

# THE MYTH OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM



SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY EXPLAINED  
by **L. G. Churchward, M.A., Dip. Ed.**

ONE SHILLING

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## FOREWORD

This is an important publication, quite the most important, on its vital subject-matter, to appear in our country since Dr. Eric Dark's book, *The World Against Russia?* (1948). It is especially encouraging that such a publication should be made at this time, by a lecturer in political science at the University of Melbourne. There could scarcely be matter more becoming the description of "essential reading" than a careful examination of the contrasting pre-war and post-war external policies of the two world Powers, U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. Directing attention chiefly to the Soviet Union, Mr. Churchward in his documented factual, scrupulously reasoned account does incidentally light his narrative with glimpses of the aggressive American colossus, with its 489 war-bases girdling the globe.

The quality of Soviet foreign policy, and the reasons for it, are clearly demonstrated in these pages. To quote some of Mr. Churchward's timely reminders—

- Despite its grievances against the Polish Government, the Soviet Government entered into a defensive pact with Poland in 1929 which was not denounced by the Soviet Union until 1938, after Poland had broken the terms of the pact by grabbing part of Czech territory.
- On the other hand the Soviet Union was the main source of outside assistance for the Chinese Central Government, 1936-41, at a time when the Western Powers were appeasing Japan by such acts as the supply of scrap iron, petroleum, and closing the Burma Road.
- If one examines the "repeated instances" of Moscow intervention since 1945 in the affairs of other peoples, in Persia, China, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Korea, etc., months of searching will discover no worthwhile evidence to substantiate the charges. Clearly, one of the chief purposes of such assertions is to excuse the open British and American intervention in the affairs of such States as Turkey, Greece, France, Italy and South Korea.
- The distinguishing feature of Soviet trade policy has been its reciprocity—if it has benefited the Soviet Union it has benefited the other countries also.

Mr. Churchward has brought together, in this treatment, such illuminating circumstances as the *post hoc* vindication by U.S. military opinion of the Soviet Union's 1939-40 attack on Finland; the Russian habit of observing international agreements in contrast to the infidelity of "our side", the explanation of the much-misrepresented "abuse of the veto power" at UN (really a simple instance of the charter provision for Security Council unanimity or inaction), and the respective Russian and Western roles in the Korea business.

Mr. Churchward devotes a great deal of space to the vexed question of Yugoslavia, very significant in relation to the



proposition that Soviet foreign policy, *ipso facto*, is non-intervening. My own opinion is that the regrettable developments which led to the Cominform ex-communication of Tito's government and party in 1948, to economic "sanctions" against Yugoslavia, and to the further deterioration of Yugoslavia as a socialist community thereafter, may have been in part occasioned by Soviet brusqueness. At any rate, there is some evidence to that effect in the White Book ("on aggressive activities by the governments of the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania towards Yugoslavia") which the Yugoslav Foreign Office published this year.

But I think Mr. Churchward would not wish to convey that in the necessarily sordid commerce of power politics any government, socialist or otherwise, can keep its hands clean. The essential matter is that the Soviet Union is by its nature non-aggressive, *not* a potential disturber of the peace. The late and lamented American authority on world affairs, Max Werner, gave in papers published last year for the Foundation for World Government, in New York, very cogent reasons for accepting this view. Mr. Churchward's lucid digest of facts seems to me, and I think will seem to every honest student of affairs, confirmatory of it.

BRIAN FITZPATRICK.

## ***Soviet Foreign Policy Explained***

### **The meaning of Imperialism:**

Most persons recognise the connection between imperialism and war, even though they are confused and uncertain of what they mean by the term imperialism. Thus the present international situation is commonly said to result from "Russian imperialism", or from "American imperialism", the choice between these alternatives depending on one's political viewpoint.

This pamphlet is primarily concerned with the first of these charges, that of "Russian imperialism". However, this charge cannot be examined without some consideration of American foreign policy, nor can we approach an understanding of either Soviet or United States foreign policy without first briefly examining the concept of imperialism.

Modern imperialism is the outcome of the economic structure we call capitalism. Its basic characteristics, the drive to control foreign raw materials, cheap labour power, and fields for investment; all flow from tendencies within the capitalist system. In the early stages of capitalist development these features are of secondary importance. This is because capitalism in its early stages is chiefly concerned with exploiting the home raw materials and labour power, with investments and sales in the home market. But as investment accumulates and as the workers at home organize to resist their exploitation, the rate of profit tends to fall. Under such conditions the more successful firms tend to eliminate the less successful ones, ownership becomes more concentrated, trusts and cartels emerge and very quickly dominate the economic scene, while bank capital and industrial capital become increasingly merged into a financial oligarchy. At the same time these monopolies exert increasing pressure towards overseas investments, markets, and exploitation, because these are more profitable than further home investment.

The outward pressure of monopoly groups is reflected in the increased interference by capitalist governments in the affairs of other peoples, leading to direct annexation, or to indirect political domination through "economic aid", "trade concessions", "military bases", etc. Thus, during the nineteenth century almost the whole of Africa was divided up between the

British, the French, the Belgians, the Germans, and the Italians. The Germans and the Italians were rather late on the scene, because Germany and Italy were less industrialised. Coming later to the grab for Africa they got less. By 1900 the United States had secured Puerto Rica, Cuba, the Philippines and valuable concessions in China.

The defeat of Germany in the first World War was followed by the transference of the German colonial possessions into the hands of the victors, Britain, France, Belgium, Japan and Australia. The United States gained no additional territory but she emerged from the war as the strongest capitalist Power and as a rival to Britain as the leading holder of overseas investments. The Second World War was followed by the transference of Japan's Pacific mandates to the United States and by the forging of economic controls over her weaker imperialist rivals as well as over many sections of the colonial world.

The expansion of United States' economic dominion has been the most obvious in Western Europe, South America, Japan and the Middle East. Economic expansion has been accompanied by the establishment of military bases. Under such conditions of economic and military dependence direct annexation is not only old-fashioned, it is superfluous. An indication of the extent of this post-war expansion of United States imperialism is shown by the fact that United States' private investments overseas increased from 10.1 billion dollars in 1940 to 19 billion dollars by the end of 1949, and that the total U.S. foreign investment had reached over 33 billion dollars by the end of 1949<sup>1</sup>, twice the value of the British overseas investment. The interest of the bigger United States monopolies in this process is shown by the fact that in 1943 100 U.S. companies and their subsidiaries owned 70 per cent. of all interests in controlled enterprises abroad,<sup>2</sup> and that over 75 per cent. of the net outflow of U.S. capital in 1947 was accounted for by 10 firms.<sup>3</sup>

### **Soviet Policy based on peaceful development:**

The Soviet Union, however, is a socialist state. This means that the main means of production, the factories, mines, banks, communications, land, etc., are in the hands of the state and are operated in the public interest, according to a common plan. The purpose of this economic plan is to raise the material and cultural level of the Soviet people by utilising the resources of the U.S.S.R. Foreign trade is merely an auxiliary, a means by which the Soviet State trades its surpluses for goods which it cannot at present produce. Foreign investment has no part

in the process, because profit is not the driving force of the Soviet economy.

Furthermore, political power in the Soviet Union is exercised by the Communist Party and its allies, who hold power on the basis of popular vote and who remain in power only because their policy is in the interests of the Soviet people, i.e. of the workers, the peasants and the intelligentsia. Under the Soviet Constitution any deputy in any Soviet may be recalled by his electors if they consider that at any time he is neglecting their wishes. The Supreme Soviet, the Soviet equivalent of our Federal Parliament, is re-elected every four years on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage. Since the monopoly groups, which force capitalist governments to pursue a policy of imperialism, are non-existent in the Soviet Union, government policy can reflect the interests of the entire people, which, like those of the common people everywhere, are for peace and progress.

The peaceful orientation of Soviet policy since 1945 is clearly revealed in an examination of the record. Space only permits a brief treatment of this, but the facts supplied here make it impossible to conceive that the Government which has achieved them is bent on war.

- Despite the fact that one quarter of the entire Soviet land was devastated during the war, by the end of 1948 grain yields were already above the 1940 average and by early 1949 gross agricultural production had exceeded that of 1940. The 1950 cereal crop was 5 million tons above the 1940 crop, sugar beet production was 2,500,000 tons above that of 1940, while cotton production was 73 per cent. above the 1940 level.

- Food rationing was abolished in 1947.

- By June, 1949, the average daily gross output of Soviet industry was 41 per cent. higher than during 1940, and by the completion of the first Post-War Five Year Plan (by late 1950) it was 73 per cent. above the 1940 level.

- Four important price cuts in essential commodities were carried out between 1947 and March, 1951, resulting in significant increases in the real income of Soviet workers. This has been the more so as the wages trend since 1945 has been steadily upward. The downward price trend in the Soviet Union contrasts favourably with the upward price trend which has gone on in all capitalist countries since the war.

- During the first Post-War Five Year Plan (1946-50), 1,076 million square feet of living space (sufficient housing for about 12 million persons, allowing three average sized rooms per family of four) was constructed in Soviet cities, and a further 2,700,000 houses were built in rural localities.

- In contrast with most capitalist states the amount of the



Soviet national budget devoted to defence has dropped since 1946. Soviet defence expenditure dropped from 32.4 per cent. of the unified State budget in 1940 to 23.9 per cent. in 1946 and to 20.1 per cent. in 1950. Although this percentage was increased in the 1951 budget to 21.3 per cent., there has been no cut-back in expenditure on civilian needs. Thus in the current budget 39.5 per cent. of total expenditure, 178,474 million roubles, is to be spent on the national economy. This represents an increase of 13.4 per cent. on the previous year's budget (1950) expenditure on the national economy. In the current budget 120,785 million roubles has been allocated for cultural development, a 3.4 per cent. increase on 1950 expenditure.<sup>4</sup>

• In 1946 the Soviet Union commenced work on an immense 15-year plan for the remaking of nature. This plan involves the re-forestation of millions of acres of the arid steppes, extensive irrigation works in central Asia, the construction of a new man-made river to flow three thousand miles through central Asia and draining into the Caspian Sea, several new hydroelectric stations and the linking of the Volga to the Black Sea by a deep canal from the Volga to the Don.


As Stalin stated in his interview with *Pravda* in February 1951, "no state, not excluding the Soviet State, can develop its civilian industry to the full, undertake huge construction works like the hydroelectric stations on the Volga, the Dnieper and the Amu Darya, which requires tens of billions in budgetary outlays, continue a policy of systematically reducing the prices of articles of mass consumption, which likewise requires tens of billions in budgetary outlays, and invest hundreds of billions in the rehabilitation of the national economy shattered by the German invaders, and at the same time, simultaneously with this, enlarge its armed forces and expand its war industry . . . without running the risk of landing in bankruptcy."

#### **Standard Accusations:**

For many, the above argument will be unconvincing. They will have read of Soviet "land-grabbing" in 1939-40 and 1945. They will argue that the Soviet treatment of Finland in 1939 and of North China today are evidence of Soviet imperialism. They might refer to special articles in the daily press and to radio news-commentaries given by "experts" as proof that the Eastern European countries are "Soviet satellites", that the Soviet army threatens the security of countries far and near, and that the Soviet Government uses Communist Parties throughout the world as weapons for Soviet aggression.

Let us consider these assertions.

# Soviet Boundaries 1939 & 1945



## KEY



## Soviet Territorial Expansion:

The Soviet frontiers are wider than they were in 1939. The extension of the Soviet Western frontier has been made on the basis of incorporating territory which in 1939 was included in Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia and Rumania. The Eastern frontiers have been extended by the incorporation of Tannu Tuva, formerly an independent State, and by taking over Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles from Japan. On the surface this seems like a full swag of imperialist booty. But this impression soon disappears when these boundary changes are examined concretely. Such an examination shows the following features.

(a) Most of the territory which is usually claimed to have been annexed by the Soviet Union during the war was Russian territory which had been forcibly removed from the Soviet during the Wars of Intervention, 1919-21. Thus the Finns seized Pechenga in 1918, although it was Russian territory as far back as the eleventh century and was Russian territory at the time of its seizure. In 1920 the Poles, with the assistance of the French and the British, seized the Western Ukraine from the Soviet. These lands, re-united with the Soviet Union in 1939, were populated by about 13 million people, over 7 million of whom were Ukrainians and a further 3 million Byelorussians. The remainder, less than 3 million, were mainly Polish and Jewish. This territory was recognised as belonging to Russia by the Allies in 1919, and in fact the Polish occupation of the territory was not recognised by the Allies until 1923, and then only on condition that the Polish Government granted full minority rights and local self-government to Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Jews. But the Polish Government followed a policy of repression of non-Polish national groups. For this, and because their sympathies since 1917 had been with the Russian peasants, the Ukrainian and Byelorussian peasants welcomed the Red Army as liberators in September, 1939. In October, 1939, 90 per cent. of the population voted in the elections for the National Assemblies of Western Byelorussia and Western Ukraine, and it was these popularly elected assemblies which voted for the inclusion of their territories in the U.S.S.R.

In 1918 the Rumanian landlords seized Bessarabia from Russia, a seizure which was never recognised by the Soviet Government. In 1940, on the demand of the Soviet Government, Rumania restored Bessarabia to the Soviet Union. In 1945, Rumania ceded the small territory of Bukovina, a region with an exceedingly mixed population the most important of which are the Moldavians, a group akin to the Ukrainians. Czechoslovakia ceded the Transcarpathian Ukraine in 1945, thus

bringing the Ukrainians together for the first time into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The Tuva people, situated around the source of the Yenisei, were incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1944 at their own request. Southern Sakhalin, ceded by the Japanese in 1945, had been colonised by the Russians in the 17th century, but was transferred to Japan after the Russian defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1905). Its population is not basically Japanese. Even the Kurile Islands had been recognised as Russian until they were bargained away to Japan in 1875 in exchange for Japanese recognition of Russian claims to Sakhalin.<sup>5</sup>

(b) Finland and the Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania and Esthonia) were all part of Czarist Russia. In 1917 the workers and peasants in these regions established Soviets which were overthrown only because of intervention in 1917-19 by German and Allied forces. These states became a part of the "cordon sanitaire" erected around the Soviet Union after 1919, the purpose of which was to provide barriers against the extension of Soviet influence in Europe and to provide bases for conspiracy and attack on the Soviet Union. Despite the anti-Soviet nature of the regimes in these States the Soviet recognised them and entered into non-aggression pacts with them. No attempt to revise this situation was made until the eve of the Second World War, after the failure of the Western Powers to join the Soviet Union in a military guarantee of the East European State system. These circumstances made a strengthening of Soviet defences essential. The 1939 Finnish frontier came within 25 miles of Leningrad. The frontier established in 1940 and maintained in 1945 has placed the frontier some miles to the westward, taking Leningrad out of artillery range from the border.

In September, 1939, Latvia, Lithuania and Esthonia granted the Soviet the right to certain air and naval bases on their territories. As Sir Stafford Cripps recognised at the time,

"To protect Leningrad it is essential that the Russians should control the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Coast. It is also necessary that there should not exist small States close to the vital points of Soviet industry which can be made use of by hostile Powers as a base for attack." (6) The incorporation of the three Baltic States into the U.S.S.R. was carried out in August, 1940. This followed requests for incorporation which came from the national Parliaments of the three States. These Parliaments had been elected in July, 1940, on the basis of secret ballot and adult suffrage, with between 90 and 95 per cent. of the people voting.<sup>7</sup> In 1945 a part of the Southern Baltic Coast, from the mouth of the Niemen and the Kurisches Haff to the Frisches Haff, was incorporated in the Soviet Union. This was former German territory to which the Soviet had no real claim on ethnic grounds but which was

essential to the defence of the Soviet Baltic States. Similarly in the East, no one would seriously dispute that control over Sakhalin and the Kuriles is essential to the defence of Vladivostok and Siberia.

### **Soviet Foreign Policy does not represent a return to Czarist Imperialism:**

The charge is often made that Soviet foreign policy, especially over the past twenty years, represents a return to Czarist policy. Thus P. Sorokin in his "Russia and the U.S.A.", states that,

"Since the middle of the thirties the foreign policy of Stalin has been merely a continuation of the foreign policy pursued by the Czarist regime during the period of its vigour." (8)

The "evidence" for such a charge consists of such items as these:—

(a) The Soviet has resumed its imperialist thrust in Central Asia and the Far East.

(b) The Soviet has resumed the drive for "warm sea ports" in Europe and has re-asserted its control over European territory lost to Russia in 1917-21.

(c) The Soviet has used Pan-Slavism in a similar fashion to the Czars, i.e., as a weapon of Russian territorial and political expansion.

Let us examine each of these assertions.

#### **(a) Soviet expansion in Asia**

It is certainly true that the Soviet wields a far greater influence over Asia than Czarist Russia ever exercised. But the key to this is not, in the first instance, Soviet military power or expansionist politics, but the fact that since November, 1917, Russia has demonstrated the road to emancipation from feudalism and imperialism. Because of this successful Revolution, Asian leaders have come to consider the Soviet Union as an inspiration, to some extent a model, and generally a friend to be trusted. This sense of friendship and alliance between the peoples of Asia and the Soviet Union was expressed very clearly in a letter written by Sun Yat-sen, shortly before his death in 1925:

"The day will soon dawn when the Soviet Union will welcome a strong and independent China as friend and ally, and in the great war for freedom of the oppressed nations of the world, these two nations will march forward hand in hand to win victory." (9)

Stalin made a correct appraisal of this attitude of Asia towards the Soviet Union when he stated in 1923 (to the 12th Congress of the Russian Communist Party) that ". . . the entire Orient regards our Union as an experimental field," and that, if the Soviet Union succeeded in solving the national question, then,



"the entire Orient will see that in our federation it possesses a banner of liberation, a vanguard in whose footsteps it should walk, and this will be the beginning of the collapse of world imperialism." (10)

Many examples could be quoted from Asian leaders of all shades of political opinion to prove the accuracy of this statement—amongst Indians one finds that Gandhi, Nehru, Tagore and others have acknowledged their indebtedness to the Soviet Union; amongst Chinese Sun Yat-sen, Lu Hsun, Mao Tse-tung and many others. Thus Rabindranath Tagore, Indian poet, philosopher and educationalist, wrote in his "Letters from Russia",

"The royal road to the solution of all our problems is education. The bulk of human society has so far been deprived of full opportunities for education: in India well-nigh completely so. It is astonishing to watch the extraordinary vigour with which education spreads throughout Russian society. The measure of education is not merely the number involved, but its thoroughness; its intensity. What abundant preparation, what tremendous effort, so that no one should remain helpless or idle! Not in European Russia alone, but in all the semi-civilised races of Central Asia, they have opened the floodgates of education. There is no limit to the effort made to bring the latest fruits of science to them. The theatres are crowded to overflowing, but those who come to them are peasants and workers. Nowhere are they humiliated . . ." (11)

The objective fact of the November Revolution, quite apart from the actual policies followed by the Soviet leaders towards their Asian neighbours, explains the rising influence of the Soviet Union in Asia. But it also results from the recognition by Asians of the essential difference between Soviet policy in Asia and Czarist policy. Nehru's present policy is clear witness to this fact, as was Sun-Yat-sen's a generation ago. The Soviet has demonstrated its renunciation of Czarist policy by these acts:—

- The renunciation of all economic and political concessions in Asia, outside of Soviet territory. For example, Russian claims to North Persia as a "sphere of influence", claims which Britain recognised in 1907, were renounced by the Soviet Government in 1918 and have not been revived.

- The Soviet Government has not revived the Czarist claims to Tibet, Sinkiang, and Mongolia, as Russian "spheres of influence".

- The Soviet has given up its claims to the East Chinese Railway, although it was Russian-built.

- The Soviet has not sought to claim any right to "police" the East Chinese Railway, as, for example, Britain has with the Suez, and the United States has with the Panama Canal.

- Czarist claims to supervise North Chinese customs and to exercise extraterritorial rights in China were given up by the Soviet Union immediately following the Revolution, and they

have not been revived. In contrast, similar American claims were not given up until 1946.

The Soviet has shown its friendship towards China by such acts as —

- Assistance to the Chinese Revolution during 1923-25.
- Economic and military assistance to China from 1931-40.
- Treaties of friendship, 1945 and 1950.
- The loan of Soviet technicians and other experts to help China in her present reconstruction. Of this current assistance, Soong Ching-ling (Madame Sun Yat-sen) has written:—

"Among the very first arrivals in China from the Soviet Union were railway technicians. They worked at the complicated questions and rendered support that put the restoration of our rail system months ahead of schedule. They came without benefit of fanfare. They did their job and not one single thing was asked in return.

"Likewise, this past summer, the Northwestern provinces of China suffered an epidemic of the plague. We did not have enough doctors and technicians to stem this dangerous disease, so we called on our great neighbor. They came, they gave their help and when they were finished, they went home. There were not even thoughts of repayment or concessions to be sought. They did not ask the right to do anything, except to serve the Chinese people." (12)

#### **(b) The Drive for Warm-water Ports**

As a result of World War II the Soviet Union has secured an Atlantic Port (Pechenga), has extended its frontage on the Black Sea, and in the East has secured limited rights to the use of Pt. Arthur. This seems like some evidence in support of the contention that the Soviet is pursuing a drive for warm-water ports. However, it is doubtful if any of these acquisitions can be explained primarily in terms of the desire of the Soviet for easier trade outlets. The rights to Pt. Arthur were clearly required to enable the Soviet to move its forces against Japan. The present rights are primarily military, not economic, and will expire at the end of 1952. As for Soviet policy in relation to the Black Sea, it is designed to establish the control of the sea by the Powers with a Black Sea frontage, namely the U.S.S.R. and Turkey. This policy of "regional control" has been applied by the Soviet to the Danube also. In both cases Soviet policy demands the revision of existing "international" control. Indeed, it is impossible to concede that there is any basic justice in the pre-1939 control over both the Black Sea and the Danube, which permitted Britain, France and the U.S. to a share in the control of these regions.

#### **(c) The Revival of Pan-Slavism**

There is no denying that there was a remarkable revival of Pan-Slavism during the war years, 1941-45. But this was essentially a reaction to the Nazi attempt to eradicate Slav

cultures. The Soviet offensive against the Nazis in 1943-45 certainly gained strength from its recognition and encouragement of the feeling of Pan-Slavism.

However, modern Pan-Slavism differs radically from Czarist Pan-Slavism.

- It has not been used to justify Russian territorial or economic expansion.

- It has not been used to undermine the national consciousness of separate Balkan nationalities. On the contrary, there has been a remarkable resurgence of Czech, Polish, Bulgarian and Yugoslav nationalism during recent years.

The recent revival of Pan-Slavism may be regarded as based on these factors:—

- The common struggle during 1941-45 against Nazism and the struggle since 1945 against any revival of Nazism.

- The restoration of natural close relations between East European and Soviet Slav peoples, relations which had been artificially broken through the policy of the "cordon sanitaire" maintained against Russia after 1919.

- The recognition by the Eastern European Slavs that the Soviet Union is willing and able to assist them to raise their economic, educational and cultural level.

### **Soviet "Satellites"**

It is frequently asserted that all countries bordering the Soviet to the West, with the exceptions of Finland, Yugoslavia and Turkey, are Soviet satellites. The same argument is used in discussing Sino-Soviet relations. The best answer to the allegation that the Soviet Union seeks to dominate, if not to dismember, all her neighbours is to examine the record of Soviet relations with surrounding countries since 1917. Soviet relations with China, Poland, and Czechoslovakia will be briefly examined as typical of Soviet policy in relation to a large, to a medium sized, and to a small neighbour.

#### **(a) Sino-Soviet Relations**

The Czarist Government regarded China as a colonial country and consequently followed a course of aggression, territorial acquisition, demands for bases, concessions, etc., towards China. Soviet policy is fundamentally different. Its starting points have been the acceptance of the right of the Chinese people to self-determination and the renunciation of Czarist imperialist claims. This is clear from the record.

- The Soviet recognised the Sun Yat-sen Government and



gave it considerable material assistance, especially over the period 1923-25.

- The Soviet recognised the Kuomintang Government as the legitimate government of China right up to late 1949, i.e. until its decisive defeat by the People's Liberation Army. During the whole of this period, 1927-49, when the Kuomintang forces were usually directed against the Chinese Communists, the Soviet Government gave no material assistance to the latter. On the other hand the Soviet Union was the main source of outside assistance for the Chinese Central Government, 1936-41, at a time when the Western Powers were appeasing Japan by such acts as the supply of scrap iron, petroleum, and closing the Burma Road.

- Chinese sovereignty was fully recognised by the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945. Under this treaty (which was concluded with the full approval of the U.S.), the Soviet Government secured certain temporary rights (for the use of Pt. Arthur base, transport of supplies over the East Chinese Railway, etc.), which were essential for the defeat of Japan, but she did not attempt to revive the special economic and legal privileges which the Czarist government had exercised in Northern China. It is worth noticing that the U.S. and Britain did not finally renounce their claims to supervise Chinese customs and to extraterritorially until 1946.<sup>13</sup>

- By the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February, 1950, the Soviet Government agreed to transfer to the People's Republic of China, all its rights to the joint administration of the Chinese-Changchun Railway, and to Darien and Pt. Arthur by the end of 1952, or immediately on the conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan. No compensation is to be paid to the Soviet in return for the surrender of these claims.<sup>14</sup>

- The Soviet has recognised Tibet and Sinkiang as Chinese territory. Inner Mongolia has also been recognised as Chinese territory, and no attempt has been made to incorporate Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian Peoples' Republic) into the U.S.S.R.

#### **(b) Polish-Soviet Relations**

Under Czarism, Poland was ruled as a Russian Province, under a Russian governor. In 1917 the Soviet State recognised the right of the Poles to independence. However, the Polish landowners were not satisfied with the Polish-speaking territories, and during 1919-20 they seized control of parts of the Western Ukraine. These territories were not recovered by the Soviet Union until 1939.

Despite its grievances against the Polish Government, the Soviet Government entered into a defensive pact with Poland in 1929<sup>15</sup> which was not denounced by the Soviet Union until

1938, after Poland had broken the terms of the Pact by grabbing a part of Czech territory.

The Soviet military occupation of Poland in September, 1939, was not, strictly speaking, an invasion. It occurred only after the German wehrmacht had defeated the Polish army and the Polish Government had fled abroad. The Soviet army was welcomed by the Ukrainian and Byelorussian peasants in Eastern Poland not merely as their defenders against the Nazi threat but as their liberators from Polish oppression.

By an agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the Polish Government in exile, July 30, 1941, the Soviet agreed to the creation of a Polish Army on U.S.S.R. territory, to be controlled by a Polish commander. By the same agreement amnesty was granted to all Polish prisoners in the U.S.S.R.<sup>16</sup> During late 1941 the Soviet Government assisted General Anders to form his Polish Army, which was permitted to leave in order to fight in the West, during 1942. Other Poles who stayed on in Russia were formed into a Polish Army, under Polish officers, which fought alongside the Red Army during the liberation of Poland (1943-44).

The Soviet Government encouraged the formation of the free Polish Government during 1943-45. When the Polish underground formed the National Council of Poland (December 31, 1943), the Soviet was the first of the Allied Powers to give it recognition and assistance. The advance of the Red Army enabled this underground government to come out into the open as the Polish Committee of National Liberation (the Lublin Government) on July 22, 1944. This Committee later was broadened into the Provisional Warsaw Government. This Provisional Cabinet, which commenced to function at the end of 1944, included leaders of the Peasant Party, the Socialist Party, the Communist Party and the Democratic Party. At the Yalta Conference (February, 1945) the Western Allies recognised the Warsaw Committee as the basis for a broader Polish government which was to include representatives of the London group. Despite this, both Britain and the U.S.A. opposed the seating of representatives of the Polish Government at the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations in April, 1945.<sup>17</sup>

Since 1945 the friendship of the Soviet Government towards the new Polish State has been demonstrated in these ways:—

- By guarantee of the new Polish frontier in the West (the Oder-Nyasa Line).
- By speedy withdrawal of the Red Army from Poland. Since 1946 the only Red Army men in Poland have been along the direct lines of communication with the Soviet zone of Germany.

• By generous economic assistance. Thus under the terms of the agreement of August, 1945, Poland was to get 15 per cent. of all reparations received by the U.S.S.R. from Germany.<sup>18</sup> Two trade agreements were signed between Poland and the U.S.S.R. in 1945, a third in April, 1946, and a fourth in March, 1947. All these provided for the exchange of definite quantities of commodities between the two countries. In return for coal, coke, textiles, sugar, iron and steel products, and cement, exported to the Soviet Union, Poland received iron and manganese, cellulose, raw cotton, petroleum, hides, agricultural equipment, grain and fodder. The agreement of March, 1947, provided Poland with a \$29 million loan, interest-free, for the purchase of overseas goods, chiefly from the United States. Later, trade pacts were signed in May, 1948, January, 1949, and in 1950.<sup>19</sup>

### (c) Soviet-Czech Relations

When the Western capitalist Powers betrayed the Czech Republic to the Nazis at Munich (September, 1938), the Soviet Government kept faith. Only the Soviet offered military assistance against Germany during 1938-39.

Czechoslovakia was liberated by the Red Army during 1944-45, after very bitter fighting in which many thousands of Soviet soldiers lost their lives. Soviet troops evacuated Czechoslovakia in 1946.

Since 1945, the friendliest relations have existed between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

• The defence of Czechoslovakia is covered by the Mutual Defence Pact between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union against a revival of German aggression.

• Many valuable cultural exchanges have occurred since the war, bringing Soviet ballet, opera, scientists, scholars, and technicians to Czechoslovakia, and Czech cultural groups to the Soviet Union.

• The Soviet has rendered valuable economic assistance to Czechoslovakia. Thus, during the Czech famine in 1947 the Soviet Union increased its grain deliveries by 200,000 tons (that is, by one-third) and speeded up deliveries.<sup>20</sup>

Thus Soviet policy towards Czechoslovakia was one of friendly assistance when it was a bourgeois State, just as it is today when it is a New Democracy with its course set towards Socialism.



## What Happened in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948?

The common view in Western countries of the February Crisis is that it was some sort of Russian-directed Communist plot which destroyed parliamentary government and established a police state. Thus Joseph C. Harsch, of the Boston *Christian Science Monitor*, has written,

"The Czechs did not feel the hand of Moscow directly in their internal affairs until the Spring of 1948. But long before that time the Czechs, under a government of their own choosing, which was conservative by Czech political standards, prepared a social revolution quite as drastic as the one which has taken place in Britain, and quite as complete as those decreed under Communists in other countries. It was not Moscow which imposed it on Czechoslovakia, but the Czechs themselves." (21)

and again,

"The only new element which Moscow imposed on Czechoslovakia was the apparatus of the police state and rigid control of the economy of the country to the advantage of the Russian state treasury and the Russian consumer." (22)

From the first quotation it would seem that Harsch is unaware that the pre-February Czech Government ("Conservative by Czech standards") was headed by the Communist Party, which at the elections of 1946 had secured 39 per cent. of the total vote of the nation, and the largest bloc of seats in Parliament. Nor is it possible to gain from these statements by Harsch any indication of the fact that the Government which followed the February crisis was a coalition government which included all of the Political Parties represented in the earlier coalition.

In order to understand what happened in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948, it will be necessary to make a brief examination of the events which led up to the crisis, as well as to consider the events of the crisis itself. The Government which had ruled Czechoslovakia since early 1946 was a coalition government (the National Front) which included representatives of the Communist Parties of the Czechs and the Slovaks, representatives of the Social-Democratic Party, the Catholic People's Party, the Slovak Democrat Party, and the National Socialist Party. All Parties and their Parliamentary representatives were pledged to the implementation of the Kosice Programme (1944),<sup>23</sup> involving the nationalisation of all key industries, banking and insurance; land reform; the purging of all traitors and collaborators; the transference of the German and Hungarian minorities; and the democratization of the army and civil service, and the police. During the latter part of 1947 it became obvious that the right-wing elements in the non-Communist Parties were going back on the common programme. For example, the law courts slowed down and frustrated the purging of Nazi collaborators,

right wing members of Parliament suggested that foreign monopolies should be permitted to hold up to 49 per cent. of the stock in the nationalised industries, and there was bitter criticism of the development of SNB, the new Czech Security Police. The significance of the latter criticism came out early in 1948 when the Government unearthed definite plans on the part of the reactionaries to provoke a Cabinet crisis and accompany it with an armed uprising. The mobilisation of U.S. Forces on the Bavarian frontier was taken as a favourable sign indicating the willingness of the U.S. to intervene if necessary "to preserve order and democracy". The reactionaries were hopeful of splitting the Socialist Party and using a section of it to form a "third Force" Government which would exclude the Communists from the Government (as had been done in France the same year, 1947). The Brno Congress of the Social-Democrats (October, 1947) which resulted in the election of a right-wing chairman, seemed to have established the basis for this manoeuvre.

In February, 1948, the right-wing Cabinet members opened up an attack on the policy being followed by the Communist Minister for the Interior, Nosek. They refused to go on with the urgent Cabinet business of the implementation of the new Constitution, the Land Law, National Insurance, and increased salaries for Civil Servants, all of which were essential parts of the programme on which the government was elected. Finally, on Friday evening, February 20, the Cabinet members from the National Socialist Party, the Catholic People's Party, and the Slovak Democrat Party, resigned. They sought to precipitate a general election. The Communists (who headed the Government) and the Social-Democrats advised the President against an immediate election in view of the need to carry through important parts of the Kosice programme. Constitutionally, the Communists and the Social-Democrats, who between them had over 51 per cent. of the national vote in 1946, could have formed a Socialist Government, but neither Party was anxious to narrow down the coalition to this.<sup>24</sup> On Friday evening, following the resignations of the right-wing Cabinet members, Premier Gottwald announced a public meeting for the following day. This meeting, on February 21, was attended by over 300,000 persons, and it gave a unanimous endorsement to the Government's request for no immediate election but a re-constitution of the Cabinet. It was addressed by leaders of the Social-Democrats and by some progressive leaders from the Parties which had withdrawn from the Government, as well as by Communists. On the Sunday, February 22, a Congress of Works' and Employees' delegates carried similar resolutions by a majority of 7,000 to 10. This Congress also demanded the

re-affirmation of the Kosice programme and its further development so that all enterprises employing over 50 would be nationalised.<sup>25</sup> Finally, the Congress called for a one-hour general strike on the following day.

On Monday, February 23, all workers in Czechoslovakia stopped work. No action gave such a clear demonstration of the unity of the workers behind the Government than this universal stoppage. President Benes recognised this popular demand when, on February 25, he agreed to the re-constitution of the Cabinet, leaving out those who had resigned. The new National Government of 24 included 12 Communists, 4 Social-Democrats, 2 People's Party, 2 National Socialist Party, 1 Slovak Freedom Party, 1 Slovak Democratic Party, and 2 non-Party persons.<sup>26</sup> Included in the Government were Jan Masaryk and Father Plojhar, the latter a Catholic priest and a representative of the People's Party.

The correct interpretation of these events was given by Mr. John Platts Mills, British Labour M.P. for Finsbury, in a broadcast over the Prague Radio shortly after the crisis:

"I don't understand how this can be described as a violent seizure of power by the Communists . . ."

"What has really happened is that the right wing of every party in the Government, what I call the backward section, has been ousted and the progressive section of each party has come into power. This has come about, with one exception . . . ((27) . . . without a single shot being fired, in a country latterly occupied by the Nazis, where there are arms officially available in every factory, and in private hands as well, and where there are many people who are known to have collaborated with the enemy."

"This is how I analyse the whole scene. The right wing of all the parties has been terrified by the increase in the Communist Party membership and its prestige. There is no doubt of this having happened, and it is vouched for by all my Social Democrat colleagues that I spoke to. The right wing are scared of the advance towards socialism. They expected that by their resignation they would force the President to support them; they expected the backing of the United States. There is ample evidence of that, which I would gladly develop if there were time. Their one chance was to put the Communist Party and the Socialist Party in the position of appearing to be anti-Benes parties, and then forcing immediate elections. This naive and ingenuous manoeuvre deceived nobody and it hopelessly miscarried. The result has been a consolidating of the power of the working people against the great business men. (28) It ends finally the possibility of a foreign intervention in Czechoslovak affairs and it leaves the new Government determined to carry on and complete the existing programme. In short, to do precisely what the Ministers who have just resigned were pledged themselves to do but latterly have refused to do." (29)

This account by a British Labour M.P. of the February crisis tallies with that given by Gerald Peel, Australian Communist, who was in Czechoslovakia at the time.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, it agrees with the explanation given by the Czech Foreign



Minister, Jan Masaryk, to the Paris newspaper *L'Orate*.<sup>31</sup> In reply to the question, "How did the Crisis Arise?", Masaryk answered,

"There were people in this country who thought it was possible to govern without the Communists or against them. I have always passionately opposed this idea. The crisis was precipitated by the resignation of the members of three parties of the National Front."<sup>31</sup> Substantially the same viewpoint is expressed by the non-Communist British authority on Eastern Europe, Dr. Doreen Warriner:

"In the Western press, the crisis was reported as a Communist 'coup', an unconstitutional seizure of power. Yet on constitutional principles it was undoubtedly correct; the right wing ministers had resigned of their own volition. The turning point was the mass demonstrations of the workers, which convinced President Benes that the resignations must be accepted. The workers' demonstrations, though well-disciplined, were genuine, for the Czech working class had looked forward to this 'turning point for a generation.'<sup>32</sup>

In all this crisis, Moscow "intervention" was limited to editorial comment in the Soviet press, none of which contained a word of instruction to the Czechs. Nor did President Benes ever mention any Soviet pressure.<sup>33</sup> In fact, the story of Soviet intervention was a clumsy fabrication which was invented by the Western Powers and which they themselves assuredly did not believe. Had the reactionaries succeeded it is most unlikely that the Soviet would have interfered. For some weeks after the February crisis the Communists were removed from the government and administration of Finland, and at this time Russian military forces were occupying parts of Finland. But Moscow made no move in the Finnish crisis. In fact, if one examines the "repeated instances" of Moscow intervention since 1945 in the affairs of other peoples, in Persia, China, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Korea, etc., months of searching will discover no worthwhile evidence to substantiate the charges. Clearly, one of the chief purposes of such assertions is to excuse the open British and American intervention in the affairs of such States as Turkey, Greece, France, Italy and South Korea.<sup>34</sup>

### **Soviet Economic Policy:**

It is sometimes argued that even if the Soviet is not an imperialist Power that she has, nevertheless, for strategic and other reasons, sought to impose unfair economic agreements on surrounding countries. This is to equate Soviet economic policy with the economic policy of capitalist States, an obviously incorrect equation.

The Soviet Government has certainly benefited from its trade with surrounding countries, and no doubt this trade has eased its post-war reconstruction in certain respects. Trade has

also strengthened the political association of the Soviet Union with surrounding countries. But the distinguishing feature of Soviet trade policy has been its reciprocity— if it has benefited the Soviet Union it has benefited still more the other countries. Nowhere has it, like Marshall Aid, produced the closing down of factories and unemployment. On the contrary it has been of major assistance to the New Democracies, and to some capitalist countries, in the building up of their industries and their food supply. This will become clear as we examine Soviet policy under the following headings—reparations, trade agreements, special economic assistance, credit, joint enterprises, and technical assistance.

### (a) Reparations

The Soviet has frequently been criticised for the amount of reparations it demanded from Germany and her Allies. But if one considers the amount of damage inflicted on the U.S.S.R. by Germany and her Allies Soviet reparations claims do not seem excessive. The Extraordinary State Commission for the U.S.S.R. on the Investigation of the Crimes of the German Invaders and their Allies on the Territory of the U.S.S.R., found in its report, 1945, as follows—

- 25 millions rendered homeless and 7½ millions killed.
- 1,710 cities and towns and 70,000 villages destroyed.
- 98,000 collective farms and 1,876 State farms destroyed.
- 31,850 industrial enterprises destroyed.
- 65,000 kilometres of railway track destroyed.
- 36,000 post and telegraph offices destroyed.
- 40,000 hospitals and medical institutes destroyed.
- 84,000 schools and other educational institutes destroyed.
- 43,000 public libraries destroyed.

The Commission estimated the damage at 679,000 million rubles, or more than twice the 1945 combined State Budget.<sup>35</sup>

In view of these facts, the reparations figures which the Soviet Government insisted on at the Paris Peace Conference, 1946, were surely moderate. Thus Rumanian reparations were fixed at \$300 million, one-fifth of the estimated damage caused by Rumanian troops on the Soviet Union: Finland and Hungary were given similar assessments. Both countries have managed to pay these amounts without in any way crippling their economic systems.<sup>36</sup> Failing agreement with the Western Powers the Soviet Union finally (in 1948) made an independent assessment for East Germany of \$10 billion. By May, 1950, one-third of this had been paid, and on the request of the East German Government that the debt be reconsidered, the Soviet halved the balance owing.

Nor is it true that the Soviet stripped Eastern Europe and Manchuria of all valuable industrial equipment in 1945-46. In actual fact, many plants were left, the reparations coming from current production. This occurred in East Germany, Austria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland. The only industrial equipment the Soviet removed from Manchuria in 1945 was that belonging to the Japanese.<sup>37</sup> It should be remembered in this connection that the chief purpose of this industry was to provide the Japanese Army with an economic base from which to attack Siberia. Moreover, the Soviet Government restored to China during 1950 all former Japanese assets seized in Manchuria. No compensation was asked.<sup>38</sup>

### (b) Trade Agreements

Some reference has already been made to trade agreements between the Soviet Union and the New Democracies, so very little need be said here. The agreements have been basically the same for all countries, i.e., bi-lateral agreements in which the governments of the countries concerned pledge themselves to exchange definite quantities of goods over a stated period. Thus, under the Soviet-Rumanian Trade Agreement of February 17, 1950, the Soviet Union will deliver to Rumania cotton, metal, iron ore, coke, industrial equipment, motor vehicles, agricultural machinery and other goods. Rumania will deliver to the Soviet Union oil products, timber, freight wagons, chemicals, meat products, and other goods. Under the Soviet-Czechoslovak Trade Agreement of February 24, 1950, the Soviet contracted to deliver to Czechoslovakia grain, raw cotton, wool, iron and manganese, ferrous alloys, non-ferrous metals, oil products, industrial equipment and other goods. Czechoslovakia contracted to supply the Soviet Union with pipes, rails, cables, locomotives, industrial and power equipment, sugar, footwear, textiles and other goods.<sup>39</sup> Under a trade agreement with Czechoslovakia, signed in April, 1951, the Soviet Union agreed to supply 600,000 tons of bread and grain to Czechoslovakia before the 1951 harvest, and feeding stuffs amounting to hundreds of thousands of tons. Other goods to be supplied included chemical raw materials, medicines, high quality seeds, fertilizers, and precious metals. According to a press release by the Czech Minister of Foreign Trade, Mr. Gregor,

"If we were to buy only part of these goods in capitalist countries we would have to export much greater quantities of our commodities and thus deprive our home market of them." (40)

Such agreements help all countries concerned, they do not upset the economic plans of individual countries.

It is perhaps worth adding that bilateral trading agreements



of this sort are not confined to the new Democracies. During 1947 the Soviet Government was negotiating for a similar trade agreement with the United Kingdom. Under this agreement Britain would have gained 1,000,000 tons of grain from the 1947 Soviet harvest; 1,500,000 tons from the 1948 harvest; and 2,000,000 tons annually in 1949 and 1950. The Soviet also agreed to supply 2,030,000 cases of tinned salmon and crab annually, 1947-50; and 53,000 standards of timber in 1947, with a substantial increase in following years. In return the Soviet Government wanted Britain to guarantee the supply of stated quantities of iron rails (to help mechanise the lumber industry) and pipes for the Soviet oil industry. It was largely because of the refusal of Britain, under U.S. pressure, to guarantee these materials that the talks broke down.<sup>41</sup>

### (c) Special Economic Assistance

The Soviet has proved herself very ready to supplement her agreements in times of emergency. Thus, in September, 1947, in order to offset the famine in Eastern Europe, the Soviet speeded up its grain deliveries to several countries and also increased their allocations. Poland was given an extra 300,000 tons;<sup>42</sup> Czechoslovakia an additional 200,000 tons.

In May, 1946, the Soviet Government waived its claim to 100,000 tons of wheat and 44,000 tons of maize due from Rumania as reparations and loaned Rumania 100,000 tons of grain.<sup>43</sup> This concession was made to help Rumania over a drought, although the Soviet Ukraine suffered severely from drought in 1946.

### (d) Credit

The Soviet has provided generous credit to assist the economic recovery of the New Democracies. In July, 1947, the Soviet granted a loan to Yugoslavia for the supply on credit of industrial equipment for the ferrous and non-ferrous metal industries, oil, chemical and timber industries necessary for Yugoslavia in connection with Yugoslavia's Five Year Plan.<sup>44</sup> In August, 1947, the Soviet Union signed an agreement with Bulgaria which provided for the supply to Bulgaria of a mineral fertilizer plant, a power station, and a coal-coking plant, all on credit.<sup>45</sup> In December, 1947, the Soviet granted Czechoslovakia a short-term loan of 1,150 million Kcs. (about \$3 million), to be paid off in goods during 1949 and 1950.<sup>46</sup> In January, 1948, the Soviet granted Poland a 10-year credit of \$450 million for the purchase of industrial equipment and raw materials, to be paid back in goods at 3 per cent. interest.<sup>47</sup> This followed a \$29 million interest-free gold loan granted the

previous year. In February, 1950, the Soviet granted China \$300 million for the purchase of industrial equipment from the Soviet Union. Interest was fixed at 1 per cent. and repayment was to cover ten years, 1951-63.<sup>48</sup>

### (e) Joint-Enterprises

Some commentators have seen in the various joint-companies established by the Soviet Union since 1945 a clear proof that the Soviet is seeking to exploit foreign resources by means of monopoly companies. But a closer examination of these enterprises reveals important differences between these economic concessions and the economic concessions sought and exercised by capitalist combines.

- The Soviet has not sought an actual economic control. In most cases the Soviet has agreed to supply 50 per cent. of the share capital, in some cases it has been less. Management is proportionate to capital ownership.

- Concessions have generally been short term. Thus the projected Soviet-Iranian Oil Company (1946) was for 50 years, after which the Iranian Government was to be given the option of buying up the entire assets.<sup>49</sup> Under the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 the joint-Soviet-Chinese administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway (the Changchun Railway) was limited to 30 years. Under the 1950 treaty the railway is to be transferred, without compensation, to Chinese control not later than the end of 1952.

- Under none of these joint-company agreements has the Soviet the right to maintain police or troops to protect the property. The terms of the Soviet-Iranian oil agreement provided explicitly for Persian policing of the company's property. This might be contrasted with the concessions exercised by the Anglo-Iranian Petroleum Co.

- In most cases the joint companies established in eastern Europe (in Hungary, Rumania, and, until 1949, Yugoslavia), have covered former German assets due to the Soviet as reparations but which, for fairly obvious reasons, were difficult to shift. Thus the joint company seemed the natural way for the Meszhart (Hungarian-Soviet River Transportation Co.), and Soviet to draw her reparations. On this basis, for example, were established Malaj (Hungarian-Soviet Petroleum Co.), and Sovromtransport (Soviet-Rumanian Transport Co.), and Tars (Soviet-Rumanian Civil Aviation Co.).

## (f) Technical Assistance

Most of the agreements covering the setting up of joint-companies, as described in the previous section, have contained sections dealing with the supply of Soviet technicians. Thus Soviet oil-engineers, agricultural and transport experts have been made available to the governments of the New Democracies. In the case of China, the restoration of the Chinese railway system was greatly facilitated by the assistance of Soviet experts. The Soviet Union, during 1949, sent more than 200 engineers and other scientists to assist in the reconstruction of North China. In all cases they worked under the direction of the Chinese Government and were paid according to Chinese standards, which are much below those of the Soviet Union.<sup>50</sup>

From this detailed examination of Soviet economic policy towards the New Democracies only one conclusion can be drawn, namely, that the Soviet has not merely followed her own economic interests but that she has given and continues to give what Mao Tse-tung has described as "genuine friendly aid."

### The "Rape of Finland":

Even now one often hears the Finnish War of 1939-40 quoted as evidence of Russian imperialism. This has been particularly noticeable since the U.S. State Department published in January, 1948, its document collection on "Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941".

What, then, are the facts of this war?

In October, 1939, a month after the German attack on Poland, the Soviet Government began to negotiate with the Finnish Government in order to strengthen her defences against a German attack. The main points of the Soviet proposals were these:—

(a) That the Soviet-Finnish frontier, then only 20 miles from Leningrad, should be moved back some miles to place Leningrad out of range of artillery fire from Finnish territory.

(b) The port of Hangoe, guarding the entrance to the Gulf of Finland and Leningrad, to be leased to Russia as a naval base and garrison for a fixed number of troops.

(c) Control of certain small islands near Leningrad and the Fisherman's Peninsula, which guards the narrow ice-free channel to the key Soviet port of Murmansk, just as Gibraltar guards the approach to the Mediterranean.

(d) In return Russia offered compensation to Finland with a grant of territory in Soviet Karelia twice as large as the areas demanded for Russian security.



(e) Russia offered a mutual assistance pact with Finland and increased trade between the two countries.<sup>51</sup>

These proposals were made because the Soviet Union feared that Finland would be used as a base for an attack against Russia. At that time Finland was under the Mannerheim dictatorship, which made no secret of its hostility towards Russia and of its sympathy towards Nazi Germany. Furthermore, it was known that the Mannerheim Line had been constructed with the help of German military engineers.

In view of the situation in October, 1939, and the obvious threat to the Soviet Union implied in the German push eastwards, the Soviet demands on the Finns were quite moderate. In fact, the Finnish Prime Minister, immediately after the Soviet proposals were made, stated that they "did not affect the integrity of Finland".<sup>52</sup> However, within a month a deadlock was reached over the leasing of Hangoe as a naval base. It is significant that the Finnish Parliament did not meet until a month after the fighting had commenced, and after the suppression of all newspapers which had supported the Soviet proposals. In all this the hand of Germany was clearly discernible.

The terms of the peace treaty made with Finland in March, 1940, are without parallel in modern history in their leniency towards a defeated power. Finland was forced to cede about 16,000 sq. miles of territory on the Karelian isthmus, territory essential for the defence of Leningrad. Finland also agreed to lease the port of Hangoe (guarding the sea approach to Leningrad) to the Soviet Union for a period of 30 years. For this concession the Soviet Government was to pay Finland 8 million Finnish marks annually. Otherwise, Finnish independence was guaranteed, and the Soviet waived all claims for reparations against Finland.<sup>53</sup>

An American Army pamphlet, published in 1945, justifies in no uncertain terms the policy followed by the Soviet Union at this time:

"The ultimate military consequences are the best evidence of whether the U.S.S.R.'s 1939 attack on Finland and subsequent over-running of the Baltic Provinces were barehanded aggressions, motivated by greed for territory, or were done to strengthen the U.S.S.R.'s western frontier against attack by Germany. The possession of this buffer territory did greatly facilitate the U.S.S.R.'s defence when the attack duly fell. Without attempting any moral judgments on the matter, it is enough to state the military fact that had the U.S.S.R. not acted so, the Allied cause would be weaker today." (54)

During 1940 the German High Command made an agreement with the Finns (September 12) which permitted German troops to move through Finland in their attack on the Soviet Union. In the following months detailed plans for German-Finnish

co-operation were worked out, and on July 10, 1941, the Order of the Day issued by the Finnish Army Command declared "Before us looms a greater Finland."<sup>55</sup> A few days later the Finnish forces supported the German attack on the Soviet Union.

The 1940 boundaries between the Soviet Union and Finland were restored in 1946 with slight modifications favouring the Soviet Union, the most important being the inclusion of the Pechanga district within the Soviet Union. In view of the damage inflicted by the Finns on the Soviet during 1941-4, the reparations payment of \$300 million to be paid over five years (later extended to seven years) must be considered moderate and in no way excessive.

### **The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia:**

The usual interpretation of Soviet-Yugoslav relations which we read in the daily papers of the West is along these lines. After the war the Soviet Union sought to dominate Yugoslavia and to exploit her resources for the benefit of the Soviet Union. But the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party, who had become regular patriots through their leadership of the national resistance to the Nazis, objected to being made subordinate to Moscow. They therefore asserted their independence and broke through the Iron Curtain in 1948. Since then the Soviet Union has tried every manner of threat, abuse and pressure to overthrow the Yugoslav Government. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union forced its condemnation of the Yugoslav Communist Party through the Cominform and thus isolated Yugoslavia in Eastern Europe. It followed this by inciting Yugoslavs to revolt and overthrow Tito. Soviet agents in Yugoslavia sought to wreck the Yugoslav State through sabotage and assassinations. When these methods failed to produce the desired results, the Soviet and her satellites imposed an economic blockade on Yugoslavia, making it difficult for her economy to survive. Further, the neighbouring satellites, Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, began to concentrate military forces along the Yugoslav frontier, threatening invasion. Such a course of events is offered as a clear proof of Soviet imperialism.<sup>56</sup>

A proper understanding of Soviet-Yugoslav relations since 1948 cannot be gained without an examination of the dispute between the Cominform and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia during that year. The main stages in the development of this dispute were as follows:—

(a) Between March and May, 1948, the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B) wrote a series of letters to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The criticisms

made by the C.P.S.U. (B) were denied by the Central Committee of the C.P.Y., so that, in conformity with the constitution and purpose of the Cominform, the C.P.S.U. (B) passed on its criticisms to the Cominform meeting late in June, 1948. Although this procedure had been followed with the earlier criticisms of the French and Italian Parties, and although the Yugoslav Party had taken part in these earlier criticisms, it refused to attend the Cominform meeting to answer the criticisms which it knew were to be made there.

(b) The Cominform, representing the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists), the Rumanian Workers' Party, the Hungarian Workers' Party, the Polish Workers' Party, the C.P.S.U., the Communist Party of France, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and the Communist Party of Italy, reached complete agreement with the C.P.S.U.(B) estimate of the situation in Yugoslavia and with its criticisms of the policies of the C.P.Y.<sup>57</sup> These criticisms were as follows:—

- The leadership of the C.P.Y. was accused of following an unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union and the C.P.S.U.(B). Soviet military and civilian experts (loaned to Yugoslavia under the terms of the 20-year treaty of friendship, mutual aid, and collaboration of April, 1945) had been defamed and kept under observation by the Yugoslav security police. Furthermore, anti-Soviet slanders were freely circulated amongst the top leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party.

- The C.P.Y. was accused of "breaking with the Marxist theory of classes and class struggle" by denying that there was a growth of capitalist elements in their country, and consequently a sharpening of the class struggle in the countryside. "The leaders of the Yugoslav Party were pursuing an incorrect policy in the countryside by ignoring the class differentiation in the countryside and by regarding the individual peasantry as a single entity, contrary to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of classes and class struggle . . ." <sup>58</sup> Furthermore, the Yugoslav leaders, by affirming that the peasantry was "the most stable foundation of the Yugoslav State" were taking up an un-Marxist attitude which could only lead towards the restoration of capitalism.

- The leaders of the C.P.Y. were accused of revising the Leninist teachings about the role of the Party as the main guiding and leading force in the country. In Yugoslavia the Peoples Front and not the Communist Party was considered the leading force. The Communist Party kept its activities secret and not continually before the eye of the public.

- The C.P.Y. was declared to be "bureaucratic" and its lack of self-criticism, elections, etc., represented a denial of "inner Party democracy" and a complete travesty of "democratic centralism".



• The C.P.Y. was censored for its un-Communist behaviour when faced with the friendly criticism of the C.P.S.U.(B). The Cominform Communiqué concluded by stating that:—

"the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia have placed themselves in opposition to the Communist Parties affiliated to the Information Bureau, and have taken the path of seceding from the united socialist front against imperialism, have taken the path of betraying the cause of international solidarity of the working people, and have taken up a position of nationalism . . ."  
and in view of this,

"the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has placed itself and the Yugoslav Party outside the family of the fraternal Communist Parties, outside the united Communist front and consequently outside the ranks of the Information Bureau . . ." (59)

The so-called "incitation to revolt" with which the Cominform resolution ended, reads mildly:

"The Information Bureau does not doubt that inside the Communist Party of Yugoslavia there are sufficient healthy elements, loyal to Marxism-Leninism, to the international traditions of the Yugoslav Communist Party and to the united socialist front.

"Their task is to compel the present leaders to recognise their mistakes openly and honestly and to rectify them; to break with nationalism, return to internationalism; and in every way to consolidate the united socialist front against imperialism.

"Should the present leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party prove incapable of doing this, their job is to replace them and to advance a new international leadership of the Party.

"The Information Bureau does not doubt that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia will be able to fulfil this honourable task." (60)

(c) A later meeting of the Cominform, in November, 1949, repeated these criticisms more emphatically when it declared:

"Recent developments have shown that the Yugoslav government is in a state of complete dependence on foreign imperialist circles and has become a tool of their aggressive policy, which has resulted in the liquidation of the sovereignty and independence of the Yugoslav Republic." (61)

The leaders of Yugoslavia were labelled as "an espionage group" and as "enemies of the working class and the peasantry, enemies of the peoples of Yugoslavia."<sup>62</sup> The resolution concluded by stating that:

"It is the duty of the Communist and Workers' Parties to assist in every way the Yugoslav working class and labouring peasantry who are struggling to bring back Yugoslavia to the camp of democracy and Socialism." (62)

(d) During the latter part of 1948 and throughout 1949 there was a steady deterioration in the economic and political relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and the other Peoples Democracies. In June, 1949, Czechoslovakia suspended all exports to Yugoslavia and Hungary denounced her trade agreement with Yugoslavia. In July, 1949, Poland, Bulgaria, and Rumania ordered a complete stoppage of exports. Trade between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia slumped during

1949, especially after the Soviet denunciation of the 1945 trade agreement on September 29, 1949.<sup>63</sup>

In assessing Soviet-Yugoslav relations it is essential to remember these points:

(a) There was nothing unusual in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union criticising the top leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party, for such mutual criticism had been one of the basic purposes of the Cominform from its establishment in 1947. Furthermore, it is not merely the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which has the right to initiate criticism. Since the end of World War II we have had the French Communist Party make basic criticisms of the Communist Party of the U.S.A., the Australian Communist Party criticise the British Communist Party, the Chinese Communist Party criticise the Japanese Communist Party. Within the Cominform itself, French and Italian Communist Parties had been subjected to severe criticism, the Yugoslav Communist Party being active in the criticism of the Italian Party. What was "unorthodox" in the Yugoslav dispute was the complete refusal of the Yugoslav leaders to accept any of the criticisms and even to attend the meeting of the Cominform at which the criticisms were originally discussed.

(b) In condemning the present leadership of the C.P.Y., the C.P.S.U.(B) and the Cominform have expressed their confidence in the ability of the Yugoslav workers and peasants to re-establish the C.P.Y. as a revolutionary socialist party. They have never hinted that an invasion by the Soviet Army or by any allied States would be a part of this process. In fact, Tito and other Yugoslav leaders have several times declared that they did not fear a Soviet invasion.<sup>64</sup>

(c) Although the deterioration in economic relations was perhaps bound to follow the political argument it is worth noting that Yugoslavia acted first in this matter. During the early part of 1948 there had been considerable criticism by the other New Democracies of the failure of Yugoslavia to deliver the goods promised under their trade agreements.

Towards the end of 1948 Tito switched exports of copper from the Soviet Union to the United States for the O.E.E.C. strategic stockpile. And yet it was a full year after this before the Soviet Government denounced its economic agreement with Yugoslavia. By the time this occurred Yugoslavia had expelled its Soviet advisers, carried on a fifteen months' campaign of unwarranted vilification of the Soviet Union, accepted American aid and diverted further materials promised the Soviet Union under its trade agreement to the U.S.<sup>65</sup>

(d) The Cominform charge (November, 1949) that the

"Yugoslav Government is in a state of complete dependence on foreign imperialist circles and has become a tool of their aggressive policy", is being proved truer every day. It is not even correct to assume that the orientation of Yugoslavia towards the Western imperialist Powers is the result of her exclusion from the Eastern European State system, for it began earlier. Even before the June, 1948, Cominform meeting, the United States had unfrozen Yugoslav gold in the United States, a treatment which was not accorded to any of the other East European States. But the full extent of Tito's connections with the United States and the British secret services did not come out until the trial of Lazzlo Rajk in Hungary (September, 1949), and of Traicho Kostov in Bulgaria (December, 1949), which trials showed that Tito's connections with the Western Powers went back to 1941 and earlier.<sup>66</sup>

Yugoslavia's growing dependence on the United States and Britain since 1948 is only too obvious. On September 8, 1949, the U.S. Export and Import Bank granted a loan of \$20 million, and in October, 1949, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (U.S. dominated) granted a loan of \$2.7 million. In December, 1949, a five-year trade agreement with Britain was concluded (providing for a total turnover of £110 million) and a long term credit agreement of £8 million was granted. By February, 1950, Yugoslavia had obtained \$36 million in loans from the West. In July, 1951, Britain and the United States agreed to extend further short term credits to Yugoslavia. Britain's share was announced as £10 million for the first year. The stated objective of this new 'aid' was to "strengthen Yugoslavia's resistance to pressure from Cominform States."<sup>67</sup>

The burden Yugoslavia is being forced to bear on account of these loans is enormous. Apart from political concessions, such as the closing of the Greek frontier and the abandonment of the Yugoslav claim to Trieste, the resources of Yugoslavia have been placed at the disposal of the Western Imperialists. The British loan was made conditional on Yugoslavia paying British capitalists £4,500,000 as compensation for the old investments in Yugoslavia. The prices which Yugoslavia gets for her food and raw materials exported to Britain under the current trade agreement are arbitrarily fixed to suit Britain and are often as low as 40 per cent. below domestic prices. The bulk of the output of Yugoslav copper, lead and zinc mines now goes to the United States.<sup>68</sup>

While complete information on the political concessions which Yugoslavia has made to the United States is not available, there is sufficient evidence to substantiate the charge made by the Cominform in November, 1949, that Yugoslavia had become "a

tool of their aggressive policy." Towards the end of 1950 President Truman urged immediate and vigorous support for the Tito regime. "This is required by the United States strategic and political interests in the area," he said, in a message to Congress. He then went on to disclose more specifically the motives for American assistance: "Tito controls the largest fighting force in Europe except the Soviet Union. . . . We plan to supply the foodstuffs in amounts equivalent to the immediate requirements of the Yugoslav armed forces."<sup>69</sup>

Yugoslav re-armament has proceeded rapidly since 1948, recently on the basis of American loans. The present strength of the Yugoslav Army is one million men, certainly excessive in a country with a population of sixteen millions. American equipment is increasing while American engineers have planned the expansion of Yugoslav airfields and the construction of military roads. It seems probable that Tito has ceded the right to use Yugoslavia's Adriatic Ports to the Americans.<sup>70</sup>

(e) While Tito still claims that he is establishing socialism in Yugoslavia, that only Yugoslavia is on the correct road to Communism, all the evidence suggests that the policies that were criticised in 1948 have been continued and, as predicted, have led away from socialism. The peasant co-operatives so much boasted of in Yugoslav propaganda statements, are dominated by the kulaks, the exploitation of the poorer peasants continues,<sup>71</sup> agricultural production targets are not realised. According to official data the Autumn 1949 sowing plan was carried out less than 50 per cent. in Croatia, only 50 per cent. in Serbia, and 30 per cent. in Macedonia, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina it was only 20 per cent. fulfilled. Even in Vojvodina, Yugoslavia's chief grain producing area, it was only 71 per cent. realized.<sup>72</sup> In the mines the exploitation of the workers has been intensified. In order to meet the demands of the British and American imperialists, the Government has been forced to increase output. But this has been done by driving the workers to harder effort rather than by mechanization of the mines. Discipline is maintained by removing discharged workers and their families from the food rationing system. Wages have fallen and accident rates are rising.<sup>73</sup> The latest sign of the restoration of capitalism in Yugoslavia is the liquidation of certain nationalised industries and the ending of the government monopoly of foreign trade.

The charge of political dictatorship has been demonstrated by the growing repression of Yugoslav workers, peasants, and intellectuals. Many have been executed, while thousands have been tortured and thrown into concentration camps. Consequently there is a growing stream of refugees from Yugoslavia to the neighboring New Democracies.<sup>74</sup>



In view of these considerations it is scarcely surprising that Soviet relations with Yugoslavia have deteriorated to the level of Soviet relations with Greece and Turkey. For the relations between a socialist state and a semi-fascist regime can scarcely be friendly and co-operative.

### **The "Menace" of Soviet Military Power**

When the United States commenced its post-war military expansion in 1947 she justified it on the grounds that the Red Army was a threat to her own security and to the security of her allies, and that while the United States had de-mobilized very rapidly after 1945, the Soviet Union had not. The argument has been used to justify every extension of American and British armament since that date. On February 17, 1951, the British Government sent a note to the Soviet Government which stated that after the War the Soviet Forces "remained far superior in numbers to those of all the Western Powers put together. At the same time they were busily engaged in rebuilding the forces of their allies, some of whom had formerly been the allies of the Nazis, in Eastern Europe, and maintained in Germany and Austria garrisons far in excess of those retained by the Western Powers."<sup>75</sup>

What are the facts about Soviet military strength?

#### **(a) Size of Soviet Forces**

At the end of the war the Soviet Union had over twelve million men mobilised and a higher proportion of them than was the case with any other great Power engaged in combat with the enemy. The demobilization of such a huge army could not be carried out overnight, but the need for manpower to reconstruct the factories, railways, farms and homes destroyed during the war was so urgent that the Soviet Government forced the pace of demobilization. Thirty-three age groups were rapidly demobilized.<sup>76</sup> Soviet troops stationed abroad were recalled, very often ahead of those of the Western Allies. Thus Soviet troops were withdrawn from North Persia in April, 1946, from North Korea in December, 1948. As for Eastern Europe, Soviet forces are confined to the garrisons in Eastern Germany and Austria, and along the direct lines of communication between these occupation areas and the Soviet Union. There is no worthwhile evidence in support of the charge in the British note that the Soviet is maintaining excessive garrisons in its occupation areas or that the Soviet Union is forcing the rearmament of Eastern Europe. There is, however, abundant material in the form of eye-witness accounts of Eastern Europe which support a contrary interpretation, namely, that the Soviet Army is conspicuous in

Eastern Europe by its absence, and that there are no signs of extensive military preparedness in Eastern Europe outside of Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia.<sup>77</sup>

There are no reliable Western estimates of the exact size of the Soviet military forces. But since the size of the Soviet Army is commonly advanced as a justification of rearmament in the West, we may be sure that Western estimates do not deliberately err on the side of under-estimation.

In view of these facts it is worth noting that Britain's Defence Minister, Mr. E. Shinwell, gave Soviet military strength as 2,800,000 in July 1950, and Soviet air strength as 19,000, including fighters and bombers.<sup>78</sup> The Soviet Government has not announced any exact figures of their present military strength, but in February 1951, Stalin stated that the strength of the combined forces of the U.S.S.R. was equal to that of 1939, which would place them at about 3 million.<sup>79</sup> As Stalin pointed out, the combined military strength of the main Atlantic Pact Powers, the United States, Britain, and France, is already over 5 million. Moreover, as has been frequently pointed out by Western military experts, the Soviet Union is lacking the weapons with which to launch an aggressive war, being deficient in heavy bombers and heavy ships. Even General MacArthur had to admit as much in his investigation by the United States Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee last May. General MacArthur declared that Russia was not in a position to "launch any predatory attack from the Asiatic continent," and that Russia's two Far Eastern Fleets would not be a match in quantity or quality for American naval forces. He furthermore admitted that the Soviet naval and submarine forces in the Pacific were "largely to prevent an amphibious thrust by us into their harbours."<sup>80</sup>

In its issue of December 15, 1950, the big business publication, *United States News and World Report*, reported that the United States Ambassador to Moscow, Admiral Kirk, had stated on his return to West Germany that there were in the Soviet Union "none of the signs of war that war experts watch for. . . ."

"For example, Soviet Army units are remaining at peace-time strength. No over-age classes are being called up. No extraordinary movement of troops or supplies have been detected."

"There is no drive in Russia to build bomb shelters or restrict civil consumption of critical materials. There is no shifting of labor away from peace-time to wartime industries."

#### **(b) Bases Abroad**

The only Soviet bases on non-Soviet territory are in Finland and North China (Pt. Arthur and Darien). The Soviet has not sought any remote bases during or since the Second World War. On the other hand the United States, by early 1949, had almost

500 military bases of one sort or another outside of U.S. territory.<sup>81</sup> These bases stretch from the Western Atlantic and Canada through Iceland, Britain, France, Spain, North Africa, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Arabia, to Formosa, Japan and the Philippines. In fact United States war bases encircle the globe and well-nigh encircle the Soviet Union.

### **(c) Facts to be remembered**

If the Soviet Army of 3 million seems excessive for peacetime, it should not be forgotten that:

- The Soviet has the longest land frontier in the world.
- The Soviet has experienced invasion through many sections of its borders. During 1918-22 the Soviet North-Western frontier was invaded by the British, its Western frontier was invaded by the British, the Poles, the French and the Germans; its Southern frontiers were invaded by the Rumanians, the British and the French; while its Siberian frontier was invaded by Japanese and Americans. Between 1922 and 1941 its Far Eastern frontier was twice invaded by the Japanese. In 1941-43 the Soviet Western frontiers were invaded by the Germans, the Finns, the Hungarians, the Rumanians, and the Italians.
- The Soviet Government has many times taken the initiative in approaching the other major Powers of the world with a view to securing either a partial or total disarmament. Since 1946 the Soviet has advocated the banning of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; has accepted the principle of international inspection of atomic plants; has proposed a Five-Power Peace Pact between the Soviet Union, Britain, the United States, France, and China; and has repeatedly suggested that all major Powers should reduce their military forces by an agreed proportion.<sup>82</sup>
- The Soviet Government has carried out the terms of the Potsdam Agreement relating to the denazification and demilitarization of Germany, and has opposed the rearmament of Japan.
- The Soviet Union has entered into defensive alliances with its neighbors, with Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland and Czechoslovakia in the West, and with China in the East. All of these Pacts are defensive, directed against any revival of German or Japanese aggression. All of them are bi-lateral, pledging mutual support if either of the contracting Powers is attacked, but nothing further. Such alliances cannot in any way be considered aggressive, nor are they contrary to the articles of the United Nations Charter.
- Despite the proximity of the fighting in Korea to the Soviet frontier the Soviet has not intervened and has striven per-

sistently for a peaceful settlement of the conflict and for the establishment of an independent, united Korea, from which all foreign troops would be evacuated.

Facts such as the ones enumerated above place the Soviet Army in true perspective as the essential defence of the Soviet Union and clearly give the lie to the slander that the Soviet maintains a large army for aggressive purposes.

Finally, if the Soviet were planning an armed attack on the West, and if, as Western leaders allege, it has enjoyed a superiority in armed strength up to the present, why has the Soviet not attacked before now? Surely an aggressor does not postpone aggression while the intended victims build up their armed might to parity and beyond?

### **Is War between Capitalist and Socialist States Inevitable?**

One aspect of the Cold War has been the search by the experts of the U.S. State Department for all manner of arguments with which to justify the present aggressive United States foreign policy. There have been so many statements by Soviet leaders since 1945 to the effect that capitalist and socialist states can co-exist peaceably that American experts have become searchers of the Marxist classics in order to prove this viewpoint un-Marxist. Thus Mr. George Kennan, then Chairman of the Policy Planning Board of the U.S. Department of State, published in the periodical *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1947, under the pseudonym "X" an article on "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." Later, in *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1949, Mr. George Morgan, a former first Secretary to the U.S. Moscow Embassy, published under the pseudonym "Historicus" an article called "Stalin on Revolution." Both articles are freely studded with quotations from the works of Lenin and Stalin. The basic argument of both articles is that—

(i) The ultimate Soviet objective is to overthrow capitalism and to establish communism on an international scale; and

(ii) The Soviet Government bases its strategy on the Marxist belief that war between capitalism and socialism is inevitable.

(iii) Therefore, if the Soviet Government, as it does at present, declares its willingness to live in peace with the capitalist world, it is merely in order to deceive the statesmen and the peoples of the West. Thus "X" writes—

"There never can be, on Moscow's side, any sincere assumption of a community of ideas between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capitalist . . . If the Soviet Union occasionally sets its signature to documents which would indicate to the contrary, this is to be regarded as a tactical manoeuvre permissible in dealing with the enemy." (83)

(iv) The several statements made by Stalin since 1945 on the possibility of the co-existence of socialism and capitalism contra-



dict basic Marxist theory, and, moreover, have all been made for Western rather than for internal consumption. They have appeared as foreign press statements, not as Soviet press statements.

(v) Soviet policy is expansive, its real object is to overthrow capitalism. A chief means of destroying other States is to use the Communist parties throughout the world to undermine their foundations. Communist parties are Moscow's Fifth Column.

On analysis, this argument stands exposed as a mixture of misstatement and downright lies.

(i) The ultimate Soviet objective is to establish a Communist society within the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders believe that socialism will ultimately displace capitalism the world over, but they have never considered that this will occur through the agency of Soviet military power. On the contrary, Lenin's theory of the "uneven development of capitalism" means that socialist revolutions will not occur at the same time in all countries, but in each country in its own time.

(ii) Marxism holds that capitalism inevitably tends to produce wars. Wars develop out of capitalism through the struggles of the imperialist powers to re-divide the world, and through the determination of the imperialists to keep colonial peoples in subjection. But Marxists have never held that the non-Socialist world would change to Socialism through the process of an international war between the Capitalist and the Socialist worlds. Moreover, owing to the great expansion of the Socialist sector in recent years, owing to the fact that the Socialist "sixth" has become the Socialist "third," and the Soviet leaders believe that it is no longer possible for the Capitalist States to check the spread of Socialism by making a military attack on the Soviet Union.<sup>84</sup> On the contrary, the Soviet leaders hold that it is possible to prevent a Third World War because the Socialist "Third" has such powerful allies against war, namely, the colonial peoples and the common people within the capitalist states.<sup>85</sup>

(iii) The Soviet Union has an unrivalled record for honoring its agreements. The Soviet alone was prepared to defend Czechoslovakia in 1938. The Soviet observed all its wartime promises, for example the promise given to Churchill in January 1945, to open up an early offensive in the East in order to reduce German pressure on the Western Allies;<sup>86</sup> the Potsdam promise to enter the war against Japan within three months. The Soviet Government, alone of the Allies, kept the terms of Potsdam and denazified and de-militarised Germany.

Shortly before the end of the war,<sup>87</sup> Mr. Churchill stated in the House of Commons that—

"Marshall Stalin and the Soviet leaders wish to live in honourable friendship and equality with the Western Democracies. I feel also that their word is their bond. I know of no government which stands to its obligations, even in its own despite, more solidly than the Russian Soviet Government." (87)

There is nothing to indicate a change in Soviet policy on these matters since 1945.

(iv) The various occasions since 1945, when Stalin has expressed his belief in the possibility of the peaceful co-existence of capitalism and socialism have not been made purely for Western consumption. Furthermore, the interviews have all been printed in the Soviet press.<sup>88</sup> Besides, such statements do not represent any new policy, but are basically the same as those which have been made from time to time since 1921. To mention only a few of these occasions here, by Chicherin at the Genoa Conference in 1922; in 1924 on the conclusion of a trade agreement with Britain; at the Geneva Economic Conference in 1929; at the Disarmament Conference in 1932; on the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Alliance in 1934; on the Soviet entry into the League of Nations in 1935;<sup>89</sup> and by Stalin at the 18th Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B.) in March, 1939.<sup>90</sup>

(v) Communist parties are not the product of Soviet espionage, but are the inevitable result of the impact of the Soviet Revolution on the Labor Movement throughout the world. In most countries throughout the world, including Britain, France, Germany, the United States and Australia, Communist parties were formed by the coalescence of various militant socialist groups during the years 1919-21. During the years 1919-43 Communist parties were associated with the C.P.S.U. (B.) in the Comintern. The Comintern was an organisation of Communist parties which existed to give general direction to Communist policy. It was not concerned with directing the details of Communist policy within individual countries. The Cominform, established in 1947, is essentially an agency for the exchange of information between European Communist parties.

If any further proof were needed to refute the assertion that the Soviet Union bases its policy on a belief in the inevitability of war, it is to be found in the fact that the Soviet Government has actively engaged in "peace propaganda" ever since the defeat of Fascism. The Soviet Government was one of the few Governments to adopt the Stockholm Appeal under which atomic warfare was condemned. More than 115 million signatures were collected in support of the Stockholm Appeal throughout the Soviet Union. Several All-Union Peace Conferences have been held, under official sanction. The Soviet Government, in March, 1951, adopted the recommendation of the Warsaw Peace Con-

ference (November, 1950) and passed legislation making it a crime to advocate war.<sup>91</sup> Such are not the actions of a Government which believes war to be inevitable, nor yet those of a Government seeking aggressive war.

### **Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy**

To date, this analysis has been chiefly concerned with refuting the charge that Soviet foreign policy is imperialist. It is now necessary to present in conclusion a statement of the basic motives and directions of Soviet foreign policy.

Since 1917, the Soviet Government has followed, with varying emphasis, four chief objectives. These objectives may be stated as follows:—

(a) The defence of the U.S.S.R. against encroachment by surrounding capitalist Powers.

(b) The development of friendly economic and cultural relations with all States, but especially with States which have broken free from imperialist domination or are moving in this direction.

(c) Support for any genuine move for international peace and understanding.

(d) By the rapid construction of socialism within the U.S.S.R. to prove to the rest of the world the superiority of socialism over other social systems.

Let us consider each of these objectives of Soviet foreign policy more fully.

#### **(a) Defence**

To defend the gains of the November Revolution was the first object of the Soviet Government under Lenin and it has continued to be the major object of Soviet foreign policy under Stalin. Between 1918 and 1922 the Soviet Union was faced with invasion from fourteen states. Throughout this period the survival of the Soviet regime was placed higher than the protection of Soviet territory. In order to protect the former concessions were made of the latter, to Germany in 1918, to Poland and Finland in 1920-21.

The ultimate objective of the Soviet policy of "collective security" followed so steadily between 1933 and 1939, was to safeguard Soviet territory and the socialist order against the Fascist marauders. This also was the purpose (and the justification) of the Soviet-German Pact of 1939. For the essence of this pact was that it was a non-aggression pact under which Germany guaranteed, at least for the time being, not to attack the Soviet Union.<sup>92</sup> When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June, 1941, the first objective of the Soviet Government was still the defence of Soviet territory, although, as a part of the anti-Fascist coalition the Soviet Government became pledged "to aid all the European peoples groaning under the yoke of German fascism."<sup>93</sup>

The defence of the Soviet Union has been the basic motive of the Soviet Government in the years since 1945. It has followed this objective by taking the initiative in establishing the United Nations, by seeking international agreements on atomic weapons, by various proposals for the regulation of armaments, as well as by entering into non-aggression Pacts with neighboring countries, and continuing to build up its own defences.

In defending its own territory and system the Soviet Union has not, as most capitalist Powers have, extended this concept so as to cover colonial territories and imperialist communications, for these are non-existent in the case of the Soviet Union. Nor does making the defence of the Soviet Union the primary objective in foreign policy constitute "a betrayal of the international working class movement." As Stalin has pointed out,

"The working class of the U.S.S.R. is a part of the world proletariat, its advanced detachment, and our republic is the child of the world proletariat." (94)

so that in fighting for the independence and freedom of the U.S.S.R. the Soviet people at the same time help the struggle for the emancipation of the entire working class.

#### **(b) Friendly Relations with all States**

At the 17th Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B.), on January 26, 1934, that is, shortly before the Soviet Union was admitted to the League of Nations, Stalin stated categorically that:

"Our foreign policy is clear. It is a policy of preserving peace and strengthening commercial relations with all countries." (95)

This was not a new formulation but was an accurate description of the policy which the Soviet Government had followed since its establishment. As soon as the Civil War was terminated the Soviet Government showed its eagerness for trade with capitalist countries in the West by rapidly concluding trade agreements with Germany (1922) and Italy (1924). The network of trade agreements between the Soviet Union and capitalist states was extended in the following years, just as soon as the individual capitalist states were prepared to make the step. Restriction of this trade has never come from the Soviet Union, but always from the West. Thus in 1948, when the United States had imposed a virtual embargo on the export of goods to the Soviet Union, the Soviet was still shipping millions of dollars' worth of skins and strategic ores to the United States monthly.<sup>96</sup>

But economic relations have often formed only one part of the agreements concluded by the Soviet Government with Capitalist Powers. In many cases they have been accompanied by political Pacts. Thus in 1920 Treaties were formed between Russia and Esthonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland. In 1921 a



Treaty was signed with Persia, in 1922 with Germany, and in 1925 with Japan. In 1935 the Franco-Soviet and the Czech-Soviet Pacts were signed, in August 1937 the Sino-Soviet Pact, in August 1939 the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. In May 1942 the Soviet Union entered into a 20 years non-aggression and assistance Pact with Great Britain; in June 1942 the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. entered into an alliance for the duration of the war. In 1944 the Soviet Union signed a Pact with Free France. In 1945 the Soviet Union concluded Pacts with Poland and Yugoslavia, in 1948 with Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland. The Soviet concluded Pacts with China in 1945 and 1950. All Pacts have been non-aggression Pacts, only some have been Pacts of mutual assistance. The Russo-German Pact of August, 1939, was purely a Pact of mutual non-aggression; those entered into with the Western Allies and with Eastern European Countries and China are Pacts of mutual assistance directed against any further German or Japanese aggression.

In September 1949, the Soviet Government proposed a non-aggression Pact between the big Five Powers, the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and People's China.

Nothing need be added to what has been said in the earlier pages on the close relations which have been established between the Soviet Union and the New Democracies. It is perfectly natural and to be expected that trade, cultural and political relations between socialist countries will be closer than similar relations between capitalist and socialist countries.

### **(c) Support for Peace and International Co-operation**

This objective of Soviet foreign policy has been demonstrated many times since 1917. The Soviet stand for collective security in the League of Nations during the years 1934-39 is well known. The long and consistent record of the Soviet Union on the question of disarmament and its policy in the United Nations are less known. Some of the main aspects of these latter two are given below.

#### **(1) The Soviet Record on Disarmament**

The Soviet Government has made over 30 separate approaches to other Powers on the question of disarmament since 1917. In the period 1927-33, the Soviet was universally recognised as the leading force in the disarmament conferences. It was the Soviet delegate who introduced the first resolutions on disarmament in the United Nations General Assembly (October 1946). Since then the Soviet has brought forward concrete suggestions for disarmament at every session of the United Nations. The

main suggestions for disarmament made by the Soviet Government since 1946 are these—

- The outlawing of the atom bomb and other weapons of mass destruction, and the establishment of international control of atomic energy.
- The reduction by one-third of all armaments of the big Five Powers.
- The signing of a non-aggression Pact by the big Five.
- The prohibition of war propaganda.
- The establishment of a United Nations security force to be responsible to the Military Staff Committee and the Security Council.

## **(2) The Soviet Stand in the United Nations**

Perhaps the commonest excuse for the failure of the United Nations is that the Soviet Union has obstructed and sabotaged its activities, especially its attempts to settle international disputes. It is frequently stated that the Soviet Union has "abused the Veto" so as to make the Security Council virtually unworkable.

Such assertions cannot be answered without first examining the basic principle on which the United Nations was established, that is, the principle of the unanimity of the major Powers. Only when this is understood can the actual record of the Soviet Union in the United Nations be fairly examined.

The "veto" is the popular label for a part of the voting procedure in the Security Council whereby any one of the permanent members (Britain, U.S.A., U.S.S.R., France and China) can by voting against a proposal on all questions other than "procedural matters" prevent action. Under Article 27 of the United Nations Charter, procedural matters can be carried if there is a majority vote of 7 out of the 11 members on the Security Council; all other matters require that the concurring vote of the five permanent members be included in this majority.

This voting procedure was worked out at the Crimea Conference in February, 1945, and was accepted by all the five major Powers in advance of the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations. The original proposal was drafted by the United States and was put forward to remove the doubts which all the major Powers, and especially the Soviet Union and the United States, felt about committing themselves to any enforcement action with which they were not in agreement. In other words, by means of the veto it was guaranteed that no action would be taken without the consent of all the five major Powers. Thus the veto underlined the responsibility which the big Five took under the Charter of together maintaining peace. As Molotov stated in his speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations on October 29, 1946:

"The principle of the unanimity of the great Powers was not a chance development, but the result of protracted and thorough discussion. The recognition of this principle expressed the desire of the United Nations to secure harmony and unity of action among the great Powers in counteracting any new aggression."

"Such a desire for unity of action in defence of peace and security was lacking among the great Powers before the second world war, and that was a great misfortune for all mankind."

And in the same speech, Molotov pointed out what was the obvious corollary, namely, that:

". . . inasmuch as the principle of unanimity of the great Powers forms the cornerstone of the United Nations organization, the abolition of this principle must lead to the collapse of the entire edifice of the Organization." (97)

It must be further borne in mind that the Soviet from the first has been in a minority position in the Security Council and has only been able to establish her policy by exercising the veto. This aspect of the matter has been put very clearly by the British historian, G. D. H. Cole, who has written that:

"The reasons why the Soviet Union held out for the unqualified veto are easy enough to understand. They rest on the assumption that, if decisions were to be taken by a majority, the verdict would usually go against the Soviet claims, and the Soviet Union would thus be put legally in the wrong by the judgment of a world majority of capitalist Powers — or of capitalist Great Powers, if the 'Big Five' alone were to call the tune." (98)

If one examines the record, one finds that the Soviet used the veto 43 times up to December 1949.<sup>99</sup> The majority of these vetoes had been exercised on the question of the admission of new members to the United Nations. But during 1949 the Soviet had several times offered to withdraw her opposition to the admission of certain States being sponsored by the Western Powers if they would withdraw their opposition to the admission of a smaller list of States being sponsored by the Soviet Union. Consequently, the deadlock on admissions reached in 1949 was not basically due to Soviet policy.

On several occasions the Soviet Union has used the veto to prevent the adoption of what she considered unsatisfactory courses of action. Thus the Soviet Union used the veto four times on the Spanish question during 1946 in a vain attempt to get the Security Council to take some action on the matter. Similarly, the Soviet Union used the veto four times during 1947 to prevent the Security Council from adopting the majority report of the United Nations Committee on Greece, because she felt, and not unjustly, that this report was biased in its findings.<sup>100</sup> But it should be recognised that the Soviet Union has not prevented the Security Council from acting on many matters, even though she has been in disagreement with the measures adopted. Many times during the handling of the Indonesian dispute the Soviet abstained rather than use the veto, so that action was able to be carried through without her active support.

The Soviet stand in the United Nations on the Korean question is a clear record of its determination to base its policy on the letter of the charter. When the fighting was first brought before the Security Council on June 25, 1950, the Soviet representative was not present, having left the body early in the year as a protest against the seating of the Kuomintang delegate and the denial of admission to the representative of the People's Government of China. The decision of the Security Council on June 27, which declared North Korea the aggressor and endorsed United States military intervention, was carried by a 7-0 vote, the United States, Britain, France, Norway, Cuba, Equador and Kuomintang China voting for it. When the Soviet Union protested against this as an illegal decision she was told that "abstention of a permanent member from the decisions of the Security Council does not constitute a veto." This ruling ignored two facts — first that the Soviet Union had not 'abstained' but was absent during the debate and the decision; second, the vote of the Kuomintang representative had been counted as the vote of China. Thus, by deliberately overlooking the requirements of Article 27, the United Nations was turned into an instrument of United States imperialism, the Korean people were brought terrific destruction and loss of life, and the world was brought to the brink of another world war.

It is not possible to examine the full record of the Soviet Union in the United Nations in this pamphlet. However, a word must needs be said about the common charge that only the Soviet has prevented the adoption of international control of atomic energy. The real position is that the Soviet has not accepted the American plan in its entirety, for this plan (the Baruch Plan, presented to the Atomic Energy Commission in June 1946 and finally adopted in 1948) does not provide for the destruction of atomic bomb stockpiles and for a ban on the use of the atomic weapon. More fully, the Soviet objections to the Baruch Plan are as follows:

- The Baruch Plan proposes an international control agency, to be known as the Atomic Development Authority (ADA), which Authority is to be given complete control over atomic raw materials and over research and the production of 'de-natured,' i.e., non-explosive atomic material. This Authority is to be empowered to take enforcement action for breaches of the covenant on atomic energy, without the need to refer such action to the Security Council. The Soviet considers that each nation must be left with the right to carry on its own research and to produce its own atomic materials, including explosive materials for peaceful purposes. The international Authority should be given full powers of inspection, including the right to check stocks of raw materials, mining projects, and all production



plants; and the right to make special investigations of alleged violations of breaches of the convention prohibiting the manufacture of atomic weapons.<sup>101</sup>

The Soviet proposed that the veto should not operate in the day to day decisions of the international Authority, but that it must continue to operate whenever enforcement action is being considered. If the Authority were to operate on such questions without the veto and without reference to the Security Council, then clearly the Charter would be overruled.

- The Soviet wants to include in the international covenant banning atomic weapons, the provision that existing stockpiles of atomic bombs must be destroyed within a stated time, preferably three months. The United States has not accepted the proposal that all atomic bombs should be destroyed by a certain date after the signing of the covenant. Her attitude is that when the international Authority (which would certainly be U.S. dominated) has been established and when she considers that it is functioning satisfactorily, then, and only then, will she decide to destroy her atomic stockpile.

In seeking to understand the Soviet attitude on atomic energy control it must never be forgotten that the Soviet is a socialist state, seeking to use every available power, including atomic energy, for the development of its economy. A socialist country, with a planned economy, could not afford to leave a major sector of that economy under the control of an international body which would inevitably be dominated by capitalist Powers. This point was put very convincingly by Mr. Gromyko in a speech he made for the American-Russian Institute at Madison Square Gardens, May 19, 1947. Mr. Gromyko stated that:

"The Soviet Union cannot agree to make its national economy dependent upon the will of even a majority in an international body, realising that this majority is capable of passing one-sided decisions too. The Soviet Union cannot make its national economy dependent on the will of a majority in an international body because the Soviet Union realises that this body may make decisions not dictated by considerations of justice alone." (102)

#### **(d) The Example of Peaceful Socialist Construction**

It is impossible to consider the post-war activities of the Soviet Government without coming to the conclusion that its basic orientation is inwards and not outwards, towards the restoration and further development of the Soviet economy. This has been the basic stress in all Soviet papers, in all Soviet political conferences, in election rallies, and in literature.<sup>103</sup> It stands out in the fact that the proportion of the Soviet budget devoted to the national economy has increased from 32.9 per cent. in 1940 to 39.5 per cent. in 1951. It is made evident by the stupendous fifteen year plan for the reafforestation of the Steppes,

and in the construction of huge new irrigation and power systems in the south and central Asian regions. All visitors to the Soviet Union since 1945 have been struck with the pre-occupation of both people and Governments with the tasks of reconstruction and peaceful development. Amongst very many such impressions<sup>104</sup> we select but two — one from a British observer, the other an Australian. In 1950 a democratically elected British trade union delegation visited the Soviet Union. The leader of this delegation and national organiser of the Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers, Mr. Fred. Hollingsworth, stated:

"We saw two of their war-torn cities. All the evidence we have gathered points unmistakably to the conclusion that there is a universal and passionate desire to live in peace, not only among the ordinary workers, but also among the leaders we have met."

"Any one seeing Kiev or Stalingrad, as we have done, or who has talked to the people as we have, could not possibly imagine that this country has the slightest reason for wanting another war. Peace is a most vital necessity to them if they are to go ahead and reach the ambitious plans they have set themselves for the future." (105)

An Australian University man, Winston Rhodes, Associate Professor of Literature at the University of New Zealand, visited the Soviet Union in May, 1950. On his way back to New Zealand, he was interviewed by the Australian Peace Council. In reply to the question:

"Did you see or hear any evidence in the Soviet Union of aggressive intentions either amongst the people or representatives of the government?"

Professor Rhodes replied:

"Not the slightest. Right through the whole of the educational system which I examined the emphasis was on peace. Wherever I went in the Soviet Union amongst all the people I found always the first questions they asked me was: 'What is the peace situation in your country?'"

In the same interview, Professor Rhodes made this statement:

"It is inconceivable to me that either those responsible for the plan of the new Moscow or the people who are engaged in working out that plan or discussing that plan should be thinking in terms of another war, which, whatever else it did, would be likely to lay waste great cities."

"The same impression was forced upon us in Stalingrad. People there and elsewhere are filled with the idea of reconstructing Stalingrad so that it will be the most beautiful city in the Soviet Union. The reason is that Stalingrad is to the Soviet people a double symbol. It is a symbol of the victory over Nazism, and also it is a symbol of the necessity for peace." (106)

In the course of his address to the 18th Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B.), March 10, 1939, Stalin made a concise statement of Soviet foreign policy in these terms:

"The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is clear and explicit. (1) We stand for peace and the strengthening of business relations with all countries. That is our position: and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union,

and as long as they make no attempt to trespass on the interests of our country."

"(2) We stand for peaceful, close and friendly relations with all the neighbouring countries which have common frontiers with the U.S.S.R. That is our position: and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass, directly or indirectly, on the integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of the Soviet State."

"(3) We stand for the support of nations which are the victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their country."

"(4) We are not afraid of the threats of aggressors, and are ready to deal two blows for every blow delivered by instigators of war who attempt to violate the Soviet borders.

"Such is the foreign policy of the Soviet Union." (107)

Such a statement of fundamentals may be called self-reliant, but it is not isolationist nor is it imperialist. Nothing that has happened since 1939 has caused the Soviet Union to change these basic principles of support for peaceful relations between nations and of resistance to aggression.

Melbourne,

January, 1952.

## NOTES

(1) Labor Research Association, "Monopoly Today" (International Publishers, New York, 1950) pp. 103-104.

(2) "Census of American Owned Assets in Foreign Countries," US Treasury Department, Washington D.C. 1947, p. 29.

(3) Labor Research Association, "Monopoly Today" p. 104.

(4) All figures are taken from official Soviet sources as quoted in Soviet Weekly. The figures for the 1950 and 1951 budgets are given in Soviet Weekly, March 15, 1951.

(5) N. Mikhailov, "Across the Map of the U.S.S.R." (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1949) ch. 11.

(6) Quoted in "Russia and the World" (Australia-Soviet Friendship League) p. 19.

(7) Ibid., p. 12.

(8) Pitirim A. Sorokin, "Russia and the U.S.A." (Dutton & Co., New York, 1944), pp. 196-97.

(9) "700 Millions for Peace and Democracy" (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1950) p. 13.

(10) Stalin, "Marxism and the National and Colonial Question" (Lawrence and Wishart, London 1947 edn.) p. 148.

(11) N. Gangulee, "The Russian Horizon" (Allen & Unwin, 1943) p. 177.

(12) "The Difference between Soviet and American Foreign Policies," *People's China*, January 16, 1950.

(13) For a good discussion of this treaty see, Israel Epstein, "The Unfinished Revolution in China" (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1947) pp. 366-68.

(14) For the text of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and related agreements, see "New China: Three Views" (Turnstile Press, London, 1950) pp. 227-35.

(15) *International Conciliation*, January, 1943, p. 62.

(16) *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

(17) The fact that the Polish Government in 1945-46 had the support of the overwhelming majority of the Polish population was frequently acknowledged by the *New Statesman and Nation* at this time.

(18) Margaret Dewar, "Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe, 1945-1949" (Royal Institute of International Affairs), pp. 33-39.

(19) *Ibid.*, p. 120.

(20) "What Happened in Czechoslovakia" (Prague, 1948), p. 10.

(21) Joseph C. Harsch, "The Curtain Isn't Iron" (London; Putnam and Co., 1950), p. 180.

(22) *Ibid.*, p. 181.

(23) For the circumstances in which the Kosice Programme was adopted, see Doreen Warriner, "Revolution in Eastern Europe" (Turnstile Press, London, 1950), pp. 10f.

(24) See the letter from the Czech Communist Party to President Benes, February 21; letter from Czech Communist Party to Czech Social-Democratic Party, February 21; and the reply of the Social-Democratic Party. "What Happened in Czechoslovakia," pp. 40-45.

(25) Resolution passed by the Conference of Works' Councils from from all over Czechoslovakia, February 21, 1948. "What Happened: in Czechoslovakia," pp. 33-37.

(26) *Ibid.*, pp. 63-68.

(27) The incident referred to was the accidental wounding of a student during a demonstration on February 21.

(28) The chief agencies for defending the National Front were the Action Committees which grew up during the crisis. Founded basically on the industrial workers, they also existed in the rural areas and included representatives of all parties participating in the National Front. They became the means whereby the rank and file held their leaders true to the common programme.

(29) "What Happened in Czechoslovakia," pp. 87-89.

(30) Gerald Peel, "Two Worlds in Europe" (Current Books, Sydney, 1949), pp. 27-37.

(31) "What Happened in Czechoslovakia," pp. 93-94.

(32) Doreen Warriner, "Revolution in Eastern Europe," p. 37.

(33) In this connection it is perhaps worth recalling the interview Benes gave to the British newspaper, *News-Chronicle*, in August, 1945. When asked if Russia had applied any pressure on Czechoslovakia for economic change, Dr. Benes replied:

"Far from it. None whatever."

"Russia, said Dr. Benes, has exerted a moderating influence on



extremists and, but for this, the changes would have been far more violent and less stable than what is promised now!" Quoted in the Sydney Communist paper, *Tribune*, August 30, 1945.

(34) A recent example of a book which freely asserts that the countries of Eastern Europe are under Russian control is Joseph C. Harsch's "The Curtain Isn't Iron" (1950). Nowhere in the book does Harsch substantiate his accusation. When Chile brought the Czech question before the Security Council in April, 1948, her charges against the Soviet were just as wild and equally unsubstantiated.

(35) Molotov's Speeches at the Paris Peace Conference (July-October, 1946), *Soviet News* booklet, London, 1946, pp. 44-45.

(36) However, when famine conditions made it difficult for Hungary to pay in 1946, the Soviet reduced the scale of reparations payments. Late in 1946 the Soviet extended the time of repayment for Finland by two years. By January, 1947, Finland had paid off one-third of her reparations.

(37) Israel Epstein, "The Unfinished Revolution in China," pp. 380-82.

(38) *Sydney Morning Herald*, January 19, 1951.

(39) *Soviet Weekly*, March 2, 1950.

(40) *Guardian*, May 3, 1951.

(41) *Soviet Weekly*, July 31, 1947. Contrast Trevor Smith's explanation in the *Melbourne Herald*, August 1, 1947.

(42) Margaret Dewar, "Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe, 1945-49," p. 42.

(43) *Ibid.*, p. 81.

(44) *Ibid.*, p. 91.

(45) *Ibid.*, p. 53.

(46) *Ibid.*, p. 26.

(47) *Ibid.*, p. 43.

(48) "New China: Three Views," pp. 233-235.

(49) See the correspondence between the Soviet Government and the Persian Ambassador to Moscow, *Soviet News*, April 9, 1947.

(50) Liu Shao-chi, "Inviolable Sino-Soviet Friendship." Speech delivered on the foundation of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, Peking, October 5, 1949. Printed in "700 Millions for Peace and Democracy," pp. 16f.

(51) "The Development of Finnish-Soviet Relations during the Autumn of 1939," published by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Harrap and Co., London, 1940), and "Russia and the World" (Australia-Soviet Friendship League publication), pp. 13-14.

(52) "Russia and the World," p. 14, the statement was made in a Finnish radio broadcast, October 13, 1939.

(53) *Ibid.*, p. 16.

(54) Information Bulletin, Volume 1, No. 17, August 19, 1945. Issued by the U.S. Armed Forces Institute, quoted by Zilliacus, "I Choose Peace" (Penguin Books, London, October, 1949), pp. 405-406.

(55) Article by Kuusinen in *New Times*, No. 3, February 1, 1946, "What the Trial of Hitler's Finnish Accomplices Has Revealed."

(56) For e.g., Joseph C. Harsch, "The Curtain Isn't Iron," ch. 7.

(57) "The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute." Full Text of Letters on the Dispute (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, November, 1948), p. 68.

- (58) Cominform Communique, 28 June, 1948; "The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute," p. 63.
- (59) Ibid., pp. 68-69.
- (60) Ibid., p. 70.
- (61) Meeting of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties in Hungary in the latter half of November, 1949. (Published by the journal, *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy*, 1950, p. 23.
- (62) Ibid., p. 28.
- (63) Margaret Dewar, "Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe, 1945-49," pp. 92-94.
- (64) For example, the *Age*, March 5, 1951, reporting an interview given to the *London Observer* by the Yugoslav Propaganda Minister, M. Djilas, quotes him as saying, "Yugoslavia doesn't fear an attack from the U.S.S.R. or her neighbors."
- (65) Doreen Warriner, "Revolution in Eastern Europe," pp. 56ff.
- (66) For a good summary of these trials see W. G. Burchett, "People's Democracies" (World Unity Publications), 1951, chs. XIV and XV.
- (67) *Age*, July 7, 1951.
- (68) Margaret Dewar, "Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe, 1945-49," p. 93. See also, the *Age*, September 10, 1949; and *New Times*, No. 42, 1949, quoting from the Paris paper *Ce Soir*.
- (69) Quoted in *New Times*, No. 48, 1950.
- (70) *New Times*, Nos. 29 and 48, 1950.
- (71) Cf. Doreen Warriner, "Revolution in Eastern Europe," pp. 51-54.
- (72) *New Times*, No. 30, 1949.
- (73) *New Times*, No. 49, 1949.
- (74) Some facts on the repression in the Universities are quoted in the International Union of Students' pamphlet, "Why the I.U.S. has severed relations with the leaders of the Student Section of the 'People's Youth of Yugoslavia,'" pp. 11-16. Up to the end of 1948, 4,500 Yugoslav students had been expelled from the Universities, and by the end of 1949, 3,900 students had been interned in concentration camps.
- (75) Supplement to *New Times*, No. 9, February 28, 1951, p. 5.
- (76) Ibid., p. 10. Note of the Soviet Government, February 24, 1951.
- (77) For example, the following books: G. Schaffer, "Russian Zone" (Allen & Unwin, 1947); W. G. Burchett, "Cold War in Germany" (World Unity Publications, 1950); W. G. Burchett, "People's Democracies" (World Unity Publications, 1951); Gerald Peel, "Two Worlds in Europe" (Current Books Distributors, 1949); John Rodgers, "Report on the Soviet Union" (1949). Even Joseph C. Harsch, "The Curtain Isn't Iron" brings down no evidence in support of his assumption that Eastern Europe is being rearmed.
- (78) *Argus*, 27 July, 1950.
- (79) Note of the Soviet Government, February 24, 1951. *New Times* Supplement, February 28, 1951.
- (80) *Age*, May 5, 1951.

(81) Soviet Weekly, January 13, 1949, quoted 489 as the number of U.S. bases overseas.

(82) The first Soviet plan on the control of atomic weapons, presented to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, June 19, 1946, contained the proposal for banning the atomic bomb. The first proposals on general disarmament were presented to the General Assembly by the Soviet Union on October 29, 1946. These proposals were the basis for the General Assembly's resolution on disarmament, December 14, 1946.

The second Soviet plan on the control of atomic energy was presented to the Atomic Energy Commission on June 11, 1947. This plan provided for international control and inspection of atomic energy plants and mines.

On September 18, 1947, Mr. Vyshinsky introduced into the General Assembly a resolution condemning war propaganda.

In October, 1948, the Soviet Union introduced into the Political Committee of the General Assembly a 3-point disarmament plan. This proposed a Convention outlawing the atomic bomb; a simultaneous convention setting up an international control authority; and a reduction of the armed forces of the Big Five Powers by one-third.

Similar proposals were introduced by the Soviet representative to the General Assembly in May, 1949.

In September, 1949, the Soviet brought down its first proposal for a Five-Power Peace Pact between the United States, the U.S.S.R., Britain, France and People's China.

This proposal was repeated in November, 1949, and on many occasions since.

(83) Foreign Affairs, July, 1947, p. 572.

(84) A. A. Zhdanov, "On the International Situation," September, 1947; speech delivered at a Conference of nine Eastern European Communist Parties.

(85) See, for example, the following speeches by Soviet leaders: V. M. Molotov, "Stalin's Policy of Peace and Democracy," November 8, 1948 (Soviet News booklet); G. M. Malenkov, "The Sure Road to New Victories," November, 1949 (Soviet News booklet); N. M. Shvernik, "Electoral Speech," March 1, 1950 (Soviet News booklet, "Soviet Union at the Polls," p. 46).

(86) Quoted by Vyshinsky, "Against Preparations for a New War—for a Five Power Peace Pact," speech to the United Nations Political Committee, November 16, 1949 (Soviet News booklet). Churchill's telegram was sent on January 6, 1945.

(87) Hansard, 27/2/1945.

(88) The most important of these post-war interviews were as follows: With Alexander Werth (1946); with Eddie Gilmore (1946); with Elliot Roosevelt (December, 1946); with Harold Stassen (May, 1947), and the reply to a letter from Henry Wallace (May 17, 1948).

(89) K. Zilliacus, "I Choose Peace," p. 418.

(90) Stalin, "Problems of Leninism" (Moscow, 1945), p. 605.

(91) New Times, No. 11, 1951.

(92) See J. Stalin, Radio Broadcast, July 3, 1941 (printed in "On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union," Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1943, pp. 8-9).

(93) Ibid., p. 12.

(94) S. Titarenko, "Patriotism and Internationalism" (Soviet News booklet, 1950), p. 12.

(95) Stalin, "Problems of Leninism," p. 459.

(96) Quoted from the Melbourne Herald, November 1, 1948.

(97) V. M. Molotov, "Problems of Foreign Policy" (Moscow, 1949), pp. 250, 255.

(98) G. D. H. Cole, "An Intelligent Man's Guide to the Post-War World" (Gollancz), p. 1015.

(99) Melbourne Sun, December 15, 1949.

(100) The majority report found that Greece's northern neighbours, Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, had given assistance to the Greek "rebels." The minority report, presented by the Soviet Union and Poland, found that while these three Powers had given refuge to Greek "rebels" when they were driven over the frontier, they were not giving direct military assistance, nor were they responsible for the state of civil war in Greece.

(101) This was included in the revised Soviet proposals on the control of atomic energy presented to the Atomic Energy Commission on June 11, 1947. It was not explicit in the original proposals as presented on June 19, 1946.

(102) Soviet News, May 22, 1947.

(103) For example, consider the post-war novels, Vera Panova, "The Factory" (English trans. published by Putnam & Co., London, 1949); Berdi Kerbabayev, "Aisoltan from the Land of White Gold" (1950) (published in Soviet Literature, No. 12, 1950).

(104) To mention only a few of these accounts, J. B. Priestley, "Russian Journey" (London, 1946); Richard E. Lauterbach, "Through Russia's Back Door" (Harpers, 1946); John Steinbeck, "Russian Journal" (Viking Press, N.Y., 1948); John Rogers, "Report on the Soviet Union" (1949); D. N. Pritt, "The Truth About Russia," Labour Monthly, November, 1950.

(105) Soviet Weekly, May 18, 1950.

(106) Quoted from "Working for Peace," Journal of the Australian Peace Council, December, 1950, p. 13.

For later statements by the Australian Ironworkers' delegates to the Warsaw Peace Congress (November, 1950), who visited the Soviet Union after the Congress, see, "Ironworkers Speak for Peace" (1951), pp. 36-50.

(107) Stalin, "Problems of Leninism" (Moscow, 1945), pp. 605-606.





