

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

J.V. STALIN

**LETTERS TO THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA**

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J.V. STALIN

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By Way of an Introduction — The End of the Titoites in Our Country

(Excerpt from Comrade Enver Hoxha's «The Titoites»)

The immediate and ignominious departure of Tito's emissaries from our country after the arrival of the first letter of the Bolshevik Party, amongst other things, brought two important consequences for our Party. The first consequence was positive: when they saw that their masters had left them in the lurch and at the mercy of the development of events, Koçi Xoxe¹ and his Titoite clan (up till yesterday predominant in the Bureau) immediately turned their coats and became «pro-Soviet», expressed unanimous «solidarity» with the letter of the CC of the CPSU(b) to the Titoite leadership! This was in our interest, because the majority of the leadership of the Party and the Party itself (when it was told) would truly express wholehearted solidarity with Stalin's first letter (and with the others), but it would not be good at all for our Party if even three or four voices were to be raised against this general stand.

However, linked with this first positive consequence, the second consequence was to come, and this

¹ Titoite agent who attempted to overthrow the Marxist-Leninist line of the Communist Party of Albania, confessed his crimes on trial in 1949. See footnote on p. 34.

would be extremely negative for our work: being obliged to express «solidarity» with the letters of the CC of the CPSU(b) and with all the Marxist-Leninist analyses which we would develop in the light of our events, Koçi Xoxe and his gang would try to camouflage themselves, to cover their tracks, to present themselves, at the most, as «mistaken», as «influenced», and not as they were in fact — recruited agents of Titoite revisionism.

In no way, however, could we allow the evil to go on existing in the sound body of our Party. It had to be uncovered, eradicated and rejected, not only because of the great damage it had brought us in the past, but also for the sake of the future. If we were to show ourselves liberal, blind, or soft with it, then in the future, as soon as the conditions were created, this evil would try to regain its lost positions and to overthrow the Party.

Thus, began that long process of work, profound analyses and discussion which took up the whole period from April-May to November of 1948. During this period an intensive struggle was waged, meetings and debates went on ceaselessly for whole days and nights. Frequently, when it was obvious that the situation was becoming clear, suddenly new facts and arguments would be brought out, which impelled us to begin the analyses all over again. It was not easy to unmask the enemies in the leadership of the Party all at once. They had been through the Tito-Ranković

«school» and their direct participation in the plot had made them masters of duplicity and deception.

The arch-agent, Koçi Xoxe, in particular, would try to twist and manoeuvre in a thousand and one ways to save, if not all, at least as much as he could, of his black past.

When he read the letters, after a phase in which he was dumbfounded and hesitant, when he realized that matters would be gone into deeply, he changed his tactic, began to be «astonished» and «angry» about the things which Tito and company had put upon us!

He had become like a wild beast stunned after the first and sudden blow which his masters had received, although he himself had still not been attacked, and indeed at first we never even said a word to him about his part in the Mafia. The great shock which he suffered at those moments, his stunned confusion, were further great proof for us that we had to do with one of the most dangerous enemies. Precisely when he expected to seize complete power, when he thought that no serious obstacle was left in front of him, that is, precisely at the moment when he expected to receive the crown, like a bolt from the blue he received a sudden and devastating blow which finally swept from his hands everything he had dreamed of and prepared for openly and secretly for a long time. On such occasions enemy elements and conspirators at first fall into a real state of shock and paralysis, while little by little they recover themselves and

do everything in their power to clutch at a straw, to save themselves from drowning in the filthy mire in which they have immersed themselves.

This was occurring also with Xoxe, the «hero» of the 8th Plenum, who changed his tactic and expressed «solidarity» with the letters of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, but who tried to manoeuvre, suggested that we should limit ourselves simply to solidarity with them and unanimously «approve» only what was said in the letters. However, I did not allow him to deceive himself with vain hopes.

«Stalin's letters are a great help to us,» I told him quietly but sternly. «We shall study the problems which are raised there, but the main thing that we must do is to examine them in the light of our own affairs, our relations, our wounds in the light of these problems, because the wounds from the blows which Tito and company dealt us are still open on our backs. Don't forget what sort of situation we were in,» I stressed deliberately. «If any minor opposition were raised to some Yugoslav technician, let alone describing them as enemies, immediately someone in the Bureau would say, 'We must look into this question because it is anti-Yugoslavism.' Is that not so?!»

«Yes, yes, that's how far things had gone!» he said in a meek voice and I saw the expression of his face change.

«All these things that have occurred during these last 4 or 5 years in our Party and in the leadership,» I

told him, «show that we have had not only pressure and blackmail from the Tito clique, but also responses, indeed strong responses to that blackmail.»

«I don't say, I don't say that we have not opposed them when the occasion arose, but we have not described them as enemies and traitors as they are. The letters of the Bolshevik Party... opened our eyes..., we must look into the problem, must look into it more extensively,» he said, «because there are things which will be of great value to the Bolshevik Party and the Cominform!»

«Yes!» I cut him short. «They certainly will be of value to them, but in the first place they will be of value to us, to our Party, to the road we have followed, to the clashes we have had, to the good things and the mistakes, to the past, the present and the future. And we have many things to re-examine, to say, to analyse and decide. Everything which has been violated and distorted by the Yugoslavs, under the influence of the Yugoslavs or in agreement with the Yugoslavs, must be restored to order, the causes must be found, the roots distinguished and the evil must be forcibly eradicated and rejected with determination.

«One thing is more than clear,» I pointed out to him looking at him hard, «they have not worked alone in their anti-Albanian operation. Long ago they created their bases of secret supporters within our ranks. We must bear this well in mind in the analyses we are going to begin.»

He scowled and began to stutter.

«That is right, mistakes have been made,» he said after a moment in which he pulled himself together. «We must look into these matters thoroughly, thoroughly,» he continued with his eyes on the ground. «We have been infected a bit with this evil, but... from the great trust we had in those dogs. We trusted them as if there were no one like them. Here we made a mistake, and I agree that we must look into it, as a party and as a leadership.»

«We are going to look into it,» I told him, «in the Party and in the leadership, but never confusing the Party or even the whole of its leadership with what you call the infection! The infected must come out and tell us why. It is they who must render account and if they don't we shall demand it from them in the way the accounting is required. We don't confuse either the Party or its leadership with them.»

These «free» conversations with Koçi Xoxe had great importance and I conducted them cautiously, because we were on the eve of the opening of the discussion and analyses in the Political Bureau. As I have described above, the Political Bureau, especially after the 8th Plenum, virtually did not function as a top organ of the Party. The Koçi Xoxe wing predominated in it, and this might now constitute a danger of confusion or wrong orientation, especially at the first moments. Hence, it had importance that Xoxe himself should come out «in solidarity» with the letters of the

Bolshevik Party, irrespective of the sinister aims which would be hidden behind this «solidarity». Pandi Kristo, Kristo Themelko, Nesti Kerenxhi and so on would follow their master and then the tangle would begin to come apart itself. Even those who saw the danger to themselves in this new turn of events could not come out against the general opinion. They were bound to express their solidarity with the letters, as they did, would twist and turn to get off as lightly as possible and to throw the main blame on the others, but in the end, on the basis of all the rules of democracy re-established in the Party, their dirty linen would be uncovered, bit by bit.

Right from the opening of the analyses in the Bureau, I considered it necessary that the spirit of the discussion should be orientated in the most correct way.

«Our Party,» I said to the comrades, «is one of those parties which can and must testify strongly and with many arguments to the existence of grave deviations and mistakes in the CC of the CP of Yugoslavia. I personally, and I believe you, too, fell deeply that the principled criticisms of the Bolshevik Party are correct and, although those criticisms are not aimed at us, I think that we must thoroughly examine and analyse our work to its foundations. We must be conscious that the Trotskyites of Belgrade, headed by Tito, have tried to peddle to us many of those mistakes and distortions that the Bolshevik Party pointed out and to impose them on us. The fact is that the Yugoslav lead-

ership has tried to introduce military methods in the leadership of our Party, to split the leadership, to peddle to us forms of opportunism which were intended to weaken the Party and our People's Republic, to peddle to us organizational forms which suppressed the internal democracy of the Party, which strangled criticism and self-criticism, etc. It went as far as plans for military occupation, that is, to impose itself on us by military force. True, these anti-Marxist views have not become established in our Party but some of them, especially of an organizational character, have been imposed on us to one extent or another. We have no reason to hide these things, but on the contrary, must acknowledge them honestly, we must determine precisely to what extent they have penetrated and struggle to eliminate them immediately, along with the external factors and, especially the internal factors, which have made their penetration possible.

«This,» I told the comrades, «must be one of the directions of our analyses. However,» I continued, «we cannot allow matters to rest at that. The harmful and anti-Albanian activity of the Yugoslav leaders has been exercised against us for years on end in other fields and with numerous anti-Marxist forms and methods which, understandably, the Bolshevik Party perhaps has not known and does not know. In our analyses we must weigh everything up on the balance of Marxism-Leninism. The time has come for the truth to be brought to light, for many things to be re-examined

from the beginning and for justice to be restored wherever it has been violated. We have no reason to be afraid of such analyses, no reason to be afraid of criticism or self-criticism. From all these things the Party will emerge a thousand times stronger and healthier and our sacred cause will be carried forward with greater confidence.»

The meetings of the Political Bureau devoted to this problem in April, May and June 1948 were developed in this way, in the spirit of solidarity with the letters of the Bolshevik Party, as well as by bringing out numerous facts and arguments about the anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian activities of the chiefs in Belgrade against our Party and country.

As a result of this, after the 9th Plenum of the CC of the CPA when we openly denounced the anti-Marxist leadership of Belgrade, we were completely prepared to reply at the proper time and with the proper force to the campaign of slanders and denigration which Tito and company launched against us.

But this first phase of our general attack against Titoite revisionism prepared all the conditions to advance further in the final exposure and unmasking of the agents of Belgrade within our own ranks.

As I said, after they expressed their «solidarity» en bloc with the letters of the Bolshevik Party, willy-nilly, these agents were involved in all the analyses which we made. The total defeat they had suffered, their fear of the disclosure of the truth which they were hiding,

their efforts to cover their tracks, automatically made Koçi Xoxe and company perform a «service» to our future, right from the first phase of the attack: they brought to light many facts and arguments which provided even better confirmation of the interference and hostile pressure of Tito and his emissaries against our Party and country. These facts were extremely grave and we could not have known all of them earlier, because only the agents of Belgrade had knowledge of them. Now, in the context of «reflecting», of «assessing the past in a new light», they tried, sometimes for purposes of skilful camouflage and sometimes purely from their confusion and fear, to make themselves out «anti-Titoites»! To hear them competing to «uncover the background of Titoism» you would think that you could hardly find «more devoted anti-Titoites»! What a pity that such men «remembered» so late «to look straight at the truth»!

They might well have been branded with their true names right at the start, but in the first phase it was better to let them express themselves freely! In this phase let them spread the grave burden of responsibility for the unpardonable mistakes and distortions over «everyone»! For the time being, the main thing was to bring out clearly this responsibility, to present to everybody the whole baggage of the Titoite filth, to convince everybody with the maximum number of arguments about what a dangerous and menacing phase the hostile activity of the chiefs of Belgrade against us

had reached!

Precisely this wise and cautious work which we did in the Political Bureau during April, May and June brought about that the 9th Plenum of the CC of the CPA took place in a lofty party spirit and the unity of thought and deed of our whole Central Committee was outstanding there. This same spirit characterized the whole Party and people when they were informed about the denunciation and unmasking of the chiefs in Belgrade through the communiqué of the CC of the CPA on July 1, 1948.

Our struggle against Titoism, against its pressure and influence within our ranks, advanced to a new phase. The mass of facts which were pouring in from all sides still had its own importance, but the main thing now was that the conspiratorial elements should be finally uncovered and exposed and should render account for the crimes they had committed against the Party and the people.

In July I presented the problem quite openly:

«The immediate solidarity and enthusiasm with which the Party and our people have welcomed the communiqué of the Central Committee, the universal indignation against the intense and unrestrained anti-Albanian activity of the chiefs of Belgrade must be evaluated correctly and thoroughly. In regard to us they demonstrate two truths in particular: first, that as a result of the activity, blackmail and pressure of the Yugoslavs, mistakes and distortions have been permit-

ted amongst us, too, and second, these mistakes and distortions which have been permitted are by no means the responsibility of the whole Party or its whole leadership. The general enthusiasm which has burst out and the indignation which is being displayed towards the evil activity of Tito and company cannot be explained otherwise. The time has come, comrades, to dwell concretely on the responsibilities of each of us. It would be unpardonable to lay the burden of the responsibility for the mistakes on the backs of all.»

Understandably this was the most delicate and difficult phase of uncovering and cleaning up the evil. True, the conspirators were confused and on the defensive, but they would continue to defend themselves, to hide their tracks and would try to mislead us.

At first, as a result of arguments and facts which I, Hysni Kapo, Gogo Nushi and, up to a point, also Bedri Spahiu and Tuk Jakova presented against Koçi Xoxe, Pandi Kristo and Kristo Themelko, they, with their backs to the wall, were forced to admit only one mistake.

«We have been ‘more heavily influenced’,» said Pandi Kristo, «but we did not know that the Yugoslav leaders were enemies.»

We presented new facts and arguments (they had to do with the whole mass of problems that I described above), but the three still stuck to their story:

«That we were influenced easily and more than

the others, this we admit,» spluttered Xoxe. «Indeed, we admit that we did not go very deeply into the things that the Yugoslavs taught us, but we did not do this deliberately. We made a mistake and that's all there is to it.»

But the moment came when the block was split. After a series of hesitations and vacillations, Kristo Themelko was convinced that it was in vain to hide the truth. He testified quite openly in the Political Bureau that his activity and that of the other «influenced persons» was not a question of «influence», but a work of a secret agency carried out systematically, organized and directed from Belgrade or by Savo Zlatić, Josip Djerdja, Kuprešanin, Sergentic and others in Tirana.

In particular, his testimony that all the tales he had told us a few months before (about «the federal union», «the coming of the division», etc.) were not his own but came from the Yugoslavs, was very valuable for the further deepening of the analyses in the Political Bureau.

Amongst other things, Themelko testified: «Tito himself, in the presence of Tempo and Koča Popović, told me: 'Go and present this to Enver Hoxha as yours and persist till you convince him.'»

Like it or not, the others, too, especially Nesti Kerenxhi and Xhoxhi Blushi, began to talk, while Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo as the «deans» of the conspirators, continued (of course to their own disadvantage, because the Party had everything clear) to

bluff and refuse to bring out everything.

Now, however, everything was ripe to raise the matter in the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party.

First, on September 6-7 the 10th Plenum of the CC of the CPA was held and there, after discussion, it was decided to call the 1st Congress of the CPA on November 1, 1948. We discussed and adopted the agenda for the Congress, the method of organization of party conferences in the districts, the method of election of delegates to the Congress, etc.

All these things had importance, not only because we were going to such an historic event as the Congress of the Party for the first time, but also because, from the organizational aspect, the Yugoslavs had imposed anti-democratic forms and methods on us in the past.

Now these would come to an end once and for all and the very method of the organization, preparation and development of the Congress would constitute the re-establishment of the practice of all the internal norms and rules of the Party. After we had also discussed the draft of the new Constitution of the Party, I closed the 10th Plenum by pointing out to the comrades:

«Time does not wait. We must mobilize ourselves to put into practice the directives and orientations of this Plenum within a few days. We must immediately transmit the orientations to the committees

of the Party in the regions, to guide and engage all the comrades in the work for the preparation of conferences and after this we shall meet again. We have a great and difficult task ahead of us: apart from the formulation and discussion of plans for the economic-cultural development, we shall analyse in detail the whole history of our relations with the Trotskyites of Belgrade and their anti-Marxist activity against us, as well as the way in which we have responded to this activity during the 6-7 years that we have been in contact with them.»

This analysis was carried out with complete success and adherence to Marxist-Leninist principles at the 11th Plenum of the CC of the CPA, which was held from September 13-24, 1948.

In the report which I presented to the Plenum on behalf of the Political Bureau, I made a profound and detailed analysis of the whole history of our relations with the CPY and the Yugoslav state, of the political and organizational line of our Party especially since the Berat Plenum (November 1944), disclosed the causes of the mistakes observed amongst us and defined the measures for the change which was dictated by the new circumstances.

It would not be of value to dwell here on the ideas, facts and conclusions presented in that report, because I would be repeating in one way or another all that I have written above. I want only to stress certain moments from the Plenum.

Above all, the sound Marxist-Leninist spirit which characterized the proceedings of the Plenum from beginning to end has remained indelible in my memory. For the first time after so many years (I can say since the 1st National Conference of the CPA in March 1943), the comrades got up and spoke freely, with maturity and great preoccupation about the acute problems which had been put forward for discussion. They spoke without partiality, without imposition and without hesitation before anyone and about everything. The solidarity of all the comrades with the report which I presented was expressed not simply in words, but with many arguments and facts which each of them brought from his own experience.

Both in the report and in the many contributions to the discussion (there were comrades who, by their own desire, spoke two or three times), the anti-Marxist activity of the Yugoslav leadership, its feverish efforts to lead us up a blind alley and to subjugate us, its ugly plot to gobble up Albania, were brought out even more clearly. Linking all these things with everything that was said in the letters of the Bolshevik Party and the Resolution of the Information Bureau, the Plenum rightly came to the conclusion that in the line of the leadership of the Yugoslav Party we had to do with an anti-Marxist line which was being concretized as a dangerous current within the international communist movement.

«It is the merit of the Bolshevik Party and the

great Stalin, but also of our Party,» said one of the comrades, «that they discovered and forcefully opposed this dangerous line. If it had been left in peace and not attacked, it would have brought grave and painful consequences to the socialist camp.»

In the course of the debate, another comrade, although he attacked the Titoite deviation, expressed the opinion that the betrayal by the Yugoslav leaders «will weaken the communist movement and the socialist camp, because we are left with one communist party and one socialist country less!»

Hysni Kapo took the floor and in his wise and concrete contribution, full of valuable arguments and generalizations, opposed the previous speaker:

«It is not true at all that the communist movement and the socialist camp will be weakened by the betrayal which the Yugoslav leaders are committing!» stressed Hysni among other things. «On the contrary, the exposure of the betrayal, the proper denunciation and condemnation which it has received will make us stronger, more compact and more determined to forge ahead. It is not the number of participating parties and countries that constitute the strength of the communist movement and the socialist camp, but the quality of these parties and countries, their determination to apply and defend Marxism-Leninism.»¹

¹ From the minutes of the 11th Plenum of the CC of the CPA. *CAP*.

A very large part of those 10-12 days of discussion and debate was occupied by analysis of the line pursued by our Party. Both the report and the discussion rightly stressed and proved that regardless of the interference, pressure and blackmail by the Titoites, the political line of the CPA had always remained correct and consistent. This line, it was said, had been attacked but had not wavered, had been threatened but had not been damaged.

«Certain individual distortions which have appeared,» the Plenum stressed, «are not the result of our line. They have been dictated to us and imposed by force and cunning in specific circumstances by the emissaries of the Yugoslav leadership. However, these occasional imposed distortions, as for example the 8th Plenum of the CC of the CPA, can never represent or sully the correct political line pursued and defended by our Party. It is an important fact,» it was stressed, «that even the grave distortions of the 8th Plenum never became established and implanted in our Party. We rejected them indignantly and now we are putting the seal on the condemnation they warranted.»

Matters were more difficult and more complicated in regard to the organizational line of the Party. Here, both the pressure and interference from outside and the scale of their penetration had been greater and on this account such violations had been permitted that the organizational line of the Party in general had been turned into an incorrect line. The 2nd and the

8th Plenums of the CC of the CPA had played a major negative role in this dangerous change. The analysis which was made of these two Plenums brought to light numerous new facts and arguments which proved not only the leading role which Tito's emissaries had played in the organization of them, but also the conspiratorial anti-party work of the secret agency headed by the organizational secretary, Koçi Xoxe with his henchmen.

Along with the incontestable facts and arguments which Comrades Gogo Nushi, Manush Myftiu, Haki Toska, Petro Papi and others brought up at the Plenum, a special role in throwing light on the plot at Berat and the 8th Plenum was played by those elements who had been implicated with the Yugoslavs, but still disguised themselves as if they were «remote from the secret agency» and «unsullied». Notable among these elements were Naxhije Dume, Nesti Kerenxhi, Pëllumb Dishnica, etc.

«Even before the Berat Plenum was held,» declared Naxhije Dume, «I knew what was being done, knew that the attack on and elimination of the Commander were being prepared, and also knew the new comrades who were to be put into the Bureau. Nako told me all these things.» Naxhije went on at length and the truth is that through her «zeal» she brought out facts which even much later were valuable for the exposure and unmasking of conspirators who still remained in the ranks of the Party. Amongst other

things, Naxhije Dume was the first to reveal Nako's statement, «If the Commander is not convinced, the pistol will convince him.»

«Nako told me this. I was together with Pandi when he told me,» she testified.

Pandi Kristo who had collapsed like a heap of cow-dung in a rain storm finally «remembered» and testified:

«Nako said this. Koçi and I were there when he said it. Velimir Stojnić was present, too. They led me up a blind alley.»

The tangle was coming apart ever more clearly. In particular, the testimony of Pandi, which he made mostly from the fear which had gripped him as well as the generally frank and sound self-criticism of Kristo Themelko, brought about that even «General Xoxe» was «shaken». Now his threatening mien and any sign of megalomania had dropped away from him. He was like a plucked rooster.

«I have been more influenced by the Yugoslavs, because I put great trust in them. This is my undoing,» he stressed, when he was put with his back to the wall, and sat down.

The comrades produced new, ever more powerful arguments. He was compelled to make further admissions:

«I, for my part... have said that Albania cannot exist without Yugoslavia. I have said this, because this was fixed in my mind. I considered that Yugoslavia

and Albania were in the camp headed by the Soviet Union, but Albania not shoulder to shoulder with, but under the wing of Yugoslavia. This was the influence of Tito's work. Then came the question of complete union, but how this union was to be brought about was not clear to me. I thought and repeated 'federation and confederation', but today it emerges clearly that they wanted Albania as a seventh republic.»

«But you, how did you want it personally?!» someone asked the «General» sarcastically.

His voice failed him.

«Eventually,» he said, «I told you I made a great mistake, but I could not see it existing independently. Under the wing of Yugoslavia, yes! Tito and Ranković influenced me greatly.»

Koçi Xoxe was even more disarmed when his «aides» Nesti Kerenxhi, a certain Vaskë Koleci (now we can say a certain Vaskë, but at that time he was a big man, deputy minister of internal affairs who wanted to wreak havoc upon us) and others, in order to save their own skins, brought to light monstrous activities carried out behind the backs of the Party and its leadership. However, it must be said that at first they did not bring out these monstrosities themselves, on their own «initiative». No, they were compelled to «confess» when the truth about them came out clearly. As far as I remember, Comrade Adil Çarçani was speaking and with wisdom combined with indigna-

tion, was criticizing the anti-party «instructions» which came to the districts from the «organizational secretary of the Party» Koçi Xoxe. Amongst others Adil brought up this fact:

«When I was secretary in the regional committee of Shkodra, not only did we receive ‘directives’ which openly violated democracy in the Party, but once Zoi Themeli, sent by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, came to me and said, ‘I have orders to control the party committee’. ‘What do you mean control it?’ I asked him. ‘You are from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, what have you to do with the committee!’ Zoi told me: ‘This is the rule. Is it for nothing that the organizational secretary is also minister of Internal Affairs at the same time?’ And he persisted, going on to say, ‘This is a clear-cut order of the General himself and the Central Committee’.»

Right after this, Nesti Kerenxhi and Vaskë Koleci got up and admitted with their own mouths things which it had never crossed my mind could occur within our Party:

«Matters had gone so far,» they said, «that in order to admit or expel a comrade from the Party, permission had first to be received from the security organs; the party documents of all those expelled were kept in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In every basic organization of the Party there had to be a comrade of the security organs who should be elected to the bureau, indeed, should be secretary or vice secretary;

likewise, in the party committees and in the bureaus of committees there had to be a 'representative' of the security organs,» and so on and so forth.

«How is it possible that these things have occurred without the knowledge of the Political Bureau, or at least without informing me, as General Secretary of the Party?» I asked Koçi Xoxe there and then.

«I had the idea that you knew about it,» he mumbled, «I did not think up these rules myself. The comrades..., that is, the Yugoslav enemies, issued, them to us. That's how they act in their Party and I..., as I told the Plenum, was greatly influenced by them.»

At this point, Vaskë Koleci in order to emerge as «unimplicated» in the evil work, decided to deal his «General» a heavy blow:

«The Yugoslavs gave them to you, but you yourself wanted those things,» he said to Xoxe. «Last year you ordered us to work out 'the regulations on operations and control', which we sent to all branches of our ministry and it seems to me that those regulations outdid all.»

«What were those 'regulations'?» I asked him.

«The organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were set the task of keeping every communist and cadre throughout the country under surveillance and control!» replied Vaskë readily, convinced that with this «testimony» he had saved his skin.

«What's this you are telling us? And was it sent?!» I asked in shocked surprise.

«Not for surveillance!» Xoxe wanted to «soften» it somewhat. «We instructed the comrades of the security service to interest themselves in the lives of the comrades, their problems, their personal and family worries. This was the aim we had, not surveillance.»

A bitter laugh burst out in the hall.

«‘Interest’ in secrecy means surveillance!» Vaskë snarled at him. «Then, what did we do with the reports which came to us? Did we solve anyone’s personal problems? No, we filled their personal files!»

It is of no value to dwell any further on the endless anti-party atrocities of Koçi Xoxe and company acting as a secret agency. The Plenum dealt with them for whole days (the Political Bureau for some months before) and, moreover, after the 11th Plenum, when its conclusions and decisions were discussed in the Party and among the people, even more facts about the bitter truth came to light.

The important thing is that from all these analyses which were protracted and wearying, but principled and profound, all the anti-party and anti-Albanian activity of these rotten elements, who for years on end had been thrown into action to destroy the Party and the freedom and independence of the Homeland, was brought to light. The whole Party and people were convinced about the evil deed the conspirators had wanted to accomplish and this was the most important thing in our analyses. As for their punishment, this was now a simple matter.

Thus, these agents of the Yugoslavs were finished and eliminated from our ranks. The distortions which had resulted from their secret and open activity were finished, too.

The 11th Plenum decided to legalize the Party completely and immediately. It described the fact that the program of the Party had been hidden under the program of the Democratic Front as a grave mistake which had to be corrected immediately, condemned and annulled as anti-party and anti-Marxist most of the decisions of the Berat Plenum and all the decisions of the 8th Plenum of the CC of the CPA, and suspended all sanctions and co-options which, as I said, had been made on an anti-democratic road, under pressure of the Yugoslav leadership and its secret agents, Koçi Xoxe and company.

The main one among those rehabilitated by the 11th Plenum of the CC of the CPA was Nako Spiru. The decision on his rehabilitation was taken because, as I explained above, the 11th Plenum rejected all the «accusations» the Yugoslav leadership had levelled on us such as that over the so-called «anti-Yugoslav line in the leadership of the CPA», or that which described Nako as «an agent of imperialism», on account of being ungrounded and made for anti-Albanian and anti-Marxist aims. With facts totally lacking, we had no reason to give credibility to this accusation which was made by people who were themselves agents of imperialism. As for the «faults» of Nako in the economy,

he, as I have explained, was not to blame for them, indeed, he was unjustly accused by the Yugoslavs as the author of a so-called autarkic five-year plan. We all were the authors of this plan, which in fact was bold, but not at all «unrealistic» or «autarkic». Likewise in the decision regarding Nako Spiru's rehabilitation we were especially influenced by the fact that in the conditions existing at that time we did not know many of his stands, mistakes and secret actions, especially since the Berat Plenum. Above all, we did not know at that time that Nako had become a secret agent of the Yugoslav leadership and that, later, in his sordid gamble for power, especially in his rivalry with Koçi Xoxe, when he saw himself abandoned by the Yugoslavs, had linked himself up (always as a secret agent) with the Soviets. These latter links we did not know, and we could not imagine that he was capable of such actions. We could only see that he defended the Soviet views, spoke well of the Soviet Union and, because of the very positive opinion which we ourselves had of the Soviet Union, we could appreciate these stands of Nako Spiru only positively. Similarly, the fact that he, especially in the years 1946 and 1947, drew closer to me and to the sound part of our leadership, had an influence on the decision we took. So, what we knew at that time, seen in its close connection with all the circumstances and conditions of that period, influenced the decision the 11th Plenum of the CC of the CPA took regarding Nako Spiru's rehabili-

tation.

The 11th Plenum of the CC of the CPA also took all measures for the re-establishment of the internal democracy of the Party and, especially, for the preparation of the Constitution of the Party as quickly as possible, etc., etc.

A little after the 11th Plenum of the CC of the CPA, the historic 1st Congress of our glorious Party was summoned in November 1948.

The political report, which I had prepared for the Congress in the course of all the endless and important work of that period and, especially in the conditions when we still had Xoxe and his supporters in our way, demanded a great deal of time and effort. At that time we still had not organized the apparatus of the Party and the original of the report is in the archives of the CC just as I wrote it directly on my small-letter typewriter. As is known, it is a very voluminous report which took me about 15 hours to read to the Congress over two days divided into four sessions. However, I must say that the extremely tiring work, with many difficulties and «unknown quantities» in the preparation of it, gave me a special satisfaction and pleasure that have remained indelible in my memory.

Through this report, serious efforts were made for the first time at a scientific presentation, as correct and accurate as possible, of a whole historical period of our people, especially from the beginning of the 20's of this century onwards. I considered this exten-

sion «beyond the historical bounds» of the life of our Party (that is before November 8, 1941) essential, proceeding from the basic premise of materialistic dialectics that nothing emerges in a vacuum, that every phenomenon, every event, has its own history, its own causes, roots and conditions, in the first place internal ones, of birth and development. This had occurred with our Communist Party, too. The analysis which I made of the period from the 20's to November 8, 1941 comprised, you might say, the prehistory of our Party and proved incontestably that the economic, social, political, historical and other conditions and forces in the Albania of this period were the decisive factors which led to the formation of the CPA, and not at all the factors about which the renegades of Belgrade were prattling, who quite openly and shamelessly attributed to themselves the role of the «founders» of our Party!

After this historical survey, the report analysed in detail all the activity of the Party from the time of its formation, correctly evaluated all the great victories achieved during and after the war, that is, in all those stages through which our Party and country had passed during those last seven years, discussed the circumstances and discovered the causes of the mistakes which had appeared in the implementation of the line of the Party and defined the main tasks and orientations on the basis of which our glorious Party would lead the country.

The lofty party spirit that pervaded the report, which the Political Bureau of the Central Committee approved unanimously, orientated the delegates correctly in their contributions to the discussion.

Thus for 15 days on end, from November 8-22, the finest representatives of our Party, elected in the most democratic forms at the regional conferences of the Party, through their correct and courageous statements and opinions, made the 1st Congress of the Party one of the most outstanding historic events, not only of the Party, but of the whole history of our people.

Amongst other things, the analysis of our relations with the CPY and the Yugoslav state occupied an important place in the Congress. There, for the first time, we openly denounced and unmasked all the hostile activity of Tito and company. The facts, arguments and conclusions which the Congress presented on this problem were unshakeable and devastating for the renegades of Belgrade. It was proved even more clearly that all the mistakes and distortions observed, especially in the organizational line of our Party, had their main source in the leadership of the CP of Yugoslavia. It had done everything in its power to impose alien, anti-Marxist views and practices on us, both because it was wrong theoretically (in essence its whole line was wrong and revisionist) and because it proceeded from aims that were purely conspiratorial, chauvinist and pragmatic towards our Party and coun-

try. Likewise, in the most democratic and just way, the Congress also decided the fate of Koçi Xoxe and company. Despite the great exposure which we had made of them at the 11th Plenum and in the meetings of party activists in the regions and in the government departments and the preliminary measures which we had taken, we still allowed them to take part in and speak at the Congress. Of course, for the Central Committee and the Political Bureau everything in connection with them was clear, but it was important that now the Congress of the Party itself should express to the end and put its seal on its opinions and judgments about them. While I was reading that part of the report which dealt with the conscious work of Koçi Xoxe, Pandi Kristo and others as secret agents, voices from the hall cried:

«Throw the enemies of the Party and people out of our ranks!»

This spirit pervaded the whole Party and the people who followed the Congress with great interest. Thousands of letters and telegrams came into us from the organizations of the Party and other organizations and institutions in the districts; thousands of working people, men, women, and youth, communists or not, were gathered in the streets outside when we entered or left the Congress hall. They shouted the one slogan: «Long live the Party! Down with the enemies!» One event which has remained deeply impressed in my memory was when we were met by the mothers of

martyrs — the mothers of those who would have certainly been delegates to this Congress, — who encircled me and, headed by the courageous mother of Mihal Duri, with their clenched fists raised, instructed us, or I might even say, «demanded» of us, in the name of the blood which their sons had shed, that we stand firm, hold high the banner of the Party, defend the people's state power, and finished with the cry: «Down with the enemies!»

The many mature contributions of the delegates showed the agents of Belgrade in their true colours. Confronted with overwhelming facts and arguments, Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo tried to manoeuvre even in the Congress. Koçi Xoxe, for example, was obliged to admit with his own mouth that at Berat «I opposed the line of the Party and the General Secretary», that «our work there was done behind the back of the Party», etc., but Xoxe tried to justify himself by saying, «we did all these things because we did not understand we were making mistakes», «we did them unconsciously», «Stojnić led us up a blind alley»¹. Xoxe had «constructed» his whole «self-criticism» (or it had been prepared for him) in this spirit: he admitted that he had done a thousand and one evil things, but after every fact he stressed: «I did it unwittingly», «I did not know that I was acting against the Party and the peo-

¹ From Koçi Xoxe's «self-criticism» at the 1st Congress of the CPA. *CAP*.

ple», «the Yugoslavs blinded me».

The delegates rejected and totally exposed this manoeuvre, too. With facts and arguments it was proved that everything had been done with full consciousness, according to a scenario prepared and approved in Belgrade.¹ At the Congress the delegates demanded insistently that Koçi Xoxe and company should answer for their anti-Albanian activity as secret agents, no longer to the Party, but to the organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Thus, the 1st Congress of the Party further deepened and finally put the seal on the change which the 11th Plenum of the CC of the CPA had marked. The Party was equipped with a correct Marxist-Leninist general line. The Congress once again attacked as incorrect and harmful the former practice imposed by the Yugoslavs of keeping the Party in a semi-legal situation and once and for all consecrated the irreplaceable leading role of our Party in the whole life of our

¹ The chiefs of Belgrade wanted to escape precisely this exposure. They did everything in their power to have Koçi Xoxe flee to Yugoslavia before the 1st Congress of the CPA. To this end they sent the Yugoslav representative in Tirana at that time a number of radiograms in one of which he was told to make contact with Koçi Xoxe without fail and bring about his fleeing to Yugoslavia. A reward of a hundred thousand leks was offered to the person who would accomplish this. (*Archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.*)

country. For the establishment of complete democracy in the Party and in the whole life of the country, for the assimilation and implementation of the Marxist-Leninist principles and norms which govern the internal life of the Party, the Constitution of the Party, which the Congress endorsed, was to play an important role.

When we discussed each paragraph of the Constitution in the Congress the comrades with concern and maturity made the comparison between many harmful practices and stands of the past and the Marxist truth that was expressed in the Constitution. Automatically our knowledge of the renegades of Belgrade and their agents in our ranks became more profound. The Congress affirmed once again the correct conclusion that in the leadership of the CP of Yugoslavia we had to do not merely with an anti-Albanian, nationalist and chauvinist leadership, but above all with an agency of imperialism, with a clique of conscious renegades, who were struggling to revise the theory and practice of socialism and the revolution in all fields. The endless stream of facts which has never dried up, as well as our further analyses for the political and ideological unmasking of Yugoslav revisionism, have proved and are still proving how correct and far-sighted was the conclusion which the 1st Congress of the CPA arrived at about the renegades of Belgrade.

After the 1st Congress of the Party, in the light of the new facts which came out, the Party and the

people rightly demanded that the chiefs of the plot should be handed over to the people's justice, to be judged for high treason to the Homeland, the Party and socialism.¹ Before the court, the agents of Belgrade through their own mouths testified that they had been trained and guided by Tito and his emissaries in everything they had done. We published their testimony in the press so that the people would read it, but also as a crushing blow to Tito over what he had done in the past and as a warning about the future.

Of course, as far as we were concerned, every kind of link with Tito and the Titoite party came to an end. The bitter past with them remained a valuable lesson for the future, because we knew we would never agree to have any direct or indirect first-hand contact with them, but the struggle against their anti-Marxist views and stands and against their uninterrupted anti-Albanian activity would never cease.

We would continue this struggle, too, adhering to Marxist-Leninist principle, to carry it consistently through to the end, through to victory.

¹ The trial of Koçi Xoxe, Pandi Kristo and their three closest collaborators took place in the city of Tirana from May 11 to June 10, 1949. The court pronounced the sentence of death by shooting only for Koçi Xoxe. Pandi Kristo was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment, whereas the others from 5 to 15 years of imprisonment.

Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Union to Comrade Tito and Other Members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia

27 March 1948

Your answers of 18 and 20 March have been received.

We regard your answer as incorrect and therefore completely unsatisfactory.

1. The question of Gagarinov¹ can be considered closed, since you have withdrawn your accusations against him, although we still consider that they were slanderous.

The statement attributed to Comrade Krutikov² that the Soviet Government has allegedly refused to enter into trade negotiations this year, does not, as can be seen, correspond to the facts, as Krutikov has categorically denied it.

2. In regard to the withdrawal of military advisers, the sources of our information are the statements of the representatives of the Ministry of Armed Forces

¹ Member of the Soviet Trade Mission in Yugoslavia.

² Aleksei D. Krutikov, Soviet Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade.

and of the advisers themselves. As is known, our military advisers were sent to Yugoslavia upon the repeated request of the Yugoslav Government, and far fewer advisers were sent than had been requested. It is therefore obvious that the Soviet Government had no desire to force its advisers on Yugoslavia.

Later, however, the Yugoslav military leaders, among them Koča Popović, thought it possible to announce that it was essential to reduce the number of advisers by 60 per cent. They gave various reasons for this; some maintained that the Soviet advisers were too great an expense for Yugoslavia; others held that the Yugoslav army was in no need of the experience of the Soviet army; some said that the rules of the Soviet army were hidebound, stereotyped and without value to the Yugoslav army, and that there was no point in paying the Soviet advisers since there was no benefit to be derived from them.

In the light of these facts we can understand the well-known and insulting statement made by Djilas¹ about the Soviet army, at a session of the CC of the CPY, namely that the Soviet officers were, from a moral standpoint, inferior to the officers of the British

¹ Milovan Djilas, head of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Yugoslav Communist Party. Former Gestapo agent and pro-American «theoretician» of Titoite anti-Soviet activity. Later he openly renounced Marxism-Leninism and Communism.

army. As is known, this anti-Soviet statement by Djilas met with no opposition from the other members of the CC of the CPY.

So, instead of seeking a friendly agreement with the Soviet Government on the question of Soviet military advisers, the Yugoslav military leaders began to abuse the Soviet military advisers and to discredit the Soviet army.

It is clear that this situation was bound to create an atmosphere of hostility around the Soviet military advisers. It would be ridiculous to think that the Soviet Government would consent to leave its advisers in Yugoslavia under such conditions. Since the Yugoslav Government took no measures to counteract these attempts to discredit the Soviet army, it bears the responsibility for the situation created,

3. The sources of our information leading to the withdrawal of Soviet civilian specialists are, for the most part, the statements of the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, Lavrentiev, as also the statements of the specialists themselves. Your statement, that Srzentić allegedly told the trade representative, Lebedev, that the Soviet specialists seeking economic information should direct their requests to higher authorities, namely to the CC of the CPY and the Yugoslav Government, does not correspond to the truth. Here is the report made by Lavrentiev on 9 March:

«Srzentić, Kidrič's assistant in the Economic Council,

informed Lebedev, the trade representative, of a Government decree forbidding the state organs to give economic information to anyone at all. Therefore, regardless of earlier promises, he could not give Lebedev the particulars required. It was one of the duties of the state security organs to exercise control in this matter. Srzentić also said that Kidrič himself intended to speak about this with Lebedev.»

From Lavrentiev's report it can be seen, firstly, that Srzentić did not even mention the possibility of obtaining economic information from the CC of the CPY or the Yugoslav Government. In any case, it would be ridiculous to think that it would be necessary to approach the CC of the CPY for all economic information while there still existed the appropriate ministries from which Soviet specialists had previously obtained the necessary economic information direct.

Secondly, it is clear from Lavrentiev's report that the reverse of what you write is true, namely that the Yugoslav security organs controlled and supervised the Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia.

One might well mention that we have come across a similar practice of secret supervision over Soviet representatives in bourgeois states, although not in all of them. It should also be emphasized that the Yugoslav security agents not only follow representatives of the Soviet Government, but also the representative of the CPSU(b) in the Cominform, Comrade Yudin. It would be ridiculous to think that the Soviet Government would agree to keep its civilian

specialists in Yugoslavia in such circumstances. As can be seen in this case, too, the responsibility for the conditions created rests with the Yugoslav Government.

4. In your letter you express the desire to be informed of the other facts which led to Soviet dissatisfaction and to the straining of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia. Such facts actually exist, although they are not connected with the withdrawal of the civilian and military advisers. We consider it necessary to inform you of them.

(a) We know that there are anti-Soviet rumours circulating among the leading comrades in Yugoslavia, for instance that «the CPSU(b) is degenerate», «great-power chauvinism is rampant in the USSR», «the USSR is trying to dominate Yugoslavia economically» and «the Cominform is a means of controlling the other Parties by the CPSU(b)», etc. These anti-Soviet allegations are usually camouflaged by left phrases, such as «socialism in the Soviet Union has ceased to be revolutionary» and that Yugoslavia alone is the exponent of «revolutionary socialism». It was naturally laughable to hear such statements about the CPSU(b) from such questionable Marxists as Djilas, Vuk-

manović,¹ Kidrič, Ranković² and others. However, the fact remains that such rumours have been circulating for a long time among many high-ranking Yugoslav officials, that they are still circulating, and that they are naturally creating an anti-Soviet atmosphere which is endangering relations between the CPSU(b) and the CPY.

We readily admit that every Communist Party, among them the Yugoslav, has the right to criticize the CPSU(b), even as the CPSU(b) has the right to criticize any other Communist Party. But Marxism demands that criticism be above-board and not underhand and slanderous, thus depriving those criticized of the opportunity to reply to the criticism. However, the criticism by the Yugoslav officials is neither open nor honest; it is both underhand and dishonest and of

¹ Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, formerly Assistant Minister of Defence, appointed Minister of Mines in August 1948. Anti-Albanian and anti-Bulgarian chauvinist who moved freely through the Balkans with the support of the Gestapo during the Anti-Fascist National Liberation War, organized Titoite infiltration blocs in the CPs of Bulgaria, Albania, and Greece.

² Aleksander Ranković, Minister of the Interior and head of the UDB secret police. Organized the «physical liquidation» (murder) of Communist-Internationalists such as Andrija Hebrang. Anti-Albanian chauvinist who organized the ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands of Albanians living in Yugoslavia.

a hypocritical nature, because, while discrediting the CPSU(b) behind its back, publicly they pharisaically praise it to the skies. Thus criticism is transformed into slander, into an attempt to discredit the CPSU(b) and to blacken the Soviet system.

We do not doubt that the Yugoslav Party masses would disown this anti-Soviet criticism as alien and hostile if they knew about it. We think this is the reason why the Yugoslav officials make these criticisms in secret, behind the backs of the masses.

Again, one might mention that, when he decided to declare war on the CPSU(b), Trotsky also started with accusations of the CPSU(b) as degenerate, as suffering from the limitations inherent in the narrow nationalism of great powers. Naturally he camouflaged all this with left slogans about world revolution. However, it is well known that Trotsky himself became degenerate, and when he was exposed, crossed over into the camp of the sworn enemies of the CPSU(b) and the Soviet Union. We think that the political career of Trotsky is quite instructive.

(b) We are disturbed by the present condition of the CPY. We are amazed by the fact that the CPY, which is the leading party, is still not completely legalized and still has a semi-legal status. Decisions of the Party organs are never published in the press, neither are the reports of Party assemblies.

Democracy is not evident within the CPY itself. The Central Committee, in its majority, was not

elected but co-opted. Criticism and self-criticism within the Party does not exist or barely exists. It is characteristic that the Personnel Secretary of the Party is also the Minister of State Security. In other words, the Party cadres are under the supervision of the Minister of State Security. According to the theory of Marxism, the Party should control all the State organs in the country, including the Ministry of State Security, while in Yugoslavia we have just the opposite: the Ministry of State Security actually controlling the Party. This probably explains the fact that the initiative of the Party masses in Yugoslavia is not on the required level.

It is understandable that we cannot consider such an organization of a Communist Party as Marxist-Leninist, Bolshevik.

The spirit of the policy of class struggle is not felt in the CPY. The increase in the capitalist elements in the villages and cities is in full swing, and the leadership of the Party is taking no measures to check these capitalist elements. The CPY is being hoodwinked by the degenerate and opportunist theory of the peaceful absorption of capitalist elements by a socialist system, borrowed from Bernstein, Vollmar and Bukharin¹.

¹ Eduard Bernstein and Georg Vollmar were revisionist leaders of the German Social-Democratic Party; Nikolai Bukharin was a rightist, pro-kulak member of the bloc of Rights and Trotskyites, executed in 1936.

According to the theory of Marxism-Leninism the Party is considered as the leading force in the country, which has its specific programme and which cannot merge with the non-party masses. In Yugoslavia, on the contrary, the People's Front is considered the chief leading force and there was an attempt to get the Party submerged within the Front. In his speech at the Second Congress of the People's Front, Comrade Tito said: «Does the CPY have any other programme but that of the People's Front? No, the CPY has no other programme. The programme of the People's Front is its programme.»

It thus appears that in Yugoslavia this amazing theory of Party organization is considered a new theory. Actually, it is far from new. In Russia forty years ago a part of the Mensheviks proposed that the Marxist Party be dissolved into a non-party workers' mass organization and that the second should supplant the first; the other part of the Mensheviks proposed that the Marxist Party be dissolved into a non-party mass organization of workers and peasants, with the latter again supplanting the former. As is known, Lenin described these Mensheviks as malicious opportunists and liquidators of the Party.

(c) We cannot understand why the English spy, Velebit, still remains in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia as the first Assistant Minister. The Yugoslav comrades know that Velebit is an English spy. They also know that the representatives of the Soviet

Government consider Velebit a spy. Nevertheless, Velebit remains in the position of First Assistant Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia. It is possible that the Yugoslav Government intends to use Velebit precisely as an English spy. As is known, bourgeois governments think it permissible to have spies of great imperialist states on their staffs with a view to insuring their goodwill, and would even agree to placing their peoples under the tutelage of these states for this purpose. We consider this practice as entirely impermissible for Marxists. Be it as it may, the Soviet Government cannot place its correspondence with the Yugoslav Government under the censorship of an English spy. It is understandable, that as long as Velebit remains in the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, the Soviet Government considers itself placed in a difficult situation and deprived of the possibility of carrying on open correspondence with the Yugoslav Government through the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

These are the facts which are causing the dissatisfaction of the Soviet Government and the CC of the CPSU(b) and which are endangering relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia.

These facts, as has already been mentioned, are not related to the question of the withdrawal of the military and civilian specialists. However, they are an important factor in the worsening of relations between our countries.

CC of the CPSU(b)

Moscow,
27 March 1948

Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Union to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia

4 May 1948

Your answer and the announcement of the decision of the Plenum of the CC of the CPY of 13 April 1948, signed by Comrades Tito and Kardelj, have been received.

Unfortunately, these documents, and especially the document signed by Tito and Kardelj, do not improve on the earlier Yugoslav documents; on the contrary, they further complicate matters and sharpen the conflict.

Our attention is drawn to the tone of the documents, which can only be described as exaggeratedly ambitious. In the documents one does not see any desire to establish the truth, honestly to admit errors, and to recognize the necessity of eliminating those errors. Yugoslav comrades do not accept criticism in a Marxist manner, but in a bourgeois manner, i.e. they regard it as an insult to the prestige of the CC of the CPY and as undermining the ambitions of the Yugoslav leaders.

So, in order to extricate themselves from the difficult situation for which they are themselves to

blame, the Yugoslav leaders are using a «new» method, a method of complete denial of their errors regardless of their obvious existence. The facts and the documents mentioned in the letter of the CC of the CPSU(b) of 27 March 1948 are denied. Comrades Tito and Kardelj, it seems, do not understand that this childish method of groundless denial of facts and documents can never be convincing, but merely laughable.

1. The Withdrawal of Soviet Military Advisers from Yugoslavia

In its letter of 27 March the CC of the CPSU(b) stated the reasons for the withdrawal of the Soviet military advisers, and said that the information of the CC of the CPSU(b) was based on the complaints of these advisers of the unfriendly attitude of the responsible Yugoslav officials towards the Soviet army and its representatives in Yugoslavia. Comrades Tito and Kardelj denounce these complaints as unsubstantiated. Why should the CC of the CPSU(b) believe the unfounded statements of Tito and Kardelj rather than the numerous complaints of the Soviet military advisers? On what grounds? The USSR has its military advisers in almost all the countries of people's democracy. We must emphasize that until now we have had no complaints from our advisers in these countries. This explains the fact that we have had no misunderstandings

in these countries arising from the work of the Soviet military advisers. Complaints and misunderstandings, in this field, exist only in Yugoslavia. Is it not clear that this can be explained only by the special unfriendly atmosphere which has been created in Yugoslavia around these military advisers?

Comrades Tito and Kardelj refer to the large expenses in connection with the salaries of the Soviet military advisers, emphasizing that the Soviet generals receive three to four times as much, in dinars, as Yugoslav generals, and that such conditions may give rise to discontent on the part of Yugoslav military personnel. But the Yugoslav generals, apart from drawing salaries, are provided with apartments, servants, food, etc. Secondly, the pay of the Soviet generals in Yugoslavia corresponds to the pay of Soviet generals in the USSR. It is understandable that the Soviet Government could not consider reducing the salaries of Soviet generals who are in Yugoslavia on official duty.

Perhaps the expense of the Soviet generals was too great a burden for the Yugoslav budget. In that case the Yugoslav Government should have approached the Soviet Government and proposed that it take over part of the expenses. There is no doubt that the Soviet Government would have done this. However, the Yugoslavs took another course; instead of solving this question in an amicable manner, they began to abuse our military advisers, to call them loafers, and to discredit the Soviet army. Only after a hostile atmos-

phere had been created around the Soviet military advisers did the Yugoslav Government approach the Soviet Government. It is understandable that the Soviet Government could not accept this situation.

2. Concerning the Soviet Civilian Specialists in Yugoslavia

In its letter of 27 March the CC of the CPSU(b) stated the reasons for the withdrawal of the Soviet civilian specialists from Yugoslavia. In the given case the CC of the CPSU(b) relied on the complaints of the civilian specialists and on the statements of the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia. From these statements it can be seen that the Soviet civilian specialists, as well as the representative of the CPSU(b) in the Cominform, Comrade Yudin, were placed under the supervision of the UDB.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj in their letter deny the truth of these complaints and reports, stating that the UDB does not supervise Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia. But why should the CC of the CPSU(b) believe the unfounded assertions of Comrades Tito and Kardelj and not the complaints of Soviet men, among them Comrade Yudin?

The Soviet Government has many of its civilian specialists in all the countries of people's democracy but it does not receive any complaints from them and there are no disagreements with the Governments of

these countries. Why have these disagreements and conflicts arisen only in Yugoslavia? Is it not because the Yugoslav Government has created a special unfriendly atmosphere around the Soviet officials in Yugoslavia, among them Comrade Yudin himself?

It is understandable that the Soviet Government could not tolerate such a situation and was forced to withdraw its civilian specialists from Yugoslavia.

3. Regarding Velebit and Other Spies in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia

It is not true, as Tito and Kardelj say, that Comrades Kardelj and Djilas, on the occasion of a meeting with Molotov, confined their doubts regarding Velebit to the remark «that all was not clear about Velebit» to them. Actually, in their meeting with Molotov there was talk that Velebit was suspected of spying for England. It was very strange that Tito and Kardelj identified the removal of Velebit from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with his ruin. Why could not Velebit be removed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs without being ruined?

Also strange was the statement by Tito and Kardelj of the reasons for leaving Velebit in his position of First Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs; it appears that Velebit was not removed from his position because he was under supervision. Would it not be better to remove Velebit just because he was under

supervision? Why so much consideration for an English spy, who at the same time is so uncompromisingly hostile towards the Soviet Union?

However, Velebit is not the only spy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Soviet representatives have many times told the Yugoslav leaders that the Yugoslav Ambassador in London, Ljubo Leontić, is an English spy. It is not known why this old and trusted English spy remains in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Soviet Government is aware that besides Leontić three other members of the Yugoslav Embassy in London, whose names are not yet disclosed, are in the English Intelligence Service. The Soviet Government makes this statement with full responsibility. It is also hard to understand why the United States Ambassador in Belgrade behaves as if he owned the place and why his «intelligence agents», whose number is increasing, move about freely, or why the friends and relations of the executioner of the Yugoslav people, Nedić,¹ so easily obtain positions in the State and Party apparatus in Yugoslavia.

It is clear that since the Yugoslav Government persistently refuses to purge its Ministry of Foreign Affairs of spies, the Soviet Government is forced to refrain from open correspondence with the Yugoslav Government through the Yugoslav Ministry of For-

¹ General Nedić was head of the puppet Serbian Government set up by Nazi Germany in 1941.

eign Affairs.

4. Concerning the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia and the Soviet State

In their letter of 13 April 1948 Tito and Kardelj wrote: «We consider that he (the Soviet Ambassador), as an ambassador, has no right to ask anyone for information about the work of our Party. That is not his business.»

We feel that this statement by Tito and Kardelj is essentially incorrect and anti-Soviet. They identify the Soviet Ambassador, a responsible communist who represents the Communist Government of the USSR, with an ordinary bourgeois ambassador, a simple official of a bourgeois state, who is called upon to undermine the foundations of the Yugoslav state. It is difficult to understand how Tito and Kardelj could sink so low. Do these comrades understand that such an attitude towards the Soviet Ambassador means the negation of all friendly relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia? Do these comrades understand that the Soviet Ambassador, a responsible communist, who represents a friendly power which liberated Yugoslavia from the German occupation, not only has the right but is obliged, from time to time, to discuss with the communists in Yugoslavia all questions which interest them? How can they be suspicious of these simple elementary matters if they intend to remain in friendly

relation with the Soviet Union?

For the information of Comrades Tito and Kardelj, it is necessary to mention that, unlike the Yugoslavs, we do not consider the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow as a simple official; we do not treat him as a mere bourgeois ambassador and we do not deny his «right to seek information about the work of our Party from anyone he chooses.» Because he became an ambassador, he did not stop being a communist. We consider him as a comrade and a high-ranking communist. He has friends and acquaintances among the Soviet people. Is he «acquiring» information about the work of our Party? Most likely he is. Let him «acquire» it. We have no reason to hide from comrades the shortcomings in our Party. We expose them ourselves in order to eliminate them.

We consider that this attitude of the Yugoslav comrades towards the Soviet Ambassador cannot be regarded as accidental. It arises from the general attitude of the Yugoslav Government, which is also the cause of the inability of the Yugoslav leaders to see the difference between the foreign policy of the USSR and the foreign policy of the Anglo-Americans; they, therefore, put the foreign policy of the USSR on a par with the foreign policy of the English and Americans and feel that they should follow the same policy towards the Soviet Union as towards the imperialist states, Great Britain and the United States.

In this respect, the speech by Comrade Tito in

Ljubljana in May 1945 is very characteristic. He said:

«It is said that this war is a just war and we have considered it as such. However, we seek also a just end; we demand that every one shall be master in his own house; we do not want to pay for others; we do not want to be used as a bribe in international bargaining; we do not want to get involved in any policy of spheres of interest.»

This was said in connection with the question of Trieste. As is well known, after a series of territorial concessions for the benefit of Yugoslavia, which the Soviet Union extracted from the Anglo-Americans, the latter, together with the French, rejected the Soviet proposal to hand Trieste over to Yugoslavia and occupied Trieste with their own forces, which were then in Italy. Since all other means were exhausted, the Soviet Union had only one other method left for gaining Trieste for Yugoslavia — to start war with the Anglo-Americans over Trieste and take it by force. The Yugoslav comrades could not fail to realize that after such a hard war the USSR could not enter another. However, this fact caused dissatisfaction among the Yugoslav leaders, whose attitude was described by Comrade Tito. The statement by Tito in Ljubljana that «Yugoslavia would not pay for others», «would not be used as a bribe», «would not be involved in any policy of spheres of interest», was directed not only against the imperialist states but also against the USSR, and in the given circumstances the relations of

Tito towards the USSR are no different from his relations towards the imperialist states, as he does not recognize any difference between the USSR and the imperialist states.

In this anti-Soviet attitude of Comrade Tito, which met no resistance in the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY, we see the basis for the slanderous propaganda of the leaders of the CPY, pursued in the narrow circles of the Yugoslav Party cadres, regarding the «degeneration» of the USSR into an imperialist state, its desire to «dominate Yugoslavia economically», also the basis for the slanderous propaganda of the leaders of the CPY regarding the «degeneration» of the CPSU(b) and its desire «through the Cominform, to control the other parties» and the «socialism in the USSR, which has ceased being revolutionary».

The Soviet Government was obliged to draw the attention of the Yugoslav Government to the fact that this statement could not be tolerated, and since the explanations given by Tito and Kardelj were unfounded, the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, Comrade Sadchikov, was instructed by the Soviet Government to make the following statement to the Yugoslav Government, which he did on 5 June 1945:

«We regard Comrade Tito's speech as an unfriendly attack on the Soviet Union, and the explanation by Comrade Kardelj as unsatisfactory. Our readers understood Comrade Tito's speech in this way, and it cannot be understood in any other. Tell Comrade Tito that if he should

once again permit such an attack on the Soviet Union we shall be forced to reply with open criticism in the press and disavow him.»

From this anti-Soviet attitude of Comrade Tito to the USSR arises the attitude of the Yugoslav leaders towards the Soviet Ambassador, by which the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade is put on a level with bourgeois ambassadors.

It seems that the Yugoslav leaders intend to retain this anti-Soviet attitude in future. The Yugoslav leaders should bear in mind that retaining this attitude means renouncing all friendly relations with the Soviet Union, and betraying the united socialist front of the Soviet Union and the people's democratic republics. They should also bear in mind that retaining this attitude means depriving themselves of the right to demand material and any other assistance from the Soviet Union, because the Soviet Union can only offer aid to friends.

For the information of Comrades Tito and Kardelj, we emphasize that this anti-Soviet attitude towards the Soviet Ambassador and the Soviet state is only found in Yugoslavia; in other countries of people's democracy the relations were and remain friendly and perfectly correct.

It is interesting to note that Comrade Kardelj, who is now in complete agreement with Comrade Tito, three years ago had a completely different opin-

ion of Tito's speech in Ljubljana. Here is what the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia, Sadchikov, reported about his conversation with Kardelj on 5 June 1945:

«Today, 5 June, I spoke to Kardelj as you suggested. (Tito has not yet returned.) The communication made a serious impression on him. After some thought he said he regarded our opinion of Tito's speech as correct. He also agreed that the Soviet Union could no longer tolerate similar statements. Naturally, in such difficult times for Yugoslavia, Kardelj said, open criticism of Tito's statement would have serious consequences for them, and for this reason they would try to avoid similar statements. However, the Soviet Union would have the right to make open criticism should similar statements be made. Such criticism would benefit them. Kardelj asked me to convey to you his gratitude for this well-timed criticism. He said it would help to improve their work. The criticism of the political mistakes made in the Government declaration in March had been of great benefit, Kardelj was sure that this criticism would also help improve the political leadership.

«In an attempt to analyse (very carefully) the causes of the mistakes, Kardelj said that Tito had done great work in liquidating factionalism in the CP and in organizing the people's liberation struggle, but he was inclined to regard Yugoslavia as a self-sufficient unit outside the general development of the proletarian revolution and socialism. Secondly, such a situation had arisen in the Party that the Central Committee does not exist as an organizational and political centre. We meet by chance, and we make decisions by chance. In practice every one of us is left to himself. The style of work is bad, and there is not enough co-ordination

in our work. Kardelj said he would like the Soviet Union to regard them, not as representatives of another country, capable of solving questions independently, but as representatives of one of the future Soviet Republics, and the CPY as a part of the All-Union Communist Party, that is, that our relations should be based on the prospect of Yugoslavia becoming in the future a constituent part of the USSR. For this reason they would like us to criticize them frankly and openly and to give them advice which would direct the internal and foreign policy of Yugoslavia along the right path.

«I told Kardelj it was necessary to recognize the facts as they are at present, namely to treat Yugoslavia as an independent state and the Yugoslav Communist Party as an independent Party. You can and must, I said, present and solve your problems independently, while we would never refuse advice should you ask for it.

«As regards Yugoslavia we have obligations, undertaken by our treaties, and still more, we have moral obligations. As far as possible we have never refused advice and assistance, when these were needed. Whenever I pass Marshal Tito's communications on to Moscow, I receive replies immediately. However, such advice is possible and beneficial only if we are approached in time, prior to any decision being reached or any statement being made.»

We leave aside the primitive and fallacious reasoning of Comrade Kardelj about Yugoslavia as a future constituent part of the USSR and the CPY as a part of the CPSU(b). However, we would like to draw attention to Kardelj's criticisms of Tito's anti-Soviet declaration in Ljubljana and the bad conditions in the CC

of the CPY.

5. Regarding the Anti-Soviet Statement by Comrade Djilas about the Intelligence Service and Trade Negotiations

In our letter of 27 March, we mentioned the anti-Soviet statement by Comrade Djilas made at a session of the CC of the CPY, in which he said that the Soviet officers, from a moral standpoint, were inferior to the officers in the English army. This statement by Djilas was made in connection with the fact that a few officers of the Soviet army in Yugoslavia indulged in actions of an immoral nature. We described this statement by Djilas as anti-Soviet because in referring to the behaviour of Soviet officers this pitiful Marxist, Comrade Djilas, did not recall the main differences between the socialist Soviet army, which liberated the peoples of Europe, and the bourgeois English army, whose function is to oppress and not to liberate the peoples of the world.

In their letter of 13 April 1948, Tito and Kardelj state «that Djilas never made such a statement in such a form», and that «Tito explained this in writing and orally in 1945» and that «Comrade Stalin and other members of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPSU(b)» accepted this explanation.

We feel it necessary to emphasize that this statement by Tito and Kardelj does not correspond with

the facts. This is how Stalin reacted to the statement by Djilas in a telegram to Tito:

«I understand the difficulty of your situation after the liberation of Belgrade. However, you must know that the Soviet Government, in spite of colossal sacrifices and losses, is doing all in its power and beyond its power to help you. However, I am surprised at the fact that a few incidents and offences committed by individual officers and soldiers of the Red Army in Yugoslavia are generalized and extended to the whole Red Army. You should not so offend an army which is helping you to get rid of the Germans and which is shedding its blood in the battle against the German invader. It is not difficult to understand that there are black sheep in every family, but it would be strange to condemn the whole family because of one black sheep.

«If the soldiers of the Red Army find out that Comrade Djilas, and those who did not challenge him, consider the English officers, from a moral standpoint, superior to the Soviet officers, they would cry out in pain at such undeserved insults.»

In this anti-Soviet attitude of Djilas, which passed unchallenged among the other members of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY, we see the basis for the slanderous campaign conducted by the leaders of the CPY against the representatives of the Red Army in Yugoslavia, which was the reason for the withdrawal of our military advisers.

How did the matter with Djilas end? It ended with Comrade Djilas arriving in Moscow, together

with the Yugoslav delegation, where he apologized to Stalin and begged that this unpleasant error, which he committed at the session of the CC of the CPY, be forgotten. As can be seen, the matter appears entirely different when presented in the letter of Tito and Kardelj. Unfortunately, Djilas's error was not an accident.

* * *

Comrades Tito and Kardelj accuse the Soviet representatives of recruiting Yugoslavs for their intelligence service. They write:

«We regard it as improper for the agents of the Soviet intelligence service to recruit, in our country, which is going towards socialism, our citizens for their intelligence service. We cannot consider this as anything else but detrimental to the interests of our country. This is done in spite of the fact that our leaders and the UDB have protested against this and made it known that it cannot be tolerated. Those being recruited include officers, various leaders, and those who are negatively disposed towards the new Yugoslavia.»

We declare that this statement by Tito and Kardelj, which is full of hostile attacks against the Soviet officials in Yugoslavia, does not at all correspond to the facts.

It would be monstrous to demand that the Soviet people who are working in Yugoslavia should fill their mouths with water and talk with no one. Soviet workers are politically mature people and not simple hired

labourers, who have no right to be interested in what is happening in Yugoslavia. It is only natural for them to talk with Yugoslav citizens, to ask them questions and to gain information, etc. One would have to be an incorrigible anti-Soviet to consider these talks as attempts to recruit people for the intelligence service, especially such people, who are «negatively disposed towards the new Yugoslavia». Only anti-Soviet people can think that the leaders of the Soviet Union care less for the welfare of new Yugoslavia than do the members of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY.

It is significant that these strange accusations against the Soviet representatives are met only in Yugoslavia. To us it appears that this accusation against the Soviet workers is made solely for the purpose of justifying the actions of the UDB in placing the Soviet workers in Yugoslavia under surveillance.

It must be emphasized that Yugoslav comrades visiting Moscow frequently visit other cities in the USSR, meet our people and freely talk with them. In no case did the Soviet Government place any restrictions on them. During his last visit to Moscow, Djilas went to Leningrad for a few days to talk with Soviet comrades.

According to the Yugoslav scheme, information about the Party and State work can only be obtained from the leading organs of the CC of the CPY or from the Government. Comrade Djilas did not obtain information from these organs of the USSR but from

the local organs of the Leningrad organizations. We did not consider it necessary to inquire into what he did there, and what facts he picked up. We think he did not collect material for the Anglo-American or French intelligence service but for the leading organs of Yugoslavia. Since this was correct we did not see any harm in it because this information might have contained instructive material for the Yugoslav comrades. Comrade Djilas cannot say that he met with any restrictions.

It may be asked now: Why should Soviet communists in Yugoslavia have fewer rights than Yugoslavs in the USSR?

* * *

In their letter of 13 April, Tito and Kardelj again refer to the question of trade relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, namely the alleged refusal of Comrade Krutikov to continue trade negotiations with the Yugoslav representatives. We have already explained to the Yugoslav comrades that Krutikov has denied the statements attributed to him. We have already explained that the Soviet Government never raised the question of suspending trade agreements and trade operations with Yugoslavia. Consequently we consider this question closed and have no intention of returning to it.

6. On the Incorrect Political Line of the

Politbureau of the CC of the CPY in Regard to the Class Struggle in Yugoslavia

In our letter we wrote that the spirit of the policy of class struggle is not felt in the CPY, that the capitalist elements are increasing in the cities and the villages and that the leaders of the Party are not undertaking any measures to check the capitalist elements.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny all this and consider our statements, which are a matter of principle, as insults to the CPY, avoiding an answer to the essential question. Their proofs are based only on the fact that consistent social reforms are being undertaken in Yugoslavia. However, this is almost negligible. The denial on the part of these comrades of the strengthening of the capitalist elements, and in connection with this, the sharpening of the class struggle in the village under the conditions of contemporary Yugoslavia, arises from the opportunist contention that, in the transition period between capitalism and socialism, the class struggle does not become sharper, as taught by Marxism-Leninism, but dies out, as averred by opportunists of the type of Bukharin, who postulated a decadent theory of the peaceful absorption of the capitalist elements into the socialist structure.

No one will deny that the social reforms which occurred in the USSR after the October Revolution were all-embracing and consistent with our teaching. However, this did not cause the CPSU(b) to conclude

that the class struggle in our country was weakening, nor that there was no danger of the strengthening of the capitalist elements. In 1920-21 Lenin stated that «while we live in a country of smallholders there is a stronger economic basis for capitalism in Russia than there is for communism», since «small-scale individual farming gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie continually, daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale». It is known that for fifteen years after the October Revolution, the question of measures for checking capitalist elements and later the liquidation of the kulaks as the last capitalist class, was never taken off the daily agenda of our Party. To underestimate the experiences of the CPSU(b) in matters relating to the development of socialism in Yugoslavia, is a great political danger, and cannot be allowed for Marxists, because socialism cannot be developed only in the cities, and in industry, but must also be developed in the villages and in agriculture.

It is no accident that the leaders of the CPY are avoiding the question of the class struggle and the checking of the capitalist elements in the village. What is more, in the speeches of the Yugoslav leaders there is no mention of the question of class differentiation in the village; the peasantry are considered as an organic whole, and the Party does not mobilize its forces in an effort to overcome the difficulties arising from the increase of the exploiting elements in the village.

However, the political situation in the village

gives no cause for complacency. Where, as in Yugoslavia, there is no nationalization of the land, where private ownership of the land exists and land is bought and sold, where considerable portions of land are concentrated in the hands of the kulaks, where hired labour is used, etc. the Party cannot be educated in the spirit of camouflaging the class struggle and smoothing over class controversies without disarming itself for the struggle with the main difficulties in the development of socialism. This means that the CPY is being lulled to sleep by the decadent opportunist theory of the peaceful integration of capitalist elements into socialism, borrowed from Bernstein, Vollmar and Bukharin.

Nor is it by accident that some of the most prominent leaders of the CPY are deviating from the Marxist-Leninist road on the question of the leading role of the working class. While Marxism-Leninism starts by recognizing the leading role of the working class in the process of liquidating capitalism and developing a socialist society, the leaders of the CPY have an entirely different opinion. It is enough to quote the following speech by Comrade Tito in Zagreb on 2 November 1946 (*Borba*, 2 November 1946): «We do not tell the peasants that they are the strongest pillar of our state in order that, eventually, we may get their votes, but because we know that that is what they are, and because they should be aware of what they are.»

This attitude is in complete contradiction to

Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism considers that in Europe and in the countries of people's democracy, the working class and not the peasantry is the most progressive, the most revolutionary class. As regards the peasantry, or rather its majority — the poor and middle peasants — they can be or are in a union with the working class, while the leading role in this union still belongs to the working class. However, the passage quoted not only denies the leading role to the working class, but proclaims that the entire peasantry, including that is the kulaks, is the strongest pillar in the new Yugoslavia. As can be seen this attitude expresses opinions which are natural to petty-bourgeois politicians but not to Marxist-Leninists.

7. On the Incorrect Policy of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY on the Question of Mutual Relations between the Party and the People's Front

In our previous letter we wrote that in Yugoslavia the CPY is not considered as the main leading force, but rather the People's Front; that Yugoslav leaders diminish the role of the Party and are in fact dissolving the Party into a non-party People's Front, allowing in this way the same cardinal error committed by the Mensheviks in Russia forty years ago.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny this, stating that all decisions of the People's Front are decisions of the

Party, but that they do not consider it necessary to state at what Party conference these decisions were approved.

In this lies the greatest error of the Yugoslav comrades. They are afraid openly to acclaim the Party and its decisions before the entire people so that the people may know that the leading force is the Party, that the Party leads the Front and not the reverse. According to the theory of Marxism-Leninism the CP is the highest form of organization of workers, which stands over all other organizations of workers, among others over the Soviet in the USSR, over the People's Front in Yugoslavia. The Party stands above all these organizations of working men not only because it has drawn in all the best elements of the workers, but because it has its own special programme, its special policy, on the basis of which it leads all the organizations of the workers. But the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY is afraid to admit this openly and proclaim it at the top of its voice to the working class and all the people of Yugoslavia. The Politbureau of the CC of the CPY feels that if it does not emphasize this factor, the other parties will not have occasion to develop their strength in their struggle. It also appears that Tito and Kardelj think that by this cheap cunning they can abolish the laws of historical development, fool the classes, fool history. But this is an illusion and self-deception. As long as there are antagonistic classes there will be a struggle between them, and as long as there is a strug-

gle it will be expressed in the work of various groups and parties, legally or illegally.

Lenin said that the Party is the most important weapon in the hands of the working class. The task of the leaders is to keep this weapon in readiness. However, since the Yugoslav leaders are hiding the banner of their Party and will not emphasize the role of the Party before the masses, they are blunting this weapon, diminishing the role of the Party and disarming the working class. It is ridiculous to think that because of the cheap cunning of the Yugoslav leaders the enemies will relinquish the fight. Because of this the Party should be kept fighting fit and ever-ready for the struggle against the enemy. Its banner should not be hidden and it should not be lulled to sleep by the thought that the enemy will relinquish the struggle. The Party should not stop organizing its forces, legally or illegally.

We feel that this limiting of the role of the CPY has gone too far. We refer here to the relations between the CPY and the People's Front, which we consider incorrect in principle. It must be borne in mind that in the People's Front a variety of classes are admitted: kulaks, merchants, small manufacturers, bourgeois intelligentsia, various political groups, including some bourgeois parties. The fact that, in Yugoslavia, only the People's Front enters the political arena and that the Party and its organizations do not take part in political life openly under their own

name, not only diminishes the role of the Party in the political life of the country but also undermines the Party as an independent political force, called upon to gain the confidence of the people and to spread its influence over ever broader masses of workers through open political work, through open propaganda of its opinions and its programme. Comrades Tito and Kardelj forget that the Party develops and that it can develop only in an open struggle with the enemy; that cheap cunning and machinations of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY cannot replace this struggle as a school for educating Party cadres. Their determined lack of desire to admit the error of their statements — namely that the CPY has no other programme than the programme of the People's Front — shows how far the Yugoslav leaders have deviated from Marxist-Leninist views on the Party. This might start liquidation tendencies regarding the CPY which would be a danger to the CPY itself and lead eventually to the degeneration of the Yugoslav People's Republic.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj state that the errors of the Mensheviks regarding the merging of the Marxist Party into a non-party mass organization were committed forty years ago and therefore can have no connection with the present mistakes of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY. Comrades Tito and Kardelj are profoundly mistaken. There can be no doubt of the theoretical and political connections between these two events, because, like the Mensheviks

in 1907 so, today, Tito and Kardelj forty years later, are equally debasing the Marxist Party, equally denying the role of the Party as the supreme form of organization which stands over all other mass workers' organizations, equally dissolving the Marxist Party into a non-party mass organization. The difference lies in the fact that the Mensheviks committed their errors in 1906-07, and, after being tried by the Marxist Party in Russia at the London Conference, did not return to these errors, whereas the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY, in spite of this instructive lesson, are bringing the same error back to life after forty years, and are passing it off as their own Party theory. This circumstance does not lessen but, on the contrary, aggravates the error of the Yugoslav comrades.

8. Regarding the Alarming Situation in the CPY

In our previous letter we wrote that the CPY retains a semi-legal status, in spite of the fact that it came into power more than three and a half years ago; that there is no democracy in the Party; there is no system of elections; there is no criticism or self-criticism, that the CPY Central Committee is not composed of elected persons but of co-opted persons.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny all these charges.

They write that «the majority of the members of the CC of the CPY are not co-opted», that «in December 1940, when the CPY was completely illegal...

at the Fifth Conference, which by the decision of the Comintern, had all the powers of a congress, a CC of the CPY was elected consisting of thirty-one members and ten candidates...» that «of this number ten members and six candidates died during the war» that besides this «two members were expelled from the CC», that the CC of the CPY now has «nineteen members elected at the Conference and seven co-opted members», that now «the CC of the CPY is composed of twenty-six members».

This statement does not correspond to the facts. As can be seen from the archives of the Comintern, at the Fifth Conference, which was held in October and not in December of 1940, thirty-one members of the CC of the CPY and ten candidates were not elected, but twenty-two members of the CC and sixteen candidates. Here is what Comrade Walter (Tito) reported from Belgrade at the end of October 1940: «To Comrade Dimitrov: The Fifth Conference of the CPY was held from 19-23 October. One hundred and one delegates from all over the country participated. A CC of twenty-two members was elected, among them two women, and sixteen candidates. Complete unity was manifested. Walter».

If, out of twenty-two elected members of the CC, ten died, this would leave twelve elected members. If two were expelled this would leave ten. Tito and Kardelj say that now there are twenty-six members of the CC of the CPY — therefore, if from this number

we subtract ten, this leaves sixteen co-opted members of the present CC of the CPY. It thus appears that the majority of the members of the CC of the CPY were co-opted. This applies not only to the members of the CC of the CPY but also to the local leaders, who are not elected but appointed.

We consider that such a system of creating leading organs of the Party, when the Party is in power and when it can use complete legality, cannot be called anything but semi-legal, and the nature of the organization sectarian-bureaucratic. It cannot be tolerated that Party meetings should not be held or held secretly; this must undermine the influence of the Party among the masses; nor can it be tolerated that acceptance into the Party is concealed from the workers; acceptance into the Party should play an important educational role in linking the Party to the working class and to all the workers.

If the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY had regard for the Party it would not tolerate such a condition in the Party and would, immediately on gaining power, that is, three and a half years ago, have asked the Party to call a Congress in order to reorganize on the lines of democratic centralism and start work as a completely legal Party.

It is entirely understandable that under such conditions in the Party, when there is no election of the leading organs, but only their appointment, there can be no talk of internal Party democracy, and much less

of criticism and self-criticism. We know that members are afraid to state their opinions, are afraid to criticize the system in the Party and prefer to keep their mouths shut, in order to avoid reprisals. It is no accident that the Minister of State Security is at the same time the Secretary of the CC for Party cadres or, as Tito and Kardelj say, the organizational secretary of the CC of the CPY. It is evident that the members and cadres of the Party are left to the supervision of the Ministry of State Security, which is completely impermissible and cannot be tolerated. It was sufficient for Žujović, at a session of the CC of the CPY, not to agree with a draft of the answer of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY to the letter from the CC of the CPSU(b), to be immediately expelled from the Central Committee.

As can be seen, the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY does not consider the Party as an independent entity, with the right to its own opinion, but as a partisan detachment, whose members have no right to discuss any questions but are obliged to fulfil all the desires of the «chief» without comment. We call this cultivating militarism in the Party, which is incompatible with the principles of democracy within a Marxist Party.

As is known, Trotsky also attempted to force a leadership based on militarist principles on the CPSU(b), but the Party, headed by Lenin, triumphed over him and condemned him; militarist measures

were rejected and internal Party democracy was confirmed as the most important principle of Party development.

We feel that this abnormal condition inside the CPY represents a serious danger to the life and development of the Party. The sooner this sectarian-bureaucratic regime within the Party is put an end to, the better it will be both for the CPY and for the Yugoslav Democratic Republic.

9. On the Arrogance of the Leaders of the CC of the CPY and Their Incorrect Attitude Towards Their Mistakes

As can be seen from the letter by Tito and Kardelj, they completely deny the existence of any mistake in the work of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY, as well as the slander and propaganda being conducted among the inner circles of Party cadres in Yugoslavia about the «degeneration» of the USSR into an imperialist state and so forth. They consider that this arises entirely from the inaccurate information received by the CPSU(b) regarding the situation in Yugoslavia. They consider that the CC of the CPSU(b) has been a «victim» of the slanderous and inaccurate information spread by Žujović and Hebrang, and maintain that if there had been no such false information regarding conditions in Yugoslavia there would have been no disagreements between the USSR and Yugo-

slavia. Because of this they came to the conclusion that it is not a matter of mistakes of the CC of the CPY and the criticism of these mistakes by the CC of the CPSU(b), but of the inaccurate information of Žujović and Hebrang who «fooled» the CPSU(b) with their information. They feel that everything would be put right if they punished Hebrang and Žujović. In this way a scapegoat has been found for their sins. We doubt whether Comrades Tito and Kardelj themselves believe the truth of this version, even though they seize on it as if it were true. They do this because they feel it is the easiest way out of the difficult situation, in which the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY finds itself. In emphasizing this false and apparently naive version they desire, not only to clear themselves of the responsibility for strained Yugoslav-Soviet relations by throwing the blame on the USSR, but also to blacken the CC of the CPSU(b) by representing it as being greedy for all «tendentious» and «anti-Party» information.

We feel that this attitude of Tito and Kardelj towards the CC of the CPSU(b) and their critical remarks regarding the errors of the Yugoslav comrades is not only dangerously unwise and false, but also deeply anti-Party.

If Tito and Kardelj were interested in discovering the truth and if the truth were not painful to them, they should think seriously about the following:

(a) Why should the CPSU(b)'s information about

the affairs in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania appear correct, and not cause any misunderstanding with the Communist Parties of those countries, while the information about Yugoslavia appears, according to the Yugoslav comrades, tendentious and anti-Party, and causes from their side anti-Soviet attacks and an unfriendly attitude towards the CPSU(b)?

(b) Why do friendly relations between the USSR and the countries of people's democracies develop and strengthen while Soviet-Yugoslav relations deteriorate?

(c) Why did the CPs of the people's democracies support the CPSU(b)'s letter of 27 March and condemn the mistakes of the CPY, while the Politbureau of the CPY, which would not admit its errors, remained isolated?

Was all this accidental?

In order to reveal the errors of the Politbureau of the CPY it is not necessary to obtain information from individual comrades such as, for example, Hebrang and Žujović. More than enough can be found in the official statements of the leaders of the CPY, such as Tito, Djilas, Kardelj and others, which appeared in the press.

We declare that Soviet citizens did not obtain any information from Hebrang. We declare that the talk between Žujović and the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia, Lavrentiev, did not reveal a tenth of what was

contained in the erroneous and anti-Soviet speeches of Yugoslav leaders. The reprisals taken against these comrades are not only an impermissible settling of private accounts incompatible with the principles of internal Party democracy, but also bear witness to the anti-Soviet attitude of the Yugoslav leaders, who consider talk between a Yugoslav communist and the Soviet Ambassador a crime.

We feel that behind the attempts of the Yugoslav leaders to clear themselves of the responsibility for straining Soviet-Yugoslav relations, lies the lack of desire by these comrades to admit their mistakes and their intention to continue an unfriendly policy towards the USSR.

Lenin says:

«The attitude of a political party towards its mistakes is one of the most important and most significant criteria of the seriousness of the party and the fulfilment of its obligations toward its class and towards the working masses. To admit errors frankly, to discover their cause, to analyse the situation which has been created by these errors, to discuss measures for correcting them — that is the sign of a serious party, that is the fulfilment of its obligations, that is the education of the class and the masses.»

Unfortunately, we must state that the leaders of the CPY, who will not admit and correct their errors, are crudely destroying this principal directive of Lenin.

We must also emphasize that, in contrast to the

Yugoslav leaders, the leaders of the French and Italian Communist Parties honourably admitted their errors at the Conference of nine Parties, conscientiously corrected them and thus enabled their Parties to strengthen their ranks and to educate their cadres.

We feel that underlying the unwillingness of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY honourably to admit their errors and to correct them is the unbounded arrogance of the Yugoslav leaders. Their heads were turned by the successes achieved. They became arrogant and now feel that the depth of the sea reaches only up to their knees. Not only have they become arrogant, but they even preach arrogance, not understanding that arrogance can be their own ruin.

Lenin says: «All revolutionary parties, which have existed in the past, perished because they were arrogant and because they did not see where their strength lay and were afraid to speak of their weaknesses. We will not perish because we are not afraid to speak of our weaknesses and we will learn to overcome them.»

Unfortunately we must state that the Yugoslav leaders, who do not suffer from undue modesty and who are still intoxicated with their successes, which are not so very great, have forgotten Lenin's teaching.

Tito and Kardelj, in their letter, speak of the merits and successes of the CPY, saying that the CC of the CPSU(b) earlier acknowledged these services and successes, but is now supposedly silent about them. This, naturally, is not true. No one can deny the services

and successes of the CPY. There is no doubt about this. However, we must also say that the services of the Communist Parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania are not less than those of the CPY. However, the leaders of these Parties behave modestly and do not boast about their successes, as do the Yugoslav leaders, who have pierced everyone's ears by their unlimited self-praises. It is also necessary to emphasize that the services of the French and Italian CPs to the revolution were not less but greater than those of Yugoslavia. Even though the French and Italian CPs have so far achieved less success than the CPY, this is not due to any special qualities of the CPY, but mainly because after the destruction of the Yugoslav Partisan Headquarters by German paratroopers, at a moment when the people's liberation movement in Yugoslavia was passing through a serious crisis, the Soviet army came to the aid of the Yugoslav people, crushed the German invader, liberated Belgrade and in this way created the conditions which were necessary for the CPY to achieve power. Unfortunately the Soviet army did not and could not render such assistance to the French and Italian CPs. If Comrade Tito and Comrade Kardelj bore this fact in mind they would be less boastful about their merits and successes and would behave with greater propriety and modesty.

The conceit of the Yugoslav leaders goes so far that they even attribute to themselves such merits as

can in no way be justified. Take, for example, the question of military science, The Yugoslav leaders claim that they have improved on the Marxist science of war with a new theory according to which war is regarded as a combined operation by regular troops, partisan units and popular insurrections. However, this so-called theory is as old as the world and is not new to Marxism. As is known, the Bolsheviks applied combined action of regular troops, partisan units and popular insurrections for the entire period of the civil war in Russia (1918-21), and applied it on a much wider scale than was done in Yugoslavia. However, the Bolsheviks did not say that by applying this method of military activity, they produced anything new in the science of war, because the same method was successfully applied long before the Bolsheviks by Field-Marshal Kutuzov in the war against Napoleon's troops in Russia in 1812.

However, even Field-Marshal Kutuzov did not claim to be the innovator in applying this method because the Spaniards in 1808 applied it in the war against Napoleon's troops. It thus appears that this science of war is actually 140 years old and this which they claim as their own service is actually the service of the Spaniards.

Besides this, we should bear in mind that the services of any leader in the past do not exclude the possibility of his committing serious errors later. We must not close our eyes to present errors because of past ser-

vices. In his time Trotsky also rendered revolutionary services, but this does not mean that the CPSU(b) could close its eyes to his crude opportunist mistakes which followed later, making him an enemy of the Soviet Union.

* * *

Tito and Kardelj in their letter proposed that the CPSU(b) should send representatives to Yugoslavia to study the Soviet-Yugoslav differences. We feel this course would be incorrect, since it is not a matter of verifying individual facts but of differences of principle.

As is known, the question of Soviet-Yugoslav differences has already become the property of the CC of the nine Communist Parties who have their Cominform. It would be highly irregular to exclude them from this matter. Therefore, we propose that this question be discussed at the next session of the Cominform.

CC of the CPSU(b)

Moscow,
4 May 1948.

Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Union to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia

22 May 1948

Your letters of 17 May 1948, and 20 May 1948, signed by Comrades Tito and Kardelj, have been received. The CPSU(b) considers that in these letters the leaders of the CPY have gone a step further in aggravating their crude mistakes in matters of principle, the harmfulness and danger of which the CPSU(b) indicated in its letter of 4 May 1948.

1. Comrades Tito and Kardelj write that they feel «so unequal that it is impossible for us to agree to have this matter decided now by the Informbureau», and further they allowed themselves the allusion that the Yugoslav leaders had allegedly been placed in that position by the CPSU(b). The CC of the CPSU(b) considers that there is not a scrap of truth in this assertion. There is no inequality for the Yugoslav Communist Party nor can there be in the Informbureau of nine Parties. All know that during the organization of the Informbureau of nine Communist Parties, all Communist Parties started from the indisputable position that every Party should submit a report to the Informbureau, just as every Party has the right to criticize

other Parties. From this point the Conference of nine Parties started when, at its meetings in September 1947, it listened to the reports of the Central Committees of all Parties without exception. The Conference of nine Communist Parties initiated the right that each Party has the right to criticize any other Party. The Italian and French comrades did not dispute the right of other Parties to criticize their mistakes, and they accepted harshness of criticism in a Bolshevik manner.

It is a known fact that the Italian and French comrades did not oppose the right of other Parties to criticize their mistakes. They have, on the contrary, borne the brunt of Bolshevik criticism and benefited from its conclusions. Moreover, the Yugoslav comrades took advantage of the opportunity to criticize the mistakes of the Italian and French comrades and did not consider that by so doing they were infringing on the equality of those Parties.

Why are Yugoslav comrades making this radical change, and demanding the liquidation of already established precedents in the Informbureau? Because they believe that the Yugoslav Party and its leadership ought to be placed in a privileged position, and that the statute of the Informbureau does not apply to them; that, having the privilege of criticizing other Parties, they should not themselves submit to the criticism of other Parties. However, if we may say so, beliefs of that kind have nothing in common with equal-

ity. In fact this is nothing but a request from the Yugoslav leaders for a privileged position for the CPY (in the Cominform), a position which does not exist and cannot exist for any Party. We have taken and continue to take this stand, for without it the work of the Informbureau could not continue. Each Communist Party is obliged to submit reports to the Informbureau, each Communist Party has the right to criticize any other Communist Party. The refusal of the Yugoslavs to submit reports on their actions to the Cominform, and to hear criticisms from other Communist Parties, means a violation of the equality of Communist Parties.

2. In their letter of 17 May, Comrades Tito and Kardelj repeat the claim made in their previous letter, alleging that the CPSU(b) criticism of Yugoslav Communist Party leadership is based on incorrect information.

But the Yugoslav comrades do not produce any evidence to prove this statement. The statement remains without substantiation and the CPSU(b)'s criticism remains unanswered, even though Comrades Tito and Kardelj state in their letter that they do not seek to avoid criticism on questions of principle. Maybe the Yugoslav leaders simply have nothing to say to justify themselves?

It is one of two things: either the Politbureau of the CPY, deep in its soul, is aware of the seriousness of the mistakes committed, but wishing to conceal this

from the CPY and to deceive it, declares that the mistakes do not exist, in the meantime laying the blame on innocent men, who were supposed to have misinformed the CPSU(b); or it really does not understand that by its mistakes it is deviating from Marxism-Leninism. However, in that case it must be admitted that the Politbureau's ignorance of the principles of Marxism is extremely great.

3. Although they refuse to answer the direct questions of the CPSU(b) and aggravate their mistakes by their stubborn unwillingness to admit and correct them, Comrades Tito and Kardelj assure us with words that they will show with deeds that they will remain true to the Soviet Union and the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. After what has happened we have no reason to believe in these verbal assurances. Comrades Tito and Kardelj have on many occasions given promises to the CPSU(b) which have not been fulfilled. From their letters and especially from their last letter we are becoming ever more certain of this. The Politbureau of the CPY, and especially Comrade Tito, should understand that the anti-Soviet and anti-Russian policy which they have recently pursued in their everyday work has done all that was needed to undermine faith in them on the part of the CPSU(b) and the Government of the USSR.

4. Comrades Tito and Kardelj complain that they have got into a difficult position and that the consequences of this are very serious for Yugoslavia. This of

course is true, but the blame for this lies exclusively with Comrades Tito and Kardelj and with other members of the Politbureau of the CPY, who have put their own prestige and ambition above the interests of the Yugoslav people, and, instead of admitting and correcting their mistakes in the interests of the people, have stubbornly denied their mistakes, which are fatal for the Yugoslav people.

5. Comrades Tito and Kardelj claim that the CC of the CPY refuses to attend the meeting of the Informbureau to discuss the question of the Yugoslav Communist Party. If this is their final decision, then it means that they have nothing to tell the Informbureau in their defence, and that they are tacitly admitting their guilt and are afraid to appear before their fraternal Communist Parties. Moreover, refusal to report to the Informbureau means that the CPY has taken the path of cutting itself off from the united socialist people's front of people's democracies headed by the Soviet Union, and that it is now preparing the Yugoslav Party and people for a betrayal of the united front of people's democracies and the USSR. Since the Informbureau is a Party foundation of the united front, such a policy leads to the betrayal of the work done for international solidarity of the workers and to the adoption of an attitude of nationalism which is hostile to the cause of the working class.

Irrespective of whether the representatives of the CC of the CPY attend the meeting of the Informbu-

reau, the CPSU(b) insists upon the discussion of the situation in the CPY at the next meeting of the Informbureau.

In view of the request of the Czechoslovak and Hungarian comrades that the meeting of the Informbureau take place in the second half of June, the CPSU(b) expresses its agreement with this proposal.

CC of the CPSU(b)

Moscow,
22 May 1948.