

Chen Po-ta

**NOTES ON TEN YEARS
OF CIVIL WAR**

(1927-1936)

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Notes on Ten Years of Civil War (1927-1936) by Chen Po-ta shows how Mao Tse-tung used the theory of Marxism-Leninism to solve the key problems of the Chinese revolution during the Second Revolutionary Civil War (1927-1936).

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I

COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY REGIMES MAY CHANGE, BUT THE REVOLUTIONARY FLAME CANNOT BE EXTINGUISHED

The Chinese revolution of 1924-27 shook the whole world. But it ended in a failure as a result of the betrayal by the Kuomintang clique headed by Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei and the capitulationism of Chen Tu-hsiu.¹

In December 1927, Comrade Stalin made an appraisal of the achievements of this revolution and predicted the inevitability of a new revolutionary upsurge as follows:

¹ During the last period of the First Revolutionary Civil War (1924-27), the Right opportunism represented in the Communist Party of China by Chen Tu-hsiu developed into a capitulationist line. While co-operating with the Kuomintang, the Right opportunists relinquished the Party's leadership among the peasant masses, among the urban petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie and especially among the armed forces, thus causing the defeat of the revolution in the First Revolutionary Civil War. At an emergency conference of the Central Committee held in August 1927, Chen Tu-hsiu was removed from his post as general secretary of the Party. Later, he was expelled from the Party for taking a counter-revolutionary stand by joining the trotskyites.

Great popular revolutions never achieve victory in the first round of battles. They grow and gain strength in the flow and ebb of their tides. This has been the case everywhere, including Russia. So will it be in China.

The most important result of the Chinese revolution is the fact that it has awakened from their age-long slumber and has set in motion hundreds of millions of exploited and oppressed people, has utterly exposed the counter-revolutionary character of the militarist cliques, has torn the mask from the faces of the Kuomintang servitors of counter-revolution, has raised the prestige of the Communist Party among the masses of the common people, has raised the movement as a whole to a higher stage and has roused new hopes in the hearts of the millions of the oppressed classes in India, Indonesia, etc. Only the blind and the faint-hearted can doubt that the Chinese workers and peasants are moving towards a new revolutionary upswing.¹

Comrade Stalin's scientific judgment and brilliant foresight have been completely borne out by history. Applying the theories of Marxism-Leninism and developing the teachings of Lenin and Stalin concerning the revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, Comrade Mao Tse-tung has taught all members of the Party how to lead the Chinese revolution out of

¹ *Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, pp. 22-23.

the most difficult situations and onto a new path of advance.

During the last hundred years, repeated changes have occurred in the revolution and counter-revolution in China. In 1927 the revolution was betrayed by one Kuomintang leader after another. This was an upheaval on the biggest scale which precipitated an unprecedentedly confused and complicated situation in the realignment of class relations.

The Kuomintang leaders and their accomplices massacred revolutionary workers and peasants as well as revolutionary intellectuals; they replaced the old northern warlords' rule¹ with their own. But after all, what class (or classes) did they represent? Was there any difference between them and the northern warlords? If there was any difference, was it one in substance or in form? If it was in substance, was it complete or partial? Our Party had to answer these basic questions before it formulated its policies. Moreover, the correct answers to these questions would smash all the nonsensical arguments of the counter-revolutionaries (including the trotskyite Chen Tu-hsiu and his followers). Comrade Mao Tse-tung answered these questions at the Second Party Congress of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area in October 1928:

The present regime of the new Kuomintang

¹ The militarists who usurped power and represented the interests of the feudal-comprador class in China from the time Yuan Shih-kai's regime fell to the time the Kuomintang warlord rule was established.

warlords is still a regime of the comprador class in the cities and the landed gentry in the countryside, a regime which has in foreign affairs capitulated to imperialism and at home replaced old warlords with new ones, and has subjected the working class and peasantry to an economic exploitation and a political oppression even more ruthless than before. The bourgeois-democratic revolution which started from Kwangtung was only halfway through when the comprador class and the landed gentry usurped its leadership and immediately switched it on to the road of counter-revolution; throughout the country the workers, the peasantry, other sections of the common people, and even the bourgeoisie (here, Comrade Mao Tse-tung refers to the national bourgeoisie—*author*) have remained under the counter-revolutionary rule and obtained not the least particle of political or economic liberation.¹

Comrade Mao Tse-tung described the Kuomintang regime as a regime of the new warlords. In other words, it was a counter-revolutionary military dictatorship. The rule of the northern warlords had also been a counter-revolutionary military dictatorship, but the Kuomintang regime was a new counter-revolutionary military dictatorship. It was new because it was headed by the new type of Kuomintang warlords and not by the old

¹ "Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist?", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, p. 63.

type of northern warlords. What then were the differences between the new and old types of warlords?

Prior to the actual establishment of a counter-revolutionary military dictatorship, the new type of warlords had to a certain extent participated in the revolution and had at one time fought under the revolutionary banner against the old warlords. Consequently, they had some influence with the masses, which the warlords of the old type did not have. Although this influence began to vanish soon after they had become counter-revolutionaries, still, for a certain period in their counter-revolutionary activities they were able to use it to deceive the people in order to reinforce their regime of naked military terrorism.

The greatest difference between the new and old types of warlords lay, however, in the fact that the former had a centralized organization in the form of a political party as well as various subsidiary organizations to assist them in their counter-revolutionary activities. This political party had once been a revolutionary party and had also once been a revolutionary alliance of various classes. The new warlords, however, usurped the leadership of the party and carried out their counter-revolutionary activities in its name, thus turning it into a counter-revolutionary political party. The warlords of the old type did not have such a political party and therefore were rather at a disadvantage as compared with the new warlords.

The regime of the new warlords represented certain definite social classes. According to Comrade Mao Tse-tung, it was "still a regime of the comprador class

in the cities and the landed gentry in the countryside." By "still" is meant that basically the classes represented by the new type of warlords were the same as those represented by the old. But with the impact of the great revolution, the big compradors and big landlords could no longer maintain their old type of rule; they needed a new one. The counter-revolutionary *coup d'etat* of April 12, 1927¹ was their initial move to establish this new type of rule, with the imperialists actually issuing orders behind the scenes. Some representatives of the national bourgeoisie who opposed the people joined the counter-revolution and became the representatives of the comprador bourgeoisie, having by then become comprador bourgeoisie themselves.

The regime of the new warlords was a new counter-revolutionary military dictatorship of the big compradors and big landlords. It was formed with the Shanghai, or the "Kiangsu-Chekiang," gangster ring of comprador-financiers as its core. It was at that time that the Shanghai gangster leaders appeared on the political stage and became "important figures in the party and government" directing the nation's political and financial affairs. Compradors, gangsters, warlords and party roughs interchanged positions in finance and politics and combined to form an incongruous comprador-gangster administration. Such was the peculiar

¹ April 12, 1927 was the day the Kuomintang reactionaries, headed by Chiang Kai-shek and instigated by the imperialists, staged a counter-revolutionary *coup d'etat*, followed by the massacring of a large number of Communists, revolutionary intellectuals and workers in Shanghai.

type of political regime which emerged in semi-colonial and semi-feudal China after the failure of the revolution in 1927.

For some time after the establishment of the new dictatorship, some of the new representatives of the big compradors and big landlords who had once represented the national bourgeoisie, were able to hoodwink the people. Moreover, favours were liberally bestowed upon a few persons who had well-known connections with the national bourgeoisie or its political representatives. For the sake of appearances, they were given dummy posts in the government. This was a reward given to the national bourgeoisie for its part in the counter-revolution. But it was not long before these puppets were kicked out.

Since the counter-revolutionary dictatorship emerged on the political stage as a result of the machinations of the imperialists, it was inevitable that it should capitulate to imperialism. The imperialists, for instance, bombarded Nanking¹ and in return they received an apology, kowtows and indemnity from Chiang Kai-shek's Nanking government. When the Japanese imperialists massacred the people of Tsinan,² they met

¹ On March 24, 1927, when the Northern Expeditionary Army occupied Nanking, the U.S., British, Japanese, French and Italian imperialists directly intervened. The warships of these imperialist powers, anchored off Nanking, were ordered to bombard the city, with the result that more than two thousand Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed and wounded.

² In 1928, supported by Anglo-American imperialism, Chiang Kai-shek advanced with his armed forces into North China. To

with no resistance; on the contrary, Chiang Kai-shek's government issued a special decree ordering the protection of Japanese nationals in China. Making use of the new warlord regime, the imperialists not only returned to power and reinstated themselves in the positions they had enjoyed before the great revolution, but even began to plan new adventures. It was not long after that there occurred the September 18 Incident (1931)¹ which led to the occupation of the Northeast by the Japanese imperialists.

Such a dictatorship — a new counter-revolutionary military dictatorship—was not, of course, “a victory for the bourgeoisie” as the trotskyite Chen Tu-hsiu clique claimed. It only served to protect the interests of foreign imperialism, and those of the compradors in the cities and the landed gentry (landlords) in the countryside. The freedom and democratic rights which the workers, peasants and urban petty bourgeoisie had struggled for and won during the revolutionary period of 1924-27 were destroyed, and they were gradually deprived of their hard-won economic gains. The national

check the spreading of Anglo-American influence northward, Japanese imperialism dispatched an expeditionary force to occupy Tsinan, capital of Shantung Province, thereby cutting off the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. On May 3, the Japanese invaders massacred a large number of Chinese in Tsinan.

¹ On September 18, 1931, Shenyang (Mukden) was seized by the Japanese “Kwantung” army stationed in China's Northeast. On Chiang Kai-shek's order of “absolute non-resistance,” the Chinese Northeastern Army in Shenyang and elsewhere withdrew to the south of the Great Wall. This enabled Japanese troops rapidly to occupy the Northeastern provinces.

bourgeoisie failed to attain the political status and win the economic rights to which they were aspiring.

This process is best explained by citing concrete facts. Let us first see the condition of the working class after the failure of the revolution in 1927.

The preface to the *Chinese Labour Yearbook*, edited and compiled by the Peiping Institute of Social Research which was headed by liberal bourgeois scholars, had the following to say about the condition of the working class during the four years from 1928 to 1931:

These four years may be considered as a period in which Chinese labour fell completely under the domination and control of the Kuomintang. The dissolution on April 12, 1927, of the Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions marked the beginning of this period.

. . . Generally speaking, these four years of Kuomintang rule do not appear to have produced any positive effect on Chinese labour (the author meant that it had not helped the workers—*translator*). . . . The initiative of the workers has been trampled upon. Trade unions not recognized by the Kuomintang have been either dissolved or re-organized. Government-managed trade unions naturally have no vitality. . . . Those in leading positions have only selfish designs . . . they have thus become harmful parasites . . . cleavages within the Kuomintang not infrequently give rise to conflicts in the party-controlled trade unions. In short, it may be said that the labour movement in China in

these four years has fallen into a state of inactivity. . . . There is no denying that open trade union activities have been greatly restricted and interfered with.

Of course, the passages quoted above are couched in moderate terms. Nevertheless, they bring out the glaring difference in the position of the working class under the rule of the new Kuomintang warlords and prior to the Kuomintang's counter-revolutionary "purge."¹

In his *Problem of the Chinese Trade Union Movement* written in 1930, Comrade Chu Chiu-pai² gave the following brief account of the workers' wages during and after the great revolution:

Since the dissolution of the Shanghai Federa-

¹ In April 1927, the Kuomintang headed by Chiang Kai-shek betrayed the revolution and perpetrated massacres throughout the country of Communists and patriots within the Kuomintang who supported the revolutionary policy of Sun Yat-sen. The Kuomintang called this a "purge."

² Veteran member and leader of the Communist Party of China. From the autumn of 1927 to the summer of 1928, he served as secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. After 1931, he co-operated with Lu Hsun in carrying on a revolutionary cultural movement in Shanghai. In 1933, he went to the Red base area in Kiangsi and served as commissioner of people's education of the Workers' and Peasants' Democratic Central Government. When the Red Army started on its long march, he remained in Kiangsi to carry on his work. In March 1935, he was captured by a Chiang Kai-shek gang in the guerilla area in Fukien Province and died a martyr's death in Changting, Fukien, on June 18.

tion of Trade Unions (after the "April 12" *coup d'etat*), the wages of Shanghai workers have been cut, particularly in the textile industry. Less than 20 per cent of the working people of Wuhan (e.g., bank staff members) continued to receive the same wages as during the so-called "Communist Period" while over 80 per cent received cuts. After the Canton uprising,¹ the capitalist owners of various enterprises in that city enforced a reduction of wages. For instance, the wages of workers in the oil industry were reduced three times in succession.²

Such were the impact on the working class of the rule of the new Kuomintang warlords. Let us now see the condition in which the peasants found themselves under the Kuomintang warlord regime.

I am not going to dwell upon the ruthlessness with which the new Kuomintang warlords attacked the peasant revolution. They consolidated their rule gradually in the course of an unprecedentedly brutal campaign against the workers, peasants and revolutionary intellectuals. I am only going to make a comparison of the conditions in the countryside under the rule of the new Kuomintang warlords with those under the

¹ On December 11, 1927, the workers and revolutionary soldiers in Canton jointly staged an uprising and set up people's political power. They fought bitterly against the counter-revolutionary troops directly supported by imperialism, and failed only because the disparity in strength was too great.

² *The Bolshevik*, Vol. III, Nos. 2-3, p. 113.

rule of the old warlords. The land surtax gives a good example for comparison. The following figures for 1927 and 1928 are taken from *Report on Investigations into Land Surtax*:

Liyang County, Kiangsu Province:	1927	1928
Tax	9.10 yuan	9.10 yuan
Surtax	9.675 yuan	9.911 yuan
Ihsing County, Kiangsu Province:		
Tax	6.00 yuan	6.00 yuan
Surtax	3.646 yuan	14.79 yuan
Nantung County, Kiangsu Province:		
Tax	3.85 yuan	4.10 yuan
Surtax	5.896 yuan	11.103 yuan
Chinhua County, Chekiang Province:		
Tax (first harvest)	1.80 yuan	1.80 yuan
Surtax (first harvest)	1.124 yuan	1.454 yuan
Sungyang County, Chekiang Province:		
Tax	5.10 yuan	5.10 yuan
Surtax	4.092 yuan	4.194 yuan

The 1927 and 1928 figures have been taken because these two years represent the dividing line between the rule of the old warlords and that of the new. The figures given above fully bear out the fact that the oppression by reactionary rule and the burden borne by the peasants both increased during the rule of the new warlords.

In short, the peasants suffered more than ever in the areas under Kuomintang rule. The figures given above relate to the first years of the new Kuomintang warlord regime. Thereafter, the figures rose year by year. For example, by 1933, surtax in Nantung County

was more than five times the amount of the regular tax. In the same year, in many counties of Kiangsu Province which were under the direct control of the new warlord, Chiang Kai-shek, surtax exceeded the regular tax by from ten to twenty-six times: in Kaoyu and Funing, the corresponding figure was 11 times; in Huaiyin, 12 times; in Lienshui, 14 times; in Jukao and Chungming, 16 times; and in Haimen, more than 26 times; in Hunan, it was from 10 to 30 times (for this, see *Problem of the Chinese Village* published by the Chunghua Book Company); in Szechuan, land tax was collected in advance up to and even beyond 1971.

Such ruthless extortion by the new Kuomintang warlords led to a reduction in the acreage of arable land and to an increase in the area of waste land. This is illustrated by the following figures:

Arable land:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Mou</i>
1914	1,578,347,925
1915	1,442,333,638
1916	1,509,975,461
1917	1,365,186,100
1918	1,314,472,190

(The figures above are taken from the statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, Peking, published in the "China Year Book").

1928	1,248,781,000
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(Figure taken from the 1928 statistics of the Directorate-General of the Budget, Accounts, and Statistics of the Kuomintang government).

Waste land:

Year	Mou
1914	358,235,867
1915	404,369,947
1916	390,363,021
1917	924,583,899
1918	848,935,748
1922	896,316,784

(The figures above are taken from the statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, Peking).

1930	1,177,340,261
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(From the statistics of the Ministry of the Interior, Nanking, 1930).

(The figures cited above were taken from the article "Trends in the Reduction of Arable Lands in China" published in "The Eastern Miscellany," Vol. 30, No. 18).

These data show the rapid decline of agricultural production in China under the new Kuomintang warlord rule.

Now let us see how the urban petty bourgeoisie fared under this rule. Leaving aside the petty-bourgeois intellectuals and students who were subjected to unprecedented ideological repression, we shall deal with only the conditions of the handicraftsmen and small merchants.

Under the old warlord regime, there were brokerage, pawnshop and butchery taxes all of which were similar in character to a business tax. Aside from these, no business tax was imposed, though in isolated instances provincial authorities temporarily imposed such a tax. Under the rule of the Kuomintang warlords, however, a business tax was imposed on the pre-

text that *likin*¹ had been abolished. The brokerage, pawnshop and butchery taxes were combined into one, but the Kuomintang warlords extorted much more than the old warlords. I have taken a few examples from *The History of Finance of the Chinese Republic, Supplementary Volume* published by the Commercial Press on the estimated receipts of some provinces from brokerage, pawnshop and butchery taxes in 1925 and from the business tax in 1931 (figures for 1927 and 1928 are not available, hence no comparison can be made for these two years):

Province	Receipts		Increase in Percentage
	1925	1931	
Kiangsu	887,800 Yuan	4,900,000 Yuan	452
Anhwei	364,800 Yuan	1,635,000 Yuan	348
Chekiang	355,000 Yuan	4,577,468 Yuan	1,189
Hupei	373,027 Yuan	3,046,000 Yuan	717

These figures show that in the short period of a few years, from the establishment of the new Kuomintang warlord rule to 1931, the urban petty bourgeoisie in conditions of a depression was compelled to shoulder a burden from three to more than eleven times heavier than that which they had borne under the old warlords, and that only in so far as the business tax alone was concerned. If we were to add miscellaneous taxes and levies, the burden would be still heavier. Take, for example, the estimated receipts in two provinces from miscellaneous taxes and levies:

¹ A provincial tax at inland stations on articles in transit.

Province	Receipts		Increase in Percentage
	1925	1931	
Kiangsi	109,388 Yuan	583,500 Yuan	436
Hupei	654,641 Yuan	1,033,200 Yuan	58

The burden of miscellaneous taxes and duties or the business tax did not fall, as a rule, directly on the businessmen but usually on the consumers. Yet it is very clear that such burdens greatly hampered the development of petty-bourgeois business enterprises and hastened them on the road to bankruptcy.

Finally, let us see the condition of the national bourgeoisie under the rule of the new warlords.

Take, for example, the textile industry. *The Shen Pao Yearbook for 1934* published the following data on the year-to-year development of the textile industry operated by national bourgeois capital and by foreign capital:

NUMBER OF SPINDLES (*in thousands*)

Year	Chinese Textile Mills	Japanese Textile Mills	Total Number of Mills in China	Percentage of Chinese Mills
1925	2,049	1,332	3,570	57.4
1927	2,099	1,383	3,685	56.9
1928	2,182	1,515	3,850	56.7
1929	2,386	1,652	4,201	56.8
1930	2,499	1,821	4,498	55.6
1931	2,730	2,003	4,904	55.7
1932	2,910	2,096	5,189	56.1
1933	2,773	—	5,200	53.3

NUMBER OF LOOMS

Year	Chinese Textile Mills	Japanese Textile Mills	Total Number of Mills in China	Percentage of Chinese Mills
1925	13,371	7,205	22,924	58.3
1927	13,459	13,981	29,788	45.2
1928	16,787	10,896	29,582	56.7
1930	15,955	11,467	29,322	54.4
1931	20,599	19,306	42,596	48.4
1932	21,559	18,289	42,739	50.4
1933	19,081	—	39,564	48.2

The figures above show that since the establishment of the new Kuomintang warlord rule, the percentage of spindles and looms owned by the Chinese national bourgeoisie gradually declined. In other words, foreign capital in China gradually outstripped national bourgeois capital. In 1928-29, the Kuomintang government's so-called "tariff autonomy" actually accorded still greater advantages to foreign capitalists. As a reactionary historian, Chen Kung-lu, in his *A Modern History of China*, said that as a result of the establishment of tariff autonomy and increase of customs duties, foreigners set up more factories in the treaty ports because the treaties provided for the payment of equal taxes for the products of both Chinese and foreign factories.

Thus, powerful foreign capital, particularly Japanese capital, rapidly took control over and replaced Chinese national bourgeois capital. The China Cultural Reconstruction Association, a Kuomintang government organization, in its book *China in the Last Ten Years* had to admit that "during the seven or eight

years since the establishment of the National Government in Nanking in 1927, new Chinese enterprises with a capital investment exceeding one million yuan have become rare."

The historical data cited above bear out Mao Tse-tung's statement that the regime of the new Kuomintang warlords was "a regime . . . which has subjected the working class and peasantry to an economic exploitation and a political oppression more ruthless than before."¹

Again, as Mao Tse-tung said: ". . . throughout the country the workers, the peasantry, other sections of the common people, and even the bourgeoisie (national bourgeoisie—*author*) have remained under the counter-revolutionary rule and obtained not the least particle of political or economic liberation."²

Comrade Mao Tse-tung also said:

In the revolution of 1926-27 which started from Kwangtung and spread towards the Yangtse River, because the proletariat was not firm in assuming the leadership, the comprador class and the landed gentry seized hold of it and turned the revolution into a counter-revolution. The bourgeois-democratic revolution thus met with a temporary defeat. The defeat meant a serious blow to the Chinese proletariat and peasantry and also a

¹ "Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist?", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, p. 63.

² *Ibid.*, p. 63.

blow to the Chinese bourgeoisie (not the comprador class and the landed gentry).¹

Obviously, the assertion of the trotskyite Chen Tu-hsiu clique that establishment of the Kuomintang rule was "a victory for the bourgeoisie" was intended only to camouflage the real nature of the counter-revolutionary rule of the comprador class and landed gentry. The assertions of these base and despicable counter-revolutionary apologists were refuted by historical facts.

Consequently, as Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote, "China is in urgent need of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and this revolution can be completed only under the leadership of the proletariat."²

And again,

The content of China's democratic revolution, according to the directives of the Third International and the Party Centre, includes overthrowing the rule in China of imperialism and its tools, the warlords, so as to complete the national revolution; and carrying out the agrarian revolution so as to eliminate the feudal exploitation of the peasants by the landed gentry.³

Only in this way can the socialist future of the Chinese revolution be envisaged. If we should refuse to recognize the necessity of the democratic

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

² *Ibid.*, p. 64.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

stage of the revolution and claim that the Chinese revolution has already reached the threshold of socialist revolution, then we would be entertaining an erroneous view extremely harmful to the Chinese revolution. The struggles we have waged confirm the correctness of the opinion of the International.¹

Obviously, the trotskyite Chen Tu-hsiu clique which refused to recognize this bourgeois-democratic revolution merely wished to help imperialism and the comprador class and landed gentry prolong their counter-revolutionary rule. Their so-called "proletarian revolution" was only a pretext for opposing the revolutionary proletariat and the masses of the people under its leadership; it was only an anti-Communist trump card to be kept in Chiang Kai-shek's strongbox. On this question too, these counter-revolutionary apologists were unable to avoid refutation by the facts of history.

* * *

The defeat of the Chinese revolution in 1927 forced a temporary recession in the tide of the Chinese revolution. In November 1928, Comrade Mao Tse-tung said in his report to the Central Committee: "Having fought in various places in the past year, we are keenly aware that the revolutionary upsurge in the country as a whole is subsiding."² A similar opinion was ex-

¹ The Decisions of the Sixth Party Congress of the Fourth Army of the Red Army.

² "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, p. 99.

pressed at the Sixth Party Congress: "The first upsurge of the workers' and peasants' movement is over. Generally speaking, in the present situation there is no popular revolutionary upsurge." Such an estimate was correct and necessary. If no estimate had been made of such a situation or if an estimate had been made incorrectly, grave errors would have been committed such as had in fact been committed by certain blind adventurists.

Let us now study the labour movement. In *The Strikes and Lockouts in Shanghai in the Last Fifteen Years*, an official publication in Shanghai in 1933, conditions after the Kuomintang counter-revolutionary "purge" are described as follows:

. . . The two general strikes which climaxed the upsurge of the labour movement were followed by months of comparative quiet. Between May and August 1927, there were only four or five disputes each month. . . .

Labour-capital conflict again became sharp towards the end of 1927. . . . Disputes, however, were much less intense than in the preceding year. In 1927, there were 117 disputes. . . . In 1928, there were 118 strikes and lockouts (more than in 1927, because after the Kuomintang's counter-revolutionary "April 12" *coup d'etat*, the labour movement was subjected to extremely savage suppression—*translator*). In 1929, the number of disputes decreased to 108 and in 1930, it dropped to

87. Despite this annual downward trend, the decrease in the number of disputes was not so great.

The above facts show, on the one hand, that the tide of the labour movement was receding and, on the other, that it was impossible for the compradors and landed gentry to suppress the labour movement for any length of time. At this juncture, however, the revived labour movement remained on the defensive. For instance, an official publication in Shanghai in 1934 entitled *Five Years of Labour-Capital Disputes in Shanghai* stated that:

1. The number of disputes in which labour gained complete victory had been decreasing year by year. In 1928, it was 41.35% of the total number of disputes; in 1929, 20.12%; in 1930, 18.58%; in 1931, 19.45%; in 1932, 17.00%.

2. The number of disputes in which labour suffered defeat had been gradually increasing. In 1928, it was only 10.55% of the total number of disputes; in 1929, it was 11.24%; in 1930, 14.16%; in 1931, 17.59%; but in 1932, it decreased to 10.67%.

Official reports of the counter-revolutionary regime called this "a change in the relative influence of capital and labour." From our point of view, it was a change from the offensive to the defensive in the struggle of the working class. The transition period was relatively protracted. History has shown that in the controversy

on this question between Comrade Liu Shao-chi and the Li Li-san line¹ and the third "Left" opportunist line,² Comrade Liu Shao-chi was right and the Li Li-

¹ This refers to the "Left" opportunist line as represented by Li Li-san, principal leader in the Chinese Communist Party Centre after June 1930. The Li Li-san line was characterized by the fact that it denied the need of building up mass strength in the revolution and refused to recognize the unevenness in the development of the Chinese revolution; it opposed Comrade Mao Tse-tung's idea of exerting the main effort over a long period to the creation of rural revolutionary base areas leading to the encirclement of cities by the forces of the countryside and to the achievement of final nation-wide victory of the revolution. On the contrary, it called for the seizure of key cities through countryside uprisings.

² After the failure of the revolution in 1927, there occurred in the Party Centre's leadership three "Left" opportunist deviations. The first "Left" opportunist deviation lasted from the winter of 1927 to the spring of 1928. The deviationists incorrectly concluded that the revolution was still on the upswing and refused to admit its defeat; they opposed retreat and wanted to continue the offensive, thus causing the revolutionary force left after the failure of 1927 to suffer further losses. The second "Left" opportunist deviation was the Li Li-san line. The third "Left" opportunist deviation lasted from January 1931 to January 1935. At that time certain leading comrades in the Party Centre who lacked practical experience in the revolutionary struggles advocated, in a new situation, a new political programme which, in fact, served to restore and develop the Li Li-san line and other "Left" ideologies and "Left" deviationist policies directly opposing Comrade Mao Tse-tung's correct line. The disastrous result of this third "Left" opportunist deviation was the loss of about ninety per cent of the strength of the Communist Party of China, of the Chinese Red Army and of the Red bases, and the subjection of tens of millions of people in the revolutionary bases to persecution by the Kuomintang. This seriously retarded the progress of the Chinese revolution. Through years of practical experience, however, most of the comrades who had committed "Left" deviationist errors, realized and rectified their mistakes.

san line and the third "Left" opportunist line were wrong.

As to the struggle in the rural areas, the Sixth Party Congress had this to say: "Breaking out here and dying out there, peasant guerilla warfare is developing despite the fact that it is still in a loosely organized and scattered state." Comrade Mao Tse-tung's report to the Central Committee of the Party contained a similar statement. I shall not dwell upon it here.

But despite the malicious assertion of the trotskyite Chen Tu-hsiu clique that "the revolution is dead," the low tide of the revolution did not mean its end. The status of the different classes under the Kuomintang rule after the defeat of the revolution as described above not only proved that the new Kuomintang warlords' rule was a rule of the comprador class and landed gentry (landlords), not only proved that the Chinese revolution was still bourgeois-democratic in character, but also proved that the foundations of this counter-revolutionary rule were extremely weak and unstable. True, the comprador class and the landed gentry had, with the support of imperialism and thanks to the ruthless schemes and savage massacres perpetrated by Chiang Kai-shek's clique, inflicted a temporary defeat on the revolution, but, as was correctly stated at the Sixth Party Congress, "None of the contradictions which have given rise to the revolution has yet been resolved." Therefore, the basis for the development of the revolution was still deep and solid. In a letter to a comrade, Comrade Mao Tse-tung made a profound analysis of this problem:

1. Although the subjective forces of the revolution in China at present are still weak, yet so are all the organs (government, armed forces, parties, etc.) of the reactionary ruling classes with their foothold on the backward and fragile social and economic structure of China. This explains why revolution cannot break out at present in the countries of Western Europe where, although the subjective forces of the revolution are perhaps stronger than those in China, the forces of the reactionary ruling classes are many times stronger than those in our country. Although the subjective forces of the revolution in China at present are weak, yet because the forces of the counter-revolution are correspondingly weak, the revolution will certainly move towards an upsurge more quickly in China than in Western Europe.

2. Since the defeat of the revolution in 1927, the subjective forces of revolution have indeed been greatly weakened. The force that remains is to all appearances very small and this naturally makes some comrades (who judge by appearances) feel pessimistic. But it is a quite different thing if we look into the essence of the matter. Here the old Chinese proverb, "A single spark can start a prairie fire," is applicable. In other words, although the force is only a small one at present, it will rapidly develop. In China, as things stand, its development is not merely a possibility but a necessity; this was fully proved in the May 30 Movement and the Great Revolutionary Movement which followed.

When we study an event, we must examine its essence and treat its appearance merely as a guide to the threshold of the essence; and once we cross the threshold, we must grasp the essence—this alone is the reliable and scientific method of analysis.¹

Comrade Mao Tse-tung, on the one hand, criticized the revolutionary impetuosity of some comrades because they unduly overestimated the subjective forces of the revolution and underestimated those of the counter-revolution. Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that such an appraisal largely stemmed from subjectivism; in the end it would undoubtedly lead to the erroneous path of adventurism. On the other hand, Comrade Mao Tse-tung disagreed with those who underestimated the subjective forces of the revolution and overestimated the strength of the counter-revolution. He pointed out that this would also be an incorrect appraisal—an erroneous appraisal which would inevitably produce bad results in another way.

On the question “whether the revolutionary upsurge will arise soon in China,” Comrade Mao Tse-tung was of the opinion that an understanding of this question could be obtained “only after studying carefully whether the contradictions leading to the revolutionary upsurge are really developing” and that only then could an answer be given.

¹“A Single Spark Can Start A Prairie Fire,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, p. 118.

What did Comrade Mao Tse-tung think of the development of these various contradictions? He wrote:

Since contradictions are developing internationally between the imperialist countries, between the imperialist countries and their colonies, and between imperialism and the proletariat in these countries, the imperialists feel all the more urgently the need to contend for China. As the imperialists' contention for China intensifies, both the contradiction between the imperialist powers and the whole Chinese nation and the contradiction among the imperialists themselves develop simultaneously in China, a daily expanding and intensifying strife thus ensues between the various cliques of the reactionary rulers in China and the contradictions between them develop daily. From these contradictions between the various cliques of the reactionary rulers—the strife between the warlords—ensues an increase of taxation; thus the development of the contradiction between the broad masses of taxpayers and the reactionary rulers is accelerated with every passing day.

From the contradiction between imperialism and China's native industry ensues the failure on the latter's part to obtain concessions from the former; this intensifies the contradiction between China's bourgeoisie and China's working class, with the Chinese capitalists trying to find a way out through the desperate exploitation of the workers and with the Chinese workers putting up resistance.

From the dumping of commodities by imperialism, the inroads of Chinese merchant capital, and the increase of taxation by the government, ensues the sharpening of the contradiction between the landlords and the peasants; the exploitation through rent and usury becomes heavier and the peasants nurse a greater hatred for the landlords. Because of the pressure of foreign goods, the exhaustion of the purchasing power of the broad masses of the workers and peasants, and the increase of taxation by the government, dealers in domestic products and independent producers are forced daily further on the road to bankruptcy. Because the reactionary government endlessly expands its troops without sufficient provisions and funds to support them, wars multiply every day and the masses of soldiers constantly find themselves in straitened circumstances. Because of the increase of taxation by the government, the mounting burden of rent and interest demanded by the landlords, and the daily extension of the horrors of war, famine and banditry have spread all over the country and the broad masses of the peasantry and the city poor are brought to such a pass that they can hardly survive. Because funds are lacking for keeping schools open, many students are worried about the interruption of their education; because China is backward in her production, many graduates are deprived of the hope of obtaining employment.

Once we understand all these contradictions, we shall see how desperately precarious is the situa-

tion and how chaotic the state in which China finds herself. We shall see also how inevitably the revolutionary upsurge against the imperialists, the warlords, and the landlords will arise, and very speedily at that.¹

Writing in January 1930, Comrade Mao Tse-tung analysed and foretold the main trends of the ten-year civil war period which started after the failure of the revolution in 1927. In these writings he described various contradictions which existed in semi-colonial and semi-feudal China: the contradictions between imperialism and the Chinese nation and among the imperialists themselves in their rivalry in China; the contradictions among the counter-revolutionary ruling cliques; the contradictions between the rulers and the broad masses of the ruled (the taxpayers, including the workers, peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie); the contradiction between the landlords and the peasantry; the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the working class; the contradiction between the warlords and their troops; and the contradiction between the counter-revolutionary regime and the intellectuals and students. Comrade Mao Tse-tung, of course, did not deal with all these contradictions in the same manner, nor did he isolate one from another. He had perceived their interrelations and interactions; he had perceived that the contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese nation (a characteristic of semi-colonial

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 120-121.

China) would precipitate or influence the development of other contradictions.

In a China ruled by the compradors and landed gentry, there is decidedly no way to reduce the sharpness of the various contradictions described above, and certainly no possibility of solving any of them. Consequently, the rivalry among the ruling cliques themselves will intensify day by day, and the revolutionary flame can never be extinguished.

In October 1928, after Chiang Kai-shek and his gang had captured Peking and were celebrating the "unification" of China, Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that much bigger wars between the warlords were imminent:

Before their capture of Peking and Tientsin, the four cliques of the new Kuomintang warlords—Chiang Kai-shek, the Kwangsi warlords, Feng Yushiang, and Yen Hsi-shan—formed a temporary alliance against Chang Tso-lin. After their capture of Peking and Tientsin, this alliance immediately broke up and changed into a bitter struggle, and a war is even brewing between the Chiang and the Kwangsi cliques. The contradictions and struggles among the various cliques of warlords in China reflect the contradictions and struggles among the various imperialist powers. Therefore, as long as China is divided up among the imperialist powers, the various cliques of warlords cannot under any circumstances come to a compromise and whatever compromises there might be would only be tem-

porary. Within the temporary compromise of today an even bigger war is brewing for tomorrow.¹

In the spring of 1929, a few months after Comrade Mao Tse-tung had uttered these prophetic words, war broke out between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords,² thus starting a series of wars among the warlords, longer and on a much larger scale than at any time since the rule of the northern warlords.

No matter how much the trotskyite Chen Tu-hsiu clique had helped the comprador class and the landed gentry, no matter how they shouted themselves hoarse, lauded the Nanking government's "unification" of China, acclaimed the civil wars and the counter-revolutionary wars of the new warlords as "wars of unification," and venomously cursed the revolutionary policy and the revolutionary movements of the Chinese Communist Party, history has fully exposed the ignominy of their counter-revolutionary activities. History has proved that under the rule of the new Kuomintang warlords (the new counter-revolutionary military dictatorship), unification of China is impossible. The Kuomintang counter-revolutionary rule cannot possibly give the people any real political rights. Therefore, the people's revolutionary struggle cannot possibly stop. The slogan of the trotskyite Chen Tu-hsiu clique calling for the convening of "the National Assembly" was a counter-revolutionary

¹ "Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist?", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, pp. 63-64.

² The war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords, Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, in March-April 1929.

slogan, pure and simple. The valiant Chinese people have adopted the revolutionary policy of the Chinese Communist Party, the revolutionary policy of Comrade Mao Tse-tung. And, the formulation of this policy is entirely the result of an accurate Marxist-Leninist appraisal of the concrete conditions of Chinese society.

II

TWO KINDS OF POLITICAL POWER EMERGE FROM THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF CHINESE SOCIETY AND STAND OPPOSED TO EACH OTHER FOR A LONG TIME. AGRARIAN REVOLUTION, ARMED FORCES, REVOLUTIONARY BASE AREAS

According to Comrade Mao Tse-tung's analysis of the concrete conditions of Chinese society, China, from an economic viewpoint, is "an economically backward, semi-colonial country . . . which is under indirect imperialist rule" and it is characterized by a "localized agricultural economy (instead of unified capitalist economy)"; from a political viewpoint, as a result of this kind of economy and "the imperialist policy of division and exploitation by marking off spheres of influence," ". . . since the first year of the Republic, the various

cliques of old and new warlords, supported by imperialism from abroad and by the comprador class and the landed gentry at home, have waged incessant wars against one another." Comrade Mao Tse-tung calls this peculiar political condition "a characteristic of semi-colonial China. . . . Such a phenomenon is found neither in any of the imperialist countries of the world, nor in any colony under direct imperialist rule, but only in a country like China which is under indirect imperialist rule."¹ In this analysis, Comrade Mao Tse-tung explains, on the one hand, the nature of the revolution, likening the revolutionary forces of the worker-peasant alliance to "a single spark which can start a prairie fire," and, on the other hand, the nature of the counter-revolution and the inability for the comprador-feudal class to consolidate their rule.

First, let us discuss the basis for the development of the revolutionary forces in China.

Modern China's economic development has created two modern classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Since the May Fourth Movement,² the Chinese proletariat

¹ All the quotations in this paragraph are taken from "Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist?", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, p. 65.

² The patriotic movement which, starting with a demonstration by the students of Peking on May 4, 1919, as a protest against Japanese imperialist aggression against China, the imperialist-dominated Paris Peace Conference and the traitorous crimes of the warlord regime in China, subsequently developed into a mass movement in which the students, workers and businessmen throughout the country went on strike. It speeded up the development of the New Culture Movement which chiefly aimed at opposition to the old ethics and promotion of the new,

has become an extremely powerful force in the political struggle. It is politically powerful, and extremely powerful for that matter, because it is highly centralized. In China, modern industries are few, and this shows that China's economy is very backward. These few modern industries, however, show a high degree of concentration. On the one hand, they are concentrated in a few big cities, and, on the other, their production, to a large extent, is controlled by big enterprises. For instance, prior to the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression, between one-half and two-thirds of China's modern industries were concentrated in Shanghai. According to a rough estimate based on the 1934 figures (there are no detailed statistics available; and industries regarding which there are absolutely no data are not included), in Shanghai alone, the number of workers in Chinese and foreign-owned factories employing 500 or more workers constituted 57 per cent of the total number of industrial workers in the country. The concentration therefore is considerable.

In *The Foundations of Leninism*, Stalin wrote, regarding the unprecedented concentration of Russian industry on the eve of the revolution, that

It is known, for instance, that in Russia 54 per cent of all the workers were employed in enterprises

opposition to the old literature and promotion of the new. Influenced by the Great October Socialist Revolution, the New Culture Movement was impregnated with socialist tendencies. Both in ideology and in matters of cadres, the May Fourth Movement prepared the way for the founding of the Communist Party of China in 1921.

employing over 500 workers each, whereas in so highly developed a country as the United States of America no more than 33 per cent of all the workers were employed in such enterprises. It need hardly be proved that this circumstance alone, in view of the existence of a revolutionary party like the Party of the Bolsheviks, transformed the working class of Russia into an immense force in the political life of the country.¹

These words of Comrade Stalin can also be applied to us. With such a concentration of modern industrial workers, with such a party as the Communist Party of China which is armed with Marxism-Leninism and in the era of world proletarian revolution, in the conditions where the powerful socialist Soviet Union has taken a prominent place in world affairs and has become a friendly neighbour of China, the Chinese proletariat has grown into the most powerful force in the political life of the country.

Nevertheless, the above is only one of the many aspects of modern China's economic life; a place like Shanghai in which industries are so concentrated is, after all, an exception. Foreign capital in Shanghai occupies a dominant position (there it constitutes two-thirds of the total capital of all the enterprises). It is precisely this that is a characteristic of semi-colonial economy.

¹J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1953, p. 62.

China furthermore is still an agricultural country. Generally speaking, just before and after the revolution of 1924-27, the development of modern industries in China was far slower than in Russia before the Russian Revolution of 1905. As the *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)* says:

By the end of that decade (the nineties) the number of workers employed in the large mills and factories, in the mining industry and on the railways amounted in the 50 European provinces of Russia alone to 2,207,000, and in the whole of Russia to 2,792,000 persons.¹

According to statistics for 1933 and 1934, the number of workers in big factories and mines and on the railways in China, excluding the Three Northeastern Provinces, totalled only about 940,000 (*China Economic Yearbook* for 1935 gave the following figures: factory workers—658,178; mine workers—200,743; railway workers—81,448). Compared with the number of workers in European Russia in the 1890's, the ratio is 3:7. China is lagging far behind.

Comparing the total industrial and agricultural population, China is also behind the Russia of the pre-1905 years. Taking the data in Lenin's great work *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* as a basis for calculation, we see that the rural population of Russia at

¹ *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1951, p. 18.

that time constituted 77.2 per cent; the industrial and commercial population, 17.3 per cent; the population not productively employed, 5.5 per cent.¹ In our country, according to Comrade Mao Tse-tung's analysis of the composition of the population in the 10th district of Hsingkuo County, Kiangsi Province, the figures are as follows: landlords, 1 per cent (about 2 or 3 per cent if the landlords living in other districts or in the county town are included); rich peasants, 5 per cent; middle peasants, 20 per cent; poor peasants, 60 per cent; farm labourers, 1 per cent; handicraftsmen, 7 per cent; small merchants, 3 per cent; and unemployed, 2 per cent. In other words, the rural population constitutes 86 per cent; the industrial and commercial population, 10 per cent; the population not productively employed, 4 per cent. Although these statistics are only for one locality, they are of a highly representative character. There are as yet no complete data for the whole country. According to the estimates of the Kuomintang Ministry of Industry for 1932 (*China Economic Yearbook*, Supplementary Volume) the rural population constituted 79 per cent; according to the estimates of *China Yearbook*, English edition for 1934, it was 80 per cent; the figure, according to the *Summarized Statistics of the Republic of China* for 1935, was 87 per cent. Taking the data available in various provinces in order to make a rough estimate, we see that the percentage of the rural population differs from place to place, being 75 per cent at the low-

¹ See Lenin, *Selected Works*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, Vol. I, p. 312.

est and 98.5 per cent at the highest, and averaging 88 per cent. These figures show that the percentage of the rural population in China is higher than that in Russia before 1905.

From the viewpoint of the development of capitalist agricultural economy, we can also say that in this respect too China lags behind the Russia of the pre-1905 years. In *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, Lenin, discussing the statistics on the rural economy of the 49 provinces in European Russia, wrote:

If one-fifth of the households owns half the number of the horses, we may draw the unmistakable conclusion that it has in its hands not less (and probably more) than half of all the agricultural production of the peasantry.

For our country, we have no complete data to hand. But, according to the data available regarding cultivated land and the number of draught animals used by peasant households in several districts, we can roughly say that the production of the landlords and rich peasants does not exceed one-fifth of the total rural production.

Summarizing the various economic conditions described above, we see the following contradiction: on one hand, the development of modern industries in China is accompanied by the formation of a powerful centralized proletariat (this proletariat includes workers in the factories run by foreign capital and is more powerful than the Chinese bourgeoisie); on the other hand, China is

not a country in which capitalism is predominant, but is still an economically backward, feudal or semi-feudal agricultural country with the peasants constituting 80-90 per cent of the entire population. This is a great contradiction, but it is nevertheless a fact. The Chinese "Narodniks" refuse to recognize the fact that China has a powerful proletariat and consequently they refuse to recognize the leadership of the proletariat, and have thus become simply pitiful Philistines. Since the Chinese trotskyites who talk nonsensically about China already being a country in which capitalism is predominant, refuse to recognize the fact that the feudal or semi-feudal system in China is the chief form of oppression, they refuse to recognize the peasant revolution, and have thus become contemptible counter-revolutionary underlings.

Following the teachings of Lenin and Stalin, Comrade Mao Tse-tung and his comrades-in-arms understood the real contradictions in the Chinese society, discovered the laws of development of the Chinese revolution and thereby formulated a truly revolutionary policy for our Party and engaged in truly revolutionary activities.

There is no doubt that with the Chinese proletariat existing as a powerful centralized class, the Communist Party of China—vanguard of this class and chief medium through which the proletariat collectively expresses itself—armed with Marxism-Leninism and steel-ed in long political struggles, is fully able to lead the Chinese revolution, and that without the leadership of

this most revolutionary class and its political party, the Chinese revolution cannot advance one step.

There is no doubt that since China is primarily an agricultural country, the Chinese proletariat and its political party cannot succeed in the revolution if it does not keep contact and unite with the peasant masses, if it does not organize a solid alliance of the workers and peasants. At the same time, as the peasant masses are politically and organizationally weak, they cannot liberate themselves until they clearly see their political objective and organize themselves under the leadership of the proletariat and its political party.

There is no doubt that since China's economy is still backward, with agricultural production constituting about 90 per cent and industrial production about 10 per cent of the total value of production of the whole country, China's rural economy continues to maintain a relatively great degree of independence in relation to the cities. Moreover, as the organized leadership of the proletariat and its political party can, to a certain extent, overcome the difficulties created for the revolution by the unorganized small producers, the revolution in the rural areas can exist independently for a long time.

China's economy has been developing unevenly. In this vast country, modern industries have made big strides in the areas where the principal cities are dominated by the economic, political and military power of imperialism while in a large number of other places,

there exist only a few or no modern industries at all.¹ In many remote regions imperialism influences and dominates the economy only indirectly, while in other remote regions its economic influence is, perhaps, even non-existent. This is why it is possible for the Chinese revolution, led by the proletariat, to achieve victory first in areas where the enemy's strength is comparatively weak, *i.e.*, in the rural areas. But because the enemy is relatively strong and we are relatively weak, the revolution cannot succeed quickly and will no doubt be a drawn-out affair.

Next, let us discuss the inevitable and endless crises within the Chinese ruling classes. Here we shall relate some historical facts about the struggles among the various warlord cliques since the first year of the Republic.

Yuan Shih-kai, the first of the northern warlords, had, with the support of imperialism, usurped the fruits of the 1911 Revolution. Outwardly, he had "unified"

¹ According to government reports for the 1920-30 period, of the 1,252 factories, two-thirds, or 827 factories, were located in four cities. There were 645 factories in Shanghai, 110 in Wusih, 38 in Hankow and 34 in Dairen. The remaining one-third were located in other parts of China. . . . The provinces in which most of the modern industries were located were Kiangsu, Liaoning, Hopei, Kwangtung, Shantung and Hupeh. The area of these six provinces constitutes only 10 per cent of the total area of the country while its population makes up only 36 per cent of the whole. In these provinces were concentrated 55 per cent of all the mining enterprises, 93 per cent of the textile mills, 92 per cent of the silk filatures, 86 per cent of the vegetable oil mills and 88 per cent of the electric power stations: (*The Chinese Economy*, a reactionary periodical published in Nanking before the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression, Vol. I, No. 7.)

the comprador-feudal ruling class, but as a matter of fact there still existed in the South the Kuomintang which opposed him and the warlords who were connected with the Kuomintang. On the surface there was unity, but due to the divide-and-rule policy of imperialism, disunity actually prevailed and there were open and concealed struggles between Yuan Shih-kai and his subordinates and among the various cliques of Yuan's subordinates. After Yuan's death, the rivalries among the northern warlords who represented the interests of different imperialist powers again came into the open. There was rivalry between the Anhwei clique (headed by Tuan Chi-jui and Hsu Shu-cheng) and the Chihli clique (headed by Tsao Kun and Wu Pei-fu), between the Anhwei clique and the Fengtien clique (headed by Chang Tso-lin), and afterwards between the Chihli clique and the Fengtien clique; there was also intense rivalry between factions within the Anhwei, Chihli and Fengtien cliques themselves. . . . In the South, too, due either to direct or indirect machinations by imperialism, there mushroomed many cliques and factions which fought against one another; in the provinces, small cliques and factions within big ones were also struggling against one another. In short, the main rivalry between the South and the North was punctuated by numerous minor rivalries, and the cliques rose and fell in quick succession. Sometimes, the Northern forces would desert to the South (as, for example, the Navy going over to the South), sometimes the Southern forces would desert to the North (as, for example, Chen Chiung-ming's revolt against Sun Yat-sen and his sup-

port of Wu Pei-fu). After the defeat of the revolution in 1927, *i.e.*, after the new Kuomintang warlords had replaced the old Northern warlords, these transformations became more and more fantastic. One day they would be on intimate terms calling one another "comrade" and "most loyal comrade," and the next they would become enemies, and even "the worst of enemies." Or today they would be "the worst of enemies," and tomorrow "comrades" again. Today, they pledged themselves to the cause of "peace," tomorrow they would start a big war. Today, they would be in opposition to each other; tomorrow they would swear allegiance.

Therefore, we can well understand that as long as the semi-colonial and semi-feudal economic and political systems in China remain unchanged, hostilities among the warlords cannot possibly end. Since, after their betrayal of the revolution, the Kuomintang leaders and their stooges were not able to change one particle of China's semi-colonial and semi-feudal system and became mere tools of imperialism more servile than their predecessors and consequently dragged the nation into a new crisis, they could not avoid armed conflicts among the warlords, which, as Comrade Mao Tse-tung had foreseen, turned out most bitterly contested. Since the contradictions within the ruling classes have become more intense—even though they had defeated the revolution temporarily, their interests remained in conflict—it is difficult and even impossible for them to form a united front, which is thoroughly counter-revolutionary in character and able to last for any length of time. There is, therefore, no doubt that by relying on the

leadership of the proletariat, the people can take full advantage of the split between the counter-revolutionary cliques caused by their struggles against one another to enable the revolutionary power to exist and grow.

Thus economics influences politics and counter-revolution brews revolution.

After the failure of the revolution in 1927, the concrete economic and political conditions in China as described above created a situation concerning which Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote:

While Red political power has been established in a few small areas, the people of the country as a whole still do not possess basic democratic rights; the workers and the peasants and even the bourgeois democrats have no rights of speech and assembly, and joining the Communist Party constitutes the greatest crime.¹

For a long time after the failure of the revolution in 1927, this was one of the basic features of Chinese politics. Comrade Mao Tse-tung clearly and correctly pointed out this feature and at the same time concluded that the Red political power could exist for a long time and develop despite its encirclement by the White political power.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote in his *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War*:

¹"The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, p. 99.

We pointed this out (at the First Party Congress of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area) when, in late 1927 and early 1928 soon after guerilla warfare was started in China, some comrades in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area—the Ching kang Mountains—raised the question: “How long can the red flag be kept flying?” For this was a most fundamental question; without answering the question whether China’s revolutionary base areas and the Chinese Red Army could exist and develop, we could not advance a single step.¹

We have no copy to hand of the decisions of the First Party Congress of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area, but we have a copy of the decisions of the Second Party Congress of that area. “The fundamental question” which was settled by the decisions was whether or not the Red political power could long exist. Lenin said, “The fundamental question of every revolution is the question of power.”² Comrade Mao Tse-tung settled this fundamental question according to this principle adapted to the conditions prevailing in China at that time.

There are three aspects of the question of the ability of the Red political power to exist for a long time though encircled by the White political power (which reflects the fact that the revolution is a long-term affair): 1. the agrarian revolution; 2. the armed forces of the people;

1 “Strategic Problems of China’s Revolutionary War,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, pp. 193-194.

2 See Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, Moscow, 1953, p. 47.

3. the building up of revolutionary base areas. The basic social content of the revolution is the agrarian revolution. The leader of the revolution is the proletariat and its political party.

In our semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, the vast majority of the rural population, which constitutes 80-90 per cent of the entire population of the country, either do not till their own land or till a piece of land insufficient for their subsistence and furthermore are subjected to savage economic plunder and political oppression. In his *Investigations in Hsingkuo County, Kiangsi Province* Comrade Mao Tse-tung gave us the following figures on land-ownership:

Landlords (1% of the population)	own 40% of the land
Ancestral halls (actually jointly owned by landlords and rich peasants)	own 10% of the land
Rich peasants (5% of the population)	own 30% of the land
Middle peasants (20% of population)	own 15% of the land
Poor peasants (60% of population)	own 5% of the land

In other words, the real exploiting classes (landlords and rich peasants) constituting 6 per cent of the population own 80 per cent of the land; the middle peasants constituting 20 per cent own 15 per cent of the land; the poor peasants constituting 60 per cent of the population own only 5 per cent of the land. Although conditions in different localities in the country vary somewhat, they are basically the same: the great majority of people own no land or only a little and poor land at that, while a small minority own large tracts of good land. This is a big contradiction. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's data explained exactly what Comrade Stalin had pointed out:

"The vestiges of feudalism are the basic form of oppression in the provinces of China."¹ This is one of the two crux of the problem of semi-colonial and semi-feudal China (the other being imperialist oppression), and it is the economic basis of the other knot. In other words, imperialism is able to oppress China because China is still a semi-feudal agricultural country. Obviously, if the Chinese proletariat does not lead the peasants to rise and eradicate this contradiction the Chinese nation will not be able really to stand up, eliminate the old system of savage exploitation and oppression and transform the country from a backward into a progressive one.

During the revolution of 1927, Comrade Mao Tse-tung's *Report of An Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan* gave a thorough explanation of this point. In 1927, when the revolution took a downward trend and after its defeat, Comrade Mao Tse-tung continued to lead our Party in its uncompromising and unflinching struggle against the counter-revolution; he advanced resolutely and unwaveringly in this direction, *i.e.*, he raised the great banner of the peasant revolution—the agrarian revolution—under which the broad masses of peasants came to rally round us.

Nevertheless, without armed forces no agrarian revolution can be carried out effectively. During the revolution of 1924-27, the opportunist Chen Tu-hsiu's surrender of the armed forces resulted, in many places, in the disastrous failure of the peasant revolution. This

¹ Stalin, *The Chinese Revolution and the Tasks of the Communist International*.

was a bitter lesson. Moreover, if the armed forces are not integrated with the agrarian revolution and if the agrarian revolution is not made the aim of an armed struggle, then even with armed force, one can achieve nothing. The Nanchang Uprising¹ had a great historical significance. But, as some of the troops participating in the uprising did not integrate their efforts with the forces of the agrarian revolution, it unfortunately ended in a failure. This was another bitter lesson.

Even if, however, the armed forces and the agrarian revolution were integrated but revolutionary base areas were not built up, the agrarian revolution could not be maintained and consolidated. Unless revolutionary base areas are established, the armed forces are compelled to become mobile, they find it difficult to unite solidly with the local population, and consequently are exposed to risk of defeat by a sudden enemy attack. This was another of the lessons drawn from the failure of the Nanchang Uprising. Comrade Mao Tse-tung, therefore, emphasized that:

We must take care to lay a solid foundation in the central districts so that we shall have something to rely upon and nothing to fear when the White terror comes.

¹The armed uprising staged by the Communist Party of China on August 1, 1927 in Nanchang, capital of Kiangsi Province. This uprising represented a new chapter in the Chinese revolution as it gave birth to the armed forces of the Chinese people. More than thirty thousand armed troops led by Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ho Lung and Yeh Ting took part in it.

... thus placing ourselves in an invincible position.¹

Such revolutionary base areas, however, cannot be established without solid foundation. The prerequisites for their establishment, as Comrade Mao Tse-tung has pointed out, are:

- (1) a sound mass basis, (2) a first-rate Party organization, (3) a Red Army of adequate strength, (4) a terrain favourable to military operations, and (5) economic strength sufficient for self-support.²

According to Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the general concept of the three aspects of the building of the Red political power—the peasant agrarian revolution under the leadership of the proletariat, the armed forces, the establishment of revolutionary bases—is a concept of the “armed independent regime of the workers and peasants.” This general concept is of necessity opposed to adventurism, liquidationism, the outlook of roving insurgents,³ and provincialism. We can see that in the course of actual struggles Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s

¹ “The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, pp. 71, 72.

² *Ibid.*, p. 71.

³ This refers to vagabond elements in the army who reject any political line, have no idea of military organization and are impatient in carrying out hard persistent struggles together with the masses. For detailed description, see “On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, p. 114.

thought had advanced another step in development since the time he wrote his *Report of An Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan*.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung summarized the concept of building the Red political power as follows:

. . . China is a semi-colony contended for by many imperialist powers. If one clearly understands this, then first, one can understand why in China alone in the world there is such an unusual thing as a prolonged strife within the ruling classes, why the fight intensifies and expands day by day, and why no unified political power has ever come into being. Secondly, one can understand how important the peasant problem is, and consequently why rural uprisings have developed on such a nation-wide scale as at present. Thirdly, one can understand the correctness of the slogan about a workers' and peasants' democratic political power. Fourthly, one can understand another unusual thing which corresponds to and arises out of the unusual thing that in China alone in the world there is a prolonged strife within the ruling classes, and that is the existence and development of the Red Army and guerilla troops, and, together with them, the existence and development of small Red areas that have grown amid the encirclement of the White political power (no such unusual thing is found anywhere except in China). Fifthly, one can also understand that the formation and development of the Red Army, the guerilla units, and the

Red areas are the highest form of the peasant struggle under the leadership of the proletariat in semi-colonial China, the inevitable outcome of the growth of the peasant struggle in a semi-colony, and are undoubtedly the most important factors in accelerating the revolutionary upsurge throughout the country. And sixthly, one can also understand that the policy of purely mobile guerilla-like activities cannot accomplish the task of accelerating the nation-wide revolutionary upsurge, while the kind of policies adopted by Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung and by Fang Chih-min are undoubtedly correct—policies such as establishing base areas; building up political power according to plan; deepening the agrarian revolution; and expanding the people's armed forces by developing in due order first the township Red guards, then the district Red guards, then the county Red guards, then the local Red Army, and then a regular Red Army; and expanding political power by advancing in a series of waves, etc., etc. Only thus can we win the confidence of the revolutionary masses throughout the country, just as the Soviet Union has done throughout the world. Only thus can we create tremendous difficulties for the reactionary ruling classes, shake their very foundations, and precipitate their internal disintegration. And only thus can we really create a Red Army that will be our chief weapon in the coming great revolution. In short,

only thus can we accelerate the revolutionary upsurge.¹

Comrade Mao Tse-tung, therefore, derived his conception of the building up of the Red political power from an analysis of the concrete conditions in China. This conception calls for the development, under the leadership of the proletariat, of the revolution in the rural areas, the waging of a protracted struggle, the accumulation of strength, the encirclement of the cities, the gradual expansion of the revolutionary bases and, finally, the achievement of victory throughout the country.

This concept of building up the Red political power includes the concept of carrying out a revolutionary armed struggle. This armed struggle is the peasant revolution under the leadership of the proletariat and its political party, waged from revolutionary base areas. Comrade Stalin said,

In China, armed revolution is fighting against armed counter-revolution. This is one of the peculiarities and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution.²

It is Comrade Mao Tse-tung who has concretely and practically developed this idea of Comrade Stalin. In

1 "A Single Spark Can Start A Prairie Fire," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, pp. 116-117.

2 Stalin, *On the Perspectives of the Revolution in China*.

his *The Struggle in the Ching kang Mountains*, he pointed out:

In the revolution in China, a country dominated by agricultural economy, the development of armed insurrections is a special feature.¹

At the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee elected by the Sixth Party Congress, Comrade Mao Tse-tung said:

The characteristic of China is that she is not an independent democratic state but a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, internally under feudal oppression for want of democracy and externally under imperialist oppression for want of national independence. Thus people have no legislative body to make use of, nor the legal right to organize the workers to strike. Basically the task of the Communist Party here is not to go through a long period of legal struggles before launching an insurrection or war, nor to seize the big cities first and then occupy the countryside, but to take the other way round.²

These words sum up once again the basic line of the revolution during the ten-year period of the civil war.

Since a protracted armed struggle is a peculiarity

¹ "The Struggle in the Ching kang Mountains," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, p. 100.

² Mao Tse-tung, *Problems of War and Strategy*.

and an advantage of the Chinese revolution, we must have not only a correct political line but also a correct military line before we can lead this revolution forward. Our Party is integrating a firm Marxist political line with a firm Marxist military line as advocated by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. Without a firm Marxist political line, no firm Marxist military line can be established; and without a firm Marxist military line, no firm Marxist political line can be carried out. The history of our Party shows that those who err politically also err militarily; and those who err militarily can trace their errors to political ones, and this will again lead to political errors.

In 1927 Comrade Stalin pointed out to us:

Revolutionary movement must not be looked upon as a movement rising on upward trend all the time. This is a bookish and unrealistic concept of revolution. Revolution always advances on a zigzag line. In some places it launches offensives and destroys the old system, while in some other places it suffers partial setbacks and has to retreat.¹

The truth about the revolution advancing on a zigzag line as expounded by Comrade Stalin has fully solved the basic question of the political line and of the military line, both of which our Party has had to solve during the ten-year period of the civil war. And it is

¹ Stalin, *Talk with Students of the Sun Yat-sen University*.

on these very basic questions that our "Left" opportunists have consistently erred. The revolution they dream of is a revolution which will develop evenly throughout the country and which will achieve nation-wide victory at one stroke. It is because of this that they oppose Comrade Mao Tse-tung's views regarding the necessity of patiently carrying out the difficult task of waging a protracted struggle in the rural areas.

As a matter of fact, historical realities have completely upset all opinions which opposed Comrade Mao Tse-tung's views on the establishment of a workers' and peasants' armed independent regime in the rural areas where the counter-revolutionary strength is comparatively weak, on waging a protracted struggle and on achieving one victory after another so as to precipitate a revolutionary upsurge throughout the country. Comrade Chou En-lai has correctly said, "All those who in the past have opposed or doubted Comrade Mao Tse-tung's leadership or views have now been proved entirely wrong."¹ This is a brief but a clear summary of all the past controversies over the line followed by our Party.

Let us now consider the ten-year period of the civil war. The Li Li-san line maintained that there could never be an independent regime; that the idea of encircling the cities by the rural areas was completely wrong, and that it was undoubtedly utterly mistaken to think of seizing one or several provinces in order to precipitate a revolutionary upsurge throughout the country.

¹ Speech at a reception in Yen-an, August 2, 1943.

But all these opinions have been shattered by realities. The third "Left" opportunist line disregarded all the actual concrete conditions of the time. They laid stress on the capture of a few central cities in order to win a victory for the revolution first in one or several provinces, opposed fighting small local wars, and ridiculed Comrade Mao Tse-tung's tactics as "conservatism." But these views, too, were shattered by realities. Li Lisan's line of a general insurrection throughout the country—of waging a nation-wide decisive battle irrespective of the strength and weakness of the opposing forces—could be likened only to Don Quixote's fight against the windmill. The third "Left" opportunist line, likewise, believed that the time was ripe for "a life-and-death struggle between the revolution and counter-revolution" and that the mistake of taking "a rest after a victory should not be repeated." They ridiculed Comrade Mao Tse-tung's strategy of drawing the enemy deep into our area so as to annihilate them as "a line of retreat." They subsequently advocated a decisive fight between the two ways in China, maintaining that "the solution of this question would come about after a very short historical period." These views, though subjectively aiming at a quick revolutionary victory, meant objectively, *i.e.*, when regarded critically on the basis of historical realities, no more than the replacement of one Don Quixote by another, perhaps even more quixotic than the first. There is a saying, "A new-born calf does not recognize a tiger." This means that it is doomed.

III

A FLEXIBLE POLICY IS CORRECT; A RIGID POLICY IS WRONG

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has written:

If only we realize that splits and wars are incessant within the White regime in China, we shall have no doubt about the emergence, existence, and daily growth of the Red political power.¹

He added:

Splits and wars among the warlords weaken the power of the White regime. Thus the Red political power is given an opportunity to emerge in small areas.²

This brings up a question of policy.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung attributed the existence and development of the Red political power, aside from "special reasons" (the economic and political basis of the Chinese society) and other conditions, to "another important condition . . . namely, that the Communist Party is strongly organized and commits no mistakes in policy."³

¹ "Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist?", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, p. 65.

² *Ibid.*, p. 67.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

It is obvious that a policy is correct if it is in harmony with actual objective conditions, and is formulated on the basis of their possible development; a policy is wrong if it is not in harmony with actual objective conditions, and is formulated in contradiction to their possible development.

Analysing the consequences—victory and defeat—of the two different policies, one correct and the other wrong, which were followed in the first stage of the wars waged by the Red Army, Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote:

The independent regime in a given area must adopt a different strategy against the ruling class forces which encircle it according to whether their political power is enjoying temporary stability or is splitting up.

When splits take place within the ruling classes, *e.g.*, the war between Li Tsung-jen and Tang Sheng-chih in Hunan and Hupeh and that between Chang Fa-kuei and Li Chi-shen in Kwangtung, we may adopt a strategy of comparatively venturesome advance and expand the independent regime over a comparatively large area by fighting. Yet all the same we must take care to lay a solid foundation in the central districts so that we shall have something to rely upon and nothing to fear when the White terror comes. When the political power of the ruling classes is relatively stable, as in the southern provinces after April this year (*i.e.*, 1928—*translator*), our strategy must be one of gradual advance. We must then take the utmost

care neither to divide up our forces for venturesome advance in the military field nor to scatter our personnel and neglect to lay a solid foundation in the central districts in the field of local work (including the distribution of land, the establishment of political power, the expansion of the Party and organization of local armed forces).

The failure in various small Red areas has been due either to a lack of favourable objective conditions or to subjective tactical mistakes. The tactics have been mistaken precisely because of the failure to distinguish clearly between the two different periods, the period when the political power of the ruling classes is temporarily stable and the period when it is splitting up. In the period when the political power of the ruling classes was temporarily stable, some comrades, as if oblivious of the fact that the enemy could muster for an attack not only the house-to-house militia but also regular troops, advocated dividing our own forces for a venturesome advance, and even proposed to leave the defence of an extensive area to the Red guards singlehanded. In local work, they utterly neglected to lay a solid foundation in the central districts, but aimed exclusively at unlimited expansion, regardless of whether we were strong enough to achieve this. And anyone who advocated gradual expansion in military work and, in civilian work, concentration of forces to build up a solid foundation in the central districts, thus placing ourselves in an invincible position, was called a "conserva-

tive." Precisely such erroneous views were the fundamental cause of the fiasco in August this year in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area and of the simultaneous defeat of the Fourth Army of the Red Army in southern Hunan.¹

Such is the consequence of an erroneous policy. The consequence of a correct policy is entirely different:

The establishment of the independent regime in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area since April coincided with the spell of stability enjoyed by the ruling power in the south, and the reactionary forces for "annihilation" dispatched by the Hunan and Kiangsi provincial governments numbered at least eight or nine regiments, sometimes as many as eighteen. Yet with a force of less than four regiments we fought the enemy for as long as four months, daily expanding the territory under our independent regime, daily deepening the agrarian revolution, daily extending the people's political power and daily strengthening the Red Army and the Red guards; this was precisely because the policies of the Party in the border area (the local and army Party organizations) were correct. The policies of the Border Area Special Party Committee (with Mao Tse-tung as secretary) and the Army Party Committee (with Chen Yi as secretary) were then as follows: struggle resolutely against

¹"The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, pp. 71-72.

the enemy, establish a regime in the middle section of the Losiao mountain range and oppose flightism; deepen the agrarian revolution in areas under the independent regime; promote the development of the local Party organization through the help of the army Party organization, and the development of the local armed forces through the help of the regular army; adopt a defensive strategy for Hunan where the ruling power was comparatively strong and an offensive strategy for Kiangsi where the ruling power was comparatively weak; devote great efforts to the development of Yungsin, set up an independent regime of the masses there and make preparations for a prolonged struggle; concentrate the Red Army to fight at opportune moments the enemy confronting it, and oppose the division of the forces in order to avoid their being smashed separately by the enemy; and adopt the policy of advancing in a series of waves for the expansion of the area under the independent regime and oppose the policy of venturesome advance. Thanks to these appropriate policies plus the terrain in the border area (which is favourable to our struggle) and the absence of perfect co-ordination between the invading troops from Hunan and those from Kiangsi, we were able to win a number of military victories and expand the independent regime of the masses in the four months from April to July.

The enemy, though several times stronger, failed not only to destroy the independent regime,

but even to check its development. And this independent regime tended to exert a daily increasing influence on the two provinces of Hunan and Kiangsi.¹

Facts thus prove that a correct policy leads the revolution towards successes even under adverse conditions, while an erroneous policy only causes it to suffer losses.

The proletarian policy, the Marxist-Leninist theory on tactics, as applied by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, is to rely on the masses, establish revolutionary bases, utilize the contradictions among our opponents and develop our strength. At a time when a split occurs in the political power of the ruling classes, a policy of venturesome advance may be adopted; the advance, however, should be made steadily from consolidated base areas. At a time when the political power of the ruling classes is relatively stable, a policy of advancing in a series of waves should be adopted and any venturesome advance should be opposed. When faced by a comparatively strong enemy force, we should assume the defensive; when faced by a weaker force, we should assume the offensive. To sum up, this tactical policy demands that we should rely on the masses, utilize the contradictions among our opponents, enlist the support of the masses, launch an offensive against small enemy forces, and destroy them one by one.

Basing himself on Marxism-Leninism, Comrade

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

Mao Tse-tung maintains that our policy must change in accordance with the changes in the situation. It is wrong to adopt one rigid policy for all conditions. It is wrong to apply a policy which is practicable and necessary in one period to another period in which it is impracticable and absolutely unsuitable (for instance, "the August fiasco was entirely due to the fact that a section of our comrades, not realizing that the period was one in which the ruling classes enjoyed temporary stability but adopting on the contrary a strategy applicable in the period of political splits among the ruling classes, divided up the forces for a venturesome advance and courted defeat in both the border area and southern Hunan").¹

We must clearly distinguish between a period in which the ruling classes are rent by conflict and one in which they are relatively stable, and the above-mentioned policies formulated by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the two different periods are, as borne out by facts, absolutely correct. Such flexible policies are applicable not only to direct armed struggles with the enemy but also to the revolutionary work and struggles in the areas under the Kuomintang rule. As is well known, Comrade Mao Tse-tung and many other comrades have adopted such flexible policies in the Red Army base areas and these policies have been responsible for the growth of the Red Army's strength "from a single spark into a prairie fire." There were, however, comrades who were guilty of "Left" deviations and refused to adopt such

¹ "Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist?", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, p. 68.

flexible policies in the Kuomintang-controlled areas, and thus caused continuous setbacks to the work there. Furthermore, when these comrades were transferred from the Kuomintang-controlled areas to the Red Army bases, they continued to apply the same rigid policies which they had followed in the Kuomintang areas, and so brought about serious setbacks to the Red Army bases.

Pointing out the necessity of relying on the masses and on the alliance of the workers and peasants, Comrade Mao Tse-tung lays special emphasis on utilizing all kinds of contradictions and on taking advantage of them to develop the revolution. As Comrade Mao Tse-tung has stressed, it is possible to utilize contradictions in both periods. It is entirely wrong to maintain that contradictions cannot be made use of in the period when the ruling classes are relatively stable. True, Comrade Mao Tse-tung has said:

. . . the warfare among the warlords does not go on every day. When the White regime in one or several provinces enjoys temporary stability, the ruling classes there will inevitably combine to exterminate the Red political power with might and main.¹

But even under such circumstances, Comrade Mao Tse-tung still holds that the counter-revolutionary offensive can be defeated. The victories in Hunan and Kiangsi in April-July, mentioned above, were won under exactly

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

such circumstances—they were won by our utilizing the contradictions among the rulers of Hunan and Kiangsi who had combined their forces to defeat us, and destroying them one by one. Needless to say, in a period when there is a split among the ruling classes, this can be done even more easily.

The “Left” opportunists are completely mistaken in underestimating the contradictions in Chinese society; they are utterly ignorant of actual conditions in China. China is a big semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. The nation is in a serious plight; society is in upheaval; many political and economic phenomena are of a temporary nature; and, as described above, there are many conflicts within the ruling classes. This is a country that is full of contradictions. At the same time, these incessant conflicts among the ruling classes lead to the continuous rise and fall of political personalities. It is like a merry-go-round with people gaining and losing power in quick succession. This is common knowledge.

Similar changes have occurred within the ruling classes in the economic field. Statistics compiled in 1935 by Tan Yi-fu relating to the number of old and new landlords in ten counties of Szechuan Province show that “the new landlords own 90 per cent of the land, the old landlords only 8 per cent; this indicates the rapid decline of the old landlords and the marked rise of the new landlords. As to number of households, the new landlords constitute 31 per cent, while the old landlords constitute 69 per cent of the total, indicating that the new landlords, representing slightly more than 30 per cent of the households, own 90 per cent of the land, while

the old landlords, representing about 70 per cent of the households, own less than 10 per cent of the land. . . . Among the new landlords, warlords and bureaucrats represent the smallest number of households but own most land. There are cases where 1.8 per cent of the households own 30.9 per cent of the land." It can thus be seen that the rise and fall of political personalities entails the rise and fall of personalities in the economic field, and that changes in the economic field are reflected in the changes in the political field. The vivid description above concerns only Szechuan, but similar conditions exist in many other parts of the country.

Consequently, we see from the rise and fall of groups in the economic and political spheres that changes in their relations with the revolution and counter-revolution can and do take place in different periods among the ruling personalities and cliques in China, who are guided by their selfish interests.

Following the example set by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, we revolutionaries and Communists must, therefore, take into account all the changes which take place among the ruling personalities and cliques in the political and economic fields in China; we must consider how to adopt a flexible policy towards them in various situations and at different periods, and how to utilize the contradictions caused by their selfish interests, in order to isolate the strongest and fiercest among our enemies and extend influence of the revolution. During the ten-year civil war, however, our "Left" opportunists have acted contrary to Comrade Mao Tse-tung's policy of utilizing all kinds of contradictions to our advantage.

Putting Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang or non-Kuomintang rulers on the same footing, they have tried to overthrow them all at the same time. Such a rigid policy is quite unsuited to the complexities of the situation. From the standpoint of the "Left" opportunists, they are all counter-revolutionaries, all equally enemies, and should, therefore, all be overthrown at the same time. From their standpoint, we have no friends but only enemies in the world; furthermore they make no distinction between our main and minor enemies, nor between present and future enemies—they treat all our enemies alike. Again, from the same standpoint, they consider that no one should be befriended, no one should be neutralized. All they recognize is opposition, pure and simple. How easy, how convenient, and how "brave"! But these "Left" opportunists have never defeated any counter-revolution nor overthrown any enemy.

Comrade Liu Shao-chi has put this point very clearly in his essay *Eradicate Closed-doorism and Adventurism*:

The champions of closed-doorism and adventurism do not know how to utilize contradictions within the enemy camp, how to take advantage of these contradictions to precipitate an open conflict, how to establish temporary alliances with elements within the enemy camp who may co-operate with us, or with those who are today not yet our main enemies, so as to oppose the present main enemies, and to sap the forces the enemy has against us and

destroy alliances hostile to us. Those comrades, who often claim to be "most revolutionary, most thorough, absolutely uncompromising and unyielding" and wish to overthrow everything, in fact can overthrow nothing.

The "Left" opportunists not only ignore contradictions within the ruling classes but also the contradictions between the national bourgeoisie and the oligarchic rule of the comprador class and the landed gentry and the important contradictions between the national bourgeoisie and imperialism. They do not realize that China is a semi-colonial country and fail to see that because of imperialist oppression and aggression and because of the contradictions between the national bourgeoisie and the comprador class and the landed gentry, it is possible that the national bourgeoisie may again change their political attitude on certain occasions in spite of the fact that they took part in the betrayal of the revolution in 1927. Some nervous comrades conjure up in their imagination a compact, broad united front against the Chinese revolution and the Communist Party, one that embraces the imperialists, the comprador, landed gentry and landlord classes, the bourgeoisie and even the petty bourgeoisie. Even after the "September 18" and "January 28"¹ incidents, when class relations

¹ On January 28, 1932, Japanese marines attacked Shanghai. The Kuomintang Nineteenth Route Army, then stationed in Shanghai, on its own initiative and against the wishes of the Kuomintang government, resisted the invasion jointly with the people of Shanghai. Due to the betrayal by Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, this resistance collapsed.

in China began to change, some comrades continued to regard all the political parties and factions of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie as "counter-revolutionary parties," calling them "all types of counter-revolutionary parties," and "all equally counter-revolutionary," and regarded them as "an even more dangerous enemy" than the comprador class and the landed gentry who were the ruling groups then in power. Some comrades, therefore, advocated the use of the main forces of the revolution to attack these wavering counter-revolutionaries and intensify the struggle against these factions; they urged that it had become more urgent than ever to struggle against these counter-revolutionary factions. It is clear that such a view and such a way of doing things can be of advantage only to the comprador class and the landed gentry in power.

The "Left" opportunists are even more ridiculous in regard to policy towards the petty bourgeoisie. We all know that Comrade Mao Tse-tung's proletarian policy attaches importance to taking the petty bourgeoisie into consideration. Comrade Mao Tse-tung said:

To turn the revolution into a seething, surging tide all over the country, it is necessary to launch a political and economic struggle for democracy involving also the urban petty bourgeoisie.¹

He pointed out that a war waged in isolation by the

¹"The Struggle in the Ching kang Mountains," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, p. 99.

poor peasantry was a very serious problem. In the following passage from *The Struggle in the Ching kang Mountains*, he compared the two very different outcomes arrived at as a result of following correct and incorrect policies towards the petty bourgeoisie:

We carried out our policy towards the petty bourgeoisie fairly well before February this year (1928—*translator*). In March, the representative of the Southern Hunan Special Committee arrived in Ning kang and criticized us for leaning to the Right, for having not done enough burning and killing, and for having failed to carry out the policy of "turning the petty bourgeois into proletarians and then forcing them into the revolution"; whereupon the leadership of the Front Committee was changed and there was a shift in our policy. In April when our entire army had arrived in the border area, though we still did not do much burning and killing, yet we quite rigorously confiscated the property of the middle merchants in the cities and assessed contributions from the small landlords and rich peasants in the countryside. The slogan of "all factories to the workers" put forward by the Southern Hunan Special Committee, was also widely propagated. This ultra-Left policy of attacking the petty bourgeois drove most of them to the side of the landed gentry; they put on white ribbons and opposed us. Since this policy has been gradually changed of late, the situation has also gradually improved. Good results have been achieved

in Suichuan in particular, for the merchants in the county towns and market places no longer shun us and quite a few of them speak well of the Red Army. The fair in Tsaolin (a midday fair held once in every three days) is attended by twenty thousand people, which is something unprecedented. This is a proof that our policy is now correct. The landed gentry imposed very heavy taxes and assessments on the people, while the pacification guards of Suichuan levied five toll charges along the seventy-*li* road from Huangao to Tsaolin, no agricultural produce being exempt. We crushed the pacification guards and abolished these tolls, thus winning the support of all the peasants as well as of the small and middle merchants.¹

The original policy was correct, then when the "Left" opportunist "envoys" arrived, they caused much harm. But, we again extended our front when we corrected the erroneous policy.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has always tried to avoid fighting with an isolated force, but the "Left" opportunists have always tried to create conditions for fighting with an isolated force. Our "Left" opportunists have completely forgotten and abandoned the brilliant advice given us by Comrade Stalin when he exposed the trotskyite renegades in July 1927: "The question of the allies of the proletariat is one of the fundamental questions of the Chinese revolution." Comrade Stalin said:

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

"The Chinese proletariat is confronted with powerful opponents. . . . In order to defeat these powerful opponents, what is necessary, apart from anything else, is a flexible and well-considered policy of the proletariat, the ability to utilize every fissure in the camp of the opponents, the ability to find allies for itself, even if these allies are vacillating and wavering allies."¹

Revolutionary life has proved over and over again that a flexible policy is correct and is of immense advantage to the revolution, that it facilitates the expansion of the revolutionary front and hastens the revolutionary victory. Conversely, a rigid policy is wrong and harmful to the revolution; it narrows the revolutionary front and may lead to the failure of the revolution.

There are different stages and many transitional periods in a revolution and not infrequently this necessitates a zigzag advance. Marxism-Leninism takes all these elements into account, teaches how they can be recognized, applies them to practice, and manifests them in practical policies, and is thus able to guide the revolution and ensure the victory of the revolution. Blanquism refuses to recognize these things, is unwilling to master them, and discards them in its activities and policies; consequently, it cannot guide the revolution, which on this account may be abortive.

Having correctly mastered Marxism-Leninism, Comrade Mao Tse-tung can analyse concrete conditions of every kind, and because of this he is able to orientate himself correctly and to follow a correct policy in the

¹ Stalin, *Comments on Current Affairs in China*.

revolutionary movement. This is revolutionary wisdom. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's opinion on the establishment of an armed independent regime of the worker-peasant alliance and on utilizing the fissure in the ruling classes to develop the strength of the revolution is an example of great Marxist-Leninist wisdom. All Chinese revolutionaries and Chinese Communists must strive to achieve such wisdom. According to the fairy tale *Pilgrimage to the West*, Sun Wu-kung was captured by Lao-tse and put into the Crucible of the Eight Trigrams to be reduced to ashes by alchemic fire. Sun, however, found a crack in the furnace through which there came a current of air. He hid there and thus saved himself from being burned alive. When the crucible was opened, he jumped out and continued his riot in Heaven, starting a revolution against the Emperor of Heaven. This story is an instance of Sun Wu-kung's supernatural wisdom. At the time of the failure of the revolution in 1927, the counter-revolutionaries attempted to burn to death all the revolutionaries and Party members, but because our Party was guided by the Marxist-Leninist wisdom of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and many other comrades, we saved the revolution and developed it. According to *Pilgrimage to the West*, Sun was finally defeated because his supernatural power proved inadequate. The Marxist-Leninist wisdom of Comrade Mao Tse-tung is very different from the wisdom of Sun Wu-kung. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has acquired it by mastering the laws of historical and current development; such wisdom comes from relying upon the firm alliance of the workers and peasants and from thorough implementa-

tion of the agrarian revolution. The development of the revolution bears out that under the wise leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, our Party and revolution have succeeded not only in breaking through the five big counter-revolutionary encirclement campaigns in the civil war but also in gradually bringing the counter-revolutionaries under control.

In other words, to possess Marxist-Leninist wisdom is to know the laws of the development of the revolution, to be able to guide the growth of the revolutionary forces and to turn defeat into victory. Without this wisdom, the revolutionary forces may weaken, and victory may turn into defeat.

The Chinese reactionary ruling classes throughout the ages have been skilful in underhand intrigue and machination. We must not forget that in the revolution of 1927 we were defeated by Chiang Kai-shek's brutal intrigues. The Communists are likely to fall into a trap and suffer serious losses if they do not acquire Marxist-Leninist wisdom, if they do not learn to rely on the firm worker-peasant alliance, if they do not learn how to carry out the agrarian revolution and wage armed revolutionary struggles, if they fail to understand the different transitional stages in the struggle, if they fail to realize that the revolution often necessitates a zigzag advance, and if they do not learn how to apply flexible policies. In the revolution of 1927, Chen Tu-hsiu was defeated because he did not possess Marxist-Leninist wisdom. During the ten-year civil war, some comrades caused serious setbacks to the revolution because they too did not possess Marxist-Leninist wisdom.

To err is bad. But, if we learn from our errors, draw lessons from them and thenceforth become wise and do better the next time, then we can turn bad things into good things. We hope that the comrades who have committed errors will learn from the lessons of the past.

We should never follow Ah Q's¹ example, because we know that Ah Q's failure was due to his stupidity.

Some comrades argue as follows: the revolution has gained in strength, and the strength of the revolutionary forces has developed, but then other persons will organize a counter-revolutionary united front to surround us with an iron ring and to attack us; such a counter-revolutionary united front would be indestructible and therefore we would no longer be able to utilize its contradictions since there would be no more contradictions to be utilized. Such a view reveals that these comrades know very little. The fact that the revolution has gained in strength will undoubtedly cause a number of people, frightened by the revolution, to unite against us. On the other hand, impressed by the growth of our strength, other people will seek our leadership. If we have no strength of our own, who will seek our leadership? Moreover, the stronger the revolution, the greater will be the vacillations and splits in the counter-revolutionary camp and more people will come into the fold of the revolution.

¹ Leading character in *The True Story of Ah Q*, a famous novel written in December 1921 by the great Chinese writer, Lu Hsun (1881-1936). The author fashioned him after the type of people who seek satisfaction for the failures and setbacks in actual life by regarding them as moral or spiritual victories.

We all know that the Communist Party of China is strong. Its strength lies in the working-class movement, in the worker-peasant alliance, and in its leadership of the peasant revolution. The sympathy and assistance consistently given by the powerful U.S.S.R. to the cause of our national liberation have immensely strengthened the Chinese revolution and the position of the Communist Party of China. The first great revolution was launched by the Chinese Communist Party which assisted Sun Yat-sen and stood in the forefront of the revolution. This has left an extremely profound impression on the Chinese people. Many people respect and admire the Communist Party of China for its ability to align itself with the masses and for its courage and self-sacrifice. Often even the enemy feels helpless in dealing with the revolutionary forces led by the Communist Party of China. The valiant struggles waged by it during the ten-year civil war have shaken the whole country and the world. As a matter of fact, even in the most difficult period of the civil war, people in various walks of life in China have always had a strong desire to see the Chinese Communists and hear their opinions. It is now the seventh year of the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression, and anyone who still thinks that we are isolated must be very ignorant indeed since this is so contrary to the facts.

The War of Resistance has disclosed that the Communist Party of China would not have been in a position to ask other people to join it in a national united front against Japanese aggression if it had not become powerful. In this war of resistance, has it not been

due to our ability to rely on the masses and to our courageous fight against 58 per cent of the enemy forces in China and 90 per cent of the puppet troops that our prestige has been further enhanced and that the majority of people of the different classes are looking up to us more and more?

It follows, therefore, that we must think over and over again of what Comrade Mao Tse-tung has repeatedly taught us during the ten-year civil war about a flexible Marxist-Leninist policy as opposed to a rigid policy. He further taught us that, with the worker-peasant alliance as our revolutionary foundation and the expansion of the revolutionary strength of the workers and peasants as our basic aim, we should learn how to take full advantage of the contradictions of our enemies to destroy them one by one. We must be boundlessly loyal to the cause of the people's revolution, possess courage and sufficient wisdom. Such is the road to revolutionary victory.

Lenin said:

N. G. Chernyshevsky, the great Russian socialist of the pre-Marxian period, used to say, "Political activity is not the pavement of the Nevsky Prospect (the clean, broad, smooth pavement of the perfectly straight principal street of St. Petersburg). Since the time of Chernyshevsky, the Russian revolutionaries have paid very dearly for ignoring or forgetting this truth. Every effort must be made to save the Left Communists and the Western European and American revolutionaries, devoted

to the working class, from paying as *dearly* for the assimilation of this truth as the backward Russians.¹

There were times during the ten years of the civil war when some of our comrades who had committed "Left" infantile errors also forgot the truth so tirelessly taught by Lenin, and rejected the flexible policy expounded by Comrade Mao Tse-tung; they have "paid very dearly" for this. We can see that after paying thus dearly, many of our comrades now understand this truth. To avoid repeating these errors, we must pursue our studies still more diligently.

IV

BUILDING THE PARTY, BUILDING THE ARMY AND WORK AMONG THE MASSES

In order to carry out the tasks of the revolution and implement the revolutionary policies correctly, it is necessary to build up a good party, a good revolutionary army and carry on the work among the masses successfully.

Without a good party, a really Bolshevized party, no good revolutionary army can be built up and work

¹ Lenin, *Left-Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder*, Little Lenin Library, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1947, p. 53.

among the masses cannot be carried on successfully. In his work *On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party*, Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote:

... there are various non-proletarian ideas which greatly hinder the carrying out of the Party's correct line. If they are not thoroughly rectified, then the Fourth Army of the Red Army will certainly be unable to shoulder the tasks which China's great revolutionary struggle has assigned to it.¹

The building up of a good party is, therefore, the key-point in guiding the development of the revolution.

The Party creates the revolutionary armed forces which in turn facilitate the development of the Party. Therefore, the building of the Party and the building of the army are interrelated tasks.

As the aim of the Party and of the army it leads is to liberate the people, it is necessary to carry out work among the masses successfully and to maintain close contact with them. Therefore, the building of the Party and the army and work among the masses are also interrelated tasks.

Comrade Stalin said: "In China armed revolution is fighting against armed counter-revolution. This is one of the peculiarities and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution."² The proper way to develop Com-

¹ "On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, p. 105.

² Stalin, *On the Perspectives of the Revolution in China*.

rade Stalin's ideas concretely in these various fields and fronts is to correlate the work of building the Party and the army with work among the masses and to treat these tasks as an integral whole.

Nevertheless, in the present revolutionary base areas it is no easy matter to build a good Bolshevized Communist party and a revolutionary army led by such a party. The difficulties we encounter there may be traced to the rural environment, because, since the failure of the revolution in 1927 "the Party's organizational basis" in the base areas "is largely made up of peasants and other elements of petty-bourgeois origin."¹ As to our army, it is mainly composed of peasants. It is a peasant army led by the proletariat. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has made a penetrating analysis of the difficulties arising from these circumstances:

The economy in the border area is agricultural, with some places remaining in the stage of the hand-pestle (e.g., while foot-pestles made of stone are frequently used on the plains, in the hilly regions rice is generally polished with wooden hand-pestles). The basis of social organization everywhere is the clan, consisting of persons bearing the same surname. In the Party organizations in the villages, it often happens that since many Party branches are formed for residential reasons by the Party members of the same surname, a Party branch

¹ "On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, p. 105.

meeting becomes virtually a clan meeting. In these circumstances it is very hard indeed to build a "fighting Bolshevik Party." . . . Localism affects strongly the relation between counties and the relation between districts and even townships in the same county. In eliminating localism arguments can at best produce certain limited results, but the oppression of the White forces, which are not localized, counts for much. For instance, only when the counter-revolutionary "joint expedition" of the two provinces gives the people a sense of their common lot in the struggle, can their localism be gradually broken. Localism is declining as a result of many such lessons.¹

Despite all these difficulties and the fighting that has been going on in the countryside, we have been able to build up a truly Bolshevized Communist Party and an army with a strict proletarian revolutionary discipline. The following are the reasons why this has been possible: Our Party has been founded and developed primarily on the basis of a powerful, centralized industrial proletariat; it has been steeled in the revolution of 1924-27 and has acquired rich political and organizational experience; the leaders of our Party and many cadres in important positions, among them Comrade Mao Tse-tung and other comrades, have, from the very beginning of their political activity, closely linked

¹ "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, p. 94.

themselves with the working class and its struggles and are thoroughly versed in Marxism-Leninism; furthermore, the Chinese revolution is part of the world proletarian revolution and as such it has the guidance of the Communist International, founded by the great Lenin and led by Lenin's pupil and successor—the great Stalin, which generalized all the experiences of the proletarian and other revolutionary struggles in various countries of the world (having fulfilled its historical task, the Communist International declared itself dissolved in 1943); we also have the achievements of the U.S.S.R. as an example and we can refer to and study the contemporary experiences gained in actual struggles by the proletariat and their political parties—the Communist Parties of various countries. Besides this, Comrade Mao Tse-tung has often said that, possessing radio, we are never politically isolated even though we live in the countryside. We are in close contact with the political activities of the whole country and the whole world. At the same time, although the revolution has been split up into parts in various rural areas, the possession of radio has enabled us to establish centralized leadership.

But how are the Party and the army to be built up and what method is to be taken to build up the Party and the army? If these two questions are solved, the question of work among the masses will also be solved.

Comrade Stalin said:

The Party must not be regarded as something isolated from the people who surround it. It lives

and works in its environment. It is not surprising that at times unhealthy moods penetrate into the Party from outside. (Report to the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B.) on the Work of the Central Committee.)¹

Since our Party is located in the rural areas, it follows that the narrow-mindedness, aversion to discipline, sectarianism, vestiges of the old patriarchal system and all kinds of other unhealthy ideas and habits of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie are apt to penetrate into our Party. As long as small peasants and the petty bourgeoisie exist around us in great numbers, there is nothing strange in the existence of such phenomena. Moreover, since in the past we were surrounded by the White political power and the armies of the warlords while at present we come into constant contact with Japanese imperialism and the Kuomintang troops, they have influenced and continue to influence certain elements within our own ranks. Such a situation will become dangerous if we allow it to drift without trying to stop it and if we allow all these vicious things to corrode our Party and the revolutionary armed forces. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has emphatically stated that "the problem of proletarian ideological leadership is a very important one."² To solve this problem, Comrade

¹ Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, Moscow, 1953, p. 630.

² "The Struggle in the Chingang Mountains," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, p. 98.

Mao Tse-tung, at the Kutien Conference,¹ submitted a resolution on ideological remoulding and education within the Party:

The most urgent issue to be attended to in the Red Army is the issue of education. To strengthen and expand the Red Army into a force able to wage the struggle, it is necessary first to carry on education within the Party. Unless the political level of the Party is raised, unless deviations within the Party are eradicated, it will certainly be impossible to strengthen or expand the Red Army, not to speak of its shouldering the important task of waging the struggle. So, it is one of the most important tasks of the Party to carry on systematic education in the Party and to end the disorganization and drift that existed in the past.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's ideas on building the Party are same as those of Lenin and Stalin. Lenin said:

Everywhere and always, the proletariat is recruited from among the petty bourgeoisie, everywhere and always it is connected with the petty bourgeoisie by thousands of transitory steps, borderlines, and shades. When a workers' party grows particularly rapidly (as was the case with us in

¹ The Ninth Party Conference of the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army called at Kutien, Fukien Province in December, 1929.

1905-1906), it is inevitable that many elements, instilled with petty-bourgeois spirit, infiltrate into it. There is nothing bad in this. The historical task of the proletariat consists of assimilating, re-training and re-educating all the elements of petty-bourgeois origin that the old society leaves to the proletariat as a legacy. Because of this, it is necessary that the proletariat re-educate them in such a manner as to be able to influence them, not to be influenced by them. Very many "social-democrats of the days of freedom," having become social-democrats in the days of infatuation, festivals, in the days of colourful slogans, in the days of the victory of the proletariat, which turned the heads even of the real bourgeois intelligentsia, began to *study seriously*, to study Marxism, to study by consistent proletarian work,—they will always remain social-democrats and Marxists. Others had no time or could not learn anything from the proletarian party except a few words they had learned by heart, the "colourful" slogans they had learned by rote, a couple of phrases on "boycott," "militancy," etc. When such elements took it into their heads to force their "theories," their world outlook, *i.e.*, their narrow-mindedness on the workers' party, a split with them became inevitable.¹

These words of Lenin are important to us in our

¹ Translated from *Complete Works of Lenin*, Vol. XVI, pp. 44-45 (Russian edition).

work of building the party as we live in a country where the petty bourgeoisie is predominant. The task of the proletariat is to assimilate the large number of elements of petty-bourgeois origin who have joined the Party, to re-educate them to be genuine Communists and Marxist-Leninists, and at the same time to expel those elements who are ideologically and politically incorrigible and who attempt to corrode our Party.

As we all know, Comrade Stalin has always stressed the importance of Party education. At the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B.), Stalin, after enumerating the various existing deviations from the Party line, pointed out the tasks of ideological and political work as follows:

1. To raise the theoretical level of the Party to the proper plane.
2. To intensify ideological work in all the organizations of the Party.
3. To carry on unceasing propaganda of Leninism in the ranks of the Party.
4. To train the Party organizations and the non-Party *active* which surrounds them in the spirit of Leninist internationalism.
5. Not to gloss over, but boldly to criticize the deviations of certain comrades from Marxism-Leninism.
6. Systematically to expose the ideology and the remnants of the ideology of trends that are hostile to Leninism.¹

¹ Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, Moscow, 1953, p. 642.

At the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B.), Stalin again stressed the importance of educating Party members and cadres in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and improving the political and theoretical level of Party members. Stalin said: "There is hardly need to dwell on the cardinal importance of Party propaganda, of the Marxist-Leninist training of our personnel."¹

We are building our Party in the countryside. It need hardly be explained why it is of the utmost importance to educate and remould our Party members in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism.

In order to build up a genuine Marxist-Leninist party, Comrade Mao Tse-tung shows why it is necessary to wage a struggle against the narrow-mindedness—subjectivism—of the small peasants and petty bourgeoisie. He wrote:

Subjectivism exists to a serious extent among certain Party members and this is very harmful in analytically studying a political situation and in guiding the work. Subjective analysis of a political situation and subjective guidance of work inevitably result either in opportunism or in adventurism. As to subjective criticism inside the Party, random talk not based on facts, or mutual suspicion, it often foments unprincipled conflicts and disrupts the Party's organization.²

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 787.

² "On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, p. 112.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung proposes the following method for rectifying such guidance which is contrary to Marxism-Leninism:

Chiefly to educate Party members so as to raise their thought and their inner-Party life to a political and scientific level. To achieve this end we must: (1) Teach Party members to apply the Marxist-Leninist method in analysing a political situation and appraising class forces in place of subjective analysis and appraisal. (2) Direct the Party members' attention to social and economic investigations and studies, to determine thereby the tactics of struggle and the methods of work, and make comrades understand that without the investigation of actual conditions they will fall into the abyss of phantasy and adventurism. (3) In inner-Party criticism, guard against subjective, dogmatic, and vulgar tendencies: statements must be based on facts and criticism must centre round politics.¹

Comrade Mao Tse-tung points out that we must wage a struggle on two fronts against two forms of subjectivism: on the one hand, against narrow-minded conservatism, against those who are short-sighted and cannot see the future of the revolution and, on the other, against adventurism, against "those who disregard the subjective and objective conditions, are seized with revolutionary impetuosity, and hate to take pains over

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

minor, detailed work among the masses."¹

Unquestionably, if we did not wage a struggle on these two fronts, we should not be able to build up a party that is ideologically genuinely Marxist-Leninist and, without such a party, we could not lead the revolution a single step forward, we could not lead the agrarian revolution, create armed forces and revolutionary base areas, nor could we achieve the best results possible in these matters.

Next, Comrade Mao Tse-tung holds that the Marxist-Leninist party which we wish to build up must be a united party possessing organizationally a strict proletarian discipline and a system of democratic centralism. Hence, we must struggle against all aspects of individualism or cliquism (Comrade Mao Tse-tung also calls it group egoism, later generalizes it as sectarianism), which are manifested within the Party by all incorrect ideas ranging from those of the small peasants to the bourgeoisie.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung points out that the Party must wage struggles on two fronts against all aspects of individualism or cliquism, namely, against extreme democratization and absolute equitarianism coming from the "Left," and against liberalism coming from the Right. Needless to say, all these deviations violate the Party's principle of democratic centralism; they undermine the Party's organization and sap its fighting power.

Unquestionably, if we did not wage struggles on

¹Ibid., p. 107.

these two fronts, we should not be able to build organizationally a party with a strict proletarian discipline. And without such a party we could not lead the revolution a single step forward, we could not lead the agrarian revolution, create armed forces and revolutionary base areas, nor achieve the best results possible in these matters.

As may be seen from the above, the party which Comrade Mao Tse-tung has built up in the revolutionary base areas is a revolutionary party guided by Marxism-Leninism and possessing a strict centralized proletarian discipline. It follows naturally that an army created by such a party can become the best and the most revolutionary army in China.

Such a revolutionary army will absolutely not tolerate warlordism. The principles of building the army discussed at the Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Army of the Red Army presided over by Comrade Mao Tse-tung (the Kutien Conference) may be summarized as follows: Firstly, this army must recognize that it is for political work to guide military work, that the Party leads the army and not vice versa, and that the Party cannot be separated from the army. Secondly, this army must maintain close contact with the masses; it simultaneously fights and carries on propaganda work; it organizes the masses, but is not isolated from the masses nor does it stand above them. Thirdly, this army should be free from group egoism and should consider the arming of the local masses of the people as one of its important tasks. Fourthly, this army must be different from the Kuomintang army which

is used by the military commanders to monopolize political power. Fifthly, the comrades in charge of military affairs must be different from the officers in the Kuomintang army in which Kuomintang members holding high military posts become privileged members of the Kuomintang. Sixthly, this army must itself be democratic; and so on.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote:

Apart from the role played by the Party, the reason why the Red Army can sustain itself without collapse in spite of such a poor standard of material life and incessant engagements is its practice of democracy. The officers do not beat the men; officers and men receive equal treatment; soldiers enjoy freedom of assembly and speech; cumbersome formalities and ceremonies are done away with; and the account books are open to the inspection of all. The soldiers handle the messing arrangements. . . . All these measures are very satisfactory to the soldiers. The newly captured soldiers in particular feel that our army and the Kuomintang's army are worlds apart. They feel that though in material life they are worse off in the Red Army than in the White army, spiritually they are liberated. The fact that the same soldier who was not brave in the enemy army yesterday becomes very brave in the Red Army today shows precisely the impact of democracy. The Red Army is like a furnace in which all captured soldiers are melted down and transformed the moment they come over.

In China not only the people need democracy, but the army needs it too. The democratic system in an army is an important weapon for destroying the feudal mercenary army.¹

This is an unprecedented and revolutionary development of the Chinese army, a great creation of the Communist Party of China, a great creation of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and Comrade Chu Teh and the whole body of the officers and men of the Red Army. The building of such a revolutionary army was started when the Communists were working in the national revolutionary army and in the Whampoa Military Academy. Consequently, the northern expeditionary army scored brilliant victories. Half-way through the expedition, however, this academy and the command of the national revolutionary army, were seized by the political and military agents of the comprador class and landed gentry. But it was precisely at this time that the people's army, a thoroughly revolutionary and democratic army, was built up by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and Comrade Chu Teh and the officers and men of the Red Army. It is only this kind of an army that can do the triple job of fighting, working among the masses and supplying itself, that can perform miraculous feats and steadfastly wage the unprecedentedly protracted and difficult War of Liberation.

Such an army must naturally oppose any tendency to become roving insurgents. At an early stage, such

¹ "The Struggle in the Ching-kang Mountains," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, pp. 82-83.

a tendency did exist in certain units of the Red Army. This is a tendency that not only hampers the steady expansion of the revolutionary ranks, but under present conditions in China can also invite the danger of such units being wiped out by the enemy. Therefore opposition to this tendency presents a very serious problem in building up the army at that time.

Analysing this tendency reflecting the outlook of the roving insurgents in the Red Army in the early stages, Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote:

The political idea of the roving insurgents arises in the Red Army because the vagabond elements form a very large proportion of it and because there are enormous numbers of vagabonds in the country, especially in the southern provinces. This idea manifests itself as follows: (1) To be unwilling to expand our political influence by strenuous work in founding base areas and establishing the political power of the masses of the people, but to try to expand it by applying only mobile guerilla methods. (2) In expanding the Red Army, to follow not the line of first expanding the local detachments of the Red guards, then the local units of the Red Army, and finally the main forces of the Red Army, but the line of "hiring men and buying horses" and "recruiting deserters and taking in mutineers." (Note: Proverbial Chinese expressions describing the activities of the ring-leaders of a rebellion or of outlaws.) (3) To be impatient in carrying on hard struggles together

with the masses, and to hope only to go to the big cities and indulge in eating and drinking. All such manifestations of the idea of the roving insurgents seriously hamper the Red Army in accomplishing its proper tasks; thus the elimination of this idea is indeed one of the important aims of the ideological struggle of the Party organization in the Red Army.¹

Comrade Mao Tse-tung proposed the following methods of rectification of the idea of the roving insurgents:

1. To intensify education, criticize incorrect ideas, and eliminate the idea of the roving insurgents.
2. To intensify education against the vagabond outlook among the basic sections of the Red Army and the newly captured soldiers.
3. To strive to draw into the ranks of the Red Army active workers and peasants experienced in struggle in order to change the composition of the Red Army.
4. To create new units of the Red Army from among the masses of workers and peasants who are in the midst of struggle.²

And, our Party has indeed finally overcome the idea of the roving insurgents. Only by succeeding in this

1 "On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, pp. 114-115.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 115.

and by opposing warlordism has our Party been able to carry out the threefold task of developing the agrarian revolution, building up the armed forces and establishing revolutionary base areas. All the counter-revolutionary elements (imperialists, the Kuomintang reactionaries and trotskyites) who expected us to end in disaster as Li Tse-cheng¹ and Hung Hsiu-chuan² had done, were deeply disillusioned.

Nevertheless, whether in building the Party or the army, if we really wish to do good work, if we really

¹ Li Tse-cheng was the leader of a peasant revolt in the last year of the Ming dynasty (A.D. 1644). Calling upon the peasants to refuse to pay taxes, he led the insurgent peasant army in and out of Shensi, Szechuan, Hupeh, Honan, Ningsia, Kansu, Shansi and Hopei. Although he had the support of the broad peasant masses and had won many victories, he always roamed about the country without being able to establish a relatively consolidated base area. In 1644, he captured Peking. Shortly afterwards, however, he was vanquished by the Manchu army.

² Hung Hsiu-chuan was the leader in the revolutionary war waged by the peasants against the feudal rule and national oppression by the Manchus in the middle of the nineteenth century. In January 1851, Hung Hsiu-chuan together with Yang Hsiu-ching, Feng Yun-shan and others organized and led an uprising in Kueiping County, Kwangsi Province, and established "The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom." In 1852, the revolutionary forces started out from Kwangsi, overran Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi and Anhwei, captured Nanking in 1853 and made it the Taiping capital. After that, part of the revolutionary forces was dispatched north and reached the vicinity of Tientsin. The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, however, failed to establish strong bases in the areas under its occupation. Its leaders committed many political and military blunders. Because of this, it could not withstand the combined assaults of the Manchu reactionary army and the British, American and French aggressors, and was finally defeated in 1864.

wish to accomplish our revolutionary tasks, we must all follow a mass line in our work. There is no other way.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has pointed out that it is necessary "to arouse the local Party organizations to make criticism of the Party organizations in the Red Army, and the organs of mass political power to make criticism of the Red Army in order to influence the Party organizations in the Red Army and officers and men of the Red Army."¹ In other words, we must depend on the criticism of the masses to keep our Party and the revolutionary army healthy.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has warned against the danger of losing contact with the masses. He has pointed out that the purely military viewpoint of "overconfidence in military strength and lack of confidence in the strength of the masses of the people"² is entirely wrong.

In January 1943, Comrade Jen Pi-shih,³ in a speech to the leading cadres in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Area on the question of unified leadership in the Party and the question of opposing warlordism and bureaucratism, stressed the necessity of following the mass line. He pointed out that in order to oppose all that is evil and to encourage what is good, "the only

¹ "On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, p. 108.

² *Ibid.*, p. 107.

³ Chinese political leader, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China since 1927, member of the Political Bureau since 1931. In 1945, he was elected member of the Political Bureau and concurrently secretary of the Secretariat. He died in Peking in October 1950.

way is to develop criticism and supervision among the rank and file of the Party and of government organs. Criticism and supervision by the masses should be developed as an important weapon in eradicating tendencies towards bureaucratism and warlordism, corruption and decadence, and other incorrect ideological tendencies, and the attitude of indifference towards these incorrect ideological tendencies."

The mass line is the key to activating all kinds of work; it is also the means with which Comrade Mao Tse-tung has correctly led the Chinese revolution. With this key, we can have a good Party, a good army, and can do good work among the masses. Then, we shall be able to handle all our work well and overcome all our difficulties, and no counter-revolutionary will be able to do anything to hinder us.

In this connection, we should also discuss the question of the attitude of the Communists towards the revolutionary struggles and various kinds of work. As is well known, Lenin and Stalin have constantly taught us Communists not to be conceited in victory or dejected in defeat. Comrade Stalin specifically has taught us not to become dizzy with success. At the Kutien Conference, Comrade Mao Tse-tung likewise brought up this question. He severely reprimanded some comrades for getting "conceited when a battle is won and . . . dejected when it is lost."¹ The cause of the Chinese revolution is a great cause; the cause of Communism

¹ "On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, p. 107.

is also a great cause. Our task is immense; our path of advance is tortuous; we Communists must strive "to improve ourselves day by day, again and again." If we should become conceited when we win a few battles and dejected when we lose some, then our efforts will be useless and our progress will be cut short. Consequently, we shall not be able to lead the masses forward and will be forsaken by them. Thus, whether or not we Communists can march forward together with the masses depends on how well we can, in our practical activities, carry out the instructions of Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-tung who teach us not to become conceited in victory or dejected in defeat.

V

CONCLUSION

Commenting on the appearance in China, after the Great October Socialist Revolution, of Marxism-Leninism and of the Communist Party, Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote, "China then began to assume a different aspect."¹ The first achievement of the Communist Party of China, standing as it was in the forefront of all the classes and parties of the country, was its

¹ Mao Tse-tung, *On People's Democratic Dictatorship*, Eng. ed., Peking, 1953, p. 5.

advocacy of a political programme directed against imperialism, feudalism and warlordism and the creation of a national democratic united front, paving the way to the First Great Revolution. Comparing this great revolution (that is, the revolution after the birth of the Communist Party of China and led by it) with the revolution of 1911 (that is, the revolution before the birth of the Communist Party of China and led by bourgeois and petty-bourgeois political parties), we see that although they were separated only by a short period, they differed vastly in scale and intensity, in the form of struggle, and in the extent and depth to which the people were enlightened.

True, the revolution failed in 1927. Our Party may be said to have lost a battle at that time. The failure was due, on the one hand, to the betrayal and sudden attack against us by Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang, an attack which caught the young Party and the proletariat morally unprepared, and, on the other, to the incorrect leadership of the opportunist Chen Tu-hsiu which presented Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang with an opportunity to carry out their sudden attack and gave a big advantage to the counter-revolutionary conspirators.

The defeat suffered by our Party, just like a defeat suffered by an army, caused some confusion within our ranks. In the revolutionary period of 1927, the chief opportunist leaders like Chen Tu-hsiu and Peng Shu-chih turned counter-revolutionary trotskyites, advocated an alliance with reaction and became the most despicable hirelings of imperialism and the Kuomintang reac-

tionaries. Other traitors surrendered one by one to the Kuomintang, became its underlings, turned against the Communists and betrayed the Party and the proletariat.

Still other opportunists became pessimistic, avoided the struggle and withdrew from our Party; they had only followed the crowd, coming in when the revolution was on the upswing and deserting when it was in difficulties; these people were simple time-servers. Still others withdrew from the Party but claimed to be revolutionaries. Feeling that the Communist Party had become much too "red," they thought they might be able to gain the favour of the masses if they put up something new (but they achieved the opposite because their severance of ties with the Communist Party meant severance of ties with the masses). They were also opportunist in their thinking. Later, however, some of them returned to the Party; some maintained friendly relations with it, while others became hostile towards it.

The great majority of those who had remained in the Party, willing to continue the struggle, were the core and mainstay of the Party. But, some displayed a tendency towards adventurism. We grant that most of those who committed this error harboured no evil intentions towards the revolution and were enthusiastic revolutionaries, but, in general, they reflected the influence of petty-bourgeois impetuosity. They substituted their subjective idealism for Marxist materialism. They did not know how to accumulate strength by working among the masses and how to apply flexible revolutionary policies. Some of them, not being sure of their objective, fought blindly. Though they had admirable in-

tentions, in actual practice they suffered complete failure and never succeeded in their revolutionary aims.

The Sixth Party Congress deserved credit for overcoming the ideological confusion arising from this failure of the revolution. That Congress charted out the course of the revolution; it determined that the revolution was still bourgeois-democratic in character and opposed the trotskyite Chen Tu-hsiu clique. It also resolved that the Chinese revolution could succeed only under the leadership of the proletariat. By so doing, the Congress unified the Party and overcame the crisis created by the elements who had betrayed or deserted the Party. It pointed out that the first upsurge of the revolution was over but that not a single task of the revolution had been fulfilled; and that a new revolutionary upsurge was inevitable. Stressing that the Party was passing through a period between two revolutionary upsurges, the Congress formulated its general line of policy: to win over the masses. Thus, on the one hand, it overcame the inactivity of some members and, on the other, it pointed out that adventurism and commandism were the chief and most dangerous deviations.

As we all know, however, the Sixth Party Congress had its shortcomings (but I shall not dwell upon this point here). Applying the methods and theory of Marxism - Leninism and following and developing Stalin's teachings concerning the Chinese revolution, Comrade Mao Tse-tung completely solved the fundamental questions raised by the revolution at that time. Following the failure of the revolution in 1927 and just before and after the Sixth Congress, only Comrade Mao

Tse-tung and the comrades who had rallied round him remained in the forefront of the Party, fully retained their Marxist-Leninist clear-headedness and never lost their bearings; they opposed both opportunism and adventurism and became the revolutionary guides of the whole Party.

Lenin said:

A revolutionary party must always study. . . .
If it does not learn how to advance and how to retreat correctly, it will not achieve success.

This is a great revolutionary truth. To be accomplished in such knowledge, it is necessary to study the various characteristics of the national socio-economic structure and political movements and to show adequate courage both in theory and in practice.

As we have seen from the *Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan* and from Comrade Mao Tse-tung's practical activities, he proved to be a capable revolutionary leader in the offensive during the revolutionary period of 1924-27. Particularly at all important junctures of the development of the revolution, he pointed out the correct direction of the offensive (that is, he not only knew when but also how to attack). Chen Tu-hsiu and the opportunists rejected this direction of offensive and led the revolution to defeat. At the time of the failure of the revolution in 1927, the retreat of the forces personally led by Comrade Mao Tse-tung was the best planned and the most orderly, and caused the least losses to the Party. Comrade Mao

Tse-tung carried out the retreat by selecting the best positions to hold on to at different stages (that is, he knew not only when but also how to retreat). Apart from this, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, taking into account the characteristics of Chinese society, succeeded even during the period of the failure of the revolution in 1927 in correctly turning the retreat into an offensive. In other words, it was a retreat on the one hand, and a retreat turned into an offensive on the other; in other words, it was a retreat from one point of view and an offensive from another. Comrade Mao Tse-tung selected a definite rural area as a central position in the retreat — one in which the counter-revolutionary forces were relatively weak and where contradictions among them were numerous—and thus enabled the revolutionary forces to manoeuvre and accumulate strength. The march towards the Chingkang Mountains is one of the best-known marches in the world's revolutionary history. At first, it was a march with the significance of a retreat. This retreat was significant because besides maintaining the retreating forces intact, it played the part of covering the nation-wide retreat of the revolution by making itself the biggest objective of the struggle waged against the revolution by the counter-revolution.

In another respect, this retreat was the beginning of a new offensive. In other words, while it is true that the failure of the revolution in 1927 forced us to retreat from the big cities, the revolution which had lost the cities established independent regimes in the rural districts it had captured in the fighting. The revolution changed the direction of its offensive—it went to the

rural areas where the counter-revolutionary forces were relatively weak and contradictions more numerous and where the revolution had had a great influence on the masses. This offensive meant the intensification of the class struggle. The immediate objectives of the offensive were the imperialist stooges—the Kuomintang which had betrayed the revolution, and the feudal landlord class; the course of the offensive led through the agrarian revolution, armed struggle, and the building up of revolutionary base areas. This offensive, therefore, went one step further than the Northern Expedition.

When the dark counter-revolutionary terror swept the country, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, Comrade Chu Teh and many comrades around them as well as the many comrades in different places who had followed Comrade Mao Tse-tung's path actually represented our whole Party. They led our comrades and the revolutionary workers, peasants and soldiers to carry onward the revolutionary achievements of 1924-27 and issued the order for the offensive against the counter-revolution. This gave encouragement to the whole nation. It was a most daring and soberly planned and executed offensive in the face of great difficulties; at that time it was only local and launched in a series of waves, but it was a well-aimed and fatal blow delivered against the enemy. Furthermore, it later became a great motive force which precipitated a new revolutionary upsurge throughout the country. This offensive, according to Comrade Mao Tse-tung, started as "a single spark" and developed into "a prairie fire."

Comrade Mao Tse-tung always stresses the para-

mount importance of theory and policies in relation to revolutionary practice. As we have noted in the foregoing pages, he recalled in his *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War* that if we had not answered the fundamental question of "How long can the Red flag be kept flying?" in the early stages of the war waged by the Red Army, we should not have been able to advance a single step. Again, as mentioned above, Comrade Mao Tse-tung has always stressed that the correctness of the policies of the Communist Party is "an important condition" for the existence and development of the revolutionary forces. It is true that "without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement." In the light of the experiences of the Chinese revolution and of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, these words of Lenin are highly instructive. The keynote of the ideology of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, faithful disciple of the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, is unity of theory and practice. He has distinguished himself by his ability to adapt Marxism-Leninism to the practice of the Chinese revolution, thus concretely illustrating the laws of the development of the revolution in China. It follows, therefore, that the Chinese revolution under his leadership is bound to overcome difficulties and be victorious.

Since the founding of our Party, the valiant struggles and sacrifices of all the comrades of the Party have been most praiseworthy and inspiring, and they have become more so as time goes on. There were such outstanding statesmen as Comrades Li Ta-

chao,¹ Chen Yen-nien,² Chao Shih-yen³ and Lo Yi-nung,⁴ and such brilliant leaders of the masses as Comrades Su Chao-cheng,⁵ Peng Pai,⁶ Liu Hua,⁷ Wang Shou-

¹ One of the earliest propagandists of Marxism-Leninism in China, a founder and veteran leader of the Communist Party of China. Arrested by the Fengtien warlord Chang Tso-lin, he died a martyr's death in April 1927.

² Veteran member and leader of the Communist Party of China, he was elected member of the Central Committee at the Fifth National Congress in 1927. In June 1927 he was arrested and killed in Shanghai.

³ Chinese Communist leader of the early labour movement and one of the leaders of the three armed uprisings staged by Shanghai workers from the end of 1926 to the spring of 1927. In July 1927 he was arrested and killed in Shanghai.

⁴ Chinese Communist leader in the early labour movement and one of the leaders of the three armed uprisings staged by Shanghai workers from the winter of 1926 to the spring of 1927. He was elected member of the Central Committee at the Fifth National Congress. In April 1928 he was arrested and killed in Shanghai.

⁵ Chinese Communist leader in the early labour movement and one of the organizers and leaders of the Hongkong seamen's strike in 1922 and of the Canton-Hongkong general strike in 1925. In 1927 he was elected member of the Central Committee and alternate member of the Political Bureau. In 1928 he was elected member of the Political Bureau. He died in Shanghai in January 1929.

⁶ Chinese Communist leader of the early peasant movement and founder of Red revolutionary political power in Haifeng and Lufeng in Kwangtung Province. He was elected member of the Central Committee in 1927 and member of the Political Bureau in 1928. He was arrested and killed by the Kuomintang reactionary government in Shanghai in 1929.

⁷ Well-known Chinese Communist organizer of the labour movement and one of the leaders of the Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions in 1925. In November 1925 he was arrested and killed by the warlord Sun Chuan-fang.

hua,¹ Fang Chih-min² and Teng Chung-hsia.³ All these comrades who were prominent fighters during the revolutionary period of 1924-27, laid down their lives for the cause of Communism. There were also such distinguished propagandists of Marxism-Leninism as Comrades Chu Chiu-pai,⁴ Yun Tai-ying,⁵ Hsiao Chu-nu⁶ and

¹ Well-known Chinese Communist organizer of the labour movement, he served as chairman of the Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions in 1925. He was killed in Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary *coup d'etat* of April 12, 1927.

² Chinese political leader and strategist; elected member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1928; established the Red area in northeastern Kiangsi and the Tenth Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. In 1934 he led the march northward of the Red Army's anti-Japanese advance units. In an encounter with the Kuomintang counter-revolutionary army in January 1935, he was taken prisoner and died a martyr's death in Nanchang in July.

³ Chinese Communist leader of the early labour movement. In 1922 he headed the Chinese Trade Union Secretariat which was the central organ of the labour movement led by the Communist Party of China. From 1922 he served as a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. In 1928 he was chosen as representative of the All-China Federation of Labour to the Red Trade Union International which elected him member of its Executive Committee at its Fourth Congress. After his return from Moscow in 1930, he served as political commissar of the Second Red Army Group in the Hunan-and-Western-Hupei revolutionary base area. In 1933 he was arrested in Shanghai and was killed in Nanking in the same year.

⁴ See footnote 2 on page 10.

⁵ Chinese Communist leader and propagandist in the early youth movement. He headed the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League in 1923 and was elected member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at the Fifth National Congress. In the spring of 1930, he was arrested and killed in Shanghai.

⁶ Chinese Communist propagandist in the early period and

Tsai Ho-shen,¹ who waged many important struggles, died for the cause of Communism and brought immortal glory to our Party and the Chinese people. Nevertheless, since the founding of our Party, it is only Comrade Mao Tse-tung who has been able correctly to apply Marxism-Leninism, continue the work of Comrade Stalin in dealing with the theoretical questions of the Chinese revolution, concretely analyse the Chinese society, concretely point out the laws of the development of the Chinese revolution, and for a long time correctly lead the Chinese revolution in its advance. It is from the works of Comrade Mao Tse-tung that we can see the close relation between Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution. Hence, if we wish to study the history of the Chinese revolution, and study our Party line, we should seriously study the works of Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

Spring 1944.

one of the editors of *Chinese Youth*, organ of the Chinese Communist Youth League. In 1924 he was a political instructor of the Whampao Military Academy. In April 1927 he was killed in the counter-revolutionary *coup d'etat* of the Kwangtung warlords.

¹ Chinese Communist propagandist in the early period. He was elected member of the Central Committee at the Second National Congress of the Communist Party of China and member of the Political Bureau at the Fifth National Congress. In 1931 he was sent to Hongkong as a representative of the Party Centre to direct Party work in Kwangtung Province. He was later arrested by the Hongkong authorities and turned over to the reactionary Kuomintang government in Canton. In 1932 he was secretly murdered.

關於十年內戰（英）