key issue of proletarian internationalism under the new historic conditions, he stated concisely: "If we want to kill this animal, we must cut off both suckers at the same time. If we only cut off one, the other sucker will continue to suck the blood of the proletariat, it will continue to live while the other sucker will regrow."

Or, when talking about revolutionary heroism under the new circumstances of Vietnam, the struggle against the most aggressive of enemies under the conditions of an extremely lopsided comparison of forces, he only spoke one simple sentence, a sentence as simple as a slogan: "Be loyal to the party, filial to the people, complete every task, overcome every difficulty and triumph over every enemy." Through this sentence, he presented the essence of revolutionary heroism and established the goals that had to be achieved; on the other hand, he described the basic conditions needed to meet these goals. Here, President Ho used universal, familiar language, but he gave it new revolutionary meaning.

President Ho gave his attention to applying his thinking and theory in practice. "Theory goes hand in hand with practice." This is something he always believed. This is also something that many foreign journalists and scholars have talked about. I. Lep-sen-co [Vietnamese phonetic] (Soviet Union) has written: "He was a Leninist in his thinking and ideology, in his everyday work and struggle." (6) Susan Sonntag, after visiting Vietnam to gain first-hand knowledge, wrote: "The Vietnamese consider President Ho Chi Minh to not only have been a thinker, but also an activist and consider his words meant to be applied." (7) The weekly magazine THE CENTURY IN INDIA, after examining the entirety of the influence of his theoretical thinking and active life upon the revolution in Indochina and throughout the world, wrote: "In the struggle of the people of Indochina, from the point of view of importance within his own country and in the international arena, the role played by Ho Chi Minh had a great influence and exerted a great strength... He was a socialist, a theorist, a supreme leader of his people. However, at the same time, he was an outstanding practitioner..." (8)

Thus, when researching the contributions made by the thinking and theory of President Ho, it is necessary to clearly see that "theory goes hand in hand with practice." He resolved many major questions in exact accordance with the concept of Marx: "Social life is basically of a practical nature. All of the mysteries that are misdirecting theory toward mysticism find their reasonable answer in the practice of man and in the realization of this practice." (9)

The founders of scientific communism were great theorists, but they always concerned themselves first with practice. According to the viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism, theory guides practice, but practice is the measurement of theory, is the test of the accuracy of theory. President Ho "always

generalized theory on the basis of practice, always decided and proved theory in practice. As a result, he not only creatively applied Marxism-Leninism, but also developed and enriched Marxism-Leninism in a practical way."(10)

President Ho always combined theory with practice and used practice in all its diversity to prove his thinking and theories. The thinking, life, career, character, personality, qualities and so forth of President Ho were always linked to one another in a very dialectical, vivid and organic manner. For this reason, the thinking and theory of President Ho became and are still becoming the strength of the masses.

Today, scholars at home and abroad recognize the major contributions made by President Ho to the storehouse of thinking and theory of Marxism-Leninism. Systematizing the thinking and theory contributed by President Ho is very necessary and must be the work of many persons and many fields of science working together. A number of matters have already been raised by many persons.

First, as Fidel Castro said, President Ho "brilliantly understood that, under the circumstances of the colonies and the dependent countries, it is necessary to coordinate the national liberation struggle with the struggle to liberate society."(11) President Ho wrote: "There is no other path for saving the country and liberating the nation than the path of the proletarian revolution."(12)

Fidel Castro also said: "Ho Chi Minh discovered the course of combining the patriotic thinking of nations with the need to liberate them from social exploitation. Liberating the nation and liberating society are the two key points in his theory."(13) "This was the extraordinary contribution made by President Ho Chi Minh to the revolutionary thinking of the world."(14) Giang Ca-na-pe [Vietnamese phonetics], a Marxist scholar of the French Communist Party, wrote: "We cannot begin to understand the events of the past 30 years if we do not begin with the primary event, namely, that the struggle for national independence and the struggle for the liberation of society in Vietnam are closely linked to each other... The work of Vietnamese patriots has proven that the two tides of thinking of our times have merged: the struggle of the working class and its allies for democracy and socialism and the struggle by the oppressed nations for national independence. The imposing stature of President Ho Chi Minh is the embodiment of this close nature."(15) Thomas Hot-kin [Vietnamese phonetics], British historian, maintains that if we carefully research the establishment of the Vietnam Association of Revolutionary Youths and the book "The Revolutionary Road," we "clearly see the thinking that the struggle to liberate the nation of Vietnam must be closely coordinated with the liberation of society and the class."(16)

Secondly, President Ho further developed upon V.I. Lenin's theory on imperialism, particularly the relationship between imperialism and the colonies and the struggle against imperialism in the new stage of history. T. Hot-kin wrote: "In this world...no one has the depth or variety of experience in imperialism, in its methods of oppression and exploitation and how to weaken it that the Vietnamese do. History has compelled them to become the most knowledgeable..."(17) "The understanding that the Vietnamese have of the various matters pertaining to imperialism has been very firmly evidenced on the basis of Marxism-Leninism; at the same time, they have made contributions of particular magnitude concerning a number of points. In the 1920's, Ho Chi Minh (Nguyen Ai Quoc) stressed the role of racism in the ideology of imperialism. He also introduced the viewpoint of a colonialism that specialized in high interest loans and illness."(18) Sibata maintains that in many of his works, President Ho "deepened and further developed upon the theory of Leninism concerning the national and colonial questions. One of its special characteristics is that, in Ho Chi Minh, the denunciation of the cruelty of colonialism was developed to a new level and became much more specific compared to the material used to denounce colonialism prior to that time."(19) Sibata observed that President Ho Chi Minh's "French Colonialism on Trial" is a work that vividly and concretely presented the system of domination, exploitation and suppression of French colonialism. He wrote: "During that period, there were very few Marxists born in the colonies who personally experienced life in the colonies; this was not only the case in Vietnam, but in many other colonies as well... Ho Chi Minh was one of very few Marxists who had this experience. This enabled him to further develop the theory on the national and colonial questions."(20)

After presenting the basic characteristics of French colonialism and the similarities and differences in the colonial systems established in the colonies described by President Ho Chi Minh in his work, the author observed that "he(President Ho-N.T.) did not stop at general theories on the colonies and vassal countries, rather, he made them more specific and simultaneously grasped their general as well as their special spirit... The special characteristics of the method of thinking of Ho Chi Minh are that he always applied the dialectical method of thinking and precisely grasped the special at the same time as the universal."(21)

Sibata points out the service performed by President Ho Chi Minh by "further concretizing Lenin's statement on the need to unite the peoples of the colonies and vassal countries with the peoples in the imperialist countries."(22) After presenting many of President Ho's arguments and viewpoints concerning this matter, the author writes: "I still think that, following the death of Lenin, it was rare to find within the international communist movement a leader like Ho Chi Minh, a person who experienced both the life of a worker in the mother country and the life of the peoples in the colonies and the vassal countries, a person who constantly struggled for the solidarity of these two

blogs... The theoretical and practical contributions made by Ho Chi Minh in this field are very deserving of attention." (23) Richard Washer, an American who writes for the GUARDIAN, also observed: "Ho Chi Minh was the first Vietnamese communist and also the first leader of the movement to win independence for Vietnam; his activities were based on an analysis of Vietnamese society and the relationship of that society to world capitalism and imperialism. In the 1920's, when very few communists correctly understood the nature of imperialism--its cruelty and demagoguery as well as its international nature and the tremendous forces controlled by it--Ho Chi Minh recognized the decisive importance of unity among the oppressed nations struggling against imperialism and the necessity for an alliance between the colonies and the working class in the imperialist countries." (24)

Thirdly, according to Sibata, the important contribution "regarding the theory and thinking of Ho Chi Minh was that he especially deepened the theory on the questions of democracy, the right of a nation to self-determination and basic national rights. In this regard, we cannot overlook the Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which was drafted and read by Ho Chi Minh on 2 September 1945." Sibata maintains that "the thinking of the Declaration of Independence of Vietnam and, as a result, Ho Chi Minh's thinking on the Vietnamese revolution were based upon the revolutionary thinking of preceding centuries." He writes: "He broadened the rights of man, with the rights of the individual being considered the foundation of the right to carry out a revolution. One contribution deserving of attention made by Ho Chi Minh is that he concretized and developed the rights of man into the rights of the nation. As a result, all nations must have the right to determine their destiny and, for this reason, all nations can and must adhere to the independent, sovereign viewpoint." (25)

Fourthly, the thinking and theories of President Ho concerning the strategy, tactics and methods of struggle of the revolution have been proven to be both correct and creative by the realities of the past 50 years of the Vietnamese revolution. This thinking and these theories primarily are: coordinating the patriotic movement within a colony and dependant country with the revolutionary struggle of the working class--the most progressive leading force of our times; establishing the role of the working class to provide leadership even when it is still small in size; establishing an alliance of workers and farmers as the foundation of the revolution and creating the internal situation of the revolution; building, strengthening and constantly developing the United National Front; waging a people's war, combining many forms of struggle, political, military and diplomatic, and developing these various forms of struggle into a combined strength; and clearly establishing the fact that the "Vietnamese revolution is a part of the world revolution. Anyone who carries out a revolution in the world is a comrade of Vietnam" (The Revolutionary Road). On this basis, a correct international line and an anti-imperialist united international front were formed.

This thinking and these theories, which originated in a clearheaded and deep analysis of the economic and social conditions of the country, a colony and semi-feudal country, clearly established the nature, the trend of development and the moving forces behind the development of the times and clearly revealed the nature and substance of each period of the revolution as well as the forms through which they were manifested. As S. Sibata pointed out: "...in terms of theory, Ho Chi Minh was the person who developed the theory of the Vietnamese revolution on the basis of the special characteristics of the circumstances of Vietnam."(26)

V.S. Ha-xo-gu-ep [Vietnamese phonetic] (Soviet Union), after studying "The Selected Works of Ho Chi Minh," confirmed that they reflect the creative development of the doctrine of Marx and Lenin concerning the national and colonial questions and especially emphasized the conclusion reached by President Ho that "the revolution in the colonial, semi-colonial and dependent countries--that is, the people's democratic revolution--must, in order to win victory, establish a broad national front and rally all the various strata of society and the various classes that want to liberate themselves from the yoke of colonialism. In these countries, the revolution must always coordinate the task of resisting imperialism with the task of resisting feudalism and must be participated in by the mass of farmers. For this reason, the alliance of farmers and workers must always be the firm foundation of the national front. In this revolution, the working class must play the leadership role, the vanguard role."(27)

Pham Van Dong, in his book "President Ho Chi Minh, the Essence and Spirit of the Nation, the Conscience of Our Times," after speaking in general terms about the genius of President Ho in the field of revolutionary strategy as well as tactics, concluded: "The works of President Ho, from those written at the start of his revolutionary struggle to those written recently, gradually mark this development and contribution and both reflect and shed light on the process of revolutionary struggle and the continuous and increasingly large victories of our party and our people."(28) Vo Nguyen Giap, when studying the strategic thinking of President Ho confirmed: "Uncle Ho brilliantly and creatively applied Marxism-Leninism to the realities of our country's revolution. His guidance of strategy and tactics was extremely determined and flexible, brave and clever. During the hours of arduous challenges, President Ho was an experienced helmsman. He was the man of the great turning points, of the historic decisions... President Ho was a brilliant strategist who charted the course of the Vietnamese revolution. He was also a strategist who made outstanding contributions to the common victory of the national liberation movement throughout the world."(29)

Fifthly, President Ho very creatively resolved the very important theoretical and practical questions involved in building the new style party of the working class in a colonial, semi-feudal country in which the working class was small in size, industry was backward and the population consisted primarily of farmers. Fidel Castro considers the founding of the Vietnam Communist Party

in 1930 "to be an extraordinary contribution by President Ho Chi Minh to world revolutionary thinking." He said: "History has proven him to have been totally correct. Only under the leadership of a Marxist-Leninist party, only under the leadership of the working class aligned with the class of farmers could the Vietnamese defeat two imperialist powers, first the French imperialists and then the U.S. imperialists... A united nation that is under the leadership of a Marxist-Leninist party and armed with revolutionary theory is a nation that cannot be defeated."(30)

S. Sibata particularly emphasizes the thinking of President Ho in applying the principles of democracy in the theory on the party and the teaching of party members. He states that "in the works of Ho Chi Minh, from his first works to his testament, there is a consistent emphasis upon the significance of democracy within the party and within the executive agencies of the people." S. Sibata gives very much attention to President Ho's thinking on party building when the party is in political power: "Ours is a party in political power. Every party member and cadre must truly be imbued with revolutionary ethics, must truly be diligent, frugal, honest and devoted, must keep our party truly pure, must be worthy of being the leader and the truly loyal servant of the people..."(The Testament of President Ho)

S. Sibata maintains that "a party which is in political power but is lax in this regard constantly faces the danger of falling into bureaucracy. Constantly preventing this and routinely emphasizing the need to mold the style of party members and build the party's relationship with the people, these are important contributions made by Ho Chi Minh." "I think that there is very much to be learned here: the theory on political parties, on the state, on the virtue of studying Marxism..."(31)

Sixthly, President Ho charted the course of our country, a colonial and semi-feudal country, as the course of carrying out a people's national democratic revolution and advancing directly to the socialist revolution without experiencing the stage of capitalist development. This was not only the sole correct course for our country to follow, "but also the genuine course of liberation to be followed by the countless oppressed nations living miserable lives under the yoke of colonialism and feudalism."(32) This was a major contribution by President Ho to the storehouse of Marxist-Leninist theory.

S. Sibata maintains that "one of the extremely important contributions by President Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnam Lao Dong Party was the adoption of the theory of building socialism while waging a people's war... Ordinarily, it is held that socialism can only be built under peace time conditions. The universal viewpoint in the Marxist theory on socialist construction holds that socialism can only be built upon the completion of a war. However, over the past quarter century, ever since the Vietnamese were forced to fight the war...they have had to build socialism under the conditions of

waging a war at the same time. To the best of my knowledge, the Vietnam Lao Dong Party is the first Marxist party in the world to adopt this theory."(33) "They are also theoretical matters of an epochal nature set forth by Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnam Lao Dong Party."(34)

Waging a war of resistance while building socialism is a very important characteristic of the Vietnamese revolution, which was first proposed by President Ho. This thinking was a pressing requirement of the Vietnamese revolution and represented the dialectical coordination of the two tides of thinking of our times: national independence and socialism. "We successfully combined the two types of laws: the laws of revolutionary warfare with the laws of the socialist revolution, consequently, we developed the strength of the socialist system...while continuing to develop socialist construction in a number of areas."(35)

Seventhly, President Ho made major contributions to Marxist ethics. His ethical thinking vividly embodied the revolutionary world view and philosophy of life of the proletariat and was formed on the basis of inheriting and enhancing the fine traditions of the nation while incorporating and developing upon the spiritual values of mankind. His ethical thinking was both revolutionary and scientific in nature.

President Ho pointed out: "Carrying out a revolution to transform the old society into the new society is a very glorious undertaking; however, it is also a very large task, a very complicated, long and arduous struggle. A person must be strong before he can pick up a heavy weight and carry it a long distance. A revolutionary must possess revolutionary ethics to serve as his foundation before he can complete the glorious task of the revolution."(36) Thus, revolutionary ethics were considered by President Ho to be the "foundation" of the revolutionary in the complete sense of the term: revolutionary qualities and the ability to complete revolutionary tasks must be organically linked to one another.

President Ho knew very well that man is the product of society and when he said "To build socialism, it is necessary to have socialists..."(37), he wanted to stress the requirements of man in the performance of the task of the socialist revolution: to be aware of ideals, to possess fine qualities and the ability to act in accordance with the laws of the socialist revolution.

President Ho said: "Diligence, frugality, honesty and righteousness are the foundation of the new life..."(38) In terms of philosophy, political economics and scientific socialism as well as Marxist ethics, these words have such significance and embody many relationships: the relationship between one person and another; the relationship between the individual and the collective, the individual and society; the obligations and responsibilities of man to production, to the nation; the responsibility of man to the develop-

ment of the productive forces of society and the perfection of social production relations; the development of the infrastructure and the strengthening of the superstructure...

President Ho was very concerned with developing revolutionary ethical thinking. A rather high percentage of his works was devoted to discussing revolutionary ethics. His ethical thinking made very large contributions to Marxist ethics.

President Ho Chi Minh was a great thinker. "The greatness of his thinking, his clearheadedness, foresight and breadth of vision could only have originated in a deep understanding of the forces behind the most explosive change in the entire work of mankind in all the various stages of history." (39)

"He was a great communist revolutionary, a great theorist, a truly great personality." (40)

"The thinking of Ho Chi Minh continues to live and is developing." (41)

FOOTNOTES

1. K. Marx and F. Engels: "On Literature and Art," Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1958, pp 21-22.
2. "Mot gio voi dong chi Ho Chi Minh" [One Hour with Ho Chi Minh], Thanh Nien Publishing House, Hanoi, 1975, p 48.
3. Ibid., p 15.
4. S. Sibata: "Ho Chi Minh, the Thinker" from the book "Setonamu to shiso no mondai," Tokyo, Aoki Shoten, 1972, p 271.
5. VNA News Release, 29 August 1973.
6. VNA News Release, 17 October 1969.
7. PHU NU VIET-NAM, No 305, 13 February 1973.
8. "The gioi ca ngoi va thuong tiec Ho Chu tich," [The World Praises and Mourns President Ho], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1976, p 20.
9. F. Engels: "L. Feurbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy," Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1955, p 67.
10. Pham Van Dong: "Chu tich Ho Chi Minh, tinh hoa va khi phach cua dan toc, luong tam cu a thoi dai" [President Ho Chi Minh, the Essence and Spirit of the Nation, the Conscience of the Times], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1970, p 23.

11. Fidel Castro: "Address welcoming the delegation from our party and government led by Pham Van Dong on a visit to Cuba, 27 March 1974.
12. Ho Chi Minh: "Tuyen Tap" [Selected Works], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1960, p 705.
13. "The gioi ca ngoi va thuong tiec Ho Chu tich,"...p 76.
14. Fidel Castro: address welcoming...
15. Giang Ca-na-pa: "The Magnitude of the Victory of the Nations of Indochina," REVIEW OF COMMUNISM, Paris, 1975, No 6, pp 6-12.
16. T. Hot-kin: "The Vietnamese Revolution and a Few Lessons," RACE AND CLASS Journal, London, 1975, Volume XVI, n. 3, pp 223-249.
17. Ibid., p 243.
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19. S. Sibata: "Ho Chi Minh, the Thinker,"...
20. Ibid., p 265.
21. Ibid., p 266.
22. Ibid., p 267.
23. Ibid., p 268.
24. Excerpt from "The World Praises and Mourns President Ho," Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1976, p 391.
25. S. Sibata: "Ho Chi Minh, the Thinker,"... p 268.
26. Ibid., p 269.
27. V.S. Ra-xto-gu-ep: "Ho Chi Minh, Lenin, Leninism and the Unshakeable Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship," the JOURNAL OF ASIAN AND AFRICAN NATIONS, No 5, 1970, p 177.
28. Pham Van Dong: "Chu tich Ho Chi Minh, tinh hoa va khi phach cua dan toc,..." pp 22-23.
29. Vo Nguyen Giap: "Ho Chu tich, nha chien lược thien tai, nguoi cha than yeu cua cac luc luong vu trang nhan dan" [President Ho, the Brilliant Strategist, the Beloved Father of the People's Armed Forces], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1970, p 11.

30. Fidel Castro: "The Extraordinary Contributions of President Ho Chi Minh," THONG NHAT Journal, No 245, 16 June 1974, p 6.
31. S. Sibata: "Ho Chi Minh, the Thinker,"... p 270.
32. Vo Nguyen Giap: "Ho Chu tich, nha chien luoc thien tai,..." pp 11-12.
33. S. Sibata: "President Ho, the Thinker,"...p 270.
34. Ibid., p 271.
35. The Political Report of the Party Central Committee at the 4th National Congress of Delegates, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1978, p 33.
36. Ho Chi Minh: "Vi doc lap, tu do, vi chu nghĩa xã hội" [For Independence, Freedom, for Socialism], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1970, p 178.
37. Ho Chi Minh: "Phat huy tinh than cau hoc cau tien bo" [Spreading the Spirit of Wanting To Learn, Wanting To Make Progress], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1960, p 85.
38. Le Quyet Thang: "Can, kien, lien, chinh" [Diligence, Frugality, Honesty, Righteousness], published by the Labor Union of the Hong Linh Printing House in Ha Tinh Province, 1949, p 2. (Le Quyet Thang was one of the pen names used by President Ho-N.T.)
39. "Address by Gus Hall, general secretary of the American Communist Party," "The World Praises and Mourns President Ho," Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1976, p 530.
40. Article written by Gion Gon-lan [Vietnamese phonetics], general secretary of the British Communist Party, "The World Praises and Mourns President Ho," p 474.
41. "Mot gio voi dong chi Ho Chi Minh,"...p 68.

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TO HUU, POET OF THE VIETNAMESE REVOLUTION

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN [COMMUNIST REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 8, Aug 80
pp 48-55

[Article by Le Dinh Ky]

[Text] The October Revolution was not only a milestone in the history of man, of very many nations, but also an important milestone to everyone. Neither the walls and dragnets of the colonialist and feudal system nor the blindness of bourgeois viewpoints prevented the current of the times from flowing into Vietnamese society:

The Soviet Union blossomed before I was 3 years of age
(Hope)

The October Revolution achieved success and the first socialist country in the world was born before To Huu was 3 years of age and their influence will encompass many centuries. The Vietnamese working class, led by Nguyen Ai Quoc and brandishing the banner of the great October Revolution, built its political party and led all the people in waging a liberation struggle for national independence and socialism.

The revolutionary movement during the period of the Indochina Democratic Front demanded that a series of questions be answered, questions which the public and clandestine press of the party had to place before public opinion. The new and bold issues of the revolution became the inspiration for increasingly interesting and attractive poetry. The poems in the collection entitled "Then" encompass a full range of subjects: blood and fire-the chains-liberation, subjects that were not and could not be seen in contemporary romantic poetry.

"Then" embodied the thinking of the party which:

Sowed the seeds early
(Remembering the Fields)

The seeds began to sprout, promising brilliant harvests that would sooner or later lead to the following:

...And then, they naturally will become stupified,
As wave after wave of youths build a world higher than the horizon.
(Hope)

The poet-soldier was never once vague about the course that had to be followed, about the price that would have to be paid for the future. When he passed through Lao Bao and saw the savage, terrible scenes of prison, he only became more determined to dedicate his life to the following ideal:

To possess the will to fight,
To cement my flesh to the future,
To dedicate my life until my very last drop of blood
In order to turn the dull gray surroundings red!
(Lao Bao)

The poems that were written by the poet when he began to become aware of the revolution and began to conduct revolutionary activities under relatively favorable conditions were still placed under the title: blood and fire. Because, the revolution, in general, and especially the revolution under the circumstances of our country during that period could only be developed amidst blood and fire: such was the case from the Can Vuong movement and the Phan Boi Chau movement to the Nghe Tinh Soviet movement.

World War II broke out. Many revolutionary fighters were imprisoned. The inevitable could not be avoided; that for which he had been waiting came to the poet-soldier:

A revolutionary life, for as long as I could recall,
Seemed unexplainably linked to imprisonment,
Like a knife to my throat, a gun to my head,
As if my life were to be cut in half.
(Shackles)

But it was "then," when the light of the truth was spreading, that his soul, even though he was imprisoned, even though he was experiencing the darkest of situations, was still filled with light and beauty. The reality of prison was the reality of the struggle of the times and represented a large portion of every soldier's life. In prison, a new challenge began, a new school of revolutionary activity was established. To waver, retreat, surrender and commit betrayal or to remain brave and fight until the end, these were the questions faced each day. The cruel prison regime of suppression, terror, butchery and corruption could not shake or conquer the communists. It could not imprison their thoughts, could not silence their song. Later, when the nation was liberated, the poet could look back on his life with peace of mind:

Cattle prods and stocks brought a flow of fresh blood,
But a cell cannot imprison the soul of man;
Spirited singing reverberated through the iron,
And, the sound of our singing was the breath of life.

Fire tests gold, adversity tests strength. From the "Then" poems emanated boundless loyalty to the ideals, to the organization of the party, an indomitable will and an unshakeable spirit of revolutionary optimism. When we learn that the following thoughts were written during the days of a hunger strike:

Soon, very shortly
We must wage a non-ending struggle
Fight the iron and fire to the end with our flesh and blood;
(Two Friends)

And, when we learn that when "death was at hand" the poet reviewed his past life:

In the long tempest of those several very difficult years
I was never playing at revolution
And, I never dared deny the peril
Then, I stared death in the face:
The long struggle became an epic,
I was going to die in the struggle;
(Shackles)

we realize the highly moving and penetrating nature of his poems.

In 1940, when the Japanese fascists swept into Vietnam and Indochina, they shared power with and ultimately kicked out the French colonialists. Our people were trapped between two evils; as a result, a terrible famine occurred during the winter and spring of 1944 and 1945, killing some 2 million persons. The Viet Minh Front was established. The hatred felt by the masses was fertile ground for the seed of revolution; revolutionary spirit was surging. To Huu wrote the poems: "Singing on the Dike," "Hunger, Hunger!" and "The Broken Embankment."

The August Revolution broke out. Every Vietnamese felt reborn in the revival of the nation. Following many years of anxious searching for the course to follow and living a life of disgrace, the joy of liberation was truly overwhelming, truly immense. The country, its mountains and rivers, the hearts of the people, everything was fluttering with elation like a forest of red flags with the gold star fluttering in the sky over the fatherland:

Now Hue, Hue! The shackles and stocks are shattered
Arise! The rivers and mountains are ours!
(Hue in August)

wind, oh wind! Blow hard and strong
Blow the bright blood red flag
Blowing in the win, how beautiful!

The feelings expressed in the poems in "Then" are feelings about revolutionary ideals, the revolutionary world view, the course that had to be chosen to achieve a worthy life. The poems in the collection "Viet Bac" were written after the success of the revolution and during the resistance against the French colonialists. Whereas, in the past, the poet wanted to cry out, to share with everyone the newness and beauty of his ideals and be able to contribute his entire life to socialism, by now, these ideals had become part of the everyday life of the masses. The beauty of these ideals became the brilliant spectacle of our entire nation, which had risen to carry out the August Revolution, waging a sacred people's war, became the infinite beauty of real people, of real life. The concept of militiamen being like fish in the sea is seen very simply but profoundly in the meeting and conversation between the cadre and the nationalist soldier Ve:

I was coming up from Vinh Yen
He, down from Son Cot
We met in the middle of Nhe Pass
A grove of bamboo shading us
(Fish in the Water)

Prior to this time, the poet was romantic in inclination for the purpose of striking a contrast to ordinary life in colonial-feudal society; now, the extraordinary situation that was the war of resistance had become the ordinary life of our people. Ordinary people performing extraordinary feats-- the Viet Bac collection of poems helps us to understand the revolution in this light. The soldiers living in the mountainous jungles were racked by malaria like everyone else:

His body was covered with perspiration
His cheeks were yellow
His appearance was most terrifying
A good natured soldier
His hand resting upon his rifle
(Fish in the Water)

Such was the soldier who fought the French and such was the only true picture of him. But it was he and the members of his unit who were the terror of the enemy, who won victory after victory and who brought the people's war to the "earth-shattering" victory of Dien Bien Phu. In the end, through its

determination to fight and win, its energies, talents and unparalleled revolutionary heroism, our nation won decisive victory;

Dien Bien Phu is a bright star in the night of history
The name of our country is like a medal on our chest
Our nation, our heroic nation
(Hurrah for the Soldiers of Dien Bien)

Dien Bien Phu victoriously concluded the first war of resistance and our people entered the new stage of the revolution with greatly enhanced position and power. The U.S.-puppet regime in the South was the child of the defeat of the French. Socialism in the North was the product of victory and was built by victors, the victory of revolutionary truth, of socialism, of the future of all nations.

Our beautiful and prosperous country that was won back from the grasp of the enemy aggressor, of the exploiting classes was waiting to be developed and rebuilt. The essence of socialism is the liberation of labor. Never has the common laborer been portrayed as solidly and majestically as in To Huu's "The Sound of the Bamboo Broom":

A winter night
The wind is blowing
The lights went out
I stood watching
On the silent street
A woman laborer
Like iron
Like brass
This woman laborer
Sweeping the trash

With socialism, labor that was once degrading and disdained became free and creative labor, became the *raison d'être*, the source of joy, the measurement of the value and qualities of man:

Go, let's go clear the wilderness
Ask the high mountains, where is the iron, the gold?
Ask the ocean, where are the fish?
The Da, Lo, Red and Chay Rivers
Ask these rapids, where can we find electricity!
(Ode to Spring 1961)

The spring of 1961 was welcomed like a great festival as it marked the end of the period of economic reconstruction and socialist transformation and the start of the first 5-year plan in our country:

Life has been reborn. Everything is revolutionary!
Loneliness, private property, poverty have been swept away.

The poems in "Windy" overflow with great joy. There was joy because one-half of the country had been totally liberated and was rapidly and strongly moving into the future:

A piece of the fatherland is in our hands
Although not complete, it is under the red flag
(Ode to Spring 1961)

There was joy over the bustling, busy scenes of producing while fighting,
building socialism and resisting the United States for national salvation:

How bustling is the homeland
Half a workmate, half a noisy battlefield
(Song in Spring)

Mother Suot, the heroic mother on the Nhat Le River, who felt this joy in
her heart, spent her days and nights taking our troops and cadres across
the river under the bombs of the U.S. pirates' war of destruction:

Now, the waters are ours
Despite rough waters and high winds, the boats come and go
Now, in the vast and surging sea
The fish and shrimp are joyful, it is spring in every heart!
(Mother Suot)

When the U.S. imperialists widened the war to the entire country, the poems
of To Huu still sung the praises of the increasing vitality of socialism
and our people in the North:

The white stork flying across the sky
Does it see the bright green rows of rice?
Look down here
See how fast the women are transplanting, as if they are weaving
See the calves standing obediently
Don't land on the newly planted rows of banana and lilac trees
The canals and ditches are perfectly straight
Don't walk on the newly built embankments
(An Early Spring)

As the situation in the South became more urgent, the compatriots of the
North felt increasingly heartbroken and acutely anxious and mourned in their
hearts for the South. The truth was that the South had not lived 1 day in
peace since the outbreak of the Nam Bo resistance, even when the resistance
against the French concluded. It was not by chance that the first poem in
the collection of poems entitled "To the Front" is "How Can We Sit Still?"
"How can we sit still, how can we be indifferent? How can we turn our backs?
How can we forget?" "Why, why?" The poem is unrelenting:

Oh, South Vietnam, why is it that every time
The afternoon clouds fly in on the wings of birds
And day becomes late night, the sound of a flute
A cry...goes up in our hearts?
Why, like a promise unfulfilled
Is there not one day of complete happiness?
Why does our food stick in our throats?
One-half of us is still in misery: the South!
(The South)

When the country was divided, the struggle to reunify the fatherland was an important political issue and a major emotional issue as well. Even when action was being taken, the lines of poetry that penetrated to the very depth of the soul still expressed torment, expressed the inability to part with the South. Such were the feelings of the North toward the South!

Let us return to our place of birth
The banks of the Perfume River or the shore of the Bo River
And with our mothers, aunts and uncles
Take back every piece of that sacred soil!
Let us make mine factories
And bury the enemy at Hai Van Pass
Let us make stakes in pits
And stab to death the enemy terrorizing our combat zone!
(How Can We Sit Still?)

War is the greatest challenge to a nation, a system. The enemy was very dangerous, possessed huge material strength and wanted to push us back to the Stone Age. However, the time when the imperialists could do as they pleased was gone forever. We were not pushed back to the Stone Age, rather it was the U.S. imperialists who suffered increasingly bitter defeats.

The entire country was at war! The entire country was on the move. The road to the front was even more appealing and inspiring because it brought us ever closer to the South:

The road into Zone 4, into Thanh
Must be followed at all costs
(The Road South)

The picture of our army and people going to the frontlines for the sake of the affection between the North and the South, of the great reasons for living of a nation, of the age, was also portrayed in poems that were both eloquent and warmly lyrical:

Our camouflaged troops marching
Like endless waves on a river bank
The road we follow is most beautiful
How many heroes has it forged in the past 1,000 years?
(The Road South)

To Huu has long been composing moving poems for the mothers of Vietnam, from "The Mothers of Hau Giang" and "Mother Tom" to "The Mothers of Viet Bac" and "Mother Suot," typical mothers of the age of resisting the United States for national salvation. Mother Suot placed herself in the middle of combat and simply but impressively:

Piloted the ferry with one hand
Taking troops across the Nhat Le River day and night

These lines appear to be describing a woman general in the age of the Trung Sisters, such as the one in "Dai Nam quoc su dien ca." But no, she was merely a mother during the period of the resistance against the United States for national salvation, a courageous mother who was just as kind, loving and simple-hearted as the hundreds of thousands of other ordinary mothers:

The waves of aircraft brought no fear
On the other side, victory had been won, on this side, the U.S. still had not been defeated!
And, mindless of old age,
She stubbornly asked to be allowed to emulate until the end!
She was simple, but also strangely imposing and majestic:
Head held high, her hair tossing about,
In the wind like sea waves on a white beach.
(Mother Suot)

Our nation chose the course of honor and conscience. The long and extremely arduous march demanded extraordinary bravery and an unshakeable spirit of sacrifice. Although they had stood on brilliant pinnacles, our people knew that they had to cross much dangerous terrain, cross countless passes, streams and rapids, but they were determined to overcome everything:

One after the other, they come: the Lua rapids,
the Chong rapids, the Dai, Kho, Ong and Ba rapids,
Rapids, so many rapids, and all of them crossed,
Smoothly flows our ship in life.

..
Aircraft into the wind they land
Knowing shortcuts through the treacherous terrain
Our troops dare to follow them everywhere
In those loose-fitting shirts and tropical helmets!
(One Thousand Miles of Water and Mountains)

We followed the only course we could have chosen in order to be worthy of the tradition of our forefathers and the hope of our friends and brothers throughout the world, the oppressed peoples and progressive mankind. Like our liberation troops, shod only in rubber sandals and travelling only in

small boats, but who moved like ghosts on the water striking fear in the hearts of the enemy, the prestige of the fatherland resounded to all corners of the globe, "all five continents are watching the truth unfold." Wherever they went, they brought glory to the nation, glory which history shall record for generations to come:

Truong Son, they cut through and across these mountains
Their shovels wrote pages of red history
Truong Son, over the mountains and across the rivers
Trucks rolled endlessly, feats of arms were recorded in all four seasons
(One Thousand Miles of Water and Mountains)

They marched for independence, to become worthy of the people of Vietnam.

The South was totally liberated in the campaign that bore the name of Uncle Ho in April 1975. He had long predicted that these days would come. During those unforgettable hours, our first thoughts were of him, of his tremendous contributions:

Let us give him a bouquet
The entire country, everyone under one roof
Like a solid block of marble or granite
One thousand years around him, an epic.
(The Joy of Today)

In the great fraternal socialist family, in the great family of oppressed and exploited peoples, on the frontline in the struggle for national independence and socialism, we stand fully aware of our responsibilities:

We are for ourselves, for our 30 million people
But also for the 3 billion people of the world!
(The South)

In the face of the joy and esteem of progressive mankind:

The star of truth in the heavens
Vietnam, the gold of man today.

Our nation has become increasingly encouraged by and firmly confident in the course it selected for the sake of its own survival and the future of all mankind:

Allowed to be the seed of a bumper harvest
Selected by history to be a fulcrum
Then, what could be more joyous than to be the soldier in the lead
On a dark night, our hearts being our torch!
(Ode to Spring 67)

The spirit of nationhood, the sense of independence overflow with genuine internationalism.

Clearly, the growth of our nation cannot be separated from the leadership of the party, the organizer of each of our nation's victories. We cannot talk about our nation, our people, without talking about our party. In "Then," The poet talks about "the sun of truth," "the soul of philosophy," which were also references to the party. However, we had to wait until "Windy" and later for the party to become the direct source of inspiration of other creative works of To Huu.

Ever since it was born amidst trials and tribulations, the party has led the people in a resolute struggle against the enemy and brought to each of us:

Broad horizons, a vast land
Food, clothing, the beauty of the soul
(Our 30 Years with the Party)

A great life under the eyes of the party
Each step bringing us closer, heightening our dreams
(Song of Spring 71)

President Ho, the founder of the party of the Vietnamese working class, was portrayed in moving poems of great stature by To Huu. The poet frequently used nature, the earth and the sky to symbolize the bearing and virtues of Uncle Ho. When President Ho first appeared before his compatriots at historic Ba Dinh Square, "the sky suddenly became more blue and the sun shown brilliantly." Uncle Ho's words reverberated in the breasts of millions of compatriots:

As if the Truong Son were intoxicated on the winds of
The South China Sea
(In His Footsteps)

When Uncle Ho took leave of the capital Hanoi and travelled to the Viet Bac combat zone:

The wind left the capital from all four directions.
(A Morning in May)

At the place Uncle Ho stayed:

The wind parted the clouds
The birds warbled outside in the morning
A small lantern flickered at night
A stream sounded like far-distant singing
(In His Footsteps)

When Uncle Ho appeared in the middle of the mountainous forests;

The people of the forest looked only at his shadow
(Viet Bac)

Uncle Ho was the essence of our mountains and rivers, our fatherland;
he went and discovered the path to be followed by the revolution as a poor
but honest man. When he returned, became president of the country and led
all the people in waging the wars of resistance and building the country,
he continued to live the simple, cultured lifestyle of our nation. When he
passed away, he left behind a great revolutionary career, a very Vietnamese
communist soul:

Frail, modest clothing, a cane
A simple upstairs apartment, a small garden
Unpainted wood furniture, not even lacquered
A rush mat for a bed, one blanket, one pillow
A small closet with several thread-bare shirts hanging inside
(In His Footsteps)

The Vietnamese virtues of sacrifice and the Vietnamese feeling of love, of
which Uncle Ho was the unparalleled image, were reflected in his feelings
toward the people and the country:

Why? When the world needs kindness
It constantly repeats his name: Ho Chi Minh
As though it were a source of confidence, of bravery
A source of love and righteousness, of the virtue of sacrifice
(In His Footsteps)

To Huu's poems about Uncle Ho always overflowed with confidence and love.
Revolutionary sentiments, revolutionary love and revolutionary tasks have
usually been expressed by the poet under the Vietnamese form of feelings
and duty.

To Huu's poems are revolutionary poems in the true meaning of the term, from
the time the poet was concerned with finding a reason for loving life and
then began his revolutionary activities, following the footsteps of Uncle Ho
to victory after victory.

From the very outset, the poems of To Huu possessed something that some of
our poems still lack: the heart of a writer. There are places in "Then"
where a person can reach one opinion or another but there are no dry
dissertations or poems lacking commitment. Every poem that is written is
the result of an inner need at a certain point in time or under certain
circumstances compelling the poet to write.

In "Viet Bac," the poems of To Huu underwent a marked change in style and artistic level. The growth of the poet coincided with the growth of our people through the revolution and the war of resistance, that is, of objective reality itself, of the subjects reflected in his poems, primarily in the ideals used by the artist to shed light on his subject. And, in the final analysis, the final selection of one subject or another is also determined by the world view and ideals of the artist.

The changes, development and rapid success of the poet in "Then" and subsequent works are one. This is the essence of a life devoted to the revolution, a life of experiencing formidable challenges under the colonial-feudal regime and, after the success of the revolution, a life of always standing in the vanguard of the movement, fulfilling weighty responsibilities assigned by the party and people.

To Huu considers "poetry to be the most natural voice of the soul in the face of life, in the face of everything that occurs around oneself..." "Poetry is the voice of reason and sentiment, the voice of comradeship." "One must speak from the heart of a comrade to touch the heart of a comrade"; "to be correct, a poem for a person must be a poem of one's complete self"; "It can be said that a poem only overflows with feeling when our hearts are truly overflowing with life." (1) These are the premises of revolutionary poems. This concept has been fully proven in the career of the poet. When we say that the singular characteristic of the poetry of To Huu is lyricism, we are talking about the depth and abundance of revolutionary feelings and our ardent love of man and life as seen in decent poems of great instructive power. The independence, freedom and revolutionary heroism of the masses and socialist construction--the great reasons for living for which the poet "never dared to deny the peril" and to which he devoted his entire life, have become everyday reality and are like the song in the soul of the poet. This song must be recorded, given to life and made to reverberate in the soul of everyone:

Let us join hands and sing in joy
(Viet Bac)

The poet writes his poetry from the pinnacle of revolutionary ideals, but what he says is always relevant: the noble ideals are being transformed into reality by our people every minute of every hour. But, voicing the cherished feelings of the masses and giving them form, vitality and soul, this is the contribution of To Huu as well as every other genuine artist. It is often said that the classical writers were persons who knew how to express the thinking of many persons in the thinking of a couple of persons. Seen in this light, many of To Huu's poems are worthy of being included among the classics of the nation's literature.

Revolutionary poems are songs emanating from revolutionary life, from the creativity of the poet and from the very bottom of the soul of the people. To Huu has long been one of the bright stars of Vietnamese revolutionary poetry, primarily because his subjectivity has blended as one with the objectivity of the class, the nation. The poet has a style that vividly combines ideals and reality, ideology and art, thoughts and feelings, the nation and modern times. Herein lies the very beautiful unity of life and writing, of soldier and poet. The creative career of To Huu is brilliant proof of the correctness of the line of the party on art; at the same time, it is a great lesson to creative circles in Vietnam, to the writers and artists who want to contribute as much as possible to the nation, to the revolution.

FOOTNOTES

1. To Huu: "Xay dung mot nen van nghe lon xung dang noi nhan dan ta, voi thoi dat ta" [Building a Great System of Literature Worthy of Our People, of Our Times], Van Hoc Publishing House, Hanoi, 1973, pp 440, 441 and 442.

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SEVERAL PROBLEMS WITHIN AGRICULTURE IN VINH PHU PROVINCE

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN [COMMUNIST REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 8, Aug 80
pp 56-60

[Article by Hoang Quy, secretary of the Vinh Phu Provincial Party Committee]

[Text] Vinh Phu is a midland province that has much potential for developing agriculture comprehensively but which is also encountering many difficulties due to the diversity and complexity of production, underdeveloped material-technical bases and farming habits that vary very widely from one area to another.

In late 1971, Vinh Phu began to reorganize agricultural production along centralized, specialized lines. Together with planning the acceleration of grain production, especially the production of subsidiary food crops, Vinh Phu endeavored to gradually establish industrial crop growing areas and centralized forests: a 7,000 hectare tea growing area (in the two districts of Song Lo and Song Thao), a 3,000 hectare lacquer growing area (in the districts of Tam Thanh and Thanh Son), a 3,000 hectare pineapple growing area (in the districts of Tam Thanh, Lap Thach and Tam Dao), a 1,500 hectare centralized sugarcane growing area (in Vinh Lac District), a cassava growing area measuring more than 10,000 hectares (in the districts of Phong Chau, Song Lo, Thanh Son and Song Thao) and a 7,000 hectare area of grasslands (in the districts of Song Lo, Song Thao and Phong Chau); it is now building a vegetable growing area of roughly 320 hectares (Tam Dao) and planting 70,000 hectares of forests to supply raw materials for paper production.

Along with replanning the various production areas, Vinh Phu expanded the scale of cooperatives (the majority are now village size cooperatives) to be consistent with the requirements of reorganizing production and the new distribution of labor. The size of the districts has also been increased, with each district being characterized by one specialized production area and coordinating production with processing. For example, Song Lo District has a centralized production area measuring more than 6,000 hectares. In addition to cooperatives, the district also has two state tea farms and

three tea processing plants. Tam Dao District, which has pineapple, tobacco and export crop growing areas that measure roughly 2,000 hectares, has a network of processing enterprises consisting of the Tam Dao Fruit Processing Plant, the Dong Xuan Distillery, the Ngoai Trach Oil Extraction Plant and 36 cassava processing installations.

The reorganization of agricultural production along centralized, specialized lines has created the conditions needed to strengthen cooperatives in a manner closely linked to the building of districts. At first, Vinh Phu, like many other places, organized production along the lines of the manual labor worksite and centralized labor in order to manage it on a district-wide basis. Although this method resulted in a number of immediate returns, if this method of management is abused, the organization of production at installations becomes unstable and sometimes even causes violations of cost accounting procedures, thereby making it impossible to insure the quality of work, especially detailed technical work. The management of labor on a district-wide basis usually gives rise to the practice of giving light attention to the basic production units, a desire to organize too many "specialized units" within the scope of the cooperative and the abandonment of the three contracts for production units, thereby leading to a situation in which no one is routinely responsible for each field and for the products harvested.

In mid-1978, Vinh Phu changed its methods of organizing and managing labor to be consistent with production work and labor conditions within agriculture, especially at that time, when, in the face of the scheme of aggression of the Beijing reactionaries, more and more young, healthy laborers in the countryside were leaving to support combat and protect the border.

On the basis of redistributing the labor at cooperatives along the lines of gradually achieving specialized farming and intensive cultivation, Vinh Phu has attached particular importance to strengthening the basic production units. In the 2 years 1978 and 1979, it reorganized the 7,415 basic production units (15 to 20 hectares and 40 to 60 laborers apiece) and 1,900 specialized support units (seed, water conservancy, farmland water conservancy, transportation, crop protection, farm tool repair and so forth). The plowing units and fertilizer processing units, which used to be centralized on the district level, were now organized into soil preparation and fertilizer processing groups within the basic production units. Facts have shown that the strong cooperatives are those cooperatives that have many strong basic production units. One of the jobs of decisive significance in strengthening the basic production units is implementing the system of contracts well.

In the winter of 1978, Vinh Phu began to improve the way it contracts for the raising of subsidiary food crops (tuberous crops), thereby correcting the loose management of instruments of production (land and draft power) under the old "household contracts" and avoiding sloppy work that yielded little

return. The contracting for the production of western potatoes is carried out in the following manner: in accordance with the plan of the cooperative, the production unit sows an area for the cultivation of western potatoes, prepares the ground collectively and then assigns contracts to cooperative members and their families to plant, fertilize, cultivate and harvest the crop in exact accordance with production regulations and to turn over to the unit the quantity of product stipulated in the contract. If the unit plants the field as a collective, the contracts with cooperative members and families are for the jobs following planting. The cooperative receives 100 percent of the product exceeding the contract quota or is penalized, at market value, 100 percent of the shortfall; the production unit collects the output required under the contract quota and turns it over to the cooperative.

During the 1978 winter season, as a result of the contracting method mentioned above, the production of western potatoes was strongly developed in terms of both the amount of area under cultivation and output. On the basis of this experience, Vinh Phu established a common method of contracting for tuberous subsidiary food crops (western potatoes, sweet potatoes, cassava and taro); at the same time, it supplemented the incentive provided to persons to accept contracts to interplant legumes on land used to raise subsidiary food crops and allows these persons to take 100 percent of the output of interplanted crops, leaving only the stems and leaves of the plants for the cooperative to use as fertilizer; this is done at all places except those at which interplanting has become a habit and the cooperative provides cooperative members with seeds and takes a certain percentage of the crop for the collective. This method has restored the habit of raising companion crops at many places and has been welcomed by the masses. And, also on the basis of the results mentioned above, Vinh Phu has come to see that it is necessary to boldly conduct a pilot project in contracting for each crop in a manner consistent with the technical conditions required by each crop.

The implementation of contracts such as those described above (in accordance with resolution number 13 of the provincial party committee) led to the following results: during the 1979 winter season, the amount of area under cultivation increased 2.5 times compared to 1978, subsidiary food crop output (in paddy equivalent) during the winter season increased by more than 10,000 tons and the planting of beans and peanuts in pure stands and as companion crops on winter-spring subsidiary food crop fields increased 1.5 to 2 times. The Dong Thanh Cooperative, which is representative of the hilly area, harvested three times as many beans and peanuts as it did during the previous year. Very many families harvested from 50 to 200-300 kilograms of beans and peanuts as a result of interplanting.

At the start of 1980, in order to put the management of cooperatives on a regular basis and perfect the contract system, Vinh Phu held a conference to gain experience and established the following four contracting principles:

1. Contracts must be suited to the economic and technical conditions of each crop and species of livestock, establish close coordination between management and technology, maintain and expand centralized production areas, protect and strengthen material-technical bases and apply technical advances in order to constantly raise the output of products and the business returns from crops and livestock.
2. Contracts must tightly control the basic instruments of production (arable land and draft power), properly manage and use the primary technical supplies and tightly control the final product in order to establish a unified business, unified distribution in accordance with the plan of the cooperative and, at the same time, implement the principle of distribution in accordance with labor.
3. Contracts must tap the combined strength of the production forces that have been collectivized and the ability to work as well as the farming experience of cooperative members and their families in order to develop the potential that lies in arable land as best possible.
4. Contracts must closely coordinate and correctly resolve the various matters related to the responsibility and the interests of cooperatives, production units and cooperative members (as well as their families), insure a constant increase in the accumulation of capital by the cooperative and in material bases, both in the immediate future and over the long range, and, at the same time, provide incentive for production units and workers to work diligently and efficiently and receive appropriate remuneration commensurate with their contribution, thereby insuring that the sense of collective ownership of cooperative members is heightened and that they are close to the collective economy.

The four principles mentioned above must be considered to be of equal importance, none can be emphasized more than the other. In Vinh Phu, facts have shown that, in the course of implementing resolution number 13 of the provincial party committee, some cadres and party members have only placed emphasis upon family labor and the interests of the laborer; there have even been some who have maintained that contracting with cooperative member families is better than collective labor. These persons do not see that on collectivized land, even if a number of jobs are contracted to cooperative members and their families, the final product that is produced is the result of very large contributions by the state and collective. For example, if it wants to raise western potatoes, a cooperative must raise early 10th month rice, must make integrated use of draft power, including tractors of the state and small tractors and buffalo of the collective to be able to prepare the soil fully, and must also regulate the flow of water and supply a certain amount of nitrogen fertilizer. Of course, cultivation and harvesting are also very important technical jobs and, in these jobs, the labor of cooperative member families makes a significant contribution. There

are also comrades who emphasize the coordination of the three interests (of the state, the collective and the laborer) but give light attention to technical management. Facts have pointed out that if production does not increase or only increases slowly, it is not due solely to management, but also to technology; therefore, if management is not closely linked to technology, is not based on economic-technical conditions or impedes the application of technical measures, it is impossible to achieve the desired results.

In order to closely link technology to management, the method of contracting for each crop and each species of livestock cannot be the same. Production in Vinh Phu is less than strong not only because of an unreasonable method of contracting, but also because of the failure to attach importance to technology, to correctly employ technology. In this regard, the good lessons of Hai Hung and a number of fraternal provinces is very valuable to our province. Vinh Phu has long had experience in planting overlapping catch crops to combat erosion and made good use of arable land; therefore, we must properly coordinate the green revolution with the effective mode of farming of our forefathers. On the basis of coordinating technology with management in conjunction with coordinating the three interests, Vinh Phu has adopted a specific method of contracting for each type subsidiary food crop and each type industrial crop; in addition, two or three different contracts might be used for each crop depending upon the specific technical conditions and the level of management of the cooperative.

There are two methods of contracting, each of which has different bonuses and penalties:

1. The piecework wage and product cost ceiling contract (which is used at places that have good production conditions and a rather high level of management): if output exceeds the plan by less than 10 percent, the bonus coefficient is 1.5 times the contract piecework wage; if output exceeds the plan by more than 10 percent, a bonus coefficient of 2 is received. Fifty to one hundred percent of this bonus money can be spent buying grain from the cooperative, depending upon its supply of grain.
2. The output contract with payment and cost ceilings based on economic-technical quotas (which is used at places that have stable production conditions, such as collective livestock installations and the trade sectors): if the contract is exceeded, a bonus of 70 to 80 percent of the additional output is received in product or in cash; if the bonus is received in cash, 20 to 30 percent of it can be used to buy products from the cooperative. If the contract is not fulfilled, a penalty of 70 to 80 percent of the shortfall must be paid in product or in cash at the directed price.

Of these two methods of contracting, the product contracting method is a method with a strict system of bonuses and penalties that demands a high level

of responsibility, a rather high level of organization and management, relatively stable production conditions and relatively stable balances in the production process.

One of these two contracting methods can and must be applied for each crop, each species of livestock and each trade sector in a manner consistent with the economic-technical requirements within each cooperative. The output contract method is used for subsidiary food crops and annual industrial crops but, in order to heighten the level of responsibility, bonuses and penalties are raised to 100 percent. As regards perennial industrial crops, such as tea, lacquer, citronella and so forth, which require intensive cultivation from the very outset, contracting should be divided into two stages consistent with the actual organization of production in order to maintain production over the entire economic cycle: the first contracting method is used in the stage of planting new crops while, in the harvesting stages, such as picking tea leaves and cutting lacquer, bonuses and penalties based on purchasing prices are employed and, in order to provide incentive, 20 to 30 percent of this bonus can be used to buy grain.

The point common to both methods is that in order to heighten the responsibility of production units, unit cadres and cooperative members, bonuses are computed on the basis of the mandays actually worked and penalties are computed on the basis of the obligatory number of mandays that must be worked. For unit cadres, bonuses and penalties are based on the percentage of the output plan completed by the unit, not on the basis of a relative percentage of the salary of the cooperative head or assistant head as was done in the past.

Depending upon the technical requirements of production and the method of cooperation used to achieve high labor productivity and high economic returns, either work contracts or final product contracts are used. Contracts are made with groups and individual laborers or with cooperative members and cooperative member families, but the production unit is still the contracting unit, the contract payment unit and the basic unit organizing the labor within the cooperative. The cooperative must manage the key aspects of production, such as zoning production areas, establishing the structure of the labor force, supplying water, organic and inorganic fertilizer and insecticide and preparing large fields for cultivation, and must control the final product and unify distribution.

When implementing the contract system at places where the movement is weak, it is easy for management to become lax, to fall into the old habit of contracting for everything or "contracting with households." For this reason, Vinh Phu has provided training to cooperative heads and assistant heads in economic-technical quotas, organization and management to insure that cooperatives not only tightly control their instruments of production and

final product, but also know how to use technical advances and establish an allocation of crops that is suitable and yields the highest possible economic returns. When contracting with cooperative members and their families, it should not be thought that this is their own private production and that the cooperative need not conduct inspections or help them, especially when technical conditions and the weather change. To the contrary, the guidance by the cooperative must be increasingly close and the cooperative especially must delve deeply into the guidance of implementation of very specific technical standards and economic quotas with a view toward increasing the product produced on each piece of land. It is necessary to train a corps of unit and assistant unit chiefs who possess zeal and know how to provide good management.

In recent years, Vinh Phu has trained 2,800 cooperative heads and chief accountants and has begun a pilot project in appointing chief accountants at cooperatives. Vinh Phu has compiled a training program for production unit cadres and has provided the management boards and professional cadres of cooperatives with advanced training so that they can provide training to the unit cadres of their cooperatives. In this way, by rapidly expanding training and keeping abreast of the actual situation at cooperatives, the relationship between the leadership of the cooperative and the leadership of the production units has become a closer relationship. Prior to the 1980 10th month season, the cooperatives, with the assistance of the district party school and the district agriculture committee, had virtually completed the retraining of practically all unit and assistant unit chiefs in the methods of using contracts and in management within the production unit.

Every success or failure of the new management system, the new contract system occurs at installations; for this reason, the provincial and district levels must strongly direct their attention toward the installation and make every effort to strengthen the installation. The responsibilities of the province and the districts toward the agricultural production installations differ. The province must not only concern itself with planning and general production plans, with coordinating industry with agriculture and the other areas of work, but must also routinely attach importance to conducting research and gaining experience in order to establish management regulations that are consistent with the specific conditions of the locality and gaining experience in guiding units that are models of the implementation of the programs and policies of the party and state while improving the material and economic-technical conditions of installations through the district. The district, which is the level directly above the installation, must guide the installation on a daily basis. It must define in detail exactly what is involved in each job; adopt a work program and operations schedule; give each member of the district party committee the assignment of using the various departments as necessary and being responsible for each job in order to guide the implementation of the established program; determinedly guide each job until it is completed, intensify inspections and help the installation to implement the work program

and immediately revamp the system of economic information from the installation upward. In the work methods of the district, working with both strong and weak installations is very important; therefore, in conjunction with providing training to good cooperatives, it is necessary to strengthen weak and deficient cooperatives. Ordinarily, weak, deficient installations exhibit the following: a low level of production, difficulties in everyday life, a lack of internal unity and very weak material-technical bases. The weaknesses of cooperatives are related to the guidance provided by the district and the province. Weak, deficient cooperatives will surely make rapid progress if their weaknesses are accurately determined and if close and effective guidance and effective help are provided by the district party committee and the various sectors within the district. In 2 years of effort (1978-1979), Vinh Phu reduced the percentage of weak, deficient cooperatives from 19.9 percent to 11 percent; in Vinh Lac District, only 6 percent of the cooperatives are weak and deficient, and these cooperatives have undergone changes for the better in every area.

Under the light of the resolutions of the Party Central Committee and studying the experiences of the fraternal provinces while summarizing the experiences gained by the locality in economic management and agricultural technology over the past 2 years, Vinh Phu is confident that it will soon achieve more comprehensive and stronger stages of development in agricultural production.

7809

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IDEOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES: LOVE

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN [COMMUNIST REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 8, Aug 80
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[Article by Huong Giang]

[Text] "Love others as you love yourself." This is a very beautiful part of the ethical tradition of our nation.

Love is a concept that lies within the category of ethics. In other words, love is a part of ethics.

In societies that have classes, love, according to the viewpoint of the exploiting classes, is only a concept that is flowery in form but devoid of substance.

The feudal class as well as the bourgeoisie always speak about love in all kinds of good and beautiful words, but behind these words lie extremely cruel acts of mistreatment of others.

The feudal class looks for every possible way to deprive farmers of all their farmland and turn them into persons who own absolutely no land whatsoever; then, however, they stand ready to "help" farmers, to loan them land or hire their families to work as menial laborers or servants in order to force them to toil for and serve the exploiters for the rest of their lives. The feudal class shattered the happiness of countless poor peasant families but still loudly proclaimed that they were ready to loan them rice and money to "help" them through their difficulties. Such is love to the feudal class; it is a deception, a cruel kind of robbery disguised as a favor, a kind of love referred to in folklore as: "A wolf in sheep's clothing." The bourgeoisie often voice the slogan "respect and love others." But this, too, is nothing more than a deception. The actual situation is quite the contrary. The bourgeoisie severed all relations between one person and another, except for indifference and the immediate payment of money with no emotional attachments whatsoever. The bourgeoisie submerged every feeling in the cold icewater of

selfish considerations and turned the dignity of man into a commodity to be traded. Love, affection, friendship, the feeling between parents and their children, between husband and wife and so forth, all of these have become commodities. Because, the only *raison d'être* of the bourgeoisie is money; the ideal of the bourgeoisie is profit. To the bourgeoisie, the most sacred and noble word is profit; profit possesses miraculous powers. In fact, a British commentator once observed: "As nature abhors a vacuum, so, too, does the capitalist abhor a situation in which he earns little or no profit; for a modest profit, the capitalist will become bold, for a guaranteed 10 percent profit, he might use all of his capital; for a guaranteed 20 percent profit, he becomes more adventurous; for 50 percent, he becomes so bold as to not know what fear is; for 100 percent, he will trample upon every law of man; and for 300 percent, there is no crime that he would not commit, even if it meant that he might be hanged." (1)

Persons in the exploiting classes are incapable of feeling genuine love. They exploit others but can still say that they love that person. Instead of working, they live off the sweat of others but can still say that they possess genuine feelings of love. To know the feeling of genuine love, one must work, must abolish oppression and exploitation. To know genuine love, it is necessary to abolish the classes and build a classless society.

In the true meaning of the term, love is in opposition to the ideology of the exploiting classes. It can only exist among the working people and can only become an emotional need of the working people. In the old societies, the working people always had to struggle with material as well as spiritual adversities caused by the ruling exploiting classes. Therefore, that which they needed, that which supported them the most was the feeling of love. This love was manifested in family, hamlet and village relations, in mutual help and support among persons trapped in the same situation. In folk literature as well as written literature, there are countless beautiful words such as "crepe covers the vanity, the persons of a country must love one another," "loving one another means sharing food and shelter" and so forth denoting this love of the working people.

However, due to their limited world view, the feeling of love of the working people under the old system was restricted and limited in one area or another; in particular, it was influenced by feudal thinking, was not of a profound class nature and had not developed into immense, noble revolutionary feelings.

Under our system, love has become a part, a need of social life and, it can be said, become a moving force in society.

The love that we are building is love based on the viewpoint of the working class, which has inherited, developed upon and raised to a new and higher level all of the very best and most beautiful that is in our nation's tradition of unity, love and mutual help.

The love that we are building is a love that is closely linked to struggle. On the one hand, we have been molding and cultivating beautiful feelings and noble actions consistent with the requirements of building the new lifestyle and molding the new, socialist man; on the other hand, we have been taking steps to overcome the limitations and negative aspects of the old feeling of love and regularly struggle against conceptions, attitudes and actions that are contrary to socialist ethics, have a negative influence upon the development of the revolution and harm the effort to mold a feeling of genuine love, harm the beautiful relations between one person and another.

The feeling of love that we are molding at this time originates in the beautiful nature of our society, in the revolutionary ethics of the working class that is leading the government, in the essential demands of the system of socialist collective ownership. Without true love among persons, there can be no system of socialist collective ownership and, consequently, we cannot successfully build socialism.

Building a widespread spirit of love throughout our society is the common responsibility of our party, our state and all the people. Very many persons among us have the correct viewpoint concerning love and have displayed a high spirit of responsibility in molding a spirit of love. However, it is regrettable that there are also persons who do not have the correct viewpoint concerning love, that the attitude and actions of some persons have destroyed love and that some persons feel love but "do not know how to love."

There are some who maintain that, in the past, under the extremely difficult conditions of the revolutionary struggle, people showed more sentiment, more devotion, more love toward one another and helped one another more. Today, under the new circumstances, everyone has his own private family life, cadres have different systems of remuneration and different benefits, consequently, the love among them is not as deep or ardent as it once was. According to these persons, true love only exists today between parents and children, between husband and wife, among brothers and sisters and so forth, but the concept of love no longer exists on a society-wide scale.

This viewpoint is totally incorrect. Today, under the new conditions that exist, it is true that each person has his own circumstances, his own life; partially because of these new circumstances, the revolutionary sentiments, the feeling of love for others, the willingness to help others and the unselfishness of some persons have declined and cooled. These persons only know how to take care of themselves and their families, show no concern for others and they never derive personal happiness from the wholesome, good deeds of others. However, this cannot tarnish the beautiful nature of our system nor can it be taken as a basis for stating that love is not as deep or ardent today as it once was.

We all know that the socialist revolution is the creative undertaking of millions of working persons. Without deep, noble love for the people and the

country, how could we have triumphed over enemy attacks and natural disasters, overcome poverty and backwardness and gradually moved the country forward? And, it was also because of this deep and extremely noble love that countless persons gave their lives in the fight against the imperialists and the Chinese expansionist aggressors. Millions of families have harvested every available potato and grain of rice to fulfill their obligations to the state in the desire to help protect the beloved fatherland. In combat as well as everyday life, the cadres and soldiers of our army, be they in the rear area or on the frontlines, along the border or on the remote islands, have lived together as brothers, they share their food and clothing and are ready to sacrifice their lives to protect the other members of their units. Tens of thousands of teachers and physicians have volunteered to temporarily leave their comfortable lives with their families and go to the mountains to serve the compatriots of the ethnic minorities, etc. It is possible to relate countless other beautiful examples. What do all of these facts show if not love--an immense, extremely beautiful love, a love that has been broadened from love of the people and the country to noble international feelings, not a narrow, selfish love. Those who say that love no longer exists today or that it has been narrowed in scope either do not have a correct understanding of or are distorting the nature of our society, and this goes against a very beautiful tradition of our nation, against the noble sentiments of countless compatriots and comrades, sentiments expressed in the countless good deeds performed each day in our country.

We must also make mention of those persons whose attitude and actions are totally contrary to the ethical tradition of the nation, to the ethics of socialism and have harmed the effort to mold and protect a feeling of love. These are persons who generally lack an attitude of good will, lack a constructive spirit and are irresponsible in their dealings with everyone. They are envious of the progress and happiness of others. They are displeased when they see that their friends are better at something than they are. They no longer have any generosity or unselfishness within them. They often engage in activities to establish factions, to suppress or intimidate others, to violate the right of collective ownership of the working people.

There are also persons who feel love but "do not know how to love." Some cadres, when seeing a comrade or friend of theirs take something from an agency or enterprise, do not struggle against him because they "love" this person who finds himself in difficult circumstances and, if they criticize or denounce him, he will be disciplined and will lose his job.(!)

There are also families who, because they "love" their children, allow them to have their own way, to do anything they want to do, to live as they please, etc.

These views of love are also incorrect because these are mistaken kinds of love, are contrary to our socialist ethics. Life has often shown us the tragic consequences of these kinds of love.

President Ho often taught us: to mold a feeling of love among all the people, among all of society, it is first of all necessary to build unity and love within the party. Unity and love are a very precious tradition of our party and people. The source of our party's strength is the unity, oneness of mind and love among party members based on Marxism-Leninism and the organizational principles of the party. Therefore, cadres and party members must always keep the unity and oneness of mind of the party as the "apple of their eye" and must truly love one another with pure revolutionary feelings.

An important measure in building love within the party is to practice strict self-criticism and criticism. Practicing strict self-criticism and criticism means that we eliminate both of the following problems: first, the problem of defending and tolerating the shortcomings and bad habits of one another, of being unconcerned or irresponsible in the face of the shortcomings of one's comrades; secondly, the problem of digging up the past and using criticism to attack, belittle and dress down one another and quickly reaching conclusions concerning one crime or another. Self-criticism and criticism must be used to mold genuine, pure revolutionary sentiments for one another, mold unity and sincere love so that every party member, in addition to his organizational and work relationships, also truly feels that he is living amidst the care and love of the party.

FOOTNOTES

1. K. Marx: "Capital," Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1960, Book I, Volume 3, p 285.

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BOOK REVIEW: ON MR. NIXON'S COMMENTS

Hanoi PAP CHI CONG SAN [COMMUNIST REVIEW] in Vietnamese No 8, Aug 80
pp 65-70

[Article by Phan Lang]

[Text] Recently, in several consecutive editions of the French Newspaper PARIS MATCH, key excerpts from a book by an author who is well known to many persons in the world, especially we Vietnamese, a book entitled "The Real War," were printed. The author is Richard Nixon, a person whom the U.S. press has given the titles the "B-52 president," the "Watergate president" and many other not very attractive titles.

By means of true "Nixonian" prose (the author is a person who, in the words of the introduction by PARIS MATCH, is an "unethical and very aggressive man usually devoid of feeling"), the 37th American president, after putting U.S. imperialism on the operating table, performs surgery on this patient and prescribes a prescription.

Nixon maintains that if it takes his prescription, one which has violent side effects, U.S. imperialism, which is now old and very ill and is still "licking the wounds of the Vietnam war," will become well, will regain the vigor of its youth.

Mr. Nixon's surgery itself is in need of surgery; his comments are deserving of comment.

Nixon begins his book by taking inventory, by recounting in rather deep detail the "losses" of U.S. imperialism, of imperialism in general, over the past decade. Below is the picture drawn by Nixon:

--"Since 1974-Nixon writes-nearly 100 million people have, in the space of 5 years, fallen under communist influence. Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Yemen, Mozambique, Laos, Kampuchea and South Vietnam have come under communist domination."

--The anti-American movement is boiling everywhere. "Iran, which has become engulfed in bloody strife, will sooner or later be turned from a fortress of the western forces into a boiling cauldron of resistance against the West."

--"The West has passed a turning point into a period of sharp crisis, in which its survival in the 21st Century is threatened."

--At present, 21 countries are lying within the orb of communism. In terms of territory, the communist superpowers are on the march throughout the world and the West is withdrawing."

--"With its rapid advances in missile and nuclear technology, with the rapid development of new weapons systems, the Soviet Union is rapidly closing the gap in all fields and increasing their superiority at places where they have overtaken the United States. The Soviet Union has a very large advantage in conventional forces on the ground."

From this review of the situation, Nixon concludes: "In the 1980's, for the first time in modern history, the United States will have to face two realities. First, if a war breaks out, the United States faces the danger of losing the war. Secondly, the United States might lose without ever going to war. The second prospect is more possible than the first and is worthy of concern."

According to persons who knew Nixon throughout his "one-third century of political activity" and knew him (his talents as well as his character) when he was in the position of commander-in-chief directing the war of aggression in Vietnam, the excerpts presented above are the most clearly written lines in this entire book, which reeks of gangsterism, and reflect the truth to some extent.

For many years, communists have been making the following general observations concerning the present day world situation:

--The three revolutionary currents are on the offensive and winning increasingly large victories on practically all continents.

--The system of socialist countries, of which the Soviet Union is the citadel, has become the factor determining the direction of the development of mankind and is exerting a tremendous influence everywhere on our planet.

--Imperialism, led by U.S. imperialism, has reached a downward turning point and fallen into a third general crisis, the noteworthy characteristic of which is, in contrast to the two previous general crises, this general crisis is occurring in the absence of a world war.

Throughout the more than 10 chapters of his book, Nixon frequently "denounces" communists as "cheaters and liars"; however, in the end, the author could say

nothing else compared to what communists themselves have said. Mr. Nixon's "insight" can only be logically explained as follows: The picture of the present day world that Mr. Nixon has partially revealed has actually become a very evident fact!

Of course, putting some of the truth in black and white was not Nixon's ultimate objective. It is only necessary to read a few lines to see the true reason why the author decided to put his efforts into writing "The Real War."

Having assigned himself the mission of healing and saving the United States, Nixon, after examining the symptoms, turns to diagnosis. This is one of the most vivid expressions of the "unprincipled" viewpoint of the "hawk" Nixon--a viewpoint which is actually the bellicose, reactionary and radical-right viewpoint of the U.S. military-industrial groups, the powers that found the right man for the job and appointed Nixon to be their representative, their spokesman.

Nixon used much paper and ink, expended much effort on plagiarism, quotes the speeches of famous capitalists and presents a good many "facts" and "reasons"; and, like the western saying "all roads lead to Rome," all of his "reasons" are designed to lead the reader to the conclusion that the United States was defeated because it lacked the will, and this was the only reason.

As the "theoretical basis" of his argument, Mr. Nixon cites a formula that defines the "power of a nation," a formula in which he is clearly very confident and which was developed by an old acquaintance of his, Sir Robert Thompson, a British expert in counter-insurgency warfare (and another figure who is well known to the Vietnamese).

This formula, which is presented in the form of a mathematical equation, is as follows:

the power of a country = (manpower + materiel) x willpower.

The author of "The Real War" explains: "When examining Thompson's equation, we can immediately see that if willpower is 0, the value of the entire equation is 0."

Then, Mr. Nixon states: "Even the Soviet Union knows that it cannot overtake the United States' economy (that is, manpower and materiel). But they have discovered in the will of the United States a weakness that poses the danger of reducing the impact of the other cards of the United States... The strategy of the Soviet Union is this: first, they will cause the United States to lose its morale so that they can then destroy the opposition. The Soviet Union wants World War III to end not with a brilliant stroke, but

whimper by the United States"(that is, by first reducing the will of the United States to 0 so that the equation on the power of the United States would equal 0).

Mr. Nixon reproached a number of persons in the White House for "saying that they were leading the United States but actually being the persons organizing withdrawals," for not recognizing the "sinister scheme" of the Soviet Union, for "naively" and "stupidly" thinking that the "United States can maintain freedom by expressing good will" and for "hoping that if the United States limits its equipment and weapons, the other countries will follow" and, as a result, "causing the Soviet Union to think that the United States is weak, that the United States is wavering and terrified."

The "loss" by the United States of its "will to fight"--Mr. Nixon's analysis continues--has not only occurred within ruling circles, but even among the masses, especially among the stratum of intellectuals who not only opposed the war and oppose the arms race, but also provide free propaganda for communism.

Under the subtitle "It Was the Very Best of the United States That Lost Vietnam," Mr. Nixon belittles, without any remorse, the colleges, newspapers, and television networks of the United States: "Harvard University, which is a very good symbol of the majority of the intellectuals and American culture, is a slave to 'trends,' allows itself to be deceived, is self-satisfied, is blind in one eye and has a tendency to be extremely simple and naive when faced with a global conflict." As regards the U.S. television networks, "they have painted a romantic picture of revolutionaries and, as a result, greatly increased the possibility of victory for the revolutionary wars supported by the Soviet Union just as the placing of a romantic halo over Fidel Castro by the NEW YORK TIMES 20 years ago played the decisive role in legitimatizing the Cuban revolution, which was precisely the condition needed by Castro to win victory."

Very briefly stated, the argument of the author of "The Real war" is: in view of its superiority in manpower and materiel, historical developments of the entire past decade could have been totally different if the "will" of the United States did not equal 0; the imperialist United States sits with a halo above its head as if it never had to lower its flag and flee by helicopter as it did in Vietnam and many other places in the world!

Mr. Nixon's reasons are not accepted even by the most gullible of Americans. Mr. Nixon was a person who not only possessed excessive will (so much will that a French general, a former paratroop officer at Dien Bien Phu, recently called him a "pirate general"), but also had more power than any other American to fulfill this will. During his years as U.S. president, he "dared to take calculated risks and do things that no other president had done (widen the war to Kampuchea, use B-52's to directly attack population

centers and the capital of Vietnam and blockade the seaports of Vietnam with total disregard for the denunciation of these acts by all mankind). Yet, it was under Nixon's fully determined guidance of the war that one-half million U.S. troops hurriedly withdrew and placed the heavy burden of the war on the puppet army in a vain attempt to save face and not be killed along with them--is this not the undeniable truth?

Of course, there were things that Mr. Nixon did not do, not because his hands were tied by the "naive" and "stupid" thinking of those around him, but because he could not do them. He was "limited," could not bring equipment up to date and had to accept the fact that "the United States Navy is a generation behind in warships" because the cost of the Vietnam war was too high and had absorbed a very large portion of the U.S. defense budget.

Mr. Nixon considered himself to be an expert, to be standing upon a teacher's podium and instructing the entire United States; however, there was extreme skepticism over his "expertise."

The world situation today is the inevitable result of the struggle between the two opposing social systems, the result of events consistent with laws, with the trend of development of the antagonisms of our times. This struggle is a comprehensive challenge to both sides in every area; the nature of the social system, economic and military might, the human factor, strategy, tactics.

Mr. Nixon, refusing to engage in serious, comprehensive analysis and comparison, tries to present the defeats of imperialism during the past decade as defeats of an accidental nature (meaning that if the United States had only corrected its lack of "will," the situation would have been completely different). But how can these defeats be explained as "accidental" when the victories of the three revolutionary currents in the world have not been isolated cases that have, as Nixon himself has admitted, been large-scale, been part of a trend of history that cannot be stopped?

Mr. Nixon only shines his light on the factor of "will" and refuses to perform true surgery. This is easily understood. Because, by doing this, he is not forced to reach the conclusion that socialism and communism have won victory and are continuing to win victory.

No one can deny that in the social struggle the will of man plays a very important role. In the social struggle, in contrast to the realm of nature, laws can only have an effect and become reality through the activities of man. However, will is not a product of nothingness, not something that can be conveniently manufactured. On the other hand, will does not always play a positive role; it is not always a "plus"(+). When the activities of man are consistent with the objective laws of nature, of history, will multiplies the strength of man into a great strength. But when the opposite is true--more correctly stated, when this will is an eccentric will--and the desire of

man becomes increasingly large, the consequences of it become increasingly disastrous.

Long ago, Marx said that the greatest tragedy of mankind is the tragedy that results when the subjective actions of man are not consistent with objective conditions. One of the reasons why Cervantes' work became immortal is that this Spanish author knew how to exploit this antagonism. Don Quixote would not have suffered such a beating and been so disgraced when he went into battle with the windmill if the "will" of this knight equalled a small number.

It is clear that when the American people went into the streets to protest the war of aggression in Vietnam and the arms race, they displayed 10,000 times more wisdom than Mr. Nixon and the arms dealers behind him.

However, we also should not raise the matter of arguing theory with Mr. Nixon. Because, this was not the task he set for himself when writing "The Real War."

What were the true objectives of the 37th U.S. president?

First, let us see what Mr. Nixon prescribes for the United States upon the completion of his diagnosis.

His entire prescription reads as follows:

"The United States is a sleeping giant, it has come time to awaken this giant, to set goals for him, to restore his health and revive his will."

Mr. Nixon proposes many measures for doing this, from the "10 principles for using the White House" and "increasing the power of the U.S. president" to the "U.S. president must be a good card player." However, these measures are nothing more than empty talk and the measure that "the United States must carry a very big stick" has the value of a corn cob. Mr. Nixon declares: "Determined steps must be taken to reverse the present trend which is unfavorable to the United States. It will be a long time before the 5 percent increase in the military budget announced by President Carter will be considered sufficient. In the next 5 years, it must be increased much more, by 20 percent, that is, by roughly 30 billion dollars calculated at the 1980 value of the dollar." Thus, at first glance, Mr. Nixon's prescription seems to be a lengthy one; actually, however, it comes down to but one ingredient: bombs! More bombs! Many more bombs!

The increase in the military budget must not only be "strong," but must also be immediate because--Nixon continues--"the history of wars that have been lost can be summarized in two words: too late!"

To convince the United States to accept the prescription of the arms dealers, whose profit rate and capital depend upon the degree and rate of the arms race, Mr. Nixon makes very obvious use of provocative methods. He looks for every possible way to exploit the big-country chauvinist mentality among some Americans through arguments which he says are the "judgement of history."

Nixon writes: "The characteristic of advanced civilizations is that as their wealth increases and their life becomes richer, these civilizations weaken and can easily be more seriously hurt. Throughout history, civilizations controlling their age have been destroyed by barbarians because they became aware of the danger facing them too late and reacted in a resistance strategy too slowly."

Mr. Nixon also looks for every way to shock the United States and tells the American people that the United States not only faces the threat of a war, but actually--according to Nixon's new definition of war--World War III has already broken out, it "broke out immediately after the end of World War II" and "the United States and the West are losing the fight in peace time."

Mr. Nixon also resorts to a very familiar trick used by colonial officials: directly attacking the colonial sentiments of the domestic ruling and business strata. He describes, in a truly "thirsty" fashion, the sources of natural resources in the world that the U.S. must and can control if it has strong military forces, especially the two major sources of mankind, the Persian Gulf and the mineral deposits in central and southern Africa.

It is clear that through his book "the Real War," Mr. Nixon does not intend to serve as a theorist, but only to serve as a leading figure in the psychological war with a view toward arousing improper and unwholesome sentiments within the United States in order to find a social base for an adventurous, bellicose and very dangerous line toward which U.S. arms dealers are pushing the United States.

There are some books that are quite incomplete but which are good books because of what lies behind them. Such is the case with Mr. Nixon's book.

Man created the "shield" because of the emergence of the "lance." Mr. Nixon had to put his energies into writing a thick book propagandizing war because, in the United States and the rest of the western world, there has been and is a developing anti-war and anti-arms race movement ever since the Carter administration decided to pursue a "rigid foreign policy," thereby creating a tense situation throughout the world. The bellicose ruling groups in the United States must pull the political corpse of Nixon from its grave and use it to fight public opinion, thereby showing that the warmongering clique is weak, not strong, that it is confused.

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