

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

*To Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin,
the most tireless fighter for progress history has ever known*

*“Well, here is the dawn! Soon the sun will rise.
The time will come when this sun will shine for us.”*
— J.V. Stalin’s 1901 New Year’s toast at
a worker’s home in Batumi

J. V.
STALIN
SELECTED WORKS

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J.V. STALIN

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THE LIFE AND WORK OF J.V. STALIN

(Statement of the Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist) on the Occasion of the 70th Anniversary of the Death of Comrade J.V. Stalin, March 5, 2023)

J.V. Stalin died on March 5, 1953, 70 years ago. He left a socialist system constituted of 12 countries at a time the world was engaged in an historic struggle between democratic and anti-imperialist forces, on one side, and imperialist and anti-democratic forces, on the other. Stalin and the Soviet Union supported the anti-imperialist and democratic forces, the cause of the peoples of the world and peaceful coexistence between countries with different and even opposite economic and political systems. Following his death, events unfolded which finally led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the eastern European states between 1989 and 1991.

As is the case with the life and work of all the personalities of the 20th century, the assessment of the life and work of J.V. Stalin is on-going. This is because the period in which he lived and worked was the battleground between socialism and capitalism and to this day remains the fighting ground between the forces of renewal and the forces of retrogression. Assessments have been given in the past according to the ideological convictions of the assessors. People will yet make their own judgements in the present and future as well. We are confident they will look at the name and work of Stalin favourably.

During this period when revolution is in retreat and there is an urgent need for renewal, it is necessary to assess various events and personalities of the 20th century on the basis of the objectivity of consideration. There is no place for glossing over important matters and making judgements on the basis of prejudice. For example, the Anglo-American imperialist propagandists attributed the collapse of the former Soviet Union and people's democracies in eastern Europe to Stalin, declaring that it proved socialism and communism were failures.

Stalin died nearly 40 years prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. How is it that from the time of Nikita Khrushchev to that of Mikhail Gorbachev, during which the leaders of the Soviet Union were openly anti-Stalin, none of the contradictions gnawing at the base of the system in the Soviet Union were resolved? How is it that

they transformed the Soviet Union into a military-industrial complex and destroyed its socialist economy, which put the Soviet Union in deep crisis and finally led it to its collapse? How is it that they colluded with the U.S. against revolution and socialism and contended for world domination?

As was the case with Khrushchev, so too with those who followed him — they not only blamed Stalin for whatever problems existed but, most importantly, none of them analysed and summed up the actual conditions of their times. They did not find out what was wrong at that time. They did not resolve the contradictions within the system in favour of the working class and people, in favour of the advance of the society.

Those who hate Stalin and concentrate their attacks on his personality and honour are either misled or afraid to analyse and discuss in an unprejudiced manner. Attempts to reduce discourse to either being for Stalin or against him do not look at the period during which Stalin was at the head of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) and the state of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This covers the period from the time V.I. Lenin died on January 24, 1924 to the day Stalin himself died.

This is an opportune time to discuss the Stalin period in the Soviet Union and the experience of socialist revolution and socialist construction. It is also incumbent upon those who wish to take up the historic task of renewal to examine the role of other countries and personalities during the same period and the 40-year period which followed, known as the Cold War period, and what has happened since then. Far from engaging in this analysis and objective assessment, the enemies of change zero-in on slandering the personality of J.V. Stalin as well as blocking discussion today by turning the serious concerns of the people over matters of war and peace into personality politics, scandal mongering and nonsense about the world being divided between allegedly progressive liberal democracies which uphold human rights and want peace and democracy because they follow what they call a rules-based international order and backward autocracies that want hegemony, oppose human rights and are warmongering. Disinformation to ensure that the objective and subjective reality of that time and the one that followed are not discussed dispassionately is for purposes of denying the peoples of the world of an outlook on the basis of which they can turn things around in a manner that favours them today.

How is it possible to deal with the problems of the economy

without analysing the experience of the construction of socialism? How is it possible to deal with the problems of democracy at this time, the period of renewal, without assessing what has been achieved in the sphere of the political process on the world scale? There is a need to sum up the achievements in the sphere of theory, as well, and draw the warranted conclusions in order to enrich social science. This is crucial for the renewal of the society.

Speaking objectively and without paying any attention to anyone's personal prejudices or ideological preferences or beliefs, it has to be recognized that socialism was built in the Soviet Union and that this was an entirely new system. No such system existed in the world before. Stalin was also the architect of the victory of the world over nazi-fascism. This too was a new experience. For the first time in recent history, a world crisis of the dimensions of the Second World War was resolved in favour of the peoples. This victory over fascism transformed the ratio of class forces which, for the first time in human history, favoured socialism.

Stalin was also the architect of turning into life the policy of peaceful coexistence between differing systems and states. The new social system, the socialist system based on the theory of Karl Marx, Frederick Engels and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, to which Stalin also made important contributions, was only in its initial stage. It had yet to develop in the course of the class struggle against all those forces internally and externally standing in its way.

The death of J.V. Stalin however was a signal to all enemies of socialism to get to work and destroy it before it could assume permanence in the course of its development to creating a communist society, without classes or any form of exploitation and oppression so that the world could stand united as one humanity of fraternal peoples. A decisive element for this advance was the uninterrupted development in the economic sphere and deepening and broadening of democracy in the political sphere, so as to create and strengthen a mass democratic political process which ensures it is the working class and other working people who wield the political power. The role of the communist party and mass organizations of collectives of all kinds is to organize the working class and people to participate in defining and defending the general interests of the society so that the individual and collective interests of its members are harmonized and affirmed.

The economy develops on an uninterrupted basis when more is put back into it than is taken out, ensuring that the well-being of the

working population and of those who have retired and the rearing of the new generation are put in the first place. Consistent with investing in the economy is the steady creation of forms which empower the working class and other working people by renewing the political process and democratic institutions so that only the electorate wields political power.

Far from this taking place in the period after Stalin died, first Khrushchev and then Leonid Brezhnev not only concentrated more and more political power in their own hands but they also militarized the economy. This led to the discontent of the masses and the ruination of the economy. Far from blaming Stalin for the consequences of such measures, the retrogression requires analysis and for warranted conclusions to be drawn.

It cannot be said that there were no problems during the period of Stalin and that he was infallible. Those who raise such issues do so to divert the posing of pertinent questions. What were the problems of socialist construction and socialist revolution? What was going on on the world scale? This should be analysed just as the problems of capitalism should also be analysed, far from dismissing them by declaring that capitalism represents individual rights and freedom or by repeating that it is riddled with contradictions and needs to be replaced without elaborating an alternative and bringing it into being.

What is going on all over the world today is there for all to see. Is the world aspiring for a society which is filled with anarchy and violence and in which narrow private interests organized into oligopolies operate as cartels and coalitions and usurp power by force? Do the peoples of the world favour the rule of narrow private interests over the majority and to have retrogression be the order of the day? This is not the kind of society the working class and masses of the people aspire to. The working class already has its own direct experience with such societies as do the peoples of the world.

What kind of society is the future to bring? What changes are to be brought about? These are the pertinent questions. Human civilization cannot go backwards. Motion takes place independent of anyone's will. The peoples of the world can influence the constant changes and developments to favour them on the basis of putting forward the demand of the present for renewal, by defending and bringing to the fore what was positive from the past and discarding what is negative in the present — all that is beneath the modern standards human beings have given rise to.

Those who hate Stalin do not want to answer the call of history, the call of the present. They are satisfied that the Soviet Union and the eastern European regimes collapsed and do not want to see what the results of that have given rise to in the present. They have a guilty conscience and self-interest in not permitting the summation of the entire historical experience of the over 100 years since the triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution or the last 80 years since World War II began and ended.

Today it is incumbent on the working class to take stock of the situation and resolve the present-day contradictions in favour of the people. When a summation of this period is done, the name of J.V. Stalin will shine. It is in the interests of the working class to take up his achievements by acting on what history is telling us to do today and turn historic success into historic victory. The name and work of J.V. Stalin will continue to be highly evaluated by all progressive forces.

(cpcml.ca)

THE PROLETARIAN CLASS AND THE PROLETARIAN PARTY

(Concerning Paragraph One of the Party Rules)

January 1, 1905

The time when people boldly proclaimed “Russia, one and indivisible,” has gone. Today even a child knows that there is no such thing as Russia “one and indivisible,” that Russia long ago split up into two opposite classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Today it is no secret to anyone that the struggle between these two classes has become the axis around which our contemporary life revolves.

Nevertheless, until recently it was difficult to notice all this, the reason being that hitherto we saw only individual groups in the arena of the struggle, for it was only individual groups in individual towns and parts of the country that waged the struggle, while the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, as classes, were not easily discernible. But now towns and districts have united, various groups of the proletariat have joined hands, joint strikes and demonstrations have broken out — and before us has unfolded the magnificent picture of the struggle between the two Russias — bourgeois Russia and proletarian Russia. Two big armies have entered the arena — the army of proletarians and the army of the bourgeoisie — and the struggle between these two armies embraces the whole of our social life.

Since an army cannot operate without leaders, and since every army has a vanguard which marches at its head and lights up its path, it is obvious that with these armies there had to appear corresponding groups of leaders, corresponding parties, as they are usually called.

Thus, the picture presents the following scene: on one side there is the bourgeois army, headed by the liberal party; on the other, there is the proletarian army, headed by the Social-Democratic Party; each army, in its class struggle, is led by its own party.*

We have mentioned all this in order to compare the proletarian party with the proletarian class and thus briefly to bring out the general features of the Party.

* We do not mention the other parties in Russia, because there is no need to deal with them in examining the questions under discussion.

The foregoing makes it sufficiently clear that the proletarian party, being a fighting group of leaders, must, firstly, be considerably smaller than the proletarian class with respect to membership; secondly, it must be superior to the proletarian class with respect to its understanding and its experience; and, thirdly, it must be a united organization.

In our opinion, what has been said needs no proof, for it is self-evident that, so long as the capitalist system exists, with its inevitably attendant poverty and backwardness of the masses, the proletariat as a whole cannot rise to the desired level of class consciousness, and, consequently, there must be a group of class-conscious leaders to enlighten the proletarian army in the spirit of socialism, to unite and lead it in its struggle. It is also clear that a party which has set out to lead the *fighting* proletariat must not be a chance conglomeration of individuals, but a united centralized *organization*, so that its activities can be directed according to a single plan.

Such, in brief, are the general features of our Party. Bearing all this in mind, let us pass to the main question: Whom can we call a Party member? Paragraph One of the Party Rules, which is the subject of the present article, deals with precisely this question.

And so, let us examine this question.

Whom, then, can we call a member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party — i.e., what are the duties of a Party member?

Our Party is a Social-Democratic Party. This means that it has its own program (the immediate and the ultimate aims of the movement), its own tactics (methods of struggle) and its own organizational principle (form of association). *Unity* of programmatic, tactical and organizational views is the basis on which our Party is built. Only the *unity* of these views can unite the Party members in *one* centralized party. If unity of views collapses, the Party collapses. Consequently, only one who fully accepts the Party's program, tactics and organizational principle can be called a Party member. Only one who has adequately studied and has fully accepted our Party's programmatic, tactical and organizational views can be in the ranks of our Party and, thereby, in the ranks of the leaders of the proletarian army.

But is it enough for a Party member merely to *accept* the Party's program, tactics and organizational views? Can a person like that be regarded as a true leader of the proletarian army? Of course not! In the first place, everybody knows that there are plenty of windbags in

the world who would readily “accept” the Party’s program, tactics and organizational views, but who are incapable of being anything else than windbags. It would be a desecration of the Party’s Holy of Holies to call a windbag like that a Party member (i.e., a leader of the proletarian army)! Moreover, our Party is not a school of philosophy or a religious sect. Is not our Party a *fighting* party? Since it is, is it not self-evident that our Party will not be satisfied with a platonic *acceptance* of its program, tactics and organizational views, that it will undoubtedly demand that its members should *apply* the views they have accepted? Hence, whoever wants to be a member of our Party cannot rest content with merely accepting our Party’s programmatic, tactical and organizational views, but must set about applying these views, putting them into effect.

But what does applying the Party’s views mean for a Party member? When can he apply these views? Only when he is fighting, when he is marching with the whole Party at the head of the proletarian army. Can the struggle be waged by solitary, scattered individuals? Certainly not! On the contrary, people first unite, first they organize, and only then do they go into battle. If that is not done, all struggle is fruitless. Clearly, then, the Party members, too, will be able to fight and, consequently, apply the Party’s views, only if they unite in a compact *organization*. It is also clear that the more compact the organization in which the Party members unite, the better will they be able to fight, and, consequently, the more fully will they apply the Party’s program, tactics and organizational views. It is not for nothing that our Party is called an *organization* of leaders and not a conglomeration of individuals. And, if our Party is an *organization* of leaders, it is obvious that only those can be regarded as members of this Party, of this organization, who work in this organization and, therefore, deem it their duty to merge their wishes with the wishes of the Party and to act in unison with the Party.

Hence, to be a Party member one must apply the Party’s program, tactics and organizational views; to apply the Party’s views one must fight for them; and to fight for these views one must work in a Party organization, work in unison with the Party. Clearly, to be a Party member one must belong to one of the Party organizations.*

* Just as every complex organism is made up of an incalculable number of extremely simple organisms, so our Party, being a complex and general organization, is made up of numerous district and local bodies called Party organizations, provided they have been endorsed by the Party congress or

Only when we join one of the Party organizations and thus merge our personal interests with the Party's interests can we become Party members, and, consequently, real leaders of the proletarian army.

If our Party is not a conglomeration of individual windbags, but an *organization* of leaders which, through its Central Committee, is worthily leading the proletarian army forward, then all that has been said above is self-evident.

The following must also be noted.

Up till now our Party has resembled a hospitable patriarchal family, ready to take in all who sympathize. But now that our Party has become a centralized *organization*, it has thrown off its patriarchal aspect and has become in all respects like a *fortress*, the gates of which are opened only to those who are worthy. And that is of great importance to us. At a time when the autocracy is trying to corrupt the class consciousness of the proletariat with "trade unionism," nationalism, clericalism and the like, and when, on the other hand, the liberal intelligentsia is persistently striving to kill the political independence of the proletariat and to impose its tutelage upon it — at such a time we must be extremely vigilant and never forget that our Party is a *fortress*, the gates of which are opened only to those who have been tested.

We have ascertained two essential conditions of Party membership (acceptance of the program and work in a Party organization). If to these we add a third condition, namely, that a Party member must render the Party financial support, then we shall have all the conditions that give one right to the title of Party member.

Hence, a member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is one who accepts the program of this Party, renders the Party financial support and *works in one of the Party organizations*.

That is how Paragraph One of the Party Rules, drafted by Comrade Lenin,* was formulated.

The formula, as you see, springs entirely from the view that our Party is a centralized *organization* and not a *conglomeration* of individuals.

Therein lies the supreme merit of this formula.

the Central Committee. As you see, not only committees are called Party organizations. To direct the activities of these organizations according to a single plan there is a Central Committee, through which these local Party organizations constitute one large centralised organization.

* Lenin is the outstanding theoretician and practical leader of revolutionary social-democracy.

But it appears that some comrades reject Lenin's formula on the grounds that it is "narrow" and "inconvenient," and propose their own formula, which, it must be supposed, is neither "narrow" nor "inconvenient." We are referring to Martov's* formula, which we shall now analyse.

Martov's formula is: "A member of the RSDLP is one who accepts its program, supports the Party financially and renders it regular personal assistance under the direction of one of its organizations." As you see, this formula omits the third essential condition of Party membership, namely, the duty of Party members *to work* in one of the Party *organizations*. It appears that Martov regards this definite and essential condition as superfluous, and in his formula he has substituted for it the nebulous and dubious "personal assistance under the direction of one of the Party organizations." It appears, then, that one can be a member of the Party without belonging to any Party organization (a fine "party," to be sure!) and without feeling obliged to submit to the Party's will (fine "Party discipline," to be sure!). Well, and how can the Party "regularly" direct persons who do not belong to any Party organization and, consequently, do not feel absolutely obliged to submit to Party discipline?

That is the question that shatters Martov's formula of Paragraph One of the Party Rules, and it is answered in masterly fashion in Lenin's formula, inasmuch as the latter definitely stipulates that a third and indispensable condition of Party membership is *that one must work in a Party organization*.

All we have to do is to throw out of Martov's formula the nebulous and meaningless "personal assistance under the direction of one of the Party organizations." With this condition eliminated, there remain only two conditions in Martov's formula (acceptance of the program and financial support), which, by themselves, are utterly worthless, since every windbag can "accept" the Party program and support the Party financially — but that does not in the least entitle him to Party membership.

A "convenient" formula, we must say!

We say that real Party members cannot possibly rest content with merely accepting the Party program, but must without fail strive to apply the program they have accepted. Martov answers: You are too strict, for it is not so very necessary for a Party member to apply the program he has accepted, once he is willing to render

* Martov is one of the editors of *Iskra*.

the Party financial support, and so forth. It looks as though Martov is sorry for certain windbag “social-democrats” and does not want to close the Party’s doors to them.

We say, further, that inasmuch as the application of the program entails fighting, and that it is impossible to fight without unity, it is the duty of every prospective Party member to join one of the Party organizations, merge his wishes with those of the Party and, in unison with the Party, lead the fighting proletarian army, i.e., he must organize in the well-formed detachments of a centralized party. To this Martov answers: It is not so very necessary for Party members to organize in well-formed detachments, to unite in organizations; fighting single-handed is good enough.

What, then, is our Party? we ask. A chance conglomeration of individuals, or a united organization of leaders? And if it is an organization of leaders, can we regard as a member one who does not belong to it and, consequently, does not consider it his bounden duty to submit to its discipline? Martov answers that the Party is not an organization, or, rather, that the Party is an *unorganized* organization (fine “centralism,” to be sure!)

Evidently, in Martov’s opinion, our Party is not a centralized organization, but a conglomeration of local organizations and individual “social-democrats” who have accepted our Party program, etc. But if our Party is not a centralized organization it will not be a fortress, the gates of which can be opened only for those who have been tested. And, indeed, to Martov, as is evident from his formula, the Party is not a fortress but a banquet, which every sympathizer can freely attend. A little knowledge, an equal amount of sympathy, a little financial support and there you are — you have full right to count as a Party member. Don’t listen — cries Martov to cheer up the frightened “Party members” — don’t listen to those people who maintain that a Party member must belong to one of the Party organizations and thus subordinate his wishes to the wishes of the Party. In the first place, it is hard for a man to accept these conditions; it is no joke to subordinate one’s wishes to those of the Party! And, secondly, as I have already pointed out in my explanation, the opinion of those people is mistaken. And so, gentlemen, you are welcome to... the banquet!

It looks as though Martov is sorry for certain professors and high-school students who are loth to subordinate their wishes to the wishes of the Party, and so he is forcing a breach in our Party fortress through which these estimable gentlemen may smuggle into

our Party. He is opening the door to opportunism, and this at a time when thousands of enemies are assailing the class consciousness of the proletariat!

But that is not all. The point is that Martov's dubious formula makes it possible for opportunism to arise in our Party from another side.

Martov's formula, as we know, refers only to the acceptance of the program; about tactics and organization it contains not a word; and yet, unity of organizational and tactical views is no less essential for Party unity than unity of programmatic views. We may be told that nothing is said about this even in Comrade Lenin's formula. True, but there is no need to say anything about it in Comrade Lenin's formula. Is it not self-evident that one who works in a Party organization and, consequently, fights in unison with the Party and submits to Party discipline, cannot pursue tactics and organizational principles other than the Party's tactics and the Party's organizational principles? But what would you say of a "Party member" who has accepted the Party program, but does not belong to any Party organization? What guarantee is there that such a "member's" tactics and organizational views will be those of the Party and not some other? That is what Martov's formula fails to explain! As a result of Martov's formula we would have a queer "party," whose "members" subscribe to the same program (and that is questionable!), but differ in their tactical and organizational views! What ideal variety! In what way will our Party differ from a banquet?

There is just one question we should like to ask: What are we to do with the ideological and practical centralism that was handed down to us by the Second Party Congress and which is radically contradicted by Martov's formula? Throw it overboard? If it comes to making a choice, it will undoubtedly be more correct to throw Martov's formula overboard.

Such is the absurd formula Martov presents to us in opposition to Comrade Lenin's formula!

We are of the opinion that the decision of the Second Party Congress, which adopted Martov's formula, was the result of thoughtlessness, and we hope that the Third Party Congress will not fail to rectify the blunder of the Second Congress and adopt Comrade Lenin's formula.

We shall briefly recapitulate: The proletarian army entered the arena of the struggle. Since every army must have a vanguard, this army also had to have such a vanguard. Hence the appearance of a

group of proletarian leaders — the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. As the vanguard of a definite army, this Party must, firstly, be armed with its own program, tactics and organizational principle; and, secondly, it must be a united organization. To the question — who can be called a member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party? — this Party can have only one answer: one who accepts the Party program, supports the Party financially and works in one of the Party organizations.

It is this obvious truth that Comrade Lenin has expressed in his splendid formula.

ARMED INSURRECTION AND OUR TACTICS

July 15, 1905

The revolutionary movement “has already brought about the necessity for an armed uprising” — this idea, expressed by the Third Congress of our Party, finds increasing confirmation day after day. The flames of revolution are flaring up with ever-increasing intensity, now here and now there calling forth local uprisings. The three days’ barricade and street fighting in Lodz, the strike of many tens of thousands of workers in Ivanovo-Voznesensk with the inevitable bloody collisions with the troops, the uprising in Odessa, the “mutiny” in the Black Sea Fleet and in the Libau naval depot, and the “week” in Tiflis — are all harbingers of the approaching storm. It is approaching, approaching irresistibly, it will break over Russia any day and, in a mighty, cleansing flood, sweep away all that is antiquated and rotten; it will wipe out the disgrace called the autocracy, under which the Russian people have suffered for ages. The last convulsive efforts of Tsarism — the intensification of repression of every kind, the proclamation of martial law over half the country and the multiplication of gallows, all accompanied by alluring speeches addressed to the liberals and by false promises of reform — these things will not save it from the fate history has in store for it. The days of the autocracy are numbered; the storm is inevitable. A new social order is already being born, welcomed by the entire people, who are expecting renovation and regeneration from it.

What new questions is this approaching storm raising before our Party? How must we adjust our organization and tactics to the new requirements of life so that we may take a more active and organized part in the uprising, which is the only necessary beginning of the revolution? To guide the uprising, should we — the advanced detachment of the class which is not only the vanguard, but also the main driving force of the revolution — set up special bodies, or is the existing Party machinery enough?

These questions have been confronting the Party and demanding immediate solution for several months already. For those who worship “spontaneity,” who degrade the Party’s objects to the level of simply following in the wake of life, who drag at the tail and do not march at the head as the advanced class-conscious detachment

should do, such questions do not exist. Insurrection is spontaneous, they say, it is impossible to organize and prepare it, every prearranged plan of action is a utopia (they are opposed to any sort of “plan” — why, that is “consciousness” and not a “spontaneous phenomenon”!), a waste of effort — social life follows its own, unknown paths and will shatter all our projects. Hence, they say, we must confine ourselves to conducting propaganda and agitation in favour of the idea of insurrection, the idea of the “self-arming” of the masses; we must only exercise “political guidance”; as regards “technical” guidance of the insurgent people, let anybody who likes undertake that.

But we have always exercised such guidance up to now! — the opponents of the “khvostist policy” reply. Wide agitation and propaganda, political guidance of the proletariat, are absolutely essential. That goes without saying. But to confine ourselves to such general tasks means either evading an answer to the question which life bluntly puts to us, or revealing an utter inability to adjust our tactics to the requirements of the rapidly growing revolutionary struggle. We must, of course, now intensify political agitation tenfold, we must try to establish our influence not only over the proletariat, but also over those numerous strata of the “people” who are gradually joining the revolution; we must try to popularize among all classes of the population the idea that an uprising is necessary. But we cannot confine ourselves solely to this! To enable the proletariat to utilize the impending revolution for the purposes of its own class struggle, to enable it to establish a democratic system that will provide the greatest guarantees for the subsequent struggle for socialism — it, the proletariat, around which the opposition is rallying, must not only be in the centre of the struggle, but become the leader and guide of the uprising. It is *the technical guidance and organizational preparation of the all-Russian uprising* that constitute the new tasks with which life has confronted the proletariat. And if our Party wishes to be the real political leader of the working class it cannot and must not repudiate these new tasks.

And so, what must we do to achieve this object? What must our first steps be?

Many of our organizations have already answered this question in a practical way by directing part of their forces and resources to the purpose of arming the proletariat. Our struggle against the autocracy has entered the stage when the necessity of arming is universally admitted. But mere realization of the necessity of arming is

not enough — *the practical task must be bluntly and clearly put before the Party*. Hence, our committees must at once, forthwith, proceed to arm the people locally, to set up special groups to arrange this matter, to organize district groups for the purpose of procuring arms, to organize workshops for the manufacture of different kinds of explosives, to draw up plans for seizing state and private stores of arms and arsenals. We must not only arm the people “with a burning desire to arm themselves,” as the new *Iskra* advises us, but also “take the most energetic measures to arm the proletariat” in actual fact, as the Third Party Congress made it incumbent upon us to do. It is easier on this issue than on any other to reach agreement with the section that has split off from the Party (if it is really in earnest about arming and is not merely talking about “a burning desire to arm themselves”), as well as with the national social-democratic organizations, such as, for example, the Armenian Federalists and others who have set themselves the same object. Such an attempt has already been made in Baku, where after the February massacre our committee, the Balakhany-Bibi-Eibat group and the Gnchak Committee¹ set up among themselves an organizing committee for procuring arms. It is absolutely essential that this difficult and responsible undertaking be organized by joint efforts, and we believe that factional interests should least of all hinder the amalgamation of all the social-democratic forces on this ground.

In addition to increasing stocks of arms and organizing their procurement and manufacture, it is necessary to devote most serious attention to the task of organizing fighting squads of every kind for the purpose of utilising the arms that are being procured. Under no circumstances should actions such as distributing arms directly to the masses be resorted to. In view of the fact that our resources are limited and that it is extremely difficult to conceal weapons from the vigilant eyes of the police, we shall be unable to arm any considerable section of the population, and all our efforts will be wasted. It will be quite different when we set up a special fighting organization. Our fighting squads will learn to handle their weapons, and during the uprising — irrespective of whether it breaks out spontaneously or is prepared beforehand — they will come out as the chief and leading units around which the insurgent people will rally, and under whose leadership they will march into battle. Thanks to their experience and organization, and also to the fact that they will be well armed, it will be possible to utilize all the forces of the insurgent people and thereby achieve the immediate object — the arming

of the entire people and the execution of the prearranged plan of action. They will quickly capture various stores of arms, government and public offices, the post office, the telephone exchange, and so forth, which will be necessary for the further development of the revolution.

But these fighting squads will be needed not only when the revolutionary uprising has already spread over the whole town; their role will be no less important on the eve of the uprising. During the past six months it has become convincingly clear to us that the autocracy, which has discredited itself in the eyes of all classes of the population, has concentrated all its energy on mobilizing the dark forces of the country — professional hooligans, or the ignorant and fanatical elements among the Tatars — for the purpose of fighting the revolutionaries. Armed and protected by the police, they are terrorizing the population and creating a tense atmosphere for the liberation movement. Our fighting organizations must always be ready to offer due resistance to all the attempts made by these dark forces, and must try to convert the anger and the resistance called forth by their actions into an anti-government movement. The armed fighting squads, ready to go out into the streets and take their place at the head of the masses of the people at any moment, can easily achieve the object set by the Third Congress — “to organize armed resistance to the actions of the Black Hundreds, and generally, of all reactionary elements led by the government” (“Resolution on Attitude Towards the Government’s Tactics on the Eve of the Revolution” — see “Announcement”).²

One of the main tasks of our fighting squads, and of military-technical organization in general, should be to draw up the plan of the uprising for their particular districts and coordinate it with the plan drawn up by the Party centre for the whole of Russia. Ascertain the enemy’s weakest spots, choose the points from which the attack against him is to be launched, distribute all the forces over the district and thoroughly study the topography of the town — all this must be done beforehand, so that we shall not be taken by surprise under any circumstances. It is totally inappropriate here to go into a detailed analysis of this aspect of our organizations’ activity. Strict secrecy in drawing up the plan of action must be accompanied by the widest possible dissemination among the proletariat of military-technical knowledge which is absolutely necessary for conducting street fighting. For this purpose we must utilize the services of the military men in the organization. For this purpose also we must uti-

lize the services of a number of other comrades who will be extremely useful in this matter because of their natural talent and inclinations.

Only such thorough preparation for insurrection can ensure for social-democracy the leading role in the forthcoming battles between the people and the autocracy.

Only complete fighting preparedness will enable the proletariat to transform the isolated clashes with the police and the troops into a nationwide uprising with the object of setting up a provisional revolutionary government in place of the Tsarist government.

The supporters of the “khvostist policy” notwithstanding, the organized proletariat will exert all its efforts to concentrate both the technical and political leadership of the uprising in its own hands. This leadership is the essential condition which will enable us to utilize the impending revolution in the interests of our class struggle.

ANARCHISM OR SOCIALISM?³

December 1906-January 1907

The hub of modern social life is the class struggle. In the course of this struggle each class is guided by its own ideology. The bourgeoisie has its own ideology — so-called *liberalism*. The proletariat also has its own ideology — this, as is well known, is *socialism*.

Liberalism must not be regarded as something whole and indivisible: it is subdivided into different trends, corresponding to the different strata of the bourgeoisie.

Nor is socialism whole and indivisible: in it there are also different trends.

We shall not here examine liberalism — that task had better be left for another time. We want to acquaint the reader only with socialism and its trends. We think that he will find this more interesting.

Socialism is divided into three main trends: *reformism*, *anarchism* and *Marxism*.

Reformism (Bernstein and others), which regards socialism as a remote goal and nothing more, reformism, which actually repudiates the socialist revolution and aims at establishing socialism by peaceful means, reformism, which advocates not class struggle but class collaboration — this reformism is decaying day by day, is day by day losing all semblance of socialism and, in our opinion, it is totally unnecessary to examine it in these articles when defining socialism.

It is altogether different with Marxism and anarchism: both are at the present time recognized as socialist trends, they are waging a fierce struggle against each other, both are trying to present themselves to the proletariat as genuinely socialist doctrines, and, of course, a study and comparison of the two will be far more interesting for the reader.

We are not the kind of people who, when the word “anarchism” is mentioned, turn away contemptuously and say with a supercilious wave of the hand: “Why waste time on that, it’s not worth talking about!” We think that such cheap “criticism” is undignified and useless.

Nor are we the kind of people who console themselves with the thought that the anarchists “have no masses behind them and, therefore, are not so dangerous.” It is not who has a larger or smaller “mass” following today, but the essence of the doctrine that mat-

ters. If the "doctrine" of the anarchists expresses the truth, then it goes without saying that it will certainly hew a path for itself and will rally the masses around itself. If, however, it is unsound and built up on a false foundation, it will not last long and will remain suspended in mid-air. But the unsoundness of anarchism must be proved.

Some people believe that Marxism and anarchism are based on the same principles and that the disagreements between them concern only tactics, so that, in the opinion of these people, it is quite impossible to draw a contrast between these two trends.

This is a great mistake.

We believe that the anarchists are real enemies of Marxism. Accordingly, we also hold that a real struggle must be waged against real enemies. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the "doctrine" of the anarchists from beginning to end and weigh it up thoroughly from all aspects.

The point is that Marxism and anarchism are built up on entirely different principles, in spite of the fact that both come into the arena of the struggle under the flag of socialism. The cornerstone of anarchism is the *individual*, whose emancipation, according to its tenets, is the principal condition for the emancipation of the masses, the collective body. According to the tenets of anarchism, the emancipation of the masses is impossible until the individual is emancipated. Accordingly, its slogan is: "Everything for the individual." The cornerstone of Marxism, however, is the masses, whose emancipation, according to its tenets, is the principal condition for the emancipation of the individual. That is to say, according to the tenets of Marxism, the emancipation of the individual is impossible until the masses are emancipated. Accordingly, its slogan is: "Everything for the masses."

Clearly, we have here two principles, one negating the other, and not merely disagreements on tactics.

The object of our articles is to place these two opposite principles side by side, to compare Marxism with anarchism, and thereby throw light on their respective virtues and defects. At this point we think it necessary to acquaint the reader with the plan of these articles.

We shall begin with a description of Marxism, deal, in passing, with the anarchists' views on Marxism, and then proceed to criticize anarchism itself. Namely: we shall expound the dialectical method, the anarchists' views on this method, and our criticism; the material-

ist theory, the anarchists' views and our criticism (here, too, we shall discuss the socialist revolution, the socialist dictatorship, the minimum program and tactics generally); the philosophy of the anarchists and our criticism; the socialism of the anarchists and our criticism; anarchist tactics and organization — and, in conclusion, we shall give our deductions.

We shall try to prove that, as advocates of small community socialism, the anarchists are not genuine socialists.

We shall also try to prove that, in so far as they repudiate the dictatorship of the proletariat, the anarchists are also not genuine revolutionaries...

And so, let us proceed with our subject.

I

THE DIALECTICAL METHOD

*Everything in the world is in motion...
Life changes, productive forces grow, old
relations collapse.*

Karl Marx

Marxism is not only the theory of socialism, it is an integral world outlook, a philosophical system, from which Marx's proletarian socialism logically follows. This philosophical system is called dialectical materialism.

Hence, to expound Marxism means to expound also dialectical materialism.

Why is this system called dialectical materialism?

Because its *method* is dialectical, and its *theory* is materialistic.

What is the dialectical method?

It is said that social life is in continual motion and development. And that is true: life must not be regarded as something immutable and static; it never remains at one level, it is in eternal motion, in an eternal process of destruction and creation. Therefore, life always contains the *new* and the *old*, the *growing* and the *dying*, the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary.

The dialectical method tells us that we must regard life as it actually is. We have seen that life is in continual motion; consequently, we must regard life in its motion and ask: Where is life going? We have seen that life presents a picture of constant destruction and

creation; consequently, we must examine life in its process of destruction and creation and ask: What is being destroyed and what is being created in life?

That which in life is born and grows day by day is invincible, its progress cannot be checked. That is to say, if, for example, in life the proletariat as a class is born and grows day by day, no matter how weak and small in numbers it may be *today*, in the long run it must triumph. Why? Because it is growing, gaining strength and marching forward. On the other hand, that which in life is growing old and advancing to its grave must inevitably suffer defeat, even if *today* it represents a titanic force. That is to say, if, for example, the bourgeoisie is gradually losing ground and is slipping farther and farther back every day, then, no matter how strong and numerous it may be today, it must, in the long run, suffer defeat. Why? Because as a class it is decaying, growing feeble, growing old, and becoming a burden to life.

Hence arose the well-known dialectical proposition: all that which really exists, i.e., all that which grows day by day is rational, and all that which decays day by day is irrational and, consequently, cannot avoid defeat.

For example. In the eighties of the last century a great controversy flared up among the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia. The Narodniks asserted that the main force that could undertake the task of "emancipating Russia" was the petty bourgeoisie, rural and urban. Why? — the Marxists asked them. Because, answered the Narodniks, the rural and urban petty bourgeoisie now constitute the majority and, moreover, they are poor, they live in poverty.

To this the Marxists replied: It is true that the rural and urban petty bourgeoisie now constitute the majority and are really poor, but is that the point? The petty bourgeoisie has long constituted the majority, but up to now it has displayed no initiative in the struggle for "freedom" without the assistance of the proletariat. Why? Because the petty bourgeoisie as a class is not growing; on the contrary, it is disintegrating day by day and breaking up into bourgeois and proletarians. On the other hand, nor is poverty of decisive importance here, of course: "tramps" are poorer than the petty bourgeoisie, but nobody will say that they can undertake the task of "emancipating Russia."

As you see, the point is not which class today constitutes the majority, or which class is poorer, but which class is gaining strength and which is decaying.

And as the proletariat is the only class which is steadily growing and gaining strength, which is pushing social life forward and rallying all the revolutionary elements around itself, our duty is to regard it as the main force in the present-day movement, join its ranks and make its progressive strivings our strivings.

That is how the Marxists answered.

Obviously the Marxists looked at life dialectically, whereas the Narodniks argued metaphysically — they pictured social life as having become static at a particular stage.

That is how the dialectical method looks upon the development of life.

But there is movement and movement. There was movement in social life during the “December days,” when the proletariat, straightening its back, stormed arms depots and launched an attack upon reaction. But the movement of preceding years, when the proletariat, under the conditions of “peaceful” development, limited itself to individual strikes and the formation of small trade unions, must also be called social movement.

Clearly, movement assumes different forms.

And so the dialectical method says that movement has two forms: the evolutionary and the revolutionary form.

Movement is evolutionary when the progressive elements spontaneously continue their daily activities and introduce minor, *quantitative* changes into the old order.

Movement is revolutionary when the same elements combine, become imbued with a single idea and sweep down upon the enemy camp with the object of uprooting the old order and of introducing *qualitative* changes in life, of establishing a new order.

Evolution prepares for revolution and creates the ground for it; revolution consummates the process of evolution and facilitates its further activity.

Similar processes take place in nature. The history of science shows that the dialectical method is a truly scientific method: from astronomy to sociology, in every field we find confirmation of the idea that nothing is eternal in the universe, everything changes, everything develops. Consequently, everything in nature must be regarded from the point of view of movement, development. And this means that the spirit of dialectics permeates the whole of present-day science.

As regards the forms of movement, as regards the fact that according to dialectics, minor, *quantitative* changes sooner or later lead

to major, *qualitative* changes — this law applies with equal force to the history of nature Mendeleev's "periodic system of elements" clearly shows how very important in the history of nature is the emergence of qualitative changes out of quantitative changes. The same thing is shown in biology by the theory of neo-Lamarckism, to which neo-Darwinism is yielding place.

We shall say nothing about other facts, on which F. Engels has thrown sufficiently full light in his *Anti-Dühring*.

Such is the content of the dialectical method.

* * *

How do the anarchists look upon the dialectical method?

Everybody knows that Hegel was the father of the dialectical method. Marx purged and improved this method. The anarchists are aware of this, of course. They know that Hegel was a conservative, and so, taking advantage of this, they vehemently revile Hegel as a supporter of "restoration," they try with the utmost zeal to "prove" that "Hegel is a philosopher of restoration... that he eulogizes bureaucratic constitutionalism in its absolute form, that the general idea of his philosophy of history is subordinate to and serves the philosophical trend of the period of restoration," and so on and so forth (see *Nobati*, No. 6, Article by V. Cherkezishvili.)

The well-known anarchist Kropotkin tries to "prove" the same thing in his works (see, for example, his *Science and Anarchism*, in Russian).

Our Kropotkinites, from Cherkezishvili right down to Sh. G., all with one voice echo Kropotkin (see *Nobati*).

True, nobody contests what they say on this point; on the contrary, everybody agrees that Hegel was not a revolutionary. Marx and Engels themselves proved before anybody else did, in their *Critique of Critical Criticism*, that Hegel's views on history fundamentally contradict the idea of the sovereignty of the people. But in spite of this, the anarchists go on trying to "prove," and deem it necessary to go on day in and day out trying to "prove," that Hegel was a supporter of "restoration." Why do they do this? Probably, in order by all this to discredit Hegel and make their readers feel that the "reactionary" Hegel's method also cannot be other than "repugnant" and unscientific.

The anarchists think that they can refute the dialectical method in this way.

We affirm that in this way they can prove nothing but their own

ignorance. Pascal and Leibnitz were not revolutionaries, but the mathematical method they discovered is recognized today as a scientific method. Mayer and Helmholtz were not revolutionaries, but their discoveries in the field of physics became the basis of science. Nor were Lamarck and Darwin revolutionaries, but their evolutionary method put biological science on its feet... Why, then, should the fact not be admitted that, in spite of his conservatism, Hegel succeeded in working out a scientific method which is called the dialectical method?

No, *in this way* the anarchists will prove nothing but their own ignorance.

To proceed. In the opinion of the anarchists, “dialectics is metaphysics,” and as they “want to free science from metaphysics, philosophy from theology,” they repudiate the dialectical method (see *Nobati*, Nos. 3 and 9, Sh. G. See also Kropotkin’s *Science and Anarchism*).

Oh, those anarchists! As the saying goes: “Blame others for your own sins.” Dialectics matured in the struggle against metaphysics and gained fame in this struggle; but according to the anarchists, dialectics is metaphysics!

Dialectics tells us that nothing in the world is eternal, everything in the world is transient and mutable; nature changes, society changes, habits and customs change, conceptions of justice change, truth itself changes — that is why dialectics regards everything critically; that is why it denies the existence of a once-and-for-all established truth. Consequently, it also repudiates abstract “dogmatic propositions, which, once discovered, had merely to be learned by heart” (see F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*).⁴

Metaphysics, however, tells us something altogether different. From its standpoint the world is something eternal and immutable (see F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*), it has been once and for all determined by someone or something — that is why the metaphysicians always have “eternal justice” or “immutable truth” on their lips.

Proudhon, the “father” of the anarchists, said that there existed in the world an *immutable justice determined once and for all*, which must be made the basis of future society. That is why Proudhon has been called a metaphysician. Marx fought Proudhon with the aid of the dialectical method and proved that since everything in the world changes, “justice” must also change, and that, consequently, “immutable justice” is metaphysical nonsense (see K. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*). The Georgian disciples of the metaphysician Prou-

dhon, however, keep reiterating that “Marx’s dialectics is metaphysics”!

Metaphysics recognizes various nebulous dogmas, such as, for example, the “unknowable,” the “thing-in-itself,” and, in the long run, passes into empty theology. In contrast to Proudhon and Spencer, Engels combatted these dogmas with the aid of the dialectical method (see *Ludwig Feuerbach*); but the anarchists — the disciples of Proudhon and Spencer — tell us that Proudhon and Spencer were scientists, whereas Marx and Engels were metaphysicians!

One of two things: either the anarchists are deceiving themselves, or else they do not know what they are talking about.

At all events, it is beyond doubt that the anarchists confuse Hegel’s *metaphysical* system with his *dialectical* method.

Needless to say, Hegel’s *philosophical system*, which rests on the immutable idea, is from beginning to end *metaphysical*. But it is also clear that Hegel’s *dialectical method*, which repudiates all immutable ideas, is from beginning to end *scientific* and *revolutionary*.

That is why Karl Marx, who subjected Hegel’s metaphysical system to devastating criticism, at the same time praised his dialectical method, which, as Marx said, “lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary” (see *Capital*, Vol. I, Preface).

That is why Engels sees a big difference between Hegel’s method and his *system*. “Whoever placed the chief emphasis on the Hegelian system could be fairly conservative in both spheres; whoever regarded the dialectical *method* as the main thing could belong to the most extreme opposition, both in politics and religion” (see *Ludwig Feuerbach*).

The anarchists fail to see this difference and thoughtlessly maintain that “dialectics is metaphysics.”

To proceed. The anarchists say that the dialectical method is “subtle word-weaving,” “the method of sophistry,” “logical somersaults” (see *Nobati*, No. 8, Sh. G.), “with the aid of which both truth and falsehood are proved with equal facility” (see *Nobati*, No. 4, Article by V. Cherkeshvili).

Thus, in the opinion of the anarchists, the dialectical method proves both truth and falsehood.

At first sight it would seem that the accusation advanced by the anarchists has some foundation. Listen, for example, to what Engels says about the follower of the metaphysical method:

“...His communication is: ‘Yea, yea; nay, nay, for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.’ For him a thing either exists, or it does not exist;

it is equally impossible for a thing to be itself and at the same time something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another..." (see *Anti-Dühring*, Introduction).

How is that? — the anarchists cry heatedly. Is it possible for a thing to be good and bad at the same time?! That is "sophistry," "juggling with words," it shows that "you want to prove truth and falsehood with equal facility"!...

Let us, however, go into the substance of the matter.

Today we are demanding a democratic republic. Can we say that a democratic republic is good in all respects, or bad in all respects? No we cannot! Why? Because a democratic republic is good only in one respect: when it destroys the feudal system; but it is bad in another respect: when it strengthens the bourgeois system. Hence we say: in so far as the democratic republic destroys the feudal system it is good — and we fight for it; but in so far as it strengthens the bourgeois system it is bad — and we fight against it.

So the same democratic republic can be "good" and "bad" at the same time — it is "yes" and "no."

The same thing may be said about the eight-hour day, which is good and bad at the same time: "good" in so far as it strengthens the proletariat, and "bad" in so far as it strengthens the wage system.

It was *facts* of this kind that Engels had in mind when he characterized the dialectical method in the words we quoted above.

The anarchists, however, fail to understand this, and an absolutely clear idea seems to them to be nebulous "sophistry."

The anarchists are, of course, at liberty to note or ignore these *facts*, they may even ignore the sand on the sandy seashore — they have every right to do that. But why drag in the dialectical method, which, unlike anarchism, does not look at life with its eyes shut, which has its finger on the pulse of life and openly says: since life changes and is in motion, every phenomenon of life has two trends: a positive and a negative; the first we must defend, the second we must reject.

To proceed further. In the opinion of our anarchists, "dialectical development is catastrophic development, by means of which, first the past is utterly destroyed, and then the future is established quite separately... Cuvier's cataclysms were due to unknown causes, but Marx and Engels's catastrophes are engendered by dialectics" (see *Nobati*, No. 8, Sh. G.).

In another place the same author writes: "Marxism rests on Darwinism and treats it uncritically" (see *Nobati*, No. 6).

Now listen!

Cuvier rejects Darwin's theory of evolution, he recognizes only cataclysms, and cataclysms are *unexpected* upheavals "due to *unknown* causes." The anarchists say that the Marxists *adhere to Cuvier's view* and therefore *repudiate Darwinism*.

Darwin rejects Cuvier's cataclysms, he recognizes gradual evolution. But the same anarchists say that "Marxism rests on Darwinism and treats it uncritically," i.e., the Marxists repudiate *Cuvier's cataclysms*.

In short, the anarchists accuse the Marxists of adhering to Cuvier's view and at the same time reproach them for adhering to Darwin's and not to Cuvier's view.

This is anarchy if you like! As the saying goes: the Sergeant's widow flogged herself! Clearly, Sh. G. of No. 8 of *Nobati* forgot what Sh. G. of No. 6 said.

Which is right: No. 8 or No. 6?

Let us turn to the facts. Marx says:

"At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or — what is but a legal expression for the same thing — with the property relations... Then begins an epoch of social revolution."

But "no social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed..." (see K. Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Preface).⁵

If this thesis of Marx is applied to modern social life, we shall find that between the present-day productive forces, which are social in character, and the form of appropriation of the product, which is *private* in character, there is a fundamental conflict which must culminate in the socialist revolution (see F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Part III, Chapter II).

As you see, in the opinion of Marx and Engels, revolution is engendered not by Cuvier's "unknown causes," but by very definite and vital social causes called "the development of the productive forces."

As you see, in the opinion of Marx and Engels, revolution comes only when the productive forces have sufficiently matured, and not *unexpectedly*, as Cuvier thought.

Clearly, there is nothing in common between Cuvier's cataclysms and Marx's dialectical method.

On the other hand, Darwinism repudiates not only Cuvier's cataclysms, but also dialectically understood development, which in-

cludes revolution; whereas, from the standpoint of the dialectical method, evolution and revolution, quantitative and qualitative changes, are two essential forms of the same motion.

Obviously, it is also wrong to assert that “Marxism... treats Darwinism uncritically.”

It turns out therefore, that *Nobati* is wrong in both cases, in No. 6 as well as in No. 8.

Lastly, the anarchists tell us reproachfully that “dialectics... provides no possibility of getting, or jumping, out of oneself, or of jumping over oneself” (see *Nobati*, No. 8. Sh. G.).

Now that is the downright truth, Messieurs anarchists! Here you are absolutely right, my dear sirs: the dialectical method does not, indeed, provide such a possibility. But why not? Because “jumping out of oneself, or jumping over oneself” is an exercise for wild goats, while the dialectical method was created for human beings.

That is the secret!...

Such, in general, are the anarchists’ views on the dialectical method.

Clearly, the anarchists fail to understand the dialectical method of Marx and Engels; they have conjured up their own dialectics, and it is against this dialectics that they are fighting so ruthlessly.

All we can do is to laugh as we gaze at this spectacle, for one cannot help laughing when one sees a man fighting his own imagination, smashing his own inventions, while at the same time heatedly asserting that he is smashing his opponent.

II

THE MATERIALIST THEORY

“It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.”

Karl Marx

We already know what the dialectical method is. What is the materialist theory?

Everything in the world changes, everything in life develops, but *how* do these changes take place and *in what form* does this development proceed?

We know, for example, that the earth was once an incandescent, fiery mass; then it gradually cooled, plants and animals appeared, the development of the animal kingdom was followed by the appearance of a certain species of ape, and all this was followed by the appearance of man.

This, broadly speaking, is the way nature developed.

We also know that social life did not remain static either. There was a time when men lived on a primitive-communist basis; at that time they gained their livelihood by primitive hunting; they roamed through the forests and procured their food in that way. There came a time when primitive communism was superseded by the matriarchate — at that time men satisfied their needs mainly by means of primitive agriculture. Later the matriarchate was superseded by the patriarchate, under which men gained their livelihood mainly by cattle-breeding. The patriarchate was later superseded by the slave-owning system — at that time men gained their livelihood by means of relatively more developed agriculture. The slave-owning system was followed by feudalism, and then, after all this, came the bourgeois system.

That, broadly speaking, is the way social life developed.

Yes, all this is well known... But *how* did this development take place; did consciousness call forth the development of “nature” and of “society,” or, on the contrary, did the development of “nature” and “society” call forth the development of consciousness?

This is how the materialist theory presents the question.

Some people say that “nature” and “social life” were preceded by the universal idea, which subsequently served as the basis of their development, so that the development of the phenomena of “nature” and of “social life” is, so to speak, the external form, merely the expression of the development of the universal idea.

Such, for example, was the doctrine of the *idealists*, who in the course of time split up into several trends.

Others say that from the very beginning there have existed in the world two mutually negating forces — idea and matter, consciousness and being, and that correspondingly, phenomena also fall into two categories — the ideal and the material, which negate each other, and contend against each other, so that the development of nature and society is a constant struggle between ideal and material phenomena.

Such, for example, was the doctrine of the *dualists*, who in the course of time, like the idealists, split up into several trends.

The materialist theory utterly repudiates both dualism and idealism.

Of course, both ideal and material phenomena exist in the world, but this does not mean that they negate each other. On the contrary, the ideal and the material sides are two different forms of one and the same nature or society, the one cannot be conceived without the other, they exist together, develop together, and, consequently, we have no grounds whatever for thinking that they negate each other.

Thus, so-called dualism proves to be unsound.

A single and indivisible nature expressed in two different forms — material and ideal; a single and indivisible social life expressed in two different forms — material and ideal — that is how we should regard the development of nature and of social life.

Such is the monism of the materialist theory.

At the same time, the materialist theory also repudiates idealism.

It is wrong to think that in its development the ideal side, and consciousness in general, precedes the development of the material side. So-called external “non-living” nature existed before there were any living beings. The first living matter possessed no consciousness, it possessed only *irritability* and the first rudiments of *sensation*. Later, animals gradually developed the power of sensation, which slowly passed into *consciousness*, in conformity with the development of the structure of their organisms and nervous systems. If the ape had always walked on all fours, if it had never stood upright, its descendant — man — would not have been able freely to use his lungs and vocal chords and, therefore, would not have been able to speak; and that would have fundamentally retarded the development of his consciousness. If, furthermore, the ape had not risen up on its hind legs, its descendant — man — would have been compelled always to walk on all fours, to look downwards and obtain his impressions only from there; he would have been unable to look up and around himself and, consequently, his brain would have obtained no more impressions than the brain of a quadruped. All this would have fundamentally retarded the development of human consciousness.

It follows, therefore, that the development of consciousness needs a particular structure of the organism and development of its nervous system.

It follows, therefore, that the development of the ideal side, the

development of consciousness, is *preceded* by the development of the material side, the development of the external conditions: first the external conditions change, first the material side changes, and *then* consciousness, the ideal side, changes accordingly.

Thus, the history of the development of nature utterly refutes so-called idealism.

The same thing must be said about the history of the development of human society.

History shows that if at different times men were imbued with different ideas and desires, the reason for this is that at different times men fought nature in different ways to satisfy their needs and, accordingly, their economic relations assumed different forms. There was a time when men fought nature collectively, on the basis of primitive communism; at that time their property was communist property and, therefore, at that time they drew scarcely any distinction between “mine” and “thine,” their consciousness was communistic. There came a time when the distinction between “mine” and “thine” penetrated the process of production; at that time property, too, assumed a private, individualist character and, therefore, the consciousness of men became imbued with the sense of private property. Then came the time, the present time, when production is again assuming a social character and, consequently, property, too, will soon assume a social character — and this is precisely why the consciousness of men is gradually becoming imbued with socialism.

Here is a simple illustration. Let us take a shoemaker who owned a tiny workshop, but who, unable to withstand the competition of the big manufacturers, closed his workshop and took a job, say, at Adelnkhanov’s shoe factory in Tiflis. He went to work at Adelnkhanov’s factory not with the view to becoming a permanent wage-worker, but with the object of saving up some money, of accumulating a little capital to enable him to reopen his workshop. As you see, the position of this shoemaker is *already* proletarian, but his consciousness is *still* non-proletarian, it is thoroughly petty-bourgeois. In other words, this shoemaker has *already* lost his petty-bourgeois position, it has gone, but his petty-bourgeois consciousness has *not yet* gone, it has lagged behind his actual position.

Clearly, here too, in social life, first the external conditions change, first the conditions of men change and then their consciousness changes accordingly.

But let us return to our shoemaker. As we already know, he intends to save up some money and then reopen his workshop. This

proletarianized shoemaker goes on working, but finds that it is a very difficult matter to save money, because what he earns barely suffices to maintain an existence. Moreover, he realizes that the opening of a private workshop is after all not so alluring: the rent he will have to pay for the premises, the caprices of customers, shortage of money, the competition of the big manufacturers and similar worries — such are the many troubles that torment the private workshop owner. On the other hand, the proletarian is relatively freer from such cares; he is not troubled by customers, or by having to pay rent for premises. He goes to the factory every morning, “calmly” goes home in the evening, and as calmly pockets his “pay” on Saturdays. Here, for the first time, the wings of our shoemaker’s petty-bourgeois dreams are clipped; here for the first time proletarian strivings awaken in his soul.

Time passes and our shoemaker sees that he has not enough money to satisfy his most essential needs, that what he needs very badly is a rise in wages. At the same time, he hears his fellow-workers talking about unions and strikes. Here our shoemaker realizes that in order to improve his conditions he must fight the masters and not open a workshop of his own. He joins the union, enters the strike movement, and soon becomes imbued with socialist ideas...

Thus, *in the long run*, the change in the shoemaker’s material conditions was followed by a change in his consciousness: first his material conditions changed, and then, after a time, his consciousness changed accordingly.

The same must be said about classes and about society as a whole.

In social life, too, first the external conditions change, first the material conditions change, and then the ideas of men, their habits, customs and their world outlook change accordingly.

That is why Marx says:

“It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.”

If we can call the material side, the external conditions, being, and other phenomena of the same kind, the *content*, then we can call the ideal side, consciousness and other phenomena of the same kind, the *form*. Hence arose the well-known materialist proposition: in the process of development content precedes form, form lags behind content.

And as, in Marx's opinion, economic development is the "material foundation" of social life, its *content*, while legal-political and religious-philosophical development is the "ideological form" of this content, its "superstructure," Marx draws the conclusion that: "With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is *more or less rapidly* transformed."

This, of course, does not mean that in Marx's opinion content is possible without form, as Sh. G. imagines (see *Noboati*, No. 1, "A Critique of Monism"). Content is impossible without form, but the point is that since a given form lags behind its content, it never *fully* corresponds to this content; and so the new content is "obliged" to clothe itself for a time in the old form, and this causes a conflict between them. At the present time, for example, the form of appropriation of the product, which is *private* in character, does not correspond to the *social* content of production, and this is the basis of the present-day social "conflict."

On the other hand, the idea that consciousness is a form of being does not mean that by its nature consciousness, too, is matter. That was the opinion held only by the vulgar materialists (for example, Büchner and Moleschott), whose theories fundamentally contradict Marx's materialism, and whom Engels rightly ridiculed in his *Ludwig Feuerbach*. According to Marx's materialism, consciousness and being, idea and matter, are two different forms of the same phenomenon, which, broadly speaking, is called nature, or society. Consequently, they do not negate each other*; nor are they one and the same phenomenon. The only point is that, in the development of nature and society, consciousness, i.e., what takes place in our heads, is preceded by a corresponding material change, i.e., what takes place outside of us; any given material change is, sooner or later, inevitably followed by a corresponding ideal change.

Very well, we shall be told, perhaps this is true as applied to the history of nature and society. But how do different conceptions and ideas arise in our heads at the present time? Do so-called external conditions really exist, or is it only our conceptions of these external conditions that exist? And if external conditions exist, to what degree are they perceptible and cognizable?

* This does not contradict the idea that there is a conflict between form and content. The point is that the conflict is not between content and form in general, but between the *old* form and the *new* content, which is seeking a new form and is striving towards it.

On this point the materialist theory says that our conceptions, our “self,” exist only in so far as external conditions exist that give rise to impressions in our “self.” Whoever unthinkingly says that nothing exists but our conceptions, is compelled to deny the existence of all external conditions and, consequently, must deny the existence of all other people and admit the existence only of his own “self,” which is absurd, and utterly contradicts the principles of science.

Obviously, external conditions do actually exist; these conditions existed before us, and will exist after us; and the more often and the more strongly they affect our consciousness, the more easily perceptible and cognizable do they become.

As regards the question as to how different conceptions and ideas arise in our heads *at the present time*, we must observe that here we have a repetition in brief of what takes place in the history of nature and society. In this case, too, the object outside of us preceded our conception of it; in this case, too, our conception, the form, lags behind the object — behind its content. When I look at a tree and see it — that only shows that this tree existed even before the conception of a tree arose in my head, that it was this tree that aroused the corresponding conception in my head...

Such, in brief, is the content of Marx’s materialist theory.

The importance of the materialist theory for the practical activities of mankind can be readily understood.

If the economic conditions change *first* and the consciousness of men undergoes a corresponding change *later*, it is clear that we must seek the grounds for a given ideal not in the minds of men, not in their imaginations, but in the development of their economic conditions. Only that ideal is good and acceptable which is based on a study of economic conditions. All those ideals which ignore economic conditions and are not based upon their development are useless and unacceptable.

Such is the first practical conclusion to be drawn from the materialist theory.

If the consciousness of men, their habits and customs, are determined by external conditions, if the unsuitability of legal and political forms rests on an economic content, it is clear that we must help to bring about a radical change in economic relations in order, with this change, to bring about a radical change in the habits and customs of the people, and in their political system.

Here is what Karl Marx says on that score:

“No great acumen is required to perceive the necessary interconnection of materialism with... socialism. If man constructs all his knowledge, perceptions, etc., from the world of sense... then it follows that it is a question of so arranging the empirical world that he experiences the truly human in it, that he becomes accustomed to experiencing himself as a human being... If man is unfree in the materialist sense — that is, is free not by reason of the negative force of being able to avoid this or that, but by reason of the positive power to assert his true individuality, then one should not punish individuals for crimes, but rather destroy the anti-social breeding places of crime... If man is moulded circumstances, then the circumstances must be moulded humanly” (see *Ludwig Feuerbach*, Appendix: “Karl Marx on the History of French Materialism of the XVIII Century”).⁶

* * *

What is the anarchist view of the materialist theory of Marx and Engels?

While the dialectical method originated with Hegel, the materialist theory is a further development of the materialism of Feuerbach. The anarchists know this very well, and they try to take advantage of the defects of Hegel and Feuerbach to discredit the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels. We have already shown with reference to Hegel and the dialectical method that these tricks of the anarchists prove nothing but their own ignorance. The same must be said with reference to their attacks on Feuerbach and the materialist theory.

For example. The anarchists tell us with great aplomb that “Feuerbach was a pantheist...” that he “deified man...” (see *Nobati*, No. 7, D. Delendi), that “in Feuerbach’s opinion man is what he eats...” alleging that from this Marx drew the following conclusion: “Consequently, the main and primary thing is economic conditions...” (see *Nobati*, No. 6, Sh. G.).

True, nobody has any doubts about Feuerbach’s pantheism, his deification of man, and other errors of his of the same kind. On the contrary, Marx and Engels were the first to reveal Feuerbach’s errors. Nevertheless, the anarchists deem it necessary once again to “expose” the already exposed errors. Why? Probably because, in reviling Feuerbach, they want indirectly to discredit the materialist theory of Marx and Engels. Of course, if we examine the subject impartially we shall certainly find that in addition to erroneous ideas, Feuerbach gave utterance to correct ideas, as has been the case with many scholars in history. Nevertheless, the anarchists go on “exposing...”

We say again that by tricks of this kind they prove nothing but their own ignorance.

It is interesting to note (as we shall see later on) that the anarchists took it into their heads to criticize the materialist theory from hearsay, without any acquaintance with it. As a consequence, they often contradict and refute each other, which, of course, makes our “critics” look ridiculous. If, for example, we listen to what Mr. Cherkezishvili has to say, it would appear that Marx and Engels detested monistic materialism, that their materialism was vulgar and not monistic materialism:

“The great science of the naturalists, with its system of evolution, transformism and monistic materialism, which *Engels so heartily detested...* avoided dialectics,” etc. (see *Nobati*, No. 4, V. Cherkezishvili).

It follows, therefore, that natural-scientific materialism, which Cherkezishvili approves of and which Engels “detested,” was monistic materialism and, *therefore*, deserves approval, whereas the materialism of Marx and Engels is not monistic and, of course, does not deserve recognition.

Another anarchist, however, says that the materialism of Marx and Engels is monistic and *therefore* should be rejected.

“Marx’s conception of history is a throwback to Hegel. The monistic materialism of absolute objectivism in general, and Marx’s economic monism in particular, are impossible in nature and fallacious in theory... Monistic materialism is poorly disguised dualism and a compromise between metaphysics and science...” (see *Nobati*, No. 6, Sh. G.).

It would follow, therefore, that monistic materialism is unacceptable, that Marx and Engels do not detest it, but, on the contrary, are themselves monistic materialists — and therefore, monistic materialism must be rejected.

They are all at sixes and sevens. Try and make out which of them is right, the former or the latter! They have not yet agreed among themselves about the merits and demerits of Marx’s materialism, they have not yet understood whether it is monistic or not, and have not yet made up their minds themselves as to which is the more acceptable, vulgar or monistic materialism — but they already deafen us with their boastful claims to have shattered Marxism!

Well, well, if Messieurs the anarchists continue to shatter each other’s views as zealously as they are doing now, we need say no more, the future belongs to the anarchists...

No less ridiculous is the fact that certain “celebrated” anar-

chists, notwithstanding their “celebrity,” have not yet made themselves familiar with the different trends in science. It appears that they are ignorant of the fact that there are various kinds of materialism in science which differ a great deal from each other: there is, for example, vulgar materialism, which denies the importance of the ideal side and the effect it has upon the material side; but there is also so-called monistic materialism — the materialist theory of Marx — which scientifically examines the interrelation between the ideal and the material sides. But the anarchists *confuse* these different kinds of materialism, fail to see even the obvious differences between them, and at the same time affirm with great aplomb that they are regenerating science!

P. Kropotkin, for example, smugly asserts in his “philosophical” works that anarcho-communism rests on “contemporary materialist philosophy,” but he does not utter a single word to explain on which “materialist philosophy” anarcho-communism rests: on vulgar, monistic, or some other. Evidently he is ignorant of the fact that there are fundamental contradictions between the different trends of materialism, and he fails to understand that to confuse these trends means not “regenerating science,” but displaying one’s own downright ignorance (see Kropotkin, *Science and Anarchism*, and also *Anarchy and Its Philosophy*).

The same thing must be said about Kropotkin’s Georgian disciples. Listen to this:

“In the opinion of Engels, and also of Kautsky, Marx rendered mankind a great service in that he...” among other things, discovered the “materialist conception. Is this true? We do not think so, for we know... that all the historians, scientists and philosophers who adhere to the view that the social mechanism is set in motion by geographic, climatic and telluric, cosmic, anthropological and biological conditions — *are all materialists*” (see *Nobati*, No. 2).

It follows, therefore, that there is no difference whatever between the “materialism” of Aristotle and Holbach, or between the “materialism” of Marx and Moleschott! This is criticism if you like! And people whose knowledge is on such a level have taken it into their heads to renovate science! Indeed, it is an apt saying: “It’s a bad lookout when a cobbler begins to bake pies!...”

To proceed. Our “celebrated” anarchists heard somewhere that Marx’s materialism was a “belly theory,” and so they rebuke us, Marxists, saying:

“In the opinion of Feuerbach, man is what he eats. This formula had a magic effect on Marx and Engels,” and, as a consequence, Marx drew the conclusion that “the main and primary thing is economic conditions, relations of production...” And then the anarchists proceed to instruct us in a philosophical tone: “It would be a mistake to say that the *sole* means of achieving this object of social life) is *eating* and economic production... If *ideology were determined* mainly, monistically, by *eating* and economic conditions — then some gluttons would be geniuses” (see *Nobati*, No. 6, Sh. G.).

You see how easy it is to refute the materialism of Marx and Engels! It is sufficient to hear some gossip in the street from some schoolgirl about Marx and Engels, it is sufficient to repeat that street gossip with philosophical aplomb in the columns of a paper like *Nobati*, to leap into fame as a “critic” of Marxism!

But tell me, gentlemen: Where, when, on which planet, and which Marx did you hear say that “*eating determines ideology*”? Why did you not cite a single sentence, a single word from the works of Marx to back your assertion? True, Marx said that the economic conditions of men determine their consciousness, their ideology, but who told you that eating and economic conditions are the same thing? Don’t you really know that physiological phenomena, such as *eating*, for example, differ fundamentally from sociological phenomena, such as the *economic conditions* of men, for example? One can forgive a schoolgirl, say, for confusing these two different phenomena; but how is it that you, the “vanquishers of social-democracy,” “regenerators of science,” so carelessly repeat the mistake of a schoolgirl?

How, indeed, can eating determine social ideology? Ponder over what you yourselves have said: eating, the form of eating, does not change; in ancient times people ate, masticated and digested their food in the same way as they do now, but ideology changes all the time. Ancient, feudal, bourgeois and proletarian — such are the forms of ideology. Is it conceivable that *that which does not change* can determine *that which is constantly changing*?

To proceed further. In the opinion of the anarchists, Marx’s materialism “is parallelism...” Or again: “monistic materialism is poorly disguised dualism and a compromise between metaphysics and science...”

“Marx drops into dualism because he depicts relations of production as material, and human striving and will *as an illusion and a utopia*, which, even though it exists, *is of no importance*” (see *Nobati*, No. 6, Sh. G.).

Firstly, Marx's monistic materialism has nothing in common with silly parallelism. From the standpoint of this materialism, the material side, content, necessarily *precedes* the ideal side, form. Parallelism, however, repudiates this view and emphatically affirms that neither the material nor the ideal *comes first*, that both develop together, side by side.

Secondly, even if Marx had in fact "depicted relations of production as material, and human striving and will as an illusion and a utopia having no importance," does that mean that Marx was a dualist? The dualist, as is well known, ascribes *equal* importance to the ideal and material sides as two opposite principles. But if, as you say, Marx attaches higher importance to the material side and no importance to the ideal side because it is a "utopia," how do you make out that Marx was a dualist, Messieurs "Critics"?

Thirdly, what connection can there be between materialist monism and dualism, when even a child knows that monism springs from *one principle* — nature, or being, which has a material and an ideal form, whereas dualism springs from *two principles* — the material and the ideal, which, according to dualism, negate each other?

Fourthly, when did Marx depict "human striving and will as a utopia and an illusion"? True, Marx explained "human striving and will" by economic development, and when the strivings of certain armchair philosophers failed to harmonize with economic conditions he called them utopian. But does this mean that Marx believed that human striving in general is utopian? Does this, too, really need explanation? Have you really not read Marx's statement that: "*mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve*" (see Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*), i.e., that, generally speaking, mankind does not pursue utopian aims? Clearly, either our "critic" does not know what he is talking about, or he is deliberately distorting the facts.

Fifthly, who told you that in the opinion of Marx and Engels "human striving and will are of no importance"? Why do you not point to the place where they say that? Does not Marx speak of the importance of "striving and will" in his *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, in his *Class Struggles in France*, in his *Civil War in France*, and in other pamphlets of the same kind? Why then did Marx try to develop the proletarians' "will and striving" in the socialist spirit, why did he conduct propaganda among them if he attached no importance to "striving and will"? Or, what did Engels talk about in his well-known articles of 1891-94 if not the "importance of will and

striving”? True, in Marx’s opinion human “will and striving” acquire their content from economic conditions, but does that mean that they themselves exert no influence on the development of economic relations? Is it really so difficult for the anarchists to understand such a simple idea?

Here is another “accusation” Messieurs the anarchists make: “form is inconceivable without content...” therefore, one cannot say that “form *comes after* content (lags behind content. *K.*)... they ‘co-exist’... Otherwise, monism would be an absurdity” (see *Nobati*, No. 1, Sh. G.).

Our “scholar” is somewhat confused again. It is quite true that content is inconceivable without form. But it is also true that the *existing form* never fully corresponds to the *existing content*: the former lags behind the latter, to a certain extent the new content is always clothed in the old form and, as a consequence, there is always a conflict between the old form and the new content. It is precisely on this ground that revolutions occur, and this, among other things, expresses the revolutionary spirit of Marx’s materialism. The “celebrated” anarchists, however, have failed to understand this, and for this they themselves and not the materialist theory are to blame, of course.

Such are the views of the anarchists on the materialist theory of Marx and Engels, that is, if they can be called views at all.

III

PROLETARIAN SOCIALISM

We are now familiar with Marx’s theoretical doctrine; we are familiar with his *method* and also with his *theory*.

What practical conclusions must we draw from this doctrine?

What connection is there between dialectical materialism and proletarian socialism?

The dialectical method affirms that only that class which is growing day by day, which always marches forward and fights unceasingly for a better future, can be progressive to the end, only that class can smash the yoke of slavery. We see that the only class which is steadily growing, which always marches forward and is fighting for the future is the urban and rural proletariat. Therefore, we must serve the proletariat and place our hopes on it.

Such is the first practical conclusion to be drawn from Marx’s

theoretical doctrine.

But there is service and service. Bernstein also “serves” the proletariat when he urges it to forget about socialism. Kropotkin also “serves” the proletariat when he offers it community “socialism,” which is scattered and has no broad industrial base. And Karl Marx serves the proletariat when he calls it to proletarian socialism, which will rest on the broad basis of modern large-scale industry.

What must we do in order that our activities may benefit the proletariat? How should we serve the proletariat?

The materialist theory affirms that a given ideal may be of direct service to the proletariat only if it does not run counter to the economic development of the country, if it fully answers to the requirements of that development. The economic development of the capitalist system shows that present-day production is assuming a social character, that the social character of production is a fundamental negation of existing capitalist property; consequently, our main task is to help to abolish capitalist property and to establish socialist property. And that means that the doctrine of Bernstein, who urges that socialism should be forgotten, fundamentally contradicts the requirements of economic development — it is harmful to the proletariat.

Further, the economic development of the capitalist system shows that present-day production is expanding day by day; it is not confined within the limits of individual towns and provinces, but constantly overflows these limits and embraces the territory of the whole state — consequently, we must welcome the expansion of production and regard as the basis of future socialism not separate towns and communities, but the entire and indivisible territory of the whole state which, in the future, will, of course, expand more and more. And this means that the doctrine advocated by Kropotkin, which confines future socialism within the limits of separate towns and communities, is contrary to the interests of a powerful expansion of production — it is harmful to the proletariat.

Fight for a *broad* socialist life as the *principal* goal — this is how we should serve the proletariat.

Such is the second practical conclusion to be drawn from Marx’s theoretical doctrine.

Clearly, proletarian socialism is the logical deduction from dialectical materialism.

What is proletarian socialism?

The present system is a capitalist system. This means that the

world is divided up into two opposing camps, the camp of a small handful of capitalists and the camp of the majority — the proletarians. The proletarians work day and night, nevertheless they remain poor. The capitalists do not work, nevertheless they are rich. This takes place not because the proletarians are unintelligent and the capitalists are geniuses, but because the capitalists appropriate the fruits of the labour of the proletarians, because the capitalists exploit the proletarians.

Why are the fruits of the labour of the proletarians appropriated by the capitalists and not by the proletarians? Why do the capitalists exploit the proletarians and not vice versa?

Because the capitalist system is based on commodity production: here everything assumes the form of a commodity, everywhere the principle of buying and selling prevails. Here you can buy not only articles of consumption, not only food products, but also the labour power of men, their blood and their consciences. The capitalists know all this and purchase the labour power of the proletarians, they hire them. This means that the capitalists become the owners of the labour power they buy. The proletarians, however, lose their right to the labour power which they have sold. That is to say, what is produced by that labour power no longer belongs to the proletarians, it belongs only to the capitalists and goes into their pockets. The labour power which you have sold may produce in the course of a day goods to the value of 100 rubles, but that is not your business, those goods do not belong to you, it is the business only of the capitalists, and the goods belong to them — all that you are due to receive is your daily wage which, perhaps, may be sufficient to satisfy your essential needs if, of course, you live frugally. Briefly: the capitalists buy the labour power of the proletarians, they hire the proletarians, and this is precisely why the capitalists appropriate the fruits of the labour of the proletarians, this is precisely why the capitalists exploit the proletarians and not vice versa.

But why is it precisely the capitalists who buy the labour power of the proletarians? Why do the capitalists hire the proletarians and not vice versa?

Because the principal basis of the capitalist system is the private ownership of the instruments and means of production. Because the factories, mills, the land and minerals, the forests, the railways, machines and other means of production have become the private property of a small handful of capitalists. Because the proletarians lack all this. That is why the capitalists hire proletarians to keep the

factories and mills going — if they did not do that their instruments and means of production would yield no profit. That is why the proletarians sell their labour power to the capitalists — if they did not, they would die of starvation.

All this throws light on the general character of capitalist production. Firstly, it is self-evident that capitalist production cannot be united and organized: it is all split up among the private enterprises of individual capitalists. Secondly, it is also clear that the immediate purpose of this scattered production is not to satisfy the needs of the people, but to produce goods for sale in order to increase the profits of the capitalists. But as every capitalist strives to increase his profits, each one tries to produce the largest possible quantity of goods and, as a result, the market is soon glutted, prices fall and — a general crisis sets in.

Thus, crises, unemployment, suspension of production, anarchy of production, and the like, are the direct results of present-day unorganized capitalist production.

If this unorganized social system still remains standing, if it still firmly withstands the attacks of the proletariat, it is primarily because it is protected by the capitalist state, by the capitalist government.

Such is the basis of present-day capitalist society.

* * *

There can be no doubt that future society will be built on an entirely different basis.

Future society will be socialist society. This means primarily, that there will be no classes in that society; there will be neither capitalists nor proletarians and, consequently, there will be no exploitation. In that society there will be only workers engaged in collective labour.

Future society will be socialist society. This means also that, with the abolition of exploitation commodity production and buying and selling will also be abolished and, therefore, there will be no room for buyers and sellers of labour power, for employers and employed — there will be only free workers.

Future society will be socialist society. This means, lastly, that in that society the abolition of wage-labour will be accompanied by the complete abolition of the private ownership of the instruments and means of production; there will be neither poor proletarians nor rich capitalists — there will be only workers who collectively own all

the land and minerals, all the forests, all the factories and mills, all the railways, etc.

As you see, the main purpose of production in the future will be to satisfy the needs of society and not to produce goods for sale in order to increase the profits of the capitalists. Where there will be no room for commodity production, struggle for profits, etc.

It is also clear that future production will be socialistically organized, highly developed production, which will take into account the needs of society and will produce as much as society needs. Here there will be no room whether for scattered production, competition, crises or unemployment.

Where there are no classes, where there are neither rich nor poor, there is no need for a state, there is no need either for political power, which oppresses the poor and protects the rich. Consequently, in socialist society there will be no need for the existence of political power.

That is why Karl Marx said as far back as 1846:

“The working class in the course of its development will substitute for the old bourgeois society an *association* which will exclude classes and their antagonism, and there will be *no more political power properly so-called...*” (see *The Poverty of Philosophy*).⁷

That is why Engels said in 1884:

“The state, then, has not existed from all eternity. There have been societies that did without it, that had no conception of the state and state power. At a certain stage of economic development, which was necessarily bound up with the cleavage of society into classes, the state became a necessity... We are now rapidly approaching a stage in the development of production at which the existence of these classes not only will have ceased to be a necessity, but will become a positive hindrance to production. They will fall as inevitably as they arose at an earlier stage. *Along with them the state will inevitably fall.* The society that will organize production on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers will put the whole machinery of state where it will then belong: into the Museum of Antiquities, by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze axe” (see *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*).⁸

At the same time, it is self-evident that for the purpose of administering public affairs there will have to be in socialist society, in addition to local offices which will collect all sorts of information, a central statistical bureau, which will collect information about the needs of the whole of society, and then distribute the various kinds of work among the working people accordingly. It will also be nec-

essary to hold conferences, and particularly congresses, the decisions of which will certainly be binding upon the comrades in the minority until the next congress is held.

Lastly, it is obvious that free and comradesly labour should result in an equally comradesly, and complete, satisfaction of all needs in the future socialist society. This means that if future society demands from each of its members as much labour as he can perform, it, in its turn, must provide each member with all the products he needs. From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs! — such is the basis upon which the future collectivist system must be created. It goes without saying that in the *first* stage of socialism, when elements who have not yet grown accustomed to work are being drawn into the new way of life, when the productive forces also will not yet have been sufficiently developed and there will still be “dirty” and “clean” work to do, the application of the principle: “to each according to his needs,” will undoubtedly be greatly hindered and, as a consequence, society will be obliged *temporarily* to take some other path, a middle path. But it is also clear that when future society runs into its groove, when the survivals of capitalism will have been eradicated, the only principle that will conform to socialist society will be the one pointed out above.

That is why Marx said in 1875:

“In a higher phase of communist (i.e., socialist) society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labour, has vanished; after labour has become not only a means of livelihood but life’s prime want; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual... only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois law be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: ‘From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.’” (see *Critique of the Gotha Programme*).⁹

Such, in general, is the picture of future socialist society according to the theory of Marx.

This is all very well. But is the achievement of socialism conceivable? Can we assume that man will rid himself of his “savage habits”?

Or again: if everybody receives according to his needs, can we assume that the level of the productive forces of socialist society will be adequate for this?

Socialist society presupposes an adequate development of productive forces and socialist consciousness among men, their social-

ist enlightenment. At the present time the development of productive forces is hindered by the existence of capitalist property, but if we bear in mind that this capitalist property will not exist in future society, it is self-evident that the productive forces will increase ten-fold. Nor must it be forgotten that in future society the hundreds of thousands of present-day parasites, and also the unemployed, will set to work and augment the ranks of the working people; and this will greatly stimulate the development of the productive forces. As regards men's "savage" sentiments and opinions, these are not as eternal as some people imagine; there was a time, under primitive communism, when man did not recognize private property; there came a time, the time of individualistic production, when private property dominated the hearts and minds of men; a new time is coming, the time of socialist production — will it be surprising if the hearts and minds of men become imbued with socialist strivings? Does not being determine the "sentiments" and opinions of men?

But what proof is there that the establishment of the socialist system is inevitable? Must the development of modern capitalism inevitably be followed by socialism? Or, in other words: How do we know that Marx's proletarian socialism is not merely a sentimental dream, a fantasy? Where is the scientific proof that it is not?

History shows that the form of property is directly determined by the form of production and, as a consequence, a change in the form of production is sooner or later inevitably followed by a change in the form of property. There was a time when property bore a communistic character, when the forests and fields in which primitive men roamed belonged to all and not to individuals. Why did communist property exist at that time? Because production was communistic, labour was performed in common, collectively — all worked together and could not dispense with each other. A different period set in, the period of petty-bourgeois production, when property assumed an individualistic (private) character, when everything that man needed (with the exception, of course, of air, sunlight, etc.) was regarded as private property. Why did this change take place? Because production became individualistic; each one began to work for himself, stuck in his own little corner. Finally there came a time, the time of large-scale capitalist production, when hundreds and thousands of workers gather under one roof, in one factory, and engage in collective labour. Here you do not see the old method of working individually, each pulling his own way — here every worker is closely associated in his work with his comrades in his own shop,

and all of them are associated with the other shops. It is sufficient for one shop to stop work for the workers in the entire plant to become idle. As you see, the process of production, labour, has already assumed a social character, has acquired a socialist hue. And this takes place not only in individual factories, but in entire branches of industry, and between branches of industry; it is sufficient for the railwaymen to go on strike for production to be put in difficulties, it is sufficient for the production of oil and coal to come to a standstill for whole factories and mills to close down after a time. Clearly, here the process of production has assumed a social, collective character. As, however, the private character of appropriation does not correspond to the social character of production, as present-day collective labour must inevitably lead to collective property, it is self-evident that the socialist system will follow capitalism as inevitably as day follows night.

That is how history proves the inevitability of Marx's proletarian socialism.

* * *

History teaches us that the class or social group which plays the principal role in social production and performs the main functions in production must, in the course of time, inevitably take control of that production. There was a time, under the matriarchate, when women were regarded as the masters of production. Why was this? Because under the kind of production then prevailing, primitive agriculture, women played the principal role in production, they performed the main functions, while the men roamed the forests in quest of game. Then came the time, under the patriarchate, when the predominant position in production passed to men. Why did this change take place? Because under the kind of production prevailing at that time, stock-raising, in which the principal instruments of production were the spear, the lasso and the bow and arrow, the principal role was played by men... There came the time of large-scale capitalist production, in which the proletarians begin to play the principal role in production, when all the principal functions in production pass to them, when without them production cannot go on for a single day (let us recall general strikes), and when the capitalists, far from being needed for production, are even a hindrance to it. What does this signify? It signifies either that all social life must collapse entirely, or that the proletariat, sooner or later, but inevitably, must take control of modern production, must become

its sole owner, its socialistic owner.

Modern industrial crises, which sound the death knell of capitalist property and bluntly put the question: capitalism *or* socialism, make this conclusion absolutely obvious; they vividly reveal the parasitism of the capitalists and the inevitability of the victory of socialism.

That is how history further proves the inevitability of Marx's proletarian socialism.

Proletarian socialism is based not on sentiment, not on abstract "justice," not on love for the proletariat, but on the scientific grounds referred to above.

That is why proletarian socialism is also called "scientific socialism."

Engels said as far back as 1877:

"If for the imminent overthrow of the present mode of distribution of the products of labour... we had no better guarantee than the consciousness that this mode of distribution is unjust, and that justice must eventually triumph, we should be in a pretty bad way, and we might have a long time to wait..." The most important thing in this is that "the productive forces created by the modern capitalist mode of production and the system of distribution of goods established by it have come into crying contradiction with that mode of production itself, and in fact to such a degree that, if the whole of modern society is not to perish, a revolution of the mode of production and distribution must take place, a revolution which will put an end to all class divisions. On this tangible, material fact... and not on the conceptions of justice and injustice held by any armchair philosopher, is modern socialism's confidence of victory founded" (see *Anti-Dühring*).¹⁰

That does not mean, of course, that since capitalism is decaying the socialist system can be established any time we like. Only anarchists and other petty-bourgeois ideologists think that. The socialist ideal is not the ideal of all classes. It is the ideal only of the proletariat; not all classes are directly interested in its fulfilment the proletariat alone is so interested. This means that as long as the proletariat constitutes a small section of society the establishment of the socialist system is impossible. The decay of the old form of production, the further concentration of capitalist production, and the proletarianization of the majority in society — such are the conditions needed for the achievement of socialism. But this is still not enough. The majority in society may already be proletarianized, but socialism may still not be achievable. This is because, in addition to all this, the achievement of socialism calls for class consciousness, the

unity of the proletariat and the ability of the proletariat to manage its own affairs. In order that all this may be acquired, what is called political freedom is needed, i.e., freedom of speech, press, strikes and association, in short, freedom to wage the class struggle. But political freedom is not equally ensured everywhere. Therefore, the conditions under which it is obliged to wage the struggle: under a feudal autocracy (Russia), a constitutional monarchy (Germany), a big-bourgeois republic (France), or under a democratic republic (which Russian social-democracy is demanding), are not a matter of indifference to the proletariat. Political freedom is best and most fully ensured in a democratic republic, that is, of course, in so far as it can be ensured under capitalism at all. Therefore, all advocates of proletarian socialism necessarily strive for the establishment of a democratic republic as the best "bridge" to socialism.

That is why, under present conditions, the Marxist program is divided into two parts: the *maximum program*, the goal of which is socialism, and the *minimum program*, the object of which is to lay the road to socialism through a democratic republic.

* * *

What must the proletariat do, what path must it take in order consciously to carry out its program, to overthrow capitalism and build socialism?

The answer is clear: the proletariat cannot achieve socialism by making peace with the bourgeoisie — it must unfailingly take the path of struggle, and this struggle must be a class struggle, a struggle of the entire proletariat against the entire bourgeoisie. Either the bourgeoisie and its capitalism, or the proletariat and its socialism! That must be the basis of the proletariat's actions, of its class struggle.

But the proletarian class struggle assumes numerous forms. A strike, for example — whether partial or general makes no difference — is class struggle. Boycott and sabotage are undoubtedly class struggle. Meetings, demonstrations, activity in public representative bodies, etc. — whether national parliaments or local government bodies makes no difference — are also class struggle. All these are different forms of the same class struggle. We shall not here examine which form of struggle is more important for the proletariat in its class struggle, we shall merely observe that, in its proper time and place, each is undoubtedly needed by the proletariat as essential means for developing its class consciousness and organization; and

the proletariat needs class consciousness and organization as much as it needs air. It must also be observed, however, that for the proletariat, all these forms of struggle are merely *preparatory* means, that not one of them, taken separately, constitutes the *decisive* means by which the proletariat can smash capitalism. Capitalism cannot be smashed by the general strike alone: the general strike can only create some of the conditions that are necessary for the smashing of capitalism. It is inconceivable that the proletariat should be able to overthrow capitalism merely by its activity in parliament: parliamentarism can only prepare some of the conditions that are necessary for overthrowing capitalism.

What, then, is the *decisive* means by which the proletariat will overthrow the capitalist system?

The *socialist revolution* is this means.

Strikes, boycott, parliamentarism, meetings and demonstrations are all good forms of struggle as means for preparing and organizing the proletariat. But not one of these means is capable of abolishing existing inequality. All these means must be concentrated in one principal and decisive means; the proletariat must rise and launch a determined attack upon the bourgeoisie in order to destroy capitalism to its foundations. This principal and decisive means is the socialist revolution.

The socialist revolution must not be conceived as a sudden and short blow, it is a prolonged struggle waged by the proletarian masses, who inflict defeat upon the bourgeoisie and capture its positions. And as the victory of the proletariat will at the same time mean domination over the vanquished bourgeoisie, as, *in a collision of classes*, the defeat of one class signifies the domination of the other, the first stage of the socialist revolution will be the political domination of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie.

The socialist *dictatorship of the proletariat*, capture of power by the proletariat — this is what the socialist revolution must start with.

This means that *until the bourgeoisie is completely vanquished*, until its wealth has been confiscated, the proletariat must without fail possess a military force, it must without fail have its “proletarian guard,” with the aid of which it will repel the counter-revolutionary attacks of the dying bourgeoisie, exactly as the Paris proletariat did during the Commune.

The socialist dictatorship of the proletariat is needed to enable the proletariat to expropriate the bourgeoisie, to enable it to confis-

cate the land, forests, factories and mills, machines, railways, etc., from the entire bourgeoisie.

The expropriation of the bourgeoisie — this is what the socialist revolution must lead to.

This, then, is the principal and decisive means by which the proletariat will overthrow the present capitalist system.

That is why Karl Marx said as far back as 1847:

“...The first step in the revolution by the working class, is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class... The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands... of the proletariat organized as the ruling class...” (see the *Communist Manifesto*).

That is how the proletariat must proceed if it wants to bring about socialism.

From this general principle emerge all the other views on tactics. Strikes, boycott, demonstrations and parliamentarism are important only in so far as they help to organize the proletariat and to strengthen and enlarge its organizations for accomplishing the socialist revolution.

* * *

Thus, to bring about socialism, the socialist revolution is needed, and the socialist revolution must begin with the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the proletariat must capture political power as a means with which to expropriate the bourgeoisie.

But to achieve all this the proletariat must be organized, the proletarian ranks must be closely-knit and united, strong proletarian organizations must be formed, and these must steadily grow.

What forms must the proletarian organizations assume?

The most widespread, mass organizations are trade unions and workers' cooperatives (mainly producers' and consumers' cooperatives). The object of the trade unions is to fight (mainly) against industrial capital to improve the conditions of the workers within the limits of the present capitalist system. The object of the cooperatives is to fight (mainly) against merchant capital to secure an increase of consumption among the workers by reducing the prices of articles of prime necessity, also within the limits of the capitalist system, of course. The proletariat undoubtedly needs both trade unions and cooperatives as means of organizing the proletarian masses. Hence, from the point of view of the proletarian socialism of Marx and Engels, the proletariat must utilize both these forms of

organization and reinforce and strengthen them, as far as this is possible under present political conditions, of course.

But trade unions and cooperatives alone cannot satisfy the organizational needs of the militant proletariat. This is because the organizations mentioned cannot go beyond the limits of capitalism, for their object is to improve the conditions of the workers under the capitalist system. The workers, however, want to free themselves entirely from capitalist slavery, they want to smash these limits, and not merely operate within the limits of capitalism. Hence, in addition, an organization is needed that will rally around itself the class-conscious elements of the workers of *all* trades, that will transform the proletariat into a conscious class and make it its chief aim to smash the capitalist system, to prepare for the socialist revolution.

Such an organization is the Social-Democratic Party of the proletariat.

This Party must be a class party, and it must be quite independent of other parties — and this is because it is the party of the proletarian class, the emancipation of which can be brought about only by this class itself.

This Party must be a revolutionary party — and this because the workers can be emancipated only by revolutionary means, by means of the socialist revolution.

This Party must be an international party, the doors of the Party must be open to all class-conscious proletarians — and this because the emancipation of the workers is not a national but a social question, equally important for the Georgian proletarians, for the Russian proletarians, and for the proletarians of other nations.

Hence, it is clear, that the more closely the proletarians of the different nations are united, the more thoroughly the national barriers which have been raised between them are demolished, the stronger will the Party of the proletariat be, and the more will the organization of the proletariat in one indivisible class be facilitated.

Hence, it is necessary, as far as possible, to introduce the principle of centralism in the proletarian organizations as against the looseness of federation — irrespective of whether these organizations are party, trade union or cooperative.

It is also clear that all these organizations must be built on a democratic basis, in so far as this is not hindered by political or other conditions, of course.

What should be the relations between the Party on the one hand and the cooperatives and trade unions on the other? Should the lat-

ter be party or non-party? The answer to this question depends upon where and under what conditions the proletariat has to fight. At all events, there can be no doubt that the friendlier the trade unions and cooperatives are towards the socialist party of the proletariat, the more fully will both develop. And this is because both these economic organizations, if they are not closely connected with a strong socialist party, often become petty, allow narrow craft interests to obscure general class interests and thereby cause great harm to the proletariat. It is therefore necessary, in all cases, to ensure that the trade unions and cooperatives are under the ideological and political influence of the Party. Only if this is done will the organizations mentioned be transformed into a socialist school that will organize the proletariat — at present split up into separate groups — into a conscious class.

Such, in general, are the characteristic features of the proletarian socialism of Marx and Engels.

How do the anarchists look upon proletarian socialism?

First of all we must know that proletarian socialism is not simply a philosophical doctrine. It is the doctrine of the proletarian masses, their banner; it is honoured and “revered” by the proletarians all over the world. Consequently, Marx and Engels are not simply the founders of a philosophical “school” — they are the living leaders of the living proletarian movement, which is growing and gaining strength every day. Whoever fights against this doctrine, whoever wants to “overthrow” it, must keep all this well in mind so as to avoid having his head cracked for nothing in an unequal struggle. Messieurs the anarchists are well aware of this. That is why, in fighting Marx and Engels, they resort to a most unusual and, in its way, a new weapon.

What is this new weapon? A new investigation of capitalist production? A refutation of Marx’s *Capital*? Of course not! Or perhaps, having armed themselves with “new facts” and the “inductive” method, they “scientifically” refute the “Bible” of social-democracy — the *Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels? Again no! Then what is this extraordinary weapon?

It is the accusation that Marx and Engels indulged in “plagiarism”! Would you believe it? It appears that Marx and Engels wrote nothing original, that scientific socialism is a pure fiction, because the *Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels was, from beginning to end, “stolen” from the *Manifesto* of Victor Considérant. This is quite ludicrous, of course, but V. Cherkezishvili, the “incomparable lead-

er” of the anarchists, relates this amusing story with such aplomb, and a certain Pierre Ramus, Cherkezishvili’s foolish “apostle,” and our homegrown anarchists repeat this “discovery” with such fervour, that it is worthwhile dealing at least briefly with this “story.”

Listen to Cherkezishvili:

“The entire theoretical part of the *Communist Manifesto*, namely, the first and second chapters... are taken from V. Considérant. Consequently, the *Manifesto* of Marx and Engels — that Bible of legal revolutionary democracy — is nothing but a clumsy paraphrasing of V. Considérant’s *Manifesto*. Marx and Engels not only appropriated the contents of Considérant’s *Manifesto* but even... borrowed some of its chapter headings” (see the symposium of articles by Cherkezishvili, Ramus and Labriola, published in German under the title of *The Origin of the “Communist Manifesto,”* p. 10).

This story is repeated by another anarchist, P. Ramus:

“It can be emphatically asserted that their (Marx-Engels’s) major work (the *Communist Manifesto*) is simply theft (a plagiary), shameless theft; they did not, however, copy it word for word as ordinary thieves do, but stole only the ideas and theories...” (*Ibid.*, p. 4).

This is repeated by our anarchists in *Nobati, Musha, Khma* and other papers.

Thus it appears that scientific socialism and its theoretical principles were “stolen” from Considérant’s *Manifesto*.

Are there any grounds for this assertion?

What was V. Considérant?

What was Karl Marx?

V. Considérant, who died in 1893, was a disciple of the utopian Fourier and remained an incorrigible *utopian*, who placed his hopes for the “salvation of France” on the *conciliation* of classes.

Karl Marx, who died in 1883, was a materialist, an *enemy of the utopians*. He regarded the development of the productive forces and the *struggle* between classes as the guarantee of the liberation of mankind.

Is there anything in common between them?

The *theoretical* basis of scientific socialism is the materialist theory of Marx and Engels. From the standpoint of this theory the development of social life is wholly determined by the development of the productive forces. If the feudal-landlord system was superseded by the bourgeois system, the “blame” for this rests upon the development of the productive forces, which made the rise of the bourgeois system inevitable. Or again: if the present bourgeois system

will inevitably be superseded by the socialist system, it is because this is called for by the development of the modern productive forces. Hence the historical necessity of the destruction of capitalism and the establishment of socialism. Hence the Marxist proposition that we must seek our ideals in the history of the development of the productive forces and not in the minds of men.

Such is the theoretical basis of the *Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels (see the *Communist Manifesto*, Chapters I and II).

Does V. Considérant's *Democratic Manifesto* say anything of the kind? Did Considérant accept the materialist point of view?

We assert that neither Cherkezishvili, nor Ramus, nor our *Nobatists* quote a single statement, or a single word from Considérant's *Democratic Manifesto* which would confirm that Considérant was a materialist and based the evolution of social life upon the development of the productive forces. On the contrary, we know very well that Considérant is known in the history of socialism as an idealist utopian (see Paul Louis, *The History of Socialism in France*).

What, then, induces these queer "critics" to indulge in this idle chatter? Why do they undertake to criticize Marx and Engels when they are even unable to distinguish idealism from materialism? Is it only to amuse people?...

The *tactical* basis of scientific socialism is the doctrine of uncompromising class struggle, for this is the *best* weapon the proletariat possesses. The proletarian class struggle is the weapon by means of which the proletariat will capture political power and then expropriate the bourgeoisie in order to establish socialism.

Such is the *tactical* basis of scientific socialism as expounded in the *Manifesto* of Marx and Engels.

Is anything like this said in Considérant's *Democratic Manifesto*? Did Considérant regard the class struggle as the best weapon the proletariat possesses?

As is evident from the articles of Cherkezishvili and Ramus (see the above-mentioned symposium), there is not a word about this in Considérant's *Manifesto* — it merely notes the class struggle as a deplorable fact. As regards the class struggle as a means of smashing capitalism, Considérant spoke of it in his *Manifesto* as follows:

"Capital, labour and talent — such are the three basic elements of production, the three sources of wealth, the three wheels of the industrial mechanism... The three classes which represent them have 'common interests'; their function is to make the machines work for the capitalists and for the people... Before them... is the great goal of organizing *the association of*

classes within the unity of the nation...” (see K. Kautsky’s pamphlet *The Communist Manifesto — A Plagiarist*, p. 14, where this passage from Considérant’s *Manifesto* is quoted).

All classes, unite! — this is the slogan that V. Considérant proclaimed in his *Democratic Manifesto*.

What is there in common between these tactics of class *conciliation* and the tactics of uncompromising class *struggle* advocated by Marx and Engels, whose resolute call was: *Proletarians of all countries, unite against all anti-proletarian classes?*

There is nothing in common between them, of course!

Why, then, do Messieurs Cherkezishvili and their foolish followers talk this rubbish? Do they think we are dead? Do they think we shall not drag them into the light of day?!

And lastly, there is one other interesting point. V. Considérant lived right up to 1893. He published his *Democratic Manifesto* in 1843. At the end of 1847 Marx and Engels wrote their *Communist Manifesto*. After that the *Manifesto* of Marx and Engels was published over and over again in all European languages. Everybody knows that the *Manifesto* of Marx and Engels was an epoch-making document. Nevertheless, *nowhere* did Considérant or his friends *ever* state during the lifetime of Marx and Engels that the latter had stolen “socialism” from Considérant’s *Manifesto*. Is this not strange, reader?

What, then, impels the “inductive” upstarts — I beg your pardon, “scholars” — to talk this rubbish? In whose name are they speaking? Are they more familiar with Considérant’s *Manifesto* than was Considérant himself? Or perhaps they think that V. Considérant and his supporters had not read the *Communist Manifesto*?

But enough... Enough because the anarchists themselves do not take seriously the Quixotic crusade launched by Ramus and Cherkezishvili: the inglorious end of this ridiculous crusade is too obvious to make it worthy of much attention...

Let us proceed to the actual criticism.

* * *

The anarchists suffer from a certain ailment: they are very fond of “criticizing” the parties of their opponents, but they do not take the trouble to make themselves in the least familiar with these parties. We have seen the anarchists behave precisely in this way when “criticizing” the dialectical method and the materialist theory of the social-democrats (see Chapters I and II). They behave in the same

way when they deal with the theory of scientific socialism of the social-democrats.

Let us, for example, take the following fact. Who does not know that fundamental disagreements exist between the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the social-democrats? Who does not know that the former repudiate Marxism, the materialist theory of Marxism, its dialectical method, its program and the class struggle — whereas the social-democrats take their stand entirely on Marxism? These fundamental disagreements must be self-evident to anybody who has heard anything, if only with half an ear, about the controversy between *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (the organ of the Socialist-Revolutionaries) and *Iskra* (the organ of the social-democrats). But what will you say about those “critics” who fail to see this difference between the two and shout that both the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the social-democrats are Marxists? Thus, for example, the anarchists assert that both *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* and *Iskra* are *Marxist organs* (see the anarchists’ symposium *Bread and Freedom*, p. 202).

That shows how “familiar” the anarchists are with the principles of social-democracy!

After this, the soundness of their “scientific criticism” will be self-evident...

Let us examine this “criticism.”

The anarchists’ principal “accusation” is that they do not regard the social-democrats as genuine *socialists* — you are not socialists, you are enemies of socialism, they keep on repeating.

This is what Kropotkin writes on this score:

“...We arrive at conclusions different from those arrived at by the majority of the Economists... of the social-democratic school... We... arrive at free communism, whereas the majority of socialists (meaning social-democrats too — *The Author*) arrive at state capitalism and collectivism” (see Kropotkin, *Modern Science and Anarchism*, pp. 74-75).

What is this “state capitalism” and “collectivism” of the social-democrats?

This is what Kropotkin writes about it:

“The German socialists say that all accumulated wealth must be concentrated in the hands of the state, which will place it at the disposal of workers’ associations, organize production and exchange, and control the life and work of society” (see Kropotkin, *The Speeches of a Rebel*, p. 64).

And further:

“In their schemes... the collectivists commit... a double mistake. They want to abolish the capitalist system, but they preserve the two institutions which constitute the foundations of this system: representative government and wage-labour” (see *The Conquest of Bread*, p. 148)... “Collectivism, as is well known... preserves... wage-labour. Only... representative government... takes the place of the employer...” The representatives of this government “retain the right to utilize in the interests of all the surplus value obtained from production. Moreover, in this system a distinction is made... between the labour of the common labourer and that of the trained man: the labour of the unskilled worker, in the opinion of the collectivists, is *simple* labour, whereas the skilled craftsman, engineer, scientist and so forth perform what Marx calls *complex* labour and have the right to higher wages” (*Ibid.*, p. 52). Thus, the workers will receive their necessary products not according to their needs, but “in proportion to the services they render society” (*Ibid.*, p. 157).

The Georgian anarchists say the same thing only with greater aplomb. Particularly outstanding among them for the recklessness of his statements is Mr. Bâton. He writes:

“What is the collectivism of the social-democrats? Collectivism, or more correctly, state capitalism, is based on the following principle: each must work as much as he likes, or as much as the state determines, and receives in reward the value of his labour in the shape of goods...” Consequently, here “there is needed a legislative assembly... there is needed (also) an executive power, i.e., ministers, all sorts of administrators, gendarmes and spies and, perhaps, also troops, if there are too many discontented” (see *Nobati*, No. 5, pp. 68-69).

Such is the first “accusation” of Messieurs the anarchists against social-democracy.

* * *

Thus, from the arguments of the anarchists it follows that:

1. In the opinion of the social-democrats, socialist society is impossible without a government which, in the capacity of principal master, will hire workers and will certainly have “ministers... gendarmes and spies.” 2. In socialist society, in the opinion of the social-democrats, the distinction between “dirty” and “clean” work will be retained, the principle “to each according to his needs” will be rejected, and another principle will prevail, viz., “to each according to his services.”

Those are the two points on which the anarchists’ “accusation” against social-democracy is based.

Has this “accusation” advanced by Messieurs the anarchists any

foundation?

We assert that everything the anarchists say on this subject is either the result of stupidity, or it is despicable slander.

Here are the facts.

As far back as 1846 Karl Marx said:

“The working class in the course of its development will substitute for the old bourgeois society an *association* which will exclude classes and their antagonism, and there will be *no more political power properly so-called...*” (see *Poverty of Philosophy*).

A year later Marx and Engels expressed the same idea in the *Communist Manifesto* (*Communist Manifesto*, Chapter II).

In 1877 Engels wrote:

“The first act in which the state really comes forward as the representative of society as a whole — the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society — is at the same time its last independent act as a state. The interference of the state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself... The state is not ‘abolished,’ it *withers away*” (*Anti-Dühring*).

In 1884 the same Engels wrote:

“The state, then, has not existed from all eternity. There have been societies that did without it, that had no conception of the state... At a certain stage of economic development, which was necessarily bound up with the cleavage of society into classes, the state became a necessity... We are now rapidly approaching a stage in the development of production at which the existence of these classes not only will have ceased to be a necessity, but will become a positive hindrance to production. They will fall as inevitably as they arose at an earlier stage. *Along with them the state will inevitably fall.* The society that will organize production on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers will put the whole machinery of state where it will then belong: into the Museum of Antiquities, by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze axe” (see *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*).

Engels said the same thing again in 1891 (see his Introduction to *The Civil War in France*).

As you see, in the opinion of the social-democrats, socialist society is a society in which there will be no room for the so-called state, political power, with its ministers, governors, gendarmes, police and soldiers. The last stage in the existence of the state will be the period of the socialist revolution, when the proletariat will capture political power and set up its own government (dictatorship) for

the final abolition of the bourgeoisie. But when the bourgeoisie is abolished, when classes are abolished, when socialism becomes firmly established, there will be no need for any political power — and the so-called state will retire into the sphere of history.

As you see, the above-mentioned “accusation” of the anarchists is mere tittle-tattle devoid of all foundation.

As regards the second point in the “accusation,” Karl Marx says the following about it:

“In a higher phase of communist (i.e., socialist) society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the *antithesis* between *mental* and *physical labour*, has vanished; after labour has become... life’s prime want; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual... only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois law be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: ‘From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs’” (*Critique of the Gotha Programme*).

As you see, in Marx’s opinion, the higher phase of communist (i.e., socialist) society will be a system under which the division of work into “dirty” and “clean,” and the contradiction between mental and physical labour will be completely abolished, labour will be equal, and in society the genuine communist principle will prevail: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs. Here there is no room for wage-labour.

Clearly this “accusation” is also devoid of all foundation.

One of two things: either Messieurs the anarchists have never seen the above-mentioned works of Marx and Engels and indulge in “criticism” on the basis of hearsay, or they are familiar with the above-mentioned works of Marx and Engels and are deliberately lying.

Such is the fate of the first “accusation.”

* * *

The second “accusation” of the anarchists is that they deny that social-democracy is *revolutionary*. You are not revolutionaries, you repudiate violent revolution, you want to establish socialism only by means of ballot papers — Messieurs the anarchists tell us.

Listen to this:

“...social-democrats... are fond of declaiming on the theme of ‘revolution,’ ‘revolutionary struggle,’ ‘fighting with arms in hand’... But if you, in the simplicity of your heart, ask them for arms, they will solemnly hand you a ballot paper to vote in elections...” They affirm that “the only expedient

tactics befitting revolutionaries are peaceful and legal parliamentarism, with the oath of allegiance to capitalism, to established power and to the entire existing bourgeois system” (see symposium *Bread and Freedom*, pp. 21, 22-23).

The Georgian anarchists say the same thing, with even greater aplomb, of course. Take, for example, Bâton, who writes:

“The whole of social-democracy... openly asserts that fighting with the aid of rifles and weapons is a bourgeois method of revolution, and that only by means of ballot papers, only by means of general elections, can parties capture power, and then, by means of a parliamentary majority and legislation, reorganize society” (see *The Capture of Political Power*, pp. 3-4).

That is what Messieurs the anarchists say about the Marxists.
Has this “accusation” any foundation?

We affirm that here, too, the anarchists betray their ignorance and their passion for slander.

Here are the facts.

As far back as the end of 1847, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels wrote:

“The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their *ends can be obtained only by the forcible overthrow* of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic Revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. *Working men of all countries, unite!*” (See the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. In some of the legal editions several words have been omitted in the translation.)

In 1850, in anticipation of another outbreak in Germany, Karl Marx wrote to the German comrades of that time as follows:

“Arms and ammunition must not be surrendered on any pretext... the workers must... *organize themselves independently as a proletarian guard with commanders... and with a general staff...*” And this “you must keep in view during and after the impending insurrection” (see *The Cologne Trial*, Marx’s Address to the Communists).¹¹

In 1851-52 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels wrote:

“...The insurrectionary career once entered upon, *act with the greatest determination, and on the offensive*. The defensive is the death of every armed rising... Surprise your antagonists while their forces are scattering, prepare new successes, however small, but daily... force your enemies to a retreat before they can collect their strength against you; in the words of Danton, the greatest master of revolutionary policy yet known: *de l’audace, de l’audace, encore de l’audace!*” (*Revolution and Counter-revolution in Germany*.)

We think that something more than “ballot papers” is meant here.

Lastly, recall the history of the Paris Commune, recall how peacefully the Commune acted, when it was content with the victory in Paris and refrained from attacking Versailles, that hotbed of counter-revolution. What do you think Marx said at that time? Did he call upon the Parisians to go to the ballot box? Did he express approval of the complacency of the Paris workers (the whole of Paris was in the hands of the workers), did he approve of the good nature they displayed towards the vanquished Versaillese? Listen to what Marx said:

“What elasticity, what historical initiative, what a capacity for sacrifice in these Parisians! After six months of hunger... they rise, beneath Prussian bayonets... History has no like example of like greatness! If they are defeated only their ‘good nature’ will be to blame. *They should have marched at once on Versailles*, after first Vinoy and then the reactionary section of the Paris National Guard had themselves retreated. They missed their opportunity because of conscientious scruples. They did not want to *start a civil war*, as if that mischievous abortion Thiers had not already started the civil war with his attempt to disarm Paris!” (*Letters to Kugelmann.*)¹²

That is how Karl Marx and Frederick Engels thought and acted.
That is how the social-democrats think and act.

But the anarchists go on repeating: Marx and Engels and their followers are interested only in ballot papers — they repudiate violent revolutionary action!

As you see, this “accusation” is also slander, which exposes the anarchists’ ignorance about the essence of Marxism.

Such is the fate of the second “accusation.”

* * *

The third “accusation” of the anarchists consists in denying that social-democracy is a popular movement, describing the social-democrats as bureaucrats, and affirming that the social-democratic plan for the dictatorship of the proletariat spells death to the revolution, and since the social-democrats stand for such a dictatorship they actually want to establish not the dictatorship of the proletariat, but their own dictatorship over the proletariat.

Listen to Mr. Kropotkin:

“We anarchists have pronounced final sentence upon dictatorship... We know that every dictatorship, no matter how honest its intentions, will lead to the death of the revolution. We know... that the idea of dictatorship is

nothing more or less than the pernicious product of governmental fetishism which... has always striven to perpetuate slavery” (see Kropotkin, *The Speeches of a Rebel*, p. 131). The social-democrats not only recognize revolutionary dictatorship, they also “advocate dictatorship over the proletariat... The workers are of interest to them only in so far as they are a disciplined army under their control... social-democracy strives through the medium of the proletariat to capture the state machine” (see *Bread and Freedom*, pp. 62, 63).

The Georgian anarchists say the same thing:

“The dictatorship of the proletariat in the direct sense of the term is utterly impossible, because the advocates of dictatorship are state men, and their dictatorship will be not the free activities of the entire proletariat, but the establishment at the head of society of the same representative government that exists today” (see Bâton, *The Capture of Political Power*, p. 45). The social-democrats stand for dictatorship not in order to facilitate the emancipation of the proletariat, but in order... “by their own rule to establish a new slavery” (see *Nobati*, No. 1, p. 5, Bâton).

Such is the third “accusation” of Messieurs the anarchists.

It requires no great effort to expose this, one of the regular slanders uttered by the anarchists with the object of deceiving their readers.

We shall not analyse here the deeply mistaken view of Kropotkin, according to whom every dictatorship spells death to revolution. We shall discuss this later when we discuss the anarchists’ tactics. At present we shall touch upon only the “accusation” itself.

As far back as the end of 1847 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels said that to establish socialism the proletariat must achieve political dictatorship in order, with the aid of this dictatorship, to repel the counter-revolutionary attacks of the bourgeoisie and to take from it the means of production; that this dictatorship must be not the dictatorship of a few individuals, but the dictatorship of the entire proletariat as a class:

“The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands... of the proletariat organized as the ruling class...” (see the *Communist Manifesto*).

That is to say, the dictatorship of the proletariat will be a dictatorship of the entire proletariat as a class over the bourgeoisie and not the domination of a few individuals over the proletariat.

Later they repeated this same idea in nearly all their other

works, such as, for example, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, *The Class Struggles in France*, *The Civil War in France*, *Revolution and Counterrevolution in Germany*, *Anti-Dühring* and other works.

But this is not all; To ascertain how Marx and Engels conceived of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to ascertain to what extent they regarded this dictatorship as possible, for all this it is very interesting to know their attitude towards the Paris Commune. The point is that the dictatorship of the proletariat is denounced not only by the anarchists but also by the urban petty bourgeoisie, including all kinds of butchers and tavern-keepers — by all those whom Marx and Engels called philistines. This is what Engels said about the dictatorship of the proletariat, addressing such philistines:

“Of late, the German philistine has once more been filled with wholesome terror at the words: *Dictatorship of the Proletariat*. Well and good, gentlemen, do you want to know what this dictatorship looks like? Look at the Paris Commune. That was the Dictatorship of the Proletariat” (see *The Civil War in France*, Introduction by Engels).¹³

As you see, Engels conceived of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the shape of the Paris Commune.

Clearly, everybody who wants to know what the dictatorship of the proletariat is as conceived of by Marxists must study the Paris Commune. Let us then turn to the Paris Commune. If it turns out that the Paris Commune was indeed the dictatorship of a few individuals over the proletariat, then — down with Marxism, down with the dictatorship of the proletariat! But if we find that the Paris Commune was indeed the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, then... we shall laugh heartily at the anarchist slanderers who in their struggle against the Marxists have no alternative but to invent slander.

The history of the Paris Commune can be divided into two periods: the first period, when affairs in Paris were controlled by the well-known “Central Committee,” and the second period, when, after the authority of the “Central Committee” had expired, control of affairs was transferred to the recently elected Commune. What was this “Central Committee,” what was its composition? Before us lies Arthur Arnould’s *Popular History of the Paris Commune* which, according to Arnould, briefly answers this question. The struggle had only just commenced when about 300,000 Paris workers, organized in companies and battalions, elected delegates from their ranks. In this way the “Central Committee” was formed.

“All these citizens (members of the “Central Committee”) elected during partial elections by their companies or battalions,” says Arnould, “were known only to the small groups whose delegates they were. Who were these people, what kind of people were they, and what did they want to do?” This was “an anonymous government consisting almost exclusively of common workers and minor office employees, the names of three fourths of whom were unknown outside their streets or offices... Tradition was upset. Something unexpected had happened in the world. There was not a single member of the ruling classes among them. A revolution had broken out which was not represented by a single *lawyer*, *deputy*, *journalist* or *general*. Instead, there was a *miner* from Creusot, a *bookbinder*, a *cook*, and so forth” (see *A Popular History of the Paris Commune*, p. 107).

Arthur Arnould goes on to say:

“The members of the ‘Central Committee’ said: ‘We are obscure bodies, humble tools of the attacked people... Instruments of the people’s will, we are here to be its echo, to achieve its triumph. The people want a Commune, and we shall remain in order to proceed to the election of the Commune.’ Neither more nor less. These dictators do not put themselves above nor stand aloof from the masses. One feels that they are living with the masses, in the masses, by means of the masses, that they consult with them every second, that they listen and convey all they hear, striving only, in a concise form... to convey the opinion of three hundred thousand men” (*Ibid.*, p. 109).

That is how the Paris Commune behaved in the first period of its existence.

Such was the Paris Commune.

Such is the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Let us now pass to the second period of the Commune, when the Commune functioned in place of the “Central Committee.” Speaking of these two periods, which lasted two months, Arnould exclaims with enthusiasm that this was a real dictatorship of the people. Listen:

“The magnificent spectacle which this people presented during those two months imbues us with strength and hope... to look into the face of the future. During those two months there was a real dictatorship in Paris, a most complete and uncontested dictatorship not of one man, *but of the entire people* — the sole master of the situation... This dictatorship lasted uninterruptedly for over two months, from March 18 to May 22 (1871)...” In itself “...the Commune was only a moral power and possessed no other material strength than the universal sympathy... of the citizens, *the people were the rulers*, the only rulers, they themselves set up their police and magistracy...” (*Ibid.*, pp. 242, 244).

That is how the Paris Commune is described by *Arthur Arnould*, a member of the Commune and an active participant in its hand-to-hand fighting.

The Paris Commune is described in the same way by another of its members and equally active participant *Lissagaray* (see his *History of the Paris Commune*).

The people as the “only rulers,” “not the dictatorship of one man, but of the whole people” — this is what the Paris Commune was.

“Look at the Paris Commune. That was the dictatorship of the proletariat” — exclaimed Engels for the information of philistines.

So this is the dictatorship of the proletariat as conceived of by Marx and Engels.

As you see, Messieurs the anarchists know as much about the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Paris Commune and Marxism, which they so often “criticize,” as you and I, dear reader, know about the Chinese language.

Clearly, there are two kinds of dictatorship. There is the dictatorship of the minority, the dictatorship of a small group, the dictatorship of the Trepovs and Ignatyevs, which is directed against the people. This kind of dictatorship is usually headed by a camarilla which adopts secret decisions and tightens the noose around the neck of the majority of the people.

Marxists are the enemies of such a dictatorship, and they fight such a dictatorship far more stubbornly and self-sacrificingly than do our noisy anarchists.

There is another kind of dictatorship, the dictatorship of the proletarian majority, the dictatorship of the masses, which is directed against the bourgeoisie, against the minority. At the head of this dictatorship stand the masses; here there is no room either for a camarilla or for secret decisions, here everything is done openly, in the streets, at meetings — because it is the dictatorship of the street, of the masses, a dictatorship directed against all oppressors.

Marxists support this kind of dictatorship “with both hands” — and that is because such a dictatorship is the magnificent beginning of the great socialist revolution.

Messieurs the anarchists confused these two mutually negating dictatorships and thereby put themselves in a ridiculous position: they are fighting not Marxism but the figments of their own imagination, they are fighting not Marx and Engels but windmills, as Don Quixote of blessed memory did in his day...

Such is the fate of the third “accusation.”

(to be continued)*

* The continuation did not appear in the press because, in the middle of 1907, Comrade Stalin was transferred by the Central Committee of the Party to Baku for Party work, and several months later he was arrested there. His notes on the last chapters of his work *Anarchism or Socialism?* were lost when the police searched his lodgings. — *Ed.*

MUDDLE...

April 10, 1907

The “publicists” of *Lakhvari*¹⁴ are still unable to define their tactics. In their first issue they wrote: We are supporting only the “progressive steps” of the Cadets, but not the Cadets themselves. Commenting on this we said that it was amusing sophistry, since the Mensheviks voted for the Cadet candidates to the Duma and not only for their “steps”; they helped to get into the Duma Cadets as such and not only their “steps,” and they helped to elect a Cadet as such as President of the Duma and not only his “steps” — and this clearly confirms the fact that the Mensheviks supported the Cadets. This is so obvious and the Mensheviks have talked so much about supporting the Cadets, that denial of the fact has only raised a laugh...

Now, having “pondered” over the matter a little, they are talking differently: true, “during the elections we supported the Cadets” (see *Lakhvari*, No. 3), but this was only during the elections; in the Duma we are supporting not the Cadets but only their “steps”; you, they say, “do not distinguish between tactics in the Duma and tactics during elections.” In the first place, “tactics” which safeguard you from doing stupid things only in the Duma but prompt you to do stupid things during elections are very funny tactics. Secondly, is it not true that the Mensheviks helped to elect a Cadet as President of the Duma? Under what category of tactics should we place helping to elect a Cadet as President — “tactics in the Duma” or tactics outside the Duma? We think that Golovin was elected President of the Duma in the Duma, and not president of the street in the street.

Clearly, the Mensheviks pursued the same tactics in the Duma as they pursued outside the Duma. These are the tactics of supporting the Cadets. If they deny it now, it is because they have fallen victims to muddle.

Supporting the Cadets does not mean creating a reputation for the Cadets; if it does, then you are creating a reputation for the Socialist-Revolutionaries by supporting them — says *Lakhvari*. What comical fellows those “Lakhvarists” are! Apparently it does not occur to them that any support that social-democracy lends a party creates a reputation for that party! That is why they have been so lavish in their promises of every kind of “support”... Yes, dear comrades, by supporting the Socialist-Revolutionaries, social-

democracy creates a reputation for them in the eyes of the people, and this is exactly why such support is permissible *only in exceptional cases, and as a means of defeating the Cadets*. Supporting the Socialist-Revolutionaries is by no means ideal, it is an inevitable evil, resorted to in order to curb the Cadets. You, however, supported the very Cadets who are betraying the workers and peasants; the Socialist-Revolutionaries are superior to them because they side with the revolution...

“The Cadets, for example, demanded universal suffrage. It turns out that this demand is a great evil, because it is a Cadet demand” (*Ibid.*).

Well, aren't they comical? You see, it turns out that universal suffrage is a “Cadet demand”! The Tiflis Mensheviks, it turns out, do not know that universal suffrage is not a Cadet demand, but the demand of revolutionary democracy, which social-democracy advocates more consistently than anyone else! No, comrades, if you cannot even understand that the Cadets are not revolutionary democrats; if you cannot even understand that the fight against them in order to strengthen the hegemony of the proletariat is the question of the day for us; if you cannot even distinguish between what you said yesterday and what you are saying today — then you had better put your pens aside, get yourselves out of the muddle you are in, and only after that launch into “criticism”...

By the holy Duma, that would be better!

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION¹⁵

(Excerpts)

March-May 1913

The period of counter-revolution in Russia brought not only “thunder and lightning” in its train, but also disillusionment in the movement and lack of faith in common forces. As long as people believed in “a bright future,” they fought side by side irrespective of nationality — common questions first and foremost! But when doubt crept into people’s hearts, they began to depart, each to his own national tent — let every man count only upon himself! The “national question” first and foremost!

At the same time a profound upheaval was taking place in the economic life of the country. The year 1905 had not been in vain: one more blow had been struck at the survivals of serfdom in the countryside. The series of good harvests which succeeded the famine years, and the industrial boom which followed, furthered the progress of capitalism. Class differentiation in the countryside, the growth of the towns, the development of trade and means of communication all took a big stride forward. This applied particularly to the border regions. And it could not but hasten the process of economic consolidation of the nationalities of Russia. They were bound to be stirred into movement...

The “constitutional regime” established at that time also acted in the same direction of awakening the nationalities. The spread of newspapers and of literature generally, a certain freedom of the press and cultural institutions, an increase in the number of national theatres, and so forth, all unquestionably helped to strengthen “national sentiments.” The Duma, with its election campaign and political groups, gave fresh opportunities for greater activity of the nations and provided a new and wide arena for their mobilization.

And the mounting wave of militant nationalism above and the series of repressive measures taken by the “powers that be” in vengeance on the border regions for their “love of freedom,” evoked an answering wave of nationalism below, which at times took the form of crude chauvinism. The spread of Zionism¹⁶ among the Jews, the increase of chauvinism in Poland, Pan-Islamism among the Tatars, the spread of nationalism among the Armenians, Georgians and

Ukrainians, the general swing of the philistine towards anti-Semitism — all these are generally known facts.

The wave of nationalism swept onwards with increasing force, threatening to engulf the mass of the workers. And the more the movement for emancipation declined, the more plentifully nationalism pushed forth its blossoms.

At this difficult time social-democracy had a high mission — to resist nationalism and to protect the masses from the general “epidemic.” For social-democracy, and social-democracy alone, could do this, by countering nationalism with the tried weapon of internationalism, with the unity and indivisibility of the class struggle. And the more powerfully the wave of nationalism advanced, the louder had to be the call of social-democracy for fraternity and unity among the proletarians of all the nationalities of Russia. And in this connection particular firmness was demanded of the social-democrats of the border regions, who came into direct contact with the nationalist movement.

But not all social-democrats proved equal to the task — and this applies particularly to the social-democrats of the border regions. The Bund, which had previously laid stress on the common tasks, now began to give prominence to its own specific, purely nationalist aims: it went to the length of declaring “observance of the Sabbath” and “recognition of Yiddish” a fighting issue in its election campaign.* The Bund was followed by the Caucasus; one section of the Caucasian social-democrats, which, like the rest of the Caucasian social-democrats, had formerly rejected “cultural-national autonomy,” are now making it an immediate demand.** This is without mentioning the conference of the Liquidators, which in a diplomatic way gave its sanction to nationalist vacillations.***

But from this it follows that the views of Russian social-democracy on the national question are not yet clear to all social-democrats.

It is evident that a serious and comprehensive discussion of the national question is required. Consistent social-democrats must work solidly and indefatigably against the fog of nationalism, no matter from what quarter it proceeds.

* See “Report of the Ninth Conference of the Bund.”

** See “Announcement of the August Conference.”

*** *Ibid.*

I

THE NATION

What is a nation?

A nation is primarily a community, a definite community of people.

This community is not racial, nor is it tribal. The modern Italian nation was formed from Romans, Teutons, Etruscans, Greeks, Arabs, and so forth. The French nation was formed from Gauls, Romans, Britons, Teutons, and so on. The same must be said of the British, the Germans and others, who were formed into nations from people of diverse races and tribes.

Thus, a nation is not a racial or tribal, but an historically constituted community of people.

On the other hand, it is unquestionable that the great empires of Cyrus and Alexander could not be called nations, although they came to be constituted historically and were formed out of different tribes and races. They were not nations, but casual and loosely-connected conglomerations of groups, which fell apart or joined together according to the victories or defeats of this or that conqueror.

Thus, a nation is not a casual or ephemeral conglomeration, but a stable community of people.

But not every stable community constitutes a nation. Austria and Russia are also stable communities, but nobody calls them nations. What distinguishes a national community from a state community? The fact, among others, that a national community is inconceivable without a common language, while a state need not have a common language. The Czech nation in Austria and the Polish in Russia would be impossible if each did not have a common language, whereas the integrity of Russia and Austria is not affected by the fact that there are a number of different languages within their borders. We are referring, of course, to the spoken languages of the people and not to the official governmental languages.

Thus, *a common language* is one of the characteristic features of a nation.

This, of course, does not mean that different nations always and everywhere speak different languages, or that all who speak one language necessarily constitute one nation. A *common* language for every nation, but not necessarily different languages for different nations! There is no nation which at one and the same time speaks sev-

eral languages, but this does not mean that there cannot be two nations speaking the same language! Englishmen and Americans speak one language, but they do not constitute one nation. The same is true of the Norwegians and the Danes, the English and the Irish.

But why, for instance, do the English and the Americans not constitute one nation in spite of their common language?

Firstly, because they do not live together, but inhabit different territories. A nation is formed only as a result of lengthy and systematic intercourse, as a result of people living together generation after generation. But people cannot live together for lengthy periods unless they have a common territory. Englishmen and Americans originally inhabited the same territory, England, and constituted one nation. Later, one section of the English emigrated from England to a new territory, America, and there, in the new territory, in the course of time, came to form the new American nation. Difference of territory led to the formation of different nations.

Thus, *a common territory* is one of the characteristic features of a nation.

But this is not all. Common territory does not by itself create a nation. This requires, in addition, an internal economic bond to weld the various parts of the nation into a single whole. There is no such bond between England and America, and so they constitute two different nations. But the Americans themselves would not deserve to be called a nation were not the different parts of America bound together into an economic whole, as a result of division of labour between them, the development of means of communication, and so forth.

Take the Georgians, for instance. The Georgians before the Reform inhabited a common territory and spoke one language. Nevertheless, they did not, strictly speaking, constitute one nation, for, being split up into a number of disconnected principalities, they could not share a common economic life; for centuries they waged war against each other and pillaged each other, each inciting the Persians and Turks against the other. The ephemeral and casual union of the principalities which some successful king sometimes managed to bring about embraced at best a superficial administrative sphere, and rapidly disintegrated owing to the caprices of the princes and the indifference of the peasants. Nor could it be otherwise in economically disunited Georgia...

Georgia came on the scene as a nation only in the latter half of the nineteenth century, when the fall of serfdom and the growth of

the economic life of the country, the development of means of communication and the rise of capitalism, introduced division of labour between the various districts of Georgia, completely shattered the economic isolation of the principalities and bound them together into a single whole.

The same must be said of the other nations which have passed through the stage of feudalism and have developed capitalism.

Thus, *a common economic life, economic cohesion*, is one of the characteristic features of a nation.

But even this is not all. Apart from the foregoing, one must take into consideration the specific spiritual complexion of the people constituting a nation. Nations differ not only in their conditions of life, but also in spiritual complexion, which manifests itself in peculiarities of national culture. If England, America and Ireland, which speak one language, nevertheless constitute three distinct nations, it is in no small measure due to the peculiar psychological make-up which they developed from generation to generation as a result of dissimilar conditions of existence.

Of course, by itself, psychological make-up or, as it is otherwise called, “national character,” is something intangible for the observer, but in so far as it manifests itself in a distinctive culture common to the nation it is something tangible and cannot be ignored.

Needless to say, “national character” is not a thing that is fixed once and for all, but is modified by changes in the conditions of life; but since it exists at every given moment, it leaves its impress on the physiognomy of the nation.

Thus, *a common psychological make-up*, which manifests itself in a common culture, is one of the characteristic features of a nation.

We have now exhausted the characteristic features of a nation.

A nation is an historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.

It goes without saying that a nation, like every historical phenomenon, is subject to the law of change, has its history, its beginning and end.

It must be emphasized that none of the above characteristics taken separately is sufficient to define a nation. More than that, it is sufficient for a single one of these characteristics to be lacking and the nation ceases to be a nation.

It is possible to conceive of people possessing a common “national character” who, nevertheless, cannot be said to constitute a

single nation if they are economically disunited, inhabit different territories, speak different languages, and so forth. Such, for instance, are the Russian, Galician, American, Georgian and Caucasian Highland *Jews*, who, in our opinion, do not constitute a single nation.

It is possible to conceive of people with a common territory and economic life who nevertheless would not constitute a single nation because they have no common language and no common “national character.” Such, for instance, are the Germans and Letts in the Baltic region.

Finally, the Norwegians and the Danes speak one language, but they do not constitute a single nation owing to the absence of the other characteristics.

It is only when all these characteristics are present together that we have a nation.

It might appear that “national character” is not one of the characteristics but the *sole* essential characteristic of a nation, and that all the other characteristics are, properly speaking, only *conditions* for the development of a nation, rather than its characteristics. Such, for instance, is the view held by R. Springer, and more particularly by O. Bauer, who are social-democratic theoreticians on the national question well known in Austria.

Let us examine their theory of the nation.

According to Springer, “a nation is a union of similarly thinking and similarly speaking persons.” It is “a cultural community of modern people *no longer tied to the ‘soil’*” (our italics).

Thus, a “union” of similarly thinking and similarly speaking people, no matter how disconnected they may be, no matter where they live, is a nation.

Bauer goes even further.

“What is a nation?” he asks. “Is it a common language which makes people a nation? But the English and the Irish... speak the same language without, however, being one people; the Jews have no common language and yet are a nation.”**

What, then, is a nation?

* See R. Springer, *The National Problem*, Obshchestvennaya Polza Publishing House, 1909, p. 43.

** See O. Bauer, *The National Question and Social-Democracy*, Serp Publishing House, 1909, pp. 1-2.

“A nation is a relative community of character.”*

But what is character, in this case national character?

National character is “the sum total of characteristics which distinguish the people of one nationality from the people of another nationality — the complex of physical and spiritual characteristics which distinguish one nation from another.”**

Bauer knows, of course, that national character does not drop from the skies, and he therefore adds:

“The character of people is determined by nothing so much as by their destiny... A nation is nothing but a community with a common destiny” which, in turn, is determined “by the conditions under which people produce their means of subsistence and distribute the products of their labour.”***

We thus arrive at the most “complete,” as Bauer calls it, definition of a nation:

“A nation is an aggregate of people bound into a community of character by a common destiny.”****

We thus have common national character based on a common destiny, but not necessarily connected with a common territory, language or economic life.

But what in that case remains of the nation? What common nationality can there be among people who are economically disconnected, inhabit different territories and from generation to generation speak different languages.

Bauer speaks of the Jews as a nation, although they “have no common language”;***** but what “common destiny” and national cohesion is there, for instance, between the Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian and American Jews, who are completely separated from one another, inhabit different territories and speak different languages?

The above-mentioned Jews undoubtedly lead their economic and political life in common with the Georgians, Daghestanians, Russians and Americans respectively, and they live in the same cultural

* See O. Bauer, *The National Question and Social-Democracy*, Serp Publishing House, 1909, p. 6.

** *Ibid.*, p. 2.

*** *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.

**** *Ibid.*, p. 139.

***** *Ibid.*, p. 2.

atmosphere as these; this is bound to leave a definite impress on their national character; if there is anything common to them left, it is their religion, their common origin and certain relics of the national character. All this is beyond question. But how can it be seriously maintained that petrified religious rites and fading psychological relics affect the "destiny" of these Jews more powerfully than the living social, economic and cultural environment that surrounds them? And it is only on this assumption that it is possible to speak of the Jews as a single nation at all.

What, then, distinguishes Bauer's nation from the mystical and self-sufficient "national spirit" of the spiritualists?

Bauer sets up an impassable barrier between the "distinctive feature" of nations (national character) and the "conditions" of their life, divorcing the one from the other. But what is national character if not a reflection of the conditions of life, a coagulation of impressions derived from environment? How can one limit the matter to national character alone, isolating and divorcing it from the soil that gave rise to it?

Further, what indeed distinguished the English nation from the American nation at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, when America was still known as New England? Not national character, of course; for the Americans had originated from England and had brought with them to America not only the English language, but also the English national character, which, of course, they could not lose so soon; although, under the influence of the new conditions, they would naturally be developing their own specific character. Yet, despite their more or less common character, they at that time already constituted a nation distinct from England! Obviously, New England as a nation differed then from England as a nation not by its specific national character, or not so much by its national character, as by its environment and conditions of life, which were distinct from those of England.

It is therefore clear that there is in fact no single distinguishing characteristic of a nation. There is only a sum total of characteristics, of which, when nations are compared, sometimes one characteristic (national character), sometimes another (language), or sometimes a third (territory, economic conditions), stands out in sharper relief. A nation constitutes the combination of all these characteristics taken together.

Bauer's point of view, which identifies a nation with its national character, divorces the nation from its soil and converts it into an

invisible, self-contained force. The result is not a living and active nation, but something mystical, intangible and supernatural. For, I repeat, what sort of nation, for instance, is a Jewish nation which consists of Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian, American and other Jews, the members of which do not understand each other (since they speak different languages), inhabit different parts of the globe, will never see each other, and will never act together, whether in time of peace or in time of war?!

No, it is not for such paper “nations” that social-democracy draws up its national program. It can reckon only with real nations, which act and move, and therefore insist on being reckoned with.

Bauer is obviously confusing *nation*, which is an historical category, with *tribe*, which is an ethnographical category.

However, Bauer himself apparently feels the weakness of his position. While in the beginning of his book he definitely declares the Jews to be a nation,* he corrects himself at the end of the book and states that “in general capitalist society makes it impossible for them (the Jews) to continue as a nation,”** by causing them to assimilate with other nations. The reason, it appears, is that “the Jews have no closed territory of settlement,”*** whereas the Czechs, for instance, have such a territory and, according to Bauer, will survive as a nation. In short, the reason lies in the absence of a territory.

By arguing thus, Bauer wanted to prove that the Jewish workers cannot demand national autonomy,**** but he thereby inadvertently refuted his own theory, which denies that a common territory is one of the characteristics of a nation.

But Bauer goes further. In the beginning of his book he definitely declares that “the Jews have no *common* language, and yet are a nation.”***** But hardly has he reached p. 130 than he effects a change of front and just as definitely declares that “*unquestionably, no nation is possible without a common language*”***** (our italics).

Bauer wanted to prove that “language is the most important instrument of human intercourse,”***** but at the same time he inadvertently proved something he did not mean to prove, namely, the

* See p. 2 of his book.

** *Ibid.*, p. 389.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 388.

**** *Ibid.*, p. 396.

***** *Ibid.*, p. 2.

***** *Ibid.*, p. 130.

***** *Ibid.*

unsoundness of his own theory of nations, which denies the significance of a common language.

Thus this theory, stitched together by idealistic threads, refutes itself.

II

THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT

A nation is not merely an historical category but an historical category belonging to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism. The process of elimination of feudalism and development of capitalism is at the same time a process of the constitution of people into nations. Such, for instance, was the case in Western Europe. The British, French, Germans, Italians and others were formed into nations at the time of the victorious advance of capitalism and its triumph over feudal disunity.

But the formation of nations in those instances at the same time signified their conversion into independent national states. The British, French and other nations are at the same time British, etc., states. Ireland, which did not participate in this process, does not alter the general picture.

Matters proceeded somewhat differently in Eastern Europe. Whereas in the West nations developed into states, in the East multi-national states were formed, states consisting of several nationalities. Such are Austria-Hungary and Russia. In Austria, the Germans proved to be politically the most developed, and they took it upon themselves to unite the Austrian nationalities into a state. In Hungary, the most adapted for state organization were the Magyars — the core of the Hungarian nationalities — and it was they who united Hungary. In Russia, the uniting of the nationalities was undertaken by the Great Russians, who were headed by an historically formed, powerful and well-organized aristocratic military bureaucracy.

That was how matters proceeded in the East.

This special method of formation of states could take place only where feudalism had not yet been eliminated, where capitalism was feebly developed, where the nationalities which had been forced into the background had not yet been able to consolidate themselves economically into integral nations.

But capitalism also began to develop in the Eastern states. Trade and means of communication were developing. Large towns were

springing up. The nations were becoming economically consolidated. Capitalism, erupting into the tranquil life of the nationalities which had been pushed into the background, was arousing them and stirring them into action. The development of the press and the theatre, the activity of the Reichsrat (Austria) and of the Duma (Russia) were helping to strengthen "national sentiments." The intelligentsia that had arisen was being imbued with "the national idea" and was acting in the same direction...

But the nations which had been pushed into the background and had now awakened to independent life, could no longer form themselves into independent national states; they encountered on their path the very powerful resistance of the ruling strata of the dominant nations, which had long ago assumed the control of the state. They were too late!...

In this way the Czechs, Poles, etc., formed themselves into nations in Austria; the Croats, etc., in Hungary; the Letts, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, etc., in Russia. What had been an exception in Western Europe (Ireland) became the rule in the East.

In the West, Ireland responded to its exceptional position by a national movement. In the East, the awakened nations were bound to respond in the same fashion.

Thus arose the circumstances which impelled the young nations of Eastern Europe on to the path of struggle.

The struggle began and flared up, to be sure, not between nations as a whole, but between the ruling classes of the dominant nations and of those that had been pushed into the background. The struggle is usually conducted by the urban petty bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation against the big bourgeoisie of the dominant nation (Czechs and Germans), or by the rural bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation against the landlords of the dominant nation (Ukrainians in Poland), or by the whole "national" bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations against the ruling nobility of the dominant nation (Poland, Lithuania and the Ukraine in Russia).

The bourgeoisie plays the leading role.

The chief problem for the young bourgeoisie is the problem of the market. Its aim is to sell its goods and to emerge victorious from competition with the bourgeoisie of a different nationality. Hence its desire to secure its "own," its "home" market. The market is the first school in which the bourgeoisie learns its nationalism.

But matters are usually not confined to the market. The semi-

feudal, semi-bourgeois bureaucracy of the dominant nation intervenes in the struggle with its own methods of "arresting and preventing." The bourgeoisie — whether big or small — of the dominant nation is able to deal more "swiftly" and "decisively" with its competitor. "Forces" are united and a series of restrictive measures is put into operation against the "alien" bourgeoisie, measures passing into acts of repression. The struggle spreads from the economic sphere to the political sphere. Restriction of freedom of movement, repression of language, restriction of franchise, closing of schools, religious restrictions, and so on, are piled upon the head of the "competitor." Of course, such measures are designed not only in the interest of the bourgeois classes of the dominant nation, but also in furtherance of the specifically caste aims, so to speak, of the ruling bureaucracy. But from the point of view of the results achieved this is quite immaterial; the bourgeois classes and the bureaucracy in this matter go hand in hand — whether it be in Austria-Hungary or in Russia.

The bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation, repressed on every hand, is naturally stirred into movement. It appeals to its "native folk" and begins to shout about the "fatherland," claiming that its own cause is the cause of the nation as a whole. It recruits itself an army from among its "countrymen" in the interests of... the "fatherland." Nor do the "folk" always remain unresponsive to its appeals; they rally around its banner: the repression from above affects them too and provokes their discontent.

Thus the national movement begins.

The strength of the national movement is determined by the degree to which the wide strata of the nation, the proletariat and peasantry, participate in it.

Whether the proletariat rallies to the banner of bourgeois nationalism depends on the degree of development of class antagonisms, on the class consciousness and degree of organization of the proletariat. The class-conscious proletariat has its own tried banner, and has no need to rally to the banner of the bourgeoisie.

As far as the peasants are concerned, their participation in the national movement depends primarily on the character of the repressions. If the repressions affect the "land," as was the case in Ireland, then the mass of the peasants immediately rally to the banner of the national movement.

On the other hand, if, for example, there is no serious *anti-Russian* nationalism in Georgia, it is primarily because there are nei-

ther Russian landlords nor a Russian big bourgeoisie there to supply the fuel for such nationalism among the masses. In Georgia there is *anti-Armenian* nationalism; but this is because there is still an Armenian big bourgeoisie there which, by getting the better of the small and still unconsolidated Georgian bourgeoisie, drives the latter to anti-Armenian nationalism.

Depending on these factors, the national movement either assumes a mass character and steadily grows (as in Ireland and Galicia), or is converted into a series of petty collisions, degenerating into squabbles and “fights” over signboards (as in some of the small towns of Bohemia).

The content of the national movement, of course, cannot everywhere be the same: it is wholly determined by the diverse demands made by the movement. In Ireland the movement bears an agrarian character; in Bohemia it bears a “language” character; in one place the demand is for civil equality and religious freedom, in another for the nation’s “own” officials, or its own Diet. The diversity of demands not infrequently reveals the diverse features which characterize a nation in general (language, territory, etc.). It is worthy of note that we never meet with a demand based on Bauer’s all-embracing “national character.” And this is natural: “national character” *in itself* is something intangible, and, as was correctly remarked by J. Strasser, “a politician can’t do anything with it.”*

Such, in general, are the forms and character of the national movement.

From what has been said it will be clear that the national struggle under the conditions of *rising* capitalism is a struggle of the bourgeois classes among themselves. Sometimes the bourgeoisie succeeds in drawing the proletariat into the national movement, and then the national struggle *externally* assumes a “nationwide” character. But this is so only externally. *In its essence* it is always a bourgeois struggle, one that is to the advantage and profit mainly of the bourgeoisie.

But it does not by any means follow that the proletariat should not put up a fight against the policy of national oppression.

Restriction of freedom of movement, disfranchisement, repression of language, closing of schools, and other forms of persecution affect the workers no less, if not more, than the bourgeoisie. Such a state of affairs can only serve to retard the free development of the

* See his *Der Arbeiter und die Nation*, 1912, p. 33.

intellectual forces of the proletariat of subject nations. One cannot speak seriously of a full development of the intellectual faculties of the Tatar or Jewish worker if he is not allowed to use his native language at meetings and lectures, and if his schools are closed down.

But the policy of nationalist persecution is dangerous to the cause of the proletariat also on another account. It diverts the attention of large strata from social questions, questions of the class struggle, to national questions, questions "common" to the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. And this creates a favourable soil for lying propaganda about "harmony of interests," for glossing over the class interests of the proletariat and for the intellectual enslavement of the workers. This creates a serious obstacle to the cause of uniting the workers of all nationalities. If a considerable proportion of the Polish workers are still in intellectual bondage to the bourgeois nationalists, if they still stand aloof from the international labour movement, it is chiefly because the age-old anti-Polish policy of the "powers that be" creates the soil for this bondage and hinders the emancipation of the workers from it.

But the policy of persecution does not stop there. It not infrequently passes from a "system" of *oppression* to a "system" of *inciting* nations against each other, to a "system" of massacres and pogroms. Of course, the latter system is not everywhere and always possible, but where it is possible — in the absence of elementary civil rights — it frequently assumes horrifying proportions and threatens to drown the cause of unity of the workers in blood and tears. The Caucasus and South Russia furnish numerous examples. "Divide and rule" — such is the purpose of the policy of incitement. And where such a policy succeeds, it is a tremendous evil for the proletariat and a serious obstacle to the cause of uniting the workers of all the nationalities in the state.

But the workers are interested in the complete amalgamation of all their fellow-workers into a single international army, in their speedy and final emancipation from intellectual bondage to the bourgeoisie, and in the full and free development of the intellectual forces of their brothers, whatever nation they may belong to.

The workers therefore combat and will continue to combat the policy of national oppression in all its forms, from the most subtle to the most crude, as well as the policy of inciting nations against each other in all its forms.

Social-democracy in all countries therefore proclaims the right of nations to self-determination.

The right of self-determination means that only the nation itself has the right to determine its destiny, that no one has the right *forcibly* to interfere in the life of the nation, to *destroy* its schools and other institutions, to *violate* its habits and customs, to *repress* its language, or *curtail* its rights.

This, of course, does not mean that social-democracy will support every custom and institution of a nation. While combatting the coercion of any nation, it will uphold only the right of the *nation* itself to determine its own destiny, at the same time agitating against harmful customs and institutions of that nation in order to enable the toiling strata of the nation to emancipate themselves from them.

The right of self-determination means that a nation may arrange its life in the way it wishes. It has the right to arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It has the right to enter into federal relations with other nations. It has the right to complete secession. Nations are sovereign, and all nations have equal rights.

This, of course, does not mean that social-democracy will support every demand of a nation. A nation has the right even to return to the old order of things; but this does not mean that social-democracy will subscribe to such a decision if taken by some institution of a particular nation. The obligations of social-democracy, which defends the interests of the proletariat, and the rights of a nation, which consists of various classes, are two different things.

In fighting for the right of nations to self-determination, the aim of social-democracy is to put an end to the policy of national oppression, to render it impossible, and thereby to remove the grounds of strife between nations, to take the edge off that strife and reduce it to a minimum.

This is what essentially distinguishes the policy of the class-conscious proletariat from the policy of the bourgeoisie, which attempts to aggravate and fan the national struggle and to prolong and sharpen the national movement.

And that is why the class-conscious proletariat cannot rally under the “national” flag of the bourgeoisie.

That is why the so-called “evolutionary national” policy advocated by Bauer cannot become the policy of the proletariat. Bauer’s attempt to identify his “evolutionary national” policy with the policy of the “modern working class”^{*} is an attempt to adapt the class struggle of the workers to the struggle of the nations.

^{*} See Bauer’s book, p. 166.

The fate of a national movement, which is essentially a bourgeois movement, is naturally bound up with the fate of the bourgeoisie. The final disappearance of a national movement is possible only with the downfall of the bourgeoisie. Only under the reign of socialism can peace be fully established. But even within the framework of capitalism it is possible to reduce the national struggle to a minimum, to undermine it at the root, to render it as harmless as possible to the proletariat. This is borne out, for example, by Switzerland and America. It requires that the country should be democratized and the nations be given the opportunity of free development.

III

PRESENTATION OF THE QUESTION

A nation has the right freely to determine its own destiny. It has the right to arrange its life as it sees fit, without, of course, trampling on the rights of other nations. That is beyond dispute.

But *how* exactly should it arrange its own life, *what forms* should its future constitution take, if the interests of the majority of the nation and, above all, of the proletariat are to be borne in mind?

A nation has the right to arrange its life on autonomous lines. It even has the right to secede. But this does not mean that it should do so under all circumstances, that autonomy, or separation, will everywhere and always be advantageous for a nation, i.e., for its majority, i.e., for the toiling strata. The Transcaucasian Tatars as a nation may assemble, let us say, in their Diet and, succumbing to the influence of their beys and mullahs, decide to restore the old order of things and to secede from the state. According to the meaning of the clause on self-determination they are fully entitled to do so. But will this be in the interest of the toiling strata of the Tatar nation? Can social-democracy look on indifferently when the beys and mullahs assume the leadership of the masses in the solution of the national question? Should not social-democracy interfere in the matter and influence the will of the nation in a definite way? Should it not come forward with a definite plan for the solution of the question, a plan which would be most advantageous for the Tatar masses?

But what solution would be most compatible with the interests of the toiling masses? Autonomy, federation or separation?

All these are problems the solution of which will depend on the concrete historical conditions in which the given nation finds itself.

More than that; conditions, like everything else, change, and a decision which is correct at one particular time may prove to be entirely unsuitable at another.

In the middle of the nineteenth century Marx was in favour of the secession of Russian Poland; and he was right, for it was then a question of emancipating a higher culture from a lower culture that was destroying it. And the question at that time was not only a theoretical one, an academic question, but a practical one, a question of actual reality...

At the end of the nineteenth century the Polish Marxists were already declaring against the secession of Poland; and they too were right, for during the fifty years that had elapsed profound changes had taken place, bringing Russia and Poland closer economically and culturally. Moreover, during that period the question of secession had been converted from a practical matter into a matter of academic dispute, which excited nobody except perhaps intellectuals abroad.

This, of course, by no means precludes the possibility that certain internal and external conditions may arise in which the question of the secession of Poland may again come on the order of the day.

The solution of the national question is possible only in connection with the historical conditions taken in their development.

The economic, political and cultural conditions of a given nation constitute the only key to the question *how* a particular nation ought to arrange its life and *what forms* its future constitution ought to take. It is possible that a specific solution of the question will be required for each nation. If the dialectical approach to a question is required anywhere it is required here, in the national question.

In view of this we must declare our decided opposition to a certain very widespread, but very summary manner of "solving" the national question, which owes its inception to the Bund. We have in mind the easy method of referring to Austrian and South-Slav* social-democracy, which has supposedly already solved the national question and whose solution the Russian social-democrats should simply borrow. It is assumed that whatever, say, is right for Austria is also right for Russia. The most important and decisive factor is lost sight of here, namely, the concrete historical conditions in Russia as a whole and in the life of each of the nations inhabiting Russia in particular.

* South-Slav social-democracy operates in the southern part of Austria.

Listen, for example, to what the well-known Bundist, V. Kossovsky, says:

“When at the Fourth Congress of the Bund the principles of the question (i.e., the national question — *J. St.*) were discussed, the proposal made by one of the members of the congress to settle the question in the spirit of the resolution of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party met with general approval.”*

And the result was that “the congress unanimously adopted”... national autonomy.

And that was all! No analysis of the actual conditions in Russia, no investigation of the condition of the Jews in Russia. They first borrowed the solution of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party, then they “approved” it, and finally they “unanimously adopted” it! This is the way the Bundists present and “solve” the national question in Russia...

As a matter of fact, Austria and Russia represent entirely different conditions. This explains why the social-democrats in Austria, when they adopted their national program at Brünn (1899)¹⁷ in the spirit of the resolution of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party (with certain insignificant amendments, it is true), approached the question in an entirely non-Russian way, so to speak, and, of course, solved it in a non-Russian way.

First, as to the presentation of the question. How is the question presented by the Austrian theoreticians of cultural-national autonomy, the interpreters of the Brünn national program and the resolution of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party, Springer and Bauer?

“Whether a multi-national state is possible,” says Springer, “and whether, in particular, the Austrian nationalities are obliged to form a single political entity, is a question we shall not answer here but shall assume to be settled. For anyone who will not concede this possibility and necessity, our investigation will, of course, be purposeless. Our theme is as follows: inasmuch as these nations are *obliged* to live together, what *legal forms* will enable them *to live together in the best possible way?*” (Springer’s italics).**

Thus, the starting point is the state integrity of Austria.

Bauer says the same thing:

“We therefore start from the assumption that the Austrian nations will remain in the same state union in which they exist at present and inquire

* See V. Kossovsky, *Problems of Nationality*, 1907, pp. 16-17.

** See Springer, *The National Problem*, p. 14.

how the nations within this union will arrange their relations among themselves and to the state.”*

Here again the first thing is the integrity of Austria.

Can Russian social-democracy present the question *in this way*? No, it cannot. And it cannot because from the very outset it holds the view of the right of nations to self-determination, by virtue of which a nation has the right of secession.

Even the Bundist Goldblatt admitted at the Second Congress of Russian Social-Democracy that the latter could not abandon the standpoint of self-determination. Here is what Goldblatt said on that occasion:

“Nothing can be said against the right of self-determination. If any nation is striving for independence, we must not oppose it. If Poland does not wish to enter into ‘lawful wedlock’ with Russia, it is not for us to interfere with her.”

All this is true. But it follows that the starting points of the Austrian and Russian social-democrats, far from being identical, are diametrically opposite. After this, can there be any question of borrowing the national program of the Austrians?

Furthermore, the Austrians hope to achieve the “freedom of nationalities” by means of petty reforms, by slow steps. While they propose cultural-national autonomy as a practical measure, they do not count on any radical change, on a democratic movement for liberation, which they do not even contemplate. The Russian Marxists, on the other hand, associate the “freedom of nationalities” with a probable radical change, with a democratic movement for liberation, having no grounds for counting on reforms. And this essentially alters matters in regard to the probable fate of the nations of Russia.

“Of course,” says Bauer, “there is little probability that national autonomy will be the result of a great decision, of a bold action. Austria will develop towards national autonomy step by step, by a slow process of development, in the course of a severe struggle, as a consequence of which legislation and administration will be in a state of chronic paralysis. The new constitution will not be created by a great legislative act, but by a multitude of separate enactments for individual provinces and individual communities.”**

Springer says the same thing.

* See Bauer, *The National Question and Social-Democracy*, p. 399.

** See Bauer, *The National Question*, p. 422.

“I am very well aware,” he writes, “that institutions of this kind (i.e., organs of national autonomy — *J. St.*) are not created in a single year or a single decade. The reorganization of the Prussian administration alone took considerable time... It took the Prussians two decades finally to establish their basic administrative institutions. Let nobody think that I harbour any illusions as to the time required and the difficulties to be overcome in Austria.”*

All this is very definite. But can the Russian Marxists avoid associating the national question with “bold actions”? Can they count on partial reforms, on “a multitude of separate enactments” as a means for achieving the “freedom of nationalities”? But if they cannot and must not do so, is it not clear that the methods of struggle of the Austrians and the Russians and their prospects must be entirely different? How in such a state of affairs can they confine themselves to the one-sided, milk-and-water cultural-national autonomy of the Austrians? One or the other: either those who are in favour of borrowing do not count on “bold actions” in Russia, or they do count on such actions but “know not what they do.”

Finally, the immediate tasks facing Russia and Austria are entirely different and consequently dictate different methods of solving the national question. In Austria parliamentarism prevails, and under present conditions no development in Austria is possible without parliament. But parliamentary life and legislation in Austria are frequently brought to a complete standstill by severe conflicts between the national parties. That explains the chronic political crisis from which Austria has for a long time been suffering. Hence, in Austria the national question is the very hub of political life; it is the vital question. It is therefore not surprising that the Austrian social-democratic politicians should first of all try in one way or another to find a solution for the national conflicts — of course on the basis of the existing parliamentary system, by parliamentary methods...

Not so with Russia. In the first place, in Russia “there is no parliament, thank God.”¹⁸ In the second place — and this is the main point — the hub of the political life of Russia is not the national but the agrarian question. Consequently, the fate of the Russian problem, and, accordingly, the “liberation” of the nations too, is bound up in Russia with the solution of the agrarian question, i.e., with the destruction of the relics of feudalism, i.e., with the democratization of the country. That explains why in Russia the national question is

* See Springer, *The National Problem*, pp. 281-82.

not an independent and decisive one, but a part of the general and more important question of the emancipation of the country.

“The barrenness of the Austrian parliament,” writes Springer, “is due precisely to the fact that every reform gives rise to antagonisms within the national parties which may affect their unity. The leaders of the parties, therefore, avoid everything that smacks of reform. Progress in Austria is generally conceivable only if the nations are granted indefeasible legal rights which will relieve them of the necessity of constantly maintaining national militant groups in parliament and will enable them to turn their attention to the solution of economic and social problems.”*

Bauer says the same thing.

“National peace is indispensable first of all for the state. The state cannot permit legislation to be brought to a standstill by the very stupid question of language or by every quarrel between excited people on a linguistic frontier, or over every new school.”**

All this is clear. But it is no less clear that the national question in Russia is on an entirely different plane. It is not the national, but the agrarian question that decides the fate of progress in Russia. The national question is a subordinate one.

And so we have different presentations of the question, different prospects and methods of struggle, different immediate tasks. Is it not clear that, such being the state of affairs, only pedants who “solve” the national question without reference to space and time can think of adopting examples from Austria and of borrowing a program?

To repeat: the concrete historical conditions as the starting point, and the dialectical presentation of the question as the only correct way of presenting it — such is the key to solving the national question.

IV

CULTURAL-NATIONAL AUTONOMY

We spoke above of the formal aspect of the Austrian national program and of the methodological grounds which make it impossible for the Russian Marxists simply to adopt the example of Austri-

* See Springer, *The National Problem*, p. 36.

** See Bauer, *The National Question*, p. 401.

an social-democracy and make the latter's program their own.

Let us now examine the essence of the program itself.

What then is the national program of the Austrian social-democrats?

It is expressed in two words: cultural-national autonomy.

This means, firstly, that autonomy would be granted, let us say, not to Bohemia or Poland, which are inhabited mainly by Czechs and Poles, but to Czechs and Poles generally, irrespective of territory, no matter what part of Austria they inhabit.

That is why this autonomy is called *national* and not territorial.

It means, secondly, that the Czechs, Poles, Germans, and so on, scattered over the various parts of Austria, taken personally, as individuals, are to be organized into integral nations, and are as such to form part of the Austrian state. In this way Austria would represent not a union of autonomous regions, but a union of autonomous nationalities, constituted irrespective of territory.

It means, thirdly, that the national institutions which are to be created for this purpose for the Poles, Czechs, and so forth, are to have jurisdiction only over "cultural," not "political" questions. Specifically political questions would be reserved for the Austrian parliament (the Reichsrat).

That is why this autonomy is also called *cultural*, cultural-national autonomy.

And here is the text of the program adopted by the Austrian Social-Democratic Party at the Brünn Congress in 1899.*

Having referred to the fact that "national dissension in Austria is hindering political progress," that "the final solution of the national question... is primarily a cultural necessity," and that "the solution is possible only in a genuinely democratic society, constructed on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage," the program goes on to say:

*"The preservation and development of the national peculiarities** of the peo-*

* The representatives of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party also voted for it. See *Discussion of the National Question at the Brünn Congress*, 1906, p. 72.

** In M. Panin's Russian translation (see his translation of Bauer's book), "national individualities" is given in place of "national peculiarities." Panin translated this passage incorrectly. The word "individuality" is not in the German text, which speaks of *nationalen Eigenart*, i.e., *peculiarities*, which is far from being the same thing.

ples of Austria is possible only on the basis of equal rights and by avoiding all oppression. Hence, all bureaucratic state centralism and the feudal privileges of individual provinces must first of all be rejected.

“Under these conditions, and only under these conditions, will it be possible to establish national order in Austria in place of national dissension, namely, on the following principles:

“1. Austria must be transformed into a democratic state federation of nationalities.

“2. The historical crown provinces must be replaced by nationally delimited self-governing corporations, in each of which legislation and administration shall be entrusted to national parliaments elected on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage.

“3. All the self-governing regions of one and the same nation must jointly form a single national union, which shall manage its national affairs on an absolutely autonomous basis.

“4. The rights of national minorities must be guaranteed by a special law passed by the Imperial Parliament.”

The program ends with an appeal for the solidarity of all the nations of Austria.*

It is not difficult to see that this program retains certain traces of “territorialism,” but that in general it gives a formulation of national autonomy. It is not without good reason that Springer, the first agitator on behalf of cultural-national autonomy, greets it with enthusiasm; ** Bauer also supports this program, calling it a “theoretical victory”*** for national autonomy; only, in the interests of greater clarity, he proposes that Point 4 be replaced by a more definite formulation, which would declare the necessity of “constituting the national minority within each self-governing region into a public corporation” for the management of educational and other cultural affairs.****

Such is the national program of Austrian social-democracy.

Let us examine its scientific foundations.

Let us see how the Austrian Social-Democratic Party justifies the cultural-national autonomy it advocates.

Let us turn to the theoreticians of cultural-national autonomy, Springer and Bauer.

The starting point of national autonomy is the conception of a nation as a union of individuals without regard to a definite territo-

* *Verhandlungen des Gesamtparteitages* in Brünn, 1899.

** See Springer, *The National Problem*, p. 286.

*** See *The National Question*, p. 549.

**** *Ibid.*, p. 555.

ry.

“Nationality,” according to Springer, “is not essentially connected with territory”; nations are “autonomous unions of persons.”*

Bauer also speaks of a nation as a “community of persons” which does not enjoy “exclusive sovereignty in any particular region.”**

But the persons constituting a nation do not always live in one compact mass; they are frequently divided into groups, and in that form are interspersed among alien national organisms. It is capitalism which drives them into various regions and cities in search of a livelihood. But when they enter foreign national territories and there form minorities, these groups are made to suffer by the local national majorities in the way of restrictions on their language, schools, etc. Hence national conflicts. Hence the “unsuitability” of territorial autonomy. The only solution to such a situation, according to Springer and Bauer, is to organize the minorities of the given nationality dispersed over various parts of the state into a single, general, inter-class national union. Such a union alone, in their opinion, can protect the cultural interests of national minorities, and it alone is capable of putting an end to national discord.

“Hence the necessity,” says Springer, “to organize the nationalities, to invest them with rights and responsibilities...”***

Of course, “a law is easily drafted, but will it be effective?”... “If one wants to make a law for nations, one must first create the nations...”**** “Unless the nationalities are constituted it is impossible to create national rights and eliminate national dissension.”*****

Bauer expressed himself in the same spirit when he proposed, as “a demand of the working class,” that “the minorities should be constituted into public corporations based on the personal principle.”*****

But how is a nation to be organized? How is one to determine to what nation any given individual belongs?

“Nationality,” says Springer, “will be determined by certificates; every

* See Springer, *The National Problem*, p. 19.

** See *The National Question*, p. 286.

*** See *The National Problem*, p. 74.

**** *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.

***** *Ibid.*, p. 89.

***** See *The National Question*, p. 552.

individual domiciled in a given region must declare his affiliation to one of the nationalities of that region.”*

“The personal principle,” says Bauer, “presumes that the population will be divided into nationalities... On the basis of the free declaration of the adult citizens national registers must be drawn up.”**

Further.

“All the Germans in nationally homogeneous districts,” says Bauer, “and all the Germans entered in the national registers in the dual districts will constitute the German nation and elect a *National Council*.”***

The same applies to the Czechs, Poles, and so on.

“The *National Council*,” according to Springer, “is the cultural parliament of the nation, empowered to establish the principles and to grant funds, thereby assuming guardianship over national education, national literature, art and science, the formation of academies, museums, galleries, theatres,” etc.****

Such will be the organization of a nation and its central institution.

According to Bauer, the Austrian Social-Democratic Party is striving, by the creation of these inter-class institutions “to make national culture... the possession of the whole people and thereby *unite all the members of the nation into a national-cultural community*,”***** (our italics).

One might think that all this concerns Austria alone. But Bauer does not agree. He emphatically declares that national autonomy is essential also for other states which, like Austria, consist of several nationalities.

“In the multi-national state,” according to Bauer, “the working class of all the nations opposes the national power policy of the propertied classes with the demand for national autonomy.”*****

Then, imperceptibly substituting national autonomy for the self-determination of nations, he continues:

“Thus, national autonomy, the self-determination of nations, will neces-

* See *The National Problem*, p. 226.

** See *The National Question*, p. 368.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 375.

**** See *The National Problem*, p. 234.

***** See *The National Question*, p. 553.

***** *Ibid.*, p. 337.

sarily become the constitutional program of the proletariat of all the nations in a multi-national state.”*

But he goes still further. He profoundly believes that the inter-class “national unions” “constituted” by him and Springer will serve as a sort of prototype of the future socialist society. For he knows that “the socialist system of society... will divide humanity into nationally delimited communities”**; that under socialism there will take place “a grouping of humanity into autonomous national communities,”*** that thus, “socialist society will undoubtedly present a checkered picture of national unions of persons and territorial corporations,”**** and that accordingly “the socialist principle of nationality is a higher synthesis of the national principle and national autonomy.”*****

Enough, it would seem...

These are the arguments for cultural-national autonomy as given in the works of Bauer and Springer.

The first thing that strikes the eye is the entirely inexplicable and absolutely unjustifiable substitution of national autonomy for self-determination of nations. One or the other: either Bauer failed to understand the meaning of self-determination, or he did understand it but for some reason or other deliberately narrowed its meaning. For there is no doubt a) that cultural-national autonomy presupposes the integrity of the multi-national state, whereas self-determination goes outside the framework of this integrity, and b) that self-determination endows a nation with complete rights, whereas national autonomy endows it only with “cultural” rights. That in the first place.

In the second place, a combination of internal and external conditions is fully possible at some future time by virtue of which one or another of the nationalities may decide to secede from a multi-national state, say from Austria. Did not the Ruthenian social-democrats at the Brünn Party Congress announce their readiness to unite the “two parts” of their people into one whole?***** What, in such a case, becomes of national autonomy, which is “*inevitable for*

* See *The National Question*, p. 333.

** *Ibid.*, p. 555.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 556.

**** *Ibid.*, p. 543.

***** *Ibid.*, p. 542.

***** See *Proceedings of the Brünn Social-Democratic Party Congress*, p. 48.

the proletariat of all the nations”? That sort of “solution” of the problem is it that mechanically squeezes nations into the Procrustean bed of an integral state?

Further: National autonomy is contrary to the whole course of development of nations. It calls for the organization of nations; but can they be artificially welded together if life, if economic development tears whole groups from them and disperses these groups over various regions? There is no doubt that in the early stages of capitalism nations become welded together. But there is also no doubt that in the higher stages of capitalism a process of dispersion of nations sets in, a process whereby a whole number of groups separate off from the nations, going off in search of a livelihood and subsequently settling permanently in other regions of the state; in the course of this these settlers lose their old connections and acquire new ones in their new domicile, and from generation to generation acquire new habits and new tastes, and possibly a new language. The question arises: is it possible to unite into a single national union groups that have grown so distinct? Where are the magic links to unite what cannot be united? Is it conceivable that, for instance, the Germans of the Baltic Provinces and the Germans of Transcaucasia can be “united into a single nation”? But if it is not conceivable and not possible, wherein does national autonomy differ from the utopia of the old nationalists, who endeavoured to turn back the wheel of history?

But the unity of a nation diminishes not only as a result of migration. It diminishes also from internal causes, owing to the growing acuteness of the class struggle. In the early stages of capitalism one can still speak of a “common culture” of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. But as large-scale industry develops and the class struggle becomes more and more acute, this “common culture” begins to melt away. One cannot seriously speak of the “common culture” of a nation when employers and workers of one and the same nation cease to understand each other. What “common destiny” can there be when the bourgeoisie thirsts for war, and the proletariat declares “war on war”? Can a single inter-class national union be formed from such opposed elements? And, after this, can one speak of the “union of all the members of the nation into a national-cultural community”?* Is it not obvious that national autonomy is contrary to the whole course of the class struggle?

* Bauer, *The National Question*, p. 553.

But let us assume for a moment that the slogan “organize the nation” is practicable. One might understand bourgeois-nationalist parliamentarians endeavouring to “organize” a nation for the purpose of securing additional votes. But since when have social-democrats begun to occupy themselves with “organizing” nations, “constituting” nations, “creating” nations?

What sort of social-democrats are they who in the epoch of extreme intensification of the class struggle organize inter-class national unions? Until now the Austrian, as well as every other, Social-Democratic Party, had one task before it: namely, to organize the proletariat. That task has apparently become “antiquated.” Springer and Bauer are now setting a “new” task, a more absorbing task, namely, to “create,” to “organize” a nation.

However, logic has its obligations: he who adopts national autonomy must also adopt this “new” task; but to adopt the latter means to abandon the class position and to take the path of nationalism.

Springer’s and Bauer’s cultural-national autonomy is a subtle form of nationalism.

And it is by no means fortuitous that the national program of the Austrian social-democrats enjoins a concern for the “*preservation and development* of the national peculiarities of the peoples.” Just think: to “preserve” such “national peculiarities” of the Transcaucasian Tatars as self-flagellation at the festival of *Shakhsei-Vakhsei*; or to “develop” such “national peculiarities” of the Georgians as the vendetta!...

A demand of this character is in place in an outright bourgeois nationalist program; and if it appears in the program of the Austrian social-democrats it is because national autonomy tolerates such demands, it does not contradict them.

But if national autonomy is unsuitable now, it will be still more unsuitable in the future, socialist society.

Bauer’s prophecy regarding the “division of humanity into nationally delimited communities”^{*} is refuted by the whole course of development of modern human society. National barriers are being demolished and are falling, rather than becoming firmer. As early as the ‘forties Marx declared that “national differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing” and that “the supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still fast-

* See the beginning of this chapter.

er.”¹⁹ The subsequent development of mankind, accompanied as it was by the colossal growth of capitalist production, the reshuffling of nationalities and the union of people within ever larger territories, emphatically confirms Marx’s thought.

Bauer’s desire to represent socialist society as a “checkered picture of national unions of persons and territorial corporations” is a timid attempt to substitute for Marx’s conception of socialism a revised version of Bakunin’s conception. The history of socialism proves that every such attempt contains the elements of inevitable failure.

There is no need to mention the kind of “socialist principle of nationality” glorified by Bauer, which, in our opinion, substitutes for the socialist principle of the *class struggle* the bourgeois “*principle of nationality*.” If national autonomy is based on such a dubious principle, it must be admitted that it can only cause harm to the working-class movement.

True, such nationalism is not so transparent, for it is skilfully masked by socialist phrases, but it is all the more harmful to the proletariat for that reason. We can always cope with open nationalism, for it can easily be discerned. It is much more difficult to combat nationalism when it is masked and unrecognizable beneath its mask. Protected by the armour of socialism, it is less vulnerable and more tenacious. Implanted among the workers, it poisons the atmosphere and spreads harmful ideas of mutual distrust and segregation among the workers of the different nationalities.

But this does not exhaust the harm caused by national autonomy. It prepares the ground not only for the segregation of nations, but also for breaking up the united labour movement. The idea of national autonomy creates the psychological conditions for the division of the united workers’ party into separate parties built on national lines. The break-up of the party is followed by the break-up of the trade unions, and complete segregation is the result. In this way the united class movement is broken up into separate national rivulets.

Austria, the home of “national autonomy,” provides the most deplorable examples of this. As early as 1897 the Wimberg Party Congress²⁰ the once united Austrian Social-Democratic Party began to break up into separate parties. The break-up became still more marked after the Brünn Party Congress (1899), which adopted national autonomy. Matters have finally come to such a pass that in place of a united international party there are now six national par-

ties, of which the Czech Social-Democratic Party will not even have anything to do with the German Social-Democratic Party.

But with the parties are associated the trade unions. In Austria, both in the parties and in the trade unions, the main brunt of the work is borne by the same social-democratic workers. There was therefore reason to fear that separatism in the party would lead to separatism in the trade unions and that the trade unions would also break up. That, in fact, is what happened: the trade unions have also divided according to nationality. Now things frequently go so far that the Czech workers will even break a strike of German workers, or will unite at municipal elections with the Czech bourgeois against the German workers.

It will be seen from the foregoing that cultural-national autonomy is no solution of the national question. Not only that, it serves to aggravate and confuse the question by creating a situation which favours the destruction of the unity of the labour movement, fosters the segregation of the workers according to nationality and intensifies friction among them.

Such is the harvest of national autonomy...

VII

THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN RUSSIA

It remains for us to suggest a positive solution of the national question.

We take as our starting point that the question can be solved only in intimate connection with the present situation in Russia.

Russia is in a transitional period, when "normal," "constitutional" life has not yet been established and when the political crisis has not yet been settled. Days of storm and "complications" are ahead. And this gives rise to the movement, the present and the future movement, the aim of which is to achieve complete democratization.

It is in connection with this movement that the national question must be examined.

Thus the complete democratization of the country is the *basis* and condition for the solution of the national question.

When seeking a solution of the question we must take into account not only the situation at home but also the situation abroad. Russia is situated between Europe and Asia, between Austria and China. The growth of democracy in Asia is inevitable. The growth of

imperialism in Europe is not fortuitous. In Europe, capital is beginning to feel cramped, and it is reaching out towards foreign countries in search of new markets, cheap labour and new fields of investment. But this leads to external complications and to war. No one can assert that the Balkan War²¹ is the end and not the beginning of the complications. It is quite possible, therefore, that a combination of internal and external conditions may arise in which one or another nationality in Russia may find it necessary to raise and settle the question of its independence. And, of course, it is not for Marxists to create obstacles in such cases.

But it follows that Russian Marxists cannot dispense with the right of nations to self-determination.

Thus, *the right of self-determination is an essential element* in the solution of the national question.

Further. What must be our attitude towards nations which for one reason or another will prefer to remain within the framework of the whole?

We have seen that cultural-national autonomy is unsuitable. Firstly, it is artificial and impracticable, for it proposes artificially to draw into a single nation people whom the march of events, real events, is disuniting and dispersing to every corner of the country. Secondly, it stimulates nationalism, because it leads to the viewpoint in favour of the "demarcation" of people according to national curiae, the "organization" of nations, the "preservation" and cultivation of "national peculiarities" — all of which are entirely incompatible with social-democracy. It is not fortuitous that the Moravian separatists in the Reichsrat, having severed themselves from the German Social-Democratic deputies, have united with the Moravian bourgeois deputies to form a single, so to speak, Moravian "kolo." Nor is it fortuitous that the separatists of the Bund have got themselves involved in nationalism by acclaiming the "Sabbath" and "Yiddish." There are no Bundist deputies yet in the Duma, but in the Bund area there is a clerical-reactionary Jewish community, in the "controlling institutions" of which the Bund is arranging, for a beginning, a "get-together" of the Jewish workers and bourgeois.* Such is the logic of cultural-national autonomy.

Thus, *national* autonomy does not solve the problem.

What, then, is the way out?

* See *Report of the Eighth Conference of the Bund*, the concluding part of the resolution on the community.

The only correct solution is *regional* autonomy, autonomy for such crystallized units as Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, etc.

The advantage of regional autonomy consists, first of all, in the fact that it does not deal with a fiction bereft of territory, but with a definite population inhabiting a definite territory. Next, it does not divide people according to nations, it does not strengthen national barriers; on the contrary, it breaks down these barriers and unites the population in such a manner as to open the way for division of a different kind, division according to classes. Finally, it makes it possible to utilize the natural wealth of the region and to develop its productive forces in the best possible way without awaiting the decisions of a common centre — functions which are not inherent features of cultural-national autonomy.

Thus, *regional autonomy is an essential element* in the solution of the national question.

Of course, not one of the regions constitutes a compact, homogeneous nation, for each is interspersed with national minorities. Such are the Jews in Poland, the Letts in Lithuania, the Russians in the Caucasus, the Poles in the Ukraine, and so on. It may be feared, therefore, that the minorities will be oppressed by the national majorities. But there will be grounds for fear only if the old order continues to prevail in the country. Give the country complete democracy and all grounds for fear will vanish.

It is proposed to bind the dispersed minorities into a single national union. But what the minorities want is not an artificial union, but real rights in the localities they inhabit. What can such a union give them *without* complete democratization? On the other hand, what need is there for a national union *when there is* complete democratization?

What is it that particularly agitates a national minority?

A minority is discontented not because there is no national union but because it does not enjoy the right to use its native language. Permit it to use its native language and the discontent will pass of itself.

A minority is discontented not because there is no artificial union but because it does not possess its own schools. Give it its own schools and all grounds for discontent will disappear.

A minority is discontented not because there is no national union, but because it does not enjoy liberty of conscience (religious liberty), liberty of movement, etc. Give it these liberties and it will

cease to be discontented.

Thus, *equal rights of nations in all forms (language, schools, etc.) is an essential element* in the solution of the national question. Consequently, a state law based on complete democratization of the country is required, prohibiting all national privileges without exception and every kind of disability or restriction on the rights of national minorities.

That, and that alone, is the real, not a paper guarantee of the rights of a minority.

One may or may not dispute the existence of a logical connection between organizational federalism and cultural-national autonomy. But one cannot dispute the fact that the latter creates an atmosphere favouring unlimited federalism, developing into complete rupture, into separatism. If the Czechs in Austria and the Bundists in Russia began with autonomy, passed to federation and ended in separatism, there can be no doubt that an important part in this was played by the nationalist atmosphere that is naturally generated by cultural-national autonomy. It is not fortuitous that national autonomy and organizational federalism go hand in hand. It is quite understandable. Both demand demarcation according to nationalities. Both presume organization according to nationalities. The similarity is beyond question. The only difference is that in one case the population as a whole is divided, while in the other it is the social-democratic workers who are divided.

We know where the demarcation of workers according to nationalities leads to. The disintegration of a united workers' party, the splitting of trade unions according to nationalities, aggravation of national friction, national strike-breaking, complete demoralization within the ranks of social-democracy — such are the results of organizational federalism. This is eloquently borne out by the history of social-democracy in Austria and the activities of the Bund in Russia.

The only cure for this is organization on the basis of internationalism.

To unite locally the workers of all nationalities of Russia into *single, integral* collective bodies, to unite these collective bodies into a *single* party — such is the task.

It goes without saying that a party structure of this kind does not preclude, but on the contrary presumes, wide autonomy for the *regions* within the single integral party.

The experience of the Caucasus proves the expediency of this

type of organization. If the Caucasians have succeeded in overcoming the national friction between the Armenian and Tatar workers; if they have succeeded in safeguarding the population against the possibility of massacres and shooting affrays; if in Baku, that kaleidoscope of national groups, national conflicts are now no longer possible, and if it has been possible to draw the workers there into the single current of a powerful movement, then the international structure of the Caucasian social-democracy was not the least factor in bringing this about.

The type of organization influences not only practical work. It stamps an indelible impress on the whole mental life of the worker. The worker lives the life of his organization, which stimulates his intellectual growth and educates him. And thus, acting within his organization and continually meeting there comrades from other nationalities, and side by side with them waging a common struggle under the leadership of a common collective body, he becomes deeply imbued with the idea that workers are *primarily* members of one class family, members of the united army of socialism. And this cannot but have a tremendous educational value for large sections of the working class.

Therefore, the international type of organization serves as a school of fraternal sentiments and is a tremendous agitational factor on behalf of internationalism.

But this is not the case with an organization on the basis of nationalities. When the workers are organized according to nationality they isolate themselves within their national shells, fenced off from each other by organizational barriers. The stress is laid not on what is *common* to the workers but on what distinguishes them from each other. In this type of organization the worker is *primarily* a member of his nation: a Jew, a Pole, and so on. It is not surprising that *national* federalism in organization inculcates in the workers a spirit of national seclusion.

Therefore, the national type of organization is a school of national narrow-mindedness and stagnation.

Thus we are confronted by two *fundamentally* different types of organization: the type based on international solidarity and the type based on the organizational "demarcation" of the workers according to nationalities.

Attempts to reconcile these two types have so far been vain. The compromise rules of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party drawn up in Wimberg in 1897 were left hanging in the air. The Austrian party

fell to pieces and dragged the trade unions with it. "Compromise" proved to be not only utopian, but harmful. Strasser is right when he says that "separatism achieved its first triumph at the Wimberg Party Congress."* The same is true in Russia. The "compromise" with the federalism of the Bund which took place at the Stockholm Congress ended in a complete fiasco. The Bund violated the Stockholm compromise. Ever since the Stockholm Congress the Bund has been an obstacle in the way of union of the workers locally in a *single* organization, which would include workers of all nationalities. And the Bund has obstinately persisted in its separatist tactics in spite of the fact that in 1907 and in 1908 Russian social-democracy repeatedly demanded that unity should at last be established from below among the workers of all nationalities.²² The Bund, which began with organizational national autonomy, in fact passed to federalism, only to end in complete rupture, separatism. And by breaking with the Russian Social-Democratic Party it caused disharmony and disorganization in the ranks of the latter. Let us recall the Jagiello affair,²³ for instance.

The path of "compromise" must therefore be discarded as utopian and harmful.

One thing or the other: *either* the federalism of the Bund, in which case the Russian Social-Democratic Party must re-form itself on a basis of "demarcation" of the workers according to nationalities; *or* an international type of organization, in which case the Bund must reform itself on a basis of territorial autonomy after the pattern of the Caucasian, Lettish and Polish social-democracies, and thus make possible the direct union of the Jewish workers with the workers of the other nationalities of Russia.

There is no middle course: principles triumph, they do not "compromise."

Thus, *the principle of international solidarity of the workers is an essential element* in the solution of the national question.

* See his *Der Arbeiter und die Nation*, 1912.

TWO CAMPS

February 22, 1919

The world has definitely and irrevocably split into two camps: the camp of imperialism and the camp of socialism.

Over there, *in their* camp, are America and Britain, France and Japan, with their capital, armaments, tried agents and experienced administrators.

Here, *in our* camp, are Soviet Russia and the young Soviet republics and the growing proletarian revolution in the countries of Europe, without capital, without tried agents or experienced administrators, but, on the other hand, with experienced agitators capable of firing the hearts of the working people with the spirit of emancipation.

The struggle between these two camps constitutes the hub of present-day affairs, determines the whole substance of the present home and foreign policies of the leaders of the old and the new worlds.

Estland and Lithuania, the Ukraine and the Crimea, Turkestan and Siberia, Poland and the Caucasus, and, finally, Russia itself are not aims in themselves. They are only an arena of struggle, of a mortal struggle between two forces: imperialism, which is striving to strengthen the yoke of slavery, and socialism, which is fighting for emancipation from slavery.

The strength of imperialism lies in the ignorance of the masses, who create wealth for their masters and forge chains of oppression for themselves. But the ignorance of the masses is a transient thing and inevitably tends to be dispelled in the course of time, as the dissatisfaction of the masses grows and the revolutionary movement spreads. The imperialists have capital — but who does not know that capital is powerless in the face of the inevitable? For this reason, the rule of imperialism is impermanent and insecure.

The weakness of imperialism lies in its powerlessness to end the war *without* catastrophe, *without* increasing mass unemployment, *without* further robbery of its own workers and peasants, *without* further seizures of foreign territory. It is a question not of ending the war, nor even of victory over Germany, but of who is to be made to pay the billions spent on the war. Russia emerged from the imperialist war rejuvenated, because she ended the war at the cost of the imperialists, home and foreign, and laid the expense of the war on

those who were directly responsible for it by expropriating them. The imperialists cannot do this; they cannot expropriate themselves, otherwise they would not be imperialists. To end the war in imperialist fashion, they are "compelled" to doom the workers to starvation (wholesale unemployment due to the closing down of "unprofitable" plants, additional indirect taxation, a terrific rise in prices of food); they are "compelled" to plunder Germany, Austria-Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, Turkestan, Siberia.

Need it be said that all this broadens the base of revolution, shakes the foundations of imperialism and hastens the inevitable catastrophe?

Three months ago imperialism, drunk with victory, was rattling the sabre and threatening to overrun Russia with its armed hordes. How could "poverty-stricken" and "savage" Soviet Russia hold out against the "disciplined" army of the British and French, who had smashed "even" the Germans, for all their vaunted technical equipment? So they thought. But they overlooked a "trifle," they failed to realize that peace, even an "indecent" peace, would inevitably undermine the "discipline" of their army and rouse its opposition to another war, while unemployment and high living costs would inevitably strengthen the revolutionary movement of the workers against their imperialists.

And what did we find? The "disciplined" army proved unfit for purposes of intervention: it sickened with an inevitable disease — demoralization. The boasted "civil peace" and "law and order" turned into their opposite, into civil war. The hastily concocted bourgeois "governments" in the border regions of Russia proved to be soap bubbles, unsuitable as a camouflage for intervention, which had been undertaken, of course (of course!), in the name of "humanitarianism" and "civilization." As to Soviet Russia, not only did their hope for a "walk over" fail; they even deemed it necessary to retreat a little and invite her to a "conference," on the Princes' Islands.²⁴ For the successes of the Red Army, the appearance of new national Soviet republics which were infecting neighbouring countries with the spirit of revolution, the spread of revolution in the West and the appearance of Workers' and Soldiers' Soviets in the Entente countries were arguments that were more than persuasive. What is more, things have reached a point where even Clemenceau the "implacable," who only yesterday refused to issue passports to the Berne Conference²⁵ and who was preparing to devour "anarchistic" Russia, is today, having been rather mauled by the revolution,

not averse to availing himself of the services of that honest “Marxist” broker, the old Kautsky, and wants to send him to Russia to negotiate — that is to say, “investigate.”

Truly:

*“Where are they now, the haughty words,
The lordly strength, the royal mien?”*²⁶

All these changes took place in the space of some three months.

We have every ground for affirming that the trend will continue in the same direction, for it has to be admitted that in the present moment of “storm and stress” Russia is the *only* country in which social and economic life is proceeding “normally,” without strikes or anti-government demonstrations, that the Soviet government is the *most stable* of all the existing governments in Europe, and that the strength and prestige of Soviet Russia, both at home and abroad, are growing day by day in direct proportion to the decline of the strength and prestige of the imperialist governments.

The world has split into two irreconcilable camps: the camp of imperialism and the camp of socialism. Imperialism in its death throes is clutching at the last straw, the “League of Nations,” trying to save itself by uniting the robbers of all countries into a single alliance. But its efforts are in vain, because time and circumstances are working against it and in favour of socialism. The tide of socialist revolution is irresistibly rising and investing the strongholds of imperialism. Its thunder is re-echoing through the countries of the oppressed East. The soil is beginning to burn under the feet of imperialism. Imperialism is doomed to inevitable destruction.

ON THE DEATH OF LENIN

(Speech Delivered at the Second All-Union Congress of Soviets²⁷)

January 26, 1924

Comrades, we communists are people of a special mould. We are made of a special stuff. We are those who form the army of the great proletarian strategist, the army of Comrade Lenin. There is nothing higher than the honour of belonging to this army. There is nothing higher than the title of member of the Party whose founder and leader was Comrade Lenin. It is not given to everyone to be a member of such a party. It is not given to everyone to withstand the stresses and storms that accompany membership in such a party. It is the sons of the working class, the sons of want and struggle, the sons of incredible privation and heroic effort who before all should be members of such a party. That is why the Party of the Leninists, the Party of the communists, is also called the Party of the working class.

DEPARTING FROM US, COMRADE LENIN ENJOINED US TO HOLD HIGH AND GUARD THE PURITY OF THE GREAT TITLE OF MEMBER OF THE PARTY. WE VOW TO YOU, COMRADE LENIN, THAT WE SHALL FULFIL YOUR BEHEST WITH HONOUR!

For twenty-five years Comrade Lenin tended our Party and made it into the strongest and most highly steeled workers' party in the world. The blows of Tsarism and its henchmen, the fury of the bourgeoisie and the landlords, the armed attacks of Kolchak and Denikin, the armed intervention of Britain and France, the lies and slanders of the hundred-mouthed bourgeois press — all these scorpions constantly chastised our Party for a quarter of a century. But our Party stood firm as a rock, repelling the countless blows of its enemies and leading the working class forward, to victory. In fierce battles our Party forged the unity and solidarity of its ranks. And by unity and solidarity it achieved victory over the enemies of the working class.

DEPARTING FROM US, COMRADE LENIN ENJOINED US TO GUARD THE UNITY OF OUR PARTY AS THE APPLE OF OUR EYE. WE VOW TO YOU, COMRADE LENIN, THAT THIS BEHEST, TOO, WE SHALL FULFIL WITH HONOUR!

Burdensome and intolerable has been the lot of the working

class. Painful and grievous have been the sufferings of the labouring people. Slaves and slaveholders, serfs and serf-owners, peasants and landlords, workers and capitalists, oppressed and oppressors — so the world has been built from time immemorial, and so it remains to this day in the vast majority of countries. Scores and indeed hundreds of times in the course of the centuries the labouring people have striven to throw off the oppressors from their backs and to become the masters of their own destiny. But each time, defeated and disgraced, they have been forced to retreat, harbouring in their breasts resentment and humiliation, anger and despair, and lifting up their eyes to an inscrutable heaven where they hoped to find deliverance. The chains of slavery remained intact, or the old chains were replaced by new ones, equally burdensome and degrading. Ours is the only country where the oppressed and downtrodden labouring masses have succeeded in throwing off the rule of the landlords and capitalists and replacing it by the rule of the workers and peasants. You know, comrades, and the whole world now admits it, that this gigantic struggle was led by Comrade Lenin and his Party. The greatness of Lenin lies above all in this, that by creating the Republic of Soviets he gave a practical demonstration to the oppressed masses of the whole world that hope of deliverance is not lost, that the rule of the landlords and capitalists is short-lived, that the kingdom of labour can be created by the efforts of the labouring people themselves, and that the kingdom of labour must be created not in heaven, but on *earth*. He thus fired the hearts of the workers and peasants of the whole world with the hope of liberation. That explains why Lenin's name has become the name most beloved of the labouring and exploited masses.

DEPARTING FROM US, COMRADE LENIN ENJOINED US TO GUARD AND STRENGTHEN THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT. WE VOW TO YOU, COMRADE LENIN, THAT WE SHALL SPARE NO EFFORT TO FULFIL THIS BEHEST, TOO, WITH HONOUR!

The dictatorship of the proletariat was established in our country on the basis of an alliance between the workers and peasants. This is the first and fundamental basis of the Republic of Soviets. The workers and peasants could not have vanquished the capitalists and landlords without such an alliance. The workers could not have defeated the capitalists without the support of the peasants. The peasants could not have defeated the landlords without the leadership of the workers. This is borne out by the whole history of the civil war

in our country. But the struggle to consolidate the Republic of Soviets is by no means at an end — it has only taken on a new form. Before, the alliance of the workers and peasants took the form of a military alliance, because it was directed against Kolchak and Denikin. Now, the alliance of the workers and peasants must assume the form of economic cooperation between town and country, between workers and peasants, because it is directed against the merchant and the kulak, and its aim is the mutual supply by peasants and workers of all they require. You know that nobody worked for this more persistently than Comrade Lenin.

DEPARTING FROM US, COMRADE LENIN ENJOINED US TO STRENGTHEN WITH ALL OUR MIGHT THE ALLIANCE OF THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS. WE VOW TO YOU, COMRADE, LENIN, THAT THIS BEHEST, TOO, WE SHALL FULFIL WITH HONOUR!

The second basis of the Republic of Soviets is the union of the working people of the different nationalities of our country. Russians and Ukrainians, Bashkirs and Byelorussians, Georgians and Azerbaijanians, Armenians and Daghestanians, Tatars and Kirghiz, Uzbeks and Turkmenians are all equally interested in strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat. Not only does the dictatorship of the proletariat deliver these peoples from fetters and oppression, but these peoples on their part deliver our Republic of Soviets from the intrigues and assaults of the enemies of the working class by their supreme devotion to the Republic of Soviets and their readiness to make sacrifices for it. That is why Comrade Lenin untiringly urged upon us the necessity of the voluntary union of the peoples of our country, the necessity of their fraternal cooperation within the framework of the Union of Republics.

DEPARTING FROM US, COMRADE LENIN ENJOINED US TO STRENGTHEN AND EXTEND THE UNION OF REPUBLICS. WE VOW TO YOU, COMRADE LENIN, THAT THIS BEHEST, TOO, WE SHALL FULFIL WITH HONOUR!

The third basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat is our Red Army and our Red Navy. More than once did Lenin impress upon us that the respite we had won from the capitalist states might prove a short one. More than once did Lenin point out to us that the strengthening of the Red Army and the improvement of its condition is one of the most important tasks of our Party. The events connected with Curzon's ultimatum and the crisis in Germany²⁸ once more confirmed that, as always, Lenin was right. Let us vow then, com-

rades, that we shall spare no effort to strengthen our Red Army and our Red Navy.

Like a huge rock, our country stands out amid an ocean of bourgeois states. Wave after wave dashes against it, threatening to submerge it and wash it away. But the rock stands unshakable. Wherein lies its strength? Not only in the fact that our country rests on an alliance of the workers and peasants, that it embodies a union of free nationalities, that it is protected by the mighty arm of the Red Army and the Red Navy. The strength, the firmness, the solidity of our country is due to the profound sympathy and unfailing support it finds in the hearts of the workers and peasants of the whole world. The workers and peasants of the whole world want to preserve the Republic of Soviets as an arrow shot by the sure hand of Comrade Lenin into the camp of the enemy, as the pillar of their hopes of deliverance from oppression and exploitation, as a reliable beacon pointing the path to their emancipation. They want to preserve it, and they will not allow the landlords and capitalists to destroy it. Therein lies our strength. Therein lies the strength of the working people of all countries. And therein lies the weakness of the bourgeoisie all over the world.

Lenin never regarded the Republic of Soviets as an end in itself. He always looked on it as an essential link for strengthening the revolutionary movement in the countries of the West and the East, an essential link for facilitating the victory of the working people of the whole world over capitalism. Lenin knew that this was the only right conception, both from the international standpoint and from the standpoint of preserving the Republic of Soviets itself. Lenin knew that this alone could fire the hearts of the working people of the whole world with determination to fight the decisive battles for their emancipation. That is why, on the very morrow of the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, he, the greatest of the geniuses who have led the proletariat, laid the foundation of the workers' International. That is why he never tired of extending and strengthening the union of the working people of the whole world — the Communist International.

You have seen during the past few days the pilgrimage of scores and hundreds of thousands of working people to Comrade Lenin's bier. Before long you will see the pilgrimage of representatives of millions of working people to Comrade Lenin's tomb. You need not doubt that the representatives of millions will be followed by representatives of scores and hundreds of millions from all parts of the

earth, who will come to testify that Lenin was the leader not only of the Russian proletariat, not only of the European workers, not only of the colonial East, but of all the working people of the globe.

DEPARTING FROM US, COMRADE LENIN ENJOINED US TO REMAIN FAITHFUL TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL. WE VOW TO YOU, COMRADE LENIN, THAT WE SHALL NOT SPARE OUR LIVES TO STRENGTHEN AND EXTEND THE UNION OF THE WORKING PEOPLE OF THE WHOLE WORLD — THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL!

THE FOUNDATIONS OF LENINISM²⁹

(Lectures Delivered at the Sverdlov University)

April-May 1924

DEDICATED TO THE
LENIN ENROLMENT
J. STALIN

The foundations of Leninism is a big subject. To exhaust it a whole volume would be required. Indeed, a number of volumes would be required. Naturally, therefore, my lectures cannot be an exhaustive exposition of Leninism; at best they can only offer a concise synopsis of the foundations of Leninism. Nevertheless, I consider it useful to give this synopsis, in order to lay down some basic points of departure necessary for the successful study of Leninism.

Expounding the foundations of Leninism still does not mean expounding the basis of Lenin's world outlook. Lenin's world outlook and the foundations of Leninism are not identical in scope. Lenin was a Marxist, and Marxism is, of course, the basis of his world outlook. But from this it does not at all follow that an exposition of Leninism ought to begin with an exposition of the foundations of Marxism. To expound Leninism means to expound the distinctive and new in the works of Lenin that Lenin contributed to the general treasury of Marxism and that is naturally connected with his name. Only in this sense will I speak in my lectures of the foundations of Leninism.

And so, what is Leninism?

Some say that Leninism is the application of Marxism to the conditions that are peculiar to the situation in Russia. This definition contains a particle of truth, but not the whole truth by any means. Lenin, indeed, applied Marxism to Russian conditions, and applied it in a masterly way. But if Leninism were only the application of Marxism to the conditions that are peculiar to Russia it would be a purely national and only a national, a purely Russian and only a Russian, phenomenon. We know, however, that Leninism is not merely a Russian, but an international phenomenon rooted in the whole of international development. That is why I think this definition suffers from one-sidedness.

Others say that Leninism is the revival of the revolutionary ele-

ments of Marxism of the forties of the nineteenth century, as distinct from the Marxism of subsequent years, when, it is alleged, it became moderate, non-revolutionary. If we disregard this foolish and vulgar division of the teachings of Marx into two parts, revolutionary and moderate, we must admit that even this totally inadequate and unsatisfactory definition contains a particle of truth. This particle of truth is that Lenin did indeed restore the revolutionary content of Marxism, which had been suppressed by the opportunists of the Second International. Still, that is but a particle of the truth. The whole truth about Leninism is that Leninism not only restored Marxism, but also took a step forward, developing Marxism further under the new conditions of capitalism and of the class struggle of the proletariat.

What, then, in the last analysis, is Leninism?

Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution. To be more exact, Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution in general, the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular. Marx and Engels pursued their activities in the pre-revolutionary period (we have the proletarian revolution in mind), when developed imperialism did not yet exist, in the period of the proletarians' preparation for revolution, in the period when the proletarian revolution was not yet an immediate practical inevitability. But Lenin, the disciple of Marx and Engels, pursued his activities in the period of developed imperialism, in the period of the unfolding proletarian revolution, when the proletarian revolution had already triumphed in one country, had smashed bourgeois democracy and had ushered in the era of proletarian democracy, the era of the Soviets.

That is why Leninism is the further development of Marxism.

It is usual to point to the exceptionally militant and exceptionally revolutionary character of Leninism. This is quite correct. But this specific feature of Leninism is due to two causes: firstly, to the fact that Leninism emerged from the proletarian revolution, the imprint of which it cannot but bear; secondly, to the fact that it grew and became strong in clashes with the opportunism of the Second International, the fight against which was and remains an essential preliminary condition for a successful fight against capitalism. It must not be forgotten that between Marx and Engels, on the one hand, and Lenin, on the other, there lies a whole period of undivided domination of the opportunism of the Second International, and the ruthless struggle against this opportunism could not but constitute one

of the most important tasks of Leninism.

I

THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF LENINISM

Leninism grew up and took shape under the conditions of imperialism, when the contradictions of capitalism had reached an extreme point, when the proletarian revolution had become an immediate practical question, when the old period of preparation of the working class for revolution had come up and passed over to a new period, that of direct assault on capitalism.

Lenin called imperialism “moribund capitalism.” Why? Because imperialism carries the contradictions of capitalism to their last bounds, to the extreme limit, beyond which revolution begins. Of these contradictions, there are three which must be regarded as the most important.

The *first contradiction* is the contradiction between labour and capital. Imperialism is the omnipotence of the monopolist trusts and syndicates, of the banks and the financial oligarchy, in the industrial countries. In the fight against this omnipotence, the customary methods of the working class — trade unions and cooperatives, parliamentary parties and the parliamentary struggle — have proved to be totally inadequate. Either place yourself at the mercy of capital, eke out a wretched existence as of old and sink lower and lower, or adopt a new weapon — this is the alternative imperialism puts before the vast masses of the proletariat. Imperialism brings the working class to revolution.

The *second contradiction* is the contradiction among the various financial groups and imperialist powers in their struggle for sources of raw materials, for foreign territory. Imperialism is the export of capital to the sources of raw materials, the frenzied struggle for monopolist possession of these sources, the struggle for a redivision of the already divided world, a struggle waged with particular fury by new financial groups and powers seeking a “place in the sun” against the old groups and powers, which cling tenaciously to what they have seized. This frenzied struggle among the various groups of capitalists is notable in that it includes as an inevitable element imperialist wars, wars for the annexation of foreign territories. This circumstance, in its turn, is notable in that it leads to the mutual weakening of the imperialists, to the weakening of the position of capital-

ism in general, to the acceleration of the advent of the proletarian revolution and to the practical necessity of this revolution.

The *third contradiction* is the contradiction between the handful of ruling, “civilized” nations and the hundreds of millions of the colonial and dependent peoples of the world. Imperialism is the most barefaced exploitation and the most inhuman oppression of hundreds of millions of people inhabiting vast colonies and dependent countries. The purpose of this exploitation and of this oppression is to squeeze out superprofits. But in exploiting these countries imperialism is compelled to build there railways, factories and mills, industrial and commercial centres. The appearance of a class of proletarians, the emergence of a native intelligentsia, the awakening of national consciousness, the growth of the liberation movement — such are the inevitable results of this “policy.” The growth of the revolutionary movement in all colonies and dependent countries without exception clearly testifies to this fact. This circumstance is of importance for the proletariat inasmuch as it saps radically the position of capitalism by converting the colonies and dependent countries from reserves of imperialism into reserves of the proletarian revolution.

Such, in general, are the principal contradictions of imperialism which have converted the old, “flourishing” capitalism into moribund capitalism.

The significance of the imperialist war which broke out 10 years ago lies, among other things, in the fact that it gathered all these contradictions into a single knot and threw them on to the scales, thereby accelerating and facilitating the revolutionary battles of the proletariat.

In other words, imperialism was instrumental not only in making the revolution a practical inevitability, but also in creating favourable conditions for a direct assault on the citadels of capitalism.

Such was the international situation which gave birth to Leninism.

Some may say: This is all very well, but what has it to do with Russia, which was not and could not be a classical land of imperialism? What has it to do with Lenin, who worked primarily in Russia and for Russia? Why did Russia, of all countries, become the home of Leninism, the birthplace of the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution?

Because Russia was the focus of all these contradictions of imperialism.

Because Russia, more than any other country, was pregnant with revolution, and she alone, therefore, was in a position to solve those contradictions in a revolutionary way.

To begin with, Tsarist Russia was the home of every kind of oppression — capitalist, colonial and militarist — in its most inhuman and barbarous form. Who does not know that in Russia the omnipotence of capital was combined with the despotism of Tsarism, the aggressiveness of Russian nationalism with Tsarism's role of executioner in regard to the non-Russian peoples, the exploitation of entire regions — Turkey, Persia, China — with the seizure of these regions by Tsarism, with wars of conquest? Lenin was right in saying that Tsarism was "military-feudal imperialism." Tsarism was the concentration of the worst features of imperialism, raised to a high pitch.

To proceed. Tsarist Russia was a major reserve of Western imperialism, not only in the sense that it gave free entry to foreign capital, which controlled such basic branches of Russia's national economy as the fuel and metallurgical industries, but also in the sense that it could supply the Western imperialists with millions of soldiers. Remember the Russian army, fourteen million strong, which shed its blood on the imperialist fronts to safeguard the staggering profits of the British and French capitalists.

Further. Tsarism was not only the watchdog of imperialism in the east of Europe, but, in addition, it was the agent of Western imperialism for squeezing out of the population hundreds of millions by way of interest on loans obtained in Paris and London, Berlin and Brussels.

Finally, Tsarism was a most faithful ally of Western imperialism in the partition of Turkey, Persia, China, etc. Who does not know that the imperialist war was waged by Tsarism in alliance with the imperialists of the Entente, and that Russia was an essential element in that war?

That is why the interests of Tsarism and of Western imperialism were interwoven and ultimately became merged in a single skein of imperialist interests.

Could Western imperialism resign itself to the loss of such a powerful support in the East and of such a rich reservoir of manpower and resources as old, Tsarist, bourgeois Russia was without exerting all its strength to wage a life-and-death struggle against the revolution in Russia, with the object of defending and preserving Tsarism? Of course not.

But from this it follows that whoever wanted to strike at Tsarism necessarily raised his hand against imperialism, who ever rose against Tsarism had to rise against imperialism as well; for whoever was bent on overthrowing Tsarism had to overthrow imperialism too, if he really intended not merely to defeat Tsarism, but to make a clean sweep of it. Thus the revolution against Tsarism verged on and had to pass into a revolution against imperialism, into a proletarian revolution.

Meanwhile, in Russia a tremendous popular revolution was rising, headed by the most revolutionary proletariat in the world, which possessed such an important ally as the revolutionary peasantry of Russia. Does it need proof that such a revolution could not stop halfway, that in the event of success it was bound to advance further and raise the banner of revolt against imperialism?

That is why Russia was bound to become the focus of the contradictions of imperialism, not only in the sense that it was in Russia that these contradictions were revealed most plainly, in view of their particularly repulsive and particularly intolerable character, and not only because Russia was a highly important prop of Western imperialism, connecting Western finance capital with the colonies in the East, but also because Russia was the only country in which there existed a real force capable of resolving the contradictions of imperialism in a revolutionary way.

From this it follows, however, that the revolution in Russia could not but become a proletarian revolution, that from its very inception it could not but assume an international character, and that, therefore, it could not but shake the very foundations of world imperialism.

Under these circumstances, could the Russian communists confine their work within the narrow national bounds of the Russian revolution? Of course not. On the contrary, the whole situation, both internal (the profound revolutionary crisis) and external (the war), impelled them to go beyond these bounds in their work, to transfer the struggle to the international arena, to expose the ulcers of imperialism, to prove that the collapse of capitalism was inevitable, to smash social-chauvinism and social-pacifism, and, finally, to overthrow capitalism in their own country and to forge a new fighting weapon for the proletariat — the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution — in order to facilitate the task of overthrowing capitalism for the proletarians of all countries. Nor could the Russian communists act otherwise; for only this path offered the chance of

producing certain changes in the international situation which could safeguard Russia against the restoration of the bourgeois order.

That is why Russia became the home of Leninism, and why Lenin, the leader of the Russian communists, became its creator.

The same thing, approximately, “happened” in the case of Russia and Lenin as in the case of Germany and Marx and Engels in the forties of the last century. Germany at that time was pregnant with bourgeois revolution just like Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century. Marx wrote at that time in the *Communist Manifesto*:

“The Communists turn their attention chiefly to Germany, because that country is on the eve of a bourgeois revolution that is bound to be carried out under more advanced conditions of European civilization, and with a much more developed proletariat than that of England was in the seventeenth, and of France in the eighteenth century, and because the bourgeois revolution in Germany will be but the prelude to an immediately following proletarian revolution.”³⁰

In other words, the centre of the revolutionary movement was shifting to Germany.

There can hardly be any doubt that it was this very circumstance, noted by Marx in the above-quoted passage, that served as the probable reason why it was precisely Germany that became the birthplace of scientific socialism and why the leaders of the German proletariat, Marx and Engels, became its creators.

The same, only to a still greater degree, must be said of Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century. Russia was then on the eve of a bourgeois revolution; she had to accomplish this revolution at a time when conditions in Europe were more advanced, and with a proletariat that was more developed than that of Germany in the forties of the nineteenth century (let alone Britain and France); moreover, all the evidence went to show that this revolution was bound to serve as a ferment and as a prelude to the proletarian revolution.

We cannot regard it as accidental that as early as 1902, when the Russian revolution was still in an embryonic state, Lenin wrote the prophetic words in his pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?*:

“History has now confronted us (i.e., the Russian Marxists — *J. St.*) with an immediate task which is the *most revolutionary* of all the *immediate* tasks that confront the proletariat of any country,” and that... “fulfilment of this task, the destruction of the most powerful bulwark, not only of European, but also (it may now be said) of Asiatic reaction, would make the Russian proletariat the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat” (See Vol. IV, p. 382).

In other words, the centre of the revolutionary movement was bound to shift to Russia.

As we know, the course of the revolution in Russia has more than vindicated Lenin's prediction.

Is it surprising, after all this, that a country which has accomplished such a revolution and possesses such a proletariat should have been the birthplace of the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution?

Is it surprising that Lenin, the leader of Russia's proletariat, became also the creator of this theory and tactics and the leader of the international proletariat?

II

METHOD

I have already said that between Marx and Engels, on the one hand, and Lenin, on the other, there lies a whole period of domination of the opportunism of the Second International. For the sake of exactitude I must add that it is not the formal domination of opportunism I have in mind, but only its actual domination. Formally, the Second International was headed by "faithful" Marxists, by the "orthodox" — Kautsky and others. Actually, however, the main work of the Second International followed the line of opportunism. The opportunists adapted themselves to the bourgeoisie because of their adaptive, petty-bourgeois nature; the "orthodox," in their turn adapted themselves to the opportunists in order to "preserve unity" with them, in the interests of "peace within the party." Thus the link between the policy of the bourgeoisie and the policy of the "orthodox" was closed, and, as a result, opportunism reigned supreme.

This was the period of the relatively peaceful development of capitalism, the prewar period, so to speak, when the catastrophic contradictions of imperialism had not yet become so glaringly evident, when workers' economic strikes and trade unions were developing more or less "normally," when election campaigns and parliamentary groups yielded "dizzying" successes, when legal forms of struggle were lauded to the skies, and when it was thought that capitalism would be "killed" by legal means — in short, when the parties of the Second International were living in clover and had no inclination to think seriously about revolution, about the dictatorship of the proletariat, about the revolutionary education of the masses.

Instead of an integral revolutionary theory, there were contradictory theoretical postulates and fragments of theory, which were divorced from the actual revolutionary struggle of the masses and had been turned into threadbare dogmas. For the sake of appearances, Marx's theory was mentioned, of course, but only to rob it of its living, revolutionary spirit.

Instead of a revolutionary policy, there was flabby philistinism and sordid political bargaining, parliamentary diplomacy and parliamentary scheming. For the sake of appearances, of course, "revolutionary" resolutions and slogans were adopted, but only to be pi-geonholed.

Instead of the party being trained and taught correct revolutionary tactics on the basis of its own mistakes, there was a studied evasion of nagging questions, which were glossed over and veiled. For the sake of appearances, of course, there was no objection to talking about nagging questions, but only in order to wind up with some sort of "elastic" resolution.

Such was the physiognomy of the Second International, its method of work, its arsenal.

Meanwhile, a new period of imperialist wars and of revolutionary battles of the proletariat was approaching. The old methods of fighting were proving obviously inadequate and impotent in face of the omnipotence of finance capital.

It became necessary to overhaul the entire activity of the Second International, its entire method of work, and to drive out all philistinism, narrow-mindedness, politicians' tricks, renegacy, social-chauvinism and social-pacifism. It became necessary to examine the entire arsenal of the Second International, to throw out all that was rusty and antiquated, to forge new weapons. Without this preliminary work it was useless embarking upon war against capitalism. Without this work the proletariat ran the risk of finding itself inadequately armed, or even completely unarmed, in the future revolutionary battles.

The honour of bringing about this general overhauling and general cleansing of the Augean stables of the Second International fell to Leninism.

Such were the conditions under which the method of Leninism was born and hammered out.

What are the requirements of this method?

Firstly, the *testing* of the theoretical dogmas of the Second International in the crucible of the revolutionary struggle of the masses,

in the crucible of living practice — that is to say, the restoration of the broken unity between theory and practice, the healing of the rift between them; for only in this way can a truly proletarian party armed with revolutionary theory be created.

Secondly, the *testing* of the policy of the parties of the Second International, not by their slogans and resolutions (which cannot be trusted), but by their deeds, by their actions; for only in this way can the confidence of the proletarian masses be won and deserved.

Thirdly, the *reorganization* of all Party work on new revolutionary lines, with a view to training and preparing the masses for the revolutionary struggle; for only in this way can the masses be prepared for the proletarian revolution.

Fourthly, *self-criticism* within the proletarian parties, their education and training on the basis of their own mistakes; for only in this way can genuine cadres and genuine leaders of the Party be trained.

Such is the basis and substance of the method of Leninism.

How was this method applied in practice?

The opportunists of the Second International have a number of theoretical dogmas to which they always revert as their starting point. Let us take a few of these.

First dogma: concerning the conditions for the seizure of power by the proletariat. The opportunists assert that the proletariat cannot and ought not to take power unless it constitutes a majority in the country. No proofs are brought forward; for there are no proofs, either theoretical or practical, that can bear out this absurd thesis. Let us assume that this is so, Lenin replies to the gentlemen of the Second International; but suppose an historical situation has arisen (a war, an agrarian crisis, etc.) in which the proletariat, constituting a minority of the population, has an opportunity to rally around itself the vast majority of the labouring masses; why should it not take power then? Why should the proletariat not take advantage of a favourable international and internal situation to pierce the front of capital and hasten the general denouement? Did not Marx say as far back as the fifties of the last century that things could go “splendidly” with the proletarian revolution in Germany were it possible to back it by, so to speak, a “second edition of the Peasants’ War”³¹? Is it not a generally known fact that in those days the number of proletarians in Germany was relatively smaller than, for example, in Russia in 1917? Has not the practical experience of the Russian proletarian revolution shown that this favourite dogma of the heroes of the Second International is devoid of all vital significance for the prole-

tariat? Is it not clear that the practical experience of the revolutionary struggle of the masses refutes and smashes this obsolete dogma?

Second dogma: The proletariat cannot retain power if it lacks an adequate number of trained cultural and administrative cadres capable of organizing the administration of the country; these cadres must first be trained under capitalist conditions, and only then can power be taken. Let us assume that this is so, replies Lenin; but why not turn it this way: first take power, create favourable conditions for the development of the proletariat, and then proceed with seven-league strides to raise the cultural level of the labouring masses and train numerous cadres of leaders and administrators from among the workers? Has not Russian experience shown that the cadres of leaders recruited from the ranks of the workers develop a hundred times more rapidly and effectually under the rule of the proletariat than under the rule of capital? Is it not clear that the practical experience of the revolutionary struggle of the masses ruthlessly smashes this theoretical dogma of the opportunists too?

Third dogma: The proletariat cannot accept the method of the *political* general strike because it is unsound in theory (see Engels' criticism) and dangerous in practice (it may disturb the normal course of economic life in the country, it may deplete the coffers of the trade unions), and cannot serve as a substitute for parliamentary forms of struggle, which are the principal form of the class struggle of the proletariat. Very well, reply the Leninists; but, firstly, Engels did not criticize every kind of general strike. He only criticized a certain kind of general strike, namely, the *economic* general strike advocated by the anarchists³² *in place of* the political struggle of the proletariat. What has this to do with the method of the *political* general strike? Secondly, where and by whom has it ever been proved that the parliamentary form of struggle is the principal form of struggle of the proletariat? Does not the history of the revolutionary movement show that the parliamentary struggle is only a school for, and an auxiliary in, organizing the extraparliamentary struggle of the proletariat, that under capitalism the fundamental problems of the working-class movement are solved by force, by the direct struggle of the proletarian masses, their general strike, their uprising? Thirdly, who suggested that the method of the political general strike be substituted for the parliamentary struggle? Where and when have the supporters of the *political* general strike sought to substitute extraparliamentary forms of struggle for parliamentary forms? Fourthly, has not the revolution in Russia shown that the political general

strike is a highly important school for the proletarian revolution and an indispensable means of mobilizing and organizing the vast masses of the proletariat on the eve of storming the citadels of capitalism? Why then the philistine lamentations over the disturbance of the normal course of economic life and over the coffers of the trade unions? Is it not clear that the practical experience of the revolutionary struggle smashes this dogma of the opportunists too?

And so on and so forth.

That is why Lenin said that “revolutionary theory... is not a dogma,” that it “assumes final shape only in close connection with the practical activity of a truly mass and truly revolutionary movement” (“*Left-Wing*” *Communism*³³); for theory must serve practice, for “theory must answer the questions raised by practice” (*What the “Friends of the People” Are*³⁴), for it must be tested by practical results.

As to the political slogans and political resolutions of the parties of the Second International, it is sufficient to recall the history of the slogan “war against war” to realize how utterly false and utterly rotten are the political practices of these parties, which use pompous revolutionary slogans and resolutions to cloak their anti-revolutionary deeds. We all remember the pompous demonstration of the Second International at the Basle Congress,³⁵ at which it threatened the imperialists with all the horrors of insurrection if they should dare to start a war, and with the menacing slogan “war against war.” But who does not remember that some time after, on the very eve of the war, the Basle resolution was pigeonholed and the workers were given a new slogan — to exterminate each other for the glory of their capitalist fatherlands? Is it not clear that revolutionary slogans and resolutions are not worth a farthing unless backed by deeds? One need only contrast the Leninist policy of transforming the imperialist war into civil war with the treacherous policy of the Second International during the war to understand the utter baseness of the opportunist politicians and the full grandeur of the method of Leninism.

I cannot refrain from quoting at this point a passage from Lenin’s book *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, in which Lenin severely castigates an opportunist attempt by the leader of the Second International, K. Kautsky, to judge parties not by their deeds, but by their paper slogans and documents:

“Kautsky is pursuing a typically petty-bourgeois, philistine policy by pretending... that *putting forward a slogan* alters the position. The entire his-

tory of bourgeois democracy refutes this illusion; the bourgeois democrats have always advanced and still advance all sorts of 'slogans' in order to deceive the people. The point is to *test* their sincerity, to compare their words with their *deeds*, not to be satisfied with idealistic or charlatan *phrases*, but to get down to *class reality*" (see Vol. XXIII, p. 377).

There is no need to mention the fear the parties of the Second International have of self-criticism, their habit of concealing their mistakes, of glossing over nagging questions, of covering up their shortcomings by a deceptive show of well-being which blunts living thought and prevents the Party from deriving revolutionary training from its own mistakes — a habit which was ridiculed and pilloried by Lenin. Here is what Lenin wrote about self-criticism in proletarian parties in his pamphlet "*Left-Wing Communism*":

"The attitude of a political party towards its own mistakes is one of the most important and surest ways of judging how earnest the party is and how it *in practice* fulfils its obligations towards its *class* and the toiling *masses*. Frankly admitting a mistake, ascertaining the reasons for it, analysing the circumstances which gave rise to it, and thoroughly discussing the means of correcting it — that is the earmark of a serious party; that is the way it should perform its duties, that is the way it should educate and train the *class*, and then the *masses*" (see Vol. XXV, p. 200).

Some say that the exposure of its own mistakes and self-criticism are dangerous for the Party because they may be used by the enemy against the party of the proletariat. Lenin regarded such objections as trivial and entirely wrong. Here is what he wrote on this subject as far back as 1904, in his pamphlet *One Step Forward*, when our Party was still weak and small:

"They (i.e., the opponents of the Marxists — *J. St.*) gloat and grimace over our controversies; and, of course, they will try to pick isolated passages from my pamphlet, which deals with the defects and shortcomings of our Party, and to use them for their own ends. The Russian social-democrats are already steeled enough in battle not to be perturbed by these pinpricks and to continue, in spite of them, their work of self-criticism and ruthless exposure of their own shortcomings, which will unquestionably and inevitably be overcome as the working-class movement grows" (see Vol. VI, p. 161).

Such, in general, are the characteristic features of the method of Leninism.

What is contained in Lenin's method was in the main already contained in the teachings of Marx, which, according to Marx himself, were "in essence critical and revolutionary."³⁶ It is precisely this critical and revolutionary spirit that pervades Lenin's method from

beginning to end. But it would be wrong to suppose that Lenin's method is merely the restoration of the method of Marx. As a matter of fact, Lenin's method is not only the restoration, but also the concretization and further development of the critical and revolutionary method of Marx, of his materialist dialectics.

III

THEORY

From this theme I take three questions:

- a) the importance of theory for the proletarian movement;
- b) criticism of the "theory" of spontaneity;
- c) the theory of the proletarian revolution.

1) *The importance of theory.* Some think that Leninism is the precedence of practice over theory in the sense that its main point is the translation of the Marxist theses into deeds, their "execution"; as for theory, it is alleged that Leninism is rather unconcerned about it. We know that Plekhanov time and again chaffed Lenin about his "unconcern" for theory, and particularly for philosophy. We also know that theory is not held in great favour by many present-day Leninist practical workers, particularly in view of the immense amount of practical work imposed upon them by the situation. I must declare that this more than odd opinion about Lenin and Leninism is quite wrong and bears no relation whatever to the truth; that the attempt of practical workers to brush theory aside runs counter to the whole spirit of Leninism and is fraught with serious dangers to the work.

Theory is the experience of the working-class movement in all countries taken in its general aspect. Of course, theory becomes purposeless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice, just as practice gropes in the dark if its path is not illumined by revolutionary theory. But theory can become a tremendous force in the working-class movement if it is built up in indissoluble connection with revolutionary practice; for theory, and theory alone, can give the movement confidence, the power of orientation, and an understanding of the inner relation of surrounding events; for it, and it alone, can help practice to realize not only how and in which direction classes are moving at the present time, but also how and in which direction they will move in the near future. None other than Lenin uttered and repeated scores of times the well-known thesis that:

“*Without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement*”* (see Vol. IV, p. 380).

Lenin, better than anyone else, understood the great importance of theory, particularly for a party such as ours, in view of the role of vanguard fighter of the international proletariat which has fallen to its lot, and in view of the complicated internal and international situation in which it finds itself. Foreseeing this special role of our Party as far back as 1902, he thought it necessary even then to point out that:

“*The role of vanguard fighter can be fulfilled only by a party that is guided by the most advanced theory*” (see Vol. IV, p. 380).

It scarcely needs proof that now, when Lenin’s prediction about the role of our Party has come true, this thesis of Lenin’s acquires special force and special importance.

Perhaps the most striking expression of the great importance which Lenin attached to theory is the fact that none other than Lenin undertook the very serious task of generalizing, on the basis of materialist philosophy, the most important achievements of science from the time of Engels down to his own time, as well as of subjecting to comprehensive criticism the anti-materialistic trends among Marxists. Engels said that “materialism must assume a new aspect with every new great discovery.”³⁷ It is well known that none other than Lenin accomplished this task for his own time in his remarkable work *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*.³⁸ It is well known that Plekhanov, who loved to chaff Lenin about his “unconcern” for philosophy, did not even dare to make a serious attempt to undertake such a task.

2) *Criticism of the “theory” of spontaneity, or the role of the vanguard in the movement.* The “theory” of spontaneity is a theory of opportunism, a theory of worshipping the spontaneity of the labour movement, a theory which actually repudiates the leading role of the vanguard of the working class, of the party of the working class.

The theory of worshipping spontaneity is decidedly opposed to the revolutionary character of the working-class movement; it is opposed to the movement taking the line of struggle against the foundations of capitalism; it is in favour of the movement proceeding exclusively along the line of “realisable” demands, of demands “acceptable” to capitalism; it is wholly in favour of the “line of least re-

* My italics. — *J. St.*

sistance.” The theory of spontaneity is the ideology of trade-unionism.

The theory of worshipping spontaneity is decidedly opposed to giving the spontaneous movement a politically conscious, planned character. It is opposed to the Party marching at the head of the working class, to the Party raising the masses to the level of political consciousness, to the Party leading the movement; it is in favour of the politically conscious elements of the movement not hindering the movement from taking its own course; it is in favour of the Party only heeding the spontaneous movement and dragging at the tail of it. The theory of spontaneity is the theory of belittling the role of the conscious element in the movement, the ideology of “khvostism,” the logical basis of *all* opportunism.

In practice this theory, which appeared on the scene even before the first revolution in Russia, led its adherents, the so-called “Economists,” to deny the need for an independent workers’ party in Russia, to oppose the revolutionary struggle of the working class for the overthrow of Tsarism, to preach a purely trade-unionist policy in the movement, and, in general, to surrender the labour movement to the hegemony of the liberal bourgeoisie.

The fight of the old *Iskra* and the brilliant criticism of the theory of “khvostism” in Lenin’s pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?* not only smashed so-called “Economism,” but also created the theoretical foundations for a truly revolutionary movement of the Russian working class.

Without this fight it would have been quite useless even to think of creating an independent workers’ party in Russia and of its playing a leading part in the revolution.

But the theory of worshipping spontaneity is not an exclusively Russian phenomenon. It is extremely widespread — in a somewhat different form, it is true — in all the parties of the Second International, without exception. I have in mind the so-called “productive forces” theory as debased by the leaders of the Second International, which justifies everything and conciliates everybody, which records facts and explains them after everyone has become sick and tired of them, and, having recorded them, rests content. Marx said that the materialist theory could not confine itself to explaining the world, that it must also change it.³⁹ But Kautsky and Co. are not concerned with this; they prefer to rest content with the first part of Marx’s formula.

Here is one of the numerous examples of the application of this

“theory.” It is said that before the imperialist war the parties of the Second International threatened to declare “war against war” if the imperialists should start a war. It is said that on the very eve of the war these parties pigeon-holed the “war against war” slogan and applied an opposite one, viz., “war for the imperialist fatherland.” It is said that as a result of this change of slogans millions of workers were sent to their death. But it would be a mistake to think that there were some people to blame for this, that someone was unfaithful to the working class or betrayed it. Not at all! Everything happened as it should have happened. Firstly, because the International, it seems, is “an instrument of peace,” and not of war. Secondly, because, in view of the “level of the productive forces” which then prevailed, nothing else could be done. The “productive forces” are “to blame.” That is the precise explanation vouchsafed to “us” by Mr. Kautsky’s “theory of the productive forces.” And whoever does not believe in that “theory” is not a Marxist. The role of the parties? Their importance for the movement? But what can a party do against so decisive a factor as the “level of the productive forces”?...

One could cite a host of similar examples of the falsification of Marxism.

It scarcely needs proof that this spurious “Marxism,” designed to hide the nakedness of opportunism, is merely a European variety of the selfsame theory of “khvostism” which Lenin fought even before the first Russian revolution.

It scarcely needs proof that the demolition of this theoretical falsification is a preliminary condition for the creation of truly revolutionary parties in the West.

3) *The theory of the proletarian revolution.* Lenin’s theory of the proletarian revolution proceeds from three fundamental theses.

First thesis: The domination of finance capital in the advanced capitalist countries; the issue of stocks and bonds as one of the principal operations of finance capital; the export of capital to the sources of raw materials, which is one of the foundations of imperialism; the omnipotence of a financial oligarchy, which is the result of the domination of finance capital — all this reveals the grossly parasitic character of monopolist capitalism, makes the yoke of the capitalist trusts and syndicates a hundred times more burdensome, intensifies the indignation of the working class with the foundations of capitalism, and brings the masses to the proletarian revolution as their only salvation (see Lenin, *Imperialism*⁴⁰).

Hence the first conclusion: intensification of the revolutionary

crisis within the capitalist countries and growth of the elements of an explosion on the internal, proletarian front in the “metropolises.”

Second thesis: The increase in the export of capital to the colonies and dependent countries; the expansion of “spheres of influence” and colonial possessions until they cover the whole globe; the transformation of capitalism into a *world system* of financial enslavement and colonial oppression of the vast majority of the population of the world by a handful of “advanced” countries — all this has, on the one hand, converted the separate national economies and national territories into links in a single chain called world economy, and, on the other hand, split the population of the globe into two camps: a handful of “advanced” capitalist countries which exploit and oppress vast colonies and dependencies, and the huge majority consisting of colonial and dependent countries which are compelled to wage a struggle for liberation from the imperialist yoke (see *Imperialism*).

Hence the second conclusion: intensification of the revolutionary crisis in the colonial countries and growth of the elements of revolt against imperialism on the external, colonial front.

Third thesis: The monopolistic possession of “spheres of influence” and colonies; the uneven development of the capitalist countries, leading to a frenzied struggle for the redivision of the world between the countries which have already seized territories and those claiming their “share”; imperialist wars as the only means of restoring the disturbed “equilibrium” — all this leads to the intensification of the struggle on the third front, the inter-capitalist front, which weakens imperialism and facilitates the union of the first two fronts against imperialism: the front of the revolutionary proletariat and the front of colonial emancipation (see *Imperialism*).

Hence the third conclusion: that under imperialism wars cannot be averted, and that a coalition between the proletarian revolution in Europe and the colonial revolution in the East in a united world front of revolution against the world front of imperialism is inevitable.

Lenin combines all these conclusions into one general conclusion that “*imperialism is the eve of the socialist revolution*”* (see Vol. XIX, p. 71).

The very approach to the question of the proletarian revolution, of the character of the revolution, of its scope, of its depth, the scheme of the revolution in general, changes accordingly.

* My italics. — *J. St.*

Formerly, the analysis of the prerequisites for the proletarian revolution was usually approached from the point of view of the economic state of individual countries. Now, this approach is no longer adequate. Now the matter must be approached from the point of view of the economic state of all or the majority of countries, from the point of view of the state of world economy; for individual countries and individual national economies have ceased to be self-sufficient units, have become links in a single chain called world economy; for the old "cultured" capitalism has evolved into imperialism, and imperialism is a world system of financial enslavement and colonial oppression of the vast majority of the population of the world by a handful of "advanced" countries.

Formerly it was the accepted thing to speak of the existence or absence of objective conditions for the proletarian revolution in individual countries, or, to be more precise, in one or another developed country. Now this point of view is no longer adequate. Now we must speak of the existence of objective conditions for the revolution in the entire system of world imperialist economy as an integral whole; the existence within this system of some countries that are not sufficiently developed industrially cannot serve as an insuperable obstacle to the revolution, *if* the system as a whole or, more correctly, *because* the system as a whole is already ripe for revolution.

Formerly it was the accepted thing to speak of the proletarian revolution in one or another developed country as of a separate and self-sufficient entity opposing a separate national front of capital as its antipode. Now, this point of view is no longer adequate. Now we must speak of the world proletarian revolution; for the separate national fronts of capital have become links in a single chain called the world front of imperialism, which must be opposed by a common front of the revolutionary movement in all countries.

Formerly the proletarian revolution was regarded exclusively as the result of the internal development of a given country. Now, this point of view is no longer adequate. Now the proletarian revolution must be regarded primarily as the result of the development of the contradictions within the world system of imperialism, as the result of the breaking of the chain of the world imperialist front in one country or another.

Where will the revolution begin? Where, in what country, can the front of capital be pierced first?

Where industry is more developed, where the proletariat constitutes the majority, where there is more culture, where there is more

democracy — that was the reply usually given formerly.

No, objects the Leninist theory of revolution, *not necessarily where industry is more developed*, and so forth. The front of capital will be pierced where the chain of imperialism is weakest, for the proletarian revolution is the result of the breaking of the chain of the world imperialist front at its weakest link; and it may turn out that the country which has started the revolution, which has made a breach in the front of capital, is less developed in a capitalist sense than other, more developed, countries, which have, however, remained within the framework of capitalism.

In 1917 the chain of the imperialist world front proved to be weaker in Russia than in the other countries. It was there that the chain broke and provided an outlet for the proletarian revolution. Why? Because in Russia a great popular revolution was unfolding, and at its head marched the revolutionary proletariat, which had such an important ally as the vast mass of the peasantry, which was oppressed and exploited by the landlords. Because the revolution there was opposed by such a hideous representative of imperialism as Tsarism, which lacked all moral prestige and was deservedly hated by the whole population. The chain proved to be weaker in Russia, although Russia was less developed in a capitalist sense than, say, France or Germany, Britain or America.

Where will the chain break in the near future? Again, where it is weakest. It is not precluded that the chain may break, say, in India. Why? Because that country has a young, militant, revolutionary proletariat, which has such an ally as the national liberation movement — an undoubtedly powerful and undoubtedly important ally. Because there the revolution is confronted by such a well-known foe as foreign imperialism, which has no moral credit and is deservedly hated by all the oppressed and exploited masses of India.

It is also quite possible that the chain will break in Germany. Why? Because the factors which are operating, say, in India are beginning to operate in Germany as well, but, of course, the enormous difference in the level of development between India and Germany cannot but stamp its imprint on the progress and outcome of a revolution in Germany.

That is why Lenin said:

“The West-European capitalist countries will consummate their development towards socialism... not by the even ‘maturing’ of socialism in them, but by the exploitation of some countries by others, by the exploitation of the first of the countries to be vanquished in the imperialist war combined

with the exploitation of the whole of the East. On the other hand, precisely as a result of the first imperialist war, the East has definitely come into the revolutionary movement, has been definitely drawn into the general maelstrom of the world revolutionary movement" (see Vol. XXVII, pp. 415-16).

Briefly, the chain of the imperialist front must, as a rule, break where the links are weaker and, at all events, not necessarily where capitalism is more developed, where there is such and such a percentage of proletarians and such and such a percentage of peasants, and so on.

That is why in deciding the question of proletarian revolution statistical estimates of the percentage of the proletarian population in a given country lose the exceptional importance so eagerly attached to them by the doctrinaires of the Second International, who have not understood imperialism and who fear revolution like the plague.

To proceed. The heroes of the Second International asserted (and continue to assert) that between the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the proletarian revolution there is a chasm, or at any rate a Chinese Wall, separating one from the other by a more or less protracted interval of time, during which the bourgeoisie, having come into power, develops capitalism, while the proletariat accumulates strength and prepares for the "decisive struggle" against capitalism. This interval is usually calculated to extend over many decades, if not longer. It scarcely needs proof that this Chinese Wall "theory" is totally devoid of scientific meaning under the conditions of imperialism, that it is and can be only a means of concealing and camouflaging the counter-revolutionary aspirations of the bourgeoisie. It scarcely needs proof that under the conditions of imperialism, fraught as it is with collisions and wars; under the conditions of the "eve of the socialist revolution," when "flourishing" capitalism becomes "moribund" capitalism (*Lenin*) and the revolutionary movement is growing in all countries of the world; when imperialism is allying itself with all reactionary forces without exception down to and including Tsarism and serfdom, thus making imperative the coalition of all revolutionary forces, from the proletarian movement of the West to the national liberation movement of the East; when the overthrow of the survivals of the regime of feudal serfdom becomes impossible without a revolutionary struggle against imperialism — it scarcely needs proof that the bourgeois-democratic revolution, in a more or less developed country, must under such circumstances verge upon the proletarian revolution, that the former must pass into

the latter. The history of the revolution in Russia has provided palpable proof that this thesis is correct and incontrovertible. It was not without reason that Lenin, as far back as 1905, on the eve of the first Russian revolution, in his pamphlet *Two Tactics* depicted the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the socialist revolution as two links in the same chain, as a single and integral picture of the sweep of the Russian revolution:

“The proletariat must carry to completion the democratic revolution by allying to itself the mass of the peasantry in order to crush by force the resistance of the autocracy and to paralyse the instability of the bourgeoisie. The proletariat must accomplish the socialist revolution, by allying to itself the mass of the semi-proletarian elements of the population in order to crush by force the resistance of the bourgeoisie and to paralyse the instability of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. Such are the tasks of the proletariat, which the new Iskra-ists present so narrowly in all their arguments and resolutions about the sweep of the revolution” (see Lenin, Vol. VIII, p. 96).

There is no need to mention other, later works of Lenin’s, in which the idea of the bourgeois revolution passing into the proletarian revolution stands out in greater relief than in *Two Tactics* as one of the cornerstones of the Leninist theory of revolution.

Some comrades believe, it seems; that Lenin arrived at this idea only in 1916, that up to that time he had thought that the revolution in Russia would remain within the bourgeois framework, that power, consequently, would pass from the hands of the organ of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry into the hands of the bourgeoisie and not of the proletariat. It is said that this assertion has even penetrated into our communist press. I must say that this assertion is absolutely wrong, that it is totally at variance with the facts.

I might refer to Lenin’s well-known speech at the Third Congress of the Party (1905),⁴¹ in which he defined the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, i.e., the victory of the democratic revolution, not as the “organization of ‘order’” but as the “organization of war” (see Vol. VII, p. 264).

Further, I might refer to Lenin’s well-known articles “On the Provisional Government” (1905), where, outlining the prospects of the unfolding Russian revolution, he assigns to the Party the task of “ensuring that the Russian revolution is not a movement of a few months, but a movement of many years, that it leads, not merely to slight concessions on the part of the powers that be, but to the complete overthrow of those powers”; where, enlarging further on these prospects and linking them with the revolution in Europe, he goes

on to say:

“And if we succeed in doing that, then... then the revolutionary conflagration will spread all over Europe; the European worker, languishing under bourgeois reaction, will rise in his turn and will show us ‘how it is done’; then the revolutionary wave in Europe will sweep back again into Russia and will convert an epoch of a few revolutionary years into an epoch of several revolutionary decades...” (*Ibid.*, p. 191).

I might further refer to a well-known article by Lenin published in November 1915, in which he writes:

“The proletariat is fighting, and will fight valiantly, to capture power, for a republic, for the confiscation of the land... for the participation of the ‘non-proletarian masses of the people’ in liberating *bourgeois* Russia from *military-feudal* ‘imperialism’ (=Tsarism). And the proletariat will *immediately** take advantage of this liberation of bourgeois Russia from Tsarism, from the agrarian power of the landlords, not to aid the rich peasants in their struggle against the rural worker, but to bring about the socialist revolution in alliance with the proletarians of Europe” (see Vol. XVIII, p. 318).

Finally, I might refer to the well-known passage in Lenin’s pamphlet *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, where, referring to the above-quoted passage in *Two Tactics* on the sweep of the Russian revolution, he arrives at the following conclusion:

“Things turned out just as we said they would. The course taken by the revolution confirmed the correctness of our reasoning. *First*, with the ‘whole’ of the peasantry against the monarchy, against the landlords, against the medieval regime (and to that extent the revolution remains bourgeois, bourgeois-democratic), *Then*, with the poor peasantry, with the semi-proletarians, with all the exploited, *against capitalism*, including the rural rich, the kulaks, the profiteers, and to that extent the revolution becomes a *socialist* one. To attempt to raise an artificial Chinese Wall between the first and the second, to separate them by anything else *than* the degree of preparedness of the proletariat and the degree of its unity with the poor peasants, means monstrously to distort Marxism, to vulgarize it, to replace it by liberalism” (see Vol. XXIII, p. 391).

That is sufficient, I think.

Very well, we may be told; but if that is the case, why did Lenin combat the idea of “permanent (uninterrupted) revolution”?

Because Lenin proposed that the revolutionary capacities of the peasantry be “exhausted” and that the fullest use be made of their revolutionary energy for the complete liquidation of Tsarism and for

* My italics. — *J. St.*

the transition to the proletarian revolution, whereas the adherents of “permanent revolution” did not understand the important role of the peasantry in the Russian revolution, underestimated the strength of the revolutionary energy of the peasantry, underestimated the strength and ability of the Russian proletariat to lead the peasantry, and thereby hampered the work of emancipating the peasantry from the influence of the bourgeoisie, the work of rallying the peasantry around the proletariat.

Because Lenin proposed that the revolution *be crowned* with the transfer of power to the proletariat, whereas the adherents of “permanent” revolution wanted *to begin* at once with the establishment of the power of the proletariat, failing to realize that in so doing they were closing their eyes to such a “minor detail” as the survivals of serfdom and were leaving out of account so important a force as the Russian peasantry, failing to understand that such a policy could only retard the winning of the peasantry over to the side of the proletariat.

Consequently, Lenin fought the adherents of “permanent” revolution, not over the question of uninterruptedness, for Lenin himself maintained the point of view of uninterrupted revolution, but because they underestimated the role of the peasantry, which is an enormous reserve of the proletariat, because they failed to understand the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat.

The idea of “permanent” revolution should not be regarded as a new idea. It was first advanced by Marx at the end of the forties in his well-known *Address to the Communist League* (1850). It is from this document that our “permanentists” took the idea of uninterrupted revolution. It should be noted that in taking it from Marx our “permanentists” altered it somewhat, and in altering it “spoilt” it and made it unfit for practical use. The experienced hand of Lenin was needed to rectify this mistake, to take Marx’s idea of uninterrupted revolution in its pure form and make it a cornerstone of his theory of revolution.

Here is what Marx says in his *Address* about uninterrupted (permanent) revolution, after enumerating a number of revolutionary-democratic demands which he calls upon the communists to win:

“While the democratic petty bourgeois wish to bring the revolution to a conclusion as quickly as possible, and with the achievement, at most, of the above demands, it is our interest and our task to make the revolution permanent, until all more or less possessing classes have been forced out of their position of dominance, until the proletariat has conquered state power,

and the association of proletarians, not only in one country but in all the dominant countries of the world, has advanced so far that competition among the proletarians of these countries has ceased and that at least the decisive productive forces are concentrated in the hands of the proletarians.”⁴²

In other words:

a) Marx did not at all propose *to begin* the revolution in the Germany of the fifties with the immediate establishment of proletarian power — *contrary* to the plans of our Russian “permanentists.”

b) Marx proposed only that the revolution *be crowned* with the establishment of proletarian state power, by hurling, step by step, one section of the bourgeoisie after another from the heights of power, in order, after the attainment of power by the proletariat, to kindle the fire of revolution in every country — and everything that Lenin taught and carried out in the course of our revolution in pursuit of his theory of the proletarian revolution under the conditions of imperialism was *fully in line* with that proposition.

It follows, then, that our Russian “permanentists” have not only underestimated the role of the peasantry in the Russian revolution and the importance of the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat, but have altered (for the worse) Marx’s idea of “permanent” revolution and made it unfit for practical use.

That is why Lenin ridiculed the theory of our “permanentists,” calling it “original” and “fine,” and accusing them of refusing to “think why, for ten whole years, life has passed by this fine theory.” (Lenin’s article was written in 1915, 10 years after the appearance of the theory of the “permanentists” in Russia. See Vol. XVIII, p. 317.)

That is why Lenin regarded this theory as a semi-Menshevik theory and said that it “borrows from the Bolsheviks their call for a resolute revolutionary struggle by the proletariat and the conquest of political power by the latter, and from the Mensheviks the ‘repudiation’ of the role of the peasantry.” (See Lenin’s article “Two Lines of the Revolution,” *Ibid.*).

This, then, is the position in regard to Lenin’s idea of the bourgeois-democratic revolution passing into the proletarian revolution, of utilizing the bourgeois revolution for the “immediate” transition to the proletarian revolution.

To proceed. Formerly, the victory of the revolution in one country was considered impossible, on the assumption that it would require the combined action of the proletarians of all or at least of a majority of the advanced countries to achieve victory over the bour-

geoisie. Now this point of view no longer fits in with the facts. Now we must proceed from the possibility of such a victory; for the uneven and spasmodic character of the development of the various capitalist countries under the conditions of imperialism, the development within imperialism of catastrophic contradictions leading to inevitable wars, the growth of the revolutionary movement in all countries of the world — all this leads, not only to the possibility, but also to the necessity of the victory of the proletariat in individual countries. The history of the revolution in Russia is direct proof of this. At the same time, however, it must be borne in mind that the overthrow of the bourgeoisie can be successfully accomplished only when certain absolutely necessary conditions exist, in the absence of which there can be even no question of the proletariat taking power.

Here is what Lenin says about these conditions in his pamphlet “*Left-Wing*” *Communism*:

“The fundamental law of revolution, which has been confirmed by all revolutions, and particularly by all three Russian revolutions in the twentieth century, is as follows: It is not enough for revolution that the exploited and oppressed masses should understand the impossibility of living in the old way and demand changes; it is essential for revolution that the exploiters should not be able to live and rule in the old way. Only when the ‘*lower classes*’ do not want the old way, and when the ‘*upper classes*’ cannot carry on in the old way — only then can revolution triumph. This truth may be expressed in other words: *revolution is impossible without a nationwide crisis (affecting both the exploited and the exploiters).** It follows that for revolution it is essential, first, that a majority of the workers (or at least a majority of the class conscious, thinking, politically active workers) should fully understand that revolution is necessary and be ready to sacrifice their lives for it; secondly, that the ruling classes should be passing through a governmental crisis, which draws even the most backward masses into politics,... weakens the government and makes it possible for the revolutionaries to overthrow it rapidly” (see Vol. XXV, p. 222).

But the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and establishment of the power of the proletariat in one country does not yet mean that the complete victory of socialism has been ensured. After consolidating its power and leading the peasantry in its wake the proletariat of the victorious country can and must build a socialist society. But does this mean that it will thereby achieve the complete and final victory of socialism, i.e., does it mean that with the forces of only one country it can finally consolidate socialism and fully

* My italics. — *J. St.*

guarantee that country against intervention and, consequently, also against restoration? No, it does not. For this the victory of the revolution in at least several countries is needed. Therefore, the development and support of revolution in other countries is an essential task of the victorious revolution. Therefore, the revolution which has been victorious in one country must regard itself not as a self-sufficient entity, but as an aid, as a means for hastening the victory of the proletariat in other countries.

Lenin expressed this thought succinctly when he said that the task of the victorious revolution is to do “the utmost possible in one country *for* the development, support and awakening of the revolution *in all countries*” (see Vol. XXIII, p. 385).

These, in general, are the characteristic features of Lenin’s theory of proletarian revolution.

IV

THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

From this theme I take three fundamental questions:

- a) the dictatorship of the proletariat as the instrument of the proletarian revolution;
- b) the dictatorship of the proletariat as the rule of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie;
- c) Soviet power as the state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

1) *The dictatorship of the proletariat as the instrument of the proletarian revolution.* The question of the proletarian dictatorship is above all a question of the main content of the proletarian revolution. The proletarian revolution, its movement, its sweep and its achievements acquire flesh and blood only through the dictatorship of the proletariat. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the instrument of the proletarian revolution, its organ, its most important mainstay, brought into being for the purpose of, firstly, crushing the resistance of the overthrown exploiters and consolidating the achievements of the proletarian revolution, and, secondly, carrying the proletarian revolution to its completion, carrying the revolution to the complete victory of socialism. The revolution can defeat the bourgeoisie, can overthrow its power, even without the dictatorship of the proletariat. But the revolution will be unable to crush the resistance of the bourgeoisie, to maintain its victory and to push forward to the final victo-

ry of socialism unless, at a certain stage in its development, it creates a special organ in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat as its principal mainstay.

“The fundamental question of every revolution is the question of power.” (*Lenin.*) Does this mean that all that is required is to assume power, to seize it? No, it does not. The seizure of power is only the beginning. For many reasons, the bourgeoisie that is overthrown in one country remains for a long time stronger than the proletariat which has overthrown it. Therefore, the whole point is to retain power, to consolidate it, to make it invincible. What is needed to attain this? To attain this it is necessary to carry out at least three main tasks that confront the dictatorship of the proletariat “on the morrow” of victory:

a) to break the resistance of the landlords and capitalists who have been overthrown and expropriated by the revolution, to liquidate every attempt on their part to restore the power of capital;

b) to organize construction in such a way as to rally all the working people around the proletariat, and to carry on this work along the lines of preparing for the elimination, the abolition of classes;

c) to arm the revolution, to organize the army of the revolution for the struggle against foreign enemies, for the struggle against imperialism.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is needed to carry out, to fulfil these tasks.

“The transition from capitalism to communism,” says Lenin, “represents an entire historical epoch. Until this epoch has terminated, the exploiters inevitably cherish the hope of restoration, and this *hope* is converted into *attempts* at restoration. And after their first serious defeat, the overthrown exploiters — who had not expected their overthrow, never believed it possible, never conceded the thought of it — throw themselves with energy grown tenfold, with furious passion and hatred grown a hundredfold, into the battle for the recovery of the ‘paradise’ of which they have been deprived, on behalf of their families, who had been leading such a sweet and easy life and whom now the ‘common herd’ is condemning to ruin and destitution (or to ‘common’ labour...). In the train of the capitalist exploiters follow the broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie, with regard to whom decades of historical experience of all countries testify that they vacillate and hesitate, one day marching behind the proletariat and the next day taking fright at the difficulties of the revolution; that they become panic stricken at the first defeat or semi-defeat of the workers, grow nervous, rush about, snivel and run from one camp into the other” (see Vol. XXIII, p. 355).

The bourgeoisie has its grounds for making attempts at restora-

tion, because for a long time after its overthrow it remains stronger than the proletariat which has overthrown it.

“If the exploiters are defeated in one country only,” says Lenin, “and this, of course, is the typical case, since a simultaneous revolution in a number of countries is a rare exception, they *still* remain *stronger* than the exploited” (*Ibid.*, p. 354).

Wherein lies the strength of the overthrown bourgeoisie?

Firstly, “in the strength of international capital, in the strength and durability of the international connections of the bourgeoisie” (see Vol. XXV, p. 173).

Secondly, in the fact that “for a long time after the revolution the exploiters inevitably retain a number of great practical advantages: they still have money (it is impossible to abolish money all at once); some movable property — often fairly considerable; they still have various connections, habits of organization and management, knowledge of all the ‘secrets’ (customs, methods, means and possibilities) of management, superior education, close connections with the higher technical personnel (who live and think like the bourgeoisie), incomparably greater experience in the art of war (this is very important), and so on, and so forth” (see Vol. XXIII, p. 354).

Thirdly, “in the *force of habit*, in the strength of *small production*. For, unfortunately, small production is still very, very widespread in the world, and small production *engenders* capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale”... for “the abolition of classes means not only driving out the landlords and capitalists — that we accomplished with comparative ease — it also means *abolishing the small commodity producers*, and they *cannot be driven out*, or crushed; we *must live in harmony* with them, they can (and must) be remoulded and re-educated only by very prolonged, slow, cautious organizational work” (see Vol. XXV, pp. 173 and 189).

That is why Lenin says:

“The dictatorship of the proletariat is a most determined and most ruthless war waged by the new class against a *more powerful* enemy, the bourgeoisie, whose resistance is increased *tenfold* by its overthrow,” that “the dictatorship of the proletariat is a stubborn struggle — bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative — against the forces and traditions of the old society” (*Ibid.*, pp. 173 and 190).

It scarcely needs proof that there is not the slightest possibility

of carrying out these tasks in a short period, of accomplishing all this in a few years. Therefore, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the transition from capitalism to communism, must not be regarded as a fleeting period of “super-revolutionary” acts and decrees, but as an entire historical era, replete with civil wars and external conflicts, with persistent organizational work and economic construction, with advances and retreats, victories and defeats. This historical era is needed not only to create the economic and cultural prerequisites for the complete victory of socialism, but also to enable the proletariat, firstly, to educate itself and become steeled as a force capable of governing the country, and, secondly, to re-educate and remould the petty-bourgeois strata along such lines as will assure the organization of socialist production.

“You will have to go through fifteen, twenty, fifty years of civil wars and international conflicts,” Marx said to the workers, “not only to change existing conditions, but also to change yourselves and to make yourselves capable of wielding political power” (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Works*, Vol. VIII, p. 506).

Continuing and developing Marx’s idea still further, Lenin wrote:

“It will be necessary under the dictatorship of the proletariat to re-educate millions of peasants and small proprietors, hundreds of thousands of office employees, officials and bourgeois intellectuals, to subordinate them all to the proletarian state and to proletarian leadership, to overcome their bourgeois habits and traditions,” just as we must “— in a protracted struggle waged on the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat — re-educate the proletarians themselves, who do not abandon their petty-bourgeois prejudices at one stroke, by a miracle, at the bidding of the Virgin Mary, at the bidding of a slogan, resolution or decree, but only in the course of a long and difficult mass struggle against mass petty-bourgeois influences” (see Vol. XXV, pp. 248 and 247).

2) *The dictatorship of the proletariat as the rule of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie.* From the foregoing it is evident that the dictatorship of the proletariat is not a mere change of personalities in the government, a change of the “cabinet,” etc., leaving the old economic and political order intact. The Mensheviks and opportunists of all countries, who fear dictatorship like fire and in their fright substitute the concept “conquest of power” for the concept dictatorship, usually reduce the “conquest of power” to a change of the “cabinet,” to the accession to power of a new ministry made up of people like Scheidemann and Noske, MacDonald and Henderson. It is hardly

necessary to explain that these and similar cabinet changes have nothing in common with the dictatorship of the proletariat, with the conquest of real power by the real proletariat. With the MacDonaldis and Scheidemanns in power, while the old bourgeois order is allowed to remain, their so-called governments cannot be anything else than an apparatus serving the bourgeoisie, a screen to conceal the ulcers of imperialism, a weapon in the hands of the bourgeoisie against the revolutionary movement of the oppressed and exploited masses. Capital needs such governments as a screen when it finds it inconvenient, unprofitable, difficult to oppress and exploit the masses without the aid of a screen. Of course, the appearance of such governments is a symptom that "over there" (i.e., in the capitalist camp) all is not quiet "at the Shipka Pass"; nevertheless, governments of this kind inevitably remain governments of capital in disguise. The government of a MacDonald or a Scheidemann is as far removed from the conquest of power by the proletariat as the sky from the earth. The dictatorship of the proletariat is not a change of government, but a new state, with new organs of power, both central and local; it is the state of the proletariat, which has arisen on the ruins of the old state, the state of the bourgeoisie.

The dictatorship of the proletariat arises not on the basis of the bourgeois order, but in the process of the breaking up of this order, after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, in the process of the expropriation of the landlords and capitalists, in the process of the socialization of the principal instruments and means of production, in the process of violent proletarian revolution. The dictatorship of the proletariat is a revolutionary power based on the use of force against the bourgeoisie.

The state is a machine in the hands of the ruling class for suppressing the resistance of its class enemies. *In this respect* the dictatorship of the proletariat does not differ essentially from the dictatorship of any other class; for the proletarian state is a machine for the suppression of the bourgeoisie. But there is one *substantial* difference. This difference consists in the fact that all hitherto existing class states have been dictatorships of an exploiting minority over the exploited majority, whereas the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of the exploited majority over the exploiting minority.

Briefly: *the dictatorship of the proletariat is the rule — unrestricted by law and based on force — of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, a rule enjoying the sympathy and support of the labouring and exploited masses.*

(Lenin, *The State and Revolution*.)

From this follow two main conclusions:

First conclusion: The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be “complete” democracy, democracy for *all*, for the rich as well as for the poor; the dictatorship of the proletariat “must be a state that is democratic *in a new way* (*for** the proletarians and the non-propertied in general) and dictatorial *in a new way* (*against** the bourgeoisie)” (see Vol. XXI, p. 393). The talk of Kautsky and Co. about universal equality, about “pure” democracy, about “perfect” democracy, and the like, is a bourgeois disguise of the indubitable fact that equality between the exploited and exploiters is impossible. The theory of “pure” democracy is the theory of the upper stratum of the working class, which has been broken in and is being fed by the imperialist robbers. It was brought into being for the purpose of concealing the ulcers of capitalism, of embellishing imperialism and lending it moral strength in the struggle against the exploited masses. Under capitalism there are no real “liberties” for the exploited, nor can there be, if for no other reason than that the premises, printing plants, paper supplies, etc., indispensable for the enjoyment of “liberties” are the privilege of the exploiters. Under capitalism the exploited masses do not, nor can they ever, really participate in governing the country, if for no other reason than that, even under the most democratic regime, under conditions of capitalism, governments are not set up by the people but by the Rothschilds and Stinneses, the Rockefellers and Morgans. Democracy under capitalism is *capitalist* democracy, the democracy of the exploiting minority, based on the restriction of the rights of the exploited majority and directed against this majority. Only under the proletarian dictatorship are real liberties for the exploited and real participation of the proletarians and peasants in governing the country possible. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, democracy is *proletarian* democracy, the democracy of the exploited majority, based on the restriction of the rights of the exploiting minority and directed against this minority.

Second conclusion: The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot arise as the result of the peaceful development of bourgeois society and of bourgeois democracy; it can arise only as the result of the smashing of the bourgeois state machine, the bourgeois army, the bourgeois bureaucratic apparatus, the bourgeois police.

“The working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state ma-

* My italics. — *J. St.*

chinery, and wield it for its own purposes," say Marx and Engels in a preface to the *Communist Manifesto*. — The task of the proletarian revolution is "...no longer, as before, to transfer the bureaucratic-military machine from one hand to another, *but to smash* it and this is the preliminary condition for every real people's revolution on the continent," says Marx in his letter to Kugelmann in 1871.⁴³

Marx's qualifying phrase about the continent gave the opportunists and Mensheviks of all countries a pretext for clamouring that Marx had thus conceded the possibility of the peaceful evolution of bourgeois democracy into a proletarian democracy, at least in certain countries outside the European continent (Britain, America). Marx did in fact concede that possibility, and he had good grounds for conceding it in regard to Britain and America in the seventies of the last century, when monopoly capitalism and imperialism did not yet exist, and when these countries, owing to the particular conditions of their development, had as yet no developed militarism and bureaucracy. That was the situation before the appearance of developed imperialism. But later, after a lapse of thirty or forty years, when the situation in these countries had radically changed, when imperialism had developed and had embraced all capitalist countries without exception, when militarism and bureaucracy had appeared in Britain and America also, when the particular conditions for peaceful development in Britain and America had disappeared — then the qualification in regard to these countries necessarily could no longer hold good.

"Today," said Lenin, "in 1917, in the epoch of the first great imperialist war, this qualification made by Marx is no longer valid. Both Britain and America, the biggest and the last representatives — in the whole world — of Anglo-Saxon 'liberty' in the sense that they had no militarism and bureaucracy, have completely sunk into the all-European filthy, bloody morass of bureaucratic-military institutions which subordinate everything to themselves and trample everything underfoot. Today, in Britain and in America, too, 'the preliminary condition for every real people's revolution' is the *smashing*, the *destruction* of the 'ready-made state machinery' (perfected in those countries, between 1914 and 1917, up to the 'European' general imperialist standard)" (see Vol. XXI, p. 395).

In other words, the law of violent proletarian revolution, the law of the smashing of the bourgeois state machine as a preliminary condition for such a revolution, is an inevitable law of the revolutionary movement in the imperialist countries of the world.

Of course, in the remote future, if the proletariat is victorious in

the principal capitalist countries, and if the present capitalist encirclement is replaced by a socialist encirclement, a “peaceful” path of development is quite possible for certain capitalist countries, whose capitalists, in view of the “unfavourable” international situation, will consider it expedient “voluntarily” to make substantial concessions to the proletariat. But this supposition applies only to a remote and possible future. With regard to the immediate future, there is no ground whatsoever for this supposition.

Therefore, Lenin is right in saying:

“The proletarian revolution is impossible without the forcible destruction of the bourgeois state machine and the substitution for it of a *new one*” (see Vol. XXIII, p. 342).

3) *Soviet power as the state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.*

The victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat signifies the suppression of the bourgeoisie, the smashing of the bourgeois state machine, and the substitution of proletarian democracy for bourgeois democracy. That is clear. But by means of what organizations can this colossal work be carried out? The old forms of organization of the proletariat, which grew up on the basis of bourgeois parliamentarism, are inadequate for this work — of that there can hardly be any doubt. What, then, are the new forms of organization of the proletariat that are capable of serving as the gravediggers of the bourgeois state machine, that are capable not only of smashing this machine, not only of substituting proletarian democracy for bourgeois democracy, but also of becoming the foundation of the proletarian state power?

This new form of organization of the proletariat is the Soviets.

Wherein lies the strength of the Soviets as compared with the old forms of organization?

In that the Soviets are the most *all-embracing* mass organizations of the proletariat, for they and they alone embrace all workers without exception.

In that the Soviets are the *only* mass organizations which unite all the oppressed and exploited, workers and peasants, soldiers and sailors, and in which the vanguard of the masses, the proletariat, can, for this reason, most easily and most completely exercise its political leadership of the mass struggle.

In that the Soviets are the *most powerful organs* of the revolutionary struggle of the masses, of the political actions of the masses, of the uprising of the masses — organs capable of breaking the omnipo-

tence of finance capital and its political appendages.

In that the Soviets are the *immediate* organizations of the masses themselves, i.e., they are *the most democratic* and therefore the most authoritative organizations of the masses, which facilitate to the utmost their participation in the work of building up the new state and in its administration, and which bring into full play the revolutionary energy, initiative and creative abilities of the masses in the struggle for the destruction of the old order, in the struggle for the new, proletarian order.

Soviet power is the union and constitution of the local Soviets into one common state organization, into the state organization of the proletariat as the vanguard of the oppressed and exploited masses and as the ruling class — their union in the Republic of Soviets.

The essence of Soviet power consists in the fact that these most all-embracing and most revolutionary mass organizations of precisely those classes that were oppressed by the capitalists and landlords are now the “*permanent and sole* basis of the whole power of the state, of the whole state apparatus”; that “precisely those masses which even in the most democratic bourgeois republics,” while being equal in law, “have in fact been prevented by thousands of tricks and devices from taking part in political life and from enjoying democratic rights and liberties, are now drawn unflinchingly into *constant* and, more over, *decisive* participation in the democratic administration of the state”* (see Lenin, Vol. XXIV, p. 13).

That is why Soviet power is a *new form* of state organization different in principle from the old bourgeois-democratic and parliamentary form, a *new type* of state, adapted not to the task of exploiting and oppressing the labouring masses, but to the task of completely emancipating them from all oppression and exploitation, to the tasks facing the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Lenin is right in saying that with the appearance of Soviet power “the era of bourgeois-democratic parliamentarism has drawn to a close and a new chapter in world history — the era of proletarian dictatorship — has been opened.”

Wherein lie the characteristic features of Soviet power?

In that Soviet power is the most all-embracing and most democratic state organization of all possible state organizations while classes continue to exist; for, being the arena of the bond and collaboration between the workers and the exploited peasants in their

* All italics mine. — J. St.

struggle against the exploiters, and basing itself in its work on this bond and on this collaboration, Soviet power is thus the power of the majority of the population over the minority, it is the state of the majority, the expression of its dictatorship.

In that Soviet power is the most internationalist of all state organizations in class society; for, by destroying every kind of national oppression and resting on the collaboration of the labouring masses of the various nationalities, it facilitates the uniting of these masses into a single state union.

In that Soviet power, by its very structure, facilitates the task of leading the oppressed and exploited masses by the vanguard of these masses — by the proletariat, as the most united and most politically conscious core of the Soviets.

“The experience of all revolutions and of all movements of the oppressed classes, the experience of the world socialist movement teaches us,” says Lenin, “that the proletariat alone is able to unite and lead the scattered and backward strata of the toiling and exploited population” (see Vol. XXIV, p. 14). The point is that the structure of Soviet power facilitates the practical application of the lessons drawn from this experience.

In that Soviet power, by combining legislative and executive power in a single state organization and replacing territorial electoral constituencies by industrial units, factories and mills thereby directly links the workers and the labouring masses in general with the apparatus of state administration, teaches them how to govern the country.

In that Soviet power alone is capable of releasing the army from its subordination to bourgeois command and of converting it from the instrument of oppression of the people which it is under the bourgeois order, into an instrument for the liberation of the people from the yoke of the bourgeoisie, both native and foreign.

In that “the Soviet organization of the state alone is capable of immediately and effectively smashing and finally destroying the old, i.e., the bourgeois, bureaucratic and judicial apparatus” (*Ibid.*).

In that the Soviet form of state alone, by drawing the mass organizations of the toilers and exploited into constant and unrestricted participation in state administration, is capable of preparing the ground for the withering away of the state, which is one of the basic elements of the future stateless communist society.

The Republic of Soviets is thus the political form, so long sought and finally discovered, within the framework of which the economic

emancipation of the proletariat, the complete victory of socialism, must be accomplished.

The Paris Commune was the embryo of this form; Soviet power is its development and culmination.

That is why Lenin says:

“The Republic of Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies is not only the form of a higher type of democratic institution..., but is the *only** form capable of ensuring the most painless transition to socialism” (see Vol. XXII, p. 131).

V

THE PEASANT QUESTION

From this theme I take four questions:

- a) the presentation of the question;
- b) the peasantry during the bourgeois-democratic revolution;
- c) the peasantry during the proletarian revolution;
- d) the peasantry after the consolidation of Soviet power.

1) *The presentation of the question.* Some think that the fundamental thing in Leninism is the peasant question, that the point of departure of Leninism is the question of the peasantry, of its role, its relative importance. This is absolutely wrong. The fundamental question of Leninism, its point of departure, is not the peasant question, but the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of the conditions under which it can be achieved, of the conditions under which it can be consolidated. The peasant question, as the question of the ally of the proletariat in its struggle for power, is a derivative question.

This circumstance, however, does not in the least deprive the peasant question of the serious and vital importance it unquestionably has for the proletarian revolution. It is known that the serious study of the peasant question in the ranks of Russian Marxists began precisely on the eve of the first revolution (1905), when the question of overthrowing Tsarism and of realizing the hegemony of the proletariat confronted the Party in all its magnitude, and when the question of the ally of the proletariat in the impending bourgeois revolution became of vital importance. It is also known that the peasant question in Russia assumed a still more urgent character during the proletarian revolution, when the question of the dictatorship of the

* My italics. — *J. St.*

proletariat, of achieving and maintaining it, led to the question of allies for the proletariat in the impending proletarian revolution. And this was natural. Those who are marching towards and preparing to assume power cannot but be interested in the question of who are their real allies.

In this sense the peasant question is part of the general question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and as such it is one of the most vital problems of Leninism.

The attitude of indifference and sometimes even of outright aversion displayed by the parties of the Second International towards the peasant question is to be explained not only by the specific conditions of development in the West. It is to be explained primarily by the fact that these parties do not believe in the proletarian dictatorship, that they fear revolution and have no intention of leading the proletariat to power. And those who are afraid of revolution, who do not intend to lead the proletarians to power, cannot be interested in the question of allies for the proletariat in the revolution — to them the question of allies is one of indifference, of no immediate significance. The ironical attitude of the heroes of the Second International towards the peasant question is regarded by them as a sign of good breeding, a sign of “true” Marxism. As a matter of fact, there is not a grain of Marxism in this; for indifference towards so important a question as the peasant question on the eve of the proletarian revolution is the other side of the coin of repudiation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, it is an unmistakable sign of downright betrayal of Marxism.

The question is as follows: Are the revolutionary potentialities latent in the peasantry by virtue of certain conditions of its existence *already exhausted*, or not; and if not, *is there any hope, any basis*, for utilizing these potentialities *for* the proletarian revolution, for transforming the peasantry, the exploited majority of it, from the reserve of the bourgeoisie which it was during the bourgeois revolutions in the West and still is even now, into a reserve of the proletariat, into its ally?

Leninism replies to this question in the affirmative, i.e., it recognizes the existence of revolutionary capacities in the ranks of the majority of the peasantry, and the possibility of using these in the interests of the proletarian dictatorship.

The history of the three revolutions in Russia fully corroborates the conclusions of Leninism on this score.

Hence the practical conclusion that the toiling masses of the

peasantry must be supported in their struggle against bondage and exploitation, in their struggle for deliverance from oppression and poverty. This does not mean, of course, that the proletariat must support *every* peasant movement. What we have in mind here is support for a movement or struggle of the peasantry which, directly or indirectly, facilitates the emancipation movement of the proletariat, which, in one way or another, brings grist to the mill of the proletarian revolution, and which helps to transform the peasantry into a reserve and ally of the working class.

2) *The peasantry during the bourgeois-democratic revolution.* This period extends from the first Russian revolution (1905) to the second revolution (February 1917), inclusive. The characteristic feature of this period is the emancipation of the peasantry from the influence of the liberal bourgeoisie, the peasantry's *desertion* of the Cadets, its *turn* towards the proletariat, towards the Bolshevik Party. The history of this period is the history of the struggle between the Cadets (the liberal bourgeoisie) and the Bolsheviks (the proletariat) for the peasantry. The outcome of this struggle was decided by the Duma period; for the period of the four Dumas served as an object lesson to the peasantry, and this lesson brought home to the peasantry the fact that they would receive neither land nor liberty at the hands of the Cadets, that the Tsar was wholly in favour of the landlords and that the Cadets were supporting the Tsar, that the only force they could rely on for assistance was the urban workers, the proletariat. The imperialist war merely confirmed the lessons of the Duma period and consummated the peasantry's desertion of the bourgeoisie, consummated the isolation of the liberal bourgeoisie; for the years of the war revealed the utter futility, the utter deceptiveness of all hopes of obtaining peace from the Tsar and his bourgeois allies. Without the object lessons of the Duma period, the hegemony of the proletariat would have been impossible.

That is how the alliance between the workers and the peasants in the bourgeois-democratic revolution took shape. That is how the hegemony (leadership) of the proletariat in the common struggle for the overthrow of Tsarism took shape — the hegemony which led to the February Revolution of 1917.

The bourgeois revolutions in the West (Britain, France, Germany, Austria) took, as is well known, a different road. There, hegemony in the revolution belonged not to the proletariat, which by reason of its weakness did not and could not represent an independent political force, but to the liberal bourgeoisie. There the peasantry ob-

tained its emancipation from feudal regimes, not at the hands of the proletariat, which was numerically weak and unorganized, but at the hands of the bourgeoisie. There the peasantry marched against the old order side by side with the liberal bourgeoisie. There the peasantry acted as the reserve of the bourgeoisie. There the revolution, in consequence of this, led to an enormous increase in the political weight of the bourgeoisie.

In Russia, on the contrary, the bourgeois revolution produced quite opposite results. The revolution in Russia led not to the strengthening, but to the weakening of the bourgeoisie as a political force, not to an increase in its political reserves, but to the loss of its main reserve, to the loss of the peasantry. The bourgeois revolution in Russia brought to the forefront not the liberal bourgeoisie but the revolutionary proletariat, rallying around the latter the millions of the peasantry.

Incidentally, this explains why the bourgeois revolution in Russia passed into a proletarian revolution in a comparatively short space of time. The hegemony of the proletariat was the embryo of, and the transitional stage to, the dictatorship of the proletariat.

How is this peculiar phenomenon of the Russian revolution, which has no precedent in the history of the bourgeois revolutions of the West, to be explained? Whence this peculiarity?

It is to be explained by the fact that the bourgeois revolution unfolded in Russia under more advanced conditions of class struggle than in the West; that the Russian proletariat had at that time already become an independent political force, whereas the liberal bourgeoisie, frightened by the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat, lost all semblance of revolutionary spirit (especially after the lessons of 1905) and turned towards an alliance with the Tsar and the landlords against the revolution, against the workers and peasants.

We should bear in mind the following circumstances, which determined the peculiar character of the Russian bourgeois revolution.

a) The unprecedented concentration of Russian industry on the eve of the revolution. It is known, for instance, that in Russia 54 per cent of all the workers were employed in enterprises employing over 500 workers each, whereas in so highly developed a country as the United States of America no more than 33 per cent of all the workers were employed in such enterprises. It scarcely needs proof that this circumstance alone, in view of the existence of a revolutionary party like the Party of the Bolsheviks, transformed the working class of Russia into an immense force in the political life of the country.

b) The hideous forms of exploitation in the factories, coupled with the intolerable police regime of the Tsarist henchmen — a circumstance which transformed every important strike of the workers into an imposing political action and steeled the working class as a force that was revolutionary to the end.

c) The political flabbiness of the Russian bourgeoisie, which after the Revolution of 1905 turned into servility to Tsarism and downright counter-revolution — a fact to be explained not only by the revolutionary spirit of the Russian proletariat, which flung the Russian bourgeoisie into the embrace of Tsarism, but also by the direct dependence of this bourgeoisie upon government contracts.

d) The existence in the countryside of the most hideous and most intolerable survivals of serfdom, coupled with the unlimited power of the landlords — a circumstance which threw the peasantry into the embrace of the revolution.

e) Tsarism, which stifled everything that was alive, and whose tyranny aggravated the oppression of the capitalist and the landlord — a circumstance which united the struggle of the workers and peasants into a single torrent of revolution.

f) The imperialist war, which fused all these contradictions in the political life of Russia into a profound revolutionary crisis, and which lent the revolution tremendous striking force.

To whom could the peasantry turn under these circumstances? From whom could it seek support against the unlimited power of the landlords, against the tyranny of the Tsar against the devastating war which was ruining it? From the liberal bourgeoisie? But it was an enemy, as the long years of experience of all four Dumas had proved. From the Socialist-Revolutionaries? The Socialist-Revolutionaries were “better” than the Cadets, of course, and their program was “suitable,” almost a peasant program; but what could the Socialist-Revolutionaries offer, considering that they thought of relying only on the peasants and were weak in the towns from which the enemy primarily drew its forces? Where was the new force which would stop at nothing either in town or country, which would boldly march in the front ranks to fight the Tsar and the landlords, which would help the peasantry to extricate itself from bondage, from land hunger, from oppression, from war? Was there such a force in Russia at all? Yes, there was. It was the Russian proletariat, which had shown its strength, its ability to fight to the end, its boldness and revolutionary spirit, as far back as 1905.

At any rate, there was no other such force; nor could any other

be found anywhere.

That is why the peasantry, when it turned its back on the Cadets and attached itself to the Socialist-Revolutionaries, at the same time came to realize the necessity of submitting to the leadership of such a courageous leader of the revolution as the Russian proletariat.

Such were the circumstances which determined the peculiar character of the Russian bourgeois revolution.

3) *The peasantry during the proletarian revolution.* This period extends from the February Revolution of 1917 to the October Revolution of 1917. This period is comparatively short, eight months in all; but from the point of view of the political enlightenment and revolutionary training of the masses these eight months can safely be put on a par with whole decades of ordinary constitutional development, for they were eight months of *revolution*. The characteristic feature of this period was the further revolutionization of the peasantry, its disillusionment with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the peasantry's *desertion* of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, its new *turn* towards a *direct rally* around the proletariat as the only consistently revolutionary force, capable of leading the country to peace. The history of this period is the history of the struggle between the Socialist-Revolutionaries (petty-bourgeois democracy) and the Bolsheviks (proletarian democracy) for the peasantry, to win over the majority of the peasantry. The outcome of this struggle was decided by the coalition period, the Kerensky period, the refusal of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks to confiscate the landlords' land, the fight of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks to continue the war, the June offensive at the front, the introduction of capital punishment for soldiers, the Kornilov revolt.

Whereas before, in the preceding period, the basic question of the revolution had been the overthrow of the Tsar and of the power of the landlords, now, in the period following the February Revolution, when there was no longer any Tsar, and when the interminable war had exhausted the economy of the country and utterly ruined the peasantry, the question of liquidating the war became the main problem of the revolution. The centre of gravity had manifestly shifted from purely internal questions to the main question — the war. "End the war," "Let's get out of the war" — such was the general outcry of the war-weary nation and primarily of the peasantry.

But in order to get out of the war it was necessary to overthrow the Provisional Government, it was necessary to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie, it was necessary to overthrow the power of the

Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, for they, and they alone, were dragging out the war to a "victorious finish." Practically, there was no way of getting out of the war except by overthrowing the bourgeoisie.

This was a new revolution, a proletarian revolution, for it ousted from power the last group of the imperialist bourgeoisie, its extreme left wing, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and the Mensheviks, in order to set up a new, proletarian power, the power of the Soviets, in order to put in power the party of the revolutionary proletariat, the Bolshevik Party, the party of the revolutionary struggle against the imperialist war and for a democratic peace. The majority of the peasantry supported the struggle of the workers for peace, for the power of the Soviets.

There was no other way out for the peasantry. Nor could there be any other way out.

Thus, the Kerensky period was a great object lesson for the toiling masses of the peasantry; for it showed clearly that with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks in power the country would not extricate itself from the war, and the peasants would never get either land or liberty; that the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries differed from the Cadets only in their honeyed phrases and false promises, while they actually pursued the same imperialist, Cadet policy; that the only power that could lead the country on to the proper road was the power of the Soviets. The further prolongation of the war merely confirmed the truth of this lesson, spurred on the revolution, and drove millions of peasants and soldiers to *rally directly* around the proletarian revolution. The isolation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks became an incontrovertible fact. Without the object lessons of the coalition period the dictatorship of the proletariat would have been impossible.

Such were the circumstances which facilitated the process of the bourgeois revolution passing into the proletarian revolution.

That is how the dictatorship of the proletariat took shape in Russia.

4) *The peasantry after the consolidation of Soviet power.* Whereas before, in the first period of the revolution, the main objective was the overthrow of Tsarism, and later, after the February Revolution, the primary objective was to get out of the imperialist war by overthrowing the bourgeoisie, now, after the liquidation of the civil war and the consolidation of Soviet power, questions of economic construction came to the forefront. Strengthen and develop the national-

ized industry; for this purpose link up industry with peasant economy through state-regulated trade; replace the surplus-appropriation system by the tax in kind so as, later on, by gradually lowering the tax in kind, to reduce matters to the exchange of products of industry for the products of peasant farming; revive trade and develop the cooperatives, drawing into them the vast masses of the peasantry — this is how Lenin outlined the immediate tasks of economic construction on the way to building the foundations of socialist economy.

It is said that this task may prove beyond the strength of a peasant country like Russia. Some sceptics even say that it is simply utopian, impossible; for the peasantry is a peasantry — it consists of small producers, and therefore cannot be of use in organizing the foundations of socialist production.

But the sceptics are mistaken; for they fail to take into account certain circumstances which in the present case are of decisive significance. Let us examine the most important of these:

Firstly. The peasantry in the Soviet Union must not be confused with the peasantry in the West. A peasantry that has been schooled in three revolutions, that fought against the Tsar and the power of the bourgeoisie side by side with the proletariat and under the leadership of the proletariat, a peasantry that has received land and peace at the hands of the proletarian revolution and by reason of this has become the reserve of the proletariat — such a peasantry cannot but be different from a peasantry which during the bourgeois revolution fought under the leadership of the liberal bourgeoisie, which received land at the hands of that bourgeoisie, and in view of this became the reserve of the bourgeoisie. It scarcely needs proof that the Soviet peasantry, which has learnt to appreciate its political friendship and political collaboration with the proletariat and which owes its freedom to this friendship and collaboration, cannot but represent exceptionally favourable material for economic collaboration with the proletariat.

Engels said that “the conquest of political power by the Socialist Party has become a matter of the not too distant future,” that “in order to conquer political power this party must first go from the towns to the country, must become a power in the countryside.” (See Engels, *The Peasant Question*, 1922 ed.⁴⁴). He wrote this in the nineties of the last century, having in mind the Western peasantry. Does it need proof that the Russian communists, after accomplishing an enormous amount of work in this field in the course of three revolu-

tions, have already succeeded in gaining in the countryside an influence and backing the like of which our Western comrades dare not even dream of? How can it be denied that this circumstance must decidedly facilitate the organization of economic collaboration between the working class and the peasantry of Russia?

The sceptics maintain that the small peasants are a factor that is incompatible with socialist construction. But listen to what Engels says about the small peasants of the West:

“We are decidedly on the side of the small peasant; we shall do everything at all permissible to make his lot more bearable, to facilitate his transition to the cooperative should he decide to do so, and even to make it possible for him to remain on his small holding for a protracted length of time to think the matter over, should he still be unable to bring himself to this decision. We do this not only because we consider the small peasant who does his own work as virtually belonging to us, but also in the direct interest of the Party. The greater the number of peasants whom we can save from being actually hurled down into the proletariat, whom we can win to our side while they are still peasants, the more quickly and easily the social transformation will be accomplished. It will serve us nought to wait with this transformation until capitalist production has developed everywhere to its utmost consequences, until the last small handicraftsman and the last small peasant have fallen victim to capitalist large-scale production. The material sacrifice to be made for this purpose in the interest of the peasants and to be defrayed out of public funds can, from the point of view of capitalist economy, be viewed only as money thrown away, but it is nevertheless an excellent investment because it will effect a perhaps tenfold saving in the cost of the social reorganization in general. In this sense we can, therefore, afford to deal very liberally with the peasants” (*Ibid.*).

That is what Engels said, having in mind the Western peasantry. But is it not clear that what Engels said can nowhere be realized so easily and so completely as in the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat? Is it not clear that only in Soviet Russia is it possible at once and to the fullest extent for “the small peasant who does his own work” to come over to our side, for the “material sacrifice” necessary for this to be made, and for the necessary “liberality towards the peasants” to be displayed? Is it not clear that these and similar measures for the benefit of the peasantry are already being carried out in Russia? How can it be denied that this circumstance, in its turn, must facilitate and advance the work of economic construction in the land of the Soviets?

Secondly. Agriculture in Russia must not be confused with agriculture in the West. There, agriculture is developing along the ordi-

nary lines of capitalism, under conditions of profound differentiation among the peasantry, with large landed estates and private capitalist latifundia at one extreme and pauperism, destitution and wage slavery at the other. Owing to this, disintegration and decay are quite natural there. Not so in Russia. Here agriculture cannot develop along such a path, if for no other reason than that the existence of Soviet power and the nationalization of the principal instruments and means of production preclude such a development. In Russia the development of agriculture must proceed along a different path, along the path of organizing millions of small and middle peasants in cooperatives, along the path of developing in the countryside a mass cooperative movement supported by the state by means of preferential credits. Lenin rightly pointed out in his articles on cooperation that the development of agriculture in our country must proceed along a new path, along the path of drawing the majority of the peasants into socialist construction through the cooperatives, along the path of gradually introducing into agriculture the principles of collectivism, first in the sphere of marketing and later in the sphere of production of agricultural products.

Of extreme interest in this respect are several new phenomena observed in the countryside in connection with the work of the agricultural cooperatives. It is well known that new, large organizations have sprung up within the Selskosoyuz,⁴⁵ in different branches of agriculture, such as production of flax, potatoes, butter, etc., which have a great future before them. Of these, the Flax Centre, for instance, unites a whole network of peasant flax growers' associations. The Flax Centre supplies the peasants with seeds and implements; then it buys all the flax produced by these peasants, disposes of it on the market on a large scale, guarantees the peasants a share in the profits, and in this way links peasant economy with state industry through the Selskosoyuz. What shall we call this form of organization of production? In my opinion, it is the domestic system of large-scale state-socialist production in the sphere of agriculture. In speaking of the domestic system of state-socialist production I do so by analogy with the domestic system under capitalism, let us say, in the textile industry, where the handicraftsmen received their raw material and tools from the capitalist and turned over to him the entire product of their labour, thus being in fact semi-wage earners working in their own homes. This is one of numerous indices showing the path along which our agriculture must develop. There is no need to mention here similar indices in other branches of agriculture.

It scarcely needs proof that the vast majority of the peasantry will eagerly take this new path of development, rejecting the path of private capitalist latifundia and wage slavery, the path of destitution and ruin.

Here is what Lenin says about the path of development of our agriculture:

“State power over all large-scale means of production, state power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this proletariat with the many millions of small and very small peasants, the assured leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat, etc. — is not this all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society from the cooperatives, from the cooperatives alone, which we formerly looked down upon as huckstering and which from a certain aspect we have the right to look down upon as such now, under NEP? Is this not all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society? This is not yet the building of socialist society, but it is all that is necessary and sufficient for this building” (see Vol. XXVII, p. 392).

Further on, speaking of the necessity of giving financial and other assistance to the cooperatives, as a “new principle of organizing the population” and a new “social system” under the dictatorship of the proletariat, Lenin continues:

“Every social system arises only with the financial assistance of a definite class. There is no need to mention the hundreds and hundreds of millions of rubles that the birth of ‘free’ capitalism cost. Now we must realize, and apply in our practical work, the fact that the social system which we must now give more than usual assistance is the cooperative system. But it must be assisted in the real sense of the word, i.e., it will not be enough to interpret assistance to mean assistance for any kind of cooperative trade; by assistance we must mean assistance for cooperative trade in which *really large masses of the population really take part*” (*Ibid.*, p. 393).

What do all these facts prove?

That the sceptics are wrong.

That Leninism is right in regarding the masses of labouring peasants as the reserve of the proletariat.

That the proletariat in power can and must use this reserve in order to link industry with agriculture, to advance socialist construction, and to provide for the dictatorship of the proletariat that necessary foundation without which the transition to socialist economy is impossible.

THE NATIONAL QUESTION

From this theme I take two main questions:

a) the presentation of the question;

b) the liberation movement of the oppressed peoples and the proletarian revolution.

1) *The presentation of the question.* During the last two decades the national question has undergone a number of very important changes. The national question in the period of the Second International and the national question in the period of Leninism are far from being the same thing. They differ profoundly from each other, not only in their scope, but also in their intrinsic character.

Formerly, the national question was usually confined to a narrow circle of questions, concerning, primarily, “civilized” nationalities. The Irish, the Hungarians, the Poles, the Finns, the Serbs, and several other European nationalities — that was the circle of unequal peoples in whose destinies the leaders of the Second International were interested. The scores and hundreds of millions of Asian and African peoples who are suffering national oppression in its most savage and cruel form usually remained outside of their field of vision. They hesitated to put white and black, “civilized” and “uncivilized” on the same plane. Two or three meaningless, lukewarm resolutions, which carefully evaded the question of the liberation of the colonies — that was all the leaders of the Second International could boast of. Now we can say that this duplicity and half-heartedness in dealing with the national question has been brought to an end. Leninism laid bare this crying incongruity, broke down the wall between whites and blacks, between Europeans and Asiatics, between the “civilized” and “uncivilized” slaves of imperialism, and thus linked the national question with the question of the colonies. The national question was thereby transformed from a particular and internal state problem into a general and international problem, into a world problem of the liberation of the oppressed peoples in the dependent countries and colonies from the yoke of imperialism.

Formerly, the principle of self-determination of nations was usually misinterpreted, and not infrequently it was narrowed down to the idea of the right of nations to autonomy. Certain leaders of the Second International even went so far as to turn the right to self-determination into the right to cultural autonomy, i.e., the right of oppressed nations to have their own cultural institutions, leaving all political power in the hands of the ruling nation. As a consequence,

the idea of self-determination stood in danger of being transformed from an instrument for combatting annexations into an instrument for justifying them. Now we can say that this confusion has been cleared up. Leninism broadened the conception of self-determination, interpreting it as the right of the oppressed peoples of the dependent countries and colonies to complete secession, as the right of nations to independent existence as states. This precluded the possibility of justifying annexations by interpreting the right to self-determination as the right to autonomy. Thus, the principle of self-determination itself was transformed from an instrument for deceiving the masses, which it undoubtedly was in the hands of the social-chauvinists during the imperialist war, into an instrument for exposing all imperialist aspirations and chauvinist machinations, into an instrument for the political education of the masses in the spirit of internationalism.

Formerly, the question of the oppressed nations was usually regarded as purely a juridical question. Solemn proclamations about "national equality of rights," innumerable declarations about the "equality of nations" — that was the stock in trade of the parties of the Second International, which glossed over the fact that "equality of nations" under imperialism, where one group of nations (a minority) lives by exploiting another group of nations, is sheer mockery of the oppressed nations. Now we can say that this bourgeois-juridical point of view on the national question has been exposed. Leninism brought the national question down from the lofty heights of high-sounding declarations to solid ground, and declared that pronouncements about the "equality of nations" not backed by the direct support of the proletarian parties for the liberation struggle of the oppressed nations are meaningless and false. In this way the question of the oppressed nations became one of supporting the oppressed nations, of rendering real and continuous assistance to them in their struggle against imperialism for real equality of nations, for their independent existence as states.

Formerly, the national question was regarded from a reformist point of view, as an independent question having no connection with the general question of the power of capital, of the overthrow of imperialism, of the proletarian revolution. It was tacitly assumed that the victory of the proletariat in Europe was possible without a direct alliance with the liberation movement in the colonies, that the national-colonial question could be solved on the quiet, "of its own accord," off the highway of the proletarian revolution, without a

revolutionary struggle against imperialism. Now we can say that this anti-revolutionary point of view has been exposed. Leninism has proved, and the imperialist war and the revolution in Russia have confirmed, that the national question can be solved only in connection with and on the basis of the proletarian revolution, and that the road to victory of the revolution in the West lies through the revolutionary alliance with the liberation movement of the colonies and dependent countries against imperialism. The national question is a part of the general question of the proletarian revolution, a part of the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The question is as follows: Are the revolutionary potentialities latent in the revolutionary liberation movement of the oppressed countries *already exhausted*, or not; and if not, is there any hope, any basis, for utilizing these potentialities for the proletarian revolution, for transforming the dependent and colonial countries from a reserve of the imperialist bourgeoisie into a reserve of the revolutionary proletariat, into an ally of the latter?

Leninism replies to this question in the affirmative, i.e., it recognizes the existence of revolutionary capacities in the national liberation movement of the oppressed countries, and the possibility of using these for overthrowing the common enemy, for overthrowing imperialism. The mechanics of the development of imperialism, the imperialist war and the revolution in Russia wholly confirm the conclusions of Leninism on this score.

Hence the necessity for the proletariat of the “dominant” nations to support — resolutely and actively to support — the national liberation movement of the oppressed and dependent peoples.

This does not mean, of course, that the proletariat must support *every* national movement, everywhere and always, in every individual concrete case. It means that support must be given to such national movements as tend to weaken, to overthrow imperialism, and not to strengthen and preserve it. Cases occur when the national movements in certain oppressed countries come into conflict with the interests of the development of the proletarian movement. In such cases support is, of course, entirely out of the question. The question of the rights of nations is not an isolated, self-sufficient question; it is a part of the general problem of the proletarian revolution, subordinate to the whole, and must be considered from the point of view of the whole. In the forties of the last century Marx supported the national movement of the Poles and the Hungarians and was opposed to the national movement of the Czechs and the South Slavs.

Why? Because the Czechs and the South Slavs were then “reactionary nations,” “Russian outposts” in Europe, outposts of absolutism; whereas the Poles and the Hungarians were “revolutionary nations,” fighting against absolutism. Because support of the national movement of the Czechs and the South Slavs was at that time equivalent to indirect support for Tsarism, the most dangerous enemy of the revolutionary movement in Europe.

“The various demands of democracy,” writes Lenin, “including self-determination, are not an absolute, but a *small part* of the general democratic (now: general socialist) *world* movement. In individual concrete cases, the part may contradict the whole; if so, it must be rejected” (See Vol. XIX, pp. 257-58).

This is the position in regard to the question of particular national movements, of the possible reactionary character of these movements — if, of course, they are appraised not from the formal point of view, not from the point of view of abstract rights, but concretely, from the point of view of the interests of the revolutionary movement.

The same must be said of the revolutionary character of national movements in general. The unquestionably revolutionary character of the vast majority of national movements is as relative and peculiar as is the possible reactionary character of certain particular national movements. The revolutionary character of a national movement under the conditions of imperialist oppression does not necessarily presuppose the existence of proletarian elements in the movement, the existence of a revolutionary or a republican program of the movement, the existence of a democratic basis of the movement. The struggle that the Emir of Afghanistan is waging for the independence of Afghanistan is objectively a *revolutionary* struggle, despite the monarchist views of the Emir and his associates, for it weakens, disintegrates and undermines imperialism; whereas the struggle waged by such “desperate” democrats and “socialists,” “revolutionaries” and republicans as, for example, Kerensky and Tsereteli, Renaudel and Scheidemann, Chernov and Dan, Henderson and Clynes, during the imperialist war was a *reactionary* struggle, for its result was the embellishment, the strengthening, the victory, of imperialism. For the same reasons, the struggle that the Egyptian merchants and bourgeois intellectuals are waging for the independence of Egypt is objectively a *revolutionary* struggle, despite the bourgeois origin and bourgeois title of the leaders of the Egyptian

national movement, despite the fact that they are opposed to socialism; whereas the struggle that the British "Labour" government is waging to preserve Egypt's dependent position is for the same reasons a *reactionary* struggle, despite the proletarian origin and the proletarian title of the members of that government, despite the fact that they are "for" socialism. There is no need to mention the national movement in other, larger, colonial and dependent countries, such as India and China, every step of which along the road to liberation, even if it runs counter to the demands of formal democracy, is a steam-hammer blow at imperialism, i.e., is undoubtedly a *revolutionary* step.

Lenin was right in saying that the national movement of the oppressed countries should be appraised not from the point of view of formal democracy, but from the point of view of the actual results, as shown by the general balance sheet of the struggle against imperialism, that is to say, "not in isolation, but on a world scale" (see Vol. XIX, p. 257).

2) *The liberation movement of the oppressed peoples and the proletarian revolution.* In solving the national question Leninism proceeds from the following theses:

a) The world is divided into two camps: the camp of a handful of civilized nations, which possess finance capital and exploit the vast majority of the population of the globe; and the camp of the oppressed and exploited peoples in the colonies and dependent countries, which constitute that majority;

b) The colonies and dependent countries, oppressed and exploited by finance capital, constitute a vast reserve and a very important source of strength for imperialism;

c) The revolutionary struggle of the oppressed peoples in the dependent and colonial countries against imperialism is the only road that leads to their emancipation from oppression and exploitation;

d) The most important colonial and dependent countries have already taken the path of the national liberation movement, which cannot but lead to the crisis of world capitalism;

e) The interests of the proletarian movement in the developed countries and of the national liberation movement in the colonies call for the union of these two forms of the revolutionary movement into a common front against the common enemy, against imperialism;

f) The victory of the working class in the developed countries and the liberation of the oppressed peoples from the yoke of imperi-

alism are impossible without the formation and consolidation of a common revolutionary front;

g) The formation of a common revolutionary front is impossible unless the proletariat of the oppressor nations renders direct and determined support to the liberation movement of the oppressed peoples against the imperialism of its “own country,” for “no nation can be free if it oppresses other nations” (*Engels*);

h) This support implies the upholding, defence and implementation of the slogan of the right of nations to secession, to independent existence as states;

i) Unless this slogan is implemented, the union and collaboration of nations within a single world economic system, which is the material basis for the victory of world socialism, cannot be brought about;

j) This union can only be voluntary, arising on the basis of mutual confidence and fraternal relations among peoples.

Hence the two sides, the two tendencies in the national question: the tendency towards political emancipation from the shackles of imperialism and towards the formation of an independent national state — a tendency which arose as a consequence of imperialist oppression and colonial exploitation; and the tendency towards closer economic relations among nations, which arose as a result of the formation of a world market and a world economic system.

“Developing capitalism,” says Lenin, “knows two historical tendencies in the national question. First: the awakening of national life and national movements, struggle against all national oppression, creation of national states. Second: development and acceleration of all kinds of intercourse between nations, breakdown of national barriers, creation of the international unity of capital, of economic life in general, of politics, science, etc.

“Both tendencies are a worldwide law of capitalism. The first predominates at the beginning of its development, the second characterizes mature capitalism that is moving towards its transformation into socialist society” (see Vol. XVII, pp. 139-40).

For imperialism these two tendencies represent irreconcilable contradictions; because imperialism cannot exist without exploiting colonies and forcibly retaining them within the framework of the “integral whole”; because imperialism can bring nations together only by means of annexations and colonial conquest, without which imperialism is, generally speaking, inconceivable.

For communism, on the contrary, these tendencies are but two sides of a single cause — the cause of the emancipation of the op-

pressed peoples from the yoke of imperialism; because communism knows that the union of peoples in a single world economic system is possible only on the basis of mutual confidence and voluntary agreement, and that the road to the formation of a voluntary union of peoples lies through the separation of the colonies from the "integral" imperialist "whole," through the transformation of the colonies into independent states.

Hence the necessity for a stubborn, continuous and determined struggle against the dominant-nation chauvinism of the "Socialists" of the ruling nations (Britain, France, America, Italy, Japan, etc.), who do not want to fight their imperialist governments, who do not want to support the struggle of the oppressed peoples in "their" colonies for emancipation from oppression, for secession.

Without such a struggle the education of the working class of the ruling nations in the spirit of true internationalism, in the spirit of closer relations with the toiling masses of the dependent countries and colonies, in the spirit of real preparation for the proletarian revolution, is inconceivable. The revolution would not have been victorious in Russia, and Kolchak and Denikin would not have been crushed, had not the Russian proletariat enjoyed the sympathy and support of the oppressed peoples of the former Russian Empire. But to win the sympathy and support of these peoples it had first of all to break the fetters of Russian imperialism and free these peoples from the yoke of national oppression.

Without this it would have been impossible to consolidate Soviet power, to implant real internationalism and to create that remarkable organization for the collaboration of peoples which is called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and which is the living prototype of the future union of peoples in a single world economic system.

Hence the necessity of fighting against the national isolationism, narrowness and aloofness of the Socialists in the oppressed countries, who do not want to rise above their national parochialism and who do not understand the connection between the liberation movement in their own countries and the proletarian movement in the ruling countries.

Without such a struggle it is inconceivable that the proletariat of the oppressed nations can maintain an independent policy and its class solidarity with the proletariat of the ruling countries in the fight for the overthrow of the common enemy, in the fight for the overthrow of imperialism.

Without such a struggle, internationalism would be impossible.

Such is the way in which the toiling masses of the dominant and the oppressed nations must be educated in the spirit of revolutionary internationalism.

Here is what Lenin says about this twofold task of communism in educating the workers in the spirit of internationalism:

“Can such education... be *concretely identical* in great, oppressing nations and in small, oppressed nations, in annexing nations and in annexed nations?

“Obviously not. The way to the one goal — to complete equality, to the closest relations and the subsequent *amalgamation of all* nations — obviously proceeds here by different routes in each concrete case; in the same way, let us say, as the route to a point in the middle of a given page lies towards the left from one edge and towards the right from the opposite edge. If a Social-Democrat belonging to a great, oppressing, annexing nation, while advocating the amalgamation of nations in general, were to forget even for one moment that ‘his’ Nicholas II, ‘his’ Wilhelm, George, Poincaré, etc., *also stands for amalgamation* with small nations (by means of annexations) — Nicholas II being for ‘amalgamation’ with Galicia, Wilhelm II for ‘amalgamation’ with Belgium, etc. — such a social-democrat would be a ridiculous doctrinaire in theory and an abettor of imperialism in practice.

“The weight of emphasis in the internationalist education of the workers in the oppressing countries must necessarily consist in their advocating and upholding freedom of secession for oppressed countries. Without this there can be no internationalism. It is our right and duty to treat every social-democrat of an oppressing nation who *fails* to conduct such propaganda as an imperialist and a scoundrel. This is an absolute demand, even if the *chance* of secession being possible and ‘feasible’ before the introduction of socialism be only one in a thousand...

“On the other hand, a social-democrat belonging to a small nation must emphasize in his agitation the *second* word of our general formula: ‘voluntary *union*’ of nations, He may, without violating his duties as an internationalist, be in favour of *either* the political independence of his nation *or* its inclusion in a neighbouring state X, Y, Z, etc. But in all cases he must fight *against* small-nation narrow-mindedness, isolationism and aloofness, he must fight for the recognition of the whole and the general, for the subordination of the interests of the particular to the interests of the general.

“People who have not gone thoroughly into the question think there is a ‘contradiction’ in social-democrats of oppressing nations insisting on ‘freedom of *secession*,’ while social-democrats of oppressed nations insist on ‘freedom of *union*.’ However, a little reflection will show that there is not, and cannot be, any *other* road leading from the *given* situation to internationalism and the amalgamation of nations, any other road to this goal” (see Vol. XIX, pp. 261-62).

VII

STRATEGY AND TACTICS

From this theme I take six questions:

- a) strategy and tactics as the science of leadership in the class struggle of the proletariat;
- b) stages of the revolution, and strategy;
- c) the flow and ebb of the movement, and tactics;
- d) strategic leadership;
- e) tactical leadership;
- f) reformism and revolutionism.

1) *Strategy and tactics as the science of leadership in the class struggle of the proletariat.* The period of the domination of the Second International was mainly a period of the formation and training of the proletarian political armies under conditions of more or less peaceful development. It was the period of parliamentarism as the predominant form of the class struggle. Questions of great class conflicts, of preparing the proletariat for revolutionary clashes, of the means of achieving the dictatorship of the proletariat, did not seem to be on the order of the day at that time. The task was confined to utilizing all means of legal development for the purpose of forming and training the proletarian armies, to utilizing parliamentarism in conformity with the conditions under which the status of the proletariat remained, and, as it seemed, had to remain, that of an opposition. It scarcely needs proof that in such a period and with such a conception of the tasks of the proletariat there could be neither an integral strategy nor any elaborated tactics. There were fragmentary and detached ideas about tactics and strategy, but no tactics or strategy as such.

The mortal sin of the Second International was not that it pursued at that time the tactics of utilizing parliamentary forms of struggle, but that it overestimated the importance of these forms, that it considered them virtually the only forms; and that when the period of open revolutionary battles set in and the question of extra-parliamentary forms of struggle came to the fore, the parties of the Second International turned their backs on these new tasks, refused to shoulder them.

Only in the subsequent period, the period of direct action by the proletariat, the period of proletarian revolution, when the question of overthrowing the bourgeoisie became a question of immediate

practical action; when the question of the reserves of the proletariat (strategy) became one of the most burning questions; when all forms of struggle and of organization, parliamentary and extraparliamentary (tactics), had quite clearly manifested themselves — only in this period could an integral strategy and elaborated tactics for the struggle of the proletariat be worked out. It was precisely in this period that Lenin brought out into the light of day the brilliant ideas of Marx and Engels on tactics and strategy that had been suppressed by the opportunists of the Second International. But Lenin did not confine himself to restoring particular tactical propositions of Marx and Engels. He developed them further and supplemented them with new ideas and propositions, combining them all into a system of rules and guiding principles for the leadership of the class struggle of the proletariat. Lenin's pamphlets, such as *What Is To Be Done?*, *Two Tactics*, *Imperialism*, *The State and Revolution*, *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, "*Left Wing*" *Communism*, undoubtedly constitute priceless contributions to the general treasury of Marxism, to its revolutionary arsenal. The strategy and tactics of Leninism constitute the science of leadership in the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat.

2) *Stages of the revolution, and strategy.* Strategy is the determination of the direction of the main blow of the proletariat at a given stage of the revolution, the elaboration of a corresponding plan for the disposition of the revolutionary forces (main and secondary reserves), the fight to carry out this plan throughout the given stage of the revolution.

Our revolution had already passed through two stages, and after the October Revolution it entered a third one. Our strategy changed accordingly.

First stage. 1903 to February 1917. Objective: to overthrow Tsarism and completely wipe out the survivals of medievalism. The main force of the revolution: the proletariat. Immediate reserves: the peasantry. Direction of the main blow: the isolation of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, which was striving to win over the peasantry and liquidate the revolution by a *compromise* with Tsarism. Plan for the disposition of forces: alliance of the working class with the peasantry. "The proletariat must carry to completion the democratic revolution, by allying to itself the mass of the peasantry in order to crush by force the resistance of the autocracy and to paralyse the instability of the bourgeoisie" (see Lenin, Vol. VIII, p. 96).

Second stage. March 1917 to October 1917. Objective: to over-

throw imperialism in Russia and to withdraw from the imperialist war. The main force of the revolution: the proletariat. Immediate reserves: the poor peasantry. The proletariat of neighbouring countries as probable reserves. The protracted war and the crisis of imperialism as a favourable factor. Direction of the main blow: isolation of the petty-bourgeois democrats (Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries), who were striving to win over the toiling masses of the peasantry and to put an end to the revolution by a *compromise* with imperialism. Plan for the disposition of forces: alliance of the proletariat with the poor peasantry. "The proletariat must accomplish the socialist revolution, by allying to itself the mass of the semi-proletarian elements of the population in order to crush by force the resistance of the bourgeoisie and to paralyse the instability of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie" (*Ibid.*).

Third stage. Began after the October Revolution. Objective: to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, using it as a base for the defeat of imperialism in all countries. The revolution spreads beyond the confines of one country; the epoch of world revolution has begun. The main forces of the revolution: the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, and the revolutionary movement of the proletariat in all countries. Main reserves: the semi-proletarian and small-peasant masses in the developed countries, and the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries. Direction of the main blow: isolation of the petty-bourgeois democrats, and isolation of the parties of the Second International, which constitute the main support of the policy of *compromise* with imperialism. Plan for the disposition of forces: alliance of the proletarian revolution with the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries.

Strategy deals with the main forces of the revolution and their reserves. It changes with the passing of the revolution from one stage to another, but remains basically unchanged throughout a given stage.

3) *The flow and ebb of the movement, and tactics.* Tactics are the determination of the line of conduct of the proletariat in the comparatively short period of the flow or ebb of the movement, of the rise or decline of the revolution, the fight to carry out this line by means of replacing old forms of struggle and organization by new ones, old slogans by new ones, by combining these forms, etc. While the object of strategy is to win the war against Tsarism, let us say, or against the bourgeoisie, to carry through the struggle against Tsar-

ism or against the bourgeoisie to its end, tactics pursue less important objects, for their aim is not the winning of the war as a whole, but the winning of some particular engagements or some particular battles, the carrying through successfully of some particular campaigns or actions corresponding to the concrete circumstances in the given period of rise or decline of the revolution. Tactics are a part of strategy, subordinate to it and serving it.

Tactics change according to flow and ebb. While the strategic plan remained unchanged during the first stage of the revolution (1903 to February 1917), tactics changed several times during that period. In the period from 1903 to 1905 the Party pursued offensive tactics, for the tide of the revolution was rising, the movement was on the upgrade, and tactics had to proceed from this fact. Accordingly, the forms of struggle were revolutionary, corresponding to the requirements of the rising tide of the revolution. Local political strikes, political demonstrations, the general political strike, boycott of the Duma, uprising, revolutionary fighting slogans — such were the successive forms of struggle during that period. These changes in the forms of struggle were accompanied by corresponding changes in the forms of organization. Factory committees, revolutionary peasant committees, strike committees, Soviets of workers' deputies, a workers' party operating more or less openly — such were the forms of organization during that period.

In the period from 1907 to 1912 the Party was compelled to resort to tactics of retreat; for we then experienced a decline in the revolutionary movement, the ebb of the revolution, and tactics necessarily had to take this fact into consideration. The forms of struggle, as well as the forms of organization, changed accordingly: instead of the boycott of the Duma — participation in the Duma; instead of open revolutionary actions outside the Duma — actions and work in the Duma; instead of general political strikes — partial economic strikes, or simply a lull in activities. Of course, the Party had to go underground during that period, while the revolutionary mass organizations were replaced by cultural, educational, cooperative, insurance and other legal organizations.

The same must be said of the second and third stages of the revolution, during which tactics changed dozens of times, whereas the strategic plans remained unchanged.

Tactics deal with the forms of struggle and the forms of organization of the proletariat, with their changes and combinations. During a given stage of the revolution tactics may change several times, de-

pending on the flow or ebb, the rise or decline, of the revolution.

4) *Strategic leadership*. The reserves of the revolution can be:

direct: a) the peasantry and in general the intermediate strata of the population within the country; b) the proletariat of neighbouring countries; c) the revolutionary movement in the colonies and dependent countries; d) the conquests and gains of the dictatorship of the proletariat — part of which the proletariat may give up temporarily, while retaining superiority of forces, in order to buy off a powerful enemy and gain a respite; and

indirect: a) the contradictions and conflicts among the non-proletarian classes within the country, which can be utilized by the proletariat to weaken the enemy and to strengthen its own reserves; b) contradictions, conflicts and wars (the imperialist war, for instance) among the bourgeois states hostile to the proletarian state, which can be utilized by the proletariat in its offensive or in manoeuvring in the event of a forced retreat.

There is no need to speak at length about the reserves of the first category, as their significance is clear to everyone. As for the reserves of the second category, whose significance is not always clear, it must be said that sometimes they are of prime importance for the progress of the revolution. One can hardly deny the enormous importance, for example, of the conflict between the petty-bourgeois democrats (the Socialist-Revolutionaries) and the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie (the Cadets) during and after the first revolution, which undoubtedly played its part in freeing the peasantry from the influence of the bourgeoisie. Still less reason is there for denying the colossal importance of the fact that the principal groups of imperialists were engaged in a deadly war during the period of the October Revolution, when the imperialists, engrossed in war among themselves, were unable to concentrate their forces against the young Soviet power, and the proletariat, for this very reason, was able to get down to the work of organizing its forces and consolidating its power, and to prepare the rout of Kolchak and Denikin. It must be presumed that now, when the contradictions among the imperialist groups are becoming more and more profound, and when a new war among them is becoming inevitable, reserves of this description will assume ever greater importance for the proletariat.

The task of strategic leadership is to make proper use of all these reserves for the achievement of the main object of the revolution at the given stage of its development.

What does making proper use of reserves mean?

It means fulfilling certain necessary conditions, of which the following must be regarded as the principal ones:

Firstly. The concentration of the main forces of the revolution at the enemy's most vulnerable spot at the decisive moment, when the revolution has already become ripe, when the offensive is going full-steam ahead, when insurrection is knocking at the door, and when bringing the reserves up to the vanguard is the decisive condition of success. The Party's strategy during the period from April to October 1917 can be taken as an example of this manner of utilizing reserves. Undoubtedly, the enemy's most vulnerable spot at that time was the war. Undoubtedly, it was on this question, as the fundamental one, that the Party rallied the broadest masses of the population around the proletarian vanguard. The Party's strategy during that period was, while training the vanguard for street action by means of manifestations and demonstrations, to bring the reserves up to the vanguard through the medium of the Soviets in the rear and the soldiers' committees at the front. The outcome of the revolution has shown that the reserves were properly utilized.

Here is what Lenin, paraphrasing the well-known theses of Marx and Engels on insurrection, says about this condition of the strategic utilization of the forces of the revolution:

"1) Never *play* with insurrection, but when beginning it firmly realize that you must *go to the end*.

"2) Concentrate a great *superiority of forces* at the decisive point, at the decisive moment, otherwise the enemy, who has the advantage of better preparation and organization, will destroy the insurgents.

"3) Once the insurrection has begun, you must act with the greatest *determination*, and by all means, without fail, take the *offensive*. 'The defensive is the death of every armed rising.'

"4) You must try to take the enemy by surprise and seize the moment when his forces are scattered.

"5) You must strive for *daily* successes, even if small (one might say hourly, if it is the case of one town), and at all costs retain the '*moral ascendancy*'" (see Vol. XXI, pp. 319-20).

Secondly. The selection of the moment for the decisive blow, of the moment for starting the insurrection, so timed as to coincide with the moment when the crisis has reached its climax, when it is already the case that the vanguard is prepared to fight to the end, the reserves are prepared to support the vanguard, and maximum consternation reigns in the ranks of the enemy.

The decisive battle, says Lenin, may be deemed to have fully ma-

tured *if* “(1) all the class forces hostile to us have become sufficiently entangled, are sufficiently at loggerheads, have sufficiently weakened themselves in a struggle which is beyond their strength”; *if* “(2) all the vacillating, wavering, unstable, intermediate elements — the petty bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeois democrats as distinct from the bourgeoisie — have sufficiently exposed themselves in the eyes of the people, have sufficiently disgraced themselves through their practical bankruptcy”; *if* “(3) among the proletariat a mass sentiment in favour of supporting the most determined, supremely bold, revolutionary action against the bourgeoisie has arisen and begun vigorously to grow. Then revolution is indeed ripe; then, indeed, if we have correctly gauged all the conditions indicated above... and if we have chosen the moment rightly, our victory is assured” (see Vol. XXV, p. 229).

The manner in which the October uprising was carried out may be taken as a model of such strategy.

Failure to observe this condition leads to a dangerous error called “loss of tempo,” when the Party lags behind the movement or runs far ahead of it, courting the danger of failure. An example of such “loss of tempo,” of how the moment for an uprising should not be chosen, may be seen in the attempt made by a section of our comrades to begin the uprising by arresting the Democratic Conference in September 1917, when wavering was still apparent in the Soviets, when the armies at the front were still at the crossroads, when the reserves had not yet been brought up to the vanguard.

Thirdly. Undeviating pursuit of the course adopted, no matter what difficulties and complications are encountered on the road towards the goal; this is necessary in order that the vanguard may not lose sight of the main goal of the struggle and that the masses may not stray from the road while marching towards that goal and striving to rally around the vanguard. Failure to observe this condition leads to a grave error, well known to sailors as “losing one’s bearings.” As an example of this “losing one’s bearings” we may take the erroneous conduct of our Party when, immediately after the Democratic Conference, it adopted a resolution to participate in the Pre-parliament. For the moment the Party, as it were, forgot that the Pre-parliament was an attempt of the bourgeoisie to switch the country from the path of the Soviets to the path of bourgeois parliamentarism, that the Party’s participation in such a body might result in mixing everything up and confusing the workers and peasants, who were waging a revolutionary struggle under the slogan: “All power

to the Soviets.” This mistake was rectified by the withdrawal of the Bolsheviks from the Pre-parliament.

Fourthly. Manoeuvring the reserves with a view to effecting a proper retreat when the enemy is strong, when retreat is inevitable, when to accept battle forced upon us by the enemy is obviously disadvantageous, when, with the given relation of forces, retreat becomes the only way to escape a blow against the vanguard and to retain the reserves for the latter.

“The revolutionary parties,” says Lenin, “must complete their education. They have learnt to attack. Now they have to realize that this knowledge must be supplemented with the knowledge how to retreat properly. They have to realize — and the revolutionary class is taught to realize it by its own bitter experience — that victory is impossible unless they have learnt both how to attack and how to retreat properly” (see Vol. XXV, p. 177).

The object of this strategy is to gain time, to disrupt the enemy, and to accumulate forces in order later to assume the offensive.

The signing of the Brest Peace may be taken as a model of this strategy; for it enabled the Party to gain time, to take advantage of the conflicts in the camp of the imperialists, to disrupt the forces of the enemy, to retain the support of the peasantry, and to accumulate forces in preparation for the offensive against Kolchak and Denikin.

“In concluding a separate peace,” said Lenin at that time, “we free ourselves as much *as is possible at the present moment* from both warring imperialist groups, we take advantage of their mutual enmity and warfare, which hinder them from making a deal against us, and for a certain period have our hands free to advance and to consolidate the socialist revolution” (see Vol. XXII, p. 198).

“Now even the biggest fool,” said Lenin three years after the Brest Peace, “can see that the ‘Brest Peace’ was a concession that strengthened us and broke up the forces of international imperialism” (see Vol. XXVII, p. 7).

Such are the principal conditions which ensure correct strategic leadership.

5) *Tactical leadership.* Tactical leadership is a part of strategic leadership, subordinated to the tasks and the requirements of the latter. The task of tactical leadership is to master all forms of struggle and organization of the proletariat and to ensure that they are used properly so as to achieve, with the given relation of forces, the maximum results necessary to prepare for strategic success.

What is meant by making proper use of the forms of struggle and

organization of the proletariat?

It means fulfilling certain necessary conditions, of which the following must be regarded as the principal ones:

Firstly. To put in the forefront precisely those forms of struggle and organization which are best suited to the conditions prevailing during the flow or ebb of the movement at a given moment, and which therefore can facilitate and ensure the bringing of the masses to the revolutionary positions, the bringing of the millions to the revolutionary front, and their disposition at the revolutionary front.

The point here is not that the vanguard should realize the impossibility of preserving the old regime and the inevitability of its overthrow. The point is that the masses, the millions, should understand this inevitability and display their readiness to support the vanguard. But the masses can understand this only from their own experience. The task is to enable the vast masses to realize from their own experience the inevitability of the overthrow of the old regime, to promote such methods of struggle and forms of organization as will make it easier for the masses to realize from experience the correctness of the revolutionary slogans.

The vanguard would have become detached from the working class, and the working class would have lost contact with the masses, if the Party had not decided at the time to participate in the Duma, if it had not decided to concentrate its forces on work in the Duma and to develop a struggle on the basis of this work, in order to make it easier for the masses to realize from their own experience the futility of the Duma, the falsity of the promises of the Cadets, the impossibility of compromise with Tsarism, and the inevitability of an alliance between the peasantry and the working class. Had the masses not gained their experience during the period of the Duma, the exposure of the Cadets and the hegemony of the proletariat would have been impossible.

The danger of the "Otzovist" tactics was that they threatened to detach the vanguard from the millions of its reserves.

The Party would have become detached from the working class, and the working class would have lost its influence among the broad masses of the peasants and soldiers, if the proletariat had followed the "Left" Communists, who called for an uprising in April 1917, when the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries had not yet exposed themselves as advocates of war and imperialism, when the masses had not yet realized from their own experience the falsity of the speeches of the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries

about peace, land and freedom. Had the masses not gained this experience during the Kerensky period, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries would not have been isolated and the dictatorship of the proletariat would have been impossible. Therefore, the tactics of "patiently explaining" the mistakes of the petty-bourgeois parties and of open struggle in the Soviets were the only correct tactics.

The danger of the tactics of the "Left" Communists was that they threatened to transform the Party from the leader of the proletarian revolution into a handful of futile conspirators with no ground to stand on.

"Victory cannot be won with the vanguard alone," says Lenin. "To throw the vanguard alone into the decisive battle, before the whole class, before the broad masses have taken up a position either of direct support of the vanguard, or at least of benevolent neutrality towards it... would be not merely folly but a crime. And in order that actually the whole class, that actually the broad masses of the working people and those oppressed by capital may take up such a position, propaganda and agitation alone are not enough. For this the masses must have their own political experience. Such is the fundamental law of all great revolutions, now confirmed with astonishing force and vividness not only in Russia but also in Germany. Not only the uncultured, often illiterate masses of Russia, but the highly cultured, entirely literate masses of Germany had to realize through their own painful experience the absolute impotence and spinelessness, the absolute helplessness and servility to the bourgeoisie, the utter vileness of the government of the knights of the Second International, the absolute inevitability of a dictatorship of the extreme reactionaries (Kornilov in Russia, Kapp and Co. in Germany) as the only alternative to a dictatorship of the proletariat, in order to turn resolutely towards communism" (see Vol. XXV, p. 228).

Secondly. To locate at any given moment the particular link in the chain of processes which, if grasped, will enable us to keep hold of the whole chain and to prepare the conditions for achieving strategic success.

The point here is to single out from all the tasks confronting the Party the particular immediate task, the fulfilment of which constitutes the central point, and the accomplishment of which ensures the successful fulfilment of the other immediate tasks.

The importance of this thesis may be illustrated by two examples, one of which could be taken from the remote past (the period of the formation of the Party) and the other from the immediate present (the period of the NEP).

In the period of the formation of the Party, when the innumera-

ble circles and organizations had not yet been linked together, when amateurishness and the parochial outlook of the circles were corroding the Party from top to bottom, when ideological confusion was the characteristic feature of the internal life of the Party, the main link and the main task in the chain of links and in the chain of tasks then confronting the Party proved to be the establishment of an all-Russian illegal newspaper (*Iskra*). Why? Because, under the conditions then prevailing, only by means of an all-Russian illegal newspaper was it possible to create a solid core of the Party capable of uniting the innumerable circles and organizations into one whole, to prepare the conditions for ideological and tactical unity, and thus to build the foundations for the formation of a real party.

During the period of transition from war to economic construction, when industry was vegetating in the grip of disruption and agriculture was suffering from a shortage of urban manufactured goods, when the establishment of a bond between state industry and peasant economy became the fundamental condition for successful socialist construction — in that period it turned out that the main link in the chain of processes, the main task among a number of tasks, was to develop trade. Why? Because under the conditions of the NEP the bond between industry and peasant economy cannot be established except through trade; because under the conditions of the NEP production without sale is fatal for industry; because industry can be expanded only by the expansion of sales as a result of developing trade; because only after we have consolidated our position in the sphere of trade, only after we have secured control of trade, only after we have secured this link can there be any hope of linking industry with the peasant market and successfully fulfilling the other immediate tasks in order to create the conditions for building the foundations of socialist economy.

“It is not enough to be a revolutionary and an adherent of socialism or a communist in general,” says Lenin. “One must be able at each particular moment to find the particular link in the chain which one must grasp with all one’s might in order to keep hold of the whole chain and to prepare firmly for the transition to the next link...”

“At the present time... this link is the revival of internal *trade* under proper state regulation (direction). Trade — that is the ‘link’ in the historical chain of events, in the transitional forms of our socialist construction in 1921-22, ‘*which we must grasp with all our might*’...” (see Vol. XXVII, p. 82).

Such are the principal conditions which ensure correct tactical leadership.

6) *Reformism and revolutionism*. What is the difference between revolutionary tactics and reformist tactics?

Some think that Leninism is opposed to reforms, opposed to compromises and agreements in general. This is absolutely wrong. Bolsheviks know as well as anybody else that in a certain sense “every little helps,” that under certain conditions reforms in general, and compromises and agreements in particular, are necessary and useful.

“To carry on a war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie,” says Lenin, “a war which is a hundred times more difficult, protracted and complicated than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between states, and to refuse beforehand to manoeuvre, to utilize the conflict of interests (even though temporary) among one’s enemies, to reject agreements and compromises with possible (even though temporary, unstable, vacillating and conditional) allies — is not this ridiculous in the extreme? Is it not as though, when making a difficult ascent of an unexplored and hitherto inaccessible mountain, we were to refuse beforehand ever to move in zigzags, ever to retrace our steps, ever to abandon the course once selected and to try others?” (see Vol. XXV, p. 210).

Obviously, therefore, it is not a matter of reforms or of compromises and agreements, but of the use people make of reforms and agreements.

To a reformist, reforms are everything, while revolutionary work is something incidental, something just to talk about, mere eyewash. That is why, with reformist tactics under the conditions of bourgeois rule, reforms are inevitably transformed into an instrument for strengthening that rule, an instrument for disintegrating the revolution.

To a revolutionary, on the contrary, the main thing is revolutionary work and not reforms; to him reforms are a by-product of the revolution. That is why, with revolutionary tactics under the conditions of bourgeois rule, reforms are naturally transformed into an instrument for disintegrating that rule, into an instrument for strengthening the revolution, into a strongpoint for the further development of the revolutionary movement.

The revolutionary will accept a reform in order to use it as an aid in combining legal work with illegal work and to intensify, under its cover, the illegal work for the revolutionary preparation of the masses for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

That is the essence of making revolutionary use of reforms and agreements under the conditions of imperialism.

The reformist, on the contrary, will accept reforms in order to

renounce all illegal work, to thwart the preparation of the masses for the revolution and to rest in the shade of “bestowed” reforms.

That is the essence of reformist tactics.

Such is the position in regard to reforms and agreements under the conditions of imperialism.

The situation changes somewhat, however, after the overthrow of imperialism, under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Under certain conditions, in a certain situation, the proletarian power may find itself compelled temporarily to leave the path of the revolutionary reconstruction of the existing order of things and to take the path of its gradual transformation, the “reformist path,” as Lenin says in his well-known article “The Importance of Gold,”⁴⁶ the path of flanking movements, of reforms and concessions to the non-proletarian classes — in order to disintegrate these classes, to give the revolution a respite, to recuperate one’s forces and prepare the conditions for a new offensive. It cannot be denied that in a sense this is a “reformist” path. But it must be borne in mind that there is a fundamental distinction here, which consists in the fact that in this case the reform emanates from the proletarian power, it strengthens the proletarian power, it procures for it a necessary respite, and its purpose is to disintegrate, not the revolution, but the non-proletarian classes.

Under such conditions a reform is thus transformed into its opposite.

The proletarian power is able to adopt such a policy because, and only because, the sweep of the revolution in the preceding period was great enough and therefore provided a sufficiently wide expanse within which to retreat, substituting for offensive tactics the tactics of temporary retreat, the tactics of flanking movements.

Thus, while formerly, under bourgeois rule, reforms were a by-product of revolution, now, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the source of reforms is the revolutionary gains of the proletariat, the reserves accumulated in the hands of the proletariat and consisting of these gains.

“Only Marxism,” says Lenin, “has precisely and correctly defined the relation of reforms to revolution. However, Marx was able to see this relation only from one aspect, namely, under the conditions preceding the first to any extent permanent and lasting victory of the proletariat, if only in a single country. Under those conditions, the basis of the proper relation was: reforms are a by-product of the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat... After the victory of the proletariat, if only in a single country, something new enters into the relation between reforms and revolution. In prin-

inciple, it is the same as before, but a change in form takes place, which Marx himself could not foresee, but which can be appreciated only on the basis of the philosophy and politics of Marxism... After the victory (while still remaining a 'by-product' on an international scale) they (i.e., reforms — *J. St.*) are, in addition, for the country in which victory has been achieved, a necessary and legitimate respite in those cases when, after the utmost exertion of effort, it becomes obvious that sufficient strength is lacking for the revolutionary accomplishment of this or that transition. Victory creates such a 'reserve of strength' that it is possible to hold out even in a forced retreat, to hold out both materially and morally" (see Vol. XXVII, pp. 84-85).

VIII

THE PARTY

In the pre-revolutionary period, the period of more or less peaceful development, when the parties of the Second International were the predominant force in the working-class movement and parliamentary forms of struggle were regarded as the principal forms — under these conditions the Party neither had nor could have had that great and decisive importance which it acquired afterwards, under conditions of open revolutionary clashes. Defending the Second International against attacks made upon it, Kautsky says that the parties of the Second International are an instrument of peace and not of war, and that for this very reason they were powerless to take any important steps during the war, during the period of revolutionary action by the proletariat. That is quite true. But what does it mean? It means that the parties of the Second International are unfit for the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, that they are not militant parties of the proletariat, leading the workers to power, but election machines adapted for parliamentary elections and parliamentary struggle. This, in fact, explains why, in the days when the opportunists of the Second International were in the ascendancy, it was not the party but its parliamentary group that was the chief political organization of the proletariat. It is well known that the party at that time was really an appendage and subsidiary of the parliamentary group. It scarcely needs proof that under such circumstances and with such a party at the helm there could be no question of preparing the proletariat for revolution.

But matters have changed radically with the dawn of the new period. The new period is one of open class collisions, of revolutionary action by the proletariat, of proletarian revolution, a period when

forces are being directly mustered for the overthrow of imperialism and the seizure of power by the proletariat. In this period the proletariat is confronted with new tasks, the tasks of reorganizing all party work on new, revolutionary lines; of educating the workers in the spirit of revolutionary struggle for power; of preparing and moving up reserves; of establishing an alliance with the proletarians of neighbouring countries; of establishing firm ties with the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries, etc., etc. To think that these new tasks can be performed by the old social-democratic parties, brought up as they were in the peaceful conditions of parliamentarism, is to doom oneself to hopeless despair, to inevitable defeat. If, with such tasks to shoulder, the proletariat remained under the leadership of the old parties, it would be completely unarmed. It scarcely needs proof that the proletariat could not consent to such a state of affairs.

Hence the necessity for a new party, a militant party, a revolutionary party, one bold enough to lead the proletarians in the struggle for power, sufficiently experienced to find its bearings amidst the complex conditions of a revolutionary situation, and sufficiently flexible to steer clear of all submerged rocks in the path to its goal.

Without such a party it is useless even to think of overthrowing imperialism, of achieving the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This new party is the party of Leninism.

What are the specific features of this new party?

1) *The Party as the advanced detachment of the working class.* The Party must be, first of all, the *advanced* detachment of the working class. The Party must absorb all the best elements of the working class, their experience, their revolutionary spirit, their selfless devotion to the cause of the proletariat. But in order that it may really be the advanced detachment, the Party must be armed with revolutionary theory, with a knowledge of the laws of the movement, with a knowledge of the laws of revolution. Without this it will be incapable of directing the struggle of the proletariat, of leading the proletariat. The Party cannot be a real party if it limits itself to registering what the masses of the working class feel and think, if it drags at the tail of the spontaneous movement, if it is unable to overcome the inertia and political indifference of the spontaneous movement, if it is unable to rise above the momentary interests of the proletariat, if it is unable to raise the masses to the level of understanding the class interests of the proletariat. The Party must stand at the head of the working class; it must see farther than the working class, it must lead

the proletariat, and not drag at the tail of the spontaneous movement. The parties of the Second International, which preach "khvostism," are vehicles of bourgeois policy, which condemns the proletariat to the role of a tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie. Only a party which adopts the standpoint of the advanced detachment of the proletariat and is able to raise the masses to the level of understanding the class interests of the proletariat — only such a party can divert the working class from the path of trade-unionism and convert it into an independent political force.

The Party is the political leader of the working class.

I have already spoken of the difficulties of the struggle of the working class, of the complicated conditions of the struggle, of strategy and tactics, of reserves and manoeuvring, of attack and retreat. These conditions are no less complicated, if not more so, than the conditions of war. Who can see clearly in these conditions, who can give correct guidance to the proletarian millions? No army at war can dispense with an experienced General Staff if it does not want to be doomed to defeat. Is it not clear that the proletariat can still less dispense with such a General Staff if it does not want to allow itself to be devoured by its mortal enemies? But where is this General Staff? Only the revolutionary party of the proletariat can serve as this General Staff. The working class without a revolutionary party is an army without a General Staff.

The Party is the General Staff of the proletariat.

But the Party cannot be only an *advanced* detachment. It must at the same time be a detachment of the *class*, part of the class, closely bound up with it by all the fibres of its being. The distinction between the advanced detachment and the rest of the working class, between Party members and non-Party people, cannot disappear until classes disappear; it will exist as long as the ranks of the proletariat continue to be replenished with former members of other classes, as long as the working class as a whole is not in a position to rise to the level of the advanced detachment. But the Party would cease to be a party if this distinction developed into a gap, if the Party turned in on itself and became divorced from the non-Party masses. The Party cannot lead the class if it is not connected with the non-Party masses, if there is no bond between the Party and the non-Party masses, if these masses do not accept its leadership, if the Party enjoys no moral and political credit among the masses.

Recently two hundred thousand new members from the ranks of the workers were admitted into our Party. The remarkable thing

about this is the fact that these people did not merely join the Party themselves, but were rather sent there by all the rest of the non-Party workers, who took an active part in the admission of the new members, and without whose approval no new member was accepted. This fact shows that the broad masses of non-Party workers regard our Party as *their* Party, as a Party *near* and *dear* to them, in whose expansion and consolidation they are vitally interested and to whose leadership they voluntarily entrust their destiny. It scarcely needs proof that without these intangible moral threads which connect the Party with the non-Party masses, the Party could not have become the decisive force of its class.

The Party is an inseparable part of the working class.

“We,” says Lenin, “are the Party of a class, and therefore *almost the whole class* (and in times of war, in the period of civil war, the whole class) should act under the leadership of our Party, should adhere to our Party as closely as possible. But it would be Manilovism and ‘khvostism’ to think that at any time under capitalism almost the whole class, or the whole class, would be able to rise to the level of consciousness and activity of its advanced detachment, of its Social-Democratic Party. No sensible social-democrat has ever yet doubted that under capitalism even the trade union organizations (which are more primitive and more comprehensible to the undeveloped strata) are unable to embrace almost the whole, or the whole, working class. To forget the distinction between the advanced detachment and the whole of the masses which gravitate towards it, to forget the constant duty of the advanced detachment to *raise* ever wider strata to this advanced level, means merely to deceive oneself, to shut one’s eyes to the immensity of our tasks, and to narrow down these tasks” (See Vol. VI, pp. 205-06).

2) *The Party as the organized detachment of the working class.* The Party is not only the *advanced* detachment of the working class. If it desires really to direct the struggle of the class it must at the same time be the *organized* detachment of its class. The Party’s tasks under the conditions of capitalism are immense and extremely varied. The Party must direct the struggle of the proletariat under the exceptionally difficult conditions of internal and external development; it must lead the proletariat in the offensive when the situation calls for an offensive; it must lead the proletariat so as to escape the blow of a powerful enemy when the situation calls for retreat; it must imbue the millions of unorganized non-Party workers with the spirit of discipline and system in the struggle, with the spirit of organization and endurance. But the Party can fulfil these tasks only if it is itself the embodiment of discipline and organization, if it is itself the *organized*

detachment of the proletariat. Without these conditions there can be no question of the Party really leading the vast masses of the proletariat.

The Party is the organized detachment of the working class.

The conception of the Party as an organized whole is embodied in Lenin's well-known formulation of the first paragraph of our Party Rules, in which the Party is regarded as the *sum total* of its organizations, and the Party member as a member of one of the organizations of the Party. The Mensheviks, who objected to this formulation as early as 1903, proposed to substitute for it a "system" of self-enrolment in the Party, a "system" of conferring the "title" of Party member upon every "professor" and "high-school student," upon every "sympathizer" and "striker" who supported the Party in one way or another, but who did not join and did not want to join any one of the Party organizations. It scarcely needs proof that had this singular "system" become entrenched in our Party it would inevitably have led to our Party becoming inundated with professors and high-school students and to its degeneration into a loose, amorphous, disorganized "formation," lost in a sea of "sympathizers," that would have obliterated the dividing line between the Party and the class and would have upset the Party's task of raising the unorganized masses to the level of the advanced detachment. Needless to say, under such an opportunist "system" our Party would have been unable to fulfil the role of the organizing core of the working class in the course of our revolution.

"From the point of view of Comrade Martov," says Lenin, "the border line of the Party remains quite indefinite, for 'every striker' may 'proclaim himself a Party member.' What is the use of this vagueness? A wide extension of the 'title.' Its harm is that it introduces a *disorganizing* idea, the confusing of class and Party" (see Vol. VI, p. 211).

But the Party is not merely the *sum total* of Party organizations. The Party is at the same time a single *system* of these organizations, their formal union into a single whole, with higher and lower leading bodies, with subordination of the minority to the majority, with practical decisions binding on all members of the Party. Without these conditions the Party cannot be a single organized whole capable of exercising systematic and organized leadership in the struggle of the working class.

"Formerly," says Lenin, "our Party was not a formally organized whole, but only the sum of separate groups, and therefore no other relations except

those of ideological influence were possible between these groups. *Now we have become an organized party, and this implies the establishment of authority, the transformation of the power of ideas into the power of authority, the subordination of lower Party bodies to higher Party bodies*" (see Vol. VI, p. 291).

The principle of the minority submitting to the majority, the principle of directing Party work from a centre, not infrequently gives rise to attacks on the part of wavering elements, to accusations of "bureaucracy," "formalism," etc. It scarcely needs proof that systematic work by the Party as one whole, and the directing of the struggle of the working class, would be impossible without putting these principles into effect. Leninism in questions of organization is the unswerving application of these principles. Lenin terms the fight against these principles "Russian nihilism" and "aristocratic anarchism," which deserves to be ridiculed and swept aside.

Here is what Lenin says about these wavering elements in his book *One Step Forward*:

"This aristocratic anarchism is particularly characteristic of the Russian nihilist. He thinks of the Party organization as a monstrous 'factory,' he regards the subordination of the part to the whole and of the minority to the majority as 'serfdom,'... division of labour under the direction of a centre evokes from him a tragi-comical outcry against people being transformed into 'wheels and cogs,'... mention of the organizational rules of the Party calls forth a contemptuous grimace and the disdainful... remark that one could very well dispense with rules altogether."

"It is clear, I think, that the cries about this celebrated bureaucracy are just a screen for dissatisfaction with the personal composition of the central bodies, a fig leaf... You are a bureaucrat because you were appointed by the congress not by my will, but against it; you are a formalist because you rely on the formal decisions of the congress, and not on my consent; you are acting in a grossly mechanical way because you plead the 'mechanical' majority at the Party Congress and pay no heed to my wish to be co-opted; you are an autocrat because you refuse to hand over the power to the old gang"* (see Vol. VI, pp. 310, 287).

3) *The Party as the highest form of class organization of the proletariat.* The Party is the organized detachment of the working class. But the Party is not the only organization of the working class. The proletariat has also a number of other organizations, without which it

* The "gang" here referred to is that of Axelrod, Martov, Potresov and others, who would not submit to the decisions of the Second Congress and who accused Lenin of being a "bureaucrat." — *J. St.*

cannot wage a successful struggle against capital: trade unions, co-operatives, factory organizations, parliamentary groups, non-Party women's associations, the press, cultural and educational organizations, youth leagues, revolutionary fighting organizations (in times of open revolutionary action), Soviets of deputies as the form of state organization (if the proletariat is in power), etc. The overwhelming majority of these organizations are non-Party, and only some of them adhere directly to the Party, or constitute offshoots from it. All these organizations, under certain conditions, are absolutely necessary for the working class; for without them it would be impossible to consolidate the class positions of the proletariat in the diverse spheres of struggle; for without them it would be impossible to steel the proletariat as the force whose mission it is to replace the bourgeois order by the socialist order. But how can single leadership be exercised with such an abundance of organizations? What guarantee is there that this multiplicity of organizations will not lead to divergency in leadership? It may be said that each of these organizations carries on its work in its own special field, and that therefore these organizations cannot hinder one another. That, of course, is true. But it is also true that all these organizations should work in one direction for they serve *one* class, the class of the proletarians. The question then arises: Who is to determine the line, the general direction, along which the work of all these organizations is to be conducted? Where is the central organization which is not only able, because it has the necessary experience, to work out such a general line, but, in addition, is in a position, because it has sufficient prestige, to induce all these organizations to carry out this line, so as to attain unity of leadership and to make hitches impossible?

That organization is the Party of the proletariat.

The Party possesses all the necessary qualifications for this because, in the first place, it is the rallying centre of the finest elements in the working class, who have direct connections with the non-Party organizations of the proletariat and very frequently lead them; because, secondly, the Party, as the rallying centre of the finest members of the working class, is the best school for training leaders of the working class, capable of directing every form of organization of their class; because, thirdly, the Party, as the best school for training leaders of the working class, is, by reason of its experience and prestige, the only organization capable of centralizing the leadership of the struggle of the proletariat, thus transforming each and every non-Party organization of the working class into an auxiliary body and

transmission belt linking the Party with the class.

The Party is the highest form of class organization of the proletariat.

This does not mean, of course, that non-Party organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, etc., should be officially subordinated to the Party leadership. It only means that the members of the Party who belong to these organizations and are doubtlessly influential in them should do all they can to persuade these non-Party organizations to draw nearer to the Party of the proletariat in their work and voluntarily accept its political leadership.

That is why Lenin says that the Party is “the *highest* form of proletarian class association,” whose political leadership must extend to every other form of organization of the proletariat (see Vol. XXV, p. 194).

That is why the opportunist theory of the “independence” and “neutrality” of the non-Party organizations, which breeds *independent* members of parliament and journalists *isolated* from the Party, *narrow-minded* trade union leaders and *philistine* cooperative officials, is wholly incompatible with the theory and practice of Leninism.

4) *The Party as an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat.* The Party is the highest form of organization of the proletariat. The Party is the principal guiding force within the class of the proletarians and among the organizations of that class. But it does not by any means follow from this that the Party can be regarded as an end in itself, as a self-sufficient force. The Party is not only the highest form of class association of the proletarians; it is at the same time an *instrument* in the hands of the proletariat *for* achieving the dictatorship when that has not yet been achieved and *for* consolidating and expanding the dictatorship when it has already been achieved. The Party could not have risen so high in importance and could not have established its influence over all other forms of organization of the proletariat, if the latter had not been confronted with the question of power, if the conditions of imperialism, the inevitability of wars and the existence of a crisis had not demanded the concentration of all the forces of the proletariat at one point, the gathering of all the threads of the revolutionary movement in one spot in order to overthrow the bourgeoisie and to achieve the dictatorship of the proletariat. The proletariat needs the Party first of all as its General Staff, which it must have for the successful seizure of power. It scarcely needs proof that without a party capable of rallying around itself the mass organizations of the proletariat, and of centralizing the leader-

ship of the entire movement during the progress of the struggle, the proletariat in Russia could not have established its revolutionary dictatorship.

But the proletariat needs the Party not only to achieve the dictatorship; it needs it still more to maintain the dictatorship, to consolidate and expand it in order to achieve the complete victory of socialism.

“Certainly, almost everyone now realizes,” says Lenin, “that the Bolsheviks could not have maintained themselves in power for two and a half months, let alone two and a half years, without the strictest, truly iron discipline in our Party, and without the fullest and unreserved support of the latter by the whole mass of the working class, that is, by all its thinking, honest, self-sacrificing and influential elements, capable of leading or of carrying with them the backward strata” (see Vol. XXV, p. 173).

Now, what does to “maintain” and “expand” the dictatorship mean? It means imbuing the millions of proletarians with the spirit of discipline and organization; it means creating among the proletarian masses a cementing force and a bulwark against the corrosive influences of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces and petty-bourgeois habits; it means enhancing the organizing work of the proletarians in re-educating and remoulding the petty-bourgeois strata; it means helping the masses of the proletarians to educate themselves as a force capable of abolishing classes and of preparing the conditions for the organization of socialist production. But it is impossible to accomplish all this without a party which is strong by reason of its solidarity and discipline.

“The dictatorship of the proletariat,” says Lenin, “is a stubborn struggle — bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative — against the forces and traditions of the old society. The force of habit of millions and tens of millions is a most terrible force. Without an iron party tempered in the struggle, without a party enjoying the confidence of all that is honest in the given class, without a party capable of watching and influencing the mood of the masses, it is impossible to conduct such a struggle successfully” (see Vol. XXV, p. 190).

The proletariat needs the Party *for* the purpose of achieving and maintaining the dictatorship. The Party is an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But from this it follows that when classes disappear and the dictatorship of the proletariat withers away, the Party also will wither away.

5) *The Party as the embodiment of unity of will, unity incompatible*

with the existence of factions. The achievement and maintenance of the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible without a party which is strong by reason of its solidarity and iron discipline. But iron discipline in the Party is inconceivable without unity of will, without complete and absolute unity of action on the part of all members of the Party. This does not mean, of course, that the possibility of conflicts of opinion within the Party is thereby precluded. On the contrary, iron discipline does not preclude but presupposes criticism and conflict of opinion within the Party. Least of all does it mean that discipline must be "blind." On the contrary, iron discipline does not preclude but presupposes conscious and voluntary submission, for only conscious discipline can be truly iron discipline. But after a conflict of opinion has been closed, after criticism has been exhausted and a decision has been arrived at, unity of will and unity of action of all Party members are the necessary conditions without which neither Party unity nor iron discipline in the Party is conceivable.

"In the present epoch of acute civil war," says Lenin, "the Communist Party will be able to perform its duty only if it is organized in the most centralized manner, if iron discipline bordering on military discipline prevails in it, and if its Party centre is a powerful and authoritative organ, wielding wide powers and enjoying the universal confidence of the members of the Party" (see Vol. XXV, pp. 282-83).

This is the position in regard to discipline in the Party in the period of struggle preceding the achievement of the dictatorship.

The same, but to an even greater degree, must be said about discipline in the Party after the dictatorship has been achieved.

"Whoever," says Lenin, "weakens in the least the iron discipline of the party of the proletariat (especially during the time of its dictatorship), actually aids the bourgeoisie against the proletariat" (see Vol. XXV, p. 190).

But from this it follows that the existence of factions is compatible neither with the Party's unity nor with its iron discipline. It scarcely needs proof that the existence of factions leads to the existence of a number of centres, and the existence of a number of centres means the absence of one common centre in the Party, the breaking up of unity of will, the weakening and disintegration of discipline, the weakening and disintegration of the dictatorship. Of course, the parties of the Second International, which are fighting against the dictatorship of the proletariat and have no desire to lead the proletarians to power, can afford such liberalism as freedom of

factions, for they have no need at all for iron discipline. But the parties of the Communist International, whose activities are conditioned by the task of achieving and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, cannot afford to be "liberal" or to permit freedom of factions.

The Party represents unity of will, which precludes all factionalism and division of authority in the Party.

Hence Lenin's warning about the "danger of factionalism from the point of view of Party unity and of effecting the unity of will of the vanguard of the proletariat as the fundamental condition for the success of the dictatorship of the proletariat," which is embodied in the special resolution of the Tenth Congress of our Party "On Party Unity."⁴⁷

Hence Lenin's demand for the "complete elimination of all factionalism" and the "immediate dissolution of all groups, without exception, that have been formed on the basis of various platforms," on pain of "unconditional and immediate expulsion from the Party" (see the resolution "On Party Unity").

6) *The Party becomes strong by purging itself of opportunist elements.* The source of factionalism in the Party is its opportunist elements. The proletariat is not an isolated class. It is constantly replenished by the influx of peasants, petty bourgeois and intellectuals proletarianized by the development of capitalism. At the same time the upper stratum of the proletariat, principally trade-union leaders and members of parliament who are fed by the bourgeoisie out of the super-profits extracted from the colonies, is undergoing a process of decay. "This stratum of bourgeoisified workers, or the 'labour aristocracy,'" says Lenin, "who are quite philistine in their mode of life, in the size of their earnings and in their entire outlook, is the principal prop of the Second International, and, in our days, the principal *social* (not military) *prop of the bourgeoisie*. For they are real *agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class* movement, the labour lieutenants of the capitalist class, real channels of reformism and chauvinism" (see Vol. XIX, p. 77).

In one way or another, all these petty-bourgeois groups penetrate into the Party and introduce into it the spirit of hesitancy and opportunism, the spirit of demoralization and uncertainty. It is they, principally, that constitute the source of factionalism and disintegration, the source of disorganization and disruption of the Party from within. To fight imperialism with such "allies" in one's rear means to put oneself in the position of being caught between two fires,

from the front and from the rear. Therefore, ruthless struggle against such elements, their expulsion from the Party, is a pre-requisite for the successful struggle against imperialism.

The theory of “defeating” opportunist elements by ideological struggle within the Party, the theory of “overcoming” these elements within the confines of a single party, is a rotten and dangerous theory, which threatens to condemn the Party to paralysis and chronic infirmity, threatens to make the Party a prey to opportunism, threatens to leave the proletariat without a revolutionary party, threatens to deprive the proletariat of its main weapon in the fight against imperialism. Our Party could not have emerged on to the broad highway, it could not have seized power and organized the dictatorship of the proletariat, it could not have emerged victorious from the civil war, if it had had within its ranks people like Martov and Dan, Potresov and Axelrod. Our Party succeeded in achieving internal unity and unexampled cohesion of its ranks primarily because it was able in good time to purge itself of the opportunist pollution, because it was able to rid its ranks of Liquidators and Mensheviks. Proletarian parties develop and become strong by purging themselves of opportunists and reformists, social-imperialists and social-chauvinists, social-patriots and social-pacifists.

The Party becomes strong by purging itself of opportunist elements.

“With reformists, Mensheviks, in our ranks,” says Lenin, “it is *impossible* to be victorious in the proletarian revolution, it is *impossible* to defend it. That is obvious in principle, and it has been strikingly confirmed by the experience of both Russia and Hungary... In Russia, difficult situations have arisen *many times*, when the Soviet regime would *most certainly* have been overthrown had Mensheviks, reformists and petty-bourgeois democrats remained in our Party... In Italy, where, as is generally admitted, decisive battles between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie for the possession of state power are imminent. At such a moment it is not only absolutely necessary to remove the Mensheviks, reformists, Turatists from the Party, but it may even be useful to remove excellent communists who are liable to waver, and who reveal a tendency to waver towards ‘unity’ with the reformists, to remove them from all responsible posts... On the eve of a revolution, and at a moment when a most fierce struggle is being waged for its victory, the slightest wavering in the ranks of the Party may *wreck everything*, frustrate the revolution, wrest the power from the hands of the proletariat; for this power is not yet consolidated, the attack upon it is still very strong. The desertion of wavering leaders at such a time does not weaken but strengthens the Party, the working-class movement and the revolution” (see Vol. XXV,

pp. 462, 463, 464).

IX

STYLE IN WORK

I am not referring to literary style. What I have in mind is style in work, that specific and peculiar feature in the practice of Leninism which creates the special type of Leninist worker. Leninism is a school of theory and practice which trains a special type of Party and state worker, creates a special Leninist style in work.

What are the characteristic features of this style? What are its peculiarities?

It has two specific features:

- a) Russian revolutionary sweep and
- b) American efficiency.

The style of Leninism consists in combining these two specific features in Party and state work.

Russian revolutionary sweep is an antidote to inertia, routine, conservatism, mental stagnation and slavish submission to ancient traditions. Russian revolutionary sweep is the life-giving force which stimulates thought, impels things forward, breaks the past and opens up perspectives. Without it no progress is possible.

But Russian revolutionary sweep has every chance of degenerating in practice into empty “revolutionary” Manilovism if it is not combined with American efficiency in work. Examples of this degeneration are only too numerous. Who does not know the disease of “revolutionary” scheme concocting and “revolutionary” plan drafting, which springs from the belief in the power of decrees to arrange everything and remake everything? A Russian writer, I. Ehrenburg, in his story *The Percomman (The Perfect Communist Man)*, has portrayed the type of a “Bolshevik” afflicted with this disease, who set himself the task of finding a formula for the ideally perfect man and... became “submerged” in this “work.” The story contains a great exaggeration, but it certainly gives a correct likeness of the disease. But no one, I think, has so ruthlessly and bitterly ridiculed those afflicted with this disease as Lenin. Lenin stigmatized this morbid belief in concocting schemes and in turning out decrees as “communist vainglory.”

“Communist vainglory,” says Lenin, “means that a man, who is a mem-

ber of the Communist Party, and has not yet been purged from it, imagines that he can solve all his problems by issuing communist decrees" (see Vol. XXVII, pp. 50-51).

Lenin usually contrasted hollow "revolutionary" phrase mongering with plain everyday work, thus emphasizing that "revolutionary" scheme concocting is repugnant to the spirit and the letter of true Leninism.

"Fewer pompous phrases, more plain, *everyday* work...," says Lenin.

"Less political fireworks and more attention to the simplest but vital... facts of communist construction..." (See Vol. XXIV, pp. 343 and 335).

American efficiency, on the other hand, is an antidote to "revolutionary" Manilovism and fantastic scheme concocting. American efficiency is that indomitable force which neither knows nor recognizes obstacles; which with its business-like perseverance brushes aside all obstacles; which continues at a task once started until it is finished, even if it is a minor task; and without which serious constructive work is inconceivable.

But American efficiency has every chance of degenerating into narrow and unprincipled practicalism if it is not combined with Russian revolutionary sweep. Who has not heard of that disease of narrow empiricism and unprincipled practicalism which has not infrequently caused certain "Bolsheviks" to degenerate and to abandon the cause of the revolution? We find a reflection of this peculiar disease in a story by B. Pilnyak, entitled *The Barren Year*, which depicts types of Russian "Bolsheviks" of strong will and practical determination who "function" very "energetically," but without vision, without knowing "what it is all about," and who, therefore, stray from the path of revolutionary work. No one has ridiculed this disease of practicalism so incisively as Lenin. He branded it as "narrow-minded empiricism" and "brainless practicalism." He usually contrasted it with vital revolutionary work and the necessity of having a revolutionary perspective in all our daily activities, thus emphasizing that this unprincipled practicalism is as repugnant to true Leninism as "revolutionary" scheme concocting.

The combination of Russian revolutionary sweep with American efficiency is the essence of Leninism in Party and state work.

This combination alone produces the finished type of Leninist worker, the style of Leninism in work.

TROTSKYISM OR LENINISM?

(Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the Communist Group in the
AUCCTU)

November 19, 1924

Comrades, after Kamenev's comprehensive report there is little left for me to say. I shall therefore confine myself to exposing certain legends that are being spread by Trotsky and his supporters about the October uprising, about Trotsky's role in the uprising, about the Party and the preparation for October, and so forth. I shall also touch upon Trotskyism as a peculiar ideology that is incompatible with Leninism, and upon the Party's tasks in connection with Trotsky's latest literary pronouncements.

I

THE FACTS ABOUT THE OCTOBER UPRISING

First of all about the October uprising. Rumours are being vigorously spread among members of the Party that the Central Committee as a whole was opposed to an uprising in October 1917. The usual story is that on October 10, when the Central Committee adopted the decision to organize the uprising, the majority of the Central Committee at first spoke against an uprising, but, so the story runs, at that moment a worker burst in on the meeting of the Central Committee and said: "You are deciding against an uprising, but I tell you that there will be an uprising all the same, in spite of everything." And so, after that threat, the story runs, the Central Committee, which is alleged to have become frightened, raised the question of an uprising afresh and adopted a decision to organize it.

This is not merely a rumour, comrades. It is related by the well-known John Reed in his book *Ten Days*. Reed was remote from our Party and, of course, could not know the history of our secret meeting on October 10, and, consequently, he was taken in by the gossip spread by people like Sukhanov. This story was later passed round and repeated in a number of pamphlets written by Trotskyites, including one of the latest pamphlets on October written by Syrkin. These rumours have been strongly supported in Trotsky's latest lit-

erary pronouncements.

It scarcely needs proof that all these and similar "Arabian Nights" fairy tales are not in accordance with the truth, that in fact nothing of the kind happened, nor could have happened, at the meeting of the Central Committee. Consequently, we could ignore these absurd rumours; after all, lots of rumours are fabricated in the office rooms of the oppositionists or those who are remote from the Party. Indeed, we have ignored them till now; for example, we paid no attention to John Reed's mistakes and did not take the trouble to rectify them. After Trotsky's latest pronouncements, however, it is no longer possible to ignore such legends, for attempts are being made now to bring up our young people on them and, unfortunately, some results have already been achieved in this respect. In view of this, I must counter these absurd rumours with the actual facts.

I take the minutes of the meeting of the Central Committee of our Party on October 10 (23), 1917. Present: Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin, Trotsky, Sverdlov, Uritsky, Dzerzhinsky, Kollontai, Bubnov, Sokolnikov, Lomov. The question of the current situation and the uprising was discussed. After the discussion, Comrade Lenin's resolution on the uprising was put to the vote. The resolution was adopted by a majority of 10 against 2. Clear, one would think: by a majority of 10 against 2, the Central Committee decided to proceed with the immediate, practical work of organizing the uprising. At this very same meeting the Central Committee elected a *political* centre to direct the uprising; this centre, called the Political Bureau, consisted of Lenin, Zinoviev, Stalin, Kamenev, Trotsky, Sokolnikov and Bubnov.

Such are the facts.

These minutes at one stroke destroy several legends. They destroy the legend that the majority on the Central Committee was opposed to an uprising. They also destroy the legend that on the question of the uprising the Central Committee was on the verge of a split. It is clear from the minutes that the opponents of an immediate uprising — Kamenev and Zinoviev — were elected to the body that was to exercise political direction of the uprising on a par with those who were in favour of an uprising. There was no question of a split, nor could there be.

Trotsky asserts that in October our Party had a right wing in the persons of Kamenev and Zinoviev, who, he says, were almost social-democrats. What one cannot understand then is how, under those circumstances, it could happen that the Party avoided a split; how it

could happen that the disagreements with Kamenev and Zinoviev lasted only a few days; how it could happen that, in spite of those disagreements, the Party appointed these comrades to highly important posts, elected them to the political centre of the uprising, and so forth. Lenin's implacable attitude towards social-democrats is sufficiently well known in the Party; the Party knows that Lenin would not for a single moment have agreed to have social-democratically-minded comrades in the Party, let alone in highly important posts. How, then, are we to explain the fact that the Party avoided a split? The explanation is that in spite of the disagreements, these comrades were old Bolsheviks who stood on the common ground of Bolshevism. What was that common ground? Unity of views on the fundamental questions: the character of the Russian revolution, the driving forces of the revolution, the role of the peasantry, the principles of Party leadership, and so forth. Had there not been this common ground, a split would have been inevitable. There was no split, and the disagreements lasted only a few days, because, and only because, Kamenev and Zinoviev were Leninists, Bolsheviks.

Let us now pass to the legend about Trotsky's special role in the October uprising. The Trotskyites are vigorously spreading rumours that Trotsky inspired and was the sole leader of the October uprising. These rumours are being spread with exceptional zeal by the so-called editor of Trotsky's works, Lentsner. Trotsky himself, by consistently avoiding mention of the Party, the Central Committee and the Petrograd Committee of the Party, by saying nothing about the leading role of these organizations in the uprising and vigorously pushing himself forward as the central figure in the October uprising, voluntarily or involuntarily helps to spread the rumours about the special role he is supposed to have played in the uprising. I am far from denying Trotsky's undoubtedly important role in the uprising. I must say, however, that Trotsky did not play any special role in the October uprising, nor could he do so; being chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, he merely carried out the will of the appropriate Party bodies, which directed every step that Trotsky took. To philistines like Sukhanov, all this may seem strange, but the facts, the true facts, wholly and fully confirm what I say.

Let us take the minutes of the next meeting of the Central Committee, the one held on October 16 (29), 1917. Present: the members of the Central Committee, plus representatives of the Petrograd Committee, plus representatives of the military organization, factory

committees, trade unions and the railwaymen. Among those present, besides the members of the Central Committee, were: Krylenko, Shotman, Kalinin, Volodarsky, Shlyapnikov, Lacin, and others, twenty-five in all. The question of the uprising was discussed from the purely practical-organizational aspect. Lenin's resolution on the uprising was adopted by a majority of 20 against 2, three abstaining. A *practical* centre was elected for the organizational leadership of the uprising. Who was elected to this centre? The following five: Sverdlov, Stalin, Dzerzhinsky, Bubnov, Uritsky. The functions of the practical centre: to direct all the practical organs of the uprising in conformity with the directives of the Central Committee. Thus, as you see, something "terrible" happened at this meeting of the Central Committee, i.e., "strange to relate," the "inspirer," the "chief figure," the "sole leader" of the uprising, Trotsky, was not elected to the practical centre, which was called upon to direct the uprising. How is this to be reconciled with the current opinion about Trotsky's special role? Is not all this somewhat "strange," as Sukhanov, or the Trotskyites, would say? And yet, strictly speaking, there is nothing strange about it, for neither in the Party, nor in the October uprising, did Trotsky play any *special* role, nor could he do so, for he was a relatively new man in our Party in the period of October. He, like all the responsible workers, merely carried out the will of the Central Committee and of its organs. Whoever is familiar with the mechanics of Bolshevik Party leadership will have no difficulty in understanding that it could not be otherwise: it would have been enough for Trotsky to have gone against the will of the Central Committee to have been deprived of influence on the course of events. This talk about Trotsky's special role is a legend that is being spread by obliging "Party" gossips.

This, of course, does not mean that the October uprising did not have its inspirer. It did have its inspirer and leader, but this was Lenin, and none other than Lenin, that same Lenin whose resolutions the Central Committee adopted when deciding the question of the uprising, that same Lenin who, in spite of what Trotsky says, was not prevented by being in hiding from being the actual inspirer of the uprising. It is foolish and ridiculous to attempt now, by gossip about Lenin having been in hiding, to obscure the indubitable fact that the inspirer of the uprising was the leader of the Party, V.I. Lenin.

Such are the facts.

Granted, we are told, but it cannot be denied that Trotsky fought

well in the period of October. Yes, that is true, Trotsky did, indeed, fight well in October; but Trotsky was not the only one who fought well in the period of October. Even people like the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who then stood side by side with the Bolsheviki, also fought well. In general, I must say that in the period of a victorious uprising, when the enemy is isolated and the uprising is growing, it is not difficult to fight well. At such moments even backward people become heroes.

The proletarian struggle is not, however, an uninterrupted advance, an unbroken chain of victories. The proletarian struggle also has its trials, its defeats. The genuine revolutionary is not one who displays courage in the period of a victorious uprising, but one who, while fighting well during the victorious advance of the revolution, also displays courage when the revolution is in retreat, when the proletariat suffers defeat; who does not lose his head and does not funk when the revolution suffers reverses, when the enemy achieves success; who does not become panic-stricken or give way to despair when the revolution is in a period of retreat. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries did not fight badly in the period of October, and they supported the Bolsheviki. But who does not know that those "brave" fighters became panic-stricken in the period of Brest, when the advance of German imperialism drove them to despair and hysteria? It is a very sad but indubitable fact that Trotsky, who fought well in the period of October, did not, in the period of Brest, in the period when the revolution suffered temporary reverses, possess the courage to display sufficient staunchness at that difficult moment and to refrain from following in the footsteps of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. Beyond question, that moment was a difficult one; one had to display exceptional courage and imperturbable coolness not to be dismayed, to retreat in good time, to accept peace in good time, to withdraw the proletarian army out of range of the blows of German imperialism, to preserve the peasant reserves and, after obtaining a respite in this way, to strike at the enemy with renewed force. Unfortunately, Trotsky was found to lack this courage and revolutionary staunchness at that difficult moment.

In Trotsky's opinion, the principal lesson of the proletarian revolution is "not to funk" during October. That is wrong, for Trotsky's assertion contains only a *particle* of the truth about the lessons of the revolution. The *whole* truth about the lessons of the proletarian revolution is "not to funk" not only when the revolution is advancing, but also when it is in retreat, when the enemy is gaining the upper

hand and the revolution is suffering reverses. The revolution did not end with October. October was only the beginning of the proletarian revolution. It is bad to funk when the tide of insurrection is rising; but it is worse to funk when the revolution is passing through severe trials after power has been captured. To retain power on the morrow of the revolution is no less important than to capture power. If Trotsky funked during the period of Brest, when our revolution was passing through severe trials, when it was almost a matter of “sur-rendering” power, he ought to know that the mistakes committed by Kamenev and Zinoviev in October are quite irrelevant here.

That is how matters stand with the legends about the October uprising.

II

THE PARTY AND THE PREPARATION FOR OCTOBER

Let us now pass to the question of the preparation for October.

Listening to Trotsky, one might think that during the whole of the period of preparation, from March to October, the Bolshevik Party did nothing but mark time; that it was being corroded by internal contradictions and hindered Lenin in every way; that had it not been for Trotsky, nobody knows how the October Revolution would have ended. It is rather amusing to hear this strange talk about the Party from Trotsky, who declares in this same “preface” to Volume III that “the chief instrument of the proletarian revolution is the Party,” that “without the Party, apart from the Party, bypassing the Party, with a substitute for the Party, the proletarian revolution cannot be victorious.” Allah himself would not understand how our revolution could have succeeded if “its chief instrument” proved to be useless, while success was impossible, as it appears, “bypassing the Party.” But this is not the first time that Trotsky treats us to oddities. It must be supposed that this amusing talk about our Party is one of Trotsky’s usual oddities.

Let us briefly review the history of the preparation for October according to periods.

1) *The period of the Party’s new orientation (March-April).* The major facts of this period:

a) the overthrow of Tsarism;

- b) the formation of the Provisional Government (dictatorship of the bourgeoisie);
- c) the appearance of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry);
- d) dual power;
- e) the April demonstration;
- f) the first crisis of power.

The characteristic feature of this period is the fact that there existed together, side by side and simultaneously, both the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry; the latter trusts the former, believes that it is striving for peace, voluntarily surrenders power to the bourgeoisie and thereby becomes an appendage of the bourgeoisie. There are as yet no serious conflicts between the two dictatorships. On the other hand, there is the "Contact Committee."⁴⁸

This was the greatest turning point in the history of Russia and an unprecedented turning point in the history of our Party. The old, pre-revolutionary platform of direct overthrow of the government was clear and definite, but it was no longer suitable for the new conditions of the struggle. It was now no longer possible to go straight out for the overthrow of the government, for the latter was connected with the Soviets, then under the influence of the defencists, and the Party would have had to wage war against both the government and the Soviets, a war that would have been beyond its strength. Nor was it possible to pursue a policy of supporting the Provisional Government, for it was the government of imperialism. Under the new conditions of the struggle the Party had to adopt a new orientation. The Party (its majority) groped its way towards this new orientation. It adopted the policy of pressure on the Provisional Government through the Soviets on the question of peace and did not venture to step forward at once from the old slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry to the new slogan of power to the Soviets. The aim of this halfway policy was to enable the Soviets to discern the actual imperialist nature of the Provisional Government on the basis of the concrete questions of peace, and in this way to wrest the Soviets from the Provisional Government. But this was a profoundly mistaken position, for it gave rise to pacifist illusions, brought grist to the mill of defencism and hindered the revolutionary education of the masses. At that time I shared this mistaken position with other Party comrades and fully abandoned it only in the middle of April, when I associated myself with Lenin's theses. A new orientation was

needed. This new orientation was given to the Party by Lenin, in his celebrated April Theses.⁴⁹ I shall not deal with these theses, for they are known to everybody. Were there any disagreements between the Party and Lenin at that time? Yes, there were. How long did these disagreements last? Not more than two weeks. The City Conference of the Petrograd organization⁵⁰ (in the latter half of April), which adopted Lenin's theses, marked a turning point in our Party's development. The All-Russian April Conference⁵¹ (at the end of April) merely completed on an all-Russian scale the work of the Petrograd Conference, rallying nine-tenths of the Party around this united Party position.

Now, seven years later, Trotsky gloats maliciously over the past disagreements among the Bolsheviks and depicts them as a struggle waged as if there were almost two parties within Bolshevism. But, firstly, Trotsky disgracefully exaggerates and inflates the matter, for the Bolshevik Party lived through these disagreements without the slightest shock. Secondly, our Party would be a caste and not a revolutionary party if it did not permit different shades of opinion in its ranks. Moreover, it is well known that there were disagreements among us even before that, for example, in the period of the Third Duma, but they did not shake the unity of our Party. Thirdly, it will not be out of place to ask what was *then* the position of Trotsky himself, who is *now* gloating so eagerly over the past disagreements among the Bolsheviks. Lentsner, the so-called editor of Trotsky's works, assures us that Trotsky's letters from America (March) "wholly anticipated" Lenin's *Letters from Afar*⁵² (March), which served as the basis of Lenin's April Theses. That is what he says: "wholly anticipated." Trotsky does not object to this analogy; apparently, he accepts it with thanks. But, firstly, Trotsky's letters "do not in the least resemble" Lenin's letters either in spirit or in conclusions, for they wholly and entirely reflect Trotsky's anti-Bolshevik slogan of "no Tsar, but a workers' government," a slogan which implies a revolution *without* the peasantry. It is enough to glance through these two series of letters to be convinced of this. Secondly, if what Lentsner says is true, how are we to explain the fact that Lenin on the very next day after his arrival from abroad considered it necessary to dissociate himself from Trotsky? Who does not know of Lenin's repeated statements that Trotsky's slogan of "*no Tsar, but a workers' government*" was an attempt "to skip the still unexhausted peasant movement," that this slogan meant "playing at the seizure of

power by a workers' government"?*

What can there be in common between Lenin's Bolshevik theses and Trotsky's anti-Bolshevik scheme with its "playing at the seizure of power"? And what prompts this passion that some people display for comparing a wretched hovel with Mont Blanc? For what purpose did Lentsner find it necessary to make this risky addition to the heap of old legends about our revolution of still another legend, about Trotsky's letters from America "anticipating" Lenin's well-known *Letters from Afar***?

* See Lenin's *Works*, Vol. XX, p. 104. See also the reports made at the Petrograd City Conference and at the All-Russian Conference of the RSDLP(B) (middle and end of April 1917).

** Among these legends must be included also the very widespread story that Trotsky was the "sole" or "chief organizer" of the victories on the fronts of the Civil War. I must declare, comrades, in the interest of truth, that this version is quite out of accord with the facts. I am far from denying that Trotsky played an important role in the Civil War. But I must emphatically declare that the high honour of being the organizer of our victories belongs not to individuals, but to the great collective body of advanced workers in our country, the Russian Communist Party. Perhaps it will not be out of place to quote a few examples. You know that Kolchak and Denikin were regarded as the principal enemies of the Soviet Republic. You know that our country breathed freely only after those enemies were defeated. Well, history shows that both those enemies, i.e., Kolchak and Denikin, were routed by our troops *in spite* of Trotsky's plans.

Judge for yourselves.

1) *Kolchak*. This is in the summer of 1919. Our troops are advancing against Kolchak and are operating near Ufa. A meeting of the Central Committee is held. Trotsky proposes that the advance be halted along the line of the River Belaya (near Ufa), leaving the Urals in the hands of Kolchak, and that part of the troops be withdrawn from the Eastern Front and transferred to the Southern Front. A heated debate takes place. The Central Committee disagrees with Trotsky, being of the opinion that the Urals, with its factories and railway network, must not be left in the hands of Kolchak, for the latter could easily recuperate there, organize a strong force and reach the Volga again; Kolchak must first be driven beyond the Ural range into the Siberian steppes, and only after that has been done should forces be transferred to the South. The Central Committee rejects Trotsky's plan. Trotsky hands in his resignation. The Central Committee refuses to accept it. Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis, who supported Trotsky's plan, resigns. His place is taken by a new Commander-in-Chief, Kamenev. From that moment Trotsky ceases to take a direct part in the affairs of the Eastern Front.

No wonder it is said that an obliging fool is more dangerous than an enemy.

2) *The period of the revolutionary mobilization of the masses (May-August)*. The major facts of this period:

a) the April demonstration in Petrograd and the formation of the coalition government with the participation of “Socialists”;

b) the May Day demonstrations in the principal centres of Russia with the slogan of “a democratic peace”;

c) the June demonstration in Petrograd with the principal slogan: “Down with the capitalist ministers!”;

d) the June offensive at the front and the reverses of the Russian army;

e) the July armed demonstration in Petrograd; the Cadet ministers resign from the government;

f) counter-revolutionary troops are called in from the front; the editorial offices of *Pravda* are wrecked; the counter-revolution launches a struggle against the Soviets and a new coalition government is formed, headed by Kerensky;

g) the Sixth Congress of our Party, which issues the slogan to prepare for an armed uprising;

h) the counter-revolutionary Conference of State and the general strike in Moscow;

i) Kornilov’s unsuccessful march on Petrograd, the revitalizing of the Soviets; the Cadets resign and a “Directory” is formed.

The characteristic feature of this period is the intensification of the crisis and the upsetting of the unstable equilibrium between the Soviets and the Provisional Government which, for good or evil, had existed in the preceding period. Dual power has become intolerable for both sides. The fragile edifice of the “Contact Committee” is tot-

2) *Denikin*. This is in the autumn of 1919. The offensive against Denikin is not proceeding successfully. The “steel ring” around Mamontov (Mamontov’s raid) is obviously collapsing. Denikin captures Kursk. Denikin is approaching Orel. Trotsky is summoned from the Southern Front to attend a meeting of the Central Committee. The Central Committee regards the situation as alarming and decides to send new military leaders to the Southern Front and to withdraw Trotsky. The new military leaders demand “no intervention” by Trotsky in the affairs of the Southern Front. Trotsky ceases to take a direct part in the affairs of the Southern Front. Operations on the Southern Front, right up to the capture of Rostov-on-Don and Odessa by our troops, proceed without Trotsky.

Let anybody try to refute these facts.

tering. "Crisis of power" and "ministerial re-shuffle" are the most fashionable catch-words of the day. The crisis at the front and the disruption in the rear are doing their work, strengthening the extreme flanks and squeezing the defencist compromisers from both sides. The revolution is mobilizing, causing the mobilization of the counter-revolution. The counter-revolution, in its turn, is spurring on the revolution, stirring up new waves of the revolutionary tide. The question of transferring power to the new class becomes the immediate question of the day.

Were there disagreements in our Party then? Yes, there were. They were, however, of a purely practical character, despite the assertions of Trotsky, who is trying to discover a "right" and a "left" wing in the Party. That is to say, they were such disagreements as are inevitable where there is vigorous Party life and real Party activity.

Trotsky is wrong in asserting that the April demonstration in Petrograd gave rise to disagreements in the Central Committee. The Central Committee was absolutely united on this question and condemned the attempt of a group of comrades to arrest the Provisional Government at a time when the Bolsheviks were in a minority both in the Soviets and in the army. Had Trotsky written the "history" of October not according to Sukhanov, but according to authentic documents, he would easily have convinced himself of the error of his assertion.

Trotsky is absolutely wrong in asserting that the attempt, "on Lenin's initiative," to arrange a demonstration on June 10 was described as "adventurism" by the "right-wing" members of the Central Committee. Had Trotsky not written according to Sukhanov he would surely have known that the June 10 demonstration was postponed with the full agreement of Lenin, and that he urged the necessity of postponing it in a big speech he delivered at the well-known meeting of the Petrograd Committee (see minutes of the Petrograd Committee⁵³).

Trotsky is absolutely wrong in speaking about "tragic" disagreements in the Central Committee in connection with the July armed demonstration. Trotsky is simply inventing in asserting that some members of the leading group in the Central Committee "could not but regard the July episode as a harmful adventure." Trotsky, who was then not yet a member of our Central Committee and was merely our Soviet parliamentary, might, of course, not have known that the Central Committee regarded the July demonstration

only as a means of sounding the enemy, that the Central Committee (and Lenin) did not want to convert, did not even think of converting, the demonstration into an uprising at a time when the Soviets in the capitals still supported the defencists. It is quite possible that some Bolsheviks did whimper over the July defeat. I know, for example, that some of the Bolsheviks who were arrested at the time were even prepared to desert our ranks. But to draw inferences from this against certain supposed "rights," supposed to be members of the Central Committee, is a shameful distortion of history.

Trotsky is wrong in declaring that during the Kornilov days a section of the Party leaders inclined towards the formation of a bloc with the defencists, towards supporting the Provisional Government. He, of course, is referring to those same alleged "rights" who keep him awake at night. Trotsky is wrong, for there exist documents, such as the Central Organ of the Party of that time, which refute his statements. Trotsky refers to Lenin's letter to the Central Committee warning against supporting Kerensky; but Trotsky fails to understand Lenin's letters, their significance, their purpose. In his letters Lenin sometimes deliberately ran ahead, pushing into the forefront mistakes that might *possibly* be committed, and criticizing them in advance with the object of warning the Party and of safeguarding it against mistakes. Sometimes he would even magnify a "trifle" and "make a mountain out of a molehill" for the same pedagogical purpose. The leader of the Party, especially if he is in hiding, cannot act otherwise, for he must see further than his comrades-in-arms, he must sound the alarm over every possible mistake, even over "trifles." But to infer from such letters of Lenin's (and he wrote quite a number of such letters) the existence of "tragic" disagreements and to trumpet them forth means not to understand Lenin's letters, means not to know Lenin. This, probably, explains why Trotsky sometimes is wide of the mark. In short: there were no disagreements in the Central Committee during the Kornilov revolt, absolutely none.

After the July defeat disagreement did indeed arise between the Central Committee and Lenin on the question of the future of the Soviets. It is known that Lenin, wishing to concentrate the Party's attention on the task of preparing the uprising outside the Soviets, warned against any infatuation with the latter, for he was of the opinion that, having been defiled by the defencists, they had become useless. The Central Committee and the Sixth Party Congress took a more cautious line and decided that there were no grounds for ex-

cluding the possibility that the Soviets would revive. The Kornilov revolt showed that this decision was correct. This disagreement, however, was of no great consequence for the Party. Later, Lenin admitted that the line taken by the Sixth Congress had been correct. It is interesting that Trotsky has not clutched at this disagreement and has not magnified it to “monstrous” proportions.

A united and solid party, the hub of the revolutionary mobilization of the masses — such was the picture presented by our Party in that period.

3) *The period of organization of the assault (September-October)*. The major facts of this period:

a) the convocation of the Democratic Conference and the collapse of the idea of a bloc with the Cadets;

b) the Moscow and Petrograd Soviets go over to the side of the Bolsheviks;

c) the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region⁵⁴; the Petrograd Soviet decides against the withdrawal of the troops;

d) the decision of the Central Committee on the uprising and the formation of the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet;

e) the Petrograd garrison decides to render the Petrograd Soviet armed support; a network of commissars of the Revolutionary Military Committee is organized;

f) the Bolshevik armed forces go into action; the members of the Provisional Government are arrested;

g) the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet takes power; the Second Congress of Soviets sets up the Council of People's Commissars.

The characteristic feature of this period is the rapid growth of the crisis, the utter consternation reigning among the ruling circles, the isolation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and the mass flight of the vacillating elements to the side of the Bolsheviks. A peculiar feature of the tactics of the revolution in this period must be noted, namely, that the revolution strove to take every, or nearly every, step in its attack in the guise of defence. Undoubtedly, the refusal to allow the troops to be withdrawn from Petrograd was an important step in the revolution's attack; nevertheless, this attack was carried out under the slogan of protecting Petrograd from possible attack by the external enemy. Undoubtedly, the formation of the Revolutionary Military Committee was a still more important step in the attack upon the Provisional Government; nevertheless, it was

carried out under the slogan of organizing Soviet control over the actions of the Headquarters of the Military Area. Undoubtedly, the open transition of the garrison to the side of the Revolutionary Military Committee and the organization of a network of Soviet Commissars marked the beginning of the uprising; nevertheless, the revolution took these steps under the slogan of protecting the Petrograd Soviet from possible action by the counter-revolution. The revolution, as it were, masked its actions in attack under the cloak of defence in order the more easily to draw the irresolute, vacillating elements into its orbit. This, no doubt, explains the outwardly defensive character of the speeches, articles and slogans of that period, the inner content of which, nonetheless, was of a profoundly attacking nature.

Were there disagreements in the Central Committee in that period? Yes, there were, and fairly important ones at that. I have already spoken about the disagreements over the uprising. They are fully reflected in the minutes of the meetings of the Central Committee of October 10 and 16. I shall, therefore, not repeat what I have already said. Three questions must now be dealt with: participation in the Pre-parliament, the role of the Soviets in the uprising, and the date of the uprising. This is all the more necessary because Trotsky, in his zeal to push himself into a prominent place, has "inadvertently" misrepresented the stand Lenin took on the last two questions.

Undoubtedly, the disagreements on the question of the Pre-parliament were of a serious nature. What was, so to speak, the aim of the Pre-parliament? It was: to help the bourgeoisie to push the Soviets into the background and to lay the foundations of bourgeois parliamentarism. Whether the Pre-parliament could have accomplished this task in the revolutionary situation that had arisen is another matter. Events showed that this aim could not be realized, and the Pre-parliament itself was a Kornilovite abortion. There can be no doubt, however, that it was precisely this aim that the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries pursued in setting up the Pre-parliament. What could the Bolsheviks' participation in the Pre-parliament mean under those circumstances? Nothing but deceiving the proletarian masses about the true nature of the Pre-parliament. This is the chief explanation for the passion with which Lenin, in his letters, scourged those who were in favour of taking part in the Pre-parliament. There can be no doubt that it was a grave mistake to have taken part in the Pre-parliament.

It would be a mistake, however, to think, as Trotsky does, that

those who were in favour of taking part in the Pre-parliament went into it for the purpose of constructive work, for the purpose of “directing the working-class movement” “into the channel of social-democracy.” That is not at all the case. It is not true. Had that been the case, the Party would not have been able to rectify this mistake “in two ticks” by demonstratively walking out of the Pre-parliament. Incidentally, the swift rectification of this mistake was an expression of our Party’s vitality and revolutionary might.

And now, permit me to correct a slight inaccuracy that has crept into the report of Lentsner, the “editor” of Trotsky’s works, about the meeting of the Bolshevik group at which a decision on the question of the Pre-parliament was taken. Lentsner says that there were two reporters at this meeting, Kamenev and Trotsky. That is not true. Actually, there were four reporters: two in favour of boycotting the Pre-parliament (Trotsky and Stalin), and two in favour of participation (Kamenev and Nogin).

Trotsky is in a still worse position when dealing with the stand Lenin took on the question of the form of the uprising. According to Trotsky, it appears that Lenin’s view was that the Party should take power in October “independently of and behind the back of the Soviet.” Later on, criticizing this nonsense, which he ascribes to Lenin, Trotsky “cuts capers” and finally delivers the following condescending utterance: “That would have been a mistake.” Trotsky is here uttering a falsehood about Lenin, he is misrepresenting Lenin’s views on the role of the Soviets in the uprising. A pile of documents can be cited, showing that Lenin proposed that power be taken *through* the Soviets, either the Petrograd or the Moscow Soviet, and not *behind the back* of the Soviets. Why did Trotsky have to invent this more than strange legend about Lenin?

Nor is Trotsky in a better position when he “analyses” the stand taken by the Central Committee and Lenin on the question of the date of the uprising. Reporting the famous meeting of the Central Committee of October 10, Trotsky asserts that at that meeting “a resolution was carried to the effect that the uprising should take place not later than October 15.” From this it appears that the Central Committee fixed October 15 as the date of the uprising and then itself violated that decision by postponing the date of the uprising to October 25. Is that true? No, it is not. During that period the Central Committee passed only two resolutions on the uprising — one on October 10 and the other on October 16. Let us read these resolutions.

The Central Committee's resolution of October 10:

“The Central Committee recognizes that the international position of the Russian revolution (the mutiny in the German navy, which is an extreme manifestation of the growth throughout Europe of the world socialist revolution, and the threat of peace* between the imperialists with the object of strangling the revolution in Russia) as well as the military situation (the indubitable decision of the Russian bourgeoisie and Kerensky and Co. to surrender Petrograd to the Germans), and the fact that the proletarian party has gained a majority in the Soviets — all this, taken in conjunction with the peasant revolt and the swing of popular confidence towards our Party (the elections in Moscow), and, finally, the obvious preparations being made for a second Kornilov affair (the withdrawal of troops from Petrograd, the dispatch of Cossacks to Petrograd, the surrounding of Minsk by Cossacks. etc.) — all this places an armed uprising on the order of the day.

“Considering, therefore, that an armed uprising is inevitable, and that the time for it is fully ripe, the Central Committee instructs all Party organizations to be guided accordingly, and to discuss and decide all practical questions (the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region, the withdrawal of troops from Petrograd, the actions of the people in Moscow and Minsk, etc.) from this point of view.”⁵⁵

The resolution adopted by the conference of the Central Committee with responsible workers on October 16:

“This meeting fully welcomes and wholly supports the Central Committee's resolution, calls upon all organizations and all workers and soldiers to make thorough and most intense preparations for an armed uprising and for support of the centre set up by the Central Committee for this purpose, and expresses complete confidence that the Central Committee and the Soviet will in good time indicate the favourable moment and the suitable means for launching the attack.”⁵⁶

You see that Trotsky's memory betrayed him about the date of the uprising and the Central Committee's resolution on the uprising.

Trotsky is absolutely wrong in asserting that Lenin underrated Soviet legality, that Lenin failed to appreciate the great importance of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets taking power on October 25, and that this was the reason why he insisted that power be taken before October 25. That is not true. Lenin proposed that power be taken before October 25 for two reasons. Firstly, because the counter-revolutionaries might have surrendered Petrograd at any moment, which would have drained the blood of the developing uprising, and so every day was precious. Secondly, because the mistake made by

* Obviously, this should be “a separate peace.” — *J. St.*

the Petrograd Soviet in *openly* fixing and announcing the day of the uprising (October 25) could not be rectified in any other way than by actually launching the uprising *before* the legal date set for it. The fact of the matter is that Lenin regarded insurrection as an art, and he could not help knowing that the enemy, informed about the date of the uprising (owing to the carelessness of the Petrograd Soviet) would certainly try to prepare for that day. Consequently, it was necessary to forestall the enemy, i.e., without fail to launch the uprising *before* the legal date. This is the chief explanation for the passion with which Lenin in his letters scourged those who made a fetish of the date — October 25. Events showed that Lenin was absolutely right. It is well known that the uprising was launched prior to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. It is well known that power was actually taken before the opening of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and it was taken not by the Congress of Soviets, but by the Petrograd Soviet, by the Revolutionary Military Committee. The Congress of Soviets merely *took over* power from the Petrograd Soviet. That is why Trotsky's lengthy arguments about the importance of Soviet legality are quite beside the point.

A virile and mighty party standing at the head of the revolutionary masses who were storming and overthrowing bourgeois rule — such was the state of our Party in that period.

That is how matters stand with the legends about the preparation for October.

III

TROTSKYISM OR LENINISM?

We have dealt above with the legends directed against the Party and those about Lenin spread by Trotsky and his supporters in connection with October and the preparation for it. We have exposed and refuted these legends. But the question arises: For what purpose did Trotsky need all these legends about October and the preparation for October, about Lenin and the Party of Lenin? What is the purpose of Trotsky's new literary pronouncements against the Party? What is the sense, the purpose, the aim of these pronouncements now, when the Party does not want a discussion, when the Party is busy with a host of urgent tasks, when the Party needs united efforts to restore our economy and not a new struggle around old questions? For what purpose does Trotsky need to drag the Party back,

to new discussions?

Trotsky asserts that all this is needed for the purpose of “studying” October. But is it not possible to study October without giving another kick at the Party and its leader Lenin? What sort of a “history” of October is it that begins and ends with attempts to discredit the chief leader of the October uprising, to discredit the Party, which organized and carried through the uprising? No, it is not a matter here of studying October. *That* is not the way to study October. *That* is not the way to write the history of October. Obviously, there is a different “design” here, and everything goes to show that this “design” is that Trotsky by his literary pronouncements is making another (yet another!) attempt to create the conditions for substituting Trotskyism for Leninism. Trotsky needs “desperately” to discredit the Party, and its cadres who carried through the uprising, in order, after discrediting the Party, to proceed to discredit Leninism. And it is necessary for him to discredit Leninism in order to drag in Trotskyism as the “sole” “proletarian” (don’t laugh!) ideology. All this, of course (oh of course!) under the flag of Leninism, so that the dragging operation may be performed “as painlessly as possible.”

That is the essence of Trotsky’s latest literary pronouncements.

That is why those literary pronouncements of Trotsky’s sharply raise the question of Trotskyism.

And so, what is Trotskyism?

Trotskyism possesses three specific features which bring it into irreconcilable contradiction with Leninism.

What are these features?

Firstly. Trotskyism is the theory of “permanent” (uninterrupted) revolution. But what is permanent revolution in its Trotskyist interpretation? It is revolution that fails to take the poor peasantry into account as a revolutionary force. Trotsky’s “permanent” revolution is, as Lenin said, “skipping” the peasant movement, “playing at the seizure of power.” Why is it dangerous? Because such a revolution, if an attempt had been made to bring it about, would inevitably have ended in failure, for it would have divorced from the Russian proletariat its ally, the poor peasantry. This explains the struggle that Leninism has been waging against Trotskyism ever since 1905.

How does Trotsky appraise Leninism from the standpoint of this struggle? He regards it as a theory that possesses “anti-revolutionary features.” What is this indignant opinion about Leninism based on? On the fact that at the proper time Leninism advocated and upheld the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and *peasantry*.

But Trotsky does not confine himself to this indignant opinion. He goes further and asserts: "The entire edifice of Leninism at the present time is built on lies and falsification and bears within itself the poisonous elements of its own decay" (see Trotsky's letter to Chkheidze, 1913). As you see, we have before us two opposite lines.

Secondly. Trotskyism is distrust of the Bolshevik Party principle, of the monolithic character of the Party, of its hostility towards opportunist elements. In the sphere of organization, Trotskyism is the theory that revolutionaries and opportunists can co-exist and form groups and coteries within a single party. You are, no doubt, familiar with the history of Trotsky's August bloc, in which the Martovites and Otzovists, the Liquidators and Trotskyites, happily cooperated, pretending that they were a "real" party. It is well known that this patchwork "party" pursued the aim of destroying the Bolshevik Party. What was the nature of "our disagreements" at that time? It was that Leninism regarded the destruction of the August bloc as a guarantee of the development of the proletarian party, whereas Trotskyism regarded that bloc as the basis for building a "real" party.

Again, as you see, we have two opposite lines.

Thirdly. Trotskyism is distrust of the leaders of Bolshevism, an attempt to discredit, to defame them. I do not know of a single trend in the Party that could compare with Trotskyism in the matter of discrediting the leaders of Leninism or the central institutions of the Party. For example, what should be said of Trotsky's "polite" opinion of Lenin, whom he described as "a professional exploiter of every kind of backwardness in the Russian working-class movement" (*Ibid.*)? And this is far from being the most "polite" of the "polite" opinions Trotsky has expressed.

How could it happen that Trotsky, who carried such a nasty stock-in-trade on his back, found himself, after all, in the ranks of the Bolsheviks during the October movement? It happened because at that time Trotsky abandoned (actually did abandon) that stock-in-trade; he hid it in the cupboard. Had he not performed that "operation," real cooperation with him would have been impossible. The theory of the August bloc, i.e., the theory of unity with the Mensheviks, had already been shattered and thrown overboard by the revolution, for how could there be any talk about unity when an armed struggle was raging between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks? Trotsky had no alternative but to admit that this theory was useless.

The same misadventure "happened" to the theory of permanent

revolution, for not a single Bolshevik contemplated the immediate seizure of power on the morrow of the February Revolution, and Trotsky could not help knowing that the Bolsheviks would not allow him, in the words of Lenin, "to play at the seizure of power." Trotsky had no alternative but recognize the Bolsheviks' policy of fighting for influence in the Soviets, of fighting to win over the peasantry. As regards the third specific feature of Trotskyism (distrust of the Bolshevik leaders), it naturally had to retire into the background owing to the obvious failure of the first two features.

Under those circumstances, could Trotsky do anything else but hide his stock-in-trade in the cupboard and follow the Bolsheviks, considering that he had no group of his own of any significance, and that he came to the Bolsheviks as a political individual, without an army? Of course, he could not!

What is the lesson to be learnt from this? Only one: that prolonged collaboration between the Leninists and Trotsky is possible only if the latter completely abandons his old stock-in-trade, only if he completely accepts Leninism. Trotsky writes about the lessons of October, but he forgets that, in addition to all the other lessons, there is one more lesson of October, the one I have just mentioned, which is of prime importance for Trotskyism. Trotskyism ought to learn that lesson of October too.

It is evident, however, that Trotskyism has not learnt that lesson. The fact of the matter is that the old stock-in-trade of Trotskyism that was hidden in the cupboard in the period of the October movement is now being dragged into the light again in the hope that a market will be found for it, seeing that the market in our country is expanding. Undoubtedly, Trotsky's new literary pronouncements are an attempt to revert to Trotskyism, to "overcome" Leninism, to drag in, implant, all the specific features of Trotskyism. The new Trotskyism is not a mere repetition of the old Trotskyism; its feathers have been plucked and it is rather bedraggled; it is incomparably milder in spirit and more moderate in form than the old Trotskyism; but, in essence, it undoubtedly retains all the specific features of the old Trotskyism. The new Trotskyism does not dare to come out as a militant force against Leninism; it prefers to operate under the common flag of Leninism, under the slogan of interpreting, improving Leninism. That is because it is weak. It cannot be regarded as an accident that the appearance of the new Trotskyism coincided with Lenin's departure. In Lenin's lifetime it would not have dared to take this risky step.

What are the characteristic features of the new Trotskyism?

1) *On the question of "permanent" revolution.* The new Trotskyism does not deem it necessary openly to uphold the theory of "permanent" revolution. It "simply" asserts that the October Revolution fully confirmed the idea of "permanent" revolution. From this it draws the following conclusion: the important and acceptable part of Leninism is the part that came after the war, in the period of the October Revolution; on the other hand, the part of Leninism that existed before the war, before the October Revolution, is wrong and unacceptable. Hence, the Trotskyites' theory of the division of Leninism into two parts: prewar Leninism, the "old," "useless" Leninism with its idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, and the new, postwar, October Leninism, which they count on adapting to the requirements of Trotskyism. Trotskyism needs this theory of the division of Leninism as a first, more or less "acceptable" step that is necessary to facilitate further steps in its struggle against Leninism.

But Leninism is not an eclectic theory stuck together out of diverse elements and capable of being cut into parts. Leninism is an integral theory, which arose in 1903, has passed the test of three revolutions, and is now being carried forward as the battle flag of the world proletariat.

"Bolshevism," Lenin said, "as a trend of political thought and as a political party, has existed since 1903. Only the history of Bolshevism during the *whole* period of its existence can satisfactorily explain why it was able to build up and to maintain under most difficult conditions the iron discipline needed for the victory of the proletariat" (see Vol. XXV, p. 174).

Bolshevism and Leninism are one. They are two names for one and the same thing. Hence, the theory of the division of Leninism into two parts is a theory intended to destroy Leninism, to substitute Trotskyism for Leninism.

Needless to say, the Party cannot reconcile itself to this grotesque theory.

2) *On the question of the Party principle.* The old Trotskyism tried to undermine the Bolshevik Party principle by means of the theory (and practice) of unity with the Mensheviks. But that theory has suffered such disgrace that nobody now even wants to mention it. To undermine the Party principle, present-day Trotskyism has invented the new, less odious and almost "democratic" theory of contrasting the old cadres to the younger

Party members. According to Trotskyism, our Party has not a single and integral history. Trotskyism divides the history of our Party into two parts of unequal importance: pre-October and post-October. The pre-October part of the history of our Party is, properly speaking, not history, but “pre-history,” the unimportant or, at all events, not very important preparatory period of our Party. The post-October part of the history of our Party, however, is real, genuine history. In the former, there are the “old,” “pre-historic,” unimportant cadres of our Party. In the latter there is the new, real, “historic” Party. It scarcely needs proof that this singular scheme of the history of the Party is a scheme to disrupt the unity between the old and the new cadres of our Party, a scheme to destroy the Bolshevik Party principle.

Needless to say, the Party cannot reconcile itself to this grotesque scheme.

3) *On the question of the leaders of Bolshevism.* The old Trotskyism tried to discredit Lenin more or less openly, without fearing the consequences. The new Trotskyism is more cautious. It tries to achieve the purpose of the old Trotskyism by pretending to praise, to exalt Lenin. I think it is worthwhile quoting a few examples.

The Party knows that Lenin was a relentless revolutionary; but it knows also that he was cautious, that he disliked reckless people and often, with a firm hand, restrained those who were infatuated with terrorism, including Trotsky himself. Trotsky touches on this subject in his book *On Lenin*, but from his portrayal of Lenin one might think that all Lenin did was “at every opportunity to din into people’s minds the idea that terrorism was inevitable.” The impression is created that Lenin was the most bloodthirsty of all the bloodthirsty Bolsheviks.

For what purpose did Trotsky need this uncalled-for and totally unjustified exaggeration?

The Party knows that Lenin was an exemplary Party man, who did not like to settle questions alone, without the leading collective body, on the spur of the moment, without careful investigation and verification. Trotsky touches upon this aspect, too, in his book. But the portrait he paints is not that of Lenin, but of a sort of Chinese mandarin, who settles important questions in the quiet of his study, by intuition.

Do you want to know how our Party settled the question of dispersing the Constituent Assembly? Listen to Trotsky:

“Of course, the Constituent Assembly will have to be dispersed,” said

Lenin, 'but what about the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries?'

"But our apprehensions were greatly allayed by old Natanson. He came in to 'take counsel' with us, and after the first few words he said:

"We shall probably have to disperse the Constituent Assembly by force.'

"'Bravo!' exclaimed Lenin. 'What is true is true! But will your people agree to it?'

"'Some of our people are wavering, but I think that in the end they will agree,' answered Natanson."

That is how history is written.

Do you want to know how the Party settled the question about the Supreme Military Council? Listen to Trotsky:

"'Unless we have serious and experienced military experts we shall never extricate ourselves from this chaos,' I said to Vladimir Ilyich after every visit to the Staff.

"'That is evidently true, but they might betray us...'

"'Let us attach a commissar to each of them.'

"'Two would be better,' exclaimed Lenin, 'and strong handed ones. There surely must be strong-handed communists in our ranks.'

"That is how the structure of the Supreme Military Council arose."

That is how Trotsky writes history.

Why did Trotsky need these "Arabian Nights" stories derogatory to Lenin? Was it to exalt V.I. Lenin, the leader of the Party? It doesn't look like it.

The Party knows that Lenin was the greatest Marxist of our times, a profound theoretician and a most experienced revolutionary, to whom any trace of Blanquism was alien. Trotsky touches upon this aspect, too, in his book. But the portrait he paints is not that of the giant Lenin, but of a dwarf like Blanquist who, in the October days, advises the Party "to take power by its own hand, independently of and behind the back of the Soviet." I have already said, however, that there is not a scrap of truth in this description.

Why did Trotsky need this flagrant... inaccuracy? Is this not an attempt to discredit Lenin "just a little"?

Such are the characteristic features of the new Trotskyism.

What is the danger of this new Trotskyism? It is that Trotskyism, owing to its entire inner content, stands every chance of becoming the centre and rallying point of the non-proletarian elements who are striving to weaken, to disintegrate the proletarian dictatorship.

You will ask: what is to be done now? What are the Party's immediate tasks in connection with Trotsky's new literary pronounce-

ments?

Trotskyism is taking action now in order to discredit Bolshevism and to undermine its foundations. It is the duty of the Party *to bury Trotskyism as an ideological trend.*

There is talk about repressive measures against the opposition and about the possibility of a split. That is nonsense, comrades. Our Party is strong and mighty. It will not allow any splits. As regards repressive measures, I am emphatically opposed to them. What we need now is not repressive measures, but an extensive ideological struggle against renascent Trotskyism.

We did not want and did not strive for this literary discussion. Trotskyism is forcing it upon us by its anti-Leninist pronouncements. Well, we are ready, comrades.

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE TACTICS OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISTS

(Preface to the Book "On the Road to October"⁵⁷)

December 1924

I

THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SETTING FOR THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

Three circumstances of an external nature determined the comparative ease with which the proletarian revolution in Russia succeeded in breaking the chains of imperialism and thus overthrowing the rule of the bourgeoisie.

Firstly, the circumstance that the October Revolution began in a period of desperate struggle between the two principal imperialist groups, the Anglo-French and the Austro-German; at a time when, engaged in mortal struggle between themselves, these two groups had neither the time nor the means to devote serious attention to the struggle against the October Revolution. This circumstance was of tremendous importance for the October Revolution; for it enabled it to take advantage of the fierce conflicts within the imperialist world to strengthen and organize its own forces.

Secondly, the circumstance that the October Revolution began during the imperialist war, at a time when the labouring masses, exhausted by the war and thirsting for peace, were by the very logic of facts led up to the proletarian revolution as the only way out of the war. This circumstance was of extreme importance for the October Revolution; for it put into its hands the mighty weapon of peace, made it easier for it to link the Soviet revolution with the ending of the hated war, and thus created mass sympathy for it both in the West, among the workers, and in the East, among the oppressed peoples.

Thirdly, the existence of a powerful working-class movement in Europe and the fact that a revolutionary crisis was maturing in the West and in the East, brought on by the protracted imperialist war. This circumstance was of inestimable importance for the revolution

in Russia; for it ensured the revolution faithful allies outside Russia in its struggle against world imperialism.

But in addition to circumstances of an external nature, there were also a number of favourable internal conditions which facilitated the victory of the October Revolution.

Of these conditions, the following must be regarded as the chief ones:

Firstly, the October Revolution enjoyed the most active support of the overwhelming majority of the working class in Russia.

Secondly, it enjoyed the undoubted support of the poor peasants and of the majority of the soldiers, who were thirsting for peace and land.

Thirdly, it had at its head, as its guiding force, such a tried and tested party as the Bolshevik Party, strong not only by reason of its experience and discipline acquired through the years, but also by reason of its vast connections with the labouring masses.

Fourthly, the October Revolution was confronted by enemies who were comparatively easy to overcome, such as the rather weak Russian bourgeoisie, a landlord class which was utterly demoralized by peasant "revolts," and the compromising parties (the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries), which had become completely bankrupt during the war.

Fifthly, it had at its disposal the vast expanses of the young state, in which it was able to manoeuvre freely, retreat when circumstances so required, enjoy a respite, gather strength, etc.

Sixthly, in its struggle against counter-revolution the October Revolution could count upon sufficient resources of food, fuel and raw materials within the country.

The combination of these external and internal circumstances created that peculiar situation which determined the comparative ease with which the October Revolution won its victory.

This does not mean, of course, that there were no unfavourable features in the external and internal setting of the October Revolution. Think of such an unfavourable feature as, for example, the isolation, to some extent, of the October Revolution, the absence near it, or bordering on it, of a Soviet country on which it could rely for support. Undoubtedly, the future revolution, for example, in Germany, will be in a more favourable situation in this respect, for it has in close proximity a powerful Soviet country like our Soviet Union. I need not mention so unfavourable a feature of the October Revolution as the absence of a proletarian majority within the country.

But these unfavourable features only emphasize the tremendous importance of the peculiar internal and external conditions of the October Revolution of which I have spoken above.

These peculiar conditions must not be lost sight of for a single moment. They must be borne in mind particularly in analysing the events of the autumn of 1923 in Germany. Above all, they should be borne in mind by Trotsky, who draws an unfounded analogy between the October Revolution and the revolution in Germany and lashes violently at the German Communist Party for its actual and alleged mistakes.

“It was easy for Russia,” says Lenin, “in the specific, historically very special situation of 1917, to *start* the socialist revolution, but it will be more difficult for Russia than for the European countries to *continue* the revolution and carry it through to the end. I had occasion to point this out already at the beginning of 1918, and our experience of the past two years has entirely confirmed the correctness of this view. Such specific conditions, as 1) the possibility of linking up the Soviet revolution with the ending, as a consequence of this revolution, of the imperialist war, which had exhausted the workers and peasants to an incredible degree; 2) the possibility of taking advantage for a certain time of the mortal conflict between two world-powerful groups of imperialist robbers, who were unable to unite against their Soviet enemy; 3) the possibility of enduring a comparatively lengthy civil war, partly owing to the enormous size of the country and to the poor means of communication; 4) the existence of such a profound bourgeois-democratic revolutionary movement among the peasantry that the party of the proletariat was able to take the revolutionary demands of the peasant party (the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the majority of the members of which were definitely hostile to Bolshevism) and realize them at once, thanks to the conquest of political power by the proletariat — such specific conditions do not exist in Western Europe at present; and a repetition of such or similar conditions will not come so easily. That, by the way, apart from a number of other causes, is why it will be more difficult for Western Europe to *start* a socialist revolution than it was for us” (See Vol. XXV, p. 205).

These words of Lenin’s should not be forgotten.

II

TWO SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION — OR OCTOBER AND TROTSKY’S THEORY OF “PERMANENT” REVOLUTION

There are two specific features of the October Revolution which must be understood first of all if we are to comprehend the inner meaning and the historical significance of that revolution.

What are these features?

Firstly, the fact that the dictatorship of the proletariat was born in our country as a power which came into existence on the basis of an alliance between the proletariat and the labouring masses of the peasantry, the latter being led by the proletariat. Secondly, the fact that the dictatorship of the proletariat became established in our country as a result of the victory of socialism in one country — a country in which capitalism was little developed — while capitalism was preserved in other countries where capitalism was more highly developed. This does not mean, of course, that the October Revolution has no other specific features. But it is precisely these two specific features that are important for us at the present moment, not only because they distinctly express the essence of the October Revolution, but also because they brilliantly reveal the opportunist nature of the theory of “permanent revolution.”

Let us briefly examine these features.

The question of the labouring masses of the petty bourgeoisie, both urban and rural, the question of winning these masses to the side of the proletariat, is highly important for the proletarian revolution. Whom will the labouring people of town and country support in the struggle for power, the bourgeoisie or the proletariat; whose reserve will they become, the reserve of the bourgeoisie or the reserve of the proletariat — on this depend the fate of the revolution and the stability of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The revolutions in France in 1848 and 1871 came to grief chiefly because the peasant reserves proved to be on the side of the bourgeoisie. The October Revolution was victorious because it was able to deprive the bourgeoisie of its peasant reserves, because it was able to win these reserves to the side of the proletariat, and because in this revolution the proletariat proved to be the only guiding force for the vast masses of the labouring people of town and country.

He who has not understood this will never understand either the character of the October Revolution, or the nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat, or the specific characteristics of the internal policy of our proletarian power.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is not simply a governmental top stratum “skilfully” “selected” by the careful hand of an “experienced strategist,” and “judiciously relying” on the support of one

section or another of the population. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the class alliance between the proletariat and the labouring masses of the peasantry for the purpose of overthrowing capital, for achieving the final victory of socialism, on the condition that the guiding force of this alliance is the proletariat.

Thus, it is not a question of “slightly” underestimating or “slightly” overestimating the revolutionary potentialities of the peasant movement, as certain diplomatic advocates of “permanent revolution” are now fond of expressing it. It is a question of the nature of the new proletarian state which arose as a result of the October Revolution. It is a question of the character of the proletarian power, of the foundations of the dictatorship of the proletariat itself.

“The dictatorship of the proletariat,” says Lenin, “is a special form of class alliance between the proletariat, the vanguard of the working people, and the numerous non-proletarian strata of working people (the petty bourgeoisie, the small proprietors, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, etc.), or the majority of these; it is an alliance against capital, an alliance aiming at the complete overthrow of capital, at the complete suppression of the resistance of the bourgeoisie and of any attempt on its part at restoration, an alliance aiming at the final establishment and consolidation of socialism” (see Vol. XXIV, p. 311).

And further on:

“The dictatorship of the proletariat, if we translate this Latin, scientific, historical-philosophical term into simpler language, means the following:

“Only a definite class, namely, the urban workers and the factory, industrial workers in general, is able to lead the whole mass of the toilers and exploited in the struggle for the overthrow of the yoke of capital, in the process of the overthrow itself, in the struggle to maintain and consolidate the victory, in the work of creating the new, socialist social system, in the whole struggle for the complete abolition of classes” (see Vol. XXIV, p. 336).

Such is the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat given by Lenin.

One of the specific features of the October Revolution is the fact that this revolution represents a classic application of Lenin’s theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Some comrades believe that this theory is a purely “Russian” theory, applicable only to Russian conditions. That is wrong. It is absolutely wrong. In speaking of the labouring masses of the non-proletarian classes which are led by the proletariat, Lenin has in mind not only the Russian peasants, but also the labouring elements of the border regions of the Soviet Union, which until recently were

colonies of Russia. Lenin constantly reiterated that without an alliance with these masses of other nationalities the proletariat of Russia could not achieve victory. In his articles on the national question and in his speeches at the congresses of the Comintern, Lenin repeatedly said that the victory of the world revolution was impossible without a revolutionary alliance, a revolutionary bloc, between the proletariat of the advanced countries and the oppressed peoples of the enslaved colonies. But what are colonies if not the oppressed labouring masses, and, primarily, the labouring masses of the peasantry? Who does not know that the question of the liberation of the colonies is *essentially* a question of the liberation of the labouring masses of the non-proletarian classes from the oppression and exploitation of finance capital?

But from this it follows that Lenin's theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat is not a purely "Russian" theory, but a theory which necessarily applies to all countries. Bolshevism is not only a Russian phenomenon. "Bolshevism," says Lenin, is "*a model of tactics for all*" (see Vol. XXIII, p. 386).

Such are the characteristics of the first specific feature of the October Revolution.

How do matters stand with regard to Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution" in the light of this specific feature of the October Revolution?

We shall not dwell at length on Trotsky's position in 1905, when he "simply" forgot all about the peasantry as a revolutionary force and advanced the slogan of "no Tsar, but a workers' government," that is, the slogan of revolution without the peasantry. Even Radek, that diplomatic defender of "permanent revolution," is now obliged to admit that "permanent revolution" in 1905 meant a "leap into the air" away from reality. Now, apparently everyone admits that it is not worthwhile bothering with this "leap into the air" any more.

Nor shall we dwell at length on Trotsky's position in the period of the war, say, in 1915, when, in his article "The Struggle for Power," proceeding from the fact that "we are living in the era of imperialism," that imperialism "sets up not the bourgeois nation in opposition to the old regime, but the proletariat in opposition to the bourgeois nation," he arrived at the conclusion that the revolutionary role of the peasantry was bound to subside, that the slogan of the confiscation of the land no longer had the same importance as formerly. It is well known that at that time, Lenin, examining this article of Trotsky's, accused him of "denying" "the role of the peasant-

ry,” and said that “Trotsky is in fact helping the liberal labour politicians in Russia who understand ‘denial’ of the role of the peasantry to mean *refusal* to rouse the peasants to revolution!” (see Vol. XVIII, p. 318).

Let us rather pass on to the later works of Trotsky on this subject, to the works of the period when the proletarian dictatorship had already become established and when Trotsky had had the opportunity to test his theory of “permanent revolution” in the light of actual events and to correct his errors. Let us take Trotsky’s “Preface” to his book *The Year 1905*, written in 1922. Here is what Trotsky says in this “Preface” concerning “permanent revolution”:

“It was precisely during the interval between January 9 and the October strike of 1905 that the views on the character of the revolutionary development of Russia which came to be known as the theory of ‘permanent revolution’ crystallized in the author’s mind. This abstruse term represented the idea that the Russian revolution, whose immediate objectives were bourgeois in nature, could not, however, stop when these objectives had been achieved. The revolution would not be able to solve its immediate bourgeois problems except by placing the proletariat in power. And the latter, upon assuming power, would not be able to confine itself to the bourgeois limits of the revolution. On the contrary, precisely in order to ensure its victory, the proletarian vanguard would be forced in the very early stages of its rule to make deep inroads not only into feudal property but into bourgeois property as well. In this it would come into *hostile collision* not only with all the bourgeois groupings which supported the proletariat during the first stages of its revolutionary struggle, but also *with the broad masses of the peasantry* with whose assistance it came into power. The contradictions in the position of a workers’ government in a backward country with an overwhelmingly peasant population could be solved *only* on an international scale, in the arena of the world proletarian revolution.”*

That is what Trotsky says about his “permanent revolution.”

One need only compare this quotation with the above quotations from Lenin’s works on the dictatorship of the proletariat to perceive the great chasm that separates Lenin’s theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat from Trotsky’s theory of “permanent revolution.”

Lenin speaks of the *alliance* between the proletariat and the labouring strata of the peasantry as the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Trotsky sees a “*hostile collision*” between “the proletarian vanguard” and “the broad masses of the peasantry.”

Lenin speaks of the *leadership* of the toiling and exploited masses

* My italics. — *J. St.*

by the proletariat. Trotsky sees “*contradictions* in the position of a workers’ government in a backward country with an overwhelmingly peasant population.”

According to Lenin, the revolution draws its strength primarily from among the workers and peasants of Russia itself. According to Trotsky, the necessary strength can be found *only* “in the arena of the world proletarian revolution.”

But what if the world revolution is fated to arrive with some delay? Is there any ray of hope for our revolution? Trotsky offers no ray of hope; for “the contradictions in the position of a workers’ government... could be solved *only*... in the arena of the world proletarian revolution.” According to this plan, there is but one prospect left for our revolution: to vegetate in its own contradictions and rot away while waiting for the world revolution.

What is the dictatorship of the proletariat according to Lenin?

The dictatorship of the proletariat is a power which rests on an alliance between the proletariat and the labouring masses of the peasantry for “the complete overthrow of capital” and for “the final establishment and consolidation of socialism.”

What is the dictatorship of the proletariat according to Trotsky?

The dictatorship of the proletariat is a power which comes “into hostile collision” with “the broad masses of the peasantry” and seeks the solution of its “contradictions” *only* “in the arena of the world proletarian revolution.”

What difference is there between this “theory of permanent revolution” and the well-known theory of Menshevism which repudiates the concept of dictatorship of the proletariat?

Essentially, there is no difference.

There can be no doubt at all. “Permanent revolution” is not a mere underestimation of the revolutionary potentialities of the peasant movement. “Permanent revolution” is an underestimation of the peasant movement which leads to the *repudiation* of Lenin’s theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Trotsky’s “permanent revolution” is a variety of Menshevism.

This is how matters stand with regard to the first specific feature of the October Revolution.

What are the characteristics of the second specific feature of the October Revolution?

In his study of imperialism, especially in the period of the war, Lenin arrived at the law of the uneven, spasmodic, economic and political development of the capitalist countries. According to this

law, the development of enterprises, trusts, branches of industry and individual countries proceeds not evenly — not according to an established sequence, not in such a way that one trust, one branch of industry or one country is always in advance of the others, while other trusts or countries keep consistently one behind the other — but spasmodically, with interruptions in the development of some countries and leaps ahead in the development of others. Under these circumstances the “quite legitimate” striving of the countries that have slowed down to hold their old positions, and the equally “legitimate” striving of the countries that have leapt ahead to seize new positions, lead to a situation in which armed clashes among the imperialist countries become an inescapable necessity. Such was the case, for example, with Germany, which half a century ago was a backward country in comparison with France and Britain. The same must be said of Japan as compared with Russia. It is well known, however, that by the beginning of the twentieth century Germany and Japan had leapt so far ahead that Germany had succeeded in overtaking France and had begun to press Britain hard on the world market, while Japan was pressing Russia. As is well known, it was from these contradictions that the recent imperialist war arose.

This law proceeds from the following:

1) “Capitalism has grown into a world system of colonial oppression and of the financial strangulation of the vast majority of the population of the world by a handful of ‘advanced’ countries” (see Preface to the French edition of Lenin’s *Imperialism*, Vol. XIX, p. 74);

2) “This ‘booty’ is shared between two or three powerful world robbers armed to the teeth (America, Britain, Japan), who involve the whole world in *their* war over the sharing of *their* booty” (*Ibid.*);

3) The growth of contradictions within the world system of financial oppression and the inevitability of armed clashes lead to the world front of imperialism becoming easily vulnerable to revolution, and to a breach in this front in individual countries becoming probable;

4) This breach is most likely to occur at those points, and in those countries, where the chain of the imperialist front is weakest, that is to say, where imperialism is least consolidated, and where it is easiest for a revolution to expand;

5) In view of this, the victory of socialism in one country, even if that country is less developed in the capitalist sense, while capitalism remains in other countries, even if those countries are more

highly developed in the capitalist sense — is quite possible and probable.

Such, briefly, are the foundations of Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution.

What is the second specific feature of the October Revolution?

The second specific feature of the October Revolution lies in the fact that this revolution represents a model of the practical application of Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution.

He who has not understood this specific feature of the October Revolution will never understand either the international nature of this revolution, or its colossal international might, or the specific features of its foreign policy.

“Uneven economic and political development,” says Lenin, “is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country taken separately. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and organized its own socialist production, would stand up *against* the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states.” For “the free union of nations in socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle of the socialist republics against the backward states” (see Vol. XVIII, pp. 232-33).

The opportunists of all countries assert that the proletarian revolution can begin — if it is to begin anywhere at all, according to their theory — only in industrially developed countries, and that the more highly developed these countries are industrially the more chances there are for the victory of socialism. Moreover, according to them, the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, and one in which capitalism is little developed at that, is excluded as something absolutely improbable. As far back as the period of the war, Lenin, taking as his basis the law of the uneven development of the imperialist states, opposed to the opportunists his theory of the proletarian revolution about the victory of socialism in one country, even if that country is one in which capitalism is less developed.

It is well known that the October Revolution fully confirmed the correctness of Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution.

How do matters stand with Trotsky's “permanent revolution” in the light of Lenin's theory of the victory of the proletarian revolution in one country?

Let us take Trotsky's pamphlet *Our Revolution* (1906).

Trotsky writes:

“Without direct state support from the European proletariat, the working class of Russia will not be able to maintain itself in power and to transform its temporary rule into a lasting socialist dictatorship. This we cannot doubt for an instant.”

What does this quotation mean? It means that the victory of socialism in one country, in this case Russia, is impossible “*without* direct state support from the European proletariat,” i.e., before the European proletariat has conquered power.

What is there in common between this “theory” and Lenin’s thesis on the possibility of the victory of socialism “in one capitalist country taken separately”?

Clearly, there is nothing in common.

But let us assume that Trotsky’s pamphlet, which was published in 1906, at a time when it was difficult to determine the character of our revolution, contains inadvertent errors and does not fully correspond to Trotsky’s views at a later period. Let us examine another pamphlet written by Trotsky, his *Peace Program*, which appeared before the October Revolution of 1917 and has now (1924) been republished in his book *The Year 1917*. In this pamphlet Trotsky criticizes Lenin’s theory of the proletarian revolution about the victory of socialism in one country and opposes to it the slogan of a United States of Europe. He asserts that the victory of socialism in one country is impossible, that the victory of socialism is possible only as the victory of several of the principal countries of Europe (Britain, Russia, Germany), which combine into a United States of Europe; otherwise it is not possible at all. He says quite plainly that “a victorious revolution in Russia or in Britain is inconceivable without a revolution in Germany, and vice versa.”

“The only more or less concrete historical argument,” says Trotsky, “advanced against the slogan of a United States of Europe was formulated in the Swiss *Sotsial-Demokrat* (at that time the central organ of the Bolsheviks — *J. St.*) in the following sentence: ‘Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism.’ From this the *Sotsial-Demokrat* draws the conclusion that the victory of socialism is possible in one country, and that therefore there is no reason to make the dictatorship of the proletariat in each separate country contingent upon the establishment of a United States of Europe. That capitalist development in different countries is uneven is an absolutely incontrovertible argument. But this unevenness is itself extremely uneven. The capitalist level of Britain, Austria, Germany or France is not identical. But in comparison with Africa and Asia all these

countries represent capitalist 'Europe,' which has grown ripe for the social revolution. That no country in its struggle must 'wait' for others, is an elementary thought which it is useful and necessary to reiterate in order that the idea of concurrent international action may not be replaced by the idea of temporizing international inaction. Without waiting for the others, we begin and continue the struggle nationally, in the full confidence that our initiative will give an impetus to the struggle in other countries; but if this should not occur, it would be hopeless to think — as historical experience and theoretical considerations testify — that, for example, a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe, or that a socialist Germany could exist in isolation in a capitalist world."

As you see, we have before us the same theory of the simultaneous victory of socialism in the principal countries of Europe which, as a rule, excludes Lenin's theory of revolution about the victory of socialism in one country.

It goes without saying that for the *complete* victory of socialism, for a *complete* guarantee against the restoration of the old order, the united efforts of the proletarians of several countries are necessary. It goes without saying that, without the support given to our revolution by the proletariat of Europe, the proletariat of Russia could not have held out against the general onslaught, just as without the support given by the revolution in Russia to the revolutionary movement in the West the latter could not have developed at the pace at which it has begun to develop since the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship in Russia. It goes without saying that we need support. But what does support of our revolution by the West-European proletariat imply? Is not the sympathy of the European workers for our revolution, their readiness to thwart the imperialists' plans of intervention — is not all this support, real assistance? Unquestionably it is. Without such support, without such assistance, not only from the European workers but also from the colonial and dependent countries, the proletarian dictatorship in Russia would have been hard pressed. Up to now, has this sympathy and this assistance, coupled with the might of our Red Army and the readiness of the workers and peasants of Russia to defend their socialist fatherland to the last — has all this been sufficient to beat off the attacks of the imperialists and to win us the necessary conditions for the serious work of construction? Yes, it has been sufficient. Is this sympathy growing stronger, or is it waning? Unquestionably, it is growing stronger. Hence, have we favourable conditions, not only for pushing on with the organizing of socialist economy, but also, in our turn, for giving support to the West-European workers and to the

oppressed peoples of the East? Yes, we have. This is eloquently proved by the seven years history of the proletarian dictatorship in Russia. Can it be denied that a mighty wave of labour enthusiasm has already risen in our country? No, it cannot be denied.

After all this, what does Trotsky's assertion that a revolutionary Russia could not hold out in the face of a conservative Europe signify?

It can signify only this: firstly, that Trotsky does not appreciate the inherent strength of our revolution; secondly, that Trotsky does not understand the inestimable importance of the moral support which is given to our revolution by the workers of the West and the peasants of the East; thirdly, that Trotsky does not perceive the internal infirmity which is consuming imperialism today.

Carried away by his criticism of Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution, Trotsky unwittingly dealt himself a smashing blow in his pamphlet *Peace Program* which appeared in 1917 and was republished in 1924.

But perhaps this pamphlet, too, has become out of date and has ceased for some reason or other to correspond to Trotsky's present views? Let us take his later works, written after the victory of the proletarian revolution in *one country*, in Russia. Let us take, for example, Trotsky's "Postscript," written in 1922, for the new edition of his pamphlet *Peace Program*. Here is what he says in this "Postscript":

"The assertion reiterated several times in the *Peace Program* that a proletarian revolution cannot culminate victoriously within national bounds may perhaps seem to some readers to have been refuted by the nearly five years' experience of our Soviet Republic. But such a conclusion would be unwarranted. The fact that the workers' state has held out against the whole world in one country, and a backward country at that, testifies to the colossal might of the proletariat, which in other, more advanced, more civilized countries will be truly capable of performing miracles. But while we have held our ground as a state politically and militarily, we have not arrived, or even begun to arrive, at the creation of a socialist society... As long as the bourgeoisie remains in power in the other European countries we shall be compelled, in our struggle against economic isolation, to strive for agreements with the capitalist world; at the same time it may be said with certainty that these agreements may at best help us to mitigate some of our economic ills, to take one or another step forward, but real progress of a socialist economy in Russia will become possible *only after the victory** of the prole-

* My italics. — *J. St.*

tariat in the major European countries.”

Well, then, since there is still no victory in the West, the only “choice” that remains for the revolution in Russia is: either to rot away or to degenerate into a bourgeois state.

It is no accident that Trotsky has been talking for two years now about the “degeneration” of our Party.

It is no accident that last year Trotsky prophesied the “doom” of our country.

How can this strange “theory” be reconciled with Lenin’s theory of the “victory of socialism in one country”?

How can this strange “prospect” be reconciled with Lenin’s view that the New Economic Policy will enable us “to build the foundations of socialist economy”?

How can this “permanent” hopelessness be reconciled, for instance, with the following words of Lenin:

“Socialism is no longer a matter of the distant future, or an abstract picture, or an icon. We still retain our old bad opinion of icons. We have dragged socialism into everyday life, and here we must find our way. This is the task of our day, the task of our epoch. Permit me to conclude by expressing the conviction that, difficult as this task may be, new as it may be compared with our previous task, and no matter how many difficulties it may entail, we shall all — not in one day, but in the course of several years — all of us together fulfil it whatever happens so that NEP Russia will become socialist Russia” (see Vol. XXVII, p. 366).

How can this “permanent” gloominess of Trotsky’s be reconciled, for instance, with the following words of Lenin:

“As a matter of fact, state power over all large-scale means of production, state power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this proletariat with the many millions of small and very small peasants, the assured leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat, etc. — is not this all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society from the cooperatives, from the cooperatives alone, which we formerly looked down upon as huckstering and which from a certain aspect we have the right to look down upon as such now, under NEP? Is this not all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society? This is not yet the building of socialist society, but it is all that is necessary and sufficient for this building” (see Vol. XXVII, p. 392).

It is plain that these two views are incompatible and cannot in any way be reconciled. Trotsky’s “permanent revolution” is the repudiation of Lenin’s theory of the proletarian revolution; and conversely, Lenin’s theory of the proletarian revolution is the repudia-

tion of the theory of “permanent revolution.”

Lack of faith in the strength and capacities of our revolution, lack of faith in the strength and capacity of the Russian proletariat — that is what lies at the root of the theory of “permanent revolution.”

Hitherto only *one* aspect of the theory of “permanent revolution” has usually been noted — lack of faith in the revolutionary potentialities of the peasant movement. Now, in fairness, this must be supplemented by *another* aspect — lack of faith in the strength and capacity of the proletariat in Russia.

What difference is there between Trotsky’s theory and the ordinary Menshevik theory that the victory of socialism in one country, and in a backward country at that, is impossible without the preliminary victory of the proletarian revolution “in the principal countries of Western Europe”?

Essentially, there is no difference.

There can be no doubt at all. Trotsky’s theory of “permanent revolution” is a variety of Menshevism.

Of late rotten diplomats have appeared in our press who try to palm off the theory of “permanent revolution” as something compatible with Leninism. Of course, they say, this theory proved to be worthless in 1905; but the mistake Trotsky made was that he ran too far ahead at that time, in an attempt to apply to the situation in 1905 what could not then be applied. But later, they say, in October 1917, for example, when the revolution had had time to mature completely, Trotsky’s theory proved to be quite appropriate. It is not difficult to guess that the chief of these diplomats is Radek. Here, if you please, is what he says:

“The war created a chasm between the peasantry, which was striving to win land and peace, and the petty-bourgeois parties; the war placed the peasantry under the leadership of the working class and of its vanguard the Bolshevik Party. This rendered possible, not the dictatorship of the working class and peasantry, but the dictatorship of the working class relying on the peasantry. What Rosa Luxemburg and Trotsky advanced against Lenin in 1905 (i.e., “permanent revolution” — *J. St.*) proved, as a matter of fact, to be the second stage of the historic development.”

Here every statement is a distortion.

It is not true that the war “rendered possible, not the dictatorship of the working class and peasantry, but the dictatorship of the working class relying on the peasantry.” Actually, the February Revolution of 1917 was the materialization of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, interwoven in a peculiar way with the dic-

tatorship of the bourgeoisie.

It is not true that the theory of “permanent revolution,” which Radek bashfully refrains from mentioning, was advanced in 1905 by Rosa Luxemburg and Trotsky. Actually, this theory was advanced by Parvus and Trotsky. Now, 10 months later, Radek corrects himself and deems it necessary to castigate Parvus for the theory of “permanent revolution.” But in all fairness Radek should also castigate Parvus’ partner, Trotsky.

It is not true that the theory of “permanent revolution,” which was brushed aside by the 1905 revolution, proved to be correct in the “second stage of the historic development,” that is, during the October Revolution. The whole course of the October Revolution, its whole development, demonstrated and proved the utter bankruptcy of the theory of “permanent revolution” and its absolute incompatibility with the foundations of Leninism.

Honeyed speeches and rotten diplomacy cannot hide the yawning chasm which lies between the theory of “permanent revolution” and Leninism.

III

CERTAIN SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE TACTICS OF THE BOLSHEVIKS DURING THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION FOR OCTOBER

In order to understand the tactics pursued by the Bolsheviks during the period of preparation for October we must get a clear idea of at least some of the particularly important features of those tactics. This is all the more necessary since in numerous pamphlets on the tactics of the Bolsheviks precisely these features are frequently overlooked.

What are these features?

First specific feature. If one were to listen to Trotsky, one would think that there were only two periods in the history of the preparation for October: the period of reconnaissance and the period of uprising, and that all else comes from the evil one. What was the April demonstration of 1917? “The April demonstration, which went more to the ‘left’ than it should have, was a reconnoitring sortie for the purpose of probing the disposition of the masses and the relations between them and the majority in the Soviets.” And what was the

July demonstration of 1917? In Trotsky's opinion, "this, too, was in fact another, more extensive, reconnaissance at a new and higher phase of the movement." Needless to say, the June demonstration of 1917, which was organized at the demand of our Party, should, according to Trotsky's idea, all the more be termed a "reconnaissance."

This would seem to imply that as early as March 1917, the Bolsheviks had ready a political army of workers and peasants, and that if they did not bring this army into action for an uprising in April, or in June, or in July, but engaged merely in "reconnaissance," it was because, and only because, "the information obtained from the reconnaissance" at the time was unfavourable.

Needless to say, this oversimplified notion of the political tactics of our Party is nothing but a confusion of ordinary military tactics with the revolutionary tactics of the Bolsheviks.

Actually, all these demonstrations were primarily the result of the spontaneous pressure of the masses, the result of the fact that the indignation of the masses against the war had boiled over and sought an outlet in the streets.

Actually, the task of the Party at that time was to shape and to guide the spontaneously arising demonstrations of the masses along the line of the revolutionary slogans of the Bolsheviks.

Actually, the Bolsheviks had no political army ready in March 1917, nor could they have had one. The Bolsheviks built up such an army (and had finally built it up by October 1917) only in the course of the struggle and conflicts of the classes between April and October 1917, through the April demonstration, the June and July demonstrations, the elections to the district and city Dumas, the struggle against the Kornilov revolt, and the winning over of the Soviets. A political army is not like a military army. A military command begins a war with an army ready to hand, whereas the Party has to create its army in the course of the struggle itself, in the course of class conflicts, as the masses themselves become convinced through their own experience of the correctness of the Party's slogans and policy.

Of course, every such demonstration at the same time threw a certain amount of light on the hidden interrelations of the forces involved, provided certain reconnaissance information, but this reconnaissance was not the motive for the demonstration, but its natural result.

In analysing the events preceding the uprising in October and

comparing them with the events that marked the period from April to July, Lenin says:

“The situation now is not at all what it was prior to April 20-21, June 9, July 3; for then there was *spontaneous excitement* which we, as a party, either failed to perceive (April 20) or tried to restrain and shape into a peaceful demonstration (June 9 and July 3). For at that time we were fully aware that the Soviets were *not yet* ours, that the peasants *still* trusted the Lieber-Dan-Chernov course and not the Bolshevik course (uprising), and that, consequently, we could not have the majority of the people behind us, and hence, an uprising was premature” (see Vol. XXI, p. 345).

It is plain that “reconnaissance” alone does not get one very far.

Obviously, it was not a question of “reconnaissance,” but of the following:

1) all through the period of preparation for October the Party invariably relied in its struggle upon the spontaneous upsurge of the mass revolutionary movement;

2) while relying on the spontaneous upsurge, it maintained its own undivided leadership of the movement;

3) this leadership of the movement helped it to form the mass political army for the October uprising;

4) this policy was bound to result in the entire preparation for October proceeding under the leadership of *one* party, the Bolshevik Party;

5) this preparation for October, in its turn, brought it about that as a result of the October uprising power was concentrated in the hands of *one* party, the Bolshevik Party.

Thus, the undivided leadership of *one* party, the Communist Party, as the principal factor in the preparation for October — such is the characteristic feature of the October Revolution, such is the first specific feature of the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the period of preparation for October.

It scarcely needs proof that without this feature of Bolshevik tactics the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the conditions of imperialism would have been impossible.

In this the October Revolution differs favourably from the revolution of 1871 in France, where the leadership was divided between two parties, neither of which could be called a Communist Party.

Second specific feature. The preparation for October thus proceeded under the leadership of one party, the Bolshevik Party. But how did the Party carry out this leadership, along what line did the latter proceed? This leadership proceeded along the line of isolating

the *compromising* parties, as the most dangerous groupings in the period of the outbreak of the revolution, the line of isolating the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

What is the fundamental strategic rule of Leninism?

It is the recognition of the following:

1) the *compromising* parties are the most dangerous social support of the enemies of the revolution in the period of the approaching revolutionary outbreak;

2) it is impossible to overthrow the enemy (Tsarism or the bourgeoisie) unless these parties are isolated;

3) the main weapons in the period of preparation for the revolution must therefore be directed towards isolating these parties, towards winning the broad masses of the working people away from them.

In the period of the struggle against Tsarism, in the period of preparation for the bourgeois-democratic revolution (1905-16), the most dangerous social support of Tsarism was the liberal-monarchist party, the Cadet Party. Why? Because it was the compromising party, the party of *compromise* between Tsarism and the majority of the people, i.e., the peasantry as a whole. Naturally, the Party at that time directed its main blows at the Cadets, for unless the Cadets were isolated there could be no hope of a *rupture* between the peasantry and Tsarism, and unless this rupture was ensured there could be no hope of the victory of the revolution. Many people at that time did not understand this specific feature of Bolshevik strategy and accused the Bolsheviks of excessive "Cadetophobia"; they asserted that with the Bolsheviks the struggle against the Cadets "overshadowed" the struggle against the principal enemy — Tsarism. But these accusations, for which there was no justification, revealed an utter failure to understand the Bolshevik strategy, which called for the isolation of the compromising party *in order* to facilitate, to hasten the victory over the principal enemy.

It scarcely needs proof that without this strategy the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution would have been impossible.

In the period of preparation for October the centre of gravity of the conflicting forces shifted to another plane. The Tsar was gone. The Cadet Party had been transformed from a compromising force into a governing force, into the ruling force of imperialism. Now the fight was no longer between Tsarism and the people, but between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In this period the petty-

bourgeois democratic parties, the parties of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, were the most dangerous social support of imperialism. Why? Because these parties were then the compromising parties, the parties of *compromise* between imperialism and the labouring masses. Naturally, the Bolsheviks at that time directed their main blows at these parties; for unless these parties were isolated there could be no hope of a *rupture* between the labouring masses and imperialism, and unless this rupture was ensured there could be no hope of the victory of the Soviet revolution. Many people at that time did not understand this specific feature of the Bolshevik tactics and accused the Bolsheviks of displaying “excessive hatred” towards the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and of “forgetting” the principal goal. But the entire period of preparation for October eloquently testifies to the fact that only by pursuing these tactics could the Bolsheviks ensure the victory of the October Revolution.

The characteristic feature of this period was the further revolutionization of the labouring masses of the peasantry, their disillusionment with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, their defection from these parties, their turn towards rallying directly around the proletariat as the only consistently revolutionary force, capable of leading the country to peace. The history of this period is the history of the struggle between the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, on the one hand, and the Bolsheviks, on the other, for the labouring masses of the peasantry, for winning over these masses. The outcome of this struggle was decided by the coalition period, the Kerensky period, the refusal of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks to confiscate the landlords’ land, the fight of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks to continue the war, the June offensive at the front, the introduction of capital punishment for soldiers, the Kornilov revolt. And they decided the issue of this struggle entirely in favour of the Bolshevik strategy; for had not the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks been isolated it would have been impossible to overthrow the government of the imperialists, and had this government not been overthrown it would have been impossible to break away from the war. The policy of isolating the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks proved to be the only correct policy.

Thus, isolation of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties as the main line in directing the preparations for October — such was the second specific feature of the tactics of the Bolsheviks.

It scarcely needs proof that without this feature of the tactics of the Bolsheviks, the alliance of the working class and the labouring masses of the peasantry would have been left hanging in the air.

It is characteristic that in his *Lessons of October* Trotsky says nothing, or next to nothing, about this specific feature of the Bolshevik tactics.

Third specific feature. Thus, the Party, in directing the preparations for October, pursued the line of isolating the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, of winning the broad masses of the workers and peasants away from them. But how, concretely, was this isolation effected by the Party — in what form, under what slogan? It was effected in the form of the revolutionary mass movement for the power of the Soviets, under the slogan “All power to the Soviets!,” by means of the struggle to convert the Soviets from organs for mobilizing the masses into organs of the uprising, into organs of power, into the apparatus of a new proletarian state power.

Why was it precisely the Soviets that the Bolsheviks seized upon as the principal organizational lever that could facilitate the task of isolating the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, that was capable of advancing the cause of the proletarian revolution, and that was destined to lead the millions of labouring masses to the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat?

What are the Soviets?

“The Soviets,” said Lenin as early as September 1917, “are a new state apparatus, which, in the first place, provides an armed force of workers and peasants; and this force is not divorced from the people, as was the old standing army, but is most closely bound up with the people. From the military standpoint, this force is incomparably more powerful than previous forces; from the revolutionary standpoint, it cannot be replaced by anything else. Secondly, this apparatus provides a bond with the masses, with the majority of the people, so intimate, so indissoluble, so readily controllable and renewable, that there was nothing even remotely like it in the previous state apparatus. Thirdly, this apparatus, by virtue of the fact that its personnel is elected and subject to recall at the will of the people without any bureaucratic formalities, is far more democratic than any previous apparatus. Fourthly, it provides a close contact with the most diverse professions, thus facilitating the adoption of the most varied and most profound reforms without bureaucracy. Fifthly, it provides a form of organization of the vanguard, i.e., of the most politically conscious, most energetic and most progressive section of the *oppressed* classes, the workers and peasants, and thus constitutes an apparatus by means of which the vanguard of the oppressed classes can elevate, train, educate and lead *the entire vast mass* of these classes, which has

hitherto stood quite remote from political life, from history. Sixthly, it makes it possible to combine the advantages of parliamentarism with the advantages of immediate and direct democracy, i.e., to unite in the persons of the elected representatives of the people both legislative *and executive* functions. Compared with bourgeois parliamentarism, this represents an advance in the development of democracy which is of worldwide historic significance...

“Had not the creative spirit of the revolutionary classes of the people given rise to the Soviets, the proletarian revolution in Russia would be a hopeless affair; for the proletariat undoubtedly could not retain power with the old state apparatus, and it is impossible to create a new apparatus immediately” (see Vol. XXI, pp. 258-59).

That is why the Bolsheviks seized upon the Soviets as the principal organizational link that could facilitate the task of organizing the October Revolution and the creation of a new, powerful apparatus of the proletarian state power.

From the point of view of its internal development, the slogan “All power to the Soviets!” passed through two stages: the first (up to the July defeat of the Bolsheviks, during the period of dual power), and the second (after the defeat of the Kornilov revolt).

During the first stage this slogan meant breaking the bloc of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries with the Cadets, the formation of a Soviet government consisting of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries (for at that time the Soviets were Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik), the right of free agitation for the opposition (i.e., for the Bolsheviks), and the free struggle of parties within the Soviets, in the expectation that by means of such a struggle the Bolsheviks would succeed in capturing the Soviets and changing the composition of the Soviet government in the course of a peaceful development of the revolution. This plan, of course, did not signify the dictatorship of the proletariat. But it undoubtedly facilitated the preparation of the conditions required for ensuring the dictatorship; for, by putting the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in power and compelling them to carry out in practice their anti-revolutionary platform, it hastened the exposure of the true nature of these parties, hastened their isolation, their divorce from the masses. The July defeat of the Bolsheviks, however, interrupted this development; for it gave preponderance to the generals’ and Cadets’ counter-revolution and threw the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks into the arms of that counter-revolution. This compelled the Party temporarily to withdraw the slogan “All power to the Soviets!,” only to put it forward again in

the conditions of a fresh revolutionary upsurge.

The defeat of the Kornilov revolt ushered in the second stage. The slogan "All power to the Soviets!" became again the immediate slogan. But now this slogan had a different meaning from that in the first stage. Its content had radically changed. Now this slogan meant a complete rupture with imperialism and the passing of power to the Bolsheviks, for the majority of the Soviets were already Bolshevik. Now this slogan meant the revolution's direct approach towards the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of an uprising. More than that, this slogan now meant the organization of the dictatorship of the proletariat and giving it a state form.

The inestimable significance of the tactics of transforming the Soviets into organs of state power lay in the fact that they caused millions of working people to break away from imperialism, exposed the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties as the tools of imperialism, and brought the masses by a direct route, as it were, to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Thus, the policy of transforming the Soviets into organs of state power, as the most important condition for isolating the compromising parties and for the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat — such is the third specific feature of the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the period of preparation for October.

Fourth specific feature. The picture would not be complete if we did not deal with the question of how and why the Bolsheviks were able to transform their Party slogans into slogans for the vast masses, into slogans which pushed the revolution forward; how and why they succeeded in convincing not only the vanguard, and not only the majority of the working class, but also the majority of the people, of the correctness of their policy.

The point is that for the victory of the revolution, if it is really a people's revolution embracing the masses in their millions, correct Party slogans alone are not enough. For the victory of the revolution one more necessary condition is required, namely, that the masses themselves become convinced through their own experience of the correctness of these slogans. Only then do the slogans of the Party become the slogans of the masses themselves. Only then does the revolution really become a people's revolution. One of the specific features of the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the period of preparation for October was that they correctly determined the paths and turns which would naturally lead the masses to the Party's slogans — to the very threshold of the revolution, so to speak — thus helping

them to feel, to test, to realize by their own experience the correctness of these slogans. In other words, one of the specific features of the tactics of the Bolsheviks is that they do not confuse leadership of the Party with leadership of the masses; that they clearly see the difference between the first sort of leadership and the second; that they, therefore, represent the science, not only of leadership of the Party, but of leadership of the vast masses of the working people.

A graphic example of the manifestation of this feature of Bolshevik tactics was provided by the experience of convening and dispersing the Constituent Assembly.

It is well known that the Bolsheviks advanced the slogan of a Republic of Soviets as early as April 1917. It is well known that the Constituent Assembly was a bourgeois parliament, fundamentally opposed to the principles of a Republic of Soviets. How could it happen that the Bolsheviks, who were advancing towards a Republic of Soviets, at the same time demanded that the Provisional Government should immediately convene the Constituent Assembly? How could it happen that the Bolsheviks not only took part in the elections, but themselves convened the Constituent Assembly? How could it happen that a month before the uprising, in the transition from the old to the new, the Bolsheviks considered a temporary combination of a Republic of Soviets with the Constituent Assembly possible?

This “happened” because:

1) the idea of a Constituent Assembly was one of the most popular ideas among the broad masses of the population;

2) the slogan of the immediate convocation of the Constituent Assembly helped to expose the counter-revolutionary nature of the Provisional Government;

3) in order to discredit the idea of a Constituent Assembly in the eyes of the masses, it was necessary to lead the masses to the walls of the Constituent Assembly with their demands for land, for peace, for the power of the Soviets, thus bringing them face to face with the actual, live Constituent Assembly;

4) only this could help the masses to become convinced through their own experience of the counter-revolutionary nature of the Constituent Assembly and of the necessity of dispersing it;

5) all this naturally presupposed the possibility of a temporary combination of the Republic of Soviets with the Constituent Assembly, as one of the means for eliminating the Constituent Assembly;

6) such a combination, if brought about *under* the condition that

all power was transferred to the Soviets, could only signify the subordination of the Constituent Assembly to the Soviets, its conversion into an appendage of the Soviets, its painless extinction.

It scarcely needs proof that had the Bolsheviks not adopted such a policy the dispersion of the Constituent Assembly would not have taken place so smoothly, and the subsequent actions of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks under the slogan "All power to the Constituent Assembly!" would not have failed so signally.

"We took part," says Lenin, "in the elections to the Russian bourgeois parliament, the Constituent Assembly, in September-November 1917. Were our tactics correct or not?... Did not we, the Russian Bolsheviks, have more right in September-November 1917 than any Western communists to consider that parliamentarism was politically obsolete in Russia? Of course we had; for the point is not whether bourgeois parliaments have existed for a long or a short time, but how far the broad masses of the working people are *prepared* (ideologically, politically and practically) to accept the Soviet system and to disperse the bourgeois-democratic parliament (or allow it to be dispersed). That, owing to a number of special conditions, the working class of the towns and the soldiers and peasants of Russia were in September-November 1917 exceptionally well prepared to accept the Soviet system and to disperse the most democratic of bourgeois parliaments, is an absolutely incontestable and fully established historical fact. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks did *not* boycott the Constituent Assembly, but took part in the elections both before the proletariat conquered political power and *after*" (see Vol. XXV, pp. 201-02).

Why then did they not boycott the Constituent Assembly? Because, says Lenin,

"participation in a bourgeois-democratic parliament even a few weeks before the victory of a Soviet Republic, and even *after* such a victory, not only does not harm the revolutionary proletariat, but actually helps it to *prove* to the backward masses why such parliaments deserve to be dispersed; it *helps* their successful dispersal, and *helps* to make bourgeois parliamentarism 'politically obsolete.'" (*Ibid.*)

It is characteristic that Trotsky does not understand this feature of Bolshevik tactics and snorts at the "theory" of combining the Constituent Assembly with the Soviets, qualifying it as Hilferdingism.

He does not understand that to permit such a combination, *accompanied* by the slogan of an uprising and the probable victory of the Soviets, in connection with the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, was the only revolutionary tactics, which had nothing in

common with the Hilferding tactics of converting the Soviets into an appendage of the Constituent Assembly; he does not understand that the mistake committed by some comrades in *this* question gives him no grounds for disparaging the absolutely correct position taken by Lenin and the Party on the “combined type of state power” *under* certain conditions (*cf.* Vol. XXI, p. 338).

He does not understand that if the Bolsheviks had not adopted this special policy towards the Constituent Assembly they would not have succeeded in winning over to their side the vast masses of the people; and if they had not won over these masses they could not have transformed the October uprising into a profound people’s revolution.

It is interesting to note that Trotsky even snorts at the words “people,” “revolutionary democracy,” etc., occurring in articles by Bolsheviks, and considers them improper for a Marxist to use.

Trotsky has evidently forgotten that even in September 1917, a month before the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Lenin, that unquestionable Marxist, wrote of “the necessity of the immediate transfer of the whole power to *the revolutionary democracy headed by the revolutionary proletariat*” (see Vol. XXI, p. 198).

Trotsky has evidently forgotten that Lenin, that unquestionable Marxist, quoting the well-known letter of Marx to Kugelmann (April 1871)⁵⁸ to the effect that the smashing of the bureaucratic-military state machine is the preliminary condition for every real *people’s* revolution on the continent, writes in black and white the following lines:

“particular attention should be paid to Marx’s extremely profound remark that the destruction of the bureaucratic-military state machine is ‘the preliminary condition for every real *people’s* revolution.’ This concept of a ‘people’s’ revolution seems strange coming from Marx, and the Russian Plekhanovites and Mensheviks, those followers of Struve who wish to be regarded as Marxists, might possibly declare such an expression to be a ‘slip of the pen’ on Marx’s part. They have reduced Marxism to such a state of wretchedly liberal distortion that nothing exists for them beyond the antithesis between bourgeois revolution and proletarian revolution — and even this antithesis they interpret in an extremely lifeless way...

“In Europe, in 1871, there was not a single country on the continent in which the proletariat constituted the majority of the people. A ‘people’s’ revolution, one that actually brought the majority into movement, could be such only if it embraced both the proletariat and the peasantry. These two classes then constituted the ‘people.’ These two classes are united by the fact that the ‘bureaucratic-military state machine’ oppresses, crushes, ex-

plots them. To *break up* this machine, to *smash* it — this is truly in the interest of the ‘people,’ of the majority, of the workers and most of the peasants, this is ‘the preliminary condition’ for a free alliance between the poor peasants and the proletarians, whereas without such an alliance democracy is unstable and socialist transformation is impossible” (see Vol. XXI, pp. 395-96).

These words of Lenin’s should not be forgotten.

Thus, ability to convince the masses of the correctness of the Party slogans on the basis of their own experience, by bringing them to the revolutionary positions, as the most important condition for the winning over of the millions of working people to the side of the Party — such is the fourth specific feature of the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the period of preparation for October.

I think that what I have said is quite sufficient to get a clear idea of the characteristic features of these tactics.

IV

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AS THE BEGINNING OF AND THE PRE-CONDITION FOR THE WORLD REVOLUTION

There can be no doubt that the universal theory of a simultaneous victory of the revolution in the principal countries of Europe, the theory that the victory of socialism in one country is impossible, has proved to be an artificial and untenable theory. The seven years’ history of the proletarian revolution in Russia speaks not for but against this theory. This theory is unacceptable not only as a scheme of development of the world revolution, for it contradicts obvious facts. It is still less acceptable as a slogan; for it fetters, rather than releases, the initiative of individual countries which, by reason of certain historical conditions, obtain the opportunity to break through the front of capital independently; for it does not stimulate an active onslaught on capital in individual countries, but encourages passive waiting for the moment of the “universal denouement”; for it cultivates among the proletarians of the different countries not the spirit of revolutionary determination, but the mood of Hamlet-like doubt over the question as to “what if the others fail to back us up?” Lenin was absolutely right in saying that the victory of the proletariat in one country is the “typical case,” that “a simultaneous

revolution in a number of countries” can only be a “rare exception” (see Vol. XXIII, p. 354).

But, as is well known, Lenin’s theory of revolution is not limited only to this side of the question. It is also the theory of the development of the world revolution.* The victory of socialism in one country is not a self-sufficient task. The revolution which has been victorious in one country must regard itself not as a self-sufficient entity, but as an aid, as a means *for* hastening the victory of the proletariat in all countries. For the victory of the revolution in one country, in the present case Russia, is not only the product of the uneven development and progressive decay of imperialism; it is at the same time the beginning of and the pre-condition for the world revolution.

Undoubtedly, the paths of development of the world revolution are not as plain as it may have seemed previously, before the victory of the revolution in one country, before the appearance of developed imperialism, which is “the eve of the socialist revolution.” For a new factor has arisen — the law of the uneven development of the capitalist countries, which operates under the conditions of developed imperialism, and which implies the inevitability of armed collisions, the general weakening of the world front of capital, and the possibility of the victory of socialism in individual countries. For a new factor has arisen — the vast Soviet country, lying between the West and the East, between the centre of the financial exploitation of the world and the arena of colonial oppression, a country which by its very existence is revolutionizing the whole world.

All these are factors (not to mention other less important ones) which cannot be left out of account in studying the paths of development of the world revolution.

Formerly, it was commonly thought that the revolution would develop through the even “maturing” of the elements of socialism, primarily in the more developed, the “advanced,” countries. Now this view must be considerably modified.

“The system of international relationships,” says Lenin, “has now taken a form in which one of the states of Europe, viz., Germany, has been enslaved by the victor countries. Furthermore, a number of states, which are, moreover, the oldest states in the West, find themselves in a position, as the result of their victory, to utilize this victory to make a number of insignificant concessions to their oppressed classes — concessions which nevertheless retard the revolutionary movement in those countries and create some

* See above *The Foundations of Leninism*. — *J. St.*

semblance of 'social peace.'

"At the same time, precisely as a result of the last imperialist war, a number of countries — the East, India, China, etc. — have been completely dislodged from their groove. Their development has definitely shifted to the general European capitalist lines. The general European ferment has begun to affect them, and it is now clear to the whole world that they have been drawn into a process of development that cannot but lead to a crisis in the whole of world capitalism."

In view of this fact, and in connection with it, "the West-European capitalist countries will consummate their development towards socialism... not as we formerly expected. They are consummating it not by the even 'maturing' of socialism in them, but by the exploitation of some countries by others, by the exploitation of the first of the countries to be vanquished in the imperialist war combined with the exploitation of the whole of the East. On the other hand, precisely as a result of the first imperialist war, the East has definitely come into the revolutionary movement, has been definitely drawn into the general maelstrom of the world revolutionary movement" (see Vol. XXVII, pp. 415-16).

If we add to this the fact that not only the defeated countries and colonies are being exploited by the victorious countries, but that some of the victorious countries are falling into the orbit of financial exploitation at the hands of the most powerful of the victorious countries, America and Britain; that the contradictions among all these countries are an extremely important factor in the disintegration of world imperialism; that, in addition to these contradictions, very profound contradictions exist and are developing within each of these countries; that all these contradictions are becoming more profound and more acute because of the existence, alongside these countries, of the great Republic of Soviets — if all this is taken into consideration, then the picture of the special character of the international situation will become more or less complete.

Most probably, the world revolution will develop by the breaking away of a number of new countries from the system of the imperialist states as a result of revolution, while the proletarians of these countries will be supported by the proletariat of the imperialist states. We see that the first country to break away, the first victorious country, is already being supported by the workers and the labouring masses of other countries. Without this support it could not hold out. Undoubtedly, this support will increase and grow. But there can also be no doubt that the very development of the world revolution, the very process of the breaking away from imperialism of a number of new countries will be the more rapid and thorough,

the more thoroughly socialism becomes consolidated in the first victorious country, the faster this country is transformed into a base for the further unfolding of the world revolution, into a lever for the further disintegration of imperialism.

While it is true that the *final* victory of socialism in the first country to emancipate itself is impossible without the combined efforts of the proletarians of several countries, it is equally true that the unfolding of the world revolution will be the more rapid and thorough, the more effective the assistance rendered by the first socialist country to the workers and labouring masses of all other countries.

In what should this assistance be expressed?

It should be expressed, firstly, in the victorious country achieving “the utmost possible in one country *for* the development, support and awakening of the revolution *in all countries*” (see Lenin, Vol. XXIII, p. 385).

It should be expressed, secondly, in that the “victorious proletariat” of one country, “having expropriated the capitalists and organized socialist production, would stand up... *against* the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states” (see Lenin, Vol. XVIII, pp. 232-33).

The characteristic feature of the assistance given by the victorious country is not only that it hastens the victory of the proletarians of other countries, but also that, by facilitating this victory, it ensures the *final* victory of socialism in the first victorious country.

Most probably, in the course of development of the world revolution, side by side with the centres of imperialism in individual capitalist countries and with the system of these countries throughout the world, centres of socialism will be created in individual Soviet countries and a system of these centres throughout the world, and the struggle between these two systems will fill the history of the unfolding of the world revolution.

For, says Lenin, “the free union of nations in socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle of the socialist republics against the backward states.” (*Ibid.*)

The world significance of the October Revolution lies not only in the fact that it constitutes a great beginning made by one country in causing a breach in the system of imperialism and that it is the first

centre of socialism in the ocean of imperialist countries, but also in that it constitutes the first stage of the world revolution and a mighty base for its further development.

Therefore, not only those are wrong who forget the international character of the October Revolution and declare the victory of socialism in one country to be a purely national, and only a national, phenomenon, but also those who, although they bear in mind the international character of the October Revolution, are inclined to regard this revolution as something passive, merely destined to accept help from without. Actually, not only does the October Revolution need support from the revolution in other countries, but the revolution in those countries needs the support of the October Revolution, in order to accelerate and advance the cause of overthrowing world imperialism.

CONCERNING THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA

(Speech Delivered in the Yugoslav Commission of the ECCI)

March 30, 1925

Comrades, I think that Semich has not fully understood the main essence of the Bolshevik presentation of the national question. The Bolsheviks never separated the national question from the general question of revolution, either before October or after October. The main essence of the Bolshevik approach to the national question is that the Bolsheviks always examined the national question in inseparable connection with the revolutionary perspective.

Semich quoted Lenin, saying that Lenin was in favour of embodying the solution of the national question in the constitution. By this he, Semich, evidently wanted to say that Lenin regarded the national question as a constitutional one, that is, not as a question of revolution but as a question of reform. That is quite wrong. Lenin never had, nor could he have had, constitutional illusions. It is enough to consult his works to be convinced of that. If Lenin spoke of a constitution, he had in mind not the constitutional, but the revolutionary way of settling the national question, that is to say, he regarded a constitution as something that would result from the victory of the revolution. We in the USSR also have a Constitution, and it reflects a definite solution of the national question. This Constitution, however, came into being not as the result of a deal with the bourgeoisie, but as the result of a victorious revolution.

Semich further referred to Stalin's pamphlet on the national question written in 1912,⁵⁹ and tried to find in it at least indirect corroboration of his point of view. But this reference was fruitless, because he did not and could not find even a remote hint, let alone a quotation, that would in the least justify his "constitutional" approach to the national question. In confirmation of this, I might remind Semich of the passage in Stalin's pamphlet where a contrast is drawn between the Austrian (constitutional) method of settling the national question and the Russian Marxists' (revolutionary) method.

Here it is:

"The Austrians hope to achieve the 'freedom of nationalities' by means of petty reforms, by slow steps. While they propose cultural-national auton-

omy as a practical measure, they do not count on any radical change, on a democratic movement for liberation, which they do not even contemplate. The Russian Marxists, on the other hand, associate the 'freedom of nationalities' with a probable radical change, with a democratic movement for liberation, having no grounds for counting on reforms. And this essentially alters matters in regard to the probable fate of the nations of Russia."

Clear, one would think.

And this is not Stalin's personal view, but the general view of the Russian Marxists, who examined, and continue to examine, the national question in inseparable connection with the general question of revolution.

It can be said without stretching a point that in the history of Russian Marxism there were two stages in the presentation of the national question: the first, or pre-October stage; and the second, or October stage. In the first stage, the national question was regarded as part of the general question of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, that is to say, as part of the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. In the second stage, when the national question assumed wider scope and became a question of the colonies, when it became transformed from an intra-state question into a world question, it came to be regarded as part of the general question of the proletarian revolution, as part of the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In both stages, as you see, the approach was strictly revolutionary.

I think that Semich has not yet fully grasped all this. Hence his attempts to reduce the national question to a constitutional issue, i.e., to regard it as a question of reform.

That mistake leads him to another, namely, his refusal to regard the national question as being, in essence, a peasant question. Not an agrarian but a peasant question, for these are two different things. It is quite true that the national question must not be identified with the peasant question, for, in addition to peasant questions, the national question includes such questions as national culture, national statehood, etc. But it is also beyond doubt that, after all, the peasant question is the basis, the quintessence, of the national question. That explains the fact that the peasantry constitutes the main army of the national movement, that there is no powerful national movement without the peasant army, nor can there be. That is what is meant when it is said that, *in essence*, the national question is a peasant question. I think that Semich's reluctance to accept this formula is due to an underestimation of the inherent strength of the national

movement and a failure to understand the profoundly popular and profoundly revolutionary character of the national movement. This lack of understanding and this underestimation constitute a grave danger, for, in practice, they imply an underestimation of the potential might latent, for instance, in the movement of the Croats for national emancipation. This underestimation is fraught with serious complications for the entire Yugoslav Communist Party.

That is Semich's second mistake.

Undoubtedly, Semich's attempt to treat the national question in Yugoslavia in isolation from the international situation and the probable prospects in Europe must also be regarded as a mistake. Proceeding from the fact that there is no serious popular movement for independence among the Croats and the Slovenes at the present moment, Semich arrives at the conclusion that the question of the right of nations to secede is an academic question, at any rate, not an urgent one. That is wrong, of course. Even if we admit that this question is not urgent at the present moment, it might definitely become very urgent *if war begins*, or when war begins, *if a revolution breaks out in Europe*, or when it breaks out. That war will inevitably begin, and that *they*, over there, are bound to come to blows there can be no doubt, bearing in mind the nature and development of imperialism.

In 1912, when we Russian Marxists were outlining the first draft of the national program, no serious movement for independence yet existed in any of the border regions of the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, we deemed it necessary to include in our program the point on the right of nations to self-determination, i.e., the right of every nationality to secede and exist as an independent state. Why? Because we based ourselves not only on what existed then, but also on what was developing and impending in the general system of international relations; that is, we took into account not only the present, but also the future. We knew that if any nationality were to demand secession, the Russian Marxists would fight to ensure the right to secede for every such nationality. In the course of his speech Semich repeatedly referred to Stalin's pamphlet on the national question. But here is what Stalin's pamphlet says about self-determination and independence:

"The growth of imperialism in Europe is not fortuitous. In Europe, capital is beginning to feel cramped, and it is reaching out towards foreign countries in search of new markets, cheap labour and new fields of investment. But this leads to external complications and to war... It is quite possi-

ble that a combination of internal and external conditions may arise in which one or another nationality in Russia may find it necessary to raise and settle the question of its independence. And, of course, it is not for Marxists to create obstacles in such cases.”

That was written as far back as 1912. You know that subsequently this view was fully confirmed both during the war and afterwards, and especially after the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia.

All the more reason, therefore, why we must reckon with such possibilities in Europe in general, and in Yugoslavia in particular, especially now, when the national revolutionary movement in the oppressed countries has become more profound, and after the victory of the revolution in Russia. It must also be borne in mind that Yugoslavia is not a fully independent country, that she is tied up with certain imperialist groups, and that, consequently, she cannot escape the great play of forces that is going on outside Yugoslavia. If you are drawing up a national program for the Yugoslav Party — and that is precisely what we are dealing with now — you must remember that this program must proceed not only from what exists at present, but also from what is developing and what will inevitably occur by virtue of international relations. That is why I think that the question of the right of nations to self-determination must be regarded as an immediate and vital question.

Now about the national program. The starting point of the national program must be the thesis of a Soviet revolution in Yugoslavia, the thesis that the national question cannot be solved at all satisfactorily unless the bourgeoisie is overthrown and the revolution is victorious. Of course, there may be exceptions; there was such an exception, for instance, before the war, when Norway separated from Sweden — of which Lenin treats in detail in one of his articles.⁶⁰ But that was before the war, and under an exceptional combination of favourable circumstances. Since the war, and especially since the victory of the Soviet revolution in Russia, such cases are hardly possible. At any rate, the chances of their being possible are now so slight that they can be put as nil. But if that is so, it is obvious that we cannot construct our program from elements whose significance is nil. That is why the thesis of a revolution must be the starting point of the national program.

Further, it is imperatively necessary to include in the national program a special point on the right of nations to self-determination, including the right to secede. I have already said why such a point

cannot be omitted under present internal and international conditions.

Finally, the program must also include a special point providing for national territorial autonomy for those nationalities in Yugoslavia which may not deem it necessary to secede from that country. Those who think that such a contingency must be excluded are incorrect. That is wrong. Under certain circumstances, as a result of the victory of a Soviet revolution in Yugoslavia, it may well be that some nationalities will not wish to secede, just as happened here in Russia. It is clear that to meet such a contingency it is necessary to have in the program a point on autonomy, envisaging the transformation of the state of Yugoslavia into a federation of autonomous national states based on the Soviet system.

Thus, the right to secede must be provided for those nationalities that may wish to secede, and the right to autonomy must be provided for those nationalities that may prefer to remain within the framework of the Yugoslav state.

To avoid misunderstanding, I must say that the *right* to secede must not be understood as an *obligation*, as a duty to secede. A nation may take advantage of this right and secede, but it may also forgo the right, and if it does not wish to exercise it, that is its business and we cannot but reckon with the fact. Some comrades turn this right to secede into an obligation and demand from the Croats, for instance, that they secede *whatever happens*. That position is wrong and must be rejected. We must not confuse a right with an obligation.

CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF LENINISM

DEDICATED TO THE LENINGRAD
ORGANIZATION OF THE CPSU(B)

J. STALIN

January 25, 1926

I

THE DEFINITION OF LENINISM

The pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism* contains a definition of Leninism which seems to have received general recognition. It runs as follows:

“Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution. To be more exact, Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution in general, the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular.”⁶¹

Is this definition correct?

I think it is correct. It is correct, firstly, because it correctly indicates the historical roots of Leninism, characterizing it as Marxism of the *era of imperialism*, as against certain critics of Lenin who wrongly think that Leninism originated after the imperialist war. It is correct, secondly, because it correctly notes the international character of Leninism, as against social-democracy, which considers that Leninism is applicable only to Russian national conditions. It is correct, thirdly, because it correctly notes the organic connection between Leninism and the teachings of Marx, characterizing Leninism as *Marxism* of the era of imperialism, as against certain critics of Leninism who consider it not a further development of Marxism, but merely the restoration of Marxism and its application to Russian conditions.

All that, one would think, needs no special comment.

Nevertheless, it appears that there are people in our Party who consider it necessary to define Leninism somewhat differently. Zinoviev, for example, thinks that:

“Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialist wars and of the world revolution *which began directly in a country where the peasantry predominates.*”

What can be the meaning of the words underlined by Zinoviev? What does introducing the backwardness of Russia, its peasant character, into the definition of Leninism mean?

It means transforming Leninism from an international proletarian doctrine into a product of specifically Russian conditions.

It means playing into the hands of Bauer and Kautsky, who deny that Leninism is suitable for other countries, for countries in which capitalism is more developed.

It goes without saying that the peasant question is of very great importance for Russia, that our country is a peasant country. But what significance can this fact have in characterizing the foundations of Leninism? Was Leninism elaborated only on Russian soil, for Russia alone, and not on the soil of imperialism, and for the imperialist countries generally? Do such works of Lenin as *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*,⁶² *The State and Revolution*,⁶³ *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*,⁶⁴ "*Left-Wing*" *Communism, an Infantile Disorder*,⁶⁵ etc., apply only to Russia, and not to all imperialist countries in general? Is not Leninism the generalization of the experience of the revolutionary movement of *all* countries? Are not the fundamentals of the theory and tactics of Leninism suitable, are they not obligatory, for the proletarian parties of all countries? Was not Lenin right when he said that "*Bolshevism can serve as a model of tactics for all*"? (See Vol. XXIII, p. 386.)* Was not Lenin right when he spoke about the "*international significance*"** of Soviet power and of the fundamentals of Bolshevik theory and tactics"? (See Vol. XXV, pp. 171-72.) Are not, for example, the following words of Lenin correct?

"In Russia, the dictatorship of the proletariat must inevitably differ in certain specific features from that in the advanced countries, owing to the very great backwardness and petty-bourgeois character of our country. But the basic forces — and the basic forms of social economy — are the same in Russia as in any capitalist country, so that *these specific features can relate only to what is not most important*"*** (see Vol. XXIV, p. 508).

But if all that is true, does it not follow that Zinoviev's definition of Leninism cannot be regarded as correct?

How can this nationally restricted definition of Leninism be reconciled with internationalism?

* References in Roman numerals to Lenin's works here and elsewhere are to the 3rd Russian edition of the *Works*. — *Tr.*

** My italics. — *J. St.*

II

THE MAIN THING IN LENINISM

In the pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism*, it is stated:

“Some think that the fundamental thing in Leninism is the peasant question, that the point of departure of Leninism is the question of the peasantry, of its role, its relative importance. This is absolutely wrong. The fundamental question of Leninism, its point of departure, is not the peasant question, but the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of the conditions under which it can be achieved, of the conditions under which it can be consolidated. The peasant question, as the question of the ally of the proletariat in its struggle for power, is a derivative question.”⁶⁶

Is this thesis correct?

I think it is correct. This thesis follows entirely from the definition of Leninism. Indeed, if Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution, and the basic content of the proletarian revolution is the dictatorship of the proletariat, then it is clear that the main thing in Leninism is the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the elaboration of this question, the substantiation and concretization of this question.

Nevertheless, Zinoviev evidently does not agree with this thesis. In his article “In Memory of Lenin,” he says:

“As I have already said, the question of the role of the peasantry is the *fundamental question** of Bolshevism, of Leninism.”

As you see, Zinoviev’s thesis follows entirely from his wrong definition of Leninism. It is therefore as wrong as his definition of Leninism is wrong.

Is Lenin’s thesis that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the “root content of the proletarian revolution” correct? (See Vol. XXIII, p. 337.) It is unquestionably correct. Is the thesis that Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution correct? I think it is correct. But what follows from this? From this it follows that the fundamental question of Leninism, its point of departure, its foundation, is the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Is it not true that the question of imperialism, the question of the spasmodic character of the development of imperialism, the question of the victory of socialism in one country, the question of the

* My italics. — *J. St.*

proletarian state, the question of the Soviet form of this state, the question of the role of the Party in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the question of the paths of building socialism — that all these questions were elaborated precisely by Lenin? Is it not true that it is precisely these questions that constitute the basis, the foundation of the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat? Is it not true that without the elaboration of these fundamental questions, the elaboration of the peasant question from the standpoint of the dictatorship of the proletariat would be inconceivable?

It goes without saying that Lenin was an expert on the peasant question. It goes without saying that the peasant question as the question of the ally of the proletariat is of the greatest significance for the proletariat and forms a constituent part of the fundamental question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But is it not clear that if Leninism had not been faced with the fundamental question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the derivative question of the ally of the proletariat, the question of the peasantry, would not have arisen either? Is it not clear that if Leninism had not been faced with the practical question of the conquest of power by the proletariat, the question of an alliance with the peasantry would not have arisen either?

Lenin would not have been the great ideological leader of the proletariat that he unquestionably is — he would have been a simple “peasant philosopher,” as foreign literary philistines often depict him — had he elaborated the peasant question, not on the basis of the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but independently of this basis, apart from this basis.

One or the other:

Either the peasant question is the main thing in Leninism, and in that case Leninism is not suitable, not obligatory, for capitalistically developed countries, for those which are not peasant countries.

Or the main thing in Leninism is the dictatorship of the proletariat, and in that case Leninism is the international doctrine of the proletarians of all lands, suitable and obligatory for all countries without exception, including the capitalistically developed countries.

Here one must choose.

III

THE QUESTION OF “PERMANENT”

REVOLUTION

In the pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism*, the “theory of permanent revolution” is appraised as a “theory” which underestimates the role of the peasantry. There it is stated:

“Consequently, Lenin fought the adherents of ‘permanent’ revolution, not over the question of uninterruptedness, for Lenin himself maintained the point of view of uninterrupted revolution, but because they underestimated the role of the peasantry, which is an enormous reserve of the proletariat.”⁶⁷

This characterization of the Russian “permanentists” was considered as generally accepted until recently. Nevertheless, although in general correct, it cannot be regarded as exhaustive. The discussion of 1924, on the one hand, and a careful analysis of the works of Lenin, on the other hand, have shown that the mistake of the Russian “permanentists” lay not only in their underestimation of the role of the peasantry, but also in their underestimation of the strength of the proletariat and its capacity to lead the peasantry, in their disbelief in the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat.

That is why, in my pamphlet *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists* (December 1924), I broadened this characterization and replaced it by another, more complete one. Here is what is stated in that pamphlet:

“Hitherto only *one* aspect of the theory of ‘permanent revolution’ has usually been noted — lack of faith in the revolutionary potentialities of the peasant movement. Now, in fairness, this must be supplemented by *another* aspect — lack of faith in the strength and capacity of the proletariat in Russia.”⁶⁸

This does not mean, of course, that Leninism has been or is opposed to the idea of permanent revolution, without quotation marks, which was proclaimed by Marx in the forties of the last century.⁶⁹ On the contrary, Lenin was the only Marxist who correctly understood and developed the idea of permanent revolution. What distinguishes Lenin from the “permanentists” on this question is that the “permanentists” distorted Marx’s idea of permanent revolution and transformed it into lifeless, bookish wisdom, whereas Lenin took it in its pure form and made it one of the foundations of his own theory of revolution. It should be borne in mind that the idea of the growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the socialist revolution, propounded by Lenin as long ago as 1905, is one of the forms

of the embodiment of Marx's theory of permanent revolution. Here is what Lenin wrote about this as far back as 1905:

"From the democratic revolution we shall at once, and just to the extent of our strength, the strength of the class-conscious and organized proletariat, begin to pass to the socialist revolution. *We stand for uninterrupted revolution.** We shall not stop halfway...

"Without succumbing to adventurism or going against our scientific conscience, without striving for cheap popularity, we can and do say *only one thing*: we shall put every effort into assisting the entire peasantry to carry out the democratic revolution *in order thereby to make it easier* for us, the party of the proletariat, to pass on, as quickly as possible, to the new and higher task — the socialist revolution" (see Vol. VIII, pp. 186-87).

And here is what Lenin wrote on this subject sixteen years later, after the conquest of power by the proletariat:

"The Kautskys, Hilferdings, Martovs, Chernovs, Hillquits, Longuets, MacDonalds, Turatis, and other heroes of 'Two-and-a-Half' Marxism were incapable of understanding... the relation between the bourgeois-democratic and the proletarian-socialist revolutions. *The first grows over into the second.** The second, in passing, solves the questions of the first. The second consolidates the work of the first. Struggle, and struggle alone, decides how far the second succeeds in outgrowing the first" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 26).

I draw special attention to the first of the above quotations, taken from Lenin's article entitled "The Attitude of social-democracy Towards the Peasant Movement," published on September 1, 1905. I emphasize this for the information of those who still continue to assert that Lenin arrived at the idea of the growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the socialist revolution, that is to say, the idea of permanent revolution, after the imperialist war. This quotation leaves no doubt that these people are profoundly mistaken.

IV

THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION AND THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

What are the characteristic features of the proletarian revolution as distinct from the bourgeois revolution?

* My italics. — *J. St.*

The distinction between the proletarian revolution and the bourgeois revolution may be reduced to five main points.

1) The bourgeois revolution usually begins when there already exist more or less ready-made forms belonging to the capitalist order, forms which have grown and matured within the womb of feudal society prior to the open revolution, whereas the proletarian revolution begins when ready-made forms belonging to the socialist order are either absent, or almost absent.

2) The main task of the bourgeois revolution consists in seizing power and making it conform to the already existing bourgeois economy, whereas the main task of the proletarian revolution consists, after seizing power, in building a new, socialist economy.

3) The bourgeois revolution is usually *consummated* with the seizure of power, whereas in the proletarian revolution the seizure of power is only the *beginning*, and power is used as a lever for transforming the old economy and organizing the new one.

4) The bourgeois revolution limits itself to replacing one group of exploiters in power by another group of exploiters, in view of which it need not smash the old state machine; whereas the proletarian revolution removes all exploiting groups from power and places in power the leader of all the toilers and exploited, the class of proletarians, in view of which it cannot manage without smashing the old state machine and substituting a new one for it.

5) The bourgeois revolution cannot rally the millions of the toiling and exploited masses around the bourgeoisie for any length of time, for the very reason that they are toilers and exploited; whereas the proletarian revolution can and must link them, precisely as toilers and exploited, in a durable alliance with the proletariat, if it wishes to carry out its main task of consolidating the power of the proletariat and building a new, socialist economy.

Here are some of Lenin's main theses on this subject:

“One of the fundamental differences between bourgeois revolution and socialist revolution,” says Lenin, “is that for the bourgeois revolution, which arises out of feudalism, the new economic organizations are gradually created in the womb of the old order, gradually changing all the aspects of feudal society. Bourgeois revolution was confronted by only one task — to sweep away, to cast aside, to destroy all the fetters of the preceding society. By fulfilling this task every bourgeois revolution fulfils all that is required of it: it accelerates the growth of capitalism.

“The socialist revolution is in an altogether different position. The more backward the country which, owing to the zigzags of history, has proved to be the one to start the socialist revolution, the more difficult it is for it to

pass from the old capitalist relations to socialist relations. To the tasks of destruction are added new tasks of unprecedented difficulty — organizational tasks” (see Vol. XXII, p. 315).

“Had not the popular creative spirit of the Russian revolution,” continues Lenin, “which had gone through the great experience of the year 1905, given rise to the Soviets as early as February 1917, they could not under any circumstances have seized power in October, because success depended entirely upon the existence of ready-made organizational forms of a movement embracing millions. These ready-made forms were the Soviets, and that is why in the political sphere there awaited us those brilliant successes, the continuous triumphant march, that we experienced; for the new form of political power was ready to hand, and all we had to do was, by passing a few decrees, to transform the power of the Soviets from the embryonic state in which it existed in the first months of the revolution into a legally recognized form which has become established in the Russian state — i.e., into the Russian Soviet Republic” (see Vol. XXII, p. 315).

“But two problems of enormous difficulty still remained,” says Lenin, “the solution of which could not possibly be the triumphant march which our revolution experienced in the first months...” (*Ibid.*).

“Firstly, there were the problems of internal organization, which confront every socialist revolution. The difference between socialist revolution and bourgeois revolution lies precisely in the fact that the latter finds ready-made forms of capitalist relationships, while Soviet power — proletarian power — does not inherit such ready-made relationships, if we leave out of account the most developed forms of capitalism, which, strictly speaking, extended to but a small top layer of industry and hardly touched agriculture. The organization of accounting, the control of large enterprises, the transformation of the whole of the state economic mechanism into a single huge machine, into an economic organism that works in such a way that hundreds of millions of people are guided by a single plan — such was the enormous organizational problem that rested on our shoulders. Under the present conditions of labour this problem could not possibly be solved by the ‘hurrah’ methods by which we were able to solve the problems of the Civil War” (*Ibid.*, p. 316).

“The second enormous difficulty... was the international question. The reason why we were able to cope so easily with Kerensky’s gangs, why we so easily established our power and without the slightest difficulty passed the decrees on the socialization of the land and on workers’ control, the reason why we achieved all this so easily was only that a fortunate combination of circumstances protected us for a short time from international imperialism. International imperialism, with the entire might of its capital, with its highly organized military technique, which is a real force, a real fortress of international capital, could in no case, under no circumstances, live side by side with the Soviet Republic, both because of its objective position and because of the economic interests of the capitalist class which is embodied in it — it could not do so because of commercial connections, of international finan-

cial relations. In this sphere a conflict is inevitable. Therein lies the greatest difficulty of the Russian revolution, its greatest historical problem: the necessity of solving the international tasks, the necessity of calling forth an international revolution" (see Vol. XXII, p. 317).

Such is the intrinsic character and the basic meaning of the proletarian revolution.

Can such a radical transformation of the old bourgeois order be achieved without a violent revolution, without the dictatorship of the proletariat?

Obviously not. To think that such a revolution can be carried out peacefully, within the framework of bourgeois democracy, which is adapted to the rule of the bourgeoisie, means that one has either gone out of one's mind and lost normal human understanding, or has grossly and openly repudiated the proletarian revolution.

This thesis must be emphasized all the more strongly and categorically for the reason that we are dealing with the proletarian revolution which for the time being has triumphed only in one country, a country which is surrounded by hostile capitalist countries and the bourgeoisie of which cannot fail to receive the support of international capital.

That is why Lenin says that:

"The emancipation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a violent revolution, *but also without the destruction* of the apparatus of state power which was created by the ruling class" (see Vol. XXI, p. 373).

"First let the majority of the population, while private property still exists, i.e., while the rule and yoke of capital still exists, express themselves in favour of the party of the proletariat and only then can and should the party take power — *so say the petty-bourgeois democrats who call themselves 'socialists' but who are in reality the servitors of the bourgeoisie*"* (see Vol. XXIV p. 647)

"*We say:** Let the revolutionary proletariat first overthrow the bourgeoisie, break the yoke of capital, and smash the bourgeois state apparatus, then the victorious proletariat will be able rapidly to gain the sympathy and support of the majority of the toiling non-proletarian masses by satisfying their needs at the expense of the exploiters" (*Ibid.*).

"In order to win the majority of the population to its side," Lenin says further, "the proletariat must, in the first place, overthrow the bourgeoisie and seize state power; secondly, it must introduce Soviet power and smash the old state apparatus to bits, whereby it immediately undermines the rule, prestige and influence of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeois compromisers over the non-proletarian toiling masses. Thirdly, it must *entirely destroy* the

* My italics. — *J. St.*

influence of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeois compromisers over the *majority* of the non-proletarian toiling masses by satisfying *their* economic needs *in a revolutionary way at the expense of the exploiters*" (*Ibid.*, p. 641).

Such are the characteristic features of the proletarian revolution.

What, in this connection, are the main features of the dictatorship of the proletariat, once it is admitted that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the basic content of the proletarian revolution?

Here is the most general definition of the dictatorship of the proletariat given by Lenin:

"The dictatorship of the proletariat is not the end of the class struggle, but its continuation in new forms. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the class struggle of the proletariat, which has won victory and has seized political power, against the bourgeoisie, which although vanquished has not been annihilated, has not disappeared, has not ceased its resistance, has increased its resistance" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 311).

Arguing against confusing the dictatorship of the proletariat with "popular" government, "elected by all," with "non-class" government, Lenin says:

"The class which took political power into its hands did so knowing that it took power *alone*." That is a part of the concept dictatorship of the proletariat. This concept has meaning only when this one class knows that it alone is taking political power in its hands, and does not deceive itself or others with talk about 'popular' government, 'elected by all, sanctified by the whole people'" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 286).

This does not mean, however, that the power of one class, the class of the proletarians, which does not and cannot share power with other classes, does not need aid from, and an alliance with, the labouring and exploited masses of other classes for the achievement of its aims. On the contrary. This power, the power of one class, can be firmly established and exercised to the full only by means of a special form of alliance between the class of proletarians and the labouring masses of the petty-bourgeois classes, primarily the labouring masses of the peasantry.

What is this special form of alliance? What does it consist in? Does not this alliance with the labouring masses of other, non-proletarian, classes wholly contradict the idea of the dictatorship of one class?

This special form of alliance consists in that the guiding force of

* My italics. — *J. St.*

this alliance is the proletariat. This special form of alliance consists in that the leader of the state, the leader in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat is *one* party, the party of the proletariat, the Party of the Communists, which *does not and cannot share* leadership with other parties.

As you see, the contradiction is only an apparent, a seeming one.

“The dictatorship of the proletariat,” says Lenin, “is a *special form of class alliance** between the proletariat, the vanguard of the working people, and the numerous non-proletarian strata of working people (the petty bourgeoisie, the small proprietors, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, etc.), or the majority of these; it is an alliance against capital, an alliance aiming at the complete overthrow of capital, at the complete suppression of the resistance of the bourgeoisie and of any attempt on its part at restoration, an alliance aiming at the final establishment and consolidation of socialism. It is a special type of alliance, which is being built up in special circumstances, namely, in the circumstances of fierce civil war; it is an alliance of the firm supporters of socialism with the latter’s wavering allies and sometimes with ‘neutrals’ (then instead of an agreement for struggle, the alliance becomes an agreement for neutrality), *an alliance between classes which differ economically, politically, socially and ideologically*”* (see Vol. XXIV, p. 311).

In one of his instructional reports, Kamenev, disputing this conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat, states:

“The dictatorship *is not** an alliance of one class with another.”

I believe that Kamenev here has in view, primarily, a passage in my pamphlet *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists*, where it is stated:

“The dictatorship of the proletariat is not simply a governmental top stratum ‘skilfully’ ‘selected’ by the careful hand of an ‘experienced strategist,’ and ‘judiciously relying’ on the support of one section or another of the population. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the class alliance between the proletariat and the labouring masses of the peasantry for the purpose of overthrowing capital, for achieving the final victory of socialism, on the condition that the guiding force of this alliance is the proletariat.”⁷⁰

I wholly endorse this formulation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, for I think that it fully and entirely coincides with Lenin’s formulation, just quoted.

I assert that Kamenev’s statement that “the dictatorship *is not* an alliance of one class with another,” in the categorical form in which

* My italics. — *J. St.*

it is made, has nothing in common with Lenin's theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

I assert that such statements can be made only by people who have failed to understand the meaning of the idea of the bond, the idea of the alliance of the proletariat and peasantry, the idea of the *hegemony* of the proletariat within this alliance.

Such statements can be made only by people who have failed to understand Lenin's thesis:

*"Only an agreement with the peasantry** can save the socialist revolution in Russia as long as the revolution in other countries has not taken place" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 238).

Such statements can be made only by people who have failed to understand Lenin's thesis:

*"The supreme principle of the dictatorship** is the maintenance of the alliance of the proletariat and peasantry in order that the proletariat may retain its leading role and state power" (*Ibid.*, p. 460).

Pointing out one of the most important aims of the dictatorship, the aim of suppressing the exploiters, Lenin says:

"The scientific concept of dictatorship means nothing more nor less than completely unrestricted power, absolutely unimpeded by laws or regulations and resting directly on the use of force" (see Vol. XXV, p. 441).

"Dictatorship means — note this once and for all, Messrs. Cadets — unrestricted power, based on force and not on law. In time of civil war any victorious power can be only a dictatorship" (see Vol. XXV, p. 436).

But of course, the dictatorship of the proletariat does not mean only the use of force, although there is no dictatorship without the use of force.

"Dictatorship," says Lenin, "does not mean only the use of force, although it is impossible without the use of force; it also means the organization of labour on a higher level than the previous organization" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 305).

"The dictatorship of the proletariat... is not only the use of force against the exploiters, and not even mainly the use of force. The economic foundation of this revolutionary use of force, the guarantee of its effectiveness and success is the fact that the proletariat represents and creates a higher type of social organization of labour compared with capitalism. This is the essence. This is the source of the strength and the guarantee of the inevitable complete triumph of communism" (see Vol. XXIV, pp. 335-36).

* My italics. — *J. St.*

“Its quintessence (i.e., of the dictatorship — *J. St.*) is the organization and discipline of the advanced detachment of the working people, of its vanguard, its sole leader, the proletariat, whose object is to build socialism, to abolish the division of society into classes, to make all members of society working people, to remove the basis for any exploitation of man by man. This object cannot be achieved at one stroke. It requires a fairly long period of transition from capitalism to socialism, because the reorganization of production is a difficult matter, because radical changes in all spheres of life need time, and because the enormous force of habit of petty-bourgeois and bourgeois conduct of economy can be overcome only by a long and stubborn struggle. That is why Marx spoke of an entire period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, as the period of transition from capitalism to socialism” (*Ibid.*, p. 314).

Such are the characteristic features of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Hence the three main aspects of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

1) The utilization of the rule of the proletariat for the suppression of the exploiters, for the defence of the country, for the consolidation of the ties with the proletarians of other lands, and for the development and victory of the revolution in all countries.

2) The utilization of the rule of the proletariat in order to detach the labouring and exploited masses once and for all from the bourgeoisie, to consolidate the alliance of the proletariat with these masses, to draw these masses into the work of socialist construction, and to ensure the state leadership of these masses by the proletariat.

3) The utilization of the rule of the proletariat for the organization of socialism, for the abolition of classes, for the transition to a society without classes, to a socialist society.

The proletarian dictatorship is a combination of all these three aspects. No single one of these aspects can be advanced as the *sole* characteristic feature of the dictatorship of the proletariat. On the other hand, in the circumstances of capitalist encirclement, the absence of even one of these features is sufficient for the dictatorship of the proletariat to cease being a dictatorship. Therefore, not one of these three aspects can be omitted without running the risk of distorting the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Only all these three aspects taken together give us the complete and finished concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The dictatorship of the proletariat has its periods, its special forms, diverse methods of work. During the period of civil war, it is the forcible aspect of the dictatorship that is most conspicuous. But

it by no means follows from this that no constructive work is carried on during the period of civil war. Without constructive work it is impossible to wage civil war. During the period of socialist construction, on the other hand, it is the peaceful, organizational and cultural work of the dictatorship, revolutionary law, etc., that are most conspicuous. But, again, it by no means follows from this that the forcible aspect of the dictatorship has ceased to exist or can cease to exist in the period of construction. The organs of suppression, the army and other organizations, are as necessary now, at the time of construction, as they were during the period of civil war. Without these organs, constructive work by the dictatorship with any degree of security would be impossible. It should not be forgotten that for the time being the revolution has been victorious in only one country. It should not be forgotten that as long as capitalist encirclement exists the danger of intervention, with all the consequences resulting from this danger, will also exist.

V

THE PARTY AND THE WORKING CLASS IN THE SYSTEM OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

I have dealt above with the dictatorship of the proletariat from the point of view of its historical inevitability, from the point of view of its class content, from the point of view of its state nature, and, finally, from the point of view of the destructive and creative tasks which it performs throughout the entire historical period that is termed the period of transition from capitalism to socialism.

Now we must say something about the dictatorship of the proletariat from the point of view of its structure, from the point of view of its "mechanism," from the point of view of the role and significance of the "transmission belts," the "levers," and the "directing force" which in their totality constitute "the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat" (*Lenin*), and with the help of which the daily work of the dictatorship of the proletariat is accomplished.

What are these "transmission belts" or "levers" in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat? What is this "directing force"? Why are they needed?

The levers or transmission belts are those very mass organiza-

tions of the proletariat without the aid of which the dictatorship cannot be realized.

The directing force is the advanced detachment of the proletariat, its vanguard, which is the main guiding force of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The proletariat needs these transmission belts, these levers, and this directing force, because without them, in its struggle for victory, it would be a weaponless army in face of organized and armed capital. The proletariat needs these organizations because without them it would suffer inevitable defeat in its fight for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, in its fight for the consolidation of its rule, in its fight for the building of socialism. The systematic help of these organizations and the directing force of the vanguard are needed because in the absence of these conditions it is impossible for the dictatorship of the proletariat to be at all durable and firm.

What are these organizations?

Firstly, there are the workers' *trade unions*, with their central and local ramifications in the shape of whole series of organizations concerned with production, culture, education, etc. These unite the workers of all trades. They are non-Party organizations. The trade unions may be termed the all-embracing organization of the working class, which is in power in our country. They are a school of communism. They promote the best people from their midst for the work of leadership in all branches of administration. They form the link between the advanced and the backward elements in the ranks of the working class. They connect the masses of the workers with the vanguard of the working class.

Secondly, there are the *Soviets*, with their numerous central and local ramifications in the shape of administrative, economic, military, cultural and other state organizations, plus the innumerable mass associations of the working people which have sprung up of their own accord and which encompass these organizations and connect them with the population. The Soviets are a mass organization of all the working people of town and country. They are a non-Party organization. The Soviets are the direct expression of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is through the Soviets that all measures for strengthening the dictatorship and for building socialism are carried out. It is through the Soviets that the state leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat is exercised. The Soviets connect the vast masses of the working people with the vanguard of the proletariat.

Thirdly, there are the *cooperatives* of all kinds, with all their rami-

fications. These are a mass organization of the working people, a non-Party organization, which unites the working people primarily as consumers, and also, in the course of time, as producers (agricultural cooperatives). The cooperatives acquire special significance after the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, during the period of extensive construction. They facilitate contact between the vanguard of the proletariat and the mass of the peasantry and make it possible to draw the latter into the channel of socialist construction.

Fourthly, there is the *Youth League*. This is a mass organization of young workers and peasants; it is a non-Party organization, but is linked with the Party. Its task is to help the Party to educate the young generation in the spirit of socialism. It provides young reserves for all the other mass organizations of the proletariat in all branches of administration. The Youth League has acquired special significance since the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the period of extensive cultural and educational work carried on by the proletariat.

Lastly, there is the *Party* of the proletariat, its vanguard. Its strength lies in the fact that it draws into its ranks all the best elements of the proletariat from all the mass organizations of the latter. Its function is to *combine* the work of all the mass organizations of the proletariat without exception and to *direct* their activities towards a single goal, the goal of the emancipation of the proletariat. And it is absolutely necessary to combine and direct them towards a single goal, for otherwise unity in the struggle of the proletariat is impossible, for otherwise the guidance of the proletarian masses in their struggle for power, in their struggle for building socialism, is impossible. But only the vanguard of the proletariat, its Party, is capable of combining and directing the work of the mass organizations of the proletariat. Only the Party of the proletariat, only the Communist Party, is capable of fulfilling this role of main leader in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Why?

“...because, in the first place, it is the rallying centre of the finest elements in the working class, who have direct connections with the non-Party organizations of the proletariat and very frequently lead them; because, secondly, the Party, as the rallying centre of the finest members of the working class, is the best school for training leaders of the working class, capable of directing every form of organization of their class; because, thirdly, the Party, as the best school for training leaders of the working class, is, by reason of its ex-

perience and prestige, the only organization capable of centralizing the leadership of the struggle of the proletariat, thus transforming each and every non-Party organization of the working class into an auxiliary body and transmission belt linking the Party with the class” (see *The Foundations of Leninism*⁷¹).

The Party is the main guiding force in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

“The Party is the highest form of class organization of the proletariat” (*Lenin*).

To sum up: the *trade unions*, as the mass organization of the proletariat, linking the Party with the class primarily in the sphere of production; the *Soviets*, as the mass organization of the working people, linking the Party with the latter primarily in the sphere of state administration; the *cooperatives*, as the mass organization mainly of the peasantry, linking the Party with the peasant masses primarily in the economic sphere, in the sphere of drawing the peasantry into the work of socialist construction; the *Youth League*, as the mass organization of young workers and peasants, whose mission it is to help the vanguard of the proletariat in the socialist education of the new generation and in training young reserves; and, finally, the *Party*, as the main directing force in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, whose mission it is to lead all these mass organizations — such, in general, is the picture of the “mechanism” of the dictatorship, the picture of “the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.”

Without the Party as the main guiding force, it is impossible for the dictatorship of the proletariat to be at all durable and firm.

Thus, in the words of Lenin, “taken as a whole, we have a formally non-communist, flexible and relatively wide, and very powerful proletarian apparatus, by means of which the Party is closely linked with the *class* and with the *masses*, and by means of which, under the leadership of the Party, the *dictatorship of the class* is exercised” (see Vol. XXV, p. 192).

Of course, this must not be understood in the sense that the Party can or should take the place of the trade unions, the Soviets, and the other mass organizations. The Party exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, it exercises it not directly, but with the help of the trade unions, and through the Soviets and their ramifications. Without these “transmission belts, “it would be impossible for the dictatorship to be at all firm.

“It is impossible to exercise the dictatorship,” says Lenin “without having a number of ‘transmission belts’ from the vanguard to the mass of the advanced class, and from the latter to the mass of the working people” (see Vol. XXVI, p. 65).

“The Party, so to speak, draws into its ranks the vanguard of the proletariat, and this vanguard exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat. Without a foundation like the trade unions the dictatorship cannot be exercised, state functions cannot be fulfilled. And these functions have to be exercised *through** a number of special institutions also of a new type, namely, *through** the Soviet apparatus” (see Vol. XXVI, p. 64).

The highest expression of the leading role of the Party, here, in the Soviet Union, in the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat, for example, is the fact that not a single important political or organizational question is decided by our Soviet and other mass organizations without guiding directives from the Party. *In this sense* it could be said that the dictatorship of the proletariat is, *in essence*, the “dictatorship” of its vanguard, the “dictatorship” of its Party, as the main guiding force of the proletariat. Here is what Lenin said on this subject at the Second Congress of the Comintern⁷²:

“Tanner says that he stands for the dictatorship of the proletariat, but the dictatorship of the proletariat is not conceived quite in the same way as we conceive it. He says that by the dictatorship of the proletariat we mean, *in essence*,* the dictatorship of its organized and class-conscious minority.

“And, as a matter of fact, in the era of capitalism, when the masses of the workers are continuously subjected to exploitation and cannot develop their human potentialities, the most characteristic feature of working-class political parties is that they can embrace only a minority of their class. A political party can comprise only a minority of the class, in the same way as the really class-conscious workers in every capitalist society constitute only a minority of all the workers. That is why we must admit that only this class-conscious minority can guide the broad masses of the workers and lead them. And if Comrade Tanner says that he is opposed to parties, but at the same time is in favour of the minority consisting of the best organized and most revolutionary workers showing the way to the whole of the proletariat, then I say that there is really no difference between us” (see Vol. XXV, p. 347).

But this, however, must not be understood in the sense that a *sign of equality* can be put between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leading role of the Party (the “dictatorship” of the Party), that the former can be *identified* with the latter, that the latter can be

* My italics. — *J. St.*

substituted for the former. Sorin, for example, says that “*the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of our Party.*” This thesis, as you see, identifies the “dictatorship of the Party” with the dictatorship of the proletariat. Can we regard this identification as correct and yet remain on the ground of Leninism? No, we cannot. And for the following reasons:

Firstly. In the passage from his speech at the Second Congress of the Comintern quoted above, Lenin does not by any means identify the leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat. He merely says that “only this class-conscious minority (i.e., the Party — *J. St.*) can guide the broad masses of the workers and lead them,” that it is *precisely in this sense* that “by the dictatorship of the proletariat we mean, *in essence*,* the dictatorship of its organized and class-conscious minority.”

To say “in essence” does not mean “wholly.” We often say that the national question is, in essence, a peasant question. And this is quite true. But this does not mean that the national question is covered by the peasant question, that the peasant question is equal in scope to the national question, that the peasant question and the national question are identical. There is no need to prove that the national question is wider and richer in its scope than the peasant question. The same must be said by analogy as regards the leading role of the Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Although the Party carries out the dictatorship of the proletariat, and in this sense the dictatorship of the proletariat is, *in essence*, the “dictatorship” of its Party, this does not mean that the “dictatorship of the Party” (its leading role) is *identical* with the dictatorship of the proletariat, that the former is *equal* in scope to the latter. There is no need to prove that the dictatorship of the proletariat is wider and richer in its scope than the leading role of the Party. The Party carries out the dictatorship of the proletariat, but it carries out the dictatorship of the *proletariat*, and not any other kind of dictatorship. Whoever identifies the leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat substitutes “dictatorship” of the Party for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Secondly. Not a single important decision is arrived at by the mass organizations of the proletariat without guiding directives from the Party. That is perfectly true. But does that mean that the dictatorship of the proletariat *consists entirely* of the guiding directives

* My italics. — *J. St.*

given by the Party? Does that mean that, in view of this, the guiding directives of the Party can be identified with the dictatorship of the proletariat? Of course not. The dictatorship of the proletariat consists of the guiding directives of the Party plus the carrying out of these directives by the mass organizations of the proletariat, plus their fulfilment by the population. Here, as you see, we have to deal with a whole series of transitions and intermediary steps which are by no means unimportant elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Hence, between the guiding directives of the Party and their fulfilment lie the will and actions of those who are led, the will and actions of the class, its willingness (or unwillingness) to support such directives, its ability (or inability) to carry out these directives, its ability (or inability) to carry them out in strict accordance with the demands of the situation. It scarcely needs proof that the Party, having taken the leadership into its hands, cannot but reckon with the will, the condition, the level of political consciousness of those who are led, cannot leave out of account the will, the condition and level of political consciousness of its class. Therefore, whoever identifies the leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat substitutes the directives given by the Party for the will and actions of the class.

Thirdly. "The dictatorship of the proletariat," says Lenin, "is the class struggle of the proletariat, which has won victory and has seized political power" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 311). How can this *class* struggle find expression? It may find expression in a series of armed actions by the proletariat against the sorties of the overthrown bourgeoisie, or against the intervention of the foreign bourgeoisie. It may find expression in civil war, if the power of the proletariat has not yet been consolidated. It may find expression, after power has already been consolidated, in the extensive organizational and constructive work of the proletariat, with the enlistment of the broad masses in this work. In all these cases, the acting force is the proletariat as *a class*. It has never happened that the Party, the Party alone, has undertaken all these actions with only its own forces, without the support of the class. Usually it only directs these actions, and it can direct them only to the extent that it has the support of the class. For the Party cannot cover, cannot replace the class. For, despite all its important leading role, the Party still remains *a part* of the class. Therefore, whoever identifies the leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat substitutes the Party for the class.

Fourthly. The Party exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat. "The Party is the direct governing vanguard of the proletariat; it is the leader" (*Lenin*).⁷³ In this sense the Party *takes* power, the Party *governs the country*. But this must not be understood in the sense that the Party exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat separately from the state power, without the state power; that the Party governs the country separately from the Soviets, not through the Soviets. This does not mean that the Party can be identified with the Soviets, with the state power. The Party is the core of this power, but it is not and cannot be identified with the state power.

"As the ruling Party," says Lenin, "we could not but merge the Soviet 'top leadership' with the Party 'top leadership' — in our country they are merged and will remain so" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 208). This is quite true. But by this Lenin by no means wants to imply that our Soviet institutions as a whole, for instance our army, our transport, our economic institutions, etc., are Party institutions, that the Party can replace the Soviets and their ramifications, that the Party can be identified with the state power. Lenin repeatedly said that "the system of Soviets is the dictatorship of the proletariat," and that "the Soviet power is the dictatorship of the proletariat" (see Vol. XXIV, pp. 15, 14); but he never said that the Party is the state power, that the Soviets and the Party are one and the same thing. The Party, with a membership of several hundred thousand, guides the Soviets and their central and local ramifications, which embrace tens of millions of people, both Party and non-Party, but it cannot and should not supplant them. That is why Lenin says that "the dictatorship is exercised by the proletariat organized in the Soviets, the proletariat led by the Communist Party of Bolsheviks"; that "all the work of the Party is carried on *through** the Soviets, which embrace the labouring masses irrespective of occupation" (see Vol. XXV, pp. 192, 193); and that the dictatorship "has to be exercised... *through** the Soviet apparatus" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 64). Therefore, whoever identifies the leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat substitutes the Party for the Soviets, i.e., for the state power.

Fifthly. The concept of dictatorship of the proletariat is a state concept. The dictatorship of the proletariat necessarily includes the concept of force. There is no dictatorship without the use of force, if dictatorship is to be understood in the strict sense of the word. Len-

* My italics. — *J. St.*

in defines the dictatorship of the proletariat as “power based directly on the *use of force*” (see Vol. XIX, p. 315). Hence, to talk about dictatorship of the Party in *relation to the proletarian class*, and to identify it with the dictatorship of the proletariat, is tantamount to saying that in relation to its class the Party must be not only a guide, not only a leader and teacher, but also a sort of dictator employing force against it, which, of course, is quite incorrect. Therefore, whoever identifies “dictatorship of the Party” with the dictatorship of the proletariat tacitly proceeds from the assumption that the prestige of the Party can be built up on force employed against the working class, which is absurd and quite incompatible with Leninism. The prestige of the Party is sustained by the confidence of the working class. And the confidence of the working class is gained not by force — force only kills it — but by the Party’s correct theory, by the Party’s correct policy, by the Party’s devotion to the working class, by its connection with the masses of the working class, by its readiness and ability to *convince* the masses of the correctness of its slogans.

What, then, follows from all this?

From this it follows that:

1) Lenin uses the word *dictatorship* of the Party not in the strict sense of the word (“power based on the use of force”), but in the figurative sense, in the sense of its undivided leadership.

2) Whoever identifies the leadership of the Party with the *dictatorship* of the proletariat distorts Lenin, wrongly attributing to the Party the function of employing force against the working class as a whole.

3) Whoever attributes to the Party the function, which it does not possess, of employing force against the working class as a whole, violates the elementary requirements of correct mutual relations between the vanguard and the class, between the Party and the proletariat.

Thus, we have come right up to the question of the mutual relations between the Party and the class, between Party and non-Party members of the working class.

Lenin defines these mutual relations as “*mutual confidence** between the vanguard of the working class and the mass of the workers” (see Vol. XXVI, p. 235).

What does this mean?

It means, firstly, that the Party must closely heed the voice of the

* My italics. — *J. St.*

masses; that it must pay careful attention to the revolutionary instinct of the masses; that it must study the practice of the struggle of the masses and on this basis test the correctness of its own policy; that, consequently, it must not only teach the masses, but also learn from them.

It means, secondly, that the Party must day by day win the confidence of the proletarian masses; that it must by its policy and work secure the support of the masses; that it must not command but primarily convince the masses, helping them to realize through their own experience the correctness of the policy of the Party; that, consequently, it must be the guide, the leader and teacher of its class.

To violate these conditions means to upset the correct mutual relations between the vanguard and the class, to undermine “mutual confidence,” to shatter both class and Party discipline.

“Certainly,” says Lenin, “almost everyone now realizes that the Bolsheviks could not have maintained themselves in power for two-and-a-half months, let alone two-and-a-half years, without the strictest, truly iron discipline in our Party, and *without the fullest and unreserved support of the latter by the whole mass of the working class*,* that is, by all its thinking, honest, self-sacrificing and influential elements, capable of leading or of carrying with them the backward strata” (see Vol. XXV, p. 173).

“The dictatorship of the proletariat,” says Lenin further, “is a stubborn struggle — bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative — against the forces and traditions of the old society. The force of habit of millions and tens of millions is a most terrible force. Without an iron party tempered in the struggle, without a party *enjoying the confidence of all that is honest in the given class*,* without a party capable of watching and influencing the mood of the masses, it is impossible to conduct such a struggle successfully” (see Vol. XXV, p. 190).

But how does the Party acquire this confidence and support of the class? How is the iron discipline necessary for the dictatorship of the proletariat built up within the working class; on what soil does it grow up?

Here is what Lenin says on this subject:

“How is the discipline of the revolutionary party of the proletariat maintained? How is it tested? How is it reinforced? Firstly, by the class consciousness of the proletarian vanguard and by its devotion to the revolution, by its stamina, self-sacrifice and heroism. Secondly, by its ability to link itself with, to keep in close touch with, and to a certain extent, if you like, *to merge with the broadest masses of the working people** — primarily with the pro-

* My italics. — J. St.

letarian, *but also with the non-proletarian*, labouring masses. Thirdly, by the correctness of the political leadership exercised by this vanguard, by the correctness of its political strategy and tactics, provided that the broadest masses have been convinced *through their own experience* of this correctness. Without these conditions, discipline in a revolutionary party that is really capable of being the party of the advanced class, whose mission it is to overthrow the bourgeoisie and transform the whole of society, cannot be achieved. Without these conditions, attempts to establish discipline inevitably become a cipher, an empty phrase, mere affectation. On the other hand, these conditions cannot arise all at once. They are created only by prolonged effort and hard-won experience. Their creation is facilitated only by correct revolutionary theory, which, in its turn, is not a dogma, but assumes final shape only in close connection with the practical activity of a truly mass and truly revolutionary movement” (see Vol. XXV, p. 174).

And further:

“Victory over capitalism requires the correct correlation between the leading, Communist, Party, the revolutionary class — the proletariat — and the masses, i.e., the working people and exploited as a whole. Only the Communist Party, if it is really the vanguard of the revolutionary class, if it contains all the best representatives of that class, if it consists of fully class-conscious and devoted communists who have been educated and steeled by the experience of stubborn revolutionary struggle, if this Party has succeeded in linking itself inseparably with the whole life of its class and, through it, with the whole mass of exploited, and if it has succeeded in inspiring *the complete confidence* of this class and *this mass** — only such a party is capable of leading the proletariat in the most ruthless, resolute and final struggle against all the forces of capitalism. On the other hand, only under the leadership of such a party can the proletariat develop the full might of its revolutionary onslaught and nullify the inevitable apathy and, partly, resistance of the small minority of the labour aristocracy corrupted by capitalism, and of the old trade-union and cooperative leaders, etc. — only then will it be able to display its full strength, which, owing to the very economic structure of capitalist society, is immeasurably greater than the proportion of the population it constitutes” (see Vol. XXV, p. 315).

From these quotations it follows that:

1) The prestige of the Party and the iron discipline within the working class that are necessary for the dictatorship of the proletariat are built up not on fear or on “unrestricted” rights of the Party, but on the confidence of the working class in the Party, on the support which the Party receives from the working class.

2) The confidence of the working class in the Party is not ac-

* My italics. — *J. St.*

quired at one stroke, and not by means of force against the working class, but by the Party's prolonged work among the masses, by the correct policy of the Party, by the ability of the Party to convince the masses through their own experience of the correctness of its policy, by the ability of the Party to secure the support of the working class and to take the lead of the masses of the working class.

3) Without a correct Party policy, reinforced by the experience of the struggle of the masses, and without the confidence of the working class, there is not and cannot be real leadership by the Party.

4) The Party and its leadership, if the Party enjoys the confidence of the class, and if this leadership is real leadership, cannot be counterposed to the dictatorship of the proletariat, because without the leadership of the Party (the "dictatorship" of the Party), enjoying the confidence of the working class, it is impossible for the dictatorship of the proletariat to be at all firm.

Without these conditions, the prestige of the Party and iron discipline within the working class are either empty phrases or boastfulness and adventurism.

It is impossible to counterpose the dictatorship of the proletariat to the leadership (the "dictatorship") of the Party. It is impossible because the leadership of the Party is the principal thing in the dictatorship of the proletariat, if we have in mind a dictatorship that is at all firm and complete, and not one like the Paris Commune, for instance, which was neither a complete nor a firm dictatorship. It is impossible because the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leadership of the Party lie, as it were, on the same line of activity, operate in the same direction.

"The mere presentation of the question," says Lenin, "dictatorship of the Party *or* dictatorship of the class? dictatorship (Party) of the leaders *or* dictatorship (Party) of the masses?" testifies to the most incredible and hopeless confusion of thought... Everyone knows that the masses are divided into classes...; that usually, and in the majority of cases, at least in modern civilized countries, classes are led by political parties; that political parties, as a general rule, are directed by more or less stable groups composed of the most authoritative, influential and experienced members, who are elected to the most responsible positions and are called leaders... To go so far... as to counterpose, in general, dictatorship of the masses to dictatorship of the leaders is ridiculously absurd and stupid" (see Vol. XXV, pp. 187, 188).

That is absolutely correct. But that correct statement proceeds from the premise that correct mutual relations exist between the vanguard and the masses of the workers, between the Party and the

class. It proceeds from the assumption that the mutual relations between the vanguard and the class remain, so to say, normal, remain within the bounds of “mutual confidence.”

But what if the correct mutual relations between the vanguard and the class, the relations of “mutual confidence” between the Party and the class are upset?

What if the Party itself begins, in some way or other, to counterpose itself to the class, thus upsetting the foundations of its correct mutual relations with the class, thus upsetting the foundations of “mutual confidence”?

Are such cases at all possible?

Yes, they are.

They are possible:

1) *if* the Party begins to build its prestige among the masses, not on its work and on the confidence of the masses, but on its “unrestricted” rights;

2) *if* the Party’s policy is obviously wrong and the Party is unwilling to reconsider and rectify its mistake;

3) *if* the Party’s policy is correct on the whole but the masses are not yet ready to make it their own, and the Party is either unwilling or unable to bide its time so as to give the masses an opportunity to become convinced through their own experience that the Party’s policy is correct, and seeks to impose it on the masses.

The history of our Party provides a number of such cases. Various groups and factions in our Party have come to grief and disappeared because they violated one of these three conditions, and sometimes all these conditions taken together.

But it follows from this that counterposing the dictatorship of the proletariat to the “dictatorship” (leadership) of the Party can be regarded as incorrect only:

1) *if* by dictatorship of the Party in relation to the working class we mean not a dictatorship in the proper sense of the word (“power based on the use of force”), but the leadership of the Party, which precludes the use of force against the working class as a whole, against its majority, precisely as Lenin meant it;

2) *if* the Party has the qualifications to be the real leader of the class, i.e., if the Party’s policy is correct, if this policy accords with the interests of the class;

3) *if* the class, if the majority of the class, accepts that policy, makes that policy its own, becomes convinced, as a result of the work of the Party, that that policy is correct, has confidence in the

Party and supports it.

The violation of these conditions inevitably gives rise to a conflict between the Party and the class, to a split between them, to their being counterposed to each other.

Can the Party's leadership be imposed on the class by force? No, it cannot. At all events, *such* a leadership cannot be at all durable. If the Party wants to remain the Party of the proletariat it must know that it is, primarily and principally, the *guide*, the *leader*, the *teacher* of the working class. We must not forget what Lenin said on this subject in his pamphlet *The State and Revolution*:

“By educating the workers' party, Marxism educates the vanguard of the proletariat, which is capable of taking power and *of leading the whole people* to socialism, of directing and organizing the new order, of being the *teacher*, the *guide*, the *leader** of all the toilers and exploited in building up their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie” (see Vol. XXI, p. 386).

Can one consider the Party as the real leader of the class if its policy is wrong, if its policy comes into collision with the interests of the class? Of course not. In such cases the Party, if it wants to remain the leader, must reconsider its policy, must correct its policy, must acknowledge its mistake and correct it. In confirmation of this thesis one could cite, for example, such a fact from the history of our Party as the period of the abolition of the surplus-appropriation system, when the masses of workers and peasants were obviously discontented with our policy and when the Party openly and honestly decided to reconsider this policy. Here is what Lenin said at the time, at the Tenth Party Congress, on the question of abolishing the surplus-appropriation system and introducing the New Economic Policy:

“We must not try to conceal anything, but must say straightforwardly that the peasantry is not satisfied with the form of relations that has been established with it, that it does not want this form of relations and will not go on living in this way. That is indisputable. It has definitely expressed this will. This is the will of the vast mass of the labouring population. We must reckon with this; and we are sufficiently sober politicians to say straightforwardly: *Let us reconsider our policy towards the peasantry*”* (see Vol. XXVI, p. 238).

Can one consider that the Party should take the initiative and

* My italics. — *J. St.*

leadership in organizing decisive actions by the masses merely on the ground that its policy is correct on the whole, *if* that policy does not yet meet the confidence and support of the class because, say, of the latter's political backwardness; *if* the Party has not yet succeeded in convincing the class of the correctness of its policy because, say, events have not yet matured? No, one cannot. In such cases the Party, if it wants to be a real leader, must know how to bide its time, must convince the masses that its policy is correct, must help the masses to become convinced through their own experience that this policy is correct.

"If the revolutionary party," says Lenin, "has not a majority in the advanced detachments of the revolutionary classes and in the country, an uprising is out of the question" (see Vol. XXI, p. 282).

"Revolution is impossible without a change in the views of the majority of the working class, and this change is brought about by the political experience of the masses" (see Vol. XXV, p. 221)

"The proletarian vanguard has been won over ideologically. That is the main thing. Without this not even the first step towards victory can be made. But it is still a fairly long way from victory. Victory cannot be won with the vanguard alone. To throw the vanguard alone into the decisive battle, before the whole class, before the broad masses have taken up a position either of direct support of the vanguard, or at least of benevolent neutrality towards it, and one in which they cannot possibly support the enemy, would be not merely folly but a crime. And in order that actually the whole class, that actually the broad masses of the working people and those oppressed by capital may take up such a position, propaganda and agitation alone are not enough. For this the masses must have their own political experience" (*Ibid.*, p. 228).

We know that this is precisely how our Party acted during the period from Lenin's April Theses to the October uprising of 1917. And it was precisely because it acted according to these directives of Lenin's that it was successful in the uprising.

Such, basically, are the conditions for correct mutual relations between the vanguard and the class.

What does *leadership* mean when the policy of the Party is correct and the correct relations between the vanguard and the class are not upset?

Leadership under these circumstances means the ability to convince the masses of the correctness of the Party's policy; the ability to put forward and to carry out such slogans as bring the masses to the Party's positions and help them to realize through their own experience the correctness of the Party's policy; the ability to raise the

masses to the Party's level of political consciousness, and thus secure the support of the masses and their readiness for the decisive struggle.

Therefore, the method of persuasion is the principal method of the Party's leadership of the working class.

"If we, in Russia today," says Lenin, "after two-and-a-half years of unprecedented victories over the bourgeoisie of Russia and the Entente, were to make 'recognition of the dictatorship' a condition of trade-union membership, we should be committing a folly, we should be damaging our influence over the masses, we should be helping the Mensheviks. For the whole task of the communists is to be able to *convince* the backward elements, to be able to work *among* them, and not to *fence themselves off* from them by artificial and childishly 'left' slogans" (see Vol. XXV, p. 197).

This, of course, must not be understood in the sense that the Party must convince all the workers, down to the last man, and that only after this is it possible to proceed to action, that only after this is it possible to start operations. Not at all! It only means that before entering upon decisive political actions the Party must, by means of prolonged revolutionary work, secure for itself the support of the majority of the masses of the workers, or at least the benevolent neutrality of the majority of the class. Otherwise Lenin's thesis, that a necessary condition for victorious revolution is that the Party should win over the majority of the working class, would be devoid of all meaning.

Well, and what is to be done with the minority, if it does not wish, if it does not agree voluntarily to submit to the will of the majority? Can the Party, must the Party, enjoying the confidence of the majority, compel the minority to submit to the will of the majority? Yes, it can and it must. Leadership is ensured by the method of persuading the masses, as the principal method by which the Party influences the masses. This, however, does not preclude, but presupposes, the use of coercion, if such coercion is based on confidence in the Party and support for it on the part of the majority of the working class, if it is applied to the minority after the Party has convinced the majority.

It would be well to recall the controversies around this subject that took place in our Party during the discussion on the trade-union question. What was the mistake of the opposition, the mistake of the Tsektran,⁷⁴ at that time? Was it that the opposition then considered it possible to resort to coercion? No! It was not that. The mistake of the opposition at that time was that, being unable to convince the

majority of the correctness of its position, having lost the confidence of the majority, it nevertheless began to apply coercion, began to insist on “shaking up” those who enjoyed the confidence of the majority.

Here is what Lenin said at that time, at the Tenth Congress of the Party, in his speech on the trade unions:

“In order to establish mutual relations and mutual confidence between the vanguard of the working class and the masses of the workers, it was necessary, if the Tsektran had made a mistake... to correct this mistake. But when people begin to defend this mistake, it becomes a source of political danger. Had not the utmost possible been done in the way of democracy in heeding the moods expressed here by Kutuzov, we would have met with political bankruptcy. *First we must convince, and then coerce. We must at all costs first convince, and then coerce.** We were not able to convince the broad masses, and we upset the correct relations between the vanguard and the masses” (see Vol. XXVI, p. 235).

Lenin says the same thing in his pamphlet *On the Trade Unions*⁷⁵:

“We applied coercion correctly and successfully only when we were able to create beforehand a basis of conviction for it” (*Ibid.*, p. 74).

And that is quite true, for without those conditions no leadership is possible. For only in that way can we ensure unity of action in the Party, if we are speaking of the Party, or unity of action of the class, if we are speaking of the class as a whole. Without this there is splitting, confusion and demoralization in the ranks of the working class.

Such in general are the fundamentals of correct leadership of the working class by the Party.

Any other conception of leadership is syndicalism, anarchism, bureaucracy — anything you please, but not Bolshevism, not Leninism.

The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be counterposed to the leadership (“dictatorship”) of the Party if correct mutual relations exist between the Party and the working class, between the vanguard and the masses of the workers. But from this it follows that it is all the more impermissible to identify the Party with the working class, the leadership (“dictatorship”) of the Party with the dictatorship of the working class. *On the ground* that the “dictatorship” of the Party cannot be counterposed to the dictatorship of the proletariat, Sorin arrived at the wrong conclusion that “*the dictatorship of the proletariat*

* My italics. — *J. St.*

is the dictatorship of our Party."

But Lenin not only speaks of the impermissibility of such counterposition, he also speaks of the impermissibility of counterposing "the dictatorship of the masses to the dictatorship of the leaders." Would you, *on this ground*, have us identify the dictatorship of leaders with the dictatorship of the proletariat? If we took that line, we would have to say that "*the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of our leaders.*" But it is precisely to this absurdity that we are led, properly speaking, by the policy of identifying the "dictatorship" of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat...

Where does Zinoviev stand on this subject?

In essence, Zinoviev shares Sorin's point of view of identifying the "dictatorship" of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat — with the difference, however, that Sorin expresses himself more openly and clearly, whereas Zinoviev "wiggles." One need only take, for instance, the following passage in Zinoviev's book *Leninism* to be convinced of this:

"What," says Zinoviev, "is the system existing in the USSR from the standpoint of its class content? It is the dictatorship of the proletariat. What is the direct mainspring of power in the USSR? Who exercises the power of the working class? The Communist Party! In this sense, *we have* the dictatorship of the Party.* What is the juridical form of power in the USSR? What is the new type of state system that was created by the October Revolution? The Soviet system. The one does not in the least contradict the other."

That the one does not contradict the other is, of course, correct *if* by the dictatorship of the Party in relation to the working class as a whole we mean the leadership of the Party. But how is it possible, *on this ground*, to place a sign of equality between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the "dictatorship" of the Party, between the Soviet system and the "dictatorship" of the Party? Lenin identified the system of Soviets with the dictatorship of the proletariat, and he was right, for the Soviets, *our* Soviets, are organizations which rally the labouring masses around the proletariat under the leadership of the Party. But when, where, and in which of his writings did Lenin place a sign of equality between the "dictatorship" of the Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat, between the "dictatorship" of the Party and the system of Soviets, as Zinoviev does now? Neither the leadership ("dictatorship") of the Party nor the leadership ("dictatorship") of the leaders contradicts the dictatorship of the proletari-

* My italics. — *J. St.*

at. Would you, *on this ground*, have us proclaim that our country is the country of the dictatorship of the proletariat, *that is to say*, the country of the dictatorship of the Party, *that is to say*, the country of the dictatorship of the leaders? And yet the “principle” of identifying the “dictatorship” of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat, which Zinoviev enunciates surreptitiously and uncourageously, leads precisely to this absurdity.

In Lenin’s numerous works I have been able to note only five cases in which he touches, in passing, on the question of the dictatorship of the Party.

The first case is in his controversy with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, where he says:

“When we are reproached with the dictatorship of one party and when, as you have heard, a proposal is made to establish a united socialist front, we reply: ‘Yes, the dictatorship of one party! We stand by it, and cannot depart from it, for it is that Party which, in the course of decades, has won the position of vanguard of the whole factory and industrial proletariat’” (see Vol. XXIV, p. 423).

The second case is in his “Letter to the Workers and Peasants in Connection with the Victory over Kolchak,” in which he says:

“Some people (especially the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries — all of them, even the ‘Lefts’ among them) are trying to scare the peasants with the bogey of the ‘dictatorship of one party,’ the Party of Bolsheviks, Communists.

“The peasants have learned from the instance of Kolchak not to be afraid of this bogey.

“Either the dictatorship (i.e., iron rule) of the landlords and capitalists, or the dictatorship of the working class” (see Vol. XXIV, p. 436).

The third case is Lenin’s speech at the Second Congress of the Comintern in his controversy with Tanner. I have quoted it above.

The fourth case is a few lines in the pamphlet “*Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*.” The passages in question have already been quoted above.

And the fifth case is in his draft outline of the dictatorship of the proletariat, published in the *Lenin Miscellany*, Volume III, where there is a sub-heading “Dictatorship of One Party” (see *Lenin Miscellany*, Vol. III, p. 497).

It should be noted that in two out of the five cases, the last and the second, Lenin puts the words “dictatorship of one party” in quotation marks, thus clearly emphasizing the inexact, figurative sense

of this formula.

It should also be noted that in every one of these cases, by the “dictatorship of the Party” Lenin meant dictatorship (“iron rule”) over the “landlords and capitalists,” and not over the working class, contrary to the slanderous fabrications of Kautsky and Co.

It is characteristic that in *none* of his works, major or secondary, in which Lenin discusses or merely alludes to the dictatorship of the proletariat and the role of the Party in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, is there any hint whatever that “the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of our Party.” On the contrary, every page, every line of these works cries out against such a formula (see *The State and Revolution*, *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, “*Left-Wing*” *Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, etc.).

Even more characteristic is the fact that in the theses of the Second Congress of the Comintern⁷⁶ on the role of a political party, which were drawn up under the direct guidance of Lenin, and to which Lenin repeatedly referred in his speeches as a model of the correct formulation of the role and tasks of the Party, we find *not one word*, literally *not one word*, about dictatorship of the Party.

What does all this indicate?

It indicates that:

a) Lenin did not regard the formula “dictatorship of the Party” as irreproachable and exact, for which reason it is very rarely used in Lenin’s works, and is sometimes put in quotation marks;

b) on the few occasions that Lenin was obliged, in controversy with opponents, to speak of the dictatorship of the Party, he usually referred to the “dictatorship of *one* party,” i.e., to the fact that our Party holds power *alone*, that it *does not share* power with *other* parties. Moreover, he always made it clear that the dictatorship of the Party *in relation to the working class* meant the leadership of the Party, its leading role;

c) in all those cases in which Lenin thought it necessary to give a scientific definition of the role of the Party in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, he spoke *exclusively* of the leading role of the Party in relation to the working class (and there are thousands of such cases);

d) that is why it never “occurred” to Lenin to include the formula “dictatorship of the Party” in the fundamental resolution on the role of the Party — I have in mind the resolution adopted at the Second Congress of the Comintern;

e) the comrades who identify, or try to identify, the “dictator-

ship” of the Party and, therefore, the “dictatorship of the leaders” with the dictatorship of the proletariat are wrong from the point of view of Leninism, and are politically short-sighted, for they thereby violate the conditions for correct mutual relations between the vanguard and the class.

This is apart from the fact that the formula “dictatorship of the Party,” when taken without the above-mentioned reservations, can give rise to quite a number of dangers and political setbacks in our practical work. This formula, taken without reservations, says, as it were:

a) *to the non-Party masses*: don’t dare to contradict, don’t dare to argue, for the Party can do everything, for we have the dictatorship of the Party;

b) *to the Party cadres*: act more boldly, tighten the screw, there is no need to heed what the non-Party masses say, we have the dictatorship of the Party;

c) *to the top leadership of the Party*: you may indulge in the luxury of a certain amount of complacency, you may even become conceited, for we have the dictatorship of the Party, and, “consequently,” the dictatorship of the leaders.

It is opportune to call attention to these dangers precisely at the present moment, in a period when the political activity of the masses is rising, when the readiness of the Party to heed the voice of the masses is of particular value to us, when attention to the requirements of the masses is a fundamental precept of our Party, when it is incumbent upon the Party to display particular caution and particular flexibility in its policy, when the danger of becoming conceited is one of the most serious dangers confronting the Party in its task of correctly leading the masses.

One cannot but recall Lenin’s golden words at the Eleventh Congress of our Party:

“Among the mass of the people we (the communists — *J. St.*) are after all but a drop in the ocean, and we can administer only when we properly express what the people are conscious of. Unless we do this the Communist Party will not lead the proletariat, the proletariat will not lead the masses, and the whole machine will collapse” (see Vol. XXVII, p. 256).

“*Properly express what the people are conscious of*” — this is precisely the necessary condition that ensures for the Party the honourable role of the principal guiding force in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

VI

**THE QUESTION OF THE VICTORY OF
SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY**

The pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism* (May 1924, first edition) contains two formulations on the question of the victory of socialism in one country. The first of these says:

“Formerly, the victory of the revolution in one country was considered impossible, on the assumption that it would require the combined action of the proletarians of all or at least of a majority of the advanced countries to achieve victory over the bourgeoisie. Now this point of view no longer fits in with the facts. Now we must proceed from the possibility of such a victory, for the uneven and spasmodic character of the development of the various capitalist countries under the conditions of imperialism, the development within imperialism of catastrophic contradictions leading to inevitable wars, the growth of the revolutionary movement in all countries of the world — all this leads, not only to the possibility, but also to the necessity of the victory of the proletariat in individual countries” (see *The Foundations of Leninism*⁷⁷)

This thesis is quite correct and needs no comment. It is directed against the theory of the social-democrats, who regard the seizure of power by the proletariat in one country, without the simultaneous victory of the revolution in other countries, as utopian.

But the pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism* contains a second formulation, which says:

“But the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and establishment of the power of the proletariat in one country does not yet mean that the complete victory of socialism has been ensured. The principal task of socialism — the organization of socialist production — has still to be fulfilled. Can this task be fulfilled, can the final victory of socialism be achieved in one country, without the joint efforts of the proletarians in several advanced countries? No, it cannot. To overthrow the bourgeoisie the efforts of one country are sufficient; this is proved by the history of our revolution. For the final victory of socialism, for the organization of socialist production, the efforts of one country, particularly of a peasant country like Russia, are insufficient; for that, the efforts of the proletarians of several advanced countries are required” (see *The Foundations of Leninism*, first edition⁷⁸).

This second formulation was directed against the assertions of the critics of Leninism, against the Trotskyists, who declared that the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, in the absence of victory in other countries, could not “hold out in the face of a con-

servative Europe.”

To that extent — but only to that extent — this formulation was then (May 1924) adequate, and undoubtedly it was of some service.

Subsequently, however, when the criticism of Leninism in this sphere had already been overcome in the Party, when a new question had come to the fore — the question of the possibility of building a complete socialist society by the efforts of our country, without help from abroad — the second formulation became obviously inadequate, and therefore incorrect.

What is the defect in this formulation?

Its defect is that it joins two different questions into one: it joins the question of the *possibility* of building socialism by the efforts of one country — which must be answered in the affirmative — with the question whether a country in which the dictatorship of the proletariat exists can consider itself *fully guaranteed* against intervention, and consequently against the restoration of the old order, without a victorious revolution in a number of other countries — which must be answered in the negative. This is apart from the fact that this formulation may give occasion for thinking that the organization of a socialist society by the efforts of one country is impossible — which, of course, is incorrect.

On this ground I modified and corrected this formulation in my pamphlet *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists* (December 1924); I divided the question into two — into the question of a *full guarantee against the restoration of the bourgeois order*, and the question of the *possibility of building a complete socialist society* in one country. This was effected, in the first place, by treating the “complete victory of socialism” as a “full guarantee against the restoration of the old order,” which is possible only through “the joint efforts of the proletarians of several countries”; and, secondly, by proclaiming, on the basis of Lenin’s pamphlet *On Cooperation*,⁷⁹ the indisputable truth that we have all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society (see *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists*).*

It was this new formulation of the question that formed the basis for the well-known resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference “The Tasks of the Comintern and the RCP(B),”⁸⁰ which examines the question of the victory of socialism in one country in connection

* This new formulation of the question was substituted for the old one in subsequent editions of the pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism*.

with the stabilization of capitalism (April 1925), and considers that the building of socialism by the efforts of our country is possible and necessary.

This new formulation also served as the basis for my pamphlet *The Results of the Work of the Fourteenth Conference of the RCP(B)* published in May 1925, immediately after the Fourteenth Party Conference.

With regard to the presentation of the question of the victory of socialism in one country, this pamphlet states:

“Our country exhibits two groups of contradictions. One group consists of the internal contradictions that exist between the proletariat and the peasantry (this refers to the building of socialism in one country — *J. St.*). The other group consists of the external contradictions that exist between our country, as the land of socialism, and all the other countries, as lands of capitalism (this refers to the final victory of socialism — *J. St.*)...” “Anyone who confuses the first group of contradictions, which can be overcome entirely by the efforts of one country, with the second group of contradictions, the solution of which requires the efforts of the proletarians of several countries, commits a gross error against Leninism. He is either a muddle-head or an incorrigible opportunist” (see *The Results of the Work of the Fourteenth Conference of the RCP(B)*)⁸¹).

On the question of the *victory* of socialism in our country, the pamphlet states:

“We can build socialism, and we will build it together with the peasantry under the leadership of the working class”... for “under the dictatorship of the proletariat we possess... all that is needed to build a complete socialist society, overcoming all internal difficulties, for we can and must overcome them by our own efforts” (*Ibid.*⁸²).

On the question of the *final* victory of socialism, it states:

“The final victory of socialism is the full guarantee against attempts at intervention, and hence against restoration, for any serious attempt at restoration can take place only with serious support from outside, only with the support of international capital. Therefore, the support of our revolution by the workers of all countries, and still more the victory of the workers in at least several countries, is a necessary condition for fully guaranteeing the first victorious country against attempts at intervention and restoration, a necessary condition for the final victory of socialism” (*Ibid.*⁸³).

Clear, one would think.

It is well known that this question was treated in the same spirit in my pamphlet *Questions and Answers* (June 1925) and in the politi-

cal report of the Central Committee to the Fourteenth Congress of the CPSU(B)⁸⁴ (December 1925).

Such are the facts.

These facts, I think, are known to all the comrades, including Zinoviev.

If now, nearly two years after the ideological struggle in the Party and after the resolution that was adopted at the Fourteenth Party Conference (April 1925), Zinoviev finds it possible in his reply to the discussion at the Fourteenth Party Congress (December 1925) to dig up the old and quite inadequate formula contained in Stalin's pamphlet written in April 1924, and to make it the basis for deciding the already decided question of the victory of socialism in one country — then this peculiar trick of his only goes to show that he has got completely muddled on this question. To drag the Party back after it has moved forward, to evade the resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference after it has been confirmed by a Plenum of the Central Committee,⁸⁵ means to become hopelessly entangled in contradictions, to have no faith in the cause of building socialism, to abandon the path of Lenin, and to acknowledge one's own defeat.

What is meant by the *possibility* of the victory of socialism in one country?

It means the possibility of solving the contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry by means of the internal forces of our country, the possibility of the proletariat seizing power and using that power to build a complete socialist society in our country, with the sympathy and the support of the proletarians of other countries, but without the preliminary victory of the proletarian revolution in other countries.

Without such a possibility, building socialism is building without prospects, building without being sure that socialism will be completely built. It is no use engaging in building socialism without being sure that we can build it completely, without being sure that the technical backwardness of our country is not an *insuperable* obstacle to the building of a complete socialist society. To deny such a possibility means disbelief in the cause of building socialism, departure from Leninism.

What is meant by the *impossibility* of the complete, final victory of socialism in one country without the victory of the revolution in other countries?

It means the impossibility of having a full guarantee against intervention, and consequently against the restoration of the bourgeois

order, without the victory of the revolution in at least a number of countries. To deny this indisputable thesis means departure from internationalism, departure from Leninism.

“We are living,” says Lenin, “not merely in a state, but *in a system of states*, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end comes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable. That means that if the ruling class, the proletariat, wants to, and will hold sway, it must prove this by its military organization also” (see Vol. XXIV, p. 122).

“We have before us,” says Lenin in another passage, “a certain equilibrium, which is in the highest degree unstable, but an unquestionable, an indisputable equilibrium nevertheless. Will it last long? I do not know and, I think, it is impossible to know. And therefore we must exercise very great caution. And the first precept of our policy, the first lesson to be learned from our governmental activities during the past year, the lesson which all the workers and peasants must learn, is that we must be on the alert, we must remember that we are surrounded by people, classes and governments who openly express their intense hatred for us. We must remember that we are at all times but a hair’s breadth from every manner of invasion” (see Vol. XXVII, p. 117).

Clear, one would think.

Where does Zinoviev stand as regards the question of the victory of socialism in one country?

Listen:

“By the final victory of socialism is meant, at least: 1) the abolition of classes, and therefore 2) the abolition of the dictatorship of one class, in this case the dictatorship of the proletariat.”... “In order to get a clearer idea of how the question stands here, in the USSR, in the year 1925,” says Zinoviev further, “we must distinguish between two things: 1) the assured *possibility* of engaging in building socialism — such a possibility, it stands to reason, is quite conceivable within the limits of one country; and 2) the final construction and consolidation of socialism, i.e., the achievement of a socialist system, of a socialist society.”

What can all this signify?

It signifies that by the final victory of socialism in one country Zinoviev understands, not a guarantee against intervention and restoration, but the possibility of completely building socialist society. And by the victory of socialism in one country Zinoviev understands the kind of building socialism which cannot and should not lead to completely building socialism. Building at haphazard, without prospects, building socialism although completely building a socialist

society is impossible — such is Zinoviev's position.

To engage in building socialism *without the possibility* of completely building it, *knowing that it cannot be completely built* — such are the absurdities in which Zinoviev has involved himself.

But this is a mockery of the question, not a solution of it!

Here is another extract from Zinoviev's reply to the discussion at the Fourteenth Party Congress:

“Take a look, for instance, at what Comrade Yakovlev went so far as to say at the last Kursk Gubernia Party Conference. He asks: ‘Is it possible for us, surrounded as we are on all sides by capitalist enemies, to completely build socialism in one country under such conditions?’ And he answers: ‘On the basis of all that has been said we have the right to say not only that we are building socialism, but that in spite of the fact that for the time being we are alone, that for the time being we are the only Soviet country, the only Soviet state in the world, we shall completely build socialism’ (*Kurskaya Pravda*, No. 279, December 8, 1925). *Is this the Leninist method of presenting the question,*” Zinoviev asks, *“does not this smack of national narrow-mindedness?”**

Thus, according to Zinoviev, to recognize the possibility of completely building socialism in one country means adopting the point of view of national narrow-mindedness, while to deny such a possibility means adopting the point of view of internationalism.

But if that is true, is it at all worthwhile fighting for victory over the capitalist elements in our economy? Does it not follow from this that such a victory is impossible?

Capitulation to the capitalist elements in our economy — that is what the inherent logic of Zinoviev's line of argument leads us to.

And this absurdity, which has nothing in common with Leninism, is presented to us by Zinoviev as “internationalism,” as “100 per cent Leninism”!

I assert that on this most important question of building socialism Zinoviev is deserting Leninism and slipping to the standpoint of the Menshevik Sukhanov.

Let us turn to Lenin. Here is what he said about the victory of socialism in one country even before the October Revolution, in August 1915:

“Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country taken separately. The victorious proletariat of that

* My italics. — *J. St.*

country, having expropriated the capitalists and *organized socialist production*,* would stand up *against* the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states” (see Vol. XVIII, pp. 232-33).

What is meant by Lenin’s phrase “having... organized socialist production” which I have stressed? It means that the proletariat of the victorious country, having seized power, *can* and *must* organize socialist production. And what does to “organize socialist production” mean? It means completely building a socialist society. It scarcely needs proof that this clear and definite statement of Lenin’s requires no further comment. Otherwise Lenin’s call for the seizure of power by the proletariat in October 1917 would be incomprehensible.

You see that this clear thesis of Lenin’s, in comparison with Zinoviev’s muddled and anti-Leninist “thesis” that we can engage in building socialism “within the limits of one country,” although it is *impossible* to build it completely, is as different from the latter as the heavens from the earth.

The statement quoted above was made by Lenin in 1915, before the proletariat had taken power. But perhaps he modified his views after the experience of taking power, after 1917? Let us turn to Lenin’s pamphlet *On Cooperation*, written in 1923.

“As a matter of fact,” says Lenin, “state power over all large-scale means of production, state power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this proletariat with the many millions of small and very small peasants, the assured leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat, etc. — is not this all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society from the cooperatives, from the cooperatives alone, which we formerly looked down upon as huckstering and which from a certain aspect we have the right to look down upon as such now, under NEP? *Is this not all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society?*” This is not yet the building of socialist society, but *it is all that is necessary and sufficient for this building*”* (see Vol. XXVII, p. 392).

In other words, we can and must build a complete socialist society, for we have at our disposal all that is necessary and sufficient for this building.

I think it would be difficult to express oneself more clearly.

* My italics. — *J. St.*

Compare this classical thesis of Lenin's with the anti-Leninist rebuke Zinoviev administered to Yakovlev, and you will realize that Yakovlev was only repeating Lenin's words about the possibility of completely building socialism in one country, whereas Zinoviev, by attacking this thesis and castigating Yakovlev, deserted Lenin and adopted the point of view of the Menshevik Sukhanov, the point of view that it is impossible to build socialism completely in our country owing to its technical backwardness.

One can only wonder why we took power in October 1917 if we did not count on completely building socialism.

We should not have taken power in October 1917 — this is the conclusion to which the inherent logic of Zinoviev's line of argument leads us.

I assert further that in the highly important question of the victory of socialism Zinoviev has gone *counter* to the definite decisions of our Party, as registered in the well-known resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference "The Tasks of the Comintern and the RCP(B) in Connection with the Enlarged Plenum of the ECCI"

Let us turn to this resolution. Here is what it says about the victory of socialism in one country:

"The existence of two directly opposite social systems gives rise to the constant menace of capitalist blockade, of other forms of economic pressure, of armed intervention, of restoration. Consequently, the only guarantee of the *final victory of socialism*, i.e., *the guarantee against restoration*,* is a victorious socialist revolution in a number of countries..." "Leninism teaches that the *final victory of socialism, in the sense of a full guarantee against the restoration** of bourgeois relationships, is possible only on an international scale..." "But it *does not follow** from this that it is impossible to build a *complete socialist society** in a backward country like Russia, without the 'state aid' (Trotsky) of countries more developed technically and economically" (see the resolution⁸⁶).

As you see, the resolution interprets the final victory of socialism as a guarantee against intervention and restoration, *in complete contrast* to Zinoviev's interpretation in his book *Leninism*.

As you see, the resolution recognizes the possibility of building a complete socialist society in a backward country like Russia without the "state aid" of countries more developed technically and economically, *in complete contrast* to what Zinoviev said when he rebuked Yakovlev in his reply to the discussion at the Fourteenth Party Con-

* My italics. — J. St.

gress.

How else can this be described if not as a struggle on Zinoviev's part *against* the resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference?

Of course, Party resolutions are sometimes not free from error. Sometimes they contain mistakes. Speaking generally, one may assume that the resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference also contains certain errors. Perhaps Zinoviev thinks that this resolution is erroneous. But then he should say so clearly and openly, as befits a Bolshevik. For some reason or other, however, Zinoviev does not do so. He preferred to choose another path, that of attacking the resolution of the Fourteenth Party

Conference from the rear, while keeping silent about this resolution and refraining from any open criticism of the resolution. Zinoviev evidently thinks that this will be the best way of achieving his purpose. And he has but one purpose, namely — to “improve” the resolution, and to amend Lenin “just a little bit.” It scarcely needs proof that Zinoviev has made a mistake in his calculations.

What is Zinoviev's mistake due to? What is the root of this mistake?

The root of this mistake, in my opinion, lies in Zinoviev's conviction that the technical backwardness of our country is an *insuperable* obstacle to the building of a complete socialist society; that the proletariat cannot completely build socialism owing to the technical backwardness of our country. Zinoviev and Kamenev once tried to raise this argument at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Party prior to the April Party Conference.⁸⁷ But they received a rebuff and were compelled to retreat, and *formally* they submitted to the opposite point of view, the point of view of the majority of the Central Committee. But although he formally submitted to it, Zinoviev has continued to wage a struggle against it all the time. Here is what the Moscow Committee of our Party says about this “incident” in the Central Committee of the RCP(B) in its “Reply” to the letter of the Leningrad Gubernia Party Conference⁸⁸:

“Recently, in the Political Bureau, Kamenev and Zinoviev advocated the point of view that we cannot cope with the internal difficulties due to our technical and economic backwardness unless an international revolution comes to our rescue. We, however, with the majority of the members of the Central Committee, think that we can build socialism, are building it, and will completely build it, notwithstanding our technical backwardness and in spite of it. We think that the work of building will proceed far more slowly, of course, than in the conditions of a world victory; nevertheless, we are

making progress and will continue to do so. We also believe that the view held by Kamenev and Zinoviev expresses disbelief in the internal forces of our working class and of the peasant masses who follow its lead. We believe that it is a departure from the Leninist position" (see "Reply").

This document appeared in the press during the first sittings of the Fourteenth Party Congress. Zinoviev, of course, had the opportunity of attacking this document at the congress. It is characteristic that Zinoviev and Kamenev found no arguments against this grave accusation directed against them by the Moscow Committee of our Party. Was this accidental? I think not. The accusation, apparently, hit the mark. Zinoviev and Kamenev "replied" to this accusation by silence, because they had no "card to beat it."

The "New Opposition" is offended because Zinoviev is accused of disbelief in the victory of socialist construction in our country. But if after a whole year of discussion on the question of the victory of socialism in one country; after Zinoviev's viewpoint has been rejected by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee (April 1925); after the Party has arrived at a definite opinion on this question, recorded in the well-known resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference (April 1925) — if, after all this, Zinoviev ventures to oppose the point of view of the Party in his book *Leninism* (September 1925), if he then repeats this opposition at the Fourteenth Party Congress — how can all this, this stubbornness, this persistence in his error, be explained if not by the fact that Zinoviev is infected, hopelessly infected, with disbelief in the victory of socialist construction in our country?

It pleases Zinoviev to regard this disbelief of his as internationalism. But since when have we come to regard departure from Leninism on a cardinal question of Leninism as internationalism?

Will it not be more correct to say that it is not the Party but Zinoviev who is sinning against internationalism and the international revolution? For what is our country, the country "that is building socialism," if not the base of the world revolution? But can it be a real base of the world revolution if it is incapable of completely building a socialist society? Can it remain the mighty centre of attraction for the workers of all countries that it undoubtedly is now, if it is incapable of achieving victory at home over the capitalist elements in our economy, the victory of socialist construction? I think not. But does it not follow from this that disbelief in the victory of socialist construction, the dissemination of such disbelief, will lead to our country being discredited as the base of the world revolution?

And if our country is discredited the world revolutionary movement will be weakened. How did Messrs. the social-democrats try to scare the workers away from us? By preaching that “the Russians will not get anywhere.” What are we beating the social-democrats with now, when we are attracting a whole series of workers’ delegations to our country and thereby strengthening the position of communism all over the world? By our successes in building socialism. Is it not obvious, then, that whoever disseminates disbelief in our successes in building socialism thereby indirectly helps the social-democrats, reduces the sweep of the international revolutionary movement, and inevitably departs from internationalism?...

You see that Zinoviev is in no better position in regard to his “internationalism” than in regard to his “100 per cent Leninism” on the question of building socialism in one country.

That is why the Fourteenth Party Congress rightly defined the views of the “New Opposition” as “disbelief in the cause of socialist construction,” as “a distortion of Leninism.”⁸⁹

VII

THE FIGHT FOR THE VICTORY OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

I think that disbelief in the victory of socialist construction is the principal error of the “New Opposition.” In my opinion, it is the principal error because from it spring all the other errors of the “New Opposition.” The errors of the “New Opposition” on the questions of NEP, state capitalism, the nature of our socialist industry, the role of the cooperatives under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the methods of fighting the kulaks, the role and importance of the middle peasantry — all these errors are to be traced to the principal error of the opposition, to disbelief in the possibility of completely building a socialist society by the efforts of our country.

What is disbelief in the victory of socialist construction in our country?

It is, first of all, lack of confidence that, owing to certain conditions of development in our country, the main mass of the peasantry *can be drawn* into the work of socialist construction.

It is, secondly, lack of confidence that the proletariat of our country, which holds the key positions in our national economy, *is*

capable of drawing the main mass of the peasantry into the work of socialist construction.

It is from these theses that the opposition tacitly proceeds in its arguments about the paths of our development — no matter whether it does so consciously or unconsciously.

Can the main mass of the Soviet peasantry be drawn into the work of socialist construction?

In the pamphlet *The Foundations of Leninism* there are two main theses on this subject:

1) “The peasantry in the Soviet Union must not be confused with the peasantry in the West. A peasantry that has been schooled in three revolutions, that fought against the Tsar and the power of the bourgeoisie side by side with the proletariat and under the leadership of the proletariat, a peasantry that has received land and peace at the hands of the proletarian revolution and by reason of this has become the reserve of the proletariat — such a peasantry cannot but be different from a peasantry which during the bourgeois revolution fought under the leadership of the liberal bourgeoisie, which received land at the hands of that bourgeoisie, and in view of this became the reserve of the bourgeoisie. It scarcely needs proof that the Soviet peasantry, which has learnt to appreciate its political friendship and *political* collaboration with the proletariat and which owes its freedom to this friendship and collaboration, cannot but represent exceptionally favourable material for *economic* collaboration with the proletariat.”

2) “Agriculture in Russia must not be confused with agriculture in the West. There, agriculture is developing along the ordinary lines of capitalism, under conditions of profound differentiation among the peasantry, with large landed estates and private capitalist latifundia at one extreme and pauperism, destitution and wage slavery at the other. Owing to this, disintegration and decay are quite natural there. Not so in Russia. Here agriculture cannot develop along such a path, if for no other reason than that the existence of Soviet power and the nationalization of the principal instruments and means of production preclude such a development. In Russia the development of agriculture must proceed along a different path, along the path of organizing millions of small and middle peasants in cooperatives, along the path of developing in the countryside a mass cooperative movement supported by the state by means of preferential credits. Lenin rightly pointed out in his articles on cooperation that the development of agriculture in our country must proceed

along a new path, along the path of drawing the majority of the peasants into socialist construction through the cooperatives, along the path of gradually introducing into agriculture the principles of collectivism, first in the sphere of marketing and later in the sphere of production of agricultural products...

“It scarcely needs proof that the vast majority of the peasantry will eagerly take this new path of development, rejecting the path of private capitalist latifundia and wage slavery, the path of destitution and ruin.”⁹⁰

Are these theses correct?

I think that both theses are correct and incontrovertible for the whole of our construction period under the conditions of NEP.

They are merely the expression of Lenin’s well-known theses on the bond between the proletariat and the peasantry, on the inclusion of the peasant farms in the system of socialist development of our country; of his theses that the proletariat must march towards socialism together with the main mass of the peasantry, that the organization of the vast masses of the peasantry in cooperatives is the high road of socialist construction in the countryside, that with the growth of our socialist industry, “for us, the mere growth of cooperation is identical... with the growth of socialism” (see Vol. XXVII, p. 396).

Indeed, along what path can and must the development of peasant economy in our country proceed?

Peasant economy is not capitalist economy. Peasant economy, if you take the overwhelming majority of the peasant farms, is small commodity economy. And what is peasant small commodity economy? It is economy standing at the crossroads between capitalism and socialism. It may develop in the direction of capitalism, as it is now doing in capitalist countries, or in the direction of socialism, as it must do here, in our country, under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Whence this instability, this lack of independence of peasant economy? How is it to be explained?

It is to be explained by the scattered character of the peasant farms, their lack of organization, their dependence on the towns, on industry, on the credit system, on the character of the state power in the country, and, lastly, by the well-known fact that the countryside follows, and necessarily must follow, the town both in material and in cultural matters.

The capitalist path of development of peasant economy means

development through profound differentiation among the peasantry, with large latifundia at one extreme and mass impoverishment at the other. Such a path of development is inevitable in capitalist countries, because the countryside, peasant economy, is dependent on the towns, on industry, on credit concentrated in the towns, on the character of the state power — and in the towns it is the bourgeoisie, capitalist industry, the capitalist credit system and the capitalist state power that hold sway.

Is this path of development of peasant farms obligatory for our country, where the towns have quite a different aspect, where industry is in the hands of the proletariat, where transport, the credit system, the state power, etc., are concentrated in the hands of the proletariat, where the nationalization of the land is a universal law of the country? Of course not. On the contrary. Precisely because the towns do lead the countryside, while we have in the towns the rule of the proletariat, which holds all the key positions of national economy — precisely for this reason the peasant farms in their development must proceed along a different path, the path of socialist construction.

What is this path?

It is the path of the mass organization of millions of peasant farms into cooperatives in all spheres of cooperation, the path of uniting the scattered peasant farms around socialist industry, the path of implanting the elements of collectivism among the peasantry at first in the sphere of *marketing* agricultural produce and *supplying* the peasant farms with the products of urban industry and later in the sphere of agricultural *production*.

And the further we advance the more this path becomes inevitable under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, because cooperative marketing, cooperative supplying, and, finally, cooperative credit and production (agricultural cooperatives) are the only way to promote the welfare of the countryside, the only way to save the broad masses of the peasantry from poverty and ruin.

It is said that our peasantry, by its position, is not socialist, and, therefore, incapable of socialist development. It is true, of course, that the peasantry, by its position, is not socialist. But this is no argument against the development of the peasant farms along the path of socialism, once it has been proved that the countryside follows the town, and in the towns it is socialist industry that holds sway. The peasantry, by its position, was not socialist at the time of the October Revolution either, and it did not by any means want to es-

tablish socialism in our country. At that time it strove mainly for the abolition of the power of the landlords and for the ending of the war, for the establishment of peace. Nevertheless, it followed the lead of the socialist proletariat. Why? Because the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the seizure of power by the socialist proletariat was at that time the only way of getting out of the imperialist war, the only way of establishing peace. Because there was no other way at that time, nor could there be any. Because our Party was able to hit upon that degree of the combination of the specific interests of the peasantry (the overthrow of the landlords, peace) with, and their subordination to, the general interests of the country (the dictatorship of the proletariat) which proved acceptable and advantageous to the peasantry. And so the peasantry, in spite of its non-socialist character, at that time followed the lead of the socialist proletariat.

The same must be said about socialist construction in our country, about drawing the peasantry into the channel of this construction. The peasantry is non-socialist by its position. But it must, and certainly will, take the path of socialist development, for there is not, and cannot be, any other way of saving the peasantry from poverty and ruin except the bond with the proletariat, except the bond with socialist industry, except the inclusion of peasant economy in the common channel of socialist development by the mass organization of the peasantry in cooperatives.

But why precisely by the mass organization of the peasantry in cooperatives?

Because in the mass organization in cooperatives “we have found that degree of the combination of private interest, private trading interest, with state supervision and control of this interest, that degree of its subordination to the general interests” (*Lenin*)⁹¹ which is acceptable and advantageous to the peasantry and which ensures the proletariat the possibility of drawing the main mass of the peasantry into the work of socialist construction. It is precisely because it is advantageous to the peasantry to organize the sale of its products and the purchase of machines for its farms through cooperatives, it is precisely for that reason that it should and will proceed along the path of mass organization in cooperatives.

What does the mass organization of peasant farms in cooperatives mean when we have the supremacy of socialist industry?

It means that peasant small commodity economy *abandons* the old capitalist path, which is fraught with mass ruin for the peasantry, and *goes over* to the new path of development, the path of socialist

construction.

This is why the fight for the new path of development of peasant economy, the fight to draw the main mass of the peasantry into the work of socialist construction, is the immediate task facing our Party.

The Fourteenth Congress of the CPSU(B), therefore, was right in declaring:

“The main path of building socialism in the countryside consists in using the growing economic leadership of socialist state industry, of the state credit institutions, and of the other key positions in the hands of the proletariat to draw the main mass of the peasantry into cooperative organization and to ensure for this organization a socialist development, while utilizing, overcoming and ousting its capitalist elements” (see Resolution of the Congress on the Report of the Central Committee⁹²)

The profound mistake of the “New Opposition” lies in the fact that it does not believe in this new path of development of the peasantry, that it does not see, or does not understand, the absolute inevitability of this path under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And it does not understand this because it does not believe in the victory of socialist construction in our country, it does not believe in the capacity of our proletariat to lead the peasantry along the path to socialism.

Hence the failure to understand the dual character of NEP, the exaggeration of the negative aspects of NEP and the treatment of NEP as being mainly a retreat.

Hence the exaggeration of the role of the capitalist elements in our economy, and the belittling of the role of the levers of our socialist development (socialist industry, the credit system, the cooperatives, the rule of the proletariat, etc.).

Hence the failure to understand the socialist nature of our state industry, and the doubts concerning the correctness of Lenin’s cooperative plan.

Hence the inflated accounts of differentiation in the countryside, the panic in face of the kulak, the belittling of the role of the middle peasant, the attempts to thwart the Party’s policy of securing a firm alliance with the middle peasant, and, in general, the wobbling from one side to another on the question of the Party’s policy in the countryside.

Hence the failure to understand the tremendous work of the Party in drawing the vast masses of the workers and peasants into building up industry and agriculture, revitalizing the cooperatives and the

Soviets, administering the country, combatting bureaucracy, improving and remodelling our state apparatus — work which marks a new stage of development and without which no socialist construction is conceivable.

Hence the hopelessness and consternation in face of the difficulties of our work of construction, the doubts about the possibility of industrializing our country, the pessimistic chatter about degeneration of the Party, etc.

Over there, among the bourgeoisie, all is going on fairly well, but here, among the proletarians, things are fairly bad; unless the revolution in the West takes place pretty soon, our cause is lost — such is the general tone of the “New Opposition” which, in my opinion, is a liquidationist tone, but which, for some reason or other (probably in jest), the opposition tries to pass off as “internationalism.”

NEP is capitalism, says the opposition. NEP is mainly a retreat, says Zinoviev. All this, of course, is untrue. In actual fact, NEP is the Party’s policy, permitting a struggle between the socialist and the capitalist elements and aimed at the victory of the socialist elements over the capitalist elements. In actual fact, NEP only began as a retreat, but it aimed at regrouping our forces during the retreat and launching an offensive. In actual fact, we have been on the offensive for several years now, and are attacking successfully, developing our industry, developing Soviet trade, and ousting private capital.

But what is the meaning of the thesis that NEP is capitalism, that NEP is mainly a retreat? What does this thesis proceed from?

It proceeds from the wrong assumption that what is now taking place in our country is simply the restoration of capitalism, simply a “return” to capitalism. This assumption alone can explain the doubts of the opposition regarding the socialist nature of our industry. This assumption alone can explain the panic of the opposition in face of the kulak. This assumption alone can explain the haste with which the opposition seized upon the inaccurate statistics on differentiation in the peasantry. This assumption alone can explain the opposition’s special forgetfulness of the fact that the middle peasant is the central figure in our agriculture. This assumption alone can explain the underestimation of the importance of the middle peasant and the doubts concerning Lenin’s cooperative plan. This assumption alone can serve to “substantiate” the “New Opposition’s” disbelief in the new path of development of the countryside, the path of drawing it into the work of socialist construction.

As a matter of fact, what is taking place in our country now is

not a one-sided process of restoration of capitalism, but a double process of development of capitalism and development of socialism — a contradictory process of struggle between the socialist and the capitalist elements, a process in which the socialist elements are overcoming the capitalist elements. This is equally incontestable as regards the towns, where state industry is the basis of socialism, and as regards the countryside, where the main foothold for socialist development is mass cooperation linked up with socialist industry.

The simple restoration of capitalism is impossible, if only for the reason that the proletariat is in power, that large-scale industry is in the hands of the proletariat, and that transport and credit are in the possession of the proletarian state.

Differentiation in the countryside cannot assume its former dimensions, the middle peasants still constitute the main mass of the peasantry, and the kulak cannot regain his former strength, if only for the reason that the land has been nationalized, that it has been withdrawn from circulation, while our trade, credit, tax and cooperative policy is directed towards restricting the kulaks' exploiting proclivities, towards promoting the welfare of the broad mass of the peasantry and levelling out the extremes in the countryside. That is quite apart from the fact that the fight against the kulaks is now proceeding not only along the old line of organizing the poor peasants against the kulaks, but also along the new line of strengthening the alliance of the proletariat and the poor peasants with the mass of the middle peasants against the kulaks. The fact that the opposition does not understand the meaning and significance of the fight against the kulaks along this second line once more confirms that the opposition is straying towards the old path of development in the countryside — the path of capitalist development, when the kulaks and the poor peasants constituted the main forces in the countryside, while the middle peasants were "melting away."

cooperation is a variety of state capitalism, says the opposition, citing in this connection Lenin's pamphlet *The Tax in Kind*⁹³; and, consequently, it does not believe it possible to utilize the cooperatives as the main foothold for socialist development. Here, too, the opposition commits a gross error. Such an interpretation of cooperation was adequate and satisfactory in 1921, when *The Tax in Kind* was written, when we had no developed socialist industry, when Lenin conceived of state capitalism as the possible basic form of conducting our economy, and when he considered cooperation in conjunction with state capitalism. But this interpretation has now

become inadequate and has been rendered obsolete by history, for times have changed since then: our socialist industry has developed, state capitalism never took hold to the degree expected, whereas the cooperatives, which now have over ten million members, have begun to link up with socialist industry.

How else are we to explain the fact that already in 1923, two years after *The Tax in Kind* was written, Lenin began to regard cooperation in a different light, and considered that “cooperation, under our conditions, very often entirely coincides with socialism” (see Vol. XXVII, p. 396).

How else can this be explained except by the fact that during those two years socialist industry had grown, whereas state capitalism had failed to take hold to the required extent, in view of which Lenin began to consider cooperation, not in conjunction with state capitalism, but in conjunction with socialist industry?

The conditions of development of cooperation had changed. And so the approach to the question of cooperation had to be changed also.

Here, for instance, is a remarkable passage from Lenin’s pamphlet *On Cooperation* (1923), which throws light on this matter:

“*Under state capitalism*,* cooperative enterprises differ from state capitalist enterprises, firstly, in that they are private enterprises and, secondly, in that they are collective enterprises. *Under our present system*,* cooperative enterprises differ from private capitalist enterprises because they are collective enterprises, but they *do not differ** from socialist enterprises if the land on which they are situated and the means of production belong to the state, i.e., the working class” (see Vol. XXVII, p. 396).

In this short passage two big questions are solved. Firstly, that “our present system” is not state capitalism. Secondly, that cooperative enterprises taken in conjunction with “our system” “do not differ” from socialist enterprises.

I think it would be difficult to express oneself more clearly.

Here is another passage from the same pamphlet of Lenin’s:

“...for us, the mere growth of cooperation (with the ‘slight’ exception mentioned above) is identical with the growth of socialism, and at the same time we must admit that a radical change has taken place in our whole outlook on socialism” (*Ibid.*).

Obviously, the pamphlet *On Cooperation* gives a new appraisal of

* My italics. — *J. St.*

the cooperatives, a thing which the “New Opposition” does not want to admit, and which it is carefully hushing up, in defiance of the facts, in defiance of the obvious truth, in defiance of Leninism.

cooperation taken in conjunction with state capitalism is one thing, and cooperation taken in conjunction with socialist industry is another.

From this, however, it must not be concluded that a gulf lies between *The Tax in Kind* and *On Cooperation*. That would, of course, be wrong. It is sufficient, for instance, to refer to the following passage in *The Tax in Kind* to discern immediately the inseparable connection between *The Tax in Kind* and the pamphlet *On Cooperation* as regards appraisal of the cooperatives. Here it is:

“The transition from concessions to socialism is a transition from one form of large-scale production to another form of large-scale production. The transition from small-proprietor cooperatives to socialism is a transition from small production to large-scale production, i.e., it is a more complicated transition, but, if successful, is capable of embracing wider masses of the population, is capable of pulling up the deeper and more tenacious roots of the old, *pre-socialist** and even pre-capitalist relations, which most stubbornly resist all ‘innovations’” (see Vol. XXVI, p. 337).

From this quotation it is evident that even during the time of *The Tax in Kind*, when we had as yet no developed socialist industry, Lenin was of the opinion that, *if successful*, cooperation could be transformed into a powerful weapon in the struggle against “pre-socialist,” and, hence, against *capitalist relations*. I think it was precisely this idea that subsequently served as the point of departure for his pamphlet *On Cooperation*.

But what follows from all this?

From all this it follows that the “New Opposition” approaches the question of cooperation, not in a Marxist way, but metaphysically. It regards cooperation not as an historical phenomenon taken in conjunction with other phenomena, in conjunction, say, with state capitalism (in 1921) or with socialist industry (in 1923), but as something constant and immutable, as a “thing in itself.”

Hence the mistakes of the opposition on the question of cooperation, hence its disbelief in the development of the countryside towards socialism through cooperation, hence its turning back to the old path, the path of capitalist development in the countryside.

Such, in general, is the position of the “New Opposition” on the

* My italics. — *J. St.*

practical questions of socialist construction.

There is only one conclusion: the line of the opposition, so far as it has a line, its wavering and vacillation, its disbelief in our cause and its consternation in face of difficulties, lead to capitulation to the capitalist elements of our economy.

For, if NEP is mainly a retreat, if the socialist nature of state industry is doubted, if the kulak is almost omnipotent, if little hope can be placed in the cooperatives, if the role of the middle peasant is progressively declining, if the new path of development in the countryside is open to doubt, if the Party is almost degenerating, while the revolution in the West is not very near — then what is there left in the arsenal of the opposition, what can it count on in the struggle against the capitalist elements in our economy? You cannot go into battle armed only with “The Philosophy of the Epoch.”⁹⁴

It is clear that the arsenal of the “New Opposition,” if it can be termed an arsenal at all, is an unenviable one. It is not an arsenal for battle. Still less is it one for victory,

It is clear that the Party would be doomed “in no time” if it entered the fight equipped with such an arsenal; it would simply have to capitulate to the capitalist elements in our economy.

That is why the Fourteenth Congress of the Party was absolutely right in deciding that “the fight for the victory of socialist construction in the USSR is the main task of our Party”; that one of the necessary conditions for the fulfilment of this task is “to combat disbelief in the cause of building socialism in our country and the attempts to represent our enterprises, which are of a ‘consistently socialist type’ (*Lenin*), as state capitalist enterprises”; that “such ideological trends, which prevent the masses from adopting a conscious attitude towards the building of socialism in general and of a socialist industry in particular, can only serve to hinder the growth of the socialist elements in our economy and to facilitate the struggle of private capital against them”; that “the congress therefore considers that widespread educational work must be carried on for the purpose of overcoming these distortions of Leninism” (see Resolution on the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B)⁹⁵)

The historical significance of the Fourteenth Congress of the CPSU(B) lies in the fact that it was able radically to expose the mistakes of the “New Opposition,” that it rejected their disbelief and whining, that it clearly and precisely indicated the path of the further struggle for socialism, opened before the Party the prospect of victory, and thus armed the proletariat with an invincible faith in the vic-

tory of socialist construction.

THE TROTSKYIST OPPOSITION BEFORE AND NOW

(Excerpt from the Speech Delivered at a Meeting of the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the CPSU(B)⁹⁶)

October 23, 1927

You have heard here how assiduously the oppositionists hurl abuse at Stalin, abuse him with all their might. That does not surprise me, comrades. The reason why the main attacks were directed against Stalin is because Stalin knows all the opposition's tricks better, perhaps, than some of our comrades do, and it is not so easy, I dare say, to fool him. So they strike their blows primarily at Stalin. Well, let them hurl abuse to their heart's content.

And what is Stalin? Stalin is only a minor figure. Take Lenin. Who does not know that at the time of the August bloc the opposition, headed by Trotsky, waged an even more scurrilous campaign of slander against Lenin? Listen to Trotsky, for example:

“The wretched squabbling systematically provoked by Lenin, that old hand at the game, that professional exploiter of all that is backward in the Russian labour movement, seems like a senseless obsession” (see “Trotsky's Letter to Chkheidze,” April 1913).

Note the language, comrades! Note the language! It is Trotsky writing. And writing about Lenin.

Is it surprising, then, that Trotsky, who wrote in such an ill-mannered way about the great Lenin, whose shoelaces he was not worthy of tying, should now hurl abuse at one of Lenin's numerous pupils — Comrade Stalin?

More than that. I think the opposition does me honour by venting all its hatred against Stalin. That is as it should be. I think it would be strange and offensive if the opposition, which is trying to wreck the Party, were to praise Stalin, who is defending the fundamentals of the Leninist Party principle.

Now about Lenin's “will.” The oppositionists shouted here — you heard them — that the Central Committee of the Party “concealed” Lenin's “will.” We have discussed this question several times at the plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control

Commission, you know that. (*A voice*: “Scores of times.”) It has been proved and proved again that nobody has concealed anything, that Lenin’s “will” was addressed to the Thirteenth Party Congress, that this “will” was read out at the congress (*Voices*: “That’s right!”), that the congress *unanimously* decided not to publish it because, among other things, Lenin himself did not want it to be published and did not ask that it should be published. The opposition knows all this just as well as we do. Nevertheless, it has the audacity to declare that the Central Committee is “concealing” the “will.”

The question of Lenin’s “will” was brought up, if I am not mistaken, as far back as 1924. There is a certain Eastman, a former American communist who was later expelled from the Party. This gentleman, who mixed with the Trotskyists in Moscow, picked up some rumours and gossip about Lenin’s “will,” went abroad and published a book entitled *After Lenin’s Death*, in which he did his best to blacken the Party, the Central Committee and the Soviet regime, and the gist of which was that the Central Committee of our Party was “concealing” Lenin’s “will.” In view of the fact that this Eastman had at one time been connected with Trotsky, we, the members of the Political Bureau, called upon Trotsky to dissociate himself from Eastman who, clutching at Trotsky and referring to the opposition, had made Trotsky responsible for the slanderous statements against our Party about the “will.” Since the question was so obvious, Trotsky did, indeed, publicly dissociate himself from Eastman in a statement he made in the press. It was published in September 1925 in *Bolshevik*, No. 16.

Permit me to read the passage in Trotsky’s article in which he deals with the question whether the Party and its Central Committee was concealing Lenin’s “will” or not. I quote Trotsky’s article:

“In several parts of his book Eastman says that the Central Committee ‘concealed’ from the Party a number of exceptionally important documents written by Lenin in the last period of his life (it is a matter of letters on the national question, the so-called ‘will,’ and others); *there can be no other name for this than slander against the Central Committee of our Party.** From what Eastman says it may be inferred that Vladimir Ilyich intended those letters, which bore the character of advice on internal organization, for the press. In point of fact, that is absolutely untrue. During his illness Vladimir Ilyich often sent proposals, letters, and so forth, to the Party’s leading institutions and to its congress. It goes without saying that all those letters and proposals were always delivered to those for whom they were intended, were

* My italics. — *J. St.*

brought to the knowledge of the delegates at the Twelfth and Thirteenth Congresses, and always, of course, exercised due influence upon the Party's decisions; and if not all of those letters were published, it was because the author did not intend them for the press. Vladimir Ilyich did not leave any 'will,' and the very character of his attitude towards the Party, as well as the character of the Party itself, precluded the possibility of such a 'will.' What is usually referred to as a 'will' in the émigré and foreign bourgeois and Menshevik press (in a manner garbled beyond recognition) is one of Vladimir Ilyich's letters containing advice on organizational matters. The Thirteenth Congress of the Party paid the closest attention to that letter, as to all of the others, and drew from it conclusions appropriate to the conditions and circumstances of the time. *All talk about concealing or violating a 'will' is a malicious invention and is entirely directed against Vladimir Ilyich's real will,** and against the interests of the Party he created" (see Trotsky's article "Concerning Eastman's Book *After Lenin's Death*," *Bolshevik*, No. 16, September 1, 1925, p. 68).

Clear, one would think. That was written by none other than Trotsky. On what grounds, then, are Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamelev now spinning a yarn about the Party and its Central Committee "concealing" Lenin's "will"? It is "permissible" to spin yarns, but one should know where to stop.

It is said that in that "will" Comrade Lenin suggested to the congress that in view of Stalin's "rudeness" it should consider the question of putting another comrade in Stalin's place as General Secretary. That is quite true. Yes, comrades, I am rude to those who grossly and perfidiously wreck and split the Party. I have never concealed this and do not conceal it now. Perhaps some mildness is needed in the treatment of splitters, but I am a bad hand at that. At the very first meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee after the Thirteenth Congress I asked the plenum of the Central Committee to release me from my duties as General Secretary. The congress itself discussed this question. It was discussed by each delegation separately, and all the delegations unanimously, including Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev, *obliged* Stalin to remain at his post.

What could I do? Desert my post? That is not in my nature; I have never deserted any post, and I have no right to do so, for that would be desertion. As I have already said before, I am not a free agent, and when the Party imposes an obligation upon me, I must obey.

A year later I again put in a request to the plenum to release me,

* My italics. — *J. St.*

but I was again obliged to remain at my post.

What else could I do?

As regards publishing the “will,” the congress decided not to publish it, since it was addressed to the congress and was not intended for publication.

We have the decision of a plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission in 1926 to ask the Fifteenth Congress for permission to publish this document. We have the decision of the same plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission to publish other letters of Lenin’s, in which he pointed out the mistakes of Kamenev and Zinoviev just before the October uprising and demanded their expulsion from the Party.⁹⁷

Obviously, talk about the Party concealing these documents is infamous slander. Among these documents are letters from Lenin urging the necessity of expelling Zinoviev and Kamenev from the Party. The Bolshevik Party, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, have never feared the truth. The strength of the Bolshevik Party lies precisely in the fact that it does not fear the truth and looks the truth straight in the face.

The opposition is trying to use Lenin’s “will” as a trump card; but it is enough to read this “will” to see that it is not a trump card for them at all. On the contrary, Lenin’s “will” is fatal to the present leaders of the opposition.

Indeed, it is a fact that in his “will” Lenin accuses Trotsky of being guilty of “non-Bolshevism” and, as regards the mistake Kamenev and Zinoviev made during October, he says that that mistake was not “accidental.” What does that mean? It means that Trotsky, who suffers from “non-Bolshevism,” and Kamenev and Zinoviev, whose mistakes are not “accidental” and can and certainly will be repeated, cannot be *politically* trusted.

It is characteristic that there is not a word, not a hint in the “will” about Stalin having made mistakes. It refers only to Stalin’s rudeness. But rudeness is not and cannot be counted as a defect in Stalin’s *political* line or position.

Here is the relevant passage in the “will”:

“I shall not go on to characterize the personal qualities of the other members of the Central Committee. I shall merely remind you that the October episode with Zinoviev and Kamenev was, of course, not accidental, but that they can be blamed for it personally as little as Trotsky can be blamed for his non-Bolshevism.”

Clear, one would think.

THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

(On the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the October Revolution)

November 6-7, 1927

The October Revolution cannot be regarded merely as a revolution "within national bounds." It is, primarily, a revolution of an international, world order, for it signifies a radical turn in the world history of mankind, a turn from the old, capitalist world to the new, socialist world.

Revolutions in the past usually ended by one group of exploiters at the helm of government being replaced by another group of exploiters. The exploiters changed, exploitation remained. Such was the case during the liberation movements of the slaves. Such was the case during the period of the uprisings of the serfs. Such was the case during the period of the well-known "great" revolutions in England, France and Germany. I am not speaking of the Paris Commune, which was the first glorious, heroic, yet unsuccessful attempt on the part of the proletariat to turn history against capitalism.

The October Revolution differs from these revolutions *in principle*. Its aim is not to replace one form of exploitation by another form of exploitation, one group of exploiters by another group of exploiters, but to abolish all exploitation of man by man, to abolish all groups of exploiters, to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, to establish the power of the most revolutionary class of all the oppressed classes that have ever existed, to organize a new, classless, socialist society.

It is precisely for this reason that the *victory* of the October Revolution signifies a radical change in the history of mankind, a radical change in the historical destiny of world capitalism, a radical change in the liberation movement of the world proletariat, a radical change in the methods of struggle and the forms of organization, in the manner of life and traditions, in the culture and ideology of the exploited masses throughout the world.

That is the basic reason why the October Revolution is a revolution of an international, world order.

That also is the source of the profound sympathy which the oppressed classes in all countries entertain for the October Revolution,

which they regard as a pledge of their own emancipation.

A number of fundamental issues could be noted on which the October Revolution influences the development of the revolutionary movement throughout the world.

1. The October Revolution is noteworthy primarily for having breached the front of world imperialism, for having overthrown the imperialist bourgeoisie in one of the biggest capitalist countries and put the socialist proletariat in power.

The class of wage-workers, the class of the persecuted, the class of the oppressed and exploited has *for the first time* in the history of mankind risen to the position of the *ruling* class, setting a contagious example to the proletarians of all countries.

This means that the October Revolution *has ushered in* a new era, the era of *proletarian* revolutions in the countries of *imperialism*.

It took the instruments and means of production from the landlords and capitalists and converted them into public property, thus counterposing socialist property to bourgeois property. It thereby exposed the lie of the capitalists that bourgeois property is inviolable, sacred, eternal.

It wrested power from the bourgeoisie, deprived the bourgeoisie of political rights, destroyed the bourgeois state apparatus and transferred power to the Soviets, thus counter-posing the socialist rule of the Soviets, as *proletarian* democracy, to bourgeois parliamentarism, as *capitalist* democracy. Lafargue was right when he said, as far back as 1887, that on the morrow of the revolution "all former capitalists will be disfranchised."⁹⁸

The October Revolution thereby exposed the lie of the social-democrats that at the present time a peaceful transition to socialism is possible through bourgeois parliamentarism.

But the October Revolution did not and could not stop there. Having destroyed the old, bourgeois order, it began to build the new, socialist order. The 10 years of the October Revolution have been 10 years of building the Party, trade unions, Soviets, cooperatives, cultural organizations, transport, industry, the Red Army. The indubitable successes of socialism in the USSR on the front of construction have clearly shown that the proletariat *can* successfully govern the country *without* the bourgeoisie and *against* the bourgeoisie, that it *can* successfully build industry *without* the bourgeoisie and *against* the bourgeoisie, that it *can* successfully direct the whole of the national economy *without* the bourgeoisie and *against* the bourgeoisie, that it *can* successfully build socialism in spite of the capital-

ist encirclement.

Menenius Agrippa, the famous Roman senator of ancient times, was not the only one to uphold the old "theory" that the exploited cannot do without the exploiters any more than the head and other parts of the body can do without the stomach. This "theory" is now the cornerstone of the political "philosophy" of social-democracy in general, and of the social-democratic policy of *coalition* with the imperialist bourgeoisie in particular. This "theory," which has acquired the character of a prejudice, is now one of the most serious obstacles in the path towards the revolutionization of the proletariat in the capitalist countries. One of the most important results of the October Revolution is that it dealt this false "theory" a mortal blow.

Is there any further need to prove that these and similar results of the October Revolution could not and cannot fail to exert an important influence on the revolutionary movement of the working class in the capitalist countries?

Such generally known facts as the progressive growth of communism in the capitalist countries, the growing sympathy of the proletarians of all countries for the working class of the USSR and, finally, the many workers' delegations that come to the Land of Soviets, prove beyond doubt that the seeds sown by the October Revolution are already beginning to bear fruit.

2. The October Revolution has shaken imperialism not only in the centres of its domination, not only in the "metropolises." It has also struck at the rear of imperialism, its periphery, having undermined the rule of imperialism in the colonial and dependent countries.

Having overthrown the landlords and the capitalists, the October Revolution broke the chains of national and colonial oppression and freed from it, without exception, all the oppressed peoples of a vast state. The proletariat cannot emancipate itself unless it emancipates the oppressed peoples. It is a characteristic feature of the October Revolution that it accomplished these national-colonial revolutions in the USSR not under the flag of national enmity and conflicts among nations, but under the flag of mutual confidence and fraternal rapprochement of the workers and peasants of the various peoples in the USSR, not in the name of *nationalism*, but in the name of *internationalism*.

It is precisely because the national-colonial revolutions took place in our country under the leadership of the proletariat and under the banner of internationalism that pariah peoples, slave peo-

ples, have for the *first time* in the history of mankind risen to the position of peoples that are *really* free and *really* equal, thereby setting a contagious example to the oppressed nations of the whole world.

This means that the October Revolution *has ushered in* new era, the era of *colonial* revolutions which are being carried out *in the oppressed countries* of the world *in alliance* with the proletariat and *under the leadership* of the proletariat.

It was formerly the “accepted” idea that the world has been divided from time immemorial into inferior and superior races, into blacks and whites, of whom the former are unfit for civilization and are doomed to be objects of exploitation, while the latter are the only bearers of civilization, whose mission it is to exploit the former.

That legend must now be regarded as shattered and discarded. One of the most important results of the October Revolution is that it dealt that legend a mortal blow, by demonstrating in practice that the liberated non-European peoples, drawn into the channel of Soviet development, are not one whit less capable of promoting a *really* progressive culture and a *really* progressive civilization than are the European peoples.

It was formerly the “accepted” idea that the only method of liberating the oppressed peoples is the method of *bourgeois nationalism*, the method of nations drawing apart from one another, the method of disuniting nations, the method of intensifying national enmity among the labouring masses of the various nations.

That legend must now be regarded as refuted. One of the most important results of the October Revolution is that it dealt that legend a mortal blow, by demonstrating in practice the possibility and expediency of the *proletarian, internationalist* method of liberating the oppressed peoples, as the only correct method; by demonstrating in practice the possibility and expediency of a *fraternal union* of the workers and peasants of the most diverse nations based on the principles of *voluntariness* and *internationalism*. The existence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which is the prototype of the future integration of the working people of all countries into a single world economic system, cannot but serve as direct proof of this.

It need hardly be said that these and similar results of the October Revolution could not and cannot fail to exert an important influence on the revolutionary movement in the colonial and dependent countries. Such facts as the growth of the revolutionary movement of the oppressed peoples in China, Indonesia, India, etc., and the growing sympathy of these peoples for the USSR, unquestionably bear

this out.

The era of tranquil exploitation and oppression of the colonies and dependent countries *has passed away*.

The era of liberating revolutions in the colonies and dependent countries, the era of the awakening of the *proletariat* in those countries, the era of its *hegemony* in the revolution, *has begun*.

3. Having sown the seeds of revolution both in the centres of imperialism and in its rear, having weakened the might of imperialism in the “metropolises” and having shaken its domination in the colonies, the October Revolution has thereby put in jeopardy the very existence of world capitalism *as a whole*.

While the spontaneous development of capitalism in the conditions of imperialism has passed — owing to its unevenness, owing to the inevitability of conflicts and armed collisions, owing, finally, to the unprecedented imperialist slaughter — into the process of the decay and the dying of capitalism, the October Revolution and the resultant dropping out of a vast country from the world system of capitalism could not but accelerate this process, undermining, bit by bit, the very foundations of world imperialism.

More than that. While shaking imperialism, the October Revolution has at the same time created — in the shape of the first proletarian dictatorship — a powerful and open *base* for the world revolutionary movement, a base such as the latter *never possessed* before and on which it now can rely for support. It has created a powerful and open *centre* of the world revolutionary movement, such as the latter *never possessed* before and around which it can now rally, organizing a *united revolutionary front of the proletarians and of the oppressed peoples of all countries against imperialism*.

This means, firstly, that the October Revolution inflicted a mortal wound on world capitalism from which the latter will never recover. For that very reason capitalism will never recover the “equilibrium” and “stability” that it possessed before October.

Capitalism may become partly stabilized, it may rationalize its production, turn over the administration of the country to fascism, temporarily hold down the working class; but it will never recover the “tranquillity,” the “assurance,” the “equilibrium” and the “stability” that it flaunted before; for the crisis of world capitalism has reached the stage of development when the flames of revolution must inevitably break out, now in the centres of imperialism, now in the periphery, reducing to naught the capitalist patchwork and daily bringing nearer the fall of capitalism. Exactly as in the well-known

fable, "when it pulled its tail out of the mud, its beak got stuck; when it pulled its beak out, its tail got stuck."

This means, secondly, that the October Revolution has raised to such a height the strength and importance, the courage and the fighting preparedness of the oppressed classes of the whole world as to compel the ruling classes to reckon with them as a *new*, important factor. Now the labouring masses of the world can no longer be regarded as a "blind mob," groping in the dark and devoid of prospects; for the October Revolution has created a beacon which illumines their path and opens up prospects for them. Whereas formerly there was no *worldwide* open forum from which the aspirations and strivings of the oppressed classes could be expounded and formulated, now such a forum exists in the shape of the first proletarian dictatorship.

There is hardly room for doubt that the destruction of this forum would for a long time cast the gloom of unbridled, black reaction over the social and political life of the "advanced countries." It cannot be denied that the very existence of a "Bolshevik state" puts a curb upon the dark forces of reaction, thus helping the oppressed classes in their struggle for liberation. It is this that explains the savage hatred which the exploiters of all countries entertain for the Bolsheviks.

History repeats itself, though on a new basis. Just as formerly, during the period of the downfall of *feudalism*, the word "Jacobin" evoked dread and abhorrence among the aristocrats of all countries, so now, in the period of the down fall of *capitalism*, the word "Bolshevik" evokes dread and abhorrence among the bourgeois in all countries. And conversely, just as formerly Paris was the refuge and school for the revolutionary representatives of the rising *bourgeoisie*, so now Moscow is the refuge and school for the revolutionary representatives of the rising *proletariat*. Hatred of the Jacobins did not save feudalism from collapse. Can there be any doubt that hatred of the Bolsheviks will not save capitalism from its inevitable downfall?

The era of the "stability" of capitalism *has passed away*, carrying away with it the legend of the indestructibility of the bourgeois order.

The era of the collapse of capitalism *has begun*.

4. The October Revolution cannot be regarded merely as a revolution in the sphere of economic and social-political relations. It is at the same time a revolution in the minds, a revolution in the ideology, of the working class. The October Revolution was born and

gained strength under the banner of Marxism, under the banner of the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat, under the banner of Leninism, which is Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. Hence it marks the victory of Marxism over reformism, the victory of Leninism over social-democratism, the victory of the Third International over the Second International.

The October Revolution has brought into being an impassable chasm between Marxism and social-democratism, between the policy of Leninism and the policy of social-democratism.

Formerly, *before the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat*, social-democracy, while refraining from openly repudiating the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat but doing nothing, absolutely nothing, to bring nearer the realization of this idea, could flaunt the banner of Marxism, and it is obvious that this behaviour of social-democracy created no danger whatever for capitalism. Then, in that period, social-democracy was formally identified, or almost completely identified, with Marxism.

Now, *after the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat*, when everybody has seen for himself to what Marxism leads and *what* its victory may signify, social-democracy is no longer able to flaunt the banner of Marxism, can no longer coquet with the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat without creating a certain danger for capitalism. Having long ago broken with the spirit of Marxism, it has found itself compelled to discard also the banner of Marxism; it has openly and unambiguously taken a stand against the offspring of Marxism, against the October Revolution, against the first dictatorship of the proletariat in the world.

Now it has had to dissociate itself from Marxism, and has actually done so; for under present conditions one cannot call oneself a Marxist unless one openly and devotedly supports the first proletarian dictatorship in the world, unless one wages a revolutionary struggle against one's own bourgeoisie, unless one creates the conditions for the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat in one's own country.

A chasm has opened between social-democracy and Marxism. Henceforth, the *only* bearer and bulwark of Marxism is Leninism, communism.

But matters did not end there. The October Revolution went further than drawing a demarcation line between social-democracy and Marxism; it relegated social-democracy to the camp of the direct defenders of capitalism *against* the first proletarian dictatorship in the

world. When Messieurs the Adlers and Bauers, the Welses and Levis, the Longuets and Blums abuse the “Soviet regime” and extol parliamentary “democracy,” these gentlemen mean that they are fighting and will continue to fight *for* the restoration of the capitalist order in the USSR, *for* the preservation of capitalist slavery in the “civilized” states.

Present-day social-democratism is an *ideological support* of capitalism. Lenin was a thousand times right when he said that the present-day social-democratic politicians are “real *agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class* movement, the labour lieutenants of the capitalist class,” that in the “civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie” they would inevitably range themselves “on the side of the ‘Versaillese’ against the ‘Communards.’”⁹⁹

It is impossible to put an end to capitalism without putting an end to social-democratism in the labour movement. That is why the era of dying capitalism is also the era of dying social-democratism in the labour movement.

The great significance of the October Revolution consists, among other things, in the fact that it marks the inevitable victory of Leninism over social-democratism in the world labour movement.

The era of the domination of the Second International and of social-democratism in the labour movement *has ended*.

The era of the domination of Leninism and of the Third International *has begun*.

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU(B)

Political Report of the Central Committee

December 3, 1927

(Excerpts)

The state apparatus and the struggle against bureaucracy. So much is being said about bureaucracy that there is no need to dilate on it. That elements of bureaucracy exist in our state, cooperative and Party apparatus, there can be no doubt. That it is necessary to combat the elements of bureaucracy, and that this task will confront us all the time, as long as we have state power, as long as the state exists, is also a fact.

But one must know how far one can go. To carry the struggle against bureaucracy in the state apparatus to the point of destroying the state apparatus, of discrediting the state apparatus, of attempts to break it up — that means going against Leninism, means forgetting that our apparatus is a Soviet apparatus, which is a state apparatus of a higher type than any other state apparatus in the world.

Wherein lies the strength of our state apparatus? In that it links the state power with the millions of workers and peasants through the Soviets. In that the Soviets are schools of administration for tens and hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants. In that the state apparatus does not fence itself off from the vast masses of the people, but merges with them through an incalculable number of mass organizations, all sorts of commissions, committees, conferences, delegate meetings, etc., which encompass the Soviets and in this way buttress the organs of government.

Wherein lies the weakness of our state apparatus? In the existence within it of elements of bureaucracy, which spoil and distort its work. In order to eliminate bureaucracy from it — and this cannot be done in one or two years — we must systematically improve the state apparatus, bring it closer to the masses, reinvigorate it by bringing in new people loyal to the cause of the working class, remodel it in the spirit of communism, but not break it up or discredit it. Lenin was a thousand times right when he said: "*Without an 'apparatus' we would have perished long ago. If we do not wage a systematic and stubborn*

struggle to improve the apparatus we shall perish before we have created the base for socialism.”¹⁰⁰

I shall not dilate on those defects in our state apparatus that are glaring enough as it is. I have in mind, primarily, “Mother Red Tape.” I have at hand a heap of materials on the matter of red tape, exposing the criminal negligence of a number of judicial, administrative, insurance, cooperative and other organizations.

Here is a peasant who went to a certain insurance office twenty-one times to get some matter put right, and even then failed to get any result.

Here is another peasant, an old man of sixty-six, who walked 600 versts to get his case cleared up at an Uyezd Social Maintenance Office, and even then failed to get any result.

Here is an old peasant woman, fifty-six years old, who, in response to a summons by a people’s court, walked 500 versts and travelled over 600 versts by horse and cart, and even then failed to get justice done.

A multitude of such facts could be quoted. It is not worthwhile enumerating them. But this is a disgrace to us, comrades! How can such outrageous things be tolerated?

Lastly, facts about “demoting.” It appears, that in addition to workers who are promoted, there are also such as are “demoted,” who are pushed into the background by their own comrades, not because they are incapable or inefficient, but because they are conscientious and honest in their work.

Here is a worker, a tool-maker, who was promoted to a managerial post at his plant because he was a capable and incorruptible man. He worked for a couple of years, worked honestly, introduced order, put a stop to inefficiency and waste. But, working in this way, he trod on the toes of a gang of so-called “communists,” he disturbed their peace and quiet. And what happened? This gang of “communists” put a spoke in his wheel and thus compelled him to “demote himself,” as much as to say: “You wanted to be smarter than us, you won’t let us live and make a bit in quiet — so take a back seat, brother.”

Here is another worker, also a tool-maker, an adjuster of bolt-cutting machines, who was promoted to a managerial post at his factory. He worked zealously and honestly. But, working in this way, he disturbed somebody’s peace and quiet. And what happened? A pretext was found and they got rid of this “troublesome” comrade. How did this promoted comrade leave, what were his feelings? Like this:

“In whatever post I was appointed to I tried to justify the confidence that was placed in me. But this promotion played a dirty trick on me and I shall never forget it. They threw mud at me. My wish to bring everything into the light of day remained a mere wish. Neither the works committee, nor the management, nor the Party unit would listen to me. I am finished with promotion, I would not take another managerial post even if offered my weight in gold” (*Trud*,¹⁰¹ No. 128, June 9, 1927).

But this is a disgrace to us, comrades! How can such outrageous things be tolerated?

The Party’s task is, in fighting against bureaucracy and for the improvement of the state apparatus, to extirpate with a red-hot iron such outrageous things in our practical work as those I have just spoken about.

Concerning Lenin’s slogan about the cultural revolution. The surest remedy for bureaucracy is raising the cultural level of the workers and peasants. One can curse and denounce bureaucracy in the state apparatus, one can stigmatize and pillory bureaucracy in our practical work, but unless the masses of the workers reach a certain level of culture, which will create the possibility, the desire, the ability to control the state apparatus from below, by the masses of the workers themselves, bureaucracy will continue to exist in spite of everything. Therefore, the cultural development of the working class and of the masses of the working peasantry, not only the development of literacy, although literacy is the basis of all culture, but primarily the cultivation of the ability to take part in the administration of the country, is the chief lever for improving the state and every other apparatus. This is the sense and significance of Lenin’s slogan about the cultural revolution.

Here is what Lenin said about this in March 1922, before the opening of the Eleventh Congress of our Party, in his letter to the Central Committee addressed to Comrade Molotov:

“The chief thing we lack is culture, ability to administer... Economically and politically NEP fully ensures us the possibility of laying the foundation of socialist economy. It is ‘only’ a matter of the cultural forces of the proletariat and of its vanguard.”*¹⁰²

These words of Lenin’s must not be forgotten, comrades. (*Voices: “Quite right!”*)

Hence the Party’s task: to exert greater efforts to raise the cultural lev-

* My italics. — *J. St.*

el of the working class and of the working strata of the peasantry.

ORGANIZE MASS CRITICISM FROM BELOW

(Excerpt from the Speech Delivered at the Eighth Congress of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League¹⁰³)

May 16, 1928

...The second question concerns the task of combatting bureaucracy, of organizing mass criticism of our shortcomings, of organizing mass control from below.

Bureaucracy is one of the worst enemies of our progress. It exists in all our organizations — Party, YCL, trade-union and economic. When people talk of bureaucrats, they usually point to the old non-Party officials, who as a rule are depicted in our cartoons as men wearing spectacles. (*Laughter.*) That is not quite true, comrades. If it were only a question of the old bureaucrats, the fight against bureaucracy would be very easy. The trouble is that it is not a matter of the old bureaucrats. It is a matter of the new bureaucrats, bureaucrats who sympathize with the Soviet government, and finally, communist bureaucrats. The communist bureaucrat is the most dangerous type of bureaucrat. Why? Because he masks his bureaucracy with the title of Party member. And, unfortunately, we have quite a number of such communist bureaucrats.

Take our Party organizations. You have no doubt read about the Smolensk affair, the Artyomovsk affair and so on. What do you think, were they matters of chance? What is the explanation of these shameful instances of corruption and moral deterioration in certain of our Party organizations? The fact that Party monopoly was carried to absurd lengths, that the voice of the rank and file was stifled, that inner-Party democracy was abolished and bureaucracy became rife. How is this evil to be combatted? I think that there is not and cannot be any other way of combatting this evil than by organizing control from below by the Party masses, by implanting inner-Party democracy. What objection can there be to rousing the fury of the mass of the Party membership against these corrupt elements and giving it the opportunity to send such elements packing? There can hardly be any objection to that.

Or take the Young Communist League, for instance. You will not deny, of course, that here and there in the Young Communist

League there are utterly corrupt elements against whom it is absolutely essential to wage a ruthless struggle. But let us leave aside the corrupt elements. Let us take the latest fact of an unprincipled struggle waged by groups within the Young Communist League around personalities, a struggle which is poisoning the atmosphere in the Young Communist League. Why is it that you can find as many "Kosarevites" and "Sobolevites" as you like in the Young Communist League, while Marxists have to be looked for with a candle? (*Applause.*) What does this indicate, if not that a process of bureaucratic petrification is taking place in certain sections of the YCL top leadership?

And the trade unions? Who will deny that in the trade unions there is bureaucracy in plenty? We have production conferences in the factories. We have temporary control commissions in the trade unions. It is the task of these organizations to rouse the masses, to bring our shortcomings to light and to indicate ways and means of improving our constructive work. Why are these organizations not developing? Why are they not seething with activity? Is it not obvious that it is bureaucracy in the trade unions, coupled with bureaucracy in the Party organizations, that is preventing these highly important organizations of the working class from developing?

Lastly, our economic organizations. Who will deny that our economic bodies suffer from bureaucracy? Take the Shakhty affair as an illustration. Does not the Shakhty affair indicate that our economic bodies are not speeding ahead, but crawling, dragging their feet?

How are we to put an end to bureaucracy in all these organizations?

There is only one sole way of doing this, and that is to organize control from below, to organize criticism of the bureaucracy in our institutions, of their shortcomings and their mistakes, by the vast masses of the working class.

I know that by rousing the fury of the masses of the working people against the bureaucratic distortions in our organizations, we sometimes have to tread on the toes of some of our comrades who have past services to their credit, but who are now suffering from the disease of bureaucracy. But ought this to stop our work of organizing control from below? I think that it ought not and must not. For their past services we should take off our hats to them, but for their present blunders and bureaucracy it would be quite in order to give them a good drubbing. (*Laughter and applause.*) How else? Why not do this if the interests of the work demand it?

There is talk of criticism from above, criticism by the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, by the Central Committee of our Party and so on. That, of course, is all very good. But it is still far from enough. More, it is by no means the chief thing now. The chief thing now is to start a broad tide of criticism from below against bureaucracy in general, against shortcomings in our work in particular. Only by organizing twofold pressure — from above and from below — and only by shifting the principal stress to criticism from below, can we count on waging a successful struggle against bureaucracy and on rooting it out.

It would be a mistake to think that only the leaders possess experience in constructive work. That is not true, comrades. The vast masses of the workers who are engaged in building our industry are day by day accumulating vast experience in construction, experience which is not a whit less valuable to us than the experience of the leaders. Mass criticism from below, control from below, is needed by us in order that, among other things, this experience of the vast masses should not be wasted, but be reckoned with and translated into practice.

From this follows the immediate task of the Party: *to wage a ruthless struggle against bureaucracy, to organize mass criticism from below, and to take this criticism into account when adopting practical decisions for eliminating our shortcomings.*

It cannot be said that the Young Communist League, and especially *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, have not appreciated the importance of this task. The shortcoming here is that often the fulfilment of this task is not carried out completely. And in order to carry it out completely, it is necessary to give heed not only to criticism, but also to the results of criticism, to the improvements that are introduced as a result of criticism...

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE CPSU(B)

(Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the Moscow Committee and Moscow Control Commission of the CPSU(B))

October 19, 1928

I think, comrades, that we must first rid our minds of trivialities, of personal matters, and so forth, in order to settle the question which interests us, that of the right deviation.

Is there a right, opportunist danger in our Party? Do there exist objective conditions favourable to the development of such a danger? How should this danger be fought? These are the questions that now confront us.

But we shall not settle this question of the right deviation unless we purge it of all the trivialities and adventitious elements which have surrounded it and which prevent us from understanding its essence.

Zapolsky is wrong in thinking that the question of the right deviation is an accidental one. He asserts that it is all not a matter of a right deviation, but of petty squabbles, personal intrigues, etc. Let us assume for a moment that petty squabbles and personal intrigues do play some part here, as in all struggles. But to explain everything by petty squabbles and to fail to see the essence of the question behind the squabbles, is to depart from the correct, Marxist path.

A large, united organization of long standing, such as the Moscow organization undoubtedly is, could not be stirred up from top to bottom and set into motion by the efforts of a few squabblers or intriguers. No, comrades, such miracles do not happen. That is apart from the fact that the strength and power of the Moscow organization cannot be estimated so lightly. Obviously, more profound causes have been at work here causes which have nothing to do with either petty squabbles or intrigues.

Fruntov is also wrong; for although he admits the existence of a right danger, he does not think it worthwhile for serious, busy people to concern themselves with it seriously. In his opinion, the question of the right deviation is a subject for noise-makers, not for serious people. I quite understand Fruntov: he is so absorbed in the day-to-day practical work that he has no time to think about the prospects of our development. But that does not mean that we must convert the narrow, practical empiricism of certain of our Party

workers into a dogma of our work of construction. A healthy practicalism is a good thing; but if it loses sight of the prospects in the work and fails to subordinate the work to the basic line of the Party, it becomes a drawback. And yet it should not be difficult to understand that the question of the right deviation is a question of the basic line of our Party; it is the question as to whether the prospects of development outlined by our Party at the Fifteenth Congress are correct or incorrect.

Those comrades who in discussing the problem of the right deviation concentrate on the question of the individuals representing the right deviation are also wrong. Show us who are the rights and the conciliators, they say, name them, so that we can deal with them accordingly. That is not the correct way of presenting the question. Individuals, of course, play some part. Nevertheless, the question is not one of individuals, but of the conditions, of the situation, giving rise to the right danger in the Party. Individuals can be kept out, but that does not mean that we have thereby cut the roots of the right danger in our Party. Hence, the question of individuals does not settle the matter, although it is undoubtedly of interest.

In this connection I cannot help recalling an incident which occurred in Odessa at the end of 1919 and the beginning of 1920, when our forces, having driven Denikin's forces out of the Ukraine, were crushing the last remnants of his armies in the area of Odessa. One group of Red Army men searched high and low for the "Entente" in Odessa, convinced that if they could only capture it — the Entente — the war would be over. (*General laughter.*) It is conceivable that our Red Army men might have captured some representatives of the Entente in Odessa, but that, of course, would not have settled the question of the Entente, for the roots of the Entente did not lie in Odessa, although Odessa at that time was the Denikinites' last terrain, but in world capitalism.

The same can be said of certain of our comrades, who in the question of the right deviation concentrate on the individuals representing that deviation, and forget about the conditions that give rise to it.

That is why we must first of all elucidate here the conditions that give rise to the right, and also to the "left" (Trotskyite), deviation from the Leninist line.

Under capitalist conditions the right deviation in communism signifies a tendency, an inclination that has not yet taken shape, it is true, and is perhaps not yet consciously realized, but nevertheless a ten-

dency of a section of the communists to depart from the revolutionary line of Marxism in the direction of social-democracy. When certain groups of communists deny the expediency of the slogan "Class against class" in election campaigns (France), or are opposed to the Communist Party nominating its own candidates (Britain), or are disinclined to make a sharp issue of the fight against "left" social-democracy (Germany), etc., etc., it means that there are people in the communist parties who are striving to adapt communism to social-democratism.

A victory of the right deviation in the communist parties of the capitalist countries would mean the ideological rout of the communist parties and an enormous strengthening of social-democratism. And what does an enormous strengthening of social-democratism mean? It means the strengthening and consolidation of capitalism, for social-democracy is the main support of capitalism in the working class.

Consequently, a victory of the right deviation in the communist parties of the capitalist countries would lead to a development of the conditions necessary for the *preservation* of capitalism.

Under the conditions of Soviet development, when capitalism has already been overthrown, but its roots have not yet been torn out, the right deviation in communism signifies a tendency, an inclination that has not yet taken shape, it is true, and is perhaps not yet consciously realized, but nevertheless a tendency of a section of the communists to depart from the general line of our Party in the direction of bourgeois ideology. When certain circles of our communists strive to drag the Party back from the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress, by denying the need for an offensive against the capitalist elements in the countryside; or demand a contraction of our industry, in the belief that its present rapid rate of development is fatal for the country; or deny the expediency of subsidies to the collective farms and state farms, in the belief that such subsidies are money thrown to the winds; or deny the expediency of fighting against bureaucracy by methods of self-criticism, in the belief that self-criticism undermines our apparatus; or demand that the monopoly of foreign trade be relaxed, etc., etc., it means that there are people in the ranks of our Party who are striving, perhaps without themselves realizing it, to adapt our socialist construction to the tastes and requirements of the "Soviet" bourgeoisie.

A victory of the right deviation in our Party would mean an enormous strengthening of the capitalist elements in our country.

And what does the strengthening of the capitalist elements in our country mean? It means weakening the proletarian dictatorship and increasing the chances of the restoration of capitalism.

Consequently, a victory of the right deviation in our Party would mean a development of the conditions necessary *for the restoration* of capitalism in our country.

Have we in our Soviet country any of the conditions that would make the restoration of capitalism *possible*? Yes, we have. That, comrades, may appear strange, but it is a fact. We have overthrown capitalism, we have established the dictatorship of the proletariat, we are developing our socialist industry at a rapid pace and are linking peasant economy with it. But we have not yet torn out the roots of capitalism. Where are these roots imbedded? They are imbedded in commodity production, in small production in the towns and, especially, the countryside.

As Lenin says, the strength of capitalism lies “in the strength of *small production*. For, unfortunately, small production is still very, very widespread in the world, and small production *engenders* capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale” (see Vol. XXV, p. 173).

It is clear that, since small production bears a mass, and even a predominant character in our country, and since it *engenders* capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously and on a mass scale, particularly under the conditions of NEP, we have in our country conditions which make the restoration of capitalism *possible*.

Have we in our Soviet country the necessary means and forces to abolish, to eliminate the *possibility* of the restoration of capitalism? Yes, we have. And it is this fact that proves the correctness of Lenin’s thesis on the *possibility* of building a complete socialist society in the USSR. For this purpose it is necessary to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, strengthen the alliance between the working class and peasantry, develop our key positions from the standpoint of industrializing the country, develop industry at a rapid rate, electrify the country, place the whole of our national economy on a new technical basis, organize the peasantry into cooperatives on a mass scale and increase the yield of its farms gradually unite the individual peasant farms into socially conducted, collective farms, develop state farms, restrict and overcome the capitalist elements in town and country, etc., etc.

Here is what Lenin says on this subject:

“As long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. This must be borne in mind. Anyone who has carefully observed life in the countryside, as compared with life in the towns, knows that we have not torn out the roots of capitalism and have not undermined the foundation, the basis of the internal enemy. The latter depends on small-scale production, and there is only one way of undermining it, namely, to place the economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production. And it is only electricity that is such a basis. Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country. Otherwise, the country will remain a small-peasant country, and we have got to understand that clearly. We are weaker than capitalism, not only on a world scale, but also within the country. Everybody knows this. We are conscious of it, and we shall see to it that our economic base is transformed from a small-peasant base into a large-scale industrial base. Only when the country has been electrified, only when our industry, our agriculture, our transport system have been placed upon the technical basis of modern large-scale industry shall we achieve final victory” (Vol. XXVI, pp. 46-47).

It follows, firstly, that as long as we live in a small-peasant country, as long as we have not torn out the roots of capitalism, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism than for communism. It may happen that you cut down a tree but fail to tear out the roots; your strength does not suffice for this. Hence the *possibility* of the restoration of capitalism in our country.

Secondly, it follows that besides the possibility of the restoration of capitalism there is also the *possibility of the victory of socialism* in our country, because we *can* destroy the *possibility* of the restoration of capitalism, we can tear out the roots of capitalism and achieve final victory over capitalism in our country, *if* we intensify the work of electrifying the country, *if* we place our industry, agriculture and transport on the technical basis of modern, large-scale industry. Hence the *possibility* of the victory of socialism in our country.

Lastly, it follows that we cannot build socialism in industry alone and leave agriculture to the mercy of spontaneous development on the assumption that the countryside will “move by itself” following the lead of the towns. The existence of socialist industry in the towns is the principal factor in the socialist transformation of the countryside. But it does not mean that that factor is quite sufficient. If the socialist towns are to take the lead of the peasant countryside all the way, it is essential, as Lenin says, “to place the economy of the coun-

try, *including agriculture*,* on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production.”

Does this quotation from Lenin contradict another of his statements, to the effect that “NEP fully ensures us the *possibility** of laying the foundation of a socialist economy”? No, it does not. On the contrary, the two statements fully coincide. Lenin by no means says that NEP gives us socialism ready-made. Lenin merely says that NEP ensures us the *possibility* of laying the foundation of a socialist economy. There is a great difference between the *possibility* of building socialism and the *actual building of socialism*. Possibility and actuality must not be confused. It is precisely for the purpose of transforming possibility into actuality that Lenin proposes the electrification of the country and the placing of industry, agriculture and transport on the technical basis of modern large-scale production as a condition for the final victory of socialism in our country.

But this condition for the building of socialism cannot be fulfilled in one or two years. It is impossible in one or two years to industrialize the country, build up a powerful industry, organize the vast masses of the peasantry into cooperatives, place agriculture on a new technical basis, unite the individual peasant farms into large collective farms, develop state farms, and restrict and overcome the capitalist elements in town and country. Years and years of intense constructive work by the proletarian dictatorship will be needed for this. And until that is accomplished — and it cannot be accomplished all at once — we shall remain a small peasant country, where small production engenders capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously and on a mass scale, and where the danger of the restoration of capitalism remains.

And since our proletariat does not live in a vacuum, but in the midst of the most actual and real life with all its variety of forms, the bourgeois elements arising on the basis of small production “encircle the proletariat on every side with petty bourgeois elemental forces, by means of which they permeate and corrupt the proletariat and continually cause relapses among the proletariat into petty-bourgeois spinelessness, disunity, individualism, and alternate moods of exaltation and dejection” (Lenin, Vol. XXV, p. 189), thereby introducing into the ranks of the proletariat and of its Party a certain amount of vacillation, a certain amount of wavering.

There you have the root and the basis of all sorts of vacillations

* My italics. — *J. St.*

and deviations from the Leninist line in the ranks of our Party.

That is why the right and “left” deviations in our Party cannot be regarded as a trifling matter.

Where does the danger of the *right*, frankly opportunist, deviation in our Party lie? In the fact that it *underestimates* the strength of our enemies, the strength of capitalism: it does not see the danger of the restoration of capitalism; it does not understand the mechanism of the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat and therefore so readily agrees to make concessions to capitalism, demanding a slowing down of the rate of development of our industry, demanding concessions for the capitalist elements in town and country, demanding that the question of collective farms and state farms be relegated to the background, demanding that the monopoly of foreign trade be relaxed, etc., etc.

There is no doubt that the triumph of the right deviation in our Party would unleash the forces of capitalism, undermine the revolutionary positions of the proletariat and increase the chances of the restoration of capitalism in our country.

Where does the danger of the “*left*” (Trotskyite) deviation in our Party lie? In the fact that it *overestimates* the strength of our enemies, the strength of capitalism; it sees only the possibility of the restoration of capitalism, but cannot see the possibility of building socialism by the efforts of our country; it gives way to despair and is obliged to console itself with chatter about Thermidor tendencies in our Party.

From the words of Lenin that “as long as we live in a small peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism,” the “left” deviation draws the false conclusion that it is impossible to build socialism in the USSR at all; that we cannot get anywhere with the peasantry; that the idea of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry is an obsolete idea; that unless a victorious revolution in the West comes to our aid the dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR must fall or degenerate; that unless we adopt the fantastic plan of super-industrialization, even at the cost of a split with the peasantry, the cause of socialism in the USSR must be regarded as doomed.

Hence the adventurism in the policy of the “left” deviation. Hence its “superhuman” leaps in the sphere of policy.

There is no doubt that the triumph of the “left” deviation in our Party would lead to the working class being separated from its peasant base, to the vanguard of the working class being separated from

the rest of the working-class masses, and, consequently, to the defeat of the proletariat and to facilitating conditions for the restoration of capitalism.

You see, therefore, that both these dangers, the “left” and the right, both these deviations from the Leninist line, the right and the “left,” lead to the same result, although from different directions.

Which of these dangers is worse? In my opinion one is as bad as the other.

The difference between these deviations from the point of view of successfully combatting them consists in the fact that the danger of the “left” deviation is at the present moment more obvious to the Party than the danger of the right deviation. The fact that an intense struggle has been waged against the “left” deviation for several years now has, of course, not been without its value for the Party. It is clear that the Party has learned a great deal in the years of the fight against the “left,” Trotskyite deviation and cannot now be easily deceived by “left” phrases.

As for the right danger, which existed before, but which has now become more prominent because of the growth of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces resulting from last year’s grain-procurement crisis, I think it is not quite so obvious to certain sections of our Party. That is why our task must be — while not in the least relaxing the fight against the “left,” Trotskyite danger — to lay the emphasis on the fight against the right deviation and to take all measures to make the danger of this deviation as obvious to the Party as the Trotskyite danger.

The question of the right deviation would not, perhaps, be as acute as it is now, were it not for the fact that it is connected *with the difficulties* accompanying our development. But the whole point is that the existence of the right deviation complicates the difficulties accompanying our development and hinders our efforts to overcome these difficulties. And for the very reason that the right danger hinders the efforts to overcome the difficulties, the question of overcoming the right danger has assumed particularly great importance for us.

A few words about the nature of our difficulties. It should be borne in mind that our difficulties should by no means be regarded as difficulties of stagnation or decline. There are difficulties that arise at a time of economic decline or stagnation, and in such cases efforts are made to render the stagnation less painful, or the decline less profound. Our difficulties have nothing in common with difficul-

ties of that kind. The characteristic feature of our difficulties is that they are difficulties of *expansion*, difficulties of growth. When we speak about difficulties we usually mean by what percentage industry ought to be *expanded*, by what percentage the crop area ought to be *enlarged*, by how many poods the crop yield ought to be *increased*, etc., etc. And because our difficulties are those of expansion, and not of decline or stagnation, they should not be anything particularly dangerous for the Party.

But difficulties are difficulties, nevertheless. And since in order to overcome difficulties it is necessary to exert all efforts, to display firmness and endurance, and since not everybody possesses sufficient firmness and endurance — perhaps as a result of fatigue and overstrain, or because of a preference for a quiet life, free from struggle and commotion — it is just here that vacillations and waverings begin to take place, tendencies to adopt the line of least resistance, talk about slowing down the rate of industrial development, about making concessions to the capitalist elements, about rejecting collective farms and state farms and, in general, everything that goes beyond the calm and familiar conditions of the daily routine.

But unless we overcome the difficulties in our path we shall make no progress. And in order to overcome the difficulties we must first defeat the right danger, we must first overcome the right deviation, which is hindering the fight against the difficulties and is trying to undermine our Party's will to fight and overcome the difficulties.

I am speaking, of course, of a real fight against the right deviation, not a verbal, paper fight. There are people in our Party who, to soothe their conscience, are quite willing to proclaim a fight against the right danger in the same way as priests sometimes cry, "Hallelujah! Hallelujah!" But they will not undertake any practical measures at all to organize the fight against the right deviation on a firm basis, and to overcome this deviation in actual fact. We call this tendency a *conciliatory* tendency towards the right, frankly opportunist, deviation. It is not difficult to understand that the fight against this conciliatory tendency is an integral part of the general fight against the right deviation, against the right danger. For it is impossible to overcome the right, opportunist deviation without waging a systematic fight against the conciliatory tendency, which takes the opportunists under its wing.

The question who are the exponents of the right deviation is undoubtedly of interest, although it is not of decisive importance. We came across exponents of the right danger in our lower Party organi-

zations during the grain-procurement crisis last year, when a number of communists in the volosts and villages opposed the Party's policy and worked towards forming a bond with kulak elements. As you know, such people were cleared out of the Party last spring, a matter specially referred to in the document of the Central Committee of our Party in February this year.

But it would be wrong to say that there are no such people left in our Party. If we go higher up, to the uyezd and gubernia Party organizations, or if we dig deeper into the Soviet and cooperative apparatus, we could without difficulty find exponents of the right danger and conciliation towards it. We know of "letters," "declarations," and other documents written by a number of functionaries in our Party and Soviet apparatus, in which the drift towards the right deviation is quite distinctly expressed. You know that these letters and documents were referred to in the verbatim report of the July plenum of the Central Committee.

If we go higher still, and ask about the members of the Central Committee, we shall have to admit that within the Central Committee, too, there are certain elements, very insignificant it is true, of a conciliatory attitude towards the right danger. The verbatim report of the July plenum of the Central Committee provides direct proof of this.

Well, and what about the Political Bureau? Are there any deviations in the Political Bureau? In the Political Bureau there are neither right nor "left" deviations nor conciliators towards those deviations. This must be said quite categorically. It is time to put a stop to the tittle-tattle spread by enemies of the Party and by the oppositionists of all kinds about there being a right deviation, or a conciliatory attitude towards the right deviation in the Political Bureau of our Central Committee.

Were there vacillations and waverings in the Moscow organization, or in its top leadership, the Moscow Committee? Yes, there were. It would be absurd to assert now that there were no waverings, no vacillations there. The candid speech made by Penkov is direct proof of this. Penkov is by no means the least important person in the Moscow organization and in the Moscow Committee. You heard him plainly and frankly admit that he had been wrong on a number of important questions of our Party policy. That does not mean, of course, that the Moscow Committee as a whole was subject to vacillation. No, it does not mean that. A document like the appeal of the Moscow Committee to the members of the Moscow organization in

October of this year undoubtedly shows that the Moscow Committee has succeeded in overcoming the vacillations of certain of its members. I have no doubt that the leading core of the Moscow Committee will be able completely to straighten out the situation.

Certain comrades are dissatisfied with the fact that the district organizations interfered in this matter and demanded that an end be put to the mistakes and vacillations of certain leaders of the Moscow organization. I do not see how this dissatisfaction can be justified. What is there wrong about district activists of the Moscow organization raising the demand that an end be put to mistakes and vacillations? Does not our work proceed under the slogan of self-criticism from below? Is it not a fact that self-criticism increases the activity of the Party rank and file and of the proletarian rank and file in general? What is there wrong or dangerous in the fact that the district activists proved equal to the situation?

Did the Central Committee act rightly in interfering in this matter? I think that it did. Berzin thinks that the Central Committee acted too drastically in demanding the removal of one of the district leaders to whom the district organization was opposed. That is absolutely wrong. Let me remind Berzin of certain incidents in 1919 or 1920, when some members of the Central Committee who were guilty of certain, in my opinion, not very serious errors in respect of the Party line were, on Lenin's suggestion, subjected to exemplary punishment, one of them being sent to Turkestan, and the other almost paying the penalty of expulsion from the Central Committee.

Was Lenin right in acting as he did? I think he was quite right. The situation in the Central Committee then was not what it is now. Half the members of the Central Committee followed Trotsky, and the situation in the Central Committee was not a stable one. The Central Committee today is acting much more mildly. Why? Is it, perhaps, because we want to be more gentle than Lenin? No, that is not the point. The point is that the position of the Central Committee is more stable now than it was then, and the Central Committee can afford to act more mildly.

Nor is Sakharov right in asserting that the intervention of the Central Committee was belated. Sakharov is wrong because he evidently does not know that, properly speaking, the intervention of the Central Committee began in February of this year. Sakharov can convince himself of that if he desires. It is true that the intervention of the Central Committee did not immediately yield required results. But it would be strange to blame the Central Committee for that.

Conclusions:

1) the right danger is a serious danger in our Party, for it is rooted in the social and economic situation in our country;

2) the danger of the right deviation is aggravated by the existence of difficulties which cannot be overcome unless the right deviation and conciliation towards it are overcome;

3) in the Moscow organization there were vacillations and waverings, there were elements of instability;

4) the core of the Moscow Committee, with the help of the Central Committee and the district activists, took all measures to put an end to these vacillations;

5) there can be no doubt that the Moscow Committee will succeed in overcoming the mistakes which began to take shape in the past;

6) our task is to put a stop to the internal struggle, to unite the Moscow organization into a single whole, and to carry through the elections in the Party units successfully on the basis of fully developed self-criticism. (*Applause.*)

INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE COUNTRY AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE CPSU(B)

(Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the CPSU(B)¹⁰⁴)

November 19, 1928

(Excerpts)

THE RATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY

Our theses proceed from the premise that a fast rate of development of industry in general, and of the production of the means of production in particular, is the underlying principle of, and the key to, the industrialization of the country, the underlying principle of, and the key to, the transformation of our entire national economy along the lines of socialist development.

But what does a fast rate of development of industry involve? It involves the maximum capital investment in industry. And that leads to a state of tension in all our plans, budgetary and non-budgetary. And, indeed, the characteristic feature of our control figures in the past three years, in the period of reconstruction, is that they have been compiled and carried out at a high tension. Take our control figures, examine our budget estimates, talk with our Party comrades — both those who work in the Party organizations and those who direct our Soviet, economic and cooperative affairs — and you will invariably find this one characteristic feature everywhere, namely, the state of tension in our plans.

The question arises: is this state of tension in our plans really necessary for us? Cannot we do without it? Is it not possible to conduct the work at a slower pace, in a more “restful” atmosphere? Is not the fast rate of industrial development that we have adopted due to the restless character of the members of the Political Bureau and the Council of People’s Commissars?

Of course not! The members of the Political Bureau and the Council of People’s Commissars are calm and sober people. Abstractly speaking, that is, if we disregarded the external and internal situation, we could, of course, conduct the work at a slower speed.

But the point is that, firstly, we cannot disregard the external and internal situation, and, secondly, if we take the surrounding situation as our starting-point, it has to be admitted that it is precisely this situation that dictates a fast rate of development of our industry.

Permit me to pass to an examination of this situation, of these conditions of an external and internal order that dictate a fast rate of industrial development.

External conditions. We have assumed power in a country whose technical equipment is terribly backward. Along with a few big industrial units more or less based upon modern technology, we have hundreds and thousands of mills and factories the technical equipment of which is beneath all criticism from the point of view of modern achievements. At the same time we have around us a number of capitalist countries whose industrial technique is far more developed and up-to-date than that of our country. Look at the capitalist countries and you will see that their technology is not only advancing, but advancing by leaps and bounds, outstripping the old forms of industrial technique. And so we find that, on the one hand, we in our country have the most advanced system, the Soviet system, and the most advanced type of state power in the world, Soviet power, while, on the other hand, our industry, which should be the basis of socialism and of Soviet power, is extremely backward technically. Do you think that we can achieve the final victory of socialism in our country so long as this contradiction exists?

What has to be done to end this contradiction? To end it, we must overtake and outstrip the advanced technology of the developed capitalist countries. We have overtaken and outstripped the advanced capitalist countries in the sense of establishing a new political system, the Soviet system. That is good. But it is not enough. In order to secure the final victory of socialism in our country, we must also overtake and outstrip these countries technically and economically. Either we do this, or we shall be forced to the wall.

This applies not only to the building of socialism. It applies also to upholding the independence of our country in the circumstances of the capitalist encirclement. The independence of our country cannot be upheld unless we have an adequate industrial basis for defence. And such an industrial basis cannot be created if our industry is not more highly developed technically.

That is why a fast rate of development of our industry is necessary and imperative.

The technical and economic backwardness of our country was

not invented by us. This backwardness is age-old and was bequeathed to us by the whole history of our country. This backwardness was felt to be an evil both earlier, before the revolution, and later, after the revolution. When Peter the Great, having to deal with the more highly developed countries of the West, feverishly built mills and factories to supply the army and strengthen the country's defences, that was in its way an attempt to break out of the grip of this backwardness. It is quite understandable, however, that none of the old classes, neither the feudal aristocracy nor the bourgeoisie, could solve the problem of putting an end to the backwardness of our country. More than that, not only were these classes unable to solve this problem, they were not even able to formulate the task in any satisfactory way. The age-old backwardness of our country can be ended only on the lines of successful socialist construction. And it can be ended only by the proletariat, which has established its dictatorship and has charge of the direction of the country.

It would be foolish to console ourselves with the thought that, since the backwardness of our country was not invented by us and was bequeathed to us by the whole history of our country, we cannot be, and do not have to be, responsible for it. That is not true, comrades. Since we have come to power and taken upon ourselves the task of transforming the country on the basis of socialism, we are responsible, and have to be responsible, for everything, the bad as well as the good. And just because we are responsible for everything, we must put an end to our technical and economic backwardness. We must do so without fail if we really want to overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries. And only we Bolsheviks can do it. But precisely in order to accomplish this task, we must systematically achieve a fast rate of development of our industry. And that we are already achieving a fast rate of industrial development is now clear to everyone.

The question of overtaking and outstripping the advanced capitalist countries technically and economically is for us Bolsheviks neither new nor unexpected. It was raised in our country as early as in 1917, before the October Revolution. It was raised by Lenin as early as in September 1917, on the eve of the October Revolution, during the imperialist war, in his pamphlet *The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It*.

Here is what Lenin said on this score:

“The result of the revolution has been that the *political* system of Russia has in a few months caught up with that of the advanced countries. But that

is not enough. The war is inexorable; it puts the alternative with ruthless severity: either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced countries *economically as well*... Perish or drive full-steam ahead. That is the alternative with which history has confronted us" (Vol. XXI, p. 191).

You see how bluntly Lenin put the question of ending our technical and economic backwardness.

Lenin wrote all this on the eve of the October Revolution, in the period before the proletariat had taken power, when the Bolsheviks had as yet neither state power, nor a socialized industry, nor a widely ramified cooperative network embracing millions of peasants, nor collective farms, nor state farms. Today, when we already have something substantial with which to end completely our technical and economic backwardness, we might paraphrase Lenin's words roughly as follows:

"We have overtaken and *outripped* the advanced capitalist countries *politically* by establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat. But that is not enough. We must utilize the dictatorship of the proletariat, our socialized industry, transport, credit system, etc., the cooperatives, collective farms, state farms, etc., in order to overtake and *outripe* the advanced capitalist countries *economically* as well."

The question of a fast rate of development of industry would not face us so acutely as it does now if we had such a highly developed industry and such a highly developed technology as Germany, say, and if the relative importance of industry in the entire national economy were as high in our country as it is in Germany, for example. *If that were the case*, we could develop our industry at a slower rate without fearing to fall behind the capitalist countries and knowing that we could outstrip them at one stroke. But then we should not be so seriously backward technically and economically as we are now. The whole point is that we are behind Germany in this respect and are still far from having overtaken her technically and economically.

The question of a fast rate of development of industry would not face us so acutely if we were not the *only* country but *one of the countries* of the dictatorship of the proletariat, if there were a proletarian dictatorship not only in our country but in other, more advanced countries as well, Germany and France, say.

If that were the case, the capitalist encirclement could not be so serious a danger as it is now, the question of the economic independence of our country would naturally recede into the back-

ground, we could integrate ourselves into the system of more developed proletarian states, we could receive from them machines for making our industry and agriculture more productive, supplying them in turn with raw materials and foodstuffs, and we could, consequently, expand our industry at a slower rate. But you know very well that that is not yet the case and that we are still the *only* country of the proletarian dictatorship and are surrounded by capitalist countries, many of which are far in advance of us technically and economically.

That is why Lenin raised the question of overtaking and outstripping the economically advanced countries as one of life and death for our development.

Such are the *external* conditions dictating a fast rate of development of our industry.

Internal conditions. But besides the external conditions, there are also internal conditions which dictate a fast rate of development of our industry as the main foundation of our entire national economy. I am referring to the extreme backwardness of our agriculture, of its technical and cultural level. I am referring to the existence in our country of an overwhelming preponderance of small commodity producers, with their scattered and utterly backward production, compared with which our large-scale socialist industry is like an island in the midst of the sea, an island whose base is expanding daily, but which is nevertheless an island in the midst of the sea.

We are in the habit of saying that industry is the main foundation of our entire national economy, including agriculture, that it is the key to the reconstruction of our backward and scattered system of agriculture on a collectivist basis. That is perfectly true. From that position we must not retreat for a single moment. But it must also be remembered that, while industry is the main foundation, agriculture constitutes the basis for industrial development, both as a market which absorbs the products of industry and as a supplier of raw materials and foodstuffs, as well as a source of the export reserves essential in order to import machinery for the needs of our national economy. Can we advance industry while leaving agriculture in a state of complete technical backwardness, without providing an agricultural base for industry, without reconstructing agriculture and bringing it up to the level of industry? No, we cannot.

Hence the task of supplying agriculture with the maximum amount of instruments and means of production essential in order to accelerate and promote its reconstruction on a new technical basis.

But for the accomplishment of this task a fast rate of development of our industry is necessary. Of course, the reconstruction of a disunited and scattered agriculture is an incomparably more difficult matter than the reconstruction of a united and centralized socialist industry. But that is the task that confronts us, and we must accomplish it. And it cannot be accomplished except by a fast rate of industrial development.

We cannot go on indefinitely, that is, for too long a period, basing the Soviet regime and socialist construction on two *different* foundations, the foundation of the most large-scale and united socialist industry and the foundation of the most scattered and backward, small commodity economy of the peasants. We must gradually, but systematically and persistently, place our agriculture on a new technical basis, the basis of large-scale production, and bring it up to the level of socialist industry. Either we accomplish this task — in which case the final victory of socialism in our country will be assured, or we turn away from it and do not accomplish it — in which case a return to capitalism may become inevitable.

Here is what Lenin says on this score:

“As long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. This must be borne in mind. Anyone who has carefully observed life in the countryside, as compared with life in the towns, knows that we have not torn out the roots of capitalism and have not undermined the foundation, the basis of the internal enemy. The latter depends on small-scale production, and there is only one way of undermining it, namely, to place the economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production. And it is only electricity that is such a basis. Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country” (Vol. XXVI, p. 46).

As you see, when Lenin speaks of the electrification of the country he means not the isolated construction of individual power stations, but the gradual “placing of the economy of the country, *including agriculture*,* on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production,” which in one way or another, directly or indirectly, is connected with electrification.

Lenin delivered this speech at the Eighth Congress of Soviets in December 1920, on the very eve of the introduction of NEP, when he was substantiating the so-called plan of electrification, that is, the

* My italics. — *J. St.*

GOELRO plan. Some comrades argue on these grounds that the views expressed in this quotation have become inapplicable under present conditions. Why, we ask? Because, they say, much water has flown under the bridges since then. It is, of course, true that much water has flown under the bridges since then. We now have a developed socialist industry, we have collective farms on a mass scale, we have old and new state farms, we have a wide network of well-developed cooperative organizations, we have machine-hiring stations at the service of the peasant farms, we now practise the contract system as a new form of the bond, and we can put into operation all these and a number of other levers for gradually placing agriculture on a new technical basis. All this is true. But it is also true that, in spite of all this, we are still a small-peasant country where small-scale production predominates. And that is the fundamental thing. And as long as it continues to be the fundamental thing, Lenin's thesis remains valid that "as long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism," and that, consequently, the danger of the restoration of capitalism is no empty phrase.

Lenin says the same thing, but in a sharper form, in the plan of his pamphlet, *The Tax in Kind*, which was written *after* the introduction of NEP (March-April 1921):

"If we have electrification in 10-20 years, then the individualism of the small tiller, and freedom *for him* to trade locally are not a whit terrible. If we do not have electrification, a return to capitalism will be inevitable *anyhow*."

And further on he says:

"Ten or twenty years of correct relations with the peasantry, and victory on a world scale is assured (even if the proletarian revolutions, which are growing, are delayed); otherwise, 20-40 years of the torments of whiteguard terrorism" (Vol. XXVI, p. 313).

You see how bluntly Lenin puts the question: either electrification, that is, the "placing of the economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production," or a return to capitalism.

That is how Lenin understood the question of "correct relations with the peasantry."

It is not a matter of coddling the peasant and regarding this as establishing correct relations with him, for coddling will not carry you very far. It is a matter of helping the peasant to place his husbandry "on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern

large-scale production”; for that is the principal way to rid the peasant of his poverty.

And it is impossible to place the economy of the country on a new technical basis unless our industry and, in the first place, the production of means of production, are developed at a fast rate.

Such are the internal conditions dictating a fast rate of development of our industry.

It is these external and internal conditions which are the cause of the control figures of our national economy being under such tension.

That explains, too, why our economic plans, both budgetary and non-budgetary, are marked by a state of tension, by substantial investments in capital development, the object of which is to maintain a fast rate of industrial development.

It may be asked where this is said in the theses, in what passage of the theses. (*A voice*: “Yes, where is it said?”) Evidence of this in the theses is the sum-total of capital investments in industry for 1928-29. After all, our theses are called theses on the control figures. That is so, is it not, comrades? (*A voice*: “Yes.”) Well, the theses say that in 1928-29 we shall be investing 1,650 million rubles in capital construction in industry. In other words, this year we shall be investing in industry 330,000,000 rubles more than last year.

It follows, therefore, that we are not only maintaining the rate of industrial development, but are going a step farther by investing more in industry than last year, that is, by expanding capital construction in industry both absolutely and relatively.

That is the crux of the theses on the control figures of the national economy. Yet certain comrades failed to observe this staring fact. They criticized the theses on the control figures right and left as regards petty details, but the most important thing they failed to observe.

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE CPSU(B)

(Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the CPSU(B)¹⁰⁵)

April 1929

(Excerpts)

II

CLASS CHANGES AND OUR DISAGREEMENTS

What are our disagreements? What are they connected with?

They are connected, first of all, with the class changes that have been taking place recently in our country and in capitalist countries. Some comrades think that the disagreements in our Party are of an accidental nature. That is wrong, comrades. That is quite wrong. The disagreements in our Party have their roots in the class changes, in the intensification of the class struggle which has been taking place lately and which marks a turning point in development.

The chief mistake of Bukharin's group is that it fails to see these changes and this turning point; it does not see them, and does not want to notice them. That, in fact, explains the failure to understand the new tasks of the Party and of the Comintern, which is the characteristic feature of the Bukharin opposition.

Have you noticed, comrades, that the leaders of the Bukharin opposition, in their speeches at the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, completely evaded the question of the class changes in our country, that they did not say a single word about the intensification of the class struggle and did not even remotely hint at the fact that our disagreements are connected with this very intensification of the class struggle? They talked about everything, about philosophy and about theory, but they did not say a single word about the class changes which determine the orientation and the practical activity of our Party at the present moment.

How is this strange fact to be explained? Is it forgetfulness, perhaps? Of course not! Political leaders cannot forget the chief thing. The explanation is that they neither see nor understand the new revolutionary processes now going on both here, in our country, and in

the capitalist countries. The explanation is that they have overlooked the chief thing, they have overlooked those class changes, which a political leader has no right to overlook. This is the real explanation for the confusion and unpreparedness displayed by the Bukharin opposition in face of the new tasks of our Party.

Recall the recent events in our Party. Recall the slogans our Party has issued lately in connection with the new class changes in our country. I refer to such slogans as the slogan of *self-criticism*, the slogan of intensifying *the fight against bureaucracy and of purging the Soviet apparatus*, the slogan of *training new economic cadres and Red experts*, the slogan of strengthening *the collective-farm and state-farm movement*, the slogan of *an offensive against the kulaks*, the slogan of *reducing production costs and radically improving the methods of trade-union work*, the slogan of *purging the Party*, etc. To some comrades these slogans seemed staggering and dizzying. Yet it is obvious that these slogans are the most necessary and urgent slogans of the Party at the present moment.

The whole thing began when, as a result of the Shakhty affair, we raised in a new way the question of new economic cadres, of training Red experts from the ranks of the working class to take the place of the old experts.

What did the Shakhty affair reveal? It revealed that the bourgeoisie was still far from being crushed; that it was organizing and would continue to organize wrecking activities to hamper our work of economic construction; that our economic, trade-union and, to a certain extent, Party organizations had failed to notice the undermining operations of our class enemies, and that it was therefore necessary to exert all efforts and employ all resources to reinforce and improve our organizations, to develop and heighten their class vigilance.

In this connection the slogan of *self-criticism* became sharply stressed. Why? Because we cannot improve our economic, trade-union and Party organizations, we cannot advance the cause of building socialism and of curbing the wrecking activities of the bourgeoisie, unless we develop criticism and self-criticism to the utmost, unless we place the work of our organizations under the control of the masses. It is indeed a fact that wrecking has been and is going on not only in the coal-fields, but also in the metallurgical industries, in the war industries, in the People's Commissariat of Transport, in the gold and platinum industries, etc., etc. Hence the slogan of self-criticism.

Further, in connection with the grain-procurement difficulties, in connection with the opposition of the kulaks to the Soviet price policy, we stressed the question of developing collective farms and state farms to the utmost, of launching an offensive against the kulaks, of organizing grain procurements by means of pressure on the kulak and well-to-do elements.

What did the grain-procurement difficulties reveal? They revealed that the kulak was not asleep, that the kulak was growing, that he was busy undermining the policy of the Soviet government, while our Party, Soviet and cooperative organizations — at all events, some of them — either failed to see the enemy, or adapted themselves to him instead of fighting him.

Hence the new stress laid on the slogan of self-criticism, on the slogan of checking and improving our Party, cooperative and procurement organizations generally.

Further, in connection with the new tasks of reconstructing industry and agriculture on the basis of socialism, there arose the slogan of systematically reducing production costs, of strengthening labour discipline, of developing socialist emulation, etc. These tasks called for a revision of the entire activities of the trade unions and Soviet apparatus, for radical measures to put new life into these organizations and for purging them of bureaucratic elements.

Hence the stress laid on the slogan of fighting bureaucracy in the trade unions and in the Soviet apparatus.

Finally, the slogan of purging the Party. It would be ridiculous to think that it is possible to strengthen our Soviet, economic, trade-union and cooperative organizations, that it is possible to purge them of the dross of bureaucracy, without giving a sharp edge to the Party itself. There can be no doubt that bureaucratic elements exist not only in the economic and cooperative, trade-union and Soviet organizations, but in the organizations of the Party itself. Since the Party is the guiding force of all these organizations, it is obvious that purging the Party is the essential condition for thoroughly revitalizing and improving all the other organizations of the working class. Hence the slogan of purging the Party.

Are these slogans a matter of accident? No, they are not. You see yourselves that they are not accidental. *They are necessary links in the single continuous chain which is called the offensive of socialism against the elements of capitalism.*

They are connected, primarily, with the period of the reconstruction of our industry and agriculture on the basis of socialism. And

what is the reconstruction of the national economy on the basis of socialism? It is the offensive of socialism against the capitalist elements of the national economy along the whole front. It is a most important advance of the working class of our country towards the complete building of socialism. But in order to carry out this reconstruction we must first of all improve and strengthen the cadres of socialist construction — the economic, Soviet and trade-union cadres and also Party and cooperative cadres; we must give a sharp edge to all our organizations, purge them of dross; we must stimulate the activity of the vast masses of the working class and peasantry.

Further, these slogans are connected with the fact of the resistance of the capitalist elements of the national economy to the offensive of socialism. The so-called Shakhty affair cannot be regarded as something accidental. “Shakhtyists” are at present entrenched in every branch of our industry. Many of them have been caught, but by no means all of them. The wrecking activities of the bourgeois intelligentsia are one of the most dangerous forms of resistance to developing socialism. The wrecking activities are all the more dangerous because they are connected with international capital. Bourgeois wrecking is undoubtedly an indication of the fact that the capitalist elements have by no means laid down their arms, that they are gathering strength for fresh attacks on the Soviet regime.

As for the capitalist elements in the countryside, there is still less reason to regard as accidental the opposition of the kulaks to the Soviet price policy, which has been going on for over a year already. Many people are still unable to understand why it is that until 1927 the kulak gave his grain of his own accord, whereas since 1927 he has ceased to do so. But there is nothing surprising in it. Formerly the kulak was still relatively weak; he was unable to organize his farming properly; he lacked sufficient capital to improve his farm and so he was obliged to bring all, or nearly all, his surplus grain to the market. Now, however, after a number of good harvests, since he has been able to build up his farm, since he has succeeded in accumulating the necessary capital, he is in a position to manoeuvre on the market, he is able to set aside grain, this currency of currencies, as a reserve for himself, and prefers to bring to the market meat, oats, barley and other secondary crops. It would be ridiculous now to hope that the kulak can be made to part with his grain voluntarily.

There you have the root of the resistance which the kulak is now offering to the policy of the Soviet regime.

And what does the resistance offered by the capitalist elements of town and country to the socialist offensive represent? It represents a regrouping of the forces of the class enemies of the proletariat for the purpose of defending the old against the new. It is not difficult to understand that these circumstances cannot but lead to an intensification of the class struggle. But if we are to break the resistance of the class enemies and clear the way for the advance of socialism, we must, besides everything else, give a sharp edge to all our organizations, purge them of bureaucracy, improve their cadres and mobilize the vast masses of the working class and labouring strata of the countryside against the capitalist elements of town and country.

It was on the basis of these class changes that our Party's present slogans arose.

The same must be said about the class changes in capitalist countries. It would be ridiculous to think that the stabilization of capitalism has remained unchanged. Still more ridiculous would it be to assert that the stabilization is gaining in strength, that it is becoming secure. As a matter of fact, capitalist stabilization is being undermined and shaken month by month and day by day. The intensification of the struggle for foreign markets and raw materials, the growth of armaments, the growing antagonism between America and Britain, the growth of socialism in the USSR, the swing to the left of the working class in the capitalist countries, the wave of strikes and class conflicts in the European countries, the growing revolutionary movement in the colonies, including India, the growth of communism in all countries of the world — all these are facts which indicate beyond a doubt that the elements of a new revolutionary upsurge are accumulating in the capitalist countries.

Hence the task of intensifying the fight against social-democracy, and, above all, against its "left" wing, as being the social buttress of capitalism.

Hence the task of intensifying the fight in the communist parties against the right elements, as being the agents of social-democratic influence.

Hence the task of intensifying the fight against conciliation towards the right deviation, as being the refuge of opportunism in the communist parties.

Hence the slogan of purging the communist parties of social-democratic traditions.

Hence the so-called new tactics of communism in the trade un-

ions.

Some comrades do not understand the significance and importance of these slogans. But a Marxist will always understand that, unless these slogans are put into effect, the preparation of the proletarian masses for new class battles is unthinkable, victory over social-democracy is unthinkable, and the selection of real leaders of the communist movement, capable of leading the working class into the fight against capitalism, is impossible.

Such, comrades, are the class changes in our country and in the capitalist countries, on the basis of which the present slogans of our Party both in its internal policy and in relation to the Comintern have arisen.

Our Party sees these class changes. It understands the significance of the new tasks and it mobilizes forces for their fulfilment. That is why it is facing events fully armed. That is why it does not fear the difficulties confronting it, for it is prepared to overcome them.

The misfortune of Bukharin's group is that it does not see these class changes and does not understand the new tasks of the Party. And it is precisely because it does not understand them that it is in a state of complete bewilderment, is ready to flee from difficulties, to retreat in the face of difficulties, to surrender the positions.

Have you ever seen fishermen when a storm is brewing on a big river — such as the Yenisei? I have seen them many a time. In the face of a storm one group of fishermen will muster all their forces, encourage their fellows and boldly guide the boat to meet the storm: "Cheer up, lads, keep a tight hold of the tiller, cut the waves, we'll win through!"

But there is another type of fishermen — those who, on sensing a storm, lose heart, begin to snivel and demoralize their own ranks: "It's terrible, a storm is brewing: lie down, lads, in the bottom of the boat, shut your eyes, let's hope she'll make the shore somehow." (*General laughter.*)

Does it still need proof that the line and conduct of Bukharin's group exactly resembles the line and conduct of the second group of fishermen, who retreat in panic in the face of difficulties?

We say that in Europe the conditions are maturing for a new revolutionary upsurge, that this circumstance dictates to us new tasks along the line of intensifying the fight against the right deviation in the communist parties and of driving the right deviators out of the Party, of intensifying the fight against conciliation, which

screens the right deviation, of intensifying the fight against social-democratic traditions in the communist parties, etc., etc. But Bukharin answers us that all this is nonsense, that no such new tasks confront us, that the whole fact of the matter is that the majority in the Central Committee wants to “haul” him, i.e., Bukharin, “over the coals.”

We say that the class changes in our country dictate to us new tasks which call for a systematic reduction of costs of production and improvement of labour discipline in industry, that these tasks cannot be carried out without radical change in the practices of work of the trade unions. But Tomsy answers us that all this is nonsense, that no such new tasks confront us, that the whole fact of the matter is that the majority in the Central Committee wants to “haul” him, i.e., Tomsy, “over the coals.”

We say that the reconstruction of the national economy dictates to us new tasks along the line of intensifying the fight against bureaucracy in the Soviet and economic apparatus, of purging this apparatus of rotten and alien elements, wreckers, etc., etc. But Rykov answers us that all this is nonsense, that no such new tasks confront us, that the whole fact of the matter is that the majority in the Central Committee wants to “haul” him, i.e., Rykov, “over the coals.”

Now, is this not ridiculous, comrades? Is it not obvious that Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy see nothing but their own navels?

The misfortune of Bukharin’s group is that it does not see the new class changes and does not understand the new tasks of the Party. And it is precisely because it does not understand them that it is compelled to drag in the wake of events and to yield to difficulties.

There you have the root of our disagreements.

III

DISAGREEMENTS IN REGARD TO THE COMINTERN

I have already said that Bukharin does not see and does not understand the new tasks of the Comintern along the line of driving the rights out of the communist parties, of curbing conciliation, and of purging the communist parties of social-democratic traditions — tasks which are dictated by the maturing conditions for a new revolutionary upsurge. This thesis is fully confirmed by our disagree-

ments on Comintern questions.

How did the disagreements in this sphere begin?

They began with Bukharin's theses at the Sixth Congress¹⁰⁶ on the international situation. As a rule, theses are first examined by the delegation of the CPSU(B). In this case, however, that condition was not observed. What happened was that the theses, signed by Bukharin, were sent to the delegation of the CPSU(B) at the same time as they were distributed to the foreign delegations at the Sixth Congress. But the theses proved to be unsatisfactory on a number of points. The delegation of the CPSU(B) was obliged to introduce about twenty amendments into the theses.

This created a rather awkward situation for Bukharin. But who was to blame for that? Why was it necessary for Bukharin to distribute the theses to the foreign delegations before they had been examined by the delegation of the CPSU(B)? Could the delegation of the CPSU(B) refrain from introducing amendments if the theses proved to be unsatisfactory? And so it came about that the delegation of the CPSU(B) issued what were practically new theses on the international situation, which the foreign delegations began to counterpose to the old theses signed by Bukharin. Obviously, this awkward situation would not have arisen if Bukharin had not been in a hurry to distribute his theses to the foreign delegations.

I should like to draw attention to four principal amendments which the delegation of the CPSU(B) introduced into Bukharin's theses. I should like to draw attention to these principal amendments in order to illustrate more clearly the character of the disagreements on Comintern questions.

The first question is that of the character of the stabilization of capitalism. According to Bukharin's theses it appeared that nothing new is taking place at the present time to shake capitalist stabilization, but that, on the contrary, capitalism is *reconstructing itself* and that, on the whole, it is maintaining itself more or less *securely*. Obviously, the delegation of the CPSU(B) could not agree with such a characterization of what is called the third period, i.e., the period through which we are now passing. The delegation could not agree with it because to retain such a characterization of the third period might give our critics grounds for saying that we have adopted the point of view of so-called capitalist "recovery," i.e., the point of view of Hilferding, a point of view which we communists cannot adopt. Owing to this, the delegation of the CPSU(B) introduced an amendment which makes it evident that capitalist stabilization is not and

cannot be secure, that it is being shaken and will continue to be shaken by the march of events, owing to the aggravation of the crisis of world capitalism.

This question, comrades, is of decisive importance for the Sections of the Comintern. Is capitalist stabilization being shaken or is it becoming more secure? It is on this that the whole line of the communist parties in their day-to-day political work depends. Are we passing through a period of decline of the revolutionary movement, a period of the mere gathering of forces, or are we passing through a period when the conditions are maturing for a new revolutionary upsurge, a period of preparation of the working class for future class battles? It is on this that the tactical line of the communist parties depends. The amendment of the delegation of the CPSU(B), subsequently adopted by the congress, is a good one for the very reason that it gives a clear line based on the latter prospect, the prospect of maturing conditions for a new revolutionary upsurge.

The second question is that of the fight against social-democracy. In Bukharin's theses it was stated that the fight against social-democracy is one of the fundamental tasks of the Sections of the Comintern. That, of course, is true. But it is not enough. In order that the fight against social-democracy may be waged successfully, stress must be laid on the fight against the so-called "left" wing of social-democracy, that "left" wing which, by playing with "left" phrases and thus adroitly deceiving the workers, is retarding their mass defection from social-democracy. It is obvious that unless the "left" social-democrats are routed it will be impossible to overcome social-democracy in general. Yet in Bukharin's theses the question of "left" social-democracy was entirely ignored. That, of course, was a great defect. The delegation of the CPSU(B) was therefore obliged to introduce into Bukharin's theses an appropriate amendment, which was subsequently adopted by the congress.

The third question is that of the conciliatory tendency in the Sections of the Comintern. Bukharin's theses spoke of the necessity of fighting the right deviation, but not a word was said there about fighting conciliation towards the right deviation. That, of course, was a great defect. The point is that when war is declared on the right deviation, the right deviators usually disguise themselves as conciliators and place the Party in an awkward position. To forestall this manoeuvre of the right deviators we must insist on a determined fight against conciliation. That is why the delegation of the CPSU(B) considered it necessary to introduce into Bukharin's theses an ap-

appropriate amendment, which was subsequently adopted by the congress.

The fourth question is that of Party discipline. In Bukharin's theses no mention was made of the necessity of maintaining iron discipline in the communist parties. That also was a defect of no little importance. Why? Because in a period when the fight against the right deviation is being intensified, in a period when the slogan of purging the communist parties of opportunist elements is being put into effect, the right deviators usually organize themselves as a faction, set up their own factional discipline and disrupt and destroy the discipline of the Party. To protect the Party from the factional sorities of the right deviators we must insist on iron discipline in the Party and on the unconditional subordination of Party members to this discipline. Without that there can be no question of waging a serious fight against the right deviation. That is why the delegation of the CPSU(B) introduced into Bukharin's theses an appropriate amendment, which was subsequently adopted by the Sixth Congress.

Could we refrain from introducing these amendments into Bukharin's theses? Of course not. In olden times it was said about the philosopher Plato: We love Plato, but we love truth even more. The same must be said about Bukharin: We love Bukharin, but we love truth, the Party and the Comintern even more. That is why the delegation of the CPSU(B) found itself obliged to introduce these amendments into Bukharin's theses.

That, so to speak, was *the first stage of our disagreements* on Comintern questions.

The second stage of our disagreements is connected with what is known as the Wittorf and Thälmann case. Wittorf was formerly secretary of the Hamburg organization, and was accused of embezzling Party funds. For this he was expelled from the Party. The conciliators in the Central Committee of the German Communist Party, taking advantage of the fact that Wittorf had been close to Comrade Thälmann, although Comrade Thälmann was in no way implicated in Wittorf's crime, converted the Wittorf case into a Thälmann case, and set out to overthrow the leadership of the German Communist Party. No doubt you know from the press that at that time the conciliators Ewert and Gerhart succeeded temporarily in winning over a majority of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party against Comrade Thälmann. And what followed? They removed Thälmann from the leadership, began to accuse him of corruption and published a "corresponding" resolution without the knowledge

and sanction of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

Thus, instead of the directive of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern about fighting conciliation being carried out, instead of a fight against the right deviation and against conciliation, there was, in fact, a most gross violation of this directive, there was a fight against the revolutionary leadership of the German Communist Party, a fight against Comrade Thälmann, with the object of *covering up* the right deviation and of *consolidating* the conciliatory tendency in the ranks of the German communists.

And so, instead of swinging the tiller over and correcting the situation, instead of restoring the validity of the violated directive of the Sixth Congress and calling the conciliators to order, Bukharin proposed in his well-known letter *to sanction* the conciliators' coup, to hand over the German Communist Party to the conciliators, and to revile Comrade Thälmann in the press again by issuing another statement declaring him to be guilty. And this is supposed to be a "leader" of the Comintern! Can there really be such "leaders"?

The Central Committee discussed Bukharin's proposal and rejected it. Bukharin, of course, did not like that. But who is to blame? The decisions of the Sixth Congress were adopted not in order that they should be violated but in order that they should be carried out. If the Sixth Congress decided to declare war on the right deviation and conciliation towards it, keeping the leadership in the hands of the main core of the German Communist Party, headed by Comrade Thälmann, and if it occurred to the conciliators Ewert and Gerhart to upset that decision, it was Bukharin's duty to call the conciliators to order and not to leave in their hands the leadership of the German Communist Party. It is Bukharin, who "forgot" the decisions of the Sixth Congress, who is to blame.

The third stage of our disagreements is connected with the question of the fight against the rights in the German Communist Party, with the question of routing the Brandler and Thalheimer faction, and of expelling the leaders of that faction from the German Communist Party. The "position" taken up by Bukharin and his friends on that cardinal question was that they persistently avoided taking part in settling it. At bottom, it was the fate of the German Communist Party that was being decided. Yet Bukharin and his friends, knowing this, nevertheless continually hindered matters by systematically keeping away from the meetings of the bodies which had the question under consideration. For the sake of what? Presumably, for the sake of remaining "clean" in the eyes of both the Comintern and the

rights in the German Communist Party. For the sake of being able subsequently to say: "It was not we, the Bukharinites, who carried out the expulsion of Brandler and Thalheimer from the Communist Party, but they, the majority in the Central Committee." And that is what is called fighting the right danger!

Finally, *the fourth stage of our disagreements*. It is connected with Bukharin's demand prior to the November plenum of the Central Committee¹⁰⁷ that Neumann be recalled from Germany and that Comrade Thälmann, who, it was alleged, had criticized in one of his speeches Bukharin's report at the Sixth Congress, be called to order. We, of course, could not agree with Bukharin, since there was not a single document in our possession supporting his demand. Bukharin promised to submit documents against Neumann and Thälmann but never submitted a single one. Instead of documents, he distributed to the members of the delegation of the CPSU(B) copies of the speech delivered by Humbert-Droz at the Political Secretariat of the ECCI, the very speech which was subsequently qualified by the Presidium of the ECCI as an opportunist speech. By distributing Humbert-Droz's speech to the members of the delegation of the CPSU(B), and by recommending it as material against Thälmann, Bukharin wanted to prove the justice of his demand for the recall of Neumann and for calling Comrade Thälmann to order. In fact, however, he thereby showed that he identified himself with the position taken up by Humbert-Droz, a position which the ECCI regards as opportunist.

Those, comrades, are the main points of our disagreements on Comintern questions.

Bukharin thinks that by conducting a struggle against the right deviation and conciliation towards it in the Sections of the Comintern, by purging the German and Czechoslovak communist parties of social-democratic elements and traditions, and by expelling the Brandlers and the Thalheimers from the communist parties, we are "disintegrating" the Comintern, "ruining" the Comintern. We, on the contrary, think that by carrying out such a policy and by laying stress on the fight against the right deviation and conciliation towards it, we are strengthening the Comintern, purging it of opportunists, bolshevizing its Sections and helping the communist parties to prepare the working class for the future revolutionary battles, for the Party is strengthened by purging itself of dross.

You see that these are not merely shades of difference in the ranks of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B), but quite serious

disagreements on fundamental questions of Comintern policy.

IV

DISAGREEMENTS IN REGARD TO INTERNAL POLICY

I have spoken above on the class changes and the class struggle in our country. I said that Bukharin's group is afflicted with blindness and does not see these changes, does not understand the new tasks of the Party. I said that this has caused bewilderment among the Bukharin opposition, has made it fearful of difficulties and ready to yield to them.

It cannot be said that these mistakes of the Bukharinites are purely accidental. On the contrary, they are connected with the stage of development we have already passed through and which is known as the period of *restoration* of the national economy, a period during which construction proceeded peace fully, automatically, so to speak; during which the class changes now taking place did not yet exist; and during which the intensification of the class struggle that we now observe was not yet in evidence.

But we are now at a new stage of development, distinct from the old period, from the period of restoration. We are now in a new period of construction, the period of the *reconstruction* of the whole national economy on the basis of socialism. This new period is giving rise to new class changes, to an intensification of the class struggle. It demands new methods of struggle, the regrouping of our forces, the improvement and strengthening of all our organizations.

The misfortune of Bukharin's group is that it is living in the past, that it fails to see the specific features of this new period and does not understand the need for new methods of struggle. Hence its blindness, its bewilderment, its panic in the face of difficulties.

a) THE CLASS STRUGGLE

What is the theoretical basis of this blindness and bewilderment of Bukharin's group?

I think that the theoretical basis of this blindness and bewilderment is Bukharin's incorrect, non-Marxist approach to the question of the class struggle in our country. I have in mind Bukharin's non-Marxist theory of the kulaks growing into socialism, his failure to

understand the mechanics of the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The passage from Bukharin's book, *The Path to Socialism*, on the kulaks growing into socialism has been quoted several times here. But it has been quoted here with some omissions. Permit me to quote it in full. This is necessary, comrades, in order to demonstrate the full extent of Bukharin's departure from the Marxist theory of the class struggle.

Listen:

"The main network of our cooperative peasant organizations will consist of cooperative units, not of a kulak, but of a 'toiler' type, units that grow into the system of our general state organs and thus become *links in the single chain of socialist economy*. On the other hand, *the kulak cooperative nests will, similarly, through the banks, etc., grow into the same system; but they will be to a certain extent an alien body, similar, for instance, to the concession enterprises.*"*

In quoting this passage from Bukharin's pamphlet, some comrades, for some reason or other, omitted the last phrase about the concessionaires. Rosit, apparently desiring to help Bukharin, took advantage of this and shouted here from his seat that Bukharin was being misquoted. And yet, the crux of this whole passage lies precisely in the last phrase about the concessionaires. For if concessionaires are put on a par with the kulaks, and the kulaks are growing into socialism — what follows from that? The only thing that follows is that the concessionaires are also growing into socialism; that not only the kulaks, but the concessionaires, too, are growing into socialism. (*General laughter.*)

That is what follows.

Rosit: Bukharin says, "an alien body."

Stalin: Bukharin says not "an alien body," but "to a certain extent an alien body." Consequently, the kulaks and concessionaires are "to a certain extent" an alien body in the system of socialism. But Bukharin's mistake is precisely that, according to him, kulaks and concessionaires, while being "to a certain extent" an alien body, nevertheless grow into socialism.

Such is the nonsense to which Bukharin's theory leads.

Capitalists in town and country, kulaks and concessionaires, growing into socialism — such is the absurdity Bukharin has arrived at.

No, comrades, that is not the kind of "socialism" we want. Let

* My italics. — *J. St.*

Bukharin keep it for himself.

Until now, we Marxist-Leninists were of the opinion that between the capitalists of town and country, on the one hand, and the working class, on the other hand, there is an *irreconcilable* antagonism of interests. That is what the Marxist theory of the class struggle rests on. But now, according to Bukharin's theory of the capitalists' *peaceful growth* into socialism, all this is turned upside down, the irreconcilable antagonism of class interests between the exploiters and the exploited disappears, the exploiters grow into socialism.

Rosit: That is not true, the dictatorship of the proletariat is presumed.

Stalin: But the dictatorship of the proletariat is the sharpest form of the class struggle.

Rosit: Yes, that is the whole point.

Stalin: But, according to Bukharin, the capitalists grow into this very dictatorship of the proletariat. How is it that you cannot understand this, *Rosit*? Against whom must we fight, against whom must we wage the sharpest form of the class struggle, if the capitalists of town and country grow into the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat?

The dictatorship of the proletariat is needed for the purpose of waging a relentless struggle against the capitalist elements, for the purpose of suppressing the bourgeoisie and of uprooting capitalism. But if the capitalists of town and country, if the kulak and the concessionaire are growing into socialism, is the dictatorship of the proletariat needed at all? If it is, then for the suppression of what class is it needed?

Rosit: The whole point is that, according to Bukharin, the growing into presumes the class struggle.

Stalin: I see that *Rosit* has sworn to be of service to Bukharin. But his service is really like that of the bear in the fable; for in his eagerness to save Bukharin he is actually hugging him to death. It is not without reason that it is said, "An obliging fool is more dangerous than an enemy." (*General laughter.*)

One thing or the other: either there is an irreconcilable antagonism of interests between the capitalist class and the class of the workers who have come to power and have organized their dictatorship, or there is no such antagonism of interests, in which case only one thing remains — namely, to proclaim the harmony of class interests.

One thing or the other:

either Marx's theory of the class struggle, *or* the theory of the capitalists growing into socialism;

either an irreconcilable antagonism of class interests, *or* the theory of harmony of class interests.

We can understand "socialists" of the type of Brentano or Sydney Webb preaching about socialism growing into capitalism and capitalism into socialism, for these "socialists" are really anti-socialists, bourgeois liberals. But one cannot understand a man who wishes to be a Marxist, and who at the same time preaches the theory of the capitalist class growing into socialism.

In his speech Bukharin tried to reinforce the theory of the kulaks growing into socialism by referring to a well-known passage from Lenin. He asserted that Lenin says the *same thing* as Bukharin.

That is not true, comrades. It is a gross and unpardonable slander against Lenin.

Here is the text of this passage from Lenin:

"Of course, in our Soviet Republic the social order is based on the collaboration of two classes: the workers and peasants, in which the 'Nepmen,' i.e., the bourgeoisie, are now permitted to participate on certain conditions" (Vol. XXVII, p. 405).

You see that there is not a word here about the capitalist class growing into socialism. All that is said is that we have "permitted" the Nepmen, i.e., the bourgeoisie, "on certain conditions" to participate in the collaboration between the workers and the peasants.

What does that mean? Does it mean that we have thereby admitted the possibility of the Nepmen growing into socialism? Of course not. Only people who have lost all sense of shame can interpret the quotation from Lenin in that way. All that it means is that *at present* we do not destroy the bourgeoisie, that *at present* we do not confiscate their property, but permit them to exist on certain conditions, i.e., provided they unconditionally submit to the laws of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which lead to increasingly restricting the capitalists and gradually ousting them from national-economic life.

Can the capitalists be ousted and the roots of capitalism destroyed without a fierce class struggle? No, they cannot.

Can classes be abolished if the theory and practice of the capitalists growing into socialism prevails? No, they cannot. Such theory and practice can only cultivate and perpetuate classes, for this theory contradicts the Marxist theory of the class struggle.

But the passage from Lenin is wholly and entirely based on the

Marxist theory of the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

What can there be in common between Bukharin's theory of the kulaks growing into socialism and Lenin's theory of the dictatorship as a fierce class struggle? Obviously, there is not, and cannot be, anything in common between them.

Bukharin thinks that under the dictatorship of the proletariat the class struggle must *die down* and *come to an end* so that the abolition of classes may be brought about. Lenin, on the contrary, teaches us that classes can be abolished only by means of a stubborn class struggle, which under the dictatorship of the proletariat becomes *even fiercer* than it was before the dictatorship of the proletariat.

"The abolition of classes," says Lenin, "requires a long, difficult and stubborn *class struggle*, which, *after* the overthrow of the power of capital, *after* the destruction of the bourgeois state, *after* the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, *does not disappear* (as the vulgar representatives of the old socialism and the old social-democracy imagine), but merely changes its forms and in many respects becomes even fiercer" (Vol. XXIV, p. 315).

That is what Lenin says about the abolition of classes.

The abolition of classes *by means of the fierce class struggle of the proletariat* — such is Lenin's formula.

The abolition of classes *by means of the extinction of the class struggle and by the capitalists growing into socialism* — such is Bukharin's formula.

What can there be in common between these two formulas?

Bukharin's theory of the kulaks growing into socialism is therefore a departure from the Marxist-Leninist theory of the class struggle. It comes close to the theory propounded by Katheder-Socialism.¹⁰⁸

That is the basis of all the errors committed by Bukharin and his friends.

It may be said that it is not worthwhile dwelling at length on Bukharin's theory of the kulaks growing into socialism, since it itself speaks, and not only speaks, but cries out, against Bukharin. That is wrong, comrades! As long as that theory was kept hidden it was possible not to pay attention to it — there are plenty of such stupid things in what various comrades write! Such has been our attitude until quite lately. But recently the situation has changed. The petty-bourgeois elemental forces, which have been breaking out in recent years, have begun to encourage this anti-Marxist theory and made it

topical. Now it cannot be said that it is being kept hidden. Now this strange theory of Bukharin's is aspiring to become the banner of the right deviation in our Party, the banner of opportunism. That is why we cannot now ignore this theory. That is why we must demolish it as a wrong and harmful theory, so as to help our Party comrades to fight the right deviation.

b) THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE

Bukharin's second mistake, which follows from his first one, consists in a wrong, non-Marxist approach to the question of the intensification of the class struggle, of the increasing resistance of the capitalist elements to the socialist policy of the Soviet government.

What is the point at issue here? Is it that the capitalist elements are growing faster than the socialist sector of our economy, and that, because of this, they are increasing their resistance, undermining socialist construction? No, that is not the point. Moreover, it is not true that the capitalist elements are growing faster than the socialist sector. If that were true, socialist construction would already be on the verge of collapse.

The point is that socialism is successfully attacking the capitalist elements, socialism is growing *faster* than the capitalist elements; as a result the relative importance of the capitalist elements is *declining*, and for the very reason that the relative importance of the capitalist elements is *declining* the capitalist elements realize that they are in mortal danger and are increasing their resistance.

And they are still able to increase their resistance not only because world capitalism is supporting them, but also because, in spite of the decline in their relative importance, in spite of the decline in their relative growth as compared with the growth of socialism, there is still taking place an absolute growth of the capitalist elements, and this, to a certain extent, enables them to accumulate forces to resist the growth of socialism.

It is on this basis that, *at the present stage of development and under the present conditions* of the relation of forces, the intensification of the class struggle and the increase in the resistance of the capitalist elements of town and country are taking place.

The mistake of Bukharin and his friends lies in failing to understand this simple and obvious truth. Their mistake lies in approaching the matter not in a Marxist, but in a philistine way, and trying to explain the intensification of the class struggle by all kinds of accidental causes: the "incompetence" of the Soviet apparatus, the "im-

prudent” policy of local comrades, the “absence” of flexibility, “excesses,” etc., etc.

Here, for instance, is a quotation from Bukharin’s pamphlet, *The Path to Socialism*, which demonstrates an absolutely non-Marxist approach to the question of the intensification of the class struggle:

“Here and there the class struggle in the countryside breaks out in its former manifestations, and, as a rule, this intensification is provoked by the kulak elements. When, for instance, kulaks, or people who are growing rich at the expense of others and have wormed their way into the organs of Soviet power, begin to shoot village correspondents, that is a manifestation of the class struggle in its most acute form. (This is not true, for the most acute form of the struggle is rebellion. — *J. Stalin*) However, such incidents, as a rule, occur in those places where the local Soviet apparatus is weak. *As this apparatus improves*, as all the lower units of Soviet power become stronger, as the local, village, Party and Young Communist League organizations improve and become stronger, *such phenomena*, it is perfectly obvious, will become more and more rare and will finally *disappear without a trace.*”*

It follows, therefore, that the intensification of the class struggle is to be explained by causes connected with the character of the apparatus, the competence or incompetence, the strength or weakness of our lower organizations.

It follows, for instance, that the wrecking activities of the bourgeois intellectuals in Shakhty, which are a form of resistance of the bourgeois elements to the Soviet government and a form of intensification of the class struggle, are to be explained, not by the relation of class forces, not by the growth of socialism, but by the incompetence of our apparatus.

It follows that before the wholesale wrecking occurred in the Shakhty area, our apparatus was a good one, but that later, the moment wholesale wrecking occurred, the apparatus, for some unspecified reason, suddenly became utterly incompetent.

It follows that until last year, when grain procurements proceeded automatically and there was no particular intensification of the class struggle, our local organizations were good, even ideal; but that from last year, when the resistance of the kulaks assumed particularly acute forms, our organizations have suddenly become bad and utterly incompetent.

That is not an explanation, but a mockery of an explanation. That is not science, but quackery.

* My italics. — *J. St.*

What then is the actual reason for this intensification of the class struggle?

There are two reasons.

Firstly, our advance, our offensive, the growth of socialist forms of economy both in industry and in agriculture, a growth which is accompanied by a corresponding ousting of certain sections of capitalists in town and country. The fact is that we are living according to Lenin's formula: "Who will beat whom?" Will we overpower them, the capitalists — engage them, as Lenin put it, in the last and decisive fight — or will they overpower us?

Secondly, the fact that the capitalist elements have no desire to depart from the scene voluntarily; they are resisting, and will continue to resist socialism, for they realize that their last days are approaching. And they are still able to resist because, in spite of the decline of their relative importance, they are nevertheless growing in absolute numbers; the petty bourgeoisie in town and country, as Lenin said, daily and hourly produces from its midst capitalists, big and small, and these capitalist elements go to all lengths to preserve their existence.

There have been no cases in history where dying classes have voluntarily departed from the scene. There have been no cases in history where the dying bourgeoisie has not exerted all its remaining strength to preserve its existence. Whether our lower Soviet apparatus is good or bad, our advance, our offensive will diminish the capitalist elements and oust them, and they, the dying classes, will carry on their resistance at all costs.

That is the basis for the intensification of the class struggle in our country.

The mistake of Bukharin and his friends is that they identify the growing resistance of the capitalists with the growth of the latter's relative importance. But there are absolutely no grounds for this identification. There are no grounds because the fact that the capitalists are resisting by no means implies that they have become stronger than we are. The very opposite is the case. The dying classes are resisting, not because they have become stronger than we are, but because socialism is growing faster than they are, and they are becoming weaker than we are. And precisely because they are becoming weaker, they feel that their last days are approaching and are compelled to resist with all the forces and all the means in their power.

Such is the mechanics of the intensification of the class struggle

and of the resistance of the capitalists at the present moment of history.

What should be the policy of the Party in view of this state of affairs?

The policy should be to arouse the working class and the exploited masses of the countryside, to increase their fighting capacity and develop their mobilized preparedness for the fight against the capitalist elements in town and country, for the fight against the resisting class enemies.

The Marxist-Leninist theory of the class struggle is valuable, among other reasons, because it facilitates the mobilization of the working class against the enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Wherein lies the harm of the Bukharin theory of the capitalists growing into socialism and of the Bukharin conception of the intensification of the class struggle?

It lies in the fact that it lulls the working class to sleep, undermines the mobilized preparedness of the revolutionary forces of our country, demobilizes the working class and facilitates the attack of the capitalist elements against the Soviet regime.

c) THE PEASANTRY

Bukharin's third mistake is on the question of the peasantry. As you know, this question is one of the most important questions of our policy. In the conditions prevailing in our country, the peasantry consists of various social groups, namely, the poor peasants, the middle peasants and the kulaks. It is obvious that our attitude to these various groups cannot be the same. The poor peasant as the *support* of the working class, the middle peasant as the *ally*, the kulak as the *class enemy* — such is our attitude to these social groups. All this is clear and generally known.

Bukharin, however, regards the matter somewhat differently. In his description of the peasantry this differentiation is omitted, the existence of social groups disappears, and there remains but a single drab patch, called the countryside. According to him, the kulak is not a kulak, and the middle peasant is not a middle peasant, but there is a sort of uniform poverty in the countryside. That is what he said in his speech here: Can our kulak really be called a kulak? he said. Why, he is a pauper! And our middle peasant, is he really like a middle peasant? Why, he is a pauper, living on the verge of starvation. Obviously, such a view of the peasantry is a radically wrong

view, incompatible with Leninism.

Lenin said that the individual peasantry is *the last capitalist class*. Is that thesis correct? Yes, it is absolutely correct. Why is the individual peasantry defined as the last capitalist class? Because, of the two main classes of which our society is composed, the peasantry is the class whose economy is based on private property and small commodity production. Because the peasantry, as long as it remains an individual peasantry carrying on small commodity production, produces capitalists from its midst, and cannot help producing them, constantly and continuously.

This fact is of decisive importance for us in the question of our Marxist attitude to the problem of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry. This means that we need, not *just any kind* of alliance with the peasantry, but only *such an alliance* as is based on the struggle against the capitalist elements of the peasantry.

As you see, Lenin's thesis about the peasantry being the last capitalist class not only does not contradict the idea of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry, but, on the contrary, supplies the basis for this alliance as an alliance between the working class and the majority of the peasantry directed against the capitalist elements in general and against the capitalist elements of the peasantry in the countryside in particular.

Lenin advanced this thesis in order to show that the alliance between the working class and the peasantry can be stable only if it is based on the struggle against those capitalist elements which the peasantry produces from its midst.

Bukharin's mistake is that he does not understand and does not accept this simple thing, he forgets about the social groups in the countryside, he loses sight of the kulaks and the poor peasants, and all that remains is one uniform mass of middle peasants.

This is undoubtedly a deviation to the right on the part of Bukharin, in contradistinction to the "left," Trotskyite, deviation, which sees no other social groups in the countryside than the poor peasants and the kulaks, and which loses sight of the middle peasants.

Wherein lies the difference between Trotskyism and Bukharin's group on the question of the alliance with the peasantry? It lies in the fact that Trotskyism is *opposed* to the policy of a *stable* alliance with the middle-peasant masses, while Bukharin's group is in favour of *any kind* of alliance with the peasantry in general. There is no need to prove that both these positions are wrong and that they are equal-

ly worthless.

Leninism unquestionably stands for a stable alliance with the main mass of the peasantry, for an alliance with the middle peasants; but not just any kind of alliance, however, but such an alliance with the middle peasants as ensures the *leading role* of the working class, *consolidates* the dictatorship of the proletariat and *facilitates the abolition of classes*.

“Agreement between the working class and the peasantry,” says Lenin, “may be taken to mean anything. If we do not bear in mind that, from the point of view of the working class, agreement is permissible, correct and possible in principle only if it supports the dictatorship of the working class and is one of the measures aimed at the abolition of classes, then the formula of agreement between the working class and the peasantry remains, of course, a formula to which all the enemies of the Soviet regime and all the enemies of the dictatorship subscribe” (Vol. XXVI, p. 387).

And further:

“At present,” says Lenin, “the proletariat holds power and guides the state. It guides the peasantry. What does guiding the peasantry mean? It means, in the first place, pursuing a course towards the abolition of classes, and not towards the small producer. If we wandered away from this radical and main course we should cease to be socialists and should find ourselves in the camp of the petty bourgeoisie, in the camp of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who are now the most bitter enemies of the proletariat” (*Ibid.*, pp. 399-400).

There you have Lenin’s point of view on the question of the alliance with the main mass of the peasantry, of the alliance with the middle peasants.

The mistake of Bukharin’s group on the question of the middle peasant is that it does not see the dual nature, the dual position of the middle peasant between the working class and the capitalists. “The middle peasantry is a vacillating class,” said Lenin. Why? Because, on the one hand, the middle peasant is a toiler, which brings him close to the working class, but, on the other hand, he is a property owner, which brings him close to the kulak. Hence the vacillations of the middle peasant. And this is true not only theoretically. These vacillations manifest themselves also in practice, daily and hourly.

“As a toiler,” says Lenin, “the peasant gravitates towards socialism, preferring the dictatorship of the workers to the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. As a seller of grain, the peasant gravitates towards the bourgeoisie, towards freedom of trade, i.e., back to the ‘habitual,’ old, ‘time-hallowed’ capital-

ism" (Vol. XXIV, p. 314).

That is why the alliance with the middle peasant can be stable only if it is directed against the capitalist elements, against capitalism in general, if it guarantees the leading role of the working class in this alliance, if it facilitates the abolition of classes.

Bukharin's group forgets these simple and obvious things.

d) NEP AND MARKET RELATIONS

Bukharin's fourth mistake is on the question of NEP (the New Economic Policy). Bukharin's mistake is that he fails to see the two-fold character of NEP, he sees only one aspect of NEP. When we introduced NEP in 1921, we directed its spearhead against War Communism, against a regime and system which excluded *any and every form* of freedom for private trade. We considered, and still consider, that NEP implies a *certain* freedom for private trade. Bukharin remembers this aspect of the matter. That is very good.

But Bukharin is mistaken in supposing that this is the only aspect of NEP. Bukharin forgets that NEP has also another aspect. The point is that NEP by no means implies *complete* freedom for private trade, the *free* play of prices in the market. NEP is freedom for private trade within *certain* limits, within *certain* boundaries, *with the proviso that the role of the state as the regulator of the market is guaranteed*. That, precisely, is the second aspect of NEP. Moreover, this aspect of NEP is more important for us than the first. In our country there is no free play of prices in the market, such as is usually the case in capitalist countries. We, in the main, determine the price of grain. We determine the price of manufactured goods. We try to carry out a policy of reducing production costs and reducing prices of manufactured goods, while striving to stabilize the prices of agricultural produce. Is it not obvious that such special and specific market conditions do not exist in capitalist countries?

From this it follows that as long as NEP exists, both its aspects must be retained: the first aspect, which is directed against the regime of War Communism and aims at ensuring a *certain* freedom for private trade, and the second aspect, which is directed against *complete* freedom for private trade, and aims at ensuring the role of the state as the regulator of the market. Destroy one of these aspects, and the New Economic Policy disappears.

Bukharin thinks that danger can threaten NEP only "from the left," from people who want to abolish *all* freedom of trade. That is

not true. It is a gross error. Moreover, such a danger is the least real at the present moment, since there is nobody, or hardly anybody, in our local and central organizations now who does not understand the necessity and expediency of preserving a *certain measure* of freedom of trade.

The danger from the right, from those who want to abolish the role of the state as regulator of the market, who want to “emancipate” the market and thereby open up an era of complete freedom for private trade, is much more real. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the danger of disrupting NEP from the right is much more real at the present time.

It should not be forgotten that the petty-bourgeois elemental forces are working precisely in this direction, in the direction of disrupting NEP from the right. It should also be borne in mind that the outcries of the kulaks and the well-to-do elements, the outcries of the speculators and profiteers, to which many of our comrades often yield, bombard NEP from precisely this quarter. The fact that Bukharin does not see this second, and very real, danger of NEP being disrupted undoubtedly shows that he has yielded to the pressure of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces.

Bukharin proposes to “normalize” the market and to “manoeuvre” with grain-procurement prices according to areas, i.e., to raise the price of grain. What does this mean? It means that he is not satisfied with Soviet market conditions, he wants to put a brake on the role of the state as the regulator of the market and proposes that concessions be made to the petty-bourgeois elemental forces, which are disrupting NEP from the right.

Let us assume for a moment that we followed Bukharin’s advice. What would be the result? We raise the price of grain in the autumn, let us say, at the beginning of the grain-purchasing period. But since there are always people on the market, all sorts of speculators and profiteers, who can pay three times as much for grain, and since we cannot keep up with the speculators, for they buy some ten million poods in all while we have to buy hundreds of millions of poods, those who hold grain will all the same continue to hold it in expectation of a further rise in price. Consequently, towards the spring, when the state’s real need for grain mainly begins, we should again have to raise the price of grain. But what would raising the price of grain in the spring mean? It would mean ruining the poor and economically weaker strata of the rural population, who are themselves obliged to buy grain in the spring, partly for seed and partly for food

— the very grain which they sold in the autumn at a lower price. Can we by such operations obtain any really useful results in the way of securing a sufficient quantity of grain? Most probably not, for there will always be speculators and profiteers able to pay twice and three times as much for the same grain. Consequently, we would have to be prepared to raise the price of grain once again in a vain effort to catch up with the speculators and profiteers.

From this, however, it follows that once having started on the path of raising grain prices we should have to continue down the slippery slope without any guarantee of securing a sufficient quantity of grain.

But the matter does not end there.

Firstly, having raised grain-*procurement* prices, we should next have to raise the prices of agricultural raw materials as well, in order to maintain a certain proportion in the prices of agricultural produce.

Secondly, having raised grain-*procurement* prices, we should not be able to maintain low retail prices of bread in the towns — consequently, we should have to raise the *selling* price of bread. And since we cannot and must not injure the workers, we should have to increase wages at an accelerated pace. But this is bound to lead to a rise in the prices of manufactured goods, for, otherwise, there could be a diversion of resources from the towns into the countryside to the detriment of industrialization.

As a result, we should have to adjust the prices of manufactured goods and of agricultural produce not on the basis of *falling* or, at any rate, stabilized prices, but on the basis of *rising* prices, both of grain and of manufactured goods.

In other words, we should have to pursue a policy of *raising the prices* of manufactured goods and agricultural produce.

It is not difficult to understand that such “manoeuvring” with prices can only lead to the complete nullification of the Soviet price policy, to the nullification of the role of the state as the regulator of the market, and to giving a free rein to the petty-bourgeois elemental forces.

Who would profit by this?

Only the well-to-do strata of the urban and rural population, for expensive manufactured goods and agricultural produce would necessarily become out of the reach both of the working class and of the poor and economically weaker strata of the rural population. It would profit the kulaks and the well-to-do, the Nepmen and other

prosperous classes.

That, too, would be a bond, but a peculiar one, a bond with the wealthy strata of the rural and urban population. The workers and the economically weaker strata of the rural population would have every right to ask us: Whose government are you, a workers' and peasants' government or a kulak and Nepmen's government?

A rupture with the working class and the economically weaker strata of the rural population, and a bond with the wealthy strata of the urban and rural population — that is what Bukharin's "normalization" of the market and "manoeuvring" with grain prices according to areas must lead to.

Obviously, the Party cannot take this fatal path.

The extent to which all conceptions of NEP in Bukharin's mind have become muddled and the extent to which he is firmly held captive by the petty-bourgeois elemental forces is shown, among other things, by the more than negative attitude he displays to the question of the new forms of trade turnover between town and country, between the state and the peasantry. He is indignant and cries out against the fact that the state has become the supplier of goods for the peasantry and that the peasantry is becoming the supplier of grain for the state. He regards this as a violation of all the rules of NEP, as almost the disruption of NEP. Why? On what grounds?

What can there be objectionable in the fact that the state, state industry, is the supplier, without middlemen, of goods for the peasantry, and that the peasantry is the supplier of grain for industry, for the state, also without middlemen?

What can there be objectionable, from the point of view of Marxism and a Marxist policy, in the fact that the peasantry *has already become* the supplier of cotton, beet and flax for the needs of state industry, and that state industry has become the supplier of urban goods, seed and instruments of production for these branches of agriculture?

The contract system is here the principal method of establishing these new forms of trade turnover between town and country. But is the contract system contrary to the principles of NEP?

What can there be objectionable in the fact that, thanks to this contract system, the peasantry *is becoming* the state's supplier not only of cotton, beet and flax, but also of grain?

If trade in small consignments, petty trade, can be termed trade turnover, why cannot trade in large consignments, conducted by means of agreements concluded in advance (contracts) as to price

and quality of goods be regarded as trade turnover?

Is it difficult to understand that it is on the basis of NEP that these new, mass forms of trade turnover between town and country based on the contract system have arisen, that they mark a very big step forward on the part of our organizations as regards strengthening the planned, socialist direction of our national economy?

Bukharin has lost the capacity to understand these simple and obvious things.

e) THE SO-CALLED "TRIBUTE"

Bukharin's fifth mistake (I am speaking of his principal mistakes) is his opportunist distortion of the Party line on the question of the "scissors" between town and country, on the question of the so-called "tribute."

What is the point dealt with in the well-known resolution of the joint meeting of the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission (February 1929) on the question of the "scissors"? What is said there is that, in addition to the usual taxes, direct and indirect, which the peasantry pays to the state, the peasantry also pays a certain supertax in the form of an over-payment for manufactured goods, and in the form of an under-payment received for agricultural produce.

Is it true that this supertax paid by the peasantry actually exists? Yes, it is. What other name have we for this supertax? We also call it the "scissors," the "diversion" of resources from agriculture into industry for the purpose of speeding up our industrial development.

Is this "diversion" necessary? We all agree that, as a temporary measure, it is necessary if we really wish to maintain a speedy rate of industrial development. Indeed, we must at all costs maintain a rapid growth of our industry, for this growth is necessary not only for industry itself, but primarily for agriculture, for the peasantry, which at the present time needs most of all tractors, agricultural machinery and fertilizers.

Can we abolish this supertax at the present time? Unfortunately, we cannot. We must abolish it at the first opportunity, in the next few years. But we cannot abolish it at the present moment.

Now, as you see, this supertax obtained as a result of the "scissors" does constitute "something in the nature of a tribute." Not a tribute, but "something in the nature of a tribute." It is "something in the nature of a tribute" on account of our backwardness. We need this supertax to stimulate the development of our industry and to do

away with our backwardness.

But does this mean that by levying this additional tax we are thereby exploiting the peasantry? No, it does not. The very nature of the Soviet regime precludes any sort of exploitation of the peasantry by the state. It was plainly stated in the speeches of our comrades at the July plenum¹⁰⁹ that under the Soviet regime exploitation of the peasantry by the socialist state is *ruled out*; for a constant rise in the well-being of the labouring peasantry is a law of development of Soviet society, and this rules out any possibility of exploiting the peasantry.

Is the peasantry capable of paying this additional tax? Yes, it is. Why?

Firstly, because the levying of this additional tax is effected under conditions of a constant improvement of the material position of the peasantry.

Secondly, because the peasants have their own private husbandry, the income from which enables them to meet the additional tax, and in this they differ from the industrial workers, who have no private husbandry, but who nonetheless devote all their energies to the cause of industrialization.

Thirdly, because the amount of this additional tax is being reduced year by year.

Are we right in calling this additional tax “something in the nature of a tribute”? Unquestionably, we are. By our choice of words we are pointing out to our comrades that this additional tax is detestable and undesirable, and that its continuance for any considerable period is impermissible. By giving this name to the additional tax on the peasantry we intend to convey that we are levying it not because we want to, but because we are forced to, and that we, Bolsheviks, must take all measures to abolish this additional tax at the first opportunity, as soon as possible.

Such is the essence of the question of the “scissors,” the “diversion,” the “supertax,” of what the abovementioned documents designate as “something in the nature of a tribute.”

At first, Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy tried to wrangle over the word “tribute,” and accused the Party of pursuing a policy of military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry. But now even the blind can see that this was just an unscrupulous attempt of the Bukharinites at gross slander against our Party. Now, even they themselves are compelled tacitly to acknowledge that their chatter about military-feudal exploitation was a resounding failure.

One thing or the other:

either the Bukharinites recognize the inevitability, at the present time, of the “scissors” and “diversion” of resources from agriculture into industry — in which case they are forced to admit that their accusations are of a slanderous nature, and that the Party is entirely right;

or they deny the inevitability, at the present time, of the “scissors” and “diversion,” but in that case let them say it frankly, so that the Party may class them as opponents of the industrialization of our country.

I could, incidentally, refer to a number of speeches of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, in which they recognize without any reservations the inevitability, at the present time, of the “scissors” and “diversion” of resources from agriculture into industry. And this, indeed, is equivalent to an acceptance of the formula “something in the nature of a tribute.”

Well then, do they continue to uphold the point of view with regard to the “diversion,” and the preservation of the “scissors” at the present time, or not? Let them say it frankly.

Bukharin: The diversion is necessary, but “tribute” is an unfortunate word. (*General laughter.*)

Stalin: Consequently, *we do not differ on the essence of the question;* consequently, the “diversion” of resources from agriculture into industry, the so-called “scissors,” the additional tax, “something in the nature of a tribute” — is a necessary though temporary means for industrializing our country at the present time.

Very well. Then what is the point at issue? Why all the tumult? They do not like the *word* “tribute” or the words “something in the nature of a tribute,” because they believe that this expression is not commonly used in Marxist literature?

Well then, let us discuss the *word* “tribute.”

I assert, comrades, that this word has long been in use in our Marxist literature, in Comrade Lenin’s writings, for example. This may surprise some people who do not read Lenin’s works, but it is a fact, comrades. Bukharin vehemently asserted here that “tribute” is an unfitting word to use in Marxist literature. He was indignant and surprised at the fact that the Central Committee of the Party, and Marxists in general, take the liberty of using the word “tribute.” But what is surprising in this, if there is proof that this word has long been in use in the writings of such a Marxist as Comrade Lenin. Or perhaps, from Bukharin’s viewpoint, Lenin does not qualify as a

Marxist? Well, you should be straightforward about it, dear comrades.

Take for example the article “‘Left-Wing’ Childishness and Petty-Bourgeois Mentality” (May 1918), which was written by no less a Marxist than Lenin, and read the following passage:

“The petty bourgeois who hoards his thousands is an enemy of state capitalism; he wants to employ these thousands just for himself, against the poor, in opposition to any kind of state control; yet the sum total of these thousands amounts to many thousands of millions that supply a base for speculation, which undermines our socialist construction. Let us assume that a certain number of workers produce in a few days values equal to 1,000. Let us then assume that 200 out of this total vanishes owing to petty speculation, all kinds of pilfering and of “dodging” Soviet decrees and regulations by small property owners. Every class-conscious worker would say: If I could give up 300 out of the 1,000 for the sake of achieving better order and organization, I would willingly give up 300 instead of 200, because to reduce this “tribute” later on, to, say, 100 or 50, will be quite an easy matter under the Soviet regime, once we have achieved order and organization and once we have completely overcome the disruption of all state monopoly by small property owners” (Vol. XXII, p. 515).

That is clear, I think. Should Lenin on this account be declared an advocate of the policy of military-feudal exploitation of the working class? Just try, dear comrades!

A voice: Nevertheless the term “tribute” has never been used in relation to the middle peasant.

Stalin: Do you believe by any chance that the middle peasant is closer to the Party than the working class? You are some Marxist! (*General laughter.*) If we, the Party of the working class, can speak of “tribute” when it concerns the working class, why cannot we do so when it concerns the middle peasantry, which is only our ally?

Some of the fault-finding people may imagine that the word “tribute” in Lenin’s article “‘Left-Wing’ Childishness” is just a slip of the pen, an accidental slip. A check-up on this point, however, will show that the suspicions of those fault-finding people are entirely groundless. Take another article, or rather a pamphlet, written by Lenin: *The Tax in Kind* (April 1921) and read page 324 (Vol. XXVI, p. 324). You will see that the above-quoted passage regarding “tribute” is repeated by Lenin word for word. Finally, take Lenin’s article “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Power” (Vol. XXII, p. 448, March-April 1918), and you will see that in it, too, Lenin speaks of the “tribute (without quotation marks) which we are paying for our

backwardness in the matter of organizing accounting and control from below on a nationwide scale.”

It turns out that the *word* “tribute” is very far from being a fortuitous element in Lenin’s writings. Comrade Lenin uses this *word* to stress the temporary nature of the “tribute,” to stimulate the energy of the Bolsheviks and to direct it so as at the first opportunity, to abolish this “tribute,” the price the working class has to pay for our backwardness and our “muddling.”

It turns out that when I use the expression “something in the nature of a tribute” I find myself in quite good Marxist company, that of Comrade Lenin.

Bukharin said here that Marxists should not tolerate the word “tribute” in their writings. What kind of Marxists was he speaking about? If he had in mind such Marxists, if they may be so called, as Slepkov, Maretsky, Petrovsky, Rosit, etc., who are more like liberals than Marxists, then his indignation is perfectly justified. If, on the other hand, he has in mind real Marxists, Comrade Lenin, for example, then it must be admitted that among them the word “tribute” has been in use for a long time, while Bukharin, who is not well acquainted with Lenin’s writings, is wide of the mark.

But this does not fully dispose of the question of the “tribute.” The point is that it was no accident that Bukharin and his friends took exception to the word “tribute” and began to speak of a policy of military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry. Their outcry about military-feudal exploitation was undoubtedly meant to express their extreme dissatisfaction with the Party policy towards the kulaks that is being applied by our organizations. Dissatisfaction with the Leninist policy of the Party in its leadership of the peasantry, dissatisfaction with our grain-procurement policy, with our policy of developing collective farms and state farms to the utmost, and lastly, the desire to “emancipate” the market and to establish complete freedom for private trade — that is what was expressed in Bukharin’s howling about a policy of military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry.

In the history of our Party I cannot recall any other instance of the Party being accused of pursuing a policy of military-feudal exploitation. That weapon against the Party was not borrowed from the arsenal of Marxists. Where, then, was it borrowed from? From the arsenal of Milyukov, the leader of the Cadets. When the Cadets wish to sow dissension between the working class and the peasantry, they usually say: You, Messieurs the Bolsheviks, are building socialism on the corpses of the peasants. When Bukharin raises an outcry

about the "tribute," he is singing to the tune of Messieurs the Milyukovs, and is following in the wake of the enemies of the people.

f) THE RATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY AND THE NEW FORMS OF THE BOND

Finally, the question of the rate of development of industry and of the new forms of the bond between town and country. This is one of the most important questions of our disagreements. Its importance lies in the fact that it is the converging point of all the threads of our *practical* disagreements about the economic policy of the Party.

What are the new forms of the bond, what do they signify from the point of view of our economic policy?

They signify, first of all, that besides the old forms of the bond between town and country, whereby industry chiefly satisfied the *personal* requirements of the peasant (cotton fabrics, footwear, and textiles in general, etc.), we now need new forms of the bond, whereby industry will satisfy the *productive* requirements of peasant economy (agricultural machinery, tractors, improved seed, fertilizers, etc.).

Whereas formerly we satisfied *mainly* the personal requirements of the peasant, hardly touching the productive requirements of his economy, now, while continuing to satisfy the personal requirements of the peasant, we must do our utmost to supply agricultural machinery, tractors, fertilizers, etc., which have a direct bearing on the reconstruction of agricultural production on a new technical basis.

As long as it was a question of *restoring* agriculture and of the peasants putting into use the land formerly belonging to the landlords and kulaks, we could be content with the old forms of the bond. But now, when it is a question of *reconstructing* agriculture, that is not enough. Now we must go further and help the peasantry to reorganize agricultural production on the basis of new technique and collective labour.

Secondly, they signify that simultaneously with the re-equipment of our industry, we must begin seriously re-equipping agriculture too. We are re-equipping, and have already partly re-equipped our industry, placing it on a new technical basis, supplying it with new, improved machinery and new, improved cadres. We are building new mills and factories and are reconstructing and extending the old ones; we are developing the metallurgical, chemical and machine-

building industries. On this basis new towns are springing up, new industrial centres are multiplying and the old ones are expanding. On this basis the demand for food products and for raw materials for industry is growing. But agriculture continues to employ the old equipment, the old methods of tillage practised by our forefathers, the old, primitive, now useless, or nearly useless technique, the old, small-peasant, individual forms of farming and labour.

Consider, for example, the fact that before the revolution we had nearly 16,000,000 peasant households, while now there are no less than 25,000,000. What does this indicate if not that agriculture is becoming more and more scattered and disunited. And the characteristic feature of scattered small farms is that they are unable properly to employ technique, machines, tractors and scientific agronomic knowledge, that they are farms with a small marketable surplus.

Hence the insufficient output of agricultural produce for the market.

Hence the danger of a rift between town and country, between industry and agriculture.

Hence the necessity for increasing the rate of development of agriculture, bringing it up to that of our industry.

And so, in order to eliminate this danger of a rift, we must begin seriously re-equipping agriculture on the basis of new technique. But in order to re-equip it we must gradually unite the scattered individual peasant farms into large farms, into collective farms; we must build up agriculture on the basis of collective labour, we must enlarge the collectives, we must develop the old and new state farms, we must systematically employ the contract system on a mass scale in all the principal branches of agriculture, we must develop the system of machine and tractor stations which help the peasantry to master the new technique and to collectivize labour — in a word, we must gradually transfer the small individual peasant farms to the basis of large-scale collective production, for only large-scale production of a socially-conducted type is capable of making full use of scientific knowledge and modern technique, and of advancing the development of our agriculture with giant strides.

This, of course, does not mean that we must neglect poor and middle individual peasant farming. Not at all. Poor and middle individual peasant farming plays a predominant part in supplying industry with food and raw materials, and will continue to do so in the immediate future. For that very reason we must continue to assist

poor and middle individual peasant farms which have not yet united into collective farms.

But this does mean that individual peasant farming alone is *no longer* adequate. That is shown by our grain-procurement difficulties. That is why the development of poor and middle individual peasant farming must be *supplemented* by the widest possible development of collective forms of farming and of state farms.

That is why we must make a bridge between individual poor- and middle-peasant farming and collective, socially-conducted forms of farming by means of the contract system on a mass scale, by means of machine and tractor stations and by the fullest development of a cooperative communal life in order to help the peasants to transfer their small, individual farming on to the lines of collective labour.

Failing this it will be impossible to develop agriculture to any extent. Failing this it will be impossible to solve the grain problem. Failing this it will be impossible to save the economically weaker strata of the peasantry from poverty and ruin.

Finally, this signifies that we must develop our industry to the utmost as the principal source from which agriculture will be supplied with the means required for its reconstruction: we must develop our iron and steel, chemical and machine-building industries; we must build tractor works, agricultural-machinery works, etc.

There is no need to prove that it is impossible to develop collective farms, that it is impossible to develop machine and tractor stations, without drawing the main mass of the peasantry into collective forms of farming, with the aid of the contract system on a mass scale, without supplying agriculture with a fairly large quantity of tractors, agricultural machinery, etc.

But it will be impossible to supply the countryside with machines and tractors unless we accelerate the development of our industry. Hence, rapid development of our industry is the key to the reconstruction of agriculture on the basis of collectivism.

Such is the significance and importance of the new forms of the bond.

Bukharin's group is obliged to admit, in words, the necessity of the new forms of the bond. But it is an admission only *in words*, with the intention, under cover of a verbal recognition of the new forms of the bond, of smuggling in something which is the very *opposite*. Actually, Bukharin is opposed to the new forms of the bond. Bukharin's starting point is not a rapid rate of development of industry as the lever for the reconstruction of agriculture, but the development

of individual peasant farming. He puts in the foreground the “normalization” of the market and permission for the free play of prices on the agricultural produce market, complete freedom for private trade. Hence his distrustful attitude to the collective farms which manifested itself in his speech at the July plenum of the Central Committee and in his theses prior to that July plenum. Hence his disapproval of any form of emergency measures against the kulaks during grain procurement.

We know that Bukharin shuns emergency measures as the devil shuns holy water.

We know that Bukharin is still unable to understand that under present conditions the kulak will not supply a sufficient quantity of grain voluntarily, of his own accord.

That has been proved by our two years’ experience of grain-procurement work.

But what if, in spite of everything, there is not enough marketable grain? To this Bukharin replies: Do not worry the kulaks with emergency measures; import grain from abroad. Not long ago he proposed that we import about 50,000,000 poods of grain, i.e., to the value of about 100,000,000 rubles in foreign currency. But what if foreign currency is required to import equipment for industry? To this Bukharin replies: Preference must be given to grain imports — thus, evidently, relegating imports of equipment for industry to the background.

It follows, therefore, that the basis for the solution of the grain problem and for the reconstruction of agriculture is not a rapid rate of development of industry, but the development of individual peasant farming, including kulak farming, on the basis of a free market and the free play of prices in the market.

Thus we have two different plans of economic policy.

The Party’s plan:

1. We are re-equipping industry (reconstruction).
2. We are beginning seriously to re-equip agriculture (reconstruction).
3. For this we must expand the development of collective farms and state farms, employ on a mass scale the contract system and machine and tractor stations as means of establishing a *bond* between industry and agriculture *in the sphere of production*.
4. As for the present grain-procurement difficulties, we must admit the permissibility of temporary emergency measures that are backed by the popular support of the middle- and poor-peasant

masses, as one of the means of breaking the resistance of the kulaks and of obtaining from them the maximum grain surpluses necessary for dispensing with imported grain and saving foreign currency for the development of industry.

5. Individual poor- and middle-peasant farming plays, and will continue to play, a predominant part in supplying the country with food and raw materials; but alone it is no longer adequate — the development of individual poor- and middle-peasant farming must therefore be *supplemented* by the development of collective farms and state farms, by the contract system on a mass scale, by accelerating the development of machine and tractor stations, in order to facilitate the ousting of the capitalist elements from agriculture and the gradual transfer of the individual peasant farms on to the lines of large-scale collective farming, on to the lines of collective labour.

6. But in order to achieve all this, it is necessary first of all to accelerate the development of industry, of the metallurgical chemical and machine-building industries, tractor works, agricultural-machinery works, etc. Failing this it will be impossible to solve the grain problem just as it will be impossible to reconstruct agriculture.

Conclusion: *the key to the reconstruction of agriculture is a rapid rate of development of our industry.*

Bukharin's plan:

1. "Normalize" the market; permit the free play of prices on the market and a rise in the price of grain, undeterred by the fact that this may lead to a rise in the prices of manufactured goods, raw materials and bread.

2. The utmost development of individual peasant farming accompanied by a certain reduction of the rate of development of collective farms and state farms (Bukharin's theses in July and his speech at the July plenum).

3. Grain procurements to proceed automatically, excluding at any time or under any circumstances even a partial use of emergency measures against the kulaks, even though such measures are supported by the middle- and poor-peasant masses.

4. In the event of shortage of grain, to import about 100 million rubles' worth of grain.

5. And if there is not enough foreign currency to pay for grain imports and imports of equipment for industry, to reduce imports of equipment and, consequently, the rate of development of our industry — otherwise our agriculture will simply "mark time," or even "directly decline."

Conclusion: *the key to the reconstruction of agriculture is the development of individual peasant farming.*

That is how it works out, comrades!

Bukharin's plan is a plan to *reduce* the rate of development of industry and to *undermine* the new forms of the bond.

Such are our disagreements.

Sometimes the question is asked: Have we not been late in developing the new forms of the bond, in developing collective farms, state farms, etc.?

Some people assert that the Party was at least about two years late in starting with this work. That is wrong, comrades. It is absolutely wrong. Only noisy "lefts," who have no conception of the economy of the USSR, can talk like that.

What is meant by being late in this matter? If it is a question of foreseeing the need for collective farms and state farms, then we can say that we began that at the time of the October Revolution. There cannot be the slightest doubt that already then — at the time of the October Revolution — the Party foresaw the need for collective farms and state farms. Lastly, one can take our program, adopted at the Eighth Congress of the Party (March 1919). The need for collective farms and state farms is recognized there quite clearly.

But the mere fact that the top leadership of our Party fore saw the need for collective farms and state farms was not enough for carrying into effect and organizing a *mass movement* for collective farms and state farms. Consequently, it is not a matter of foreseeing, but of *carrying out* a plan of collective-farm and state-farm development. But in order to carry out such a plan a number of conditions are required which did not exist before, and which came into existence only recently.

That is the point, comrades.

In order to carry out the plan for a mass movement in favour of collective farms and state farms, it is necessary, first of all, that the Party's top leadership should be supported in this matter by the *mass* of the Party membership. As you know, ours is a Party of a million members. It was therefore necessary to convince the mass of the Party membership of the correctness of the policy of the top leadership. That is the first point.

Further, it is necessary that a mass movement in favour of collective should arise within the peasantry, that the peasants — far from fearing the collective farms — should themselves join the collective farms and become convinced by experience of the advantage of col-

lective farming over individual farming. This is a serious matter, requiring a certain amount of time. That is the second point.

Further, it is necessary that the state should possess the material resources required to finance collective-farm development, to finance the collective farms and state farms. And this, dear comrades, is a matter that requires many hundreds of millions of rubles. That is the third point.

Finally, it is necessary that industry should be fairly adequately developed so as to be able to supply agriculture with machinery, tractors, fertilizers, etc. That is the fourth point.

Can it be asserted that all these conditions existed here two or three years ago? No, it cannot.

It must not be forgotten that we are a party *in power, not in opposition*. An opposition party can issue slogans — I am speaking of fundamental practical slogans of the movement — in order to carry them into effect after coming into power. Nobody can accuse an opposition party of not carrying out its fundamental slogans immediately, for everybody knows that it is not the opposition party which is at the helm, but other parties.

In the case of a party in power, however, such as our Bolshevik Party is, the matter is entirely different. The slogans of such a party are not mere agitational slogans, but something much more than that, for they have the force of *practical decision*, the *force of law*, and must be carried out immediately. Our Party cannot issue a practical slogan and then defer its implementation. That would be deceiving the masses. For a practical slogan to be issued, especially so serious a slogan as transferring the vast masses of the peasantry on to the lines of collectivism, the conditions must exist that will enable the slogan to be carried out directly; finally, these conditions must be created, organized. That is why it is not enough for the Party's top leadership merely to foresee the need for collective farms and state farms. That is why we also need the conditions to enable us *to realize, to carry out*, our slogans immediately.

Was the mass of our Party membership ready for the utmost development of collective farms and state farms, say, some two or three years ago? No, it was not ready. The serious turn of the mass of the Party membership towards the new forms of the bond began only with the first serious grain-procurement difficulties. It required those difficulties for the mass of the Party membership to become conscious of the full necessity of accelerating the adoption of the new forms of the bond, and primarily, of the collective farms and

state farms, and resolutely to support its Central Committee in this matter. This is one condition which did not exist before, but which does exist now.

Was there any serious movement among the vast masses of the peasantry in favour of collective farms or state farms some two or three years ago? No, there was not. Everybody knows that two or three years ago the peasantry was hostilely disposed to the state farms, while they contemptuously called the collective farms the "kommunia," regarding them as something utterly useless. And now? Now, the situation is different. Now we have whole strata of the peasantry who regard the state farms and collective farms as a source of assistance to peasant farming in the way of seed, pedigree cattle, machines and tractors. Now we have only to supply machines and tractors, and collective farms will develop at an accelerated pace.

What was the cause of this change of attitude among certain, fairly considerable, strata of the peasantry? What helped to bring it about?

In the first place, the development of the cooperatives and a cooperative communal life. There can be no doubt that without the powerful development of the cooperatives, particularly the agricultural cooperatives, which produced among the peasantry a psychological background in favour of the collective farms, we would not have that urge towards the collective farms which is now displayed by whole strata of the peasantry.

An important part in this was also played by the existence of well-organized collective farms, which set the peasants good examples of how agriculture can be improved by uniting small peasant farms into large, collective, farms.

The existence of well-organized state farms, which helped the peasants to improve their methods of farming, also played its part here. I need not mention other facts with which you are all familiar. There you have another condition which did not exist before, but which does exist now.

Further, can it be asserted that we were able some two or three years ago to give substantial financial aid to the collective farms and state farms, to assign hundreds of millions of rubles for this purpose? No, it cannot be asserted. You know very well that we even lacked sufficient means for developing that minimum of industry without which no industrialization at all is possible, let alone the reconstruction of agriculture. Could we take those means from indus-

try, which is the basis for the industrialization of the country, and transfer them to the collective farms and state farms? Obviously, we could not. But now? Now we have the means for developing the collective farms and state farms.

Finally, can it be asserted that some two or three years ago our industry was an adequate basis for supplying agriculture with large quantities of machines, tractors, etc.? No, it cannot be asserted. At that time our task was to create the *minimum industrial basis* required for supplying machines and tractors to agriculture *in the future*. It was on the creation of such a basis that our scanty financial resources were then spent. And now? Now we have this industrial basis for agriculture. At all events, this industrial basis is being created at a very rapid rate.

It follows that the conditions required for the mass development of the collective farms and state farms were created only recently.

That is how matters stand, comrades.

That is why it cannot be said that we were late in developing the new forms of the bond.

g) BUKHARIN AS A THEORETICIAN

Such, in the main, are the principal mistakes committed by the theoretician of the right opposition, Bukharin, on the fundamental questions of our policy.

It is said that Bukharin is one of the theoreticians of our Party. This is true, of course. But the point is that not all is well with his theorizing. This is evident if only from the fact that on questions of Party theory and policy he has piled up the heap of mistakes which I have just described. These mistakes, mistakes on Comintern questions, mistakes on questions of the class struggle, the intensification of the class struggle, the peasantry, NEP, the new forms of the bond — these mistakes could not possibly have occurred accidentally. No, these mistakes are not accidental. These mistakes of Bukharin's followed from his wrong theoretical line, from the defects in his theories. Yes, Bukharin is a theoretician, but he is not altogether a Marxist theoretician; he is a theoretician who has much to learn before he can become a Marxist theoretician.

Reference has been made to the letter in which Comrade Lenin speaks of Bukharin as a theoretician. Let us read this letter:

“Of the younger members of the Central Committee,” says Lenin, “I should like to say a few words about Bukharin and Pyatakov. In my opinion, they are the most outstanding forces (of the youngest ones), and regarding

them the following should be borne in mind: Bukharin is not only a very valuable and important theoretician in our Party, he is also legitimately regarded as the favourite of the whole Party, *but it is very doubtful whether his theoretical views can be classed as fully Marxist, for there is something scholastic in him (he has never studied and, I think, has never fully understood dialectics)*** (Verbatim report of the July plenum, 1926, Part IV, p. 66).

Thus, he is a theoretician without dialectics. A scholastic theoretician. A theoretician about whom it was said: "It is very doubtful whether his theoretical views can be classed as fully Marxist." That is how Lenin characterized Bukharin's theoretical complexion.

You can well understand, comrades, that such a theoretician has still much to learn. And if Bukharin understood that he is not yet a full-fledged theoretician, that he still has much to learn, that he is a theoretician who has not yet mastered dialectics — and dialectics is the soul of Marxism — if he understood that, he would be more modest, and the Party would only benefit thereby. But the trouble is that Bukharin is wanting in modesty. The trouble is that not only is he wanting in modesty, but he even presumes to teach our teacher Lenin on a number of questions and, above all, on the question of the state. And that is Bukharin's misfortune.

Allow me in this connection to refer to the well-known theoretical controversy which flared up in 1916 between Lenin and Bukharin on the question of the state. This is important for us in order to expose both Bukharin's inordinate pretensions to teach Lenin and the roots of his theoretical weaknesses on such important questions as the dictatorship of the proletariat, the class struggle, etc.

As you know, an article by Bukharin appeared in 1916 in the magazine *Internatsional Molodyozhy*,¹¹⁰ signed Nota Bene; this article was in point of fact directed against Comrade Lenin. In this article Bukharin wrote:

"...It is quite a mistake to seek the difference between the socialists and the anarchists in the fact that the former are in favour of the state while the latter are against it. The real difference is that revolutionary social-democracy desires to organize the new social production as centralized production, i.e., technically the most advanced production; whereas decentralized anarchist production would mean only retrogression to old technique, to the old form of enterprises..."

"...social-democracy, which is, or at least should be, the educator of the masses, must now more than ever emphasize its hostility in principle to the state... The present war has shown how deeply the roots of the state idea

* My italics. — *J. St.*

have penetrated the souls of the workers.”

Criticizing these views of Bukharin’s, Lenin says in a well-known article published in 1916:

“This is wrong. The author raises the question of the difference in the attitude of socialists and anarchists *towards the state*. But he replies *not* to this question, but to *another*, namely, the difference in the attitude of socialists and anarchists towards the economic foundation of future society. That, of course, is a very important and necessary question. But it does not follow that the *main* point of difference in the attitude of the socialists and anarchists towards the state can be ignored. The socialists are in favour of utilizing the modern state and its institutions in the struggle for the emancipation of the working class, and they also urge the necessity of utilizing the state for the peculiar transitional form from capitalism to socialism. This transitional form, which is *also* a state, is the dictatorship of the proletariat. The anarchists want to ‘abolish’ the state, to ‘blow it up’ (“sprengen”), as Comrade Nota Bene expresses it in one place, erroneously ascribing this view to the socialists. The socialists — unfortunately the author quotes the words of Engels relevant to this subject rather incompletely — hold that the state will ‘wither away,’ will gradually ‘fall asleep’ *after* the bourgeoisie has been expropriated...

“In order to ‘emphasize’ out ‘hostility in principle’ to the state, we must indeed understand it ‘clearly.’ This clarity, however, our author lacks. His phrase about the ‘roots of the state idea’ is entirely muddled, non-Marxist and non-socialist. It is not ‘the state idea’ that has clashed with the repudiation of the idea of the state, but opportunist policy (i.e., an opportunist, reformist, bourgeois attitude towards the state) that has clashed with revolutionary social-democratic policy (i.e., with the revolutionary social-democratic attitude to the bourgeois state and towards utilizing the state against the bourgeoisie in order to overthrow it). These are entirely different things” (Vol. XIX, p. 296).

I think it is clear what the point at issue is, and what a semi-anarchist mess Bukharin has got into!

Sten: At that time Lenin had not yet fully formulated the necessity for “blowing up” the state. Bukharin, while committing anarchist mistakes, was approaching a formulation of the question.

Stalin: No, that is not what we are concerned with at present. What we are concerned with is the attitude towards the state in general. The point is that in Bukharin’s opinion the working class should be hostile *in principle* to *any kind* of state, including the working-class state.

Sten: Lenin then only spoke about utilizing the state; he said nothing in his criticism of Bukharin regarding the “blowing up” of

the state.

Stalin: You are mistaken, the “blowing up” of the state is not a Marxist formula, it is an anarchist formula. Let me assure you that the point here is that, in the opinion of Bukharin (and of the anarchists), the workers should emphasize their hostility in principle to any kind of state, and, therefore, also to the state of the transition period, to the working-class state.

Just try to explain to our workers that the working class must become imbued with hostility in principle to the proletarian dictatorship, which, of course, is also a state.

Bukharin’s position, as set forth in his article in *Internatsional Molodyozhy*, is one of repudiating the state in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism.

Bukharin overlooked a “trifle” here, namely, the whole transition period, during which the working class cannot do without its own state if it really wants to suppress the bourgeoisie and build socialism. That is the first point.

Secondly, it is not true that at the time Comrade Lenin in his criticism did not deal with the theory of “blowing up,” of “abolishing” the state in general. Lenin not only dealt with this theory, as is evident from the passages I have quoted, but he criticized and demolished it as an anarchist theory, and counterposed to it the theory of *forming* and *utilizing* a new state after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, namely, the state of the proletarian dictatorship.

Finally, the anarchist theory of “blowing up” and “abolishing” the state must not be confused with the Marxist theory of the “withering away” of the *proletarian* state or the “breaking up,” the “smashing” of the *bourgeois* state machine. There are persons who are inclined to confuse these two different concepts in the belief that they express one and the same idea. But that is wrong. Lenin proceeded precisely from the Marxist theory of “smashing” the *bourgeois* state machine and the “withering away” of the *proletarian* state when he criticized the anarchist theory of “blowing up” and “abolishing” the state in general.

Perhaps it will not be superfluous if, for the sake of greater clarity, I quote here one of Comrade Lenin’s manuscripts on the state, apparently written at the end of 1916, or the beginning of 1917 (before the February Revolution of 1917). From this manuscript it is easily seen that:

a) in criticizing Bukharin’s semi-anarchist errors on the question of the state, Lenin proceeded from the Marxist theory of the “with-

ering away” of the proletarian state and the “smashing” of the bourgeois state machine;

b) although Bukharin, as Lenin expressed it, “is nearer to the truth than Kautsky,” nevertheless, “instead of exposing the Kautskyites, he helps them with his mistakes.”

Here is the text of this manuscript:

“Of *extremely* great importance on the question of the state is the letter of *Engels* to *Bebel* dated March 18-28, 1875.

“Here is the most important passage in full:

“...‘The free people’s state is transformed into the free state. Taken in its grammatical sense, a free state is one where the state is free in relation to its citizens, hence a state with a despotic government. *The whole talk about the state should be dropped*, especially since the Commune, which was no longer a state in the proper sense of the word. The “people’s state” has been thrown in our faces by the anarchists to the point of disgust, although already Marx’s book against Proudhon and later the *Communist Manifesto* directly declare that *with the introduction of the socialist order of society the state will dissolve of itself* (sich auflöst) *and disappear*. As, therefore, the state is only a transitional institution which is used in the struggle, in the revolution, in order to hold down one’s adversaries by force, it is pure nonsense to talk of a free people’s state: so long as the proletariat still *uses* (Engels’ italics) the state, it does *not use it in the interests of freedom but in order to hold down its adversaries, and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom the state as such ceases to exist*. We would therefore propose to replace the word state (Engels’ italics) everywhere by the word “community” (Gemeinwesen), a good old German word which can very well represent the French word “commune.””

“This is, perhaps, the most remarkable, and certainly, the most pronounced passage, so to speak, in the works of Marx and Engels ‘*against* the state.’

“(1) ‘The whole talk about the state should be dropped.’

“(2) ‘The Commune was *no longer* a state in the proper sense of the word.’ (What was it, then? A transitional form from the state to no state, obviously!)

“(3) The ‘people’s state’ has been ‘thrown in our faces’ (in die Zähne geworfen, literally — thrown in our teeth) by the anarchists too long (that is, Marx and Engels were ashamed of the obvious mistake made by their German friends; but they regarded it, and of course, *in the circumstances* that then existed, correctly regarded it as a far less serious mistake than that made by the anarchists. This NB!!).

“(4) The state will ‘disintegrate (“dissolve”) (Nota Bene) of itself and disappear’... (compare later “will wither away”) ‘with the introduction of the socialist order of society’...

“(5) The state is a ‘temporary institution’ which is used ‘in the struggle, in the revolution’... (used by the *proletariat*, of course)...

“(6) The state is needed *not for freedom*, but for *holding down* (Niederhaltung is not suppression in the proper sense of the word, but preventing restoration, keeping in submission) the *adversaries of the proletariat*.

“(7) When there will be freedom, there will be no state.

“(8) ‘We’ (i.e., Engels and *Marx*) would propose to replace the word ‘state’ ‘*everywhere*’ (in the program) by the word ‘community’ (Gemeinwesen), ‘commune’!!!

“This shows how Marx and Engels were vulgarized and defiled not only by the opportunists, but also by Kautsky.

“The opportunists *have not* understood a single one of these *eight* rich ideas!!

“They have taken *only* what is practically necessary for the present time: to utilize the political struggle, to utilize the *present* state to educate, to train the proletariat, to ‘wrest concessions.’ That is correct (as against the anarchists), but that is only $1/100$ part of Marxism, if one can thus express it arithmetically.

“In his propagandist works, and publications generally, Kautsky has completely slurred over (or forgotten? or not understood?) points 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8, and the ‘Zerbrechen’ of Marx (in his controversy with Pannekoek in 1912 or 1913, Kautsky (see below, pp. 45-47) completely dropped into opportunism on this question.)

“What distinguishes us from the anarchists is (α) the use of the state *now* and (β) during the proletarian *revolution* (the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’) — points of very great importance in practice at this moment. (But it is these very points that Bukharin *forgot!*)

“What distinguishes us from the opportunists is the more profound, ‘more permanent’ truths regarding ($\alpha\alpha$) the ‘temporary’ nature of the state, ($\beta\beta$) the *harm* of ‘chatter’ about it now, ($\gamma\gamma$) the not entirely state character of the dictatorship of the proletariat, ($\delta\delta$) the contradiction between the state and freedom, ($\epsilon\epsilon$) the more correct idea (concept, programmatic term) ‘community’ instead of state, ($\zeta\zeta$) ‘smashing’ (Zerbrechen) of the bureaucratic-military machine.

“It must not be forgotten also that the avowed opportunists in Germany (Bernstein, Kolb, etc.) directly repudiate the *dictatorship of the proletariat*, while the official program and Kautsky *indirectly* repudiate it, by not saying anything about it in their day-to-day agitation and *tolerating* the renegacy of Kolb and Co.

“In August 1916, Bukharin was written to: ‘Allow your ideas about the state *to mature.*’ *Without*, however, allowing them to mature, he broke into print, as ‘Nota Bene,’ and did it in such a way that, instead of exposing the Kautskyites, he *helped them* with his mistakes!! Yet, as a matter of fact, Bukharin is nearer to the truth than Kautsky.”¹¹¹

Such is the brief history of the theoretical controversy on the question of the state.

It would seem that the matter is clear: Bukharin made semi-anarchist mistakes — it is time to correct those mistakes and proceed further in the footsteps of Lenin. But only Leninists can think like that. Bukharin, it appears, does not agree. On the contrary, he asserts that it was not he who was mistaken, but Lenin; that it was not he who followed, or ought to have followed, in the footsteps of Lenin, but, on the contrary, that it was Lenin who found himself compelled to follow in the footsteps of Bukharin.

You do not believe this, comrades? In that case, listen further. After the controversy in 1916, nine years later, during which interval Bukharin maintained silence, and *a year after the death of Lenin* — namely, in 1925 — Bukharin published an article in the symposium *Revolutsia Prava*, entitled “Concerning the Theory of the Imperialist State,” which previously had been rejected by the editors of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*¹¹² (i.e., by Lenin). In a *footnote* to this article Bukharin bluntly declares that it was not Lenin but he, Bukharin, who was right in this controversy. That may seem incredible, comrades, but it is a fact.

Listen to the text of this footnote:

“V.I. (i.e., Lenin) wrote a short article containing criticism of the article in *Internatsional Molodyozhy*. The reader will easily see that I had not made the mistake attributed to me, for I clearly saw the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat; on the other hand, from Ilyich’s article it will be seen that at that time he was wrong about the thesis on ‘*blowing up*’ the state (bourgeois state, of course), and confused that question with the question of the withering away of the dictatorship of the proletariat.* Perhaps I should have enlarged on the subject of the dictatorship at that time. But in justification I may say that *at that time* there was such a wholesale exaltation of the bourgeois state by the social-democrats that it was natural to concentrate all attention on the question of *blowing up* that machine.

“When I arrived in Russia from America and saw Nadezhda Konstantinovna** (that was at our illegal Sixth Congress and at that time V.I. was in hiding) her first words were: ‘V.I. asked me to tell you that he has no disagreements with you now over the question of the state.’ Studying this question, *Ilyich came to the same conclusions** regarding ‘blowing up,’ but he developed this theme, and later the theory of the dictatorship, to such an extent as to create a whole epoch in the development of theoretical thought in this field.”

That is how Bukharin writes about Lenin *a year after Lenin’s*

* My italics. — *J. St.*

** Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya, Lenin’s wife. — *Tr.*

death.

There you have a pretty example of the hypertrophied pretentiousness of a half-educated theoretician!

Quite possibly, Nadezhda Konstantinovna did tell Bukharin what he writes here. But what conclusions can be drawn from this fact? The only conclusion that can be drawn is that Lenin had certain grounds for believing that Bukharin had renounced or was ready to renounce his mistakes. That is all. But Bukharin thought differently. He decided that henceforth, not Lenin, but he, i.e., Bukharin, must be regarded as the creator, or, at least, the inspirer of the Marxist theory of the state.

Hitherto we have regarded ourselves as Leninists, and we continue to do so. But it now appears that both Lenin and we, his disciples, are Bukharinites. Rather funny, comrades. But that's what happens when one has to deal with Bukharin's puffed-up pretentiousness.

It might be thought that Bukharin's footnote to the above-mentioned article was a slip of the pen, that he wrote something silly, and then forgot about it. But it turns out that that is not the case. Bukharin, it turns out, spoke in all seriousness. That is evident, for example, from the fact that the statement he made in this footnote regarding Lenin's *mistakes* and Bukharin's *correctness* was republished recently, namely, in 1927, i.e., two years after Bukharin's first attack on Lenin, in a biographical sketch of Bukharin written by Maretsky, and it never occurred to Bukharin to protest against this... boldness of Maretsky. Obviously Bukharin's attack on Lenin cannot be regarded as accidental.

It appears, therefore, that Bukharin is right, and not Lenin, that the inspirer of the Marxist theory of the state is not Lenin, but Bukharin.

Such, comrades, is the picture of the theoretical distortions and the theoretical pretensions of Bukharin.

And this man, after all this, has the presumption to say in his speech here that there is "something rotten" in the theoretical line of our Party, that there is a deviation towards Trotskyism in the theoretical line of our Party!

And this is said by that same Bukharin who is making (and has made in the past) a number of gross theoretical and practical mistakes, who only recently was a pupil of Trotsky's, and who only the other day was seeking to form a bloc with the Trotskyites against the Leninists and was paying them visits by the backdoor.

Is that not funny, comrades?...

V

QUESTIONS OF PARTY LEADERSHIP

Thus we have reviewed all the principal questions relating to our disagreements in the sphere of theory as well as in the sphere of the policy of the Comintern and the internal policy of our Party. From what has been said it is apparent that Rykov's statement about the existence of a *single* line does not correspond to the real state of affairs. From what has been said it is apparent that we have in fact *two* lines. One line is the general line of the Party, the revolutionary Leninist line of our Party. The other line is the line of Bukharin's group. This second line has not quite crystallized yet, partly because of the incredible confusion of views within the ranks of Bukharin's group, and partly because this second line, being of little importance in the Party, tries to disguise itself in one way or another. Nevertheless, as you have seen, this line exists, and it exists as a line which is *distinct* from the Party line, as a line *opposed* to the general Party line on almost all questions of our policy. This second line is that of the *right* deviation.

Let us pass now to questions of Party leadership.

a) THE FACTIONALISM OF BUKHARIN'S GROUP

Bukharin said that there is no opposition within our Party, that Bukharin's group is not an opposition. That is not true, comrades. The discussion at the plenum showed quite clearly that Bukharin's group constitutes a new opposition. The oppositional work of this group consists in attempts to revise the Party line; it seeks to revise the Party line and is preparing the ground for replacing the Party line by another line, the line of the opposition, which can be nothing but the line of the right deviation.

Bukharin said that the group of three does not constitute a factional group. That is not true, comrades. Bukharin's group has all the characteristics of a faction. There is the platform the factional secrecy, the policy of resigning, the organized struggle against the Central Committee. What more is required? Why hide the truth about the factionalism of Bukharin's group, when it is self-evident? The very reason why the plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission has met is to tell all the truth here about

our disagreements. And the truth is that Bukharin's group is a factional group. And it is not merely a factional group, but — I would say — the most repulsive and the pettiest of all the factional groups that ever existed in our Party.

This is evident if only from the fact that it is now attempting to use for its factional aims such an insignificant and petty affair as the disturbances in Adjaria. In point of fact, what does the so-called "revolt" in Adjaria amount to in comparison with such revolts as the Kronstadt revolt? I believe that in comparison with this the so-called "revolt" in Adjaria is not even a drop in the ocean. Were there any instances of Trotskyites or Zinovievites attempting to make use of the serious revolt which occurred in Kronstadt to combat the Central Committee, the Party? It must be admitted, comrades, that there were no such instances. On the contrary, the opposition groups which existed in our Party at the time of that serious revolt helped the Party in suppressing it, and they did not dare to make use of it against the Party.

Well, and how is Bukharin's group acting now? You have already had evidence that it is attempting in the pettiest and most offensive way to utilize against the Party the microscopic "revolt" in Adjaria. What is this if not an extreme degree of factional blindness and factional degeneration?

Apparently, it is being demanded of us that no disturbances should occur in our border regions which have common frontiers with capitalist countries. Apparently, it is being demanded of us that we should carry out a policy which would satisfy all classes of our society, the rich and the poor, the workers and the capitalists. Apparently, it is being demanded of us that there should be no discontented elements. Have not these comrades from Bukharin's group gone out of their minds?

How can anybody demand of us, people of the proletarian dictatorship who are waging a struggle against the capitalist world, both inside and outside our country, that there should be no discontented elements in our country, and that disturbances should not sometimes occur in certain border regions which have common frontiers with hostile countries? For what purpose then does the capitalist encirclement exist, if not to enable international capital to apply all its efforts to organize actions by discontented elements in our border regions against the Soviet regime? Who, except empty-headed liberals, would raise such demands? Is it not obvious that factional pettiness can sometimes produce in people a typically liberal blindness

and narrow-mindedness?

b) LOYALTY AND COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP

Rykov assured us here that Bukharin is one of the most “irreproachable” and “loyal” Party members in his attitude towards the Central Committee of our Party.

I am inclined to doubt it. We cannot take Rykov’s word for it. We demand facts. And Rykov is unable to supply facts.

Take, for example, such a fact as the negotiations Bukharin conducted behind the scenes with Kamenev’s group, which is connected with the Trotskyites; the negotiations about setting up a factional bloc, about changing the policy of the Central Committee, about changing the composition of the Political Bureau, about using the grain-procurement crisis for attacking the Central Committee. The question arises: Where is Bukharin’s “loyal” and “irreproachable” attitude towards his Central Committee?

Is not such behaviour, on the contrary, a violation of *any kind of* loyalty to his Central Committee, to his Party, on the part of a member of the Political Bureau? If this is called loyalty to the Central Committee, then what is the word for betrayal of one’s Central Committee?

Bukharin likes to talk about loyalty and honesty, but why does he not try to examine his own conscience and ask himself whether he is not violating in the most dishonest manner the elementary requirements of loyalty to his Central Committee when he conducts secret negotiations with Trotskyites against his Central Committee and thereby betrays his Central Committee?

Bukharin spoke here about the lack of collective leadership in the Central Committee of the Party, and assured us that the requirements of collective leadership were being violated by the majority of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.

Our plenum, of course, has put up with everything. It can even tolerate this shameless and hypocritical assertion of Bukharin’s. But one must have really lost all sense of shame to make so bold as to speak in this way at the plenum against the majority of the Central Committee.

In truth, how can we speak of collective leadership if the majority of the Central Committee, having harnessed itself to the chariot of state, is straining all its forces to move it forward and is urging Bukharin’s group to give a helping hand in this arduous task, while Bukharin’s group is not only not helping its Central Committee but, on

the contrary, is hampering it in every way, is putting a spoke in its wheels, is threatening to resign, and comes to terms with enemies of the Party, with Trotskyites, against the Central Committee of our Party?

Who, indeed, but hypocrites can deny that Bukharin, who is setting up a bloc with the Trotskyites against the Party, and is betraying his Central Committee, does not want to and will not implement collective leadership in the Central Committee of our Party?

Who, indeed, but the blind can fail to see that if Bukharin nevertheless chatters about collective leadership in the Central Committee, putting the blame on the majority of the Central Committee, he is doing so with the object of disguising his treacherous conduct?

It should be noted that this is not the first time that Bukharin has violated the elementary requirements of loyalty and collective leadership in relation to the Central Committee of the Party. The history of our Party knows of instances when, in Lenin's lifetime, in the period of the Brest Peace, Bukharin, being in the minority on the question of peace, rushed to the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who were the enemies of our Party, conducted backstairs negotiations with them, and attempted to set up a bloc with them against Lenin and the Central Committee. What agreement he was trying to reach at the time with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries — we, unfortunately, do not yet know.¹¹³ But we do know that at the time the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries were planning to arrest Lenin and carry out an anti-Soviet coup d'état... But the most amazing thing is that, while rushing to the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and conspiring with them against the Central Committee, Bukharin continued, just as he is doing now, to clamour about the necessity of collective leadership.

The history of our Party knows, too, of instances when, in Lenin's lifetime, Bukharin, who had a majority in the Moscow Regional Bureau of our Party and the support of a group of "Left" Communists, called on all Party members to express lack of confidence in the Central Committee of the Party, to refuse to submit to its decisions and to raise the question of splitting our Party. That was during the period of the Brest Peace, after the Central Committee had already decided that it was necessary to accept the conditions of the Brest Peace.

Such is the character of Bukharin's loyalty and collective leadership.

Rykov spoke here about the necessity of collective work. At the same time he pointed an accusing finger at the majority of the Politi-

cal Bureau, asserting that he and his close friends were in favour of collective work, while the majority of the Political Bureau, consequently, were against it. However, Rykov was unable to cite a single fact in support of his assertion.

In order to expose this fable of Rykov's, let me cite a few facts, a few examples which will show you how Rykov carries out collective work.

First example. You have heard the story about the export of gold to America. Many of you may believe that the gold was shipped to America by decision of the Council of People's Commissars or the Central Committee, or with the consent of the Central Committee, or with its knowledge. But that is not true, comrades. The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars have had nothing to do with this matter. There is a ruling which prohibits the export of gold without the approval of the Central Committee. But this ruling was violated. Who was it that authorized the export? It turns out that the shipment of gold was authorized by one of Rykov's deputies with Rykov's knowledge and consent.

Is that collective work?

Second example. This concerns negotiations with one of the big private banks in America, whose property was nationalized after the October Revolution, and which is now demanding compensation for its losses. The Central Committee has learned that a representative of our State Bank has been discussing terms of compensation with that bank.

Settlement of private claim is, as you are aware, a very important question inseparably connected with our foreign policy. One might think that these negotiations were conducted with the approval of the Council of People's Commissars or the Central Committee. However, that is not the case, comrades. The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars have had nothing to do with this matter. Subsequently, upon learning about these negotiations, the Central Committee decided to stop them. But the question arises: Who authorized these negotiations? It turns out that they were authorized by one of Rykov's deputies with Rykov's knowledge and consent.

Is that collective work?

Third example. This concerns the supplying of agricultural machinery to kulaks and middle peasants. The point is that the EKOSO of the RSFSR,¹¹⁴ which is presided over by one of Rykov's deputies for matters concerning the RSFSR, decided to *reduce* the supply of

agricultural machines to the middle peasants and *increase* the supply of machines to the upper strata of the peasantry, i.e., to the kulaks. Here is the text of this anti-Party, anti-Soviet ruling of the EKOSO of the RSFSR:

“In the Kazakh and Bashkir ASSR, the Siberian and Lower Volga territories, the Middle Volga and Urals regions, the proportion of sales of farm machines and implements set forth in this paragraph shall be *increased* to 20 per cent for the upper strata of the peasantry and *decreased* to 30 per cent for the middle strata.”

How do you like that? At a time when the Party is intensifying the offensive against the kulaks and is organizing the masses of the poor and middle peasants against the kulaks, the EKOSO of the RSFSR adopts a decision to *reduce* the level of deliveries of farm machinery to the middle peasants and *increase* the level of deliveries to the upper strata of the peasantry.

And it is suggested that this is a Leninist, communist policy.

Subsequently, when the Central Committee learned about this incident, it annulled the decision of the EKOSO. But who was it that authorized this anti-Soviet ruling? It was authorized by one of Rykov's deputies, with Rykov's knowledge and consent.

Is that collective work?

I believe that these examples are sufficient to show how Rykov and his deputies practise collective work.

c) THE FIGHT AGAINST THE RIGHT DEVIATION

Bukharin spoke here of the “civil execution” of three members of the Political Bureau, who, he says, “were being hauled over the coals” by the organizations of our Party. He said that the Party had subjected these three members of the Political Bureau — Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy — to “civil execution” by criticizing their errors in the press and at meetings, while they, the three members of the Political Bureau, were “compelled” to keep silent.

All that is nonsense, comrades. Those are the false words of a communist gone liberal who is trying to weaken the Party in its fight against the right deviation. According to Bukharin, if he and his friends have become entangled in right deviationist mistakes, the Party has no right to expose those mistakes, the Party must stop fighting the right deviation and wait until it shall please Bukharin and his friends to renounce their mistakes.

Is not Bukharin asking too much from us? Is he not under the

impression that the Party exists for him, and not he for the Party? Who is compelling him to keep silent, to remain in a state of inaction when the whole Party is mobilized against the right deviation and is conducting determined attacks against difficulties? Why should not he, Bukharin, and his close friends come forward now and engage in a determined fight against the right deviation and conciliation towards it? Can anyone doubt that the Party would welcome Bukharin and his close friends if they decided to take this not so difficult step? Why do they not decide to take this step, which, after all, is their duty? Is it not because they place the interests of their group above the interests of the Party and its general line? Whose fault is it that Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky are missing in the fight against the right deviation? Is it not obvious that talk about the "civil execution" of the three members of the Political Bureau is a poorly camouflaged attempt on the part of the three members of the Political Bureau to compel the Party to keep silent and to stop fighting against the right deviation?

The fight against the right deviation must not be regarded as a secondary task of our Party. The fight against the right deviation is one of the most decisive tasks of our Party. If we, in our own ranks, in our own Party, in the political General Staff of the proletariat, which is directing the movement and is leading the proletariat forward — if we in this General Staff should allow the free existence and the free functioning of the right deviators, who are trying to demobilize the Party, demoralize the working class, adapt our policy to the tastes of the "Soviet" bourgeoisie, and thus yield to the difficulties of our socialist construction — if we should allow all this, what would it mean? Would it not mean that we are ready to put a brake on the revolution, disrupt our socialist construction, flee from difficulties and surrender our positions to the capitalist elements?

Does Bukharin's group understand that to refuse to fight the right deviation is to betray the working class, to betray the revolution?

Does Bukharin's group understand that unless we overcome the right deviation and conciliation towards it, it will be impossible to overcome the difficulties facing us, and that unless we overcome these difficulties it will be impossible to achieve decisive successes in socialist construction?

In view of this, what is the worth of this pitiful talk about the "civil execution" of three members of the Political Bureau?

No, comrades, the Bukharinites will not frighten the Party with

liberal chatter about “civil execution.” The Party demands that they should wage a determined fight against the right deviation and conciliation towards it side by side with all the members of the Central Committee of our Party. It demands this of Bukharin’s group in order to help to mobilize the working class, to break down the resistance of the class enemies and to organize decisive victory over the difficulties of our socialist construction.

Either the Bukharinites will fulfil this demand of the Party, in which case the Party will welcome them, or they will not do so, in which case they will have only themselves to blame.

DIZZY WITH SUCCESS

(Concerning Questions of the Collective-Farm Movement)

March 2, 1930

The Soviet government's successes in the sphere of the collective-farm movement are now being spoken of by everyone. Even our enemies are forced to admit that the successes are substantial. And they really are very great.

It is a fact that by February 20 of this year 50 per cent of the peasant farms throughout the USSR had been collectivized. That means that by February 20, 1930, we had *overfulfilled* the five-year plan of collectivization by more than 100 per cent.

It is a fact that on February 28 of this year the collective farms had *already succeeded* in stocking upwards of 36,000,000 centners, i.e., about 220,000,000 poods, of seed for the spring sowing, which is more than 90 per cent of the plan. It must be admitted that the accumulation of 220,000,000 poods of seed by the collective farms alone — after the successful fulfilment of the grain-procurement plan — is a tremendous achievement.

What does all this show?

That a *radical turn of the countryside towards socialism may be considered as already achieved*.

There is no need to prove that these successes are of supreme importance for the fate of our country, for the whole working class, which is the leading force of our country, and, lastly, for the Party itself. To say nothing of the direct practical results, these successes are of immense value for the internal life of the Party itself, for the education of our Party. They imbue our Party with a spirit of cheerfulness and confidence in its strength. They arm the working class with confidence in the victory of our cause. They bring forward additional millions of reserves for our Party.

Hence the Party's task is: to *consolidate* the successes achieved and to *utilize* them systematically for our further advancement.

But successes have their seamy side, especially when they are attained with comparative "ease" — "unexpectedly," so to speak. Such successes sometimes induce a spirit of vanity and conceit: "We can achieve anything!," "There's nothing we can't do!" People not infrequently become intoxicated by such successes; they become dizzy

with success, lose all sense of proportion and the capacity to understand realities; they show a tendency to overrate their own strength and to underrate the strength of the enemy; adventurist attempts are made to solve all questions of socialist construction "in a trice." In such a case, there is no room for concern to *consolidate* the successes achieved and to *utilize* them systematically for further advancement. Why should we consolidate the successes achieved when, as it is, we can dash to the full victory of socialism "in a trice": "We can achieve anything!," "There's nothing we can't do!"

Hence the Party's task is: to wage a determined struggle against these sentiments, which are dangerous and harmful to our cause, and to drive them out of the Party.

It cannot be said that these dangerous and harmful sentiments are at all widespread in the ranks of our Party. But they do exist in our Party, and there are no grounds for asserting that they will not become stronger. And if they should be allowed free scope, then there can be no doubt that the collective-farm movement will be considerably weakened and the danger of its breaking down may become a reality.

Hence the task of our press is: systematically to denounce these and similar anti-Leninist sentiments.

A few facts.

1. The successes of our collective-farm policy are due, among other things, to the fact that it rests on the *voluntary character* of the collective-farm movement and on *taking into account the diversity of conditions* in the various regions of the USSR. Collective farms must not be established by force. That would be foolish and reactionary. The collective-farm movement must rest on the active support of the main mass of the peasantry. Examples of the formation of collective farms in the developed areas must not be mechanically transplanted to underdeveloped areas. That would be foolish and reactionary. Such a "policy" would discredit the collectivization idea at one stroke. In determining the speed and methods of collective-farm development, careful consideration must be given to the diversity of conditions in the various regions of the USSR.

Our grain-growing areas are ahead of all others in the collective-farm movement. Why is this?

Firstly, because in these areas we have the largest number of already firmly-established state farms and collective farms, thanks to which the peasants have had the opportunity to convince themselves of the power and importance of the new technical equipment, of the

power and importance of the new, collective organization of farming.

Secondly, because these areas have had two years' schooling in the fight against the kulaks during the grain-procurement campaigns, and this could not but facilitate the development of the collective-farm movement.

Lastly, because these areas in recent years have been extensively supplied with the best cadres from the industrial centres.

Can it be said that these especially favourable conditions also exist in other areas, the consuming areas, for example, such as our northern regions, or in areas where there are still backward nationalities, such as Turkestan, say?

No, it cannot be said.

Clearly, the principle of taking into account the diversity of conditions in the various regions of the USSR is, together with the voluntary principle, one of the most important prerequisites for a sound collective-farm movement.

But what actually happens sometimes? Can it be said that the voluntary principle and the principle of taking local peculiarities into account are not violated in a number of areas? No, that cannot be said, unfortunately. We know, for example, that in a number of the northern areas of the consuming zone, where conditions for the immediate organization of collective farms are comparatively less favourable than in the grain-growing areas, attempts are not infrequently made to *replace* preparatory work for the organization of collective farms by bureaucratic decreeing of the collective-farm movement, paper resolutions on the growth of collective farms, organization of collective farms on paper — collective farms which have as yet no reality, but whose “existence” is proclaimed in a heap of boastful resolutions.

Or take certain areas of Turkestan, where conditions for the immediate organization of collective farms are even less favourable than in the northern regions of the consuming zone. We know that in a number of areas of Turkestan there have already been attempts to “overtake and outstrip” the advanced areas of the USSR by threatening to use armed force, by threatening that peasants who are not yet ready to join the collective farms will be deprived of irrigation, water and manufactured goods.

What can there be in common between this Sergeant Prishibeyev “policy” and the Party's policy of relying on the voluntary principle and of taking local peculiarities into account in collective-farm development? Clearly, there is not and cannot be anything in common

between them.

Who benefits by these distortions, this bureaucratic decreeing of the collective-farm movement, these unworthy threats against the peasants? Nobody, except our enemies!

What may these distortions lead to? To strengthening our enemies and to discrediting the idea of the collective-farm movement.

Is it not clear that the authors of these distortions, who imagine themselves to be “lefts,” are in reality bringing grist to the mill of right opportunism?

2. One of the greatest merits of our Party’s political strategy is that it is able at any given moment to pick out the *main link* in the movement, by grasping which the Party draws the whole chain towards one common goal in order to achieve the solution of the problem. Can it be said that the Party has already picked out the main link of the collective-farm movement in the system of collective-farm development? Yes, this can and should be said.

What is this chief link?

Is it, perhaps, *association for joint cultivation* of the land? No, it is not that. Associations for joint cultivation of the land, in which the means of production are not yet socialized, are already a past stage of the collective-farm movement.

Is it, perhaps, the *agricultural commune*? No, it is not that. Communes are still of isolated occurrence in the collective farm movement. The conditions are not yet ripe for agricultural communes — in which not only production, but also distribution is socialized — to be the *predominant* form.

The main link of the collective-farm movement, its *predominant* form at the present moment, the link which has to be grasped now, is the *agricultural artel*.

In the *agricultural artel*, the basic means of production, primarily for grain-farming — labour, use of the land, machines and other implements, draught animals and farm buildings — are socialized. In the artel, the household plots (small vegetable gardens, small orchards), the dwelling houses, a part of the dairy cattle, small live-stock, poultry, etc., are *not socialized*.

The artel is the *main link of the collective-farm movement* because it is the form best adapted for solving the grain problem. And the grain problem is the *main link in the whole system of agriculture* because, if it is not solved, it will be impossible to solve either the problem of stock-breeding (small and large), or the problem of the industrial and special crops that provide the principal raw materials for indus-

try. That is why the agricultural artel is the main link in the system of the collective-farm movement at the present moment.

That is the point of departure of the "Model Rules" for collective farms, the final text of which is published today.*

And that should be the point of departure of our Party and Soviet workers, one of whose duties it is to make a thorough study of these Rules and to carry them out down to the last detail.

Such is the line of the Party at the present moment.

Can it be said that this line of the Party is being carried out without violation or distortion? No, it cannot, unfortunately. We know that in a number of areas of the USSR, where the struggle for the existence of the collective farms is still far from over, and where artels are not yet consolidated, attempts are being made to skip the artel framework and to leap straight away into the agricultural commune. The artel is still not consolidated, but they are already "socializing" dwelling houses, small livestock and poultry; moreover, this "socialization" is degenerating into bureaucratic decreeing on paper, because the conditions which would make such socialization necessary do not yet exist. One might think that the grain problem has already been solved in the collective farms, that it is already a past stage, that the principal task at the present moment is not solution of the grain problem, but solution of the problem of livestock-and poultry-breeding. Who, we may ask, benefits from this block-headed "work" of lumping together different forms of the collective-farm movement? Who benefits from this running too far ahead, which is stupid and harmful to our cause? Irritating the collective-farm peasant by "socializing" dwelling houses, all dairy cattle, all small livestock and poultry, when the grain problem is still *unsolved*, when the artel form of collective farming is *not yet consolidated* — is it not obvious that such a "policy" can be to the satisfaction and advantage only of our sworn enemies?

One such overzealous "socializer" even goes so far as to issue an order to an artel containing the following instructions: "Within three days, register all the poultry of every household"; establish posts of special "commanders" for registration and supervision; "occupy the key positions in the artel"; "command the socialist battle without quitting your posts" and — of course — get a tight grip on the whole life of the artel.

What is this — a policy of directing the collective farms, or a pol-

* *Pravda*, March 2, 1930.

icy of *disrupting* and *discrediting* them?

I say nothing of those “revolutionaries” — save the mark! — who *begin* the work of organizing artels by removing the bells from the churches. Just imagine, removing the church bells — how r-r-revolutionary!

How could there have arisen in our midst such blockheaded exercises in “socialization,” such ludicrous attempts to over-leap oneself, attempts which aim at bypassing, classes and the class struggle, and which in fact bring grist to the mill of our class enemies?

They could have arisen only in the atmosphere of our “easy” and “unexpected” successes on the front of collective-farm development.

They could have arisen only as a result of the blockheaded belief of a section of our Party: “We can achieve anything!,” “There’s nothing we can’t do!”

They could have arisen only because some of our comrades have become dizzy with success and for the moment have lost clearness of mind and sobriety of vision.

To correct the line of our work in the sphere of collective-farm development, *we must put an end to these sentiments.*

That is now one of the immediate tasks of the Party.

The art of leadership is a serious matter. One must not lag behind the movement, because to do so is to lose contact with the masses. But neither must one run too far ahead, because to run too far ahead is to lose the masses and to isolate oneself. He who wants to lead a movement and at the same time keep in touch with the vast masses must wage a fight on two fronts — against those who lag behind and against those who run too far ahead.

Our Party is strong and invincible because, when leading a movement, it is able to preserve and multiply its contacts with the vast masses of the workers and peasants.

ANTI-SEMITISM

(Reply to an Inquiry of the Jewish News Agency in the United States)

January 12, 1931

In answer to your inquiry:

National and racial chauvinism is a vestige of the misanthropic customs characteristic of the period of cannibalism. Anti-Semitism, as an extreme form of racial chauvinism, is the most dangerous vestige of cannibalism.

Anti-Semitism is of advantage to the exploiters as a lightning conductor that deflects the blows aimed by the working people at capitalism. Anti-Semitism is dangerous for the working people as being a false path that leads them off the right road and lands them in the jungle. Hence communists, as consistent internationalists, cannot but be irreconcilable, sworn enemies of anti-Semitism.

In the USSR anti-Semitism is punishable with the utmost severity of the law as a phenomenon deeply hostile to the Soviet system. Under USSR law active anti-Semites are liable to the death penalty.

THE TASKS OF BUSINESS EXECUTIVES

(Speech Delivered at the First All-Union Conference of Leading Personnel of Socialist Industry¹¹⁵)

February 4, 1931

Comrades, the deliberations of your conference are drawing to a close. You are now about to adopt resolutions. I have no doubt that they will be adopted unanimously. In these resolutions — I am somewhat familiar with them — you approve the control figures of industry for 1931 and pledge yourselves to fulfil them.

A Bolshevik's word is his bond. Bolsheviks are in the habit of fulfilling promises made by them. But what does the pledge to fulfil the control figures for 1931 mean? It means ensuring a total increase of industrial output by 45 per cent. And that is a very big task. More than that. Such a pledge means that you not only pledge yourselves to fulfil our five-year plan in four years — that matter has already been settled, and no more resolutions on it are needed — it means that you promise to fulfil it in three years in all the basic, decisive branches of industry.

It is good that the conference gives a promise to fulfil the plan for 1931, to fulfil the five-year plan in three years. But we have been taught by "bitter experience." We know that promises are not always kept. In the beginning of 1930, too, a promise was given to fulfil the plan for the year. At that time it was necessary to increase the output of our industries by 31 to 32 per cent. But that promise was not kept to the full. Actually, the increase in industrial output during 1930 amounted to 25 per cent. We must ask: Will not the same thing occur again this year? The managers and leading personnel of our industries now promise to increase industrial output in 1931 by 45 per cent. But what guarantee is there that this promise will be kept?

What is needed in order to fulfil the control figures, to achieve a 45 per cent increase in output, to secure the fulfilment of the five-year plan not in four, but, as regards the basic and decisive branches of industry, in three years?

Two fundamental conditions are needed for this.

Firstly, real or, as we term it, "objective" possibilities.

Secondly, the willingness and ability to direct our enterprises in such a way as to realize these possibilities.

Did we have the "objective" possibilities last year for completely

fulfilling the plan? Yes, we had. Incontestable facts testify to this. These facts show that in March and April of last year industry achieved an increase of 31 per cent in output compared with the previous year. Why then, it will be asked, did we fail to fulfil the plan for the whole year? What prevented it? What was lacking? The ability to make use of the existing possibilities was lacking. The ability to manage the factories, mills and mines properly was lacking.

We had the first condition: the “objective” possibilities for fulfilling the plan. But we did not have in sufficient degree the second condition: the ability to manage production. And precisely because we lacked the ability to manage the factories, the plan was not fulfilled. Instead of a 31-32 per cent increase we had one of only 25 per cent.

Of course, a 25 per cent increase is a big thing. Not a single capitalist country increased its production in 1930, or is increasing production now. In all capitalist countries without exception a sharp decline in production is taking place. Under such circumstances a 25 per cent increase is a big step forward. But we could have achieved more. We had all the necessary “objective” conditions for this.

And so, what guarantee is there that what happened last year will not be repeated this year, that the plan will be fulfilled, that we shall use the existing possibilities in the way that they should be used, that your promise will not to some extent remain a promise on paper?

In the history of states and countries, in the history of armies, there have been cases when there was every possibility for success and victory, but these possibilities were wasted because the leaders failed to notice them, did not know how to take advantage of them, and the armies suffered defeat.

Have we all the possibilities that are needed to fulfil the control figures for 1931?

Yes, we have such possibilities.

What are these possibilities? What is needed in order that these possibilities should really exist?

First of all, adequate natural resources in the country: iron ore, coal, oil, grain, cotton. Have we these resources? Yes, we have. We have them in larger quantities than any other country. Take the Urals, for example, which provide a combination of resources not to be found in any other country. Ore, coal, oil, grain — what is there not in the Urals? We have everything in our country, except, perhaps, rubber. But within a year or two we shall have our own rubber

as well. As far as natural resources are concerned we are fully provided. We have even more than necessary.

What else is needed?

A government desirous and capable of utilizing these immense natural resources for the benefit of the people. Have we such a government? We have. True, our work in utilizing natural resources does not always proceed without friction among our leading personnel. For instance, last year the Soviet government had to conduct a certain amount of struggle over the question of creating a second coal and metallurgical base, without which we cannot develop further. But we have already overcome these obstacles and shall soon have this base.

What else is needed?

That this government should enjoy the support of the vast masses of workers and peasants. Does our government enjoy such support? Yes, it does. You will find no other government in the world that enjoys such support from the workers and peasants as does the Soviet government. There is no need for me to refer to the growth of socialist emulation, the spread of shock-brigade work, the campaign and struggle for counter-plans. All these facts, which vividly demonstrate the support that the vast masses give the Soviet government, are well known.

What else is needed in order to fulfil and overfulfil the control figures for 1931?

A system that is free from the incurable diseases of capitalism and has great advantages over capitalism. Crises, unemployment, waste, destitution among the masses — such are the incurable diseases of capitalism. Our system does not suffer from these diseases because power is in our hands, in the hands of the working class; because we are conducting a planned economy, systematically accumulating resources and properly distributing them among the different branches of the national economy. We are free from the incurable diseases of capitalism. That is what distinguishes us from capitalism; that is what constitutes our decisive superiority over capitalism.

Notice the way in which the capitalists are trying to escape from the economic crisis. They are reducing the workers' wages as much as possible. They are reducing the prices of raw materials as much as possible. But they do not want to reduce the prices of food and industrial commodities for mass consumption to any important extent. This means that they want to escape from the crisis at the expense of the principal consumers, at the expense of the workers and peasants,

at the expense of the working people. The capitalists are cutting the ground from under their own feet. And instead of overcoming the crisis they are aggravating it; new conditions are accumulating which lead to a new, even more severe crisis.

Our superiority lies in the fact that we have no crises of overproduction, we have not and never will have millions of unemployed, we have no anarchy in production, for we are conducting a planned economy. But that is not all. We are a land of the most concentrated industry. This means that we can build our industry on the basis of the best technique and thereby secure an unprecedented productivity of labour, an unprecedented rate of accumulation. Our weakness in the past was that this industry was based upon scattered and small peasant farming. That was so in the past; it is no longer so now. Soon, perhaps within a year, we shall become the country of the largest-scale agriculture in the world. This year, the state farms and collective farms — and these are forms of large-scale farming — have already supplied half of all our marketable grain. And that means that our system, the Soviet system, affords us opportunities of rapid progress of which not a single bourgeois country can dream.

What else is needed in order to advance with giant strides?

A party sufficiently solid and united to direct the efforts of all the best members of the working class to one point, and sufficiently experienced to be unafraid of difficulties and to pursue systematically a correct, revolutionary, Bolshevik policy. Have we such a party? Yes, we have. Is its policy correct? Yes, it is, for it is yielding important successes. This is now admitted not only by the friends but also by the enemies of the working class. See how all the well-known “honourable” gentlemen, Fish in America, Churchill in Britain, Poincaré in France, fume and rave against our Party. Why do they fume and rave? Because the policy of our Party is correct, because it is yielding success after success.

There, comrades, you have all those objective possibilities which assist us in realizing the control figures for 1931, which help us to fulfil the five-year plan in four years, and in the key industries even in three years.

Thus we have the first condition for fulfilment of the plan — the “objective” possibilities.

Have we the second condition, the ability to use these possibilities?

In other words, are our factories, mills and mines properly managed? Is everything in order in this respect?

Unfortunately, not everything is in order here. And, as Bolsheviks, we must say this plainly and frankly.

What does management of production mean? There are people among us who do not always have a Bolshevik approach to the question of the management of our factories. There are many people among us who think that management is synonymous with signing papers and orders. This is sad, but true. At times one cannot help recalling Shchedrin's Pompadours. Do you remember how Madame Pompadour taught the young Pompadour: "Don't bother your head with science, don't go into matters, let others do that, it is not your business — your business is to sign papers." It must be admitted to our shame that even among us Bolsheviks there are not a few who carry out management by signing papers. But as for going into matters, mastering technique, becoming master of the business — why, that is out of the question.

How is it that we Bolsheviks, who have made three revolutions, who emerged victorious from the bitter civil war, who have solved the tremendous task of building a modern industry, who have swung the peasantry on to the path of socialism — how is it that in the matter of the management of production we bow to a slip of paper?

The reason is that it is easier to sign papers than to manage production. And so, many economic executives are taking this line of least resistance. We, too, in the centre, are also to blame. About ten years ago a slogan was issued: "Since communists do not yet properly understand the technique of production, since they have yet to learn the art of management, let the old technicians and engineers — the experts — carry on production, and you, communists, do not interfere with the technique of the business; but, while not interfering, study technique, study the art of management tirelessly, in order later on, together with the experts who are loyal to us, to become true managers of production, true masters of the business." Such was the slogan. But what actually happened? The second part of this formula was cast aside, for it is harder to study than to sign papers; and the first part of the formula was vulgarized: non-interference was interpreted to mean refraining from studying the technique of production. The result has been nonsense, harmful and dangerous nonsense, which the sooner we discard the better.

Life itself has more than once warned us that all was not well in this field. The Shakhty affair was the first grave warning. The Shakhty affair showed that the Party organizations and the trade unions lacked revolutionary vigilance. It showed that our economic execu-

tives were disgracefully backward in technical knowledge; that some of the old engineers and technicians, working without supervision, rather easily go over to wrecking activities, especially as they are constantly being besieged by “offers” from our enemies abroad.

The second warning was the “Industrial Party” trial.¹¹⁶

Of course, the underlying cause of wrecking activities is the class struggle. Of course, the class enemy furiously resists the socialist offensive. This alone, however, is not an adequate explanation for the luxuriant growth of wrecking activities.

How is it that wrecking activities assumed such wide dimensions? Who is to blame for this? We are to blame. Had we handled the business of managing production differently, had we started much earlier to learn the technique of the business, to master technique, had we more frequently and efficiently intervened in the management of production, the wreckers would not have succeeded in doing so much damage.

We must ourselves become experts, masters of the business; we must turn to technical science — such was the lesson life itself was teaching us. But neither the first warning nor even the second brought about the necessary change. It is time, high time that we turned towards technique. It is time to discard the old slogan, the obsolete slogan of non-interference in technique, and ourselves become specialists, experts, complete masters of our economic affairs.

It is frequently asked: Why have we not one-man management? We do not have it and we shall not get it until we have mastered technique. Until there are among us Bolsheviki a sufficient number of people thoroughly familiar with technique, economy and finance, we shall not have real one-man management. You can write as many resolutions as you please, take as many vows as you please, but, unless you master the technique, economy and finance of the mill, factory or mine, nothing will come of it, there will be no one-man management.

Hence, the task is for us to master technique ourselves, to become masters of the business ourselves. This is the sole guarantee that our plans will be carried out in full, and that one-man management will be established.

This, of course, is no easy matter; but it can certainly be accomplished. Science, technical experience, knowledge, are all things that can be acquired. We may not have them today, but tomorrow we shall. The main thing is to have the passionate Bolshevik desire to master technique, to master the science of production. Everything

can be achieved, everything can be overcome, if there is a passionate desire for it.

It is sometimes asked whether it is not possible to slow down the tempo somewhat, to put a check on the movement. No, comrades, it is not possible! The tempo must not be reduced! On the contrary, we must increase it as much as is within our powers and possibilities. This is dictated to us by our obligations to the workers and peasants of the USSR. This is dictated to us by our obligations to the working class of the whole world.

To slacken the tempo would mean falling behind. And those who fall behind get beaten. But we do not want to be beaten. No, we refuse to be beaten! One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual beatings she suffered because of her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her — because of her backwardness, because of her military backwardness, cultural backwardness, political backwardness, industrial backwardness, agricultural backwardness. They beat her because it was profitable and could be done with impunity. You remember the words of the pre-revolutionary poet: “You are poor and abundant, mighty and impotent, Mother Russia.”¹¹⁷ Those gentlemen were quite familiar with the verses of the old poet. They beat her, saying: “You are abundant,” so one can enrich oneself at your expense. They beat her, saying: “You are poor and impotent,” so you can be beaten and plundered with impunity. Such is the law of the exploiters — to beat the backward and the weak. It is the jungle law of capitalism. You are backward, you are weak — therefore you are wrong; hence you can be beaten and enslaved. You are mighty — therefore you are right; hence we must be wary of you.

That is why we must no longer lag behind.

In the past we had no fatherland, nor could we have had one. But now that we have overthrown capitalism and power is in our hands, in the hands of the people, we have a fatherland, and we will uphold its independence. Do you want our socialist fatherland to be beaten and to lose its independence? If you do not want this, you must put an end to its backwardness in the shortest possible time and develop a genuine Bolshevik tempo in building up its socialist economy. There is no other way. That is why Lenin said on the eve of the October Revolution: “Either perish, or overtake and outstrip the ad-

vanced capitalist countries.”

We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we shall go under.

That is what our obligations to the workers and peasants of the USSR dictate to us.

But we have yet other, more serious and more important, obligations. They are our obligations to the world proletariat. They coincide with our obligations to the workers and peasants of the USSR. But we place them higher. The working class of the USSR is part of the world working class. We achieved victory not solely through the efforts of the working class of the USSR, but also thanks to the support of the working class of the world. Without this support we would have been torn to pieces long ago. It is said that our country is the shock brigade of the proletariat of all countries. That is well said. But it imposes very serious obligations upon us. Why does the international proletariat support us? How did we merit this support? By the fact that we were the first to hurl ourselves into the battle against capitalism, we were the first to establish working-class state power, we were the first to begin building socialism. By the fact that we were engaged on a cause which, if successful, will transform the whole world and free the entire working class. But what is needed for success? The elimination of our backwardness, the development of a high Bolshevik tempo of construction. We must march forward in such a way that the working class of the whole world, looking at us, may say: There you have my advanced detachment, my shock brigade, my working-class state power, my fatherland; they are engaged on their cause, our cause, and they are working well; let us support them against the capitalists and promote the cause of the world revolution. Must we not justify the hopes of the world's working class, must we not fulfil our obligations to them? Yes, we must if we do not want to utterly disgrace ourselves.

Such are our obligations, internal and international.

As you see, they dictate to us a Bolshevik tempo of development.

I will not say that we have accomplished nothing in regard to management of production during these years. In fact, we have accomplished a good deal. We have doubled our industrial output compared with the prewar level. We have created the largest-scale agricultural production in the world. But we could have accomplished still more if we had tried during this period really to master production, the technique of production, the financial and economic

side of it.

In ten years at most we must make good the distance that separates us from the advanced capitalist countries. We have all the “objective” possibilities for this. The only thing lacking is the ability to make proper use of these possibilities. And that depends on us. Only on us! It is time we learned to make use of these possibilities. It is time to put an end to the rotten line of non-interference in production. It is time to adopt a new line, one corresponding to the present period — the line of interfering in everything. If you are a factory manager — interfere in all the affairs of the factory, look into everything, let nothing escape you, learn and learn again. Bolsheviki must master technique. It is time Bolsheviki themselves became experts. In the period of reconstruction, technique decides everything. And an economic executive who does not want to study technique, who does not want to master technique, is a joke and not an executive.

It is said that it is hard to master technique. That is not true! There are no fortresses that Bolsheviki cannot capture. We have solved a number of most difficult problems. We have overthrown capitalism. We have assumed power. We have built up a huge socialist industry. We have transferred the middle peasants on to the path of socialism. We have already accomplished what is most important from the point of view of construction. What remains to be done is not so much: to study technique, to master science. And when we have done that we shall develop a tempo of which we dare not even dream at present.

And we shall do it if we really want to.

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU(B)¹¹⁸

January 26, 1934

I

THE CONTINUING CRISIS OF WORLD CAPITALISM AND THE EXTERNAL SITUATION OF THE SOVIET UNION

Comrades, more than three years have passed since the Sixteenth Congress. That is not a very long period. But it has been fuller in content than any other period. I do not think that any period in the last decade has been so rich in events as this one.

In the *economic* sphere these years have been years of continuing world economic crisis. The crisis has affected not only industry, but also agriculture as a whole. The crisis has raged not only in the sphere of production and trade; it has also extended to the sphere of credit and money circulation, and has completely upset the established credit and currency relations among countries. While formerly people here and there still disputed whether there was a world economic crisis or not, now they no longer do so, for the existence of the crisis and its devastating effects are only too obvious. Now the controversy centres around another question: Is there a way out of the crisis or not; and if there is, then what is to be done?

In the *political* sphere these years have been years of further tension both in the relations between the capitalist countries and in the relations within them. Japan's war against China and the occupation of Manchuria, which have strained relations in the Far East; the victory of fascism in Germany and the triumph of the idea of revenge, which have strained relations in Europe; the withdrawal of Japan and Germany from the League of Nations, which has given a new impetus to the growth of armaments and to the preparations for an imperialist war; the defeat of fascism in Spain,¹¹⁹ which is one more indication that a revolutionary crisis is maturing and that fascism is

far from being long-lived — such are the most important events of the period under review. It is not surprising that bourgeois pacifism is breathing its last and that the trend towards disarmament is openly and definitely giving way to a trend towards armament and rearmament.

Amid the surging waves of economic perturbations and military-political catastrophes, the USSR stands out like a rock, continuing its work of socialist construction and its fight to preserve peace. Whereas in the capitalist countries the economic crisis is still raging, in the USSR the advance continues both in industry and in agriculture. Whereas in the capitalist countries feverish preparations are in progress for a new war for a new redivision of the world and of spheres of influence, the USSR is continuing its systematic and persistent struggle against the menace of war and for peace; and it cannot be said that the efforts of the USSR in this direction have had no success.

Such is the general picture of the international situation at the present moment.

Let us pass to an examination of the principal data on the economic and political situation in the capitalist countries.

1. THE COURSE OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

The present economic crisis in the capitalist countries differs from all analogous crises, among other things, in that it is the longest and most protracted crisis. Formerly crises would come to an end in a year or two; the present crisis, however, is now in its fifth year, devastating the economy of the capitalist countries year after year and draining it of the fat accumulated in previous years. It is not surprising that this is the most severe of all the crises that have taken place.

How is this unprecedentedly protracted character of the present industrial crisis to be explained?

It is to be explained, first of all, by the fact that the industrial crisis has affected every capitalist country without exception, which has made it difficult for some countries to manoeuvre at the expense of others.

Secondly, it is to be explained by the fact that the industrial crisis has become interwoven with the agrarian crisis which has affected all the agrarian and semi-agrarian countries without exception, which could not but make the industrial crisis more complicated and more

profound.

Thirdly, it is to be explained by the fact that the agrarian crisis has grown more acute in this period, and has affected all branches of agriculture, including livestock farming; that it has brought about a retrogression of agriculture, a reversion from machines to hand labour, a substitution of horses for tractors, a sharp reduction in the use of artificial fertilizers, and in some cases a complete abandonment of them — all of which has caused the industrial crisis to become still more protracted.

Fourthly, it is to be explained by the fact that the monopolist cartels which dominate industry strive to maintain high commodity prices, a circumstance which makes the crisis particularly painful and hinders the absorption of commodity stocks.

Lastly — and this is the chief thing — it is to be explained by the fact that the industrial crisis broke out in the conditions of the *general* crisis of capitalism, when capitalism no longer has, nor can have, either in the major countries or in the colonial and dependent countries, the strength and stability it had before the war and the October Revolution; when industry in the capitalist countries has acquired, as a heritage from the imperialist war, chronic under-capacity operation of plants and armies of millions of unemployed, of which it is no longer able to rid itself.

Such are the circumstances that have given rise to the extremely protracted character of the present industrial crisis.

It is these circumstances also that explain the fact that the crisis has not been confined to the sphere of production and trade, but has also affected the credit system, foreign exchange, the debt settlements, etc., and has broken down the traditionally established relations both between countries and between social groups in the various countries.

An important part was played by the fall in commodity prices. In spite of the resistance of the monopolist cartels, the fall in prices increased with elemental force, affecting primarily and mainly the commodities of the unorganized commodity owners — peasants, artisans, small capitalists — and only gradually and to a smaller degree those of the organized commodity owners — the capitalists united in cartels. The fall in prices made the position of debtors (manufacturers, artisans, peasants, etc.) intolerable, while, on the other hand, it placed creditors in an unprecedentedly privileged position. Such a situation was bound to lead, and actually did lead to the mass bankruptcy of firms and of individual capitalists. As a result, tens of

thousands of joint-stock companies have failed in the United States, Germany, Britain and France during the past three years. The bankruptcy of joint-stock companies was followed by a depreciation of currency, which slightly alleviated the position of debtors. The depreciation of currency was followed by the non-payment of debts, both foreign and internal, legalized by the state. The collapse of such banks as the Darmstadt and Dresden banks in Germany and the Kreditanstalt in Austria, and of concerns like Kreuger's in Sweden, the Insull corporation in the United States, etc. is well known to all.

Naturally, these phenomena, which shook the foundations of the credit system, were bound to be followed, and actually were followed, by the cessation of payments on credits and foreign loans, the cessation of payments on inter-Allied debts, the cessation of export of capital, a further decline in foreign trade, a further decline in the export of commodities, an intensification of the struggle for foreign markets, trade war between countries, and — dumping. Yes, comrades, dumping. I am not referring to the alleged Soviet dumping, about which only very recently certain honourable members of honourable parliaments in Europe and America were shouting themselves hoarse. I am referring to the real dumping that is now being practised by almost all “civilized” states, and about which these gallant and honourable members of parliaments maintain a prudent silence.

Naturally, also, these destructive phenomena accompanying the industrial crisis, which took place outside the sphere of production, could not but in their turn influence the course of the industrial crisis, aggravating it and complicating the situation still further.

Such is the general picture of the course of the industrial crisis.

Here are a few figures, taken from official data, that illustrate the course of the industrial crisis during the period under review.

*Volume of Industrial Output
(Per cent of 1929)*

	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
USSR	100	129.7	161.9	184.7	201.6
USA	100	80.7	68.1	53.8	64.9
Britain	100	92.4	83.8	83.8	86.1
Germany	100	88.3	71.7	59.8	66.8
France	100	100.7	89.2	69.1	77.4

As you see, this table speaks for itself.

While industry in the principal capitalist countries declined from year to year, compared with 1929, and began to recover somewhat only in 1933 — although still far from reaching the level of 1929 — industry in the USSR grew from year to year, experiencing an uninterrupted rise.

While industry in the principal capitalist countries at the end of 1933 shows on the average a *reduction* of 25 per cent and more in volume of output compared with 1929, industrial output in the USSR has more than doubled during this period, i.e., it has *increased* more than 100 per cent. (*Applause.*)

Judging by this table, it may seem that of these four capitalist countries Britain is in the most favourable position. But that is not quite true. If we compare industry in these countries with its prewar level we get a somewhat different picture.

Here is the corresponding table:

Volume of Industrial Output
(Per cent of prewar level)

	1913	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
USSR	100	194.3	252.1	314.7	359.0	391.9
USA	100	170.2	137.3	115.9	91.4	110.2
Britain	100	99.1	91.5	83.0	82.5	85.2
Germany	100	113.0	99.8	81.0	67.6	75.4
France	100	139.0	140.0	124.0	96.1	107.6

As you see, industry in Britain and Germany has not yet reached the prewar level, while the United States and France have exceeded it by several per cent, and the USSR has raised, increased its industrial output during this period by more than 290 per cent over the prewar level. (*Applause.*)

But there is still another conclusion to be drawn from these tables.

While industry in the principal capitalist countries declined steadily after 1930, and particularly after 1931, and reached its lowest point in 1932, in 1933 it began to recover and pick up somewhat. If we take the monthly returns for 1932 and 1933 we find still further confirmation of this conclusion; for they show that, despite fluctua-

tions of output in the course of 1933, industry in these countries revealed no tendency to fall to the lowest point reached in the summer of 1932.

What does this mean?

It means that, apparently, industry in the principal capitalist countries had already reached the lowest point of decline and did not return to it in the course of 1933.

Some people are inclined to ascribe this phenomenon exclusively to the influence of artificial factors, such as the war-inflation boom. There can be no doubt that the war-inflation boom plays no small part in it. This is particularly true in regard to Japan, where this artificial factor is the principal and decisive force stimulating a certain revival in some industries, mainly war industries. But it would be a gross mistake to explain everything by the war-inflation boom. Such an explanation would be incorrect, if only for the reason that the changes in industry which I have described are observed, not in separate and chance areas, but in all, or nearly all, the industrial countries, including the countries with a stable currency. Apparently, in addition to the war-inflation boom, the internal economic forces of capitalism are also operating here.

Capitalism has succeeded in somewhat alleviating the position of industry *at the expense of the workers*, by heightening their exploitation through increased intensity of labour; *at the expense of the farmers*, by pursuing a policy of paying the lowest prices for the products of their labour, for foodstuffs and, partly, raw materials; and *at the expense of the peasants in the colonies and economically weak countries*, by still further forcing down prices for the products of their labour, principally for raw materials, and also for foodstuffs.

Does this mean that we are witnessing a transition from a crisis to an ordinary depression, to be followed by a new upswing and flourishing of industry? No, it does not. At any rate, at the present time there is no evidence, direct or indirect, to indicate the approach of an upswing of industry in the capitalist countries. More than that, judging by all things, there can be no such evidence, at least in the near future. There can be no such evidence, because all the unfavourable conditions which prevent industry in the capitalist countries from making any considerable advance continue to operate. I have in mind the continuing *general* crisis of capitalism, in the circumstances of which the *economic* crisis is proceeding; the chronic under-capacity operation of the enterprises; chronic mass unemployment; the interweaving of the industrial crisis with an agricul-

tural crisis; the absence of tendencies towards a more or less serious renewal of fixed capital, which usually heralds the approach of a boom, etc., etc.

Evidently, what we are witnessing is a transition from the lowest point of decline of industry, from the lowest point of the industrial crisis, to a depression — not an ordinary depression, but a depression of a special kind, which does not lead to a new upswing and flourishing of industry, but which, on the other hand, does not force industry back to the lowest point of decline.

2. THE GROWING TENSION IN THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

A result of the protracted economic crisis has been an unprecedented increase in the tension of the political situation in the capitalist countries, both within those countries and in their mutual relations.

The intensified struggle for foreign markets, the abolition of the last vestiges of free trade, the prohibitive tariffs, the trade war, the foreign currency war, dumping, and many other analogous measures which demonstrate extreme *nationalism* in economic policy have strained to the utmost the relations among the various countries, have created the basis for military conflicts, and have put war on the order of the day as a means for a new redivision of the world and of spheres of influence in favour of the stronger states.

Japan's war against China, the occupation of Manchuria, Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations and her advance in North China, have made the situation still more tense. The intensified struggle for the Pacific and the growth of naval armaments in Japan, the United States, Britain and France are results of this increased tension.

Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations and the spectre of revanchism have further added to the tension and have given a fresh impetus to the growth of armaments in Europe.

It is not surprising that bourgeois pacifism is now dragging out a miserable existence, and that idle talk of disarmament is giving way to "business-like" talk about armament and rearmament.

Once again, as in 1914, the parties of bellicose imperialism, the parties of war and revanchism are coming to the foreground.

Quite clearly things are heading for a new war.

The internal situation of the capitalist countries, in view of the operation of these same factors, is becoming still more tense. Four

years of industrial crisis have exhausted the working class and reduced it to despair. Four years of agricultural crisis have utterly ruined the poorer strata of the peasantry, not only in the principal capitalist countries, but also — and particularly — in the dependent and colonial countries. It is a fact that, notwithstanding all kinds of statistical trickery designed to minimize unemployment, the number of unemployed, according to the official figures of bourgeois institutions, reaches 3,000,000 in Britain, 5,000,000 in Germany and 10,000,000 in the United States, not to mention the other European countries. Add to this the more than ten million partially unemployed; add the vast masses of ruined peasants — and you will get an approximate picture of the poverty and despair of the labouring masses. The masses of the people have not yet reached the stage when they are ready to storm capitalism; but the idea of storming it is maturing in the minds of the masses — of that there can hardly be any doubt. This is eloquently testified to by such facts as, say, the Spanish revolution which overthrew the fascist regime, and the expansion of the Soviet districts in China, which the united counter-revolution of the Chinese and foreign bourgeoisie is unable to stop.

This, indeed, explains why the ruling classes in the capitalist countries are so zealously destroying or nullifying the last vestiges of parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy which might be used by the working class in its struggle against the oppressors, why they are driving the communist parties underground and resorting to openly terrorist methods of maintaining their dictatorship.

Chauvinism and preparation of war as the main elements of foreign policy; repression of the working class and terrorism in the sphere of home policy as a necessary means for strengthening the rear of future war fronts — that is what is now particularly engaging the minds of contemporary imperialist politicians.

It is not surprising that fascism has now become the most fashionable commodity among warmongering bourgeois politicians. I am referring not only to fascism in general, but, primarily, to fascism of the German type, which is wrongly called national-socialism — wrongly because the most searching examination will fail to reveal even an atom of socialism in it.

In this connection the victory of fascism in Germany must be regarded not only as a symptom of the weakness of the working class and a result of the betrayals of the working class by social-democracy, which paved the way for fascism; it must also be regarded as a sign of the weakness of the bourgeoisie, a sign that the bour-

geoisie is no longer able to rule by the old methods of parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy, and, as a consequence, is compelled in its home policy to resort to terrorist methods of rule — as a sign that it is no longer able to find a way out of the present situation on the basis of a peaceful foreign policy, and, as a consequence, is compelled to resort to a policy of war.

Such is the situation.

As you see, things are heading towards a new imperialist war as a way out of the present situation.

Of course, there are no grounds for assuming that war can provide a real way out. On the contrary, it is bound to confuse the situation still more. More than that, it is sure to unleash revolution and jeopardize the very existence of capitalism in a number of countries, as happened in the course of the first imperialist war. And if, in spite of the experience of the first imperialist war, the bourgeois politicians clutch at war as a drowning man clutches at a straw, that shows that they have got into a hopeless muddle, have landed in an impasse, and are ready to rush headlong into the abyss.

It is worthwhile, therefore, briefly to examine the plans for the organization of war which are now being hatched in the circles of bourgeois politicians.

Some think that war should be organized against one of the great powers. They think of inflicting a crushing defeat upon that power and of improving their affairs at its expense. Let us assume that they organize such a war. What may be the result of that?

As is well known, during the first imperialist war it was also intended to destroy one of the great powers, viz., Germany, and to profit at its expense. But what was the upshot of this? They did not destroy Germany; but they sowed in Germany such a hatred of the victors, and created such a rich soil for revenge, that even to this day they have not been able to clear up the revolting mess they made, and will not, perhaps, be able to do so for some time. On the other hand, the result they obtained was the smashing of capitalism in Russia, the victory of the proletarian revolution in Russia, and — of course — the Soviet Union. What guarantee is there that a second imperialist war will produce “better” results for them than the first? Would it not be more correct to assume that the opposite will be the case?

Others think that war should be organized against a country that is weak in the military sense, but represents an extensive market — for example, against China, which, it is claimed, cannot even be de-

scribed as a state in the strict sense of the word, but is merely “unorganized territory” which needs to be seized by strong states. They evidently want to divide it up completely and improve their affairs at its expense. Let us assume that they organize such a war. What may be the result of that?

It is well known that at the beginning of the nineteenth century Italy and Germany were regarded in the same light as China is today, i.e., they were considered “unorganized territories” and not states, and they were subjugated. But what was the result of that? As is well known, it resulted in wars for independence waged by Germany and Italy, and the union of these countries into independent states. It resulted in increased hatred for the oppressors in the hearts of the peoples of these countries, the effects of which have not been removed to this day and will not, perhaps, be removed for some time. The question arises: What guarantee is there that the same thing will not result from a war of the imperialists against China?

Still others think that war should be organized by a “superior race,” say, the German “race,” against an “inferior race,” primarily against the Slavs; that only such a war can provide a way out of the situation, for it is the mission of the “superior race” to render the “inferior race” fruitful and to rule over it. Let us assume that this queer theory, which is as far removed from science as the sky from the earth, let us assume that this queer theory is put into practice. What may be the result of that?

It is well known that ancient Rome looked upon the ancestors of the present-day Germans and French in the same way as the representatives of the “superior race” now look upon the Slav races. It is well known that ancient Rome treated them as an “inferior race,” as “barbarians,” destined to live in eternal subordination to the “superior race,” to “great Rome,” and, between ourselves be it said, ancient Rome had some grounds for this, which cannot be said of the representatives of the “superior race” of today. (*Thunderous applause.*) But what was the upshot of this? The upshot was that the non-Romans, i.e., all the “barbarians,” united against the common enemy and brought Rome down with a crash. The question arises: What guarantee is there that the claims of the representatives of the “superior race” of today will not lead to the same lamentable results? What guarantee is there that the fascist literary politicians in Berlin will be more fortunate than the old and experienced conquerors in Rome? Would it not be more correct to assume that the opposite will be the case?

Finally, there are others who think that war should be organized against the USSR. Their plan is to defeat the USSR, divide up its territory, and profit at its expense. It would be a mistake to believe that it is only certain military circles in Japan who think in this way. We know that similar plans are being hatched in the circles of the political leaders of certain states in Europe. Let us assume that these gentlemen pass from words to deeds. What may be the result of that?

There can hardly be any doubt that such a war would be the most dangerous war for the bourgeoisie. It would be the most dangerous war, not only because the peoples of the USSR would fight to the death to preserve the gains of the revolution; it would be the most dangerous war for the bourgeoisie for the added reason that it would be waged not only at the fronts, but also in the enemy's rear. The bourgeoisie need have no doubt that the numerous friends of the working class of the USSR in Europe and Asia will endeavour to strike a blow in the rear at their oppressors who have launched a criminal war against the fatherland of the working class of all countries. And let not Messieurs the bourgeoisie blame us if some of the governments near and dear to them, which today rule happily "by the grace of God," are missing on the morrow after such a war. (*Thunderous applause.*)

There has already been one such war against the USSR, if you remember, 15 years ago. As is well known, the universally esteemed Churchill clothed that war in a poetic formula — "the campaign of fourteen states." You remember, of course, that that war rallied all the working people of our country into one united camp of self-sacrificing warriors, who with their lives defended their workers' and peasants' motherland against the foreign foe. You know how it ended. It ended in the ejection of the invaders from our country and the formation of revolutionary Councils of Action¹²⁰ in Europe. It can hardly be doubted that a second war against the USSR will lead to the complete defeat of the aggressors, to revolution in a number of countries in Europe and in Asia, and to the destruction of the bourgeois-landlord governments in those countries.

Such are the war plans of the perplexed bourgeois politicians.

As you see, they are not distinguished either for their brains or for their valour. (*Applause.*)

But while the bourgeoisie chooses the path of war, the working class in the capitalist countries, brought to despair by four years of crisis and unemployment, is beginning to take the path of revolution. This means that a revolutionary crisis is maturing and will continue

to mature. And the more the bourgeoisie becomes entangled in its war schemes, the more frequently it resorts to terrorist methods of fighting against the working class and the labouring peasantry, the more rapidly will the revolutionary crisis develop.

Some comrades think that, once there is a revolutionary crisis, the bourgeoisie is bound to get into a hopeless position, that its end is therefore a foregone conclusion, that the victory of the revolution is thus assured, and that all they have to do is to wait for the fall of the bourgeoisie and to draw up victorious resolutions. That is a profound mistake. The victory of the revolution never comes of itself. It must be prepared for and won. And only a strong proletarian revolutionary party can prepare for and win victory. Moments occur when the situation is revolutionary, when the rule of the bourgeoisie is shaken to its very foundations, and yet the victory of the revolution does not come, because there is no revolutionary party of the proletariat with sufficient strength and prestige to lead the masses and to take power. It would be unwise to believe that such "cases" cannot occur.

It is worthwhile in this connection to recall Lenin's prophetic words on revolutionary crisis, uttered at the Second Congress of the Communist International¹²¹:

"We have now come to the question of the revolutionary crisis as the basis of our revolutionary action. And here we must first of all note two widespread errors. On the one hand, the bourgeois economists depict this crisis as mere 'unrest,' as the English so elegantly express it. On the other hand, revolutionaries sometimes try to prove that the crisis is absolutely hopeless. That is a mistake. There is no such thing as an absolutely hopeless situation. The bourgeoisie behaves like an arrogant plunderer who has lost his head; it commits folly after folly, making the situation more acute and hastening its own doom. All this is true. But it cannot be 'proved' that there is absolutely no chance of its gulling some minority of the exploited with some kind of minor concessions, or of suppressing some movement or uprising of some section or another of the oppressed and exploited. To try to 'prove' beforehand that a situation is 'absolutely' hopeless would be sheer pedantry, or juggling with concepts and catchwords. In this and similar questions the only real 'proof' is practice. The bourgeois system all over the world is experiencing a most profound revolutionary crisis. The revolutionary parties must now 'prove' by their practical actions that they are sufficiently intelligent and organized, are sufficiently in contact with the exploited masses, are sufficiently determined and skilful, to utilize this crisis for a successful and victorious revolution" (Lenin, Vol. XXV, pp. 340-41¹²²).

III

THE PARTY

I pass to the question of the Party.

The present congress is taking place under the flag of the complete victory of Leninism, under the flag of the liquidation of the remnants of the anti-Leninist groups.

The anti-Leninist group of Trotskyites has been smashed and scattered. Its organizers are now to be found in the backyards of the bourgeois parties abroad.

The anti-Leninist group of the right deviators has been smashed and scattered. Its organizers have long ago renounced their views and are now trying in every way to expiate the sins they committed against the Party.

The groups of nationalist deviators have been smashed and scattered. Their organizers have either completely merged with the interventionist émigrés, or else they have recanted.

The majority of the adherents to these anti-revolutionary groups had to admit that the line of the Party was correct and they have capitulated to the Party.

At the Fifteenth Party Congress¹²³ it was still necessary to prove that the Party line was correct and to wage a struggle against certain anti-Leninist groups; and at the Sixteenth Party Congress we had to deal the final blow to the last adherents of these groups. At this congress, however, there is nothing to prove and, it seems, no one to fight. Everyone sees that the line of the Party has triumphed. (*Thunderous applause.*)

The policy of industrializing the country has triumphed. Its results are obvious to everyone. What arguments can be advanced against this fact?

The policy of eliminating the kulaks and of complete collectivization has triumphed. Its results are also obvious to every one. What arguments can be advanced against this fact?

The experience of our country has shown that it is fully possible for socialism to achieve victory in one country taken separately. What arguments can be advanced against this fact?

It is evident that all these successes, and primarily the victory of the five-year plan, have utterly demoralized and smashed all the various anti-Leninist groups.

It must be admitted that the Party today is united as it has never

been before. (*Stormy and prolonged applause.*)

1. QUESTIONS OF IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Does this mean, however, that the fight is ended, and that the offense of socialism is to be discontinued as superfluous?

No, it does not.

Does it mean that all is well in our Party, that there will be no more deviations in the Party, and that, therefore, we may now rest on our laurels?

No, it does not.

We have smashed the enemies of the Party, the opportunists of all shades, the nationalist deviators of all kinds. But remnants of their ideology still live in the minds of individual members of the Party, and not infrequently they find expression. The Party must not be regarded as something isolated from the people who surround it. It lives and works in its environment. It is not surprising that at times unhealthy moods penetrate into the Party from outside. And the ground for such moods undoubtedly exists in our country, if only for the reason that there still exist in town and country certain intermediary strata of the population who constitute a medium which breeds such moods.

The Seventeenth Conference of our Party¹²⁴ declared that one of the fundamental political tasks in fulfilling the Second Five-Year Plan is "to overcome the survivals of capitalism in economic life and in the minds of people." That is an absolutely correct idea. But can we say that we have already overcome all the survivals of capitalism in economic life? No, we cannot say that. Still less can we say that we have overcome the survivals of capitalism in the minds of people. We cannot say that, not only because in development the minds of people lag behind their economic position, but also because the capitalist encirclement still exists, which endeavours to revive and sustain the survivals of capitalism in the economic life and in the minds of the people of the USSR, and against which we Bolsheviks must always keep our powder dry.

Naturally, these survivals cannot but be a favourable ground for a revival of the ideology of the defeated anti-Leninist groups in the minds of individual members of our Party. Add to this the not very high theoretical level of the majority of our Party members, the inadequate ideological work of the Party bodies, and the fact that our Party functionaries are overburdened with purely practical work,

which deprives them of the opportunity of augmenting their theoretical knowledge, and you will understand the origin of the confusion on a number of questions of Leninism that exists in the minds of individual Party members, a confusion which not infrequently penetrates into our press and helps to revive the survivals of the ideology of the defeated anti-Leninist groups.

That is why we cannot say that the fight is ended and that there is no longer any need for the policy of the socialist offensive.

It would be possible to take a number of questions of Leninism and demonstrate by means of them how tenaciously the survivals of the ideology of the defeated anti-Leninist groups continue to exist in the minds of certain Party members.

Take, for example, the question of building a *classless socialist society*. The Seventeenth Party Conference declared that we are advancing towards the formation of a classless socialist society. Naturally, a classless society cannot come of its own accord, as it were. It has to be achieved and built by the efforts of all the working people, by strengthening the organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat, by intensifying the class struggle, by abolishing classes, by eliminating the remnants of the capitalist classes, and in battles with enemies, both internal and external.

The point is clear, one would think.

And yet, who does not know that the enunciation of this clear and elementary thesis of Leninism has given rise to not a little confusion in the minds of a section of Party members and to unhealthy sentiments among them? The thesis that we are advancing towards a classless society — put forward as a slogan — was interpreted by them to mean a spontaneous process. And they began to reason in this way: If it is a classless society, then we can relax the class struggle, we can relax the dictatorship of the proletariat, and get rid of the state altogether, since it is fated to wither away soon in any case. And they fell into a state of foolish rapture, in the expectation that soon there would be no classes, and therefore no class struggle, and therefore no cares and worries, and therefore it is possible to lay down one's arms and go to bed — to sleep in expectation of the advent of a classless society. (*General laughter.*)

There can be no doubt that this confusion of mind and these sentiments are exactly like the well-known views of the right deviators, who believed that the old must automatically grow into the new, and that one fine day we shall wake up and find ourselves in a socialist society.

As you see, remnants of the ideology of the defeated anti-Leninist groups are capable of revival, and are far from having lost their vitality.

Naturally, if this confusion of views and these non-Bolshevik sentiments obtained a hold over the majority of our Party, the Party would find itself demobilized and disarmed...

Or take, for example, the *national question*. Here, too, in the sphere of the national question, just as in the sphere of other questions, there is in the views of a section of the Party a confusion which creates a certain danger. I have spoken of the tenacity of the survivals of capitalism. It should be observed that the survivals of capitalism in people's minds are much more tenacious in the sphere of the national question than in any other sphere. They are more tenacious because they are able to disguise themselves well in national costume. Many think that Skrypnik's fall from grace was an individual case, an exception to the rule. This is not true. The fall from grace of Skrypnik and his group in the Ukraine is not an exception. Similar aberrations are observed among certain comrades in other national republics as well.

What is the deviation towards nationalism — regardless whether it is a matter of the deviation towards Great-Russian nationalism or the deviation towards local nationalism? The deviation towards nationalism is the adaptation of the internationalist policy of the working class to the nationalist policy of the bourgeoisie. The deviation towards nationalism reflects the attempts of "one's own," "national" bourgeoisie to undermine the Soviet system and to restore capitalism. The source of both these deviations, as you see, is the same. It is a *departure* from Leninist internationalism. If you want to keep both deviations under fire, then aim primarily against this source, against those who depart from internationalism — regardless whether it is a matter of the deviation towards local nationalism or the deviation towards Great-Russian nationalism. (*Stormy applause.*)

There is a controversy as to which deviation represents the chief danger: the deviation towards Great-Russian nationalism, or the deviation towards local nationalism. Under present conditions, this is a formal and, therefore, a pointless controversy. It would be foolish to attempt to give ready-made recipes suitable for all times and for all conditions as regards the chief and the lesser danger. Such recipes do not exist. The chief danger is the deviation against which we have ceased to fight, thereby allowing it to grow into a danger to the state.

(*Prolonged applause.*)

In the Ukraine, only very recently, the deviation towards Ukrainian nationalism did not represent the chief danger; but when the fight against it ceased and it was allowed to grow to such an extent that it linked up with the interventionists, this deviation became the chief danger. The question as to which is the chief danger in the sphere of the national question is determined not by futile, formal controversies, but by a Marxist analysis of the situation at the given moment, and by a study of the mistakes that have been committed in this sphere.

The same should be said of *the right and "left" deviations* in the sphere of general policy. Here, too, as in other spheres, there is no little confusion in the views of certain members of our Party. Sometimes, while fighting against the right deviation, they turn away from the "left" deviation and relax the fight against it, on the assumption that it is not dangerous, or hardly dangerous. This is a grave and dangerous error. It is a concession to the "left" deviation which is impermissible for a member of the Party. It is all the more impermissible for the reason that of late the "lefts" have completely slid over to the position of the rights, so that there is no longer any essential difference between them.

We have always said that the "lefts" are in fact rights who mask their rightness by left phrases. Now the "lefts" themselves confirm the correctness of our statement. Take last year's issues of the Trotskyist Bulletin. What do Messieurs the Trotskyists demand, what do they write about, in what does their "left" program find expression? They demand: *the dissolution of the state farms*, on the grounds that they do not pay; *the dissolution of the majority of the collective farms*, on the grounds that they are fictitious; *the abandonment of the policy of eliminating the kulaks*; *reversion to the policy of concessions*, and *the leasing to concessionaires of a number of our industrial enterprises*, on the grounds that they do not pay.

There you have the program of these contemptible cowards and capitulators — their counter-revolutionary program of restoring capitalism in the USSR!

What difference is there between this program and that of the extreme rights? Clearly, there is none. It follows that the "lefts" have openly associated themselves with the counter-revolutionary program of the rights in order to enter into a bloc with them and to wage a joint struggle against the Party.

How can it be said after this that the "lefts" are not dangerous,

or hardly dangerous? Is it not clear that those who talk such rubbish bring grist to the mill of the sworn enemies of Leninism?

As you see, here too, in the sphere of deviations from the line of the Party — regardless of whether we are dealing with deviations on general policy or with deviations on the national question — the survivals of capitalism in people's minds, including the minds of certain members of our Party, are quite tenacious.

There you have some of the serious and urgent problems of our ideological and political work on which there is lack of clarity, confusion, and even direct departure from Leninism in certain strata of the Party. Nor are these the only questions which could serve to demonstrate the confusion in the views of certain members of the Party.

After this, can it be said that all is well in the Party? Clearly, it cannot.

Our tasks in the sphere of ideological and political work are:

- 1) To raise the theoretical level of the Party to the proper height.
- 2) To intensify ideological work in all the organizations of the Party.
- 3) To carry on unceasing propaganda of Leninism in the ranks of the Party.
- 4) To train the Party organizations and the non-Party active which surrounds them in the spirit of Leninist internationalism.
- 5) Not to gloss over, but boldly to criticize the deviations of certain comrades from Marxism-Leninism.
- 6) Systematically to expose the ideology and the remnants of the ideology of trends that are hostile to Leninism.

2. QUESTIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP

I have spoken of our successes. I have spoken of the victory of the Party line in the sphere of the national economy and of culture, and also in the sphere of overcoming anti-Leninist groups in the Party. I have spoken of the historic significance of our victory. But this does not mean that we have achieved victory everywhere and in all things, and that all questions have already been settled. Such successes and such victories do not occur in real life. We still have plenty of unsolved problems and defects of all sorts. Ahead of us is a host of problems demanding solution. But it does undoubtedly mean that the greater part of the urgent and immediate problems has already been successfully solved, and in this sense the very great victory of our Party is beyond doubt.

But here the question arises: How was this victory brought about, how was it actually achieved, as the result of what fight, as the result of what efforts?

Some people think that it is sufficient to draw up a correct Party line, proclaim it for all to hear, state it in the form of general theses and resolutions, and have it voted for unanimously, for victory to come of itself, automatically, as it were. That, of course, is wrong. It is a gross delusion. Only incorrigible bureaucrats and red-tapists can think so. As a matter of fact, these successes and victories did not come automatically, but as the result of a fierce struggle for the application of the Party line. Victory never comes of itself — it is usually won by effort. Good resolutions and declarations in favour of the general line of the Party are only a beginning; they merely express the desire for victory, but not the victory itself. After the correct line has been laid down, after a correct solution of the problem has been found, success depends on how the work is organized; on the organization of the struggle for carrying out the Party line; on the proper selection of personnel; on checking upon the fulfilment of the decisions of the leading bodies. Otherwise the correct line of the Party and the correct solutions are in danger of being seriously prejudiced. More than that, after the correct political line has been laid down, organizational work decides everything, including the fate of the political line itself, its success or failure.

As a matter of fact, victory was achieved and won by a systematic and fierce struggle against all sorts of difficulties in the way of carrying out the Party line; by overcoming these difficulties; by mobilizing the Party and the working class for the task of overcoming the difficulties; by organizing the struggle to overcome the difficulties; by removing inefficient executives and choosing better ones, capable of waging the struggle against difficulties.

What are these difficulties; and where do they lie?

They are difficulties of our organizational work, difficulties of our organizational leadership. They lie in ourselves, in our leading people, in our organizations, in the apparatus of our Party, Soviet, economic, trade-union, Young Communist League and all other organizations.

We must realize that the strength and prestige of our Party and Soviet, economic and all other organizations, and of their leaders, have grown to an unprecedented degree. And precisely because their strength and prestige have grown to an unprecedented degree, it is their work that now determines everything, or nearly everything.

There can be no justification for references to so-called objective conditions. Now that the correctness of the Party's political line has been confirmed by the experience of a number of years, and that there is no longer any doubt as to the readiness of the workers and peasants to support this line, the part played by so-called objective conditions has been reduced to a minimum; whereas the part played by our organizations and their leaders has become decisive, exceptional. What does this mean? It means that from now on nine-tenths of the responsibility for the failures and defects in our work rest, not on "objective" conditions, but on ourselves, and on ourselves alone.

We have in our Party more than 2,000,000 members and candidate members. In the Young Communist League we have more than 4,000,000 members and candidate members. We have over 3,000,000 worker and peasant correspondents. The Society for the Promotion of Air and Chemical Defence has more than 12,000,000 members. The trade unions have a membership of over 17,000,000. It is to these organizations that we are indebted for our successes. And if, in spite of the existence of such organizations and of such possibilities, which facilitate the achievement of successes, we still have quite a number of shortcomings in our work and not a few failures, then it is only we ourselves, our organizational work, our bad organizational leadership, that are to blame for this.

Bureaucracy and red tape in the administrative apparatus; idle chatter about "leadership in general" instead of real and concrete leadership; the functional structure of our organizations and lack of individual responsibility; lack of personal responsibility in work, and wage equalization; the absence of a systematic check on the fulfilment of decisions; fear of self-criticism — these are the sources of our difficulties; this is where our difficulties now lie.

It would be naive to think that these difficulties can be overcome by means of resolutions and decisions. The bureaucrats and red-tapists have long been past masters in the art of demonstrating their loyalty to Party and government decisions in words, and pigeon holding them in deed. In order to overcome these difficulties it was necessary to put an end to the disparity between our organizational work and the requirements of the political line of the Party; it was necessary to raise the level of organizational leadership in all spheres of the national economy to the level of political leadership; it was necessary to see to it that our organizational work ensured the practical realization of the political slogans and decisions of the Party.

In order to overcome these difficulties and achieve success it was

necessary to *organize* the struggle to eliminate them; it was necessary to draw the masses of the workers and peasants into this struggle; it was necessary to mobilize the Party itself; it was necessary to purge the Party and the economic organizations of unreliable, unstable and degenerate elements.

What was needed for this?

We had to organize:

1) Full development of self-criticism and exposure of shortcomings in our work.

2) The mobilization of the Party, Soviet, economic, trade-union and Young Communist League organizations for the struggle against difficulties.

3) The mobilization of the masses of the workers and peasants to fight for the application of the slogans and decisions of the Party and of the government.

4) Full development of emulation and shock-brigade work among the working people.

5) A wide network of Political Departments of machine and tractor stations and state farms and the bringing of the Party and Soviet leadership closer to the villages.

6) The subdivision of the People's Commissariats, chief boards and trusts, and the bringing of economic leadership closer to the enterprises.

7) The abolition of lack of personal responsibility in work and the elimination of wage equalization.

8) The elimination of the "functional" system, the extension of individual responsibility and a policy aiming at the abolition of collegium management.

9) An increase in checking the fulfilment of decisions, and a policy aiming at the reorganization of the Central Control Commission and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection with a view to a further increase in checking the fulfilment of decisions.

10) The transfer of skilled personnel from offices to posts closer to production.

11) The exposure and expulsion from the administrative apparatus of incorrigible bureaucrats and red-tapists.

12) The removal from their posts of people who violate the decisions of the Party and the government, of "window-dressers" and windbags, and the promotion to their place of new people — business-like people, capable of concretely directing the work entrusted to them and of strengthening Party and Soviet discipline.

13) The purging of Soviet and economic organizations and the reduction of their staffs.

14) Lastly, the purging of the Party of unreliable and degenerate people.

These, in the main, are the measures which the Party has had to adopt in order to overcome difficulties, to raise the level of our organizational work to that of political leadership, and thus ensure the application of the Party line.

You know that it was precisely in this way that the Central Committee of the Party carried on its organizational work during the period under review.

In this the Central Committee was guided by Lenin's brilliant thought that the chief thing in organizational work is *selection of personnel and checking fulfilment*.

In regard to *selecting* the right people and dismissing those who fail to justify the confidence placed in them, I should like to say a few words.

Besides the incorrigible bureaucrats and red-tapists, as to whose removal there are no differences of opinion among us, there are two other types of executives who retard our work, hinder our work and hold up our advance.

One of these types of executive consists of people who rendered certain services in the past, people who have become bigwigs, who consider that Party decisions and Soviet laws are not written for them, but for fools. These are the people who do not consider it their duty to fulfil the decisions of the Party and of the government, and who thus destroy the foundations of Party and state discipline. What do they count upon when they violate Party decisions and Soviet laws? They presume that the Soviet government will not venture to touch them, because of their past services. These overconceited bigwigs think that they are irreplaceable, and that they can violate the decisions of the leading bodies with impunity. What is to be done with executives of this kind? They must unhesitatingly be removed from their leading posts, irrespective of past services. (*Voices*: "Quite right!") They must be demoted to lower positions and this must be announced in the press. (*Voices*: "Quite right!") This is essential in order to bring those conceited bigwig bureaucrats down a peg or two, and to put them in their proper place. This is essential in order to strengthen Party and Soviet discipline in the whole of our work. (*Voices*: "Quite right!")

And now about the second type of executive. I have in mind the

windbags, I would say honest windbags, people who are honest and loyal to the Soviet power, but who are incapable of leadership, incapable of organizing anything. Last year I had a conversation with one such comrade, a very respected comrade, but an incorrigible windbag, capable of drowning any live undertaking in a flood of talk. Here is the conversation.

I: How are you getting on with the sowing?

He: With the sowing, Comrade Stalin? We have mobilized ourselves.

I: Well, and what then?

He: We have put the question squarely.

I: And what next?

He: There is a turn, Comrade Stalin; soon there will be a turn.

I: But still?

He: We can see an indication of some improvement.

I: But still, how are you getting on with the sowing?

He: So far, Comrade Stalin, we have not made any headway with the sowing.

There you have the portrait of the windbag. They have mobilized themselves, they have put the question squarely, they have a turn and some improvement, but things remain as they were.

This is exactly how a Ukrainian worker recently described the state of a certain organization when he was asked whether that organization had any definite line: "Well," he said, "as to a line... they have a line all right, but they don't seem to be doing any work." Evidently that organization also has its honest windbags.

And when such windbags are dismissed from their posts and are given jobs far removed from operative work, they shrug their shoulders in perplexity and ask: "Why have we been dismissed? Did we not do all that was necessary to get the work done? Did we not organize a rally of shock brigaders? Did we not proclaim the slogans of the Party and of the government at the conference of shock brigaders? Did we not elect the whole of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to the Honorary Presidium? Did we not send greetings to Comrade Stalin — what more do you want of us?"

What is to be done with these incorrigible windbags? Why, if they were allowed to remain on operative work they are capable of drowning every live undertaking in a flood of watery and endless speeches. Obviously, they must be removed from leading posts and given work other than operative work. There is no place for windbags on operative work. (*Voices:* "Quite right!")

I have already briefly reported how the Central Committee handled the selection of personnel for the state and economic organizations, and how it strengthened the checking on the fulfilment of decisions. Comrade Kaganovich will deal with this in greater detail in his report on the third item of the congress agenda.

I should like to say a few words, however, about further work in connection with increased checking on the fulfilment of decisions.

The proper organization of checking the fulfilment of decisions is of decisive importance in the fight against bureaucracy and red tape. Are the decisions of the leading bodies carried out, or are they pigeon-holed by bureaucrats and red-tapists? Are they carried out properly, or are they distorted? Is the apparatus working conscientiously and in a Bolshevik manner, or is it working to no purpose? These things can be promptly found out only by a well-organized check on the fulfilment of decisions. A well-organized check on the fulfilment of decisions is the searchlight which helps to reveal how the apparatus is functioning at any moment and to bring bureaucrats and red-tapists into the light of day. We can say with certainty that nine-tenths of our defects and failures are due to the lack of a properly organized check on the fulfilment of decisions. There can be no doubt that with such a check on fulfilment, defects and failures would certainly have been averted.

But if checking fulfilment is to achieve its purpose, two conditions at least are required: firstly, that fulfilment is checked systematically and not spasmodically; secondly, that the work of checking fulfilment in all sections of the Party, Soviet and economic organizations is entrusted not to second-rate people, but to people with sufficient authority, to the leaders of the organizations concerned.

The proper organization of checking fulfilment is most important of all for the central leading bodies. The organizational structure of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection does not meet the requirements of a well-devised system for checking fulfilment. Several years ago, when our economic work was simpler and less satisfactory, and when we could count on the possibility of *inspecting* the work of all the People's Commissariats and of all the economic organizations, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection was adequate. But now, when our economic work has expanded and has become more complicated, and when it is no longer necessary, or possible, to *inspect* it from one centre, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection must be reorganized. What we need now is not an inspection, but a check on the fulfilment of the decisions of the centre — what we need now is *con-*

trol over the fulfilment of the decisions of the centre. We now need an organization that would not set itself the universal aim of inspecting everything and everybody, but which could concentrate all its attention on the work of control, on the work of checking fulfilment of the decisions of the central bodies of the Soviet power. Such an organization can be only a Soviet Control Commission under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, working on assignments of the Council of People's Commissars, and having representatives in the localities who are independent of the local bodies. And in order that this organization may have sufficient authority and be able, if necessary, to take proceedings against any responsible executive, candidates for the Soviet Control Commission must be nominated by the Party Congress and endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. I think that only such an organization could strengthen Soviet control and Soviet discipline.

As for the Central Control Commission, it is well known that it was set up primarily and mainly for the purpose of averting a split in the Party. You know that at one time there really was a danger of a split. You know that the Central Control Commission and its organizations succeeded in averting the danger of a split. Now there is no longer any danger of a split. But, on the other hand, we are urgently in need of an organization that could concentrate its attention mainly on checking the fulfilment of the decisions of the Party and of its Central Committee. Such an organization can be only a Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the CPSU(B), working on assignments of the Party and its Central Committee and having representatives in the localities who are independent of the local organizations. Naturally, such a responsible organization must have great authority. In order that it may have sufficient authority and be able to take proceedings against any responsible executive who has committed an offence, including members of the Central Committee, the right to elect or dismiss the members of this commission must be vested only in the supreme organ of the Party, viz., the Party congress. There can be no doubt that such an organization will be quite capable of ensuring control over the fulfilment of the decisions of the central organs of the Party and of strengthening Party discipline.

That is how matters stand with regard to questions of organizational leadership.

Our tasks in the sphere of organizational work are:

- 1) To continue to adapt organizational work to the requirements of the political line of the Party;
- 2) To raise organizational leadership to the level of political leadership;
- 3) To secure that organizational leadership fully ensures the implementation of the political slogans and decisions of the Party.

* * *

I am coming to the end of my report, comrades.

What conclusions must be drawn from it?

Everybody now admits that our successes are great and extraordinary. In a relatively short space of time our country has been transferred on to the lines of industrialization and collectivization. The First Five-Year Plan has been successfully carried out. This arouses a feeling of pride among our workers and increases their self-confidence.

That is very good, of course. But successes sometimes have their seamy side. They sometimes give rise to certain dangers, which, if allowed to develop, may wreck the whole work. There is, for example, the danger that some of our comrades may become dizzy with successes. There have been such cases among us, as you know. There is the danger that certain of our comrades, having become intoxicated with success, will get swelled heads and begin to lull themselves with boastful songs, such as: "It's a walkover," "We can knock anybody into a cocked hat," etc. This is not precluded by any means, comrades. There is nothing more dangerous than sentiments of this kind, for they disarm the Party and demobilize its ranks. If such sentiments gain the upper hand in our Party we may be faced with the danger of all our successes being wrecked.

Of course, the First Five-Year Plan has been successfully carried out. That is true. But the matter does not and cannot end there, comrades. Before us is the Second Five-Year Plan, which we must also carry out, and successfully too. You know that plans are carried out in the course of a struggle against difficulties, in the process of overcoming difficulties. That means that there will be difficulties and there will be a struggle against them. Comrades Molotov and Kuibyshev will report to you on the Second Five-Year Plan. From their reports you will see what great difficulties we shall have to overcome in order to carry out this great plan. This means that we must not lull the Party, but sharpen its vigilance; we must not lull it to sleep, but keep it ready for action; not disarm it, but arm it; not demobilize

it, but keep it in a state of mobilization for the fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan.

Hence, the first conclusion: *We must not become infatuated with the successes achieved, and must not become conceited.*

We have achieved successes because we have had the correct guiding line of the Party, and because we have been able to organize the masses for putting this line into effect. Needless to say, without these conditions we should not have achieved the successes that we have achieved, and of which we are justly proud. But it is a very rare thing for ruling parties to have a correct line and to be able to put it into effect.

Look at the countries which surround us. Can you find many ruling parties there that have a correct line and are putting it into effect? Actually, there are now no such parties in the world; for they are all living without prospects, they are floundering in the chaos of the crisis, and see no way of getting out of the swamp. Our Party alone knows in what direction to steer its course, and it is going forward successfully. To what does our Party owe its superiority? To the fact that it is a Marxist party, a Leninist party. It owes it to the fact that it is guided in its work by the teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin. There can be no doubt that as long as we remain true to this teaching, as long as we have this compass, we shall achieve successes in our work.

It is said that in some countries in the West Marxism has already been destroyed. It is said that it has been destroyed by the bourgeois-nationalist trend known as fascism. That, of course, is nonsense. Only people who are ignorant of history can talk like that. Marxism is the scientific expression of the fundamental interests of the working class. To destroy Marxism, the working class must be destroyed. But it is impossible to destroy the working class. More than 80 years have passed since Marxism came into the arena. During this time scores and hundreds of bourgeois governments have tried to destroy Marxism. And what has happened? Bourgeois governments have come and gone, but Marxism has remained. (*Stormy applause.*) Moreover, Marxism has achieved complete victory on one-sixth of the globe; moreover, it has achieved victory in the very country in which Marxism was considered to have been utterly destroyed. (*Stormy applause.*) It cannot be regarded as an accident that the country in which Marxism has achieved complete victory is now the only country in the world which knows no crises and unemployment, whereas in all other countries, including the fascist countries,

crisis and unemployment have been reigning for four years now. No, comrades, that is no accident. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Yes, comrades, our successes are due to the fact that we have worked and fought under the banner of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

Hence, the second conclusion: *We must remain true to the end to the great banner of Marx, Engels, Lenin.* (*Applause.*)

The working class of the USSR is strong not only because it has a Leninist party that has been tried and tested in battle; further, it is strong not only because it enjoys the support of the vast masses of the labouring peasants; it is strong also because it is supported and assisted by the world proletariat. The working class of the USSR is part of the world proletariat, its advanced detachment, and our republic is the cherished child of the world proletariat. There can be no doubt that if our working class had not had the support of the working class in the capitalist countries it would not have been able to retain power, it would not have secured the conditions for socialist construction, and, consequently, it would not have achieved the successes that it has achieved. International ties between the working class of the USSR and the workers of the capitalist countries, the fraternal alliance between the workers of the USSR and the workers of all countries — this is one of the cornerstones of the strength and might of the Republic of Soviets. The workers in the West say that the working class of the USSR is the shock brigade of the world proletariat. That is very good. It means that the world proletariat is prepared to continue rendering all the support it can to the working class of the USSR. But it imposes serious duties upon us. It means that we must prove by our work that we deserve the honourable title of shock brigade of the proletarians of all countries. It imposes upon us the duty of working better and fighting better for the final victory of socialism in our country, for the victory of socialism in all countries.

Hence, the third conclusion: *We must be true to the end to the cause of proletarian internationalism, to the cause of the fraternal alliance of the proletarians of all countries.* (*Applause.*)

Such are the conclusions.

THE SOVIETS AND THE INDIVIDUAL

(Address to the Graduates from the Red Army Academies Delivered in the Kremlin)

May 4, 1935

Comrades, it cannot be denied that in the last few years we have achieved great successes both in the sphere of construction and in the sphere of administration. In this connection there is too much talk about the services rendered by chiefs, by leaders. They are credited with all, or nearly all, of our achievements. That, of course, is wrong, it is incorrect. It is not merely a matter of leaders. But it is not of this I wanted to speak today. I should like to say a few words about cadres, about our cadres in general and about the cadres of our Red Army in particular.

You know that we inherited from the past a technically backward, impoverished and ruined country. Ruined by four years of imperialist war, and ruined again by three years of civil war, a country with a semi-literate population, with a low technical level, with isolated industrial oases lost in a sea of dwarf peasant farms — such was the country we inherited from the past. The task was to transfer this country from medieval darkness to modern industry and mechanized agriculture. A serious and difficult task, as you see. The question that confronted us was: Either we solve this problem in the shortest possible time and consolidate socialism in our country, or we do not solve it, in which case our country — weak technically and unenlightened in the cultural sense — will lose its independence and become a stake in the game of the imperialist powers.

At that time our country was passing through a period of an appalling dearth of technique. There were not enough machines for industry. There were no machines for agriculture. There were no machines for transport. There was not that elementary technical base without which the reorganization of a country on industrial lines is inconceivable. There were only isolated prerequisites for the creation of such a base. A first-class industry had to be built up. This industry had to be so directed as to be capable of technically reorganizing not only industry, but also agriculture and our railway transport. And to achieve this it was necessary to make sacrifices and to exercise the most rigorous economy in everything; it was necessary to economize on food, on schools, on textiles, in order to ac-

cumulate the funds required for building industry. There was no other way of overcoming the dearth of technique. That is what Lenin taught us, and in this matter we followed in the footsteps of Lenin.

Naturally, uniform and rapid success could not be expected in so great and difficult a task. In a task like this, successes only become apparent after several years. We therefore had to arm ourselves with strong nerves, Bolshevik grit and stubborn patience to overcome our first failures and to march unswervingly towards the great goal, permitting no wavering or uncertainty in our ranks.

You know that that is precisely how we set about this task. But not all our comrades had the necessary spirit, patience and grit. There turned out to be people among our comrades who at the first difficulties began to call for a retreat. "Let bygones be bygones," it is said. That, of course, is true. But man is endowed with memory, and in summing up the results of our work, one involuntarily recalls the past. (*Animation.*) Well, then, there were comrades among us who were frightened by the difficulties and began to call on the Party to retreat. They said: "What is the good of your industrialization and collectivization, your machines, your iron and steel industry, tractors, harvester combines, automobiles? You should rather have given us more textiles, bought more raw materials for the production of consumers' goods, and given the population more of the small things that make life pleasant. The creation of an industry, and a first-class industry at that, when we are so backward, is a dangerous dream."

Of course, we could have used the 3,000,000,000 rubles in foreign currency obtained as a result of a most rigorous economy, and spent on building up our industry, for importing raw materials, and for increasing the output of articles of general consumption. That is also a "plan," in a way. But with such a "plan" we would not now have a metallurgical industry, or a machine-building industry, or tractors and automobiles, or airplanes and tanks. We would have found ourselves unarmed in the face of foreign foes. We would have undermined the foundations of socialism in our country. We would have fallen captive to the bourgeoisie, home and foreign.

It is obvious that a choice had to be made between two plans: between the plan of retreat, which would have led, and was bound to lead, to the defeat of socialism, and the plan of advance, which led, as you know, and has already brought us to the victory of socialism in our country.

We chose the plan of advance, and moved forward along the Leninist road, brushing aside those comrades as people who could

see more or less what was under their noses, but who closed their eyes to the immediate future of our country, to the future of socialism in our country.

But these comrades did not always confine themselves to criticism and passive resistance. They threatened to raise a revolt in the Party against the Central Committee. More, they threatened some of us with bullets. Evidently, they reckoned on frightening us and compelling us to turn from the Leninist road. These people, apparently, forgot that we Bolsheviks are people of a special cut. They forgot that neither difficulties nor threats can frighten Bolsheviks. They forgot that we had been trained and steeled by the great Lenin, our leader, our teacher, our father, who knew and recognized no fear in the fight. They forgot that the more the enemies rage and the more hysterical the foes within the Party become, the more ardent the Bolsheviks become for fresh struggles and the more vigorously they push forward.

Of course, it never even occurred to us to turn from the Leninist road. Moreover, once we stood firmly on this road, we pushed forward still more vigorously, brushing every obstacle from our path. True, in pursuing this course we were obliged to handle some of these comrades roughly. But that cannot be helped. I must confess that I too had a hand in this. (*Loud cheers and applause.*)

Yes, comrades, we proceeded confidently and vigorously along the road of industrializing and collectivizing our country. And now we may consider that the road has been traversed.

Everybody now admits that we have achieved tremendous successes along this road. Everybody now admits that we already have a powerful, first-class industry, a powerful mechanized agriculture, a growing and improving transport system, an organized and excellently equipped Red Army.

This means that we have in the main emerged from the period of dearth in technique.

But, having emerged from the period of dearth of technique, we have entered a new period, a period, I would say, of a dearth of people, of cadres, of workers capable of harnessing technique, and advancing it. The point is that we have factories, mills, collective farms, state farms, a transport system, an army; we have technique for all this; but we lack people with sufficient experience to squeeze out of this technique all that can be squeezed out of it. Formerly, we used to say that "technique decides everything." This slogan helped us to put an end to the dearth of technique and to create a vast tech-

nical base in every branch of activity, for the equipment of our people with first-class technique. That is very good. But it is not enough by far. In order to set technique going and to utilize it to the full, we need people who have mastered technique, we need cadres capable of mastering and utilizing this technique according to all the rules of the art. Without people who have mastered technique, technique is dead. In the charge of people who have mastered technique, technique can and should perform miracles. If in our first-class mills and factories, in our state farms and collective farms, in our transport system and in our Red Army we had sufficient cadres capable of harnessing this technique, our country would secure results three times and four times as great as at present. That is why emphasis must now be laid on people, on cadres, on workers who have mastered technique. That is why the old slogan, "Technique decides everything," which is a reflection of a period already passed, a period in which we suffered from a dearth of technique, must now be replaced by a new slogan, the slogan "Cadres decide everything." That is the main thing now.

Can it be said that our people have fully grasped and realized the great significance of this new slogan? I would not say that. Otherwise, there would not have been the outrageous attitude towards people, towards cadres, towards workers, which we not infrequently observe in practice. The slogan "Cadres decide everything" demands that our leaders should display the most solicitous attitude towards our workers, "little" and "big," no matter in what sphere they are engaged, cultivating them assiduously, assisting them when they need support, encouraging them when they show their first successes, promoting them, and so forth. Yet we meet in practice in a number of cases with a soulless, bureaucratic and positively outrageous attitude towards workers. This, indeed, explains why instead of being studied, and placed at their posts only after being studied, people are frequently flung about like pawns. People have learned to value machinery and to make reports on how many machines we have in our mills and factories. But I do not know of a single instance when a report was made with equal zest on the number of people we trained in a given period, on how we have assisted people to grow and become tempered in their work. How is this to be explained? It is to be explained by the fact that we have not yet learned to value people, to value workers, to value cadres.

I recall an incident in Siberia, where I lived at one time in exile. It was in the spring, at the time of the spring floods. About thirty

men went to the river to pull out timber which had been carried away by the vast, swollen river. Towards evening they returned to the village, but with one comrade missing. When asked where the thirtieth man was, they replied indifferently that the thirtieth man had "remained there." To my question, "How do you mean, remained there?" they replied with the same indifference, "Why ask — drowned, of course." And thereupon one of them began to hurry away, saying, "I've got to go and water the mare." When I reproached them with having more concern for animals than for men, one of them said, amid the general approval of the rest: "Why should we be concerned about men? We can always make men. But a mare... just try and make a mare." (*Animation.*) Here you have a case, not very significant perhaps, but very characteristic. It seems to me that the indifference of certain of our leaders to people, to cadres, their inability to value people, is a survival of that strange attitude of man to man displayed in the episode in far off Siberia that I have just related.

And so, comrades, if we want successfully to get over the dearth of people and to provide our country with sufficient cadres capable of advancing technique and setting it going, we must first of all, learn to value people, to value cadres, to value every worker capable of benefitting our common cause. It is time to realize that of all the valuable capital the world possesses, the most valuable and most decisive is people, cadres. It must be realized that under our present conditions "cadres decide everything." If we have good and numerous cadres in industry, agriculture, transport and the army — our country will be invincible. If we do not have such cadres — we shall be lame on both legs.

In concluding my speech, permit me to offer a toast to the health and success of our graduates from the Red Army Academies. I wish them success in the work of organizing and directing the defence of our country.

Comrades, you have graduated from institutions of higher learning, in which you received your first tempering. But school is only a preparatory stage. Cadres receive their real tempering in practical work, outside school, in fighting difficulties, in overcoming difficulties. Remember, comrades, that only those cadres are any good who do not fear difficulties, who do not hide from difficulties, but who, on the contrary, go out to meet difficulties, in order to overcome them and eliminate them. It is only in the fight against difficulties that real cadres are forged. And if our army possesses genuinely

steeled cadres in sufficient numbers, it will be invincible.

Your health, comrades! (*Stormy applause. All rise. Loud cheers for Comrade Stalin.*)

SPEECH AT THE FIRST ALL-UNION CONFERENCE OF STAKHANOVITES

November 17, 1935

1. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STAKHANOV MOVEMENT

Comrades, so much has been said at this conference about the Stakhanovites, and it has been said so well, that there is really very little left for me to say. But since I have been called on to speak, I will have to say a few words.

The Stakhanov movement cannot be regarded as an ordinary movement of working men and women. The Stakhanov movement is a movement of working men and women which will go down in the history of our socialist construction as one of its most glorious pages.

Wherein lies the significance of the Stakhanov movement?

Primarily, in the fact that it is the expression of a new wave of socialist emulation, a new and higher stage of socialist emulation. Why new, and why higher? Because the Stakhanov movement, as an expression of socialist emulation, contrasts favourably with the old stage of socialist emulation. In the past, some three years ago, in the period of the first stage of socialist emulation, socialist emulation was not necessarily associated with modern technique. At that time, in fact, we had hardly any modern technique. The present stage of socialist emulation, the Stakhanov movement, on the other hand, is necessarily associated with modern technique. The Stakhanov movement would be inconceivable without a new and higher technique. We have before us people like Comrades Stakhanov, Busygin, Smetanin, Krivonoss, Pronin, the Vinogradovas, and many others, new people, working men and women, who have completely mastered the technique of their jobs, have harnessed it and driven ahead. There were no such people, or hardly any such people, some three years ago. These are new people, people of a special type.

Further, the Stakhanov movement is a movement of working men and women which sets itself the aim of surpassing the present technical standards, surpassing the existing designed capacities, surpassing the existing production plans and estimates. Surpassing them — because these standards have already become antiquated for

our day, for our new people. This movement is breaking down the old views on technique, it is shattering the old technical standards, the old designed capacities and the old production plans, and demands the creation of new and higher technical standards, designed capacities and production plans. It is destined to produce a revolution in our industry. That is why the Stakhanov movement is at bottom a profoundly revolutionary movement.

It has already been said here that the Stakhanov movement, as an expression of new and higher technical standards, is a model of that high productivity of labour which only socialism can give, and which capitalism cannot give. That is absolutely true. Why was it that capitalism smashed and defeated feudalism? Because it created higher standards of productivity of labour, it enabled society to procure an incomparably greater quantity of products than could be procured under the feudal system; because it made society richer. Why is it that socialism can, should and certainly will defeat the capitalist system of economy? Because it can furnish higher models of labour, a higher productivity of labour, than the capitalist system of economy; because it can provide society with more products and can make society richer than the capitalist system of economy.

Some people think that socialism can be consolidated by a certain equalization of people's material conditions, based on a poor man's standard of living. That is not true. That is a petty-bourgeois conception of socialism. In point of fact, socialism can succeed only on the basis of a high productivity of labour, higher than under capitalism, on the basis of an abundance of products and of articles of consumption of all kinds, on the basis of a prosperous and cultured life for all members of society. But if socialism is to achieve this aim and make our Soviet society the most prosperous of all societies, our country, must have a productivity of labour which surpasses that of the foremost capitalist countries. Without this we cannot even think of securing an abundance of products and of articles of consumption of all kinds. The significance of the Stakhanov movement lies in the fact that it is a movement which is smashing the old technical standards, because they are inadequate, which in a number of cases is surpassing the productivity of labour of the foremost capitalist countries, and is thus creating the practical possibility of further consolidating socialism in our country, the possibility of converting our country into the most prosperous of all countries.

But the significance of the Stakhanov movement does not end there. Its significance lies also in the fact that it is preparing the con-

ditions for the transition from socialism to communism.

The principle of socialism is that in a socialist society each works according to his abilities and receives articles of consumption, not according to his needs, but according to the work he performs for society. This means that the cultural and technical level of the working class is as yet not a high one, that the distinction between mental and manual labour still exists, that the productivity of labour is still not high enough to ensure an abundance of articles of consumption, and, as a result, society is obliged to distribute articles of consumption not in accordance with the needs of its members, but in accordance with the work they perform for society.

Communism represents a higher stage of development. The principle of communism is that in a communist society each works according to his abilities and receives articles of consumption, not according to the work he performs, but according to his needs as a culturally developed individual. This means that the cultural and technical level of the working class has become high enough to undermine the basis of the distinction between mental labour and manual labour, that the distinction between mental labour and manual labour has already disappeared, and that productivity of labour has reached such a high level that it can provide an absolute abundance of articles of consumption, and as a result society is able to distribute these articles in accordance with the needs of its members.

Some people think that the elimination of the distinction between mental labour and manual labour can be achieved by means of a certain cultural and technical equalization of mental and manual workers by lowering the cultural and technical level of engineers and technicians, of mental workers, to the level of average skilled workers. That is absolutely incorrect. Only petty-bourgeois windbags can conceive communism in this way. In reality the elimination of the distinction between mental labour and manual labour can be brought about only by raising the cultural and technical level of the working class to the level of engineers and technical workers. It would be absurd to think that this is unfeasible. It is entirely feasible under the Soviet system, where the productive forces of the country have been freed from the fetters of capitalism, where labour has been freed from the yoke of exploitation, where the working class is in power, and where the younger generation of the working class has every opportunity of obtaining an adequate technical education. There is no reason to doubt that only such a rise in the cultural and technical level of the working class can undermine the basis of the

distinction between mental labour and manual labour, that only this can ensure the high level of productivity of labour and the abundance of articles of consumption which are necessary in order to begin the transition from socialism to communism.

In this connection, the Stakhanov movement is significant for the fact that it contains the first beginnings — still feeble, it is true, but nevertheless the beginnings — of precisely such a rise in the cultural and technical level of the working class of our country.

And, indeed, look at our comrades, the Stakhanovites, more closely. What type of people are they? They are mostly young or middle-aged working men and women, people with culture and technical knowledge, who show examples of precision and accuracy in work, who are able to appreciate the time factor in work, and who have learned to count not only the minutes, but also the seconds. The majority of them have taken the technical minimum courses and are continuing their technical education. They are free of the conservatism and stagnation of certain engineers, technicians and business executives; they are marching boldly forward, smashing the antiquated technical standards and creating new and higher standards; they are introducing amendments into the designed capacities and economic plans drawn up by the leaders of our industry; they often supplement and correct what the engineers and technicians have to say, they often teach them and impel them forward, for they are people who have completely mastered the technique of their job, and who are able to squeeze out of technique the maximum that can be squeezed out of it. Today the Stakhanovites are still few in number, but who can doubt that tomorrow there will be ten times more of them? Is it not clear that the Stakhanovites are innovators in our industry, that the Stakhanov movement represents the future of our industry, that it contains the seed of the future rise in the culture and technical level of the working class, that it opens to us the path by which alone can be achieved those high indices of productivity of labour which are essential for the transition from socialism to communism and for the elimination of the distinction between mental labour and manual labour.

Such, comrades, is the significance of the Stakhanov movement for our socialist construction.

Did Stakhanov and Busygin think of this great significance of the Stakhanov movement when they began to smash the old technical standards? Of course not. They had their own worries — they were trying to get their enterprise out of difficulties and to overfulfil the

economic plan. But in seeking to achieve this aim they had to smash the old technical standards and to develop a high productivity of labour, surpassing that of the foremost capitalist countries. It would be ridiculous, however, to think that this circumstance can in any way detract from the great historical significance of the movement of the Stakhanovites.

The same may be said of those workers who first organized the Soviets of Workers' Deputies in our country in 1905. They never thought, of course, that the Soviets of Workers' Deputies would become the foundation of the socialist system. They were only defending themselves against Tsarism, against the bourgeoisie, when they created the Soviets of Workers' Deputies. But this circumstance in no way contradicts the unquestionable fact that the movement for the Soviets of Workers' Deputies begun in 1905 by the workers of Leningrad and Moscow, led in the end, to the rout of capitalism and the victory of socialism on one-sixth of the globe.

2. THE ROOTS OF THE STAKHANOV MOVEMENT

We now stand at the cradle of the Stakhanov movement, at its source.

Certain characteristic features of the Stakhanov movement should be noted.

What first of all strikes the eye is the fact that this movement began somehow, of itself, almost spontaneously, from below, without any pressure whatsoever from the administrators of our enterprises. More than that — this movement in a way, arose and began to develop in spite of the administrators of our enterprises, even in opposition to them. Comrade Molotov has already told you what troubles Comrade Mussinsky, the Archangelsk sawmill worker, had to go through when he worked out new and higher technical standards, in secret from the administration, in secret from the inspectors. The lot of Stakhanov himself was no better, for in his progress he had to defend himself not only against certain officials of the administration, but also against certain workers who hounded him because of his "new-fangled ideas." As to Busygin, we know that he almost paid for his "new-fangled ideas" by losing his job at the factory, and it was only the intervention of the shop superintendent, Comrade Sokolinsky, that helped him to remain at the factory.

So you see, if there was any kind of action at all on the part of the administrators of our enterprises, it was not to help the Sta-

khanov movement, but to hinder it. Consequently, the Stakhanov movement arose and developed as a movement coming from below. And just because it arose of itself, just because it comes from below, it is the most vital and irresistible movement of the present day.

Mention should further be made of another characteristic feature of the Stakhanov movement. This characteristic feature is that the Stakhanov movement spread over the whole of our Soviet Union not gradually, but at an unparalleled speed, like a hurricane. How did it begin? Stakhanov raised the technical standard of output of coal five or six times, if not more. Busygin and Smetanin did the same — one in the sphere of machine-building and the other in the shoe industry. The newspapers reported these facts. And suddenly, the flames of the Stakhanov movement enveloped the whole country. What was the reason? How is it that the Stakhanov movement has spread so rapidly? Is it perhaps because Stakhanov and Busygin are great organizers, with wide contacts in the regions and districts of the USSR, and they organized this movement themselves? No, of course not! Is it perhaps because Stakhanov and Busygin have ambitions of becoming great figures in our country, and they themselves carried the sparks of the Stakhanov movement all over the country? That is also not true. You have seen Stakhanov and Busygin here. They spoke at this conference. They are simple, modest people, without the slightest ambition to acquire the laurels of national figures. It even seems to me that they are somewhat embarrassed by the scope the movement has acquired, beyond all their expectations. And if, in spite of this, the match thrown by Stakhanov and Busygin was sufficient to start a conflagration, that means that the Stakhanov movement is absolutely ripe. Only a movement that is absolutely ripe, and is awaiting just a jolt in order to burst free — only such a movement can spread with such rapidity and grow like a rolling snowball.

How is it to be explained that the Stakhanov movement proved to be absolutely ripe? What are the causes for its rapid spread? What are the roots of the Stakhanov movement?

There are at least four such causes.

1. The basis for the Stakhanov movement was first and foremost the radical improvement in the material welfare of the workers. Life has improved, comrades. Life has become more joyous. And when life is joyous, work goes well. Hence the high rates of output. Hence the heroes and heroines of labour. That, primarily, is the root of the Stakhanov movement. If there had been a crisis in our country, if there had been unemployment — that scourge of the working class

— if people in our country lived badly, drably, joylessly, we should have had nothing like the Stakhanov movement. (*Applause.*) Our proletarian revolution is the only revolution in the world which had the opportunity of showing the people not only political results but also material results. Of all workers' revolutions, we know only one which managed to achieve power. That was the Paris Commune. But it did not last long. True, it endeavoured to smash the fetters of capitalism; but it did not have time enough to smash them, and still less to show the people the beneficial material results of revolution. Our revolution is the only one which not only smashed the fetters of capitalism and brought the people freedom, but also succeeded in creating the material conditions of a prosperous life for the people. Therein lies the strength and invincibility of our revolution. It is a good thing, of course, to drive out the capitalists, to drive out the landlords, to drive out the Tsarist henchmen, to seize power and achieve freedom. That is very good. But, unfortunately, freedom alone is not enough, by far. If there is a shortage of bread, a shortage of butter and fats, a shortage of textiles, and if housing conditions are bad, freedom will not carry you very far. It is very difficult, comrades, to live on freedom alone. (*Shouts of approval. Applause.*) In order to live well and joyously, the benefits of political freedom must be supplemented by material benefits. It is a distinctive feature of our revolution that it brought the people not only freedom, but also material benefits and the possibility of a prosperous and cultured life. That is why life has become joyous in our country, and that is the soil from which the Stakhanov movement sprang.

2. The second source of the Stakhanov movement is the fact that there is no exploitation in our country. People in our country do not work for exploiters, for the enrichment of parasites, but for themselves, for their own class, for their own Soviet society, where power is wielded by the best members of the working class. That is why labour in our country has social significance, and is a matter of honour and glory. Under capitalism, labour bears a private and personal character. You have produced more — well, then, receive more, and live as best you can. Nobody knows you or wants to know you. You work for the capitalists, you enrich them? Well, what do you expect? That is why they hired you, so that you should enrich the exploiters. If you do not agree with that, join the ranks of the unemployed, and get along as best you can — “we shall find others who are more tractable.” That is why people's labour is not valued very highly under capitalism. Under such conditions, of course, there can be no room

for a Stakhanov movement. But things are different under the Soviet system. Here, the working man is held in esteem. Here, he works, not for the exploiters, but for himself, for his class, for society. Here, the working man cannot feel neglected and alone. On the contrary, the man who works, feels himself a free citizen of his country, a public figure in a way. And if he works well and gives society his best — he is a hero of labour, and is covered with glory. Obviously, the Stakhanov movement could have arisen only under such conditions.

3. We must regard, as the third source of the Stakhanov movement, the fact that we have a modern technique. The Stakhanov movement is organically bound up with the modern technique. Without the modern technique, without the modern mills and factories, without the modern machinery, the Stakhanov movement could not have arisen. Without modern technique, technical standards might have been doubled or trebled, but not more. And if the Stakhanovites have raised technical standards five and six times, that means that they rely entirely on the modern technique. It thus follows, that the industrialization of our country, the reconstruction of our mills and factories, the introduction of modern technique and modern machinery, was one of the causes that gave rise to the Stakhanov movement.

4. But modern technique alone will not carry you very far. You may have first-class technique, first-class mills and factories, but if you have not the people capable of harnessing that technique, you will find that your technique is just bare technique. For modern technique to produce results, people are required, cadres of working men and women, capable of taking charge of the technique and advancing it. The birth and growth of the Stakhanov movement means that such cadres have already appeared among the working men and women of our country. Some two years ago, the Party declared that in building new mills and factories, and supplying our enterprises with modern machinery, we had performed only half of the job. The Party then declared that enthusiasm for the construction of new factories must be supplemented by enthusiasm for mastering these new factories, that only in this way could the job be completed. It is obvious that the mastering of this new technique and the growth of new cadres have been proceeding during these two years. It is now clear that we already have such cadres. It is obvious that without such cadres, without these new people, we would never have had a Stakhanov movement. Hence the new people, working men and women, who have mastered the new technique, constitute the force that has

shaped and advanced the Stakhanov movement.

Such are the conditions that gave rise to, and advanced the Stakhanov movement.

3. NEW PEOPLE — NEW TECHNICAL STANDARDS

I have said that the Stakhanov movement developed not gradually, but like an explosion, as if it had broken through some sort of dam. It is obvious that it had to overcome certain barriers. Somebody was hindering it, somebody was holding it back; and then, having gathered strength, the Stakhanov movement broke through these barriers and swept over the country.

What was wrong? Who exactly was hindering it?

It was the old technical standards, and the people behind these standards, that were hindering it. Several years ago, our engineers, technical workers and business managers drew up certain technical standards, adapted to the technical backwardness of our working men and women. Several years have elapsed since then. During this period, people have grown, and acquired technical knowledge. But the technical standards have remained unchanged. Of course, these standards have now proved out of date for our new people. Everybody now abuses the existing technical standards. But, after all, they did not fall from the skies. And the point is not that these technical standards were set too low at the time when they were drawn up. The point is, primarily, that now, when these standards have already become antiquated, attempts are made to defend them as modern standards. People cling to the technical backwardness of our working men and women, guiding themselves by this backwardness, basing themselves on this backwardness, and matters finally reach a pitch, when people begin to pretend backwardness. But what is to be done if this backwardness is becoming a thing of the past? Are we really going to worship our backwardness and turn it into an icon, a fetish? What is to be done if the working men and women have already managed to grow and to gain technical knowledge? What is to be done if the old technical standards no longer correspond to reality, and our working men and women have already managed in practice to exceed them five or tenfold? Have we ever taken an oath of loyalty to our backwardness? It seems to me we have not, have we, comrades? (*General laughter.*) Did we ever assume that our working men and women would remain backward forever? We never did, did

we? (*General laughter.*) Then what is the trouble? Will we really lack the courage to smash the conservatism of certain of our engineers and technicians, to smash the old traditions and standards and allow free scope to the new forces of the working class?

People talk about science. They say that the data of science, the data contained in technical handbooks and instructions, contradict the demands of the Stakhanovites for new and higher technical standards. But what kind of science are they talking about? The data of science have always been tested by practice, by experience. Science which has severed contact with practice, with experience — what sort of science is that? If science were the thing it is represented to be by certain of our conservative comrades, it would have perished for humanity long ago. Science is called science just because it does not recognize fetishes, just because it does not fear to raise its hand against the obsolete and antiquated, and because it lends an attentive ear to the voice of experience, of practice. If it were otherwise, we would have no science at all; we would have no astronomy, say, and would still have to get along with the outworn system of Ptolemy; we would have no biology, and would still be comforting ourselves with the legend of the creation of man; we would have no chemistry, and would still have to get along with the auguries of the alchemists.

That is why I think that our engineers, technical workers and business managers, who have already managed to fall a fairly long distance behind the Stakhanov movement, would do well if they ceased to cling to the old technical standards and readjusted their work in a real scientific manner to the new way, the Stakhanov way.

Very well, we shall be told, but what about technical standards in general? Does industry need them, or can we get along without any standards at all?

Some say that we no longer need any technical standards. That is not true, comrades. More, it is stupid. Without technical standards, planned economy is impossible. Technical standards are, moreover, necessary in order to help the masses who have fallen behind to catch up with the more advanced. Technical standards are a great regulating force which organizes the masses of the workers in the factories around the advanced elements of the working class. We therefore need technical standards; not those, however, that now exist, but higher ones.

Others say that we need technical standards, but that they must immediately be raised to the level of the achievements of people like

Stakhanov, Busygin, the Vinogradovas, and the others. That is also not true. Such standards would be unreal at the present time, since working men and women with less technical knowledge than Stakhanov and Busygin could not fulfil these standards. We need technical standards somewhere between the present technical standards and those achieved by people like Stakhanov and Busygin. Take, for example, Maria Demchenko, the well-known "five-hundreder" in sugar beet. She achieved a harvest of over 500 centners of sugar beet per hectare. Can this achievement be made the standard yield for the whole of sugar beet production, say, in the Ukraine? No, it cannot. It is too early to speak of that. Maria Demchenko secured over 500 centners from one hectare, whereas the average sugar beet harvest this year in the Ukraine, for instance, is 130 or 132 centners per hectare. The difference, as you see, is not a small one. Can we set the standard of sugar beet yield at 400 or 300 centners? Every expert in this field says that this cannot be done yet. Evidently, the standard yield per hectare for the Ukraine in 1936 must be set at 200 or 250 centners. And this is not a low standard, for if it were fulfilled it might give us twice as much sugar as we got in 1935. The same must be said of industry. Stakhanov exceeded the existing standard of output ten times, or even more, I believe. To declare this achievement the new technical standard for all pneumatic drill operators would be unwise. Obviously, a standard must be set somewhere between the existing technical standard and that achieved by Comrade Stakhanov.

One thing, at any rate, is clear: the present technical standards no longer correspond to reality; they have fallen behind and become a brake on our industry; and in order that there shall be no brake on our industry, they must be replaced by new, higher technical standards. New people, new times — new technical standards.

4. IMMEDIATE TASKS

What are our immediate tasks from the standpoint of the interests of the Stakhanov movement?

In order not to be diffuse, let us reduce the matter to two immediate tasks.

First. The task is to help the Stakhanovites to further develop the Stakhanov movement, and to spread it in all directions, throughout all the regions and districts of the USSR. That, on the one hand. And on the other hand, the task is to curb all those elements among

the business managers, engineers and technical workers who obstinately cling to the old, do not want to advance, and systematically hinder the development of the Stakhanov movement. The Stakhanovites alone, of course, cannot spread the Stakhanov movement in its full scope over the whole face of our country. Our Party organizations must take a hand in this matter, and help the Stakhanovites to consummate the movement. In this respect, the Donetsk regional organization has undoubtedly displayed great initiative. Good work is being done in this direction by the Moscow and Leningrad regional organizations. But what about the other regions? They, apparently, are still "getting started." For instance, we somehow hear nothing, or very little from the Urals, although, as you know, the Urals is a vast industrial centre. The same must be said of Western Siberia and the Kuzbas, where, to all appearances, they have not yet managed to "get started." However, we need have no doubt that our Party organizations will take a hand in this matter and help the Stakhanovites to overcome their difficulties. As to the other aspect of the matter — the curbing of the obstinate conservatives among the business managers, engineers and technical workers — things will be a little more complicated. We shall have in the first place, to persuade these conservative elements in industry, persuade them in a patient and comradely manner, of the progressive nature of the Stakhanov movement, and of the necessity of readjusting themselves to the Stakhanov way. And if persuasion does not help, more vigorous measures will have to be adopted. Take, for instance, the People's Commissariat of Railways. In the central apparatus of that Commissariat, there was, until recently, a group of professors, engineers, and other experts — among them communists — who assured everybody that a commercial speed of 13 or 14 kilometres per hour was a limit that could not be exceeded without contradicting "the science of railway operation." This was a fairly authoritative group, who preached their views in verbal and printed form, issued instructions to the various departments of the People's Commissariat of Railways, and, in general, were the "dictators of opinion" in the traffic departments. We, who are not experts in this sphere, basing ourselves on the suggestions of a number of practical workers on the railway, on our part assured these authoritative professors that 13 or 14 kilometres could not be the limit, and that if matters were organized in a certain way, this limit could be extended. In reply, this group, instead of heeding the voice of experience and practice, and revising their attitude to the matter, launched into a fight against the

progressive elements on the railways and still further intensified the propaganda of their conservative views. Of course, we had to give these esteemed individuals a light tap on the jaw and very politely remove them from the central apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Railways. (*Applause.*) And what is the result? We now have a commercial speed of 18 and 19 kilometres per hour. (*Applause.*) It seems to me, comrades, that at the worst, we shall have to resort to this method in other branches of our national economy as well — that is, of course, if the stubborn conservatives do not cease interfering and putting spokes in the wheels of the Stakhanov movement.

Second. In the case of those business executives, engineers and technicians who do not want to hinder the Stakhanov movement, who sympathize with this movement, but have not yet been able to readjust themselves and assume the lead of the Stakhanov movement, the task is to help them readjust themselves and take the lead of the Stakhanov movement. I must say, comrades, that we have quite a few such business executives, engineers and technicians. And if we help these comrades, there will undoubtedly be still more of them.

I think that if we fulfil these tasks, the Stakhanov movement will develop to its full scope, will embrace every region and district of our country, and will show us miracles of new achievements.

5. A FEW MORE WORDS

A few words regarding the present conference, regarding its significance. Lenin taught us that only such leaders can be real Bolshevik leaders, as know not only how to teach the workers and peasants, but also how to learn from them. Certain Bolsheviks were not pleased with these words of Lenin's. But history has shown that Lenin was one hundred per cent right in this field also. And, indeed, millions of working people, workers and peasants, labour, live and struggle. Who can doubt that these people do not live in vain, that, living and struggling, these people accumulate vast practical experience? Can it be doubted that leaders who scorn this experience cannot be regarded as real leaders? Hence, we leaders of the Party and the government must not only teach the workers, but also learn from them. I shall not undertake to deny that you, the members of the present conference, have learned something here at this conference from the leaders of our government. But neither can it be denied that we, the leaders of the government, have learned a great deal from

you, the Stakhanovites, the members of this conference. Well, comrades, thanks for the lesson, many thanks! (*Loud applause.*)

Finally, two words about how it would be fitting to mark this conference. We here in the presidium have conferred and have decided that this conference between the leaders of the government and the leaders of the Stakhanov movement must be marked in some way. Well, we have come to the decision that a hundred or a hundred and twenty of you will have to be recommended for the highest distinction.

Voices: Quite right. (*Loud applause.*)

Stalin: If you approve, comrades, that is what we shall do.

(The conference accords a stormy ovation to Comrade Stalin. Thunderous cheers and applause. Greetings are shouted to Comrade Stalin, the leader of the Party, from all parts of the hall. The three thousand members of the conference join in singing the proletarian hymn, the "Internationale.")

ON THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE USSR

*(Report Delivered at the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of Soviets of the
USSR)*

November 25, 1936

(Comrade Stalin's appearance on the rostrum is greeted by all present with loud and prolonged cheers. All rise. Shouts from all parts of the hall: "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!" "Long live Comrade Stalin!" "Long live the great Stalin!" "Hurrah for the great genius, Comrade Stalin!" "Vivat!" "Rot Front!" "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!")

I. FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION COMMISSION AND ITS TASKS

Comrades, the Constitution Commission, whose draft has been submitted for consideration to the present Congress, was formed, as you know, by special decision of the Seventh Congress of Soviets of the USSR. This decision was adopted on February 6, 1935. It reads:

"1. To amend the Constitution of the Union Soviet Socialist Republics in the direction of:

"a) further democratizing the electoral system by replacing not entirely equal suffrage by equal suffrage, indirect elections, by direct elections and the open ballot by the secret ballot;

"b) giving more precise definition to the social and economic basis of the Constitution by bringing the Constitution into conformity with the present relation of class forces in the USSR (the creation of a new, socialist industry, the demolition of the kulak class, the victory of the collective farm system, the consolidation of socialist property as the basis of Soviet society, and so on).

"2. To enjoin the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to elect a Constitution Commission which shall be instructed to draw up an amended text of the Constitution in accordance with the principles indicated in Clause 1, and to submit it for approval to a Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"3. To conduct the next ordinary elections of the organs of Soviet government in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the basis of the new electoral system."

This was on February 6, 1935. The day after this decision was adopted, i.e., February 7, 1935, the First Session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR met, and in pursuance of the decision of the Seventh Congress of Soviets of the USSR, set up a Constitution Commission consisting of 31 persons. It instructed the Constitution Commission to prepare a draft of an amended Constitution of the USSR.

Such were the formal grounds and instructions of the supreme body of the USSR on the basis of which the work of the Constitution Commission was to proceed.

Thus, the Constitution Commission was to introduce changes in the Constitution now in force, which was adopted in 1924, taking into account the changes in the direction of socialism which have been brought about in the life of the USSR in the period from 1924 to the present day.

II. CHANGES IN THE LIFE OF THE USSR IN THE PERIOD FROM 1924 TO 1936

What are the changes in the life of the USSR that have been brought about in the period from 1924 to 1936 and which the Constitution Commission was to reflect in its Draft Constitution?

What is the essence of these changes?

What was the situation in 1924?

That was the first period of the New Economic Policy, when the Soviet government permitted a certain revival of capitalism while taking all measures to develop socialism; when it calculated on securing, in the course of competition between the two systems of economy — the capitalist system and the socialist system — the preponderance of the socialist system over the capitalist system. The task was to consolidate the position of socialism in the course of this competition, to achieve the elimination of the capitalist elements, and to consummate the victory of the socialist system as the fundamental system of the national economy.

Our industry, particularly heavy industry, presented an unenviable picture at that time. True, it was being gradually restored, but it had not yet raised its output to anywhere near the prewar level. It was based on the old, backward, and insufficient technique. Of course, it was developing in the direction of socialism. The socialist sector of our industry at that time accounted for about 80 per cent of the whole. But the capitalist sector still controlled no less than 20

per cent of industry.

Our agriculture presented a still more unsightly picture. True, the landlord class had already been eliminated, but, on the other hand, the agricultural capitalist class, the kulak class, still represented a fairly considerable force. On the whole, agriculture at that time resembled a boundless ocean of small individual peasant farms with backward, medieval technical equipment. In this ocean there existed, in the form of isolated small dots and islets, collective farms and state farms which, strictly speaking, were not yet of any considerable significance in our national economy. The collective farms and state farms were weak, while the kulak was still strong. At that time we spoke not of eliminating the kulaks, but of restricting them.

The same must be said about our country's trade. The socialist sector in trade represented some 50 or 60 per cent, not more, while all the rest of the field was occupied by merchants, profiteers and other private traders.

Such was the picture of economic life in our country in 1924.

What is the situation now, in 1936?

At that time we were in the first period of the New Economic Policy, the beginning of NEP, the period of a certain revival of capitalism; now, however, we are in the last period of NEP, the end of NEP, the period of the complete liquidation of capitalism in all spheres of the national economy.

Take the fact, to begin with, that during this period our industry has grown into a gigantic force. Now it can no longer be described as weak and technically ill-equipped. On the contrary, it is now based on new, rich, modern technical equipment, with a powerfully developed heavy industry, and an even more developed machine-building industry. But the most important thing is that capitalism has been banished entirely from the sphere of our industry, while the socialist form of production now holds undivided sway in the sphere of our industry. The fact that in volume of output our present socialist industry exceeds prewar industry more than sevenfold cannot be regarded as a minor detail.

In the sphere of agriculture, instead of the ocean of small individual peasant farms, with their poor technical equipment, and a strong kulak influence, we now have mechanized production, conducted on a scale larger than anywhere else in the world, with up-to-date technical equipment, in the form of an all-embracing system of collective farms and state farms. Everybody knows that the kulak class in agriculture has been eliminated, while the sector of small

individual peasant farms, with its backward, medieval technical equipment, now occupies an insignificant place; its share in agriculture as regards crop area does not amount to more than two or three per cent. We must not overlook the fact that the collective farms now have at their disposal 316,000 tractors with a total of 5,700,000 horse power, and, together with the state farms, over 400,000 tractors, with a total of 7,580,000 horse power.

As for the country's trade, the merchants and profiteers have been banished entirely from this sphere. All trade is now in the hands of the state, the cooperative societies and the collective farms. A new, Soviet trade — trade without profiteers, trade without capitalists — has arisen and developed.

Thus the complete victory of the socialist system in all spheres of the national economy is now a fact.

And what does this mean?

It means that the exploitation of man by man has been abolished, eliminated, while the socialist ownership of the implements and means of production has been established as the unshakable foundation of our Soviet society. (*Prolonged applause.*)

As a result of all these changes in the sphere of the national economy of the USSR, we now have a new, socialist economy, which knows neither crises nor unemployment, which knows neither poverty nor ruin, and which provides our citizens with every opportunity to lead a prosperous and cultured life.

Such, in the main, are the changes which have taken place in the sphere of our economy during the period from 1924 to 1936.

In conformity with these changes in the economic life of the USSR, the class structure of our society has also changed.

The landlord class, as you know, had already been eliminated as a result of the victorious conclusion of the civil war. As for the other exploiting classes, they have shared the fate of the landlord class. The capitalist class in the sphere of industry has ceased to exist. The kulak class in the sphere of agriculture has ceased to exist. And the merchants and profiteers in the sphere of trade have ceased to exist. Thus all the exploiting classes have been eliminated.

There remains the working class.

There remains the peasant class.

There remains the intelligentsia.

But it would be a mistake to think that these social groups have undergone no change during this period, that they have remained the same as they were, say, in the period of capitalism.

Take, for example, the working class of the USSR. By force of habit, it is often called the proletariat. But what is the proletariat? The proletariat is a class bereft of the instruments and means of production, under an economic system in which the means and instruments of production belong to the capitalists and in which the capitalist class exploits the proletariat. The proletariat is a class exploited by the capitalists. But in our country, as you know, the capitalist class has already been eliminated, and the instruments and means of production have been taken from the capitalists and transferred to the state, of which the leading force is the working class. Consequently, our working class, far from being bereft of the instruments and means of production, on the contrary, possess them jointly with the whole people. And since it possesses them, and the capitalist class has been eliminated, all possibility of the working class being exploited is precluded. This being the case, can our working class be called the proletariat? Clearly, it cannot. Marx said that if the proletariat is to emancipate itself, it must crush the capitalist class, take the instruments and means of production from the capitalists, and abolish those conditions of production which give rise to the proletariat. Can it be said that the working class of the USSR has already brought about these conditions for its emancipation? Unquestionably, this can and must be said. And what does this mean? This means that the proletariat of the USSR has been transformed into an entirely new class, into the working class of the USSR, which has abolished the capitalist economic system, which has established the socialist ownership of the instruments and means of production and is directing Soviet society along the road to communism.

As you see, the working class of the USSR is an entirely new working class, a working class emancipated from exploitation, the like of which the history of mankind has never known before.

Let us pass on to the question of the peasantry. It is customary to say that the peasantry is a class of small producers, with its members atomized, scattered over the face of the land, delving away in isolation on their small farms with their backward technical equipment; that they are slaves to private property and are exploited with impunity by landlords, kulaks, merchants, profiteers, usurers, and the like. And, indeed, in capitalist countries the peasantry, if we take it in the mass, is precisely such a class. Can it be said that our present-day peasantry, the Soviet peasantry, taken in the mass, resembles that kind of peasantry? No, that cannot be said. There is no longer such a peasantry in our country. Our Soviet peasantry is an

entirely new peasantry. In our country there are no longer any landlords and kulaks, merchants and usurers who could exploit the peasants. Consequently, our peasantry is a peasantry emancipated from exploitation. Further, our Soviet peasantry, its overwhelming majority, is a collective farm peasantry, i.e., it bases its work and wealth not on individual labour and on backward technical equipment, but on collective labour and up-to-date technical equipment. Finally, the economy of our peasants is based, not on private property, but on collective property, which has grown up on the basis of collective labour.

As you see, the Soviet peasantry is an entirely new peasantry, the like of which the history of mankind has never known before.

Lastly, let us pass on to the question of the intelligentsia, to the question of engineers and technicians, of workers on the cultural front, of employees in general, and so on. The intelligentsia too, has undergone great changes during this period. It is no longer the old hidebound intelligentsia which tried to place itself above classes, but which actually, for the most part, served the landlords and the capitalists. Our Soviet intelligentsia is an entirely new intelligentsia, bound up by its very roots with the working class and the peasantry. In the first place, the composition of the intelligentsia has changed. People who come from the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie constitute but a small percentage of our Soviet intelligentsia; 80 to 90 per cent of the Soviet intelligentsia are people who have come from the working class, from the peasantry, or from some other strata of the working population. Finally, the very nature of the activities of the intelligentsia has changed. Formerly it had to serve the wealthy classes, for it had no alternative. Today it must serve the people, for there are no longer any exploiting classes. And that is precisely why it is now an equal member of Soviet society, in which, side by side with the workers and peasants, pulling together with them, it is engaged in building the new, classless, socialist society.

As you see, this is an entirely new, working intelligentsia, the like of which you will not find in any other country on earth.

Such are the changes which have taken place during this period as regards the class structure of Soviet society.

What do these changes signify?

Firstly, they signify that the dividing lines between the working class and the peasantry, and between these classes and the intelligentsia, are being obliterated, and that the old class exclusiveness is disappearing. This means that the distance between these social

groups is steadily diminishing.

Secondly, they signify that the economic contradictions between these social groups are declining are becoming obliterated.

And lastly, they signify that the political contradictions between them are also declining and becoming obliterated.

Such is the position in regard to the changes in the class structure of the USSR.

The picture of the changes in the social life of the USSR would be incomplete if a few words were not said about the changes in yet another sphere. I have in mind the sphere of national relationships in the USSR. As you know, within the Soviet Union there are about sixty nations, national groups and nationalities. The Soviet state is a multi-national state. Clearly, the question of the relations among the peoples of the USSR cannot but be one of prime importance for us.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as you know, was formed in 1922, at the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR. It was formed on the principles of equality and the voluntary affiliation of the peoples of the USSR. The Constitution now in force, adopted in 1924, was the first Constitution of the USSR. That was the period when relations among the peoples had not yet been properly adjusted, when survivals of distrust towards the Great-Russians had not yet disappeared, and when centrifugal forces still continued to operate. Under those conditions it was necessary to establish fraternal cooperation among the peoples on the basis of economic, political and military mutual aid by uniting them in a single federated, multi-national state. The Soviet government could not but see the difficulties of this task. It had before it the unsuccessful experiments of multi-national states in bourgeois countries. It had before it the experiment of old Austria-Hungary, which ended in failure. Nevertheless, it resolved to make the experiment of creating a multi-national state, for it knew that a multi-national state which has arisen on the basis of socialism is bound to stand every and any test.

Since then fourteen years have elapsed. A period long enough to test the experiment. And what do we find? This period has shown beyond a doubt that the experiment of forming a multi-national state based on socialism has been completely successful. This is the undoubted victory of the Leninist national policy. (*Prolonged applause.*)

How is this victory to be explained?

The absence of exploiting classes, which are the principal organizers of strife between nations; the absence of exploitation, which cultivates mutual distrust and kindles nationalist passions; the fact

that power is in the hands of the working class, which is the foe of all enslavement and the true vehicle of the ideas of internationalism; the actual practice of mutual aid among the peoples in all spheres of economic and social life; and, finally, the flourishing national culture of the peoples of the USSR, culture which is national in form and socialist in content — all these and similar factors have brought about a radical change in the aspect of the peoples of the USSR; their feeling of mutual distrust has disappeared, a feeling of mutual friendship has developed among them, and thus real fraternal cooperation among the peoples has been established within the system of a single federated state.

As a result, we now have a fully formed multi-national socialist state, which has stood all tests, and whose stability might well be envied by any national state in any part of the world. (*Loud applause.*)

Such are the changes which have taken place during this period in the sphere of national relations in the USSR.

Such is the sum total of changes which have taken place in the sphere of the economic and social-political life of the USSR in the period from 1924 to 1936.

III. THE PRINCIPAL SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION

How are all these changes in the life of the USSR reflected in the draft of the new Constitution?

In other words: What are the principal specific features of the Draft Constitution submitted for consideration to the present Congress?

The Constitution Commission was instructed to amend the text of the Constitution of 1924. The work of the Constitution Commission has resulted in a new text of the Constitution, a draft of a new Constitution of the USSR. In drafting the new Constitution, the Constitution Commission proceeded from the proposition that a constitution must not be confused with a program. This means that there is an essential difference between a program and a constitution. Whereas a program speaks of that which does not yet exist, of that which has yet to be achieved and won in the future, a constitution, on the contrary, must speak of that which already exists, of that which has already been achieved and won now, at the present time. A program deals mainly with the future, a constitution with the present.

Two examples by way of illustration.

Our Soviet society has already, in the main, succeeded in achieving socialism; it has created a socialist system, i.e., it has brought about what Marxists in other words call the first, or lower, phase of communism. Hence, in the main, we have already achieved the first phase of communism, socialism. (*Prolonged applause.*) The fundamental principle of this phase of communism is, as you know, the formula: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his work." Should our Constitution reflect this fact, the fact that socialism has been achieved? Should it be based on this achievement? Unquestionably, it should. It should, because for the USSR socialism is something already achieved and won.

But Soviet society has not yet reached the higher phase of communism, in which the ruling principle will be the formula: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs," although it sets itself the aim of achieving the higher phase of communism in the future. Can our Constitution be based on the higher phase of communism, which does not yet exist and which has still to be achieved? No, it cannot, because for the USSR the higher phase of communism is something that has not yet been realized, and which has to be realized in the future. It cannot, if it is not to be converted into a program or a declaration of future achievements.

Such are the limits of our Constitution at the present historical moment.

Thus, the draft of the new Constitution is a summary of the path that has been traversed, a summary of the gains already achieved. In other words, it is the registration and legislative embodiment of what has already been achieved and won in actual fact. (*Loud applause.*)

That is the first specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR.

Further. The constitutions of bourgeois countries usually proceed from the conviction that the capitalist system is immutable. The main foundation of these constitutions consists of the principles of capitalism, of its main pillars: the private ownership of the land, forests, factories, works, and other implements and means of production; the exploitation of man by man and the existence of exploiters and exploited; insecurity for the toiling majority at one pole of society, and luxury for the non-toiling but secure minority at the other pole, etc., etc. They rest on these, and similar pillars of capitalism. They reflect them, they embody them in law.

Unlike these, the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR proceeds from the fact that the capitalist system has been liquidated, and that the socialist system has triumphed in the USSR. The main foundation of the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR is the principles of socialism, whose main pillars are things that have already been achieved and realized: the socialist ownership of the land, forests, factories, works and other instruments and means of production; the abolition of exploitation and of exploiting classes; the abolition of poverty for the majority and of luxury for the minority; the abolition of unemployment; work as an obligation and an honourable duty for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the formula: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat"; the right to work, i.e., the right of every citizen to receive guaranteed employment; the right to rest and leisure; the right to education, etc., etc. The draft of the new Constitution rests on these and similar pillars of socialism. It reflects them, it embodies them in law.

Such is the second specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution.

Further. Bourgeois constitutions tacitly proceed from the premise that society consists of antagonistic classes, of classes which own wealth and classes which do not own wealth; that no matter what party comes into power, the guidance of society by the state (the dictatorship) must be in the hands of the bourgeoisie; that a constitution is needed for the purpose of consolidating a social order desired by, and beneficial to, the propertied classes.

Unlike bourgeois constitutions, the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR proceeds from the fact that there are no longer any antagonistic classes in society; that society consists of two friendly classes, of workers and peasants; that it is these classes, the labouring classes, that are in power; that the guidance of society by the state (the dictatorship) is in the hands of the working class, the most advanced class in society, that a constitution is needed for the purpose of consolidating a social order desired by, and beneficial to, the working people.

Such is the third specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution.

Further. Bourgeois constitutions tacitly proceed from the premise that nations and races cannot have equal rights, that there are nations with full rights and nations without full rights, and that, in addition, there is a third category of nations or races, for example the colonies, which have even fewer rights than the nations without

full rights. This means that, at bottom, all these constitutions are nationalistic, i.e., constitutions of ruling nations.

Unlike these constitutions, the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR is, on the contrary, profoundly internationalistic. It proceeds from the proposition that all nations and races have equal rights. It proceeds from the fact that neither difference in colour or language, cultural level or level of political development, nor any other difference between nations and races, can serve as grounds for justifying national inequality of rights. It proceeds from the proposition that all nations and races, irrespective of their past and present position, irrespective of their strength or weakness, should enjoy equal rights in all spheres of the economic, social, political and cultural life of society.

Such is the fourth specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution.

The fifth specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution is its consistent and thoroughgoing democratism. From the standpoint of democratism, bourgeois constitutions may be divided into two groups: One group of constitutions openly denies, or actually nullifies, the equality of rights of citizens and democratic liberties. The other group of constitutions readily accepts, and even advertises democratic principles, but at the same time it makes reservations and provides for restrictions which utterly mutilate these democratic rights and liberties. They speak of equal suffrage for all citizens, but at the same time limit it by residential, educational and even property qualifications. They speak of equal rights for citizens, but at the same time they make the reservation that this does not apply to women, or applies to them only in part. And so on and so forth.

What distinguishes the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR is the fact that it is free from such reservations and restrictions. For it, there exists no division of citizens into active and passive ones; for it, all citizens are active. It does not recognize any difference in rights as between men and women, "residents" and "non-residents," propertied and propertyless, educated and uneducated. For it, all citizens have equal rights. It is not property status, not national origin, not sex, nor office, but personal ability and personal labour, that determines the position of every citizen in society.

Lastly, there is still one more specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution. Bourgeois constitutions usually confine themselves to stating the formal rights of citizens, without bothering about the conditions for the exercise of these rights, about the op-

portunity of exercising them, about the means by which they can be exercised. They speak of the equality of citizens, but forget that there cannot be real equality between employer and workman, between landlord and peasant, if the former possess wealth and political weight in society while the latter are deprived of both — if the former are exploiters while the latter are exploited. Or again: they speak of freedom of speech, assembly and the press, but forget that all these liberties may be merely a hollow sound for the working class if the latter cannot have access to suitable premises for meetings, good printing shops, a sufficient quantity of printing paper, etc.

What distinguishes the draft of the new Constitution is the fact that it does not confine itself to stating the formal rights of citizens, but stresses the guarantee of these rights, the means by which these rights can be exercised. It does not merely proclaim equality of rights for citizens, but ensures it by giving legislative embodiment to the fact that the regime of exploitation has been abolished, to the fact that the citizens have been emancipated from all exploitation. It does not merely proclaim the right to work, but ensures it by giving legislative embodiment to the fact that there are no crises in Soviet society and that unemployment has been abolished. It does not merely proclaim democratic liberties, but legislatively ensures them by providing definite material resources. It is clear, therefore, that the democratism of the draft of the new Constitution is not the “ordinary” and “universally recognized” democratism in the abstract, but socialist democratism.

These are the principle specific features of the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR.

This is the way the draft of the new Constitution reflects the progress and changes that have been brought about in the economic and social-political life of the USSR in the period from 1924 to 1936.

IV. BOURGEOIS CRITICISM OF THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION

A few words about bourgeois criticism of the Draft Constitution.

The question of the attitude of the foreign bourgeois press towards the Draft Constitution is undoubtedly of some interest. Inasmuch as the foreign press reflects the public opinion of the various sections of the population of bourgeois countries, we cannot ignore its criticism of the Draft Constitution.

The first reaction of the foreign press to the Draft Constitution

was expressed in a definite tendency — to hush up the Draft Constitution. I am referring here to the most reactionary press, the fascist press. This group of critics thought it best to simply hush up the Draft Constitution and to pretend that there is no such Draft, and never has been. It may be said that silence is not criticism. But that is not true. The method of keeping silence, as a special method of ignoring things, is also a form of criticism — a stupid and ridiculous form, it is true, but a form of criticism, for all that. (*Laughter and applause.*) But their silence was of no avail. In the end they were obliged to open the valve and to inform the world that, sad though it may be, a Draft Constitution of the USSR does exist, and not only does it exist but it is beginning to exercise a pernicious influence on people's minds. Nor could it be otherwise; for, after all, there is such a thing as public opinion in the world, there is the reading public, living people, who want to know the facts, and to hold them in the vise of deception for long is quite impossible. Deception does not carry one far...

The second group of critics admits that there really is such a thing as a Draft Constitution, but considers that the draft is not of much interest, because it is really not a Draft Constitution but a scrap of paper, an empty promise, with the idea of performing a certain manoeuvre to deceive people. And they add that the USSR could not produce a better draft, because the USSR itself is not a state, but only a geographical concept (*general laughter*), and since it is not a state, its Constitution cannot be a real constitution. A typical representative of this group of critics is, strange as it may appear, the German semi-official organ, "Deutsche Diplomatisch-Politische Korrespondenz." This journal bluntly declares that the Draft Constitution of the USSR is an empty promise, a fraud, a "Potemkin village." It unhesitatingly declares that the USSR is not a state, that the USSR "is nothing more nor less than a strictly defined geographical concept" (*general laughter*), and that in view of this, the Constitution of the USSR cannot be regarded as a real constitution.

What can one say about such critics, so-called?

In one of his tales the great Russian writer Shchedrin portrays a pig-headed official, very narrow-minded and obtuse, but self-confident and zealous to the extreme. After this bureaucrat had established "order and tranquillity" in the region "under his charge," having exterminated thousands of its inhabitants and burned down scores of towns in the process, he looked around him, and on the horizon espied America — a country little known, of course, where,

it appears, there are liberties of some sort or other which serve to agitate the people, and where the state is administered in a different way. The bureaucrat espied America and became indignant: What country is that, how did it get there, by what right does it exist? (*Laughter and applause.*) Of course, it was discovered accidentally several centuries ago, but couldn't it be shut up again so that not a ghost of it remains? (*General laughter.*) Thereupon he wrote an order: "Shut America up again!" (*General laughter.*)

It seems to me that the gentlemen of the "Deutsche Diplomatisch-Politische Korrespondenz" and Shchedrin's bureaucrat are as like as two peas. (*Laughter and applause.*) The USSR has long been an eyesore to these gentlemen. For nineteen years the USSR has stood like a beacon, spreading the spirit of emancipation among the working class all over the world and rousing the fury of the enemies of the working class. And it turns out that this USSR not only exists, but is even growing; is not only growing, but is even flourishing; and is not only flourishing, but is even composing a draft of a new Constitution, a draft which is stirring the minds and inspiring the oppressed classes with new hope. (*Applause.*) How can the gentlemen of the German semi-official organ be anything but indignant after this? What sort of country is this? — they howl; by what right does it exist? (*General laughter.*) And if it was discovered in October 1917, why can't it be shut up again so that not a ghost of it remains? Thereupon they resolved: Shut the USSR up again; proclaim publicly that the USSR, as a state, does not exist, that the USSR is nothing but a mere geographical concept. (*General laughter.*)

In writing his order to shut America up again, Shchedrin's bureaucrat, despite all his obtuseness, evinced some reality by adding to himself: "However, it seems that same is not within my power." (*Roars of laughter and applause.*) I do not know whether the gentlemen of the German semi-official organ are endowed with sufficient intelligence to suspect that — while, of course, they can "shut up" this or that country on paper — speaking seriously, however, "same is not within their power..." (*Roars of laughter and applause.*)

As for the Constitution of the USSR being an empty promise, a "Potemkin village," etc., I would like to refer to a number of established facts which speak for themselves.

In 1917 the peoples of the USSR overthrew the bourgeoisie and established the dictatorship of the proletariat, established a Soviet government. This is a fact, not a promise.

Further, the Soviet government eliminated the landlord class and

transferred to the peasants over 150,000,000 hectares of former landlord, government and monasterial lands, over and above the lands which were already in the possession of the peasants. This is a fact, not a promise.

Further, the Soviet government expropriated the capitalist class, took away their banks, factories, railways, and other implements and means of production, declared these to be socialist property, and placed at the head of these enterprises the best members of the working class. This is a fact, not a promise. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Further, having organized industry and agriculture on new, socialist lines, with a new technical base, the Soviet government has today attained a position where agriculture in the USSR is producing one and a half times as much as was produced in prewar times, where industry is producing seven times more than was produced in prewar times, and where the national income has increased fourfold compared with prewar times. All these are facts, not promises. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Further, the Soviet government has abolished unemployment, has introduced the right to work, the right to rest and leisure, the right to education, has provided better material and cultural conditions for the workers, peasants and intelligentsia, and has ensured the introduction of universal, direct and equal suffrage with secret ballot for its citizens. All these are facts, not promises. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Finally, the USSR has produced the draft of a new Constitution which is not a promise but the registration and legislative embodiment of these generally known facts, the registration and legislative embodiment of what has already been achieved and won.

One may ask: In view of all this, what can all the talk of the gentlemen of the German semi-official organ about "Potemkin villages" amount to but an attempt on their part to conceal from the people the truth about the USSR, to mislead the people, to deceive them.

Such are the facts. And facts, it is said, are stubborn things. The gentlemen of the German semi-official organ may say: So much the worse for the facts. (*Laughter.*) But then, we can answer them in the words of the well-known Russian proverb: "Laws are not made for fools." (*Laughter and prolonged applause.*)

The third group of critics are not averse to recognizing certain merits in the Draft Constitution; they regard it as a good thing; but, you see, they doubt very much whether a number of its principles can be applied in practice, because they are convinced that these

principles are generally impracticable and must remain a dead letter. These, to put it mildly, are sceptics. These sceptics are to be found in all countries.

It must be said that this is not the first time we have met them. When the Bolsheviks took power in 1917 the sceptics said: The Bolsheviks are not bad fellows, perhaps, but nothing will come of their government; they will fail. Actually it turned out, however, that it was not the Bolsheviks who failed, but the sceptics.

During the civil war and foreign intervention this group of sceptics said: The Soviet government is not a bad thing, of course, but Denikin and Kolchak, plus the foreigners, will, we venture to say, come out on top. Actually, it turned out, however, that the sceptics were wrong again in their calculations.

When the Soviet government published the First Five-Year Plan the sceptics again appeared on the scene saying: The Five-Year Plan is a good thing, of course, but it is hardly feasible; the Bolsheviks' Five-Year Plan is not likely to succeed. The facts proved, however, that once again the sceptics had bad luck: the Five-Year Plan was carried out in four years.

The same must be said about the draft of the new Constitution and the criticism levelled against it by the sceptics. No sooner was the Draft published than this group of critics again appeared on the scene with their gloomy scepticism and their doubts as to the practicability of certain principles of the Constitution. There is not the slightest ground for doubt that in this case, too, the sceptics will fail, that they will fail today as they have failed more than once in the past.

The fourth group of critics, in attacking the draft of the new Constitution, characterize it as a "swing to the right," as the "abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat," as the "liquidation of the Bolshevik regime." "The Bolsheviks have swung to the right, that is a fact," they declare in a chorus of different voices. Particularly zealous in this respect are certain Polish newspapers and also some American newspapers.

What can one say about these critics, so-called?

If the broadening of the basis of the dictatorship of the working class and the transformation of the dictatorship into a more flexible, and, consequently, a more powerful system of guidance of society by the state is interpreted by them not as strengthening the dictatorship of the working class but as weakening it, or even abandoning it, then it is legitimate to ask: Do these gentlemen really know what the dic-

tatorship of the working class means?

If the legislative embodiment given to the victories of socialism, the legislative embodiment given to the successes of industrialization, collectivization and democratization is represented by them as a “swing to the right,” then it is legitimate to ask: Do these gentlemen really know the difference between left and right? (*General laughter and applause.*)

There can be no doubt that these gentlemen have entirely lost their way in their criticism of the Draft Constitution, and, having lost their way, they confuse right with left.

One cannot help recalling, in this connection, the “wench” Pelageya in Gogol’s “Dead Souls.” Gogol relates that Pelageya offered to act as guide to Chichikov’s coachman, Seliphan; but not knowing the right side of the road from the left, she lost her way and got into an embarrassing situation. It must be admitted that, notwithstanding all their pretensions, the intelligence of our critics on the Polish newspapers is not much above that of the “wench” Pelageya in “Dead Souls.” (*Applause.*) If you remember, the coachman Seliphan thought fit to chide Pelageya for confusing right with left and said to her: “Oh, you dirty-legs... you don’t know which is right and which is left.” It seems to me that our luckless critics should be chided in the same way: “Oh, you sorry critics... you don’t know which is right and which is left.” (*Prolonged applause.*)

Finally, there is yet another group of critics. While the last-mentioned group accuses the Draft Constitution of abandoning the dictatorship of the working class, this group, on the contrary, accuses it of not changing anything in the existing position in the USSR, of leaving the dictatorship of the working class intact, of not granting freedom to political parties, and of preserving the present leading position of the Communist Party in the USSR. And this group of critics maintains that the absence of freedom for parties in the USSR is a symptom of the violation of the principles of democratism.

I must admit that the draft of the new Constitution does preserve the regime of the dictatorship of the working class, just as it also preserves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party of the USSR. (*Loud applause.*) If the esteemed critics regard this as a flaw in the Draft Constitution, that is only to be regretted. We Bolsheviks regard it as a merit of the Draft Constitution. (*Loud applause.*)

As to freedom for various political parties, we adhere to somewhat different views. A party is a part of a class, its most advanced

part. Several parties, and, consequently, freedom for parties, can exist only in a society in which there are antagonistic classes whose interests are mutually hostile and irreconcilable — in which there are, say, capitalists and workers, landlords and peasants, kulaks and poor peasants, etc. But in the USSR there are no longer such classes as the capitalists, the landlords, the kulaks, etc. In the USSR there are only two classes, workers and peasants, whose interests — far from being mutually hostile — are, on the contrary, friendly. Hence, there is no ground in the USSR for the existence of several parties, and, consequently, for freedom for these parties. In the USSR there is ground only for one party, the Communist Party. In the USSR only one party can exist, the Communist Party, which courageously defends the interests of the workers and peasants to the very end. And that it defends the interests of these classes not at all badly, of that there can hardly be any doubt. (*Loud applause.*)

They talk of democracy. But what is democracy? Democracy in capitalist countries, where there are antagonistic classes, is, in the last analysis, democracy for the strong, democracy for the propertied minority. In the USSR, on the contrary, democracy is democracy for the working people, i.e., democracy for all. But from this it follows that the principles of democratism are violated, not by the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR, but by the bourgeois constitutions. That is why I think that the Constitution of the USSR is the only thoroughly democratic Constitution in the world.

Such is the position with regard to the bourgeois criticism of the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR.

V. AMENDMENTS AND ADDENDA TO THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION

Let us pass on to the amendments and addenda to the Draft Constitution proposed by citizens during the nationwide discussion of the draft.

The nationwide discussion of the Draft Constitution, as you know, produced a fairly large number of amendments and addenda. These have all been published in the Soviet press. In view of the great variety of amendments and the fact that they are not all of equal value, they should, in my opinion, be divided into three categories.

The distinguishing feature of the amendments in the first category is that they deal not with constitutional questions but with ques-

tions which come within the scope of the current legislative work of the future legislative bodies. Certain questions concerning insurance, some questions concerning collective farm development, some questions concerning industrial development, financial questions — such are the subjects with which these amendments deal. Evidently the authors of these amendments were not clear as to the difference between constitutional questions and questions of current legislation. That is why they strive to squeeze as many laws as possible into the Constitution, thus tending to convert the Constitution into something in the nature of a code of laws. But a constitution is not a code of laws. A constitution is the fundamental law, and only the fundamental law. A constitution does not preclude but presupposes current legislative work on the part of the future legislative bodies. A constitution provides the juridical basis for the future legislative activities of these bodies. Therefore, amendments and addenda of this kind, which have no direct bearing on the Constitution, should, in my opinion, be referred to the future legislative bodies of the country.

To the second category should be assigned those amendments and addenda which strive to introduce into the Constitution elements of historical references, or elements of declarations concerning what the Soviet government has not yet achieved and what it should achieve in the future. To describe in the Constitution the difficulties the Party, the working class, and all the working people have overcome during the long years of struggle for the victory of socialism; to indicate in the Constitution the ultimate goal of the Soviet movement, i.e., the building of a complete communist society — such are the subjects with which these amendments deal, in different variations. I think that such amendments and addenda should also be set aside as having no direct bearing on the Constitution. The Constitution is the registration and legislative embodiment of the gains that have already been achieved and secured. Unless we want to distort this fundamental character of the Constitution, we must refrain from filling it with historical references to the past, or with declarations concerning the future achievements of the working people of the USSR. For this we have other means and other documents.

Finally, to the third category should be assigned amendments and addenda which have a direct bearing on the Draft Constitution.

A large number of amendments in this category are simply a matter of wording. They could therefore be referred to the Drafting

Commission of the present Congress which I think the Congress will set up, with instructions to decide on the final text of the new Constitution.

As for the rest of the amendments in the third category, they are of greater material significance, and in my opinion a few words should be said about them.

1. First of all about the amendments to Article 1 of the Draft Constitution. There are four amendments. Some propose that we substitute for the words "state of workers and peasants" the words "state of working people." Others propose that we add the words "and working intelligentsia" to the words "state of workers and peasants." A third group proposes that we substitute for the words "state of workers and peasants" the words "state of all the races and nationalities inhabiting the territory of the USSR." A fourth group proposes that we substitute for the word "peasants" the words "collective farmers" or "toilers of socialist agriculture."

Should these amendments be adopted? I think they should not.

What does Article 1 of the Draft Constitution speak of? It speaks of the class composition of Soviet society. Can we Marxists ignore the question of the class composition of our society in the Constitution? No, we cannot. As we know, Soviet society consists of two classes, workers and peasants. And it is of this that Article 1 of the Draft Constitution speaks. Consequently, Article 1 of the Draft Constitution properly reflects the class composition of our society. It may be asked: What about the working intelligentsia? The intelligentsia has never been a class, and can never be a class — it was and remains a stratum, which recruits its members from all classes of society. In the old days the intelligentsia recruited its members from the ranks of the nobility, of the bourgeoisie, partly from the ranks of the peasantry, and only to a very inconsiderable extent from the ranks of the workers. In our day, under the Soviets, the intelligentsia recruits its members mainly from the ranks of the workers and peasants. But no matter where it may recruit its members, and what character it may bear, the intelligentsia is nevertheless a stratum and not a class.

Does this circumstance infringe upon the rights of the working intelligentsia? Not in the least! Article 1 of the Draft Constitution deals not with the rights of the various strata of Soviet society, but with the class composition of that society. The rights of the various strata of Soviet society, including the rights of the working intelligentsia, are dealt with mainly in Chapters X and XI of the Draft

Constitution. It is evident from these chapters that the workers, the peasants and the working intelligentsia enjoy entirely equal rights in all spheres of the economic, political, social and cultural life of the country. Consequently, there can be no question of an infringement upon the rights of the working intelligentsia.

The same must be said of the nations and races comprising the USSR. In Chapter II of the Draft Constitution it is stated that the USSR is a free union of nations possessing equal rights. Is it worthwhile repeating this formula in Article 1 of the Draft Constitution, which deals not with the national composition of Soviet society, but with its class composition? Clearly, it is not worthwhile. As to the rights of the nations and races comprising the USSR, these are dealt with in Chapters II, X, and XI of the Draft Constitution. From these chapters it is evident that the nations and races of the USSR enjoy equal rights in all spheres of the economic, political, social and cultural life of the country. Consequently, there can be no question of an infringement upon national rights.

It would also be wrong to substitute for the word "peasant" the words "collective farmer" or "toiler of socialist agriculture." In the first place, besides the collective farmers, there are still over a million households of non-collective farmers among the peasantry. What is to be done about them? Do the authors of this amendment propose to strike them off the books? That would be unwise. Secondly, the fact that the majority of the peasants have started collective farming does not mean that they have already ceased to be peasants, that they no longer have their personal economy, their own households, etc. Thirdly, for the word "worker" we would then have to substitute the words "toiler of socialist industry," which, however, the authors of the amendment for some reason or other do not propose. Finally, have the working class and the peasant class already disappeared in our country? And if they have not disappeared, is it worthwhile deleting from our vocabulary the established names for them? Evidently, what the authors of the amendment have in mind is not present society, but future society, when classes will no longer exist and when the workers and peasants will have been transformed into toilers of a homogeneous communist society. Consequently, they are obviously running ahead. But in drawing up a constitution one must not proceed from the future, but from the present, from what already exists. A constitution should not and must not run ahead.

2. Then follows an amendment to Article 17 of the Draft Consti-

tution. The amendment proposes that we completely delete from the Constitution Article 17, which reserves to the Union Republics the right of free secession from the USSR. I think that this proposal is a wrong one and therefore should not be adopted by the Congress. The USSR is a voluntary union of Union Republics with equal rights. To delete from the Constitution the article providing for the right of free secession from the USSR would be to violate the voluntary character of this union. Can we agree to this step? I think that we cannot and should not agree to it. It is said that there is not a single republic in the USSR that would want to secede from the USSR, and that therefore Article 17 is of no practical importance. It is, of course, true that there is not a single republic that would want to secede from the USSR. But this does not in the least mean that we should not fix in the Constitution the right of Union Republics freely to secede from the USSR. In the USSR there is not a single Union Republic that would want to subjugate another Union Republic. But this does not in the least mean that we ought to delete from the Constitution of the USSR the article dealing with the equality of rights of the Union Republics.

3. Then there is a proposal that we add a new article to Chapter II of the Draft Constitution, to the following effect: that on reaching the proper level of economic and cultural development Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics may be raised to the status of Union Soviet Socialist Republics. Can this proposal be adopted? I think that it should not be adopted. It is a wrong proposal, not only because of its content, but also because of the condition it lays down. Economic and cultural maturity can no more be urged as grounds for transferring Autonomous Republics to the category of Union Republics than economic or cultural backwardness can be urged as grounds for leaving any particular republic in the list of Autonomous Republics. This would not be a Marxist, not a Leninist approach. The Tatar Republic, for example, remains an Autonomous Republic, while the Kazakh Republic is to become a Union Republic; but this does not mean that from the standpoint of cultural and economic development the Kazakh Republic is on a higher level than the Tatar Republic. The very opposite is the case. The same can be said, for example, of the Volga German Autonomous Republic and the Kirghiz Union Republic, of which the former is on a higher cultural and economic level than the latter, although it remains an Autonomous Republic.

What are the grounds for transferring Autonomous Republics to the category of Union Republics?

There are three such grounds.

First, the republic concerned must be a border republic, not surrounded on all sides by USSR territory. Why? Because since the Union Republics have the right to secede from the USSR, a republic, on becoming a Union Republic, must be in a position logically and actually to raise the question of secession from the USSR. And this question can be raised only by a republic which, say, borders on some foreign state, and, consequently, is not surrounded on all sides by USSR territory. Of course, none of our republics would actually raise the question of seceding from the USSR. But since the right to secede from the USSR is reserved to the Union Republics, it must be so arranged that this right does not become a meaningless scrap of paper. Take, for example, the Bashkir Republic or the Tatar Republic. Let us assume that these Autonomous Republics are transferred to the category of Union Republics. Could they logically and actually raise the question of seceding from the USSR? No, they could not. Why? Because they are surrounded on all sides by Soviet republics and regions, and, strictly speaking, they have nowhere to go if they secede from the USSR. (*Laughter and applause.*) Therefore, it would be wrong to transfer such republics to the category of Union Republics.

Secondly, the nationality which gives its name to a given Soviet republic must constitute a more or less compact majority within that republic. Take the Crimean Autonomous Republic, for example. It is a border republic, but the Crimean Tatars do not constitute the majority in that republic; on the contrary, they are a minority. Consequently, it would be wrong to transfer the Crimean Republic to the category of Union Republics.

Thirdly, the republic must not have too small a population; it should have a population of, say, not less but more than a million, at least. Why? Because it would be wrong to assume that a small Soviet republic with a very small population and a small army could hope to maintain its existence as an independent state. There can hardly be any doubt that the imperialist beasts of prey would soon lay hands on it.

I think that unless these three objective grounds exist, it would be wrong at the present historical moment to raise the question of transferring any particular Autonomous Republic to the category of Union Republics.

4. Next it is proposed to delete from Articles 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 the detailed enumeration of the administrative territo-

rial division of the Union Republics into territories and regions. I think that this proposal is also unacceptable. There are people in the USSR who are always ready and eager to go on tirelessly recarving the territories and regions and thus cause confusion and uncertainty in our work. The Draft Constitution puts a check on these people. And that is very good, because here, as in many other things, we need an atmosphere of certainty, we need stability and clarity.

5. The fifth amendment concerns Article 33. The creation of two chambers is regarded as inexpedient, and it is proposed that the Soviet of Nationalities be abolished. I think that this amendment is also wrong. A single-chamber system would be better than a dual-chamber system if the USSR were a single-nation state. But the USSR is not a single-nation state. The USSR, as we know, is a multinational state. We have a supreme body in which are represented the common interests of all the working people of the USSR irrespective of nationality. This is the Soviet of the Union. But in addition to common interests, the nationalities of the USSR have their particular, specific interests, connected with their specific national characteristics. Can these specific interests be ignored? No, they cannot. Do we need a special supreme body to reflect precisely these specific interests? Unquestionably, we do. There can be no doubt that without such a body it would be impossible to administer a multinational state like the USSR. Such a body is the second chamber, the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR.

Reference is made to the parliamentary history of European and American states; it is pointed out that the dual-chamber system in these countries has produced only negative results — that the second chamber usually degenerates into a centre of reaction and a brake on progress. All that is true. But this is due to the fact that in those countries there is no equality between the two chambers. As we know, the second chamber is not infrequently granted more rights than the first chamber, and, moreover, as a rule the second chamber is constituted undemocratically, its members not infrequently being appointed from above. Undoubtedly, these defects will be obviated if equality is established between the chambers and if the second chamber is constituted as democratically as the first.

6. Further, an addendum to the Draft Constitution is proposed calling for an equal number of members in both chambers. I think that this proposal might be adopted. In my opinion, it has obvious political advantages, for it emphasizes the equality of the chambers.

7. Next comes an addendum to the Draft Constitution which

proposes that the members of the Soviet of Nationalities be elected by direct vote, as in the case of the members of the Soviet of the Union. I think that this proposal might also be adopted. True, it may create certain technical inconveniences during elections; but, on the other hand, it would be of great political advantage, for it would enhance the prestige of the Soviet of Nationalities.

8. Then follows an addendum to Article 40, proposing that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet be granted the right to pass provisional acts of legislation. I think that this addendum is wrong and should not be adopted by the Congress. It is time we put an end to a situation in which not one but a number of bodies legislate. Such a situation runs counter to the principle that laws should be stable. And we need stability of laws now more than ever. Legislative power in the USSR must be exercised only by one body, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

9. Further, an addendum is proposed to Article 48 of the Draft Constitution, demanding that the President of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR be elected not by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR but by the whole population of the country. I think this addendum is wrong, because it runs counter to the spirit of our Constitution. According to the system of our Constitution there must not be an individual president in the USSR, elected by the whole population on a par with the Supreme Soviet, and able to put himself in opposition to the Supreme Soviet. The president in the USSR is a collegium, it is the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, including the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, elected, not by the whole population, but by the Supreme Soviet, and accountable to the Supreme Soviet. Historical experience shows that such a structure of the supreme bodies is the most democratic and safeguards the country against undesirable contingencies.

10. Then follows another amendment to Article 48. It reads as follows: that the number of Vice-Presidents of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR be increased to eleven, one from each Union Republic. I think that this amendment might be adopted, for it would be an improvement and would only enhance the prestige of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

11. Then follows an amendment to Article 77. It calls for the organization of a new All-Union People's Commissariat — the People's Commissariat of the Defence Industry. I think that this amendment should likewise be accepted (*applause*), for the time has arrived to separate our defence industry and have a People's Com-

missariat for it. It seems to me that this would only improve the defence of our country.

12. Next follows an amendment to Article 124 of the Draft Constitution, demanding that the article be changed to provide for the prohibition of religious rites. I think that this amendment should be rejected as running counter to the spirit of our Constitution.

13. Finally, there is one other amendment of a more or less material character. I am referring to an amendment to Article 135 of the Draft Constitution. It proposes that ministers of religion, former Whiteguards, all the former rich, and persons not engaged in socially useful occupations be disfranchised, or, at all events, that the franchise of people in this category be restricted to the right to elect, but not to be elected. I think that this amendment should likewise be rejected. The Soviet government disfranchised the non-working and exploiting elements not for all time, but temporarily, up to a certain period. There was a time when these elements waged open war against the people and actively resisted the Soviet laws. The Soviet law depriving them of the franchise was the Soviet government's reply to this resistance. Quite some time has elapsed since then. During this period we have succeeded in abolishing the exploiting classes, and the Soviet government has become an invincible force. Has not the time arrived for us to revise this law? I think the time has arrived. It is said that this is dangerous, as elements hostile to the Soviet government, some of the former Whiteguards, kulaks, priests, etc., may worm their way into the supreme governing bodies of the country. But what is there to be afraid of? If you are afraid of wolves, keep out of the woods. (*Laughter and loud applause.*) In the first place, not all the former kulaks, Whiteguards and priests are hostile to the Soviet government. Secondly, if the people in some place or other do elect hostile persons, that will show that our propaganda work was very badly organized and we shall fully deserve such a disgrace; if, however, our propaganda work is conducted in a Bolshevik way, the people will not let hostile persons slip into the supreme governing bodies. This means that we must work and not whine (*loud applause*), we must work and not wait to have everything put before us ready-made by official order. As far back as 1919, Lenin said that the time was not far distant when the Soviet government would deem it expedient to introduce universal suffrage without any restrictions. Please note: without any restrictions. He said this at a time when foreign military intervention had not yet been overcome, and when our industry and agriculture were in a desperate condition. Since then,

seventeen years have elapsed. Comrades, is it not time we carried out Lenin's behest? I think it is.

Here is what Lenin said in 1919 in his "Draft Program of the Communist Party of Russia." Permit me to read it.

"The Russian Communist Party must explain to the masses of the working people, in order to avoid a wrong generalization of transient historical needs, that the disfranchisement of a section of citizens does not in the Soviet Republic affect, as has been the case in the majority of bourgeois-democratic republics, a definite category of citizens disfranchised for life, but applies only to the exploiters, only to those who in violation of the fundamental laws of the Socialist Soviet Republic, persist in defending their position as exploiters, in preserving capitalist relationships. Consequently, in the Soviet Republic, on the one hand, every day of added strength for socialism and diminution in the number of those who have objective possibilities of remaining exploiters or of preserving capitalist relationships, automatically reduces the percentage of disfranchised persons. In Russia at the present time this percentage is hardly more than two or three per cent. On the other hand in the not distant future the cessation of foreign invasion and the completion of the expropriation of the expropriators may, under certain conditions, create a situation in which the proletarian state power will choose other methods of suppressing the resistance of the exploiters and will introduce universal suffrage without any restrictions."¹²⁵

That is clear, I think.

Such is the position with regard to the amendments and addenda to the Draft Constitution of the USSR.

VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF THE USSR

Judging by the results of the nationwide discussion, which lasted nearly five months, it may be presumed that the Draft Constitution will be approved by the present Congress. (*Loud applause and cheers. All rise.*)

In a few days' time the Soviet Union will have a new, socialist Constitution, built on the principles of fully developed socialist democracy.

It will be an historical document dealing in simple and concise terms, almost in the style of minutes, with the facts of the victory of socialism in the USSR, with the facts of the emancipation of the

working people of the USSR from capitalist slavery, with the facts of the victory in the USSR of full and thoroughly consistent democracy.

It will be a document testifying to the fact that what millions of honest people in capitalist countries have dreamed of and still dream of has already been realized in the USSR. (*Loud applause.*)

It will be a document testifying to the fact that what has been realized in the USSR is fully possible of realization in other countries also. (*Loud applause.*)

But from this it follows that the international significance of the new Constitution of the USSR can hardly be exaggerated.

Today, when the turbid wave of fascism is bespattering the socialist movement of the working class and besmirching the democratic strivings of the best people in the civilized world, the new Constitution of the USSR will be an indictment against fascism, declaring that socialism and democracy are invincible. (*Applause.*) The new Constitution of the USSR will give moral assistance and real support to all those who are today fighting fascist barbarism. (*Loud applause.*)

Still greater is the significance of the new Constitution of the USSR for the peoples of the USSR. While for the peoples of capitalist countries the Constitution of the USSR will have the significance of a program of action, it is significant for the peoples of the USSR, as the summary of their struggles, a summary of their victories in the struggle for the emancipation of mankind. After the path of struggle and privation that has been traversed, it is pleasant and joyful to have our Constitution, which treats of the fruits of our victories. It is pleasant and joyful to know what our people fought for and how they achieved this victory of worldwide historical importance. It is pleasant and joyful to know that the blood our people shed so plentifully was not shed in vain, that it has produced results. (*Prolonged applause.*) This arms our working class, our peasantry, our working intelligentsia spiritually. It impels them forward and rouses a sense of legitimate pride. It increases confidence in our strength and mobilizes us for fresh struggles for the achievement of new victories of communism.

(*Thunderous ovation. All rise. Shouts from all parts of the hall: "Long live Comrade Stalin." All stand and sing the "Internationale," after which the ovation is resumed. Shouts of "Long live our leader, Comrade Stalin, hurrah."*)

DEFECTS IN PARTY WORK AND MEASURES FOR LIQUIDATING TROTSKYITE AND OTHER DOUBLE- DEALERS

*(Report and Speech in Reply to Debate at the Plenum of the Central
Committee of the CPSU(B))*

March 3, 1937

Comrades, from the reports and the debates on these reports heard at this Plenum it is evident that we are dealing with the following three main facts.

First, the wrecking, diversionist and espionage work of the agents of foreign countries, among whom a rather active role was played by the Trotskyites, affected more or less all, or nearly all, our organizations — economic, administrative and Party.

Second, the agents of foreign countries, among them the Trotskyites, not only penetrated into our lower organizations, but also into a number of responsible positions.

Third, some of our leading comrades, at the centre and in the districts, not only failed to discern the real face of these wreckers, diversionists, spies and assassins, but proved to be so careless, complacent and naive that not infrequently they themselves helped to promote agents of foreign powers to responsible positions.

Such are the three incontrovertible facts which naturally emerge from the reports and the debates on these reports.

I. POLITICAL CARELESSNESS

How are we to explain the fact that our leading comrades, who have rich experience in the fight against all sorts of anti-Party and anti-Soviet trends, proved in this case to be so naive and blind that they were unable to see the real face of the enemies of the people, were unable to discern the wolves in sheep's clothing, unable to tear off their masks?

Can it be said that the wrecking, diversionist and espionage work of the agents of foreign powers operating in the territory of the USSR can be anything unexpected and unprecedented for us? No,

that cannot be said. This is shown by the wrecking activities in various branches of national economy during the past ten years, beginning with the Shakhti period, activities which are registered in official documents.

Can it be said that in this past period there were no warning signals and warning signs about the wrecking, espionage or terrorist activities of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite agents of fascism? No, that cannot be said. We had such signals, and Bolsheviks have no right to forget about them.

The foul murder of Comrade Kirov was the first serious warning which showed that the enemies of the people would resort to duplicity, and resorting to duplicity would disguise themselves as Bolsheviks, as Party members, in order to worm their way into our confidence and gain access to our organizations.

The trial of the "Leningrad Centre" as well as the "Zinoviev-Kamenev" trial gave fresh grounds for the lessons which followed from the foul murder of Comrade Kirov.

The trial of the "Zinovievite-Trotskyite bloc" broadened the lessons of the preceding trials and strikingly demonstrated that the Zinovievites and Trotskyites had united around themselves all the hostile bourgeois elements, that they had become transformed into an espionage, diversionist and terrorist agency of the German secret police, that duplicity and camouflage are the only means by which the Zinovievites and Trotskyites can penetrate into our organizations, that vigilance and political insight are the surest means of preventing such penetration, of liquidating the Zinovievite-Trotskyite gang.

The Central Committee of the CPSU(B) in its confidential letter of January 18, 1935, on the foul murder of Comrade Kirov emphatically warned the Party organizations against political complacency and philistine heedlessness. In the confidential letter it was stated:

"We must put a stop to opportunist complacency which comes from the mistaken assumption that as we grow in strength our enemies become tamer and more innocuous. Such an assumption is radically wrong. It is an echo of the right deviation which assured all and sundry that the enemy would quietly creep into socialism, that in the end they would become real socialists. Bolsheviks cannot rest on their laurels and become heedless. We do not want complacency, but vigilance, real Bolshevik, revolutionary vigilance. We must remember that the more hopeless the position of the enemies becomes the more eagerly will they clutch at extreme methods as the only methods of the doomed in their struggle against the Soviet power. We must remember this and be vigilant."

In its confidential letter of July 29, 1936, on the espionage-terrorist activities of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) once again called upon the Party organizations to display the utmost vigilance, to acquire the ability to discern the enemies of the people no matter how well disguised they may be. In that confidential letter it was stated:

“Now that it has been proven that the Trotskyite-Zinovievite monsters are uniting in their struggle against the Soviet power all the most enraged and sworn enemies of the toilers of our country — spies, provocateurs, diversionists, whiteguards, kulaks, etc. — when between these elements and the Trotskyites and Zinovievites all lines of demarcation have been obliterated, all our Party organizations, all members of the Party, must understand that the vigilance of communists is needed on every sector and under all circumstances. An inalienable quality of every Bolshevik under present conditions must be the ability to discern the enemy of the Party no matter how well he may disguise himself.”

And so there were signals and warnings.

What did these signals and warnings call for?

They called for the elimination of the weakness of Party organizational work and for the transformation of the Party into an impregnable fortress into which not a single double-dealer could penetrate.

They called upon us to put a stop to the underestimation of Party political work and to make an emphatic turn in the direction of intensifying this work to the utmost, of intensifying political vigilance.

But what happened? The facts show that our comrades reacted to these signals and warnings very slowly.

This is eloquently shown by all the known facts that have emerged from the campaign of verifying and exchanging Party documents.

How are we to explain the fact that these warnings and signals did not have the required effect?

How are we to explain the fact that our Party comrades, notwithstanding their experience in the struggle against anti-Soviet elements, notwithstanding the numerous warning signals and warning signs, proved to be politically short-sighted in face of the wrecking, espionage and diversionist work of the enemies of the people?

Perhaps our Party comrades have deteriorated, have become less class-conscious and less disciplined? No, of course not!

Perhaps they have begun to degenerate? Again, of course not! There are no grounds whatever for such an assumption.

What is the matter then? Whence this heedlessness, carelessness, complacency, blindness?

The matter is that our comrades, carried away by economic campaigns and by colossal successes on the front of economic construction, simply forgot about certain very important facts which Bolsheviks have no right to forget. They forgot about the main fact in the international position of the USSR and failed to notice two very important facts which have direct relation to the present-day wreckers, spies, diversionists and assassins who are concealing themselves behind Party membership cards and disguising themselves as Bolsheviks.

II. THE CAPITALIST ENCIRCLEMENT

What are the facts which our Party comrades forgot about, or simply failed to notice?

They forgot that the Soviet power is victorious only on one-sixth of the globe, that five-sixths of the globe are in the possession of capitalist states. They forgot that the Soviet Union is encircled by capitalist states. It is an accepted thing among us to chatter about capitalist encirclement, but people refuse to ponder over what sort of thing this capitalist encirclement is. Capitalist encirclement is not an empty phrase, it is a very real and unpleasant thing. Capitalist encirclement means that there is a country, the Soviet Union, which has established the socialist system, and that there are, besides, many other countries, bourgeois countries, which continue to lead the capitalist mode of life and which surround the Soviet Union, waiting for an opportunity to attack her, to crush her, or, at all events, to undermine her might and weaken her.

It is this main fact that our comrades forgot. But it is precisely this fact that determines the basis of the relations between the capitalist encirclement and the Soviet Union.

Take the bourgeois states, for example. Naive people might think that exceptionally good relations exist between them, as between states of the same type. But only naive people can think like that. As a matter of fact relations far from neighbourly exist between them. It has been proved as definitely as twice two are four that the bourgeois states send to each other spies, wreckers, diversionists and sometimes also assassins, instruct them to penetrate into the institutions and enterprises of these states, set up their agencies and "in case of necessity" disrupt their rear, in order to weaken them and

to undermine their strength. Such is the case at the present time. Such, also, was the case in the past. For example, take the states in Europe at the time of Napoleon the First. At that time France was swarming with spies and diversionists from the side of the Russians, Germans, Austrians and English. On the other hand, England, the German states, Austria and Russia, had in their rear a no smaller number of spies and diversionists from the French side. English agents twice made an attempt on the life of Napoleon, and several times they roused the peasants of the Vendee in France against the Napoleon government. And what was this Napoleon government? A bourgeois government, which strangled the French Revolution and preserved only those results of the revolution which were of advantage to the big bourgeoisie. Needless to say the Napoleon government did not remain in debt to its neighbours and also undertook diversionist measures. Such was the case in the past, 130 years ago. That is the case now, 130 years after Napoleon the First. Today France and England are swarming with German spies and diversionists, and, on the other hand, Anglo-French spies and diversionists are busy in Germany; America is swarming with Japanese spies and diversionists, and Japan is swarming with American spies and diversionists.

Such is the law of the relations between bourgeois states.

The question arises, why should the bourgeois states treat the Soviet socialist state more gently and in a more neighbourly manner than they treat bourgeois states of their own type? Why should they send to the Soviet Union fewer spies, wreckers, diversionists and assassins than they send to their kindred bourgeois states? Why should you think so? Would it not be more correct from the point of view of Marxism to assume that the bourgeois states would send twice and three times as many wreckers, spies, diversionists and assassins to the Soviet Union as they send to any bourgeois state?

Is it not clear that as long as capitalist encirclement exists we shall have wreckers, spies, diversionists and assassins sent to us by agents of foreign states?

Our Party comrades forgot about all this, and having forgotten about it, they were caught unawares.

That is why the espionage and diversionist work of the Trotskyite agents of the Japano-German secret police proved to be quite unexpected for some of our comrades.

III. PRESENT DAY TROTSKYISM

Further, while fighting the Trotskyite agents, our Party comrades failed to notice, overlooked the fact that present-day Trotskyism is not what it was, say, seven or eight years ago, that during this period Trotskyism and the Trotskyites had undergone an important evolution which radically changed the face of Trotskyism, that in view of this, the struggle against Trotskyism, the methods of fighting it, have to be radically changed. Our Party comrades failed to notice that Trotskyism had ceased to be a political trend in the working class, that from the political trend in the working class that it was seven or eight years ago Trotskyism had become transformed into a wild and unprincipled gang of wreckers, diversionists, spies and assassins acting on the instructions of the intelligence services of foreign states.

What is a political trend in the working class? A political trend in the working class is a group, or party, which has a definite political face, a platform, a program, which does not and cannot hide its views from the working class, but on the contrary, advocates its views openly and honestly before the working class, which is not afraid of showing its political face to the working class, which is not afraid of demonstrating its real aims and objects to the working class, but on the contrary, goes to the working class with open visor in order to convince it of the correctness of its views. In the past, seven or eight years ago, Trotskyism was such a political trend in the working class, an anti-Leninist and, therefore, a profoundly mistaken trend, it is true, but a political trend, nevertheless.

Can it be said that present-day Trotskyism, Trotskyism, say, of 1936, is a political trend in the working class? No, this cannot be said, Why? Because the present-day Trotskyites are afraid to show their real face to the working class, are afraid to reveal to it their real aims and objects, carefully hide their political face from the working class, fearing that if the working class learns about their real intentions it will curse them as people alien to it and drive them away. This, in fact, explains why the principal methods of Trotskyite work are now not the open and honest advocacy of its views in the working class, but the disguising of its views, the obsequious, fawning eulogy of the views of its opponents, the pharisaical and hypocritical trampling of its own views in the mud.

At the trial in 1936, if you remember, Kamenev and Zinoviev emphatically denied that they had any political platform. They had every opportunity of unfolding their political platform at the trial. But they did not do this, declaring that they had no political platform. There can be no doubt that both of them were lying when they

denied that they had a political platform. Now even the blind can see that they had a political platform. But why did they deny that they had a political platform? Because they were afraid to reveal their real political face, they were afraid to demonstrate their real platform of restoring capitalism in the USSR, they were afraid because such a platform would cause revulsion in the ranks of the working class.

At the trial in 1937, Pyatakov, Radek and Sokolnikov took a different line. They did not deny that the Trotskyites and Zinovievites had a political platform. They admitted that they had a definite political platform, admitted it and unfolded it in their evidence. But they unfolded it not in order to call upon the working class, to call upon the people, to support the Trotskyite platform, but in order to curse and brand it as an anti-people and anti-proletarian platform. The restoration of capitalism, the liquidation of the collective farms and state farms, the restoration of the system of exploitation, alliance with the fascist forces of Germany and Japan to bring nearer war against the Soviet Union, the fight for war and against the policy of peace, the territorial dismemberment of the Soviet Union in which the Ukraine was to be surrendered to the Germans and the Maritime Region to the Japanese, preparation for the military defeat of the Soviet Union in the event of an attack on her by hostile states and, as a means of achieving these aims, wrecking, diversion, individual acts of terrorism against the leaders of the Soviet government, espionage on behalf of the Japano-German fascist forces — such was the political platform of present-day Trotskyism unfolded by Pyatakov, Radek and Sokolnikov. Naturally the Trotskyites could not but hide such a platform from the people, from the working class. And they hid it not only from the working class, but also from the rank-and-file Trotskyites, and not only from the rank-and-file Trotskyites, but even from the leading Trotskyite group consisting of a small clique of thirty or forty people. When Radek and Pyatakov demanded from Trotsky permission to convene a small conference of thirty or forty Trotskyites for the purpose of informing them about the character of this platform, Trotsky forbade them on the ground that it was inexpedient to tell even a small clique of Trotskyites about the real character of this platform, for such an “operation” might cause a split.

“Political figures,” hiding their views and their platform not only from the working class, but also from the Trotskyite rank-and-file, and not only from the Trotskyite rank-and-file, but from the leading group of the Trotskyites — such is the face of present-day Trotsky-

ism.

But it follows from this that present-day Trotskyism can no longer be called a political trend in the working class.

Present-day Trotskyism is not a political trend in the working class, but a gang without principles and without ideals, a gang of wreckers, diversionists, intelligence service agents, spies, assassins, a gang of sworn enemies of the working class, working in the pay of the intelligence services of foreign states.

Such is the incontrovertible result of the evolution of Trotskyism in the last seven or eight years.

Such is the difference between Trotskyism in the past and Trotskyism at the present time.

The mistake our Party comrades made is that they failed to notice this profound difference between Trotskyism in the past and Trotskyism at the present time. They failed to notice that the Trotskyites have long ceased to be people devoted to an ideal, that the Trotskyites long ago became highway robbers, capable of any foulness, capable of all that is disgusting, to the point of espionage and the downright betrayal of their country, if only they can harm the Soviet government and Soviet power. They failed to notice this and therefore were unable to adapt themselves in time to fight the Trotskyites in a new way, more determinedly.

That is why the abominable work of the Trotskyites during the last few years was quite unexpected for some of our Party comrades.

To proceed. Finally, our Party comrades failed to notice that there is an important difference between the present-day wreckers and diversionists, among whom the Trotskyite agents of fascism play rather an active part, and the wreckers and diversionists of the time of the Shakhti case.

Firstly, the Shakhti and Industrial Party wreckers were people openly alien to us. They were for the most part former factory owners, former managers for the old employers, former shareholders in joint stock companies, or simply old bourgeois specialists who were openly hostile to us politically. None of our people had any doubt about the real political face of these gentlemen. And the Shakhti wreckers themselves did not conceal their dislike for the Soviet system. The same cannot be said about the present-day wreckers and diversionists, the Trotskyites. The present-day wreckers and diversionists, the Trotskyites, are for the most part Party people with a Party card in their pocket, consequently, people who, formally, are not alien to us. The old wreckers opposed our people, but the new

wreckers fawn upon our people, praise them, toady to them in order to worm their way into their confidence. As you see, the difference is an important one.

Secondly, the strength of the Shakhti and Industrial Party wreckers was that they, more or less, possessed the necessary technical knowledge, whereas our people, not possessing such knowledge, were compelled to learn from them. This circumstance put the wreckers of the Shakhti period in an advantageous position, it enabled them to carry on their wrecking work freely and unhindered, enabled them to deceive our people technically. This is not the case with the present-day wreckers, with the Trotskyites. The present-day wreckers are not superior to our people in technical knowledge. On the contrary, our people are technically better trained than the present-day wreckers, than the Trotskyites. During the period from the Shakhti case to the present day tens of thousands of genuine, technically well-equipped Bolshevik cadres have grown up among us. One could mention thousands and tens of thousands of technically educated Bolshevik leaders, compared with whom people like Pyatakov and Livshitz, Shestov and Boguslavsky, Muralov and Drobnis are empty windbags and mere tyros from the standpoint of technical training. That being the case, wherein lies the strength of the present-day wreckers, the Trotskyites? Their strength lies in the Party card, in the possession of a Party card. Their strength lies in the fact that the Party card enables them to be politically trusted and gives them access to all our institutions and organizations. Their advantage lies in that, holding a Party card and pretending to be friends of the Soviet power, they deceived our people politically, abused their confidence, did their wrecking work furtively and disclosed our state secrets to the enemies of the Soviet Union. The political and moral value of this "advantage" is a doubtful one, but still, it is an "advantage." This "advantage" explains why the Trotskyite wreckers, having a Party card, having access to all places in our institutions and organizations, were a real windfall for the intelligence services of foreign states.

The mistake some of our Party comrades made is that they failed to notice, did not understand this difference between the old and the new wreckers, between the Shakhti wreckers and the Trotskyites, and, not noticing this, they were unable to adapt themselves in time to fight the new wreckers in a new way.

IV. THE BAD SIDE OF ECONOMIC SUCCESSES

Such are the main facts of our international and internal situation which many of our Party comrades forgot, or which they failed to notice.

That is why our people were taken unawares by the events of the last few years as regards wrecking and diversion.

It may be asked: But why did our people fail to notice all this, why did they forget about all this?

Where did all this forgetfulness, blindness, carelessness, complacency, come from?

Is it an organic defect in the work of our people?

No, it is not an organic defect. It is a temporary phenomenon which can be rapidly removed if our people make some effort.

What is the matter then?

The matter is that during the last few years our Party comrades have been totally absorbed in economic work, have been carried away to the extreme by economic successes, and being absorbed by all this, they forgot about everything else, neglected everything else.

The matter is that, being carried away by economic successes, they began to regard this as the beginning and end of all things, and simply ceased to pay attention to such things as the international position of the Soviet Union, the capitalist encirclement, increasing the political work of the Party, the struggle against wrecking, etc., assuming that all these were second-rate or even third-rate matters.

Successes and achievements are a great thing, of course. Our successes in the sphere of socialist construction are truly enormous. But successes, like everything else in the world, have their bad side. Among people who are not very skilled in politics, big successes and big achievements not infrequently give rise to carelessness, complacency, self satisfaction, excessive self-confidence, swelled-headedness and boastfulness. You cannot deny that lately braggarts have multiplied among us enormously. It is not surprising that in this atmosphere of great and important successes in the sphere of socialist construction boastfulness should arise, that showy demonstrations of our successes, underestimation of the strength of our enemies, overestimation of our own strength, and, as a result of all this, political blindness, should arise.

Here I must say a few words about the dangers connected with successes, about the dangers connected with achievements.

We know by experience about the dangers connected with difficulties. We have been fighting against such dangers for a number of years and, I may say, not without success. Among people who are

not staunch, dangers connected with difficulties not infrequently give rise to despondency, lack of confidence in their own strength, feelings of pessimism. When, however, it is a matter of combatting dangers which arise from difficulties, people are hardened in this struggle and emerge from the struggle really granite Bolsheviks. Such is the nature of the dangers connected with difficulties. Such are the results of overcoming difficulties.

But there is another kind of danger, the danger connected with successes, the danger connected with achievements. Yes, yes, comrades, dangers connected with successes, with achievements. These dangers are that among people not very skilled in politics and not having seen much, the atmosphere of successes — success after success, achievement after achievement, overfulfilment of plans after overfulfilment of plans — gives rise to carelessness and self-satisfaction, creates an atmosphere of showy triumphs and mutual congratulations, which kills the sense of proportion and dulls political intuition, takes the spring out of people and causes them to rest on their laurels.

It is not surprising that in this intoxicating atmosphere of swelled-headedness and self-satisfaction, in this atmosphere of showy demonstrations and loud self-praise, people forget certain essential facts of first-rate importance for the fate of our country; people begin not to notice such unpleasant facts as the capitalist encirclement, the new forms of wrecking, the dangers connected with our successes, and so forth. Capitalist encirclement? Oh, that's nothing! What does capitalist encirclement matter if we are fulfilling and overfulfilling our economic plans? The new forms of wrecking, the struggle against Trotskyism? Mere trifles! What do these trifles matter if we are fulfilling and overfulfilling our economic plans? The Party rules, electing Party bodies, Party leaders reporting to the Party members? Is there really any need for all this? Is it worthwhile bothering about all these trifles if our economy is growing and the material conditions of the workers and peasants are becoming better and better? Mere trifles! The plans are being overfulfilled, our Party is not a bad one, the Central Committee of our Party is also not a bad one — what else do we need? They are some funny people sitting there in Moscow, in the Central Committee of the Party, inventing all sorts of problems, talk about wrecking, don't sleep themselves and don't let other people sleep...

This is a striking example of how easily and “simply” some of our inexperienced comrades are infected with political blindness as a

result of dizzying rapture over economic successes.

Such are the dangers connected with successes, with achievements.

Such are the reasons why our Party comrades, having been carried away by economic successes, forgot about facts of an international and internal character which are of vital importance for the Soviet Union, and failed to notice a number of dangers surrounding our country.

Such are the roots of our carelessness, forgetfulness, complacency, political blindness.

Such are the roots of the defects in our economic and Party work.

V. OUR TASKS

How can these defects in our work be removed? What must be done to achieve this?

The following measures must be carried out:

1) First of all the attention of our Party comrades who have become submerged in "current questions" in some department or other must be turned towards the big political international and internal problems.

2) The political work of our Party must be raised to the proper level, making the cornerstone the task of politically educating and giving Bolshevik hardness to the Party, Soviet and economic cadres.

3) It must be explained to our Party comrades that the economic successes, the significance of which is undoubtedly very great and which we shall go on striving to achieve, day after day, year after year, are nevertheless not the whole of our work of socialist construction.

It must be explained that the bad sides connected with economic successes which are expressed in self-satisfaction, carelessness, the dulling of political intuition, can be removed only if economic successes are combined with successes in Party construction and extensive political work of our Party.

It must be explained that economic successes, their stability and duration wholly and entirely depend on the successes of Party organizational and Party political work, that without this, economic successes may prove to have been built on sand.

4) We must remember and never forget that the capitalist encirclement is the main fact which determines the international position

of the Soviet Union.

We must remember and never forget that as long as the capitalist encirclement exists there will be wreckers, diversionists, spies, terrorists, sent to the Soviet Union by the intelligence services of foreign states; this must be borne in mind and a struggle must be waged against those comrades who underestimate the significance of the capitalist encirclement, who underestimate the strength and significance of wrecking.

It must be explained to our Party comrades that no economic successes, no matter how great, can annul the capitalist encirclement and the consequences arising from it.

The necessary measures must be taken to enable our comrades, both Party and non-Party Bolsheviki, to become familiar with the aims and objects, with the practice and technique of the wrecking, diversionist and espionage work of the foreign intelligence services.

5) It must be explained to our Party comrades that the Trotskyites, who are the active elements in the diversionist, wrecking and espionage work of the foreign intelligence services, have long ceased to be a political trend in the working class, that they have long ceased to serve any ideal compatible with the interests of the working class, that they have become a gang of wreckers, diversionists, spies, assassins, without principles and ideals, working in the pay of foreign intelligence services.

It must be explained that in the struggle against present-day Trotskyism, not the old methods, the methods of discussion, must be used, but new methods, uprooting and smashing methods.

6) We must explain to our Party comrades the difference between the present-day wreckers and the wreckers of the Shakhti period; we must explain that whereas the wreckers of the Shakhti period deceived our people in the sphere of technique, taking advantage of their technical backwardness, the present-day wreckers, with Party cards in their possession, deceive our people by taking advantage of the political confidence shown towards them as Party members, by taking advantage of the political carelessness of our people.

The old slogan of the mastery of technique which corresponded to the Shakhti period must be supplemented by the new slogan of political training of cadres, the mastery of Bolshevism and abandonment of our political trustfulness, a slogan which fully corresponds to the period we are now passing through.

It may be asked: Was it not possible ten years ago, during the Shakhti period, to advance both slogans simultaneously, the first

slogan on the mastery of technique, and the second slogan on the political training of cadres? No, it was not possible. Things are not done that way in the Bolshevik Party. At the turning points of the revolutionary movement some basic slogan is always advanced as the key slogan which we grasp in order to pull the whole chain. That is what Lenin taught us: find the main link in the chain of our work, grasp it, pull it and thus pull the whole chain forward. The history of the revolutionary movement shows that this is the only correct tactic. In the Shakhti period the weakness of our people lay in their technical backwardness. Technical questions and not political ones were our weak spot at that time. Our political attitude towards the wreckers of that time was perfectly clear, it was the attitude of Bolsheviks towards politically alien people. We eliminated our technical weakness by advancing the slogan on the mastery of technique and by educating during this period tens and hundreds of technically equipped Bolshevik cadres. It is a different matter now when we have technically equipped Bolshevik cadres and when the part of wreckers is being played by people who are not openly alien to us and moreover are not technically superior to us, but who possess Party cards and enjoy all the rights of Party members. The weakness from which our people suffer now is not technical backwardness but political carelessness, blind faith in people who have accidentally obtained Party cards, the failure to judge people not by their political declarations, but by the results of their work. The key question now facing us is not the elimination of the technical backwardness of our cadres for, in the main, this has already been done, but the elimination of the political carelessness and political trustfulness in wreckers who have accidentally obtained Party cards.

Such is the radical difference between the key question in the struggle for cadres in the Shakhti period and the key question at the present time.

That is why we could and should not have issued both slogans ten years ago: the one on the mastery of technique and the one on the political training of cadres.

That is why the old slogan on the mastery of technique must now be supplemented by the new slogan on the mastery of Bolshevism, the political training of cadres and the abandonment of our political carelessness.

7) We must smash and cast aside the rotten theory that with every advance we make the class struggle here must subside, the more successes we achieve the tamer will the class enemy become.

This is not only a rotten theory but a dangerous one, for it lulls our people, leads them into a trap, and enables the class enemy to recuperate for the struggle against the Soviet government.

On the contrary, the further forward we advance, the greater the successes we achieve, the greater will be the fury of the remnants of the defeated exploiting classes, the more ready will they be to resort to sharper forms of struggle, the more will they seek to harm the Soviet state, and the more will they clutch at the most desperate means of struggle as the last resort of the doomed.

It must be borne in mind that the remnants of the defeated classes in the USSR do not stand alone. They have the direct support of our enemies beyond the frontiers of the USSR. It would be a mistake to think that the sphere of the class struggle is limited to the frontiers of the USSR. One end of the class struggle operates within the frontiers of the USSR, but its other end stretches across the frontiers of the bourgeois states surrounding us. The remnants of the defeated classes cannot but be aware of this. And precisely because they are aware of it, they will continue their desperate sorties.

This is what history teaches us. This is what Leninism teaches us.

We must remember all this and be on the alert.

8) We must smash and cast aside another rotten theory to the effect that a person who is not always engaged in wrecking and who even occasionally shows successes in his work cannot be a wrecker.

This strange theory exposes the naivete of its authors. No wrecker will engage in wrecking all the time if he wants to avoid being exposed in the shortest possible time. On the contrary, the real wrecker must from time to time show successes in his work, for this is his only means of preservation as a wrecker, of winning the confidence of people and of continuing his wrecking work.

I think that this question is clear and requires no further explanation.

9) We must smash and cast aside the third rotten theory to the effect that the systematic fulfilment of the economic plans nullifies wrecking and its consequences.

Such a theory can only have one purpose, namely to tickle the self-esteem of our department officials, to lull them and to weaken their struggle against wrecking.

What does "the systematic fulfilment of our economic plans" mean?

Firstly, it has been proved that all our economic plans are too

low, for they do not take into account the enormous reserves and possibilities lying hidden in our national economy.

Secondly, the total fulfilment of economic plans by the respective People's Commissariats does not mean that there are not some very important branches which fail to fulfil their plans. On the contrary, the facts go to show that quite a number of People's Commissariats which have fulfilled or even more than fulfilled the annual economic plans, systematically fail to fulfil the plans in several very important branches of national economy.

Thirdly, there can be no doubt that had the wreckers not been exposed and ejected, the position in respect to the fulfilment of economic plans would have been far worse. This is something which the short-sighted authors of the theory under review ought to remember.

Fourthly, the wreckers usually time the main part of their wrecking work not for peace time, but for the eve of war, or for war itself. Suppose we lulled ourselves with this rotten "systematic fulfilment of economic plans" theory and did not touch the wreckers. Do the authors of this rotten theory appreciate what an enormous amount of harm the wreckers would do to our country in case of war if we allowed them to remain within the body of our national economy, sheltered by the rotten "systematic fulfilment of economic plans" theory?

Is it not clear that this "systematic fulfilment of economic plans" theory is a theory which is advantageous to the wreckers?

10) We must smash and cast aside the fourth rotten theory to the effect that the Stakhanov movement is the principal means for the liquidation of wrecking.

This theory has been invented in order, amidst the noisy chatter about the Stakhanovites and the Stakhanov movement, to parry the blow against the wreckers.

In his report Comrade Molotov quoted a number of facts which show how the Trotskyite and non-Trotskyite wreckers of the Kuznetsk and Donetz Basins abused the confidence of our politically careless comrades, systematically led the Stakhanovites by the nose, put spokes in their wheel, so to speak, deliberately created numerous obstacles to prevent them from working successfully and finally succeeded in disorganizing their work. What can the Stakhanovites do alone if capital construction as carried on by the wreckers, let us say, in the Donetz Basin, caused the preparatory work of coal mining to lag behind all other branches of the work?

Is it not clear that the Stakhanov movement itself is in need of

our real assistance against the various machinations of the wreckers so as to advance the movement and enable it to fulfil its great mission? Is it not clear that the struggle against wrecking, the fight to liquidate it, to curb this wrecking is a necessary condition to enable the Stakhanov movement to expand to the full?

I think that this question is also clear and needs no further comment.

11) We must smash and cast aside the fifth rotten theory to the effect that the Trotskyite wreckers have no more reserves, that they are mustering their last cadres.

This is not true, comrades. Only naive people could invent such a theory. The Trotskyite wreckers have their reserves. These consist first of all of the remnants of the defeated exploiting classes in the USSR. They consist of a whole number of groups and organizations beyond the frontiers of the USSR which are hostile to the Soviet Union.

Take, for example, the Trotskyite counter-revolutionary Fourth International, two-thirds of which is made up of spies and diversionist agents. Is not this a reserve? Is it not clear that this international of spies will provide forces for the spying and wrecking work of the Trotskyites?

Or take, for example, the group of that rascal, Scheflo, in Norway who provided a haven for the arch spy Trotsky and helped him to harm the Soviet Union. Is not this group a reserve? Who can deny that this counter-revolutionary group will continue to render services to the Trotskyite spies and wreckers?

Or take, for example, the group of another rascal like Scheflo, the Souvarine group in France. Is not this a reserve? Can it be denied that this group of rascals will also help the Trotskyites in their espionage and wrecking work against the Soviet Union?

Those ladies and gentlemen from Germany, the Ruth Fischers, Maslovs and Urbahns who have sold themselves body and soul to the fascists — are they not reserves for the espionage and wrecking work of the Trotskyites?

Or take, for example, the well-known gang of writers in America headed by the well-known crook Eastman, all these pen pirates who live by slandering the working class of the Soviet Union — are they not reserves for Trotskyism?

No, the rotten theory that the Trotskyites are mustering their last forces must be cast aside.

12) Finally we must smash and cast aside still another rotten

theory to the effect that since we Bolsheviks are many, while the wreckers are few, since we Bolsheviks have the support of tens of millions of people, while the Trotskyite wreckers can be numbered in tens and units, then we Bolsheviks can afford to ignore this handful of wreckers.

This is wrong, comrades. This more than strange theory has been invented for the consolation of certain of our leading comrades who have failed in their work because of their inability to combat wrecking. It has been invented to lull their vigilance, to enable them to sleep peacefully.

Of course it is true that the Trotskyite wreckers have the support of individuals, while the Bolsheviks have the support of tens of millions of people. But it by no means follows from this that the wreckers are not able to inflict very serious damage on us. It does not need a large number of people to do harm and to cause damage. To build a Dnieper Dam tens of thousands of workers have to be set to work. But to blow it up, only a score or so would be required. To win a battle in a war several Red Army corps may be required. But to nullify this gain at the front only a few spies are needed at Army Headquarters, or even at Divisional Headquarters, to steal the plan of operations and pass it on to the enemy. To build a big railway bridge thousands of people are required. But to blow it up a few are sufficient. Scores and hundreds of similar examples could be quoted.

Consequently, we must not comfort ourselves with the fact that we are many, while they, the Trotskyite wreckers, are few.

We must see to it that not a single Trotskyite wrecker is left in our ranks.

This is how the matter stands with the question of how to remove the defects in our work, which are common to all our organizations — economic, Soviet, administrative and Party.

Such are the measures that are necessary to remove these defects.

As regards the Party organizations in particular, and the defects in their work, the measures necessary to remove these defects are indicated in sufficient detail in the Draft Resolution submitted for your consideration. I think, therefore, that there is no need to enlarge on this aspect of the question here.

I would like to say just a few words on the question of political training and of improving our Party cadres.

I think that if we were able, if we succeeded in giving our Party cadres, from top to bottom, ideological training and in hardening

them politically so that they could easily find their bearings in the internal and international situation, if we succeeded in making them fully mature Leninists, Marxists, capable of solving the problems of leading the country without serious error, we would thereby solve nine-tenths of our problems.

What is the situation with regard to the leading forces of our Party?

In our Party, if we have in mind its leading strata, there are 3,000 to 4,000 first rank leaders. These are what I would call the generals of our Party.

Then there are 30,000 to 40,000 middle rank leaders, who are our Party's commissioned officers.

Then there are about 100,000 to 150,000 lower Party leaders who are, so to speak, our Party's non-commissioned officers.

The task is to raise the ideological level of these commanding cadres, to harden them politically, to infuse them with new forces which are awaiting promotion, and thus enlarge the ranks of these leading cadres.

What is needed for this?

First of all we must instruct each of our Party leaders, from secretaries of Party cells to secretaries of Regional and Republic Party organizations, to select within a certain time two persons, two Party workers, who are capable of acting as his effective deputies. It might be asked: where are we to get these two deputies for each secretary, we have no such people, no workers who answer these requirements. This is wrong, comrades. We have tens of thousands of capable and talented people. All we have to do is get to know them and promote them in time so as not to keep them in one place too long, until they begin to rot. Seek and ye shall find.

Further. For the Party instruction and re-training of secretaries of Party cells, four months' "Party courses" should be established in every regional centre. The secretaries of all primary Party organizations (cells) should be sent to these courses, and when they finish and return home, their deputies and the most capable members of the primary Party organizations should be sent to these courses.

Further. For the political re-training of first secretaries of district organizations, eight months' "Lenin courses" should be established in, say, ten of the most important centres in the USSR. The first secretaries of district and regional Party organizations should be sent to these courses, and when they finish and return home, their deputies and the most capable members of the district and regional organiza-

tions should be sent.

Further, For the ideological re-training and political improvement of secretaries of city organizations, six months' "Courses for the study of Party history and policy" under the CC of the CPSU(B) should be established. The first or second secretaries of city Party organizations should be sent to these courses, and when they finish and return home, the most capable members of the city Party organizations should be sent.

Finally, a six months' "Conference on Questions of Internal and International Policy" under the CC of the CPSU(B) should be established. The first secretaries of Regional and Territorial organizations and of Central Committees of national communist parties should be sent here. These comrades should provide not one but several relays, capable of replacing the leaders of the Central Committee of our Party. This should and must be done.

I now conclude, comrades.

We have thus indicated the main defects in our work, those which are common to all our organizations — economic, administrative and Party, and also those which are peculiar only to the Party organizations, defects which the enemies of the working class have taken advantage of in their diversionist and wrecking, espionage and terrorist work.

We have also indicated the principal measures that have to be adopted to remove these defects and to render harmless the diversionist, wrecking, espionage and terrorist sorties of the Trotskyite-fascist agents of the foreign intelligence services.

The question arises: can we carry out all these measures, have we all the necessary means for this?

Undoubtedly we can. We can because we have all the means necessary to carry out these measures.

What do we lack?

We lack only one thing, the readiness to rid ourselves of our carelessness, our complacency, our political short-sightedness.

There's the rub.

Cannot we, who have overthrown capitalism, who, in the main, have built socialism and have raised aloft the great banner of world communism, get rid of this ridiculous and idiotic disease?

We have no reason to doubt that we shall certainly get rid of it, if, of course, we want to do so. We will not just get rid of it, but get rid of it in the Bolshevik way, in real earnest.

And when we get rid of this idiotic disease we shall be able to

say with complete confidence that we fear no enemies from within or without, we do not fear their sorties, for we shall smash them in the future as we are smashing them now and as we have smashed them in the past. (*Applause.*)

ON THE FINAL VICTORY OF SOCIALISM IN THE USSR

January 18-February 12, 1938

Ivan Philipovich Ivanov, staff propagandist of the Manturovsk District of the Young Communist League in the Kursk Region of the USSR, addressed a letter to Comrade Stalin requesting his opinion on the question of the final victory of socialism in the Soviet Union.

IVANOV TO STALIN

Dear Comrade Stalin,

I earnestly request you to explain the following question: In the local districts here and even in the Regional Committee of the Young Communist League, a two-fold conception prevails about the final victory of socialism in our country, i.e., the first group of contradictions is confused with the second.

In your works on the destiny of socialism in the USSR you speak of two groups of contradictions — internal and external.

As for the first group of contradictions, we have, of course, solved them — within the country socialism is victorious.

I would like to have your answer about the second group of contradictions, i.e., those between the land of socialism and capitalism.

You point out that the final victory of socialism implies the solution of the external contradictions, that we must be fully guaranteed against intervention and, consequently, against the restoration of capitalism.

But this group of contradictions can only be solved by the efforts of the workers of all countries.

Besides, Comrade Lenin taught us that “we can achieve final victory only on a world scale, only by the joint efforts of the workers of all countries.”

While attending the class for staff propagandists at the Regional Committee of the YCL, I, basing myself on your works, said that the final victory of socialism is possible only on a world scale. But the leading regional committee workers — Urozhenko, First Secretary of the Regional Committee, and Kazelkov, propaganda instructor — described my statement as a Trotskyist sortie.

I began to read to them passages from your works on this ques-

tion, but Urozhenko ordered me to close the book and said: "Comrade Stalin said this in 1926, but we are now in 1938. At that time we did not have the final victory, but now we have it and there is no need for us at all to worry about intervention and restoration."

Then he went on to say: "We have now the final victory of socialism and a full guarantee against intervention and the restoration of capitalism."

And so I was counted as an abettor of Trotskyism and removed from propaganda work and the question was raised as to whether I was fit to remain in the YCL.

Please, Comrade Stalin, will you explain whether we have the final victory of socialism yet or not. Perhaps there is additional contemporary material on this question connected with recent changes that I have not come across yet. Also I think that Urozhenko's statement that Comrade Stalin's works on this question are somewhat out of date is an anti-Bolshevik one.

Are the leading workers of the Regional Committee right in counting me as a Trotskyist? I feel very much hurt and offended over this.

I hope, Comrade Stalin, that you will grant my request and reply to the Manturovsk District, Kursk Region, First Zasemsky Village Soviet, Ivan Philipovich Ivanov.

(Signed) *I. Ivanov.*

January 18, 1938.

STALIN TO IVANOV

Of course you are right, Comrade Ivanov, and your ideological opponents, i.e., Comrades Urozhenko and Kazelkov, are wrong. And for the following reasons:

Undoubtedly the question of the victory of socialism in one country, in this case our country, has two different sides.

The first side of the question of the victory of socialism in our country embraces the problem of the mutual relations between classes in our country. This concerns the sphere of internal relations.

Can the working class of our country overcome the contradictions with our peasantry and establish an alliance, collaboration with them?

Can the working class of our country, in alliance with our peasantry, smash the bourgeoisie of our country, deprive it of the land, factories, mines, etc., and by its own efforts build a new, classless

society, complete socialist society?

Such are the problems that are connected with the first side of the question of the victory of socialism in our country.

Leninism answers these problems in the affirmative. Lenin teaches us that "we have all that is necessary for the building of a complete socialist society."

Hence we can and must, by our own efforts, overcome our bourgeoisie and build socialist society.

Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and those other gentlemen who later became spies and agents of fascism, denied that it was possible to build socialism in our country unless the victory of the socialist revolution was first achieved in other countries, in capitalist countries. As a matter of fact, these gentlemen wanted to turn our country back to the path of bourgeois development and they concealed their apostasy by hypocritically talking about the "victory of the revolution" in other countries.

This was precisely the point of controversy between our Party and these gentlemen.

Our country's subsequent course of development proved that the Party was right and that Trotsky and company were wrong.

For, during this period, we succeeded in liquidating our bourgeoisie, in establishing fraternal collaboration with our peasantry and in building, in the main, socialist society, notwithstanding the fact that the socialist revolution has not yet been victorious in other countries.

This is the position in regard to the first side of the question of the victory of socialism in our country.

I think, Comrade Ivanov, that this is not the side of the question that is the point of controversy between you and Comrades Urozhenko and Kazelkov.

The second side of the question of the victory of socialism in our country embraces the problem of the mutual relations between our country and other countries, capitalist countries; the problem of the mutual relations between the working class of our country and the bourgeoisie of other countries. This concerns the sphere of external, international relations. Can the victorious socialism of one country, which is encircled by many strong capitalist countries, regard itself as being fully guaranteed against the danger of military invasion, and hence, against attempts to restore capitalism in our country?

Can our working class and our peasantry, by their own efforts, without the serious assistance of the working class in capitalist coun-

tries, overcome the bourgeoisie of other countries in the same way as we overcame our own bourgeoisie? In other words: Can we regard the victory of socialism in our country as final, i.e., as being free from the dangers of military attack and of attempts to restore capitalism, assuming that socialism is victorious only in one country and that the capitalist encirclement continues to exist?

Such are the problems that are connected with the second side of the question of the victory of socialism in our country.

Leninism answers these problems in the negative. Leninism teaches that “the final victory of socialism, in the sense of full guarantee against the restoration of bourgeois relations, is possible only on an international scale” (c.f. Resolution of the Fourteenth Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union).

This means that the serious assistance of the international proletariat is a force without which the problem of the final victory of socialism in one country cannot be solved.

This, of course, does not mean that we must sit with folded arms and wait for assistance from outside. On the contrary, this assistance of the international proletariat must be combined with our work to strengthen the defence of our country, to strengthen the Red Army and the Red Navy, to mobilize the whole country for the purpose of resisting military attack and attempts to restore bourgeois relations.

This is what Lenin says on this score:

“We are living not merely in a state but in a system of states, and it is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue to coexist for a long period side by side with imperialist states. Ultimately one or other must conquer. Meanwhile, a number of terrible clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois States is inevitable. This means that if the proletariat, as the ruling class, wants to and will rule, it must prove this also by military organization.” (Collected Works, Vol. 24, p. 122.)

And further:

“We are surrounded by people, classes and governments which openly express their hatred for us. We must remember that we are at all times but a hair’s breadth from invasion.” (Collected Works, Vol. 27, p. 117.)

This is said sharply and strongly but honestly and truthfully without embellishment as Lenin was able to speak.

On the basis of these premises Stalin stated in “Problems of Leninism” that:

“The final victory of socialism is the full guarantee against attempts at intervention, and that means against restoration, for any serious attempt at

restoration can take place only with serious support from outside, only with the support of international capital.

“Hence the support of our revolution by the workers of all countries, and still more, the victory of the workers in at least several countries, is a necessary condition for fully guaranteeing the first victorious country against attempts at intervention and restoration, a necessary condition for the final victory of socialism.” (Problems of Leninism, 1937, p. 134.)

Indeed, it would be ridiculous and stupid to close our eyes to the capitalist encirclement and to think that our external enemies, the fascists, for example, will not, if the opportunity arises, make an attempt at a military attack upon the USSR. Only blind braggarts or masked enemies who desire to lull the vigilance of our people can think like that.

No less ridiculous would it be to deny that in the event of the slightest success of military intervention, the interventionists would try to destroy the Soviet system in the districts they occupied and restore the bourgeois system.

Did not Denikin and Kolchak restore the bourgeois system in the districts they occupied? Are the fascists any better than Denikin or Kolchak?

Only blockheads or masked enemies who with their boastfulness want to conceal their hostility and are striving to demobilize the people can deny the danger of military intervention and attempts at restoration as long as the capitalist encirclement exists.

Can the victory of socialism in one country be regarded as final if this country is encircled by capitalism, and if it is not fully guaranteed against the danger of intervention and restoration?

Clearly, it cannot.

This is the position in regard to the question of the victory of socialism in one country.

It follows that this question contains two different problems:

1. The problem of the internal relations in our country, i.e., the problem of overcoming our own bourgeoisie and building complete socialism; and

2. The problem of the external relations of our country, i.e., the problem of completely ensuring our country against the dangers of military intervention and restoration.

We have already solved the first problem, for our bourgeoisie has already been liquidated and socialism has already been built in the main. This is what we call the victory of socialism, or, to be more exact, the victory of socialist construction in one country.

We could say that this victory is final if our country were situated on an island and if it were not surrounded by numerous capitalist countries.

But as we are not living on an island but “in a system of states,” a considerable number of which are hostile to the land of socialism and create the danger of intervention and restoration, we say openly and honestly that the victory of socialism in our country is not yet final.

But from this it follows that the second problem is not yet solved and that it has yet to be solved. More than that: the second problem cannot be solved in the way that we solved the first problem, i.e., solely by the efforts of our country.

The second problem can be solved only by combining the serious efforts of the international proletariat with the still more serious efforts of the whole of our Soviet people.

The international proletarian ties between the working class of the USSR and the working class in bourgeois countries must be increased and strengthened; the political assistance of the working class in the bourgeois countries for the working class of our country must be organized in the event of a military attack on our country; and also every assistance of the working class of our country for the working class in bourgeois countries must be organized; our Red Army, Red Navy, Red Air Fleet, and the Chemical and Air Defence Society must be increased and strengthened to the utmost.

The whole of our people must be kept in a state of mobilization and preparedness in the face of the danger of a military attack, so that no “accident” and no tricks on the part of our external enemies may take us by surprise...

From your letter it is evident that Comrade Urozhenko adheres to different and not quite Leninist opinions. He, it appears, asserts that “we now have the final victory of socialism and full guarantee against intervention and the restoration of capitalism.”

There cannot be the slightest doubt that Comrade Urozhenko is fundamentally wrong.

Comrade Urozhenko’s assertion can be explained only by his failure to understand the surrounding reality and his ignorance of the elementary propositions of Leninism, or by empty boastfulness of a conceited young bureaucrat.

If it is true that “we have full guarantee against intervention and restoration of capitalism,” then why do we need a strong Red Army, Red Navy, Red Air Fleet, a strong Chemical and Air Defence Socie-

ty, more and stronger ties with the international proletariat?

Would it not be better to spend the milliards that now go for the purpose of strengthening the Red Army on other needs and to reduce the Red Army to the utmost, or even to dissolve it altogether?

People like Comrade Urozhenko, even if subjectively they are loyal to our cause, are objectively dangerous to it because by their boastfulness they — willingly or unwillingly (it makes no difference!) — lull the vigilance of our people, demobilize the workers and peasants and help the enemies to take us by surprise in the event of international complications.

As for the fact that, as it appears, you, Comrade Ivanov, have been “removed from propaganda work and the question has been raised of your fitness to remain in the YCL,” you have nothing to fear.

If the people in the Regional Committee of the YCL really want to imitate Chekov’s Sergeant Prishibeyev, you can be quite sure that they will lose on this game.

Prishibeyevs are not liked in our country.

Now you can judge whether the passage from the book “Problems of Leninism” on the victory of socialism in one country is out of date or not.

I myself would very much like it to be out of date. I would like unpleasant things like capitalist encirclement, the danger of military attack, the danger of the restoration of capitalism, etc., to be things of the past. Unfortunately, however, these unpleasant things still exist.

(Signed) *J. Stalin.*

February 12, 1938.

LETTER ON PUBLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN DIRECTED TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE ALL-UNION COMMUNIST YOUTH

February 16, 1938

I am absolutely against the publication of "Stories of the Childhood of Stalin."

The book abounds with a mass of inexactitudes of fact, of alterations, of exaggerations and of unmerited praise. Some amateur writers, scribblers, (perhaps honest scribblers) and some adulators have led the author astray. It is a shame for the author, but a fact remains a fact.

But this is not the important thing. The important thing resides in the fact that the book has a tendency to engrave on the minds of Soviet children (and people in general) the personality cult of leaders, of infallible heroes. This is dangerous and detrimental.

The theory of "heroes" and the "crowd" is not a Bolshevik, but a Social-Revolutionary theory. The heroes make the people, transform them from a crowd into people, thus say the Social-Revolutionaries.

The people make the heroes, thus reply the Bolsheviks to the Social-Revolutionaries. The book carries water to the windmill of the Social-Revolutionaries. No matter which book it is that brings the water to the windmill of the Social-Revolutionaries, this book is going to drown in our common, Bolshevik cause.

I suggest we burn this book.

DIALECTICAL AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

September 1938

Dialectical materialism is the world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist party. It is called dialectical materialism because its approach to the phenomena of nature, its method of studying and apprehending them, is *dialectical*, while its interpretation of the phenomena of nature, its conception of these phenomena, its theory, is *materialistic*.

Historical materialism is the extension of the principles of dialectical materialism to the study of social life, an application of the principles of dialectical materialism to the phenomena of the life of society, to the study of society and of its history.

When describing their dialectical method, Marx and Engels usually refer to Hegel as the philosopher who formulated the main features of dialectics. This, however, does not mean that the dialectics of Marx and Engels is identical with the dialectics of Hegel. As a matter of fact, Marx and Engels took from the Hegelian dialectics only its "rational kernel," casting aside its Hegelian idealistic shell, and developed dialectics further so as to lend it a modern scientific form.

"My dialectic method," says Marx, "is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel,... the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea,' he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos (creator) of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea.' With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought." (Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, p. XXX, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1938.)

When describing their materialism, Marx and Engels usually refer to Feuerbach as the philosopher who restored materialism to its rights. This, however, does not mean that the materialism of Marx and Engels is identical with Feuerbach's materialism. As a matter of fact, Marx and Engels took from Feuerbach's materialism its "inner kernel," developed it into a scientific-philosophical theory of materialism and cast aside its idealistic and religious-ethical encumbrances. We know that Feuerbach, although he was fundamentally a materialist, objected to the name materialism. Engels more than

once declared that “in spite of the” materialist “foundation,” Feuerbach “remained... bound by the traditional idealist fetters,” and that “the real idealism of Feuerbach becomes evident as soon as we come to his philosophy of religion and ethics.” (Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., Moscow 1946, Vol. I, pp. 373, 375.)

Dialectics comes from the Greek *dialego*, to discourse, to debate. In ancient times dialectics was the art of arriving at the truth by disclosing the contradictions in the argument of an opponent and overcoming these contradictions. There were philosophers in ancient times who believed that the disclosure of contradictions in thought and the clash of opposite opinions was the best method of arriving at the truth. This dialectical method of thought, later extended to the phenomena of nature, developed into the dialectical method of apprehending nature, which regards the phenomena of nature as being in constant movement and undergoing constant change, and the development of nature as the result of the development of the contradictions in nature, as the result of the interaction of opposed forces in nature.

In its essence, dialectics is the direct opposite of metaphysics.

1) The principal features of the *Marxist dialectical method* are as follows:

a) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but as a connected and integral whole, in which things, phenomena are organically connected with, dependent on, and determined by, each other.

The dialectical method therefore holds that no phenomenon in nature can be understood if taken by itself, isolated from surrounding phenomena, inasmuch as any phenomenon in any realm of nature may become meaningless to us if it is not considered in connection with the surrounding conditions, but divorced from them; and that, vice versa, any phenomenon can be understood and explained if considered in its inseparable connection with surrounding phenomena, as one conditioned by surrounding phenomena.

b) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that nature is not a state of rest and immobility, stagnation and immutability, but a state of continuous movement and change, of continuous renewal and development, where something is always arising and developing, and something always disintegrating and dying away.

The dialectical method therefore requires that phenomena should be considered not only from the standpoint of their intercon-

nection and interdependence, but also from the standpoint of their movement, their change, their development, their coming into being and going out of being.

The dialectical method regards as important primarily not that which at the given moment seems to be durable and yet is already beginning to die away, but that which is arising and developing, even though at the given moment it may appear to be not durable, for the dialectical method considers invincible only that which is arising and developing.

“All nature,” says Engels, “from the smallest thing to the biggest, from a grain of sand to the sun, from the protista [the primary living cells — *Ed.*] to man, is in a constant state of coming into being and going out of being, in a constant flux, in a ceaseless state of movement and change.” (F. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*.)

Therefore, dialectics, Engels says, “takes things and their perceptual images essentially in their interconnection, in their concatenation, in their movement, in their rise and disappearance.” (F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*.)

c) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard the process of development as a simple process of growth, where quantitative changes do not lead to qualitative changes, but as a development which passes from insignificant and imperceptible quantitative changes to open, fundamental changes, to qualitative changes; a development in which the qualitative changes occur not gradually, but rapidly and abruptly, taking the form of a leap from one state to another; they occur not accidentally but as the natural result of an accumulation of imperceptible and gradual quantitative changes.

The dialectical method therefore holds that the process of development should be understood not as movement in a circle, not as a simple repetition of what has already occurred, but as an onward and upward movement, as a transition from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state, as a development from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher:

“Nature,” says Engels, “is the test of dialectics, and it must be said for modern natural science that it has furnished extremely rich and daily increasing materials for this test, and has thus proved that in the last analysis nature’s process is dialectical and not metaphysical, that it does not move in an eternally uniform and constantly repeated circle, but passes through a real history. Here prime mention should be made of Darwin, who dealt a severe blow to the metaphysical conception of nature by proving that the organic world of today, plants and animals, and consequently man too, is all

a product of a process of development that has been in progress for millions of years." (*Ibid.*)

Describing dialectical development as a transition from quantitative changes to qualitative changes, Engels says:

"In physics... every change is a passing of quantity into quality, as a result of a quantitative change of some form of movement either inherent in a body or imparted to it. For example, the temperature of water has at first no effect on its liquid state; but as the temperature of liquid water rises or falls, a moment arrives when this state of cohesion changes and the water is converted in one case into steam and in the other into ice... A definite minimum current is required to make a platinum wire glow; every metal has its melting temperature; every liquid has a definite freezing point and boiling point at a given pressure, as far as we are able with the means at our disposal to attain the required temperatures; finally, every gas has its critical point at which, by proper pressure and cooling, it can be converted into a liquid state... What are known as the constants of physics [the point at which one state passes into another — *Ed.*] are in most cases nothing but designations for the nodal points at which a quantitative [change,] increase or decrease of movement causes a qualitative change in the state of the given body, and at which, consequently, quantity is transformed into quality." (*Dialectics of Nature.*)

Passing to chemistry, Engels continues:

"Chemistry may be called the science of the qualitative changes which take place in bodies as the effect of changes of quantitative composition. This was already known to Hegel... Take oxygen: if the molecule contains three atoms instead of the customary two, we get ozone, a body definitely distinct in odour and reaction from ordinary oxygen. And what shall we say of the different proportions in which oxygen combines with nitrogen or sulphur, and each of which produces a body qualitatively different from all other bodies!" (*Ibid.*)

Finally, criticizing Dühring, who scolded Hegel for all he was worth, but surreptitiously borrowed from him the well-known thesis that the transition from the insentient world to the sentient world, from the kingdom of inorganic matter to the kingdom of organic life, is a leap to a new state, Engels says:

"This is precisely the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations, in which, at certain definite nodal points, the purely quantitative increase or decrease gives rise to a *qualitative leap*, for example, in the case of water which is heated or cooled, where boiling point and freezing point are the nodes at which — under normal pressure — the leap to a new aggregate state takes place, and where consequently quantity is transformed into quality."

(F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*.)

d) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature, for they all have their negative and positive sides, a past and a future, something dying away and something developing; and that the struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and that which is developing, constitutes the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes.

The dialectical method therefore holds that the process of development from the lower to the higher takes place not as a harmonious unfolding of phenomena, but as a disclosure of the contradictions inherent in things and phenomena, as a “struggle” of opposite tendencies which operate on the basis of these contradictions.

“In its proper meaning,” Lenin says, “dialectics is the study of the contradiction *within the very essence of things*.” (Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks*, Russ, ed., p.263.)

And further:

“Development is the ‘struggle’ of opposites.” (Lenin, *Collected Works*, Russ, ed., Vol. XIII, p. 301.)

Such, in brief, are the principal features of the Marxist dialectical method.

It is easy to understand how immensely important is the extension of the principles of the dialectical method to the study of social life and the history of society, and how immensely important is the application of these principles to the history of society and to the practical activities of the party of the proletariat.

If there are no isolated phenomena in the world, if all phenomena are interconnected and interdependent, then it is clear that every social system and every social movement in history must be evaluated not from the standpoint of “eternal justice” or some other preconceived idea, as is not infrequently done by historians, but from the standpoint of the conditions which gave rise to that system or that social movement and with which they are connected.

The slave system would be senseless, stupid and unnatural under modern conditions. But under the conditions of a disintegrating primitive communal system, the slave system is a quite understand-

able and natural phenomenon, since it represents an advance on the primitive communal system.

The demand for a bourgeois-democratic republic when Tsardom and bourgeois society existed, as, let us say, in Russia in 1905, was a quite understandable, proper and revolutionary demand, for at that time a bourgeois republic would have meant a step forward. But now, under the conditions of the USSR, the demand for a bourgeois-democratic republic would be a senseless and counter-revolutionary demand, for a bourgeois republic would be a retrograde step compared with the Soviet republic.

Everything depends on the conditions, time and place.

It is clear that without such an historical approach to social phenomena, the existence and development of the science of history is impossible, for only such an approach saves the science of history from becoming a jumble of accidents and an agglomeration of most absurd mistakes.

Further, if the world is in a state of constant movement and development, if the dying away of the old and the upgrowth of the new is a law of development, then it is clear that there can be no "immutable" social systems, no "eternal principles" of private property and exploitation, no "eternal ideas" of the subjugation of the peasant to the landlord, of the worker to the capitalist.

Hence, the capitalist system can be replaced by the socialist system, just as at one time the feudal system was replaced by the capitalist system.

Hence, we must not base our orientation on the strata of society which are no longer developing, even though they at present constitute the predominant force, but on those strata which are developing and have a future before them, even though they at present do not constitute the predominant force.

In the eighties of the past century, in the period of the struggle between the Marxists and the Narodniks, the proletariat in Russia constituted an insignificant minority of the population, whereas the individual peasants constituted the vast majority of the population. But the proletariat was developing as a class, whereas the peasantry as a class was disintegrating. And just because the proletariat was developing as a class the Marxists based their orientation on the proletariat. And they were not mistaken, for, as we know, the proletariat subsequently grew from an insignificant force into a first-rate historical and political force.

Hence, in order not to err in policy, one must look forward, not

backward.

Further, if the passing of slow quantitative changes into rapid and abrupt qualitative changes is a law of development, then it is clear that revolutions made by oppressed classes are a quite natural and inevitable phenomenon.

Hence, the transition from capitalism to socialism and the liberation of the working class from the yoke of capitalism cannot be effected by slow changes, by reforms, but only by a qualitative change of the capitalist system, by revolution.

Hence, in order not to err in policy, one must be a revolutionary, not a reformist.

Further, if development proceeds by way of the disclosure of internal contradictions, by way of collisions between opposite forces on the basis of these contradictions and so as to overcome these contradictions, then it is clear that the class struggle of the proletariat is a quite natural and inevitable phenomenon.

Hence, we must not cover up the contradictions of the capitalist system, but disclose and unravel them; we must not try to check the class struggle but carry it to its conclusion.

Hence, in order not to err in policy, one must pursue an uncompromising proletarian class policy, not a reformist policy of harmony of the interests of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, not a compromisers' policy of "the growing of capitalism into socialism."

Such is the Marxist dialectical method when applied to social life, to the history of society.

As to Marxist philosophical materialism, it is fundamentally the direct opposite of philosophical idealism.

2) The principal features of *Marxist philosophical materialism* are as follows:

a) Contrary to idealism, which regards the world as the embodiment of an "absolute idea," a "universal spirit," "consciousness," Marx's philosophical materialism holds that the world is by its very nature *material*, that the multifold phenomena of the world constitute different forms of matter in motion, that interconnection and interdependence of phenomena, as established by the dialectical method, are a law of the development of moving matter, and that the world develops in accordance with the laws of movement of matter and stands in no need of a "universal spirit."

"The materialistic outlook on nature," says Engels, "means no more than simply conceiving nature just as it exists, without any foreign admixture." (F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, Eng., ed., Moscow 1934, p. 79.)

Speaking of the materialist views of the ancient philosopher Heraclitus, who held that “the world, the all in one, was not created by any god or any man, but was, is and ever will be a living flame, systematically flaring tip and systematically dying down,” Lenin comments: “A very good exposition of the rudiments of dialectical materialism.” (Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks*, Russ, ed., p. 318.)

b) Contrary to idealism, which asserts that only our consciousness really exists, and that the material world, being, nature, exists only in our consciousness, in our sensations, ideas and perceptions, the Marxist materialist philosophy holds that matter, nature, being, is an objective reality existing outside and independent of our consciousness; that matter is primary, since it is the source of sensations, ideas, consciousness, and that consciousness is secondary, derivative, since it is a reflection of matter, a reflection of being; that thought is a product of matter which in its development has reached a high degree of perfection, namely, of the brain, and the brain is the organ of thought; and that therefore one cannot separate thought from matter without committing a grave error. Engels says:

“The question of the relation of thinking to being, the relation of spirit to nature is the paramount question of the whole of philosophy... The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature... comprised the camp of *idealism*. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of *materialism*.”* (Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., Moscow 1946, Vol. I, pp. 366-67.)

And further:

“The material, sensuously perceptible world to which we ourselves belong is the only reality... Our consciousness and thinking, however supra-sensuous they may seem, are the product of a material, bodily organ, the brain. Matter is not a product of consciousness, but consciousness itself is merely the highest product of matter.” (Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Russ, ed., Vol. I, p. 332.)

Concerning the question of matter and thought, Marx says:

“It is impossible to separate thought from matter that thinks. Matter is the subject of all changes.” (Ibid., p. 335.)

Describing Marxist philosophical materialism, Lenin says:

“Materialism in general recognizes objectively real being (matter) as in-

* Our italics. — *Ed.*

dependent of consciousness, sensation, experience... Consciousness is only the reflection of being, at best an approximately true (adequate, perfectly exact) reflection of it.” (Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Eng. ed., Moscow 1947, pp. 337-38.)

And further:

“Matter is that which, acting upon our sense-organs, produces sensation; matter is the objective reality given to us in sensation... Matter, nature, being, the physical — is primary, and spirit, consciousness, sensation, the psychical — is secondary.” pp. 145-46.)

“The world picture is a picture of how matter moves and of how ‘*matter thinks*’” (*Ibid.*, p. 367.)

“The brain is the organ of thought.” (*Ibid.*, p. 152.)

c) Contrary to idealism, which denies the possibility of knowing the world and its laws, which does not believe in the authenticity of our knowledge, does not recognize objective truth, and holds that the world is full of “things-in-themselves” that can never be known to science, Marxist philosophical materialism holds that the world and its laws are fully knowable, that our knowledge of the laws of nature, tested by experiment and practice, is authentic knowledge having the validity of objective truth, and that there are no things in the world which are unknowable, but only things which are still not known, but which will be disclosed and made known by the efforts of science and practice.

Criticizing the thesis of Kant and other idealists that the world is unknowable and that there are “things-in-themselves” which are unknowable, and defending the well-known materialist thesis that our knowledge is authentic knowledge, Engels writes:

“The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical crotchets is practice, viz., experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and making it serve our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end of the Kantian incomprehensible ‘thing-in-itself.’ The chemical substances produced in the bodies of plants and animals remained such ‘things-in-themselves’ until organic chemistry began to produce them one after another, whereupon the ‘thing-in-itself became a thing for us, as for instance, alizarin, the colouring matter of the madder, which we no longer trouble to grow in the madder roots in the field, but produce much more cheaply and simply from coal tar. For three hundred years the Copernican solar system was a hypothesis, with a hundred, a thousand or ten thousand chances to one in its favour, but still always a hypothesis. But when Leverrier, by means of the data provided by this system, not only deduced the necessity of the existence of an unknown planet, but

also calculated the position in the heavens which this planet must necessarily occupy, and when Galle really found this planet, the Copernican system was proved.” (Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., Moscow 1946, Vol. I, p. 368.)

Accusing Bogdanov, Bazarov, Yushkevich and the other followers of Mach of fideism, and defending the well-known materialist thesis that our scientific knowledge of the laws of nature is authentic knowledge, and that the laws of science represent objective truth, Lenin says:

“Contemporary fideism does not at all reject science; all it rejects is the ‘exaggerated claims’ of science, to wit, its claim to objective truth. If objective truth exists (as the materialists think), if natural science, reflecting the outer world in human ‘experience,’ is alone capable of giving us objective truth, then all fideism is absolutely refuted.” (Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Eng. ed., Moscow 1947, pp. 123-24.)

Such, in brief, are the characteristic features of the Marxist philosophical materialism.

It is easy to understand how immensely important is the extension of the principles of philosophical materialism to the study of social life, of the history of society, and how immensely important is the application of these principles to the history of society and to the practical activities of the party of the proletariat.

If the connection between the phenomena of nature and their interdependence are laws of the development of nature, it follows, too, that the connection and interdependence of the phenomena of social life are laws of the development of society, and not something accidental.

Hence, social life, the history of society, ceases to be an agglomeration of “accidents,” and becomes the history of the development of society according to regular laws, and the study of the history of society becomes a science.

Hence, the practical activity of the party of the proletariat must not be based on the good wishes of “outstanding individuals,” not on the dictates of “reason,” “universal morals,” etc., but on the laws of development of society and on the study of these laws.

Further, if the world is knowable and our knowledge of the laws of development of nature is authentic knowledge, having the validity of objective truth, it follows that social life, the development of society, is also knowable, and that the data of science regarding the laws of development of society are authentic data having the validity of

objective truths.

Hence, the science of the history of society, despite all the complexity of the phenomena of social life, can become as precise a science as, let us say, biology, and capable of making use of the laws of development of society for practical purposes.

Hence, the party of the proletariat should not guide itself in its practical activity by casual motives, but by the laws of development of society, and by practical deductions from these laws.

Hence, socialism is converted from a dream of a better future for humanity into a science.

Hence, the bond between science and practical activity, between theory and practice, their unity, should be the guiding star of the party of the proletariat.

Further, if nature, being, the material world, is primary, and consciousness, thought, is secondary, derivative; if the material world represents objective reality existing independently of the consciousness of men, while consciousness is a reflection of this objective reality, it follows that the material life of society, its being, is also primary, and its spiritual life secondary, derivative, and that the material life of society is an objective reality existing independently of the will of men, while the spiritual life of society is a reflection of this objective reality, a reflection of being.

Hence, the source of formation of the spiritual life of society, the origin of social ideas, social theories, political views and political institutions, should not be sought for in the ideas, theories, views and political institutions themselves, but in the conditions of the material life of society, in social being, of which these ideas, theories, views, etc., are the reflection.

Hence, if in different periods of the history of society different social ideas, theories, views and political institutions are to be observed; if under the slave system we encounter certain social ideas, theories, views and political institutions, under feudalism others, and under capitalism others still, this is not to be explained by the "nature," the "properties" of the ideas, theories, views and political institutions themselves but by the different conditions of the material life of society at different periods of social development.

Whatever is the being of a society, whatever are the conditions of material life of a society, such are the ideas, theories, political views and political institutions of that society.

In this connection, Marx says:

"It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on

the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.” (Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., Moscow 1946, Vol. I, p. 300.)

Hence, in order not to err in policy, in order not to find itself in the position of idle dreamers, the party of the proletariat must not base its activities on abstract “principles of human reason,” but on the concrete conditions of the material life of society, as the determining force of social development; not on the good wishes of “great men,” but on the real needs of development of the material life of society.

The fall of the Utopians, including the Narodniks, anarchists and Socialist-Revolutionaries, was due, among other things, to the fact that they did not recognize the primary role which the conditions of the material life of society play in the development of society, and, sinking to idealism, did not base their practical activities on the needs of the development of the material life of society, but, independently of and in spite of these needs, on “ideal plans” and “all-embracing projects” divorced from the real life of society.

The strength and vitality of Marxism-Leninism lies in the fact that it does base its practical activity on the needs of the development of the material life of society and never divorces itself from the real life of society.

It does not follow from Marx’s words, however, that social ideas, theories, political views and political institutions are of no significance in the life of society, that they do not reciprocally affect social being, the development of the material conditions of the life of society. We have been speaking so far of the *origin* of social ideas, theories, views and political institutions, of *the way they arise*, of the fact that the spiritual life of society is a reflection of the conditions of its material life. As regards the *significance* of social ideas, theories, views and political institutions, as regards their *role* in history, historical materialism, far from denying them, stresses the important role and significance of these factors in the life of society, in its history.

There are different kinds of social ideas and theories. There are old ideas and theories which have outlived their day and which serve the interests of the moribund forces of society. Their significance lies in the fact that they hamper the development, the progress of society. Then there are new and advanced ideas and theories which serve the interests of the advanced forces of society. Their significance lies in the fact that they facilitate the development, the progress of society; and their significance is the greater the more accu-

rately they reflect the needs of development of the material life of society.

New social ideas and theories arise only after the development of the material life of society has set new tasks before society. But once they have arisen they become a most potent force which facilitates the carrying out of the new tasks set by the development of the material life of society, a force which facilitates the progress of society. It is precisely here that the tremendous organizing, mobilizing and transforming value of new ideas, new theories, new political views and new political institutions manifests itself. New social ideas and theories arise precisely because they are necessary to society, because it is *impossible* to carry out the urgent tasks of development of the material life of society without their organizing, mobilizing and transforming action. Arising out of the new tasks set by the development of the material life of society, the new social ideas and theories force their way through, become the possession of the masses, mobilize and organize them against the moribund forces of society, and thus facilitate the overthrow of these forces, which hamper the development of the material life of society.

Thus social ideas, theories and political institutions, having arisen on the basis of the urgent tasks of the development of the material life of society, the development of social being, themselves then react upon social being, upon the material life of society, creating the conditions necessary for completely carrying out the urgent tasks of the material life of society, and for rendering its further development possible.

In this connection, Marx says:

“Theory becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses.”
(*Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie.*)

Hence, in order to be able to influence the conditions of material life of society and to accelerate their development and their improvement, the party of the proletariat must rely upon such a social theory, such a social idea as correctly reflects the needs of development of the material life of society, and which is therefore capable of setting into motion broad masses of the people and of mobilizing them and organizing them into a great army of the proletarian party, prepared to smash the reactionary forces and to clear the way for the advanced forces of society.

The fall of the “Economists” and Mensheviks was due among other things to the fact that they did not recognize the mobilizing,

organizing and transforming role of advanced theory, of advanced ideas and, sinking to vulgar materialism, reduced the role of these factors almost to nothing, thus condemning the Party to passivity and inaction.

The strength and vitality of Marxism-Leninism is derived from the fact that it relies upon an advanced theory which correctly reflects the needs of development of the material life of society, that it elevates theory to a proper level, and that it deems it its duty to utilize every ounce of the mobilizing, organizing and transforming power of this theory.

That is the answer historical materialism gives to the question of the relation between social being and social consciousness, between the conditions of development of material life and the development of the spiritual life of society.

3) *Historical Materialism:*

It now remains to elucidate the following question: what, from the viewpoint of historical materialism, is meant by the "conditions of material life of society" which in the final analysis determine the physiognomy of society, its ideas, views, political institutions, etc.?

What, after all, are these "conditions of material life of society," what are their distinguishing features?

There can be no doubt that the concept "conditions of material life of society" includes, first of all, nature which surrounds society, geographical environment, which is one of the indispensable and constant conditions of material life of society and which, of course, influences the development of society. What role does geographical environment play in the development of society? Is geographical environment the chief force determining the physiognomy of society, the character of the social system of man; the transition from one system to another?

Historical materialism answers this question in the negative.

Geographical environment is unquestionably one of the constant and indispensable conditions of development of society and, of course, influences the development of society, accelerates or retards its development. But its influence is not the *determining* influence, inasmuch as the changes and development of society proceed at an incomparably faster rate than the changes and development of geographical environment. In the space of three thousand years three different social systems have been successively superseded in Europe: the primitive communal system, the slave system and the feudal system. In the eastern part of Europe, in the USSR, even four social

systems have been superseded. Yet during this period geographical conditions in Europe have either not changed at all, or have changed so slightly that geography takes no note of them. And that is quite natural. Changes in geographical environment of any importance require millions of years, whereas a few hundred or a couple of thousand years are enough for even very important changes in the system of human society.

It follows from this that geographical environment cannot be the chief cause, the *determining* cause of social development, for that which remains almost unchanged in the course of tens of thousands of years cannot be the chief cause of development of that which undergoes fundamental changes in the course of a few hundred years.

Further, there can be no doubt that the concept "conditions of material life of society" also includes growth of population, density of population of one degree or another, for people are an essential element of the conditions of material life of society, and without a definite minimum number of people there can be no material life of society. Is not growth of population the chief force that determines the character of the social system of man?

Historical materialism answers this question too in the negative.

Of course, growth of population does influence the development of society, does facilitate or retard the development of society, but it cannot be the chief force of development of society, and its influence on the development of society cannot be the *determining* influence because, by itself, growth of population does not furnish the clue to the question why a given social system is replaced precisely by such and such a new system and not by another, why the primitive communal system is succeeded precisely by the slave system, the slave system by the feudal system, and the feudal system by the bourgeois system, and not by some other.

If growth of population were the determining force of social development, then a higher density of population would be bound to give rise to a correspondingly higher type of social system. But we do not find this to be the case. The density of population in China is four times as great as in the USA, yet the USA stands higher than China in the scale of social development, for in China a semi-feudal system still prevails, whereas the USA has long ago reached the highest stage of development of capitalism. The density of population in Belgium is 19 times as great as in the USA, and 26 times as great as in the USSR. Yet the USA stands higher than Belgium in the scale of social development; and as for the USSR, Belgium lags a

whole historical epoch behind this country, for in Belgium the capitalist system prevails, whereas the USSR has already done away with capitalism and has set up a socialist system.

It follows from this that growth of population is not, and cannot be, the chief force of development of society, the force which *determines* the character of the social system, the physiognomy of society.

a) What, then, is the chief force in the complex of conditions of material life of society which determines the physiognomy of society, the character of the social system, the development of society from one system to another?

This force, historical materialism holds, is the *method of procuring the means of life* necessary for human existence, the *mode of production of material values* — food, clothing, footwear, houses, fuel, instruments of production, etc. — which are indispensable for the life and development of society.

In order to live, people must have food, clothing, footwear, shelter, fuel, etc.; in order to have these material values, people must produce them; and in order to produce them, people must have the instruments of production with which food, clothing, footwear, shelter, fuel, etc., are produced; they must be able to produce these instruments and to use them.

The *instruments of production* wherewith material values are produced, the *people* who operate the instruments of production and carry on the production of material values thanks to a certain *production experience* and *labour skill* — all these elements jointly constitute the *productive forces* of society.

But the productive forces are only one aspect of production, only one aspect of the mode of production, an aspect that expresses the relation of men to the objects and forces of nature which they make use of for the production of material values. Another aspect of production, another aspect of the mode of production, is the relation of men to each other in the process of production, men's *relations of production*. Men carry on a struggle against nature and utilize nature for the production of material values not in isolation from each other, not as separate individuals, but in common, in groups, in societies. Production, therefore, is at all times and under all conditions *social* production. In the production of material values men enter into mutual relations of one kind or another within production, into relations of production of one kind or another. These may be relations of cooperation and mutual help between people who are free from exploitation; they may be relations of domination and subordi-

nation; and, lastly, they may be transitional from one form of relations of production to another. But whatever the character of the relations of production may be, always and in every system, they constitute just as essential an element of production as the productive force of society.

“In production,” Marx says, “men not only act on nature but also on one another. They produce only by cooperating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations with one another and only within these social connections and relations does their action on nature, does production, take place.” (Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., Moscow 1946, Vol. I p. 211.)

Consequently, production, the mode of production, embraces both the productive forces of society and men’s relations of production, and is thus the embodiment of their unity in the process of production of material values.

b) *The first feature* of production is that it never stays at one point for a long time and is always in a state of change and development, and that, furthermore, changes in the mode of production inevitably call forth changes in the whole social system, social ideas, political views and political institutions — they call forth a reconstruction of the whole social and political order. At different stages of development people make use of different modes of production, or, to put it more crudely, lead different manners of life. In the primitive commune there is one mode of production, under slavery there is another mode of production, under feudalism a third mode of production, and so on. And, correspondingly, men’s social system, the spiritual life of men, their views and political institutions also vary.

Whatever is the mode of production of a society, such in the main is the society itself, its ideas and theories, its political views and institutions.

Or, to put it more crudely, whatever is man’s manner of life, such is his manner of thought.

This means that the history of development of society is above all the history of the development of production, the history of the modes of production which succeed each other in the course of centuries, the history of the development of productive forces and of people’s relations of production.

Hence, the history of social development is at the same time the history of the producers of material values themselves, the history of the labouring masses, who are the chief force in the process of production and who carry on the production of material values neces-

sary for the existence of society.

Hence, if historical science is to be a real science, it can no longer reduce the history of social development to the actions of kings and generals, to the actions of “conquerors” and “subjugators” of states, but must above all devote itself to the history of the producers of material values, the history of the labouring masses, the history of peoples.

Hence, the clue to the study of the laws of history of society must not be sought in men’s minds, in the views and ideas of society, but in the mode of production practised by society in any given historical period; it must be sought in the economic life of society.

Hence, the prime task of historical science is to study and disclose the laws of production, the laws of development of the productive forces and of the relations of production, the laws of economic development of society.

Hence, if the party of the proletariat is to be a real party, it must above all acquire a knowledge of the laws of development of production, of the laws of economic development of society.

Hence, if it is not to err in policy, the party of the proletariat must both in drafting its program and in its practical activities proceed primarily from the laws of development of production, from the laws of economic development of society.

c) *The second feature* of production is that its changes and development always begin with changes and development of the productive forces, and in the first place, with changes and development of the instruments of production. Productive forces are therefore the most mobile and revolutionary element of production. First the productive forces of society change and develop, and then, *depending* on these changes and *in conformity with them*, men’s relations of production, their economic relations, change. This, however, does not mean that the relations of production do not influence the development of the productive forces and that the latter are not dependent on the former. While their development is dependent on the development of the productive forces, the relations of production in their turn react upon the development of the productive forces, accelerating or retarding it. In this connection it should be noted that the relations of production cannot for too long a time lag behind and be in a state of contradiction to the growth of the productive forces, inasmuch as the productive forces can develop in full measure only when the relations of production correspond to the character, the state of the productive forces and allow full scope for their development. Therefore,

however much the relations of production may lag behind the development of the productive forces, they must, sooner or later, come into correspondence with — and actually do come into correspondence with — the level of development of the productive forces, the character of the productive forces. Otherwise we would have a fundamental violation of the unity of the productive forces and the relations of production within the system of production, a disruption of production as a whole, a crisis of production, a destruction of productive forces.

An instance in which the relations of production do not correspond to the character of the productive forces, conflict with them, is the economic crises in capitalist countries, where private capitalist ownership of the means of production is in glaring incongruity with the social character of the process of production, with the character of the productive forces. This results in economic crises, which lead to the destruction of productive forces. Furthermore, this incongruity itself constitutes the economic basis of social revolution, the purpose of which is to destroy the existing relations of production and to create new relations of production corresponding to the character of the productive forces.

In contrast, an instance in which the relations of production completely correspond to the character of the productive forces is the socialist national economy of the USSR, where the social ownership of the means of production fully corresponds to the social character of the process of production, and where, because of this, economic crises and the destruction of productive forces are unknown.

Consequently, the productive forces are not only the most mobile and revolutionary element in production, but are also the determining element in the development of production.

Whatever are the productive forces such must be the relations of production.

While the state of the productive forces furnishes the answer to the question — with what instruments of production do men produce the material values they need? — the state of the relations of production furnishes the answer to another question — who owns the *means of productions* (the land, forests, waters, mineral resources, raw materials, instruments of production, production premises, means of transportation and communication, etc.), who commands the means of production, whether the whole of society, or individual persons, groups, or classes which utilize them for the exploitation of other persons, groups or classes?

Here is a rough picture of the development of productive forces from ancient times to our day. The transition from crude stone tools to the bow and arrow, and the accompanying transition from the life of hunters to the domestication of animals and primitive pasturage; the transition from stone tools to metal tools (the iron axe, the wooden plough fitted with an iron colter, etc.), with a corresponding transition to tillage and agriculture; a further improvement in metal tools for the working up of materials, the introduction of the blacksmith's bellows, the introduction of pottery, with a corresponding development of handicrafts, the separation of handicrafts from agriculture, the development of an independent handicraft industry and, subsequently, of manufacture; the transition from handicraft tools to machines and the transformation of handicraft and manufacture into machine industry; the transition to the machine system and the rise of modern large-scale machine industry — such is a general and far from complete picture of the development of the productive forces of society in the course of man's history. It will be clear that the development and improvement of the instruments of production was affected by men who were related to production, and not independently of men; and, consequently, the change and development of the instruments of production was accompanied by a change and development of men, as the most important element of the productive forces, by a change and development of their production experience, their labour skill, their ability to handle the instruments of production.

In conformity with the change and development of the productive forces of society in the course of history, men's relations of production, their economic relations also changed and developed.

Five *main* types of relations of production are known to history: primitive communal, slave, feudal, capitalist and Socialist.

The basis of the relations of production under the primitive communal system is that the means of production are socially owned. This in the main corresponds to the character of the productive forces of that period. Stone tools, and, later, the bow and arrow, precluded the possibility of men individually combatting the forces of nature and beasts of prey. In order to gather the fruits of the forest, to catch fish, to build some sort of habitation, men were obliged to work in common if they did not want to die of starvation, or fall victim to beasts of prey or to neighbouring societies. Labour in common led to the common ownership of the means of production, as well as of the fruits of production. Here the conception of private

ownership of the means of production did not yet exist, except for the personal ownership of certain implements of production which were at the same time means of defence against beasts of prey. Here there was no exploitation, no classes.

The basis of the relations of production under the slave system is that the slave-owner owns the means of production: he also owns the worker in production — the slave, whom he can sell, purchase, or kill as though he were an animal. Such relations of production in the main correspond to the state of the productive forces of that period. Instead of stone tools, men now have metal tools at their command; instead of the wretched and primitive husbandry of the hunter, who knew neither pasturage nor tillage, there now appear pasturage, tillage, handicrafts, and a division of labour between these branches of production. There appears the possibility of the exchange of products between individuals and between societies, of the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few, the actual accumulation of the means of production in the hands of a minority, and the possibility of subjugation of the majority by a minority and the conversion of the majority into slaves. Here we no longer find the common and free labour of all members of society in the production process — here there prevails the forced labour of slaves, who are exploited by the non-labouring slave-owners. Here, therefore, there is no common ownership of the means of production or of the fruits of production. It is replaced by private ownership. Here the slave-owner appears as the prime and principal property owner in the full sense of the term.

Rich and poor, exploiters and exploited, people with full rights and people with no rights, and a fierce class struggle between them — such is the picture of the slave system.

The basis of the relations of production under the feudal system is that the feudal lord owns the means of production and does not fully own the worker in production — the serf, whom the feudal lord can no longer kill, but whom he can buy and sell. Alongside of feudal ownership there exists individual ownership by the peasant and the handicraftsman of his implements of production and his private enterprise based on his personal labour. Such relations of production in the main correspond to the state of the productive forces of that period. Further improvements in the smelting and working of iron; the spread of the iron plough and the loom; the further development of agriculture, horticulture, viticulture and dairying; the appearance of manufactories alongside of the handicraft workshops —

such are the characteristic features of the state of the productive forces.

The new productive forces demand that the labourer shall display some kind of initiative in production and an inclination for work, an interest in work. The feudal lord therefore discards the slave, as a labourer who has no interest in work and is entirely without initiative, and prefers to deal with the serf, who has his own husbandry, implements of production, and a certain interest in work essential for the cultivation of the land and for the payment in kind of a part of his harvest to the feudal lord.

Here private ownership is further developed. Exploitation is nearly as severe as it was under slavery — it is only slightly mitigated. A class struggle between exploiters and exploited is the principal feature of the feudal system.

The basis of the relations of production under the capitalist system is that the capitalist owns the means of production, but not the workers in production — the wage labourers, whom the capitalist can neither kill nor sell because they are personally free, but who are deprived of means of production and, in order not to die of hunger, are obliged to sell their labour power to the capitalist and to bear the yoke of exploitation. Alongside of capitalist property in the means of production, we find, at first on a wide scale, private property of the peasants and handicraftsmen in the means of production, these peasants and handicraftsmen no longer being serfs, and their private property being based on personal labour. In place of the handicrafts workshops and manufactories there appear huge mills and factories equipped with machinery. In place of the manorial estates tilled by the primitive implements of production of the peasant, there now appear large capitalist farms run on scientific lines and supplied with agricultural machinery.

The new productive forces require that the workers in production shall be better educated and more intelligent than the down-trodden and ignorant serfs, that they be able to understand machinery and operate it properly. Therefore, the capitalists prefer to deal with wage workers, who are free from the bonds of serfdom and who are educated enough to be able properly to operate machinery.

But having developed productive forces to a tremendous extent, capitalism has become enmeshed in contradictions which it is unable to solve. By producing larger and larger quantities of commodities, and reducing their prices, capitalism intensifies competition, ruins the mass of small and medium private owners, converts them into

proletarians and reduces their purchasing power, with the result that it becomes impossible to dispose of the commodities produced. On the other hand, by expanding production and concentrating millions of workers in huge mills and factories, capitalism lends the process of production a social character and thus undermines its own foundation, inasmuch as the social character of the process of production demands the social ownership of the means of production; yet the means of production remain private capitalist property, which is incompatible with the social character of the process of production.

These irreconcilable contradictions between the character of the productive forces and the relations of production make themselves felt in periodical crises of overproduction, when the capitalists, finding no effective demand for their goods owing to the ruin of the mass of the population which they themselves have brought about, are compelled to burn products, destroy manufactured goods, suspend production, and destroy productive forces at a time when millions of people are forced to suffer unemployment and starvation, not because there are not enough goods, but because there is an overproduction of goods.

This means that the capitalist relations of production have ceased to correspond to the state of productive forces of society and have come into irreconcilable contradiction with them.

This means that capitalism is pregnant with revolution, whose mission it is to replace the existing capitalist ownership of the means of production by socialist ownership.

This means that the main feature of the capitalist system is a most acute class struggle between the exploiters and the exploited.

The basis of the relations of production under the socialist system, which so far has been established only in the USSR, is the social ownership of the means of production. Here there are no longer exploiters and exploited. The goods produced are distributed according to labour performed, on the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat." Here the mutual relations of people in the process of production are marked by comradely cooperation and the socialist mutual assistance of workers who are free from exploitation. Here the relations of production fully correspond to the state of productive forces, for the social character of the process of production is reinforced by the social ownership of the means of production.

For this reason, socialist production in the USSR knows no periodical crises of overproduction and their accompanying absurdities.

For this reason, the productive forces here develop at an accelerated pace, for the relations of production that correspond to them offer full scope for such development.

Such is the picture of the development of men's relations of production in the course of human history.

Such is the dependence of the development of the relations of production on the development of the productive forces of society, and primarily, on the development of the instruments of production, the dependence by virtue of which the changes and development of the productive forces sooner or later lead to corresponding changes and development of the relations of production.

"The use and fabrication of instruments of labour,"* says Marx, "although existing in the germ among certain species of animals, is specifically characteristic of the human labour-process, and Franklin therefore defines man as a tool-making animal. Relics of by-gone instruments of labour possess the same importance for the investigation of extinct economical forms of society, as do fossil bones for the determination of extinct species of animals. It is not the articles made, but how they are made, and by what instruments, that enables us to distinguish different economical epochs. Instruments of labour not only supply a standard of the degree of development to which human labour has attained, but they are also indicators of the social conditions under which that labour is carried on." (Karl Marx, *Capital*, London 1938, Vol. I, p. 159.)

And further:

"Social relations are closely bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production; and in changing their mode of production, in changing the way of earning their living, they change all their social relations. The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist." (Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Eng. ed., Moscow 1935, p. 92.)

"There is a continual movement of growth in productive forces, of destruction in social relations, of formation in ideas; the only immutable thing is-the abstraction of movement." (*Ibid.*, p. 93.)

Speaking of historical materialism as formulated in the *Communist Manifesto*, Engels says:

"Economic production and the structure of society of every historical epoch necessarily arising therefrom constitute the foundation for the political and intellectual history of that epoch;... consequently (ever since the dis-

* By instruments of labour Marx has in mind primarily instruments of production. — *Ed.*

solution of the primeval communal ownership of land) all history has been a history of class struggles, of struggles between exploited and exploiting, between dominated and dominating classes at various stages of social evolution;... this struggle, however, has now reached a stage where the exploited and oppressed class (the proletariat) can no longer emancipate itself from the class which exploits and oppresses it (the bourgeoisie), without at the same time forever freeing the whole of society from exploitation, oppression and class struggles.” (Preface to the German edition of the *Communist Manifesto* — Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., Moscow 1946, Vol. I, pp. 100-01.)

d) *The third feature* of production is that the rise of new productive forces and of the relations of production corresponding to them does not take place separately from the old system, after the disappearance of the old system, but within the old system; it takes place not as a result of the deliberate and conscious activity of man, but spontaneously, unconsciously, independently of the will of man. It takes place spontaneously and independently of the will of man for two reasons.

Firstly, because men are not free to choose one mode of production or another, because as every new generation enters life it finds productive forces and relations of production already existing as the result of the work of former generations, owing to which it is obliged at first to accept and adapt itself to everything it finds ready made in the sphere of production in order to be able to produce material values.

Secondly, because, when improving one instrument of production or another, one element of the productive forces or another, men do not realize, do not understand or stop to reflect what *social* results these improvements will lead to, but only think of their everyday interests, of lightening their labour and of securing some direct and tangible advantage for themselves.

When, gradually and gropingly, certain members of primitive communal society passed from the use of stone tools to the use of iron tools, they, of course, did not know and did not stop to reflect what *social* results this innovation would lead to; they did not understand or realize that the change to metal tools meant a revolution in production, that it would in the long run lead to the slave system. They simply wanted to lighten their labour and secure an immediate and tangible advantage; their conscious activity was confined within the narrow bounds of this everyday personal interest.

When, in the period of the feudal system, the young bourgeoisie

of Europe began to erect, alongside of the small guild workshops, large manufactories, and thus advanced the productive forces of society, it, of course, did not know and did not stop to reflect what *social* consequences this innovation would lead to; it did not realize or understand that this “small” innovation would lead to a regrouping of social forces which was to end in a revolution both against the power of kings, whose favours it so highly valued, and against the nobility, to whose ranks its foremost representatives not infrequently aspired. It simply wanted to lower the cost of producing goods, to throw larger quantities of goods on the markets of Asia and of recently discovered America, and to make bigger profits. Its conscious activity was confined within the narrow bounds of this commonplace practical aim.

When the Russian capitalists, in conjunction with foreign capitalists, energetically implanted modern large scale machine industry in Russia, while leaving Tsardom intact and turning the peasants over to the tender mercies of the landlords, they, of course, did not know and did not stop to reflect what *social* consequences this extensive growth of productive forces would lead to; they did not realize or understand that this big leap in the realm of the productive forces of society would lead to a regrouping of social forces that would enable the proletariat to effect a union with the peasantry and to bring about a victorious socialist revolution. They simply wanted to expand industrial production to the limit, to gain control of the huge home market, to become monopolists, and to squeeze as much profit as possible out of the national economy. Their conscious activity did not extend beyond their commonplace, strictly practical interests. Accordingly, Marx says:

“In the social production of their life, [that is, in the production of the material values necessary to the life of men — *Ed.*] men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and *independent** of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production.” (Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., Moscow 1946, Vol. I, p. 300.)

This, however, does not mean that changes in the relations of production, and the transition from old relations of production to new relations of production proceed smoothly, without conflicts, without upheavals. On the contrary, such a transition usually takes place by means of the revolutionary overthrow of the old relations of

* Our italics. — Ed.

production and the establishment of new relations of production. Up to a certain period the development of the productive forces and the changes in the realm of the relations of production proceed spontaneously, independently of the will of men. But that is so only up to a certain moment, until the new and developing productive forces have reached a proper state of maturity. After the new productive forces have matured, the existing relations of production and their upholders — the ruling classes — become that “insuperable” obstacle which can only be removed by the conscious action of the new classes, by the forcible acts of these classes, by revolution. Here there stands out in bold relief the *tremendous role* of new social ideas, of new political institutions, of a new political power, whose mission it is to abolish by force the old relations of production. Out of the conflict between the new productive forces and the old relations of production, out of the new economic demands of society, there arise new social ideas; the new ideas organize and mobilize the masses; the masses become welded into a new political army, create a new revolutionary power, and make use of it to abolish by force the old system of relations of production, and to firmly establish the new system. The spontaneous process of development yields place to the conscious actions of men, peaceful development to violent upheaval, evolution to revolution.

“The proletariat,” says Marx, “during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organize itself as a class... by means of a revolution it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production.” (*The Communist Manifesto* — Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., Moscow 1946, Vol. I, p. 131.)

And further:

“The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the state, *i.e.*, of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible.” (*Ibid.*, p. 129.)

“Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one.” (Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I. p. 776.)

Here is the formulation — a formulation of genius — of the essence of historical materialism given by Marx in 1859 in his historic Preface to his famous book, *Critique of Political Economy*:

“In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of pro-

duction correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society — the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life determines the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or — what is but a legal expression for the same thing — with the property relations within which they have been at work before. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic — in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of production. No social order ever disappears before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have been developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself. Therefore, mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve; since, looking at the matter more closely, we will always find that the task itself arises only when the material conditions necessary for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation.” (Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., Moscow 1946, Vol. I, pp. 300-01.)

Such is Marxist materialism as applied to social life, to the history of society.

Such are the principal features of dialectical and historical materialism.

It will be seen from this what a theoretical treasure was safeguarded by Lenin for the Party and protected from the attacks of the revisionists and renegades, and how important was the appearance of Lenin's book, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, for the development of our Party.

REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO THE EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU(B)

March 10, 1939

I

THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Comrades, five years have elapsed since the Seventeenth Party Congress. No small period, as you see. During this period the world has undergone considerable changes. States and countries, and their mutual relations, are now in many respects totally altered.

What changes exactly have taken place in the international situation in this period? In what way exactly have the foreign and internal affairs of our country changed?

For the capitalist countries this period was one of very profound perturbations in both the economic and political spheres. In the economic sphere these were years of depression, followed, from the beginning of the latter half of 1937, by a period of new economic crisis, of a new decline of industry in the United States, Great Britain and France; consequently, these were years of new economic complications. In the political sphere they were years of serious political conflicts and perturbations. A new imperialist war is already in its second year, a war waged over a huge territory stretching from Shanghai to Gibraltar and involving over five hundred million people. The map of Europe, Africa and Asia is being forcibly redrawn. The entire postwar system, the so-called regime of peace, has been shaken to its foundations.

For the Soviet Union, on the contrary, these were years of growth and prosperity, of further economic and cultural progress, of further development of political and military might, of struggle for the preservation of peace throughout the world.

Such is the general picture.

Let us now examine the concrete data illustrating the changes in the international situation.

1. NEW ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES, INTENSIFICATION OF THE STRUGGLE FOR MARKETS AND SOURCES OF RAW MATERIAL, AND FOR A NEW REDIVISION OF THE WORLD

The economic crisis which broke out in the capitalist countries in the latter half of 1929 lasted until the end of 1933. After that the crisis passed into a depression, and was then followed by a certain revival, a certain upward trend of industry. But this upward trend of industry did not develop into a boom, as is usually the case in a period of revival. On the contrary, in the latter half of 1937 a new economic crisis began which seized the United States first of all and then England, France and a number of other countries.

The capitalist countries thus found themselves faced with a new economic crisis before they had even recovered from the ravages of the recent one.

This circumstance naturally led to an increase of unemployment. The number of unemployed in capitalist countries, which had fallen from thirty million in 1933 to fourteen million in 1937, has now again risen to eighteen million as a result of the new economic crisis.

A distinguishing feature of the new crisis is that it differs in many respects from the preceding one, and, moreover, differs for the worse and not for the better.

Firstly, the new crisis did not begin after an industrial boom, as was the case in 1929, but after a depression and a certain revival, which, however, did not develop into a boom. This means that the present crisis will be more severe and more difficult to cope with than the previous crisis.

Further, the present crisis has broken out not in time of peace, but at a time when a second imperialist war has already begun; at a time when Japan, already in the second year of her war with China, is disorganizing the immense Chinese market and rendering it almost inaccessible to the goods of other countries; when Italy and Germany have already placed their national economy on a war footing, squandering their reserves of raw material and foreign currency for this purpose; and when all the other big capitalist powers are beginning to reorganize themselves on a war footing. This means that capitalism will have far less resources at its disposal for a normal way out of the present crisis than during the preceding crisis.

Lastly, as distinct from the preceding crisis, the present crisis is not a general one, but as yet involves chiefly the economically pow-

erful countries which have not yet placed themselves on a war economy basis. As regards the aggressive countries, such as Japan, Germany and Italy, who have already reorganized their economy on a war footing, they, because of the intense development of their war industry, are not yet experiencing a crisis of overproduction, although they are approaching it. This means that by the time the economically powerful, non-aggressive countries begin to emerge from the phase of crisis the aggressive countries, having exhausted their reserves of gold and raw material in the course of the war fever, are bound to enter a phase of very severe crisis.

This is clearly illustrated, for example, by the figures for the visible gold reserves of the capitalist countries.

Visible Gold Reserves of the Capitalist Countries
(In millions of former gold dollars)

	<i>End of 1936</i>	<i>September 1938</i>
<i>Total</i>	12,980	14,301
USA	6,649	8,126
Great Britain	2,029	2,396
France	1,769	1,435
Holland	289	595
Belgium	373	318
Switzerland	387	407
Germany	16	17
Italy	123	124
Japan	273	97

This table shows that the combined gold reserves of Germany, Italy and Japan amount to less than the reserves of Switzerland alone.

Here are a few figures illustrating the state of crisis of industry in the capitalist countries during the past five years and the trend of industrial progress in the USSR.

Volume of Industrial Output Compared With 1929
(1929 = 100)

	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
USA	66.4	75.6	88.1	92.2	72.0
Great Britain	98.8	105.8	115.9	123.7	112.0

France	71.0	67.4	79.3	82.8	70.0
Italy	80.0	93.8	87.5	99.6	96.0
Germany	79.8	94.0	106.3	117.2	125.0
Japan	128.7	141.8	151.1	170.8	165.0
USSR	283.3	293.4	382.3	424.0	477.0

This table shows that the Soviet Union is the only country in the world where crises are unknown and where industry is continuously on the upgrade.

This table also shows that a serious economic crisis has already begun and is developing in the United States, Great Britain and France.

Further, this table shows that in Italy and Japan, who placed their national economy on a war footing earlier than Germany, the downward course of industry already began in 1938.

Lastly, this table shows that in Germany, who reorganized her economy on a war footing later than Italy and Japan, industry is still experiencing a certain upward trend — although a small one, it is true — corresponding to that which took place in Japan and Italy until recently.

There can be no doubt that unless something unforeseen occurs, German industry must enter the same downward path as Japan and Italy have already taken. For what does placing the economy of a country on a war footing mean? It means giving industry a one-sided war direction; developing to the utmost the production of goods necessary for war and not for consumption by the population; restricting to the utmost the production and, especially, the sale of articles of general consumption — and, consequently, reducing consumption by the population and confronting the country with an economic crisis.

Such is the concrete picture of the trend of the new economic crisis in the capitalist countries.

Naturally, such an unfavourable turn of economic affairs could not but aggravate relations among the powers. The preceding crisis had already mixed the cards and intensified the struggle for markets and sources of raw materials. The seizure of Manchuria and North China by Japan, the seizure of Abyssinia by Italy — all this reflected the acuteness of the struggle among the powers. The new economic crisis must lead, and is actually leading, to a further sharpening of the imperialist struggle. It is no longer a question of competition in the markets, of a commercial war, of dumping. These methods of

struggle have long been recognized as inadequate. It is now a question of a new redivision of the world, of spheres of influence and colonies, by military action.

Japan tried to justify her aggressive actions by the argument that she had been cheated when the Nine-Power Pact was concluded and had not been allowed to extend her territory at the expense of China, whereas Britain and France possess vast colonies. Italy recalled that she had been cheated during the division of the spoils after the first imperialist war and that she must recompense herself at the expense of the spheres of influence of Britain and France. Germany, who had suffered severely as a result of the first imperialist war and the Peace of Versailles, joined forces with Japan and Italy, and demanded an extension of her territory in Europe and the return of the colonies of which the victors in the first imperialist war had deprived her.

Thus the bloc of three aggressive states came to be formed.

A new redivision of the world by means of war became imminent.

2. AGGRAVATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SITUATION. COLLAPSE OF THE POSTWAR SYSTEM OF PEACE TREATIES. BEGINNING OF A NEW IMPERIALIST WAR

Here is a list of the most important events during the period under review which mark the beginning of the new imperialist war. In 1935 Italy attacked and seized Abyssinia. In the summer of 1936 Germany and Italy organized military intervention in Spain, Germany entrenching herself in the north of Spain and in Spanish Morocco, and Italy in the south of Spain and in the Balearic Islands. Having seized Manchuria, Japan in 1937 invaded North and Central China, occupied Peking, Tientsin and Shanghai and began to oust her foreign competitors from the occupied zone. In the beginning of 1938 Germany seized Austria, and in the autumn of 1938 the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia. At the end of 1938 Japan seized Canton, and at the beginning of 1939 the Island of Hainan.

Thus the war, which has stolen so imperceptibly upon the nations, has drawn over five hundred million people into its orbit and has extended its sphere of action over a vast territory, stretching from Tientsin, Shanghai and Canton, through Abyssinia, to Gibraltar.

After the first imperialist war the victor states, primarily Britain, France and the United States, had set up a new regime in the rela-

tions between countries, the postwar regime of peace. The main props of this regime were the Nine-Power Pact in the Far East, and the Versailles Treaty and a number of other treaties in Europe. The League of Nations was set up to regulate relations between countries within the framework of this regime, on the basis of a united front of states, of collective defence of the security of states. However, three aggressive states, and the new imperialist war launched by them, have upset the entire system of this postwar peace regime. Japan tore up the Nine-Power Pact, and Germany and Italy the Versailles Treaty. In order to have their hands free, these three states withdrew from the League of Nations.

The new imperialist war became a fact.

It is not so easy in our day to suddenly break loose and plunge straight into war without regard for treaties of any kind or for public opinion. Bourgeois politicians know this very well. So do the fascist rulers. That is why the fascist rulers decided, before plunging into war, to frame public opinion to suit their ends, that is, to mislead it, to deceive it.

A military bloc of Germany and Italy against the interests of England and France in Europe? Bless us, do you call that a bloc? "We" have no military bloc. All "we" have is an innocuous "Berlin-Rome axis"; that is, just a geometrical equation for an axis. (*Laughter.*)

A military bloc of Germany, Italy and Japan against the interests of the United States, Great Britain and France in the Far East? Nothing of the kind. "We" have no military bloc. All "we" have is an innocuous "Berlin-Rome-Tokyo triangle"; that is, a slight pentachant for geometry. (*General laughter.*)

A war against the interests of England, France, the United States? Nonsense! "We" are waging war on the Comintern, not on these states. If you don't believe it, read the "anti-Comintern pact" concluded between Italy, Germany and Japan.

That is how Messieurs the aggressors thought of framing public opinion, although it was not hard to see how preposterous this whole clumsy game of camouflage was; for it is ridiculous to look for Comintern "hotbeds" in the deserts of Mongolia, in the mountains of Abyssinia, or in the wilds of Spanish Morocco. (*Laughter.*)

But war is inexorable. It cannot be hidden under any guise. For no "axes," "triangles" or "anti-Comintern pacts" can hide the fact that in this period Japan has seized a vast stretch of territory in China, that Italy has seized Abyssinia, that Germany has seized Austria

and the Sudeten region, that Germany and Italy together have seized Spain — and all this in defiance of the interests of the non-aggressive states. The war remains a war; the military bloc of aggressors remains a military bloc; and the aggressors remain aggressors.

It is a distinguishing feature of the new imperialist war that it has not yet become universal, a world war. The war is being waged by aggressor states, who in every way infringe upon the interests of the non-aggressive states, primarily England, France and the USA, while the latter draw back and retreat, making concession after concession to the aggressors.

Thus we are witnessing an open redivision of the world and spheres of influence at the expense of the non-aggressive states, without the least attempt at resistance, and even with a certain amount of connivance, on the part of the latter.

Incredible, but true.

To what are we to attribute this one-sided and strange character of the new imperialist war?

How is it that the non-aggressive countries, which possess such vast opportunities, have so easily, and without any resistance, abandoned their positions and their obligations to please the aggressors?

Is it to be attributed to the weakness of the non-aggressive states? Of course not. Combined, the non-aggressive, democratic states are unquestionably stronger than the fascist states, both economically and in the military sense.

To what then are we to attribute the systematic concessions made by these states to the aggressors?

It might be attributed, for example, to the fear that a revolution might break out if the non-aggressive states were to go to war and the war were to assume worldwide proportions. The bourgeois politicians know, of course, that the first imperialist world war led to the victory of the revolution in one of the largest countries. They are afraid that the second imperialist world war may also lead to the victory of the revolution in one or several countries.

But at present this is not the sole or even the chief reason. The chief reason is that the majority of the non-aggressive countries, particularly England and France, have rejected the policy of collective security, the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors, and have taken up a position of non-intervention, a position of “neutrality.”

Formally speaking, the policy of non-intervention might be defined as follows: “Let each country defend itself from the aggressors

as it likes and as best it can. That is not our affair. We shall trade both with the aggressors and with their victims." But actually speaking, the policy of non-intervention means conniving at aggression, giving free rein to war, and, consequently, transforming the war into a world war. The policy of non-intervention reveals an eagerness, a desire, not to hinder the aggressors in their nefarious work: not to hinder Japan, say, from embroiling herself in a war with China, or, better still, with the Soviet Union: to allow all the belligerents to sink deeply into the mire of war, to encourage them surreptitiously in this, to allow them to weaken and exhaust one another; and then, when they have become weak enough, to appear on the scene with fresh strength, to appear, of course, "in the interests of peace," and to dictate conditions to the enfeebled belligerents.

Cheap and easy!

Take Japan, for instance. It is characteristic that before Japan invaded North China all the influential French and British newspapers shouted about China's weakness and her inability to offer resistance, and declared that Japan with her army could subjugate China in two or three months. Then the European and American politicians began to watch and wait. And then, when Japan started military operations, they let her have Shanghai, the vital centre of foreign capital in China; they let her have Canton, a centre of Britain's monopoly influence in South China; they let her have Hainan, and they allowed her to surround Hong Kong. Does not this look very much like encouraging the aggressor? It is as though they were saying: "Embroider yourself deeper in war; then we shall see."

Or take Germany, for instance. They let her have Austria, despite the undertaking to defend her independence; they let her have the Sudeten region; they abandoned Czechoslovakia to her fate, thereby violating all their obligations; and then began to lie vociferously in the press about "the weakness of the Russian army," "the demoralization of the Russian air force" and "riots" in the Soviet Union, egging the Germans on to march farther east, promising them easy pickings, and prompting them: "Just start war on the Bolsheviks, and everything will be all right." It must be admitted that this too looks very much like egging on and encouraging the aggressor.

The hullabaloo raised by the British, French and American press over the Soviet Ukraine is characteristic. The gentlemen of the press there shouted until they were hoarse that the Germans were marching on Soviet Ukraine, that they now had what is called the Carpa-

thian Ukraine, with a population of some seven hundred thousand, and that not later than this spring the Germans would annex the Soviet Ukraine, which has a population of over thirty million, to this so-called Carpathian Ukraine. It looks as if the object of this suspicious hullabaloo was to incense the Soviet Union against Germany, to poison the atmosphere and to provoke a conflict with Germany without any visible grounds.

It is quite possible, of course, that there are madmen in Germany who dream of annexing the elephant, that is, the Soviet Ukraine, to the gnat, namely, the so-called Carpathian Ukraine. If there really are such lunatics in Germany, rest assured that we shall find enough straitjackets for them in our country. (*Thunderous applause.*) But if we ignore the madmen and turn to normal people, is it not clearly absurd and foolish to seriously talk of annexing the Soviet Ukraine to this so-called Carpathian Ukraine? Imagine: The gnat comes to the elephant and says perkily: "Ah, brother, how sorry I am for you... Here you are without any landlords, without any capitalists, with no national oppression, without any fascist bosses. Is that a way to live?... As I look at you I can't help thinking that there is no hope for you unless you annex yourself to me... (*General laughter.*) Well, so be it: I allow you to annex your tiny domain to my vast territories..." (*General laughter and applause.*)

Even more characteristic is the fact that certain European and American politicians and pressmen, having lost patience waiting for "the march on the Soviet Ukraine," are themselves beginning to disclose what is really behind the policy of non-intervention. They are saying quite openly, putting it down in black on white, that the Germans have cruelly "disappointed" them, for instead of marching farther east, against the Soviet Union, they have turned, you see, to the west and are demanding colonies. One might think that the districts of Czechoslovakia were yielded to Germany as the price of an undertaking to launch war on the Soviet Union, but that now the Germans are refusing to meet their bills and are sending them to Hades.

Far be it from me to moralize on the policy of non-intervention, to talk of treason, treachery and so on. It would be naive to preach morals to people who recognize no human morality. Politics is politics, as the old, case-hardened bourgeois diplomats say. It must be remarked, however, that the big and dangerous political game started by the supporters of the policy of non-intervention may end in a serious fiasco for them.

Such is the true face of the prevailing policy of non-intervention.
Such is the political situation in the capitalist countries.

3. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

The war has created a new situation with regard to the relations between countries. It has enveloped them in an atmosphere of alarm and uncertainty. By undermining the postwar peace regime and overriding the elementary principles of international law, it has cast doubt on the value of international treaties and obligations. Pacifism and disarmament schemes are dead and buried. Feverish arming has taken their place. Everybody is arming, small states and big states, including primarily those which practise the policy of non-intervention. Nobody believes any longer in the unctuous speeches which claim that the Munich concessions to the aggressors and the Munich agreement opened a new era of "appeasement." They are disbelieved even by the signatories to the Munich agreement, Britain and France, who are increasing their armaments no less than other countries.

Naturally, the USSR could not ignore these ominous events. There is no doubt that any war, however small, started by the aggressors in any remote corner of the world constitutes a danger to the peaceable countries. All the more serious then is the danger arising from the new imperialist war, which has already drawn into its orbit over five hundred million people in Asia, Africa and Europe. In view of this, while our country is unswervingly pursuing a policy of preserving peace, it is at the same time doing a great deal to increase the preparedness of our Red Army and our Red Navy.

At the same time, in order to strengthen its international position, the Soviet Union decided to take certain other steps. At the end of 1934 our country joined the League of Nations, considering that despite its weakness the League might nevertheless serve as a place where aggressors can be exposed, and as a certain instrument of peace, however feeble, that might hinder the outbreak of war. The Soviet Union considers that in alarming times like these even so weak an international organization as the League of Nations should not be ignored. In May 1935 a treaty of mutual assistance against possible attack by aggressors was signed between France and the Soviet Union. A similar treaty was simultaneously concluded with Czechoslovakia. In March 1936 the Soviet Union concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with the Mongolian People's Republic. In August 1937 the Soviet Union concluded a pact of non-aggression with

the Chinese Republic.

It was in such difficult international conditions that the Soviet Union pursued its foreign policy of upholding the cause of peace.

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is clear and explicit.

1. We stand for peace and the strengthening of business relations with all countries. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass on the interests of our country.

2. We stand for peaceful, close and friendly relations with all the neighbouring countries which have common frontiers with the USSR. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass, directly or indirectly, on the integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of the Soviet state.

3. We stand for the support of nations which are the victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their country.

4. We are not afraid of the threats of aggressors, and are ready to deal two blows for every blow delivered by instigators of war who attempt to violate the Soviet borders.

Such is the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

In its foreign policy the Soviet Union relies upon:

1. Its growing economic, political and cultural might;
2. The moral and political unity of our Soviet society;
3. The mutual friendship of the nations of our country;
4. Its Red Army and Red Navy;
5. Its policy of peace;
6. The moral support of the working people of all countries, who are vitally concerned in the preservation of peace;
7. The good sense of the countries which for one reason or another have no interest in the violation of peace.

* * *

The tasks of the Party in the sphere of foreign policy are:

1. To continue the policy of peace and of strengthening business relations with all countries;
2. To be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them;

3. To strengthen the might of our Red Army and Red Navy to the utmost;

4. To strengthen the international bonds of friendship with the working people of all countries, who are interested in peace and friendship among nations.

III

FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF THE CPSU(B)

From the standpoint of the political line and day-to-day practical work, the period under review was one of complete victory for the general line of our Party. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

The principal achievements demonstrating the correctness of the policy of our Party and the correctness of its leadership are the firm establishment of the socialist system in the entire national economy, the completion of the reconstruction of industry and agriculture on the basis of a new technique, the fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan in industry ahead of time, the increase of the annual grain harvest to a level of 7,000,000,000 poods, the abolition of poverty and unemployment and the raising of the material and cultural standard of the people.

In the face of these imposing achievements, the opponents of the general line of our Party, all the various “left” and “right” trends, all the Trotsky-Pyatakov and Bukharin-Rykov degenerates were forced to creep into their shells, to tuck away their hackneyed “platforms” and to go into hiding. Lacking the manhood to submit to the will of the people, they preferred to merge with the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and fascists, to become the tools of foreign espionage services, to hire themselves out as spies and to obligate themselves to help the enemies of the Soviet Union to dismember our country and to restore capitalist slavery in it.

Such was the inglorious end of the opponents of the line of our Party, who finished up as enemies of the people.

When it had smashed the enemies of the people and purged the Party and Soviet organizations of degenerates, the Party became still more united in its political and organizational work and rallied even more solidly around its Central Committee (*Stormy applause. All the delegates rise and cheer the speaker. Shouts of “Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!” “Long live Comrade Stalin!” “Hurrah for the Central Committee of our Party!”*)

Let us examine the concrete facts illustrating the development of the internal life of the Party and its organizational and propaganda work during the period under review.

1. MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE COMPOSITION OF THE PARTY DIVISION OF ORGANIZATIONS CLOSER CONTACT BETWEEN THE LEADING PARTY BODIES AND THE WORK OF THE LOWER BODIES

The strengthening of the Party and of its leading bodies during the period under review proceeded chiefly along two lines: along the line of regulating the composition of the Party, ejecting unreliable elements and selecting the best elements, and along the line of dividing up the organizations, reducing their size, and bringing the leading bodies closer to the concrete, day-to-day work of the lower bodies.

There were 1,874,488 Party members represented at the Seventeenth Party Congress. Comparing this figure with the number of Party members represented at the preceding congress, the Sixteenth Party Congress, we find that in the interval between these two congresses 600,000 new members joined the Party. The Party could not but feel that in the conditions prevailing in 1930-33 such a mass influx into its ranks was an unhealthy and undesirable expansion of its membership. The Party knew that its ranks were being joined not only by honest and loyal people, but also by chance elements and careerists, who were seeking to utilize the badge of the Party for their own personal ends. The Party could not but know that its strength lay not only in the size of its membership, but, and above all, in the quality of its members. This raised the question of regulating the composition of the Party. It was decided to continue the purge of Party members and candidate members begun in 1933; and the purge actually was continued until May 1935. It was further decided to suspend the admission of new members into the Party; and the admission of new members actually was suspended until September 1936, the admission of new members being resumed only on November 1, 1936. Further, in connection with the dastardly murder of Comrade Kirov, which showed that there were quite a number of suspicious elements in the Party, it was decided to undertake a verification of the records of Party members and an exchange of old Party cards for new ones, both these measures being completed only in September 1936. Only after this was the admission of new members and candidate members into the Party resumed. As a result of all

these measures, the Party succeeded in weeding out chance, passive, careerist and directly hostile elements, and in selecting the most staunch and loyal people. It cannot be said that the purge was not accompanied by grave mistakes. There were unfortunately more mistakes than might have been expected. Undoubtedly, we shall have no further need of resorting to the method of mass purges. Nevertheless, the purge of 1933-36 was unavoidable and its results, on the whole, were beneficial. The number of Party members represented at this, the Eighteenth Congress is about 1,600,000, which is 270,000 less than were represented at the Seventeenth Congress. But there is nothing bad in that. On the contrary, it is all to the good, for the Party strengthens itself by clearing its ranks of dross. Our Party is now somewhat smaller in membership, but on the other hand it is better in quality.

That is a big achievement.

As regards the improvement of the day-to-day leadership of the Party by bringing it closer to the work of the lower bodies and by making it more concrete, the Party came to the conclusion that the best way to make it easier for the Party bodies to guide the organizations and to make the leadership itself concrete, alive and practical was to divide up the organizations, to reduce their size, People's Commissariats as well as the administrative organizations of the various territorial divisions, that is, the Union Republics, territories, regions, districts, etc., were divided up. The result of the measures adopted is that instead of 7 Union Republics, we now have 11; instead of 14 People's Commissariats of the USSR we now have 34; instead of 70 territories and regions we now have 110; instead of 2,559 urban and rural districts we now have 3,815. Correspondingly, within the system of leading Party bodies, we now have 11 central committees, headed by the Central Committee of the CPSU(B), 6 territorial committees, 104 regional committees, 30 area committees, 212 city committees, 336 city district committees, 3,479 rural district committees and 113,060 primary Party organizations.

It cannot be said that the division of organizations is already over. Most likely it will be carried further. But, however that may be, it is already yielding good results both in the improvement of the day-to-day leadership of the work and in bringing the leadership itself closer to the concrete work of the lower bodies. I need not mention that the division of organizations has made it possible to promote hundreds and thousands of new people to leading posts.

That, too, is a big achievement.

2. SELECTION, PROMOTION AND ALLOCATION OF CADRES

The regulation of the composition of the Party and the bringing of the leading bodies closer to the concrete work of the lower bodies was not, and could not be, the only means of further strengthening the Party and its leadership. Another means adopted in the period under review was a radical improvement in the training of cadres, an improvement in the work of selecting, promoting and allocating cadres and of testing them in the process of work.

The Party cadres constitute the commanding staff of the Party; and since our Party is in power, they also constitute the commanding staff of the leading organs of state. After a correct political line has been worked out and tested in practice, the Party cadres become the decisive force in the work of guiding the Party and the state. A correct political line is, of course, the primary and most important thing. But that in itself is not enough. A correct political line is not needed as a declaration, but as something to be carried into effect. But in order to carry a correct political line into effect, we must have cadres, people who understand the political line of the Party, who accept it as their own line, who are prepared to carry it into effect, who are able to put it into practice and are capable of answering for it, defending it and fighting for it. Failing this, a correct political line runs the risk of being purely nominal.

And here arises the question of the correct selection of cadres, the training of cadres, the promotion of new people, the correct allocation of cadres, and the testing of cadres by work accomplished.

What is meant by the correct selection of cadres?

The correct selection of cadres does not mean just gathering around one a lot of assistants and subs, setting up an office and issuing order after order. (*Laughter.*) Nor does it mean abusing one's powers, switching scores and hundreds of people back and forth from one job to another without rhyme or reason and conducting endless "reorganizations." (*Laughter.*)

The proper selection of cadres means:

Firstly, valuing cadres as the gold reserve of the Party and the state, treasuring them, respecting them.

Secondly, knowing cadres carefully studying their individual merits and shortcomings, knowing in what post the capacities of a given worker are most likely to develop.

Thirdly, carefully fostering cadres, helping every promising

worker to advance, not grudging time on patiently “bothering” with such workers and accelerating their development.

Fourthly, boldly promoting new and young cadres in time, so as not to allow them to stagnate in their old posts and grow stale.

Fifthly, allocating workers to posts in such a way that each feels he is in the right place, that each may contribute to our common cause the maximum his personal capacities enable him to contribute, and that the general trend of the work of allocating cadres may fully answer to the demands of the political line for the carrying out of which this allocation of cadres is designed.

Particularly important in this respect is the bold and timely promotion of new and young cadres. It seems to me that our people are not quite clear on this point yet. Some think that in selecting people we must chiefly rely on the old cadres. Others, on the contrary, think that we must rely chiefly on the young cadres. It seems to me that both are mistaken. The old cadres, of course, represent a valuable asset to the Party and the state. They possess what the young cadres lack, namely, tremendous experience in leadership, a schooling in Marxist-Leninist principles, knowledge of affairs, and a capacity for orientation. But, firstly, there are never enough old cadres, there are far less than required, and they are already partly going out of commission owing to the operation of the laws of nature. Secondly, part of the old cadres are sometimes inclined to keep a too persistent eye on the past, to cling to the past, to stay in the old rut and fail to observe the new in life. This is called losing the sense of the new. It is a very serious and dangerous shortcoming. As to the young cadres, they, of course, have not the experience, the schooling, the knowledge of affairs and the capacity of orientation of the old cadres. But, firstly, the young cadres constitute the vast majority; secondly, they are young, and as yet are not subject to the danger of going out of commission; thirdly, they possess in abundance the sense of the new, which is a valuable quality in every Bolshevik worker; and, fourthly, they develop and acquire knowledge so rapidly, they press upward so eagerly, that the time is not far off when they will overtake the old fellows, take their stand side by side with them, and become worthy of replacing them. Consequently, the thing is not whether to rely on the old cadres or on the new cadres, but to steer for a combination, a union of the old and the young cadres in one common symphony of leadership of the Party and the state, (*Prolonged applause.*)

That is why we must boldly and in good time promote young ca-

dres to leading posts.

One of the important achievements of the Party during the period under review in the matter of strengthening the Party leadership is that, when selecting cadres, it has successfully pursued, from top to bottom, just this course of combining old and young workers.

Data in the possession of the Central Committee of the Party, show that during the period under review the Party succeeded in promoting to leading state and Party posts over five hundred thousand young Bolsheviks, members of the Party and people standing close to the Party, over twenty per cent of whom were women.

What is our task now?

Our task now is to concentrate the work of selecting cadres from top to bottom, in the hands of one body and to raise it to a proper, scientific, Bolshevik level.

This entails putting an end to the division of the work of studying, promoting and selecting cadres among various departments and sectors, and concentrating it in one body.

This body should be the Cadres Administration of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) and a corresponding cadres department in each of the republican, territorial and regional Party organizations.

3. PARTY PROPAGANDA. MARXIST-LENINIST TRAINING OF PARTY MEMBERS AND PARTY CADRES

There is still another sphere of Party work, a very important and very responsible sphere, in which the work of strengthening the Party and its leading bodies has been carried on during the period under review. I am referring to Party propaganda and agitation, oral and printed, the work of training the Party members and the Party cadres in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, the work of raising the political and theoretical level of the Party and its workers.

There is hardly need to dwell on the cardinal importance of Party propaganda, of the Marxist-Leninist training of our people. I am referring not only to Party functionaries. I am also referring to the workers in the Young Communist League, trade union, trade, cooperative, economic, state, educational, military and other organizations. The work of regulating the composition of the Party and of bringing the leading bodies closer to the activities of the lower bodies may be organized satisfactorily; the work of promoting, selecting and allocating cadres may be organized satisfactorily; but, with all this, if our Party propaganda for some reason or other goes lame, if

the Marxist-Leninist training of our cadres begins to languish, if our work of raising the political and theoretical level of these cadres flags, and the cadres themselves cease on account of this to show interest in the prospect of our further progress, cease to understand the truth of our cause and are transformed into narrow plodders with no outlook, blindly and mechanically carrying out instructions from above — then our entire state and Party work must inevitably languish. It must be accepted as an axiom that the higher the political level and the Marxist-Leninist knowledge of the workers in any branch of state Party work the better and more fruitful will be the work itself, and the more effective the results of the work; and, vice versa, the lower the political level of the workers, and the less they are imbued with the knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, the greater will be the likelihood of disruption and failure in the work, of the workers themselves becoming shallow and deteriorating into paltry plodders, of their degenerating altogether. It may be confidently stated that if we succeeded in training the cadres in all branches of our work ideologically, and in schooling them politically, to such an extent as to enable them easily to orientate themselves in the internal and international situation; if we succeeded in making them quite mature Marxist-Leninists capable of solving the problems involved in the guidance of the country without serious error, we would have every reason to consider nine-tenths of our problems already settled. And we certainly can accomplish this, for we have all the means and opportunities for doing so.

The training and moulding of our young cadres usually proceeds in some particular branch of science or technology, along the line of specialization. This is necessary and desirable. There is no reason why a man who specializes in medicine should at the same time specialize in physics or botany, or vice versa, But there is one branch of science which Bolsheviks in all branches of science are in duty bound to know, and that is the Marxist-Leninist science of society, of the laws of social development, of the laws of development of the proletarian revolution, of the laws of development of socialist construction, and of the victory of communism. For a man who calls himself a Leninist cannot be considered a real Leninist if he shuts himself up in his speciality, in mathematics, botany or chemistry, let us say, and sees nothing beyond that speciality. A Leninist cannot be just a specialist in his favourite science; he must also be a political and social worker, keenly interested in the destinies of his country, acquainted with the laws of social development, capable of applying

these laws, and striving to be an active participant in the political guidance of the country, This, of course, will be an additional burden on specialists who are Bolsheviks, But it will be a burden more than compensated for by its results.

The task of Party propaganda, the task of the Marxist-Leninist training of cadres, is to help our cadres in all branches of work to become versed in the Marxist-Leninist science of the laws of social development.

Measures for improving the work of propaganda and of the Marxist-Leninist training of cadres have been discussed many times by the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) jointly with propagandists from various regional Party organizations. The publication, in September 1938, of the "History of the CPSU(B) — Short Course" was taken into account in this connection. It was ascertained that the publication of the "History of the CPSU(B)" had given a new impetus to Marxist-Leninist propaganda in our country. The results of the work of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) have been published in its decision, "On the Organization of Party Propaganda in Connection with the Publication of the History of the CPSU(B) — Short Course."

On the basis of this decision and with due reference to the decisions of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) of March 1937, "On Defects in Party Work," the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) has outlined the following major measures for eliminating the defects in Party propaganda and improving the work of the Marxist-Leninist training of Party members and Party cadres:

1. To concentrate the work of Party propaganda and agitation in one body and to merge the propaganda and agitation departments and the press departments into a single Propaganda and Agitation Administration of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B), and to organize corresponding propaganda and agitation departments in each republican, territorial and regional Party organization;

2. Recognizing as incorrect the infatuation for the system of propaganda through study circles, and considering the method of individual study of the principles of Marxism-Leninism by Party members to be more expedient, to centre the attention of the Party on propaganda through the press and on the organization of a system of propaganda by lectures;

3. To organize one-year Courses of Instruction for our lower cadres in each regional centre;

4. To organize two-year Lenin Schools for our middle cadres in

various centres of the country;

5. To organize a Higher School of Marxism-Leninism under the auspices of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) with a three-year course for the training of highly qualified Party theoreticians;

6. To set up one-year Courses of Instruction for propagandists and journalists in various centres of the country;

7. To set up in connection with the Higher School of Marxism-Leninism six-month Courses of Instruction for teachers of Marxism-Leninism in the higher educational establishments.

There can be no doubt that the realization of these measures, which are already being carried out, although not yet sufficiently, will soon yield beneficial results.

RADIO BROADCAST, JULY 3, 1941

Comrades, citizens, brothers and sisters, men of our Army and Navy! My words are addressed to you, dear friends!

The perfidious military attack by Hitlerite Germany on our Fatherland, begun on June 22, is continuing. In spite of the heroic resistance of the Red Army, and although the enemy's finest divisions and finest air force units have already been smashed and have met their doom on the field of battle, the enemy continues to push forward, hurling fresh forces to the front. Hitler's troops have succeeded in capturing Lithuania, a considerable part of Latvia, the western part of Byelorussia and part of Western Ukraine. The fascist aircraft are extending the range of their operations, bombing Murmansk, Orsha, Moghilev, Smolensk, Kiev, Odessa, Sevastopol. Grave danger overhangs our country.

How could it have happened that our glorious Red Army surrendered a number of our cities and districts to the fascist armies? Is it really true that the German-fascist troops are invincible, as the braggart fascist propagandists are ceaselessly blaring forth?

Of course not! History shows that there are no invincible armies and never have been. Napoleon's army was considered invincible, but it was beaten successively by the armies of Russia, England and Germany. Kaiser Wilhelm's German army in the period of the First Imperialist War was also considered invincible, but it was beaten several times by Russian and Anglo-French troops, and was finally smashed by the Anglo-French forces. The same must be said of Hitler's German-fascist army of today. This army had not yet met with serious resistance on the continent of Europe. Only on our territory has it met with serious resistance. And if as a result of this resistance the finest divisions of Hitler's German-fascist army have been defeated by our Red Army, this means that it too can be smashed and will be smashed, as were the armies of Napoleon and Wilhelm.

As to part of our territory having nevertheless been seized by the German-fascist troops, this is chiefly due to the fact that the war of fascist Germany against the USSR began under conditions that were favourable for the German forces and unfavourable for the Soviet forces. The fact of the matter is that the troops of Germany, a country at war, were already fully mobilized, and the 170 divisions brought up to the Soviet frontiers and hurled by Germany against the USSR were in a state of complete readiness, only awaiting the signal to move into action, whereas the Soviet troops had still to ef-

fect mobilization and move up to the frontiers. Of no little importance in this respect was the fact that fascist Germany suddenly and treacherously violated the non-aggression pact which she had concluded in 1939 with the USSR, regardless of the circumstance that she would be regarded as the aggressor by the whole world. Naturally, our peace-loving country, not wishing to take the initiative in breaking the pact, could not resort to perfidy.

It may be asked, how could the Soviet government have consented to conclude a non-aggression pact with such perfidious people, such fiends as Hitler and Ribbentrop? Was this not an error on the part of the Soviet government? Of course not! Non-aggression pacts are pacts of peace between two states. It was such a pact that Germany proposed to us in 1939. Could the Soviet government have declined such a proposal? I think that not a single peace-loving state could decline a peace treaty with a neighbouring state even though the latter were headed by such monsters and cannibals as Hitler and Ribbentrop. But that, of course, only on the one indispensable condition — that this peace treaty did not jeopardize, either directly or indirectly, the territorial integrity, independence and honour of the peace-loving state. As is well known, the non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR was precisely such a pact.

What did we gain by concluding the non-aggression pact with Germany? We secured our country peace for a year and a half and the opportunity of preparing our forces to repulse fascist Germany should she risk an attack on our country despite the pact. This was a definite advantage for us and a disadvantage for fascist Germany.

What has fascist Germany gained and what has she lost by perfidiously tearing up the pact and attacking the USSR? She has gained a certain advantageous position for her troops for a short period of time, but she has lost politically by exposing herself in the eyes of the entire world as a bloodthirsty aggressor. There can be no doubt that this short-lived military gain for Germany is only an episode, while the tremendous political gain of the USSR is a weighty and lasting factor that is bound to form the basis for the development of outstanding military successes of the Red Army in the war with fascist Germany.

That is why the whole of our valiant Red Army, the whole of our valiant Navy, all the falcons of our Air Force, all the peoples of our country, all the finest men and women of Europe, America and Asia, and, finally, all the finest men and women of Germany — denounce the treacherous acts of the German-fascists, sympathize with the So-

viet government, approve its conduct, and see that ours is a just cause, that the enemy will be defeated, and that we are bound to win.

In consequence of this war which has been forced upon us, our country has come to death grips with its bitterest and most cunning enemy — German fascism. Our troops are fighting heroically against an enemy armed to the teeth with tanks and aircraft. Overcoming numerous difficulties, the Red Army and Red Navy are self-sacrificingly fighting for every inch of Soviet soil. The main forces of the Red Army are coming into action equipped with thousands of tanks and planes. The soldiers of the Red Army are displaying unexampled valour.

Our resistance to the enemy is growing in strength and power. Side by side with the Red Army, the entire Soviet people is rising in defence of our native land.

What is required to put an end to the danger imperilling our country and what measures must be taken to smash the enemy?

Above all it is essential that our people, the Soviet people, should appreciate the full immensity of the danger that threatens our country and give up all complacency, casualness and the mentality of peaceful constructive work that was so natural before the war, but which is fatal today, when war has radically changed the whole situation. The enemy is cruel and implacable. He is out to seize our lands watered by the sweat of our brows, to seize our grain and oil secured by the labour of our hands. He is out to restore the rule of the landlords, to restore Tsarism, to destroy the national culture and the national existence as states of the Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Uzbeks, Tatars, Moldavians, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanians and the other free peoples of the Soviet Union, to Germanize them, to turn them into the slaves of German princes and barons. Thus the issue is one of life and death for the Soviet state, of life and death for the peoples of the USSR; the issue is whether the peoples of the Soviet Union shall be free or fall into slavery. The Soviet people must realize this and abandon all complacency; they must mobilize themselves and reorganize all their work on a new, war-time footing, where there can be no mercy to the enemy.

Further, there must be no room in our ranks for whimperers and cowards, for panic-mongers and deserters; our people must know no fear in the fight and must selflessly join our patriotic war of liberation against the fascist enslavers. Lenin, the great founder of our

state, used to say that the chief virtues of Soviet men and women must be courage, valour, fearlessness in struggle, readiness to fight together with the people against the enemies of our country. These splendid virtues of the Bolshevik must become the virtues of millions and millions of the Red Army, of the Red Navy, of all the peoples of the Soviet Union.

All our work must be immediately reorganized on a war footing, everything must be subordinated to the interests of the front and the task of organizing the destruction of the enemy. The peoples of the Soviet Union now see that German fascism is untameable in its savage fury and hatred of our native country, which has ensured all its working people labour in freedom and prosperity. The peoples of the Soviet Union must rise against the enemy and defend their rights and their land.

The Red Army, Red Navy and all citizens of the Soviet Union must defend every inch of Soviet soil, must fight to the last drop of blood for our towns and villages, must display the daring, initiative and mental alertness that are inherent in our people.

We must organize all-round assistance to the Red Army, ensure powerful reinforcements for its ranks and the supply of everything it requires; we must organize the rapid transport of troops and military freight and extensive aid to the wounded.

We must strengthen the Red Army's rear, subordinating all our work to this end; all our industries must be got to work with greater intensity, to produce more rifles, machine-guns, guns, cartridges, shells, planes; we must organize the guarding of factories, power stations, telephonic and telegraphic communications, and arrange effective air-raid protection in all localities.

We must wage a ruthless fight against all disorganizers of the rear, deserters, panic-mongers and rumour-mongers; we must exterminate spies, sabotage agents and enemy parachutists, rendering rapid aid in all this to our extermination battalions. We must bear in mind that the enemy is crafty, unscrupulous, experienced in deception and the dissemination of false rumours. We must reckon with all this and not fall victims to stratagem. All who by their panic-mongering and cowardice hinder the work of defence, no matter who they may be, must be immediately haled before a military tribunal.

In case of a forced retreat of Red Army units, all rolling stock must be evacuated, the enemy must not be left a single engine, a single railway car, not a single pound of grain or gallon of fuel. The collective farmers must drive off all their cattle and turn over their grain

to the safe keeping of the state authorities for transportation to the rear. All valuable property, including non-ferrous metals, grain and fuel that cannot be withdrawn must be destroyed without fail.

In areas occupied by the enemy, guerilla units, mounted and on loot, must be formed; sabotage groups must be organized to combat enemy units, to foment guerilla warfare everywhere, blow up bridges and roads, damage telephone and telegraph lines, set fire to forests, stores and transports. In occupied regions conditions must be made unbearable for the enemy and all his accomplices. They must be hounded and annihilated at every step, and all their measures frustrated.

The war with fascist Germany cannot be considered an ordinary war. It is not only a war between two armies, it is also a great war of the entire Soviet people against the German-fascist armies. The aim of this national patriotic war in defence of our country against the fascist oppressors is not only to eliminate the danger hanging over our country, but also to aid all the European peoples groaning under the yoke of German fascism. In this war of liberation we shall not be alone. In this great war we shall have true allies in the peoples of Europe and America, including the German people which is enslaved by the Hitlerite misrulers. Our war for the freedom of our country will merge with the struggle of the peoples of Europe and America for their independence, for democratic liberties. It will be a united front of the peoples standing for freedom and against enslavement and threats of enslavement by Hitler's fascist armies. In this connection the historic utterance of the British Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, regarding aid to the Soviet Union, and the declaration of the United States government signifying readiness to render aid to our country, which can only evoke a feeling of gratitude in the hearts of the peoples of the Soviet Union, are fully comprehensible and symptomatic.

Comrades, our forces are numberless. The overweening enemy will soon learn this to his cost. Side by side with the Red Army many thousands of workers, collective farmers and intellectuals are rising to fight the enemy aggressor. The masses of our people will rise up in their millions. The working people of Moscow and Leningrad have already begun to form huge People's Guards in support of the Red Army. Such People's Guards must be raised in every city which is in danger of enemy invasion; all the working people must be roused to defend with their lives their freedom, their honour and their country in this patriotic war against German fascism.

In order to ensure the rapid mobilization of all the forces of the peoples of the USSR and to repulse the enemy who has treacherously attacked our country, a State Committee of Defence has been formed and the entire state authority has now been vested in it. The State Committee of Defence has entered on the performance of its functions and calls upon all our people to rally around the Party of Lenin and Stalin and around the Soviet government, so as to render self-sacrificing support to the Red Army and Red Navy, to exterminate the enemy and secure victory.

All our forces for the support of our heroic Red Army and our glorious Red Navy!

All the forces of the people for the destruction of the enemy!

Forward to victory!

SPEECH AT THE CELEBRATORY MEETING IN THE MAYAKOVSKAYA METRO STATION

(Delivered at the Celebration of the Moscow Soviet, Working People's Deputies and Moscow Party and Public Organizations on the Occasion of the 24th Anniversary of the October Revolution)

November 6, 1941

Comrades, twenty-four years have elapsed since the victory of the October Socialist Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet system in our country. We stand now on the threshold of the next, the twenty-fifth, year of existence of the Soviet system.

Usually at meetings in celebration of the anniversaries of the October Revolution the results of our successes in the realm of peaceful construction for the past year are summed up. We have really the possibility to sum up such results as our successes in the realm of peaceful construction are growing not only from year to year, but from month to month. What these successes are and how great they are is known to all, both friends and foes.

But this past year is not only a year of peaceful construction. It is also a year of war with the German invaders who perfidiously attacked our peace-loving country. Only during the first six months of the past year were we able to continue our peaceful, constructive work. In the second half of the year more than four months were spent under conditions of a fierce war with the German imperialists. The war has thus become a turning-point in the development of our country for the last year. The war has considerably curtailed and, in some branches, altogether stopped, our peaceful constructive work. It has forced us to reorganize all our work on a war footing. It has converted our country into a united and all-embracing rear serving the front, our Red Army and our Navy.

The period of peaceful construction has ended. The period of the war of liberation from the German invaders has begun.

It is therefore quite appropriate to sum up the results of the war for the second half of the past year, or rather for the period of somewhat over four months of the second half of the year, as well as the tasks confronting us in this war of liberation.

THE COURSE OF THE WAR FOR FOUR MONTHS

I have already said in my speech at the beginning of the war that the war had created a dangerous threat to our country, that a serious danger was looming over our country, that we must understand and realize this danger and remodel our work on a war-time basis. Now, after four months of war, I must emphasize that this danger has not only not grown less, but, on the contrary, has even increased. The enemy has seized a large part of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and a number of other regions, has forced his way into the Donetz Basin, hangs like a black cloud over Leningrad and is threatening our glorious capital, Moscow. The German-fascist invaders are plundering our country, destroying the towns and villages created by the labours of the workers, peasants and intellectuals. The Hitlerite hordes are murdering and outraging the peaceful inhabitants of our country, having no mercy on women, children or old people. Our brothers in the regions of our country seized by the Germans are groaning under the yoke of the German oppressors.

Streams of enemy blood have been spilt by the men of our Army and Navy, who are defending the honour and freedom of our Motherland, courageously beating off the attacks of the bestial enemy and displaying examples of valour and heroism. But the enemy stops at no sacrifice, he does not care one iota for the blood of his soldiers, he throws into action more and more detachments to replace those which have been shattered, and is straining all his efforts to capture Leningrad and Moscow before the advent of winter, for he knows that winter bodes him no good.

In four months of war we have lost 350,000 in killed, and 378,000 missing, and our wounded number 1,020,000. In the same period the enemy has in killed, wounded and prisoners lost more than four and a half million men.

There can be no doubt that as a result of four months of war Germany, whose reserves of manpower are already being exhausted, has been considerably more weakened than the Soviet Union, whose reserves are only now being mobilized to the full.

FAILURE OF THE “BLITZKRIEG”

In launching their attack on our country the German-fascist invaders thought that they would certainly be able to “finish off” the

Soviet Union in one and a half or two months, and in this short period would succeed in reaching the Urals. It must be said that the Germans did not conceal this plan of a “lightning” victory. On the contrary, they advertised it in every possible way. The facts, however, have demonstrated the utter irresponsibility and groundlessness of this “lightning” plan. Now this mad plan must be regarded as having finally failed. (*Applause.*)

How is it to be explained that the “blitzkrieg” which succeeded in Western Europe has failed and collapsed in the East?

What did the German-fascist strategists count on when they asserted that they would finish off the Soviet Union in two months and reach the Urals in this short period?

They seriously calculated in the first place on creating a general coalition against the USSR, on enlisting Great Britain and the USA in this coalition, first having frightened the ruling circles of these countries with the spectre of revolution, and thus completely isolating our country from the other powers. The Germans knew that their policy of playing on the contradictions between the classes of individual states, and between these states and the Soviet country, had already produced results in France, the rulers of which, having let themselves be frightened by the spectre of revolution, in their fright laid their country at the feet of Hitler and renounced all resistance. The German-fascist strategists thought that the same would occur in Great Britain and the United States. The notorious Hess was in fact sent to England by the German-fascists precisely in order to persuade the English politicians to join in the general crusade against the USSR. But the Germans gravely miscalculated. (*Applause.*) Great Britain and the United States, despite the efforts of Hess, not only did not join in the campaign of the German-fascist invaders against the USSR, but, on the contrary, proved to be in one camp with the USSR against Hitlerite Germany. The USSR not only was not isolated, but, on the contrary, it acquired new allies in the shape of Great Britain, the United States and other countries occupied by the Germans. It turned out that the German policy of playing on contradictions and of intimidation by means of the spectre of revolution has been exhausted and is no longer suitable in the new situation. And not only is it unsuitable, but it is even fraught with grave danger for the German invaders, because in the new conditions of the war it leads to diametrically opposite results.

The Germans counted, secondly, on the instability of the Soviet system, and the unreliability of the Soviet rear, reckoning that after

the first serious blow and the first setbacks of the Red Army, conflicts would break out between the workers and peasants, dissension would begin between the peoples of the USSR, uprisings would occur, and the country would disintegrate into its component parts — which would facilitate the advance of the German invaders right up to the Urals. But here, also, the Germans gravely miscalculated. The setbacks of the Red Army not only did not weaken but, on the contrary, strengthened even further the alliance of the workers and peasants, as well as the friendship of the peoples of the USSR. (*Applause.*) Moreover, they converted the family of peoples of the USSR into a single and unshakable camp, selflessly supporting its Red Army and its Red Navy. Never before has the Soviet rear been so firm as it is today. (*Loud applause.*) It is quite probable that any other state, having suffered such territorial losses as we have now, would not have withstood the test and would have fallen into decline. If the Soviet system has so successfully passed through this trial and even strengthened its rear, then this means that the Soviet system is now the most stable one. (*Loud applause.*)

Finally, the German invaders counted on the weakness of the Red Army and Red Navy, believing that the German army and German navy would succeed at the very first blow in overwhelming and dispersing our army and navy and opening the way for an unopposed advance into the depths of our country. But here, too, the Germans gravely miscalculated, overrating their own strength and underrating our army and navy. Of course, our army and navy are still young, they have been fighting for four months in all, they have not yet succeeded in becoming thoroughly seasoned, whereas they are confronted by the seasoned army and navy of the Germans, who have already been waging war for two years. But, in the first place, the morale of our army is higher than that of the Germans, because it is defending its native land from alien invaders and believes in the justice of its cause, whereas the German army is waging an aggressive war and is plundering a foreign country, having no possibility of believing even for a moment in the justice of its vile cause. There can be no doubt that the idea of defending one's own native land — and it is in the name of this that our people are fighting — is bound to create, and actually is creating in our army, heroes who are cementing the Red Army; whereas the idea of seizing and plundering a foreign country — and it is in the name of this that the Germans are in fact waging war — is bound to breed, and actually is breeding in the German army, professional plunderers, devoid of all moral princi-

ples and corrupting the German army. Secondly, advancing into the depths of our country, the German army is moving farther and farther away from its own German rear, is forced to operate in hostile surroundings, is forced to create a new rear in an alien country, a rear which is at the same time being disrupted by our guerillas — all of which is radically disorganizing the supply of the German army, forcing it to fear its own rear, and destroying its faith in the stability of its own position; whereas our army is operating on its own native surroundings, enjoys the constant support of its own rear, has assured supplies of men, munitions and food, and has a profound faith in its rear. That is why our army has proved to be stronger than the Germans anticipated and the German army weaker than might have been expected judging by the boastful self-advertisement of the German invaders. The defence of Leningrad and Moscow, where our divisions lately wiped out about a score and a half of seasoned German divisions, shows that in the fire of our patriotic war there are being forged, and have already been forged, new Soviet fighters and commanders, airmen, artillerymen, mortar crews, tankmen, infantrymen and sailors, who tomorrow will become a deadly menace to the German army. (*Loud applause.*)

There is no doubt that all these circumstances taken together predetermined the inevitable failure of the “blitzkrieg” in the East.

REASONS FOR THE TEMPORARY REVERSES OF OUR ARMY

All that, of course, is true. But it is likewise true that alongside these favourable factors there are a number of factors unfavourable to the Red Army, as a result of which our army is suffering temporary reverses, is obliged to retreat and to surrender a number of regions of our country to the enemy.

What are these unfavourable factors? What are the reasons for the temporary military reverses of the Red Army?

One of the reasons for the reverses of the Red Army is the absence of a second front in Europe against the German-fascist troops. The fact of the matter is that at the present time there are still no armies of Great Britain or the United States of America on the European continent to wage war against the German-fascist troops, with the result that the Germans are not compelled to dissipate their forces and to wage war on two fronts, in the West and in the East. Well, the effect of this is that the Germans, considering their rear in

the West secure, are able to move all their troops and the troops of their allies in Europe against our country. The situation at present is such that our country is carrying on the war of liberation single-handed, without any military assistance, against the combined forces of Germans, Finns, Romanians, Italians and Hungarians. The Germans preen themselves on their temporary successes and are lavish in the praises of their army, claiming that it can always defeat the Red Army in single combat. But the Germans' claims are empty boasting, for it is incomprehensible why in that case the Germans have resorted to the aid of the Finns, Romanians, Italians and Hungarians against the Red Army, which is fighting absolutely single-handed without any military help from outside. There is no doubt that the absence of a second front in Europe against the Germans considerably eases the position of the German army. But neither can there be any doubt that the appearance of a second front on the European continent — and it must unquestionably appear in the near future (*loud applause*) — will essentially ease the situation of our army to the detriment of the German army.

The other reason for the temporary reverses of our army is our lack of an adequate number of tanks and, partly, of aircraft. In modern warfare it is very difficult for infantry to fight without tanks and without adequate aircraft protection. Our aviation is superior in quality to that of the Germans, and our valiant airmen have covered themselves with glory as fearless fighters. (*Applause.*) But we still have fewer aircraft than the Germans. Our tanks are superior in quality to the German tanks, and our glorious tankmen and artillerymen have more than once put the vaunted troops of the Germans, with their numerous tanks, to flight. (*Applause.*) But we still have several times fewer tanks than the Germans. Therein lies the secret of the temporary successes of the German army. It cannot be said that our tank-building industry is working badly and supplying our front with few tanks. No, it is working very well and is producing quite a number of excellent tanks. But the Germans are producing considerably more tanks, for they now have at their disposal not only their own tank-building industry, but also the industry of Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland and France. Had it not been for this circumstance, the Red Army would long ago have smashed the German army, which does not go into battle without tanks and cannot stand up to the blows of our troops if it has not a superiority in tanks. (*Applause.*)

There is only one way of nullifying the Germans' superiority in

tanks and thus radically improving the position of our army. This way is, not only to increase the output of tanks in our country several times over, but also sharply to increase the production of anti-tank aircraft, anti-tank rifles and guns, and anti-tank grenades and mortars, and to construct more anti-tank trenches and every other kind of anti-tank obstacle.

Herein lies our present task.

We can accomplish this task, and we must accomplish it at all costs!

WHO ARE THE “NATIONAL SOCIALISTS”?

In our country the German invaders, i.e., the Hitlerites, are usually called fascists. The Hitlerites, it appears, consider this wrong and obstinately continue to call themselves “National Socialists.” Hence the Germans want to assure us that the Hitlerite party, the party of the German invaders, which is plundering Europe and has organized the villainous attack on our socialist state, is a socialist party. Is this possible? What can there be in common between socialism and the bestial Hitlerite invaders who are plundering and oppressing the nations of Europe?

Can the Hitlerites be regarded as nationalists? No, they cannot. Actually, the Hitlerites are now not nationalists but imperialists. As long as the Hitlerites were engaged in assembling the German lands and reuniting the Rhine district, Austria, etc., it was possible with a certain amount of foundation to call them nationalists. But after they seized foreign territories and enslaved European nations — the Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, Belgians, French, Serbs, Greeks, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, the inhabitants of the Baltic countries, etc. — and began to reach out for world domination, the Hitlerite party ceased to be a nationalist party, because from that moment it became an imperialist party, a party of annexation and oppression.

The Hitlerite party is a party of imperialists, and the most rapacious and predatory imperialists among all the imperialists of the world.

Can the Hitlerites be regarded as socialists? No, they cannot. Actually, the Hitlerites are the sworn enemies of socialism, arrant reactionaries and Black-Hundreds who have robbed the working class and the peoples of Europe of the most elementary democratic liberties. In order to cover up their reactionary, Black-Hundred essence,

the Hitlerites denounce the internal regimes of Britain and America as plutocratic regimes. But in Britain and the United States there are elementary democratic liberties, there exist trade unions of workers and employees, there exist workers' parties, there exist parliaments; whereas in Germany, under the Hitler regime, all these institutions have been destroyed. One only needs to compare these two sets of facts to perceive the reactionary nature of the Hitler regime and the utter hypocrisy of the German-fascist pratings about a plutocratic regime in Britain and in America. In point of fact the Hitler regime is a copy of that reactionary regime which existed in Russia under Tsardom. It is well known that the Hitlerites suppress the rights of the workers, the rights of the intellectuals and the rights of nations as readily as the Tsarist regime suppressed them, and that they organize medieval Jewish pogroms as readily as the Tsarist regime organized them.

The Hitlerite party is a party of enemies of democratic liberties, a party of medieval reaction and Black-Hundred pogroms.

And if these brazen imperialists and arrant reactionaries still continue to masquerade in the togas of "nationalists" and "socialists," they do this in order to deceive the people, to fool the simpletons and to hide under the flag of "nationalism" and "socialism" their piratical and imperialist nature.

Crows decked in peacocks' feathers... But no matter how much crows may deck themselves in peacocks' feathers they will not cease to be crows.

"We must at all costs," says Hitler, "strive to achieve the German conquest of the world. If we want to create our great German empire we must first of all oust and exterminate the Slav peoples — the Russians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians. There are no reasons why this should not be done."

"Man," says Hitler, "is sinful from birth and can be ruled only with the help of force. In dealing with him all methods are permissible. When policy demands it one must lie, betray and even kill."

"Kill everyone who is against us," says Göring. "Kill, kill! — It is not you who will be held responsible, but I. Therefore, kill!"

"I emancipate man," says Hitler, "from the humiliating chimera which is called conscience. Conscience, like education, mutilates man. I have the advantage of not being restrained by any considerations of a theoretical or moral nature."

In one of the orders of the German command, dated September 25, to the 489th infantry regiment, and found on a killed German

non-commissioned officer, it is stated:

“I order you to open fire on every Russian as soon as he appears at a distance of 600 metres. The Russian must learn that he is faced by a resolute foe from whom he cannot expect any mercy.”

In one of the declarations of the German command to the soldiers, found on the dead body of Lieutenant Gustav Ziegel, a native of Frankfort-on-Main, it is stated:

“You have no heart or nerves; they are not needed in war. Eradicate every trace of pity and sympathy from your heart — kill every Russian, every Soviet person. Do not stop even if before you stands an old man or a woman, girl or boy, kill! By this you will save yourselves from destruction, ensure the future of your family and win eternal glory.”

There you have the program and instructions of the leaders of the Hitlerite party and of the Hitlerite command, the program and instructions of men who have lost all semblance of human beings and have sunk to the level of wild beasts.

And these men, bereft of conscience and honour, these men with the morals of beasts, have the insolence to call for the extermination of the great Russian nation, the nation of Plekhanov and Lenin, Belinsky and Chernyshevsky, Pushkin and Tolstoy, Glinka and Chaikovsky, Gorky and Chekhov, Sechenov and Pavlov, Repin and Surikov, Suvorov and Kutuzov!

The German invaders want a war of extermination with the peoples of the USSR. Well, if the Germans want to have a war of extermination, they will get it. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

From now on our task, the task of the peoples of the USSR, the task of the fighters, commanders and the political workers of our Army and our Navy will be to exterminate every single German who has set his invading foot on the territory of our Fatherland. (*Loud applause. “Hear, hear!” Cheers.*)

No mercy for the German invaders!

Death to the German invaders! (*Loud applause.*)

THE DEFEAT OF THE GERMAN IMPERIALISTS AND THEIR ARMIES IS INEVITABLE

Already the very moral degradation of the German invaders, who have lost all human semblance, and long ago sunk to the level of wild beasts, this one circumstance is already evidence of the fact

that they have doomed themselves to inevitable destruction.

But the inevitable destruction of the Hitlerite invaders and their armies is not determined by moral factors alone.

There exist three other basic factors, which are operating more powerfully with each day that passes, and which are bound to lead in the near future to the inevitable defeat of Hitler's bandit imperialism. (*Applause.*)

First, there is the instability of the European rear of imperialist Germany, the instability of the "New Order" in Europe. The German invaders have enslaved the peoples of the European continent — from France to the Soviet Baltic, from Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Holland and Soviet Byelorussia to the Balkans and the Soviet Ukraine; they have robbed them of their elementary democratic liberties; they have deprived them of the right to dispose of their own destinies; have taken away their bread, meat and raw materials; they have turned them into their slaves; they have crucified the Poles, Czechs, Serbs and decided that, having achieved domination in Europe, they can now use it as a basis for building up Germany's world domination. That is what they call the "New Order in Europe." But what is this "basis," what is this "New Order"? Only the conceited Hitlerite fools fail to see that the "New Order" in Europe and the infamous "basis" of this order represent a volcano which is ready to erupt at any moment and overwhelm the German imperialist house of cards. They refer to Napoleon, assuring us that Hitler is acting like Napoleon, and that he resembles Napoleon in everything. In the first place, however, one should not forget Napoleon's fate. And, secondly, Hitler resembles Napoleon no more than a kitten resembles a lion. (*Laughter, loud applause.*) For Napoleon fought against the forces of reaction and relied on progressive forces, whereas Hitler, on the contrary, relies on the forces of reaction and is fighting the progressive forces. Only the Hitlerite fools in Berlin fail to realize that the enslaved peoples of Europe will fight and revolt against Hitler's tyranny. Who can doubt that the USSR, Great Britain and the USA will afford full support to the peoples of Europe in their struggle for liberation against Hitler's tyranny? (*Applause.*)

Secondly, there is the instability of the German rear of the Hitlerite invaders. So long as the Hitlerites were engaged in the assembling of Germany, which had been split up by the Versailles Treaty, they could enjoy the support of the German people, who were inspired by the ideal of the restoration of Germany. But after this aim had been achieved and the Hitlerites entered the road of imperial-

ism, of the seizure of foreign lands and the subjugation of foreign nations, converting the peoples of Europe and the peoples of the USSR into sworn enemies of present-day Germany, a profound change of feeling took place in the German people — against the continuation of the war, in favour of the termination of the war. Over two years of sanguinary war, the end of which is not yet in sight; the millions of human lives sacrificed; starvation; impoverishment; epidemics; an atmosphere of hostility to the Germans all around them; Hitler's stupid policy, which has turned the peoples of the USSR into the sworn enemies of present-day Germany — all this could not but set the German people against the unnecessary and ruinous war. Only the Hitlerite fools fail to understand that not only the European rear but also the German rear of the German troops represents a volcano which is ready to erupt and overwhelm the Hitlerite adventurers.

There is, finally, the coalition of the USSR, Great Britain and the United States of America against the German-fascist imperialists. It is a fact that Great Britain, the United States of America and the Soviet Union have united into a single camp, which has set itself the aim of smashing the Hitlerite imperialists and their predatory armies. The present war is a war of engines. The war will be won by the side that has an overwhelming preponderance in engine production. If we aggregate the production of engines in the USA, Great Britain and the USSR, then we get a superiority of at least three times in comparison with Germany. That is one of the grounds for the inevitable doom of Hitler's robber imperialism.

The recent three-power conference in Moscow, attended by Lord Beaverbrook as representative of Great Britain and by Mr. Harri-man as representative of the United States, decided systematically to help our country with tanks and aircraft. As is well known, we have already begun to receive tanks and planes on the basis of that decision. Even prior to that, England arranged for supplies to our country of such materials in short supply as aluminium, lead, tin, nickel and rubber. If to this we add the fact that a few days ago the United States of America decided to grant the Soviet Union a loan of 1,000,000,000 dollars we can say with certainty that the coalition of the United States of America, Great Britain and the USSR is a reality (*loud applause*), which is growing and will continue to grow to the benefit of our common cause of liberation.

Such are the factors which determine the inevitable doom of German-fascist imperialism.

OUR TASKS

Lenin distinguished between two kinds of wars — predatory, and therefore, unjust wars, and wars of liberation — just wars.

The Germans are now waging a predatory war, an unjust war, for the purpose of seizing foreign territory and subjugating foreign peoples. That is why all honest people must rise against the German invaders as their enemies.

In contradistinction to Hitlerite Germany, the Soviet Union and its allies are waging a war of liberation, a just war, for the purpose of liberating the enslaved peoples of Europe and the USSR from Hitler's tyranny. That is why all honest people must support the armies of the USSR, Great Britain and the other allies, as armies of liberation.

We have not, and cannot have, such war aims as the seizure of foreign territories and the subjugation of foreign peoples — whether it be the peoples and territories of Europe or the peoples and territories of Asia, including Iran. Our first aim is to liberate our territories and our peoples from the German-fascist yoke.

We have not, and cannot have, any such war aims as that of imposing our will and our regime upon the Slavonic or other enslaved nations of Europe, who are expecting our help. Our aim is to help these nations in their struggle for liberation against Hitler's tyranny and then to leave it to them quite freely to organize their life on their lands as they think fit. No interference in the internal affairs of other nations!

But if these aims are to be achieved, we must crush the military might of the German invaders, we must destroy, to the last man, the German forces of occupation who have intruded into our country for the purpose of enslaving it. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

But for this it is necessary that our Army and Navy receive active and effective support from our whole country, that all our workers and office employees, men and women, work untiringly in the factories and supply the front with ever-increasing quantities of tanks, anti-tank rifles and guns, aircraft, artillery, trench mortars, machine-guns, rifles and ammunition; that our collective farmers, men and women, work untiringly in their fields and supply the front and the country with ever-greater quantities of bread, meat, raw materials for industry; that our whole country and all the peoples of the USSR organize into a single fighting camp, waging, together with our Army and Navy, the great war of liberation for the honour and freedom of

our Motherland, for the rout of the German armies. (Loud applause.)

This is now our task.

We can and we must accomplish this task.

Only when we have accomplished this task and routed the German invaders can we achieve a lasting and just peace.

For the complete rout of the German invaders! (*Loud applause.*)
For the liberation of all the oppressed peoples groaning under the yoke of Hitler's tyranny! (*Loud applause.*)

Long live the unshakable friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union! (*Loud applause.*)

Long live our Red Army and our Red Navy! (*Loud applause.*)

Long live our glorious Motherland! (*Loud applause.*)

Our cause is just — victory will be ours! (*Loud applause. All rise.*)
Shouts: "Cheers for the great Stalin!" "Long live Comrade Stalin!" Prolonged applause. The Internationale is sung.

SPEECH TO THE RED ARMY PARADE ON THE RED SQUARE

November 7, 1941

Comrades, men of the Red Army and Red Navy, commanders and political instructors, working men and working women, collective farmers — men and women, workers in the intellectual professions, brothers and sisters in the rear of our enemy who have temporarily fallen under the yoke of the German brigands, and our valiant men and women guerillas who are destroying the rear of the German invaders!

On behalf of the Soviet government and our Bolshevik Party I am greeting you and congratulating you on the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

Comrades, it is in strenuous circumstances that we are today celebrating the twenty-fourth anniversary of the October Revolution. The perfidious attack of the German brigands and the war which has been forced upon us have created a threat to our country. We have temporarily lost a number of regions, the enemy has appeared at the gates of Leningrad and Moscow. The enemy reckoned that after the very first blow our army would be dispersed, and our country would be forced to her knees. But the enemy gravely miscalculated. In spite of temporary reverses, our Army and Navy are heroically repulsing the enemy's attacks along the entire front and inflicting heavy losses upon him, while our country — our entire country — has organized itself into one fighting camp in order, together with our Army and our Navy, to encompass the rout of the German invaders.

There were times when our country was in a still more difficult position. Remember the year 1918, when we celebrated the first anniversary of the October Revolution. Three-quarters of our country was at that time in the hands of foreign interventionists. The Ukraine, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Urals, Siberia and the Far East were temporarily lost to us. We had no allies, we had no Red Army — we had only just begun to create it; there was a shortage of food, of armaments, of clothing for the Army. Fourteen states were pressing against our country. But we did not become despondent, we did not lose heart. In the fire of war we forged the Red Army and converted our country into a military camp. The spirit of the great Lenin animated us at that time for the war against the intervention-

ists. And what happened? We routed the interventionists, recovered all our lost territory and achieved victory.

Today the position of our country is far better than twenty-three years ago. Our country is now many times richer than it was twenty-three years ago as regards industry, food and raw materials. We now have allies, who together with us are maintaining a united front against the German invaders. We now enjoy the sympathy and support of all the nations of Europe who have fallen under the yoke of Hitler's tyranny. We now have a splendid Army and a splendid Navy, who are defending with their lives the liberty and independence of our country. We experience no serious shortage of either food, or armaments or army clothing. Our entire country, all the peoples of our country, support our Army and our Navy, helping them to smash the invading hordes of German fascists. Our reserves of manpower are inexhaustible. The spirit of the great Lenin and his victorious banner animate us now in this patriotic war just as they did twenty-three years ago.

Can there be any doubt that we can, and are bound to, defeat the German invaders?

The enemy is not so strong as some frightened little intellectuals picture him. The devil is not so terrible as he is painted. Who can deny that our Red Army has more than once put the vaunted German troops to panic flight? If one judges, not by the boastful assertions of the German propagandists, but by the actual position of Germany, it will not be difficult to understand that the German-fascist invaders are facing disaster. Hunger and impoverishment reign in Germany today; in four months of war Germany has lost four and a half million men; Germany is bleeding, her reserves of manpower are giving out, the spirit of indignation is spreading not only among the peoples of Europe who have fallen under the yoke of the German invaders but also among the German people themselves, who see no end to war. The German invaders are straining their last efforts. There is no doubt that Germany cannot sustain such a strain for long. Another few months, another half-year, perhaps another year, and Hitlerite Germany must burst under the pressure of her crimes.

Comrades, men of the Red Army and Red Navy, commanders and political instructors, men and women guerillas, the whole world is looking to you as the force capable of destroying the plundering hordes of German invaders. The enslaved peoples of Europe who have fallen under the yoke of the German invaders look to you as

their liberators. A great liberating mission has fallen to your lot. Be worthy of this mission! The war you are waging is a war of liberation, a just war. Let the manly images of our great ancestors — Alexander Nevsky, Dimitry Donskoy, Kuzma Minin, Dimitry Pozharsky, Alexander Suvorov and Mikhail Kutuzov — inspire you in this war! May the victorious banner of the great Lenin be your lodestar!

For the complete destruction of the German invaders!

Death to the German invaders!

Long live our glorious Motherland, her liberty and her independence!

Under the banner of Lenin, forward to victory!

SPEECH AT THE CELEBRATORY MEETING OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

*(Delivered at the Celebration of the Moscow Soviet, of Working People's
Deputies and Moscow Party and Public Organizations)*

November 6, 1943

Comrades, today the people of the Soviet Union are celebrating the twenty-sixth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

For the third time our country is marking the anniversary of her people's revolution in the conditions of the Patriotic War.

In October 1941, our Motherland lived through hard days. The enemy was approaching the capital and he encircled Leningrad from the land. Our troops were compelled to retreat. It demanded enormous efforts by the army and the exertion of all the forces of the people to check the enemy and deal him a serious blow before Moscow.

By October 1942, the danger to our Motherland had become even greater. The enemy stood then barely 120 kilometres (75 miles) from Moscow, had broken into Stalingrad and had entered the foothills of the Caucasus. But even in those grave days the army and the people did not lose heart, but steadfastly endured all trials. They found in themselves the strength to check the enemy and deal him an answering blow. True to the behests of the great Lenin, they defended the achievements of the October Revolution without sparing their strength or their lives. As is well known, these efforts of the army and the people were not in vain.

Soon after the October days of last year, our troops went over to the offensive and inflicted new, powerful blows on the Germans, first at Stalingrad, in the Caucasus and in the area of the middle reaches of the Don, and then, at the beginning of 1943, at Velikie Luki, before Leningrad and in the area of Rzhev and Vyazma. Since then the Red Army has never let the initiative out of its hands. Throughout the summer of this year its blows became harder and harder, its military mastery grew with every month. Since then our

troops have won big victories, and the Germans have suffered one defeat after another. However hard the enemy tried, he still failed to gain any success of the least importance on the Soviet-German front.

I. A YEAR MARKING A RADICAL TURN IN THE COURSE OF THE WAR

The past year, from the twenty-fifth to the twenty-sixth anniversaries of the October Revolution, marked a turn in the Patriotic War.

It was a turning-point above all because in this year the Red Army for the first time in the war succeeded in carrying through a big summer offensive against the German troops, and under the blows of our forces the German-fascist troops were compelled hurriedly to give up territory seized by them, not infrequently saving themselves from encirclement by flight and abandoning on the battlefield huge quantities of war material, stores of armaments and ammunition and large numbers of wounded officers and men.

Thus, the successes of our summer campaign in the second half of this year continued and crowned the successes achieved in our winter campaign at the beginning of this year.

Now, when the Red Army, developing the successes of the winter campaign, has inflicted a mighty blow on the German troops in the summer, it is possible to consider as finally dead and buried the fairy tale that the Red Army is incapable of conducting a successful offensive in summer. The past year has shown that the Red Army can advance in summer just as well as in winter.

In the course of the past year, as a result of these offensive operations, our troops succeeded in fighting their way forward from 500 kilometres (312 miles) in the central part of the front and up to 1,300 kilometres (812 miles) in the south (*applause*), liberating nearly 1,000,000 square kilometres (390,000 square miles) of territory, i.e., almost two-thirds of the Soviet soil temporarily seized by the enemy, while the enemy troops were being thrown back from Vladikavkaz to Kherson, from Elista to Krivoi Rog, from Stalingrad to Kiev, from Voronezh to Gomel, from Vyazma and Rzhev to the approaches of Orsha and Vitebsk.

Having no faith in the stability of their past successes on the Soviet-German front, the Germans already, over a long period, built powerful defence zones, particularly along the big rivers. But in this year's battles neither rivers nor powerful fortifications saved the

Germans. Our troops shattered the German defences, and in only three months of the summer of 1943 skilfully forced four important water barriers — the Northern Donets, Desna, Sozh and Dnieper. I do not even mention such barriers as the German defences in the area of the river Mius, west of Rostov, and the defences in the area of the river Molochnaya, near Melitopol. At present the Red Army is successfully battering the enemy on the other side of the Dnieper.

This year marked a turning-point also because the Red Army was able in a comparatively short time to grind down the most experienced veteran cadres of the German-fascist troops, and at the same time to steel and multiply its own cadres in successful offensive battles in the course of the year. In the battles on the Soviet-German front during the past year, the German-fascist army lost over 4,000,000 officers and men, including not less than 1,800,000 killed. Moreover, during this year the Germans lost over 14,000 planes, over 25,000 tanks and not less than 40,000 guns.

The German-fascist army today is not what it was at the outbreak of the war. Whereas at the outbreak of the war it had sufficient numbers of experienced cadres, now it has been diluted with newly baked, young, inexperienced officers whom the Germans are hurriedly throwing on to the front, as they have neither the necessary reserve of officers, nor the time to train them.

Altogether different is the picture presented today by the Red Army. Its cadres have grown and become steeled in successful offensive battles during the past year. The numbers of its fighting cadres are growing and will continue to grow, since the existence of the necessary officer reserve gives it time and opportunity to train young officer cadres and promote them to responsible posts.

It is characteristic that instead of the 240 divisions which faced our front last year, of which 179 divisions were German, this year the Red Army front is faced by 257 divisions, of which 207 divisions are German. The Germans, evidently, count on compensating for the lowered quality of their divisions by increasing their number. However, the defeat of the Germans during the past year shows that it is impossible to compensate for deterioration in the quality of divisions by increasing their number.

From the purely military point of view, the defeat of the German troops on our front by the close of this year was predetermined by two major events: the battle of Stalingrad and the battle of Kursk.

The battle of Stalingrad ended in the encirclement of a German army 300,000 strong, its rout and the capture of about one-third of

the encircled troops. To form an idea of the scale of the slaughter, unparalleled in history, which took place on the battlefields of Stalingrad, one must realize that after the battle of Stalingrad was over, 147,200 bodies of killed German officers and men and 46,700 bodies of killed Soviet officers and men were found and buried. Stalingrad signified the decline of the German-fascist army. After the Stalingrad slaughter, as is known, the Germans were unable to recover.

As for the battle of Kursk, it ended in the rout of the two main groups of the attacking German-fascist troops, and in our troops passing over to a counter-offensive, which subsequently turned into the powerful Red Army summer offensive. The battle of Kursk began with the German offensive against Kursk from the north and south. This was the last attempt of the Germans to carry out a big summer offensive and, in the event of its success, to recoup their losses. As is well known, the offensive ended in failure, the Red Army not only repulsed the German offensive, but itself passed over to the offensive and, by a series of consecutive blows, in the course of the summer period hurled the German-fascist troops back beyond the Dnieper.

While the battle of Stalingrad heralded the decline of the German-fascist army, the battle of Kursk confronted it with disaster. Finally, this year marked a turning-point because the successful Red Army offensive radically aggravated the economic and military political situation of fascist Germany, and confronted her with a profound crisis.

The Germans counted on carrying out in the summer of this year a successful offensive on the Soviet-German front, to redeem their losses and to bolster up their shaken prestige in Europe. But the Red Army upset the Germans' calculations, repulsed their offensive, itself launched an offensive and proceeded to drive the Germans westwards, thereby shattering the prestige of German arms.

The Germans counted on prolonging the war, started building defence lines and "walls," and proclaimed for all to hear that their new positions were impregnable. But here again the Red Army upset the calculations of the Germans, broke through their defence lines and "walls," and continued successfully to advance, giving them no time to drag out the war.

The Germans counted on rectifying the situation at the front by means of "total" mobilization. But here, too, events upset the Germans' calculations. The summer campaign has already eaten up two-thirds of the "totally" mobilized. However, it does not look as if this

circumstance has brought about any improvement in the position of the German-fascist army. It may prove necessary to proclaim yet another "total" mobilization, and there is no reason why a repetition of such a measure should not result in the "total" collapse of a certain state. (*Loud applause.*)

The Germans counted on retaining a firm hold on the Ukraine in order to avail themselves of Ukrainian agricultural produce for their army and population, and of Donbas coal for the factories and railways serving the German army. But here, too, they miscalculated. As a result of the successful Red Army offensive the Germans lost not only the Donbas coal, but also the richest grain-producing regions of the Ukraine, and there is no reason to suppose that they will not also lose the rest of the Ukraine in the very near future. (*Loud applause.*) Naturally, all these miscalculations could not but worsen, and in fact did radically worsen, the economic and military-political position of fascist Germany.

Fascist Germany is passing through a profound crisis. She is facing disaster.

II. NATIONWIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE FRONT

The successes of the Red Army would have been impossible without the support of the people, without the self-sacrificing work of the Soviet people in the factories and workshops, collieries and mines, transport and agriculture. In the hard conditions of war the Soviet people have proved able to ensure for their Army everything at all necessary and have incessantly perfected its fighting equipment. Never during the whole course of the war has the enemy been able to surpass our Army in quality of armaments. At the same time our industry has given the front ever-increasing quantities of war equipment.

The past year marked a turning-point not only in the trend of military operations but also in the work of our home front. We were no longer confronted with such tasks as the evacuation of enterprises to the east and the switching of industry to production of armaments. The Soviet state now has an efficient and rapidly expanding war economy. Thus all the efforts of the people could be concentrated on increase of production and further improvement of armaments, particularly tanks, planes, guns and self-propelled artillery. Here we achieved big successes. The Red Army, supported by the entire people, has received uninterrupted supplies of fighting

equipment, rained millions of bombs, mines and shells upon the enemy and brought thousands of tanks and planes into battle. One has every ground for saying that the self-sacrificing labour of the Soviet people in the rear will go down in history side by side with the Red Army's heroic struggle and the unparalleled feat of the people in defence of their Motherland. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Workers of the Soviet Union, who in the years of peaceful construction built up our highly developed, powerful socialist industry, have during the Patriotic War been working with intense zeal and energy to help the front, displaying true labour heroism.

Everyone knows that in the war against the USSR the Hitlerites had at their disposal not only the highly developed industry of Germany, but also the rather powerful industries of the vassal and occupied countries. Yet the Hitlerites have failed to maintain the quantitative superiority in military equipment which they had at the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union. If the former superiority of the enemy as regards number of tanks, planes, mortars and automatic rifles has now been liquidated, if our army today experiences no serious shortage of arms, ammunition and equipment, the credit for this is due, in the first place, to our working class. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

The peasants of the Soviet Union, who in the years of peaceful construction on the basis of the collective farm system transformed a backward agriculture into an advanced agriculture, have displayed during the Patriotic War a high degree of awareness of the common national interest unparalleled in the history of the countryside. By self-sacrificing labour to help the front, they have shown that the Soviet peasantry considers the present war against the Germans to be its own cause, a war for its own life and liberty.

It is well known that as a result of invasion by the fascist hordes, our country was temporarily deprived of the important agricultural districts of the Ukraine, the Don and the Kuban. And yet our collective and state farms supplied the army and the country with food without any serious interruptions. Of course, without the collective farm system, without the self-sacrificing labour of the men and women collective farmers, we could not have coped with this most difficult task. If in the third year of the war our army is not experiencing a shortage of food, and if the population is supplied with food and industry with raw materials, this is evidence of the strength and vitality of the collective farm system, of the patriotism of the collective farm peasantry. (*Prolonged applause.*)

A great part in helping the front has been played by our transport, primarily by railway transport, and also by river, sea and motor transport. As is known, transport is the vital means of connecting the rear and the front. One may produce large quantities of arms and ammunition, but if transport does not deliver them to the front on time they may remain useless freight as far as the front is concerned. It must be said that transport plays a decisive part in the timely delivery of arms and ammunition, food, clothing and so on to the front. If in spite of war-time difficulties and a shortage of fuel, we have been able to supply the front with everything necessary, the credit goes in the first place to our transport workers and office employees. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Nor does our intelligentsia lag behind the working class and peasantry in their aid to the front. The Soviet intelligentsia is working with devotion for the defence of our country, continually improving the Red Army's armaments and the technology and organization of production. It helps the workers and collective farmers to improve industry and agriculture, advances Soviet science and culture in the conditions of war.

This is to the honour of our intelligentsia. (*Prolonged applause.*)

All the peoples of the Soviet Union have risen as one in defence of their Motherland, rightly regarding the present Patriotic War as the common cause of all working people irrespective of nationality or religion. By now the Hitlerite politicians themselves see how hopelessly stupid were their calculations on discord and conflict among the peoples of the Soviet Union. The friendship of the peoples of our country has withstood all the hardship and trials of the war and has become tempered still further in the common struggle of all Soviet people against the fascist invaders.

Herein lies the source of the strength of the Soviet Union. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

As in the years of peaceful construction, so in the days of war, the leading and guiding force of the Soviet people has been the Party of Lenin, the Party of the Bolsheviks. No other Party has ever enjoyed, or enjoys, such prestige among the masses of the people as our Bolshevik Party. And this is natural. Under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, the workers, peasants and intelligentsia of our country have won their freedom and built a socialist society. In the Patriotic War the Party has stood before us as the inspirer and organizer of the nationwide struggle against the fascist invaders. The organizational work of the Party has united and directed all the ef-

forts of the Soviet people towards the common goal, subordinating all our forces and means to the cause of defeating the enemy. During the war, the Party has increased its kinship with the people, has established still closer links with the wide masses of the working people.

Herein lies the source of the strength of our state. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

The present war has forcefully confirmed the well-known statement of Lenin to the effect that war is an all-round test of a nation's material and spiritual forces. The history of war teaches that only those states withstood this test which proved stronger than their adversaries as regards the development and organization of their economy, as regards the experience, skill and fighting spirit of their troops, as regards the fortitude and unity of the people throughout the whole course of the war. Ours is just such a state.

The Soviet state was never so stable and unshakable as now, in the third year of the Patriotic War. The lessons of the war show that the Soviet system is not only the best form of organizing the economic and cultural development of the country in the years of peaceful construction, but also the best form of mobilizing all the forces of the people for resistance to the enemy in war time. Soviet power, established 26 years ago, has transformed our country within a short historical period into an impregnable fortress. The Red Army has the most stable and reliable rear of all the armies in the world.

Herein lies the source of the strength of the Soviet Union. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

There is no doubt that the Soviet state will emerge from the war even stronger and even more consolidated. The German invaders are ruining and devastating our land in an endeavour to undermine the power of our state. To an even greater extent than before, the offensive of the Red Army has exposed the barbarous, bandit character of the Hitlerite army. In districts seized by them, the Germans have exterminated hundreds of thousands of our peaceful civilians. Like the medieval barbarians of Attila's hordes, the German fiends trample down our fields, burn down our towns and villages, demolish our industrial enterprises and cultural institutions. The Germans' crimes are evidence of the weakness of the fascist invaders, for only usurpers who themselves do not believe in their victory would behave in this way. And the more hopeless the position of the Hitlerites becomes, the more viciously do they rage in their atrocities and plunder. Our people will not forgive the German fiends for these crimes.

We shall make the German criminals answer for all their misdeeds. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

In the areas where the fascist cut-throats have temporarily held sway, we shall have to restore demolished towns and villages, industry, transport, agricultural and cultural institutions, and create normal living conditions for the Soviet people delivered from fascist slavery. Work is already in full swing for the restoration of economy and culture in areas liberated from the enemy. But this is only the beginning. We must completely eliminate the consequences of the rule of the Germans in areas liberated from German occupation. This is a great, national task. We can and must cope with this difficult task within a short time.

III. CONSOLIDATION OF THE ANTI-HITLERITE COALITION AND DISINTEGRATION OF THE FASCIST BLOC

The past year has marked a turning-point not only in the Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, but also in the whole world war.

The changes which have taken place during this year in the military and international situation have been to the advantage of the USSR and the Allied countries friendly to it and detrimental to Germany and her accomplices in the plundering of Europe.

The victories of the Red Army have had results and consequences far beyond the limits of the Soviet-German front. They have changed the whole further course of the world war and acquired great international significance. The victory of the Allied countries over the common enemy has come nearer, while relations among the Allies and the fighting partnership of their armies, far from weakening, have, contrary to the expectations of the enemy, become stronger and more consolidated. The historic decisions of the Moscow Conference of representatives of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States of America, published recently in the press, are eloquent testimony of this. Now the united countries are filled with determination to strike joint blows against the enemy which will result in final victory over him.

This year the Red Army's blows at the German-fascist troops were supported by the military operations of our Allies in North Africa, in the Mediterranean Basin and in Southern Italy. At the same time the Allies subjected and are still subjecting important industrial

centres of Germany to heavy air bombing and thus considerably weakening the enemy's military power. If we add to all this the fact that the Allies are regularly supplying us with various armaments and raw materials, it can be said without exaggeration that, by doing all this, they have considerably facilitated the successes of our summer campaign. Of course, the present operations of the Allied armies in south Europe cannot yet be regarded as a second front. But still it is something in the nature of a second front. Obviously, the opening of a real second front in Europe, which is not far off, would considerably hasten victory over Hitlerite Germany and still further consolidate the comradeship-in-arms of the Allied countries.

Thus, the events of the past year show that the anti-Hitlerite coalition is a firm union of the peoples and rests on a solid foundation. By now it is obvious to everybody that, by unleashing the present war, the Hitlerite clique has led Germany and her satellites into a hopeless impasse. The defeats of the fascist troops on the Soviet-German front and the blows of our Allies at the Italy-German troops have shaken the whole edifice of the fascist bloc, and it is now crumbling before our very eyes. Italy has irrevocably dropped out of the Hitlerite coalition. Mussolini can change nothing, for he is in actual fact a prisoner of the Germans. Next comes the turn of the other participants of the coalition. Finland, Hungary, Rumania and the other vassals of Hitler, discouraged by Germany's military defeats, have now finally lost faith that the outcome of the war will be favourable to them and are anxious to find a way out of the quagmire into which Hitler has dragged them. Now that the time has come to answer for their plundering, Hitler-Germany's accomplices in plunder, but recently so obedient to their master, are now in search of a favourable moment to creep away unnoticed from the robber band. (*Laughter.*)

When they entered the war, the partners in the Hitlerite bloc counted on a rapid victory. Already beforehand they had decided on who would receive what — who would get the puddings and pies, who would get the bruises and black eyes. Of course they intended the bruises and black eyes for their adversaries and the puddings and pies for themselves. But now it is clear that Germany and her flunkies will get no puddings and pies, but will have to share the bruises and black eyes. (*Laughter and applause.*)

Foreseeing this unattractive prospect, Hitler's accomplices are now racking their brains to find a way out of the war with as few bruises and black eyes as possible. (*Laughter.*)

Italy's example shows Hitler's vassals that the longer they postpone their inevitable break with the Germans and allow them to lord it in their states, the greater the devastation in store for their countries, the greater the sufferings their peoples will have to endure. Italy's example also shows that Hitlerite Germany has not the least intention of defending her vassal countries, but intends to convert them into a scene of devastating war, if only she can stave off the hour of her own defeat.

The cause of German fascism is lost, and the sanguinary "New Order" it has established is approaching collapse. In the occupied countries of Europe an outburst of the people's wrath against the fascist enslavers is developing. Germany's former prestige in the countries of her allies and in the neutral countries is lost beyond recovery; and her economic and political ties with neutral states have been undermined.

The time is long past when the Hitlerite clique made a great noise about the Germans winning world domination. Now as is known, the Germans have other matters than world domination to worry about. They have to think about keeping body and soul together. (*Laughter and applause.*)

Thus, the course of the war has shown that the alliance of the fascist states did not and does not rest on a reliable foundation. The Hitlerite coalition was formed on the basis of the predatory, rapacious ambitions of its members. As long as the Hitlerites were gaining military successes, the fascist coalition appeared to be a stable association. But the very first defeats of the fascist troops resulted in the actual disintegration of the bandit bloc.

Hitlerite Germany and her vassals stand on the verge of catastrophe. The victory of the Allied countries over Hitlerite Germany will put on the agenda the important questions of organizing and rebuilding the state, economic and cultural life of the European peoples. The policy of our government on these questions remains constant. Together with our Allies, we must:

(1) Liberate the peoples of Europe from the fascist invaders and help to rebuild their national states, dismembered by the fascist enslavers — the peoples of France, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Greece and other states now under the German yoke, must once more become free and independent;

(2) Grant the liberated peoples of Europe the full right and freedom to determine their own form of government;

(3) Adopt measures to ensure that all the fascist criminals re-

sponsible for the present war and the sufferings of the people should bear stern punishment and retribution for all the crimes perpetrated by them no matter in what country they may hide;

(4) Establish such an order in Europe as will completely exclude the possibility of fresh aggression on the part of Germany;

(5) Establish lasting economic, political and cultural collaboration among the peoples of Europe, based on mutual confidence and mutual assistance for the purpose of restoring economic and cultural life destroyed by the Germans.

* * *

The Red Army and the Soviet people during the past year have achieved great successes in the struggle against the German invaders. We have achieved a radical turning-point in the war in favour of our country, and the war is now proceeding to its final climax. But it is not the habit of Soviet people to rest satisfied with their achievements, to exult over their successes. Victory may elude us if complacency appears in our ranks. Victory cannot be won without struggle and effort. It is achieved in fighting. Victory is now near, but to win it there must be a fresh strenuous effort, self-sacrificing work throughout the rear and skilful and resolute actions of the Red Army at the front. It would be a crime against the Motherland, against the Soviet people who have fallen temporarily under the fascist yoke, against the peoples of Europe, languishing under German oppression, if we failed to use every opportunity of hastening the enemy's defeat. The enemy must not be allowed any respite. That is why we must exert all our strength to finish off the enemy.

The Soviet people and the Red Army clearly see the difficulties of the forthcoming struggle. But today it is already clear that the day of our victory is approaching. The war has entered the stage when it is a question of completely expelling the invaders from Soviet soil and liquidating the fascist "New Order in Europe." The time is not far off when we shall completely expel the enemy from the Ukraine and Byelorussia, from the Leningrad and Kalinin Regions, and liberate from the German invaders the peoples of the Crimea, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldavia and the Karelo-Finnish Republic.

Comrades!

For the victory of the Anglo-Soviet-American fighting alliance!
(*Applause.*)

For the liberation of the peoples of Europe from the fascist yoke!

(Applause.)

For the complete expulsion of the German fiends from our soil!

(Applause.)

Long live our Red Army! *(Applause.)*

Long live our navy! *(Applause.)*

Long live our gallant men and women guerillas! *(Applause.)*

Long live our great Motherland! *(Applause.)*

Death to the German invaders! *(Loud and prolonged applause. All stand.)*

VICTORY SPEECH

(Broadcast from Moscow at 20.00 hours (Moscow time))

May 9, 1945

Comrades! Men and women compatriots!

The great day of victory over Germany has come. Fascist Germany, forced to her knees by the Red Army and the troops of our Allies, has acknowledged herself defeated and declared unconditional surrender.

On May 7 the preliminary protocol on surrender was signed in the city of Rheims. On May 8 representatives of the German High Command, in the presence of representatives of the Supreme Command of the Allied troops and the Supreme Command of the Soviet Troops, signed in Berlin the final act of surrender, the execution of which began at 24.00 hours on May 8.

Being aware of the wolfish habits of the German ringleaders, who regard treaties and agreements as empty scraps of paper, we have no reason to trust their words. However, this morning, in pursuance of the act of surrender, the German troops began to lay down their arms and surrender to our troops en masse. This is no longer an empty scrap of paper. This is actual surrender of Germany's armed forces. True, one group of German troops in the area of Czechoslovakia is still evading surrender. But I trust that the Red Army will be able to bring it to its senses.

Now we can state with full justification that the historic day of the final defeat of Germany, the day of the great victory of our people over German imperialism has come.

The great sacrifices we made in the name of the freedom and independence of our Motherland, the incalculable privations and sufferings experienced by our people in the course of the war, the intense work in the rear and at the front, placed on the altar of the Motherland, have not been in vain, and have been crowned by complete victory over the enemy. The age-long struggle of the Slav peoples for their existence and their independence has ended in victory over the German invaders and German tyranny.

Henceforth the great banner of the freedom of the peoples and peace among peoples will fly over Europe.

Three years ago Hitler declared for all to hear that his aims included the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the wresting

from it of the Caucasus, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic lands and other areas. He declared bluntly: "We will destroy Russia so that she will never be able to rise again." This was three years ago. However, Hitler's crazy ideas were not fated to come true — the progress of the war scattered them to the winds. In actual fact the direct opposite of the Hitlerites' ravings has taken place. Germany is utterly defeated. The German troops are surrendering. The Soviet Union is celebrating Victory, although it does not intend either to dismember or to destroy Germany.

Comrades! The Great Patriotic War has ended in our complete victory. The period of war in Europe is over. The period of peaceful development has begun.

I congratulate you upon victory, my dear men and women compatriots!

Glory to our heroic Red Army, which upheld the independence of our Motherland and won victory over the enemy!

Glory to our great people, the people victorious!

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle against the enemy and gave their lives for the freedom and happiness of our people!

INTERVIEW WITH “PRAVDA” CONCERNING MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL’S SPEECH AT FULTON

March 13, 1946

The other day a “Pravda” correspondent asked Comrade Stalin to clarify a number of questions connected with Mr. Churchill’s speech. Below are given Comrade Stalin’s replies to the questions put by the correspondent.

Question: How do you appraise the latest speech Mr. Churchill delivered in the United States of America?

Answer: I appraise it as a dangerous act calculated to sow the seeds of discord between the Allied States and hamper their cooperation.

Question: Can Mr. Churchill’s speech be regarded as harmful to the cause of peace and security?

Answer: Unquestionably, yes. As a matter of fact, Mr. Churchill’s position is now that of the incendiaries of war. And Mr. Churchill is not alone in this — he has friends not only in England but in the United States of America as well.

It should be noted that in this respect Mr. Churchill and his friends strikingly resemble Hitler and his friends. Hitler set out to unleash war by proclaiming the race theory, declaring that the German-speaking people constituted a superior nation. Mr. Churchill sets out to unleash war also with a race theory, by asserting that the English-speaking nations are superior nations called upon to decide the destinies of the entire world. The German race theory led Hitler and his friends to the conclusion that the Germans as the only superior nation must dominate other nations. The English race theory leads Mr. Churchill and his friends to the conclusion that the English-speaking nations, as the only superior nations, must dominate the other nations of the world.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Churchill and his friends in England and the USA are presenting something in the nature of an ultimatum to nations which do not speak English: recognize our domination voluntarily, and then everything will be in order — otherwise war is inevitable.

But the nations shed their blood during five years of fierce war

for the sake of the freedom and independence of their countries, and not for the sake of replacing the domination of the Hitlers by the domination of the Churchills. Therefore, it is quite probable that the nations which do not speak English and at the same time constitute the vast majority of the world's population, will not agree to submit to the new slavery.

Mr. Churchill's tragedy is that he, as an inveterate Tory, does not understand this simple and obvious truth.

Undoubtedly, Mr. Churchill's line is that of war, a call to war against the USSR. It is also clear that this line of Mr. Churchill's is incompatible with the existing treaty of alliance between Britain and the USSR. True, in order to confuse the readers, Mr. Churchill states in passing that the term of the Soviet-British treaty of mutual assistance and cooperation could perfectly well be extended to fifty years. But how can such a statement by Mr. Churchill be reconciled with his line of war against the USSR, with his preaching of war against the USSR? Clearly these things cannot be reconciled by any means. And if Mr. Churchill, who is calling for war against the Soviet Union, at the same time believes it possible to extend the term of the Anglo-Soviet treaty to fifty years, that means that he regards this treaty as a mere scrap of paper which he needs only to cover up and camouflage his anti-Soviet line. Therefore we cannot treat seriously the hypocritical statement of Mr. Churchill's friends in England concerning the extension of the term of the Soviet-British treaty to fifty years or more. The extension of the term of the treaty is meaningless if one of the parties violates the treaty and turns it into a mere scam of paper.

Question: How do you appraise that part of Mr. Churchill's speech in which he attacks the democratic systems in the European states neighbouring with us and in which he criticizes the good-neighbourly relations established between these states and the Soviet Union?

Answer: This part of Mr. Churchill's speech represents a mixture of elements of slander and with elements of rudeness and tactlessness.

Mr. Churchill asserts that "Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia — all these famous cities and populations around them lie within the Soviet sphere and all are subject in one form or another not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow." Mr. Churchill describes all this as boundless "expansionist tendencies" of the

Soviet Union.

No special effort is necessary to prove that in this case Mr. Churchill is rudely and shamelessly slandering both Moscow and the above-mentioned states neighbouring with the USSR.

Firstly, it is utterly absurd to speak of exclusive control of the USSR in Vienna and Berlin, where there are Allied Control Councils composed of representatives of the four states and where the USSR has only one-fourth of the votes. It does happen that some people cannot help slandering, but even then there should be a limit.

Secondly, one must not forget the following fact. The Germans invaded the USSR through Finland, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary. The Germans were able to effect their invasion by way of these countries because at that time governments hostile to the Soviet Union existed in these countries. Owing to the German invasion, the Soviet Union irrevocably lost in battles with the Germans and also as a result of German occupation and the driving off of Soviet people to German penal servitude, some 7,000,000 persons. In other words the Soviet Union lost several times more people than Britain and the United States of America taken together. Possibly some quarters are inclined to consign to oblivion these colossal sacrifices of the Soviet people which secured the liberation of Europe from the Hitlerite yoke. But the Soviet Union cannot forget them. The question arises, what can there be surprising about the fact that the Soviet Union, desiring to insure its security in the future, seeks to achieve a situation when those countries will have governments maintaining a friendly attitude towards the Soviet Union? How can anyone who has not gone mad describe these peaceful aspirations of the Soviet Union as expansionist tendencies of our state?

Mr. Churchill further states that “the Russian-dominated Polish government has been encouraged to make enormous wrongful inroads upon Germany.”

Here every word is rude and offensive slander. Present-day democratic Poland is guided by outstanding men. They have proved by deeds that they are capable of defending the interests and dignity of their homeland in a manner of which their predecessors were not capable. What grounds has Mr. Churchill to assert that the leaders of present-day Poland can permit the “domination” of representatives of any foreign states whatever in their country? Is it not because Mr. Churchill intends to sow the seeds of discord in the relations between Poland and the Soviet Union that he slanders “the Russians” here?...

Mr. Churchill is displeased with the fact that Poland has effected a turn in her policy towards friendship and alliance with the USSR. There was a time when elements of conflict and contradiction prevailed in the relations between Poland and the USSR. That furnished statesmen of Mr. Churchill's kind with an opportunity to play on these contradictions, to lay their hands on Poland under the guise of protecting her from the Russians, to intimidate Russia with the spectre of war between her and Poland, and to reserve the position of arbitrators for themselves. But that time is past, for the enmity between Poland and Russia has yielded place to friendship between them, while Poland, present-day democratic Poland, does not want to be tossed around like a ball by foreigners any longer. It seems to me that it is this very circumstance that irritates Mr. Churchill and impels him to rude, tactless sallies against Poland. It is no joke: he is not allowed to play his game at someone else's expense...

As regards Mr. Churchill's attack on the Soviet Union in connection with Poland's extending her western frontier into Polish territories seized by the Germans in the past, here, it seems to me, he is obviously sharpening. It is well known that the decision on Poland's western frontier was adopted at the Berlin Conference of the Three Powers on the basis of Poland's demands. The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated that it regards Poland's demands correct and just. It is quite probable that Mr. Churchill is displeased with that decision. But why does Mr. Churchill, while sparing no arrows against the position of the Russians in this matter, conceal from his readers the fact that the decision was adopted at the Berlin Conference unanimously, that not the Russians alone but the British and the Americans too voted for this decision? Why did Mr. Churchill need to mislead people?

Mr. Churchill further asserts that "the communist parties, which were previously very small in all these eastern states of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers, and seek everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. Police governments prevail in nearly every case, and thus far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is no true democracy."

It is well known that in Britain the state is now governed by one party, the Labour Party, while the opposition parties are devoid of the right to participate in the government of Britain. This is what Mr. Churchill calls true democracy. Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Hungary are governed by blocs of several parties — from four to six parties — while the opposition, if it is more or less

loyal, is secured the right of participating in the government. That is what Mr. Churchill calls totalitarianism, tyranny, police rule. Why and on what grounds — do not expect an answer from Mr. Churchill. Mr. Churchill does not understand in what a ridiculous position he places himself by his vociferous speeches about totalitarianism, tyranny, police rule.

Mr. Churchill would like Poland to be governed by Sosnkowski and Anders; Yugoslavia by Mihailović and Pavelić; Romania by Prince Stirbei and Radescu; Hungary and Austria by some king of the house of Hapsburg, and so forth. Mr. Churchill wants to convince us that these gentlemen from the fascist backyard are capable of securing “true democracy.” Such is Mr. Churchill’s “democracy.”

Mr. Churchill is wandering about the truth when he speaks of the growth of the influence of the communist parties in Eastern Europe. It should be noted, however, that he is not quite accurate. The influence of the communist parties has grown not only in Eastern Europe but in almost all the countries of Europe where fascism ruled before (Italy, Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Finland), or where German, Italian or Hungarian occupation took place (France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, the Soviet Union and so forth).

The growth of the influence of the communists cannot be regarded as fortuitous. It is a perfectly legitimate phenomenon. The influence of the communists has grown because in the hard years of fascist domination in Europe, the communists proved reliable, courageous, self-sacrificing fighters against the fascist regime, for the freedom of the peoples. Mr. Churchill sometimes mentions in his speeches “the simple people of cottages,” patting them on the back in a lordly manner and posing as their friend. But these people are not so simple as they may seem at first glance. They, these “simple people,” have their own views, their own policy, and they are able to stand up for themselves. It is they, the millions of these “simple people,” who voted down Mr. Churchill and his party in England by casting their votes for the Labourites. It is they, the millions of these “simple people,” who isolated the reactionaries in Europe, the adherents of collaboration with fascism, and gave preference to the left democratic parties. It is they, the millions of these “simple people,” who tested the communists in the fire of struggle and resistance to fascism and decided that the communists fully deserved the people’s trust. That is how the influence of the communists has grown in Europe. Such is the law of historical development.

Naturally, Mr. Churchill does not like such a course of development and he sounds the alarm, appealing to force. But he similarly did not like the birth of the Soviet regime in Russia after the First World War. Then, too, he sounded the alarm and organized the military campaign of "14 states" against Russia, setting himself the goal of turning the wheel of history back. But history proved stronger than Churchillian intervention, and Mr. Churchill's quixotic ways brought about his utter defeat. I do not know whether Mr. Churchill and his friends will succeed in organizing after the Second World War a new military campaign against "Eastern Europe." But should they succeed — which is hardly probable, since millions of "simple people" are guarding the cause of peace — one can confidently say that they will be beaten just as they were beaten in the past, twenty-six years ago.

DISCUSSION IN THE MEETING WITH THE CREATIVE INTELLECTUALS

n, 1946

Stalin: What do you want to tell me Comrade Fadeyev?

*Fadeyev*¹²⁶: Comrade Stalin, we have come to you for advice. Many think that our literature and art have reached a dead end and we do not know how to develop it further. Today in every cinema hall, films are being shown where the hero is endlessly fighting with the enemy and where human blood is flowing like a river. Everywhere scarcity and difficulties are being shown. People are tired of struggle and blood. We want your advice on how to project a different life in our works: the future life, where there will be no blood nor force, where all the innumerable difficulties which our country is facing will be absent. In one word, the time has come to narrate a happy, cloudless future.

Stalin: The main thing is missing from your reasoning. The Marxist-Leninist analysis of the task is missing. And this is what life is bringing before literary workers and artists. Once Peter I opened the window to Europe. But after 1917, the imperialists boarded it up for a long time out of the fear of socialism spreading in their countries. Before the Great Patriotic War through radio, films, newspapers and journals, we were presented before the world as northern barbarians who had a blood dripping knife in our teeth. This is how they painted the dictatorship of the proletariat. Our people were shown dressed in threadbare shirts, drinking vodka from the samovar. All of a sudden, this backward Russia, these primitive cave dwellers as represented by the world bourgeoisie, defeated two great world powers — the fascists in Germany and the imperialists in Japan — before whom the whole world was trembling in fear. Today the world wants to know — who are these people who accomplished such an heroic deed and saved mankind? Mankind was saved by simple Soviet people, who without any fuss under the most difficult situation achieved their industrialization and collectivization. They fortified their defence system and at the cost of their own lives, under the leadership of the communists, and destroyed the enemy. In only the first six months of the war more than 500 thousand communists died on the front line and in total more than three million fell. They were the best of us — noble, pure, dedicated and selfless

fighters for socialism, for the happiness of our people. Now we miss them. If they were alive many of our problems would have been solved. The main task of our creative Soviet intellectuals today is to reflect in their works, all the aspects of this simple Soviet man, to reveal and show the best traits of his character. Today this is the general line for the development of literature and art.

Why is the literary hero Pavel Korchagin in Nikolai Ostrovski's "How the Steel was Tempered" dear to us?

This is so because of his limitless dedication to the revolution, to the people, to socialism and his selflessness.

The artistic image of the great pilot of our time, Valeri Chkalova, in film greatly contributed to the training of thousands of fearless Soviet falcons — fighters with undying fame during the Great Patriotic War. Colonel Sergei Lukonim — tankist from the film "Young Man From Our City" — is the distinctive hero of thousands of tankists.

It is necessary to continue with this tradition. Create such literary heroes, fighters for communism with whom the Soviet people would equate to and whom they would imitate. I have a list of questions, which I think would be interesting for the Soviet creative intellectuals. If there is no objection I will answer them.

Shouts from the hall: We request you to answer them please.

Question: What, according to you, are the main shortcomings in the work of modern Soviet writers, dramatists and film directors.

Stalin: Unfortunately, they are extremely substantial. In recent times a dangerous tendency is apparently discerned in a number of literary works emanating under the pernicious influence of the decaying West and brought into life by the subversive activity of foreign intelligence. Frequently in the pages of Soviet literary journals, works are found where the Soviet people, the builders of communism, are shown in a pathetic and ludicrous form. The positive hero is derided and inferiority before all things foreign, and cosmopolitanism, so characteristic of our political leftovers, is applauded. In the theatre repertoire Soviet plays are being pushed aside in favour of disgraceful plays of foreign bourgeois authors.

In films petty themes dominate and they distort the heroic history of the valiant Russian people.

Question: How dangerous ideologically are the *avantgarde* tendencies in music and the *abstract school* in art and sculpture?

Stalin: Today, under the guise of innovation, formalism and abstraction are being induced in Soviet music and paintings. Once in a

while a question can be heard such as: "Is it necessary for such great people as Bolsheviks and Leninists to be engaged in such petty things and spend time criticizing abstract paintings and formalism? Let the psychiatrists deal with it."

In these types of questions lie a misunderstanding of the role of ideological sabotage against our country and especially against our youth. It is with their help that attempts are being made against socialist realism in art and literature. It is impossible to do so openly. In these so-called abstract paintings, there is no real face of the people, whom our people would have liked to imitate in the fight for their happiness, for communism and for the path on which they want to progress. This portrayal is substituted by an abstract mysticism clouding the issue of socialist class struggle against capitalism. During the war how many people came to the statue of Minin and Pozharsky on the Red Square to instill in us the feelings of victory? To what can a bust of twisted iron representing "innovation" as an art inspire us? To what can an abstract painting inspire?

This is the reason why modern American financial magnates are propagating modernism, paying for this type of work huge royalties which the great masters of realism may not ever see.

There is an underlying idea of class struggle in the so-called western popular music, in the so-called formalist tendencies. This music, if one can call it such, is created from the sect of "shakers" — dance that induces people to ecstasy, trance and makes them into wild animals ready for any wild action. This type of music is created with the help of psychiatrists so as to influence the brain and psychology of the people. This is one type of musical narcotics under whose influence a person cannot think of fresh ideas and are turned into a herd. It is useless to invite such people for revolution, for building communism. As you see music can also fight.

In 1944, I had an opportunity to read an instruction written by an officer of the British intelligence, with the title: "How to Use Formalist Music to Corrupt the Enemy Army."

Question: What concretely are the subversive activities of the agents of foreign intelligence in the sphere of art and literature?

Stalin: While talking about the future development of Soviet art and literature it must be taken into consideration that it is developing in a condition of an unprecedented discreet war, a war that has been unleashed on us and our art and literature by the world imperialist circles. The job of foreign agents in our country is to penetrate Soviet organizations dealing with culture, to capture the editorships

of major newspapers and journals, to decisively influence the repertoire of theatres and movies and in the publication of fiction and poetry, to stop by any means the publication of revolutionary works which awaken patriotism and lead the Soviet people towards creating communism. They support and publish works where the failure of communism is preached. They are ecstatic in their support and propaganda of the capitalist method of production and the bourgeois lifestyle.

At the same time foreign agents are asked to popularize the feelings of pessimism, decadence and demoralization in art and literature.

One popular American senator said, "If we were able to show Bolshevik Russia our horror films it most probably would be able to destroy communist construction." Not for nothing did Lev Tolstoi say that art and literature is a strong form of indoctrination.

We must seriously ponder over who and what is inspiring us today in literature and art so that we can put an end to ideological subversion. We must understand and accept that culture is one of the integral parts of social ideology, of class and is used for safeguarding the interest of the ruling class. For us it is to safeguard the interest of the working class, of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

There is no art for art's sake. There are no, and cannot be, "free" artists, writers, poets, dramatists, directors and journalists, standing above the society. Nobody needs them. Such people don't and can't exist.

For those who don't want to serve the Soviet people as a result of old traditions of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, or are antagonistic towards the power of the working class which is dedicated to serving the Soviet people, we give the permission to leave the country and stay abroad. Let them be convinced of the meaning of "free creativity" in the notorious bourgeois society, where everything can be brought and sold, and the creative intelligentsia is completely dependent on the monetary support of the financial magnates in their creative endeavours.

Unfortunately, friends, because of a lack of time we must finish our discussion.

I hope that to some extent I have answered your questions. I think that the position of the CC of the CPSU(B) and that of the Soviet government on the question of the further development of Soviet literature is clear to all.

LETTER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA

May 4, 1948

Your answer and the announcement of the decision of the Plenum of the CC of the CPY of April 13, 1948, signed by Comrades Tito and Kardelj, have been received.

Unfortunately, these documents, and especially the document signed by Tito and Kardelj, do not improve on the earlier Yugoslav documents; on the contrary, they further complicate matters and sharpen the conflict.

Our attention is drawn to the tone of the documents, which can only be described as exaggeratedly ambitious. In the documents one does not see any desire to establish the truth, honestly to admit errors, and to recognize the necessity of eliminating those errors. The Yugoslav comrades do not accept criticism in a Marxist manner, but in a bourgeois manner, i.e. they regard it as an insult to the prestige of the CC of the CPY and as undermining the ambitions of the Yugoslav leaders.

So in order to extricate themselves from the difficult situation for which they are themselves to blame, the Yugoslav leaders are using a "new" method, a method of complete denial of their errors regardless of their obvious existence. The facts and the documents mentioned in the letter of the CC of the CPSU(B) of March 27, 1948 are denied. Comrades Tito and Kardelj, it seems, do not understand that this childish method of groundless denial of facts and documents can never be convincing, but merely laughable.

1. THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS FROM YUGOSLAVIA

In its letter of March 27, the CC of the CPSU(B) stated the reasons for the withdrawal of the Soviet military advisers, and said that the information of the CC of the CPSU(B) was based on the complaints of these advisers of the unfriendly attitude of the responsible Yugoslav officials towards the Soviet army and its representatives in Yugoslavia. Comrades Tito and Kardelj denounce these complaints

as unsubstantiated. Why should the CC of the CPSU(B) believe the unfounded statements of Tito and Kardelj rather than the numerous complaints of the Soviet military advisers? On what grounds? The USSR has its military advisers in almost all the countries of people's democracy. We must emphasize that until now we have had no complaints from our advisers in these countries. This explains the fact that we have had no misunderstandings in these countries arising from the work of the Soviet military advisers. Complaints and misunderstandings, in this field, exist only in Yugoslavia. Is it not clear that this can be explained only by the special unfriendly atmosphere which has been created in Yugoslavia around these military advisers?

Comrades Tito and Kardelj refer to the large expenses in connection with the salaries of the Soviet military advisers, emphasizing that the Soviet generals receive three to four times as much, in dinars, as Yugoslav generals, and that such conditions may give rise to discontent on the part of Yugoslav military personnel. But the Yugoslav generals, apart from drawing salaries, are provided with apartments, servants, food, etc. Secondly, the pay of the Soviet generals in Yugoslavia corresponds to the pay of Soviet generals in the USSR. It is understandable that the Soviet government could not consider reducing the salaries of Soviet generals who are in Yugoslavia on official duty.

Perhaps the expense of the Soviet generals was too great a burden for the Yugoslav budget. In that case the Yugoslav government should have approached the Soviet government and proposed that it take over part of the expenses. There is no doubt that the Soviet government would have done this. However, the Yugoslavs took another course; instead of solving this question in an amicable manner, they began to abuse our military advisers, to call them loafers, and to discredit the Soviet army. Only after a hostile atmosphere had been created around the Soviet military advisers did the Yugoslav government approach the Soviet government. It is understandable that the Soviet government could not accept this situation.

2. CONCERNING THE SOVIET CIVILIAN SPECIALISTS IN YUGOSLAVIA

In its letter of March 27, the CC of the CPSU(B) stated the reasons for the withdrawal of the Soviet civilian specialists from Yugoslavia. In the given case the CC of the CPSU(B) relied on the com-

plaints of the civilian specialists and on the statements of the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia. From these statements it can be seen that the Soviet civilian specialists, as well as the representative of the CPSU(B) in the Cominform, Comrade Yudin, were placed under the supervision of the UDB.¹²⁷

Comrades Tito and Kardelj in their letter deny the truth of these complaints and reports, stating that the UDB does not supervise Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia. But why should the CC of the CPSU(B) believe the unfounded assertions of Comrades Tito and Kardelj and not the complaints of Soviet men, among them Comrade Yudin?

The Soviet government has many of its civilian specialists in all the countries of people's democracy but it does not receive any complaints from them and there are no disagreements with the governments of these countries. Why have these disagreements and conflicts arisen only in Yugoslavia? Is it not because the Yugoslav government has created a special unfriendly atmosphere around the Soviet officials in Yugoslavia, among them Comrade Yudin himself?

It is understandable that the Soviet government could not tolerate such a situation and was forced to withdraw its civilian specialists from Yugoslavia.

3. REGARDING VELEBIT AND OTHER SPIES IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF YUGOSLAVIA

It is not true, as Tito and Kardelj say, that Comrades Kardelj and Djilas, on the occasion of a meeting with Molotov, confined their doubts regarding Velebit to the remark "that all was not clear about Velebit" to them. Actually, in their meeting with Molotov there was talk that Velebit was suspected of spying for England. It was very strange that Tito and Kardelj identified the removal of Velebit from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with his ruin. Why could not Velebit be removed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs without being ruined?

Also strange was the statement by Tito and Kardelj of the reasons for leaving Velebit in his position of First Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs; it appears that Velebit was not removed from his position because he was under supervision. Would it not be better to remove Velebit just because he was under supervision? Why so much consideration for an English spy, who at the same time is so

uncompromisingly hostile towards the Soviet Union?

However, Velebit is not the only spy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Soviet representatives have many times told the Yugoslav leaders that the Yugoslav Ambassador in London, Ljubo Leontić, is an English spy. It is not known why this old and trusted English spy remains in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Soviet government is aware that besides Leontić three other members of the Yugoslav Embassy in London, whose names are not yet disclosed, are in the English Intelligence Service. The Soviet government makes this statement with full responsibility. It is also hard to understand why the United States Ambassador in Belgrade behaves as if he owns the place and why his "intelligence agents," whose number is increasing, move about freely, or why the friends and relations of the executioner of the Yugoslav people, Nedić,¹²⁸ so easily obtain positions in the state and Party apparatus in Yugoslavia.

It is clear that since the Yugoslav government persistently refuses to purge its Ministry of Foreign Affairs of spies, the Soviet government is forced to refrain from open correspondence with the Yugoslav government through the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

4. CONCERNING THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE SOVIET STATE

In their letter of April 13, 1948, Tito and Kardelj wrote: "We consider that he (the Soviet Ambassador), as an ambassador, has no right to ask anyone for information about the work of our Party. That is not his business."

We feel that this statement by Tito and Kardelj is essentially incorrect and anti-Soviet. They identify the Soviet Ambassador, a responsible communist who represents the communist government of the USSR, with an ordinary bourgeois ambassador, a simple official of a bourgeois state, who is called upon to undermine the foundations of the Yugoslav state. It is difficult to understand how Tito and Kardelj could sink so low. Do these comrades understand that such an attitude towards the Soviet Ambassador means the negation of all friendly relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia? Do these comrades understand that the Soviet Ambassador, a responsible communist, who represents a friendly power which liberated Yugoslavia from the German occupation, not only has the right but is obliged,

from time to time, to discuss with the communists in Yugoslavia all questions which interest them? How can they be suspicious of these simple elementary matters if they intend to remain in friendly relation with the Soviet Union?

For the information of Comrades Tito and Kardelj, it is necessary to mention that, unlike the Yugoslavs, we do not consider the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow as a simple official; we do not treat him as a mere bourgeois ambassador and we do not deny his "right to seek information about the work of our Party from anyone he chooses." Because he became an ambassador, he did not stop being a communist. We consider him as a comrade and a high-ranking communist. He has friends and acquaintances among the Soviet people. Is he "acquiring" information about the work of our Party? Most likely he is. Let him "acquire" it. We have no reason to hide from comrades the shortcomings in our Party. We expose them ourselves in order to eliminate them.

We consider that this attitude of the Yugoslav comrades towards the Soviet Ambassador cannot be regarded as accidental. It arises from the general attitude of the Yugoslav government, which is also the cause of the inability of the Yugoslav leaders to see the difference between the foreign policy of the USSR and the foreign policy of the Anglo-Americans; they, therefore, put the foreign policy of the USSR on a par with the foreign policy of the English and Americans and feel that they should follow the same policy towards the Soviet Union as towards the imperialist states, Great Britain and the United States.

In this respect, the speech by Comrade Tito in Ljubljana in May 1945 is very characteristic. He said:

"It is said that this war is a just war and we have considered it as such. However, we seek also a just end; we demand that everyone shall be master in his own house; we do not want to pay for others; we do not want to be used as a bribe in international bargaining; we do not want to get involved in any policy of spheres of interest."

This was said in connection with the question of Trieste. As is well known, after a series of territorial concessions for the benefit of Yugoslavia, which the Soviet Union extracted from the Anglo-Americans, the latter, together with the French, rejected the Soviet proposal to hand Trieste over to Yugoslavia and occupied Trieste with their own forces, which were then in Italy. Since all other means were exhausted, the Soviet Union had only one other method

left for gaining Trieste for Yugoslavia — to start war with the Anglo-Americans over Trieste and take it by force. The Yugoslav comrades could not fail to realize that after such a hard war the USSR could not enter another. However, this fact caused dissatisfaction among the Yugoslav leaders, whose attitude was described by Comrade Tito. The statement by Tito in Ljubljana that “Yugoslavia would not pay for others,” “would not be used as a bribe,” “would not be involved in any policy of spheres of interest,” was directed not only against the imperialist states but also against the USSR, and in the given circumstances the relations of Tito towards the USSR are no different from his relations towards the imperialist states, as he does not recognize any difference between the USSR and the imperialist states.

In this anti-Soviet attitude of Comrade Tito, which met no resistance in the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY, we see the basis for the slanderous propaganda of the leaders of the CPY, pursued in the narrow circles of the Yugoslav Party cadres, regarding the “degeneration” of the USSR into an imperialist state, its desire to “dominate Yugoslavia economically,” also the basis for the slanderous propaganda of the leaders of the CPY regarding the “degeneration” of the CPSU(B) and its desire “through the Cominform,¹²⁹ to control the other parties” and the “socialism in the USSR, which has ceased being revolutionary.”

The Soviet government was obliged to draw the attention of the Yugoslav government to the fact that this statement could not be tolerated, and since the explanations given by Tito and Kardelj were unfounded, the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, Comrade Sadchikov, was instructed by the Soviet government to make the following statement to the Yugoslav government, which he did on June 5, 1945:

“We regard Comrade Tito’s speech as an unfriendly attack on the Soviet Union, and the explanation by Comrade Kardelj as unsatisfactory. Our readers understood Comrade Tito’s speech in this way, and it cannot be understood in any other. Tell Comrade Tito that if he should once again permit such an attack on the Soviet Union we shall be forced to reply with open criticism in the press and disavow him.”

From this anti-Soviet attitude of Comrade Tito to the USSR arises the attitude of the Yugoslav leaders towards the Soviet Ambassador, by which the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade is put on a level with bourgeois ambassadors.

It seems that the Yugoslav leaders intend to retain this anti-

Soviet attitude in future. The Yugoslav leaders should bear in mind that retaining this attitude means renouncing all friendly relations with the Soviet Union, and betraying the united socialist front of the Soviet Union and the people's democratic republics. They should also bear in mind that retaining this attitude means depriving themselves of the right to demand material and any other assistance from the Soviet Union, because the Soviet Union can only offer aid to friends.

For the information of Comrades Tito and Kardelj, we emphasize that this anti-Soviet attitude towards the Soviet Ambassador and the Soviet state is only found in Yugoslavia; in other countries of people's democracy the relations were and remain friendly and perfectly correct.

It is interesting to note that Comrade Kardelj, who is now in complete agreement with Comrade Tito, three years ago had a completely different opinion of Tito's speech in Ljubljana. Here is what the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia, Sadchikov, reported about his conversation with Kardelj on June 5, 1945:

"Today, 5 June, I spoke to Kardelj as you suggested. (Tito has not yet returned.) The communication made a serious impression on him. After some thought he said he regarded our opinion of Tito's speech as correct. He also agreed that the Soviet Union could no longer tolerate similar statements. Naturally, in such difficult times for Yugoslavia, Kardelj said, open criticism of Tito's statement would have serious consequences for them, and for this reason they would try to avoid similar statements. However, the Soviet Union would have the right to make open criticism should similar statements be made. Such criticism would benefit them. Kardelj asked me to convey to you his gratitude for this well-timed criticism. He said it would help to improve their work. The criticism of the political mistakes made in the government declaration in March had been of great benefit, Kardelj was sure that this criticism would also help improve the political leadership.

"In an attempt to analyse (very carefully) the causes of the mistakes, Kardelj said that Tito had done great work in liquidating factionalism in the CP and in organizing the people's liberation struggle, but he was inclined to regard Yugoslavia as a self-sufficient unit outside the general development of the proletarian revolution and socialism. Secondly, such a situation had arisen in the Party that the Central Committee does not exist as an organizational and political centre. We meet by chance, and we make decisions by chance. In practice every one of us is left to himself. The style of work is bad, and there is not enough coordination in our work. Kardelj said he would like the Soviet Union to regard them, not as representatives of another country, capable of solving questions independently, but as representatives of one of the future Soviet Republics, and the CPY as a part of the All-

Union Communist Party, that is, that our relations should be based on the prospect of Yugoslavia becoming in the future a constituent part of the USSR. For this reason they would like us to criticize them frankly and openly and to give them advice which would direct the internal and foreign policy of Yugoslavia along the right path.

“I told Kardelj it was necessary to recognize the facts as they are at present, namely to treat Yugoslavia as an independent state and the Yugoslav Communist Party as an independent Party. You can and must, I said, present and solve your problems independently, while we would never refuse advice should you ask for it.

“As regards Yugoslavia we have obligations, undertaken by our treaties, and still more, we have moral obligations. As far as possible we have never refused advice and assistance, when these were needed. Whenever I pass Marshal Tito’s communications on to Moscow, I receive replies immediately. However, such advice is possible and beneficial only if we are approached in time, prior to any decision being reached or any statement being made.”

We leave aside the primitive and fallacious reasoning of Comrade Kardelj about Yugoslavia as a future constituent part of the USSR and the CPY as a part of the CPSU(B). However, we would like to draw attention to Kardelj’s criticisms of Tito’s anti-Soviet declaration in Ljubljana and the bad conditions in the CC of the CPY.

5. REGARDING THE ANTI-SOVIET STATEMENT BY COMRADE DJILAS ABOUT THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AND TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

In our letter of March 27, we mentioned the anti-Soviet statement by Comrade Djilas made at a session of the CC of the CPY, in which he said that the Soviet officers, from a moral standpoint, were inferior to the officers in the English army. This statement by Djilas was made in connection with the fact that a few officers of the Soviet army in Yugoslavia indulged in actions of an immoral nature. We described this statement by Djilas as anti-Soviet because in referring to the behaviour of Soviet officers this pitiful Marxist, Comrade Djilas, did not recall the main differences between the socialist Soviet army, which liberated the peoples of Europe, and the bourgeois English army, whose function is to oppress and not to liberate the peoples of the world.

In their letter of April 13, 1948, Tito and Kardelj state "that Djilas never made such a statement in such a form," and that "Tito explained this in writing and orally in 1945" and that "Comrade Stalin and other members of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPSU(B)" accepted this explanation.

We feel it necessary to emphasize that this statement by Tito and Kardelj does not correspond with the facts. This is how Stalin reacted to the statement by Djilas in a telegram to Tito:

"I understand the difficulty of your situation after the liberation of Belgrade. However, you must know that the Soviet government, in spite of colossal sacrifices and losses, is doing all in its power and beyond its power to help you. However, I am surprised at the fact that a few incidents and offences committed by individual officers and soldiers of the Red Army in Yugoslavia are generalized and extended to the whole Red Army. You should not so offend an army which is helping you to get rid of the Germans and which is shedding its blood in the battle against the German invader. It is not difficult to understand that there are black sheep in every family, but it would be strange to condemn the whole family because of one black sheep.

"If the soldiers of the Red Army find out that Comrade Djilas, and those who did not challenge him, consider the English officers, from a moral standpoint, superior to the Soviet officers, they would cry out in pain at such undeserved insults."

In this anti-Soviet attitude of Djilas, which passed unchallenged among the other members of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY, we see the basis for the slanderous campaign conducted by the leaders of the CPY against the representatives of the Red Army in Yugoslavia, which was the reason for the withdrawal of our military advisers.

How did the matter with Djilas end? It ended with Comrade Djilas arriving in Moscow, together with the Yugoslav delegation, where he apologized to Stalin and begged that this unpleasant error, which he committed at the session of the CC of the CPY, be forgotten. As can be seen, the matter appears entirely different when presented in the letter of Tito and Kardelj. Unfortunately, Djilas's error was not an accident.

* * *

Comrades Tito and Kardelj accuse the Soviet representatives of recruiting Yugoslavs for their intelligence service. They write:

"We regard it as improper for the agents of the Soviet intelligence ser-

vice to recruit, in our country, which is going towards socialism, our citizens for their intelligence service. We cannot consider this as anything else but detrimental to the interests of our country. This is done in spite of the fact that our leaders and the UDB have protested against this and made it known that it cannot be tolerated. Those being recruited include officers, various leaders, and those who are negatively disposed towards the new Yugoslavia.”

We declare that this statement by Tito and Kardelj, which is full of hostile attacks against the Soviet officials in Yugoslavia, does not at all correspond to the facts.

It would be monstrous to demand that the Soviet people who are working in Yugoslavia should fill their mouths with water and talk with no one. Soviet workers are politically mature people and not simple hired labourers, who have no right to be interested in what is happening in Yugoslavia. It is only natural for them to talk with Yugoslav citizens, to ask them questions and to gain information, etc. One would have to be an incorrigible anti-Soviet to consider these talks as attempts to recruit people for the intelligence service, especially such people who are “negatively disposed towards the new Yugoslavia.” Only anti-Soviet people can think that the leaders of the Soviet Union care less for the welfare of new Yugoslavia than do the members of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY.

It is significant that these strange accusations against the Soviet representatives are met only in Yugoslavia. To us it appears that this accusation against the Soviet workers is made solely for the purpose of justifying the actions of the UDB in placing the Soviet workers in Yugoslavia under surveillance.

It must be emphasized that Yugoslav comrades visiting Moscow frequently visit other cities in the USSR, meet our people and freely talk with them. In no case did the Soviet government place any restrictions on them. During his last visit to Moscow, Djilas went to Leningrad for a few days to talk with Soviet comrades.

According to the Yugoslav scheme, information about the Party and state work can only be obtained from the leading organs of the CC of the CPY or from the government. Comrade Djilas did not obtain information from these organs of the USSR but from the local organs of the Leningrad organizations. We did not consider it necessary to inquire into what he did there, and what facts he picked up. We think he did not collect material for the Anglo-American or French intelligence service but for the leading organs of Yugoslavia. Since this was correct we did not see any harm in it because this in-

formation might have contained instructive material for the Yugoslav comrades. Comrade Djilas cannot say that he met with any restrictions.

It may be asked now: Why should Soviet communists in Yugoslavia have fewer rights than Yugoslavs in the USSR?

* * *

In their letter of April 13, Tito and Kardelj again refer to the question of trade relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, namely the alleged refusal of Comrade Krutikov to continue trade negotiations with the Yugoslav representatives. We have already explained to the Yugoslav comrades that Krutikov has denied the statements attributed to him. We have already explained that the Soviet government never raised the question of suspending trade agreements and trade operations with Yugoslavia. Consequently we consider this question closed and have no intention of returning to it.

6. ON THE INCORRECT POLITICAL LINE OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CC OF THE CPY IN REGARD TO THE CLASS STRUGGLE IN YUGOSLAVIA

In our letter we wrote that the spirit of the policy of class struggle is not felt in the CPY, that the capitalist elements are increasing in the cities and the villages and that the leaders of the Party are not undertaking any measures to check the capitalist elements.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny all this and consider our statements, which are a matter of principle, as insults to the CPY, avoiding an answer to the essential question. Their proofs are based only on the fact that consistent social reforms are being undertaken in Yugoslavia. However, this is almost negligible. The denial on the part of these comrades of the strengthening of the capitalist elements, and in connection with this, the sharpening of the class struggle in the village under the conditions of contemporary Yugoslavia, arises from the opportunist contention that, in the transition period between capitalism and socialism, the class struggle does not become sharper, as taught by Marxism-Leninism, but dies out, as averred by opportunists of the type of Bukharin, who postulated a decadent theory of the peaceful absorption of the capitalist elements

into the socialist structure.

No one will deny that the social reforms which occurred in the USSR after the October Revolution were all-embracing and consistent with our teaching. However, this did not cause the CPSU(B) to conclude that the class struggle in our country was weakening, nor that there was no danger of the strengthening of the capitalist elements. In 1920-21 Lenin stated that "while we live in a country of smallholders there is a stronger economic basis for capitalism in Russia than there is for communism," since "small-scale individual farming gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie continually, daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale." It is known that for fifteen years after the October Revolution, the question of measures for checking capitalist elements and later the liquidation of the kulaks as the last capitalist class, was never taken off the daily agenda of our Party. To underestimate the experiences of the CPSU(B) in matters relating to the development of socialism in Yugoslavia is a great political danger and cannot be allowed for Marxists, because socialism cannot be developed only in the cities and in industry, but must also be developed in the villages and in agriculture.

It is no accident that the leaders of the CPY are avoiding the question of the class struggle and the checking of the capitalist elements in the village. What is more, in the speeches of the Yugoslav leaders there is no mention of the question of class differentiation in the village; the peasantry are considered as an organic whole, and the Party does not mobilize its forces in an effort to overcome the difficulties arising from the increase of the exploiting elements in the village.

However, the political situation in the village gives no cause for complacency. Where, as in Yugoslavia, there is no nationalization of the land, where private ownership of the land exists and land is bought and sold, where considerable portions of land are concentrated in the hands of the kulaks, where hired labour is used, etc. the Party cannot be educated in the spirit of camouflaging the class struggle and smoothing over class controversies without disarming itself for the struggle with the main difficulties in the development of socialism. This means that the CPY is being lulled to sleep by the decadent opportunist theory of the peaceful integration of capitalist elements into socialism, borrowed from Bernstein, Vollmar¹³⁰ and Bukharin.

Nor is it by accident that some of the most prominent leaders of

the CPY are deviating from the Marxist-Leninist road on the question of the leading role of the working class. While Marxism-Leninism starts by recognizing the leading role of the working class in the process of liquidating capitalism and developing a socialist society, the leaders of the CPY have an entirely different opinion. It is enough to quote the following speech by Comrade Tito in Zagreb on November 2, 1946 (*Borba*, 2 November 1946): "We do not tell the peasants that they are the strongest pillar of our state in order that, eventually, we may get their votes, but because we know that that is what they are, and because they should be aware of what they are."

This attitude is in complete contradiction to Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism considers that in Europe and in the countries of people's democracy, the working class and not the peasantry is the most progressive, the most revolutionary class. As regards the peasantry, or rather its majority — the poor and middle peasants — they can be or are in a union with the working class, while the leading role in this union still belongs to the working class. However, the passage quoted not only denies the leading role to the working class, but proclaims that the entire peasantry, including that is the kulaks, is the strongest pillar in the new Yugoslavia. As can be seen this attitude expresses opinions which are natural to petty-bourgeois politicians but not to Marxist-Leninists.

7. ON THE INCORRECT POLICY OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CC OF THE CPY ON THE QUESTION OF MUTUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTY AND THE PEOPLE'S FRONT

In our previous letter we wrote that in Yugoslavia the CPY is not considered as the main leading force, but rather the People's Front; that the Yugoslav leaders diminish the role of the Party and are in fact dissolving the Party into a non-party People's Front, allowing in this way the same cardinal error committed by the Mensheviks in Russia forty years ago.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny this, stating that all decisions of the People's Front are decisions of the Party, but that they do not consider it necessary to state at what Party conference these decisions were approved.

In this lies the greatest error of the Yugoslav comrades. They are afraid openly to acclaim the Party and its decisions before the entire people so that the people may know that the leading force is the Party, that the Party leads the Front and not the reverse. According to the theory of Marxism-Leninism the CP is the highest form of organization of workers, which stands over all other organizations of workers, among others over the Soviet in the USSR, over the People's Front in Yugoslavia. The Party stands above all these organizations of working men not only because it has drawn in all the best elements of the workers, but because it has its own special program, its special policy, on the basis of which it leads all the organizations of the workers. But the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY is afraid to admit this openly and proclaim it at the top of its voice to the working class and all the people of Yugoslavia. The Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY feels that if it does not emphasize this factor, the other parties will not have occasion to develop their strength in their struggle. It also appears that Tito and Kardelj think that by this cheap cunning they can abolish the laws of historical development, fool the classes, fool history. But this is an illusion and self-deception. As long as there are antagonistic classes there will be a struggle between them, and as long as there is a struggle it will be expressed in the work of various groups and parties, legally or illegally.

Lenin said that the Party is the most important weapon in the hands of the working class. The task of the leaders is to keep this weapon in readiness. However, since the Yugoslav leaders are hiding the banner of their Party and will not emphasize the role of the Party before the masses, they are blunting this weapon, diminishing the role of the Party and disarming the working class. It is ridiculous to think that because of the cheap cunning of the Yugoslav leaders the enemies will relinquish the fight. Because of this the Party should be kept fighting fit and ever-ready for the struggle against the enemy. Its banner should not be hidden and it should not be lulled to sleep by the thought that the enemy will relinquish the struggle. The Party should not stop organizing its forces, legally or illegally.

We feel that this limiting of the role of the CPY has gone too far. We refer here to the relations between the CPY and the People's Front, which we consider incorrect in principle. It must be borne in mind that in the People's Front a variety of classes are admitted: kulaks, merchants, small manufacturers, bourgeois intelligentsia, various political groups, including some bourgeois parties. The fact that,

in Yugoslavia, only the People's Front enters the political arena and that the Party and its organizations do not take part in political life openly under their own name, not only diminishes the role of the Party in the political life of the country but also undermines the Party as an independent political force, called upon to gain the confidence of the people and to spread its influence over ever broader masses of workers through open political work, through open propaganda of its opinions and its program. Comrades Tito and Kardelj forget that the Party develops and that it can develop only in an open struggle with the enemy; that cheap cunning and machinations of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY cannot replace this struggle as a school for educating Party cadres. Their determined lack of desire to admit the error of their statements — namely that the CPY has no other program than the program of the People's Front — shows how far the Yugoslav leaders have deviated from Marxist-Leninist views on the Party. This might start liquidation tendencies regarding the CPY which would be a danger to the CPY itself and lead eventually to the degeneration of the Yugoslav People's Republic.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj state that the errors of the Mensheviks regarding the merging of the Marxist Party into a non-party mass organization were committed forty years ago and therefore can have no connection with the present mistakes of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY. Comrades Tito and Kardelj are profoundly mistaken. There can be no doubt of the theoretical and political connections between these two events, because like the Mensheviks in 1907, so, today, Tito and Kardelj, forty years later, are equally debasing the Marxist Party, equally denying the role of the Party as the supreme form of organization which stands over all other mass workers' organizations, equally dissolving the Marxist Party into a non-party mass organization. The difference lies in the fact that the Mensheviks committed their errors in 1906-07, and, after being tried by the Marxist Party in Russia at the London Conference, did not return to these errors, whereas the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY, in spite of this instructive lesson, are bringing the same error back to life after forty years, and are passing it off as their own Party theory. This circumstance does not lessen but, on the contrary, aggravates the error of the Yugoslav comrades.

8. REGARDING THE ALARMING SITUATION IN THE CPY

In our previous letter we wrote that the CPY retains a semi-legal status, in spite of the fact that it came into power more than three and a half years ago; that there is no democracy in the Party; there is no system of elections; there is no criticism or self-criticism, that the CPY Central Committee is not composed of elected persons but of co-opted persons.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny all these charges.

They write that “the majority of the members of the CC of the CPY are not co-opted,” that “in December 1940, when the CPY was completely illegal... at the Fifth Conference, which by the decision of the Comintern, had all the powers of a congress, a CC of the CPY was elected consisting of thirty-one members and ten candidates...” that “of this number ten members and six candidates died during the war” that besides this “two members were expelled from the CC,” that the CC of the CPY now has “nineteen members elected at the Conference and seven co-opted members,” that now “the CC of the CPY is composed of twenty-six members.”

This statement does not correspond to the facts. As can be seen from the archives of the Comintern, at the Fifth Conference, which was held in October and not in December of 1940, thirty-one members of the CC of the CPY and ten candidates were not elected, but twenty-two members of the CC and sixteen candidates. Here is what Comrade Walter (Tito) reported from Belgrade at the end of October 1940: “To Comrade Dimitrov: The Fifth Conference of the CPY was held from 19-23 October. One hundred and one delegates from all over the country participated. A CC of twenty-two members was elected, among them two women, and sixteen candidates. Complete unity was manifested. Walter.”

If, out of twenty-two elected members of the CC, ten died, this would leave twelve elected members. If two were expelled this would leave ten. Tito and Kardelj say that now there are twenty-six members of the CC of the CPY — therefore, if from this number we subtract ten, this leaves sixteen co-opted members of the present CC of the CPY. It thus appears that the majority of the members of the CC of the CPY were co-opted. This applies not only to the members of the CC of the CPY but also to the local leaders, who are not elected but appointed.

We consider that such a system of creating leading organs of the Party, when the Party is in power and when it can use complete legality, cannot be called anything but semi-legal, and the nature of the organization sectarian-bureaucratic. It cannot be tolerated that

Party meetings should not be held or held secretly; this must undermine the influence of the Party among the masses; nor can it be tolerated that acceptance into the Party is concealed from the workers; acceptance into the Party should play an important educational role in linking the Party to the working class and to all the workers.

If the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY had regard for the Party it would not tolerate such a condition in the Party and would, immediately on gaining power, that is, three and a half years ago, have asked the Party to call a Congress in order to reorganize on the lines of democratic centralism and start work as a completely legal Party.

It is entirely understandable that under such conditions in the Party, when there is no election of the leading organs, but only their appointment, there can be no talk of internal Party democracy, and much less of criticism and self-criticism. We know that members are afraid to state their opinions, are afraid to criticize the system in the Party and prefer to keep their mouths shut in order to avoid reprisals. It is no accident that the Minister of State Security is at the same time the Secretary of the CC for Party cadres or, as Tito and Kardelj say, the organizational secretary of the CC of the CPY. It is evident that the members and cadres of the Party are left to the supervision of the Ministry of State Security, which is completely impermissible and cannot be tolerated. It was sufficient for Žujović, at a session of the CC of the CPY, not to agree with a draft of the answer of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY to the letter from the CC of the CPSU(B), to be immediately expelled from the Central Committee.

As can be seen, the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY does not consider the Party as an independent entity, with the right to its own opinion, but as a partisan detachment, whose members have no right to discuss any questions but are obliged to fulfil all the desires of the "chief" without comment. We call this cultivating militarism in the Party, which is incompatible with the principles of democracy within a Marxist Party.

As is known, Trotsky also attempted to force a leadership based on militarist principles on the CPSU(B), but the Party, headed by Lenin, triumphed over him and condemned him; militarist measures were rejected and internal Party democracy was confirmed as the most important principle of Party development.

We feel that this abnormal condition inside the CPY represents a serious danger to the life and development of the Party. The sooner this sectarian-bureaucratic regime within the Party is put an end to,

the better it will be both for the CPY and for the Yugoslav Democratic Republic.

9. ON THE ARROGANCE OF THE LEADERS OF THE CC OF THE CPY AND THEIR INCORRECT ATTITUDE TOWARDS THEIR MISTAKES

As can be seen from the letter by Tito and Kardelj, they completely deny the existence of any mistake in the work of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY, as well as the slander and propaganda being conducted among the inner circles of Party cadres in Yugoslavia about the “degeneration” of the USSR into an imperialist state and so forth. They consider that this arises entirely from the inaccurate information received by the CPSU(B) regarding the situation in Yugoslavia. They consider that the CC of the CPSU(B) has been a “victim” of the slanderous and inaccurate information spread by Žujović and Hebrang, and maintain that if there had been no such false information regarding conditions in Yugoslavia there would have been no disagreements between the USSR and Yugoslavia. Because of this they came to the conclusion that it is not a matter of mistakes of the CC of the CPY and the criticism of these mistakes by the CC of the CPSU(B), but of the inaccurate information of Žujović and Hebrang who “fooled” the CPSU(B) with their information. They feel that everything would be put right if they punished Hebrang and Žujović. In this way a scapegoat has been found for their sins. We doubt whether Comrades Tito and Kardelj themselves believe the truth of this version, even though they seize on it as if it were true. They do this because they feel it is the easiest way out of the difficult situation, in which the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY finds itself. In emphasizing this false and apparently naive version they desire, not only to clear themselves of the responsibility for strained Yugoslav-Soviet relations by throwing the blame on the USSR, but also to blacken the CC of the CPSU(B) by representing it as being greedy for all “tendentious” and “anti-Party” information.

We feel that this attitude of Tito and Kardelj towards the CC of the CPSU(B) and their critical remarks regarding the errors of the Yugoslav comrades is not only dangerously unwise and false, but also deeply anti-Party.

If Tito and Kardelj were interested in discovering the truth and if the truth were not painful to them, they should think seriously about

the following:

(a) Why should the CPSU(B)'s information about the affairs in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania appear correct, and not cause any misunderstanding with the communist parties of those countries, while the information about Yugoslavia appears, according to the Yugoslav comrades, tendentious and anti-Party, and causes from their side anti-Soviet attacks and an unfriendly attitude towards the CPSU(B)?

(b) Why do friendly relations between the USSR and the countries of people's democracies develop and strengthen while Soviet-Yugoslav relations deteriorate?

(c) Why did the CPs of the people's democracies support the CPSU(B)'s letter of March 27 and condemn the mistakes of the CPY, while the Political Bureau of the CPY, which would not admit its errors, remained isolated?

Was all this accidental?

In order to reveal the errors of the Political Bureau of the CPY it is not necessary to obtain information from individual comrades such as, for example, Hebrang and Žujović. More than enough can be found in the official statements of the leaders of the CPY, such as Tito, Djilas, Kardelj and others, which appeared in the press.

We declare that Soviet citizens did not obtain any information from Hebrang. We declare that the talk between Žujović and the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia, Lavrentiev, did not reveal a tenth of what was contained in the erroneous and anti-Soviet speeches of Yugoslav leaders. The reprisals taken against these comrades are not only an impermissible settling of private accounts incompatible with the principles of internal Party democracy, but also bear witness to the anti-Soviet attitude of the Yugoslav leaders, who consider talk between a Yugoslav communist and the Soviet Ambassador a crime.

We feel that behind the attempts of the Yugoslav leaders to clear themselves of the responsibility for straining Soviet-Yugoslav relations, lies the lack of desire by these comrades to admit their mistakes and their intention to continue an unfriendly policy towards the USSR.

Lenin says:

“The attitude of a political party towards its mistakes is one of the most important and most significant criteria of the seriousness of the party and the fulfilment of its obligations toward its class and towards the working masses. To admit errors frankly, to discover their cause, to analyse the situation which has been created by these errors, to discuss measures for cor-

recting them — that is the sign of a serious party, that is the fulfilment of its obligations, that is the education of the class and the masses.”

Unfortunately, we must state that the leaders of the CPY, who will not admit and correct their errors, are crudely destroying this principal directive of Lenin.

We must also emphasize that, in contrast to the Yugoslav leaders, the leaders of the French and Italian communist parties honourably admitted their errors at the Conference of Nine Parties, conscientiously corrected them and thus enabled their parties to strengthen their ranks and to educate their cadres.

We feel that underlying the unwillingness of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY honourably to admit their errors and to correct them is the unbounded arrogance of the Yugoslav leaders. Their heads were turned by the successes achieved. They became arrogant and now feel that the depth of the sea reaches only up to their knees. Not only have they become arrogant, but they even preach arrogance, not understanding that arrogance can be their own ruin.

Lenin says: “All revolutionary parties, which have existed in the past, perished because they were arrogant and because they did not see where their strength lay and were afraid to speak of their weaknesses. We will not perish because we are not afraid to speak of our weaknesses and we will learn to overcome them.”

Unfortunately we must state that the Yugoslav leaders, who do not suffer from undue modesty and who are still intoxicated with their successes, which are not so very great, have forgotten Lenin’s teaching.

Tito and Kardelj, in their letter, speak of the merits and successes of the CPY, saying that the CC of the CPSU(B) earlier acknowledged these services and successes, but is now supposedly silent about them. This, naturally, is not true. No one can deny the services and successes of the CPY. There is no doubt about this. However, we must also say that the services of the communist parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania are not less than those of the CPY. However, the leaders of these parties behave modestly and do not boast about their successes, as do the Yugoslav leaders, who have pierced everyone’s ears by their unlimited self-praises. It is also necessary to emphasize that the services of the French and Italian CPs to the revolution were not less but greater than those of Yugoslavia. Even though the French and Italian CPs have so far achieved less success than the CPY, this is not due to any special qualities of the CPY, but mainly because after

the destruction of the Yugoslav Partisan Headquarters by German paratroopers, at a moment when the people's liberation movement in Yugoslavia was passing through a serious crisis, the Soviet army came to the aid of the Yugoslav people, crushed the German invader, liberated Belgrade and in this way created the conditions which were necessary for the CPY to achieve power. Unfortunately the Soviet army did not and could not render such assistance to the French and Italian CPs. If Comrade Tito and Comrade Kardelj bore this fact in mind they would be less boastful about their merits and successes and would behave with greater propriety and modesty.

The conceit of the Yugoslav leaders goes so far that they even attribute to themselves such merits as can in no way be justified. Take, for example, the question of military science, The Yugoslav leaders claim that they have improved on the Marxist science of war with a new theory according to which war is regarded as a combined operation by regular troops, partisan units and popular insurrections. However, this so-called theory is as old as the world and is not new to Marxism. As is known, the Bolsheviks applied combined action of regular troops, partisan units and popular insurrections for the entire period of the civil war in Russia (1918-21), and applied it on a much wider scale than was done in Yugoslavia. However, the Bolsheviks did not say that by applying this method of military activity, they produced anything new in the science of war, because the same method was successfully applied long before the Bolsheviks by Field-Marshal Kutuzov in the war against Napoleon's troops in Russia in 1812.

However, even Field-Marshal Kutuzov did not claim to be the innovator in applying this method because the Spaniards in 1808 applied it in the war against Napoleon's troops. It thus appears that this science of war is actually 140 years old and this which they claim as their own service is actually the service of the Spaniards.

Besides this, we should bear in mind that the services of any leader in the past do not exclude the possibility of his committing serious errors later. We must not close our eyes to present errors because of past services. In his time Trotsky also rendered revolutionary services, but this does not mean that the CPSU(B) could close its eyes to his crude opportunist mistakes which followed later, making him an enemy of the Soviet Union.

* * *

Tito and Kardelj in their letter proposed that the CPSU(B)

should send representatives to Yugoslavia to study the Soviet-Yugoslav differences. We feel this course would be incorrect, since it is not a matter of verifying individual facts but of differences of principle.

As is known, the question of Soviet-Yugoslav differences has already become the property of the CC of the nine communist parties who have their Cominform. It would be highly irregular to exclude them from this matter. Therefore, we propose that this question be discussed at the next session of the Cominform.

BERLIN CRISIS, THE UN AND ANGLO-AMERICAN AGGRESSIVE POLICIES, CHURCHILL

(Interview with a Correspondent of Pravda)

October 28, 1948

Question: How do you regard the results of the discussions in the Security Council on the question of the situation in Berlin and the conduct of the Anglo-American and French representatives in this matter?

Answer: I regard them as a display of the aggressiveness of the policy of Anglo-American and French ruling circles.

Question: Is it true that in August of this year agreement had already been reached among the four powers on the question of Berlin?

Answer: Yes, that is true. Agreement is known to have been reached in Moscow on August 30 last, among the representatives of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France regarding the simultaneous implementation of measures for the lifting of transport restrictions, on the one hand, and for the introduction of the German mark of the Soviet zone in Berlin as the sole currency, on the other hand. That agreement does not hurt anyone's prestige. It takes into account the interests of the parties concerned and insures the possibility of further cooperation. But the governments of the USA and Great Britain disavowed then representatives in Moscow and declared the agreement to be null and void, that is, they violated the agreement, having decided to refer the question to the Security Council where the Anglo-Americans have a guaranteed majority.

Question: Is it true that, in Paris during the recent discussions on the question in the Security Council, an agreement on the situation in Berlin had again been reached in unofficial talks even before the question was voted upon in the Security Council?

Answer: Yes. That is true. Dr. Bramuglia, the representative of Argentina and president of the Security Council, who conducted unofficial talks with Comrade Vyshinsky on behalf of the other powers concerned, did have in his hands an agreed-upon draft decision on the question of the situation in Berlin. But the representatives of the USA and Great Britain once again declared that agreement to be

null and void.

Question: What is the matter then? Would you explain?

Answer: The thing is that those in the United States and Great Britain who inspire an aggressive policy do not consider themselves interested in an agreement and in cooperation with the USSR. What they want is not agreement and cooperation, but talk about agreement and cooperation, so as to put the blame on the USSR by preventing agreement and thus to “prove” that cooperation with the USSR is impossible. What the war instigators who are striving to unleash a new war fear most of all is the reaching of agreements and cooperation with the USSR because a policy of concord with the USSR undermines the position of the instigators of war and deprives the aggressive policy of these gentlemen of any purpose.

It is for this reason that they disrupt agreements that have already been reached, that they disavow their representatives who have drawn up such agreements together with the USSR, and in violation of the United Nations Charter refer the question to the Security Council, where they have a guaranteed majority and where they can “prove” whatever they like. All this is done to “show” that cooperation with the USSR is impossible and to “show” the necessity for a new war, and thus to prepare the ground for the unleashing of war. The policy of the present leaders of the USA and Great Britain is a policy of aggression, a policy of unleashing a new war.

Question: How should one regard the conduct of the representatives of the six states, members of the Security Council: of China, Canada, Belgium, Argentina, Colombia and Syria?

Answer: Those gentlemen are obviously lending their support to the policy of aggression, to the policy of unleashing a new war.

Question: What can all this end in?

Answer: It can only end in ignominious failure on the part of the instigators of a new war. Churchill, the main instigator of a new war, has already managed to deprive himself of the trust of his own nation and of democratic forces throughout the world. The same fate lies in store for all other instigators of war. The horrors of the recent war are still too fresh in the memory of the peoples; and public forces favouring peace are too strong for Churchill’s pupils in aggression to overpower them and to turn them toward a new war.

WHERE IS THE NATIONALISM OF THE TITO GROUP IN YUGOSLAVIA LEADING TO?

December 8, 1948

In a well-known resolution of the Information Bureau of Communist Parties adopted in June 1948, titled "On the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia," it was indicated that nationalist elements had gained prominence in the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in recent months, which had previously existed in a concealed form. The leadership of the Yugoslav Party broke away from the internationalist traditions of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and embarked on the path of nationalism.

All communist parties and the entire camp of people's democracy and socialism unanimously approved the resolution of the Information Bureau "On the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia." All communist parties in the world recognized that the current Yugoslav leadership, i.e., the Tito group, with its nationalist policies, was playing into the hands of the imperialists. It isolated Yugoslavia and weakened it.

Did the Tito group draw the proper lessons from these facts?

Did the Tito group understand that nationalist policies lead to the loss of Yugoslavia's most loyal allies, namely the communist parties of the world, and that this circumstance has already led to the isolation and weakening of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia both externally and internally?

Did the Tito group understand that the only way out of this difficult situation in which it has put the Party and the country is to acknowledge its mistakes, break away from nationalism and return to the family of communist parties?

No, the Tito group did not draw the proper lessons, and it is not apparent that they understood these simple and clear matters.

On the contrary, in response to fair comradely criticism of the Tito group's mistakes from fraternal communist parties, as well as from the entire camp of people's democracy and socialism, they respond through the mouthpiece of the Belgrade press with slanderous attacks, incitement of national hostility towards the peoples of neighbouring democratic countries, widespread repression, arrests and the killing of both communist and non-communist individuals

who dare to express doubt about the correctness of the Tito group's nationalist policy. Just recently, the deputy of Tito, the notorious Ranković,¹³¹ had the Yugoslav Army's Colonel-General, Comrade Arso Jovanović, who was a hero of the Yugoslav liberation war, former chief of the General Staff of Yugoslavia during the liberation movement and the head of the Yugoslav Military School, assassinated by agents. He was killed because he doubted the correctness of the nationalist and terrorist policy of the Tito group. In connection with this, it is openly said in Yugoslavia that "the Tito group is degenerating into a clique of political assassins."

As it can be seen, the Tito group is not willing to acknowledge and rectify its mistakes. Rather, it is afraid and lacks the courage to admit them because acknowledging one's mistakes and rectifying them requires courage. What's worse is that out of fear, they resort to repression and persecute anyone who dares to mention their mistakes.

Lenin says:

"A political party's attitude towards its own mistakes is one of the most important and surest ways of judging how earnest the party is and how it fulfils in practice its obligations towards its class and the working people. Frankly acknowledging a mistake, ascertaining the reasons for it, analysing the conditions that have led up to it, and thrashing out the means of its rectification — that is the hallmark of a serious party; that is how it should perform its duties, and how it should educate and train its class, and then the masses."

It is evident that the Tito group cannot be classified among those courageous and honest leaders who love their party, as mentioned by Lenin.

The main nationalist deviation of the Tito group occurred prior to the meeting of the Information Bureau of Communist Parties in the spring of 1948. The open nationalist position of the Tito group began with their refusal to participate in the Meeting of the Information Bureau of Communist Parties and discuss the situation within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia together with the fraternal parties. Despite repeated offers for the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to send a delegation to the meeting and present their point of view, as had been done in previous meetings regarding other communist parties, the Tito group categorically refused to participate in the proceedings. It became clear that the Tito group did not value their friendship with the communist parties, including the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This was an open rupture with the

internationalist united front of communist parties. It was a break from internationalism and a shift towards nationalism.

The Belgrade newspaper *Borba* assures that Tito and his like-minded individuals stand for a united anti-imperialist front. This, of course, is untrue and aimed at deceiving the "common people." In reality, how can we speak of an anti-imperialist position of the Tito group when they cannot even maintain unity with communist parties of neighbouring countries close to Yugoslavia?

The second significant fact demonstrating the nationalist deviation of the Tito group is their unworthy, hypocritical and anti-Leninist behaviour at the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Naive people expected that the congress would work under the banner of friendship with the communist parties and the strengthening of the anti-imperialist front of the countries of people's democracy and the USSR. However, in reality, the opposite occurred. In reality, the Tito group turned the Congress into an arena for fighting against the communist parties of neighbouring countries, a battle against the united anti-imperialist front of the countries of people's democracy. It was a congress that went against the countries of people's democracy and their communist parties, against the USSR and its Communist Party.

Of course, it is not entirely safe to openly discuss the campaign against the USSR and the countries of people's democracy in Yugoslavia because the Yugoslav peoples firmly stand for the alliance with the USSR and the countries of people's democracy. Therefore, the Tito group resorted to a cheap trick and decided to disguise this reactionary campaign with grandiose phrases about their love for the USSR, friendship with the USSR, the great role of the USSR in the liberation movement, and so on. They even went so far as to propose to Stalin that he join this dishonourable campaign and take up the defence of the nationalist Tito group against criticism from communist parties in the USSR and other democratic countries. The employees of the Belgrade press employed all sorts of tricks and manipulations, performing the most unexpected and ridiculous acrobatic jumps and somersaults in order to convince the Yugoslav people that black is white and white is black, that the Tito group's campaign against socialism and democracy is a secondary matter, while the "alliance" with the USSR and the "united front" with them are the group's top priorities. In reality, however, the Tito group ended up aligning itself with the imperialists, smearing the communist parties of the countries of people's democracy and the USSR

to the delight of the imperialists from all nations. Instead of a united front with the communist parties, they formed a united front with the imperialists. The Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia approved and cemented the nationalist policy of the Tito group.

The political acrobats from the newspaper *Borba* demand that communist parties cease exposing the mistakes of the Tito group and instead place their trust and support in this group. Otherwise, they claim that such a “campaign” against the Tito group could cause serious damage to Yugoslavia.

No, gentlemen! Communist parties cannot place their trust or support in the nationalist policy of the Tito group. It is entirely possible that this circumstance may harm Yugoslavia. However, the blame for this should not be placed on the communist parties but on the nationalist Tito group, which severed ties with the communist parties and declared war on them.

The political acrobats from the newspaper *Borba* must realize that Marxism and nationalism are incompatible, that nationalism, as an ideology of the bourgeoisie, is an enemy of Marxism. They must recognize that Marxism-Leninism cannot be reconciled with nationalism or any inclination towards nationalism within communist parties, and that it is obliged to dismantle nationalism in whatever form it may take in the name of the interests of the working class, freedom and the friendship of nations, in the name of the victorious construction of socialism.

Lenin says:

“Bourgeois nationalism and proletarian internationalism — these are the two irreconcilably hostile slogans that correspond to the two great class camps throughout the capitalist world, and express the two policies (nay, the two world outlooks).”

In the conditions when the bourgeoisie’s power has been overthrown, the exploiting classes and their agents try to use the poisoned weapon of nationalism to restore the old order.

In connection with this, Stalin says:

“The deviation towards nationalism is the adaptation of the internationalist policy of the working class to the nationalist policy of the bourgeoisie. The deviation towards nationalism reflects the attempts of ‘one’s own,’ ‘national’ bourgeoisie... to restore capitalism.”

Nationalism within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia strikes a blow not only to the general anti-imperialist front but, above all, to

the interests of Yugoslavia itself, both in foreign and domestic policy.

The nationalism of the Tito group in foreign policy leads to a rupture with the united front of the global revolutionary movement of the working class, the loss of Yugoslavia's most loyal allies and the self-isolation of Yugoslavia. The nationalism of the Tito group disarms Yugoslavia in the face of its external enemies.

The nationalism of the Tito group in domestic policy leads to a policy of peace between exploiters and the exploited, a policy of "uniting" exploiters and the exploited into a single "national" front, a policy of departing from class struggle and towards the possibility of peaceful integration of exploiters into socialism — leading to the demobilization of the fighting spirit of the Yugoslav working class. The nationalism of the Tito group disarms the Yugoslav workers in the face of their internal enemies.

A year ago, when the Tito group had not yet displayed nationalist aspirations and cooperated with fraternal parties, Yugoslavia felt confident and boldly moved forward, relying on its closest allies in the form of foreign communist parties. That was the situation in the recent past. However, after the Tito group embraced the rails of nationalism, the situation changed drastically. After the Tito group broke away from the united front of communist parties and started to arrogantly disregard the countries of people's democracy, Yugoslavia began to lose its most loyal allies and found itself isolated in the face of its external and internal enemies.

These are the sad results of the nationalist policy of the Tito group.

The Tito group did not understand what is perfectly clear and obvious to every communist. They failed to grasp the simple truth that in the current international situation, fraternal solidarity among communist parties, mutual cooperation and friendship with countries of people's democracy, and cooperation and friendship with the USSR are the main conditions for the rise and flourishing of countries of people's democracy in the construction of socialism. They are the main guarantee of their national freedom and independence against imperialism's encroachments.

The political acrobats from the newspaper *Borba* further claim that the criticism of the Tito group's mistakes has turned into a campaign against the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the peoples of Yugoslavia.

This, of course, is incorrect. There has been no campaign and

there is no campaign against the peoples of Yugoslavia. It would be criminal to launch any campaign against the Yugoslav peoples, whose heroic deeds are well known. It is also known that the peoples of Yugoslavia firmly stand behind the united front with countries of people's democracy and the USSR. They bear no responsibility for the nationalist policy of the Tito group. We consider the Yugoslav peoples as our loyal allies.

There has also been no campaign against the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as a whole. It is well known to us that the majority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia firmly stands for friendship with communists from other countries, for friendship with the USSR and its Communist Party. The presence of internationalist traditions within the ranks of the majority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is beyond doubt. It is also known to us that the majority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia does not approve of the nationalist policy of the Tito group. It is known that it is precisely for this reason that it faces harsh repression from the Tito group and its agents.

The "campaign" is not conducted against the peoples of Yugoslavia and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as a whole, but against the nationalist group of Tito. It is conducted in order to help the Communist Party of Yugoslavia understand the mistakes of the Tito group and eliminate the nationalist policy of the Yugoslav leadership.

Finally, the political acrobats from the newspaper *Borba* claim that the Tito group is inseparable from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, that it represents the majority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

That is also incorrect. A year ago, the Tito group may have represented the majority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. But that was a year ago. Now, after breaking ties with the communist parties, after severing relations with all neighbouring republics, after shifting towards nationalism, the Tito group no longer represents the majority of the Party. Now, the Tito group is a faction, trusted only by a minority of the Party, and it uses the state apparatus to suppress the will of the internationalist majority of the Party. The Tito faction itself has separated from the Party, as it handed over the Party to the supervision of the executioner Ranković and established a cruel terrorist regime within the Party with its repressions, mass arrests and killings. In reality, the Tito faction is now at war with its own party. Only the blind cannot see this. If the Tito faction has proven incapable of maintaining order within the Party through reg-

ular democratic methods and has resorted to mass repressions, it means that it has long lost the trust of the majority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

The Tito faction represents only a minority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, relying not on the Party's trust but on the administrative-police apparatus of Yugoslavia.

MARXISM AND PROBLEMS OF LINGUISTICS¹³²

CONCERNING MARXISM IN LINGUISTICS

June-July 1950

A group of younger comrades have asked me to give my opinion in the press on problems relating to linguistics, particularly in reference to Marxism in linguistics. I am not a linguistic expert and, of course, cannot fully satisfy the request of the comrades. As to Marxism in linguistics, as in other social sciences, this is something directly in my field. I have therefore consented to answer a number of questions put by the comrades.

Question: Is it true that language is a superstructure on the base?

Answer: No, it is not true.

The base is the economic structure of society at the given stage of its development. The superstructure is the political, legal, religious, artistic, philosophical views of society and the political, legal and other institutions corresponding to them.

Every base has its own corresponding superstructure. The base of the feudal system has its superstructure, its political, legal and other views, and the corresponding institutions; the capitalist base has its own superstructure, so has the socialist base. If the base changes or is eliminated, then, following this, its superstructure changes or is eliminated; if a new base arises, then, following this, a superstructure arises corresponding to it.

In this respect language radically differs from the superstructure. Take, for example, Russian society and the Russian language. In the course of the past thirty years the old, capitalist base has been eliminated in Russia and a new, socialist base has been built. Correspondingly, the superstructure on the capitalist base has been eliminated and a new superstructure created corresponding to the socialist base. The old political, legal and other institutions, consequently, have been supplanted by new, socialist institutions. But in spite of this the Russian language has remained basically what it was before the October Revolution.

What has changed in the Russian language in this period? To a certain extent the vocabulary of the Russian language has changed, in the sense that it has been replenished with a considerable number

of new words and expressions, which have arisen in connection with the rise of the new socialist production, the appearance of a new state, a new socialist culture, new social relations and morals, and, lastly, in connection with the development of technology and science; a number of words and expressions have changed their meaning, have acquired a new signification; a number of obsolete words have dropped out of the vocabulary. As to the basic stock of words and the grammatical system of the Russian language, which constitute the foundation of a language, they, after the elimination of the capitalist base, far from having been eliminated and supplanted by a new basic word stock and a new grammatical system of the language, have been preserved in their entirety and have not undergone any serious changes — they have been preserved precisely as the foundation of the modern Russian language.

Further, the superstructure is a product of the base, but this by no means implies that it merely reflects the base, that it is passive, neutral, indifferent to the fate of its base, to the fate of the classes, to the character of the system. On the contrary, having come into being, it becomes an exceedingly active force, actively assisting its base to take shape and consolidate itself, and doing its utmost to help the new system to finish off and eliminate the old base and the old classes.

It cannot be otherwise. The superstructure is created by the base precisely in order to serve it, to actively help it to take shape and consolidate itself, to actively fight for the elimination of the old, moribund base together with its old superstructure. The superstructure has only to renounce this role of auxiliary, it has only to pass from a position of active defence of its base to one of indifference towards it, to adopt an equal attitude to all classes, and it loses its virtue and ceases to be a superstructure.

In this respect language radically differs from the superstructure. Language is not a product of one or another base, old or new, within the given society, but of the whole course of the history of the society and of the history of the bases for many centuries. It was created not by some one class, but by the entire society, by all the classes of the society, by the efforts of hundreds of generations. It was created for the satisfaction of the needs not of one particular class, but of the entire society, of all the classes of the society. Precisely for this reason it was created as a single language for the society, common to all members of that society, as the common language of the whole people. Hence the functional role of language, as a means of intercourse

between people, consists not in serving one class to the detriment of other classes, but in equally serving the entire society, all the classes of society. This in fact explains why a language may equally serve both the old, moribund system and the new, rising system; both the old base and the new base; both the exploiters and the exploited.

It is no secret to anyone that the Russian language served Russian capitalism and Russian bourgeois culture before the October Revolution just as well as it now serves the socialist system and socialist culture of Russian society.

The same must be said of the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Uzbek, Kazakh, Georgian, Armenian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Moldavian, Tatar, Azerbaijanian, Bashkirian, Turkmenian and other languages of the Soviet nations; they served the old, bourgeois system of these nations just as well as they serve the new, socialist system.

It cannot be otherwise. Language exists, language has been created precisely in order to serve society as a whole, as a means of intercourse between people, in order to be common to the members of society and constitute the single language of society, serving members of society equally, irrespective of their class status. A language has only to depart from this position of being a language common to the whole people, it has only to give preference and support to some one social group to the detriment of other social groups of the society, and it loses its virtue, ceases to be a means of intercourse between the people of the society, and becomes the jargon of some social group, degenerates and is doomed to disappear.

In this respect, while it differs in principle from the superstructure, language does not differ from instruments of production, from machines, let us say, which are as indifferent to classes as is language and may, like it, equally serve a capitalist system and a socialist system.

Further, the superstructure is the product of one epoch, the epoch in which the given economic base exists and operates. The superstructure is therefore short-lived; it is eliminated and disappears with the elimination and disappearance of the given base.

Language, on the contrary, is the product of a whole number of epochs, in the course of which it takes shape, is enriched, develops and is smoothed. A language therefore lives immeasurably longer than any base or any superstructure. This in fact explains why the rise and elimination not only of one base and its superstructure, but of several bases and their corresponding superstructures, have not

led in history to the elimination of a given language, to the elimination of its structure and the rise of a new language with a new stock of words and a new grammatical system.

It is more than a hundred years since Pushkin died. In this period the feudal system and the capitalist system were eliminated in Russia, and a third, a socialist system has arisen. Hence two bases, with their superstructures, were eliminated, and a new, socialist base has arisen, with its new superstructure. Yet, if we take the Russian language, for example, it has not in this long span of time undergone any fundamental change, and the modern Russian language differs very little in structure from the language of Pushkin.

What has changed in the Russian language in this period? The Russian vocabulary has in this period been greatly replenished; a large number of obsolete words have dropped out of the vocabulary; the meaning of a great many words has changed; the grammatical system of the language has improved. As to the structure of Pushkin's language, with its grammatical system and its basic stock of words, in all essentials it has remained as the basis of modern Russian.

And this is quite understandable. Indeed, what necessity is there, after every revolution, for the existing structure of the language, its grammatical system and basic stock of words to be destroyed and supplanted by new ones, as is usually the case with the superstructure? What object would there be in calling "water," "earth," "mountain," "forest," "fish," "man," "to walk," "to do," "to produce," "to trade," etc., not water, earth, mountain, etc., but something else? What object would there be in having the modification of words in a language and the combination of words in sentences follow not the existing grammar, but some entirely different grammar? What would the revolution gain from such an upheaval in language? History in general never does anything of any importance without some special necessity for it. What, one asks, can be the necessity for such a linguistic revolution, if it has been demonstrated that the existing language and its structure are fundamentally quite suited to the needs of the new system? The old superstructure can and should be destroyed and replaced by a new one in the course of a few years, in order to give free scope for the development of the productive forces of society; but how can an existing language be destroyed and a new one built in its place in the course of a few years without causing anarchy in social life and without creating the threat of the disintegration of society? Who but a Don Quixote could set himself such

a task?

Lastly, one other radical distinction between the superstructure and language. The superstructure is not directly connected with production, with man's productive activity. It is connected with production only indirectly, through the economy, through the base. The superstructure therefore reflects changes in the level of development of the productive forces not immediately and not directly, but only after changes in the base, through the prism of the changes wrought in the base by the changes in production. This means that the sphere of action of the superstructure is narrow and restricted.

Language, on the contrary, is connected with man's productive activity directly, and not only with man's productive activity, but with all his other activity in all his spheres of work, from production to the base, and from the base to the superstructure. For this reason language reflects changes in production immediately and directly, without waiting for changes in the base. For this reason the sphere of action of language, which embraces all fields of man's activity, is far broader and more comprehensive than the sphere of action of the superstructure. More, it is practically unlimited.

It is this that primarily explains why language, or rather its vocabulary, is in a state of almost constant change. The continuous development of industry and agriculture, of trade and transport, of technology and science, demands that language should replenish its vocabulary with new words and expressions needed for their functioning. And language, directly reflecting these needs, does replenish its vocabulary with new words, and perfects its grammatical system.

Hence:

a) A Marxist cannot regard language as a superstructure on the base;

b) To confuse language and superstructure is to commit a serious error.

Question: Is it true that language always was and is class language, that there is no such thing as language which is the single and common language of a society, a non-class language common to the whole people?

Answer: No, it is not true.

It is not difficult to understand that in a society which has no classes there can be no such thing as a class language. There were no classes in the primitive communal clan system, and consequently there could be no class language — the language was then the single and common language of the whole community. The objection that

the concept class should be taken as covering every human community, including the primitive communal community, is not an objection but a playing with words that is not worth refuting.

As to the subsequent development from clan languages to tribal languages, from tribal languages to the languages of nationalities, and from the languages of nationalities to national languages — everywhere and at all stages of development, language, as a means of intercourse between the people of a society, was the common and single language of that society, serving its members equally, irrespective of their social status.

I am not referring here to the empires of the slave and medieval periods, the empires of Cyrus or Alexander the Great, let us say, or of Caesar or Charles the Great, which had no economic foundations of their own and were transient and unstable military and administrative associations. Not only did these empires not have, they could not have had a single language common to the whole empire and understood by all the members of the empire. They were conglomerations of tribes and nationalities, each of which lived its own life and had its own language. Consequently, it is not these or similar empires I have in mind, but the tribes and nationalities composing them, which had their own economic foundations and their own languages, evolved in the distant past. History tells us that the languages of these tribes and nationalities were not class languages, but languages common to the whole of a tribe or nationality, and understood by all its people.

Side by side with this, there were, of course, dialects, local vernaculars, but they were dominated by and subordinated to the single and common language of the tribe or nationality.

Later, with the appearance of capitalism, the elimination of feudal division and the formation of national markets, nationalities developed into nations, and the languages of nationalities into national languages. History shows that national languages are not class, but common languages, common to all the members of each nation and constituting the single language of that nation.

It has been said above that language, as a means of intercourse between the people of a society, serves all classes of society equally, and in this respect displays what may be called an indifference to classes. But people, the various social groups, the classes, are far from being indifferent to language. They strive to utilize the language in their own interests, to impose their own special lingo, their own special terms, their own special expressions upon it. The upper

strata of the propertied classes, who have divorced themselves from and detest the people — the aristocratic nobility, the upper strata of the bourgeoisie — particularly distinguish themselves in this respect. “Class” dialects, jargons, high-society “languages” are created. These dialects and jargons are often incorrectly referred to in literature as languages — the “aristocratic language” or the “bourgeois language” in contradistinction to the “proletarian language” or the “peasant language.” For this reason, strange as it may seem, some of our comrades have come to the conclusion that national language is a fiction, and that only class languages exist in reality.

There is nothing, I think, more erroneous than this conclusion. Can these dialects and jargons be regarded as languages? Certainly not. They cannot, firstly, because these dialects and jargons have no grammatical systems or basic word stocks of their own — they borrow them from the national language. They cannot, secondly, because these dialects and jargons are confined to a narrow sphere, are current only among the upper strata of a given class and are entirely unsuitable as a means of human intercourse for society as a whole. What, then, have they? They have a collection of specific words reflecting the specific tastes of the aristocracy or the upper strata of the bourgeoisie; a certain number of expressions and turns of phrase distinguished by refinement and gallantry and free of the “coarse” expressions and turns of phrase of the national language; lastly, a certain number of foreign words. But all the fundamentals, that is, the overwhelming majority of the words and the grammatical system, are borrowed from the common, national language. Dialects and jargons are therefore offshoots of the common national language, devoid of all linguistic independence and doomed to stagnation. To believe that dialects and jargons can develop into independent languages capable of ousting and supplanting the national language means losing one’s sense of historical perspective and abandoning the Marxist position.

References are made to Marx, and the passage from his article *St. Max* is quoted which says that the bourgeois have “their own language,” that this language “is a product of the bourgeoisie”¹³³ that it is permeated with the spirit of mercantilism and huckstering. Certain comrades cite this passage with the idea of proving that Marx believed in the “class character” of language and denied the existence of a single national language. If these comrades were impartial, they should have cited another passage from this same article *St. Max*, where Marx, touching on the ways single national lan-

guages arose, speaks of “the concentration of dialects into a single national language resulting from economic and political concentration.”¹³⁴

Marx, consequently, did recognize the necessity of a *single* national language, as a higher form, to which dialects, as lower forms, are subordinate.

What, then, can this bourgeois language be which Marx says “is a product of the bourgeoisie”? Did Marx consider it as much a language as the national language, with a specific linguistic structure of its own? Could he have considered it such a language? Of course, not. Marx merely wanted to say that the bourgeois had polluted the single national language with their hucksters’ lingo, that the bourgeois, in other words, have their hucksters’ jargon.

It thus appears that these comrades have misrepresented Marx. And they misrepresented him because they quoted Marx not like Marxists but like dogmatists, without delving into the essence of the matter.

References are made to Engels, and the words from his *The Condition of the Working Class in England* are cited where he says that in Britain “...the working class has gradually become a race wholly apart from the English bourgeoisie,” that “the workers speak other dialects, have other thoughts and ideals, other customs and moral principles, a different religion and other politics than those of the bourgeoisie.”¹³⁵ Certain comrades conclude from this passage that Engels denied the necessity of a common, national language, that he believed, consequently, in the “class character” of language. True, Engels speaks here of dialects, not languages, fully realizing that, being an offshoot of the national language, a dialect cannot supplant the national language. But apparently, these comrades regard the existence of a difference between a language and a dialect with no particular enthusiasm...

It is obvious that the quotation is inappropriate, because Engels here speaks not of “class languages” but chiefly of class thoughts, ideals, customs, moral principles, religion, politics. It is perfectly true that the thoughts, ideals, customs, moral principles, religion and politics of bourgeois and proletarians are directly antithetical. But what has this to do with national language, or the “class character” of language? Can the existence of class antagonisms in society serve as an argument in favour of the “class character” of language, or against the necessity of a single national language? Marxism says that a common language is one of the cardinal earmarks of a nation,

although knowing very well that there are class antagonisms within the nation. Do the comrades referred to recognize this Marxist thesis?

References are made to Lafargue,¹³⁶ and it is said that in his pamphlet *The French Language Before and After the Revolution* he recognizes the "class character" of language and denies the necessity of a national language common to the whole people. That is not true. Lafargue does indeed speak of a "noble" or "aristocratic language" and of the "jargons" of various strata of society. But these comrades forget that Lafargue, who was not interested in the difference between languages and jargons and referred to dialects now as "artificial languages," now as "jargons," definitely says in this pamphlet that "the artificial language which distinguished the aristocracy... arose out of the language common to the whole people, which was spoken both by bourgeois and artisan, by town and country."

Consequently, Lafargue recognizes the existence and necessity of a common language of the whole people, and fully realizes that the "aristocratic language" and other dialects and jargons are subordinate to and dependent on the language common to the whole people.

It follows that the reference to Lafargue is wide of the mark.

References are made to the fact that at one time in England the feudal lords spoke "for centuries" in French, while the English people spoke English, and this is alleged to be an argument in favour of the "class character" of language and against the necessity of a language common to the whole people. But this is not an argument, it is rather an anecdote. Firstly, not all the feudal lords spoke French at that time, but only a small upper stratum of English feudal lords attached to the court and at county seats. Secondly, it was not some "class language" they spoke, but the ordinary language common to all the French people. Thirdly, we know that in the course of time this French language had disappeared without a trace, yielding place to the English language common to the whole people. Do these comrades think that the English feudal lords "for centuries" held intercourse with the English people through interpreters, that they did not use the English language, that there was no language common to all the English at that time, and that the French language in England was then anything more than the language of high society, current only in the restricted circle of the upper English aristocracy? How can one possibly deny the existence and the necessity of a language common to the whole people on the basis of anecdotic "arguments" like these?

There was a time when Russian aristocrats at the Tsar's court and in high society also made a fad of the French language. They prided themselves on the fact that when they spoke Russian they often lapsed into French, that they could only speak Russian with a French accent. Does this mean that there was no Russian language common to the whole people at that time in Russia, that a language common to the whole people was a fiction, and "class languages" a reality?

Our comrades are here committing at least two mistakes.

The first mistake is that they confuse language with superstructure. They think that since the superstructure has a class character, language too must be a class language, and not a language common to the whole people. But I have already said that language and superstructure are two different concepts, and that a Marxist must not confuse them.

The second mistake of these comrades is that they conceive the opposition of interests of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the fierce class struggle between them, as meaning the disintegration of society, as a break of all ties between the hostile classes. They believe that, since society has disintegrated and there is no longer a single society, but only classes, a single language of society, a national language, is unnecessary. If society has disintegrated and there is no longer a language common to the whole people, a national language, what remains? There remain classes and "class languages." Naturally, every "class language" will have its "class" grammar — a "proletarian" grammar or a "bourgeois" grammar. True, such grammars do not exist anywhere. But that does not worry these comrades: they believe that such grammars will appear in due course.

At one time there were "Marxists" in our country who asserted that the railways left to us after the October Revolution were bourgeois railways, that it would be unseemly for us Marxists to use them, that they should be torn up and new, "proletarian" railways built. For this they were nicknamed "troglydites."

It goes without saying that such a primitive-anarchist view of society, of classes, of language has nothing in common with Marxism. But it undoubtedly exists and continues to prevail in the minds of certain of our muddled comrades.

It is of course wrong to say that, because of the existence of a fierce class struggle, society has split up into classes which are no longer economically connected with one another in one society. On

the contrary, as long as capitalism exists, the bourgeois and the proletarians will be bound together by every economic thread as parts of a single capitalist society. The bourgeois cannot live and enrich themselves unless they have wage-labourers at their command; the proletarians cannot survive unless they hire themselves to the capitalists. If all economic ties between them were to cease, it would mean the cessation of all production, and the cessation of all production would mean the doom of society, the doom of the classes themselves. Naturally, no class wants to incur self-destruction. Consequently, however sharp the class struggle may be, it cannot lead to the disintegration of society. Only ignorance of Marxism and complete failure to understand the nature of language could have suggested to some of our comrades the fairy tale about the disintegration of society, about “class” languages and “class” grammars.

Reference is further made to Lenin, and it is pointed out that Lenin recognized the existence of two cultures under capitalism — bourgeois and proletarian — and that the slogan of national culture under capitalism is a nationalist slogan. All this is true and Lenin is absolutely right here. But what has this to do with the “class character” of language? When these comrades refer to what Lenin said about two cultures under capitalism, it is evidently with the idea of suggesting to the reader that the existence of two cultures, bourgeois and proletarian, in society means that there must also be two languages, inasmuch as language is linked with culture — and, consequently, that Lenin denies the necessity of a single national language, and, consequently, that Lenin believes in “class” languages. The mistake these comrades make here is that they identify and confuse language with culture. But culture and language are two different things. Culture may be bourgeois or socialist, but language, as a means of intercourse, is always a language common to the whole people and can serve both bourgeois and socialist culture. Is it not a fact that the Russian, the Ukrainian, the Uzbek languages are now serving the socialist culture of these nations just as well as they served their bourgeois cultures before the October Revolution? Consequently, these comrades are profoundly mistaken when they assert that the existence of two different cultures leads to the formation of two different languages and to the negation of the necessity of a single language.

When Lenin spoke of two cultures, he proceeded precisely from the thesis that the existence of two cultures cannot lead to the negation of a single language and to the formation of two languages, that

there must be a single language. When the Bundists accused Lenin of denying the necessity of a national language and of regarding culture as “non-national,” Lenin, as we know, vigorously protested and declared that he was fighting against bourgeois culture, and not against national languages, the necessity of which he regarded as indisputable. It is strange that some of our comrades should be trailing in the footsteps of the Bundists.

As to a single language, the necessity of which Lenin is alleged to deny, it would be well to pay heed to the following words of Lenin:

“Language is the most important means of human intercourse. Unity of language and its unimpeded development form one of the most important conditions for genuinely free and extensive commercial intercourse appropriate to modern capitalism, for a free and broad grouping of the population in all its separate classes.”¹³⁷

It follows that our highly respected comrades have misrepresented the views of Lenin.

Reference, lastly, is made to Stalin. The passage from Stalin is quoted which says that “the bourgeoisie and its nationalist parties were and remain in this period the chief directing force of such nations.”¹³⁸ This is all true. The bourgeoisie and its nationalist party really do direct bourgeois culture, just as the proletariat and its internationalist party direct proletarian culture. But what has this to do with the “class character” of language? Do not these comrades know that national language is a form of national culture, that a national language may serve both bourgeois and socialist culture? Are our comrades unaware of the well-known formula of the Marxists that the present Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian and other cultures are socialist in content and national in form, i.e., in language? Do they agree with this Marxist formula?

The mistake our comrades commit here is that they do not see the difference between culture and language, and do not understand that culture changes in content with every new period in the development of society, whereas language remains basically the same through a number of periods, equally serving both the new culture and the old.

Hence:

- a) Language, as a means of intercourse, always was and remains the single language of a society, common to all its members;
- b) The existence of dialects and jargons does not negate but con-

firmly the existence of a language common to the whole of the given people, of which they are offshoots and to which they are subordinate;

c) The "class character" of language formula is erroneous and non-Marxist.

Question: What are the characteristic features of language?

Answer: Language is one of those social phenomena which operate throughout the existence of a society. It arises and develops with the rise and development of a society. It dies when the society dies. Apart from society there is no language. Accordingly, language and its laws of development can be understood only if studied in inseparable connection with the history of society, with the history of the people to whom the language under study belongs, and who are its creators and repositories.

Language is a medium, an instrument with the help of which people communicate with one another, exchange thoughts and understand each other. Being directly connected with thinking, language registers and fixes in words, and in words combined into sentences, the results of the process of thinking and achievements of man's cognitive activity, and thus makes possible the exchange of thoughts in human society.

Exchange of thoughts is a constant and vital necessity, for without it, it is impossible to coordinate the joint actions of people in the struggle against the forces of nature, in the struggle to produce the necessary material values; without it, it is impossible to ensure the success of society's productive activity, and, hence, the very existence of social production becomes impossible. Consequently, without a language understood by a society and common to all its members, that society must cease to produce, must disintegrate and cease to exist as a society. In this sense, language, while it is a medium of intercourse, is at the same time an instrument of struggle and development of society.

As we know, all the words in a language taken together constitute what is known as its vocabulary. The chief thing in the vocabulary of a language is its basic stock of words, which includes also all the root words, as its kernel. It is far less extensive than the language's vocabulary, but it persists for a very long time, for centuries, and provides the language with a basis for the formation of new words. The vocabulary reflects the state of the language: the richer and more diversified the vocabulary, the richer and more developed the language.

However, by itself, the vocabulary does not constitute the language — it is rather the building material of the language. Just as in construction work the building materials do not constitute the building, although the latter cannot be constructed without them, so too the vocabulary of a language does not constitute the language itself, although no language is conceivable without it. But the vocabulary of a language assumes tremendous importance when it comes under the control of grammar, which defines the rules governing the modification of words and the combination of words into sentences, and thus makes the language a coherent and significant function. Grammar (morphology, syntax) is the collection of rules governing the modification of words and their combination into sentences. It is therefore thanks to grammar that it becomes possible for language to invest man's thoughts in a material linguistic integument.

The distinguishing feature of grammar is that it gives rules for the modification of words not in reference to concrete words, but to words in general, not taken concretely; that it gives rules for the formation of sentences not in reference to particular concrete sentences — with, let us say, a concrete subject, a concrete predicate, etc. — but to all sentences in general, irrespective of the concrete form of any sentence in particular. Hence, abstracting itself, as regards both words and sentences, from the particular and concrete, grammar takes that which is common and basic in the modification of words and their combination into sentences and builds it into grammatical rules, grammatical laws. Grammar is the outcome of a process of abstraction performed by the human mind over a long period of time; it is an indication of the tremendous achievement of thought.

In this respect grammar resembles geometry, which in giving its laws abstracts itself from concrete objects, regarding objects as bodies devoid of concreteness, and defining the relations between them not as the concrete relations of concrete objects but as the relations of bodies in general, devoid of all concreteness.

Unlike the superstructure, which is connected with production not directly, but through the economy, language is directly connected with man's productive activity, as well as with all his other activity in all his spheres of work without exception. That is why the vocabulary of a language, being the most sensitive to change, is in a state of almost constant change and, unlike the superstructure, language does not have to wait until the base is eliminated, but makes changes in its vocabulary before the base is eliminated and irrespec-

tive of the state of the base.

However, the vocabulary of a language does not change in the way the superstructure does, that is, by abolishing the old and building something new, but by replenishing the existing vocabulary with new words which arise with changes in the social system, with the development of production, of culture, science, etc. Moreover, although a certain number of obsolete words usually drop out of the vocabulary of a language, a far larger number of new words are added. As to the basic word stock, it is preserved in all its fundamentals and is used as the basis for the vocabulary of the language.

This is quite understandable. There is no necessity to destroy the basic word stock when it can be effectively used through the course of several historical periods; not to speak of the fact that, it being impossible to create a new basic word stock in a short time, the destruction of the basic word stock accumulated in the course of centuries would result in paralysis of the language, in the complete disruption of intercourse between people.

The grammatical system of a language changes even more slowly than its basic word stock. Elaborated in the course of epochs, and having become part of the flesh and blood of the language, the grammatical system changes still more slowly than the basic word stock. With the lapse of time it, of course, undergoes changes, becomes more perfected, improves its rules, makes them more specific and acquires new rules; but the fundamentals of the grammatical system are preserved for a very long time, since, as history shows, they are able to serve society effectively through a succession of epochs.

Hence, grammatical system and basic word stock constitute the foundation of language, the essence of its specific character.

History shows that languages possess great stability and a tremendous power of resistance to forcible assimilation. Some historians, instead of explaining this phenomenon, confine themselves to expressing their surprise at it. But there is no reason for surprise whatsoever. Languages owe their stability to the stability of their grammatical systems and basic word stocks. The Turkish assimilators strove for hundreds of years to mutilate, shatter and destroy the languages of the Balkan peoples. During this period the vocabulary of the Balkan languages underwent considerable change; quite a few Turkish words and expressions were absorbed; there were "convergencies" and "divergencies." Nevertheless, the Balkan languages held their own and survived. Why? Because their grammatical sys-

tems and basic word stocks were in the main preserved.

It follows from all this that a language, its structure, cannot be regarded as the product of some one epoch. The structure of a language, its grammatical system and basic word stock, is the product of a number of epochs.

We may assume that the rudiments of modern language already existed in hoary antiquity, before the epoch of slavery. It was a rather simple language, with a very meagre stock of words, but with a grammatical system of its own — true, a primitive one, but a grammatical system nonetheless.

The further development of production, the appearance of classes, the introduction of writing, the rise of the state which needed a more or less well-regulated correspondence for its administration, the development of trade, which needed a well-regulated correspondence still more, the appearance of the printing press, the development of literature — all this caused big changes in the development of language. During this time, tribes and nationalities broke up and scattered, intermingled and intercrossed; later there arose national languages and states, revolutions took place, and old social systems were replaced by new ones. All this caused even greater changes in language and its development.

However, it would be a profound mistake to think that language developed in the way the superstructure developed — by the destruction of that which existed and the building of something new. In point of fact, languages did not develop by the destruction of existing languages and the creation of new ones, but by extending and perfecting the basic elements of existing languages. And the transition of the language from one quality to another did not take the form of an explosion, of the destruction at one blow of the old and the creation of the new, but of the gradual and long-continued accumulation of the elements of the new quality, of the new linguistic structure, and the gradual dying away of the elements of the old quality.

It is said that the theory that languages develop by stages is a Marxist theory, since it recognizes the necessity of sudden explosions as a condition for the transition of a language from an old quality to a new. This is of course untrue, for it is difficult to find anything resembling Marxism in this theory. And if the theory of stages really does recognize sudden explosions in the history of the development of languages, so much the worse for that theory. Marxism does not recognize sudden explosions in the development of

languages, the sudden death of an existing language and the sudden erection of a new language. Lafargue was wrong when he spoke of a "sudden linguistic revolution which took place between 1789 and 1794" in France (see Lafargue's pamphlet *The French Language Before and After the Revolution*). There was no linguistic revolution, let alone a sudden one, in France at that time. True enough, during that period the vocabulary of the French language was replenished with new words and expressions, a certain number of obsolete words dropped out of it and the meaning of certain words changed — but that was all. Changes of this nature, however, by no means determine the destiny of a language. The chief thing in a language is its grammatical system and basic word stock. But far from disappearing in the period of the French bourgeois revolution, the grammatical system and basic word stock of the French language were preserved without substantial change, and not only were they preserved, but they continue to exist in the French language of today. I need hardly say that five or six years is a ridiculously small period for the elimination of an existing language and the building of a new national language ("a sudden linguistic revolution"! — centuries are needed for this.

Marxism holds that the transition of a language from an old quality to a new does not take place by way of an explosion, of the destruction of an existing language and the creation of a new one, but by the gradual accumulation of the elements of the new quality, and hence by the gradual dying away of the elements of the old quality.

It should be said in general for the benefit of comrades who have an infatuation for explosions that the law of transition from an old quality to a new by means of an explosion is inapplicable not only to the history of the development of languages; it is not always applicable to other social phenomena of a basis or superstructural character. It applies of necessity to a society divided into hostile classes. But it does not necessarily apply to a society which has no hostile classes. In a period of eight to ten years we effected a transition in the agriculture of our country from the bourgeois, individual-peasant system to the socialist, collective-farm system. This was a revolution which eliminated the old bourgeois economic system in the countryside and created a new, socialist system. But that revolution did not take place by means of an explosion, that is, by the overthrow of the existing government power and the creation of a new power, but by a gradual transition from the old bourgeois system in

the countryside to a new system. And it was possible to do that because it was a revolution from above, because the revolution was accomplished on the initiative of the existing power with the support of the bulk of the peasantry.

It is said that the numerous instances of linguistic crossing in past history furnish reason to believe that when languages cross a new language is formed by means of an explosion, by a sudden transition from an old quality to a new. This is quite wrong.

Linguistic crossing cannot be regarded as the single impact of a decisive blow which produces its results within a few years. Linguistic crossing is a prolonged process which continues for hundreds of years. There can therefore be no question of explosion here.

Further, it would be quite wrong to think that the crossing of, say, two languages results in a new, third language which does not resemble either of the languages crossed and differs qualitatively from both of them. As a matter of fact one of the languages usually emerges victorious from the cross, retains its grammatical system and its basic word stock and continues to develop in accordance with its inherent laws of development, while the other language gradually loses its quality and gradually dies away.

Consequently, a cross does not result in some new, third language; one of the languages persists, retains its grammatical system and basic word stock and is able to develop in accordance with its inherent laws of development.

True, in the process the vocabulary of the victorious language is somewhat enriched from the vanquished language, but this strengthens rather than weakens it.

Such was the case, for instance, with the Russian language, with which, in the course of historical development, the languages of a number of other peoples crossed and which always emerged the victor.

Of course, in the process the vocabulary of the Russian language was enlarged at the expense of the vocabularies of the other languages, but far from weakening, this enriched and strengthened the Russian language.

As to the specific national individuality of the Russian language, it did not suffer in the slightest, because the Russian language preserved its grammatical system and basic word stock and continued to advance and perfect itself in accordance with its inherent laws of development.

There can be no doubt that the crossing theory has little or no

value for Soviet linguistics. If it is true that the chief task of linguistics is to study the inherent laws of language development, it has to be admitted that the crossing theory does not even set itself this task, let alone accomplish it — it simply does not notice it, or does not understand it.

Question: Did *Pravda* act rightly in starting an open discussion on problems of linguistics?

Answer: Yes, it did.

Along what lines the problems of linguistics will be settled, will become clear at the conclusion of the discussion. But it may be said already that the discussion has been very useful.

It has brought out, in the first place, that in linguistic bodies both in the centre and in the republics a regime has prevailed which is alien to science and men of science. The slightest criticism of the state of affairs in Soviet linguistics, even the most timid attempt to criticize the so-called “new doctrine” in linguistics, was persecuted and suppressed by the leading linguistic circles. Valuable workers and researchers in linguistics were dismissed from their posts or demoted for being critical of N.Y. Marr’s heritage or expressing the slightest disapproval of his teachings. Linguistic scholars were appointed to leading posts not on their merits, but because of their unqualified acceptance of N.Y. Marr’s theories.

It is generally recognized that no science can develop and flourish without a battle of opinions, without freedom of criticism. But this generally recognized rule was ignored and flouted in the most unceremonious fashion. There arose a close group of infallible leaders, who, having secured themselves against any possible criticism, became a law unto themselves and did whatever they pleased.

To give one example: the so-called “Baku Course” (lectures delivered by N.Y. Marr in Baku), which the author himself had rejected and forbidden to be republished, was republished nevertheless by order of this leading caste (Comrade Meshchaninov calls them “disciples” of N.Y. Marr) and included without any reservations in the list of textbooks recommended to students. This means that the students were deceived, a rejected “Course” being suggested to them as a sound textbook. If I were not convinced of the integrity of Comrade Meshchaninov and the other linguistic leaders, I would say that such conduct is tantamount to sabotage.

How could this have happened? It happened because the Arakcheyev regime¹³⁹ established in linguistics cultivates irresponsibility and encourages such arbitrary actions.

The discussion has proved to be very useful first of all because it brought this Arakcheyev regime into the light of day and smashed it to smithereens.

But the usefulness of the discussion does not end there. It not only smashed the old regime in linguistics but also brought out the incredible confusion of ideas on cardinal questions of linguistics which prevails among the leading circles in this branch of science. Until the discussion began the "disciples" of N.Y. Marr kept silence and glossed over the unsatisfactory state of affairs in linguistics. But when the discussion started silence became impossible, and they were compelled to express their opinion in the press. And what did we find? It turned out that in N.Y. Marr's teachings there are a whole number of defects, errors, ill-defined problems and sketchy propositions. Why, one asks, have N.Y. Marr's "disciples" begun to talk about this only now, after the discussion opened? Why did they not see to it before? Why did they not speak about it in due time openly and honestly, as befits scientists?

Having admitted "some" errors of N.Y. Marr, his "disciples," it appears, think that Soviet linguistics can only be advanced on the basis of a "rectified" version of N.Y. Marr's theory, which they consider a Marxist one. No, save us from N.Y. Marr's "Marxism"! N.Y. Marr did indeed want to be, and endeavoured to be, a Marxist, but he failed to become one. He was nothing but a simplifier and vulgarizer of Marxism, similar to the "proletcultists" or the "Rappists."

N.Y. Marr introduced into linguistics the incorrect, non-Marxist formula that language is a superstructure, and got himself into a muddle and put linguistics into a muddle. Soviet linguistics cannot be advanced on the basis of an incorrect formula.

N.Y. Marr introduced into linguistics another and also incorrect and non-Marxist formula, regarding the "class character" of language, and got himself into a muddle and put linguistics into a muddle. Soviet linguistics cannot be advanced on the basis of an incorrect formula which is contrary to the whole course of the history of peoples and languages.

N.Y. Marr introduced into linguistics an immodest, boastful, arrogant tone alien to Marxism and tending towards a bald and off-hand negation of everything done in linguistics prior to N.Y. Marr.

N.Y. Marr shrilly abused the comparative-historical method as "idealistic." Yet it must be said that, despite its serious shortcomings, the comparative-historical method is nevertheless better than N.Y. Marr's really idealistic four-element analysis,¹⁴⁰ because the

former gives a stimulus to work, to a study of languages, while the latter only gives a stimulus to loll in one's armchair and tell fortunes in the tea cup of the celebrated four elements.

N.Y. Marr haughtily discountenanced every attempt to study groups (families) of languages on the grounds that it was a manifestation of the "proto-language" theory.¹⁴¹ Yet it cannot be denied that the linguistic affinity of nations like the Slav nations, say, is beyond question, and that a study of the linguistic affinity of these nations might be of great value to linguistics in the study of the laws of language development. The "proto-language" theory, I need hardly say, has nothing to do with it.

To listen to N.Y. Marr, and especially to his "disciples," one might think that prior to N.Y. Marr there was no such thing as the science of language, that the science of language appeared with the "new doctrine" of N.Y. Marr. Marx and Engels were much more modest: they held that their dialectical materialism was a product of the development of the sciences, including philosophy, in earlier periods.

Thus, the discussion was useful also because it brought to light ideological shortcomings in Soviet linguistics.

I think that the sooner our linguistics rids itself of N.Y. Marr's errors, the sooner will it be possible to extricate it from its present crisis.

Elimination of the Arakcheyev regime in linguistics, rejection of N.Y. Marr's errors, and the introduction of Marxism into linguistics — that, in my opinion, is the way in which Soviet linguistics could be put on a sound basis.

June 20, 1950

CONCERNING CERTAIN PROBLEMS OF LINGUISTICS

(Reply to Comrade E. Krasheninnikova)

Comrade Krasheninnikova,
I am answering your questions.

1. *Question:* Your article convincingly shows that language is neither the base nor the superstructure. Would it be right to regard language as a phenomenon characteristic of both the base and the superstructure, or would it be more correct to regard language as an

intermediate phenomenon?

Answer: Of course, characteristic of language, as a social phenomenon, is that common feature which is inherent in all social phenomena, including the base and the superstructure, namely: it serves society just as society is served by all other social phenomena, including the base and the superstructure. But this, properly speaking, exhausts that common feature which is inherent in all social phenomena. Beyond this, important distinctions begin between social phenomena.

The point is that social phenomena have, in addition to this common feature, their own specific features which distinguish them from each other and which are of primary importance for science. The specific features of the base consist in that it serves society economically. The specific features of the superstructure consist in that it serves society by means of political, legal, aesthetic and other ideas and provides society with corresponding political, legal and other institutions. What then are the specific features of language, distinguishing it from other social phenomena? They consist in that language serves society as a means of intercourse between people, as a means for exchanging thoughts in society, as a means enabling people to understand one another and to coordinate joint work in all spheres of human activity, both in the sphere of production and in the sphere of economic relations, both in the sphere of politics and in the sphere of culture, both in social life and in everyday life. These specific features are characteristic only of language, and precisely because they are characteristic only of language, language is the object of study by an independent science — linguistics. If there were no such specific features of language, linguistics would lose its right to independent existence.

In brief: language cannot be included either in the category of bases or in the category of superstructures.

Nor can it be included in the category of “intermediate” phenomena between the base and the superstructure, for such “intermediate” phenomena do not exist.

But perhaps language could be included in the category of the productive forces of society, in the category, say, of instruments of production? Indeed, there does exist a certain analogy between language and instruments of production: instruments of production manifest, just as language does, a kind of indifference towards classes and can serve equally different classes of society, both old and new. Does this circumstance provide ground for including language

in the category of instruments of production? No, it does not.

At one time, N.Y. Marr, seeing that his formula — “language is a superstructure on the base” — encountered objections, decided to “reshape” it and announced that “language is an instrument of production.” Was N.Y. Marr right in including language in the category of instruments of production? No, he certainly was not.

The point is that the similarity between language and instruments of production ends with the analogy I have just mentioned. But, on the other hand, there is a radical difference between language and instruments of production. This difference lies in the fact that whereas instruments of production produce material wealth, language produces nothing or “produces” words only. To put it more plainly, people possessing instruments of production can produce material wealth, but those very same people, if they possess a language but not instruments of production, cannot produce material wealth. It is not difficult to see that were language capable of producing material wealth, windbags would be the richest men on earth.

2. *Question:* Marx and Engels define language as “the immediate reality of thought,” as “practical,... actual consciousness.”¹⁴² “Ideas,” Marx says, “do not exist divorced from language.” In what measure, in your opinion, should linguistics occupy itself with the semantic aspect of language, semantics, historical semasiology and stylistics, or should form alone be the subject of linguistics?

Answer: Semantics (semasiology) is one of the important branches of linguistics. The semantic aspect of words and expressions is of serious importance in the study of language. Hence, semantics (semasiology) must be assured its due place in linguistics.

However, in working on problems of semantics and in utilizing its data, its significance must in no way be overestimated, and still less must it be abused. I have in mind certain philologists who, having an excessive passion for semantics, disregard language as “the immediate reality of thought” inseparably connected with thinking, divorce thinking from language and maintain that language is outliving its age and that it is possible to do without language.

Listen to what N.Y. Marr says:

“Language exists only inasmuch as it is expressed in sounds; the action of thinking occurs also without being expressed... Language (spoken) has already begun to surrender its functions to the latest inventions which are unreservedly conquering space, while thinking is on the up-grade, departing from its unutilized accumulations in the past and its new acquisitions, and is to oust and fully replace language. The language of the future is thinking

which will be developing in technique free of natural matter. No language, even the spoken language, which is all the same connected with the standards of nature, will be able to withstand it" (see *Selected Works* by N.Y. Marr).

If we interpret this "labour-magic" gibberish into simple human language, the conclusion may be drawn that:

a) N.Y. Marr divorces thinking from language;

b) N.Y. Marr considers that communication between people can be realized without language, with the help of thinking itself, which is free of the "natural matter" of language, free of the "standards of nature";

c) Divorcing thinking from language and "having freed" it from the "natural matter" of language, N.Y. Marr lands into the swamp of idealism.

It is said that thoughts arise in the mind of man prior to their being expressed in speech, that they arise without linguistic material, without linguistic integument, in, so to say, a naked form. But that is absolutely wrong. Whatever thoughts arise in the human mind and at whatever moment, they can arise and exist only on the basis of the linguistic material, on the basis of language terms and phrases. Bare thoughts, free of the linguistic material, free of the "natural matter" of language, do not exist. "Language is the immediate reality of thought" (*Marx*). The reality of thought is manifested in language. Only idealists can speak of thinking not being connected with "the natural matter" of language, of thinking without language.

In brief: overestimation of semantics and abuse of it led N.Y. Marr to idealism.

Consequently, if semantics (semasiology) is safeguarded against exaggerations and abuses of the kind committed by N.Y. Marr and some of his "disciples," semantics can be of great benefit to linguistics.

3. *Question:* You quite justly say that the ideas, concepts, customs and moral principles of the bourgeoisie and those of the proletariat are directly antithetical. The class character of these phenomena is certainly reflected in the semantic aspect of language (and sometimes in its form — in the vocabulary — as is correctly pointed out in your article). In analysing concrete linguistic material and, in the first place, the semantic aspect of language, can we speak of the class essence of the concepts expressed by language, particularly in those cases when language expresses not only the thought of man but also his attitude towards reality, where his class affinity mani-

feels itself with especial clarity?

Answer: Putting it more briefly, you want to know whether classes influence language, whether they introduce into language their specific words and expressions, whether there are cases when people attach a different meaning to one and the same word or expression depending on their class affinity?

Yes, classes influence language, introduce into the language their own specific words and expressions and sometimes understand one and the same word or expression differently. There is no doubt about that.

However, it does not follow that specific words and expressions, as well as difference in semantics, can be of serious importance for the development of a single language common to the whole people, that they are capable of detracting from its significance or of changing its character.

Firstly, such specific words and expressions, as well as cases of difference in semantics, are so few in language that they hardly make up even one per cent of the entire linguistic material. Consequently, all the remaining overwhelming mass of words and expressions, as well as their semantics, are *common* to all classes of society.

Secondly, specific words and expressions with a class tinge are used in speech not according to rules of some sort of "class" grammar, which does not exist, but according to the grammatical rules of the existing language common to the whole people.

Hence, the existence of specific words and expressions and the facts of differences in the semantics of language do not refute, but, on the contrary, confirm the existence and necessity of a single language common to the whole people.

4. *Question:* In your article you quite correctly appraise Marr as a vulgarizer of Marxism. Does this mean that the linguists, including us, the young linguists, should reject the *whole* linguistic heritage of Marr, who all the same has to his credit a number of valuable linguistic researches (Comrades Chikobava, Sanzheyev and others wrote about them during the discussion)? Approaching Marr critically, cannot we take from him what is useful and valuable?

Answer: Of course, the works of N.Y. Marr do not consist solely of errors. N.Y. Marr made very gross mistakes when he introduced into linguistics elements of Marxism in a distorted form, when he tried to create an independent theory of language. But N.Y. Marr has certain good and ably written works, in which he, forgetting his theoretical claims, conscientiously and, one must say, skilfully inves-

tigates individual languages. In these works one can find not a little that is valuable and instructive. Clearly, these valuable and instructive things should be taken from N.Y. Marr and utilized.

5. *Question:* Many linguists consider *formalism* one of the main causes of the stagnation in Soviet linguistics. We should very much like to know your opinion as to what formalism in linguistics consists in and how it should be overcome.

Answer: N.Y. Marr and his “disciples” accuse of “formalism” all linguists who do not accept the “new doctrine” of N.Y. Marr. This of course is not serious or clever.

N.Y. Marr considered that grammar is an empty “formality,” and that people who regard the grammatical system as the foundation of language are formalists. This is altogether foolish.

I think that “formalism” was invented by the authors of the “new doctrine” to facilitate their struggle against their opponents in linguistics.

The cause of the stagnation in Soviet linguistics is not the “formalism” invented by N.Y. Marr and his “disciples,” but the Arakcheyev regime and the theoretical gaps in linguistics. The Arakcheyev regime was set up by the “disciples” of N.Y. Marr. Theoretical confusion was brought into linguistics by N.Y. Marr and his closest colleagues. To put an end to stagnation, both the one and the other must be eliminated. The removal of these plague spots will put Soviet linguistics on a sound basis, will lead it out on to the broad highway and enable Soviet linguistics to occupy first place in world linguistics.

June 29, 1950

REPLY TO COMRADES

TO COMRADE SANZHEYEV

Esteemed Comrade *Sanzheyev*,

I am replying to your letter with considerable delay, for it was only yesterday forwarded to me from the apparatus of the Central Committee.

Your interpretation of my standpoint on the question of dialects is absolutely correct.

“Class” dialects, which it would be more correct to call jargons, do not serve the mass of the people, but a narrow social upper crust.

Moreover, they do not have a grammatical system or basic word stock of their own. In view of this, they cannot possibly develop into independent languages.

Local ("territorial") dialects, on the other hand, serve the mass of the people and have a grammatical system and basic word stock of their own. In view of this, some local dialects, in the process of formation of nations, may become the basis of national languages and develop into independent national languages. This was the case, for instance, with the Kursk-Orel dialect (the Kursk-Orel "speech") of the Russian language, which formed the basis of the Russian national language. The same must be said of the Poltava-Kiev dialect of the Ukrainian language, which formed the basis of the Ukrainian national language. As for the other dialects of such languages, they lose their originality, merge with those languages and disappear in them.

Reverse processes also occur, when the single language of a nationality, which has not yet become a nation owing to the absence of the necessary economic conditions of development, collapses as a result of the disintegration of the state of that nationality, and the local dialects, which have not yet had time to be fully uniformized in the single language, revive and give rise to the formation of separate independent languages. Possibly, this was the case, for example, with the single Mongolian language.

July n, 1950

TO COMRADES D. BELKIN AND S. FURER

I have received your letters.

Your mistake is that you have confused two different things and substituted another subject for that examined in my reply to Comrade Krashennikova.

1. In that reply I criticized N.Y. Marr who, dealing with language (spoken) and thought, divorces language from thought and thus lapses into idealism. Therefore, I referred in my reply to normal human beings possessing the faculty of speech. I maintained, moreover, that with such human beings thoughts can arise only on the basis of linguistic material, that bare thoughts unconnected with linguistic material do not exist among people, who possess the faculty of speech.

Instead of accepting or rejecting this thesis, you introduce anomalous human beings, people without language, deaf-mutes, who have

no language at their disposal and whose thoughts, of course, cannot arise on the basis of linguistic material. As you see, this is an entirely different subject which I did not touch upon and could not have touched upon since linguistics concerns itself with normal human beings possessing the faculty of speech and not with anomalous deaf-mutes who do not possess the faculty of speech.

You have substituted for the subject under discussion another subject that was not discussed.

2. From Comrade Belkin's letter it is evident that he places on a par the "language of words" (spoken language) and "gesture language" ("hand" language, according to N.Y. Marr). He seems to think that gesture language and the language of words are of equal significance, that at one time human society had no language of words, that "hand" language at that time played the part of the language of words which appeared later.

But if Comrade Belkin really thinks so, he is committing a serious error. Spoken language or the language of words has always been the sole language of human society capable of serving as an adequate means of intercourse between people. History does not know of a single human society, be it the most backward, that did not have its own spoken language. Ethnography does not know of a single backward tribe, be it as primitive or even more primitive than, say, the Australians or the Tierra del Fuegians of the last century, which did not have its own spoken language. In the history of mankind, spoken language has been one of the forces which helped human beings to emerge from the animal world, unite into communities, develop their faculty of thinking, organize social production, wage a successful struggle against the forces of nature and attain the stage of progress we have today.

In this respect, the significance of the so-called gesture language, in view of its extreme poverty and limitations, is negligible. Properly speaking, this is not a language, and not even a linguistic substitute that could in one way or another replace spoken language, but an auxiliary means of extremely limited possibilities to which man sometimes resorts to emphasize this or that point in his speech. Gesture language and spoken language are just as incomparable as are the primitive wooden hoe and the modern caterpillar tractor with its five-furrow plough or tractor row drill.

3. Apparently, you are primarily interested in the deaf-mutes, and only secondarily in problems of linguistics. Evidently, it was precisely this circumstance that prompted you to put a number of

questions to me. Well, if you insist, I am not averse to granting your request. How do matters stand with regard to deaf-mutes? Do they possess the faculty of thinking? Do thoughts arise with them? Yes, they possess the faculty of thinking and thoughts arise with them. Clearly, since deaf-mutes are deprived of the faculty of speech, their thoughts cannot arise on the basis of linguistic material. Can this be taken to mean that the thoughts of deaf-mutes are naked, are not connected with the "standards of nature" (N.Y. Marr's expression)? No, it cannot. The thoughts of deaf-mutes arise and can exist only on the basis of the images, sensations and conceptions they form in everyday life on the objects of the outside world and their relations among themselves, thanks to the senses of sight, of touch, taste and smell. Apart from these images, sensations and conceptions, thought is empty, is deprived of all content, that is, it does not exist.

July 22, 1950

TO COMRADE A. KHOLOPOV

I have received your letter.

Pressure of work has somewhat delayed my reply.

Your letter tacitly proceeds from two premises: from the premise that it is permissible to quote the work of this or that author *apart* from the historical period of which the quotation treats, and secondly, from the premise that this or that conclusion or formula of Marxism, derived as a result of studying one of the periods of historical development, holds good for all periods of development and therefore must remain *invariable*.

I must say that both these premises are deeply mistaken.

A few examples.

1. In the forties of the past century when there was no monopoly capitalism as yet, when capitalism was developing more or less smoothly along an ascending line, spreading to new territories it had not yet occupied, and the law of uneven development could not yet fully operate, Marx and Engels concluded that a socialist revolution could not be victorious in one particular country, that it could be victorious only as a result of a joint blow in all, or in most, civilized countries. This conclusion subsequently became a guiding principle for all Marxists.

However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, especially in the period of the first world war, when it became clear to everyone that pre-monopoly capitalism had definitely developed into monopo-

ly capitalism, when rising capitalism had become dying capitalism, when the war had revealed the incurable weaknesses of the world imperialist front, and the law of uneven development predetermined that the proletarian revolution would mature in different countries at different times, Lenin, proceeding from Marxist theory, came to the conclusion that in the new conditions of development, the socialist revolution could fully prove victorious in one country taken separately, that the simultaneous victory of the socialist revolution in all countries, or in a majority of civilized countries, was impossible owing to the uneven maturing of the revolution in those countries, that the old formula of Marx and Engels no longer corresponded to the new historical conditions.

It is evident that here we have two different conclusions on the question of the victory of socialism, which not only contradict, but exclude each other.

Some textualists and Talmudists who quote mechanically without delving into the essence of the matter, and apart from historical conditions, may say that one of these conclusions should be discarded as being absolutely incorrect, while the other conclusion, as the absolutely correct one, should be applied to all periods of development. Marxists, however, cannot but know that the textualists and Talmudists are mistaken; they cannot but know that both of these conclusions are correct, though not absolutely, each being correct for its own time: Marx's and Engels' conclusion — for the period of pre-monopoly capitalism; and Lenin's conclusion — for the period of monopoly capitalism.

2. Engels in his *Anti-Dühring* said that after the victory of the socialist revolution, the state is bound to wither away. On these grounds, after the victory of the socialist revolution in our country, textualists and Talmudists in our Party began demanding that the Party should take steps to ensure the speedy withering away of our state, to disband state organs, to give up a standing army.

However, the study of the world situation of our time led Soviet Marxists to the conclusion that in the conditions of capitalist encirclement, when the socialist revolution has been victorious only in one country, and capitalism reigns in all other countries, the land of the victorious revolution should not weaken, but in every way strengthen its state, state organs, intelligence organs and army, if that land does not want to be crushed by the capitalist encirclement. Russian Marxists came to the conclusion that Engels' formula has in view the victory of socialism in all, or in most, countries, that it can-

not be applied in the case where socialism is victorious in one country taken separately and capitalism reigns in all the other countries.

Evidently, we have here two different formulas regarding the destiny of the socialist state, each formula excluding the other.

The textualists and Talmudists may say that this circumstance creates an intolerable situation, that one of these formulas must be discarded as being absolutely erroneous, and the other — as the absolutely correct one — must be applied to all periods of development of the socialist state. Marxists, however, cannot but know that the textualists and Talmudists are mistaken, for both these formulas are correct, though not absolutely, each being correct for its time: the formula of Soviet Marxists — for the period of the victory of socialism in one or several countries; and the formula of Engels — for the period when the consecutive victory of socialism in separate countries will lead to the victory of socialism in the majority of countries and when the necessary conditions will thus have been created for the application of Engels' formula.

The number of such examples could be multiplied.

The same must be said of the two different formulas on the question of language, taken from various works of Stalin and cited by Comrade Kholopov in his letter.

Comrade Kholopov refers to Stalin's work *Concerning Marxism in Linguistics*, where the conclusion is drawn that, as a result of the crossing, say, of two languages, one of them usually emerges victorious, while the other dies away, that, consequently, crossing does not produce some new, third language, but preserves one of the languages. He refers further to another conclusion, taken from Stalin's report to the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU(B), where it is said that in the period of the victory of socialism on a world scale, when socialism is consolidated and becomes part of everyday life, national languages will inevitably merge into one common language which, of course, will be neither Great Russian nor German, but something new. Comparing these two formulas and seeing that, far from coinciding, they exclude each other, Comrade Kholopov falls into despair. "From your article," he writes in his letter, "I understood that the crossing of languages can *never* produce some new language, whereas prior to your article I was firmly convinced, in conformity with your speech at the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU(B), that under *communism*, languages would merge into one common language."

Evidently, having discovered a contradiction between these two

formulas and being deeply convinced that the contradiction must be removed, Comrade Kholopov considers it necessary to get rid of one of these formulas as incorrect and to clutch at the other as being correct for all periods and countries; but which formula to clutch at — he does not know. The result is something in the nature of a hopeless situation. Comrade Kholopov does not even suspect that both formulas can be correct — each for its own time.

That is always the case with textualists and Talmudists who do not delve into the essence of the matter, quote mechanically and irrespective of the historical conditions of which the quotations treat, and invariably find themselves in a hopeless situation.

Yet if one examines the essence of the matter, there are no grounds for considering the situation hopeless. The fact is that Stalin's pamphlet *Concerning Marxism in Linguistics*, and Stalin's speech at the Sixteenth Party Congress, refer to two entirely different epochs, owing to which the formulas, too, prove to be different.

The formula given by Stalin in his pamphlet, in the part where it speaks of the crossing of languages, refers to the epoch *prior to the victory of socialism* on a world scale, when the exploiting classes are the dominant power in the world; when national and colonial oppression remains in force; when national isolation and mutual distrust among nations are consolidated by differences between states; when, as yet, there is no national equality of rights; when the crossing of languages takes place as a struggle for the domination of one of the languages; when the conditions necessary for the peaceful and friendly cooperation of nations and languages are as yet lacking; when it is not the cooperation and mutual enrichment of languages that are on the order of the day, but the assimilation of some and the victory of other languages. It is clear that in such conditions there can be only victorious and defeated languages. It is precisely these conditions that Stalin's formula has in view when it says that the crossing, say, of two languages, results not in the formation of a new language, but in the victory of one of the languages and the defeat of the other.

As regards the other formula by Stalin, taken from his speech at the Sixteenth Party Congress, in the part that touches on the merging of languages into one common language, it has in view another epoch, namely, the epoch *after the victory of socialism* on a world scale, when world imperialism no longer exists; when the exploiting classes are overthrown and national and colonial oppression is eradicated; when national isolation and mutual distrust among nations is

replaced by mutual confidence and rapprochement between nations; when national equality has been put into practice; when the policy of suppressing and assimilating languages is abolished; when the cooperation of nations has been established, and it is possible for national languages freely to enrich one another through their cooperation. It is clear that in these conditions there can be no question of the suppression and defeat of some languages, and the victory of others. Here we shall have not two languages, one of which is to suffer defeat, while the other is to emerge from the struggle victorious, but hundreds of national languages, out of which, as a result of a prolonged economic, political and cultural cooperation of nations, there will first appear most enriched unified zonal languages, and subsequently the zonal languages will merge into a single international language, which, of course, will be neither German, nor Russian, nor English, but a new language that has absorbed the best elements of the national and zonal languages.

Consequently, the two different formulas correspond to two different epochs in the development of society, and precisely because they correspond to them, both formulas are correct — each for its epoch.

To demand that these formulas should not be at variance with each other, that they should not exclude each other, is just as absurd as it would be to demand that the epoch of the domination of capitalism should not be at variance with the epoch of the domination of socialism, that socialism and capitalism should not exclude each other.

The textualists and Talmudists regard Marxism and separate conclusions and formulas of Marxism as a collection of dogmas, which “never” change, notwithstanding changes in the conditions of the development of society. They believe that if they learn these conclusions and formulas by heart and start citing them at random, they will be able to solve any problem, reckoning that the memorized conclusions and formulas will serve them for all times and countries, for all occasions in life. But this can be the conviction only of people who see the letter of Marxism, but not its essence, who learn by rote the texts of conclusions and formulas of Marxism, but do not understand their meaning.

Marxism is the science of the laws governing the development of nature and society, the science of the revolution of the oppressed and exploited masses, the science of the victory of socialism in all countries, the science of building communist society. As a science,

Marxism cannot stand still, it develops and is perfected. In its development, Marxism cannot but be enriched by new experience, new knowledge — consequently some of its formulas and conclusions cannot but change in the course of time, cannot but be replaced by new formulas and conclusions, corresponding to the new historical tasks. Marxism does not recognize invariable conclusions and formulas, obligatory for all epochs and periods. Marxism is the enemy of all dogmatism.

July 28, 1950

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF SOCIALISM IN THE USSR

February-May 1952

REMARKS ON ECONOMIC QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE NOVEMBER 1951 DISCUSSION

I have received all the materials on the economic discussion arranged to assess the draft textbook on political economy. The material received includes the "Proposals for the Improvement of the Draft Textbook on Political Economy," "Proposals for the Elimination of Mistakes and Inaccuracies" in the draft, and the "Memorandum on Disputed Issues."

On all these materials, as well as on the draft textbook, I consider it necessary to make the following remarks.

1. CHARACTER OF ECONOMIC LAWS UNDER SOCIALISM

Some comrades deny the objective character of laws of science, and of laws of political economy particularly, under socialism. They deny that the laws of political economy reflect law-governed processes which operate independently of the will of man. They believe that in view of the specific role assigned to the Soviet state by history, the Soviet state and its leaders can abolish existing laws of political economy and can "form," "create," new laws.

These comrades are profoundly mistaken. It is evident that they confuse laws of science, which reflect objective processes in nature or society, processes which take place independently of the will of man, with the laws which are issued by governments, which are made by the will of man, and which have only juridical validity. But they must not be confused.

Marxism regards laws of science — whether they be laws of natural science or laws of political economy — as the reflection of objective processes which take place independently of the will of man. Man may discover these laws, get to know them, study them, reckon with them in his activities and utilize them in the interests of society, but he cannot change or abolish them. Still less can he form or create new laws of science.

Does this mean, for instance, that the results of the action of the laws of nature, the results of the action of the forces of nature, are generally inavertible, that the destructive action of the forces of nature always and everywhere proceeds with an elemental and inexorable power that does not yield to the influence of man? No, it does not. Leaving aside astronomical, geological and other similar processes, which man really is powerless to influence, even if he has come to know the laws of their development, in many other cases man is very far from powerless, in the sense of being able to influence the processes of nature. In all such cases, having come to know the laws of nature, reckoning with them and relying on them, and intelligently applying and utilizing them, man can restrict their sphere of action, and can impart a different direction to the destructive forces of nature and convert them to the use of society.

To take one of numerous examples. In olden times the overflow of big rivers, floods, and the resulting destruction of homes and crops, was considered an inavertible calamity, against which man was powerless. But with the lapse of time and the development of human knowledge, when man had learned to build dams and hydroelectric stations, it became possible to protect society from the calamity of flood which had formerly seemed to be inavertible. More, man learned to curb the destructive forces of nature, to harness them, so to speak, to convert the force of water to the use of society and to utilize it for the irrigation of fields and the generation of power.

Does this mean that man has thereby abolished laws of nature, laws of science, and has created new laws of nature, new laws of science? No, it does not. The fact is that all this procedure of averting the action of the destructive forces of water and of utilizing them in the interests of society takes place without any violation, alteration or abolition of scientific laws or the creation of new scientific laws. On the contrary, all this procedure is effected in precise conformity with the laws of nature and the laws of science, since any violation, even the slightest, of the laws of nature would only upset matters and render the procedure futile.

The same must be said of the laws of economic development, the laws of political economy — whether in the period of capitalism or in the period of socialism. Here, too, the laws of economic development, as in the case of natural science, are objective laws, reflecting processes of economic development which take place independently of the will of man. Man may discover these laws, get to know them

and, relying upon them, utilize them in the interests of society, impart a different direction to the destructive action of some of the laws, restrict their sphere of action, and allow fuller scope to other laws that are forcing their way to the forefront; but he cannot destroy them or create new economic laws.

One of the distinguishing features of political economy is that its laws, unlike those of natural science, are impermanent, that they, or at least the majority of them, operate for a definite historical period, after which they give place to new laws. However, these laws are not abolished, but lose their validity owing to the new economic conditions and depart from the scene in order to give place to new laws, laws which are not created by the will of man, but which arise from the new economic conditions.

Reference is made to Engels' *Anti-Dühring*, to his formula which says that, with the abolition of capitalism and the socialization of the means of production, man will obtain control of his means of production, that he will be set free from the yoke of social and economic relations and become the "master" of his social life. Engels calls this freedom "appreciation of necessity."¹⁴³ And what can this "appreciation of necessity" mean? It means that, having come to know objective laws ("necessity"), man will apply them with full consciousness in the interests of society. That is why Engels says in the same book:

"The laws of his own social action, hitherto standing face to face with man as laws of nature foreign to, and dominating him, will then be used with full understanding, and so mastered by him."¹⁴⁴

As we see, Engels' formula does not speak at all in favour of those who think that under socialism existing economic laws can be abolished and new ones created. On the contrary, it demands, not the abolition, but the understanding of economic laws and their intelligent application.

It is said that economic laws are elemental in character, that their action is inavertible and that society is powerless against them. That is not true. It is making a fetish of laws, and oneself the slave of laws. It has been demonstrated that society is not powerless against laws, that, having come to know economic laws and relying upon them, society can restrict their sphere of action, utilize them in the interests of society and "harness" them, just as in the case of the forces of nature and their laws, just as in the case of the overflow of big rivers cited in the illustration above.

Reference is made to the specific role of Soviet government in

building socialism, which allegedly enables it to abolish existing laws of economic development and to “form” new ones. That also is untrue.

The specific role of Soviet government was due to two circumstances: first, that what Soviet government had to do was not to replace one form of exploitation by another, as was the case in earlier revolutions, but to abolish exploitation altogether; second, that in view of the absence in the country of any ready-made rudiments of a socialist economy, it had to create new, socialist forms of economy, “starting from scratch,” so to speak.

That was undoubtedly a difficult, complex and unprecedented task. Nevertheless, the Soviet government accomplished this task with credit. But it accomplished it not because it supposedly destroyed the existing economic laws and “formed” new ones, but only because it relied on the economic law that the relations of production *must necessarily conform* with the character of the productive forces. The productive forces of our country, especially in industry, were social in character, the form of ownership, on the other hand, was private, capitalistic. Relying on the economic law that the relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces, the Soviet government socialized the means of production, made them the property of the whole people, and thereby abolished the exploiting system and created socialist forms of economy. Had it not been for this law, and had the Soviet government not relied upon it, it could not have accomplished its mission.

The economic law that the relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces has long been forcing its way to the forefront in the capitalist countries. If it has failed so far to force its way into the open, it is because it is encountering powerful resistance on the part of obsolescent forces of society. Here we have another distinguishing feature of economic laws. Unlike the laws of natural science, where the discovery and application of a new law proceeds more or less smoothly, the discovery and application of a new law in the economic field, affecting as it does the interests of obsolescent forces of society, meets with the most powerful resistance on their part. A force, a social force, capable of overcoming this resistance, is therefore necessary. In our country, such a force was the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, who represented the overwhelming majority of society. There is no such force yet in other, capitalist countries. This explains the secret why the Soviet government was able to smash the old

forces of society, and why in our country the economic law that the relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces received full scope.

It is said that the necessity for balanced (proportionate) development of the national economy in our country enables the Soviet government to abolish existing economic laws and to create new ones. That is absolutely untrue. Our yearly and five-yearly plans must not be confused with the objective economic law of balanced, proportionate development of the national economy. The law of balanced development of the national economy arose in opposition to the law of competition and anarchy of production under capitalism. It arose from the socialization of the means of production, after the law of competition and anarchy of production had lost its validity. It became operative because a socialist economy can be conducted only on the basis of the economic law of balanced development of the national economy. That means that the law of balanced development of the national economy makes it *possible* for our planning bodies to plan social production correctly. But *possibility* must not be confused with actuality. They are two different things. In order to turn the possibility into *actuality*, it is necessary to study this economic law, to master it, to learn to apply it with full understanding, and to compile such plans as fully reflect the requirements of this law. It cannot be said that the requirements of this economic law are fully reflected by our yearly and five-yearly plans.

It is said that some of the economic laws operating in our country under socialism, including the law of value, have been “transformed,” or even “radically transformed,” on the basis of planned economy. That is likewise untrue. Laws cannot be “transformed,” still less “radically” transformed. If they can be transformed, then they can be abolished and replaced by other laws. The thesis that laws can be “transformed” is a relic of the incorrect formula that laws can be “abolished” or “formed.” Although the formula that economic laws can be transformed has already been current in our country for a long time, it must be abandoned for the sake of accuracy. The sphere of action of this or that economic law may be restricted, its destructive action — that is, of course, if it is liable to be destructive — may be averted, but it cannot be “transformed” or “abolished.”

Consequently, when we speak of “subjugating” natural forces or economic forces, of “dominating” them, etc., this does not mean that man can “abolish” or “form” scientific laws. On the contrary, it only

means that man can discover laws, get to know them and master them, learn to apply them with full understanding, utilize them in the interests of society, and thus subjugate them, secure mastery over them.

Hence, the laws of political economy under socialism are objective laws, which reflect the fact that the processes of economic life are law-governed and operate independently of our will. People who deny this postulate are in point of fact denying science, and, by denying science, they are denying all possibility of prognostication — and, consequently, are denying the possibility of directing economic activity.

It may be said that all this is correct and generally known; but that there is nothing new in it, and that it is therefore not worth spending time reiterating generally-known truths. Of course, there really is nothing new in this; but it would be a mistake to think that it is not worth spending time reiterating certain truths that are well known to us. The fact is that we, the leading core, are joined every year by thousands of new and young forces who are ardently desirous of assisting us and ardently desirous of proving their worth, but who do not possess an adequate Marxist education, are unfamiliar with many truths that are well known to us, and are therefore compelled to grope in the darkness. They are staggered by the colossal achievements of Soviet government, they are dazzled by the extraordinary successes of the Soviet system, and they begin to imagine that Soviet government can “do anything,” that “nothing is beyond it,” that it can abolish scientific laws and form new ones. What are we to do with these comrades? How are we to educate them in Marxism-Leninism? I think that systematic reiteration and patient explanation of so-called “generally-known” truths is one of the best methods of educating these comrades in Marxism.

2. COMMODITY PRODUCTION UNDER SOCIALISM

Certain comrades affirm that the Party acted wrongly in preserving commodity production after it had assumed power and nationalized the means of production in our country. They consider that the Party should have banished commodity production there and then. In this connection they cite Engels, who says:

“With the seizing of the means of production by society, production of commodities is done away with, and, simultaneously, the mastery of the product over the producer.”¹⁴⁵

These comrades are profoundly mistaken.

Let us examine Engels' formula. Engels' formula cannot be considered fully clear and precise, because it does not indicate whether it is referring to the seizure by society of *all* or only part of the means of production, that is, whether *all* or only part of the means of production are converted into public property. Hence, *this* formula of Engels' may be understood either way.

Elsewhere in *Anti-Dühring* Engels speaks of mastering "all the means of production," of taking possession of "all means of production." Hence, in this formula Engels has in mind the nationalization not of part, but of all the means of production, that is, the conversion into public property of the means of production not only of industry, but also of agriculture.

It follows from this that Engels has in mind countries where capitalism and the concentration of production have advanced far enough both in industry and in agriculture to permit the expropriation of *all* the means of production in the country and their conversion into public property. Engels, consequently, considers that in *such* countries, parallel with the socialization of *all* the means of production, commodity production should be put an end to. And that, of course, is correct.

There was only one such country at the close of the last century, when *Anti-Dühring* was published — Britain. There the development of capitalism and the concentration of production both in industry and in agriculture had reached such a point that it would have been possible, in the event of the assumption of power by the proletariat, to convert *all* the country's means of production into public property and to put an end to commodity production.

I leave aside in this instance the question of the importance of foreign trade to Britain and the vast part it plays in her national economy. I think that only after an investigation of this question can it be finally decided what would be the future of commodity production in Britain after the proletariat had assumed power and *all* the means of production had been nationalized.

However, not only at the close of the last century, but today too, no country has attained such a degree of development of capitalism and concentration of production in agriculture as is to be observed in Britain. As to the other countries, notwithstanding the development of capitalism in the countryside, they still have a fairly numerous class of small and medium rural owner-producers, whose future would have to be decided if the proletariat should assume power.

But here is a question: what are the proletariat and its party to do in countries, ours being a case in point, where the conditions are favourable for the assumption of power by the proletariat and the overthrow of capitalism, where capitalism has so concentrated the means of production in industry that they may be expropriated and made the property of society, but where agriculture, notwithstanding the growth of capitalism, is divided up among numerous small and medium owner-producers to such an extent as to make it impossible to consider the expropriation of these producers?

To this question Engels' formula does not furnish an answer. Incidentally, it was not supposed to furnish an answer, since the formula arose from another question, namely, what should be the fate of commodity production after *all* the means of production had been socialized.

And so, what is to be done if *not all*, but only part of the means of production have been socialized, yet the conditions are favourable for the assumption of power by the proletariat — should the proletariat assume power and should commodity production be abolished immediately thereafter?

We cannot, of course, regard as an answer the opinion of certain half-baked Marxists who believe that under such conditions the thing to do is to refrain from taking power and to wait until capitalism has succeeded in ruining the millions of small and medium producers and converting them into farm labourers and in concentrating the means of production in agriculture, and that only after this would it be possible to consider the assumption of power by the proletariat and the socialization of *all* the means of production. Naturally, this is a "solution" which Marxists cannot accept if they do not want to disgrace themselves completely.

Nor can we regard as an answer the opinion of other half-baked Marxists, who think that the thing to do would be to assume power and to expropriate the small and medium rural producers and to socialize their means of production. Marxists cannot adopt this senseless and criminal course either, because it would destroy all chances of victory for the proletarian revolution, and would throw the peasantry into the camp of the enemies of the proletariat for a long time.

The answer to this question was given by Lenin in his writings on the "tax in kind" and in his celebrated "cooperative plan."

Lenin's answer may be briefly summed up as follows:

a) Favourable conditions for the assumption of power should not be missed — the proletariat should assume power without waiting

until capitalism has succeeded in ruining the millions of small and medium individual producers;

b) The means of production in industry should be expropriated and converted into public property;

c) As to the small and medium individual producers, they should be gradually united in producers' cooperatives, *i.e.*, in large agricultural enterprises, collective farms;

d) Industry should be developed to the utmost and the collective farms should be placed on the modern technical basis of large-scale production, not expropriating them, but on the contrary generously supplying them with first-class tractors and other machines;

e) In order to ensure an economic bond between town and country, between industry and agriculture, commodity production (exchange through purchase and sale) should be preserved for a certain period, it being the form of economic tie with the town which is *alone acceptable* to the peasants, and Soviet trade — state, cooperative, and collective-farm — should be developed to the full and the capitalists of all types and descriptions ousted from trading activity.

The history of socialist construction in our country has shown that this path of development, mapped out by Lenin, has fully justified itself.

There can be no doubt that in the case of all capitalist countries with a more or less numerous class of small and medium producers, this path of development is the only possible and expedient one for the victory of socialism.

It is said that commodity production must lead, is bound to lead, to capitalism all the same, under all conditions. That is not true. Not always and not under all conditions! Commodity production must not be identified with capitalist production. They are two different things. Capitalist production is the highest form of commodity production. Commodity production leads to capitalism only *if* there is private ownership of the means of production, *if* labour power appears in the market as a commodity which can be bought by the capitalist and exploited in the process of production, and *if*, consequently, the system of exploitation of wageworkers by capitalists exists in the country. Capitalist production begins when the means of production are concentrated in private hands, and when the workers are bereft of means of production and are compelled to sell their labour power as a commodity. Without this there is no such thing as capitalist production.

Well, and what is to be done if the conditions for the conversion

of commodity production into capitalist production do not exist, if the means of production are no longer private but socialist property, if the system of wage labour no longer exists and labour power is no longer a commodity, and if the system of exploitation has long been abolished — can it be considered then that commodity production will lead to capitalism all the same? No, it cannot. Yet ours is precisely such a society, a society where private ownership of the means of production, the system of wage labour, and the system of exploitation have long ceased to exist.

Commodity production must not be regarded as something sufficient unto itself, something independent of the surrounding economic conditions. Commodity production is older than capitalist production. It existed in slave-owning society, and served it, but did not lead to capitalism. It existed in feudal society and served it, yet, although it prepared some of the conditions for capitalist production, it did not lead to capitalism. Why then, one asks, cannot commodity production similarly serve our socialist society for a certain period without leading to capitalism, bearing in mind that in our country commodity production is not so boundless and all-embracing as it is under capitalist conditions, being confined within strict bounds thanks to such decisive economic conditions as social ownership of the means of production, the abolition of the system of wage labour, and the elimination of the system of exploitation?

It is said that, since the domination of social ownership of the means of production has been established in our country, and the system of wage labour and exploitation has been abolished, commodity production has lost all meaning and should therefore be done away with.

That is also untrue. Today there are two basic forms of socialist production in our county: state, or publicly-owned production and collective-farm production, which cannot be said to be publicly owned. In the state enterprises, the means of production and the product of production are national property. In the collective farm, although the means of production (land, machines) do belong to the state, the product of production is the property of the different collective farms since the labour, as well as the seed, is their own, while the land, which has been turned over to the collective farms in perpetual tenure, is used by them virtually as their own property, in spite of the fact that they cannot sell, buy, lease or mortgage it.

The effect of this is that the state disposes only of the product of the state enterprises, while the product of the collective farms, being

their property, is disposed of only by them. But the collective farms are unwilling to alienate the products except in the form of commodities in exchange for which they desire to receive the commodities they need. At present the collective farms will not recognize any other economic relation with the town except the commodity relation — exchange through purchase and sale. Because of this, commodity production and trade are as much a necessity with us today as they were, say, thirty years ago, when Lenin spoke of the necessity of developing trade to the utmost.

Of course, when instead of the two basic production sectors, the state sector and the collective-farm sector, there will be only one all-embracing production sector, with the right to dispose of all the consumer goods produced in the country, commodity circulation, with its “money economy,” will disappear, as being an unnecessary element in the national economy. But so long as this is not the case, so long as the two basic production sectors remain, commodity production and commodity circulation must remain in force, as a necessary and very useful element in our system of national economy. How the formation of a single and united sector will come about, whether simply by the swallowing up of the collective-farm sector by the state sector — which is hardly likely (because that would be looked upon as the expropriation of the collective farms) — or by the setting up of a single *national* economic body (comprising representatives of state industry and of the collective farms), with the right at first to keep account of all consumer product in the country, and eventually also to distribute it, by way, say, of products-exchange — is a special question which requires separate discussion.

Consequently, *our* commodity production is not of the ordinary type, but is a special kind of commodity production, commodity production without capitalists, which is concerned mainly with the goods of associated socialist producers (the state, the collective farms, the cooperatives), the sphere of action of which is confined to items of personal consumption, which obviously cannot possibly develop into capitalist production, and which, together with its “money economy,” is designed to serve the development and consolidation of socialist production.

Absolutely mistaken, therefore, are those comrades who allege that, since socialist society has not abolished commodity forms of production, we are bound to have the reappearance of all the economic categories characteristic of capitalism: labour power as a commodity, surplus value, capital, capitalist profit, the average rate

of profit, etc. These comrades confuse commodity production with capitalist production, and believe that once there is commodity production there must also be capitalist production. They do not realize that our commodity production radically differs from commodity production under capitalism.

Further, I think that we must also discard certain other concepts taken from Marx's *Capital* — where Marx was concerned with an analysis of capitalism — and artificially applied to our socialist relations. I am referring to such concepts, among others, as “necessary” and “surplus” labour, “necessary” and “surplus” product, “necessary” and “surplus” time. Marx analysed capitalism in order to elucidate the source of exploitation of the working class — surplus value — and to arm the working class, which was bereft of means of production, with an intellectual weapon for the overthrow of capitalism. It is natural that Marx used concepts (categories) which fully corresponded to capitalist relations. But it is strange, to say the least, to use these concepts now, when the working class is not only not bereft of power and means of production, but, on the contrary, is in possession of the power and controls the means of production. Talk of labour power being a commodity, and of “hiring” of workers sounds rather absurd now, under our system: as though the working class, which possesses means of production, hires itself and sells its labour power to itself. It is just as strange to speak now of “necessary” and “surplus” labour: as though, under our conditions, the labour contributed by the workers to society for the extension of production, the promotion of education and public health, the organization of defence, etc., is not just as necessary to the working class, now in power, as the labour expended to supply the personal needs of the worker and his family.

It should be remarked that in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, where it is no longer capitalism that he is investigating, but, among other things, the first phase of communist society, Marx recognizes labour contributed to society for extension of production, for education and public health, for administrative expenses, for building up reserves, etc., to be just as necessary as the labour expended to supply the consumption requirements of the working class.

I think that our economists should put an end to this incongruity between the old concepts and the new state of affairs in our socialist country, by replacing the old concepts with new ones that correspond to the new situation.

We could tolerate this incongruity for a certain period, but the

time has come to put an end to it.

3. THE LAW OF VALUE UNDER SOCIALISM

It is sometimes asked whether the law of value exists and operates in our country, under the socialist system.

Yes, it does exist and does operate. Wherever commodities and commodity production exist, there the law of value must also exist.

In our country, the sphere of operation of the law of value extends, first of all, to commodity circulation, to the exchange of commodities through purchase and sale, the exchange, chiefly, of articles of personal consumption. Here, in this sphere, the law of value preserves, within certain limits, of course, the function of a regulator.

But the operation of the law of value is not confined to the sphere of commodity circulation. It also extends to production. True, the law of value has no regulating function in our socialist production, but it nevertheless influences production, and this fact cannot be ignored when directing production. As a matter of fact, consumer goods, which are needed to compensate the labour power expended in the process of production, are produced and realized in our country as commodities coming under the operation of the law of value. It is precisely here that the law of value exercises its influence on production. In this connection, such things as cost accounting and profitableness, production costs, prices, etc., are of actual importance in our enterprises. Consequently, our enterprises cannot, and must not, function without taking the law of value into account.

Is this a good thing? It is not a bad thing. Under present conditions, it really is not a bad thing, since it trains our business executives to conduct production on rational lines and disciplines them. It is not a bad thing because it teaches our executives to count production magnitudes, to count them accurately, and also to calculate the real things in production precisely, and not to talk nonsense about "approximate figures," spun out of thin air. It is not a bad thing because it teaches our executives to look for, find and utilize hidden reserves latent in production, and not to trample them under foot. It is not a bad thing because it teaches our executives systematically to improve methods of production, to lower production costs, to practise cost accounting, and to make their enterprises pay. It is a good practical school which accelerates the development of our executive personnel and their growth into genuine leaders of socialist production at the present stage of development.

The trouble is not that production in our country is influenced by the law of value. The trouble is that our business executives and planners, with few exceptions, are poorly acquainted with the operations of the law of value, do not study them, and are unable to take account of them in their computations. This, in fact, explains the confusion that still reigns in the sphere of price-fixing policy. Here is one of many examples. Some time ago it was decided to adjust the prices of cotton and grain in the interest of cotton growing, to establish more accurate prices for grain sold to the cotton growers, and to raise the prices of cotton delivered to the state. Our business executives and planners submitted a proposal on this score which could not but astound the members of the Central Committee, since it suggested fixing the price of a ton of grain at practically the same level as a ton of cotton, and, moreover, the price of a ton of grain was taken as equivalent to that of a ton of baked bread. In reply to the remarks of members of the Central Committee that the price of a ton of bread must be higher than that of a ton of grain, because of the additional expense of milling and baking, and that cotton was generally much dearer than grain, as was also borne out by their prices in the world market, the authors of the proposal could find nothing coherent to say. The Central Committee was therefore obliged to take the matter into its own hands and to lower the prices of grain and raise the prices of cotton. What would have happened if the proposal of these comrades had received legal force? We should have ruined the cotton growers and would have found ourselves without cotton.

But does this mean that the operation of the law of value has as much scope with us as it has under capitalism, and that it is the regulator of production in our country too? No, it does not. Actually, the sphere of operation of the law of value under our economic system is strictly limited and placed within definite bounds. It has already been said that the sphere of operation of commodity production is restricted and placed within definite bounds by our system. The same must be said of the sphere of operation of the law of value. Undoubtedly, the fact that private ownership of the means of production does not exist, and that the means of production both in town and country are socialized, cannot but restrict the sphere of operation of the law of value and the extent of its influence on production.

In this same direction operates the law of balanced (proportionate) development of the national economy, which has superseded the

law of competition and anarchy of production.

In this same direction, too, operate our yearly and five-yearly plans and our economic policy generally, which are based on the requirements of the law of balanced development of the national economy.

The effect of all this, taken together, is that the sphere of operation of the law of value in our country is strictly limited, and that the law of value cannot under our system function as the regulator of production.

This, indeed, explains the “striking” fact that whereas in our country the law of value, in spite of the steady and rapid expansion of our socialist production, does not lead to crises of overproduction, in the capitalist countries this same law, whose sphere of operation is very wide under capitalism, does lead, in spite of the low rate of expansion of production, to periodical crises of overproduction.

It is said that the law of value is a permanent law, binding upon all periods of historical development, and that if it does lose its function as a regulator of exchange relations in the second phase of communist society, it retains at this phase of development its function as a regulator of the relations between the various branches of production, as a regulator of the distribution of labour among them.

That is quite untrue. Value, like the law of value, is an historical category connected with the existence of commodity production. With the disappearance of commodity production, value and its forms and the law of value also disappear.

In the second phase of communist society, the amount of labour expended on the production of goods will be measured not in a roundabout way, not through value and its forms, as is the case under commodity production, but directly and immediately — by the amount of time, the number of hours, expended on the production of goods. As to the distribution of labour, its distribution among the branches of production will be regulated not by the law of value, which will have ceased to function by that time, but by the growth of society’s demand for goods. It will be a society in which production will be regulated by the requirements of society, and computation of the requirements of society will acquire paramount importance for the planning bodies.

Totally incorrect, too, is the assertion that under our present economic system, in the first phase of development of communist society, the law of value regulates the “proportions” of labour distributed among the various branches of production.

If this were true, it would be incomprehensible why our light industries, which are the most profitable, are not being developed to the utmost, and why preference is given to our heavy industries, which are often less profitable, and sometimes altogether unprofitable.

If this were true, it would be incomprehensible why a number of our heavy industry plants which are still unprofitable and where the labour of the worker does not yield the "proper returns," are not closed down, and why new light industry plants, which would certainly be profitable and where the labour of the workers might yield "big returns," are not opened.

If this were true, it would be incomprehensible why workers are not transferred from plants that are less profitable, but very necessary to our national economy, to plants which are more profitable — in accordance with the law of value, which supposedly regulates the "proportions" of labour distributed among the branches of production.

Obviously, if we were to follow the lead of these comrades, we should have to cease giving primacy to the production of means of production in favour of the production of articles of consumption. And what would be the effect of ceasing to give primacy to the production of the means of production? The effect would be to destroy the possibility of the continuous expansion of our national economy, because the national economy cannot be continuously expanded without giving primacy to the production of means of production.

These comrades forget that the law of value can be a regulator of production only under capitalism, with private ownership of the means of production, and competition, anarchy of production, and crises of overproduction. They forget that in our country the sphere of operation of the law of value is limited by the social ownership of the means of production, and by the law of balanced development of the national economy, and is consequently also limited by our yearly and five-yearly plans, which are an approximate reflection of the requirements of this law.

Some comrades draw the conclusion from this that the law of balanced development of the national economy and economic planning annul the principle of profitability of production. That is quite untrue. It is just the other way round. If profitability is considered not from the standpoint of individual plants or industries, and not over a period of one year, but from the standpoint of the entire national economy and over a period of, say, ten or fifteen years,

which is the only correct approach to the question, then the temporary and unstable profitableness of some plants or industries is beneath all comparison with that higher form of stable and permanent profitableness which we get from the operation of the law of balanced development of the national economy and from economic planning, which save us from periodical economic crises disruptive to the national economy and causing tremendous material damage to society, and which ensure a continuous and high rate of expansion of our national economy.

In brief, there can be no doubt that under our present socialist conditions of production, the law of value cannot be a "regulator of the proportions" of labour distributed among the various branches of production.

4. ABOLITION OF THE ANTITHESIS BETWEEN TOWN AND COUNTRY, AND BETWEEN MENTAL AND PHYSICAL LABOUR, AND ELIMINATION OF DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THEM

This heading covers a number of problems which essentially differ from one another. I combine them in one section, not in order to lump them together, but solely for brevity of exposition.

Abolition of the antithesis between town and country, between industry and agriculture, is a well-known problem which was discussed long ago by Marx and Engels. The economic basis of this antithesis is the exploitation of the country by the town, the expropriation of the peasantry and the ruin of the majority of the rural population by the whole course of development of industry, trade and credit under capitalism. Hence, the antithesis between town and country under capitalism must be regarded as an antagonism of interests. This it was that gave rise to the hostile attitude of the country towards the town and towards "townfolk" in general.

Undoubtedly, with the abolition of capitalism and the exploiting system in our country, and with the consolidation of the socialist system, the antagonism of interests between town and country, between industry and agriculture, was also bound to disappear. And that is what happened. The immense assistance rendered by the socialist town, by our working class, to our peasantry in eliminating the landlords and kulaks strengthened the foundation for the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, while the systematic supply of first-class tractors and other machines to the peasantry and its collective farms converted the alliance between the working

class and the peasantry into friendship between them. Of course, the workers and the collective-farm peasantry do represent two classes differing from one another in status. But this difference does not weaken their friendship in any way. On the contrary, their interests lie along one common line, that of strengthening the socialist system and attaining the victory of communism. It is not surprising, therefore, that not a trace remains of the former distrust, not to speak of the former hatred, of the country for the town.

All this means that the ground for the antithesis between town and country, between industry and agriculture, has already been eliminated by our present socialist system.

This, of course, does not mean that the effect of the abolition of the antithesis between town and country will be that "the great towns will perish."* Not only will the great towns not perish, but new great towns will appear as centres of the maximum development of culture, and as centres not only of large-scale industry, but also of the processing of agricultural produce and of powerful development of all branches of the food industry. This will facilitate the cultural progress of the nation and will tend to even up conditions of life in town and country.

We have a similar situation as regards the problem of the abolition of the antithesis between mental and physical labour. This too is a well-known problem which was discussed by Marx and Engels long ago. The economic basis of the antithesis between mental and physical labour is the exploitation of the physical workers by the mental workers. Everyone is familiar with the gulf which under capitalism divided the physical workers of enterprises from the managerial personnel. We know that this gulf gave rise to a hostile attitude on the part of the workers towards managers, foremen, engineers and other members of the technical staff, whom the workers regarded as their enemies. Naturally, with the abolition of capitalism and the exploiting system, the antagonism of interests between physical and mental labour was also bound to disappear. And it really has disappeared in our present socialist system. Today, the physical workers and the managerial personnel are not enemies, but comrades and friends, members of a single collective body of producers who are vitally interested in the progress and improvement of production. Not a trace remains of the former enmity between them.

* Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, p. 412.

Of quite a different character is the problem of the disappearance of distinctions between town (industry) and country (agriculture), and between physical and mental labour. This problem was not discussed in the Marxist classics. It is a new problem, one that has been raised practically by our socialist construction.

Is this problem an imaginary one? Has it any practical or theoretical importance for us? No, this problem cannot be considered an imaginary one. On the contrary, it is for us a problem of the greatest seriousness.

Take, for instance, the distinction between agriculture and industry. In our country it consists not only in the fact that the conditions of labour in agriculture differ from those in industry, but, mainly and chiefly, in the fact that whereas in industry we have public ownership of the means of production and of the product of industry, in agriculture we have not public, but group, collective-farm ownership. It has already been said that this fact leads to the preservation of commodity circulation, and that only when this distinction between industry and agriculture disappears, can commodity production with all its attendant consequences also disappear. It therefore cannot be denied that the disappearance of this essential distinction between agriculture and industry must be a matter of paramount importance for us.

The same must be said of the problem of the abolition of the essential distinction between mental labour and physical labour. It, too, is a problem of paramount importance for us. Before the socialist emulation movement assumed mass proportions, the growth of our industry proceeded very haltingly, and many comrades even suggested that the rate of industrial development should be retarded. This was due chiefly to the fact that the cultural and technical level of the workers was too low and lagged far behind that of the technical personnel. But the situation changed radically when the socialist emulation movement assumed a mass character. It was from that moment on that industry began to advance at accelerated speed. Why did socialist emulation assume the character of a mass movement? Because among the workers whole groups of comrades came to the fore who had not only mastered the minimum requirements of technical knowledge, but had gone further and risen to the level of the technical personnel; they began to correct technicians and engineers, to break down the existing norms as antiquated, to introduce new and more up-to-date norms, and so on. What should we have had if not only isolated groups, but the majority of the workers had

raised their cultural and technical level to that of the engineering and technical personnel? Our industry would have risen to a height unattainable by industry in other countries. It therefore cannot be denied that the abolition of the essential distinction between mental and physical labour by raising the cultural and technical level of the workers to that of the technical personnel cannot but be of paramount importance for us.

Some comrades assert that in the course of time not only will the essential distinction between industry and agriculture, and between physical and mental labour, disappear, but so will *all* distinction between them. That is not true. Abolition of the essential distinction between industry and agriculture cannot lead to the abolition of all distinction between them. Some distinction, even if inessential, will certainly remain, owing to the difference between the conditions of work in industry and in agriculture. Even in industry the conditions of labour are not the same in all its branches: the conditions of labour, for example, of coal miners differ from those of the workers of a mechanized shoe factory, and the conditions of labour of ore miners from those of engineering workers. If that is so, then all the more must a certain distinction remain between industry and agriculture.

The same must be said of the distinction between mental and physical labour. The essential distinction between them, the difference in their cultural and technical levels, will certainly disappear. But some distinction, even if inessential, will remain, if only because the conditions of labour of the managerial staffs and those of the workers are not identical.

The comrades who assert the contrary do so presumably on the basis of the formulation given in some of my statements, which speaks of the abolition of the distinction between industry and agriculture, and between mental and physical labour, without any reservation to the effect that what is meant is the abolition of the *essential* distinction, not of all distinction. That is exactly how the comrades understood my formulation, assuming that it implied the abolition of all distinction. But this indicates that the formulation was unprecise, unsatisfactory. It must be discarded and replaced by another formulation, one that speaks of the abolition of essential distinctions and the persistence of inessential distinctions between industry and agriculture, and between mental and physical labour.

5. DISINTEGRATION OF THE SINGLE WORLD MARKET AND DEEPENING OF THE CRISIS OF THE WORLD

The disintegration of the single, all-embracing world market must be regarded as the most important economic sequel of the Second World War and of its economic consequences. It has had the effect of further deepening the general crisis of the world capitalist system.

The Second World War was itself a product of this crisis. Each of the two capitalist coalitions which locked horns in the war calculated on defeating its adversary and gaining world supremacy. It was in this that they sought a way out of the crisis. The United States of America hoped to put its most dangerous competitors, Germany and Japan, out of action, seize foreign markets and the world's raw material resources, and establish its world supremacy.

But the war did not justify these hopes. It is true that Germany and Japan were put out of action as competitors of the three major capitalist countries: the USA, Great Britain and France. But at the same time China and other, European, people's democracies broke away from the capitalist system and, together with the Soviet Union, formed a united and powerful socialist camp confronting the camp of capitalism. The economic consequence of the existence of two opposite camps was that the single all-embracing world market disintegrated, so that now we have two parallel world markets, also confronting one another.

It should be observed that the USA, and Great Britain and France, themselves contributed — without themselves desiring it, of course — to the formation and consolidation of the new, parallel world market. They imposed an economic blockade on the USSR, China and the European people's democracies, which did not join the "Marshall plan" system, thinking thereby to strangle them. The effect, however, was not to strangle, but to strengthen the new world market.

But the fundamental thing, of course, is not the economic blockade, but the fact that since the war these countries have joined together economically and established economic cooperation and mutual assistance. The experience of this cooperation shows that not a single capitalist country could have rendered such effective and technically competent assistance to the people's democracies as the Soviet Union is rendering them. The point is not only that this assistance is the cheapest possible and technically superb. The chief point is that at the bottom of this cooperation lies a sincere desire to help one another and to promote the economic progress of all. The result

is a fast pace of industrial development in these countries. It may be confidently said that, with this pace of industrial development, it will soon come to pass that these countries will not only be in no need of imports from capitalist countries, but will themselves feel the necessity of finding an outside market for their surplus products.

But it follows from this that the sphere of exploitation of the world's resources by the major capitalist countries (USA, Britain France) will not expand, but contract; that their opportunities for sale in the world market will deteriorate, and that their industries will be operating more and more below capacity. That, in fact, is what is meant by the deepening of the general crisis of the world capitalist system in connection with the disintegration of the world market.

This is felt by the capitalists themselves, for it would be difficult for them not to feel the loss of such markets as the USSR and China. They are trying to offset these difficulties with the "Marshall plan," the war in Korea, frantic rearmament, and industrial militarization. But that is very much like a drowning man clutching at a straw.

This state of affairs has confronted the economists with two questions:

a) Can it be affirmed that the thesis expounded by Stalin before the Second World War regarding the relative stability of markets in the period of the general crisis of capitalism is still valid?

b) Can it be affirmed that the thesis expounded by Lenin in the spring of 1916 — namely, that, in spite of the decay of capitalism, "on the whole, capitalism is growing far more rapidly than before"¹⁴⁶ — is still valid?

I think that it cannot. In view of the new conditions to which the Second World War has given rise, both these theses must be regarded as having lost their validity.

6. INEVITABILITY OF WARS BETWEEN CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

Some comrades hold that, owing to the development of new international conditions since the Second World War, wars between capitalist countries have ceased to be inevitable. They consider that the contradictions between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp are more acute than the contradictions among the capitalist countries; that the USA has brought the other capitalist countries sufficiently under its sway to be able to prevent them going to war among themselves and weakening one another; that the foremost

capitalist minds have been sufficiently taught by the two world wars and the severe damage they caused to the whole capitalist world not to venture to involve the capitalist countries in war with one another again — and that, because of all this, wars between capitalist countries are no longer inevitable.

These comrades are mistaken. They see the outward phenomena that come and go on the surface, but they do not see those profound forces which, although they are so far operating imperceptibly, will nevertheless determine the course of developments.

Outwardly, everything would seem to be “going well”: the USA has put Western Europe, Japan and other capitalist countries on rations; Germany (Western), Britain, France, Italy and Japan have fallen into the clutches of the USA and are meekly obeying its commands. But it would be mistaken to think that things can continue to “go well” for “all eternity,” that these countries will tolerate the domination and oppression of the United States endlessly, that they will not endeavour to tear loose from American bondage and take the path of independent development.

Take, first of all, Britain and France. Undoubtedly, they are imperialist countries. Undoubtedly, cheap raw materials and secure markets are of paramount importance to them. Can it be assumed that they will endlessly tolerate the present situation, in which, under the guise of “Marshall plan aid,” Americans are penetrating into the economies of Britain and France and trying to convert them into adjuncts of the United States economy, and American capital is seizing raw materials and markets in the British and French colonies and thereby plotting disaster for the high profits of the British and French capitalists? Would it not be truer to say that capitalist Britain, and, after her, capitalist France, will be compelled in the end to break from the embrace of the USA and enter into conflict with it in order to secure an independent position and, of course, high profits?

Let us pass to the major vanquished countries, Germany (Western) and Japan. These countries are now languishing in misery under the jackboot of American imperialism. Their industry and agriculture, their trade, their foreign and home policies, and their whole life are fettered by the American occupation “regime.” Yet only yesterday these countries were great imperialist powers and were shaking the foundations of the domination of Britain, the USA and France in Europe and Asia. To think that these countries will not try to get on their feet again, will not try to smash the U.S. “regime,” and force their way to independent development, is to believe in miracles.

It is said that the contradictions between capitalism and socialism are stronger than the contradictions among the capitalist countries. Theoretically, of course, that is true. It is not only true now, today; it was true before the Second World War. And it was more or less realized by the leaders of the capitalist countries. Yet the Second World War began not as a war with the USSR, but as a war between capitalist countries. Why? Firstly, because war with the USSR, as a socialist land, is more dangerous to capitalism than war between capitalist countries; for whereas war between capitalist countries puts in question only the supremacy of certain capitalist countries over others, war with the USSR must certainly put in question the existence of capitalism itself. Secondly, because the capitalists, although they clamour, for "propaganda" purposes, about the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union, do not themselves believe that it is aggressive, because they are aware of the Soviet Union's peaceful policy and know that it will not itself attack capitalist countries.

After the First World War it was similarly believed that Germany had been definitely put out of action, just as certain comrades now believe that Japan and Germany have been definitely put out of action. Then, too, it was said and clamoured in the press that the United States had put Europe on rations; that Germany would never rise to her feet again, and that there would be no more wars between capitalist countries. In spite of this, Germany rose to her feet again as a great power within the space of some fifteen or twenty years after her defeat, having broken out of bondage and taken the path of independent development. And it is significant that it was none other than Britain and the United States that helped Germany to recover economically and to enhance her economic war potential. Of course, when the United States and Britain assisted Germany's economic recovery, they did so with a view to setting a recovered Germany against the Soviet Union, to utilizing her against the land of socialism. But Germany directed her forces in the first place against the Anglo-French-American bloc. And when Hitler Germany declared war on the Soviet Union, the Anglo-French-American bloc, far from joining with Hitler Germany, was compelled to enter into a coalition with the USSR against Hitler Germany.

Consequently, the struggle of the capitalist countries for markets and their desire to crush their competitors proved in practice to be stronger than the contradictions between the capitalist camp and the socialist camp.

What guarantee is there, then, that Germany and Japan will not

rise to their feet again, will not attempt to break out of American bondage and live their own independent lives? I think there is no such guarantee.

But it follows from this that the inevitability of wars between capitalist countries remains in force.

It is said that Lenin's thesis that imperialism inevitably generates war must now be regarded as obsolete, since powerful popular forces have come forward today in defence of peace and against another world war. That is not true.

The object of the present-day peace movement is to rouse the masses of the people to fight for the preservation of peace and for the prevention of another world war. Consequently, the aim of this movement is not to overthrow capitalism and establish socialism — it confines itself to the democratic aim of preserving peace. In this respect, the present-day peace movement differs from the movement of the time of the First World War for the conversion of the imperialist war into civil war, since the latter movement went farther and pursued socialist aims.

It is possible that in a definite conjuncture of circumstances the fight for peace will develop here or there into a fight for socialism. But then it will no longer be the present-day peace movement; it will be a movement for the overthrow of capitalism.

What is most likely is that the present-day peace movement, as a movement for the preservation of peace, will, if it succeeds, result in preventing a *particular* war, in its temporary postponement, in the temporary preservation of a *particular* peace, in the resignation of a bellicose government and its supersession by another that is prepared temporarily to keep the peace. That, of course, will be good. Even very good. But, all the same, it will not be enough to eliminate the inevitability of wars between capitalist countries generally. It will not be enough, because, for all the successes of the peace movement, imperialism will remain, continue in force — and, consequently, the inevitability of wars will also continue in force.

To eliminate the inevitability of war, it is necessary to abolish imperialism.

7. THE BASIC ECONOMIC LAWS OF MODERN CAPITALISM AND OF SOCIALISM

As you know, the question of the basic economic laws of capitalism and of socialism arose several times in the course of the discussion. Various views were expressed on this score, even the most fan-

tastic. True, the majority of the participants in the discussion reacted feebly to the matter, and no decision on the point was indicated. However, none of the participants denied that such laws exist.

Is there a basic economic law of capitalism? Yes, there is. What is this law, and what are its characteristic features? The basic economic law of capitalism is such a law as determines not some particular aspect or particular processes of the development of capitalist production, but all the principal aspects and all the principal processes of its development — one, consequently, which determines the essence of capitalist production, its essential nature.

Is the law of value the basic economic law of capitalism? No. The law of value is primarily a law of commodity production. It existed before capitalism, and, like commodity production, will continue to exist after the overthrow of capitalism, as it does, for instance, in our country, although, it is true, with a restricted sphere of operation. Having a wide sphere of operation in capitalist conditions, the law of value, of course, plays a big part in the development of capitalist production. But not only does it not determine the essence of capitalist production and the principles of capitalist profit; it does not even pose these problems. Therefore, it cannot be the basic economic law of modern capitalism.

For the same reasons, the law of competition and anarchy of production, or the law of uneven development of capitalism in the various countries cannot be the basic economic law of capitalism either.

It is said that the law of the average rate of profit is the basic economic law of modern capitalism. That is not true. Modern capitalism, monopoly capitalism, cannot content itself with the average profit, which moreover has a tendency to decline, in view of the increasing organic composition of capital. It is not the average profit, but the maximum profit that modern monopoly capitalism demands, which it needs for more or less regular extended reproduction.

Most appropriate to the concept of a basic economic law of capitalism is the law of surplus value, the law of the origin and growth of capitalist profit. It really does determine the basic features of capitalist production. But the law of surplus value is too general a law that does not cover the problem of the highest rate of profit, the securing of which is a condition for the development of monopoly capitalism. In order to fill this hiatus, the law of surplus value must be made more concrete and developed further in adaptation to the conditions of monopoly capitalism, at the same time bearing in mind

that monopoly capitalism demands not any sort of profit, but precisely the maximum profit. That will be the basic economic law of modern capitalism.

The main features and requirements of the basic economic law of modern capitalism might be formulated roughly in this way: the securing of the maximum capitalist profit through the exploitation, ruin and impoverishment of the majority of the population of the given country, through the enslavement and systematic robbery of the peoples of other countries, especially backward countries, and, lastly, through wars and militarization of the national economy, which are utilized for the obtaining of the highest profits.

It is said that the average profit might nevertheless be regarded as quite sufficient for capitalist development under modern conditions. That is not true. The average profit is the lowest point of profitability, below which capitalist production becomes impossible. But it would be absurd to think that, in seizing colonies, subjugating peoples and engineering wars, the magnates of modern monopoly capitalism are striving to secure only the average profit. No, it is not the average profit, nor yet super-profit — which, as a rule, represents only a slight addition to the average profit — but precisely the maximum profit that is the motor of monopoly capitalism. It is precisely the necessity of securing the maximum profits that drives monopoly capitalism to such risky undertakings as the enslavement and systematic plunder of colonies and other backward countries, the conversion of a number of independent countries into dependent countries, the organization of new wars — which to the magnates of modern capitalism is the “business” best adapted to the extraction of the maximum profit — and, lastly, attempts to win world economic supremacy.

The importance of the basic economic law of capitalism consists, among other things, in the circumstance that, since it determines all the major phenomena in the development of the capitalist mode of production, its booms and crises, its victories and defeats, its merits and demerits — the whole process of its contradictory development — it enables us to understand and explain them.

Here is one of many “striking” examples.

We are all acquainted with facts from the history and practice of capitalism illustrative of the rapid development of technology under capitalism, when the capitalists appear as the standard-bearers of the most advanced techniques, as revolutionaries in the development of the technique of production. But we are also familiar with facts of a

different kind, illustrative of a halt in technical development under capitalism, when the capitalists appear as reactionaries in the development of new techniques and not infrequently resort to hand labour.

How is this howling contradiction to be explained? It can only be explained by the basic economic law of modern capitalism, that is, by the necessity of obtaining the maximum profit. Capitalism is in favour of new techniques when they promise it the highest profit. Capitalism is against new techniques, and for resort to hand labour, when the new techniques do not promise the highest profit.

That is how matters stand with the basic economic law of modern capitalism.

Is there a basic economic law of socialism? Yes, there is. What are the essential features and requirements of this law? The essential features and requirements of the basic law of socialism might be formulated roughly in this way: the securing of the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society through the continuous expansion and perfection of socialist production on the basis of higher techniques.

Consequently: instead of maximum profits — maximum satisfaction of the material and cultural requirements of society; instead of development of production with breaks in continuity from boom to crisis and from crisis to boom — unbroken expansion of production; instead of periodic breaks in technical development, accompanied by destruction of the productive forces of society — an unbroken process of perfecting production on the basis of higher techniques.

It is said that the law of the balanced, proportionate development of the national economy is the basic economic law of socialism. That is not true. Balanced development of the national economy, and hence, economic planning, which is a more or less faithful reflection of this law, can yield nothing by themselves, if it is not known for what purpose economic development is planned, or if that purpose is not clear. The law of balanced development of the national economy can yield the desired result only if there is a purpose for the sake of which economic development is planned. This purpose the law of balanced development of the national economy cannot itself provide. Still less can economic planning provide it. This purpose is inherent in the basic economic law of socialism, in the shape of its requirements, as expounded above. Consequently, the law of balanced development of the national economy can operate to its full scope only if its operation rests on the basic economic law of

socialism.

As to economic planning, it can achieve positive results only if two conditions are observed: a) if it correctly reflects the requirements of the law of balanced development of the national economy, and b) if it conforms in every way to the requirements of the basic economic law of socialism.

8. OTHER QUESTIONS

1) Extra-economic coercion under feudalism.

Of course, extra-economic coercion did play a part in strengthening the economic power of the feudal landlords; however, not it, but feudal ownership of the land was the basis of feudalism.

2) Personal property of the collective-farm household.

It would be wrong to say, as the draft textbook does, that "every household in a collective farm has in personal use a cow, small livestock and poultry." Actually, as we know, it is not in personal use, but as personal *property* that the collective-farm household has its cow, small livestock, poultry, etc. The expression "in personal use" has evidently been taken from the Model Rules of the Agricultural Artel. But a mistake was made in the Model Rules of the Agricultural Artel. The Constitution of the USSR, which was drafted more carefully, puts it differently, viz.:

"Every household in a collective farm... has as its personal property a subsidiary husbandry on the plot, a dwelling house, livestock, poultry and minor agricultural implements."

That, of course, is correct.

It would be well, in addition, to state more particularly that every collective farmer has as his personal property from one to so many cows, depending on local conditions, so many sheep, goats, pigs (the number also depending on local conditions), and an unlimited quantity of poultry (ducks, geese, hens, turkeys).

Such detailed particulars are of great importance for our comrades abroad, who want to know what exactly has remained as the personal property of the collective-farm household now that agriculture in our country has been collectivized.

3) Total rent paid by the peasants to the landlords; also total expenditure on the purchase of land.

The draft textbook says that as a result of the nationalization of the land, "the peasantry were released from paying rent to the landlords to a total of about 500 million rubles annually" (it should be

“gold” rubles). This figure should be verified, because it seems to me that it does not include the rent paid over the whole of Russia, but only in a majority of the Russian *gubernias*. It should also be borne in mind that in some of the border regions of Russia rent was paid in kind, a fact which the authors of the draft textbook have evidently overlooked. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the peasants were released not only from the payment of rent, but also from annual expenditure for the purchase of land. Was this taken into account in the draft textbook? It seems to me that it was not; but it should have been.

4) Coalescence of the monopolies with the state machine.

The word “coalescence” is not appropriate. It superficially and descriptively notes the process of merging of the monopolies with the state, but it does not reveal the economic import of this process. The fact of the matter is that the merging process is not simply a process of coalescence, but the subjugation of the state machine to the monopolies. The word “coalescence” should therefore be discarded and replaced by the words “subjugation of the state machine to the monopolies.”

5) Use of machines in the USSR

The draft textbook says that “in the USSR machines are used in all cases when they economize the labour of society.” That is by no means what should be said. In the first place, machines in the USSR always economize the labour of society, and we accordingly do not know of any cases in the USSR where they have not economized the labour of society. In the second place, machines not only economize labour; they also lighten the labour of the worker, and accordingly, in our conditions, in contradistinction to the conditions of capitalism, the workers use machines in the processes of labour with the greatest eagerness.

It should therefore be said that nowhere are machines used so willingly as in the USSR, because they economize the labour of society and lighten the labour of the worker, and, as there is no unemployment in the USSR, the workers use machines in the national economy with the greatest eagerness.

6) Living standards of the working class in capitalist countries.

Usually, when speaking of the living standards of the working class, what is meant is only the standards of employed workers, and not of what is known as the reserve army of unemployed. Is such an attitude to the question of the living standards of the working class correct? I think it is not. If there is a reserve army of unemployed,

whose members cannot live except by the sale of their labour power, then the unemployed must necessarily form part of the working class; and if they do form part of the working class, then their destitute condition cannot but influence the living standards of the workers engaged in production. I therefore think that when describing the living standards of the working class in capitalist countries, the condition of the reserve army of unemployed workers should also be taken into account.

7) National income.

I think it *absolutely* necessary to add a chapter on national income to the draft textbook.

8) Should there be a special chapter in the textbook on Lenin and Stalin as the founders of the political economy of socialism?

I think that the chapter, "The Marxist Theory of Socialism. Founding of the Political Economy of Socialism by V.I. Lenin and J.V. Stalin," should be excluded from the textbook. It is entirely unnecessary, since it adds nothing, and only colourlessly reiterates what has already been said in greater detail in earlier chapters of the textbook.

As regards the other questions, I have no remarks to make on the "Proposals" of Comrades Ostrovityanov, Leontyev, Shepilov, Gatovsky, etc.

9. INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE OF A MARXIST TEXTBOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY

I think that the comrades do not appreciate the importance of a Marxist textbook on political economy as fully as they should. It is needed not only by our Soviet youth. It is particularly needed by communists and communist sympathizers in all countries. Our comrades abroad want to know how we broke out of capitalist slavery; how we rebuilt the economy of our country on socialist lines; how we secured the friendship of the peasantry; how we managed to convert a country which was only so recently poverty-stricken and weak into a rich and mighty country; what are the collective farms; why, although the means of production are socialized, we do not abolish commodity production, money, trade, etc. They want to know all this, and much else, not out of mere curiosity, but in order to learn from us and to utilize our experience in their own countries. Consequently, the appearance of a good Marxist textbook on political economy is not only of political importance at home, but also of great international importance.

What is needed, therefore, is a textbook which might serve as a reference book for the revolutionary youth not only at home, but also abroad. It must not be too bulky, because an over-bulky textbook cannot be a reference book and is difficult to assimilate, to master. But it must contain everything fundamental relating both to the economy of our country and to the economy of capitalism and the colonial system.

During the discussion, some comrades proposed the inclusion in the textbook of a number of additional chapters: the historians — on history, the political scientists — on politics, the philosophers — on philosophy, the economists — on economics. But the effect of this would be to swell the textbook to unwieldy dimensions. That, of course, must not be done. The textbook employs the historical method to illustrate problems of political economy, but that does not mean that we must turn a textbook on political economy into a history of economic relations.

What we need is a textbook of 500 pages, 600 at most, no more. This would be a reference book on Marxist political economy — and an excellent gift to the young communists of all countries.

Incidentally, in view of the inadequate level of Marxist development of the majority of the communist parties abroad, such a textbook might also be of great use to communist cadres abroad who are no longer young.

10. WAYS OF IMPROVING THE DRAFT TEXTBOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY

During the discussion some comrades “ran down” the draft textbook much too assiduously, berated its authors for errors and oversights, and claimed that the draft was a failure. That is unfair. Of course, there are errors and oversights in the textbook — they are to be found in practically every big undertaking. Be that as it may, the overwhelming majority of the participants in the discussion were nevertheless of the opinion that the draft might serve as a basis for the future textbook and only needed certain corrections and additions. Indeed, one has only to compare the draft with the textbooks on political economy already in circulation to see that the draft stands head and shoulders above them. For that the authors of the draft deserve great credit.

I think that in order to improve the draft textbook, it would be well to appoint a small committee which would include not only the authors of the textbook, and not only supporters, but also opponents

of the majority of the participants in the discussion, out-and-out critics of the draft textbook.

It would also be well to include in the committee a competent statistician to verify the figures and to supply additional statistical material for the draft, as well as a competent jurist to verify the accuracy of the formulations.

The members of the committee should be temporarily relieved of all other work and should be well provided for, so that they might devote themselves entirely to the textbook.

Furthermore, it would be well to appoint an editorial committee, of say three persons, to take care of the final editing of the textbook. This is necessary also in order to achieve unity of style, which, unfortunately, the draft textbook lacks.

Time limit for presentation of the finished textbook to the Central Committee — one year.

February 1, 1952

REPLY TO COMRADE ALEXANDER ILYICH NOTKIN

Comrade Notkin,

I was in no hurry to reply, because I saw no urgency in the questions you raised. All the more so because there are other questions which are urgent, and which naturally deflected attention from your letter.

I shall answer point by point.

The first point.

There is a statement in the “Remarks” to the effect that society is not powerless against the laws of science, that man, having come to know economic laws, can utilize them in the interests of society. You assert that this postulate cannot be extended to other social formations, that it holds good only under socialism and communism, that the elemental character of the economic processes under capitalism, for example, makes it impossible for society to utilize economic laws in the interests of society.

That is not true. At the time of the bourgeois revolution in France, for instance, the bourgeoisie utilized against feudalism the law that relations of production must necessarily conform with the

character of the productive forces, overthrew the feudal relations of production, created new, bourgeois relations of production, and brought them into conformity with the character of the productive forces which had arisen in the bosom of the feudal system. The bourgeoisie did this not because of any particular abilities it possessed, but because it was vitally interested in doing so. The feudal lords put up resistance to this not from stupidity, but because they were vitally interested in preventing this law from becoming effective.

The same must be said of the socialist revolution in our country. The working class utilized the law that the relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces, overthrew the bourgeois relations of production, created new, socialist relations of production and brought them into conformity with the character of the productive forces. It was able to do so not because of any particular abilities it possessed, but because it was vitally interested in doing so. The bourgeoisie, which from an advanced force at the dawn of the bourgeois revolution had already become a counter-revolutionary force offered every resistance to the implementation of this law — and it did so not because it lacked organization, and not because the elemental nature of economic processes drove it to resist, but chiefly because it was to its vital interest that the law should not become operative.

Consequently:

1. Economic processes, economic laws are in one degree or another utilized in the interests of society not only under socialism and communism, but under other formations as well;

2. The utilization of economic laws in class society always and everywhere has a class background, and, moreover, always and everywhere the champion of the utilization of economic laws in the interests of society is the advanced class, while the obsolescent classes resist it.

The difference in this matter between the proletariat and the other classes which at any time in the course of history revolutionized the relations of production consists in the fact that the class interests of the proletariat merge with the interests of the overwhelming majority of society, because proletarian revolution implies the abolition not of one or another form of exploitation, but of all exploitation, while the revolutions of other classes, which abolished only one or another form of exploitation, were confined within the limits of their narrow class interests, which conflicted with the inter-

ests of the majority of society.

The "Remarks" speak of the class background of the utilization of economic laws in the interests of society. It is stated there that "unlike the laws of natural science, where the discovery and application of a new law proceeds more or less smoothly, the discovery and application of a new law in the economic field, affecting as it does the interests of obsolescent forces of society, meets with the most powerful resistance on their part."^{*} This point you missed.

The second point.

You assert that complete conformity of the relations of production with the character of the productive forces can be achieved only under socialism and communism, and that under other formations the conformity can only be partial.

This is not true. In the epoch following the bourgeois revolution, when the bourgeoisie had shattered the feudal relations of production and established bourgeois relations of production, there undoubtedly were periods when the bourgeois production relations did fully conform with the character of the productive forces. Otherwise, capitalism could not have developed as swiftly as it did after the bourgeois revolution.

Further, the words "full conformity" must not be understood in the absolute sense. They must not be understood as meaning that there is altogether no lagging of the relations of production behind the growth of the productive forces under socialism. The productive forces are the most mobile and revolutionary forces of production. They undeniably move in advance of the relations of production even under socialism. Only after a certain lapse of time do the relations of production change in line with the character of the productive forces.

How, then, are the words "full conformity" to be understood? They are to be understood as meaning that under socialism things do not usually go to the length of a conflict between the relations of production and the productive forces, that society is in a position to take timely steps to bring the lagging relations of production into conformity with the character of the productive forces. Socialist society is in a position to do so because it does not include the obsolescent classes that might organize resistance. Of course, even under socialism there will be backward, inert forces that do not realize the

* See p. 686 of this book.

necessity for changing the relations of production; but they, of course, will not be difficult to overcome without bringing matters to a conflict.

The third point.

It appears from your argument that you regard the means of production, and, in the first place, the implements of production produced by our nationalized enterprises, as commodities.

Can means of production be regarded as commodities in our socialist system? In my opinion they certainly cannot.

A commodity is a product which may be sold to any purchaser, and when its owner sells it, he loses ownership of it and the purchaser becomes the owner of the commodity which he may resell, pledge or allow to rot. Do means of production come within this category? They obviously do not. In the first place, means of production are not "sold" to any purchaser, they are not "sold" even to collective farms; they are only allocated by the state to its enterprises. In the second place, when transferring means of production to any enterprise, their owner — the state — does not at all lose the ownership of them; on the contrary, it retains it fully. In the third place, directors of enterprises who receive means of production from the Soviet state, far from becoming their owners, are deemed to be the agents of the state in the utilization of the means of production in accordance with the plans established by the state.

It will be seen, then, that under our system means of production can certainly not be classed in the category of commodities.

Why, in that case, do we speak of the value of means of production, their cost of production, their price, etc.?

For two reasons.

Firstly, this is needed for purposes of calculation and settlement, for determining whether enterprises are paying or running at a loss, for checking and controlling the enterprises. But that is only the formal aspect of the matter.

Secondly, it is needed in order, in the interests of our foreign trade, to conduct sales of means of production to foreign countries. Here, in the sphere of foreign trade, but *only in this sphere*, our means of production really are commodities, and really are sold (in the direct meaning of the term).

It therefore follows that in the sphere of foreign trade the means of production produced by our enterprises retain the properties of commodities both essentially and formally, but that in the sphere of

domestic economic circulation, means of production lose the properties of commodities, cease to be commodities and pass out of the sphere of operation of the law of value, retaining only the outward integument of commodities (calculation, etc.).

How is this peculiarity to be explained?

The fact of the matter is that in our socialist conditions economic development proceeds not by way of upheavals, but by way of gradual changes, the old not simply being abolished out of hand, but changing its nature in adaptation to the new, and retaining only its form; while the new does not simply destroy the old, but infiltrates into it, changes its nature and its functions, without smashing its form, but utilizing it for the development of the new. This, in our economic circulation, is true not only of commodities, but also of money, as well as of banks, which, while they lose their old functions and acquire new ones, preserve their old form, which is utilized by the socialist system.

If the matter is approached from the formal angle, from the angle of the processes taking place on the surface of phenomena, one may arrive at the incorrect conclusion that the categories of capitalism retain their validity under our economy. If, however, the matter is approached from the standpoint of Marxist analysis, which strictly distinguishes between the substance of an economic process and its form, between the deep processes of development and the surface phenomena, one comes to the only correct conclusion, namely, that it is chiefly the form, the outward appearance, of the old categories of capitalism that have remained in our country, but that their essence has radically changed in adaptation to the requirements of the development of the socialist economy.

The fourth point.

You assert that the law of value exercises a regulating influence on the prices of the “means of production” produced by agriculture and delivered to the state at the procurement prices. You refer to such “means of production” as raw materials — cotton, for instance. You might have added flax, wool and other agricultural raw materials.

It should first of all be observed that in this case it is not “means of production” that agriculture produces, but only one of the means of production — raw materials. The words “means of production” should not be juggled with. When Marxists speak of the production of means of production, what they primarily have in mind is the pro-

duction of implements of production, what Marx calls “the instruments of labour, those of a mechanical nature, which, taken as a whole, we may call the bone and muscles of production,” which constitute the “characteristics of a given epoch of production.”¹⁴⁷ To equate a part of the means of production (raw materials) with the means of production, including the implements of production, is to sin against Marxism, because Marxism considers that the implements of production play a decisive role compared with all other means of production. Everyone knows that, by themselves, raw materials cannot produce implements of production, although certain kinds of raw material are necessary for the production of implements of production, while no raw material can be produced without implements of production.

Further: is the influence of the law of value on the price of raw materials produced by agriculture a *regulating* influence, as you, Comrade Notkin, claim? It would be a regulating one if prices of agricultural raw materials had “free” play in our country, if the law of competition and anarchy of production prevailed, if we did not have a planned economy, and if the production of raw materials were not regulated by plan. But since all these “ifs” are missing in our economic system, the influence of the law of value on the price of agricultural raw materials cannot be a regulating one. In the first place, in our country prices of agricultural raw materials are fixed, established by plan, and are not “free.” In the second place, the quantities of agricultural raw materials produced are not determined spontaneously or by chance elements, but by plan. In the third place, the implements of production needed for the producing of agricultural raw materials are concentrated not in the hands of individuals, or groups of individuals, but in the hands of the state. What then, after this, remains of the regulating function of the law of value? It appears that the law of value is itself regulated by the above-mentioned factors characteristic of socialist production.

Consequently, it cannot be denied that the law of value does influence the formation of prices of agricultural raw materials, that it is one of the factors in this process. But still less can it be denied that its influence is not, and cannot be, a regulating one.

The fifth point.

When speaking, in my “Remarks,” of the profitableness of the socialist national economy, I was controverting certain comrades who allege that, by not giving great preference to profitable enter-

prises, and by tolerating the existence side by side with them of unprofitable enterprises, our planned economy is killing the very principle of profitableness of economic undertakings. The "Remarks" say that profitableness considered from the standpoint of individual plants or industries is beneath all comparison with that higher form of profitableness which we get from our socialist mode of production, which saves us from crises of overproduction and ensures us a continuous expansion of production.

But it would be mistaken to conclude from this that the profitableness of individual plants and industries is of no particular value and is not deserving of serious attention. That, of course, is not true. The profitableness of individual plants and industries is of immense value for the development of our industry. It must be taken into account both when planning construction and when planning production. It is an elementary requirement of our economic activity at the present stage of development.

The sixth point.

It is not clear how your words "extended production in strongly deformed guise" in reference to capitalism are to be understood. It should be said that such production, and extended production at that, does not occur in nature.

It is evident that, after the world market has split, and the sphere of exploitation of the world's resources by the major capitalist countries (USA, Britain, France) has begun to contract, the cyclical character of the development of capitalism — expansion and contraction of production — must continue to operate. However, expansion of production in these countries will proceed on a narrower basis, since the volume of production in these countries will diminish.

The seventh point.

The general crisis of the world capitalist system began in the period of the First World War, particularly due to the falling away of the Soviet Union from the capitalist system. That was the first stage in the general crisis. A second stage in the general crisis developed in the period of the Second World War, especially after the European and Asian people's democracies fell away from the capitalist system. The first crisis, in the period of the First World War, and the second crisis, in the period of the Second World War, must not be regarded as separate, unconnected and independent crises, but as stages in the development of the general crisis of the world capitalist

system.

Is the general crisis of world capitalism only a political, or only an economic crisis? Neither the one, nor the other. It is a general, *i.e.*, all-round crisis of the world capitalist system, embracing both the economic and the political spheres. And it is clear that at the bottom of it lies the ever increasing decay of the world capitalist economic system, on the one hand, and the growing economic might of the countries which have fallen away from capitalism — the USSR, China and the other people's democracies — on the other.

April 21, 1952

CONCERNING THE ERRORS OF COMRADE L.D. YAROSHENKO

Some time ago the members of the Political Bureau of the CC, CPSU(B) received a letter from Comrade Yaroshenko, dated March 20, 1952, on a number of economic questions which were debated at the November discussion. The author of the letter complains that the basic documents summing up the discussion, and Comrade Stalin's "Remarks," "contain no reflection whatever of the opinion" of Comrade Yaroshenko. Comrade Yaroshenko also suggests in his note that he should be allowed to write a "Political Economy of Socialism," to be completed in a year or a year and a half, and that he should be given two assistants to help him in the work.

I think that both Comrade Yaroshenko's complaint and his proposal need to be examined on their merits.

Let us begin with the complaint.

Well, then, what is the "opinion" of Comrade Yaroshenko which has received no reflection whatever in the above-mentioned documents?

I

COMRADE YAROSHENKO'S CHIEF ERROR

To describe Comrade Yaroshenko's opinion in a couple of words, it should be said that it is un-Marxist — and, hence, profoundly erroneous.

Comrade Yaroshenko's chief error is that he forsakes the Marxist position on the question of the role of the productive forces and of the relations of production in the development of society, that he

inordinately overrates the role of the productive forces, and just as inordinately underrates the role of the relations of production, and ends up by declaring that under socialism the relations of production are a component part of the productive forces.

Comrade Yaroshenko is prepared to grant the relations of production a certain role under the conditions of “antagonistic class contradictions,” inasmuch as there the relations of production “run counter to the development of the productive forces.” But he confines it to a purely negative role, the role of a factor which retards the development of the productive forces, which fetters their development. Any other functions, positive functions, of the relations of production, Comrade Yaroshenko fails to see.

As to the socialist system, where “antagonistic class contradictions” no longer exist, and where the relations of production “no longer run counter to the development of the productive forces,” here, according to Comrade Yaroshenko, the relations of production lose every vestige of an independent role, they cease to be a serious factor of development, and are absorbed by the productive forces, becoming a component part of them. Under socialism, Comrade Yaroshenko says, “men’s production relations become part of the organization of the productive forces, as a means, an element of their organization.”*

If that is so, what is the chief task of the “Political Economy of Socialism”? Comrade Yaroshenko replies: “The chief problem of the Political Economy of Socialism, therefore, *is not* to investigate the relations of production of the members of socialist society; *it is* to elaborate and develop a scientific theory of the organization of the productive forces in social production, a theory of the planning of economic development.”**

That, in fact, explains why Comrade Yaroshenko is not interested in such economic questions of the socialist system as the existence of different forms of property in our economy, commodity circulation, the law of value, etc., which he believes to be minor questions that only give rise to scholastic disputes. He plainly declares that in his Political Economy of Socialism “disputes as to the role of any particular category of socialist political economy — value, commodity, money, credit, etc., — which very often with us are of a

* Comrade Yaroshenko’s letter to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.

** Comrade Yaroshenko’s speech in the Plenary Discussion.

scholastic character, *are replaced* by a healthy discussion of the rational organization of the productive forces in social production, by a scientific demonstration of the validity of such organization.”*

In short, political economy without economic problems.

Comrade Yaroshenko thinks that it is enough to arrange a “rational organization of the productive forces,” and the transition from socialism to communism will take place without any particular difficulty. He considers that this is quite sufficient for the transition to communism. He plainly declares that “under socialism, the basic struggle for the building of a communist society reduces itself to a struggle for the proper organization of the productive forces and their rational utilization in social production.”** Comrade Yaroshenko solemnly proclaims that “Communism is the highest scientific organization of the productive forces in social production.”

It appears, then, that the essence of the communist system begins and ends with the “rational organization of the productive forces.”

From all this, Comrade Yaroshenko concludes that there cannot be a single political economy for all social formations, that there must be two political economies: one for pre-socialist social formations, the subject of investigation of which is men’s relations production, and the other for the socialist system, the subject of investigation of which should be not the production, *i.e.*, the economic, relations, but the rational organization of the productive forces.

Such is the opinion of Comrade Yaroshenko.

What can be said of this opinion?

It is not true, in the first place, that the role of the relations of production in the history of society has been confined to that of a brake, a fetter on the development of the productive forces. When Marxists speak of the retarding role of the relations of production, it is not all relations of production they have in mind, but only the old relations of production, which no longer conform to the growth of the productive forces and, consequently, retard their development. But, as we know, besides the old, there are also new relations of production, which supersede the old. Can it be said that the role of the new relations of production is that of a brake on the productive forces? No, it cannot. On the contrary, the new relations of production are the *chief* and decisive force, the one which in fact determines

* Comrade Yaroshenko’s speech at the Discussion Working Panel.

** Comrade Yaroshenko’s speech in the Plenary Discussion.

the further, and, moreover, powerful, development of the productive forces, and without which the latter would be doomed to stagnation, as is the case today in the capitalist countries.

Nobody can deny that the development of the productive forces of our Soviet industry has made tremendous strides in the period of the five-year plans. But this development would not have occurred if we had not, in October 1917, replaced the old, capitalist relations of production by new, socialist relations of production. Without this revolution in the production, the economic, relations of our country, our productive forces would have stagnated, just as they are stagnating today in the capitalist countries.

Nobody can deny that the development of the productive forces of our agriculture has made tremendous strides in the past twenty or twenty-five years. But this development would not have occurred if we had not in the 'thirties replaced the old, capitalist production relations in the countryside by new, collectivist production relations. Without this revolution in production, the productive forces of our agriculture would have stagnated, just as they are stagnating today in the capitalist countries.

Of course, new relations of production cannot, and do not, remain new forever; they begin to grow old and to run counter to the further development of the productive forces; they begin to lose their role of principal mainspring of the productive forces, and become a brake on them. At this point, in place of these production relations which have become antiquated, new production relations appear whose role it is to be the principal mainspring spurring the further development of the productive forces.

This peculiar development of the relations of production from the role of a brake on the productive forces to that of the principal mainspring impelling them forward, and from the role of principal mainspring to that of a brake on the productive forces, constitutes one of the chief elements of the Marxist materialist dialectics. Every novice in Marxism knows that nowadays. But Comrade Yaroshenko, it appears, does not know it.

It is not true, in the second place that the production, *i.e.*, the economic, relation lose their independent role under socialism, that they are absorbed by the productive forces, that social production under socialism is reduced to the organization of the productive forces. Marxism regards social production as an integral whole which has two inseparable sides: the productive forces of society (the relation of society to the forces of nature, in contest with which it

secures the material values it needs), and the relations of production (the relations of men to one another in the process of production). These are two different sides of social production, although they are inseparably connected with one another. And just because they constitute different sides of social production, they are able to influence one another. To assert that one of these sides may be absorbed by the other and be converted into its component part, is to commit a very grave sin against Marxism.

Marx said:

“In production, men not only act on nature but also on one another. They produce only by cooperating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations with one another and only within these social connections and relations does their action on nature, does production, take place.”¹⁴⁸

Consequently, social production consists of two sides, which, although they are inseparably connected, reflect two different categories of relations: the relations of men to nature (productive forces), and the relations of men to one another in the process of production (production relations). Only when both sides of production are present do we have social production, whether it be under the socialist system or under any other social formation.

Comrade Yaroshenko, evidently, is not quite in agreement with Marx. He considers that this postulate of Marx is not applicable to the socialist system. Precisely for this reason he reduces the problem of the Political Economy of Socialism to the rational organization of the productive forces, discarding the production, the economic, relations and severing the productive forces from them.

If we followed Comrade Yaroshenko, therefore, what we would get is, instead of a Marxist political economy, something in the nature of Bogdanov’s “Universal Organizing Science.”

Hence, starting from the right idea that the productive forces are the most mobile and revolutionary forces of production, Comrade Yaroshenko reduces the idea to an absurdity, to the point of denying the role of the production, the economic, relations under socialism; and instead of a full-blooded social production, what he gets is a lopsided and scraggy technology of production — something in the nature of Bukharin’s “technique of social organization.”

Marx says:

“In the social production of their life [that is, in the production of the material values necessary to the life of men — *J. St.*], men enter into definite

relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness."¹⁴⁹

This means that every social formation, socialist society not excluded, has its economic foundation, consisting of the sum total of men's relations of production. What, one asks, happens to the economic foundation of the socialist system with Comrade Yaroshenko? As we know, Comrade Yaroshenko has already done away with relations of production under socialism as a more or less independent sphere, and has included the little that remains of them in the organization of the productive forces. Has the socialist system, one asks, its own economic foundation? Obviously, seeing that the relations of production have disappeared as a more or less independent factor under socialism, the socialist system is left without an economic foundation.

In short, a socialist system without an economic foundation. A rather funny situation...

Is a social system without an economic foundation possible at all? Comrade Yaroshenko evidently believes that it is. Marxism, however, believes that such social systems do not occur in nature.

It is not true, lastly, that communism means the rational organization of the productive forces, that the rational organization of the productive forces is the beginning and end of the communist system, that it is only necessary to organize the productive forces rationally, and the transition to communism will take place without particular difficulty. There is in our literature another definition, another formula of communism — Lenin's formula: "Communism is Soviet rule plus the electrification of the whole country."¹⁵⁰ Lenin's formula is evidently not to Comrade Yaroshenko's liking, and he replaces it with his own homemade formula: "Communism is the highest scientific organization of the productive forces in social production."

In the first place, nobody knows what this "higher scientific" or "rational" organization of the productive forces which Comrade Yaroshenko advertises represents, what its concrete import is. In his speeches at the Plenum and in the working panels of the discussion, and in his letter to the members of the Political Bureau, Comrade Yaroshenko reiterates this mythical formula dozens of times, but nowhere does he say a single word to explain how the "rational or-

ganization” of the productive forces, which supposedly constitutes the beginning and end of the essence of the communist system, should be understood.

In the second place, if a choice must be made between the two formulas, then it is not Lenin’s formula, which is the only correct one, that should be discarded, but Comrade Yaroshenko’s pseudo formula, which is so obviously chimerical and un-Marxist, and is borrowed from the arsenal of Bogdanov, from his “Universal Organizing Science.”

Comrade Yaroshenko thinks that we have only to ensure a rational organization of the productive forces, and we shall be able to obtain an abundance of products and to pass to communism, to pass from the formula, “to each according to his work,” to the formula, “to each according to his needs.” That is a profound error, and reveals a complete lack of understanding of the laws of economic development of socialism. Comrade Yaroshenko’s conception of the conditions for the transition from socialism to communism is far too rudimentary and puerile. He does not understand that neither an abundance of products, capable of covering all the requirements of society, nor the transition to the formula, “to each according to his needs,” can be brought about if such economic factors as collective farm, group, property, commodity circulation, etc., remain in force. Comrade Yaroshenko does not understand that before we can pass to the formula, “to each according to his needs,” we shall have to pass through a number of stages of economic and cultural re-education of society, in the course of which work will be transformed in the eyes of society from only a means of supporting life into life’s prime want, and social property into the sacred and inviolable basis of the existence of society.

In order to pave the way for a real, and not declaratory transition to communism, at least three main preliminary conditions have to be satisfied.

1. It is necessary, in the first place, to ensure, not a mythical “rational organization” of the productive forces, but a continuous expansion of all social production, with a relatively higher rate of expansion of the production of means of production. The relatively higher rate of expansion of production of means of production is necessary not only because it has to provide the equipment both for its own plants and for all the other branches of the national economy, but also because reproduction on an extended scale becomes altogether impossible without it.

2. It is necessary, in the second place, by means of gradual transitions carried out to the advantage of the collective farms, and, hence, of all society, to raise collective-farm property to the level of public property, and, also by means of gradual transitions, to replace commodity circulation by a system of products-exchange, under which the central government, or some other social-economic centre, might control the whole product of social production in the interests of society.

Comrade Yaroshenko is mistaken when he asserts that there is no contradiction between the relations of production and the productive forces of society under socialism. Of course, our present relations of production are in a period when they fully conform to the growth of the productive forces and help to advance them at seven-league strides. But it would be wrong to rest easy at that and to think that there are no contradictions between our productive forces and the relations of production. There certainly are, and will be, contradictions, seeing that the development of the relations of production lags, and will lag, behind the development of the productive forces. Given a correct policy on the part of the directing bodies these contradictions cannot grow into antagonisms, and there is no chance of matters coming to a conflict between the relations of production and the productive forces of society. It would be a different matter if we were to conduct a wrong policy, such as that which Comrade Yaroshenko recommends. In that case conflict would be inevitable, and our relations of production might become a serious brake on the further development of the productive forces.

The task of the directing bodies is therefore promptly to discern incipient contradictions, and to take timely measures to resolve them by adapting the relations of production to the growth of the productive forces. This, above all, concerns such economic factors as group, or collective-farm, property and commodity circulation. At present, of course, these factors are being successfully utilized by us for the promotion of the socialist economy, and they are of undeniable benefit to our society. It is undeniable, too, that they will be of benefit also in the near future. But it would be unpardonable blindness not to see at the same time that these factors are already beginning to hamper the powerful development of our productive forces, since they create obstacles to the full extension of government planning to the whole of the national economy, especially agriculture. There is no doubt that these factors will hamper the continued growth of the productive forces of our country more and more as

time goes on. The task, therefore, is to eliminate these contradictions by gradually converting collective-farm property into public property, and by introducing — also gradually — products-exchange in place of commodity circulation.

3. It is necessary, in the third place, to ensure such a cultural advancement of society as will secure for all members of society the all-round development of their physical and mental abilities, so that the members of society may be in a position to receive an education sufficient to enable them to be active agents of social development, and in a position freely to choose their occupations and not be tied all their lives, owing to the existing division of labour, to some one occupation.

What is required for this?

It would be wrong to think that such a substantial advance in the cultural standard of the members of society can be brought about without substantial changes in the present status of labour. For this, it is necessary, first of all, to shorten the working day at least to six, and subsequently to five hours. This is needed in order that the members of society might have the necessary free time to receive an all-round education. It is necessary, further, to introduce universal compulsory poly-technical education, which is required in order that the members of society might be able freely to choose their occupations and not be tied to some one occupation all their lives. It is likewise necessary that housing conditions should be radically improved and that real wages of workers and employees should be at least doubled, if not more, both by means of direct increases of wages and salaries, and, more especially, by further systematic reductions of prices for consumer goods.

These are the basic conditions required to pave the way for the transition to communism.

Only after *all* these preliminary conditions are satisfied in their entirety may it be hoped that work will be converted in the eyes of the members of society from a nuisance into “life’s prime want” (Marx),¹⁵¹ that “labour will become a pleasure instead of being a burden” (Engels),¹⁵² and that social property will be regarded by all members of society as the sacred and inviolable basis of the existence of society.

Only after *all* these preliminary conditions have been satisfied in their entirety will it be possible to pass from the socialist formula, “from each according to his ability, to each according to his work,” to the communist formula, “from each according to his ability, to

each according to his needs.”

This will be a radical transition from one form of economy, the economy of socialism, to another, higher form of economy, the economy of communism.

As we see, the transition from socialism to communism is not such a simple matter as Comrade Yaroshenko imagines.

To attempt to reduce this complex and multiform process, which demands deep-going economic changes, to the “rational organization of the productive forces,” as Comrade Yaroshenko does, is to substitute Bogdanovism for Marxism.

II

OTHER ERRORS OF COMRADE YAROSHENKO

1. From his incorrect opinion, Comrade Yaroshenko draws incorrect conclusions relative to the character and province of political economy.

Comrade Yaroshenko denies the necessity for a single political economy for all social formations, on the grounds that every social formation has its specific economic laws. But he is absolutely wrong there, and is at variance with such Marxists as Engels and Lenin.

Engels says that political economy is “the science of the conditions and forms under which the *various human societies* have produced and exchanged and on this basis have distributed their products.”¹⁵³ Hence, political economy investigates the laws of economic development not of any one social formation, but of the various social formations.

With this, as we know, Lenin was in full agreement. In his critical comments on Bukharin’s *Economics of the Transition Period*, he said that Bukharin was wrong in restricting the province of political economy to commodity production, and above all to capitalist production, observing that in doing so Bukharin was taking “a step backward from Engels.”¹⁵⁴

Fully in conformity with this is the definition of political economy given in the draft textbook, when it says that political economy is the science which studies “the laws of the social production and distribution of material values *at the various stages* of development of human society.”

That is understandable. The various social formations are governed in their economic development not only by their own specific economic laws, but also by the economic laws that are common to

all formations, such as, for instance, the law that the productive forces and the relations of production are united in one integral social production, and the law governing the relations between the productive forces and the relations of production in the process of development of all social formations. Hence, social formations are not only divided from one another by their own specific laws, but also connected with one another by the economic laws common to all formations.

Engels was quite right when he said:

“In order to carry out this critique of bourgeois economy completely, an acquaintance with the capitalist form of production, exchange and distribution did not suffice. The forms which had preceded it or those which still exist alongside it in less developed countries had also, at least in their main features, to be examined and compared.”¹⁵⁵

It is obvious that here, on this question, Comrade Yaroshenko is in tune with Bukharin.

Further, Comrade Yaroshenko declares that in his “Political Economy of Socialism,” “the categories of political economy — value, commodity, money, credit, etc., — *are replaced* by a healthy discussion of the rational organization of the productive forces in social production,” that, consequently, the subject of investigation of *this* political economy will *not* be the production relations of socialism, *but* “the elaboration and development of a scientific theory of the organization of the productive forces, theory of economic planning, etc.,” and that, under socialism, the relations of production lose their independent significance and are absorbed by the productive forces as a component part of them.

It must be said that never before has any retrograde “Marxist” delivered himself of such unholy twaddle. Just imagine a political economy of socialism without economic, production problems! Does such a political economy exist anywhere in creation? What is the effect, in a political economy of socialism, of replacing economic problems by problems of organization of the productive forces? The effect is to abolish the political economy of socialism. And that is just what Comrade Yaroshenko does — he abolishes the political economy of socialism. In this, his position fully gibes with that of Bukharin. Bukharin *said* that with the elimination of capitalism, political economy would also be eliminated. Comrade Yaroshenko does not say this, but he *does* it; he does abolish the political economy of socialism. True, he pretends that he is not in full agreement

with Bukharin; but that is only a trick, and a cheap trick at that. In actual fact he is doing what Bukharin preached and what Lenin rose up in arms against. Comrade Yaroshenko is following in the footsteps of Bukharin.

Further, Comrade Yaroshenko reduces the problems of the political economy of socialism to problems of the rational organization of the productive forces, to problems of economic planning, etc. But he is profoundly in error. The rational organization of the productive forces, economic planning, etc., are not problems of political economy, but problems of the economic policy of the directing bodies. They are two different provinces, which must not be confused. Comrade Yaroshenko has confused these two different things, and has made a terrible mess of it. Political economy investigates the laws of development of men's relations of production. Economic policy draws practical conclusions from this, gives them concrete shape, and builds its day-to-day work on them. To foist upon political economy problems of economic policy is to kill it as a science.

The province of political economy is the production, the economic, relations of men. It includes: a) the forms of ownership of the means of production; b) the status of the various social groups in production and their interrelations that follow from these forms, or what Marx calls: "they exchange their activities";¹⁵⁶ c) the forms of distribution of products, which are entirely determined by them. All these together constitute the province of political economy.

This definition does not contain the word "exchange," which figures in Engels' definition. It is omitted because "exchange" is usually understood by many to mean exchange of commodities, which is characteristic not of all, but only of some social formations, and this sometimes gives rise to misunderstanding, even though the word "exchange" with Engels did not mean only commodity exchange. As will be seen, however, that which Engels meant by the word "exchange" has been included, as a component part, in the above definition. Hence, this definition of the province of political economy fully coincides in content with Engels' definition.

2. When speaking of the basic economic law of some particular social formation, the presumption usually is that the latter cannot have several basic economic laws, that it can have only some one basic economic law, which precisely for that reason is the *basic* law. Otherwise we should have several basic economic laws for each social formation, which would be contrary to the very concept of a basic law. But Comrade Yaroshenko does not agree with this. He

thinks that it is possible to have not one, but several basic economic laws of socialism. It is incredible, but a fact. At the Plenary Discussion, he said:

“The magnitudes and correlations of the material funds of social production and reproduction are determined by the available labour power engaged in social production and its prospective increase. This is the basic economic law of socialist society, and it determines the structure of socialist social production and reproduction.”

That is one basic economic law of socialism.

In this same speech Comrade Yaroshenko declared:

“In socialist society, the correlations between Departments I and II are determined by the fact that production must have means of production in quantities sufficient to enlist all the able-bodied members of the population in social production. This is the basic economic law of socialism, and it is at the same time a demand of our Constitution, following from the right to work enjoyed by Soviet citizens.”

That, so to speak, is a second basic economic law of socialism.

Lastly, in his letter to the members of the Political Bureau, Comrade Yaroshenko declares:

“Accordingly, the essential features and requirements of the basic economic law of socialism may, it seems to me, be roughly formulated as follows: the continuous expansion and perfection of the production of the material and cultural conditions of life of society.”

Here we have a third basic economic law of socialism.

Whether all these laws are basic economic laws of socialism, or only one of them, and if only one of them, which exactly — to these questions Comrade Yaroshenko gives no answer in his last letter addressed to the members of the Political Bureau. When formulating the basic economic law of socialism in his letter to the members of the Political Bureau he “forgot,” it is to be presumed, that in his speech at the Plenary Discussion three months earlier he had already formulated two other basic economic laws of socialism, evidently believing that nobody would notice this dubious manoeuvre, to say the least of it. But, as we see, he miscalculated.

Let us assume that the first two basic economic laws of socialism formulated by Comrade Yaroshenko no longer exist, and that from now on he regards as the basic economic law of socialism the third one, which he formulated in his letter to the members of the Political Bureau. Let us turn to this letter.

Comrade Yaroshenko says in this letter that he does not agree

with the definition of the basic economic law of socialism which Comrade Stalin gave in his "Remarks." He says:

"The chief thing in this definition is 'the securing of the maximum satisfaction of... the requirements of the whole of society.' Production is presented here as the means of attaining this principal aim — satisfaction of requirements. Such a definition furnishes grounds for assuming that the basic economic law of socialism formulated by you is based not on the primacy of production, but on the primacy of consumption."

It is evident that Comrade Yaroshenko has completely failed to understand the essence of the problem, and does not see that talk about the primacy of consumption or of production has absolutely nothing to do with the case. When speaking of the primacy of any social process over another, it is usually assumed that the two processes are more or less homogeneous in character. One may, and should, speak of the primacy of the production of means of production over the production of means of consumption, because production is involved in both cases, and they are therefore more or less homogeneous. But one cannot speak, and it would be wrong to speak, of the primacy of consumption over production, or of production over consumption, because production and consumption are two entirely different spheres, which, it is true, are connected with one another, but which are different spheres all the same. Comrade Yaroshenko obviously fails to realize that what we are speaking of here is not the primacy of consumption or of production, but of what *aim* society sets social production, to what *purpose* it subordinates social production, say under socialism. So that when Comrade Yaroshenko says that "the basis of the life of socialist society, as of all other society, is production," it is entirely beside the point. Comrade Yaroshenko forgets that men produce not for production's sake, but in order to satisfy their needs. He forgets that production divorced from the satisfaction of the needs of society withers and dies.

Can we speak in general of the aims of capitalist or socialist production, of the purposes to which capitalist or socialist production are subordinated? I think that we can and should.

Marx says:

"The direct aim of production is not the production of goods, but the production surplus value, or of profit in its developed form; not the product, but the surplus product. From this standpoint, labour itself is productive only in so far as it creates profit or surplus product for capital. In so far as the worker does not create it, his labour is unproductive. Consequently, the sum-total of applied productive labour is of interest to capital only to the

extent that through it — or in relation to it — the sum-total of surplus labour increases. Only to that extent is what is called necessary labour time necessary. To the extent that it does not produce this result, it is superfluous and has to be discontinued.

“It is the constant aim of capitalist production to produce the maximum surplus value or surplus product with the minimum of capital advanced; in so far as this result is not attained by overworking the labourer, it is a tendency of capital to seek to produce a given product with the least expenditure — economizing labour power and costs...

“The labourers themselves figure in this conception as what they actually are in capitalist production — only means of production; not an aim in themselves and not the aim of production.”¹⁵⁷

These words of Marx are remarkable not only because they define the aim of capitalist production concisely and precisely, but also because they indicate the basic aim, the principal purpose, which should be set for socialist production.

Hence, the aim of capitalist production is profit-making. As to consumption, capitalism needs it only in so far as it ensures the making of profit. Outside of this, consumption means nothing to capitalism. Man and his needs disappear from its field of vision.

What is the aim of socialist production? What is that main purpose to which social production should be subordinated under socialism?

The aim of socialist production is not profit, but man and his needs, that is, the satisfaction of his material and cultural requirements. As is stated in Comrade Stalin’s “Remarks,” the aim of socialist production is “the securing of the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society.”*

Comrade Yaroshenko thinks that what he is confronted with here is the “primacy” of consumption over production. That, of course, is a misapprehension. Actually, what we have here is not the primacy of consumption, but the *subordination* of socialist production to its principal aim of securing the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society.

Consequently, maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society is the *aim* of socialist production; continuous expansion and perfection of socialist production on the basis of higher techniques is the *means* for the

* See p. 710 of this book.

achievement of the aim.

Such is the basic economic law of socialism.

Desiring to preserve what he calls the "primacy" of production over consumption, Comrade Yaroshenko claims that the "basic economic law of socialism" consists in "the continuous expansion and perfection of the production of the material and cultural conditions of society." That is absolutely wrong. Comrade Yaroshenko grossly distorts and vitiates the formula given in Comrade Stalin's "Remarks." With him, production is converted from a means into an end, and the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of society is thrown out. What we get is expansion of production for the sake of expansion of production, production as an aim in itself; man and his requirements disappear from Comrade Yaroshenko's field of vision.

It is therefore not surprising that, with the disappearance of man as the aim of socialist production, every vestige of Marxism disappears from Comrade Yaroshenko's "conception."

And so, what Comrade Yaroshenko arrives at is not the "primacy" of production over consumption, but something like the "primacy" of bourgeois ideology over Marxist ideology.

3. A question by itself is Marx's theory of reproduction. Comrade Yaroshenko asserts that the Marxist theory of reproduction is a theory of capitalist reproduction only, that it contains nothing that might have validity for other social formations, the socialist social formation in particular. He says:

"The extension of Marx's scheme of reproduction, which he elaborated for the capitalist economy, to socialist social production is the fruit of a dogmatic understanding of Marx's theory and runs counter to the essence of his theory."*

He further asserts: "Marx's scheme of reproduction does not correspond to the economic laws of socialist society and cannot serve as a basis in the investigation of socialist reproduction."*

Concerning Marx's theory of simple reproduction, which establishes a definite correlation between the production of means of production (Department I) and the production of means of consumption (Department II), Comrade Yaroshenko says:

"In socialist society, the correlation between Departments I and II is not determined by Marx's formula $v+m$ of Department I and c of Depart-

* Comrade Yaroshenko's speech in the Plenary Discussion.

ment II.¹⁵⁸ There should be no such interconnection in development between Departments I and II under socialist conditions.”*

He asserts: “The theory of the correlation between Departments I and II worked out by Marx is not applicable in our socialist conditions, since Marx’s theory is based on capitalist economy and its laws.”**

That is how Comrade Yaroshenko makes mincemeat of Marx’s theory of reproduction.

Of course, Marx’s theory of reproduction, which was the fruit of an investigation of the laws of the capitalist mode of production, reflects the specific character of the latter, and, naturally, is clothed in the form of capitalist-commodity value relations. It could not have been otherwise. But he who sees in Marx’s theory of reproduction only its form, and does not observe its fundamentals, its essential substance, which holds good not only for the capitalist social formation alone, has no understanding whatever of this theory. If Comrade Yaroshenko had any understanding at all of the matter, he would have realized the self-evident truth that Marx’s scheme of reproduction does not begin and end with a reflection of the specific character of the capitalist mode of production, that it at the same time contains a whole number of fundamental tenets on the subject of reproduction which hold good for all social formations, particularly and especially for the socialist social formation. Such fundamental tenets of the Marxist theory of reproduction as the division of social production into the production of means of production and the production of means of consumption; the relatively greater increase of production of means of production in reproduction on an extended scale; the correlation between Departments I and II; surplus product as the sole source of accumulation; the formation and designation of the social funds; accumulation as the sole source of reproduction on an extended scale — all these fundamental tenets of the Marxist theory of reproduction are at the same time tenets which hold good not only for the capitalist formation, and which no socialist society can dispense with in the planning of its national economy. It is significant that Comrade Yaroshenko himself, who snorts so haughtily at Marx’s “schemes of reproduction,” is obliged every now and again to call in the help of these “schemes” when discussing

* Comrade Yaroshenko’s speech in the Plenary Discussion.

** Comrade Yaroshenko’s letter to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.

problems of socialist reproduction.

And how did Lenin and Marx view the matter?

Everyone is familiar with Lenin's critical comments on Bukharin's *Economics of the Transition Period*. In these remarks, as we know, Lenin recognized that Marx's formula of the correlation between Departments I and II, against which Comrade Yaroshenko rises in arms, holds true both for socialism and for "pure communism," that is, for the second phase of communism.

As to Marx, he, as we know, did not like to digress from his investigation of the laws of capitalist production, and did not, in his *Capital*, discuss the applicability of his schemes of reproduction to socialism. However, in Chapter XX, Vol. II of *Capital*, in the section, "The Constant Capital of Department I," where he examines the exchange of Department I products within this department, Marx, as though in passing, observes that under socialism the exchange of products within this department would proceed with the same regularity as under the capitalist mode of production. He says:

"If production were socialized, instead of capitalistic, it is evident that these products of Department I would just as regularly be redistributed as means of production to the various lines of production of this department, for purposes of reproduction, one portion remaining directly in that sphere of production which created it, another passing over to other lines of production of the same department, thereby entertaining a constant mutual exchange between the various lines of production of this department."¹⁵⁹

Consequently, Marx by no means considered that his theory of reproduction was valid only for the capitalist mode of production, although it was the laws of the capitalist mode of production he was investigating. We see, on the contrary, that he held that his theory of reproduction might be valid also for the socialist mode of production.

It should be remarked that, when analysing the economics of socialism and of the transitional period to communism in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, Marx proceeds from the fundamental tenets of his theory of reproduction, evidently regarding them as obligatory for the communist system.

It should also be remarked that when Engels, in his *Anti-Dühring*, criticizes Dühring's "socialitarian system" and discusses the economics of the socialist system, he likewise proceeds from the fundamental tenets of Marx's theory of reproduction, regarding them as obligatory for the communist system.

Such are the facts.

It appears, then, that here too, in the question of reproduction, Comrade Yaroshenko, despite his sneering attitude towards Marx's "schemes," has again landed on the shoals.

4. Comrade Yaroshenko concludes his letter to the members of the Political Bureau with the proposal that the compilation of the "Political Economy of Socialism" be entrusted to him. He writes:

"On the basis of the definition of the province of the political-economic science of socialism outlined by me at the plenary meeting, in the working panel, and in the present letter, and utilizing the Marxist dialectical method, I could, with the help of two assistants, work out in the space of one year, or a year and a half at most, the theoretical solution of the basic problems of the political economy of socialism, that is, expound the Marxist, Leninist-Stalinist theory of the political economy of socialism, a theory which would convert this science into an effective weapon of the struggle of the people for communism."

It must be confessed that modesty is not one of Comrade Yaroshenko's failings — "even the other way round," it might be said, borrowing the style of some of our writers.

It has already been pointed out above that Comrade Yaroshenko confuses the political economy of socialism with the economic policy of the directing bodies. That which he considers the province of the political economy of socialism — rational organization of the productive forces, economic planning, formation of social funds, etc. — is the province of the economic policy of the directing bodies, and not of the political economy of socialism.

I say nothing of the fact that the serious blunders committed by Comrade Yaroshenko, and his un-Marxist "opinion" do not incline one to entrust him with such a task.

* * *

Conclusions:

1) The complaint Comrade Yaroshenko levels at the managers of the discussion is untenable, since they, being Marxists, could not in their summarizing documents reflect his un-Marxist "opinion";

2) Comrade Yaroshenko's request to be entrusted with the writing of the political economy of socialism cannot be taken seriously, if only because it reeks of Khlestakovism.¹⁶⁰

May 22, 1952

**REPLY TO COMRADES A.V. SANINA AND V.G.
VENZHER**

I have received your letters. It can be seen from them that their authors are making a profound and serious study of the economic problems of our country. There are quite a number of correct formulations and interesting arguments in the letters. But alongside of these, there are some grave theoretical errors. It is on these errors that I propose to dwell in this reply.

1. CHARACTER OF THE ECONOMIC LAWS OF SOCIALISM

Comrades Sanina and Venzher claim that “only because of the conscious action of the Soviet citizens engaged in material production do the economic laws of socialism arise.” This opinion is absolutely incorrect.

Do the laws of economic development exist objectively, outside of us, independently of the will and consciousness of man? Marxism answers this question in the affirmative. Marxism holds that the laws of the political economy of socialism are a reflection in the minds of men of objective laws existing outside of us. But Comrades Sanina’s and Venzher’s formula answers this question in the negative. That means that these comrades are adopting the position of an incorrect theory which asserts that under socialism the laws of economic development are “created,” “transformed” by the directing bodies of society. In other words, they are breaking with Marxism and taking the stand of subjective idealism.

Of course, men can discover these objective laws, come to know them and, relying upon them, utilize them in the interests of society. But they cannot “create” them, nor can they “transform” them.

Suppose for a moment that we accepted this incorrect theory which denies the existence of objective laws of economic activity under socialism, and which proclaims the possibility of “creating” and “transforming” economic laws. Where would it lead us? It would lead us into the realm of chaos and chance, we should find ourselves in slavish dependence on chances, and we should be forfeiting the possibility not only of understanding, but of simply finding our way about in this chaos of chances.

The effect would be that we should be destroying political economy as a science, because science cannot exist and develop unless it recognizes the existence of objective laws, and studies them. And by destroying science, we should be forfeiting the possibility of foresee-

ing the course of developments in the economic life of the country, in other words, we should be forfeiting the possibility of providing even the most elementary economic leadership.

In the end we should find ourselves at the mercy of “economic” adventurers who are ready to “destroy” the laws of economic development and to “create” new laws without any understanding of, or consideration for objective law.

Everyone is familiar with the classic formulation of the Marxist position on this question given by Engels in his *Anti-Dühring*:

“Active social forces work exactly like natural forces: blindly, forcibly, destructively, so long as we do not understand, and reckon with, them. But when once we understand them, when once we grasp their action, their direction, their effects, it depends only upon ourselves to subject them more and more to our own will, and by means of them to reach our own ends. And this holds quite especially of the mighty productive forces of today. As long as we obstinately refuse to understand the nature and the character of these productive forces — and this understanding goes against the grain of the capitalist mode of production and its defenders — so long these forces are at work in spite of us, in opposition to us, so long they master us, as we have shown above in detail. But when once their nature is understood, they can, in the hands of the producers working together, be transformed from master demons into willing servants. The difference is as that between the destructive force of electricity in the lightning of the storm, and electricity under command in the telegraph and the voltaic arc; the difference between a conflagration, and fire working in the service of man. With this recognition, at last, of the real nature of the productive forces of today, the social anarchy of production gives place to a social regulation of production upon a definite plan, according to the needs of the community and of each individual. Then the capitalist mode of appropriation, in which the product enslaves first the producer and then the appropriator, is replaced by the mode of appropriation of the products that is based upon the nature of the modern means of production; upon the one hand, direct social appropriation, as means to the maintenance and extension of production — on the other, direct individual appropriation, as means of subsistence and of enjoyment.”¹⁶¹

2. MEASURES FOR ELEVATING COLLECTIVE-FARM PROPERTY TO THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC PROPERTY

What measures are necessary to raise collective-farm property, which, of course, is not public property, to the level of public (“national”) property?

Some comrades think that the thing to do is simply to nationalize collective-farm property, to proclaim it public property, in the way that was done in the past in the case of capitalist property. Such a

proposal would be absolutely wrong and quite unacceptable. Collective-farm property is socialist property, and we simply cannot treat it in the same way as capitalist property. From the fact that collective-farm property is not public property, it by no means follows that it is not socialist property.

These comrades believe that the conversion of the property of individuals or groups of individuals into state property is the only, or at any rate the best, form of nationalization. That is not true. The fact is that conversion into state property is not the only, or even the best, form of nationalization, but the initial form of nationalization, as Engels quite rightly says in *Anti-Dühring*. Unquestionably, so long as the state exists, conversion into state property is the most natural initial form of nationalization. But the state will not exist forever. With the extension of the sphere of operation of socialism in the majority of the countries of the world the state will die away, and, of course, the conversion of the property of individuals or groups of individuals into state property will consequently lose its meaning. The state will have died away, but society will remain. Hence, the heir of the public property will then be not the state, which will have died away, but society itself, in the shape of a central, directing economic body.

That being so, what must be done to raise collective-farm property to the level of public property?

The proposal made by Comrades Sanina and Venzher as the chief means of achieving such an elevation of collective-farm property is to sell the basic implements of production concentrated in the machine and tractor stations to the collective farms as their property, thus releasing the state from the necessity of making capital investments in agriculture, and to make the collective farms themselves responsible for the maintenance and development of the machine and tractor stations. They say:

“It is wrong to believe that collective-farm investments must be used chiefly for the cultural needs of the collective-farm village, while the greater bulk of the investments for the needs of agricultural production must continue as hitherto to be borne by the state. Would it not be more correct to relieve the state of this burden, seeing that the collective farms are capable of taking it entirely upon themselves? The state will have plenty of undertakings in which to invest its funds with a view to creating an abundance of articles of consumption in the country.”

The authors advance several arguments in support of their proposal.

First. Referring to Stalin's statement that means of production are not sold even to the collective farms, the authors of the proposal cast doubt on this statement of Stalin's by declaring that the state, after all, does sell means of production to the collective farms, such as minor implements, like scythes and sickles, small power engines, etc. They consider that if the state can sell such means of production to the collective farms, it might also sell them other means of production, such as the machines of the machine and tractor stations.

This argument is untenable. The state, of course, does sell minor implements to the collective farms, as, indeed, it has to in compliance with the Rules of the Agricultural Artel and the Constitution. But can we lump in one category minor implements and such basic agricultural means of production as the machines of the machine and tractor stations, or, let us say, the land, which, after all, is also one of the basic means of production in agriculture? Obviously not. They cannot be lumped in one category because minor implements do not in any degree decide the fate of collective-farm production, whereas such means of production as the machines of the machine and tractor stations and the land entirely decide the fate of agriculture in our present-day conditions.

It should not be difficult to understand that when Stalin said that means of production are not sold to the collective farms, it was not minor implements he had in mind, but the basic means of agricultural production: the machines of the machine and tractor stations, the land. The authors are playing with the words "means of production" and are confusing two different things, without observing that they are getting into a mess.

Second. Comrades Sanina and Venzher further refer to the fact that in the early period of the mass collective-farm movement — end of 1929 and beginning of 1930 — the CC, CPSU(B) was itself in favour of transferring the machine and tractor stations to the collective farms as their property, requiring them to pay off the cost of the machine and tractor stations over a period of three years. They consider that although nothing came of this at the time, "in view of the poverty" of the collective farms, now that they have become wealthy it might be expedient to return to this policy, namely, the sale of the machine and tractor stations to the collective farms.

This argument is likewise untenable. A decision really was adopted by the CC, CPSU(B) in the early part of 1930 to sell the machine and tractor stations to the collective farms. It was adopted at the suggestion of a group of collective-farm shock workers as an ex-

periment, as a trial, with the idea of reverting to the question at an early date and re-examining it. But the first trial demonstrated the inadvisability of this decision, and a few months later, namely, at the close of 1930, it was rescinded.

The subsequent spread of the collective-farm movement and the development of collective-farm construction definitely convinced both the collective farmers and the leading officials that concentration of the basic implements of agricultural production in the hands of the state, in the hands of the machine and tractor stations, was the only way of ensuring a high rate of expansion of collective-farm production.

We are all gratified by the tremendous strides agricultural production in our country is making, by the increasing output of grain, cotton, flax, sugar beet, etc. What is the source of this increase? It is the increase of up-to-date technical equipment, the numerous up-to-date machines which are serving all branches of production. It is not a question of machinery generally; the question is that machinery cannot remain at a standstill, it must be perfected all the time, old machinery being scrapped and replaced by new, and the new by newer still. Without this, the onward march of our socialist agriculture would be impossible; big harvests and an abundance of agricultural produce would be out of the question. But what is involved in scrapping hundreds of thousands of wheel tractors and replacing them by caterpillar tractors, in replacing tens of thousands of obsolete harvester-combines by more up-to-date ones, in creating new machines, say, for industrial crops? It involves an expenditure of billions of rubles which can be recouped only after the lapse of six or eight years. Are our collective farms capable of bearing such an expense, even though their incomes may run into the millions? No, they are not, since they are not in the position to undertake the expenditure of billions of rubles which may be recouped only after a period of six or eight years. Such expenditures can be borne only by the state, for it, and it alone, is in the position to bear the loss involved by the scrapping of old machines and replacing them by new; because it, and it alone, is in a position to bear such losses for six or eight years and only then recover the outlays.

What, in view of this, would be the effect of selling the machine and tractor stations to the collective farms as their property? The effect would be to involve the collective farms in heavy loss and to ruin them, to undermine the mechanization of agriculture, and to slow up the development of collective-farm production.

The conclusion therefore is that, in proposing that the machine and tractor stations should be sold to the collective farms as their property, Comrades Sanina and Venzher are suggesting a step in reversion to the old backwardness and are trying to turn back the wheel of history.

Assuming for a moment that we accepted Comrades Sanina's and Venzher's proposal and began to sell the basic implements of production, the machine and tractor stations, to the collective farms as their property. What would be the outcome?

The outcome would be, first, that the collective farms would become the owners of the basic instruments of production; that is, their status would be an exceptional one, such as is not shared by any other enterprise in our country, for, as we know, even the nationalized enterprises do not own their instruments of production. How, by what considerations of progress and advancement, could this exceptional status of the collective farms be justified? Can it be said that such a status would facilitate the elevation of collective-farm property to the level of public property, that it would expedite the transition of our society from socialism to communism? Would it not be truer to say that such a status could only dig a deeper gulf between collective-farm property and public property, and would not bring us any nearer to communism, but, on the contrary, remove us farther from it?

The outcome would be, secondly, an extension of the sphere of operation of commodity circulation, because a gigantic quantity of instruments of agricultural production would come within its orbit. What do Comrades Sanina and Venzher think — is the extension of the sphere of commodity circulation calculated to promote our advance towards communism? Would it not be truer to say that our advance towards communism would only be retarded by it?

Comrades Sanina's and Venzher's basic error lies in the fact that they do not understand the role and significance of commodity circulation under socialism; that they do not understand that commodity circulation is incompatible with the prospective transition from socialism to communism. They evidently think that the transition from socialism to communism is possible even with commodity circulation, that commodity circulation can be no obstacle to this. That is a profound error, arising from an inadequate grasp of Marxism.

Criticizing Dühring's "economic commune," which functions in the conditions of commodity circulation, Engels, in his *Anti-Dühring*, convincingly shows that the existence of commodity circulation was

inevitably bound to lead Dühring's so-called "economic communes" to the regeneration of capitalism. Comrades Sanina and Venzher evidently do not agree with this. All the worse for them. But we, Marxists, adhere to the Marxist view that the transition from socialism to communism and the communist principle of distribution of products according to needs preclude all commodity exchange, and, hence, preclude the conversion of products into commodities, and, with it, their conversion into value.

So much for the proposal and arguments of Comrades Sanina and Venzher.

But what, then, should be done to elevate collective-farm property to the level of public property?

The collective farm is an unusual kind of enterprise. It operates on land, and cultivates land which has long been public, and not collective-farm property. Consequently, the collective farm is not the owner of the land it cultivates.

Further, the collective farm operates with basic implements of production which are public, not collective-farm property. Consequently, the collective farm is not the owner of its basic implements of production.

Further, the collective farm is a cooperative enterprise: it utilizes the labour of its members, and it distributes its income among its members on the basis of workday units; it owns its seed, which is renewed every year and goes into production.

What, then, does the collective farm own? Where is the collective-farm property which it disposes of quite freely, at its own discretion? This property of the collective farm is its product, the product of collective farming: grain, meat, butter, vegetables, cotton, sugar beet, flax, etc., not counting the buildings and the personal husbandry of the collective farmers on their household plots. The fact is that a considerable part of this product, the surplus collective-farm output, goes into the market and is thus included in the system of commodity circulation. It is precisely this circumstance which now prevents the elevation of collective-farm property to the level of public property. It is therefore precisely from this end that the work of elevating collective-farm property to the level of public property must be tackled.

In order to raise collective-farm property to the level of public property, the surplus collective-farm output must be excluded from the system of commodity circulation and included in the system of products-exchange between state industry and the collective farms.

That is the point.

We still have no developed system of products-exchange, but the rudiments of such a system exist in the shape of the “merchandising” of agricultural products. For quite a long time already, as we know, the products of the cotton-growing, flax-growing, beet-growing and other collective farms are “merchandised.” They are not “merchandised” in full, it is true, but only partly, still they are “merchandised.” Be it mentioned in passing that “merchandising” is not a happy word, and should be replaced by “products-exchange.” The task is to extend these rudiments of products-exchange to all branches of agriculture and to develop them into a broad system, under which the collective farms would receive for their products not only money, but also and chiefly the manufactures they need. Such a system would require an immense increase in the goods allocated by the town to the country, and it would therefore have to be introduced without any particular hurry, and only as the products of the town multiply. But it must be introduced unswervingly and unhesitatingly, step by step contracting the sphere of operation of commodity circulation and widening the sphere of operation of products-exchange.

Such a system, by contracting the sphere of operation of commodity circulation, will facilitate the transition from socialism to communism. Moreover, it will make it possible to include the basic property of the collective farms, the product of collective farming, in the general system of national planning.

That will be a real and effective means of raising collective-farm property to the level of public property under our present-day conditions.

Will such a system be advantageous to the collective-farm peasantry? It undoubtedly will. It will, because the collective-farm peasantry will receive far more products from the state than under commodity circulation, and at much cheaper prices. Everyone knows that the collective farms which have products-exchange (“merchandising”) contracts with the government receive incomparably greater advantages than the collective farms which have no such contracts. If the products-exchange system is extended to all the collective farms in the country, these advantages will become available to all our collective-farm peasantry.

May 22, 1952

SPEECH TO THE NINETEENTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

October 14, 1952

Comrades!

Permit me, in the name of our Party Congress, to express our thanks to all fraternal parties and organizations whose representatives have honoured our Party Congress by their presence, or who have sent our Party Congress greetings of friendship, for their wishes for our further success and for their confidence. (*Stormy, prolonged applause that became an ovation.*)

For us, this trust is especially valuable as it signifies their readiness to support our Party in its struggle for a better future for the people, in its struggle against war, in its struggle to keep peace. (*Stormy, prolonged applause.*)

It would be a mistake to believe that our Party, which has become a mighty power, does not need more support. That would be wrong. Our Party and our country need the continuous trust, sympathy and support of fraternal peoples outside our borders, and will always need it.

The special quality of this support lies in that every support of the peace endeavours of our Party by each fraternal party, simultaneously signifies the support of their own people in their struggle to keep peace. As the English workers in the years 1918-1919, during the armed attack of the English bourgeoisie on the Soviet Union, organized their struggle against the war under the slogan "Hands off Russia!," was a support, it was above all a support of the struggle of their own people for peace, and then, also, a support of the Soviet Union. If Comrade Thorez or Comrade Togliatti declare that their people do not want to be led into a war against the people of the Soviet Union (*stormy applause*) — then that is a support, above all a support for the French and Italian workers and peasants who struggle for peace, and then, also, a support of the peace endeavours of the Soviet Union. The special quality of the present support is thus explained, that the interests of our Party are not only not against the interests of the peace-loving people, but on the contrary, blend with them. (*Stormy applause.*) Where the Soviet Union is concerned, its interest in the matter of world peace cannot be separated from the

cause of peace in the whole world.

It is understood that our Party must do its duty by its fraternal parties and support them and their peoples in the struggle for liberation and in their struggle for keeping peace. This is what the Party does. (*Stormy applause.*) After the seizure of power by our Party in 1917, and after our Party took real measures to eliminate the yoke of capitalists and landlords, the representatives of the fraternal parties, inspired by our daring and the success of our Party, gave it the name "Shock Brigade" of the revolutionary movement and the workers' movement of the world. Thereby they expressed the hope that the success of the "Shock Brigade" would alleviate the sufferings of the people in the situation of being under the capitalist yoke. I think that our Party has fulfilled these hopes, especially in the time of the second world war, as the Soviet Union smashed the German and Japanese fascist tyranny and liberated the European and Asian peoples from the danger of fascist slavery. (*Stormy applause.*)

Of course it was very difficult to fulfil this honourable task as long as there was only one "Shock Brigade," as long as it stood alone, the avantgarde in the fulfillment of this task. But that is in the past. Now it is completely different. Now, from China and Korea to Czechoslovakia and Hungary, new "Shock Brigades" have appeared on the map, in the form of people's democracies; now the struggle has been eased for our Party and also the work proceeds better. (*Stormy, prolonged applause.*)

Special attention must be paid to the communist, democratic or worker and peasant parties that are not yet in power and which must carry out their work under the yoke of strict, bourgeois rule. Of course, their work is more difficult. But their work is not so difficult as it was for us Russian communists in the time of the Tsar, as the smallest step forward was declared a serious crime. The Russian communists nevertheless held firm, did not retreat from difficulties and came to victory. The same will be the case with these parties.

Why is it that these parties do not have such difficult work as the Russian communists had in the times of Tsarism?

Because, first of all, they have the example of the struggle and success, as in the Soviet Union and in the people's democratic countries, before them. Consequently, they can learn from the mistakes and successes of these countries and thus ease their work.

Because, secondly, the bourgeoisie itself, the arch-enemy of the freedom movement, has become different, has essentially changed, has become more reactionary, has lost the cooperation of the people

and thus has been weakened. It is understood that these circumstances must likewise ease the work of the revolutionary and democratic parties. (*Stormy applause.*)

Earlier, the bourgeoisie presented themselves as liberal, they were for bourgeois democratic freedom and in that way gained popularity with the people. Now there is not one remaining trace of liberalism.

There is no such thing as “freedom of personality” anymore — personal rights are now only acknowledged by them, the owners of capital — all the other citizens are regarded as raw materials that are only for exploitation. The principle of equal rights for people and nations is trodden in the dust and it is replaced by the principle of full rights for the exploiting minority and the lack of rights of the exploited majority of the citizens. The banner of bourgeois democratic freedom has been flung overboard. I think that you, the representatives of communist and democratic parties must pick up this banner and carry it forward if you want to gain the majority of the people. There is nobody else to raise it. (*Stormy applause.*)

Earlier, the bourgeoisie, as the heads of nations, were for the rights and independence of nations and put that “above all.” Now there is no trace left of this “national principle.” Now the bourgeoisie sells the rights and independence of their nations for dollars. The banner of national independence and national sovereignty has been thrown overboard. Without doubt, you, the representatives of the communist and democratic parties must raise this banner and carry it forward if you want to be patriots of your countries, if you want to be the leading powers of the nations. There is nobody else to raise it. (*Stormy applause.*)

That is how matters stand at present.

It is understood that all these circumstances must ease the work of the communist and democratic parties that are not yet in power.

Consequently, there is every ground for the success and victory of the fraternal parties in the lands of capitalist rule. (*Stormy applause.*)

Long live our fraternal parties! (*Prolonged applause.*)

Long life and health to the leaders of the fraternal parties! (*Prolonged applause.*)

Long live the peace between the peoples! (*Prolonged applause.*)

Down with the arsonists of war! (*Everyone stood up. Stormy, prolonged applause that became an ovation. There were shouts of “Long live Comrade Stalin!” “Long live the great leader of the working people of the*

world, Comrade Stalin!" "The great Stalin!" "Long live peace between the peoples!")

NOTES

¹ Gnchak Committee — a committee of the Armenian petty-bourgeois party called Gnchak which was formed in Geneva in 1887 on the initiative of Armenian students. In Transcaucasia the party assumed the title of the Armenian Social-Democratic Party and conducted a splitting policy in the labour movement. After the revolution of 1905-07 the party degenerated into a reactionary nationalist group.

² See *Resolutions and Decisions of CPSU(B) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 6th Russ. ed., 1940, p. 45.

³ At the end of 1905 and the beginning of 1906, a group of anarchists in Georgia, headed by the well-known anarchist and follower of Kropotkin, V. Cherkezishvili and his supporters Mikhako Tsereteli (Bâton), Shalva Gogelia (Sh. G.) and others conducted a fierce campaign against the social-democrats. This group published in Tiflis the newspapers *Nobati*, *Musha* and others. The anarchists had no support among the proletariat, but they achieved some success among the declassed and petty-bourgeois elements. J.V. Stalin wrote a series of articles against the anarchists under the general title of *Anarchism or Socialism?* The first four instalments appeared in *Akhali Tskhovreba* in June and July 1906. The rest were not published as the newspaper was suppressed by the authorities. In December 1906 and on January 1, 1907, the articles that were published in *Akhali Tskhovreba* were reprinted in *Akhali Droyeba*, in a slightly revised form, with the following editorial comment: "Recently, the Office Employees' Union wrote to us suggesting that we should publish articles on anarchism, socialism and cognate questions (see *Akhali Droyeba*, No. 3). The same wish was expressed by several other comrades. We gladly meet these wishes and publish these articles. Regarding them, we think it necessary to mention that some have already appeared in the Georgian press (but for reasons over which the author had no control, they were not completed). Nevertheless we considered it necessary to reprint all the articles in full and requested the author to rewrite them in a more popular style, and this he gladly did."

⁴ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1951, p. 328.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 329.

⁶ See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Die heilige Familie*, "Kritische Schlacht gegen den französischen Materialismus." (Marx-Engels, *Gesamtausgabe*, Erste Abteilung, Band 3, S. 307-08.)

⁷ See Karl Marx, *Misère de la Philosophie*. (Marx-Engels, *Gesamtausgabe*, Erste Abteilung, Band 6, S. 227.)

⁸ See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1951, p. 292.

⁹ See *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁰ See Frederick Engels, *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science (Anti-*

Dühring), Moscow 1947, pp. 233-35.

¹¹ Karl Marx, *The Cologne Trial of the Communists*, published by Molot Publishers, St. Petersburg, 1906, p. 113 (IX. Appendix. *Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League*, March, 1850). (See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, pp. 104-05.)

¹² See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1951, p. 420.

¹³ The author quotes this passage from Karl Marx's pamphlet *The Civil War in France*, with a preface by F. Engels, Russian translation from the German edited by N. Lenin, 1905 (see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, p. 440).

¹⁴ *Lakhvari (The Spear)* — a Georgian daily Menshevik newspaper published in Tiflis from April to June 1907.

¹⁵ *Marxism and the National Question* was written at the end of 1912 and the beginning of 1913 in Vienna. It first appeared in the magazine *Prosveshcheniye (Enlightenment)*, Nos. 3-5, 1913, under the title "The National Question and Social-Democracy" and was signed K. Stalin. In 1914 it was published by the Priboy Publishers, St. Petersburg, as a separate pamphlet entitled *The National Question and Marxism*. By order of the Minister of the Interior the pamphlet was withdrawn from all public libraries and reading rooms. In 1920 the article was republished by the People's Commissariat for Nationalities in a *Collection of Articles* by J.V. Stalin on the national question (State Publishing House, Tula). In 1934 the article was included in the book: J. Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question. A Collection of Articles and Speeches*. Lenin, in his article "The National Program of the RSDLP," referring to the reasons which were lending prominence to the national question at that period, wrote: "This state of affairs, and the principles of the national program of social-democracy, have already been dealt with recently in theoretical Marxist literature (prime place must here be given to Stalin's article)." In February 1913, Lenin wrote to Maxim Gorky: "We have a wonderful Georgian here who has sat down to write a big article for *Prosveshcheniye* after collecting all the Austrian and other material." Learning that it was proposed to print the article with the reservation that it was for discussion only, Lenin vigorously objected, and wrote: "Of course, we are absolutely against this. It is a *very good* article. The question is a burning issue, and we shall not yield one jot of principle to the Bundist scum." (Archives of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute.) Soon after J.V. Stalin's arrest, in March 1913, Lenin wrote to the editors of *Sotsial-Demokrat*: "...Arrests among us are very heavy. Koba has been taken... Koba managed to write a long article (for three issues of *Prosveshcheniye*) on the national question. Good! We must fight for the truth and against separatists and opportunists of the Bund and among the Liquidators." (Archives of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute.)

¹⁶ Zionism — a reactionary nationalist trend of the Jewish bourgeoisie, which had followers among the intellectuals and the more backward sec-

tions of the Jewish workers. The Zionists endeavoured to isolate the Jewish working-class masses from the general struggle of the proletariat. Later the Zionist organizations were the agents of the American imperialists in their machinations directed against the USSR and the people's democracies and the revolutionary movement in capitalist and colonial countries.

¹⁷ The Brünn Parteitag, or Congress, of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party was held on September 24-29, 1899.

¹⁸ "Thank God we have no parliament here" — the words uttered by V. Kokovtsev, Tsarist Minister of Finance (later Prime Minister), in the State Duma on April 24, 1908.

¹⁹ See Chapter II of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, Moscow 1951, p. 49).

²⁰ The Vienna Congress (or *Wimberg* Congress — after the name of the hotel in which it met) of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party was held June 6-12, 1897.

²¹ The reference is to the first Balkan War, which broke out in October 1912 between Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro on the one hand, and Turkey on the other.

²² See the resolutions of the Fourth (the "Third All-Russian") Conference of the RSDLP held November 5-12, 1907, and of the Fifth (the "All-Russian 1908") Conference of the RSDLP held December 21-27, 1908 (January 3-9, 1909) (See *Resolutions and Decisions of CPSU(B) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Vol. 1, 6th Russ. ed., 1940, pp. 118, 131.)

²³ E.J. Jagiello — a member of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), was elected to the Fourth State Duma for Warsaw as a result of a bloc formed by the Bund, the Polish Socialist Party and the bourgeois nationalists against the Polish social-democrats. By a vote of the seven Menshevik Liquidators against the six Bolsheviks, the social-democratic group in the Duma adopted a resolution that Jagiello be accepted as a member of the group.

²⁴ The Council of the Entente, with the professed aim of establishing peace in Russia, decided to invite the Soviet government and the Kolchak, Denikin and other counter-revolutionary governments to send representatives to a conference to be held in February 1919 on the Princes' Islands, in the Sea of Marmora. The conference did not take place.

²⁵ Berne Conference — a conference of social-chauvinist and centrist parties of the Second International held in Berne, Switzerland, February 3-10, 1919.

²⁶ From A.V. Koltsov's poem, "The Forest" (See A.V. Koltsov, *Complete Collection of Poems*, Leningrad 1939, p. 90)

²⁷ *The Second All-Union Congress of Soviets* was held in Moscow from January 26 to February 2, 1924. At the first sitting, which was devoted to the memory of Lenin, J.V. Stalin delivered a speech in which, in the name of the Bolshevik Party, he took a solemn vow to hold sacred and fulfil the be-

hests of Lenin. In connection with the death of Lenin, the congress adopted an appeal "To Toiling Mankind." To perpetuate the memory of Lenin, the congress adopted a decision to publish Lenin's Works, to change the name of Petrograd to Leningrad, to establish a Day of Mourning, and to erect a mausoleum for Lenin in the Red Square in Moscow, and monuments to him in the capitals of the Union Republics and also in the cities of Leningrad and Tashkent. The congress discussed a report on the activities of the Soviet government, the budget of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the establishment of a Central Agricultural Bank. On January 31, the congress endorsed the first Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the USSR which had been drafted under the guidance of J.V. Stalin. The congress elected a Central Executive Committee — the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. J.V. Stalin was elected to the Soviet of the Union.

²⁸ This refers to the economic and political crisis in Germany in 1923. A mass revolutionary movement spread over the country, as a result of which workers' governments were set up in Saxony and Thuringia, and an armed uprising broke out in Hamburg. After the suppression of the revolutionary movement in Germany, bourgeois reaction was intensified all over Europe, as well as the danger of a new intervention against the Soviet Republic.

²⁹ J.V. Stalin's lectures, *The Foundations of Leninism*, were published in *Pravda* in April and May 1924. In May 1924, J.V. Stalin's pamphlet *On Lenin and Leninism* appeared, containing his reminiscences on *Lenin* and the lectures *The Foundations of Leninism*. J.V. Stalin's work *The Foundations of Leninism* is included in all the editions of his book *Problems of Leninism*.

³⁰ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, (*Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, p. 61).

³¹ This refers to the statement by Karl Marx in his letter to Frederick Engels of April 16, 1856 (see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1951, p. 412).

³² This refers to Frederick Engels' article "The Bakuninists at Work" (see F. Engels, "Die Bakunisten an der Arbeit" in *Der Volksstaat*, No. 105, 106, and 107, 1873).

³³ V.I. Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, p. 9).

³⁴ V.I. Lenin, *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 1, pp. 278-79).

³⁵ The Basle Congress of the Second International was held on November 24-25, 1912. It was convened in connection with the Balkan War and the impending threat of a world war. Only one question was discussed: the international situation and joint action against war. The congress adopted a manifesto calling upon the workers to utilize their proletarian organization and might to wage a revolutionary struggle against the danger of war, to declare "war against war."

³⁶ See Karl Marx, Preface to the Second German Edition of the first volume of *Capital* (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I,

Moscow, 1951, p. 414).

³⁷ See Frederick Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1951, p. 338).

³⁸ See V.I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 14.

³⁹ Karl Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach* (see Frederick Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, Appendix). (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1951, p. 367).

⁴⁰ V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, pp. 173-290).

⁴¹ J.V. Stalin refers to the following articles written by V.I. Lenin in 1905: "Social-Democracy and the Provisional Revolutionary Government," from which he cites a passage; "The Revolutionary Democratic-Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Peasantry"; and "On the Provisional Revolutionary Government." (see V.I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 8, pp. 247-63, 264-74, 427-47).

⁴² Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The First Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League* (see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1951, p. 102).

⁴³ See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 22, and Vol. II, p. 420, Moscow 1951).

⁴⁴ See Frederick Engels, *The Peasant Question in France and Germany* (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow 1951, p. 382).

⁴⁵ *Selskosoyuz* — the All-Russian Union of Rural Cooperatives — existed from August 1921 to June 1929.

⁴⁶ See V.I. Lenin, "The Importance of Gold Now and After the Complete Victory of Socialism" (*Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 85-92).

⁴⁷ The resolution "On Party Unity" was written by V.I. Lenin and adopted by the Tenth Congress of the RCP(B), held March 8-16, 1921 (see V.I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 217-21, and also *Resolutions and Decisions of CPSU(B) Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, in Russian, 1941, Part I, pp. 364-66).

⁴⁸ The "Contact Committee," consisting of Chkheidze, Steklov, Sukhanov, Filippovsky and Skobelev (and later Chernov and Tsereteli), was set up by the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on March 7, 1917, for the purpose of establishing contact with the Provisional Government, of "influencing" it and "controlling" its activities. Actually, the "Contact Committee" helped to carry out the bourgeois policy of the Provisional Government and restrained the masses of the workers from waging an active revolutionary struggle to transfer all power to the Soviets. The "Contact Committee" existed until May 1917, when representatives of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries entered the Provisional Government.

⁴⁹ See V.I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, pp. 1-7.

⁵⁰ The Petrograd City Conference of the RSDLP(B) took place from April 14-22 (April 27-May 5), 1917, with 57 delegates present. V.I. Lenin and J.V. Stalin took part in the proceedings. V.I. Lenin delivered a report on the current situation based on his April Theses. J.V. Stalin was elected to the commission for drafting the resolution on V.I. Lenin's report.

⁵¹ Concerning the Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference of the Bolshevik Party see the *History of the CPSU(B), Short Course*, Moscow, 1952, pp. 291-96.

⁵² See V.I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 23, pp. 289-333.

⁵³ See "Speech by V.I. Lenin at the Meeting of the Petrograd Committee of the RSDLP(B), June 24 (11), 1917, Concerning the Cancelling of the Demonstration." (*Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 25, pp. 62-63.

⁵⁴ The Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of the Northern Region took place in Petrograd on October 24-26 (11-13), 1917, under the direction of the Bolsheviks. Representatives were present from Petrograd, Moscow, Kronstadt, Novgorod, Reval, Helsingfors, Vyborg and other cities. In all there were 94 delegates, of whom 51 were Bolsheviks. The congress adopted a resolution on the need for immediate transference of all power to the Soviets, central and local.

It called upon the peasants to support the struggle for the transference of power to the Soviets and urged the Soviets themselves to commence active operations and to set up Revolutionary Military Committees for organising the military defence of the revolution. The congress set up a Northern Regional Committee and instructed it to prepare for the convocation of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets and to coordinate the activities of all the Regional Soviets.

⁵⁵ See V.I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 26, p. 162.

⁵⁶ See *Ibid.*, p. 165.

⁵⁷ J.V. Stalin's book *On the Road to October* appeared in two editions, one in January and the other in May 1925. The articles and speeches published in that book are included in Vol. 3 of J.V. Stalin's *Works*. The author finished the preface in December 1924, but it was given in full only in the book *On the Road to October*. The greater part of the preface, under the general title *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists*, has appeared in all the editions of J.V. Stalin's *Problems of Leninism*, as well as in various symposia and separate pamphlets. A part of the preface is given in Vol. 3 of Stalin's *Works* as an author's note to the article "Against Federalism."

⁵⁸ See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1951, pp. 420-21.

⁵⁹ See J.V. Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question*.

⁶⁰ See V.I. Lenin, *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination* (*Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 20, pp. 365-424).

⁶¹ See J.V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 6, p. 73.

⁶² See V.I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, pp. 173-290.

⁶³ See *Ibid.*, Vol. 25, pp. 353-462.

⁶⁴ See *Ibid.*, Vol. 28, pp. 207-302.

⁶⁵ See *Ibid.*, Vol. 31, pp. 1-97.

⁶⁶ See J.V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 6, p. 126.

⁶⁷ See *Ibid.*, p. 107.

⁶⁸ See *Ibid.*, pp. 395-96.

⁶⁹ See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The First Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League (Selected Works, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, pp. 98-108)*.

⁷⁰ See J.V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 6, pp. 379-80.

⁷¹ See *Ibid.*, pp. 185-86.

⁷² The Second Congress of the Communist International was held July 19-August 7, 1920. J.V. Stalin is here quoting from Lenin's speech on "The Role of the Communist Party."

⁷³ See V.I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 76.

⁷⁴ Tsektran — the Central Committee of the Joint Union of Rail and Water Transport Workers — was formed in September 1920. In 1920 and in the beginning of 1921, the leadership of the Tsektran was in the hands of Trotskyists, who used methods of sheer compulsion and dictation in conducting trade-union activities. In March 1921 the First All-Russian Joint Congress of Rail and Water Transport Workers expelled the Trotskyists from the leadership of the Tsektran, elected a new Central Committee and outlined new methods of trade-union work.

⁷⁵ See V.I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 1-22.

⁷⁶ The theses of the Second Congress of the Comintern on "The Role of the Communist Party in the Proletarian Revolution" were adopted as a resolution of the congress (for the resolution, see V.I. Lenin, *Works*, 3rd Russ. ed., Vol. XX, pp. 560-66).

⁷⁷ See J.V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 6, p. 109.

⁷⁸ See J.V. Stalin's pamphlet, *Lenin and Leninism*, 1924, p. 60.

⁷⁹ See V.I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 427-35.

⁸⁰ For the resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference "The Tasks of the Comintern and the RCP(B) in Connection with the Enlarged Plenum of the ECCI," see *Resolutions and Decisions of CPSU Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part. II, 1953, pp. 43-52*.

⁸¹ See J.V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 111, 120-21.

⁸² See *Ibid.*, pp. 111, 117-18.

⁸³ See *Ibid.*, p. 120.

⁸⁴ See *Ibid.*, pp. 267-403.

⁸⁵ This refers to the plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(B) which was held April 23-30, 1925. The plenum endorsed the resolutions adopted by the Fourteenth Conference of the RCP(B), including the resolution on "The Tasks of the Comintern and the RCP(B) in Connection with the Enlarged Plenum of the ECCI" that defined the Party's position on the

question of the victory of socialism in the USSR (See *Resolutions and Decisions of CPSU Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 43-52.)

⁸⁶ *Resolutions and Decisions of CPSU Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 49 and 46.

⁸⁷ This refers to the Fourteenth Conference of the RCP(B), held April 27-29, 1925.

⁸⁸ The reply of the Moscow Committee of the RCP(B) to the letter of the Twenty-Second Leningrad Gubernia Party Conference, a letter that was a factional attack by the followers of Zinoviev and Kamenev, was published in *Pravda*, No. 291, December 20, 1925.

⁸⁹ See *Resolutions and Decisions of CPSU Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 77.

⁹⁰ See J.V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 6, pp. 137-38, 140, 141.

⁹¹ See V.I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, p. 428.

⁹² See *Resolutions and Decisions of CPSU Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 78.

⁹³ See V.I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 308-43.

⁹⁴ "The Philosophy of the Epoch" was the title of an anti-Party article written by Zinoviev in 1925. For a criticism of this article, see J.V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 385-88.

⁹⁵ See *Resolutions and Decisions of CPSU Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 75, 77.

⁹⁶ The joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the CPSU(B) was held October 21-23, 1927. It discussed and approved the draft theses submitted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) on the questions of the agenda of the Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B), namely: directives for drawing up a five-year plan for the national economy; work in the countryside. The plenum approved the appointment of reporters, resolved to open a discussion in the Party, and decided to publish the theses for the Fifteenth Congress for discussion at Party meetings and in the press. In view of the attack of the leaders of the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition against the Manifesto issued by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR in commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, particularly against the point about going over to a seven-hour working day, the plenum discussed this question and in a special decision declared that the Political Bureau of the Central Committee had acted rightly in its initiative in the publication of the Manifesto of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and approved the Manifesto itself. The plenum heard a report of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission on the factional activities of Trotsky and Zinoviev after the August (1927) plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the CPSU(B). During the discussion of this matter at the meeting of the plenum held on October 23, J.V. Stalin delivered the speech: "The Trotskyist Opposition Before and Now." For deceiving the Party and

waging a factional struggle against it, the plenum expelled Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central Committee and decided to submit to the Fifteenth Party Congress all the documents relating to the splitting activities of the leaders of the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition. For the resolutions and decisions of the plenum, see *Resolutions and Decisions of CPSU Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 275-311.)

⁹⁷ V.I. Lenin, "A Letter to the Members of the Bolshevik Party" and "A Letter to the Central Committee of the RSDLP" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 26, pp. 185-88 and 192-96).

⁹⁸ Paul Lafargue, *On the Morrow of the Revolution* (see *Works*, Russ. ed., Vol. I, 1925, pp. 329-30).

⁹⁹ V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, p. 182).

¹⁰⁰ V.I. Lenin, "Outline of the Pamphlet *The Tax in Kind*" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 301).

¹⁰¹ *Trud (Labour)* — a daily newspaper, organ of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, issued in Moscow since February 19, 1921.

¹⁰² V.I. Lenin, Letter to V.M. Molotov on a Plan of the Political Report for the Eleventh Congress of the Party (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 223-24).

¹⁰³ The Eighth Congress of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League was held in Moscow, May 5-16, 1928. It discussed the results and prospects of socialist construction and the tasks of communist education of the youth; reports of the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission of the YCL; the report of the YCL delegation in the Communist Youth International; work and education of the youth in connection with the five-year plan of development of the national economy; work of the YCL among children, and other questions. J.V. Stalin delivered a speech at the final sitting of the Congress on May 16.

¹⁰⁴ The plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B), together with members of the Central Control Commission and the Central Auditing Commission, was held on November 16-24, 1928. It examined the control figures of the national economy for 1928-29, and also the following questions: the first results and wider use of the seven-hour working day; the recruitment of workers into the Party and regulation of the Party's growth; a report of the North Caucasian Territorial Committee of the CPSU(B) on work in the countryside; and measures for the progress of agriculture. J.V. Stalin's speech, *Industrialization of the Country and the Right Deviation in the CPSU(B)*, was delivered on November 19 in connection with the first item of the agenda. On November 20, J.V. Stalin was elected to the commission set up by the plenum to draft the resolution on the control figures of the national economy for 1928-29. (For the resolutions of the plenum of the CC, CPSU(B), see *Resolutions and Decisions of CPSU Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 405-28).

¹⁰⁵ The plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commis-

sion, CPSU(B) held April 16-23, 1929, discussed: 1) inner-Party affairs; 2) questions concerning the Sixteenth All-Union Party Conference; and 3) the purging of the Party. The plenum approved the resolution on inner-Party affairs which had been adopted by a joint meeting of the Political Bureau of the CC and the Presidium of the CCC on February 9, 1929, and in a special resolution condemned the right-opportunist activities of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky. The plenum approved and resolved to submit to the Sixteenth All-Union Party Conference the theses presented by the Political Bureau on a five-year plan for the development of the national economy, on ways and means of promoting agriculture and tax relief for the middle peasants, and on the results and immediate tasks of the fight against bureaucracy. It also decided to submit to the Sixteenth Party Conference theses, which it had approved in principle, on a purge of members and candidate members of the CPSU(B). J.V. Stalin delivered a speech on "The Right Deviation in the CPSU(B)" at the meeting of the plenum on April 22. (For the resolutions of the plenum of the CC and the CCC of the CPSU(B), see *Resolutions and Decisions of CPSU Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 429-47).

¹⁰⁶ The Sixth Congress of the Comintern was held in Moscow, July 17-September 1, 1928. It discussed a report on the activities of the Executive Committee of the Comintern and reports of the Executive Committee of the Young Communist International and of the International Control Commission, measures for combatting the danger of imperialist wars, the program of the Communist International, the revolutionary movement in the colonies and semi-colonies, the economic situation in the USSR and the situation in the CPSU(B), and endorsed the Rules of the Comintern. In its resolutions, the congress drew attention to the growth of the internal contradictions of capitalism, which were inevitably leading to a further shaking of the capitalist stabilization and to a sharp accentuation of the general crisis of capitalism. The congress defined the tasks of the Communist International springing from the new conditions of the working-class struggle, and mobilized the communist parties to intensify the fight against the right deviation, as the chief danger, and against conciliation towards it. The congress took note of the achievements of socialist construction in the USSR and their importance in strengthening the revolutionary positions of the international proletariat, and called upon the working people of the whole world to defend the Soviet Union. J.V. Stalin took a leading part in the work of the congress. He was elected to the Presidium of the congress, to the Programme Commission and to the Political Commission set up to draft the theses on the international situation and the tasks of the Communist International.

¹⁰⁷ This refers to the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B), together with members of the Central Control Commission and Central Auditing Commission, which was held November 16-24, 1928.

¹⁰⁸ Katheder-Socialism — a trend in bourgeois ideology, chiefly in bour-

geois political economy, which arose in Germany in the latter half of the nineteenth century and later became widespread in Britain, America and France. Its representatives were bourgeois-liberal professors who used their university chairs (*Katheders* means university chair) to combat Marxism and the developing revolutionary working-class movement, to slur over the contradictions of capitalism, and to preach class conciliation. The Katheder-Socialists denied the class, exploiting character of the bourgeois state and alleged that the latter was capable of perfecting capitalism by means of social reforms. Referring to the German representatives of this trend, Engels wrote: "Our Katheder-Socialists have never been much more, theoretically, than slightly philanthropic vulgar economists, and now they have sunk to the level of simple apologists of Bismarck's state socialism" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Works*, Vol. XXVII, p. 499). In Russia, the bourgeois-liberal reformist ideas of the Katheder-Socialists were preached by the legal Marxists. The Russian Mensheviks, the opportunist parties of the Second International and the modern Right-wing Socialists also went over to the position of Katheder-Socialism, striving to subordinate the working-class movement to the interests of the bourgeoisie and preaching that capitalism would grow gradually and peacefully into socialism.

¹⁰⁹ This refers to the plenum of the CC, CPSU(B) held July 4-12, 1928.

¹¹⁰ *Youth International (Jugend Internationale)* — a magazine, the organ of the International Union of Socialist Youth Organizations, published in Zurich from September 1915 to May 1918. From 1919 to 1941 it was the organ of the Executive Committee of the Young Communist International. (In 1925-28, it appeared under the title *Communist Youth International*.)

¹¹¹ See *Lenin Miscellany* XIV, pp. 250-59.

¹¹² *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata (Symposium of Sotsial Demokrat)* was published by the CC, RSDLP in 1916 under the personal direction of V.I. Lenin. Two numbers were issued: in October and December 1916.

¹¹³ At the time of the Brest Peace (1918), Bukharin and the group of "Left" Communists he headed joined with Trotsky in waging a fierce struggle within the Party against Lenin, demanding the continuation of the war with the aim of exposing the young Soviet Republic, which still had no army, to the blows of German imperialism. At the trial of the anti-Soviet "Right-Trotskyist bloc" in 1938, it was established that Bukharin and the group of "Left" Communists headed by him had joined with Trotsky and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in a secret counter-revolutionary conspiracy against the Soviet government with the object of torpedoing the Brest Peace Treaty, arresting and assassinating V.I. Lenin, J.V. Stalin and Y.M. Sverdlov, and establishing a government of Bukharinites, Trotskyists and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.

¹¹⁴ EKOSO of the RSFSR — Economic Council of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR.

¹¹⁵ The First All-Union Conference of Leading Personnel of Socialist Industry took place in Moscow, January 30 to February 4, 1931. It was at-

tended by 728 delegates, including representatives of industrial combines, factory directors and chiefs of construction works, engineers, foremen and foremost shock brigaders, and leaders of Party and trade-union organizations. The conference heard the report of G.K. Orjonikidze, Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy, entitled "Control Figures for 1931 and the Tasks of Economic Organizations." On February 3, V.M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, addressed the conference on "The Fundamental Premises and Fulfilment of the Economic Plan." J.V. Stalin delivered a speech on "The Tasks of Business Executives" on February 4 at the final sitting of the conference. Taking J.V. Stalin's directives as their guide, the conference mapped out practical measures for the fulfilment of the national-economic plan for the third and decisive year of the first five-year plan period. The conference laid stress on the following as the chief tasks of business executives: mastery of technique, improvement of the quality of leadership in industry, consistent application of the principle of one-man management, introduction of business accounting and struggle for increased labour productivity, lowering of production costs and improvement of the quality of output. The conference sent greetings to the Central Committee of the CPSU(B).

¹¹⁶ The trial of the counter-revolutionary organization of wreckers and spies known as the "Industrial Party" took place in Moscow, November 25 to December 7, 1930. The case was heard at a special session of the Supreme Court of the USSR. It was established at the trial that the "Industrial Party," which united the counter-revolutionary elements of the top stratum of the old, bourgeois technical intelligentsia, was an espionage and military agency of international capital in the Soviet Union. It was linked with White emigres — former big capitalists of Tsarist Russia — and acted under the direct instructions of the French general staff, preparing for military intervention by the imperialists and armed overthrow of the Soviet government. The foreign imperialists supplied the wreckers with directives and funds for carrying on espionage and sabotage in various branches of the national economy of the USSR.

¹¹⁷ From N.A. Nekrasov's poem, "Who Lives Well in Russia?" (See N.A. Nekrasov, *Selected Works*, Russ. ed., 1947, p. 323.)

¹¹⁸ The Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU(B) was held in Moscow from January 26 to February 10, 1934. It discussed the report of the Central Committee, CPSU(B), the reports of the Central Auditing Commission, of the Central Control Commission and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, of the CPSU(B) delegation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and reports on the Second Five-Year Plan and on organizational questions (Party and Soviet affairs). On J.V. Stalin's report on the work of the CC, CPSU(B) the congress adopted a decision in which it wholly approved the political line and practical work of the CC, CPSU(B) and instructed all Party organizations to be guided in their work by the principles and tasks enunciated in J.V. Stalin's report. The congress noted the decisive successes of so-

cialist construction in the USSR and declared that the general line of the Party had triumphed. The Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU(B) has gone down in the history of the Party as the Congress of Victors. On the reports of V.M. Molotov and V.V. Kuibyshev, the congress adopted a resolution on "The Second Five-Year Plan of Development of the National Economy of the USSR (1933-1937)" — a plan for the building of socialist society, thereby endorsing the grand program for completing the technical reconstruction of the entire national economy, and for a still more rapid rise of the living and cultural standards of the workers and peasants. The congress emphasized that the basic political task during the second five-year plan period was the final elimination of capitalist elements and the overcoming of the survivals of capitalism in economic life and in the minds of people. On the report of L.M. Kaganovich, the congress adopted decisions on organizational questions (Party and Soviet affairs). The congress pointed out that the principal tasks of the Second Five-Year Plan sharply raised the question of improving the quality of work in all spheres, and first and foremost the quality of organizational and practical leadership. The congress adopted new Party Rules. It replaced the Central Control Commission and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection by a Party Control Commission under the CC, CPSU(B) and a Soviet Control Commission under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (On the Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU(B) see *History of the CPSU(B), Short Course*, Moscow 1954, pp. 496-503. For the resolutions and decisions of the congress, see *Resolutions and Decisions of CPSU Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 744-87.)

¹¹⁹ In 1931 the proletariat and peasantry of Spain overthrew the military-fascist dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera, which had been set up in 1923, and abolished the monarchy. On April 14, 1931, a republic was proclaimed in Spain. Owing, however, to the political weakness and organizational disunity of the proletariat and the treachery of the leadership of the Socialist Party and anarchists, the bourgeoisie and landlords were able to seize power, and a coalition government of representatives of the bourgeois parties and the Socialists was formed. In spite of the attempts of the coalition government to hold back the further development of the revolution, the revolutionary mass battles of the workers and peasants against the landlords and the bourgeoisie continued. With the general strike and the armed struggle of the Asturian miners in October 1934 the revolutionary movement of this period reached its peak.

¹²⁰ Councils of Action: Revolutionary organizations of workers in Britain, France and other capitalist countries that took part in military intervention against the Soviet Republic in 1918-20. The Councils of Action arose under the slogan of "Hands off Soviet Russia!" Under the leadership of the Councils of Action, the workers organized strikes and demonstrations, and refused to load war equipment, with the aim of bringing about the collapse of the intervention. The Councils of Action were most widespread in Brit-

ain, in 1920.

¹²¹ The Second Congress of the Communist International took place on July 19-August 7, 1920. It opened in Petrograd the subsequent sittings were held in Moscow. It was attended by more than 200 delegates representing working-class organizations from 37 countries. V.I. Lenin directed all the preparatory work for convening the congress. At the congress Lenin delivered a report on the international situation and the chief tasks of the Communist International, as well as other reports and speeches. V.I. Lenin and J.V. Stalin were elected by the RCP(B) delegation to sit on the Executive Committee of the Communist International. The Second Congress laid the foundations of the program, organizational principles strategy and tactics of the Communist International.

¹²² See V.I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 202-03.

¹²³ The Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B) took place in Moscow, December 2-19, 1927. On December 3, J.V. Stalin delivered the political report of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) and on December 7 he replied to the discussion. The congress approved the political and organizational line of the Party's Central Committee and instructed it to continue to pursue a policy of peace and of strengthening the defence capacity of the USSR, to continue with unrelaxing tempo the socialist industrialization of the country, to develop to the full the collectivization of agriculture and to steer a course towards eliminating the capitalist elements from the national economy. In its decisions on the opposition the congress noted that the disagreements between the Party and the opposition had developed into programmatic disagreements, that the Trotskyist opposition had taken the path of anti-Soviet struggle, and declared that adherence to the Trotskyist opposition and the propagation of its views were incompatible with membership of the Bolshevik Party. The congress approved the decision of the joint meeting of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the CPSU(B) of November 14, 1927, to expel Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party and decided to expel from the Party all active members of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc and the whole "Democratic Centralism" group. (On the Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU(B) see *History of the CPSU(B), Short Course*, Moscow 1954, pp. 447-49. For the resolutions and decisions of the congress see *Resolutions and Decisions of CPSU Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 313-71.)

¹²⁴ The Seventeenth Conference of the CPSU(B) took place in Moscow, January 30-February 4, 1932. The conference was directed by J.V. Stalin. It discussed G.K. Orjonikidze's report on the results of industrial development in 1931 and the tasks for 1932, and the reports of V.M. Molotov and V.V. Kuibyshev on the directives for drawing up the Second Five-Year Plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR in 1933-37. The conference noted that the decisions of the Party congresses on the building and completion of the foundations of a socialist economy and on securing economic independence for the USSR had been carried out with immense suc-

cess. The conference approved the plan for the development of socialist industry in 1932, which ensured the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan in four years. In its directives for the drawing up of the Second Five-Year Plan, the conference defined the chief political and economic tasks of that plan, pointing out that its main and decisive economic task was the completion of the reconstruction of the entire national economy on the basis of the most up-to-date technique. (For the resolutions of the Seventeenth Conference of the CPSU(B), see *Resolutions and Decisions of CPSU Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 679-99.)

¹²⁵ V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 24, Russ. ed., p. 94.

¹²⁶ A.A. Fadeyev — General Secretary of the Writer's Union of the USSR from 1946 to 1954.

¹²⁷ State Security Administration (UDB) — the secret police apparatus of the Titoite regime. For many years, it was led by a certain Aleksander Ranković, an old agent of the Gestapo and Anglo-Americans who carried out the murders, tortures and criminalizations of thousands of progressive Yugoslavs following the Titoites' departure from the socialist camp into the hands of the imperialists.

¹²⁸ General Milan Nedić — head of the puppet Serbian fascist government set up by Nazi Germany in 1941, traitor to and executioner of the Yugoslav peoples.

¹²⁹ Cominform — the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties was set up to coordinate the activity of European communist parties following victory in the Great Patriotic War and the threat of U.S. and British imperialism. Headquartered in Bucharest, it issued two important resolutions on the Yugoslav question in 1948 and 1949 which condemned the renegacy of the Titoites.

¹³⁰ Georg von Vollmar — a traitorous German social-democrat in the pay of capital, a reformist sham "socialist" and a close accomplice of Eduard Bernstein in the bourgeoisie's struggle to liquidate the Second International.

¹³¹ Aleksander Ranković — see note 127.

¹³² Stalin's essay *Marxism and Problems of Linguistics* was published in *Pravda* on June 20, 1950. Prior to this, there had already been discussion on Soviet linguistic problems in *Pravda*. This essay by Comrade Stalin is in reply to questions put to him by a group of Soviet students in connection with the discussion, and to essays published in *Pravda's* columns. The titles of these latter were "On the Path of Materialist Linguistics" by member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences Bulakhovsky, "The History of Russian Linguistics and Marx's Theory" by Nikiforov, "On the Problem of the Class Character of Language" by Kudriavtsev and others.

¹³³ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Works*, Ger. ed., Berlin, 1958, Vol. 3, p. 212.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 411-12.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 1957, Vol. 2, p. 351.

¹³⁶ Paul Lafargue (1842-1911), well-known activist of French and international workers' movements, and outstanding Marxist propagandist and publicist. He was one of the founders of the French Workers' Party, student and comrade-in-arms of Marx and Engels, and husband of Marx's daughter Laura.

¹³⁷ V.I. Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination," *Selected Works in Two Volumes*, Eng. ed., Moscow, 1952, Vol. I, Part 2. pp. 318-19.

¹³⁸ J.V. Stalin, "The National Question and Leninism," *Works*, Eng. ed., Moscow, 1954, Vol. II, p. 353.

¹³⁹ Arakcheyev regime, named after the reactionary politician Count Arakcheyev, was an unrestrained dictatorial police state, warlord despotism and brutal rule enforced in Russia in the first quarter of the 19th century. Stalin uses the term here to indicate Marr's overriding domination in Soviet linguistic circles.

¹⁴⁰ Four-element analysis — Marr asserted that pronunciation of mankind's primitive language was evolved from the four syllables *sal*, *her*, *yon* and *rosh*.

¹⁴¹ "Proto-language" theory — the doctrine of the Indo-European school which holds that a linguistic family consists of a group of *patois* (dialects), split from a common primitive "parent language." For example, modern Italian, French, Spanish, Portuguese and Romanian are sister languages derived from Latin, and were originally only different *patois*. However, as there is no documentary evidence for the existence of a "parent language" of most of the dialects or languages, the Indo-European scholars have worked out a hypothetical "parent language," their main aim being to facilitate explanation of the rules of phonetic changes, but there is no way to prove the extent of the truth.

¹⁴² Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Works*, Ger. ed., Berlin, 1958, Vol. 3, pp. 432 and 430.

¹⁴³ Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, p. 158.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 392-93.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 392.

¹⁴⁶ V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1969, p. 151.

¹⁴⁷ Karl Marx, *Capital*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, Chapter 5, Section I.

¹⁴⁸ Karl Marx, "Wage Labour and Capital," *Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1951, Vol. I, p. 63.

¹⁴⁹ Karl Marx, "Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*", *Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1951, Vol. I, pp. 328-29.

¹⁵⁰ V.I. Lenin, "Our Foreign and Domestic Position and the Tasks of the Party", *Collected Works*, Russian ed., Vol. 31.

¹⁵¹ Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," *Selected Works of*

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1951, Vol. 2, p. 23.

¹⁵² Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, p. 408.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

¹⁵⁴ V.I. Lenin, *Critical Comments on Bukharin's "Economics of the Transition Period,"* Russian ed.

¹⁵⁵ Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, p. 209.

¹⁵⁶ Karl Marx, "Wage Labour and Capital," *Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1951, Vol. I, p. 83.

¹⁵⁷ Karl Marx, "Theory of Surplus Value," Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Works*, German ed., Vol. 26, Part 2, Chapter 18.

¹⁵⁸ Here "V" stands for varied capital, "M" for surplus value and "C" for constant capital. For the formula, see Karl Marx, *Capital*, Eng. ed., Vol. 2, Chapter 20.

¹⁵⁹ Karl Marx, *Capital*, Eng. ed., Vol. 2, Chapter 20, Section 6.

¹⁶⁰ After the central figure, Khlestakov, in the play *The Inspector General* by Nikolai Gogol, meaning an impostor and a braggart.

¹⁶¹ Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, pp. 387-88.



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