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STALIN'S ROLE IN THE COMMUNIST VICTORY IN CHINA

PETER S. H. TANG

MAO TSE-TUNG'S 1949 VICTORY has frequently been credited to Mao's ability as an astute peasant revolutionary rather than to his standing as an orthodox Communist leader. The record suggests that Stalin's development of tactics for Mao had more influence on the course of events than is commonly supposed. It is the purpose of this study to indicate the influence upon the Chinese revolutionary leadership of Stalin's doctrines.

In developing a Communist revolutionary strategy for China, Stalin tried first of all to determine the character of a Chinese revolution. In accordance with the principles of Leninism, Stalin drew a clear distinction between two types of Communist revolution—"the revolutions in the imperialist countries oppressing other peoples," such as Russia, and "the revolutions in the colonial and dependent countries suffering imperialist oppression," such as China.¹ Stalin's consideration of the two possible approaches to the same Communist objective indicates that there was no basis in fact for those wishful thinkers who assumed that Mao's brand of Communism was different from Leninism-Stalinism simply because the revolution took place in China in a manner unlike that of Russia.

In April 1927, Stalin pointed out the basic factors that would determine the character of the Chinese revolution: 1) the semi-colonial status of China and the financial-economic supremacy of imperialism therein; 2) the oppression of feudalist remnants intensified by warlordism and bureaucratism; 3) the rising revolutionary struggle of the millions of workers and peasants against the oppression of feudalist officials, warlords and imperialists; 4) the political weakness of the national bourgeoisie, its dependence on imperialism and fear of the scope of the revolutionary movement; 5) the increasing revolutionary activities of the Chinese proletariat and the growth of its authority among the millions of the working masses;

¹ J. V. Stalin, "Meždunarodnoe položenie i oborona SSSR II: o Kitae—reč' na zasedanii ob'edinennogo plenuma TsK i TsKK VKP(b) 1 avgusta 1927 g." (International Situation and the Defense of the U.S.S.R. II: On China—Speech Delivered at the Joint Plenary Meeting of the C.C. and the C.C.C. of the C.P.S.U.(B) on August 1, 1927, referred to hereafter as "Meždunarodnoe"), in Stalin, *Ob oppozicii: stat'i i reči 1921-1927 g. g.* (On the Opposition: Articles and Speeches 1921-1927, referred to hereafter as *Ob oppozicii*) (Moscow-Leningrad, 1928), p. 645; and in Stalin, *Sočinenija* (Collected Works, referred to hereafter as *Sočinenija*) (Moscow, 1949), X, 10-11.

and finally 6) the existence of the proletarian dictatorship in the neighboring Soviet Union.²

According to Stalin, these factors established the character of the Chinese revolution as a "bourgeois-democratic" one against foreign imperialism and domestic semi-feudalism.³ Because of its anti-imperialist character, the Communist revolution in China was considered by him "directly associated with the anti-imperialist proletarian revolutions of all countries."⁴ It is, therefore, a part of the world proletarian revolution in accordance with the Leninist principle.⁵ Furthermore, Stalin declared:

There is a . . . characteristic of the Chinese revolution that should not be overlooked: By China's side stands the Soviet Union, which by virtue of its revolutionary experience and its assistance, cannot but facilitate the struggle of the Chinese proletariat against the imperialism and the survivals of the medieval feudalism in China.⁶

Stalin pointed out in November 1926 that in view of the semi-feudalist social structure in China, the then big national bourgeoisie in China was politically far weaker than the Russian bourgeoisie in 1905. He thus saw that the situation would help the Chinese proletariat and its political party—the Communist Party—to assume the leadership over the Chinese peasantry in the revolutionary struggle.⁷ Moreover, Stalin prophesied in 1926 that the most im-

² Stalin, "Voprosy Kitaiskoj revoljucii: tezisy dlja propagandistov odobrennye TsK VKP(b)" (Problems of the Chinese Revolution: Thesis for Propagandists Approved by the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. (B), referred to hereafter as "Voprosy"). *Pravda*, No. 90 (3622), April 21, 1927, p. 3; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 551; and *Sočinenija* (Moscow, 1948), IX, 221.

³ Stalin, "O perspektivakh revoljucii v Kitae: reč' v Kitaiskoj komissii IKKI 30 nojabrja 1926 g." (On the Prospects of the Revolution in China: Speech Delivered at the Chinese Commission of the E.C.C.I. on November 30, 1926, referred to hereafter as "O perspektivakh"), *Kommunističeskij internacional* (Communist International) No. 13(71) (Moscow, Dec. 10, 1926), pp. 9–10; *Ob oppozicii*, pp. 423–24; and *Sočinenija* (Moscow, 1948), VIII, 358. Also Stalin, "Revoljucija v Kitae i zadači komintern—reč' na X zasedanii VIII plenuma IKKI 24 maja 1927 g." (Revolution in China and the Tasks of the Comintern—Speech Delivered at the 10th Meeting of the 8th Plenum of the E.C.C.I. on May 24, 1927, referred to hereafter as "Revoljucija"), *Bol'ševik*, No. 10 (Moscow, May 31, 1927), pp. 15, 25; *Ob oppozicii*, pp. 588, 603; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 286–87, 308.

⁴ Stalin, "O perspektivakh," *Kommunističeskij internacional*, No. 13(71) (Dec. 10, 1926), p. 10; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 424; and *Sočinenija*, VIII, 358.

⁵ *Ibid.*, *Kommunističeskij internacional*, p. 14; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 429; *Sočinenija*, VIII, 365.

⁶ *Ibid.*, *Kommunističeskij internacional*, p. 10; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 424; and *Sočinenija*, VIII, 359. Later in the same speech, Stalin reiterated: ". . . The revolution in China will develop under circumstances offering the possibility of using the experience and aid of the revolution won in the Soviet Union." *Ibid.*, *Kommunističeskij internacional*, p. 14; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 429; and *Sočinenija*, VIII, 366.

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Kommunističeskij internacional*, pp. 10, 14; *Ob oppozicii*, pp. 424, 429; and *Sočinenija*, VIII, 358–59, 366.

portant form of revolutionary struggle of workers and peasants in China should be "an armed revolution fighting against an armed counter-revolution."⁸

As early as 1926,⁹ Mao's writings showed a rudimentary inclination toward Stalin's way of thinking in regard to the class structure of Chinese society. By 1939,¹⁰ his first systematic treatment of the subject embodied a full acceptance of Stalin's analysis of the character of the Chinese revolution. Like Stalin,¹¹ Mao called the current stage of the Communist revolution in China not a proletarian socialist revolution, but an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal bourgeois democratic revolution of the new type or the so-called new democratic revolution.¹²

In the words of Ch'en Po-ta, a leading Chinese Communist theoretician, the conclusion reached by Stalin in his masterly analysis of Chinese society is of tremendous historical significance to the Chinese revolution.¹³ Ch'en pointed out that in the past, those who had ignored Stalin's doctrine concerning the anti-imperialist character of the Communist revolution in China suffered a deviation of "left opportunism." Those who had overlooked his prescriptions for the anti-feudal character of the revolution committed a mistake of "right opportunism."¹⁴ Both groups were condemned for having forgotten the lessons given by Stalin in his famous refutation of the Trotskyite heresy in 1927, while Mao Tse-tung's "correct" Party line since then has been considered in full compliance with Stalin's teachings on the character of, and strategy for, the Communist revolution in China.¹⁵

The Chinese Communists have firmly believed that Stalin prescribed not only the political line, i.e., the character and prospect, of the Communist revolution in China, but also its strategic and

⁸ *Ibid.*, *Kommunističeskij internacional*, p. 12; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 427; and *Sočinenija*, VIII, 363.

⁹ Mao Tse-tung, "Chung-Kuo She-hui Ko Chieh-chi ti Fen-hsi" (An Analysis of the Various Classes in the Chinese Society), *Mao Tse-tung Hsüan-chi* (Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, referred to hereafter as *Hsüan-chi*) (Peking, 1951), I, 3-9.

¹⁰ Mao Tse-tung, "Chung-Kuo-Ko-Ming yü Chung-Kuo-Kung-Ch'an-Tang" (The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China, referred to hereafter as "Chung-Kuo-Ko-Ming"), *Hsüan-chi* (Peking, 1952), II, 591-623.

¹¹ Cf. footnote 3.

¹² Mao Tse-tung, *op. cit.*, II, 603, 604, 607, 617-18.

¹³ Ch'en Po-ta, "Szu-Ta-Lin yü Chung-Kuo-Ko-Ming" (Stalin and the Chinese Revolution), (Substituting Introduction), in Stalin, *Lun Chung-Kuo-Ko-Ming* (On the Chinese Revolution, a Chinese translation of Stalin's writings on the problems of the revolution in China, edited by the National Council of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association) (Peking, 1949), p. 12.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.

tactical line. They have attributed the Communist victory in China to the successful implementation of the Stalinist strategies specifically designed for China.¹⁶

The most significant points of Stalin's contribution to Communist revolutionary strategy in China are: 1) the leadership of the proletariat and its Communist Party, 2) the alliance with the peasantry, 3) the armed revolution, 4) united front tactics, and 5) an allegedly transitional regime leading toward socialism.

Stalin taught the Chinese Communists that "in China there is a well-known basic number of the fighting and active industrial proletariat enjoying enormous prestige among the peasants."¹⁷ This situation was different from that which existed in countries like Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan, where the industrial proletariat was absent or almost non-existent, and where only a Kemalist type of national commercial bourgeois revolution might take place.¹⁸ He concluded that the Chinese proletariat and its political party, the Communist Party of China (CPC), should initiate the Communist revolution in China and lead the Chinese peasantry.¹⁹

Stalin believed that without the leadership of the Chinese proletariat, one could hardly think of victory for the Communist revolution in China. He warned that it would be a great mistake for the Chinese Communists not to utilize all circumstances and means, including the method of strike, to help the workers improve their material and legal status. He encouraged the Chinese proletariat to have confidence in its own strength and learn its merits in order that it might assume the leadership of the revolutionary movement in China.²⁰

As Stalin saw it, to achieve Communist victory in China, the Chinese proletariat and its vanguard, the CPC, needed to abandon the national bourgeoisie, strengthen its own hegemony, and lead millions of the working masses in cities and villages to overcome the resistance of the national bourgeoisie, that is, a complete bour-

¹⁶ Chang Ju-hsin, "Szu-Ta-Lin tui Chung-Kuo Ko-ming Li-len ti Wei-ta Kung-hsien" (Stalin's Great Contribution to the Theory of the Chinese Revolution), *Jen-Min Jih-Pao* (People's Daily, Peking), Apr. 3, 1953, p. 3.

¹⁷ Stalin, "Beseda so studentami universiteta imeni Sun Iatsena 13 maja, 1927 g." (A Conversation with the Students of the Sun Yat-sen University on May 13, 1927, referred to hereafter as "Beseda"), in Stalin, *Revoljucija v Kitae i ošibki oppozicii* (Revolution in China and the Mistakes of the Opposition) (Moscow-Leningrad, 1927); *Ob oppozicii*, p. 573; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 256.

¹⁸ *Loc. cit.*

¹⁹ Stalin, "O perspektivakh," *Kommunističeskij internacional*, No. 13 (71) (Dec. 10, 1926), p. 10; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 424; and *Sočinenija*, VIII, 359.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, *Kommunističeskij internacional*, p. 18; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 434; and *Sočinenija*, VIII, 372.

geois-democratic revolution. Then the Chinese proletariat could gradually proceed toward the socialist revolution.²¹

Stalin also stressed that in order to promote its leadership in the current bourgeois-democratic revolution, the Chinese proletariat must have its own powerful political party—the CPC, with its own program, platform, organization and course of action.²² This Party should lead the peasants' land revolution, revolutionize the army and obtain control of the government machinery.²³ He instructed that the real proletarian revolution must be conducted under the sole leadership of the Communist Party. Only under this Party could the dictatorship of the proletariat be prepared, achieved and developed.²⁴

Contrary to the common, but erroneous, assumption that he was leading agrarian revolutionists and had nothing to do with the working class, Mao, in 1939, declared the Chinese proletariat to be “the most basic driving force” of the Communist revolution in China. “Without the leadership of the proletariat, the revolution in China will definitely have no chance of success,”²⁵ he added. Mao was said to have fought vigorously against both the left and the right deviationists who had denied the leading position of the Chinese proletariat.²⁶

According to Mao, there are three outstanding advantages in a leadership of the Chinese proletariat: 1) It is revolutionary in spirit because it had suffered oppression on three sides—imperialism, feudalism, and the bourgeoisie. 2) It is conscious of its destiny because it has been under the Communist Party of China ever since the beginning of the revolutionary movement. 3) Its natural tie with the vast peasantry has facilitated the formation of an intimate alliance with the peasantry.²⁷

Like Stalin, Mao was convinced of the necessity of the leadership of the proletariat for a successful Communist revolution in China. He explained that the revolution of 1911 was abortive because there had been neither self-conscious participation of the proletariat nor the existence of the CPC, whereas the revolution of 1924–1927 did achieve a tremendous victory as a result of proletarian participation and an organized Party. The subsequent failure

²¹ Stalin, “Voprosy,” *Pravda*, Apr. 21, 1927, p. 3; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 551; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 222.

²² Stalin, “Beseda,” *Ob oppozicii*, pp. 563, 578–79; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 242, 264.

²³ *Ibid.*, *Ob oppozicii*, p. 579; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 264–65; Stalin, “Meždunarodnoe,” *Ob oppozicii*, pp. 663–64; and *Sočinenija*, X, 35–36.

²⁴ Stalin, “Beseda,” *Ob oppozicii*, p. 569; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 250.

²⁵ Mao Tse-tung, “Chung-Kuo-Ko-Ming,” *Hsüan-chi*, II, 616.

²⁶ Chang Ju-hsin, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

²⁷ Mao Tse-tung, “Chung-Kuo-Ko-Ming,” *Hsüan-chi*, II, 615.

of the revolution, he said, was due to the lack of revolutionary experience on the part of the Chinese proletariat and its Communist Party. The successful conduct of the Communist revolution since the Japanese War he attributed to the leadership of the proletariat and the CPC.²⁸

In this respect, Stalin's theory and practice of Party-building did help the Chinese Communists organize a powerful monolithic party machine. Like Stalin, Mao constantly demanded further strengthening of the Party by ideological, political and organizational means so as to fortify its leadership over the army and the regime.²⁹ Without the leadership of the CPC, that is, of the Bolshevized proletarian party of China, neither bourgeois-democratic revolution nor socialist revolution can succeed.³⁰ Mao and his lieutenants have claimed that the most effective weapon in their victory was the Party, modeled on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and guided by Leninism-Stalinism.³¹

Stalin counseled the Chinese Communists that agrarian revolution is the basis and the content of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China.³² He reasoned that the surviving feudalism and its militarist-bureaucratic super-structure formed the fundamental oppression in China.³³ Accordingly, only after an all-out agrarian revolution could the bourgeois-democratic revolution be expected to reach completion.³⁴

As early as June 1925, Stalin pointed out that the peasant masses, as the first objective of imperialist exploitation and oppression among the colonial and dependent peoples, once drawn into the

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 616.

²⁹ Mao Tse-tung, "Kung-Ch'an-Tang Jen' Fa-k'an-tz'u" (Introducing "The Communists," referred to hereafter as "Kung-Ch'an-Tang Jen"), *Hsüan-chi*, II, 570-73, 577-80. Mao Tse-tung, "Mu-ch'ien Hsing-shih ho Tang ti Jen-wu" (The Current Situation and the Task of the Party), *Hsüan-chi*, II, 585.

³⁰ Mao Tse-tung, "Chung-Kuo-Ko-Ming," *Hsüan-chi*, II, 622-23.

³¹ Mao Tse-tung, "Kung-Ch'an-Tang Jen," *Hsüan-chi*, II, 570; Liu Shao-ch'i, "Tsai Chung-Kuo-Kung-Ch'an-Tang Ch'en-li San-shih-chou-lien Ch'ing-chu-ta-hui shang ti Chiang-hua" (Address on the 30th Anniversary of the Communist Party of China), *Jen-Min Jih-Pao* (People's Daily, Peking), July 1, 1951, p. 2; Cf. "General Program" of the "Constitution of the Communist Party of China" in Liu Shao-ch'i, *On the Party* (Peking, 1950), p. 157.

³² Stalin, "Revolucija," *Bol'shevik*, No. 10 (May 31, 1927), p. 14; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 587; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 286.

³³ *Ibid.*, *Bol'shevik*, No. 10 (May 31, 1927), p. 14; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 587; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 285. Cf. also Stalin, "Zametki na sovremennye temy II: o Kitae" (Remarks on the Contemporary Problems II: on China, referred to hereafter as "Zametki"), *Pravda*, No. 169 (3701), July 28, 1927, p. 3; *Ob oppozicii*, pp. 618-19; *Sočinenija*, IX, 336; Stalin, "Beseda," *Ob oppozicii*, p. 562; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 240-41.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, *Ob oppozicii*, pp. 569-70; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 251-52.

anti-imperialist struggle, would become a revolutionary ally of the proletariat.³⁵ He warned the Chinese Communists that in order to facilitate the establishment of the leadership of the proletariat and of its Communist Party, the Party should stand at the fore of the agrarian revolution. It must teach the peasants, especially the poor peasants, to organize into revolutionary unions and committees, and then lead them to confiscate the holdings of the landlords.³⁶

Stalin thought that the sooner the peasantry was drawn into the revolution, the stronger would be the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal front in China.³⁷ He even advised the Chinese Communists, and especially their revolutionary army, to help the peasants in their struggle against the landlords, just as the Bolsheviks did during the Russian Civil War, to win their sympathetic understanding and their support.³⁸ This was the approach necessary to stir up millions of the Chinese peasants to revolution.³⁹

It is thought that on the subject of strategy for the Communist revolution in China, Stalin and Trotsky differed chiefly in the importance of the peasantry. Trotsky, in Stalin's opinion, underestimated the agrarian revolution and the role of the peasantry in the Chinese revolution.⁴⁰ This stand, Stalin felt, constituted a fundamental mistake from which the other mistakes of the Trotsky oppositionists on the Chinese problem arose.⁴¹

In fact, Stalin was greatly impressed by the large-scale agrarian uprisings in Hunan, Hupeh, Honan and other provinces in the early phase of the revolution.⁴² Again he stressed his point: "The victory of the agrarian revolution is the victory of the bourgeois-

³⁵ Stalin, "Ešče raz k natsional'nomu voprosu—po povodu stat'i t. Semiča" (Once Again on the National Problem—in Connection with Comrade Semich's Article), *Bol'shevik*, No. 11-12 (June 30, 1925), p. 26; and *Sočinenija* (Moscow, 1947), VII, 222.

³⁶ Stalin, "Beseda," *Ob oppozicii*, pp. 578-79; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 264-65.

³⁷ Stalin, "O perspektivakh," *Kommunističeskij internacional*, No. 13(71) (Dec. 10, 1926), pp. 15-16; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 431; and *Sočinenija*, VIII, 368; Stalin, "Meždunarodnoe," *Ob oppozicii*, p. 651; and *Sočinenija*, X, 19.

³⁸ Stalin, "O perspektivakh," *Kommunističeskij internacional*, No. 13(71) (Dec. 10, 1926), p. 17; *Ob oppozicii*, pp. 432-33; and *Sočinenija*, VIII, 370-71.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, *Kommunističeskij internacional*, p. 16; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 431; and *Sočinenija*, VIII, 369.

⁴⁰ Stalin, "Revoljucija," *Bol'shevik*, No. 10 (May 31, 1927), p. 17; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 591; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 290-91; Stalin, "Zametki," *Pravda*, July 28, 1927, p. 3; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 619; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 337.

⁴¹ Stalin, "Revoljucija," *Bol'shevik*, No. 10, p. 18; *Ob oppozicii*, pp. 592-93; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 293.

⁴² *Ibid.*, *Bol'shevik*, No. 10, p. 16; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 590; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 289; Stalin, "Zametki," *Pravda*, July 28, 1927, p. 3; *Ob oppozicii*, pp. 619, 623; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 336, 342-43.

democratic revolution” and “the victory of the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.”⁴³

Evidently Mao has found no reason to reject the place given by Stalin to the peasantry in the Communist revolution in China. He regards the peasantry as the most reliable ally of the Chinese proletariat, indeed, the core of the revolutionary forces in China.⁴⁴ The Chinese Communists, in general, accept Stalin’s dicta on the Chinese revolution, that is, forming a strong, solid alliance between workers and peasants in order to guarantee the complete victory of the revolution.⁴⁵

As early as November 1926, Stalin said, “The revolutionary armies in China are the most important factor in the struggle of the Chinese workers and peasants for their own liberation.”⁴⁶ In China, he continued, unlike the Russian revolution of 1905, there were not the unarmed people opposing the armies of the old regime, “but an armed people represented by its revolutionary army.” He characterized the Communist revolution in China as “an armed revolution fighting against an armed counter-revolution.” He considered this armed revolution “one of the special features as well as one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution.”⁴⁷

In theory, Stalin elaborated that as a rule, peaceful transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the proletarian revolution is impossible. He referred to Lenin’s judgment regarding the course of revolution in Russia after the failure in July 1917, emphasizing that in China it would be even more impossible to achieve a peaceful revolution—“peaceful transition to the proletarian revolution should be considered excluded.”⁴⁸ Because there were too many “enemies” of the Communist revolution in China, he declared that revolution “cannot go on without a fight.”⁴⁹

On the practical side, Stalin felt that “the Chinese Communists should pay special attention to the work in the army.”⁵⁰ The Chinese Communists needed to strengthen their position in the

⁴³ Stalin, “Revoljucija,” *Bol’shevik*, No. 10, p. 19; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 593; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 293.

⁴⁴ Mao Tse-tung, “Chung-Kuo-Ko-Ming,” *Chüan-chi*, II, 614.

⁴⁵ Chang Ju-hsin, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁴⁶ Stalin, “O perspektivakh,” *Kommunističeskij internacional*, No. 13 (71) (Dec. 10, 1926), p. 12; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 427; and *Sočinenija*, VIII, 362.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, *Kommunističeskij internacional*, p. 12; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 427; and *Sočinenija*, VIII, 363.

⁴⁸ Stalin, “Beseda,” *Ob oppozicii*, pp. 570–71; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 253; Stalin, “Revoljucija,” *Bol’shevik*, No. 10, p. 23; *Ob oppozicii*, pp. 599–600; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 303.

⁴⁹ Stalin, “Beseda,” *Ob oppozicii*, p. 570; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 252–53.

⁵⁰ Stalin, “O perspektivakh,” *Kommunističeskij internacional*, No. 13 (71) (Dec. 10, 1926), p. 13; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 427; and *Sočinenija*, VIII, 363.

army, revolutionize it, reorganize it. From the instrument of individual militarist-adventurists they must fashion the army into the weapon of revolution.⁵¹

Stalin also advocated the creation of the Red Army in China. He considered the Red Army a sheer necessity for the struggle, not only at the actual fighting fronts but especially in the rear against all kinds of counter-revolutionary forces.⁵² He suggested that the Red Army be created on the basis of reliable corps composed of revolutionary peasants and workers.⁵³ The Chinese Communists should intensify political work in the Red Army and turn it into the "real and model carrier of the ideas" of revolution in China.⁵⁴ They were also advised to put military affairs first, to study military science closely, and to take up commanding posts in order to "guarantee that the revolutionary army in China go along the right way, directly to the goal."⁵⁵

In fact, the idea of military bases for the revolutionary armies in China was Stalin's suggestion. Whether it was a coincidence or not, Mao Tse-tung's successful strategy of armed soviets had first been conceived and hinted at by Stalin. In February 1927, a month and a half before Chiang Kai-shek's drastic purging of the Communists from the Kuomintang, it was Stalin who had the Comintern instruct the Chinese Party to arm the workers and peasants and turn the various adjacent localities of peasant committees into bases of revolutionary power "with armed self-defense."⁵⁶

Mao has often quoted as a favorite guiding concept Stalin's dictum that armed revolution is an advantageous attribute of the Communist revolution in China.⁵⁷ Where Chinese Communist literature blames the former "opportunistic" leadership of Ch'en Tu-hsiu for ignoring Stalin's plan of action in regard to armed struggle so that the Chinese Party became helpless in defeat, it praises Mao for faithfully executing and supporting Stalin's plan for China. He (Mao) created a people's revolutionary army and established revolutionary bases in the villages, and finally won the great victory of the

⁵¹ Stalin, "Beseda," *Ob oppozicii*, p. 579; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 265.

⁵² *Ibid.*, *Ob oppozicii*, p. 580; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 266-67.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, *Ob oppozicii*, p. 580; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 266.

⁵⁴ Stalin, "O perspektivakh," *Kommunističeskij internacional*, No. 13(71), p. 13; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 427; and *Sočinenija*, VIII, 363.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, *Kommunističeskij internacional*, No. 13(71), p. 13; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 428; and *Sočinenija*, VIII, 364.

⁵⁶ Stalin, "Meždunarodnoe," *Ob oppozicii*, p. 652; and *Sočinenija*, X, 20.

⁵⁷ Mao Tse-tung, "Chan-cheng ho Chan-lüeh Wen-ti" (The War and Strategic Problems), *Hsüan-chi*, II, 505, 507, 508; Mao Tse-tung, "Kung-Ch'an-Tang Jen," *Hsüan-chi*, II, 571; Mao Tse-tung, "Chung-Kuo-Ko-Ming," *Hsüan-chi*, II, 605; *et. al.*

revolutionary war. Thus he is extolled for having "developed Stalin's teachings on armed struggle into a complete and integral theory of the peasants' revolutionary war under the leadership of the proletariat in semi-colonial and semi-feudal China."⁵⁸

"The problem of allies of the proletariat is one of the principal questions of the Chinese [Communist] revolution,"⁵⁹ Stalin said, for he considered the "united front policy" a fundamental requirement. Lenin first advocated this principle of revolution for defeating more powerful enemies. He urged the Communists in various bourgeois countries to utilize all available opportunities to win allies of a mass character, no matter how temporary, unstable, unreliable or conditional.⁶⁰ Stalin specifically stressed these Leninist tactics of making revolutionary blocs with the non-proletarian classes and groups.⁶¹

The "revolutionary significance" of the "united front" tactics is to enable the Communist Party "to conduct independent political and organizational work" among its allies so as to organize the revolutionary workers, peasants, intelligentsia, and other social groups, under the leadership of the proletariat.⁶² The Communist Party must become the leading force in the broad working masses.⁶³ According to Stalin, as early as March 1927, the Comintern instructed the Chinese Party in the necessity of conducting a determined "united front" policy through the development of mass movements, or the so-called mass line tactics.⁶⁴

Stalin made it clear that the Chinese proletariat had the peasantry, the city poor, the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia and the national bourgeoisie as allies during the Canton period of the Northern Expedition,⁶⁵ the first three as allies during the Wuhan period,⁶⁶

⁵⁸ Chang Ju-hsin, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁵⁹ Stalin, "Zametki," *Pravda*, July 28, 1927, p. 3; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 621; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 339.

⁶⁰ V. I. Lenin, "Detskaja bolezn' 'levizny' v kommunizme" (Left-Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder, referred to hereafter as "Detskaja"), in Lenin, *Sočinenija* (Collected Works, referred to hereafter as *Sočinenija*), 3rd ed. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1931), XXV, 210-11.

⁶¹ Stalin, "Zametki," *Pravda*, July 28, 1927, p. 3; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 626; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 347-48.

⁶² Stalin, "Meždunarodnoe," *Ob oppozicii*, pp. 649-50; and *Sočinenija*, X, 16-17.

⁶³ Stalin, "Beseda," *Ob oppozicii*, p. 579; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 265-66.

⁶⁴ Stalin, "Voprosy," *Pravda*, April 21, 1927, p. 3; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 553; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 224; Stalin, "Meždunarodnoe," *Ob oppozicii*, pp. 652-53; and *Sočinenija*, X, 20.

⁶⁵ Stalin, "Zametki," *Pravda*, July 28, 1927, p. 3; *Ob oppozicii*, pp. 621, 625; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 340, 346.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, *Pravda*, July 28, 1927, p. 3; *Ob oppozicii*, pp. 622, 625; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 341, 346.

and the first two as allies during the subsequent period.⁶⁷ He considered the peasantry and the city poor as more reliable, the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia as less reliable, and the national bourgeoisie as completely unreliable.⁶⁸ To offset the Wuhan debacle, Stalin urged that the broad masses of the peasantry and the city poor be rallied around the proletariat to constitute a basis for the proletarian leadership and to aid enormously in the cause of revolution.⁶⁹ He was convinced that without the "united front" tactics, success for the proletariat in China would be impossible.⁷⁰

In accord with the Leninist-Stalinist thesis of the "united front," Mao Tse-tung called on the Chinese proletariat to understand that they could not achieve the victory of revolution singlehanded. They could hope to succeed, said he, only through "the formation of a revolutionary united front with all possible revolutionary classes and strata under various different circumstances."⁷¹ He also accepted the Stalin gradation of the dependability of alliances with the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie. He called this Stalinist formula "one of the principal laws verified by the history of the Chinese revolution."⁷²

The Chinese Communists generally believe that Mao has ably followed the Leninist-Stalinist "united front" tactics and developed it into a working revolutionary strategy for China. Mao himself has stated that the bourgeois-democratic revolution should be a revolution of an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal united front, and that the subsequent regime should be "a dictatorship of the united front," both under the leadership of the proletariat.⁷³ On July 1, 1949, following the conquest of most of the Chinese mainland, Mao did not hesitate to announce publicly that the Stalinist "united front" tactics had played a prominent role in the Communist victory in China.⁷⁴

Stalin taught the Chinese Communists that "the creation of the soviets of the workers' and peasants' deputies means to lay the foundation of the soviet regime in China."⁷⁵ Organizing the soviets

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, *Pravda*, July 28, 1927, p. 3; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 623; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 343.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, *Pravda*, July 28, 1927, p. 3; *Ob oppozicii*, pp. 621-22; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 340.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, *Pravda*, July 28, 1927, p. 3; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 624; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 343-44.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, *Pravda*, July 28, 1927, p. 3; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 621; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 339.

⁷¹ Mao Tse-tung, "Chung-Kuo-Ko-Ming," *Hsüan-chi*, II, 616.

⁷² *Loc. cit.*

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 618-19.

⁷⁴ Mao Tse-tung, *Lun Jen-Min-Min-Chu-Chuan-Cheng* (On People's Democratic Dictatorship) (Sian, 1949), pp. 7-8.

⁷⁵ Stalin, "Beseda," *Ob oppozicii*, p. 578; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 264.

as the revolutionary regime would provide the necessary transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the proletarian revolution. Under the given conditions in China, "no transition is possible without the soviets of the workers' and peasants' deputies."⁷⁶

Stalin thought it particularly pertinent for the Communist Party to establish these soviets during the transition from the agrarian revolution and from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the proletarian revolution,⁷⁷ since they are, in the main, also "organs of the new revolutionary regime" and "the centers for the organization of revolution." As a matter of fact, the Second Congress of the Comintern adopted a resolution concerning the creation of the soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies in such countries as China and India.⁷⁸

In Stalin's eyes the nature of the future regime in China should be principally anti-imperialist. It would be a transitional regime leading away from capitalism into socialism. For this purpose the soviets of the workers' and peasants' deputies would serve best, because they would be all-embracing organs of mass character for immediate revolutionary struggle.⁷⁹ When the victorious agrarian revolution expands at full swing in China, the soviets must be set up for the gradual change "to the new proletarian type of the organization of state."⁸⁰

For the Chinese Communists, Stalin's analysis of the problem of the revolutionary regime in China set up for the Chinese revolution a clear-cut objective. They regarded Stalin's theory in this respect as "highly instructive." "For more than two decades, the Chinese revolution has followed exactly Stalin's directions," and "the people's democracy they established is modeled after the very pattern of regime anticipated by Stalin."⁸¹

In general, the Communist authors in China and the USSR all recognize that under the successful leadership of Mao Tse-tung the course of revolution in China has followed the path indicated by Stalin.⁸² Ever since the early days of the active Communist revolu-

⁷⁶ Stalin, "Revoljucija," *Bol'shevik*, No. 10 (May 31, 1927), p. 23; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 600; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 303.

⁷⁷ Stalin, "Beseda," *Ob oppozicii*, pp. 576, 578; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 261, 264.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, *Ob oppozicii*, p. 576; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 261.

⁷⁹ Stalin, "K voprosam Kitaiskoj revoljucii: otvet t. Marčulinu" (On the Problems of the Chinese Revolution: a Reply to Comrade Marčulin), *Derevenskij kommunist* (Rural Communist), No. 10 (Moscow, May 15, 1927); and *Sočinenija*, IX, 235.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, *Sočinenija*, IX, 237.

⁸¹ Chang Ju-hsin, *op. cit.*, p. 3; cf. Mao Tse-tung, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8, 11-14.

⁸² Chang Ju-hsin, *op. cit.*, p. 3; "Tridcatiletie kommunističeskoj partii Kitaja" (The Thirtieth Anniversary of the Communist Party of China, Editorial), *Bol'shevik*, No. 12 (June, 1952), p. 8; M. Mitin, "Pervyj tom izbrannykh proizvedenij

tion in China, Mao and his lieutenants have been mindful of Stalin's plan of action in creating the leadership of the proletariat. They have supported the peasants' revolution, organized the revolutionary army, adopted the "united front" tactics, and established the revolutionary regime. Mao is said "to have executed faithfully Stalin's instructions" and thus to have led the Communist revolution in China to its final victory.⁸³

Ch'en Po-ta, Communist theoretician and one-time political secretary of Mao Tse-tung, points out that Stalin had had a close relationship with the Communist revolution in China, through his tracts and his step-by-step plan of action.⁸⁴ Stalin's analyses of the problems of the Chinese revolution are said to have defeated the so-called Trotskyite nonsense and armed the minds of the Chinese Communists. According to Ch'en, Stalin's program for the revolution in China was concrete and practical so that theory could be put into reality. "They were not only completely correct for that time," he says, "but have been verified as completely accurate by more than two decades of revolutionary practice in China."⁸⁵ Hence, he concludes, the victory of the Chinese revolution is the victory of Marxism-Leninism and the victory of Stalin's theory on the Chinese revolution.⁸⁶

Since the prominence given Stalin for his role in the Communist revolution in China is tantamount to worship, it is not surprising that in both Soviet and Chinese Communist literature, Mao Tse-tung has been given credit only for the successful implementation of the Stalinist principles.⁸⁷

In his salutatory message to Stalin and the delegates attending the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mao, on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPC and in his own behalf, declared: "Comrade Stalin's brilliant instructions on the

Mao Cze-duna" (The First Volume of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung), *ibid.*, No. 17 (Sept., 1952), p. 60. Cf. also footnote 87, below.

⁸³ Chang Ju-hsin, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁸⁴ Ch'en Po-ta, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁸⁶ Ch'en Po-ta, *Lun Mao-Tse-Tung Szu-hsiang: Ma-K'e-Szu-Le-Nin-Chu-I yu Chung-Kuo-Ko-Ming ti Cbieh-ho* (On the Thought of Mao Tse-tung: Combination of Marxism-Leninism and the Chinese Revolution) (Peking, 1951), pp. 18, 56.

⁸⁷ Cf. footnote 82; M. F. Jur'ev, *Istoričeskaja pobeda Kitaiskogo naroda* (Historical Victory of the Chinese People) (Moscow, 1950), pp. 3, 26-27; V. Ja. Avarin, *Uspekhi Kitaiskoj Narodnoj Respubliki* (The Successes of the Chinese People's Republic) (Moscow, 1950), pp. 4, 13; O. A. Arturov, *Gosudarstvennyj stroj Kitaiskoj Narodnoj Respubliki* (The Governmental Structure of the Chinese People's Republic) (Moscow, 1951), pp. 3-4; Hu Hua, *Hsieh-hsi Le-Nin Szu-Ta-Lin kuan-yu Chung-Kuo-Ko-Ming ti Hsieh-shuo* (Learning the Theories of Lenin and Stalin on the Chinese Revolution) (Peking, 1951), pp. 76-77; *et al.*

problems of the Chinese revolution have immense and invaluable significance for the victory” of the Communist revolution in China.⁸⁸ In an article honoring Stalin’s death, Mao again acknowledged Stalin’s leading role in the Communist cause in China by saying that “we Chinese Communists . . . find our own road to victory in the great works of Comrade Stalin.”⁸⁹

A basic rule of Leninism advocates the application of “international tactics of the proletarian revolution to the struggle for an all-world Soviet republic.”⁹⁰ According to Stalin, leaders of international Communism are to give account of this tactical principle of Leninism for individual countries in the light of their political, economic and cultural characteristics.⁹¹ Stalin’s successful role as the guiding light of Communist victory in China is, of course, applauded in the Communist world.

This is, however, not all. In his final major, though brief, speech at the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Stalin described Communist China as a “shock brigade” which would greatly facilitate the “revolutionary struggle” in other non-Communist countries.⁹² The Chinese Communists have indicated their determination to continue to follow Stalin’s “immortal” theory and “invincible . . . scientific” thought to further victories.⁹³ Their devotion to Stalin’s cause was clearly reflected in their unprecedented mourning at Stalin’s death.⁹⁴ Thus, the influence of Stalin the Master, even after death, and the unreserved efforts of his Chinese disciples may spell far more than mere Communist victory within the Chinese boundaries.

⁸⁸ The message was signed by Mao and read at the Congress in Moscow by Liu Shao-ch’i, head of the Chinese Communist delegation. For the text of the message see *Jen-Min Jih-Pao* (People’s Daily), Oct. 11, 1952, p. 1. The theme here cited was revealed earlier in “Ch’ing-ho Su-Lien-Kung-Ch’an-Tang Ti-Shih-Chiu-Tzu-Tai-Piao-Ta-Hui” (Congratulate the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Editorial), *ibid.*, Oct. 7, 1952, p. 1.

⁸⁹ Mao Tse-tung, “The Greatest Friendship,” *People’s China*, No. 6 (Peking, March 16, 1953), p. 4.

⁹⁰ Lenin, “Detskaja,” *Sočinenija*, XXV, 228.

⁹¹ Stalin, “Zametki,” *Pravda*, July 28, 1927, p. 3; *Ob oppozicii*, p. 620; and *Sočinenija*, IX, 338.

⁹² For the text of Stalin’s speech see *Pravda*, Oct. 15, 1952, p. 1.

⁹³ Chang Ju-hsin, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁹⁴ “A Nation Mourns,” *People’s China*, No. 6 (March 16, 1953), pp. 13–20; “Farewell to Stalin,” *ibid.*, pp. 21–23; “Stalin Continues to Inspire the Chinese People,” *ibid.*, No. 7 (Apr. 1, 1953), pp. 25–26; “Forward under the Banner of Stalin,” *ibid.*, pp. 26–28.