

AGAINST MAOISM

**DOSSIER**

BEIJING'S EXPANSIONISM  
AND  
HEGEMONISM

Published by  
VIETNAM COURIER  
Hanoi - 1980

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## APPENDIX

Abridged version of the White Book of the SRV  
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EDITOR'S NOTE

*Maoism, which has wrought great havoc to China, is now a great danger to world peace and the independence of other peoples, Southeast Asian peoples in particular, especially when Beijing is entering into overt collusion with Washington and other imperialist forces.*

*We begin our dossier "Against Maoism" with this book on Chinese hegemonism and expansionism. It includes two articles published in Tap Chi Cong San (Communist Review), the theoretical and political organ of the Communist Party of Vietnam, and as an appendix, an abridged version of the White Book published by the SRV Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 1979 entitled "The Truth about Vietnam - China Relations over the Last Thirty Years".*

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### 1. Origin and nature of Maoism

Maoism is not a perfect, consistent and logical system. It is rather a mixture of quite different and often conflicting concepts and ideas. In that mixture, *petty-bourgeois and bourgeois nationalism which has developed from Great-Han chauvinism into great-nation expansionism and great-power hegemonism*, constitutes the essence, the nucleus. Around this all the borrowed elements are mixed and associated; and the skin is painted with Marxist-Leninist phrases.

At a given period, Maoism cannot help having certain deformations, as changing circumstances force it to adapt itself. And because of its pragmatic character it can easily adapt itself to circumstances. However, behind those deformations, the core has not changed — that is great-power chauvinism, expansionism and hegemonism. As for the Maoists, they are not homogeneous. They split into several factions with more or less different views. There are even differences of

views, even contradictions between those factions and Mao himself, in one respect or another. Despite that fact, the *common ground* on which they are standing is great-power nationalism, expansionism and hegemonism. That common, unified basis has its focus in Mao. It uses Mao as a symbol. That is why despite the sharp and antagonistic contradictions which sometimes render them incompatible, they all hold high Mao's banner to accuse their opponents of being anti-Maoists.

After overthrowing the "gang of four" the present Beijing leadership declared themselves the only people loyal to Mao. In the resolutions of the XIth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (August 1977) and the National People's Congress, 5th legislature (February 1978), the present Beijing leadership affirmed that Maoism is still the political-ideological foundation of the Chinese Party and State. In the meantime, under the pressure of the situation, they had to repair the conspicuous blunders of practices under Mao and "the gang of four", and start an apparently

"de-Mao-ization" process in home policy. So, it is true that they are now holding high Mao's banner to eliminate Maoism? At first, some people thought that the Hua-Deng clique were gradually coming round to the right path, that the logic of home policy would eventually force them to put right their foreign policy too. But that prediction was soon shown to be unfounded.

Of course, we do not rule out the possibility of "de-Mao-ization" in certain aspects and to a certain degree. A series of events which have been going on in Beijing recently have led to that opinion. The "Practice is the only criterion of truth" debate; the acquittal of many people who were unjustly sanctioned under the "great proletarian cultural revolution"; the rehabilitation and admission into the Political Bureau and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party of a number of former personalities; the reversal of the assessment of the Tien An Men incident; the appearance of a number of articles critical of Mao in the wave of wallpapers, etc. Isn't it

true that all those events are gradually knocking down the idol of Mao Zedong?

Yes, the logic of the scramble between the present factions in Beijing inevitably affects Mao himself, even Mao's teachings. But, those questioned teachings of Mao are after all only of secondary importance. And basically the present Beijing leadership remains Maoist, for it still stands on the foundations of Maoism, that is great-power chauvinism, expansionism and hegemonism.

In fact, Deng Xiaoping, twice a victim of Mao himself, nurtures a deep hatred for Mao. Yet, ideologically, he remains a Maoist, because together with other people he is the guiding spirit of the "four modernizations" aimed at creating a material basis for carrying out his ambitions of great-power chauvinism and expansionism. Despite his change of heart—today he may praise Mao to the skies because he cannot do otherwise and because he considers it beneficial to do so, and tomorrow he may throw away that torn umbrella into the dustbin of history—Deng Xiaoping, the typical

pragmatist, is objectively Maoist, because he is standing on the foundation of Maoism.

Lenin said: "Naturally, we must take as our basis, not individuals or groups, but a class analysis of the content of social trends, and an ideological and political examination of their essential and main principles" (1).

*So far as the assimilation of the great-power chauvinistic and hegemonistic goals — which are the nucleus of Maoism — are concerned, we can say that the present Beijing leadership is more Maoist than Mao.*

Maoism is not a one-off phenomenon or accident. *Its appearance and evolution are linked with the Chinese social and historical conditions in the first half of the 20th century, with the social structure and the degree of development of China, with the Chinese ideological and psycho-social traditions.*

The prime condition for the emergence and existence of Maoism is the economic, social and political backwardness of Chinese society, the obscurantism, darkness, superstition and

feebleness left by the feudal autocratic regime in the Chinese masses of people. We know that the history of China is the history of millennia feudalism. On the basis of a backward agricultural economy and a patriarchal system, it developed into a type of Oriental despotism. At the end of the 19th century, capitalist relations emerged in China. These relations accelerated the decay of feudalism, but the backward and patriarchal agricultural production remained the main production. Corresponding to the backward economy was an under-developed social structure, and inadequate class differentiation. In 1949, out of a population of 450 million there were only 2.5 — 3 million factory workers. The petty-bourgeoisie was overwhelmingly predominant, especially the peasants who accounted for 90% of the population. Small traders, artisans, and urban lumpen proletariat accounted for a rather high percentage. The Chinese bourgeoisie had scarcely had a chance to grow up during the time of penetration of foreign capital, and the bourgeois revolution which broke out in 1911 was

too weak, and was unable to destroy completely the solid citadel of feudalism. That is why after the revolution, Yuan Shikai proclaimed himself Emperor and the warlords fiefs mushroomed in the immense mainland China.

The backward socio-economic structure checked the development of the working class, the growth of its class conscience and its political independence. Despite its stubborn struggles in the '20s, despite the fact that it had already started to co-ordinate its actions with Marxism-Leninism which had come to China in the wake of the Russian October Revolution, the Chinese working class had just begun its history. The working-class movement was not mature enough to hold high the banner of national independence, whereas the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois movement had been emerging since the beginning of the century and was already very strong. Voytinsky, the Comintern representative, wrote in 1923: "In the present situation of China, the working class movement is far from becoming a factor strong enough to attract the

national movement in its struggle against imperialism".

Under those circumstances the Chinese Communist Party came into being. It was not fully prepared ideologically and therefore was not strong enough to fight and defeat the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalist viewpoints. It had no definite political programme. Mao Zedong admitted: "At the time my thinking was a strange mixture of liberalism, democratic reformism and utopian socialism!" He added: "Then... I did not know anything about Marx and did not know about Lenin either. Therefore, I had no idea about organizing a Communist Party. I believed in Confucian idealism and Kantian dualism." (Talk with representatives of the Japanese Social Party in Beijing, 1964).

However, the Chinese Communist Party had at that time great advantages offered by historical necessity. These advantages created the objective conditions for the Chinese revolution to reach an epoch-making turning point—to

