

J. STALIN

POLITICAL REPORT
OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
TO THE
FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

*

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J. S T A L I N

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OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
TO THE
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December 3, 1927



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I THE GROWING CRISIS OF WORLD CAPITALISM AND THE EXTERNAL SITUATION OF THE U.S.S.R.

Our country, comrades, is living and developing in a capitalist encirclement. Its external situation is determined not only by its internal strength, but also by the state of this capitalist encirclement, by the situation in the capitalist countries which surround our country, by their strength and weakness, by the strength and weakness of the oppressed classes all over the world, by the strength and weakness of the revolutionary movement of these classes. Not to speak of the fact that our revolution is a part of the international revolutionary movement of the oppressed classes.

That is why I think that the Central Committee's report should start with a brief sketch of our country's international situation; with a brief sketch of the situation in the capitalist countries and of the state of the revolutionary movement in all countries.

THE ECONOMICS OF WORLD CAPITALISM AND THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE STRUGGLE FOR FOREIGN MARKETS

a) The first question is that of the state of production and trade in the biggest capitalist countries.

The fundamental fact in this sphere, comrades, is that during the past two years, during the period under review, *production* in the capitalist countries has exceeded the prewar standards, has gone beyond the prewar standards.

Here are some figures pertaining to this.

Index of world output of *pig iron*: in 1925 it was 97.6 per cent of prewar; in 1926 it was already 100.5 per cent of prewar; for 1927 no complete figures are available; figures are available for the first half year, which indicate a further increase in the output of pig iron.

Index of world output of *steel*: 1925—118.5 per cent; 1926—122.6 per cent of prewar.

Index of world output of *coal*: 1925—97.9 per cent; 1926—a slight drop—96.8 per cent. This was evidently the effect of the English strike.

World consumption of *cotton*: 1925-26—108.3 per cent of prewar; 1926-27—112.5 per cent of prewar.

World crop of five *bread grains*:² 1925—107.2 per cent of prewar; 1926—110.5 per cent; 1927—112.3 per cent.

Thus, slowly, in tiny steps, the general index of world production is going forward and has exceeded the prewar level.

Some capitalist countries, however, are not going, but leaping forward, leaving behind the prewar level; for example, the United States of America, and partly Japan. Figures for the United States: output of manufacturing industry in 1925—148 per cent of prewar; 1926—152 per cent of prewar; output of mining industry in 1925—143 per cent of prewar; 1926—154 per cent.

Growth of world *trade*. World trade is not proceeding as rapidly as production, it usually lags behind production, but for all that it has approached the prewar standard. Index of foreign trade all over the world and in the major countries in 1925—98.1 per cent of prewar; in 1926—97.1 per cent. For individual countries: United States of America—1925—134.3 per cent of prewar; 1926—143 per cent. France—98.2 per cent and 99.2 per cent. Germany—74.8 per cent and 73.6 per cent. Japan—176.9 and 170.1 per cent.

In general and on the whole, world trade has already approached the prewar standard and some countries, the United States and Japan,

for example, have already exceeded the prewar standards.

Lastly, a third series of facts which indicate technical progress, the rationalization of capitalist industry, the creation of new branches, growth of trustification, growth of the cartelization of industry on an international scale. These facts, I think, are known to everybody. Therefore, I will not dilate on them. I will merely observe that capital has prospered not only as regards increasing output and trade, but also as regards improving the techniques of production, as regards technical progress, the rationalization of production; and all this has led to the further strengthening of the largest trusts and to the organization of new, powerful, monopolistic cartels.

Such are the facts, comrades, that must be noted, and which must serve as the point of departure.

Does all this mean that, thereby, the stabilization of capitalism has become firm and stable? Of course not! It was already stated in the report to the Fourteenth Congress³ that capitalism may reach the prewar standard, may exceed this prewar standard, may rationalize its production, but that this did not imply—did not by a long way imply—that the stabilization of capitalism could become firm, that capitalism could recover its former, prewar stability. On the

contrary, it is this very stabilization, the fact that output is growing, that trade is growing, that technical progress and the potentialities for production are increasing, whereas the world market, the limits of this market and the spheres of influence of the individual imperialist groups remain more or less stable—it is precisely this that is giving rise to the deepest and acutest crisis of world capitalism, which is fraught with new wars and is threatening the possibility of any degree of stabilization whatever.

Partial stabilization is giving rise to the intensification of the crisis of capitalism; the growing crisis is upsetting stabilization—such are the dialectics of the development of capitalism in the present period of history.

b) The most characteristic feature of this growth of production and trade of world capitalism is that this development is *uneven*. Development is not proceeding in such a way that the capitalist countries are moving forward one behind the other, smoothly and evenly, without hindering each other and without upsetting each other, but, on the contrary, in such a way that some countries are being ousted and are declining, while others are pushing forward and upward; it is proceeding in the form of a mortal struggle between continents and countries for supremacy in the market.

The economic centre is shifting from Europe to America, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. As a consequence, the share of world trade of America and Asia is growing at the expense of Europe.

A few figures: whereas in 1913, Europe's share of world foreign trade was 58.5 per cent, America's—21.2 per cent and Asia's—12.3 per cent, in 1925, however, Europe's share dropped to 50 per cent, America's share rose to 26.6 per cent and Asia's share to 16 per cent. While we have countries in which capitalism is tearing ahead (U.S.A. and partly Japan), we have other countries which are in a state of economic decline (England). Parallel with growing capitalist Germany and rising countries which have been coming to the front in recent years (Canada, Australia, Argentina, China and India), we have countries with stabilized capitalism (France, Italy). The number of claimants to markets is growing, production potentialities are growing and supply is growing, but the dimensions of markets and the borders of spheres of influence remain more or less stable.

Such is the basis of the growing irreconcilable contradictions of present-day capitalism.

c) This contradiction between the growth of the potentialities of production and the relative stability of markets is the basis of the fact that the problem of markets is today the fundamental

problem of capitalism. Intensification of the problem of markets in general, especially the intensification of the problem of foreign markets, intensification of the problem of markets for the export of capital in particular—such is the present state of capitalism.

This, properly speaking, explains why the working of mills and factories under capacity is becoming a common phenomenon. Raising tariff barriers only pours oil on the flames. Capitalism is finding that the present limits of markets and spheres of influence are becoming too tight for it. Peaceful attempts to solve the problem of markets have produced no results, nor could they do so. The well-known declaration of the bankers in 1926 concerning free trade ended, as is common knowledge, in a fiasco.⁴ The Economic Conference of the League of Nations in 1927, the object of which was to "unite the economic interests" of the capitalist countries, also ended in a fiasco. The peaceful road to the solution of the problem of markets is closed to capitalism. There remains only *one* "way out" for capitalism: a *new* division of colonies and spheres of influence by force, by armed conflict, by means of new imperialist wars.

Stabilization is engendering the growth of the crisis of capitalism.

THE INTERNATIONAL POLICY OF CAPITALISM AND THE PREPARATION OF NEW IMPERIALIST WARS

a) In this connection, the question of re-dividing the world and spheres of influence, which constitute the basis of foreign markets, is today the fundamental question in the policy of world capitalism. I have already said that the present distribution of colonies and spheres of influence established as a result of the last imperialist war has already managed to become obsolete. It now fails to satisfy either the United States, which is trying to penetrate into Asia (primarily China), not being content with South America; or England, whose dominions and a number of most important Eastern markets are slipping from her hands; or Japan, who every now and again is "hindered" in China by England and America; or Italy and France, who have an incalculable number of "points of dispute" in the Danube countries and in the Mediterranean; and least of all does it satisfy Germany, who is still bereft of colonies.

Hence the "general" striving for a new division of markets and sources of raw materials. That the Asiatic markets and the routes to them constitute the chief arena of the struggle needs no proof. Hence the series of key problems, which constitute whole hotbeds of new conflicts. Hence

the so-called Pacific problem, (the America-Japan-England antagonism) as the cause of the struggle for supremacy in Asia and on the routes to it. Hence the Mediterranean problem (the England-France-Italy antagonism) as the cause of the struggle for supremacy on the Mediterranean coast, as the cause of the struggle for the shortest routes to the East. Hence the intensification of the oil problem (antagonism between England and America), for without oil it is impossible to fight, and whoever has the advantage in oil has a chance of victory in the impending war.

Recently, the British press published Chamberlain's "latest" plan for "settling" the Mediterranean problem. I cannot guarantee the authenticity of this plan; but there can be no doubt that the appearance of Chamberlain's plan in the press is symptomatic. This plan is to transfer the "mandate" for Syria from France to Italy, Tangier is to be transferred to France on the payment of financial compensation to Spain, the Cameroons are to be restored to Germany, Italy is to pledge herself to stop "making trouble" in the Balkans, etc.

All this is on the pretext of fighting the Soviets. It is well known that no dirty work is undertaken nowadays without dragging in the Soviets.

But what is the real meaning of this plan? The real meaning of the plan is to oust the

French bourgeoisie from Syria. Since ancient times Syria has been the gate to the East, to Mesopotamia, Egypt, etc. From Syria it is possible to cause England harm in the region of the Suez Canal and in the region of Mesopotamia. And so, apparently, Chamberlain wants to put a stop to this unpleasant state of affairs. Needless to say, the appearance of this plan in the press cannot be called an accident. The value of this fact lies in that it presents a vivid picture of the squabbling, conflicts and military clashes with which the present relations between the so-called "great powers" are fraught.

As regards the present state of the oil problem and the struggle around it, rather eloquent evidence on this is given in the October issue of the well-known American magazine the *World's Work*.⁵

"Herein lies a very real danger to peace and understanding between the Anglo-Saxon peoples. . . . The support of American businessmen by the State Department will inevitably become stronger as the need for it increases. If the British Government becomes identified with the British oil industry, sooner or later the American Government will become identified with the American oil industry. The struggle cannot be transferred to the governments without vastly increasing the *danger of war*."

Doubts are impossible: things are moving in the direction of organizing new coalitions of

powers for the purpose of preparing new wars for foreign markets, for sources of raw materials, and for the routes to them.

b) Have attempts been made during the period under review to bring about a "peaceful settlement" of the maturing military conflicts? Yes, more than might have been expected; but they have led to nothing, absolutely nothing. Not only that: these attempts have turned out to be merely a screen for the preparatory work the "powers" are conducting for new wars, a screen for the purpose of deceiving the people, for deceiving "public opinion."

Take the League of Nations, which, according to the mendacious bourgeois press and no less mendacious Social-Democratic press, is an instrument of peace. What has all the League of Nations' chatter about peace, disarmament, reduction of armaments, led to? To nothing, except the deception of the masses, except new spurts in armaments, except a further intensification of maturing conflicts. Can it be regarded as accidental that the League of Nations has been chattering about disarmament for three years and that the so-called Second International has been supporting this false chatter for three years, and yet the "nations" are continuing to arm and arm, expanding the old conflicts among the "powers," piling up new conflicts, and thus undermining the cause of peace?

What does the failure of the tripartite conference for the reduction of naval armaments (England, America and Japan)⁶ indicate if not that the Pacific problem will be the cause of new imperialist wars, that the "powers" do not want either to disarm or to reduce armaments? What has the League of Nations done to avert this danger?

Or take, for example, the recent declarations of the Soviet delegation in Geneva on the question of genuine (and not sham) disarmament.⁷ What is the explanation of the fact that Comrade Litvinov's straightforward and honest declaration in favour of complete disarmament gave the League of Nations a stroke of paralysis and came as a "complete surprise" to it? Does not this fact show that the League of Nations is not an instrument of peace and disarmament, but an instrument for covering up new armaments and the preparation of new wars?

The corrupt bourgeois press of all countries, from Japan to England, from France to America, is shouting at the top of its voice that the Soviet disarmament proposals are "insincere." Why not, then, test the sincerity of the Soviet proposals and proceed at once, in practice, to disarm, or at least considerably to reduce armaments? What prevents this?

Or, for example, the series of "friendship pacts" between capitalist states: the pact be-

tween France and Yugoslavia, the pact between Italy and Albania, the "pact of friendship" that Pilsudski is preparing between Poland and Lithuania, the "Locarno system,"⁸ the "spirit of Locarno," etc.—what is this if not a system of preparation of new wars and of the alignment of forces for future military clashes?

Or, for example, take the following facts: from 1913 to 1927, *the numerical strength of the armies* of France, England, Italy, the United States and Japan increased from 1,888,000 to 2,262,000 men; in the same period the *military budgets* of the same countries grew from 2,345 million gold rubles to 3,948 million, the number of *aircraft in commission* in these five countries rose, in the period from 1923 to 1927, from 2,655 to 4,340; the *cruiser tonnage* of these five powers rose from 724,000 tons in 1922 to 864,000 tons in 1926; the position as regards *war chemicals* is illustrated by the well-known statement of General Fries, Chief of the United States War Chemical Service: "One aerial-chemical bomb of 450 kilograms charged with Lewisite can make ten blocks of New York uninhabitable, and 100 tons of Lewisite dropped from 50 aeroplanes can make the whole of New York uninhabitable, at least for a week."

What do these facts show if not that the preparation of a new war is going full steam ahead?

Such are the results of the "peace policy" and of the "disarmament" policy of the bourgeois states in general, especially of the League of Nations, and of Social-Democratic servility to capital in particular.

Formerly, they justified the growth of armaments on the grounds that Germany was armed from head to foot. This "justification" falls away today because Germany has been disarmed.

Is it not clear that the growth of armaments is dictated by the inevitability of new imperialist wars between the "powers," that the "spirit of war" is the chief content of the "spirit of Locarno"?

I think that the present "peaceful relations" could be compared with an old, worn-out shirt consisting of patches held together by thin thread. It would be enough to tug this thread fairly hard, to break it in some place or other, for the entire shirt to fall to pieces, leaving nothing but patches. It would be enough to shake the present "peaceful relations" somewhere in Albania or Lithuania, in China or North Africa, for the whole "edifice of peaceful relations" to collapse.

Such was the situation before the last imperialist war, when the assassination in Sarajevo⁹ led to war.

Such is the situation now.

Out of stabilization the inevitability of new imperialist wars is arising.

THE STATE OF THE WORLD REVOLUTIONARY
MOVEMENT AND THE
HARBINGERS OF THE NEW REVOLUTIONARY
UPSWING

a) To conduct war increased armaments are not enough, the organization of new coalitions is not enough. For this it is also necessary to strengthen the rear in the capitalist countries. Not a single capitalist country can wage a serious war without first strengthening its own rear, without curbing "its" workers, without curbing "its" colonies. Hence the gradual fascistization of the policy of the bourgeois governments.

The fact that the Right bloc now rules in France, the Hicks-Deterding-Urquhart bloc in England, the bourgeois bloc in Germany, the militarist party in Japan and fascist governments in Italy and Poland cannot be called accidental.

Hence the pressure that is being brought to bear upon the working class, the anti-trade union act in England,¹⁰ the "nation in arms" act in France,¹¹ the abolition of the eight-hour day in a number of countries and the bourgeois offensive against the proletariat everywhere.

Hence the increased pressure that is being brought to bear upon the colonies and depend-

ent countries, the reinforcement in those countries of imperialist troops whose number has now reached a million, of which over 700,000 are quartered in the British "spheres of influence" and "possessions."

b) It is not difficult to understand that this brutal pressure of the fascistized governments was bound to meet with a counter-movement on the part of the oppressed peoples in the colonies and of the working class in the metropolitan countries. Facts like the growth of the revolutionary movement in China, Indonesia, India, etc., are bound to have decisive significance for the fate of world imperialism.

Judge for yourselves. Of the 1,905 million inhabitants of the entire globe, 1,134 million live in colonies and dependent countries, 143,000,000 live in the U.S.S.R., 264,000,000 live in the intermediate countries, and only 363,000,000 live in the big imperialist countries which oppress colonies and dependent countries.

Clearly, the revolutionary awakening of the colonial and dependent countries presages the end of world imperialism. The fact that the Chinese revolution has not yet led to the direct victory over imperialism cannot be of decisive significance for the prospects of the revolution. Great popular revolutions never achieve final victory in the first round of battles. They grow and gain strength in the flow and ebb of their tides.

This has been the case everywhere, including Russia. So will it be in China.

The most important result of the Chinese revolution is the fact that it has awakened from their age-long slumber and has set in motion hundreds of millions of exploited and oppressed people, has utterly exposed the counterrevolutionary character of the militarist cliques, has torn the mask from the faces of the Kuomintang servitors of counterrevolution, has raised the prestige of the Communist Party among the masses of the common people, has raised the movement as a whole to a higher stage and has roused new hope in the hearts of the millions of the oppressed classes in India, Indonesia, etc. Only the blind and the fainthearted can doubt that the Chinese workers and peasants are moving towards a new revolutionary upswing.

As regards the revolutionary working-class movement in Europe, here, in this sphere too we have obvious signs of a swing to the left on the part of the rank-and-file workers and of a revolutionary revival. Facts like the English general strike and coal strike,¹² the revolutionary action of the workers of Vienna,¹³ the revolutionary demonstrations in France and Germany in connection with the murder of Sacco and Vanzetti,¹⁴ the election successes achieved by the German and Polish Communist Parties, the obvious process of differentiation that is

taking place in the British working-class movement, whereby the workers are going to the left, whereas the leaders are going to the right, into the camp of avowed social-imperialism, the degeneration of the Second International into a direct appendage of the imperialist League of Nations, the decline of the prestige of the Social-Democratic parties among broad masses of the working class, the universal growth of influence and prestige of the Comintern and its sections among the proletarians in all countries, the growth of the prestige of the U.S.S.R. among the oppressed classes all over the world, the "Congress of the Friends of the U.S.S.R.,"¹⁵ etc.—all these facts undoubtedly indicate that Europe is entering a new period of revolutionary upswing.

If a fact like the murder of Sacco and Vanzetti could serve as grounds for working-class demonstrations, it undoubtedly indicates that revolutionary energy has accumulated in the depths of the working class and is seeking, and will continue to seek, a cause, an occasion, sometimes seemingly most insignificant, to break out to the surface and hurl itself upon the capitalist regime.

We are living on the eve of a new revolutionary upswing both in the colonies and in the metropolitan countries.

Out of stabilization a new revolutionary upswing is arising.

THE CAPITALIST WORLD AND THE U.S.S.R.

a) Thus, we have all the symptoms of an extremely profound crisis and growing instability of world capitalism.

Whereas the *temporary* postwar economic crisis of 1920-1921, with its chaos within and breakdown of connections outside the capitalist countries, may be regarded as having been overcome, as a result of which the period of partial stabilization was ushered in, the *general* and *fundamental* crisis of capitalism observed as a result of the victory of the October Revolution and the dropping out of the U.S.S.R. from the world capitalist system, far from being overcome is, on the contrary, becoming more and more intense, and is shaking the very foundations of the existence of world capitalism.

Far from hindering the development of this general and fundamental crisis, stabilization, on the contrary, has created the grounds and source for its further development. The growing struggle for markets, the necessity of a new division of the world and spheres of influence, the bankruptcy of bourgeois pacifism and of the League of Nations, the feverish efforts to form new coalitions and an alignment of forces in view of the possibility of a new war, the furious

increase in armaments, the brutal pressure upon the working class and the colonial countries, the growth of the revolutionary movement in the colonies and in Europe, the growth of the prestige of the Comintern throughout the world, and lastly, the consolidation of the might of the Soviet Union and its enhanced prestige among the workers of Europe and the masses of the working people in the colonies—are all facts which cannot but shake the very foundation of world capitalism.

The stabilization of capitalism is becoming increasingly decayed and unstable.

Whereas a year or two ago it was possible, and necessary, to speak of the ebb of the revolutionary tide in Europe, today, we have all grounds for asserting that *Europe is obviously entering the period of a new revolutionary upswing*. Not to mention the colonies and dependent countries, where the position of the imperialists is becoming more and more catastrophic.

b) The hopes of the capitalists that the U.S.S.R. would be tamed, that it would undergo capitalistic degeneration, that its prestige among the workers of Europe and the masses of the working people in the colonies would decline, have collapsed. The U.S.S.R. is growing and developing precisely as a country in which Socialism is being built. Its influence among the

workers and peasants all over the world is growing and gaining strength. The very existence of the U.S.S.R. as a country in which Socialism is being built is one of the greatest factors in the disintegration of world imperialism and in the undermining of its stability both in Europe and in the colonies. The U.S.S.R. is obviously becoming the banner of the working class of Europe and of the oppressed peoples of the colonies.

Therefore, to clear the ground for the future imperialist wars, to put a tighter grip on "their" working class and to curb "their" colonies with the view to strengthening the capitalist rear, it is necessary, the bourgeois bosses think, first of all to curb the U.S.S.R., that seat and hotbed of revolution, which, moreover, represents one of the biggest markets for the capitalist countries. Hence the revival of interventionist tendencies among the imperialists, the policy of isolating the U.S.S.R., the policy of surrounding the U.S.S.R., the policy of preparing the conditions for war against the U.S.S.R.

The strengthening of interventionist tendencies in the camp of the imperialists and the danger of war (against the U.S.S.R.) is one of the fundamental factors in the present situation.

It is considered that the most "threatened" and "injured" party under the conditions of the

developing crisis of capitalism is the English bourgeoisie. And it is the English bourgeoisie that has taken the initiative in strengthening interventionist tendencies. Obviously, the assistance the Soviet workers rendered the British coal miners, and the sympathy the working class of the U.S.S.R. displays for the revolutionary movement in China, were bound to pour oil on the flames. All these circumstances determined England's rupture with the U.S.S.R. and the worsening of relations with a number of other states.

c) The struggle between two tendencies in the relations between the capitalist world and the U.S.S.R., the tendency towards military aggression (primarily England) and the tendency to continue peaceful relations (a number of other capitalist countries), is, in view of this, the fundamental fact in our foreign relations at the present time.

The facts indicating the tendency towards peaceful relations during the period under review are as follows: the Non-Aggression Pact with Turkey; the Guarantee Pact with Germany; the Tariff Agreement with Greece; the agreement with Germany regarding credits; the Guarantee Pact with Afghanistan; the Guarantee Pact with Lithuania; the initialing of a Guarantee Pact with Latvia; the Trade Agreement with Turkey; the settlement of the conflict with Switzerland; the Treaty of Neutrality with Per-

sia; improvement in relations with Japan; growth of commercial intercourse with America and Italy.

The facts indicating the tendency towards military aggression during the period under review are as follows: England's note concerning financial assistance to the striking coal miners; the raid upon the Soviet diplomatic representatives in Peking, Tientsin and Shanghai; the raid on Arcos;¹⁶ England's rupture with the U.S.S.R.; the assassination of Voikov;¹⁷ terroristic acts by British hirelings in the U.S.S.R.; strained relations with France on the question of the recall of Rakovsky.

Whereas a year or two ago it was possible, and necessary, to speak of a period of a certain equilibrium and "peaceful coexistence" between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist countries, today, we have all grounds for asserting that *the period of "peaceful coexistence" is receding into the past*, making way for the period of imperialist raids and preparation for intervention against the U.S.S.R.

True, England's attempts to form a united front against the U.S.S.R. have failed so far. The reasons for this failure are: the antagonism of interests in the camp of the imperialists; the fact that some countries are interested in maintaining economic intercourse with the U.S.S.R.; the U.S.S.R.'s peace policy; the counteraction of

the working class of Europe; the imperialists' fear of unleashing revolution in their own countries in the event of war against the U.S.S.R. But this does not mean that England will abandon her efforts to organize a united front against the U.S.S.R., that she will fail to organize such a front. The danger of war remains in spite of England's temporary failure.

Hence the task of taking into account the antagonisms in the camp of the imperialists, of postponing war by "buying off" the capitalists and of taking all measures to maintain peaceful relations.

We must not forget what Lenin said about very much in our work of construction depending upon whether we succeed in postponing war with the capitalist world, which is inevitable, but which can be postponed either until the moment when the proletarian revolution in Europe matures, or until the moment when the colonial revolutions have fully matured, or, lastly, until the moment when the capitalists fight among themselves over the division of the colonies.

Therefore, the maintenance of peaceful relations with the capitalist countries is an obligatory task for us.

Our relations with the capitalist countries are based on the assumption that the coexistence of two opposite systems is possible. Prac-

tice has fully confirmed this. Sometimes the question of the debts and credits is a stumbling block. In this our policy is clear. It is based on the formula: "give and take." If you give us credits with which to fertilize our industry, you will get a certain part of the prewar debts, which we regard as extra interest on the credits. If you don't give, you will get nothing. Facts show that we have some achievements to record as regards receiving industrial credits. I have in mind just now not only Germany, but also America and England. Wherein lies the secret? In the fact that our country represents a vast market for imports of equipment, while the capitalist countries need markets for precisely this kind of goods.

5

CONCLUSIONS

To sum up, we have:

Firstly, an increase in the contradictions within the capitalist encirclement; the necessity for capitalism of a new division of the world by means of war; the interventionist tendencies of one part of the capitalist world headed by England; the reluctance of the other part of the capitalist world to become involved in war with the U.S.S.R., preferring to establish

economic intercourse with it; the struggle between these two tendencies and the possibility, to some extent, for the U.S.S.R. to take these contradictions into account for the purpose of maintaining peace.

Secondly, we have the collapsing stabilization; growth of the colonial-revolutionary movement; symptoms of a new revolutionary upswing in Europe; enhancement of the prestige of the Comintern and its sections all over the world; obvious growth of sympathy of the working class of Europe for the U.S.S.R.; growing might of the U.S.S.R. and growing prestige of the working class of our country among the oppressed classes all over the world.

Hence the Party's tasks:

1) Along the line of the international revolutionary movement:

a) *to fight to develop the Communist parties all over the world;*

b) *to fight to strengthen the revolutionary trade unions and the workers' united front against the capitalist offensive;*

c) *to fight to strengthen the friendship between the working class of the U.S.S.R. and the working class of the capitalist countries;*

d) *to fight to strengthen the link between the working class of the U.S.S.R. and the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries.*

2) Along the line of the U.S.S.R.'s foreign policy:

a) *to fight the preparation of new imperialist wars;*

b) *to fight England's interventionist tendencies and to strengthen the U.S.S.R.'s defensive power;*

c) *a policy of peace and the maintenance of peaceful relations with the capitalist countries;*

d) *to expand our trade with the outside world on the basis of strengthening the monopoly of foreign trade;*

e) *rapprochement with the so-called "weak" and "unequal" states which are suffering from the oppression and exploitation of the ruling imperialist powers.*

II

SUCCESSES IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION AND THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN THE U.S.S.R.

Permit me, comrades, to pass to the internal situation in our country, to the successes achieved in our socialist construction, to the question of the destiny of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of its development, of its consolidation.

The Fourteenth Congress of our Party instructed the Central Committee to direct the development of our national economy from the angle of the following fundamental tasks:

firstly, that our policy should facilitate the progressive growth of production in the whole of our national economy;

secondly, that the Party's policy should facilitate the acceleration of the rate of development of industry and secure for industry the leading role in the whole of the national economy;

thirdly, that in the course of development of the national economy, the socialist sector of the national economy, the socialist forms of economy, should gain ever-increasing weight at

the expense of the private-commodity and capitalist sectors;

fourthly, that the whole of our economic development, the organization of new branches of industry, the development of certain branches for raw materials, etc., should be directed in such a way that the general development should ensure the economic independence of our country, should prevent our country from becoming an appendage of the capitalist system of world economy;

fifthly, that the dictatorship of the proletariat, the bloc of the working class and the peasant masses, and the leadership of the working class in this bloc, should be strengthened, and

sixthly, that the material and cultural conditions of the working class and of the rural poor should steadily improve.

What has our Party, the Central Committee of our Party, done in the matter of carrying out these tasks of our Party during the period under review?

I

THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AS A WHOLE

The first question—the development of the national economy as a whole. I will quote here a few of the principal figures showing the growth of the national economy as a whole, and of industry and agriculture in particular, during

the period under review. I take these figures from the well-known calculations of the State Planning Commission. I have in mind the State Planning Commission's control figures for 1927-28 and the rough draft of the five-year plan.

a) Growth of production in the whole of the national economy of the U.S.S.R. during two years. Whereas, in 1924-25, according to the State Planning Commission's new calculations, the gross output of agriculture amounted to 87.3 per cent of the prewar level and the output of industry as a whole amounted to 63.7 per cent of the prewar level, now, two years after, in 1926-27, agricultural output already amounts to 108.3 per cent, and industrial output 100.9 per cent. According to the State Planning Commission's control figures for 1927-28, a further increase in agricultural output to 111.8 per cent and of industrial output to 114.4 per cent of the prewar level is anticipated.

Growth of all trade in the country during the two years. Taking the volume of trade in 1924-25 at 100 (14,613 million chervoni rubles), we have an increase in 1926-27 of 97 per cent (28,775 million rubles), and in 1927-28 a further increase of over 116 per cent (33,440 million rubles) is anticipated.

Development of our credit system during the two years. Taking the combined balance

sheets of all our credit institutions on October 1, 1925 at 100 (5,343 million chervoni rubles), we have an increase on July 1, 1927 of 53 per cent (8,175 million rubles). There are no grounds for doubting that 1927-28 will show a further growth of our nationalized credit system.

Development of railway transport during the two years. Whereas the freight turnover of the whole of our railway system in 1924-25 amounted to 63.1 per cent of the prewar level, now, in 1926-27, it amounts to 99.1 per cent, and in 1927-28 will amount to 111.6 per cent. This is apart from the fact that during these two years the total length of our railways increased from 74,400 kilometres to 76,200 kilometres, which is an increase of 30.3 per cent above the prewar level and of 8.9 per cent above the level of 1917.

Growth of the state budget during the two years. Whereas our combined budget (the single state budget plus local budgets) in 1925-26 amounted to 72.4 per cent of the prewar level (5,024 million rubles), at the present time, i.e., 1927-28, the combined budget must amount to 110-112 per cent of the prewar level (over 7,000 million rubles). Increase during the two years—41.5 per cent.

Growth of foreign trade during the two years. Whereas our total foreign trade in 1924-

25 amounted to 1,282 million rubles, i.e., about 27 per cent of the prewar trade, now, in 1926-27, we have a turnover of 1,483 million rubles, i.e., 35.6 per cent of the prewar turnover, and it is anticipated that in 1927-28 we will have a turnover of 1,626 million rubles, i.e., 37.9 per cent of prewar.

Reasons for the slow rate of development of foreign trade:

first, the fact that the bourgeois states often place obstacles in the way of our foreign trade which sometimes amount to a secret blockade;

second, the fact that we cannot trade in conformity with the bourgeois formula: "export, even if we starve ourselves."

A good feature is the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade's favourable balance in 1926-27 amounting to 57,000,000 rubles. This is the first year since 1923-24 that we have a favourable balance of foreign trade.

As a result, we have the following picture of the general growth of the total national income during the two years: whereas the national income of the U.S.S.R. in 1924-25 amounted to 15,589 million chervoni rubles, in 1925-26 we had 20,252 million rubles, i.e., an increase for the year of 29.9 per cent; and in 1926-27 we had 22,560 million rubles, i.e., an increase of 11.4 per cent for the year. According to the State

Planning Commission's control figures, in 1927-28 we will have 24,208 million rubles, i.e., an increase of 7.3 per cent.

Bearing in mind that the average annual increase in the national income of the United States does not exceed 3-4 per cent (only once, in the '80's of the last century, did the United States have an increase in national income of about 7 per cent) and that the annual increase in the national income of other countries, England and Germany, for example, does not exceed 1-3 per cent, it must be admitted that *the rate of increase of the U.S.S.R.'s national income during the past years is a record compared with that of the big capitalist countries of Europe and America.*

Conclusion: the national economy of our country is growing at a rapid rate.

The Party's task: further to promote the development of our country's national economy in all branches of production.

b) The growth of our national economy is proceeding not blindly, not along the line of a simple quantitative increase in production, but in a certain, strictly defined direction. The decisive factors in the development of our national economy during the past two years have been the following two fundamental circumstances:

Firstly, the *keynote* of the development of our national economy is the *industrialization*

of the country, the increasingly important role played by industry in relation to agriculture.

Secondly, the development of our national economy, the industrialization of the country is proceeding *in the direction of increasing the relative weight and the commanding role of the socialist forms of economy*, in both production and trade, at the expense of the private-commodity and capitalist sectors.

Figures showing the increase of the relative weight of industry in the national economy (exclusive of transport and electrification). Whereas in 1924-25, industry's share of the gross output of the national economy, calculated at prewar prices, amounted to 32.4 per cent, and that of agriculture to 67.6 per cent, in 1926-27 industry's share rose to 38 per cent and that of agriculture dropped to 62 per cent. In 1927-28, industry's share should rise to 40.2 and that of agriculture should drop to 59.8 per cent.

Figures showing the increase in the share of *the production of instruments and means of production*—which is the chief core of industry—in *total* industry during the two years: 1924-25, production of means of production—34.1 per cent; 1926-27—37.6 per cent; in 1927-28 it is proposed to bring it up to 38.6 per cent.

Figures showing the increase of the share of the production of means of production in *state*, large-scale industry during the two years:

1924-25—42.0 per cent; 1926-27—41.0 per cent; in 1927-28 it is proposed to bring it up to 44.9 per cent.

As regards industry's output of *commodities* and its share of the total volume of commodities, industry's share in the two years rose from 53.1 per cent in 1924-25 to 59.5 per cent in 1926-27, and in 1927-28 it should reach 60.7 per cent, whereas agriculture's share of the output of commodities amounted to 46.9 per cent in 1924-25, dropped to 40.5 per cent in 1926-27, and in 1927-28 should drop further to 39.3 per cent.

Conclusion: our country is becoming an industrial country.

The Party's task: to take all measures further to promote the industrialization of our country.

Figures showing the growth of the relative weight and commanding role of the socialist forms of economy at the expense of the private-commodity and capitalist sectors during the two years. Whereas *capital investments* in the socialized sector of the national economy (state and cooperative industry, transport, electrification, etc.) increased from 1,231 million rubles in 1924-25 to 2,683 million rubles in 1926-27, and in 1927-28 should rise to 3,456 million rubles, which amounts to an increase of investments from 43.8 per cent in 1924-25 to 65.3 per cent in 1927-28; investments in the non-social-

ized sector of the national economy have been relatively decreasing all the time, and in absolute figures have increased slightly from 1,577 million rubles in 1924-25 to 1,717 million rubles in 1926-27, and in 1927-28 should reach the figure of 1,836 million rubles, which will be a drop in the share of investments in the non-socialized sector from 56.2 per cent in 1924-25 to 34.7 per cent in 1927-28.

While the gross output of the socialized sector of industry rose from 81 per cent in 1924-25 to 86 per cent of total industry in 1926-27, and in 1927-28 should rise to 86.9 per cent, the share of the non-socialized sector of industry has been dropping from year to year: from 19 per cent of gross industrial output in 1924-25 to 14 per cent in 1926-27, and in 1927-28 should drop still further to 13.1 per cent.

As regards the share of private capital in large-scale (rated) industry, it shows not only a relative drop (3.9 per cent in 1924-25 and 2.4 per cent in 1926-27), but also an absolute drop (169,000,000 prewar rubles in 1924-25 and 165,000,000 prewar rubles in 1926-27).

We see the same ousting of the private capitalist elements from the country's trade. Whereas the socialized sector's share of the total trade in 1924-25 amounted to 72.6 per cent—wholesale 90.6 per cent and retail 57.3 per cent—in 1926-27, the socialized sector's share of the

total trade rose to 81.9 per cent—wholesale to 94.9 per cent and retail to 67.4 per cent; on the other hand, the private sector's share dropped in this period from 27.4 per cent of the total trade to 18.1 per cent—wholesale from 9.4 per cent to 5.1 per cent and retail from 42.7 per cent to 32.6 per cent—and in 1927-28 a further drop in the private sector's share in all branches of trade is anticipated.

Conclusion: our country is confidently and rapidly proceeding towards Socialism, pushing the capitalist elements into the background and step by step ousting them from the national economy.

This fact reveals to us the basis of the question: "Who will win?" This question was raised by Lenin in 1921, after the New Economic Policy was introduced. Will we succeed in linking our socialized industry with peasant husbandry, pushing aside the private trader, the private capitalist, and having learned to trade; or will private capital beat us by causing a split between the proletariat and the peasantry?—that is how the question stood at that time. Today we can say that, in the main, we have already achieved decisive successes in this sphere. Only the blind or the daft can deny this.

But today the question: "Who will win?" acquires a new character. This question is now shifting from the sphere of trade to the sphere

of production, to the sphere of handicraft production, to the sphere of agricultural production, where private capital possesses certain weight, and from which it must be systematically squeezed out.

The Party's task: to extend and consolidate our socialist key positions in all branches of our national economy, both in town and in country, and to pursue a course of eliminating the capitalist elements from our national economy.

2

THE RATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF OUR
LARGE-SCALE SOCIALIST INDUSTRY

a) Growth of output of large-scale nationalized industry, which constitutes over 77 per cent of the *total* industry in the country. Whereas in 1925-26 the increase in output (calculated in prewar rubles) of large-scale nationalized industry over that of the preceding year amounted to 42.2 per cent, in 1926-27 to 18.2 per cent, and in 1927-28 will amount to 15.8 per cent, the State Planning Commission's rough and very conservative estimates for the next five years provide for an increase in output during the five years of 76.7 per cent, with an average arithmetical annual increase of 15 per cent and a *two-fold* increase in industrial output in 1931-32 compared with prewar output.

If we take the gross output of all industry in the country, both large-scale (state and private) and small industry, the annual, average arithmetical increase in output, according to the State Planning Commission's five-year estimates, will be about 12 per cent, which will be an increase in total industrial output in 1931-32 of nearly 70 per cent compared with the prewar level.

In America, the annual increase in total industrial output for the five years 1890-1895 was 8.2 per cent, for the five years 1895-1900—5.2 per cent, for the five years 1900-1905—2.6 per cent, for the five years 1905-1910—3.6 per cent. In Russia, for the ten years 1895-1905, the average annual increase was 10.7 per cent, for the eight years 1905-1913—8.1 per cent.

The percentage of annual increase in output of our socialist industry, and also in the output of all industry, is a record one, such as not a single big capitalist country in the world can show.

And this in spite of the fact that American industry, and especially Russian prewar industry, were abundantly fertilized by a mighty flow of foreign capital, whereas our nationalized industry is forced to base itself on its own accumulations.

And this notwithstanding the fact that our nationalized industry has already entered the

period of reconstruction, when the re-equipment of old plants and the erection of new ones acquire decisive importance for increasing industrial output.

In rate of development, our industry in general, and our socialist industry in particular, is overtaking and outstripping the development of industry in the capitalist countries.

b) How is this unprecedented rate of development of our large-scale industry to be explained?

Firstly, by the fact that it is nationalized industry, thanks to which it is not hampered by the selfish and anti-social interests of private capitalist groups and is able to develop in conformity with the interests of society as a whole.

Secondly, by the fact that it is conducted on a larger scale and is more concentrated than industry anywhere else in the world, thanks to which it has every possibility of beating private capitalist industry.

Thirdly, by the fact that the state, controlling nationalized transport, nationalized credit, nationalized foreign trade and the general state budget, has every possibility of directing the nationalized industry according to a plan as a single industrial enterprise, which gives it enormous advantages over all other industry and greatly accelerates its rate of development.

Fourthly, by the fact that nationalized industry, being the biggest and most powerful industry, possesses every possibility of pursuing a policy of steadily reducing cost of production, reducing wholesale prices and cheapening its goods, thereby expanding the market for its goods, increasing the capacity of the home market and creating for itself a continuously increasing source for the further expansion of production.

Fifthly, by the fact that nationalized industry is able for many reasons, one of them being that it pursues the policy of reducing prices, to develop under conditions of gradual rapprochement between town and country, between the proletariat and the peasantry, in contrast to capitalist industry, which is developing under conditions of increasing enmity between the bourgeois town, which bleeds the peasantry, and the decaying countryside.

Lastly, by the fact that nationalized industry is based on the working class, which is the master of the whole of our development, thanks to which it is able more easily to develop technology in general, and the productivity of labour in particular, and apply rationalization to production and management, having the support of the broad masses of the working class, which is not and cannot be the case under the capitalist system of industry.

All this is undoubtedly proved by the rapid growth of our technology during the past two years and the rapid development of new branches of industry (machine building, machine-tool building, turbine building, automobile and aircraft building, chemicals, etc.)

It is also proved by the rationalization of production that we are carrying out *with* a shorter working day (a 7-hour day) and *with* a steady improvement in the material and cultural conditions of the working class, which is not and cannot be the case under the capitalist system of production.

The unprecedented rate of development of our socialist industry is direct and undoubted proof of the superiority of the Soviet system of production over that of the capitalist system.

Lenin was right in saying, as far back as September 1917, before the Bolsheviks had captured power, that after establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat we can and must "overtake the advanced countries and outstrip them *economically as well*" (Vol. XXI, p. 191).

The Party's task: to maintain the achieved rate of development of socialist industry and to increase it in the near future with the object of creating the favourable conditions necessary for overtaking and outstripping the advanced capitalist countries.

THE RATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF OUR AGRICULTURE

a) In the rural districts, on the contrary, we have a relatively slow growth of output. Whereas in 1925-26 the increase in gross output (in prewar rubles) compared with the preceding year amounted to 19.2 per cent, in 1926-27 to 4.1 per cent, and in 1927-28 will amount to 3.2 per cent, the State Planning Commission's rough and very conservative estimates for the next five years provide for an increase in output for the five years of 24 per cent, with an average arithmetical annual increase of output of 4.8 per cent, and with an increase in agricultural output in 1931-32 of 28-30 per cent compared with prewar output.

This is a more or less tolerable annual increase in agricultural output. But it cannot possibly be called either a record compared with the capitalist countries, or adequate for the purpose of maintaining in future the necessary equilibrium between agriculture and our nationalized industry.

In the U.S.A., the annual increase in the gross output of agriculture was 9.3 per cent in the decade 1890-1900, 3.1 per cent in the decade 1900-1910, and 1.4 per cent in the decade

1910-1920. In prewar Russia the annual increase in agricultural output in the decade 1900-1911 amounted to 3.2-3.5 per cent.

True, the annual increase in the output of our agriculture in the five years 1926-27—1931-32 will amount to 4.8 per cent, and, as is evident, the percentage of increase of agricultural output under Soviet conditions has grown compared with that in the period of capitalist Russia. But it must not be forgotten that whereas the gross output of nationalized industry in 1931-32 will be *double* that of prewar industrial output and the output of all industry in 1931-32 will be about 70 per cent above the prewar level, the output of agriculture will by that time exceed the prewar agricultural output only by 28-30 per cent, i.e., *less than a third*.

In view of this, the rate of development of our agriculture cannot be regarded as being sufficiently satisfactory.

b) How is this relatively slow rate of development of agriculture compared with that of our nationalized industry to be explained?

It is to be explained both by the extreme backwardness of our agricultural techniques and excessively low cultural level of the rural districts, and especially by the fact that our scattered agricultural production does not enjoy the advantages possessed by our large-scale, united, nationalized industry. First of all, agricultural

production is not nationalized and not united, but scattered and broken up. It is not carried on according to plan, and for the time being an enormous part of it is subjected to the anarchy of small production. It is not united and organized on the lines of collective farming and for that reason still provides a convenient field for exploitation by the kulak elements. These circumstances deprive scattered agriculture of the colossal advantages of large-scale, united production carried on according to plan possessed by our nationalized industry.

What is the way out for agriculture? Perhaps the slowing down of the rate of development of our industry in general and of our nationalized industry in particular? Under no circumstances! That would be a reactionary, anti-proletarian utopia. (*Voices*: "Quite right!") Nationalized industry must and will develop at an accelerated rate. That is the guarantee of our advance to Socialism. That is the guarantee that, at last, agriculture itself will be industrialized.

What is the way out? The way out is to turn the small and scattered peasant farms into large united farms based on the common cultivation of the land; to turn to the collective cultivation of the land on the basis of a new and higher technique.

The way out is to unite the small and dwarf peasant farms gradually but surely, not by pres-

sure, but by example and persuasion, into large farms based on common, cooperative, collective cultivation of the land with the use of agricultural machines and tractors and scientific methods of intensive agriculture.

There is no other way out.

If this is not done, our agriculture will be unable either to overtake or outstrip the capitalist countries with the most developed agriculture (Canada and others).

All the measures we have taken to restrict the capitalist elements in agriculture, to develop the socialist elements in the rural districts, to draw the peasant farms into the channel of cooperative development, to exercise planned state influence on the rural districts by embracing peasant agriculture in the matter of supplies and marketing, as well as production—all these measures are decisive, it is true, but for all that, only preparatory to transferring agriculture to the lines of collectivism.

c) What has the Party done in this direction during the two years? No little has been done, but far from all that could have been done.

As regards embracing agriculture *from outside*, so to speak, in the matter of supplying agriculture with the manufactured goods it needs and the marketing of agricultural produce, we have the following achievements: the agricultural cooperatives now unite about a third of

the total peasant households; the consumers' cooperatives have increased their area of supply operations in the rural districts from 25.6 per cent in 1924-25 to 50.8 per cent in 1926-27; the cooperative and state purchasing organizations have increased their purchases of agricultural produce from 55.7 per cent in 1924-25 to 63 per cent in 1926-27.

As regards embracing agriculture *from inside*, so to speak, in the matter of agricultural production, we have done frightfully little. Suffice it to say that at the present time the kolkhozes and sovkhozes provide only a little over 2 per cent of the total agricultural produce and 7 per cent of the total marketed produce.

There are no few reasons for this, of course, both objective and subjective. Unskilful approach to the matter, insufficient attention to the matter on the part of our workers, the conservatism and backwardness of the peasants, shortage of funds necessary for financing the transfer of the peasants to the common cultivation of the land, etc. And quite large funds are needed for this purpose.

Lenin said at the Tenth Congress that we still lack the funds necessary for the purpose of subjecting agriculture to the state or collective principle. I think that we will now have these funds, and they ought to grow in the course of time. But meanwhile, things are taking such

a turn, that unless the scattered peasant farms are united, unless they are transferred to the common cultivation of the land, it will be impossible to make serious progress either in the intensification or in the mechanization of agriculture, it will be impossible to organize things so that the rate of development of our agriculture will be able to exceed that of capitalist countries, such as Canada, for example.

Therefore, the task is to concentrate the attention of our workers in the rural districts on this important question.

I think that in this matter the machine-hiring stations of the People's Commissariats for Agriculture and of the agricultural cooperatives must play an exceedingly important role.

Here is an example of how the sovkhoses sometimes help the peasants to go over to the collective cultivation of the land with enormous benefit to the peasants. I have in mind the assistance in the way of tractors which the Associated Ukrainian Sovkhoses rendered the peasants in the Odessa region, and the letter from these peasants, recently published in *Izvestia*, expressing thanks for this assistance. Permit me to read this letter. (Voices: "Please!")

"We settlers of the Shevchenko, Krasin, Kalinin, Red Dawn and Rising Sun homesteads, express our profound gratitude to the Soviet government for the enormous assistance that was rendered us in rehabilitat-

ing our husbandry. The majority of us—being poor, possessing no horses or implements—were unable to cultivate the plots of land that had been allotted to us and *were obliged to rent them out to the old-inhabitant kulaks for a part of the crop.* The crop was a bad one because, naturally, a tenant will not trouble to cultivate properly another person's land. The small credits we received from the state we used up for food for ourselves and we sank into deeper poverty every year.

"This year a representative of the Associated Ukrainian Sovkhoses visited us and proposed to us that instead of taking financial credits we should allow them to plough our land with tractors. All the settlers, except for a few kulaks, agreed to this, although we had little confidence that the work would be done efficiently. To our great joy, and to the chagrin of the kulaks, the tractors ploughed up all the virgin land and fallow land; they ploughed and harrowed 5-6 times to clear the land of weeds and finally sowed the entire field with high-grade wheat. The kulaks are not jeering at the work of the tractor detachment now. This year, owing to the absence of rain, the peasants in our district planted hardly any winter wheat, and where it was planted it has not come up yet. *But our settlers' fallow fields, stretching for hundreds of dessiatins, are already green with splendid wheat such as cannot be seen even among the richest German colonists.*

"In addition to sowing winter wheat, the tractors ploughed up the whole of the winter fallow for the spring crops. *Now, not a dessiatin of our land has been left unploughed, or has been rented out. There is not a single poor peasant among us who has not several dessiatins of winter wheat.*

"After we have seen the way the tractors work we do not want to carry on poor, small farming any more, and *we have decided to organize common tractor*

farming in which there will be no separate peasant plots. The organization of tractor farming for us has already been undertaken by the Taras Shevchenko Sovkhoz, with which we have signed a contract" (*Izvestia*, No. 267, November 22, 1927).

That is what the peasants write.

If we had more examples like this, comrades, it would be possible to make great progress in the collectivization of the rural districts.

The Party's task: to enlarge the area of peasant farming embraced by the cooperatives and state organizations in the matter of marketing and supplies, and make it the immediate practical task of our work in the rural districts gradually to transfer the scattered peasant farms to the lines of united, big farms, to the common, collective cultivation of the land on the basis of the intensification and mechanization of agriculture, calculating that such a path of development is the most important means of accelerating the rate of development of agriculture and of vanquishing the capitalist elements in the rural districts.

* * *

Such, on the whole, are the results and achievements in the sphere of economic development.

This does not mean that all is well with us in this sphere. No, comrades, things are far from being all well with us.

For example, we have elements of a goods shortage. This must be put on the liability side of our economy; but, unfortunately, for the time being this liability is inevitable. Because, the fact that we are developing the production of instruments and means of production at a faster rate than the consumers' goods industry, this fact in itself predetermines the existence of the elements of a goods shortage in the country during the next few years. But we cannot act otherwise if we want to push forward the industrialization of the country to the utmost.

There are people, our opposition, for example, who glean material for their ideology in profiteers' queues and shout about the goods shortage, and at the same time demand a policy of "superindustrialization." But this, of course, is stupid, comrades. Only ignoramuses can talk like that. We cannot, and must not, reduce our heavy industry for the sake of developing light industry to the utmost. And besides, it is impossible to develop light industry to a sufficient degree unless the development of heavy industry is accelerated.

We could increase imports of manufactured goods and thus mitigate the goods shortage, and this is what the opposition insisted on at one time. But this proposal was so silly that the opposition had to drop it. Whether we are working efficiently enough to mitigate the elements

of goods shortage, which is quite possible under our conditions, and on which our Party has always insisted, is another question. I think that precisely in this sphere, not all is well with us.

Further, we have a fact like the relatively large number of capitalists in the sphere of industry as well as in the sphere of trade. The relative weight of these elements is really not as small as some of our comrades depict. This too is a liability in the balance sheet of our economy.

Recently I read what is in every respect an interesting book by Comrade Larin: *Private Capital in the U.S.S.R.* I would advise you to read this little book, comrades. In it you will see how adroitly and skilfully the capitalist screens himself with the flag of producers' cooperatives, with the flag of agricultural cooperatives, with the flag of some state trading organization or other. Is everything being done to restrict, reduce and finally to oust the capitalist elements from the sphere of our national economy? I do not think that everything is being done. I know, for example, that in handicraft industry in general, and in the leather and textile industries in particular, there are not a few new millionaires who are enslaving the handicraft workers and small producers generally. Is everything being done economically to surround and oust these exploiting elements by linking the handicraft workers with the cooperatives

or with the state organizations? There can scarcely be any doubt that far from everything is being done in this sphere. And yet this question is of extreme importance for us.

Further, we have a certain increase in the number of kulaks in the rural districts. This is a liability in the balance sheet of our economy. Is everything being done economically to restrict and isolate the kulaks? I do not think that everything is being done. Those comrades are wrong who think that it is possible and necessary to put an end to the kulaks by means of administrative measures, through the G.P.U.: draft an order, affix a seal, and finished. This is an easy way, but it is far from being effective. The kulak must be defeated by means of economic measures and in conformity with Soviet law. Soviet law is not an empty phrase. This does not, of course, preclude the taking of certain necessary administrative measures against the kulaks. But administrative measures must not serve as a substitute for economic measures. Serious attention must be paid to the distortion of the Party's line of fighting the kulaks by cooperative organizations, especially in the matter of agricultural credits.

Further, we have a fact like the extremely slow rate of reduction of cost of production in industry, of reduction of wholesale prices for manufactured goods, and especially of retail

prices of urban goods. This too is a liability in the balance sheet of our economic development. We cannot but observe that in this we encounter the tremendous resistance of the apparatus, state, cooperative and Party. Evidently, our comrades fail to understand that the policy of reducing the prices of manufactured goods is one of the principal levers for improving our industry, expanding the market and strengthening the very basis on which alone our industry can expand. There can scarcely be any doubt that only by ruthlessly combating this inertness of the apparatus, this resistance of the apparatus to the policy of reducing prices, will it be possible to wipe out this liability.

Lastly, we have liabilities like vodka in the budget, the extremely slow rate of development of foreign trade and the shortage of reserves. I think that it would be possible to start gradually to reduce the sale of vodka and, instead of vodka, to resort to sources of revenue such as radio and the cinema. Indeed, why not take these extremely important means in hand and put on this job real Bolsheviks, men with push and go, who could successfully expand the business and make it possible, at last, to reduce the sale of vodka?

As regards foreign trade, it seems to me that a number of the economic difficulties we are encountering are due to the insufficiency of exports. Can we push exports forward? I think

we can. Is everything being done to increase exports to the utmost? I do not think that everything is being done.

The same must be said about reserves. Those comrades are wrong who say, sometimes thoughtlessly and sometimes because of their ignorance of the business, that we have no reserves. No, comrades, we have some small reserves. All the organs of our state, from uyezd and gubernia to regional and central, try to put something in reserve for a rainy day. But these reserves are too small. This must be admitted. Therefore, the task is to increase reserves as much as possible, even if that sometimes entails cutting down certain current requirements.

Such, comrades, are the darker sides of our economic development, to which attention must be paid, and which must be removed at all costs in order to be able to move forward at a faster rate.

4

CLASSES, THE STATE APPARATUS AND THE COUNTRY'S CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

From questions concerning the country's economic situation we will pass to questions concerning the political situation.

a) *The working class.* Figures showing the quantitative growth of the working class and

of wageworkers generally. In 1924-25 there were 8,215,000 wageworkers (not including unemployed); in 1926-27 there are 10,346,000. An increase of 25 per cent. Of these, manual workers, including agricultural and seasonal, there were 5,448,000 in 1924-25 and in 1926-27—7,060,000. An increase of 29.6 per cent. Of these, workers in large-scale industry numbered 1,794,000 in 1924-25 and in 1926-27 they numbered 2,388,000. An increase of 33 per cent.

The material conditions of the working class. In 1924-25 the wageworkers' share of the national income amounted to 24.1 per cent and in 1926-27 it has grown to 29.4 per cent, which is 30 per cent above the wageworkers' prewar share of the national income, whereas the share of the national income received by other social groups, including the bourgeoisie, diminished during this period (for example, the share of the bourgeoisie dropped from 5.5 per cent to 4.8 per cent). In 1924-25 the real wages of the workers in the whole of state industry (not including social services) amounted to 25.18 Moscow standard rubles per month; in 1926-27 they amount to 32.14 rubles, which is an increase of 27.6 per cent for the two years and is 5.4 per cent above the prewar level. If we add social insurance and cultural, municipal and other services, wages in 1924-25 were 101.5 per cent

of the prewar level and in 1926-27—128.4 per cent of the prewar level. The social insurance funds increased from 461,000,000 rubles in 1924-25 to 852,000,000 rubles in 1926-27, i.e., by 85 per cent, which made it possible to send 513,000 persons to rest homes and sanatoria, to provide allowances for 460,000 unemployed and 700,000 pensioners (disabled workers and disabled Civil War veterans) and to pay workers full wages during sickness.

Expenditure, i.e., disbursements on workers' housing, amounted two years ago, in 1924-25, to over 132,000,000 rubles; in 1925-26 it amounted to over 230,000,000 rubles; in 1926-27 it amounts to 282,000,000 rubles, and in 1927-28 it will amount to over 391,000,000 rubles, including 50,000,000 rubles provided for in the Manifesto of the Central Executive Committee. The total expenditure on workers' housing for the past three years by industry, transport, local Executive Committees and cooperative societies (thus not including individual construction), amounted to 644,700,000 rubles, and including the assignments for 1927-28, amounts to 1,036 million rubles. These assignments for the three years made it possible to build house accommodation amounting to a floor space of 4,594,000 sq. metres and to provide accommodation for 257,000 workers, and counting their families, to about 900,000 persons.

The question of unemployment. I must say that there is a discrepancy here between the figures of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and those of the People's Commissariat of Labour. I take the figures of the People's Commissariat of Labour because they cover the truly unemployed element connected with the labour exchanges. According to the returns of the People's Commissariat of Labour, the number of unemployed during the two years increased from 950,000 to 1,048,000. Of these, industrial workers constitute 16.5 per cent and brain workers and unskilled labourers 74 per cent. Thus, the chief cause of unemployment in our country is the overpopulation of the rural districts; and the fact that our industry has to some extent failed to absorb a certain minimum of industrial workers is only a subsidiary cause.

To sum up: there is an undoubted rise in the material standard of living of the working class as a whole.

The Party's task: to continue along the line of further improving the material and cultural conditions of the working class, of further raising the wages of the working class.

b) *The peasantry.* I do not think it is worth while quoting figures on the differentiation among the peasantry because my report is already too long drawn out, and everybody knows the figures. There can be no doubt that

differentiation under the dictatorship of the proletariat must not be identified with differentiation under the capitalist system. Under capitalism the extremes grow: the poor peasants and the kulaks, while the middle peasants are washed away. In our country the opposite is the case; the number of middle peasants is growing, because a certain part of the poor peasants rise to the status of middle peasants; the number of kulaks is growing; the number of poor peasants is diminishing. This fact shows that the middle peasant has been and remains the central figure in agriculture. The bloc with the middle peasants, while relying on the poor peasants, is of decisive importance for the future of our entire development, for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The general improvement of material conditions in the rural districts. We have figures showing an increase in the incomes of the peasant population. Two years ago, in 1924-25, the income of the peasant population amounted to 3,548 million rubles, but in 1926-27 this income has grown to 4,792 million rubles, i.e., by 35.1 per cent, whereas the peasant population during this period increased only 2.38 per cent. This is an undoubted indication that material conditions in the rural districts are improving.

This does not mean that the conditions of the peasantry have improved in all the districts

of our country. It is well known that in some places there have been uneven harvests during these two years, and the effects of the crop failure of 1924 have not yet been fully overcome. Hence the assistance the state renders the working peasantry in general and the poor peasants in particular. In 1925-26 state assistance to the working peasantry amounted to 373,000,000 rubles and in 1926-27 to 427,000,000 rubles. Special assistance to the rural poor in 1925-26 in the shape of grants to the poorest farms amounted to 38,000,000 rubles, tax exemptions for poor farms amounted to 44,000,000 rubles and insurance exemptions for the poorest peasant farms to 9,000,000 rubles, making a total of 91,000,000 rubles. Special assistance to the rural poor in 1926-27 under the same items: 39,000,000 rubles, 52,000,000 rubles and 9,000,000 rubles, making a total of about 100,000,000 rubles.

To sum up: there is an improvement in the material conditions of the bulk of the peasantry.

The Party's task: to continue along the line of further improving the material and cultural conditions of the bulk of the peasantry, primarily of the poor peasants, to strengthen the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, to raise the prestige of the working class and of its Party in the rural districts.

c) *The new bourgeoisie. The intelligentsia.*

A characteristic feature of the new bourgeoisie is that, unlike the working class and the peasantry, it has no reason to be pleased with the Soviet regime. Its discontent is not accidental. It has its roots in life.

I have spoken about the growth of our national economy, I have spoken about the growth of our industry, about the growth of the socialist elements of our national economy, about the decline in the relative weight of the private capitalists, about the elimination of the small traders. But what does this signify? It signifies that while our industry and our trading organizations are growing, tens of thousands of small and medium capitalists are being ruined. How many small and medium shops have been closed during these years? Thousands. How many small manufacturers have been proletarianized? Thousands. And how many civil servants have been discharged in connection with the reduction of staffs in our state apparatus? Hundreds and thousands.

Progress in our industry, progress in our trading and cooperative organizations and improvement of our state apparatus is progress and improvement for the benefit of the working class, for the benefit of the bulk of the peasantry, but to the detriment of the new bourgeoisie, to the detriment of the middle strata.

generally and of the urban middle strata in particular. Is it to be wondered at that discontent with the Soviet regime is growing among these strata? Hence the counterrevolutionary moods among these people. Hence the Smena-Vekh ideology, a fashionable article in the new bourgeoisie's political market.

But it would be a mistake to think that the whole of the civil service element, the whole of the intelligentsia is in this state of discontent, in this state of grumbling or unrest against the Soviet regime. Parallel with the growth of discontent we have in the depths of the new bourgeoisie a differentiation among the intelligentsia, desertion from Smena-Vekhism, the passing of hundreds and thousands of working intellectuals to the side of the Soviet regime. This, comrades, is undoubtedly a favourable factor that must be noted.

The pioneers in this are the technical intelligentsia, because, being closely connected with the process of production, they cannot help seeing that the Bolsheviks are leading the country forward, to a better future. Gigantic works of construction like the Volkhov Power Plant, the Dnieper Power Plant, the Svir Power Plant, the Turkestan Railway, the Volga-Don Canal and a whole series of new gigantic industrial plants with which the fate of whole strata of the technical intelligentsia is bound, cannot

but exercise some beneficial influence upon these strata. It is not only a bread and butter question for them, it is also a matter of honour, a matter of creative effort, which naturally draws them to the working class, to the Soviet regime.

This is apart from the rural working intelligentsia, especially village schoolteachers, who turned towards the Soviet regime long ago, and who cannot help welcoming the development of education in the rural districts.

Therefore, parallel with the growth of discontent among certain strata of the intelligentsia, we have the link between the working intelligentsia and the working class.

The Party's task is to continue along the line of isolating the new bourgeoisie and to strengthen the link between the working class and the working Soviet intelligentsia in town and country.

d) *The state apparatus and the struggle against bureaucracy.* So much is being talked about bureaucracy that there is no need to dilate upon it. That elements of bureaucracy exist in the state, in the cooperative and in the Party apparatus there can be no doubt. That it is necessary to combat the elements of bureaucracy, and that this task will confront us all the time, as long as we have state power, as long as the state exists, is also a fact.

But there must also be a limit. To carry the struggle against bureaucracy in the state apparatus to the point of destroying the state apparatus, to the point of discrediting the state apparatus, to attempt to break it up, means going against Leninism, means forgetting that our apparatus is a Soviet apparatus, which represents a higher type of state apparatus compared with all the other state apparatuses that exist in the world.

Wherein lies the strength of our state apparatus? In that it links the state power with the millions of workers and peasants through the Soviets. In that the Soviets are schools of administration for tens and hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants. In that the state apparatus does not set up a barrier between itself and the vast masses of the people, but merges with them through an incalculable number of mass organizations, all sorts of commissions, sections, conferences, delegate meetings, etc., which encompass the Soviets and in this way buttress the organs of government.

Wherein lies the weakness of our state apparatus? In the existence within it of elements of bureaucracy, which spoil and distort its work. In order to eliminate bureaucracy from it—and this cannot be done in one year, or two—we must systematically improve the state apparatus, bring it still nearer to the masses,

reinvigorate it by bringing in new people who are loyal to the cause of the working class, remodel it in the spirit of Communism, but not break it up or discredit it. Lenin was a thousand times right when he said: *"Had we not had an 'apparatus' we would have perished long ago. If we do not wage a systematic and stubborn struggle to improve the apparatus we will perish before we have created the base for Socialism."*¹⁸

I will not dilate on the defects in our state apparatus, which are glaring enough as it is. I have in mind, primarily, "Mother Red Tape." I have at hand a heap of documents testifying to the red tape, exposing the criminal negligence of a number of judicial, administrative, insurance, cooperative and other organizations.

Here is a peasant who went to a certain insurance office twenty-one times to get some matter put right and even then failed to get anything done.

Here is another peasant, an old man of sixty-six, who walked 600 versts to get his case cleared up at the Uyezd Social Maintenance Department and yet got no results.

Here is an old woman, a peasant, fifty-six years old, who, summoned by the People's Court, walked 500 versts and travelled over 600 versts by horse and cart and still did not get justice done.

A multitude of facts like these could be quoted. It is not worth while quoting them all. But this is a disgrace to us, comrades! How can such outrageous things be tolerated?

Lastly, facts about "demoting." It appears, that in addition to workingmen who are promoted, there are also such as are "demoted," who are pushed into the background by their own comrades, not because they are incapable, or inefficient, but because they are conscientious and honest in their work.

Here is a workingman, a toolmaker, who was promoted to a managerial post at his plant because he was a capable man and incorruptible. He worked for a year and then another, worked honestly, introduced order, put a stop to inefficiency and waste. But working in this way he harmfully affected the interests of a gang of so-called "Communists," he disturbed their peace and quiet. And what happened? This gang of "Communists" put spokes in his wheel and thus compelled him to "demote" himself. "You wanted to be smarter than us, you won't let us live and make a bit, so take a back seat, brother."

Here is another workingman, also a toolmaker, he adjusted bolt-cutting machines, and he was promoted to a managerial post at his plant. He worked zealously and honestly. But working in this way he disturbed somebody's

peace and quiet. And what happened? A pretext was found and they got rid of this "disturbing" comrade. How did this promoted comrade leave, what were his feelings? Like this: "In whatever post I was appointed to I tried to justify the confidence that was put in me. But this promotion, which played a dirty trick on me, I will never forget. They threw mud at me. My wish to bring everything into the light of day remained a mere wish. Neither the works committee, nor the management, nor the Party nucleus would listen to me. I am finished with promotion, I would not take another managerial post even if I were offered my weight in gold" (*Trud*,¹⁹ No. 128, June 9, 1927).

But this is a disgrace to us, comrades! How can such outrageous things be tolerated?

The Party's task is, in fighting against bureaucracy and for the improvement of the state apparatus, to expurgate from our practice with red-hot irons outrages of the kind I have just spoken about.

e) *Concerning Lenin's slogan about the cultural revolution.* The surest remedy for bureaucracy is raising the cultural level of the workers and peasants. One can curse and hurl abuse at bureaucracy in the state apparatus, one can stigmatize and pillory the bureaucracy in our practice, but unless the broad masses of the

workers reach a certain level of culture, which will create the possibility, the desire, the ability to control the state apparatus from below, by the masses of the workers themselves, bureaucracy will continue to exist in spite of everything. Therefore, the cultural development of the working class and of the masses of the working peasantry, not only the development of literacy, although literacy is the basis of all culture, but primarily the cultivation of the knack and ability of participating in the administration of the country, is the chief lever for improving the state and every other apparatus. This is the sense and significance of Lenin's slogan about the cultural revolution.

Here is what Lenin said about this in March 1922, before the opening of the Eleventh Congress of our Party, in his letter to the Central Committee addressed to Comrade Molotov:

"The chief thing we lack is culture, ability to administer.... Economically and politically NEP fully ensures us the possibility of building the foundation of socialist economy. It is 'only' a matter of the cultural forces of the proletariat and of its vanguard."*²⁰

These words of Lenin's must not be forgotten, comrades. (Voices: "Quite right!")

* My italics.—J. St.

Hence the Party's task: to intensify the struggle to raise the cultural level of the working class and of the working strata of the peasantry.

* * *

How can the internal political situation in our country be summed up?

It can be summed up in this way: *The Soviet regime is more stable than all the other regimes existing in the world (Loud applause.)*

But while the Soviet regime is more stable than all the other regimes existing in the world, a regime that any bourgeois government may envy, it does not mean that all is well with us in this sphere. No, comrades, we have shortcomings in this sphere too, which we, as Bolsheviks, cannot and must not conceal.

We have, first of all, unemployment. This is a serious shortcoming, which we must overcome, or at least reduce to a minimum at all costs.

We have, secondly, grave defects in workers' housing, a housing crisis, which we must also overcome, or at least reduce to a minimum within the next few years.

We have some elements of anti-Semitism, not only among certain circles of the middle strata of the population, but also among a certain section of the workers, and even in some links of our Party. This evil must be combated, comrades, with all ruthlessness.

We also have a shortcoming like the slackening of the anti-religious struggle.

And lastly, we have this frightful cultural backwardness, not only in the broad sense of the term, but also in its narrow sense, in the sense of elementary literacy, for the percentage of illiteracy in the U.S.S.R. is still considerable.

All these and similar shortcomings must be liquidated, comrades, if we want to advance at a more or less rapid rate.

To finish with this section of my report, permit me to say a few words about the most characteristic appointments during the period under review. I will not deal with the appointment of the Vice-Chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. Nor will I deal with the appointment of the People's Commissars of the Supreme Council of National Economy, of the People's Commissariat of Trade, and of the State Political Administration of the U.S.S.R. I would like to deal with three appointments which are significant. You know that Lobov has been endorsed as Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy of the R.S.F.S.R. He is a metalworker. You know that Ukhanov, a metalworker, has been elected Chairman of the Moscow Soviet in place of Kamenev. You also know that Komarov, also a metalworker, has been elected Chairman of the Leningrad Soviet in place of Zinoviev. Thus the "Lord Mayors" of our two

capitals are metalworkers. (*Applause.*) It is true that they are not of the nobility, but they are managing the affairs of our capitals better than any member of the nobility. (*Applause.*) You will say that this is a tendency towards metalization, but I don't think there is anything bad about that. (*Voices: "On the contrary, it is very good."*)

We wish the capitalist countries, we wish London, we wish Paris to catch up with us at last and put up their metalworkers as "Lord Mayors." (*Applause.*)

III

THE PARTY AND THE OPPOSITION

1

THE STATE OF THE PARTY

I will not, comrades, dilate on the numerical and ideological growth of our Party, I will not quote figures, because Kossior will report to you on this in detail.

Nor will I speak about the social composition of our Party, or about the figures pertaining to this, because Kossior will give you exhaustive data on this in his report.

I would like to say a few words about the higher level, the qualitative improvement in our Party's work of leadership both in the sphere of economics and in the sphere of politics. There was a time, comrades, two or three years ago, when a section of our comrades, headed by Trotsky, I think (*laughter, voices*: "Think?"), hurled reproaches at our gubernia committees, regional committees and at our Central Committee, asserting that the Party organizations were incompetent and had no business to interfere in the country's

economic affairs. Yes, there was such a time. Today, however, it is doubtful whether anybody would dare to hurl such accusations against the Party organizations. That the gubernia and regional committees have mastered the art of economic leadership, that the Party organizations are leading economic construction and not trailing in its rear, is such a glaring fact that only the blind or the daft would dare deny it. The very fact that we have decided to put on the agenda of this Congress the question of a five-year plan of development of the national economy, this very fact alone shows that the Party has made immense progress in the planned leadership of our economic construction both in the districts and at the centre.

Some people think that there is nothing exceptional in this. No, comrades, there is something exceptional and important in this, which must be noted. Reference is sometimes made to American and German economic bodies which, it is alleged, also direct their national economy according to a plan. No, comrades, those countries have not yet achieved this, and never will as long as the capitalist system exists there. To be able to lead according to a plan it is necessary to have a different system of industry, a socialist and not a capitalist system; it is necessary to have at least a nationalized industry, a nationalized credit system, nationalized land, the socialist link with the

rural districts, working-class rule in the country, etc.

True, they have something in the nature of plans; but these are forecast plans, guesswork plans, not binding on anybody, and they cannot serve as a basis for directing the country's economy. It is different in our country. Our plans are not forecast plans, not guesswork plans, but *directive* plans, which are *binding* upon our leading bodies, and which *determine* the trend of our *future* economic development on a *country-wide* scale.

You see, we have a *fundamental* difference here.

That is why I say that even the simple fact that the question of a five-year plan of development of the national economy has been put on the Congress agenda, even this fact is an indication of the qualitatively higher level of our work of planned leadership.

Nor will I dilate on the growth of inner-Party democracy in our Party. Only the blind fail to see that inner-Party democracy, genuine inner-Party democracy, an actual upsurge of activity of the Party membership, is growing and developing in our Party. Some people chatter about democracy. But what is democracy in the Party? Democracy for whom? If by democracy is meant freedom for a couple or so of intellectuals divorced from the revolution to engage in endless chat-

ter, to have their own organ of the press, etc., then we do not need such "democracy," because it is democracy for an insignificant minority that goes against the will of the overwhelming majority. If, however, by democracy is meant freedom for the Party membership to decide the questions connected with our construction, an upsurge of activity of the Party membership, drawing them into the work of Party leadership, developing in them the feeling that they are the masters in the Party, then we have such democracy, that is the democracy we need, and we will steadily develop it in spite of everything. (*Applause.*)

Nor will I, comrades, dilate on the fact that, parallel with inner-Party democracy, collective leadership is growing; step by step, in our Party. Take our Central Committee and Central Control Commission. Together they constitute a leading centre of 200-250 comrades, which meets regularly and decides most important questions connected with our work of construction. It is one of the most democratic and collectively functioning centres our Party has ever had. Well? Is it not a fact that the settlement of most important questions concerning our work is passing more and more from the hands of a narrow group at the top to the hands of this broad centre, which is most closely connected with all branches of construction and with all the regions of our vast country?

Nor will I dilate on the growth of our Party cadres. It is indisputable that during the past few years the old cadres of our Party have been permeated with new, rising cadres, consisting mainly of workingmen. Formerly, we counted our cadres in hundreds and thousands, but now we must count them in tens of thousands. I think that if we begin from the lowest organizations, the shop and team organizations, and go to the top, all over the Union, we will find that our Party cadres, the overwhelming majority of whom are workingmen, now number no less than 100,000. This indicates the immense growth of our Party. It indicates the immense growth of our cadres, the growth of their ideological and organizational experience, the growth of their communist culture.

Lastly, there is one other question on which there is no need to dilate, but which ought to be mentioned. This is the question of the growth of the Party's prestige among the non-Party workers and among the masses of the working people of our country generally, among the workers and the oppressed classes generally all over the world. There can scarcely be any doubt now that our Party is becoming the banner of liberation for the toiling masses all over the world, and that the title, Bolshevik, is becoming the honourable title for the best members of the working class.

Such, in general, comrades, is the picture of

our achievements in the sphere of Party development.

This does not mean, comrades, that there are no defects in our Party. No, there are defects, and grave defects at that. Permit me to say a few words about these defects.

Let us take, for example, the guidance of economic and other organizations by our Party organizations. Is all well in this respect? No, not all. Often we settle questions, not only in the districts, but also at the centre, in the family, domestic circle way, as it were. Ivan Ivanovich, a member of the leading top body of such and such an organization, has, say, committed a grave blunder and has messed things up. But Ivan Fyodorovich is reluctant to criticize him, to expose the blunder he has committed, to rectify this blunder. He is reluctant to do so because he does not want to "make enemies." He has committed a blunder, messed things up? What of it? Who of us does not commit blunders? I will let him, Ivan Fyodorovich, off today; tomorrow he will let me, Ivan Ivanovich, off; for what guarantee is there that I will not commit a blunder? All nice and quiet. Peace and good will. What, do they say that a neglected blunder is detrimental to our great cause? That's nothing! We'll muddle through somehow.

Such, comrades, is the way some of our responsible comrades usually argue.

But what does this signify? If we Bolsheviks, who criticize the whole world, who, in the words of Marx, are storming heaven, if we, for the sake of this or that comrade's peace of mind, abandon self-criticism, is it not clear that this can lead only to the doom of our great cause? (*Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.*)

Marx said that what, among other things, distinguishes the proletarian revolution from every other revolution is that it criticizes itself and, in criticizing itself, strengthens itself.²¹ This is an extremely important point of Marx's. If we, the representatives of the proletarian revolution, shut our eyes to our defects, settle questions by the family circle-method, hush up each others mistakes and drive the ulcers inwards into the Party's body, who will rectify these mistakes, these defects?

Is it not clear that we will cease to be proletarian revolutionaries, and that we will certainly perish if we fail to eradicate from our midst these philistine, family-circle methods of settling most important questions concerning our work of construction?

Is it not clear that by abandoning honest and straightforward self-criticism, by abandoning the honest and open rectification of our mistakes, we block our road to progress, to the improvement of our work, to new successes in our work?

After all, our development is not proceeding smoothly, not in an all-round, ascending curve. No, comrades, we have classes, we have contradictions within the country, we have a past, we have a present and a future, we have contradictions between them, and we cannot advance in the manner of a smooth and gentle rocking on the waves of life. We are advancing in the process of struggle, in the process of development of contradictions, in the process of overcoming these contradictions, in the process of bringing these contradictions to light and liquidating them

We will never be in such a position, as long as classes exist, as to be able to say: Well, thank god, everything is all right now. We will never be in such a position, comrades.

Something in life is always dying. But that which is dying refuses to die quietly; it fights for its existence, defends its moribund cause.

Something new in life is always being born. But that which is being born does not come into the world quietly: it comes in squealing and screaming, defending its right to existence. (*Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.*)

The struggle between the old and the new, between the dying and nascent—such is the foundation of our development. By failing openly and honestly, as befits Bolsheviks, to point to, to bring to light, the defects and mistakes in our work, we close our road to progress. But we want

to go forward. And precisely because we want to go forward we must make honest and revolutionary self-criticism one of our most important tasks. Without this there is no progress. Without this there is no development.

But it is precisely along this line that things are still in a bad way. More than that, it is enough for us to achieve a few successes for us to forget about the defects, to calm down and get conceited. Two or three big successes—and everything is a walkover. Another two or three big successes, and we get a swelled head: “knock him into a cocked hat!” But the mistakes remain, the defects continue to exist, the ulcers are driven inwards into the Party’s body and the Party begins to sicken.

The second defect. It consists in introducing administrative methods in the Party, in substituting the method of administration for the method of persuasion, which is of decisive importance for the Party. This defect is a danger no less serious than the first one. Why? Because it creates the danger of our Party organizations, which are self-acting organizations, being converted into mere bureaucratic institutions. Calculating that we have no less than 60,000 most active workers scattered among all sorts of economic, cooperative and state institutions where they are fighting bureaucracy, it must be admitted that some of them, while fighting bureaucracy in these

institutions, sometimes become infected with bureaucracy themselves and carry this infection into the Party organization. And this is not our fault, comrades, but our misfortune, because as long as the state exists, this process will continue to a greater or lesser degree. And precisely because this process has some roots in life, we must arm ourselves for the struggle against this defect, rouse the activity of the Party membership, draw them into the work of settling questions concerning the Party leadership, systematically implant inner-Party democracy and prevent the substitution in our Party practice of the administrative method for the method of persuasion.

The third defect. This defect consists in the desire of a number of our comrades to float with the current, smoothly and calmly, without perspective, without looking into the future, in such a way that a festive and holiday atmosphere should be felt all around, that we should have celebration meetings every day, with applause everywhere, and that all of us in turn be elected as honorary members of all sort of presidiums. *(Laughter, applause.)*

Now it is this irresistible desire to see a festive atmosphere everywhere, this longing for decoration, for all sorts of anniversaries, necessary and unnecessary, this desire to float with the current without caring a hang where they are floating to *(laughter, applause)*, all this constitutes the sub-

stance of the third defect in our Party practice, the basis of the shortcomings in our Party life.

Have you seen boatmen, rowing conscientiously, by the sweat of their brow, but not seeing whither the current is carrying them? I have seen such boatmen on the Yenisei. They are honest and tireless boatmen. But the trouble is that they do not see, and do not wish to see, that the current may carry them against the rocks, where doom awaits them.

The same thing happens to some of our comrades. They row conscientiously, pulling hard all the time; their boat floats smoothly, with the current, but not only don't they know whither the current is carrying them, they do not wish to know. Working without perspective, floating without sail or rudder—this is what wishing to float only with the current leads to.

And the results? The results are obvious: first they become coated with mould, then they become drab, after that they sink into the quagmire of philistinism and are finally transformed into ordinary philistines. This is precisely the path of real degeneration.

Such, comrades, are some of the defects in our Party practice and in our Party life, about which I wanted to say a few bitter words to you.

And now permit me to pass to the questions connected with the discussion and with our so-called opposition.

THE RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSION

Is there any sense, any value in a Party discussion?

Sometimes people say: why on earth did they start this discussion, what good is it to anyone, would it not have been better to settle the dispute privately, without washing dirty linen in public? This is wrong, comrades. Sometimes a discussion is absolutely necessary, and certainly useful. The whole point is—what kind of discussion? If the discussion is conducted within comradely limits, within Party limits, if its object is honest self-criticism, criticism of the defects in the Party, if, therefore, it improves our work and arms the working class, then such a discussion is necessary and useful.

But there is another kind of discussion, the object of which is not to improve our common work but to worsen it; not to strengthen the Party, but to disintegrate and discredit it. Such a discussion usually leads not to the arming but to the disarming of the proletariat. Such a discussion we do not need. (*Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.*)

When the opposition demanded an all-Union discussion about three months before the Congress, before the Central Committee's theses

had been drawn up, before the publication of these theses, they tried to thrust upon us a kind of discussion that would have inevitably facilitated the task of our enemies, the task of the enemies of the working class, the task of the enemies of our Party. It was precisely for this reason that the Central Committee opposed the opposition's plans. And it is precisely because it opposed the opposition's plans that we succeeded in placing the discussion on the right lines by giving it a basis in the shape of the Central Committee's theses for the Congress. Now we can say without hesitation that, on the whole, the discussion has been a gain.

As regards washing dirty linen in public, this is nonsense, comrades. We have never been, and never will be, afraid of openly criticizing ourselves and our mistakes in front of the whole Party. The strength of Bolshevism lies precisely in that it is not afraid of criticism and that, in criticizing its defects, it acquires the energy to push further forward. Thus, the present discussion is a sign of our Party's strength, a sign of its might.

It must not be forgotten that in every big party, especially a party like ours, which is in power, and which contains some part of the peasant and civil servant element, there accumulate in the course of a certain time certain elements who are indifferent to questions concerning

Party practice, who vote blindfolded and float with the current. The presence of a large number of these elements is an evil which must be combated. These elements constitute the marsh in our Party.

A discussion is an appeal to this marsh. The opposition appeal to it in order to win over some part of it. And they do indeed win over its worst part. The Party appeals to it in order to win over its best part, to draw it into active Party life. As a result, the marsh is compelled to self-determine itself in spite of all its inertness. And it does indeed self-determine itself as a result of these appeals, by giving up one section of its ranks to the opposition and another to the Party, thus ceasing to exist as a marsh. In the general balance sheet of our Party development this is an asset. As a result of the present discussion the marsh has diminished, or has ceased, or is ceasing, to exist. In this respect the discussion has been a gain.

The results of the discussion? The results are known. Up till yesterday, it appears, 724,000 comrades voted for the Party and a little over 4,000 voted for the opposition. Such are the results. Our opposition thundered that the Central Committee had divorced itself from the Party, that the Party had divorced itself from the class, that if ifs and ans were pots and pans they, the opposition, would certainly have had 99 per cent on their side.

But as ifs and ans are not pots and pans it turns out that the opposition have not even one per cent. Such are the results.

How could it happen that the entire Party, as a whole, and following it the working class too, so thoroughly isolated the opposition? After all, the opposition are headed by well-known people with well-known names, people who know how to advertise themselves (*voices*: "Quite right!"), people who are not afflicted with modesty (*applause*) and are able to blow their own trumpets.

It happened because the leading group of the opposition proved to be a group of petty-bourgeois intellectuals divorced from life, divorced from the revolution, divorced from the Party, from the working class. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause*.)

A little while ago I spoke about the successes we have achieved in our work, about our achievements in the sphere of industry, in the sphere of trade, in the sphere of our economy as a whole, and in the sphere of foreign policy. But the opposition are not interested in these achievements. They do not see, or do not wish to see, them. They do not wish to see them partly because of their ignorance and partly because of the obstinacy characteristic of intellectuals who are divorced from life.

THE FUNDAMENTAL DIVERGENCES BETWEEN THE PARTY AND THE OPPOSITION

You will ask, what then, are the disagreements between the Party and the opposition, on what questions do they disagree?

On all questions, comrades. (*Voices*: "Quite right!")

Recently I read a statement made by a non-party workingman in Moscow, who is joining, or has already joined the Party. This is how he formulates the disagreements between the Party and the opposition:

"Formerly we tried to find out what the Party and the opposition disagreed about. Now we cannot find out on what the opposition agrees with the Party. (*Laughter, applause*.) The opposition is opposed to the Party on all questions, therefore, if I sided with the opposition I would not join the Party." (*Laughter, applause*.) (Cf. *Izvestia*, No. 264.)

You see how aptly and yet concisely workingmen are sometimes able to express themselves. I think that this is the aptest and truest characterization of the opposition's attitude towards the Party, towards its ideology, its program and its tactics.

It is precisely because the opposition disagree with the Party on all questions that the opposition

constitute a group with its own ideology, its own program, its own tactics and its own organizational principles.

The opposition possess everything that is needed to form a new party, everything except a "trifle,"—strength to do so. (*Laughter, applause.*)

I could mention seven fundamental questions on which there is disagreement between the Party and the opposition.

First The question of the possibility of victorious socialist construction in our country. I will not refer to the opposition's documents and statements on this question. Everybody is familiar with them and there is no need to repeat them. It is clear to everybody that the opposition deny the possibility of the victorious construction of Socialism in our country. And in denying this possibility they are directly and openly slipping into the position of the Mensheviks.

The opposition's stand on this question is not a new one for their present leaders. It was the stand taken by Kamenev and Zinoviev when they refused to go to the October insurrection. They openly stated at the time that by raising an insurrection we were going to our destruction, that we must wait for the Constituent Assembly, that the conditions for Socialism had not matured and would not mature soon.

Trotsky took the very same stand when he went to the insurrection; for he openly said that

if a victorious proletarian revolution in the West did not bring timely assistance in the more or less near future, it would be foolish to think that revolutionary Russia could hold its own in face of a conservative Europe.

Indeed, how did Kamenev and Zinoviev on the one side, Trotsky on the other, and Lenin and the Party on the third, go to the insurrection? This is a very interesting question, about which it is worth saying a few words, comrades.

You know that Kamenev and Zinoviev were driven to the insurrection with a stick. Lenin drove them with a stick, threatening them with expulsion from the Party (*laughter, applause*) and they were forced to hobble to the insurrection. (*Laughter, applause.*)

Trotsky went to the insurrection voluntarily. He did not go straightforwardly, however, but with a reservation, which already at that time brought him close to Kamenev and Zinoviev. It is an interesting fact that it was precisely before the October Revolution, in June 1917, that Trotsky deemed it appropriate to publish in Petrograd a new edition of his old pamphlet *A Peace Program*, as if wishing to show thereby that he was going to the insurrection under his own flag. What does he say in that pamphlet? In it he polemizes with Lenin on the question of the possibility of the victory of Socialism in one country, claims that this idea of Lenin's is wrong and

asserts that we will have to take power, but if timely aid does not come from the victorious West-European workers it is hopeless to think that a revolutionary Russia can hold its own in face of a conservative Europe, and whoever does not agree with Trotsky's criticism suffers from national narrow-mindedness.

Here is an excerpt from the pamphlet Trotsky published at that time.

"Without waiting for the others, we begin and continue our struggle on our national soil. fully confident that our initiative will give an impetus to the struggle in other countries; but if that does not happen, it will be hopeless, in the light of historical experience and in the light of theoretical reasoning, to think that a revolutionary Russia, for example, could hold its own in face of a conservative Europe. . . . To regard the prospects of the social revolution within national limits would mean falling a victim to the very same national narrow-mindedness that constitutes the substance of social-patriotism." (Trotsky, 1917, Vol. III, part 1, p. 90.)

Such, comrades, was the trotskyite reservation, which does a great deal to explain to us the roots and the subsoil of his present bloc with Kamenev and Zinoviev.

But how did Lenin, how did the Party go to the insurrection? Also, with a reservation? No. Lenin and his Party went to the insurrection without any reservations. Here is an excerpt from one of Lenin's splendid articles, "The War Pro-

gram of the Proletarian Revolution," published abroad in September 1917:

"Victorious Socialism in one country does not at one stroke eliminate all war in general. On the contrary, it presupposes such wars. The development of capitalism proceeds extremely unevenly in the various countries. It cannot be otherwise under the commodity production system. From this it follows irrefutably that Socialism cannot achieve victory simultaneously in *all* countries. It will achieve victory first in one or several countries, while the others will remain bourgeois or prebourgeois for some time. This must not only create friction, but a direct striving on the part of the bourgeoisie of the other countries to crush the victorious proletariat of the socialist state. In such cases a war on our part would be a legitimate and just war. It would be a war for Socialism, for the liberation of other nations from the bourgeoisie." (Lenin, "The War Program of the Proletarian Revolution," *Notes of the Lenin Institute*, Vol. II, p. 7.)²²

You see that we have a totally different stand here. Whereas Trotsky went to the insurrection with a reservation that brought him close to Kamenev and Zinoviev, asserting that, taken by itself, proletarian power cannot be worth anything if timely aid does not come from outside, Lenin, on the contrary, went to the insurrection without reservations, asserting that proletarian power in our country must serve as a *base* for assisting the proletarians of other countries to free themselves from the yoke of the bourgeoisie.

That is how the Bolsheviks went to the October insurrection, and that is why Trotsky, and Kamenev and Zinoviev, have found common ground nearly ten years after the October Revolution.

One could depict in the form of a dialogue the conversation between Trotsky on the one hand, and Kamenev and Zinoviev on the other, when the opposition bloc was being formed.

Kamenev and Zinoviev to Trotsky: "So you see, dear comrade, in the end we proved to be right when we said that we ought not to go to the October insurrection, that we ought to wait for the Constituent Assembly, and so forth. Now, everybody sees that the country is degenerating, the government is degenerating, we are heading for destruction and there won't be any Socialism in our country. We should not have gone to the insurrection. But you went to the insurrection voluntarily. You made a big mistake."

Trotsky replies to them: "No, dear colleagues, you are unjust towards me. True, I went to the insurrection, but you forgot to say how I went. After all, I did not go to the insurrection straightforwardly, but with a reservation. (*General laughter.*) And since it is evident now that aid cannot be expected from anywhere, it is obvious that we are heading for destruction, as I foretold at the time in *A Peace Program*."

Zinoviev and Kamenev: "Yes, you are right.

We forgot about your reservation. It is clear now that our bloc has an ideological foundation." (*General laughter. Applause.*)

That is how the opposition took its stand on the denial of the possibility of victorious socialist construction in our country.

What does that stand signify? It signifies surrender. To whom? Obviously to the capitalist elements in our country. To whom else? To the world bourgeoisie. But the Left phrases, the revolutionary arm waving—what has become of them? They have scattered like dust. Give our opposition a good shaking, cast aside the revolutionary phraseology, and at bottom you will find that they are defeatists. (*Applause.*)

Second. The question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Have we the dictatorship of the proletariat or not? Rather a strange question. (*Laughter.*) Nevertheless, the opposition raise it in every one of their statements. The opposition say that we are in a state of Thermidor degeneration. What does that mean? It means that we have not the dictatorship of the proletariat, that our economics and our politics are a failure, are going backwards, that we are not going towards Socialism, but towards capitalism. This, of course, is strange and foolish. But the opposition insist on it.

Here, comrades, you have another divergence. It is on this that Trotsky's well-known thesis

about Clemenceau is based. If the government has degenerated, or is degenerating, is it worth while to spare it, defend it, uphold it? Clearly, it is not worth while. If a situation arises favourable for the "removal" of such a government, if, say, the enemy comes within 80 kilometres of Moscow, is it not obvious that advantage should be taken of this situation to sweep this government away and set up a new, Clemenceau, i.e., Trotsky, government?

Clearly, there is nothing Leninist in this "stand." It is Menshevism of the purest water. The opposition have slipped into Menshevism.

Third. The question of the bloc between the working class and the middle peasants. All the time the opposition have concealed their hostility towards the idea of such a bloc. Their platform, their countertheses, are remarkable not so much for what they say as for what the opposition have tried to conceal from the working class. But a man was found, I. N. Smirnov, also a leader of the opposition, who had the courage to tell the truth about the opposition, to drag them into the light of day. And what do we find? We find that we "are heading towards destruction," and if we want to "save" ourselves, we must fall out with the middle peasants. Not very clever, but clear.

Here the opposition's Menshevik ears have at last become exposed for everybody to see.

Fourth. The question of the character of our revolution. If the possibility of the victorious construction of Socialism in our country is denied, if the existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat is denied, if the necessity of a bloc between the working class and the peasantry is denied, what then remains of our revolution, of its socialist character? Clearly, nothing, absolutely nothing. The proletariat came into power, it carried the bourgeois revolution to the end, the peasantry now have nothing to do with the revolution since they have already received land, so the proletariat can now retire and make room for other classes.

Such is the opposition's stand, if we delve down to the roots of the oppositional views.

Such are all the roots of our opposition's defeatism. No wonder the Bundist defeatist Abramovich praises them.

Fifth. The question of Lenin's stand on the leadership of colonial revolutions. Lenin took his stand on the difference between imperialist countries and oppressed countries, between the communist policy in imperialist countries and the communist policy in colonial countries. Taking his stand on this difference, he said, already during the war, that the idea of defending the fatherland is unacceptable and counterrevolutionary for Communism in imperialist countries, but

quite acceptable and correct in oppressed countries which are waging a war of liberation against imperialism.

It is precisely for this reason that Lenin conceded the possibility, at a certain stage and for a certain period, of a bloc, and even of an alliance, with the national bourgeoisie in colonial countries if it is waging war against imperialism, and if it is not preventing the Communists from training the workers and the peasant poor in the spirit of Communism.

The sin the opposition have fallen into here is that they have completely broken away from this stand of Lenin's and have slipped into the position held by the Second International, which denies the expediency of supporting revolutionary wars waged by colonial countries against imperialism. And it is this that explains all the misfortunes that have befallen our opposition on the question of the Chinese revolution.

And so you have still another divergence.

Sixth. The question of the united front tactics in the international working-class movement. The sin which the opposition have fallen into here is that they are breaking away from the Leninist tactics on the question of gradually winning the vast working-class masses to the side of Communism. The vast working-class masses are won over to the side of Communism not only by the

Party pursuing a correct policy. The Party's correct policy is a big thing, but it is far from being everything. In order that the vast working-class masses should come over to Communism, it is necessary that the masses themselves should be convinced by their own experience that the communist policy is correct. And in order that the masses should become so convinced time is needed, the Party must work skilfully and ably in leading the masses to their positions, the Party must work skilfully and ably to convince the vast masses that its policy is correct.

We were absolutely right in April 1917, for we knew that things were moving towards the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and to the establishment of the power of the Soviets. But we did not yet call upon the broad working-class masses to rise in revolt against the power of the bourgeoisie. Why? Because the masses had not yet had the opportunity to convince themselves that our absolutely correct policy was correct. Only when the petty-bourgeois Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties had utterly discredited themselves on the fundamental questions of the revolution, only when the masses were beginning to convince themselves that our policy was correct, only then did we lead the masses to the insurrection. And it is precisely because we led the masses to the insurrection at the proper time that we achieved victory then.

Such are the roots of the united front idea. Lenin put the united front tactics into operation precisely for the purpose of helping the vast working-class masses in the capitalist countries, who are imbued with the prejudices of Social-Democratic compromise, to learn from their own experience that the Communists' policy is correct and to pass to the side of Communism.

The sin the opposition have fallen into is that they utterly repudiate these tactics. At one time they were infatuated, foolishly and unwisely infatuated, with the united front tactics and heartily welcomed the conclusion of an agreement with the General Council in England,²³ believing that this agreement was "one of the surest guarantees of peace," "one of the surest guarantees against intervention," one of the surest means of "making reformism in Europe harmless" (cf. Zinoviev's report to the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.[B.]). But when their hopes of making reformism in Europe "harmless" with the aid of the Purcells and Hickses were cruelly dashed to the ground, they rushed to the other extreme and utterly repudiated the united front tactics idea.

Such, comrades, is still another divergence, which demonstrates the opposition's complete abandonment of the Leninist united front tactics.

Seventh. The question of the Leninist Party principle, of Leninist unity in the C.P.S.U.(B.)

and in the Comintern. Here, the opposition utterly break away from the Leninist principle of organization and take the path of organizing a second party, the path of organizing a new International.

Such are the seven fundamental questions which indicate that on all these questions the opposition have slipped into Menshevism.

Can these Menshevik views of the opposition be regarded as compatible with our Party's ideology, with our Party's program, with its tactics, with the tactics of the Comintern, with the organizational principles of Leninism?

Under no circumstances; not for a single moment!

You will ask: how could such an opposition come into being among us; where are their social roots? I think that the social roots of the opposition lie in the fact that the urban petty-bourgeois strata are being ruined under the conditions of our development, in the fact that these strata are discontented with the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the striving of these strata to change this regime, to "improve" it in the spirit of establishing bourgeois democracy.

I have already said that as a result of our progress, as a result of the growth of our industry, as a result of the growth of the relative weight of the socialist forms of economy, a section of

the petty-bourgeoisie, particularly the urban bourgeoisie, is being ruined and is going under. The opposition reflect the grumbling and discontent of these strata with the regime of the proletarian revolution.

Such are the social roots of the opposition.

4

WHAT IS TO BE DONE FURTHER

What is to be done further with the opposition?

Before passing to this question I would like to tell you the story about an experiment in joint work with Trotsky that Kamenev made in 1910. This is a very interesting question. The more so that it could give us some clue to the proper approach to the afore-mentioned question. In 1910 a plenum of our Central Committee was held abroad. It discussed the question of the relations between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, and Trotsky in particular (we were then a part of one party together with the Mensheviks, and we called ourselves a faction). The plenum decided in favour of conciliation with the Mensheviks and, consequently, with Trotsky, in spite of Lenin, in opposition to Lenin. Lenin was left in the minority. But what about Kamenev? Kamenev undertook to cooperate with Trotsky.

He did so with Lenin's knowledge and consent, because Lenin wanted to prove to Kamenev by experience that it was harmful and impermissible to cooperate with Trotsky against the Bolsheviks.

Listen to what Kamenev relates about this.

"In 1910, the majority of our faction made an attempt at conciliation and agreement with Comrade Trotsky. Vladimir Ilyich was strongly opposed to this attempt and, as a 'punishment,' as it were, for my persistence in the attempt to reach agreement with Trotsky, insisted that the Central Committee should send me as its delegate on the editorial board of Comrade Trotsky's newspaper. By the autumn of 1910—having worked on this editorial board for several months—I was convinced that Vladimir Ilyich was right in his opposition to my 'conciliatory' line, and with his consent I resigned from the editorial board of Comrade Trotsky's paper. Our rupture with Comrade Trotsky at that time was marked by a series of sharply-worded articles in the Central Organ of the Party. It was at that time that Vladimir Ilyich suggested to me that I should write a pamphlet summing up our disagreements with the Liquidator-Mensheviks and with Comrade Trotsky. 'You have made an experiment in trying to reach agreement with the extreme Left (trotskyite) wing of the anti-Bolshevik groups, you have been convinced that agreement is impossible, and so you must write a summarizing pamphlet,' Vladimir Ilyich said to me. Naturally, Vladimir Ilyich insisted particularly that precisely on the subject of the relations between the Bolsheviks and what we then called trotskyism everything should be told... to the very end." (L. Kamenev's preface to his pamphlet *Two Parties*.)

What were the results of this? Listen further:

"The experiment in joint work with Trotsky—which, I make so bold to say, I performed with sincerity, as is proved precisely by the way Trotsky is now exploiting my letters and private conversations—showed that conciliation irresistibly slips into defence of liquidationism and definitely takes the side of the latter." (L. Kamenev, *Two Parties*.)

And further:

"Oh, had 'trotskyism' been victorious as a mood in the Party, what freedom there would have been for liquidationism, for otsovism, and for all the trends that were fighting the Party." (*Ibid.*)

Such, comrades, was an experiment in joint work with Trotsky. (*A voice*: "An instructive experiment.") Kamenev, at that time, described these results in a special pamphlet that was published in 1911 under the title of *Two Parties*. I have no doubt that this pamphlet was very useful to all those comrades who still harboured illusions concerning cooperation with Trotsky.

And now I would ask: would not Kamenev try to write another pamphlet, also bearing the title *Two Parties*, about his present experiment in trying to cooperate with Trotsky? (*General laughter. Applause.*) Perhaps there would be some use in his doing so. Of course, I can give Kamenev no guarantee that Trotsky will not now use his letters and intimate conversations against him as he did then. (*General laughter.*) But it is scarcely

worth while being afraid of that. At all events, a choice has to be made: either to be afraid that Trotsky will use Kamenev's letters and divulge his secret conversations with Trotsky, in which case the danger arises of being outside the Party; or to cast off all fear and remain in the Party.

That is how the question stands now, comrades: one thing or another.

It is said that the opposition intend to present to the Congress some kind of a statement to the effect that they, the opposition, submit and will in future submit to all the Party decisions (*a voice*: "In the same way as they did in October 1926?"), dissolve their faction (*a voice*: "We have heard that twice!") and defend their views, which they do not renounce (*voices*: "Oh!" "No, we had better dissolve it ourselves!") within the limits of the Party Rules. (*Voices*: "With reservations." "Our limits are not elastic.")

I think, comrades, that nothing will come of this. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Prolonged applause.*) We too, comrades, have some experience of statements (*applause*), some experience of two statements (*voices*: "Quite right!"), of October 16, 1926 and of August 8, 1927. What did this experience lead to? Although I do not intend to write a pamphlet *Two Parties*, I dare say that this experience led to the most negative results (*voices*: "Quite right!") to the deception of the Party on two occasions, to the slack-

ening of Party discipline. What grounds have the opposition now to demand that we, the Congress of a great Party, the Congress of Lenin's Party, should take their word after such an experience? (Voices: "It would be foolish." "Whoever does so will get done in.")

It is said that they are also raising the question of the reinstatement in the Party of those who have been expelled. (Voices: "That won't come off." "Let them go into the Menshevik marsh.") I think, comrades, that this too will not come off. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Why did the Party expel Trotsky and Zinoviev? Because they are the organizers of the entire anti-Party opposition (voices: "Quite right!"), because they set themselves the aim of breaking the laws of the Party, because they thought that nobody would dare to touch them, because they wanted to create for themselves the privileged position of nobles in the Party.

But do we want to have a privileged nobility and an unprivileged peasantry in the Party? Shall we Bolsheviks, who uprooted the nobility, restore them in our Party? (*Applause.*)

You ask: why did we expel Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party? Because we do not want a nobility in the Party. Because there is one law in our Party, and all members of the Party have equal rights. (Voices: "Quite right!" *Prolonged applause.*)

If the opposition want to be in the Party let them submit to the will of the Party, to its laws, to its instructions, without reservations, without equivocation. If they refuse to do that, let them go wherever they please. (Voices: "Quite right!" *Applause.*) We do not want new laws providing privileges for the opposition, and we will not create them. (*Applause.*)

The question is raised about terms. We have only one set of terms: the opposition must disarm wholly and entirely, in ideological and organizational respects. (Voices: "Quite right!" *Prolonged applause.*)

They must renounce their anti-Bolshevik views openly and honestly, before the whole world. (Voices: "Quite right!" *Prolonged applause.*)

They must denounce the mistakes they have committed, mistakes which have grown into crimes against the Party, openly and honestly, before the whole world.

They must surrender their nuclei to us in order that the Party may be able to dissolve them without leaving a trace. (Voices: "Quite right!" *Prolonged applause.*)

Either that or else, let them leave the Party. If they don't go out, we'll throw them out. (Voices: "Quite right!" *Prolonged applause.*)

That is how the matter stands with the opposition, comrades.

GENERAL SUMMARY

I will now conclude, comrades.

What is the general summary for the period under review? It is as follows:

1) *We have maintained peace with the surrounding states, in spite of enormous difficulties, in spite of the provocative attacks of the bourgeoisie of the "great powers";*

2) *we have strengthened the link between the working class of the U.S.S.R. and the workers in the imperialist countries and in the colonies, in spite of a multitude of obstacles, in spite of the ocean of slander poured out against us by the corrupt, hundred-mouthed bourgeois press;*

3) *we have raised the prestige of the dictatorship of the proletariat among the vast toiling masses in all parts of the world;*

4) *we, as a party, have helped the Comintern and its sections to increase their influence in all countries in the world;*

5) *we have done everything one party can do to develop and accelerate the world revolutionary movement;*

6) *we have raised our socialist industry, setting for it a record rate of development and establishing its predominance in the whole of our national economy;*

7) *we have established a link between socialist industry and peasant farming;*

8) *we have strengthened the alliance between the working class and the middle peasants, while relying on the peasant poor;*

9) *we have strengthened the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country in spite of the hostile international encirclement, and have shown the workers of all countries that the proletariat is able not only to destroy capitalism, but also to build Socialism;*

10) *we have strengthened the Party, upheld Leninism and utterly routed the opposition.*

Such is the general summary.

What is the conclusion? Only one conclusion can be drawn: we are on the right road; our Party's policy is correct. (Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.)

And from this it follows that, continuing along this road, we will certainly achieve the victory of Socialism in our country, the victory of Socialism in all countries. (Prolonged applause.)

But this does not mean that we will not encounter difficulties on our road. There will be difficulties. But difficulties do not daunt us, for

we Bolsheviks have been steeled in the furnace of revolution.

There will be difficulties. But we will surmount them, as we have surmounted difficulties up till now, for we are Bolsheviks, who have been wrought by Lenin's iron Party in order to combat difficulties and surmount them, and not to snivel and whine.

And precisely because we are Bolsheviks we will certainly be victorious.

Comrades! To the victory of Communism in our country, to the victory of Communism all over the world—forward! (*Loud and prolonged applause. All rise and give Comrade Stalin an ovation. The "Internationale" is sung.*)

REPLY TO DEBATE ON THE POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

December 7, 1927

Comrades, after the speeches delivered by a number of delegates, there is little left for me to say. Concerning the speeches delivered by Yevdokimov and Muralov I cannot say anything in substance, for they provide no material for it. Only one thing could be said about them: Allah, forgive them their trespasses, for they know not what they are talking about. (*Laughter, applause.*) I would like to deal with the speeches delivered by Rakovsky and, particularly, Kamenev, whose speech was the most pharisaical and hypocritical of all the speeches of the opposition. (*Voices: "Quite right!"*)

I

CONCERNING RAKOVSKY'S SPEECH

a) *Concerning foreign policy.* I think that Rakovsky should not have touched upon the question of war and foreign policy here. Everybody knows that at the Moscow conference Ra-

kovsky made a fool of himself on the question of war. Evidently, he came here and took the floor in order to rectify that blunder, but he made a bigger fool of himself. (*Laughter.*) I think it would have been better for Rakovsky had he kept quiet about foreign policy.

b) *Concerning Left and Right.* Rakovsky asserts that the opposition are the Left sector of our Party. This is enough to make a cat laugh, comrades. Evidently, such statements are made for the self-consolation of political bankrupts. It has been proved that the opposition are the Menshevik wing of our Party, that the opposition have slipped into Menshevism, that, objectively, the opposition have become a tool of the bourgeois elements. All this has been proved over and over again. How can there be any talk here about the opposition's Leftism? How can a Menshevik group which, objectively, has become a tool of the "third force," of the bourgeois elements, how can such a group be more Left than the Bolsheviks? Is it not obvious that the opposition are the Right, the Menshevik wing of the C.P.S.U. (B.)?

Evidently, Rakovsky has got himself entirely mixed up and has confused the right with the left. Do you remember Gogol's Seliphan?—"On you, dirty legs.... You don't know right from left!"

c) *Concerning the opposition's assistance.* Rakovsky says that the opposition are willing to

support the Party if the imperialists attack us. How generous, to be sure! They, a tiny group, representing scarcely half of one per cent of our Party, graciously promise to assist us if the imperialists attack our country. We don't believe in your assistance, and we don't need it! We ask only one thing of you: Do not hinder us, stop hindering us! All the rest we will do ourselves, you can be sure about that. (*Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.*)

d) *Concerning "signalmen."* Rakovsky says further that the opposition signalled to us the dangers, the difficulties, the "doom" that face our country. Fine "signalmen," indeed, who want to save the Party when they themselves are rushing to their doom and need saving! They can barely keep on their feet themselves and yet want to save others! Isn't it ridiculous, comrades? (*Laughter.*)

Picture to yourselves a tiny boat at sea, barely able to keep afloat, ready to founder at any moment, and picture to yourselves a magnificent steamship powerfully cutting the waves and confidently making headway. What would you say if this tiny boat rushed to save the huge steamship? (*Laughter.*) It would be more than ridiculous, would it not? This is exactly the position the "signalmen" of our opposition are in now. They are signalling to us dangers, difficulties, "doom," and what not, but they themselves are sinking,

do not realize that they have already gone to the bottom.

Speaking of themselves as "signalmen," the opposition thereby claim the leadership of the Party, of the working class, of the country. The question is—on what grounds? Have the opposition given any practical proof that they are capable of leading anything, let alone the Party, the class, the country? Is it not a fact that the opposition, headed by men like Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev, have been leading their group for two years already and, leading their group, the leaders of the opposition have brought it to utter bankruptcy? Is it not a fact that during these two years the opposition led their group from defeat to defeat? What does this show if not that the leaders of the opposition are bankrupt, that their leadership has proved to be leadership to defeat, not to victory? Since the leaders of the opposition failed in a small thing, what grounds are there for thinking that they will be successful in a big one? Is it not obvious that people who went bankrupt in leading a small group cannot possibly be entrusted with the leadership of such a big thing as the Party, the working class, the country?

That is what our "signalmen" refuse to understand.

II

CONCERNING KAMENEV'S SPEECH

I will pass to Kamenev's speech. That speech was the most hypocritical, most pharisaical, most mendacious and most rascally speech of all the opposition speeches delivered here, in this rostrum. (Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.)

a) *Two faces in one.* The first thing Kamenev tried to do in his speech was to wipe out the traces. The representatives of the Party spoke here about our Party's achievements, about our successes in construction, about the improvement in our work, etc. Further, they spoke about the Menshevik sins the opposition have fallen into, about their having slipped into Menshevism by denying the possibility of successfully building Socialism in our country, denying the existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R., denying the expediency of the policy of alliance between the working class and the middle peasants, spreading slander about Thermidor, etc. Lastly, they said that these views of the opposition are incompatible with membership of our Party, that the opposition must abandon these Menshevik views if they want to be in the Party.

Well? Kamenev could think of nothing better than evade these questions, to wipe out the

traces and pass on. He is asked about vital questions concerning our program, our policy, about our work of construction; but he evades them, as if they did not concern him. Can this behaviour of Kamenev's be called a serious attitude towards the matter? How is this behaviour of the opposition to be explained? It can be explained only by one thing: the desire to deceive the Party, to lull its vigilance, to fool the Party once again.

The opposition have two faces: a pharisaically smiling one, and a Menshevik anti-revolutionary one. They show the Party their pharisaical smiling face when the Party puts pressure on them and demands that they should abandon their factionalism, their splitting policy. They show their Menshevik anti-revolutionary face when they set out to appeal to the nonproletarian forces, when they set out to appeal to the "street" against the Party, against the Soviet regime. Just now, as you see, they have turned their pharisaically smiling face to us in the endeavour to deceive the Party once again. That is why Kamenev tried to wipe out the traces by evading the vital questions on which we disagree. Can this duplicity, this two-facedness, be tolerated any longer?

One of two things: either the opposition want to talk seriously to the Party, in which case they must throw off their mask; or they think of retaining two faces, in which case they will find

themselves outside the Party. (Voices: "Quite right!")

b) *Concerning the traditions of Bolshevism.* Kamenev asserts that there is nothing in the traditions of our Party, in the traditions of Bolshevism, that justifies the demand that a member of the Party should give up certain views that are incompatible with our Party's ideology, with our program. Is that true? Of course not. Nay more, it is a lie, comrades!

Is it not a fact that all of us, including Kamenev, expelled Myasnikov and the myasnikovites from the Party? Why did we expel them? Because their Menshevik views were incompatible with the Party's views.

Is it not a fact that all of us, including Kamenev, expelled a section of the "workers' opposition" from the Party? Why did we expel it? Because its Menshevik views were incompatible with our Party's views.

Why were Ossovsky and Dashkovsky expelled from the Party? Why were Maslov, Ruth Fischer, Katz and others expelled from the Comintern? Because their views were incompatible with the ideology of the Comintern, with the ideology of the C.P.S.U.(B.):

Our Party would not be a Leninist Party if it permitted the existence of anti-Leninist elements within our organizations. If this were permitted, why, then, not bring the Mensheviks into our

Party? What is to be done with such people who, while in the ranks of our Party, have slipped into Menshevism and conduct propaganda in favour of their anti-Leninist views? What can there be in common between the Leninist Party and such people? Kamenev calumniates our Party, breaks away from the traditions of our Party, breaks away from the traditions of Bolshevism in asserting that we can tolerate within our Party people who profess and preach Menshevik views. And it is precisely because Kamenev, and the entire opposition with him, trample upon the revolutionary traditions of our Party, precisely because of this, the Party demands that the opposition should abandon their anti-Leninist views.

c) *The opposition's sham devotion to principles.* Kamenev asserts that it is difficult for him and the rest of the opposition to abandon their views because they are accustomed, in the Bolshevik manner, to defend their views. He says that it would be unprincipled on the part of the opposition to abandon their views. It appears, then, that the leaders of the opposition are men of high principle. Is that true, comrades? Do the leaders of the opposition really cherish their principles, their views, their convictions so highly? It doesn't seem like it, comrades. It doesn't seem like it, bearing in mind the history of the formation of the opposition bloc. (*Laughter.*) The very opposite is the case. History shows, facts show,

that nobody has jumped so easily from one set of principles to another, nobody has changed his views so easily and freely as the leaders of our opposition have done. Why, then, should they not abandon their views now, since the interests of the Party demand it?

Here are a few examples from the history of trotskyism.

It is known that Lenin, mustering the Party, convened a conference of Bolsheviks in Prague in 1912. It is known that this conference was of vital importance in the history of our Party, for it drew a dividing line between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks and united the Bolshevik organizations all over the country into a single Bolshevik Party.

It is known that in that same year, 1912, a Menshevik conference of the August bloc, headed by Trotsky, was held. Further, it is known that this conference proclaimed war on the Bolshevik conference and called upon the workers' organizations to liquidate Lenin's Party. What did the conference of Trotsky's August bloc accuse the Prague Bolshevik conference of at that time? Of all mortal sins. It accused it of usurpation, of sectarianism, of organizing a "coup d'état" in the Party, and the devil knows what else.

This is what the conference of the August bloc said at that time about the Bolshevik conference

in Prague in its statement to the Second International:

"This conference declares that the conference" (the Bolshevik conference in Prague in 1912—*J. St.*) "is an open attempt of a group of persons who have quite deliberately led the Party to a split, to usurp the Party's flag, and it expresses its profound regret that several party organizations and comrades have fallen victims to this deception and have thereby facilitated the splitting and usurpatory policy of Lenin's sect. This conference expresses the conviction that all the party organizations in Russia and abroad will protest against the coup d'état that has been brought about, will refuse to recognize the central bodies elected at that conference, and will by every means help to restore the unity of the Party by the convocation of a genuine all-party conference." (From the statement of the August bloc to the Second International, published in *Vorwärts*, March 26, 1912.)

As you see, everything is here: Lenin's sect, usurpation, and a "coup d'état" in the Party.

Well? A few years passed—and Trotsky abandoned these views of his concerning the Bolshevik Party. He not only abandoned his views, but crawled on his belly to the Bolshevik Party, joining it as one of its active members. (*Laughter.*)

What grounds are there for assuming, after all this, that Trotsky and the trotskyites will not be able once again to abandon their views about the Thermidor trends in our Party, about usurpation, etc.?

Another example from the same sphere.

It is known that at the end of 1924, Trotsky published a pamphlet entitled *The Lessons of October*. It is known that in this pamphlet Trotsky qualified Kamenev and Zinoviev as the Right, semi-Menshevik wing of our Party. It is known that Trotsky's pamphlet served as the cause of a whole discussion in our Party. Well? Only about a year passed—and Trotsky abandoned his views and proclaimed that Zinoviev and Kamenev represented not the Right but the Left, the revolutionary wing of our Party.

Another example, this time from the history of the Zinoviev group. It is known that Zinoviev and Kamenev have written a whole pile of pamphlets against trotskyism. It is known that as far back as 1925, Zinoviev and Kamenev declared, together with the whole Party, that trotskyism is incompatible with Leninism. It is known that Zinoviev and Kamenev, together with the whole Party, carried resolutions at the congresses of our Party and at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, concerning the petty-bourgeois deviation of trotskyism. Well? Less than a year had passed after that when they renounced their views and proclaimed that Trotsky's group is a genuine Leninist and revolutionary group within our Party. (*A voice: "Mutual amnesty!"*)

Such, comrades, are the facts, the number of which could be increased if so desired.

Is it not obvious from this that the high principledness of the leaders of the opposition that Kamenev tells us about here is a fairy tale that has nothing in common with reality?

Is it not obvious that nobody in our Party has been able to renounce his principles as easily and freely as Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev? (*Laughter.*)

The question is: what grounds are there for assuming that the leaders of the opposition, who have abandoned their principles, their views, several times already, will not be able to abandon them once again?

Is it not obvious that our demand that the opposition should abandon their Menshevik views is not as harsh for the leaders of the opposition as Kamenev tries to make out? (*Laughter.*) This is not the first time they have had occasion to abandon their views, so why should they not abandon them just once again? (*Laughter.*)

d) *Either the Party, or the opposition.* Kamenev asserts that it is wrong to call upon the opposition to abandon some of their views which have become incompatible with the Party's ideology and program. I have already shown how utterly foolish this assertion is, bearing in mind the opposition bloc's past and present. But let us assume for a moment that Kamenev is right. What will the position be then? Can the Party, our Party, abandon its views, convictions,

principles? Can we demand that our Party should abandon its views, its principles? The Party has arrived at the definite conviction that the opposition must abandon their anti-Leninist views, that if they do not do so they will have to fly out of the Party. If it is wrong to demand that the opposition should abandon their convictions, why is it right to demand that the Party should abandon its views and convictions about the opposition? According to Kamenev, however, the opposition cannot abandon their anti-Leninist views, but the Party must abandon its view that the opposition cannot be allowed to remain in our Party unless the opposition abandon their anti-Leninist views. Where's the logic? (*Laughter, applause.*)

Kamenev asserts that the opposition are brave men who stand up for their convictions to the last. I have little faith in the bravery and devotion to principle of the leaders of the opposition. I have exceptionally little faith in the bravery, for example, of Zinoviev or Kamenev (*laughter*), who abuse Trotsky one day and embrace him the next. (*A voice: "They are accustomed to playing leapfrog."*) But let us assume for a moment that the leaders of the opposition have retained a particle of bravery and devotion to principle. What grounds are there for assuming that the Party is less brave and devoted to principle than, say, Zinoviev, Kamenev or Trotsky?

What grounds are there for assuming that it is easier for the Party to abandon its convictions about the opposition, the conviction that their Menshevik views are incompatible with the Party's ideology and program, than it is for the leaders of the opposition to abandon their views, which every now and again they change like gloves? (*Laughter.*)

Is it not obvious from this that Kamenev is demanding that the Party should abandon its views about the opposition and their Menshevik mistakes? Is not Kamenev going too far? Will he not agree that it is dangerous to go so far?

The question stands like this: either the Party, or the opposition. Either the opposition abandon their anti-Leninist views; or they do not do so—in which case not even the memory of them will be left in the Party. (*Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.*)

e) *The opposition have broken away from the traditions of Bolshevism.* Kamenev asserts that there is nothing in Bolshevik traditions to justify the demand that members of the Party should abandon their views. Speakers here have fully proved that this is wrong. Facts confirm that Kamenev is telling a downright untruth.

But the question is: is there anything in Bolshevik traditions to justify what the opposition has taken, and continues to take, the liberty to do? The opposition organized a faction and con-

verted it into a party within our Bolshevik Party. But who has ever heard that Bolshevik traditions permitted anybody to do such an outrageous thing? How can one talk about Bolshevik traditions and at the same time cause a split in the Party and form within it a new, anti-Bolshevik party?

Further. The opposition organized an underground printing plant, entering into a bloc with bourgeois intellectuals, who, in their turn, were found to be in a bloc with avowed Whiteguards. The question is: how can one talk about the traditions of Bolshevism after committing such an outrageous deed, which borders on downright treachery to the Party and the Soviet regime?

Lastly, the opposition organized an anti-Party, anti-Soviet demonstration, appealing to the "street," appealing to the nonproletarian elements. But how can one talk about Bolshevik traditions after appealing to the "street" against your own Party, against your own Soviet regime? Who has ever heard that Bolshevik traditions permitted such an outrageous deed, which borders on downright counterrevolution?

Is it not obvious that Kamenev talks about the traditions of Bolshevism in order to screen his rupture with these traditions in the interests of his anti-Bolshevik group?

The opposition gained nothing from their appeal to the "street" because they turned out to

be an insignificant coterie. That was not their fault, it was their misfortune. But supposing the opposition had had a little more strength behind it. Is it not obvious that their appeal to the "street" would have grown into an open putsch against the Soviet regime? Is it difficult to understand that, in essence, this attempt of the opposition's differed in no way from the well-known attempt of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in 1918? (*Voices: "Quite right!"*) By rights, for these attempts we ought to have arrested all the active members of the opposition on November 7. (*Voices: "Quite right!" Prolonged applause.*) We did not do so only because we pitied them, we displayed magnanimity and wanted to give them an opportunity to come to their senses. And they interpreted our magnanimity as weakness.

Is it not obvious that Kamenev's talk about Bolshevik traditions is empty and hypocritical chatter intended for the purpose of screening the opposition's rupture with the traditions of Bolshevism?

f) *Concerning sham unity and genuine unity.* Kamenev, here, sang to us about unity. He simply warbled, begging the Party to come to the rescue and establish unity "at all costs." They, the leaders of the opposition, don't you see, are opposed to the two-party policy. They, don't you see, are in favour of party unity "at all costs."

And yet, we know for certain that at the very moment that Kamenev was singing about unity here, his like-minded friends were passing resolutions at their secret meetings to the effect that the opposition's statement about unity was a manoeuvre for the purpose of preserving their forces and of continuing their splitting policy. On the one hand, the opposition sing about unity at the Congress of the Leninist Party. On the other hand, the opposition work underground to split the Party, to organize a second party, to disrupt party unity. This is what they call unity "at all costs." Is it not time to drop this criminal, rascally game?

Kamenev talked about unity. Unity with whom? Unity with the Party or with Shcherbakov? Is it not time to understand that Leninists and gentlemen of the Shcherbakov ilk cannot be united in one Party?

Kamenev talked about unity. Unity with whom? With Maslov and Souvarine, or with the Comintern and the C.P.S.U. (B)? Is it not time to understand that one cannot speak of unity with the C.P.S.U. (B.) and the Comintern while remaining united with the Maslovs and Souvarines? Is it not time to understand that it is impossible to unite the Leninist views with the opposition's Menshevik views?

Unite Lenin with Abramovich? No thanks, comrades! It is time to drop this rascally game.

That is why I think that Kamenev's talk about unity "at all costs" is a pharisaical game for the purpose of deceiving the Party.

We need genuine unity and not mock unity. Have we genuine, Leninist unity in our Party? Yes, we have. When 99 per cent of our Party vote for the Party and against the opposition, that is real, genuine, proletarian unity such as there has not been in our Party before. Here is this Party Congress, at which there is not a single opposition delegate. (*Applause.*) What is this if not the unity of our Leninist Party? It is what we call the Leninist unity of the Bolshevik Party.

g) "*The lid on the opposition!*" The Party has done all that possibly could be done to put the opposition on the Leninist road. The Party has displayed the utmost leniency and magnanimity to enable the opposition to come to their senses and rectify their mistakes. The Party has called upon the opposition openly and honestly, before the whole Party, to abandon their anti-Leninist views. The Party has called upon the opposition to admit their mistakes and denounce them in order to free themselves of them once and for all. The Party has called upon the opposition completely to disarm in ideological and organizational respects.

What is the Party's object in doing so? Its object is to finish with the opposition and pass

on to positive work. Its object is to liquidate the opposition at last and obtain the opportunity to get right down to our great work of construction.

Lenin said at the Tenth Congress: "We don't want an opposition now... the opposition is finished now, the lid is on it, we have had enough of oppositions now!"²⁴

The Party wants this slogan of Lenin's to be put into effect at last in the ranks of our Party. (*Prolonged applause.*)

If the opposition disarms—well and good. If they refuse to disarm—we will disarm them. (*Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.*)

III

SUMMARY

From Kamenev's speech it is evident that the opposition do not intend to disarm completely. The opposition's statement of December 3 indicates the same thing. Evidently, the opposition prefer to be outside the Party. Well, let them be outside the Party. There is nothing terrible, nor exceptional, nor surprising in the fact that they prefer to be outside the Party, that they have cut themselves off from the Party. If you study the history of our Party you will find that always, at certain serious turns taken by our Party, a

certain section of the old leaders fell out of the cart of the Bolshevik Party and made room for new men. A turn is a serious thing, comrades. A turn is dangerous for those who do not sit firmly in the Party cart. Not everybody can keep his balance when a turn is made. You turn the cart—and when you look round you find that somebody has fallen out. (*Applause.*)

Let us take 1903, the period of the Second Congress of our Party. That was the period of the Party's turn from agreement with the Liberals to a mortal struggle against the liberal bourgeoisie, from preparing for the struggle against tsarism to open struggle for the utter rout of tsarism and feudalism. At that time the Party was headed by the six: Plekhanov, Zassulich, Martov, Lenin, Axelrod and Potressov. The turn proved fatal for five out of the six. They fell out of the cart. Lenin alone remained. (*Applause.*) It turned out that the old leaders of the Party, the founders of the Party (Plekhanov, Zassulich and Axelrod) plus two young ones (Martov and Potressov) were against one, also a young one, Lenin. If only you knew how much howling, weeping and wailing there was then that the Party was doomed, that the Party would not hold out, that nothing could be done without the old leaders. The howling and wailing passed away, however, but the facts remained. And the facts were that precisely because

the five left, the Party got on to the right road. It is now obvious to every Bolshevik that if Lenin had not waged a resolute struggle against the five, if the five had not been pushed aside, our Party could not have rallied as a Bolshevik Party capable of leading the proletarians to the revolution against the bourgeoisie. (*Voices: "That's true!"*)

Let us take the next period, the period 1907-1908. That was the period of our Party's turn from open revolutionary struggle against tsarism to flanking methods of struggle, the utilization of all and sundry legal possibilities—from insurance funds to the rostrum of the Duma. It was the period of retreat after we had been defeated in the 1905 Revolution. This turn made it necessary for us to learn new methods of struggle in order, after mustering our forces, to resume the open revolutionary struggle against tsarism. But this turn proved fatal for a number of old Bolsheviks. Alexinsky fell out of the cart. At one time he was not at all a bad Bolshevik. Bogdanov fell out. He was one of the most serious leaders of our Party. Rozhkov—a former member of the Central Committee of our Party—fell out. And so forth. Of howling and wailing that the Party would perish there was, perhaps, no less then than in 1903. The howling, however, passed away, but the facts remained. And the facts showed that the Party would not have

been able to get out on to the road under the new conditions of struggle had it not purged itself of the people who had wavered and were hindering the cause of the revolution. What was Lenin's object at that time? He had only one object: to rid the Party of the unstable and whining elements as quickly as possible, so that they should not be getting in our way. (*Applause.*)

That is how our Party grew, comrades.

Our Party is a living organism. As is the case with every organism, it goes through the process of metabolism: the old and obsolete passes away (*applause*), the new and growing lives and develops. (*Applause.*) Some pass away, at the top and at the bottom. New ones grow, at the top and at the bottom, and lead the cause forward. That is how our Party grew. That is how it will continue to grow.

The same must be said about the present period of our revolution. We are in the period of a turn from the restoration of industry and agriculture to the reconstruction of the entire national economy, to its reconstruction on a new technical basis, when the building of Socialism is no longer merely in prospect, but a living, practical matter, which calls for the surmounting of extremely great difficulties of an internal and external character.

You know that this turn has proved fatal for the leaders of our opposition, who were scared

by the difficulties and intended to turn the Party in the direction of surrender. And if some of the leaders who do not want to sit firmly in the cart now fall out of the cart, there is nothing surprising in this. It will only rid the Party of people who are getting in its way and hindering its progress. Evidently, they seriously want to free themselves from our Party cart. Well, if some of the old leaders who have turned into trash intend to fall out of the cart—a good ride! (*Loud and prolonged applause. The whole Congress rises and gives Comrade Stalin an ovation.*)

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NOTES

1. The Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) took place in Moscow on December 2-19, 1927. The Congress discussed the political and organization reports of the Central Committee, the reports of the Central Auditing Commission, of the Central Control Commission—Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, and of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation on the Executive Committee of the Comintern, the instructions for the drawing up of a Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy and a report on work in the rural districts; it heard the report of the Congress Commission on the question of the opposition and elected the central bodies of the Party. On December 3, J. V. Stalin delivered the political report of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and on December 7, he wound up the debate on that report. On December 12, the Congress elected J. V. Stalin a member of the commission for drafting the resolution on the report of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation on the Executive Committee of the Comintern. The Congress approved the Central Committee's political and organizational line and instructed it to continue to pursue a policy of peace and of strengthening the defence capacity of the U.S.S.R., to continue with unrelaxing tempo the socialist industrialization of the country, to expand and

strengthen the socialist sector in town and country and to steer a course towards the liquidation of the capitalist elements in the national economy. The Congress passed a resolution calling for the fullest development of the collectivization of agriculture and also adopted a plan for the extension of kolkhozes and sovkhozes and formulated the methods of fighting for the collectivization of agriculture. The Fifteenth Congress has gone into the history of the Party as the Collectivization of Agriculture Congress. It gave instructions for the drawing up of the First Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. In its decisions on the opposition directed towards the liquidation of the trotskyite-zinovievite bloc, the Congress found that the disagreements between the Party and the opposition had developed into disagreements on program, that the trotskyite opposition had taken the path of anti-Soviet struggle and declared that adherence to the trotskyite opposition and the propagation of its views were incompatible with membership of the Bolshevik Party. The Congress approved the decision of the joint meeting of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) of November 1927 to expel Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party and resolved on the expulsion of all active members of the trotskyite-zinovievite bloc. (For the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.[B.] cf. *History of the C.P.S.U.[B.]*, *Short Course*, Moscow 1950, pp. 355-357. For the resolutions and decisions of the Congress cf. *The C.P.S.U.[B.] in the Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee*, Part II, 1941, pp. 222-262.)

Title page

2. This refers to the grain crops: wheat, rye, barley, oats and maize.

3. J. V. Stalin, *Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)*, December 18, 1925, Moscow 1950, pp. 7-121. p. 10
4. This refers to the declaration of the bankers, industrialists and merchants of the United States, Great Britain and other countries, published in October 1926, calling for the abolition of the tariff barriers set up by the European states. Actually, it was an attempt on the part of Anglo-American finance capital to establish its hegemony in Europe. p. 13
5. The *World's Work*, a magazine that expressed the views of the ruling circles of the big bourgeoisie of the United States, published in Garden City, New York State from 1899 to 1932. p. 16
6. The tripartite conference on the reduction of naval armaments took place in Geneva, Switzerland, from June 20 to August 4, 1927. p. 18
7. On November 30, 1927, the Fourth Session was opened of the League of Nations Preparatory Commission for the forthcoming conference on disarmament. The Soviet delegation made a declaration at the session proposing a program of universal total disarmament. The Soviet disarmament project was rejected. p. 18
8. The "Locarno System"—a series of treaties and agreements concluded by the imperialist states at a conference held in Locarno, Switzerland, on October 5-16, 1925, for the purpose of stabilizing the postwar situation in Europe created by the Versailles Peace Treaty and of utilizing Germany against the Soviet Union. (Concerning the Locarno Conference cf. J. V. Stalin, *Political Report of the Central Committee to the Four-*

- teenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.[B.]*, Moscow 1950, pp. 22-23.)
9. This refers to the assassination by a Serbian nationalist of the Austrian Crown Prince, Francis-Ferdinand, in Sarajevo, Bosnia, on June 28, 1914, which served as the ostensible reason for unleashing the world imperialist war of 1914-1918. p. 20
10. The Trade Union Act passed by the Conservative Government of England in 1927 encouraged strike-breaking, restricted the right of the trade unions to collect dues for political purposes, and prohibited civil servants from belonging to trade unions affiliated to the Trade Union Congress and the Labour Party. It authorized the government to ban any strike. p. 21
11. The "Nations in Arms" Act passed by the French Chamber of Deputies in March 1927, was part of a general plan for the reorganization of the war machine of French imperialism and for the preparation of a new war. It provided for the militarization of the political and economic life of the country, for the mobilization of the entire population of the metropolis and the colonies in the event of war, for the militarization of the trade unions and other workers' organizations, annulment of the right to strike, increase of the standing army and for the employment of the armed forces for the suppression of revolutionary action by the proletariat of France and the oppressed peoples of the colonies. p. 21
12. The general strike and coal miners' strike in England were called forth by the offensive the employers launched upon the standard of living of the working class. On the refusal of the coal miners to accept a

reduction of wages and increased hours, the coal owners declared a lockout. In retaliation to this, the miners, on May 1, 1926, declared a strike. On May 3, a general strike was proclaimed in solidarity with the miners. Several million organized workers in the most important branches of industry and transport took part in the strike. On May 12, when the workers' struggle was at its height, the leaders of the General Council of the Trade Union Congress betrayed the strikers by calling off the general strike. The miners, however, continued the struggle. It was only due to the repressive measures taken by the government and employers and the extreme distress among the miners that the latter went back to work on the coal owners' terms. (Concerning the English Strike cf. J. V. Stalin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 156-168.) p. 23

13. This refers to the revolutionary action of the workers in Vienna on July 15-18, 1927, called forth by the acquittal by a bourgeois court in Vienna of a group of fascists who had killed a number of workers. The spontaneous movement of protest developed into an insurrection with street fighting against the police and troops. The insurrection was suppressed as a result of the treachery of the leaders of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party. p. 23

14. *Sacco and Vanzetti*, Italian workers, immigrants in the United States, were on May 5, 1920, arrested in Brockton, Massachusetts, on the obviously framed-up charge of murder and robbery and in 1921 were sentenced to death by an American reactionary court. Mass demonstrations, meetings and strikes in protest against this sentence were held all over the world, millions of working people participating. On August 23, 1927, Sacco and Vanzetti were executed. p. 23

15. The World Congress of the Friends of the U.S.S.R. was held in Moscow on November 10-12, 1927. It was convened on the initiative of the foreign workers' delegations that had arrived in the Soviet Union for the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The Congress was attended by 947 delegates from 43 countries. The delegates heard reports on the progress of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. during the ten years and on the protection of the first proletarian state in the world from the danger of war. The Congress adopted an appeal to the working people of all countries ending with the words: "Fight, defend, protect the U.S.S.R., the motherland of the working people, the bulwark of peace, the centre of liberation, the fortress of Socialism, by all means and methods!" p. 24

16. This refers to the police raid on the Soviet trade representation and on Arcos (the All-Russian Cooperative Society) in London, carried out on May 12, 1927, by order of the British Conservative government. p. 29

17. *P. L. Voikov* (1888-1927), Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative in Poland, was murdered by Whiteguards in Warsaw on June 7, 1927. p. 29

18. V. I. Lenin, "Plan and Synopsis of Pamphlet *On the Food Tax*" (cf. *Collected Works*, 3rd Russ. ed., Vol. XXVI, p. 312). p. 71

19. *Trud (Labour)*, the daily organ of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, issued in Moscow since February 19, 1921. p. 73

20. V. I. Lenin, Letter to V. M. Molotov on a Plan of the Political Report for the Eleventh Congress of the

- Party (cf. *Collected Works*, 3rd Russ. ed., Vol. XXVII, p. 207). p. 74
21. Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (cf. K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Two-Volume Edition, Vol. I, Moscow 1950, p. 228). p. 84
22. Cf. V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, Two-Volume Edition, Vol. I, Part 2, Moscow 1950, p. 571. p. 97
23. This refers to the General Council of the British Trade Union Congress; was first elected in 1921. p. 104
24. V. I. Lenin, "Reply to Debate on the Report of the Central Committee to the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), March 9, 1921" (cf. *Collected Works*, Third Russian edition, Vol. XXVI, p. 228). p. 133
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