

Soviet Civilization

By CORLISS LAMONT

NEW AND ENLARGED EDITION

SOVIET CIVILIZATION

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
"The dynamic new society of Soviet socialism, based on nation-wide economic planning, the public ownership of industry, and the collectivization of agriculture, has gone through major changes since *Soviet Civilization* was first published in November 1952. Changes in human affairs are often for the worse. But in the U.S.S.R. over the past two years they have been for the better, with considerable improvements in both domestic affairs and foreign relations. These developments tend to corroborate, I believe, the main conclusions of this book." With these words Dr. Corliss Lamont begins the Epilogue to the Second Edition of this book.

Soviet Civilization is a major work by the author of *The Peoples of the Soviet Union* and seeks to give a general picture and evaluation of Soviet affairs, domestic and foreign. Thoroughly documented, this book is based on Dr. Lamont's unceasing study of Soviet Russia over the past twenty years and on two extended trips to that country. The volume discusses calmly and objectively many of the controversial issues of the day concerning the Soviet Union and American-Soviet relations. And it shows the feasibility of lasting peace, far-reaching disarmament, and normal trade between the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. grounded in the mutual self-interest of the two nations.

This new and enlarged edition has not only been brought up to date by the addition of an epilogue covering both foreign and domestic developments in the U.S.S.R. since 1952, but it contains an introduction by James Aronson which evaluates Dr. Lamont's important book in the light of the most recent movements of the American and other peoples toward co-existence between the capitalist countries and the socialist countries of the world.

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NEW SOVIET TREE-PLANTING, WATER




The map illustrates the industrial and infrastructure development in the New Siberian Islands and surrounding regions. Key features include:


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 - Cattle
 - Iron



Forest Shelter

 Oil Refineries Oil Fields

General Industry

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Grain**

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New
Dams

 Cattle

I Iron

By Corliss Lamont

The Peoples of the Soviet Union

Humanism as a Philosophy

The Illusion of Immortality

The Independent Mind

Editor of *Man Answers Death: An Anthology of Poetry*

SOVIET CIVILIZATION

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SECOND EDITION

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To
ALBERT RHYS WILLIAMS

INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION

"Remember what our ultimate choice is — to *live* together or to *die* together. Those who follow the 'You can't trust Russia' line are casting their votes for dying together."

—Ernest T. Weir, chairman of the
National Steel Corp., December, 1954

What Mr. Weir is saying is very much akin to the simple question Dr. Lamont has posed by writing this book: Do you want to live? If so, since you have to live together with the Soviet Union, what sort of a country is it that you have to live with?

Mr. Weir is one of the nation's foremost industrialists and a frequent visitor to the White House. Yet few, if any, American newspapers paid him the courtesy of publishing his remarks. You might conclude therefore, from reading American newspapers, that there is no simple question before us. If fact, the more you read them, the more confused you are likely to get.

Take my own daily paper, for example (the one I read; I resigned as a member of its staff seven years ago). Let us see how the problem Mr. Weir states so simply — the problem of life or death—looks through the pages of the *New York Times*.

The *Times* is a newspaperman's dream of what a newspaper could be. Sitting astride Manhattan at the Crossroads of the World, it houses great presses and linotype machines, teletype and cable apparatus, a forest of newsprint and a lake of printer's ink.

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Under its roof hundreds of men and women work to put out a newspaper which the Sunday Editor weighs each week in pounds. These are people skilled in their craft, temperately varied in their viewpoint, devoted to the *Times*. It is a newspaper of record — and of many contradictions. There is, for example, a distinguished military analyst with a rightful reputation for careful dispatches. There is an observer of what is known as the Soviet scene who covers Moscow by telescope at a distance of 4,000 miles. There was a correspondent in Moscow who for five years sent home sober reports on the Soviet Union, only to come home to write a series of articles which might easily be subtitled: "A Thousand and One Nights in the Blood-Stained Cellars of Lubyanka Prison." At the conclusion of this series he undertook another, on American garbage, and when last noted was compiling recipes for Russian cabbage soup for the home-makers page. The *Times* now has another sober and careful correspondent in Moscow, and the cellars have been purged of blood.

Our potential dream newspaper does not confine itself to the printed word; it owns a radio station. A feature of this station is the *New York Times* Youth Forum, conducted every week-end with a distinguished invited guest.

On the week-end of January 9, 1955, the guest of the Forum was Theodore H. White, national correspondent of the *Reporter* magazine, just back from a five-week trip through Western Germany. The topic was "What Does European Defense Mean to Us?" A questioner in the audience asked Mr. White what he thought about co-existence with the Soviet Union. Mr. White replied:

"I loathe that word co-existence. It is a thoroughly Communist word, and every American commentator has now picked it up. It is nothing but Marxist jargon."

For Mr. White, as for many who are embarrassed by the facts of life, the phrase "peaceful co-existence" is the core of a great semantic battle. For others, including the President of

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the United States, the Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and several hundreds of millions of people of all colors, peaceful co-existence has lost its quotation marks and become the core of the battle for survival — for the whole human race.

But, in quotation marks or out, the arguments make greater sense if we understand what is meant by co-existence in two great opposing capitals of the world: Washington and Moscow. Once again the *New York Times* is the frame. On November 17, 1954, there appeared side by side in the *Times* dispatches from Dana Adams Schmidt in Washington and Clifton Daniel in Moscow. Mr. Schmidt wrote:

"Most Washington officials have no objection to the phrase 'peaceful co-existence' as used by the President. But they do not like the phrase because, they say, Moscow has corrupted it by using it insincerely and misleadingly. United States officials say the Russians use the phrase to play effectively on the world's fear of atomic war.

"Stripped of its Communist connotations, the officials say, peaceful co-existence is a rather barren concept. All it means is that the principal protagonists in the world agree not to murder each other.

"The irritating thing from the United States point of view is that the Communists lend propagandistic value to their advocacy of peaceful co-existence by brushing aside the basic policies of the United States and using irresponsible statements by individual Americans to indicate the United States wants war.

"Some officials in Washington would like to formulate a positive rejoinder to peaceful co-existence. The United States, they say, has a much broader, more positive and constructive concept of international relations than that represented by peaceful co-existence.

"The United States concept is one of a variety of states, of differing ideological persuasions, having ever increasing

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contacts on governmental and individual levels. One might describe the system as one of 'international cooperation in peace and security.' "

Mr. Daniel wrote from Moscow:

"What does the Soviet Union mean by 'peaceful co-existence,' which is the underlying theme of all its present diplomatic efforts? What are the terms and conditions of co-existence?

"In its simplest terms, of course, peaceful co-existence means the absence of war between capitalist and communist countries. 'The need for co-existence is especially imperative now,' the magazine *Kommunist* says, 'because the alternative would be bloody and destructive war.'

"However, according to Soviet interpretations, peaceful co-existence has aspects more positive than mere abstention from war. Maxim D. Saburov, deputy premier, said in his recent speech on the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution that it involved 'the desire of both sides to cooperate,' 'readiness to fulfill obligations assumed,' and 'observance of the principles of equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.'

"The Soviet Union's immediate proposals for political and military collaboration between the two camps have been put forward many times. They are a four-power agreement on Germany's reunification, general agreement on disarmament and the banning of atomic weapons, and an all-European pact for collective security.

"Many Soviet publications in recent months have emphasized the possibility and value of increased trade and cultural contact among nations as a means of creating understanding and reducing tension.

"As for the ground rules under which peaceful cooperation would operate, *Kommunist* suggest that the principles worked out by Nehru and Chou En-lai could be taken as a basis for relations among all countries. These principles

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are: Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and co-existence."

This was the setting in which the battle was joined in Washington two weeks after Election Day, in November, 1954. There had been speculation as to how much cooperation the President would receive from the new Democratic majority in Congress. On November 16, a major speech was made — not, however, by a Democrat, but by the President's own leader on Capitol Hill, Senator William F. Knowland of California. He asked whether the time had not come for a drastic reappraisal of our foreign policy. He drew grim portents for democracy. He said:

"The Soviet Union is advancing the Trojan Horse of co-existence only for the purpose of gaining sufficient time to accomplish what we may term atomic stalemate. During such a time the United States will become a continental Dienbienphu in a Communist totalitarian world, the chances of our winning such a struggle would be so lessened and the Soviet world so extended that they then would be prepared for an all-out challenge to us wherein we would be allowed the choice of surrender or die."

Mr. Knowland's brashness sent reporters calling, and the first call was on Secretary of State Dulles. Mr. Dulles, aware that the President had been taking a new look at the world, yet being himself ideologically attuned to Mr. Knowland, was in something of a quandary. If by co-existence, he said, is meant the ability of people who think differently to exist in the world, there is of course co-existence. But if the word is in the sense of the compatibility of the different philosophical views held by the free nations and the Communists, that is not practical.

Groggy from this encounter with obscurantism, the reporters reeled into Department of Defense, which is presided over by a very blunt man. The United States and the Soviet Union had to live in peaceful co-existence "or look forward to

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war," said Secretary Wilson. This follows, he added, from the fact that "we are all on the same planet [and] it must be done." Thus was the nation brought back from outer space.

A few days later, at a White House press conference, the President himself attempted a definition in his typical earnest manner. He said:

"Co-existence, after all . . . has a relatively simple meaning. You either live with someone in this world or you are fighting him and trying to kill him. As long as you are not trying to destroy him, you are co-existing."

Even with this negative interpretation, the President widened the gap between himself and Senator Knowland. But in doing so he was being somewhat less consistent over the course than the Senator. It was, after all, the President and the Secretary of State who proclaimed in 1952 that the Truman-Acheson policy of "containment" of communism was not enough and had to be replaced by the policy of "liberation." Senator Knowland indorsed this view heartily; but he discovered, in the bleak November of 1954, that the Presidential back he was slapping seemed to be slipping from under him.

What has caused the shift in policy need not be discussed in detail here. Literate and aware readers know. It need be said only, if the present time is compared with 1938 — when the Soviet Union also called repeatedly for collective security as the only way to peace — that the situation is vastly different:

Today the Soviet Union does not stand alone. The fact of China with one-fifth of the world's people is stark and clear.

The smaller socialist countries are coming of age. Throughout Europe, despite parliamentary votes, there is a revulsion at the thought of German rearmament; the sound of the jackboot is still a universal nightmare. All Asia wants peace — and is saying so. Africa is restless; the clanking chains are being broken. Asia and Africa, with half the people of the world, are joining forces and a new kind of chain is being forged. The colonial world is dying.

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The difference between Senator Knowland and the others may be stated simply in the question: Do we or do we not already have the atomic stalemate? He says we do not. The others say we do, and they are talking co-existence because there is nothing else for sane people to talk about. All Europe has become aware of it and the governments of Europe have been forced to heed the people's warning: they will not be reduced to radioactive ash to vindicate John Foster Dulles.

Thus the facts of life are taking the semantics out of the battle for peace. It does not mean that there has been an abandonment of the "peace through strength" theory of the leaders of the Western world. It does not mean that co-existence is being accepted in many important places with anything save reluctance. A bristling acceptance was made by Adlai Stevenson in the New Year's issue of *Look* magazine. He said United States relations with the Soviet Union are a question of "either co-existence or no existence," even though he saw no prospect for a "change in the Communist policy of creeping conquest . . . little prospect that we can safely further reduce our defenses or relax our guard. We will have to co-exist with our ruthless, ambitious, implacable Communist neighbors, whether we like it or not."

While the *Times* worried editorially whether co-existence is not "that equivocal concept thrown into international debate as a substitute for real peace," the *New York Herald Tribune* seemed less anxious. It said:

"The real question is whether a more reasonable and conciliatory tone can by itself lead to better relations and a more secure peace. There are those who deny it. Soft words in Moscow, it is argued, by this group, only increase our danger, for they lull the West into a false conviction of safety. They tempt it into measures which will only make easier the accomplishments of Russia's long-range plans.

"President Eisenhower is among the world's statesmen

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who will not accept this defeatist view. As he made plain, there are some things which can be done step by step, with open eyes, to smooth over some of the friction points and to open wider possibilities of agreement."

But there are some things that cannot be done, eyes open or closed, as Stewart and Joseph Alsop pointed out in their syndicated column of November 29, 1954:

"No government can go on indefinitely facing two ways on basic issues of policy . . . You cannot, after all, seek a way of living with the Communist world and seek to strangle the Chinese Communist baby in its cradle at one and the same time."

Things do change. General Mark Clark said: "I don't think you could drag the Soviet Union into a shooting war." *The Times* reported "top military men" as saying they doubted it "would be possible to provoke a war with the Soviet Union at this time." And the *New York Daily Mirror* complained bitterly of the "increasing tempo and force . . . of the tom-toms of 'peace.' "

It remained for two persons — one a philosopher and one a hard-headed businessman — to come to the heart of the matter. The philosopher was Ralph Barton Perry, professor emeritus of Harvard, who wrote in a letter to *The Times* on December 27, 1954:

"For the Western democracies to accept the idea of co-existence concedes nothing as to the merits of the rival systems. The program for an uncompromising adherence to the gospel of freedom is not the stopping of communism or the imposition of democracy by force, both of which are impossible achievements in the realm of ideas.

"It has been said that the central question is 'Can the free and the communist worlds exist permanently side by side without war?' There are fatal objections to this statement: these two worlds cannot exist permanently

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side by side with war, and no two worlds can exist permanently side by side. The real question is whether a partially free world and a partially communist world can exist side by side long enough to learn how to live at peace.

"Ideologies whose realization would be contradictory or mutually exclusive may and do nevertheless co-exist as ideologies. Their collision is indefinitely postponed and may be permanently averted. Meanwhile they not only live side by side but interact, and they may change in the direction of compromise and compatibility."

The businessman who came to the heart of the matter was Ernest T. Weir who, in a speech before the Cleveland Engineering Society last December, said:

"Remember what our ultimate choice is — to *live* together or to *die* together. Those who follow the 'You can't trust Russia' line are casting their votes for dying together. Their arguments all boil down to continuance of hostility and suspicion . . . of the warlike posture which will eventually lead to *actual* war.

"Now we must realize that to a large degree the basis for this position is the thought that communism can be eliminated from the world. The fact is that war — the rejection of peaceful co-existence as the only other alternative — would *not* eliminate communism. Communism is an idea. In all history, ideas have *never* been changed or driven from the minds of men by force. Force has simply served to strengthen and spread ideas.

"This problem will not solve itself. *We* must solve it. By 'we' I do not mean just the President or the State Department or the Congress. I mean you and the State Department, or the Congress. I mean you and I and the other fellow working for a firm and clear national policy with the objective of world peace.

"There can be no such national policy without wide-spread public recognition of its need and strong public

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support. Recognition and support will not develop spontaneously. They must be generated by individuals . . . who have the vision to see this problem in its full meaning and the public spirit to do something about it . . . You can initiate the discussion, the thrashing out, the coming to conclusions on this subject at everything from small home groups to large gatherings. In short—in the broadest meaning of the term—you can take political action.”

Mr. Weir is an individual with vision, and such individuals are not notable for their number in our country today. Yet they are there, and when the people have the opportunity to hear what they have to say, they stand with them.

An individual with vision today will easily diagnose the smog of misinformation, delusion and hypocrisy which hangs over the land. Some will rest on the diagnosis and turn away; others will seek a cure. They will say: “Co-existence yes; but how is it to be achieved until we reach the minds and the hearts of America with the facts? How can we make them aware of *what* they will be co-existing with? Co-existence with a bogey is impossible, and for most of America today the Soviet Union is a bogey.”

Such a man of vision is Corliss Lamont. Not only has he asked the questions but he has spent a good portion of his adult life seeking the answers. Being a man of logic and direction, he has gone to the source. Twice he visited the Soviet Union. A third visit was barred by the State Department as not in the “best interests” of the United States.

In a career devoted to the furtherance of the philosophy of Humanism and the preservation of the Bill of Rights, Dr. Lamont has found time to lecture, pamphleteer and write books on sanity in foreign affairs. This, he believes, is the surest way of letting the people know, however slow and tedious may be the process.

He wrote *The Peoples of the Soviet Union* (1946) and then,

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in 1952, completed the first edition of this book. It is a book for smog-bound Americans about the Soviet Union and what makes it tick: the government, the people, the constitution and the culture, its attitudes toward religion, the rights of man and foreign affairs. This is Dr. Lamont's major work on the Soviet Union and, as all the things he has done, it is a work of simplicity and honesty.

Many things in the Soviet Union Dr. Lamont finds commendable; other things he criticizes sharply — especially the attitudes toward civil liberties, as he sees them, and aspects of foreign relations. The book will displease the inflexible on both sides of the political centerpiece; it will be read with gratification by all who are watching and studying the changes now taking place in the Soviet Union in a changing world.

In the time since this book was first published, Dr. Lamont has felt personally the sting of the unreason he fights. On the ground of freedom of speech and the invasion of privacy he has defied the American Inquisition, which seeks to maintain the smog of delusion. As this is written he faces trial for contempt of Congress in one of the most contemptible chapters of our history.

The charges are solemnly stated and the public issue is one of civil liberties. But underlying the charges and the hysteria, as they apply in this particular case, are Dr. Lamont's writings, speeches and associations. It was his book *The Peoples of the Soviet Union* which Senator McCarthy used to launch the attack on him.

Since Dr. Lamont has spent much of his life spreading the doctrine of co-existence — among Americans and between America and the world — then the target in the attack on him is co-existence. The madmen who would rather die together than live together have him on their list. But the more they prod, the sharper are his counter-thrusts and, despite the overwhelming odds, the wounds are not all on one side.

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In the tides and currents that make America in so many ways so beautiful, Corliss Lamont and this writer have arrived at our conclusions (let us rather say, present findings) from vastly different backgrounds. Yet from these divergent backgrounds, we gravitated to Harvard university, each absorbing from it in our time what was fine and decent, and then diverged again into new experiences. But there are basic principles which must bring men together, and these principles have brought us together in the great struggle for co-existence.

This *is* the great struggle. To be outside it is to count oneself as already not among the living. To participate in it is to understand the love of living. In his career I am sure that Dr. Lamont has found affirmation in Milton's words: "Where there is much desire to learn, there of necessity will be much arguing, much writing, many opinions; for opinion in good men is but knowledge in the making."

This, I think, is the reason Dr. Lamont wrote this book.

James Aronson

New York City
January 24, 1955

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Historical superlatives are dangerous, yet it is no exaggeration to say that seldom, if ever, in the whole of human experience has so momentous a social change been condensed into so brief a span as that represented by the Russian Revolution and the consequent establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Scarcely a generation ago there was not a single country of any importance in which socialism was the established mode of life. Now nearly one-third of the entire human race is living in countries with a full socialist economy, and the socialist principle is deeply entrenched in many other areas. It would be a denial of the essential character of social evolution to assume that this portentous movement had now reached its apogee and would come to a sudden stop, or even be reversed.

Up to the present the result has been an international situation dominated by two great Powers, one individualist-capitalist and the other socialist. Current developments in the Far East indicate the possibility that in the relatively near future there may be a third world Power, with a population far exceeding the combined total of the other two. This will be socialist. What then?

In the face of these facts one might reasonably suppose that intelligent persons would wish to know all they could about this remarkable phenomenon, whether it seemed admirable to them or not — not merely historians,

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sociologists, and professors of political science, but everyday citizens of democracies who are presumed, through their political activities, to determine the course of their own countries. Such, unfortunately, does not seem to be the case, at least in that pioneer of democracies which we call the United States. It sometimes seems that the more an individual knows, through first-hand observation and study, about those other countries that call themselves the "new democracies" or the "people's democracies," the harder it is for him to get an audience.

This is not too difficult to understand. In the first place, it is very hard to be sure that one is getting the truth about socialist lands, and consequently there is the temptation to reject all testimony as unreliable, or else, even worse, to accept only such evidence as accords with one's own existing preconceptions, prejudices, beliefs, wishes, or hopes. In the second place, it is very difficult for any moulder of public opinion, however fair and conscientious he may be, to be entirely objective about the Soviet Union and its associated countries. In the present state of world thought and international relations, socialism and individualistic-capitalism are much more than mere abstract contrasting patterns for organizing social life. They are "causes," with a high emotional content. Basic moral values are attributed to them on one side as well as the other. Individuals who are committed to one or the other become champions, devotees, sometimes fanatics. It is just as improbable that a Communist can write dispassionately about the Soviet Union as that the president of a giant corporation could portray capitalism in an entirely objective fashion.

But, for the sake of world understanding and lasting peace, it is vitally important that such a book as *Soviet*

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Civilization should be written. Who, then, is to write it?

The best answer is, simply — such a person as Corliss Lamont.

It is clear from the record that Dr. Lamont is not a Communist. His background of family, education, and occupation is that of Western capitalism. But he is a student, a scholar, a thinker, a teacher, and a philosopher. And he is an honest man.

Being himself an excellent exemplar of "the independent mind," for which he has such a deep regard, and having realized from the beginning that the Russian Revolution was introducing an era of extraordinary potentialities, he has devoted years of study, including two visits to the Soviet Union, to what was at first dubbed a "great experiment" — and which, from the scholastic point of view of the social scientist, is actually a spontaneous experiment of unparalleled significance. It would be hard to find anybody better fitted than Corliss Lamont to throw the spotlight of reality upon some of the vital features of this unprecedented civilization.

Being addressed primarily to the citizens of a democracy, the practical value of this book depends directly upon the number of those who become acquainted with it. If it were read by ten million Americans it could have a profound influence on the whole shape of human destiny. It might be one of the determinative factors in preventing World War III.

Perhaps it would even be worth while to settle for one million readers.

HENRY PRATT FAIRCHILD

P R E F A C E

For full twenty years, ever since my first visit to the Soviet Union in 1932, I have devoted considerable time to the study of Soviet affairs; and to teaching, lecturing and writing about them. Despite the temper of these times and an atmosphere hostile to an objective consideration of the Soviets, I believe it is worth while to sum up calmly my conclusions concerning the U.S.S.R. and American-Soviet relations. This is my major effort, intellectual and moral, to help stem the tide of misunderstanding between the United States and Soviet Russia and thereby to make some contribution to the enduring peace for which our two peoples and the whole world so yearn.

Since this volume is critical of many things in Soviet civilization, it will not please left-wing groups who consider the Soviet Union above all criticism. On the other hand, because the book is sympathetic to the true achievements of the Soviets, it is likely to be denounced by the dogmatic right as Communist propaganda or Utopian naivete. I am repelled by the dictatorial and repressive aspects of the Soviet regime, but am unwilling to join in wholesale condemnations of it based on a one-sided over-emphasis of its negative points. The complete and many-sided story is what we need for a just evaluation of Soviet life; the common-sense recognition, avoiding both extremes, that it contains much that is good and much that is bad.

In my analysis of Soviet Russia I have tried to use

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the same method of reliance on fact and reason which I have applied to other subjects and especially in the field of philosophy. We may as well realize, however, that to stand out these days against the irrational fears and passions that hold sway, to endeavor to be dispassionate and scientific about controversial subjects of a political and international character, is to invite bitter comments from almost every quarter. But my function as a scholar and a writer remains as always to tell the truth as I find it. Putting forward no claims to infallibility and ready to reverse my judgments if they prove wrong, I present this work as the nearest approach I can make to the truth about Soviet Russia.

I have often been accused of wishful thinking about Soviet Russia and of viewing conditions in that country more favorably than the facts warrant. That is what happened, when after my return from the Soviet Union in 1938, I wrote: "It is my own feeling that the Soviet people are well-nigh invincible in an economic, moral and military sense. From without Soviet socialism can undoubtedly be set back, but hardly destroyed."¹ For that and other statements pointing out the great progress which had taken place in the U.S.S.R. I was widely set down as an apologist for Soviet Russia. This was still the case in the summer of 1941 when, three weeks after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Republic and disagreeing with 95 percent of American public opinion, I predicted in an address that Hitler would never get to Moscow and that the Russians would hold off the Germans and eventually defeat them.

"The Soviets will never yield," I said. "They will fight on their plains, they will fight in their mountains, they will fight along their rivers, their lakes and their

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seas, till the trampling march of Nazi power dies away into the silence of history."² Somewhat later, in January, 1942, Mr. George E. Sokolsky, an anti-Soviet diehard and one of my most slashing critics, asserted in his column in the *New York Sun*: "So even those of us who are not given to seeing any good in Russia are faced by the very cold facts of the moment, and until we are proved right about our prognostications and doubts, we have to bow to such superior prophets as Corliss Lamont, who always said that the Bolshies would do it."³

The point is, of course, that to tell the plain and demonstrable truth about the Soviet Union, even if that truth recognizes considerable Soviet achievements, indicates that you are a careful observer rather than a Soviet apologist. And by reporting the actualities of the Soviet situation I was surely serving my country better than the so-called experts who continually misled the American people by supplying information about the U.S.S.R. that had such dangerously little resemblance to the facts. That holds as much for 1952 as 1941. We may be sure that the truth concerning Soviet Russia has not altogether changed in a decade. And we may also be sure that it is just as important to know the truth now as it was then.

What I am trying to establish here is not that I am always right about the Soviet Union — for I have made my share of mistakes regarding Soviet affairs — but that I have made an earnest effort to be objective and that events have proved me correct on a number of important points. However, as the climate of opinion changes towards Soviet Russia, so, too, does the general attitude towards writers on this subject. Today many Americans will call you a Soviet apologist if you find any good at all in the U.S.S.R. and will become quite annoyed if you

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remind them of indisputable facts such as the Red Army's victory over the Nazis at Stalingrad. So it is that Mr. Sokolsky and his confreres are firing away at me once more as an apologist for everything Soviet.

In the spring of 1951 I made plans to visit Western Europe and the Soviet Union during the summer, and actually engaged passage on the S.S. *Queen Mary*. Then week after week I waited for the Passport Division of the United States Department of State to grant an extension of my passport. The Passport Division finally turned down my application on the vague grounds that my "travel abroad at this time would be contrary to the best interests of the United States."⁴ However, my extended correspondence with the passport authorities made clear that they were discriminating against me for political reasons and especially because I had publicly expressed disagreement with American foreign policy.* In October, 1951, I appealed in an Open Letter to President Truman to intervene on my behalf. As a consequence the Passport Division reconsidered my case, but again denied my application.

I had hoped during my intended trip to Soviet Russia to make a first-hand appraisal of current conditions. While there was no guarantee that the Soviet Government would have let me have a visa — though my chances were good — it was in the first instance the arbitrary action of the U. S. State Department, violating my ordinary privileges as an American citizen, that prevented the fulfilment of my traveling plans. Faced with the alternatives of waiting indefinitely, perhaps several years, for the re-establishment of my right to go to Europe or of finishing this book with the abundant factual materials at

* Cf. p. 402.

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hand, I decided on the latter course. Both in my own case and in many other recent cases the State Department must take the responsibility for seriously obstructing knowledge of foreign affairs by preventing American writers and teachers from making on-the-spot investigations into conditions in Soviet Russia and other countries.

While this volume deals with a variety of fundamental questions concerning the Soviet Union, it does not presume to attempt the hazardous undertaking of giving an all-inclusive picture of the U.S.S.R. I have concentrated on those features of Soviet civilization which have particularly interested me and to which I have devoted special study. Much of the material here has appeared previously in preliminary form in articles or pamphlets. In Chapter III on "Soviet Ethnic Democracy" I have drawn to some extent upon an earlier work of mine, *The Peoples of the Soviet Union*.

For assistance in the preparation and writing of this book I wish to thank especially Mr. Bernard L. Koten, of the Library for Intercultural Studies, who made a careful check of the factual material throughout and cheerfully provided the answers to my innumerable questions. He has no responsibility, however, for the many judgments of interpretation I have made. I am also greatly indebted to countless other individuals who have helped me with this volume, but shall not try to list their names.

It has been difficult for me to bring this work to an end. New facts about the Soviet Union and American-Soviet relations keep pouring in; and the international situation changes from day to day. Moreover, I realize that in attempting to compress into one volume a summary and an analysis of these very large subjects I have not done complete justice to the problems involved and

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have had to omit many details that would throw further light upon them. Yet I cannot go on indefinitely and must at last put aside the temptation to include further material and to keep this book abreast of the current news.

C. L.

New York City
August 25, 1952

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PART I

*SOVIET DOMESTIC POLICY AND
ACHIEVEMENTS*

CHAPTER I ON EVALUATING SOVIET RUSSIA

1. *Introductory*

In March of 1951 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was one-third of a century old. In the never-ending debate that has gone on about Soviet Russia for more than three decades, the unbending enemies of the U.S.S.R., the uncritical sympathizers, and those who like myself stand somewhere in the middle all agree on at least one point: that the subject of discussion is of portentous significance for the present and future of all men, all nations, all peoples. It may well be, as stated by Father Edmund A. Walsh, an anti-Soviet writer of long standing, that the establishment of the Soviet Republic was the most important political event since the fall of the Roman Empire. Great revolutions and sweeping changes in any major country have invariably resulted in widespread, heated controversy in other lands. And they have aroused such hostility abroad that usually serious attempts have been made on the part of foreign governments to undermine or overthrow the revolutionary forces and reverse the course of history. It was so at the time of the American Revolution of 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789. We need not be surprised that the Russian Revolution of 1917 has given rise to similar reactions.

In the case of the Russian Revolution, however, the

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reactions have been even more violent and far-reaching. This has been due to the fact that the program of the Soviets was itself more far-reaching than that associated with any other political overturn in history. The Soviet aim was not merely a redistribution of property in the interests of this class or that, but the total abolition of private property in the main means of production and distribution, and the establishment on that basis of a planned socialist economy and a classless society.

The possibility of the creation of a socialist society in a huge and populous country, nearly three times the size of continental United States and containing a vast wealth of natural resources, aroused ardent hopes and fanatical fears from one end of the earth to the other. These hopes and fears were augmented by the fact that Lenin and his fellow-Communists held world socialism as their ultimate ideal; that the Soviet Union, stretching over large portions of both Europe and Asia, was admirably located for extending its international influence; and that radical working class movements of one sort or another were already well under way in a number of nations besides the U.S.S.R. There can be no doubt that whereas the American and French Revolutions almost exclusively affected the Western World, the Russian Revolution has had just as profound an impact upon the East as upon the West.

Year after year the argument about Soviet Russia continued, some claiming that the first socialist state in history was a disastrous failure, others that it was an overwhelming success. Then came the Second World War and the Nazi invasion of the U.S.S.R. in 1941. America and Britain rendered invaluable aid to the Soviet Union; but its efficient handling of that aid, its

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intrepid resistance to Hitler's attack and its eventual counter-offensive all the way to Berlin were convincing proof that here was a nation of remarkable strength, capacity and morale. The Soviet Republic's defeat of the Nazis and its contribution to the over-all victory of the United Nations mightily increased its influence and power in the world.

Along its western frontier the border states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania became firm allies of the Soviet Union and have gone far in developing socialist systems of their own. In the Far East the Chinese Communists ousted the Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek, instituted a People's Republic friendly to the U.S.S.R. and started China along the path to socialism. In international affairs, with the defeat and decline of Germany and Japan, the role of Soviet Russia has greatly increased. Today as the socialist giant of the world it stands on a par with the capitalist giant, America, in power and prestige. Upon the relations between the Soviet Union, leader of the Communist bloc, and the United States, leader of the anti-Communist bloc, primarily depend whether we shall see an enduring peace under the aegis of the United Nations or a new global war even more devastating than the last.

Because, then, of the acknowledged world importance of Soviet Russia today, a sound understanding of both its domestic and foreign policies, is a necessity for all informed and educated persons in this era. There is an enormous diversity of opinion concerning what is going on in the Soviet Union and what its intentions are in the sphere of international relations. Unfortunately ignorance and prejudice play an unusually large part in attitudes toward the U.S.S.R. Yet regarding no subject that

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confronts the minds of men is objectivity more essential.

To be misinformed about the Soviet Union, to misjudge its purposes and achievements, can lead foreign states and peoples to make crucial mistakes in national policies. Americans in particular, because relations between the U. S. Government and that of Soviet Russia have deteriorated to the danger point since the end of the Second World War, have a responsibility to acquaint themselves with the facts about the U.S.S.R. Since American foreign policy so seriously affects the entire future of the United States and the world, and since at present that foreign policy is so largely determined by what Americans think of Russia, it is imperative for us to seek out the truth about the Soviet Union.

2. Much Reliable Information Is Available

Despite all reports to the contrary, during the thirty-five years since the Soviet Republic came into existence there has been ample opportunity for Americans to learn about what is going on in the U.S.S.R. and to obtain reliable information about that country and its people. True enough, there have been difficulties in the way of getting all the data we should like about the Soviet Union — difficulties caused by both the American and Soviet Governments. Yet on the whole and over the years a veritable flood of facts has come through from Soviet Russia on the basis of which foreigners have been able to make valid judgments concerning the Soviet experiment in economic, political and social organization. These facts have appeared in innumerable newspaper dispatches, magazine articles and books published in English in the United States.

While a knowledge of the Russian language is, of

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course, a valuable asset for the understanding of Soviet affairs, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient foundation for such understanding. The White Russian émigrés and exiles who were born and brought up in Tsarist Russia, and who speak the language perfectly, are hardly to be counted on as impartial observers of the Soviet scene. There are plenty of Britishers who speak English with the best Oxford accent whom we should not trust to give an objective account of political and economic affairs under a Labor Government. More important than a knowledge of Russian for the understanding of the Soviet Union is a basic comprehension of social and economic problems in the contemporary world, an earnest attempt to be objective, and a discriminating choice of authorities on the U.S.S.R.

Whether we are making a study of Russia or England, Germany or France or ancient Greece, the principle is the same. In the nature of the case a large part of the knowledge of every informed man *must be vicarious*; he cannot possibly acquire at first-hand all the facts he needs for comprehending the past and for functioning properly in our complex society of the present. In the realm of international relations the twentieth-century American would be utterly lost if, in lieu of his own first-hand observation, he could not depend to a considerable degree on vicarious knowledge stemming from the reports and opinions of others whom he has learned from tested experience to consider dependable.

In any case sufficient material of an authentic nature about the Soviet Union has been translated into English or written in English to enable the average literate person in America and other English-speaking nations to keep informed about Soviet life. To assert, in the phrase orig-

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inally coined by Joseph Goebbels and later popularized by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, that the Russians have erected an "Iron Curtain" to rule out the exchange of information with the outside world is extremely misleading. Again and again I have read editorials in American newspapers lambasting the alleged Iron Curtain, while on a different page in the same edition there is a detailed story on one aspect or another of Soviet affairs by some American correspondent in Moscow. And those who spread the Iron Curtain myth most freely at the same time dispense all kinds of supposed information about the Soviet Union, such as that from 15 to 20 million people live in slave labor camps there or that the Red Army is about to march westward through Europe to the English Channel. So we see clearly that the Iron Curtain is an anti-Soviet propaganda slogan, turned on or off as the situation may require.

It was Mr. Churchill, again, who referred to Soviet policy as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma," a quotation printed repeatedly throughout the non-Soviet world and called upon whenever some commentator is too ignorant to understand the Soviets or too indolent to try. While Soviet policy is sometimes difficult to comprehend, I deny that it constitutes a riddle or that life as a whole in Soviet Russia must remain a mystery to foreigners. In this modern age knowledge is the accepted method of dissolving mysteries. Portraying the U.S.S.R. as a mystery is, like the Iron Curtain stereotype, a substitute for real thinking and an excuse for laziness in seeking out the facts.

On the same level is the claim that the Russians, and especially Joseph Stalin, are inscrutable Orientals whose devious ways it is impossible for Westerners to fathom.

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To consider Russia and the Russians as a mystery, a riddle or an Oriental enigma gives the anti-Soviet forces free reign to describe the Soviet Union as they choose and to make the most exaggerated charges against it. For if the truth about the U.S.S.R. is really impossible to obtain, then one statement about that country is as good as another and the wildest surmises are permissible.

The shallowness and partisanship of those who propagate on every possible occasion Mr. Churchill's quarter-truth is revealed in their failure to give the context of the quotation in his speech of October 1, 1939, commenting on the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland after Hitler's decisive defeat of the Polish army. The Soviet occupation, said Churchill, is "the assertion of the power of Russia. Russia has pursued a cold policy of self-interest. We could have wished that the Russian armies should be standing on their present line as the friends and allies of Poland instead of as invaders. But that the Russian armies should stand on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi menace. . . .

"I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest. It cannot be in accordance with the interest or the safety of Russia that Germany should plant itself upon the shores of the Black Sea, or that it should overrun the Balkan States and subjugate the Slavonic peoples of south-eastern Europe. That would be contrary to the historic life-interests of Russia."¹

So Churchill himself significantly qualified the half-sentence which is usually quoted all by itself from his speech. He did not regard the Soviet march into Eastern Poland as a riddle in the slightest; to him it was a measure

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of justifiable self-protection against Hitler. And although Churchill did not claim prophetic powers for the future, he strongly suggested an interpretation of Soviet policy that took it entirely out of the category of mystery. Soviet "national interest," evaluated always in socialist terms and with especial reference to self-defense, is indeed the foundation-stone of Soviet foreign policy, even though other factors also play a role. Churchill's realistic analysis in essence contradicts his briefer, more quotable rhetoric.

Leaving now the question of Winston Churchill's prose and its misuse to confuse the international situation, I wish to state that on both the American and Soviet sides there have all along existed serious barriers to the exchange of news and cultural materials. I deplore the present censorship of foreign newspaper correspondents by the Soviet Government and hope that it will be removed as time goes on. I also deplore the fact that the Soviet authorities, evidently responding to the fears and suspicions engendered by the cold war, have extended the usage of terms like *spy* and *espionage* so broadly as to hamper legitimate reporting and scholarly inquiry.

The cold war has also been responsible, I believe, for a growing lack of interest on the part of Soviet authorities over the past few years in an exchange of students, teachers, scientists and artists with the United States. A number of American universities during this period extended invitations to Soviet scholars to lecture or teach, but none of them were accepted and in several cases no acknowledgment was made. American efforts to have the Red Army Chorus and a Soviet ballet company perform in the United States came to nothing. At the same time the Soviet Government, always hesitant to allow within

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its borders foreigners who have expressed hostility towards the new regime, has made it increasingly difficult for Americans to obtain visas for travel in the U.S.S.R.

On the other hand, the United States Government and Congress, in thrall to a blinding anti-Soviet psychosis, have created their own special barriers to cultural interchange. During the past few years the U. S. Department of State has repeatedly denied passports to Americans who dissent from government policies. Also it is not generally realized that Congress passed a law as far back as 1918 which forbids the entry of known Communists into America from the U.S.S.R. or elsewhere, except in cases where the State Department is willing to make a special ruling granting alien applicants a visa.

A good example of how this law works is to be seen in the handicaps and hindrances that the American Government placed in the way of the Soviet and other foreign delegates wishing to attend the Cultural and Scientific Conference for World Peace held in New York City during March, 1949. A number of foreign delegates planning to come to the Conference had their American visas canceled at the last minute. The noted Soviet composer, Dmitri Shostakovich, and other delegates from the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries were scheduled to make a country-wide tour on behalf of American-Soviet understanding and world peace at the close of the Conference. This tour the U. S. State Department made impossible by limiting the visas of the delegates to the New York affair alone and insisting that they return home without further appearances in America.

Since September, 1950, when Congress passed, over President Truman's veto, the Internal Security Act (McCarran Bill), the situation regarding the admission

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of foreigners, even temporarily, into the United States has become much worse. This Act excludes from the United States all persons who are or ever were members of a Communist or fascist party anywhere, or who ever belonged to an organization "affiliated" with such a party or who ever advocated "the economic, international and governmental doctrines of world communism." These inclusive and vague provisions effectively bar out not only all Communists and ex-Communists from whatever land, but all citizens of the Soviet Union (except diplomats and other government representatives), as well as many individuals from non-Communist countries whose only crime has been to dissent openly from prevailing orthodoxies or to join an organization whose aim was world peace.

In a letter printed in *The New York Times* on September 23, 1951, Dr. Paul Doty, Associate Professor of Chemistry at Harvard University, described the baneful effects of the Internal Security Act on the fall meetings in New York City of the International Congress of Pure and Applied Chemistry, the International Union of Chemistry and the American Chemical Society. Wrote Professor Doty: "The unexpected absence of a considerable number of well-known members of the scientific community cast a shadow over the proceedings. A number of scheduled papers could not be presented and often in discussion the expert in a given field was not there to comment. Those absent were for the most part scientists who had previously visited this country but who on this occasion were denied visas due to the sweeping and indiscriminate regulations of the McCarran Act."²

If the McCarran Act can so cripple conferences in one of the less controversial natural sciences, one can

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easily see how much more seriously it affects meetings on economics, political science or race relations. In fact, strict enforcement of the Act means that no Soviet expert in any subject can now come to America and present his viewpoint to his fellow-scientists. I agree fully with what President Truman said in his letter of July 7, 1951, to Nikolai M. Shvernik, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Supreme Soviet: "We shall never be able to remove suspicion and fear as potential causes of war until communication is permitted to flow, free and open, across international boundaries."³ But certainly the United States, as well as Soviet Russia, is constantly violating this ideal.

In other words, there are curtains of considerable thickness originating on both sides. And from 1917 on a majority of the American people have had a formidable mental block against possible light from the direction of the Soviet Union. "Never have so many known so little about so much" was the telling way one observer a few years ago summed up American understanding of Soviet Russia.

Illustrative of the American attitude is an incident related by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in a speech about foreign policy in 1944. He told how in 1933 a certain lady, presumably Mrs. Roosevelt, went on a trip during which she attended the opening of a schoolhouse. "And she told me," said the President, "that she had seen there a map of the world with a great big white space on it. No name, no information, and the teacher told her that it was blank, with no name, because the school board wouldn't let her say anything about that big blank space. Oh, there were only 180,000,000 to 200,000,000 people in it! It was called Soviet Russia, and

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there were a lot of children, and they were told that the teacher was forbidden by the school board even to put the name of that blank space on the map."⁴

Yet even when Americans have made some attempt to fill in "that big blank space," they have tended to fill it with misinformation about the Soviet Union gleaned from hostile sources. The curious notion has taken hold in the United States that only those who are basically anti-Soviet are qualified to write and speak objectively about the U.S.S.R. This is an absurd idea. In learning about the Civil War we do not depend primarily on the memoirs of southern slave-owners who favored secession; nor in evaluating the principles of democracy do we rely principally on the opinions of the fascists or others who despise the democratic way. A deep-seated and overpowering emotion of hate is not conducive to an objective treatment of any country. And it is to be recalled that the classic study of democracy in the U.S.A. was made in *The American Commonwealth* by James Bryce, who had an attitude of critical sympathy toward American institutions.

Thus an attitude of critical sympathy toward the Soviet Union does not disqualify anyone as an objective observer concerning Soviet affairs, so long as he retains a hearty respect for the facts. Actually, the temptation that beckons most persistently for American writers on the U.S.S.R. is to take an *unsympathetic* attitude toward that country and to conform to the prevailing hostility against it. The pressures against that small minority of Americans who through the years have remained open-minded toward the Soviet Union, and who have tried to tell the unpopular truth about it, have been heavy indeed, frequently leading to the loss of jobs, friends and

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standing in the community. Such persons are unconscionably vilified as subversive and un-American. It would in many ways be much easier and safer for them to stay silent or go over to the anti-Soviet camp.

One of the worst aspects of the situation is that people display such anger and intolerance in discussing Soviet Russia or American-Soviet relations. Temperatures on both sides in the dispute are likely to rise so high that the participants are soon screaming at each other and accusing those who differ with them of being utter scoundrels and inveterate liars. I decry this mode of argument, for it violates the method of reason and closes the gates to a rational settlement of the issues involved. I hope I will not appear self-righteous if I say frankly that while friends and acquaintances have frequently excommunicated me for my position in regard to the Soviet Union, I have never myself broken with anyone because he disagreed with me about the U.S.S.R. I habitually move in so many different political circles that keeping cool on hot issues is for me a necessity of life.

Aside from the personal pressures that affect him, it is very difficult for the average American to withstand the terrific barrage of anti-Soviet propaganda that assails his mind daily in the press and on the radio and television. This propaganda makes constant use of what has aptly been described as "the multiple untruth," an untruth which "is composed of so many parts that anyone wishing to set the record straight will discover that it is utterly impossible to keep all the elements of the falsehood in mind at the same time. Anyone making the attempt may seize upon a few selected statements and show them to be false, but doing this may leave the impression that only the statements selected are false and

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the rest true. An even greater advantage of the 'multiple untruth' is that statements shown to be false can still be repeated over and over again with impunity, because no one will remember which statements have been disproved and which ones haven't."⁵

Even when American newspapers print factual news about the U.S.S.R., they are prone to twist it against the Russians in the lead sentences or to headline it in a provocative or misleading way. Honest reporters have a difficult time with their editors. Thus, in telling of his trip to the Far East in 1946, the late Richard E. Lauterbach, noted correspondent for *Time* and *Life*, wrote this revealing comment: "It's tough to make page one. . . . Home-office cables reiterate that U.S. versus Russia stories make the headlines. It would be super-human of the men assigned to the Orient if they didn't dig around for a good Russian-American squabble or an angle that slammed the Soviets."⁶

Mr. George Seldes, well-known author and editor, reported in 1949 a similar situation in Yugoslavia, at that time still allied with the Soviet Union. An assistant in the Belgrade Bureau of the Associated Press told him: "We can't write the news straight from Yugoslavia. We have to wrap it up." Citing the trial of Mikhailovich, the former Yugoslav patriot who finally turned traitor, Mr. Seldes' informant stated: "Not one foreign correspondent at the trial doubted that Mikhailovich was guilty of treason. In fact, his confession and admissions were enough to hang him. But we did not report the news that way. . . . Here at the A.P. the cables arrived daily saying that the newspapers taking the service were protesting that we 'favored' the government, that we were not fair to Mikhailovich, and we were told to change the style of

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our cables. In other words, we were told to slant the news in favor of Mikhailovich instead of reporting the facts as they were. . . . So the head of the bureau said, 'Wrap it up, write it so it gets by the papers which buy the service and which want crooked news.' So we wrapped it up."⁷

In addition to such pressures on newspaper men as described by Mr. Seldes, there are those stemming from the U. S. State Department. When Mr. Wilfred May, editor of the *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, reported over the radio in April, 1952, his impressions of the International Economic Conference at Moscow, the announcement was made before his broadcast that it had been cleared by the State Department. This points up the fact that American correspondents abroad, depending to a large extent on U.S. embassies for both valuable social contacts and news tips, are likely to see to it that what they write is not offensive to the State Department and its diplomatic representatives. This consideration has loomed larger and larger in recent years because of the Passport Division's tendency to refuse or revoke the passports of Americans who are critical of U.S. foreign policy. If many American foreign correspondents become dependable propagandists for their country's foreign policy, that fits in well with Secretary of State Dean Acheson's encouragement of what he has described as "total diplomacy."

American newspapers revel in printing, over and over again, the most fantastic rumors so long as they are calculated to fan anti-Soviet sentiment. During the summer of 1946 there were repeated dispatches in the press that the Soviet army was shooting long-distance rocket bombs over Sweden and other European countries. As these rumors multiplied, reports came in that rocket missiles had also been seen flaming through the night in

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France, Greece and Italy. Editorials began to appear denouncing these new acts of "Soviet aggression." On September 24, William Henry Chamberlin, who had often posed as a scholarly authority on Soviet affairs, wrote a perfectly serious article in the *New York Journal American* in which he charged that the Red Army had been firing the bombs from a base on the Baltic Sea and thereby threatening world peace.

On October 2 the whole mid-summer's madness collapsed when some Swedish astronomers issued a statement that the so-called rockets were meteorites pure and simple. It was further pointed out that the annual meteor showers usually reached their climax during August just when the rocket rumors were at their peak. This entire episode constitutes an excellent example of how easily mass fear and hysteria of an anti-Soviet character, when stimulated by an unscrupulous press, can spread. It pointed to the possibility of an uninformed and gullible public becoming so aroused over a false and cooked-up charge of Soviet aggression that actual war might result.

Of course the most horrendous mistake of all resulting from American ignorance and prejudice concerning Soviet Russia — and one that was completely exposed by events — occurred over the crucial matter of Soviet resistance to the Nazi invasion in World War II. During those early summer days of 1941 when Hitler's mechanized legions surged over the Soviet border with the supposition that they would smash the Russians in a brief *blitzkrieg*, the press and public opinion in the United States overwhelmingly supported the idea that the Germans would win decisively within three weeks or six weeks or three months at most. The Nazis, as several commentators

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put it, were going to slice through the Soviet defense "as a knife through butter."

In March, 1941, Mr. Walter Lippmann had said, in his column "Today and Tomorrow" in the *New York Herald Tribune*, that the Nazis would find the Soviet Union "easy to conquer and well worth conquering." By September he had changed his mind and with some asperity wrote: "In the first days of July . . . it was the almost unanimous conviction of our staff officers that the Germans had already broken through the Russian defenses and disorganized the Russian army, that a gigantic Russian military disaster was in the making, that the Russian regime would collapse and be replaced by one under German control, and that Hitler would have finished with Russia at the latest sometime in September."⁸ Only a handful of American observers held with me that the Soviets were strong enough to resist Hitler successfully and ultimately to defeat him.

Coming back to the theme of American facilities for learning about the Soviet Union, I contend that in spite of everything, reliable information concerning that country is and has been available in the United States. A few American newspapers publish the texts of official statements by the Soviet Government. There are frequent news stories about conditions within the U.S.S.R. which, however angled they may be, cannot conceal altogether the progress that the Soviet people have made. The big news services — Associated Press, United Press and International News Service — as well as a paper like *The New York Times*, have their own correspondents in Moscow. Weekly journals of opinion such as *The Nation* and the *New Republic* contain special reports and analyses of real

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value concerning Soviet affairs. And monthlies such as *Harper's* and *The Atlantic Monthly* occasionally run good articles about the Soviet Union.

For nineteen years, 1932-1951, the illustrated monthly *Soviet Russia Today*, the only American magazine that has concentrated entirely on the U.S.S.R., provided a mine of information regarding Soviet affairs under the able editorship of Miss Jessica Smith. In 1951 it became the *New World Review*, covering not only the Soviet Union, but also the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Far East.

For twenty-five years beginning in 1926 the recognized center of information and research on Soviet Russia in the United States was the American Russian Institute of New York City, with its scholarly quarterly, *The American Review on the Soviet Union*. At its headquarters there was readily available to students, writers and the general public a large collection of books, periodicals and clippings relating to both Tsarist and Soviet Russia. Since the Institute's demise in 1950, its valuable collection has been acquired by the Library for Intercultural Studies. American Russian Institutes continue to function in Los Angeles and San Francisco.

The vigorous National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, through its meetings and publications, has also done much to spread knowledge of the Soviet Union. For this crime of attempting to make known the truth about the U.S.S.R. the Attorney General of the United States, granting no hearing and possessing no justification, put the National Council on his list of "subversive" organizations. The Council contested this listing by bringing suit; and in April, 1951, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Attorney General must present in court

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adequate reasons for listing the group as subversive and thus crippling its activities.

For many years the Soviet Embassy in Washington published the semi-monthly *U.S.S.R. Information Bulletin*, to which anyone could subscribe and which printed a great deal of useful official data emanating from Soviet sources. The Soviet Government, however, is bound by its agreement not to attempt the spread of propaganda in the United States; and this is a major reason why it does not, like so many other foreign governments, maintain a general information bureau on American soil. The British Library of Information, for instance, with headquarters in New York City, has been in existence for more than twenty-five years and has branches in three American cities. Its annual budget comes to approximately \$1,000,000.

The American counterpart of the Soviet Embassy *Bulletin* was *Amerika*, a colorful illustrated monthly about life in the United States published, beginning in 1944, by the International Information Administration of the U. S. State Department. *Amerika* was sold on news-stands in the big Soviet cities and reached a top circulation of 50,000 copies. In July, 1952, the State Department closed down this magazine and simultaneously ordered the Soviet Embassy to discontinue publication of the *Bulletin*, with its circulation of 15,000, and any supplementary pamphlets and periodicals. The American Government took this latter step as a retaliatory measure on the grounds, primarily, that the circulation of *Amerika* had fallen to 13,000 due to restrictions imposed by the Soviet Government. But there was no proof that the Soviet authorities had directly intervened in the manner charged. And the action of the Truman

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Administration seemed neither wise nor conducive to international understanding.

Also tending to refute the claim that a solid, Soviet-erected Iron Curtain keeps the people of the U.S.S.R. from learning the truth about the United States was the publication in Moscow in 1946, in a second edition of 90,000 copies, of a Soviet handbook on the U.S.A. entitled *The United States of America*, first issued in 1942. Edited by a group of four Soviet scholars, this 576-page work included an elaborate statistical and analytical survey of American geography and economy, sections on American history, government, the armed forces and foreign possessions, and a summary of the American cultural scene. There were occasional errors in the statistics, but on the whole the figures were substantially accurate. The volume did not attempt to compare the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Its severest criticisms were reserved for the American press. As Paul H. Aron of the Sarah Lawrence faculty wrote in the scholarly *American Slavic and East European Review*: "The over-all picture of our country which a Soviet citizen would derive from this book is distinctly favorable. . . . The book can in no sense be classified as anti-American propaganda, and the dominant note seems to be one of impartiality."⁹

So much printed material comes into America from the Soviet Union that in 1948 the Library of Congress started to publish each month a substantial document called *Monthly List of Russian Accessions*. This itemizes under seventeen different section headings, ranging from Fine Arts to Medicine to Political Science, the publications received by the Library itself and a group of co-operating public and university libraries in the United States. A typical copy of this *List*, the issue of January,

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1952, contains no less than 621 Soviet items — 453 for books and monographs, 168 for periodicals.

In February of 1949 the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies, appointed by the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council, began weekly publication of the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*. Its headquarters is near Columbia University in New York City. This *Digest* translates, prints in full or condenses the more important articles and news items from over forty of the leading Soviet newspapers and magazines. These include the two most authoritative dailies, *Pravda* (Truth), leading organ of the Communist Party, and *Izvestia* (News), official organ of the Government, as well as periodicals concerned with some special field, such as *The Whistle*, newspaper of the railroads; *Red Star*, the army daily; *Labor*, organ of the trade unions; *Culture and Life*, dealing with the arts; *Soviet Music*; *Soviet Education*; *Problems of Philosophy*; and the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate*, dealing with the Russian Orthodox Church. This *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, presenting every week an enormous amount of information and opinion from Soviet sources, alone disproves the charge that an impenetrable Iron Curtain prevents foreigners from knowing what is taking place in the Soviet Union.

American colleges and universities, since the United States and Soviet Russia fought as allies against world fascism, have increasingly expanded curriculum facilities for teaching the Russian language and have established numerous courses of a general character on Soviet affairs. Pioneering in the Soviet field was Cornell University with its Intensive Study of Contemporary Russian Civilization during the summer semesters of 1943 and 1944.

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Professor Ernest J. Simmons, outstanding authority on Russian literature, was the Director and moving spirit of this Intensive Study, which included five basic courses: The History of Russia and the Soviet Union; Soviet Government and International Relations; Soviet Economics; Soviet Social Institutions and Life; and Soviet Literature.

Professor Simmons later became head of the Department of Slavic Languages at Columbia University and helped to initiate Columbia's new Russian Institute, modeled after the Cornell experiment and set up on a permanent basis in 1946 with the aid of a \$250,000 grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. Other educational institutions such as Harvard, Leland Stanford, Yale and the University of California have developed in a somewhat similar fashion staffs concentrating on Soviet civilization.

Serious students wishing to learn about Soviet affairs under competent direction can find plenty of opportunity today in America. And writers on the U.S.S.R. continue to be overwhelmed by the amount of factual material on the subject. In general where there is a will to understand the Soviet Union, there is a way.

3. *Some Standards of Judgment*

It is not necessary to be an expert on the subject of the Soviet Union in order to have sound opinions about that country. It is my contention that the average literate person in America can, through judicious reading, listening and thinking, reach valid judgments concerning Soviet Russia, Great Britain, China, Spain or almost any other foreign nation. Since the First World War and even more since the Second, the American voter has

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needed a considerable understanding of United States foreign policy and world affairs, in order to cast his ballot intelligently in elections that involve issues of foreign relations. What I am saying is that to do this he does not himself have to be an international expert, either in relation to the U.S.S.R. or other lands or the world as a whole.

The objective study of Soviet affairs, like the study of anything else, requires reliance on the method of reason in seeking out the facts and in reaching dependable conclusions. The method of reason implies not only great diligence in distinguishing the true from the false, but also a *comprehensive* evaluation. In line with this approach, I wish to suggest a few general propositions which it is well to keep in mind in attempting adequately to assess Soviet life. These propositions are closely inter-related and are to some extent overlapping, but each bears on distinguishable aspects of the subject.

First of all, I believe we should recognize the simple point that *Soviet Russia is neither a heaven nor a hell.*

The U.S.S.R. is such a controversial topic and evokes such passionate reactions that many Americans tend to think of that vast country in terms of either all black or all white. The fanatical Russia-haters maintain that the Soviet Union is a veritable hell on earth; the fanatical Soviet-worshippers maintain that it is paradise itself finally come into being on this terrestrial globe. The intelligent and common-sense approach does not fall into either of these extremes.

The obvious truth is that Soviet Russia, like the United States, Great Britain or Mexico, is a mixture of good and bad, of noteworthy accomplishments and distressing failures and a sincere striving for future better-

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ment. The U.S.S.R. is an enormous country of continental dimensions with an immense population and a thousand and one different aspects of development. Yet numberless Americans have gone to the Soviet Union and apparently seen nothing but the defects of the socialist system in process of evolution there. They return to the United States and write exaggerated books or articles depicting Soviet Russia as one horrible bottomless pit of grinding poverty and grueling dictatorship, economic inefficiency and human misery.

Some of their observations have a factual basis, but they neglect entirely to give the other side, the positive side of Soviet life which has resulted in such tremendous achievements over the third of a century since 1917. Unfortunately the altogether negative picture that such observers give of the U.S.S.R. has been eagerly seized upon and accepted by the majority of the people in the United States and other capitalist countries. This biased and false viewpoint has been the prevailing one outside of Soviet Russia and has been responsible for an infinite amount of misunderstanding.

On the other hand, there are those Americans who visit the Soviet Union and seemingly have an eye only for its good points. They come back to the United States and, forgetting or overlooking the many and serious shortcomings of the new Soviet civilization, talk as if the Russians had already achieved the millennium. Now these observers who insist that Soviet Russia has become some sort of Utopia are not only unrealistic; they are also more Russian than the Russians, who themselves are often extremely critical, particularly in comments in their press, concerning conditions within their country.

The enthusiasts who believe that the long-sought

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heaven-on-earth of human hopes and ideals has come to pass in the Soviet Union present a one-sided viewpoint and also build up false expectations. They stimulate others to visit the U.S.S.R. with the notion that they will find there the practically perfect state. When these others make the trip, they see that existence in Soviet Russia is still pretty difficult, that living standards are quite low and that the Communists are a tough-minded group of revolutionaries hard on both themselves and others. Frequently the paradise-seekers, with their religious psychology, become quickly disillusioned, leave the U.S.S.R. with their naive hopes blasted and forthwith take a bitter, anti-Soviet attitude. On their return to the United States they find a ready market for articles, books and lectures which denounce the Soviet Union and all its works. This pattern repeats itself again and again; and it is easily discernible in the very titles of anti-Soviet best-sellers such as *Assignment in Utopia* by Eugene Lyons and *The Dream We Lost* by Freda Uteley.

It seems to me that in order to avoid the extremes which I have been describing, we ought to take a middle-of-the-road position which gives honest consideration to both the defects and virtues of the U.S.S.R. For instance, I believe that Soviet Russia, for various reasons that I shall comment on later, still lags lamentably behind the United States in the development of civil liberties and political democracy, notwithstanding grave American shortcomings and backslidings in these fields. On the other hand, the Soviet Russians have forged far ahead of America in the establishment of ethnic equality and racial democracy among the many different minority nationalities and races that live within the far-flung borders of the U.S.S.R. Anti-Semitism and other forms

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of racial prejudice and discrimination have almost entirely disappeared in Soviet Russia. It would be possible to make a number of other comparisons between American and Soviet life, some of them favorable to the U.S.A., some of them favorable to the U.S.S.R.

It is folly to be either completely condemnatory of Soviet civilization or completely uncritical of it. Specific criticisms of Soviet institutions and policies are often justified; what we must object to are general obsessions about Soviet Russia resulting in denunciation of practically everything Soviet and an automatic finding that the U.S.S.R. is always wrong. Through the jaundiced eyes of the Russia-haters what ordinarily would be regarded as a virtue is interpreted as a vice when it manifests itself in Soviet life. These fanatics, when during World War II Soviet troops demonstrated signal bravery in fighting the Nazis to the death and in refusing to surrender even in the most impossible circumstances, claimed that this showed Stalinist contempt for human life and for the worth of the individual.

Again, in a book, *Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority*, published in 1951, the author, Miss Margaret Mead, stresses the present re-establishment of parental authority in the U.S.S.R. as compared with the early years of the Revolution; and then surprisingly treats this unsurprising development as an undemocratic introduction into the home of dictatorial attitudes which "bear a closer resemblance to Stalin's relationship to every Soviet citizen."¹⁰ Yet I had thought that "Honor thy father and thy mother" was a precept valued throughout the world and not considered altogether outmoded even in democratic America. Miss Mead also makes the remarkable sugges-

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tion that the wily Russians smoke heavy pipes in order to conceal their facial reactions. Here of course is the key to the sinister pipe-smoking of Joseph Stalin! So it is that those who feel psychologically compelled to condemn everything Soviet must likewise discover a way of stigmatizing even innocent personal habits.

This kind of attitude tends to blame all evil in the sphere of international affairs on Moscow. In this manner the Russia-haters turn the U.S.S.R. into a convenient scapegoat for the collective sins of mankind; and in effect assign to it the role of the old-time devil. Professor Phillip Marshall Brown, formerly of Princeton University provided a good example of what I mean in his letter to *The New York Times* on February 2, 1949, in which he attributed to Soviet Russia not only the troubles among the Jews, the Arabs and the British in Palestine, but also the violence and unrest in Indonesia resulting in armed hostilities between the Netherlands Government and the Indonesian Republic. Anyone with a mite of information knows that seething cauldrons of local tensions had long existed in both Palestine and Indonesia and required no Communist intrigue to make them boil over.

As for Europe and Asia, the blame-it-on-Russia attitude overlooks, among other things, the fact that the larger portions of these continents are still in the throes of recovering from the most destructive war in history, brought about by fascist aggression; and that many peoples, trying their best to reconstruct their economies and to remedy ills ruinous to them in the past, have shown a leftward trend which in some degree or other would have existed with or without the stimulus of Soviet

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socialism. Socialist developments in Great Britain under an anti-Soviet Labor Government lend support to this point.

The approach that I am suggesting to the subject of Soviet Russia gets away from the fanaticism of both the Russo-phobes and the Russo-philés. It weighs both the pros and cons in the unceasing debate about the Soviet Union. It attempts to assess the contributions of Soviet Russia to international peace and to the downfall of the fascist Axis in World War II as well as its domestic achievements and failures. In short, this approach calls upon us to take an over-all view of Soviet civilization that includes a thorough and honest balance sheet of the credits and debits in the Soviet ledger.

Secondly, we should take into constant consideration *the extraordinary complexity of the Soviet Union*.

The U.S.S.R. is by far the biggest national unit on the face of the globe, with a total area of approximately 8,597,000 square miles spreading out over two continents. As a European country alone it is the largest in Europe and even as an Asiatic country the largest in Asia. It is greater in size than all of North and Central America. It covers a territory amounting to over one-sixth of the earth's land surface. From west to east the Soviet Union extends more than 6,000 miles; from north to south at the widest point more than 2,700.

Within its borders there are to be found all sorts of climate, vegetation and animal life; and an infinite variety and scope of basic natural resources such as minerals, oil, water-power, fertile soil and timber. The old peasant proverb is indeed true: "Russia is not a country, it is a world." Plainly, then, the Soviet regime has been operating in what amounts to an entire continent

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rather than in one nation in the ordinary sense of the word. The huge proportions and great natural wealth of the Soviet Union of course carry with them preeminent advantages in economic self-sufficiency and military defense. But they also create formidable problems of administration, transportation and general development — problems that go far to explain many of the troubles that the Soviet Government has encountered during its existence.

Another continuing complexity in Soviet Russia is that its fast-growing population, approximately 210,000,000 in 1952 and outnumbered only by that of India and China, is made up of over 170 distinguishable races, nationalities and tribes. The ethnic minorities range from the Baltic peoples in the northwest to the Ukrainians and Moldavians in the southwest; from the Armenians and the Georgians of the Transcaucasus to the Uzbeks and Kazakhs of Central Asia; from the Tatars and Mari of the middle Volga River to the Yakuts and Buryat Mongolians of eastern Siberia.

The autocratic Tsarist governments oppressed the national minorities in the extreme, attempting to impose upon them a strict Russification and to stamp out their native cultures. The Soviet regime reversed this policy and established complete ethnic equality. It has had the task of encouraging the minority languages and cultures while uniting all the different peoples in the immense work of building a socialist economy and state. The existence in the U.S.S.R. of so many minority groups, and in 1917 at so many different stages of culture, has been a serious complicating factor.

Considering both the geographical extent and the ethnic make-up of the Soviet Union, we see that it is

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unique in being a great multi-national, multi-racial Eurasian federation that combines European and Asiatic peoples and cultures. Instead of a cleavage between East and West, there is a merging of East and West. Marxism originated in the West, in Germany; but its first actualization in state and economic forms came in a nation that fans out from Europe clear across Asia to the Pacific Ocean and Far East. This East-West union is a fact of utmost significance and in itself makes the Soviet Republic harder to comprehend than a purely Western country like England or France.

These reflections lead us to a further recognition of complexity. In the Soviet Union there is a unique merging not only of East and West, but of old and new. In 1917 one of the most backward nations in the world, economically and culturally, was Tsarist Russia. It was hardly modern in any sense of the word. When the Communists took power they immediately set out to establish something so modern that it had never been tried before, namely a full-fledged, nation-wide socialist society based on Marxist principles. Marx had thought that such a society would probably first come into being in one of the highly industrialized states like England or Germany. Instead it happened in the least industrialized of all the Great Powers.

The Soviet Communists proceeded energetically and enthusiastically with their unheard-of job, hitching a powerful twentieth-century automobile engine, as it were, to an antiquated horse carriage. The strange combination went ahead by fits and starts, with frequent breakdowns and numerous repairs. Gradually the Communists succeeded in constructing a fairly adequate chassis for the engine. The pervasive and dramatic interweaving of

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medieval and modern and ultra-modern in the U.S.S.R. is a phenomenon that demands the most careful analysis. Truly the Soviet Union presents a most complex picture.

Continuing with our introductory bases of judgment, I suggest, thirdly, that we should be aware of the *historical and cultural background of Soviet Russia*.

The Revolution of 1917 took place in a semi-feudal country which had lived under Tsarist absolutism for some 400 years. Russia had never experienced the progressive, invigorating influences of a Renaissance and Reformation, an Enlightenment and Bourgeois Revolution. It had never gone through anything remotely resembling the long evolution of democracy and civil liberties characteristic of England and the United States. While the oppressive Tsarist dictatorship, noted for the number and cruelty of its political persecutions, made a concession towards democracy by instituting, as a result of the unsuccessful Revolution of 1905, the Duma or House of Representatives, this body was soon reduced to a parliamentary nonentity.

In 1917 approximately 85 percent of the population were peasants engaged in agricultural pursuits and using, for the most part, primitive methods. Only in 1861 had the Russian peasants been legally freed from the old medieval system of serfdom. Grafted onto an incredibly inefficient and backward agricultural economy, there was in 1917 a weak and spasmodically developed capitalist industry, largely depending on foreign financing and foreign technical management. The peasants and the relatively small working class endured an extremely low living standard comparable to that of India and China. About 70 percent of the entire people were illiterate; and enjoyment of the splendid Russian achievements in

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drama and literature and music was limited to a thin top-layer of the economically and socially privileged. In the development of industry Tsarist Russia was in 1917 at least a century behind advanced countries like the United States and Great Britain; in the development of democratic institutions easily two centuries behind.

The influence of the Tsarist background upon Soviet Russia cannot be exaggerated. Many of the weaknesses and shortcomings that the U.S.S.R. has demonstrated during its existence can be traced to the Tsarist inheritance. No people can quickly throw off the habits and customs of centuries. Part holdovers from Tsarist days are the intense Soviet suspicion of foreigners, the pervasive activity of the secret police, the lag in free speech and civil liberties, and a certain unsophisticated and frequently undiplomatic bluntness of language.

The basic principles of Marxism are internationally relevant and applicable. Yet the precise way in which these general principles are put into effect is moulded by the traditions and circumstances of each country in which they take root. The evolution of both Christianity and capitalism indicates such an outcome. Inevitably the whole complex of a particular people's history, geographical situation, economic resources, national characteristics and cultural level condition that people's future, sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse. Soviet socialism, therefore, is bound to differ from British socialism in the West and from Chinese socialism in the East, though they all share certain fundamental economic and social methods and objectives.

In March of 1917, following more than two and one-half years of disastrous belligerency in the First World War, Tsar Nicholas II abdicated and a provisional Gov-

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ernment of liberals and middle-class Republicans took over the state. Under its muddling eight months' rule things went from bad to worse throughout the land. When Lenin and his colleagues seized control in November, they faced the chaos of a completely disorganized economy, with the transportation system in collapse and famine threatening; and the problems of a people whose morale had been shattered by defeat after defeat at the hands of the Germans, by some 7,000,000 military casualties, including over 2,000,000 dead, and by overwhelmingly trying economic conditions. Such were the unpropitious circumstances under which the Russian Bolsheviks set out to construct the first socialist commonwealth in history.

No sooner had the new Soviet Government made peace with imperialist Germany, through signing the humiliating Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March, 1918, than it was forced to rally all its strength to resist a fresh invasion, from east, west, south and north, on the part of the Allies. This Allied intervention of 1918-22 continued for four years after final defeat of the Central Powers had done away with the shadowy excuse of trying to re-establish the Eastern Front. And it quickly joined hands with the White counter-revolution in a joint campaign to overthrow the Soviets by force. During this period the armies of fourteen nations, including expeditionary units from the United States, invaded the Soviet Republic.

Although finally victorious, the Soviet regime suffered enormous property losses and approximately 2,000,000 more dead. One of the worst effects of the combined intervention and Civil War was that the Soviet Government, forced to fight for its very life, found it necessary

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to tighten up the political dictatorship and to institute the most repressive measures against the White counter-revolutionaries. When the Communists actually took power in 1917, they did so with a comparatively small loss of life throughout Russia. Bloodshed on a large scale came later. The author R. H. Bruce Lockhart (later knighted), attached to the British diplomatic corps during the exciting Civil War days and never a Soviet sympathizer, throws light on these matters.

In his book *British Agent* Mr. Lockhart, referring to the early months of 1918, writes that the Communists "had not yet embarked on their own campaign of suppression. I mention this comparative tolerance of the Bolsheviks, because the cruelties which followed were the result of the intensification of the Civil War. For the intensification of that bloody struggle Allied intervention, with the false hopes it raised, was largely responsible . . . and sent thousands of Russians to their death. Indirectly it was responsible for the Terror."¹¹ The Communists as well as their opponents fought ferociously and with little regard for the so-called rules of warfare. Both sides in the terrible civil conflict fully bore out an old Russian saying, "One life, one kopek."

During this period, in the autumn and winter of 1921-22, the Soviet Union suffered a fearful drought and famine, aggravated by the shattered state of transportation, the ravages of counter-revolution and intervention, and the war-weariness of the peasantry. This crisis of crops and hunger brought another fearful toll, with at least 1,000,000 people perishing. To its lasting credit the American Relief Administration rendered yeoman service to the Soviet Russians in this emergency and so

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offset to some degree United States participation in the Allied invasion.

On October 25, 1922, when the Japanese forces and the last remnants of the White armies evacuated Vladivostok in Far Eastern Siberia, civil war and armed foreign intervention finally came to an end.* Not until almost five full years after the Revolution of 1917 was the Soviet Government able to cease military operations and settle down to the immense tasks of peaceful reconstruction. With the odds heavily against them at the start and the whole world expecting their downfall, the Soviets had struggled through to victory over foreign invasion, civil conflict, territorial loss, economic breakdown and famine, all inflicted on a country that had already experienced three calamitous years of the First World War and two far-reaching revolutions. It was an epic triumph.

These first five years of the Soviet Republic's existence naturally conditioned its entire future. The long battle for survival made it doubly aware and doubly suspicious of enemies plotting violence against it both at home and abroad. The dictatorial features of Soviet political life were accordingly accentuated. Well-founded fears of still another attack on the part of foreign powers retarded the evolution of democracy in the U.S.S.R. and held down living standards by necessitating enormous investments in the production of armaments for self-defense.

Despite earnest efforts on behalf of international amity, Soviet Russia continued to live in a world bitterly hostile to it and reluctant to enter into normal diplomatic and trade relations with it. The United States did not

* Japanese military units remained in the Soviet northern half of the Far Eastern island of Sakhalin until April, 1925.

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officially recognize the Soviet Government until 1933 during the first term of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Handicapped by a credit blockade, the Soviet regime was unable to obtain foreign loans of any substance and had to lift itself by its own bootstraps in regard to economic reconstruction and development.

Fourthly, it follows from what I have already said about the historical background of the Soviet Union that *in comparing the U.S.S.R. with other countries, we must pay constant attention to the principle of historical relativity.*

I mean by this that different peoples of the earth are in different stages of historical development and that it would not be fair to apply to all of them the same absolute measuring rod of judgment. Since Russia in 1917 was from one to two centuries behind the United States in most of the ways we deem modern, it is obviously absurd to expect that the Soviet Union, having to cope with such Herculean tasks as the repulse of the Nazi invasion, could completely catch up to America in a short thirty-five years. The building of either a highly advanced capitalist society or a highly advanced socialist society takes a good deal of time. And frequently in discussing some special aspect of Soviet life, our real question should be: How much have conditions improved since Tsarist Russia of 1917?

I would apply the same principle of relative comparisons to any country that had been in a generally backward condition and had made some drastic change in government or economic system in an effort to develop a more mature and secure civilization. So today we would all do well to judge with restraint, and with some

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understanding of the past, recent revolutionary events in India and China, both of which have joined the twentieth-century march toward progress.

The need of making comparisons between the U.S. S.R. and other nations on a relative as well as an absolute basis extends to all spheres of Soviet life. Regarding the average material standard of living in Soviet Russia, unquestionably it is still considerably below that enjoyed in the United States. Yet it has gone up a great deal since 1917 and promises to advance to much higher levels. Those Americans who emphasize the fact that Soviet living standards in terms of consumption goods lag far behind what we take for granted in the U.S.A. tend to forget that the American standard of living is by all odds the highest in the world and has for a long time outstripped that of any European or Asiatic country. It is easy to overlook or romanticize the material shortcomings of lands other than Soviet Russia.

Many return from the U.S.S.R., however, and condemn it wholesale for the sort of material backwardness that they regard as merely picturesque in other parts of the world. And they will construct whole books or lecture tours around the lack of those mechanical gadgets and modern conveniences for which the United States is noted. But it is hardly to be expected that the Soviet Russians, who have had a multitude of world-shaking and world-making problems, could have turned the U.S.S.R. into a tourist's paradise in so short a time or would in any case have made that a main objective. Actually, in 1938 when I last visited Soviet Russia, traveling was becoming fairly comfortable there; and the Russians were becoming increasingly efficient in the

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small things that often loom so large in the consciousness of travelers from abroad.

Again, the pertinency of relative comparisons becomes plain in regard to Soviet democracy. So far as political democracy and civil liberties are concerned, the Soviet Union has not caught up with the Anglo-Saxon countries, but it has made notable headway since Tsarist days. When we turn to other significant forms of democracy — racial, cultural, economic, or that which consists of equality between the sexes — we find that Soviet progress since 1917 has been even more impressive. Indeed, as I shall show in Chapter III, in racial democracy Soviet Russia has gone beyond the United States and most other nations of the world. This brings out the important point that in some respects, even on the basis of absolute comparisons, the Soviet Union ranks above the most highly developed countries.

Fifthly and finally, any proper evaluation of the Soviet Union *must take into account not only the past and present, but also the probable future.*

No sensible person expects that a radical and inclusive new social-economic order such as socialism could be built overnight in any country, let alone in one that had as many handicaps holding over from the past as Soviet Russia. The construction of a socialist society entailed a long, hard pull in overcoming the initial political chaos and economic ruin of 1917; in warding off foreign aggression and putting down civil strife; in setting up the economic and cultural foundations of socialism; and in eradicating the habits and psychology of the former absolutist-feudalist-capitalist state. In this evolution upward there were bound to be bad years as well as good, failures as well as triumphs, detours as well as marches straight

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ahead. Since the Soviet Union was the first nation in history to attempt the creation of a socialist civilization and since the Communists and their supporters had practically no precedents on which to draw, it was almost inevitable that unforeseen problems should arise and serious mistakes be made.

Accordingly, if the student of Soviet affairs concentrates exclusively on some present phase, perhaps one of the bad years, in the development of Soviet socialism, he will get a misleading impression because he will be neglecting the possible or probable course of future events. Again and again the Soviets have faced, fought through and surmounted some crisis that might have proved disastrous to a less determined people. Since the revolution the domestic or international situation has repeatedly called on them to make tremendous sacrifices; but those sacrifices have always had meaning and purpose. The Soviet people have suffered, bled and died, as they did during the Nazi onslaught from 1941 to 1945, in order to preserve their new socialist order and to press forward with the fulfilment of the Marxist ideal of a society guaranteeing security, abundance and freedom to everyone. In the perspectives of history the distinction between constructive and fruitless sacrifice is of utmost significance. The Soviet people never forget the future.

The story of the Five-Year Plans, the long-range, country-wide programs of social-economic development starting in 1928, provides examples of what I am talking about. The First Five-Year Plan, 1928-32, with its enormous stress on heavy industry and machine building, required that the Soviet people forego the more rapid rise in living standards which could have been brought about by concentration on the manufacture of consumer goods.

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But the more Spartan policy proved sound, because it enabled the nation to lay the permanent foundations of socialism. The Second Five-Year Plan, 1933-37, put considerably more emphasis on consumer goods, and the standard of living rose higher than ever before in Tsarist or Soviet Russia.

The Third Five-Year Plan, scheduled for 1938-42, was designed to continue this progress. But with the growing menace of foreign aggression and the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, the stress had to be shifted to the production of defense implements such as guns, airplanes and tanks. An accelerated increase in consumer goods was necessarily postponed. Again, the sacrifice on the part of the Soviet people paid off in terms of the future; for it was an essential factor in their ability to hold off and hurl back Hitler's assault.

In examining the status of democracy in the Soviet Union, we likewise need to consider future prospects. In the first place, the lack of democratic institutions and the low cultural level in the old Tsarist autocracy did not provide an auspicious starting point for the development of democracy under the Soviets. It was obvious from the beginning that the evolution of the Soviet people into modern democracy in the best sense of that term would take decades to accomplish. As America's greatest philosopher, the late John Dewey, repeatedly pointed out, the intelligent and efficient functioning of political democracy requires a fairly high development of popular education. But as we have seen, the population of Russia was only about 30 percent literate in 1917; most of them, therefore, did not possess the elementary cultural prerequisites for proper participation in the

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complicated processes of democratic government. They did not even know what a ballot was or how to mark it.

In the second place, the Soviet Communists have frankly put into effect the Marxist theory that a temporary dictatorship of the proletariat is necessary during the transition from capitalism to socialism, with that dictatorship having strong elements of democracy within it. Again in line with Marxist doctrine, the Communists claim that the dictatorship will sink into the past entirely as the need for it passes with the disappearance of pressing dangers both internal and external. They insist, above all, that the enduring *economic* foundations of democracy must be securely established in the new socialist system; and that democratic institutions in capitalist countries remain weak, unstable and in danger of complete overthrow by fascist movements precisely because capitalist economies are constantly floundering about in the quicksand of financial crisis, economic depression and mass unemployment.

To *explain* is not always to excuse. The Soviet Government has from time to time used unnecessarily harsh measures to maintain itself. Yet we should not lose sight of the ultimate democratic aims of the Soviet Republic. In my opinion the Soviet people and their leaders have never relinquished those objectives. In the nature of the case, however, since the Communists both in theory and in practice give priority to the economic base of their socialist society, and believe that democracy can grow and expand only if this fundamental substructure is sound, it is not surprising that the full flourishing of democratic institutions in the Soviet Union should come gradually and late. In this matter, taking the long view

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of Soviet civilization is a helpful corrective to hasty condemnation and premature judgment.

In the light of the future, too, and of Soviet Russia's many difficulties, the various compromises and shifts in policy that occur in the U.S.S.R. become intelligible. It was Lenin himself who enunciated the strategy of "one step backward, if necessary, in order to take two steps forward." And the Soviets have frequently followed out this common-sense procedure. In 1921, for instance, toward the end of the trying Civil War period, the Soviet Government, in order to expedite recovery and give the population a breathing spell, introduced the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.), which encouraged certain compromises toward capitalist principles. Practically the entire foreign press interpreted the N.E.P. as heralding the final abandonment of socialism in Russia. Of course, as the Soviet regime had planned all along, it constituted only a temporary episode and in due course was discarded altogether.

Another instance of the same sort of thing occurred during the 1932-33 food crisis when, in the drive to collectivize agriculture, the Communists went too fast and provoked dangerous opposition among the peasants by extremist policies. Joseph Stalin himself finally intervened and pointed out that some of the comrades had become over-zealous, "dizzy with success," as he put it. The Government proceeded to make certain concessions to the individualistic tendencies of the peasants.

Commenting on these compromise measures, the *New York Herald Tribune*, in an editorial published in November of 1932, stated that the Soviet agrarian problem could be solved "only by such a swift retreat from Marxian first principles as will leave no doubt in any

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Russian or foreign mind of the collapse of the Communist experiment under the relentless pressure of faulty but unalterable human nature."¹² Actually "a swift retreat" did take place, but the final result was a record-breaking harvest in 1933 and the successful completion of the collectivization program, which meant the extension of socialism to the vital sphere of agriculture.

The statement from the *Herald Tribune*, which over the years has run much first-rate material about the Soviet Union, is one which I always like to quote. For it shows how even one of the more restrained and reliable American newspapers is ever ready to seize upon the slightest sign of Soviet weakness and draw from it the most exaggerated implications. To this day most foreign observers of the U.S.S.R. have failed to learn that occasional steps backward in Soviet Russia do not necessarily spell failure, but usually indicate a willingness on the part of a radical government with all the responsibilities of political power to face the facts and to exercise intelligent flexibility in the conduct of affairs. The Communists always remember their great goal of a full-fledged socialist and Communist system and do not mind too much if they have to pursue a zigzag course to get there.

In more recent years the greatest compromise which circumstances compelled the Russians to adopt was the extensive retreat of the Soviet armies during the high-tide of the Nazi invasion in 1941 and 1942. During this critical period the Soviet forces fell back almost to the gates of Moscow and yielded most of the city of Stalin-grad. With blood, territory and scorched earth tactics they bought time and opportunity for preparing a mighty counter-offensive that finally broke the back of German military power. Yet, as we know, foreign observers

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everywhere misread the signs. Just as earlier swift retreats (of a non-military nature) had led them to forecast the failure of the whole drive toward socialism in Soviet Russia, so Soviet military defeats and withdrawals during the Second World War caused them to pronounce a premature sentence of doom on the Soviet war effort. Sheer ignorance plus neglect of future prospects brought them unenviable reputations as discredited prophets.

Professor John Dewey was one of the typical American intellectuals who, at first sympathetic toward the Soviet Union, later turned against it in disillusionment that was also typical. Yet he provides an answer to himself in an excellent passage on the sort of ethical standards that intelligence requires in the modern world: "No individual or group will be judged by whether they come up to or fall short of some fixed result, but by the direction in which they are moving. The bad man is the man who no matter how good he *has* been is beginning to deteriorate, to grow less good. The good man is the man who no matter how morally unworthy he *has* been is moving to become better. Such a conception makes one severe in judging himself and humane in judging others."¹³ It is my claim, of course, that the large group of people who make up the population of Soviet Russia have been steadily moving in an upward direction.

The Utopian liberals and the infantile leftists have violated Dewey's proposed criterion by judging the U.S.S.R. in terms of whether it comes up to or falls short of "some fixed result" held inflexibly in their minds. Evidently expecting that Soviet Russia would set up in the twinkling of an eye the brave new world of all their dreams, they have been most neglectful in considering

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the future of the U.S.S.R. Impetuous, impatient souls, they could not wait for history to catch up with their beautiful ideals and were ever ready to consign the Soviet Republic to limbo for its tactics of compromise and delay, for shifting gears and reducing speed in order to overcome mountains of trouble.

Many of them sincere idealists and humanitarians, they apparently thought that the most tremendous social upheaval on record, telescoping into itself the sort of revolutions which had occurred in America, England and France during the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, could take place with the relative restraint of a New Deal movement in the United States. These naive Utopians were offended to their depths by the rough-and-tumble aspects of the Russian Revolution and finally adopted a policy of resolving every doubt in a manner hostile to the Soviet regime.

The Soviet Revolution, like the great Western Revolutions long before it, constituted an irrepressible movement of liberation that swept like an avalanche over whatever opposed or threatened it. Released at last from the tyranny and oppression of ages, the Russian workers and peasants, led by a stern and determined Communist minority, took destiny into their own hands and rode roughshod over the enemies of the new order. Internally the immense scope and rapid tempo of economic development, especially the speedy industrialization of the country, demanded a discipline in work far removed from the easy-going psychology of Tsarist days when "Nichevol" (No matter!) was such a common response to difficulties. Such discipline only too often had to be imposed from above on lagging or unwilling elements of the population during the arduous era of the initial Five-Year Plans.

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Due to the continuing danger and frequent actuality of foreign aggression, the Government and the people developed understandable nervous tensions and a distinct crisis psychology. The Soviet Republic, with its back to the wall in the early years and once more in the later years during World War II, lashed out savagely to preserve itself. Many of its actions were crude and cruel; blood flowed throughout the Russian land; purges and political persecutions took place; sometimes the innocent suffered along with the guilty. But the first socialist society in history survived, persevered and moved forward into the future.

* * *

In this introductory chapter I have outlined some elementary principles that should be helpful, I feel, in the understanding of Soviet Russia. Having assumed at the start the importance of the Soviet Union as a topic of discussion and study, having laid down the proposition that much reliable information has been and is available about the U.S.S.R., and having insisted that the method of reason must be followed in our inquiries concerning it, I have presented five standards of judgment, often overlooked, for aid in the evaluation of Soviet affairs.

These are, to summarize, first, that Soviet Russia is neither a heaven nor a hell; second, that we should realize the extraordinary complexity of the Soviet Union; third, that we should bear in mind the historical and cultural background of Soviet Russia; fourth, that in comparing the U.S.S.R. with other countries, we must make allowances for historical relativity; and fifth, that if we are to assess Soviet civilization as a whole, we ought to consider not only the past and present, but also future

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prospects and eventual goals. Actually, these suggested standards of judgment are applicable today not only to the Soviet Union, but also to most other countries and particularly to those which are emerging out of a dark past under the leadership of new and radical regimes.

CHAPTER II THE SOVIET CONSTITUTION

1. *Background of the Constitution*

Of all the primary documents from original Soviet sources most conducive to an understanding of the U.S. S.R. the Soviet Constitution ranks first. Usually printed in pamphlet form and totaling only about forty pages, it is also the briefest single document I know that presents an over-all survey of Soviet institutions and aims. For it goes beyond a description of the machinery of government, with which most state constitutions are primarily concerned, to define the fundamental economic, social and political principles upon which the Soviet commonwealth is based.

It was adopted late in 1936. Instead of going through the cumbrous process of drastically amending and bringing up to date the previous Constitution of 1924, the Soviets followed the sensible procedure of drawing up a new Constitution altogether. The first tentative draft of it was published in June, 1936. This text was issued in 60,000,000 pamphlet copies and printed repeatedly in the Soviet press. During some six months of public discussion of the proposed Constitution 527,000 meetings were held with a total attendance of 36,500,000 people. Individuals, meetings or organizations sent into the Constitutional Commission 154,000 amendments, of which forty-three were finally accepted. The supreme

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legislative body of the U.S.S.R., corresponding to the Congress of the United States, ratified the Constitution on December 5, 1936, and decreed that December 5 should thereafter be a public holiday, "Constitution Day."

The rapid development of Soviet Russia between 1924 and 1936 necessitated the framing of a new Constitution that would reflect the changed conditions. The first two Five-Year Plans, particularly, had brought about such progress in both industry and agriculture that Stalin was able to say: "The complete victory of the socialist system in all spheres of national economy is now a fact."¹ Hence the 1936 document, advancing beyond the Constitutions of 1918* and 1924, which had proclaimed socialism as an object of aspiration, formalized the new situation by treating socialism in the Soviet Union as an achieved actuality.

At the same time the 1936 Constitution sets up new and specific goals of aspiration within the framework of socialism, especially in the Chapter entitled "Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens." There, for example, the present Constitution makes provision for a system of civil liberties which has obviously not yet been put fully into effect. This fact has led critics to claim that the Soviets have been trying to fool the world with a mere *paper* constitution. Of course all state constitutions are paper constitutions and their actualization is seldom speedy or complete. For example, the Bill of Rights has been part of the United States Constitution for almost 160 years, but is still constantly, flagrantly and widely violated by government officials as well as non-

* The 1918 Constitution applied only to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

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governmental groups. We need not, then, accuse Soviet Russia of hypocrisy simply because some of the ideals written into its Constitution have not been fulfilled a short sixteen years after the adoption of that document. The truth, as we shall see, is that most of the Soviet Constitution is in effect because it describes to such a large extent the concrete functioning of the Soviet state.

2. *The Structure of Soviet Society and State*

In the introductory Chapter of the Soviet Constitution entitled "The Organization of Society," Article 1 reads: "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of workers and peasants." First to be noted in this opening statement is that, as throughout the Constitution, the word *socialist* and not the word *Communist* is used to describe Soviet society.

There are two fundamental stages, socialism and communism, in the development of a Marxist society. Socialism is the initial stage in which the wage return is still quite unequal and based on the principle, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work." Under socialism, also, the amount and quality of production still falls considerably short of the ideal, and political dictatorship may still be considered necessary. Communism is the far-off eventual stage in which wages become more nearly equal and are regulated on the principle, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." The actualization of this principle is to be made possible by an overflowing economy of abundance such as the world has never seen. Under communism, too, there is to be a complete abrogation of the dictatorship.

It is essential to correct the common misunderstanding-

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ing that socialism and communism mean an absolute equality in remuneration and living standards. Stalin has taken pains to clarify this matter: "By equality, Marxism means, not equalization of individual requirements and individual life, but the abolition of classes, *i.e.*, (a) the equal emancipation of all working people from exploitation after the capitalists have been overthrown and expropriated; (b) the equal abolition for all of private property in the means of production after they have been converted into the property of the whole of society; (c) the equal duty of all to work according to their ability, and the equal right of all working people to receive remuneration according to the amount of work performed (a socialist society); (d) the equal duty of all to work according to their ability, and the equal right of all working people to receive remuneration according to their needs (a communist society) .

"Furthermore, Marxism proceeds from the assumption that people's tastes and requirements are not, and cannot be, identical, equal, in quality or in quantity, either in the period of socialism or in the period of communism. That is the Marxian conception of equality. Marxism has never recognized, nor does it recognize, any other equality. To draw from this the conclusion that socialism calls for equalization, for the leveling of the requirements of the members of society, for the leveling of their tastes and of their individual lives — that according to the plans of the Marxists all should wear the same clothes and eat the same dishes in the same quantity — is to deal in vulgarities and to slander Marxism."²

In any event real communism, as Marxism understands it, has at no time existed in the Soviet Union,

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either in an economic or political sense. The Soviet system, however, is often *called* "communism" because of its ultimate goals and because the Communist Party is so extremely important in the life of the country. Actually, the Socialist Parties in various nations have much the same economic aims as the Communist Parties, but differ radically in the methods used to reach those ends, particularly in their strict adherence to legal and democratic forms.

The second important point in Article 1 is the use of the word *Soviet*, which means *council* in Russian and therefore carries with it a democratic connotation. The Soviet is the pervading governmental pattern in the Soviet Republic, from the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. at the top to the village Soviets at the other end of the scale. Thus Article 3 asserts: "In the U.S.S.R. all power belongs to the working people of town and country as represented by the Soviets of Working People's Deputies."

Article 4 states: "The socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the means and instruments of production firmly established as a result of the abolition of the capitalist system of economy, the abrogation of private ownership of the means and instruments of production and the abolition of the exploitation of man by man, constitute the economic foundation of the U.S.S.R." Article 5 defines socialist property as existing "either in the form of state property (the possession of the whole people), or in the form of cooperative and collective-farm property (property of a collective farm or property of a cooperative association)."

Yet not all property in the Soviet Union has been

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nationalized or socialized, since, according to Article 9, "the law permits the small private economy of individual peasants and handicraftsmen based on their personal labor and precluding the exploitation of the labor of others." Such exploitation occurs, in Marxist theory, as soon as you hire someone else to work for you and make a profit out of his services. Employing household or domestic workers does not come under the heading of exploitation.

Furthermore, as Article 10 makes clear: "The right of citizens to personal ownership of their incomes from work and of their savings, of their dwelling houses and subsidiary household economy, their household furniture and utensils and articles of personal use and convenience, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property of citizens, is protected by law." This statement corrects the widespread misconception that collective ownership under socialism covers literally everything. The chief economic goal of socialism is to keep on raising the standard of living in terms of personal consumer goods such as just described. Collective ownership is of the main means of production and distribution like mineral deposits, the land, forests, factories, railroads, banks, communications and so on.

Individual property rights are further defined in Article 7 regarding collective farms: "In addition to its basic income from the public, collective-farm enterprise, every household in a collective farm has for its personal use a small plot of land attached to the dwelling and, as its personal property, a subsidiary establishment on the plot, a dwelling house, livestock, poultry and minor agricultural implements." This same Article tells us:

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"Public enterprises in collective farms and cooperative organizations, with their livestock and implements, the products of the collective farms and cooperative organizations, as well as their common buildings, constitute the common, socialist property of the collective farms and cooperative organizations."

Not less than 60 percent of Soviet families own their own homes today. Within city limits the size of the plot permitted for a privately owned house is not more than 720 square yards; in the country it may be twice that size. Persons building a house are entitled to a credit of 10,000 rubles to assist them in the venture. The credit carries 2 percent interest and is to be paid back in seven years. The owner-builder's personal investment must not be less than 30 percent; but — and this is a novel feature — it need not be in the form of cash, since the labor put in by the builder and members of his family is counted as part of his investment. Free timber is available for construction to war invalids and to ex-servicemen and their families.

Article 11 gives the key, in my opinion, to the rapid economic development of the Soviet Union and to its general economic stability in war and peace: "The economic life of the U.S.S.R. is determined and directed by the state national economic plan with the aim of increasing the public wealth, of steadily improving the material conditions of the working people and raising their cultural level, of consolidating the independence of the U.S.S.R. and strengthening its defensive capacity." Country-wide social-economic planning in Soviet Russia, upon the socialist foundations already outlined, is an asset of inestimable value and definitely something new

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under the sun. I shall later include an entire section on it.*

In article 12 we find the important statement: "In the U.S.S.R. work is a duty and a matter of honor for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: 'He who does not work, neither shall he eat.'" This same thought was enunciated in the Bible by St. Paul in the second book of Thessalonians, third chapter, tenth verse: "For even when we were with you, this we commanded you, that if any would not work, neither shall he eat." In the Soviet Union the principle of performing useful work amounts to gospel. It naturally conduces, through ever-increasing production, to the general welfare and also to individual happiness, since the average Soviet citizen is absorbed in a socially significant job that brings meaning into his life.

There is no place for idlers in Soviet Russia. The new Soviet morality looks upon all forms of socially useful labor as ethically worth while and praiseworthy. To win the award of "Hero of Socialist Labor" in the Soviet Republic is an honor of highest repute. At the same time the Soviet system makes wide provisions for economic assistance to workers in case of accident or illness, and during old age, giving them throughout adulthood a sense of security that encourages psychological stability and devoted public service.

Chapters II-IX of the Soviet Constitution provide most of the essential information on how the Soviet state is organized. I shall merely make a few general remarks on the formal governmental set-up, which is not difficult to grasp and has many similarities with demo-

* See p. 165.

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cratic institutions in the United States and Great Britain. Like the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. is a federal republic. It is made up of sixteen different Union or Soviet Socialist Republics, organized on the basis of nationality and each possessing a large degree of autonomy and "its own Constitution, which takes account of the specific features of the Republic and is drawn up in full conformity with the Constitution of the U.S.S.R." (Article 16). The formal autonomy of the Union Republics goes further than that of States in the U.S.A. in that they have "the right freely to secede from the U.S.S.R." (Article 17). It is doubtful, however, whether in the last analysis any of them would or could put this provision into effect.

In the U.S.S.R., as in the United States and England, the highest legislative body, known as the Supreme Soviet, has two chambers. These are the Soviet of the Union, with 678 deputies (1950) who are elected on the basis of one for every 300,000 of the population; and the Soviet of Nationalities, with 638 representatives (1950) elected according to nationality from the Union Republics and from the national divisions of lesser size within them.* Unlike the comparable American and British bodies, the two Soviet chambers have equal rights. The Soviet of Nationalities, a unique institution in the history of parliamentary development at the time it was set up, reflects the multi-national character of the Soviet commonwealth and the particular interests of the various national groups. The Constitution gives special recognition throughout to the many different ethnic minorities of the U.S.S.R. This theme is of great importance and I shall devote the next chapter to it.

* In the national elections of 1946 and 1950 both Soviets added several extra members, elected by military units serving outside of the country. In 1950 the number of additional Deputies chosen for each chamber was seven.

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The term of office for each house in the Supreme Soviet is four years. The Supreme Soviet meets twice annually. It names the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. for a term of five years. It likewise elects a Presidium or Executive Committee of thirty-three members to carry on its functions when it is not in session. Foreign correspondents often refer to the Chairman of the Presidium, at present Nikolai M. Shvernik, former head of the trade union movement, as the Soviet "President." He represents the Soviet Government at many official functions, his duties and powers conforming in considerable degree to those of the President of France.

The Supreme Soviet also chooses the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., which has about sixty members. This Council corresponds to the Cabinet in America and England and constitutes the Government of the U.S.S.R. Its Chairman, at present Joseph Stalin, is Premier of the Soviet Union, and it has more than twelve Deputy Chairmen. The Council of Ministers is responsible and accountable to the Presidium, which has the power to annul its decisions and orders "in case they do not conform to law" (Article 49f). And the Presidium is in its turn accountable to the Supreme Soviet.

Thus the Soviet Constitution follows the British pattern, in form at least, in setting up direct parliamentary responsibility for the central government instead of giving a chief executive the power, as does the American Constitution, to continue his administration even after the highest legislative body has repudiated him. Likewise it resembles the British model in doing without a popularly elected chief executive. Again, the Soviet system is like the British rather than the American in that the Supreme Court does not have the power to declare

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legislation unconstitutional. The final court of authority on legislation in Soviet Russia is the Supreme Soviet. Many constitutional experts believe that placing ultimate power in the legislature is, other things being equal, a more democratic arrangement than the American system of checks and balances.

The immense scope of a socialist government under which there is public ownership and operation of the main means of production and distribution becomes clear in viewing the functions of the Council of Ministers. Whereas the American Cabinet administers only nine separate departments, the Soviet is responsible for fifty-six. The Council of Ministers (Cabinet) includes the heads of fifty-one Ministries* and the chairmen of five special bodies of ministerial rank, namely, the Committee on Arts, the State Planning Committee, the State Committee for Construction, the State Committee for Food and Industrial Commodity Supplies and the State Committee for Material and Technical Supplies to the National Economy.

The Cabinet also has direct charge of more than twenty Chief Administrations, Administrations, Bureaus, Commissions, Councils or Committees which do not have ministerial status, but whose chairmen sit in the Cabinet in a consultative capacity. Examples of such bodies are the Central Statistical Administration, the Chief Administration of Protective Afforestation, the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., the Committee on the Affairs of Physical Culture and Sport, the Council on Affairs of the Orthodox Church and the State Arbitration Bureau, which has the duty of ironing out disagreements and dif-

* Until 1946 the official title of Soviet Ministries was *People's Commissariats* and of Ministers, *People's Commissars*.

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facilities between the various Ministries and sub-Ministries.

Twenty-nine of the Ministries under the Soviet Cabinet are in the All-Union category with nation-wide scope and function. They are as follows (Article 77) :

- Agricultural Machine-Building Industry
- Agricultural Stocks
- Armaments
- Automobile and Tractor Industry
- Aviation Industry
- Chemical Industry
- Coal Industry
- Communications
- Communications Equipment Industry
- Construction and Road-Building Machinery
- Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises
- Construction of Machine-Building Enterprises
- Electrical Industry
- Electric Power Stations
- Ferrous Metallurgy
- Foreign Trade
- Geology
- Heavy Machine-Building Industry
- Labor Reserves
- Machine-Tool Building Industry
- Machine-Building and Instrument-Building
- Merchant Marine
- Navy
- Non-Ferrous Metallurgy
- Oil Industry
- Railroads
- River Fleet

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Ship-Building Industry

Transport Machine-Building Industry

The central Soviet Government also is in charge of twenty-two Union-Republican Ministries which, "as a rule, direct the branches of state administration entrusted to them through the corresponding Ministries of the Union Republics" (Article 76). These corresponding Ministries of each of the sixteen constituent Republics have a dual responsibility and accountability, being "subordinate both to the Council of Ministers of the Union Republic and to the corresponding Union-Republican Ministries of the U.S.S.R." (Article 87). The twenty-two Union-Republican Ministries are (Article 78):

Agriculture

Army

Building Materials Industry

Cinematography

Cotton Growing

Finance

Fishing Industry

Food Industry

Foreign Affairs

Forestry

Higher Education

Internal Affairs

Justice

Light Industry

Meat and Dairy Industry

Paper and Woodworking

Public Health

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
State Control
State Farms
State Security
Timber Industry
Trade

The economic, cultural and political affairs assigned to the Union-Republican Ministries are run jointly by the federal and the Republican governments. The Union Republics administer a few Republican Ministries which are concerned with local affairs and have no opposite numbers in the federal government. To summarize, there are altogether four classes of Ministries in the governments of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics: the exclusively Republican Ministries just mentioned, the Republics' Union-Republican Ministries, the federal Union-Republican Ministries (bearing the same names as the corresponding Republican departments), and the All-Union Ministries which are the responsibility of the federal administration alone.

The governmental structures of the Union Republics, and of the subdivisions within them called Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, are somewhat less complicated than those of the federal state, the most important difference being that their Supreme Soviets are unicameral instead of bicameral. This means, of course, that they do not have a separate Chamber of Nationalities. Representation in the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics varies, according to size of population, from one deputy for every 5,000 inhabitants to one for every 150,000. For the Supreme Soviets of the Autonomous Republics the general rule is one representative for every 3,000 to 5,000 inhabitants.


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GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE OF THE U.S.S.R.



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GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE OF A UNION REPUBLIC



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In Chapter XI the 1936 Constitution outlines an electoral system which contains five new provisions that signify a real advance and that show, to my mind, a gradual evolution toward full-fledged democracy in the Soviet Union. In the first place, the Constitution renders the ballot universal, giving the franchise to certain groups and individuals formerly barred from voting because they were considered too hostile to the Soviet state or too unreliable. Article 135 reads: "Elections of deputies are universal: all citizens of the U.S.S.R. who have reached the age of eighteen, irrespective of race or nationality, sex, religion, educational and residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities, have the right to vote in the election of deputies, with the exception of insane persons and persons who have been convicted by a court of law and whose sentences include deprivation of electoral rights."

In the second place, the 1936 Constitution asserts the principle of equal suffrage for all and does not discriminate against any group or class. The 1924 Constitution provided for unequal representation of workers and peasants in the chief elective bodies, one deputy being elected for every 25,000 city electors as compared with one for every 125,000 people in the rural districts. The reason for this disproportion was that the agricultural population was at the time still predominantly illiterate and wedded to individualistic methods of farming. Only with the progress of education among the peasants and the triumph of collective farming was it deemed wise for the Socialist Republic to eliminate the weighting of the ballot in favor of the progressive city workers. In the United States today the ballot is still unequal in the

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sense of being generally weighted *against* the urban population.

In the third place, the 1936 Constitution establishes secret voting in the election of all the different grades of Soviet. Previously elections had been conducted by a show of hands at open meetings, in the fashion of the old New England town meeting. Again, in the earlier years of the Soviet Republic there did not exist the cultural prerequisites among the largely illiterate Soviet people for carrying through efficiently the processes of the secret ballot. The simple show of hands, however subject to abuse, was the natural and intelligent procedure for a considerable period.

In the fourth place, the 1936 Constitution does away with the old method of indirect voting for members of the upper Soviets and replaces it with the method of direct popular vote. Under the 1924 Constitution the voters elected directly only the village and city governments, which sent representatives to the regional and Union Republic Soviets, which in turn chose the deputies to the federal All-Union Congress of Soviets. This hierarchical system was similar to the election of United States Senators by the State legislatures until 1913. Now in the Soviet Union the electorate votes separately and directly for the delegates to each Soviet.

In the fifth place, the direct ballot guaranteed by the 1936 Constitution makes possible the direct recall of deputies to any Soviet during their term of office, whereas previously such recall was limited to the lower Soviets. Article 142 states: "It is the duty of every deputy to report to his electors on his work and on the work of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies, and he is liable

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to be recalled at any time in the manner established by law upon decision of a majority of the electors." The Soviet people hold their deputies up to rigorous standards of representation, frequently becoming dissatisfied with them and using the power of recall. This method of democratic vigilance is highly developed in Soviet Russia.

Since there is only one legal political party in the U.S.S.R., the Communist Party, the regulations for nomination to the Soviets are of especial importance. Article 141 lays down the rules: "Candidates for election are nominated according to electoral areas. The right to nominate candidates is secured to public organizations and societies of the working people: Communist Party organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, youth organizations and cultural societies." The only other mention of the Communist Party occurs in Article 126 of the Constitution which declares that "the most active and politically most conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state."

The Soviet Constitution has often been denounced as "a mere fraudulent facade" on the grounds that it does not adequately describe the pervasive and all-important role of the Communist Party in Soviet life. However, since the Constitution explicitly states that the Communist Party "is the leading core of all organizations . . . both public and state," I think that it does indicate the importance of the Communist Party. It is

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appropriate to recall that the American Constitution makes no mention of any political party whatsoever and does not even hint at a two-party system or at the part that political parties have played in American democracy. In fact, the Founding Fathers of the American Republic did not envisage a two-party or multi-party system and felt strongly that parties would be a menace to the new democratic state. Two distinct and separate political parties did not come into existence for fifteen years after the Revolution of 1776; and no candidate was nominated to oppose George Washington in the first two elections for President.

A one-party system, then, in which the nominations are the fundamental thing and in which a single slate is ratified in elections, does not *necessarily* prevent true democracy. In the United States today we have many examples of democratic single-slate voting. Frequently the Republican and Democratic Parties agree on the same candidates for judgeships. In Leonia, New Jersey, a community of 7,000 people, the Leonia Civic Conference, a non-partisan group, selects the best candidates for local offices whom it can find, regardless of political labels, and nominates them. Almost without exception the single slate it recommends is elected. The Civic Conference is composed of delegates from the local Democratic and Republican organizations, from the men's and women's clubs, and from parents' and veterans' groups. Any organization with fifty members can send a delegate to the Conference, or any twenty-five citizens who sign a petition. In America, too, there are a huge number of non-governmental societies, associations, councils and committees most of which elect their officers through the uncontested single-slate method.

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It is the Soviet and Marxist theory that different political parties arise from conflicting property interests on the part of different economic classes such as workers and capitalists, landowners and farmers (or peasants), small businessmen and monopolists; and that as long as such groupings exist political freedom, in whatever degree it can be attained under such circumstances, does demand different political parties. The Marxist idea is that when these classes have been eliminated, as in the Soviet Union, then the need for a multiplicity of parties also disappears. Whether or not this theory is sound, we cannot insist or expect that the evolution of democracy in the U.S.S.R. follow the institutional pattern of the decidedly imperfect democracies with which the world is already acquainted.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, numbering in 1952 over 6,000,000 out of an adult population of some 130,000,000, far from trying to keep all government posts to itself, makes every effort to draw non-Party people into elective and other offices. In the highest legislative body in the land the percentage of non-Party members has tended to grow larger since the early years of the Soviet Republic. From 10 percent in 1924 this ratio rose to 23.9 percent in the Supreme Soviet elected in 1937, although it fell to 17 percent in that chosen in 1950. The percentage of non-Party deputies noticeably increases in the lower Soviets, rising in 1939 to 47.4 percent in the city Soviets, to 53.2 in the town Soviets and to 76.9 in the village Soviets. In the elections held in 1947-48 for all Soviets, including regional and provincial, below the level of the Union Republic Soviets, the figure for non-Party representatives was 62.6 percent.

In any of the Soviets, however, whatever the Com-

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munist Party supports in the way of legislation practically always goes through; and whatever it opposes is practically always lost. The Central Committee of the Party, with its more than seventy members, meets every four months. It elects an executive committee called the Political Bureau (Politburo),* composed of ten members and four alternates. The Politburo, on which Premier Stalin, General Secretary of the Communist Party since 1922, and his closest associates sit, is far and away the most powerful political unit in Soviet Russia at present, overshadowing the Government itself. The power of the Communist Party nationally and locally does not imply that the governmental and administrative machinery outlined by the Constitution is a meaningless shell; for whatever the power of the Party, it is this constitutional machinery which it and the people as a whole use to carry on the political and economic affairs of the country. And there is wide popular participation in government through the Soviets, with the population maintaining close contact with their deputies in the Soviets at all levels.

Of democratic significance are the relatively large number of elective positions in the U.S.S.R. "*Ten times as many Soviet citizens hold elective posts as are chosen by the American people. . . . Moscow has 1,200 members in its Council, whereas New York has twenty-seven. . . . Each neighborhood of about a quarter of a million people has its own governing council, with considerable authority in local school, housing, police, retailing and civil serv-*

* In August, 1952, the Central Committee announced that under a new statute to be voted on at the Nineteenth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in October, 1952, a Presidium takes the place of the Politburo and is "to guide the work of the Central Committee between plenary sessions." For the complete text of the statute see *The New York Times*, August 21, 1952.

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ice affairs. Delegates are elected on the basis of one to every thousand people, or about 250 families. In terms of New York that means about one elected representative for each side of each city block. Certainly, government could hardly get closer to the people than that."³

It seems to me that there is in the Soviet Union a mixed governmental system in which dictatorship is conjoined with strong and growing elements of democracy. The function of the Communist Party, exercising what Sidney and Beatrice Webb called its "vocation of leadership," is to act as guide and educator of the people until they are fully versed in the intricacies of self-government. To this thought we must add the point that as long as Soviet Russia feels threatened by "capitalistic encirclement" and foreign aggression, Soviet democratic institutions will be subject to ups and downs and the dictatorship will remain.

According to Marxist theory, not only the dictatorship but the state itself is destined to "wither away" in the Communist society that is eventually established. I believe that in the Soviet Union the *dictatorship* will probably give way in due course to a truly democratic government. But I have never been able to accept the thesis that the U.S.S.R. or any other country would be able to dispense entirely with the state as an administrative apparatus and as the final authority in nation-wide economic planning. The Soviet State, however, as the guardian of the interests of a special class, will no doubt disappear in time. And when that happens, there will no longer be a need for the Communist Party, as Soviet theoreticians predict.

It is regrettable that during the past few years the

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Soviet dictatorship has manifestly become tighter instead of relaxing. But this is not surprising in light of the menacing international situation that has come into being since World War II and the widespread discussion of a Third World War directed against the Soviet Republic. The Soviet Government has operated on the principle that it is better to preserve the new institutions of socialism, even through the most rigorous and ruthless measures, in order that those institutions may keep on developing instead of being destroyed at the outset.

3. *The New Rights of Man*

The most striking and novel section of the Soviet Constitution is Chapter X entitled "Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens." In this Chapter the Constitution advances far beyond any other such state document in history and assures to all citizens certain basic economic, social and cultural rights that had never before been considered constitutional prerogatives of citizenship as such. According to eye-witnesses, the Soviet delegates to the constitutional convention cheered each Article of this Chapter, and only of this Chapter, in the final reading and adoption of the Constitution.

In accordance with the priority of economics in Soviet theory, Article 118, laying down the fundamental economic foundation for the many different aspects of citizenship, comes first in Chapter X. This Article reads: "Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to work, that is, are guaranteed the right to employment and payment for their work in accordance with its quantity and quality. The right to work is ensured by the socialist organization of the national economy, the steady growth of the

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productive forces of Soviet society, the elimination of the possibility of economic crises, and the abolition of unemployment."

Although we must keep a weather eye on future developments, it does indeed seem true that Soviet socialism, without depending on the stimulus of armaments or war, has been able to eliminate the general economic crises and mass unemployment characteristic of the capitalist world. This is why the Constitution dares declare, in effect, that unemployment is unconstitutional.

The next Article also deals with economic affairs: "The right to rest and leisure is ensured by the establishment of the eight-hour workday for office employees and by reducing the workday to seven and six hours for a number of arduous professions and to four hours in factory shops with particularly arduous working conditions; by establishing annual vacations with full pay for workers and office employees; by providing a wide network of sanitariums, rest homes and clubs to serve the working people."

Vacations with pay in Soviet Russia range from two weeks to two months. There are of course a multitude of opportunities for recreation. In every town and city — and in most villages — there is at least one public library. Theatre and opera, concert and motion picture are available to everyone. The municipalities and the trade unions provide ample facilities for sports. The "parks of culture and rest," offering the most varied recreational programs, are outstanding features in most Soviet cities. Outdoor life, taking advantage of river, lake, beach, mountain and forest, is encouraged throughout the U.S.S.R.

Article 120 is concerned with various forms of social

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security: "Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to maintenance in old age and also in case of sickness or loss of capacity to work. This right is ensured by the extensive development of social insurance of workers and employees at state expense, free medical service for the working people and the provision of a wide network of health resorts for the use of the working people."

It is to be noted that in this Article covering social security there is no mention of unemployment insurance, which had been guaranteed by the Soviet Labor Code up till 1930 and which is of such vital importance in capitalist countries. To repeat, involuntary unemployment has disappeared in the U.S.S.R., and so unemployment insurance would be superfluous. Old age pensions begin at the age of fifty-five for women and at sixty for men. The free medical service includes dental care.

In the United States we are accustomed to hear virulent criticism of socialized medicine, but this new system of health instituted in the U.S.S.R. is, in my judgment, one of the greatest of Soviet achievements. England under the Labor Government successfully established a similar system. I do not claim that every Soviet citizen is obtaining the best medical care; for Soviet medicine still lacks adequate supplies and a sufficient number of well-trained physicians. I do claim, however, that no one in Soviet Russia lacks proper medical service because he cannot afford it.

The fact is that the health of the Soviet people has made tremendous progress since 1917. The chief endemic diseases of Tsarist times, such as bubonic plague, cholera, smallpox, typhus and venereal disease, are virtually non-existent today. The number of typhoid cases are more than 80 percent below the 1913 level and the

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incidence of tuberculosis more than 40 percent below it. The death rate among adults has fallen over 65 percent since 1913 and that of children by even more. The Soviet public health system emphasizes preventive medicine. Dr. Henry Sigerist, formerly of Johns Hopkins University and an expert on Soviet medicine, has estimated that in the U.S.S.R. the equivalent of \$27 out of \$30 of medical expenditures goes to prevention as compared with only \$1 out of \$30 in America.

The next Article in the Soviet Constitution on the new rights of man brings us into the field of culture: "Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to education. This right is ensured by universal, compulsory, elementary education; by free seven-year education; by a system of state stipends to the outstanding students in higher schools; by instruction in schools being conducted in the native language, and by the organization in the factories, state farms, machine and tractor stations and collective farms of free vocational, technical and agronomic training for the working people."

Day nurseries under the Ministry of Public Health care for infants from thirty-six days old through the age of three. Kindergartens take children from three to seven. Neither kindergartens nor nurseries are compulsory. Both charge working mothers a nominal fee amounting to one day's pay a month. Only a small proportion of Soviet mothers take advantage of the creche and kindergarten system. Free, universal, compulsory education extends from the age of seven through thirteen; and the eventual aim is to make it so for everyone up to eighteen.

Although a capitalist democracy like the United States does not make any guarantee about education in its Constitution, it does by law have free, compulsory

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elementary education and a free liberal arts education or vocational training at the high school and college levels for those who wish it and can afford to remain without a paying job. Hence the provisions in the Soviet Constitution concerning education, while they mark a signal improvement over Tsarist days, are not exceptional. The educational upsurge that has taken place in the U.S.S.R. since 1917 has not been confined to youth or based merely on state-run institutions. Serious adult education has been a pervasive phenomenon and special educational enterprises have been a regular part of the activities of labor unions, the Communist Party and the Soviet army.

In article 122 we come again to a unique constitutional provision: "Women in the U.S.S.R. are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life. The possibility of exercising these rights is ensured to women by granting them an equal right with men to work, payment for work, rest and leisure, social insurance and education, by state protection of the interests of mother and child, by state aid to mothers of large families and unmarried mothers, prematernity and maternity leave with full pay, and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens."

Lenin once said that no nation can be free when half its population, the women, are household slaves and doomed to "daily sacrifice to a thousand unimportant trivialities."⁴ This statement applies to all countries, but it had special relevance for Tsarist Russia in which women were almost universally treated as basically inferior to men. An old Russian proverb stressed the inherent inferiority of the female sex: "A hen is no bird,

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and a woman is no human being." Other Russian sayings indicate the harsh treatment that women in Tsarist days were likely to receive: "Love your wife like your soul, but thrash her like a pear tree"; "Beat your wife, the food will be tastier."

The Soviet Government not only reversed the former Russian attitude toward women, but went ahead of any other country in eradicating exploitation of woman by man and establishing full sex equality in all relevant ways. This means much more than giving women the suffrage, a right granted even in the United States and Great Britain only during the past few decades. Soviet theory and practice extend equality between the sexes to the relationship between husband and wife, to economic and professional activity, to educational and cultural opportunity, and to participation in every form of political life.

In the 1937 elections 16.5 percent of the deputies chosen for the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. were women; in both the 1946 and 1950 elections the percentage increased to about 21 as compared with less than 2 percent in the United States Congress for the same years. Hundreds of women are members of the Supreme Soviets of the Union and Autonomous Republics. All Soviet judges and jurors are elected; and in 1949 over 39 percent of them were women. In 1951 approximately 413,000 women were students in higher educational institutions and comprised more than 30 percent of the student body. In the same year more than 40 percent of all persons employed in the national economy were women. Over 383,000 women were working as engineers and technicians and over 1,000,000 in the public health system, including 191,000 qualified physicians and surgeons.

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The Soviet policy does not neglect the biological function of women as mothers, and indeed extends to mother and child every possible protection. Sex equality in Soviet Russia has certainly not led to the break-up of home life; and there is much evidence that it has brought increasing stability to the family as an institution. The system of easy divorces characteristic of the early post-revolutionary years has given way to a tightening of the marital bond through making divorces more difficult and expensive; and to an emphasis on building up a psychologically adjusted and permanent family unit. Grounds for divorce are desertion, mental disease, the sentencing of one spouse to three or more years in jail and other weighty reasons satisfying to the People's Courts. Birth control techniques are legal, but not encouraged.

In any case we must guard against the fallacy of thinking that Soviet sex equality, or any other social-economic reforms in the U.S.S.R., can automatically solve the complex problems of sex relations and of women's role in home management. At the same time we are warranted in doubting whether the exigencies of the cold war justify the Soviet Government's policy of refusing to allow Soviet women married to foreigners to join their husbands abroad.

The Soviet Constitution takes another epoch-making step forward in the next Article (123), which ensures ethnic democracy: "Equality of rights of citizens of the U.S.S.R., irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life, is an indefeasible law. Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or, conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges for, citizens on account of their race or nationality, as well as any advocacy of racial

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or national exclusiveness or hatred and contempt, is punishable by law." The Soviet attitude toward racial and national minorities within the U.S.S.R. is fraught with world-wide significance, particularly in view of the fascist attempt in World War II to foist permanently on mankind a program of racial prejudice and oppression and in view of the present distressing minorities situations in such nations as the United States and South Africa.

Article 124 concerns the much misunderstood Soviet attitude toward religion: "In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the Church in the U.S.S.R. is separated from the State, and the school from the Church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens." In the old Russia the Orthodox Eastern Church was the official state church and had a controlling voice in the educational system. A large part of the outcry against the Soviet Government's treatment of religion has been due precisely to its taking over a principle long established in the United States, namely, the separation of state and religion and of school and religion.

A more friendly feeling between government and church has recently developed in the Soviet Union for the reason that the Orthodox Church gave such loyal support in resisting the Nazi invasion. However, it is my belief that on the whole there has been true freedom of *worship*, despite some local excesses against the Church authorities in the early years, since the Revolution of 1917. There has actually been more religious freedom than under the Tsars in the sense that the disestablished Orthodox Church has no longer been able to persecute minority Protestant, Hebrew and Mohammedan sects;

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and so all religions under the Soviets have legally stood on a plane of equality. In a later chapter I shall go into the details of the status of religion in Soviet Russia.*

The next few Articles cover the controversial topic of civil liberties in the Soviet Union. Article 125 states: "In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed by law: freedom of speech; freedom of the press; freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings; freedom of street processions and demonstrations. These civil rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material prerequisites for the exercise of these rights." Article 127 guarantees the "inviolability of the person. No person may be placed under arrest except by decision of a court or with the sanction of a procurator." Article 128 reads: "The inviolability of the homes of citizens and privacy of correspondence are protected by law."

The opening statement on civil liberties obviously qualifies freedom of opinion by the clause "in order to strengthen the socialist system." This definitely implies that those who are opposed to socialism in Soviet Russia are not granted the right to express their opposition. Individuals in favor of the restoration of Tsarism or the capitalist system would quickly get into hot water if they attempted to express their views. Soviet practice up to date has gone further and has denied freedom of opinion to citizens who, even while agreeing that socialism is the goal, continue to take issue, after a policy decision has

* See p. 121.

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been made, with basic Communist Party or government directives.

In his book, *The Law of the Soviet State*, Andrei Y. Vishinsky, former Procurator-General (Attorney General) of the U.S.S.R. and since 1949 Minister of Foreign Affairs, asserted: "In our state, naturally there is and can be no place for freedom of speech, press and so on for the foes of socialism."⁵ How flagrant a violation of civil liberties this amounts to becomes clear if we apply the converse of the principle expressed to the capitalist United States. Then we would have: "Under the Bill of Rights, naturally there can be no place for freedom of speech, press, assembly and political organization for the enemies of capitalism."

Nevertheless, Soviet citizens retain a wide area for the operation of free speech in the determination of policy, up to the point when a final decision is taken, and in criticism of the way in which policy is carried out. Soviet workers have been outspoken in their slashing criticism of economic affairs, factory officials and government bureaucrats. This constant self-criticism in the Soviet Union has become a well-established institution and provides hostile foreign writers with a great deal of ammunition for exposing bureaucracy, inefficiencies and other defects in the Soviet system. We can express the situation in this manner: Within a limited yet fairly broad circle of controversial subjects Soviet citizens have full latitude of speech, but when they go outside that circle to question settled government policies or fundamental Marxist principles, their freedom of speech is drastically curtailed.

The second part of Article 125 underlines once more the stress that the Soviets put on the economic implemen-

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tation of civil liberties. What use is freedom of the press unless printing presses and stocks of paper are available? What good are constitutional guarantees for freedom of opinion unless the people have "the material requisites for the exercise of these rights"? Soviet political scientists make the claim that in the capitalist countries the workers, especially, do *not* possess these material requisites because they lack in general the financial means to hire printing presses, print newspapers and magazines, rent meeting halls and buy radio time. Capitalist democracies, Soviet critics go on to say, talk a lot about the *abstract forms* of civil liberty, but do not give those forms substance in economic realities.

The Communists also argue that in capitalist countries, although governmental authorities crack down only too often on freedom of speech, the main incidence of censorship comes from pressures by private businessmen and corporations that own and operate at least 95 percent of the press, the radio, the movies and book publishing. These prime mediums of communication are slanted overwhelmingly on the capitalist side of every fundamental issue and need no government prompting to carry on a constant campaign against socialist and Communist doctrines. What this amounts to, the argument concludes, is that under capitalism there is a pervasive private and voluntary censorship of ideas which is less honest yet just as effective as the open government censorship in the Soviet Union.

The remaining articles in Chapter X are primarily concerned with the duties of Soviet citizens, such as observance of the laws, maintaining labor discipline and taking part in universal military service. Article 131 is particularly worth quoting: "It is the duty of every

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citizen of the U.S.S.R. to safeguard and strengthen public, socialist property as the sacred and inviolable foundation of the Soviet system, as the source of the wealth and might of the country, as the source of the prosperous and cultured life of all the working people. Persons committing offenses against public, socialist property are enemies of the people."

The new rights of man guaranteed in the Soviet Constitution show more clearly than any other section of that document the ideals toward which Soviet socialism is driving. Some of those ideals have already been largely fulfilled. It is no small thing for the Soviet Republic to have abolished unemployment and depression, to have provided social insurance and free medical care for all, and to have established racial, economic and educational democracy as well as equality between the sexes. It is the challenge of such achievements which, as Edward H. Carr, a British professor of international politics, shows in his illuminating book, *The Soviet Impact on the Western World*, has led to much salutary social and economic legislation in the West during the past two decades. These accomplishments of the U.S.S.R. are either slighted or not mentioned at all in the great hue and cry which anti-Soviet forces are continually stirring up.

Naturally those hostile to Soviet Russia concentrate on its salient weaknesses, such as the state of civil liberties and of political democracy. Any impartial observer of the Soviet scene must admit that the Socialist Republic limps and lags in these two significant criteria of a civilized nation. Despotism practices inherited from Tsardom, the historical Russian pattern of exalting the community above individual rights, the long tradition —

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fostered by the Orthodox Church — of the principle of unanimous agreement on important issues, the domestic turbulence and hatreds resulting from the greatest revolution in history, the fear and actuality of foreign aggression, and the Marxist theory of proletarian dictatorship have all combined to hold back the evolution of civil liberties and political democracy in the Soviet Union.

Many people in the Western democracies thought that the famous Moscow Trials of 1936-38, in which a number of prominent Communist leaders were convicted of treason, were a ghastly travesty on due process of law and were complete frame-ups. I myself, after reading carefully the voluminous verbatim testimony in the three big trials — something which few critics of Soviet justice have bothered to do — became convinced that the defendants' sweeping confessions were genuine and that they were indeed guilty of conspiring with Leon Trotsky and outright fascist agents to overthrow the Soviet Government. Since Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin and the others firmly believed that Stalin had betrayed socialism both at home and abroad, they felt justified as revolutionaries in adopting any methods whatever to get rid of his regime.

At the same time, when fascist plotting under the direction of Hitler and Mussolini was making such headway throughout the European continent, it was too much to expect that Soviet Russia had become so stable that there could be no fifth column within it. Actually, many of those who denounced the Moscow Trials naively assumed that political progress had been so rapid in the Soviet Union that it was simply impossible for a conspiracy linked with the Fascist-Nazi Axis to find root

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there. During this trying period miscarriages of justice occurred, in my judgment, not in the Moscow Trials, but in the general purges that accompanied them throughout the country and in which many innocent persons suffered. Furthermore, the feeling against Trotsky was so extreme that the Soviet authorities not only condemned him as a traitor — which he was — but took the lamentable and ludicrous step of re-writing history in an endeavor to erase from the records all accounts of the leading role he played in the 1917 Revolution and in the defense of the Socialist Republic during its initial stages.

In his memoirs of the pre-war years Winston Churchill makes a most significant comment on the Moscow Trials. He relates that while President Benes of Czechoslovakia was bickering with Hitler in the fall of 1936, "he became aware that communications were passing through the Soviet Embassy in Prague between important personages in Russia and the German Government. This was part of the so-called Old-Guard Communist conspiracy to overthrow Stalin, and introduce a new regime based on a pro-German policy. President Benes lost no time in communicating all he could find out to Stalin. Thereafter there followed the merciless, but perhaps not needless, military and political purge in Soviet Russia and the series of trials in January, 1937, in which Vishinsky, the Public Prosecutor, played so masterful a part."⁶

To see the Soviet picture clearly we must also recognize that history shows that far-reaching revolutions have usually given rise to the most unscrupulous conduct and to bitter, throat-cutting dissension among the revolutionaries themselves. Sidney and Beatrice Webb give us the historical perspective: "Even England and Scot-

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land, in the small population of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with a much less fundamental revolution, produced generation after generation of conspirators, to whom treason and killing, with lies and deceit, were only part of what they felt to be a righteous effort. . . .

"The French Revolution of 1789-95 ushered in a similar period of conspiracy and struggle, leading to a whole succession of counter-revolutions, not reaching the stability of a democratic republic, with its large measure of personal security and social equality, for nearly a century. . . . In Russia [which was in 1900 in the matter of morals and civilization very much where Britain and France stood in 1700] the pattern of behavior of the revolutionary conspirators culminated in a bitterness and mutual antagonism more acute and all-pervading than in any other example."

Especially since the end of World War II reckless charges have been made that the Soviet Union is a horrible slave state keeping from ten to twenty million people at forced labor in concentration camps situated in Siberia and other places. While there is no question that the Soviet authorities have isolated political prisoners and ordinary criminals in special work camps, the numbers involved have steadily declined in recent years and have at no time reached the huge totals conjured up in the lurid imaginations of anti-Soviet propagandists.

The Soviet Government has from its earliest years prided itself on its method of retraining and rehabilitating prisoners of whatever variety for a normal life in the community by giving them useful work to do while imprisoned. One of the chief aims of this procedure is to ensure a good job for the prisoner when he is finally re-

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leased and to make certain that society does not permanently boycott him for his original offense. Prior to the Second World War penologists from foreign countries had frequently praised this Soviet system of curative work as highly intelligent and effective. Now, with malice aforethought, the same thing is stigmatized as "slave labor" as part of an endeavor to indict the totality of Soviet civilization.

These remarks are not intended to negate the fact that the administration of justice in the Soviet Union has been biased and harsh towards those considered enemies of the socialist state; that the Soviet authorities, relying on an omnipresent secret police, have jailed tens of thousands of blameless individuals in their periodic purges; and that Soviet prisons and labor camps have frequently failed to maintain decent and healthy conditions. In a country where general standards of living have remained comparatively low, the life of political and other prisoners is likely to be on a correspondingly low plane. We can accept as true many of the bitter experiences related by escaped Soviet prisoners without generalizing their reports into a condemnation of the entire Soviet system of penology.

In 1949 the Soviet Government expelled an American writer, Miss Anna Louise Strong, as a foreign agent and a spy without giving her a proper opportunity for legal defense or even explaining what precisely were the charges against her. I am glad to say that later, during 1950, my wife and I organized a group of American writers and intellectuals who sent a vigorous letter on the Strong case to Mr. Alexander S. Panyushkin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States from 1947 to 1952. This communication urged the Soviet Government "to review

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carefully the case of Anna Louise Strong and to see whether some mistake was not made regarding her by the Soviet Security police or other officials in immediate charge."⁸ Nothing ever came of this protest.

Persons like myself, who believe firmly in the Western ideals of individual liberty and the toleration of dissent, often as these ideals have been thwarted or betrayed in the West, have the obligation to continue our criticism of Soviet institutions insofar as they do not measure up to true democratic standards.

It would be possible to write a book of considerable length concerning the violation of civil liberties and political democracy in Soviet Russia. In fact author after author has done this very thing, as if the repressive aspects of the Soviet dictatorship were the complete story about the U.S.S.R. Yet despite all the legitimate qualifications about Soviet political life, the Soviet Constitution itself clearly belongs on the positive side of the ledger. It is a document that does great credit to its framers and that presents a grand design of human living of which the Soviet people can well be proud.

CHAPTER III SOVIET ETHNIC DEMOCRACY

1. *Soviet National and Racial Minorities*

Take the map of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and identify, each with a distinct color, the homeland of each of the 177 Soviet races, nationalities or tribes, and you will have an incomparable crazy-quilt of gay and gaudy hue. For within the sprawling boundaries of the U.S.S.R. and amongst its population of 210,000,000 there are scattered a greater number of different ethnic groups, both large and small, maintaining their separate territories and cultures, than in any other country on earth. They speak over 125 different languages and dialects and practice as many as forty different religions.

Most people outside the Soviet Union still refer to that country as "Russia." This is incorrect, since the Russian Republic is only one of the sixteen main republics of the U.S.S.R. and the Russians themselves come to only a little more than half of the total Soviet population. A prime reason for Lenin and his associates choosing the official title, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for the new state was to try to make sure that none of the minority races and nationalities of the former Russian Empire would feel subordinate, as in pre-revolutionary days, to the large Russian majority. The idea implied in the very name was that all the racial and national

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groups in the confederation would stand on a plane of freedom and equality.

The Soviet policy toward minorities goes back to the earliest period of the 1917 Revolution. On November 15, nine days after it came into power, the Soviet Government issued, under the signatures of Lenin as Premier and Stalin as Commissar of Nationalities, a revolutionary document entitled, "The Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia." This emancipation proclamation for ethnic minorities, unique in the annals of statecraft up to that time, pledged the Communist regime to support the following four basic principles: (1) "The equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia; (2) the right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, even to the extent of separation and the formation of independent states; (3) the abolition of all national and national-religious privileges and restrictions; and (4) the free development of the national minorities and ethnic groups inhabiting Russia."¹

Before many weeks had passed the Soviet Government made another significant pronouncement directed to the Moslem peoples of the former Tsarist Empire. "Moslems of Russia," it began, "Tatars of the Volga and Crimea, Kirgiz and Sarts of Siberia and Turkestan, Turks and Tatars of Transcaucasia, Chechens and Mountaineers of the Caucasus — all those whose mosques and chapels have been destroyed, whose beliefs and customs have been trampled under foot by the Tsars and oppressors of Russia! Henceforth your beliefs and customs, your national and cultural institutions are free and inviolable. Build your national life free and unhindered. You have a right to do so. Know that your rights, as well as the rights of all peoples of Russia, are protected by the

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Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies."² This second declaration indicates to some extent the complex ethnic make-up of the Soviet Union.

The largest single ethnic division, which includes three chief nationalities, is the Slav, which totals about 150,000,000 or approximately three-fourths of the entire Soviet population.* The Slavs consist mainly of the Great Russians, the Russians proper, who number almost 105,000,000 and who have settled in all parts of the U.S.S.R.; the 37,000,000 Ukrainians, sometimes known as "Little Russians," whose republic of rich agricultural and industrial regions borders the Black Sea and Poland in the southwest and is about as large and populous as France; and the Belorussians, numbering a little under 9,000,000, who live in the western zone just north of the Ukraine and whose name means "White Russian" in the Russian language. They should not be confused with the anti-Soviet exiles and émigrés who left the Soviet Union during the Revolution and Civil War and who are also called White Russians. The Ukrainian and Belorussian Republics bore the brunt of the Nazi invasion in 1941-42, were completely overrun by the German armies and suffered terrible devastation.

The Slavs have for centuries been predominantly members of the Orthodox Eastern Church, which, like the Protestant, has consistently refused to acknowledge the authority of the Catholic Pope. The Soviet or eastern Slavs are closely related, racially and linguistically, to the western Slavs (the Poles, Czechs and Slovaks) and to the southern or Balkan Slavs (the Bulgarians, Croats, Mace-

* All population figures for Soviet ethnic groups in this chapter are estimated as of January 1, 1949; and are based on the last national census of 1939, together with estimates of the natural increase since that time and of the appalling number of deaths during World War II. Allowance must be made for some margin of error.

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donians, Montenegrins, Serbs and Slovenes). The U.S. S.R. contains small minorities of Bulgarians, Czechoslovaks and Poles.

Next to the Slav the most prevalent racial strain in the Soviet confederation of peoples is the Turco-Tatar, some 21,000,000 strong and largely Mohammedan in religion. The Turco-Tatars, dark-visaged and oblique-eyed, are mostly the mixed descendants of fierce Asiatic warriors led to far-ranging conquest in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries by the mighty Eastern emperors: Genghis Khan, he who said that "as there is one ruler in heaven, so there should be but one on earth"; and Tamerlane, "the Earth-Shaker." Tamerlane's victorious sweep into Europe reached as far north and west as the Volga River and left along its banks settlements which centuries later developed into the thriving, present-day Bashkir, Chuvash and Kazan Tatars of the great Volga basin.

Several Soviet peoples of the mountainous Caucasus and Transcaucasus are also Turco-Tatar in origin, pre-eminent among them being the Azerbaidzhanians, over 3,000,000 in number, who form one of the sixteen constituent Union Republics of the U.S.S.R. The Azerbaidzhan Republic, bordering the Caspian Sea and Iran, has traditionally been known as the "Land of Fire," because of its easily combustible oil and gas deposits. (*Azer* means *fire*.) In the early nineteenth century fire-worshippers of the cult of Zoroaster still carried out their rites before the flames of their sacred temple in Baku. This internationally famous city is the capital of Azerbaidzhan and the greatest center of oil production in Soviet Russia.

However, the heart of Turco-Tatar strength in the

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U.S.S.R. lies east across the Caspian Sea in the warm, rich domain of Soviet Central Asia. Here the Kazakhs, the Kirgiz, the Turkmenians and the Uzbeks, all of Turco-Tatar stock and possessing their own Union Republics, dwell in what is historically one of the most interesting and romantic parts of the Soviet Union. It was in this land that there rose the famous and fabulously wealthy cities of Holy Bukhara and Golden Samarkand, their many mosques, minarets and other structures combining to create an architectural splendor unsurpassed in the Moslem world. Here met and merged the trade, the art, the civilization of the ancient and medieval East, with Persian, Turkish, Indian and Chinese influences all playing their role.

The hot, arid climate of Soviet Central Asia has been a major factor in bringing a large proportion of the land under the sway of soil-destroying sands. For instance, in the Turkmenian Republic 80 percent of the territory consists of desert wastes. Since earliest times, the prosperity of Central Asia has depended primarily upon the proper utilization of water and the efficient maintenance of the irrigation system. And the Soviets, with their tireless energy and scientific techniques, have made enormous strides in the battle to extend fertility to one of the world's driest and most barren plains.*

The Uzbek S.S.R., containing the cities of Bukhara, Samarkand and Tashkent, its capital, is the most prosperous and populous of the Central Asiatic Republics. It is the great cotton state of the Soviet Union and also excels in the growing of silk. But since 1917 it has also become highly industrialized. In Tsarist times the Uzbeks were called "Sarts" from the old Turkish for "wan-

* See pp. 204-207.

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der." Their country, comparable to the American southwest, has an over-abundance of sunshine. "The men of Uzbekistan wear white clothing open to the waist, exposing their sunburned chests, and black skull caps embroidered in white. The women are dressed in brightly colored gowns of radiant pale yellows and reds. The girls' black hair is braided in innumerable thin plaits; old men in colored turbans ride along on donkeys."³

East of Uzbekistan is the Kirgiz Republic, situated in a high and mountainous region contiguous to China's Sinkiang Province. There is a widely held belief that the birthplace of the human race was in what is now Kirgizia. The Kirgiz people were poverty-stricken nomads under the Tsar, but have since developed a fairly stable and prosperous agricultural life. To the north of Uzbekistan lies the huge Kazakh Republic, in itself alone one-third as large as the United States. In its climate, expanse and great business of stock-breeding northern Kazakhstan is much like Montana, Wyoming, Colorado and Utah; while the southern portion of the Republic is reminiscent of New Mexico and Arizona. In mineral resources the Kazakh S.S.R. is even richer than America's Rocky Mountain region.

The Kazakhs are generally of medium build, black hair and swarthy complexion. Until the Soviets took over, this people were roving herdsmen wandering with their big flocks and herds over the unending steppe and desert, living the major part of their lives in the saddle, and moving their tents and scanty possessions from place to place on the backs of camels. They have shared in the vast industrial and agricultural progress that has come to Central Asia during the last third of a century; and their nomadic life is now mainly a thing of the past.

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Generalizing again about Soviet Central Asia, we can say that in no section of Soviet Russia is the contrast of old and new more marked. For this entire region has leaped, in but a moment of history, from a stagnant semi-feudalism, characterized by Asiatic tyranny of the most barbarous type, to a progressive, modern, dynamic stage of society in the form of Marxist socialism. This revolutionary advance is apparent wherever one goes in Central Asia, whether in the city districts where the old buildings and the new stand side by side, in the rural areas where the native population in their traditional garb operate tractors and combines, or in the remote valleys and mountain ranges where isolated peoples have for the first time been brought into contact with twentieth-century civilization.

The third largest ethnic group in the U.S.S.R. consists of the olive-skinned Japhetic peoples living for the most part in the highlands and mountains of the Caucasus and Transcaucasus. These are the picturesque Armenians, Adzharians, Abkhazians, Georgians, Kurds, Kabardinians and others, numbering about 7,000,000 altogether. These nationalities are rather mixed in their religious faith, some being followers of Allah, others regular Orthodox, and the Armenians adhering to their own particular and independent brand of Christianity.

Armenia, on the crossroads between Europe and Asia, has a long and turbulent history going back to the times of ancient Greece and Rome. The freedom-loving Armenians, often temporarily conquered but never ethnically absorbed, today maintain one of the constituent Union Republics of the U.S.S.R. and are noted for their energy and enterprise. Predominantly agrarian under Tsarist Russia, Armenia has undergone considerable manufac-

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turing development under the Soviets and has put its agriculture on a modernized basis, with cotton fields, vineyards, orchards, tobacco plantations and cattle-raising all collectivized. It is successfully exploiting its high mountain lakes and rivers in ambitious water-power and irrigation projects. The best-known contemporary Armenians are Aram I. Khachaturian, a first-rate symphonic composer, and Anastas I. Mikoyan, a Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers.

The gay, wine-drinking Georgians, their Union Republic adjoining Armenia, are an ancient Japhetic people who were converted to Christianity in 345 A.D., three centuries before the Anglo-Saxons. It was to the Black Sea shores of Georgia that Jason and his Argonauts, according to Greek mythology, sailed in quest of the Golden Fleece. Legend also tells us that Prometheus was chained to a wild precipice of Georgia's Mt. Kazbek and eternally devoured by vultures for having made known to mankind the magic of fire. Georgia boasts of an amazing diversity of agricultural and mineral wealth, possessing some of the largest manganese deposits in the world. The most famous of all Georgians is Premier and Generalissimo Joseph Stalin, born in 1879 near the capital, Tbilisi. The Georgians were severely oppressed by the Tsars; and the fact that Stalin has risen to the highest positions of leadership in the U.S.S.R. fittingly symbolizes the genuineness of Soviet equalitarian policy towards minorities.

Two closely related Japhetic peoples, the Adzharians and the Abkhazians, minorities within a minority, have their own Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics within Georgia. This sort of set-up is typical of the ethnic complexity that we find in the U.S.S.R. Moreover, in the

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Abkhazian Republic and speaking the Abkhazian tongue, is a minority within a minority within a minority, namely several hundred of the Soviet Union's few indigenous Negroes, chiefly descendants of African slaves originally brought into this vicinity by native Turkish landowners. Another striking ethnic group in the Georgian Republic is the primitive tribe of Khevsurs, who, hemmed in and isolated for centuries by the towering peaks of the Transcaucasus, are reputed to be descended from a wandering band of Crusaders who became stranded in this region. On occasion the Khevsurs still put on medieval helmets, chain armor and white Frankish crosses which have been handed down from generation to generation.

Another major ethnic stock in the U.S.S.R. is the approximately 5,000,000 Finno-Ugrians, who are closely related to the Hungarians, and who are concentrated in the northwestern part of Soviet Russia. They consist of the Finns and Karelians of the Karelo-Finnish Union Republic; their Estonian cousins just south across the Gulf of Finland in the Estonian Union Republic; and a related patchwork of peoples like the Mari along the middle Volga River and the Komi scattered as far east as the northern Ural Mountains. The Finno-Ugrians are in general Russian Orthodox in religion, except for the Finns and Estonians, who are mainly Protestant.

A fifth pervasive ethnic strain is the Jewish, totaling around 5,000,000 in 1941, but reduced during World War II to about 3,000,000 by the monstrous mass murders and genocide of the Nazi invaders in the occupied territories. While most of the Jews in both Tsarist and Soviet Russia have lived in the western parts of the country, Jews in considerable numbers are to be found in each of the sixteen constituent Republics of the U.S.S.R.

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In 1928 the Soviet Government established a special district in the Far East where Jews from all over the Soviet Union could go and settle if they so desired. This region, almost three times as big as the state of Israel, is situated along the Manchurian frontier and centers upon the Amur River and two of its tributaries, the Bira and Bidzhan. Hence the territory is usually known as Biro-bidzhan, although since 1934 its official name has been the Jewish Autonomous Region. This thriving Autonomous Region has an estimated population (1949) of 185,000, of whom about 50 percent are Jewish. Like other Autonomous Regions in Soviet Russia, it enjoys self-government in regard to purely local affairs and elects five deputies to the Soviet of Nationalities. The official language of the Jewish A.R. is Yiddish.

Even more important, in my judgment, than the setting up of this Jewish Autonomous Region is the fact that the Soviets have virtually eliminated throughout the U.S.S.R. the virulent and often violent anti-Semitic discrimination and persecution that prevailed in Tsarist days. The Soviet Government is sometimes accused of hostility toward Jews because it opposes Judaism, their religion, and Zionism, their characteristic national movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But the Soviet Government, controlled as it is by the Communist Party, discourages *all* religions in the U.S.S.R. (while protecting their freedom of functioning) and is against Zionism as a bourgeois nationalist manifestation. The truth remains that the Jews of the Soviet Union enjoy a fully rounded racial democracy that no other nation on earth except the newly founded Republic of Israel at present makes possible for the Jewish people.

Scores of other racial and national minorities dwell

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in the U.S.S.R. besides the ones which I have already mentioned. For example, the Latvians and the Lithuanians of the Baltic littoral are both organized into Union Republics. The Moldavians, too, of the Black Sea region in the southwest have their own Union Republic. In the mountainous uplands of Soviet Central Asia the Tadzhiks, of old Iranian (Persian) stock, maintain one of the Union Republics, bordering Afghanistan and near to India. Tall, straight-nosed and blue-eyed, the Tadzhiks are probably more closely related to the so-called Aryans than the Germans or any other alleged "Nordics" in the West.

Then there is a minority of almost 1,500,000 Germans, many of whom are descendants of those who emigrated to Russia as skilled workers during the eighteenth century. For eighteen years starting in 1923 a sizeable group of these Germans had an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic on the lower Volga about 150 miles above Stalingrad. In the fall of 1941, when the Nazi armies were rapidly advancing, the Soviet Government abolished this Volga German Republic on the grounds that a dangerous proportion of its citizens were fifth-columnists for Adolf Hitler; and moved all of its German inhabitants to a remote, though fertile, region in south central Siberia.

Siberia in general, that place of exile and evil repute under the Tsars, the Soviet regime has transformed into a flourishing empire of industrial and agricultural productivity. Many of the indigenous peoples of this largest section of Soviet Asia are Mongols in origin and are of the same ethnic stock as the Mongols to the south in China. (The word *Mongol* is derived from *mong*, meaning *brave*.) Prominent among the Soviet Mongolian

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groups are the Buryat-Mongols who have their own Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in southeastern Siberia. Nomadic for centuries past, the Buryats are yellow-skinned and slant-eyed, with broad noses and high cheek-bones.

They are one of the several Siberian peoples who resemble the American Indian in facial and physical characteristics, in certain customs, songs and religious ceremonies, and in basic living habits such as the use of tents or wigwams constructed from a framework of poles covered with skins or bark. All this is not surprising when we consider that, according to the best scientific opinion, distant ancestors of the Indians migrated from Asia across Bering Strait, which is only fifty-six miles wide and interspersed with islands, or across a vanished land bridge in that vicinity. The noted anthropologist, the late Professor Franz Boas of Columbia University, states: "The physical relationship of the American native to the east Asiatic is closer than that to any other race. Straight, dark hair; wide, rather flat face; heavy nose; tendency to a Mongoloid eye are common to both of them. Locally, types are found that are so much alike that it would be rather difficult to say whether an individual is an Asiatic or an American."⁴

Small Siberian tribes clearly akin to the American Indians are the Evenkis and Nenets up north near the Arctic Circle and the Far Eastern Luoravetlans of the Bering Strait region. Each of these peoples is organized into a National Area, the smallest nationalities subdivision mentioned in the Soviet Constitution. National Areas are represented by one deputy apiece in the Soviet of Nationalities. The few Soviet Eskimos are also ethnically close to the American Indian and are racial brothers

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of the North American and Greenland Eskimos. Eskimos today live on both sides of Bering Strait and are nearly identical in physique, customs and language.

The Soviet North and the Soviet Far East, both fascinating subjects of study in themselves, contain a number of other small peoples whom I shall not try to treat of here. For further details of this kind I must refer the reader to my earlier book, *The Peoples of the Soviet Union*. Some of the smaller tribal groupings in the U.S.S.R. number but a few thousands, like those of the Dagestan Autonomous Republic in the Caucasus, or even a few hundred, like the Aleuts living on the bleak Komandorskie Islands of the Pacific. Of the 177 ethnic groups that make up the Soviet population only ninety-three total more than 10,000.

It is important to realize, too, that all of the main ethnic territorial divisions have within their borders a minority or minorities other than the predominant one. Thus in the Ukrainian Republic there are some 3,000,000 Russians, and several hundred thousand each of Belorussians, Bulgarians and Greeks. At the same time, several million Ukrainians live outside the borders of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in other Union Republics. Practically every Union Republic, Autonomous Republic and Autonomous Region includes substantial numbers of Russians.

2. *The Soviet Minorities Policy*

The policy of the Soviet regime toward national and racial minorities constitutes a direct antithesis to the Tsarist attitude, which won for pre-revolutionary Russia the label "prison of nations." The old Russian Empire contained practically all of the same peoples who live today in the Soviet Union, although its minorities of

Finns and Poles were much larger. The absolutistic Russian monarchy functioned frankly under the twin slogans of "One Tsar, one religion, one language" and "Autocracy, orthodoxy, nationalism." For the minority groups in general this meant political oppression, economic exploitation and enforced (if superficial) Russification.

The Tsarist Government filled official positions in the minority territories almost exclusively with Russians and made every effort to suppress and destroy the indigenous cultures and languages of non-Russian peoples. Throughout the Empire the Russian language became the sole medium of the courts, the government schools and official business, the use of other tongues being severely discouraged or forbidden. For example, "A Kalmyk boy caught speaking his own dialect in class or school had to wear round his neck the sign, 'It is forbidden to speak Kalmyk,' and go without dinner."

The ruling class of Russians viewed with open contempt the subject peoples, who hated them bitterly in return. The relation existing between the imperial government and the Kazakhs was quite typical. As one Tsarist official put it, "There is no other way to manage the Kazakhs except through massacres." The Kazakhs, on the other hand, had a well-known proverb, "If a Russian travel with you, hold an ax in readiness." The Tsars followed the well-established imperialist policy of "divide and rule," stirring up inter-racial animosities whenever and wherever possible: Poles against Ukrainians, Armenians against Georgians, everyone against the Jews.

Indicative of the minorities policy of the Tsars was their ferocious anti-Semitism, which became a scandal throughout the civilized world. I have already called

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attention to the horrible pogroms, promoted and protected by both the government and the official Orthodox Church. The Jews were compelled to live in the so-called Pale of Settlement and were therefore barred, except under special regulations, from many cities and districts of imperial Russia. They were also excluded, unless they adopted Christianity, from all public administrative posts and from most professions. Numerous restrictions limited their attending educational institutions and engaging in agriculture.

But beyond all this the Jews under the Tsarist regime were subject to organized raids and massacres in which thousands upon thousands — men, women and children — were brutally slain or driven from their plundered homes. These appalling slaughters of the innocent (previews of what the more efficient Nazis would later do) were called *pogroms* in Russian; and this word of awful import has been taken over intact into English and other languages. The official anti-Semitism of the Tsarist regime, which included refusal of passports to American Jewish citizens, aroused intense indignation in the United States during the first two decades of the twentieth century and led the American Government in 1913 to let lapse a commercial treaty with Russia (the 1832 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation) of eighty years' standing.

To all acts of ethnic discrimination, whether against the Jews or other minorities, the Soviet Republic has put an end. Typical of the drastic change in viewpoint was Joseph Stalin's statement on the Jewish question in 1931. "National and racial chauvinism," he said, "is a remnant of man-hating customs characteristic of the era of cannibalism. Anti-Semitism is an extreme expression of racial chauvinism and as such is the most dangerous survivor

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of cannibalism. It is useful to the exploiter, for it serves as a lightning rod enabling capitalism to evade the blows of the toilers. . . In the U.S.S.R. anti-Semitism is prosecuted most severely as a phenomenon profoundly inimical to the Soviet system."⁵

It is of considerable significance that Premier Stalin himself, more than any other top Soviet leader, has been responsible for both the theoretical and practical development of the minorities policy. This has helped to give to the policy additional authority and prestige throughout the Soviet Union. Stalin's *Marxism and the National Question* is the outstanding Soviet book on the subject. Also during the formative years of the Soviet regime, from 1917 to 1923, Stalin specialized in this field and did yeoman work as the first and only Soviet Commissar of Nationalities. This post was eliminated in 1923 as no longer necessary, since plans were already advanced, and were soon embodied in the Soviet Constitution of 1924, to establish a special Chamber of Nationalities which would concentrate upon the interests of the minority groups.

As we saw in discussing the present Soviet Constitution,* Article 123 makes a sweeping guarantee of racial and national democracy and penalizes by law "any advocacy of racial or national exclusiveness or hatred and contempt." The enlightened Soviet minorities policy runs as a major motif right through the Constitution. Regarding the Soviet of Nationalities, which is so important in the political set-up, Article 35 provides that it be elected "on the basis of twenty-five deputies from each Union Republic, eleven deputies from each Autonomous Republic, five deputies from each Autonomous Region

* See pp. 79-80.

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and one deputy from each National Area." With fifty-one national divisions concerned, this adds up to a total of 631 representatives.* For the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, chosen at a joint sitting of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, sixteen Vice-Chairmen are designated, one from each Union Republic.

The electoral provisions for the Soviet of Nationalities mean that all the main national groups organized in territories of their own have adequate representation in the central Soviet Congress. The Armenian Soviet Republic, for instance, with a population of about 1,350,000 sends the same number of delegates as the Russian Soviet Republic, with a population of more than 114,000,000. The Yakut Autonomous Republic, with approximately 400,000 people, elects the same number as the Tatar Autonomous Republic, with over 3,000,000 people. And each of the Autonomous Regions, ranging in population from around 86,000 to 284,000, gets a voice in the Supreme Soviet with five representatives. It is only in a very limited sense, however, that the Soviet of Nationalities can be said to correspond with the United States Senate and the Soviet of the Union with the House of Representatives.

All of the fifty-one national divisions of the U.S.S.R. have control over purely local affairs in general, but they must conform in all ways to the socialist principles laid down in the Soviet Constitution. Naturally the Union Republics possess greater power than the various ethnic subdivisions within them. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. made important amendments to the Constitution in 1944, giving to all Union Republics "the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states, to conclude

* Cf. p. 58.

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agreements with them and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them" (Article 18A); and the right to have their own republican military formations as component parts of the Soviet army (Article 18B).

These war-time amendments were a logical development in the Soviet minorities policy in the direction of democratic functioning and administrative decentralization. And they showed that cooperation and confidence among the different peoples of the Soviet Union had become still further tempered in the crucible of Hitler's invasion. It is to be remembered, however, that the federal state retains the responsibility of establishing the general pattern of foreign relations for the U.S.S.R. and its constituent Republics; and of organizing the defense of the country and formulating the guiding principles for the organization of all military units.

The first Union Republics to set up their own Ministries of Foreign Affairs were those of the Ukraine and Belorussia. At the San Francisco Conference in the spring of 1945, the representatives of the United Nations voted to admit the Ukrainian and Belorussian Republics as participants in the Conference and as initial members of the General Assembly. Thus the Soviet Union as a whole, the Ukrainian Republic and the Belorussian Republic each has a vote in the U. N. Assembly, as distinct from the Security Council where the chief and ultimate power lies. In appealing for separate representation for the Ukraine and Belorussia, Soviet spokesmen stressed the great contributions and sacrifices which these two nations had made in the war against Nazi Germany and their direct involvement all the way through.

The unity in diversity which the Soviet Union and its many nationalities have achieved is the resultant of

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several interacting factors. One of the most weighty has been the Communist Party, whose influence extends to every nook and cranny of the U.S.S.R. It is well organized in every Union Republic and other national division. In the Soviet of Nationalities, as well as in the legislative bodies and governments of the different ethnic groups, a high proportion of the members ordinarily belong to the Communist Party. The various nationalities on their part are well represented in the Communist Party Congresses, in the Party's Central Committee and in the inner Politburo. The Soviet Communist Party acts as a most potent force in welding the races, nations and tribes of the U.S.S.R. into a vast and harmonious whole.

Turning from the political to the cultural, we find that under the Soviet minorities policy the cultures of the various ethnic groups follow the basic formula of "national in form and *socialist* in content" as distinguished from "national in form and *bourgeois or capitalist* in content." This means that literature, art, drama, journalism, science and other expressions of culture are free to develop in the native languages and national forms, but must stay within the limits of fundamental socialist and Marxist principles in what they say. And they are subject to the general controls of Communist censorship in effect throughout the Soviet Union.

In the definitive volume by Stalin that I cited earlier, the author describes a nation as "a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture."⁶ In practice in Soviet Russia language has been the most important single element in the determination of nationality. The role of language in the existence and development of nationhood can hardly be over-

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estimated. Without a native tongue, spoken or written, it is difficult, if not impossible, for any people to achieve the spirit of self-consciousness characteristic of a nation.

From the start the Soviets have been aware of the primary place of language in the life of the different peoples and have officially recognized in each minority area the primacy of its predominant tongue. The Constitution includes special provisions concerning this matter. Thus, Article 121 provides that instruction in schools is to be "conducted in the native language"; and Article 40 that "laws passed by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S. S.R. are published in the language of the Union Republics." Article 110 is also revealing: "Judicial proceedings are conducted in the language of the Union Republic, Autonomous Republic or Autonomous Region, persons not knowing this language being guaranteed every opportunity of fully acquainting themselves with the material of the case through an interpreter and likewise the right to use their own language in court." With few exceptions, Russian is the second language taught among the minorities and is the common medium for communication.

Since the Revolution of 1917 Soviet experts have drawn up written alphabets, grammars and dictionaries for sixty-seven of the smaller peoples who possessed only oral languages. A number of additional groups have substituted simplified alphabets for the complicated Arabic or Mongolian scripts upon which they previously relied. Soviet schools use at least seventy languages altogether; books are printed in no less than 110. The encouragement and teaching of the native vernacular has been of enormous assistance in reducing the high rate of illiteracy among formerly backward races and national-

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ities; and in advancing their general cultural level.

An outstanding feature of the cultural renaissance among minorities has been the progress of women. In the Tsarist Empire women led an even harder existence among the subject nationalities, especially in Mohammedan areas, than among the Russians themselves. Since 1917 women in typically Moslem districts, such as the Caucasus and Central Asia, have gone far toward attaining equality with men. The Soviet Government, so often pictured abroad as bent on destroying the institution of monogamy, has put into effect strict laws throughout the U.S.S.R. against bigamy and polygamy. It has also forbidden by law other traditional practices spelling indignity and suffering for the female sex, such as child marriage, bride abduction and bride purchase. Bride purchase, in which prospective wives were regarded as chattels and literally sold to their future husbands, brought many flagrant evils in its train and was probably the worst of the old Mohammedan marriage customs.

In the long crusade for the emancipation of women in the Soviet East the most intense and dramatic struggles revolved around the wearing of the veil, visible and ever-present symbol of the Moslem woman's inferior lot, as well as a hateful, unhealthy instrument in her spiritual and physical degradation. By 1924 "Away with the Veil!" had become the fighting slogan of hundreds of thousands of women in the Mohammedan areas. Naturally the forces of religious reaction bitterly resisted the campaign against the veil. Hundreds of women became martyrs to the cause, as many as 500 being killed by their enraged husbands or other men. But as time went on the anti-veil cohorts, with the full backing of the Soviet

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regime, won out, so that today relatively few women in the U.S.S.R. adhere to the ancient practice of the veil.

Women's life among the minorities has also greatly improved because of the general cultural and economic advances under the Soviets. Soviet stress on the abolition of illiteracy, the care of mother and child, the spread of science and the betterment of material conditions have wrought tremendous benefits for the female sex. In every part of the old Empire the large majority of the inhabitants were positively medieval in their treatment of disease and their ignorance of the simplest laws of hygiene. All but universal was the reliance on spells, incantations, witch doctors, faith healing, or the magic powers of icons and holy water. The far-flung system of public health, including insistence upon elementary cleanliness, has resulted in the establishment of up-to-date medical techniques among ethnic minorities formerly quite primitive in their living habits.

As for material progress in the large, whereas the Tsars consciously held back the economic development of the subject nationalities, so that their labor and raw materials could be better exploited, the Soviet Government has furthered to the best of its ability the development of well-rounded economies in each Union Republic. The Five-Year Plans have reached out to the most distant and undeveloped regions, investing huge amounts of capital, stimulating increased production in industry and agriculture, providing for education in scientific methods and machine techniques. The Soviet planners have paid particular attention to the poorer, more backward sections of the country and thus allocated, in the nation-wide federal budgets, especially large increases in

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expenditures for the Union Republics of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia.

The prodigious task in 1917 was to lead the minorities from feudal, patriarchal and nomadic forms of life to the advanced stage of a socialist system, without their passing through a transitional period of industrial capitalism. Actually, in the thirty-five years since they assumed power, the Soviets have accomplished this end amongst all but a fraction of the peoples of the U.S.S.R.

3. *Summary and Evaluation*

We can summarize the basic principles behind the Soviet minorities policy under five main headings:

First, *cultural*. The Soviets believe that the many diverse national cultures of the U.S.S.R. have ample scope for self-expression and development in functioning according to the maxim of "national in form and socialist in content." The "national in form" lays stress on the native languages and folk traditions, while the "socialist in content" refers to the new economic, social and political ideology and institutions characteristic of socialism. In the very distant future this cultural pluralism may give way to a qualitatively different sort of civilization in which the various national cultures, after fulfilling their greatest promise, merge into a single common culture with a single common language. But this outcome will take place, according to Communist theory, only after mankind as a whole adopts socialism. The final result in the world at large is to be the disappearance of national languages through gradual desuetude and the coming into being of a new international language. These vague and far-off possibilities I look upon as purely speculative.

Second, *economic*. The Soviet theory is that the fun-

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damental roots of national and racial prejudice and persecution are economic. When these roots have been eradicated through the abolition of poverty, depression and unemployment, so that different peoples do not fear one another as economic competitors, then the traditional hatreds and antagonisms tend to die out. Social psychologists, both Communist and non-Communist, have long pointed out the extent to which group as well as individual tensions result from economic insecurity. In an economy of scarcity, one racial or national unit may have real reason to dread the competition of another for the limited supply of jobs and material goods available. And a group with a sense of rancor or of inferiority arising from constant want and exploitation is only too likely to work out its frustrations in hostile attitudes and actions toward other groups.

From the Soviet viewpoint, the planned socialist system of the U.S.S.R. has eradicated the basic causes of inter-racial and inter-national friction by ensuring economic security for everyone from birth to death; by instilling a new unity among the Soviet nationalities with the great common aim of socialism; and by providing the Soviet peoples as a whole, in the nation-wide campaigns to put across the Five-Year Plans, with the sort of peacetime dedication of energy and idealism that the American philosopher, William James, envisaged as "the moral equivalent of war."

Third, *scientific*. Biology, anthropology and related sciences have shown that all the peoples of this planet have a common origin; and that there are no inherently superior races or nations. Modern science declares that neither the shape of the head nor the texture of the hair, the color of the skin nor the color of the eyes, the weight

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of the brain nor the height of the body, make one ethnic group generally superior or inferior to another. On the basis of such scientific findings, Soviet thinkers assert that the retarded socio-cultural level of any national group at any period of history is not a reliable index of its native abilities, but can be explained primarily in terms of the total environmental situation and more particularly in terms of economic causation.

The Soviet socialist system throughout rests upon a profound belief in the general educability of human nature; it consciously pursues this principle in regard to nationalities as well as individuals and classes. It is a cardinal point in the minorities policy to deny the existence of unalterable socio-cultural traits and to affirm the influence of education and environment. The progress of the Soviet nationalities bears out the claim of the Soviet leaders, in their earliest period of power, that the backward minority peoples could, if given a proper opportunity, catch up with the more advanced peoples of the U.S.S.R.

Fourth, *democratic*. Soviet theory and practice uphold the right of all racial and national groups to freedom and equality. The Soviet people are perfectly clear that without full ethnic democracy no country containing substantial minorities can be considered truly democratic. To paraphrase the American Declaration of Independence, the Soviets take the stand that not only all individuals, but also all *nations* "are created equal, that they are endowed . . . with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."

Fifth, *ethical and international*. The professed ethical aim is the freedom and welfare of all individuals and

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ethnic groups within the U.S.S.R., irrespective of nation or race. This ethical attitude extends to mankind as a whole and includes the hope that all the manifold peoples of the earth, in whatever country or continent, may live together in peace and equality. The ideal of eventual international brotherhood is a part of Soviet philosophy, although this feeling of good will does not apply to exploiting or war-making classes or groups. It does embrace, however, the masses of the people even in fascist countries; and it is significant that during the height of the Second World War the Soviet leaders never denounced the German people, but always the Nazis, the Hitlerites, the German invaders or the German imperialists.

In a war-torn, hate-filled era during which the rise of arrogant and aggressive nationalism has given undue emphasis to the differences between races and nations, it is of singular purport that the Soviet experience should bring out the *similarities* between races and nations. In this process the Soviets have underlined the great truth that all peoples are part of the same human family and possess common needs and aspirations.

Proceeding to an evaluation of the Soviet minorities policy, we must be careful not to claim too much for it. It would be an exaggeration to say and Utopian to expect that all racial and national prejudice has disappeared from Soviet Russia. Lingering traces of the old antipathies and suspicions undoubtedly still exist, particularly among the older generation; and we know that the Nazis were able to rekindle some of the old racial antagonisms in the occupied areas. When the Soviet authorities regained control of these regions they undertook vigorous and successful counter-measures against the Hitlerite

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propaganda. Rumors in the anti-Soviet press of officially condoned or encouraged anti-Semitism in the U.S.S.R. in the post-war period are not, so far as I can discover, founded on fact.

Typical of newspaper misrepresentations was an article by Mr. Harry Schwartz in *The New York Times* of April 20, 1949, charging that the Soviet satirical weekly, *Krokodil*, had run a cartoon in its issue of March 20, 1949, of an anti-Semitic character. The *Times* story stated: "One cartoon on the front page of *Krokodil* juxtaposes the name of Lippmann, which is usually Jewish in the Soviet Union, with the word *Zhid*, a derisive Russian term for Jews used by Russian-speaking anti-Semites." But it turned out that the cartoon was one satirizing "bourgeois cosmopolitanism" and that in doing so it specified certain foreign writers, among them the American, Walter Lippmann, and the Frenchman, André Gide, whose name in Russian is spelled *Zhid*. The *Times*' error was the more inexcusable because Gide's first name as well as last was clearly printed in the cartoon.

In this same unscrupulous press war against Soviet Russia *Newsweek* of May 2, 1949, published a layout of five Soviet cartoons, including the one mentioned by the *Times*, under the heading: "Poison in Pen and Ink: the Soviet Anti-Semitic Campaign." The text claimed that these cartoons, all of them satirizing "homeless cosmopolitans," were anti-Semitic because the main figures in them were drawn with deliberately emphasized "hooked noses." However, anyone who is familiar with Soviet cartoons and posters knows that one of the favorite methods used by Soviet artists to ridicule a type or character is to make him resemble a bird with a beak or a

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fantastic bird-animal combination. Soviet cartoonists often depicted the Nazi Goebbels, for instance, as a long-beaked, humpbacked crow or vulture. The cartoons reproduced by *Newsweek* simply continued this tradition and gave long predatory beaks, not noses at all, to the characters satirized.

It is significant also that in 1949, 1950 and 1951 a considerably larger percentage of the annual Stalin awards for noteworthy achievement in the arts and sciences went to Soviet Jews than the proportion of Jews — some 2 percent — to the total population.

It cannot be denied, however, that the traditional aspects of Jewish culture — in religion, literature and social custom — have been declining. This apparently is due to the fact that the Soviet Jews, finally living in full equality, with racial discrimination and persecution ended, and having become an integral part of a great new social movement, in considerable numbers no longer feel the urge to preserve their special identity as a people and to maintain in their daily lives the historic characteristics of Jewry.

In summarizing the minorities situation, we can objectively state that over its whole vast area the numerous Soviet peoples, regardless of race or color, nationality or physiognomy, mingle with one another at will, attend the same educational institutions, sit next to one another at theatres and other places of amusement, travel and eat together, have rooms at the same hotels or clubs, participate on equal terms in the same crafts or professions, join the same trade unions and cultural associations, and possess the same rights of suffrage and of election or appointment to public office. No persons in the Soviet Union can be barred, on account of race or nationality,

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from a hospital or hotel, from a vacation resort or bathing beach, from a restaurant or inn, from some section of a train or trolley, or from a special residential district in town or city.

Soviet men and women of whatever nationality marry if there is mutual love; and marital intermixture does constantly take place. The opinion of foreign visitors to Soviet Russia is almost unanimous in testifying that the various peoples associate freely together in every visible way. In large cities like Moscow and Kiev there are always a considerable number of Soviet citizens from the minority Republics of the Volga, the Transcaucasus or Asia. And one of the best means of obtaining a sense of the multi-national character and racial equality of the Soviet commonwealth is to see, as I have seen, the polyglot audiences at the theatre, opera, ballet and motion picture.

During the strain of the Nazi invasion several cracks appeared in the structure of Soviet inter-ethnic harmony. I have already told of the abolition of the German Volga Republic in the first few months of Hitler's assault, because its population failed to maintain its loyalty to the Soviet federation.* For the same reason the Soviet Government during the war years dissolved the Chechen-Ingush, Crimean and Kalmyk Autonomous Republics, and the Karachai Autonomous Region. The German aggressors penetrated to all of these territories and received extensive aid and comfort from fifth-columnists or collaborationists among their peoples. The disloyalty and dissolution of five national divisions during the war period must be counted as a disturbing failure in the Soviet minorities policy.

Nonetheless, this Soviet policy as a whole has, in my

* See p. 100.

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judgment, proven a marked success. Whatever criticisms one may have of the Soviet socialist system, one has to admit that the Soviet Union has made impressive progress in the sphere of inter-ethnic relationships. Even its severest critics, writers such as William Henry Chamberlin and Louis Fischer, have had a good word to say about its handling of the nationalities problem.

Manifestly the national federalism of the U.S.S.R. constitutes one possible solution of the minorities question that must be seriously considered henceforth in this general field. In a world still infected by the results of fascist and Nazi racist propaganda, the Soviet example of more than 170 different ethnic groups cooperating in harmony and friendship is of the utmost consequence. It is clear that this attitude toward nationalities is in accord with the general aims of the United Nations Charter and that other countries with minorities problems have much to learn from the Soviet experience.

Already among the Babel of Balkan peoples, Yugoslavia has gone a long way in eliminating the ethnic strife so long rampant within its borders by instituting a government patterned along Soviet lines, consisting of six federated republics representing the chief national groups: the Bosnia-Herzegovinians, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs and Slovenes. In a conference held in New Delhi during June, 1952, on India's complex ethnic problems no less an Eastern statesman than Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru praised the U.S.S.R. as the "only country" that had adopted a "wise and successful policy in winning over people in outlying areas."⁷ He gave particular credit to the Soviet practice of encouraging the native languages of minority groups.

The Soviet minorities policy has far-reaching impli-

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cations in regard to the current international scene. For general recognition on the part of colored and colonial peoples that the Soviets stand for racial equality and democracy is a factor of inestimable importance in increasing Soviet influence throughout the Far East, Middle East and Africa. These same peoples feel that Britain, France and the United States, no matter how loudly they boast of their democracy, still retain their traditional attitude of white superiority.

Constant educational work by both private and public authorities has not been able to overcome the habit of American soldiers and newspapermen in calling Koreans and other dark-skinned peoples of the East by the derogatory term *gook*. *Life* magazine printed an article as late as December, 1951, using this word in the text and also in a picture caption. Worst of all has been the example of the Union of South Africa, which, supposedly part of the "free world," has adopted since World War II policies towards its Negro population characteristic of a Nazi state.

The advanced Soviet theory and practice of friendly race relations is important for international ethics and peace. For we have little chance of attaining enduring amity among the peoples of the earth if national and racial prejudices remain as virulent as during the first half of this twentieth century. Toward the elimination of these age-long animosities that have so afflicted the world, the Soviet Union, in establishing full ethnic democracy among its multitude of minorities, has taken genuine leadership and made a profound contribution of global significance.

CHAPTER IV SOVIET RUSSIA AND RELIGION

1. *The Tsarist Background*

In order to understand the status of religion in Soviet Russia since the Communist Revolution of 1917, we must have adequate knowledge of the religious situation under the Tsars. It is essential to realize that the Eastern Orthodox Church (more often known as the *Greek* or the *Russian* Orthodox) was the official state church of old Russia, with the Tsar himself as its head. Peter the Great abolished the independent Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church in 1721 and established in its place a Holy Synod subject to appointment and control by the Crown. Thenceforth the Orthodox Church became in reality a department of the Government. The lay official directly in charge of it, the Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod, whom Peter significantly described as "the Tsar's eye," was appointed by the Tsar and held the rank of a cabinet minister.

The Church received huge subsidies from the Tsarist State for the erection and maintenance of its cathedrals, churches, monasteries, schools and seminaries. Its bishops and higher clergy were paid their salaries by the Government. Education in the Tsarist regime was under the spiritual dominion of the Orthodox Church; and religious instruction, except in the relatively few institutions maintained by non-Orthodox sects, inculcated the Ortho-

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dox interpretation of Christianity. In 1910 the Orthodox Church itself operated approximately 40,000 elementary schools, containing about 2,000,000 pupils or 50 percent of the total enrollment in elementary schools at that time.

The Orthodox Church reserved unto itself a number of privileges denied to other religious groups, whether Christian like the Roman Catholics and Baptists or non-Christian like the Jews and Mohammedans. The Church-State tyranny, in fact, continually subjected these minority sects to discrimination and persecution. Especially was this true in reference to the Jews. Time and again Russian Orthodox priests and higher-ups joined Government officials in instigating the bloodiest sort of pogroms against the Jews. In the fall of 1905, for example, following the abortive revolution against Tsar Nicholas II, more than 100 pogroms occurred in different parts of Russia, resulting in an estimated 4,000 Jews killed and 10,000 injured. These mass murders took place with either the open or tacit approval of the Orthodox Church. Church-State authorities mistakenly believed that the Jews were the prime factor in the revolutionary movement and roused popular feeling against them by playing up the familiar charges of so-called ritual murder.

The Orthodox priests, furthermore, cooperated closely with the secret service of the Tsars and turned over to it the names of those carrying on revolutionary or liberal propaganda in their parishes. A number of priests went so far as to betray the confessional for purposes of espionage. And the Church could boast that it had brought about the imprisonment, exile or execution of thousands upon thousands of progressive or radical intellectuals and workers. That scholarly and objective observer of the Russian scene, Sir Bernard Pares, tells us: "By the

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time of the Revolution the official Church had become something very like an extra police ministry. Priests were expected to report the words of their parishioners to the police, some had to send in their sermons for censorship, and two of my own friends among them were actually unfrocked."¹ The Russian Church worked hand in hand generation after generation with the cruel Tsarist autocracy and was a knowing accomplice in the most constant and brutal injustices.

Upon its own adherents the Orthodox Church of Russia exercised a most baneful influence. Professor Julius Hecker, able student of religion under both Tsars and Soviets, told me that the ascetic outlook on life of the Russian Church was directed not only towards the mortification of the flesh, but equally towards the mortification of the mind. In imperial Russia there never took place, as in Western Europe, a Protestant Reformation and successful Bourgeois Revolution to push the Church in the direction of modernity. The State-controlled Holy Synod, the governing ecclesiastical body, promptly and harshly suppressed all attempts to develop a liberal wing within the Church. It frequently imprisoned non-conforming prelates in frigid Solovetsky Monastery on a far-northern island in the White Sea. While individual priests here and there showed sympathy for the down-trodden workers and peasants, there existed no considerable element in the Russian Church, as in many Christian countries, which supported social and economic reform. The clergy of the Orthodox Church were on the whole ignorant, superstitious and highly reactionary in their views on public affairs.

Morally the Russian Church sank to the lowest level of any ecclesiastical organization in the history of Chris-

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tendom. It is generally admitted that in 1917 it had become as corrupt and decadent as the Tsarist Government itself. The crowning scandal occurred with the rise to power of the notorious monk Rasputin at the court of Tsar Nicholas. This licentious, drunken, half-literate peasant attained a tremendous hold over the credulous Tsarina through his forceful personality and his supposed assistance in improving the health of her ailing son, heir to the Russian throne. As the spiritual adviser of the Empress, Rasputin was able to secure virtually any favor for which he or his friends asked. And he finally came to prescribe the principal appointments in the Church, of which for a time he became in effect the dictator. The shame of it became at last so widely and deeply felt that certain members of the nobility and of the Imperial family itself took the drastic step of assassinating Rasputin. But the reputation of the Church had suffered a crushing blow.

It is evident that the Russian Orthodox Church had plenty of reasons for strongly supporting the Tsarist regime. And it is no wonder that both before and after the Revolution it should have fought the Communists and other radical groups with all the means at its disposal. Consequent to the Communist seizure of power in the autumn of 1917, the Church became a rallying center for the foes of the new order. In the bitter Civil War which ensued it backed with its full strength the White forces of counter-revolution and gave aid to the invading anti-Soviet armies. Priests helped to organize special *Jesus* and *Virgin Mary* regiments among the Whites.

In January, 1918, the head of the Orthodox Church, the Patriarch Tikhon, declared the Soviets anathema and

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called on all Orthodox believers "not to enter into any kind of association with these monsters of the human race."² Another high Church official, the Metropolitan Antoninii, laid a curse on the Communists by promising to bless every weapon raised against the "Red, satanic power" and to remit the sins of everyone who gave his life in the cause of Russia and Christ.

Such incitements on the part of well-known prelates had a considerable influence. And the general attitude of the Church and its officials during the terrible years of the Civil War shows clearly enough why priests and other religious individuals were frequently imprisoned, and sometimes shot, for counter-revolutionary activity against the Soviet Republic. In such cases, however, they received the same treatment as others committing the same offence. The point is that the Soviet Government's policy from the beginning was to punish religious persons, as well as all others, for crimes against the State, but *not* for the practice of their religion. This is not to imply that in the early days of the Revolution local excesses of one kind or another were not committed against the hated Church authorities. But such occurrences were probably inevitable in the first stages of such a far-reaching overturn and ceased as soon as the Government was able to set up stable control throughout the land.

2. *Soviet Theory in regard to Religion*

With their own survival as the all-important issue, the Soviets concluded that they must at any cost break the economic, educational and temporal power of organized religion in Russia; and that the role played by the Orthodox Church, and to a lesser extent by the other denominations, during the Revolution and Civil War

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constituted yet one more proof of the Marxist theory that religion, while occasionally rendering service to the forces of progress, had on the whole been on the side of reaction or conservatism. According to the Communists, Christian theology, with its emphasis on a supernatural God behind the visible universe and a realm of immortality beyond the visible world, is bound to make for a this-earthly *status quo*.

The Marxist believes that traditional religion, by teaching people to rely on prayer and on God's intervention to help them in times of trouble, deters men from taking collective action against the government and the social-economic system which are responsible for their difficulties; and encourages them to take refuge in the loving arms of an alleged all-seeing Heavenly Father.

Supplying striking documentation for the Marxist thesis was the 1932 encyclical of Pope Pius XI issued at the height of the great world depression of the early thirties. Admonished the Pope: "Let the poor and all those who at this time are facing the hard trial of want of work and scarcity of food, let them in a like spirit of penance suffer with greater resignation the privations imposed upon them by these hard times and the state of society, which Divine Providence in an ever-loving but inscrutable plan has assigned them. Let them accept with a humble and trustful heart from the hand of God the effects of poverty, rendered harder by the distress in which mankind now is struggling. . . . Let them take comfort in the certainty that their sacrifices and troubles borne in a Christian spirit will concur efficaciously to hasten the hour of mercy and peace."

Old-time theology also discourages the faithful from utilizing the problem-solving techniques of science. The

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tearful mother with her sick child, the poverty-stricken laborer with his miserable family, the tragic peasant facing drought and the failure of his crop — all will appeal to the Almighty to remedy their plight instead of initiating scientific procedures. A beautiful example of this tendency was the way peasants in Tsarist Russia relied upon religious superstition in practical affairs. It was part of the old agricultural technique to have a procession march through the fields after the sowing, with an Orthodox priest in the lead sprinkling holy water over the earth and chanting the following:

“Worms and grasshoppers!
Mice and rats!
Ants, moles and reptiles!
Flies and horseflies and hornets!
And all flying things that wreak
Destruction

“I forbid you in the name of the Saviour come on earth to suffer for men; I forbid you in the name of the all-seeing cherubim and seraphim who fly around the heavenly throne; I forbid you in the name of the angels and the millions of heavenly spirits standing in the glory of God. I forbid you to touch any tree, fruitful or unfruitful, or leaf or plant or flower. I forbid you to bring any woe on the fields of these people.”

Furthermore, according to Soviet theory, Christianity's promise of a life eternal beyond death in which the wretched and oppressed receive marvelous rewards in heaven while their oppressors go to hell, results in the exploited classes remaining resigned and humble instead

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of insisting upon their right to a full and happy existence during their one and only life upon this earth. Karl Marx aptly expressed his views on the consequences of belief in immortality when he declared: "The mortgage held by the peasants on the heavenly estates guarantees the mortgage held by the bourgeoisie on the peasant estates."³ Marx was thinking especially of the supernatural doctrines of religion, such as the ideas of God and immortality, when he penned his famous statement that "religion is the opium of the people."⁴

From its theological supernaturalism the Christian Church has derived an ethical code of human behavior that makes whole-hearted and rational enjoyment of this earthly life all but impossible. In the first place, the Marxist points out, Christians are supposed to carry out with absolute obedience the commands of God as laid down in the Ten Commandments delivered to Moses about 2,000 B.C. and as interpreted by the Church authorities. These moral precepts ordained by the Almighty and designed for the regulation of a primitive Hebrew society are looked upon by the traditional Church as eternal and universal principles to be neither altered nor questioned no matter what the differences or changes in the condition of the human race. Orthodox Christian ethics leaves little room for the operation of intelligence working upon the specific and unique problems that are ever arising in men's lives.

In the second place, the Marxist claims that Christian supernaturalism has led in theory to the artificial splitting up of human beings into two distinct and separate parts, the body and the soul or personality. Since the important thing is for a man to keep his soul pure and undefiled for its rendezvous with God beyond the grave, he must

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hold the body under strict control and not become contaminated with animal needs and desires. This viewpoint leads to the unhealthy suppression of many wholesome human impulses. For instance, it has caused the Christian Church from its earliest days to treat the natural and normal manifestations of sex as something essentially sinful and base; and this has resulted in the most distressing psychological problems and neuroses.

Marxism rejects the Christian stress on nay-saying and teaches an affirmative way of life based on the view that this-worldly existence is man's sole opportunity to achieve happiness. In place of the dualistic conception of human nature supported by Christianity, it upholds the monistic psychology which considers man as an interfunctioning unity of personality, including the mind, on the one hand, and body or physical organism on the other. This modern and scientific psychology recognizes the importance of giving a proper outlet and expression to man's emotional urges. It realizes the effects of bodily conditions on the personality, yet at the same time understands the profound influence that mental states can have on bodily conditions.

Except, however, for purposes of abstract analysis, the Marxist believes that it is impossible to separate the mind and personality from the body. In conscious action at all its various levels, personality and body always function as an indissoluble unit. For the reason that they are in every way so intimately and fundamentally associated, as exhibited by psychology, biology, physiology, medicine and common sense itself, Marxism argues that it is impossible for the personality to go on existing independently after the death and dissolution of the body and the brain; and that therefore intellectual integrity

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demands the discarding of all notions of personal immortality.

It is the general philosophic viewpoint known as Dialectical Materialism, drawing on the facts and principles of modern experimental science, that leads the Communists in Soviet Russia and elsewhere to reject all the supernatural vagaries paraded by religion. For the Marxist a thorough science and a consistent philosophy finds no sign of an omnipotent Providence in the universe. Since all things operate according to natural law, there would be nothing for God to do even if he did exist. The Dialectical Materialist holds, relying particularly on astronomy and biology, that Nature (the universe as a whole) does not demonstrate favoritism towards man or any other of its creatures; that this little world of ours is only a tiny speck in Nature's infinite empire, as vast in time as in space; and that there is no reason to believe Nature cares more about our puny planet than about any other spot in the cosmos.

In their over-all philosophy and attitude towards religion the Communists assert that they are simply stating openly and putting into practice conclusions with which many of the best minds of the Western World are in fundamental agreement. In fact, the three most eminent American philosophers of the twentieth century—John Dewey, George Santayana and Morris R. Cohen—give no place to God, immortality or any other supernaturalist doctrine in their systems of philosophic Naturalism. Neither does Bertrand Russell, the leading British philosopher of the present, nor many of the brilliant scientific minds of our day. Numerous thinkers in the West who call themselves either Naturalists or Human-

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ists agree in the broad outlines of their cosmology or metaphysics with the Dialectical Materialists and hold with them that the chief ethical aim of man should be to strive for the happiness, freedom and progress of all humanity upon this earth.

Catholic and other anti-Soviet churchmen have repeatedly tried to line up the United States and other capitalist democracies in a crusade of the "Christian West" against the Soviet Union and its "degrading Materialism." This issue is a palpably false and manufactured one. For the Materialist, Naturalist and Humanist schools of philosophy are all part of the great tradition of Western civilization; all of them reject Christian supernaturalism, rely upon scientific fact and method, and support the goal of building a better and more abundant life for mankind in this world.

Nonetheless, Western teachers and thinkers are often reluctant to make publicly known their full views on religion and religious philosophies; whereas the Marxists of Soviet Russia always take a perfectly frank and thorough-going stand on these questions. In their noteworthy book *Soviet Communism* the late Sidney and Beatrice Webb develop some of the implications of this situation. The Communist position, they write, "has, it is claimed, the merit of a public and persistent repudiation of the equivocal hypocrisy in which the governments and churches of other countries, together with hosts of merely conventional Christians, are today implicated. That is, for the remaking of man, no small matter. It is not with impunity that nations or individuals, outgrowing any faith in a personal deity who hears their prayers and governs alike the ocean and the earthquake,

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the harvest and the hearts of men, can continue to practise rites and accept religious institutions as if they were still believers.

"No code of conduct professedly based on the commands of an all-powerful ruler will outlast the discovery that it has, in fact, no such foundation. One result of this widely spread equivocation is seen in the practical abandonment at the present time by millions of young persons in Europe and America, not only of Christianity, but also, along with it, of nearly all the commandments by which their parents were guided, without acquiring any substitute."⁵ Lip-service in the nominally Christian countries of the West to a traditional religion and a code of morals associated with it prevents the development, which has been going on in the Soviet Union, of an up-to-date philosophy and ethics appropriate to a modern civilization based on science and the machine.

I should add, however, that some of the most important aims and achievements of Soviet civilization are in harmony with the highest Christian ethics. Soviet stress on international peace, race equality, the elimination of brute selfishness, a life of abundance for all and the eventual brotherhood of man certainly conforms with the ideals of Jesus as set forth in the New Testament, although Christians and Communists usually disagree as to the methods of attaining such ends. Of course, there are other teachings of Jesus recommending meekness or turning the other cheek, which run entirely counter to Soviet theory and practice.

The Communists, too, have a much more optimistic conception of human nature than orthodox Christianity with its insistent stress on original sin and man's proclivity for evil. Some critics think that Marxist optimism

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about man is as much an over-emphasis as Christian pessimism. As Professor John C. Bennett of Union Theological Seminary expresses it, the Marxist doctrine "finds the only obstacle to the good life in economic institutions that can be changed by a political and social revolution. . . . To concentrate on the capitalist form of property as the one root of all social evil is to neglect other roots that are universally human and that will outlast capitalism and all other social systems."⁶ I believe Dr. Bennett's analysis is sound.

But however implacably the Soviets oppose Christian theology and other doctrines of Christianity, they are striving to put into effect some of the chief precepts of Christian ethics. So it is that Sir Bernard Pares writes in the quarterly *Foreign Affairs*: "The Marxist objective was the happiness of all — the poor, the maimed, the oppressed, the weak, the very old, the very young, the weaker sex — in other words, what we should describe as the Kingdom of God on earth, and the really great things that have been achieved in these directions are the finest part of the Soviet record."⁷ It is for the same reason that many Christian clergymen, such as the Dean of Canterbury in England and Dr. Harry F. Ward in America, see much to praise in Soviet society.

True to its economic interpretation of history and culture, Soviet Marxism goes beyond the logical objections to religion and analyzes the reasons why it is so readily accepted by so many people. In Lenin's words: "In modern capitalist countries the basis of religion is primarily *social*. The roots of modern religion are deeply embedded in the social oppression of the working masses, and in their apparently complete helplessness before the blind forces of capitalism. . . . Fear of the blind forces of

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capital — blind because its action cannot be foreseen by the masses — a force which at every step in life threatens the worker and the small businessman with 'sudden,' 'unexpected,' 'accidental' destruction and ruin, bringing in their train beggary, pauperism, prostitution and deaths from starvation — this is *THE tap-root* of modern religion. . . . No amount of reading matter, however enlightening, will eradicate religion from those masses who are crushed by the grinding toil of capitalism and subjected to the blind, destructive forces of capitalism, until these masses, themselves, learn to fight against the social facts from which religion arises in a united, disciplined, planned and conscious manner — until they learn to fight *against the rule of the capitalist in all its forms.*"⁸

The Communists maintain that organized religion's customary opposition to social change has been due primarily to the Church's stake in the economic *status quo*. Marx forcefully brings out this point when he asserts that "the Anglican Church will more readily pardon attacks upon thirty-eight of its thirty-nine articles than upon one thirty-ninth of its income."⁹ In recent times, although there has been a minority in practically every religious denomination which backs liberal or radical causes, the Christian Church as a whole has been a firm supporter of the capitalist system. And its most conservative section, the Catholic Church, has thrown its weight behind fascist governments in Italy, Spain and Argentina; in Germany it made some gestures of disapproval against Hitler, but dropped even this mild form of opposition after the outbreak of World War II. Today the Vatican and its closely knit churches in every land are in the forefront of the crusade against socialism and the Soviet Union.

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The Soviet Communists, on their part, have never hesitated to lash out vigorously against the Catholic Church and particularly against its hierarchy. They point out that the encyclical "Rerum Noverum" issued by Pope Leo XIII in 1891 and concentrating on the relations between capital and labor still remains the chief guide to Catholic policy on economic affairs. Leo declared that the primary purpose of the state is "the safeguarding, by legal enactment and policy, of private property. Most of all it is essential in these times of covetous greed to keep the multitude within line of duty." In 1931 Pius XI promulgated an encyclical on labor which stated frankly: "The differences in social conditions in the human family, which were wisely decreed by the Creator, must not and cannot ever be abolished. . . . All opposition between the classes must cease and harmonious collaboration must be established between the various classes." Such statements are naturally anathema to the Marxists of Soviet Russia.

The economic foundations and connections of the Russian Orthodox Church are important to note. Up till 1917 it was the wealthiest single organization in all of Russia, exploiting scores of thousands of peasants on its immense estates and owning large blocks of the most profitable stocks and bonds. At the time of the Revolution the bank account of the Church amounted to about 8,000,000,000 rubles (equal to \$4,000,000,000 in 1917) and its annual income to about 500,000,000 rubles. In addition, there was the enormous capital value of its 20,000,000 acres of land, its cathedrals, its churches, its monasteries and the gorgeous gold and silver decorations of these religious edifices. And all of these assets were being continually augmented by very substantial financial

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grants from the Government. In short, the Church itself was a great feudal-capitalist institution in the old Russia, with its fundamental economic interests everywhere intertwined with and dependent upon the Tsarist system of political oppression and economic exploitation.

The Orthodox Church within the U.S.S.R. and the Catholic Church outside it have been the two religious institutions which the Soviets have most feared and opposed. But on principle they are against all religions, including Protestantism, Judaism, Mohammedanism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism or any other. A reformed and liberal Church does not seem, either, an acceptable solution to the Communist. His position is that since religion is necessarily tied up with a belief in the supernatural, it cannot be reformed so as to become a good influence in the world without ceasing to be religion. In this respect it is unlike education, for example, which can clearly be bent to the purposes of a socialist regime.

The Marxist also considers most confusing and harmful the widespread habit of redefining religious terms, like *God*, *immortality* and *religion* itself, so broadly and vaguely that they lose all distinctive meaning. He is likely to think that this is a theological trick to retain for religion the support of the more educated and sophisticated groups. In 1913 Maxim Gorky, for instance, redefined *God* as "a complex of those ideas, worked out by tribes, by nations, by humanity at large, which arouse and organize the social emotions, and which serve to unite the individual with society and to curb zoological individualism."¹⁰ Under such a definition *God* ceases to be an independent supernatural being or Creator and becomes synonymous with the higher ethical and social ideals of men. This meaning of *God* enables even out-

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right atheists to believe in him. Though Gorky was sympathetic to the Left, Lenin criticized him severely for his "God-building" and accused him of playing into the hands of the clerics.

3. *Soviet Practice in regard to Religion*

There are three main documentary sources for the understanding of the Soviet policy toward religion. The first of these is the Government decree of February 5, 1918, entitled "Separation of the Church from the State and the School from the Church." Its thirteen sections are as follows:

1. The Church is separated from the State.

2. Within the territory of the Republic the passing of any local laws or regulations limiting or interfering with freedom of conscience or granting special rights or privileges to citizens because they belong to a certain faith is forbidden.

3. Every citizen has a right to adopt any religion or not to adopt any at all. Every legal restriction connected with the profession of certain faiths or with the non-profession of any faith is now abolished. Official acts shall make no mention of a citizen's faith.

4. State or semi-official public functions are not to be accompanied by religious ceremonies or rituals.

5. Religious performances may be carried on freely insofar as they do not disturb the public order or encroach upon the rights of citizens of the Soviet Republic. Local authorities have the right to take the necessary measures to preserve order and safeguard the rights of citizens.

6. No one can decline to carry out his civic duties on

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the ground of his religious views. Exception to this ruling may be made by special decision of the people's court provided one civic duty is substituted for another.

7. Religious oaths are abolished. In case of necessity a solemn promise will suffice.

8. All civil acts are performed exclusively by the civic authorities in charge of the department for the registration of marriages and births.

9. The school is separated from the Church. The teaching of religion in state and public schools, as well as in private schools where general subjects are taught, is forbidden. Citizens may study or teach religious subjects privately.

10. Church and religious societies are subject to the same laws and regulations as private societies and unions. They do not enjoy any special privileges or subsidies from the State or from local institutions.

11. The levying of obligatory collections or impositions for the benefit of church or religious societies is forbidden. These organizations are forbidden also to coerce or punish their members.

12. Church and religious societies have no right to own property. They do not have the rights of a legal person.

13. All property in Russia now owned by churches and religious organizations is henceforth the property of the people. Buildings and objects that are needed for religious services revert to the free use of religious organizations by special decree of the local or central government authorities.

The second source is the Article in the Soviet Consti-

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tution which I cited earlier:* "In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the Church in the U.S. S.R. is separated from the State, and the school from the Church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens." The third source, which I shall quote later, is the statements of policy issued by the recently created Council on Affairs of the Orthodox Church.

The two documents which I have quoted above make clear that while there is complete freedom of conscience and worship in the Soviet Union, the Church no longer receives any financial backing from the Government. Equally important is the fact that it must confine itself to strictly religious activities. It is not permitted to organize charitable associations, hospitals, orphan asylums, playgrounds or, of course, parochial schools. One of the first steps the Soviets took in 1917-18 was to secularize the 40,000 elementary schools run by the Orthodox Church. As in the United States, religious instruction is not allowed in the State schools of the U.S.S.R., although such instruction is legal in special religious seminaries for older students; and parents can teach what they choose about religion to their children at home or send them to the homes of priests and ministers for religious education. Religious rites are allowed for births, marriages and funerals at the home, the church or elsewhere, according to the desires of the family concerned.

What these various regulations mean is that the religious function in Soviet Russia has been separated from other functions and is required to stand on its own feet. As I saw again and again at first-hand on my trips to the

* See p. 80.

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Soviet Union, the Russian churches are open, and full, for worship, prayer and meditation; the colorfully clad priests are chanting and swinging incense; the Orthodox choruses, famed the world over, are singing as of old. To what extent pure religion, unconnected with other community activities and relying upon its own moral and spiritual qualities, can maintain popular support, remains to be seen.

Concerning this situation the Reverend William Howard Melish, Jr., who has been fighting a courageous battle for religious liberty as Associate Director of the Church of the Holy Trinity, Brooklyn, has made an enlightening comment in his pamphlet, *Religion Today in the U.S.S.R.* "On first acquaintance," writes Dr. Melish, "it seems to many Americans that religion has been robbed of its rightful sphere of operations. It is severed from the educational system and from the administration of public philanthropies. But let us frankly face this question: Why did the Church in our society feel drawn to pioneer in education except because there was so little of it? To build hospitals except because there were so few? To care for the orphans and the aged except that no one else would bother? The Church entered these fields in Western society because there were human needs crying to be met!

"But suppose that there had been an adequate provision within our society to care for educating all its members, healing the sick, providing for the orphans and the aged, assuring work for the unemployed? The Church would not have felt constrained to enter these areas. It would have sought to serve another function. In such a society it would have undertaken to stimulate the knowledge and worship of God so that character

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would be built, life be infused with healthy purpose, and the social structure constantly leavened by the creative faith of the Church's sons. In the Soviet Union the community undertakes to perform these many social functions. . . . Religion in Russia is simpler, more elemental, more spiritual. The Church is freed of innumerable responsibilities and philanthropic chores, the infinite raising of money for this and for that."¹¹

Today in Soviet Russia no church owns any land or building. This is not due to discrimination against religion, but to the fact that all land and edifices, as distinct from dwelling houses, have become publicly owned. It simply means that the property of the Church, like that of the nobility, the large landowners, the banks and the private industries, has become socialized. During the terrible famine of 1921-22 the Soviet Government took over from individual churches for the relief fund surplus articles of gold, silver and precious stones which it claimed they did not need for the practice of their cult. This humanitarian measure stirred up bitter opposition within the Church, though a large section of the clergy approved the move.

In regard to places of worship, the Soviet Government lets religious congregations have the necessary buildings rent free and now tax exempt, although they were for a long time subject to high local taxes. Because, however, the Church possesses no revenue-producing taxes and receives no State subsidies, the salaries of priests and all other expenses must be provided for, as in America, by voluntary contributions of the faithful, fees for services, and the sale of candles and other religious articles.

Actually, this same situation prevailed in Tsarist Russia for all of the non-Orthodox sects, since the Gov-

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ernment rendered them no economic assistance. Today, *all* religions in the U.S.S.R. are on an equal basis financially and legally, so far as the State is concerned. Government discrimination in favor of the Orthodox Church and against the other religious bodies is ended. The Mufti of Soviet Islam, the religious head of Soviet Mohammedans, is on record as saying: "The Soviet regime has done one thing which we Moslems will never forget. It has accorded us religious liberty and civil equality."¹²

Whereas in the old days, atheists were unmercifully hounded, there is now freedom of conscience for both believers and unbelievers. Although the religious-minded Government of the Tsars made a point of persecuting anti-religious individuals, the anti-religious-minded Government of the Soviets makes a point of *not* persecuting religious individuals. It is true that the Soviet Republic has used firm governmental pressure to eradicate harmful religious customs left untouched by the Tsars, such as the sacred polygamy of the Moslems and the self-mutilation practices of certain esoteric religious cults.

There can be no doubt, either, that the Soviet authorities have thrown all of their influence behind the difficult, long-term task of eradicating the hold of religion on the population. In view of the Government's control over education and the organs of public opinion, it cannot be said that in the struggle between religion and anti-religion the Church is on a fair and equal basis with the State. Unfortunately the 1936 Constitution by implication ruled out freedom of religious *propaganda*, meaning that the faithful were not at liberty to carry on proselytizing in an organized way outside of the churches themselves. Curiously enough, the Orthodox Church itself

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was in favor of this provision, since it gave it an advantage in competing with the missionary fervor of the Protestant sects. As we shall see, the 1936 ruling is now no longer in effect.*

The Communist theory is that the establishment of a socialist system which does away with man's major economic and social ills will gradually dry up the roots of religious belief. But the Soviets have not been content to sit by and await this ultimate result; on the contrary they have vigorously attempted to speed up the process and have put into effect over the years the widest variety of anti-religious education and propaganda. The educational campaign against religion in the U.S.S.R. has taken advantage of every conceivable device that might help overcome the superstitions of workers and peasants. In addition to teaching anti-religion and the philosophy of Dialectical Materialism in the schools and higher educational institutions, the Communists have utilized anti-religious books, magazines, newspapers, motion pictures, plays, lectures and radio broadcasts.

Noteworthy in the larger cities are the anti-religious museums, several of which I went through during my visits to Soviet Russia. These museums are just as much *pro-science* as anti-religious and stress scientific discoveries, such as the evolution of man from lower species, which educated people in Western Europe and the Americas have long since accepted as true. There are also exhibits exposing the myths of the Bible, the miracles claimed by the Church and its saints, and the anti-social practices of various cults, such as their opposition to education and science and their encouragement of drunkenness and of the treatment of women as inferiors.

* See pp. 150-151.

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Not the least important of the teachings in these museums are those directed against superstitious beliefs which hinder the extension of health measures for the prevention and cure of disease.

The stronghold of religion in the Soviet Union, as in all other countries, has been in the rural districts where the population is likely to be less culturally advanced than in the cities. In the U.S.S.R. scientific and anti-religious education have been absolutely essential in the agricultural regions on account of the socialist program to mechanize and collectivize the farms. Because the peasants depended to so large an extent on primitive religious beliefs, it was decided that the most effective form of enlightenment lay in explaining the origin of hail, rain, drought, thunderstorms, the appearance of insect plagues, the properties of various soils, the action of fertilizers and so on. The Soviet Five-Year Plans for agriculture would have been doomed to failure had the peasants continued to rely upon their age-old superstitions.

Much of the strenuous opposition to collective farming came from priests who thought, quite rightly, that this new system of agriculture would tend to diminish their influence. They told their flocks that the establishment of collectives was contrary to the wishes of Divine Providence and those who joined them would suffer dire punishment from the Almighty. Professor Hecker writes that he once "enquired of a peasant why he was so opposed to collective farming, which promised so many advantages. His bizarre reply was that it was opposed to the will of God; for had God desired collectives, he would have created not the individual Adam and Eve, whom he had put into the Garden of Eden, but he would have

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created a collective and instructed them to work the garden as a group."¹⁸

In the urban as well as the agricultural districts the Communists have insisted on reducing the inordinate number of celebrations of Saints' Days and Church feasts formerly taken for granted. The Soviet Government has at the same time established various secular holidays such as November 7, the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, and May 1, the International Day of Labor. The effort has also been made, with some success, to transfer to New Year's Day the non-religious, festival aspects of Christmas, with children receiving presents around "New Year's trees" and with much ado over a personage known as Grandfather Frost.

In general the anti-religious campaign in the U.S.S.R. has been carried on with far more forbearance than hostile and exaggerated reports in the foreign press would indicate. Common sense and political strategy have been guiding factors in this matter, since obviously the Communists have not wished to give unnecessary offence to backward elements in the population. At its Thirteenth Congress in 1924 the Soviet Communist Party declared: "Special care must be taken not to offend the religious sentiments of the believers, which can only be overcome by years and decades of systematic educational work. This last point is to be borne particularly in mind in the Eastern Republics and districts."

Another Communist Party pronouncement, made several years later, counseled: "Anti-religious propaganda in the village must have the nature of a quiet, cautious talk, a deepening propaganda influencing the minds of the hearers. With no less caution it is necessary to carry on anti-religious propaganda among the workers,

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particularly at present when there is observed a considerable influx of peasantry into the working class." These official statements call to mind the warning given in 1928 by Anatole Lunacharsky, Soviet Minister of Education: "Religion is like a nail; the harder you hit it, the deeper it goes into the wood."¹⁴

Certainly, however, there were periods and places in which Lunacharsky's good advice was not followed. Some of the policies and activities of the Union of Militant Atheists, in its heyday, so affronted the religious feelings of Church members that they became more passionate than ever in their allegiance to the old beliefs. This anti-religious organization, formed in 1925, was responsible for many scurrilous and offensive attacks on religion, including the most crude and derisive posters, and at times outright hooliganism. The churches, however, never lost the right of appeal to the Soviet courts against excesses on the part of anti-religious enthusiasts. For example, in 1936-37 the courts tried 157 complaints by individual churches and granted damages in 78 percent of these cases. And in 1939 a group of anti-religious offenders received sentences ranging from six to eighteen months for rowdyism on Easter Day outside a church in Yaroslav.

The Union of Militant Atheists reached its height of organizational strength and influence about 1932 when it reported 5,500,000 members as compared with an anticipated membership of 17,000,000. Much of its useful work on behalf of the new socialist society was accomplished in the rural sections of the country where, as I have said, religious superstitions were a real obstacle to the achievement of collectivization among the peasants. After the marked success of the collective farm movement

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in 1933 and 1934, the membership of the godless organization steadily declined. And anti-religious education in the Soviet Union became more mellowed and mature.

During the same period the Second Five-Year Plan, 1933-38, got into its stride and the Soviet leaders felt reasonably certain that the underlying economic foundations of socialism would be completed in short order. The standard of living was rising and tensions were easing. With the Constitution of 1936 came the restoration of full civil rights and voting privileges to the clergy as well as to former Tsarist officials and former capitalists. In 1940 the Soviet Government, after experimenting for about a decade with a six-day week and a rotating free day in the urban centers, restored throughout the nation the seven-day week with Sunday as the rest day. One of the reasons for this experiment had been the hope of weakening the hold of Sunday as a religious holiday. The Union of Militant Atheists in vain protested the Government's action in re-establishing the old system.

When the Nazis attacked the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, it was the confident expectation of Hitler and Goebbels that religious groups throughout the U.S.S.R. would welcome the Germans as liberators and help to overthrow the Soviet Government. On the contrary, although a few isolated churchmen in the occupied districts of western Russia did become traitors to their country, Soviet religious leaders and believers in general quickly rallied to the support of the Soviet regime. On the day of the invasion the head of the Orthodox Church, the Metropolitan Sergius, issued a message to all the parishes, stating in part:

"The fascist robbers have fallen upon our homeland. Despising treaties and promises, they have suddenly

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descended upon us, and now the blood of peaceful citizens is already wetting the land of our birth.¹⁵ . . . Our Orthodox Church has always shared the fate of the people. Together with the people she stood trials and shouldered burdens and rejoiced over successes. She will not desert the people now. We, the pastors of the Church, at this time when our motherland calls all to heroic deeds, would indeed prove unworthy if we remained silent and just watched what was happening around us without encouraging the faint-hearted, without comforting the distressed, without reminding the hesitant of his duty and God's will.¹⁶ . . . The Church of Christ gives its blessing to all Orthodox for the defense of the sacred borders of our homeland. May the Lord give us victory."¹⁷

The Orthodox Church and other religious bodies in the U.S.S.R. maintained this attitude during the darkest days of the Nazi onslaught. Instead of opposing the Government, priests constantly offered up prayers for it and for the valiant Soviet armies in the thick of battle. Religious congregations were zealous in subscribing to the national Defense Fund. And the Government authorized, after being petitioned, two "all-church" tank columns, which were equipped through contributions from the Orthodox Church and the Armenian-Gregorian Church respectively. In 1942 the Moscow Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church published a handsome, illustrated volume entitled *The Truth about Religion in Russia*. This book exposed the horrors of Hitler's crusade against the Soviet Republic and the myth of Nazi friendship for religion. It also explained the constitutional guarantees of freedom of worship and expressed the Church's satisfaction with them.

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The Government responded cordially to the moral and material support which religious organizations gave to it during the war. It is significant that *The Truth about Religion in Russia* was printed on the presses of the Union of Militant Atheists. In the previous year, 1941, the leading publications of the Union had been suspended on the grounds that there was a paper shortage. Soon thereafter the atheist organization became quite inactive, if not altogether dormant. In 1943 Premier Stalin, Foreign Minister Molotov and three Orthodox bishops held a conference at the Kremlin on the relations between Church and State. As a result of this conference the Orthodox Church was able to hold a Congress of Bishops later in the year at Moscow and to elect the Metropolitan Sergius as the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. This was a momentous step because it meant the re-establishment of an independent Patriarchate for the first time since it was abolished in 1721, over 200 years before.

The Kremlin conference also decided to set up a state Council on Affairs of the Orthodox Church, with headquarters in Moscow and over 100 field representatives, to act as a clearing house for the complex relations between the Church and various government agencies. For the reason that nation-wide economic planning, controlled by the State, is the dominant factor in the socialist economy, this Council has as one of its chief problems the organization of the production and distribution of the many things, such as ikons, candles, vestments, printing facilities and repairs, which a church needs for its regular functioning. Prior to 1943 there had been great inefficiency in these matters.

The Government also established a Council on Affairs

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of Religious Cults to handle state relations with the non-Orthodox religious bodies in the U.S.S.R. These include the Armenian-Gregorians, the Greek Catholics, the Roman Catholics, the Lutherans, the Methodists, the Evangelical Christian-Baptists, the Seventh Day Adventists, the Old Believers (a schismatic offshoot of the Orthodox Church), the Jews, the Mohammedans (second in number to the Orthodox adherents), the Buddhists, the Lamaists, the Shammanists and lesser sects. This Council is likewise centered in Moscow and has many branch offices.

In 1944 the Chairman of the Council on Affairs of the Orthodox Church, Mr. Georgi Gregorievich Karpov, asserted in a news interview: "The only rule the Soviet Government insists upon is that religious instruction must not violate the basic principle of separation of Church and State. Under our laws each person may or may not teach his children religion. However, religion may not be taught in the schools. Parents may educate children in the privacy of their homes or may send their children to the homes of priests for such education. Children of any number of parents may also gather or be gathered in groups to receive religious instruction."¹⁸ (Formerly the law forbade religious education to persons under eighteen in groups of more than four.)

Mr. Karpov went on to say: "We have given explicit permission for the Church to order any quantity of Testaments, prayer books and liturgical books and are ready to facilitate this step in every way, even to the extent of making representations to the paper rationing authorities. As to the distribution of such materials, there is no objection and no restrictions."¹⁹ In a later statement he averred: "Priests may go to their parishioners and

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may engage in proselytizing work without any restriction except those placed on every orderly citizen of the U.S.S.R. They may go about church business wherever they wish."²⁰ The mention here of "proselytizing work" is of particular significance because it indicates that the Government is again permitting freedom of religious propaganda, as under the first Constitution of 1918.

Early in 1945 the Orthodox Church held a plenary meeting or Sobor in Moscow to elect a new Patriarch to take the place of Sergius, who had died in 1944. It was a most representative gathering and included four Metropolitans and forty-one Archbishops, 126 clerical and lay delegates, and the Metropolitan Benjamin, who represented the Orthodox congregations of the United States and Canada. The Sobor proceeded to nominate and unanimously elect as the new Patriarch the Metropolitan Alexius of Leningrad and Novgorod, a holder of the Leningrad Defense Medal for heroism during the defense of Soviet Russia's great northern city.

Present as guests at the Sobor were high religious officials from the Orthodox Churches of Serbia, of Rumania and of several cities of the Near East such as Constantinople and Jerusalem. This was the first occasion since 1917 on which representatives of the Orthodox religion outside the Soviet Union had officially and openly met together with the Russian Church authorities. And it raised hopes that there might be organized, as proposed by the late Patriarch Sergius, a Confederation of the autonomous Orthodox Churches of the world. Regular consultation and mutual action on the part of these Churches would be a natural thing in view of their common creed and their opposition, with the Anglican and other Protestant groups, to the claim of the Roman

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Catholics that the Pope is the true and only Vicar of Christ on earth. The Great Schism between the Eastern and Western branches of Christianity occurred over this very issue nine centuries ago in 1054.

The Government itself can hardly be indifferent to the political and international implications of the rejuvenation of the Russian Orthodox Church. Increasing influence for this religious body in Eastern Europe serves both to further Slav unity and to weaken the hold of the passionately anti-Soviet Catholic Church. Premier Stalin and his associates undoubtedly welcomed the announcement in 1946 that the Greek Catholic or Uniate Church of the western Ukraine had broken its centuries-old union with the Vatican and returned to the Russian Orthodox fold. The Assembly of the Uniate Church sent a special letter to Mr. Stalin in which it referred frankly to "proud and power-loving Rome, which had always dreamed of establishing its own dictatorship in the Christian world."²¹ In 1948 the Greek Catholic or Uniate Church of Rumania also broke away from the Roman Catholics and rejoined the Eastern Orthodox Church.

The best available estimate for the number of Orthodox churches functioning in 1952 in the U.S.S.R. was 22,000 as compared with 46,457 in 1917. Close to 100 monasteries and nunneries were open, in comparison with 550 in 1917. In 1914 the Orthodox Church, in a country so pious that it was constantly referred to as "Holy Russia," boasted of more than 90,000,000 communicants. Although no reliable statistics are available on the number of religious believers in the Soviet Union today, it seems probable that the Orthodox faithful have been reduced by at least one-half since the Revolution.

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Some of the Protestant sects, however, for the first time possessing equal rights with the Orthodox Church, have gained in membership. As would be expected, religion remains strongest among the peasants and is weakest in the urban districts, especially in the scores of new industrial centers which have sprung up under the Five-Year Plans.

The more tolerant attitude of the Soviets toward organized religion in the U.S.S.R. has been due not only to the Church's loyalty during the Second World War, but also to the fact that even before the war religious leaders and their following had finally accepted the establishment of a socialist economy and commonwealth and had determined to live in peace with the new order of things. There is nothing in the social principles of Christianity that cannot be reconciled with a socialist economic system; and there is much in a socialist economic system that aids in the actualization of the social principles of Christianity.

The Soviet Government and the Communist Party have evidently decided, that the economic, educational and temporal power of the Church has been permanently broken and that religion no longer constitutes a political threat. There were two times, especially, in Soviet development, the years of the Civil War and the period of farm collectivization, when religious organizations did become hostile and dangerous foci of opposition to the regime. Since *the objective situation* has led Church and State, though for different reasons, to become more conciliatory towards each other, in my judgment the present harmonious relations between the two are likely to be of long duration. The practical policy of the Govern-

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ment and the Communist Party does not, however, mean that they have altered their basic anti-religious philosophy.

It remains to be said that the persistence of religious faith among considerable sections of Soviet citizens proves that the creation of socialism does not automatically put an end to religion. The capitalist system did not bring religion into existence and its disappearance will not necessarily usher religion out. The Marxists are convinced that the social-economic roots of religion, as presently embodied in capitalism, will wither away along with the capitalist order. But granting the great importance of these social-economic roots, I am of the opinion that certain psychological and biological phenomena which have in the past helped to stimulate religious belief will continue to exist under any economic system. There are always likely to be, for instance, various kinds of personal frustration; and above all there will always be the event called death. Thus, even if the last theist renounced belief in the last god, religious concepts centering around the hope of immortality might well endure or revive.

Nonetheless, it seems probable that more and more of the Soviet population will come to accept the purely secular philosophy of Dialectical Materialism. This inclusive, affirmative, and life-asserting philosophy is perhaps best described as socialist Humanism. The entire educational apparatus of the country, working in harmony with ever more successful social and economic construction, is geared toward teaching this way of life. And the younger generations, reared for the most part in an atmosphere hostile or indifferent toward religion, are growing up with the Communist world-view as a natural

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and accepted part of their intellectual outlook. As new generations reach maturity this attitude will become ever more deeply ingrained and widespread.

CHAPTER V SOVIET ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL PROGRESS

1. *What the Second World War Showed*

On September 7, 1941, two and one-half months after the Nazi armies attacked the Soviet Union, the conservative *Boston Herald* ran an editorial entitled "The Russian Revelation," which read in part as follows: "Americans are forced to revise their beliefs as to the physical prowess of the Soviets, the skill of the leaders, the morale of the civilian populace, the willingness of all, women as well as men, to make tremendous sacrifices to turn back the invaders. . . . How strange it seems! A nation which was thought to be the most backward, careless, least efficient and least patriotic in the world has checked a mighty host from the nation which has been assumed to be the most advanced in organization, morale, leadership and efficiency."

As time passed, this generous admission from an unexpected quarter was more and more confirmed by events. In December, 1941, the Soviet armies went on the offensive and hurled back the Germans from the approaches to Moscow. In 1942 they held the Nazi juggernaut month after month at the desperate Battle of Stalingrad and destroyed in ferocious fighting at close quarters the flower of Hitler's Wehrmacht. In the final encirclement of the invaders, the Soviet command killed off more than

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200,000 enemy troops and captured 91,000. In 1943 the Soviet forces unleashed a general counter-offensive along a line more than 1,000 miles in length, all the way from Leningrad in the north to the Caucasus in the south.

This far-flung counter-offensive, one of the most remarkable in military annals, steadily pushed back the Nazis and gathered further momentum in 1944, greatly aided by the Anglo-American invasion of France in June of that year. In July the Red Army crossed into Poland and marched on towards the German frontier. Then in the first months of 1945 came the rapid sweep across Eastern Germany, as the Allied troops stormed over the Rhine and dealt body-blows to Hitler from the west. On May 2 Marshal Stalin proclaimed the capture of Berlin by the Soviet army and on May 8 the German military forces surrendered unconditionally to the Allies and Soviet Russia. Finally, early in August, 1945, the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan, its armies quickly subduing the considerable Japanese concentration in Manchuria.

Unquestionably the Russian Revelation had grown ever more impressive since the *Boston Herald's* acknowledgment of 1941. And as we pursue the logic of the Soviet showing against the combined forces of Germany, Hungary, Romania and Finland, we see in more detail the meaning of what the Soviet people, leaders and armies accomplished. Admittedly, the natural advantages of the country, such as its vast size, the rigor of its winters and its tremendous reserves of man-power, were significant factors in the downfall of Hitler; but these advantages were also present during the First World War when the German armies inflicted overwhelming defeat upon the Russians. It is clear that additional factors must

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have contributed to what the Russians achieved in the Second World War.

The immense Soviet military strength displayed from 1941 to 1945 had certain definite implications. First, it meant that the Soviet armies possessed up-to-date, mechanized equipment, in large quantity and of excellent quality, with which to combat the most highly mechanized attacking force yet assembled in history. Otherwise Hitler's ruthless Luftwaffe and fast-moving panzer divisions would indeed have knocked out the Soviet Union in a matter of weeks, as the cocksure prophets of Soviet doom had with relish kept repeating.

Second, we realize that the hard-hitting Soviet tanks, artillery, airplanes, machine guns and rifles did not just appear miraculously out of the blue. In fact, they came from those very Russian factories which for so long had been described by the American press as hopelessly inefficient and bogged down in general confusion. The Soviets did receive valuable military supplies through American-British Lend-Lease. But these supplies did not start coming through in great quantity until after the Battle of Stalingrad and they never added up to more than 10 percent of the total military *materiel* at the disposal of the Soviet armies. Contrary to reports circulated abroad, the workers in the Soviet defense industries did an excellent job during the pre-war years in producing armaments of the highest grade. The proof of this is in what those armaments did to the Nazis.

Soviet defense industries and armaments workers did not function in a vacuum. They were part of an ambitious program for the development of industry throughout the U.S.S.R. and especially of heavy industry, which

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is so basic to the manufacture of armaments. The third implication, then, is that the country's industrial expansion was a noteworthy success and that the Five-Year Plans, often ridiculed as "Red Smoke," achieved their main objectives in industry. Furthermore, these Plans provided for the erection of vast industrial facilities behind the Ural Mountains and throughout Siberia where enemy bombers could not reach them. And this was a major reason why the Soviets were able to keep on turning out armaments all through the war, in spite of the occupation by the invading armies of so much of western Russia, including the great industrial centers of the Ukraine.

Fourth, the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany demonstrated that the socialist economic system as a whole had developed in a remarkably successful manner under the Five-Year Plans and that it continued to function effectively under the terrific stress of an all-out war. The defense industry, and heavy industry in general, of course had to be closely integrated with the rest of the economy, including the vital facilities of transportation. The anti-Soviet critics had frequently called transportation the "weak link" in the Soviet economic order and had predicted that it would break down disastrously under the strain of war conditions. Yet transportation, whether by railroad or otherwise, made a brilliant record for itself from 1941 to 1945. The notable defensive and offensive operations could not possibly have been carried out unless there had been a transportation system functioning fairly efficiently behind the lines. This is not to gainsay the fact that during the last two years of the war several hundred thousand American trucks and jeeps

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were of immense assistance to the mobility of the Red Army.

One of the feats of the Soviet railways was the removal of whole factories on flat cars from the path of the advancing Nazi forces to eastern regions beyond the reach of the enemy. Then the factories in their component parts were set down, quickly assembled, and harnessed to production again in short order. Approximately 1300 plants were moved in this manner and 1,000,000 freight carloads used to do it. The *New York Herald Tribune* called it "a miracle." But behind all such war-time "miracles" in the Soviet Union was a long sequence of economic cause and effect stretching back over the years and always an integral part of the country-wide socialist planning.

Another sector which performed in outstanding fashion during the war years was agriculture. The production of food would surely have broken down during this period had it not been for the prior collectivization of agriculture so that it could operate on a large scale with modern machinery. What this meant for the war effort Alexander Werth explains in his book, *The Year of Stalingrad*: "It was, indeed, one of the remarkable achievements of the Soviet war machine that, by contrast with the war of 1914-18, the Russian Army was, on the whole, well fed. There were occasional hitches due to transport difficulties, especially when a unit was more or less isolated; but in the main the army ate better than anybody else in the Soviet Union, even in the very difficult days of 1941 and 1942, when many cities were hungry. In 1943 the situation became even better, with the influx of American supplies."¹

The fifth point is that clearly neither the pre-war de-

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velopment of the Soviet economy nor its functioning during the Nazi invasion nor the victories of the Red Army could have taken place unless in general the workers had become well trained in modern industrial techniques and the soldiers in the effective use and servicing of mechanized war equipment. Mass production of the implements of war and of countless other things necessary for an industrialized society meant that millions of Russians must have learned to operate the complicated machinery so typical of the twentieth-century world. In order to defeat the Nazis, Soviet plane pilots, tank drivers, machine-gunners, artillery-men, engineers, mechanics and the rest must have mastered their jobs in both theory and practice.

Mr. W. Averell Harriman, former Ambassador of the United States to the U.S.S.R. and head of an American Mission to that country in 1941, stated in a radio broadcast shortly after he left the Soviet Union: "The Russian has become a first-class mechanic in this last generation. . . . Out on the airfields, where much has to be done with little equipment, our American officers report — and I quote from one of them — that they have never seen such skill, ingenuity, resourcefulness and morale. The Russian mechanics work without shelter in sleet, rain and wind an average of fourteen hours a day. Their pilots learn to fly American aircraft as quickly, as skilfully, as our own pilots or the British. And so we have our answer to why Hitler's time schedule has been dislocated. The clumsy Russian mujik has become a skilled mechanic."² Lord Beaverbrook, the English press magnate, testified at the same time that Soviet "pilots are of the very best, just as much experienced as any pilots anywhere. And the mechanics who service their aircraft compare in all

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respects with the mechanics of Great Britain and the United States. Indeed, the Russians have a genius for mechanization."³

The vast extension of education and technical training in the Soviet Union since 1917 has included all segments of the population. Women as well as men have become wise in the ways of the machine. This was of crucial importance during World War II because hundreds of thousands of women had to take over the skilled jobs of men who had been called into the army. Especially was this true in agriculture where in many districts the women had to shoulder the major part of the responsibility, driving the tractors and mechanical reapers.

Another aspect of the cultural revolution that proved significant was the improvement in the science of medicine. In contrast to the First World War, the Soviet doctors were able to prevent any large-scale epidemics in the armed forces and the population at large. And the medical services of the Red Army made a spectacular record in restoring wounded soldiers to full health or at least in making them available for civilian work. Surgery of all varieties contributed notably to this result.

The sixth implication of the war effort was that leadership in the army and government was well qualified to cope with the crisis caused by the Nazi invasion. The reservation must be made here that during the first few weeks of the war the Soviet forces suffered severe defeats and enormous losses in prisoners. When Hitler struck on June 22, 1941, he took the Soviet armies to a large extent by surprise and was able, for instance, to destroy many hundreds of Soviet planes before they could get into the air. Why Premier Stalin and his associates, explicitly warned of the coming attack through reliable

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information forwarded by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, were not more on guard against the approaching storm, is still a mystery.

Nonetheless, on the whole both generals and civilian administrators carried through with eminent success the formidable tasks imposed upon them. Events did not bear out the claim that the Moscow Trials and general purges of 1937-38 had fatally weakened Soviet leadership. The crushing by the Soviet Republic of an extensive conspiracy to overthrow it — a conspiracy having definite links with Nazi Germany — resulted in strengthening Soviet leadership and morale.

This brings us to the seventh and final point: that the economic developments of the Five-Year Plans, the first-class fighting equipment of the Red Army and the educational progress of the population would have availed but little if the people had been lacking in morale. Here again the actual course of the Nazi-Soviet conflict disproved any number of misconceptions. Although a certain number of traitors, Hitler collaborators, or slackers appeared among them, the people as a whole rallied to the defense of their country with ardor and determination. This was proved daily by the fighting spirit of the armies, the widespread activity of the guerrillas, the civilian defenders of Leningrad and other cities, and the relentless execution of the scorched earth policy.

Joseph Goebbels and the Nazi propagandists expected that the peasants, particularly in the Ukraine, would revolt against the Government and welcome the invading forces as liberators. On the contrary, with few exceptions the peasants in the enemy-occupied regions remained loyal to the regime and joined the guerrilla bands by the scores of thousands. And those guerrilla fighters, coming

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from a population whose individual initiative had supposedly been stamped out by the Communist dictatorship, displayed remarkable initiative. The Nazis also hoped that discord would break out among the different minorities. This did not happen either, though five minor groups did not fulfil their patriotic obligations. All but a fraction of the more than 170 minority peoples, constituting almost one-half of the total population, gave their utmost in the nation's supreme ordeal and played an indispensable role in the final debacle of Hitler's legions.

Despite the tons of newsprint expended in America and other lands to show that they were the slaves of a bloodthirsty tyranny and seething with hatred for the Stalin regime, the people evidently thought from 1941 to 1945 that their new socialist system was worth fighting and dying for. We cannot afford to forget that socialism is more than an economic system and a political affiliation; it is an inclusive way of life capable of arousing the most intense devotion in those who give it allegiance.

* * *

To recapitulate my review of the implications which we can draw from the Soviet achievement in the Second World War, I believe that it showed, first, that the armies possessed up-to-date and mechanized equipment, in large quantity and of excellent quality; second, that the bulk of this war *materiel* was efficiently produced in Soviet factories; third, that the industrial program in general had been a conspicuous success; fourth, that the country's socialist system as a whole functioned most effectively under the terrific impact of the Nazi invasion; fifth, that the population had made impressive advances in education and technical training; sixth, that the leadership

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lived up fully to its responsibilities during the war crisis; and, seventh, that the people displayed splendid morale throughout the entire titanic struggle with Hitler.

It seems to me that any objective student, conservative as he may be in outlook or antagonistic as he may be to the Soviets, must arrive at similar conclusions if he faithfully follows through the logic of the showing against the Nazis. That logic demonstrates, through pragmatic reference to the incontestable records of history, that Soviet socialism possesses formidable and deeply rooted powers of resistance and endurance. It does not demonstrate that Soviet socialism is superior to capitalism, since both the United States and Britain put on their own magnificent performances during the war. Nor can success in war, which has frequently been achieved by governments of a reactionary character, prove in itself that the Soviet system is a good or progressive form of society.

Even before World War II, I had decided that Soviet socialism was succeeding in the large. In my judgment that system works in peace as well as war. It was no choice of the Russians that their country was made the testing ground of how a socialist commonwealth stands up in the fury and horror of world Armageddon. But since that did happen, I have tried to unfold its full meaning, which is quite relevant to the peacetime accomplishments of the U.S.S.R.

2. *The Role of Socialist Planning*

In our discussion of the Soviet Constitution we saw that one of its most important Articles concerned socialist planning.* I shall repeat that Article here: "The economic life of the U.S.S.R. is determined and directed

* See p. 56.

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by the state national economic plan with the aim of increasing the public wealth, of steadily improving the material conditions of the working people and raising their cultural level, of consolidating the independence of the U.S.S.R. and strengthening its defensive capacity." In my opinion social-economic planning is, together with the public ownership and operation of the main means of production and distribution, the most basic factor in the economic life of the country.

The great Five-Year Plans have aroused interest, skepticism, hope and fury throughout the world. The First Five-Year Plan (or *Piatiletka* in the Russian) went into effect in the fall of 1928 and made such rapid headway that it was completed in four and a quarter years, at the end of 1932. The Second Five-Year Plan lasted from 1933 through 1937. The Third Five-Year Plan was scheduled from 1938 through 1942. It was proceeding most successfully when unexpectedly interrupted by the Nazi onslaught in the middle of 1941. Shortly after the conclusion of the Second World War, the Soviet Union launched its Fourth Five-Year Plan, for the period from January 1, 1946, through December 31, 1950.

The fundamental principle of planning is fairly simple. Whether operative on a small or large scale it consists of trying to coordinate future activities in the light of the external environment, especially its economic aspects, and of capacities, desires and potentialities. The individual himself, if he is to lead an integrated and satisfactory life, must continually plan from year to year and even from day to day. Planning is in fact an indispensable factor in the functioning of human reason for the solution of individual and social problems. Whenever any person or organization or government draws up an

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annual budget, that is financial planning of the most essential sort for twelve months in advance.

The intelligent family adopts some measure of planning. It looks into the future so far as is possible and plans, according to its resources, for the needs of its various members. If it is wise, it makes a yearly budget, allocating definite sums from its income to food, housing, clothing, recreation, baby carriages and the like. The next level of planning occurs in relation to individual business enterprises. Every business has to plan carefully if it is to be successful and make a profit. The larger and more complex it is, the more carefully it must plan. A huge corporation like the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, U. S. Steel or R. H. Macy & Co. must have central planning in order to coordinate its many different departments and its far-flung business operations. In the capitalist world today we occasionally find government economic planning in effect for large-scale enterprises such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and sometimes for a whole industry, as when the state owns and operates the railroads. However, the greatest degree of government planning under capitalism takes place during the crisis of international conflict, as it did during the First and Second World Wars.

Now the planning that has been going on in Soviet Russia since 1928 is the most extensive in history. The Soviets believe that the limited, piecemeal, crisis planning under capitalism cannot solve permanently the economic problems that face mankind. They are convinced that just as the different departments in a big business must be consciously correlated, so must the different departments of a nation's economy as a whole. Coal must be integrated with steel, steel with transportation, trans-

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portation with agriculture, agriculture with wholesale and retail distribution, distribution with finance, finance with production in general, and so on down the line. Such a concept demands that for the complex economic activity of the entire country there be one great all-inclusive Plan, covering all divisions and subdivisions of the economy and under one vast unitary budget. This is precisely what a Five-Year Plan entails.

The socialist planning of the U.S.S.R. differs from any planning that takes place in capitalist lands in that it is continuous and nation-wide and not confined to special localities, industries or critical situations; in that it is based on the public ownership and operation of all the main means of production and distribution; and in that its guiding aim is use, not profit. The welfare of the whole community is the *direct* end and not secondary or incidental to the making of profits.

Soviet and Marxist economists claim that only socialist planning can overcome the contradictions inherent in the capitalist order and eliminate recurring depression, financial crisis and mass unemployment. In general terms it achieves economic stability by maintaining a proper balance between production and consumption, between supply and demand. Of primary importance here is the central control over wages, prices, hours of work and currency. As more and more goods are produced in field and factory, wages go up throughout the entire nation; or prices decrease. (From 1946 through the middle of 1952 there occurred five general reductions in prices.) To take care of an increasing turnover in goods, currency may be expanded, depending on its rate of circulation.

The fundamental point is that the Soviet people al-

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ways have sufficient wealth to buy back the goods which they produce. This means that there can be no such thing as overproduction, which is simply under-consumption under a different name; and that unemployment, except while workers are shifting from one job to another, and depressions become extremely unlikely. If on some distant day absolute overproduction, in some foodstuff, for instance, does threaten the U.S.S.R., it will be simple to solve the problem by reducing hours of work and giving people more time for leisure and recreation.

The harmony between production and purchasing power in Soviet Russia means in actuality that the country is always as rich as its productive capacity during any given period. The United States and other capitalist nations, however, are only as rich as the amount of goods that can be sold for a profit during any given period. In times of depression anywhere from one-third to one-half of their productive capacity is idle; and even during prosperity a considerable proportion of their plant capacity may be unutilized. The national wealth and standard of living in the Soviet Union are of course not nearly as high as those of America, but they would have remained far lower had it not been for the Five-Year Plans.

How, exactly, does socialist planning operate in the U.S.S.R.? This is a large question indeed and I can do no more than sketch in the main outlines of an answer. The key organizations in this field are the State Planning Committee* or *Gosplan* and the State Committee for Material and Technical Supplies to the National Economy† or *Gosnab*. *Gosplan* works out the programs for over-all production, new capital investment and financial

* Until 1948 this was called the State Planning Commission.

† This Committee was created in 1948.

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arrangements between the different sectors of industry and agriculture. Gosnab plans for the distribution of materials and capital equipment, determining the exact quantity of raw materials and machinery that are to go to each branch of the economy for the carrying out of Gosplan's blueprints.

The Soviet Government approves the eleven-member Presidium or Governing Board of Gosplan as well as its Advisory Council of ninety. The Chairman of this Planning Committee is automatically a member of the Soviet Cabinet and a Vice-Premier of the U.S.S.R. It is this Planning Committee, employing over a thousand experts, which welds together into one vast, integrated, long-range Plan all the minor plans and reports of all the various republics, districts, industries, factories, farms, distribution units and cultural organizations throughout the Soviet Union. It is this Committee that from week to week, from month to month, from year to year, casts its all-seeing eye over the economic activities of the nation and shifts the schedules within the Plan to keep pace with new and unforeseen developments.

The work of the Planning Committee is divided into over fifty different specialized departments, corresponding to the different Ministries of the Soviet Government.* Prominent among the Committee Departments are those concerned with Agriculture, Automobile and Tractor Industry, Building Materials Industry, Coal, Electrical Industry, Foreign Trade, Machine-Tool Building Industry, Public Health, Railroads, Ship-Building Industry, River Fleet and the Synthetic Plan. This last section has the crucial task of constructing the final Plan from the projects submitted by the various departments.

* See pp. 60-63.

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There are also the Organization Section, which runs an Academy to train experts for the Committee and handles the selecting and managing of the personnel; and the Central Administration for National Economic Accounting, which is in charge of the census and the highly ramified accounting system that socialist business activities require.

Until 1949 the Central Statistical Administration was a subsidiary of the State Planning Committee. In that year, however, its work had assumed such importance that it was made a separate agency under the Federal Government, continuing to function, of course, closely with the Planning Committee. The activities of the Statistical Administration are indispensable to planning. This bureau has the duty of obtaining the basic statistical information concerning the complex Soviet economy. It is not possible even to start planning on a broad scale without a considerable amount of such data; yet it is not possible to get complete and reliable data until planning has made considerable progress. Since in the old Russia accurate statistical procedures were honored more in the breach than in the observance, Soviet statisticians had a hard row to hoe. As social-economic planning has made more and more headway, the reliability of statistics has steadily improved and has brought about what has been aptly called adequate *economic visibility*.

Planning Committees similar to the federal Committee function in each of the sixteen federated Republics and in the numerous Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Region and National Districts. In fact, there is some planning agency in every community having a population of 20,000 or more. Likewise, planning organs operate in all the Ministries of the constituent Republics.

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These various planning bodies all work under the general direction of the State Planning Committee; and they present frequent reports to the planning organization to which they are immediately subordinate. There are also planning divisions in each federal Ministry and in the different subdivisions of each Ministry. For instance, the Automobile and Tractor Industry as a whole has its planning division; the various regional trusts in this industry also have theirs; and finally there are planning committees in each factory of each trust and in each shop of each factory.

Thus all the workers in an automobile or tractor factory combine to carry out a plan for that unit; all the factories in a certain district combine to carry out a central plan for the trust of which they are part; all the trusts combine to carry out a plan for the entire Automobile and Tractor Industry; and then this industry combines with every other branch of the economy to carry out a balanced plan for the country as a whole. The *geographical* planning units operate on the same principle as the *functional*: The cities' plans fit into that of the regions, the regions' into that of the Republics and the Republics' into that of the U.S.S.R. *in toto*. And these two planning procedures, the functional and the geographic, serve to stimulate and check on each other in their mutual cooperation on behalf of the over-all Plan.

The geographic and planning agencies operate *both* from the smaller up through the larger *and* from the larger down through the smaller, providing a constant *two-way* flow of ideas, initiative, plans and counter-plans. The higher bodies of course have more authority, but they encourage local responsibility and are on guard

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against the red tape and hardening of the ideational arteries which have handicapped many a centralized bureaucracy.

Another cross-check occurs in the all-embracing Financial Plan or State budget, which includes all the sub-budgets of governmental and economic units throughout the U.S.S.R. This Financial Plan, which is the counterpart of the Material Plan (drawn up in terms of concrete goods), translates all production and distribution schedules into ruble figures. The ruble, worth twenty-five cents at the official Soviet exchange rate, is the common denominator in which the thousand and one different aspects of the National Plan can be accurately expressed and clearly related to one another. The Financial Plan and the Material Plan are simply two different versions of the same thing.

The State Bank and its more than 3,000 branches act as a great central pool for the national income. They achieve this role through the direct taxation of individuals, which provides about 6 percent of the national income, and especially through the turnover tax on each economic enterprise throughout the land and an additional tax on its profits. The Government also raises a certain amount of capital through savings banks and the flotation of public loans. A significant feature of financial planning is that it makes possible the distribution and redistribution of the total capital resources according to the needs of the national economy as a whole. Some businesses, such as the railroads or the oil industry, will run up handsome surpluses, part of which can be invested in other less developed fields of industrial activity or in the sphere of culture and education. A considerable portion of such surpluses, however, are retained locally

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by the unit earning them and used collectively for expansion, improvements or social benefits connected with the same enterprise.

Planned investment, then, is a fundamental aspect of Soviet socialist planning. Instead of over-investment in some directions and under-investment in others, central economic planning ensures an even flow of capital into the channels most useful and important. It would be inconceivable for manufacturing plants to be continually duplicating one another, ruining one another through cut-throat competition, spending huge fortunes in misleading advertising and glutting a locality or even the entire country with an over-supply of practically identical goods. Planned investment also prevents the flow of capital into the production of things for which there might be some demand, but which would be clearly harmful to the well-being of the people.

This strict supervision of investment, however, by no means implies that so-called luxuries are taboo or that a flat conformity of standardized goods must prevail. One of the chief aims of Soviet planning is that everyone should have an abundance of all sorts of personal possessions, including luxuries. These consumption goods, moreover, are to be as different in quality and design as can reasonably be expected. With its informational apparatus carefully attuned to the needs and desires of consumers, the National Planning Committee presents the citizens with a wide range of choices in commodities. It is true that up till now Soviet clothes, shoes, hats and so on have frequently been of an inferior grade; this is not due, however, to socialist planning, but to the fact that the handicaps of the past have not yet been overcome.

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It is essential to note that the surpluses or "profits" built up by economic enterprises play a very different role from what we have been accustomed to expect under capitalism. They are, in effect, mainly a bookkeeping device. Socialist business is run, as I have said, not for profits, but in order to provide goods and services to the community at large. The most convenient process of accounting and distribution, however, demands the mechanism of buying and selling, of money and prices. Furthermore, identifiable "profits" are necessary so that a certain proportion of the nation's income can be set aside to take care of depreciation and obsolescence and, above all, to expand the means of production, particularly heavy industry. Soviet Russia, for instance, put into social savings for such purposes an annual average of one-third its total income during the first two Five-Year Plans.

Under the financial system I have been outlining, every producing and distributing unit in the country has an account in the central State Bank or one of its branches. And it is the duty of each bank to check frequently on the use of the credits, long-term, short-term or emergency, issued from time to time. It must make certain, for example, that the automobile factory to which it has advanced credit actually turns out the cars called for by the Plan and supposedly made possible by the credit. The factory has the obligation of giving the bank reports on definite dates showing how it is fulfilling its program. If the bank discovers that the credit is being used inefficiently, it will at once stop further credits until the matter is cleared up, even instituting a special investigation if necessary. As a brilliant student of Soviet economics, Vladimir D. Kazakévich, writes: "The mechanism of

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banking is used as a rudder to direct, through extension and withholding of credit allocations, the fulfilment of the Plan in production and distribution."⁴

Thus, socialist planning makes the banks even more important than they are in a capitalist country. For the banks become the watchdogs of the whole economy by carrying on what amounts to a constant audit of business enterprise. They act as the vital link between the various sets of plans drawn up on paper and the fulfilment of those plans in terms of concrete goods and services. Their vigilance means that there can be no let-down on the part of management or workers in a concern without those responsible being called to task. In this function the banks are aided by a system of detailed accounting that penetrates into every nook and cranny of economic activity. Soviet accounting, organized on the strictest basis, aims to cut production costs and to attain the greatest possible results for the least possible expenditures. Here again book profits enter into the picture as a partial test of whether or not a plant is being operated efficiently.

Let us consider some of the established procedures in drawing up and putting into effect a Soviet Five-Year Plan. After consultation with key Soviet and Communist Party bodies, the State Planning Committee works out general goals for the economic, social and cultural development of the country during the next five-year period. They are realistically based on the experience of the past and the requirements and possibilities of the future. With these goals as the objective, the State Planning Committee, several months before the Plan is to go into effect, sends out preliminary and tentative figures to all the subordinate planning committees.

These planning agencies, and the various factories

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and collective farms throughout the land, carefully consider the proposed estimates with special attention to those figures that concern them. Then, in the light of their own experience, they make fresh suggestions and counter-plans, returning the revised drafts to the central Planning Committee. After receiving all available information and criticism regarding the preliminary schedules, including the reactions of the various government Ministries, the Planning Committee proceeds to draw up the final Plan for presentation to the Council of Ministers (or Cabinet), to the Communist Party and to the Supreme Soviet. These three bodies must all pass on the Five-Year Plan. It is to be remembered that the State Planning Committee, in spite of its enormous importance and influence, remains in the last analysis an expert advisory board whose recommendations must be ratified by the higher political authorities.

Along with the Five-Year Plan as a whole the Planning Committee also submits for ratification the control figures for the first year of the Plan. In fact, every January the Committee submits a one-year plan to cover the current year. This must of course fit into the general outlines of the Five-Year Plan, but need not agree exactly with the original figures of the Plan. The Committee's obligation annually to decide upon a one-year schedule gives it the invaluable opportunity of revising the Five-Year Plan itself in the face of changing circumstances. Furthermore, the Committee divides the yearly plan into quarters and at the beginning of each quarter re-examines the estimates for the next three months. In short, social-economic planning is carried out on the principle of intelligent flexibility and not on that of unbending, unalterable dogma.

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It is perfectly obvious that a Planning Committee composed of the wisest men in the world would be bound to make some mistakes, particularly when country-wide, long-range planning is being tried for the first time in human history. Moreover, there exist certain factors which the most flawless technique of planning cannot precisely anticipate: weather conditions, for example, affecting the fortunes of crops throughout the country; new inventions and new discoveries of mineral wealth, affecting the progress of industry and agriculture; the movement of world prices, affecting payments for needed imports; and the external threat of military aggression, affecting both the productive needs and the psychology of the people.

Such unpredictable developments in foreign and domestic affairs mean that the State Planning Committee must keep constantly on the alert, ready to alter the direction and the tempo of the Plan as the total situation may require. Premier Stalin has ably summed up the matter: "The Five-Year Plan, like every plan . . . must be changed and perfected on the basis of experience in carrying through the Plan. No Five-Year Plan can calculate all the potentialities which are present in our system and which become revealed only in the process of work and in the application of the Plan in factory, mill, collective and State farms, in the districts, etc. Only bureaucrats can imagine that planning is concluded with the drafting of a plan."⁵

In the actual carrying out of a Soviet Five-Year Plan much the same machinery is used as in drawing it up. All the planning organs, in the Ministries of the Federal and Republican Governments, in the individual industries and trusts, in the regions and cities, down to the

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factories and farms, actively function in putting the Plan across. They stimulate the fulfilment of the Plan in whatever sector of the economic front they are primarily concerned with, keep abreast from day to day with what is actually being accomplished, and forward periodic reports to the Planning Committee to which they are directly responsible. The trade unions play a particularly important part in the administration of the Plan.

In other words, the transformation of a Five-Year Plan from a beautiful, inspiring set of blueprints into concrete material and cultural achievement is dependent on the rank and file of workers and farmers. And their participation in the execution of the Plan is a matter of conscious volition. As one of the Soviet planning experts puts it: "It was necessary not only that the working class as a whole should direct industry but that every individual worker should understand his part in the total scheme of production and the connection between his own work and that of other workers in the same or allied branches of industry." This points to one of the outstanding advantages of social-economic planning: that it enables every individual in the community to see how and why his work fits into the larger scheme of things and to feel a significance and dignity in his job that was seldom present before.

Socialist planning definitely implies the full use of productive capacity and its continual development. In putting this policy into effect it has created among the workers a new psychology. Under capitalism the worker, thinking over the experience of the past, is quite prone to say to himself: "Why should I try to work harder and produce more when I know that may bring on overproduction and the loss of my job?" Or he may object strong-

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ly to the installation of new labor-saving machinery, fearing that it also will cause unemployment. In the U.S.S.R., however, the workers know that increased production, far from leading to unemployment and economic misery, will raise the standard of living for both themselves and everyone else — a major reason for their entering with enthusiasm into schemes for heightening productivity.

I have already mentioned the counter-plans, usually proposing higher schedules, that factories and other units may suggest to the State Planning Committee. In the fulfilment of such counter-plans Stakhanovites, workers who make the most effective use of tools, time and group effort, lead the way in increasing the quantity and improving the quality of production. Individual factories, coal mines, electric power stations and trade unions enter into "socialist competition" to do the same. "Socialism," writes Lenin, "does not do away with competition; on the contrary it for the first time creates the possibility of applying it widely, on a really mass scale; of drawing the majority of toilers into the field of this work, where they can really show themselves, develop their abilities and disclose their talents, which have been an untapped source — trampled upon, crushed and strangled by capitalism."⁶

And Stalin adds: "Socialist competition and capitalist competition represent two entirely different principles. The principle of capitalist competition is: defeat and death for some and victory for others. The principle of socialist competition is: comradely assistance to those lagging behind the more advanced, with the purpose of reaching general advancement."⁷ There is plenty of competition within the general framework of a cooperative economic order: competition in doing a first-rate job for

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the community and in climbing the ladder of achievement in socially useful ways; competition in the contributions one makes to the progress of a whole people all working together on the basis of conscious teamwork.

In the U.S.S.R. the new motivation of striving for the social good, including one's own, has been steadily taking the place of the old motivation of seeking to pile up personal monetary profits. Not only education and propaganda has been directed to bring about this change in fundamental incentives; planning itself, through establishing general economic security and the promise of ultimate abundance, has been an even more effective factor. This sort of economy makes it unnecessary for a man to carry on a bitter struggle with others in order to maintain himself and his family. The basic economic functionings and relationships harmonize with and support the higher social and ethical ideals instead of brutally contradicting and counteracting them. And the Five-Year Plans give Soviet citizens something definite and compelling to which they can devote their energies and loyalties. In this way central planning for the nation in general brings central planning into the activity of each individual, pulling together the various strands of his nature and putting a great purpose into his life.

In the United States it is a commonplace to say that the social sciences like economics and sociology have lagged far behind the natural sciences. Scientific planning in Soviet Russia, as represented particularly by the State Planning Committee, means that economics and sociology, with a huge country of continental proportions as the arena for experimentation, are enshrined at the very center of things; and have become, in scope, prestige and effectiveness, the equal of the physical sciences. This

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socialist planning, directed by experts in all the relevant fields, does not permit the reckless squandering of natural resources for profit or for any other purpose. It not only conserves the priceless bequests of Nature, but expands and increases them, as in the great river, hydroelectric and irrigation projects now under way.*

Over the ages intelligent men have ever sought to deepen and broaden the reach of reason in human affairs. The Russians have gone far in advancing this goal by instituting, in the form of central planning, integrated social-economic thinking on a vast nation-wide scale. Soviet socialist planning, through its coordination and controls, attains what might be called a great Community Mind operating on behalf of the common welfare.

3. *Achievements of the Five-Year Plans*

Let us now review briefly what the Five-Year Plans have accomplished. The major goals of the First Five-Year Plan, 1928-1932, were to establish heavy industry and machine-building on a permanent basis, to mechanize and socialize agriculture, and to bring about the rapid technical training of the population. The fulfilment of these aims was designed both to provide a solid foundation for the building of socialism and to make the Soviet Union, in case of need, independent of the capitalist world. The Plan admittedly cost a great deal in terms of human strain and stress, especially since the emphasis on heavy industry entailed unprecedented savings being put into capital investment and therefore the temporary foregoing of consumers' goods. Accordingly, the Soviet people tightened their belts in order that the manufacture

* See pp. 203-208.

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of producers' goods such as blast furnaces and steel foundries, tractors and agricultural combines, hydroelectric plants and all kinds of machinery should go forward at top speed. Huge quantities of foodstuffs and raw materials, badly needed at home, were exported to pay for the import of machines and the hiring of foreign technicians.

What the socialization of agriculture meant in Soviet Russia was the merging of separate farms into large-scale collectives (*kolkhozes*), each managed as a single cooperative unit by the individual members and owners, who distribute the total income on the basis of the work performed by each peasant. (The average Soviet collective farm was, as of 1939, about 1200 acres in size and contained about seventy-eight households.) Each peasant family retains, as guaranteed by the Constitution,* the ownership of its own dwelling, small kitchen garden, cows, pigs, poultry or perhaps beehives. The communal side of the collectives chiefly involves the major aspects of agricultural production in sowing, reaping, storing, caring for the herds and in applying scientific methods and machine techniques so far as possible in all such activities. Undeniably crucial in the collectivization program was the establishment throughout the countryside of the Government-run Machine-and-Tractor Stations, which rent to the collective farms tractors, threshing machines and reapers; and provide technical assistance or instruction for the operation of this mechanized equipment.

Besides the collectives, the First Five-Year Plan saw instituted thousands of huge State farms (*sovkhoses*), owned outright by the Government and managed by a special Ministry. One of their main functions has been

* See p. 55.

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to carry on big-scale agricultural experiments. All hands on these State farms work for regular wages and are organized into labor unions.

There can be no shadow of doubt that collectivization was a necessity for the advance of socialism in the Soviet Union. The continued existence of some 25,000,000 scattered strips and peasant holdings, with primitive implements like the wooden plough still widely in use, meant production that was terribly inefficient, with an extremely low yield per acre, and therefore insufficient for the needs of a growing population and an expanding socialist economy. The obvious solution was to combine these innumerable small farms into two or three hundred thousand large-scale enterprises in which the advantages of modern machinery and planned cooperative endeavor could be utilized. Moreover, the retention of the old individualistic agricultural system meant the persistence of the old individualistic psychology that went with it. And since the peasants constituted an overwhelming proportion of the population, it would very likely have proved fatal for the new society had they gone on maintaining an attitude antagonistic to socialism.

The campaign for collectivization during the First Five-Year Plan met the stubborn resistance of the kulaks, the comparatively rich peasants to whom the whole idea of collectives was anathema. They fought the new program in agriculture with all possible weapons, including those of murder and arson. The Communist Government, on its part, retaliated with severity and harshness, deporting hundreds of thousands of the kulaks to work-camps in the Urals and Siberia. Other groups among the peasants, especially in the Ukraine where a separatist movement was stirring, became disgruntled over the

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collectivization program. And in 1931 and 1932 the grain crops fell to a critical level, while an enormous number of livestock were slaughtered. During the winter of 1933 the entire U.S.S.R. felt the effects of a serious food shortage, which in some areas was undoubtedly responsible for a heavy toll in malnutrition and death.

But the bad situation quickly changed for the better. The Communists and the Government became more moderate in their attitude and made certain compromises to the still strongly individualistic psychology of the peasants. The collectives themselves began to operate more efficiently and to attract farmers by their marked superiority to the old system. In the fall of 1933 the country had the biggest harvest in its entire annals. By the end of the same year two-thirds of all the peasants in the U.S.S.R. had joined collectives numbering almost 225,000. Collectivization had won through to a great and lasting victory. It was one of the most significant agrarian revolutions in history; and was of invaluable aid to the industrial program in that it ensured plenty of food for the cities and, by effecting much labor-saving on the farms, released millions of peasants for work in industry.

The accomplishment of the third main goal of the First Five-Year Plan, the mastering of twentieth-century technique, was likewise a costly process. A large proportion of the skilled professional class had left Russia at the time of the 1917 Revolution; and many of those who remained continued to be hostile to the new regime and to sabotage its economic program whenever possible. Hence the Soviet Government had to train a whole new generation of socialist technicians whose efficiency and loyalty could be counted on. This took time. It was also

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expensive in terms of production costs. Tens of thousands of unskilled workers and raw peasants, starting from scratch to learn how to operate complicated machinery, showed much awkwardness at first and ruined much machinery in the course of their education. Yet in the end the objective was largely achieved. The workers demonstrated proficiency in the arts of modern industry. The institutes of technical education turned out increasing numbers of engineers and other specialists fully capable of coping with the complex problems of the machine age. And the quality of all sorts of manufactured goods steadily improved.

The Second Five-Year Plan, extending from January 1, 1933, to December 31, 1937, continued in practically every respect the advances made under the First. The chief differences were a greater stress on consumption goods — clothes, kitchen utensils, furniture, phonographs, radios, cameras, bicycles and so on — and a somewhat less arduous rate of expansion. As the Second Plan progressed, the people proceeded more and more to reap the benefits of the hard work and self-sacrifice necessitated by the First. As Stalin put it in 1935, "Life has improved, comrades. Life is more joyous."⁸ Consumers' goods, the output of which more than doubled between 1933 and the end of 1937, poured out of the factories in vast quantities, visibly raising the standard of living in urban and rural districts alike. Meanwhile the average real wage went up 103 percent and labor productivity in industry 82 percent.

The last year of the Second Five-Year Plan witnessed the gross volume of industrial output with socialized property accounting for 99.8 percent of it, rise no less than 800 percent above 1913 and attain a place among

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the countries of the world second only to that of the United States. We have already seen that in 1933, the first year of the Second Five-Year Plan, collective agriculture became firmly established. By 1937, Soviet industry was manufacturing approximately 90 percent of the tractors and harvester-combines used in farming; while the proportion of collectivized peasant households had risen to 92 percent of the total number and, together with 4,000 State farms, covered 99 percent of the cultivated land. With the exception of two years when drought conditions were widespread, the harvests continued to be bigger and bigger. Famine, which for generation after generation in the old Russia constituted the major economic evil, had become a thing of the past.

It was also during the Second Five-Year Plan that the new Constitution of 1936, reflecting the immense economic and cultural progress of the preceding years, went into effect. V. M. Molotov, at that time Premier of the U.S.S.R., summed up the achievements of the Plan in typically Marxist fashion: "*The chief historical task assigned by the Second Five-Year Plan has been accomplished: all exploiting classes have been completely abolished, and the causes giving rise to the exploitation of man by man and to the division of society into exploiters and exploited have been done away with for all time. All this is primarily the result of the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production. It is the result of the triumph in our country of state and of co-operative and collective-farm property, that is, socialist property.*"⁹

As the Third Five-Year Plan, scheduled for 1938-43, swung into high gear, it was evident that the planned economy was by and large succeeding and was beginning

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to fulfil its promise of an abundant existence for the entire population. These were indeed the "Fat Years" for the Soviet people. When my wife and I made our second trip to the U.S.S.R. in the spring of 1938, we immediately noticed the great improvement over 1932 in foodstuffs, manufactured articles and the clothes which people were wearing. Consumers' goods filled to overflowing the shops of Moscow and other cities, as well as of the villages through which we wandered in the Ukraine. An immense amount of new construction was going on everywhere. All the chief cities were putting across five- or ten-year plans of reconstruction and were erecting factories, workers' apartments, offices, hotels, schools, theatres, stadiums and bridges.

We were struck, too, by the widespread mechanical development. Soviet-manufactured automobiles, buses and trucks now filled the newly macadamized streets of the cities with quite heavy traffic. And the new Moscow subway, with its smooth-working escalators and beautiful, airy stations, seemed to be running with admirable efficiency. The people themselves constantly impressed us with their spirit of gaiety and confidence. We saw them dancing and merry-making in the public squares; we mingled with them in the streets and parks, at workers' clubs and children's schools; we participated with them in festivities during holidays and other occasions; we enjoyed with them theatre and movie; opera and ballet; we met them personally at their offices and homes, at lunch and dinner and during special outings.

The widely circulated idea that tourists in Soviet Russia are shown only what is sure to make a good impression and are strictly kept away from everything else is simply fantastic. My wife and I walked around alone

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a large part of the time and observed plenty of things that were on the seamy side, such as wretched housing here and there, bad sanitary facilities, run-down public buildings and spoiled food. As for our favorable impressions, it is rather difficult to believe that Stalin issued a secret decree ordering the Soviet people everywhere to smile and look happy on our behalf, or that the bustling economic activity and large supplies of consumers' goods were in any sense faked for the benefit of foreign visitors.

The Third Five-Year Plan was designed to achieve more social-economic progress than both of its predecessors put together. The colossal expansion of industry was to be continued. In the first three years of the Plan, through 1940, the capital investment was 192 billion rubles as compared with a total of 165 billion from 1928 to 1938 — 51 billion for the First Five-Year Plan and 114 billion for the Second. At the same time the schedules of the Third Five-Year Plan called for a large increase in consumption goods and in wages, both of which by 1941 rose by a third over 1937. Labor productivity, providing much of the growth in national income from which higher wages were to come, went up even faster.

Yet no sooner was the Third Five-Year Plan well under way than the shadows of war began to gather most menacingly. The Anglo-French surrender to Hitler at Munich took place in the fall of 1938. The Second World War broke out a year later. And in June, 1940, France yielded to the Nazi *blitzkrieg*. These tragic happenings naturally had a heavy impact on the Soviet Union. From the time of Munich on, the Soviet Government felt impelled to put more and more into the defense budget and the manufacture of armaments. When fascist aggression finally engulfed the Soviet Republic in June of

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1941, much of the Third Five-Year Plan, especially that part of it concerned with higher living standards, was discarded so that the energies of the nation could be concentrated on war production and defense.

Once more the people had to forego the rewards of their titanic labors, postponing their richly deserved leisure and enjoyments to a future when peace would reign again. The hurricane that had swept Europe descended upon the Russians with unparalleled fury. And the additional tragedy for the Soviet Union was that it was truly in sight of the promised land when Hitler's murderous legions marched into the depths of the country carrying death, arson and destruction.

Ralph Parker, *New York Times* correspondent in Moscow during the war years, wrote: "Try hard as they can, it is well-nigh impossible for people in lands that have not been fought over and occupied to grasp the scale of the hardships borne by the individual Russian during the war. Conditions had been such in the pre-war years that very few had been able to accumulate more than the most modest possessions, and when victory came, everything had been consumed. The furniture had been used to feed the little stoves. Schoolchildren wrote their exercises in copy-books made of old newspapers. In winter, the office-workers sat in their overcoats. Large cities like Smolensk and Kiev were without electric light or tap water. Over areas the size of France the factories stood idle or in ruins. There were large farms where only women worked. Peasants stood in markets from dawn to dusk with three or four eggs to sell. The trains ran ten miles an hour. With eyes smudged with fatigue, shabby, speechless, people dragged themselves slowly to work."¹⁰ Mr. Parker was echoing what Winston Chur-

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chill had said earlier: "The Russians, under their warrior chief, Stalin, sustained losses which no other country or government has ever borne in so short a time and lived."¹¹

From the moment of the Nazi invasion total planning for total war became the order of the day. The specialists of the State Planning Committee one and all had to become experts on how to mobilize the full economic resources of the U.S.S.R. Throughout the conflict this Committee worked closely with the special State Defense Committee, a war cabinet of eight high-ranking Soviet leaders, with Premier Stalin as Chairman, which took over the full powers of government from June, 1941, to September, 1945. The people themselves, in locality after locality, having learned over the years the meaning and methods of planning, adapted their cooperative technique to the war emergency and coordinated all efforts for victory over the invader.

Social-economic planning went right on operating throughout the four years of terrible warfare and, as I have already recounted, played an indispensable part in the ultimate defeat of Hitler. Prior to the war, that planning had built up the economic and armed strength of the U.S.S.R. to the point where the country could withstand the greatest military assault ever unleashed upon this planet. The Five-Year Plans had not only created immense industrial facilities behind the barrier of the Ural Mountains, but also a huge and reliable agricultural reserve for the production of foodstuffs in this same Siberian hinterland. Had it not been for this reserve, the nation might well have collapsed from lack of food after the Germans had occupied the Ukraine, traditional granary for all Russia.

As soon as, in 1943, the Red Army started to recapture

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large sections of the Ukraine and western Russia, the Soviet planners were on the spot to help reconstruct the devastated regions. Declared the head of the Technical Department of the Coal Ministry in 1943: "The earth has not yet cooled off after the hot fighting, when the coal experts who follow in the wake of the Red Army are already on the job, organizing restoration of the mines."¹² The miners were back working in the pits one week after the liberation of the vital Donbas area in the Ukraine; and within another week newly dug coal from these mines was reaching Moscow. During the same year the Government launched in the liberated regions a general program of rebuilding and restoration.

By the end of December, 1944, when it seemed that Hitler's downfall was not far off, some industries began to make initial preparations for peacetime production. Almost immediately after the Nazi surrender extensive demobilization started in the Soviet Union. Less than a week after Japan's unconditional surrender to the Allies on August 14, 1945, the Soviet Government and the Communist Party called upon the State Planning Committee to make ready tentative schedules for a Fourth Five-Year Plan. The Committee proceeded to draw up the Plan, which was later ratified, with some revisions, by the Supreme Soviet. It went into effect on January 1, 1946, to run through 1950.

4. *Post-War Economic Gains*

It was clear that the main goals of the Fourth Five-Year Plan would have to be economic reconstruction and reconversion. The war against Germany and Japan had cost the Soviet Union approximately 485 billion dollars, including total property damages of about 128 billion

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from the Nazi invasion and occupation. The Nazis demolished or put out of commission more than one-third of the industrial plant existing in 1941; they destroyed 1,710 towns, 70,000 villages and hamlets, 35,000 factories and 40,000 hospitals; and they made 25,000,000 persons homeless.

The vast tasks of reconversion were apparent in the fact that toward the conclusion of the war the Soviets were manufacturing annually 40,000 airplanes, 30,000 tanks, 120,000 pieces of artillery, 450,000 machine-guns and 5,000,000 rifles and tommy-guns. The Plan aimed to bring back over-all production to the pre-war level of 1940 by the end of 1948; and by the end of 1950 to achieve complete restoration in the devastated areas and increase total production 48 percent beyond 1940. It stressed the development of transportation by railway and water, further electrification and the expansion of light industries producing consumer goods such as textiles, leather and canned foodstuffs.

In December, 1947, rationing, which had been a necessary hold-over from the war years, was totally abolished; and the ruble, which had depreciated in worth because of the war inflation, was drastically revalued. During 1948^{*} production in general fulfilled the Fourth Five-Year Plan's program of reaching the pre-war level. In 1949 most industries, as well as agriculture, surged considerably ahead of the 1940 figures. The 1949 report of the Central Statistical Administration included the significant statement: "In 1949, as in preceding years, there was no unemployment in the country." Unfortunately, due to fear of aggression and the Government's insistence on secrecy, the Soviet authorities have continued the policy instituted in 1940 of releasing no totals

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for actual output and giving out only *percentages* of achievement and increase.

On March 1, 1950, as a result of the economic advances made in 1949, the Government effected a sweeping reduction in prices on 234 different kinds of food and consumption goods. This amounted to an average lowering in price levels of at least 20 percent and of course a corresponding rise in the purchasing power of the ruble. It was the fourth general price reduction which had taken place under the Fourth Five-Year Plan. At the same time the Soviet Cabinet put the ruble on the gold standard and increased its official value, in terms of the dollar, from nineteen to twenty-five cents. This movement strengthened the ruble both internally and as a medium of international monetary exchange.

The Fourth Five-Year Plan as a whole was fulfilled in four years and three months; and in its last year — 1950 — the total volume of Soviet industry rose 73 percent above the level of 1940, as compared with the 48 percent increase envisaged by the Plan. The production schedules of the Plan were all exceeded in iron, steel, coal, peat, oil, electric power, machine-building and tractors. All the hydroelectric power stations destroyed during the Nazi invasion were restored and many new ones built. However, the Five-Year Plan goals were not reached for certain types of machine equipment, for the production of bricks and tiles, for the hauling of timber and for the general reduction of construction costs. But in all these categories the figures were far above those of 1940.

Soviet economists considered the repair of destroyed railways as the most decisive task of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. By the end of 1950 the full Plan for the restoration and building of railroads, bridges and stations had been

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met. Average daily loadings on the railways for 1950 amounted to 121 percent of 1940 and 103 percent of the Plan figure. Production of locomotives rose to 4,000 per year. The carriage of cargoes by inland water transport increased to 26 percent above 1940, but did not fulfil the level set by the Plan.

One of the most significant features of the Fourth Five-Year Plan was the rapid advance in technology throughout industry. In steel manufacturing, the use of oxygen was generally introduced, resulting in much faster smelting and therefore in greater productive capacities for furnaces. In the coal industry, cutting, breaking and hauling the coal underground, and loading it into freight cars at the surface were largely mechanized, thus saving much labor and easing the lot of the miner. Much attention is now being given to developing remote control and automatic operation of mining equipment so as to reduce to a minimum the need of underground work by human beings. Horrifying mine explosions such as still take place in Britain and America — witness the one which killed 119 miners in Illinois in December, 1951 — have become unknown in the Soviet Union, due to modern ventilation systems and other technical devices.

During the Fourth Five-Year Plan, in the oil industry, the production of high-octane aviation fuel and lubricants was expanded, and quality improved. This period also continued a major trend, very important for Soviet defense, in the geographical distribution of oil extraction. Whereas in 1940 only 12 percent of Soviet oil came from areas outside the Caucasus and Transcaucasus, now 44 percent is taken from territories far away from the frontier, such as the Ural Mountains region and Soviet Central Asia.

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In the manufacture of machine tools, so vital to modern industry, the Soviet Union has come closest of all to the United States in quantity and quality. By 1950 there were more than 1,300,000 machine tools in the U.S.S.R., and production, at over 100,000 per year, was 2.3 times as much as 1940. The rapid expansion of the machine-building industry ensures regular re-equipment of the entire economy, a steady increase in labor productivity and continuous technical progress. A striking new development was the establishment of automatically operated lines of machinery in twenty-six factories. The only persons on duty in these installations are supervisory engineers and maintenance mechanics.

The Fourth Five-Year Plan brought about sensational strides in heavy construction machinery. Today a single plant in the Urals turns out six complete blast furnaces a year, each one being, in height and bulk, the equivalent of a high office building. The bulldozer, the earth-mover and the walking-excavator — a power shovel too heavy for caterpillar tracks — have now become standard equipment on construction projects. In the building of the Volga-Don Canal engineers used a dragline excavator doing the labor of 7,000 pick-and-shovel men and requiring two freight trains each a mile long to move its disassembled parts. According to Soviet engineers, the new giant dredge-digger, an electric-powered model called "Stalingrad II," performs the work of more than 300,000 laborers. It can move and transport close to 340,000 cubic yards of earth in a twenty-hour day.

The unceasing development of machine processes has wrought a revolution on field and farm by leading to the almost complete *industrialization of agriculture*. In 1950 more than 95 percent of the ploughing, sowing and har-

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vesting of grain was done by mechanical traction. The output of combines had increased 3.6 times as compared with 1940 and that of tractors 3.8 times. And agriculture in general had received 536,000 new tractors, in terms of fifteen-horsepower units, as contrasted with 523,000 in use in 1940. Experiments with electrically operated tractors were proving successful. It is to be stressed that there is a whole federal Ministry concerned with agricultural machine-building.

The expansion in agricultural machinery from 1946 through 1950 was so great that it became desirable to merge a large proportion of the smaller collective farms in order to permit the most effective use of the new equipment. Three-quarters of the collectives amalgamated on an average basis of three into one. One-quarter of the previously existing farms were considered big enough for maximum efficiency and underwent no change. The result has been a reduction in the number of collective farms from approximately 252,000 to approximately 123,000. The average collective now probably has about 2,500 acres of arable land worked by close to 200 families.

The Fourth Five-Year Plan also saw the rapid collectivization of agriculture in the three Baltic Republics, in Moldavia, in western Ukraine and in western Belorussia — the areas reunited with the U.S.S.R. just before the Nazi invasion. According to Mr. C. L. Sulzberger, writing in *The New York Times* of July 26, 1949, special inducements offered to Baltic farmers to join collectives that year included: "A 50 percent reduction in income taxes; loans to collective farmers; and a 10 percent reduction in charges for hiring of state tractors." The guarantee of these and other immediate benefits, as well as intensive education as to the general superiority of

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collective effort, resulted in some 95 percent of the farmers in the Baltic States joining collective farms by the end of 1950.

The post-war progress of agriculture quickly put an end to the meagre food rations of the war period. By the conclusion of the Fourth Five-Year Plan the total grain yield was 13 percent above 1940. Butter production had risen 57 percent, vegetable oil and other fats 10 percent, meat 7 percent, sausage products 20 percent, tinned goods 48 percent, sugar 17 percent and confectionery products 23 percent. The fish catch increased 27 percent. Baby foods went up 5.7 times above the pre-war level and vitamins 10.4 times.

Consumers' goods other than edibles kept pace with the other advances in the economy. Output in textiles, clothing, knitted goods and other branches of light industry increased 17 percent over 1940. To quote the official report issued jointly by the State Planning Committee and Central Statistical Administration: "Production of the chief articles of light industry increased during the five-year period as follows: cotton goods 2.4 times, woollen fabrics 2.9 times, hosiery 5.2 times, leather footwear 3.2 times, rubber footwear 7 times. However, the Five-Year Plan assignment for production of cotton goods and footwear was not fully met. The assortment of fabrics, clothing, knitted goods and footwear was substantially improved and expanded. . . . In 1950 sales of clocks and watches were 3.3 times the pre-war year of 1940, radio sets 6 times, electric household appliances 1.5 times, bicycles 2.9 times, sewing machines almost 3 times and motorcycles 16 times."¹³

I could go on citing innumerable statistics of this sort. But I have mentioned enough to show that the Fourth

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Five-Year Plan fulfilled all its main objectives and demonstrated the ability of socialist planning to surmount the post-war problems of reconstruction and go far beyond. Nineteen fifty-one, the first year of the Fifth Five-Year Plan*, 1951-1955, extended the advances and pushed up total industrial production to twice the pre-war figure. This puts the people within sight of the transition to a communist system, since Soviet economists claim that a threefold industrial increase over 1940 will lay the basis for communism. Under communism distribution will be according to need and the country will, it is predicted, be "literally saturated" with consumer goods in unheard-of abundance. Soviet theoreticians are now saying that if the present rate of economic growth continues, the U.S.S.R. will be ready for communism around 1960.

Of vital import to evolution towards communism is likely to be the application of atomic energy to peaceful purposes in the Soviet Union. On September 23, 1949, President Truman announced that within recent weeks an atomic explosion had occurred in the U.S.S.R. The Russians then asserted that they had possessed the secret of the atom bomb as early as 1947. In 1950 a leading Soviet atomic specialist, Professor V. Golubtsov, wrote in an article that Soviet science had discovered how to directly transform atomic energy into both electrical power and heat. In 1951 a top Soviet chemist, A. N. Nesmeyanov, said that "Russian scientists now are using atomic energy for developing the nation's industry and agriculture."¹⁴

While these claims have not yet been verified, I be-

* For the detailed directives and goals of the Fifth Five-Year Plan, which aims at a 70 percent increase in industrial production and the turnover of retail goods by the end of 1955, see *The New York Times* of August 23, 1952.

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lieve it highly probable that atomic power is being harnessed in some measure to economic ends. As Mr. Harrison E. Salisbury, Moscow correspondent of *The New York Times*, has pointed out, Soviet Russia "is free to apply this new energy when and as needed without encountering the problem of competition with existing forms of energy or of establishing new machinery for governmental operation of the plants, which in time, may become the industrial backbone of the nation."¹⁶ In other words, the Soviet socialist order, based as it is on public ownership, can adjust rather easily to the peaceful utilization of the potent atom.

Despite the major emphasis in all the Five-Year Plans to date on capital construction and heavy industry, the post-war upsurge in general living standards has been notable. Although it is most difficult to compare accurately the standard of living with that in other countries, it is sound to state that the Soviet worker today eats as well as the British, French, German or Italian worker.

A well-known English chocolate manufacturer, Paul Cadbury, who visited the Soviet Union with a Quaker group in the summer of 1951, declared in an address at Swarthmore College: "The standard of living of the ordinary people in Russia today is comparable, perhaps not exactly the same, but in the same bracket as the standard of living in England; they are well fed, well clothed, satisfied and content with the country in which they live. . . . I find that there is a good deal of ignorance in America about conditions as they are in Russia. Several people have asked me, 'Did you see anyone smile?' Well, it made me smile to be asked that question because quite unlike the conditions in Germany before the war, or even

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as I noticed them in Czechoslovakia on our way out to Moscow, people in Russia seem happy. I think that the reason is this: They measure everything by their own past."¹⁶

What the secretary of a British workers' delegation to the Soviet Union in 1950 reported about the Russians is of equal significance: "When you talk to them as we did on our visit, and ask them about their living standards, they usually start right off by telling you that they have abolished fear of being unemployed, fear of being thrown on the scrap heap because of old age, fear of what might happen if the breadwinner became ill, fear of not being able to pay rent, fear of not being able to give the children a good start in life. This complete absence of anxiety about the future, this lack of worry about whether there will be enough work, surely must be ranked among the most priceless possessions. It must create a light-heartedness and care-free spirit such as few of us, not even the wealthy ones among us with their stocks and share troubles, can imagine. It must release tremendous energies, mental and physical."¹⁷

Typical of Soviet Russia's earth-shaking projects is the Fifteen-Year Agricultural Plan, 1949-65. This ambitious scheme, generally known as the Plan for Field Protecting Forest Belts, aims to alter the climate, prevent drought and stabilize the harvests throughout an area in southern Russia and Siberia that is half the size of the United States and contains 75,000,000 people. In this vast region west and south of the Ural Mountains the hot, dry, relentless winds from the east have for centuries swept over the open steppes of the Lower Volga Valley, the Northern Caucasus and Ukraine, drying out or blow-

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ing away the vital topsoil, burning up the crops and depositing tons of stifling dust and sand upon the fertile fields.

The destruction of forests by man or nature — forests that hold the soil, preserve moisture and temper the winds — has been the prime factor in this process and has in addition led to perennial floods. In his notable book, *Our Plundered Planet*, the American naturalist, Mr. Fairfield Osborn, shows how again and again in human history the reckless felling of forests has eventually brought to the richest lands erosion, flood, drought, desert and desolation. And he cites as deplorable examples the Yellow River Valley in China, the Tigris-Euphrates Valley in the Near East and the life-devouring dust-bowls in the southwest of the United States.

Insofar as Russia has been subject to this same process, the Soviets intend to arrest it by an unprecedented program of man-created woodlands, whose spongy floors will retain both snow and rain, thus preventing sudden thaws and floods, and whose bulk will act as windbreaks. Evaporation of water from the new forest areas and from a far-flung new system of reservoirs will moisten the atmosphere and cause more frequent rainfall. The Soviet Fifteen-Year Plan of transforming the face of the earth envisages five main steps:

First, the planting, at intervals of 100 to 200 miles across the immense expanse from the Ukraine to the Urals, of eight huge forest zones each consisting of several tree-belts; second, the planting of extensive tree-belts on the collective farms themselves, to protect the fields and to cover some 5 percent of the total farmlands concerned; third, the planting of bushes to hold down the sands on over 805,000 acres; fourth, the construction throughout

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the area now subject to drought of more than 44,000 new ponds and reservoirs; and fifth, systematization of improved methods in crop rotation, including the introduction of special grasses to bind and restore the soil.

A number of government agencies and 80,000 collective farms, possessing a total of 300,000,000 acres, are cooperating to put through these various measures. The entire project is under the direction of the newly created Chief Administration of Protective Afforestation, which is directly responsible to the Soviet Cabinet. By the end of 1951, 5,790,000 acres of land had been planted to trees and the planting completed in two of the eight forest zones: the 100-mile wall from Stalingrad north to Kamyshin along the west bank of the Volga River, and the winding 300-mile belt on both sides of the Northern Donets from Belgorod to the river's junction with the Don. During the same period approximately 13,500 ponds and reservoirs had been constructed.

Rivaling in scope the great Agricultural Plan are six new projects recently undertaken by the Soviets in a combined program of dams, hydroelectric power, irrigation and inland waterways that surpasses in magnitude anything of the sort ever attempted by man. The first of these huge enterprises is the 62-mile Volga-Don Ship Canal, which was opened in 1952. Included in this project is a dam at Tsimlyanskaya twice as long as America's longest at Fort Peck on the Missouri, and 350 miles of trunk irrigation canals which will carry much-needed water to 6,790,000 acres.

The economic importance of the Volga-Don Canal is obvious. With the Moscow-Volga Canal and other waterways to the north, it will provide through navigation from the Black Sea to the Baltic and White Seas;

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and will make the capital of the Soviet Union directly accessible to oceangoing vessels from the Mediterranean. It will link, through cheap water transport, the Moscow and Ural industrial areas, the Don-Volga grain belts and the Baku oil fields with the Ukraine's coal, iron, steel and other resources; and with the outside world via the Black Sea.

Second and third in the Soviet prospectus I have been outlining here are new giant dams across the Volga at Kuibyshev, temporary capital of the Soviet Union during the recent war, and at Stalingrad, embattled city where the tide finally turned against the Nazis. Soviet experts calculate that each dam will produce a minimum of 2,000,000 kilowatts of electric power per year, which is as much as the output of America's greatest hydroelectric development — Grand Coulee on the Columbia River. It is expected that the two new Volga dams will go into operation by 1956 and that together they will irrigate some 35,000,000 acres of potentially rich agricultural lands.

Fourth in this impressive Soviet program are a second dam on the Dnieper River at Kakhovka, about 150 miles below the old dam at Zaporozhe which Americans helped to erect, and a companion structure on a smaller river to the east. These two dams, to be finished in 1957, will make possible the irrigation of large tracts along the Black Sea coast suitable for cotton and other crops. A unique feature of this project is that the main irrigation canal, 350 miles long, will be carried across the western arm of the Sea of Azov in order to irrigate the Crimean Peninsula.

Fifth in this brief look at the Soviet future is the Great Turkmenian Canal in Central Asia to be built

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680 miles across the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic and its immense Desert of Kara-Kum (Black Sands). The purpose of the combined ship and irrigation canal is both to restore fertility to thousands of square miles of sun-scorched, arid wasteland and also to connect Soviet Central Asia by water traffic with the western part of the U.S.S.R. and, through the Volga-Don development, with foreign countries. The project will link together the Amu-Darya River, now emptying into the land-locked Aral Sea, and the Caspian Sea. It will draw its water from the Amu-Darya and, for about two-thirds of its length, will flow along the ancient bed of this river, which centuries ago wound across the present desert region into the Caspian just south of Krasnovodsk.

This canal, together with its three big hydroelectric stations, is scheduled for completion in 1957; and will irrigate, through 750 miles of permanent branch canals, 3,250,000 acres for cotton growing. In addition it will provide supplementary water to 17,500,000 acres of cattle range. The plans also call for the planting of 1,250,000 acres of trees along the canal and its main branches, and around the borders of the newly irrigated lands in order to confine the desert sands and to serve as shelter belts. Six hundred and twenty miles of pipe lines connected with the canal will bring fresh water to such cities as Krasnovodsk, which now obtains its water by tankers or by distillation from the salty Caspian.

One of the striking things about these remarkable Soviet developments is the speed with which they are being accomplished. The Volga-Don Canal, its huge dam, and power installations were built in two years. The two new Volga dams and installations are timed to go into operation within five years from the start of work;

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the two new Dnieper dams and the Grand Turkmenian Canal within six years. Of course public ownership of land and power in the Soviet Union is an indispensable factor in the rapid fulfilment of these great projects.

Sixth and most spectacular is the plan worked out by a Soviet engineer, Mitrofan Davydov. His novel idea is to reverse the courses of the Ob and Yenisei — great rivers comparable to the Mississippi in length and volume — now flowing north through Siberia to the Arctic Ocean, in order to drain the useless, unending Siberian swamplands, to irrigate an enormous desert region in Central Asia and to raise the level of the falling Caspian Sea. Since the Siberian territories involved are very flat, it is possible to block the northward course of the two rivers by building dams only a little more than 250 feet high.

The Ob dam alone will create the world's biggest reservoir, with a surface area of nearly 100,000 square miles, larger than all of America's Great Lakes put together. From this reservoir, to be called the Lower Ob Sea, a new river will run 2,500 miles southwest, through man-made canals, existing bodies of water and the channels of ancient rivers. It will pass through the Aral Sea, turning its water from salt into fresh, and then flow into the Amu-Darya River and the Great Turkmenian Canal for its final journey to the Caspian.

The Yenisei River will later be brought into the system by the cutting of a 56-mile-long canal connecting it with the Lower Ob Sea. Sufficient water will then become available to supply regular irrigation for approximately 61,700,000 acres of land and to water at least 74,000,000 acres more of meadow and pasture. The chief beneficiary of these developments will be the Kazakh Re-

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public, the agricultural produce of which will increase, it is estimated, five- to seven-fold. The new Soviet-constructed river will be wide enough and deep enough for navigation; and the entire project, after the Yenisei is included, will provide the Soviet Union with 5,000 additional miles of arterial waterways. Numerous hydroelectric plants will be built throughout the river-canal network.

Let me quote Mr. Davydov himself on the general effects of his scheme: "The artificially created Lower Ob Sea and the appearance of billions of cubic meters of water in what have from time immemorial been arid and desert regions will have a beneficent influence on the climate of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, as well as of western Siberia. The climate of Central Asia will be of a less pronounced continental character, and the sharp annual and diurnal extremes of temperature characteristic of this region will become a thing of the past. Over a large part of Siberia the atmosphere will become more humid, and the winters milder. It will be possible to carry agriculture into latitudes where it is now precluded owing to the severe climate."¹⁸

Engineers and scientists have thoroughly discussed and debated the Davydov plan. Specialized groups showing a particular interest in it have been the Moscow Institute of Electrical Engineering, the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences' Institute for the Study of Productive Forces, the Power Research Institute of the Academy of Sciences, the All-Union Forestry Society, the Water Conservation Board of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Agriculture, the Scientific Council of the Ministry of Fisheries and the Science and Technology Council of the Ministry of Electric Power Stations. In 1951 the Government officially ap-

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proved the proposal and allocated funds for further preparatory and research work. Several score engineers are now drawing up and elaborating final blueprints under the direction of Mr. Davydov. The detailed planning and execution of the whole Ob-Yenisei Project will take at least fifteen years.

The Fifteen-Year Agricultural Plan, the various new dams and canals, and the remarkable Davydov project bring out the extraordinary scale and far-sightedness of socialist planning more effectively than any recitation of statistics on industrial and agricultural production. The Soviets are literally re-making nature throughout an area as large as continental United States. They are changing the course of mighty rivers, creating new rivers, constructing inland seas, digging through hundreds of miles of earth and rock, building a vast network of waterways, bringing electric power to thousands of economic enterprises and millions of people, irrigating enormous areas of land, making centuries-old deserts bloom, increasing the rainfall, eliminating drought, permanently altering the climate of entire nations within the Soviet confederation. These tremendous programs are beyond anything Goethe's aspiring Faust ever imagined and remind one of a science novel by H. G. Wells.

The tree-growing plan, involving the planting of billions upon billions of new trees, will not achieve its full effects for fifty years, nor the Ob-Yenisei Project for twenty-five. Truly the Soviet planners are much concerned with the welfare of unborn generations and with ensuring them the economic foundations of an abundant life. In most countries the kind of schemes which Soviet engineers and social scientists are continually suggesting would be dismissed as irresponsible dreams; in Soviet

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Russia these "dreams," in essence rational as well as imaginative, go speedily into effect and become the reality of the future.

5. *Cultural Advances*

One does not have to be a Marxist or a Communist to accept the view that every great culture in the history of mankind has had an economic or material base. Economic foundations have of course always been necessary for the production of the requisite cultural goods and tools, such as schoolhouses, books, library buildings, scientific instruments, musical instruments, paints and other artistic media; to provide artists, teachers, writers and other cultural workers with their living essentials; and to make possible leisure in which to appreciate, criticize and stimulate cultural productions.

A prime Soviet aim from the start has been to develop an outstanding new culture on the economic foundations of socialism; to preserve the splendid artistic and literary achievements of the Russian past; and to extend the opportunity for cultural appreciation and creation to the entire population. There is no sharp separation between material and cultural output, since these two facets of civilization go hand in hand. The development of machine processes and scientific techniques so central in a modern economy require a continuing expansion of general education and scientific training; while educational and scientific expansion need a steady flow from the factories of material equipment of all kinds.

The primary requisites for the cultural progress of a whole people are literacy and education. Since only 30 percent of the Tsar's subjects were literate, the great majority could not know the works of Chekov, Pushkin

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and Leo Tolstoy. One of the first steps the new Government took was to organize a far-reaching campaign against adult illiteracy. In the tense years of civil war and foreign intervention following the Revolution thousands of individuals contributed their time without pay to teach reading, writing and the elements of arithmetic. They organized classes in apartment houses and at places of work. And tens of millions of Soviet citizens became able for the first time to read newspapers, magazines and books.

Simultaneously the educational system was reorganized. Even during the Civil War period they were able to increase the school population to 10,000,000, 25 per cent beyond the highest school figure of Tsarist times. Teachers kept schools open, and set up new ones, despite cold, hunger and an appalling lack of schoolhouses, books, pencils, and even paper. The paper shortage was partly solved by such means as using the reverse sides of the mounds of petty documentary records stored in local government offices for decades. Professors gave lectures before the workers' clubs that were being established everywhere. This not only stimulated latent interests and talents among the people, but also brought many scholars and men of science out of their academic isolation, compelling them to simplify and freshen their language, to think in terms of the popular application of knowledge.

Economic recovery from World War I gradually enabled the Soviet Union to produce paper, publish books, erect theatres, movie halls, clubrooms and laboratories, and manufacture scientific instruments and other such equipment to extend cultural facilities beyond the bare necessities. By 1930 the nation's economy was strong

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enough to bear the considerable burden of free, universal, compulsory elementary education, established in that year. Tens of thousands of new schools were built and hundreds of institutes for the training of teachers. Textbooks were printed by the tens of millions. During these same years the growing collectivization of agriculture shortened the working day of the peasant so that he had more time for reading and other cultural activities; and he could let his children remain at school instead of taking them out at an early age to work on the farm.

The First Five-Year Plan saw school attendance grow by almost 9,500,000, practically doubling. College enrollment nearly trebled as the Government opened wide the gates to workers and peasants, who had been all but excluded under the old regime. The parallel systems of compulsory education for children and voluntary education for adults brought literacy up to 80 percent in 1939. By that time 50,000,000 adults had been to school and had acquired a taste for reading reflected in a fourteen-fold rise in newspaper circulation and an eight fold increase in book publishing as compared with 1913. In 1939-41, however, the illiteracy ratio rose as a result of Soviet annexations in the west which brought 23,000,000 new people into the U.S.S.R.*

World War II took 15,000,000 children out of school in the areas under German occupation; and millions more interrupted their schooling as they went to work for the defense effort or as the authorities requisitioned schools for hospitals and other emergency uses. In 1944 the Government reduced the age for entering school from eight to seven, and the first-grade enrollment dou-

* See pp. 309-312.

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bled that year, with 2,000,000 additional pupils. Five years later, in 1949, the authorities decreed the extension of free universal, compulsory education of seven years' duration from the cities and industrial settlements to the rural districts, where previously only four years had been required. This new development was completed by the end of the Fourth Five-Year Plan in 1950. It sent school attendance up by 5,200,000, necessitating the building of many thousands of new schools.

During the period of the Plan the number of students throughout the country in elementary, seven-year and secondary schools, technical schools and other secondary establishments increased altogether by 8,000,000 and reached the total figure of 37,000,000. College and university enrollment climbed to 840,000 plus 470,000 in correspondence courses. After the war the elimination of illiteracy was resumed in the western borderlands. And in 1950, without fanfare, the Soviet Union brought to an end its great literacy campaigns, with adult illiteracy virtually wiped out in every part of the country.

The regime was only eight weeks old when, with civil war in the immediate offing, it established by statute a State Publishing House, the main purpose of which was to issue cheap editions of the great Russian authors whose works, under this law, were to become available to all of the people. That aim has been pursued consistently. When Albert Rhys Williams, noted American authority on the U.S.S.R., wanted to express what was going on in this field, he wrote an article called "Billions of Books." "Bookstalls and bookstands," he said, "are as numerous in the Soviet Union as are soda fountains in the United States. The problem is no longer that of awakening an interest in books, but rather of finding

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some way to satisfy the truly insatiable demand."¹⁹

On the eve of the Second World War there were six times as many libraries, with eighteen times as many books, as in 1913. The Nazis destroyed 43,000 libraries with their 100,000,000 books. Yet at the end of the Fourth Five-Year Plan there were 15 percent more public libraries and clubhouses than in 1940. Book publishing of all types was 84 percent higher than pre-war and sixteen times higher than in 1913. The year 1951 saw the number of libraries maintained by the State and public organizations rise to 350,000, containing more than 700,000,000 books.

By the end of 1951 many millions of copies had been issued of all the chief Russian classics in the novel, the drama and poetry. For instance, the various works of Alexander Pushkin had been published beyond a total of 57,000,000, of Maxim Gorky beyond 59,000,000 and of Leo Tolstoy beyond 42,000,000. Even in the rather abstract sphere of philosophy the Soviets print editions ranging in number from 10,000 to 150,000, including translations of the outstanding classics from Plato and Aristotle to the nineteenth century.

It is enlightening to compare publishing figures for the first twenty years of the Soviet regime with the last twenty years of Tsarist rule. Precise data are available as of October, 1947, and are as follows:

Author	Copies	Copies
	1888-1917	1918-1947
Chekhov, Anton O.	627,000	18,386,000
Gogol, Nikolai V.	5,813,000	10,526,000
Gorky, Maxim	1,083,000	44,504,000
Griboedov, Alexander S.	619,000	1,173,000

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Author	Copies	Copies
	1888-1917	1918-1947
Herzen, Alexander I.	167,000	1,810,000
Lermontov, Mikhail Y.	4,036,000	9,740,000
Nekrasov, Nikolai A.	254,000	9,648,000
Ostrovsky, Alexander N.	254,000	3,350,000
Pushkin, Alexander S.	10,711,000	35,429,000
Saltykov-Shchedrin, Mikhail E.	231,000	7,884,000
Tolstoy, Leo N.	10,784,000	26,459,000
Turgenev, Ivan S.	?	12,432,000

Soviet publishers have also issued by the millions the translated work of foreign authors. Victor Hugo heads the list with more than 6,600,000 copies; Guy de Maupassant is next with more than 4,000,000; while Balzac, Barbusse, Dickens, Rolland and Zola total over 2,000,000 each. An official survey by the Soviet Book Chamber in 1951 showed that books by 210 American authors have appeared in the Soviet Union since 1918. These added up to 44,400,000 copies, translated into no less than fifty of the languages used in the U.S.S.R. Jack London came first with 12,259,000 copies; Mark Twain second with 4,267,000; Ernest Thompson Seton third with more than 2,300,000; O. Henry fourth with 1,649,000; and Theodore Dreiser fifth with 1,445,000.

The Soviet people often celebrate the birthdays or other anniversaries of famous world writers. Thus in February, 1952, the Russian press and literary journals made a great deal of the 150th anniversary of Victor Hugo's birth. Publishers were getting ready for the press a two-volume edition of his selected works to be issued in 90,000 copies; and a special subscription edition of his complete works in 150,000 copies. Soviet readers and critics see

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in Hugo a powerful defender of the disinherited and oppressed, and one who fought passionately for democracy and the liberation of the masses. In 1952 the Soviet Union also celebrated the 500th anniversary of the birth of Leonardo da Vinci.

In all of the arts progress similar to that in education and literature has taken place. Lenin himself set the tone when he said: "Art belongs to the people. It ought to extend with deep roots into the very thick of the broad toiling masses. It ought to be intelligible to these masses and loved by them. And it ought to unify the freedom, thought and will of these masses, and elevate them. It ought to arouse and develop artists among them."²⁰ Up till 1917 the fine arts (as distinct from the folk arts) were the private property of a small minority at the top. The overwhelming majority of the people did not have the money to buy tickets for performances of drama, ballet, opera and music. Now all this is changed. And in no country on earth do a larger proportion of the population share in the enjoyment of all the arts than in Soviet Russia.

Not only do huge audiences attend professional productions everywhere, but amateur art circles flourish by the scores of thousands. The wide network of amateur groups are mainly sponsored and equipped by the trade unions, which make available to them their 8,000 club-houses and 80,000 recreation rooms. In 1951 there entered the national elimination contests 102,000 amateur groups with over 2,000,000 members. Included were 14,000 symphony orchestras, brass bands and string ensembles, 12,000 dance groups, 25,000 choral groups and 40,000 drama groups.

During my two trips to the Soviet Union, in 1932

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and 1938, I went frequently to the theatre, ballet and opera and was always struck by the first-rate quality of the performances, including presentations of Shakespeare's plays. As a Shakespeare enthusiast since my school days, I have been impressed by the immense popularity of England's greatest dramatist throughout the U.S.S.R. Shakespeare festivals are a common occurrence there and Shakespeare's plays have been published in hundreds of thousands of copies in at least twenty languages. A special section of the All-Russian Theatrical Society concerns itself entirely with Shakespeare and the Western European Theatre. This section organizes scholarly research and lectures on Shakespeare, and arranges an annual conference on his work every year in April, which is known as "Shakespeare Month."

Although in my opinion the quality of Soviet architecture has remained mediocre, artists and writers have on the whole set a high record of accomplishment. The compelling music of Shostakovich, Prokofiev and Khachaturian has won international acclaim. The work of Eisenstein, Pudovkin and Dovzhenko in the motion picture ranks as classic. Mikhail Sholokhov and Alexei Tolstoy are among the greatest novelists of our time. As for the status of painting and sculpture, Mr. F. B. Taylor, an Associate of the Royal Canadian Academy of Arts, offered the opinion, after a visit to Soviet Russia in 1951, that the "Soviet standard of workmanship and craftsmanship and all-round technical capacity in the visual arts is the highest I know of in the world today."²¹

Significant, too, was the testimony in 1947 of General Walter Bedell Smith, at that time American Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., before a House of Representatives subcommittee on Foreign Affairs: "The Soviet Union is

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setting a higher cultural standard within its borders, I believe, than exists anywhere else in the world. I say that advisedly. . . . I mean, at least according to my tastes, the Soviet radio, the Soviet ballet, the opera, their puppet theatres — things of that sort — are based on a higher cultural level than that which public demand dictates in this country.”²²

Along with the enormous expansion of recreational facilities in the arts has gone a comparable development in sports, which are constantly encouraged by the Ministry of Public Health and which come under the supervision of the Committee on Affairs of Physical Culture and Sport — a body directly accountable to the Cabinet. Scattered throughout the country are 150,000 athletic organizations with more than 23,000,000 members and coordinated into forty large sports societies, the best known of which are Bolshevik, Dynamo and Spartacus. The Government gives every aid to a broad people's program of sports and exercise, believing that they are essential to national defense as well as to health.

Today all citizens enjoy ample opportunity to take part in indoor and outdoor sports of a most varied nature. This contrasts with the old Tsarist days when the masses of the people had neither the leisure, the money nor the equipment to participate in sports. The upper classes themselves were not given much to outdoor sports. Writing about the typical pre-revolutionary Russian, Sir Maurice Baring states: “His chief pastimes were singing, endless conversation, chess playing, broiling himself red in steambaths, guzzling tremendous amounts of tea and vodka.”²³ The Soviet Russians have not lost any of these particular skills, but have added a great many others.

As to chess, the most intellectual of all popular games,

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millions now play it and enter into local, regional or national competitions. Children are urged to start learning the game at an early age. In 1951 Soviet citizens won the world's chess championship for both men and women. Mr. Harry Schwartz, critical commentator of *The New York Times* on Soviet affairs, acknowledges that "the U.S.S.R. does stand pre-eminent" in chess. "Soviet primacy is complete," he says, "and the U.S.S.R. has at least a dozen players who rank at the very top of the chess ladder, a greater number than any other country."²⁴

As for other sports, boating, swimming, rowing, skiing, skating, ice-hockey, basketball, volleyball, soccer, tennis, bicycling, boxing, wrestling, marksmanship, track, cross-country meets, horseback riding, horse-racing and mountain climbing are all popular. Tennis is for most Russians a new game in which they are not yet very proficient. But in soccer their teams are a match for those from other European countries. Cross-country racing — on foot or on ski — is probably the first in popularity and in a single season draws as many as 6,000,000 competitors (foot) and 10,000,000 (ski).

In 1952 the Soviet Union for the first time took part in the Olympic Games, held in Helsinki, Finland, July 19-August 3. Competing against the teams of sixty-six other nations, the Soviet athletes, both men and women, showed great prowess in a number of events. The Olympics do not tabulate official team scores, but according to the unofficial Western scoring system the United States won first place with a total of 614 points, while Soviet Russia came second with 553½. A marked feature of the Games was the display of good fellowship between the Soviet entrants and those from other countries, including the United States. After Soviet oarsmen had pre-

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sented the U.S. crew a scull, the American captain said: "They couldn't have been nicer. They're a swell bunch of fellows."

Later, after the U.S. crew had won the eight-oar championship over the Soviet crew in the finals, the Russians lavishly wined and dined the victors. At the end of the banquet the Soviet chairman rose and said: "Welcome, friends of America! We are happy for these friendships we have made on the water. We want the sportsmen of Russia and the sportsmen of America always to compete in this friendly spirit." Then he offered a toast to "international understanding"; and everyone stood up and clinked glasses of vodka.*

In my account of Soviet Russia's achievements in World War II and of its remarkable economic progress under the Five-Year Plans, I noted how rapidly the country has forged ahead in the realm of science. In every sphere of existence the Soviets stress the utilization of scientific principles and techniques for the solution of problems, in place of the dependence, characteristic of Tsarist times, on the myths and methods of supernaturalism. As early as 1918, when the Government had its back to the wall, Premier Lenin drew up a far-seeing "Draft of a Plan of Scientific and Technical Work," which outlined some of the more significant scientific tasks facing the nation.

As the eminent British physicist and Fellow of the Royal Society, Professor J. D. Bernal, has said: "The great change which the Revolution brought was to make conscious for the first time the necessary connection between the ordered development of science and the life and work

* For a more detailed account of this episode, see *The New York Times*, July 25, 1952.

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of the whole community. . . . Lenin had a wider and deeper knowledge of science than any statesman of his day, and even in the most difficult period of famine and civil war he laid the foundations of an entirely new development of science. . . . The task that was undertaken was not to push forward the bounds of knowledge by the work of a few isolated scientists, but to make scientific the whole productive and cultural activity of 160,000,000 people."²⁵

As compared with only several thousand scientific workers under the old regime, the Soviet Union had 80,000 in 1939 and 150,000 by the end of 1951, of whom about 60,000 were women. These figures do not include 700,000 laboratory specialists and 1,000,000 technicians on all levels. The Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., regarded as so important that it is directly responsible to the Cabinet, has its headquarters in Moscow and acts as a general staff for the furtherance of scientific endeavor throughout the country. It not only arranges numberless conferences and meetings on scientific topics, but initiates and coordinates scientific research from one end of the land to the other. Colleges and universities, under the Ministry of Higher Education, also have their own scientific institutes and conduct extensive research.

The central Academy is divided into eight main sections: the departments of physico-mathematical science, of geology and geography, of chemical sciences, of biological sciences and medicine, of technical or applied sciences, of history and philosophy, of economics and law, and of literature and languages. The Academy maintains various institutes, laboratories, field stations, museums and observatories totaling more than seventy. It has affiliates in many remote districts of the U.S.S.R. and in

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all the Union Republics. Twelve out of sixteen of those Republics now have their own Academies of Science. Likewise extremely important are the Academy of Medical Sciences and the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences.

A revolutionary advance since 1917 has been the carrying over of the methods of science into agriculture and peasant life, ever the last refuge of traditional supernaturalism. Throughout the Soviet Republic today, the farmers, in their efforts to obtain a good harvest, no longer resort to prayer, religious ritual and priests sprinkling the fields with holy water; they rely instead upon tractors, combines and other machine techniques, as well as on the general principles of scientific, collectivized agriculture. Today the U.S.S.R. has hundreds of agricultural institutes, experimental stations and experimental farms. And most of the collectives carry on research in their own small laboratories, with the aid and advice of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences.

Of course science is closely linked up with the economic system of socialist planning, which has turned the whole country into one vast laboratory where, because of the central controls, public ownership and all but unlimited funds, there can be carried on scientific experiments and undertakings of unparalleled scope. The great hydroelectric-irrigation-afforestation projects described in the last section are excellent examples of what large-scale planning on a scientific basis can do. And they have had the special attention of the Academy of Sciences and its research facilities. Planning is, in fact, an essential factor in all scientific method, since the scientific solution of a problem always involves some definite plan of action, whether fairly simple or quite complex.

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Soviet science operates within the general — and limiting — postulates and principles of Marxism. Yet the record shows that within those limits broad and vigorous scientific discussions have constantly taken place. For example, in the famous genetics controversy centering around Trofim Lysenko's theory, opposed to modern Mendelism, that under certain circumstances living species can inherit acquired characteristics, open discussions raged in the Soviet Union for a decade. In 1948 the Academy of Agricultural Sciences held a week-long conference on the subject in which scientists on both sides of the question gave their uncensored opinions. *Pravda* printed every word of the debate, which later appeared in a thick tome published in 500,000 copies.

A careful study of the controversy by Dr. Bernhard J. Stern of Columbia University indicates that both Lysenko and many non-Soviet scientists who answered him were laboring under grave misunderstandings. In his attack on American geneticists Lysenko unfortunately relied on articles in the 1947 edition of the *Encyclopedia Americana* which were reprinted by the editors without change from the 1917 edition. "They were therefore written," as Dr. Stern says, "about 1917 or 1918, and reflect genetic doctrines of thirty years ago rather than of today."²⁶ . . . However meritorious," concludes Dr. Stern, "Lysenko's positive practical achievements are,* his critical analysis of genetic theory represents an attack upon positions long abandoned by the vanguard of geneticists in this country and in England. . . . Thus it becomes clear that the gap between Lysenko and geneticists does not appear to be absolute, and may be further

* Some Western scientists believe that Lysenko may have succeeded in introducing into Soviet agriculture, not the inheritance of acquired characteristics, but *directed mutations*.

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narrowed as reliable evidence becomes more readily available to both groups."²⁷

The outcome of the Soviet genetics debate was that in July, 1948, the Agricultural Academy voted in favor of Lysenko's position. A few weeks later the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences also officially adopted the Lysenko view and stated that his report, "which has been approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, lays down the party line in biology."²⁸ The Academy of Sciences then put into effect a series of measures to ensure the acceptance of Lysenko's principles throughout the country. The worst aspect of this situation was not that Soviet scientists may have taken over the wrong theory, but that they and the Communist Party set up an official line from which dissent would clearly be dangerous. Soviet Marxism makes allowance for changes in its formulations, and such changes do frequently occur; but the more fundamental ones must have official Communist approval.

It is in the light of this fact that we must qualify the otherwise excellent statements of Lenin and Stalin against dogmatic attitudes. For instance, Lenin asserted in 1899: "In no sense do we regard the Marxist theory as something complete and unassailable. On the contrary, we are convinced that this theory is only the cornerstone of that science which socialists must advance in all directions if they do not wish to fall behind life."²⁹

In 1950, in his comments on the extended Soviet linguistics controversy, Stalin wrote: "Textualists and Talmudists regard Marxism, the separate deductions and formulas of Marxism, as a collection of dogmas which 'never' change, regardless of the changes in the condition of development of society. . . . But Marxism as a

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science cannot stand still; it develops and perfects itself. In the course of its development Marxism cannot but be enriched by new experience, by new knowledge; consequently, its separate formulas and deductions cannot but change in the course of time, cannot but be replaced by new formulas and deductions corresponding to the new historical tasks. Marxism does not recognize any immutable deductions and formulas, applicable to all epochs and periods. Marxism is an enemy of all dogmatism."³⁰

The lamentable truth is that despite the undeniable progress of Soviet culture since 1917, especially in the tremendous increase of cultural facilities for the people, it still is subject to Communist and governmental censorship, whether science, literature or even music is concerned. A comment on Soviet writing by Professor Ernest J. Simmons, Columbia's well-known Russian expert, is to the point: "Since the whole manufacturing process of the printed word — paper, presses, publishing houses, distribution — is ultimately under government control, the Party has an economic strangle-hold on the output and content of literature. The propaganda line that determines the broad direction of literary content is usually initiated in the Politburo and announced by the Central Committee in resolutions which have almost the force of law."³¹

Yet, as Professor Simmons acknowledges, in Soviet Russia "much of high worth has been achieved in the arts and sciences." And he solves the seeming paradox in this manner: "The proposition must be squarely faced, with all its implications, that many Soviet creative artists and thinkers may have come quite seriously and honestly to accept as convictions what at first may have

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been regarded by them as hostile controls of the Communist government under which they live. Are we too far removed from the kind of religious faith that turns the ends achieved by instruments of control into fighting convictions? Though art cannot serve propaganda, propaganda can serve art by giving it a renewed meaning and purpose, and a new virility. After all, the cathedrals of Notre Dame and Chartres are in a real sense glorious artistic monuments to Christian propaganda. . . .

"In the Middle Ages society was sure of the church; it provided a definite pattern of life that took man hopefully from the cradle to the grave. Men did not wish to escape the controls of the church; on the contrary, these controls had become convictions, for they had come to be accepted on faith. To a considerable extent the same may be true in the Soviet Union with regard to the Party. Life is officially represented as sure, and the future is always presented in a hopeful light as all struggle toward the great 'Age of Communism.' Under such conditions, for the creative spirit art and life become one. There is no more desire to escape from a socialist art than there was to escape from a Christian art in the Middle Ages."³² Dr. Simmons' analysis rings true to me.

Although I think it is semantically incorrect to call communism a religion, the Soviet Communists do subscribe to and teach an integrated and inclusive way of life, with definite implications for every field of human endeavor, which fills the vacuum left by the decline of religious supernaturalism. To this Marxist philosophy they and scores of millions of Soviet citizens who are not members of the Communist Party render supreme commitment. This general viewpoint on man and the universe sets up as the ultimate ethical goal the welfare of

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humanity upon this earth, and expounds a militant message of human betterment. It advocates an advanced morality at least in the sense of insisting that men should subordinate their personal pleasures and desires to working together for the common good, and that all exploitation of man by man should cease.

No matter how much one may disagree with or dislike the Soviet way of life, one must admit that the formulation and teaching of the complex philosophy of Dialectical Materialism is a genuine cultural achievement. Unhappily Soviet philosophers have weakened their own case by displaying a formidable ignorance of American philosophy, especially in their continued misunderstanding of the American school of Naturalism led by the late John Dewey. They still rely on a rather shallow footnote run by Lenin in his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* condemning William James and his pragmatism. The Dialectical Materialists have never taken the trouble to discover how much Dewey differs from James and has improved on him. Yet Dialectical Materialism, in spite of its provincialism, its taint of being the *official* Soviet philosophy and other weaknesses, takes its place today as one of the outstanding philosophical systems of the twentieth century.

According to Marxist theory, when the Soviet political dictatorship fades away, the dictatorial controls over Soviet culture will also disappear. This is a consummation most earnestly to be desired. For otherwise the art, literature and science of the U.S.S.R. will in the long run find themselves at a dead end, with originality, fresh ideas and that questioning of authority and basic assumptions so necessary to progress all stifled in a dreary mediocrity of official doctrine and prescribed taste.

CHAPTER VI CONTRASTS BETWEEN SOVIET SOCIALISM AND FASCISM

1. *Ten Fundamental Differences*

As we come to the end of Part I of this book, a comparison between Soviet socialism and fascism will serve both to summarize much that we have covered and to expose one of the most dangerous weapons in the arsenal of anti-Soviet propaganda. For the claim that Soviet socialism and fascism are, after all, just the same is a provocative device that goes far in whipping up the passions of war. This unscrupulous charge seeks to turn upon the Soviet Union the justified hatred and fear which the peoples of the world have felt, and still feel, toward the Nazi and fascist regimes. The notion of a fundamental identity between the Soviet regime and fascism is especially widespread in the United States, where the Hearst press in particular makes a point of referring to the Soviet system as "Red Fascism."

In the decade prior to the outbreak of the Second World War the appeasers of fascism, and other enemies of cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the Western democracies, were continually branding Soviet Russia as just another fascist nation. There was method in this madness, for it became a major factor in preventing a

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genuine peace front, while there was still time, against the fascist aggression of the German, Italian and Japanese Governments. The post-war revival of the fallacy of equating Communist and fascist regimes can again have catastrophic consequences for world peace, since it leads to serious misunderstandings of Soviet policy.

The charge that Soviet socialism and fascism are essentially the same falls quickly to the ground under objective analysis. We can note at least ten fundamental differences between the two systems. Soviet socialism as compared with fascism stands, first, for evolution to full political democracy instead of for permanent dictatorship; second, for racial democracy and equality instead of racial discrimination and persecution; third, for equality of the sexes instead of the treatment of women as inferiors; fourth, for the expansion of the trade unions instead of their destruction; fifth, for an unceasing emphasis on the proletariat, the class struggle and the classless society instead of a glossing over of class conflict and the continuation of a class system; sixth, for a planned socialist economy operated for use and abundance instead of a monopolistic capitalist economy run on behalf of profits and aggression; seventh, for the development and expansion of culture instead of its general retrogression and debasement; eighth, for the intellectual formulation and teaching of an inclusive, integrated and anti-supernatural philosophy of life instead of a primitive pot-pourri of tribal superstition, conceit and blood-thirsty war-cries; ninth, for government by leaders with intellect, social idealism and international vision instead of leaders noted for their ignorance, egotism and savage nationalism; and, tenth, for international peace and disarmament instead of war and an armaments race.

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2. *Attitudes towards Democracy*

The most common misunderstanding concerning the nature of Soviet socialism and fascism is that since both have employed violence to attain power and have established political dictatorships, they are therefore the same. This is like saying that because police departments and gangs of thugs in American cities are armed with rifles and revolvers and use force to achieve certain objectives, therefore their fundamental character and social effects are substantially identical. Or, to take another example, it is like stating that there is no real difference between surgeons and murderers due to the fact that they both resort to knives in the pursuit of their professions.

The central fallacy is of course to treat two forms of government or two groups of men as equivalent, regardless of their ultimate ends, if they hold certain *means* in common. Pushing this species of argument further, we could assert that the American Government under President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Nazi Government under Chancellor Adolf Hitler were of the same sort because they both relied upon armies, navies and air fleets to win a war. Or going far back into the past, we could say that General George Washington and the American armies of 1776 were fundamentally on the same moral level as General Francisco Franco and the Spanish fascist armies of 1936-38, for the reason that they both used the violent means of revolution.

As I have reiterated throughout this book, the Soviet Republic has always considered the dictatorship of the proletariat as a transitional measure necessary for the firm establishment of socialism in the U.S.S.R. and as a governmental form to be superseded when the need for

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it ceases. Authoritative Soviet leaders like Lenin and Stalin, however severe their criticisms of *capitalist* democracy, have constantly made clear that they favor the development of *socialist* democracy — and there has been much in Soviet life and culture that bears witness to their sincerity — in a most inclusive sense.

The fascist states, on the other hand, have made a point of categorically denouncing democracy as such and all its manifestations. They are against democracy on principle and have continually pronounced it permanently finished as a way of government and life. Mussolini's statement that democracy is "a putrid corpse" accurately expresses the fascist attitude. And Hitler in his heyday boasted that the Nazi mode of government would last at least a thousand years. In the fascist theory of a ruling elite there is no provision for, or even suggestion of, an ultimate transition to democracy. In practice and theory, in past (Germany and Italy) and present (Spain), fascism is undemocratic and anti-democratic all along the line.

The Soviet Constitution shows how genuine and wide-ranging are the democratic aims of the Soviet Republic. It makes plain that the socialist concept of democracy covers the significant categories of cultural, economic, racial and sex democracy. Cultural democracy I define as the right of all to a full and equal opportunity to share in the cultural and educational, the artistic and intellectual life of the nation. Economic democracy, which means much more than the functioning of trade unions, is the right of every normal adult to a useful job at decent remuneration, to general economic security and opportunity, to an equitable share in the material goods of this life and to a proportionate voice in the con-

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duct of economic affairs. Racial and sex democracy I define elsewhere in this book.

Soviet failure up to the present to implement fully the constitutional guarantees of political democracy and civil liberties, for reasons which I earlier discussed, is by no means sufficient for equating Soviet socialism with fascism. We can render no final judgment about political democracy in the U.S.S.R. until at last and at least the danger of foreign military aggression has died away. Catastrophic invasions during two world wars, with international tensions and an armed truce following each of them, have meant that the Soviet Republic has had to live in a state of emergency during much of its history. Undeniably the bitterly hostile environment surrounding the U.S.S.R. since its birth has created an atmosphere of tension and crisis unfavorable to the full flowering of democratic institutions. Meanwhile, let us reflect on a statement by Joseph Stalin which it is difficult to imagine a fascist leader ever making: "Leaders come and go, but the people remain. Only the people are immortal. Everything else is transient."

In connection with the use of force and dictatorship to attain Communist goals, it is often said that Russia follows an immoral philosophy of letting the ends justify the means. This represents shallow thinking. As a matter of fact, every individual and every nation lets *some* ends justify *some* means. Police departments in all civilized countries frequently employ the bad means of violence in order to maintain law and order. In the late war the American and British Governments sanctioned the evil means of destructive and frightful air raids upon the densely populated industrial centers of Germany in order to achieve the good end of winning the conflict with the

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Nazi aggressors. And the United States Air Force dropped the atom bomb on Japan in order to hasten the surrender of that country. To make the Soviet Union, then, the scapegoat for a means-end philosophy that allegedly violates human decency and morality is a very one-sided business.

The contrast between Soviet socialism and fascism receives perhaps its most striking exemplification in the diametrically opposed policies of the two systems toward racial and national minorities. The fascist states have invariably set up discrimination against and persecution of racial and national minorities as an intrinsic part of their program and philosophy. Of course the outstanding example was the cruel and hideous treatment of the Jews in Hitler's Germany and in the extensive territories occupied by the Nazis during World War II. It is reliably estimated that the Nazis killed off more than 6,000,000 Jews in Europe during the war years through planned starvation or exposure in concentration camps or direct slaughter by means of gas chambers, mass shootings and the like.

Nazi racist doctrines, as contrary to scientific truth as to moral principle, went far beyond legitimate national pride in the historical achievements of the German people and glorified the pure "Aryan" Germans as the chosen of the earth and a master race therefore rightfully entitled to rule the globe. The foundation-stone of Nazi politics, ethics and biology was a colossal arrogance unmatched in history. It was not Jews alone who were held in contempt. At the 1936 Olympic Games Nazi officials accused America of bad sportsmanship for entering "fleet-footed animals," that is, Negroes, in the races. The subject Czechs, Poles, Belgians, Dutch, French, Yugoslavs and

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other conquered peoples in Hitler's "New Order" were looked down upon as degenerate and treated as serfs under a regime of terror. And the Nazis regarded as inferior not only their most powerful enemies like the English, Russians and Americans, but also their allies such as the Italians and Japanese. The concepts of the brotherhood of man and the equality of peoples can have no possible place in fascist philosophy.

As we have observed, these concepts are cardinal principles in the Soviet philosophy. From 1917 down to the present the Soviets have bent every effort to overcome the deep-seated racial prejudice and discrimination inherited from the Tsarist regime and to establish full equality among the numerous peoples and nationalities of the U.S.S.R. In both theory and practice ethnic democracy has been a constant preoccupation of the regime. It is written into the Constitution and the law of the land; it is a basic precept in Soviet education; it is an ideal that has been reiterated by recognized leaders such as Lenin and Stalin. And the Soviets consider ethnic democracy desirable not only at home, but also in the world at large.

In 1942 Premier Stalin officially stated that the war aims of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition must include "abolition of racial exclusiveness" and "equality of nations." In 1944 he went into the question in further detail, saying: "Soviet patriotism does not disunite, but on the contrary consolidates all nations and nationalities in our country into one single fraternal family. In this should be seen the basis of the indestructible and still stronger friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union."¹ And in speaking of Germany in this same speech, Stalin brought out the Soviet opposition to hatred or prejudice

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on the grounds of nationality: "The Soviet people hate the German invaders not because they are people of a foreign nation, but because they have brought our people and all freedom-loving peoples misery and suffering. It is an old saying of our people: 'The wolf is not bad because he is gray, but because he ate the sheep.'"²

A prime reason for Soviet influence among the yellow and brown peoples of the colonial and semi-colonial areas in the East is precisely that these peoples, all the way from Iran to China, realize that the Soviets both preach and practice racial equality and are opposed to the arrogant fascist attitude as well as to imperialistic exploitation by any nation, white or non-white. All in all we can assert that Soviet policies toward racial and national groups, in both the domestic and international fields, offer the greatest contrast to those of Nazism and fascism.

Another sphere in which Soviet socialism and totalitarian fascism are at opposite poles is in the treatment of women. The fascist position is that the female sex is inherently inferior to the male. In Hitler's Germany there was a decided intensification of the traditional view that women are fit only for the well-known trinity of "Kinder, Kuche, Kirche" (Children, Kitchen, Church). Family life in the fascist countries has centered around the needs and desires of the male partner and the breeding of children to augment the fighting man-power of the war-making state. The fascist dictators, while crying out one day that their people were being suffocated for lack of space or "Lebensraum," on the next were urging all mothers to bear more and more children. At the same time, under the Nazis, women were dismissed or barred from all important governmental posts and were auto-

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matically paid lower wages than men in the limited types of job open to them.

In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the principle of full equality between the sexes is upheld. As we saw in our discussion of the Soviet Constitution, the important category of sex democracy is embodied in that document.* The actualization of women's rights in the U.S. S.R. is ensured by affording women equally with men the right to work, fair remuneration, rest, recreation, social insurance and education; and by government guarantees for the welfare of mother and child, pregnancy leave with pay, and ample maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens. The economic, legal, political and social position of women is at opposite poles from the status they have in any fascist country.

One of the first steps which the Nazi regime took to crush democracy was to destroy the trade unions, root and branch. This enabled the individual employer under fascism to exploit the workers according to his own free, profit-motivated will; and enabled the state, representing the dominant business groups as a whole, to go ahead with its armament and aggression programs unhampered by organized opposition from the working class. In place of the old trade unions the Nazis established fake workers' organizations with control from the top down and with democratic procedures as completely absent as in the nation at large. Italian fascism had a similar set-up.

Unlike the fascist states, the Soviet Union has from its earliest days, as part of its emphasis on economic democracy, placed unceasing reliance upon the trade unions and encouraged their growth in membership and

* See p. 77

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influence. A far larger proportion of wage and salary earners are members of trade unions than in any other country. In 1949, out of some 33,500,000 eligible for membership (and this excludes agricultural workers, except those on State farms), about 28,500,000 or more than 85 percent belonged to one of the sixty-seven different unions. Membership in a trade union is of course voluntary. While industries are publicly owned, the trade unions carry on collective bargaining with the managements of factories and other enterprises over wages, hours and working conditions.

The official Soviet labor code enacted into legislation is so comprehensive that it covers many matters that in the United States and other nations are subject to collective bargaining between trade unions and management. Contrary to the general impression abroad, strikes are not illegal, but are expressly authorized by law as one means of enforcing compliance with labor legislation. However, very few strikes actually take place for the reason that a workers' government is in power, that the elimination of the private profit motive eliminates the chief factor in management's resisting legitimate demands on the part of labor, and that there is on the whole an identity of interest between labor and management for maintaining maximum, uninterrupted production. In England under the Labor Government, whose main political support lay in the trade union movement, a similar tendency was observable for labor-management problems to be settled before they spilled over into the wasteful procedure of strikes.

In 1933 the Soviet Government, indicating its high opinion of the trade unions, turned over to them the entire administration of social insurance benefits, which

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so substantially supplement regular wage income. Moreover, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions itself drafts the annual government appropriation bill for social insurance. Thus the trade unions as such play a direct and important part in the functioning of the Government and in the carrying out of state services on behalf of the public. The trade unions are also active in various community enterprises such as the maintenance of factory restaurants, cultural centers and recreational facilities.

3. *The Other Contrasts*

The differing attitudes of Soviet socialism and fascism towards trade unions tie in naturally with their contrasting positions in regard to the proletariat and the class struggle. Far from having any particular love for the working class, the fascists continued to exploit it to the utmost and keep it "in its place." The Nazis insisted on establishing the "leadership principle" in industry, which meant in effect setting up each capitalist boss as a little *fuehrer* in his own right. The fascists wanted to forget the class struggle, and their "corporate state" represented an attempt to reconcile divergent class interests on behalf of capitalism. They never pretended that they were backing the proletariat or trying to eliminate the bourgeoisie and create a classless society.

But Soviet socialism from the start has proclaimed its primary reliance on the working class both in overthrowing the old government and in instituting the new. No slogan has been more honored in the Soviet Union than Marx's "Workers of the world, unite!" Whether one supports or condemns proletarian class struggle, it is incontestable that the Soviet Communists have given

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primary stress to that struggle as a means for the attainment of socialist power and for the eventual achievement of a completely classless commonwealth. Indeed Marxist and Soviet theoreticians make so much of the class struggle that they give it a central place in their highly developed philosophy of history known as Historical Materialism. There is nothing in fascism remotely corresponding to all this.

Still another fundamental difference between Soviet socialism and fascism lies in the functioning and objectives of their respective economic systems. In the fascist countries, although there is a considerable increase in state controls, the main means of production and distribution remain in the hands of individual capitalists; and the decisive economic power is wielded by a small group of reactionary businessmen, in particular the armament monopolists, working closely with the government. Economic enterprise is run for profits and super-profits to enrich the few at the expense of the people as a whole.

The partial planning of fascism has for its chief purpose the accumulation of colossal armaments and the waging of aggressive war. This means in effect planning for poverty as well as for war, since the workers are expected and required to subordinate their entire existence to the needs of the state for enhanced military resources. Here General Goering's famous phrase "Cannon instead of butter" well expressed the basic principle. In fact, living standards and real wages in Germany, Italy and Japan declined steadily under fascism. There can be intense industrial activity and lack of unemployment in fascist states due to the stimulus of armaments and war; but such shots in the arm do not indicate any lasting way out of underlying economic difficulties.

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In the Soviet Union social-economic planning is truly nation-wide and has for its aim the achievement of security and abundance for *all* the people. This planning is for *use*, not profit; and it proceeds on the basis of the collective ownership and operation of the natural resources, the agricultural lands, the industries and the means of distribution. There are no capitalists left. The great Five-Year Plans were able spectacularly to increase production, though unfortunately much of the industrial output had to go into armaments and defense. But the successful functioning of the economy does not depend on the stimulus of armaments, the piling up of which naturally holds back to one degree or another the standard of living in terms of consumer goods.

The long and short of it is that in Soviet Russia there exists a full-fledged socialist economy, while under fascism the capitalist system continues—a capitalism which is in its last stages of decay, desperation and imperialism and which has eliminated all vestiges of democracy. Those who declare that the Soviet and fascist states are basically the same are essentially making the ridiculous statement that there is no real difference between a socialist economic system and one which remains fundamentally capitalist.

The retrogression of culture under book-burning, art-killing, genius-banishing fascism offers a dramatic contrast to the general development of culture under Soviet socialism. As one of the Nazi leaders put it: "When I hear the word *culture*, I reach for my revolver." Hitler's anti-Semitic terror caused brilliant German intellectuals, like Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud, to emigrate; imprisoned others in concentration camps; and drove still others to suicide. The Nazi police-state naturally

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banned the work of Jewish writers and artists, even of figures long dead like the composer Mendelssohn and the poet Heine.

In the fascist states the whole of education from the tenderest years to the more mature, from physical training to reading in the classics, is turned into a glorification of military conquest and the attuning of mind and body to the ferocities of war. And the appreciation of Nature is transformed into a study of military strategy in the open country. Since fascism is anti-democratic in its very essence, there is no room where it rules for such a thing as cultural democracy. The people are viewed as innately inferior and incapable of developing the mental capacity or aesthetic sensitivity to comprehend the higher intellectual and artistic pursuits.

Hand in hand with the tremendous material progress of the Soviets has gone a cultural expansion of equally great proportions. The Communist regime has brought about a true cultural revolution by making art and literature, the drama and the opera, music and the ballet a shared asset and enjoyment for all of the people. The cultural awakening has extended to tens of millions of formerly ignorant and primitive peasants as well as to the once backward minority peoples. The total number of students in a vastly expanded system of higher educational institutions was over 1,000,000 in 1951, more than nine times the figure of Tsarist days.

A fundamental educational aim is to teach the population the facts and methods of modern experimental science. And Soviet science in general has made mighty strides since 1917. It is, moreover, science geared to the service of the people; it has no prior obligation, as under fascism, to the enterprise of aggressive war and of profits

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for the few. The ultimate goal is to build, on the foundations of economic security and equilibrium, a culture of socialist Humanism unequalled in qualitative achievement and in the proportion of the people participating as creators and sharers.

One index of the quality of a civilization has always been the nature and level of its philosophic thinking. The fascists never worked through a consistent, over-all view of man and the universe. The Nazi philosophy, if we can call it that, was a weird mixture of pseudo-scientific mumbo-jumbo and the misleading, compensatory myths of supernaturalism. Nazis who turned against Christianity substituted for it ancient tribal superstitions like the worship of Wotan. And central to the Nazi way of life was the mystic concept of pure and impure races, of the innate inferiority or superiority of certain peoples, of the Jews as the most degraded race on earth and the "Aryan" Germans as the most glorious. In Italy and Spain the fascists in general accepted the backward supernaturalist doctrines of Catholicism and maintained the preeminent position of the Catholic Church in religion and education.

The Soviet Union, however, as we have clearly seen,* teaches an advanced, rigorously thought out philosophy of life known as Dialectical Materialism, first formulated by Marx and Engels in the nineteenth century. Dialectical Materialism, with deep roots in the earlier Materialisms of ancient Greece, ancient Rome and Western Europe, is based primarily on modern science and the experimental method. The ponderous phrase *Dialectical Materialism* really means *Dynamic Materialism*; it stresses the ceaselessly active, ever-changing, onrushing

* See pp. 130-131.

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quality of life and existence in contrast to more mechanical and static interpretations given by certain philosophies of the past. This Soviet philosophy is anti-theological and anti-religious. Hand in hand with it goes opposition to the church and to religious teaching; and insistence upon the separation of church and state, and of church and education. Only an upside-down logic could possibly equate these aspects of socialism with fascist practices.

Closely related to our discussion of the cultural, intellectual and philosophic superiority of Soviet socialism over fascism are the respective merits of representative fascist and Soviet leaders. Compare, for example, Adolf Hitler, the Nazi Fuehrer, Benito Mussolini, the fascist Duce, and Joachim von Ribbentrop, the Nazi Foreign Minister, with Vladimir I. Lenin, first head of the Soviet Republic, Joseph V. Stalin, Soviet Premier since 1941 and Generalissimo during the Second World War, and Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Foreign Minister from 1930 to 1939.

In contrast to these figures, Hitler, Mussolini and von Ribbentrop were ignoramuses and demagogues. Both the German and Italian dictators were strutting sawdust Caesars cowing the population under their sway by bombastic oratory and fierce appeals to the violent emotions. The mental content in their speeches and writings was always at a minimum. Von Ribbentrop was a small-minded peddler of hate and distrust, a smooth plotter against peace and the freedom of peoples, who ended up properly on the gallows as a war criminal. These three fascist adventurers betrayed the welfare of their own countries as well as of Europe, leading their nations into a war of aggression which in the end resulted in disaster

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and degradation for both Germany and Italy.

All three of the Soviet leaders mentioned stand out as intelligent and educated, with broad social vision and a keen understanding of the problems of the modern world. Lenin and Stalin were rugged men of action during a most tempestuous period of history and displayed iron ruthlessness in putting across the Russian Revolution and in building socialism. Yet throughout their careers they showed genuine statesmanship and an unceasing concern for the welfare of the people. Both of them carried on intellectual work of an impressive character and wrote books of real substance in philosophy and other fields. Their speeches were usually quite calm and without rhetoric, giving in plainest terms carefully reasoned analyses.

After meeting Stalin, Wendell Willkie reported: "On the personal side Stalin is a simple man, with no affectations or poses. He does not seek to impress by any artificial mannerisms. His sense of humor is a robust one and he laughs readily at unsubtle jokes and repartee."⁸ Certainly we must rank Stalin as a great world leader with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, while decrying the unending adulation of the Soviet Premier within the U.S.S.R.

Maxim Litvinov, a charming and cultured person, whom I talked with on several occasions when he was Soviet Ambassador to the United States, made an outstanding record in the sphere of international relations. In the pre-1939 years of fascist aggression, he became mankind's most eloquent spokesman on behalf of peace through collective security and earned the respect of the Western democracies. Litvinov stands out as one of the most impressive international statesmen and diplomats

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during the era between the First and Second World Wars. His death late in 1951 was a loss to all peace-loving peoples.

So far as the personal lives of fascist and Soviet leaders are concerned, I think that a brief passage from Ralph Parker's *Moscow Correspondent* sums up the matter rather well: "During the whole of the seven years I have spent in Russia, I have never heard it suggested that Party leaders abuse their power to provide themselves with extravagant comforts. Not a breath of scandal is breathed about the private lives of the rulers of Russia. How different was the case in Nazi Germany, where, in a single-party system, the rulers led lives of wild extravagance and pomp, outraging the public with their expenditures on mansions and mistresses!"⁴

Finally, Soviet socialism stands firmly for international peace and cooperation among the peoples of the earth in utter contrast to fascism's drive toward armed aggression and the enslavement of peoples. Obviously it was fascism's aggressive character and ambition for the military domination of the world, aided by appeasement on the part of the Western democracies, that brought on the Second World War. The fascists have never made any secret of the fact that war-making, like racial oppression, is a basic part of their philosophy. Mussolini stated, "War is to man what maternity is to woman. We reject the absurdity of eternal peace, which is foreign to our creed and temperament." His son Vittorio called war "the most complete and beautiful of sports." And Hitler asserted that "in eternal struggle humanity has grown to greatness; in eternal peace it will go down to destruction."

It cannot be denied that the German, Italian and Jap-

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anese fascists carried out their philosophy of war to the utmost of their ability. Their attacks upon Ethiopia, Spain and China were simply previews of their world-wide aggression in the Second World War. Hitler, Mussolini and their satellites succeeded in transforming the pleasant and plentiful continent of Europe into an appalling welter of slaughter-house and cemetery, prison and desert. On the other side of the globe, in China and the Far East in general, the Japanese imperialists likewise did their brutal best in depopulating the earth and flaunting high the banner of barbarism.

On the other hand, the Soviet Republic, since its birth in 1917, has been consistently opposed, in both theory and practice, to international war. War is as counter to its general self-interest as to its ethical ideals. And it is impossible to find any statement by any responsible leader or citizen praising or glorifying war as such. In the pre-war period of fascist aggression, the Soviet Union loyally supported the principle, supposedly embodied in the League of Nations, that peace, as Litvinov said, is *indivisible* and can be preserved only through genuine collective security, a banding together of the peace-loving countries to stop any aggressor or potential aggressor.

Since the victory in 1945 of the United States, Great Britain, Soviet Russia and their allies over the Axis, the U.S.S.R. has maintained its solid support of world peace. While I believe that the Soviet Government has committed its share of errors in foreign policy, it has sincerely striven to make the United Nations a functioning organization for collective security and enduring peace. All the mountains of post-war propaganda about Soviet aggression have failed to disclose a single act of military

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aggression on the part of Soviet Russia since the close of World War II. And the Soviets would be only too happy to be relieved of the heavy burden of armaments which the requirements of self-defense in face of a hostile world have forced upon them throughout their existence.

There is one further point which I want to make about the differences between Soviet socialism and fascism. That concerns the reactions to these two systems in the outside world. The indisputable fact is that in foreign countries many socially sensitive and progressive intellectuals, writers, artists, teachers, scientists, trade-unionists, social workers and clergymen have been and are sympathetic to Soviet achievements, while practically all such persons have been and are militantly anti-fascist. In the non-Soviet and non-fascist nations there has scarcely been a single outstanding leader in any walk of life, except in the most conservative business, political and military circles, who has been favorable to fascism. I do not believe that the sympathy of so many first-rate minds for the Soviet regime and their opposition to fascist rule is a mere coincidence.

Such people have realized clearly all along that, whatever the shortcomings of the U.S.S.R., the charge that Soviet socialism and fascism are substantially the same is an outright libel on the Soviet Union. In this chapter I have pointed out ten basic differences between the fascist and Soviet systems. To employ a simile suggested by Mr. John Strachey, Minister of War in the late British Labor Government, the two systems are like two express trains rushing by each other and going in totally opposite directions. Fascism and Soviet socialism may look alike to an unsophisticated observer, but any profound student

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must reach the conclusion that this likeness is superficial and extends only to some of their methods.

Although happily German and Italian fascism no longer exist, Spanish fascism under Generalissimo Francisco Franco still does survive. For those who view the world scene objectively there could hardly be a greater contrast between two countries than between semi-feudal, culturally backward, economically unprogressive, poverty-stricken, church-ridden Spain today and Soviet Russia. When Franco came into power fourteen years ago — early in 1938 — the economy and culture of Spain resembled in many ways those of Russia in 1917. The Spanish dictator has kept things that way.

If Franco's fascism were essentially the same as socialism in the U.S.S.R., it would have put through many fundamental changes. Long ago it would have cracked down upon the wealthy landowning classes (actually the economic mainstay of the regime), divided up their estates among the peasants, started a collective farm program, initiated vast economic plans to industrialize the country, socialized the main means of production, reformed the educational system to stress science and the class struggle, declared for full equality between women and men, broken the economic, educational and political power of the dominant religious body (the Roman Catholic Church) and made Materialism Spain's official philosophy. But all such measures are abhorrent to Franco and his Falangist Party. So when we translate the abstractions "fascism" and "socialism" into terms of concrete programs, we see at once that what fascists do and do not differs from what Communists do and do not do as night from day.

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To make our contrast complete, had Spanish fascism been truly a form of socialism or communism, the foreign capitalist powers-that-be would have done everything possible to encompass its downfall, as they did in the case of Soviet Russia. Yet everywhere individual capitalists and capitalist governments have been on the whole sympathetic towards the Franco regime; and the United States has taken it to its bosom as a military ally and is helping to bolster up its sagging economy.

Let us recall, finally, that Hitler, in order to deceive the German people and to exploit whatever anti-capitalist feeling existed among them, utilized the demagogic slogan "National Socialism." But the Nazis' *ersatz* socialism resembled the Soviet system about as much as the Fuehrer's literary style resembled Shakespeare's. The repeated assertion that Soviet socialism and totalitarian fascism are twins in the realm of public affairs is the sort of desperate and preposterous "big lie" to which the Nazis and fascists themselves have been accustomed to resort — a slander of such absolute enormity that its very daring and extravagance lend it weight among the uninformed. This evil untruth, so disruptive of world peace and understanding, does not stand up for a moment under the clear light of reason.

PART II
AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

CHAPTER VII

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1. *From the American Revolution to the Russian*

For more than a hundred years, from the early part of the nineteenth century to the early part of the twentieth, American-Russian cooperation was a significant factor in the international situation. The friendly association of the United States and Russia during this period was due in the first instance to their geographical positions in the world. Although the continued expansion of the United States and the Tsarist Empire gave the two countries seaboard on or near both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, they had no basic territorial rivalries or conflicts. Their collaboration in diplomacy was based in the second instance on their possession of mutual antagonists in the international arena. And geography interacted with the shape of global politics so that America and Russia became each for the other, as Mr. DeWitt Clinton Poole has put it, "a potential friend in the rear of potential enemies." It is worth remembering, too, that the United States and Russia, whether Tsarist or Soviet, are the only two Great Powers in history that have never declared war on each other.

During the American Revolution Russia pursued an armed neutrality which favored the American colonies; but it turned a deaf ear to the appeal of the Continental

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Congress for direct assistance. Following the establishment of the American Republic, Catherine the Great of Russia, hostile to any form of political democracy and fearing the influence of democratic ideas, refused to recognize the new Government. It was not until 1809, thirty-three years after the Declaration of Independence, that the Russian Government, under Tsar Alexander I, recognized the United States.

President Thomas Jefferson carried on a warm correspondence with Alexander I and said in a letter to a friend in 1807: "I am confident that Russia (while her present sovereign lives) is the most cordially friendly to us of any Power on earth, will go furthest to serve us and is most worthy of conciliation."¹ Throughout the nineteenth century Russia acted as a counterpoise to those European Powers hostile to the United States, principally Great Britain and to a lesser degree France. When America and Britain became embroiled in the War of 1812, Alexander I volunteered to mediate. The American State Department immediately accepted the offer, but the British Foreign Secretary rejected it.

In 1832 America and Russia signed their first general Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, which lasted almost a hundred years. In 1854 the United States sought to aid the Russians by offering to mediate the dispute between England and Russia that led to the Crimean War. In this conflict in which Britain, France and Turkey combined to attack the Russians, American public opinion was distinctly favorable to Russia. In 1863 during the American Civil War Russia sent naval squadrons to New York and San Francisco, with the effect of discouraging Great Britain and France from recognizing the Confederacy or giving it other decisive aid. This

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visit by Russian warships was a great psychological stimulus to the North; and the U.S. Secretary of the Navy gave a public expression of gratitude by saying, "God bless the Russians!"

Meanwhile, possible friction between the American Republic and the Tsarist regime had been eliminated by the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 by the United States. This not only made plain that America would not permit intervention in Latin America on the part of European nations, perhaps backed by Russia and the Holy Alliance; but also was designed to put an end to further Russian encroachments in the Pacific region where Russian traders had come south from Alaska and established an outpost only forty-eight miles north of San Francisco Bay. In 1867 Russia withdrew from North America entirely by selling Alaska to the United States for \$7,200,000 in gold. Bering Strait then became the border between Russia and U. S. possessions. The mainlands of Alaska and Siberia are fifty-six miles apart, though scarcely three and a half miles of water separate Alaskan and Russian islands in the Strait.

During the last decade of the nineteenth century Russian imperialist ambitions in China aroused American resentment and contributed to Secretary Hay's pronouncement of the Open Door policy in 1899. With the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 both the American Government and the American public favored the Japanese. As the conflict progressed, however, President Theodore Roosevelt became concerned lest Japan win too much in the Far East and upset there the balance of power which he thought to America's interest. Both belligerents accepted his mediation in the summer of 1905; and at the peace conference held at Portsmouth,

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New Hampshire, the American representatives were able to tone down considerably Japanese demands on Russia.

In the First World War the United States and Russia became mutual friends in the rear of active enemies, America entering the conflict in April, 1917, less than a month after the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II on March 15. The United States had quickly recognized the Provisional Government with Prince Lvov as Premier and later Alexander Kerensky. And American public opinion at large was enthusiastic about the overthrow of the crumbling Tsarist autocracy. President Wilson himself voiced the general sentiment in his war message to Congress when he spoke of the "wonderful and heartening things that have been happening within the last few weeks in Russia."² The Wilson Administration promptly dispatched two special missions to Russia: a Diplomatic Mission, headed by the Republican elder statesman Elihu Root; and a Railroad Mission, headed by John F. Stevens, formerly Chief Engineer of the Panama Canal. The American Red Cross sent a third mission, headed first by William B. Thompson, an American copper magnate and millionaire, and then by Raymond Robins, a prominent progressive and reformer. The United States also loaned the Provisional Government a total of \$187,000,000 while it was in power.

But this Provisional Government was weak and vacillating from the start. The military and economic situation steadily deteriorated. Kerensky became Premier in July and tried desperately to stem the tide. He turned out to be, however, more an orator than an effective administrator or commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The Bolsheviks under the leadership of Lenin grew stronger week by week during the summer of 1917,

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spreading abroad everywhere the slogan, "Peace, bread and the land." On November 7 they forcibly took over Petrograd (formerly St. Petersburg, now Leningrad) and the next day established a Soviet government. The Communist Revolution was an accomplished fact.

2. *From November, 1917, through World War II*

American Government officials, most of our representatives in Russia and public opinion in the United States were almost totally unprepared for the Communist Revolution. With the advent of the Soviet Government, American-Russian relations immediately took a turn for the worse. The American press constantly depicted Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin and the other Soviet leaders as criminals, murderers and paid agents of the German Government. The fact that Lenin got back to Russia from Switzerland through Germany in a sealed train provided by the German Government, which wished to see Russia withdraw from the war, was widely interpreted as proof that he was in the pay of the Kaiser. And understandably enough, America, Britain, France and Italy became incensed over the attempt of the Soviets to make a separate peace with the Germans and over the Bolshevik propaganda for world revolution.

The two American representatives in Russia who came to possess the clearest grasp of the situation were Colonel W. B. Thompson and Colonel Raymond Robins of the Red Cross Mission, which arrived in Petrograd early in August, 1917. Thompson and Robins both sympathized with the Kerensky regime and supported it and the Left against the revolt led by the reactionary Tsarist officer, General Kornilov, and favored by the various Allied ambassadors. The incredible Thompson donated

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\$1,000,000 of his own money for pro-Kerensky and anti-Bolshevik propaganda.

Both Thompson and Robins, however, quickly adjusted themselves to the realities of Soviet power. As Robins said of the Provisional Government, "The thing to do with a corpse is not to sit up with it but to bury it."³ Colonels Thompson and Robins adopted a view opposed to that of practically every other American or Allied representative in Soviet Russia; and sent cable after cable to America stating that Lenin and his colleagues had come to stay, that they were not German agents and that the Allies ought to cooperate with them against the German armies. Meanwhile the Kaiser's forces were rolling steadily onward against the crumbling Russian defenses. And although Lenin and his associates favored neither side in the imperialist conflict, they were perfectly willing to utilize international capitalist contradictions to promote their own cause.

Colonel Thompson realized that he would come in for some pretty bitter criticism back home. "I guess they would call me tainted down on Wall Street now," he confided to a friend. "I have learned a lot over here. . . . Why, this revolution was as necessary to the development of Russia as the abolition of slavery to us. All they are asking for is land, a little land. . . . Russia looks to me now as the West used to look when I was a boy. . . . The mines in Russia are where the mines in the Rocky Mountains were forty years ago. I can shut my eyes and see Russia exporting the hard metals and feeding the whole world. And the people are crying out for just a little land."⁴

At a special meeting Thompson and Robins outlined their ideas to the representatives of the different Allied

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embassies and missions: "If support is given by the Allies to the present Bolshevik Government, it is entirely possible to use existing Russian opinion and governmental activity to undermine the morale of the German army. To this end a genuine friendliness on the part of the Allied embassies to the existing or any revolutionary government — involving loans of money and the transport of supplies for the relief of the civilian population — is in our judgment justified by the soundest considerations for the Allied cause."⁵

The Allied diplomats were indignant. "Deal with the Bolsheviks?" they cried. "Those creatures are German agents, traitors, crooks, thieves!" Colonel Robins hit back with a priceless bit of repartee. "Suppose they are," he remarked. "Some of us have dealt with American political bosses, and if there is anyone in Smolny [temporary headquarters of the Soviet Government in Petrograd] more corrupt than some of our crooks, then they are some crooked, that's all."⁶ The diplomats ended the conversation by declaring that the Soviets would last six weeks at the most.

But Thompson and Robins were determined characters. They decided together that Thompson should go to England and the United States to present their case first-hand to leading British and American officials. It was a paradoxical situation, not only because W. B. Thompson, fabulously wealthy, a conservative Republican and, from all past appearances, a typical American capitalist, should take such an unorthodox view of Soviet Russia; but also because among Thompson's firmest backers on this matter in America were none other than three partners of the banking firm of J. P. Morgan & Co. These were Henry P. Davison, chief of the American

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Red Cross, who had appointed Thompson in the first place and maintained a sympathetic attitude toward his opinions; Dwight W. Morrow, later American Ambassador to Mexico; and my father, Thomas W. Lamont, who had been a close friend of Thompson since they had gone to the Phillips Exeter Academy together some thirty years previously.

Mr. Lamont was in Europe during November and December of 1917 as an unofficial adviser to the American Mission, led by E. M. House, which was consulting with the Allies on the conduct of the war. When Colonel Thompson arrived in London on December 10, Mr. Lamont had a long talk with him and was greatly impressed by what he had to say concerning the new Russia. Two days later Mr. Lamont cabled Mr. Davison in the United States that he was "much depressed" over the lack of understanding in England and France of Russian conditions; that it seemed to him "of real importance to have all Allied authorities secure benefits of Thompson's experience and viewpoint";⁷ and that "after his interviews here, Thompson should immediately return to America for personal interview with President to acquaint him fully at first hand with this gigantic international situation, upon the possible solution of which depends the future peace of the world."⁸

Mr. Lamont proceeded to put Thompson in touch with high British officials, such as Admiral Reginald Hall, chief of Naval Intelligence, and John Buchan (later Lord Tweedsmuir), head of British propaganda. Then Lamont and Thompson went to 10 Downing Street for luncheon with Prime Minister Lloyd George, who gave them two full hours and reacted most favorably to Thompson's story about Soviet Russia. According to a memorandum

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drawn up by Mr. Lamont, the Prime Minister "said more than once that he was convinced that the Allied representatives in Petrograd had failed utterly to grasp the significance of developments in Russia."⁹

At the close of the interview he added: "I want you to tell President Wilson of this talk with me. Tell him that we are most sympathetic here with the idea of trying to handle Russia with greater insight and that I will co-operate with him to the full. I think it would be wise if the President were to see fit to make a concrete suggestion. . . . I will pick out the best man we have in Great Britain and will send him to Russia to work with the best man President Wilson will pick out in America. Together they shall go to those people and see if they cannot help them work out a better destiny."¹⁰ Only a month or so later Lloyd George fulfilled his half of the proposed bargain by sending R. H. Bruce Lockhart on a special mission to Petrograd with the purpose of working out a fresh and more fruitful policy.

The day after their talk with Lloyd George, Thompson and Lamont sailed for America on His Majesty's Transport No. 8210 (the former liner *Olympic*). Arriving in the United States, they immediately went to Washington on the supposition that President Wilson would surely see them. The President, however, refused to receive them. Secretary of State Lansing gave them an interview, and cut it short before Thompson could really deliver his message. Colonel Thompson tried all sorts of indirect approaches with the aim of reaching Wilson, but did not succeed. Together with Mr. Lamont, he drew up a "Memorandum on the Present Situation in Russia" and sent it to the President. Among other things this memorandum stated: "We are forcing Russia into

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German power by our silence and our refusal to display the slightest interest in the deep convictions that possess the Russian people. They want peace, but they do not want a German peace, nor will they submit to one if given any intelligent aid or support in the negotiations."¹¹

About a week later, on January 8, 1918, President Wilson delivered to Congress his address embodying the famous Fourteen Points on America's conditions for peace. Point Six was devoted to the Soviet situation and included some very sensible and sympathetic ideas. It mentioned that all Russian territory must be evacuated and that there should be an independent development of Russia "under institutions of her own choosing." Then Wilson declared: "The treatment accorded to Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy."¹²

Meanwhile the Soviet Government, on December 22, 1917, had sent its delegation to negotiate with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk for a treaty based on the principle of no annexations and no indemnities. As was to have been expected, the German imperialists insisted on terms which were in utter violation of this principle; they offered a robber's peace at the point of the sword. On February 10, 1918, the Soviet delegation broke off the negotiations, although Lenin wisely opposed this step on the grounds that it would be merely playing into the hands of Germany.

During the previous few months there had been no real change in the bitterly hostile attitude of the Allies

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toward the Soviet regime. The Lockhart Mission, as Mr. Lockhart himself tells us in his book *British Agent*, was sabotaged by the British Foreign Office and accomplished next to nothing. Though Lloyd George was probably sincere in wanting to establish better relations with the Soviets, he was not able or not sufficiently determined to overcome, either in this early period or later at the Paris Peace Conference, the resistance of the implacable anti-Soviet Tories.

With the breakdown of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and the almost immediate advance of the German army all along the line, the Communists decided to ask the Allies for definite aid against the Kaiser. And Lenin sent his famous note to a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party: "Please add my vote *in favor of* the receipt of support and arms from the Anglo-French imperialist bandits."¹⁸ Through Raymond Robins, who personally talked the matter over with Lenin, and through Bruce Lockhart, the Allied and American Governments were thoroughly apprised of the situation. But since no significant shift of policy on their part took place, the Soviet Government felt forced, on March 3, 1918, to accept the considerably worsened German terms.

Even then Lenin and the others kept hoping that the Allies would move. After all, the Supreme Congress of the Soviets still had to ratify the treaty. At 11.30 P.M. on the night of March 16 Lenin was sitting on the platform where the Congress was meeting and Robins on the steps leading to the platform. Lenin beckoned Robins to him and asked, "What have you heard from your Government?" "Nothing," Robins replied. "What has

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Lockhart heard from London?" "Nothing," Robins repeated.

Then Lenin said slowly: "Neither the American Government nor any of the Allied Governments will cooperate, even against the Germans, with the workmen's and peasants' revolutionary government of Russia. I shall now speak for the peace. It will be ratified."¹⁴ And the Congress adopted the onerous Treaty of Brest-Litovsk by a vote of 724 to 276, with 204 abstaining.

Thus it was that back in 1917 and 1918 hate and fear, and the misunderstandings engendered by hate and fear, held back America and the Allies from any reasonable collaboration with Soviet Russia, and left the Soviets with no practicable alternative except to submit to the imperialist peace imposed by an arrogant German government flushed with victory. We cannot resist the conclusion that the Allies and associated powers, rather than take a single step which might strengthen the Socialist Republic, preferred to see the German militarists weaken it, tap the resources of the immense territories they had annexed and grow stronger against the Allies themselves.

All this has a familiar ring in view of the Franco-British attitude toward Soviet Russia and Germany some two decades later. In 1938 and 1939 the French and British Governments, with plenty of encouragement from America, refused to take effective action on behalf of a genuine peace front with the U.S.S.R. against Nazi aggression. On the contrary, by their vacillations and surrender to Hitler at Munich they egged on Germany once more against Russia, forcing the Soviet Government in self-defense to come to an agreement with imperialist Germany. So it was that Foreign Minister Molotov, in explaining the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of

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1939, stated that the French and British Governments were afraid that "the conclusion of a real pact of mutual assistance with the U.S.S.R. may strengthen our country, the Soviet Union, which, it appears, does not answer their purpose. It must be admitted that these fears outweighed other considerations."¹⁵ In this situation at least, history repeated itself with a vengeance.

Returning to the eventful year of 1918, we find that within a month after the Brest-Litovsk Treaty the Allies commenced their armed intervention against Soviet Russia and their close military collaboration with the White counter-revolutionaries. Soon French, English and American expeditionary forces landed at Murmansk and Archangel in the Arctic region; the Japanese attacked at Vladivostok in the Far East, and later American troops pushed in from the same port; a British army invaded the Caucasus and occupied Baku and Batumi.

The public pretext for all this was to re-establish the Eastern Front. The real reason was to overthrow the Soviet Government, "to throttle in its infancy the noisome beast of Bolshevism," as one British general frankly put it. That this was the fundamental purpose of the intervention was proved up to the hilt by the fact that after the German surrender on November 11, 1918, the Allied invasion and blockade, far from ceasing, was intensified. What President Wilson had called "the acid test" of good will and sympathy on the part of Russia's sister nations had become for the Russians very acid indeed.

The Allied statements at the Paris Peace Conference did nothing to halt the undeclared world war against Soviet Russia; nor did they arrive at any workable solution of the Russian problem. Paris was swarming with

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Tsarist refugees who were certain that they would soon return to their native land and resume the life of leisure to which they had been accustomed. Émigré liberals also spread their own particular brand of confusion, and among them the likable ex-premier, Kerensky. Here again my father entered the picture briefly. Early in 1919 the Big Four (Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando and Wilson) delegated him and Felix Frankfurter, now a Justice of the United States Supreme Court, to meet with Kerensky and find out what he thought ought to be done about Russia. Mr. Lamont and Mr. Frankfurter had dinner with Kerensky one night in a private room at a Paris restaurant and talked with him till two o'clock in the morning. Kerensky, true to his oratorical nature, kept making stump speeches all evening, rising from the table and striding around the room in his excitement. But he never came down from the clouds to concrete formulations and definite plans, and his hazy ideas seemed to keep floating away into thin air.

In Russia itself the Communist regime continued to fight for its life. But in Siberia General William S. Graves, in command of the 7,000 troops of the American expeditionary force, refused to attack the Soviets and instead tried to counter Japanese infiltration into the Russian Far East and to forestall any Japanese move to annex Russian territory. The Americans were also helpful to Soviet Russia in the extensive famine relief which they supplied from 1921 to 1923. The head of the American Relief Administration was Herbert Hoover, then U. S. Secretary of Commerce. He collected approximately \$66,000,000 for Russian relief and shipped almost a million tons of food to the U.S.S.R. American altruism

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and humanitarianism saved millions of Russians from starvation during this terrible emergency.

At the same time the American Government came out for the territorial integrity of Russia and declined to enter into various imperialist schemes for the dismemberment of the country. In 1920 Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby officially stated that the United States "would regard with satisfaction a declaration by the Allied and associated powers that the territorial integrity and true boundaries of Russia shall be respected. These boundaries should include the whole of the former Russian Empire, with the exception of Finland proper, ethnic Poland, and such territory as may by agreement form a part of the Armenian state."¹⁶ The American Government reluctantly recognized the independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania only in 1922 and with the expectation that the Baltic States would return to Russia when the Soviet Republic collapsed.

Aside from the antagonistic and often hysterical attitude of America toward the Soviet Union in the early years of the Revolution, direct friction between the two Governments and peoples arose over the matter of debts. The United States Government demanded that the \$187,000,000 loaned to the Provisional Government should be paid back by the Soviet regime. Also there were the claims, totaling about \$400,000,000, of private American citizens who had held property in Tsarist Russia or who had bought Tsarist bonds. They recovered hardly a penny. As for the Provisional Government's obligation, the Soviet Republic took the position that while it had the right to repudiate the debts of its predecessors, it would be glad to discuss the matter with the American

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Government and try to reach a satisfactory settlement.

The Soviets pointed out that much of the loan had been spent *after* they came into power for anti-Soviet propaganda and for military supplies which were actually used against them. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had large counter-claims to advance because of damages inflicted by American soldiers in northern Russia and Siberia. A further complication arose from the fact that in the Treaty of Rapallo, signed in 1922, Germany renounced all its financial claims on Soviet Russia, provided that the Russians did not "satisfy similar claims made by any third state." The Soviet proposal was to work off the debt to the United States obliquely by paying excess interest rates on a loan from America. But this plan never got very far.

Long before diplomatic ties were established between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. a considerable volume of trade developed between the two nations which was of much economic assistance to the Soviets and helped keep American workers employed during some of the worst years of the Great Depression. The peak was reached in 1930 when exports from the United States to Soviet Russia amounted to \$114,000,000 and imports from Russia to \$24,000,000. The year 1931 was almost equally good for American-Soviet trade. American firms such as General Electric, the Ford Motor Company and International Harvester carried through technical aid contracts with the Soviet regime which were of immense importance for its industrialization program and heightened the admiration the Russians have always had for American technique. An outstanding American engineer, the late Colonel Hugh Cooper, was decorated by the Soviet Government for his part in the construction

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of the great Dnieper River Dam in the Ukraine.

Despite America's continued failure to recognize the Soviet Government, the Soviets welcomed American visitors in their country. And up till the outbreak of World War II thousands of American students, intellectuals and tourists in general went to the U.S.S.R. to observe conditions. Many eminent American writers and journalists produced articles or books on the progress of Soviet Russia which contributed to an understanding of that country in the United States. But the anti-Soviet chorus always remained vociferous and swayed large sectors of American public opinion.

Shortly after the Communist Revolution individuals and groups in the United States started to call for American recognition of the Soviet Republic. Later Senator William E. Borah of Idaho and Senator Joseph I. France of Maryland labored ceaselessly towards the same end. However, as long as the Republican Party remained in power, under Presidents Harding, Coolidge and Hoover, there was little chance for a far-reaching shift in the official American attitude toward the Soviets. When in 1932 the people of the United States elected as President Franklin D. Roosevelt, a man of profound vision in international as well as domestic affairs, it soon became evident that drastic changes in foreign policy were in the offing. The coming of Hitler to power early in 1933 and the continued aggression of the Japanese in China were also significant factors in moderating American policy toward the U.S.S.R. and in the general climate of opinion.

In the spring of 1933 a group of private citizens set up a special Committee on Russian-American Relations, with Curtis Bok of Philadelphia as Chairman and including Thomas S. Gates, President of the University of

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Pennsylvania, Thomas W. Lamont, Roland S. Morris, former Ambassador to Japan, and Roscoe W. Pound, Dean of the Harvard Law School. A few months later this Committee issued a report thoroughly reviewing Russian-American relations and calmly presenting the factual material essential to "the interested non-expert citizen in making up his mind" about recognition. Since the report was objective and got away from the atmosphere of heated controversy, its effect was unquestionably to further the campaign for recognition.

In October, 1933, President Roosevelt wrote Soviet President Kalinin a letter stressing "the desirability of an effort to end the present abnormal relations between the one hundred and twenty-five million people of the United States and the one hundred and sixty million people of Russia"; and saying that he would be "glad to receive any representatives you may designate to explore with me personally all questions outstanding between our two countries." The Soviet authorities promptly accepted this invitation and sent as their representative to Washington Foreign Secretary Litvinov. After private conferences lasting over a week the United States, on November 16, 1933, formally recognized the Soviet Government on the basis of notes exchanged by Litvinov and Roosevelt covering the principal points at issue between the two Governments. Thus, sixteen years after the Soviet Republic came into existence the American Government recognized it, whereas Tsarist Russia had taken double that time to recognize the American Republic. Paradoxically, now America instead of Russia was the great conservative power and Russia instead of America the great radical power.

Alexander Troyanovsky became the first Soviet Am-

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bassador to the United States and William C. Bullitt the first American Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Mr. Bullitt, who had headed the abortive American Mission to Soviet Russia in 1919, was at first fairly friendly towards the Russians. After he went to Moscow as ambassador he soon grew disillusioned with the U.S.S.R. and later developed into one of the most bitter of anti-Soviet fanatics. In the summer of 1935 the American Government through Mr. Bullitt protested to the Soviet Government over speeches made by American Communists at the Seventh World Congress of the Third International or Comintern. Ambassador Bullitt stated that this constituted a violation of the recognition agreement, which pledged non-interference in each other's domestic affairs and which promised that neither the U.S.A. nor the U.S.S.R. would permit the formation on its soil of any group aiming to use force in changing the political or economic system of the other country.

The Soviet Government replied that it had no responsibility for the actions of the Comintern. It argued that freedom of speech and assembly for workers' organizations implied the right of the Third International to meet in the Soviet Union. "It is therefore quite incomprehensible," the Soviet note went on to say, "why the Soviet Government alone should place obstacles in the way of the activities of Communist organizations, when even the conservative bourgeois governments of various countries are compelled to tolerate the existence of legal Communist Parties." This whole issue became rather academic a few years later when, in 1940, the Communist Party of the United States withdrew from the Comintern. In 1943 the Communist International itself dissolved.

In 1936 Joseph E. Davies succeeded Mr. Bullitt as

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Ambassador to Moscow and served until the middle of 1938. Making a genuine attempt to understand Soviet affairs and the Soviet point of view, Mr. Davies did much to improve relations between the United States and Soviet Russia. But following the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August, 1939, and the Soviet invasion of Finland in November, those relations sank to a new low. In December, President Roosevelt imposed a "moral embargo" on the sale of certain war materials to the U.S.S.R. This embargo was repealed in January of 1941; and American-Soviet relations took a turn for the better as rumors filtered through of German-Soviet friction and a probable Nazi attack on the Soviet Union.

When that attack finally came in June the whole American-Soviet picture rapidly altered. In November President Roosevelt publicly stated, "I have found that the defense of the U.S.S.R. is vital to the defense of the United States," and thereby brought Soviet Russia within the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act. The American Government immediately set up a billion-dollar credit for the Soviets, and by the end of the war had extended a total of \$11,000,000,000 in Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union. Cooperation and good feeling between the United States and Soviet Russia reached a high point from the autumn of 1941 to the conclusion of the Second World War. At both the Teheran Conference in 1943 and the Yalta Conference in 1945 President Roosevelt and Premier Stalin, together with Prime Minister Churchill, personally talked through and came to an accord on various problems of military collaboration and post-war international affairs. During this period the only consequential rift in the lute was the long controversy over the opening of an Anglo-American Second Front in

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France. The Russians, carrying the brunt of Hitler's land assault, hoped for the Second Front in 1942, expected it in 1943 and were bitterly disappointed that it did not take place until 1944. When, however, the American and British forces landed in Normandy and swept the Germans back, the Soviet reaction was enthusiastic. And Generalissimo Stalin stated: "The history of war knows no similar undertaking as regards breadth of design, vastness of scale and high skill in execution."¹⁷

The Second Front controversy brought out the important fact that Winston Churchill much preferred that the Anglo-American assault on the Nazis should go through the general region of the Balkans, "the soft underbelly of Europe," as he fondly kept calling it. A prime reason for this plan was Mr. Churchill's devout wish to forestall and counteract Soviet power and influence in southeastern Europe. And there seems little doubt that the British Prime Minister was influential in delaying the landings in France and that he remained lukewarm to the end concerning this operation. Had it not been for the firmness of Mr. Roosevelt, General Eisenhower and other highly placed Americans, Churchill's alternative might well have been adopted.

In April, 1945, as Hitler's armies were staggering to final surrender, American and Soviet delegates again worked closely together at the San Francisco Conference which established the United Nations. On April 12 American-Soviet understanding and cooperation received a heavy blow when President Roosevelt died. In July the Potsdam Conference met, with President Truman as the top representative of the United States and Premier Stalin as the top representative of the Soviet Union. This Conference reached a number of basic agreements

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about the future of defeated Germany and of Eastern Europe.

At the Yalta Conference Premier Stalin had promised Mr. Roosevelt that the U.S.S.R. would come into the war against Japan three months after the surrender of Germany. True to its pledged word, the Soviet Union declared war on the Japanese Government August 8, precisely on schedule, and immediately attacked the large Japanese forces, numbering more than 600,000, in Manchuria. The Soviet offensive was forging swiftly ahead when, on August 14, Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allies. The entrance of Soviet Russia into the Far Eastern conflict, combined with the dropping of atomic bombs by American fliers on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and August 9 respectively, finally convinced the Japanese that further struggle was hopeless.

Summarizing this brief historical survey, we can assert that the United States and Russia, despite wide divergences in their economic and political systems both before and after the Revolution of 1917, have had far-reaching common interests in the international sphere and have been able to cooperate with much mutual benefit during periods of world peace as well as world war. For almost 100 years they have had no territorial rivalries. And in the sphere of trade the two countries have all along nicely supplemented each other rather than competing on the world market. This is still true. What Soviet Russia wishes primarily to sell America are raw materials, which are exactly what America wants; what America wishes to sell the U.S.S.R. are machinery, machine tools and manufactured goods, which are precisely what the Russians want.

In essence both the American and Russian peoples

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are peace-loving and stand together for the permanent abolition of international conflict. The two Governments, the American and Soviet, have for many years favored the same method for preventing war, that is, the establishment of collective security through a world organization such as the United Nations consisting of all states wishing to band together in the cause of international amity. This was the identical idea which President Wilson had when in 1919 he drafted the League of Nations Covenant, later unhappily turned down by the United States Senate.

The League was handicapped from the start by the absence of the United States and Soviet Russia as founding members. Both countries, however, have been from the outset members of the United Nations. And this, at least, is a gain as compared with the situation following the First World War.

3. *American Names on Soviet Maps*

An intriguing sidelight on American-Russian relations is the degree to which American explorers have been interested in remote Russian territories and the paradoxical consequences to which this has led. For concerning the frigid far north of the U.S.S.R., official and detailed maps of the Soviet Arctic regions reveal strange and astonishing things. Such maps show that the Soviet Union, world pioneer in socialism, contains more than a dozen places named after prominent citizens of capitalist America, including such pillars of the banking business as J. Pierpont Morgan, the elder, founder of J. P. Morgan & Co., and Charles G. Dawes, Chicago financier and Vice-President of the United States in the conservative Republican Administration of Calvin Coolidge.

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Most of these places are situated in Soviet Europe in the eastern or central parts of polar Franz Josef Land, a large, almost completely ice-covered archipelago of some 800 islands located far above the Arctic Circle and about 600 miles northeast of Murmansk. This was the Soviet Arctic port which was so vital in receiving Lend-Lease supplies from Britain and America during the Second World War.

An Austrian explorer, Julius Payer, discovered this group of islands in 1873 and named it after the long-lived Emperor Franz Josef of Austria-Hungary. Payer also named the northernmost island in the archipelago Crown Prince Rudolf Land (simply Rudolf Island on Soviet maps), after the Emperor's ill-fated only son; while he honored Count Wilczek, who financed his expedition, by naming a large island in the northeast Wilczek Land. In general the Soviet Government has retained the names assigned by Payer and other non-Russian explorers.

American polar explorers first came to Franz Josef Land in 1898 and 1899 when an expedition headed by Walter Wellman charted much of the eastern section. Wellman, who subsequently tried to reach the North Pole by airship, published a book in 1911 entitled *The Aerial Age*. There he tells of his hair-raising adventures and narrow escapes in Franz Josef Land and of his abortive attempts to fly to the North Pole from Spitsbergen. He also lists a number of prominent Americans who assisted in financing his expedition to Franz Josef Land.

These included J. Pierpont Morgan, then at the height of his career; William K. Vanderbilt, railway magnate and grandson of Cornelius ("Commodore") Vanderbilt; Helen M. Gould, daughter of the railroad capi-

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talist, Jay Gould, and later Mrs. Finley J. Shepard; Levi Z. Leiter, Chicago dry goods merchant and in the early days a partner of Marshall Field; William McKinley, President of the United States; Cornelius N. Bliss, Secretary of the Interior under McKinley; William C. Whitney, Secretary of the Navy during President Cleveland's first administration; and "other friends."

In the same book Wellman, writing of the expedition's activities in 1899, states: "Up to this time the eastward extent of the Franz Josef Land archipelago was unknown and was a moot question among geographers. Our party delimited the archipelago to the northeast, discovering many new islands. One of them, of considerable area, beyond Wilczek Land, I named after Alexander Graham Bell, then President of the Geographic Society. Other islands, capes and straits I named in honor of friends who had helped me finance the expedition." Bell was of course the inventor of the telephone and the big island named after him is called plain Graham Bell.

Morgan Strait lies directly south of Graham Bell Island between it and Wilczek Land. There can be no doubt that Wellman named this body of water after the American financier, and the map of Franz Josef Land in the 1929 Edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica gives the fuller title of Pierpont Morgan Strait. This map also includes Vanderbilt Sound and Whitney Island in the same vicinity, but neither of these places is on our Soviet reference map from the Large Soviet Encyclopedia. This map, however, does show, off the southeast end of Wilczek Land, Dawes Island, named after ex-Vice-President Dawes, who has confirmed the fact that he made a financial contribution to the Wellman expedition.

Just south of Dawes Island is McNulta Island, prob-

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ably named after John McNulta, an Illinois lawyer and member of the House of Representatives toward the end of the last century. Somewhat north of Dawes is Gould Bay, obviously named after Helen M. Gould. At the southeast tip of Graham Bell Island we find Cape Leiter, named after Levi Z. Leiter; and at the central eastern extremity of Graham Bell, Cape Olney, in all likelihood named after Richard Olney, Secretary of State during Cleveland's second term. Cape Olney is not shown on the map, but is definitely marked on the official one in the Large Soviet Atlas of the World.

Turning again to our main reference map, we discover in the south central section of the Franz Josef archipelago Bliss Island, evidently named after Cornelius N. Bliss; and near it to the east Alger Island, not named after the popular American author of juveniles, but after Senator Russell A. Alger of Michigan, Secretary of War in McKinley's first administration.

In 1901-02 another expedition from the United States went to Franz Josef Land under the command of Evelyn Briggs Baldwin; while in 1903-05 the famous Ziegler Polar Expedition spent three years in this region under Anthony Fiala. Fiala named a large body of land in the central portion Ziegler Island; an island to the north of this he called Greely, after an American Arctic explorer of that name, and one to the south Champ, after Ziegler's secretary, who was very active in helping to plan the expedition. In November of 1903 Fiala's yacht *America* was crushed in the ice on the western side of Rudolf Island. But his party had been able to land most of its supplies and equipment, and built a sturdy camp and an astronomical observatory at Teplitz Bay.

In 1944 I called on Mr. Fiala at his New York City

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office, which was a miniature museum of all sorts of Arctic pictures, maps and mementos. Fiala told me that in 1934 the Soviet Arctic Institute in Leningrad wrote him that Soviet explorers had recently found his library of about seventy-five books that he had taken ashore to his wooden hut on Rudolf Island and left behind in 1903. The Institute offered to send the books back to the United States if Fiala would pay the transportation charges. Fiala did not think this worth the trouble and instead presented his books to the library of the Arctic Institute.

Noted explorers from England and Norway have also visited Franz Josef Land, which explains why in the western section of the archipelago there are such islands as Alexandra Land, Prince George Land (simply George Land on Soviet maps) and Nansen Island. Nansen Island is named after the well-known Norwegian explorer, Fridtjof Nansen, who spent nine severe and exciting months in Franz Josef Land from August, 1895, to May, 1896.

Returning, finally, to the discoverer of Franz Josef Land, Julius Payer, we learn from his book *New Lands within the Arctic Circle* that he, too, named certain places after Americans. These were Hall Island, a large island south of Wilczek Land, and Hayes Island, a small body of land northwest of Hall. Charles Francis Hall and Dr. I. I. Hayes were both American Arctic explorers who had won Payer's admiration for their records in reaching northern latitudes in the neighborhood of Greenland.

At the extreme southeast of the archipelago Payer also named a tiny island, a mere dot on the Soviet map, Lamont Island, important for Payer and his party because it was the last bit of land on which they were able

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to camp during their retreat south after abandoning their ship in the ice. This island was named after a noted Scotch Arctic explorer of the nineteenth century, Sir James Lamont. Sir James was no relation to the author, though his ancestry like my own went back to the Clan Lamont of Scotland.

Much smaller than Franz Josef Land and situated in the Siberian Arctic of Soviet Asia is another group of Soviet islands with American names. Most prominent of these on Soviet maps is Bennett Island, named after the eminent American newspaper publisher, James Gordon Bennett, the younger. For almost half a century Bennett was owner of the New York *Herald*, which merged with the New York *Tribune* in 1924 to form the present *Herald Tribune*. Near Soviet Russia's Bennett Island are two other small islands named after members of the publisher's family.

Early in his life James Gordon Bennett developed a deep interest in exploration and it was he who in 1869, at his own expense, sent Stanley to Africa on his successful search for Livingstone. In 1879, Bennett gave his enthusiastic support and financial backing to George Washington De Long's expedition to reach the North Pole. By special act of Congress the De Long expedition was made a national undertaking under charge of the Secretary of the Navy. In July, 1879, De Long set sail from San Francisco in the steamer *Jeannette*, named after Bennett's sister, and headed at once for Bering Strait.

During September the *Jeannette* passed Russia's Herald Island, about 200 miles west of Alaska and named after a ship in the British Navy. From then on, however, the expedition became involved in major difficulties. The *Jeannette* got caught in the Arctic ice-pack and

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drifted slowly westward over a period lasting twenty-one months. On May 17, 1881, Captain De Long sighted a very small island some 200 miles north of the Siberian mainland and named it Jeannette Island. Two weeks later a landing party went ashore at a neighboring island and named it Henrietta, in honor of Bennett's mother, baptizing the ground "with a few — a very few — drops of corn extract from a small but precious wicker bottle that had been placed in the boat-box for medicinal purposes."

Towards 4:00 a.m. on June 12, a few hours after De Long had given the order to abandon ship, the *Jeannette*, hopelessly battered and crushed by the unceasing onslaught of the ice, plunged beneath the waters of the Arctic. Less than a week later the crew set out over the shifting floes and huge hummocks of ice, hauling their sleds and small boats behind them with the utmost exertion. For almost two months De Long and his men pushed forward desperately across the treacherous ice-pack, often marching as much as twenty-five miles in order to cover two on their direct course. On July 29, approximately 150 miles west of where the *Jeannette* sank, the hard-pressed explorers came upon a good-sized island with precipitous mountains rising from the sea. Chief Engineer George W. Melville has described the scene:

"Suddenly, as we approached, the sun, as though by an extraordinary effort, rent the cloud veil in twain, and lo! before us, so close that it seemed we might step on shore, uprose and towered to a height of 3,000 feet the almost perpendicular masses of black basaltic rock, stained here and there with patches of red lichens, and begrimed with the decayed vegetable matter of unknown ages, the bold projections fissured and seamed, and the

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giant rocks split and powdered by the hand of time. The sight was glorious. Involuntary exclamations escaped from all. It infused new life and vigor into us; and each man straightway became a Hercules. Now or never, thought we, and so seized boats and sleds, rushing them upon a tongue of the ice-foot which our main floe grazed in passing. At last! The ice-foot rested on the beach and now many of our company set foot on *terra firma* the first time in two years."¹⁸

That evening Captain De Long's party, thirty-three in number, staged a brief ceremony, including a short procession with flags flying, as De Long named the island in honor of James Gordon Bennett. At the same time De Long named the landing place Cape Emma after his own wife.

The *Jeannette's* company then broke up into three groups, each one taking a boat equipped with oars and sail. They went southward together and passed safely through the New Siberian Islands, a Russian archipelago of considerable size. On September 12, 1881, however, the boats became separated in a bad gale.

The party led by Lieutenant Chipp was never heard from again, and it is assumed that his cutter foundered in the storm. Engineer Melville's party, in the whaleboat, all survived due to the good fortune of encountering some Siberian natives on the mainland. Though De Long's party, in the second cutter, succeeded in reaching the delta of the Lena River and pitching camp there, De Long himself and all but two members of his group starved to death. Subsequently the bodies of De Long and his companions were found by Melville and brought back to the United States.

Later Jeannette, Henrietta and Bennett Islands, to-

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gether with two other islands in the same vicinity, were grouped under the over-all name of De Long Islands. The De Long group and the individual islands within it are marked clearly on most current maps of the Soviet Union. These islands are all part of the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which is a subdivision of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

In 1938, fifty-seven years after the disastrous ending of the De Long expedition, scientists of the Soviet Arctic Institute found on Henrietta Island a copper cylinder left there by Melville's landing party and containing a rolled-up record of the voyage of the *Jeannette*. A polar bear had bitten at the cylinder and partly crushed it, so that water had leaked in and the pulpy record could not be deciphered. The Soviet group also discovered Melville's flagstaff, which was brought to Moscow, and three empty shotgun shells. This Soviet expedition built a meteorological station high up on the island.

1. *The Basic Principles*

Since the outside world has misrepresented Soviet Russia's position on so many major issues, it is not surprising that it has done likewise regarding Soviet policies in foreign relations. So it is that the Soviet Republic, standing forthright for international peace since its first day of existence, is generally depicted at present in America and the West as a nation bent on aggression and plotting the military conquest of other countries. This wretched falsehood serves to keep many of the leading peoples of the earth in a constant state of alarm and undermines the rational bases for international amity and cooperation.

There are five main points in Soviet foreign policy. First and foremost, the Soviet Union wants peace above all else in its international relations. Since its founding in 1917 the Soviet Republic has twice gone through the terrible ordeal of invasion by hostile states. The first time was during the Civil War and intervention from 1918 to 1922; the second during the four years of struggle to the death with the Nazis, from 1941 to 1945. In both of these periods it lost many millions in dead and suffered economic destruction amounting to tens of billions of dollars. War has twice meant staggering setbacks to the country's development.

The Soviets are most desirous of enduring peace, so

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that their people can live in security and happiness and put their full efforts into the building of socialism and communism. The dictates of simple self-preservation and sheer self-interest, as well as special concern for the welfare of workers and peasants everywhere, cause the Soviet Union steadfastly to oppose international war. True enough, the Soviet Communists are eager to see Communist or socialist regimes established throughout the earth. But Marxist theory predicts the eventual collapse of capitalism everywhere from within and disproves the idea of Communist countries seeking to extend their system by conquest to capitalist countries.*

Although Soviet Russia considers wars of national liberation such as the American Revolution justified, it holds that the two world wars which have plagued humanity in the twentieth century originated in a drive against the freedom of peoples and were counter-revolutionary in the sense of holding back peaceful and democratic progress. In the Second World War the fascists, according to Soviet opinion, represented the most reactionary elements in modern society. They resorted to domestic violence and terror, and then to external violence and terror, in a desperate, last-ditch effort to prevent mankind from naturally evolving toward a more cooperative economic system. And in their attempt to turn back the clock of history, they aimed to conquer, plunder and dominate the entire globe.

The Soviet Government has all along recognized that the establishment of socialism throughout the enormous empire of the Tsars resulted in many difficult problems in world affairs and in a qualitatively new situation. But except for a brief period following the 1917 Revolu-

* Cf. pp. 330-331.

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tion, it has insisted on the desirability and possibility of peaceful co-existence between the socialist and capitalist sectors of the world. It has argued that in spite of the deep-reaching differences between the capitalist and socialist nations in their economic and political systems, they could cooperate to their respective advantage on certain broad international ends. As Maxim Litvinov once expressed it, the relative merits of capitalism and socialism are not going to be decided by various kinds of non-cooperation, mutual annoyance and pinpricks in the international sphere, but by the ultimate strength, efficiency and living standards of the two systems.

Premier Stalin has again and again reaffirmed the possibility of peaceful co-existence between the capitalist and socialist worlds. In 1927 he stated at the Fifteenth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, "The foundation of our relations with capitalist countries lies in allowing for the existence of two opposing systems. Experience has borne that out completely." In 1936 he told Mr. Roy Howard, head of the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain, substantially the same thing. In 1946, when Elliott Roosevelt asked Stalin if American democracy and Soviet communism could live in peace side by side and without interfering in each other's internal affairs, he replied: "Yes, of course. This is not only possible. It is wise and entirely within the bounds of realization. In the most strenuous times during the war the differences in government did not prevent our two nations from joining together and vanquishing our foes. Even more so is it possible to continue this relationship in time of peace."¹

During the Soviet election campaign of March, 1950, several of Stalin's most prominent colleagues emphasized the same theme. V. M. Molotov, a Deputy Premier of the

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Soviet Union and a possible successor to Stalin as Premier, said: "We whole-heartedly support the Leninist-Stalinist principles of the peaceful co-existence of the two systems and of their peaceful economic competition."² Marshal Klimenti E. Voroshilov, another Deputy Premier, asserted: "The Lenin and Stalin concept of the possibility of the prolonged co-existence of the two systems — socialist and capitalist — constitutes the consistent expression of the aspiration of the Soviet people to ensure peace, security and the steady material and cultural progress of mankind."³

It is a fact that in the early years of the U.S.S.R. Soviet theoreticians occasionally uttered dire warnings about the "inevitability" of war as long as capitalism existed. This loose talk, however, soon gave way to the theory of the possible peaceful co-existence of the two systems and to the more moderate view that *danger* of war would remain inevitable as long as powerful sectors of the capitalist economy continued in being. Since World War II American writers and speakers, in particular, have stressed a few outdated Soviet quotations about the inevitability of an armed clash between the capitalist and socialist countries and have neglected the theory of co-existence. Instead of thanking heaven that the Soviets neither favor war nor believe it must come, these Americans have gone out of their way to try to prove the opposite; and thereby to condemn mankind to the horrors of a Third World War. But we may be sure that neither the American people nor any other are willing to accept this mad doctrine of *death by quotation*.

The second point in Soviet foreign policy is that the U.S.S.R. supports firmly the principle of collective security as a foundation for international peace. It backed

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collective security unequivocally during the critical pre-war period of fascist aggression from 1935 to 1939. It stood ready and willing to participate in League of Nations sanctions when fascist force on the part of Germany, Italy or Japan was loosed against Ethiopia (1935), Spain (1936), China (1937), Austria (1938) and Czechoslovakia (September, 1938, and March, 1939). The Soviet Government also favored League measures against Hitler when he violated the Treaty of Versailles by going ahead with rearmament in 1935, and with the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936.

Not only was Soviet Russia foremost in exposing and opposing these eight separate acts of aggression or treaty violations; it also was the one major Power which sent substantial aid to the invaded Spanish and Chinese Republics, in conformance with its pledge under Article XVI of the League to render assistance to countries under attack by aggressors. Britain and France, on the other hand, especially in reference to the Ethiopians and Spanish Loyalists, entered into official or unofficial agreements which, with a touching impartiality, barred the sale of military supplies to both the well-armed aggressor and the poorly armed victim.

Time and again during the years preceding World War II, Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov rose at the meetings of the League of Nations, which the U.S.S.R. had joined in 1934, and called for action against the fascist and Nazi aggressors. On each and every occasion Soviet Russia was unable to obtain sufficient response from the Western democracies to make possible collective measures of real efficacy. The democratic Powers, with the states that depended primarily on their leadership, signally failed to implement their own formulation

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of collective security as written into the Covenant of the League of Nations. Soviet Russia, however, fought energetically during this period on behalf of the League's principles and thus became the outstanding champion of those new methods of world cooperation which many years earlier President Taft, President Wilson and other American leaders had been instrumental in bringing to the fore and which later the United States repudiated.

Specifically the Soviet Government, through Mr. Litvinov, repeatedly expressed itself in favor of the fundamental Articles X and XVI of the League Covenant, whereas Great Britain and France repeatedly demonstrated their reluctance to put these Articles into effect. Article X read: "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."

Article XVI read in part: "Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles XII, XIII or XV it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations. . . . It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air forces Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League."

When Mussolini brutally invaded Ethiopia in 1935 the Soviet Union advocated that the League act in ac-

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cordance with Articles X and XVI. In a speech at the League Plenum on July 1, 1936, Foreign Minister Litvinov expressed his regret that the members of the League had not taken firmer action in regard to Italy's aggression. After reaffirming Soviet support for Article X, he went on to say: "I maintain that Article XVI has provided the League of Nations with such a powerful weapon that any aggression could be broken if it were brought into full play. Furthermore, the very belief that it may be brought into play may discourage the aggressor from putting his criminal plans into effect.

"Least of all does the sad experience of the Italo-Abyssinian war contradict this statement. In the present case either because this was the first experiment in applying collective measures, or because some people thought this case had specific features, or because it coincided with the preparation for a more serious aggression elsewhere, to which Europe had to pay special attention, or because of other reasons, the fact remains that not only was the formidable machinery of Article XVI not brought into play, but the tendency to keep to minimum measures was displayed from the outset. Even the economic sanctions were limited in scope and action. And even in this limited scope the sanctions were not applied by all the Members of the League. . . .

"If I say all this in the interests of strengthening peace, I cannot do otherwise than mention the measure which the Soviet Union has always considered the maximum guarantee of peace — I mean complete disarmament. . . . But while this radical measure is in abeyance, all we can do is to strengthen the League of Nations as an instrument of peace. To strengthen the League is to abide by the principle of collective security, which is by

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no means a product of idealism, but is a practical measure towards the security of all peoples, to abide by the principle that peace is indivisible! We must recognize that at the present time there is not one state, large or small, that is not open to aggression, and that even if the next war spares one state or another she must, sooner or later, attract the longing eyes of the victorious aggressor."⁴

Because of faint-hearted support on the part of Britain and France, and because of America's complete refusal to cooperate, even the partial economic sanctions voted against Italy by the vacillating League soon faded away. There were four main reasons in my opinion why the British and French Governments did not wish to enforce against Mussolini either economic or military sanctions. In the first place, preferring fascism to socialism, they feared that far-reaching pressures against Italy would topple the fascist regime and that genuine socialism would take its place. In the second place, they did not want their own nationals to lose, even temporarily, the economic advantages of trade with Italy.

In the third place, they were afraid that a defeat of the Italian army by the forces of Emperor Haile Selassie would give too much encouragement to the Negro populations of Africa against the imperialistic encroachments of the white man. Even as intelligent a statesman as Jan C. Smuts, several times Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, thought that an Ethiopian victory against a white nation would be a very dangerous thing. In the fourth place, the British and French were already putting into effect their considered policy of appeasing the fascist Powers and letting them conquer and annex foreign lands on the supposition that they would eventually

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attack the Soviet Union and not the Western democracies.

The general appeasement policy, fear of undermining the fascist dictatorships and plain reluctance to risk war led England and France to make only a pretense of opposing Italian and Nazi intervention in Spain on behalf of General Franco's rebellion against the democratically elected Loyalist Government. Mussolini actually sent an army of more than 100,000 troops to Franco's aid. And the frequently expressed horror of high British and French officials against violent revolution quickly subsided when it was the fascists who were doing the revolting. The Anglo-French "defenders" of Western democracy instituted an effective boycott on the sale of military equipment to democratic Spain; and the United States took the same attitude. Loyalist Spain was thus denied its ordinary rights under international law and early in 1939 finally went down to defeat.

In 1937 the Japanese army invaded China proper, as distinct from Manchuria, which Japan had invaded and overrun beginning with 1931. On this second occasion of outright Japanese aggression the League of Nations, under Anglo-French leadership, spent much time setting up committees and sub-committees to write polite notes to the Japanese Government asking what its intentions were. After a considerable delay the League decided that while there was no general obligation for its members to impose economic sanctions against Japan, such sanctions were applicable on a discretionary basis. Of course this very discreet action did not get anywhere; and imperialist Japan, looked upon by Tories the world over as the great bulwark against Bolshevism in the Far East, pursued its bloody course unhampered. Again, the Soviet Union took its principled position of standing "in readi-

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ness to rebuff the aggressor jointly with other great states, and small states too."⁵

In March, 1938, Hitler sent his mechanized armies across the Austrian border and annexed the whole of Austria in the long-expected *Anschluss*. The Soviet Government vigorously protested this action and reaffirmed its obligations under the principle of collective security. Foreign Minister Litvinov urged a special conference to consider the necessary means for "arresting the further development of aggression and removing the accentuated danger of a new world shambles."⁶ Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain of Great Britain rejected this proposal and nothing came of it.

In September, 1938, the Nazi dictator brought to a head the outrageous demand of Germany for the annexation of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. The British and French Governments crumpled quickly under Hitler's threats of launching a general war; and on September 15 Chamberlain made his first flight to Munich to meet the Nazi Chancellor. While Anglo-French diplomacy was busy selling Czechoslovakia down the river, Mr. Litvinov, on September 21, made one of his greatest speeches before the League of Nations Assembly at Geneva.

The Soviet Foreign Minister reminded his League colleagues that the U.S.S.R. had advocated strong measures of collective security against the aggressor at the time of the attacks on Ethiopia, Spain and Austria. As to Czechoslovakia and the Soviet treaty of mutual assistance with that country, Mr. Litvinov stated: "We intend to fulfill our obligations under the pact, and together with France, to afford assistance to Czechoslovakia by the ways open to us. Our War Department is

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ready immediately to participate in a conference with representatives of the French and Czechoslovak War Departments, in order to discuss the measures appropriate to the moment. Independently of this we considered that the question be raised at the League of Nations. . . . [and that there be an] immediate consultation between the Great Powers of Europe and other interested states, in order if possible to decide on the terms of a collective *démarche*.

"Unfortunately, other steps were taken, which would have led, and which could not but lead, to such a capitulation as is bound sooner or later to have quite incalculable and disastrous consequences. To avoid a problematic war today and receive in return a certain and large-scale war tomorrow — moreover at the price of assuaging the appetites of insatiable aggressors and of the destruction or mutilation of sovereign states — is not to act in the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations. To grant bonuses for sabre-rattling and recourse to arms for the solution of international problems — in other words, to reward and encourage aggressive super-imperialism — is not to act in the spirit of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. The Soviet Government takes pride in the fact that it has no part in such a policy."⁷

Indeed, as the negotiations went on between Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain and Daladier (Premier of France), the Soviet Government was not even consulted by the British and French Governments. Those two Governments brusquely turned down the idea of any conference on behalf of collective security and instead came to an agreement, behind closed doors, with the Axis dictators for the partition of Czechoslovakia. On the even-

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ing of September 29, following Chamberlain's second trip to Munich, the deal was concluded and announced to the Czechoslovak Government, which was required to hand over the Sudeten territory peacefully to the Nazis. The next day this Government acquiesced, although adding that it "protests the decision of the Four Great Powers, which was entirely one-sided and taken without Czechoslovakia's participation."

Through the Munich settlement the British Tories, with the French men-like-mice following their lead, aimed to isolate the Soviet Union diplomatically, to avoid a military clash with Hitler, to strengthen European fascism as the best insurance against communism and to turn the Nazi war machine east against the Russians. Instead the Anglo-French super-diplomats dug their own graves. As Winston Churchill later said: "France and Britain had to choose between war and dishonor. They chose dishonor. They will have war."⁸ How correct were the predictions of both Churchill and Litvinov World War II soon proved.

Hitler speedily swallowed up the Sudetenland, but had further plans in mind for the Czechoslovaks. On March 15, 1939, the German army swept into Prague and took over the rest of Czechoslovakia, which the Nazis then incorporated into their Greater Germany. Prime Minister Chamberlain adopted an attitude of wounded surprise. On March 18 the Soviet Government again proposed a conference of European states to institute measures for resisting aggression. At this very late date in history the British Government rejected the Soviet proposal as "premature." With its approval the League of Nations Secretariat suppressed an appeal to the League,

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so that nobody would be embarrassed by the question arising there.

On March 10, 1939, Joseph Stalin, as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, delivered an address carefully reviewing the international situation. He summed up Soviet foreign policy under four main points: "First, we stand for peace and the strengthening of business-like relations with all countries. This is our position and we will adhere to it as long as these countries maintain identical relations with the Soviet Union, as long as they make no attempt to trespass on the interests of our country. Second, we stand for peaceful, close and friendly relations with all the neighboring countries which have common frontiers with the U.S.S.R. That is our position; and we shall adhere to it as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass, directly or indirectly, on the integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of the Soviet state. Third, we stand for the support of nations which have fallen prey to aggression and are fighting for the independence of their country. Fourth, we are not afraid of the threats of aggressors and we are ready to retaliate with two blows for one against instigators of war who attempt to violate the Soviet borders."⁹

In spite of the many rebuffs it had received, the Soviet Union was still desirous of working out with the Western democracies common measures for collective security and defense. But the Soviets were becoming restive. In the same speech from which I have just quoted, Mr. Stalin suggested that the dangerous game of the appeasers "may end in serious failure for themselves." And he asserted that the U.S.S.R. did not intend

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"to pull chestnuts out of the fire" for anyone. However, on April 16, 1939, shortly after the wanton Italian seizure of Albania on Easter week-end, the Soviet Government tried again. In the words of Mr. Churchill in his book, *The Gathering Storm*, the Soviets "made a formal offer, the text of which was not published, for the creation of a united front of mutual assistance between Great Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. The three Powers, with Poland added if possible, were furthermore to guarantee those states in Central and Eastern Europe which lay under the menace of German aggression. . . .

"The alliance of Britain, France and Russia would have struck deep alarm into the heart of Germany in 1939, and no one can prove that war might not even then have been averted. . . . Hitler could afford neither to embark upon the war on two fronts, which he himself had so deeply condemned, nor to sustain a check. It was a pity not to have placed him in this awkward position, which might well have cost him his life. . . . If Mr. Chamberlain on receipt of the Russian offer had replied, 'Yes. Let us three band together and break Hitler's neck,' or words to that effect, Parliament would have approved. Stalin would have understood, and history might have taken a different course. At least it could not have taken a worse. . . . Instead there was a long silence while half-measures and judicious compromises were being prepared."¹⁰

On May 3 Maxim Litvinov resigned as Soviet Foreign Secretary and the more intransigent V. M. Molotov took his place. This was clearly a sign that Soviet Russia was becoming doubtful whether it could rely on the collective security policy of which Litvinov had been the prime architect. At the end of May Mr. Molotov repeated

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Stalin's warning that the U.S.S.R. was tired of appeasement. Prime Minister Chamberlain, it is true, had entered into active negotiations with the Soviet Union; but to quote Mr. Churchill again, they "proceeded languidly." In June Chamberlain sent a minor official, Mr. William Strang, to Moscow to carry on talks; and two months later, on August 11, an Anglo-French military mission arrived in the U.S.S.R. after a leisurely trip by boat. Mr. Chamberlain appeared to think there was no hurry. The hopeful conversations with the Russians undertaken by this mission finally broke down when the British and French representatives refused to agree that the Soviet army would have the right to march into Poland and the Baltic States to meet a German attack on those countries or to prevent a Nazi fifth column from taking control.

The Western negotiators said that since Poland and the Baltic nations had asserted they would refuse to allow Soviet troops in under any conditions, it would not be honorable to bring pressure on these governments to change their minds. Yet only about a year before the Anglo-French partnership had considered it perfectly honorable to submit to Nazi blackmail and to gang up with Hitler in insisting that Czechoslovakia hand over a large slice of its territory to Germany. Furthermore, the League of Nations Covenant itself, in Article XVI, lent support to the Soviet demand by stating: "The Members of the League . . . agree that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are cooperating to protect the covenants of the League."

I for one have never been convinced that the emissaries of Chamberlain and Daladier — two Prime Minis-

ters who had repeatedly betrayed the principles of collective security — really intended serious business. Light is thrown upon their attitude by a statement made about the same time by Sir Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador to Germany and a personal friend of General Hermann Goering. In his own book, *Failure of a Mission*, Sir Nevile writes that he told Adolf Hitler in August, 1939, that "if an agreement had to be made with Moscow, for whom communism was now merely the cloak for intense nationalism and whose ulterior motives seemed to me highly suspicious, I had rather Germany made it than ourselves."¹¹

Certainly Nevile Henderson got his wish. For the Soviet Government, believing that the Anglo-French terms for a mutual security pact would gravely endanger Soviet defenses in case of a Nazi attack, felt compelled to accept the other alternative: a treaty of non-aggression with Germany. This was signed on August 23, 1939. The pact was not an alliance any more than was the non-aggression agreement with Japan concluded in April of 1941. The Soviet-German treaty gave the U.S.S.R. insurance against having to withstand, under the most serious military and diplomatic handicaps, a Nazi assault in 1939 and a valuable breathing spell to strengthen itself for the later invasion. The Soviet-Japanese treaty protected the rear of the U.S.S.R. during Hitler's murderous attack. Both pacts, even though made with die-hard Soviet enemies, seemed justified as hard-boiled defensive strategy in the midst of a most threatening international situation and in view of the terrific struggle the Soviet Union was facing.

It is widely held that the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact gave Hitler the needed encouragement to

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launch his assault on Poland; and that therefore the Soviets were morally culpable for that crime and the outbreak of World War II. The actual fact is, however, that *months before the pact was concluded the Nazi dictator had made his decision to march against Poland in the fall of 1939*. Mr. F. H. Hinsley, a Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge University, proves this up to the hilt in his book, *Hitler's Strategy*, based to a large extent on documents captured from the German Government. The author shows that early in April, 1939, Hitler issued two directives "ordering preparations so to begin that the attack on Poland could take place at any time after 1 September."¹² And in a secret speech to his Commanders-in-Chief on May 23 he announced his decision to invade Poland "at the first suitable opportunity." All this was before negotiations with Soviet Russia had begun in earnest.

Regarding Hitler's remarks on May 23, 1939, Mr. Hinsley writes: "Far more important than the Russian attitude as a factor in his determination to attack Poland without delay was the problem of relative power between Germany and the West. . . . With every month, he was convinced, Germany's armaments advantage relative to Poland and the Western Powers would now decline."¹³ In another speech, on August 22, to his Commanders-in-Chief, telling them about the coming treaty with the U.S.S.R., Hitler said: "Our economic situation is such that we cannot hold out more than a few years. . . . We have no other choice; we must act. . . . Therefore conflict is better now. . . . The initiative cannot be allowed to pass to others. . . . We must accept the risk with reckless resolution. . . . We are facing the alternative of striking now or being destroyed with certainty sooner or

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later."¹⁴ These arguments, Mr. Hinsley points out, justified the German war against Poland and the danger of Britain and France becoming involved, regardless of the Soviet pact. Of course that agreement was helpful in the general strategy of the Nazis.

On the day on which the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact was announced Joseph E. Davies, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, wrote Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles as follows: "The Soviet regime, in my opinion, diligently and vigorously tried to maintain a vigorous common front against the aggressors and were sincere advocates of the 'indivisibility of peace.' Litvinov's able battle for peace and democratic ideas at the League of Nations and the vigorous attitude of the Soviet Government in being prepared to fight for Czechoslovakia were indications of real sincerity of purpose and a marked degree of highmindedness. Beginning with Munich, and even before, however, there had been an accumulation of events which gradually broke down this attitude on the part of the Soviet Government. . . . The suspicion continued to grow that Britain and France were playing a diplomatic game to place the Soviets in the position where Russia would have to fight Germany alone."¹⁵

It is significant that Winston Churchill, who since World War II has wielded such immense influence on American attitudes toward Soviet Russia, was leader during the pre-war years of a minority group in the British Conservative Party which opposed Chamberlain's foreign policy. Concerning the issue upon which the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations foundered in August, 1939, Mr. Churchill in essence backed the Soviet position when he asserted: "It is certain . . . that if Lithuania, Latvia

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and Estonia were invaded by the Nazis or subverted to the Nazi system by propaganda and intrigue from within, the whole of Europe would be dragged into war. . . . Why not then concert in good time, publicly and courageously, the measures which may render such a fight unnecessary?"¹⁶ Present Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and ex-Prime Minister David Lloyd George shared these views.

Had Churchill, instead of the faltering Chamberlain, been the head of England's government in 1938 and 1939, the chances are that the Western democracies would have established a solid peace front with the Soviet Union and that events in Europe would have taken a very different turn. In any case what the record of international affairs shows — and the comments of eminent men far from sympathetic towards the Soviet system — is that throughout the eventful period of 1935-39 the Soviet Union stood firm for the League Covenant and the principles of collective security outlined therein.

On September 1, 1939, the Nazi armies swept into Poland. The League of Nations had failed in the main purpose for which it was established twenty-odd years before. In 1940 Hitler's *blitzkrieg* engulfed the Low Countries and France; in 1941 western Russia. Nonetheless, the idea of collective security through a world organization did not down. And it was specifically included in the Polish-Soviet Agreement of 1941 and the Twenty-Year British-Soviet Pact of 1942. The Four-Nation Moscow Declaration of October, 1943, stated that China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States "recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of sovereign equality of

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all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security."

Such an international organization came into being in June of 1945 with the creation of the United Nations at the San Francisco Conference. The Soviet Government took an active part in this Conference and sent a delegation headed by Foreign Minister Molotov. The United Nations reaffirmed in its Charter the basic principle of collective security and outlined effective measures to bring it about. In the drawing up of the Charter a number of disagreements took place between the different delegations. Noteworthy is the fact that Soviet Russia was willing to compromise, as *The New York Times* pointed out in an editorial, on at least ten important issues in order to assure the prompt and successful establishment of the U.N.

Whatever its differences of opinion with other countries in the discussions over the U.N. Charter, Soviet Russia continued to uphold the same principle of collective security for which it had fought in the arenas of diplomacy during the pre-war years. There was no basic alteration in its policy; nor was it to be rationally expected that it would suddenly change from being a peace-loving nation to a war-loving nation. Rarely do great peoples reverse their fundamental historical pattern overnight. Yet today we are asked to believe the far-fetched story that the Soviet Republic, having vigorously sought international peace for the first thirty years of its existence, has become all at once the chief fomenter of war in the world.

The third major goal in its foreign policy is universal disarmament, including the abolition of atomic

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weapons and international controls for atomic energy. The Soviet record on disarmament has been a notable one. At the Genoa Conference of 1922, the first international conference which Soviet Russia attended, the Soviet Foreign Minister, G. V. Chicherin, proposed a general reduction of armaments. At the meeting of the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference at Geneva in 1927 the Soviet delegate, Maxim Litvinov, surprised the world by his proposal for general and complete disarmament. But, during the life of the League of Nations, armaments increased immensely among the Great Powers instead of diminishing.

After the formation of the United Nations the Soviet delegation urged, in 1946, a general reduction of armaments and prohibition of the production and utilization of atomic energy for war purposes. In 1948, when the cold war was well under way, the Soviet Government put forward a plan at the U.N. to reduce the armaments and armed forces of the Great Powers by one-third within a year. As recently as November, 1951, Soviet Foreign Minister Vishinsky repeated this proposal at a meeting of the United Nations in Paris. The Western Powers treated Mr. Vishinsky's scheme primarily as propaganda; and, indeed, the tendency of the non-Soviet world from 1917 on has been to sneer at Soviet disarmament proposals as insincere and designed to deceive. This attitude I am convinced is unjustified.

Soviet Russia has upheld the goal of disarmament in order to lessen international fears and frictions, decrease the danger of war and save for constructive economic purposes the colossal sums and energies which go into the manufacture of armaments. The absence of unemployment and the general stability of its economic system are

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not contingent on the armaments industry, but are based on socialist ownership and country-wide planning. The Soviets consider armaments production an economic waste. Nonetheless, the very real menace of foreign aggression has compelled them to develop a great defense industry and to maintain a large army. It was fortunate for America and the rest of the democratic world that Soviet Russia was so well prepared when Hitler struck in World War II.

Fourth, the Soviet Union believes in normal, flourishing international trade as beneficial to itself and conducive to peace. Naturally it was never in favor of the economic and financial boycott imposed upon it by the capitalist Powers after the First World War. And it has always considered that substantial trade with the outside world was an important part of its policy of peaceful co-existence with the capitalist countries. It has all along been particularly desirous of having good trade relations with the United States.

In subscribing to the Atlantic Charter Soviet Russia went on record with the other signatory nations in stating: "They will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity. They desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field, with the object of securing for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security."

It is no choice of Soviet Russia that these international economic aims written into the Atlantic Charter have been so disregarded since the Second World War.

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In fact it has decried from the start the economic consequences of the cold war that have necessarily followed from the American policy of drastically restricting trade with the U.S.S.R. and the countries of Eastern Europe. It has regretted the serious drop in trade between Eastern and Western Europe. As to American-Soviet business relations, the Soviet Union stands ready to resume normal trade on a reciprocal basis at any time. Of course the Soviets will benefit from such commerce, but the United States on its part will gain just as much.

Fifth in its peace program, Soviet Russia supports the self-determination of peoples. Again, the Atlantic Charter of 1941 sets forth the principles involved, asserting: "Their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other. They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them."

On November 6, 1942, Premier Stalin, speaking officially for his Government, said that "the program of action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition" for winning the war must include "abolition of racial exclusiveness; equality of nations and integrity of their territories; liberation of enslaved nations and the restoration of their sovereign rights; the right of every nation to arrange its affairs as it wishes; economic aid to nations that have suffered and assistance to them in attaining their material welfare; restoration of democratic liberties; destruction of the Hitlerite regime." While insisting on the sternest possible attitude toward Hitler and all the Nazi criminals

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who "have turned Europe into a prison of nations," Stalin made clear: "It is not our aim to destroy Germany, for it is impossible to destroy Germany, just as it is impossible to destroy Russia, but the Hitlerite State can and should be destroyed."

As a member of the United Nations, the Soviet Union subscribes to the clause in the Charter which gives as one of the main purposes of the organization, "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples."¹⁷ The Russians are of course keen on the extension of complete self-determination to the colonial areas of the world. In the setting up of the United Nations at San Francisco, the Soviet delegation proposed: "The basic objectives of the trusteeship system should be to promote the political, economic and social advancement of the trust territories and their inhabitants and their progressive development toward self-government and self-determination, with active participation of the peoples of these territories having the aim to expedite the achievement by them of full national independence."¹⁸

The final U.N. draft watered down this statement by eliminating "with active participation of the peoples of these territories"; and adding to the phrasing on independence the important qualification, "as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship provision."¹⁹ This weakened formulation was adopted with the support of the United States and under pressure from Great Britain and France, the two countries still holding large colonial possessions.

The Russians are of the opinion that historically the

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violation of self-determination through foreign intervention has been in general a tool of reaction and imperialism, especially since the Metternich period of the early nineteenth century. And they point out that the flagrant military intervention directed against various countries between the First World War and the Second was clearly on behalf of old-time imperialist or outright fascist interests. In the next section I discuss the principle of self-determination in relation to certain actions of the Soviet Union since the beginning of the Second World War in 1939.

2. *Does Soviet Russia Wage Aggression?*

The principle of self-determination of peoples leads naturally to the question of whether the Soviet Union has been guilty of aggression against foreign countries. The tendency has been in the West to favor self-determination only so long as it is applied in a way unfavorable to the U.S.S.R. and the new socialist governments which have sprung into existence since the defeat of world fascism. The same sort of people who supported the widespread imperialist intervention against the Soviet Republic during its early years today claim that Soviet Russia is itself imperialistic because during World War II it took back the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and Eastern Poland, and because Communist-led regimes have come into power throughout most of Eastern Europe and in China.

As to the Baltic provinces and Eastern Poland, we should recall that these were torn from Russia after the First World War by means of force and power politics, which had as their objective the weakening of the Soviet

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Republic and the creation of a "cordon sanitaire," both to hem it in from a military standpoint and to protect Europe from its influence. In 1920 the American Government quite rightly protested against this dismemberment of Russia and called for the restitution of the old Russian boundaries, except in regard to Armenia, Finland and ethnic Poland.*

The governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were first set up in 1918 with the aid of the Kaiser's armies and in line with the harsh Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which formalized Germany's conquests and spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. They were soon recognized by the Allies, which, for their own obvious reasons, wished to see these anti-Soviet outposts become permanent. When the American Government finally granted them recognition in 1922, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes made this significant reservation: "The United States has consistently maintained that the disturbed conditions of Russian affairs may not be made the occasion for the alienation of Russian territory, and this principle is not deemed to be infringed upon by the recognition *at this time* of the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania."²⁰ Thus Mr. Hughes qualified his recognition statement so as to leave the door open for a future return of these nations to Russia.

The matter of Armenia quickly became an academic one, since the idea of America's accepting a mandate for that country rapidly faded away and since a native Communist group gained the upper hand in 1920 and proclaimed an Armenian Autonomous Republic linked up with the U.S.S.R. Finland also became an academic issue, due to the fact that the Soviet regime under Lenin

* See p. 265.

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recognized the full independence of the Finnish Government in 1918.

But why did the American Government later change its attitude on the right of Russia to the Baltic States and that part of Poland inhabited principally by Russian peoples? The reason is perfectly clear. When the U.S. State Department made its declarations against Russian dismemberment in 1920 and 1922, it thought that the Soviet Republic was soon going to collapse. But when instead Premier Lenin and his colleagues actually consolidated their power, Washington shifted its attitude, not because of the fundamental rights or wrongs of the question, but because it wanted Soviet socialism to remain as weak as possible. In short, the guiding principle in American policy was that a non-Communist, merely liberal, Russian regime had a right to the old Tsarist frontiers, but not a radical, Communist one.

There can be no doubt that economically speaking the Baltic States, which were conquered by the Tsars back in the eighteenth century, belong naturally with Russia and Russia with them. Peter the Great acquired Estonia and Latvia in 1721 and Catherine the Great Lithuania in 1795. The only year-round ice-free ports which Russia had in the west and which were directly accessible to the Atlantic Ocean were in these territories. Prior to the First World War almost a third of Russia's exports and imports went through these outlets to the sea. The artificial separation of the Baltic States from the U.S.S.R. in 1918 proved an immense handicap to the Soviet Union and disrupted the economies of those three countries themselves.

It became widely believed that between the two world wars the Baltic nations were beautiful little demo-

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cracies functioning on behalf of liberty. This was far from true. As Walter Lippmann wrote in 1943, these three states "some years before the war fell into the hands of fascist rulers and became the focal points of intrigue against Russia. Thus the last Lithuanian parliament had been dissolved in 1927 by a conspiracy of army officers; the Latvian Republic became fascist in 1934; and Estonia, though it never went quite that far, fell under strong fascist influence between 1933 and 1937."²¹

In mid-June of 1940, as France and the Low Countries crumpled under the Nazi *blitzkrieg*, the Soviet Government charged that the three Baltic States had violated their mutual-aid pacts with the U.S.S.R. and sent in troops to occupy them. This Soviet move, however hard-boiled in conception and execution, definitely forestalled Hitler, who all along had been casting covetous eyes in the direction of these weak and strategically situated nations. A few weeks after the Soviet military occupation, newly elected parliaments in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania proclaimed their countries Soviet Republics; and in August the Supreme Soviet officially admitted them into the U.S.S.R. For the Baltic peoples this was a logical step, particularly from the economic viewpoint. For the Soviet Union it was an essential development from the viewpoint of self-defense against the Nazi threat; and a justified recovery of lands wrested from the U.S.S.R. in defiance of historical right.

An even clearer case for the revision of Soviet boundaries during the Second World War concerned Eastern Poland, with its population of around 11,000,000 in 1939 consisting of approximately 5,000,000 Ukrainians, 2,500,000 Belorussians, 2,500,000 Poles and 1,000,000 Jews. The regions comprising Eastern Poland, except a small

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southern area known as East Galicia, were all part of the old Tsarist Empire and were taken away from an exhausted Soviet Russia under the Treaty of Riga in 1921 by the Polish imperialists after their unprovoked war of aggression against the Socialist Republic. At the time even the anti-Soviet Allies protested against Poland, which had also seized the Lithuanian capital, Vilna (Vilnius), grabbing so much territory that was obviously non-Polish. In fact, before the Polish-Soviet war broke out, the Supreme Council of Allied Powers had recommended as a just boundary the so-called Curzon Line, which was first officially proposed at a meeting in 1919 presided over by America's Under Secretary of State, Frank L. Polk. The Curzon Line assigned to Soviet Russia almost all of what later became Eastern Poland.

In September of 1939, as the Polish Government was collapsing under the impact of Hitler's attack, the Soviet army marched into Eastern Poland and occupied it. This was an important and reasonable anti-Nazi move and had not the Soviets effected it, the Germans undoubtedly would have taken over Eastern Poland themselves. To repeat what Prime Minister Churchill said in a speech shortly afterwards,* "That the Russian armies should stand on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi menace."

In October, 1939, the peoples of Eastern Poland voted overwhelmingly to join the Belorussian and Ukrainian Republics and thus to become part of the U.S.S.R. The new Polish-Soviet boundary, along most of its 400-odd miles, was close to the old Curzon Line. At the end of World War II Poland received territorial compensation in acquiring from Germany substantial regions in

* See p. 9.

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Silesia and East Prussia, including 300 miles of the Baltic coastline. Following the defeat of the Nazis in 1945, systematic repatriation took place between the Belorussian and Ukrainian Republics, on the one hand, and Poland on the other. Hence today there are relatively few Poles left in the Soviet Union and relatively few Belorussians or Ukrainians still living in Poland.

Again to quote Winston Churchill, he told the British House of Commons in February, 1944, that at the Teheran Conference "I took occasion to raise personally with Marshal Stalin the question of the future of Poland. . . . We ourselves have never in the past guaranteed, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, any particular frontier line to Poland. We did not approve of the Polish occupation of Vilna in 1920. The British view in 1919 stands expressed in the so-called Curzon Line, which attempted to deal, at any rate partially, with the problem. . . . Russia has the right of reassurance against future attacks from the west, and we are going all the way with her to see that she gets it, not only by the might of her arms but by the approval and assent of the United Nations. . . . I cannot feel that the Russian demand for a reassurance about her western frontiers goes beyond the limits of what is reasonable or just. Marshal Stalin and I also spoke and agreed upon the need for Poland to obtain compensation at the expense of Germany both in the north and in the west."²²

Bessarabia in the Balkans raises another question concerning alleged Soviet aggression. It was stolen, as all the world knows, from Russia in 1918 by Romania. Bessarabia had been an integral part of the Tsarist Empire since 1812 and in fact fifty-five years previous to Romania's establishment as an independent state. Its an-

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nexation by the Romanians was never recognized by the Soviet Union or even by the United States. As in the case of the Baltic States, Bessarabia's forced separation from the U.S.S.R. proved very bad economically, especially for Bessarabia. By applying heavy diplomatic pressure on Romania in 1940, the Soviet Government was able to regain this province without violence; and also took from Romania at the same time Northern Bukovina with its primarily Ukrainian population.

The case of Finland belongs in a special category. The Soviet invasion of Finland in the fall of 1939 was certainly an act of aggression and a terrible mistake. It has always seemed to me that had the Soviet Government been more patient in this situation, it might well have been able to work out a reasonably satisfactory redrawing of the Finnish frontier. However, the Nazis had gone on the rampage and all Europe was in turmoil. The Soviets were justifiably feeling extremely nervous about their western borders and the possibility of soon having to defend them. One of the weakest spots was in the vicinity of Leningrad, which was the Soviet Union's second city and an industrial, munitions, shipping and naval center of paramount importance. Here the boundary with Finland was less than twenty miles away. To imagine a quite comparable situation, what would the United States do if Long Island, up to within twenty miles of New York City, belonged to a small, hostile, foreign nation that was continually intriguing with foreign Powers against the security and welfare of the U.S.A.?

At any rate the Soviet army struck against the Finns and outraged the public opinion of the democratic world. The result, however, was that in the Finnish-Soviet peace

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treaty of 1940 the frontier near Leningrad was pushed back some eighty miles and the U.S.S.R. acquired some strategic territory farther north. A U.S. Army manual used during the World War II for information officers and orientation course teachers said, in reference to the Soviet attack on Finland: "Without attempting any moral judgments on the matter, it is enough to state the military fact that had the U.S.S.R. not acted so, the Allied cause would be weaker today." Actually, the Soviets later held Leningrad against Hitler only with the utmost difficulty and sacrifice. Both the Finns and the Nazis attacked from the north; and the new border may well have been the decisive factor in saving the city.

The fact that Finland so readily joined hands with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union in 1941, in what President Roosevelt called "this hateful partnership," indicated that it was scarcely the pure-hearted little democracy which anti-Soviet propagandists had painted it. During the Second World War the Finns and Nazis used the Arctic port of Petsamo as an important submarine and airplane base against Allied ships sailing the northern route with supplies for the U.S.S.R. So it is clear why, when Soviet Russia made peace with Finland in 1944, it demanded and received permanently Petsamo and a small surrounding region. In this treaty the revised Finnish frontiers which the Soviets had won in 1939-40 were also restored.

After the downfall of Hitler the Soviet Union, with the concurrence of President Truman and Prime Minister Atlee in the Potsdam Declaration, annexed the north-east third of East Prussia, including the big Baltic port of Koenigsberg, which was renamed Kaliningrad after the late Mikhail Kalinin, prominent peasant and government

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leader in the Communist regime. This again meant a strengthening of the U.S.S.R.'s western defenses, but also comes under the heading of spoils of victory. In June, 1945, the Czechoslovak Government ceded to Soviet Russia and the Ukrainian Republic the province of Carpatho-Ukraine, or Ruthenia, a heavily forested, mountainous strip of land at the eastern tip of Czechoslovakia. Approximately 500,000 of its 725,000 inhabitants were Ukrainians.

Following the defeat of Japan by the United Nations, the Soviet Union, on the basis of agreements made between Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt and Premier Stalin at the 1945 Yalta Conference, took over southern Sakhalin Island, which the Japanese had acquired from Russia after the war of 1904-05; and the Kurile Islands, from which the Tsarist Government had agreed to withdraw in 1875 in return for Japan relinquishing its claims to any part of Sakhalin. These acquisitions in the Far East considerably improved the Soviet defensive position in that quarter. Finally, in 1944, the Tannu Tuva People's Republic, a region south of Siberia in Central Asia which had been a colony of Tsarist Russia but whose national independence the Soviets recognized in 1918, voted to join the U.S.S.R. as an Autonomous Region.

In my opinion the various Soviet territorial acquisitions from 1939 to 1945 do not, despite the Finnish venture, add up to aggression or imperialism. In the first place, with the exception of the Carpatho-Ukraine, East Galicia, Northern Bukovina and part of East Prussia — all small regions — the Soviet Union added only territory to which it had an historical claim through the expansion of the Tsarist Empire. And the only territories to which

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it still lays claim were part of pre-revolutionary Russia. These are two districts in northeastern Turkey: Kars and Ardahan, which were part of Russian Armenia and which the Soviets were forced to cede to the Turks under the Brest-Litovsk treaty imposed by imperial Germany. Soviet Armenians consider these territories as an Armenian *terra irredenta*.

In the second place, 95 percent of the populations incorporated by the U.S.S.R. since 1930 were ethnically Belorussian or Ukrainian and therefore properly belonged to the Soviet family of nations. In the third place, except for Tannu Tuva, all the Soviet annexations corresponded with clear and definite security interests of the U.S.S.R.

In line with the third point, we ought, I believe, to make a special effort to comprehend the imperative necessity which the Russians feel about having strategic boundaries that will provide relative security against aggression by land and sea. The United States has always been protected by vast oceans to both east and west; yet even so it has insisted upon military bases in the Atlantic and Pacific hundreds and thousands of miles beyond its two coastlines. For centuries Britain has had the effective water barrier of the English Channel. But Russia ever since its rise to statehood has repeatedly had to cope with potential and actual enemies just over its borders, east, west and south — borders that today stretch out approximately 19,000 miles and abut on eleven different countries. No Great Power has been so vulnerable to attack from so many directions; none has actually suffered in its history from so many invasions on the part of hostile nations. If the Russians sometimes appear apprehensive about foreign aggression, we can well understand why.

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The question remains whether Soviet actions since 1945 spell military aggression or indicate a will to such aggression. Admittedly the Soviet Government has committed a number of serious errors in foreign policy during these post-war years, such as its failure to withdraw its troops from Iran at the agreed-upon time in 1946, its too-frequent use of the veto in the Security Council of the United Nations, and its harsh and mistaken attitude towards the Tito regime in Yugoslavia. But I am convinced that during this period the U.S.S.R. has not been guilty of aggression; and that it intends no aggression in the future.

On the basis of agreements with Great Britain, France and the United States after the final defeat of Hitler, the Soviet Government for several years kept military contingents in the western border states, in Bulgaria and in Iran. But except for the Iranian incident, which was finally settled peacefully through a Soviet-Iranian accord, Soviet troops have been withdrawn on schedule. There are still Soviet forces in Austria and Eastern Germany,* but American, British and French troops likewise remain in Austria and Western Germany. This unfortunate situation is due to the fact that the Big Four, with Soviet Russia certainly bearing its share of the blame, have been unable to agree upon peace treaties for Austria and a unified Germany.

As to Soviet influence in foreign countries, most of the Soviet Russians of course wish socialism to triumph everywhere just as most Americans would like democratic capitalism to triumph everywhere. The Soviets, however, have never favored trying to extend Communist prin-

* A few Soviet contingents are also stationed by agreement in Hungary and Poland in order to safeguard communications with the Soviet forces in Austria and Germany respectively.

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ciples to other lands through the means of armed invasion. They have instead supported the thesis that "Revolution cannot be exported," but must be the outcome of indigenous radical movements on the part of whatever peoples are concerned. Especially since Joseph Stalin wrested leadership from Leon Trotsky in 1927, the Soviet Republic has pursued the idea of "building socialism in one country" and letting the successful example of Soviet socialism serve as a spur to other nations. The Soviet method, then, of spreading socialism is primarily that of rendering moral encouragement and ideological stimulus.

Let us for a moment compare the course of the Russian Revolution with that of the other great European upheaval of modern times — the French Revolution of 1789. The latter, after approximately ten years of bloody struggle among the revolutionaries themselves, fell into the hands of an ambitious and aggressive military dictator, Napoleon Bonaparte, who made himself First Consul. Five years later, in 1804, Napoleon had himself crowned Emperor of France and was soon marching his armies all over Europe, defeating, subjugating and annexing country after country on the continent in his endeavor to set up a "Grand Empire." After his threats of invading England had come to nothing, he undertook in 1812 the disastrous campaign against Russia.

Although Napoleon represented a reaction against the Revolution, he maintained certain of the fundamental economic and social changes effected by it. And before he was finally defeated at Waterloo in 1815, he and his armies had spread anti-feudalistic ideas and institutions over much of Europe. Here indeed was a patent example of an aggressive nation and government propa-

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gating their doctrines abroad by the sword. The Russian Revolution, on the other hand, has at no point deteriorated into a military dictatorship or adopted the policy of seeking to impose the Communist way of life on other peoples through military aggression.

The Soviet Government as such took no part in either the Third International (the Comintern), which went out of existence in 1943; or in the Communist Information Bureau (the Cominform), founded in 1945 to function as a coordinating body among the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe, France and Italy. The Soviet Communist Party of course has wielded enormous influence in these two international organizations and Communist Parties in every country have in general adopted policies in agreement with those of the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet Government itself.

Foreign Communists claim, however, that they are not automatically following a Soviet line, but that being Marxists, they tend to think in the same manner as their fellow-Marxists in the U.S.S.R. and to reach the same conclusions. Their primary intellectual allegiance, they assert, is to Marxism as a science; and it is to that they render discipline. We must indeed recognize the possibility that rational men the world over in the field of social science, as well as natural science, may arrive at the same conclusions. As modern science has developed, thinkers and researchers in different countries have more and more found themselves in agreement on many different facts and principles. The Communists point out that such parallelism in thought flowing across national boundaries is being widely utilized today to brand and prosecute non-Soviet Communists as Soviet agents. And they have satirized the reasoning involved by suggesting

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the following syllogism: Joseph Stalin believes that 2 and 2 make 4; Mr. X in the U.S.A. believes that 2 and 2 make 4; therefore Mr. X is a dangerous Soviet agent.

Non-Soviet Communists do not deny, however, that since the Soviet Communist Party was the first one to put across a successful revolution and to build socialism, Communists everywhere naturally take into consideration the Soviet Party's great experience and prestige, and tend to defer, perfectly freely, to its wisdom. With the recent rise of a triumphant Communist Party in a second major Power, China, it is improbable that the Soviet Communists will continue to play such a paramount role as heretofore in the world Communist movement.

Yet even granting the extreme — and I believe incorrect — view that Communist Parties the world over slavishly obey the orders of the Kremlin, the aim of these Parties, as repeatedly set forth in official books, pamphlets, newspapers, speeches, demonstrations and political campaigns, is not to embroil their respective nations in war, but to establish socialism in their native lands and urge on the populations to world peace. One of the most effective slogans of the Russian Communist Party in the Revolution of 1917 was precisely "Peace." Ever since then Communist Parties everywhere have steadily emphasized the peace issue, and in fact to such an extent that capitalist governments have considered it necessary continually to warn their peoples against "Communist peace propaganda." So, even if Moscow is laying down this anti-war line for foreign Communist Parties, it is not one that can sensibly be interpreted as a call to international aggression.

Plainly, the danger of "Soviet aggression" must be distinguished from the tendency in one country or an-

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other for Communist movements, exploiting backward economic and social conditions, to come into power. Western propaganda has illogically striven to equate these two alleged dangers and to brand vigorous Communist political action anywhere as an example of and due to Soviet aggression.

This loose use of the term "aggression" is typical of the vehement yet vague charges which the governments, press and radio of the Western World fling about in reference to the artificially concocted Soviet menace. American commentators constantly talk as if the militant propaganda emanating from the Soviet Union were itself equivalent to military aggression. Perhaps such propaganda can be classified as "ideological aggression"; but if so, then the United States and England, with high-powered press and radio networks circling the globe, can certainly be accused of the same thing. The main point, however, is the necessity for distinguishing clearly between *military* and *ideological* aggression. Throughout modern times various revolutionary governments, highly organized religions and dissenting philosophies have done their best to spread their particular messages throughout the world.

Americans and the American Republic have been active from the beginning in secular missionary work. It was President Thomas Jefferson who said, "Nor are we acting for ourselves alone, but for the whole human race."²³ There is nothing reprehensible as such in a particular country or some group in a particular country having a sense of world mission and trying to get their ideas across national frontiers and into the minds of the various peoples of the earth. With the remarkable development of techniques of communication during the

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twentieth century, the opportunities for effective international propaganda have of course greatly increased. Soviet Russia has taken advantage of these opportunities to further the cause of universal socialism, as has the United States on behalf of democratic capitalism. In neither case is it reasonable or accurate to describe such propaganda as "aggression."

What many Americans in particular seem unable to grasp is the indigenous origin, the fundamental motivation and the broad scope of the revolutionary movements which have been sweeping into the vacuum left by the downfall of the Axis and achieving state power throughout much of Europe and Asia. In an address in 1951, Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas well described what is happening: "The plain fact is that the world is in a revolution which cannot be bought off with dollars. There are rumblings in every village from the Mediterranean to the Pacific. A force is gathering for a mighty effort. We think of that force as Communistic. Communists exploit the situation, stirring every discontent and making the pot boil. The revolutions which are brewing are not, however, Communist in origin nor will they end even if Soviet Russia is crushed in war.

"The revolutionaries are hungry men who have been exploited from time out of mind. This is the century of their awakening and mobilization. . . . The spirit which motivates these people is pretty much the same as the one which inspired the French and American Revolutions. . . . The complaints of the peasants of Asia are just as specific as those in our own Declaration of Independence; and to the people involved they are just as important. . . . These people, though illiterate, are intelligent. The people of Asia have a catalogue of

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specific complaints. The absence of medical care always comes first. The absence of schools is always second. Then comes land reform. . . . The right to vote, the right to elect a representative government, the power to expel and punish corrupt officials — these too are important claims to reform. Finally they have a new sense of nationality . . . an exultant feeling of independence and resentment against intermeddling by outside powers.”²⁴

Justice Douglas makes it clear that the primary reason for today's revolutions is not Soviet propaganda, plots or intervention, but a deep-seated reaction against poverty, starvation, disease, graft, cultural backwardness, exploitation by feudal land-owners, and foreign domination. As one keen observer puts it: “To assert that the U.S.S.R. causes Communist revolutions wherever they occur is like saying that the first horse to finish a race causes the other horses to finish!”²⁵ When native Communist Parties win leadership of the masses, popular unrest and upsurge is already well under way.

In important instances the post-war upheavals have been both anti-Soviet and anti-Communist. This is true of the Labor Government's attempt to establish socialism in England; of Prime Minister Nehru's efforts to strengthen and stabilize India's newly won freedom; of Iran's nationalistic and anti-Western move, led by a right-wing administration, in taking over ownership of the country's southern oil wells from British interests; and of Egypt's drive to oust the English from the Suez Canal Zone and the Sudan.

Obviously the Soviet Russians were very happy when in the Far East the Chinese Communists, led by Mao Tse-tung, finally overthrew in 1949 the reactionary and corrupt government of Chiang Kai-shek and set up the

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People's Republic of China. But the Soviets had not given Mao Tse-tung and his followers either military or material aid. The country which supplied most arms to the Chinese Communists, though indirectly, was the United States, since large quantities of the more than \$4,000,000,000 worth of American *materiel* for Chiang's armies reached the Communists through secret sale by grafting officials or through capture from the demoralized Nationalist forces. The Communists also obtained valuable arms from the Japanese invaders after their collapse in the summer of 1945.

The Communist-controlled Chinese Government naturally established close and friendly relations with the Soviet Government and in 1950 cemented those relations in a detailed and mutually advantageous Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid. In this pact Soviet Russia agreed to give the Chinese Government long-term credits for payments for Soviet industrial and railway equipment. It also agreed to withdraw Soviet troops from the harbor of Port Arthur not later than 1952 and to discuss the special Soviet privileges at the harbor of Dairen after the conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty.

There was nothing in the Chinese-Soviet Treaty to bear out the charge of the U.S. State Department that the Chinese Republic had become subject to the control and exploitation of Moscow. Of course, Soviet Russia has great influence in Communist China, but that does not prove that President Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues are puppets of the Kremlin. And it does not seem likely that the proud new China, with its population of almost half a billion and finally free from the shackles of Western imperialism, is going to submit to the domination of any foreign Power whatever. In the fall of 1951, the

Indian Ambassador to China, Mr. Sardar K. M. Panikkar, commenting on Soviet-Chinese relations, took the view, according to *The New York Times* correspondent at New Delhi, "that the greater weight of influence was on the Chinese side. In other words, he thought that the Soviet Union was more influenced by the importance of China than Peiping was by Moscow."²⁸ I do not think that any reasonable person can legitimately claim that the success of the Chinese Communist Revolution and the subsequent course of Chinese affairs have constituted Soviet aggression.

If we turn our attention to Eastern Europe, we shall see that such aggression has not taken place there either. Towards the end of World War II the Soviet armies marched into Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Austria not as aggressors, but in pursuit of the Nazi, Hungarian and Romanian forces which had earlier invaded the U.S.S.R. Soviet troops occupied Bulgaria, which had been an ally of Hitler. While Soviet soldiers and occupation authorities remained stationed, by international agreement, in these various countries, they of course actively encouraged the liquidation of the old fascist elements and the establishment of People's Republics dedicated to drastic social-economic reform and favoring friendly relations with the U.S.S.R.

That such governments, firmly supported or controlled by the domestic Communist Parties, finally did come into being along the Soviet border from the Black Sea to the Baltic is hardly to be attributed to Soviet aggression. Soviet influence has naturally been especially strong in these nations because the Red Army liberated them from the Nazi yoke; because, with the exception of Hungary and Romania, their peoples are dominantly Slavic

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and feel a deep kinship with the Slavs of Soviet Russia; and because close economic and political relations with the U.S.S.R. seem to their national self-interest.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union itself has brought pressures to bear for the establishment in these lands of peaceful and friendly regimes, instead of governments bitterly hostile to the U.S.S.R. and ready to serve once more as springboards for military assault against it. Fortunately, high officials of the American Government have clarified this situation for us. At a meeting of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship in New York's Madison Square Garden on November, 14, 1945, the Honorable Dean Acheson, then Under Secretary of State, told the audience:

"The attack upon the Soviet Union came from just beyond her western borders. There was grave danger of attack from just beyond her eastern border. We can get some idea of the consequences of this attack — the second of its kind in a quarter of a century — if we imagine the United States invaded by the German Wehrmacht, and an area roughly comparable to the New England and Middle Atlantic States almost completely devastated. If we imagine this area as including not only the industrial centers of New York, Boston and Pittsburgh, but a large part of the Middle Western bread basket and a third of our population as well, we can learn what aggression means to the Soviet people. We can understand also the measure of their determination to prevent it.

"We understand and agree with them that to have friendly governments along their borders is essential both for the security of the Soviet Union and the peace of the world. Secretary Byrnes made this clear beyond doubt

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in his speech of October 31st."²⁷ Mr. Acheson was referring to an address by James F. Byrnes, then U.S. Secretary of State, who, recalling the evolution of the American Good Neighbor policy from the Monroe Doctrine, had said:

"We surely cannot and will not deny to other nations the right to develop such a policy. Far from opposing, we have sympathized with, for example, the effort of the Soviet Union to draw into closer and more friendly association with her Central and Eastern European neighbors. We are fully aware of her special security interests in those countries and we have recognized those interests in the arrangements we have made for the occupation and control of the former enemy states. We can appreciate the determination of the people of the Soviet Union that never again will they tolerate the pursuit of policies in those countries deliberately directed against the Soviet Union's security and way of life."²⁸ Growing hostility against the U.S.S.R. on the part of the West has made the 1945 statements of Acheson and Byrnes even more relevant in this year of 1952.

In the spring of 1948 the Communist elements in the Czechoslovakian coalition government, acting after the resignation of several of the less radical Ministers and fearing a counter-revolutionary movement against the Left under American stimulus, took advantage of the parliamentary situation and set up a new coalition government clearly Communist-dominated. Loud cries of "Soviet aggression" immediately went up throughout Western Europe and the United States, although all Soviet occupation forces had long before left Czechoslovakia. Western anger over the events in Czechoslovakia was certainly not unconnected with the fact that, as Mr.

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Walter Lippmann pointed out, Communist control of the country effectively sealed off one of the main gateways for a military attack on the Soviet Union.

Although I have always regretted that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia took such drastic action, I have never been able to view it as an example of Soviet aggression. Even with Soviet encouragement, the new Czechoslovakian Government could not have been successfully established unless the internal situation and political relationships favored it. Following the Second World War, Eastern Europe's Communist Parties, which had in most cases led the underground struggle against the Nazis, emerged with great strength and prestige; and they everywhere used their new-won power to political advantage. Only in Finland, which also has a long frontier with the Soviet Union, has the Communist Party been too weak to gain a commanding position in the government. Yet in that case, where Soviet aggression would be necessary to bring the Communists into control, there has not been the slightest sign of a Soviet military move in the post-war period; and relations between the Finnish and Soviet Governments have become increasingly amicable.

These observations about the small states bordering Soviet Russia on the west lead naturally to some consideration of the charge that the Soviets seek eventual world domination, if not through outright conquest, then by means of control over foreign Communist Parties. In my judgment the Soviet Union not only can never achieve world domination; it also does not include this aim in its dynamic view of the future. The Marxists do indeed look forward to world socialism or world communism, but they have never envisaged it in terms of one country dominating all other countries. The goal is, rather, a

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Communist form of federalism on an international scale.

The paramount influence of Soviet Russia on its western neighbors is no more a mystery than the like influence of the United States on the countries of Latin America. But when a Communist regime takes over in a major Power such as China, then influence is likely to be a two-way process on an equal basis. And if additional Powers go Communist, the authority of the Soviet Union will grow less and less. All this, I believe, the leaders of the Communist Party and of the Federal Government in the U.S.S.R. recognize as a normal development.

Turning now to what goes on inside Soviet Russia, it seems to me that if Soviet propaganda, intemperate and full of invective as it often is, ever called for military aggression against any nation or nations and urged the dropping of atom bombs upon them, that would indeed indicate aggressive designs on the part of the U.S.S.R. But at no time during the troubled years since World War II has any responsible leader or commentator in Soviet military, governmental, economic, journalistic or cultural affairs made the suggestion that the Soviet army or air fleet should attack any foreign country. Instead, in March, 1951, the Supreme Soviet passed a law declaring any kind of war propaganda illegal throughout the Republic and imposing penalties of up to twenty-five years in jail for its violation.* The Government itself has year after year gone on launching peace campaigns, which the U.S. State Department keeps insisting are altogether phony.

Yet the entire atmosphere in the Soviet Union indicates that both the Government and the people are sincere in their desire for world peace; and that they wish

* See also p. 354.

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to go ahead with their economic upbuilding and the transition to full communism without again having their program wrecked and set back for years by an all-out war. Repeated and reliable reports from the U.S.S.R. since 1945 show that the Soviet people are preoccupied with tremendous projects of construction and that their minds are not dwelling on military conquest. On January 1, 1951, they launched a Fifth Five-Year Plan designed to continue the great economic gains registered in the Fourth Five-Year Plan concluded at the end of 1950.

Soviet socialism as a whole, together with the physical characteristics of the country, definitely makes for the elimination of the chief economic roots of war-making and war-mongering in the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union, from east to west twice the width of the United States and stretching all the way from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean, possesses within its continental domains practically all the raw materials necessary for its economy. It needs no new territories to provide it with natural resources, although it is glad to supplement its own basic wealth through doing business with other nations. The huge size of Soviet Russia, together with its material riches and accelerating economic development, means that it has plenty of room for and can readily support its expanding population. Over-population, which has often been a spur to military conquest, is not a problem in the U.S.S.R.

Furthermore, the economic stability of the Soviet socialist system and the steady rise in the standard of living make altogether needless and irrelevant the classic method of military adventure as a way of temporarily submerging internal crises and sidetracking the revolu-

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tionary discontent of the population. Likewise, because the home market is always sufficient to absorb the goods produced, there is no overwhelming pressure to acquire foreign markets and spheres of influence for getting rid of surplus products. As for private individuals and groups who might profit financially from armaments or some activity connected with war, they simply do not exist, since there is public ownership of the main means of production and distribution.

As an indication of the Soviet Union's peaceful intentions, there is the fact that since the end of World War II it has undertaken no concrete military moves anywhere against any country. On the other hand it carried out extensive demobilization of its armies during 1945, 1946 and 1947. The continual rumors in the West of threatening Soviet troop movements have never turned out to have a basis in fact. However, regular army maneuvers do take place from time to time in the U.S.S.R., as in other nations.

If the Soviet Government were really plotting military aggression against, for example, Western Europe, it would presumably have started its assault before the rearmament of America and the Atlantic Powers had made such headway and at a time, like the fall of 1950, when the United States forces were preoccupied in the Far East. Moreover, the Soviet leaders, if they intended war, would have preferred to see the American army bogged down indefinitely in Korea. Instead, Deputy Foreign Minister Jacob A. Malik, chief Soviet delegate to the United Nations, initiated the conference for a cease-fire and peaceful settlement by his special U.N. broadcast of June 23, 1951.

We must ask, too, whether the Soviets can logically

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favor war, which would be fearfully costly to them, to spread socialism when they are confident that this new system will in due course sweep the earth anyway. Mr. George F. Kennan, present American Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., after citing one outworn statement by Lenin on the inevitability of war, tells us: "Current Stalinist doctrine does not demand war. On the contrary, it also teaches that eventually capitalism will fall largely of its own weight, *i.e.*, as a result of the inner 'contradictions' which the Communists believe it embodies. They see the role of communism as one of hastening the collapse of capitalism and assisting, as a midwife, at the birth of the socialist order. In theory, they seem inclined to regard this as primarily the task of the native Communists in each country, and not of the Soviet Red Army.

"There is nothing in Stalinist doctrine which would make it necessarily the main responsibility of the armed forces of the Soviet Union themselves to overthrow capitalism everywhere by direct military action. This premise would actually seem illogical and improper, from the Communist point of view; for it would imply that capitalism, in the absence of such an attack, would be basically sound and capable of coping permanently with its own 'contradictions.' "29

Finally, we can state that the basic psychology of the Soviet people, reinforced by education, law, historical conditioning, philosophy and economic interests, is definitely anti-war. Unlike the Germans under Hitler, the Russians do not have a background of aggressive militarism. With World War II successfully concluded, they have no humiliating defeat to live down, nor are they out to wreak revenge on anyone. Indeed, in the conflict with fascism they won the greatest military victory in their

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history, overwhelmingly defeating their ancient foe, imperialist Germany. And in the East they evened up old scores with a treacherous aggressor, imperialist Japan. From 1941 to 1945 the Soviet Union rolled up a record of military prowess and glory sufficient to last it indefinitely.

Yet in spite of the remarkable achievements of Soviet soldiers and generals during the late war, there has been no sign of unusual military influence in Soviet governing circles. No Soviet military figure was elevated, for instance, to the position of Foreign Minister, although in the United States General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff during the Second World War, served as Secretary of State from 1947 to 1949. Nor did the Soviet Government send high-ranking military men as envoys to the United States, although General Walter Bedell Smith and Admiral Alan G. Kirk were the American ambassadors to the U.S.S.R. during the immediate post-war years. No Soviet general has become anywhere near as important in non-military affairs as General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was appointed President of Columbia University in 1948 and ran for President of the United States on the Republican ticket in 1952.

Marshal Klimenti Voroshilov has been prominent in Soviet governmental activities for twenty-five years and has long been a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party. But this represents no change since World War II. Although Premier Joseph Stalin was Commander-in-Chief in that conflict, he has always been primarily a civilian figure. Since the war there has been added to the Politburo one military man — Colonel Nikolai Bulganin, who was Vice-Minister of Defense during the struggle with Nazi Germany. It is clear that on the whole

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civilian authority still reigns supreme in the Soviet Union. As Dorothy Thompson has summarized the situation in her column, "Soviet generals are very much in the background. No hint comes out of Russia that they have anything to do with making political policy. American generals are all over the place, and patently do influence political policy."⁸⁰

As for Premier Stalin himself, having successfully seen his country through to the establishment of the first socialist commonwealth in history and having led the Soviet people to victory in the Second World War, it seems likely that he would prefer now to enhance his reputation as a statesman by helping to ensure an era of peace for the U.S.S.R. and mankind. Surely he has no desire to go down in history, like Adolf Hitler, as a notorious leader of military aggression and as one of the most infamous war criminals of all time.

Many Americans think that the outbreak of war in Korea during the summer of 1950 was due to Soviet aggression. I do not believe that we can accept this interpretation. The situation in Korea was a most complex one, aggravated by the continuation of the cold war, the barring of the Chinese People's Republic from the United Nations and the rottenness of the reactionary South Korean regime led by the unspeakable Syngman Rhee. President Rhee had made provocative threats of military action against Communist-controlled North Korea and serious incidents had taken place along the border marked by the 38th parallel. Both North and South Koreans seemed to be spoiling for a fight; and competent observers reported it was only a matter of time before a bitter civil war would break out.

Precisely what occurred on the fateful morning of

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June 25, 1950, still remains shrouded in obscurity. The North Koreans claimed that the South Koreans attacked first; the South Koreans asserted they were blameless, a view promptly adopted by the United States Government and the United Nations. What is absolutely certain is that on the afternoon of June 25 the U.N. Security Council, with the Soviet delegate absent, passed a resolution calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and for the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th parallel.

It seems probable to me that the North Koreans were guilty of the initial aggression; but even if they were not, they committed a colossal political blunder and an unpardonable act of international immorality in continuing their march southward in defiance of the United Nations cease-fire order. This surely constituted deliberate aggression. The Soviet and Communist apologists for the North Koreans have repeatedly argued that the Communists of the East were afraid that South Korea would become a threatening American military bridgehead on the continent of Asia. In my opinion, however, neither this nor any other excuse could justify the North Korean Government in going through with its invasion of South Korea. In so doing it not only brought the entire world to the brink of war, but unleashed a chain of events which led to the devastation of all Korea and worked out disastrously for the North Koreans themselves.

Yet admitting all this, I still claim that the aggression was that of North Korea and not of Soviet Russia; and that foreign intervention on behalf of the North Koreans in the fall of 1950 came from Communist China, which felt menaced by the U.S.-U.N. advance toward the Manchurian border, and not from Communist Rus-

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sia. It is regrettable that the Soviet Union did not use its influence at the outset to dissuade the North Koreans from their mad venture. But, again, its failure to do so was not the same as Soviet aggression or intervention. Finally, as I have already pointed out, the Russians were instrumental in getting under way the long-drawn-out conference for a cease-fire in Korea.

While the Soviet Government, since World War II, has at times acted in an arbitrary, brusque and obdurate manner in the conduct of its foreign relations, it has all along made clear its willingness to make reasonable compromises on behalf of world amity. Despite this attitude, however, the Truman Administration has constantly kept the American people stirred up over the supposed imminence of Soviet aggression.

In the spring of 1948 Administration rumor-mongers spread through the halls of Congress the sensational statement: "We will be at war with Russia in thirty days." About the same time U.S. intelligence agents in Europe sent back word that the Soviet Union was preparing to launch an armed attack on Western Germany. It later turned out, as explained in an official report of the Commission for Reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government, of which ex-President Herbert Hoover was Chairman, that these agents were "mistaken." The character of other far-fetched stories concerning Soviet military moves is well brought out in a 1951 dispatch in *The Chicago Daily News* from its European correspondent: "A wave of resentment swept Paris as the result of what newspapers hint is a deliberate attempt by the American Government to alarm the public on Soviet troop concentrations."

It is no wonder that the conservative *Wall Street*

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Journal declared in April, 1951: "Unfortunately, the tactic of the manufactured crisis has been used so often that neither the Congress nor the people know what they can believe."³¹ In August, 1951, the same newspaper said: "Grim warnings from the Pentagon are largely propaganda. Global war danger is increasing, according to Marshall and Pace. What they really fear is a let-down in the arms program, as fighting subsides in Korea. And they want to be sure Congress will appropriate the full 61 billion dollars they're asking for defense in the current fiscal year. Hence the scare talk. Actually, military advisors and diplomats have no evidence of new Russian moves. A build-up in Soviet satellites got headlines recently, but it's old stuff. Intelligence sources say the danger of war hasn't changed, for better or worse."³²

The myth of Soviet aggression, then, while it hardly serves the cause of peace, does help push through the largest peacetime armaments program in the history of the world. And it discourages any genuine steps to end the cold war and reach a peaceful agreement with the Soviet Government on the basis of mutual advantage. Thus the false proposition that Soviet Russia aims at, works for and intends military aggression has had the most disastrous effects on the formulation of an intelligent foreign policy by the United States and other Western countries. In international affairs, as in other spheres of human relations, disregard of the truth is not sound strategy.

3. *Incitements to War against the U.S.S.R.*

It is natural for Soviet Russia, having been the victim of ruinous aggression during the First and Second World Wars, to wonder whether its enemies are going to make

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a third attempt to put an end to the first socialist commonwealth. The Soviet Government and the Soviet people cannot fail to note, in addition to concrete military steps endangering their country, the constant, provocative and well-publicized war talk against the U.S.S.R., emanating particularly from the United States. The journalistic peak of incitements to war against Soviet Russia occurred, in my opinion, with *Collier's* special edition of October 27, 1951, entitled: "Russia's Defeat and Occupation 1952-1960, Preview of the War We Do Not Want." The editors of *Collier's* devoted this entire issue, including profuse and lurid illustrations, to a melodramatic account of a Third World War. They printed and sold hundreds of thousands of extra copies.

In a foreword *Collier's* stated: "Our over-all conception of this issue was confirmed in study and consultation with top political, military and economic thinkers — including high-level Washington officials and foreign-affairs experts, both here and abroad."³³ This gave the issue a quasi-official standing which was certain to be noted in diplomatic circles throughout the globe. A United States Senator, Margaret Chase Smith of Maine, was one of the twenty-one prominent individuals who wrote a special article for the edition. Others who in like manner contributed to this remarkable enterprise were Hanson W. Baldwin of *The New York Times*; Stuart Chase, economist; Allan Nevins, Professor of History at Columbia University; Walter Reuther, president of the United Automobile Workers of America; Robert Sherwood, dramatist; and Walter Winchell, newspaper columnist and radio commentator.

According to the *Collier's* fantasy, the Soviet Government initiated the Third World War in May, 1952, by

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sending to Belgrade two secret agents to assassinate Marshal Tito (the attempt failed); and then ordering the Albanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian and Romanian armies, backed by fifteen Soviet divisions, to attack Yugoslavia. As one read through the various articles by big-name writers, all suddenly become "experts" on the U.S.S.R., the issue took on more and more the aspect of a streamlined psychological scheme for justifying war against Soviet Russia. And there can be no question that it provided a carefully worked out blueprint for the conquest of the Soviets. Even the bitterly anti-Soviet *New Leader* stated: "While *Collier's* editorially disclaims the theory of preventive war, its special number can be construed, not inaccurately, as a plea for preventive war."⁸⁴

The cover of this edition had a map showing U.N. and U.S. forces in occupation of Moscow, the whole of the Ukraine and all the so-called satellites. And the contents tried to allay the American people's natural apprehension over a war with Russia by picturing the defeat of the Communist bloc as "inevitable." In *Collier's* simple victory program, the American-led coalition knocked out the Russians in three years and a half, with Communist China conveniently deserting the Soviet Union after a little more than a year of conflict and with the Soviet people opportunely rising in revolt against Stalin at the right moment. According to the piece by Marguerite Higgins of the *New York Herald Tribune*, the U.S.S.R. lost 32,000,000 dead during this war.

Russians who saw the *Collier's* preview of World War III must have been simply appalled. We can sense their reaction by imagining our own feelings if a prominent Soviet magazine were to give over a whole issue to describing Soviet Russia's conquest of the United States,

occupation of its key regions and the sovietization of its economy. In fact, a French magazine, *L'Observateur*, satirized *Collier's* idea by precisely reversing it, printing a cover with a Russian soldier standing guard over America and the Red flag flying over the city of Washington. The effect of the *Collier's coup* was far-reaching in Western Europe. Asserted Alexander Werth in *The Nation*: "*Collier's* has managed not only to make the United States odious in the eyes of millions of Europeans — as years of Communist propaganda have not done — but also to make it rather ridiculous."³⁵

Soviet journalism's considered reply to the *Collier's* war issue constituted a dramatic contrast. It took the form of a special series in the January 1, 1952, number of *New Times*, a weekly Moscow magazine published in Russian, English, French, German, Polish, Spanish and Swedish editions. This series, with several contributions from prominent foreign authors, was written as of December, 1955, on the assumption that three years previously the United Nations had put through a Five-Power Peace Pact, the world-wide banning of the atom bomb and a considerable reduction in conventional armaments. The articles described the splendid economic and psychological effects of these agreements throughout Europe and America, and stressed the widespread use of atomic energy for constructive economic purposes.

As the foreword of this "Report from the Future" stated, the 1952 agreements have "not solved all the problems facing the masses in many countries. Nevertheless, the elimination of the immediate threat of war has had a great influence and has relieved international tension. . . . The cold war is over, normal economic relations have been restored between West and East, the

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burden of armaments, which weighed so heavily on the peoples, has been substantially diminished."

During the very same week of *Collier's* sensational issue, *The Saturday Evening Post* published an article by a retired British general, J. F. C. Fuller, calling for the immediate adoption by the Western Powers of a plan completely and permanently to dismember the U.S.S.R. "This means," General Fuller said, "that the Soviet Empire must be dealt with as was the Turkish — that is, split up into its component parts, each part becoming an independent country."³⁶ In this mad scheme the General would have the Western Powers cooperate with an organization known as the Anti-Bolshevik Block of Nations, the A.B.N. *The New Leader* describes this organization of reactionary émigrés as a "fascist band of separatist sects."³⁷

Such open incitements against the Soviet Union have been going on for years; they predated the post-war tensions between the United States and Soviet Russia and were widespread long before the Second World War ended. They had, in truth, already reached a danger point shortly after the great Soviet victory at Stalingrad in February, 1943, when the diehard anti-Soviet elements in America and Europe became horrified at Soviet socialism's immense strength and commenced to refurbish the thesis that Russia was the real enemy. At that time the notion of a war with the Soviets was so much discussed that Maurice Hindus, in his *Mother Russia* published in the spring of 1943, felt obliged to include a whole chapter called, "Will We Have To Fight Russia?" Mr. Hindus, a well-known writer on the U.S.S.R., answered in the negative.

In September of 1944, almost a year before the final

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triumph over the Axis Powers, William C. Bullitt, embittered ex-Ambassador to Soviet Russia, played up the idea of a Third World War in an article in *Life* entitled "The World from Rome." According to Mr. Bullitt, Western civilization was being threatened "by hordes of invaders from the East." Talking about what he claimed was the prevailing viewpoint of the Italians, he wrote: "A sad joke going the rounds in Rome gives the spirit of their hope: What is an optimist? A man who believes that the Third World War will begin in about fifteen years between the Soviet Union and Western Europe, backed by Great Britain and the U.S. What is a pessimist? A man who believes that Western Europe, Great Britain and the U.S. will not dare to fight."³⁸

In 1945, subsequent to President Roosevelt's death and the surrender of the Nazis, the American Government became so concerned over the rising tide of war talk against the U.S.S.R. that it took specific action. Thus on May 26, 1945, over a nation-wide broadcast sponsored officially by the U.S. State Department, Archibald MacLeish, then Assistant Secretary of State, lashed out at the suggestions of an inevitable Armageddon between the United States and Soviet Russia: "There is no necessary reason in the logic of geography, or in the logic of economics, or in the logic of national objectives, why the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union ever should find themselves in conflict with each other, let alone in the kind of conflict reckless and irresponsible men have begun now to suggest."³⁹

In 1947 Paul H. Griffith, National Commander of the American Legion and later Assistant Secretary of Defense, urged President Truman to order an atomic bomb dropped "some place over there" in order to demonstrate

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American support of "the people of the world who wanted to remain free." Mr. Griffith himself revealed this fact in a radio interview at Washington, D. C., on June 6, 1950. Reported *The New York Times*, "Presumably Mr. Griffith meant that a bomb be dropped on the Soviet Union, but this could not be confirmed. . . . Mr. Griffith declined to comment on the meaning of 'some place.'"⁴⁰ However, this coyness ought not to deceive anybody as to what country he had in mind.

Also in 1947 George H. Earle, Democratic ex-Governor of Pennsylvania and former American Minister to Bulgaria and Austria, advocated on the radio an attack on the Soviet Union as soon as possible and without a formal declaration of war. "One nice little bomb dropped on the Kremlin," Earle boasted, "and the Russian people of 165,000,000 would fly to pieces with centrifugal force."⁴¹ Previously Earle had ranted against the Russians over the Town Meeting of the Air and had demolished the straw-man of a Soviet atom-bomb assault on the United States with the violent assertion: "We can and will wipe out every city, town and village in Russia."

During 1948 there took place a mounting crescendo of American war incitements against the Soviet Union. In February, in a letter to *The New York Times*, Mr. Maxwell Anderson, the dramatist, lamented the fact that Russia "tries to give us no provocation that might lead to war" and demanded that the United States force "a showdown of military strength with Russia before Russia's military strength has caught up with ours." Speaking with incredible recklessness, Mr. Anderson concluded: "I don't know how to bring on a crisis, but there are professional diplomats who might know how if our nation were sufficiently aware and had the will to do it."⁴²

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In March former Major General Claire Chennault of the U.S. Air Force told the House Foreign Affairs Committee, as *PM* correspondent Alexander H. Uhl reported it, "that air bases in Western China were superior to those in North Africa for bombing the industrialized areas of Russia in the Ural Mountains. The whole Committee watched with fascination as he pointed out the 'target objectives,' as he called them, on an illuminated globe."⁴³

In May *Newsweek* ran a featured article discussing a recent speech by General George C. Kenney, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Air Command. The General, starting with the pretense that the Soviets might soon assault the United States, outlined plans to carry death and destruction by means of air power to the very vitals of the Soviet Republic. Expanding on the implications of this thesis, *Newsweek* explained that "American strategy called for securing bases around the perimeter of Russia and then striking back from the air. . . ." Planes loaded with atom bombs "would go out from England in very small groups — perhaps in twos and threes. Flying at more than 35,000 feet they would seek to slip into Russia unnoticed. Their targets: first, Moscow — Moscow above all. Then the other large cities of European Russia — Kiev, Leningrad, Kharkov, Odessa. . . . American strategists are thinking . . . in terms of closing the circle of air bases around Russia, making it smaller and smaller, tighter and tighter, until the Russians are throttled. This means getting bases through combined air, sea and ground operations ever closer to Russia's heartland, then using the bases for sustained bombing and guided-missile attacks."⁴⁴

On June 9, 1948, the Soviet Government vigorously

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protested to the American Government against the *Newsweek* article, stating that it violated a United Nations resolution against war propaganda. This resolution in part reads: "The General Assembly condemns all forms of propaganda in whatever country conducted, which is either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression."⁴⁵ The American Government took no action regarding the Soviet protest.

In its issue of Sunday, May 30, 1948, *The New York Times Magazine* published "What Air Power Can—and Cannot—Do," by Hanson W. Baldwin, well-known military expert of the *Times*. Mr. Baldwin discussed frankly some of the chief difficulties in the way of successfully bombing Soviet Russia from the air and thought that ordinary strafing in the daytime would be too dangerous for American planes. "Night bombing," he frankly asserted, "or bombing from high above the clouds would, therefore, be preferable." Yet, complained Mr. Baldwin, "and this is perhaps the greatest disadvantage the offense would suffer in bombing attacks upon Russia, we have no really satisfactory maps of most of the Russian interior." It was this article to which Andrei Vishinsky, then a Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, called attention in an address before the United Nations Assembly at Paris on September 25 as an instance of the open instigation "of war against the U.S.S.R. and the new democracies."

Not to be outdone, *Look* magazine, on June 22, the precise anniversary of the Nazi invasion of Soviet Russia, ran as its lead article, "Air Force Plans for Bombing Russia," as the title was announced on the front cover. The author, Ben Kocivar, declared that he had "recently

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talked about the problem with a number of top Air Force and Navy officials," one of whom at least favored a so-called preventive war against the Soviet Union. The *Look* analysis pointed out that "the only long-range planes we have in operation ready to go are our World War II B-29's with an operating radius of some 2,000 miles. 'Draw a couple of thousand-mile circles around the industrial heart of Russia,' a general told me [Mr. Kocivar], 'and you will see why we must have operating bases outside this country.' The two-thousand-mile ring, as the map shows, borders Greenland, Iceland, England, France, Italy, Greece, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and India. We need these bases not only for offensive operations, but to prevent the Russians from using them against us."⁴⁶

In August, Henry Luce's *Life*, taking up the refrain, printed a detailed description by General Carl Spaatz, retired Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, on how the United States could bomb the Soviet Union into submission. General Spaatz said that "air bases have the same significance that naval bases had in the last century" and that, comparable to the British Empire in its heyday, America must at once secure a global framework of bases for the development of air power. "Space is no longer an effective shield," asserted the General. "Now an attacker would not have to plod laboriously and bloodily along the Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow road to strike at the Russian vitals. The air offers a direct, operationally feasible route for a determined attacker to knock out the industries that it has cost the Russians so much to create."⁴⁷

In September *The Saturday Evening Post*, determined to keep up with its rivals, made its own blood-curdling

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contribution to the master plan of smashing the U.S.S.R. In an article entitled "If War Comes—", Joseph and Stewart Alsop, using the well-worn pretext of a Soviet attack on America, predicted: "From Baku north to Leningrad, from Smolensk east to Novosibirsk, the vitals of the Soviet state will be scorched and destroyed with the terrible fire of the atomic bomb."⁴⁸ Then the authors listed the many places where the United States must have air bases, beyond its own borders, in Europe, the Near East and the Far East.

For 1949 I find in my files a clipping from *The New York World-Telegram* of March 14, with the dateline of Washington, D. C., and reading as follows: "About seventy strategic targets in Russia have been marked by military planners as possible objectives for attack in event of a war, it was learned today. The Air Force has given the Joint Chiefs of Staff documented assurances that the B-36 superbomber could strike every one of these, flying out of bases on this continent and returning without refueling. The targets have been marked off on top-secret maps at the national defense establishment. Reliable military authorities said they include major Soviet industrial centers. All would be within a 4,000-mile radius of air bases in Alaska and Labrador."

In August, 1950, Francis P. Matthews, Secretary of the Navy, told an audience in Boston that the United States should be willing to pay "even the price of instituting a war to compel cooperation for peace." This recommendation of a preventive war against the Soviet Union caused such a scandal in official circles that the next day the U. S. State Department issued a special statement: "Secretary Matthews' speech was not cleared with the Department of State and his views do not represent

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United States policy. The United States does not favor instituting a war of any kind."⁴⁹ Mr. Matthews, however, remained as Secretary of the Navy for eleven months after this episode.

In March, 1951, Lieutenant General Norstad, Commander of the United States Air Forces in Europe, declared at Frankfurt, Germany: "There is no target in the Soviet Union that cannot be attacked by United States bombers."⁵⁰ In April Charles E. Wilson, Director of Defense Mobilization, said at Washington that if Stalin "could see the new bombs, which are far more devastating than anything we knew in the last war, he'd realize that these new bombs will make fine 'calling cards' from the United States for Russia!" Mr. Wilson added the disclaimer: "I hope we never use these bombs — that we never have to — but it is comforting to know that they will be on hand if needed."⁵¹

In May *Look*, one of the most persistent offenders in outlining sensational attacks on the Soviet Union, published an article called, "Can Our A-Bombers Get Through?", with a map showing the chief centers to be bombed in the U.S.S.R. and their exact distance from American air bases. Reported *Look*: "We have ringed Russia with a multitude of airfields, scores of them. Even if by some military miracle all these bases in Germany, England, Spain and North Africa should be denied to us, the U.S. Air Force still could deliver the A-bomb on Russia from air bases in the continental United States. . . . Ten planes, B-50s and B-36s, would cross the frontiers of Russia at approximately the same time from ten different directions. Each would be carrying an atomic bomb, and each would have a target or choice of targets. From the Air Force point of view it would be ideal if

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the weather were extremely murky. . . . Attacking planes would be scheduled over targets at night. They would bomb by radar sighting, which is reasonably accurate."⁵² There can be no doubt about it—*Look* has the plans worked out in meticulous detail.

In November, 1951, Senator J. Allen Frear, Jr., a Delaware Democrat, declared that the United States should drop an A-bomb on the Kremlin. The Senator said: "The one place to use the atomic bomb is at the source of the Korean war. That source is the Soviet. I think the Soviet has given us provocation."⁵³ The Very Reverend J. Brooke Mosley, Dean of the Cathedral Church of St. John in Wilmington, promptly sent to Senator Frear a telegram of protest, reading: "This is suggesting that we immediately destroy 100,000 civilian men, women and children in an act of murderous aggression. I believe that such an amazing recommendation should be labeled for what it plainly is: a morally irresponsible, vicious and bloody suggestion, unworthy of this country and certainly unworthy of Christian people."⁵⁴

In March, 1952, *The Washington Post* broke the story of the astounding passages in Major General Robert W. Grow's diary, written while he was U.S. military attaché in Moscow and later presumably photocopied secretly by Communist agents during the General's visit to Frankfurt, Germany. The quotations were reproduced in a book published in Eastern Germany by a former British officer. Typical entries in General Grow's diary for 1951 were: January 27— "The bridge here [at Rostov] is best target in S. Russia. This, together with bridge over Kuban R. at Kavkazskaya, would cut off all the Caucasus except for poor line to Astrakhan which could easily be

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cut"; February 5— "We need a voice to lead us without equivocation: Communism must be destroyed. . . . This war cannot be conducted according to Marquis of Queensberry rules. . . . We must employ every subversive device to undermine the confidence and loyalty of Soviet subjects for their regime. . . . Anything, truth or falsehood, to poison the thoughts of the population."⁵⁵

On April 28, 1952, the U.S. Army initiated court-martial proceedings against General Grow "on charges of having improperly recorded secret military information in private records and of having failed to safeguard such classified information."⁵⁶ In July an army court-martial found Grow guilty of these charges and sentenced him to "a reprimand and suspension from command for six months."⁵⁷ The conviction was to be reviewed by higher army authorities.

Morally on the same plane as American threats of war or bombing against the U.S.S.R. have been the various suggestions made in the United States to assassinate Premier Joseph Stalin. The worst example I have seen of this outright incitement to murder appeared in *The American Magazine* of February, 1951, under the title "Why Doesn't Somebody Kill Stalin?" The article was featured on the cover. Its author was Ellsworth Raymond, who served for six years as a political analyst and translator for the American Embassy in Moscow and who during World War II was stationed in Washington as Chief of the U.S.S.R. Economic Section, Military Intelligence, U.S. Army General Staff.

Mr. Raymond started his shameful article as follows: " 'Wouldn't it be a wonderful thing if somebody killed Stalin?' This is a question I've heard over and over since the cold war turned hot. Many people today blame the

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world's troubles on this one man, who has held Russia in his iron grip for twenty-five years. They believe his death would bring peace to mankind."⁵⁸ The author goes on to show that unfortunately Stalin is very well protected against assassins and outlines the many precautions the Soviet leader has taken. In the middle of the piece there is a picture of Premier Stalin with the reproduction of a target and its concentric circles superimposed over his face. The obvious intent is to suggest that someone should shoot for the bull's-eye.

In August, 1951, the publishing house of Farrar, Straus and Young brought out a new novel by Sterling Noel called *I Killed Stalin*. The story is told in the first person and the advertisements played up the quotation: "The date was 1959 when the most dangerous manhunt in the world was ended."⁵⁹ This registers the fact that the "hero" of the book finally tracked down Stalin and shot him to death. Eton Books later published the novel in a cheap, paper-bound edition. The back cover had a representation of Stalin lying dead with a large blood-stain on his tunic just over the heart. Again to reverse the situation, imagine the reaction of Americans in every walk of life if a leading Soviet magazine ran an article called "Why Doesn't Somebody Kill Truman?" and a Soviet publisher followed this up a few months later by issuing a book with the title "I Killed Truman!"

We must not blink the fact that terrorism in foreign lands is a method that now definitely figures in the minds of American officials. In September, 1951, the American Congress passed a Mutual Security Act, signed by President Truman, which sets aside the handsome total of \$100,000,000 to finance the activities of "selected persons who are residing in or escapees" from Soviet Russia or

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any country in the Communist bloc. An amendment incorporated in the new law reads that this sum is to be used "either to form such persons into elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes." It is the vague clause "for other purposes" which carries the most sinister connotation.

In October, 1951, Congressman Charles J. Kersten, Wisconsin Republican and sponsor of the amendment in question, publicly protested that a new United Nations code under consideration would conflict with the American legislation. He was referring to Section 5 of "Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind," prepared by the U.N. International Law Commission. This section outlaws "the undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a state, of terrorist activities in another state, or the toleration by the authorities of a state, of organized activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in another state."

In a letter to Warren R. Austin, chief United States delegate to the United Nations, Mr. Kersten said that the enactment of the proposed U.N. code "might prevent groups in this country, as well as our Government, from assisting in the liberation of the peoples of Eastern European countries and other countries enslaved by the Communist tyranny." He added that "one of the main objectives of a real liberation movement is to strike terror into the hearts of the Communist tyrants. . . . Liberation will not be achieved merely by propaganda and parliamentary maneuver."⁶⁰ Mr. Austin replied to the frank and undiplomatic Representative from Wisconsin that "the attempt to restore a people's freedom does not seem to merit the characterization of 'terrorist.'"⁶¹

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The Soviet Government, however, felt that Mr. Kersten knew what his amendment was meant to accomplish better than Mr. Austin; and in November, 1951, protested officially to the U.S. Government that the Mutual Security Act violated the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreements made in 1933 at the time of American recognition of the Soviet Union. The Soviet note charged that the Act "constitutes crass intervention of the United States in the internal affairs of other countries. At the same time it represents unparalleled violation of the standards of international law and is incompatible with the normal relations between countries and respect for state sovereignty. The adoption of such a law cannot be regarded as other than an aggressive act aimed at further complicating relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. . . . The law envisages financing persons and armed groups in the territory of the Soviet Union and a number of other states for carrying out subversive activity and sabotage within the above states."⁶² We must grant that the Soviet Government presents a very strong case.

This matter of the Mutual Security Act ties in closely with the general saber-rattling against Soviet Russia and the whole hysterical atmosphere prevailing in America. The United States Government has done little to discourage this state of mind. President Truman could have vetoed the Mutual Security Act; and from 1948 to 1952 he or his Cabinet officers could have administered some effective rebuke to the American *provocateurs* of war. Instead a high Government official, the Secretary of the Navy, joined, as we have seen, in the hate-Russia, hit-Russia chorus. In fact, it must be admitted that the war incitements aid and abet the Truman-Acheson foreign

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policy by conditioning the people of the United States to the idea of American-Soviet hostilities and by creating a psychology favorable to colossal armaments.

In this section I have included only the highlights in provocative statements carried by the American press calling for or describing war with or subjugation of the Soviet Union. Because I listen to the radio so infrequently, I have undoubtedly missed many similar utterances over the air which were not reproduced in the newspapers. And in any case I do not pretend that my coverage of the press has been thorough. But the quotations I have given, a number of them from officials or ex-officials of the U.S. Government or armed forces, are representative of an influential group in the United States. Although this group is a minority one at present, it is conceivable that a swing in the political pendulum could bring it into power.

Here we have one set of reasons why the Soviet leaders and the Soviet people harbor some doubts as to America's peaceful intentions. Nor is it only people in Soviet Russia or other Communist lands who are apprehensive about where the United States is heading. Mr. Frank Owen, editor of the conservative *London Daily Mail*, recently remarked that American war hysteria was "not only terrific but terrifying." And Professor Arnold Toynbee, noted British historian, was so appalled by what he learned that after returning from a visit to America in 1952, he coined for his countrymen the slogan, "No Annihilation without Representation."

A leading Republican, Mr. John Cowles, President of *The Minneapolis Star and Tribune*, summed up the matter in *Look* in October, 1951, when he wrote: "Many highly intelligent Europeans and Asians, individuals who

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loathe Russian totalitarianism and believe completely in the democratic ideal, fear that through ineptness the United States is going to blunder into war with Russia, or that we will become so provoked at Russia's exasperating conduct that we will ourselves precipitate war."⁶³

Actions are of course more important than words. Yet in the tense situation that has developed since the Second World War, widely publicized statements that threaten the Soviets with armed violence, bombing, military conquest and dismemberment can hardly be said to help the cause of international amity. Such fulminations, furthermore, can be interpreted as a conscious effort to counteract the American people's traditional longing for peace. Yet some of those who indulge in this bombastic war talk evidently do not themselves realize fully the serious implications of what they are saying. And their attitude is typical of the immaturity which many keen observers see as a widespread trait of American political life.

While Soviet writers, speakers and government officials currently use harsh and vituperative language only too often in reference to foreign countries, their public pronouncements do not threaten war, aggression or any incendiary act on the part of the Soviet armed forces. There is to be found in the Soviet press not a single statement by anyone concerning war that is comparable to the shocking, clenched-fist abuse which pours forth year after year from the United States. The fundamental attitude of the Russians is well represented, I venture to suggest, in the new legislation outlawing war propaganda throughout the U.S.S.R.*

* Cf. p. 328.

CHAPTER IX

CO-EXISTENCE OR CO-DESTRUCTION?

1. *The Madness of a Third World War*

Those Americans who talk so blithely about knocking out the Soviet Union in a quick atom-bomb war and who draw up cocky blueprints for the conquest of the U.S.S.R. know very little about either modern warfare or modern communism. They are essentially political dreamers out of touch with reality and the victims of their own foolish propaganda. They are the sort who spread the silly story that Hitler would have defeated the Soviet Government in short order, except that his invading troops treated the Russians so badly that they decided not to revolt against Stalin after all. These wishful thinkers, preoccupied with their fantasies of Soviet doom, choose to forget or ignore the lessons of modern European history, the fate of Napoleon, the immensity of the Russian tableland, the coldness of the Russian winter, the heroism of the Russian people and, above all, everything that the Soviets accomplished in the Second World War.

In this year 1952, however, Soviet Russia is a good deal more powerful than in 1941 when the Nazis attacked. Seven additional years of peacetime planning have advanced it far beyond pre-war strength as regards both its economic system and armaments. It possesses both the atom bomb in various calibres and improved jet planes.

Also there is not the slightest indication that the Soviet people, whatever their dissatisfactions, are in a mood to overthrow the Stalin regime or to greet a fresh wave of invaders as saviors. Indeed, the Soviet Government, having led the nation successfully through the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45, as the Russians call it, and then to complete recuperation during the post-war years, is more firmly entrenched than ever before. It is very doubtful indeed that a revolutionary movement can make headway in *any* country when, as in the U.S.S.R., its people have recently won a smashing military victory and are enjoying full employment and a steady bettering of economic conditions.

Furthermore, insofar as defense is concerned, a string of buffer-state allies buttress the European borders of Soviet Russia; while in Asia Communist China, with its huge resources, a population of 460 million and a rapidly developing economy, is allied to the U.S.S.R. in a mutual security pact. A war with the Soviet Union clearly means a conflict with the entire bloc of Communist-led countries from Poland and Czechoslovakia in the West to China and North Korea in the East. The military deadlock in the Korean struggle has demonstrated that the Communist-trained troops of the Asiatic mainland are formidable fighters.

The Library of Congress has estimated that the Second World War cost mankind approximately \$4,000,000,000,000—four trillion dollars—and 40,000,000 in human casualties. The United States alone spent \$351,000,000,000 initially, but the ultimate expense — including interest, pensions, bonuses and so on — will come to about \$1,400,000,000,000,000. We can be sure that a Third World War, with atom and quite possibly hydrogen

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bombs showering down upon the great industrial centers of Europe, Asia and America, will be far more costly in terms of property and human life. But the main question I want to ask is this: When the fearful holocaust is over, what will the net gain be for the United States or *any* of the belligerents? In a war to the death between the American-led bloc and the Communist-led bloc will not both sides essentially be losers, no matter who "wins"?

In the *New York Herald Tribune* of June 18, 1951, Mr. Walter Lippmann, the most intelligent columnist of the conservative press in America, made some interesting predictions about the over-all economic and political consequences of a total war between the American and the Communist coalitions. Mr. Lippmann is of the opinion that the United States and its allies would ultimately win the global conflict. But in the process "Western Europe would sink into anarchy, and North America, victorious but weary, impoverished and isolated, would find it hard to preserve the remnants of its freedom and harder still to bring back to life again the stricken civilization of the Western World."

This terrible war, Mr. Lippmann goes on to say, "would be so devastating and prolonged that in all of the Eurasian continent there would be left no governments of sufficient power and authority to restore order and reconstruct the ruined world." The final outcome would be "a vast and formless disorder . . . for in a total war we would have to destroy many of the great cities, and particularly the great centers of administration and communication, in order to achieve victory." Accordingly, Mr. Lippmann prophesies, there would be a breakdown of national states throughout Eurasia, with local dictatorships and terrorist gangs taking their place.

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Mr. Lippmann's analysis makes clear that even an American military triumph in the Great Atomic War would result disastrously for both America and the world at large. It would be a Pyrrhic victory of immeasurable proportions. Instead of preserving and extending democracy, such a duel with communism would probably bring about dictatorships throughout Europe and Asia, and quite possibly in the United States as well. Instead of bolstering capitalism, it would finish it abroad and very much weaken it in America. However, and this Mr. Lippmann does not state, it would create on a widespread scale such catastrophic conditions of poverty, starvation, economic collapse and political chaos that Communist and socialist movements would have a unique opportunity for triumphant resurgence.

Those who think they can contain communism through military power overlook the revolutionary possibilities, if not probabilities, of international conflict. As Dorothy Thompson explains: "Revolutions, to be sure, carry on wars; but wars create the revolutions. For war is, itself, a revolution, embodying the very spirit of violence in its most complete expression, infecting the human spirit, accustoming men to hideous cruelties, dislocating stable economies, and intensifying all the grievances and injustices which are present in every society, by adding to them the *supreme* injustice — injustice against the very order of nature. For in the order of nature, the sons of men bury their parents; but in the order of war, the parents bury their sons. Both ancient and modern revolutions illustrate this inter-relationship between war and revolution."¹

Miss Thompson goes on to state that the French, Russian and Chinese Revolutions all followed on the

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heels of international war. "A handful of Bolshevik agitators," she says, "could never have seized power in Russia but for the anarchy accompanying collapsing armies and the cry of a war-weary people for peace. . . . The Chinese Revolution was also a direct result of over a decade of war. . . . As for Europe, the thought that it could be saved for any order of liberty and law by another war fought on its soil cannot be entertained by anyone with a political mind. Another war would break down the last remnants of political, social and economic order, already undermined by the last war, and regardless of the machinations of the European Communist Parties."

The facts are, of course, that the First World War, in which the Western democracies were victorious, did give the Communists their chance to put across the Russian Revolution. The Second World War, in which the Western Powers were again triumphant, and in which the Fascist Triplice desperately tried to wipe out "the Red peril" in both East and West, opened the gates to Communist domination throughout Eastern Europe and the vast domain of China, with its teeming population; wrecked or bankrupted capitalism in Britain, France, Germany and Italy; and set off the chain reaction of rebellion against Western imperialism all over Asia. The Third World War could comparatively advance the cause of international communism, which might as a result engulf Western Europe, the Middle East and southern Asia. As I have said many times, the Communists are opposed to international war; but if it is imposed upon them, they will most certainly try to take advantage of it to spread their influence and rule.

Where I disagree with Walter Lippmann is in his too easy assumption that the American-led bloc would win

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over the Communist-led bloc in a Third World War. Although I am no more of a military expert than Mr. Lippmann, I think it more likely that in the long-drawn-out struggle both sides would score dramatic successes here and there, but neither would emerge with decisive victory. The result would be a military stalemate; and the two blocs would cease fighting at last because of mutual exhaustion and destruction.

I am convinced that despite all the recent developments in airplanes and atomic bombs, no well-organized modern state possessing a large population, up-to-date armaments and a territory of continental proportions is likely to capitulate without an overwhelming invasion by ground troops. I doubt whether American-led armies would have even as much success in marching through the U.S.S.R. as did Hitler's mechanized legions, which at least had the advantage of proximity. And let us remember that the Nazis never captured Moscow, as did the ill-fated Napoleon in 1812. In fact today the Soviets, with their vast industrial development of the Siberian hinterland and Soviet Central Asia, could lose Moscow, Gorky and Stalingrad, and yet remain a formidable fighting force defending and striking back from the Volga River line and setting up a new capital far behind the Urals in the middle of Siberia. Under these circumstances the Soviets would still retain an area twice as big as continental United States.

But the sensational blueprints for the conquest of the U.S.S.R. overlook little details like this. For instance, *Collier's* issue about the Third World War envisages the Red armies falling apart and the Soviet Government collapsing on the basis of "peripheral attacks against the 'heartland' by land, air and sea (utilizing to the full the

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transport capacity and mobility of sea and air power) and heavy bombing attacks against the enemy's interior. No deep land penetration of Russia was ever attempted — or indeed, ever seriously contemplated."² According to this scheme, the anti-Soviet armies halted only two or three hundred miles within the Soviet border, at the Pripet Marshes and Kiev. Thus the *Collier's* military "experts" light-heartedly sidestep that very inconvenient *defense-in-depth* which is the classic Russian method of dealing with an invading foe.

Moreover, in the conflict with the Communist-led bloc, America and its allies would have to knock out through invasion another exceedingly tough customer, namely, the People's Republic of China. If the hard-hitting Japanese armies could not subdue a disorganized though stubborn China over a period of some ten years, it does not seem probable that a new expeditionary force would get much farther against a China now far more unified and far better able to defend itself than under the corrupt and inefficient regime of Chiang Kai-shek.

In this discussion I have been assuming that the forces at the command of the American coalition have been able with no great trouble to reach the frontiers of Soviet Russia and China. But naturally the Soviet-Chinese coalition is not going to sit idly by permitting such a thing to happen. Indeed, if a Third World War should break out, it seems likely that one of the first developments would be for Soviet armies to push a considerable distance westward in Europe and for Chinese armies to overrun much of southeastern Asia. If this should take place, the American bloc, with less manpower at its disposal than the enemy, would have a tremendous job simply driving him back to his own borders.

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In analyzing what might happen in a Third World War, we cannot neglect the possibility of a victory for the Communist bloc. In my opinion this eventuality is as unlikely as a clearcut defeat for the Communist bloc. For it would be just as difficult for the Soviet coalition to invade and knock out the United States and Canada as for America and its allies to invade and knock out Communist China and Russia. One very fundamental complication would immediately arise for the Soviet-Chinese command in that it does not possess a vast fleet of steamships, with a powerful navy to escort them, for the transportation of the necessary millions of men across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to the shores of the U.S.A. This consideration alone shows how utterly irrational it would be for the Soviet Union or China to contemplate or undertake a war of aggression against North America.

As to atomic bombing, Americans cannot afford to forget that continental United States is less than one-fourth the combined area of China and Soviet Russia, in both of which industry is widely dispersed over an enormous territory. Discussing this situation Mr. Stephen White, an editor of *Look* and a close student of atomic developments, wrote in 1952: "It must be realized that Russia doesn't need as many bombs as the United States needs. We live in a highly organized country. Russia is generations behind in organization. That is our strength, and our weakness. . . . America is like a watch — a few bombs at vulnerable spots could create chaos. Russia is like a sundial — not nearly as efficient as we are, and not nearly as vulnerable."³

A global conflict, then, between the two Great Power blocs that control so much of the earth today would be a futile, horrible catastrophe for all the countries in-

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volved and for humanity as a whole. It would unloose a mutual outpouring of death and destruction that could set back human progress for centuries. And it would surely result in the accelerated development of new weapons of war even more fearful than the present atom bombs. Already in February, 1952, William L. Laurence, science reporter of *The New York Times*, stated that American scientists can definitely produce the "cataclysmic hydrogen bomb." About the same time Dr. L. E. C. Hughes, Chairman of Britain's Atomic Information Institute, said that a big-scale H-bomb explosion would probably be the end of the world.

Even if there were any capitalism or any socialism left, the Great Atomic War would not bring an ultimate decision as to the respective merits of the two systems. In any case we cannot accept as the main criterion of a civilization's worth its ability to wage and win an international conflict. The Third World War would most certainly create more problems than it solved; and would leave mankind in a bitter, disorganized, economically chaotic state which would in all likelihood lead to future wars and revolutions. We cannot doubt that such a war would be madness for everyone concerned.

2. *Effects of American Foreign Policy*

In his speech of November, 1945, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, referring to American-Russian relations, said: "For nearly a century and a half we have gotten along well — remarkably well when you consider that our forms of government, our economic systems and our special habits have never been similar. . . . Never, in the past, has there been any place on the globe where the vital interests of the American and Russian people

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have clashed or even been antagonistic — and there is no objective reason to suppose that there should, now or in the future, ever be such a place. There is an obvious reason for this. We are both continental peoples with adequate living space — interested in developing and enjoying the living space we have. Our ambition is to achieve the highest possible standards of living among our own peoples, and we have the wherewithal to achieve high standards of living without conquest, through peaceful development and trade. We have that opportunity, moreover, only to the extent that we can create conditions of peace and prevent war. Thus the paramount interest, the only conceivable hope of both nations, lies in the cooperative enterprise of peace.”⁴

Mr. Acheson's words are as applicable today as in 1945. But Mr. Acheson as Secretary of State has, I submit, followed policies inconsistent with his earlier opinions. As the member of President Truman's Cabinet primarily responsible for the foreign policy of the United States, he has taken the lead in curtly turning down the repeated proposals of the Soviet Government over the past few years for a top-level conference between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. for the purpose of coming to an over-all settlement. Mr. Acheson and Mr. Truman have fallen into the bad habit of stigmatizing all such offers as mere propaganda on the part of the Soviet Union. The trouble is, of course, that the American Government cannot admit the sincerity of Soviet peace campaigns without undermining its favorite thesis that Soviet aggression is the great menace facing the United States and the world at large. The underlying premise of the Truman Doctrine, the cold war, the North Atlantic Pact and the stupendous American armaments program is that

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Soviet armies will invade and overrun Western Europe if they have the opportunity.

Undoubtedly many high-ranking officials of the U.S. Government, as well as members of Congress and party leaders in the country at large, do not themselves really take stock in the fearful Soviet military threat which they keep talking about. But the originators of our bi-partisan foreign policy have succeeded in creating a situation in the United States in which loud cries about Soviet aggression and Communist conspiracy have become fundamental to orthodox political ritual both during and between elections. The high priests of the Democratic and Republican Parties have become the prisoners of their own myth-making and must maintain the pretense of absolute Soviet wickedness lest the foundations of their ideology melt away in the light of the simple truth.

A lamentable consequence of all this is that a powerful public opinion has grown up in America which regards as appeasement any attempts to work out a peaceful accord with the Soviets. So it is that in various quarters the whole notion of peace has become suspect; and peace committees, peace meetings, peace addresses, peace articles are all regarded as most likely originating in a Soviet plot to undermine the strength of the United States and its allies. In 1950 a Hollywood studio went so far as to suppress a movie on the story of Hiawatha, because it was felt that the Indian chief's constant smoking of the peace-pipe and general opposition to war might be interpreted as un-American. The continuing Red hunt on the part of such agencies as the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Senate Committee on Internal Security, and by such demagogues as Senators Joseph McCarthy and Pat McCarran, has made most

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members of Congress and most citizens afraid to agree publicly with any part of the Soviet peace program, lest they then be smeared as Communists.

Today a majority of Americans tend to reject almost automatically any idea, in the controversial realms of economics, politics and international relations, which originated in Soviet Russia or is generally approved there. In fact, this trend has gone so far that the relatively few dissenters who do express agreement with some Soviet doctrines may be indicted or jailed as foreign agents on the grounds of "parallelism" between their views and those of the Soviet Government. Yet if Americans for one reason or another feel unable ever to agree with Soviet opinions, then the Soviets are actually controlling them in reverse by forcing them always to support contrary conclusions. The truly independent mind cannot permit itself to be placed in such a senseless position.

I wonder how many millions of Americans, during the steady deterioration of American-Soviet relations since the end of World War II, have asked themselves the question I have so often put to myself: Would the present American-Soviet impasse have developed if President Franklin D. Roosevelt had lived out his last term of office through 1948? My answer has always been that while these post-war years would have been difficult in any case, President Roosevelt, with his wide experience in foreign affairs, his political sagacity, his liberalism and wisdom, would have been able to lay the basis for continuing American-Soviet cooperation. Assuredly he would have had the moral strength and the basic statesmanship to resist Winston Churchill's suggestion in his famous Fulton, Missouri, speech of March, 1946, for an

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Anglo-American military alliance against the Soviet Union.

President Truman, however, never noted for his forcefulness of personality or independence of mind, fell in readily with Churchill's anti-Soviet rhetoric and apologetics for a cold war. Moreover, being unsure of himself on international issues, Mr. Truman has consistently leaned on others in the formulation of American foreign policy rather than assuming leadership himself. And he has often taken very bad advice, as in accepting the idea, first put forward by "Mr. X" in the magazine *Foreign Affairs* in 1947, of the "containment" of communism through armed force and the heightening of pressures against the U.S.S.R. Even "Mr. X," universally recognized as George Kennan, now U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, has become rather doubtful of his original thesis.

Also President Truman, despite his dismissal of General MacArthur for sabotaging American policy in Korea, has on the whole relied heavily upon the military mind. Writing in the *New York Herald Tribune* about the powers of the National Security Council, composed chiefly of military men and defense secretaries, Mr. Sumner Welles, former Under Secretary of State, asserts: "No President since General Grant has had such child-like faith in the omniscience of the high brass as the present occupant of the White House. It is no surprise to learn that President Truman invariably approves every decision of the Council. . . . The Council passes on all important questions in this country's international relations and decides the policy to be adopted. It has now been given authority by the President to determine our political objectives in every part of the world. . . . But no

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emergency can justify the control of this country's foreign policy by a Council which reaches its decisions from a military standpoint."⁵

Generals and admirals, secretaries of war and navy and air, have traditionally been in favor of continued expansion of the services in which they function. Such expansion increases their power, prestige and sense of mission. Furthermore, they tend to look for the solution of international tensions in terms of war rather than of diplomacy. These are some of the reasons why civilian control over the U.S. defense departments is of such great importance. But there are many indications that the White House bows in general to the Pentagon. And one unhappy sign of this is President Truman's willingness to spur on a dangerous armaments race, to foist Universal Military Training on America and to encourage wild war scares as the occasion demands. Even an anti-Soviet stalwart like Congressman Joseph W. Martin, Jr., leader of the Republican minority in the House of Representatives, has stated: "Down through the years the high officials of this Government uttered time and again the direst warnings of bloodshed when a particular piece of legislation they wanted was before Congress."

In September, 1951, as reported in *The New York Times*, President Truman signed a "measure authorizing a \$5,864,301,178 global military construction program, including a ring of secret overseas bases close enough to the Soviet Union so that the Air Force could retaliate against attack and neutralize the enemy's war potential. It was the largest amount ever voted for military construction during peacetime."⁶ Although the stated reason for this vast appropriation was that it was essential for defense, obviously the air bases alluded to could also

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be used for a sudden A-bomb onslaught against the U.S.S.R. The acknowledged U.S. policy of building a round-the-world network of air bases, now several hundreds in number, as near as possible to the frontiers of Soviet Russia and its allies, makes the Soviets understandably nervous.

There are grounds for believing that Harry Truman hopes to go down in history as one of America's greatest Presidents because of his militant crusade against communism. Be that as it may, he will certainly be remembered as the Chief Executive who engineered through Congress the largest peacetime budgets on record through his second term of office. For the fiscal year of 1952 he obtained Congressional approval for a budget of almost 71 billion dollars, with 49.7 billions earmarked for military purposes, exclusive of payments to veterans. For the fiscal year of 1953, running from July 1, 1952, to July 1, 1953, the President demanded, shortly after new Soviet peace overtures, a budget of over 85 billions.*

Of this budget, which the *Wall Street Journal* termed "so monstrous as to defy reasoned comment," approximately 76 percent or 65.1 billions were for national security,† including 52.4 billions for the armed forces and 10.5 billions for international security (aid to U.S. allies). This does not include 4.2 billions for veterans and 6.2 billions for interest, chiefly on loans which financed past wars. Fourteen billions of the new budget were to go to the building of airplanes, while 1.7 billions were for speeding up the stockpiling of atomic weapons as part of a 5- to 6-billion dollar program over the next

* This budget, announced in January, 1952, was reduced by President Truman in August by 6.4 billion dollars, leaving a total of approximately 79 billions.

† For comparative Soviet figures see p. 391.

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few years for mass production of America's "fantastic new weapons," including the dreaded hydrogen bomb.

These astronomical Truman totals mean that the President was asking the United States to spend approximately 180 million dollars a day on defense, which is about 3.7 times the entire 48-million budget of the United Nations for 1952. Let that sink in: Mr. Truman expected the U.S. to expend for military purposes in a single day over three and a half times what the U.N. can devote to international peace during a full year. Or, to make another comparison, the U.S. was to pour into defense every day more than twice as much as the total endowment of Columbia University, America's fourth wealthiest educational institution. These colossal armament figures seem alarming not only to the Russians, but also to some of America's own allies.

The skyrocketing U.S. armaments outlays of the past few years have kept the American economy booming and headed off the depression that many competent economists think would otherwise have taken place. A brink-of-war economy, with government spending on a huge scale stimulating business and bringing enormous profits, is one way of temporarily overcoming fundamental economic difficulties in a capitalist economy. Government expenditure on weapons of war is the favorite form of public works for capitalist businessmen, since it results in very profitable contracts and since the end product is something that does not compete, like public hydroelectric developments, or public housing, with private capitalist enterprise.

As a larger and larger proportion of American business becomes geared to the manufacture of arms and the servicing of armies, it grows harder and harder to turn

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back from a brink-of-war economy to a peace economy. It is for the time being more expedient, especially from a political viewpoint, to accelerate the armaments boom than to put the brakes on it. And the terrible Communist blunder in Korea played directly into the hands of those powerful groups in America which had been agitating for an expanded armaments program.

That program has become so prodigiously enlarged over the past few years, and so interwoven with the basic fabric of the economy, that government leaders, private businessmen and even trade union officials are anxious lest the general cold war and the little hot war be concluded too quickly and peace break out. Typical was the reaction to talk of peace in Korea as reported in the *Wall Street Journal* of May 16, 1951: "Stock prices experienced the sharpest decline since March 13. Brokers ascribed the break to widespread peace rumors. . . . Traders are fearful that the end of hostilities might also halt rearmament and catch leading companies with swollen inventories unbalanced for peacetime production."

As Mr. Norman Thomas, an outspoken anti-Soviet crusader, has said: "Millions of Americans, despite their best hopes, have acquired a vested interest in the economic waste of the arms race. Its sudden end would be greeted with an outpouring of joy, but it would be followed by economic panic — unless we were ready with constructive plans for a cooperative war on hunger, illiteracy and disease."⁷ Such plans the powers-that-be do not have, although vastly extended government spending for great economic projects at home and for the development of backward nations abroad (Point Four) could obviously be just as much of a business stimulus as shovelling unending billions into the maw of Mars.

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In his 85-billion budget, Mr. Truman assigned only \$600,000,000 to the Point Four program as contrasted with the approximately \$19,000,000,000 needed annually according to a report of five U.N. experts in May, 1951.

Resilient as it is, even the American economy will not be able to stand indefinitely the strain of such enormous arms budgets and staggering government deficits as those imposed by the Truman Administration. And if the people as a whole finally start to offer serious objection to the armaments burden, reckless political leaders may be tempted to overcome popular opposition by actually plunging America into a world war. When war preparations, and in the last analysis war itself, seem to the rulers of a country the easiest way to maintain prosperity and full employment, the danger is that they will choose the path of international conflict in preference to facing an immediate economic crisis and running the risk of becoming discredited.

The disturbing distension of armaments has already inflicted on the American people a spiral of inflation, with rising prices and rising taxes cutting drastically into the consumer's income. As ex-President Herbert Hoover stated in his address of January 27, 1952: "The outstanding phenomenon in the United States is the dangerous overstraining of our economy by our gigantic expenditures. The American people have not yet felt the full impact of the gigantic increase in government spending and taxes. Yet we already suffer from the blight of inflation and confiscatory taxes. We are actually in a war economy except for world-wide shooting. We are diverting more and more civilian production to war materials. . . .

"Since the end of the Second World War the purchas-

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ing power of our money, measured in wholesale price indexes, has decreased 40 percent. . . . It is the average family who pays the bulk of taxes, both income and hidden. Among them are corporation taxes. These are ultimately passed on to their customers or the corporation would quickly go bankrupt. . . . These huge taxes are also overstraining our economy."⁸ In addition, President Truman's reckless program is using up America's limited natural resources, such as iron ore and oil, at such a furious rate that coming generations, under whatever form of economy, will be seriously handicapped. The Washington spendthrifts are robbing future Americans of their birthright for a wasteful mess of bombs and battleships, guns, tanks and warplanes.

The burgeoning American armaments economy has brought the United States to a condition, as described by Walter Lippmann, "of gigantic, almost explosive, industrial expansion which draws tremendously and competitively on the available supplies."⁹ America's accelerating need for raw materials, scrap metal and finished goods to meet the insatiable demands of a defense policy run wild has made it increasingly difficult for Britain, France, Italy and the Benelux countries to find the necessary imports for their own needs; to pay the inflated prices asked, most frequently by American manufacturers; and to put across their vast rearmament programs, in conformance with American foreign policy, without more and more lowering their own standards of living through domestic inflation, crushing taxation and a sheer lack of consumers' goods.

Mr. Aneurin Bevan commented most persuasively on the situation in his speech of April 23, 1951, when he resigned in protest as Minister of Labor in the British

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Labor Government: "It is now perfectly clear to anyone who examines the matter objectively — the lurchings of the American economy, the extravagance and unpredictable behavior of the production machine, the failure of the American Government to inject the arms program into the economy slowly enough has already caused a vast inflation of prices all over the world. It has disturbed the economy of the Western World to such an extent that if it goes on more damage will be done by this unrestrained behavior than by the behavior of the nation the arms are intended to restrain. . . .

"I say, therefore, with full solemnity of the seriousness of what I am saying, that the £4,700,000,000 arms program is already dead. It cannot be achieved without irreparable damage to the economy of Great Britain and the world. . . . The fact is that the Western World has embarked upon a campaign of arms production and upon a scale of arms production so quickly and of such extent that the foundations of political liberty and parliamentary democracy will not be able to sustain the shock."^{10*}

In December, 1951, Winston Churchill, soon after he became Prime Minister for the second time, declared frankly in the House of Commons that Britain would be unable to complete on schedule its three-year \$13-billion rearmament program. He said that he was giving Aneurin Bevan "honorable mention" for having, "it appears by accident — perhaps not from the best of motives — happened to be right."¹¹ Early in 1952 Churchill's Conservative Government launched a new *austerity* program "to avert national bankruptcy." Measures included a drastic curtailment of the social services, cuts in the civil

* In his challenging book, *In Place of Fear*, published in the spring of 1952, Mr. Bevan expanded this thesis in detail.

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service staff, a sharp reduction in manufactured goods for the home market and a record low foreign travel allowance for each individual annually of \$70 for Europe and \$14 for the United States.

The remarks of Bevan and Churchill raise the portentous question of whether the long-range effect of American policy will not be to force Western Europe farther and farther to the left instead of rescuing it from the Communists. A most significant report issued in March, 1952, by the ultra-conservative U.S. Chamber of Commerce puts the issue squarely: "There is little surplus fat in Western Europe to permit the luxury of large armies. It will take decades fully to repair the destruction of the recent war. . . . Further sacrifice would inevitably drive many into the already large Communist and Socialist Parties. It would seem the part of wisdom, given these trends, not to overlook the political and economic problems of Europe. Heavy emphasis upon the military may well backfire."¹²

The only sound way, of course, to prevent the spread of Communist regimes is to institute far-reaching social and economic reforms which will do away with poverty, unemployment, depression, currency crises and the other ills which have afflicted Europe over the past few decades. But the heavy-handed Truman Administration, insisting everywhere on the *warfare* state in place of the *welfare* state, has offered no effective plan for permanent economic well-being and is, on the contrary, depressing living standards in the nations it purports to be aiding.

The careening American economic juggernaut has affected for the worse not only England, France and Western Europe in general. A staggering rise in prices has taken place during the past few years in most of the

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nations having a close economic relationship to the United States. If President Truman had studied his own reports more carefully, he would have been more conscious of the unhappy consequences of his policies. For example, his Mid-Year Economic Report of 1951 stated: "The enormous price increases which have occurred constitute in some countries a danger to political and social stability, and to the security program of the free world. . . . Because the economies of these countries have been under great strain and because in some of them the political and social situation is tense, inflation raises not only the question of equitable distribution of the economic burden of defense; it also raises the grave question of the ability of their governments to carry through the needed defense programs and maintain economic stability."¹³

With the economic situation steadily deteriorating in the very nations the American Government proclaims it is saving from the Soviet menace, the Truman Administration has all along insisted that its allies follow its own lead of drastically curtailing trade with members of the Soviet-led bloc for the purpose of weakening Communist military potential. The U.S. Congress reinforced this policy in 1951 by passing the Battle Act, under which any nation selling strategic goods, very broadly defined, to customers in the Communist bloc loses all American economic and military aid. The over-all result has been a severe decline in commerce between Western and Eastern Europe, and between Japan and China, which has traditionally been Japan's best customer as well as its main source of raw materials.

The lack of normal trade relations with Western Europe has indeed been some handicap to the Soviet Union

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and the smaller Eastern European countries in their post-war economic reconstruction; but it has been considerably more of a handicap to the Western European economies. This is because Soviet Russia and its allies, with their far-reaching economic planning, have been better able to adjust to the falling off of commerce than the West.

Furthermore, the American-imposed barriers against economic relations with the East have forced the North Atlantic Pact countries to attempt to fill the vacuum through trade with the U.S. This endeavor is impossible of fulfilment because European exports run into the barrier of America's high tariffs and because European imports must be paid for in dollars. These difficulties have combined to create throughout Western Europe a critical and continuing dollar deficit. And it is my belief that the U.S. "get-tough" policy towards the U.S.S.R. is toughest of all on the hard-pressed Western European peoples.

In July, 1951, the American Government took the extreme step of breaking off its formal trade and commercial agreements with Soviet Russia and the People's Republics of Eastern Europe, despite the fact that these nations have been most desirous of maintaining trade relations with the West. American business of course loses out economically from this short-sighted policy. The total value of exports from the U.S. to the U.S.S.R. fell from \$149,504,000 (including \$50,540,000 in aid and relief) in 1947 to \$27,879,000 in 1948, to \$6,617,000 in 1949, to a trickle of \$621,407 in 1950 and \$55,000 in 1951.

Walter Lippmann makes some pertinent and penetrating remarks about the all too successful American

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campaign to dislocate international trade. "A dominating part of Congress," he writes, "which Mr. Truman and Mr. Acheson have felt it necessary to appease, is demanding a virtual embargo and blockade of the whole Communist orbit. The reasoning of these Congressmen is that an embargo and blockade of this kind would hurt the Communists more than it hurts the United States. That, considering our immense self-sufficiency and enormous financial power, is no doubt true. But from this truth they have jumped to the quite unwarranted conclusion that the embargo hurts the Communists more than it hurts our weak and stricken allies. That is not true, and we shall be learning more and more, but in the hard way, how untrue it is."

Mr. Lippmann analyzes the situation further: "The great problem looming on the horizon is how to keep the large, congested, industrial populations of Britain, West Germany and Japan at work and at a standard of living which they will accept as reasonable for themselves. To deal with this problem we are compelled — as things stand now — to replace the markets and sources of supply which they have lost by finding markets and sources of supply within the world which is dependably in the Western political orbit. This is perhaps the most radical reconstruction and rerouting of the trade of the world which men have ever dreamed of trying to bring about."¹⁴ Although Mr. Lippmann does not say so, the chances are slim that this drastic and unnatural alteration in long-established trade patterns will succeed.

The reference by Mr. Lippmann to appeasement on the part of the Truman Administration reveals the extent to which American foreign policy, in its aspects of combating and denouncing the alleged Communist

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menace, has been formulated, not for the benefit of the American people or the world, but to enable the Democratic Party to stay in power by outdoing the Republican Party in anti-Soviet and anti-Communist declarations and deeds. President Truman's announced determination to "contain" communism was far more successful in containing the Republicans than in its original goal. The *Chicago Tribune* is not my favorite newspaper, but it hit the nail on the head when it stated "it may be surmised that if Russia did not exist, it would be necessary for Truman and Acheson to invent her."¹⁵

Unfortunately, current in Administration and Congressional circles is a strong feeling that an armed conflict with the Soviet Union is inevitable. Mr. Demaree Bess corroborates this fact in *The Saturday Evening Post*: "A fatalistic feeling has pervaded both major political parties that we can solve our own and the world's problems only by overthrowing the expanding Soviet Empire by force of arms. This fatalism has spread so widely that we no longer pay much attention to the most belligerent statements by our representatives in Washington."¹⁶

One of the most disturbing — and threatening — features of American foreign policy is that the U. S. has lined up as allies an incredible assortment of fascist or semi-fascist governments dedicated to violence, terror and tyranny. The so-called "free world," supposedly banded together to extend the blessings of intellectual liberty and political democracy, includes seventeen Latin American dictatorships or quasi-dictatorships (I exclude here Guatemala, Mexico and Uruguay); the royal fascist regime of Greece; the cruel police state of Turkey; the Formosan remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's bloody and primitive fascism; the Union of South Africa with its

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horrible racist laws; Franco's Falangist Spain, established with the help of Hitler and Mussolini and perpetuated in their image; the Nazi-tending republic of Western Germany; and still semi-feudal Japan with its thin veneer of democracy. This roll-call obviously shows that "the free world" is a propaganda myth.

Mrs. Vera M. Dean of the moderate Foreign Policy Association makes clear in the weekly *Bulletin* of that organization the strange double standard characteristic of American policy: "In Eastern Europe Washington has urged free and unfettered elections and has denounced the establishment of dictatorial governments dominated by Communists. Yet at the Bogotá conference of 1948 the United States proposed recognition of governments in Latin America without inquiry into their character and without the requirement of prior elections. In the opinion of many observers, this doctrine has encouraged seizure of power by military juntas in Peru, Venezuela and El Salvador at the expense of the kind of middle-of-the-road regimes we have urged for Eastern Europe and the Balkans."¹⁷

The efficient manner in which the United States Government has enlisted in its coalition well-nigh every reactionary force and gangster government throughout the world indicates the possible use of such elements in the unscrupulous rough-and-tumble of aggressive warfare. Certainly the make-up of the American-led bloc must in itself awaken grave apprehensions in the Soviet mind. And when in addition the Truman Administration insists on the provocative rearmament of Western Germany and Japan, both the Russians and all other peace-loving peoples have a right to be anxious. Let us remember that already coming to the fore in post-war Western Germany

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and Japan are the same sort of economic and political groupings which so ruthlessly unleashed the Second World War.

The Japanese Peace Treaty, forced upon the world by the United States at San Francisco in September, 1951, summarily violated the Cairo Agreement, which promised the return of Formosa to China; and the Potsdam Declaration, which guaranteed that there should be no revival of Japanese militarism. The Treaty provided for continuing American military occupation of Japan and for numerous U.S. bases for land, sea and air forces. With India and Burma refusing to attend the San Francisco Conference because of their opposition to the Treaty and with the Chinese Republic deliberately excluded, representatives of two-thirds of the people of Asia took no part in this settlement directly affecting that half of the earth's population living in the Orient.

Closely related to the Truman Administration's collaboration with and support of reactionary regimes is its reversal of America's traditional attitude of sympathy towards the aspirations of colonial peoples for self-determination and independence. Americans are themselves a proud and freedom-loving people who threw off the yoke of empire through revolution. But today the United States has become the great champion of Western imperialism, resorting to dollar diplomacy, political intimidation and military intervention in taking over the suppressive functions of faltering empires.

The Tunisian crisis — to cite but one example — revealed plainly the unmistakable direction of American policy as regards colonial struggles for liberty. In April, 1952, eleven Asian and African members of the United Nations appealed to the Security Council to put on its

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agenda the question of Tunisia, the French North African Protectorate where France's violent suppression of the independence movement was, according to the complaint, threatening international peace and security. The motion for Council discussion was lost owing to the adverse votes of Britain and France, and to the abstention of the United States and three of its associates in the North Atlantic bloc.

The fact is that the American Government preferred not to offend its two strongest allies, the imperialist Powers of Britain and France, by supporting even a discussion of the right of a long-suffering colonial people to self-determination. As Thomas J. Hamilton, chief correspondent at the U.N. Bureau of *The New York Times*, further explained: "In the case of such areas as North Africa which are of such strategic importance . . . it is vital for the United States to have the right to maintain bases in them against the Soviet threat."¹⁸ Apparently the alleged Soviet menace justifies any betrayal of principle whatsoever.

The effects of American foreign policy, then, since Mr. Truman took over the White House, have been such as to cause deepest misgivings throughout the globe. The apparent readiness of leaders in the United States Government to risk blowing civilization to smithereens for the sake of political advantage, the bellicose attitude of many American journalists, radio commentators and other prominent citizens, the stratospheric sums spent on atom bombs and other weapons, the expanding global ring of U.S. air and military bases, America's alliance with outright fascist or old-fashioned military dictatorships, the rearming of Western Germany and Japan — all these things raise the question whether American policy is not directed towards war rather than towards peace

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through preparedness. Even the conservative *London Economist* states: "In large measure the present American program is designed for fighting Russia, not for staying at peace by deterring a Russian aggression."¹⁹ And some of the missteps that Soviet Russia and other members of the Communist bloc have taken in foreign policy are attributable in no small degree to fear of American intentions and a sharp defensive reaction to them.

Most of these deplorable developments flow from a policy that has been worked out and put through as the answer to the danger of "Soviet aggression." Returning to this theme a moment, let me again cite a man who, in the American community, is as respectable as the Washington Monument and who was denouncing the Soviet Union and all its works for years before Harry Truman even became a Senator. I refer to Mr. Herbert Hoover, who, in his speech early in 1952,* noted that Western Europe, in its judgment as to the risk of a Communist invasion, takes a view "profoundly different from the attitude of Washington."

"There is in Europe today," asserted Mr. Hoover, "no such public alarm as has been fanned up in the United States. None of those nations has declared emergencies or taken measures comparable with ours. They do not propagandize war fears or war psychosis such as we get out of Washington. Not one European country conducts such exercises in protection from bombs as we have had in New York." Mr. Hoover then cited eight major reasons why public opinion in Western Europe estimates the "risk of invasion as so much less than does Washington." "I cannot say," he added, "whether these eight assumptions are correct or not. But they do con-

* Cf. pp. 372-373.

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tribute to Western Europe's lack of hysteria and their calculation of low risk and, therefore, their lack of hurry to arm. In any event this whole European situation requires that the United States recalculate our own risks and reconsider the possible alternatives."²⁰

I have quoted ex-President Hoover at some length, not only because of the intrinsic soundness of the statements cited, but also in order to show that conservative defenders of the capitalist system, opponents of socialism and enemies of the Soviet Union are also critical of American foreign policy and agree on important international issues with liberals and radicals. The point is that the U.S. drift toward war and a garrison state is likely to prove catastrophic for the well-being of all Americans, regardless of their political and economic viewpoints.

Another conservative gravely troubled by the international situation is Pope Pius XII. In a Christmas message broadcast to the world on December 23, 1950, the Supreme Pontiff of the Roman Catholic Church appealed to Soviet Russia and the Western Powers to enter into direct negotiations before their deepening cleavage degenerated into war. "How earnestly," he pleaded, "the Church desires to smooth the way for these friendly relations between peoples! For her, East and West do not represent opposite ideals, but share a common heritage to which both have generously contributed and to which both are called to contribute in the future also."²¹

Now it is precisely "direct negotiations," especially with the United States, that the Soviet Government has been suggesting over the past few years and to which the Truman Administration has turned a cold — very cold — shoulder. The U.S. Government argues that diplomatic negotiations for the settlement of the cold war and

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the easing of American-Soviet tensions should take place within the framework of the United Nations. Yet the United States has itself by-passed the U.N. whenever it seemed convenient, as in the drawing up and effectuation of the Truman Doctrine regarding Greece and Turkey, the institution of the North Atlantic Treaty and the N.A.T.O., and the rearming of Western Germany and Japan.

Certainly the founders of the United Nations never intended that its establishment was to rule out special conversations and confidential negotiations between two or more of its members. Indeed, the first Article in the U.N. Charter's Chapter on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes reads: "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."²²

The negative American attitude towards Soviet overtures has brought forth from the right-wing David Lawrence, writing in the Republican-oriented *New York Herald Tribune*, the following comment: "The biggest barrier to world peace today has been erected by persons inside and outside Washington who have closed their minds to any further discussion with the Russians. This school of thought says conferences are no good, that Russians can't be trusted, that sooner or later there will be war and that America must stay on a war footing every day and night, borrow unearned billions from tomorrow's generations and even perhaps fight a 'preventive war' striking before the enemy can. The exponents of that

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doctrine have nothing to offer but physical force and threats."²³

Soviet foreign policy does not and cannot function within a vacuum; to be realistic it must take into consideration the fundamental forces operating in international affairs, including the actions and policies of the United States, world capitalism's acknowledged leader. Hence the Soviet Government shapes and re-shapes its own policies with the particular attitude of America always in mind. As we have seen, you do not have to be a Soviet diplomat to feel that the effects of current American policy are not conducive to international peace and economic stability.

If I am correct in my analysis, then the trade, armament and cold war policies of the Truman Administration, while certainly not helpful to the Soviet-led coalition, will not in the long run be helpful, either, for U.S. capitalism, world democracy and the so-called containment of communism. And these policies may well prove fatal for Western Europe. To cite Aneurin Bevan again: "The main weapons in the hands of the Soviet rulers are not military but social, economic and ideological. But, in my opinion, the U.S. Administration has mistaken the nature of the Soviet threat. And because it is easier to frame a military than an economic answer to it, the United States has not only prescribed the wrong remedy, but this remedy itself feeds the danger."²⁴

The artificially created anti-Soviet atmosphere in the United States so stifles objective thinking that there is a tendency here among many leaders in government, business and public opinion automatically to discard as bad any move that would be good for the Soviet Union or the other Communist countries. Now indubitably interna-

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tional peace, disarmament and a normal exchange of goods on the world market would be beneficial for the Communist nations. But to reject these aims on this account is to negate the processes of reason. For plainly the fulfilment of such goals would also be immensely beneficial to America and the rest of the non-Communist world. *Mutual self-interest is the key to ending the present American-Soviet impasse.*

3. *Recent Soviet Efforts towards World Peace*

On April 1, 1952, Premier Joseph Stalin, replying to questions wired him by a group of American newspaper editors, stated, regarding a meeting of the heads of the Great Powers, that "possibly it would be helpful. . . . The peaceful co-existence of capitalism and communism is quite possible, provided there is a mutual desire to co-operate, readiness to carry out undertaken commitments, and observance of the principle of equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states."²⁵ On the following day *Izvestia*, official Soviet Government newspaper, declared: "In the answer of Comrade Stalin there is expressed the readiness of the Soviet Union to solve all international questions by peaceful means on the basis of international cooperation, on the basis of equality, on the basis of respect of mutual interests."²⁶

Government quarters in the United States and England reacted in a bored manner to Stalin's statement, insisting that there was nothing new in it. This of course was true, since Stalin has been proclaiming the possibility of co-existence for the last twenty-five years, and since the Soviet authorities have long been pressing for direct conversations between the top statesmen of America, Britain and the other Powers. So far as the Soviet Union

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is concerned, the idea of peace is an old one and hardly needs refurbishing. The wonder is, to a rational man, why the Western governments keep on refusing the Soviet bid for a peace parley and maintain at full blast their propaganda that the Socialist Republic is conspiring to unleash a war against the West.

Stalin's statement which I have quoted above pointed up a number of serious Soviet efforts towards world peace during the previous six months. I shall summarize under ten headings these Soviet proposals, most of which were put forward at the sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly held at Paris from November, 1951, to early February, 1952.

First, the Soviet Government offered a resolution in the General Assembly proposing admission to the U.N. of fourteen new nations, five of them (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Mongolian People's Republic) supported by the U.S.S.R., and nine of them (Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Jordan, Italy, Libya, Nepal and Portugal) supported by the United States.* Soviet Russia was unwilling to accept the application of the South Korean Government, but on the other hand did not ask for the admission of North Korea. The Soviet proposition received wide support and actually won out in the Political and Security Committee; but it was vigorously opposed by the American delegation and was defeated in the final Assembly vote, which requires a two-thirds majority on important questions. The Soviet suggestion, however, bringing in five Soviet-backed countries as compared with nine American-backed, seemed a fair compromise.

* Japan did not become eligible for U.N. membership until April 28, 1952.

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Second, the Soviet delegation won Assembly approval, thirty to twelve, with eight abstentions, for a resolution that a carefully worked out definition of aggression is both possible and necessary, and that the matter should be taken up by the next General Assembly. In a long debate in the Legal Committee the Soviet delegate argued that an aggressor state should be defined as one which initiated any kind of armed attack, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory of another nation; which undertook armed intervention in another country's domestic affairs; which instituted a blockade against another state; or which supported armed bands invading it. The United States and Great Britain stood out against this clearcut definition of aggression; and it is difficult to understand why.

Third, the Soviet delegation at the General Assembly supported a resolution, passed over U.S. opposition, that the political and civil liberties section of the proposed Human Rights Covenant include an article stating that "All peoples have the right of self-determination." This new Covenant is being drawn up by a special U.N. Human Rights Commission and will be legally binding on all nations which ratify it. It will embody in international law much that has been set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which has moral force only.

The Soviet Union implemented its strong backing of national self-determination by asking for the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Libya, in order to give reality to the newly announced independence of that country. Some months later the Soviet delegate on the U.N. Security Council voted with the minority to place on the Council agenda the matter of the French

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Protectorate of Tunisia, after the French Government had wielded the Big Stick against the nationalist movement and had jailed the Tunisian Prime Minister and most of his Cabinet.*

Fourth, the U.S.S.R. submitted a resolution, which met defeat, calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities in Korea, the conclusion of an armistice and withdrawal from the country of all foreign troops and volunteer detachments within three months. It also moved, unsuccessfully, to have the U.N. Security Council consider measures to help bring the slow-moving cease-fire and truce negotiations in Korea to a successful conclusion.

Fifth, Foreign Minister Vishinsky urged another resolution, likewise not adopted, that the establishment by several states of military, naval or air bases on foreign territory was incompatible with membership in the United Nations.

Sixth, he called, again unsuccessfully, for a Five-Power Pact of Peace between France, the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States as a step "to counteract the threat of a new war and to strengthen peace and friendship among nations."²⁷

Seventh, the Soviet Union moved that the five Great Powers reduce their armed forces and armaments by one-third, within a year after such a disarmament accord; that a world disarmament conference be held not later than July 15, 1952; and that all governments should file with the U.N. "complete official data on the status of their armaments and armed forces, including atomic weapons, and concerning military bases on foreign territory."²⁸ In connection with the last-mentioned resolu-

* Cf. p. 382.

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tion the Soviet delegation recommended that an international control organ be created under the Security Council for the "checking of information presented by the states about the status of their armaments and armed forces."²⁰ The U.N. Assembly referred these three proposals to the new Disarmament Commission, which now combines the functions of the former Commission on Conventional Armaments and the former Atomic Energy Commission.

As compared with the 65.1 billion dollars or 76 percent of the 1952-53 Truman budget allocated for defense, the 1952 Soviet budget of 119.2 billions earmarked for defense 28.4 billions (at the official ruble exchange rate) or 24 percent. Discounting the fact that the Soviet Government budget covers a much larger proportion of the national economy than the American, the percentage devoted to the military still is far smaller than in the United States.

The clarifying *Steps to Peace: A Quaker View of Foreign Policy*, a 1951 report of the American Friends Service Committee, sets us right on another important comparison. It is widely believed, the report states, "that the United States disarmed unilaterally after World War II, thereby weakening itself and opening the way for Soviet expansion. The fallacy in this is in its frame of reference, for while it is true that we demobilized our army to a much larger extent than did the Russians, the military strength of the United States has never been measured by the size of its standing army.

"For geographic reasons we rely primarily on sea and air power, while the Soviet Union is primarily a land power. If all categories of weapons are included, as they must be in any fair analysis of military strength, the

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theory of America's unilateral disarmament collapses. In the years since the war, our production of atomic weapons has proceeded at an increasing tempo, accompanied by the maintenance of a far-flung network of air bases and the bombing planes necessary for their delivery. Our navy, by far the largest in the world, has been maintained on a standby basis. In no post-war year has our military budget fallen below eleven billion dollars. This is hardly unilateral disarmament."⁸⁰

Eight, the Soviet delegation brought before the Assembly important new proposals, also referred to the Disarmament Commission, for the international control of atomic energy. These embodied significant concessions on the part of the Soviet Government. The American State Department had previously claimed that the Soviet plan was unacceptable because it meant that the convention on banning atomic weapons would be signed before adequate inspection could be instituted. But Foreign Minister Vishinsky now proposed that the machinery of inspection should go into effect simultaneously with the agreement to prohibit and destroy all atom bombs.

Another American objection to the position of the U.S.S.R. had been that the Soviet offer of periodic inspection of atomic facilities, from the mining of raw materials to plant production, was not a sufficient guarantee against violations. However, Vishinsky's 1952 compromise provided that agents of the international control agency should have the right of *continuous* on-the-spot inspection in every country, with the qualification that the agency was not entitled to "interfere in the domestic affairs of states." The Soviet Government had already agreed in October, 1950, that this agency was to make all its decisions on investigation and inspection by majority vote

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and not subject to any veto. It had also suggested that atomic materials be de-natured in such a way that they could not be used for atomic weapons.

Later Deputy Foreign Minister Malik went into further details concerning the Soviet idea of inspection, saying that the representatives of the international authority "will have access to all plants producing, stock-piling and using atomic raw materials as well as plants which exploit atomic energy. They will have the possibility of getting to know the production operations to an extent necessary for control purposes. They will conduct the weighing, measuring and different analysis of atomic raw materials, materials and half-finished products. They will have the right to demand from the government of any state various information and reports on the activities of plants producing atomic energy and the right to verify this information. . . . They will have the right to conduct special investigations in cases of suspicion of violation of the convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons and to make recommendations to the Security Council on measures of warning and prevention with regard to violators of the convention."³¹ All this sounds sufficiently explicit.

The major point still at issue, then, between the American and Soviet Governments regarding atomic regulation is the insistence of the United States, under the plan drawn up by Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, on *international ownership and operation* of all atomic facilities throughout the world. The Soviets have opposed this ownership project as a "super-trust"; and are afraid that the U.N. agency in charge might limit or prevent Soviet application of atomic power to peaceful economic development. And we must ask whether in the last analysis

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the Congress of the United States itself would permit the drastic and far-reaching interference with national sovereignty implied in international ownership of all American atomic resources and installations.

In any event it is high time for the U.S. Government to show that it is willing, in the interests of world peace, to revise in some degree the Baruch Plan, which was originally presented to the U.N. in June, 1946, and had as its major premise America's monopoly at that time of the atomic bomb. When it became known in 1949 that the Soviets definitely possessed the secret of atomic fission, the situation immediately changed. Walter Lippmann summed it up: "Now that the Russians have broken the monopoly, the basic premise of the American policy has disappeared. A totally different policy, based on the radically new condition, will have to be formulated. . . . There is no alternative to the negotiation of a *modus vivendi* based on the balance of power and of reciprocal advantages."²²

The direct answer of the United States to the Soviet proposals for immediate disarmament, immediate abolition of the atomic bomb and immediate international atomic control was to offer a complicated plan for a step-by-step census by United Nations inspectors of all armed forces and armaments throughout the world as a prelude to any disarmament whatsoever. The Soviet idea had been that each of the Big Five, following an agreement to reduce armaments one-third within a year, should furnish within a month complete information on their arms and armed forces, such data to be checked by a special U.N. control body. Thus, the Soviet Government tied in the arms census and inspection with a going disarmament plan.

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It is obvious to everyone that the American counter-proposal would delay actual disarmament for years and years. Commenting from Paris on the Western plan, James Reston of *The New York Times* said: "As an instrument for ending the 'cold war' it was, to use an old diplomatic term, a bust." Mr. Vishinsky, he continued, "accused the Western Allies of hypocrisy, and if the truth is to be reported there are a lot of people around here who believe there is some justification for the charge."³³

On April 22, 1952, the U.S. Government gave another answer to the Soviet Union by exploding in the Nevada desert an atom bomb releasing energy equal to over 20,000 tons of TNT and far more powerful than the two wartime missiles dropped on Japan. This test, the fifteenth of the kind made in continental United States, was carried out with much fanfare and as part of a complicated military maneuver in which more than 2,000 troops participated. Television cameras relayed images of the explosion to TV stations from coast to coast. Typical of the publicity build-up was the message sent out in advance by Hugh Baillie, president of the United Press: "A demonstration of the atom bomb as a humane weapon was scheduled today at Yucca Flat. Atom bombing as a mercy stroke is based on the theory that it will kill troops quickly and in large numbers, and enable the capture of positions with a minimum of loss and a maximum speed and thus shorten wars."³⁴ Dictionaries, at least those published in America, should at once undertake to revise their definitions of "humane" and "mercy"!

In discussions of atomic energy it is essential to remember that it was not the Soviet Government, but the American Government which manufactured the first atom bombs and assumed the terrible moral responsibil-

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ity of dropping them on two densely populated Japanese industrial centers, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with the purpose of causing economic havoc and undermining enemy morale by mass killings. In the two gigantic explosions approximately 120,000 persons lost their lives; about 110,000 more were injured. Throwing light on the wisdom and morality of the American move is an official government report, the *United States Strategic Bombing Survey*, issued in 1946, which came to the conclusion that Japan had been so weakened by the spring of 1945 that it was highly probable she would have surrendered during the summer or autumn, even without the added disaster of the A-bombs and the Soviet offensive in Manchuria. The *Survey* revealed that as early as May the Japanese were tendering peace feelers through the U.S.S.R. In 1950 Rear Admiral Ellis M. Zacharias, war-time Deputy Director of U.S. Naval Intelligence, published an article in *Look* entitled, "We Did Not Have to Drop the A-Bomb," in which he asserted that Japan had been ready to surrender anyway in August of 1945.

It is possible, however, that an unexpressed motive may have entered into the calculations of U.S. military leaders and of President Truman, who personally gave the order for the dropping of the atomic bomb: That was the potential advantage from an American viewpoint of winning the war against Japan before the Soviet Union could enter the conflict and take a substantial share of the credit for victory. Since Stalin had agreed at Yalta that the Soviets would attack the Japanese army on the Asiatic mainland three months after V-E Day, it was well known in highest governmental circles in England and the United States that the expected date of the Soviet

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war declaration would be August 8, 1945.* And there is weighty opinion to the effect that U.S. Army officials moved heaven and earth in their eminently successful effort to have the first atomic missiles ready before that particular day.

Mr. Thomas K. Finletter, now U.S. Secretary of the Air Force, in a joint article with Mr. Norman Cousins, Editor of the *Saturday Review of Literature*, stated in June, 1946: "Assuming that the use of the bomb was justified, why did we not demonstrate its power in a test under the auspices of the U.N. on the basis of which an ultimatum would be issued to Japan — transferring the burden of responsibility to the Japanese themselves?† . . . Whatever the answer, one thing seems likely: There was not enough time between July 16, when we knew at New Mexico that the bomb would work, and August 8, the Russian deadline date, for us to have set up the very complicated machinery of a test atomic bombing. . . .

"No; any test would have been impossible if the purpose was to knock Japan out before Russia came in — or at least before Russia could make anything other than a token of participation prior to a Japanese collapse."⁸⁵ This plan, according to Messrs. Finletter and Cousins, was supposed to prevent a "struggle for authority" between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in the defeated country. Professor P.M.S. Blackett of Manchester University, a Nobel prize-winner in physics, agrees with the Finletter-Cousins interpretation in his devastating book, *Fear*,

* See p. 272.

† Dr. Alexander Sachs, a personal, non-official adviser to President Roosevelt on atomic energy, has revealed (*Look*, March 14, 1950) that Mr. Roosevelt favored a similar plan for a great warning demonstration of the atom bomb's destructive power.

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War, and the Bomb. "We may conclude," he writes, "that the dropping of the atomic bombs was not so much the last military act of the Second World War, as the first major operation of the cold diplomatic war with Russia."⁸⁶

Included in the general disarmament program of the Soviet Union has been its insistent appeal that all states which have not yet done so should ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting bacteriological warfare and the use of poison gas in international conflict. The American Government originally took the leading part in drawing up this agreement and later signed it. But the U.S. Senate never ratified the Protocol, and in 1947 President Truman withdrew it from that body's consideration.

In June, 1952, the Soviet U.N. delegate, Jacob Malik, brought the matter to the attention of the U.N. Security Council, pointing out that the United States was the only major Power which had not ratified the Protocol. Ernest A. Gross, U.S. representative on the Council, answered that the convention did not set up adequate means of enforcing the merely "paper" prohibitions. This excuse hardly seemed sufficient, especially in view of the existence of an official U.S. Biological Warfare Committee and the expenditure of millions of dollars a year by the U.S. Army Chemical Corps on the development of bacteriological weapons. *The New York Times* U.N. correspondent, Thomas J. Hamilton, commented: "One of the most important parts of Mr. Gross' speech, in fact, was the omission of even an implied pledge that the United States, in keeping with the spirit of the Protocol, would not use bacteriological warfare unless the enemy used it first."⁸⁷

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The ninth Soviet peace move was made independently of the United Nations and centered upon the question of Germany. On March 10, 1952, the U.S.S.R. sent notes to the Governments of France, Great Britain and the United States proposing that a peace treaty be concluded with an all-German Government, that Germany be re-established as a unified state and that full democratic rights be guaranteed to the German people. In the treaty envisioned by the Soviet Union, "Germany obligates itself not to enter into any kind of coalition or military alliance directed against any power which took part with its armed forces in the war against Germany."³⁸ On the Soviet interpretation this would prevent the new Germany from becoming a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which Soviet Russia regards as an alliance directed against itself. Thus Germany would be neutral as between the two Great Power blocs and could serve the cause of peace well by being a buffer state.

Surprising and disturbing to many devoted to the cause of peace was the Soviet position on German rearmament: "Germany will be permitted to have its own national armed forces (land, air and sea) which are necessary for the defense of the country. Germany is permitted to produce war materials and equipment, the quantity and type of which must not exceed the limitations required for the armed forces established for Germany by the peace treaty."³⁹ While this means definite limitations on German arms, it represents a reversal of policy on the part of the U.S.S.R. For the Soviet Government had stood firmly behind the Potsdam directive for "the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany"; and had refused to sanction rearmament of the eastern zone of occupation under its control, even after

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the American bloc had started rearmament of the western zone.

In its second note of April 10 to the three Western Powers, the Soviet Union explained that the suggestion regarding German armed forces "is in accord with the principle of national sovereignty and equal rights between governments. It is impossible to imagine such a position whereby Japan would have the right of its national armed forces designed for the defense of the country, but Germany would be deprived of this right and placed in a worse position."⁴⁰ The key to Soviet Russia's view lies perhaps in its statement that "it will be much better to create such armed forces than to create in West Germany hireling troops of revengers headed by Fascist-Hitlerite generals ready to engulf Europe in a Third World War."⁴¹

This same Soviet note of April 10 agreed that there should be "free, all-German elections," but insisted that a Four-Power commission of the occupying states should supervise them. The Soviet Government also held pat on its claim that the Potsdam Conference established the eastern borders of Germany. This is certainly correct regarding the Koenigsberg area, which went outright to the U.S.S.R. with only the reservation that the ultimate transfer would be "subject to expert examination of the actual frontier." In reference to the Polish-German border, the Potsdam Declaration said that its final delimitation "should await the peace settlement," but did not make clear whether this delimitation was meant to apply merely to details or to substantive considerations.

The U.S. State Department was greatly embarrassed by the Soviet proposals on Germany, fearing that they would weaken Chancellor Adenauer's regime in Western

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Germany and interfere with Secretary Acheson's policy of building "situations of strength" *vis-a-vis* the U.S.S.R., particularly through the rearmament of Western Germany. In a dispatch to *The New York Times* from Bonn, Drew Middleton suggested that Washington really views reunification as undesirable because it could mean "that the present fairly tractable Government of Chancellor Adenauer would be replaced by one much more difficult to handle. It might be a Socialist Government or a combination of Socialists and right-wing nationalists. But at the head of the nation of 70,000,000 Germans, a people not noted for calm or restraint, any Government of a United Germany would be independent and self-centered."⁴²

While the Soviet Union and the Western Powers proceeded to exchange bitter notes on the German question, the United States and its European allies went straight ahead to forge an armed alliance with Western Germany and make German unification impossible for a long time to come. During the last week of May, 1952, the Western Powers signed a Contractual Agreement, in effect a regular treaty, with the Adenauer Government officially freeing Western Germany from military occupation, though maintaining Allied troops there for its defense. The West Germans agreed to raise a substantial army, with America paying a large share of the bill, as part of the so-called European Defense Community (E.D.C.) and to forego temporarily the manufacture of atomic, germ and chemical weapons. Whether the fifteen national parliaments concerned would ratify the various agreements with Western Germany was by no means assured.

The tenth Soviet effort in the direction of peace has revolved around the U.S.S.R.'s attempts to lessen world

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trade barriers, with special emphasis upon the International Economic Conference held in Moscow during April, 1952. More than 450 businessmen from countries in every part of the globe attended the meetings. Notwithstanding the publicly announced hostility of the Western governments, a French delegation of thirty participated in the Conference and a British delegation of twenty-four, including Lord Boyd Orr, former head of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization. A handful of Americans were present, in spite of Secretary Acheson's denunciation of the Conference as another malevolent Soviet stratagem, and severe U.S. State Department pressures to discourage American businessmen from attending.

The U.S. Government was so agitated over the fact that a few Americans had the hardihood to go to the Conference that shortly afterwards, on May 1, 1952, it announced a sweeping ban against American citizens traveling to the Soviet Union and other countries in the Communist bloc. According to *The New York Times*, these drastic restrictions "seemed necessary after a number of United States citizens already abroad attended the recent Moscow Economic Conference without notifying the State Department."⁴³ Under the new regulations American passports will not be valid for any Communist nation unless the applicant can prove to the U.S. State Department that he has "compelling reasons" for his visit. The State Department asserted that its action was essential "to warn American citizens of the risks of travel in Iron Curtain countries." What this really means, so far as Soviet Russia is concerned, is that the U.S. Government believes it cannot take the risk of having Americans who dissent from its foreign policy go to the U.S.S.R. and

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possibly bring back reports about Soviet affairs which run counter to the totally black picture painted by the State Department propagandists.

The delegates at the International Conference discussed at length the possibilities of increasing East-West trade and of setting up a permanent international organization for the expansion of world commerce. Total business transactions arranged at the Conference were estimated at over \$250,000,000, with American, British, French and Italian firms making deals with the Soviet Union, China or countries in Eastern Europe. Lord Boyd Orr stated that a "very substantial dent" had been made in East-West trade barriers. According to Marcus Duffield of the *New York Herald Tribune*, "Russian and Chinese offers to purchase large orders of British goods, especially textiles . . . sounded very enticing indeed to the British textile industry, which is suffering from a slump, with 75,000 workers unemployed in Manchester."⁴⁴ What Mr. Duffield failed to mention was that American textile manufacturers, who were also in the throes of a slump, could likewise profit from Communist orders.

In general the foreign businessmen at the International Economic Conference were convinced that the Soviet Russians would be reliable in any business arrangements they agreed upon. The truth is that in the pre-war period the Soviet Government and the trade organizations under its control made an enviable record for business reliability and a strict carrying out of contracts. In a planned socialist economy, business enterprises do not go bankrupt, since they can depend, if necessary, on the financial backing of the government. So, in international trade the resources of the entire

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U.S.S.R. stand, in the last analysis, behind every obligation.

Intelligent analyses of international affairs have invariably come to the conclusion that flourishing and mutually advantageous trade among countries helps substantially in the advancement of world peace. Economic self-interest and well-being weigh so heavily in the motivation of men and of nations that when peoples are actively trading with one another, they are less likely to become embroiled in military hostilities against one another. And insofar as normal trade stimulates prosperity, it reduces national tensions of a domestic nature that may lead towards war. For these reasons I feel justified in saying that Soviet Russia's encouragement of good business relations on a global scale is a genuine contribution to the cause of international amity.

Surely the cooperative Communist attitude at the International Economic Conference made more sense than the many captious endeavors in the West to show sinister intent. America's Dean Acheson, sallying forth once more to slay the Soviet dragon with bitter words, charged that "The true purposes of the organizers of this Conference are to confuse and weaken our unity of purpose"; and "to discourage us from carrying forward our program of creating strength."⁴⁵ Yet it must be clear to anyone with a grasp of reality that the allies of the United States will neither build up nor maintain dependable strength if their economies are further weakened through artificial interference with world trade.

The situation is ironic in that a central feature of America's Marshall Plan, initiated in 1947, was the restoration of East-West trade, especially in order to overcome the dependence of the Western European nations

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upon their diminishing dollar resources. For instance, the first report of the Committee of European Economic Cooperation, transmitted by Secretary of State Marshall in September, 1947, stated: "A substantial and steady resumption of Eastern European food, feeding stuffs and timber supplies is assumed in this report; the pre-war flow of cereals from Eastern Europe is assumed to be restored by 1951."⁴⁶

The report went on to say it was "essential that there should be an adequate flow of dollars to the rest of the world so that the participating countries and Western Germany may be able to earn dollars, not only by their exports to the American continent, but also indirectly by their exports to other countries." The East, expanding its trade with the United States, was to obtain dollars which would then go in part to the Western European nations in payment for imports from them. Yet U.S. policy has gone far in negating this goal of the Marshall Plan by making it impossible for many Eastern countries to secure dollars through those natural channels of commerce long established by the operation of economic need and financial profit.

The question is not whether all the ten points in the Soviet peace program I have outlined are acceptable; but whether these recent moves in the direction of world peace do not indicate that the Soviet Russians are sincerely seeking a reasonable international settlement. It is my feeling that their various proposals, while of course provoking much disagreement, do provide a hopeful agenda for discussion by the Western Powers. The American attitude, however, has seemed only too often to be one of shutting — or slamming — the door against all Soviet peace overtures on the ground that to entertain

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them seriously would jeopardize Western rearmament and unity of purpose. Such a foreign policy, encouraging on principle tensions that produce a brink-of-war mentality and implying that all peace offers to the West must be indefinitely rejected, is both unintelligent and dangerous.

Again and again over the past few years the U.S. State Department has issued releases to the effect that "the Soviet peace offensive" is solely intended to embarrass and impede Western rearmament. But the Soviet Union's foreign policy has remained substantially the same since the end of World War II; and the Russians are almost always conducting some kind of peace offensive, whether the Western Powers are demobilizing, disarming, rearming, intervening, occupying, withdrawing, sending notes, holding conferences or anything else. It is not rational, then, to claim that the unceasing Soviet drive for peace is merely Machiavellian in its import.

It has not been my intention in this chapter to try to cover the entire complex course of American-Soviet relations since 1945; or to assess the precise amount of blame on either side for such exacerbated happenings as the Berlin crisis of 1948, with the Soviet blockade and the American airlift, and other tense situations in the cold war. There have been numerous instances in which the U.S.S.R. has plainly been in the wrong. I think especially of the harsh and insupportable practice of Soviet flyers in shooting down foreign airplanes, some of them passenger planes, which may be inadvertently violating Soviet territory or the Soviet zone in Germany. In the spring of 1952 this happened to both French and Swedish airplanes.

Frankly, however, I do think that the United States

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bears the major responsibility for *starting* the cold war and that after Hitler's defeat in 1945 the Truman Administration took the first hostile steps towards the Soviet Union rather than the other way around.

The first such step to arouse Soviet resentment was the abrupt order, issued by Leo T. Crowley, chief of the Foreign Economic Administration, on May 12, 1945, four days after the Nazi surrender, for the suspension of all Lend-Lease shipments to the Soviet Union. The American Government took this action without any previous consultation with or warning to the Russians, to whom it appeared as an insult and as a handicap in carrying out their promise to join forces later against Japan.

Under Crowley's order ships on the high seas with supplies for the U.S.S.R. were recalled and other ships about to sail with goods were unloaded. Among the equipment never delivered to Soviet Russia were forty-six wide-gauge locomotives built especially for the Soviet railways at a cost of almost \$4,000,000 and not usable anywhere else — valuable equipment which the U.S. Army ultimately auctioned off as scrap. The Crowley directive was later relaxed to some extent; but President Truman soon put an end to the whole business when on August 21, 1945, one week after the Japanese collapse, he terminated Lend-Lease for all countries which had been receiving it.

The second thing which so antagonized the Soviet Union was the U.S. treatment of Soviet reparations claims against Germany. The Soviet proposal had been that Germany should pay total reparations of \$20,000,000,000 with half of it going to the U.S.S.R. It was Stalin's judgment at Yalta that the aggregate German

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industrial plant at the end of World War II was as large as, if not larger than, it had been in 1939, wartime expansion having been greater than all the destruction. This estimate was later substantiated by the facts. Since the Nazis had wrought property damages in the U.S.S.R. of more than \$125,000,000,000, the Soviet claim for \$10,000,000,000 in reparations was not exorbitant.

The issue came to a head shortly after Hitler's defeat when President Truman sent to Germany and Soviet Russia a Reparations Commission chaired by an oil executive, Edwin W. Pauley, a political appointee who proved to be without the slightest competence for the job. This whole mission on reparations was a tragic debacle. There were no actual discussions with the Soviets that by any stretch of the imagination could be called negotiations; and the result was that Pauley arrived at the Potsdam Conference in the latter part of July, 1945, with nothing to present except a beautifully embossed "progress report" looking like the Gutenberg Bible. It contained a perfect hodge-podge of views emanating from individuals on the American staff whose brief "inspection" tour of German industry had been primarily a sightseeing junket.

Of course neither Pauley's Commission nor any other body ever worked out an agreement on total reparations with the Soviets. And the Western Powers never came anywhere near fulfilling the guarantees made in the Potsdam Declaration for the removal of industrial equipment from the western zones of occupation as reparations for the U.S.S.R.

* * *

I have not attempted to state all the problems or give all the answers in the broad sphere of American-Soviet

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relations. Rather I have endeavored to fill in some of the gaps in the general knowledge of the average American in this field; and to present facts and interpretations concerning the subject which are neglected at present by U.S. public opinion in its preoccupation with the cold war. It is my thesis that whatever the defects of the American and Soviet systems, whatever the past mistakes of their respective governments, whatever those governments' disagreements as so far expressed, they can come to an intelligent over-all agreement that will stop the drift towards war and turn the tide instead in the direction of peaceful co-existence between the two countries and between the capitalist and Communist blocs in general.

As that oracle of conservative sanity, the *Wall Street Journal*, stated in commenting on the desirability of an American settlement with the Soviet Union: "The U.S. has many differences with nations with which it lives at peace. To live together peaceably it is only necessary that differences be resolved to the point where the remaining disputes seem less important than the danger of war. What is necessary is not perfect agreement, but only a method of living together."⁴⁷

So far as concrete Soviet peace moves are concerned, there is much in them that is valid for the U.S.A. as well as the U.S.S.R. A sound American peace policy is bound to have a number of basic points in common with Soviet policies. During the war against the Axis, Soviet Russia and the United States drew up and faithfully carried out many joint military agreements which were to the obvious interest of both countries. In these years high officials in the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations did not turn down suggestions merely because they were

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initiated or advocated by the Soviets. It is not sensible to do so today.

War and violence have always been the worst ways to deal with problems between countries. There is a far better method for the solution of current dilemmas — for nations, for peoples, for governments, for capitalists, for Communists, for conservatives, for radicals, for politicians, for businessmen, for this alliance and that bloc, for East and West. That is the method of reason, understanding, negotiation and compromise. I believe that this method now demands that the American Government give more serious and reasonable consideration to the major Soviet peace proposals; and that it should accept the invitation of the Soviet Government to have highest ranking officials from each side sit down and talk things over calmly, with the aim of settling the chief issues in dispute on terms advantageous to both.

The President of the United States during the next four years will have an unexcelled opportunity to serve America and humanity through initiating more constructive measures for international peace than those supported by the Truman Administration. And if he is politically wise, the President will realize that nothing will gain him stronger backing among the American electorate than success in putting across a peace and disarmament program that reverses the trend of the past few years towards global disaster; and that embodies the principle of atomic power for life, not death. The American people themselves have their own unique power and responsibility in the current situation. They can elect public officials who are pledged to carry through a genuine peace policy; and they can maintain steady pressure on the President, the State Department and Con-

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gress to avoid extremist actions and to pursue the path of world amity.

Military aggressors have gone down to defeat many times in history, but mankind has never succeeded in doing away with international conflict itself. In every country the living generations of today have the chance, in this era of unprecedented possibilities for both good and evil, of bestowing on their direct descendants and all posterity the greatest boon in the records of the race: the permanent abolition of the scourge of war. That is the supreme challenge of these fateful times.

If we compare the United States and Soviet Russia, certain basic similarities stand out. Both countries possess large and vigorous populations inhabiting huge domains of continental extent and untold natural wealth. Both nations have had to cope with geographic, economic and social problems of a like character. Just as American enterprise pushed west to the Pacific, settling the land and developing the resources, so Russian enterprise pushed *east* to the Pacific, creating finally under the Soviet Republic an impressive new industrial civilization throughout the former wasteland of Siberia. Both peoples believe in the desirability and possibility of continued progress and rely upon scientific method and machine techniques to implement that progress. And historically we have both been pioneers in seeking to hew out new paths for the well-being of all the people.

In make-up the populations of America and Russia are alike in containing many diverse nationalities and races; and so it is that each nation aims at full ethnic democracy. Both peoples are friendly and democratic in spirit; frank, warm and informal in their social behavior. Mrs. Vera M. Dean, herself Russian-born, writes: "In many ways the Russians resemble the Americans more than any other people. Like Americans, they are eager to ask questions and learn new things; they are not afraid to make mistakes; they have an attitude of breezy but not

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annoying self-confidence, born of the knowledge that they have vast spaces and great material resources at their disposal; and they adapt themselves readily to new and entirely untried conditions."¹

Both Americans and Russians have about them a certain largeness of vision and broad sense of humanity that expresses itself in the struggle for freedom and in the goal of international peace. "To be a genuine Russian," said Dostoyevski, "means to become the blood brother of all human beings."² A strong sense of social and international idealism has been typical of Americans and Russians. Great leaders of the respective countries, such as Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vladimir I. Lenin and Joseph Stalin, could with equal sincerity subscribe to the thought, "Above all nations is humanity."

These considerations show clearly enough that in spite of all the ideological disagreements between the United States and Soviet Russia, there exists a sound basis for close and fruitful cooperation between them. Geography and modern techniques of communication and transportation have made the two countries neighbors; mutual enemies, international crises and world wars have made them associates and allies; intelligent self-interest and patient understanding on both sides can result in the attainment of their common aims of living in peace together, enjoying mutually profitable trade relations and participating in wide cultural interchange with each other.

Turning finally to the situation in the Soviet Union, I shall call as a witness the eminent British historian, Thomas Babington Macaulay. In his *Essay on Milton Macaulay*, describing the English Revolution of 1688, wrote: "Many evils, no doubt, were produced by the

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civil war. They were the price of our liberty. Has the acquisition been worth the sacrifice? . . . We deplore the outrages which accompany revolutions. But the more violent the outrages, the more we feel that a revolution was necessary. The violence of these outrages . . . will be proportioned to the oppression and degradation under which the people have been accustomed to live. . . .

"It is the character of such revolutions that we always see the worst of them first. Till men have been some time free they know not how to use their freedom. The final and permanent fruits of liberty are wisdom, moderation and mercy. Its immediate effects are often atrocious crimes, conflicting errors, skepticism on points the most clear, dogmatism on points the most mysterious. . . . It is just at this crisis that its enemies love to exhibit it. . . . If men are to wait for liberty till they become wise and good in slavery, they may indeed wait forever."

Macaulay's reflections are applicable without the alteration of a word to the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the subsequent course of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. And they pose our central problem in evaluating Soviet Russia: Do the evils existent during the first thirty-five years of the Communist regime, especially in the realm of means, outweigh the total good achieved or reasonably to be anticipated for the near future? My answer is "No"; in a complete and true balance sheet, the Soviet good greatly outweighs the bad.

Macaulay's enduring words give insight into the harsh reality that altogether democratic means for the attainment of fundamental economic and social changes can be expected only in a society which has already achieved full democracy. No such national community exists today, although we can see an approximation to it in

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Great Britain and to a lesser extent in the United States. In these two countries, the comparatively high degree of democracy, despite serious violations of its principles and processes, leads intelligent men to rely on democratic procedures for liberal reforms or radical transformation. But in Tsarist Russia of 1917 the development of democracy did not remotely approach that of the Anglo-Saxon commonwealths. This important truth is not easy for many of us to remember.

And while the American people have attained the highest material standard of living on record, that considerable advantage functions as a disadvantage in their judgment of other nations. For it tends to make Americans forget or neglect the abysmally low living standards of the majority of the human race, whose struggle to maintain a bare existence necessarily comes first and often to the neglect of democratic and cultural values which more advanced peoples take for granted. President Truman indicated understanding of this problem when he said in a 1952 speech on Point Four: "If we could help the people of the Orient to get a well-balanced diet — three square meals a day — instead of the few mouthfuls of rice that most of them eat now, just that one change alone would have more impact on the whole world than all the armies and battles in history."³ Malnutrition or famine, debilitating disease, exhausting over-work or heart-breaking unemployment, inadequate clothing and pitiful housing afflict at least one-half of the earth's population, possessors of an annual per capita income of less than \$100.

Those same evils, for ages past the lot of the masses of mankind, prevailed to a large extent in the old Russia. To eliminate them was the primary aim in the domestic

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program of the Soviet Communists; they have gone far in achieving this goal. What they have not achieved are the democratic patterns of living which they believe can be permanently established only on the basis of economic security and with the assurance of international peace. Accordingly, the need for more time is of the essence, considering the pressing initial problems — such as counter-revolution, foreign intervention and fascist aggression — with which the Soviet regime has had to cope.

Westerners who today dismiss Soviet socialism as a horrible failure and an international menace disregard the lesson of history that it is reckless to make hasty adverse judgments on far-reaching revolutionary movements before those tradition-shattering upsurges of peoples and nations have had an opportunity to work themselves out, to correct their cruelties and crudities, to fulfill the generous ideals of their founders. I could be wrong; but in my opinion the objective verdict of coming generations will be that the Soviet Russians, during their first thirty-five years, laid the foundations of a great new civilization of enduring achievement and high promise, ranking in world historical significance with the outstanding civilizations of the past.

EPILOGUE FOR SECOND EDITION

I. *Soviet Foreign Relations*

The dynamic new society of Soviet socialism, based on nation-wide economic planning, the public ownership of industry and the collectivization of agriculture, has gone through major changes since *Soviet Civilization* was first published in November 1952. Changes in human affairs are often for the worse. But in the U.S.S.R. over the past two years they have been for the better, with considerable improvements in both domestic affairs and foreign relations. These developments tend to corroborate, I believe, the main conclusions of this book.

On March 5, 1953, Joseph Stalin died at the age of 73. He had been Premier of the Soviet Union since May 1941, shortly before the Nazis invaded the U.S.S.R. As this volume has already made clear, the Stalin regime, tough-minded, ruthless and relentless in pursuing its aims, provided the initiative and leadership for many great achievements during a period of repeated crisis in Soviet and world affairs. Constantly subject to enormous pressures, it inevitably committed blunders from time to time; and during the post-war years Stalin did not always seem to be aware of what some of his subordinates were doing.

Georgi M. Malenkov, who for many years had worked closely with Stalin in both the Communist Party and the Government, succeeded him as Premier. He was born in 1902 of Russian origin. V. M. Molotov returned once more to the

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position of Foreign Minister; Marshal Klimenti Voroshilov became "President" of the U.S.S.R. as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Supreme Soviet; and Nikita S. Khrushchev took over the important post of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Soon after they took office, Mr. Malenkov and his associates started to correct some of the mistakes that had been accumulating. The new regime quickly showed itself to be relatively more conciliatory and flexible than Stalin's, and effected a marked relaxation in both domestic and foreign policies.

In March 1953, in one of his first speeches as Premier, Mr. Malenkov stated: "At the present time there is not one disputed or undecided question that cannot be decided on the basis of the mutual understanding of interested countries. This is our attitude towards all states, among them the United States of America."

The viewpoint that the U.S.S.R. is not plotting aggression has gained wider and wider acceptance. In the *New York Herald Tribune* of November 3, 1953, the always lucid Walter Lippmann wrote: "Reduced to its simplest elements the governing assumption of American policy is still that of 1950 — that Western Europe is threatened by a Soviet military aggression, and that all policies must be directed, must be pinpointed, to the objective of resisting that aggression. . . . This assumption is, however, no longer that of any West European government, including the British, or of any important section of opinion in Europe."

In other words, while the idea of a Soviet Russia poised for attack is still central in U.S. Government circles, the Europeans, who are infinitely more vulnerable to such aggression than the Americans, do not harbor such a delusion.

Premier Malenkov, like Stalin before him, has repeatedly expressed his belief in the possibility of peaceful co-existence between the capitalist and socialist states, and in the advisability of a special conference between highest officials of the

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big Powers in order to reach a general international settlement. Prime Minister Churchill has gone on record at least twice as favoring such a meeting between the heads of the leading Powers, but because of American opposition has soft-pedaled the project.

In Washington in July 1954, Mr. Churchill asserted: "I am of the opinion that we ought to have a try at peaceful co-existence, a really good try for it. Although anyone can see that it doesn't solve all problems, it will create a very different situation to the one so full of peril, so doom-laden as the present one."

Then on November 16 President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles and Secretary of Defense Wilson all took specific issue with Senator William F. Knowland's warning against the Soviet "Trojan horse of co-existence." The President said in a speech that a "modus vivendi," a means of living together, must be reached with the Russians. A week later at a press conference, Mr. Eisenhower talked in a conciliatory tone about the Russians and again discussed the desirability of peaceful co-existence.

At last this idea, so long denounced in America as a Soviet propaganda device, was becoming respectable among the leaders of the Western bloc of nations. A significant factor in this change of attitude was the easing of international tensions through the armistice in Korea in July 1953, and the armistice in Indo-China, a year later. Probably most important of all, however, was the growing recognition during 1954 that the latest atomic bombs and, above all, the development of hydrogen bombs by both the United States and Soviet Russia made a Third World War suicidal for both sides.

On March 31, 1954, Rear Admiral Lewis I. Strauss, chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, revealed that the recently tested U. S. hydrogen bomb was powerful enough to destroy any city on the face of the earth. Experts in the field of nuclear energy further pointed out that the

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radioactivity released by dropping a number of such bombs in an international conflict might exterminate not only the urban populations of the belligerent powers, but threaten the survival of the entire human race and all living organisms on this earth.

In March of 1954 Premier Malenkov warned that a new war which brought into operation the terrible arms invented since the end of the last world war would mean the "destruction of world civilization." In April the Soviet Government announced that it was making a 10 percent cut in its defense budget for 1954. In June it revealed that a 5,000-kilowatt electric power station using atomic energy had been built in the U.S.S.R. and was providing electricity for industrial and agricultural needs in neighboring regions. The announcement added that work on a far bigger atomic power station was under way.

In October the late Andrei Vishinsky, Deputy Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., again presented to the United Nations General Assembly a concrete plan for the general reduction of armaments and the abolition of atomic weapons. He agreed on behalf of his Government that such a treaty was to be drafted on the basis of proposals made by France and Great Britain in June 1954 and rejected by the Soviet Union at that time. Mr. Vishinsky suggested in part: "The complete prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction is implemented with a cessation of the manufacture of these types of weapons and their complete elimination from the armaments of states; all existing atomic materials are to be used for peaceful purposes only."

In January 1955 the Soviet Government stated that at the coming United Nations conference at Geneva on the peaceful uses of atomic energy it would hand over the scientific and technical experience gained in the operation of its atom-driven industrial plant. It also announced that it would offer aid to China, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and East Germany for the designing, building and equipping with necessary

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fissionable materials of one atomic power station with a 5,000-kilowatt capacity.

The Berlin Conference early in 1954 between Great Britain, France, Soviet Russia and the United States was unable to achieve anything even approaching a settlement of the German question. But on the initiative of the Soviet delegation headed by Foreign Minister Molotov, the Four Powers agreed that they should invite the Chinese People's Republic and other interested nations to a conference later in the year at Geneva to try to discuss and act upon the critical Far Eastern situation.

The Geneva Conference, April 26-July 21, succeeded in arranging an armistice in Indo-China after seven years and seven months of warfare between the opposing forces in that unhappy country. In this truce the Vietminh regime, under the leadership of Communist Ho Chi Minh, received the northern half of Vietnam and the pro-French regime the southern half. The Soviet Government played a mediating role in these crucial negotiations. This was in contrast to the negative role of the United States Government whose plan for direct military intervention by American bombers just before the Conference started failed to go through mainly because Prime Minister Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff refused to support it.

During the Geneva negotiations there was no sign that the Chinese Government, represented by its Premier and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai, was acting, according to the familiar thesis of the U.S. State Department, under the control of the Kremlin. True, Mr. Chou found himself in accord with Mr. Molotov on the fundamental issues, but it was agreement between co-equals. In an article in *The New York Times* entitled "Chou Talks Back in Moscow to Communist Sponsors," Harrison Salisbury writes about a reception which Mr. Molotov gave for Mr. Chou after the close of the Geneva Conference.

"The Chinese Foreign Minister," says Mr. Salisbury, "obviously was in a mood of great personal self-satisfaction.

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He certainly did not behave like a man who felt in any way subservient to his Russian hosts. He was polite to Mr. Molotov and respectful to Premier Georgi M. Malenkov, but quite sharp to most of the other Russians present." According to Mr. Salisbury, Chou En-lai expressed no little annoyance that the members of the Soviet Cabinet had in general not bothered to learn the Chinese language.

Confirming my opinion that the Chinese and Soviet Republics cooperate on the basis of parity is the fact that at the end of 1952 the Soviet Government relinquished its partnership in China's 1,500-mile Manchurian railroad line and gave over complete control to the Chinese. Even more important are the seven agreements which the Chinese and Soviet Governments made in October 1954. One of these agreements provided for the evacuation of Soviet military units from the Chinese naval base at Port Arthur (a zone which includes the free port of Dairen) and for the transfer to China, without compensation, of all installations in the area. Another accord dissolved four Chinese-Soviet joint stock companies which had operated for several years in developing certain sectors of the Chinese economy. The Soviet Government agreed to transfer all of its shares to the Chinese Republic, with some compensation in the form of export goods to the U.S.S.R.

If the settlement of the explosive Indo-China crisis was the major victory for world peace during 1954, the major defeat was the decision of the American-led bloc to permit, or rather to stimulate, the rearmament of Western Germany, with its strong resurgent Nazi elements. Although the European Defense Community (E.D.C.) collapsed in August 1954 when the French National Assembly shelved the project, the Western Powers evolved a new plan for Western European Union and Bonn rearmament, announcing it in treaty form at Paris in October.

The Paris Pacts provide that the West German Government shall have at its disposal a mechanized army of 12

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divisions, an air force, a navy and a General Staff. The total armed forces will amount to at least 500,000 men, five times the number allowed Germany under the Treaty of Versailles and from which evolved the fearful and ferocious Wehrmacht of Adolf Hitler.

Under tremendous pressure from its Western allies the French National Assembly, flouting the feelings of the overwhelming majority of the French people, ratified the Paris accords late in 1954. But at this writing the West German Parliament, in which the powerful Social Democratic Party is strongly opposed to the pacts, has not yet voted in their favor.

Throughout these diplomatic maneuverings the Soviet Government has maintained its position in favor of a Four-Power conference to withdraw all occupation forces and re-establish Eastern and Western Germany as a unified state holding free, all-German elections and not entering into any military grouping directed at other countries. At the same time the U.S.S.R. has warned that ratification of the Paris undertakings will result in prolonging the unnatural division of Germany, will constitute a serious threat to the peace of Europe and may lead the Soviet Union to abrogate its treaties of mutual military aid, in case of aggression, with Britain and France. Considering the record of three major German aggressions in Europe since 1870, we must admit that Soviet Russia is justified in its misgivings.

In another part of Europe — the Balkans — the Malenkov regime has taken effective steps to repair the unfortunate rift with Yugoslavia dating back to 1948. In 1953 the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia restored diplomatic relations; and since that time the Russians have shown their desire to resume normal, friendly relations all along the line. At a reception given last November by the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow, Premier Malenkov, Foreign Minister Molotov, and Secretary of the Communist Party Khrushchev gathered around the Yugoslav

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Ambassador, Dobrivoje Vidic, and drank a toast to President Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia.

Other acts of conciliation in the international sphere on the part of the Malenkov regime have been the restoration of diplomatic relations with Israel; the signing of an agreement with Turkey for the joint use of waters controlled by an important dam in Soviet territory; entrance into U.N.E.S.C.O. (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) after a long period of boycott; and the granting of exit permissions to the Russian wives of American newspaper correspondents and of visas to an increasing number of Americans wishing to visit the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Government has also done its best to establish normal trade relations with other countries and to break through the commercial boycotts organized against it under the initiative of the United States. In 1953 it signed 26 foreign trade pacts and in 1954, 32.

The over-all record, then, of the Malenkov Government in international affairs during almost two years has been impressive. It improved its relations with the rest of the world, including America, and helped measurably in making a Third World War less of a possibility. While many obstacles remain to be overcome and some setbacks are bound to occur, the achievement of peaceful co-existence between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. now seems definitely within the realm of probability. Or, to put it another way, there is good reason to believe that the co-existence which the United States and Russia, Tsarist or Soviet, have shared for close to 180 years will continue into the future.

II. *Soviet Domestic Affairs*

During 1953 and 1954 Soviet economic progress continued at a rapid pace under the Fifth Five-Year Plan, 1951-1955. The volume of industrial production for 1954 amounted to 103 percent of the Plan's quotas and was almost three times the 1940 pre-war figure. The standard of living rose sharply owing to the current Plan's emphasis on consumers' goods and

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the general price cuts put into effect by the Government approximately once a year since 1947. These reductions numbered seven through 1954 and had sent down retail prices by 56 percent. Real wages were more than 70 percent higher than in 1940. The growing social insurance and social maintenance funds covering almost the entire population also contributed substantially to the rise in living standards. Full employment continued with an average of about 2,000,000 new jobs becoming available each year throughout the U.S.S.R.

In spite of a vast amount of construction under the Fifth Five-Year Plan, a severe housing shortage still exists in the Soviet Union. The planning authorities have not yet solved the problem of adequate housing for the fast-growing cities. In agriculture, unsatisfactory living conditions and the recent dangerous decline in the number of cattle, especially cows, have been receiving the definite attention of the new regime.

Premier Malenkov himself admitted that the Government had been taxing the peasants too heavily, particularly in regard to their private auxiliary farmsteads. These provided, beyond the basic needs satisfied by the collective farm economy, extra income for the individual peasants on a private incentive basis, and also extra produce. In 1953 the Government considerably reduced tax quotas for both the auxiliary farms and the collective farms; and agreed to pay much more for produce from the auxiliary farms, raising five and a half times the prices which the state paid for cattle and poultry. The new policy resulted in genuine improvement, with a 1,900,000 increase in the number of cows during 1954.

Despite a severe drought in the southern Ukraine and the Volga region during 1954, total yields of grain and other major crops were higher than in the previous year. This was partly due to the fact that the new regime was already undertaking the speedy expansion of farmlands, especially in Western Siberia. This plan called for the planting of new lands, 1954-1956, equal in size to the entire crop acreage of

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France and Italy combined. This new concentration in agriculture has led to the shelving of the ambitious Fifteen-Year afforestation program, which was 40 percent completed at the end of 1952; to turning the Great Turkmenian Canal into an irrigation canal only; and to the revision downward of the Davydov Plan, which in any case still remains in the blueprint stage.

Starting with the Supreme Soviet's sweeping amnesty decree of March 28, 1953, which released all prisoners serving terms of less than five years, a freer atmosphere has come to prevail in the U.S.S.R. since Malenkov assumed office.

In 1953 Aram Khachaturian, noted composer, and Ilya Ehrenburg, prominent author, expressed the new trends in frank articles calling for greater freedom for Soviet artists and writers. Both men protested against cultural creativity being subject to political conformity and bureaucratic controls. "Can there be a writer," asked Mr. Ehrenburg, "so lacking in individuality, or so apathetic to everything, that he needs to be told what he must write?"

In 1954 scientific opinion in the field of Soviet genetics seemed to be turning against Lysenko's shallow theories. But Lysenko was given full freedom to answer his critics; and there was no indication that his opponents would try to do what he had previously done, that is, to establish an official, Party-backed school of thought. In January 1955 two leading Soviet scientists, Academicians Ivan L. Knunyants and L. Zubkov, came out with an appeal for open competition among rival schools of scientific thought. They asserted: "Only under conditions of free exchange of ideas, in discussions, in criticism and self-criticism, does vital creative thought pulsate, do the results obtained receive correct evaluation, are new and fruitful scientific ideas conceived."

During the summer of 1953 the Soviet Communist Party issued a special manifesto condemning "the cult of the individual" and exalting "the collective leadership principle."

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This principle, according to the summary in *Pravda*, "guarantees the party against unforeseen events and one-sidedness in the adoption of decisions The cult of the individual is contrary to the principle of collective leadership and will result in the reduced role of the party In our party's propaganda work there is at present a greater need than ever for the alleviation of a dogmatic approach to the study of Marxist-Leninist theory."

In another editorial about the same time *Pravda* significantly reminded its readers of Karl Marx's "well-known proposition on the harm and impermissibility of the cult of the individual"; and of his opposition to "everything which might foster superstitious worship of authorities." Marx was further quoted as saying: "Out of dislike for any cult of the individual figure, during the existence of the International I never allowed to be made public the numerous declarations of recognition of my services, declarations with which I was plagued from all countries — I never even answered them, except sometimes to acknowledge their receipt."

Many observers are of the opinion that these statements by the Communist Party's leading journal were designed to show the Soviet people and the world at large that previous tendencies under Stalin to "one-man rule" and the adulation of authority had been reversed. It is also to be noted that the Soviet press has adopted a new phrase of collective implication — "The leaders of Party and Government" — when referring to the top figures in Soviet political life. Likewise important is the fact that when such leaders are reported as attending public functions, they are listed *alphabetically* in the newspapers. This was the case, for instance, when 12 of them, including Khrushchev, Malenkov and Molotov, attended the opening of the Second Congress of Soviet Writers in December 1954.

Despite the growth of democracy under the Malenkov regime, two serious political crimes involving death sentences marred the Soviet scene in 1953. First, Lavrenti P. Beria,

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Minister of Internal Affairs and a Deputy Premier, and six of his aides were tried, condemned and executed on the charge that they used Beria's Ministry, with its secret police apparatus, to organize a conspiratorial group for the seizure of the Soviet state.

Second, the Malenkov Government imposed the death penalty upon M. D. Ryumin, former deputy chief of the Ministry of State Security, who was found guilty of having falsified evidence and fabricated the entire case against 15 Soviet doctors arrested in January 1953 and charged with plotting to kill Soviet military and civilian leaders through faulty medical treatment. The fabrication was exposed and the doctors were released in April 1953.

An article in *Pravda* claimed that through this case Mr. Ryumin had attempted to kindle in the Soviet people "feelings of national hostility" contrary to Soviet moral and political unity. This comment had reference to the fact that nine of the accused doctors were Jewish and indicated that Ryumin as a Soviet official had been guilty of anti-Semitic conduct. However, this was far from bearing out foreign imputations that the Soviet Government was officially fostering anti-Semitism, since the Government promptly cracked down on the offender.

In its lengthy comment on this matter, *Pravda* stated: "The protection of the rights of Soviet citizens written into the Soviet Constitution is an important basis for the further development and strengthening of Soviet legality. Each worker, each collective farmer, each member of the Soviet intelligentsia may quietly and confidently work knowing that his citizen's rights are under the reliable protection of Soviet socialist legality."

In 1954 the Central Committee of the Communist Party cited the Constitution's guarantee of "freedom to practice religion" in an open rebuke to over-zealous individuals and newspapers carrying on anti-religious propaganda. The state-

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ment, signed by First Secretary Khrushchev, condemned crude and derisive propaganda that offended the feelings of the faithful, and asserted that believers and clergymen had been depicted "without basis at all as persons who do not deserve political confidence."

These various developments point to an increasing concern in the Soviet Union for the implementation of the civil liberties guaranteed in the great Constitution of 1936.

New York City
January 24, 1955

Corliss Lamont

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
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About the Author

Corliss Lamont, dissenter and progressive from a family long prominent in American life, graduated from the Phillips Exeter Academy in 1920 and Harvard College in 1924. He then studied for a year at New College, Oxford, and took his Ph.D. at Columbia University in 1932. He has taught at Columbia, Cornell, Harvard, and the New School. He is a member of the American Philosophical Association, the American Humanist Association, and is Chairman of the Bill of Rights Fund.

Dr. Lamont is the author of *The Illusion of Immortality*, *Humanism as a Philosophy*, *The Peoples of the Soviet Union*, and *The Independent Mind*. He is editor of *Man Answers Death: An Anthology of Poetry*. In 1952 he started a new publishing venture, Basic Pamphlets, and has issued 8 notable pamphlets dealing with current issues of the day in civil liberties, international relations, and philosophy.

No armchair intellectual, Dr. Lamont has participated actively for the past twenty-five years in movements concerned with civil liberties, racial equality, American-Soviet understanding, and political liberalism. In the election campaign of 1952 he ran on the American Labor Party ticket for U. S. Senator from New York State. He has traveled extensively throughout the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Europe. In 1932 and 1938 he visited the Soviet Union.

Dr. Lamont is married and has three daughters and a son.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR AND HIS BOOK

(From the Introduction to the Second Edition by James Aronson)

An individual with vision today will easily diagnose the smog of misinformation, delusion and hypocrisy which hangs over the land. Some will rest on the diagnosis and turn away; others will seek a cure. They will say: "Co-existence yes; but how is it to be achieved until we reach the minds and the hearts of America with the facts? How can we make them aware of what they will be co-existing with? Co-existence with a bogey is impossible, and for most of America today the Soviet Union is a bogey."

Such a man of vision is Corliss Lamont. Not only has he asked the questions but he has spent a good portion of his adult life seeking the answers. Being a man of logic and direction, he has gone to the source. Twice he visited the Soviet Union. A third visit was barred by the State Department as not in the "best interests" of the United States.

In a career devoted to the furtherance of the philosophy of Humanism and the preservation of the Bill of Rights, Dr. Lamont has found time to lecture, pamphleteer, and write books on sanity in foreign affairs. This, he believes, is the surest way of letting the people know, however slow and tedious may be the process.

He wrote *THE PEOPLES OF THE SOVIET UNION* (1946) and then, in 1952, completed the first edition of this book. It is a book for smog-bound Americans about the Soviet Union and what makes it tick: the government, the people, the constitution and the culture, its attitudes toward religion, the rights of man, and foreign affairs. This is Dr. Lamont's major work on the Soviet Union and, as all the things he has done, it is a work of simplicity and honesty.

Many things in the Soviet Union Dr. Lamont finds commendable; other things he criticizes sharply—especially the attitudes toward civil liberties, as he sees them, and aspects of foreign relations. The book will displease the inflexible on both sides of the political centerpiece; it will be read with gratification by all who are watching and studying the changes now taking place in the Soviet Union in a changing world.

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