

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

ENVER HOXHA

**CAN THE CHINESE
REVOLUTION BE CALLED A
PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION?**

ISBN: 978-1-6781-7003-5

Published according to: Enver Hoxha, *Reflections on China*, vol. 2, Tirana 1979, pp. 760-798,
Eng. ed., with slight editorial changes.

THE NOVEMBER 8TH PUBLISHING HOUSE
TORONTO 2022



ENVER HOXHA

Naturally, to determine such an important problem, on the one hand, one must have at his disposal a relatively long time and more extensive and precise documents about the development of situations in China, which are very complicated, at least from the period of Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang down to the present day. On the other hand, one must be acquainted with the development of the revolution as a whole and of the classical French bourgeois-democratic revolution as well as the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolutions in other countries.

I cannot claim to be acquainted with the French bourgeois-democratic revolution in all its breadth and depth, but nevertheless I am better acquainted with it. I have studied it, not just in the school manuals, but afterwards in many important authors such as Michelet, Mathiez,

Jaurès, etc., who have written about this revolution. We are also acquainted with the assessments of the French Revolution by the classics of Marxism-Leninism.

Marx, when he speaks of the French Revolution in his work «The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte», describes it as a revolution of the years from 1789-1814. At the same time, however, he emphasizes that the ascent of this revolution continues to the year 1794. He writes:

*«In the first French Revolution the rule of the **Constitutionalists** is followed by the rule of the **Girondins** and the rule of the **Girondins** by the rule of the **Jacobins**. Each of these parties relies on the more progressive party for support. As soon as it has brought the revolution far enough to be unable to follow it further, still less to go ahead of it, it is thrust aside by the bolder ally that stands behind it and sent to the guillotine. The revolution thus moves along an ascending line.»¹*

After the overthrow of the Jacobins the

¹ K. Marx — F. Engels, Selected Works, vol. 1, p. 275. Tirana, 1975 (Alb. ed.).

revolution «**takes a downward course**» and the period of the counter-revolution begins, although the bourgeoisie remains in power. Apart from this, we are well acquainted with the process of the development of the proletarian revolution and its theory and practice, because we have studied it in detail in the works of our great classics Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. We have acquainted ourselves with and studied the development and the triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution in the Soviet Union and of the proletarian revolution in our country and the other so-called socialist countries which, like the Soviet Union, have now turned into capitalist countries.

I say all these things because, in order to make an accurate, correct and profound study of this problem which interests us now, that is, in order to define the character of the Chinese revolution and the different stages through which it passed, it is necessary to be acquainted with, to know especially the decisive key moments, the ideas, the struggle of factions, the different stages, the motive forces which, all together, define a revolution, and then one can come to a correct conclusion, by judging and analysing the question as a whole

and in a scientific manner from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint. However, even with this incomplete knowledge we have about China, which is not properly coordinated and classified, by means of comparisons and making parallels, sometimes perhaps not all that precise, we can give an opinion about the revolution there, which up till now has been called «socialist», «proletarian», but which, in fact, does not seem to have been such.

On the basis of my reflections, especially after all these things which have occurred and are occurring in China, of course, without claiming that they constitute a profound study, I am of the opinion that a proletarian revolution, such as the Great October Socialist Revolution was considered to be and was, was not carried out in China. Here I am not raising the issue that the stages of the bourgeois revolution ought to have been skipped over, allowing the transition directly to the socialist revolution.

In China, Sun Yat-sen, through his struggle in the leadership of the Kuomintang, going through many wars and battles, although he did not complete his work, managed to overthrow the monarchy and establish the republic, to form the democratic government in Canton, but without

managing to unify China. This Chinese Republic was a «bourgeois-democratic» republic, still not fully formed with all the features and characteristics of an advanced bourgeois democracy, although it was moving in that direction. Like every bourgeois-democratic revolution, that headed by Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang, too, in my opinion, carried out a series of political-economic reforms which resulted in some improvement, as one might say, and were intended to unify China. At that time China was languishing under the double domination of the absolute monarchy, of the chaos in the provinces, where the «warlords» reigned with their autonomous administrations and their virtually private «armies», and under the domination of a series of imperialist states. These states had established themselves with their concessions, had divided among themselves nearly all the east coast of this great country, had created their colonies and counting houses, through which they sucked the blood and sweat of the Chinese people for the profit of the British, American, French, German, and other metropolises, intrigued and exerted their influence in a state of division and chaos.

The proclamation of the republic and the

coming to power of the Kuomintang did not mean that the big Chinese bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and the comprador bourgeoisie were eliminated. In no way. This bourgeoisie remained in power and continued to maintain, protect and develop its links with the imperialist states, especially with American imperialism, and to create friction and splits which reached the point of armed clashes between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang. Indeed, the father-in-law of Sun Yat-sen, who was also the father-in-law of Chiang Kai-shek and a member of the Executive Committee of Kuomintang, was one of the biggest comprador bourgeois of China. And there were many others like him.

Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang chose and developed the course of bourgeois-democratic reforms and, although they had friendly relations with the Leninist Soviet Union, they were far from following the Leninist road for the transformation of China. In the report which the delegate of the Comintern made on January 26, 1923, he writes that Sun Yat-sen had said that the system of the Soviets could not be introduced in China, because not a single favourable condition existed for its implementation in that country. Sun Yat-

sen did not show himself to be fully capable of working out a clear-cut and precise program for the development of China. His views and social inclinations were radical in words, but feeble in content. The ideo-political inclinations of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang as a whole leaned mostly and mainly towards the bourgeois-democratic views of Western Europe, America and other countries such as Japan. From what I have read, it seems that Sun Yat-sen several times tried to find support, although very hazardous and dangerous support, sometimes among the internal military clans, and sometimes among the great powers such as the United States of America and Japan. He accepted aid from them for the strengthening of the regime which was being created in China. It is self-evident that this aid from American democratic circles had no altruistic character. The United States of America, as an imperialist power, was seeking to dig in its claws and plant its feet in the Far East, especially in China.

Although Sun Yat-sen remained a progressive democrat with liberal tendencies, he nurtured sympathy for the October Revolution and the Soviet Union. The bourgeois-democratic republic

he created established relations with the Soviet Union and, in the Soviet Union and Lenin, had powerful assistance for carrying further the social, political and military transformations which were beginning in China. The testament which Sun Yat-sen left reveals very well his ardent desire to carry the bourgeois-democratic revolution through to the end and the trust and sympathy which he nurtured for the Soviet Union. He closes his testament with these words:

«Dear comrades, at the time I am leaving you I desire to express a great hope, the hope that soon the dawn will break, then the Soviet Union, its friends and allies will accept a strong China, developed and independent, in the great struggle for the emancipation of the peoples of the earth. Our two countries will advance hand in hand towards victory. I send you my fraternal greetings».

In this period, when the Kuomintang was all-powerful and Sun Yat-sen was at the head of it, when the Chinese Republic was developing and in friendship with the Soviet Union of Lenin, the Communist Party of China was created in 1921.

The Communist Party of China was born and developed in the bosom of the old Chinese society and civilization and its members, at that

time, were products of the Confucian moral and intellectual education, democratic liberal education, and finally, Marxist-Leninist education. But even later it cannot be said that the Chinese Marxists broke away completely from the traditional civilization which continued to exert its influence on them through their individual psychology and the national psychology.

Prior to the October Revolution and after it, the spread of Marxism in China took the character of a movement for national liberation rather than for social liberation. The first Marxist groups were characterized by ideological confusion and vacillation in political line. Chu Jiang, who before 1966 was in charge of cultural questions in the Maoist regime, writes in an article of September 1957: «Let us look back at the past, we were thirsting for all the new knowledge which came from the foreigners and we were unable to see the difference between anarchy and socialism, between individualism and collectivism. Nietzsche, Kropotkin and Karl Marx all attracted us, one as much as the other. Later, we understood that Marxism-Leninism was the only truth and a weapon to liberate mankind. We believed in abstract communism and our acts were always

inspired by a desire for individual heroism. We did not have close contact with the workers and the peasants, and made very little effort to approach them. The democratic revolution was our immediate aim, while the socialist revolution was a distant ideal. Many times we were influenced by individualism. We dreamed like Ibsen and were very fond of his motto: 'The strongest man in the world is he who is the loneliest'».

All these various ideological and political views should have been brought under control, in the sense that the ranks should have been purged and the influence of those elements who were democrats, but were not Marxists and who did not follow the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism, should have been reduced. With this I want to say that **the terrain should have been purged in order to form a genuine communist party, which would follow the theory of Marxism-Leninism, and apply it in a creative manner** in the conditions of China, but apply it with a more profound and clearer understanding according to the ideas which guided the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Marxist ideas of Lenin.

The Comintern made its contribution here

and it was it which helped in the formation of more radical, clearer new cadres, who came one after the other, following the May 4th Movement in 1919, from Li Lisan down to Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong was much more progressive than his predecessors, much more revolutionary, more consistently for the Soviet road than Sun Yat-sen, and even the other older comrades like Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao and others. Nevertheless in the views of the new cadres there remained a pronounced feeling of Chinese nationalism, of the independence of this «great state» and pronounced influences of old philosophical ideas of Confucius, Mencius, etc. This prevented the Chinese comrades, who were being formed during the struggle and battles, from considering Marxism-Leninism a true compass which would guide them in the very dark forest of the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution and from working out a Marxist-Leninist political line with clear objectives, which would guide them unwaveringly in all the stages of the Chinese revolution. However, right from the start to this day such a thing has not been done properly. The Communist Party of China adopted only certain Marxist slogans and formulations, but in essence it was not a

genuine party of the proletariat, a party of the revolution, which could secure the leadership in the democratic revolution and ensure its transformation into a proletarian revolution. In fact, within its ranks a series of anarchist and other theories and deviations developed. The whole development of China, from the formation of the party, from the foundation of the bourgeois-democratic republic of Sun Yat-sen to this day shows this chaotic course. The newly formed Communist Party of China should have followed the course of strengthening itself ideologically and organizationally, should have worked to build up its identity and, step by step, create its alliances with the revolutionary classes and forces, should have fought for the strengthening of the positions of the bourgeois democracy which was being built in this first stage, that is, to ensure the democratic freedoms of the people, to increase the influence of the people and, in the first place, of the proletariat in the country, in the state, in the army, and everywhere; it should have worked to capture dominant positions in the trade unions which were created within the Kuomintang and to carry on its propaganda with its own class stand, in order to consolidate its positions in the working

class, in order to make that class the leading force of the revolution. At the same time, it should have extended its influence into the Chinese countryside, because it was there that the overwhelming part of the population of this whole continent, as you might call it, lived, and should have proceeded more consistently in implementing the agrarian reform and the political-educational awakening of the countryside.

Lenin and the Comintern, the October Revolution and the experience of the Soviet Union had opened this road to the Communist Party of China.

Lenin had written a series of articles about China. The article which bears the title «Democracy and Narodism in China», which was published on the 15th of July 1912, is interesting. There Lenin analyses the situation in China, the revolution of 1911. He recognized the progressive character of Sun Yat-sen's ideas despite the limitations of his doctrine. The bourgeois-democratic revolution led by the Kuomintang seemed to Lenin of special interest because of the fact that it fought against oppression by the Western states and prevented the partitioning of the country and the national dismemberment with which China

was threatened. He recognized the important role which was reserved to the peasantry, while always raising the question of its revolutionary value in the absence of a proletariat in China. But in «Pravda» of the 8th of November 1912, amongst other things, Lenin wrote about the peasantry:

*«Whether the peasants, who are not led by a proletarian party will be able to retain their democratic positions **against** the liberals, who are only waiting for an opportunity to shift to the right, will be seen in the near future».*¹

Lenin was fully convinced that the proletariat would be created in China and stressed:

«Lastly, the Chinese proletariat will increase as the number of Shanghais increases. It will probably form some kind of Chinese Social-Democratic labour party, which, while criticizing the petty-bourgeois utopias and reactionary views of Sun Yat-sen, will certainly take care to single out, defend and develop the revolutionary-democratic core of his political and agrarian

¹ V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 18, p. 445 (Alb. ed.).

*program.»*¹

These two articles are sufficient to show how clearly Lenin defined the tasks that awaited solution by the Communist Party of China.

At the 2nd Congress of the Comintern, which was held from July 19 to August 7, 1920, the theses on the national and colonial question, according to the teachings of Lenin, a large number of which referred to China, too, were adopted. The Congress approved the thesis that «the revolution in China and other colonial countries must have a program which permits the inclusion of bourgeois reforms and, especially, the agrarian reform», but stressed that **the leadership of the revolution must not be handed over to the democratic bourgeoisie**; on the contrary, say the decisions of the Congress, **the party of the proletariat must direct a strong and systematic propaganda in favour of Soviets and organize the Soviets of workers and peasants as quickly as possible. This was the general line of the Comintern, which should have been followed by the party in China, too.**

¹ V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 18, p. 178 (Alb. ed.).

We can say that, in general, the Communist Party of China did not properly carry out this role in this situation which had been created in China in a studied and systematic manner, seen from the angle of scientific socialism. On this question, there were different tendencies in that small party which called itself the Communist Party of China, tendencies which have never permitted a correct Marxist-Leninist line to be established, or Marxist-Leninist thought and action to guide it. These initial tendencies which were displayed many times among the main leaders of the party, were frequently leftist, sometimes right-opportunist, sometimes centrist, going as far as anarchist, Trotskyite, bourgeois, and marked chauvinist and racist views. Even later, these tendencies remained as one of the distinctive characteristics of the Communist Party of China which Mao Zedong and his group eventually led.

For this new party to have carried on a systematic, organized, studied and mature struggle in those very complicated situations, on such a large continent, on which the ideas of Confucius and the feudal order had left deep, not to say, indelible impressions, it was necessary that the Chinese communists should have had absolute faith

in scientific Marxism, in Lenin and the Comintern, should have reported to them realistically about the situations in China, with the aim that the decisions which were taken by the Comintern about China **should be correct and applied correctly by the Chinese communists.**

In my opinion, despite the good will of neophytes, these things were not achieved by the Communist Party of China; therefore I think that this is where all the vacillations to the left or to the right, from that time down to this day, have their source.

From the formation of the party, two currents appeared: the one wing wanted to carry on legal work and to collaborate with the bourgeois-democratic parties, while the other wing defended the view that they should not have any relations with the others. In general the party took the decision to isolate itself, in other words, to maintain a hostile stand towards all other parties, including that of Sun Yat-sen, which was blamed for the political chaos. In a letter which Chen Duxiu sent to Voitinsky, the delegate of the Comintern in China, on April 6, 1922, he wrote that they were against unity with the Kuomintang, because their aims were different. The Comintern opposed this

stand and directed the party towards close collaboration with the Kuomintang.

At the Congress of the Peoples of the Far East, the Comintern correctly laid down the line of collaboration between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China, as well as the tasks of the latter for that period of the Chinese revolution. The Soviet representative there also defended the idea of supporting the Kuomintang as an ally which was fighting for national and democratic liberation, for national emancipation, but stressed at the same time that the Communist Party of China should not base itself on the organizations and the trade unions which were under the leadership of the Kuomintang, but the party, together with the proletarian masses, should give leadership and should struggle to influence the masses and to create its own organizations among them. «Therefore, on this question,» he said, «we think that the Kuomintang will not hinder us in our work, and we shall collaborate sincerely with it. Thus, we speak openly. Our tendency is, and this should be the dominant tendency for us, towards the workers' movement of China; it must develop freely, regardless of the existence of the bourgeoisie with radical tendencies

and with democratic organizations and parties».

Thus this small communist party was defended politically and assisted materially by the Comintern and Soviet Russia, which carefully followed its activity among the masses and especially among the urban proletariat. In this direction, rapid progress was made, especially on the trade union platform, while political progress was to come more slowly and began later, in 1925, with the May 30th Movement. As a result of the May 30th Movement, a new success was achieved at the 4th Congress of the Party. The collaboration between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang was strengthened and became closer, a thing which had a direct influence on the strengthening temporarily, of the national unity, which had been weakened, if not wiped out completely, after 1911. From this collaboration the Kuomintang gained new and greater strength, but the Communist Party of China, also, reached its 4th Congress with multiplied forces. At the 7th Plenary Session of the Chinese Commission of the Executive Committee of the Comintern on the 30th of November 1926, Stalin said, among other things:

«...the whole course, character, and prospects of the Chinese revolution, undoubtedly testify in favour of the Chinese communists remaining in the Kuomintang and intensifying their work in it»¹

The collaboration of the two parties was maintained up until 1927. At that time things went sour between them, and this is not surprising, because bourgeois reaction is always reaction. Chiang Kai-shek, the comprador bourgeoisie and the Chinese big bourgeoisie, which operated within the framework of this Chinese «democracy», saw a danger in the Communist Party of China, with the influence which it was gradually gaining over the working class and the peasantry. Thus came about the break, the split and the attack in Canton in 1926, and in Shanghai in 1927, during which a large number of proletarians and communists were liquidated. This was a heavy blow to the trade unions and the Communist Party of China.

Not only in its stand towards the Kuomintang, but also in its stand towards the working class and the peasantry, the CP of China has not

¹ J.V. Stalin, Works, vol. 8, pp. 374-375 (Alb. ed.).

known how to determine a clear Marxist-Leninist line. In the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China, the peasantry played a decisive role, but this does not mean to say that the Communist Party of China should have called it the leading force of the revolution. In the new conditions, this revolution should have been led by the working class.

The Kuomintang people were not elements of the peasantry, but progressive elements of the urban bourgeoisie, intellectuals, first of all, united with reactionary bourgeois elements, which were to strive to ensure that democratic freedoms were not implanted in China. The bourgeoisie of the new Chinese Republic tried to have the Chinese peasantry, the poor, middle and rich peasantry, as its instrument and support. It cannot be denied that the Chinese peasantry was a revolutionary element. In the French bourgeois-democratic revolution, also, this class had such features. Although at some moments of the revolution, the French peasantry was mostly monarchist, in general it was against feudalism and wanted to escape the burden of the heavy taxes of the French feudal lords, taxes not only in money, but also in compulsory services, and especially and first of all, it

wanted to gain the land.

In China the peasantry was a progressive revolutionary element; it was against the monarchy, against oppression, against the «warlords» and provincial lords, but it needed to be worked on. As I said, the bourgeoisie which carried out the revolution in China was to try to use this peasantry for its own ends. In this situation the Communist Party of China should have worked on the peasantry, but not falling into the positions of the bourgeoisie of the Kuomintang of either its «progressive» or reactionary wings. The CP of China should have had its own independent political line, and this line should have been based on the teachings of Marx and Lenin. At this stage, the Communist Party should have strengthened the positions gained over the monarchy, over feudalism, and backwardness. While bearing in mind the stages, it should not have forgotten the perspective of the revolution, should not have forgotten that it was a Marxist-Leninist party of the working class, the spearhead of this class. At the time when the CP of China was formed, a proletariat relatively small in comparison with the class of the Chinese peasantry existed in China. Nevertheless, the proletariat did exist **and the**

Communist Party of China, already formed, should have been the party of the proletariat, while the peasantry should have been considered by this party its main ally. Therefore, the party should have worked to make the peasantry an ally of the working class in order to strengthen the progressive bourgeois-democratic republic, and to go over later, after the conditions had matured, to a more advanced stage — the socialist revolution. It has never been clear on this main idea, this basic revolutionary guiding principle, even in theory, and consequently, it was not applied properly and consistently in practice, either.

After the break between the CP of China and the Kuomintang in 1927, a new stage, which is known as the 2nd Revolutionary Civil War, began for the Chinese revolution.

The tasks of the party for this stage were laid down at the extraordinary Plenum of the Central Committee which was held on August 7, 1927. The plenum removed Chen Duxiu and his followers from the leadership of the party and set the agrarian revolution as the main task for the party. After the plenum there was an upsurge of the revolutionary movement and the party began to create its own armed forces. Then the 6th Congress

of the Party which was held in 1928 gave the orientation for the further development of the revolution and set as the main task the creation of revolutionary bases and the formation of the Red Army.

The revolutionary movement was beginning to build up. In December 1929, the Executive Committee of the Communist International [ECCI] arrived at the conclusion that China had entered a profound national crisis and was at the initial moment of a revolutionary upsurge. However, it stressed that the transition from the national crisis to the directly revolutionary situation would not take place immediately. At the same time the Comintern drew the attention of the CC of the CP of China that «the revolution in China was developing in an uneven way». In these conditions, the strengthening of the party and its struggle to make the masses conscious and win them over remained the main task.

It seems to me that the conclusions of the Comintern were not understood properly by the Chinese leadership at that time. In February 1930, the CC of the CP of China sent out to the party organizations a circular in which, in fact, the thesis of the Comintern about the uneven

development of the revolution in China was ignored. It said that the whole of China had been gripped by a revolutionary crisis. Meanwhile, on June 11, 1930, the Political Bureau, with Li Lisan at the head, approved the resolution «On the new revolutionary upsurge and the seizure of power at first in a few provinces». The Chinese leadership had the idea that in the conditions of the crisis which had seized the capitalist world and the crisis which had affected the country, the revolutionary situation in China had matured and they should immediately hurl themselves into insurrection, first in one or a few provinces, and then over the whole country. It also stressed that the decisive factor of the revolution was the struggle of the proletariat. However, with only the organization of a wave of strikes by the urban working class, without an attack of the army on the big cities, the insurrection could not result in success. Meanwhile, Mao Zedong regarded the insurrection simply as a military action and was not for joint action of the urban working class and the army.

The insurrection began in June and on June 28, the Red Army entered Changsha. The city was held for a few days and then retaken by the

Kuomintang, which launched a white terror against the residents of the city and especially against the working class and the communists.

From what I have read, it emerges that the only army which supported the insurrection and resisted was the 5th Group of the Red Army. Meanwhile the forces of the Jiangxi zone, where Zhu De and Mao Zedong were in the leadership, instead of attacking and holding Changsha, turned back to go to the aid of the 5th Group of the Red Army. Thus the big offensive on the provincial scale failed. But even after this the Political Bureau of the CC of the CP of China did not relinquish its idea. On the 18th of July it sent a letter to the ECCI asking it to sanction the commencement of the insurrection in Wuhan, Changsha and Shanghai. The Presidium of the ECCI refused this request. On August 5, the Political Bureau of the CC of the CP of China repeated this request. On August 26, 1930, the ECCI sent a letter to the CC of the CP of China in which it stressed that it was essential to cancel the plan of the insurrection in several provinces.

In September 1930, the 3rd Session of the 6th Meeting of the Central Committee was held in Lushan. At this meeting Pavel Mif took part as

the representative of the ECCI. The report which was delivered by Zhou Enlai, who had just returned from Moscow, where he was the delegate of the CC of the CP of China to the Comintern, was very prudent and tried to reconcile the view of the Comintern with the line of Li Lisan. The plenum considered the stand of the Chinese leadership merely a serious tactical error but not a stand in opposition to the directives of the Comintern. Four months later, in January 1931, the Central Committee held a 4th Session. The resolution of this session stressed that the leadership of the Communist Party of China headed by Li Lisan, had followed an adventurous putschist policy, contrary to the directives of the Comintern. The report said that the line of Li Lisan about the taking of big cities, at a time when the conditions had not matured, was in contradiction with the theses of the Comintern about the character and the stages of the Chinese revolution.

The Chinese communists with Mao Zedong lay the blame for their defeats and deviations, for their failure to understand and draw correct deductions from the situations which were developing in China, on the Comintern or its representatives in China. They make many accusations

that the Comintern hindered them and confused them in the waging of a consistent struggle for the seizure of state power and the construction of socialism in China. Of course, the period of the Chinese revolution is long and complicated. But the views of the Chinese remain without any scientific argument and backing. I have frequently said that the documents of the Comintern, not only on the Chinese question but on many problems of that time, are in the hands of the Soviets and in the archives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Many of them have not been published because the various factions and the present Soviet revisionists do not bring out the truth from their archives, and thus the Chinese can manipulate and interpret the facts according to their own wishes. The Chinese representatives at the Comintern and the representatives of the Comintern in China cannot be completely exonerated, but neither can the Communist Party of China which operated in the terrain be exonerated, because its actions were not mature, and the reports which it made about the situation in the country were not realistic. In these conditions, it is possible that some decisions of the Comintern were not on the mark, or were not transmitted

and applied correctly by the representatives of the Comintern in China, whether Soviet or Chinese, and there are many reasons for this, because at that time there were elements such as Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev and Kamenev in the Comintern who were exposed for what they were only later. At the beginning of the 20's the representative of the Comintern in China was the Soviet citizen, Adolf Abramovich Joffe, who was a partisan of Trotskyism and later committed suicide. In October 1923, Borodin went to China and he, too, was a Trotskyite element.

I am of the opinion, however that, in general, the decisions and directives of the Comintern, first of all of the time of Lenin, were correct, and that those of the time of Stalin were correct, too.

The facts indicate that in the period of the First Civil War, or the first period of the collaboration between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, but also in the other periods, there does not seem to have been a mistaken orientation by the Comintern about the development of the struggle of the Communist Party of China as an independent party. In general Stalin wanted the Communist Party of China to fight in close alliance with Kuomintang, at the time when the

historical development of China put this forward as an objective need. In my opinion, this was a correct directive. But that Stalin could have given the directive, as the Chinese claim, that the Communist Party of China should be liquidated and incorporated into the Kuomintang without maintaining its individuality, this I cannot believe and it could never have been Stalin's opinion. The Chinese are not able to provide any document to prove this, but on the contrary, documents exist which prove the opposite. This is confirmed by the admissions of the Chinese themselves, who say that Stalin had allegedly made a self-criticism when Mao Zedong went to Moscow, although not over these questions; he allegedly admitted that «at one moment of the Chinese revolution he has exerted some influence to ensure that the Communist Party of China should be based only on the proletariat and less on the peasantry». «This is the one and only mistake I have made in regard to China and over this I make self-criticism,» said Stalin, according to the Chinese. However, even if this were true, it is unacceptable to draw the conclusion, as the Chinese do, that their defeats, the internal clashes of factions in the CP of China, the bloodshed with

the Kuomintang were allegedly caused by the «mistaken» policy of the Comintern and Stalin! Here the authentic documents must be found, because it seems to me more likely that the Chinese communists themselves, and also some of the delegates from Moscow, did not know how to carry out such a correct, principled policy with the Kuomintang and its chiefs so as to achieve their maximum aims.

We see that the start of the collaboration of the Chinese communists and the Kuomintang was reasonable and close, to the point that the two sides together trained the officer cadres at the Whampoa Academy, where Chiang Kai-Shek was commander, and Zhou Enlai commissar. Hence Zhou Enlai and Chiang Kai-shek worked and collaborated quite well. Mao, himself, was in charge of cadres (education) in the Kuomintang. That means that the directives of the Comintern were not wrong. Not wrong also was the directive of the Comintern (if this was its directive) that, in order to avoid the split at the time of the Japanese aggression, the Communist Party of China, through Zhou Enlai, should intervene to free Chiang Kai-shek who had been arrested on the 12th of December, 1936, by the commander of

the North-eastern Army of China, an arrest which threatened to split the nationalist forces in the war against Japan.

It is now very difficult to judge the line and activity of the Communist Party of China towards the Kuomintang, over the decisions which the CC of the Party took under the leadership of Li Lisan in 1930, and the decisions which it took after the failure of the insurrection of 1930, because the Communist Party of China, in the ranks of which many factions have always vegetated, has never written of these important events which have occurred in the country and in the ranks of the party with the necessary objectivity. On the contrary, the facts, conclusions, thoughts and aims have been distorted and interpreted according to the interests of various factions which dominated at given periods in the Central Committee.

Thus we are faced with two difficulties: first, we must judge apriori, bearing in mind only the events and drawing conclusions not on the basis of documents; and second, we are faced with that incoherence, or, as you might say, ideological confusion of the Communist Party of China, which, divided into factions, has never at any

time made an analysis of events and never drawn conclusions as lessons for education. At least we do not find documents published in foreign languages, a thing which the Communist Party of China ought to have done, because it has had and still has the possibilities to do this.

After September 1931, the National Liberation War against the Japanese occupiers began. This National Liberation War, also, was waged with its ups and downs, not only military but also ideological and political. During this war, alliances were formed between the progressive bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie, and the comprador bourgeoisie, between the Kuomintang, the proletariat and the peasantry, and between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang.

In all this complicated situation, again we do not see clearly the line and direction of the Communist Party of China. We have read materials which, you might say, are more propaganda articles, but here we are not talking about propaganda. Here we have to do with questions of alliances between the proletariat and the peasantry, between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China, between the army of the Kuomintang and the army which the Communist Party

led, and all these together, in alliance or disalliance, were in struggle against the Japanese and against one another. We must have the documents in order to find the thread of events.

We know, in general, that first the war was waged in alliance with the Kuomintang, and later they went to war with each other. Chiang Kai-shek led the Kuomintang, that is, the reactionary bourgeoisie. It is a fact that seeing the danger of the rise of the Communist Party of China and its fight against the Japanese occupiers, the Kuomintang broke with it and thus the war against Japanese, on its part, was weakened or stopped altogether. The Kuomintang, led by Chiang Kai-shek, went over completely to war against the Communist Party of China and strove in every way to liquidate its fighting detachments. In other words, in this way it went to the aid of the Japanese occupiers. At the same time, its links were tightened and became closer every day with American imperialism, though in opposition to the special representative of America in China, General Marshall, who, in the beginning supported the Chiang Kai-shek lobby, but later, as far as we have read, considered the Chiang Kai-shek government a «corrupt government».

However, during and after the anti-Japanese war the Communist Party of China which Mao Zedong led, did not lack contacts with American imperialism, either.

During the anti-Japanese war Mao Zedong had managed to liquidate the factions of Li Lisan, Wang Ming and many others and had established his hegemony. Besides Mao, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Lin Biao, and many other leaders of the Chinese revolution who had emerged from the anti-Japanese war, came into the leadership of the party. But these, too, were in opposition to Mao and to one another, time after time. Hence, the war led by Mao Zedong in China was a national liberation war against the Japanese occupiers, and against the Kuomintang led by Chiang Kai-shek, who was in *de facto* alliance with the Japanese, and in *de jure* and open alliance with the American imperialists.

After the historic Long March led by Mao Zedong and Zhu De, which was a correct tactical retreat in order to avoid liquidating the forces of the revolution, after assembling at Yen-an, reorganizing the army and then the assault, which ended with driving Chiang Kai-shek and the remnants of his army into the sea, on the 1st of

October, 1949 China was liberated and proclaimed a People's Republic.

As can be seen, this is an extremely general summary of this event of great importance, not only to China but also on a world scale, because the People's Republic of China was created and together with the Soviet Union, if it had followed a genuine Marxist-Leninist road, would have become a powerful fortress of the great world proletarian revolution.

For the period following the liberation of China, the question arises, and this is a great and important question which cannot be analysed and solved with these few facts and documents or without special study on our part: is People's China building socialism on the Marxist-Leninist road, or is it a bourgeois-democratic republic and remaining as such? Was the revolution which was carried out in China, and did it remain, a bourgeois-democratic revolution, which marked the first stage of the revolution, or did it succeed in going beyond this stage, to the second stage of the revolution, to socialism, under the dictatorship of the proletariat? This is a major question which must be cleared up with facts.

Mao Zedong called the period of liberation «the new democracy», the tasks and orientations of which were defined. The theoretical foundations of this doctrine were laid by Mao Zedong in a document, «The New Democracy», which came out in 1940. According to Mao Zedong, «The New Democracy» is a regime suitable to China and resembles neither the Western republics controlled by the bourgeoisie nor the Soviet proletarian republics.

The new democratic republic, according to Mao Zedong, would be made up of «four» anti-imperialist and anti-feudal «classes»(!) which are the proletariat, the peasantry, the petty-bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. In this republic, the economy, also, had to be new democratic, the state would take over management of it, but would not confiscate the assets of the bourgeoisie, because the backward character of the Chinese economy justified the existence of some capitalist forms. Of course, the land would be divided up, according to this new economy, but the economy of the rich peasants would exist, because the above formula is applicable to the rich peasants also, since their production is very necessary. Naturally, the new culture has to be the ideological

reflection of this new policy and new economy and serve this policy and economy.

This policy sounds liberal and nationalist, because, even after the creation of the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong still remained loyal to his doctrine.

In my opinion, and as far as I can judge, China carried out a bourgeois-democratic revolution of a new type through the national liberation armed struggle. The Communist Party of China stood at the head and led this struggle to victory and there is no disputing that. Mao Zedong, the General Secretary, or the Chairman of the Communist Party of China, has great merits during this period, in this direction and in this outcome. Along with Mao Zedong, naturally all those others who, in one way or another, in unity of opinion, or in diversity of opinions with one another, attained this final objective which was the liberation of China, a capital problem, as well as the establishment there of a people's democratic republic, also have their merits.

Was this to be a people's democratic regime? Was it to be built in the form of the Western or American bourgeois-democratic regimes? We must examine this in its development. From

external appearances, since it had a communist party at the head and this communist party was a member of the Comintern, since it apparently followed the directives of the Comintern, and its general line of the fight against fascism, the idea and hopes arose that this bourgeois democracy, this first stage through which the Chinese revolution passed, would be different from that of the classical bourgeois-democratic revolution and that the Chinese republic would be different from the American or Western bourgeois democratic republics, and would proceed on the road of the people's democracy, a new form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Regardless of the fact that both before and after the liberation Mao Zedong said (and documents about this exist) that in the construction of the People's Republic of China «we shall be much inspired by American democracy», in its propaganda and in many of its initial acts and because the Communist Party of China came to power, it looked as if China was a country which was preparing to go over to socialism. This was the general picture.

After liberation, the construction of the country, the strengthening of the state and the creation

of the state apparatus, the strengthening and modernization of the army, were not to be carried out without struggle and clashes with the different trends of Chinese reaction which existed within China and which had exceptionally powerful support from abroad and from the new cadres who were admitted to the party and the state apparatuses. Hence, in this period of the first years, we are unable to distinguish properly that radical line of the Communist Party of China over the very grave problem, that of the consolidation of the Republic, and when we say the consolidation of the Republic, we mean, in the first place, the consolidation of a correct and consistent Marxist-Leninist policy for the strengthening of the state power and the preparation of conditions to go over to the period of socialist construction. In particular, we do not see a correct line on the organization of the party of the Lenin and Stalin type, in which unity of thought and deed, the unity of Marxist-Leninist thought and very carefully organized activity, would prevail in a great China, just emerged from a complicated struggle, from a complex situation, in which feudalism, the bourgeoisie, and different strata of the peasantry, the intelligentsia, Confucianism,

Buddhism, etc., were all active.

In the period of the first years we did not see a sound and well-based organization of the Chinese army on the example of the army of Stalin. Irrespective of the fact that it was organized in big detachments during the partisan national liberation war, the characteristics of these detachments were not always partisan characteristics, because the tendencies of a bourgeois capitalist army existed, for the reason that whole detachments of the armies of the Kuomintang and the «warlords» joined the army of Mao Zedong. And thus, together with them, the reactionary views were introduced into the detachments of the Chinese national liberation army, because, at the head of these detachments of the Kuomintang and the «warlords», there were senior commanders and officers of the Kuomintang who had been trained in the war against the people and against communism. The old views of the «warlords» also existed in this army which emerged from the war. Even the top cadres who had waged the great liberation war and were members of the CP of China were affected by these views to some extent. This we shall see later, when a number of main military leaders deviated and tried to seize

power, to overthrow one and the other. This means that the old views of the «warlords», or the views of top military cadres of a bourgeois capitalist army, existed among them.

In this direction then, at that time we do not see a consistent, correct, well-thought out policy, properly formulated and applied by the Communist Party which Mao Zedong led. It is true its policy was called Marxist-Leninist, but in essence it was not such a policy.

In regard to economic matters in this period we may say that many positive changes were made. Poverty and unemployment were combated in China, and to some extent the backwardness in education and culture were combated, too, although the bourgeois and capitalist views among the masses of intellectuals were not eliminated. Naturally, these cannot be wiped out at a touch of the magic wand; however, in regard to the reconstruction of the devastated country and the organization of the state of the economy in the country to some extent, we can say that the regime of new democracy brought many good and pleasing changes in this direction. Famine no longer existed in China and this was a great success. These are the obvious features of this stage

of the regime of new democracy.

After the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the Communist Party of China had to proceed with great caution, and this was natural. It had to avoid being leftist and skipping the stages, and we can say that the stages were not skipped. This is a fact which cannot be denied. The question arose, also, that the Communist Party of China ought not to have shown itself to be «democratic», that is, liberal and opportunist, as it proved to be, towards the Chinese bourgeoisie and the big landowners. The fact is that both the Liu-Deng faction and the Mao faction supported these classes, making serious, liberal, opportunist concessions to them.

The Communist Party of China should have consolidated the alliance of the working class with the peasantry first of all, and the Chinese bourgeoisie should have been subjected to the laws of the proletariat. This was absolutely essential. On this course, the party could have used various forms to disarm the bourgeoisie, to turn it from the road of subversion and armed attacks which it might make on the new state; it could also have made temporary concessions of a tactical character, but without altering the strategic aims of the

revolution or violating its principles. In other words it should have disarmed the bourgeoisie, but disarmed it politically first of all, ideologically it should not have allowed its views to develop, and economically it should have taken from it all the assets it had and not allowed it to retain nearly the same positions which it had at a time when the peasantry, in the first place, and the proletariat were going through economic difficulties, not to mention political and ideological difficulties.

On this question, in these first moments after liberation, for four or five years on end, we see that China is struggling, wallowing in ever-changing reforms. We do not see any sort of guiding line there about where these measures or reforms should lead, do not see an objective, well-studied build-up, step by step, in all directions of social, economic, political, ideological and military activity. On the contrary, we see many vacillations to all sides; a confusion of reforms of the people's democratic period with allegedly socialist trends, strikes the eye. During this period, the tendency according to which the first stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution had to be protracted was kept strong. In this stage, preached the Chinese leaders, along with the development

of capitalism the premises for socialism would be created. Mao Zedong himself said: «Although such a democratic revolution of the new type, on the one hand widens the road for capitalism, on the other hand it creates the premises for socialism». On this preaching they based their well-known thesis about coexistence with the bourgeoisie and capitalism for a very long time, which was to continue for a full thirty years after 1956. The report of the 8th Congress of the CP of China says openly that the national bourgeoisie, together with the working class, should retain the state management in China and retain a large part of its private wealth. The Chinese presented these ideas as a creative application of Lenin's teachings on the NEP. But there is a radical difference between Lenin's teachings and the Chinese theory and practice, both in content and in the period of the implementation of the NEP. Lenin admitted that the NEP was a retreat which allowed the development of private capitalism for a time, but he stressed,

«The proletarian power is in no danger, as long as the proletariat firmly holds power in its hands, and has full control of transport and

large-scale industry».¹

In China, however, the proletariat did not hold the state power or big industry completely in its own hands either in 1949 or in 1956.

One year after the proclamation of the NEP, Lenin pointed out that the retreat had come to an end and launched the slogan of preparation for the offensive on private capital in the economy. In China, however, the period of the retention of the bourgeoisie and capitalism was envisaged to go on almost forever.

In a word, at this stage the view existed in the Communist Party of China that the order established after the liberation should be a bourgeois-democratic order and the bourgeoisie, too, should have power, while in appearance the Communist Party of China should be in power (and it was in power) with Mao Zedong as chairman and with Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and all the others in the leadership. These were the views of this party. They were not clear Marxist-Leninist views. Since the views of the CP of China were not completely Marxist-Leninist views, the

¹ V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 32, p. 434 (Alb. ed.).

revolution in China could not be carried through to the end, and the transformation of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into socialist revolution could not be assured. The transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution can be achieved only when the proletariat resolutely removes the bourgeoisie from power, even in those cases when the bourgeoisie has been its ally for a time. So long as the working class in China shared power with the bourgeoisie, this power, in essence, was never transformed into a dictatorship of the proletariat, and consequently the Chinese revolution could not be a socialist revolution.

Despite all the slogans the important problem of nationalities, also, was not solved in the Marxist-Leninist way. The directives of the Comintern on the problem of nationalities, languages, and the multinational proletarian state were not clear to the Chinese leaders, not just at the start, but even after the creation of the People's Republic of China.

Stalin, speaking about the tasks which emerge for the Marxist-Leninist party for the creation of the proletarian state, in the interview he gave Emil Ludwig, says:

*«That task is not the consolidation of some 'national' state, but of a socialist state, and that means an international state...».*¹

The CP of China should have followed this course. However, in Mao, who speaks continually about the emperors, about the heroes of fables, whom he sometimes praises and sometimes attacks, we do not find this precision of expression about the struggle for an international proletarian state. We do not find this precision of expression about the future of China and the question of the correct solution for this great grouping of nations even in the time of his maturity.

The state organization in newly liberated China, at least to us foreigners, did not seem to be very clear, the forms of organization and connections of the base with the centre were not obvious, it was not plain on what basis the divisions were made, and apart from the general reconstruction, the economic orientations as to which was given priority, heavy industry, light industry, or agriculture, could not be seen. There was a great deal of talk, directives were issued, but we see that not only were these directives not

¹ J.V. Stalin, Works, vol. 13, p. 101 (Alb. ed.).

implemented but they were also confused and ill-defined.

One faction in the party was of the view that heavy industry should be developed in the first place. Another was against this; in its opinion, priority should be given to light industry. A third faction claimed that great importance must be given to agriculture, and there were also those who said they must walk on both feet. Many formulas were issued, as many as you like, however, while it cannot be said that nothing was done and that no work was carried out, in general the orientations which were given were not clear and were not properly implemented. The reason for this lack of orientation stemmed from the fact that during the whole of this period, from the time it was founded until it achieved the liberation of the country and later, the Communist Party of China was unable to consolidate itself ideologically, to implant the theory of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin deeply in the minds and hearts of its members, to adopt the key points of this unerring scientific theory and, basing itself on this ideology, to apply it step by step in the conditions of China, in the dialectical development of the struggle in that country. This brought

about that the Communist Party of China was divided into many factions within itself; at the same time, outside it permitted the existence of the other parties of the bourgeoisie and their participation in the state. Indeed Mao himself officially described their participation in the state and the government, with the same rights and prerogatives as the Communist Party of China, as essential and, moreover, according to him, these parties of the bourgeoisie «were historical» and could not die out until the time came that the Communist Party of China withered away.

In a word, Mao Zedong had the view that they should go to socialism through pluralism. This was a rightist reactionary slogan. It was not a Marxist slogan which could have been understood, up to a point, as a form of alliance of the Communist Party of China with other traditional parties in the Front, in which the Communist Party of China had the leading role. No.

In his theoretical writings Mao Zedong says that China could not have been liberated without the leadership of the peasantry, that the revolution in China was a peasant revolution. According to him, the peasantry was the most revolutionary class, that it had to lead the revolution

«and did lead the revolution». This is a major theoretical error on the part of Mao Zedong and shows that he was not a Marxist-Leninist but an eclectic and a bourgeois-democrat. Mao Zedong, as a progressive democrat, was for a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and when China was liberated, he clung to the same views. According to his views, the peasantry was the leading force and the working class had to be its ally, the state power in China had to be, first of all, the state of the peasantry and «the countryside had to encircle the city», but when the line of Li Lisan was being pursued, the army of Mao and Zhu De did not carry out the directive of the Central Committee and did not encircle the given city. Mao Zedong wanted to transform this bourgeois-democratic theory of his into a universal theory and, in fact, this «theory» was called «Mao Zedong thought». In order to make it as acceptable as possible the Chinese leaders put an equal sign between Marxism-Leninism and «Mao Zedong thought».

The monarchy was overthrown in China in 1911, but even after the creation of the People's Republic of China the Chinese did not execute Puyi of Manchuria, the puppet emperor of the Japanese occupiers. After keeping him for some

years in an education camp, they turned him into a museum exhibit, to whom various delegations were brought to meet and talk with and to create the «belief» that such people are re-educated in «socialist» China. Apart from other things, the purpose of the publicity about this former emperor was to relieve the fears of the monarchs, chiefs, and puppets of reaction of other countries with which China maintains relations, so that they would think: «Mao's socialism is good, why should we be afraid of it?»! In other words, with their profoundly opportunist stand towards the Emperor Puyi, the Chinese revisionists are saying: «You emperors, kings, sultans, princes, fascists, dictators of the second world and the third world are ours. We shall go to socialism together with you»! What beautiful socialism!

Similar stands, which have nothing in common with the class struggle, have been adopted in China also towards the feudal lords and the capitalists whose assets were not touched either in the bourgeois-democratic revolution of Sun Yat-sen or even after China was liberated by the army of Mao Zedong and was proclaimed a «new democracy», where, as you might say, three quarters of the wealth of the exploiters was protected because

the reforms which were carried out in «socialist» China were not thorough-going.

We know that during the bourgeois-democratic revolution in France the assets of the Church and the feudal class were confiscated, and, of course, these assets went in favour of the bourgeoisie, which when it saw that it was endangered by the internal disturbances and from outside by Brunswick and from Koblenz and in these conditions its political and economic power might be overthrown, cut off the king's head, liquidated the different factions of the Girondists one after the other, and then the strongest factions of the republicans, among whom the views of the conservative bourgeoisie infiltrated. Hence the heads of Dantonists and Hebertists were cut off with the guillotine just as those of Robespierre and Saint-Just were cut off later by their comrades of the right, such as Billaud-Varenne and others. The French bourgeoisie did not allow its class interests to be damaged and did not divide the land amongst the peasantry as Babeuf and Buonarroti advocated.

Throughout its whole history the Communist Party of China has contained a large number of factions. There have been factions,

ideological deviations, in every Marxist-Leninist party, but in China these deviations have had another character, which can be equated with the factions of the French bourgeois-democratic revolution, apart from the fact that in China they did not cut off the heads of political opponents. In China, of course, these factions retained their allegedly ideological character, but in fact they had more of a political character and were for the aim of establishing personal power, had precisely the character of the actions of «warlords», who naturally, did not want the newly created Chinese Republic to take the road to socialism, the road of a centralized disciplined state.

The Chinese list these as «10 struggles» which Mao Zedong has waged. They are struggles, but in the Communist Party of China these are not struggles like those in the Bolshevik Party or in our Party, where on the one side there were genuine Marxist-Leninists who fought to defend the Party and its Marxist-Leninist line, and on the other side, the Trotskyite, anarchist deviators and what not. No, in these factions of the Communist Party of China none of the sides was guided by Marxism-Leninism. There were factions in which all were guided by confused views, progressive

bourgeois views rather than Marxist-Leninist; other factions were more to the right or more to the left, but in the leadership of the Communist Party of China there was never a Marxist-Leninist faction, that is, a sound Marxist-Leninist nucleus. Thus, Mao Zedong and the comrades around him were not genuine Marxist-Leninists, they were progressive bourgeois democrats, Marxists in appearance and phraseology, but who fought, and fought to the end, for the consolidation of a progressive bourgeois-democratic great state, for a «new democracy», as Mao Zedong called it.

Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen and other elements were rightists, elements of the bourgeoisie who defended the big national bourgeoisie in order to preserve its prerogatives, of course, disguised with leftist demagoguery, and this faction did this under the communist disguise. For a long period after the liberation this group had power within the CP of China and acted on this course for the consolidation of the Chinese capitalist bourgeoisie.

Mao Zedong was not a Marxist-Leninist, but a progressive bourgeois revolutionary, more progressive than Liu Shaoqi, but still a centrist revolutionary, who posed as a communist and stood

at the head of the Communist Party. Within China, in the party, among the people, and abroad, he had the reputation of a great Marxist-Leninist who fought for the construction of socialism. But his views were not Marxist-Leninist, he did not follow the theory of Marx and Lenin, was a continuer of the work of Sun Yat-sen, but in more advanced positions, and dressed up his views, so to say, with some leftist revolutionary formulas, some Marxist-Leninist theses and slogans. Mao Zedong posed as a Marxist-Leninist dialectician, but he was not so. He was an eclectic who combined the Marxist dialectic with Confucian idealism and the old Chinese philosophy. The fact is that in his leadership of the party and the state, in his policy and ideology, in the development of China and its party, and in international developments, he did not base himself on the Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics to guide China on the road to socialism.

On the other hand we see that a leftist wing existed in the party which also disguised itself with Marxist-Leninist slogans. All these deviations did not assist the cause of socialism. In order to achieve the one aim, with different forms and through different methods, all the sides, with

nearly the same disguise, raised the banner of Mao Zedong, all fought under the banner of Mao Zedong, which was not a Marxist-Leninist banner. It merely had this reputation. After the death of Mao Zedong it became quite clear that this banner was not Marxist-Leninist.

What happened? As he says himself, Hua Guofeng «at one blow» overthrew «The Four» and the whole non-Marxist centrist theory of Mao Zedong, brought to power the right wing, in a word, all the elements condemned by the «Great Cultural», allegedly, Proletarian Revolution, and carried out a coup d'état as Napoleon I did and as Napoleon III did later. And Deng Xiaoping is nothing other than a petty Napoleon. Just like Napoleon, who wanted to create the French Empire, with the aim that France should dominate Europe at that time and stop the expansion of the British Empire, to blockade Britain on its island and defeat it, Deng Xiaoping and company are fighting for world hegemony today with the aim that China should become a superpower which can dominate the world and indeed predominate, if possible, even over the United States of America, let alone over the Soviet Union. China is trying to achieve this aim by means of

war, by arming itself with the most modern means, by developing its economy and technology with the aid of capitalist states, and by pursuing, a certain policy, a certain ideology, which is based on a non-Marxist theory, which is called «Mao Zedong thought».

The Chinese revisionists will use this theory as a disguise to pose as socialists, but in fact they are not and cannot be socialists, cannot be Marxist-Leninists. The Chinese revisionists can no more be Marxist-Leninists than Napoleon could have been a follower of Robespierre, a Jacobin, or a supporter of Babeuf. The Chinese revisionists are just like Napoleon who sought to establish his empire. He did create and establish his empire, but it was soon destroyed. In the same way, the day will come when the Chinese revisionists are destroyed.

Marxism-Leninism and the proletarian revolution will triumph in China, and these renegades will be defeated. Naturally, such a revolution will not triumph without fighting and bloodshed, because great efforts must be made in China to create the main subjective factor — the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party, which did not exist as such before and does not exist now.

Likewise, the masses must be prepared so that they understand that one cannot live with illusions. The masses must become politically aware that those leading them are not Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries, but elements of the bourgeoisie, of capitalism, who have entered a course which has nothing in common with socialism and communism. But if they are to understand this, the masses must understand the basic question that «Mao Zedong thought» is not Marxism-Leninism and that Mao Zedong was not a Marxist-Leninist. He did not betray himself, as you might say. We say that Mao is a renegade, is an anti-Marxist, and this is a fact. We say this because he tried to disguise himself with Marxism-Leninism, but in fact he was never a Marxist.

In general, we can say that in some directions the revolution in China had certain features of a tendency to develop on the socialist road, but the measures taken stopped halfway, or were annulled, as they are being annulled at present, and the masks will be dropped one after the other. All these things must be understood by the Chinese people, and they must be understood outside China, too, because, unfortunately, the whole development of that country,

the national liberation war of the Chinese people, the establishment of the progressive bourgeois people's democratic state, has gone down in history as a proletarian revolution, which in fact it was not, has gone down in history as if China is a country which is building socialism, which is not true, either.

I think that, in general, all that we have said about China at the 2nd and 3rd plenums of the CC of the PLA and in these notes, reveals the Chinese reality, but we must not be content with saying only this. The duty devolves on us to make a profound study of the main and decisive questions of the policy and activity of the Communist Party of China in the dialectical development of its history, so that we prove these ideas and general conclusions we have arrived at, which I think are not mistaken, with facts and documents. There is no doubt that there are questions to which we have not given a full answer, there are things missing and debatable problems which require deeper study. This cannot be denied. But in general the facts show that China has travelled over such a chaotic non-Marxist road.

With what has just occurred, that is, after the putsch of Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping,

China is passing into a more backward stage than what it had achieved with Mao Zedong. He was more progressive than Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping. These are ultra-rightists, while Mao Zedong was a centrist.

In one of my notes, I have said that the myths must be exploded, and I had in mind that precisely the myth of Mao Zedong, that myth which has described him as a «great» Marxist-Leninist, had and has to be exploded. **Mao Zedong is not a Marxist-Leninist but a progressive revolutionary democrat, and in my opinion, this is the angle from which his work should be studied.**

I have said that the views of Mao Zedong should not be studied merely from the edited phrases in the four volumes which have been published, but **must be studied in their practical application**, and they have been applied in a period not like that of the bourgeois-democratic revolution of France, when, in its own time, the bourgeoisie was a progressive class. The ideas of Mao Zedong developed in the present period of the decay of imperialism, the final stage of capitalism, hence, at a time when proletarian revolutions are on the order of the day and when the example and

the great lessons of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the teachings of Marx and Lenin are an unerring guide for us. The theory of Mao Zedong, «Mao Zedong thought», which emerged in these new conditions, was bound to cloak itself with the most revolutionary and most scientific theory of the time — Marxism-Leninism, but in essence it remained an anti-Marxist theory, because it is opposed to proletarian revolutions and goes to the aid of imperialism in decay.

Therefore, in the ideology of Mao Zedong we shall find reflected all the aspects of the ideas which capitalism and imperialism have invented during the many years of the period of their decline and decay. «Mao Zedong thought» is an amalgam of ideologies, beginning from anarchism, Trotskyism, modern revisionism à la Tito, à la Khrushchev, «Eurocommunism» à la Marchais-Berlinguer-Carrillo, and finally down to the use of Marxist-Leninist formulas. In all this amalgam we must also discern the old ideas of Confucius, Mencius, and other Chinese philosophers, which had a very great influence on the formation of Mao Zedong's ideas and his cultural-theoretical development. Thus it is hard to define a single line or, so to say, a clear line of the Chinese

ideology. Even those aspects of it which may be said to be a kind of distorted Marxism-Leninism, have an Asiatic seal and character, have the specific character of an «Asiatic communism», are a sort of «Asiocommunism» the same as «Eurocommunism», in which you cannot find the proletarian internationalism of Marx and Lenin in its full and true meaning. In the Chinese ideology we shall find heavy doses of nationalism, xenophobia, religion, Buddhism, marked hangovers of the feudal ideology, not to mention many other hangovers which exist and were not systematically combated, not only during the period of the national liberation war, but especially during the period of the establishment of the state of people's democracy.

It must be admitted that the reactionary world bourgeoisie has followed and studied the development of the policy and ideology of Mao Zedong, the development of political-ideological struggles in China, more carefully not only in the periods prior to the revolution, but also during the revolution. Precisely because the reactionary world bourgeoisie saw that this policy and this ideology had its specific Chinese Asiatic character, was far removed from Marxism-Leninism, it

has defended, supported and propagated it, moreover as Marxist-Leninist. In its own writings and publications, the bourgeoisie clearly sets out the orientation of the policy and ideology of Mao Zedong and describes it not as Marxist, but as a revolutionary bourgeois ideology and, in fact, that is what it is. It was in the interests of imperialism, world capitalism, that China, a huge continent, you might say, should continue on this course, should follow the political and ideological orientation of Mao Zedong, which one day would come into open opposition to scientific Marxism, because China would not follow the road of scientific Marxism. In the development of China, this became obvious. The ideological contradictions between Marxism-Leninism and «Mao Zedong thought» became inevitable, not only now but even earlier.

All the differences and misunderstandings on the part of the Chinese with the Soviet Union, the Comintern, and Stalin were opposition over issues of principle, and for no other reason.

I think that when we analyse «Mao Zedong thought», we must bear in mind all these factors, which have played a major role in the political-theoretical development of the Chinese

leadership and the Communist Party of China and have been reflected in their orientations and actions. The present strategy of Maoism which, as we know, consists of its alliance with the United States of America and the whole of world capitalism in order to oppose the revisionist Soviet Union, flows from this.

This is not simply a policy of adaptation to the changing political developments, but a policy which has an ideological content and the Maoists have an ideological conviction about it. The Chinese leaders think in virtually the same way as the American imperialists and the leaders of the other developed capitalist «democracies». They are at one ideologically, especially in their aims of domination, because, China, too, as a big state, does not want to put itself under the leadership and under the heel of any of these imperialists and capitalists, but wants to dominate, or at least, to have its own big say which must be listened to throughout the world. It is for this reason that, in one way or another, Maoist China advocates the alliance of the world proletariat with the capitalist bourgeoisie and American imperialism. By putting itself on this course, China in fact is hindering the world revolution and distorting the

Marxist-Leninist theory just as the other revisionists are doing. Its policy and activity serve imperialism and capitalism, which is giving up the ghost, as a fresh injection to revive it and prolong its life.

The basis of the opposition which Maoist China has with Soviet revisionism is simply that Maoist China considers the Soviet Union a weaker imperialist power than the United States of America and thinks that, in alliance with American imperialism, it will realize its expansionist dreams — the occupation of Siberia and other eastern regions of the Soviet Union.

This is the basis of the contradiction between China and the Soviet Union, and this contradiction does not have an ideological character, as it is presented, that is, that China is allegedly Marxist-Leninist and the Soviet Union revisionist. No, both these countries are revisionist, have a bourgeois ideology which guides them and they are fighting against the revolution precisely in the conditions of the decay of imperialism.

Therefore, it seems to me that all these notes must be deepened and backed up more thoroughly with a richer documentation, a documentation which must be searched for, because it

exists in one way or another, either in the newspapers or books which, from time to time, are published in China or abroad. However, these must be studied in a critical manner, and must be compared with the Chinese reality and the fundamental principles and theses of our great revolutionary ideology — Marxism-Leninism.