

# END


EUROPE

JOURNAL OF  
EUROPEAN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Issue 2 February to March 1983

85p

## Direct Action: a winning tradition



*Boston Tea Party 1773  
US independence from Britain*



*Protests: 1960 ▲  
and 1982 ▼  
Britain's  
independence  
from the US?*



Exclusive interview with  
**Greek Premier  
Andreas Papandreou**

Keeping the Peace:  
Grace Paley – Author  
and activist

**Cruise and  
Pershing:**  
Facts for  
the activist in '83  
Free pull-out  
guide and map

**American Freeze:**  
secrets of a  
sudden success

# A strategy for 1983

**1** 983 is the year when the cruise missiles are scheduled to arrive in Europe – our 'traumatic year of confrontation', as Edward Thompson has called it. Why is the struggle against cruise and Pershing II so important?

First of all, ground-launched cruise missiles, together with those cruise missiles launched from aircraft and submarines, are part of a new family of nuclear-equipped cruise missiles, which represent a new round of the arms race, equivalent perhaps to the introduction of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) or Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs). The cruise missile family will add thousands of nuclear warheads to the US arsenal and will, undoubtedly, be followed by a Soviet long-range cruise missile.

Furthermore, the introduction of the new cruise missile will virtually signify the end of arms control. This is because it is almost impossible to distinguish between nuclear and conventionally armed cruise missiles, without on-site inspection.

Secondly, cruise and Pershing II missiles are much more accurate than previous missiles and are designed for use against military targets – 'counter-force' in the jargon – as opposed to civilian targets – 'counter-value'. This means that they are envisaged for limited use, i.e. they are nuclear war-fighting as opposed to nuclear war-detering weapons. There has never been any clear statement about the doctrine governing the use of these missiles. But there has been talk of their

use in a 'warning shot', to demonstrate the seriousness of the American readiness to use nuclear weapons. Or more recently, in discussion about NATO's new 'Air-Land-Battle' strategy, it is argued that cruise missiles would be used in 'deep strikes' against the 'rear echelons' of an attacking force.

Nuclear war-fighting weapons are supposed to be more 'credible' – to use another strategists' phrase – than nuclear war deterring weapons. This is because everyone knows that it would be suicidal to let off an ICBM, say, against Moscow or Leningrad. But a nice little 'limited' attack, so the argument goes, especially if launched from Europe, might not immediately invite retaliation against US territory.

This argument has a special importance for Europe. It is argued that no American president would risk American lives to save Europe – risk Chicago for Dusseldorf, to use Kissinger's example. This is why the decision to deploy cruise and Pershing II was taken. They were not, contrary to popular impression, designed to counter SS-20s. They were designed to couple Europe's fate with America, to provide 'reassurance' to Europeans that the Americans were prepared to come to the defence of Europe with nuclear weapons. The idea was that the Americans would be more willing to use cruise and Pershing II missiles than, say, MX or Trident. Some reassurance!

Thus the third and most important reason for the struggle against cruise is political. For it is really about who controls

European lives. We in Europe have abdicated responsibility for war-making to the American Government. If indeed, the Americans believe that a 'limited' nuclear war is possible without affecting American territory, then American leaders can gamble with our lives, treat them as so many computer casualties as they do in the Pentagon war-games. Cruise and Pershing II are a public affirmation of American power in Europe. The High Level Group, in NATO, which drew up the plans, argued that the missiles had to be land-based in order to increase their 'public visibility'. The Group also argued that the advantage of cruise missiles was that, because of their numbers, many countries could 'participate' in the programme.

Our campaign over the last two years has been a campaign for political independence. The declaration of local nuclear free zones, the effort to achieve national and regional nuclear free zones, as in the Nordic countries or the Balkans, has been a way of reclaiming our own individual responsibility for our future. It is precisely because cruise and Pershing II have come to symbolize Western Europe's dependence that we have to win in 1983. We have to show that through massive popular protest, with millions in the streets, with majority support in probably all West European countries (except perhaps France), with strikes and prayers and blockades, that we are capable of at least one independent act.

## The second Convention on European Nuclear Disarmament

**The second convention on European nuclear disarmament will be held in Berlin between May 9th and 15th.**

The conference which follows the very successful Brussels convention of July 1982, will this time be held in two stages. First, between May 9th and 11th, there will be discussions in the form of hearings, with a limited number of participants which will deal with the main themes of the convention.

This will be followed between May 12th and 15th, by open sessions and fora, which will also discuss the main themes and a number of workshops organised according to affinity, country, region or particular form of practical peace making.

The following are the main themes which will be discussed in Berlin:

- The possibilities for coordinated European initiatives against the stationing of new nuclear weapons in western Europe.
- Perspectives for a nuclear weapon free Europe; alternative European 'security politics'.
- Bloc confrontation and ideas for overcoming this confrontation.
- The social, economic and ecological costs of armaments.
- The interconnection of the East/West conflict and the North/South Conflict.

For further information, registrations etc contact: Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, Gamble Street, Nottingham, NG7 4ET.

## Berlin Appeal

**To date, over 400 individuals and 100 CND groups, trade unions and other organisations have contributed to pay for an advert to publicise the Berlin Appeal, written and signed by independent peace activists in East Germany.**

Artwork and a cheque were sent to 'The Guardian' on November 15. But at the last minute, 'The Guardian' refused the advert on legal grounds (that we were not publishing everyone's addresses and that other people of the same name could claim misrepresentation).

By the time this appears, we hope the advert will have appeared in 'The Times'. All who have supported it will receive a copy – provided they sent us their address!



# END

## JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

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### Would you like to sell the END Journal in your area?

We are hoping to develop a network of regional contacts who will sell the END Journal all over the country. We will arrange and pay for delivery to you and will offer a 25 per cent commission on all orders of 10 copies and over. And since all orders are sale or return you can't really lose!

If you are interested in helping END in this way then write to us at END Journal, Circulation Department, Freepost, 227 Seven Sisters Road, London N4. No stamp is needed.

In an article in END Bulletin 10 I stated, incorrectly, that the Radical Party in Comiso were a part of the alternative peace committee in favour of construction of the base. I should in fact have said the Republican Party. The Radical Party have for many years consistently opposed all nuclear weapons, as well as other forms of militarisation.

BEN THOMPSON



New Spanish premier Felipe Gonzalez on his election victory

## Spanish socialists face up to NATO

The victory of PSOE (the Spanish Socialist Party) in the October general elections is, without doubt, an extremely important event both for Spain and for the international community. But the foreign policy of a future Socialist Government should be examined in the light of several questions, above all regarding NATO and European defence.

The last Government, headed by Calvo Sotelo, had a contradictory foreign policy, but it secured Spanish membership of NATO. With the elections looming though, the Government did not have time to organise Spain's effective integration into NATO's military structure.

The first question, therefore, is what the Government of Felipe Gonzalez will do about the problem of NATO. On the one hand PSOE traditionally had a clear anti-NATO position, but when the last Government decid-

ed to enter the alliance, PSOE conducted a somewhat ambiguous campaign around the slogan, 'OTAN, de entrada, no!' This is difficult to translate but implies, 'NATO? Not so soon' or 'Not under such conditions'.

Felipe Gonzalez is in a rather uncomfortable position: he promised a referendum on whether Spain should stay in NATO, but no longer views this as a top priority. At an informed guess, the scenario will be this: the Socialist Government will put off calling a referendum for as long as possible; it will not reopen the debate around Spain's membership of NATO as a political alliance - but it will try to limit NATO's military presence, or at least to reduce it. At the same time the Government will try to obtain guarantees for denuclearisation and, in exchange, all the Spanish military installations that the Americans have had at their disposal for years will be offered to NATO. □

Pedro Vilanova

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Special thanks this issue to: Pat Kahn, Barbara Einhorn

Typeset by Red Lion Setters, 22 Brownlow Mews, London WC1

Printed by Spider Web, 14-16 Sussex Way, London N7

Cover photos (from top to bottom) Unknown artist; Peace News Library; Tim Malyon.

The END JOURNAL is published bi-monthly by European Nuclear Disarmament, 227 Seven Sisters Road, London N7. Tel 01-272 1236.



**Defence workers in Europe are beginning to see the importance of developing alternative non-military products. Here we report on a unique development of trade union international co-operation towards that aim.**

## Weapons workers look to future peace

The combined effects of a growing European Peace Movement and national economic pressures to reduce defence budgets are now causing trade unions to examine more closely how conversion of the industry can be achieved.

In a major new initiative, shop stewards representing Tornado workers in Italy, the UK and the Federal Republic of Germany, met at the Transnational Institute in Amsterdam from 12 to 14 November to discuss current employment problems and the future beyond Tornado. The emphasis throughout was on the need for alternative products and structures for conversion of defence plants.

Organised by the SPRU (Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, UK) the conference brought together shop stewards from British Aerospace, Rolls-Royce, Aeritalia, Aeromacchi, Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm and Motoren-Turbo-Union, and national trade union officials from the three countries. As the end of the Tornado programme looms up on the horizon, all were aware that the future for almost 100,000 workers involved in its production hangs in the balance.

The 809 multi-role combat aircraft, ordered jointly by the Italian, West German and Bri-

tish governments, at a (current) cost to Britain alone of £11.3 billion, are due to be completed in 1985/86. But recent decisions by the British and West German governments to slow down production are causing immediate employment problems.

Policies of 'natural wastage' are already operating at most airframe locations - particularly in design areas - as the programme rolls to the production stage and the impact of new technology on jobs continues. But the real crisis will come in 1984/85 when over 14,000 redundancies are expected unless alternative work can be found for Europe's aero-space industry.

That led to the central discussion of how best the trade union movement can implement its policies on disarmament and maintain the jobs of defence workers. Efforts have been made in all three countries to develop proposals on alternative non-military products but with only limited success. It was evident that these attempts at conversion tended to follow different patterns in each country.

In West Germany the SPD (Social Democrat Party) and the DGB (the TUC equivalent) have formed joint working groups to discuss

conversion. Some 'conversion councils' have been established at plant level but the prevailing view seemed to be that existing works councils, operating within the general framework of 'co-determination', could deal with conversion. The main thrust of the works councils in Tornado plants was to persuade the Company, MBB, to switch totally to civil aerospace production - in particular the A300 airliner series.

Italian unions take the view that arms conversion is an integral part of the general planning process and is best resolved within the context of an alternative socialist strategy for the economy as a whole. They have been partially successful in persuading the Government to intervene in funding alternative projects on a national scale, and at plant level works councils negotiate directly on funding for civil research and development investment. There was a need, however, for greater interaction between works councils and community interests when deciding on alternatives.

In the UK tribute was paid to the shop stewards at Lucas Aerospace and the conversion ideas developed in their Corporate Plan. But it was still an isolated example and had not been adopted by other defence workers. A paper on conversion, produced by Bill Niven at SPRU, argued that an institutional framework comprising government, unions and employers was required to speed up discussions on innovation and to assist shop stewards in establishing Alternative-Use Committees. A new, and more formal, national structure sustained by adequate funding and direct Government participation was necessary to stimulate preparatory work on the scale required to meet disarmament.

Long discussions on all of these views and experiences ensued. It was a beginning for Tornado workers and each group of shop stewards agreed to report back to their respective plants and to broaden the debate among their members. It was decided that a pamphlet giving a detailed account of the discussions should be produced. □

**Bill Niven, former national organiser of AUEW TASS**

## Britain breaches world's only nuclear-free zone

Frank Blackaby, the Director of SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) has said that the one treaty in the world that establishes a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, the Treaty of Tlatelolco making Latin America 'forever free from nuclear weapons' (Protocol 11), was broken when British naval ships arrived in the area still carrying their nuclear weapons during the start of the Falklands war. The Falklands Islands lie within the geographical area defined by the Treaty and the definition of nuclear weapons given in Article 5 is broad enough to cover bombs, missile warheads, torpedos or mines, in whatever form and whether

armed (made ready for use) or not. Britain has signed and ratified the Treaty and its two Protocols.

People are asked to raise this issue with the Government, MPs, the media, etc. And if the allegations are true that not only the ships that were diverted to the S. Atlantic for the Falklands war, but also those sailing direct from Britain, were in some cases carrying nuclear weapons, then the breaking of this Treaty will have been premeditated and even the smallest excuse will have disappeared. □

(Information from the National Peace Council.)



## Turkish peace prisoners granted bail.

**It was reported on 18 December that Mahmut Dikerdem, President of the Turkish Peace Association, has been released on bail after ten months in gaol. The other 29 defendants were also released on December 24. Their trial continues.**

EEC air funds to Turkey have been blocked because of European governments' concern for the shameful denial of human rights in Turkey. At a meeting in early January the question of whether or not the time has come to unblock these funds will be discussed. It is possible that the Turkish military government will attempt to defuse international outrage at the treatment of the TPA leaders, and of trade union leaders involved in the DISK trial, by releasing some prisoners on bail while continuing the prosecution.

It is essential that the international campaign for the unconditional release of TPA and trade union leaders be maintained. Mahmut Dikerdem reported that he had been receiving sackfuls of mail expressing solidarity, at his hospital bed. He had over 200 letters from Scotland alone! He has sent this message of thanks:

*'We were greatly moved by the concern shown to us by the activists and representatives of peace organisations in the United Kingdom and are grateful for the solidarity shown during the past difficult months. On behalf of all of us who have so recently shared the same fate, it is my pleasurable duty to extend our heartfelt thanks to all those END, CND and other peace activists in the United Kingdom who work patiently towards the establishment of an enduring world peace, towards the abolition of weapons of mass destruction and calling a halt to the arms race... I would also like to take this opportunity to thank personally all our gallant friends who were kind enough to enquire about my health and well-being.'*

Before this latest news a correspondent

sent the following report on the TPA trial.

Under Turkey's new constitution any peace movement is effectively banned. Meanwhile, the trial of members of the Turkish Peace Association executive continues and the accused are subjected to increasingly brutal treatment by the military authorities.

On 5 November the imprisoned TPA leaders were transferred to the Bayrampasa prison in Istanbul. Though normal regulations in Turkish gaols allow prisoners, even those charged with terrorist offences, to keep their own clothes, the male TPA executive members were forced to put on convicts clothing and had their heads shaved. These former

MPs, scientists, lawyers and poets were kept without food and water for over twelve hours.

The new Turkish constitution comes into force after a referendum in which any argument for rejection was banned by the authorities. It outlaws individual liberties, trade union rights, freedom of speech and association. It is illegal for organisations such as a peace association to 'engage in politics', to criticise official foreign or defence policy, or to call for joint actions with political parties, trade unions or other organisations.

On 29-31 October the first International Conference of Turkish Democrats Abroad was held in Cologne. Forty-four major European organisations, including the British TUC, the Labour Party and END, sent messages of support. The Conference resolved to struggle for peace and democracy in Turkey.

● *A special report on Turkey and the trial of the TPA will be available as an END pamphlet shortly.*



Turkish Peace Association before being released on bail

## Norwegians rethink the cost of cruise

**The question of Norwegian contribution to construction costs of European bases for cruise and Pershing II missiles became this Autumn's major political issue in Norway.**

On November 22 a vote was taken in *Stortinget*, the Norwegian parliament. The Conservative Government's proposal for an appropriation of 3 million Norwegian krone (£300,000) was carried by 77 votes in favour, 76 against.

Opposing the Government's extremely controversial proposal were the Labour Party, the Radical Liberal Party, the Socialist Left, and five MPs of the centrist Christian People's Party and the Agrarian Centre Party. It was the first time the Labour Party had put a whip on the issue of nuclear arms.

Opposition has greatly increased since a preliminary parliamentary debate last June, when 32 MPs voted against. It is now an open ques-

tion whether there will be next year a majority supporting deployment of cruise and Pershing II. The Labour Party is expected to take a position against deployment at its conference next April. Resistance is also increasing among the membership of the centrist parties. The strong missile opposition in Norway is to a great extent the result of the campaigning by *Nei til atomvapen*, the Norwegian movement for nuclear disarmament. □

**Jon Grepstad**



A demonstrator is removed by police from a blockade outside the US nuclear weapons base at Grossengstingen, Germany

## Europe protests

Greenham Common may have attracted the most people and publicity on December 12 but many other, if smaller, protests also took place on the third anniversary of the NATO 'two-track' decision to place American cruise and Peshing II missiles in Europe. Here our correspondents report on some of those other demonstrations.

One of the notable aspects of the day was the fact that people from many different countries attended most of the demonstrations both here and abroad and there was indeed a truly international spirit to the events.

### West Germany

More than 20,000 people took part in over fifty different actions throughout Germany on the third anniversary of the NATO decision to base cruise missiles in Europe. Peaceful blockades took place outside 20 different nuclear and military installations, mostly in snow storms.

The largest single direct action took place outside the US 'EUCOM' headquarters in Stuttgart where 500 people gathered to join in the demonstration on December 12. The Stuttgart base had been very much in the headlines following revelations in the British *Guardian* newspaper that the Americans were making plans to move the base to High Wycombe in England in the event of war. During the course of the protest West German police arrested more than 290 people.

Another blockade took place outside the US nuclear weapons base at Grossengstingen. But the demonstrators were later faced with a mas-

sive bill for the services of the police force. The Baden-Wuerttemberg state parliament had decided two weeks before the protest to charge all groups organising such demonstrations for the cost of policing them. **Roger Bendishe**

### Sweden

**The annual 'Lucia-march' for peace was held in Sweden on Sunday 12 December. Thirty or so torchlight processions, in all parts of the country, went through the winter night, spreading light and hope for peace.**

In Stockholm about 8000 people marched – less than last year when 15,000 people participated. The main reason for this was the cold and snowy weather! In other places more people than ever before took part. (Gothenberg 3,000, Sundsvall 2,000, Malmö 1,000, Lund 1,500 among others). Altogether we were 25,000-30,000 demonstrators in Sweden on 12 December.

Speeches everywhere concentrated on two main topics. First, the very delicate subject of the planned – but not yet started – export of Swedish nuclear waste to France (to the reprocessing works in La Hague), which the peace movement and anti-nuclear campaign are assiduously trying to stop.

The reason for this is, of course, the danger connected with waste transport and the uncertainty regarding France's use of plutonium which they will produce out of the waste. We do not want to run the risk of becoming the supplier of raw material for French nuclear rearmament. Birgitta Dahl, Swedish Minister of Energy, has to decide before the end of this year whether the transportation will go ahead or not.

Thanks to special circumstances, the boat specially built for the dangerous transportation – 'Sigyn' – ran aground on her first PR trip! At the same time it was shown to be a very bad boat and public opinion swung strongly against waste export; we now hope to win this issue.

Guarding the gate: a woman sleeps the night by the fence at Greenham Common US missile base





The other talking point on 12 December was reports from the actions against cruise missiles in NATO countries. When the Greenham Common action was announced people applauded loudly! We even received reports on actions from West Germany.

These torchlight processions are very nice. It creates a wonderful atmosphere when 4000 torches are burning at the same time! To sell torches is also a good way to finance a march. We sold them for £1.00 each, and almost everyone wanted one!!

**Ulf Jederlund**

## Italy

**Over 500 people from every country in West Europe except Finland, and from Japan and the USA, took part in a march from Catania, Italy, to the cruise missile base in Comiso. The march culminated in an invasion and blockade of the base in early January.**

The marchers set off on September 24, visiting many towns on the way. They stayed in school halls and held meetings in town squares, setting up information boards and talking to local people, and singing and chanting en route.

The two main objectives of the march were to oppose:

- the military base in Comiso
- the NATO and Italian army base in Sigonella, which will be a support base for Comiso.

After three days of non-violent direct action training at Catania, the marchers walked the 26 km to Sigonella to deliver a letter to the

most senior chief of the Italian army at the base. He refused to accept it, so the protestors blockaded the main gate overnight. The next day two children were allowed to present the letter.

By New Years Eve, the march had reached Ragusa in Sicily. From there, they went on foot to Comiso, 18 km away. As dusk fell, the march turned into a torchlight procession. They were greeted by local people in the main piazza, with celebratory dancing and singing late into the night.

The next day, the marchers reached Magliocco airport, where the cruise missiles are due to be sited in December '83. About 50 of them entered the base and refused to leave. They offered only non-violent resistance to police who tried to move them but the police became violent and three demonstrators were taken to hospital. A camp was set up outside the main gate and the following day the same thing happened, with another marcher taken to hospital.



The annual 'Lucia-march' for peace in Stockholm, Sweden carries on despite driving snow.

Ulf Jederlund

On January 3, there was a women-only action. Women linked arms across the road used by the workers to enter the base. Vehicles were prevented from passing and the women gave leaflets to the workers. They found that most of them were very sympathetic to their aims – in all, they stopped around seventy out of a hundred workers from crossing their line and blockaded all afternoon.

The previous day, women had made a symbolic action by wrapping wool around the main gate early in the morning. They then wove a web around the police and themselves, which it took the police a couple of hours to sort out.

A peace camp with 30 members has now set up in a house just outside the base. It has close links with another 'peace house' in Comiso, which is used for administration and a women's house close by. Anyone interested in more information or in going to the camp should contact the END office.

**JANE HOSKINS**

**The Peace Group for Dialogue – an autonomous peace group in Hungary – held their first public meeting in Budapest in what is seen as a significant increase in official tolerance towards the autonomous peace movement.**

Between 300 and 400 people crowded into a club on the premises of Hungary's official Peace Council to hear speakers, including Ferenc Koszegi and Ferenc Rusza – both regular contributors to the END Journal, talk about their commitment to a nuclear-free Europe and an end to the Cold War.

'We are more afraid of Cold War than of nuclear war,' they said. 'We are afraid of a return to the 1950s.' For Hungarians, the 1950s meant Stalinist terror – mass deportation, concentration camps, and imprisonment without public trial.

It was irrelevant which side was responsible for the arms race, they said. They believed in a

## Hungarian peace group holds public meeting

real detente between people and not just governments in Europe.

The group discussed possible independent peace initiatives for Hungary including: that it should request the removal of Soviet missile launchers which can be equipped with nuclear warheads at short notice; a non aggression pact with Austria and Yugoslavia; an expanded Rapacki Plan to include Hungary in a nuclear free zone in Central Europe; mutual withdrawals from NATO and the Warsaw Pact by individual countries; and a defence policy for Hungary which might be based on anti-tank weapons instead of tanks.

The main preoccupation of the meeting was with the style of peace politics; how can an independent discussion about peace take place in Hungary; what kind of peace groups can exist; can they organise without members and hierarchy; what kind of programmes should a peace group adopt; how can individuals establish the right to express themselves freely about peace questions? Conscientious objection was also raised in a cautious way.

# Reagan feels the Freeze

**This Autumn more than 30% of the American electorate had an opportunity to vote on proposals calling for a US-Soviet freeze on the nuclear arms race. Never before have so many people been able to vote on any one issue of national policy. It was the closest equivalent to a national referendum in the history of American democracy, and it was an overwhelming victory for the Freeze.**

The result was a clear public mandate to end the nuclear arms race now. It was an equally clear rejection of the Reagan Administration's massive nuclear weapons build-up and of their nuclear war-fighting plans.

Freeze proposals passed in 44 out of 48 locations including nine out of ten states, the District of Columbia, and 34 out of 37 cities and counties. The result was 60% in favour, confirming numerous public opinion surveys taken during the past year.

Beyond its unprecedented size, the vote demonstrated the breadth of support for a US-Soviet freeze. Voters passed the Freeze proposition in industrial and western states, in the northern plains, in at least one major sun-belt area, in rural areas and mid-western cities, and in large metropolitan areas.

The results of this 'national referendum' are even more significant in view of the fact that the movement is still in its infancy.

Since then people all over the country have stepped forward to promote the Freeze in their local communities, creating the fastest growing political movement of our time. In addition to the ballot victories this Autumn, the Freeze has won the endorsement of 310 city councils, 61 county councils, 444 New England town meetings, one or both branches of the legislatures in 17 states, most major religious denominations, and 10 international labour unions.

What does the Freeze vote mean for the Reagan administration? It is an unmistakable message from the American people to their leaders in Washington, a message which this administration should heed for two reasons.

First, they should see that the Freeze vote was a victory for democracy itself, of government by the people. If Reagan's own election results in 1980, when he received 51% of the vote to Mr Carter's 41%, were considered a 'landslide victory' and a 'popular mandate', then the 60%-40% Freeze victory this Autumn must be seen as an even greater mandate.

Second, this Administration should heed the Freeze message out of their own political self-

provide enormous impetus to supporters and organisers to keep working towards the achievement of a US-Soviet freeze.

The national Campaign had only just begun to create an effective lobbying network when a freeze resolution came within two votes of passage in the US House of Representatives last August 5. As a result of the Autumn period this network has already grown in strength and breadth, setting the stage for a major lobbying effort directed at the 1983 Congress. Political observers say that as a result of the Congressional elections on November 2, the Freeze has now gained a majority in one House. Thus, the Campaign is aiming to get a freeze resolution passed by the House early in the new session. Passage of a freeze resolution in the US Senate is likely to take longer, but the referendum victories this Autumn are expected to give that effort a boost as well.

When former Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara was asked recently how we got ourselves into this nuclear predicament, he responded, 'Because the potential victims have not been brought into debate yet, and it's about time we brought them in.' It is clear from the massive freeze vote this Autumn that the 'potential victims' have now joined the debate.

**The national Freeze 'referendum' has shown that the American peace movement has greater support than either Carter or Reagan**

interest. The demand for a US-Soviet freeze will not diminish but will continue gaining momentum as we approach the 1984 Presidential elections. Knowledge of the potential horror of a nuclear holocaust is like a genie that will not go back into the bottle.

Finally, what do the referendum victories mean for the national Freeze Campaign? They

Therein lies our greatest hope for avoiding what Ronald Reagan has acknowledged is the 'ultimate nightmare'. It is clear that the politicians and the arms control experts are not capable of stopping the nuclear arms race by themselves. The political will and the initiative must be supplied by the people. That process has begun. **RANDY KEHLER**

**Mayors from all over Holland meet in February to discuss ways of stopping the deployment of new nuclear missiles in their communities.**

**The conference was initiated by the Dutch Inter-Church Peace Council (IKV), who have been putting pressure on nuclear-free local authorities to translate the idea into a reality.**

They have suggested a peace programme for the councils, with the eventual aim of bringing about such an intense discussion at local level that national government will be forced to bring its policy in line with local opinion.

One of IKV's biggest successes to date has been in Venray, which is expected to be on the short list for hosting cruise missiles (see feature on cruise). On December 12, 1982, the anniversary of the NATO decision to deploy cruise and Pershing II, Venray town council announced that they would not cooperate with deployment. Astoundingly, the resolution was passed unanimously despite the fact that there is a conservative majority. And the council has now pledged to discuss a paper on local initiatives before May 1.

## Dutch towns discuss becoming nuclear-free

Another town, Brielle, has organised meetings with specialist sectors of the population (unions, medical workers, womens organisations), put on an exhibition of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and is now trying to further contacts abroad. IKV has found that despite more than 70 towns declaring themselves nuclear-free—including Amsterdam, the Hague and Rotterdam—many have been slow to initiate a peace programme, generally through sheer lack of imagination.

There are four main areas that IKV are encouraging them to develop: informing the population about the way their town is forced to make war preparations; supporting existing peace initiatives; exploiting existing international contacts to open up the debate about peace and security, especially with Eastern Europe; and putting pressure on national government.

As in Britain, where Manchester took the

lead in declaring itself nuclear-free, one small Dutch town, Hellevoersluis, has sparked off a wave of nuclear-free resolutions since it narrowly voted to resist deployment of nuclear weapons in October 1981.

The Dutch Christian Democratic party has now gone on a counter-offensive calling for resolutions to support the governments policy of negotiations through NATO. And the Home Secretary stated that while local authorities had the competence to oppose nuclear weapons, national interest would take priority.

But the February meeting of mayors together with a concerted programme of other actions will put great pressure on the government. IKV hopes to stop cruise by the end of 1983 so the peace movement can return to its other tasks—the abolishment of the six other nuclear weapons systems and the construction of a real peace policy.

**WILLEM VAN DE VEN, IKV**



# Independent Soviet group: 'Our aim is to build trust'

**The Moscow independent peace group has recently written two interesting and detailed letters to END, explaining their politics and their history. The Soviet Group to Establish Trust, as they call themselves, have also sent us copies of an open letter to independent pacifist organisations in Europe and America; with an appeal to the governments of East and West.**

**We reprint one of the letters below. The other letter and the two documents can be obtained from the END office (75p incl p&p)**

*Moscow, December 29, 1982*


Dear Colleagues,

Gradually there is some progress with contacts between END and the Independent peace movement in the USSR ("The Group to Establish Trust between the USSR and the USA")... All this is very helpful for better knowledge of each other, for clearer vision of the prospects for joint efforts of various peace forces. A similar process develops with our contacts across the Atlantic, but the distances and the barriers being what they are you have the lead in keeping communications and analysis for the independent peace groups mutual education.

Obviously we all notice that more and more it is Western Europe and its public opinion in the position with the key chances of being the intermediary between the two nuclear superpowers. The Berlin meeting of the peace supporters, planned in May of 1983, is really vital in this respect.

In this letter I am trying to clarify some of the key views and key problems of the Trust-Building Group... *The Mission*. It seems to be our joint opinion, both in the Group and in the peace movements of the West, that it is urgent to invest all our energy for changing the present trend which leads the world to the insanity of arms races, to the suicidal stocks of nuclear superpowers. Today the top leaders of the two camps are not on speaking terms; they are not ready even to "tango" as one of them put it. It means that it is up to us (participants of the independent peace movements) to provide alternative forms of constructive East-West dialogues in order to shorten the time needed for the business-like attitude of the politicians to the settlement of their disagreements.

It is already well realised, in the END publications at any rate, that there is some division of labour among various peace movements. The group of Ferenc Köszegi in Hungary has succeeded in getting the green light from the government of its country for wider dialogue of the public in peace-keeping matters. For our colleagues in the GDR, the emphasis is on the conscientious objectors issue, as we hear. For the public of Western nations it



**Sergei Batrovin in a Moscow psychiatric hospital, August 1982**

is permitted to object to budgetary appropriations and to political alliances of certain kinds.

As for the Trust-Building Group, the field of vision plus the field of possibilities both dictate an emphasis on the steps for healthier detente — with our conviction that it's not weapons but people with hatred who do the killing. All these emphases are complementary. There is very substantial evidence to show that we have pinpointed a key obstacle for international peace, by selecting the emphasis on Trust Building.

At least, Mr Yuri Andropov in his speech on the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Union

(December 21, 1982) had a paragraph specifically dealing with the importance of Trust-Building steps for East-West relations. Either we have succeeded with our missionary work or (being more modest) it's a case of the truth being universally obvious to all people of reason. Either is good enough. But this is only the beginning of a long and difficult way with materialization of trust.

A.R.C.

Every morning all in our Trust Group start activities with a feeling of a miracle at being not yet in jail. This is not an exaggeration. There are forces of obscurantism at work to fabricate criminal charges. We are faced with fantastic slander: you have heard about Kornilov's accusations, you have seen a cable from Mr Zhukov. The lack of traditions for grassroots initiatives is the background to the accusations. We simply do not fit into the pattern of expected behaviour. Nor are we excused because world trends do not fit in with the continued existence of mankind!

Continued on page 30



Jan Minkiewicz and Zdena Tomin

# One Europe

by Tim Malyon

The launch meeting for the new **END Journal** attracted some 400 people to Friends House on December 2. The theme, 'the tricky but exciting idea of Europe beyond the cold war' as chairperson Mary Kaldor described it, was addressed by four speakers from the platform—Jonathan Dimbleby, Edward Thompson, Jan Minkiewicz from the Solidarnosc coordinating office in Brussels, and Zdena Tomin, who was a member of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia until she came to Britain two years ago.

Both speakers from Eastern Europe talked about the peace movement and its link to human rights struggles. 'The human rights movement has brought me, perhaps naturally, to involvement in the peace movement; the peace movement is a human rights movement,' said Zdena Tomin.

It is not realistic, said Jan Minkiewicz, to hope for a strong peace movement under a regime where everyday life is a constant struggle, and peace strategies are abstract categories. The period from August 1980 to December 1981 in Poland gave young people hope for a better life, and what is more important, the atmosphere to think about life; to think about the world, about culture, sex, politics, human relations; about war, peace, armament and disarmament. This psychological and social platform has been destroyed again. Perhaps Jaruzelski's greatest crime was that he stopped Polish society in the process of emancipation.

Autonomous peace movements in the East must be given the utmost support, as should movements for human rights. There should be better cooperation between Amnesty International and the peace movement. East bloc countries must be visited whenever possible and dialogue established. Speakers from independent eastern groups should be invited to the west, and restrictions on their travelling contested.

Not, Ms Tomin stressed, that relations with official East Bloc peace committees should be broken off. 'They must be peacefully bombarded with information about peace actions. But they are mouthpieces of

the party and the state, and cannot, by their very nature, be taken for partners. They may be sympathetic, but they will always remain official government bodies.'

Later Ms Tomin added 'There are, and will be, peace movements springing up in Eastern European countries, not just because the people are peace loving; but because the strength of the western peace movement is getting through the barriers.'

Jonathan Dimbleby disagreed with the recent CND conference decision on NATO because it might divide the movement and frighten off supporters. He called it 'hasty, ill considered, unwise and potentially disruptive not only of the peace movement, but also of the dismantling of the two blocs that now disfigure Europe and distort and stunt the development of civilisation within Europe'. Dissolving the blocs should be part of an ongoing historical process developing from détente. 'Clear Europe of nuclear weapons. Clear the men and the machines from the front line, create the space for the political atmosphere to develop, an atmosphere in which democracy and freedom, and therefore mutual trust, can flourish—an atmosphere in which the two blocs can be seen to be absurd'.

Edward Thompson also discussed NATO. He wishes Britain to be a non-aligned state, outside NATO, but we should choose the right time to campaign. 'When we've refused cruise, then people will be educated by events to the next step; and the next step in 1984 might very well be for CND to bring right forward the demand to leave NATO. This year, however, 'a traumatic year of confrontation', the peace movement must not lose sight of its co-workers in the East, and their struggles. We must not, he stressed, become 'little Englanders or little Britishers'.

While contributions from the floor gave near unanimous support for movements in the East, many disagreed with the speakers on the controversial subject of NATO—a subject which will be debated in future issues of the **END Journal**.

## Protest

Does conscription for women mean equality with men? Or is it a false equality which forces women to adopt traditionally 'male' values of institutionalised violence and militarism instead of demanding that men learn traditionally 'female' values of caring and preserving life?

These questions have confronted women in the German Democratic Republic as a result of the new clause, passed last Spring. Their anger at being asked to service the war machine led them to meet and draw up a petition, which they sent to GDR premier Erich Honecker. We reprint it below.

For many, who took part, it was the first time they had met in a women-only group and found the space to discuss their own self-image and their perception of their role in East German society.

We were struck by the great strength and courage of the women we met. They were not ashamed of admitting their fear—but were ready to discuss it and lend each other support.

By signing a petition—they used their own names and addresses—they were exercising a constitutional right. They also have a right to a reply within four weeks. But when we visited them in December the four weeks was up and they had received no reply.

Instead, many had been summonsed to their bosses at work—sometimes in the presence of a state official—to discuss their motives. Most had been asked to withdraw their signatures. None had complied. At first we were relieved because it could have been worse. But when we thought about it, we began to get angry because we were not even taken seriously. Our action was trivialised. It was even intimated that we must be under someone else's influence because women could not write such an articulate letter. One woman's husband was called in and told to keep his wife under control', said one woman.

### Working for the same goal

Many women found that putting themselves on the line has actually given them strength and the determination to



# letter from GDR women

**Over 150 women have recently signed a letter to the East German head of state to protest at a new clause providing for their conscription in times of emergency. Three representatives of END women's group went to East Berlin to talk to some of the women.**

continue to press for nuclear disarmament and an end to militarisation. Many have also resolved to carry on meeting as women to discuss personal political issues. Now similar letters are being signed and circulated in other parts of East Germany.

The circumstances of the women are very different from ours. Since the state has provided many of the social, legal and economic preconditions for 'equality' the women are largely isolated from the debates of the Western peace or women's movements. But their experiences are similar to those of many women in Britain. 'We have really enjoyed meeting as women and finding a common approach', several told us. 'It has meant that men are not dominating the conversation'. But the German women are anxious to stress that they feel solidarity with the men who work in non-official peace movements or who are conscientious objectors. One of their aims is to help the wives and children of men imprisoned for refusing conscription.

They also make it clear that they are not dissidents in the understanding of the western media. 'I was born here, this is my country' explained one woman. My friends and family are here. I don't want to leave. I don't want to live in your system. I just want the right to criticise this one,' explained one woman.

After six hours of discussion when we found much common ground both as women and peace activists, we kissed goodbye with regret. They asked us to send expressions of solidarity to western women campaigning for disarmament and particularly to the women demonstrating at Greenham Common on December 12. 'We are all working for the same goal,' they said.

Dear Head of the Council of State

We would like in this letter to communicate to you something of our concerns with regard to conscription for women in the new law on Military Service passed on 25 March, 1982. We are women with and without children, Catholics, Protestants and non-denomination-

al. Some of us have lived through a war, others have been spared that dreadful experience, but one thing unites all of us. We do not feel apathetic and do not wish to give our assent through silence to a law which imposes completely new obligations on women, obligations which can not be reconciled with the way we see ourselves.

We women wish to break the circle of violence and to withdraw from all forms of violence as a mode of conflict resolution.

We women do not regard military service for women as an expression of our equality, but as standing in contradiction to our existence as women. We regard our equality as consisting not in standing together with those men who take up arms, but in solidarity with those men who have, like us, recognised that the abstract term 'enemy' in practice means destroying human beings, and this we reject.

We women regard willingness to stand by for military service as a threatening gesture which is an obstacle to the aspiration for moral and military disarmament and which results in the voice of common sense becoming submerged in military discipline.

We feel that as women we have a particular mission to preserve life and to give our support to the old, the infirm and the weak. Working for peace and against war must be located in the social and educational spheres, if we are not to fail the future generations.

We women resist the idea that we should one day be expected to stand in the ranks of the NVA (National People's Army) and to defend a country which would be uninhabitable, even after a conventional war, which in Europe would in any case probably culminate in a nuclear catastrophe.

We women believe that humanity is today teetering on the edge of an abyss and that the accumulation of more weapons can only lead to an insane catastrophe. Perhaps this terrible end can be avoided, if all the questions which arise from this fact are publicly discussed. According to article 65, paragraph 3 of the Constitution of the GDR, draft laws of a fundamental nature are supposed to be aired in public before being passed, so that the results of this public discussion can be taken into account in the final wording of the law. In our opinion, this law is of such a fundamental variety because of its content and not least, because it directly affects half of the population of the GDR.

We women declare that we are not prepared to be conscripted for military service and we demand the legally guaranteed right to object

to being drafted. The right to conscientious objection is necessary because our freedom of conscience has been restricted as a direct consequence of this law being passed, with its imposition on women of the obligation to do general military service.

Since it has not been possible to conduct public discussions of this law, some of us have requested such discussions by means of petitions. Others of us had hoped to be able to participate in the resulting dialogues. Unfortunately, these hopes have been dashed, since no-one was prepared to begin a dialogue with us about the questions which concern us so urgently.

We were encouraged to raise our questions with you once again by the speech delivered by Professor Arbatow, member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences during the recent peace congress of different world religions held in Moscow. We request that those responsible for the new law governing military service be prepared to engage in public dialogue. You are undoubtedly acquainted with Arbatow's speech, but we would nevertheless like to quote a few sentences from it.

Professor Arbatow relates among other things to the moral and psychological supports of the arms race and refers to the myth that the stockpiling of weapons and military forces would contribute to security.

All these myths promote the arms race. Nowadays they attempt to veil them by means of complicated concepts and riddles by using terminology which is incomprehensible to the lay person. I do not exclude the possibility that this is done deliberately in order to distance themselves from the 'uninitiated', from the 'man in the street.' They even say sometimes that this hypothetical person should not be allowed access to information on nuclear weapons or matters of war and peace because he/she would only confuse and undermine everything. But this is in my opinion precisely the greatest, most dangerous and most detrimental myth of all... This problem ought to be solved through the active participation of all those who are committed to the service of people, not weapons.'

We could not have found a better argument for the necessity of our petition.

We ask that you facilitate a public dialogue.

# A voice of dissent in NATO

When the Greek Socialist party, PASOK, was elected, there were great hopes in the peace movement that the new Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, would help create Europe's first nuclear free zone in the Balkans. Some critics say that he is now backing out of election promises, while supporters still hail him as the greatest ally of the disarmament movement. MARY KALDOR questioned him on his plans in this exclusive interview for the END JOURNAL.

On December 10-12, to mark the second anniversary of NATO's double-track decision, the non-aligned Greek peace movement, KEDEA, invited representatives of the Western peace movements to a conference in Athens on nuclear free zones. The conference was fully supported by the Greek Government; indeed, it was probably the first time that the peace movements had ever received such enthusiastic recognition from any Government.

The Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, addressed the opening session. He was accompanied by 22 ministers and deputy ministers, and much adulatory applause. Peace activists sat behind rows of dark-suited politicians (the only woman among them was Melina Mercouri).

I later met Papandreou near Athens in an up-market hotel built on a beautiful peninsular jutting out into the Aegean, where he often spends his weekends. Despite the official surroundings, I was to find that the adored politician, the proclaimed ally of the peace movement, the ebullient professor of economics and friend of Galbraith are, in fact, one and the same person.

Papandreou says he is unequivocally committed to unilateral disarmament for Greece. At present, all the nuclear weapons in Greece are American and are located at American bases. He explained that there are four main American military bases in Greece: the airport at Hellenikon; the communications base at Nea Makri, close to Marathon, which coordinates the activities of the US sixth fleet; the base at Souda Bay in Crete which is a missile testing area as well as a supply facility for the sixth fleet; and the 'spy base' at Gournes in the district of Heraklion in Crete. This last base collects information and, 'may be the most important of all American bases'.


Only the base at Souda Bay has NATO facilities, so the issue of nuclear weapons is a bilateral US-Greek issue. There are some dual key nuclear systems in use with the Greek army—Honest John rockets

and nuclear-capable artillery. These are due to be retired. According to Papandreou, 'they are very short range; they are very passé, and they are going to be replaced by conventional weapons—they are just as good... All the interesting nuclear material is one key and only American.'

The agreements between America and Greece concerning these bases were made, 'after the Civil War when, truly, during that period the Americans ruled this country. We were almost technically a colony. I will give you one example: My father was, at some point during 1950-51 Deputy Prime Minister. But his signature was not valid unless the document was countersigned by the head of the American economic mission.' There were some agreements after 1958 and some secret agreements which were never published. There were over 100 separate agreements concerning the activities of American armed forces. Some of them were probably known only to the Minister of National Defence and the Prime Minister. Some were oral, not even signed.

'Nuclear weapons,' said Papandreou, 'contribute exactly zero to our national defence. Exactly zero. They may have negative implications—of course they do—in the sense that if there is a war the Soviet Union has made it clear to us that we would be a target. Brezhnev, in an interview he gave about a year before he died, made it clear that the only guarantee he could give would be for us not to have nuclear weapons on the ground. This nuclear weapons issue is the one on which I have taken a great stand... I am not using this as a bargaining card—I am committed to removing nuclear weapons altogether and unilaterally. As I have said to the Americans, this is not an issue which I consider bargainable.'

The denuclearisation of Greece is, of course, linked to Papandreou's efforts to achieve a Balkan nuclear free zone. He has announced that this can be done within eighteen months. The Bal-



Papandreou: unequivocally committed to unilateral disarmament

kan nuclear free zone will, it is hoped, comprise Yugoslavia, Albania, Rumania, Bulgaria and Turkey. Turkey, of course, has American nuclear weapons and Bulgaria has nuclear capable launchers for Soviet warheads. The zone would thus require a gesture from the Soviet Union. The Bulgarian and Rumanian governments are, according to Papandreou, very enthusiastic about the idea; indeed, their leaders are 'vying with each other as to who was really the originator of the idea'.

In March, President Ceausescu of Rumania will visit Turkey to try and persuade Turkey to join the Balkan nuclear free zone, or at least the European part of Turkey. Papandreou is very keen that Turkey should participate and believes that it would help relations between Greece and Turkey.

The Balkan nuclear free zone proposal is expected to be achieved in three steps: first, a meeting of deputy foreign ministers to look at technical questions, then, a meeting of foreign ministers to look at political implications and, finally, the heads of state and Prime Ministers will come together to reach a final agreement.

Papandreou clearly thought that what was important was the political act. He said that there may be some verification procedures—privileges for Bulgaria and Rumania to inspect Greek territory—but there would be no demand for super power guarantees. (In fact, the Soviet Union may give such a guarantee). This is because the issue of US nuclear weapons in Greece is not bargainable. 'I have made this statement publicly so many times that they must have understood it by now.'



The Balkan nuclear free zone could be a real break-through in the process of European nuclear disarmament. Unlike the Nordic nuclear free zone, it would include both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries and would lead not only to real reductions in nuclear weapons but could also contribute to a loosening of the bloc system. Papandreou places great emphasis on the liquidation of the blocs. When I explained the END position of dismantling both blocs and linking disarmament to democracy, he said, 'This is where I belong... The question of denuclearisation goes hand in hand with the effort to create a Europe without blocs. That is why I refuse to accept the word 'Europe' in connection with the Common Market. Western Europe is not Europe. What European unity are they talking about? Words are being misused and, of course, 1984 is very close... You talk about peace now. Do you know this MX? You saw the word they wanted to use for it - Peace maker. This is 1984 exactly...'

**H**e talked about the hypocrisy of the West, as regards democracy, whereby they continue to send military aid to the Turkish junta and refuse humanitarian aid to Poland. He argued, convincingly, that the Americans do not want a solution in Poland. They want a 'clear-cut Soviet kind of policy' in order to justify continuation of the blocs.

I asked Papandreou what his stance on nuclear weapons implied for the position of Greece in NATO. At present, Greece does not really participate in the integrated military structure, although it does participate in both political and military decision-making bodies, like the Defence Planning Committee or the High Level Group. Papandreou explained that Greece returned to the integrated military structure in 1980. Greece accepted a formula whereby NATO headquarters would be set up in Larissa, across the Aegean from the NATO HQ in Izmir, Turkey. Operational responsibility for the air space of the Aegean would be shared by the two headquarters, the Turkish and the Greek, on the basis of an agreement made by the three NATO commanders - the commander in Izmir, the commander in Larissa and the commander in Naples, the south-east wing of NATO.

Greece will not go ahead with this until and unless NATO accepts that Greece is responsible for the defence of its own national space, which is the islands and the sea area around the islands - the space of the Aegean. Further, Greece does not participate in exercises in the area. This is because the Greeks consider that the exercises are so drafted as to put in a quandary



Kedea's peace conference: enthusiastically received by the Greek Government.

the sovereign rights of Greece in the Aegean.

NATO, according to Papandreou, 'has been the spokesman for Turkish plans.' NATO doctrine aims to deter and counteract the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, NATO expects a northward deployment of Greek armed forces. But, as Papandreou pointed out, the relations between Greece and its northern neighbours are excellent and improving all the time, 'so that in fact we find no reason to deploy our forces in that fashion. Instead, we have our forces looking eastward because of the clear and present danger of a Turkish attack in the Aegean against our islands and our Archipelago.' Greece now spends 6.7% of the GNP on national defence, more than any other European NATO country, and this is because of the perception of a Turkish threat.

Papandreou is sceptical about what NATO can contribute to Greek security: 'They refuse to accept that there is a NATO obligation to a member country if it is attacked from any quarter, only if it is attacked from the Soviet bloc. This is the only thing they protect you from. As it happens we are not worried about that, we are worried about what an ally will do to us.'

Nevertheless, through its participation in the military decision-making bodies, Greece has had some influence on NATO. Last year, the NATO council, for the first time, did not issue a communique because of Greek dissent. In a recent NATO Council meeting, Greek dissent was noted with an asterisk. By consistently refusing to support the 1979 double-track decision, by voting in favour of the freeze resolution in the UN, and by taking a political stance independent of NATO, Greece has set a precedent for dissent in the Alliance which could be extremely important in the future for countries more closely integrated into NATO, like Britain, Holland or Italy. Papandreou is well aware of the significance of pressing the Greek position within the NATO planning machinery.

**I** asked if he accepted the argument that clear-cut opposition would lead to a loss of credit with other NATO countries. He said he recognised the phrase but his feeling was that, '(It is more important to) take a position, give the justification, moral and political, and stick to it... I don't want to brag, especially because the period is so difficult and one never knows what happens next, but my feeling is that the prestige of Greece has increased as a result of all that we have done in international fora.'

Papandreou was deeply pessimistic about the future of the Geneva negotiations. He said that the SS-20s had to be removed. But the deployment of cruise and Pershing II would make their presence permanent. He believed that the new Soviet leadership was now persuaded that Geneva is just a way of buying time until the cruise and Pershings could be installed. He did not think the Soviet Union would reduce SS-20s just to avoid the deployment of cruise and Pershing II - 'They would necessarily raise the question forward bases - like the airplanes at Hellenikon.'

We discussed the problems of carrying out a policy of defiance towards the United States. Papandreou talked about the fear of the United States and also stressed the role of state machinery: 'Governments come and go - the bureaucrats stay. They are now indoctrinated. They are tied in terms of interest - very, very complex interest structure. Here in Greece our foreign policy met with a lot of resistance in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in the end, I must say, our policy was put into effect in spite of, and not *with* the diplomatic corps. They are beginning to change but for them these are impossible agreements and so different from what they have been accustomed to. It is a different world, and basically that means that the Minister must bear much of the responsibility for all and every detail. I myself follow practically all the telegrams that come and go because

**Continued on page 28**

# Non-violent means for peaceful ends

**The New Year of the Peace Movement has been opened by forty-four women scaling the fences of Greenham Common air base and, with linked hands singing and dancing on top of the partly constructed cruise missile silos. The previous day, several hundred people blockaded all entrances of Upper Heyford US base in Oxfordshire, and prevented the normal working of the base and access by vehicles for 12 hours. These events indicate a fearless resolve and the realisation that we have to face the power of the state head on if we are going to prevent the deployment of cruise missiles.**

**The demand for non-violent direct action (NVDA) has always been in the background. But the New Year events and the enormously successful action at Greenham Common on 12 and 13 December show that now direct action will be brought right into the front line of the campaign. MEG BERESFORD looks at the history and effectiveness of NVDA.**

We are able to draw on the campaigns of the past and from other countries when we are looking for ideas and inspirations for NVDA. In the USA, there is a long history of civil disobedience stretching back to colonial days; recently the civil rights movement and the Anti-Vietnam war movement have been pushed forward by sit-ins, sit downs, occupations and blockades. In Europe, in West Germany, France and Spain the anti-nuclear power movements and the Larzac Peasants campaign have all made direct action an integral part of their activities.

Of course, here in Britain, we have had the Direct Action Committee, the Committee of 100, the Torness Alliance and other anti-nuke actions to use as models and as cautions. But we must take care that we do not get swept away in the euphoria of recent successes into thinking that NVDA and nothing but, will win for us.

With some provisos and cautions, non-violent direct action will greatly enhance and strengthen the movement. It is essential that we take the necessary steps of planning and training in small teams or affinity groups within our local organisation. We must take part in actions with the consent and support of our colleagues, who may not wish to be directly involved and we must consider very carefully the impact of what we are doing. We should also take care that we do not just go on doing the same, but larger – this will be particularly important at Greenham – and that we take the time to talk about and explain our actions and the reasons for them to the people we are confronting most directly, i.e. the police, the base personnel and the site workers. There is no reason to believe that policemen are, by definition, against us, and often young people join the services just to get work and a training. The police at Upper Heyford, referred to the blockade as 'our demonstration' and at Greenham policemen were overheard saying: 'I really admire what you are doing, that's my unofficial view', and 'I dislike doing this (dragging

women from the road). I've got a wife and mother just like you women'.

Lastly, for the sake of the whole movement it is essential that we do not become so swept up in NVDA that we forget about other, more mundane, but equally vital everyday work of the campaign.

We have a long historical tradition of non-violent direction both here in Britain and in other countries, which we can use and build on when we are thinking about NVDA. Over 200 years ago, during the struggle for independence, a small and exasperated band of men in Boston, Massachusetts, blacked their faces, dressed up as Mohawk Indians, stealthily made their way onto British cargo ships in Boston Harbour, and tipped the valuable cargo of East India Company Tea in the sea. This small and historically unimportant incident is one of the very few events most of us remember of the twelve year campaign which preceded the American War of Independence. It has all the hallmarks of a good piece of action because it confronted the British authorities and dramatised the tax on tea imposed by the British government in a way that the streams of pamphlets, letters and diplomatic visits to London had totally failed. The Boston Tea Party created a state of crisis, forced the closure of the harbour to shipping for months and caused many of the colonists previously content to simply grumble or write letters to boycott tea as well. Of course, it did not win independence any more than any number of blockades at Greenham will actually prevent the deployment of cruise. The value of such incidents, like Gandhi's salt march, is the symbolic victory, the boost to flagging spirits, and the direct means of confronting our target.

What we must hope for from large scale actions is that they will by the way they are planned, create an event, through which the dangers we face from nuclear weapons may be publicised and dramatised.

At Greenham Common, brilliant use was made of symbols to create drama. The spiders

web is a powerful image of strength, determination, and persistence; the image can be extended to join the campaign at Greenham Common to other places as a network reaching out from Greenham is created. We can ensure, that while the peace camps may be the nucleus and inspiration for direct action, their effect will extend in an ever more closely woven web throughout the disarmament movement. We must aim to spread the location of actions out from the bases and peace camps into local groups. Family commitment, age, health, jobs etc., prevent most people from joining peace camps and taking up this particular form of witness as a way of life, but there is other related work which can be done from the home base. Besides the symbolic drama, there is important work which needs to be done if the action is to have more than a publicity effect. There is an enormous amount of building work in progress on many of the bases round the country – at Welford, Fairford, Upper Heyford, High Wycombe, Molesworth, Faslane, not just at Greenham. It would be useful if members of local groups were to spend time spotting contractors so that pressure can be put on their offices by pickets, blockades and by talking to the individuals concerned (see box, below). If we want to encourage industrial action in the future, this kind of work is essential. There is also the work of talking to people who live round the local bases so that they know what we are doing, and lastly there is important research work to be done so that we know how the various buildings and sites are progressing.

Local actions may be focussed on symbols of local power, e.g., the regional bunkers, military recruiting offices, tax offices, local radio, tv and newspaper offices especially when they



**Erodeanna Robinson fasted for 93 days in prison in war tax protest, Chicago 1960.**





Tim Malton

Greenham Common women in non-violent protest, December 13, 1982

give us a consistently bad press, and – if they are not on our side – the offices of local government.

In Britain, we are very well behaved and repressed when it comes to decorating our streets and walls with symbols, posters and slogans. Walls in towns in Italy and Greece are plastered with posters and spray paintings, repeating messages and exhortations, inviting people to join in with demonstrations or mourn for the dead. As a movement we make very little use of this means of advertising ourselves.

Other forms of direct action, which are just as valuable, but less dramatic, can be individual or small scale. These may be events like vigils, which are normally practised by religious groups, or totally individual acts like tax diversion.

It is ironic that although we are campaigning against nuclear weapons, we are also paying for them out of our taxes. Tax refusal or tax diversion are two ways we can make actions of individual conscience against nuclear weapons.

In the USA, war tax refusal gained a lot of support during the Vietnam War with about 200 refusal centres. Partway through the war the Federal government levied a tax on the private telephone system to help the war effort, and this enabled resisters to find a focus for refusal. Later, people tried claiming so many dependents that they were not liable for any taxes at all; to make it clear that their protest was a moral one, they claimed all the Vietnamese people as dependents. Non violent activists used tax refusal to support the Larzac campaign against the siting of nuclear missiles in France. They gave a visible purpose to their refusal, by sending the money to the peasants who used it to buy a farm called the Bergerie de la Blaquiere.

Our taxation system in Britain makes tax diversion rather complicated, but it is possible for those paying tax by PAYE and for the self employed to try to divert part of their taxes into something socially useful and acceptable to their consciences. The Peace Tax Campaign<sup>1</sup> is pioneering 'Tax Diversion Now', a means by which tax payers try to divert the money

which would go on armaments towards overseas development.

After considerable correspondence and the intervention of her MP, Jenny Aste of York obtained permission from the Inland Revenue to pay her tax with a cheque made out to the Inland Revenue but crossed Overseas Development Fund. The Revenue accepted the cheque, but failed to pay it into any such fund, and they were by this act technically guilty of fraudulent conversion. In a court hearing in Oxford, in a similar case, the Registrar felt forced to find for the Revenue, though he did not allow them costs. During the trial, the Registrar commented 'The York incident sounds quite improper; to accept a cheque from a conscientious taxpayer, in a way that satisfied her conscience and then override it'. His advice to the defendant Tony Crofts was that he should attempt to get the law changed and added that if he should succeed, 'by means of a successful application, he has my best wishes'. Tony Crofts is taking the case to a higher court.

The Peace Tax Campaign advise that the whole exercise should be accompanied by the whole gamut of leaflets, letters to the Inland Revenue, interviews and letters to MPs. They suggest that it is useful to write to Euro MPs explaining that the government is forcing us to pay for weapons of mass destruction 'contrary to the rules of war and the code accepted at the Nuremberg trials'. The truly energetic might take the case to the European Court of Human Rights. Where PAYE is involved the first step is to obtain the permission of the employer, which provides an additional step and another opportunity to explain the case publicly.

Members of CND and other disarmament groups may well not want to go as far as the Peace Tax Campaign which is attempting to divert taxes spent on all armaments. However, it should be possible to make calculations to find the nuclear proportion of our taxes which is spent on the British 'Independent Deter-

One London Council has already started to take direct action against the firms that are working at the US cruise missile site at Greenham Common.

Southwark Borough Council voted at the end of last year to ban all those contractors who are working at the Greenham base on the construction of missile silos. This has had the immediate effect of removing Tarmac Construction from the council's list of approved contractors. At the time of the contract decision, Tarmac held a contract to supply asphalt to the council.

Several Southwark councillors took part in the massive December 12 demonstration at Greenham and it was at the instigation of one of them, Councillor Paula Moore, that the ban was made.

Southwark are now calling on all other local authorities to take similar action

and they are particularly keen to urge the GLC to join their action. It is the GLC that spends most in the area of civil engineering in London.

A GLC spokesperson said in January that he expected that the ban would be debated at a committee meeting in the near future.

For the government, the new local government minister, Mr Tom King, said 'The council's decision is a gross abuse of local government power and responsibility. Next they will be boycotting firms producing components for Britain's nuclear defence.' The GLC is also thought to have plans in this area.

Tarmac has contracts with many other local authorities around the country, which could now be in danger. Their contract to build storage shelters at Greenham Common is worth £11 million.



rent' and on our share of NATO's weapons. Others might also wish to divert the very considerable 'Falklands Factor'. Tax diversion on a large scale could create useful blockages in an already overloaded system.

Fasting is an extreme form of action and considerable care and preparation needs to be taken before people embark on it. Gandhi used fasting 'as a last resort when all other avenues of redress have been explored and failed'. He stressed that fasting must only be undertaken by those who have been properly trained and who have the right motives for undertaking the fast.<sup>2</sup> In the past few years fasting has been used as an action against nuclear weapons. A Buddhist monk from Milton Keynes joined a vigil outside the base at Greenham between Hiroshima and Nagasaki days in 1980. His presence, sitting beating his drum from dawn to dusk each day, as well as the knowledge that he was fasting, had a strengthening effect on the others taking part in the vigil. A relay fast, in which one person followed another, was held outside the Pompidou Centre in Paris at the end of the Scandinavian Women's march in 1981. Some of these same people are planning a fast for life with the slogan, 'We hunger for disarmament, Fast for Life' which is due to begin on August 6th, 1983. This event will make the link between the arms race and hunger in the third world, and is being announced now to give people who wish to join it time to train and prepare themselves. The intention is that some will make an open ended fast and be joined by others fasting for a limited period. Full back up and support is needed with money, letter writing, media support, demonstrations, work stoppages and vigils to help draw attention to the fasters and

Rosa Parks arrested in 1955 bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama



to give them moral support.<sup>3</sup>

It is clear that non-violent direct action will play a very important role in our campaign in the coming year, and it is very important that our actions of all sorts are carefully planned and coordinated. Whatever we choose to do, we must be as well trained as possible and we must avoid false acts of bravado and remember the other essential parts of our work. This article offers no more than a cursory and partial view. We hope that people will write back with ideas and plans which will enable us to start a wider discussion of NVDA in future issues of the **END Journal**. □

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Contacts:  
Solange Fernex, F68480, Biederthal, France.  
Dorothy Granada, Non Violent Development  
Tactics Development Project, Eugene, Oregon, 97401, USA.

# Comiso hunger-strikers show the way

**The Comiso hunger strike lasted for 11 days and achieved both its demands. They were that the hunger strikers should be received by the heads of the eight parliamentary parties, and also by President Pertini, and, more importantly, they be given an hour's prime-time TV where the hunger strikers could explain their opposition to the missile base.**

**Since the main TV channels are under the influence of the Christian Democrat and Socialist parties, who are in favour of the base, there has been little TV coverage of the debate in that country. Supposedly article 21 of the Italian constitution guarantees any citizen right of access to the television.**

An international hunger strike was called by the local peace movement, CUDIP, and representatives from Italy, Holland, Germany, France, Canada and the USA took part. In a previous fast, the participants had taken over a council hall, but this time the administration had specifically forbidden that. But a local shopkeepers confederation allowed us to use their offices during the day, and at night we were offered the hospitality of a Franciscan monastery. The monks insisted that we came home at eight in the evening and didn't have visitors, which provided a perfect escape from the various pressures we were under during the day.

We got lots of messages and visitors during the day. I didn't really feel hungry, mostly I just felt weak, like a small boy with 'flu, annoyed because he can't go out to play but pleased with all the attention he's getting. In fact the main disadvantage seemed to be that we were virtually imprisoned night and

day, cut off from our normal social activities and forced to conscientiously reserve our energies wherever possible.

We started the fast on Monday 15th November. The first week was rather boring, as we were just really clocking up a few days to get started. The worst time of all was the weekend because the Pope came to Palermo so we were certain that nothing would happen.

At the beginning of the next week, the negotiations started in earnest. We were all getting rather fed up of our confinement, and our mood tended to swing quite abruptly, depending on whether the negotiations were taking an up or a down turn. This made us depend upon having supporters who were able and willing to go and do things at short notice for us.

At this stage, it would have been disastrous for our morale if, for instance, a crucial negotiator had had to go away for a couple of

days. We depended also to a great extent on the help given by members of the International Peace Camp, who were able to do small jobs for us.

By Wednesday the 24th a satisfactory agreement had been negotiated with RAI TV, and six parliamentary leaders had agreed to meet us. It seemed best to contemplate breaking the fast rather than sticking out another five days for the president and then having to admit defeat. But it was necessary to wait until documentary evidence arrived. This is a tedious business at the tail end of a fast like this where small details start to look a lot bigger.

The fast eventually ended on Friday, with the President agreeing to meet us. I stopped on Thursday, on the advice of our doctor.

It seems to me that this sort of demonstration is very powerful. It is hard for the opposition to find an effective counter, and no matter how the press try to slant their reports, the gesture of fasting itself has a very disturbing effect on people. Less obvious is the way in which a hunger strike galvanises supporters and sympathisers into action. The effect is that of a sudden enormous push forwards. It's possible that something like this could be done effectively here, perhaps in favour of the UN freeze resolution.

**Ben Thompson**

# An activist's guide to cruise and Pershing II missiles

## Manufacture and deployment

END Journal

15p





**The US** already has, in Western Europe, forward-based long-range aircraft such as F-111, plus nine different shorter-range types of nuclear-capable strike aircraft, Pershing IA medium-range missiles, various short-range missiles such as Lance or Nike-Hercules, artillery and atomic demolition mines. In addition, 400 warheads fired from Poseidon submarine-based missiles are assigned to the European Command.

**Britain** has its own Polaris submarines, Vulcan and Tornado long-range bombers, various other shorter-range nuclear capable aircraft and helicopters, Lance missiles, artillery and atomic demolition mines.

**France** has its own land and sea based long range missiles, Mirage IVA bombers, some shorter range aircraft and Pluton short-range missiles.

**Other NATO countries** also have shorter-range aircraft and battlefield nuclear weapons, operated on a dual key system. All in all, there are probably around 6,000 NATO nuclear warheads in Western Europe and the surrounding waters.

#### **BRITAIN: Greenham Common, Berks**

Officially expected December '83 but possibly earlier;  
96 in 6 flights

**First ever peace camp** set up 1981. Now women-only. Has been the focus for several successful actions including surrounding and blockading the base and has attracted considerable media attention.  
Contact: Greenham Common Women's Camp, Outside Main Gate, USAF Greenham Common, Newbury, Berks.

#### **BRITAIN: Molesworth, Cambridgeshire**

Expected 1986;  
64 in 4 flights.


**Peace camp** set up December '81 and still going strong.  
Contact: People's Peace Camp, RAF Molesworth, Weston Rd, Brington, Huntingdon, Cambs.

#### **BELGIUM: Florennes**

Expected December '85; 48  
No peace camp, but strong local campaign

#### **Legend**

cruise sites ●  
Pershing II sites ◆







**HOLLAND:**

as yet unknown. Informed guess suggests either De Peel near Venray or Volkel, already a US base for F-16s.

Expected December '85; 48

**GERMANY: Wuescheim in Hunsrueck forests, near Bitburg**

Most likely site despite FRG government denials date not known. No construction work started yet; 96

NB Germany also expected to host facilities in 5 years time to maintain and test all NATO cruise missiles on West European continent.

**GERMANY: Heilbronn; Neu-Ulm; Mutlangen, all near Stuttgart.**

Expected between '83 and '85  
36 at each site, totalling in all 108.

NATO Pershing IIs in Europe.

**ITALY: Comiso, Sicily**

Expected December '83; 112 in 5 flights.

**International Peace Camp** set up Summer '82. Worked in cooperation with local campaign, CUDIP, to organise demonstrations etc.

**The Soviet Union** has several hundred SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 land-based missiles, long range nuclear capable aircraft such as Badger and Blinder, as well as shorter-range aircraft, rockets and artillery. Although there are nuclear-capable launchers, rockets, artillery and aircraft, based in Eastern European countries and operated by E. European armies, the nuclear warheads are assumed to be stored in Soviet territory. Only the E. German army is thought to operate dual-key nuclear weapons, SCUD short-range rockets. The number of Soviet warheads for use in Europe has been estimated at anywhere between 3,500 and 6,000



## Pershing II

The Pershing II is a development of the Pershing I A ballistic missile. The USA at present operates 108 Pershing I A missiles in its 56th Field Artillery Brigade, the headquarters being in the southwestern part of FR Germany (three battalions of 36 launchers each in Neckarsulm, Schwäbisch-Gmünd and Neu-Ulm). The plan is to replace them with an equal number of Pershing II launchers, beginning at the end of 1983.

Development of Pershing II began in April 1974 and a full-scale development contract was signed with Martin Marietta Company in February 1979, (several months before the NATO decision about deployment). The US Department of Defence requested funding for 207 Pershing II missiles for 1982-4 which suggests that deployment will probably be above the stated 108 missiles.

### Technical data:

<b>Size:</b>	33 ft long
<b>Weight:</b>	7 tons at launch, carrying a payload of just over 1/2 ton.
<b>Range:</b>	1,000 miles (recent sources have suggested that it may be 1,200 miles and that it may be extended to 1,500 miles).
<b>Speed:</b>	5,000 mph (ie reaching target in about 12 minutes).
<b>Warhead:</b>	expected to be 'selectable' yield from 1-20 kt.
<b>Fuel:</b>	solid fuel.

### Guidance

The accuracy achieved by RADAG (radar area guidance) terminal guidance system is said to be the best of any ballistic missile. In the fifth test shot, in May 1978, the warhead impacted within 25 meters of the designated target. In the terminal phase, radar returns are compared

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
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Both Cruise and Pershing II are short-range weapons, the former with a range of 1,500 miles, the latter 1,000 miles.

In the case of cruise, this has led people to question why the USA wishes to deploy the missiles in Britain and Sicily, when it would be impossible for them to reach Moscow. Many Sicilian peace campaigners think cruise is being sited there to use against North African and Arab states (the US has its oil interests to protect, after all).

with a reference image stored in the computer and position errors are then recorded. The reference image is based on the surroundings of the target, so that the missile is not deceived by camouflage or by a target buried underground.

### Launching

Like cruise, Pershing II is mobile and will be launched from a Transport-Erector-Launcher (TEL), an articulated truck and trailer combination that carries both the missile and its warhead and is capable of both paved and cross-country travel. The TEL will be part of a convoy, together with two other TELs and supporting vehicles. Pre-launch survivability is enhanced through readiness, part of the force being on quick-reaction alert. A Pershing II Firing Platoon can count down and fire three missiles simultaneously and the Automatic Reference System does not require that the missile be launched from presurveyed sites, since it always refers back to the home base.

For all these reasons, Pershing II is expected to be one of the most capable counterforce weapons in the US arsenal, should it ever be deployed. It would be ideally suited for 'limited' strikes against time-urgent targets (such as missile, command and control centres, quick-reaction alert aircraft and submarines in port) and therefore fits the requirements of the US countervailing or counterforce strategy, as codified in President Carter's Presidential Directive 59. It is sometimes argued that the deployment of Pershing II would induce the Soviet Union to adopt a Launch-on-Warning strategy, thus increasing the risk of nuclear war by accident.

Compiled by the END Journal from reports by Ulrich Albrecht, Berlin; Andrew Cockburn, New York; Dr Paul Rogers, Bradford; Wilke Schram, The Hague; and Ben Thompson, Sicily

## Cruise missiles

The ground-launched cruise missile which is due to be deployed in Western Europe in 1983 is one of a whole family of cruise missiles that two large aerospace companies - Boeing and General Dynamics have been working on for the American Defence Department since 1974.

In 1977 the Defence Department handed over responsibility to the Joint Cruise Project Office. There are three nuclear-capable classes of cruise missiles:

**Ground-launched** - based on the Tomahawk cruise missile produced by the Convair Division of General Dynamics.

**Sea-launched** - also based on the Tomahawk, this missile is being developed in three different forms. Only one of these carries a nuclear warhead. The nuclear capable missiles will be deployed aboard the Sturgeon and Los Angeles nuclear attack submarines and aboard six different classes of surface ships. Over 900 sea-launched cruise missiles are already scheduled for production up to 1985, with over 60% of them carrying nuclear warheads.

**Air-launched** - this is by far the biggest class of cruise missiles being developed. A total of 4,384 of the Boeing AGM-86B air-launched cruise missiles will enter service over the next ten years. They will be fitted to Boeing B-52 long range bombers, 20 per plane.

The first squadron of B-52s armed with air-launched cruise missiles came into operation on December 13th, 1982 at Griffiss Air Force Base in New York State. Two more squadrons will become operational in April and October 1983.

### Technical Data:

#### Ground Launched Cruise Missile

<b>Size:</b>	20.5 feet (6.15m) long, 21 inches (0.53m) in diameter.
<b>Weight:</b>	3,200 lb. with rocket booster.
<b>Range:</b>	1,500 miles (2,400km)
<b>Speed:</b>	550 mph (880kmph)
<b>Warhead:</b>	200 kt
<b>Guidance:</b>	This is achieved by a combination of inertial guidance and a terrain contour matching system (TERCOM)

The inertial guidance system works out the missiles' position by checking the speed and direction of travel and then examining the missiles' initial position. The TERCOM guidance system works by the missiles computer matching surface characteristics measured by a radar altimeter with digital maps of the planned flight route stored in the guidance computer. It is expected that eventually an accuracy of 35 feet will be achieved, though it is yet to be proved.

There have been numerous problems with the guidance systems aboard the missiles and it is believed that they are not yet solved. In particular, flying over snow or leafy forests confuses the TERCOM.



# Unlimited weapons for 'limited' wars

**During 1983, the West European peace movement will focus its efforts on stopping the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Britain, Italy, West Germany, Holland and Belgium. The North American peace movement will support our struggle by demonstrating at production and testing sites and at NATO embassies. In the following pages, we provide background material on cruise and Pershing II missiles, and the deployment, production and testing sites, to help activists. The information is based on reports provided by PAUL ROGERS (Department of Peace Studies, Bradford), SVERRE LODGAARD (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), ULRICH ALBRECHT for West Germany, BEN THOMPSON for Italy, WILKE SCRAM for Holland and Belgium, and ANDREW COCKBURN for North America<sup>1</sup>.**

On December 12, 1979, the NATO Council took the decision – unanimously, as is normal NATO practise – to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe, starting in 1983. At the same time, to allay the fears of smaller NATO countries, the US undertook to negotiate the limitation of so-called theatre nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union.

Theatre nuclear weapons are also known as Euro-strategic or Intermediate range nuclear weapons. They are nuclear weapons that can hit the Soviet Union from West European territory or territorial waters and vice versa. In Europe, there are also many shorter range nuclear weapons, usually known as tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons. The 1979 decision is known as the 'dual track decision'.

At the time, Holland and Belgium supported the dual-track decision but delayed the decision about deployment of the missiles on their own territory. Subsequently, the Greek government dissented from the decision. The Danish Parliament has expressed opposition to the decision by refusing to vote funds for the infrastructure programme for cruise and Pershing II, ie money for the construction of bases, etc. A similar vote in the Norwegian Parliament was rejected by only one vote but will probably be reversed next year (see European notes, Pg 5).

From the beginning, the cruise and Pershing II issue was a political symbol of the relationship between western Europe and the United States. The military-strategic rationale hinged on the 'coupling' argument; the maintenance of the US nuclear umbrella in Western Europe.

The military strategists argued that these so-

called 'Euro-missiles' were half-way between strategic and tactical weapons. Strategic weapons are those based in the US the use of which would invite retaliation against the US itself. Tactical weapons are those designed for use on the European battlefield.

This argument is, of course, self-defeating, offering the worst option in both cases. As strategic weapons they invite all-out nuclear war. As tactical missiles they mean the US would be more tempted to use them, allowing Europe to become the victim of a 'limited' nuclear war while the US escapes unharmed.

The decision to deploy cruise and Pershing was an attempt to 'reassure' Europeans of American 'protection', at a time when growing political and economic differences were emerging between Western Europe and the United States. The crucial feature of the missiles was not their suitability for 'limited' strikes, but the fact that they were forward-based in Western Europe. Since forward, land-basing is more visible than sea-basing, the Soviet Union would be able to distinguish between a strategic and theatre attack while at the same time the Europeans could be visibly 'reassured'. This latter part of the argument was given particular emphasis in the discussions leading up to the 1979 decision.

In fact, of course, the effect of the decision was the opposite to that intended. For it drew attention to the inadequacies and dangers of US nuclear strategy in Europe.

Of course, the disadvantage of land-based missiles is that they are more vulnerable than sea-based missiles and this was, indeed, the main argument for withdrawing US land-based missiles from Europe in the early 1960s. Another rationale for the missiles is the US would be forced to launch the Euro-missiles before they could be destroyed in a Soviet attack, thus linking Europe's fate to the US. But the same old problem arises. Would the US protect its missiles if their use meant retaliation against US territory?

It is important to emphasize that the argument about SS-20s came afterwards. Of course, there is no question that the 250 or so SS-20s in Western Russia are a substantial augmentation of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and are a threat to Europe, as are all existing nuclear weapons on both sides. But the argument made for cruise and Pershing II did not initially have anything to do with the SS-20s, only to do with 'coupling' the fate of Europe to that of the US. The SS-20s and the 'balance' issue were only brought in by virtue of the negotiations in Geneva.

The 'coupling' argument was always put in rather vague and general terms. How cruise and Pershing II might actually be used has never been specified. In the peace movement, we tend to impute greater rationality to the strategists than is actually the case. It is particularly difficult to find a good rationale for cruise. This is because the cruise missile is rather slow making it unsuitable for 'limited' or 'first use' roles – although these are the roles that are usually mentioned. Cruise missiles were, for a long time, a technology in search of a role. They received a boost in the 1970s, firstly during SALT when Kissinger was looking around for a new technology not covered by the talks, and then, under Carter, when funding for them was accelerated as compensation to the aerospace industry for the cancellation of the B-1 bomber project.

Their range was too small to hit anywhere except Latin America and Canada from the United States. So, if there was to be a ground-launched version, Europe was the obvious choice. Indeed the idea of basing them in Europe was put forward in the specialist literature long before the Europeans were ever supposed to have 'asked' for Euro-missiles in the late 1970s.

Whatever might be thought to be the strategic shortcomings of cruise, it is relatively cheap and numerous. The US plans to deploy some 6,000 long-range cruise missiles launched from air, sea and land. And, it is part of the logic of the arms race, that such a development is bound to be reproduced in the East. Indeed the Soviet Union is already developing a long-range cruise missile. And they have expressed serious concern that any future arms control agreement including cruise would be almost impossible to verify, because the missiles are so small and so easily concealed. It is also impossible to tell by satellite whether they are nuclear-capable or not, and whether they are long or short range.

The rationale for Pershing II is much more obvious, since it is extremely fast and accurate. There has, reportedly, been serious consideration by Britain of Pershing II as an alternative

<sup>1</sup>As far as we can tell, at the time of going to press, this information is accurate and up-to-date. However, as data about defence matters is not always easily available, there is always room for speculation, and misinformation and the need to revise in the light of new information.



to Trident. Of course Pershing II can also be explained in other ways since there was considerable pressure from the firm McDonnell Douglas to find a 'follow-on' to Pershing I in order to keep the design team together.

The Euro-missile story also provides a vivid illustration of one of the more pernicious con-

sequences of arms 'control.' For by placing undue emphasis on the numbers of weapons of a particular type held by both sides, 'arms control' agreements inevitably encourage the search for new weapons technologies that are not tied down by the negotiated quotas in the agreements.

**'By placing undue emphasis on numbers of weapons, arms control agreements inevitably encourage the search for new weapons technologies'**

## Deploying the missiles

### Great Britain

Britain will receive 160 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM). 96 will be deployed at Greenham Common in Berkshire and 64 at Molesworth in Cambridgeshire. Greenham Common is scheduled to be the first site in Europe to receive the missiles. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for Greenham Common is December 1983. But from past experience this suggests that a portion of the missiles will be deployed around September. The missile launchers, known as TELs, will arrive even sooner. Indeed END Journal has received evidence that the United States have asked the British government if they can begin testing the mobile TELs and the launch control centres (LCCs) on British roads as early as April.

The US Department of Defense is making strenuous efforts to maintain the IOC at Greenham Common in December and has appointed a 'Tiger Team' to iron out difficulties. Construction of the super-hardened concrete silos is well-advanced as could be observed during the television coverage on New Year's Day protests at Greenham. The trucks for the TELs are made in West Germany and, reportedly, the West German government has been pressed by the US Government to ensure delivery in late spring.

The main reason for the haste appears to be political. The US is anxious that the Greenham Common facility should be as advanced as possible before a general election so as to make cancellation by a future British Government more difficult.

However any early delivery of the missiles is bound to have the most serious consequences on the US/Soviet Union talks in Geneva as it is impossible for the Soviet Union to accurately verify the presence of a nuclear armed cruise. But they can detect the presence of launch vehicles and as such it has been acknowledged by the American negotiator, Paul Nitze, that the Soviet Union is likely to pull out of the talks as soon as that part of the cruise missile system is deployed.

The Molesworth base is, so far, completely open; it is currently used for RAF disposal. Only Ministry of Defence signs deter the curious visitor. The only evidence of construction is what looks like the extension and renewal of an old disused runway.

The Women's Peace Camp at Greenham

Common has been widely reported in the press. The demonstration on December 12, the invasion of the base on New Year's Day and various other forms of direct action have dramatically drawn attention to the cruise issue.

There is also a People's Peace Camp at Molesworth, with about 50 to 100 people, and much more space and facilities than Greenham. The camp includes several caravans, a windmill and a hut and campers were prosecuted for making a vegetable garden inside the base area.

**A ground-launched cruise missile is fired from a mobile transporter launcher.**



### Italy

The second site due to receive cruise missiles is Vincenzo Magliocco in Comiso, Sicily. 112 ground launched cruise missiles are to be deployed here sometime in 1984.

Taken with the development of NATO's Rapid Deployment Force, the military emphasis of NATO forces in Italy has shifted southwards towards the Mediterranean. It is argued that the Sicilian cruise missiles may not in fact be targeted on the Soviet Union but rather against targets in the Middle East. For the US is worried both about protecting its oil interests in that region and about the anti-American feelings of certain Middle Eastern states. Certainly the missiles would be better placed for an attack in the Middle East rather than on the Soviet Union which they would find hard to penetrate. (See range diagrams on Page ii and iii).

Work is continuing on the Magliocco airport site, and security against photographers has been tightened up. About 80, mainly Sicilian, people are working on the site. So far few people from Comiso work there although attempts are being made to recruit local labour. CUDIP, the local disarmament campaign, and the peace camp are resisting these efforts.

The demolition works at the site have been completed, and some barracks and offices are under construction. The actual construction of the missile hangers is not scheduled to begin until February. In the meantime it has been reported that a hospital centre will be built on the site with 3,470 beds for the exclusive use of US personnel.

There will be a local election in March, and if the PCI (the Italian Euro-communist party) are returned to power they may be able to use local planning regulations to obstruct or delay the work on the base. Also in March the National Conference of the PCI will decide how high up their agenda the Comiso issue will be placed. If the government crisis continues and the popular opposition intensifies during 1983 the PCI may be able to force at least a suspension of the base. Other possibilities include the development of a strong direct action campaign. Despite the efforts of the International Peace Camp in carrying out several blockades last year, there has not yet been a direct action demonstration comparable to the one at Greenham Common. However, a small solidarity demonstration on December 12 did bring out local women.

This could be very important, if it means that people in Comiso are becoming aware of, and interested in, the success of the campaign at Greenham.

### West Germany

The Federal Government had declined, as usual, to reveal detailed information about defence matters. The Bundessicherheitsrat, a cabinet committee similar to the US National Security Council, has decided that the locations of cruise and Pershing II missiles should remain classified. But we can be fairly certain of the following:

- All the 96 cruise missiles stationed in Germany will be deployed near Wüschheim, a small village (postal code D6541) in the Huns-

rueck forests, not far from major US Air Force installations like the Bitburg Base. (The Federal Government has denied that this is the site and has said it will change the site, if named in the press. This suggests that construction plans have not proceeded far, even though deployment is scheduled for 1984.)


●The Pershing II units, which Germany is privileged to host for all NATO countries, will be despatched in three units (36 launchers in each, making up the NATO total of 108) in Heilbronn, Neu-Ulm and Mutlangen, in the region of Stuttgart (residence of infamous US European Headquarters EUCOM) in Southern Germany.

This information comes 'courtesy of the US Army', and reveals the peculiar nature of German defence policy. The German Federal Government is, in fact, neither in a position to decide where the missiles should be deployed nor to prevent the US deployers (with their more flexible PR policies) from stating where the missiles will be deployed.

A number of local initiatives have been formed to protest the policies of the German Federal Government in allowing the deployment of NATO missiles. Their activities on December 12 are reported in European Notes. (Pages 6-7).

There are two particular issues which should also be mentioned. The Bundeswehr, along with American units, has its own small fleet of Pershing Is—two units, again made up by 36 launchers each. These units have operated their Pershings for 15 years and are urgently awaiting modernisation. The Pershing II is earmarked for them, but this was not included in the 1979 NATO decision. The 72 Bundeswehr Pershings are, according to the Federal Armed Forces, unduly neglected, maybe 'forgotten'. On the other hand, due to financial restrictions imposed by major rearmament programmes like *Tornado* aircraft, *Leopard II* tanks, and Type 122 frigates, the Bundeswehr cannot afford to have their Pershing IIs before 1986.

Because the Soviet Union would react strongly to a German-controlled nuclear capability able to reach Soviet territory, the 'Ger-



**A sea-launched cruise missile: one of the many types of cruise missiles. Several hundred such missiles will be deployed by the US Navy**

man' Pershing IIs are expected to have a cut in range: 750 kilometers instead of the 1,800 kilometers of the 'American' Pershing II version. Former Chancellor Schmidt wrote in one of his books, (which he hoped in vain the peace movement would heed) that Germany should not have a nuclear capability to hit the Soviet Union. The German 'reduced range' version (in US vernacular: Pershing IIRR) will be publicly labeled, for convenience, a 'Pershing IB'.

Secondly, what happens, if other NATO members, as a result of strength of their peace movements, refuse to accept cruise missiles? German defence planners are worried about the prospect that Belgium, will reject deployment of the 48 'Belgian' cruise missiles. According to present contingency plans, it would be Wüschheim that would have to take the additional complement of missiles.

Finally, it is planned that the German Federal Republic will, in five years time, host the central facilities to maintain and test all the NATO cruise missiles deployed on the Euro-


pean Continent.

## Holland


The political position of the Dutch government in relation to the ground launched cruise missiles is as follows: Holland supports the modernisation of NATO's nuclear force but postpones the decision about the actual deployment of 48 cruise missiles on Dutch soil. In the meantime, the preparations for the missiles have already begun and there is considerable confusion about them.

Former Minister Van Mierlo coined the terms 'passive' and 'active' preparations. The 'passive' phase of preparations has just been completed. Basically, it means that the Dutch answer questions posed by NATO. Appropriate locations have been studied by a NATO mission to see whether they met US requirements for the preparation and stationing of cruise missiles. Four to six possible site locations were submitted to the United States by

**The Launch Control Centre (LCC). It 'combines all functions in one vehicle', says the manufacturers, General Dynamics Corp.**



**The Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL). Described by the US Defence Department as 'a mobile survivable launch platform'.**



Van Mierlo, during a visit to Washington in the spring of 1982; of these, two appear to be acceptable. The final decision will be made by the Dutch Government.

After January 1, 1983, the 'active' phase is supposed to begin. The first part of the 'active' phase consists of invisible preparations, for example, drawing up the building plans, request-

can be kept a secret during this phase of preparations.

A number of sites have been named. But the most likely site is the De Peel airfield near Venray. There is already a developed infrastructure, appropriate facilities in the area, including the nuclear weapons depot near Volkel, and there appears to be space on the air-

**Finally, an item from the US Defence budget for 1984 ... \$100 million for 'wire-mesh around cruise missile launching bases'. Keep a look out!**

ing licences, etc. There have to be extensive discussions with county and even political authorities about changes in zoning regulations and regional development plans. This is not so much because of the construction of the base itself but because the package also includes a complete American village—to be baptized by the Inter Church Peace Council as 'Tomahawk City'. 650 American personnel will accompany the missiles. Together with wives and children that means about 2,200 people. They will need homes, schools, recreation and sports buildings, a (tax-free) shop, medical facilities, possibly a church etc.

But before any of this begins, a NATO inspection team will visit Holland to inspect both locations. The final choice will probably not be made before September 1983.

The second part of the active phase of preparations consists of actual construction. It is expected to begin sometime after December 1983. It will begin with bulldozing, laying roads and other infrastructural facilities (gas, water and electricity). Then the construction of the base together with Tomahawk City can begin.

There is no way that the location of the site

field. But a boost for the peace movement is the pledge to oppose deployment of cruise by Venray council. (See European Notes Page 8).

Finally, a proposed item for the US Defense Department budget for Fiscal Year 1984 (October 1983 to October 1984) is \$100 million for 'wire-mesh around cruise missile launching bases'. So ... keep a look out for delivery of new wire mesh for De Peel (or Volkel perhaps)!

### Belgium

In the late spring of 1982 the leader of the Flemish socialists Karel van Miert said that he knew for sure that the Florennes Air Force base will be the deployment site for 48 Belgian missiles.

Officials of the government did not deny that some construction work has taken place at the base but they said that this was 'logistical infrastructural measures' for NATO's communication network. There is no further confirmation of this information.

There is a thriving disarmament campaign in Florennes and according to one recent poll, the majority of the population in the locality are against the siting of cruise in the area.

## Producing cruise

### United States

During the Vietnam war, the Lockheed plant in California sported the graffiti, 'Don't knock the war that feeds you.' From the evidence of the cruise and Pershing II programme, it appears that these weapons of mass destruction do not even seem to confer the rather dubious benefit of feeding many people before incinerating them.

Defence programmes have been sold by successive administrations—and especially by Reagan—as being a provider of jobs at a time of bleak economic prospects. But the number of jobs actually produced is very small. Investment in practically any other scheme—particularly such things as housing, utilities, public transportation, etc—could yield 50 to 100 per cent more jobs and that is backed up by official US Department of Labor statistics. (For more detailed information, see article in END Journal Issue 1, by Denis McShane.)

It is estimated that the cost of cruise and Pershing II stands at around \$6 billion. But this investment will yield no more than 15,000 jobs over the next six years. **Andrew Cockburn**

## Failing the

**'If you want something bad, you get it bad.', said one of the US Air Force generals working on the Pershing II missile programme which, like the cruise programme, has been dogged with technical problems. But whatever the technical problems, it looks likely that the US will push for their early deployment.**

The idea of cruise missiles is not new. The present ground launched cruise can trace an ancestry back to the German V1 'flying bombs' of the second world war. But if the idea is not new, then neither are the problems that have dogged the small flying weapons. After all, the V1 one was eventually replaced by the V2 ballistic weapon because it was so inaccurate.

Today the technology is far more complex. But so are the problems. The modern Tomahawk cruise missile is guided towards its target by two different guidance systems. One is based on the well tried and tested method of inertial guidance using gyroscopes in much the same way as any aircraft. While this system enables the missile to determine its position to within a few miles, it is the second, more advanced, guidance system which has led the US to make claims that a European-launched cruise could knock out a particular building in Moscow (and most of the rest of the city if the weapon is armed with a nuclear warhead). But it is also this second system which has caused the problems that have been dogging the project.

The second system is known as TERCOM and it works by using a radar altimeter to look down at the ground and measure the earth's contours. It then matches these contours to a map that it has stored in its computer. Unless

**CRUISE MISSILES**

**A vital part of the West's Life Insurance.**

We want to live at peace. The United Kingdom has for years sought disarmament through talks with the Soviet Union. But it takes two to make agreements and progress has been slow.

During this period the Russians and their Warsaw Pact allies have been rapidly building up their military strength. The Soviet Union spends about 17% of its national wealth each year on its armed forces. This is over twice the proportion spent by the NATO allies.

The Warsaw Pact countries have massive forces equipped with a wide range of weapons. They have large conventional forces operating with modern tanks, guns, ships and aircraft. They also have short and medium range nuclear weapons. Simply they have the very large long range nuclear weapons which can be targeted from one continent to another.




We in the West must be strong enough to persuade the Russians that it would be too dangerous for them to start a war. But we have been falling behind. The weapons the Russians see and the cruise they are likely to make a war against us.

NATO therefore needs to strengthen its deterrent, particularly in medium range nuclear weapons where the Russians have now gained a significant advantage over the West.

By buying Cruise Missiles in the United Kingdom and other Western European countries we can go a long way to achieving this aim. Cruise Missiles are a deterrent in an increasingly hazardous world. The Cruise Missile is a vital part of the West's life insurance.

**'A vital part of the West's life insurance'. How the British Ministry of Defence sees Europe's cruise missiles in a brochure available from the MOD.**





Cape Canaveral, Florida, USA. A Pershing II missile goes up... and then comes down during the missile's first test in July, 1982.

## tests, missing the targets

the ground happens to be covered with either snow and ice or leafy forest, in which case the radar signal has a tendency to become confused thus preventing the missile establishing its accurate position.

But this vital flaw is not the only problem that besets the TERCOM guidance system. For the cruise missiles designers have had to cope with the inability of the US Intelligence Services to obtain reliable maps of the Warsaw Pact countries. Moreover, the maps that the Intelligence Services do obtain are in fact photographic maps of the countries taken from satellites. These may be accurate, but they are not maps that translate very easily into radar contours.

Other problems that have beset the Joint Cruise Project have been more mundane in their nature but just as damaging to the project. Foremost among these has been the poor quality of some of the work performed by the prime contractor and some of the sub-contractors.

These problems eventually led the JCP manager, Rear Admiral Locke, to place the prime contractor, General Dynamics, under an official notice that they would lose the multi-billion dollar project unless the standard of their work improved. The Project office also sent down a so-called 'Tiger Team' of experts to oversee the rectification of problems. But shortly after the notice was issued last August, Rear Admiral Locke was sacked. He was replaced by a navy man known to be more compliant with official policies. At the same time a Pentagon statement made it clear that certain deficiencies had been identified in the project. This statement was followed up by the mysterious removal of the official warning

notice from General Dynamics last December. No explanation has been offered for this action whatsoever, but it is rumoured in Washington that General Dynamics had suggested that Locke should be removed because of the pressure that he was putting on them.

In the United States the management problems continue into 1983. One source has said that the project is now two years behind schedule as a result of the poor management and the lack of any real chain of responsibility. Outgoing deputy Defence Secretary, Frank Carlucci has said after studying an independent report into the project that the faults would cost \$250 million to correct and that in-

only minutes after take off. On the second test an electrical fault was thought to be responsible for the missile coming down only seconds after take off.

But as with the cruise project, the US Army who are to operate the missile will not see it delayed merely because it doesn't work. As such the Army decided in June to sign a production contract with the Pershing manufacturer, Martin Marietta, before they had actually seen the weapon work.

It is generally agreed that the rush into production is purely political. NATO official fear that the politically delicate NATO compromise for placement of the missiles along with

**'The Army and the State Department are going to have the thing deployed by December 1983, come hell or high water'**

initial deployment could be delayed by up to two years in some versions of the missile.

But the chances of there being any delay in installing the ground launched missiles in Europe are negligible. The Reagan administration is determined that the missiles should be placed in their hardened silos in Europe as soon as possible—even if they don't yet work properly.

The situation regarding the Pershing II missile has in many ways been even worse than that affecting the cruise programme. To date two tests of the missiles have totally failed and a third was postponed indefinitely last year.

During the first test of the missiles, first stage fuel was thought to have burnt through the casing of the weapon and caused it to crash

arms negotiations, might fall apart if Pershing II fails to meet the deadline.

But the general rush to install the missile in Europe will certainly mean that some of the planned test flights will now have to be abandoned. It will also mean that the costs of the missile will rise and rise. By June of last year the cost had already increased by \$1.2 billion over the March 1981 estimate of \$1.022 billion. But as one General Accounting Office expert on the programme said, 'The Army and the State Department have consistently maintained they are going to have the thing deployed by December 1983, come hell or high water, even if they do have to do some retrofitting later on to correct any technical problems that remain.'

**Mark Nicholls**

# Learning from each other

**In less than 18 months since its launch the American National Freeze campaign has received a bigger mandate than either Reagan or Carter. Freeze supporters say that the European peace movements helped kindle US interest in disarmament. Now their success is fuelling our struggle.**

**Here MARY KALDOR, RANDY KEHLER (Freeze National Coordinator) and MIENT JAN FABER (Dutch Inter Church Peace Council) discuss the similarities and the differences of the campaigns on both sides of the Atlantic.**

**Mary Kaldor:** *People in Europe were very impressed that the Freeze resolution was defeated in the House of Representatives by two votes. To what do you attribute the very rapid success of the freeze?*

**Randy Kehler:** I think there have been a number of catalysts. I think the SALT talks process itself was a catalyst because it caused such great frustration for disarmament people who felt that they could not wholeheartedly support a measure which really would not in any way stop the arms race, but would only channel it perhaps in another direction. Yet they didn't want to oppose it either because of the message that would give. So there was a real search for some more decisive, comprehensive and comprehensible proposal.

Another catalyst was the December 1979 NATO decision regarding cruise and Pershing missiles. But more important in terms of our popular movement, was the demonstration in Europe in the fall of '81. For some reason I still don't understand, our press covered it very well. There was some distortion, I'm sure, but it was in the news constantly and people talked about it. There was sympathy for the European people as victims of superpower politics and militarism and ultimately perhaps the victims of nuclear war.

There is no question that the rhetoric of the Reagan administration was the fourth catalyst. He woke a lot of people up. Nobody before had ever talked about winning a nuclear war, having a contained nice little limited nuclear war, and clean surgical nuclear strikes, nuclear warning shots. That whole vocabulary shocked people and made them think.

A fifth catalyst was our own economic situation. Reagan was like an economics teacher for the whole country. He would almost hold up, in his right hand, the social services budget and, in his left hand, he'd have the military budget and he'd say, Now we have to make cuts over

here on the right, so that we can make increases here on the left and 30 billion dollars for food stamps has to be cut because we need 30 billion dollars for our Trident submarine programme. The disarmament movement has been trying for years to make these connections but he made them much better than we ever could.

**Mary:** *Can you explain what the exact aims of the freeze campaign are and how you think they might be achieved?*

**Randy:** Well I think for better or for worse our aims are very simple. The one explicit aim of the freeze campaign is to bring about a bi-lateral, that is to say mutual US/Soviet, freeze on testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery vehicles and to do that by first convincing our own government to make that its negotiation position with the Soviet Union; to propose in Geneva or wherever, to say this is what the United States will do if you Soviets will agree. We are prepared to have an immediate freeze as a first step towards balanced mutual reductions on both sides.

**Mary:** *And would this take time to negotiate? Would the freeze be subject to verification?*

**Randy:** Here I think we have a problem and I hope it's not a problem that we can't correct soon. In fact, the original wording of the peace proposal said 'immediate freeze'. For some reason that I don't understand myself, the word 'immediate' was taken out at our founding convention.

Then, to make matters worse in my opinion, when Senators Kennedy and Hatfield came up with their freeze resolution for Congress they not only failed to say 'immediate', they came up with language to the effect that the US and the Soviet Union would decide when and how to implement a mutual freeze. They deliberately made it that vague in order to win additional political support from people

who were very nervous, for whom this idea was a very new idea, and who would have been very scared had we said anything that might indicate 'immediate'.

At this point, however, the opposition has used that against us. The Reagan people have said 'Your freeze could take at least as long to negotiate as our reductions; therefore let's go for something better than a freeze, let's go for reductions.' That's been difficult for us to handle as a criticism in view of the wording of the Kennedy-Hatfield proposal.

At this point, however, I think there is consensus among our congressional supporters, like Kennedy and Hatfield and others, and within the freeze campaign itself that the language has to be very much tightened up.

**Mary:** *But couldn't even an immediate freeze take time to negotiate?*

**Randy:** Of course. The freeze campaign at this point is willing to acknowledge that there are certain aspects to a freeze which are not necessarily clear cut; for example, are the dual-capable systems included or excluded? Similarly, what constitutes a replacement that does not alter the status quo, as opposed to a modernisation which suddenly introduces a new capability? There are not only grey areas that need to be negotiated. There are verification procedures that need to be negotiated. So there are two problems that might hold the thing up. We drafted a resolution which specified those parts of the freeze that could be implemented immediately. And we limited those parts to items that we thought could be verified with a sufficient degree of certainty right now.

**Mary:** *Without on-site inspection?*

**Randy:** Yes. The following four things could be frozen on both sides virtually immediately with existing verification means, not including on-site inspection. One is testing and production of warheads because they take place in a few areas known to both sides. The second is missile development flight tests. The third is final assembly of nuclear vehicles and the fourth is all deployments.

And for us that's most of the freeze anyway. We don't feel it's a huge compromise back from the comprehensive freeze idea. It's to prevent the opposition from hanging the whole freeze up because there are aspects of production that perhaps would need verification procedures worked out through a lengthy negotiation

process. So we will press with some kind of new formulation of our congressional resolution in January 1983 that is much more specific and which calls for immediate implementation of certain aspects.

**Mary:** *Do you think that the freeze campaign is actually going to be achieved over the next two years and how do you think that will happen?*

**Randy:** I hope that we could in fact achieve a freeze in the next year but I'm not terribly optimistic. I think a more likely scenario is that we could achieve at least from the US side, with hopefully some corollary action on the Soviet side, a temporary suspension of new weapons until such time as the freeze is agreed upon.

At the moment, I should be clear, the freeze campaign has no official position about suspending new US weapons. Many of our Congressional supporters view that as unilateralism and they are opposed to it, so it's a very controversial issue. My personal opinion is that at least on an interim basis we are going to have to try to stop the continued funding for all the new weapons including Pershing and cruise; that is to say, intervening in the congressional budgetary process, maybe even taking other specific steps prohibiting or suspending deployment of Pershing or cruise until such time as the US Government has in good faith offered a complete freeze to the Soviet Union.

**Mary:** *Let's turn to Europe. In what ways do you think the European movement could support the American movement and how do you think the American movement could support our movement?*

**Randy:** In my own perhaps simple minded view, I think the overall goals of the movements on both sides of the Atlantic are basically the same, which is to say that people everywhere are horrified and revolted that our governments are wasting all these resources building weapons of mass destruction and more and more fearful that by accident or design the weapons are going to be used. I think there is a great deal of sympathy, as I said before, from the American public for the European position caught in the middle. So in that sense, the European movement will contrive to be very helpful in catalysing our movement. The stronger the popular protest against nuclear weapons, in the general sense, is on your side of the Atlantic, the more strength and reinforcement it gives us on our side of the Atlantic.

That's not to say the objectives are just the same. Because we live within one of the nuclear superpowers, I think it's natural that our approach would be somewhat different. We live in the country where all these things are produced—a



**Randy Kehler:** "our goals are basically the same."

country that has been subject to a very heavy-handed cold war propaganda machine for almost thirty years. For us to take the bi-lateral approach, aimed at not just the euro-missiles but the entire arms race, I think makes a great deal of sense. For the western Europeans to be focusing on the most immediate threat, the most visible reality—which is the euro-missiles—also makes sense.

If we succeed in bringing about a comprehensive freeze, obviously that will include the cruise and Pershing and it will be one step towards your further goal, I think, of the European nuclear free zone from Poland to Portugal. Conversely, if you succeed by your efforts in stopping the cruise and Pershing, that puts great pressure on the United States to abandon its plans to go forward with the arms race. I think that will be an important factor in discouraging the United States from going ahead with this whole new generation of nuclear weapons. After all, the US is very sensitive to opposition from its own allies. And if the allied governments under pressure from their own people are saying 'we won't stand for any new weapons, we want this arms race stopped', that's a reinforcement to the pressure that we ourselves are trying to put on our own government. It would be a big boost to the freeze.

**Mary:** *Now I'll ask Mient Jan Faber some questions. Do you think that there are any problems in the different approaches of the freeze campaign and the European movement?*

**Mient Jan:** We have to distinguish between different kinds of problems. First of all, we have to discuss with the freeze movement exactly what they expect from the negotiations. We started here by say-



**Mient Jan Faber:** "we must find ways to cooperate."

ing no to cruise and Pershing II. The reaction from NATO, and from the US in particular, was 'Well OK, we'll negotiate in order that there will be no deployment.' And now there has to be deployment in order that the negotiations can have any result. Which means that there will be deployment. This was always the intention and that's the rule of negotiations.

The freeze campaign has asked for a bi-lateral freeze. In my view, as soon as you use the word bi-lateral, it means that you are referring to negotiations. Your freeze is not saying 'freeze now and then ask the Russians to sit down at the table and to discuss how we reduce.' No, it asks for discussion on the freeze, which means first negotiations and then freeze. And once negotiations between the superpowers begin, whatever kind of wonderful proposals you may have, I think the end result will be a kind of compromise, and there is the beginning of many many problems. Your proposal can be marvelous but in the long run the proposal is not so important as the result. So you have to discuss about the mechanism of negotiations.

Another problem is more fundamental. There is, in my view, a big difference between the situation in the United States and the Soviet Union on one hand, and, on the other hand, Western Europe. For the United States and the Soviet Union, there is no real fear or political confrontation. There is a military confrontation and there is a global confrontation but there is no direct confrontation.

It's completely different if you look at the European situation. There you have two blocs, and the arms race is just a component of the division of Europe. Our



first concern is that division, that political problem which exists now. That's the first problem we have to deal with and so the arms race can *only* be understood in this political framework.

Now the point is if you look in this way at the freeze campaign, you immediately have to ask whether the freeze campaign is able to loosen and soften this confrontation between east and west or whether it is more or less an element of détente policy. We have learned to understand détente policy as a functioning of the arms race and of bloc confrontation. It serves to manage the bloc confrontation and to manage the arms race.

My fear is that the freeze proposal is functioning in that framework and not in the framework of dissolution of the bloc system and of the political self-determination of the European people. In the view of many peace movements, this is the principal answer to our problems.

So I think that is my fundamental point. You can understand both positions because both positions are coming from their own backgrounds and the backgrounds are *absolutely* different. I think that the challenge for us is if we can really find out what are the ways of cooperation by accepting the different positions and the different backgrounds. It is useless to say, Well, you in the United States have to accept our political principles and our political situation because you are in another situation. And it is also useless if the freeze campaign asks the European peace movement to do the same as they are doing. That's our starting point and we have to stay with it. We must find ways to cooperate.

**Randy:** I feel exactly the same way. I must say I came to this weekend meeting without any comprehension whatever of the whole political side of your objectives and the question of bloc dissolution, for example, was just nowhere in my mind. I also agree that we have to completely respect the differences and not try to impose one approach on the other side. But where I still fail to understand your position is when you say that disarmament would in fact lead to a détente which in turn would harden the bloc division.

My own perspective from the American side is that détente, as I understand it, is a softening process. I don't pretend for a minute that the East-West division is not very carefully managed under détente but to me it's a question of totalitarian management versus liberal management. At least under liberal management, which is what détente was all about, some things were allowed to bubble and happen and ferment under the surface with a little bit

more breathing space for things like Solidarnosc or the Czechoslovak Charter 77.

It seems to me that in that softened situation, however managed it is, there are at least the seeds of dissolution that have more chance of growing than in the hardened situation that we are now moving into as a result of increased arms race competition.

**Mient Jan:** I think it's more or less the other way around. Détente policy has never aimed at overcoming or loosening the bloc system. One of the prerequisite conditions of détente policy was that we have to recognise the political systems in east European countries as they are and vice versa and there is no influence possible from the outside world on the internal problems of east European countries. They have to solve their problems by their own means, which is the means of the ruling class.

I think we understood that precisely after the coup in Poland because Polish people learned that the Helsinki agreement of 1975 for them means nothing more than a consolidation of Yalta, February 1945. It means the splitting up of Europe. You can say that within the Helsinki process a lot of things became possible, technical relations on trade, exchange of some information and cultural exchange. But the more fundamental subjects like, for instance, political rights, emancipation processes, a connection between what's happening here and what's happening in the east, self determination, and so on, were not allowed. They were not allowed, on purpose, in that process of détente because it would have failed completely.

Détente policy for the United States is completely different from what it is for West European countries. For the US it means nothing other than a way to continue power politics towards the Soviet Union. It's a form of power struggle. Détente policy for European countries is, I think, crisis management: how to keep the situation stable and how to prevent a third world war in Europe. It has never meant a way to overcome the present splitting up of Europe.

For us, it would be very important if the freeze campaign in the United States could inform public opinion in the United States about what's going on here and what really lives in our hearts. What we are thinking. We are talking about a process of disarmament and détente. It has to be a combination. Disarmament has to be linked to new forms of détente policy.

## Towards

Hungary is a small Central European country of 93,000 square kms and a population of some ten million. Though she is a member of the Warsaw Pact, her degree of militarisation is quite low. According to SIPRI data, her military spending is the lowest in the Warsaw Pact, amounting to some 2.2 per cent of her gross domestic product.

According to official declarations and to most independent opinions she has no nuclear weapons deployed on her territory, though there are delivery systems, partly under Soviet supervision. The same can be said of her Warsaw Pact neighbour, Czechoslovakia. Her other neighbours, the 'renegade' Romania, the non-aligned Yugoslavia and the neutral Austria, apparently have no possibility of possessing nuclear weapons or of having them deployed by a foreign power on their territories. Hungary also has a 70 km border with the Soviet Union in the East.

It is the policy of the Warsaw Pact that it would never use nuclear weapons against countries which do not themselves have them. Since this is true of all of Hungary's neighbouring countries, the deployment in Hungary of short-range nuclear weapons would be pointless. As far as medium and long-range weapons are concerned, the Soviet Union deliberately refrains from deploying them in Hungary. It would seem, therefore, that Hungary would be a suitable case for a nuclear weapon-free zone. We will discuss three aspects of this idea. 1. Possible steps towards the denuclearisation of Hungary; 2. connections with wider nuclear free zones; 3. the possibilities of the peace movement in furthering these plans.

### Denuclearisation

As a first step Hungary would officially declare that she undertakes to preserve her present de facto nuclear weapon-free status for ever. The prohibition of nuclear weapons would naturally include the prohibition of transportation as all other countries of the Warsaw Pact can be easily reached through other routes from the Soviet Union. The prohibition of overflight is more problematic, as its effectuation would not be possible in case of war. However, it seems reasonable that the country should undertake obligations to this effect, as the main function of nuclear-free zones – at least as long as there are only a few – is not to limit the extent of war but rather to lessen the probability of its breaking out, as important confidence-building measures.

Hungary would proclaim that though fulfilling her duties in the Warsaw Pact, she fully and unconditionally renounces any nuclear defence possibly offered to her by the Treaty. At the same time all nuclear powers would be asked to respect the nuclear weapon-free status of Hungary, and to undertake not to use nuclear weapons or threaten to use them

# a nuclear-free Hungary

**In European Notes and in an END pamphlet we have reported on the expanding activities of the independent Peace Group for Dialogue in Hungary. Two members of that group, Dezzö Miklos and Ferenc Ruzsa here put forward proposals for a nuclear free Hungary and for the extension of the Rapacki plan for a nuclear free Central Europe, in a paper that was sent to a Conference hosted by the Greek peace movement KEDEA in Athens in December 1982. (See interview with Papandreou). Unfortunately, they did not present the paper as they could not get visas in time.**

against her. In all probability the USA, the UK and France would do this only with the usual reservations, i.e. excepting the case of Hungary taking part in an attack upon them or their allies along with a nuclear power.

The Hungarian government should be given the power to verify whether the allied troops in our country have nuclear weapons or not. A committee made up of technical experts from non-aligned countries would examine alleged violations of the treaty, and on finding the charge well-founded it would ask the Hungarian government for an on-the-scene survey. A proven violation of the treaty by Hungary would result in the cessation of all obligations of the guarantors to the treaty.

As the second step all nuclear-capable delivery systems now in Hungary would be dismantled or changed to conventional ones. This would include the 16-70 km range FROG and the 160-300 km range SCUD missiles as well as the medium-range MiG 23 (Flogger) fighter planes (if the latter are really nuclear-capable, which is not sufficiently clear).

If these acts were not met by similar responses from some western country it might be necessary for Hungary to compensate for the weakening of her participation in the Warsaw Pact in some other field. Perhaps the best way to do so would be to strengthen her conventional air-defence and anti-tank weaponry.

As a third step, foreign (i.e. Soviet) troops should leave our territory. This would be a really important measure for increasing confidence between the two halves of Europe, as Western perception normally anticipate an initial conventional attack by the Soviet Union for conquering territory. However, some troops with an early warning system could remain. Also troops could move over the territory of Hungary, but in all cases only after due international notification. Whether the political conditions of the Warsaw Pact could bear a unilateral step of such weight is at least doubtful. However, with an equally symbolic American withdrawal it seems realisable.

The fourth logical step would be the resignation of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact, with an unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops. Considering the present postures of both blocs, this seems possible only if a similar step were to be taken on the other side, e.g., by Norway, Holland or Portugal.

## Nuclear Free Zone

The creation of a nuclear-free Hungary could be connected with the forming of a wider nuclear weapons-free zone comprising more countries. In this connection several versions could be conceived. From a historical point of view the first possibility is to add Hungary to the countries in the Rapacki plan (GDR, West Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland). Obviously this would presuppose the consent of both superpowers or military blocks; probably it would need extended negotiations between them. However, the plan offers great advantages to both sides. In the GDR the missiles threatening Western Europe would be dismantled.

Later the countries could undertake the dismantling of delivery systems and the reasonable reduction of foreign troops on their territory. If put into effect, these plans would be considered enormously significant, as the first stages of a real military détente. As both previous plans seem accomplishable, with some courage they could be connected to a Central-East and South European nuclear weapons-free zone, which would include on account of their position besides the countries mentioned above Albania, Yugoslavia, the European part of Turkey and possibly Czechoslovakia.

The creation of such a wider nuclear weapons-free zone would not go against the strategic interests of the great powers. So large a nuclear-free zone would include a significant part of Europe, and would make it possible for many countries to express their concern for peace, and perhaps by its example it might induce the nuclear powers to a genuine manifestation of their intentions. In all the above cases the prohibition of nuclear weapons would include transportation, overflight and the territorial waters (except for Turkish territorial waters).

The highly attractive plan for further development is self-evident. The countries of the Rapacki plan would join the last mentioned nuclear-free zone, and also the Scandinavian nuclear-weapons free zone, which it is hoped will be formed in the near future. The chances for the effectuation of such a plan are more or less identical with what was said about the first variant (i.e. Rapacki plan plus Hungary), and depend mainly on the attitude of, West Ger-

many, the USA and the Soviet Union. A nuclear weapons-free zone including quite a few countries of the two blocs and many countries with different social structures outside the blocs would be of enormous importance. The fact that a wide nuclear-free strip would spread between Western Europe and the Soviet Union would afford much more time and possibility for negotiations in order to avoid the escalation to a nuclear conflict of any conventional war, compared to a situation when the deployment of nuclear arms close to the borders forces their firing before the enemy could take them over. The significance of thinking about such ambitious plans is that while they are already really ambitious in military terms, they are nonetheless more concrete and consequently more conceivable than the abstract notion of a nuclear-free Europe, so often mentioned in official speeches.

## Tasks of the Peace Movement

It is a regrettable fact that none of the previously outlined proposals has been put forward officially in Hungary, and the case for the denuclearisation of Hungary has not been brought before the public, though some of the wider nuclear weapons-free zones mentioned seem to be fairly obvious ideas. Therefore, the first and most important task of the peace groups is to propagate widely and effectively the proposal for the creation of a nuclear-free Hungary – on placards, with slogans and in articles. Also it would help us much if the Western peace movement would publicise our proposals.

At the same time we will inform some official organs – first of all the National Peace Council and the Patriotic People's Front, both of which are responsible for matters concerning peace. Whether they support us or not, we may gain influential help by winning over important public personalities and – with wide enough propaganda – by forwarding collective petitions. We may even try to get into personal contact with the relevant party and government authorities.

Provided we somehow succeeded in drawing the attention of public opinion and of official organs to the proposal for the creation of a Hungarian nuclear-free zone, and to its advantages for the people of Hungary, we could go on to increase propaganda by promoting the creation of nuclear-free cities or counties, as important symbolic steps also helping to build confidence. It must be clear that, as county and town leading bodies are totally dependent on the central government, such a step could not be a real first step in the sense it is in the West: its success would necessarily presuppose a positive response from the government, entitling us to greater expectations.



**The Day School organised by the Higher Education Lateral Committee and held at Aston University on November 13, attracted some 200 participants from 40 educational institutions throughout Britain. The following is a brief summary. A fuller report will be included in the articles on France in the next issue of this Journal.**

Claude Bourdet, one of the most prominent of France's post-war intellectuals, and a veteran peace leader, recalled the militaristic traditions of French history. He said the father of current French defence thinking was a general called de Gaulle, but stressed the distinction between Gaullist *deterrence* and Giscardian *war-fighting* approaches to nuclear weapons. The transition (which took place in the early 1970s) is closely linked to the evolution of US defence policy.

He explained the rapid erosion of the virtual left-wing consensus around opposition to the bomb (in the 1960s) in terms of the reaction of the two major left wing parties (Socialists and Communists) to shifts in Gaullist foreign policy and to the prospect of left-wing governmental power. He ended by stressing the tragic lack of factual information and serious discussion about nuclear weapons which afflicts France more than any country in Europe.

Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti addressed the technical and military aspects of the same problems. He demolished the arcane distinction which is often made between strategic and tactical weapons by showing that, at the receiving end, the result is identical. He analysed the shifts in French nuclear strategy (which Bourdet had outlined) in terms of inter-service rival-



ry and the French army's successful lobbying of President Pompidou.

Turning to the present government's position (he was until recently the ranking military member of the Socialist Party's defence commission), he deplored a number of Mitterrand's more "Atlanticist" declarations, denounced the modernisation of France's tactical missiles and warned strongly against production of the neutron bomb. He insisted, however, that Mitterrand was dedicated to the dissolution of the two blocs, to disarmament and to the negotiation of a collective security treaty in Europe.

Christian Mellon, an ordained priest and one of France's foremost peace researchers analysed the numerical and political weakness of the French peace movement. He noted the all-pervasive influence of Gaullism and the demobilising impact of France's technical non-membership of NATO. He argued that the French have only ever understood *their* bomb in political terms and have never really analysed it in technical or military terms. He also drew attention to the total blackout, imposed by the media, on any serious discussion of disarmament issues. Finally, he noted the total lack of

support for a non-aligned peace movement not only from France's four main political parties, but also from the major social, cultural and religious forces in the country.

However, Mellon stressed that the situation was not hopeless, despite the consensus in favour of the French bomb from every area of the establishment. He noted a variety of opinion polls indicating the strength of popular concern about the bomb and concluded that the main aim of the peace movement in coming months was to despecialise the defence debate and to draw in the wider public through discussion of technical issues and civil defence.

In a round table discussion at the end of the day, Edward Thompson addressed the broader issue of bloc dissolution and the "slippage of internationalism" which France's "separatist" behaviour revealed. He suggested a number of reasons for this. First, the peculiarity of France's half in/half out relationship to NATO. Second, the extent to which French "nationalism", although generated by the same anti-hegemonic impulses which fuelled the peace movements elsewhere, had taken a different trajectory. Third, the cultural and intellectual separatism which had characterised France in the last 20 years. Fourth, the extraordinary fact that the French left had only just discovered the Gulag and were now afflicted with an anti-Soviet tunnel vision. Lastly, the misrepresentation of the non-aligned peace movement in the French media and the intellectual blockage over East-West relations in general. He concluded by stressing the contradiction and historic irony in the fact that non-alignment had been born in France 40 years ago with men like Bourdet and yet today was less well understood in that country than in any other in Europe. **Jolyon Howorth**

**Full details of our Committee's activities during 1982, and of the growing Christian consciousness over nuclear disarmament both here and abroad will be found in our own quarterly magazine *END Churches Register*. The current (December) issue deals in detail with the Church of England Report *The Church and the Bomb*, as well as including items from or concerned with the Netherlands, Hungary, Italy, GDR, German Federal Republic and elsewhere, and an American Diary covering the exciting developments in US churches.**

The Churches lateral committee suffers from the commitment of its members! Because all those who have identified themselves with our work are intensely aware of the urgency of the need for action, all of them are heavily involved within their own organisations and churches, and often travelling in Europe when others are at their desks. We hope to hold quarterly meetings this year, to coincide if possible with publication of the *Register*,

which will appear in March, June, September and December.

At the end of November our American Diarist, the Rev. Richard Bradshaw, attended an important peace consultation in New York arranged by the inter-faith peace organization Religious Task Force (RTF). The director of the RTF, the Rev. Paul Mayer, was particularly keen to have a representative from our committee to present the European perspective, because they are mobilising support this year specifically for the anti-cruise and Pershing II campaigns. Richard Bradshaw will be writing more fully about his experience and observations in the next number of the *JOURNAL*.

In Europe our main efforts have been towards establishing links with Hungary and the GDR, and cooperating with like-minded Christian organizations in western Europe. An urgent task now is to plan what church input can be made to the forthcoming Berlin Convention. We are hampered in this by not knowing how many, if any, of our friends in central and eastern Europe will be able to attend. The Churches Workshop in Brussels was exploratory and wide-ranging, but unrepresentative and therefore inconclusive. It did not lead, as I and others had hoped, to the setting up of any coordinated structure for European Christian action. Perhaps it is too much to expect coor-

dination in any formal sense. Christianity does not stop at the Elbe, or at Checkpoint Charlie, and the existing network of contacts between East and West is already contributing significantly to a fuller understanding of our different perspectives and of the common threat we all lie under.

Many eyes will be fixed on the forthcoming Church of England Synod in February, which is charged with discussing their specially commissioned report *The Church and the Bomb*. We felt this to be a significant enough document to be worth our promulgating as widely as possible before the Synod, and have prepared a summary of chapter V to VIII, i.e. those concerned with the moral and ethical aspects of nuclear weapons. The Chair of the committee that compiled the report has welcomed our initiative, and it seems likely that we can now print our summary for wider distribution, particularly to Synod members. Is it too much to hope that the Synod might follow the inspiring lead already given by official church bodies in America, Scotland and Norway, and speak out boldly against the evil of basing policies on weapons of mass destruction, even to the length of implementing the Report's recommendations 18 to 22, which advocate unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain?

**Stephen Tunncliffe**

# The author and the activist

**GRACE PALEY is an activist of long experience around peace, feminist, anti-nuclear and community issues. As a writer her honest and detailed observations of everyday life have been highly acclaimed<sup>1</sup>. This she seems to have fitted in between her politics and raising her two children. 'Art is too long and life is too short. There is a lot more to do in life than just writing', she has said.**

**Here she talks to JANE DIBBLIN about the commitments that tear her away from her typewriter.**

Daughter of Russian Jews who were imprisoned before the Revolution for their communist ideas, Grace Paley learned the spirit of resistance from her parents. 'They were not afraid to defend their ideas and I grew up knowing that going to jail for that was not something to be ashamed of.'

In fact, she herself has been to prison on several occasions. 'I've been lucky, though, I've never had to spend long there.'

Grace Paley is a small woman with springy grey hair. She has a quick, dry sense of humour—in the middle of a serious explanation she makes numerous asides. Warm and energetic, she confides in you as a friend after a brief meeting.

Her political roots are in community activities. 'I began by working around playgrounds and schools. I learned much more about political action there than when I got involved with national stuff.'

Asked whether she is a pacifist, she replies that she is, but she doesn't like to be connected with the word 'passive'. 'I prefer to say I am a "combative pacifist". I'm also a co-operative anarchist.'

She makes it clear that her pacifism doesn't exclude support for other people's national liberation struggles or personal self-defence. 'But I am convinced that we should only use non-violence when it comes to direct action in America'.

It was during the 'fifties that she became involved in the peace movement. 'Civil defence—those cruel, ridiculous exercises—and atomic testing were what brought me in. I started protesting when strontium was found in milk. Congress just told us to go home and do our homework. Isn't it terrible to be proved right in the end?'

'I was working in a peace group in Greenwich Village around local projects and anti-drug addition campaigns. And then suddenly along came the Vietnam War. It was almost as if the war was started to divert everybody's energies while the government continued to stockpile nuclear weapons and build nuclear power plants.'

'With Vietnam, we went in for direct action in a big way. Women organised sit-downs and became "supportive resisters" against the draft. You could get a \$10,000 fine and a five year sentence for that.

'I came to Europe to help deserters who had fled here. We used to have to meet in dark alleys to avoid arrest. Many of them were white middle-class boys. Their families were ashamed if they resisted and encouraged them to go and fight. But in the black community there was tremendous resistance. It seemed like more of them were drafted but their families and the whole neighbourhood protected them. I think Blacks were more conscious of how the war was

numerous exasperating splits in movements 'because people can't agree about campaigning priorities'. The truth is that everybody should do everything they can. The idea that there is only one way to campaign is utterly ridiculous.'

She insists that people should be well prepared for direct action by training in affinity groups beforehand. 'But we should not be afraid to take risks—besides it makes it so much more fun.'

'I don't mind seeing property getting damaged in the process but I really don't want to see people getting hurt. That's why I think fire is a bad, destructive thing to use. In the Vietnam days, people used to burn draft papers. It seemed to me not only dangerous, but a very male, formal way of doing things. Why not use your imagination and drown them?'

At present, Grace Paley is living in the New England countryside ('It's the first time I've



Grace Paley: warm, energetic and wise

being used by the government. And they were less afraid because they had already been through the civil rights struggle.'

By the end of the war, Grace Paley was even more determined to carry on with disarmament work. 'People malign the 'seventies now but I think it was a tremendously important era. The women's movement and the nuclear power campaign really gained strength. And we must remember that today's disarmament movement draws on that.'

Grace Paley says she has lived through

lived in the country and I love it') and is passionately involved with 'Women for Life on Earth'. 'It seemed to me—at last I can make all the connections, between feminism, peace and ecology.' She says that everywhere she goes she now finds that women want to work with other women. 'And I can see why. Take the

1) Two volumes of short stories, 'The Little disturbances of man' and 'Enormous changes at the last minute' are both published by Virago.



campaign around the Seabrook nuclear plant for instance. I was astounded by the number of competent women. Yet when it came to talking with the press, one guy dominated the whole procedure and would not allow the women a look in.'

Does she feel optimistic about the future? 'I'm very encouraged by what is happening in

**'I think it is women who hold the key to the future...'**

Europe, the way everyone is mad at Reagan. But it's terrifying to think of the power held by so few people. And they don't even know how to decommission a nuclear power station or what to do with the waste.

'We used to think hope lay in young people, the college students. But now I go round talking to them, invited by the colleges as a writer (I'm lucky - they would never come to hear me if they had to come to a meeting). I find they are closing their eyes and just not facing up to fears. I say to them, 'Why bother working so hard and not even thinking about the future?'

'No, I really think it is women who hold the key to the future. It is things like the Pentagon women's action and Greenham Common that give me the greatest hope. Women have a totally different perspective on life.'

In between all this, Grace Paley is trying to finish another book. 'But it's taking a long time. Every time I sit down to write, something important comes up which just can't wait, and I get out campaigning again.'

## Caught in the clash

by Gerard Holden

**Superpowers In Collision: The New Cold War** By Naom Chomsky, Jonathan Steele, John Gittings. (Penguin, £1.95).

**'Superpowers In Collision' is vital reading for anyone who still doubts the magnitude and complexity of the task facing the peace movements. It provides a cool and succinct survey of the post-war operations of the USA, USSR, and China ('Half a Superpower' in John Gittings' phrase).**

Gittings' contribution on China is particularly welcome, as the issue appears too rarely in discussions of superpower relations. He discusses China's attitudes to nuclear disarmament and the country's shift towards dialogue with the USA and argues that, in the interests of world peace, an equivalence of Chinese relations with the other two powers is desirable.

One intriguing feature of all these contributions, particularly Naom Chomsky's, is the ease with which a picture of the machinations of US policy can be built up from public records, memoirs, and the like. The evidence is there for anyone who cares to look at it.

Chomsky charts US military and economic interventionism from Greece in the 'forties, to Central America today, where, as the Guardian has recently put it, 'the team that gave you

the Vietnam war' is back in operation.

Jonathan Steele argues that the Soviet Union saw the detente of the 'seventies as an acceptance by the USA that they had to be dealt with on equal terms. In the future the Soviet Union is likely to remain more cautious than America, although it is confronted with a US administration which has rejected notions of strategic parity and which clearly seeks supremacy. Steele also points out that the Soviet Union has had little success in its attempts to extend its influence in Asia and Africa. And Afghanistan has proved disastrous for Soviet relations with nonaligned countries. While Eastern Europe remains an area of potential future tension and pressure for political pluralism.

In their conclusion, Steele and Gittings clearly identify the USA as the most dangerous of the three states. But this is a book without illusions or offers of simple solutions and as Chomsky points out, 'The cold war is a highly functional system by which the superpowers control their own domains'.

I would have liked to read more about the popular attitudes and political systems which enable superpowers to function as they do, but admittedly these concerns would have to be the subjects of several additional books.□

• **Andrew Kelly**, our Books Editor, will be back next issue.

Continued from page 13

we have cases where some people in the administration have moved ahead of us and given solutions to problems that were inconsistent with ours, even votes. You have to be all the time in contact.' He stressed the importance of the peace movement in off-setting the state machinery. 'Governments have to be persuaded and this can only be done by a massive popular presence.'

**F**inally, I asked Papandreou about Greek policy towards the Third World. Greece now has a policy of support for all national liberation movements. 'I receive them, of course, and give publicity to them, and television time. The Sandinistas, I think, will have some offices here before long. Our votes in the United Nations are very carefully studied so that we support the underdog. We feel that this is a global struggle. It is not limited to one particular area. Our fate is collectively determined and, therefore, within our limits (and they are, of course, very tight) we do what we can.'

Despite his warnings about state mach-

inery, Papandreou seems to view politics in fairly personal terms. He obviously enjoys his new role, and I found this appealing. But I wondered whether this might not make him over optimistic. Zhivkov Bulgaria is, he said, 'very direct, very easy to talk with'. Kadar of Hungary is, 'a fantastic person... That's the one country where you don't see his picture everywhere, (I couldn't help thinking of the numerous pictures of Papandreou I had seen in Greece...).

'Kadar believes in pluralism. When I last saw him he said, "Look, we have the government, we have the parliament, we have the party and we have the trade union organisation, and it is a balance of power which is a situation in which solutions are reached through agreement." It is a different concept of course from Western concepts...'

He also seemed to believe that Jaruzelski was genuinely trying to reach some sort of compromise with Solidarity in Poland, 'always fearing and looking back to the Stalinist group which is well ensconced and quite powerful.'

Suddenly, in the middle of our conver-

sation he said, 'By the way, did you know that Walesa enters the Government?' He gave the impression that this was about to become public knowledge. I was shocked and asked him more. He said he had been in correspondence with Jaruzelski for some months, had met him personally at Brezhnev's funeral, and was kept informed by the 'excellent' Polish Ambassador in Athens. He evidently viewed this news as a positive development. He thought that Jaruzelski would allow Western style trade unions to exist, but not Solidarity. By the time this journal is published we shall know whether Papandreou was a victim of Polish misinformation or whether he was privy to inside information, which he had not realised was secret. Or perhaps there could be some other explanation.

Over the next few months, we may also be able to assess how far Papandreou's fine words about nuclear-free Greece, the Balkan nuclear free zone, and a Europe without blocs will lead to action. It has to be soon, for 1983 is the Year of Decision, the year before 1984, and the opportunity may pass.

## Wake up to peace

Hamburg, West Germany

Dear END,

Thanks for the postcard! I really think it looks nicer than the original. I hope it sells well and supports the whole campaign in a strong and positive way.

I am a bit frightened about developments here in West Germany. Working on my 'art for peace' exhibition in Denmark, I have been in close contact with parts of the Scandinavian peace movement and have been amazed by the spectrum of Scandinavians who take a position against nuclear arms. These include a vast number of conservatives, left-wingers and others. In West Germany, people who reject nuclear arms politics are still marked as being satellites of Moscow...

The day on which this nation might wake up and see nuclear disarmament as a necessity for survival and no longer as a political 'East or West' decision is still not in sight. The moderate neutralist direction of the last SPD government, 'towards an independent nuclear-disarmed Europe', runs in danger of drowning in submissive plans to integrate West Germany as the 53rd state of the USA.

I think that more international co-operation in Europe is in order now. I am thinking of opening an END 'branch' in Hamburg. What do you think about that?

love and peace,

Kurt-Willy Kühl, (designer of  
END peace steamer card)

## Critical support

Harpenden, Herts,

Dear END,

I hope you don't mind if I comment on what seemed slightly unfortunate aspects of the END Supporters' Conference. I do not object to the fact that disagreements were aired, as disagreements can be fruitful and make people rethink their own position. I did, however, think it was a pity that some of the disagreements were expressed rather uncharitably, and feel that as a peace movement we ought to set an example of constructive argument and attempt to work together, accepting our differences on minor matters. If we cannot do this, how can we expect nations to do so?

A second reservation about the value of the Conference concerns the very obvious determination of the committee to push the constitution through come what may. This was particularly obvious in our workshop where the chairman began the proceedings with a passionate plea for the constitution. I hope this was not only because you had put a lot of work into it which you were reluctant to see wasted. If the majority of the Conference had been against it I hope you would have considered that more important than all the work going for nothing, provided the reasons were valid. I myself did read the sheet of proposed amendments—rather hurriedly, it's true—and felt some sympathy with the attitude expressed, especially in the preamble, which was verbally barely mentioned.

Now some news of STAND (St Alban's Nuclear Disarmament Campaign), which I

hope may be cheering. At a meeting of our international group we assessed our achievement so far in contacting peace groups abroad. We have regular correspondents in France, West Germany, Holland and USA and Brazil (this group is more of an ecology group called *Conatura*), and someone in Italy who does not actually belong to a peace group, but is sympathetic. I found the booklet about Hungary most interesting and shall encourage others to read it. We are trying to make contacts there.

Another STAND member was on holiday in Greece this Summer and found a peace demonstration going on in a small village! I myself photographed a CND symbol on a wall in Halle in East Germany. I was fascinated by the pages and pages of statements of commitment to peace in the visitors' books in churches in the GDR—quite often adorned with the CND symbol.

Incidentally, we think STAND is, in essence if not in name, an END group, as one of our three 'aims', as stated in the constitution (yes, we have one, too!), is that we support the creation of a European NFZ (nuclear-free zone) both East and West. We also consider the making of international contacts a very important part of our campaign. So thank you for your encouragement and help.

With best wishes,

Susan Pomeroy, STAND (St Albans  
Nuclear Disarmament Campaign)

## Consistent stance

West Hampstead, London

Dear END,

Having recently been in Germany and Holland and been impressed by the degree of commitment and practical action towards building a peaceful future, I was interested to attend your meeting for the launch of the END journal.

My main comment concerns the uncertain stance on NATO. I realise it is a complicated issue but surely support for Eastern European peoples' movements and tacit support (taking

no firm stand against NATO) supports the status quo, for NATO can so easily be interpreted as criticising the USSR and *not* the USA. No concessions will be forthcoming from the USSR whilst it feels threatened. A more consistent stance, in my view, would be to work for the autonomy of Europe, East and West, hence support for 'dissident' Eastern movements and for anti-NATO measures.

Yours for peace,

Nick Hayden

## We're getting stronger

Dortmund, West Germany

Dear END,

Just a little information about our peace groups in Dortmund.

We have over 60 groups—doctors, trade unionists, teacher, church members, students, workers, women, and many others; and we are getting bigger every day.

We are trying now to win over the steel workers.

We have launched a *Hoesch Peace Movement*—and it's getting bigger...

Short but sweet,

Joe Durber

Isle of Lewis

Dear END,

I am writing to all the many organisations and individuals who helped to steer the Western Isles motion to its successful conclusion at the 1982 Labour Party Conference.

We are most grateful for the assistance given by END and trust you will use your influence, where possible, to ensure that the decision is properly translated into a Manifesto commitment.

Yours faithfully,

Malcolm Smith, Secretary, Western  
Isles Constituency Labour Party



Hunger strike in Sicily



# Calendar

## February 5 Britain. (LONDON).

END Women's Group Day School on Women and Peace in the Soviet Union. Jackson's Lane Community Centre, London N6 (Highgate Tube). 10.30-5 p.m. £1.50 waged, 75p unwaged. Contact: Pieta Monks, c/o END, 227 Seven Sisters Road, London N4. Telephone: Pieta Monks (01)-802-5863 or Genia Brown-ing (01)-778-6107.

## February 11-13 Britain. (BRADFORD).

European and American Activists' Conference: Opposition to cruise and Pershing II. Bradford School of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, Yorkshire, UK. Places limited: Contact END, 227 Seven Sisters Rd., London N4.

## February 15 Britain (LONDON).

CND Lobby of Parliament on Trident. Contact: Duncan Rees at CND, 11 Goodwin Street, London N4.

## February 18-20 Australia (MELBOURNE).

National Ecumenical Conference on 'Steps to Nuclear Disarmament: The Role of the Australian Churches.' Contact: Geoff Lacey, Pax christi Australia, PO Box 31, Carlton South 3053, Australia.

## February 19 Britain (OXFORD).

Day school on The Soviet Union and the Arms Race. Co-sponsored by END and Alternatives to the Arms Race. Somerville College, Oxford. Contact: Judith Pallot, c/o Christ Church College, Oxford, or Dorothy Thompson, c/o END, 227 Seven Sisters Rd., London N4.

## February 24-25 Spain.

A conference on Townships and Peace is being planned by the United Townships Association, to be held in Madrid.

## March 12-13 Britain (BRADFORD).

Weekend Conference: The British Peace Movement 1957-1983. Adult Education Centre, 10 Mornington Villas, Bradford BD8

WHAT I LIKE MOST ABOUT GOING TO GREENHAM COMMON IS THE EXCITEMENT AND HOPE THAT I FEEL ...



WHEN I SEE SO MANY OTHER PEOPLE SHARING A COMMITMENT TO CHALLENGE THE NUCLEAR THREAT ...



AND THE CONVICTION THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO RENDER IT HARMLESS THROUGH OUR CARE, OUR BELIEF IN OURSELVES ...



AND OUR DOGGED PERSEVERANCE ...



MEETING WOMEN FROM ALL OVER EUROPE AND THE STATES ...



SINGING, LINKING ARMS, PLANTING SEEDS ...



IT'S WONDERFUL THE POWER OF PEACEFUL PROTEST ...

THE SENSE OF UNITY AND STRENGTH, AND THE VERY BEST THING ... OF ALL ...

... IT TAKES SO LITTLE TO CREATE COMPLETE CHAOS!

CAROLYN HILLIER

7HB. Conference fee £5 (excludes food). Creche (50p. per child). Enrol early (numbers limited to 40). Accommodation available - indicate when writing, or phone Bradford 487054. Discussion of history of movement, strategies for the future.

**March 19-20 Germany.** Nationwide action conference planned for all involved in the West German peace movement. Contact: Aktion Suhnezeichen, Friedensdienste, Jebenstrasse 1, 1000 Berlin 12, Tel. 030 310 26 1.

**April 2-4 Germany.** Ruhr '83 Easter march planned from Duisburg to Dortmund, against Pershing II and cruise.

## April 23 Belgium (FLORENNES).

Demonstration at proposed cruise site. Contact CIDÉPE, 175, rue de Mérode, 1060, Bruxelles. Tel. 2-537-73-71.

**Easter Britain.** CND Easter actions at Greenham Common, Glasgow, Aldermar-

ston. Contact: Christine Kings at CND, 227 Seven Sisters Road, London N54.

## April 20-24 Sweden (UPPSALA).

Church Leaders' Conference: international gathering of church leaders, discussing peace work and nuclear disarmament. Contact: Conference General Secretary, Diocese Office of the Diocese of Stockholm, Erstagatan 1, S-116 36 Stockholm, Sweden.

**May 9-15 Germany (BERLIN).** Second European Nuclear Disarmament Convention. For more information, contact: Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 45 Gamble Street, Nottingham.

**May 12 Germany (BERLIN).** Peace event at the Olympic Stadium, Berlin. Contact: Raimund Pousset, Wielandstrasse 31, 1000 Berlin-West 12. Tel. 030-883-23-87.

**May 14-21** Anti-Militarist week. Contact: Peace Pledge Union, 6 Endsleigh St., London WC1. Tel. (01)-387-5501.

## Continued from page 9

For all paranoia-free minds it's obvious that the Soviet state gains from our Trust-Building activities. Ideas on how to build Trust multiply ... everybody in the Trust Movement core-group acts strictly in accordance with Soviet laws. When we say that we are not "anti-sovietchiks" and not dissidents, we mean it and we know it. Before the Trust Group activities none of us in the core-group had any clashes with the authorities. none of us was in any sort of trouble. A record of good speaking terms with the authorities was required. This explains why we have a disproportionately big percentage of professors and PhDs in the core-group. The desire to have the best possible relations with the authorities is so acute that in its creation-phase the Trust Movement debated for some time the question of admittance of "refuseniks" into the core-group. I being in this category know only the end-result of the

debate: "Yes, you may join; it's impossible to exclude people with active across-the-frontier contracts, people who have relations abroad and who are acutely suffering today due to the lack of business-like negotiation between East and West".

At the same time the core-group does its best to have a majority of "non-refuseniks". Self-discipline and very careful examination of all steps is the credo of the Trust Group. In fact, we are limited in our self-expression by our desire not to harm the Soviet state in any way. There is not a word of criticism against the government from us, since we do not think that criticism is constructive for Trust. (I may add that criticism is pointless, the state and its government are among the most stable things in the world; all talk about "difficulties" in the economy is a misunderstanding due to the inapplicability of Western economic

metrics to the Soviet economy).

In the weeks and months to come there will be a lot for END and other fellow supporters of peace to do to provide rescue operations on behalf of the Moscow independent peace movement. We read with trust in the END report on our work (p.39): "The peace movements of the world must support each other and we must come to the aid of our fellow-workers for peace". We risk our liberty and even our lives every day. But to be outside the peace movement is impossible for us. It is a point of honour, the point of being humans. Our professional expertise tells us the same. If you defend us you continue our joint educational mission. The message to the rulers is that in the present-day complex world all views are important, every piece of wisdom is badly needed.

Peace! With New Year Greetings,  
Yuri Medvedkov (Professor)

# END

## SPECIAL REPORTS

END has launched an important new series of special information pamphlets to meet the demand for up-to-date material on recent developments vital to the peace movement.

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The European peace movements could prevent the deployment of cruise on the landmass of Europe – and yet still fail. For the 400 cruise missiles could simply be transferred to the North Atlantic, along with the 3,000 already due to be stationed there.

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Angus McCormack of 'Keep NATO out' details the resistance of the people of Lewis to the development of the base. Olafur Grimmson draws the lessons from the experiences of the Icelandic peace movement.

The Nuclear North Atlantic is produced by Glasgow END, with a foreword by EP Thompson.

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option by the state, official peace council and dissidents, and remain a mass movement. Also included is E.P. Thompson's recent lecture given in Budapest on 'The normalisation of Europe'.

**Moscow independent peace group:**  
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Since the news hit the western press that a peace group independent of the official peace committee had been formed, END has received many inquiries for more information on the group. We now have first hand accounts from Jean Stead (Assistant Editor of The Guardian) and END supporter Danielle Grunberg who were on the Scandinavian women's march and visited the group while passing through Moscow. The pamphlet also presents additional documents and invites debate from the peace movement.

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**Turkey:**  
ISBN 0850362970

Jailing the leaders of Turkey's peace movement is just part of the military regime's campaign to suppress all opposition. Representatives of END have been to Turkey to monitor the drawn-out trial of the peace association, who are receiving support from peace groups all over Europe. In this pamphlet we look at the history and work of the Turkish Peace Association and analyse why a state based on terror wins Western approval.

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

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