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A HISTORY OF ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS: VOLUME I, 1917-1942

SIX CENTURIES OF RUSSO-POLISH RELATIONS

SOVIETS IN CENTRAL ASIA

A HISTORY
OF ANGLO-SOVIET
RELATIONS

Volume II

1943-1950

by

W. P. and Zelda K. Coates

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FOREWORD

OUR first volume of *A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations* covered the period, November 7, 1917, to December 31, 1942.

The present volume covers the period January 1, 1943, to the middle of 1950.

The authors are now working on Volume III, which, of course, will take up the record from the middle of 1950 onwards.

Before proceeding further we would recall that on May 26, 1942, there was signed in London a very important diplomatic instrument. The title of that instrument read:

"Treaty of Alliance in the war against Hitlerite Germany and her associates in Europe and of collaboration and mutual assistance thereafter concluded between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland."

Article II read:

"The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any negotiations with the Hitlerite Government or any other Government in Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions, and not to negotiate or conclude except by mutual consent any armistice or peace treaty with Germany or any other State associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe."

Article VII read:

"Each High Contracting Party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other High Contracting Party."

If words have any meaning these two Articles mean that so long as the Treaty exists neither the U.S.S.R. nor Great Britain would enter into any treaty or alliance directed against the other.

At the time, commenting on the Treaty in Volume I, we wrote:

"This co-operation in the war and the co-operation after the war envisaged in the Alliance is pregnant with immense benefits not only for the two countries concerned, but for the world in general. But the importance of treaties depends not merely on their terms, but on how they are carried out. The elements which prevented an understanding with the U.S.S.R. to safeguard peace before the outbreak of the war are now quiescent, but they are by no means dead."

Unfortunately subsequent events proved that our warning comment was a considerable understatement. The elements hostile to cordial and co-operative relations between London and Moscow were only "quiescent" publicly, they were anything but "quiescent" behind the scenes.

On September 2, 1941, Mr. Jack Tanner (President of the Amalgamated Engineering Union), speaking at the Trades Union Congress, said:

"There are people in high places who declare that they hope that the Russian and the German armies will exterminate each other, and that while this is taking place we, the British Commonwealth of Nations, will so develop our Air Force and other armed forces that if Russia and Germany do destroy each other we shall be the dominant Power in Europe. Now this point of view has been expressed quite recently by a Cabinet Minister, a Member of the present Government, a gentleman who holds a very important position, none other than the Minister of Aircraft Production, Colonel Moore-Brabazon. Such an attitude I think everyone here will agree is a terrible danger.

"And it is a crime—a crime against the people of this country and the people of Russia, who during these last three months, have suffered so terribly."

In 1956 Heinemann, Ltd., published a book entitled *The Brabazon Story* by Lord Brabazon, in the course of which he wrote:

"I was asked to go up to Manchester, which was doing splendid work in the production line, by Lord Simon, then Sir John Simon, who gave the lunch in a hotel—the Central, I think it was. After lunch I happened to say, with reference to the conflict that was then going on between Germany and Russia, that it suited us because, as they were fighting each other, the concentration of Germans would be, anyhow for some time, not so much focused on us, and we

should have time to get on with our manufacture of armaments in order to deal the crushing blow."

Lord Brabazon would be more than human if he did not try to put the best possible interpretation on what he had said.

Personally, we think that Jack Tanner's version is correct and this view was very widely shared in the country.

Moore-Brabazon himself, in the above book, stated:

"From that day there was organised opposition in every works I visited, and people hooted and shouted and booed wherever I went Consequently, instead of being a help to the Prime Minister I was a definite drag on him, and as a result I received the following letter:

February 21, 1942

'My dear Moore-Brabazon,—It is with very great regret that I write to tell you that the reconstruction of the Government in which I have been involved through pressure of events and opinion makes it necessary for me to have the Ministry of Aircraft Production at my disposal.'"

This meant that the Prime Minister asked Moore-Brabazon for his resignation in the usual polite diplomatic language.

Shortly afterwards a number of British officers were present at a social function. One of the officers, a scion of one of the leading Tory families in Great Britain, remarked: "We are all Moore-Brabazons here but he was a fool to blurt it out." This remark met with universal approval from the officers present.

We think that this remark reflected the views held very widely in influential circles in the ruling class in Great Britain at the time. Perhaps more important still, similar views were held by Prime Minister Churchill.

Now to have a short glance at the course of the war on the eastern front.

The Soviet forces raised the siege of Leningrad, January 18, 1943, and the last of the German forces capitulated at Stalingrad, February 22, 1943.

The Soviet forces followed up with crushing blows and although 80 per cent of the forces of Germany and her allies were concentrated on the eastern front, Kiev was liberated by the Soviet forces, November 6, 1943.

This meant that between February 2 and November 6, 1943, the Soviet forces had advanced over 800 miles. By the end of 1943 two-thirds of Soviet territory which had been occupied by the forces of Germany and her allies had been liberated.

The Soviet authorities and peoples were bitterly disappointed that a second front had not been opened in Western Europe in 1943. They and many others were convinced that the Western Powers were deliberately pulling their punches so that the U.S.S.R. would be exhausted at the end of the war.

At the end of 1943 many members of the ruling class and their hangers-on in Great Britain began to talk about the "menace of the Russian Colossus".

When the new year (1944) opened, the Soviet fighting forces continued their mighty hammer blows all along the front.

They entered Rumania, March 31, reached Czechoslovakia, April 8, liberated Odessa and Balacava on April 10 and 18, 1944, respectively.

During this period the fighting forces of the Western Powers kept up their widespread attacks, but not on such a scale as to bring very much relief to the Soviet forces, for at this period troops were being constantly transferred by the German High Command from the western to the eastern front.

The forces of the Western Powers entered Rome, June 4, 1944, and two days later, June 6, the forces of the Western Powers landed on the coast of France: at long last the Second Front in Western Europe was a reality.

During the next seventeen months, events—which are dealt with at some length in the body of this volume—moved with tremendous speed. The Soviet armed forces broke the Mannerheim Line, June 18, reached East Prussia, August 17, crossed the Yugoslav frontier, September 7, liberated Riga, October 13, captured Budapest, December 26, 1944.

The advance continued when the new year (1945) dawned. The armed forces of the U.S.S.R. entered Warsaw, January 11, and Konigsberg, April 9, 1945.

Then came the final triumph: Berlin surrendered to the Soviet fighting forces, May 2, 1945.

Now to turn to the Western front—Paris was liberated, August 25, 1944; the Rhine was crossed, March 7, 1945; the German forces in Italy surrendered, April 29, and the final act of surrender of the German forces was signed at Rheims, May 7, 1945.

Victory was complete and the Soviet Union had played the biggest part in achieving it. What next? Every dictate of common sense and decency would have shouted—Consolidate in peace the Anglo-Soviet Alliance forged in war.

However, Prime Minister Churchill had very different ideas. He revealed them some years later, when he confessed that already on VE day, 1945:

"The Soviet menace, to my eyes, had already replaced the Nazi foe."
(*The Second World War*, Volume VI, p. 495.)

What utter nonsense! The "Soviet menace" had been an obsession of Churchill's since November, 1917, but it never existed outside his heated imagination.

Churchill ceased to be Prime Minister some seven weeks later. For the convenience of our readers we here summarise the main facts dealt with at some length in this volume.

Almost immediately after the conclusion of the peace in Europe there was talk in influential circles in the U.S.A. of war between the U.S.A. and Britain on the one hand and the U.S.S.R. on the other.

Mr. Ernest Bevin, in a speech at the Labour Party Conference, May 23, 1945, definitely threw overboard the policy of the Crimean War, but at the Conference of the three Foreign Ministers (U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and Great Britain) in London, September-October, 1945, Bevin reverted to the disastrous Crimean War policy and in this he was supported enthusiastically by the representative of the U.S.A.

The U.S.A. Government decided not to reveal the "know how" of the atom bomb to the U.S.S.R. and in this they were supported by the British Government. Washington and London were convinced that Moscow would not discover the secret of the atom bomb for many years and that in the meantime the U.S.S.R. could by threats of an atom bomb attack be blackmailed into accepting conditions which the two Governments wished to impose on her.

Mr. Winston Churchill, in his notorious Fulton speech, March 5, 1946, called for an Anglo-U.S.A. ultimatum to the U.S.S.R. based on the American monopoly of the atom bomb and he continued this agitation until the U.S.S.R. had herself exploded an atom bomb. Even then he did not desist for some time.

The Baruch Plan, June, 1946, was aimed at keeping the U.S.S.R. in a permanent position of inferiority *vis à vis* the U.S.A. That was the aim of the U.S.A. and the British Governments.

Mr. George Kennan's notorious article in *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1947,

revealed beyond any doubt that the aim of U.S.A. policy was the overthrow of the Soviet Government.

At the various conferences of Foreign Ministers, the U.S.A. and Great Britain, and later also France, were not prepared to negotiate with the U.S.S.R. on the basis of reasonable compromise and give and take. That is why, in the main, these conferences ended in failure.

The North Atlantic Treaty (later known as NATO) was and is a military alliance directed against the U.S.S.R., and despite the disclaimers of the British, U.S.A. and French Governments it was universally recognised as such in the chancelleries of the world and by columnists and diplomatic correspondents in the press of the world.

NATO was a clear violation of the Anglo-Soviet and the Franco-Soviet Treaties of 1942 and 1944 respectively.

The announcement of the explosion of the first Soviet atom bomb, September 23, 1949, and the establishment of the Central Government of the Chinese People's Republic in Peking, October 1, 1949, radically changed the whole political and strategic situation in favour of the U.S.S.R.

This obviously called—as many serious students of international affairs pointed out—for a fundamental change in the policy of the three Western Powers *vis-à-vis* the U.S.S.R., but this change was never even attempted. It was evident that the Governments of the three Western Powers had neither the mental energy nor the moral courage to carry out such a change. The Western Powers still hoped against hope that something would go wrong in the U.S.S.R. and that they would then be able to negotiate from a position of strength.

From the end of 1943 to the end of the period covered in this volume there was constant talk of the "Soviet menace to Western Europe".

That "menace" never at any time existed, and the Governments of the NATO Powers were well aware of that plain fact. Apart from the fact that aggressive war was and is foreign to the policy and ideology of the Soviet system, it was common knowledge at that time that the U.S.S.R. had suffered enormous losses both in her armed forces and among her civilian population, many of whom the Nazis had either slaughtered or driven out from their homes for slave work in Germany. The U.S.S.R. also suffered terrible devastation of her industries and agriculture as well as the destruction of her housing, educational and other cultural institutions.

The U.S.A. on the other hand, so far from suffering any devastation,

was actually able to develop and extend her industry and agriculture and, had she so desired, also her cultural institutions.

Britain did suffer grievously from air raids, but the country had not been invaded by the Nazi hordes and the damage she suffered in manpower and material losses was but a fraction of that suffered by the U.S.S.R.

When the war was over the one thing the Government and peoples of the Soviet Union desired was to be left in peace to carry out the enormous work of reconstruction and further economic and cultural development.

The Soviet budget cut military expenditure from over 128,200 million roubles in 1945 to 72,200 million roubles in 1946. In 1947 there was a further cut to 67,000 million roubles; in 1948, to 66,000 million roubles. With the increased intensity of the cold war, they increased the expenditure somewhat to 79,200 million roubles in 1949 and 82,800 million roubles in 1950; increases surely justified by the circumstances.

In 1946, we ourselves (the authors of this book) travelled widely through the U.S.S.R. from Leningrad to the borders of China; we spoke to numerous people in all walks of life—rank-and-file workers in industry, collective farmers, housewives, teachers, scientists, heads of industrial enterprises, as well as the higher-ups in the Soviet Government. One and all their talk was of peace and reconstruction.

When we asked scientists and statesmen about the atom bomb, they replied that they preferred to concentrate on methods of using atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and they would have done so were it not for the threats from the Western Powers.

At the end of the war in Europe there was an enormous fund of goodwill in the U.S.S.R. both for the British Government and the British people, but that tremendous asset was recklessly thrown away by the then British Government.

The question most often put to British visitors to the U.S.S.R. from the autumn and winter of 1945 onwards was: "Why is the British Labour Government so hostile to us?"

Had the Labour Government lived up to its pledges of the 1945 General Election *vis-à-vis* the U.S.S.R., the world—in the period covered in this volume—would have been well on the way to a long, just and lasting peace.

W. P. AND ZELDA K. COATES

London,

November 7, 1957

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CHAPTER I

FROM JANUARY, 1943, TO SEPTEMBER, 1944

THE year 1943 was one of great happenings. The tide of war had definitely turned against Germany and her satellites in Europe, although the final victory of the Allies was still a long way off.

To turn first to the Soviet-German front and to the heroic cities of Leningrad and Stalingrad.

The siege of Leningrad was raised on January 18, and on the 30th of the same month Field Marshal Von Paulus—the Commander of the German forces attacking Stalingrad—and sixteen generals capitulated and by February 2, 1943, all the German forces in Stalingrad had surrendered to the Soviet forces. This was regarded as one of the greatest victories in military history. Hitler's proud boast to a wildly cheering Reichstag that Stalingrad would be captured ended in complete and shattering defeat. The victory of the Soviet forces passed into history as a great and inspiring legend.

During the months that followed the Soviet forces continued to advance, albeit with some setbacks, along the entire front from the Gulf of Finland to the Caucasus. Here we can mention only a few of the important victories. Orel was captured on August 4, 1943; Kharkov, August 23; Taganrog, August 30; Novorossiisk, September 16; Briansk, September 17; Poltava, September 23 and Smolensk, September 25, 1943.

The Soviet forces crossed the Dnieper October 7 and Melitopol was captured October 23; Kiev, November 6, 1943.

Meanwhile, other measures were being taken to co-ordinate the war efforts of Great Britain, U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and China and thus to hasten the end of hostilities.

The Foreign Secretaries of the U.S.A. (Mr. Cordell Hull), Great Britain (Mr. Anthony Eden) and of the Soviet Union (Mr. V. M. Molotov), met in conference in Moscow from October 19 to 30, 1943.

The *Times*, November 2, 1943, in a featured article headed "Complete agreement in Moscow" reported: "The Moscow Conference ended yesterday with outstanding success. Five declarations, issued last night, set forth the main results. These are:

"Plans for shortening the war in Europe have been examined.

"A European Advisory Commission is to be set up in London.

"An Advisory Council on Italy is to be formed.

"China joins with the three Powers in expressing determination to disarm their enemies and in recognising the need for a wider system of post-war security and co-operation.

"Italy is to be helped in restoring a democratic régime.

"A free and independent Austria is to be re-established.

"War criminals are to be handed over for trial in the countries in which their crimes have been committed."

The *Times* article added: "The discussions, which were characterised by mutual confidence and understanding, also covered the treatment to be given to Germany and her satellites."

The achievements of the Moscow Conference rang throughout the world. A cable date-lined Moscow, November 2, 1943, stated:

"The Press this morning describes the successful conclusion of the three-Power conference in such terms as 'a severe blow to the enemy's hopes' and 'another mighty blow at Hitler and his allies.' All to-day's newspapers publish as a banner heading a greeting to the Anglo-Russian-American coalition." (*Times*, November 3, 1943.)

The cable continued: "Particular satisfaction has been caused by the prominence given in the joint statement to the question of speeding victory, and there is no doubt in people's minds that though the statement is necessarily vague about what agreement the allies reached on this question, measures were agreed on which should hasten the defeat of Germany."

The Diplomatic Correspondent of the *Times* commented:

"The success of the Moscow Conference resounded yesterday in all the Allied countries. Reports from America, the Dominions, Moscow, and elsewhere mingle together, with little to distinguish one from another. All agree that a road has been designed which if developed and followed by the great Allied Powers, can lead the world to the only system of security likely to stand the strains of the post-war years."

The correspondent continued: "Soviet comment may dwell especially on the military discussions, London comment on the new political machinery of alliance in the European commission, and American

comment on the four-Power declaration on future security. But these are only slight differences in emphasis; the long and comprehensive reviews, published in the three countries alike, welcome and deal with all the results without reservation."

Now to return again to the fighting fronts. During the period so far dealt with much had been achieved by the Allies of the U.S.S.R. The German and Italian Forces had been crushingly defeated in North Africa and the way was cleared for an Allied invasion of Sicily and Italy. British, Canadian and U.S.A. troops landed in Sicily, July 10, and on the mainland in the toe of Italy, September 3, 1943.

Meanwhile Mussolini had been compelled to resign—although later he tried to rally support in the North. A new Italian Government was formed which signed full Armistice Terms with the Allies, September 29, 1943.

The new Government declared war on Germany, October 13, and was accepted as a co-belligerent by the Allies.

During the same period the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.A.F. continued their attacks on military targets on enemy territory.

However, during all this time about 80 per cent of the armed forces of Germany and her Allies were concentrated on the Eastern Front and the Soviet Government was disappointed—while fully acknowledging the achievements of her Allies in North Africa and Italy, and the combined attacks of the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.A.F.—that a real second front had not been opened in Western Europe.

Speaking on November 6, 1943, on the eve of the 26th Anniversary of the November Revolution, Marshal Stalin said:

"This year the Red Army's blows at the German-Fascist troops were supported by the military operations of our Allies in North Africa, in the Mediterranean Basin and in Southern Italy. At the same time the Allies subjected and are still subjecting important industrial centres of Germany to heavy air-bombing and thus considerably weakening the enemy's military power.

"If we add to all this the fact that the Allies are regularly supplying us with various armaments and raw materials, it can be said without exaggeration that, by doing all this, they have considerably facilitated the successes of our summer campaign."

Marshal Stalin concluded: "The time is not far off when we shall completely expel the enemy from the Ukraine, Byelorussia, from

the Leningrad and Kalinin Regions and liberate from the German invaders the peoples of the Crimea, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldavia and the Karelo-Finnish Republic."

Next day the well-known Military Commentator Max Werner wrote in *Reynolds News*:

"It can be a short war if we capitalise on Russia's gigantic military achievements. The Germans are not simply retreating to shorter lines. They are suffering classic military defeats in battles of encirclement and annihilation. The battle of the Dnieper has brought Germany to the very brink of defeat.

"The Russians are quite certainly holding powerful reserves for the final kill. Hardly more than one-tenth of the Anglo-American land forces in and around Europe are engaged in action. When these forces are simultaneously flung against Germany the Germans must collapse. It could be done in three to six months." (*Reynolds News*, November 7, 1943.)

The British press very appreciatively welcomed Marshal Stalin's speech. To quote just one example, the *Daily Telegraph*, November 8, 1943, editorially commented:

"It is worth noting that, doubtless as a result of the reciprocal information and confidence imparted at the Moscow Conference, the Russian leader gave his Allies a generous share of the credit for this total reversal of the fortunes of war in little over twelve months. . . .

"Marshal Stalin has now declared that the air offensive against Germany, the Italian campaign and the furnishing of regular supplies to Russia, amount to 'something like a Second Front' and that a 'real Second Front' (which presumably means a front which will actively engage a substantial portion of the German Army) is 'not far off. . . .'"

The *Daily Telegraph* continued: "The latest Russian victories are fresh evidence that when this concentric offensive develops it will indeed be crushing. . . ."

The Moscow Conference just referred to paved the way for a still more important gathering—President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill, accompanied by big staffs of experts, met in conference at Teheran from November 28-December 1, 1943, inclusive, and at the close issued the following statement:

"We, the President of the United States of America, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met these four days past in this capital of our Ally Iran and have shaped and confirmed our common policy.

"We expressed our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.

"As to war our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions and we have concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations which will be undertaken from the east, west and south.

"The common understanding which we have here reached guarantees that victory will be ours.

"And as to peace we are sure that our concord will make it an enduring peace. We recognise fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace that will command the good will of the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.

"With our diplomatic advisers we have surveyed the problems of the future. We shall seek the co-operation and the active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them as they may choose to come into a world family of democratic nations.

"No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U-boats by sea, and their war plants from the air. Our attacks will be relentless and increasing.

"From these friendly conferences we look with confidence to the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives untouched by tyranny and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.

"We came here with hope and determination. We leave here friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.

"Signed at Teheran, Dec. 1, 1943—

ROOSEVELT, STALIN, CHURCHILL."

(*Times*, December 7, 1943.)

The *Times* referred to this statement as "a momentous joint Declaration", and that was typical of the reactions throughout the Allied world.

Foreign Secretary Eden reporting to the House of Commons,

December 14, 1943, on the Teheran Conference *inter alia* said:

"When I came back to this House from Moscow I ventured to give the House a message that I was confident that the foundation had been laid for enduring collaboration between this country, the United States and the Soviet Union. I am many times more confident of this today. The work of Teheran began just where the work of Moscow left off, but the Teheran Conference, being a conference of leaders, carries a still more stirring message to the world."

Eden continued: "I would like to quote just one extract about the Conference from the Soviet newspaper *Pravda* and I quote it because it expresses exactly my own feelings at the end of this Conference. They say this:

'Only a short time separates us from the Moscow Conference of the three Foreign Ministers of the Allied Powers, the decisions of which not only demonstrated the strengthening of friendly co-operation between Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. in the war period, but laid the basis for fruitful work together after the war. But what a tremendous step forward has now been taken along this path?'"

After finishing this quotation from *Pravda*, Eden continued: "I am convinced that that is true. Let me try to sum up the results of the Teheran meeting. The first result is that the war will be shortened. The close co-ordination of all our military plans which was reached at the Conference will ensure it. Clearly, we can do better when there is a close interplay at every move, which we have not had until now. The Teheran Conference laid the plans to this end. All is now agreed. Every plan is now agreed and the timing is now agreed, and, in due course, the decisions of the Teheran Conference will be unrolled on the fields of battle."

Mr. Eden's speech was cordially received in the House of Commons. It had a very good press in Britain and, although it was fairly lengthy, was given practically in full over the Soviet radio.

A very pleasing ceremony, which appealed to the deepest emotions of the British and Soviet peoples, took place in the course of the Teheran Conference. The "Sword of Stalingrad" was handed over by Prime Minister Churchill, in the name of H.M. King George VI, to Marshal Stalin on November 29, 1943.

For obvious reason the ceremony was not reported in the British press till December 7, 1943, but then it was described at considerable length and touched the deepest chords of the British people.

We quote from the *Times*: "Marshal Stalin and Mr. Churchill entered the room almost simultaneously, but from opposite ends. The Prime Minister advanced to the centre of the room and stood there bareheaded in the uniform of a commodore of the Royal Air Force. The Marshal, whose entrance was impressive in its swiftness and silence, stood for a moment in the doorway. Both he and Mr. Churchill were obviously conscious of the significance of the occasion, and both looked deeply moved. Marshal Stalin, followed by Mr. Molotov and Marshal Voroshilov, then advanced to meet Mr. Churchill. Mr. Roosevelt followed Marshal Stalin into the room and sat by the wall."

The *Times* continued: "As the leaders of the two nations stood face to face a Russian Army band, stationed in an adjoining room, played the Internationale and God Save the King. Then Mr. Churchill, in a clear, solemn voice, said:

"Marshal Stalin. I have the command of his Majesty King George VI to present to you for transmission to the city of Stalingrad this sword of honour of which his Majesty himself has approved the design. This blade bears upon it the inscription 'To the steel-hearted citizens of Stalingrad, the gift of King George VI in token of the homage of the British people.'"

The *Times* cable went on: "The Prime Minister's speech was delivered in Russian by the British interpreter. Marshal Stalin then spoke. He was clearly deeply affected, and his voice was so low that it was difficult to catch his words. They were repeated in English by the Russian interpreter, but he too was unable to speak above a whisper. It is understood that the Marshal expressed the deep appreciation of the Russian people for the honourable gesture of their British comrades.

"The British lieutenant advanced with the sword held in his arms and placed it across Mr. Churchill's outstretched arms. The Prime Minister handed it to Marshal Stalin, who held it up, kissed the blade just below the hilt, and handed it to Marshal Voroshilov, who in turn handed it to the Russian lieutenant, who had moved forward with ceremonial step to receive it. The lieutenant, holding the sword

shoulder high, turned about and marched back, with equally resounding stride, to the head of the Russian guard."

The *Times* report concluded: "This was in effect the end of the ceremony, but before the Sword of Stalingrad was borne proudly away, Marshal Stalin took it again from the officer and showed it to President Roosevelt, who looked up at Marshal Stalin and said: 'Truly a heart of steel'."

That was not the end of this episode. The *Daily Telegraph*, December 16, 1943, carried the following:

"The King, who has been suffering from influenza, resumed his ordinary duties at Buckingham Palace yesterday when he gave a number of audiences.

"Among the first of those whom his Majesty received was Mr. Gusev, the Soviet Ambassador, who called at the Palace to convey to the King the personal thanks of Marshal Stalin, Supreme Commander of the Soviet forces, for the gift of the Sword of Honour for the City of Stalingrad."

Typical of the change in public opinion in Britain respecting the U.S.S.R. were the sentiments expressed by Bishop Deane in Aberdeen in December, 1943. He said: "We are rather ashamed, some of us, to think that after the hard things we said in the old days it is the Russian people who have saved the world. Never in the history of the human race has there been so amazing, so stupendous an achievement as was accomplished by the Russian people before the war. We ought to express our penitence for our ignorance of Russia then, and our immense admiration for this thrilling human spirit in the Russian Empire."

Meanwhile bitter fighting continued. The Red Army occupied Znamenska, December 10, and Zhitomir, December 31, 1943.

An article in *Pravda* thus summed up the achievements on the Soviet-German front in 1943: "Beginning with the defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad, with the encirclement and smashing and capturing of a huge German army, the Red Army has continued a year of avenging offensive on the front from Orel to Taganrog and ended it with the remarkable forcing of the Dnieper, the liberation of Kiev, Korosten, Kazatin, Zhitomir and other cities.

"The Germans have been driven out from two-thirds of the Soviet territory they temporarily occupied."

Also during December, 1943, the Western Powers won further successes in Italy and the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.A.F. kept up their attacks on enemy military targets.

We must now turn to the Labour Party Conference and the Trades Union Congress held in 1943.

At the Labour Party Conference, June 14-18, the questions of the war and Anglo-Soviet relations were very much in the minds of all delegates. The Chairman, Mr. A. J. Dobbs, in his presidential address *inter alia* said:

"The war still rages. Victory has not yet been won by the United Nations. But the beast, already badly mauled, has been brought to bay. The heroic forces of the United Nations, sustained by the tireless efforts of the men and women workers in the factories and on the land, and the seamen, have succeeded in doing what most of the world in 1940-41 thought to be impossible.

"To our Russian Allies who have so valiantly and successfully halted and then smashed the greatest military onslaughts in history; to the United States whose fighting men are comrades of ours on many battlefields, in the air and on the sea; to China which has so heroically carried on her fight against the Japanese invader; and to all the forces of the other United Nations who have shared in the ordeal by fire and battle, our grateful thanks are due, as well as to the heroic patriots and partisans in the occupied countries who, in defiance of all risk, continue the struggle with all the means at their disposal."

Then turning to post-war policy, the Chairman said: "The power of the Junkers and the militarists, without whom Hitler could not have gained control, must also be destroyed; otherwise the war will have been fought in vain.

"Effective steps must be taken to control German war industries, actual and potential, and to establish conditions that will prevent her ever again losing war upon the world."

The National Executive Committee's report to the Conference contained *inter alia* the following:

"At the last Annual Conference, Mr. Harold Laski made a statement on behalf of the National Executive Committee in which he said that the Committee proposed to send a Delegation from the Labour Party to the Soviet Union for the establishment of a permanent basis of friendship with the U.S.S.R.

"The Committee realises that the fulfilment of this purpose is of the utmost importance for that secure peace and progress in well-being in the post-war world with which all the hopes and interests

of the workers are bound up. This matter, therefore, has received careful and continuous attention, and the appropriate consultations have been undertaken. The necessity of the Delegation remains outstanding but not less urgent is the question of the suitable moment. Granted the military position, the National Executive does not feel that this moment has yet come, not least since the energies of the Soviet authorities are fully engaged by the heroic and immense battles in which their armed forces are fighting so superbly. The Committee, however, will not fail to keep the matter prominently in mind.

"The Committee renews its assurance to the Conference that, at the earliest moment when the situation seems favourable, it will undertake the necessary arrangements to carry out the pledge given to the Annual Conference in 1942."

These paragraphs were accepted unanimously by the Conference.

Nine Delegates from the Soviet Trade Union Movement attended the British Trades Union Congress, September 6-10, 1943.

The President, Dame Anne Loughlin, D.B.E., in her opening address *inter alia* said: "The great military successes which have cheered us, especially during the last twelve months, have been the reward of far-sighted planning, patient preparation, grim courage, hard work and grievous sacrifice. The forward march of the armies of the United Nations which began in North Africa, and has reached now the foot of the Italian Peninsula, was made possible by this planning, this mobilisation of the vast productive resources of Britain and its Allies, and by the steady and sustained industrial effort of the British working people, men and women alike, joined in a common resolve to produce for their comrades in the field the weapons and the equipment they needed."

Dame Anne continued: "It was made possible too, by the heroic and unforgettable sacrifices of our Russian Ally whose armies and people bore the weight of the Nazi onslaught. They did not break. They fought with grim endurance of unimaginable suffering and uncounted loss. The Soviet armies stood in the breach. Behind them and among them the Soviet people strove and sacrificed to maintain their armies. Soviet order, discipline and organisation provided the means, beyond all expectation or calculation, by which in due time the Red Armies were able to strike back with irresistible strength, to win back great areas of Soviet soil and to recover key cities, like Stalingrad, Orel and Kharkov."

Dame Anne Loughlin added: "Our Allies won these victories at a terrible cost. It would be a base betrayal beyond human forgiveness if we on our side should ever forget this sacrificial service of the Russian people, or if we permitted the bonds of friendship forged and tempered in the agonies of war to be weakened or broken again. I am convinced that Congress acted wisely and in time when it directed the General Council to take the steps which have led to the creation of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee. The work of that Committee, and the purpose inspiring it, have been justified by their results. The two-way visits of the Committee's members have deepened confidence and has brought our two Movements into closer association than they have ever known before."

When the Soviet Delegates were introduced to the Congress they received an exceptionally warm welcome.

Mr. Shvernik, the leader of the Soviet Delegation, addressed the Congress, September 8, 1943.

Mr. Hugh Chevins, Labour Correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, thus described Shvernik's introduction to the Congress: "As Dame Anne Loughlin, the president, introduced him, Mr. Shvernik, who is a sturdy 55-year-old metal worker, moved, with the whole of the 10 members of the Russian delegation, to the front of the platform, and members of the T.U.C. General Council withdrew to back seats.

"The huge audience rose to its feet and cheered vociferously, and as his interpreter arranged the microphone Mr. Shvernik bowed his thanks.

"Reading his speech in Russian from a copious sheaf of foolscap, Mr. Shvernik emphasised his points with vigorous nods of the head. His speech was translated at intervals and, with the translation, occupied two hours." (*Daily Telegraph*, September 9, 1943.)

Chevins added: "When Mr. Shvernik sat down Dame Anne Loughlin presented him with a gold wrist watch, remarking among other things, 'You can rest assured that there is very little wrong with the working people of this country.' The audience then rose and sang the Internationale."

Shvernik was very forthright. He emphasised that the Soviet peoples were deeply disappointed that a second front had not yet been opened in Europe.

The Trades Union Congress official report states: "He concluded with an expression of his confidence that the trade unions and working class of our countries would, shoulder to shoulder, wage a decisive

struggle against the common enemy in order to achieve his speedy defeat, and in order to liberate the millions of people suffering under the yoke of Hitlerite tyranny from all the horrors and trials they were undergoing. Let our common struggle increase the ranks of active fighters against Hitlerism with every passing day. We were fighting for a just cause, we were waging a just war of liberation against the Fascist tyranny and against Hitlerite bandit imperialism aiming at world domination. Long live the British working class! Long live the working class of the Soviet Union! Long live the international solidarity of the workers in the struggle against Hitlerite tyranny! Long live the friendship and joint active work of the trade unions of the United Nations! Long live the victory of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition! Death to the German occupationists!"

On the following day, September 9, Madam Zhukhova, also on behalf of the Soviet Trade Unions, addressed the Congress. She also appealed for the opening of a second front in Europe at the earliest moment and concluded thus: "It was time by joint effort to bring about a shortening of the war. Only the mighty joint blows of the Red Army and the Anglo-American armies could hasten the end of the war and reduce the sacrifices of the people. The Soviet women called on the women of Britain to work still better than they had done before, with re-doubled energy. They called on them still more to fan the flame of hatred of the common enemy among their husbands, brothers and sons fighting in the ranks of the British forces. The one aim was to destroy Fascism, to establish peaceful co-operation of the peoples. Strength lay in unity, in standing together, in fighting comradeship. Long might friendship live between the Soviet and British Trade Unions. Long might live the peoples of the Soviet Union and Great Britain. Long might live the victory over Hitlerite Germany, the worst enemy of the human race."

The Congress, September 9, 1943, adopted a lengthy resolution on Trade Unions and the war situation, which *inter alia* contained the following paragraphs:

"The Congress places on record its profound admiration of the magnificent achievements of the Red Army and Air Force on the field of battle, and of the strength and fortitude of the Soviet people under the heavy burdens the war has imposed upon them. Their sacrifices have won for them the homage of all the free peoples of the world.

"The Congress expresses its strong conviction that the expeditious development of a concerted effort to establish an additional front of battle by further invasion of the European Continent should be undertaken at every point where Allied forces can strike with good prospects of military success. The successful accomplishment of this will bring much needed relief to our valiant Russian Ally, and hasten defeat of the enemy."

The resolution was overwhelmingly adopted. The opposition came from those who wanted a more strongly worded resolution calling for a second front.

The Soviet Trade Union Delegation visited many industrial centres and ports in the North of Britain where they received tremendous welcomes from the factory and port workers.

Sir Walter Citrine (Secretary, Trades Union Congress) and Mr. Shvernik spoke at a conference organised by the London Trades Council, September 19, 1943, in London.

Sir Walter, among other things, said: "We will never get peace worthy of the name unless we are able to secure agreement between the Powers who will carry the major responsibility for the peace.

"I want to be quite frank. I make no exclusive claim for genius in our three great nations.

"But unless those three nations know clearly the plan they expect the peace to give, it is impossible to expect 38 nations to agree on the peace.

"The Soviet people are confident in the future. They are satisfied that under their system there is work for all.

"That progressive standard of life should be possible to us here if we can use our intelligence in the post-war period and maintain the collaboration which has been established."

Sir Walter concluded: "In that sense the Soviet Union stands out as a beacon light for us all, and it increases our determination that we shall learn everything we can by close collaboration with the Soviet Union in the days of peace as in the days of war." (*Daily Herald*, September 20, 1943.)

Mr. Shvernik told the delegates that a strict record was being kept of all German atrocities. Shvernik continued: "The hour will come when the Soviet people will present their account to the Hitlerite bandits and robbers. For all the crimes the Fascist evil-doers will pay the deserved penalty."

Sir Walter Citrine, in reply, said: "I hope that when the time does

come for us to make up our minds as to the measure of punishment for the crimes committed by the Nazi invaders, we shall not be carried away by false sentiment.

"Not in a spirit of hatred, but of justice, we must not only see that no criminal shall escape unpunished, but that the most adequate reparation it is possible to devise shall be made to the Soviet people."

Before the Soviet Trade Union delegates left for home, they were received by Mr. and Mrs. Churchill.

"The Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill received at No. 10 Downing Street, yesterday afternoon, Mr. Shvernik, chairman of the All Union Central Council of Trade Unions of the U.S.S.R. and president of the Council of Nationalities, accompanied by members of the Soviet Trade Union Delegation, who were introduced by Sir Walter Citrine.

"Mr. Shvernik thanked the Prime Minister for the opportunity of visiting British war industries and other establishments. He said that such visits were the means of further strengthening the friendship between the peoples of Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

"The Prime Minister reciprocated these good wishes and asked Mr. Shvernik to convey his personal greetings to Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov." (*Times*, October 6, 1943.)

The visit of the Soviet trade unionists to Great Britain had been an unparalleled success.

January 1, 1944, was undoubtedly the happiest New Year's Day in the U.S.S.R. since the outbreak of the second world war. The position was still grim for the Soviet citizens who had suffered under Nazi rule, and worse still for those who were still under their vile domination, but the splendid Soviet and Allied victories in 1943 and the success of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences had inspired a renewed and strong hope of speedy victory and the liberation of Soviet soil from Nazi pollution. Of course, bitter struggles still lay ahead but victory was more clearly in sight than ever before. All this explained the smiling cheery faces of the Soviet crowds which celebrated the New Year.

Pravda, in an article entitled "The New Year, 1944", declared *inter alia*:

"In the fires of the Patriotic War, on the eve of new great battles, our country enters the New Year of 1944. The whole of our people meets and greets it with a deep confidence that it will bring new

decisive successes to our heroic Red Army and to all the freedom-loving peoples of the world.

"The courageous guerillas, men and women, helped the Red Army to carry out its historic mission.

"Workers, engineers, scientists have worked in harmony together in order to give the Red Army the most perfect armaments, superior to those of the enemy. The collective farm peasantry labours selflessly in these days of war."

Pravda continued: "The victories of the Red Army and the historic role played by the Soviet Union, have raised to a new and great height the international authority of the Soviet Union. All the enemy attempts have failed to sow dissension between the great Powers who have united for victory over Hitlerism. Following on the Moscow Conference, the Teheran Conference of leaders of the three allied Powers: The Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain, has become an historic landmark in the course of the war. The Fascist game has been lost beyond recall.

"The hour is not distant when the victory of the Red Army, the victory of the Allied Armies, will open before suffering mankind the welcome road of peaceful labour, restoration of economy and further progress.

"In battles we are deciding the fate of generations."

These quotations from *Pravda* give a good indication of the spirit then prevailing throughout the U.S.S.R.

In Britain the expectation that a second front would soon be opened was very widely discussed. On the eve of the New Year (1944) Mr. A. J. Cummings wrote in the *News Chronicle*:

"Everybody is thinking now in terms of the second front. Those who know exactly when the great assault is to be launched are probably small enough in number to be contained in a suburban drawing-room.

"The Germans are guessing hard and send out fishing speculations daily. Their latest prediction is that the invasion will be attempted a fortnight hence. All they can possibly have discovered is that vast preparations are being made and that certain military signs indicate an early denouement.

"They interpret the increasing violence of the Russian attacks in Eastern Europe as an immediate pointer. But they are optimists if they think the fury of the storm on the eastern front is at its climax. Stalin's 1944 typhoon has yet to be let loose. There is good reason

for saying that it will be the most awe-inspiring onslaught of its kind in history."

"Already," continued Cummings, "one can see the effect of the mounting military threat, the outcome of a united strategy, on the enemy's nerves. His propaganda has gone to pieces. It is confused and contradictory and changes without obvious design from day to day."

Lieut.-General Martin (Military Correspondent) who contributed a featured article to the *Daily Telegraph*, January 14, 1944, entitled "When we invade Europe from the West", concluded with these words: "Such, then, are some of the circumstances of the forthcoming grand assault in the West. The Anglo-American forces go on a very great adventure, for which they have been long preparing. They have assembled great resources. They will fight with a great home base closed behind them. They will surely prevail."

These two quotations are typical of the opinions then being expressed in the British press by columnists and Military Correspondents.

The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, announced January 16, 1944, that: "General Eisenhower has assumed his duties in the United Kingdom assigned him by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. On his journey from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom he had conferences with the President and the Prime Minister." (*Times*, January 17, 1944.)

A number of other "Invasion Chiefs" had by that date already arrived in London.

On the same date, before the nine o'clock news, the new Soviet National Anthem had been introduced to Britain in a surprise broadcast.

Premier Churchill had asked Marshal Stalin at the Teheran Conference to send him the music of the new anthem which replaced the Internationale to London, and he (Churchill) had promised Stalin that he would listen to its first British broadcast. Before this broadcast Churchill had received from Stalin a personal copy of the music.

Mr. Guy Eden wrote: "Mr. Churchill regards the specially prepared and bound copy of the score as a 69th birthday present from Stalin." (*Daily Express*, January 17, 1944.)

Sir Henry Wood, asked for his opinion of the new Anthem, replied: "I am delighted with it. It is a magnificent and noble anthem and one which belongs to a very noble people—simple, straightforward and stirring music."

"I say on the first hearing that it will become immensely popular. Such music deserves to be known. The orchestration is a first-class piece of work." (*Daily Mail*, January 17, 1944.)

During January and February, 1944, the Soviet Forces kept up a steady pressure all along the front and naturally this was welcomed generally in Britain. However, ugly forces, which for a time had been quiescent, began to whisper that the U.S.S.R. was becoming too strong. These people would have liked to have seen the U.S.S.R. exhaust herself on the Eastern Front.

Here we shall quote only one from among many commentators. Simon Harcourt-Smith, writing in the *Daily Mail*, February 19, 1944, said that "the British people, when they think of Russia, fall into three rough categories:

- "1. Those who are so deeply impressed by the Soviet military achievement that they are inclined to regard everything Russian and Communist as something miraculous.
- "2. Those who point to the dissolution of the Comintern, the burying of the 'Internationale' and the revival of an Orthodox Christian hierarchy as evidence of Russia's 'going to the Right' and becoming a conservative, bourgeois Power with which we shall have no difficulty in rubbing along.
- "3. Those who in the depth of their hearts respond to the German propaganda thesis that the over-running of the Continent by Soviet armies would be a calamity for civilisation. This last category is perhaps more powerful than numerous."

In the same article Harcourt-Smith, after detailing the great achievements of the Soviet Forces, continued:

"One thing is quite clear. Wherever they halt—at the Vistula, the Oder or at Calais—in their hands and in ours will lie the future of Europe.

"It can be a future of misery and suspicion, with civilisation uselessly sacrificed on that silliest of all altars, the altar of Power Politics; or it can be a sensible collaboration which will leave mankind henceforward in peace to work and play and create."

Foreign Affairs were debated in the House of Commons, February 22 and 23, 1944. Prime Minister Churchill, after referring to the Moscow and Teheran Conferences, continued: "The three great Allies are

absolutely united in their action against the common foe. They are equally resolved to pursue the war, at whatever cost, to a victorious conclusion, and they believe that a wide field of friendly co-operation lies before them after the destruction of Hitlerite Germany. It is upon such a prolonged, intimate and honourable association that the future of the world depends." (*Hansard*, February 22, 1944, col. 697.)

And Foreign Secretary Eden supplemented thus: "I make no secret of the objective which we have set ourselves, and do set ourselves, in foreign policy.

"May I reiterate or re-explain this matter, as I see it, and see whether I can carry the assent of the House with me? I say first, that the maintenance of peace, after this conflict is over, depends upon a close and intimate understanding between the nations of the British Commonwealth, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. If we can achieve this understanding then all our problems, however difficult, can be resolved, and if we cannot achieve it, I say to this House, there is, in my judgment, no hope of a lasting peace. This seems to me to be fundamental." (*Hansard*, February 23, 1944, col. 937.)

The Convoys to North Russia, despite the additional dangers due to winter weather, kept up their courageous task and there was great satisfaction with the report which Mr. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, announced in the House of Commons, March 7, 1944:

"In the far Northern waters the Naval situation has also improved, and we have continued to deliver weapons of war, machinery, railway material and large quantities of miscellaneous stores to the North Russian Ports.

"The naval forces engaged in this task and the merchant ships of many nations who have carried the cargoes to Russia, have had to endure heavy strain and sacrifice. Since the commencement of these Russian convoys 13 British ships have been sunk on this duty, and in some periods there were very considerable losses of merchant ships. Yet over all, 88 per cent of the cargoes consigned have got through." (*Hansard*, March 7, 1944, cols. 1909-10.)

Mr. Alexander added: "That great effort has been more than rewarded for those cargoes, so costly in ships and blood, have surely been most magnificently turned to account in the hands of the Red Army."

In March, 1944, the Soviet forces opened a big offensive on the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Ukrainian fronts and on the last day of the month the

Soviet forces on the 1st Ukrainian front entered Rumania. More heavy blows followed: in the following month (April 8) the Soviet forces reached the Czechoslovak frontier, and recaptured Odessa, Balacava and Sebastopol on April 10 and 18 and May 9 respectively.

The air attacks from the West on Germany continued and undoubtedly facilitated the Soviet land attacks in the East.

May 1, 1944, was the most cheerful May Day in the U.S.S.R. since the beginning of the war. Marshal Stalin, in his *Order of the Day* stated:

"In the course of the winter campaign of 1943-44, the Red Army has won the historic battle for the Dnieper and for the territories of the Ukraine west of the Dnieper, crushed the powerful German fortified defences at Leningrad and in the Crimea by skilful and vigorous actions, overwhelmed the German defence on the water barriers of the Southern Bug, Dniester, Pruth, Sereth. Nearly the entire Ukraine, Moldavia, the Crimea, the Leningrad and Kalinin Regions, and a considerable part of Byelorussia have been cleared of the German invaders.

"The metallurgy of the south, the ore of Krivoi Rog, Kerch and Nikopol, the fertile lands between the Dnieper and the Pruth have been restored from Fascist slavery.

"Acting in the great cause of the liberation of their native land from the Fascist invaders the Red Army has emerged on our State frontiers with Rumania and Czechoslovakia and now continues battering the enemy troops on the territory of Rumania."

Stalin next paid a deserved and handsome tribute to the Allies of the U.S.S.R. He went on: "A considerable contribution to these successes has been made by our great Allies, the United States of America and Great Britain, which hold a front in Italy against the Germans and divert a considerable part of the German troops from us, supply us with very valuable strategical raw materials and armaments, subject to systematic bombings military objectives in Germany and thus undermine the latter's military might." Turning to the tasks ahead, Stalin said: "To rid our country and the countries allied with us from the danger of enslavement, the wounded German beast must be pursued close on its heels and finished off in its own lair. And while pursuing the enemy we must deliver from German bondage our brother Poles, Czechoslovaks and other peoples of Western

Europe allied with us which are under the heel of Hitlerite Germany.

"Obviously this task is more difficult than the expulsion of German troops from the Soviet Union. It can be accomplished only on condition of joint efforts of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States of America, by joint blows from the east dealt by our troops and from the west dealt by the troops of our Allies. There can be no doubt that only this combined blow can completely crush Hitlerite Germany."

Marshal Stalin's speech was very warmly welcomed in Great Britain and intensified the feeling that the long expected second front would very soon be opened.

On May 12, 1944, the British, Soviet and U.S.A. Governments warned Germany's satellites—including Finland—that it was in their own vital interest to help in the overthrow of the Nazis: their fate might well depend on this.

Relations between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain continued to be apparently very friendly.

On May 16, 1944, there was a very pleasant ceremony at the Soviet Embassy in London. It was reported thus:

"The Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Gusev, yesterday presented the Order of Suvorov, first degree—the highest Soviet military order—to Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, C.I.G.S., Admiral Sir John Tovey, C.-in-C. The Nore, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, Chief of Bomber Command.

"The presentation took place in the Soviet Embassy in London. Similar orders were presented to Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to be conferred on Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, C.-in-C. Home Fleet, and Gen. Sir Harold Alexander, C.-in-C. Italy.

"Sir Alexander Cadogan later gave the medal of the order—a five-pointed platinum star—to Lady Margaret Alexander." (*Daily Telegraph*, May 17, 1944.)

The Report added: "Mr. Gusev said that the awards were a high recognition of the military merits of the recipients and testimony of the fighting co-operation between the armed forces of Britain and the Soviet Union."

A two-day debate took place in the House of Commons, May 24-25, 1944, on foreign affairs. Prime Minister Churchill, in the course of his speech, May 24, said:

"The victories of the Russian Armies have been attended by a great rise in the strength of the Russian State, and a remarkable broadening of its views. The religious side of Russian life has had a wonderful rebirth. The discipline and military etiquette of the Russian Armies are unsurpassed.

"There is a new National Anthem, the music of which Premier Stalin sent me, which I asked the B.B.C. to play on the frequent occasions when there are great Russian victories to celebrate." (*Hansard*, May 24, 1944, col. 781.)

The Prime Minister continued: "Quite recently, some of our representatives from the Ministry of Information were allowed to make a considerable tour of Russia, and found opportunities of seeing for themselves what they liked. They found an atmosphere of candid friendliness and a keen desire to see British films, and hear about our country, and what it was doing in the war. The children in the schools were being informed about the war on the seas and of its difficulties and its perils, and how the Northern convoys got through to Russia. There seemed a great desire among the people that Britain and Russia should be friends." (*loc. cit.*, col. 782.)

Respecting the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance (1942) Mr. Churchill added: "There is nothing that has occurred which should in any way make us regret the 20 years' Treaty which we have signed with the Russians, and which will be the dominating factor in the relations which we shall have with them." (*ibid.*)

Speaking in the debate on the following day, Foreign Secretary Eden stated:

"May I, for a moment or two, look a little into the future? When the victory is won, the first task will be close collaboration between the British Commonwealth, the United States, the Soviet Union and China—but in the main, so far as Europe is concerned, between the first three—to ensure that Germany cannot start this business again." (*Hansard*, May 25, 1944, col. 1048.)

Mr. Eden added: "I want to speak for a moment about co-operation between the three in particular—ourselves, the United States and the Soviet Union. If I emphasise it, it is because I am convinced that, if we can establish real understanding, all else, though difficult, will be possible. But, if we cannot establish that understanding, then the future is very dark indeed."

In June, 1944, heavy and decisive blows were showered on Germany and her Allies from East and West.

The Allies in the West captured Rome on June 4 and landed in Normandy on June 5-6 and liberated Cherbourg on June 26. *Thus the long awaited second front was at last a reality.* The Soviet Forces broke through the Mannerheim Line (Finland), June 18, and captured Viborg two days later. The heavy blows continued in July, 1944. The Western Allies liberated Caen on July 9, Leghorn on the 19th, Avranches and Granville on July 31, 1944.

The Soviet Forces on their part liberated Kovell, July 5, Vilna, July 13, Narva, 26, Lvov, 27, Brest Litovsk, 28 and Mitau, July 31, 1944.

Both in Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. all sections of the population rejoiced in the progress made on the war fronts, and well merited felicitations passed between Moscow and London.

President Kalinin sent the following message to H.M. King George VI: "I also send to your Majesty and to the British people my congratulations on the splendid victory of the British and American forces in Italy and on the liberation of Rome. The landings of the Allied Anglo-American forces which have begun on the territory of Northern France give the assurance that the combined blows of the Allies against Hitlerite Germany will be crowned with complete and final victory over the common enemy."

His Majesty replied: "I particularly appreciate, as will also the British people, your felicitations on the successes of British and American arms in Italy, which have resulted in the freeing of Rome, and I share your confidence that the operations now so auspiciously begun in northern France will hasten the complete and final victory of the Allies over our common enemy, towards which the great achievements of the Soviet forces are so powerfully contributing." (*Times*, June 12, 1944.)

Moscow Radio, June 13, 1944, broadcast the following high tribute by Marshal Stalin:

"In summing up results of the seven days of battles of liberation by the Allied troops who have invaded Northern France, one can say without hesitation that the large-scale forcing of the Channel and the mass landing of troops of the Allies in Northern France have fully succeeded.

"This is undoubtedly a brilliant success for our Allies. One cannot but recognise that in the whole history of war there has not been

any such undertaking, so broad in conception, so grandiose in scale and so masterly in execution.

"As is well known, the 'invincible' Napoleon in his time ingloriously failed in his plan of crossing the Channel to capture the British Isles.

"Hitler, the hysteric, who for years boasted that he would force the Channel, did not even risk making the attempt to carry out his threat.

"Only the British and American troops succeeded with honour in carrying out this immense plan of forcing the Channel and landing troops on a vast scale. History will record this as an achievement of the highest order." (*Daily Telegraph*, June 14, 1944.)

The broadcast concluded: "Marshal Stalin made the statement in answer to a series of letters from foreign correspondents in Moscow, asking him for his views."

Mr. Ernest Bevin, M.P. (Minister of Labour and National Service), speaking at Birmingham, July 1, 1944, stated: "If you do not go through the first decade after this war with concentrated effort, both in this country and with the United Nations, I defy any living statesman to build a peace that will not lead to a recurrence of this trouble." (*Times*, July 3, 1944.)

At the Teheran Conference, Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill arranged the vital dates for victory, but there was no document, no elaborate, signed agreement.

"If you can do that on a basis of trust," continued Mr. Bevin, "I can only express the hope that those three great nations will always be able to work with the same degree of confidence to solve the greater problems that lie ahead." (*ibid.*)

On August 2, on the Motion for the Adjournment for the Summer Recess, Prime Minister Churchill gave a comprehensive review of the war situation in the course of which *inter alia* he stated:

"I must say that in talking about all these various campaigns that are going on at once all over the world, I have left the obvious essential fact till this point, namely, that it is the Russian armies who have done the main work in tearing the guts out of the German army. In the air and on the oceans we could maintain our place, but there was no force in the world which could have been called into being, except after several more years, that would have been able to maul and break the German army unless it had been subjected

to the terrible slaughter and manhandling that has fallen to it through the strength of the Russian Soviet armies."

Churchill continued: "I salute Marshal Stalin, the great champion, and I firmly believe that our 20 years' treaty with Russia will prove to be one of the most lasting and durable factors in preserving the peace and the good order and the progress of Europe." (*Hansard*, August 2, 1944, col. 1474.)

In the same speech the Prime Minister warned Rumania and Bulgaria that they would be well advised to break with Germany and come to terms with the U.S.S.R.

We must now deal briefly with the Polish rising in Warsaw, August 1 to October 2, 1944, which attracted much attention at that time.

First we would recall that the Soviet Government broke off diplomatic relations with the Polish emigré Government in London in 1943 because of the latter's vilification of the Government of the U.S.S.R.

Later the Soviet Government entered into relations with the Polish Committee of National Liberation established by Poles on Soviet territory and to which later rallied Poles on Polish territory even before it was liberated by Soviet forces.

The aim of the emigré Government was to restore the old feudal-fascist-military régime in Poland. The aim of the National Committee of Liberation was to establish a people's Poland.

Polish forces were organised on Soviet territory under their own commanders who fought side by side with the Soviet forces for the liberation of Poland.

On July 22, 1944, the Red Army liberated Kholm—this was the first Polish town to be liberated—and was advancing towards the east bank of the Vistula. At the same time the Red Army was advancing on an immense front from the Arctic to the Black Sea. It was acting on a long prepared strategic plan.

On August 1, 1944, the Polish Home Army, under General Bor (who gave allegiance to the emigré Government in London), without any consultation whatever with the Soviet High Command, rose in revolt in Warsaw and tried to seize the city. The Soviet High Command disapproved of the rising on the practical grounds that it would result in fruitless sacrifices on the side of the Poles.

The Red Army continued with its strategic plan and on September

11 it liberated Praga, an industrial suburb of Warsaw on the east bank of the Vistula. Contacts were established with the insurgents and from the night of September 13, 1944, they were supplied with food and arms right up to the time of the surrender. This was freely admitted both by General Bor and the emigré Government in London.

In a broadcast from London to Warsaw on September 19, the Polish Prime Minister of the emigré Government, Mr. Mikolajczyk, declared:

"To-day the Soviet air force is giving you air cover and A.A. artillery. The Russians are shelling enemy forces and are already dropping some arms and food, thus making it possible to continue the fight. On behalf of the Polish Government I acknowledge this help with gratitude, and at the same time I appeal for further help." (*Times*, September 20, 1944.)

In a report dated September 21, 1944, General Bor stated: "We again received arms and ammunition dropped by Russian aircraft."

As late as September 29, General Bor reported that supplies had been dropped during the night by Soviet planes.

The leaders of the insurrection surrendered on October 2, 1944.

Mr. Winston Churchill, reporting to the House of Commons the surrender of Warsaw, stated among other things:

"Despite all the efforts of the Soviet Army, the strong German positions on the Vistula could not be taken, and relief could not come in time. British, American, Polish and Soviet airmen did what they could to succour the Poles at Warsaw, but although this sustained the Polish resistance beyond what would have seemed possible, it could not turn the tide." (*Hansard*, October 5, 1944, cols. 1139-40).

The Polish emigré Government and its supporters made bitter complaints that the Red Army had failed to support the Warsaw rising. Actually, as we have mentioned earlier, not only was the rising started without any prior consultation with the Soviet military authorities, but from the time that it was physically possible to aid the Warsaw insurgents the Soviet forces did all that was humanly possible, bearing in mind that its military dispositions and aims on the other parts of its immense front from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea had been made

a considerable time beforehand and could not be altered without affecting adversely the course and duration of the war.¹

Without let-up the Allies in the West and East continued their massive blows.

On August 4, 1944, Rennes was liberated by the U.S.A. forces; General Eisenhower moved his Headquarters from Britain to France, August 9; Florence was evacuated by the Germans, August 11; the Western Allies landed in France from the Mediterranean on August 15; Soviet forces reached the East Prussian Border on the Sesupe river, August 17; the Germans at St. Malo surrendered, August 18; the Soviet forces liquidated three surrounded German divisions near Sandomierz, August 19; U.S.A. forces entered Marseilles, August 23, and Cannes and Grasse on the following day.

All this was good, but the last week of August brought more spectacular news: the Western Allies liberated Paris, August 25; Toulon, August 27; Marseilles, August 28; Bordeaux, Amiens and Rouen, August 31.

Rumania accepted the Soviet Armistice terms, August 23, and two days later she declared war on Germany. The Soviet forces swept forward and entered Bucharest, August 31, 1944.

The situation on the Eastern and Western fronts as seen from Moscow was thus summed up by the well-known Soviet commentator J. Viktorov in a broadcast at the end of August, 1944:

"Two months' fighting raging without let-up on the Soviet-German Front is characterised by the particularly crushing blows which the Red Army troops are dealing the enemy flanks.

"Blows from the flanks are a particularly nasty surprise for the Hitlerite Command, who had concentrated their reserves in the centre to defend the approaches to Warsaw and East Prussia.

"The Rumanian break-away from the Hitlerite bloc is of the greatest importance, both from the military and political viewpoint. It speaks of the final rout of the southern flank of the German bloc. It lays open the whole German position in the Balkans. And not only that. Do not forget that at the same time the Germans have lost Rumanian oil, which occupied a paramount place in Germany's balance sheet.

"Rumanian events are plain proof that Germany's satellites can break with the Hitlerites if they really want to. After all, the only

¹ The Warsaw rising is dealt with at length in *Six Centuries of Russo-Polish Relations* by W. P. and Zelda K. Coates (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1948.)

trump card in Hitler's hand was force, and this card the Red Army has outbid."

Turning to events in the West, Viktorov said: "German defence in France has collapsed. Its weakness is exposed, a direct result of the defeats which the Hitlerites have been suffering in the East. Things have come to such a pass that I have no hesitation in saying that it is not only the German units fighting at the Seine and beyond it that are endangered, but also the forces in the Pas de Calais and the German troops in Belgium and Holland.

"The Germans are faced with a choice—to withdraw their troops and lose Belgium and Holland, or there to lose their troops. As a matter of fact, it makes no difference in the end which way they choose.

"The liberation of Belgium, Holland and France does not mean that the Allied forces will be dispersed. On the contrary it means a huge flow of fresh reserves into the Allied Armies, and an equally big drain on the German reserves.

"Allied forces are fighting for the road to the Rhine—the road to the heart of Germany.

"Every day the situation of the Germans in North Italy becomes worse," concluded Viktorov. "Taking into account that the further development of the Balkans situation will soon open a splendid prospect for Marshal Tito's Army, then I think we may safely say that the moment of the general storming of Hitler Germany from all sides is approaching."

CHAPTER II

THE ALLIES CONTINUE THEIR MASSIVE BLOWS ON GERMANY

IN September, 1944, from East and West the iron blows of the Soviet and Western Allies forces continued on the enemy forces.

In the West, Dieppe, Brussels, Antwerp, Boulogne and Calais were liberated.

The 1st Airborne Division landed in Holland on September 17, but was withdrawn from Arnhem, September 25-26.

The Soviet forces contacted Marshal Tito's forces and crossed into Yugoslavia; they also reached the Polish-Czech border. In the North they started a general offensive South and East of Riga.

Finland now saw the game was up; she sued for peace, August 25, and hostilities ceased, September 4, 1944.

Bulgaria declared war on Germany, September 8, and hostilities ceased between the U.S.S.R. and Bulgaria on the following day.

The war situation and the decisive importance of the future of Anglo-Soviet relations were debated in the House of Commons, September 28, 1944. In the course of the debate Prime Minister Churchill said:

"The terms in which Marshal Stalin recently, in conversation, has referred to our efforts in the West have been of such a generous and admiring character that I feel, in my turn, bound to point out that Russia is holding and beating far larger hostile forces than those which face the Allies in the West, and has through long years, at enormous loss, borne the brunt of the struggle on land. There is honour for all. It is a matter of rejoicing that we, for our part and in our turn, have struck resounding blows, and it is right that they should be recorded among the other feats of arms so loyally performed throughout the Grand Alliance." (*Hansard*, September 28, 1944, col. 477.)

Later in the debate, Mr. Quintin Hogg stated: "If Russia and America quarrel there can be no possible bar to the re-emergence of

Japan in the Far East as a menace to them both. If Russia and Great Britain quarrel there can be no possible step which will prevent the re-emergence of Germany in Europe as a menace to both Poland and the rest of Europe. That is the rock upon which we must build our foreign policy.' (*Hansard*, September, 28, 1944, col. 585.)

Commenting on this debate, the *Times*, October 2, 1944, remarked:

"The foundation of Britain's policy in Europe lies in the Anglo-Soviet alliance. This alliance is not merely the product of a wartime emergency, but is deeply rooted in the European situation as it will emerge from the war. Britain and Russia stand at the western and eastern extremities of a continent which they have no ambition to dominate, but which is liable to threaten the security of both if they allow themselves to be divided; and a common European policy is an elementary necessity to both of them. Unless there is unity between them, restraint of Germany will in the long run be wholly impracticable—a fact of which German propaganda shows itself vividly aware."

How prophetic this has proved to be!

Continuing their successful march, Allied forces landed in Greece, October 4, and British troops entered Athens, October 14. Pressure was maintained against Germany's western front and the German Commander signed unconditional surrender at Aachen, October 21.

Soviet forces reached the Baltic coast in Latvia, October 10, liberated Riga, October 13, crossed the East Prussian border and captured Eydtkuhnen, October 18, and liberated Belgrade, October 20.

Soviet, Yugoslavian and Bulgarian forces were now fighting together and they liberated Nish (Yugoslavia), October 16, 1944.

Apart from the battlefields other events were taking place. Moscow Radio, October 4, 1944, broadcast a decree, signed by Mr. Kalinin, President of the Supreme Soviet, as follows:

"Lord Beaverbrook and Mr. Oliver Lyttelton have been awarded the Order of Suvorov, First Class, for their outstanding services in the task of supplying the U.S.S.R. with war materials, and for the important role that they have played in the struggle against the common enemy, Hitlerite Germany.

"It was also announced that Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery and Lieutenant-General Mark Clark had been made members of the Order of Suvorov, First Class.

"The Order of Ushakov, First Class, has been conferred upon Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, and the Order of Kutusov, First Class, upon Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh Mallory and Lieutenant-General Omar Bradley.

"Other English holders of the Order of Suworov are Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, General Sir Harold Alexander, Admiral Sir John Tovey, and Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris.—Reuter." (*Times*, October 5, 1944.)

Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden (with a party of 50) arrived in Moscow for consultations, October 9, 1944. They were most ceremoniously greeted at the Moscow airport by distinguished members of the Soviet Government and Diplomatic Corps. After reviewing the guard of honour, Mr. Churchill in a brief broadcast stated:

"It is two years since I was in Moscow—two years marked by an unbroken series of victories.

"All of us, from various corners of the world, have firmly marched against our common enemy, who has destroyed the treasures of the whole of humanity, who has stained every step with his savage crimes and horrible atrocities, and over whom the sword of the United Nations is now brandished.

"During this remarkable period of victories, which were achieved with such self-denial and devotion, the armies of the Soviet Union have inflicted powerful blows. They were the first to shatter the spirit and the war machine of the German Army.

"We too, the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations, have applied our forces up to the limit. It is for you to judge whether we have inflicted heavy blows or not." (*Daily Telegraph*, October 10, 1944.)

The Prime Minister concluded: "I have come here on the waves of hope, on the waves of certainty, that victory will be achieved and with the hope that when victory will be won, we shall all strive to make the world a better place for great masses of people."

Two days later the *Times* correspondent cabled from Moscow: "Perhaps the most striking change in atmosphere that the British visitors have been made aware of is the marked growth of a sense of responsibility in Moscow in making an approach to the problems of keeping the peace after victory. This was most clearly apparent at yesterday's luncheon. Both Mr. Churchill and Mr. Averill Harriman

had referred in short speeches to the unpreparedness of their lands for a war forced upon them by German and Japanese aggression."

The cable went on: "They were followed by Marshal Stalin, who, in a most effective speech delivered with simple directness, declared that it was in the nature of things that Powers disposed to peace should have found themselves unprepared against an enemy who had long prepared for aggression. But that should not happen again, the Marshal said emphatically, and he asked the guests to join him in drinking to the success of the international security organisation, coupled with the names of those Foreign Ministers who had worked so hard on it.

"Previously Marshal Stalin had spoken in praise of the Anglo-American war effort, pointing out that the threat of landings on the European mainland at a time when the Germans had some 240 divisions in the east, had effectively prevented them from making any addition to that great force. He paid a special tribute to the planning that had gone into the invasion and he made several warm references to the part played by the Fleet and Merchant Marine.

"Mr. Churchill was no less generous in his tribute to the Red Army. 'I always have believed and I still believe that it is the Red Army that has torn the guts out of the filthy Nazis', he said, and the interpreters did full justice to his phraseology in translation."

At the close of the Conference (October 9 to 18) the communique *inter alia* stated: "The unfolding of military plans agreed upon at Teheran was comprehensively reviewed in the light of recent events and the conclusions of the Quebec Conference¹ on the war in Western Europe, and the utmost confidence was expressed in the future progress of Allied operations on all fronts." (*Manchester Guardian*, October 21, 1944.)

The Diplomatic Correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* commented: "The communique leaves no doubt on the full and comprehensive co-ordination of military strategy in the European theatre of war, though no details are, of course, being revealed except through action in the field."

¹ Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt met in Quebec, September 13-17 (inclusive), 1944. On the conclusion of the Conference the following joint statement was issued: "The President and the Prime Minister and the Combined Chiefs of Staff held a series of meetings during which they discussed all aspects of the war. . . . In a very short space of time they reached decisions on all points both with regard to the completion of the war in Europe now approaching its final stages and the destruction of the barbarians of the Pacific. The most serious difficulty . . . has been to find room and opportunity for the marshalling against Japan of the massive forces which each and all of the nations concerned are ardent to engage against the enemy."

Prime Minister Churchill, in a brief report to the House of Commons, October 27, 1944, on the Moscow Conference, *inter alia* said: "I am satisfied that the results achieved on this occasion at Moscow have been highly satisfactory. But I am quite sure that no final result can be attained until the heads of the three Governments have met again together, as I earnestly trust they may do before this year is at its end. After all, the future of the world depends upon the united action in the next few years of our three countries. Other countries may be associated, but the future depends upon the union of the three most powerful Allies. If that fails, all fails: if that succeeds, a broad future for all nations may be assured." (*Hansard*, October 27, 1944, col. 491.)

How prophetic this too has proved to be!

The Western Allies continued their advance against Germany in November. They captured Flushing, November 3; Geilkenkirchen and Metz, November 19; Belfort, November 20; Mulhouse, November 22, and Antwerp was opened to traffic, November 30, 1944.

The British Admiralty announced, November 5, 1944, that a large and important convoy had made the double journey to and from the Soviet Union without loss.

In addition, the R.A.F. attacked Duren, Julich and Heinsberg on November 16 and this was probably the biggest air attack of the war.

On the Eastern Front, despite winter conditions, the enemy was harassed from the Baltic to Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

The *Times* in an editorial, November 6, declared:

"The Russian Armies now pounding at the defences of Budapest and firmly ensconced on East Prussian soil are the instrument and symbol of a great turning point in history—the emergence of Soviet Russia as the greatest power on the European continent.

"In the period of European history which now opens, Germany for the first time since 1871 will not be the focus of international relations and the determining factor in the foreign policies of every European country; and for the first time in history there will be no single Power at the heart of the European continent to match the strength of the two Powers at its eastern and western extremities—Russia and Britain—neither of which is exclusively, or perhaps even primarily, European in its interests and concerns."

The editorial went on: "Russia, like Great Britain, has no aggressive or expansive designs in Europe. What she wants on her western frontier

is security. What she asks from her western neighbours is a guarantee, the extent and form of which will be determined mainly by the experience of the past twenty-five years, that her security shall not be exposed to any threat from or across their territories. Admittedly she is unlikely to regard with favour intervention by other Great Powers in these countries.

"But Great Britain has traditionally resisted such intervention in the Low Countries or in the vicinity of the Suez Canal, and the United States in Central America—regions which these two Powers have properly adjudged vital to their security. It would be incongruous to ask Russia to renounce a similar right of reassurance; and it would be foolish, as well as somewhat hypocritical, to construe insistence on this right as the symptom of an aggressive policy."

Then followed this emphatic statement: "Essentially British and Russian interests in this respect not only do not clash, but are precisely the same. No country has greater reason to welcome and applaud Russia's new role than her partner in the twenty-year treaty of May, 1942."

Marshal Stalin, on the eve of the 27th Anniversary of the establishment of the Soviet Power, November 6, 1944, in a lengthy review of the position at home and on the fronts, said:

"The decisive successes of the Red Army this year and the expulsion of the Germans from Soviet territory were predetermined by the succession of shattering blows which our troops dealt the German forces, beginning as far back as last January and continuing throughout the year under review.

"The first blow was struck by our troops in January this year at Leningrad and Novgorod, when the Red Army broke up the permanent German defences and flung the enemy back to the Baltic. This blow resulted in the liberation of the Leningrad Region.

"The second blow was struck in February and March this year on the River Bug, when the Red Army routed the German forces and flung them beyond the Dniester. As a result of this blow the Ukraine west of the Dnieper was freed of the German-Fascist invaders.

"The third blow was struck in April and May this year in the area of the Crimea, when the German troops were flung into the Black Sea. As a result of this blow the Crimea and Odessa were delivered from German oppression.

"The fourth blow was struck in June this year in the area of Karelia, when the Red Army routed the Finnish forces, liberated

Viborg and Petrozavodsk, and flung the Finns back into the interior of Finland. This blow resulted in the liberation of the greater part of the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Republic.

"The fifth blow was struck at the Germans in June and July this year, when the Red Army utterly routed the German forces at Vitebsk, Bobruisk and Mogilev; this blow culminated in the encirclement of 30 German divisions at Minsk. As a result of this blow our forces: (a) liberated the whole of the Byelorussian Soviet Republic, (b) gained the Vistula and liberated a considerable part of our Ally Poland, (c) gained the Niemen and liberated the greater part of the Lithuanian Soviet Republic; and (d) forced the Niemen and approached the frontiers of Germany.

"The sixth blow was struck in July and August this year in the area of the West Ukraine, when the Red Army routed the German forces at Lvov and flung them beyond the San and the Vistula. As a result of this blow: (a) the Western Ukraine was liberated and (b) our troops forced the Vistula and set up a strong bridgehead beyond it west of Sandomir.

"The seventh blow was struck in August this year in the Kishinev and Jassy area, when our troops utterly routed the German and Rumanian forces. It culminated in the encirclement of 22 German divisions at Kishinev, this number not including Rumanian divisions. As a result of this blow: (a) the Moldavian Soviet Republic was liberated, (b) Germany's Rumanian ally was put out of action and declared war on Germany and Hungary, (c) Germany's Bulgarian ally was put out of action and likewise declared war on Germany, (d) the road was opened for our troops to Hungary, Germany's last ally in Europe, and (e) the opportunity arose to reach out a helping hand to our Ally Yugoslavia, against the German invaders.

"The eighth blow was struck in September and October this year in the Baltic, when the Red Army routed the German forces at Tallinn and Riga and drove them from the Baltic. As a result of this blow: (a) the Estonian Soviet Republic was liberated, (b) the greater part of the Latvian Soviet Republic was liberated, (c) Germany's Finnish ally was put out of action and declared war on Germany, and (d) over 30 German divisions found themselves cut off from Prussia and gripped in pincers between Tukums and Libava where they are now being hammered to a finish by our troops.

"In October this year the ninth blow was launched by our troops between the Tisza and the Danube in the area of Hungary; its purpose is to put Hungary out of the war and turn her against Germany. As a result of this blow, which has not yet been consummated: (a) our forces rendered direct assistance to our Ally Yugoslavia, in

driving out the Germans and liberating Belgrade; (b) our troops obtained the opportunity of crossing the Carpathians and stretching out a helping hand to our Ally the Czechoslovak Republic, part of whose territory has already been freed from the German invaders.

"Lastly, at the end of October this year a blow was dealt at the German troops in Northern Finland, when the German troops were knocked out of the Pechenga area and our troops, pursuing the Germans, entered the territory of our Ally Norway.

"I shall not give figures of losses in killed and prisoners which the enemy sustained in these operations or the number of guns, tanks, aircraft, shells and machine-guns captured by our troops. You are probably acquainted with these figures from the Communiques of the Soviet Information Bureau.

"Such are the principal operations carried out by the Red Army during the past year, operations which have led to the expulsion of the German forces from our country." (*Stalin's War Speeches*, pp. 104-6.)

Turning to the Western front, Stalin said:

"What must be regarded as a new factor in the war against Hitler Germany this past year is that this year the Red Army has not been operating against the German forces single-handed, as was the case in previous years, but together with the forces of our Allies. The Teheran Conference was not held for nothing. The decision of the Teheran Conference on a joint blow at Germany from west, east and south began to be carried out with astounding precision. Simultaneously with the summer operations of the Red Army on the Soviet-German Front, the Allied forces launched the invasion of France and organised powerful offensive operations which compelled Hitler Germany to wage war on two fronts. The troops and Navy of our Allies accomplished a mass landing operation on the coast of France that was unparalleled in history for scope and organisation, and overcame the German fortifications with consummate skill.

"Thus Germany found herself gripped in a vice between two fronts.

"As was to be expected, the enemy failed to withstand the joint blows of the Red Army and the Allied forces. The enemy's resistance was broken, and in a short time his troops were thrust out of Central Italy, France, Belgium and the Soviet Union. The enemy was flung back to the German frontiers." (*ibid.*, p. 107.)

"In the upshot," said Stalin, "this year has ended in the expulsion

of the German forces from the Soviet Union, France, Belgium and Central Italy, and the transfer of hostilities to German territory." (*ibid.*, p. 104.)

After pointing out that Germany had only one ally left, Hungary, Stalin continued: "Hungary will also be put out of action in the nearest future. This will mean the complete isolation of Hitler Germany in Europe and the inevitability of her collapse." (*ibid.*, p. 112.)

Towards the close of his speech he issued a serious warning: "It is common knowledge that the German chieftains are already now preparing for a new war. History shows that a short period—some 20 or 30 years—is enough for Germany to recover from defeat and re-establish her might." (*ibid.*, p. 113.)

He appealed for an international organisation to preserve peace and added: "Can we expect the actions of this world organisation to be sufficiently effective? They will be effective if the great Powers which have borne the brunt of the war against Hitler Germany continue to act in a spirit of unanimity and accord. They will not be effective if this essential condition is violated." (*ibid.*, p. 114.)

Marshal Stalin's speech was hailed with enthusiasm by the British press. The *News Chronicle*, which was typical of the other papers, stated:

"Marshal Stalin's eve of the Soviet Revolution anniversary speech last year coincided with the capture of Kiev. This year's speech only briefly precedes the imminent capture of Budapest.

"This has been a dazzling victory year for Soviet arms. The hated enemy has been driven right out of the Soviet Union.

"Armed with more guns and tanks than the enemy possesses, the Red Army is not dismayed by the 204 divisions now arrayed against it. Soon, Marshal Stalin said, the Soviet flag will be hoisted over Berlin.

"Marshal Stalin paid a fine tribute to his Allies in the West. He minimised the differences with them over the Dumbarton Oaks plan.¹

¹ As a result of discussions at Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, D.C., Aug. 21-Oct. 7, 1944, between delegates from the British, United States, Russian and Chinese Governments on the maintenance of peace and security after the war, the following proposals were made for the establishment of a general international organisation under the title of The United Nations. The purposes of the organisation should be:

- (1) To maintain international peace and security.
- (2) To develop friendly relations among nations.
- (3) To achieve international co-operation in the solution of international economic, social and other humanitarian problems.
- (4) To afford a centre for harmonising the actions of nations in the achievement of these common ends.

Membership of the organisation should be open to all peace-loving States.

'If our alliance has stood up to the tribulations of three years of war,' he said, 'all the more will it stand up to the concluding phase of the struggle.'

"The same amity between us must prevail when next year's celebrations take place in an atmosphere of victorious peace." (*News Chronicle*, November 7, 1944.)

The *Manchester Guardian* in an editorial review of Anglo-Russian relations since the Napoleonic wars stressed that Anglo-Russian differences had been bad for both countries and for Europe, and continued: "Without the Crimean War there would have been no united Militaristic Germany in the heart of Europe. Forty years later Salisbury, one of the wisest judges of our foreign policy, said that we had backed the wrong horse. 'How much easier and more pleasant things would be if we had accepted the offer of condominium (at the Straits) made by Nicholas I in 1853!'" (*Manchester Guardian*, November 11, 1944.)

Foreign Secretary Eden speaking in his constituency, Leamington, November 16, 1944, stated: "Supposing that before this war we four (U.S.A., U.S.S.R., France and Great Britain) had been in close harmony and agreement the Germans would never have been able to launch their offensive against the world, and if we are together afterwards they will never be able to start business again.

"If we are not together, how long will it be before Germany starts again and tries to play one off against another until we are menaced in another 20 years with a threat similar to the one which, we hope before long, will be overthrown." (*Times*, November 16, 1944.)

The *Times* in an editorial, November 20, 1944, referring to the future system of security under the United Nations, stated: "The system will be one; and the link between its diverse elements will be

The principal organs of The United Nations should be:

A. A GENERAL ASSEMBLY, meeting in annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasions may require.

B. A SECURITY COUNCIL, consisting of one representative of each of 11 members of the organisation: representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Republic of China, and in due course France, should have permanent seats, the General Assembly electing 6 States to fill the non-permanent seats for a term of 2 years, 3 retiring each year and being ineligible for immediate re-election. (In the first election 3 would be chosen for 1 year and 3 for 2 years).

C. AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, either the Permanent Court of International Justice continued in force with such modifications as may be desirable or a new Court established on similar lines.

D. A SECRETARIAT, consisting of a Secretary-General and such staff as may be required.

provided not only by the over-all authority of the Security Council and its agencies, but by the Anglo-Soviet treaty of May 1942, and by the agreement which may result from General De Gaulle's forthcoming visit to Moscow. But within this European system it is reasonable to suppose that Britain with the Western Powers will play a principal role in the west and Russia with her European neighbours in the east. Strength and unity are overriding conditions of security both in the west and in the east."

As to the views of the British public—the *News Chronicle*, November 27, 1944, carried the following:

"In the latest Gallup Poll an accurate cross-section of the public were asked: 'Would you like to see the Allies co-operating together after the war?'

"90 per cent. said Yes

"3 per cent. said No

"7 per cent. said Don't know."

Very seldom has the British public been so united on any major question of foreign policy.

In the speech from the throne, November 29, 1944, H.M. King George VI declared: "In Western Europe My Forces from the United Kingdom and Canada and their comrades from the United States, with the valuable aid of the Armed Forces of My European Allies and of the peoples who have risen to meet them, have routed the enemy in a series of decisive battles and are now pressing him on the borders of his own country. In Italy the Forces of the United Nations have advanced to the northern plains and in Greece and Yugoslavia the Germans are being driven from the countries which they have oppressed for three bitter years." (*Hansard*, November 29, 1944, col. 6.)

His Majesty continued: "In the East the massive achievements of My Russian Ally have deprived the Germans of vast stretches of territory which they hoped would feed their armies and provide an impassable barrier to prevent the soil of Germany from becoming a battle-ground. Both in the East and in the West, Germany is invaded. The plight in which her armies now find themselves is a measure of the success which by God's grace has crowned our arms."

But the German forces had still a lot of fight in them and on December 16, 1944, for the first time for five months, they started a counter-offensive on the Belgian and Luxemburg frontiers, which at first met with no mean measure of success. It was reported in the press of December 19 that they had advanced 15 miles on a 160-mile front.

However, an official announcement, December 27, declared that the German thrust towards the Meuse had been halted and the Allies started to retake some lost ground.

On the Eastern front, the Soviet Forces and their Allies continued their advance on a broad front in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

On December 6, 1944, the Soviet High Command issued the following:

"During to-day in Hungary, between Lake Balaton and the Danube, our troops, continuing their offensive, fought their way into more than 50 inhabited places.

"Simultaneously our troops advancing between Lake Balaton and the River Drava occupied more than 40 inhabited places.

"In fighting during December 3rd and December 4th, troops of the 3rd Ukrainian front in Hungary captured 2,375 German and Hungarian prisoners.

"In Yugoslavia, between the Danube and the Save, troops of the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation, operating in conjunction with Soviet forces, captured the town and railway junction of Sid (20 miles north-west of Mitrovica), as well as a number of other inhabited places.

"On other sectors of the front there was reconnaissance activity and local fighting at some places.

"Yesterday on all fronts our forces disabled or destroyed 21 German tanks and shot down 15 aeroplanes." (*Times*, December 7, 1944.)

This was typical of the communiques which were at this time issued daily by the Soviet High Command.

By December 17, 1944, the Soviet High Command claimed that four-fifths of Hungary had been liberated and on December 29 fierce fighting was taking place in Budapest and the Soviet forces started an advance towards Austria on a 100-mile front.

At this time there was a very strong desire in Britain, not only for good political relations with the U.S.S.R., but also for close cultural ties.

Foreign Secretary Eden stated in the House of Commons, December 1, 1944: "Both the Prime Minister and I discussed this question [intellectual contacts] at Moscow with Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov; it was one of the subjects we discussed one evening, the

question of contacts between our two countries on a literary and a language basis. There is no doubt that a very great effort is being made in Russia to-day in the teaching of English, and we have to get going to see that we do not drop far behind in a comparable effort on our part." (*Hansard*, December 1, 1944, col. 293.)

Relations between the British Military Mission in Moscow and the Soviet High Command were good. Sir J. Grigg, Secretary of State for War, informed the House of Commons that "the Head of the British Mission paid a visit to the Russian front in July of this year. Another officer of the Mission visited the front in October." (*Hansard*, December 5, 1944, col. 380.)

The B.B.C., in their European service at 10.45 p.m. on December 10, 1944, announced the signature that day in Moscow of the Soviet-French Treaty of Alliance (very similar to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance of 1942).¹ After giving some details of the treaty the announcer added that 80 years ago (1864) Disraeli remarked: "If there is a cordial alliance between England and France, war is most difficult; but if there is a thorough understanding between England, France and Russia, war is impossible."

Next day the signature of the Treaty was welcomed in jubilant terms by the British press.

The *Times* in an editorial, December 21, 1944, declared: "At the present time, it would be altogether appropriate for the three great European Powers to institute conversations on the future organisation of European security, especially now that Britain and France are united with Russia by parallel treaties of alliance. But this does not render any less urgent the need for continuous consultation on a world-wide footing between the major partners in the alliance."

Summing up the military achievements of 1944, the *Daily Telegraph* stated: "Behind us lies a twelvemonth of momentous progress. The plans made at Teheran in the last weeks of 1943 to destroy German military power by united operations from three sides have been precisely and brilliantly carried out. When Marshal Stalin summed up the full year's progress he remarked that the German armies had been chased from Russia, France, Belgium and Central Italy and the war transferred to German territory.

"This is but the bare outline of manifold achievements. The Allied entry into Rome, the piercing of the Apennines and the northward drive much diminished German prestige and confidence. But the

¹ See volume I, p. 714.

enemy's power suffered heavier and irreparable loss when the A.E.F. armies broke through from the Normandy beaches to Paris and Brussels." (*Daily Telegraph*, December 30, 1944.)

The *Daily Telegraph* continued: "Shaken by Russian blows, the German satellites fell one after the other—Finland, Bulgaria and Rumania—till only Hungary was left, and little of that now remains. The German forces have now been driven or have fled from Greece and Yugoslavia."

Lieutenant-General Viktor Poznyak, writing from Moscow in an article entitled *Ten Years Ago*, thus summed up the military achievements as he saw them:

"Towards the close of 1944, the Nazi Reich found itself in extremely difficult straits. In embarking on his aggression Hitler had underestimated the might of the Soviet Union, and the result had been a long series of heavy defeats on the Eastern front. By the winter of 1944 his armies had been expelled from the Soviet Union, his aggressive alliance had fallen apart under the blows of the Soviet Army, the American and British forces, and the Resistance fighters in the occupied lands, and some of his allies were ranged against him.

"The advancing Soviet Army had liberated East Poland, secured several bridgeheads on the west banks of the Narew and Vistula and was about to enter East Prussia. In Czechoslovakia, it had surmounted the formidable Carpathian barrier and was fighting its way into the Morava Valley. In Hungary, it held an extensive bridgehead on the west bank of the Danube and was attacking besieged Budapest.

"On the Western front, the British, American and French troops, having liberated practically the whole of France, were close to the Siegfried Line on the German frontier. Italy had withdrawn from the war, though the Nazis still held the Northern part of the peninsula, blocking the Anglo-American advance into the Po Valley. Germany herself had become one big target for the Allied air forces, which systematically bombed the leading industrial centres, transport hubs, and Berlin, the capital.

"The Nazi war machine was undermined; nothing remained of the conquests it had made in the earlier years of the war; the terrible losses in manpower could not be made good; economic resources were running low, and both people and army had lost all faith in victory." (*News*, No. 1, January, 1955, p. 21.)

The Allied armies from East, West and South were drawing ever closer around the Nazi Reich like a hangman's noose.

The joy felt at the Soviet and the Western Allied victories over Germany and the strong desire for the establishment of close friendly relations between the U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and Britain after the war had been won, were felt and expressed strongly among the organised workers of Britain. This was illustrated very vividly at the Trades Union Congress and Labour Party Conference held in 1944.

A Soviet Trade Union Delegation, led by Mr. V. Kuznetsov (Chairman, All-Union Central Council of Trades Unions of the U.S.S.R.), attended the British Trades Union Congress, October 16-20, 1944.

The General Council, in their report to Congress, stated that donations received from the National Council of Labour "Help for Russia" Fund at the end of August, 1944, amounted to £703,784, and the donations were still being received. The Chairman, Mr. Ebby Edwards, in his presidential address, said:

"One thing is certain, Germany must be completely demilitarised, actually and potentially. Never again should Germany, Japan or any other country pursuing an aggressive policy, be supplied with or allowed to manufacture arms capable of being transformed into a means which will threaten the peace of the world. In framing a policy to prevent war we must, among other things, not only take the manufacture of armaments out of private hands; but we must take account of and internationally regulate the raw materials of war industry. Economic sanction was one of the weapons with which the old League of Nations was armed in order to combat possible aggression. It was prevented from being used because of conflicting capitalist State interests. The organised workers of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States and the larger International Trade Union Movement as it exists should make it plain that on the question of 'the abolition of war' they are unitedly resolved, by action if necessary, to remove all the vested interests which stand in the way of making this the last war." (*Trades Union Congress Report 1944*, p. 13.)

Introducing the Soviet fraternal delegates (October 18, 1944), the Chairman said: "They had now come to that part of the agenda which was most important, and perhaps the most pleasing. It was his duty on behalf of Congress to ask the Fraternal Delegate from the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions of the U.S.S.R. to convey greetings to Congress, and he had the greatest possible pleasure in calling upon Mr. Vassili Kuznetsov to address Congress." (*ibid.*, p. 242.)

Mr. Kuznetsov, who was heartily applauded by the delegates, said:

"To-day the valiant Red Army and the valiant Allied forces were already fighting the German invaders on German territory. The pincers in which Hitlerite Germany were being enclosed from the East, West and South grew tighter with every passing day.

"Having brilliantly carried out the landing operations in Northern France and having shattered the myth of the impregnability of the so-called 'Atlantic fortress' the allied troops were liberating France, Belgium, Luxemburg and Holland from the Hitlerite yoke. The heroic Red Army had liberated a huge section of the territory of the Soviet Union, tens of thousands of cities and villages and had delivered from German slavery millions of Soviet people. The Red Army liberated the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Crimea, Bessarabia, Karelia and nearly the whole territory of the Baltic republics. During the summer offensive of 1944 alone the Red Army advanced from the Dnieper to the Vistula, a distance of close to 700 kilometres (420 miles). In liberating Soviet soil the Red Army was at the same time successfully helping to liberate the Polish, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and other peoples of the democratic countries from Fascist slavery. Under the smashing blows of the Red Army, Hitlerite Germany's allies, Rumania, Finland and Bulgaria had left the Fascist bloc. The same was going to happen to Hungary. Though a severe struggle lay ahead, they were fully confident to-day that Hitlerite Germany had lost the war and was on the brink of final defeat."

Kuznetsov went on: "The victories of the Red Army had become possible in consequence of the selfless help rendered to her in the rear by their men and women workers, engineers and employees from the very first days of war. Considerable assistance was rendered to the brilliant victories of the Red Army by their Allies—Great Britain and the U.S.A.—who supplied the Soviet Union with strategic raw materials, arms and provisions of a very valuable nature. The people of the Soviet Union valued highly the fraternal assistance of their great Allies and admired the heroism of the English, American, Canadian, Australian and other seamen, who in spite of extreme difficulties punctually delivered war supplies to the Soviet Union." (*ibid.*, p. 243.)

Mr. Kuznetsov concluded by saying: "Long live the victory of the United Nations over Hitlerite tyranny! Long live the British working class! Long live the working class of the Soviet Union! Long live the fraternal solidarity of the working class of the whole world!" (*ibid.*, p. 249.)

Kuznetsov received tremendous applause when he sat down.

The Trades Union Congress Report continued: "The President said he was sure the applause delegates had given Comrade Kuznetsov was an indication of what they felt as a result of the address he had delivered. As one who had attended the Anglo-Soviet Committee meetings he could say that no representative that had ever been sent had more endeared himself to the members of the Committee than their friend Kuznetsov. His tolerance, his clarity and his homeliness were very marked. As a token that he could take back with him in memory of his visit to this country, he had pleasure in presenting him with a solid gold watch, and he was sure it would emphasise for him the last remark he had made in his address, that time was an important factor in the war and for the success of the peace.

"The presentation was then made." (*ibid.*, p. 250.)

The Annual Conference of the Labour Party was held in London, December 11-15, 1944.

The National Executive Committee in its report to the Conference stated:

"The Post-War Settlement must grow out of the immediate Post-War Situation.

"When the war ends, whether in Europe or in Asia, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union will be the three outstanding Great Powers, great both in military and industrial resources of all kinds.

"Our first aim, therefore, must be to continue the closest possible Anglo-American-Russian co-operation. If we three hold together, all will be well; if we fall apart, all will be dark and uncertain. With the U.S.S.R. we have already concluded the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, which binds our two Governments and peoples together, as partners in a common quest for Peace, Security and Economic Progress, for the next twenty years. With the U.S.A. we have, as yet, no such formal bond of partnership; but we must do our best to foster, by all practicable means, Anglo-American understanding and joint endeavour." (*Annual Conference of the Labour Party*, London, 1944, p. 5.)

The Report continued: "But Anglo-American-Russian co-operation must not lead to an exclusive group, nor be an instrument of domination over the rest of the world. It must rather be the solid nucleus of a World Organisation. The form of this World Organisation must depend on what the three Great Powers will agree to. One reason why the League of Nations 'failed' was because the U.S.A.

never, and the U.S.S.R. only for a brief period, were members. Even more after this War than the last, the absence of either will fatally weaken any World Organisation. Both are immensely stronger now, both absolutely and relatively to the rest of the world, than they were then. We cannot dictate to the U.S.A. or to the U.S.S.R., nor they to us. We can only pool our ideas and hopes, and seek the widest possible measure of agreement. The Conferences between representatives of the three Governments at Moscow and Teheran are a useful beginning."

The Conference, December 12, 1944, discussed a long resolution headed "International Post-War Settlement" which stated:

"The Conference is convinced that no enduring peace is possible unless there is continuing co-operation between the British Commonwealth of Nations, the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. As Marshal Stalin declared on November 6 last: 'The alliance between the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the United States is founded not on accidental transitory considerations, but on vitally important and long-term interests' and 'the steps taken to maintain the Peace will be effective' if these three Powers 'continue to act in a spirit of unanimity and concord. They will not be effective if this essential condition is overlooked.' These three great Powers, with a reinvigorated France, must be the nucleus of a world organisation, to whose success each is indispensable." (*ibid.*, p. 131.)

The resolution continued: "The Conference is determined that Germany and Japan shall both be totally disarmed and their power to start new wars be finally destroyed. All other nations should make their contribution towards the establishment of effective measures for future security. They will thus be enabled, and should co-operate, to reduce for all the heavy burden of armaments and eliminate profit-making from the manufacture and sale of arms."

The Right Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P. (Leader of the Party) moving the Resolution, stated: "A new world organisation must be created. Rather it is already being created. Its nucleus is the close and intimate co-operation of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. That this co-operation is to extend after the war is evidenced not only by many declarations by statesmen, but by the twenty-year treaty made between Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. These three great Powers with France rising again after her misfortunes provide the rallying point for all the peace-loving nations.

We want an organisation embracing small as well as great nations, but on the three, on account of their strength, the greatest responsibility for preserving the peace of the world must fall." (*ibid.*, pp. 132-3.)

The Right Hon. Hugh Dalton, M.P., winding up the debate for the National Executive, stated: "I would draw your attention to the way in which Treaties of Alliance between separate States are now being gradually built up into the world organisation which we desire to see firmly established. The Anglo-Soviet Treaty is to run for twenty years, eighteen of which are still to go and I hope that period will be extended long before we reach the end of it. There is the great sheet-anchor for European peace in the future. If we had had it before the war, together with a wider understanding between Great Britain, France and Soviet Russia, this war would have been stopped or would have been brought to an earlier and victorious conclusion by giving Hitler a war on two fronts from the start. We fought in the days before the war for that tripartite pact, but we were not successful. Now we have first of all the Anglo-Soviet Alliance and we read yesterday of the meeting of de Gaulle and Stalin and the framing of a Soviet-French pact on similar lines. I hope that soon that will be linked up with the Anglo-Soviet Alliance and that other States will associate themselves with it."

Dalton continued: "Marshal Stalin on November 6, said that the Alliance between Soviet Russia, Great Britain and the United States is not founded on accidental and temporary considerations but on vital, important and long-term interests and he also said that the steps for maintaining peace would be effective so long as these three Powers continued to act in a spirit of unanimity and concord. These three, with France, must be the central core of any world-wide international organisation in the future, and I believe that a constructive peace can be based on that foundation." (*ibid.*, p. 140.)

The resolution of the National Executive was carried by an overwhelming majority.

CHAPTER III

JANUARY-MARCH, 1945: THE CRIMEA (YALTA) CONFERENCE

As the year 1944 drew to its close and 1945 dawned, the Soviet High Command was thinking, planning and working hard for a great new offensive which would inflict a crushing and final defeat on Nazi Germany.

Suddenly an urgent appeal came from the Western Allies for help. The then Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill, explained the background of the urgent cry in his sixth volume of *The Second World War*.

Churchill wrote that in December, 1944, "The Germans had indeed a major plan. Rundstedt assembled two Panzer armies, the Fifth and Sixth, and the Seventh Army, a total of ten Panzer and fourteen infantry divisions. This great force, led by its armour, was intended to break through our weak centre in the Ardennes to the river Meuse, swing north and northwest, cut the Allied line in two, seize the port of Antwerp, and sever the life-line of our northern armies. This bold bid was planned by Hitler, who would brook no changes in it on the part of his doubting generals. In its support the remnants of the German Air Force were assembled for a final effort, while paratroops, saboteurs and agents in Allied uniforms were all given parts to play." (Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Volume VI, p. 238.)

Churchill continued: "The attack began on December 16 under a heavy artillery barrage. At its northern flank the Sixth Panzer Army ran into the right of the First U.S. Army in the act of advancing towards the Roer dams. After a swaying battle the enemy was held. Farther south the Germans broke through a narrow front, but the determined defence of St. Vith, where the 7th U.S. Armoured Division specially distinguished itself, hindered them for several critical days. The Sixth Panzer Army launched a new spear-head to strike west and then northwards at the Meuse above Liège. The Fifth Panzer Army meanwhile drove through the centre of the VIIIth U.S.

Corps, by-passed St. Vith and Bastogne, and penetrated deeply to Marche and towards the Meuse at Dinant." (*ibid.*, pp. 238-9.)

After describing the fighting during the following ten days, Churchill went on: "The wheel of the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies produced bitter fighting around Marche, which lasted till December 26. By then the Germans were exhausted, although at one time they were only four miles from the Meuse and had penetrated over sixty miles. Bad weather and low ground fogs had kept our air forces out of the first week of the battle, but on December 23 flying conditions got better and they intervened with tremendous effect. Heavy bombers attacked railways and centres of movement behind the enemy lines, and tactical air forces played havoc in his forward areas, starving him of reinforcements, fuel, food and ammunition. Strategic raids on German refineries helped to deny him petrol and slacken the advance.

"Baulked of their foremost objective, the Meuse, the Panzers turned savagely on Bastogne. The American 101st Division had been reinforced on December 26 by part of the 4th U.S. Armoured Division, and though vastly outnumbered held the town grimly for another week. Before the end of December the German High Command must have realised, however unwillingly, that the battle was lost, for Paton's counter-offensive from Arlon, which started on the 22nd, was steadily if slowly progressing over the snow-choked countryside towards Houffalize. The enemy made one last bid, this time in the air. On January 1, they made a violent low-level surprise attack on all our forward airfields. Our losses were heavy, though promptly replaced, but the Luftwaffe lost more than they could afford in their final massed attack of the war.

"On January 3, 1945, Montgomery also launched his northern counter-offensive against Houffalize to join Paton's attack from the south." (*ibid.*, pp. 240-1.)

Mr. Churchill continued: "At this time Eisenhower and his staff were of course acutely anxious to know whether the Russians could do anything from their side to take off some of the pressure against us in the West." (*ibid.*, p. 242.)

So much for the background.

On January 6, 1945, Mr. Churchill in agreement with General Eisenhower sent the following cable to Marshal Stalin:

"The battle in the west is very heavy, and at any time large decisions may be called for from the Supreme Command. You know yourself

from your own experience how very anxious the position is when a very broad front has to be defended after the temporary loss of the initiative. It is Eisenhower's great desire and need to know in outline what you plan to do, as this obviously affects all his and our major decisions. Our envoy, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, was last night reported weather-bound in Cairo. His journey has been much delayed through no fault of yours. In case he has not reached you yet, I shall be grateful if you can tell me whether we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front, or elsewhere, during January, with any other points you may care to mention. I shall not pass this most secret information to anyone except Field-Marshal Brooke and General Eisenhower, and only under conditions of the utmost secrecy. I regard the matter as urgent." (*ibid.*, p. 243.)

Prime Minister Churchill commenting on this request and the reply wrote: "When one considers how serious was the decision asked and how many people were involved, it is remarkable that the answer should have been sent me the very next day." (*ibid.*, p. 243.)

On January 7, 1945, Marshal Stalin sent the following message to Prime Minister Churchill:

"I received your message of January 6, 1945, on the evening of January 7.

"Unfortunately Air Marshal Tedder has not yet arrived in Moscow.

"It is most important that we should be able to take advantage of our supremacy over the Germans in artillery and in the air. This demands clear flying weather and an absence of low mists, which hinder aimed artillery fire. We are preparing an offensive, but the weather is at present unfavourable. Nevertheless, taking into account the position of our Allies on the Western Front, G.H.Q. of the Supreme Command has decided to accelerate the completion of our preparation, and, regardless of the weather, to commence large-scale offensive operations against the Germans along the whole Central Front not later than the second half of January. You may rest assured that we shall do everything possible to render assistance to the glorious forces of our Allies." (*ibid.*, p. 243.)

On January 9, 1945, Prime Minister Churchill sent the following message to Marshal Stalin:

"I am most grateful to you for your thrilling message. I have sent

it over to General Eisenhower for his eyes only. May all good fortune rest upon your noble venture.

"The battle in the West goes not too badly. There is a good chance of the Huns being crushed out of their salient with very heavy losses. It is preponderantly an American battle, and their troops have fought splendidly, with heavy losses. We are both shoving everything in we can. The news you give me will be a great encouragement to General Eisenhower, because it gives him the assurance that the German reinforcements will have to be split between both our flaming fronts. The battle in the West will be continuous, according to the generals responsible for fighting it." (*ibid.*, p. 244.)

Writing from the Soviet viewpoint, this is how Lieutenant-General Poznyak described what happened: "The date of the Soviet offensive was advanced from January 20 to the 12th, and on that day the troops of the First Ukrainian Front moved into action. On the next day, the 13th, despite heavy fogs, the Third Byelorussian Front began its drive against the enemy defences and 24 hours later the infantry and tanks of the Second and First Byelorussian Fronts joined the attack, with the Fourth Ukrainian Front coming into action on the 15th.

"This was the beginning of the Soviet Army's grand winter offensive of 1945, conducted on a 750-mile front stretching from the Baltic to the Carpathians. In all, 150 divisions were brought into action, powerfully supported by artillery and aircraft. In the first three days, the enemy front was breached at many points, and the Soviet troops pressed ahead at an unparalleled pace, hurling the Germans back hundreds of miles as the offensive gained momentum.

"The whole German defence plan burst like a bubble. There could be no question now of continuing the drive on the Western Front, for the Soviet troops were rolling down on Königsberg, Berlin and industrial Silesia, disposing of the whole armies in their path. Available reserves were totally inadequate, and the Ardennes advance had to be completely abandoned: already on the 12th, the Germans gave up their attacks in the West. The German High Command was compelled to withdraw its troops from the Western Front and rush them against the advancing Soviet Army."

Lieutenant-General Poznyak concluded: "Thus the plan to decimate the British and American forces was foiled by the Soviet advance. The Americans and British were saved from disaster by their faithful ally, the Soviet Army." (*News*, January 1, 1955, pp. 21-2.)

From January 12, 1945, the Soviet forces swept forward. They liberated Radom (Central Poland) on January 14; Warsaw on the 16th, Lodz and Cracow on the 17th; they captured Tilsit on the 19th; Tannenberg on the 20th; Allenstein and Insterberg on the 21st; Bromberg on the 23rd; Gleiwitz (Silesia) on the 24th; Memel on the 27th; and for good measure the Soviet Forces invaded German Pomerania on the 28th and the German Province of Brandenburg on January 31, 1945.

The sweeping advance of the Soviet forces was welcomed with wide and deep admiration in Britain and the subject was discussed in the House of Lords, January 25, 1945. To quote from the *Times* report, January 26, 1945:

"Lord Addison called attention to the war situation, and moved for papers. He said that outstanding in their thoughts must be the achievement of the Russian Army—(hear hear)—perhaps the greatest co-ordinated military attack in history. What it meant in administrative efficiency behind the lines as well as heroism and direction in the field had evoked the admiration of everyone."

Lord Addison continued: "How far the Russian advance might go remained to be seen. It might be that before long, owing partly to difficulties of supply and partly to a certain rallying somewhere or other, the Russians would come across a stiffer resistance than they were experiencing just now. If that happened, it would only postpone the event, because recent progress on the Russian front had shown that the Russians were thoroughly competent to destroy the German Army, and it was only a matter of time before that would be accomplished."

Viscount Cranborne replying for the Government said:

"Well deserved tributes had been paid to the brilliant achievements of the Russian commanders and their soldiers in the triumphant advance, which we were still watching with breathless wonder. How far that advance was going to carry them no one yet could say. Already at several points, they had passed the frontiers of Germany and there appeared as yet to be no slackening on their progress.

"No doubt a time would come when some breathing space would be necessary to enable them to bring up their supplies. That had been the general experience in this new sort of mechanised warfare. We might have reached a new and final stage when the enemy forces even with a breathing space were unable to dam the breaches."

Meanwhile on the Western front, British forces launched an attack from Sittard in Holland against the German salient, east of the Maas and by January 26, 1945, German forces in the Ardennes had been forced back to the German frontier.

In addition to all this, Hungary had signed an Armistice with the U.S.S.R. on January 20, 1945, in Moscow.

From East and West heavy blows were unceasingly rained upon Nazi Germany.

The Soviet forces captured Thorn and were within 50 miles of the centre of Berlin on February 1; they forced the Oder south-east and north-west of Breslau on February 6 and 11 respectively and had completely surrounded the city on the 15th. The Soviet forces completely occupied Budapest on February 13; Poznan on the 23rd and they captured New Stettin on February 28, 1945.

On the Western Front also the Allied forces continued their non-stop hammer blows: Colmar was captured by French forces, February 2; Belgium was liberated on the 4th; British and Canadian Forces opened an offensive south-east of Nymegen, February 8, and captured Clevea and Gennep on the 12th. On the same date Prum was captured by U.S.A. forces.

The U.S.A. forces captured Rohrback, February 16, and British and Canadian Forces captured Gock on the 19th.

On February 23, U.S.A. forces opened an attack towards the Rhine at Dusseldorf and they captured Duren and Julick on the 25th.

In addition to the land fighting, Germany was pounded from the air; and according to an official announcement which appeared in the press, February 26, 1945, 91·6 per cent. of the convoys sent to the U.S.S.R. in the previous 42 months had arrived safely.

Also in January, 1945, there was much diplomatic activity aimed at widening and deepening Anglo-Soviet understanding and friendship.

On January 1, 1945, the press generally printed a photograph of the Head of the Soviet Military Mission in Britain, taking the salute at the passing out parade at Sandhurst.

The *Times* news story read:

"Major-General A. V. Vasiliev, head of the Russian Military Mission to Britain, took the salute on Saturday at the passing-out parade at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst.

"This is the first time in the history of the college that a Russian officer has been invited to attend the ceremony.

"After inspecting the college and workshops the General took the salute at the march-past and presented the Belt of Honour to Officer Cadet C. Jeffrey, of East Grinstead." (*Times*, January 1, 1945.)

The *Times* continued: "General Vasiliev said afterwards that he had been very impressed with what he had seen. The commandant and the staff were carrying on most important training with up-to-date methods which would in time defeat Hitlerite Germany.

"As the senior Red Army officer in Britain the General said he had been overwhelmed by the warm reception given to him."

A British Parliamentary Delegation, under the Chairmanship of Col. Walter Elliot, M.P., arrived in Moscow, January 15, 1945, where they were met by deputies of the Supreme Soviet and representatives of the Soviet Foreign Office. They had an interview with Generalissimo Stalin on January 25 and were everywhere warmly greeted by the Soviet people.

The *Daily Express*, January 10, 1945, carried the following: "Lord Beaverbrook, Lord Privy Seal, and Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, Minister of Production, yesterday received one of Russia's highest, military honours, the Order of Suvorov, First Class.

"The Orders were presented by the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Gusev, in recognition of their outstanding services in organising the delivery of war supplies to the U.S.S.R.

"Three British Service chiefs also were honoured, but since the decree¹ awarding the Orders was issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in October one of them, Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, has been killed and another, Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, is missing."

The *Daily Express* continued: "Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, received the Order of Ushakov, First Class, for the late Admiral Ramsay. Mr. Thomas Leigh-Mallory, the missing air marshal's son, received the Order of Kutuzov, First Class, on behalf of his father.

"Sir Alexander was also handed the Order of Suvorov, First Degree, on behalf of Field Marshal Montgomery. All these Service honours were awarded for outstanding direction of operations in the invasion of France and subsequent battles."

The *Daily Express* report went on: "Mr. Gusev said that as soon as Hitlerite Germany attacked the Soviet Union the British Government

¹ See p. 44.

came to the aid of the Soviet Government in providing military supplies which the Red Army needed so much.

"In the first part of the war Lord Beaverbrook and later, Mr. Lyttelton, directed those supplies. Both had played a great part in the struggle against the common enemy.

"In that struggle a successful alliance was born, developed and strengthened. Heavy battles still lay ahead, but close co-operation between our two countries and the efforts of all our armed Forces would lead to complete and final victory."

Lord Beaverbrook, in reply to the speech of the Soviet Ambassador, said:

"It is a great honour for us to receive the decoration, but it is a greater honour to have served the Red Army.

"To have served the army which fought the battles of 1941 and 1942 is a satisfaction far greater than any honour which can be bestowed upon us.

"I would mention the three officers of the Royal Navy, Army and R.A.F. who carried out the plan for the invasion of France. We recognise that that invasion was made possible by the victories of the Red Army."

Lord Beaverbrook concluded: "We know that those great heroes of ours who carried out such brilliant operations will always be connected with the history of Russia."

A very pleasant ceremony took place at the Soviet Embassy in London on February 2, 1945. To quote the *Times*: "The second anniversary of the defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad was happily marked at an Anglo-Russian gathering at the Soviet Embassy yesterday, when gifts sent by the City Council and people of that heroic city were handed over to the British craftsmen who made the Sword of Honour presented by the King to Stalingrad.

"Mr. Sobolev, Chargé d'Affaires, who presided in the absence of the Soviet Ambassador, described the 18 albums presented as a 'modest gift', but in fact they are magnificent examples of modern Russian craftsmanship. Bound in ribbed scarlet silk, with a gilt clasp, each of the large albums contains a photographic record of life in Stalingrad before, during and after the memorable siege, with greetings to the British people signed by representative citizens, reproductions of the messages congratulating Marshal Stalin on the victory by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt, and a pictorial record of the presentation of the

sword. Each album is enclosed in a casket of carved walnut, the name of the recipient being engraved on a gilt plate. The albums were designed and made by Stalingrad craftsmen." (*Times*, February 3, 1945.)

The news story continued: "The Chargé d'Affaires was accompanied by Lieutenant-General A. Vasiliev, head of the Soviet Military Mission, and among those present at the ceremony were Mr. Richard Law, Minister of State, and the Lord Mayor. The widow of Mr. R. M. Y. Gleadowe, the designer of the sword, was the first to receive an album, and all the other craftsmen who had taken part in its production were present, including Corporal Durbin who was given special leave from the R.A.F. to undertake the gold and silver work."

The *Times* report concluded: "Mr. Sobolev said that the people of Stalingrad treasured the Sword of Honour as a symbol of the growing comradeship in arms of the peoples of Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and as a token of their deep affection they had given the albums. Recalling the heroic defence of the city, he said that out of the ruins an even more fair and majestic Stalingrad was now rising. Numerous buildings were springing up, factories were working again, and schools, institutes, theatres, hospitals and restaurants were flourishing."

Again the Home Secretary, Mr. Herbert Morrison, speaking in Manchester, February 4, 1945, also paid a generous tribute to Soviet skill and prowess; he said: "The extraordinary Soviet victories, remarkable even to eyes which have become accustomed to the spectacle of Russian military prowess and organising skill, are carrying the Red Armies closer and closer to Berlin."

"In the West, though the turn of the Anglo-American Allies to play their latest and again dramatic share in the struggle has not yet come, we can look back not many months to a victory which in all the circumstances must rank as one of the most creditable and glorious of the whole war." (*Daily Mail*, February 5, 1945.)

Morrison continued: "After victory one of the first tasks must be, in a spirit of stern and relentless justice, to liquidate the brutes who have plunged the world into a misery and horror unknown since the Dark Ages, if indeed, it was matched even then."

It must however be pointed out that in spite of these and similar friendly exchanges, there was an underlying fear in the minds of many of the possibility of a break between the U.S.S.R. on the one hand, and Britain and the U.S.A. on the other. Thus to give but one example:

Sir Archibald Sinclair, M.P., Leader of the Liberal Party, speaking at a party Assembly, February 3, 1945, made no bones about the chances of another war. He said: "If Britain, Russia and America fall apart another war is certain." (*News Chronicle*, February 5, 1945.)

But Sir Archibald was not pessimistic; he added: "The three great Powers must undertake the imposing task of trustees of mankind. The central fact remains that if Britain, Russia and America learn to understand one another, to trust one another and to work together, no large-scale war will be possible."

However, the big diplomatic event at this time was the Conference of the Heads of the Governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. at Yalta (Crimea), February 4-11, 1945. This was the last War Conference of the Big Three prior to the end of the war in Europe.

The first official announcement of the Conference was made simultaneously in London, Moscow and Washington, February 7, 1945. The British Ministry of Information's statement read:

"The President of the United States of America, the Premier of the Soviet Union and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by their Chiefs of Staff, the three Foreign Secretaries, and other advisers, are now meeting in the Black Sea area.

"Their purpose is to concert plans for completing the defeat of the common enemy and for building, with their Allies, firm foundations for a lasting peace. Meetings are proceeding continuously.

"The conference began with military discussions. The present situation on all the European fronts has been reviewed and the fullest information interchanged.

"There is complete agreement for joint military operations in the final phase of the war against Nazi Germany. The military staffs of the three Governments are now engaged in working out jointly the detailed plans.

"Discussions of problems involved in establishing a secure peace have also begun.

"These discussions will cover joint plans for the occupation and control of Germany, the political and economic problems of liberated Europe, and proposals for the earliest possible establishment of a permanent international organisation to maintain peace." (*Times*, February 8, 1945.)

The statement concluded: "A communique will be issued at the conclusion of the conference."

The full text of the agreements and decisions reached at the Conference headed *Report of the Crimea Conference, February 11, 1945*, was published, February 12, 1945. It is a very lengthy document and we publish it as an appendix. The Document was thus summed up by the *Times*, February 13, 1945:

"The Conference of Mr. Churchill, President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin, held at Yalta, in the Crimea, has drawn up military plans for the final defeat of Germany.

"The conference has also agreed on plans for enforcing the no surrender terms, but these terms will not be made known until German armed resistance is crushed.

"The forces of the three Powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany, and a central control commission will have headquarters in Berlin. France will be invited to take a zone of occupation.

"The three Powers agree on joint action in the liberated countries of Europe. In Poland the provisional Government is to be re-organised on a broader basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from the Poles abroad.

"Permanent machinery of consultation is to be set up and a conference of the United Nations will be called at San Francisco in April, 1945, to prepare the charter of an international organisation to maintain peace."

The final section (No. 9) of the Document, read:

"Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our peoples and to the people of the world.

"Only with continuing and growing co-operation and understanding among our three countries and among all the peace-loving nations can the highest aspiration of humanity be realised—a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, 'afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.'

"Victory in this war and the establishment of the proposed International Organisation will provide the greatest opportunity in all

history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of such a peace.

Signed WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
J. V. STALIN."

The decisions of the Conference were as a whole very warmly approved by the British press. The *Times* Diplomatic Correspondent commented:

"Unbounded satisfaction was expressed in London last night with the results of the Crimea Conference as set out in an official statement which will rank as an outstanding diplomatic document of the war. The three leaders met at the Livadia Palace at Yalta, in the Crimea—a lovely setting with its vineyards, cypresses and woodlands, and the snow on the heights overlooking it.

"The statement is in effect the death sentence on National Socialist Germany. The three leaders have decided against making a direct appeal to the Germans to recognise the hopelessness of further resistance and to overthrow the régime which has led them to defeat. New military blows will, it has been decided, be more effective than any propagandist appeal. The occupation and control of Germany after final defeat are described in some detail. It is disclosed for the first time that a Central Control Commission shall be set up in Berlin. This will consist of the Supreme Commanders of the three Powers. France will be invited to nominate a fourth member. France will also have her own zone of occupation, to be fixed by the European Advisory Commission, on which France has her representative. It is noted with deep satisfaction that the conference showed in the most practical sense its recognition of the rights of France." (*Times*, February 13, 1945.)

The *Star* editorially commented: "Frenzied foaming by the Nazis to-day against the Big Three is a measure of their fury over the unity of the Allies. They clearly recognise that the Crimea declaration spells doom for them and means what it says." (*Star*, February 13, 1945.)

"Determination of the Big Three," continued the article, "to create a world security organisation is impressively confirmed by the fixing of a date for the United Nations Conference—April 25. That means business.

"It must be followed by a plan for the economic reconstruction of Europe on the same all-in democratic lines."

The *Star* concluded: "By its decisions the Conference is an historic event of the first magnitude. As one of its three architects, Mr. Churchill has done a wonderful job. His perseverance in bringing about the conference, his personal courage in being ready to fly anywhere, and his astonishing achievements round the table mark the crown of his great national service as Prime Minister."

"No earlier gathering of these statesmen," commented the *Evening News*, "has resulted so speedily in such practical decisions. It is a token of high hope for the future that each has accepted some compromise in detail for the sake of that supreme unity in principle." (*Evening News*, February 13, 1945.)

The *Evening Standard* wrote: "The transcending fact, however, is that the Big Three are joined, as equal partners, in the exciting dramatic adventure of eliminating from the world 'the political, social and economic causes of war.' This Grand Alliance will continue to-day's unity in war into to-morrow's peace." (*Evening Standard*, February 13, 1945.)

"The Big Three," declared the *News Chronicle* "have now reported the decisions at their momentous conference in the Crimea; and the people of the United Nations have cause for profound satisfaction at the contents of the communique we publish to-day." (*News Chronicle*, February 13, 1945.)

"Reactions to the Crimea Conference," stated the *Daily Telegraph* editorially, "fully justify the claim that the Big Three have achieved a success all the more brilliant because it could not be presumed in advance. Had there been any intransigence in any quarter the enemy's hope—his last hope—of salvation through serious disagreement among the Allies might not have been wholly futile. In actual fact every problem has clearly been approached by all the three participants in an objective and reasonable spirit which is of the happiest augury for the future." (*Daily Telegraph*, February 14, 1945.)

The Diplomatic Correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* wrote: "Satisfaction about the Crimea Conference continues to be expressed in authoritative London quarters. The impression is that good progress has been made towards safeguarding the policy of the Grand Alliance, and that the special problems that came under review were thrashed out in an atmosphere of realistic responsibility." (*Manchester Guardian* February 14, 1945.)

Editorially the *Times* declared: "Friend and foe have alike recognised the cardinal significance of the Crimea Conference. The far-reaching

decisions achieved with exemplary rapidity, have dissipated at a stroke the last fears on the one side, and the last hopes on the other, that deep-seated rifts of opinion would embarrass the principal United Nations in the hour of victory and perhaps even postpone victory itself. 'If Hitler relied on a division among the Powers at the Conference he is doomed as never before,' said Mr. Byrnes, the American director of man-power, on his return to Washington. The success of the conference has vindicated the highest expectations of those who had long urged the indispensable importance of more frequent meetings between the three leaders." (*Times*, February 15, 1945.)

So much for the reactions of the British press. The Soviet press welcomed the decisions of the Yalta Conference with equal satisfaction and warmth.

The *Times* correspondent cabled from Moscow:

"The results of the Crimea conference are greeted everywhere with the warmest and most whole-hearted approval and satisfaction. Throughout all comment, whether in the long leading article appearing to-day or in brief conversations among ordinary hard-working people, runs the assurance that the alliance has been broadened and deepened and cemented." (*Times*, February 14, 1945.)

The *Times* cable continued: "*Izvestia*, the Government journal, puts into words a strong belief which is widespread here to-day: 'The Crimea conference will enter history as the meeting which numbered the days of Hitlerite Germany, planned the final victory and opened the greatest possibility in the whole story of mankind for creating a long and durable peace.'"

Mr. D. Zaslavsky, a distinguished Soviet Commentator, wrote in the Soviet press:

"In the nine sections of the Crimea document we see not only present-day Europe, covered in the smoke of war, devastated and bloody—but the future Europe, liberated Europe. We see her new biography. This is not merely a prophecy, this is not mere wishful thinking. Behind this plan lies not only brilliant thought but iron will. Justice and strength are its foundations.

"Its authors have at their disposal everything they need to put it into practice. And it will be put into practice. To this end the struggle is being waged. To this end the Red Army is pushing into the heart of Germany.

"Liberated Europe undoubtedly means a new Europe. The decisions of the Crimea Conference destroy to the very foundation the hopes of those lovers of ancient times who consoled themselves with the thought of a return to the status quo in Europe. These political antiquarians want the war in Europe to be replaced by a Restoration. They want all States and all Governments to resume life precisely where it was interrupted by the war. They want Europe to start from the bygone.

"These lovers of political shades of history are the greatest Utopians that history knows. They call themselves world-creators, and what you will. Their main desire is that Germany should rise from the ruins, if not as she was before 1939, at least as she was before 1933, before Hitler and his band came to power."

After adding that the Crimea Conference "opens a new epoch in European relations," Zaslavsky continued:

"The Crimea Conference has pronounced the democratisation of the whole of Europe. The peoples are free to choose for themselves the government they want, but it must be democratic. That is the direct demand of the victor Powers. It arises directly from the demand to wipe Nazism in all its forms from the face of the earth.

"All protection and toleration of anti-democratic elements opens the way for the resurgence of Fascism. And here the greatest vigilance will be required. It is insufficient to drive out the enemies of democracy. Drive Fascism out of the door and it will fly in through the window.

"Democracy is varied in its forms. Britain is a democracy of one historic kind. The U.S.A. is one of another kind. The U.S.S.R. a third. The peoples of liberated Europe have the opportunity, with the destruction of the last traces of Nazism and Fascism to create democratic institutions according to their own choice. They can take any form of historically developed democracy as their example."

Zaslavsky concluded: "We read and re-read the wonderful lines of the Crimea Document. Its language, clean and stern and majestic, fascinates us. It has the simplicity of democratic force. It is addressed not to the diplomats, but to the peoples. It has the style of a simple monumental historic memorial—to the memory of our epoch.

"We know that everything laid down in this document will be carried out. Churchill pledges himself to this for the British people, Roosevelt for the American people, our people see the signature

of Comrade Stalin. And what Comrade Stalin has said, will be."

The following statement by the Most Holy Alexius, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, was published in the Soviet press on February 17:

"The Communique on the decisions of the Crimea Conference of the leaders of the Allied Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain—has been accepted in Church circles with the greatest satisfaction and joy.

"A firm foundation for future peace all over the world has been laid. That for which the Church has always prayed, 'Peace in the Whole World,' is envisaged already, in the near future. Furious and aggressive Fascism will be finally crushed—not only by the force of the valiant soldiers of the Allied States, but also by the wisdom of our great Stalin and the heads of the Governments allied to us. All this quite definitely follows the firm, clear decisions of the Conference, which set itself the task of affording 'assurance that all men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.'

"The Church blesses these bright Christian aspirations and hopes; and with even greater fervour prays that the combat actions of the allied armies for the destruction of the still resisting enemy forces may end successfully, and that peace, so greatly desired, and inviolable, may dawn upon the war-weary peoples; at the same time it increases its patriotic labours and the assistance within its power to give to the cause of final victory over the enemy."

The statement concluded: "Glory to our valiant soldiers, whose amazing courage is the admiration of the whole world, and whose sacred blood is the seed of a future peaceful life in all the world.

"Glory and honour to our Allies, and blessed be the memory of the heroes of the Motherland who sacrificed to her their skill, courage and their very lives.

"We pray God that His heavenly aid be extended to us also in the future."

As can be well imagined, the German press was livid at the Yalta decisions and Dr. Goebbels in an article in *Das Reich* tried to frighten the British Government with a lurid picture of 600 divisions under Russian command facing 60 British divisions on the continent at the end of the war. Goebbels clearly saw that Germany was doomed to crushing defeat.

Prime Minister Churchill, on the aerodrome in the Crimea, on the

eve of his departure from Soviet territory, made the following broadcast:

"Since we landed on this aerodrome in war-devastated Crimea twelve days ago great events have taken place in the world. The permanent friendship and collaboration between the three great Powers was proclaimed more precisely and with more authority than ever before. The task now before us is to enter right into the heart of the enemy's country and to crush for ever the ghastly Nazi tyranny.

"This tyranny threatened to halt mankind's march forward to further progress. The enemy set obstacles into this road and all our peoples together—our three nations and many other nations of the world—smashed these obstacles. In the vanguard of this struggle the Soviet Army covered themselves with unprecedented glory.

"We all pledged ourselves to work together after the end of the present war in order to achieve a happier life and prosperity for the large masses of the people in every country, so that the nations may be able to live in the world without fear of cruel and base aggression, without ever again being exposed to the horrors of war.

"New prospects have opened for us. Let the achievements of our common efforts materialise, thanks to our unshakable determination and our inexhaustible final energy. I am glad that we are all gathered here to-day, and that a small unit of the R.A.F. which was here with you had an opportunity to learn what true Russian hospitality means. [The reference to 'you' was directed by Mr. Churchill to a number of Red Army troops who heard his speech.] These are the seeds of a crop which will be gathered in the future by other generations, who will benefit from the present efforts of their fathers."

The British Prime Minister concluded: "On leaving the soil of Russia—the resurrected Crimea cleared from the Hun, thanks to Russian gallantry—I thank you all. I wish to express my gratitude to all of you and to your superiors, and in particular to your great leader, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal Stalin. I also wish to express my admiration of the valiant Russian peoples, and their armies, which is shared by the entire British race dispersed all over the world, over all the oceans, and all parts of the globe. We pray that Russia shall never again experience the hard trials from which she has so gloriously emerged." (*Times*, February 19, 1945.)

The decisions of the Crimea Conference were debated in the House of Commons on February 27, 28 and March 1, 1945. On February 27 the Prime Minister moved the following Motion:

"That this House approves the declaration of joint policy agreed to by the three great Powers at the Crimea Conference and, in particular, welcomes their determination to maintain unity of action not only in achieving the final defeat of the common enemy but, thereafter, in peace as in war." (*Hansard*, February 27, col. 1267.)

Mr. Churchill explained and trenchantly defended the policy adopted at the Crimea Conference. Among many other things he said: "The impression I brought back from the Crimea, and from all my other contacts, is that Marshal Stalin and the Soviet leaders wish to live in honourable friendship and equality with the Western democracies. I feel also that their word is their bond. I know of no Government which stands to its obligations, even in its own despite, more solidly than the Russian Soviet Government. I decline absolutely to embark here on a discussion about Russian good faith. It is quite evident that these matters touch the whole future of the world. Sombre indeed would be the fortunes of mankind if some awful schism arose between the Western democracies and the Russian Soviet Union, if all the future world organisation were rent asunder, and if new cataclysms of inconceivable violence destroyed all that is left of the treasures and liberties of mankind." (*ibid.*, cols. 1283-4.)

However, there were some strong criticisms of the agreement from "Diehards" on the question of the proposed Russo-Polish frontier.

Lord Dunglass said: "I accept it as a fact of power, but I cannot be asked to underwrite it as an act of justice." (*ibid.*, col. 1306.)

Captain McEwen declared: "I cannot help feeling that history, natural and otherwise, is in this matter on my side. What has been done in the Crimea Conference has been done, but I for one cannot join in the chorus of approval which has greeted its doing, and both for the sake of my own conscience and in the hope of lessening the possibilities of this sort of thing repeating itself at some future stage, I feel I cannot allow it to pass without registering a definite but uncompromising protest." (*ibid.*, col. 1328.)

Captain Graham asked: "How can the Prime Minister reconcile the honour of this country with his ignoring of the explicit understanding at the time of the signing of the Anglo-Polish Treaty of Mutual Assistance that, if this country were to enter into any new undertakings with a third State, their execution should at no time prejudice either the sovereignty or territorial inviolability of Poland, and vice versa?" (*ibid.*, col. 1336.)

Sir Archibald Southby said: "I have on past occasions tried to plead the just cause of Poland and the Baltic States. I have no desire to go over old ground, but I cannot see, either in the contents of the White Paper, or in what the Prime Minister has said, anything which shakes my belief that no solution of the Polish problem has yet been reached to which my assent could honourably be given. Incidentally, it is significant that nowhere in those portions of the White Paper dealing with liberated Europe and Poland do the words 'justice' or 'honour' occur." (*Hansard*, February 28, 1945, col. 1433.)

These quotations were typical of attacks by other "Diehards" on the Yalta Agreement.

Mr. Harold Nicholson, M.P., one of the best-informed men in the House of Commons on foreign affairs, on the same day *inter alia* stated: "I regard what has been done at Yalta as without question, the most important political agreement that we have gained in this war. Far from little having been achieved, it is amazing that so much has been done." (*ibid.*, col. 1478.)

Then turning on some "Diehard" critics who had attacked the Crimean decisions because they restored the Soviet's Western frontiers up to the Curzon Line, Nicholson declared: "I was myself a pessimist in considering the future of Poland. I realised that Russia, outraged as she was by the horrible attack made upon her by the Germans—triumphant as she was rendered by her amazing recovery and the onward march of her quite unexpected armies—dazzled as she might have been by the fact that it was she, once again, who had reached the Oder, and conquered the enemy of the world; might be determined, as I thought she would be, that whatever came out of this war, one thing that was certain was that Russia would be restored to her old Tsarist frontiers." (*ibid.*, col. 1479.)

Nicholson continued: "It would have been a very natural thing for Russia to take a rapacious view. But no, they have not done so. They have agreed in a very important way to modify the Tsarist frontier. They have agreed at Yalta to make a concession to Poland. I cannot see anyone who has studied at all the continuity of Tsarist and Communist policy, who understands what it means to Russia, to remember the humiliation to which the Bolshevik system was exposed in the early years of its existence—I do not think, unless you realise how sensitive they are on that point, you can understand how great a temptation it must have been for them to say, 'We do not care what the Western nations say, we will come out of the war with the whole map of

Europe what it was in 1912, with our frontiers stretching where the Tsarist frontiers stretched.' That they have not done that is a matter of immense relief. When I read the Yalta communique I thought, 'How could they have brought that off? This is really splendid!' " (*ibid.*, cols. 1479-80.)¹

Mr. Shinwell speaking later said: "I have frequently opposed the Government, and may do so again, but I want to say that the declarations of Yalta are a magnificent advance on anything that has gone before. I believe they have taken the first definite step towards an enduring peace." (*ibid.*, col. 1490.)

Foreign Secretary Eden winding up the debate on this date said: "As I listened to some of the speeches I could not help feeling that some of my hon. Friends, in talking about Poland, had not only Poland in mind, but the fear that Russia, flushed with the magnificent triumphs of her Armies, was also dreaming of European domination. This, of course, is the constant theme of German propaganda. It is poured out day by day and night after night and comes to us in all sorts of unexpected forms and guises." (*ibid.*, col. 1514.)

Eden went on: "It was their theme before the war. It was then the Bolshevik bogey, and how well Hitler used it. How often visitors to Nuremburg were told by the Germans they met, of the fear of Russia. I have had plenty of it chucked at me at interviews with Hitler myself. Can anyone doubt that that theme, before the war, was an element in making it difficult for us to establish an understanding with Soviet Russia?

"Can anyone doubt that, if we had had in 1939 the unity between Russia, this country and the United States that we cemented at Yalta, there would not have been the present war? I go further. Can anyone doubt that, so long as we hold that unity, there will not be another war? We do not say that we can establish conditions in which there will never be war again, but I believe if we can hold this unity we can establish peace for 25 years or 50 years or—who can say? But unless we can hold it there will be no peace for anything like that period of time.

"Finally," said Mr. Eden, "may I say this word, again to my hon. Friends? Make no mistake. The moment this fighting ceases Germany will be out on the old theme of propaganda again. She will again try

¹ The question of the Soviet-Polish frontier is dealt with fully in *Six Centuries of Russo-Polish Relations* and in *A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations*, Vol. I, by W. P. and Z. K. Coates.

to play us off against Russia, and Russia against America and ourselves. She will play on all their pity, which she knows so well how to do. The whole orchestra of German self-pity will work up again to fortissimo. Let us be very careful that we do not fall victims to that." (*ibid.*, col. 1515.)

Sir A. Salter, M.P., concluding a well-balanced speech said: "I say deliberately, that I have searched my memory for any conference which within so few days has yielded so rich a harvest as we see in the Report of this Conference. It is a harvest, it is true, which is not yet reaped. It is still subject to the hazards of political storms and weather and seasons. Much will depend upon those who reap this harvest. I personally have strong hopes that, so far as our representatives are concerned, they will prove good reapers." (*Hansard*, March 1, 1945, cols. 1586-7.)

The Motion moved by the Prime Minister on February 27, was put to the vote on March 1 and was carried by 430 to nil. About thirty M.P.s ostentatiously refrained from voting (they remained seated in the chamber when the vote was taking place) because they disagreed with the decisions taken on the subject of the Soviet-Polish frontier. However, the Government did not worry about this small band of malcontents. Not one of them was able in the course of the debate to put forward any alternative which the Soviet and Polish Governments would mutually accept.

Reynolds News, March 4, 1945, thus commented: "The foundations of a lasting peace have been raised an inch or two by last week's votes on Poland and the Yalta agreement. On the first issue the vote of Parliament accurately reflected the opinion of the nation. The handful of Tories who tried to make of Poland a wedge between Russia and the West are deluding themselves if they think they reflect anything more potent than their own ingrown prejudices."

This comment was typical of the reactions of the press generally, irrespective of political complexion.

During March, 1945, the Allied Forces from East and West kept up their remorseless pressure on the German forces.

U.S.A. forces captured Munchen-Gladbach on March 1; Trier and Krefeld on March 2; Cologne on March 6; and in addition they crossed the Rhine at Remagen on March 7. British and Canadian forces launched an attack on the German bridgehead at Xanten on March 8, and British forces captured Xanten on March 9. U.S.A.

forces launched a new attack from Remagen bridgehead on March 12; they captured Coblenz on March 17; Worms and Saarbrücken, March 19, and Ludwigshaven on March 21.

On March 18, the Western Allies made their biggest daylight air attack on Berlin. Allied forces under Field Marshal Montgomery began Rhine crossings between Rees and Wesel, March 23; U.S.A. forces captured Darmstadt on March 24 and Mannheim on March 29.

The Canadian First Army crossed the Dutch frontier on March 30, 1945. The last air-raid warning sounded in London, March 28.

From the Eastern front the unrelenting blows continued. The Soviet forces captured Stolp (on the Danzig-Stettin coast road) on March 9; Kustrin (on the east bank of the Oder opposite Berlin) on March 12; Brandenburg (East Prussia) on March 17; Gdynia on March 28; and Danzig and Kustrin on March 30, 1945.

CHAPTER IV

MORE MANIFESTATION OF GOODWILL

DURING the first half of 1945 some important visits were made to the U.S.S.R. and other manifestations of cordial relations occurred in London which it will be of interest to deal with rather fully in a separate chapter before continuing the narrative of the progress of the war.

The British Parliamentary Delegation, referred to on page 67, were all back in London early in March and on the 6th of that month an exchange of messages between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain was announced in the House of Commons. Introducing the messages Mr. Speaker said: "I beg to inform the House that I have received the following message from Russia, partly in answer to a letter which I sent when the Parliamentary Delegation went out there, and which, for the convenience of hon. Members, I will circulate in the Official Report." The following is the text of the message from Russia:

1st February, 1945.

"To the Speaker of the House of Commons,

Colonel D. Clifton Brown.

We extend cordial greetings to you and through you, to the Members of the House of Commons.

We fully share the conviction to which you have given expression that the further and comprehensive development of the Anglo-Soviet Alliance by strengthening friendly relations and mutual understanding between our peoples, constitutes a firm basis for the successful achievement of the high aims which our countries have set themselves in this war—the utter defeat of Germany and the safeguarding of a stable and lasting international peace for the future.

We hope that the visit of Members of the Commons in the British Parliamentary Delegation, which afforded them an opportunity to become closely acquainted with the feelings and aspirations of the peoples and Government of the Soviet Union at the decisive stage of our common struggle against the German aggressor, will contribute towards the strengthening of friendly relations between our

peoples and the achieving of still closer co-operation between them, both during and after the war.

(Signed) N. ANDREEV,

Chairman of the Council of the Union.

(Signed) N. SHVERNIK,

Chairman of the Council of Nationalities."

Mr. Speaker's letter read as follows:

January 9, 1945.

"The Speaker of the House of Commons sends his cordial greetings to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on the occasion of the visit to be paid to the Soviet Union by Members of the House of Commons with the Parliamentary Delegation. Members of the House of Commons have followed with profound admiration and gratitude the historic part played by the Soviet peoples and their representatives and leaders in beating back and overthrowing the barbarous forces of aggression and they warmly welcome the Anglo-Soviet Alliance which has grown out of this common struggle. The Speaker wishes to assure the Presidium of the great pleasure which it gives the House of Commons that this visit should be made and he feels that it will do much to strengthen still further the bonds which unite the British and Soviet peoples, and to foster the interest which each must increasingly feel in the institutions of the other. The Anglo-Soviet Treaty and the comradeship between our peoples which has been forged during the war forms a firm basis not only for achieving final and complete victory together but also for building a just and enduring peace for the future.

SPEAKER."

(Hansard, March 6, 1945, cols. 1795-6-7.)

The Delegates gave a press conference, March 7, which was well reported in the press but most fully in the *Manchester Guardian*, March 8, 1945, from which most of what follows has been taken.

At this conference Mr. Walter Elliot, the Chairman, said that they had had "a frank conversation with Marshal Stalin on matters concerning the Russian offensive, trade relations between the two countries, the interchange of students and his attitude to Germany.

"I found his attitude on these questions was the attitude of a man who felt his country had suffered great injuries and he was not inclined to forget it," said Mr. Elliot. As to what they could tell the people of Britain, Marshal Stalin's view was that the delegation should "tell the truth, tell the good and tell the bad."

The Delegation as a whole said that "the atmosphere of the whole Soviet Union was that of an industrial revolution in full swing and of pride in what had been accomplished. There was a great unsatisfied desire for consumer goods and a great interest in the peoples beyond the Union's borders.

"Commander Stephen King-Hall, who had discussed a variety of subjects with Soviet students, was much impressed with their wide knowledge of affairs. He hoped that further information about our country would establish close ties between the two countries.

"Mr. Elliot, as a medical man, was particularly interested in Soviet hospitals and from what he saw he was favourably impressed, especially by the arrangements for rapid evacuation by air of casualties from the battle zone to base hospital.

"Commander King-Hall visited a new maternity hospital in Stalingrad and found all the equipment was of British manufacture and much appreciated by the patients and staff.

"Mr. Tom Fraser, the young mining M.P., said that Soviet mining methods were similar to ours. Most of the machinery he saw in Soviet mines was of British or American origin. He was struck by the high proportion of women working underground.

"All the delegates paid high tribute to the women of Russia. They found women doing tough manual jobs, occupying high executive positions, and in general doing many things which were undertaken outside Russia only by men. All the delegates said that they were able to do and see what they liked."

The members of the delegation said: "As foreign visitors they themselves were entertained on a royal scale, but they found the population well fed and healthy looking. This applied more to rural and provincial centres than to big towns like Moscow, but even there food was adequate."

Finally the delegates said that they "regretted that they could spend only six weeks on this tour, but they saw enough within this short time to convince them that there was a sound basis for lasting friendship and understanding between the two countries."

At this time there was a great thirst in Britain for information about life in the U.S.S.R. and several members of the Delegation contributed articles or a series of articles to the press. Colonel Walter Elliot, M.P., wrote an excellent series for the *Evening Standard*. The following are a few extracts: "Soviet Russia's territories run in a solid belt, five thousand miles long and as much as two thousand

miles deep, through the heart of the huge land-mass of the Old World." (*Evening Standard*, March 13, 1945.)

"On the iron earth has been hammered an iron people, who speak with one voice, and who live in a place the area of the moon. They are a formidable phenomenon—particularly when there are nearly 200 millions of them." (*ibid.*)

"There is an unlimited vigour and determination manifest in the U.S.S.R. not only for the prosecution of the war, but for the development of the country in the forthcoming peace. The recovery from the German invasion has been rapid, though the injuries were very great." (*ibid.*)

"There is an intense desire for education, technical education, professional education, artistic and literary education, and for the study of pure knowledge for itself. In the middle of the war, the University of Baku in the Republic of Azerbaijan, introduced the study of Greek." (*ibid.*)

Mr. Elliot added: "The atmosphere of the U.S.S.R. is the atmosphere of an industrial revolution in full swing. New plants, new processes, higher outputs, tighter disciplines—these things are hailed and encouraged, literally with banners."

The heroic story of Leningrad evoked the warmest praise from Colonel Elliot. He wrote: "All the art in the world will not save the people unless they are also warriors. Leningrad is proud of its wide streets, its fine stone houses, its traditions, whether of the October Revolution or of Peter the Great.

"It is proud of its art galleries, its theatre, its ballets, its authors, its schools of learning.

"All these things would have faded into memories and memories that none would have liked to recall, had it not been for the cold resolution with which the Leningraders set themselves to fight and to starve when the war came to their city." (*Evening Standard*, March 14, 1945.)

Colonel Elliot added: "Leningrad won through. Kiev was sacked, Odessa was sacked, Kharkov was sacked, Rostov was sacked. A hundred towns and cities were sacked. They were recaptured, they are being rebuilt, they will be restored. But the Germans never marched down the broad streets of Leningrad to govern and destroy."

In the same article he expressed horror and burning indignation at the terrible crimes inflicted on the Soviet peoples and territory by the

Nazi hordes. The Delegation visited Western Siberia and the Central Asian Republics and were greatly impressed with the industrial developments which had taken and were taking place in these regions. Colonel Elliot wrote: "‘In 20 years,’ I said, ‘you will have covered Uzbekistan with industrial enterprises.’ ‘That is my dream,’ said Usman Yusupoff, the President. Of course it would raise the standard of living of the people. But it was also an end in itself. When this wind blows it blows with power. You can see the pride of the job blazing out at points throughout this vast structure of new industrialisation and it explains a lot." (*Evening Standard*, March 15, 1945.)

Regarding Stalingrad, he wrote: "The Sword of Honour was proudly displayed in the restored Town Council buildings. Alongside was, most touchingly, a little cloth embroidered with their signatures, by some of the women of Dover." (*ibid.*)

Colonel Elliot was greatly impressed with the physical and mental vigour of the Soviet students and with the transformation made by the Soviet Power in the former Tsarist colonies.

He wrote: "The most important people we saw in Russia were the boys and the girls pouring up from the schools into the Universities and the technical institutes.

"From them has emerged a student full of certainties, full even of social orthodoxy and with a furious zeal for work which is fostered in every possible way." (*Evening Standard*, March 16, 1945.)

Colonel Elliott added: "For instance, every scholarship in the U.S.S.R.—and practically all students are on scholarships—is kept under review, and put up, or cut down, according to the performance of the student in current examinations. Talk about incentive!"

Regarding the southern republics of the U.S.S.R., he wrote: "Before the revolution the literate population was of the order of 10 per cent. or less. The illiterates were 90 per cent. Now the proportion has been reversed. The girls are going to be aero-dynamic engineers—the boys petroleum technologists, plant breeders, textile machine engineers. The nomads have walked off the steppes into the research libraries. The peasants or the caravan attendants have begun to control the switchboards of 10,000-volt long-distance grids, or to consider whether they shall turn the Oxus River into the Caspian Sea or into the Ferghana oasis." (*ibid.*)

He added: "The South, you may say, is an ancient civilisation, or a series of ancient civilisations, only technically illiterate, coming out of a cataleptic trance and taking up life again like a sleeper awakened.

But the same eagerness is manifest in many areas quite different in circumstance which we visited.

"Sverdlovsk in the Urals is not set down as a University town. It is not an ancient city or the centre of an ancient civilisation. It has an Industrial Institute now ten years old. This has to-day 3,500 students, boys and girls. It is one of the three or four biggest in the U.S.S.R. It is residential, its course is five years in length, and, though it specialises in general engineering, with emphasis on electrical and metallurgical work, there is a Chair of modern languages and a second language is compulsory. In it are training the leaders of New Russia."

Colonel Elliot concluded: "I have spoken of the strong points of Soviet Russia. The British Empire, as a World Power, needs to know, and learn from, the strongest points in the life and work of her great neighbours. The Parliamentary Delegation of which I was chairman, went out on a mission of good will, which we did our utmost to implement—and we believe not without some mutual success."

Mr. Tom Fraser, M.P., gave an interview to a representative of the *Daily Worker* in the course of which he said:

"From the highest to the lowest the people impressed me with their conviction that nothing—absolutely nothing—must be allowed to stand in the way of the long and continued friendship between our two peoples."

Turning to the position of women in the Central Asian Republics of the U.S.S.R., Fraser said: "Only after the Revolution did they cease to wear veils.

"On two different occasions when we visited secondary schools to meet the director of the school, we were met by a young girl, 25 to 30 years old.

"We were taken to meet the assistant director of irrigation in Uzbekistan—and we met a girl of 21.

"The most important building in the remotest regions wherever we went was the village school.

"They have the greatest confidence in their own future. They have no fear that when the war is finished they will be put on the scrap-heap with loss of earnings. This they know: that when the war is won they will all go full steam ahead developing their industries for peace production."

Mr. Fraser concluded: "We were bombarded with questions on the British way of life. Many of the Soviet people are tremendously keen to come over here as soon as possible after the war. And everyone

appreciates that one of the best means of binding our friendship firmly in the future is by an exchange of students, technicians and workers." (*Daily Worker*, March 16, 1945.)

Commander King-Hall, M.P., contributed three articles to the *News Letter*. He wrote: "The Parliamentary Delegation which left London on January 12, 1945, and travelled by air to Helsinki in Finland, was an historic mission and the first delegation of its kind to proceed on a visit to the U.S.S.R. This fact was appreciated by our Russian hosts who spared no pains to show us everything we wanted to see. The theory that 'the Russians only show you what they want you to see' was completely exploded so far as we were concerned." (*News Letter*, March 15, 1945.)

In regard to the last comment, we would point out that this "theory" has been exploded not only by the experience of the Parliamentary Delegation but also by the many visitors (private and delegations) who have toured the U.S.S.R.

The authors themselves have heard the remark "Tell the good and the bad" made on numerous occasions by Soviet officials of all standings in the U.S.S.R.

The Commander continued: "Now what is Russian power? It is composed of vast natural resources and of an enormous and growing population inspired with a fervent patriotism. Ever since the revolution, the rulers of Russia, first Lenin and now Stalin, have exerted themselves to make Russia a first-class Great Power in a world of power politics.

"In all the devastated cities there are vast plans for new construction. Plans for big blocks of flats in garden city style. The accommodation aimed at is well up to modern British ideas, but it will be many years before it can be achieved.

"Whilst I was in Moscow, the new Archbishop of Moscow was enthroned. The proceedings were broadcast throughout Russia. The Patriarchs, Archbishops and Bishops of the Orthodox Church from all over the Middle East were invited to the ceremony at the expense of the Church in Russia, which in its turn was enabled to do this by the Russian Government."

In his second article, King-Hall described his long discussions with Soviet students, and continued: "After I had talked to many hundreds of students collectively, and many dozens individually, I formed a number of conclusions, which I shall summarise as follows. The technical education is good. In Russia, at present, girls and boys seem to

have equal chances of professional careers. I spoke to dozens of girls who are training to be chemists, geologists, architects, electrical engineers, oil engineers, doctors, steel engineers, etc., etc.

"At one large works where three-ton lorries were coming off the assembly line at the rate of one about every six minutes, I met a woman engineer of thirty-four with two children and a husband who was a pilot. She was second in command of the foundry, in charge of 1,300 men.

"I also visited military and naval training establishments—this was a most unusual privilege and astonished the foreign residents in Moscow, including naval and military attachés. The technical training seemed simple but good; but what chiefly remains in my mind is the austerity and the spartan nature of the living quarters.

"The Russian children looked very healthy." (*News Letter*, March 22, 1945.)

In his third article Commander King-Hall wrote: "I have no doubt at all that it is the purpose of the Russian régime substantially to raise the standard of life of the Russian people. In the past, the hostility of the 'capitalist' powers had obliged the Russians to save themselves by themselves. By incredible sacrifices, inflexible determination and ruthless concentration on the objective, considerable progress was made. The German invasion set them back ten years. Much must be done all over again. The Russians intend to do it. At least the Rulers of Russia intend to do it, and they know that, in order to do it, two conditions must be fulfilled:

"(a) Security from attack from without.

"(b) A disciplined, hard working, enthusiastic people within Russia's borders." (*News Letter*, March 29, 1945.)

The Commander continued: "As regards security from without, Russia will insist upon friendly governments on all her borders and on a Germany and Japan incapable of making war.

"Lots of things in Russia are in a mess; I don't think the Marshal would deny that; but, Heavens above! the miracle is that Russia is still there at all, and very much there. They have a very great deal to be proud of and no more than anyone else to be ashamed of."

Mr. John Parker, M.P., contributed four articles to the *Daily Herald*, dealing with the Delegation's visit to the U.S.S.R. He prefaced his first article thus:

"Tell the truth about our country. We have many things that are

good and many that are not. Tell the truth about both.' This was Stalin's frank reply when asked by members of the British Parliamentary Delegation what were his suggestions for improving relations between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain.

"We found as keen a desire in the Soviet Union to learn about Great Britain as there is in this country to learn about the U.S.S.R." (*Daily Herald*, March 22, 1945.)

After referring to the great devastation wrought by the Germans, he continued: "In the work of reconstruction industrial plants definitely have the first priority. Second priority goes to Government offices and administrative buildings. Schools and hospitals come third. The children are all back at school on a half-time basis in fine modern buildings. I visited a recently opened hospital fitted out with surgical instruments and equipment sent from Britain by the Stalingrad Hospital Fund.

"Theatres, cinemas and places of amusement come fourth on the list. Housing comes fifth.

"It was definitely claimed by the Soviet authorities that their people as a whole were better fed at present than any other nation in Europe, apart from the British and Swedes. Their food certainly seems to be sufficient, but very plain and lacking in variety.

"In the country districts, even those which have been devastated, the people look in the pink of health, particularly the children. In big towns, such as Moscow, the food supplies are nothing like so good, although no one looks under-nourished."

Parker concluded his first article thus: "There is an air of self-confidence in the Soviet Union to-day. Its people feel that they have borne the brunt of the Fascist attack and that they have been chiefly responsible for Hitler's downfall.

"They are thrilled by the possibilities which peace is opening up of building a new and better civilisation within their own borders."

In his second article entitled *Soviet Russia is Run by Young Men*, Parker wrote:

"Youth, with a capital Y, rules the Soviet Union to-day. We found young men in responsible positions in all spheres of life, whether in industry, Government administration, the Services or education.

"Most of them have risen through the Soviet education system during the last ten years. Children generally now go to school on a half-time basis from seven to 17.

"Some of the less able are permitted to leave school round about

15 if they desire, but all able boys and girls are sent on from school to suitable technical colleges or universities, even if their parents are not sympathetic.

"And necessary financial assistance is found. In fact the teacher acts as a talent scout, and the best possible use is made of ability.

"The result is that a managerial class has come into being of considerable ability, equipped with a technical training suited to their particular job. There is keen competition between members of this group for advancement and the less efficient are soon replaced."

Parker found full justification for the practical soundness of socialist principles. He wrote: "Russian experience justifies to the full the case that British labour is making out for planning the industrial and social life of the community in the interests of the whole people.

"Only a planned economy in the Soviet Union would have enabled that country to have stood up so well to the Nazi onslaught. Time and again one was struck by examples of the way in which a Socialist community would be able to move more rapidly in the field of reconstruction after the war than would a Tory-run Capitalist community in Britain.

"When the State owns all the land and runs the building industry, it is possible to plan fine new cities without opposition from any vested interest."

But big plans can only be realised by determined people.

Parker went on: "The enthusiasm of Soviet engineers and technicians for their plans of headlong industrialisation, for harnessing mountain streams, for hydro-electric power and for turning rivers across deserts to make them fertile, should prove infectious.

"We, too, must do things in the big way. We must not disappoint our constructive minds by making them work for a private enterprise which is mainly interested in projects likely to make big profits for an investor." (*Daily Herald*, April 2, 1945.)

In his third article, Parker discussed some of the Soviet leaders. Regarding Stalin, he wrote: "Past his sixty-fifth birthday, he is still, however, a man of great vitality, and probably has a number of years of active life before him. He has a pleasant fatherly smile, but gives the impression that you certainly could not put anything over on him! His voice is small, but determined, and he delights in making terse 'realist' remarks.

"Molotov told us the following story of his (Stalin's) recent meeting with Churchill:

"Says Churchill—'We must have the Pope on our side, he would be a valuable ally.'

"Says Stalin—'How many divisions does he command?' "

Respecting Mr. Molotov, Parker stated: "After a reception before the Yalta Conference, Walter Elliott and I had a frank talk with him on the Polish problem. Elliott said that Britain would like a solution that appeared reasonable to all responsible sections of British opinion, including those of British Roman Catholics, such as Lord Lovat, who was present.

"The Russians are more numerous than the British Roman Catholics and live rather closer to Poland' was Molotov's devastating reply." (*Daily Herald*, April 5, 1945.)

The Delegation met men in all spheres: "We also met many of the distinguished architects, engineers and actors. Perhaps the most picturesque of the non-political figures was Vesnin, architect of the Dnieprostroi Dam, and many other works. He is a fine figure of a man with long flowing white hair and beard.

"There are vigorous and colourful personalities in all fields of life in the Soviet Union."

In his last article, Parker treated of the former Tsarist colonies, now Soviet National Republics, and like all visitors to these now smiling and flourishing republics, he was greatly impressed by what he saw. He wrote:

"One of the most romantic stories of the Soviet Union is that of the non-Russian peoples in the thirty years since the revolution.

"Few people in the West realise that the Russians themselves form only 51 per cent. of the population of the U.S.S.R. Even if the Ukrainians and other Slavs are counted in with the Russians, one in four of the Union's people is non-Slav.

"These people had no cultural life of their own in Tsarist Russia, where they were treated as barbarians who must be absorbed by the Russians as soon as possible.

"To-day equality of status has been given to all citizens of the Soviet Union and a common loyalty has bound the great majority, whatever their language, in its defence.

"We met an Azerbaijan general who had been in charge of the forces defending his native Baku when the Germans were in the North Caucasus. We saw the amazing industrial effort put forward in the non-Russian territories especially in finding homes for plant and skilled workers moved from the devastated areas." (*Daily Herald*, April 12, 1945.)

After describing some of the Soviet achievements in these Republics, Parker went on: "When you cross the Soviet border into Persia, you are immediately struck by the enormously lower standard of life and the absence of educational and cultural developments mentioned above. In the coming years, as the Soviet standard of life rises, its example will have an ever-increasing effect on the neighbouring backward countries."

Mr. John Parker, M.P., concluded thus: "Everywhere we went in the Soviet Union we found that the words 'Great Britain' were translated as 'British Empire'. The Soviet peoples expect the British peoples to stand together and develop, in the same way that they have done, the enormous resources and the backward peoples of the territories in their control. British Labour must not miss its opportunity in this field."

We have quoted from four members of the Parliamentary Delegation; Colonel Elliot, Conservative; Commander King-Hall, Independent; Mr. John Parker, Labour; and Mr. Tom Fraser, Labour.

The estimates of all four M.P.s of conditions in the U.S.S.R. differ little.

The reports of the various members of the Delegation did much to strengthen and deepen good feelings at the time between the two countries.

In *A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations*, Vol. I, we wrote:

"An indication of the sympathy and admiration in this country for the Soviets was shown by the success of the Red Cross 'Aid to Russia' Fund sponsored by Mrs. Churchill. When that fund was launched, £1,000,000 had been asked for, but on June 23, 1942, Lord Iliffe announced that the total on that morning was just over £2,000,000."

That was very satisfactory, but there was better still to come. The *Manchester Guardian* and the other newspapers, March 20, 1945, carried the following: "The fund has now reached a total of £6,700,000, most of which has been spent or allocated."

The previous day it had been announced that Mrs. Churchill had "accepted an invitation from the Soviet Government to visit Russia as a private individual and not as the wife of the Premier and that she expected to stay in Russia for about a month, and will visit Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, the Crimea, the Caucasus and Odessa." (*ibid.*)

At a press conference Mrs. Churchill said: "One of the main objects of my journey will be to visit Rostov-on-Don, where my Red Cross Aid to Russia Fund is to equip two hospitals of 500 beds each as a symbol of the united sacrifices of our two countries and as a memorial of the work of the fund." Mrs. Churchill explained, "We hope to have all the equipment ready for shipping to Russia in about nine months. The cost will be about £400,000 and the Scottish branch of the Red Cross Society through its president, Lord Kinnaird, has just handed me a cheque for £200,000 to equip one of the hospitals. It was the largest cheque I have ever seen."

Mrs. Churchill added: "That her fund had agreed to provide the machinery and equipment for making artificial arms and legs at special factories now being built in Moscow and Kharkov."

Mrs. Churchill arrived in the U.S.S.R., April 2, 1945. A Reuter cable date-lined Moscow, April 2, 1945, stated: "Mrs. Churchill arrived in Moscow this morning on a visit to the Soviet Union as the guest of the Russian Red Cross and Red Crescent Society. She was met by Mme. Molotov and Mme. Maisky and representatives of the People's Commissariat of Public Health. The State guest house has been placed at the disposal of Mrs. Churchill and her party during their stay." (*Times*, April 3, 1945.)

Speaking into the microphone at the airport, Mrs. Churchill said: "This is one of the most inspiring and the most interesting moments of my life. I have long wished to visit your country, and during these years, with my fellow countrymen and countrywomen, I have followed with admiration and respect, awe and wonder and affection the great exploits of your wonderful army and of your men and women. I have looked forward with great pleasure to my visit here." (*ibid.*)

The Reuter cable concluded: "Mrs. Churchill was accompanied on her flight by Miss Mabel Johnson, secretary to the Aid to Russia Fund and Miss Grace Hamblin, her private secretary. Major-General J. E. Younger, of the British Red Cross, is also travelling with the party."

Later, speaking at a press conference at the British Embassy in Moscow on May 8, 1945, Mrs. Churchill said: "Unless the friendship that has been established between the Soviet Union and the English-speaking peoples during the war continues, increases and deepens, there will be very little happiness in the immediate future for the world; and by the immediate future I don't just mean the short span of

our lives, but the lives of our children, grandchildren and great grandchildren. I hope that, in a small way, my visit will help." (*Times*, May 9, 1945.)

Summing up the impressions she had gleaned from her five weeks tour of hospitals throughout the U.S.S.R., Mrs. Churchill added: "I have been struck by the devastation, but still more by the way people are rebuilding what has been ruined. I have noted the intense veneration of this country for science and learning and every form of art, and also the wonderful position achieved by women in such a short time. Wherever you go in this country you find tremendous love and care lavished on the children. Russian hospitality, of course, is world famous, but I have been most touched by it." (*ibid.*)

Another manifestation of the goodwill between the U.S.S.R. and Britain was a luncheon held in honour of the U.S.S.R. and its Armed Forces in the Services Club, Piccadilly, March 27, 1945. The chief guests were Mr. Gusev, Soviet Ambassador; Lieutenant-General Vasiliev, head of the Military Mission to Britain, and other senior officers; and Mr. A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty. Dr. S. L. Simpson presided.

Mr. Alexander, who proposed the toast of Russia and the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R., said: "The history of the war would have been entirely different but for the greatest of all Hitler's blunders—the attack on Russia on June 22, 1941.

"Our Russian friends would be the first to acknowledge the help afforded them by the Allies in supplying equipment, aeroplanes, tanks, guns and vehicles. The convoys to North Russia had been one of the great sea operations of the war. Under British naval command and almost entirely British naval escort, 739 allied cargo ships had sailed for North Russian ports. In spite of the constant battle against air, submarine and surface attacks and arctic gales, 677 arrived, the loss working out at 8.4 per cent."

Mr. Alexander added: "We lost two cruisers, five destroyers, eight escort ships and an oiler, and suffered damage to an escort aircraft carrier and seven destroyers. Ninety-five officers and 1,561 men of the Royal Navy lost their lives on the Russian convoy route and many hundreds of British and allied merchant seamen."

Mr. Alexander concluded: "One thing was certain. If the world was to have peace Russia, Britain and the United States must remain in friendship." (*Times*, March 28, 1945.)

The Soviet Ambassador responding to the toast, according to the

Times, March 28, 1945, "expressed gratitude for what the Royal Navy had done to assist the Soviet Union. The Soviet people and the Red Army were fighting to bring victory nearer. The Germans had tried to destroy the whole economy of the Soviet Union. Russian organisation, however, had overcome great difficulties and now the Red Army held the initiative on the enemy's soil."

In conclusion the Soviet Ambassador said that "the main desire of his people was to crush the enemy, achieve victory, and organise a stable peace for the future. The trend of events in the last few months showed clearly not only to the allies but to the enemy that Hitler's Germany would be crushed. It was only a question of time, but they must remember that they had very hard fighting ahead of them."

CHAPTER V

UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

As March, 1945, drew to its close and early linking up of the Allied forces attacking from the East and West became hotly discussed, Mr. Walter Farr cabled from U.S. First Army Front, March 27: "The American-Russian 'gap' is lessening every hour. A few days ago we used to talk of meeting up with the Russians in Central Germany more or less as a joke, as something far away. To-day for the first time, there are maps in command posts in the forefront of our advance which are of a smaller scale, permitting the Russian front lines to be plotted in some detail on the same operational map as ours." (*Daily Mail*, March 28, 1945.)

And a cable date-lined Moscow, March 28, read: "The Allied successes in the West have aroused great enthusiasm here. The methods of the Russian press in presenting important news are not the same as ours, but the headlines have been growing as the British and American armies advance, and maps, which are rare in newspapers here, now accompany most of the day's reports. Readers are measuring distances between the allied armies in a sense of high expectation." (*Times*, March 29, 1945.)

In April, 1945, the Allied forces continued their unabated attacks not only from east and west but also in Italy.

On April 1 the German forces in the Ruhr were trapped and by the 19th of the month twenty-one divisions were destroyed.

The U.S.A. forces captured Hamm and Cassel on April 3; Hanover, April 10; Essen, April 11; and the Canadian forces in Holland reached the North Sea and captured Leeuwarden on April 14. The French forces entered Karlsruhe, April 4, and on April 14 they began a land and sea attack on the Germans in the Bordeaux area after U.S.A. air attacks.

The British forces reached Minden on April 5. The Soviet forces liberated Bratislava (capital of Slovakia) on April 4; they captured Königsberg (capital of East Prussia), April 9, and they liberated Vienna on April 13. In addition an allied offensive was opened in Italy, April

9, 1945. The military situation east and west was thus summed up in the *News Chronicle*, April 13, 1945:

"The Americans are over the Elbe; the Russians are over the Oder. From west and east the battle is being carried to the gates of Berlin.

"The 2nd Armoured Division of the U.S. Ninth Army forced the Elbe—the Germans say the crossing was made at Schoenebeck, south-east of Magdeburg and 75 miles from the capital—and, holding six miles of the east bank, is now fanning out on the Prussian plain. A report from French sources, which has not been confirmed by Supreme H.Q., states that Allied paratroops have been dropped at Brandenburg, 20 miles west of Berlin."

The *News Chronicle* summary continued: "News that the Red Army was over the Oder, 30 miles east of the Reich capital, came from Moscow radio.

"And last night a high U.S. General Staff Officer told the Senate Military Committee that the end of organised fighting in Germany would probably come within a few days. Army chiefs are so sure of the results that shipments of durable equipment to Europe have been drastically cut."

The much-discussed question now was: when and where would the Allied Forces meet? It was only a question of days. Meanwhile the British, Soviet and American Diplomats had not been idle, with the result that on April 5, 1945, the Soviet Government denounced the Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact. Although this did not mean a declaration of war on Japan, the act alone had considerable moral effect on the opposing forces fighting in the Far East. It greatly depressed the morale of the Japanese and considerably strengthened that of the Soviet, American and British Empire forces.

To return again to the fronts in Europe, the race to "link up" entered its final lap. U.S.A. forces entered Nuremberg on April 16 and all resistance ended on the 20th.

On April 21 Bologna was captured by the Allies; Dessau was entered by the U.S.A. forces and the outskirts of Berlin were reached by the Soviet Forces; the French forces captured Stuttgart on April 22; the Allies in Italy reached the River Po on April 23. Thursday, April 26, 1945, was a "red letter" day in the history of the war in Europe. On this date Russian and American forces "linked up" on the Elbe near Torgau and in addition Verona was captured by the Fifth Army; Bremen surrendered to British forces and Milan was liberated by Italian partisans. However, the historic news was not released until

the night of April 27, 1945. It was printed in banner headlines with many photographs in the British press and the press of the other Allied countries on April 28, 1945.

The *News Chronicle*, April 28, 1945, under the banner headline "Link-up" stated:

"They have linked up. These words, flashed round the world last night, announced the conclusion of two of the greatest military marches in modern history.

"From the banks of the Volga the Red Army has battled 1,400 miles to the west; from the beaches of Normandy the Americans have fought 700 miles to the east, and at Torgau on the Elbe, in the heart of the Reich, they have at last met.

"From London, from Moscow, from Washington, the news was announced simultaneously.

"At 4.20 p.m. on Wednesday patrols met; on the following afternoon the link was firmly forged.

"Actually there were two points of contact—the first at Torgau; the second 25 miles to the south-east at Groba, a suburb of Riesa."

The *News Chronicle* continued: "The three leaders issued messages. 'This,' said President Truman, 'is not the hour of final victory in Europe, but the hour draws near'.

" 'Our task and our duty are to complete the destruction of the enemy,' said Marshal Stalin.

" 'We meet in true and victorious comradeship,' declared Mr. Churchill. 'Let us all march forward upon the foe.' "

The *Daily Telegraph* headline read: "Allied Armies Link: Cut Reich in Two."

The headlines of the *News Chronicle* and *Daily Telegraph* were typical of the British press as a whole.

All the British press carried photos of the American and Soviet officers and soldiers warmly greeting one another and drinking toasts to victory. One caption to a photo read: "With the Union Jack, the Stars and Stripes and the Red Flag flying behind them, the U.S. commander, Major-General E. F. Reinhardt, and the Russian commanding officer shake hands after the link-up had been effected." (*News Chronicle*, April 28, 1945.)

Another read: "Spick and span Russian girl soldier is talking to an American officer from Brooklyn on the Elbe banks." (*ibid.*)

Another read: "In front of a newly-painted sign depicting the historic event in which they played their parts, a Russian soldier

greet a U.S. comrade on the banks of the Elbe. And after the meeting comes the celebration." (*ibid.*)

Another read: "Picture right shows officers and men of the two armies with Ann Stringer, U.S. War Correspondent, drinking a toast to victory." (*ibid.*)

However, the fighting continued on other parts of the extensive fronts: Genoa was captured by U.S.A. forces on April 27; Mussolini was executed by Italian partisans in Milan on April 28; the German armies in Italy agreed to unconditional surrender on April 29 and hostilities ceased 12 noon, G.M.T. on May 2, 1945.

British forces entered Venice and crossed the Elbe south-east of Hamburg on April 29.

U.S.A. forces entered Munich, April 29, and Turin on April 30, 1945.

The end was now near at hand. The London evening press, April 28, carried the news in big and heavy type that Himmler had offered to surrender to Britain and U.S.A. but not to the U.S.S.R.

To quote the *Evening News*, which was typical of the others: "It was authoritatively stated in official circles here early to-day that a message from Himmler guaranteeing German unconditional surrender, but not to Russia, has been conveyed to the British and U.S. Governments, according to information sent to Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Molotov, and Mr. Eden.

"The move, which is regarded by the Allied leaders as a last-minute attempt to split the unity of the Big Three, is understood to have the backing of the German High Command but not of Hitler or of the section of the Nazi hierarchy still loyal to him.

"Himmler is authoritatively stated in San Francisco to have informed the Western Allies that he is in a position to arrange unconditional surrender and that he himself is in favour of it.

"Britain and the U.S. have informed those who delivered Himmler's message that they will accept unconditional surrender only on behalf of all the Allies." (*Evening News*, April 28, 1945.)

Later that evening the following statement was issued from 10 Downing Street: "It has been recorded by Reuter that unconditional surrender was offered by Himmler to Britain and the United States only. Further, that Britain and the United States have replied saying that they will not accept unconditional surrender except on behalf of all the Allies, including Russia." (*Sunday Times*, April 29, 1945.)

The statement continued: "No doubt at a time like this all kinds of

reports of proposals for German surrender from various parts of the German Reich are rife, as these are in harmony with the enemy's desperate situation. His Majesty's Government have no information to give about any of them at this moment, but it must be emphasised that only unconditional surrender to the three major Powers will be entertained and that the closest accord prevails between the three Powers."

On May 1, 1945, Marshal Stalin issued the following Order of the Day:

"Comrades, Red Army men and Red Navy men, sergeants and petty officers, officers of the Army and Navy, Generals and Admirals, Working people of the Soviet Union!

"To-day our country is celebrating the First of May—the international festival of the working people.

"This year the peoples of our Motherland are celebrating May Day under conditions of the victorious termination of the Great Patriotic War. The hard times when the Red Army fought back the enemy troops at Moscow and Leningrad, at Grozny and Stalingrad, are gone—never to return. Now our victorious troops are battering the enemy's armed forces in the centre of Germany, far beyond Berlin, on the River Elbe.

"Within a short time Poland, Hungary, the greater part of Czechoslovakia, a considerable part of Austria, and her capital Vienna, have been liberated.

"At the same time the Red Army has captured East Prussia—home of German imperialism—Pomerania, the greater part of Brandenburg, and the main districts of Germany's capital Berlin, having hoisted the banner of victory over Berlin.

"As a result of these offensive battles fought by the Red Army, within three to four months the Germans have lost over 800,000 officers and men in prisoners and about 1,000,000 in killed. During the same period the Red Army troops have captured or destroyed up to 6,000 enemy aircraft, up to 12,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, over 23,000 field guns and enormous quantities of other armaments and equipment.

"It should be noted that in these battles Polish, Yugoslav, Czechoslovak, Bulgarian and Rumanian divisions successfully advanced against the common enemy side by side with the Red Army.

"As a result of the Red Army's shattering blows, the German Command was compelled to transfer dozens of divisions to the Soviet-German Front, baring whole sectors on other fronts. This

circumstance helped the forces of our Allies to develop their successful offensive in the West. Thus by simultaneous blows at the German troops from East and West, the troops of the Allies and the Red Army were able to cut the German forces into two isolated parts and to effect a junction of our troops and the Allied troops in a united front.

"There can be no doubt that this circumstance means the end of Hitlerite Germany.

"The days of Hitlerite Germany are numbered. More than half of her territory is occupied by the Red Army and by the troops of our Allies. Germany has lost the most important vital districts. The industry remaining in the Hitlerites' hands cannot supply the German Army with sufficient quantities of armaments, ammunition and fuel. The manpower reserves of the German Army are depleted. Germany is completely isolated and stands alone, if her ally Japan is not counted.

"In search of a way out from their hopeless plight, the Hitlerite adventurers resort to all kinds of tricks down to flirting with the Allies, in an effort to cause dissension in the Allied camp. These fresh knavish tricks of the Hitlerites are doomed to utter failure. They can only accelerate the disintegration of the German troops.

"Mendacious Fascist propaganda intimidates the German population by absurd tales, alleging that the Armies of the United Nations wish to exterminate the German people. The United Nations do not set themselves the task of destroying the German people.

"The United Nations will destroy Fascism and German militarism, will severely punish war criminals and will compel the Germans to compensate damage they have caused to other countries. But the United Nations do not molest and will not molest Germany's civilian population if it honestly fulfils the demands of the Allied military authorities.

"The brilliant victories won by the Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War have demonstrated the colossal might of the Red Army and its high military skill. In the progress of the war our Motherland has come to possess a first-rate regular army, capable of upholding the great Socialist achievements of our people and of securing the State interests of the Soviet Union.

"Despite the fact that the Soviet Union has for nearly four years been waging war on an unparalleled scale demanding colossal expenditures, our Socialist economic system is gaining strength and developing; while the economy of the liberated regions, plundered and ruined by the German invaders, is successfully and swiftly reviving. This is the result of the heroic efforts of the workers and collective farmers, of the Soviet intellectuals, of the women and the

youth of our country inspired and guided by the great Bolshevik Party.

"The world war unleashed by the German imperialists is drawing to a close. The collapse of Hitlerite Germany is a matter of the nearest future. The Hitlerite ringleaders, who imagined themselves rulers of the world, have found themselves ruined. The mortally wounded Fascist beast is breathing its last. One thing is now required—to deal the death-blow to the Fascist beast.

"Fighting men of the Red Army and Navy! The last storming of the Hitlerite lair is on. Set new examples of military skill and gallantry in the concluding battles. Smite the enemy harder, skilfully break up his defence, pursue and surround the German invaders, give them no respite until they cease resistance.

"Beyond the border of our native land be especially vigilant! Uphold the honour and dignity of the Soviet soldier as heretofore!

"Working people of the Soviet Union! Increase your all-round assistance to the Front by persistent and indefatigable work. Swiftly heal the wounds inflicted on our country by the war, raise still higher the might of our Soviet State!

"Comrades, Red Army men and Red Navy men, sergeants and petty officers, officers of the Army and Navy, Generals and Admirals! Working people of the Soviet Union!

"On behalf of the Soviet Government and of our Bolshevik Party, I greet and congratulate you upon the First of May!

"In honour of the historic victories of the Red Army at the front and of the great achievements of the workers, collective farmers and intellectuals in the rear, to mark the international festival of the working people, I hereby order:

"To-day, on May 1, a salute of 20 artillery salvos shall be fired in the capitals of Union Republics: Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, Baku, Tbilisi, Erevan, Ashkabad, Tashkent, Stalinabad, Alma-Ata, Frunze, Petrozavodsk, Kishinev, Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn, as well as in the hero-cities of Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sevastopol and Odessa.

"Long live our mighty Soviet Motherland!

"Long live the great Soviet people, the people victorious!

"Long live the victorious Red Army and Navy!

"Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the battles for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

"Forward to the final rout of Hitlerite Germany!"

There was no baseless boasting in the Order of the Day. Hitlerite Germany was staggering to hasty and final collapse. Actually on May 1, the death of Hitler was announced in Berlin and Grand Admiral

Doenitz appointed himself as successor. Also on the same day New Zealand troops of the Eighth Army entered Monfalcone and linked up with Marshal Tito's forces.

On the following day, May 2, Berlin surrendered to the Soviet forces at 3.0 p.m.; British and Soviet forces linked up in the Wismar area on the Baltic; Trieste was captured by New Zealand troops; and next day Hamburg was captured by British forces.

The German forces were now in a state of complete collapse. On May 4 the German First and Nineteenth Armies surrendered to American forces and the Allied Fifth Army crossed the Brenner Pass and linked up with the Seventh Army. And on the following day, May 5, all German forces in Holland, North-west Germany, Denmark (including Heligoland and the Frisian Islands), surrendered as from 8.0 a.m. (B.D.S.T.)

On May 7, 1945, an Act of Unconditional Surrender of all German Forces was signed at Rheims.

Next day, May 8, 1945, was one of the most memorable days in all history. After question time in the House of Commons, Prime Minister Churchill announced the Unconditional Surrender of Germany. Churchill's statement read:

"Mr. Speaker, I have just had the duty of making an official statement to the nation and the British Empire and Commonwealth, and I thought it might perhaps be convenient to the House if I repeated it.

"Yesterday morning, at 2.41 at General Eisenhower's headquarters, General Jodl, the representative of the German High Command and of Grand Admiral Doenitz, the designated head of the German State, signed the act of unconditional surrender of all German land, sea and air forces in Europe to the Allied Expeditionary Force, and, simultaneously, to the Soviet High Command. General Bedell Smith, who is the Chief of the Staff to the Allied Expeditionary Force—and not, as I stated in a slip just now, Chief of the Staff to the United States Army—and General Francois Sevez, signed the document on behalf of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, and General Susloparov signed on behalf of the Russian High Command.

"To-day this agreement will be ratified and confirmed at Berlin, where Air Chief Marshal Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, and General de Latre de Tassigny, representing the French Republic, will sign on behalf of General Eisenhower, and General Zhukov will sign on behalf of the Soviet

High Command. The German representatives will be Field-Marshal Keitel, Chief of the High Command, and the Commanders-in-Chief of the German Army, Navy and Air forces.

"Hostilities will end officially at one minute after midnight tonight, Tuesday, 8th May, but in the interests of saving lives the 'Cease Fire' began yesterday to be sounded all along the fronts, and I should not forget to mention that our dear Channel Islands, the only part of His Majesty's Dominions that has been in the hands of the German foe, are also to be freed to-day. The Germans are still in places resisting Russian troops, but should they continue to do so after midnight, they will, of course, deprive themselves of the protection of the laws of war and will be attacked from all quarters by the Allied troops. It is not surprising that on such long fronts and in the existing disorder of the enemy that the orders of the German High Command should not in every case have been obeyed. This does not, in our opinion, constitute any reason for withholding from the nation the facts communicated to us by General Eisenhower of the unconditional surrender already signed at Rheims, nor should it prevent us from celebrating to-day, and to-morrow—Wednesday—as Victory-in-Europe Days, and I think that to-morrow it may be specially desirable for us to emphasise the debt we owe to our Soviet Ally, whose main celebrations will be taking place to-morrow.

"The German war, Mr. Speaker, is therefore at an end. After years of intense preparation Germany hurled herself on Poland at the beginning of September, 1939, and in pursuance of our guarantee to Poland, and in common action with the French Republic, Great Britain and the British Empire and Commonwealth of Nations declared war against this foul aggression. After gallant France had been struck down we from this Island and from our united Empire maintained the struggle single-handed for a whole year until we were joined by the military might of Soviet Russia and later by the overwhelming power and resources of the United States of America. Finally almost the whole world was combined against the evildoers, who are now prostrate before us. Sir, our gratitude to our splendid Allies goes forth from all our hearts. We may allow ourselves a brief period of rejoicing, but let us not forget for a moment the toils and efforts that lie ahead. Japan, with all her treachery and greed, remains unsubdued. The injuries she has inflicted upon Great Britain, the United States and other countries and her detestable cruelties call forth justice and retribution. We must now devote all our strength and resources to the completion of our tasks both at home and abroad. Advance Britannia! Long live the Cause of Freedom! God Save the King!

"Sir, that is the message which I have been instructed to deliver to the British Nation and Commonwealth. I have only two or three sentences to add. They will convey to the House my deep gratitude to this House of Commons which has proved itself the strongest foundation for waging war that has ever been seen in the whole of our long history. We have all of us made our mistakes, but the strength of the Parliamentary institution has been shown to enable it at the same moment to preserve all the title deeds of democracy while waging war in the most stern and protracted form. I wish to give my hearty thanks to men of all Parties, to everyone in every part of the House where they sit, for the way in which the liveliness of Parliamentary institutions has been maintained under the fire of the enemy and for the way in which we have been able to persevere—and we could have persevered much longer if the need had been—till all the objectives which we set before us of the procuring of the unlimited and unconditional surrender of the enemy had been achieved. I recollect well at the end of the last war, more than a quarter of a century ago, that the House, when it heard the long list of the surrender terms, the armistice terms, which had been imposed upon the Germans did not feel inclined for debate or business but desired to offer thanks to Almighty God, to the Great Power which seems to shape and design the fortunes of nations and the destiny of man, and I therefore beg, Sir, with your permission to move:

'That this House do now attend at the Church of St. Margaret, Westminster, to give humble and reverent thanks to Almighty God for our deliverance from the threat of German domination.'

"This is the identical Motion which was moved in former times."
(*Hansard*, May 8, 1945, cols. 1867-9.)

The question was put and carried unanimously. Then the members of Parliament attended a service at St. Margarets, at the conclusion of which they returned to the House of Commons and accepted at 4.25 p.m. a Motion moved by the Prime Minister "That this House do now adjourn".

May 8, 1945, was certainly Churchill's Day throughout Great Britain. He made the announcement to the British public over the wireless at 3.0 p.m. half an hour before he made it to a cheering House of Commons. The cheers in the House of Commons were re-echoed from every corner of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

On the same day, May 8, 1945, H.M. King George VI sent the following message to Mr. Kalinin.

"It is with the greatest happiness, Mr. President, that speaking on behalf of all my peoples, I address myself through you, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to the Soviet people, on this memorable occasion. At last, after so many years of valiant effort and heroic sacrifice, the united forces of the allied nations have finally and irrevocably overthrown the vile power of Hitlerite Germany. In so doing our armies have brought liberation to the tortured peoples of the whole of Europe.

"During these years of battle, our two peoples have forged a new friendship, which has been given practical form in the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Post-War Collaboration, signed in May, 1942. I trust that our wartime comradeship in arms will be followed by ever closer understanding and co-operation between our two peoples in the years of peace which will follow. On this day our thoughts turn especially to all those whose bereavements and sacrifices have made the triumph of the righteous cause possible; may their memory determine us to spare no effort to build the better world for which they fought and died.

"Victory and the liberation of Europe have been attained by the close and loyal collaboration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, and the British Commonwealth. It is for our continued collaboration to lay the foundations of an honourable, just and stable peace.

"I send you Mr. President, my warm personal greetings and congratulations on this day of victory, and through you I salute the gallant Red Army and Navy and the stalwart Soviet people, whose dogged endurance and splendid achievement have contributed so much to the victory of the United Nations." (*Times*, May 9, 1945.)

Still on the same day Prime Minister Churchill sent the following message to Mrs. Churchill in Moscow:

"It would be a good thing if you broadcast to the Russian people to-morrow, Wednesday, provided that were agreeable to the Kremlin. If so you might give them the following message from me, on which of course our Embassy would obtain approval:

'Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin, to the Red Army, and to the Russian people. From the British nation I send you heartfelt greetings on the splendid victories you have won in driving the invader

from your soil and laying the Nazi tyrant low. It is my firm belief that on the friendship and understanding between the British and Russian peoples depends the future of mankind. Here in our island home we are thinking to-day very often about you all, and we send you from the bottom of our hearts our wishes for your happiness and well-being, and that, after all the sacrifices and sufferings of the Dark Valley through which we have marched together, we may also in loyal comradeship and sympathy walk in the sunshine of victorious peace. I have asked my wife to speak these few words of friendship and admiration to you all.'

"Let me know what you will do. Much love. W."

A cable date-lined Moscow, May 9, 1945, stated: "Joyous crowds surged through Moscow streets to hear Mrs. Churchill broadcast over the Moscow radio the message which her husband had sent to Marshal Stalin.

"Moscow saluted Victory with massed searchlights, rockets and the crash of 1,000 guns, lighting up the whole sky." (*Daily Mail*, May 10, 1945.)

Victory was also celebrated throughout Great Britain on May 9, and as part of the celebration Prime Minister Churchill visited the French, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. Embassies. Photos of these visits appeared in the press of May 10, but pride of place was given to the Soviet Embassy. A photo in the *Evening Standard* showed Mr. Churchill standing on the steps of the Embassy flanked by Mr. Gusev, the Soviet Ambassador, and four Soviet officers. The photo bore the caption: "The Prime Minister visited the Soviet Embassy yesterday and he and Mr. Gusev, the Russian Ambassador, drank toasts to the Soviet Union, the British Empire and Marshal Stalin, in Russian champagne. Mr. Churchill outside the Embassy with Mr. Gusev and Soviet Officers."

Fighting was over on the Western Front and it was virtually brought to an end on the Eastern Front when the Soviet forces occupied Prague on May 10.

On the same day, May 10, 1945, Marshal Stalin sent the following message to Mr. Churchill:

"I send my personal greetings to you, the stout-hearted British Armed Forces and the whole British people, and I congratulate you with all my heart on the great victory over our common enemy, German imperialism. This historic victory has been achieved by the

joint struggle of the Soviet, British and American Armies for the liberation of Europe.

"I express my confidence in the further successful and happy development in the post-war period of the friendly relations which have grown up between our countries in the period of the war.

"I have instructed our Ambassador in London to convey my congratulations to you all on the victory we have won and to give you my very best wishes." (Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. VI, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 477.)

Prime Minister Churchill did not exaggerate when he wrote: "The unconditional surrender of our enemies was the signal for the greatest outburst of joy in the history of mankind. The Second World War had indeed been fought to the bitter end in Europe. . . . We had a moment that was sublime."

Unfortunately Churchill's words of unlimited praise of and friendship for the Soviet Union did not match his innermost thoughts, which were those of the deepest suspicion and hostility towards that heroic state, as he later revealed. Thus, speaking at Woodford, Essex, November 23, 1954, Sir Winston Churchill said:

"Even before the war had ended and while the Germans were surrendering by hundreds of thousands, I telegraphed to Lord Montgomery directing him to be careful in collecting the German arms, to stack them so that they could easily be issued again to the German soldiers whom we should have to work with if the Soviet advance continued." (*News Chronicle*, November 24, 1954.)

The same paper carried the following (also on November 24, 1954): "In New York last night Lord Montgomery said: 'It is quite true that I received this telegram from Churchill. I obeyed my orders. As a soldier I always obey orders.'"

The *Times*, November 25, 1954, editorially commented: "The remark can be looked at in every way and be put to every kind of test, and in the end it is impossible to see what purpose or good it can serve at this time. . . . It certainly will not help to convince the Russians that the Western Powers are straightforward in their declarations of peace to-day. Nor, by suggesting that we were ready to use Nazi-indoctrinated troops in 1945, will it help the cause of West German rearmament now."

The subject was discussed in the House of Commons, December 1,

1954. Mr. E. Shinwell opened on behalf of the Labour Party. The Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, in reply *inter alia* said:

"When I spoke at Woodford, I was under the rooted impression that not only had I sent this telegram to Field Marshal Montgomery, but also that I had published it a year ago in the sixth volume of my account of the Second World War. In fact, the telegram was not published in the book. . . .

"The right hon. Gentleman has asked for the text of the message. Indeed, I should be very glad to give that to the House—when I find it. It may well be that I never used these precise words in a telegram to a general—not a field-marshal; I beg pardon for that—to General Montgomery as he was at that time. Indeed, it may be, as the right hon. Gentleman has several times suggested, that it was never sent at all. [Hon. Members: 'Oh.'] I do not want to argue all the way through. At any rate, it has not been traced in the official records, though a search of the utmost extent has been made, and is still continuing. I have asked Field Marshal Montgomery, and he replied that he would be back on the 4th of this month and would, at my request, look through any private records that he may have." (*Hansard*, December 1, 1954, col. 170.)

Later in his speech the Prime Minister admitted: "Even if the telegram does not exist, in general spirit it is not contrary to my thoughts." (*ibid.*, col. 174.)

Further Churchill admitted that the danger (a Soviet advance to the West) never arose. He stated: "In any case, all was happily overtaken in a few days by events. An entirely new situation presented itself. The immediate emergency did not mature." (*ibid.*, col. 171.)

Later in his speech Churchill added that "*It was never necessary to tell*" the Soviets that if they advanced beyond a certain line German prisoners of war would be rearmed and ordered to attack them "because they (the Soviets) did not do what I felt we had to consider."

In *The Second World War*, Volume VI (*Triumph and Tragedy*), from which we have quoted earlier, Churchill also wrote:

"When in these tumultuous days of rejoicing I was asked to speak to the nation I had borne the chief responsibility in our Island for almost exactly five years. Yet it may well be there were few whose hearts were more heavily burdened with anxiety than mine." (pp. 477-8.)

Churchill continued: "Apprehension for the future and many perplexities had filled my mind as I moved about among the cheering crowds of Londoners in their hour of well-won rejoicing after all

they had gone through. The Hitler peril, with its ordeals and privations, seemed to most of them to have vanished in a blaze of glory. The tremendous foe they had fought for more than five years had surrendered unconditionally. All that remained for the three victorious Powers was to make a just and durable peace, guarded by a World Instrument, to bring the soldiers home to their longing loved ones, and to enter upon a Golden Age of prosperity and progress. No more, and surely, thought their peoples, no less.

"However, there was another side to the picture. Japan was still unconquered. The atomic bomb was still unborn. The world was in confusion. The main bond of common danger which had united the Great Allies had vanished overnight. The Soviet menace, to my eyes, had already replaced the Nazi foe. But no comradeship against it existed. At home the foundations of national unity, upon which the wartime Government had stood so firmly, were also gone. Our strength, which had overcome so many storms, would no longer continue in the sunshine. How then could we reach that final settlement which alone could reward the toils and sufferings of the struggle? I could not rid my mind of the fear that the victorious armies of democracy would soon disperse and that the real and hardest test still lay before us. . . . I could only feel the vast manifestation of Soviet and Russian imperialism rolling forward over helpless lands." (pp. 495-6.)

Churchill was evidently haunted by the same groundless fears which he had entertained and expressed after the first world war as to the Soviet Union's aims of conquest in Europe and Asia.

Did he soberly imagine, to put it on the lowest level, that the U.S.S.R. in 1945, after the incalculable losses which she had suffered, was bent on plans of conquest which in the very nature of things must have entailed more, more and still more losses and suffering?

It is difficult to believe that, unless he attributed his own concepts as a full-blooded imperialist to the Soviet leaders.

Mr. Churchill may have been haunted by these absurd nightmares—but in fact they were but the result of his deep-rooted hostility to the Soviet socialist system and all it stood for. He was no doubt haunted by the spectre not of the onward march of the Soviet armies but the onward march of the socialist ideals throughout the world; and it was this that he and many other statesmen prepared to halt if an opportunity presented itself, even with the help of the atrocious Nazi enemies who had just been laid low at so great a sacrifice.

So much for Churchill's haunting nightmares.

The war in Europe was over. Never had relations between Soviet Russia and the British people been better, in fact it is safe to say that Anglo-Russian relations had never been so good for over four centuries.

Unfortunately these cordial relations did not continue. Had they done so the state of the world would be very different from what it is to-day.

CHAPTER VI

VE DAY TO THE POTSDAM FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE, 1945

BETWEEN VE day and the coming into Power of a Labour Government, much happened in Britain and in her relations with the U.S.S.R.

To begin with internal developments. Mr. Churchill, May 18, 1945, proposed to the leaders of the Labour Party that they should remain in the government till the defeat of Japan, but Mr. Attlee and his colleagues declined the invitation and Mr. Churchill tendered his resignation to H.M. King George VI on May 23, and formed a caretaker's government on May 26, to make the necessary preparations for the general election.

The Labour Party Conference was held at Blackpool, May 21-25, 1945, and in the course of the discussions the subject of Anglo-Soviet relations was one of the most important high-lights.

The National Executive, in its report to the Conference, stated that the "Help for Russia Fund" (Labour) had reached the splendid total of £763,000, that the purpose of the fund had "been achieved" and that it had been decided to wind up the fund, June 30, 1945.

In reply to questions from the floor of the Conference, the Rt. Hon. Hugh Dalton, M.P., on behalf of the National Executive, said: "Concerning Russia, it is the intention of the National Executive to send a delegation to Moscow at a suitable moment. The suitability of the moment will turn upon a number of matters, some of which will be discussed this afternoon in private session. The Labour Party is determined to do all it can to make Anglo-Soviet friendship and co-operation a reality in every form, both between the respective Governments, between the Trade Union organisations, and between the broad masses of our peoples." (*Labour Party Report*, 1945, p. 83.)

The Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., speaking during the debate on foreign affairs, declared:

"I would ask the Conference to bear this in mind. Revolutions do

not change geography, and revolutions do not change geographical need."

"I have always believed that the tragedy in making the last peace—or armistice, which it really was—was the failure, largely out of prejudice, to bring Russia to the Conference at Versailles. Had they been brought there, the problem of the warm water ports, which is the fundamental problem of Russia's foreign policy—an absolute need for her in a great country of that kind—would have been solved.

"I think it was the late Lord Beaconsfield who once said: 'Britain and France joined together is an insurance for Peace, but Britain, France and Russia joined together is a security for Peace.' Now, with the wider development of the weapons of war we go further, and our aim has been, and the insurance premium for which we have to pay in commitments must be, the United States of America, Britain and Soviet Russia."

Bevin's statement was accepted by the Conference "as representing the policy of the Executive".

The decisions of the Labour Party Conference constituted the planks in the Party's programme with regard to Anglo-Soviet relations.

The Conservative Central Office, May 18, 1945, issued a 12-point policy programme on which the Conservative Party had decided to fight the General Election. The first point in the policy read: "Strong support for Mr. Churchill in waging war against Japan and in co-operating with America and Russia to keep the peace after final victory." (*Daily Telegraph*, May 19, 1945.)

The House of Commons was dissolved June 15, and polling took place July 5. However to all intents and purposes electioneering was in full swing from the date of the opening of the Labour Party Conference, May 21, up to the eve of polling day. The Conservative press and speakers stressed that the Conservative Party was as desirous of maintaining excellent relations (in all spheres) with the U.S.S.R. as was the Labour Party.

On the other hand, Labour spokesmen argued strongly that the Labour Party was better fitted to preserve the very satisfactory relations which had been developed during the war than was the Tory Party.

The well-known journalist Mr. J. L. Garvin, writing in the *Daily Telegraph*, stated: "Russia and the Western democracies never can lose their common memory of an immortal comradeship in arms. Their security is indivisible. Rupture and enmity between them would mean the irreparable catastrophe of mankind."

"Nothing on earth but their continued solidarity in peace as in war can ensure the world's salvation or their own." (*Daily Telegraph*, May 24, 1945.)

Prime Minister Churchill, speaking in his constituency, May 26, 1945, declared: "We are friends with Russia. We are going to remain friends with her. Let no one separate us." (*Observer*, May 27, 1945.)

Lord Beaverbrook, Lord Privy Seal, speaking at Bradford, May 26, said: "The Labour Party was making an election issue of this country's relations with Russia, but it was a Conservative Prime Minister who first extended the hand to Russia and a Conservative Minister who went to Russia to see Stalin. Friendship with Russia should be the basis of our European foreign policy. Britain should never be separated from Russia again." (*Times*, May 28, 1945.)

On the third anniversary (May 26, 1945) of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, the following message was sent by Foreign Minister Eden to Foreign Minister Molotov:

"The third Anniversary of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance occurs at a time when the first objective of that Alliance, the defeat of Hitlerite Germany, has been triumphantly attained.

"We are now entering upon the post-war phase, in which under our treaty we have agreed upon close and friendly collaboration, taking into account the interests of the other United Nations, seeking no territorial aggrandisement for ourselves, and abstaining from interference in the internal affairs of other States. I am, as always, convinced that if our two countries adhere faithfully to the spirit of the Anglo-Soviet Alliance and of the subsequent agreements to which we have both been parties, lasting peace and general prosperity can be brought to the people of Europe. I send you and, through you, the Government and peoples of the U.S.S.R. my greetings and good wishes together with those of his Majesty's Government and of the people of Great Britain." (*Times*, May 28, 1945.)

The *Times*, May 30, 1945, in an editorial on Britain's relations with the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. declared: "The British Government should on all points take careful account of the interests and wishes of its partners, especially on matters which are of major and direct concern to them, and should refrain from public polemics which are merely likely to exacerbate relations." (*Times*, May 30, 1945.)

Sir Stafford Cripps, speaking at Wembley, June 3, 1945, declared:

"Any suspicions on either side, any lack of understanding, will tend to drive both Russia and our country to resort to private schemes of security which will bring us into an inevitable clash of interests.

"If once we allow ourselves to be drawn into the position of rival spheres of interest, one in the west and another in the east, we are risking a century of antagonism and struggle.

"I am convinced that in all our foreign policy this question of Anglo-Soviet relations is the most important and critical, and I feel convinced that the Labour Party could handle that matter better than any other party in the country because they are basically more sympathetic to the Russian objectives than the other parties who have constantly expressed their dislikes or fears of them." (*Times*, June 4, 1945.)

Speaking in his constituency on the following evening Sir Stafford added: "Although I give full credit to what Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden have done as regards our policy towards the Soviet Union during the war, the striking thing about this Caretaker Government is the reintroduction into it of the very elements of the Chamberlain Government that were hostile to the Soviet Union." (*News Chronicle*, June 5, 1945.)

Conservative speakers and the press were very angry with Sir Stafford. They insisted that a Tory Government could co-operate as well with the U.S.S.R. as a Labour Government.

The *Daily Telegraph* editorially stated that all responsible people in all parties wanted to maintain and strengthen the Alliance with Russia and that Sir Stafford Cripps in implying "that the Conservatives, if elected, cannot be relied upon to carry out such a policy" was "deliberately sowing the seeds of mistrust between Russia and ourselves and thereby performing the worst disservice to the relations on which he rightly sets so much store.

"It is not the least of Mr. Churchill's claims upon the public gratitude that he was the tireless architect of Anglo-Russian friendship during the war." (*Daily Telegraph*, June 4, 1945.)

Mr. Ernest Bevin, speaking in his constituency, June 7, 1945, stated:

"With a Labour Government in office which would be believed and understood by Russia and other countries, a new atmosphere would be created and the whole international situation would be changed.

"I can understand Russian feelings when they see the kind of men who have gone back into the Caretaker Government and who were

with Chamberlain in his policy of appeasement. That is not the sort of thing to produce confidence." (*Daily Herald*, June 8, 1945.)

The *Times*, to its credit be it said, realising that sinister forces were at work to sow dissensions between the three Great Powers, issued a serious warning:

"The spirit of Dr. Goebbels lives after him: and it can hardly be doubted that there are influences of more than one nationality at work, in London and Moscow, in Washington and San Francisco, to inflame dissension where it exists, to suggest suspicious and sinister motives, and to conduct whispering campaigns against Moscow in Washington and London and against Washington and London in Moscow.

"The process is dangerous because its effects are cumulative. The weight attached to minor complaints and unsubstantiated rumours may in time, if these are not checked on both sides, imperil the solid reality of the alliance." (*Times*, June 8, 1945.)

Mr. Ernest Brown (Minister of Aircraft Production and leader of the National Liberal Party), in a broadcast, June 9, 1945, declared: "It is certain that the world's future demands active and friendly co-operation between all those nations who have fought the war and won the victory. The suggestion of Sir Stafford Cripps that his party was more likely to maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union than the other parties is a most mischievous one." (*Times*, June 11, 1945.)

Prime Minister Churchill, in his declaration of policy to the electors, stated: "There are still many difficulties to overcome. It would be wrong to pretend that so far full success has been gained. Despair would be a crime. We must persevere by any road that opens towards the uplands on which will certainly be built the calm temples of peace. Our prevailing hope is that the foundations will be laid on the indissoluble agreement of Great Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia." (*Ibid.*)

Captain Harold Balfour (Under Secretary of State for Air), speaking, June 12, 1945, stated: "Mr. Bevin and Sir Stafford Cripps are making party capital out of Russia. They declaim that a Socialist Government can deal better with Russia than a Government under Mr. Churchill.

"This talk is dangerous and disreputable. It is political Fifth Column Work.

"It is Mr. Churchill not Bevin or Cripps who has been the driving

force of British co-operation with Russia. Mr. Churchill has three times flown long and dangerous journeys to meet Marshal Stalin." (*Daily Express*, June 13, 1945.)

Friendship with Russia was certainly the most popular subject on the platform during the general election.

The following extract is from Mr. Wm. Barkley's report in the *Daily Express* of a meeting at Chatham, June 12, 1945. Lord Beaverbrook was speaking:

" 'It is my sincere belief that full employment can be assured if we first raise the standard of life in Great Britain and if we then export this idea, first to our own Colonies, and then to foreign countries.' "

" 'But we don't need to export it to the U.S.A. or to the Dominions. We must join with the U.S.A. and Russia'—he was saying, but at the name of Russia the back of the hall blew up again.

" 'You like the Russian Government, don't you? So do I.' "

" 'Does Mr. Churchill?' came the query.

" 'No man stands in higher esteem in the Kremlin than Churchill.

" 'If you want to get an abiding peace there is only one course to take—to send our Churchill to meet his buddy Stalin, and along with the President of the U.S.A. to hammer out the peace of Europe. (Loud Cheers.)

" 'Any other decision would constitute an act of madness.' " (*Daily Express*, June 13, 1945.)

Prime Minister Churchill in a broadcast to the nation, June 13, declared:

"If party passions, doctrines and ambitions were to dominate our life for any lengthy period, the great Powers of the world, one of which is steel-knitted, heroic Russia and the other of whom has a strong President with a 3½ years' tenure and purpose before him, would proceed on their way settling affairs without the British voice being heard, except in terms of meek compromise abroad or raucous brawl at home.

"We must show ourselves united in all the main essentials and thus alone can we walk side by side with mighty entities like the United States and Soviet Russia." (*Daily Telegraph*, June 14, 1945.)

Mr. Wm. Barkley reporting another meeting addressed by Lord Beaverbrook, June 26, 1945, commented: "Russia is always a winner with the gallery. In reply to many shouts of the name of that country,

Lord Beaverbrook said: 'Everybody who studies public life in Great Britain will know that I have personally throughout the years been the friend of Russia. At least,' he added, when shouts broke out, 'the intelligent people will know that I have advocated friendship with Russia. But the Socialist Party has been at odds with Russia again and again.' " (*Daily Express*, June 27, 1945.)

Foreign Secretary Eden in a broadcast, June 27, 1945, stated:

"It has been suggested by Sir Stafford Cripps and others that in order to have good relations with the Soviet Union we should have a Socialist Government in this country, because, so the argument runs, British Socialists are more sympathetic to the Russian objectives than are Conservatives and Liberals. Such an argument is not merely false, it is dangerous.

"International relations are not governed by such considerations as these. They are governed by the policy of any given foreign country on the main international issues. To attempt to align your international friendship primarily with governments who share the same domestic political creeds, whatever their foreign policy may be, is just crazy." (*Daily Telegraph*, June 28, 1945.)

The predominant part played by the U.S.S.R. in winning the war was fresh in the minds of the British electors at the time and they were determined that friendship with that great state should be preserved in all fullness. Each Party claimed that it would be better able to maintain and strengthen that friendship than the other. This verbal battle was maintained with all the vigour of which both Parties were capable right up to polling day, July 5, 1945.

However, it was not only in the political arena that the great friendship which at the time existed between the Soviet and British peoples was expressing itself. On June 10, 1945, the three Allied Commanders, Marshal Zhukov, General Eisenhower and Field-Marshal Montgomery, met at Frankfurt-on-Main. Marshal Zhukov "decorated General Eisenhower and Field-Marshal Montgomery with the highest Russian honour, and in a speech appealed for allied unity to guarantee the world against further acts of aggression." (*Times*, June 11, 1945.)

Three high dignitaries of the Russian Orthodox Church arrived in London, June 11, 1945, for a ten days visit. They were met at Waterloo Station, on behalf of the Church of England, by the Archbishop of York, Dr. Garbett, who thus greeted them: "We welcome you for

yourselves. We welcome you as representatives of a great Church. We welcome you as coming from a great and noble ally." (*Times*, June 12, 1945.)

During their stay in Britain, they visited Westminster Abbey, Lambeth Palace, Canterbury Cathedral and the Archbishop of York at Bishophthorpe.

The *Times*, June 19, 1945, reported: "The Archbishop of Canterbury attended at the Connaught Rooms last night a dinner given to the Russian Patriarchal Delegation by the Nikaeen Club. The Dean of Norwich presided and the Soviet Ambassador was present at a reception.

"In proposing the toast of 'The Russian Church and Nation,' the Archbishop of Canterbury said that behind the relation of the Church of England and the Church of Russia was the relation of their two nations, never so close and so vital as at this moment. The future of peace, freedom, brotherhood, and the comity of nations in Europe depended on the continuance of close and trusting co-operation between Russia, Britain and their great American Ally. The Churches had a great part to play in keeping the true spirit of that alliance firm and strong and by guiding and helping the two nations to put into practice those high principles to which they were pledged.

"The Metropolitan Nikolai Krututsky, in reply, said the delegation had received a wonderful welcome in London."

His Majesty King George VI, welcoming the Delegation at Buckingham Palace, June 20, 1945, said:

"Your Beatitude, I am glad to welcome to my country you and your companions, representing the Patriarchs of Moscow and the Russian Orthodox Church, which so deeply expresses the spirit of your great people. We recall with admiration the heroic suffering and achievements of the Soviet peoples and armies, which greatly contributed to the allied victory over the evil forces of Nazi tyranny.

"As our two nations have been comrades in the strife and in the victory, so must we stand together with all freedom-loving people to establish a righteous peace. In that task the Churches have a great contribution to make by witnessing to the Christian principles of which they are the guardians.

"I rejoice that the long-standing ties between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Church of England are now being renewed and strengthened by your visit here. I trust that our two Churches may increase in fellowship and understanding and that they may always

co-operate to forward Christian faith and brotherhood and to promote the true welfare of mankind. I wish you a safe journey home and beg you to convey my respectful greetings to His Holiness the Patriarch." (*Times*, June 21, 1945.)

Shortly afterwards the Delegation left for home carrying with them the happiest memories of their all-too-short stay in Britain.

Thirty British scientists were to have left London, June 15, 1945, for Moscow, as guests of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. to attend meetings in celebration of the 220th anniversary of the foundation of the Academy. But only twenty-two went because at the last moment eight of the scientists were notified by the Home Office that they would not receive exit visas on the grounds that "the work on which they were engaged was too important to be put aside".

The members of the Delegation were impressed and delighted with the treatment they received from their Soviet colleagues. A cable date-lined Moscow, June 22, 1945, from the special correspondent of the *Times* and *Manchester Guardian* read: "The Russians have delighted everybody by their lack of reserve in disclosing the progress made in the field of research and applied science, and any idea that the visiting scientists brought with them that they would find their hosts tongue-tied or inhibited by an exaggerated respect for security was quite dispelled.

"The visitors are impressed by the freedom with which the Soviet scientists were able to reveal processes which in other lands would be kept secret from respect for patent rights. As one British scientist put it, the Russians told us they have nothing to buy or sell and were interested only in the pooling of knowledge beneficial to the community." (*Manchester Guardian*, June 23, 1945.)

Dr. Julian Huxley, shortly after the Delegation returned home, wrote:

"I have just returned from two weeks in Russia attending the celebrations of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. on its 220th anniversary.

"The impression left by those two weeks is of far greater prestige and power enjoyed by science in the U.S.S.R. to-day than in any other country.

"Only a few weeks after the end of the German War, the Russian Academy had organised this great festival of international science, had transported over a hundred distinguished scientific guests by air

from all over the world—from countries as far away as India, China, the U.S.A., Canada, as well as from most of Europe.

"I try to imagine a similar celebration by our Royal Society achieving the same lavishness, or meeting with such interest on the part of our Government or our Press: and I confess that I fail to do so." (*News Chronicle*, July 10, 1945.)

We must now turn to the establishment of the United Nations organisation (U.N.) On a previous page we recorded that at the Crimea Conference (February, 1945), the premiers of Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. and the President of the United States of America "resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our Allies of a general international organisation to maintain peace and security", and that they also "agreed that a Conference of United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco in the United States on April 25, 1945, to prepare the charter of such an organisation." (*Cmd.6598*, 1945 p. 4.)

The conference duly met.

It soon became apparent both inside the Conference and also from other sources outside the Conference that at least some influential delegates were thinking not of preserving peace but of preparing for a third world war.

Mr. I. F. Stone wired, on May 6, 1945, from San Francisco, where the United Nations' Charter was being drafted:

"It is time the American people became aware of what is really going on in San Francisco. On the public plane a Charter is being written for a stable peace. But in private too many members of the American delegation conceive this as a conference for the organisation of an anti-Soviet bloc under our leadership. And it is no exaggeration to say that not a few of them are reckless enough to think and talk in terms of a third world war—this time against the Soviet Union. That this is the basic pattern of the United Nations Conference is the conviction not of myself alone but of many astute American and foreign correspondents here and of progressive members of the American delegation and its entourage." (*Nation*, May 12, 1945.)

On May 16, 1945, just eight days after VE day, Don Iddon cabled his paper from New York:

"Over all the preparations for the meeting of the leaders of America, Britain, and Russia hangs the imponderable Russian programme.

"This enigma is being discussed from one end of the country to the other. There is even blunt talk about the chances of an ultimate conflict between Russia and the Anglo-American Allies.

"The front page of *P.M.* to-day was filled by a huge headline 'Answering Hearst's bald pleas for war with Russia' and the almost entire issue was filled with articles analysing Hearst's present campaign 'to get America into a war with Russia.'

"*The New York Daily News* editorial to-day turned to the attack.

"Discussing the Prime Minister's Sunday speech, it said: 'This sounds as if Churchill were contemplating eventual war to cut down Russian power in Europe, with us to be induced to help England fight Russia in the name of Democracy.'

"The answer of the *New York News* was that there was nothing doing unless the Soviet attacked United States territory.

"It is an astonishing phenomenon that this sort of controversy should be going on only eight days after the surrender of Germany. But it has to be faced." (*Daily Mail*, May 17, 1945.)

On May, 29, 1945, the same correspondent cabled: "Then there is an insane demand for war against the Soviet which the old man of San Simeon, William Randolph Hearst (who has, of course, no intention of fighting himself), is braying in his newspapers.

"In Russia they spell Hearst hearse—and no wonder. As we say along Broadway—hearse-feathers." (*Daily Mail*, May 30, 1945.)

On June 25, 1945, the *Daily Express* Correspondent cabled from New York:

"Mr. Harold Ickes, U.S. Secretary of the Interior, denounced in a speech to-night 'the whispering campaign' which sought to edge America into a war against Russia." (*Daily Express*, June 26, 1945.)

Who were the mischief-makers whom Mr. Ickes had in mind? Ickes declared:

"A few years ago the most insidious and dangerous enemies of America were those who lived within our borders, where, under the protection of American citizenship, they proclaimed the pure and unselfish purposes of Hitler.

"Now the propaganda is different, although its objective is the same and to a considerable degree its town-criers are the same.

"Just why we should go to war with Russia, just how or when or where we should wage this war against our comrades in arms, we are not told." (*ibid.*)

However, the draft of the Charter for U.N. was finally agreed and was signed by the fifty nations represented at San Francisco on June 26, 1945.

Izvestia editorially commented on the work of the Conference: "As a result of two months' work, the countries gathered at the San Francisco Conference have drafted the full text of the Charter of the International Organisation of the United Nations for the defence of universal peace and security. With the adoption of this document, which is destined to play an outstanding part in the life of all the peace-loving peoples, the San Francisco Conference has successfully concluded its work.

"Despite the overt and covert enemies of the creation of an international security organisation, the will of the peoples to defend post-war peace has secured a favourable solution of many difficulties and produced the Charter of the United Nations." Turning to the Security Council, the article continued: "The Security Council is the heart and brain of the new organisation, including as permanent members the U.S.A., Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., China and France. These countries represent nearly half of the world's population and an overwhelming economic and military might. The main responsibility for the preservation of peace rests precisely on them.

"The powers assigned to them by the Charter correspond to their real weight and significance in the cause of defending the security of all the United Nations. Their powers are least of all privileges and most of all obligations. They follow from the obligations of the Great Powers to protect the peace, in the interests of all freedom loving peoples, based on their trust, collaboration and assistance."

Izvestia added: "The Soviet Union with full responsibility takes upon itself such obligation. The Soviet people, more than any other, knows the price one has to pay for peace. It paid for peace very dearly, having defended with arms in hand the honour, liberty and independence of its Motherland. Now the Soviet people has entered into a new period of peaceful construction. The cause of the preservation of peace is vital to it."

Unfortunately, despite the successful conclusion of the Conference and the all-round congratulations which followed, there was no let-up in the "prepare for war against the Soviets" propaganda in influential circles in the U.S.A.

So much for the San Francisco Conference. We must now turn to other developments.

A very impressive ceremony took place in Berlin, July 12, 1945. The *Times* correspondent cabled from the British zone:

"Field-Marshal Montgomery came to Berlin to-day and in the name of the King invested Marshal Zhukov, Deputy Supreme Commander of the Red Army, with the insignia of a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath. At the same time he bestowed the K.C.B. on Marshal Rokossovsky, another of the great architects of the Russian victories in the east. General Malinin, his Chief of Staff, and General Sokolovsky, Chief of Staff to Marshal Zhukov, became Knights Commanders of the Order of the British Empire.

"It was a singularly impressive happening that in the enemy's conquered capital, so remorselessly put to fire and sword, Great Britain should thus do honour to her Russian allies. It had previously been arranged that Marshal Zhukov should go to Hamburg to receive his G.C.B. but with the taking over of the British sector here the ceremony was more appropriately held in Berlin on the eve of the deliberations among the three heads of Governments." (*Times*, July 13, 1945.)

To return for a moment to the British General Election. As already mentioned, polling took place July 5, but, in order to give the servicemen an opportunity to vote, the results were not declared till July 26, 1945.

While the voting papers were lying uncounted in the sealed ballot boxes, the first post-war Conference of the Big Three, Truman,¹ Stalin and Churchill, was held at Potsdam, July 17-25, 1945.

Mr. Winston Churchill relates in his *Second World War*, Volume VI, that many outstanding issues were discussed, but none were resolved. However, in the course of the Conference Truman received a cable informing him that an atom bomb had been successfully exploded in the Nevada desert and Truman and Churchill decided to inform Stalin of this historic event. Both were apprehensive of the results, because it meant admitting for the first time to an Ally who had borne the heaviest casualties in the common effort that the scientists of Britain and the U.S.A. without informing the U.S.S.R. had been engaged for a considerable time in this field of research.

Churchill relates:

"A more intricate question was what to tell Stalin. The President and I no longer felt that we needed his aid to conquer Japan. His

¹ Roosevelt had died April 12, 1945, and Truman had become President.

word had been given at Teheran and Yalta that Soviet Russia would attack Japan as soon as the German Army was defeated and in fulfilment of this a continuous movement of Russian troops to the Far East had been in progress over the Siberian Railway since the beginning of May. In our opinion they were not likely to be needed, and Stalin's bargaining power, which he had used with such effect upon the Americans at Yalta, was therefore gone. Still, he had been a magnificent ally in the war against Hitler, and we both felt that he must be informed of the great New Fact which now dominated the scene, but not of any particulars. How should this news be imparted to him? Should it be in writing or by word of mouth? Should it be at a formal and special meeting, or in the course of our daily conferences, or after one of them?

"The conclusion which the President came to was the last of these alternatives. 'I think,' he said, 'I had best just tell him after one of our meetings that we have an entirely novel form of bomb, something quite out of the ordinary, which we think will have decisive effects upon the Japanese will to continue the war.' I agreed to this procedure." (*The Second World War*, Volume VI. "Triumph and Tragedy." p. 554.)

Continuing, Churchill related that some days later, July 24: "after our plenary meeting had ended and we all got up from the round table and stood about in twos and threes before dispersing, I saw the President go up to Stalin, and the two conversed alone with only their interpreters. I was perhaps five yards away, and I watched with the closest attention the momentous talk. I knew what the President was going to do. What was vital to measure was its effect on Stalin. I can see it all as if it were yesterday. He seemed to be delighted. A new bomb! Of extraordinary power! Probably decisive on the whole Japanese war! What a bit of luck! This was my impression at the moment, and I was sure that he had no idea of the significance of what he was being told. Evidently in his intense toils and stresses the atomic bomb had played no part.

"As we were waiting for our cars I found myself near Truman. 'How did it go?' I asked. 'He never asked a question,' he replied. I was certain therefore that at that date Stalin had no special knowledge of the vast process of research upon which the United States and Britain had been engaged for so long, and of the production for which the United States had spent over four hundred million pounds in an heroic gamble." (*Ibid.*, pp. 579-80.)

Churchill and Truman agreed that Stalin was to be "informed of the

great New Fact" which now dominated the scene, "but not of any particulars". This decision was the quintessence of meanness, the summit of stupidity and an act of incomprehensible short-sightedness.

It was mean because it was the valour and self-sacrifice of the Soviet fighting forces which enabled American and, to a lesser extent, British scientists to carry out their research work in relative calm. It was stupid because it assumed an Anglo-American mental superiority over Soviet Russia. It was short-sighted because it assumed that the secret of the production of atom bombs would not be discovered by Soviet scientists for many years.

Were Churchill and Truman deliberately shutting their eyes to obvious facts? It is difficult to believe that at the date of the Potsdam Conference they were not aware that Russian science had a two-hundred-year-old tradition of high achievement; that Soviet scientists (who were second to none in the world), with immense resources at their disposal had been studying the question of the splitting of the atom; that this research work had been handicapped, but not stopped, by the German invasion of Soviet territory and that with the end of hostilities Soviet scientists would soon catch up with their British and American opposite numbers.

Had Churchill and Truman been generous, wise and bold in their dealings with Stalin on this issue, at the Potsdam Conference, relations between "East" and "West" would in all probability be very different from what they are to-day.

The world has since hailed Churchill, and to a lesser extent Truman, as "Big" men and great statesmen. Perhaps not so "Big" and perhaps their statesmanship was not of a very high order? After all, results and not expectations are the criteria by which men of action are judged.

Mr. Churchill relates that he flew home from Potsdam on the afternoon of July 25, 1945, to hear the results of the General Election on the following day. The Conservative Central Office and Churchill expected "that we should retain a substantial majority", but "by noon (July 26) it was clear that the Socialists would have a majority". At 7.0 p.m. Mr. Churchill tendered his resignation to the King and advised His Majesty to send for the Leader of the Labour Party, Mr. Attlee, who formed a government on the following day, July 27, 1945.

Labour's victory was overwhelming: Labour 393; Conservatives (together with Ulster Unionists, National Unionists and Liberal-Nationals) 213; Liberals 12; I.L.P. 3; Communists 2; Commonwealth 1; Irish Nationalists 2; Independent 14.

Members of the British Labour Movement have been told repeatedly that the Soviet Government was dismayed at the victory of the Labour Party in 1945. This was quite untrue, as readers of the Soviet press and those who followed Soviet affairs contended repeatedly at the time. These contentions were subsequently confirmed by Alaric Jacob in his book *Scenes from a Bourgeois Life*. In it he says:

"In the Soviet Foreign Office the reaction was one of faintly agreeable surprise.

"The young men in the press department questioned me excitedly about the new government when I called to see them. I had not seen so many smiles among them or felt so much friendliness since Stalingrad had been won. To have Socialists in power in England seemed too good to be true. Could it really be true?" . . . (p. 296.)

"When little Clem Attlee's face first appeared on the newsreels in Russia the people had marvelled among themselves. It's Vladimir Ilytch all over again, they said, without the beard!" (p. 306.)

The *Daily Telegraph's* correspondent in Moscow in a cable dated July 27, 1945, stated: "The British election results were conspicuously displayed with double and triple column headlines on the foreign page of all to-day's Moscow newspapers and occupied a prominent place in the morning radio programme.

"Although no comment was carried by the press, the election upset is the topic of the day with the Russian man-in-the-street. Details of Mr. Attlee's career and information about his personality are eagerly sought." (*Daily Telegraph*, July 28, 1945.)

The *Daily Telegraph's* correspondent quoted from a Moscow broadcast of July 27, in which the broadcaster stated: "The whole world anxiously awaited the results of the British general elections, They have come as a great surprise to many people, and above all to the Conservatives themselves."

"It may be recalled that as far back as its conference in May the Socialist party came out with one accord for the consolidation of relations and friendship with Russia and issued a warning against the anti-Soviet propaganda carried on in certain reactionary circles." (*Ibid.*)

Pravda, July 29, 1945, described the Labour victory as "the greatest event in the post-war political life of Western Europe".

And Mr. Magidoff, an American radio commentator, in a broadcast from Moscow said: "It isn't that the Russians dislike Churchill.

But the Russians and the Conservatives led by Churchill never saw eye to eye.

"Much more is expected of the Potsdam talks now. An earlier victory over Japan and a more solid foundation for peace emerge." (*Daily Mail*, July 28, 1945.)

Much more could be quoted in the same strain. Labour's victory at the polls in Britain was welcomed in the U.S.S.R., albeit with restrained hope because the Soviet leaders did not know and could not know how Labour's policy *vis-à-vis* the U.S.S.R. would work out in practice.

The Potsdam Conference was resumed on July 28. However, Britain was now represented by Prime Minister Attlee and Foreign Secretary Bevin. The Conference concluded its work in the early hours of August 2 and the terms of the agreement were issued by the British Foreign Office (described as "Report of the Tripartite Conference of Berlin") in the late hours of the same day.

We publish the full text of the Report in the Appendix. Here we can only quote some of the most important articles from it.

Council of Foreign Ministers

The Conference decided to establish "a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France and the United States".

The Council was authorised "to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland", and later "a peace settlement for Germany, to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a Government adequate for the purpose is established". (*The World To-Day*, July 23-August 5, 1945, p. 69.)

China and France

China and France were invited to adopt the text of the Report "and to join in establishing the Council". (*ibid.* 70.)

Allied Control Council

The Conference decided that: "the co-ordination of allied policy for the control of Germany and Austria would in future fall within the competence of the Allied Control Council at Berlin and the Allied Commission at Vienna." (*ibid.*, p. 70.)

German Militarism and Nazism

The Conference decided that: "German militarism and Nazism will be extirpated and the Allies will take in agreement together, now and in the future, the other measures necessary to assure that Germany never again will threaten her neighbours or the peace of the world."

But the Report adds: "It is the intention of the Allies that the German people be given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis". (*ibid.*, p. 70.)

Political Principles to Govern Treatment of Germany

Supreme authority in Germany was to be exercised by the armed forces of the "United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Control Council".

The purposes of the Control Council were *inter alia*: (a) "The complete disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany." (b) "To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat." (c) "To destroy the National Socialist Party." (d) The abolition of "all Nazi laws". (e) The trial of war criminals and the arrest of prominent Nazis. (f) The removal of Nazi party members from public office. (g) Re-education of the German people. (h) Decentralisation of the political structure. (i) The establishment of democratic freedoms. (*ibid.*, p. 71.)

Economic Principles to Govern Treatment of Germany

(a) The elimination of "Germany's war potential". (b) The elimination of cartels. (c) The development of peaceful industries. (d) Germany to be treated as a "single economic unit". (e) Controls to be imposed to enable the economy to function and to carry out programmes of reparations. (f) German authorities to assume administration of controls. (g) German external assets to be placed at disposal of Control Council. (h) Enough resources to be left to the German people to enable them to subsist without external assistance.

German Reparations

(a) Germany to "be compelled to compensate to the greatest possible extent for the loss and suffering that she has caused to the United

Nations". (b) In the main reparations to be met from the zone occupied by each Power and from external German assets, but in addition the U.S.S.R. to receive reparations from the Western Zones varying from 10 per cent. to 15 per cent. (*ibid.*, p. 74.)

German Fleet

Experts to work out plans of its disposal.

Konigsberg

Konigsberg and an area adjacent to it to be transferred to the U.S.S.R.

Poland

The "Polish Provisional Government of National Unity" was recognised as the Government of Poland. That Government was to hold "free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot, in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part".

The Report states that: "pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier . . . shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany." (*ibid.*, p. 77.)

Conclusion of Peace Treaties and Admission to U.N.

The Conference agreed that: "among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers" was "the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy". Further the Conference "charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing peace treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of peace treaties with recognised democratic Governments in these States will also enable the three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations." (*ibid.*, p. 77.)

Spain

The Report states that: "the three Governments feel bound,

however, to make it clear that they for their part would not favour any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record, and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership." (*ibid.*, p. 78.)

Orderly Transfers of German Populations

"The three Governments," states the Report, "having considered the question in all its aspects, recognise that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner." (*ibid.*, p. 79.)

Proclamation to Japan

"On July 26," states the Report, "a proclamation to the Japanese people was issued from Potsdam by President Truman, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Churchill and General Chiang Kai-shek. It began by warning them that prodigious forces were now poised to strike the final blows on Japan, which would result in the complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and the utter devastation of the homeland." (*ibid.*, p. 79.)

Inter alia, the Proclamation stated: "The terms of the Cairo declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine."

The Proclamation concluded: "We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is complete and utter destruction."

The Report was approved and signed by J. V. Stalin, Harry S. Truman and C. R. Attlee.

Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin arrived back in London from Berlin on August 2, 1945.

CHAPTER VII

THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MOSCOW CONFERENCE

IMMEDIATELY after the Potsdam Conference the attacks against Japan were pressed with great vigour.

On August 6, the first atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Two days later the U.S.S.R. declared war on Japan.

On the evening of the same day the following statement was issued from Downing Street by Prime Minister Attlee:

"We in Great Britain have fully appreciated and understood the tremendous sacrifice and strain imposed on Russia by her heroic campaign against Nazi Germany, and we have always had confidence that as soon as victory had been won in the West Russia would take her stand with her allies against the enemy on the Eastern front.

"The unconditional surrender of Germany has now made possible the deployment of the forces of the U.S.S.R. against the last of the aggressors.

"The declaration of war made to-day by the U.S.S.R. upon Japan is a proof of the solidarity that exists between the principal allies, and should shorten the struggle and establish conditions which will allow general peace to be brought about. We welcome this great decision of Soviet Russia." (*Times*, August 9, 1945.)

On August 9 an atom bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, and on August 14, Japan accepted the Allied Governments' demand of unconditional surrender. Events now moved at great speed. U.S.A. forces landed in Japan, August 29; British forces landed in Hong-Kong, August 30; the Instrument of unconditional surrender by Japan was signed on board *U.S. Missouri* in Tokyo Bay, September 2, and on October 15, 1945, General MacArthur announced the complete surrender of seven million Japanese forces.

Ever since the end of the war with Japan continuous efforts have been made in the U.S.A. and to a lesser extent in Great Britain, to

belittle the part played by the U.S.S.R. in effecting the defeat of Japan. That is very far removed from the truth. In 1951 an authoritative book entitled *Eclipse of the Rising Sun* by Toshikazi Kase, a former member of the Japanese Foreign Office, was published in London. The author, we are informed on the cover: "As adviser to the highest officials and as American expert in the Japanese Foreign Office, participated in many historic events which determined Japan's history during those fateful years from the signing of the Russo-Japanese neutrality pact to the drafting of the Japanese request for an end to hostilities. He was a close friend of Prince Konoye and of many other members of the cabinet; he served in Japanese embassies in Washington, London and Berlin; and he was one of the Japanese who, well before Pearl Harbour, opposed the war and those bent on war."

In the course of the book the author reveals that from the date of Pearl Harbour onwards the Japanese Government was haunted by the fear that the U.S.S.R. would declare war on Japan. For instance:

"On November 7, 1944, the anniversary of the Red Revolution, Generalissimo Stalin unexpectedly denounced Japan as an aggressor, creating widespread speculation throughout the world. We were shocked by this denunciation which seemed at that moment uncalled-for. As every gesture, however insignificant, on the part of the Kremlin as a rule presaged some action, we could not take this ominous statement lightly." (p. 96.)

Later Toshikazi Kase states:

"In sharp contrast, the Soviet garrison in Siberia was gradually augmented. Beginning about March, 1945, trainload after trainload of soldiers and equipment was sent eastward from the European theatre where the war against Germany was drawing to a close. This was an ominous sign. Apparently something had to be done to assure the continued tranquillity of our northern border. Should the Soviet Union strike at us it would mean the instant collapse of our entire front, as we were hard-pressed everywhere." (pp. 165-6.)

The Soviet Union remained adamant against all Japanese ingratiating attempts:

"In the final stages, to save our own situation, we tried to curry favour with the Kremlin. Thus throughout the Pacific war our main

diplomatic endeavours were concentrated upon Moscow, creating a sort of habit of mind which, I think, explains why we chose the Soviet Government as the channel for addressing the Allied Powers prior to our surrender." (p. 166.)

As the Soviet Union massed its already powerful forces on the Manchurian frontier the Japanese fears increased. The author continued: "Parallel with this, we now took up the question of our policy toward the Soviet Union, a matter whose extreme urgency was universally recognised throughout the country. There was a unanimous desire to improve relations with our powerful neighbour. Our military people, frightened out of their wits at the thought of a new war with the Red Army, were willing to pay the heaviest price to prevent it." (p. 169.)

"Earlier, on June 24, 1945, Hirota called upon the Soviet Ambassador for the third time. He explained at length the earnest desire of our Government to make a drastic improvement in the relations of the two countries and to remove barriers to good understanding." (p. 187.)

"After waiting some days Hirota again requested an interview but the ambassador declined once more to receive him, on the pretext of illness. Thus the conversations ended without leading anywhere. The whole episode was like angling in waters where no fish lived." (pp. 188.)

Later, long after the conclusion of the war, the Government of the U.S.A. in the course of a Note to the Government of the U.S.S.R., May 19, 1951, stated that the latter had participated in the war against Japan only for six days. To this the Soviet Government in a Note dated June 10, 1951, replied:

"As regards the remark in the United States Memorandum that the Soviet Union participated in the war with Japan for six days only and that the role of the U.S.S.R.'s military efforts in that war was allegedly insignificant, the Soviet Government deems it necessary to state the following: Firstly, *the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan precisely at the time stipulated at the Yalta Conference, without any delay whatsoever.* Secondly, the Soviet Army waged sanguinary battles against the Japanese troops not for six days, but for one month, since the Kwantung Army continued to resist for a long time contrary to the Emperor's declaration of surrender. Thirdly, the Soviet Army routed 22 Japanese divisions in Manchuria—the main forces of the Japanese Kwantung Army—and took prisoner

approximately 600,000 Japanese officers and men. Fourthly, Japan agreed to surrender only after the first decisive blow dealt by the Soviet troops to the Kwantung Army." (Our emphasis.)

On this point the Soviet Note concluded: "Fifthly, even before the U.S.S.R. entered the war against Japan, i.e. in the course of 1941-1945, the U.S.S.R. maintained up to 40 divisions along the frontiers with Manchuria and pinned down the whole Kwantung Army, thereby facilitating the operations of China and the United States in the war against the Japanese militarists."

Which are correct? The American strictures or the Soviet claims?

Toshikazi Kase was in a good position to judge, and his views on the subject are of considerable value. He writes:

"Perhaps for a while the effect of the atomic bomb could be minimised by propaganda. But the massed invasion of Manchuria by the Red Army was impossible to hide from the people. The glacial avalanche from the north stunned G.H.Q. They knew that the game was up. Even for our generals the combination of the atomic bomb and the Russians proved too strong. (p. 214.)

"One of the first questions asked me, by the American war correspondents who swarmed into Tokyo with the vanguard of the occupation forces in September, 1945, was, 'Was it the atomic bomb or Russian participation in the war, that was responsible for the surrender?' " (p. 217.)

Mr. Winston Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons, August 16, 1945, said: "My understanding with Marshal Stalin in the talks which I had with him had been for a considerable time past, that Russia would declare war upon Japan within three months of the surrender of the German armies. The reason for the delay of three months was, of course, the need to move over the trans-Siberian Railway the large reinforcements necessary to convert the Russian-Manchurian army from a defensive to an offensive strength.

"Three months was the time mentioned, and the fact that the German armies surrendered on May 8, and the Russians declared war on Japan on August 8, is no mere coincidence but another example of the fidelity and punctuality with which Marshal Stalin and his valiant armies always keep their military engagements." (*Hansard*, August 16, 1945, col. 80.)

H.M. the King sent the following message, August 17, 1945:

"To M. Kalinin.—In this supreme moment of final victory, Mr. President, my thoughts and those of all my peoples turn toward our great Allies of East and West. . . . The years of war have achieved more than complete victory. They have laid the foundation for a lasting collaboration which will be as vital a factor in peace as it was in war. If this comradeship in arms spelt disaster for the enemies of freedom, its perpetuation in the years that lie ahead will be a promise that the ideals for which our peoples fought shall not be lost nor their sacrifices squandered. I greet you, Mr. President, most warmly on this great occasion and ask you to convey to the heroic Soviet soldier, sailor and citizen an expression of the friendship and admiration of the British peoples." (*Times*, August 18, 1945.)

The Soviet President, Mr. Kalinin, sent the following reply, August 19, 1945:

"I thank your Majesty for your kind felicitations on the occasion of the Japanese Government's announcement of surrender. I beg your Majesty to accept my sincere congratulations on the brilliant successes of British troops in the Far East and in the Pacific theatre. I am confident that the foundations of friendship between our peoples laid in the years of war will serve as a sure foundation for the further development and strengthening of the relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union in the post-war period." (*Manchester Guardian*, August 20, 1945.)

Prime Minister Attlee in a message to Premier Stalin, August 17, 1945, stated:

"I send you my warm congratulations on the advent of peace and the complete victory of our united Armies over the last of the aggressors.

"Now we have before us the perspective of creating a new spirit between the nations which will do away with insecurity and the fear of war, and which will bring about the feeling of security and co-operation without which the world cannot have any hope.

"It is my ardent desire that the friendship and common understanding which was created between the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom during the war will be renewed and further strengthened in the years of the reconstruction and that our Treat of Unity will be the basis of close co-operation between us." (*Daily Telegraph*, August 21, 1945.)

Premier Stalin replied, August 20:

"I thank you for your friendly greetings and congratulations on the occasion of the victory against Japan, and in my turn I congratulate you on this victory.

"The war against Germany and Japan and our common efforts in the war against the aggressors have brought the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom nearer and strengthened our co-operation, the basis of which for long years to come will be our Treaty of Alliance. I express the assurance that this co-operation forged in the war and all its dangers, will be developed and strengthened in the post-war years for the good of our countries." (*ibid.*)

So much for the part played by the U.S.S.R. in the war against Japan.

The new British Parliament was opened by H.M. King George VI on August 15, 1945, and His Majesty, in the Speech from the Throne, declared:

"At Berlin My Ministers, in conference with the President of the United States and Premier Stalin, have laid the foundations on which the peoples of Europe, after the long nightmare of war, may restore their shattered lands. I welcome the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers which will shortly hold its first meeting in London and will continue the work begun at Berlin in preparation for a final peace settlement." (*Hansard*, August 15, 1945, col. 54.)

Next day, August 16, 1945, Mr. Churchill advocated an act which quickly did much to destroy the cordial relationship and the profound good-will which had developed between Britain and the U.S.S.R. during the four years of war.

Speaking in the House of Commons, August 16, 1945, he said: "I may say that I am in entire agreement with the President that the secrets of the atomic bomb shall so far as possible not be imparted at the present time to any other country in the world." (*Hansard*, August 16, 1945, col. 79.)

Churchill no doubt had in mind President Truman's broadcast to the American Nation, August 9, 1945, in which he said that the U.S.A. and Britain would keep the secret of the atom bomb.

Churchill added: "So far as we know, there are at least three and perhaps four years before the concrete progress made in the United States can be overtaken. In these three years we must remould the relationships of all men, wherever they dwell, in all the nations." (*Ibid.*, cols. 79-80.)

There was, and is, no mistake of the threat to the U.S.S.R. wrapped up so carefully in the second sentence.

"Scrutator" in the *Sunday Times*, August 19, 1945, after stating that the U.S.A. was the strongest Power in the world and that the U.S.S.R. would have to reckon with her, concluded: "Meanwhile it is well that we are keeping the secret of the atom bomb. It might suitably be reinforced by a strict embargo on uranium. That element seems likely to remain for a long time indispensable for the bomb; and its bulk supplies all are, or could easily be brought, under British or American control."

On another page of the same issue of the *Sunday Times* G. M. Young wrote: "Meanwhile, it seems to be of some importance that the latest invention of war should be kept closely and firmly in the hands of people who, in the last few years, have discovered that after all they do share the same notions of right and wrong."

Other commentators wrote in very similar terms. There can be no doubt that the declarations of Truman and Churchill and the remarks of columnists made a deep impression because they showed up vividly the fundamental hostility of many in Britain and the U.S.A. towards the U.S.S.R.

However, other voices were raised. Mr. Phillips Price, speaking in the House of Commons, August 22, 1945, after citing the passage from Churchill's speech of August 16, which we quoted on a previous page, continued:

"The right hon. Gentleman is not, apparently alone in that view. It appears to be the view of the President of the United States, and I would ask the House to consider the dangerous situation that will arise if we persist in that philosophy. Is Russia likely to reconcile herself permanently to a monopoly of this kind? And I do say this, by putting a barrier between ourselves and Russia in military secrecy and scientific research, we shall only intensify the political barrier between us which does, at last, show some signs of breaking down.

"The danger is that the three great Powers of the Security Council may themselves be divided into two camps which religiously guard their military secrets and scientific inventions. I ask the House to

reflect: is this a healthy situation? The scientific world, I know, is deeply disturbed by the situation. The spirit of science is a spirit of free inquiry, untrammelled by secrecy, relentlessly searching after truth." (*Hansard*, August 22, 1945, cols. 748-9.)

Mr. Zilliacus, speaking in the House of Commons, August 23, 1945, said:

"So long as we withhold the secret of the atomic bomb from the Soviet Union we make ourselves directly responsible for starting a race in atomic bomb research, which will be far worse than a race in armaments; indeed, it will be the most fiendish form of a race in armaments.

"I realise that the Government may have difficulty in stating now their position on that issue, but I do hope that they will at least repudiate the attitude adopted by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition who declared firmly and emphatically his opposition to sharing this secret with any other State in the world. . . . I hope that they will make it perfectly clear that they do not propose to play Anglo-American atomic power politics against the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe." (*Hansard*, August 23, 1945, cols. 880-1.)

Winding up the debate Foreign Secretary Bevin replied:

"Then I have been asked: Why not give the secrets of the atomic bomb to the three Great Powers? My answer would be: To whom are we to give those secrets? Merely to the three Great Powers? Or to the five? Or to the world organisation? I think we must postpone consideration of this question until the world organisation is established and we can see clearly how matters stand. The whole question of the control of dangerous weapons is one which we must discuss together." (*ibid.*, col. 944.)

Mr. Bevin's reply was a clear refusal to share "the secrets of the atomic bomb" with the U.S.S.R.

This policy had fatal consequences for the future of Anglo-Soviet political relations.

However, relations between the British and Soviet trade unions continued to be excellent. The British Trades Union Congress, September 10-14, 1945, was attended by Mr. Tarasov as fraternal delegate from the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

In the course of his fraternal address, Mr. Tarasov dealt with the great work of reconstruction then in full swing in his country and concluded with the slogans: "Long live friendship between the workers of Great Britain and the Soviet Union! Long live the international unity of the working class'." (*Trades Union Congress 77th Annual Report*, 1945, p. 293.)

The delegates very warmly cheered his speech and after he had concluded, the chairman, Mr. Ebby Edwards said: "The applause indicates that there is no need for me to thank Mr. Tarasov for having indicated as he has the feeling of the Russian workers towards the British workers. I have much pleasure on behalf of the Congress in presenting to Mr. Tarasov a travelling clock, which we hope will remind him of this occasion. Furthermore, I may say that we are hopeful—nay, more, we are confident—that the unity of the Russian and British workers will last for all time in a solidified friendship." (*Ibid.*)

The reception which Mr. Tarasov received was indicative of the warm friendship then existing between the British and Soviet peoples.

Unfortunately relations between the British and Soviet trade unions became strained in 1948, and when early in 1949 the British Trades Union Congress and other national trade union centres withdrew from the World Federation of Trade Unions (formed in 1945) relations between the British and Soviet trade unions became considerably cooler.

The first post-war Conference of Foreign Ministers opened in London on September 11, 1945. It was attended by Mr. Bevin (U.K.), Mr. Molotov (U.S.S.R.), Mr. Byrnes (U.S.A.), Mr. Wang Shi-chieh (China), and M. Bidault (France).

Soon after the Conference started there emerged a sharp difference of opinion between Great Britain and the U.S.A. on the one hand, and the U.S.S.R. on the other, as to the interpretation of the Berlin Conference decisions regarding the part which France and China were entitled to play in concluding peace treaties with enemy Powers in Europe.

The Soviet representative based himself on decisions of the Berlin Conference of the Three Powers on the institution of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Clause 3 states:

"As its immediate important task the Council shall be authorised to

draw up treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. . . .

"For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned."

In passing we may add that in the first place the creation of the Council of Foreign Ministers was adopted on the proposal of the U.S.A. Government.

The Berlin Conference decisions were quite clear and just, but the British and U.S.A. representatives wanted to interpret them in such a way that France and China, who were not signatories of the surrender terms, should have the same powers at the Conference as the three Powers which were, i.e. Great Britain, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. The reason of this was quite clear: the U.S.A. and Great Britain wanted to have a four to one majority against the U.S.S.R. in all votes and discussions.

Each side maintained its point of view, and although the Conference continued in session and discussed a number of other subjects, it finally broke up on October 2, 1945, without any agreement being signed.

It was an open press secret that one of the most important subjects discussed at the Conference was the U.S.S.R.'s claim to bases in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Mr. Bevin, backed by the U.S.A. delegation, refused even to discuss the subject. The British Foreign Secretary in effect announced a return to Britain's traditional policy of keeping Russia bottled up in the Black Sea, the policy of the Crimean War. Bevin, in practice, repudiated the policy which he had advocated at the Labour Party Conference in May of the same year.

Nevertheless, the discussions in the course of the Conference were of some value. Mr. Molotov in a press interview October 3, 1945, after the conclusion of the Conference stated:

"The thirty-three meetings of the Council of Ministers were not held in vain. It was strenuous work. During these meetings certain questions were agreed upon by all Five Ministers, for instance, that of speeding up the work of the Allied Commission for Reparations by Germany, problems on Austria, and some others.

"Unfortunately, we have not discussed the creation of an Allied

Control Council for Japan, and not through the fault of the Soviet delegation.

"Furthermore the Ministers of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States and France, agreed upon certain questions regarding the peace treaty with Italy.

"A whole number of questions concerning peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary were also agreed upon by the Ministers of Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and the United States.

"Agreement between the Ministers of Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. on the peace treaty with Finland was reached without difficulty."

On the question of the participation of France and China in the preparation of the peace treaties, Mr. Molotov stated:

"We were told that China and France must for some reason take part in all the preparation of peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, despite the fact that the Berlin Conference established a different procedure.

"We objected in this case, too, to violation of the decisions of the Berlin Conference, the more so that both China and France not only had not participated in drafting the armistice terms with these countries, and had not signed these terms, but also had never declared war upon them.

"Even when, in reply to our well-grounded objection, we were told: either agree with us on violation of the Berlin Agreement of the Three Powers, or we shall not sign even the agreed decisions, we still maintained unshakable loyalty to the Berlin decisions, defending them from all unexpected attempts. For it is known to everybody that the Soviet Union has always been true to its word.

"I confirm that all proposals aimed at the violation of the Berlin decisions were emphatically rejected by the Soviet delegation, no matter what motives were given for such incorrect proposals."

Mr. Bevin (Foreign Minister) reporting to the House of Commons, October 9, 1945 on the work and break-down of the Conference did not differ materially from Mr. Molotov's account of what had been achieved at the Conference, but on the subject of the participation of France and China in the work of the Conference he added:

"It seemed to me, as to Mr. Byrnes, that the difference of view with the Soviet Delegation, technical though it might appear to be, in reality involved a big question of principle—to what extent are the

Big Three to exclude other nations from the discussion of matters of grave concern to them? This principle, I felt, it was incumbent on me to defend." (*Hansard*, October 9, 1945, col. 40.)

At the conclusion of his speech, Mr. Bevin read the following message which he had received from Mr. Molotov on leaving this country: "On leaving the borders of our Ally, Great Britain, I beg to transmit to the British Government my thanks for the warm welcome given to me and to those accompanying me. I express confidence that, the war against our common enemies having been victoriously concluded, our future collaboration in the interests of the peoples of Great Britain and the Soviet Union and of the strengthening of peace throughout the world will continue, having overcome the temporary difficulties encountered on the way, and that we shall jointly endeavour successfully to achieve this great end." (*Ibid.*, col. 41.)

Mr. Bevin added: "I replied to Mr. Molotov as follows: 'I was very pleased to receive your kind message sent on the occasion of your departure from this country after the Foreign Secretaries Conference. I share your confidence in our future collaboration in the interest of the peoples of the Soviet Union and Great Britain and for the strengthening of peace throughout the world. We may, as you say, encounter difficulties on the way, but the cause we serve is so compelling that no trouble must remain unmastered in the pursuit of this high aim. Mankind throughout the world wants peace, economic recovery and a rising standard of life. The fulfilment of this must be our prime purpose.'" (*Ibid.*)

Undoubtedly Mr. Molotov and Mr. Bevin greatly regretted the break-down of the Conference. Not so Mr. John Foster Dulles, who was a member of the American delegation. Writing some years later in his *War or Peace* he stated that if the U.S.A. had accepted the Soviet viewpoint at the London Conference:

"We would have destroyed the chance, which we then still had, of keeping in China a government that was friendly to us. We would have destroyed the chance of keeping in France a government friendly to us." (p. 26.)

A few pages later Dulles added:

"Our action at the London meeting has had momentous consequences—as we realised it would have. It marked the end of an

epoch, the epoch of Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam. It marked the ending of any pretence by Soviet Communists that they were our 'friends.' It began the period when their hostility to us was openly proclaimed throughout the world." (p. 30.)

This is just the opposite to the truth. It would be perfectly correct to state that this Conference marked the end of any pretence by American statesmen that they were the friends of the U.S.S.R. It began the period when American hostility to the U.S.S.R. was proclaimed throughout the world.

And this was made even clearer when Dulles, on his return to Washington, in a radio broadcast on October 6, 1945, joyously proclaimed that what had happened at London "has not created difficulties. It has merely revealed difficulties of long standing which war has obscured. It is healthier that we now know the facts." (*Ibid.*, pp. 30-1.)

There was a wide difference between the reactions of the press, politicians and public in the U.S.A. and in Great Britain to the breakdown of the London Conference. Little regret and much gratification was expressed in the U.S.A. but considerable regret and little, if any, satisfaction was expressed in Britain.

In the U.S.A. very many organs of the press and many politicians had been conducting a campaign of slander since VE day against the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet press blamed the Government of the U.S.A. for the collapse of the Conference.

At this time another source of friction arose between Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. The Soviets were concluding trade agreements with Hungary and Rumania, which they claimed were not in any way inimical to British trade, but London did not agree.

At this time the British press, including papers like the *Times*, *Daily Mail*, *Daily Express*, and many others, continuously and strongly urged that the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and Great Britain must resolve their differences if peace and stability were to be established on firm foundations.

On October 26, 1945, the House of Commons discussed "Conditions in Europe". In the course of the debate, Mr. D. N. Pritt said:

"I came to the House hoping to catch your eye, Mr. Speaker, in a certain event, and I fear that that event has happened, and it is the

very wide and terrible campaign against our friends in the Soviet Union. In a very large part of the Debate anything said against the Soviet Union appeared to me to be said most soberly and reasonably, and with proper regard for the consequences, but now I am very unhappy to say that the hon. Lady the Member for the Combined English Universities (Miss Rathbone) who has been in her seat all day, has caught this disease which, indeed, 20 miles of water cannot prevent spreading across from the realm of Goebbels.

"The hon. Lady committed herself to say that Russia, and some of the other countries in Europe, had deliberately committed themselves to a policy of destroying the Germans in order that there should be fewer Germans alive.

"The Soviet Union has a policy That policy was pronounced a long time ago, and it was that the Hitlerite State must be destroyed, but the German people and the German State must remain. Maybe the German State does not remain, but the German people do. I think it is the policy of the Soviet Union to establish a government of anti-Nazi Germans and to break up Germany in accordance with the decisions of the Potsdam Conference."

Mr. Pritt concluded: "But the hon. Lady said, 'Do let us criticise the Soviet Union, but do not let us be frightened.' I reply, 'By all means, but do not let the sacred right of criticising the Soviet Union be used to spread stories about the Soviet Union which you do not even know are true, and do not let us imagine, like so many people do, that the right of criticising the Soviet Union means that you can slander it for twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week, because, if so, all your children will die in the third world war, not as one hon. Member opposite suggested, after his death, but even before he has time to have children.'" (*Hansard*, October 26, 1945, cols. 2439-42.)

Later in the debate, Mr. Edelman said that "we shall collaborate very closely with our great Ally, the Soviet Union." (*Ibid.*, col. 2445.)

These sentiments met with a hearty reception from Mr. Molotov when he delivered the November Revolution Anniversary Speech on November 6, 1945, in Moscow.

On the question of atomic power, Mr. Molotov said:

"One should mention the discovery of atomic energy and the atomic bomb, whose application in the war with Japan demonstrated its enormous destructive power. However, atomic energy has not as yet been tested for the purposes of preventing aggression or safeguarding peace.

"On the other hand, there can at present be no such technical secrets of great importance, as could remain the possession of any single country or any narrow group of countries. Therefore the discovery of atomic energy should encourage neither fancies concerning the utilisation of this discovery in the international play of forces, nor a carefree attitude towards the future of the peace-loving nations."

At this time, and no doubt earlier, the Soviet Government was convinced that its scientists would soon catch up with British and American scientists in regard to atomic power.

On November 7, 1945, the day following Mr. Molotov's speech, the House of Commons debated foreign affairs.

In parenthesis we would mention that prior to this date, President Truman said that his government regarded the preservation of the "secret" of the atomic bomb as a "sacred trust".

Mr. Winston Churchill, during the parliamentary debate, November 7, 1945, fully endorsed Truman's point of view, and Mr. Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, following Mr. Churchill also welcomed Truman's decision. It should also be noted that Mr. Bevin on one matter was daylight clear. He, in effect, said that his Government would never agree to the Soviet Union being granted a base in the Mediterranean. He stated: "You cannot help being a little bit suspicious where a Great Power wants to come right across the throat of the British Commonwealth." One could not help wondering whether Mr. Bevin had ever glanced at a map of the Mediterranean. France and Italy at the end of the first world war had and have bases on both sides of the Mediterranean, yet the British Empire's throat had remained uncut. Was he suggesting that the Soviet Union was less to be trusted than France and Italy were at the end of the first world war?

We shall have occasion to return to this subject in future chapters.

Bevin's aims were to keep Soviet influence out of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near and Middle East.

In the course of the debate, November 7, 1945, practically every "backbencher" who spoke, strongly argued that it was vital to peace to maintain the friendliest relations with the U.S.S.R.

One of the most notable speeches came from Col. Martin Lindsay, Conservative, who said: "It is quite obvious that Russia, with her vast resources and above all her powerful State dictatorship, will very quickly catch up with the United States, and she has made it quite plain that she is going ahead just as fast as she can, with every intention

of having the atomic bomb. So the position to-day is that the world has embarked upon another arms race and one which will have consequences a thousand times worse than the last one if it is not arrested.

"It is certain that friendly co-operation between the United States, the British Empire and Russia is the only hope for the future of the world and, as the House well knows, no such co-operation exists to-day. I have listened to the weighty words of my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford. I am neither Russophile nor Russophobe, but an ordinary Englishman who is trying to take a realistic view of the situation as it is to-day. And it seems to me both obvious and understandable that Russia will not co-operate with the Western world as long as she is being treated at a lower level, as an inferior military Power, because of the conviction that she is not to be trusted." (*Hansard*, November 7, 1945, cols. 1318-19.)

The speeches by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Bevin were widely commented on and criticised in the press on the following day. A logical summing up of the editorials in the *Daily Mail*, *News Chronicle*, *Daily Express*, *Daily Herald* and *Daily Telegraph* could be expressed thus: this means the beginning of an armaments race. All sides have stated their cases, now differences must be reconciled if the world is to enjoy peace.

Many leader writers summed up the situation with far more realism and foresight than did Messrs. Churchill and Bevin.

The policy advocated by the Leader of the Opposition and the Foreign Secretary in the November 7 debates were strongly criticised in the Soviet press. For instance, *Pravda*, November 11, 1945, wrote that the U.S.S.R. would not be intimidated by "atomic diplomacy". The journal continued:

"Technical secrets on a large scale cannot to-day remain the monopoly of any one country.

"A post-war world policy of the domination of one Power, as well as the policy of the equilibrium of forces as it is painted by the supporters of the Western bloc, is doomed to bankruptcy.

"Such tendencies cannot help the cause of peace. It can be preserved and insured only by equal collaboration of the great democratic Powers which bore the brunt of the war and bear the responsibility for post-war peace and security." (*Daily Express*, November 12, 1945.)

Already at this time (November, 1945) influential voices were being

raised in favour of a Western bloc not only tacitly but actually directed against the U.S.S.R.

Indeed since the outbreak of the war and during the whole of its progress, there had been many indications of plans for such a bloc. This arose from the essentially hostile attitude to the U.S.S.R. and anxiety, particularly after her victory at Stalingrad, lest she might come out as a very mighty power at the conclusion of the war. This was manifest at the time in some organs of the British and American press as well as later in a number of books and other publications.

On September 5, 1949, Mr. Macmillan in the course of a speech at the Council of Europe read the following significant extract from a memorandum written by Churchill as Prime Minister in *October 1942*:

"I must admit that my thoughts rest primarily in Europe—the revival of the glory of Europe, the parent Continent of the modern nations and of civilisation. It would be a measureless disaster if Russian barbarism overlaid the culture and independence of the ancient States of Europe.

"Hard as it is to say now, I trust that the European family may act united as one under a Council of Europe." (*Daily Herald*, September 6, 1949.)

These words, said Mr. Macmillan, had never been published before!

Naturally—note the date—not at the time when Soviet Russia was shedding oceans of blood and carrying the main burden of stemming Hitler's advance on Europe.

At that time, October, 1942, General Smuts (Prime Minister of South Africa and member of British War Cabinet) extolled Russia's sacrifice in the common cause (see *A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations* Vol. I, pp. 737-8). But a year later Smuts seems to have become very much perturbed at the emergence of the U.S.S.R. as a mighty power. In a speech delivered to the U.K. Branch of the Empire Parliamentary Association on November 28, 1943, he declared that Russia was "the new colossus in Europe—the new colossus that bestrides this continent." (*Daily Telegraph*, December 3, 1943.)

After pointing out that three of the five Great Powers—France Germany and Italy—would have disappeared as such after the war, he declared:

"With the others down and out, and herself the mistress of the continent, Russia's power will not only be great on that account,

but it will be still greater because the Japanese Empire will also have gone the way of all flesh, and therefore any check or balance that might have arisen in the East will have disappeared."

He stressed that the leadership both in the war and after the war is and must remain in the hands of the great trinity of Powers—U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and Britain—but in order that Britain should play her part as an equal with the other two Powers he advocated a "closer union between Britain and the smaller States in Western Europe."

The theme of a Western Union was taken up quickly enough. In a broadcast from Radio Orange (operating in London), December 28, 1943, referring to Smuts' speech, Mr. E. N. Van Kleffen (Dutch Foreign Minister) thought the best guarantee for a lasting peace would be "a strong formation in the West with America, Canada and the other British Dominions as the arsenal and vast reservoir of power. England would act as the base, especially for air power, and the west of the European mainland—by which I mean the Netherlands, Belgium and France—as the bridge-head." (*Daily Herald*, December 29, 1943.)

To resume our narrative. The scene of activity next shifted to Washington. In that city, November 15, 1945, an agreement was signed by Mr. Attlee (Great Britain), Mr. Mackenzie King (Canada) and President Truman (U.S.A.) not to divulge the secrets of atomic energy. In the course of the communique it was stated:

"We have considered the question of disclosure of detailed information concerning the practical industrial application of atomic energy.

"Military exploitation of atomic energy depends to a large part upon the same methods and processes as would be required for industrial uses.

"We are not convinced that the spreading of specialised information regarding the practical application of atomic energy before it is possible to devise effective reciprocal, and enforceable safeguards acceptable to all nations would contribute to a constructive solution of the problem of the atomic bomb."

After the declaration had been issued, Mr. J. F. Byrnes, U.S.A. Secretary of State, said that copies had been sent to the U.S.S.R. and other members of the United Nations Security Council.

All the comments in the press made it unquestionably clear that this declaration was addressed to Moscow.

The *Daily Express* in an editorial on November 16, summed up

fairly accurately the reaction of many thoughtful minds in Great Britain: "The policy laid down by Britain, the United States and Canada for dealing with the atomic bomb is inadequate.

"It does not meet the situation.

"Henceforth at every international conference the atomic bomb will be present."

And on the following day the *Manchester Guardian* editorially approved of the plan; it commented: "The first reaction to the plan for the control of the atomic bomb, both in this country and in the United States, has been frankly disappointing. With notable exceptions it has been damned with faint praise, and in some cases it has been damned without even that courtesy." (*Manchester Guardian*, November 17, 1945.)

Prime Minister Attlee in opening a two days debate on Foreign Affairs reported to the House of Commons, November 22, 1945, on the decisions taken in Washington by the representatives of Great Britain, Canada and the U.S.A. The Prime Minister said that the Three Powers had decided to preserve the secret of the atomic bomb until an effective system of control was worked out by a Commission under the United Nations Organisation and accepted by the Nations comprising the U.N.

In a remark, which was undoubtedly addressed to the U.S.S.R., Attlee said: "I can see no reason for singling out particular nations." Further, in the course of his speech the Prime Minister stated:

"War between Britain and any one of the Dominions is unthinkable; war between Britain and Canada or any one of the Dominions and the United States of America is unthinkable. It seems to me that it is the task of statesmen to spread that confidence throughout the whole world." (*Hansard*, November 22, 1945, col. 606.)

And again:

"Where there is not mutual confidence, no system will be effective, but where it exists, there will be no difficulty. For instance, there is no difficulty between Britain, Canada and the United States; we trust each other, we are able to have free, full and frank discussions, we are working on plans for future co-operation between us in this field, and we wish to establish between all nations just such confidence." (*ibid.*, col. 607.)

There was not a single word in these passages, or indeed in the whole

speech, regarding relations of mutual confidence between Britain and the U.S.S.R.

Actually the mutual confidence between the U.S.A. and Great Britain was somewhat one-sided. The American Government persistently refused to share with Britain the "know how" of the construction of the atom bomb—in spite of the fact that much of the initial research work on atomic energy, etc., had been done in Britain.

The practical need of the moment, without which no system of international security could be built up, was the establishment of firm, friendly, sincere goodwill relations between the U.S.S.R., Britain and the U.S.A., but by his very insistence that "war is unthinkable" between Britain and the U.S.A., without so much as mentioning the U.S.S.R., Mr. Attlee had implied, or at any rate could be taken to have implied, that war was thinkable between Britain and the U.S.S.R.

Mr. Anthony Eden made a very thoughtful contribution to this debate. *Inter alia* he said: "Nobody here will deny that recently there has been an increase of suspicion and mistrust between the Soviet Union and the other two great partners in victory, the United States and ourselves. We all deplore that, and if I make some remarks upon it, I hope it will be understood that they are made by one who has always been and is still convinced that the future peace of the world depends upon an understanding between ourselves, the United States and Russia."

Then followed a warning: "We have not forgotten the lessons of previous wars, the Napoleonic War and the Great War, when we and Russia had to come together to prevent one Power dominating Europe and how, after those wars, we fell apart again with disastrous consequences for us both. We all of us desire, we should all work, that this should not happen again." (*Hansard*, November 22, 1945, cols. 613-14.)

Next turning to arrangements which were being made in East and West Europe, Eden went on: "We want the fullest Russian participation in all world affairs on equal terms. That is the object of our policy. Let us look at the Western bloc, as it is called—I think wrongly. Many times Russian statesmen have spoken to me and to my right hon. Friend also of their need for security and of the necessity they feel for friendly relations with their neighbours. We have never disputed that.

"The Russians have gone very far in making arrangements with

almost all their neighbours; in some cases—take Hungary, for example—they made an economic union infinitely closer than anything that I know that has ever been contemplated between us and our Western neighbours.

“Against whom are all these Russian arrangements being aimed? I know the answer; they have given it so many times.” (*ibid.*, cols. 614-15.)

Mr. Eden answered his own question: “They are being aimed against the possible resurgence of German plans for domination of Europe. The Russians are not yet by any means convinced, as are some people in this country, that the Nazi spirit is entirely dead. Any arrangements which the right hon. Gentleman may make in Western Europe are for precisely the same purpose. They will be complementary to the arrangements that Russia may make in the East and any arrangements between us and our Western neighbours are no more aimed against Russia than are Russia’s arrangements with her neighbours against us. It is desirable that that should be plainly stated, for I am convinced that it is the literal truth. We know that Russia’s arrangements are not aimed against us. We can surely ask her to believe that our arrangements are not aimed against her either.” (*ibid.*, col. 615.)

The *Times* clearly realised the dangers contained in the policy which the Government was pursuing. Next day in an editorial it stated:

“Nor did he (The Prime Minister) attempt to meet the difficulty inherent in the view generally held by scientists that any secret processes still involved in the production of the atomic bomb will be discovered and applied without great difficulty by any nation possessing adequate industrial resources within a matter of four or five years. Assuming this view to be correct—and it has nowhere been seriously challenged—the withholding of these conditional secrets during a period on which a renewal of large-scale war can scarcely be thought of in any quarter as a serious danger may prove to be an advantage dearly bought in terms of future insecurity and suspicion.

“The issue of confidence is, as Mr. Attlee said again and again, paramount. The question which Mr. Attlee’s speech insistently raised without answering it, is whether a generous and ungrudging declaration of willingness to disclose any remaining secrets of the atomic bomb to the Security Council of the United Nations Organisation or to its principal members, accompanied by an invitation to the members of that Council to meet and consider relevant questions of organisation and control, would not have been a more immediate

contribution to international confidence than the contingent and circuitous procedure of the Washington agreement." (*Times*, November 23, 1945.)

The Commons debate was continued on November 23, 1945, and the Foreign Minister, Mr. Bevin, maintained the same cold silence towards and suspicion of the U.S.S.R.

However, many back-benchers—Mrs. Ayrton Gould, Mr. Wilson Harris, Mr. Lipson, Mr. Cocks, Mr. Zilliacus and others—were strongly critical of the Government's policy in this matter and Mr. R. A. Butler admitted: "In passing I would say that there has been a great deal of criticism of the Soviet Union but I would add that in all my experience at Geneva if there was any one nation upon which one could rely to stick to its word in carrying out whatever decision had been made under an international system, it was the Soviet Union." (*Hansard*, November 23, 1945, col. 834.)

The subject was debated in the House of Lords, November 27-28. The Government's policy was defended by the Lord Chancellor, but considerable uneasiness on the subject was expressed by Peers from all parties.

The *Times* editorially commented on November 29, 1945: "Lord Cranborne, as well as several other speakers, expressed anxiety about the mutual suspicions at present affecting relations between Russia and her principal partners." (*Times*, November 29, 1945.)

The Editorial concluded: "If these relations are to be improved, if suspicions are to be exorcized, Russia has a large contribution to make. But an equally large contribution is required from the United States and from Britain. It is at least equally important that the nature of this contribution should be frankly acknowledged."

The debates in the Commons and the Lords were a great disappointment, not only to thoughtful minds who realised how much depended for world peace on confidence between Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., but to the great mass of the people in both countries.

Meanwhile preparations were in progress for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Big Three and this took place in Moscow from December 16 to 26, 1945. The results of the Conference were given in a long official statement issued simultaneously in London, Washington and Moscow, in the early hours of December 28, 1945. The following were the main points as given in the *Times*:

"Far East Commission"

"A Far Eastern Commission is to take the place of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, composed of Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and Philippine Commonwealth.

"The Commission, which will have its headquarters in Washington but may sit elsewhere on occasion, will have wide powers, and may review directives to the supreme commander of the allied Powers. Directives affecting fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure shall be issued only after agreement in the Commission. Action may be taken by majority decision, which shall include the votes of the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia and China.

"Allied Council for Japan"

"The council will have its seat in Tokyo. It will consist of the supreme commander and a United States member, a Russian member, a Chinese member, and a member representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and India.

"The supreme Commander will be sole executive authority for the allied Powers in Japan.

"Korea"

"A provisional Korean democratic government to be set up. A joint commission representing the United States command in the south and the Russian command in the north will assist in the task. Its recommendations will be 'presented' for the consideration of the Russian, Chinese, British and United States Governments.

"The commission will submit proposals for a four-Power trusteeship of Korea.

"China"

"The Foreign Ministers agreed on the need for a unified and democratic China in the National Government.

"Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Molotov were in 'complete accord' on the desirability of the earliest withdrawal of American and Russian troops from China.

"The Balkans"

"The present Governments in Rumania and Bulgaria to be broadened by the inclusion of two members of other democratic parties.

"When this has been done the two Governments, with which

Russia maintains already diplomatic relations, will be recognised by Great Britain and the United States.

"Atomic Energy"

"The establishment of a commission of the United Nations on the control of atomic energy is recommended.

"The commission will report to the Security Council. It will make specific proposals for the exchange between all nations of scientific information for peaceful ends and for eliminating atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction." (*Times* December 28, 1945.)

The three Foreign Ministers were very pleased with their work. An Associated Press cable, date-lined Moscow, December 27, 1945, stated: "Saying good-bye at the airport, Mr. Byrnes to-day declared that the conference had been 'very constructive,' not only because of the settlement of many problems but because of the 'cordial relations between the three countries represented.' He added: 'There is great hope for the settlement of other problems in the same friendly way.'" (*Times*, December 28, 1945.)

Mr. David Tirrell in a cable date-lined Moscow, December 27, stated: "Mr. Ernest Bevin tonight described the conference of Foreign Ministers as a 'most important step' to solving the world's problems." (*Daily Express*, December 28, 1945.)

The cable continued: "Mr. Bevin added: 'If the decisions reached are carried out in a good spirit of understanding they will carry us on to the next stage to bigger and more vital problems.

"'The conference achieved what was humanly possible under present circumstances. Its actual significance depends on the implementation of the agreements reached.'"

The *Times* correspondent in a cable date-lined Moscow, December 28, 1945, declared: "The conference has ended by achieving agreement to set up machinery for the drawing up of a policy and for the execution of that policy. The long statement contains no vague aspirations, no declaration of ideals, but what a war weary world will no doubt value more highly—a practical programme of action."

The results of the Conference were acclaimed in the British press. The *Daily Herald*, December 28, 1945, stated: "The Christmas Conference of the three Foreign Ministers in Moscow has been a success. This result will be greeted with relief throughout the world. Had it been otherwise—how gloomy an ending to the year of victory over

Hitlerism and Nipponism! And how dark an augury for the great international tasks which must be undertaken in 1946!

"It is not, of course, to be expected that every detail of the agreements announced to-day will be 100 per cent. acceptable to every shade of opinion. Some compromises have been necessary. But it would have been miraculous indeed if, at this stage of international development, the Governments of the three major Powers had found themselves thinking alike on every issue."

The *Times* editorially declared: "The Christmas conference of the three Foreign Ministers at Moscow has been a striking success and has gone far to redeem the breakdown of the preceding conference in London. Outside the formal meetings both Mr. Bevin and Mr. Byrnes had conversations with Mr. Stalin, who was back from his long holiday in the south and whose guiding hand undoubtedly contributed in large measure to the success of the conference." (*Times*, December 28, 1945.)

CHAPTER VIII

ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS WORSEN IN 1946

As mentioned in Chapter VI, American-Soviet relations were poisoned at the San Francisco Conference, April-June, 1945, which met to establish the Charter of U.N.

Anglo-Soviet relations were poisoned at the Conference of the Four Foreign Ministers in London in the autumn of the same year when Foreign Secretary Bevin, with the full support of the U.S.A. delegate, declared in effect that the British Government had returned to the policy of the Crimean War, i.e. to keep Soviet Russia bottled up in the Black Sea and to maintain *places d'armes* on the territories of countries adjacent to the U.S.S.R., from which vital centres of the U.S.S.R. could be attacked in a short flying time.

True, much of that poison would seem to have evaporated at the Moscow Conference, December 16-26, 1945, however it soon welled up again in 1946. Although in the course of that year many protestations of a strong desire for better relations were made, the volume of poison did not diminish.

On February 20 and 21, 1946, international affairs were debated in the House of Commons, but as so often happened it was the subject of Anglo-Soviet relations which occupied the greater part of the debate.

Many important points were raised in the course of the debate. Here we can quote only a few of them.

Mr. M. P. Price, who had just spent two months in the Soviet Union, referred *inter alia* to conversations which he had had with ordinary Soviet citizens:

"What struck me most was that the Russians are just as fearful of us as we are of them. All the time they were asking 'What are you up to, are you preparing a western bloc against us, you and the Americans?' I could see they were determined to prevent their country ever again being a scene of war and devastation to which they have been subjected for the third time in 30 years. I found a nervous suspicion of us. They cannot forget the wars of intervention. While talking to them, I was all the time trying to tell them that

1945 is not 1918 again, and that it is different here and elsewhere in Europe. The Russians are a sensitive and suspicious people, who will require handling with the utmost care." (*Hansard*, February 20, 1946, col. 1172.)

Mr. Emrys Hughes stated: "I cannot say that I was always in entire agreement with the line taken by the Foreign Secretary at the U.N. Conference. If I may say so, I rather regretted some of his references to Soviet Russia. I regretted them because it seemed to me, in one of his utterances, that he spoke rather like the ghost of Lord Curzon." (*ibid.*, col. 1188.)

Mr. H. L. Hutchinson declared: "In fact we are the unfortunate heirs to the traditional policy which dates back to Castlereagh after the Napoleonic wars and Curzon after the last war. We have not entirely broken away from it. That policy is one of bolstering up reactionary monarchs and decaying régimes wherever we can find them. In that policy I believe we can find the explanation for the antagonism between ourselves and Soviet Russia. It is an antagonism, not of peoples, but of policies.

"We are suspected of pursuing a policy of bolstering up reaction in Europe while the Soviet are supporting the policy of revolutionary forces in Europe. I believe that is the explanation of our armed intervention in Indonesia, Indo-China and Greece. It is the explanation of the maintenance, at the expense of the British taxpayer, of General Anders' anti-Soviet Army in Italy. I believe it is behind the refusal to give Russia those vital scientific secrets to which she is entitled as a fighting Ally. I also think it is behind the abuse that is showered on Russia because of her attempt to obtain that information by other means. All this suspicion and antagonism result from a misconceived policy." (*Hansard*, February 21, 1946, col. 1324.)

Mr. Anthony Eden said:

"I believe that the Soviet Union is sincere when they say to us that they want to collaborate with ourselves and the United States, their two great partners in the mortal conflict from which they and we have only just emerged. I think, also, that the Soviet Union are sincere in wishing that the United Nations Organisation should function. It can only function if there is a measure of understanding between the three great Powers. That far, I think, we are agreed.

"But here comes the rub. While Russia wants this collaboration—as I say, I am convinced sincerely with the other two great Powers

—she appears only to want it on her own terms. That will not work. Sooner or later, that must land us all into difficulties.” (*ibid.*, col. 1344.)

Mr. Ernest Bevin wound up the debate on behalf of the Government. For the first time he revealed that on his last visit to Moscow he had offered to extend the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942 from twenty to fifty years. Later in the debate Bevin said:

“Somebody yesterday raised the question of whether we offered Constantinople to the Tsar in 1914-18. We seem in that war to have done an awful lot of things of one kind and another which I do not doubt have harassed every Foreign Secretary since, but the idea behind Russia’s mind is that we are prepared to treat her in an inferior way to that in which we treated the Tsars. I do not want to do that, but what we offered the Tsars is, I think, unnecessary in the modern world with the United Nations. That is the difference.

“It is said we are drifting into war with Russia. I cannot conceive any circumstances in which Britain and the Soviet Union should go to war. The Soviet Union has a territory right from the Kuriles into the satellite States. It is the greatest in the world—one solid great land Power. I cannot see about what we have to fight. And certainly it never enters my mind and I am certain it does not any of my colleagues in the Government.” (*ibid.*, cols. 1357-8.)

Naturally this debate was very widely reported and commented on in the British press. The *Times* (whose comment was very similar to a large number of other dailies) stated: “Relations with the Soviet Union were the central theme both of Mr. Eden’s and Mr. Bevin’s speeches last night. Both reiterated the desire to see these relations on a firmer and more cordial footing. Both observed, in slightly different language, that the Soviet Government sincerely desired co-operation with Great Britain and the United States, but desired it on their own terms. The converse is no doubt equally—and, provided the ‘terms’ are reasonable, properly—true of the British attitude towards the Soviet Union.

“The trouble does not lie on either side in the lack of sincere desire for collaboration—tributes to the sincerity of Soviet preoccupation with security rather than expansion were paid by more than one speaker in the debate. The trouble lies in the fact that both parties, while sincerely desiring friendship, indulge in word and action which excite the suspicion of the other and are treated by the other as provocative. The only remedy immediately available would be to reduce

the occasions of public controversy and to multiply those of direct confidential discussion between the leaders of both countries." (*Times*, February 22, 1946.)

The next important event (in so far as a speech by the Leader of the Opposition in the British House of Commons can be an event) was enacted at Fulton, Missouri, U.S.A., on March 5, 1946. Mr. Churchill, speaking there, said among other things:

"Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organisation intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytising tendencies. . . .

"From Stettin, in the Baltic, to Trieste, in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the States of Central and Eastern Europe—Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia. All these famous cities and the populations around them lie in the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence, but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow. . . .

"On the other hand, I repulse the idea that a new war is inevitable, still more that it is imminent.

"It is because I am sure that our fortunes are in our own hands, that we hold the power to save the future, that I feel the duty to speak out, not that I love an occasion to do so. I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines. But what we have to consider here to-day while time remains is the permanent prevention of war and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries.

"Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by closing our eyes to them. They will not be removed by mere waiting to see what happens, nor will they be relieved by a policy of appeasement. What is needed is a settlement, and the longer this is delayed the more difficult it will be, and the greater our dangers will become. From what I have seen of our Russian friends and allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength and there is nothing for which they have less respect than military weakness.

"For that reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound. We cannot afford if we can help it to work on narrow margins

offering temptations to a trial of strength. If the western democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter their influence for furthering those principles will be immense, and no one is likely to molest them. If, however, they become divided or falter in their duty and if these all-important years are allowed to slip away, then indeed catastrophe may overwhelm us all.

"Last time I saw it all coming and cried aloud to my own fellow-countrymen and to the world, but no one paid any attention. . . .

"There never was a war in all history easier to prevent by timely action than the one which has just desolated such great areas of the globe. . . .

"This can only be achieved by reaching now, in 1946, a good understanding on all points with Russia under the general authority of the United Nations Organisation and by the maintenance of that good understanding through many peaceful years by the world instrument, supported by the whole strength of the English-speaking world and all its connections." (*Times*, March 6, 1946.)

Churchill's whole speech constituted in effect an appeal for an Anglo-American Military Alliance directed against the U.S.S.R.

That is how the speech was interpreted in the U.S.A., Great Britain and throughout the world, as the press comments of the following days showed.

The *New York Herald Tribune* commented: "Mr. Churchill seems quite plainly to mean that Russia is to-day a menace comparable with that of Nazism a decade ago, that can be met only by such a show of strength as Churchill once called for in vain against Germany, and that this strength can only be provided by an Anglo-American Military Alliance." (*Evening News*, March 6, 1946.)

In India, the *Morning Standard* commented: "Britain's post-war aim, according to Mr. Churchill, appears to be to prepare for a new war—war against the Soviet." (*ibid.*)

Editorially on March 7, 1946, the *Daily Herald* commented: "There is speculation all over the world about the origin of Mr. Churchill's speech at Fulton. He declared that he was speaking as a private individual, but clearly there are many who believe that the speech was composed in collaboration with the British Government.

"We can say with authority that its contents were neither known to nor influenced by the Government."

The effect of the speech in the U.S.S.R. can be imagined. The

following extracts from a long leader in *Pravda* are interesting. Under the title "Churchill Rattles His Sabre", *Pravda* gives an excellent idea of the impression made there by Churchill's speech:

"Reading the speech of the former British Prime Minister, one involuntarily remembers Churchill during the period after the First World War. Then, too, Churchill marched out of step with history. Then, too, he placed himself in the path of the historic events that were developing, and made pathetic demands to stop or halt those events. He was the inciter of the anti-Soviet campaign, and the main organiser of armed intervention against the Soviet Union.

"The British people paid dearly enough for this adventure of the British reactionaries, who tried by force of arms to inflict their will on the young Soviet Republic. As is known, this adventure fell through with a crash, despite all the efforts of the Churchills and Chamberlains.

"Many years have passed since then, and much water has flowed under the bridges. But Churchill has remained true to himself. Apparently he has forgotten nothing and learned nothing. Now, too, he is in the grip of his former conceptions and his former aspiration. Again he rides his old horse, coming out against the Soviet Union—coming out sharply, aggressively, smashingly, with the threat of the 'Bolshevik danger' and 'Bolshevik expansion' which he has dragged out of the archives.

"While the war was on, while mortal danger threatened Britain and Europe, Churchill in his speeches repeatedly pointed to the outstanding role of the U.S.S.R. At that time he pretended to be a friend of the Soviet people, and took an oath of loyalty to Soviet-British friendship as to the entire Anglo-Soviet-American Coalition.

"But the danger has passed, the mortal danger which threatened Europe and Britain from Hitler Germany has sunk into oblivion—and Churchill has become his own self. Now he can give vent to his true sentiments which he hid through all those years of war, painstakingly concealing his hostile intentions and plans towards the Soviet Union.

"Churchill is sufficiently experienced to know how to cover these intentions and plans with resounding phrases about 'democracy,' 'peace,' and 'the fraternity of peoples.' But it is enough to read through his speech, and no doubt whatsoever remains of the falsity and hypocrisy of these phrases in Churchill's mouth when he hurls words permeated with poison and hatred of genuine democracy about the 'expansionist tendencies' of the Soviet Union, on the 'iron curtain' which has descended on the Continent, on the

'shadow of the East' which 'has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory.'"

After some sharp sarcastic remarks on Churchill's attitude to the Eastern European States, the article continues: "Churchill finds his only comfort in Athens. In Churchill's conception the prototype of liberated Europe is Greece, where, under the protection of British troops, the Fascist-Monarchist reaction is doing its job, where the Greek X-ites—these last Hitlerite offsprings—are with impunity terrorising the Greek patriots. Yet just as one swallow does not make Summer, one 'democratic' Greece is unable to turn Churchill's ire from the whole of Eastern Europe.

"Just as after the First World War, so now after the Second World War, Churchill fancies himself the saviour of Europe from Communism. . . .

"Churchill," says *Pravda*, "puts forward the proposal of creating an Anglo-American military alliance. He adds quite openly that this military alliance must be directed against the U.S.S.R.—against the power which bore on its shoulders the brunt of the war and played a decisive role in the rout of Hitlerite Germany.

"But a military alliance of two of the members of the coalition against the third means the end of the coalition of the three Great Powers which was established in the course of the Second World War. Thus with one stroke Churchill wipes out everything he himself during the war preached as an indisputable truth. . . .

"According to Churchill's idea, the front of the Western democracies under Anglo-American domination must be set off against Eastern Communism. He openly proclaims the policy of force, which is to be carried out by the Anglo-American military alliance. It is perfectly clear to everybody that this in practice means nothing but the liquidation of the United Nations Organisation. . . .

"He (Churchill) himself realises that he has not the means to materialise the plans born of his wild imagination. And Churchill frantically grips Uncle Sam's coat-tails in the hope that the Anglo-American military alliance will allow the British Empire to continue the policy of imperialist expansion—at least in the role of a junior partner. . . .

"Churchill forgets that the freedom-loving peoples have during the years of war acquired tremendous political experience, and know how to differentiate between genuine friends of peace and imperialists who, under the false banner of 'defence of peace,' are preparing plans to

unleash a new imperialist war. And by no hypocritical speeches about 'democracy' and 'freedom' will the inveterate reactionaries like Churchill and his American friends from the camp of the Vandenberg, succeed in dragging the peoples on the path of new wars prepared by them."

On March 9, the *Times* commented: "At the London session of the United Nations, while the policy of the Soviet delegation strengthened allied doubts about the reality of Russian co-operation, Russia in her turn felt that once again she stood alone. The speech of Mr. Churchill at Fulton with its emphasis on an Anglo-American military understanding, she now reads as further confirmation of her fears."

Labour M.P.s who differed profoundly from Churchill's policy without loss of time tabled the following Motion:

"That this House considers that proposals for a military alliance between the British Commonwealth and the United States for the purpose of combating the spread of Communism, such as were put forward in a speech at Fulton, Missouri, United States, by the right honourable gentleman the Member for Woodford, are calculated to do injury to good relations between Great Britain, the United States and the U.S.S.R., and are inimical to the cause of world peace; and affirms its view that world peace and security can be maintained, not by sectional alliances, but by progressively strengthening the power and authority of U.N. to the point where it becomes capable of exercising, in respect to world law, order and justice, the functions of a world Government." (*Times*, March 11, 1946.)

The Motion was signed by 105 M.P.s, but the Leader of the House of Commons stated that the Government could not find time for a debate on the Motion.

The question of the Fulton speech was raised in the House of Commons, March 11, 1946. Prime Minister Attlee, after stating that "His Majesty's Government had no previous knowledge of the contents of the speech", added, "His Majesty's Government is not called upon to express any opinion of a speech delivered in another country by a private individual. The policy of His Majesty's Government has been laid down perfectly plainly in the House by the Foreign Secretary." (*Hansard*, March 11, 1946, cols. 762-3.)

The *Daily Herald* thus summed up reactions to the Fulton speech: "British comment on the whole was promptly and overwhelmingly

opposed to Mr. Churchill's proposals, which may fairly be summed up as an appeal for an anti-Soviet Alliance by Britain and the United States. Comment in the United States was also, we think, far more hostile than Mr. Churchill had anticipated." (*Daily Herald*, March 12, 1946.)

That summing up was in our judgment fairly accurate.

Generalissimo Stalin replied at length to the Fulton speech in an interview in *Pravda*, March 13.

After stating that he regarded the speech "as a dangerous act" prejudicial to the cause of peace, Stalin continued:

"Actually, Mr. Churchill and his friends in Britain and the United States, present to the non-English-speaking nations something in the nature of an ultimatum: 'accept our rule voluntarily, and then all will be well; otherwise war is inevitable'.

"But the nations shed their blood in the course of five years' bitter war for the sake of the liberty and independence of their countries, and not in order to exchange the rule of the Hitlers for the rule of the Churchills.

"It is quite probable, accordingly, that the non-English-speaking nations, which constitute the vast majority of the population of the world, will not agree to submit to a new slavery.

"It is Mr. Churchill's tragedy that, inveterate Tory that he is, he does not understand this simple and obvious truth."

Stalin concluded: "I don't know whether Mr. Churchill and his friends will succeed in organising a new armed campaign against Eastern Europe after the Second World War; but if they do succeed—which is not very probable, because millions of plain people stand guard over the cause of peace—it may be confidently said that they will be thrashed, just as they were thrashed once before, twenty-six years ago."

Mr. Churchill spoke again on March 15, this time at a dinner given by the City of New York. *Inter alia* he said:

"When I spoke at Fulton I felt it was necessary for someone in an unofficial position to speak in arresting terms about the present plight of the world. I was invited to give my counsel freely in this free country, and I am sure the hope which I expressed for increasing the association of our two countries will come to pass, not because of any speech which may be made, but because of the tides that flow in

human affairs and in the course of unfolding the destiny of the world.

"The only question which in my opinion is open is whether the necessary harmony of thought and action between the American and British peoples will be reached in a sufficiently plain and clear manner and in good time to prevent a new world struggle, or whether it will come about as it has done before, only in the course of that struggle. I remain convinced that this question will win a favourable answer. I do not believe that war is inevitable or imminent. I do not believe the rulers of Russia wish for war at the present time."

Later in his speech Churchill said:

"I have never asked for an Anglo-American military alliance or a treaty. I asked for something different, and, in a sense, I asked for something more; I asked for fraternal association—a free, voluntary, fraternal association. I have no doubt that it will come to pass as surely as the sun will rise to-morrow, but you do not need a treaty to express natural affinities and friendships which arise in a fraternal association.

"We in the British Commonwealth will stand at your side in a powerful and faithful friendship and in accordance with the world Charter, and together, I am sure, we shall succeed in lifting from the face of man the curse of war and the darker curse of tyranny. Thus will be opened ever more broadly to the anxious, toiling millions the gateways of happiness and freedom." (*Times*, March 16, 1946.)

In this speech Churchill in effect dotted the "i's" and crossed the "t's" of the anti-Soviet hostility expressed in his Fulton speech, and naturally it did nothing to reduce the tension between Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. He was still campaigning for an Anglo-American Military Alliance directed against the U.S.S.R., but this time at a second remove. The reason for this was clear: the American people were not prepared to swallow his first proposal. The *Sunday Times* Washington Correspondent cabled: "It must be said, too, however unpalatable, that few Americans are prepared to underwrite their conception of Mr. Churchill's British Empire or to accept as permanent an arrangement that seemed like an anti-Russian alliance." (*Sunday Times*, March 17, 1946.)

As has already been recorded, the first major quarrel between Great

Britain and the U.S.S.R. after the second world war arose in connection with the Near and Middle East—the countries stretching from the Dardanelles to the Persian Gulf. This matter was put very clearly by Mr. A. J. P. Taylor (Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford) in a B.B.C. broadcast on March 20, 1946. *Inter alia* Taylor said:

"We've been in the Middle East for a long time; in Palestine for twenty-five years, in Egypt for sixty years (since 1882), in Cyprus since 1878, in the Red Sea for a century (since 1838) and in the Persian Gulf for two centuries. And so, there is a sort of deadweight of habit: we're there because we're there and we repeat phrases and slogans that, I feel, are out-of-date, if they were ever in.

"For instance, it's often said that the Mediterranean, and hence the Suez Canal, is the 'life-line of the British Empire'. I doubt whether this was ever true, and I'm sure it's not true now. During the last war the Mediterranean route was closed to us for the best part of three years, the most desperate three years in our history and yet the British Empire survived—now that's hardly a life-line. Try squeezing your own wind-pipe for three minutes, let alone for three years, and see what happens. And it's quite certain that the Mediterranean 'life-line' couldn't be kept going in a new war in the atomic age which is upon us. No, the true life-line of the British Empire, as our eighteenth-century statesmen knew, is the route round the Cape—that is the thing which holds the British Empire together."

After describing the Middle East area as a great bridge uniting three continents, Europe, Asia and Africa, Taylor continued: "The Russians are no more prepared to allow us sole control of the great bridge, which don't forget is also the bridge into southern Russia, than we would allow them sole control. We can't abandon it. Only two alternatives remain, it seems to me: one is to fight and the other is to share. In the nineteenth century we fought: that was the Crimean War, the greatest of disasters. The Crimean War made the rise of great Germany possible, and so led to all the dangers and miseries of the two German wars. A new Anglo-Russian War in the Middle East would benefit Germany and no one else. And therefore we must share, as we did in 1907, when we shared responsibilities in Persia, or as we did in 1915, when we promised Constantinople to Russia. The modern form of sharing is not partition, but to put the responsibility on to the United Nations."

Prominent public men continued to emphasise the crucial importance of friendly relations between Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.

But Mr. Churchill was unrepentant. He continued to advocate a line-up against the U.S.S.R., but he expressed this with somewhat greater caution and with lip-service to a desire for Anglo-Soviet friendship.

Speaking in Church House, Westminster, May 7, 1946, Mr. Churchill stated:

"The supreme hope and prime endeavour is to reach a good and faithful understanding with Soviet Russia through the agency and organism of the United Nations.

"In this patient, persevering, resolute endeavour, the English-speaking world and the Western democracies of Europe must play their part and move together.

"Only in this way can catastrophe be avoided: only in this way can the salvation of the world be gained." (*Daily Express*, May 8, 1946.)

Speaking at the Hague two days later he stated that: "affairs in Great Britain and the Commonwealth and Empire are becoming ever more closely interwoven with those of the United States of America and that an underlying unity of thoughts and convictions is growing among the nations of the English-speaking world," and added: "There can be nothing but advantage to the whole world from such a vast and fundamental synthesis. Our twenty years' treaty with Russia, which does not conflict with other associations, we hope will prove one of the sure anchors of world peace." (*Times*, May 10, 1946.)

At this time the main questions left over from the war were still unresolved.

Foreign Ministers Byrnes (U.S.A.), Bidault (France), Molotov (U.S.S.R.), and Bevin (Britain) met in Conference in Paris on April 25, 1946, to discuss peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Finland, the question of Germany, the future of the former Italian Colonies (Tripolitania and Cyrenaica) and the future of Trieste.

The conversations continued up to the evening of May 16, 1946, with very little result.

The *Daily Herald's* correspondent cabled from Paris, May 16, 1946:

"One thing did get done to-day. At the end of the morning sitting

the Four initialled the revised Italian armistice terms which is expected to be formally signed tomorrow by Lieutenant-General Sir W. D. Morgan, Allied C.-I.-C. in the Central Mediterranean and probably by Signor Alcide de Gasperi, Italian Premier.

"That is the one mouse which has emerged from the three weeks' labour of this mountain." (*Daily Herald*, May 17, 1946.)

The *Daily Telegraph's* correspondent cabled from Paris:

"Great problems left unsolved by the Council of Foreign Ministers include the future of the Italo-Yugoslav frontier and of the Trieste district, the future of the Italian colonies, the Austrian peace treaty, the future of Germany and the peace treaties with Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Finland.

"The feature of the Paris talks is that there has been no acerbity. For the first time after a formal meeting Mr. Molotov this evening went into the buffet and had a drink—champagne—with the other Ministers.

"The Council of Foreign Ministers adjourned this evening until June 15th on a note that is officially described as disappointing." (*Daily Telegraph*, May 17, 1946.)

Meanwhile annual conferences of trade unions and prominent men in the British Labour Movement, including Sir Hartley Shawcross and Harold Laski, stressed the need to maintain and strengthen friendship with the U.S.S.R. and these sentiments were re-echoed from South Africa by General Smuts.

There was a two days debate in the House of Commons, June 4 and 5, 1946. It was opened by Foreign Secretary Bevin, who dealt at length with the questions at issue between Britain and the U.S.S.R. Amongst other things he said:

"I had a talk in Moscow last December with Generalissimo Stalin and I indicated to him that I would be willing to recommend to the Government of the United Kingdom that the Treaty of Friendship should be extended to fifty years. I had at the back of my mind the creation of some permanent link between our two countries which would avoid misunderstanding."

Bevin continued: "I was ready to go to the extent of regular consultation, exchange of views, and helping in the development of the

peace of Europe as well as facilitating the trade, commerce and exchange between our respective countries. I regret that the proposal was not taken more seriously at the time, but I am still confident it will come yet. For my part, while I am Foreign Secretary, notwithstanding the rebuffs, I shall still pursue it."

Referring to the U.S.S.R.'s claim for joint control with Turkey of the Dardanelles, he said:

"Neither do I believe that there is any basis for real misunderstanding or fundamental disagreement over the Dardanelles. We have been willing, equally with our predecessors, to consider the revision of the Montreux Convention. What we are anxious to avoid, and I emphasise this, is to do anything, or agree to anything, which will undermine the real independence of Turkey, or convert her into a mere satellite state. But, with the recognition of these principles, I am convinced that these two factors are not irreconcilable. Let me go further and say that we will always welcome the mercantile fleet of the Soviet Union on all the seas of the world. We sail to the Baltic, but we have not got a base and have not got a port there. We will sail to Odessa again, to the Black Sea and Constanza, quite freely, but we do not ask for a base or military requirements to enable us to do so.

"Our aim, as a Government, is the free movement of shipping and the world's trade. Therefore, whatever responsibilities we undertake in the defence scheme of the world in any particular area, we give a solemn undertaking that they will be on a basis of freedom to all members of the Peace Club on equal terms. I believe that if such an attitude is accepted all round, this great desire for bases can be considerably minimised."

This obviously meant that Britain could control the Suez Canal and military bases and the Straits of Gibraltar, hundreds of miles from her metropolitan territory, but the U.S.S.R. was to have no real say in the control of the Dardanelles, so vital as an outlet from her southern provinces.

Bevin in effect said to the U.S.S.R.: "Trust to our pledges, but we won't trust to yours."

The Soviet Union had proposed that the trusteeship of Tripolitania should be handed over to them. Mr. Bevin would not hear of it. He said: "At this stage the Soviet Union claimed the individual trusteeship of Tripolitania, at Paris. After a lot of discussion this scheme for the

individual trusteeship by Soviet Russia was withdrawn; but in doing so the Soviet Government demanded that in consideration for the withdrawal we should accede to their proposal for Trieste. I am bound to say that I cannot accept such a proposition, because to hand over 500,000 Italians to Yugoslavia in return for a withdrawal of what I thought was an unfounded claim by Soviet Russia which would have had the effect of handing a larger number of Arabs over to a country they may detest, seems to me to introduce a method of dealing and bargaining in international affairs that is absolutely unjust and unsound."

Then turning to British claims Mr. Bevin said:

"... We proposed that British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland and the adjacent part of Ethiopia, if Ethiopia agreed, should be lumped together as a trust territory, so that the nomads should lead their frugal existence with the least possible hindrance and there might be a real chance of a decent economic life, as understood in that territory.

"But what attracted Mr. Molotov's criticism was, I am sure, that I suggested that Great Britain should be made the administering authority. Was this unreasonable?"

He added: "In the first place, we were surrendering a protectorate comparable in size to the area we hoped that Ethiopia would contribute. Secondly, it was a British force, mainly East African and South African, which freed this area; and it was a British, Indian and South African force which bore the main brunt of restoring the independence of Ethiopia and of putting the Emperor back on his throne after several years' sanctuary in this country." A case of sauce for the goose but not sauce for the gander.

Mr. Bevin dealt at length with the question of Germany. Among other things he said:

"I desire to make it clear that in any final settlement His Majesty's Government, subject to the adjustments of reparations and other obligations which are involved, favour the transfer of the Saar to the French, but I would prefer that the German problem should be considered as a whole before that final step is taken.

"There was an attempt by our Soviet friends to make a special point of the Ruhr, but my attitude has been all through that we must not only know what is happening in the Ruhr, but what is

happening in Saxony, in Thuringia and everywhere else, including the French and American Zones.

"That brings me to the point of the present situation which is causing so much difficulty. The Potsdam Agreement envisaged Germany being treated as a whole, which meant that the surplus food supplies of the East would feed the West, and the goods of the West would go to the East, and so on; and sufficient earnings would be produced, so that Germany would not be a charge on any of the Allies. That was the basis. We, His Majesty's Government, cannot accept the position which involves a budgetary expenditure of £80 million a year to subsidise Germany."

Bevin added: "We cannot accept the position that the Soviet zone is an exclusive place, while our zone alone is wide open for inspection and we are subject to accusations for which there is not the slightest justification. As soon as that point of principle is settled, as I hope it will be, and there is a real, honest endeavour to tackle the whole problem, I believe that we can make progress on the German situation."

Turning to the question of calling a general peace conference, Mr. Bevin said:

"Our position is that if we cannot get agreement of the four in the Council of Foreign Ministers, we should take our work before the conference of twenty-one—both the drafts we have agreed, and the questions on which we have failed to agree, and if we still cannot get agreement on calling the conference of twenty-one, it is obvious that the world cannot be left in this undecided state.

"We cannot be forced to acquiesce in an indefinite stalemate. We must regularise our relations with the ex-enemy countries. It cannot go on very much longer. There have been in the course of these difficulties, other ideas promulgated, but I will not pronounce an opinion upon them now. I propose to make another effort at agreement before deciding on any final or alternative form."

Later Mr. Bevin said: "Finally, if I may go back again, I find from Press reports that we are alleged to have indulged in a bloc. I gather the interpretation is that we are engaged in some conspiracy for acquiring bases in various islands of the Pacific and Atlantic areas. The way it is put out to the world would impute a very sinister ring to what is a very straightforward affair.

"In the course of the war which has just closed, the United States Government established bases on a number of islands administered by Governments of the British Commonwealth, for the sole purpose of prosecuting the war against the common enemy, and with the willing consent of the Governments concerned. They spent a lot of money on those bases, and naturally they want to know our views about their future status and maintenance. Quite apart from any question of their future military value, many of those places are important from the point of view of civil aviation. We have been discussing all this with the United States and the Dominions. I hope we shall be able to make arrangements which will be to the general interest, and I trust that what I have said will prevent any further ill-grounded suggestions that we are engaged in some sort of conspiracy in this matter."

Bevin apparently forgot the large number of other bases which the U.S.A. occupied in the course of the war and which she then occupied and still occupies to-day.

Concluding, Mr. Bevin stated: "I repeat that I am not unduly pessimistic. I do not think that it will be impossible for us at our next meeting to arrive at agreed conclusions. There is no real and insurmountable division; if all parties will try, Europe can revive and security for all can be provided. But they must try; we can and we must, if everybody is willing, bridge the gap now existing between the East and the West, since otherwise the peace will be no more durable than that after 1919.

"The disadvantages of such a state of affairs both to the West and to the East would only be too apparent. For only so can relations of real confidence be established, and real confidence involves mutual respect and trust. It has been said in the past that East and West will never meet. The science of man has settled that. Not only must we meet, we must understand and learn to co-operate. It is my belief that mutual respect and confidence is now in the process of formation. The task is admittedly difficult. I cannot promise success at the next conference, but I will do my best, in the interests of the common people of the world, to deserve it." (*Hansard*, June 4, 1946, cols. 1836-58.)

On the following day, Mr. Churchill continued the debate. He supported in its entirety the speech of Mr. Bevin and added: "Nevertheless, I am sure that it is the general wish of the British and Russian peoples that they should have warm and friendly feelings towards each other. We seek nothing from them except their good will, and we would play our part with other nations, in coming to their aid with

such resources as we may have if their just rights or safety were assailed. We were all glad to hear the Foreign Secretary say that he was still in favour of the fifty years treaty or twenty years treaty with Russia.

"Personally, I attach great importance to the existing Treaty. I have never made a speech on European questions without referring to it. It may go through bad times—lots of treaties do—but it would be a great misfortune if it were incontinently discarded."

On the subject of Germany, Churchill said:

"Indescribable crimes have been committed by Germany under the Nazi rule. Justice must take its course, the guilty must be punished, but once that is over—and I trust it will soon be over—I fall back on the declaration of Edmund Burke, 'I cannot frame an indictment against an entire people.' We cannot plan or even dream of a new world or a new Europe which contains pariah nations, that is to say, nations permanently or for prolonged periods outcast from the human family."

Churchill apparently forgot that that was exactly what he planned for Soviet Russia after the end of the first world war.

Churchill added: "We must do our best for the German people, and after the guilty have been punished for their horrible crimes we must banish revenge against an entire race from our minds. We must make sure they do not rearm and that their industries are not capable of rapid transition to war production."

Churchill concluded: "Let us beware of delay and further degeneration. With all their virtues, democracies are changeable. After the hot fit, comes the cold. Are we to see again, as we saw the last time, the utmost severities inflicted upon the vanquished, to be followed by a period in which we let them arm anew, and in which we then seek to appease their wrath? We cannot impose our will on our Allies, but we can, at least proclaim our own convictions. Let us proclaim them fearlessly. Let Germany live. Let Austria and Hungary be freed. Let Italy resume her place in the European system. Let Europe arise again in glory, and by her strength and unity ensure the peace of the world." (*Hansard*, June 5, 1946, cols. 2030-41.)

Prime Minister Attlee followed but added very little to what Mr. Bevin had said on the previous day. However, he did state: "I say that it would be a fatal thing to accentuate, in any way, this line of division between East and Western Europe, because we have to try to get

across the barriers, and get a mutual understanding. Let me say that, at the same time we have equally to try and understand the Russian mind and Russian history, and understand why they take the line they do." (*ibid.*, col. 2046.)

Mr. Seymour Cocks, in the course of an interesting and well-informed speech said:

"At the last General Election the thought that a Labour Government in England would mean that friendship with Russia would grow ever warmer and closer, and that the two countries and peoples would be bound together by firm and unbreakable ties, cheered our people, and was cheered by audiences when it was said from our platforms. The phrase that 'Only the left can understand the left' was often quoted at our meetings and was received with the full-throated applause of deep conviction.

"Russia has a very big job in Eastern Europe and I think she should be allowed to do it without any irritating interference from the West. America has the Monroe doctrine and until we frankly recognised that doctrine our relations with her were never cordial. . . .

"To-day we fully recognise that doctrine and this country would not dream of interfering in the affairs of a South American State without having first obtained the approval of the U.S.A." (*ibid.*, col. 2059.)

Mr. McNeil, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wound up the debate for the Government. He did not add anything to what the Foreign Secretary had said. He assured the House that: "My right hon. Friend has already indicated that he will try to secure agreement with our Soviet Allies, but he will not do it by appeasement. One appeasement in any generation is one too many. He will not do anything which on the other hand can be translated as trying to shut Russia out of the scene." (*ibid.*, col. 2127.)

Next day, June 6, the press as a whole interpreted the speeches by Bevin and Churchill as a blunt warning to the U.S.S.R. that if she refused to accept the terms which would be presented to her at the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers' Council, the Western Powers would proceed without her. Here, we can only quote from three dailies.

Mr. Wilson Broadbent, the Political Correspondent of the *Daily Mail*, wrote:

"Russia's reaction to the frankest of all post-war foreign affairs debates in the House of Commons is now awaited in Whitehall, for what Moscow decides in the next few days will have a vital bearing on the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Paris on June 15.

"The crossroads have been reached in European affairs. After Mr. Byrnes' full statement of United States policy, there has been the blunt assessment by Mr. Ernest Bevin, Britain's Foreign Secretary, and the views of both coincide.

"Russia has to decide whether agreement can be reached by compromise in the Foreign Ministers' Council in Paris." (*Daily Mail*, June 6, 1946.)

Broadbent went on: "The alternative is to face a full meeting of the twenty-one nations associated with the peace treaties of Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Finland.

"The House of Commons would support Mr. Bevin in adopting a determined line for concluding separate treaties if Russia maintains her negative attitude.

"Mr. Bevin, by his speech, does not desire that development. He would prefer co-operation by compromise.

"In this approach," added Mr. Broadbent, "to Europe's gravest deadlock he has the support of Mr. Churchill, who yesterday in one of his best speeches, indicated that he found himself in the same position as Mr. Bevin."

The *Daily Herald* editorial commented:

"By all means let us tell the Soviet Government bluntly that we resent the false propaganda against Britain which has lately poured from the Moscow press and radio. There was plenty of such bluntness in this week's debate. But at the same time we must seek new opportunities for a positive and constructive approach to the Soviet Government and peoples.

"Without close contact there can be no trust; without trust there can be no friendship. Unless there be friendship between Soviet Russia and Britain there is no future for U.N.—to the success of which both nations have pledged their policies and resources. And if there were no future for international co-operation, of which U.N. is the symbol and the chosen instrument, there would be no future for Mankind." (*Daily Herald*, June 7, 1946.)

The *Times* in more measured terms commented editorially:

"Mr. Bevin has declared his determination 'to make another effort at agreement before deciding on any final alternative,' and the Prime Minister yesterday supported him in a wise and discriminating speech. In all four countries whose representatives will attend the conference the hope must be equally strong that this effort will succeed.

"All have much to lose if it fails. Failure will involve, sooner or later, the creation of real rival blocs or systems, not merely the embryonic or imaginary ones of which so much is heard to-day." (*Times*, June 6, 1946.)

Bluntness invoked bluntness and *Pravda* in a leading article, June 9, 1946, replied to Bevin and Churchill in equally unpolished terms. It stated: "This speech of Bevin's shows the extent and the character of the psychological preparations for a complete retreat from the principle of collaboration among the allied Powers. In reality, it was an obvious attempt to prepare the break-up of co-ordinated co-operation among the Allies and to substitute methods of pressure and threat against the Soviet Union. It is unnecessary to show the unreality and futility of such wicked methods.

"Bevin has expounded the views of the British Government on the problems which have arisen at the Foreign Ministers' conference. On all problems facing the conference the British Minister warmly defended the position taken up by the British delegation. This defence did not prevent the British Foreign Minister from expressing the wish that the Soviet delegation should return to Paris ready to accept the Anglo-American proposals for the conclusion of peace treaties with Austria, the settling of the Italo-Yugoslav frontier, the disposal of the former Italian colonies, Italian reparations, navigation on the Danube and other questions.

"Why does the British Minister put one-sided concessions alongside a plea for trust and mutual understanding on an equal footing? It is obvious that complete trust and real understanding have nothing in common with demands for unilateral concessions. The demand for unconditional concessions from a partner amounts to imposing one's will upon him. In negotiations between equal powers such methods cannot have any success."

After dealing with other points in Bevin's speech, *Pravda* went on:

"According to Bevin, Britain is demanding the cession of Cyrenaica—under the style of British protection—without considering the

vital interests of this area alongside Egypt. With the same clear conscience Britain proposes to round off British Somaliland by adding a part of Italian Somaliland to it, doubtless with the sole purpose of giving these poor nomads the chance to live.

"There is no need to underline the fact that the real aims of British colonial aspirations are far from this flowery declamation, and can be simply explained by the old wish to expand British possessions, interests, and privileges in northern and north-eastern Africa. This explains the Anglo-American proposal for putting the matter before the twenty-one United Nations in the case of a failure of the Paris conference."

However, at this time there were many men and women in the British Labour Movement, prominent among them the late Harold Laski, who were profoundly perturbed at the widening rift between Britain and the U.S.S.R.

Laski, albeit mildly, in his presidential address to the Labour Party's Annual Conference on June 10, 1946, *inter alia* said:

"I say to the rulers of the new Russia that the achievements of their Revolution are one of the pillars of our own strength; and we shall help them to guard those achievements as part of the conditions of our own safety as a movement seeking to build a Socialist commonwealth in Britain. I say to them that no one in this party feels this more strongly than the Foreign Secretary of the Labour Government. I ask them, having experimented with distrust, to experiment in friendship.

"Let capitalist Governments mistrust one another; that distrust is inherent in capitalist society. But Governments like the Russian and our own are the surest hope of peace where they find the road to same ends and combine their strength to fight whatever dangers they may encounter on the way."

Later in his speech, Laski added, to the accompaniment of loud cheers, that no small part of the responsibility for Russian suspicions must be borne by those who decided upon secrecy in relation to the atomic bomb. If scientific workers were put into a kind of intellectual concentration camp, those responsible for this approach would never be pardoned.

When, later on the same day, Mr. Morgan Phillips, Secretary of the Labour Party, announced that the Soviet Government had accepted the Labour Party's proposal to send a goodwill mission to the U.S.S.R. the news was warmly cheered by the delegates.

On this subject, the *Daily Herald* next day, commented: "A very welcome augury of better relations is the prompt announcement in Moscow that the Soviet Government favours the proposed goodwill mission of Labour leaders to Moscow. If any Russian had seen the pleasure with which the delegates received this news at Bournemouth yesterday he would have had no more doubts about the sincerity of our desire for friendship and co-operation." (*Daily Herald*, June 11, 1946.)

It was not only in the ranks of the Labour Party that thoughtful men and women were disturbed at the increasing disagreement between London and Moscow. The Conservative press from time to time also expressed its disappointment.

For instance, the *Daily Telegraph*, June 22, 1946, in an editorial entitled "The Spirit of 1941" with regret commented:

"It is tragic to contrast to-day the dreary round of discord at the Council of Ministers, the iron curtain that divides the East from the West of Europe, the total negation of the high promise augured at Teheran and Yalta. Instead of a new order emerging, we see a recrudescence of many of the worst features of the old; instead of collaboration, mistrust and disillusion."

The editorial concluded with the question: "Is it impossible to recapture something of the spirit inaugurated on June 22, 1941, and enshrined by the King in the Sword of Stalingrad?"

And Lord Halifax speaking as the guest of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, at a dinner in London, June 28, 1946, said:

"The second world war offers one more chance. The human race must not expect a third. It is now or never.

"From the side of the Soviet Union there have been many elements to which many people here and in America have not always given sufficient weight.

"The first and most obvious is the compelling Russian desire for security after seeing the body of their country pierced and ravaged twice within thirty years." (*Daily Telegraph*, June 29, 1946.)

In conclusion Lord Halifax said that the "clash of ideas ought not to mean that it was impossible for the Powers to work together."

CHAPTER IX

DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS; THE SLANGING MATCH IN FULL SWING

THE Four Foreign Ministers (Mr. Bevin, Great Britain; Mr. Byrnes, U.S.A.; Mr. Molotov, U.S.S.R.; M. Bidault, France), reassembled in the French capital on June 15, 1946, and continued in conference till the evening of July 12, 1946.

Draft Peace Treaties were drawn up with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Finland. It was agreed that the Italian colonies should remain under British administration pending agreement on their final disposal. A commission was appointed to study the question of Trieste. Meanwhile, Italy was to renounce her title to the territories.

No agreement was reached on Austria.

The question of Germany was discussed at considerable length.

The Soviet Delegation maintained that in accordance with the decisions at the Crimea Conference a sum total of 10,000 million dollars was due to the U.S.S.R. from Germany. This was hotly disputed by Mr. Byrnes, and in reply Mr. Molotov pointed out that the Report signed at the Crimea Conference by Mr. Churchill, Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Stalin made it clear that Germany is obliged to restitute in kind the damage inflicted by her in the course of the war on the Allied Nations.

Much was said in press comments regarding the enormity of this amount and the dire effects of the attempts made after the first world war to extract fantastic reparations from Germany. It is necessary to remember that the destruction wrought by Germany on the U.S.S.R. and other countries during the second world war was many times greater than during the first world war.

On the question of German unity Mr. Molotov stated: "We raise no objections to the setting up of a German central administration as a transitional step towards the establishment of a future German Government." But he insisted that "the remnants of Fascism" must first be extirpated.

However it was found impossible to reach agreement on this important problem.

It was decided that the Peace Conference should open on July 29, 1946.

The results of the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers (June 15-July 12) were received with moderate satisfaction in Britain.

The Diplomatic Correspondent of the *Sunday Times* commented: "Despite the failure of the Foreign Ministers to agree over Austria and Germany, on which there is complete deadlock, it is felt in diplomatic quarters in London that the Conference has had a sufficient degree of success. It has accomplished what it set out to do—to open the road to a peace settlement with most European countries.

"The Peace Conference which is to meet to-morrow fortnight, should in due course hammer out the final details of the treaties and establish not only the broad lines of national frontiers but the framework of international collaboration." (*Sunday Times*, July 14, 1946.)

A Peace Conference—at that time the press warned the public not to call it *the* Peace Conference—opened in Paris, July 29, 1946.

On the one side were the twenty-one nations which had actively waged war with substantial military forces against European enemy states. They were: The Soviet Union, Britain, the United States, China, France, Australia, Belgium, the Byelorussian Republic, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Abyssinia, Greece, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Yugoslavia and the Ukrainian Republic.

On the other side were: Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

The aim of the Conference was to examine the Draft Treaties with the five defeated nations which had been drawn up at the meetings of the Four Foreign Ministers since September, 1945.

The Conference decided that all states, large and small, should be allowed to state their views on the draft treaties and that the ex-enemy states should also be permitted to explain their viewpoints.

The Conference, after a long session of hard bargaining and at times heated discussions, concluded its meetings on October 15, 1946.

On the final day of the Conference the Special Correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* cabled from Paris: "The recommendations of the Conference on the treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, which will be sent to the Council of Foreign Ministers

for final drafting, were adopted one after the other without objection." (*Daily Telegraph*, October 16, 1946.)

The Yugoslav Delegates strongly disapproved of the decisions of the Conference, in particular with regard to Trieste and the Yugoslav frontier with Italy, and to show their disapproval they absented themselves from the final session of the Conference and declared that they would not sign the Treaty with Italy.

Mr. Harold Nicholson in a broadcast commentating on the Conference said:

"You must realise that at no previous conference of similar magnitude have the several delegations actually cast votes upon the propositions submitted to them. The idea up to now has been that the decisions at any conference should be taken unanimously, or rather, that each party should agree to the text. This entailed, of course, many months of highly confidential discussion, at which mutual concessions would be made and at which an agreed compromise would eventually be reached. I confess that I do not see much sense in all this voting business. After all, the final decisions will be taken by the Big Four, and taken after confidential argument as between themselves. I suppose that the idea was that these votes would provide the Big Four with a precise, numerical indication of what the majority of the conference felt about each clause in the five treaties."

Nicholson continued: "But it has not worked out like that. Votes, as I said, have been cast not on the merits of any given case, but in accordance with the line taken, or the instructions given, by the leading members of the two conflicting groups. There have, of course, been some slight variations in those abstaining—countries like France and Norway, who find themselves in a very awkward position, have sometimes voted with one group and sometimes with another. But, in fact, the votes have generally fallen into the proportion of fourteen to six, with one abstention, and it is in this way that the great divide between the Slav group—or the Soviet Six as I have called them so often—and the Anglo-Saxon group, has been emphasised." (*Listener*, October 17, 1946.)

It was decided that the Conference of the Four Foreign Ministers should open in New York on November 4, 1946.

At this period attacks were frequently made in the British press

on what was supposed to be happening "behind the Iron Curtain", and the Soviet press retaliated by denying the charges and making equally strong criticisms regarding what was taking place in Indonesia, India, the Middle East, Palestine, Greece and West-Germany.

The *Manchester Guardian* in an editorial, July 22, 1946, complained: "One of the most disturbing aspects of the present tension between Russia and the Western Allies is the picture of the West that is being given to the Russian people. It is not sufficiently appreciated here that that picture is uniformly a black one." (*Manchester Guardian*, July 22, 1946.)

Not a word was said about the distorted picture of life in the U.S.S.R. and her Allies which the British press was continuously giving to its readers.

The Labour Party's "Goodwill Mission" left by air for Moscow, July 28, 1946. It consisted of Mr. Harold Laski, immediate past chairman of the Executive Committee; Mr. Harold Clay; Miss Alice Bacon, M.P. for N.E. Leeds; and Mr. Morgan Phillips, Secretary.

The question of Britain's relations with the U.S.S.R. was debated in the House of Lords, July 29, 1946. Lord Cranborne (opposition) referring to the forthcoming Paris Peace Conference, said:

"... if no material progress was made, then we ought to delay no longer in taking the necessary measures to regularise the position outside the Russian sphere of influence. To continue to hold up the reconstruction of Europe and the world would only be to prolong the present unhappy situation. We ought to tackle the problem of Western Germany. We had held up long enough on that. He did not believe that the German danger was entirely over. There was no sign of a change of heart in the people so far as he could see. He hoped that steps would be taken to federalise western Germany."

Cranborne concluded: "The time was ripe for bringing about closer relationships between the nations of western Europe. That should be an essential corner-stone for our foreign policy. It must be our object to awake Russia to realities and let her see where her true interests lay. As soon as she held out the hand of friendship we should be ready to grasp it. That would be a wise policy for us and the United Nations, but to allow matters to drift, as they had been drifting, would not only impede our recovery from the war, but it would ultimately invite disaster, complete and absolute, for the United Nations, for Russia herself, and for the world."

The Lord Chancellor, replying for the Government, said:

"A policy of presupposing that we had got to have a policy without Russia was really almost a counsel of despair. He was most reluctant to see Europe divided into an East and a West permanently. For the time being they might have to make arrangements in the West, but these should always be arrangements into which Russia could come.

"It should not be thought that the Government or the Foreign Secretary intended to be downcast by all the difficulties of the day, or to give up trying for a happy co-operation between both East and West." (*Times*, July 30, 1946.)

We have referred in previous pages to attacks and counter-attacks in the British and Soviet press. This subject was dealt with at length at the Liberal Summer School, August 2, 1946, by Mr. J. W. Lawrence, former Press Attaché at the British Embassy in Moscow. *Inter alia* he said:

"During the war, the Soviet press stopped criticising the political systems of Allied countries and, in particular, there was a truce to attacks on the British Empire. In the Autumn of 1944, when civil war broke out in Greece, there was for several months no attack on British policy there, in spite of heart-searchings among some party members. It was only when our press began to criticise Russian goings on in Rumania and Bulgaria, that the Soviet press began to attack British policy in Greece. Since then the slanging match has gone from bad to worse—the Russians would say we started it and we would say they did.

"The Russian claim to detect in Britain and America two rival tendencies—one a progressive and realistic party which wants peace, the other a reactionary party which intends to 'swallow the whole world and to subject all peoples and nations to Anglo-Saxon rule.'

"The Russians certainly think we have a hand in their troubles in Rumania, in Poland and in Hungary, just as we tend to blame them for some of our difficulties in various regions.

"To some extent the Russians may be the victims of their own propaganda—perhaps we all are; but their fear of Anglo-Saxon aggression is real and this is one of the cardinal facts in the world to-day."

Lawrence concluded: "The great task of the Soviet Union is to develop its own internal frontiers; more *lebensraum* is not needed. Both we and the Soviet Union want peace and there is no reason why

we should clash, if both sides keep their heads. The best contribution we in Britain can make to better relations is to be firm on essentials but to make sure what is essential; never to jump to conclusions without asking ourselves first 'How does this look to the Russians?'; and, above all, never to shout at the Russians and never to answer pin prick with pin prick."

The House of Commons rose on August 2, 1946, for the summer recess, and "Phineas" summed up the session in the *New Statesman and Nation*, August 10, 1946. "Very early in the session," he wrote, "the Party came to realise that foreign affairs was going to mean Ernest Bevin first and last. The Foreign Secretary has no very deep feeling either for the House of Commons, or for the Labour Party. At heart he remains a trade union leader, who regards both as 'talking shops' and believes that serious business must be transacted outside them. He appreciates their applause and resents their criticism. In this Session most of the applause has come from the Opposition and the criticism from intellectuals on his own back benches. This has confirmed his identification of intellectuals and Russian agents. In pulverising the critics behind him, he feels that he is speaking for the English working man. So long as the Government's domestic policy is unaffected by Mr. Bevin's foreign policy, he will be supported by that solid phalanx of Labour M.P.s who do not worry about events across the Channel."

"Phineas" went on: "But how long will this period last? The Bournemouth Conference seemed at the time to be a signal triumph for Mr. Bevin. It may prove in retrospect to have been the high point of his prestige. The last weeks of the session have been marked by increasing uneasiness among Members, who a few months ago supported his policy. Now, even those who used to defend his attitude to Greece, Spain and Palestine and explain away his passionate hatred of the U.S.S.R., are worried by that streak of egotism which makes him identify himself with Britain and use the first person singular more than any of his predecessors. In his Union and as Minister of Labour it was notorious that he never permitted potential rivals around him. His dislike of criticism has ensured that none of the three men with departmental duties relating to external affairs are dominant personalities. Increasingly throughout the Session he has come to rely on the advice of his permanent civil servants and of the Chiefs of Staff.

"Never has the Foreign Office had a master with a more monumental power of putting over its policy as his very own both to his own party and to the House of Commons. Instead of reforming the foreign office, as many Socialists hoped he would do, he has identified himself with it wholeheartedly, and repudiated as disloyalty to a devoted body of men any analysis of its failings or proposals for its improvement."

Lord Strang, after he had retired from his position of Permanent Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in his book *Home and Abroad* wrote of Bevin's policy towards the U.S.S.R.: "The essence of his thought was the building of an international community, operating by way of intimate conference and devoted to concrete purposes. He made this his aim, first because he believed that only by banding themselves into a community could the free peoples develop a coherent and effective resistance in all spheres to the manifold menace of Stalinist Communism."

Strang's book was published in 1956 and in it, as well as in his participation in Anglo-Soviet affairs and negotiations in 1939 and earlier, it can be seen that he certainly was not pro-Soviet.

Bevin's policy was not to negotiate a give-and-take settlement with the U.S.S.R. but to build up a bloc directed against her.

Professor Harold Laski on several occasions said to his friends: "Bevin regards the Soviet Union as a breakaway from the Transport and General Workers' Union."

Bevin read all his principal speeches on foreign affairs in the House of Commons and very seldom departed in the slightest from the written text. The wording of these speeches clearly showed that they were drafted by members of the staff of the Foreign Office.

Probably no Foreign Secretary of this century was as dependent on his permanent officials as was Bevin, and these officials hated the Soviet Union and always misjudged and underestimated its great achievements within its own frontiers. The Foreign Office did not know and did not want to know the truth about the U.S.S.R., and Bevin was completely in the hands of its officials. Under these circumstances his policy *vis-à-vis* the U.S.S.R. could not but be disastrous.

The Labour Party's "Goodwill Mission", referred to on a previous page, arrived back in London on August 15, 1946. Mr. A. J. McWhinnie, who met them on arrival, wrote:

"Laden with Soviet-starred presents from the people of Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad, the British Labour Party goodwill mission arrived at Croydon Airport from Russia yesterday.

"The mission—Morgan Phillips (Labour Party Secretary), Harold Laski, Harold Clay (assistant secretary, Transport and General Workers' Union), and Miss Alice Bacon, M.P.—will report to the Labour Party Executive Committee on all aspects of the visit.

"Friendliness everywhere, generous hospitality, a sincere desire to understand the British people and the work of the British Government, was the general summing up of the trip when I talked to the delegates.

"Every facility we asked for was granted freely,' they told me. 'We saw everything we wanted to see, whenever we wanted to see it.'

"Miss Bacon told me of the two-and-a-quarter-hour interview they had with Stalin at the Kremlin.

"She described him as 'very human, a man with a fine sense of humour and a keen intellect'.

"I've got his autograph on Kremlin notepaper,' she said, as she fished it out of her handbag.

"The delegates studied at first hand Russian problems, as well as seeing Russia's triumphs." (*Daily Herald*, August 16, 1946.)

McWhinnie concluded: "Morgan Phillips will write his impressions of the Soviet Union exclusively for the *Daily Herald*."

Morgan Phillips contributed three articles to the *Daily Herald*. On the whole they were well balanced. Here we can only quote two short extracts. In the first article he wrote:

"On the whole my first impressions in Russia were very favourable. I found a vigorous, healthy people, tremendously busy on reconstruction and proud of the victory of their Socialist Army, Navy and Air Force over the Nazi invaders. There is a real feeling of common responsibility for the future among the Russian people.

"In Britain we are only just beginning our Socialist planning; in Russia it has been going on for twenty-eight years. In some ways British social standards are well ahead of the Russian, and in others the Russians can teach us a lot.

"After my first day there I thought, 'Marching together we could do big things.'" (*Daily Herald*, August 20, 1946.)

Phillips concluded his third article:

"Anglo-Russian friendship, to be lasting, can be built only on a

sound basis of frank exchange. The acting Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that criticism was welcomed, provided it was made in a friendly and constructive spirit.

"It is admitted that we are taking our separate ways to Socialism, and it is therefore inevitable that we should have our differences, and eventually make them serve as the true mortar of friendship which, while holding us distinct and separate, at the same time binds us firmly and closely together." (*Daily Herald*, August 22, 1946.)

Mr. Morgan Phillips also stated: "I trust, therefore, that our visit will be the first of many mutual exchanges."

Unfortunately, for reasons which were never explained, at any rate publicly, the British Labour Party never invited a return Delegation from the U.S.S.R.

In the meantime talks had been going on for some time on the question arising from the 1941 Anglo-Soviet Supply Agreement and on September 10, 1946, the British Board of Trade issued the following announcement:

"As the result of discussions between the Board of Trade and the Soviet Trade Delegation, agreement has been reached on certain outstanding problems relating to the supply of large quantities of civilian goods to the U.S.S.R., which have been manufactured in this country under wartime supply agreements.

"The Soviet Government has at the same time offered to make available 25,000 standards of timber this season for shipment to the United Kingdom and a contract will shortly be concluded between the Timber Control and the Soviet Exporting Organisation.

"This agreement will prepare the way for further discussions on the subject of the wider development of Anglo-Russian trade." (*Times*, September 11, 1946.)

The Diplomatic Correspondent of the *Times* wrote: "Thus ends, in a satisfactory manner, a dispute that has lasted for nearly a year. Under the Anglo-Russian Civil Supplies Agreement of 1941, Great Britain undertook to supply to Russia about £140,000,000 worth of non-consumer goods; for £100,000,000 of these Russia had already settled, but the Soviet Government disagreed over the price of the balance, which, owing to labour and other costs, had risen. The new agreement represents a compromise by both sides, the British Government

having made a discount equal roughly to 13 per cent. of the estimated manufacturer's price of the goods." (*ibid.*)

And Mr. Marquand, M.P. (Secretary of the Department of Overseas Trade), "emphasised that it marked a settlement of outstanding war-time accounts rather than a new agreement. It would, however, do what the official statement describes as clearing the way for further trade negotiations, which will be aimed at restoring normal trade channels between the two countries." (*ibid.*)

Meanwhile in Moscow the Government felt much perturbed about the large number of troops which Britain was maintaining in the Near and Middle East.

Izvestia, September 12, 1946, carried a long article on the subject by Mr. Lutsky, who *inter alia* wrote:

"For obvious reasons the exact strength of the British armed forces in the Arab east is unknown to us. The British Government and press prefer to keep them secret.

"But there is reason to believe that Britain is still keeping 200,000 officers and men in Egypt, over 100,000 in the Sudan, Ethiopia and Libya, at least 60,000 in Palestine, 150,000 in Transjordan (while the whole population of this small country amounts only to some 450,000 people), not less than 100,000 in Iraq (and fresh reinforcements are still being sent there).

"The British have covered the whole Arab East with a dense network of air bases. British military missions direct the armies of the Arab East. These armies are formed, armed and trained on the British model, and in essence are branches of the British army.

"A year since Mr. Bevin came to power, no clear-minded person can help reaching the conclusion that Bevin is continuing the imperialistic struggle against Russia, and in doing so maintains all the British traditions—that is, the traditions of Curzon and Churchill." (*Soviet Monitor*, September 12, 1946.)

Mr. Lutsky concluded: "Peoples who have lived through the nightmare of the second world war, hundreds of millions of ordinary people in all countries, are vitally concerned with the organisation of stable and lasting peace. The United Nations Organisation, created by the freedom-loving peoples, is called upon to settle this great, historic problem. The peoples of the Arab East, as well as of the whole world, expect the United Nations Organisation seriously to tackle the problem of the Arab East."

The TASS Agency, September 24, 1946, published an interview—in a question and answer form—which Mr. Alexander Werth had with Mr. Stalin. It read as follows:

“Question: Do you believe in a real danger of a ‘new war’ concerning which there is so much irresponsible talk at present throughout the world? What steps ought to be taken for averting war if such a danger exists?

“Answer: I do not believe in a real danger of a ‘new war’. Those who are clamouring about a ‘new war’ are chiefly military-political intelligence agents and their few supporters among civilian officials. They need this clamour if only for the purpose: (a) Of scaring certain naïve politicians from among their counter-agents with the spectre of war and thus helping their governments to wring as many concessions as possible from counter-agents; (b) Of obstructing for a certain time reduction of military budgets in their countries; (c) Of putting a brake on demobilisation of troops and thus preventing a rapid growth of unemployment in their countries.

“One should strictly differentiate between the hue and cry about a ‘new war’ which is taking place now and a real danger of a ‘new war’ which does not exist at present.

“Question: Do you believe that Great Britain and the United States of America are consciously creating a ‘capitalist encirclement’ of the Soviet Union?

“Answer: I do not think that the ruling circles of Great Britain and of the United States of America could create a ‘capitalist encirclement’ of the Soviet Union, even if they so desired, which, however, I cannot assert.

“Question: In the words Mr. Wallace used in his last speech can Britain, Western Europe and the United States be certain that Soviet policy in Germany will not turn into an instrument of Russian ambitions aimed against Western Europe?

“Answer: I believe that making use of Germany by the Soviet Union against Western Europe and the United States of America is precluded. I believe that it is precluded not only because the Soviet Union is bound by the treaty of mutual assistance against German aggression with Great Britain and France, and by the decisions of the Potsdam Conference of the three great Powers with the United States of America, but also because a policy of making use of Germany against Western Europe and the United States of America would mean the departure of the Soviet Union from its fundamental national interests.

Briefly speaking, the policy of the Soviet Union in the German problem reduces itself to the demilitarisation and democratisation of Germany. I believe that the demilitarisation and democratisation of Germany form one of the most important guarantees of the establishment of a stable and lasting peace.

"Question: What is your opinion concerning the accusations to the effect that the policy of the Communist Parties of Western Europe is dictated by Moscow?

"Answer: I regard this accusation as an absurdity borrowed from the bankrupt arsenal of Hitler and Goebbels.

"Question: Do you believe in the possibility of friendly and lasting co-operation between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies in spite of the existence of ideological differences, and in the 'friendly competition' between the two systems which Wallace mentioned in his speech?

"Answer: I absolutely believe so.

"Question: During the sojourn of the Labour Party delegation here you, as far as I understand, expressed the certainty of the possibility of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. What could help in establishing these relations so ardently desired by the broad masses of the British people?

"Answer: I am really certain of the possibility of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. The strengthening of political, trade and cultural ties between these countries would considerably contribute to the establishment of such relations.

"Question: Do you believe the earliest withdrawal of all American troops from China to be vital for future peace?

"Answer: Yes, I do.

"Question: Do you believe that virtual monopoly by the United States of America of the atomic bomb constitutes one of the main threats to peace?

"Answer: I do not believe the atomic bomb to be as serious a force as certain politicians are inclined to regard it. Atomic bombs are intended for intimidating the weak-nerved, but they cannot decide the outcome of war since atomic bombs are by no means sufficient for this purpose. Certainly monopolist possession of the secret of the atomic bomb does create a threat, but at least two remedies exist against it: (a) Monopolist possession of the atomic bomb cannot last long; (b) use of the atomic bomb will be prohibited.

"Question: Do you believe that with the further progress of the

Soviet Union towards Communism the possibilities of peaceful co-operation with the outside world will not decrease as far as the Soviet Union is concerned? Is 'Communism in one country' possible?

"*Answer:* I do not doubt that the possibilities of peaceful co-operation far from decreasing, may even grow. 'Communism in one country' is perfectly possible, especially in a country like the Soviet Union." (*Times*, September 25, 1946.)

The British press, as a whole, albeit with some hesitations, welcomed Stalin's statement.

Mr. Anthony Eden, speaking in Stratford-on-Avon, September 25, 1946, said that the statement was clearly of outstanding importance, and added: "at the least it offers a new opportunity, which we all welcome, for allied diplomacy. I am confident that this opportunity will be seized. There are no doubt many difficulties; I believe that with perseverance and goodwill these can be overcome." (*Times*, September 26, 1946.)

Foreign Secretary Bevin, referring at a Labour Party meeting to Stalin's statement, said:

"We have recently had a statement from Russia that they do not anticipate that a further war is likely at present.

"I do not think so, either, and I do not know anybody who is working for war.

"The acid test is not the speeches of the statesmen on the conference floor, but their approach to the problem in the conference room. I think there has been a little lifting of the clouds." (*Daily Herald*, September 28, 1946.)

On October 5, 1946, Mr. Winston Churchill, after denouncing the Labour Party for agreeing to independence for India, continued: "While Soviet Russia is expanding or seeking to expand in every direction, and has already brought many extra scores of millions of people directly or indirectly under the despotic control of the Kremlin and the rigours of Communist discipline, we who sought nothing from this war but to do our duty—and are, in fact, reducing ourselves to a fraction of our former size and population—are successfully held up to world censure." (*Observer*, October 6, 1946.)

Churchill must have been aware that at that time India could only have been held down by force and that Britain had not the necessary force. He also knew quite well that the U.S.S.R. was not expanding.

In the course of a debate in the House of Commons, October 23, 1946, Prime Minister Attlee *inter alia* said: "The general position abroad will, of course, be affected by a variety of changes in political development going on all over the world. What does constitute a danger is the presence of mobilised forces, and, while these mobilised forces may not be on other people's territory, they may still be a positive danger to peace." (*Hansard*, October 23, 1946, col. 1685.)

Later in the debate, also in the course of a speech, Mr. Churchill asked: "Is it or is it not true that there are today more than 200 Soviet divisions on a war-footing in the occupied territories of Europe from the Baltic to Vienna and from Vienna to the Black Sea?" (*ibid.*, cols. 1697-8.)

Mr. McNeil (Minister of State), wound up the debate. Replying to Mr. Churchill, he said: "The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford asked me a very heavy question. He asked me if there were more than 200 divisions of Soviet troops on a war-footing between the Baltic and the Black Seas. I must, of course, reply in measured terms. I am unable to say whether his information about the number of Russian divisions in occupied countries between the Baltic and the Black Seas is correct, or what proportion of those divisions is on a war-footing; but it is, of course, well known that there are very considerable Russian forces in these countries." (*ibid.*, col. 1796.)

Another important question which came up in the course of the debate was the U.S.S.R.'s claim for joint control of the Dardanelles.

Foreign Secretary Bevin, speaking on the previous day, said:

"... the Soviet Government suggested that the establishment of the régime in the Straits should be reserved to the Black Sea Powers alone, and that Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the most interested powers, should jointly organise the defence of the Straits. Against that H.M. Government pointed out that it had long been internationally recognised that the régime of the Straits was the concern of other Powers besides the Black Sea Powers, and that they could not, therefore, accept the Soviet view. H.M. Government also stated that the proposal that Turkey and the Soviet should jointly organise the defence of the Straits was not acceptable. They felt that Turkey, as the territorial Power, should continue to be responsible for the defence and control of the Straits." (*Hansard*, October 22, 1946, col. 1501.)

Bevin added: "This view was also expressed by the United States

Government. The Soviet Government have not been able to accept these views, and a further Note has been addressed to the Turkish Government insisting on their point of view."

The Foreign Secretary's viewpoint was strongly contested on the following day, October 23. For instance, Mr. Lyne stated:

"In passing may I say in respect of our Ally, Soviet Russia, that I think that it is well worth consideration by His Majesty's Government, and those who will be responsible for the peace treaty, whether or not Russia has a claim to an outlet to the Mediterranean. When we remember the vastness of Russia, with two of its main outlets frozen up in the winter, one outlet to the Pacific and the other through a neighbouring country, there may be some justification for the claim put forward by the Soviet Union for an outlet to the Mediterranean."

Mr. Lyne added: "After all, in the past, nations whose borders have not touched the Mediterranean have felt that it was essential to their security that they should have bases in that sea. What we and other countries have claimed as a right cannot be disputed when the matter is dealt with from the point of view of the justification of a country wanting commercial outlets at the nearest point." (*Hansard*, October 23, 1946, col. 1709-10.)

On the same day Mr. Zilliacus in a well-documented speech dealt with the same issue. He quoted the following from an article by Mr. Walter Lippman in a recent issue of the *New York Herald Tribune*:

"The direct American policy would be to build up American power at a selected point where, if war comes, the Soviet Union would from the outset be on the defensive. That point is manifestly in the Eastern Mediterranean in the direction of the Black Sea. For at that point American sea and air power can be brought within reach of the vital centres of Russia, and can, therefore, most surely counteract the striking power of the Red Army."

Mr. Zilliacus then commented: "What is the reality of this battering at the gates of the Dardanelles by the British and the Americans and I say that on that issue I am entirely on the side of the Russians. It is very big of Uncle Sam to come all the way across the world to stop Russian expansion at the very frontiers of the Soviet Union. But what about American expansion? Where are the Americans?"

"They have naval and air bases all over the world. They have settled down in Iceland and extorted an air base from the Icelanders who submitted under pressure of the American military occupation. The Americans were assisted by the subservient British Government, who sent notes to the Icelanders urging them to give in to the Americans lest the Americans should not like their attitude. That is what is happening." (*ibid.*, col. 1729.)

The *New Statesman and Nation* commented at length on the two-days debate. Among other things it stated:

"It is too early yet to judge whether Mr. Bevin's German policy is an isolated expedient or the beginning of a new approach. Mr. Bevin is an empiricist, and he must have observed the uneasiness and dismay among his own supporters during the earlier passages of his speech and the eager exultation of the Opposition at every and any sentence which could be given an anti-Russian interpretation. The attempt to maintain a bi-partisan foreign policy, acceptable to Mr. Churchill and the adherents of the Anglo-American alliance, yet somehow in conformity with Socialist principles, is doomed to failure. The experience of this session has proved that, under the pressure of events, Socialist principles remain generalisations, while anti-Bolshevik prejudices are translated into action."

The Editor continued: "Mr. Churchill understands this. Welcoming Mr. Bevin's statement, he clearly saw the proposed revival of German industry as Western rearmament against the Soviet Union, suggested all-party conversations on 'security,' and asked if it were true that the U.S.S.R. has 200 divisions on a war-footing in Eastern Europe. It was odd to raise the all-important issue of security and armaments without also asking how many divisions equal one atom bomb." (*The New Statesman and Nation*, October 26, 1946.)

On the day following Churchill's speech of October 23, 1946, a reply came from Moscow. The *Times* Special Correspondent in a cable date-lined Moscow, October 24, 1946, stated:

"Yesterday's announcement of the demobilisation of a further class of the Soviet Army brings the total of age-groups released since the war to thirty for n.c.o.s and men and thirteen for officers. In addition there has been a fairly large release of specialists, mainly affecting the officer corps."

The cable continued: "*Foreign observers who profess to understand military affairs consider that the figures of the Soviet Army's strength mentioned by Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons yesterday were highly exaggerated.*" (*Times*, October 25, 1946.)

On October 28, 1946, Marshal Stalin replied to a questionnaire submitted by Mr. Hugh Baillie, President of the United Press of America. Here we can only quote two questions and answers:

"What in your opinion, is at present the most serious threat to peace in the whole world?"

"The incendiaries of a new war, foremost Churchill and those who think like him in England and the United States."

"What is the extent of Russian military contingents in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Austria, and how long do you feel that, in the interests of securing the peace, these contingents must be maintained?"

"In the West—that is, in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland—the Soviet Union has at the present time 60 divisions altogether (rifled and armoured). The majority of them are not in full strength. There are no Soviet troops in Yugoslavia."

"In two months' time, when the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of October 22 of this year concerning the last demobilisation classes is implemented, 40 Soviet divisions will remain in the said countries." (*Daily Telegraph*, October 29, 1946.)

Here then was the answer to Churchill.

We must now turn to the repercussions to the Hugh Baillie-Marshall Stalin press interview.

Mr. Churchill issued a statement through the Press Association, October 29, 1946, in which he stated:

"I am glad to see Premier Stalin's statement about Russian forces in the occupied territories he mentions, but even 60 divisions on a war-footing would of course greatly exceed the British and American forces in enemy-occupied territory in Europe."

"I asked His Majesty's Government whether my estimate of 200 divisions applied to the west was excessive, and I asked the question in such a form that it could be answered 'yes' or 'no'. Considering the difference between 200 divisions and 60 divisions, it ought to have been possible, if I was in error, for contradiction to be given. None was forthcoming. On the contrary, the statement of the Prime Minister and the Minister of State showed only anxiety at the strength of the Soviet mobilised forces."

Mr. Churchill added: "I should add that my information, which of course, is not official information, contemplated a strength of 10,000 men per Soviet division. However, during the last war American and British divisions sometimes mean as high as 40,000 or 50,000 men and 30,000 would be a fairly good average figure, including, of course, auxiliary services, corps troops and lines of communication. It is not possible to judge the strength of an army unless not only the number of organised divisions is known but also, and at the same time, the total ration strength." (*Times*, October 30, 1946.)

On the eve of the 29th Anniversary of the November Revolution, Mr. Alexander Werth cabled from Moscow: "The November slogans of the Central Committee of the Communist party this year are interesting. Of forty-nine slogans nearly forty are concerned directly with reconstruction. Among others are 'Long-live the co-operation of the freedom-loving peoples in the struggle for a stable and lasting peace and security!' and most interesting of all perhaps is an appeal to the 'Toilers of all countries' urging them to denounce and restrain the warmongers who are sowing the seeds of discord among the nations and frightening them with the spectre of a new war!" (*Manchester Guardian*, November 6, 1946.)

On November 6, A. A. Zhdanov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, in the course of a lengthy speech at the traditional mass meeting stated:

"The unbridled anti-Soviet 'atomic' propaganda blackmail and the threats of a new war, which military-political intelligence agents and their associates are vigorously attempting to create, are needed only by the instigators of a new war, such as Churchill and people of like mind. This anti-Soviet campaign is directed by reactionary imperialist circles for whom war is a profitable enterprise, who do not want a stable democratic peace and who therefore outdo themselves in stirring up a campaign of slander against the Soviet Union as a true champion of democratic peace.

"The underlying motive of the propaganda of a new war is the fear felt by reactionary circles in face of the democratic aspirations of the nations. The Soviet Union, as the vanguard of the democratic movement, forms the principal target of this campaign. And this is self-understood. The Soviet Union is the most consistent fighter for democracy against aggression, against the policy of expansion.

"One cannot help noting that recently the campaign of slander

against the U.S.S.R. has acquired especially great scope. It is being conducted on a wide scale, and is calculated to undermine the increased confidence in and prestige of the Soviet Union among the peoples of the democratic countries. One also cannot help recalling that persistent inculcation of hatred of the Soviet Union, of its régime and of the people who inhabit it, is no novelty, and that more than once already it has ended sadly for its initiators."

Zhdanov concluded: "Together with all the working people of the Soviet Union we shall strengthen the might of our country, its armed forces, as a basic guarantee of peaceful creative labour and of further successes in the construction of Socialism." (*Soviet News*, November 8, 1946.)

At this time there was considerable dissatisfaction among many of the Labour Party back-benchers with the Government's foreign policy, particularly *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union.

On November 12 a considerable number of Labour M.P.s, many of them trade union representatives, tabled an amendment, criticising the Government's foreign affairs policy, to the Address on the King's speech.

The amendment expressed the "urgent hope" that the Government will "so review and recast its conduct of international affairs as to afford the utmost encouragement to, and collaboration with, all nations and groups striving to secure full Socialist planning and control of the world's resources."

It went on to urge that such a course would provide a "democratic and constructive Socialist alternative to an otherwise inevitable conflict between American capitalism and Soviet Communism, in which all hope of world government would be destroyed."

The subject was discussed at a meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party, November 13, 1946, and finally it was agreed by supporters and opponents that the Motion should remain on the Order Papers, but that it should not be moved. This was the biggest revolt in the Parliamentary Labour Party since the general election of 1945.

One of the sharpest critics of the Government's foreign policy was Mr. K. Zilliacus, M.P. Speaking at Gateshead, December 8, 1946, he said:

"The Anglo-French General Staff conversations and resulting entente were preparations for the first world war with Germany. The Anglo-American General Staff conversations are resulting in

an entente based on preparations for a third world war, against the U.S.S.R.

"It is not only extraordinary but scandalous that these things should be done by the War Office under the nominal authority of the Labour Government when we are bound by the obligations of the Charter and supposed to be trying to make a reality of the United Nations Organisation. The policy on which we have embarked, whether the Government know it or not, is straight Churchillian power-politics, junior partnership in an Anglo-American entente, building up a balance of power and preparing for a third world war against the Soviet Union." (*Manchester Guardian*, December 9, 1946.)

In answer to the question, what should Britain's policy be? Mr. Zilliacus, speaking at Wallasey, said:

"The British Government should invite the French and Soviet Governments to an all-in Conference to discuss how we should act on our obligations in the Anglo-Soviet and Franco-Soviet alliances. It should be possible to work out a joint Anglo-French-Soviet policy in Europe, taking the outward form of a European regional agreement within U.N." (*ibid.*)

The Council of the Four Foreign Ministers, Bevin (Great Britain), Byrnes (U.S.A.), Molotov (U.S.S.R.) and Maurice de Murville (France), met in Session in New York, November 4, 1946, to discuss among other matters the Peace Treaties with the five former German satellites: Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland.

The usual hard bargaining took place and the finishing touches were not put to the treaties until late on December 12, 1946. Nobody was quite satisfied with these treaties.

The *Times* correspondent in a cable, date-lined New York, December 13, 1946, stated: "The four Foreign Ministers separated after their New York meeting with general satisfaction expressed on all sides. Russian delegations are seldom vocal on such occasions, but yesterday Mr. Molotov gave the impression of being satisfied with the work done and the other delegations are pleased with what has been accomplished.

"Nobody claims that the treaties are perfect, but those who framed them believe them to be the best obtainable and that they are workable. Nobody is wholly satisfied with the Trieste arrangements and it is

reasonably safe to say that if by direct negotiations Italy and Yugoslavia could make better arrangements no one in the Council of Foreign Ministers would be sorry." (*Times*, December 14, 1946.)

A TASS cable also date-lined New York, December 13, 1946, stated: "The Ministers have agreed on the texts of the five peace treaties with Germany's former allies—Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

"These important results have been possible because the concluding phase of the negotiations among the four Ministers, unlike the Paris Peace Conference and even the initial period of the Council of Foreign Ministers' work in New York, was marked by an endeavour on the part of all the delegations to reach agreed decisions."

The Four Foreign Ministers decided that the texts of the Treaties should be handed to the Representatives of the countries involved in Washington at an early date and that the instruments should be signed in Paris on February 10, 1947.*

The Question of the Treaties with Austria and Germany still remained to be worked out. The Four Ministers agreed that special deputies should be appointed to prepare German and Austrian Treaties and that these deputies should meet in London, January 14, 1947.

The Four Foreign Ministers agreed to meet again in Conference in Moscow on March 10, 1947.

Foreign Minister Bevin made a broadcast to the Nation on the work of the United Nations and Foreign Ministers' Conferences in New York. *Inter alia* he said:

"There are immediate tasks to be accomplished before the debris of war is cleared up. The peace treaties are one of these tasks.

"The preparation of the treaties has been done by the Council of Foreign Ministers, beginning with Italy and the ex-satellite States of Germany. We have devoted ninety-eight meetings to the discussion of these treaties.

"Why have they taken so long? Because every clause, every paragraph, has been contested and then judged by the test of whether it would ultimately fit in with the greater organisation.

"During the last three weeks of the meeting in New York we went ahead. It was a very welcome change to the earlier stages, when passions were high and misunderstandings great, and when we were working in the atmosphere of the immediate aftermath of war.

"But it has been a very trying time and I am glad that patience has

* These treaties were duly signed in Paris, February 10, 1947.

triumphed. And I am fully convinced that understanding will grow. For at last we have succeeded, and the treaties are ready for signature." (*Daily Telegraph*, December 23, 1946.)

Turning to the next meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Bevin said:

"We have laid down an agenda for a further meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow on March 10 next, at which the whole economic and political future of Germany will have to be dealt with.

"We must avoid the creation of a cesspool of cheap and half-starved labour in Middle Europe. At the same time, we must ensure that Germany can never again be a menace to the Allies, who have had to fight her twice in twenty-five years.

"The Moscow Conference will also deal with the problem of what occupation forces should remain in Germany, and how civil government there can gradually be built up. At Moscow we shall also discuss Austria which was overrun by Hitler and which has been recreated. We shall attempt to finalise her position by a new treaty.

"When you see the agenda for this conference, you will understand the enormous amount of preparatory work that has to precede the conference and the enormous amount of work to be done at Moscow."

In concluding Bevin said: "Soviet Russia, who is now recovering from the wounds of war, fully realised, I think, at New York, that there was a great desire for complete understanding, and that there is throughout the world a readiness to co-operate with her and see her develop her system in her own way, but with the recognition that others equally have the right to their own way of life."

Mr. Winston Churchill on the last day of 1946, had an article in the *Daily Telegraph* in which *inter alia* he said:

"Greater divergencies have opened among men than those of the religious wars of the Reformation or of the political and social conflicts of the French Revolution, or of the Power-struggle just concluded with Hitler's Germany. The schism between Communism on the one hand and Christian ethics and Western Civilisation on the other is the most deadly, far-reaching and rending that the human race has known." (*Daily Telegraph*, December 31, 1946.)

So Churchill regarded the U.S.S.R. as a greater menace than Nazi

Germany had been. This only eighteen months after he had been lauding the Soviet Armed Forces to the skies for the dominant part they played in defeating the Nazi hordes!

Although many labour M.P.s objected strongly to Mr. Churchill's Fulton and subsequent speeches, there had been no official repudiation by the Labour Government of the views expressed by Churchill in his Fulton and other speeches. This could not but provoke strong Soviet suspicions of the attitude of the Labour Government towards the U.S.S.R.

CHAPTER X

THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

WE must now turn to the establishment of an Institution which figured big in international affairs until it was incorporated in another Institution in 1952. On January 24, 1946, the General Assembly of U.N. adopted a Resolution establishing the Atomic Energy Commission.

Under the Heading "Relations of the Commission with the Organs of the United Nations" the resolution read:

"(a) The Commission shall submit its reports and recommendations to the Security Council, and such reports and recommendations shall be made public unless the Security Council, in the interest of peace and security, otherwise directs. In the appropriate cases the Security Council should transmit these reports to the General Assembly and the Members of the United Nations, as well as to the Economic and Social Council and other organs within the framework of the United Nations.

"(b) In view of the Security Council's primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council shall issue directions to the Commission in matters affecting security. On these matters the Commission shall be accountable for its work to the Security Council" (*Atomic Energy, A Survey of U.N. Discussions with Selected Documents*. United Nations Information Centre, London, January, 1951.)

Under the heading "Composition of the Commission" the Resolution read:

"The Commission shall be composed of one representative from each of those States represented on the Security Council, and Canada, when that State is not a member of the Security Council. Each representative on the Commission may have such assistance as he may desire." (*ibid.*)

It will be noticed that the Commission was subject to the Security Council which in turn was subject to the General Assembly.

It is very important to bear these two points in mind because of what follows.

The first meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission was held in New York on June 14, 1946, at which meeting Mr. Bernard Baruch on behalf of the U.S.A. Government outlined a set of proposals which were afterwards known as the "Baruch Plan". In the course of his speech he said: "The United States proposes the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority, to which should be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw materials and including:

- "(1) Managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security.
- "(2) Power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities.
- "(3) The duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy.
- "(4) Research and development responsibilities of an affirmative character intended to put the Authority in the forefront of atomic knowledge and thus enable it to comprehend, and therefore to detect misuse of atomic energy. To be effective, the Authority must itself be the world's leader in the field of atomic knowledge and development and thus supplement its legal authority with the great power inherent in possession of leadership in knowledge." (*ibid.*)

Baruch continued: "I offer this as a basis for beginning our discussion. But I think, the peoples we serve would not believe, and without faith nothing counts, that a treaty merely outlawing possession or use of the atomic bomb constitutes effective fulfilment of the instructions to this Commission. Previous failures have been recorded in trying the method of simple renunciation, unsupported by effective guarantees of security and armament limitation. No one would have faith in that approach alone.

"When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon and put into effective operation and condign punishments set up for the violations of the rules of control which are to be stigmatised as international crimes, we propose that:

- “(1) manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop;
- “(2) existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of the treaty;
- “(3) the Authority shall be in possession of full information as to the know-how for the production of atomic energy.”

Baruch added: “Let me repeat, so as to avoid misunderstanding: my country is ready to make its full contribution toward the end we seek, subject, of course, to our constitutional processes, and to an adequate system of control becoming effective as we finally work it out.” (*ibid.*)

Note the words “subject, of course, to our constitutional processes”.

Many observers in Washington then and since were convinced that even if the other nations accepted the Plan the U.S.A. Congress would never have ratified it.

When he came to the question of penalties for violations, correspondents present said that “one could hear a pin drop”. That is hardly surprising, because Baruch said: “Now as to violations: in the agreement, penalties of as serious a nature as the nations may wish and as immediate and certain in their execution as possible, should be fixed for:

- “(1) illegal possession or use of an atomic bomb;
- “(2) illegal possession, or separation, of atomic material suitable for use in an atomic bomb;
- “(3) seizure of any plant or other property belonging to or licensed by the authority;
- “(4) wilful interference with the activities of the Authority;
- “(5) creation or operation of dangerous projects in a manner contrary to, or in the absence of, a licence granted by the international control body.”

Baruch went on: “It would be a deception, to which I am unwilling to lend myself, were I not to say to you and to our peoples, that the matter of punishment lies at the very heart of our present security system. It might as well be admitted, here and now, that the subject goes straight to the veto power contained in the Charter of the United Nations so far as it relates to the field of atomic energy. The Charter permits penalisation only by concurrence of each of the five great Powers: The Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, China, France and the United States.

"I want to make very plain that I am concerned here with the veto power only as it affects this particular problem. There must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes." (*ibid.*, our emphasis.)

Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Delegate, in the course of the discussions of the Baruch Plan in the Atomic Energy Commission said:

"The proposals of the U.S. representatives run counter to the principles of U.N. They provide, on the one hand, for the establishment on the basis of a special treaty an 'international authority' with broad powers of control over atomic energy. This 'international authority', however, is not provided with practical opportunities to implement its powers.

"On the other hand, these proposals disturb the basis of the efficiency of the activities of the Security Council, which bears chief responsibility for the maintenance of international peace, since they prevent the application of the principle of unanimity of the five Great Powers (the 'veto' principle) when deciding questions relating to the application of sanctions in cases where violation of the treaty have been ascertained, to say nothing of the fact that they run counter, in this respect, to the U.N. Charter.

"The question of sanctions in connection with the exercise of international control over atomic energy can be decided only in conformity with the U.N. Charter, which, as we know, provides for the Security Council to adopt decisions on sanctions subject to the unanimity of the five permanent members of the Security Council."

We pointed out earlier that the Atomic Energy Commission was subject to the Security Council, but under the Baruch Plan the Authority was to be a "law unto itself" and could act and even declare war without any reference to the Security Council or to the General Assembly.

Who in actual practice would act?

On this vital issue, Dorothy Thompson, at the time a widely read American commentator, wrote:

"Mr. Baruch has left a blank at the most critical point. We still do not know exactly where the force to impose sanctions is ultimately to rest. Is it to rest in the International Atomic Development Authority itself? Are the sanctions, whose threat is the only safeguard—as Mr. Baruch says—to be applied by the Authority directly? . . .

"Actually, whatever authority the 'Authority' would possess—at any rate at present—would be endowed upon it not by the Security Council as a body, but by the only member of the Security Council actually possessing the decisive atomic-power—the United States. That power is real; the power of the Authority would be delegated power in name only—hence fictional." (*Observer*, June 23, 1946.)

Baruch's aim was quite clear. The "Authority" would have an anti-Soviet majority; at the appropriate moment it could declare that the Soviet Union had violated the terms of the agreement; the "Authority"—which in practice would mean the U.S.A.—could then act and could put its imprint of approval on the action of the U.S.A. There could be no appeal to the Security Council. The other States represented on the twelve Nations Committee must have known that the U.S.S.R. would never accept the Baruch Plan.

On June 19, 1946, the Soviet Delegate, Mr. Gromyko, tabled the Soviet Plan and replied to Mr. Baruch's speech of June 14, 1946.

The Soviet proposals were quite definite and precise. The operative Articles 1, 2, and 3 read:

"Article 1. The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare their unanimous decision to forbid the production and utilisation of weapons based on atomic energy and for the purpose assume the obligations:

- (a) Not to use atomic weapons under any circumstances;
- (b) To forbid the production and keeping of weapons based on atomic energy;
- (c) Within three months of the Convention becoming effective to destroy the stock of finished and semi-finished atomic weapons.

"Article 2. The High Contracting Parties declare that violation of Article 1 of the present Convention constitutes a grave international crime against humanity.

"Article 3. The High Contracting Parties, within six months from the time that this convention becomes effective, shall promulgate laws establishing the severe punishment of violators of the principles of the present Convention."

Further, in regard to the work of the Atomic Energy Control Commission, the Soviet proposals provided for the setting up of two committees: one for preparing recommendations regarding practical measures for organising exchanges of information on scientific discoveries connected with the fission of the atomic nucleus and the production and utilisation of atomic energy.

The second committee was to devise ways and means to prevent the utilisation of atomic energy to the harm of humanity and was charged with the task of preparing in particular the following important recommendations:

1. On the draft of an International Convention for outlawing weapons based on atomic energy and forbidding production and use of such weapons and all other basic types of armaments which can be used for mass destruction;
2. On the search for and enforcement of measures in connection with a ban on the production of weapons based on atomic energy and in preventing use of atomic weapons and all other basic types of armaments which can be used for mass destruction;
3. On measures, system and organisation of control over the utilisation of atomic energy and observance of the terms of the above International Convention outlawing atomic weapons;
4. On the system of sanctions against the unlawful utilisation of atomic energy.

There was nothing vague about all this. The Soviet Government and people were anxious and determined to do everything in their power to prevent any possible use of atomic energy for destructive purposes.

In introducing the Soviet Plan, Mr. Gromyko said: "As one of the primary measures for the fulfilment of the resolution of the General Assembly of January 24, 1946, the Soviet Delegation proposes that consideration be given to the question of concluding an international convention prohibiting the production and employment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy for the purpose of mass destruction. The object of such a convention should be the prohibition of the production and employment of atomic weapons, the destruction of existing stocks of atomic weapons and the condemnation of all activities undertaken in violation of this convention. The elaboration and conclusion of a convention of this kind would be, in the opinion of the Soviet Delegation, only one of the primary measures to be taken to prevent the use of atomic energy to the detriment of mankind. This

act should be followed by other measures aiming at the establishment of methods to ensure the strict observance of the terms and obligations contained in the above-mentioned convention, the establishment of a system of control over the observance of the convention and the taking of decisions regarding the sanctions to be applied against the unlawful use of atomic energy. The public opinion of the whole civilised world has already rightly condemned the use in warfare of asphyxiating, poisonous and other similar gases, as well as all similar liquids and substances and likewise bacteriological means, by concluding corresponding agreements for the prohibition of their use."

Towards the end of his speech, Mr. Gromyko stated clearly that the Soviet Government was definitely against any tampering with the Charter of U.N. or with the powers of the Security Council. He said: "The activity of the Atomic Energy Commission can bring about the desired results only when it is in full conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations which are laid down as the basis of the activity of the Security Council, because the Commission is an organ of this Organisation, working under the instructions of the Security Council and responsible to the same.

"Attempts to undermine the principles, as established by the Charter, of the activity of the Security Council, including unanimity of the members of the Security Council in deciding questions of substance, are incompatible with the interests of the United Nations, who created the international organisation for the preservation of peace and security. Such attempts must be rejected.

"I deemed it necessary to make this statement in order that, from the very beginning of the work of our Commission, I might make clear the position of the Soviet Government regarding the question of the character and basis of the work of the Commission, regarding the question of the recommendations to be prepared by it, and regarding the measure of control over atomic energy to be submitted to the Security Council.

"In conclusion," said Mr. Gromyko, "I wish to say that in my present statement I set myself the task of emphasising the extreme importance of the proposal for the conclusion of the above-mentioned convention prohibiting the production and employment of atomic weapons. The conclusion of such a convention would constitute an important practical step towards the fulfilment of the tasks that lie before the Commission."

It will be noticed that there was a fundamental difference between

the U.S.A. and the Soviet Plans. Under the U.S.A. Plan a majority of the members of the International Atomic Development Authority would have supreme power, would be able to declare and make war against any member of U.N., which in the opinion of the majority was defaulting. In other words, the "Authority" would have power to start a third world war.

Under the Soviet Union Plan the powers of the General Assembly and the Security Council would remain intact as laid down in the Charter of U.N.

In the following months the two Plans were discussed on several occasions but the fundamental differences remained.

The Atomic Energy Commission on December 20, 1946, accepted the Baruch Plan by 10 votes to 2. The minority consisted of the U.S.S.R. and Poland.

As usual, the attitude of the Soviet representatives was strongly criticised in many quarters. However, some people who stopped to think admitted that there was much to be said for the Soviet point of view in the existing circumstances. For instance, the *Manchester Guardian*, December 31, 1946, in a leader declared:

"Logically, the American argument is irrefutable. If there is to be an effective international control of atomic energy in all its stages there can be no room for the right of veto. The only question is whether Mr. Baruch is entirely realistic."

That gentleman was anything but realistic. The *Manchester Guardian* leader continued:

"Mr. Baruch presumably envisages a situation when the international authority has been established and a system of inspection and control is in operation. If the international inspectorate then discovers that some country (say, Russia, if need be) is violating the treaty by manufacturing atomic bombs, what happens?"

Mr. Baruch himself was quite definite as to what he envisaged. Before the Atomic Energy Commission he stated:

"The issue at stake here is the sanctity of a treaty versus the sanctity of the veto. . . . It has been said that if a great nation decides to violate a treaty no agreements, however solemn, will prevent such

violation . . . and the result will be war. I agree. I believe that a clear realisation of this would be the greatest step toward peace that had been taken in history. Let all nations that willingly set their pens to the terms of this treaty realise that its wilful breach means punishment, and, if necessary, war. Then we will not lightly have breaches and evasions."

According to all reports from New York, Mr. Baruch was in a rather excited state of mind when he made that speech.

The *Manchester Guardian* leader continued:

"Then, says Mr. Baruch, Russia must be 'punished' by 'sanctions', and no Government should have the right to prevent it. This is fair enough in theory, but it has very serious implications. 'Sanctions' against a Great Power mean war, and it is highly doubtful whether nations will bind themselves to go to war automatically with a Great Power no matter how just the cause. If, for instance, Russia was discovered to be violating the atomic treaty, would France go to war to stop her doing so? Would Britain? Would, for that matter, the United States? The truth is that no Government can pledge itself to go to war in any particular circumstances unless it is quite sure that public opinion will support it. And it is one thing to declare war on an aggressor, which has already invaded the country of an ally, and quite another to declare war on Russia (or any other country) whose only guilt is to have made certain weapons which she has not yet used."

Supposing that the U.S.A. was the culprit, would France, would Great Britain, would China, would any nation, bind itself to go to war with her automatically? There is no need to answer that question.

The *New Statesman and Nation* also made some very pertinent comments on this subject. It stated:

"The Americans claim the right to retain exclusive possession of the atomic bomb until the U.S.S.R. has been internationally 'inspected and controlled'—a process which would reveal the location of all Russia's carefully concealed munition plants and defences. The Russian reply is to say: 'If you want to be sure that we are not making atomic bombs, we must be first sure that you will not use your bombs against us when you have discovered where they can most effectively be dropped.' This is the real crux of the matter; and, until it is solved, it is academic to argue whether agreement on

automatic sanctions against 'atomic violation' would in practice be much more effective than the provisions embodied in the Covenant of the old League for automatic sanctions against aggression in general."

The journal concluded on a more hopeful note: "For the moment, the Baruch Plan must be regarded as in suspense; but this is not the end of hopes of disarmament. The Security Council's next business must be to consider the proposals which the Russians are tabling for an agreed international reduction of armed forces, beginning with prohibition of specific weapons of mass destruction."

Finally we would emphasise that the Soviet Government agreed to the establishment of a supervision and control commission, the rules of work of which would, of course, be worked out by the Security Council and must have the unanimous support of all the major five Powers. But once these rules had been drafted, it would naturally (and the Soviet Delegate also said so) work in accordance with these rules and the question of veto could not arise. Naturally, too, there could be no inspection until all had agreed to destroy their atomic bombs and similar weapons and had declared they had done so.

The question arose as to what would happen if the Control Commission found that one country was violating the international agreement and was manufacturing atom bombs or similar weapons contrary to this agreement? Were there to be automatic sanctions? Mr. Baruch said "Yes" (and the British Delegate echoed the cry); the Soviets said "No. For such a serious matter we must have unanimity between the principal Powers."

The difference between the two sides was surely, on the one hand, of hiding one's head in abstractions, and on the other, standing erect and facing facts.

There the matter stood at the end of 1946.

We shall, of course, deal with this subject again in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER XI

IMPROVEMENT AND SETBACKS IN 1947

FIELD MARSHAL MONTGOMERY, in response to a long-standing invitation from Marshal Vassilievsky, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, arrived in Moscow on January 6, 1947, on a short visit. After inspecting the welcoming Red Army guard of honour, Montgomery went direct to the microphone and gave the following message to the Soviet peoples:

"I come to Russia as a soldier. . . . I want to establish friendly contact with the Soviet Army. I hope that out of that friendly contact there may develop and grow mutual understanding, mutual confidence and a happy relationship between our armies which will be for the mutual benefit of us all.

"I want to pay my respects to that mighty Army which played such a big part in the victory of the Allies over the Axis Powers in the late war.

"When peace came we had to build a new world out of the ruins of the old. And during the early days of peace some nations were apt to plead that they had suffered in the war more severely than any other nation, and must therefore be given preferential treatment.

"But my view, for what it is worth, is that the nation which suffered most severely was Soviet Russia.

"Her people bore suffering in brave silence and just fought on against the treacherous German invader.

"I salute the brave Russian people. . . . Good day to you all."
(*News Chronicle*, January 7, 1947.)

The *News Chronicle* cable continued: "He (Montgomery) then turned to Marshal Vassilievsky, head of the Soviet General Staff, and asked him if he would see that his speech is published in the papers to-morrow, and thus let all the Russian people know with what feelings he came to their country from Britain.

"Tonight the English text of his speech was broadcast in the Russian

language bulletin by Moscow radio—an exceptionally rare occurrence.”

On arrival at the Moscow Airport, Field Marshal Montgomery was received with the full honours to which his high position entitled him.

Montgomery took with him as a gift to Marshal Vassilievsky a case of Scotch whisky, bearing the imprint “Britain delivers the goods”.

Montgomery had a very busy few days in Moscow and made many contacts. On January 10 he had a long talk with Stalin. A cable dated Moscow, January 10, 1947, read: “Field Marshal Montgomery was received by Mr. Stalin at the Kremlin this evening and had an hour and a quarter’s talk with the Soviet Prime Minister. On return to the British Embassy, Lord Montgomery described his conversation, which was *tête-à-tête*, with interpreters, as ‘great’. It was clear that Lord Montgomery was highly satisfied with the friendly way in which his first meeting with Mr. Stalin had gone.” (*Times*, January 11, 1947.)

Late on January 10, 1947, in a statement to the Soviet press Montgomery said:

“I thank Marshal Vassilievsky (the Soviet Chief of Staff) and the Soviet Army not only for their hospitality but also for the opportunity to establish friendly contact with the army of Russia, and thus develop in peacetime that comradeship between our two armies which was formed during our struggle against the treacherous German enemy.

“During my brief visit to the Soviet Union my hosts have been most friendly and generous. I have seen your fine military academies named after Stalin, Voroshilov and Frunze. At these institutions, which greatly impressed me with their efficiency, I was shown everything I wished to see. I was given ample opportunity of meeting both staff and pupils and I had many frank and interesting talks with them.

“We soldiers, having completed our common task of defeating the Fascist enemy, must now march forward together in the equally important task of helping to consolidate a lasting peace.

“Marshal Vassilievsky has already accepted my invitation to visit the British Army. In the early summer of this year I hope to see him in London as the guest of the British Army and hope he will bring with him some of the marshals of the Soviet Union with whom I have now made great friends.

“I will be glad, indeed, to return their hospitality, to show them our military institutions and develop the friendly relations already established between the armies of our two victorious countries.

"On behalf of the soldiers of Britain I send comradely greetings to the courageous warriors of the Soviet Army and to the great Russian people." (*Times*, January 11, 1947.)

The Soviet Peoples and Government certainly attached great importance to the visit of Field Marshal Montgomery. A Reuter cable date-lined Moscow, January 12, 1947, read: "A picture of Lord Montgomery, who returned to Britain yesterday, was again given prominence in the Moscow papers to-day—for the third time in five days.

"Lord Montgomery has been given more prominence than almost any recent visitor to Moscow. To-day's picture showed him in a Soviet Marshal's uniform and accompanied by Marshal Vassilievsky, reviewing the guard of honour before his departure." (*Manchester Guardian*, January 13, 1947.)

On his return from Moscow Field Marshal Lord Montgomery sent the following messages to Generalissimo Stalin and Marshal Vassilievsky:

"To Generalissimo Stalin: On my arrival back to England I hasten to send your Excellency my deep appreciation of the friendly welcome that was given me in Moscow by the Soviet Army. I greatly enjoyed the quiet and valuable talk we had together and I am grateful to you for having given me so much of your time. The words that you wrote in my autograph book 'I salute the Brotherly British Army' will always remind me of the warm reception I received in Moscow from the Generalissimo of the Armed Forces of Russia."

"To Marshal Vassilievsky: I want to tell you how much I enjoyed my visit to you in Moscow and how grateful I am for the complete facilities you gave me to inquire into the training and organisation of the Soviet Army. I gained much benefit from my talks with you and your officers. I feel I now have some real friends in the Russian Army and I hope that these friendships will grow and develop in a spirit of mutual confidence and trust. Now that we have got to know each other we must keep in close touch and I shall look forward with eagerness to your visit to the British Army in England in June next. Thank you once more for your kindness and hospitality." (*Times*, January 14, 1947.)

The visit of the Field Marshal and the accompanying speeches and expressions of goodwill were taken in Great Britain as proof of a deep

feeling of sympathy in each country for the other. To quote the *Manchester Guardian*: "In spite of the rather depressing experiences of the last two years there is still a vast fund of goodwill towards Russia among the British people and, we believe, towards Britain among the Russian people. Given the slightest excuse, such as Field Marshal Montgomery's visit to Moscow, this friendliness bubbles to the surface on both sides." (*Manchester Guardian*, January 8, 1947.)

However, incidents occurred which demonstrated that this feeling of goodwill could be marred by thoughtless statements. In Chapter IX we refer to a broadcast made on December 22, 1946, by Foreign Secretary Bevin to the nation, in the course of which *inter alia* he said:

"You have all heard the allegations that we are joined too closely in our policies with the United States; that our relations with Soviet Russia are not as close as they should be and that this course will retard the pacification of the world and may lead to another world war.

"My first answer to these allegations is that Great Britain brings her mind to bear on every problem on its merits. She does not tie herself to anybody except in regard to her obligations under the Charter. . . . My second answer is that we hold out the hand of friendship and co-operation to all."

Bevin, although he referred to Britain's obligations under the Charter, made no reference to her obligations under the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942. Naturally this attracted sharp attention in Moscow. *Pravda*, January 15, 1947, criticised strongly Bevin's remarks. It stated:

"Mr. Bevin's announcement cannot but cause surprise. It leaves in the dark Mr. Bevin's views on Britain's international obligations. Nobody will deny British diplomacy the right to have its independent mind and goals, but in the sphere of international relations any statesman who respects his country and the nation at the same time respects those international obligations which his country enters into."

Pravda went on: "When Mr. Bevin states that Britain is not tying herself up with anybody the question arises: has Mr. Bevin forgotten that Britain is linked with the Soviet Union by a treaty which provided for the common struggle against Hitlerite Germany during the

war and for co-operation and mutual aid in post-war days? Has Mr. Bevin forgotten that this treaty was signed on May 26, 1942, in London and that it is valid for twenty years? Bevin could not possibly have forgotten about it when he said that Britain was not adhering to anything except her obligations under the United Nations Charter." (*Manchester Guardian*, January 16, 1947.)

Sir Maurice Peterson, the British Ambassador in Moscow, called on Foreign Minister Molotov, January 18, 1947, and handed him a statement on behalf of the British Government with the request that it should be passed on at once to Generalissimo Stalin. *Inter alia* the statement declared:

"His Majesty's Government were surprised at a suggestion which was elaborated in the most misleading manner by *Pravda*, in an article of January 15, that the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of alliance and post-war collaboration might be regarded in London as superseded by the United Nations organisation.

"The Foreign Secretary, on behalf of his Majesty's Government, has several times urged an extension of the treaty and has expressed regret that his Majesty's Government's proposals to this effect have not found acceptance by the Soviet Government. His Majesty's Government's attitude has not changed and it has never occurred to them to consider that the treaty could have been superseded or suspended."

The statement continued: "Mr. Bevin's words that Great Britain does not tie herself to anybody except in regard to her obligations under the Charter were quoted by *Pravda* on January 15, out of their context, for he had just explained that he was answering the allegations that British relations with Soviet Russia were not so close as they should be. He went on to express his Majesty's Government's great desire for complete understanding and their readiness to co-operate with the Soviet Union."

The statement concluded: "The logical conclusion of *Pravda's* interpretation of Mr. Bevin's remarks would be that all treaties and agreements between States are automatically superseded by the existence of the United Nations organisation, which would obviously be absurd." (*Daily Telegraph*, January 20, 1947.)

Pravda, January 23, 1947, printed the British reply in full and added an editorial comment rejecting the British contention that it had quoted out of its context that sentence from Mr. Bevin's speech which ran:

"Britain does not tie herself to anybody except in regard to her obligations under the Charter."

The paper also denied that it had misinterpreted the sentence under notice in the speech. It said:

"Mr. Bevin recalled accusations that Britain was too closely connected with the United States and that relations with the Soviet Union were not as close as they should be. Answering this charge, the British Foreign Secretary could have asked his accusers how they could make such charges when Britain was connected with the Soviet by the treaty of alliance in war and in post-war co-operation and mutual assistance. But it was this that Bevin did not say—while he did say something quite opposite.

"What other exposition of this sentence could be given by *Pravda* which did not and does not engage in guessing what Mr. Bevin wanted to say, but acquaints its readers with what he did say and with its meaning? This is the duty of the press and *Pravda* discharged this duty."

The matter was ended by an exchange of messages between Mr. Bevin and Generalissimo Stalin which were published in the press, January 25, 1947.

Mr. Bevin in his message to Generalissimo Stalin, dated January 18, 1947, stated: "I am gratified at the friendly reception which was given to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in Moscow, and am studying with interest the account which he has given me of his conversations with you.

"We are, however, disturbed at the suggestion which you made to him that the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Post-War Collaboration might be regarded in London as 'suspended in the air', since it might be regarded as superseded by the United Nations Organisation. This view has been attributed to me personally in the most misleading manner by *Pravda* in an article of January 15, which takes out of its context and misinterprets one sentence in my broadcast of December 22. In fact, I said what all other major allies have said, namely, that they based their policy on the United Nations Organisation.

"I cannot understand what is behind this line of reasoning, and I am the more amazed at the *Pravda* article, since I understand from Field Marshal Montgomery that you said this was not your own view regarding the treaty. It is certainly not my view either.

"Since *Pravda* has published this misleading article I have no alternative but to issue a statement which I should like you to see in advance, making the views of his Majesty's Government clear once again on this subject. I propose to publish it on the morning of January 20." (*Times*, January 25, 1947.)

Generalissimo Stalin, through the Soviet Ambassador in London, January 23, 1947, replied: "I have received your message of January 18. I must admit that your statement that Great Britain is not tied to anybody except in regard to her obligations arising from the Charter caused me some perplexity.

"It seems to me that such a statement, without a corresponding explanation, can be used by the enemies of Anglo-Soviet friendship. For me it is clear that no matter what reservations there are in the Anglo-Soviet Treaty and no matter how these reservations weaken the significance of the treaty in the post-war period, the existence of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty imposes obligations on our countries.

"It was just these circumstances that I had in mind when I stated on September 17, 1946, in my interview with Mr. Alexander Werth, that 'the Soviet Union is bound by the Treaty of Mutual Assistance against German aggression with Great Britain'; and that means her obligations with regard to Great Britain, not counting the obligations arising from the Charter.

"However, your message and the statement of the British Government completely explain the affair and do not leave any room for misunderstandings. It is now clear that you and I share the same viewpoint with regard to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty."

The reply concluded: "As regards the extension of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, to which special reference is made in the British Government's statement, I must say if one is to speak seriously of such an extension, then, before extending this treaty, it is necessary to change it, freeing it from the reservations which weaken this treaty. Only after such a procedure would it be possible to talk seriously of an extension of the treaty."

Mr. Bevin then sent the following telegram to the British Ambassador in Moscow: "Please thank the Generalissimo for his very frank and helpful statement and inform him that I am releasing it for tomorrow's press together with my message to him of January 18." (*ibid.*)

This exchange of messages gave rise to considerable satisfaction in Britain. The *Times* Diplomatic Correspondent expressed widely held sentiments:

"The possibility that Britain and the Soviet Union may enter a new and more friendly phase in their relations is opened up in the text of the messages exchanged between Generalissimo Stalin and Mr. Bevin. The messages show that the recent misunderstandings over the British attitude towards the Anglo-Soviet Treaty have been removed. Much more than that, Generalissimo Stalin takes up Mr. Bevin's suggestion that the treaty might be extended. Without committing himself definitely to the proposal, he suggests that it be discussed after the treaty has been revised and strengthened." (*Times*, January 25, 1947.)

The *Times* continued: "In London last night, once it was known that both sides had agreed to the publication of the messages, there was the most sincere satisfaction at the turn of events. The exchanges will be continued without any delay, and it is hoped that Mr. Bevin's visit to Moscow in March, when he will take part in the Foreign Ministers' conference on Germany and Austria, will allow the new opportunity to be used to the full. Good might emerge from the misunderstanding: that was the first and dominant thought among officials last night."

The *Times* comment was typical of the British press as a whole and the press was also unanimous in believing that both the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain were equally anxious to preserve, extend and strengthen the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance of 1942. And a cable date-lined Moscow, January 26, 1947, read:

"The exchange of messages between Mr. Stalin and Mr. Bevin continued at the week-end to excite lively interest here. In Soviet circles there is the deepest satisfaction that assurances so firm and unambiguous have been given on both sides that the treaty, of which part will automatically cease to have force with the re-establishment of peace with Germany and her former European allies, is seen as the groundwork on which future relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union will continue to be built." (*Times*, January 27, 1947.)

The cable continued: "Although there is growing confidence in the United Nations as a means of regulating world affairs, for the task of containing a Germany advancing, as the Russians are certain that Germany must advance, towards the recovery of some of her previous strength the Anglo-Soviet Treaty is considered the most effective and cogent instrument."

On the following day the *Daily Express* editorially declared:

"The British Government wants to lengthen the duration of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty.

"The Russian Government wants to strengthen the terms of that treaty."

The editorial concluded: "The people of Britain want both to lengthen it and to strengthen it, believing that complete confidence and trust between Britain and the Soviet Union, comparable with the relations of frank understanding we enjoy with the United States, is one of the main pillars of world peace." (*Daily Express*, January 28, 1947.)

On the same day, January 28, TASS, the official Soviet News Agency, commenting on the exchanges between Mr. Stalin and Mr. Bevin, said that more than a formal treaty was necessary and that the time had come "to stand by the treaty and particularly by that part of it according to which both countries undertook to work jointly for the organisation of security and economic prosperity in Europe." (*Times*, January 29, 1947.)

The outcome of the Bevin-Stalin exchanges was in general welcomed in Great Britain. The *Times* discussed it again on February 1, 1947, subjecting the correspondence to a close analysis. After stressing that Britain and the U.S.S.R. had both special and common interests in Europe and that the "friction between them is equally detrimental to both", it concluded: "If these essential truths are clearly proclaimed as the foundation of British foreign policy, and if they are not only recognised as such by the Soviet Union but also find their appropriate reflection in Russian policy, the outlook opened up by Mr. Bevin and Generalissimo Stalin for an effective reaffirmation and reinvigoration of the Anglo-Soviet alliance can be realised to the full." (*Times*, February 2, 1947.)

We would record here that the British Government made no response to Stalin's proposal that if the treaty was extended it should also be strengthened.

We must now turn back to January 17, 1947; on that date the British press carried an announcement that a "United Europe Committee" had been formed under the chairmanship of Mr. Winston Churchill. The other members were: Mr. L. S. Amery, the Rev.

Dr. Sydney Berry, Mr. Robert Boothby, M.P., Mr. Ernest Brown, Mr. Lionel Curtis, Mr. George Gibson, Mr. Victor Gollancz. Miss F. L. Josephy, Mr. Evelyn King, M.P., Commander Stephen King-Hall, the Rev. Gordon Lang, M.P., Lord Layton, Lord Lindsay of Birker, Dr. J. J. Mallon, Dr. W. R. Matthews (Dean of St. Paul's), Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, M.P., Professor Gilbert Murray, Lady Rhys Williams, Earl Russell, Mr. Duncan Sandys (hon. secretary), Mr. Oliver Stanley, M.P., and the Rt. Rev. Edward Ellis (Roman Catholic Bishop of Nottingham).

The announcement *inter alia* stated:

"The aim must be to unite all the peoples of Europe and give expression to their sense of being Europeans, while preserving their own traditions and identity.

"United Europe would have the status of a regional group under the Charter of the United Nations Organisation, and would naturally seek the close friendship and co-operation of the Soviet Union and the United States of America. It would be premature to define the precise constitutional relationship between the nations of a unified Europe." (*Daily Herald*, January 17, 1947.)

So the U.S.S.R. is not in Europe?

The names sponsoring this Committee, with Mr. Churchill at their head, could hardly bode any good for Anglo-Soviet relations; and it was pretty clear that the aim of the Committee was to unite all the other states of Europe against the U.S.S.R.

The Tory press had, on the whole, welcomed the scheme; the Liberal papers had blown somewhat hot and cold, but on the whole accepted it as genuine. (Lord Walter Layton, Chairman of the *News Chronicle*, was a signatory.)

But the Labour press—the *Daily Herald* and *Reynolds*—as in the days of armed British intervention when they came out firmly in favour of peace and friendship with Soviet Russia, had now also come forward unequivocally against Mr. Churchill's scheme for sowing new dissensions in the world.

In a signed article in the *Daily Herald*, January 17, 1947, the Editor *inter alia* said:

"Although he (Churchill) does not say so, and although many of his fellow committee men would recoil with horror from such a policy, I cannot help believing that in the back of his mind the

primary object of 'United Europe' is to check the supposed desires of Russia by forming as much as possible of the rest of Europe into a Grand Alliance. . . .

"I think that the United Europe idea, if pursued in the form in which Mr. Churchill sponsors it, would arouse suspicion and opposition in Russia and would tend to create deeper divisions between Russia and Britain. I feel pretty sure that the idea in any form, if Mr. Churchill were its chief sponsor, would have that effect."

And Reynolds declared:

"Mr. Churchill has established himself as the spokesman for a certain kind of Europe, a Europe patterned on hereditary authority, in which nations as well as classes 'know their place'. His ideal period seems to be the eighteenth century, his immediate goal a return to the status quo ante 1914. He does not conceal that he regards Russia as on the whole the greatest menace which has ever confronted Western Europe.

"We believe the exact opposite to Mr. Churchill. Europe needs and is now undergoing great social and economic changes which will sweep away much of the historical lumber which Mr. Churchill regards as so admirable. We believe that the greatest world problem is to seek a relationship of friendship and trust between Russia and the rest of the world, and that purpose will be hindered and not served by any co-called United Europe movement led by Mr. Churchill, whose record and openly proclaimed desires can rouse nothing but suspicion in Russia."

Within the Labour Party strong opposition was expressed against the Committee; and the National Executive of the Party, February 4, 1947, advised members of the Labour Party to withhold support from the Committee. After the meeting of the National Executive, Mr. Morgan Phillips told the *Daily Herald*:

"The National Executive realises that it is thoroughly desirable to encourage the maximum co-operation between the nations of Europe.

"But such co-operation is scarcely likely to be stimulated by an organisation led by Mr. Churchill.

"The future peace and progress of Europe depend on the success of the United Nations, and therefore on the strengthening of friendly collaboration between Russia, America and Britain.

"Mr. Churchill, however, explicitly excludes Russia from the 'United Europe' which he envisages."

Mr. Phillips concluded: "This fact—coupled with Mr. Churchill's record and known opinions regarding Russia—means that the Committee's policy will be interpreted, rightly or wrongly, as aiming at the elimination of Russian influence from Europe." (*Daily Herald*, February 5, 1947.)

The Committee made another big splash when Mr. Winston Churchill, at a mass meeting in the Albert Hall, London, May 14, opened a campaign under the auspices of the "United Europe Committee".

The idea behind this agitation was to divide Europe on ideological lines. All were welcome who accepted the "ideas which we call Western Civilisation".

According to Churchill: "The whole purpose of a united democratic Europe is to give decisive guarantees against aggression." (*Daily Herald*, May 15, 1947.)

Aggression from what quarter? The question was not clearly answered but it was clearly implied: it was an anti-Soviet Movement not even thinly disguised.

The meeting was supported in the main by members of the Conservative Party and by a few members of the Labour Party in their individual capacities.

The Labour Movement officially denounced this committee. The *Daily Herald* editorially, May 16, 1947 stated:

"At the Albert Hall in London this week the United Europe Committee, of which Mr. Churchill is chairman, held the first 'rally' of its propaganda campaign.

"We have studied very carefully Mr. Churchill's speech to the rally. And we are convinced more strongly than ever that we have been right in condemning the activities of this Committee and in deploring the fact that certain members of the Labour and Liberal Parties have joined in those activities."

The editorial continued: "Mr. Churchill is not seeking a United Europe but a divided Europe. He is redrawing the map of the Continent so as to exclude Russia and the Eastern European countries which are in close association with Russia."

The "United Europe Committee" had a dead-alive existence for

some time, but the firm opposition of the Labour Movement precluded it from developing into a united national movement.

A clearly inspired Foreign Office statement appeared in all the British press, February 8, 1947, to the effect that exchanges were continuing between London and Moscow on the possibility of revising the Anglo-Soviet (1942) Treaty of Alliance. No other details were given.

A study of the Soviet press and broadcasts at this time clearly demonstrated that the Soviet Government was becoming very suspicious of the West's intentions regarding Germany. This was well brought out in a cable date-lined Moscow, February 10, 1947. The cable stated:

"Soviet opinion appears to have hardened on the German question, which to-day is being regarded less as an isolated problem than as part of the general European, and particularly the western European question."

The Cable continued: "The question is being asked whether the British Government will show itself ready to stand by that part of the Anglo-Soviet alliance according to which both countries undertook to work jointly for the organisation of security and economic prosperity in Europe, or whether it will leave Russia still in doubt about how far the Labour Government is able or willing to restrain those forces in Britain's 'capitalist society' which, in the Soviet view, are ready again to tread the path from Versailles to Munich." (*Times*, February 11, 1947.)

In Moscow the opinion was often and clearly expressed that the U.S.A. and Britain were aiming to bring Germany into a European Alliance directed against U.S.S.R. Such a European Alliance would obviously be opposed to the letter and spirit of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942.

It is pleasant to recall a ceremony which took place at the Soviet Embassy in London on February 12, 1947. A delegation from the National Union of Mineworkers, headed by its president, Mr. Will Lawther, handed to the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Zarubin, a cheque for £4,500 from the Union to the Russian Aid Fund. Presenting the cheque, Mr. Lawther said:

"It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to meet you under such happy auspices. During the conflict to wipe out the foul menace of Nazism, in which our two nations made so tremendous a sacrifice, the British miners played their part in every possible way. Never a day passed without the miners giving of their best to keep the factories going to produce the weapons for Hitler's destruction.

"As you know we gave handsome donations to your people, to the extent of over £100,000. This cheque that I now have the honour to present to you, to be given to our mining colleagues in the U.S.S.R., is a further proof, if any were needed, that the bonds of comradeship in war will be maintained in peace. May we express through you to the miners of the U.S.S.R., the fact that whatever may be said or done in those circles which believe that the road to progress lies in making enmity between our two countries, will have the unrelenting opposition of the British miners, and we feel sure the rest of the organised workers of Great Britain."

Lawther concluded: "Upon the miners has fallen the role of being the peacetime commandos of reconstruction, in a war weary and shattered world. Both your nation and ours have a long uphill struggle in that task. We need peace to achieve it. Whilst system of Government may differ in our two countries, we as miners assure you that we believe, and know, that we can and will work together to solve the problems of peace, as we did in the days of war. We ask you, Mr. Zarubin, to convey these words with this cheque, as a token of our earnestness and goodwill."

Mr. Zarubin warmly thanked the delegation and promised to transmit the sentiments expressed by Mr. Lawther to his Government and to the miners of the U.S.S.R.

There can be no reasonable doubt that the sentiments expressed by Mr. Lawther on behalf of the miners were at the time, to use his own words, also shared by "the rest of the organised workers of Great Britain".

On February 27, 1947, Foreign Secretary Bevin opened a full debate in the House of Commons on foreign affairs. He made the usual *tour d'horizon*. Here we have only space to quote those parts of his speech which most directly referred to Anglo-Soviet relations.

Referring to the devastation on Soviet soil, Mr. Bevin said:

"The devastation caused by the invasion of the interior of Russia

by German, Italian, Rumanian and Hungarian forces, is almost too dreadful to be believed. I mention this because happily we were not invaded, although we were bombed from the air. But we did not suffer the total destruction that some of these countries suffered. The thousands of towns, villages, and great enterprises which were destroyed, represent an appalling figure, and since the armies of the satellites and Italy, helped the Germans, we can quite understand the feeling of the Soviet Union in this matter. . . .

"Turning to the Soviet Union, the House is aware that we have recently had a most important exchange of messages with Generalissimo Stalin. The Soviet Government is now interesting itself in the suggestions put forward in this House, that the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance should be prolonged. The position is, that Generalissimo Stalin has very naturally pointed out, that the Treaty needs bringing up to date if it is to be prolonged. There has been that little misunderstanding about a sentence in my broadcast of December 22. It was first brought to our notice by an article in *Pravda* and as soon as we got in direct touch with Generalissimo Stalin about it, I am glad to say that we found that he was good enough to say that our views exactly coincided."

Bevin continued: "I cannot help wishing, however, that the Soviet Government had taken the matter up with us in the first place through diplomatic channels, when the whole matter could have been cleared up, without creating any public excitement. It is now cleared up and I can say no more about it, except that we are entirely agreed that it would be a good thing to get rid of the out-of-date features of the Treaty. The point is that the Treaty was made before the United Nations came into existence and so, very properly there was provision for aligning the passage dealing with mutual assistance against Germany with any general international arrangements which might be made.

"I hope the country will not expect too much from us at the Moscow conference. We have terrific difficulties to face. There has never been another situation like it, so widespread, involving almost the whole planet, as this struggle did, and accompanied by probably the greatest economic disturbance the world has ever seen.

"It is not a question merely of the Foreign Minister's debating ability or arguments. The responsibility for making a good peace rests not only on governments and their civil servants but on the peoples as a whole." (*Hansard*, February 27, 1947, cols. 2298-312.)

Speaking for the Opposition, Mr. R. A. Butler said: "We, and in particular my right hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and

Leamington, would be interested to know in what particulars it is proposed to revise the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, and to prolong it. We should certainly be in favour of prolonging it and making it as effective as it can possibly be made. But if I may say so it was a good Treaty when it was made, and we should like to know in what respects it is going to be made better." (*ibid.*, col. 2319.)

Mr. Hollis (Conservative), said: "The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told us that left understands left. Now we look around the world and find the situation—in which, as I have said, none of us can rejoice—that these two great Socialist Governments are at issue with one another in very large portions of the globe. That issue constitutes the most serious of the foreign problems of the world." (*ibid.*, cols. 2343-4.)

Mr. Beverley Baxter (Conservative), who had just returned from the U.S.A., said:

"Many responsible newspapers in the United States talk openly of war with Russia. They talk of the tactics of war with Russia, and that also might account for some of their warmth towards us.

"The Americans talk too much and too openly about war with Russia.

"I have seen enough of the Russians to realise that they respond quickly to generosity and to friendship. I saw young boys who were fine young soldiers, as fine as those who went out from France, Britain or any other country.

"Russia for a long period in history has been forcibly invaded—by the Swedes, by the Tartars, by Napoleon, by the Japanese and, in the last war, by Hitler's Germany. Every time there is a mounting toll in blood and treasure.

"Every time a conqueror arises in Europe, no matter what nation he defeats in the West, he knows that he cannot make his triumph secure unless he defeats Russia. Across the Ukraine and through Finland to Leningrad comes the invader and every time Russia pays a terrible price."

Baxter concluded: "We must break down this barrier between East and West. We must convince America that, if we approach Russia, as we should, we are not turning our backs on America; and we must be sure that we are keeping our Dominions with us because they are of good heart and great purpose." (*ibid.*, col. 2358-60.)

Next day, February 28, the British press welcomed heartily what

Bevin said about extending and strengthening the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942, and wished the Foreign Secretary success in the Moscow Conference negotiations.

It is necessary here to make a digression and consider happenings in Greece at this time, because subsequently they had a considerable effect on the course of Anglo-Soviet relations. As pointed out earlier, the British Government at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in London in the autumn of 1945 announced in effect they had decided to return to the Crimean War policy *vis-à-vis* the U.S.S.R. This involved supporting an anti-Soviet Government in Greece. German and Italian troops forced Greece to capitulate in April, 1941. Three years later political and military events forced the invaders to evacuate Greece and by October 15, 1944, the whole country was cleared.

During the occupation there was a strong Resistance Movement of Left elements, but the adherents of the pre-war Metaxas Royalist dictatorship co-operated with the Germans.

If after the evacuation of the country by the Germans the Greek people had been left alone to settle their form of government, there can be little doubt but that a government of the Left would have been constituted. That fact was well known to the then British Government and was not at all to the liking of Prime Minister Churchill.

On a minor scale he repeated in Greece his policy of armed intervention in Russia of 1918-20. British forces, supplies and money were sent to Greece to support the Fascists and Quislings against the courageous Resistance Movement.

As the reaction advanced a reign of terror was enacted and thousands of political prisoners were executed.

The U.S.S.R. did not interfere in the Greek civil war. This is clear from the report of "The Committee of Eleven" appointed by U.N. in December, 1946.

The Churchill policy in Greece was continued by the Labour Government which came into office in 1945, despite strong opposition from within the ranks of the Parliamentary Labour Party.

On February 24, 1947, the British Ambassador in Washington presented a Note to Secretary of State General Marshall, stating that Britain was unable to continue to accept financial responsibility for Greece after March 31, 1947.

At the same time the U.S.A. representative on the United Nations Commission (according to press reports) said that without U.S.A.

military and financial assistance the then existing régime in Greece would collapse.

The U.S.A. Government acted quickly. A cable date-lined, Washington, March 12, 1947 read:

"President Truman, in an address to a special joint session of Congress to-day, called for immediate and resolute action to aid Greece and Turkey. He asked for a loan of £100,000,000 to be made to the two countries for the period ending June 30, 1948.

"At the same time American military and civilian personnel should be sent to help Greek and Turkish reconstruction to supervise the use of the loan and to organise training." (*Daily Telegram*, March 13, 1947.)

In his address to Congress, Truman made the fact perfectly clear that his objective was to prevent Greece going Communist, which in turn, he said, would have an unsettling effect on Turkey.

Truman's policy was intervention in the civil war in Greece on the side of the Monarchist-Fascists against the Left, on the side of the collaborators with the Germans against the Resistance, which fought the Germans.

These facts should be borne in mind in reading the accounts of subsequent events.

CHAPTER XII

MOSCOW COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS: SOVIET PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION IN BRITAIN: TRADE DEVELOPMENT

THE Council of the Four Foreign Ministers opened in Moscow, March 10, 1947. France was represented by M. Bidault, the U.S.A. by General Marshall, the U.S.S.R. by Mr. Molotov and Great Britain by Mr. Bevin.

The principal items on the Agenda were: the future political structure of Germany; reparations; peace treaty with Germany; peace treaty with Austria.

Three days before the Conference opened Mr. Alexander Werth, in a cable from Moscow, stated: "And yet, although the Russian press is in the habit of speaking of the Anglo-American bloc in relation to Germany it is nevertheless wondering whether the British are willing to follow the Americans in everything. Does not Britain want to see a Socialist Germany? Does not Britain want to see German industries nationalised? Although British Socialism, and any brand of Socialism the British would encourage in Germany, is not by any means the Soviet variety, still the Russians sometimes wonder whether there may be some common ground to be found between the Russian and British approach to Germany which would be more difficult to find with American 'ultra capitalists'." (*Manchester Guardian*, March 8, 1947.)

As already mentioned, President Truman made his appeal to Congress for aid to Greece and Turkey.

On the following day Mr. Alaric Jacob, in a cable date-lined Moscow, March 13, 1947, stated: "Russian relations with America have never been so grim as to-day. President Truman's Message to Congress, urging men and money for Greece and Turkey, has by its tone and timing eclipsed the agenda of the Big Four Conference on Germany. I report the reactions of the Russians objectively:

"1. First comment was: What will Bevin say and Britain do? Will

- Britain, because of her economic dependence on America or for other reasons, support President Truman unreservedly? Or has she still an independent contribution to make?
- "2. The Russians ask: Does Truman wish this conference to fail when it has only just begun? For if the abyss of mistrust and hostility revealed by Truman be genuine, what hope can there be of solving the German problem?
 - "3. The suggestion that Turkey, which took no part in the war, requires 'reconstruction' by American military men is seen as an excuse for sending American troops to the borders of the Soviet Union.
 - "4. If the Americans want to pour £60,000,000 into Greece on top of the millions that Britain has already lost there, that is a worry for the American taxpayer rather than for Russia. But if this is the first step towards sending American troops to Greece and Turkey, the Russians regard it as a matter which will certainly be taken to U.N." (*Daily Express*, March 14, 1947.)

Jacob concluded: "If there is one ray of brightness here to-night, it is Britain that provides it."

That hope was soon dimmed. By and large Bevin and Bidault supported General Marshall throughout the Conference. However, at the end of the second week there was a restrained optimism in Moscow.

Mr. Alexander Werth, in a cable date-lined Moscow, March 21, 1947, stated: "The Foreign Ministers' Conference is nearing the end of its second week. An immense amount of ground has been covered and everybody is beginning to understand more fully the other's viewpoint. We are approaching the stage where practical decisions will have to be taken. All four have in varying degrees and in different ways expressed the belief in the possibility of the conference being a success, Mr. Bevin emphasising that it was the most important of all the conferences yet and there might not be another chance to achieve success if Moscow did not achieve what it should." (*Manchester Guardian*, March 22, 1947.)

As the Conference drew to its close, President Truman apparently decided that the Conference should fail. In an address to the members of the Associated Press, April 21, 1947, he declared:

"It is our policy to aid free peoples of the world in their efforts to

maintain their freedom. Many of these peoples are confronted with the choice between totalitarianism and democracy. This decision has been forced upon them by the devastation of a war which has so impoverished them that they are easy targets for external pressures and alien ideologies.

"By providing economic assistance, by aiding in tasks of reconstruction and rehabilitation we can enable these countries to withstand forces which so directly threaten their way of life and ultimately our own well-being." (*Times*, April 22, 1947.)

Here it was not a case of helping countries which had been subjected to widespread devastation during the war on humanitarian grounds, it was a question of helping these countries in the hope of using that help to dissuade them from adopting a certain form of government distasteful to the U.S.A.

This speech could not but worsen the atmosphere in the Moscow Conference.

The Conference ended on April 24, 1947, without having reached any substantial agreement.

However, neither the British nor the Russians were downhearted at the comparatively few positive results. The British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Ernest Bevin, at a press conference before leaving Moscow said *inter alia*:

"I believe that when the exchange of views and opportunities given to make more detailed studies in the next few months are taken into consideration it will be found that the Moscow Conference has, after all, been one of the best contributions towards the building of peace on a sound basis."

In his broadcast to the American people, April 28, 1947, Mr. Marshall vigorously blamed the Soviet delegation for every failure to reach agreement, but struck a hopeful note regarding the future. He said:

"Despite the disagreements referred to and the difficulties encountered, possibly greater progress towards a final settlement was made than is realised."

M. Bidault was also cautiously optimistic as to what the future might bring.

The Conference did achieve some results—the dissolution once and for all of Prussia. The four Ministers hammered out a somewhat more common approach to the question of the future political organisation of Germany and in the laying down of the procedure for the peace conference on Germany.

A fair amount of preparatory work was done regarding the Austrian Treaty and a Four-Power Commission was set up to sit in Vienna and to endeavour to reach a solution on the important points in that Treaty on which no agreement had so far been reached.

At the same time, there can be no doubt whatever that there were still very wide differences of views on many important subjects—reparations and the interconnected economic unity of Germany.

The British and American press had for the most part blamed the Russians for every difficulty which had arisen. They treated every question as though the British and Americans had a right to lay down terms and if these contradicted the Soviet terms, then the Russians ought to give way. But a Conference would be unnecessary if there was not to be a good deal of give and take on all sides.

For instance, on the Four-Power Treaty for keeping Germany disarmed, Mr. Marshall refused even to discuss the Soviet counter-proposals. In principle, Mr. Molotov had, like the other Foreign Ministers, agreed with the American proposals, but he desired that the Treaty should have some teeth in it. The Moscow correspondent of the *New Statesman and Nation* put the matter very neatly:

“Its (the Four-Power Pact) advocates say:

“Why not? Its purpose of keeping Germany disarmed could not be more praiseworthy. It would have an excellent effect on the Germans. It would show them that, although we cannot agree on anything else, we at least are all equally determined to keep Germany disarmed.’ The critics reply:

“‘Don’t be silly, and don’t take the Germans for a bunch of half-wits. It’s no use producing this bit of Big Four solidarity for the shop window when there is nothing behind it. If we agree, let us really agree convincingly on everything and not just on one thing and leave everything else in the air.’ Bevin, of course, wholeheartedly endorsed Marshall’s proposal. Bidault also said: ‘Of course, it is a jolly good idea’; but if you get the French alone, they will tell you: ‘Frankly, without anything else being settled, the whole thing stinks of the Kellogg Pact and the rest of the platonic declarations which we had between the two wars and which, from the security

standpoint, were as good as useless.' And, in private, the Russians will tell you: 'There is really little advantage in a Four-Power Pact as it stands. It provides only one guarantee—a guarantee that America will have indefinitely a finger in the German pie. We don't mind—provided she is also committed to keeping the German reactionaries down. But, for all we know, the American tenderness for reactionaries may continue to grow as years go by.' ”

As for reparations—one of the crucial points—both the Americans and the British were adamant. Mr. A. Werth, Moscow correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, reported:

“On the question of reparations Mr. Bevin was certainly as unbending as the Americans and there is a strong impression that his attitude had much to do with the present deadlock on the question. Although, as Mr. Bevin has often insisted, the door is not closed to some later agreement, he certainly supported no concrete proposal during the conference which would bring a solution any nearer.” (*Manchester Guardian*, April 28, 1947.)

Of course, there was plenty of sympathy for the sufferings and losses sustained by the U.S.S.R. and the other European countries occupied by Germany. But these countries were surely entitled to ask: “How much is your sympathy worth, friend?”

It had often been argued that—yes, the U.S.S.R., France and the others have a right to reparations, but to give these out of current production in Germany would mean that in effect it would be Britain and the U.S.A. who would pay because Germany could not produce sufficient both to support herself and to pay reparations.

The Soviets, however, repudiated this argument. They did not ask that Britain and the U.S.A. should pay indirectly for their reparations. They maintained that, properly developed and organised, German peacetime industry could pay its way. The *New Times* (a Soviet journal) in a leading article stated:

“If these peace branches of industry were to work at full capacity, they could provide sufficient goods not only to meet current reparations deliveries, but also for the supply of Germany's home market and for trade with other countries.

“The Soviet reparations claim is founded precisely on this basis, namely, the demilitarisation of Germany's industry and the development of its peace branches. It is in the interest of all nations, including

Germany herself, that her economy should develop along these lines. . . .

"The proposals submitted by the Soviet Government to the Foreign Ministers on the questions of Germany's economic unity and German reparations conform with the Potsdam decisions. They envisage a number of practical measures for the development of Germany's peace industry and the democratisation of her economic administration. They specifically stipulate that, if the established plan of reparations deliveries is faithfully adhered to, no obstacles need be put in the way of an increase of output of Germany's peace industry, both for her home consumption and for the development of trade with other countries."

It is a fact that the Soviet Government had organised its zone, limited though its resources were, in such wise that the rations received by the Germans there were certainly not below those in the Western zones, were always honoured, and part of the current production went to the U.S.S.R. as reparations.

Many land, industrial and cultural reforms had been initiated and the level of industrial production was rising. The Soviet statesmen declared that with economic unification and proper organisation the same and more could be done as regards Germany as a whole.

The Soviet point of view was expressed in the following editorial in *Izvestia*, April 27, 1947:

"Problems of great, historical significance were on the agenda of the Moscow session of the Council of Foreign Ministers which has come to an end. The four great Powers who achieved victory over Hitlerite Germany undertook the settlement of the German problem, which is of decisive importance for the peace of Europe. It is necessary to accomplish what the Entente failed to accomplish—and was unable to accomplish—after the First World War. The German State, hotbed of sanguinary wars, must be deprived of its aggressive nature and brought into the family of peace-loving countries.

"The security of future generations depends on the success of this great cause. In his winding-up speech at the Moscow session, the head of the Soviet delegation and Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., V. M. Molotov, said:

" 'We have spent no little time and used no little effort in examining questions that were on the agenda of the present session of the

Council of Foreign Ministers. Our work has not been completed, but nevertheless, not a little has been done. We hope that the work performed here in Moscow will contribute to the further success of our cause and to the achievement of agreed decisions on all points not yet settled.'"

Izvestia continued: "The participants of the session achieved agreed decisions with regard to certain essential aspects of the German problem. Among such decisions is, for instance, that on the abolition of the Prussian state—that hereditary nest and stronghold of the German militarists, a permanent source of aggressive wars.

"The world democratic public has learned with satisfaction of the decisions taken by the Council of Foreign Ministers in regard to demilitarisation, denazification and democratisation, as well as to the so-called displaced population and to territorial re-organisation in Germany. These decisions have been passed on to the Control Council in Germany as directives for guidance and action. Thereby another stone has been placed in the foundation of the edifice of a peaceful and democratic German state now in construction.

"The working out of the procedure for the German peace treaty made considerable progress. Both agreed and unagreed points of procedure have been summarised in one document referred to the Ministers' deputies for further study.

"A commission has been formed to examine a number of articles of the draft treaty with Austria and to ascertain the concrete facts with a view to possible co-ordination of the viewpoints of the Governments represented in the commission.

"A decision has been taken to repatriate German prisoners of war before December 31, 1948. Certain particular issues connected with the report of the committee of experts on coal, as well as some other problems, have been settled. Undoubtedly not a little has been accomplished."

Izvestia went on: "On the other hand the examination of a number of problems was not completed. This applies in the first place to the economic principles of the German problem, to Germany's post-war economic level and to the plan for reparations. The Soviet declaration stated that it regards economic principles as organically bound up with the problem of reparations, to which it attaches exceptional importance.

"As regards the proposals made by the various delegations on

economic principles, the Soviet delegation found a number of points on which it is prepared to meet the other delegations if they reciprocate in the matter of reparations. Essentially the problem of German reparations also delays the consummation of the Austrian settlement since, apart from the Article dealing with frontiers, the main unagreed Article of the Austrian treaty is that dealing with German assets.

"In order fully to appreciate the significance of the decisions already taken, as well as the volume of the still unsettled problems, one should render oneself a precise account of the scope and significance of the tasks that have been set.

"One can safely state that perhaps problems of such importance and complexity have never yet been solved in the course of diplomatic negotiations. Naturally such problems cannot be solved easily and quickly. Their solution requires, in the first place, time. Quite naturally, big and complex problems could not have been solved as a result of the work of a single session of the Council of Foreign Ministers and thus they remained uncompleted.

"Perhaps those who are now clamouring about the 'failure' of the Moscow Conference had placed in it some particular hidden hopes which have nothing in common with the real tasks of settling European problems in a spirit of international co-operation. If this is the case, however, these people ought to speak of a collapse of their own hopes, and not of the 'failure' of the Moscow session."

Izvestia added: "It should be noted that the Moscow session of the Council of Foreign Ministers could have proved more useful to the common cause of the Allies, had it not been for the efforts of certain delegations to revert again and again to stages already passed. As a result of these efforts the session spent too much time in discussing issues on which agreed decisions had already been taken one and a half and two years ago.

"It should be plainly stated that the main struggle between the different attitudes of the various delegations at the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers centred on the question of observance of the Crimea and Potsdam decisions on Germany. Whereas the Soviet delegation consistently advocated observance of these decisions, other delegations—mostly the American and also the British delegation—systematically attempted to shake the decisions on the German problem taken unanimously in the Crimea and at Potsdam."

Izvestia concluded: "Quite naturally, attempts to shake previously agreed decisions and to avoid observing them, as well as attempts to

resort to the method of one-sided imposition of one's will upon other partners in settling international problems, could not but create serious difficulties in the work of the Council of Foreign Ministers and affect the result of its work. At any rate, however, the Soviet delegation did everything that depended on it to ensure positive results from the work of the Moscow session under the given conditions, and at any rate helped to ascertain the real attitude of each country.

"At the Moscow session of the Council of Foreign Ministers the Soviet delegation consistently and firmly championed the interests of a democratic and stable peace. It uncompromisingly insisted on observance of decisions taken by the Allied countries for the purpose of ensuring the security of the nations for many years to come. It was toward this lofty and noble aim that the efforts of the Soviet delegation were directed. All its activities constituted a striking manifestation of the Stalinist foreign policy of the Soviet Union—the reliable bulwark of peace and of the security, freedom and independence of the nations."

It is interesting to turn to the British press comments on the Conference. The *New Statesman and Nation* wrote: "The breakdown of the Moscow Conference was inevitable after the President's message to Congress on Greece and Turkey.

"Mr. Marshall would no doubt argue that the only way to 'larn the Russians' is to behave to them even more toughly than they behave to us. One cannot be squeamish, he would say, in dealing with a Communist who only understands the language of power and the courtesies of conspiracy. By deliberately standing pat at the Moscow Conference he hoped to instil into Mr. Molotov a respect for America which may result in a Russian surrender when the next big fight is staged. That this means disaster for Europe is, of course, regrettable. But Mr. Marshall feels that Europe should bear its sufferings in the knowledge that they are an unavoidable step in the process of re-educating the Kremlin and bringing it to an understanding of the facts of the American Century." (*New Statesman and Nation*, April 26, 1947.)

The *New Statesman and Nation* concluded: "Mr. Churchill was quite right in attacking Mr. Chamberlain for appeasing Hitler. Germany at that time was the strongest military power in the world and Mr. Chamberlain permitted Hitler to get his way by threats of war. Russia to-day is in no shape to threaten us, far less to make war upon us.

There is only one power in the world able to do that, and that power is America. If there is to be talk of appeasement, then it should be applied to the one country which has the economic stranglehold and military power sufficient to cajole us into sacrificing our national interest and political principle for the sake of an easy life. It is the policy advocated by Mr. Churchill and prosecuted by Mr. Bevin which is designed to placate the only great power capable of making things really unpleasant for us if we do not toe the line."

The *Times*, April 26, 1947, in an editorial on the Conference, stated that: "Mr. Truman's new policy on Greece and Turkey . . . abruptly proclaimed on its third day, overshadowed the conference and helped to make it sterile."

Reynolds News in an editorial, April 27, 1947, stated: "The Conference has produced a stalemate because so far two points of view have not been reconciled: the understandable Russian desire that Germany should help to restore a fraction of the destruction and plunder she levied on Russian soil, and the equally understandable British and American reluctance to accept a solution which might compel them to increase their already costly subsidies to German economy."

With few exceptions, as far as we have been able to trace, the press were agreed that the damage inflicted on Soviet territory by the Nazi invaders was enormous, but they argued that the Soviet claims for reparations could not be met. The *Times* editorially, April 26, 1947, stated:

"As was foreseen, reparations were the central issue of the conference. All admit the real urgency of Russia's need for help in reconstruction. All that is denied is the technical possibility of her getting refreshment from the German desert unless that desert be irrigated at the expense of others. At Moscow Britain and America refused to pay German reparations to Russia."

Several papers argued that if the three Western Powers could not come to terms with the U.S.S.R. respecting Germany the three Western Powers should proceed without her (U.S.S.R.).

For instance, the *Daily Telegraph* in an editorial entitled "After Moscow" stated: "If Germany cannot be managed as a whole with Russia, Britain and America must manage their zones without her. They must contrive as far as possible to render the zones self-supporting so that they can pay with industrial exports for the imports, including

predominantly food, which the two occupying Powers are now having to pay for by subsidies." (*Daily Telegraph*, April 30, 1947.)

The journals which advocated this policy completely ignored the fact that this policy would be a breach of the spirit and letter of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942.

At this time there was a great deal of criticism of Mr. Bevin's foreign policy, both in the ranks of the Parliamentary Labour Party and in the trade unions.

At the Scottish Trades Union Congress on April 25, 1947, a resolution demanding a radical change in the Government's foreign policy "in the interests of peace and progress" was defeated by the narrow majority of 166 to 158 votes. Had it not been for an appeal by Mr. J. Benstead (National Union of Railwaymen), not to condemn "Mr. Bevin's and the Government's foreign policy" the probabilities are that the resolution would have been carried.

At a delegate Conference of women members of the Transport and General Workers' Union, April 25, 1947, Miss Allen, declaring that "Brother Bevin is wandering off the Socialist path", moved a resolution calling for a changed foreign policy.

Mr. Arthur Deakin, the General Secretary, appealed to the Conference to defeat the resolution as it would be a vote of "no confidence" in the Government. The resolution was defeated by 64 votes to 25, but the latter figure was a good minority in the Union, especially in view of the fact that the Foreign Secretary was the ex-General Secretary of the Union.

At the Annual Conference of the Electrical Trades Union, May 5, 1947, a warning to the British Government that it must break with American imperialism was warmly applauded by 400 delegates present.

However, by and large the "Right-wing" leaders of the different sections of the Labour Movement supported Bevin's foreign policy, but it is not an exaggeration to say that the loudest and most continuous support for Bevin's policy came from the Tory ranks and press.

Editorial reflection by the *New Statesman and Nation* would appear to have confirmed the opinion that Secretary of State Marshall was relying on bluster and bullying in dealing with the U.S.S.R. In its issue, May 3, 1947, it stated: "It seems clear, in fact, that Mr. Marshall is relying on American toughness to prevail in a diplomatic war of attrition and to succeed in the end in extracting compromises from the

U.S.S.R. The indications so far are that the U.S.S.R. will go on meeting toughness with toughness. Mr. Marshall therefore intends to continue and extend the Truman counter-offensive against Communism."

The Moscow Conference was discussed in the House of Commons, May 15 and 16, 1947. The debate was opened and wound up by Foreign Secretary Bevin. He informed the House, *inter alia*, that he did not regard the Moscow Conference either as a success or as a failure and that a sufficient measure of agreement had been reached to enable the fusion of the British and American Zones in Germany to function successfully.

Respecting the next meeting of the Four Foreign Ministers, he said:

"I regard the London Conference in November, with the issues now brought clearly before us, as probably the most vital in the world's history. On behalf of this nation, I will certainly work hard to try to reach a conclusion, but I must remind the House that this settlement does not lie in the hands of His Majesty's Government alone." (*Hansard*, May 15, 1947, col. 1727.)

Mr. Eden, who followed Mr. Bevin, said that the Moscow Conference should be frankly admitted to be a failure; that the Soviet Union was to blame for this; and that Bevin's statement respecting the fusing of the American and British Zones was "the best piece of news we have had yet".

In the second day's debate the Conservatives continued urging that unless the U.S.S.R. became more co-operative the other three Western Powers should go ahead without her.

For instance, Mr. Harold Macmillan, among other things, said:

"I think we must continue quietly, but firmly, without recrimination, but without vacillation, to resist unreasonable Russian pressure where it may be brought upon us or our friends. Secondly, as has been stated in this Debate, we must make effective the Anglo-American Agreement for the control of the two zones in Germany which was supposed to have been made in January last. It has been far too long delayed. High hopes were raised in January last, only to be dashed down. Let us develop it even beyond the present conception of zonal co-ordination."

He added: "All I say is this: that if we cannot get a single economic

unit in Germany, we must organise the Western zone, French, British and American, as quickly as we can. It is no use waiting any longer for Russia; we must make the fusion a success and a reality." (*Hansard*, May 16, 1947, cols. 1955-6.)

Mr. Bevin wound up for the Government. Here we can only deal with two points from his speech. On the subject of Germany he said: "I know the anxiety of the House about making the fusion agreement in Germany a success. I can only say at this stage that I am in close consultation with the United States, with a view to improving that agreement, in order to make it work more effectively and with a view to working out the details. But I regret that I am not in a position to say any more for the moment. When these details have been worked out, I will inform the House." (*ibid.*, May 16, 1947, col. 1963.)

And in a statement, which the House recognised was addressed to Moscow, he stated very emphatically: "I have been engaged for a good many years in difficult negotiations of all kinds, and I have never given up until the final break came. I have seen many 11th hour and 59th minute settlements. The probability is that if we keep our temper and our patience, as I have said before, we may in the end reconcile these differences. I assure the House and the country that that is the attitude I am going to adopt. If, finally, I have to say, 'well, it cannot be done,' then His Majesty's Government, in the light of that situation, will have to review the whole of their policy." (*ibid.*, col. 1960.)

So ended the two days' debate. Britain had moved farther away from the U.S.S.R., had moved nearer to Germany and had become more subservient to the U.S.A.

The differences in the points of view of London and Washington, *vis-à-vis* Moscow, were succinctly stated in the *Observer* on May 18, 1947, thus: "Mr. Bevin's report on Moscow differs radically from Mr. Marshall's. Mr. Marshall implicitly acknowledged that we are at the parting of the ways. 'No compromise on principles', 'the patient is sinking', 'action cannot wait'—those were his keynotes. Mr. Bevin refused to recognise Moscow as a parting of the ways; only if the London Conference in November—'probably the most vital in the world's history'—fails also will he reconsider his policy."

Here we must turn aside for a moment to record that on May 15, 1947, the Congress of the U.S.A. gave its final approval to the 400 million dollars Greek-Turkish Assistance Bill. During the debates in the House and Senate no secret was made of the fact that the aim

of the Bill was to build up outposts directed against the U.S.S.R.

During the debate in the House of Representatives, May 9, 1947, Congressman Merrow said:

"I would like to know how much longer we are going to be insulted by those in charge of the Soviet Union before taking a stand.

"I do not think war with Russia is inevitable. But if Russia wants to regard this as an act of war let her make the most of it." (*Daily Telegraph*, May 10, 1947.)

The *Daily Telegraph's* correspondent in a cable from Washington, date-lined, May 9, 1947, stated that Mr. Merrow's remarks were "characteristic of the temper of to-day's debate". (*ibid.*)

The *Daily Telegraph's* correspondent in a cable date-lined Washington, May 18, 1947, stated:

"The War, Navy and State Departments have selected personnel for their Greek and Turkish missions. They now await the word to leave. Military members are headed by Gen. Oliver, who commanded the 5th Armoured Division in Northern France.

"In Turkey the first task will be to correlate Turkish and American ideas on the country's defence." (*Daily Telegraph*, May 19, 1947.)

The cable continued: "Passage through Congress of the Greek-Turkish Bill and the prospective passage this week of the £87,500,000 Foreign Relief Bill represents the first phase of the new United States policy set out by Mr. Truman."

The other phases of the Truman programme included the re-establishment of Japan on the eastern frontiers of the U.S.S.R., and Germany on the western frontiers of the U.S.S.R., as Great Powers.

The encirclement of the U.S.S.R. was by this date taking very concrete form.

After this short diversion we must now return to Great Britain.

On May 22, 1947, *Izvestia* replied at length to Mr. Bevin's speeches in the House of Commons on May 15 and 16, 1947.

Izvestia accused the British Foreign Secretary of giving an inaccurate report of the Moscow Conference; of confusing the issues; and of increasing the difficulties of solving the German question.

On the subject of reparations, *Izvestia* stated:

"Mr. Bevin declared that the question of reparations is not the first thing. One can by no means agree with this. And yet this wrong and unacceptable assertion underlies Mr. Bevin's entire attitude towards the reparations problem.

"Britain did not see German occupation, did not experience the horrors of destruction and devastation perpetrated by the Hitlerite invaders. Perhaps this explains the indifference with which Mr. Bevin treats the question of reparations for the Soviet Union."

In the U.S.S.R. at this time there was a very profound suspicion that the U.S.A. supported by Britain wanted to hamper the recovery of the U.S.S.R., and at the same time wanted to speed up the recovery of Germany as a future ally against the U.S.S.R.

Soviet soldiers returning from the Eastern provinces of Germany to the Western provinces of the U.S.S.R., said that the shortages of consumer goods and the devastation in the towns and villages and the difficulties of living in general were far worse in the Soviet than in the German provinces. Soviet bitterness at the attitude of Britain on the question of reparations is easily understandable.

At this time, later and up to the present day, the U.S.A. Government never hesitated when it lay in her power to interfere in the internal affairs of any foreign country to prevent the application of public ownership to industry.

At the Labour Party Conference, Margate, May 26-30, 1947, many expressions of opinion were made by leaders and rank and filers urging that every effort should be made to co-operate with the U.S.S.R., but it is difficult to believe that these sentiments were shared by Foreign Secretary Bevin.

The attack against Bevin's policy was led by Mr. Zilliacus, M.P., who moved a resolution containing the following points:

"Service estimates and strategic dispositions should be based on the assumption that Britain need not prepare for self-defence against either the United States or Russia.

"While recognising the importance of the closest relations with the United States it is equally vital to secure the closest co-operation with Russia."

This and similar resolutions critical of Bevin's foreign policy were overwhelmingly defeated on a show of hands. No card vote was called for.

At the close of his speech at the Conference the Foreign Secretary announced that an agreement had been reached on the fusion of the British and American Zones of Germany. This decision could not but worsen the relations between Britain and the U.S.A. on the one hand and the U.S.S.R. on the other.

Writing on the evening of the debate the Labour correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* stated:

"It was Mr. Bevin's day, but although attempts to light the spark of rebellion against him succeeded to-day in lighting only the dampest of damp squibs one could not help feeling a hint of uneasiness behind all the cheering. The vast sprawling misery of Germany, for instance, seemed to have been dismissed somewhat lightly. The conference was a little restive about Germany and seemed to clap with its hands rather than with its heart. Someone also mentioned 'the ghost of Spain,' and although it was a ghost that did not walk to-day, it was still there.

"Mr. Bevin enjoyed a great personal triumph and he can feel justly to-night that he has secured an overwhelming vote of confidence in his policy for the present. It would, however, be unwise to assume that the Labour movement is prepared to resign its right to criticise again when something of the magic of a great personality has worn off." (*Manchester Guardian*, May 30, 1947.)

The Conservative press hailed the defeat of the Left resolutions and welcomed Bevin's victory. On the other hand the Soviet press strongly denounced the speeches made by Bevin and the other Right-wing leaders at the Conference.

There was no doubt that the decisions of the Labour Party Conference worsened relations between London and Moscow.

On June 12, 1947, the question of developments which had taken place in Hungary was raised in the House of Commons. Shortly before this date the Prime Minister, Mr. Nagy, and his Foreign Minister, were replaced by two other ministers. There was no *coup* at all.

Mr. Nagy travelled to Switzerland without any let or hindrance and then said that he had been ousted as a result of Soviet "intrigue".

The British Ambassador in Moscow took the matter up with Mr. Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, asking for documents and a full explanation. In reply Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Government had not interfered in the internal affairs of Hungary, but on the

other hand the British Government had interfered and that the request of the British Government would constitute interference in Hungary's internal affairs which the Soviet Government could not agree to.

During the discussion in the House of Commons, June 12, 1947, the remarks of two Labour M.P.s who had returned from Hungary a short time before attracted considerable attention.

Mr. Haire said that there was "considerable misrepresentation on the part of press correspondents and others in reporting the events in Hungary of the last few days. In view of the fact that this present situation has arisen out of the resignation in exile of Mr. Nagy, the former Prime Minister, is it not highly desirable that we should seek full information from him by every possible means and is it not somewhat curious that in seeking to obtain support from the British Government the ex-Prime Minister of Hungary should have written to Lord Vansittart for his support? Would my right hon. Friend say whether he considers that in Hungary there is not also considerable pressure from Fascist elements, particularly the right-wing of the Smallholders Party, which, unfortunately leads to reciprocal action from the Left?" (*Hansard*, June 12, 1947.)

Major Cecil Poole: "Since attempts are being made to besmirch the name of the late Prime Minister of Hungary without any full knowledge of the facts on either side, and since it has been alleged that he fled the country in order to escape arrest, may I be permitted to say, as one who was with him on the evening before he left, that he disclosed to me quite freely and frankly that he was going to Switzerland for a fortnight's holiday?" (*ibid.*)

Mr. Phillip Price, in a letter in the *Times*, June 16, 1947, asked:

"Can one be sure that the Russians have not got good reason to fear some of the elements inside the Smallholders' Party? Moreover there is reason to believe that former Horthy elements and sympathisers with the old feudal régime are active. Hungary is traditionally Russophobe and there has always been a strong anti-Semitic movement there; in other words, it is a good breeding ground for Fascism and pro-Germanism."

This episode taken as a whole was typical of many which arose about this time and later between the U.S.A.—supported by Britain and France—and the U.S.S.R. The latter, quite understandably, was anxious to have friendly governments in the countries on or near her frontiers. Moscow was convinced that if these countries were left to

settle their internal affairs in their own way, the Left elements which had carried on the underground struggle against the Germans would win the support of the majority of the people. But the aim of the U.S.A. was to prevent these countries from rebuilding their economies on socialist lines, i.e. to parallel in Europe the methods which the U.S.A. was then, and is to-day, enforcing in Central and South America.

We end this chapter with two important episodes which give a rather more cheerful picture of relations between the U.S.S.R. and Britain in 1947.

While the Four-Power Conference was in session in Moscow, twenty members of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. were in Britain on a visit as the guests of both Houses of Parliament. They arrived in London on March 13, 1947, and were met on arrival by Mr. Mayel representing the Lord Chancellor.

On March 14 the delegates were the guests of the Lord Chancellor at a Reception in the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords; they were also received at the London County Hall on this date.

March 16: A Reception was given in honour of the Delegation at the Dorchester Hotel.

March 17: The Delegation visited the house in which Lenin lived while in exile in London and they also visited the Finsbury Borough Council as the guests of that Council.

March 24: A dinner was given in honour of the Delegation by the Prime Minister at St. James' Palace; the Delegation also visited the Pinewood Film Studios on this date.

March 25: Mr. and Mrs. Churchill gave a party to the Delegation at 28 Hyde Park Gate.

March 27: The Delegation attended an air display at Halton and were received by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder.

March 28: Mrs. Clifton Brown and Vicountess Jowett received the ladies of the Delegation at the Speaker's House; some members of the Delegation on this date visited Coventry.

April 1: A Reception was given in honour of the Delegation at the Soviet Embassy at which Winston Churchill was present.

April 2: The Delegation was entertained to dinner by the Lord Mayor of London.

In addition to the above, they visited many parts of the country and were enthusiastically received everywhere.

On April 9, the Delegation gave an interview to the press. At the opening of the conference the following statement was presented to the press representatives:

"The visit of the Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. to Great Britain, at the invitation of both Houses of the British Parliament, is a return visit to that paid by the British Parliamentary Delegation to the Soviet Union during the spring of 1945.

"The Delegation has set itself to contribute to a further strengthening of friendship and mutual understanding between the peoples of Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and to still closer co-operation with the people of Great Britain in the post-war period, for the sake of the peace and security of the whole of mankind.

"During our stay in Great Britain the delegation, either as a whole or in groups, has visited various factories, the Port of London, the Houses of Parliament, a number of Government institutions, and the chief universities and libraries.

"In addition to London, groups of us have visited the cities of Newcastle, Sheffield, Cardiff, Manchester, Oxford, Cambridge, Stratford and Coventry. Our final trip was to Scotland's most important industrial and cultural centres—Glasgow and Edinburgh.

"The delegation has been received by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Attlee, the Speaker of the House of Commons and the Lord Chancellor.

"We have met representatives of different sections of the British people. They have demonstrated their sympathy and esteem for the Soviet people, and are aware of its extraordinary contribution, made under the direction of our great leader Generalissimo Stalin, to the common cause of achieving victory over the German and Japanese aggressors. The Soviet people, for its part, highly appreciate the courage and firmness of the British people during the days of joint struggle against the common enemy and its contribution to the cause of victory.

"At the same time, we cannot fail to note that in your country there are not a few influential individuals and groups that are under the political influence of reactionary circles irreconcilably hostile to the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries. Therefore, the Soviet people feel some concern at the influence exercised by those circles, which form a closed bloc with reactionary cliques in the United States and other countries, on the further development of relations between our countries.

"We are returning to our motherland deeply convinced that the great majority of the British people are striving sincerely towards a permanent, just peace throughout the world, and that they will not allow the instigators of a new war to sow mistrust and discord between the peoples.

"The interests of the British, as of the Soviet people, demand that they should strive to ensure that Germany never again becomes an aggressive power, and that mankind should not be exposed to the sufferings and privations of another war.

"The common people of Great Britain, as of the whole world, have a vital interest in the creation of such post-war conditions as will safeguard their opportunities for peaceful, creative work, and raise their material and cultural level of life.

"We should like to profit by this occasion to convey once more, on behalf of the Soviet people, friendly greetings to the people of Great Britain, to wish them success in their efforts to make good the ravages of war as quickly as possible, and success in the economic and cultural sphere."

The *Manchester Guardian* reporting the press Conference, after summarising the statement, added: "It was a formal, though sometimes frivolous affair; after his statement had been read and translated, Mr. Kuznetsov, the leader of the delegation, noted the questions that were fired at him from all parts of the crowded room and then disposed of them one by one. He was in high good humour and raised many a gust of laughter with his replies and retorts." (*Manchester Guardian*, April 10, 1947.)

On April 11, 1947, the Delegation left London for the Soviet Union.

The other event was the successful—albeit rather moderate—attempt to foster Anglo-Soviet trade.

Mr. Harold Wilson, M.P. (Secretary for Overseas Trade), left for Moscow, April 18, 1947, to discuss the development of trade with the representatives of the Soviet Government. On his return home he gave a report to the House of Commons on May 12, 1947. He said: "The trade discussions which began in Moscow three weeks ago had three main objectives, namely, to see what each country could do in the immediate future towards meeting the other's most pressing shortages, to explore the possibilities of developing trade in the longer term on a mutually advantageous basis and to find solutions for certain procedural problems which are at present impeding trade between the two countries.

"The Russian Government informed me that, while their timber industry had suffered great devastation as a result of the war and their own needs for timber for internal reconstruction were very great, they planned, subject to obtaining certain machinery and transport equipment, to have available for export in 1947 moderate quantities of timber and timber products with the expectation of steadily increasing supplies in subsequent years. They also planned for a very considerable disposal surplus of foodstuffs, particularly wheat and coarse grains, starting from next year. In order to prepare and move the timber to the ports, the Russian Government said that certain equipment would be required for the mechanisation of their timber industry. I was able to inform them about the prospects of supplies from the United Kingdom and I undertook to examine further on my return the Russian list of requirements with a view to making the maximum contribution towards meeting their needs."

He added: "As regards the development of Anglo-Soviet trade in the longer term, useful information was obtained about the sort of goods which Russia wishes to buy from the United Kingdom during the next few years. We also had discussions about certain other commodities which the United Kingdom is in a position to export and which we thought would provide the basis for an expanding trade between the two countries. We emphasised the importance for the development of trade relations between the two countries, of Russia accepting the general terms and conditions of contract on which our firms are accustomed to do business with the rest of the world."

Mr. Wilson concluded: "I should add that the conversations which took place in an atmosphere of great friendliness and frankness on both sides, ranged over a wide field and were most useful in clarifying the respective points of view of the two Governments. Both sides expressed their very keen desire for a substantial expansion of the volume of trade between the two countries. It was arranged that the discussions should be continued in London with a view to finding a basis on which a definite agreement could be prepared." (*Hansard*, May 12, 1947, cols. 116-17.)

Mr. Wilson's report was received with warm approval in the House of Commons and with equal satisfaction in the British press on the following day.

The *Daily Herald* editorially commented: "Where questions of strategy and military security are not concerned, the British and the Russians can get on well together. That is shown by the report to

Parliament by Mr. Harold Wilson, Secretary for Overseas Trade, on the trade talks in Moscow.

"So we have in our mutual necessities common ground with Russia which is bound in time to influence political relations as well. To the ordinary people of both nations it is far more important to exchange the fruits of their labour than to bicker over frontiers and ideologies." (*Daily Herald*, May 13, 1947.)

The *Daily Herald's* reaction was typical of the press as a whole.

Negotiations were resumed in Moscow later but broke down in July, 1947; however, after some behind-the-scenes negotiations they were resumed in the Soviet capital on December 5, 1947. Mr. Harold Wilson, M.P., led the British Delegation; and a short-term agreement was signed on December 27, 1947.

The Parliamentary correspondent of the *Times*, December 31, 1947, summed up the agreement as follows:

(1) "We are to receive under the agreement 450,000 tons of barley, 200,000 tons of oats, and 100,000 tons of maize. These feeding stuffs will be particularly valuable in helping to increase our home production of meat, milk, poultry and eggs. The shipments of Russian grain before next autumn will be paid for in British goods whose delivery may be spread over two or three years.

(2) "The agreement provides for the shipment from this country to Russia of 25,000 tons of light rails, of which 10,000 tons will be from new production and the balance from Government surplus stocks. There will be immediate negotiations for the supply to the Soviet Union of wool, rubber, aluminium, cocoa beans and coffee; and we have agreed to discuss the question of tin supplies.

(3) "Other classes of goods required include scientific laboratory apparatus, ball mills for grinding ore, crushers, railway steam cranes, oil purifying apparatus, and miscellaneous electrical equipment (including electric motors).

(4) "Agreement was also reached on the terms of repayment of the credit advanced to the Soviet Government.

(5) "Next May there are to be further Anglo-Soviet discussions to prepare long-term supply arrangements over a wider range of goods on both sides, to provide for a balanced programme of trade between the two countries. We shall hope then to negotiate for imports from Russia of such commodities as wheat, timber, wood-pulp, tinned salmon and crab, paper, cotton and flax. The agreement provides that after the trade discussions in May there shall be regular meetings of trade

negotiators of the two countries, to be held alternately in Moscow and London not less frequently than once a year."

Mr. Harold Wilson in a press interview said: "Both sides hope that this short-term agreement will be a stepping-stone to a much broader agreement due to be signed in May." (*Daily Telegraph*, December 30, 1947.)

The Agreement received a very hearty welcome from the British press.

CHAPTER XIII

THE MARSHALL PLAN: LONDON CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

THE American Secretary of State speaking on European reconstruction at Harvard University, June 5, 1947, said that Europe's economy had been so shaken by the war that the U.S.A. ought to help Europe for the next three or four years to prevent a very grave situation arising. He continued:

"It is already evident that, before the U.S. Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part these countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a programme designed to place Europe on its feet economically. . . . The initiative must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European programme and of later support of such a programme so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The programme should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all the European nations."

Marshall added: "Any Government which manœuvres to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us."

It is a reasonable assumption that Marshall was making an indirect reference to the U.S.S.R.

That speech constituted the start of the "Marshall Plan", as far as was publicly known. In fact the French and British Governments had been in consultation with Washington on this subject prior to Marshall's speech.

The Parliamentary correspondent of the *Times* wrote: "Before Mr. Marshall's speech there had been unofficial and informal exchanges of view between members of the British Embassy and members of the State Department and other administrative departments on

this matter, and from these talks an outline was emerging of the procedure which might be adopted to give effect to this offer of financial aid. These talks will now be continued at an official level." (*Times*, June 7, 1947.)

This fact was confirmed in other papers at that time.

The Secretary of State made no direct reference to the U.S.S.R. and the question was immediately asked on both sides of the Atlantic whether the U.S.S.R. would be included.

A cable from Washington published in the *New Statesman and Nation*, June 14, 1947, read: "One highly qualified observer, now out of the Government service, gives his private opinion that Russia should be brought into the discussions and invited to participate from the start. Lippmann holds the same view. Unfortunately, there is a weighty evidence to balance against such thinking. There is, to begin with, the obvious fact that at the very time when the Marshall scheme is being put forward the State Department is pursuing from day to day a policy so clearly conditioned by distrust of Russia that it gives support to reactionaries without distinction and now finds no trace of Fascism in the immaculate Peron."

That cable was no doubt sent before the Secretary of State's press conference on June 12, 1947.

The Secretary of State said that when he outlined a plan to aid Europe in a speech on June 5, he included Britain and the U.S.S.R. in the term "Europe", by which he meant "everything west of Asia".

There can be little doubt that the postscript was made in response to representations from London and Paris.

However, that was only part of the picture. Three days after the Secretary of State had said that the U.S.S.R. could be included in the Plan, the Under-Secretary of State was expressing anything but friendly sentiments.

A Reuter cable, date-lined Middleton (Connecticut) June 15, 1947, stated:

"Mr. Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State, to-day charged Russia with obstructing world recovery by a 'pursuit of policies diametrically opposed to the very premises of international accord and recovery'." (*Manchester Guardian*, June 16, 1947.)

The world awaited Moscow's reaction. It came after due consideration. *Pravda*, June 16, 1947, commented:

"Mr. Marshall's Plan, announced in his speech of June 5 at Harvard, is, notwithstanding its apparent 'novelty', only a repetition of the Truman Plan for political pressure with the help of dollars, a plan for interference in the domestic affairs of other countries.

"As soon as any country like Hungary purges its government bodies of conspirators convicted by a court, there responds the bossy shout of the U.S.A.

"Why then deliberately obscure the phraseology of Mr. Marshall's presentation of the Truman doctrine to the world?

"At a Press Conference on June 12, Mr. Marshall said that when he told the European Countries to formulate a programme of economic rehabilitation he meant the whole of Europe west of Asia, including the Soviet Union, Britain and other European countries.

"This additional explanation of the United States Secretary of State, however, manifestly contradicts United States policy towards the East European countries."

Were the suspicions of the U.S.S.R. well founded?

Mr. Don Iddon in a cable date-lined New York, June 17, 1947, declared: "If my first week back has taught me anything, it has taught me that the feeling here towards Russia is violent and virulent, and now it is no longer considered sensational, nor exaggeration, to say as a thousand columnists and editorialists here are saying, that a state of undeclared war exists between the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.

"This is being admitted every day, and there is even glib talk, which goes unrebuked, of the 24-hour push-button atomic offensive as being the best solution." (*Daily Mail*, June 18, 1947.)

Foreign Secretaries Bevin and Bidault met in Paris, June 17 and 18, 1947, to consider the Marshall offer. At the close they issued a communique in which they "welcomed with the greatest satisfaction the declaration made by Mr. Marshall" and they "decided to suggest to Mr. Molotov that a meeting of the British, French and Soviet Foreign Ministers should take place during the week beginning June 23 next, at a place to be agreed, for a general discussion of these problems as a whole." (*Daily Telegraph*, June 19, 1947.)

On the same day, June 18, 1947, a Note was handed to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Paris for transmission to Moscow. This looked as though M. Bidault and Mr. Bevin were very anxious to bring in the U.S.S.R.

But were they? Or at least, was Mr. Bevin?

On the following day, June 19, there was a debate in the House of

Commons on foreign affairs, in the course of which Bevin made a sharp attack on Soviet policy in Eastern Europe and added that the Government was awaiting a reply from Moscow to the Note sent on the previous day.

It is significant that next day, commenting on the debate, the *Times* in an editorial stated: "There are, no doubt, genuine doubts in Russia about the motives which may have inspired the transformation of the first Truman doctrine into the Marshall project." (*Times*, June 20, 1947.)

And a Reuter cable, date-lined Washington, June 22, stated: "Mr. Henry Wallace, former U.S. Vice President, to-day declared that Mr. Bevin's speech during the House of Commons debate last Thursday represented 'a challenge to Russia so sharp that it is certain to have a deep effect.

" 'Unless his attitude is repudiated promptly by the U.S. Government the effect could be disastrous,' added Mr. Wallace." (*Daily Mail*, June 23, 1947.)

The Soviet reply to the British Note was presented to the Foreign Office on the evening of June 22, 1947. It read:

"The Soviet Government has studied the British Government's Note of June 19 regarding the formulation of European economic programmes in connection with the declaration of Mr. Marshall at the University of Harvard on June 5 of this year, which was the subject of bilateral conversations between the British and French Ministers for Foreign Affairs in Paris. The Soviet Government agrees that the primary problem of European countries at the present time is the quickest possible reconstruction and further development of their national economy, which has been destroyed by the war."

The Soviet reply continued: "It is clear that the solution of this problem could be facilitated if, from the side of the United States of America, whose productive capacity was not only not diminished but was increased during the war, aid was forthcoming corresponding to the aims set forth above. Although the Soviet Government does not at present have at its disposal data regarding the character and conditions of the possible economic assistance to European countries from the United States of America, and also regarding those measures which were the subject of discussion between the British and French Governments during the recent conversations in Paris, nevertheless, the Soviet Government accepts the proposal of the British and French

Governments, and agrees to take part in a conference of the three Ministers for Foreign Affairs. In the opinion of the Soviet Government such a conference might take place in Paris on June 27."

This Reply was read to the House of Commons, June 23, 1947. The *Times* Lobby Correspondent reported: "The House of Commons, after listening in expectant silence to Mr. Bevin's reading this evening of the opening passages of the Soviet reply to the British Note regarding European economy and the Marshall offer, broke into a warm cheer when he reached the closing sentences of the reply accepting the British and French proposal for tripartite talks this week. The cheering was renewed when Mr. Bevin announced that, in accordance with the Soviet Government's suggestion the talks of the three Foreign Ministers would be begun next Friday in Paris."

The correspondent added: "The House loudly echoed Mr. Bevin's words welcoming this 'prompt reply' and trusting that good results would follow the talks." (*Times*, June 24, 1947.)

Mr. Eden stated: "I am sure the whole House would wish to welcome the statement which the right hon. Gentleman has just made to us. I would only like to add, if I may, our good wishes to him and his colleagues for the work which they undertake in Paris, and may they now make swift and sure progress." (*ibid.*)

Mr. Eden's remarks were received by the House of Commons with "fervent acclamation", added the *Times* correspondent.

However, on the eve of the Conference the atmosphere was not propitious. The *New Statesman and Nation* commented on June 28: "If we were to regard the tone of last Thursday's debate as a definite expression of the British attitude, we might be tempted to assume that we, too, had chosen the road labelled 'ideological crusade', and that Mr. Bevin was merely going to Paris in order to establish before world opinion that Mr. Molotov was responsible for the quarrel at the crossroads."

The three Foreign Ministers met in Paris on June 27. It soon became apparent that there was a profound difference of opinion between the U.S.S.R. on one side and France and Britain on the other.

The Soviet side would have warmly welcomed American aid, but it was not prepared to accept terms which it regarded as interference in the internal affairs of European countries.

On the following day a cable from Washington, stated: "Senator Fulbright of Arkansas, said . . . 'if the present Paris conference results in

a plan from which Russia herself is to profit, I fear there will be great reluctance in this country to support it, and in that case, I suppose, Britain and France will think we have welshed on a promise.'” (*Observer*, June 29, 1947.)

Fulbright did not stand alone. On the contrary, his sentiments were widely held in the U.S.A. at that time.

The three Foreign Ministers continued in Conference on June 28 and discussed Plans tabled by Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. Although the sittings, by agreement, were in private, the French Plan leaked to the press.

In brief, the French and British Plans were to compile an inventory of the conditions existing in different European countries together with their economic needs and then submit a co-ordinated Plan for Europe to the United States, asking for help and guidance.

The Soviet Plan was to ask the U.S.A. what help it was ready to place at the disposal of Europe and that the European countries should draw up their plans, having in mind the necessity of making the best use of the American aid, but without having to submit the plans to the U.S.A. for advice or approval.

The U.S.S.R. was against a co-ordinated Plan for Europe on the grounds that this was unpractical.

When the pledge of secrecy was broken by the French, the Soviet Government decided in common fairness that its viewpoint should be made known to the world. This was done in a TASS message from Moscow, date-lined June 29, 1947.

The message, after referring to the fact that the French Government's viewpoint (which coincided in general with the British) had been published in the *Aube* and *Monde* of June 28, 1947, continued: “A definite plan of work prepared by the French Government and endorsed by the British Government has been presented at the conference. The Soviet delegation has expressed grave doubts with regard to this plan.

“It is one thing to ascertain the economic needs of the European countries for American aid in the form of credits and deliveries of goods by means of estimates drawn up by the European countries themselves. This is acceptable and may prove useful to the European countries.

“It will be an entirely different matter if the conference engages in drawing up an all-embracing economic programme for the European countries as envisaged by the French project, and only in passing

ascertains their needs of American economic aid. If the conference takes this path it will digress far from the task it has been set, and will fail to yield a positive result."

After referring to the fact that France, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and other European countries had plans which they were carrying out, the TASS message continued: "Hitherto it has been taken for granted that each nation should decide for itself how best to secure the rehabilitation and development of its economy. No European Government intends to interfere and say whether Monnet's plan is good or bad for France. This is the affair of the French people themselves. But the same applies to Great Britain and the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and every other European country.

"That is how the matter is understood in the Soviet Union, which more than once has offered resistance to attempts at foreign intervention in its affairs. It was considered perfectly obvious that internal economic affairs are to be decided by the sovereign people themselves, and that other countries should not interfere in these internal affairs.

"It is only on this basis that the normal development of relations among countries is possible. Attempts at outside interference in the economic life of various countries have not yielded favourable results, nor can they yield them."

Again the TASS message insisted that there should be no interference by the bigger countries in the affairs of the smaller. It went on: "If this is true, then attempts to compel the conference to engage in drawing up an all-embracing economic programme for the European countries, which will inevitably entail intervention on the part of some States in the affairs of other States, cannot be accepted as a basis for co-operation among the European countries. Certain Powers are at present making such attempts, which are doomed to failure and will only undermine their international prestige.

"The conference is faced with the task of ascertaining the needs of the European countries for American economic aid, by receiving appropriate estimates from the countries concerned and subjecting them to a joint examination.

"The task of the conference should be to establish co-operation among the European countries in drafting estimates of the needs of these countries for American economic aid, to ascertain the possibility of obtaining such economic aid from the United States and to assist the European countries in obtaining this aid. This is no easy task and will require considerable effort. But if the conference copes with it

successfully, an important step will have been made in developing co-operation between the countries of Europe and the United States of America."

The Soviet Government was of the opinion that Allied States should get precedence over ex-enemy states.

The TASS message added: "The Soviet Government maintains that the ascertaining of the needs (estimates) of the European countries for American economic aid cannot be the concern of only the three countries taking part in the present conference. Other European countries, too, should be invited to take part in working on the problems involved.

"In so doing, account should first be taken of the needs of those European countries which suffered German occupation and rendered support to the common cause of the Allies in defeating the enemy. These countries should be invited in the first place to take part in the economic co-operation in Europe which is now being planned. Their needs should be given special attention when the question of American economic aid comes under consideration."

The TASS message concluded: "As to the methods of examining the problems at this conference, the Soviet delegation believes it desirable to set up appropriate committees composed of representatives of the other European States, first of all the above-mentioned Allied countries, to take part in these committees. It is also necessary to consider the question of the relations to be established with the European Commission."

We have quoted this TASS message at some length because it demonstrates conclusively that the U.S.S.R. was adamantly against outside interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

On June 30, Mr. Bevin said that it was now necessary to frame a joint European programme which would embody the points specified by Mr. Marshall. Bevin added: "I am quite sure that there is no possibility of the U.S.A. giving the necessary support to any programme unless, in its design, it proves that it will ultimately produce a solvent and prosperous Europe.

"Our policy is to bring these national plans together so that the requirements can be viewed as a whole."

He then tabled a set of proposals, the two operative clauses of which were:

- (1) A steering committee should be set up forthwith to draft for

the consideration of the Governments of Europe a programme of European recovery over the next four years.

- (4) The steering committee would, as suggested by Mr. Marshall, seek the friendly aid of the U.S.A. in the drafting of the programme.

M. Bidault, on behalf of France, welcomed the British proposals, but Mr. Molotov tabled a set of proposals from which we quote: "The Conference believes it is not its function to draw up an all-embracing economic programme for the European countries, since the drawing up of such an economic programme for the whole of Europe, even with the participation of certain other countries, would inevitably result in the imposition of the will of strong European Powers upon other European countries, and would constitute intervention in the domestic affairs of those States and a violation of their sovereignty.

"The conference of the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs believes it expedient:

- "(1) To set up a committee of assistance composed of the representatives of France, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., to be supplemented later by representatives of some other European States, for the purpose of ascertaining the needs of European countries for American economic aid and the possibility of the U.S.A. granting such aid, and of assisting the European countries in obtaining such aid.
- "(2) The following sub-committees are to be set up under the committee of assistance: (a) for food, (b) for fuel, (c) for equipment. The sub-committees are to consist, in addition to representatives of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and France, also of representatives of two European Powers especially interested in the work of the given sub-committee from among the countries which suffered German occupation and helped the common allied cause in defeating the enemy. Former enemy countries may be invited by the sub-committees for consultation. The problem of Germany is to be examined by the four Powers: Great Britain, France, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.
- "(3) The committee of assistance is to be charged with the following tasks:
Firstly, to receive estimates from the European countries of the American economic aid they need.

Secondly, to compound a programme on the basis of these estimates, bearing in mind that the needs of the countries which suffered from German aggression and made their contribution to the cause of allied victory are to have first consideration.

Thirdly, to ascertain the possibilities of appropriate economic aid being granted by the U.S.A.

- "(4) The committee of assistance establishes relations with the European Economic Commission of U.N. in conformity with the tasks with which it is charged."

On July 1, 1947, M. Bidault tabled a set of proposals which were only a redraft of his earlier ones. Both Bevin and Bidault argued that their proposals complied with the conditions laid down by Mr. Marshall and that without such compliance, to quote Mr. Bevin, "there can be no hope of American aid to Europe." Bevin continued: "We are determined to do our best to meet Mr. Marshall's request. The Soviet delegation wish to reject it. This is the fundamental difference between us."

July 2, 1947, was the final day of the Conference. Mr. Molotov spoke first. He said that there were two possible ways of economic recovery: interchange between equal states; and co-operation with the Great Powers by states under their domination.

The Soviet proposals represented the former, and the others the latter. "They would lead," he said, "to Britain, France, and that group of countries which follows them separating themselves from the other States, and thus the American credits would result in dividing Europe into two groups of States and creating new difficulties in the relations between them. The Soviet Government considers it necessary to caution the French and British Governments of the consequences of such action. It would be directed not towards the unification of the efforts of the countries of Europe in their task of economic rehabilitation but would lead to opposite results which have nothing in common with the real interests of the peoples of Europe."

Mr. Molotov also objected to the proposals concerning Germany as tending to take away the "justified reparations" claims of the countries which suffered from German aggression. Not only was no special concern being shown for those countries, maintained Mr. Molotov, but it was at their expense that it was proposed to direct the resources of Germany for purposes other than reparations. On the other hand, nothing was being done to expedite the setting up of an

all-German Government which would be qualified to take care of the needs of the German people better than anyone else.

M. Bidault and Mr. Bevin strongly dissented from Mr. Molotov's conclusions and remarks and added that they would work as closely as possible with U.N. and would inform it and all Governments of what they were doing.

The Conference then ended and Europe was divided more definitely than before the conference opened.

On July 4, 1947, the British and French Governments sent invitations to twenty-two European countries to attend a Conference in Paris, to consider the Marshall offer. Sixteen countries agreed to attend, but the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Poland declined the invitation. Czechoslovakia at first accepted the invitation but later withdrew her acceptance.

It is outside the scope of this work to deal at length with what emerged from the Conference. Sufficient to say that a Report was drafted and sent to Washington in September, 1947, and that the U.S.A. Congress just before Christmas, 1947, voted "Stop gap" aid to meet the urgent needs of France, Italy and Austria.

These three countries were states in which capitalism was firmly established. However, spokesmen from the U.S.A. Government emphasised that there would be no economic help for countries going Socialist or Communist. We shall return to the Marshall Plan when dealing with the events of 1948.

Despite the attacks made on Soviet foreign policy in this period, there still existed in Great Britain a very widespread desire to renew and maintain friendship with the U.S.S.R. This was shown by the "Gallup Poll" published in the *News Chronicle*, August 29, 1947.

Summing up replies to four questions put to "a representative cross section of men and women" the journal stated: "It will be seen that the 61 per cent. preferred a friendly or very friendly policy towards the U.S.S.R., whilst 33 per cent. thought that we might be cool, or even hostile."

It is no doubt true that at this time the majority of trade unionists backed the Government's foreign policy, but the discussions at conferences of individual trade unions showed that many trade unionists were critical of that policy and a still larger number felt very unhappy about it.

On September 15, 1947, at the start of "Battle of Britain" Anniversary week, the Air Ministry released for publication some captured German documents dealing with the failure of the Luftwaffe and the success of the Allied air offensive against Germany.

Here we shall only quote from one of these documents, the most instructive as showing the German attitude. It is a report of a lecture by Hauptman Otto Bechtle (a Luftwaffe Operations Officer), explaining why the air attack on Britain in 1940 "had not been fought through to a decision". He wrote: "In view of the conviction of the inevitability of an imminent clash with the Soviet Union, the German Air Force could certainly not be unduly weakened." (*Daily Telegraph*, September 15, 1947.)

In October, 1947, the British Admiralty published a collection of documents on the "Führer Conference" (the conference between Hitler and the heads of his Navy).

Hitler is quoted as saying in January, 1941, that Great Britain was "sustained in her struggle by hopes placed in the U.S.A. and Russia."

Hitler continued: "If the United States and Russia should enter the war against Germany the situation would become very complicated. Hence any possibility for such a threat to develop must be eliminated at the very beginning. If the Russian threat were non-existent, we could wage war on Britain indefinitely." (*Manchester Guardian*, October 27, 1947.)

Preparations for the attack on the U.S.S.R. were pressed forward vigorously and the offensive was finally launched on June 22, 1941.

In 1940 and in the first half of 1941, the U.S.S.R. was not aiding Germany; on the contrary she was helping Britain at a very critical period.

In October, 1947, a group of eight Labour M.P.s visited the Soviet Union and had an interview with Stalin in Sochi, at which all present discussed the Soviet Union's relations with other countries. In a statement to the press given by a member of the group, Mr. Zilliacus quoted Stalin as saying:

"The policy of the Soviet Union remains, as it has always been, the improvement of political and economic relations with all countries, beginning with Great Britain and the United States. If those countries wish to improve their relations with the Soviet Union they will be welcome, and the Soviet Government will be prepared to go halfway to meet them regardless of any differences in economic

and social systems, since experience has proved that co-operation between countries with different economic and social systems is quite possible." (*Manchester Guardian*, October 24, 1947.)

Stalin added: "On the other hand, if they do not at present wish to improve their relations with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union will have to carry on without such co-operation until such time as they come to their senses and realise that international co-operation in the world of to-day is necessary. We can wait. We are a patient people." (*ibid.*)

On November 6, 1947, Mr. Molotov, in the course of a speech, on the occasion of the 30th Anniversary of the November Revolution, said:

"It is interesting that in expansionist circles of the United States a new, peculiar sort of illusion is widespread; placing no faith in their internal strength, they rely on the secret of the atom bomb, although this secret has long ceased to exist. Evidently the imperialists need this faith in the atom bomb, which, as is known, is not a means of defence but a weapon of aggression." (*Times*, November 7, 1947.)

This startling statement was at once flashed around the world and attracted great attention in political and scientific circles.

It is important and interesting, in view of subsequent developments, to recall the reactions of Professor Oliphant, the atomic scientist. In an interview he said, regarding the production of atom bombs: "The Russians are not in a position to make such bombs and will not be for a number of years." (*Daily Herald*, November 8, 1947.)

The *Daily Herald* carried an editorial, November 7, 1947, headed "30 Years". It read:

"Thirty years ago to-day the workers of Petrograd, answering Lenin's call, rose in revolt and the Soviet Republic was born.

"Like the storming of the Bastille in 1789 it was an event that changed the whole history of the world. There is no country whose life and ways of thought have not been profoundly affected by the Russian Revolution.

"These thirty years have been years of vast change under the impact of great and conflicting forces. And Russia itself has changed not only in the ways desired by the leaders of the Revolution, but in ways which they could not foresee.

"But the mighty achievement stands. On that November day there were comparatively few in the outside world who believed that the new Soviet régime would be in existence thirty years later, would build a great Socialist economy in its vast territory, would fight a terrible war in alliance with the Western democracies, would emerge from it as one of the strongest World Powers.

"In the early days, from the very beginning, the sympathy and friendship of British Labour went swiftly and instinctively to the Russian workers in their struggle.

"That friendship and sympathy still exist. Relations between the countries have indeed been warped and strained by misunderstanding. But on this anniversary we think not of them; we think of deeper past and future friendship."

In that editorial, in our judgment, the *Daily Herald* reflected the opinions and wishes of the millions of trade unionists, co-operators and socialists who constitute the membership of the general Labour Movement of Great Britain.

On the same date the following messages were sent by the British Government to Moscow:

"Mr. Attlee to Mr. Stalin: 'On the thirtieth anniversary of the foundation of the Soviet State, I send to you and to the Soviet people my good wishes and congratulations.'

"Mr. Bevin to Mr. Molotov: 'I send you greetings and good wishes on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the October revolution.'"

The four Foreign Ministers—Mr. Marshall, U.S.A.; Mr. Bevin, Great Britain; M. Bidault, France and Mr. Molotov, U.S.S.R.—met in conference in London, November 25, 1947, to discuss and prepare peace treaties with Austria and Germany. The question of Austria was referred to deputies, but as no agreement was reached, either by them or by the Ministers, the question was again sent back to the deputies at the end of the conference.

We shall return to this subject in later chapters.

At a session of the Conference, November 27, 1947, Mr. Molotov submitted a Memorandum on machinery for preparing a peace treaty with Germany based on the following points:

(1) That a German democratic Government should be formed straight away;

- (2) That this German Government would give its views on the draft treaty at the peace conference;
- (3) That the treaty should be signed by the German Government and be submitted to a German Parliament for ratification;
- (4) That the conference should consist of the five great Powers, the States neighbouring on Germany, and the States that took part in the common fight; and
- (5) That the decisions of Yalta and Potsdam should be the basis of the treaty.

We would specially emphasise point 1, because it proves the Soviet contention that it always favoured a united Germany.

Mr. Molotov urged that the representatives of the organisation known as the "German People's Congress" in Berlin should be received by the Council.

Mr. Molotov repeated the Soviet claim for reparations from Germany (out of which the U.S.S.R. agreed to compensate Poland) of \$10,000 m. originally tabled at Yalta and Potsdam. This, argued Molotov, was a modest claim because the damage done by the war to the U.S.S.R. was estimated at \$128,000 m.

During a discussion on this question on December 12, 1947, Mr. Molotov stated that industrial production in the Anglo-American zone was only 35 per cent. of the 1938 level; that the production could be doubled and more than doubled, and that the reparation claims could be made from this increased production. To quote his exact words:

"Our policy is to set the development of civilian industry in motion so as to increase industrial production in the Western zones from 35 per cent. to at least 70 per cent. of the 1938 level, i.e. to raise the level of reconstruction to double that reached to date in the Anglo-American zone. In this case the allocation of 10 per cent. for current reparation deliveries will leave the Germans with 60 per cent. of production instead of the present 35 per cent. As a result, current reparation deliveries would be carried out, and furthermore, the Germans themselves will get almost twice as much industrial production.

"And yet efforts should be made to achieve a level of German industry even higher than 70 per cent. of the 1938 level. It is only a matter of clearing the way and making it possible for German industry just to make a start—under four-Power control of course; then it will be easy to solve the problem of allocating a part of industrial production for reparation deliveries and at the same time

to meet the needs of the German people more fully, while the possibility of exporting German commodities to other countries will be increased."

Mr. Molotov added: "Neither should it be forgotten that, in a certain period of time, reparations will have been paid by the Germans, and then the whole industrial output will remain in their own hands and their industry will also have gathered considerable strength. If this attitude towards German industry is adopted, any suggestion that current reparation deliveries will lower the standard of living of the German people will become groundless, and will serve only to obscure the real state of affairs."

As far as the Western Powers were concerned the Conference was dominated by Mr. Marshall and the British and French Ministers tamely acquiesced.

The Soviet proposals were bluntly refused.

The reasons were quite clear—a government formed at the time would have been a "Socialist-Communist 'Left' Government".

The rank and file of all the "Left" parties had equally suffered under the Nazi régime and there was a wide feeling of common purpose between them.

This was something which Mr. Marshall feared and hated. He wanted to rebuild a capitalist landlord banker's Germany; he wanted to restore the power and influence and wealth of these classes and then hold a general election in which the scales would be heavily weighed in favour of the old governing class. Further, Marshall wanted to increase the economic difficulties of the U.S.S.R. and to delay as long as possible the recovery of that country.

Mr. Marshall's aims were thus summed up by the Foreign Editor of *Reynolds News*, December 21, 1947:

- "(1) To assist the economic recovery of Western Europe on lines that will prevent Communism; and
- "(2) To provide a strategic base in the event of a conflict between Russia and the U.S.A."

The Foreign Editor added: "For both these purposes the integration of the Ruhr, still the most potentially powerful industrial area, into the Western economic bloc is essential."

On December 15, 1947, Mr. Marshall proposed that the Conference should end.

Mr. Molotov made an eleventh hour effort to save the Conference. He pointed out that:

- (1) If they were trying to break it up on the German question, they should at least discuss the Soviet proposals on German reparations.
- (2) The Soviet Union had put forward a clear plan which would save the German people—and the British taxpayer—from bearing heavy burdens. It had not even been discussed.
- (3) A parallel Soviet plan for Austria had not been discussed either.

Mr. Molotov's efforts were in vain. Mr. Marshall succeeded and the conference broke up on December 15, 1947, without fixing any date for resumption.

When the news of the failure of the Conference reached a Labour meeting in London, Mr. K. Zilliacus, M.P., said: "The statesmanship of the Labour Government has failed utterly and completely. The basic problem in Germany was whether it was going to have a capitalist or Socialist economy."

Foreign Secretary Bevin reported to the House of Commons, December 18, 1947, on the breakdown of the Conference. *Inter alia* he said:

"We cannot go on as we have been going on. We have hoped against hope that four-Power collaboration would work. Most of the World Powers can find a basis of agreement; they cannot all be wrong." (*Hansard*, December 18, 1947, col. 1888.)

And Mr. Eden, on behalf of the Opposition, said:

"It seems to us on this side of the House that there is now no choice open to us but to do everything in our power to promote recovery in that part of Europe where we are still free to act—that is to say, Western Europe. We should, in our judgment, set to work on that task as speedily as possible." (*ibid.*, col. 1889.)

The American press was jubilant at the breakdown of the Conference, but the British press recorded its disappointment.

In Moscow Mr. Marshall was in the main blamed for the failure of the Conference. Mr. Molotov in a statement to the Soviet press, December 31, 1947, stated:

"The U.S.A. makes the restoration of complete peace in Europe, as well as the re-establishment of the unity of the German State, without which the peace treaty with Germany cannot be concluded, conditional upon the acceptance of the American plan for Germany and Europe. Either accept this anti-democratic plan unreservedly, as it is dictated by the American expansionist, or there will be no agreement concerning the peace treaties—that is, the restoration of peace in Europe will not be completed.

"This policy of diktat could not but encounter a rebuff on the part of the Soviet Union. This policy of diktat adopted by the U.S.A. resulted in the failure of the London Conference."

Mr. Molotov concluded: "The London Conference ended in failure. Quite a few attempts were made to charge the U.S.S.R. with responsibility for this. Nothing came of it. The responsibility for the failure of the London session rests with the leading circles of the United States of America. In this instance once again, both Mr. Bevin and M. Bidault followed Mr. Marshall."

RELATIONS DETERIORATE IN 1948

THE year 1948 was a black one in the chequered history of Anglo-Soviet relations. Marshall Aid was being discussed in the U.S.A.; and no secret was being made of the fact that the principal aim of the aid was to strengthen and restore to power the old governing class and thus to prevent the establishment of "Left" governments in the countries of Western Europe. The chief concern of the Governments of Western Europe was to ingratiate themselves with the Government of the U.S.A.

The Labour Government—though a sizeable well-informed minority was against this policy—was second to none in obsequiousness to the political prejudices of Washington.

On January 22, 1948, Foreign Secretary Bevin opened a two days debate in the House of Commons. He announced in effect, that as the U.S.S.R. had refused to accept the terms presented to them by the three Western Powers, that steps were being taken by Britain and France to make new treaties with Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg for a "consolidation of Western Europe". The treaties were to aim at a "brotherhood rather than a rigid system"; it was hoped to include Italy at a later date.

Mr. Bevin added that the Western Organisation of Europe must be supported by closest possible collaboration with the Commonwealth and overseas territories—not only the British, but the French, Dutch, Belgian and Portuguese territories overseas—for these areas were primary producers capable of vast development.

Mr. Bevin further announced that in a few weeks' time the British, French and U.S.A. Governments were to have a Conference on the three zones of Germany with the aim of making them work economically and of introducing a currency to take the load off the British, French and U.S.A. exchequers.

Time and again throughout his speech he made bitter attacks on the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and her Allies in Central and Eastern

Europe. It was notable that when he sat down the loudest cheers came from the Tory benches.

Next day, January 23, 1948—no doubt encouraged by Mr. Bevin's denunciation of the U.S.S.R.—Mr. Churchill went one better and urged the sending of an ultimatum to the U.S.S.R.

He asked the question "Will there be a war?" and then continued:

"I will only venture now to say that there seems to me to be very real danger in going on drifting too long. I believe that the best chance of preventing a war is to bring matters to a head and come to a settlement with the Soviet Government before it is too late. This would imply that the Western democracies, who should, of course, seek unity among themselves at the earliest moment, would take the initiative in asking the Soviet for a settlement." (*Hansard*, January 23, 1948, col. 562.)

Prime Minister Attlee wound up for the Government; a large part of his speech was devoted to distorting and attacking conditions in the U.S.S.R., which had nothing whatever to do with relations between Britain and the U.S.S.R.

Summing up the debate the Parliamentary correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* wrote:

"The grim debate in the Commons continued to-day. It was little more than an hour old when Mr. Churchill was asking 'Will there be war?'—a question which he considered it as natural as it was ugly to ask in the present situation. But if the debate was grim, it has opened, as everybody was recognising to-day, a new era in British foreign policy and a new chapter in European history. Not often has there been such a sense of a debate making history." (*Manchester Guardian*, January 24, 1948.)

The correspondent went on: "The opinion was general that Mr. Bevin's pronouncement yesterday in favour of a Western European Union is a momentous new departure and that we are now involved in Europe as never before. Mr. Churchill ranged the Conservative party wholeheartedly behind the project."

The correspondent added: "The Labour members have not been demonstrative; they rarely are in foreign affairs debates, and it may be a little time before the opinion of the party as a whole on Mr. Bevin's

speech is fully known. Superficial indications are that it has won a general measure of support among them."

The fact was, however, that many members of the Labour Party were very critical of Bevin's policy.

Pravda, January 25, 1948, commenting on Bevin's speech stated:

"His plan can be expressed in two words—split Europe.

"The project of a Western bloc is not new. Churchill has been busy with it.

"Bevin . . . reproduces the essence of the American plans for the creation in Europe of a military bloc of western countries financed by the United States, based on the rebirth of Germany's war potential and directed against the Soviet Union and the countries of the new democracy."

Across the Atlantic Government spokesmen had definite ideas as to what Churchill meant when he spoke in the House of Commons.

Cabling from Washington, January 31, 1948, Mr. David Raymond stated:

"Churchill's speech in last week's Commons debate has been interpreted here as a proposal that Britain and America should invite Stalin to a new three-power talk, in which the Russian leader would be given a final ultimatum to sign the German peace treaty, to agree to stay put within Russia's already acknowledged sphere of influence, or to submit to atomic treatment." (*Reynolds*, February 1, 1948.)

Raymond continued: "But so far no one here has taken up this proposal with any enthusiasm. On the contrary, America's defence leaders are now launching a campaign to rid American public opinion and Congress of the idea that a war can be won quickly and on the cheap."

One of the most outspoken critics of the Bevin-Attlee-Churchill policy *vis-à-vis* the U.S.S.R. and her Allies in Central and Eastern Europe was Mr. Konni Zilliacus, M.P. Speaking at Huddersfield, March 7, 1948, he stated: "It was impossible to destroy ideologies or to impose democracy by a war of extermination. The men who had faced and triumphed over the barbarity of the Nazis were not to be cowed into submission by reproof from Mr. Attlee, nor by being treated by Mr. Bevin as though they were a break-away from the Transport and General Workers' Union." (*Manchester Guardian*, March 8, 1948.)

We must stop here to consider the events in Czechoslovakia of February, 1948, which aroused much commotion in Parliament and the press of Great Britain, France and the U.S.A. and to a less extent also in other countries.

To appreciate the position it is necessary to give a very brief outline of what had been happening in Czechoslovakia.

At the conclusion of the war, a National Front Government composed of representatives of all the leading parties was formed. The Government drew up a programme of nationalisation of big industry, banking and insurance and other measures for the establishment of democratic socialism.

This programme was supported by enormous majorities in the Czechoslovak Trade Union Congress Council and the Congress of Factory Councils elected prior to February, 1948.

From the first it became apparent that there were elements in the Government which were anything but wholehearted in their desire for an economically independent socialist Czechoslovakia. These reactionary members of the Government were subsequently also accused by their fellow members of committing or instigating acts of sabotage and of being in touch with foreign—particularly the U.S.A.—Government circles.

Be that as it may, the reactionary section certainly endeavoured to hinder the Czechoslovak Government from carrying out its socialist programme and constitutional duties. Moreover, they made all the capital they could out of the difficulties resulting from the exceptionally bad harvest of 1947.

Finally on February 20, 1948, in an effort to break up the National Front Government and thus make room for a frankly capitalist Government, twelve Ministers—members all belonging to one or other of the three reactionary parties: the Czech National Socialists, the Czech People's Party and the Slovak Democratic Party—resigned. They no doubt counted upon the rejection of their resignation by President Benes and that this would rally large sections of the people to their support.

However, they were disappointed. When the news of the resignations was published, and before Benes had given his decision, there were huge demonstrations of hundreds of thousands of workers in Prague and the other parts of the country, demanding the acceptance of the resignations and pledging support to Gottwald (the Communist Prime Minister) and to the other Communist and Socialist members of

the Government, and demanding the carrying out of the Government's programme of immediate reforms as well as further nationalisation and agrarian reforms.

On February 25, President Benes accepted the resignations and nominated a new National Front Government with Gottwald as Prime Minister. The members of the new Government belonged to the Communist Party, the Slovak Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, People's Party, National Socialist Party, Slovak Freedom Party, Slovak Democratic Party; there were also representatives of the trade unions, and Jan Masaryk, described as Non-Party, was Foreign Minister.

In the British press there was a hue and cry of a Communist *coup d'état* in Czechoslovakia. Well, if this was a *coup d'état* it was certainly a very quiet constitutional *coup d'état* in which not a single drop of blood was shed.

In the U.S.S.R. it was certainly welcomed. It was, of course, a vital necessity for her that Czechoslovakia should remain a friendly socialist country and not a capitalist economic vassal of the U.S.A.

As might have been expected the events in Czechoslovakia were put down as mainly the work of the Soviet Government, and Mr. Eden at a meeting in Leamington spoke of the dangers of the events in Czechoslovakia and roundly declared: "... Reproof and exhortation are not enough. What is really required is immediate positive action on our own account. As I suggested a week ago, if the policy of western union is to be fully effective, it must be one of mutual assistance covering the economic, political and military fields. Nothing less will suffice. . . ." (*Times*, March 1, 1948.)

And he took the opportunity of urging closer unity between the Western European countries and the U.S.A.

Sir Hartley Shawcross speaking at Stourbridge actually compared events in Czechoslovakia with Nazi aggression and terror. He also took the opportunity of urging closer unity among the Western countries and declared: "Let every European country realise it can sit on the fence no longer. We must get together on our side, the free side, or one by one we shall fall off the fence into the pit which the totalitarians are preparing for democracy." (*Daily Herald*, March 13, 1948.)

Yes, at all costs we must ensure that the old capitalist régimes endure; no other country is to be permitted to adopt a socialist form of society!

An agreed statement issued simultaneously in London, Washington and Paris, on February 26, 1948, declared:

"The Governments of the United States, France and Great Britain have followed with attention the recent course of events in Czechoslovakia which jeopardised the very existence of the principles of liberty to which all democratic nations are attached.

"They declare that, thanks to the crisis, artificially and deliberately provoked, certain methods already exploited elsewhere have been used to bring about suspension of free parliamentary institutions and the establishment of a disguised dictatorship of a single party under the cloak of a Government of National Union.

"They can only condemn a development the consequences of which must surely be disastrous to the Czechoslovak people, who again proved, during the sufferings of a second world war, their devotion to the cause of liberty." (*Times*, February 27, 1948.)

Jan Masaryk (Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs), replied to this statement in the following interview with a correspondent of the Paris journal *L'Ordre*.

"Question: What do you think of the Anglo-American-French declaration on recent events in Czechoslovakia?

"Answer: It is very easy to make a declaration condemning the policy of another sovereign State. Nothing is easier than to be indignant about something happening at a neighbour's. The Czechoslovak people have had their say. The changes in our conception of democracy are new and considerable. Czechoslovaks always knew how to look after themselves and they will continue to do so. I have always been with the people, and I am with them now.

"Question: How did the crisis arise?

"Answer: There were people in this country who thought it was possible to govern without the Communists or against them. I have always passionately opposed this idea. The crisis was precipitated by the resignation of the members of three parties of the National Front. We have got a new National Front now, and it is necessary to co-operate with it. The new Government has been installed in a constitutional way, and it is going to proceed democratically in accordance with the Constitution.

"Question: How was the change of Government carried out?

"Answer: Changes of this kind generally involve civil war and great sacrifices. In 1918 Czechoslovakia carried through a change

without bloodshed. It was the same this time. The Czechoslovaks are a peace-loving people. They do not wish Europe to be divided into two camps. They desire lasting peace. We in Czechoslovakia know what war means, and whoever thinks that this desire for peace could be changed is stupid. Our people are and will remain democratically minded, and this is why I believe them and love them. If we are given a chance to set to work quietly after this bloodless change, we shall make a great contribution to Europe, the heart of which is Czechoslovakia. I went into this Government as a convinced democrat, and will serve our new democracy as well as I can and with all my strength."

After the February events in Czechoslovakia the cold war against the U.S.S.R. was waged with ever greater vigour by the U.S.A. supported by Britain and France.

The British, French and U.S.A. Governments had by February, 1948, decided to bring about a complete fusion of the Anglo-American and French Zones of Germany, to convert Bizonia into Trizonia. Representatives of the three Governments met in Conference in London on February 23, 1948. They brought the Benelux countries into the discussion, but refused to hear the views of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland despite the fact that these three countries were Allies in the war against Germany.

The Soviet Government protested against the holding of the Conference on the grounds that it was a violation of the Potsdam Agreement, but this protest was ignored.

The Conference terminated on March 6, 1948, and a communique was issued implying that substantial agreement was reached on the main issues under discussion.

The main points of agreement were:

- (1) "The three Western Powers have agreed that close co-operation should be established among themselves and among the occupation authorities in Western Germany in all matters arising out of the European Recovery Programme in relation to Western Germany", and the Anglo-American area and the French Zone "shall be fully associated in the E.R.P. and adequately represented on any continuing organisation".
- (2) Agreement in principle was reached on the association of the Benelux countries in policy towards Germany.

- (3) Respecting the Ruhr the Communique stated: "Consideration was given by all delegations to the establishment of an international control of the Ruhr on which Germany would be represented. It was implied that control apart from military measures should be limited to the distribution of the output and production of the Ruhr."
- (4) Among a number of controversial points on which a wide measure of agreement was reached was the acceptance of a federal form of government for Germany with an adequate central authority.

On March 6, 1948, the Soviet Ambassador in London handed a Note to the British Foreign Office stating that the Soviet Government considered the agreements in principle reached at the London Conference on Germany were "incapable of having legality and international authority".

Declaring the conference a violation of the Potsdam Agreement, the Note said its aim was the "preparation of a new deal on the German question between the Governments of Britain, the United States and France".

The Note added that while Russia had "consistently been adhering to a policy of unanimity among the four Powers" the other three "directly rejected" such a policy as far back as 1946.

The Soviet Note warned the three Powers that their policies were "pregnant with consequences which may be useful only to all kinds of incendiaries of a new war," and said the London conference "served the narrow aims of the creators of a western bloc opposed to other European countries".

The Soviet Note was permeated with the idea that the three Western Powers were "building up a militarist Germany", directed against the U.S.S.R. and the Peoples' Democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.

This policy was a direct violation of the Potsdam Agreement and the Anglo-Soviet and French-Soviet Treaties of Alliance.

However, in spite of this protest the Western Powers who were represented at the London Conference decided to hold a follow-up Conference some time in April, 1948.

During the weeks which immediately followed the London Conference, there was plenty of evidence that in Britain in general and in Labour ranks in particular, there was much disquiet about the growing hostility between Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. and there was a

profound desire for cordial relations between the two countries.

Mr. Shinwell, Secretary of State for War, voiced the desires of the great majority of the British people when, speaking at a public meeting, March 28, 1948, he said: "We must never cease to seek an understanding with the U.S.S.R. If we fail, then sooner or later the world will be threatened by further conflict. If we could only realise the horrible features of future war, no measures would be extreme enough to prevent it." (*Sunday Times*, March 29, 1948.)

We must now turn to what was happening in Washington. In March, 1948, the Marshall Plan was discussed in the Senate and the House of Representatives and the Bill (Foreign Aid Bill \$1,524,500,000) was passed by both Houses of Congress, April 2, 1948, and the Bill was signed by President Truman.

During the debates in Congress and in speeches outside Congress no secret was made of the fact that the chief aim was to check the spread of communism and to strengthen capitalism, or for that matter, fascism or feudalism where these were the prevailing forms of government.

It was a commonplace remark among pressmen in Washington at this time, that had it not been for Soviet opposition to the Marshall Plan it was doubtful whether the Bill would have been passed so quickly or whether the sum voted would have been so large.

The *Times* in an editorial, April 5, 1948, commented: "The overwhelming vote for the Marshall plan in the Senate, and even more in the House of Representatives, where so large a majority was less to be expected, has demonstrated to the world that economic realities and Russian pressure have welded together, underneath sharp party divisions, a formidable American unity on foreign affairs."

Mr. K. Zilliacus, M.P., speaking at Gateshead, April 4, 1948, said: "American aid to Europe is getting us into a position which I regard as extremely dangerous. I am not objecting in principle to receiving help from the U.S.A. but we have got to supplement and counterpoise this by political relations and full trade with Eastern Europe.

"The main idea of this aid is not to assist Europe but to fight Communism. America stands for using the Western Union as an American bridgehead. They are encouraging Western European States to line-up in a military alliance under their patronage." (*Daily Herald*, April 5, 1948.)

Speaking before a machinery manufacturers' convention, April 26,

1948, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Willard L. Thorp, said that U.S. aid to Europe had a dual purpose: the rebuilding of Europe's economy to a level providing tolerable living conditions and the creation of confidence "that the system of free economy can survive and so maintain the basis upon which free institutions and human rights can continue to exist."

Washington set up a Special Agency called Economic Co-operation Administration (E.C.A.) to administer the scheme and Mr. Paul Hoffman was appointed as its chief.

After this diversion to Washington we must return to London.

Despite the deep regret felt in the ranks of the Labour Movement at the worsening of relations between London and Moscow, it would appear that Mr. Attlee was determined to make them still worse and to do this quite gratuitously.

Now, the Soviet May-Day slogans had been known in London several days before May 1, 1948. No reference was made in them, either to Great Britain or to the British Labour Party. However, speaking at a 1st of May Labour Demonstration at Plymouth, Prime Minister Attlee said: "Russia was always in my young days the supreme example of the police state; the land of fear and suppression; the land where free speech, free thought and free press were banned. It is the same to-day as it was then, only with a different set of rulers. It has yet to overtake several centuries of progress which have left their mark on western civilisation." (*Times*, May 3, 1948.)

In the same speech Mr. Attlee, referring to the "Left Wing" M.P.s in the Parliamentary Labour Party, stated with apparent gusto: "We have excluded Mr. Platts-Mills from the Party and we have given a clear warning to the rest of them. They must now make their choice."

A quick and pointed reply came from Mr. Ian Mikardo, M.P., addressing his constituents on the subject of Attlee's speech. He said: "It ill becomes a Prime Minister to use a May Day platform to try to set the workers of one country against the workers of another. The whole of the working-class movement must bear its responsibility for allowing national leaders to use working-class forces to foment international rivalries and jealousies." (*Daily Herald*, May 4, 1948.)

To make matters worse, the *Daily Herald*, the organ of the Labour Movement, in an editorial, May 4, 1948, fiercely denounced Mr. Mikardo and unreservedly backed Mr. Attlee.

A two days debate on foreign affairs in the House of Commons was

opened by Foreign Secretary Bevin on May 4, 1948. He praised highly the Marshall Plan, expressed regret that no agreement had been reached with the U.S.S.R. on Germany and added: "I desire to make one or two references to the question of the Soviet Union. I have always felt that if we had to deal only with Russia, and not with Communist ideology, a settlement would be possible. We could reach agreement on territorial and other issues which from time to time may concern us. What is preventing agreement, is the fact that injected into this whole business, is the assumption that any settlement we make must be so designed as to include methods of furthering the Communist objective. . . . Until we get away from these ideological attitudes on the part of the Kremlin, there will be little chance of a real and lasting settlement." (*Hansard*, May 4, 1948, col. 1126.)

Mr. Bevin quoted no facts in support of this sweeping statement.

Mr. D. N. Pritt, M.P., in a long well-documented speech attacked Marshall Aid and the Government's policy *vis-à-vis* the U.S.S.R. *Inter alia* he said the United States wants "to build up an opposition in Europe to the U.S.S.R. which they are so anxious to 'contain'. They become almost incontinent in their hysterical desire to 'contain' the U.S.S.R. The *Daily Telegraph* described the position during the last week in these words: 'The purpose of foreign aid is to form part of the United States foreign policy of containing Communism.'" (*ibid.*, col. 1196.)

In conclusion Mr. Pritt said: "Had we started to keep our independence and kept it, and had we started to reduce our Armed Forces to help our economy, and kept friends not only with the United States but also with Eastern Europe and built up trade with Eastern Europe we should not be in a position in which the United States would be pressing on us offers of Marshall Aid; because if they do not impose Marshall Aid on somebody the slump will reach them quickly, and it will be catastrophic; then we could have said to the United States, 'Let your money come, but since you are offering it to us, there will not be any strings to it.' I want to know—I think I do know a great deal about it, but I want to know a great deal more—about what there is in the way of strings in the American plan." (*ibid.*, cols. 1203-4.)

On the following day, May 5, Mr. Eden opened for the Opposition. He endorsed the views propounded on the previous day by Mr. Bevin and said: "In all these projects which we are now considering for strengthening the Western nations, there is no provocation, there is no menace of war; on the contrary, cannot the Soviet Government rid

itself of what appears to be this Communist obsession, if we are to judge by their own propaganda, as to the inevitability of war? It is they who always speak of this in their propaganda, and no one of us has the right to say that war is inevitable." (*Hansard*, May 5, 1948, cols. 1288-9.)

Mr. Eden was completely wrong. The statesmen and press of the U.S.S.R. did not say war was inevitable. What they did say was that the Western Powers were planning war against them and they called on their defence forces to keep themselves in a condition to defend the U.S.S.R. To quote three of the slogans for May 1, 1948:

- "6. Long live the great Soviet Union, the reliable bulwark of peace and security, of the freedom and independence of the peoples!
- "7. Glory to the Soviet Army—Liberator Army—which upholds with honour the freedom and independence of our Motherland!
- "9. Long live the Soviet Frontier Guards, who vigilantly guard the sacred borders of our Motherland!"

Speaking later in the debate, Prime Minister Attlee said: "The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) made what I thought was an extremely helpful speech. I would like to agree with him emphatically that it is a horrible thought that we should be talking and discussing war; I should also like to say most emphatically that I think it is utterly wrong and dangerous to talk of war as being inevitable. I do not believe it. I do not believe that there are any people in the world who want war. If there was any drift to war, it might be, if it did arise, that it would be through someone's chancing their arm too far so to speak. I do not believe there is any aggressive desire for war. Therefore, it is a great mistake to talk of the inevitability of war." (*Hansard*, May 5, 1948, col. 1325.)

Continuing, Mr. Attlee said: "In the nineteenth century to a large extent we had in Western Europe a broad general acceptance of moral values. The difficult thing is that we have not got that common acceptance by the Soviet Union, and therefore we have to deal with it on a different basis. We want to have the most friendly relations with them, but we have to recognise that their views are not our views, and that there is that breach in the general sense of values of European civilisation." (*ibid.*, col. 1327.)

"Nineteenth-century Western European moral values"—had Mr. Attlee ever read even elementary history?

Did he know of the innumerable colonial wars waged in the nineteenth century by the countries of Western Europe against relatively unarmed peoples?

Had he not heard of the artificially manufactured famine in Ireland which cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of Irish men, women and children?

Had he never heard of the battle of Omdurman, which was not a battle but a massacre?

Did he not know that in all the colonial countries ruled by Western Europe the natives were robbed of more than half their natural span of life by undernourishment?

And what about Tsarist Russia with her repression of all freedom, her virtual serfdom, her Rasputins, her corruption in court and government circles? With her we nevertheless could have normal relations: was she too a representative of nineteenth-century Western European moral values?

This expression about different "moral values" was a cliché without any substance in fact. This was apparent to everybody who had studied the "moral values" inculcated in the Soviet schools and continually urged in the Soviet press. Anybody who travelled (with a knowledge of the Russian language) widely in the U.S.S.R. and mixed freely with its people soon learned that by and large moral values were certainly not lower than those in Western Europe.

A robust speech was made in the debate by Mr. Zilliacus. He quoted extensively from prominent columnists in the U.S.A. press to the effect that in the main the aim of Marshall Aid was to restore and strengthen capitalism in Europe; that the U.S.A. Government had no objection to the Franco régime; that the U.S.A. had interfered in France and Italy.

Later he stated: "Mr. Stassen has gone on record repeatedly, emphatically and publicly as holding that any European State receiving American aid must refrain from any further Socialist experiments during the period of receiving American assistance. He was asked at a press conference in Washington whether that meant nationalisation of the British steel industry, and he said, 'Yes.' He was then asked what he would do if the British disregarded his view and went ahead and nationalised their steel industry notwithstanding. He said that, of course, he could not interfere in British internal affairs, but that in

such circumstances Britain would become a bad risk, and the U.S.A. could not invest money in a bad risk." (*Hansard*, May 5, 1948, col. 1344.)

In conclusion, addressing himself to the Labour Party, Mr. Zilliacus said: "The appeal I make is that they should try to find common ground with the workers and trade unionists of Europe, and to think of Europe as composed of workers, trade unionists and peasants, toiling to rebuild their shattered countries, and not as a world divided into rival ideologies. If we think as Socialists we can find common ground with the workers building up their countries, and that is the task of the Labour Government in seeking peace and ensuring it. I beg my hon. Friends to lead our country and the world into the path of peace and brotherhood." (*ibid.*, cols. 1349-50.)

Mr. Mayhew (Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) wound up for the Government. He was clearly very angry with Mr. Zilliacus and made no attempt to hide it; but he made no serious attempt to reply to him.

Mayhew concluded: "I would like to end by referring to what has been said by several speakers about the perniciousness of the theory of the inevitability of war. Once war is regarded as inevitable there is only one logical policy left, and that is to strengthen yourself and to weaken your supposed enemy. Such views on the inevitability of war are utterly repudiated by His Majesty's Government." (*ibid.*, col. 1402.)

If the two days debate did not worsen Anglo-Soviet relations it certainly did not improve them.

The weight of argument was on the side of Zilliacus, but most of the expressions of approval were on the side of Bevin, Eden and Attlee.

This debate showed very clearly that at this time there were no differences between the majority of the Labour Party and the Conservative Party on relations with the U.S.S.R.

Foreign Policy was debated at the Labour Party Conference at Scarborough, May 20, 1948. The National Union of Mineworkers moved a resolution congratulating the Government on its foreign policy. On the other hand, Mr. Zilliacus moved a resolution on behalf of the Gateshead Divisional Labour Party, strongly criticising that policy.

Many delegates complained that they could take no middle way between the two resolutions.

It was a sombre debate because the cloud of a possible war hung over

the Conference. Zilliacus, moving his resolution, said: "We have to face the terrible and bitter fact that we are losing the peace and drifting to war." He argued that the policy contained in his resolution was the only genuine alternative to Churchill's policy (which he contended Bevin was following), because it posed the choice that lay at the basis of foreign policy—whether to be the friends and partners of the workers and of the trade unionists of Europe or their enemies.

Mr. Bevin defended the policy which he had been pursuing. He admitted the danger of war, but added that war was not inevitable and he blamed the Soviet Union for the then existing strained international relations.

On being put to a card vote the Gateshead resolution was defeated by 4,097,000 to 224,000 votes. However, the support of the Zilliacus policy was much greater than the minority vote would seem to indicate, because within the affiliated trade unions there were minorities—often as much as from 30 per cent. to 40 per cent.—which did not find expression in the card vote.

Writing before the vote was taken, Mr. Emrys Hughes, M.P., stated: "If the machinery works according to plan and the Executive demands a card vote, conference history of recent years will again be repeated and Mr. Bevin get his majority card vote.

"But that will not hide the fact that there is widespread disquiet about our Foreign policy and the way we are drifting into the danger of assuming that war with Russia is inevitable." (*Forward*, May 22, 1948.)

After the debate many trade unionists, officials and rank and filers warmly congratulated Zilliacus on his speech and expressed regret that their Unions had not supported his resolution.

We end this chapter with another subject which aroused much antagonism between the U.S.S.R. and Britain (together with the U.S.A. and France) in 1948. It was the question of the regulation of traffic on the Danube.

It will be well to recall here in brief a few historical facts. A European Commission of the Danube was created under the Treaty of Paris, 1856, after the Crimean War, to control traffic on that river from Braila in Rumania to Sulina at the mouth of the Danube. Eight countries were then represented on the Commission: Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Rumania and Turkey.

Under the terms of the Convention accepted by this Commission,

there was no international control over the greater part of the river, which was mainly in German and Austrian hands.

In actual fact, in the years immediately preceding the first world war, the Danube was mainly under the control of Germany and Austria-Hungary and the European Danube Commission only controlled the mouth of the Danube.

Imperialist Germany at that time planned to connect the Danube with the Rhine and to open up a direct route to Persia and the Levant. The Danube scheme was planned to supplement the German Berlin-Bagdad railway project. A century-old plan for the building of a modern Rhine-Danube canal via the river Maine had indeed been started.

However, all this came to nought with the outbreak of the war in 1914, and after the end of the war in 1918 the old Commission was reconstituted under the control of the Allies and all former representatives were excluded from it except those of Great Britain, France, Italy and Rumania.

Further, under the Treaty of Versailles, another Commission was established, the International Danube Commission, to control traffic from Braila to Ulm in Wurttemberg. In addition to the four countries already mentioned, the following States were given seats on this Commission: Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Wurttemberg and Yugoslavia.

Soviet Russia, although she was the greatest Black Sea Power and had important commercial interests in the great river-highway, was excluded from both Commissions. There was only one reason for this. Soviet Russia was then weak and her protests were flung unacknowledged into the wastepaper basket. A very dangerous policy to pursue towards a potentially Great Power!

The Kremlin at that time was powerless to reply with other than word weapons, but naturally resented deeply the affronts to which it had been subjected, and it remembered them.

At the Paris Conference of 1920-1, the two riparian States, Yugoslavia and Rumania, endeavoured to reduce international control of the Danube to a minimum, but the British and French insisted on their standpoint and the new International Commission was granted jurisdiction over the whole of the Danube except its mouth, and the U.S.A. was invited to join the Commission whilst both Russia and Germany were excluded.

The whole question of the control of the Danube again became a

subject of controversy after the conclusion of the second world war and in July-August, 1948, a Danube Conference met in Belgrade. During the Conference the 1921 Convention came under fire from the Soviet representative, Mr. Vyshinsky, who, addressing the Conference on August 18, said:

"We are told that the 1921 Convention precisely ensured true freedom of navigation, the sovereignty of the Danubian States, etc. I should like to give two references concerning the 1920 Danube Conference in order to bring to light the spirit which prevailed there and the nature of the drafts, such as the 1921 Convention, prepared by that conference. I shall remind you how, at the 1920 Paris Conference, the leading delegations treated the Danubian States.

"Their disdainful attitude towards the sovereign rights of the Danubian States is evident from the statements of the representatives of the two Danubian States who were present at the 1920 Paris Conference—that of the Serbo-Croato-Slovenian State (the present Yugoslavia) then headed by the Pasic Government, and that of General Averescu's Royal Rumanian Government. What did these two Versailles vassals say at that time? How did they react to the spirit of the Paris Conference?

"I have a French record of that conference which shows the following: firstly, the representative of the Serbo-Croato-Slovenian State expressed dissatisfaction at the fact that he was not given enough time to study the draft of the 1921 Convention, which was being examined at the conference. He stated this quite plainly. And the representatives of General Averescu's Rumanian Government did not hesitate to state that the 1921 Convention plainly contradicted the principle of respect for the sovereign rights of the Danubian States."

As already mentioned, Soviet Russia was excluded from the Paris Conference, 1920-I, a fact which was remembered in Moscow at the session of the Belgrade Conference, July 31, 1948.

Mr. Vyshinsky, addressing particularly the British representative, said:

"When signing in 1921 the Danubian Convention without the participation of Soviet Russia, Great Britain and France introduced into the Convention a provision excluding Soviet Russia from the European Danubian Commission in which Russia participated

under the Conventions of 1856 and 1878. You then handled the Danubian Convention summarily, just as a cook handles potatoes in his own kitchen. The 1921 Convention constituted a rude violation, Sir Charles Peake, of that provision of international law of which you spoke here and which you, using the words of McNair, formulated as the duty to respect the rights of those Powers which signed this Convention.

"In 1921 you violated the Convention of 1856 which Russia signed. In 1921 you violated the 1878 Convention which Russia signed. Notwithstanding the fact that under these Conventions Russia was a member of the European Danubian Commission, in 1921 you expelled her from this Commission because this country was no longer Tsarist Russia but had become worker and peasant Russia. You tolerated Tsarist Russia but you did not wish to tolerate worker and peasant Russia, and she found herself expelled from the European Danubian Commission.

"I am not complaining against this crying injustice because our people proved able to defend their rights in this issue as well. I merely wish to draw attention to your inconsistency, to the utter groundlessness of your appeals to respect some sort of 'acquired rights'—proclaiming some sort of 'international' principles to the effect that all the States which signed the former Convention must give their consent to change this Convention and that without this consent a new Convention will not be valid, whereas you yourselves do not respect 'acquired rights', you yourselves do not respect the principles of international law to which you refer to-day with such aplomb."

Throughout the Belgrade Conference the representatives of the riparian States maintained that they alone were entitled to seats on the new Commission.

This principle was laid down in Article 1 of the Appendix to the main Act of the Vienna Congress of 1815, which reads:

"The Powers through whose possessions one and the same navigable river flows, or for which it serves as a frontier, pledge themselves by common agreement to establish detailed regulations for the shipping on that river. For this purpose they will appoint special commissioners; they must meet not later than six months after the end of the Congress and adopt, as the basis of a statute which they will be instructed to create, the rules mentioned below."

Commenting on this Article at the Session of August 6, 1948, Mr.

Vyshinsky stated: "Who was made responsible for laying down the rules for the Danube shipping in 1815?—Only the riparian States."

This vital principle of international relations and justice was violated by the States who drew up the Convention of 1856 and 1921.

The U.S.S.R. and her Allies further maintained that this principle of riparian States alone controlling rivers flowing through more than one country was universally recognised.

No nation or group of nations had been more insistent on this principle than the Anglo-Saxon and the Pan-American States. On this point Vyshinsky said that:

"The Soviet draft Convention proceeds from the fact that only representatives of the riparian States must sit on the Danube Commission. There is foundation for this from the point of view of international law also. I could quote in this case jurists belonging to the Anglo-American branch of law. If for example we turn to the well-known work of Hyde on international law (1947) we can see that in his opinion the solution of the question of the character of the régime to be applied on waterways running through the territory of certain States must be left to these riparian States themselves, or as he puts it, 'to the riparian sovereigns themselves'.

"And how does the matter stand in American practice? It is well known that on the international rivers of America no international commissions such as the old European Danube Commission or the International Danube Commission exist at all. It is also well known that the first Pan-American Conference in 1889, and later the seventh Pan-American Conference in 1933, which particularly dwelt on this question, recognised that the regulation of shipping and the utilisation of the waters of these rivers should be a question for the riparian States themselves, a matter for them."

Germany and Austria too are riparian States—what of them? Reuters' Belgrade correspondent cabled on August 12, 1948:

"At to-night's session Mr. Vyshinsky said that Germany and Austria should eventually take part in the Commission. Germany is a Danube State and must enter, but this is not a question that can be settled at this Conference. 'The German question must be settled as a whole and not in part.' He also recognised the importance of the Danube to Austria, 'but there are many other questions to be settled first.'" (*Manchester Guardian*, August 13, 1948.)

What about warships on the Danube? Article 27 of the new Convention reads:

"The sailing of warships of all non-Danubian countries on the Danube is forbidden. The sailing of warships of the Danubian countries on the Danube beyond the boundaries of the country whose flag the ship is carrying, may take place only upon agreement between the Danubian States concerned."

Commenting on this article, Mr. Vyshinsky remarked: "This differs essentially from the 1921 Convention."

Will navigation on the Danube be free and fair? The *Manchester Guardian*, August 4, 1948, commenting editorially on the Soviet draft shortly after the Conference opened, stated:

"Mr. Vyshinsky's draft of a new convention would exclude the Western non-Danubian Powers from all control, but it does at least lay down the principle of free and equal navigation."

And Mr. Vyshinsky, speaking at the Belgrade Conference, August 18, 1948, declared:

"We are told that there are no guarantees of real implementation of freedom of navigation, that the Soviet draft says nothing against discrimination. Yet this is not true because a whole number of Soviet Articles specify that such discrimination is impermissible. Our draft contains an article guaranteeing equality on the Danube to all flags in regard to all kinds of dues and to merchant shipping. Equality means equality, hence no discrimination is permitted. Read Articles 26, 40, 41 and others stating that discrimination on any grounds whatever is impermissible."

However, Mr. Vyshinsky emphasised that certain past practices would not be permitted. He continued:

"But we know what you regard as guarantees. You regard participation of non-Danubian countries in the Danube Commission as guarantees. We cannot recognise such guarantees. Our guarantees consist in that the Danubian Commission will be composed of representatives of the Danubian States since the regulation of Danube navigation, just like the regulation of navigation of any other river flowing through the territories of several States in

accordance with international practice, should be solely within the competence of the riparian States."

The Convention (in accordance with the Soviet draft) was passed at the Belgrade Conference by 7 to 1—the U.S.A. voting against and Britain and France abstaining. It was fiercely attacked in the British, French and American press, since it did away with the unfair influence of the non-riparian States on traffic along the Danube. But it may quite fairly be asked:

Would the U.S.A. and Canadian Governments agree to international control of the St. Lawrence?

Would the U.S.A. and Mexican Governments agree to international control of the Colorado and the Rio Grande?

Would Uruguay and the Argentine permit international control of the River Plate?

Would Peru and Brazil permit international control of the Amazon?

Would Holland, Germany (prior to 1914-18) and Switzerland have agreed to international control of the Rhine?

Is it necessary to answer these questions?

It is clear that the Danube Convention of 1921 belonged to the era of capitulations and the bullying of weak nations. The Danube Convention agreed at the Belgrade Conference in August, 1948, is now unchallenged. The control of traffic on that important river is now completely in the hands of the riparian States, but all nations are granted the usual facilities for their shipping.

THE DIVISION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST TAKES SHAPE

IN the meantime, after six weeks of discussion in London between Great Britain, France, the U.S.A. and the Benelux countries, a set of recommendations were agreed upon on June 2, 1948, regarding Germany.

The American representative was against the nationalisation of the Ruhr industries: accordingly, proposals to transfer the basic industries of the Ruhr to public ownership were dropped and the question was left to the Germans themselves to decide.

In parenthesis we would point out that this decision meant that Foreign Secretary Bevin had again bowed to U.S.A. wishes because he had always declared against the return of the Ruhr industries to private ownership. For instance on February 21, 1946, he told the House of Commons: "I am convinced that you have got to settle the ownership of the Ruhr, that is to say the ownership of the industries of the Ruhr. The heart of the General Staff in Germany was the industrial lords of the Ruhr, and the Ruhr must not go back to their possession and it must not be controlled for that type of mentality." (*Hansard*, February, 21, 1946, col. 1352.)

It was agreed that there should be no general withdrawal from Germany until the peace of Europe was secured.

The set of recommendations were nowhere hailed with any enthusiasm. In Britain they were accepted but many members of the Labour Party were against them. These members believed that further efforts should be made to come to terms with the U.S.S.R. The recommendations were strongly criticised in Germany from the extreme "Left" to the extreme "Right".

The U.S.A. and Benelux countries accepted them.

In France the General Assembly accepted with reservations by 300 to 286 votes.

In a statement on the recommendations to the House of Commons, June 9, 1948, Foreign Secretary Bevin said that the Six-Power plan

"does not mean that we have even now abandoned hope of an eventual Four-Power agreement.

"We are still in favour of the economic and political unity of Germany."

The London Agreement of June 2, 1948, meant definitely the division of Germany and, even more than that, the division of Europe.

The agreement was viewed by the U.S.S.R. and her European Allies with the deepest suspicions and their reply in deeds was not long in coming.

A Conference was held in Warsaw, June 23, 1948, attended by the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R., Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania and Albania, to discuss the London Agreement. At the conclusion of the Conference, June 24, 1948, a statement was issued which *inter alia* declared that the London Conference had adopted proposals to set up a provisional Government for Western Germany in violation of the Potsdam Agreement. At the end of the statement the following demands were made:

- (1) Carrying out by agreement between Britain, the U.S.S.R., France and the United States—of measures which would secure the completion of Germany's demilitarisation;
- (2) Establishment for a definite period of four-Power control—Britain, the U.S.S.R., France and the United States—over the Ruhr's heavy industry, with the aim of the development of the peaceful spheres of Ruhr industry and the prohibition of the restoration of Germany's war potential;
- (3) Creation—on agreement between the Governments of Britain, the U.S.S.R., France and the United States—of a provisional democratic all-German government, consisting of representatives of democratic parties and organisations of Germany, with the purpose of creating guarantees against a repetition of German aggression.
- (4) Conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany in accordance with the Potsdam decisions in order to withdraw occupation troops of all Powers from Germany one year after the conclusion of the peace treaty; and
- (5) Elaboration of measures on the fulfilment by Germany of her reparation obligations towards States which suffered from German aggression.

The statement concluded: "We refuse to recognise the legal force or moral authority of the decisions of the London Conference."

The London Pact and the Warsaw Pact—which was the natural rejoinder to the London Pact—together constituted a considerable hardening of the division between East and West in Europe. It was now clear that as far as the British and French Governments were concerned they were prepared to treat their Treaties of Alliance with the U.S.S.R. as mere “scraps of paper”.

Contemporary with and supplementary to these events, other decisions were taken by both sides. The Western Powers on June 18, 1948, introduced a new currency into Western Germany and Western Berlin and the Soviet representative responded by introducing a new currency into Eastern Germany and Eastern Berlin. All these happenings now led to a very serious dispute between the U.S.S.R. and the three Western Powers.

The U.S.S.R.—in view of the fact that Berlin was deep in her zone—felt compelled to introduce temporary measures to restrict transport communications between Berlin and the Western sectors, but the Soviets made it clear that they were always willing to enter into negotiations to settle the question of Germany as a whole.

The Russians contended that the question of Berlin was part and only part of the general question of the attitude of the Allies towards Germany as a whole.

When Four-Power administration of Greater Berlin was instituted it was, of course, envisaged as the capital and centre of Germany as a whole and the joint administration of Berlin was part and parcel of the eventual quadripartite administration of Germany until such a time as the Allies had concluded a peace treaty with a recognised democratic German Government—after which all Four Powers would withdraw their troops.

The formation of a Western German State with Frankfurt as its capital, said the Russians, therefore completely transformed the situation—Germany had been divided and Berlin ceased to be a legitimate joint administrative centre for Germany as a whole.

To reach the sections of Greater Berlin occupied by Britain, France and U.S.A., one had to traverse the Soviet zone; it was therefore obvious that once a Western German State was formed with its own currency (introduced June 18, 1948), the position became extremely difficult. It came to a head when the Allies introduced the new Western currency in Berlin—the confusion and dislocation to the Soviet economy can be imagined.

The Soviet Government declared that it was compelled to change the

currency in the Eastern zone (June 24, 1948) since otherwise that zone would have been flooded with the old currency which circulated previously over the whole of Germany.

The Soviet Government also contended that it could not allow a currency other than its own to circulate in Berlin, which was in the centre of its zone. Whereupon the Allies suggested that the Soviet currency alone should circulate in Berlin but under Four-Power control. This the Russians found unacceptable, they could not admit the control of their currency in an area of their zone by other Powers—it would bring confusion into the economy of their zone. If the case were reversed would the Allies have agreed to the joint control (with the U.S.S.R.) of their currency in Frankfurt?

It is interesting to note that Mr. Walter Lippmann commenting on the subject said:

“Immediately the consequence of establishing a Frankfurt government will be to make our position in Berlin exceedingly difficult. For if, by our own action, we have made Frankfurt, rather than Berlin, the capital of the Germany in which we are interested, it will be difficult to convince the American people, and impossible to convince the French people, that the right to stay in Berlin is a shooting matter. It is doubtful whether the Administration is prepared to meet this summer a major crisis over Berlin.

“*We are in Berlin because Berlin is the capital of Germany.* If Berlin ceases to be the capital of Germany, and if ‘Germany’ is Western Germany (minus the French zone), then we have no more reason to be there than we have to be in Dresden or Leipzig.” (*New York Herald Tribune*, May 30, 1948.)

There was never any question of “starving Berlin” because the Soviet authorities in a decree issued July 20, 1948, expressed their readiness to feed the whole population of Berlin. The Western Powers responded by supplying goods to Berlin by a fleet of aeroplanes. This became known as the “Berlin Airlift”.

It was clear that Berlin was essentially only part of the general problem of the settlement of the German question as a whole and the Russians proposed that negotiations between the Four Powers should not be confined to the administration of Berlin, but should be concerned with “the general question of quadripartite control in relation to Germany”.

However, discussions were eventually opened in Moscow between

the envoys of Britain, U.S.A. and France on the one hand and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Molotov, on the other, on what the Western press called the "Berlin Airlift".

The negotiations continued intermittently for seven weeks. On August 22 and 23, 1948, the three envoys had a long talk with Mr. Stalin. The last meeting between Mr. Molotov and the three envoys was held, September 18, 1948, and then the unpalatable fact had to be faced that the talks had ended in failure.

The three envoys reported on their talks in Moscow to a conference of the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and the U.S.A. sitting in Paris on September 22, 1948.

At the close of the discussions the Foreign Ministers of the three Western Powers decided to deliver immediately Notes in similar terms to the Soviet Ambassadors in London, Paris and Washington. It was generally understood that the Notes informed the U.S.S.R. that if she did not accept the Western view-point the dispute would be referred to U.N.

On the afternoon of the same day, September 22, 1948, Foreign Minister Bevin spoke in the House of Commons. He said that he was not yet in a position to give a report on the Moscow talks; that the Western Powers were determined to continue their policy in Berlin; that they were not committed to war "and all the other things that might ensue"; that East and West must learn to live together.

It was, as usual, a tendentious speech in which all the blame was thrown on the Soviets for the Berlin dispute.

The Parliamentary correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* commenting on Bevin's remarks wrote: "There was no comfort in them, not the slightest. They imposed a continuous silence on the Labour benches. The Opposition only broke silence when Mr. Bevin was promising to stand firm and then they cheered heartily." (*Manchester Guardian*, September 23, 1948.)

However, a notable contribution to the debate came from a Labour back-bencher, Mr. Lester Hutchinson. *Inter alia* he said: "We on this side are in the embarrassing position of being blamed for the results of a foreign policy which the Opposition have forced upon our guileless Foreign Secretary. . . ."

Turning to the significance of American troops in Great Britain at that time, he declared:

"We have signed the Treaty of Brussels and have formed a firm

alliance with the Benelux countries and France. The object of this alliance is to build up sufficient strength in Western Europe to withstand the initial shock of the Red Army in case of war until America is ready. That is quite clear from all political comments upon the Treaty of Brussels. I must say that it does not give me much comfort to know that in a war against the Red Army we can rely on the full support of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

"We have allowed America to establish permanent air bases in this country exactly as if we were Nicaragua or Costa Rica, and it affronts the national susceptibilities of our people to see foreign soldiers in our provincial towns walking around, if not with the air of conquerors, then with the air of protectors; which is equally offensive—there is a good deal of feeling in my constituency on that matter. But more important than that, the very fact of allowing America to maintain air garrisons in this country commits us almost irrevocably to becoming a satellite ally of America in case of war with Russia."

In conclusion Mr. Hutchinson declared: "In this very dangerous world in which we live, we have to adapt our policies to the existing conditions and not to conditions which no longer exist. The weakness in my right hon. Friend's policy is that it is based too much on traditionalism. We are defending imperial interests which no longer exist. It is also wrong politically in so far as he is conducting foreign policy on ideological grounds rather than on the fundamental economic and political interests of the people of the country.

"We must shake these nineteenth-century shackles off, approach these problems afresh, break down the barriers of mistrust and suspicion. If we do not have a radical reorientation of policy there will be war, and if war comes we can say in famous words: 'The bright day is done, and we are for the dark.'" (*Hansard*, September 22, 1948, cols. 956-9.)

Mr. Hutchinson did not speak for himself alone; he reflected the views of the "Left" Labour M.P.s, who included the best-informed men and women in the House of Commons on foreign affairs.

On the other hand the Tory press at this date was advocating a firmer policy.

The Soviet reply was delivered to the three Western Powers on September 25, 1948. It was considered in Paris on September 26, 1948, by M. Schuman (France), Mr. Bevin (Britain) and Mr. Marshall (U.S.A.) The three Foreign Ministers found the Soviet reply unsatisfactory and in a Note to the Soviet Government dated September

26, 1948, they said that they had decided to refer the matter to the Security Council of U.N.

Both sides at this time were feeling very anxious over the Berlin dispute. The *Times* correspondent in a cable date-lined Paris, September 27, 1948, stated: "On all sides to-day there is the deepest anxiety. Although no one thinks that open war is probable, the danger of it is sensed for the first time." (*Times*, September 28, 1948.)

And the *News Chronicle*, September 27, 1948, in an editorial declared: "It is the uncertainty about the future which is causing to-day's intolerable tension."

The British Government on its own behalf and "in agreement with the Governments of the United States and the French Republic" sent a Note to the United Nations Secretary General, September 29, 1948, requesting "that the Security Council consider this question [Berlin] at the earliest opportunity".

The reference of the question to the Security Council as was foreseen by the *Times* Paris correspondent did not help. The Council on October 5, 1948, by nine votes to two decided to place the Berlin question on their Agenda. Mr. Vyshinsky said he would take no further part in the proceedings.

The question again came before the Security Council, October 25, 1948, but no agreement was reached. Two days later, October 27, 1948, Mr. Bevin (Britain), Mr. Marshall (U.S.A.) and M. Schuman (France), meeting in Paris decided not to take the Berlin question to the General Assembly but to leave it for the time being on the Agenda of the Security Council.

In the meantime discussions took place on disarmament. On behalf of the U.S.S.R., Mr. Vyshinsky made three concrete proposals at U.N. on September 25, 1948:

"The General Assembly recommends the permanent members of the Security Council—the United States, Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France and China—as the first step in the reduction of armaments and armed forces, to reduce by one-third within one year all existing land, naval and air forces.

"The General Assembly recommends the prohibition of the atomic weapon as a weapon intended for aggressive aims and not for defence.

"The General Assembly recommends the establishment of an

international control body within the frame-work of the Security Council to watch and control the carrying out of measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces and for the prohibition of the atomic weapon."

These proposals were reported to have been loudly cheered at the Assembly. And the Paris correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, September 27, 1948, reported:

"It is typical of the French attitude to the growing international tension that the *Figaro* not less than the *Populaire* declares that Mr Vyshinsky's proposals for disarmament should not be met with systematic scepticism but should be examined with close attention."

But in this sphere also no progress was achieved.

Simultaneously with these conversations, talks were taking place between representatives of Britain, France, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg, for the setting up of a North Atlantic Defence Pact.

After a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of these five Powers in Paris on October 25 and 26, 1948, an official communique was issued which announced *inter alia*: "complete agreement on the principle of a defensive pact for the North Atlantic, and on the next steps to be taken in this direction." (*Daily Herald*, October 27, 1948.)

A cable date-lined Paris, October 26, stated: "Naturally there is complete reticence about the 'next steps'. But one may expect that negotiations with the American and Canadian Governments will begin as soon as the new United States Administration (if there is a change) is in office."

The cable continued: "One may also assume that such phrases would not have been used in an official communique without firm assurance that the principle of 'a defensive pact for the North Atlantic' already has the approval of both Democratic and Republican leaders in the United States." (*Ibid.*)

Four days later, October 31, the Diplomatic Correspondent of the *Sunday Times* wrote:

"A Seven-Power Conference to discuss final details of a North Atlantic defensive alliance is likely to be held—probably in Canada—soon after the American Presidential election. The Powers taking

part will be the United States, Canada and the five States party to the Brussels Pact.

"The Alliance which should be ready for signature not later than January, will be based, I understand, on the principle that an attack on one member is an attack on all, and will provide for the inclusion of other nations."

The Diplomatic Correspondent added: "Its conclusion was foreshadowed last week in the communiqué issued after the meeting of the Western Union Consultative Council in Paris, and the Conference will be the next step."

There was no suggestion that the U.S.S.R. and her Allies should be invited to join the North Atlantic Pact for the very good reason—although this was not stated publicly—that the proposed Pact was directed against them. We shall return to this subject later, and now we must turn to a special effort by Mr. Winston Churchill to unleash a third world war.

In an anti-Soviet tirade at the Conservative Party Conference at Llandudno on October 9, 1948, Mr. Churchill said:

"We ought to bring matters to a head and make a final settlement. We ought not to go jogging along improvident, incompetent, waiting for something to turn up—by which I mean waiting for something bad for us to turn up. The western nations will be far more likely to reach a lasting settlement, without bloodshed, if they formulate their just demands while they have the atomic power and before the Russian Communists have got it too.

"I am therefore of the opinion that our Party is bound to support any firm measures which the Government are found capable of taking, and that our country with the rest of the British Commonwealth and Empire should be ready to work with the United States and, after consultation, act with them and with the free Governments of Europe." (*Times*, October 11, 1948.)

Reynolds News was quick to reply:

"Mr. Churchill's mind dwells constantly on war and the symbolism of war.

"He is not thinking in terms of an eventual peaceful settlement of the disputes that divide the world. He is thinking in terms of an ultimatum and a showdown.

"Churchill's irresponsible romanticism is never better revealed than by the fact that in the same breath he called on Britain to risk the most terrible European war of all time and castigated the Government because it refused to throw away thousands of British lives in an attempt to hold India by force." (*Reynolds News*, October 10, 1948.)

The Secretary for War, Mr. E. Shinwell, M.P., did not mince his words in commenting: "Mr. Churchill is a great war leader. Of course he is. That's why he wants another war." (*Daily Herald*, October 11, 1948.)

"Its logical conclusion," stated the *Manchester Guardian* editorially, October 11, 1948, "is a readiness to make preventive war and that is what the democracies will under hardly any circumstances bring themselves to do."

Mr. Aneurin Bevan, M.P. (Minister of Health), was even more downright. He stated:

"Mr. Churchill is one of the most reckless speakers in British political history.

"He does not seem to appreciate that when he is addressing advice to the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union listens to that advice from him not only against the background of 1940-41 but against the background of 1920, because Mr. Churchill was the man who attempted to murder the Russian revolution within a few years of its birth.

"They recognise him as being the leader of reactionary forces in Britain and leader of the Party which sold European Peace in 1938 and connived at Hitler's rise to power." (*Daily Herald*, October 11, 1948.)

It stands to reason that no threats or atom bomb ultimatums were likely to have any effect on the U.S.S.R. As an editorial in the *Times*, October 11, 1948, rightly said: "No great and proud nation will negotiate under duress. . . . It is unreasonable to suppose that Russia will willingly negotiate on the division of the world under threat of atomic bombardment."

Actually it is well to recall that as far back as November 6, 1947, Mr. Molotov in the course of his speech declared that the secret of the atomic bomb had long ceased to be a secret and on October 1, 1948, at U.N., Mr. Vyshinsky stated:

"It is wrong to believe—and this is a grave error on the part of those who so believe—that there is only one State which possesses a monopoly of atomic energy and the atomic bomb. This may result in very grave and dangerous miscalculation. China has declared to-day that she is unable to manufacture atomic bombs. But there are States which will not say the same thing, for this would not correspond with fact."

Before Churchill made the speech under notice a well-informed voice from Moscow warned that the policy of "toughness" would not frighten the U.S.S.R. but that Great Britain and the Soviet Union could do much to aid one another. Professor Eugene Tarle (Member of the Academy of Sciences, Moscow) wrote:

"I know that the British people are as much opposed to war as are the Russian people. Britain and Russia, co-operating in the economic sphere, could greatly contribute to the prosperity of each other. British publicists who listen to the mischievous advice of Messrs. Earle, Forrestal et tutti quanti, who are trying to assure them that the Russian people can be frightened by 'tough' language and 'tough' articles, are doing the cause of peace and their own country poor service.

"In the eleven centuries of Russia's existence as a state this method has invariably produced an effect diametrically opposed to that which her enemies expected. (*Observer*, October 10, 1948.)

Tarle continued: "In international affairs important differences between nations or groups of nations cannot be settled by automatic majority votes. Reasonable concessions must be made to the interests and view-points of minorities. Only by such a policy can peace be preserved."

That was not the end of Churchill's advocacy of an ultimatum to the U.S.S.R. as we shall see in later pages.

On November 6, 1948, at the Anniversary Celebration meeting of the October (1917) Revolution, Mr. Molotov in a lengthy speech, dealt as usual with the progress made in the country. *Inter alia* he said:

"The industries of Russia can now produce any machine and the scale of machine-building has far surpassed the pre-war scale.

"This year the farms will receive from the State three times as

many tractors, twice as many lorries and twice as many agricultural machines as in the pre-war year 1940.

"In the first nine months of 1948, the gross output of industry showed an increase of 27 per cent. as against the corresponding period of last year.

"This fact alone indicates how rapidly the post-war rehabilitation and economic progress of our country is proceeding.

"This is also borne out by the fact that in the current year industrial output is proceeding at a level 17 per cent. higher than that of 1940.

"The purchasing power of the rouble has doubled.

"This was the result of the reduction of State retail prices for foodstuffs and manufactured goods, and the accompanying reduction of prices in co-operative trade and in the collective farm market.

"Thanks to this and also to the growth of money wages, the real wages of workers and office employees have more than doubled compared with last year.

"This fact is a demonstration to the world of the vast forces and internal potentialities inherent in the Soviet State."

Mr. Molotov continued: "Everything must now be done to expand the production of consumer goods to the utmost, and to improve their quality and assortment and also to improve the service to the consumers."

Further Mr. Molotov said that the ruling circles in Britain and the U.S.A. had repudiated the wartime agreements which they had made with the U.S.S.R. and that their aim was the establishment of an Anglo-American world supremacy bloc. He concluded:

"The strength of the Soviet people grows from year to year.

"The international prestige of the U.S.S.R. and its influence in world affairs become ever stronger.

"The Socialist social system stands firmly on its feet and is the inexhaustible source of the growing strength of our State, of the labour enthusiasm and spiritual progress of the Soviet people."

An Associated Press cable date-lined Moscow, December 31, 1948, stated:

"Soviet Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy Tevosyan, reported to-day in a letter to Generalissimo Josef V. Stalin that Russia had 'significantly exceeded' its pre-war production of steel and had left Great

Britain far behind as a steel producer. He said the Soviet Union is now the second largest steel producer in the world.

"In the fourth quarter of 1948, the pre-war level of pig-iron output was exceeded, too.

"In the last full pre-war year of 1940, the Soviet Union produced 18,000,000 metric tons of steel 15,000,000 metric tons of pig-iron." (*New York Herald Tribune*, January 1, 1949.)

The cable continued: "Mr. Tevosyan's letter reported the following increases in production over 1947: Steel 27 per cent.; pig-iron 22 per cent.; rolled metal 28 per cent.; pipe 39 per cent.; coke 19 per cent.; and iron ore mining 20 per cent.

"Meanwhile, other ministers have sent telegrams to Generalissimo Stalin announcing other important industrial gains in 1948.

"Oil output has risen 19.3 per cent. in the eastern Soviet regions and drilling has risen 30 per cent. The chemical industry increased production 32 per cent. The meat and dairy industry reported it had attained the level of output for animal fat which the five-year plan set for 1950."

So much for internal conditions in the U.S.S.R. at the end of 1948.

Across the Atlantic in the U.S.A., Mr. Harry Truman had been elected President on November 2, 1948. Mr. Walter Lippman, the influential columnist, said that Truman's election showed that the people wanted peace and the solution of international differences by "pacific means".

However, that did not apply to all members of the legislature and other highly placed Americans. For instance, Congressman Bishop speaking at Wiesbaden (Germany) on November 21, 1948, *inter alia* said: "If we sent two dozen super fortresses with atomic bombs and told the Russians to see reason at last we could be sure they would understand that language." (*Manchester Guardian*, November 22, 1948.)

Bishop did not by any means stand alone. Other members of the legislature stated that sooner or later there would have to be a "show down with the Russians", and in fact the year 1952 was in some influential quarters fixed as the year of the "show down".

Joseph and Stewart Alsop, in a cable from Washington, stated in the *New York Herald Tribune*, December 8, 1948:

"Last spring the Congress wisely reversed the Administration, and authorised completion of the famous seventy-group air program by 1952.

"There was nothing mystical about either the size of the seventy-group program or the choice of 1952 as the date for its completion. On the contrary, the prospective seventy-group air force will give the bare minimum of strength for an air offensive against the Soviet Union."

The Alsops continued: "And it was considered that this offensive air strength should be created by 1952 because this is the first year in which the American experts believe the Soviets may perfect a people's democratic atomic bomb."

However, there were many responsible people in the U.S.A. who would have liked friendly relations with the U.S.S.R., and Mr. W. R. Werner, in a summing up of the events of 1948, discerned "the first faint glimmers of desire to make a firm deal with the Soviet Union, if such be possible on any acceptable terms". (*New York Herald Tribune*, December 22, 1948.)

In the meantime the third session of the United Nations Assembly (fifty-eighty States represented) which opened in Paris on September 21, 1948, and adjourned on December 13, 1948, had little to show for twelve weeks of strenuous work.

Among the important subjects discussed was the control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic warfare.

The U.S.A. insisted that a Convention on inspection and control must be concluded and made effective before any convention was drawn up on the prohibition of the manufacture and use of the atomic bomb. The U.S.S.R. argued that this was putting the cart before the horse. The essential point was the prohibition of atomic warfare and the manufacture of atomic bombs, and that the observance of this could not be controlled and inspected so long as there was no agreement on the prohibition of atomic warfare.

As regards inspection and control, the American plan envisaged an international body—control organ—which would have the right to direct what atomic plants should be permitted to function and where; which plants should be shut down and to what extent; it would control and operate plants producing fissionable materials in dangerous quantities and would own and control the production of these plants, finally it alone would have the right to carry out atomic research.

Another important point in this plan was that control was to proceed by stages. The first stage would be control over raw material production; control over all other stages of atomic energy production

would follow successively one by one after this first stage was complete.

In his speech on October 1, 1948, Mr. Vyshinsky pointed out in this connection:

"It was Baruch's plan that advanced the idea of converting the international control body into the owner of the output of plants working on fissionable materials in dangerous quantities. As to the basic and most important problem, Baruch's report admits that the manufacture of atomic bombs can be discontinued, that bombs now in existence can be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the future treaty, and that lastly all information concerning the production of atomic energy can be placed at the disposal of the international atomic development body only after—I am quoting this from the speech delivered by Mr. Baruch in Hunter College on June 14, 1946—only after an appropriate system of control of the atomic bomb as a weapon of war is agreed upon and enforced, and also when appropriate penalties are established for such violations of the regulations of control as must be branded as an international crime."

The Soviet Government objected to this form of control, which it claimed would make possible an infringement of the national sovereignty of countries without even ensuring the speedy effective prohibition of atomic warfare.

It will be noted that while the suggested all-powerful control organ was making its detailed investigation—and this might take quite a long time—the U.S.A. would have retained without any international control her atomic bombs and the plant necessary for their manufacture and for atomic research.

When at length the control organ had got to know everything there was to be known about the position of atomic research, etc., in the U.S.S.R. and other countries, it was not at all impossible, in view of the composition of the control organ, that it might decide that the most suitable place for atomic research and for the production of fissionable material was the U.S.A. with her probably very efficient plants. Could the U.S.S.R. accept this? If she did she would become a helpless prey—so far as atomic energy was concerned—at the mercy of the U.S.A.

And if she did not accept, then she would be subjected to sanctions, whilst the U.S.A. would still have the atom bombs and (or) the means of manufacturing them.

On this subject Mr. Vyshinsky declared:

"Is it not a gross departure from the General Assembly's decisions on atomic energy, when people who have been charged with this task do not venture to pass such a humane, natural and reasonable decision as that no single State will manufacture any more atomic weapons while preparations of appropriate measures for prohibiting the atomic weapon and eliminating it from national armaments are proceeding?"

"The Soviet representative," declared Mr. Vyshinsky in the same speech, "in the Atomic Commission repeatedly tried to persuade the Commission to consider the question of a time limit for establishing control at all enterprises producing atomic materials, beginning with the atomic weapon. Yet these attempts failed. This proposal in itself exposes the true aims and intentions of its authors.

"This stand of the American representatives on the given issue is nothing but an attempt to cover up their unwillingness to have any effective control whatsoever by talk about the establishment of so-called atomic energy control, without however basing this control on the prohibition of the manufacture of the atomic weapon; it is an attempt to postpone the prohibition of this weapon to the Greek Kalends which, as is well known, never existed in the Greek Calendar."

The American plan provided for the control organ acting independently of the Security Council, that is to say, in matters of the control of everything concerned with the production of atomic energy, the principle of the unanimity of the Five Powers was not to operate. So that, probably for years, if the U.S.S.R. refused to accept the findings of a body on which she and her friends would have been in a permanent minority she would be subjected to sanctions, whilst the U.S.A. would still have the atom bombs and (or) the means of manufacturing them.

The U.S.S.R. was accused of objecting to international control and inspection. This was not true. Stalin, Gromyko and Vyshinsky had all made it clear that the Soviet Government was in favour of strict international control and inspection by a special Commission set up for the purpose working within the framework of the Security Council.

As the U.S.A., Britain and their supporters insisted that a Convention on the international control of atomic weapons should precede a Convention on their prohibition. Mr. Vyshinsky on October 2, 1948, made a compromise proposal that the two Conventions should be concluded and put into operation simultaneously. He proposed:

"Having examined the first, second and third reports of the Atomic Commission, and recording the fact that the work of the Security Council and the Atomic Commission on the realisation of the decisions of the General Assembly of January 24, 1946, for the institution of a commission on questions arising from the discovery of atomic energy, and of December 14, 1946, on the principles for determining the universal regulating and curtailing of armaments, has to date brought forth no positive results, taking account of the exclusive importance of the implementation of the above-mentioned resolutions of the General Assembly of January 24, 1946, and of December 14, 1946, the General Assembly recommends the Security Council and the Atomic Commission:

- "(1) To continue its work in the direction defined by the above-mentioned resolutions of the General Assembly;
- "(2) To prepare a draft convention on the prohibition of the atomic weapon and a convention on the establishment of effective international control over atomic energy, bearing in mind that both the convention on the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the convention on the establishment of international control over atomic energy should be signed and put into operation simultaneously."

But Vyshinsky's compromise was of no avail and no decision was reached on the subject. The only two achievements of the Assembly were the adoption of a Declaration on Human Rights and the drafting of a Convention on "Genocide". The unresolved Berlin crises hung over the Assembly's proceedings, but at the close a final agreement had not yet been reached.

At the close of the session many delegates talked of great achievements, but Mr. Vyshinsky frankly told the delegates that there was no room for illusions when summing up the Assembly's work. He continued (to quote the *Times* correspondent): "The majority of member States had obediently followed in the wake of the United States and Great Britain in rejecting Soviet proposals capable of promoting international co-operation in security, such as the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments by a third, proposals that expressed the yearnings for peace of millions of people all over the world who detested and cursed war. These proposals had not been in accord with the plans for 'world mastery' of those who, under Anglo-American leadership, were inciting war against Soviet

Russia and the new democracies." (*Times*, December 13, 1948.)

The *Times* editorial agreed with the Soviet representative that the session of the Assembly had been a failure. It commented:

"To some extent the Assembly cannot be blamed for its failure. Like the United Nations as a whole and like every other attempt at international co-operation it is suffering from the disastrous division between Russia and the western world. Indeed it suffers more, for the very incapacity of the Security Council has placed the Assembly in a false position."

The editorial continued: "The statesmen who drafted the Charter at San Francisco never meant the Assembly to solve those great and dangerous questions which threaten the peace of the world. These, it was hoped, would be settled by the great Powers, sitting together in the Council, while the Assembly would await the result of those deliberations in which it was forbidden by the Charter to join. The Assembly was also intended to give the smaller Powers an opportunity once a year to offer their views, to approve or criticise; it was not imagined that they would be asked to sit in judgment on the great Powers themselves." (*Times*, December 13, 1948.)

The aim of bringing to the Assembly questions which should have been settled between the Big Four was to muster opposition against the U.S.S.R. and her Allies. They hoped in this way to compel the U.S.S.R. to accept their conditions for settlement of outstanding questions.

It will be remembered that at the end of the war in Europe the question of the future of the great industrial centre of Germany, the Ruhr, loomed large in the eyes of European statesmen, including those of the U.S.S.R. and Central and Eastern Europe.

However, the Governments of the U.S.A. and Western Europe were determined to settle this important question themselves. Representatives of the six Powers (U.S.A., Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg), met in conference in London on November 11, 1948, to hammer out a settlement.

It was at times difficult, but on December 28 a communiqué was issued declaring that an agreement had been reached to set up an international authority of the Ruhr, subject to the approval of the Governments of the six Powers.

The aims of the Authority were thus summed up: The Authority

would be empowered to determine the division of Ruhr coal, coke and steel as between German consumption and export without prejudice to any existing agreements between the occupying Powers and consistent with the objectives of the Convention for European Economic Co-operation. It would have the right to examine any measures taken by the German authorities including transport and prices affecting these commodities and, if necessary, to modify or abolish them. In making these decisions it would have due regard to the requirements of international security and to the legitimate commercial interests of Germany. During the control period the occupation authorities concerned would continue to enforce disarmament by controlling the supply of Ruhr coal, coke and steel to any prohibited industries. Thereafter these powers would be transferred to such international body as might be set up by the peace settlement. At such a time the decartellisation and economic denazification powers of the occupation authorities would be transferred to the Military Security Board or its successor, together with certain limited powers in the direction and management of Ruhr coal, coke and steel. The Authority would have the right to obtain information on the production, distribution and consumption of these products and on the supplies available to Germany from other sources.

The agreement would be valid from the date of signature until "the coming into effect of a peace settlement for Germany and thereafter as provided in such peace settlement".

The Government of the U.S.S.R. strongly protested against the six-Power Agreement.

A communiqué issued in Moscow stated that under the Ruhr Agreement:

"the fundamental principles of the Potsdam Agreement and plans envisaged by the allies for the Ruhr are being trampled under foot, in the first place by the fact that production of coal, coke and steel has been released from control by the above body. This ensures the dominant position of American and British monopolies in the Ruhr.

"A deal between the German magnates and the Anglo-American monopolies, i.e. the restoration of the military-industrial potential of Germany and the setting up of a base for new German aggression has thus been made possible.

"Instead of placing Ruhr industry under the control of the German people and establishing four-Power control over the production and distribution of Ruhr coal, coke and steel, the United

States and Britain are taking Ruhr industry into their own hands, with the object of creating a base for renewed German aggression, which is incompatible with the interests of peace and security and, in the first place, with the interests of France. Thus the London deal sets free the forces of new German aggression."

The communiqué continued: "The London Conference proposed as one of the most important measures the creation of the so-called military security board. Its co-operation with the international body for the Ruhr is assumed. It is not surprising, therefore, that the London decisions do not even mention the four-Power control body over Germany, provided for by the Potsdam conference and the only body legally entitled to settle German problems. It should also be mentioned that the stress laid by the communiqué on the role of the military security board, and the resurrection of the twenty-five year guarantee pact, proposed some time ago by State Secretary Byrnes, is an attempt to pacify the anxiety of French public opinion."

By the end of 1948 the three Western Powers had virtually torn up the Potsdam Agreements and Britain and France had violated the spirit and letter of their Treaties of Defence and Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R.

An impartial study of the facts leads clearly to the conclusion that the U.S.A., France and Great Britain were preparing a Western Alliance directed against the U.S.S.R. and her Allies.

Anglo-Soviet trade talks were also not particularly successful in 1948. There were the usual allegations that Britain was the loser in trade between the two countries.

Actually the Agreement signed in Moscow, December 29, 1947, was unique in the annals of British-Russian trade in that Russia was giving Great Britain credit.

Mr. Harold Wilson, M.P., President of the Board of Trade, in reply to Mr. Brendan Bracken, M.P., House of Commons, March 2, 1948, stated: "The right hon. Gentleman further suggested that we were lending money to the U.S.S.R., to be repaid over a period of fifteen years. As I have already made clear, that is not so. We are not lending the U.S.S.R. any money at all. In fact, in so far as shipments are made to us first, they are lending us money—the value of the grain until it is paid for by our goods." (*Hansard*, March 2, 1948, col. 331.)

This instrument was regarded only as a short-term agreement and it was decided that the two sides would meet again not later than

May 31, 1948, to negotiate a much more comprehensive agreement.

However, it was only on June 15, 1948, that the President of the Board of Trade, Mr. Harold Wilson, announced at a luncheon in London that trade talks were to be resumed "very soon" with the representatives of the Soviet Union with a view to a further development of Anglo-Soviet trade.

The position up to the middle of June was admirably summed up by the Parliamentary Correspondent of the *Times*:

"The announcement by the President of the Board of Trade in London yesterday that the Russians had welcomed his invitation to resume trade negotiations and that they would begin in the very near future fulfils after some delay the terms of the Anglo-Soviet trade and payments agreement of December 27 last.

"Article IV of that agreement states that the two Governments would appoint representatives who would meet not later than May, 1948, to review the payments position between the two Governments at that time, to draw up a balanced programme of shipments, and to arrange further meetings with a view to developing and widening the basis of mutual trade. It was not until June 1 that Mr. Wilson stated in the House of Commons that he had written to the Soviet Ambassador about the resumption of trade talks, with himself as the leader of the United Kingdom delegation, and his remarks yesterday were the first indication that the invitation had been accepted."

Deliveries of Soviet grain went on at British ports. The *Times* correspondent continued:

"Under the agreement the Soviet Government also reserved the right to withhold 200,000 tons of the 750,000 tons of grain to be shipped to this country if it had been found impossible to place half their contracts for British goods by May 1. At the end of May British manufacturers had submitted tenders to the Soviet Trade Delegation for items of capital equipment amounting to about 90 per cent. of the value of the equipment scheduled in the agreement. Contracts had been signed for just under £1,000,000 worth of this equipment.

"At that time shipments of grain from Russia totalled 337,500 tons, and it was expected that a further 137,000 tons would be shipped before the end of June. Under the agreement the whole amount is to be delivered during the eight months from February to September this year. Imports of cereals from February 1 to April 30 amounted to just over £5,000,000 c.i.f." (*Times*, June 16, 1948.)

Some Soviet orders were placed in Britain later, but not nearly enough. The way the Soviets saw the matter was summed up in an article in *Soviet News*, June 23, 1948, in the course of which it was stated:

"By June 12, 1948, the U.S.S.R. had sent to Great Britain about 400,000 tons of grain or 53·5 per cent. of the total provided for by the Agreement.

"Thus the U.S.S.R. in four and a half months had delivered more than half the grain provided for in the Agreement, and, consequently, accurately fulfilled its obligation.

"Great Britain's obligation under the Agreement was first of all, to supply to the Soviet Union 35,000 tons of light rails with fish-plates, bolts and nuts for narrow-gauge railways, including 25,000 tons from the Government military surpluses and 10,000 tons from current production.

"Up to the present time Great Britain has delivered to the U.S.S.R. 12,200 tons from surpluses, and contracts have been concluded for the supply of 13,000 tons out of current production by the end of 1948.

"According to approximate figures, by June 1, 1948, the Soviet side had been able to place orders for only 10·5 per cent. of the total value of the equipment. This unsatisfactory situation is explained by the one-sided nature of the tenders submitted by British firms which seek to retain rights for the supplier while placing all the obligations on the purchaser.

"As a rule the proposed prices are unjustifiably high, considerably exceeding world price levels. Sometimes this excess amounts to 40 or 50 per cent. However, in the Agreement it is clearly stated that 'prices to be charged by the seller to the purchaser for the goods to be delivered in accordance with Article I, of this Agreement shall be based on world prices'."

On a number of other important points the Soviet side was equally dissatisfied:

"It can be stated without exaggeration that the terms offered to the Trade Delegation of the U.S.S.R. by British firms are worse not only than the terms of its trade in Great Britain in pre-war years, but also in the post-war period, and that they are considerably worse than the terms of its trade with a number of other countries at the present time.

"Many British firms explain their unaccommodating attitude in regard to Soviet orders by references to materials in short supply, above all steel, and the vagueness of the British Government's guarantees regarding such supplies.

"It is not known how far these guarantees are definite, but judging from the above-mentioned unsatisfactory results that have attended the placing of Soviet orders, they are altogether ineffective."

The Article concluded: "It must be assumed that in future the Government of Great Britain, in fulfilling its obligations under the Agreement, will more actively assist British firms in accepting and fulfilling Soviet orders, and that trade between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain will be based on the principle of equal rights in conformity with customary trading practice, without special preferences for the interests of British suppliers to the detriment of the Soviet purchasers."

The talks were actually resumed in June, but little progress was made by the end of 1948. And although the U.S.S.R. delivered all the grain it had undertaken to deliver by the end of the year, the difficulties in the way of placing firm Soviet orders with British firms were such that the contracts concluded by December, 1948, only amounted to about £3,000,000 or just a little over 15 per cent. of the total envisaged in the Agreement.

1949—A LANDMARK IN POST-WAR ANGLO-SOVIET
RELATIONS

WHEN the year 1949 dawned, several important unresolved problems were creating embittered relations between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain and, for that matter, between on the one side the U.S.S.R., and on the other Great Britain, the U.S.A. and France.

The blockade and counter-blockade of Berlin continued. The three Western Powers were preparing to set up a West German Government and their efforts and measures to establish the "North Atlantic Pact" were being vigorously pressed.

The deadlock on the disarmament proposals and counter proposals continued.

At the Session of the Security Council, February 8, 1949, the Soviet Delegation submitted a draft resolution which, after noting the growing menace of aggressive circles, the rapid increases in all types of armaments, the swelling of military budgets and the intensification of war propaganda in spite of the condemnation of the General Assembly of U.N. of all such propaganda, and after noting further that neither the Atomic Energy Commission (set up by the decision of the General Assembly on January 24, 1946), nor the Commission on conventional armaments had accomplished the tasks set before them, *inter alia* declared:

"Establishes, thirdly, that the General Assembly decision of November 19, 1948, on the 'prohibition of the atomic weapon and the reduction of armaments and armed forces of permanent members of the Security Council by one third', contains the recommendation to the Security Council to continue examination of the problem of the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments but bypasses the decision adopted by the General Assembly in 1946 on the necessity of prohibiting the atomic weapon, and likewise bypasses the decision adopted at the same time by the General Assembly to undertake measures to effect the speediest reduction of armaments and armed forces;

"Establishes, moreover, that the General Assembly decision of November 19, 1948, draws attention to the necessity of elaborating proposals regarding the reception, checking and publication of information as to the strength of armed forces and the scope of armaments of member States of the United Nations Organisation, but says nothing about such an important question as the submitting of information on the atomic weapon to the Security Council, which is utterly intolerable, especially because the atomic weapon is a weapon of aggression and not a weapon of defence. . . ."

Finally the resolution stated:

"The Security Council, acting in accordance with the responsibility it bears for maintaining world peace and security and in compliance with the powers invested in it by Article 26 of the United Nations Charter, and likewise guided by the General Assembly decision of November 19, 1948, as well as the General Assembly decisions of January 24 and December 14, 1946:

"Hereby resolves:

"1. To entrust the Commission on Conventional Armaments to work out as a first step a plan for the reduction of the armaments and armed forces of the five permanent member States of the Security Council by one-third by March 1, 1950. The above-mentioned plan must be submitted to the Security Council not later than June 1, 1949.

"2. To entrust the Atomic Energy Commission to submit to the Security Council by June 1, 1949, both the draft convention on the prohibition of the atomic weapon as well as the draft convention on atomic energy control, on the basis that both conventions be concluded and go into effect simultaneously.

"Both conventions must be based on the consideration of the lawful interests of all member States of the United Nations Organisation and of the States maintaining the lofty principles of the Organisation, and not on the basis of the interests of some groupings of States pursuing their own, narrow ends.

"3. The Commission on Conventional Armaments and the Atomic Energy Commission must be guided in their work by the fact that the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of atomic energy control must constitute an integral part of the general plan on the reduction of armaments of the permanent members of the Security Council by one-third, as the first important step in this matter.

"4. To deem necessary the establishment within the framework of the Security Council of an international control body to observe

and control the putting into practice of measures to reduce armaments and armed forces and on the prohibition of the atomic weapon.

"5. To deem necessary that permanent members of the Security Council submit not later than March 31, 1949, full data on the armed forces and on all types of armaments, including the atomic weapon."

These Soviet proposals received but scant attention in the British press of the time and they were, of course, opposed by the Western Powers.

The three Western Powers continued their policy of encircling the U.S.S.R. and they still believed that the U.S.A. held a monopoly of the atomic bomb and that this monopoly would continue for several years.

On the other side of the globe, developments which were to change the balance of power immensely in favour of the U.S.S.R. were reaching their consummation: in China the Communist forces were rapidly and without let up defeating the Komintang forces, for a long time plentifully supplied with funds by the U.S.A., and the victories of the Communist forces were creating a profound impression among all the suffering peoples of Asia, whether they were oppressed by native or foreign governments.

At the same time maps were published occasionally in this country and very frequently in the U.S.A. depicting the encirclement of the U.S.S.R., and American "high-ups"—including men of the standing of General MacArthur—spoke about attacking the U.S.S.R. from bases in the Atlantic, the Pacific, Europe and North Africa. Foreign correspondents in Moscow wrote that the Soviet Government and peoples were well aware of these intentions, but that nerves in the U.S.S.R. were as firm as in the heroic days of the defence of Stalingrad.

All the unresolved problems acted and reacted upon one another.

In view of the "Top Level" talks which took place in Geneva in July, 1955, amidst general acclaim, and the great importance which President Eisenhower attached to them, it is only just to record here that some six years earlier, on January 27, 1949, Prime Minister Stalin expressed his willingness to meet President Truman.

He replied to four questions put to him by Mr. Kingsbury Smith, European general manager of the International News Service, thus:

"Question. (1) Will the Soviet Government be ready to discuss the question of publishing, together with the United States Government, a declaration that neither Government has any intention of going to war against the other?

"Answer. The Soviet Government would be ready to consider the question of publishing such a declaration.

"Question. (2) Is the Soviet Government prepared to co-operate with the United States Government in taking measures aimed at bringing about such a world peace pact as would lead to gradual disarmament?

"Answer. Naturally the Soviet Government would be ready to co-operate with the United States Government in adopting measures which would lead towards the realisation of a peace pact and to gradual disarmament.

"Question. (3) If the Governments of the United States, Britain and France agree to postpone the creation of a separate West German Government, pending a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to consider the German problem as a whole, will the Government of the U.S.S.R. be prepared to lift the restrictions on communications between Berlin and the Western zones of Germany?

"Answer. Provided the three Governments concerned observe the conditions mentioned in this question, the Soviet Government sees no objections to lifting transport restrictions provided that restrictions on transport and trade imposed by the three Powers are lifted at the same time.

"Question. (4) Is your Excellency prepared to meet President Truman at a mutually suitable place for the purpose of discussing the possibility of concluding such a world pact?

"Answer. I have already stated that there are no objections to such a meeting.—Reuter." (*Times*, January 31, 1949.)

The U.S.A. gave a double refusal to the Soviet proposals: on February 2, 1949, Secretary of State Acheson at a press conference turned down the Soviet offer, and on the following day President Truman, also at a press conference, endorsed Acheson's declaration.

The *Times* correspondent in a cable, date-lined Washington, February 3, 1949, stated:

"The President said categorically that the United States Government would not enter into bilateral talks with Russia. He also said that the United States Government would not enter into such talks as those proposed by Mr. Stalin even with Russia and the other

Powers concerned if the talks were outside the framework of the United Nations.

"He pointed out, however, that he had invited Mr. Stalin during the Potsdam Conference in 1945 to come to Washington. He was willing to see Mr. Stalin any time he came to Washington. He had not received any notification from Mr. Stalin of his intention to make such a visit, but if he did he would tell Mrs. Truman 'to get the guest room ready for its distinguished visitor'." (*Times*, February 4, 1949.)

The British Government was definitely opposed to direct talks between Truman and Stalin.

The London correspondent of the *New York Herald Tribune*, in a cable, date-lined London, February 2, 1949, stated:

"Premier Josef V. Stalin's invitation to President Truman for a meeting in Russia, Poland or Czechoslovakia was received here with evident anxiety. The British Government does not want an exclusive Soviet-American conference on European or world issues.

"Although British official spokesmen declined to comment on Mr. Stalin's move to-day, they indicated growing alarm at the fact that the Soviet Premier appeared to be holding the initiative in the new Russian peace offensive." (*New York Herald Tribune*, February 3, 1949.)

The cable continued: "They admitted that they thought President Truman had been put in an awkward position and they even acknowledged privately that they feared that Mr. Stalin might agree to go to Washington to see the President. The thought alarmed them."

The British press, with a few exceptions, attacked the Stalin offer and applauded Truman's decision in turning it down.

However, *Reynolds News* in an editorial, February 6, 1949, commented that Stalin's offer "has been buried beneath a mountain of diplomatic protocol. Newspaper commentators have thought up every possible reason for Stalin's words except what might just conceivably have been the right one—that he meant what he said."

Two days after the Stalin interview, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. issued on January 29, 1949 a lengthy explanation of its

objections to "Western Union" and the "North Atlantic Pact". This was a very important document and here we shall quote some of the salient passages.

The statement declared:

"In March, 1948, a Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Collective Defence was concluded in Brussels between Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg, which laid the foundation of the separate group of certain West European States, known as the 'Western Union'.

"Hardly had the Western Union come into being last March, when the ruling circles of the United States promptly declared that this Union would be given every support.

"The Western Union has launched quite a number of measures by now for giving itself structural shape. As far back as last spring, following the formation of the Consultative Council, a standing body of that Union comprising representatives of the five States was set up in London. They have likewise set up a Military Committee, and even a Western Union Defence Staff, comprising the Chiefs of Staff of the five states headed by the British Field Marshal Montgomery.

"Apart from setting up this new group in Europe, the ruling circles of the United States and Great Britain have in the past two months been engaged in setting up a North Atlantic Alliance comprising the same five West European States, Canada and the U.S.A. The aims of the North Atlantic Alliance are much more far reaching than those of the West European grouping, and it is quite easy to see that these aims are very closely interwoven with plans for the violent establishment of Anglo-American world supremacy under the aegis of the United States of America.

"Some speak of inviting such countries as Sweden, Norway and Denmark to participate in this Treaty, and refer to the peculiar activity displayed in this affair by the Government of Norway. Some quarters suggest circumventing difficulties in this respect by means of instituting a special Scandinavian pact, which should not—according to these plans—prevent the Scandinavian countries from being brought into the orbit of the States actually guided by the 'North Atlantic' grouping. They claim that the possibility of Franco Spain, Portugal, Italy and even Turkey participating in the North Atlantic Pact is being discussed, and in doing so they evidently believe that this method will help in solving the tasks of the leading grouping of the so-called 'Northern Atlantic'.

"Alongside of this, the formation of a Mediterranean Union or

East Mediterranean Pact as an auxiliary instrument of the 'North Atlantic' grouping is being discussed.

"The ruling circles of the United States, immediately after the termination of the second world war, began establishing air and naval bases in both the Atlantic and in the Pacific as well as on many remote seas, including areas located thousands and thousands of kilometres from the United States boundaries.

"Entire States, especially from among those situated close to the boundaries of the U.S.S.R., have been adjusted to provide convenient bridgeheads for the Anglo-American air forces and other conveniences for attacking the U.S.S.R.

"It is considered as universally recognised that certain circles in the United States are seeking to prepare both Western Germany and Japan as their weapons for the implementation of aggressive plans."

There is much more in the Soviet Note, but the extracts quoted contain all the essential points. It is quite clear that the Anglo-American policy then being pursued had created profound misgivings in the U.S.S.R.

On February 7, 1949, Mr. Hector McNeil, Minister of State, was asked whether the Government "will propose to the Governments involved in the present negotiations, that an invitation be extended to the U.S.S.R. to join in the proposed North Atlantic Pact?"

Mr. McNeil's reply was "No".

There was nothing new in Mr. McNeil's reply. It was in full agreement with the attitude of the British Government's policy ever since the North Atlantic Pact was first mooted.

The Government of the U.S.A., backed up by the British and French Governments put its faith on the one hand on what it supposed to be its monopoly of the atom bomb, and on the other on the build-up of a solid anti-Soviet bloc of States which would provide it with bases for encircling the U.S.S.R.

In vain did scientists deride the idea of the atom bomb remaining for long the monopoly of one side and of its sufficiency for a knock-out blow.

Professor Blackett, a noted atomic scientist and Nobel Prize winner, speaking at Cambridge, February 8, 1949, stated: "The view that atomic bombs alone can defeat a major Power in a very short time, by the use of few aircraft and a few bombs, is inane and ludicrous."

Blackett further expressed the view "that when Russia got the atomic bomb the balance of power would shift from the American group to the Russian group because of Russia's huge land forces." (*Daily Worker*, February 9, 1949.)

Other scientists expressed very similar views, but the statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic preferred to believe that the monopoly of the atom bomb was a deciding factor, that the monopoly was theirs for years to come and that when the North Atlantic Pact was completed, they would be in a much stronger position to negotiate with the U.S.S.R.

In reply to a question in the House of Commons, February 9, 1949, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Bevin, said that the projected North Atlantic Pact would "create the best conditions for discussing peace in the world".

The compatibility of the proposed North Atlantic Pact with the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942, was raised in the House of Commons, February 21, 1949, when the following dialogue took place:

"Mr. Hughes: Is the Minister aware that Article VII of the treaty says that each high contracting party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition against the other high contracting party? Will he assure the House that no steps will be taken under the Atlantic Pact which are a breach of Article VII of that treaty?

"Mr. McNeil: I can assure the House that it will not be a breach of Article VII nor of any allied Article, because the proposed pact is completely defensive in intention and character."

We shall return to this question later.

Mr. Henry Wallace appeared before the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, to testify against the North Atlantic Pact. He said: "The core of the North Atlantic Pact means that we are going to arm Western Europe and establish military bases around the periphery of the Soviet Union from Norway to Turkey. These moves will seriously undermine and weaken our national security. They will lead to economic bankruptcy for Western Europe and the United States. They invite a war which no nation can win." (*Manchester Guardian*, February 24, 1949.)

On the other hand, Mr. Winston Churchill, speaking at a public meeting in Brussels, February 26, 1949, said: "The Atlantic Pact will

give us all a guarantee that the cause of freedom will not be aggressively assaulted without effective help coming from the great American Republic." (*Sunday Times*, February 27, 1949.)

It is germane to the subject now under discussion to quote the view of General MacArthur, then the Supreme Allied Commander in the Far East. In an interview with G. Ward Price, March 1, 1949, he stated: "Now the Pacific has become an Anglo-Saxon lake and our line of defence runs through the chain of islands fringing the coast of Asia.

"It starts from the Philippines and continues through the Ryukyu Archipelago, which includes its main bastion, Okinawa. Then it bends back through Japan and the Aleutian Island chain to Alaska." (*Daily Mail*, March 2, 1949.)

At this time, as mentioned in the Soviet Note quoted from on a previous page, efforts were being made to persuade Norway to join the projected North Atlantic Pact and, strange as it may now sound, Mr. John Foster Dulles was opposed to this proposal. Mr. Alistair Cooke cabled from New York, March 8, 1949: "To-day he told a conference in Cleveland of the Federal Council of Churches that the Russians do not mean to start a war under conditions now prevailing, but might do so if they feel their homeland is 'imminently and seriously menaced'.

"This would happen, he is convinced, if the United States should send substantial military aid to Scandinavia. He recalled that two years ago he had advised that this country ought not to seek military bases so close to the Soviet Union as to carry an offensive threat that is disproportionate to their defensive value." (*Manchester Guardian*, March 9, 1949.)

A few days later, Mr. Walter Lippman commented: "What he [Dulles] was saying reflects the views of our most responsible military leaders. They are by no means pleased with the handiwork of some of their more impetuous colleagues in the Pentagon and of the foreign service officers who are more strategically-minded than the responsible strategists themselves."

Many others in the U.S.A. were convinced that the proposed North Atlantic Pact was detrimental and not helpful to the maintenance of world peace.

A sectional meeting of the Conference of the Federal Council of Churches of the U.S.A., representing 35 million Protestants at Cleveland, March 10, 1949, passed a resolution stating: "No defensive

alliance should be entered into which might well appear as aggressive to Russia as a Russian alliance with Latin America would undoubtedly appear to us."

Dr. Ernest Tittle, from Illinois, who led an anti-pact group, condemned the Atlantic Pact as "the rock on which the U.N. will be shipwrecked".

The Secretary General of U.N. was reported to be opposed to the Pact. Mr. Alistair Cooke in a cable, date-lined New York, March 20, stated: "Mr. Trygve Lie has refused all comment on the treaty, and most pointedly would say nothing about Mr. Truman's opinion that the United Nations has been strengthened. He is positively known to feel quite the contrary." (*Manchester Guardian*, March 21, 1949.)

Two days later Mr. Cooke listing the groups opposed to the North Atlantic Pact cabled: "There are not least the delegations and staff of the United Nations, some senior members of which feel for the first time that the Russians have little to gain by staying inside the organisation and may at the coming Assembly prepare their exit with long farewell from Mr. Gromyko. At the unhappy centre of this group is Mr. Trygve Lie, who is in these days an extremely unhappy man." (*Manchester Guardian*, March 23, 1949.)

Mr. T. O. Thackerey, editor of the *New York Post*, in a signed article in that journal, March 21, 1949, wrote: "The time for a U.S.-Soviet peace conference is now, in order to prevent the war which is certain to follow the armament race to which both the East and West are inevitably committed." (*United States Information Service*, March 25, 1949.)

A Soviet Note was delivered to the British Foreign Office on April 1, 1949. Similar notes were received at the same time by the Governments of the U.S.A., France, Canada and the three Benelux countries protesting against the North Atlantic Pact. We quote from the Note to the British Government:

"The North Atlantic Treaty contradicts the principles and aims of the United Nations Organisation, and the commitments which the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France have assumed under other Treaties and Agreements.

"The Pact violates the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, the Franco-Soviet Treaty and the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements.

"Such great Powers as the United States, Great Britain and France are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

"Thus the Treaty is not directed either against the United States of America, Great Britain or France."

The Note added: "Of the Great Powers, only the Soviet Union is excluded from among the parties to this Treaty, which can be explained only by the fact that this Treaty is directed against the Soviet Union."

That was the Soviet view of the North Atlantic Pact, April, 1949, and it is also its view to-day.

At this time, that is prior to the signature of the North Atlantic Pact, whenever British and American statesmen referred to the Pact they declared that it was not directed against the U.S.S.R.; but not one of them explained against what country it was directed or why the U.S.S.R. was excluded from it.

Despite Soviet protests the Pact was signed in the State Department in Washington on April 4, 1949, by the United States, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom. It was ratified by the different signatories in the following months and became effective on August 24, 1949.¹

In the Text of the instrument it is referred to as "The North Atlantic Treaty", but it is now called the "North Atlantic Treaty Organisation" (N.A.T.O.).

Reporting the signature of the Pact the *Daily Wireless Bulletin* issued by the American Embassy in London, in a cable from Washington, stated: "The historic Pact was signed here on April 4, during one of the most impressive ceremonies ever staged in a world capital.

"Ceremonies attendant to the North Atlantic Treaty signing on April 4 were seen and heard by the greatest audience in history.

"Long and short wave radio and television brought to untold millions of people—including those behind the Iron Curtain—a vivid description of the historic event as it actually unfolded in the Departmental Auditorium here. In addition, the working press, motion picture equipment, special writers and commentators—in short, hundreds of representatives of all media of public information—witnessed and reported on every detail of the two-hour ceremony." (*United States Information Service*, April 5, 1949.)

Before the signing each of the signatory Ministers made short speeches. Almost without exception they asserted that the Treaty was

¹ In February, 1952, Greece and Turkey also acceded to the treaty.

not aggressive and that it fitted into the United Nations Charter and would strengthen that international organisation.

The Treaty consists of 12 Articles. For our present purposes we shall quote four Articles.

Article 3 reads:

"In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

Article 5 reads:

"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

"Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."

Article 8 reads:

"Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty."

As regards the implementation of the Treaty, *Article 9* reads:

"The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5."

Immediately after the signatures of the Pact requests were made to the United States Government by European signatories for military

assistance, and this the Administration agreed to render subject to the approval of Congress.

The British Prime Minister in reply to a question in the House of Commons, April 8, 1949, said: "The Brussels Treaty Powers have had under consideration their common defence programme, and have drawn up a request to the United States Government for assistance in carrying out this programme. This request was sent to the United States Government on April 5. The United States Government replied on April 6 that they were prepared to recommend to Congress that this assistance should be given." (*Hansard*, April 8, 1949, col. 213.)

An Associated Press cable, date-lined Washington, April 8, 1949, stated: "The program is expected to call for around \$1,250,000,000 worth of military supplies and equipment over twelve months." (*New York Herald Tribune*, April 9, 1949.)

Presumably President Truman was convinced that the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty and the promise of military aid to its European signatories was not sufficient to intimidate the Government of the U.S.S.R., so he decided to brandish the atomic bomb as well. The *Times* correspondent in a cable, date-lined Washington, April 7, stated: "The President, in an informal talk to recently elected members of Congress, said last night that he would not hesitate to order the use of the atomic bomb if it were necessary for the welfare of the United States and if the fate of the democracies of the world were at stake. He said that he hoped and prayed it would never be necessary to do so, and added that he considered that the signing of the Atlantic Pact would prevent the United States from having to make such a decision." (*Times*, April 8, 1949.)

Immediately after the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty, the question arose: "Is it a violation of the Charter of U.N.?"

In our judgment a dispassionate study of the facts could only lead to one conclusion, i.e. "Yes".

The operative articles of the Charter of U.N. and the North Atlantic Treaty are numbers 51 and 5 respectively.

The first paragraph of Article 51 of the Charter states:

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

"Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain international peace and security."
(Our emphasis.)

The first paragraph of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states:

"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

The vital part of Article 51 of the Charter which we have underlined is missing from Article 5 of the Treaty. Instead, the second paragraph of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty declares:

"Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."

This paragraph, if words have any meaning, means that if the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty, including several members of the Security Council, consider (rightly or wrongly) that an act of aggression has been committed by, say the U.S.S.R. (also a member of the Security Council) or its associates they (the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty) are entitled to take military action and that having done so and thus having possibly precipitated a world war, they will then bring the matter before the Security Council to enable each side to tell the other to stop fighting. Does this make sense?

A group of distinguished American writers in an open letter attacking the North Atlantic Treaty stated: "According to Article 5, the Security Council of the United Nations will be informed about the

use of armed forces only after it is put into operation. This means that the United Nations will be reduced to impotence since once fighting has started on a full scale with American troops, materials, tanks, planes, ships and atomic bombs, the Security Council of the United Nations will be unable to stop the holocaust."

The North Atlantic Treaty was a clear breach of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance signed on May 26, 1942. Article VII of the Treaty reads: "Each High Contracting Party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other High Contracting Party."

If the North Atlantic Treaty was not directed against the U.S.S.R., against whom was it directed?

That question has never been answered by the spokesmen of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

In the House of Commons on April 4, 1949, Mr. C. P. Mayhew, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, said that the North Atlantic Treaty was compatible with the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance (1942); on April 11, he said that there was no intention of inviting the U.S.S.R. to join the Treaty; and the British Government, in a Note to the Soviet Government, April 12, 1949, asserted that the North Atlantic Treaty was not contrary to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942 and was in conformity with the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations.

At a meeting of the General Assembly of U.N., April 13, 1949, the Soviet delegate Mr. Gromyko, delivered a lengthy attack on the North Atlantic Treaty.

Among other things he stated:

"The circumstances which accompanied the preparations for the North Atlantic Treaty as well as the composition of the parties to this treaty show that this new military bloc of States situated on both shores of the Atlantic Ocean is aimed against the U.S.S.R. This is borne out even by the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty, similar to Western Union, denotes the creation of a limited grouping of States and excludes the participation of only one great Power—the Soviet Union.

"It cannot be regarded as fortuitous," Gromyko pointed out, "that the initiators of the North Atlantic Alliance take such great interest in the inclusion in it of States bordering on the Soviet Union. Only blind people can avoid seeing that this pursues the aim of securing the possibility for creating on the territory of these States

military bases including air bases for attacking the Soviet Union.

"The conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty means that the ruling circles of the United States and Great Britain have returned to the old anti-Soviet course in their foreign policy, aimed at isolating the U.S.S.R.

"Inasmuch as the North Atlantic Treaty is aimed against the U.S.S.R., it contradicts the aims and purposes of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942 and of the French-Soviet Treaty of 1944. The Government of Great Britain and the Government of France bear full responsibility for violating the obligations assumed by them on the strength of Treaties with the Soviet Union."

Mr. Gromyko added: "The Soviet Union will continue as hitherto consistently to uphold the principles of the United Nations, being convinced that this meets the interests of the peoples of all States. It will continue as before to expose the aggressive plans of the warmongers."

During this time, Mr. Winston Churchill was in the U.S.A. doing his utmost to inflame relations between the Western Powers and the U.S.S.R., hoping that this would lead to a Western ultimatum to the U.S.S.R.

Speaking at Boston (U.S.A.), March 31, 1949, Mr. Churchill said:

"We are now confronted with something quite as wicked but in some ways more formidable than Hitler, because Hitler had only the Herrenvolk pride and anti-Semitic hatred to exploit. He had no fundamental theme. But these fourteen men in the Kremlin have their hierarchy and a church of Communist adepts, whose missionaries are in every country as a fifth column, waiting the day when they hope to be the absolute masters of their fellow-countrymen and pay off old scores. They have their anti-God religion and their Communist doctrine of the entire subjugation of the individual to the State. Behind this stands the largest army in the world, in the hands of a Government pursuing imperialist expansion as no Tsar or Kaiser had ever done.

"I must not conceal from you the truth as I see it. It is certain that Europe would have been Communised and London under bombardment some time ago but for the deterrent of the atomic bomb in the hands of the United States.

"Another question is also asked. Is time on our side? That is not a question that can be answered, except within strict limits. We have

certainly not an unlimited period of time before a settlement should be achieved. The utmost vigilance should be practised, and I do not think myself that violent or precipitate action should be taken now. War is not inevitable. The Germans have a wise saying: 'The trees do not grow up to the sky.'"

It seems to us that Churchill could not (and cannot) reconcile himself to the existence of the Soviet Power. His attitude was not only political, it was almost pathological. To him it was unnatural that the old governing class of Tsarist Russia which he so admired, "the Russia of culture", should be dethroned for ever.

For several generations Churchill's spiritual forefathers could not or would not believe that the Republic of the U.S.A. could last. It was all against nature! These people persuaded themselves that when Great Britain declared war on the U.S.A. in 1812, the death knell of the still young Republic had sounded.

Again, when the American Civil War broke out the old governing class in Great Britain was practically unanimous in announcing the end of that "unnatural system of Government".

Even at the end of the nineteenth century the late Cecil Rhodes still hoped that the Americans would realise their mistake, acknowledge the British Monarchy and return to the fold of the British Empire.

Churchill was (and is) apparently still hoping that the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. will invite the capitalists and landlords to return and take back the factories and the land.

The victories of the Red Army in the Russian Civil War and the tremendous victory of Stalingrad in the second world war taught Churchill nothing. Apparently he did not comprehend the profound dictum of Cromwell: "Men fight best when they know what they fight for and love what they know."

Churchill's pathological attitude towards the U.S.S.R. was incurable and his political policy was just as much doomed to failure and dangerous to peace as it was at the end of the first world war.

Unfortunately Churchill represented not merely himself but a sizable section of his class and party.

But what did Churchill want at the moment? What policy was he urging on his American audience?

The two well-known American commentators Joseph and Stewart Alsop had no doubts on the subject. In an article devoted exclusively to Churchill's speech, among several other things, they stated:

"It is not often that Winston Churchill speaks in riddles. He did not do so at Fulton, where his plain words about plain facts sent the woolly-minded into agonies of wishful revulsion. But at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology last week, he chose to wrap up the hard terrible kernel of his meaning in such a way that it has actually escaped attention.

"Perhaps he chose to do this because what he was really saying was so terrible, so unpalatable, that even he did not believe the time had come to use plain words again. But Mr. Churchill being Mr. Churchill, it is none the less important to extract this kernel of his meaning from its rich philosophical wrappings."

The Alsops then posed a number of questions:

"What did he mean by denying that we had 'an unlimited period of time before a settlement should be achieved?' To what was he referring when he said he did not 'think violent or precipitate action should be taken now' with sharp emphasis on the 'now'? At what is he hinting, in his brilliant historical reminiscence of the death of Genghis Khan? Here is the knot of the riddle which can be unravelled in only one way.

"Paraphrasing Mr. Churchill is a bold enterprise. Yet his meaning becomes obvious at once, if simple positive statements are substituted for his surcharged double negatives.

"Do this . . . and the following emerges:

"'Because of the deterrent of the atomic bomb in the hands of the United States, we are safe for the present, if we practise the utmost vigilance. But there is a limit to this period of safety. Thereafter a settlement should be achieved. This may require violent and precipitate action. And it is worth putting off this action, because the death of Stalin or some other unforeseen event may shortly unleash an inner convulsion in the Soviet Union, which will suspend Russian imperialism and cause the Soviet power to contract within Russia's former border.'"

The two commentators were apparently convinced that their interpretation was correct. They continued:

"There is no straining of Mr. Churchill's actual words, except by crudely mentioning the death of Stalin, so clearly pointed to by the Genghis Khan parallel. There is here, also, a bleak statement of two simple alternatives.

"In Mr. Churchill's opinion, it is apparent that we have only two

ways to survival. Either Russia will change radically and soon, or when the 'not unlimited period' of our safety begins to run out, we must force a preventive crisis, leading if need be to preventive war, in order to secure a settlement with the Kremlin."

The Alsops summed up: "When this will be necessary is suggested by his emphasis on the temporary American monopoly of atomic energy. In short, there must be a show-down before the Kremlin possesses a people's democratic atomic bomb." (*New York Herald Tribune*, April 9, 1949.)

Representative Clarence Cannon (Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee), on April 13, said:

"If there should be another war, which God forbid, the outcome could be decisively determined by atomic warfare in three weeks or less. . . . Russia would occupy the entire European continent within ninety days. And neither the Army nor the Navy could reach Moscow with the first atomic bomb in three weeks—or three years. . . . Only land-based bombers could reach Moscow with a lethal charge. With the signing of the North Atlantic Pact we would have ample land bases and within a week we could blast every nerve centre. . . . Of course, a war could not be won by air power alone. There must be troops for occupation. . . . But under the Marshall Plan and North Atlantic Pact we will have Allies with troops and ships. . . . Why not let them contribute some of the boys necessary to occupy enemy territory after we have demoralised and annihilated [it] from the air? We followed that plan in the last war. (*New York Herald Tribune*, April 25, 1949.)

Three days after Representative Cannon's speech, a book entitled *If Russia Strikes?* by a well-known military analyst was published in the U.S.A. He argued that some time before 1952 the U.S.A. should send an ultimatum to the U.S.S.R. along these lines: "Either you will immediately accept international control of atomic energy and open your borders to agents of a world atomic authority, or we shall proceed to the destruction of your atomic plants and the supporting elements (such as major power stations) by use of our own air atomic weapons." (*New York Herald Tribune*, April 18, 1949.)

Mr. Eliot (the military analyst) averred that the Western Powers would maintain their superiority in arms until about 1952. He believed that thereafter any war would be one of mutual annihilation.

Messrs. Cannon and Eliot did not stand alone; by and large their views were shared by many influential public men. Churchill had, and was no doubt aware of the fact, a large and appreciative audience in the U.S.A.

However, some voices were also raised, urging not threats but negotiations with the U.S.S.R.

Now to turn to another subject. As mentioned on the first page of this chapter, the blockade and counter-blockade of Berlin continued when the year 1949 dawned.

The following paragraph which the Economic Observer of the *New York Star* wrote in that journal on January 2, 1949, throws a significant sidelight on the attitude of mind of certain influential sections in the U.S.A. at that time. This paragraph read: "Some businessmen fear that if peace worked out with the Soviet Union and our military budget was reduced, this would lead to a decline of business activity."

However, secret negotiations were begun on February 15, 1949, between Mr. Jacob Malik, the Soviet Delegate to the Security Council, and Dr. Philip Jessup, the U.S.A.'s roving Ambassador (acting on behalf of the three Western Powers), and these negotiations continued until an agreement was reached on May 4, 1949.

The Text of the Agreement was as follows:

"The Governments of France, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and the United States have reached the following agreement:

(1) All the restrictions imposed since March 1, 1948, by the Government of the U.S.S.R. on communications, transportation, and trade between Berlin and the western zones of Germany and between the eastern zone and the western zones will be removed on May 12, 1949.

(2) All the restrictions imposed since March 1, 1948, by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States or any one of them, on communications, transportation, and trade between Berlin and the eastern zone and between the western and the eastern zones of Germany will also be removed on May 12, 1949.

(3) Eleven days subsequent to the removal of the restrictions referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2—namely, on May 23, 1949—a meeting of the Council of the Foreign Ministers will be convened in Paris to consider questions relating to Germany and problems

arising out of the situation in Berlin, including also the question of currency in Berlin." (*Times*, May 6, 1949.)

The Agreement was announced to the House of Commons, May 5, 1949, and was warmly welcomed from all parts of the House. It was received with equal approval in the U.S.S.R. and, for that matter, the Agreement was received with enthusiasm throughout the world as a means of lessening international tension.

A week or so before the signing of the Agreement an incident occurred in Moscow which created a sensation in that city and the U.S.S.R., caused consternation in the British Foreign Office and attracted attention throughout the world. On April 24, 1949, *Pravda* carried a 3,000-word letter over the signature of Archibald R. Johnstone, editor of *British Ally*, the Foreign Office newspaper in the U.S.S.R.

Johnstone was fifty-two years of age, had been in the newspaper world for thirty-five years and had been appointed editor of *British Ally* in February, 1947. In this letter, he stated:

"Shortly after I took over the editorship, I was told in the British Embassy in Moscow, to my astonishment, that a series of anti-Soviet speeches by Attlee, Bevin and Morrison would have to be published.

"One instance, typical of many, that shook me particularly was when the Ambassador, Sir Maurice Peterson, gave specific directions to publish a speech by Attlee in which he referred to 'torrents of Soviet abuse of the British people.'" (*Daily Herald*, April 25, 1949.)

"I protested to the Ambassador that never at any time has the Soviet Press abused the British people. Everybody agreed that Mr. Attlee's speech was false, but nevertheless Sir Maurice Peterson (the British Ambassador) forced me to publish it." (*Times*, April 25, 1949.)

"It became completely apparent to me that the British Embassy in Moscow has no interest in improving relations between England and the Soviet Union, and that in fact they are doing everything to spoil them.

"During the two years of my life in the U.S.S.R. I have never heard of one single Soviet citizen, even in private talk, advocating war or proclaiming the necessity for it." (*Daily Herald*, April 25, 1949.)

Johnstone concluded: "I therefore accuse Attlee, Bevin, McNeil, Morrison and the other Labour Party leaders of using against the interests of the British people the power which they attained by deceiving the British people.

"It was the North Atlantic Pact that made me resign my British Embassy post and give up my British nationality, that made me break with the aggressive England of to-day and all it stands for." (*ibid.*)

When this matter was raised in the House of Commons, May 2, 1949, Mr. C. P. Mayhew replying for the Foreign Office said: "Mr. Johnstone had good technical qualifications and experience. His functions were those of technical editor and he was in charge of the preparation of the paper for printing. He was not responsible for its editorial policy, nor was he in a position to influence its political content. Reports on his performance of his duties during the two years since his appointment were satisfactory." (*Hansard*, May 2, 1949, col. 652.)

Here we must turn aside for the moment to deal with developments in Germany. As a result of the disagreements between the three Western Powers on the one hand and the U.S.S.R. on the other, the Military Governments in Germany gradually took on the forms more and more of separate entities and ended in two separate Governments.

A cable date-lined Bonn, May 23, 1949, stated: "The Federal Republic of Western Germany was born to-day in a brief and colourful ceremony promulgating the constitution that will govern all Germany west of the Soviet zone.

"Eighty-eight non-Communist German statesmen put their signatures to the new 'Basic law' shortly before the Big-Four Foreign Ministers were to meet in Paris for another attempt at reaching a German settlement.

"Led by Dr. Konrad Adenauer, leader of the majority Christian Democratic party and president of the assembly which wrote the constitution, the eighty-eight signers were the non-Communist members of the Constituent Assembly, the eleven Ministers-President and the Presidents of the State legislatures.

"Two constitution-framers were absent. Two Communists refused to sign.

"Dr. Adenauer, at the end of the signing ceremony, said that German relations with the occupation powers will be 'different' in the future.

"The electoral law passed along with the constitution still awaits the

approval of the Military Governors." (*New York Herald Tribune*, May 24, 1949.)

The reply from the Eastern zone came swiftly. On May 30, 1949, the German People's Congress from the Soviet Zone proclaimed a German Democratic Republic. The Congress also issued a Manifesto calling among other things for:

- "1. Elaboration of principles for a peace treaty based on Yalta and Potsdam.
- "2. Re-establishment of German unity.
- "3. A uniform currency and an end to economic and transport barriers.
- "4. Formation of a provisional central government.
- "5. Summoning of a peace conference in which the provisional government shall take part." (*New York Herald Tribune*, May 31, 1949.)

From this date onward what may be called provisional "East" and "West" governments faced each other in Germany; and although the "West" government refused to "recognise" the "East" government, on the very day on which the "East" government was proclaimed representatives from the Eastern and Western zones were carrying on trade talks in Frankfurt.

MORE EXTENSIVE RIFTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

THE sixth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers opened at the Palais Rose, Paris, on May 23, 1949. Mr. Acheson, Mr. Bevin, M. Schuman and Mr. Vyshinsky represented the U.S.A., Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. respectively.

Judging by the press reports, the Conference on several occasions was on the verge of complete collapse. However, patience and perseverance brought their reward and a limited but important agreement was signed on June 20, 1949.

To summarise the Agreement very briefly, the Ministers agreed that:

(a) Every effort should be made to establish trade and generally normal relations between the Eastern and Western areas of Berlin and the Eastern and Western zones of Germany.

(b) "During the course of the fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations to be convened next September, the four Governments, through their representatives at the Assembly, will exchange views regarding the date and other arrangements for the next session of the Council of Foreign Ministers on the German question."

(c) As regards Austria—a general agreement was reached and the four Foreign Ministers decided that "the deputies shall resume their work promptly for the purpose of reaching agreement not later than September 1 on the draft treaty as a whole."

The Agreement met with universal but restrained approval.

The *Manchester Guardian*, June 21, 1949, declared: "Things have become a little easier but the bridges between East and West are still down."

The *Daily Herald*, June 21, 1949, commented: "The Foreign Ministers' agreement on Germany and Austria is, in some ways, a 'second best'. But it is an exceedingly good second best. It is far better than sober anticipation thought likely."

The *Times*, June 21, 1949, stated: "... the declaration of policy published by the four Powers seems to reflect a determination to keep the 'cold war' at its present temperature and to practise the gentle art of 'living together' in Germany. On Austria they have gone still further. For the first time a draft treaty has been prepared in which all the main differences between Russia and the Western Powers have been resolved."

So much for the British press. Yuri Zhukov, *Pravda's* correspondent, commented in that journal:

"The results of the session, although the Ministers did not succeed in reaching agreement on the basic questions pertaining to Germany, mark definite progress in the consolidation of international co-operation.

"The real significance of the agreement achieved consists first and foremost in that it marks a substantial step towards the restoration of regular activity of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

"By helping to relieve the tension in the international atmosphere, this agreement opens the way for solution of the basic tasks for which the Council of Foreign Ministers was set up: we have in view the post-war peace settlement. In particular this agreement affords an opportunity to prepare in a short time the final draft Austrian treaty and thereby make a substantial step towards the post-war peace settlement in Europe."

Zhukov brought out the deep suspicion which existed in the U.S.S.R. regarding the intentions of the U.S.A.:

"The real significance of the agreement reached consists, lastly, in that it visually shows the possibility of reaching agreed decisions when the method of dictation is left beyond the threshold of the Council of Foreign Ministers. It will be very useful for the cause of peace if this lesson is fully learned by those reactionary circles in the United States which until now have not parted from their unrealisable dream of domination throughout the world."

As one would expect, the pressure of circumstances which at least played some part in leading up to the agreement was differently interpreted in London and Moscow. For instance, the *Manchester Guardian* stated: "Allied firmness has brought out that the Russians, in spite of the bellicosity of their propaganda, are anxious for peace." (*Manchester Guardian*, June 21, 1949.)

On the other hand, Zhukov wrote: "The ruling circles of the Western Powers were forced to reckon with the obvious fact that the mighty movement for peace and against the warmongers, the movement headed by the Soviet Union, is growing and gaining strength throughout the world. To disrupt the negotiations to ensure a peace settlement in Europe would mean that the representatives of the Western Powers would have shown themselves to the peoples of all countries, including their own peoples, in the role of overt accomplices of the instigators of war. Further, the representatives of the Western Powers had to reckon with the fact that the signs of the brewing economic crisis are daily becoming more numerous in their countries."

Most of the British, French and U.S.A. press expressed the hope that the agreement would work out satisfactorily in practice, and Zhukov also concluded in hopeful terms: "It would be naïve to expect the Council of Foreign Ministers, which gathered at the Paris session after one and a half years of recess in its work, to be able at once to settle all big and important questions on its agenda, especially since three of its four members did not manifest a striving for agreement on the basic German questions. With all this, however, one should not underestimate the importance of the negotiations conducted in Paris, in the course of which not only were the attitudes of the parties defined, but also the first agreements were reached."

The agreement reached at the Conference was cordially welcomed by the participating Foreign Ministers, but there was no tendency to exaggerate the results obtained.

Vyshinsky, in an interview in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, June 30, 1949, struck a hopeful note. He said:

"As for the question of preparing the conditions for the convocation of the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, in this matter, as is known, there were some mutual concessions both on the part of the three Western Governments and on the part of the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government declared that it was ready to remove transport and other restrictions if the three Western Governments in their turn would agree to remove their transport and other restrictions, give up the boycott of co-operation of the four Governments, and agree to restoration of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The three Governments agreed to make these concessions.

"I think that in future, too, it will be necessary to make certain mutual concessions compatible with the principles of the Potsdam Agreement."

The *Times*, referring to this interview as well as to a *Pravda* article on the same subject, commented: "Mr. Vyshinsky and the *Pravda* writers count the 'lightening of the international atmosphere' as the chief result of the Paris Conference. So far, at any rate, Western opinion will not dissent." (*The Times*, July 1, 1949.)

The Paris Conference undoubtedly marked an important step forward, and if the appeal by Mr. Vyshinsky for "mutual concessions" had been met in a reasonable spirit of compromise the next meeting of the four Foreign Ministers could have done much to improve the possibility of international concord.

During the Conference the Soviet representative urged "back to Potsdam", but this was fiercely opposed by the representative of the U.S.A. and he was supported by the representatives of Britain and France.

Whilst the Foreign Ministers Conference was sitting and in the weeks immediately following, a number of events occurred which strengthened the U.S.S.R. in her dealings with the West. To mention just a few. On June 7 it was reported that there were three and a quarter million unemployed in the U.S.A.; on June 8 it was reported that living standards were rising in the U.S.S.R.; further, the latest issue of *World Economic Report* published by the Secretariat of U.N. recorded that manufacturing production was rising proportionately more rapidly in the U.S.S.R. and the New European Democracies than in the countries in Europe receiving Marshall Aid; and, as illustrating the turn events seemed to be taking, it is significant that on June 9 Mr. Walter Lippman wrote that the U.S.A., Britain and France could no longer impose their will upon the world.

It is true that at this time (May-July, 1949) Britain was restricting the export of various types of machinery to the U.S.S.R. and to the latter's Allies in Central and Eastern Europe. But influential forces in Britain, including such powerful trade unions as the Amalgamated Engineering Union, the Transport and General Workers' Union and the National Union of Railwaymen, were pressing for increased trade between East and West.

The Foreign Secretary, Mr. E. Bevin, in the course of a debate in the House of Commons, July 18, 1949, denounced the idea of not trading with the U.S.S.R., and Mr. Bottomley (Secretary of Overseas Trade) in reply to a question, House of Commons, July 19, said: "We have reached agreement with the Soviet Government about coarse grains,

but the contract is linked with the rest of the trade agreement on which negotiations are still proceeding. I would prefer to wait until they are concluded before announcing details about any particular part of the negotiation." (*Hansard*, July 19, 1949, col. 1168.)

Sir David Kelly, the British Ambassador to Moscow, took up his post on June 24, 1949, and was received by Premier Stalin, July 18, 1949. A Reuter cable, date-lined Moscow, July 19, 1949, averred: "Authoritative British sources said to-day that a full code record of last night's Kremlin talks between Mr. Stalin and Sir David Kelly, the new British Ambassador, has been sent to London for Mr. Bevin's personal attention. The talks which lasted about thirty minutes, were described as general in character and conducted 'in a pleasant atmosphere.'

"To-day all Soviet newspapers carried a front page announcement of the talks. Accompanying Mr. Stalin were Mr. Vyshinsky and Mr. Vladimir Pavlov, head of the Soviet Foreign Office department that deals with Britain and the Commonwealth." (*Manchester Guardian*, July 20, 1949.)

A little later, August 10, 1949, the entire British press carried a report of a timber contract signed on the previous day between Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. Here we quote from the *Times* report:

"Contracts have been concluded with the U.S.S.R. for the supply of about 100,000 standards of softwood. An announcement by the Board of Trade last night stated that the purchase was the outcome of discussions between the Secretary for Overseas Trade, Mr. A. G. Bottomley, and the acting head of the Soviet trade delegation in London.

"The U.S.S.R. will send 17,000 standards of Kara Sea redwood, 52,500 standards of redwood and 2,000 standards of whitewood from the White Sea; 5,000 standards of redwood and 5,000 standards of whitewood from the Baltic ports of Riga and Windau, and 12,500 standards of redwood and 6,000 standards of whitewood from the Russian zone of Germany. The Kara Sea and White Sea goods are all of joinery quality, the balance being eminently suitable for building purposes." (*Times*, August 10, 1949.)

The *Time* report continued: "Shipping will start almost immediately and it is hoped that the total quantity will be lifted before the close of navigation this year. In line with other purchases made by the

Board of Trade this season, the prices paid are lower than those paid last year."

The *Times* welcomed the new agreement but quite rightly wanted its readers to see the transaction in its true proportions. In the course of an editorial on August 11, 1949, it stated: "The announcement that 100,000 standards of softwood are to be imported next year from Russia marks a return, on rather a small scale, to an important former source of supply. Britain imported in 1936-8 an average of 440,000 standards of softwood a year from the Soviet Union as well as larger quantities of pitprops."

The editorial added: "The Russian timber industry was badly hit during the war, and the quantities now available for export are limited."

This new Anglo-Soviet transaction was welcomed by the British and Soviet press, and further trade talks continued between the two countries.

While Britain and the U.S.S.R. negotiated trade, American statesmen, including President Truman, continued to hurl accusations at the U.S.S.R. and to use threats calculated to create an atmosphere in which talks for lessening tension could not take place.

The *New York Herald Tribune*, August 13, 1949, carried a banner headline: "General Vandenberg Asserts United States is Selecting Atomic Targets: Says Only Enemy is Russia."

Underneath the headline there was a United Press cable, date-lined Washington, August 12, 1949, which read: "General Hoyt Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, said to-day that Russia is America's only enemy, atomic bombing in the event of war has 'the first priority' and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are now selecting targets."

Mr. Anthony Eden speaking at a Conservative Rally at Plas Newydd, August 24, 1949, was not so pointed in his remarks as General Vandenberg, but he clearly implied that the one and only common enemy of Britain, the British Commonwealth and the United States of America, was the Soviet Union and he appealed for a common front against her. And Mr. Winston Churchill went one further in creating an atmosphere hostile to the U.S.S.R., not only in Britain but also in Europe and the world generally.

We would also refer here to the quotation given by Mr. Macmillan in September 1949 from a memorandum written by Mr. Churchill in October 1942. We give this quotation in Chapter VII, page 150.

In October, 1942, the Soviet forces and peoples were fighting with

amazing heroism and skill and Churchill was publicly lauding their fortitude in unmeasured terms.

However, these attacks on the U.S.S.R. did not prevent trade talks proceeding between the two countries and on September 7, 1949, the following appeared in the *Times* from its Diplomatic Correspondent.

"It was learned at the Board of Trade last evening that a contract for the supply of 1m. tons of grain from the U.S.S.R. to the United Kingdom came into force on September 1. Under this contract Great Britain will receive 500,000 tons of barley, 400,000 tons maize and 100,000 tons of oats.

"Negotiations for a trade agreement, apart from this contract, are still continuing between the Secretary for Overseas Trade, Mr. Arthur Bottomley and the Soviet trade delegation."

"The first shipment of grain is expected to take place shortly."

The conclusion of this contract was widely welcomed. On September 8, the Trades Union Congress passed a unanimous resolution in favour of developing trade on a larger scale with the U.S.S.R., and on September 14, 1949, Mr. Harold Wilson (President of the Board of Trade), speaking at a meeting of Liverpool dockers, said: "We have just signed a contract for nearly 100,000 standards of timber, enough for 67,000 or 70,000 houses, from the Soviet Union, and I have told the Soviet Government that we are willing to double that, and treble it, if they can make the timber available. We are buying a million tons of foodstuffs from Russia and we are pursuing trade wherever it can be found."

In passing we would recall that at this period Great Britain was facing considerable difficulties in the dollar market and on September 18, 1949, Sir Stafford Cripps (Chancellor of the Exchequer) in a broadcast to the nation announced that the Government had decided to devalue sterling "to reduce the dollar exchange value of the £ sterling". Sir Stafford said:

"In the last few days we have settled what the new rate should be and now I have to tell you of that decision.

"It is that in place of the present rate, fixed in 1946, of 4 dollars 3 cents for the £, the rate will in future be 2 dollars 80 cents to the £.

"That new rate will come into force to-night. To enable the necessary business adjustments to be made the banks will remain closed to-morrow." (*Daily Herald*, September 19, 1949.)

The Government's decision was due to an increasing drain on British reserves. It was a nasty blow to British pride, but on the whole it was accepted by the British press and public after the first shock with calmness.

On the same date, September 18, 1949, the Council of Foreign Ministers of the twelve Nations which had signed the North Atlantic Pact met in Washington and decided to give the Treaty a full set of teeth.

A cable from Washington, published by the United States Information Service, date-lined September 19, 1949, thus summed up the decisions taken by the Council:

"The Defence Committee established by the twelve-nation North Atlantic Council on September 17 will meet here on October 5 to organise the Atlantic Pact Military Defence against possible aggression.

"A 3,000-word communique issued by the Foreign Ministers comprising the Council outlined the goals, organisation and working methods of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

"United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson was designated Chairman of the Council for the first one-year term. After that the chairmanship will be rotated among the other treaty nations. The Council will ordinarily meet once a year at about the same time as the annual session of the United Nations General Assembly.

"The Council designated the Defence Ministers of each country as members of its Defence Committee, which also will meet annually. This Committee in turn will establish a Military Committee made up of Chiefs of Staff.

"The Military Committee will set up a Standing Group—made up of United States, United Kingdom, and French representatives—which will 'facilitate the rapid and efficient conduct of the work of the military committee'.

"The Standing Group will function continuously, with this site in Washington. The Standing Group will co-ordinate the work of five regional planning groups established by the Council. The five groups are to be set up on a geographical basis, but the United States has been requested and has agreed to participate in the defence planning of all five regional bodies."

The Council decided to divide the area of defence into five regional groupings.

North America: United States and Canada.

North Atlantic: United States, Canada, Britain, France, Belgium, Denmark and Iceland.

Northern Europe: Britain, Norway and Denmark.

Western Europe: Britain, France and the Benelux Powers.

Southern Europe: Britain, France, Italy and Portugal.

Regional group commanders were to be responsible to a Standing Committee representing Britain, France and the United States and sitting continuously in Washington.

After this Council meeting the Organisation became known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or N.A.T.O.

As a result of the Council meeting of September 18, 1949, many Soviet haters on both sides of the Atlantic believed that at long last they had established an organisation which, in view of the fact that the U.S.A. had, as they believed, a monopoly of the atom bomb, could very soon intimidate the U.S.S.R. into accepting Western terms on all the many outstanding international issues.

These stargazers received a profound shock only a few days later.

On September 23, 1949, President Truman in a statement from the White House, duplicated by one from 10 Downing Street at the same time, declared:

"I believe the American people, to the fullest extent consistent with national security, are entitled to be informed of all developments in the field of atomic energy.

"That is my reason for making public the following information: We have evidence that within recent weeks an atomic explosion occurred in the U.S.S.R.

"WE ALWAYS EXPECTED IT.

"Ever since atomic energy was first released by man, the eventual development of this new force by other nations was to be expected. This probability has always been taken into account by us.

"Nearly four years ago I pointed out that scientific opinion appears to be practically unanimous that the essential theoretical knowledge upon which the discovery is based is already widely known.

"There is also substantial agreement that foreign research can come abreast of our present theoretical knowledge in time.

"And in the three nation declaration of the President of the United States and the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and of Canada, dated November 15, 1945, it was emphasised that 'no

single nation could in fact have a monopoly of atomic weapons'." (*Evening Standard*, September 23, 1949.)

The announcement created a stupendous impression throughout the world. The monopoly of the most powerful weapon of the leading Power in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, i.e. the U.S.A., had been decisively broken by Soviet scientists, technicians and engineers. Commentators and leader-writers recognised that the balance of power had moved decisively in favour of the U.S.S.R.

The United Nations correspondent of the *Times*, in a cable from Flushing Meadows, date-lined September 23, 1949, said that in the General Assembly "the news of the bomb made by far the most profound impression". (*Times*, September 24, 1949.)

The *Times* military correspondent wrote: "The recorded explosion of an atomic bomb on the territory of Soviet Russia brings to an end many speculations and surmises. Varying estimates have been made about the time it would take the Russians, with the aid of a number of highly trained German scientists, to produce the bomb. One which had the backing of a good deal of competent opinion, was eight years. Four years is certainly below the average estimate." (*ibid.*)

Editorially the *Times* stated: "It would be useless to pretend that the firm knowledge that Russia now has at least the prototype of an atomic bomb is not a shock or that it will make no change in the balance of world power." (*ibid.*)

The *Manchester Guardian*, September 24, 1949, editorially commented: "If ever there was any sense in talking about preventive war there is none now. This is not a bad thing. There have been some irresponsible people in the United States—Mr. Truman and his associates are not among them—who might have been tempted to start such a war (which could only have been disastrous in its effects on most of the world whoever won), in an excess of confidence engendered by a supposed monopoly of the atomic bomb. Whatever political changes may take place in the United States in the future, this danger is unlikely to recur."

The *Manchester Guardian's* leader-writer ought to have known that many high-ups in the U.S.A. had persistently and vociferously campaigned for a "preventive war" against the U.S.S.R.

The *Daily Herald* editorially declared: "An atomic explosion, announces President Truman, has occurred in Soviet Russia. For years the world has uneasily awaited such a situation. Anxiety is now

bound to increase, because it will be widely felt that the atom bomb, as a deterrent to war, loses much of its effect if both sides in a possible conflict can use it." (*Daily Herald*, September 24, 1949.)

The correspondent of the *New York Herald Tribune* in a cable to his paper, date-lined London, September 23, 1949, stated: "News that the Russians have achieved an atomic explosion came as a shock to London late to-day when the last editions of the afternoon newspapers came on the streets with black screaming headlines stating that the Soviet Union 'has atom bomb'." (*New York Herald Tribune*, September 24, 1949.)

Mr. Konni Zilliacus, M.P., in a press interview stated: "I have long believed that the atom bomb in Russian possession would be the best guarantee of world peace. This may disabuse the powers that be in the United States of any idea that because they alone had the bomb they could dictate to the rest of the world." (*ibid.*)

Many British scientists, and for that matter, French and German scientists, who had a very high opinion of Soviet scientists, were not surprised, although even to some of them the Soviet success came sooner than they anticipated.

Now to turn to reactions in the U.S.A. Senator Brian McMahon said: "The news faces the United States with the most crucial dilemma of its history." (*Daily Herald*, September 24, 1949.)

Mr. Robert Waithman in a cable, date-lined New York, September 23, 1949, stated: "Members of Congress have plainly been shaken by Mr. Truman's revelation, which was followed by the statement in New York from the Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, that he was assuming the Russians had manufactured an 'atomic weapon' which they had successfully exploded." (*News Chronicle*, September 24, 1949.)

A cable, date-lined Washington, September 25, 1949, declared: "The news naturally came as more of a shock to the United States than to European countries, who are used to bombing, invasion and occupation."

The cable continued: "The Federation of American Scientists has issued a formal statement which says: 'I told you so' very politely, but even they—to judge from less prepared remarks—are somewhat taken aback by Russia having achieved its first bomb two or three years earlier than had been foreseen in any estimates." (*Times*, September 26, 1949.)

The *New York Herald Tribune* in an editorial observed: "In the still

echoing reverberations of the announcement that Russia has produced 'an atomic explosion' one theme is more prominent than any other. It is that the effort to establish an international control system—an effort definitely abandoned a bare two months ago by the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission as at present hopeless—must be immediately revived.

"One of the basic obstacles to the success of the Western plan for control lay in the fact that while, under its terms, the West would give up the bombs (but retain the dangerous knowledge of how to make them), Russia would be required to forfeit any chance of even acquiring the knowledge, and thus be left in a position of permanent inferiority. If the Russians now have developed the major techniques necessary for producing atomic explosions, they are on a much more equal bargaining basis and in that respect there exists a much better foundation on which to strike a bargain." (*New York Herald Tribune*, September 28, 1949.)

The most penetrating comment came from Mr. Walter Lippman. He wrote:

"In any event, the phantom policy, under which the Soviet régime was supposed to break down by containment all around the periphery, is now blown away—first by its total collapse in the Far East, and then by the Soviet achievement of the bomb. There is no alternative to the negotiation of a *modus vivendi* based on the balance of power and reciprocal advantages.

"The American plan, the original Acheson-Lilienthal proposals, with or without the Baruch addition to them, had as their major premise an American monopoly of the bomb and of the technological knowledge and measures to make the bomb. It was a plan for the regulated sharing of the monopoly. All the conditions we asked for assumed that the Russians must pay a price—in the form of inspection and control—to get their share of our monopoly."

Lippman concluded: "Now that the Russians have broken the monopoly, the basic premise of the American policy has disappeared. A totally different policy, based on the radically new condition, will have to be formulated. It would be a good idea to find new men, who do not have too much to unlearn, whose personal prestige is not involved in proving how right they have always been, to make a fresh study of the whole problem." (*New York Herald Tribune*, September 30, 1949.)

On the following day Lippman replied to those Americans who had advocated "a preventive war". He observed:

"We could not start a preventive war while we had a monopoly and in order to perpetuate our monopoly. The Russians knew we would not do that, though there were voices advocating it, because we were war-weary. And they knew we could not do it because we did not have enough bombs to win such a war or the Air Force to deliver them."

He added: "Quite obviously the proposals which were rejected when we had the monopoly will not be accepted now that we have lost the monopoly." (*New York Herald Tribune*, October 1, 1949.)

Joseph and Stewart Alsop observed:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff picked 1952, rather than 1949 as the year in which Soviet atomic stockpiling was likely to begin. This means simply that the timetable must be drastically revised if the strategic balance of power is not to shift disastrously in favour of the Kremlin." (*New York Herald Tribune*, October 3, 1949.)

Next day in a continuation of the same article they added: "The trance-like reception of the news that the Soviets have exploded an atomic bomb is a bitter commentary on the quality of American leadership. Scare-mongering is bad, but it is even worse for the leaders of a democracy not to tell the people the truth. And the plain truth is that the United States and the Western world are totally unprepared for the new situation that has now arisen." (*New York Herald Tribune*, October 4, 1949.)

So much for the press comments on both sides of the Atlantic. We shall now turn to reactions in U.N. On September 23, 1949, when President Truman made the announcement about the Soviet atomic bomb explosion, the General Assembly was in session at Flushing Meadows.

The announcement was made at 4.0 p.m. in Washington, London and Ottawa.

At 8.50 p.m. on the same date, Mr. Vyshinsky, Soviet Foreign Minister, tabled a three-point proposal calling on the Assembly to:

(1) Condemn preparations for a new war which, he said, were being conducted in the United States, Britain and other countries.

(2) Protest against further delay in completing treaties banning atomic weapons and establishing international atomic controls.

(3) Call for all nations to settle their disputes peacefully and for the five great powers to conclude among themselves a pact for the strengthening of peace.

Mr. Vyshinsky made no mention of the atomic explosion in the Soviet Union.

Two days later, September 25, 1949, the TASS News Agency issued the following statement and it was immediately broadcast to the four corners of the globe:

"On September 23, Truman, President of the United States, announced that, according to data of the Government of the U.S.A., during a recent week there had occurred in the U.S.S.R. an atomic explosion.

"Simultaneously a similar statement was made by the British and Canadian Governments.

"Following the publication of these statements in the American, British and Canadian press and also in the press of other countries, there appeared numerous utterances which spread alarm among broad social circles."

TASS was empowered to declare the following:

"In the Soviet Union, as is known, building work on a large scale is in progress: building hydro-electric stations, mines, canals, roads, which evoke the necessity of large-scale blasting work with the latest technical means.

"In so far as this blasting work has taken place and is taking place pretty frequently in various parts of the country, it is possible that this might draw attention beyond the confines of the Soviet Union.

"On November 6, 1947, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, made a statement concerning the secret of the atom bomb, when he declared that this secret was long ago non-existent.

"This statement signified that the Soviet Union had discovered the secret of the atomic weapon and had at its disposal this weapon.

"Scientific circles of the United States took this statement for bluff, considering that the Russians could not possess the atomic weapon earlier than 1952.

"They were mistaken.

"As for the alarm that is being spread on this account by certain foreign circles, there are not the slightest grounds for alarm.

"The Soviet Government, despite the existence in its country of the atomic weapon, adopts, and intends adopting in the future, its former position in favour of the absolute prohibition of the use of the atomic weapon.

"Control will be essential to check up on the fulfilment of the decision on the prohibition of production of the atomic weapon."

The TASS statement was printed in full in the morning newspapers in Europe and the U.S.A.

Later on the same day, Mr. Bevin, British Foreign Secretary, spoke in the General Assembly of U.N. He made exactly the same speech as he would certainly have made had the momentous announcement of September 23 never been broadcast to the world.

He rejected Vyshinsky's latest proposals, denounced the Soviets for not having accepted the Baruch plan and by implication appealed to the Soviets to accept the plan now.

To quote Mr. Bevin's exact words: "If they had been willing to come out of their shell to raise their curtain and open the way to the system of control approved by the General Assembly—which we and others believe the only workable effective system yet devised—there might well have been effective prohibition to-day." (*New York Herald Tribune*, September 27, 1949.)

The "system" which Bevin had in mind was clearly the Baruch plan.

It seems incredible that such a speech should, under the vastly changed circumstances, have been delivered on that date by Mr. Bevin, but the fact is that it was delivered.

A cable, date-lined Flushing Meadows, September 26, 1949, read: "Mr. Bevin made no fresh proposals for an international agreement on atomic energy in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly to-day." (*Manchester Guardian*, September 27, 1949.)

The mental paralysis exhibited by the statesmen gathered at Flushing Meadows moved the *News Chronicle* to comment indignantly: "The news of Russia's possession of the atom bomb has set everybody asking: 'where do we go from here?' But the world statesmen at Lake Success have so far shown a pathetic inability to come to grips morally and intellectually with the master problem."

Mr. Bevin's speech "was little more than a repetition of what he has been saying for the past two years.

"If we believe (as we must surely do), that control of the atom is the most pressing business facing us all, then the debate at Lake Success has

been so far a confession of the bankruptcy of statesmanship. Has nobody any new ideas to contribute?

"There is a mocking unreality in the sight of the United Nations passing on to discuss other subjects; Palestine and the rest, leaving the tremendous life-and-death issue of atomic control hanging (like the smoke over Hiroshima) in the air." (*News Chronicle*, September 29, 1949.)

The *News Chronicle's* strictures were severe but fully justified. The statesmen of the Western Powers were very slow and reluctant to face up to the completely changed situation.

On September 28, 1949, the following Motion was tabled in the House of Commons:

"That this House, whilst appreciating the great contributions made by the Prime Minister and of the Government to the cause of International control of atomic energy, affirms its belief that the Prime Minister should take the initiative in proposing a Conference between the heads of the States concerned, particularly the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R., for resolving the existing deadlock and ending the race for the production of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction."

The Motion was signed by forty Labour M.P.s drawn from all sections of the Party, but as so often happens with Motions tabled by backbenchers it was not debated in the House of Commons Chamber.

A number of important events happened in the last four months of 1949 which affected directly and indirectly relations between Britain and the U.S.S.R.

The airlift to Berlin came to an end on October 1, 1949. On the following day, October 2, the U.S.S.R. sent a Note to Great Britain, France and the U.S.A. protesting against the formation of the West German Government. In the course of this Note the U.S.S.R. *inter alia* stated: "In connection with the formation in Bonn on September 20 this year of a separate Government for the American, British and French zones of occupation of Germany, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to state the following:

"The formation of a separate Government for the Western zones of Germany can only be described as the culmination of the policy of splitting Germany which has been pursued by the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, and France during the

past few years in violation of the Potsdam Agreement, under which these states jointly, with the Soviet Union, undertook to regard Germany as one single whole and assist its transformation into a democratic peace-loving state.

"The Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw attention to the extremely serious responsibility which rests with the Government of the United States of America in connection with the policy in Germany pursued by the United States of America jointly with Great Britain and France, which has led to the formation in Bonn of an anti-popular separate Government that adopts a hostile attitude to the decisions of the Potsdam conference on the democratisation and demilitarisation of Germany and towards the obligations laid upon Germany, an attitude incompatible with the interests of the peace-loving peoples of Europe."

The Note concluded: "At the same time, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to state that as a separate Government had been formed at Bonn a new situation has been created in Germany which renders of particularly great importance the fulfilment of the tasks for the restoration of the unity of Germany as a democratic and peace-loving State and for ensuring the fulfilment by Germany of the obligations laid on her by the Potsdam Agreement of the four Powers."

Dr. Adenauer had been appointed Chancellor of the West German Government.

In reply, no doubt, to the formation of a separate West German Government, an Assembly consisting of 330 members from the Soviet occupation zone of Germany met in Berlin, October 7, 1949, and proclaimed the "German Democratic Republic". Herr Pieck on behalf of the Assembly, read a Manifesto consisting of twenty points. The most important were:

"The new Republic will strive to reverse the construction of the 'separatist' Western German State and the Ruhr Statute and the autonomy of the Saar;

"A peace treaty must be signed as soon as possible and all occupation forces withdrawn from German soil;

"Complete recognition must be given to the Potsdam Agreement;

"Full German sovereignty will be re-established including independent control of foreign relations and of foreign trade;

"The unity of Berlin must be reasserted;

"There must be a single currency for the whole of Germany;

"Dismantling of German industry should be stopped;

"The German people must resist warmongers and 'American agents' and the inclusion of Germany in 'military alliances' such as the Atlantic Pact and European Union." (*Manchester Guardian*, October 8, 1949.)

Four days later, October 11, Herr Pieck was elected President of the new Republic. Elections were scheduled to be held in October, 1950.

As just recorded, the West German Government was proclaimed on September 20, but the East German Government was not proclaimed till October 7. The West Germans left the East Germans no other alternative.

There were two Governments now in Germany.

However, communications and trade between East and West Germany were not cut off. In fact, a trade agreement between East and West Germany was signed in Frankfurt, October 9, 1949. Although difficulties arose from time to time, trade and communications continued between the East and West Germany.

At the final session of the Conservative Party Congress, October 14, 1949, Mr. Winston Churchill made the concluding speech. On this occasion, however, he made no suggestion whatever of sending an ultimatum to the U.S.S.R. No doubt by this date he realised that such a course would be madness.

We must now turn to China and record briefly the historic changes which developed in that ancient, immense and thickly populated country in 1949, because they greatly strengthened the strategic position of the U.S.S.R. *vis-à-vis* the Western Powers.

In August, 1949, the Communist forces swept into South China; on October 1, the People's Republic of China was proclaimed at Peking; on October 15, Communist troops entered Canton and by the middle of December, 1949, Chiang Kai-Shek's forces were completely driven from the mainland of China. He took refuge in Formosa under U.S.A. protection. The Soviet Government immediately recognised *de jure* and established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

Relations between Peking and Moscow from the very beginning were very cordial and co-operative in all spheres.

Also in India important events took place in October, 1949, which indirectly affected the strategic position of the U.S.S.R. in relation to the Western Powers. The Dominion of India (constituted in 1947),

decided in 1949 to become the Republic of India and Prime Minister Nehru paid a State visit to the U.S.A. in October, 1949, where he was very cordially received by Government and people. The White House hoped to entice Mr. Nehru into the Western anti-Soviet bloc. All their efforts ended in complete failure.

Speaking before 600 scholars and distinguished guests at Columbia University, October 18, 1949, he declared that India proposed to align herself "with no major Power or group of Powers". He deplored the armaments race and added that the world cannot long maintain peace if "the African and Asian half of it is enslaved and despised". (*Manchester Guardian* cable from New York, October 19, 1949.)

Mr. Nehru knew that the declaration was backed by the entire population of India.

In the U.S.A., Mr. Nehru's declaration of policy was recognised as an act of major importance.

The U.S.S.R.'s atom bomb explosion, the establishment of the People's Government of China and India's declaration of neutrality had changed the balance of power enormously in the U.S.S.R.'s favour. These facts were recognised by capable commentators, strategists and scientists, but statesmen apparently tried hard to close their eyes to these well-established truths.

The U.S.A.'s policy (backed by Britain and France) of "encirclement" of the U.S.S.R. was burst wide open in Asia.

Britain's position in the new circumstances was recognised as being very vulnerable.

The British Atomic Scientists Association in *Atomic Scientists' News*, October 26, 1949, stated:

"The fact that America still has a very considerable lead over Russia in the methods of production of atom bombs and has larger stocks of fissionable material can act as only very cold comfort to the western European countries.

"These countries with their relatively high densities of population and strong needs of imported foodstuffs and raw materials are very vulnerable to attacks by even small numbers of atom bombs. This argument applies with particular force to Great Britain."

The article continued: "It is therefore incumbent upon the governments of these countries to make every conceivable effort to mediate between America and Russia.

"Only if the present state of suspicion and mutual recrimination

(between Russia and America) is replaced by some workable degree of mutual trust can there be hope of peace in the world." (*New York Herald Tribune*, October 27, 1949.)

But the British Government jointly with the U.S.A. continued to argue that the Baruch plan was still the best produced, and the Service Chiefs of N.A.T.O. continued their efforts to strengthen the military power of that organisation.

However, by this date, people who stopped to think seriously, realised that it was absurd to imagine that the Soviets would accept the Baruch Plan.

On November 7, 1949, the *Manchester Guardian* in an editorial declared that the better understanding of Soviet Russia "would have shown us that they would insist on a free hand in the peaceful use of this new source of power. America in the same position would react in the same way, and our own attitude towards suggestions that the Ruhr Authority control other European heavy industries is little different. We have to realise that the Russians are unshakeable on the question, not of inspection, as our propaganda has it, but of the ownership of their resources."

As usual, on November 6, the eyes of the world were directed towards Moscow. On this occasion with added interest. Mr. Malenkov, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. made a speech on the eve (November 6) of the Anniversary of the Soviet Revolution. Much of it was devoted to foreign affairs which directly and indirectly affected Anglo-Soviet relations. *Inter alia* he said:

"Never before in all its history has our country been surrounded with neighbouring countries so friendly to our State. On the borders of the Soviet Union instead of a Polish State hostile to Russia, we now have a friendly people's democratic Poland; instead of a Czechoslovakia dismembered by the Hitlerites and only recently languishing under the yoke of the fascist invaders, we have a friendly people's democratic Czechoslovakia.

"Instead of the former vassal of Hitler Germany—Hungary, we have a friendly Hungarian People's Republic; instead of a Rumania hostile to the Soviet Union, we have a friendly Rumanian People's Republic; instead of the old Bulgaria, which was an adjunct of Hitler's war machine, the Soviet Union has a loyal friend in the Bulgarian People's Republic. The Polish, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian peoples are linked with the peoples of the

Soviet Union by ties of eternal friendship. (*Soviet News*, 2257, p. 1, November 7, 1949.)

Malenkov added: "In the East the Soviet Union is bordered by the Mongolian People's Republic, with which we are bound by long years of friendship; the young Korean People's Democratic Republic is our friendly neighbour; and lastly, instead of a China reduced to servitude by foreign capitalist marauders, we now have in the East a great and friendly neighbour, the free People's Republic of China."

On the subjects of N.A.T.O. and atomic diplomacy, Malenkov said:

"The purpose of the North Atlantic Military Pact, signed in 1949 is perfectly obvious. It is an instrument for direct and outright preparation of a new imperialist war.

"One of the most important component elements of the aggressive line of the warmongers is what is known as atomic diplomacy, the adventurist character of which has now become fully revealed. For, indeed, this diplomacy was based upon the absolutely false initial assumption that the United States possesses a monopoly of the atomic weapon. Actually, as we know, the Soviet Government made no secret of the fact that it possessed the atomic weapon.

"In 1947 the Soviet Government made it known to the world that the secret of the atomic bomb no longer existed. Nevertheless the over-weening warmongers, devoid of all sense of reality, are still not desisting from their notorious atomic diplomacy.

"We do not want war and we shall do everything on our part to prevent it. But let nobody think that we are scared by the warmongers' sabre-rattling. It is not we but the imperialists and aggressors that should be afraid of war.

"Can there be any doubt that if the imperialists unleash a third world war, it will mean the grave not of individual capitalist States but of the whole world capitalism?"

Malenkov continued: "Lenin said in 1923 that the issue of the world struggle between capitalism and Communism depended in the final analysis on the fact that Russia, India and China constituted the overwhelming majority of the population of the world, and that this majority was being drawn with extraordinary rapidity into the struggle for its emancipation. With the victory of the Chinese people, the people's democracies of Europe and Asia together with the Soviet Socialist Power embrace a population of approximately 800 million."

In conclusion, Malenkov said: "Guided by the genius of Comrade

Stalin, our teacher and leader, we face the morrow with confidence. We firmly know that the world-wide triumph of Socialism and democracy is inevitable."

Two days later the *Times* editorially commented:

"More striking than the attacks on the Western Powers was the strong note of confidence which he sounded and it is perhaps in its passages on Russian industrial progress, on eastern Europe and on Germany that his speech should be most closely studied for evidence about Soviet policy." (*Times*, November 8, 1949.)

The *Times* editorial continued: "He was able to announce that the devastated western regions of the Soviet Union had been built up at last to the 1940 level of production, while in other parts of the Union much higher levels had been reached. Russian security, he said, was further served by the trustworthy régimes in eastern Europe and by the revolution in China."

Many foreign journalists and diplomats present at the meeting were impressed by the confident tone running throughout Malenkov's speech.

A few days later, November 10, at a meeting of the United Nations Political Committee, Mr. Vyshinsky explained how the U.S.S.R. was using atomic power for peaceful purposes. He said: "We are razing mountains, irrigating deserts and cutting through jungle. We are cutting through all sorts of barriers and bringing civilisation to places where the human foot has not trod for 1,000 years. We are doing this because we are masters of our marvellous land—and we do not have to account to anyone for it."

Turning to the Baruch Plan he declared: "Under it we would take all this new force of nature and place it in the hands of a control agency which, in turn, would be controlled by the American monopolies. Uncle Sam would not give a shred of his monopoly to anyone else."

Mr. Vyshinsky added that although the U.S.S.R. was not stock-piling atomic bombs, "if unfortunately the need arises the Soviet Union would have as many atomic bombs as we need—no more or less."

The subject was again discussed in U.N. a few days later. A Reuter cable, date-lined Lake Success, November 12, 1949, stated: "Mr. Vyshinsky said in his speech to-day that the Soviet Union was willing to permit the international inspection of atomic facilities, but would

never allow any international organ to own or control Soviet enterprises.

" 'We open our doors to control, but you have distorted the word control,' he declared. 'To us it means management. The Soviet Union will not, and never will, allow foreign ownership of its lands and enterprises. That is once and for all.' Mr. Vyshinsky said that Russia was accused of being unwilling to open up her territory to inspection. 'That is not so. The Soviet proposals provide for a full system of control, including the elaboration of rules for technological control,' he asserted. 'The Soviet proposals provide for the international control organ to have full rights of access to the Soviet Union and other States.' "

However, the Western Powers and their satellites still backed the Baruch Plan; and the President of the General Assembly, General Romulo, speaking in New York, November 11, 1949, described it as "one of the most constructive feats of imaginative and general international statesmanship of all time". (*New York Herald Tribune*, November 12, 1949.)

At a meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations, November 23, 1949, Mr. Vyshinsky again made clear beyond a doubt his Government's attitude on the crucial question of inspection.

"Two years ago," he stated, "the Russian representative made it clear that inspection would entail inspection of all enterprises, starting with mines and winding up with plants for production of nuclear fuel.

"This would not be in periods established in advance, but it would be by the decision of the international control commission as needed. We wish to make it clear that periodic inspection means inspection at intervals—not at set intervals, but as determined by necessity, whenever the international control commission deems it necessary.

"It is obvious that there would be no unanimity rule, no veto. To put an end to slander and insinuations, we make it quite clear that decisions would be by a majority of votes."

At the same session the General Assembly accepted a resolution by 49 votes to 5 instructing the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission to study again the problem of an agreement on the control of atomic energy.

Both in U.N. and in the House of Commons, British representatives informed the Soviet Union that they were anxious to be friends with

her, but Britain continued to back the U.S.A. plan of encircling the U.S.S.R. and the building up of N.A.T.O. directed against the U.S.S.R.

Field Marshal Montgomery, Chairman of the Western Union Defence Committee, in a nation-wide broadcast to the American people, November 29, 1949, stated: "I declare myself an enemy of Communism and all it stands for. Unless this danger can be held, a great trouble lies ahead." (*New York Herald Tribune*, November 30, 1949.) And he appealed to the U.S.A. to save Europe from being "overrun again". In other words he was appealing for a crusade against a political creed.

There is no reason to think that the British Government objected to Montgomery's declaration.

The Alsops writing in the *New York Herald Tribune*, November 30, 1949, explained the important role that Britain played in encircling the U.S.S.R. They stated: "As everyone knows by now, B29 and B50 groups have been stationed at British bases ever since the peak moment of international tension, in 1947. Very few people understand, however, that these British bases meet only about one-third of the total requirement. This is because only the most westerly of the Soviet industrial centres are within reasonable range from airfields in Britain."

Note the words "only about one-third". This meant that Britain was the U.S.A.'s most important base directed against the U.S.S.R.

Meanwhile the Western Powers were preparing for another violation of the Potsdam Agreement.

It was announced in Frankfurt, December 6, 1949, that the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency had decided to make a final allocation among themselves of the equipment in Western Germany earmarked for reparations. Despite the Potsdam Agreement on this subject, the U.S.S.R. was not consulted and no allocation was reserved for the Soviet Union. Moreover, suggestions were now being heard to the effect that in the end the Western Allies would have to rearm Germany without prior agreement with the U.S.S.R.

However, at this time all political parties in Germany were opposed to German rearmament. A cable date-lined, Bonn, December 16, 1949, stated: "All parties in the Bundestag joined to-day in repudiating the idea of rearmament. Whatever their motives, the result was to put on record the West German Parliament's opposition to, and even detestation of a revival of the Wehrmacht." (*Times*, December 17, 1949.)

And in Great Britain, despite the hostile policy of the Government towards the U.S.S.R. some influential voices were raised in favour of efforts being made to try to find accommodation with the U.S.S.R.

Dr. Gilbert Murray in his presidential address to the Annual Council of the United Nations Association in London, December 10, 1949, said: " 'We must always try to get some working agreement with Russia. We must try to get some understanding, but do not let us doubt the great difficulty of getting an understanding.' " (*Times*, December 12, 1949.)

According to the same report in the *Times* of the proceedings of the Council: "Lord Cecil said he would like to see the Atlantic Pact strengthened and enlarged. It should aim not only at the defence of its members against attack but rather at the establishment of peace, and, ultimately, it should cover the whole world. It was much to be desired that the immense population and resources of Russia should be enlisted in the cause of world peace. We should keep the door open for Russia to join in, for without her the conception of an overwhelming force against aggression would be difficult to realise."

We would comment here that the U.S.A., France, Canada and Great Britain were adamant against the admission of the U.S.S.R. to N.A.T.O.

And Mr. E. Shinwell, M.P., Minister of War, speaking at a miners' meeting at Newcastle, December 17, 1949, stated:

"It is time for the great Powers, the United States, Soviet Russia and this country, with France and the Commonwealth, to get together and say 'Whatever happens we are going to settle our disputes by arbitration and peaceful means, and let's have no more nonsense.'"

"It cannot be left to ourselves alone or the United States. Soviet Russia must play her part."

"That country with its wonderful war record and wonderful natural resources—a Socialist country—ought to be prepared to sit down with the other great nations and in reasonable fashion work out the possibility of a lasting and enduring peace." (*Reynolds*, December 18, 1949.)

Up to this date, December, 1949, the weight of Western opinion was still against the rearmament of Germany. The pros and cons of the question were discussed by the *Times* editorially, December 19, 1949. The journal stated:

"On November 22, the three High Commissioners of the Western Powers in Germany and the Chancellor of the West German Republic signed an agreement in which it was clearly stated that 'the Federal Government declares its earnest determination to maintain the demilitarisation of the federal territory and to endeavour by all means in its power to prevent the recreation of armed forces of any kind'. No more emphatic declaration could have been made."

The *Times* continued: "Since then the leading statesmen of the Western Powers have denied that there is now or ever has been any intention of rearming Germany, and last week the German parties represented in the Bundestag also declared their opposition to any form of rearmament. In spite of these denials the possibility is everywhere discussed as if the Petersberg Agreement is no more than a polite formality to be torn up and thrown aside when convenient."

The *Times* concluded: "At present a German army, acting alone or as part of a European force, would inevitably inherit the traditions, the officers, and perhaps even the men from that other German army which did so much to destroy Europe and bring us to our present plight. There is a serious risk that in two or three years—even if war did not intervene—it would again be master of Germany and that in another four or five it would be master of Europe."

As for the attitude of the German people, the following cable, dated Frankfurt, December 18, 1949, speaks for itself: "The German people is most heavily hit by the war and its results. Therefore it must co-ordinate all its moral and material strength to recover its national life and rebuild its economy so that its citizens will be given sound and normal living conditions. We cannot abandon hope that the victorious powers may succeed in finally establishing peace after the war. Another war would bury the hopes of the Germans. Rearmament, therefore, is far from the minds of the German people. Germany being a territorial and historical part of Western culture desires to serve the peace and maintain the human freedom of a unified Europe as an equal member.'—A statement to Parliament by the Government coalition parties of West Germany." (*New York Herald Tribune*, December 19, 1949.)

On December 21, Prime Minister Attlee sent the following message to Mr. Stalin: "Permit me to tender to you my greetings and congratulations on the seventieth anniversary of your birthday and my

best wishes for your continued good health." (*Times*, December 22, 1949.)

Important further events happened in Asia which greatly strengthened the strategic position of the U.S.S.R. On December 27, 1949, the United States of Indonesia came into existence which made it less likely that the territory of these islands would be used as *place d'armes* directed against the U.S.S.R., and the Alsops in an article in the *New York Herald Tribune*, December 30, 1949, wrote that "what is in prospect in Asia is a firm Russian-Chinese partnership". As far as the U.S.S.R.'s Far Eastern frontier was concerned a great gap had been torn in the "containment" policy of the U.S.A.

The Soviet Leaders surveying from the Kremlin the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. coupled with the big progress made at home could afford to feel in a more confident mood.

This was well expressed in a leading article in the *Times* entitled "Report on Russia" dated December 31, 1949, which *inter alia* stated: "Yet there is no mistaking the new and deeper note of confidence—almost relief—which all the members of the Politburo sound."

At the end of 1949 the U.S.S.R. was immensely strong, her strategic position had greatly improved in Eastern Asia and along a large section of her southern flank and along her western frontier.

The growing strength of the U.S.S.R. was, of course, not to the liking of many in Britain. *Janes' Fighting Ships* dated 1950-1, published December, 1949, stated that "the capacity of Soviet shipbuilding is reported to be twice that of ten years ago"; that the number of submarines was "not less than 350-370" stationed chiefly in the Baltic and the Far East; and that the Soviet Union was rushing to build up a navy "already far in excess of the normal requirements of defence".

Presumably, according to *Janes*, the Soviet Union, unlike Great Britain, had no right to build up a strong force at sea.

However, the U.S.A. aided by Great Britain and the other N.A.T.O. Powers were busily engaged in building up forces and constructing bases from which the U.S.S.R. could be attacked.

During 1949, Britain and France had repudiated in practice their Treaties of 1942 and 1944 respectively with the Soviet Union and at the end of the year little remained of the high hopes which had been expressed by both sides when the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance was signed in 1942. Anglo-Soviet relations were very much worse than they were when Mr. Ernest Bevin became Foreign Secretary in 1945.

ALLEGED "FORCED LABOUR" IN THE U.S.S.R.: BLUNDER BY BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE IN 1949

RIP VAN WINKLE could perhaps advance the excuse that he lived in a very leisurely age and that it did not matter how long he slept, but the British Foreign Office cannot get away with such an excuse at a time of rapidly world changing events.

In 1949, there was a sudden resurrection of the allegation of "forced labour" in the U.S.S.R.

To understand the question we must begin at the beginning. In January, 1931, the late Mr. Arthur Henderson was British Foreign Secretary. Daily he was badgered in the House of Commons by the Tories about alleged "forced labour" in the Russian forests working for export and "forced labour" generally in the U.S.S.R. After the necessary enquiries Henderson was convinced that the allegations were baseless and retorted by publishing on January 29, 1931, a "Blue Book" (Cmd. 3775) entitled *A Selection of Documents relative to the Labour Legislation in force in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*.

As soon as the "Blue Book" had been issued the Tories realised their mistake and contented themselves with publishing some extracts from it, but after that they left it severely alone because it completely refuted their contentions. In fact, in order to minimise the effect of the "Blue Book" the *Times* in a leading article suggested that the laws were not in "effective operation". This was absolutely untrue as testified by visitors to the U.S.S.R.

The "Blue Book" contained the full text of the Labour Code which governs the conditions under which all ordinary wage-earners are employed in the U.S.S.R. This Code, which was worked out in the first instance by the Soviet trade unions, had been long recognised as an exceptionally progressive body of laws.

The "Blue Book" also contained "The Correctional Labour Code of the R.S.F.S.R. of 1924, with amendments", containing 231 Articles and covering the conditions under which persons sentenced to correctional labour worked.

This Code was not criticised by the British Labour Movement. On the contrary, it was defended by, among others, leading members of the then General Council of the Trades Union Congress as sensible and humane. For instance, Mr. John Bromley, M.P. (Secretary of the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen), writing in the *Manchester Guardian*, February 12, 1931, stated:

"Certain die-hards are asking why the Trade Unions are silent regarding the alleged use of forced labour in the Russian timber industry.

"Frankly, we are naturally suspicious of those who are leading the campaign against Russian timber.

"I think we have good grounds. They are members of the party which introduced Chinese slavery into South Africa after the Boer War in the interests of a number of cosmopolitan financiers. When have these die-hards in any way helped organised labour in this country? When have these gentlemen raised in the House of Commons, the question of forced compulsory labour in the Belgian, Dutch, French, Italian, or Portuguese colonies, or in Kenya, the Orissa States and elsewhere?

"At the moment I can only add that the Soviet Government has informed our Ambassador in Moscow that no forced or prison labour is employed in the preparation, sawing, or loading of timber for export. It is a matter of common knowledge that, as in this country, convicts in Russia have to work. It is possible that they are employed on felling timber for home purposes. Is that any worse than making mail-bags in His Majesty's prisons in this country?"

Mr. A. A. Purcell (Secretary of the Manchester and Salford Trades Council) in the *Manchester Guardian*, February 19, 1931, declared:

"I thoroughly agree that the 'die-hards' are exploiting the bogus charge of 'convict and forced labour' for an ulterior object. In my judgment, the real aims of the 'die-hards' are to hinder and, if possible frustrate the successful conclusion of the Five-Year Plan."

Mr. George Hicks (Secretary, Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers), in the *Manchester Guardian*, February 23, 1931, wrote:

"On what are the charges of 'slave' and 'forced' labour in the Russian lumber camps based? They are based on a series of affidavits each more ridiculous than the other. . . .

"Mr. Winston Churchill gave additional support to the contentions of my colleagues, namely, that the real aim of the 'die-hards' is to wreck the Five Year Plan and to organise an international boycott against the U.S.S.R. Speaking in the House of Commons on the 18th, he referred to the Five Year Plan as 'that ambitious scheme,' and declared that 'nothing will prevent it from succeeding . . . to the extent of 60 per cent.'

"And, later, in the course of the same speech, Mr. Churchill advised: 'The Government should take counsel betimes with friendly Powers for the international treatment of the problems of currency and trade and concert joint action against the uneconomic exportations which are in increasing measure to be apprehended from Russia.' In these two sentences we have, I believe, the real mind of the 'die-hards', and it is of the first importance that the country in general, and organised Labour in particular, should realise this disturbing fact."

The monthly journal of the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers' (February, 1931), in the course of a discussion under the heading "Timber from Soviet Russia", pointed out that the Tory reactionaries, having failed in their other anti-Soviet stunts:

"... have discovered another mare's nest—joinery and timber cut and manufactured by 'forced or convict labour, carried out under conditions of barbarity'. Our members do not need warning against accepting these yarns. They are fairy tales worked up for specific political purposes by the anti-trade union party."

The journal then quoted the following statement on the subject made by Mr. T. Barron (Chairman of the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers), which also appeared in *Forward*, January 3, 1931:

"For the last nine years the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers has had an agreement with the employers under which foreign firms supplying timber are placed on a Fair List. Before any firm is placed on this list, the Society makes full enquiries in the country from which the timber comes, and a statement as to wages and labour conditions has to be signed by three trade unionists and three employers. If the conditions are not satisfactory, the foreign firm does not go on the Fair List, and, as a result of this attitude, labour conditions in foreign countries, for example, Scandinavia, have been improved.

"In the case of Russian timber the same line of policy was adopted, and a statement was signed by the State Department concerned, and by the workers engaged in the industry, that the timber was produced under trade union conditions, and that trade union rates were paid. The Woodworkers' Society knows nothing about the allegations that the Duke makes about timber produced by convict labour. On the contrary, representatives of the Society who visited Russia were of the opinion that working conditions in the industry were satisfactory."

Men of the mental calibre of Arthur Henderson, John Bromley, A. A. Purcell and George Hicks were not taken in by the Tory lie of "forced labour" in the U.S.S.R.

Whilst this subject was being discussed in the British press, the *Times* New York correspondent cabled his paper:

"Tennessee Legislature to-day discussed the report of its committee on penal institutions. The Warden of the State Penitentiary told the Committee that one form of punishment administered to women was to handcuff them and then hang them up by the wrist from pegs on the wall. One woman testified that she had been left hanging by the arms in this way for ten hours. The Committee recommended that the exploitation of convict labour in Tennessee be discontinued." (*Times*, March 19, 1931.)

It is hardly necessary to add that the Tories refused to make representations to the Government of the U.S.A. regarding the ill-treatment of prisoners.

The "Blue Book" as a whole was regarded by all sections of the Labour Movement as justifying the Labour Government's policy towards the U.S.S.R.

Some months after the publication of the "Blue Book" the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society under the guidance of Sir Alan Pim, K.C.I.E., and Sir Edward Bateson, formerly a judge of the Egyptian Mixed Tribunals, made a careful study of the publication and related material. In their report, among other things, they stated that "the provisions of the Correctional Labour Code are, in the main of an advanced reformatory character".

However, to Mr. Ernest Bevin belonged the honour of giving the quietus to the stupid Tory "forced labour" lie. Speaking at the Trades Union Congress, September 10, 1931, he first explained the Tory antipathy to the U.S.S.R.:

"Cutting right across world economy to-day is the new development in Russia. Russia has introduced, whatever may be said about it, a new motive for industry—a motive which is not profit. That new economy involves planning, and the attack on the Russian planning does not arise because of Russian labour conditions, but because its planning was against the old world economy of scramble and individualism and profit. The effect of that planning could not be over-estimated. Even if the Five Year Plan fails—and it cannot fail completely—you can never start on a road and go back completely."

Then with pointed and apposite irony he added:

"Mr. Baldwin, speaking some time ago, at least was conscious that the lining up of priests and parsons to denounce Russia would not work, nor would the mania of the Swedish timber trade to denounce forced labour—and I was awfully amused at this agitation because I was a member at that time of the Colonial Development Committee and we saw something of the conditions in the British Empire. This unctuous hypocrisy ought not to influence anybody—I say Mr. Baldwin has shown that he was conscious that that sort of thing does not work."

After Mr. Bevin's speech the Tories apparently decided to put the "forced labour" story into cold storage for the time being.

Two years passed and in August, 1933, a revised version of the Code was published in Moscow under the title of *Corrective Labour Codex of the R.S.F.S.R.* Like the earlier one there was nothing secret about this document, and it was freely procurable. It dealt at considerable length with the conditions under which convicted persons sentenced to "Corrective Labour" worked. It was in large measure a codification of existing laws on this subject.

Commenting on the Codex the *Times* correspondent cabled from Riga: "A great part of the code is not really new, but merely received legal sanction, having been tested by experiment during the last few years." (*Times*, October 10, 1933.)

When the Codex was published in Russian it attracted very little attention in the British press. The vast majority of the newspapers and journals completely ignored it.

In April, 1936, the revised version was first published in English in London by the well-known firm of law-publishers, Messrs. Sweet and Maxwell, Ltd., under the title *The Labour Correction Code of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (Prison Code)*.

There was no "hush-hush" about the publication. Review copies were sent to the following journals:

<i>Times</i>	<i>19th Century</i>
<i>News Chronicle</i>	<i>Time & Tide</i>
<i>Daily Herald</i>	<i>Universe</i>
<i>Daily Telegraph</i>	<i>Methodist Recorder</i>
<i>New Statesman</i>	<i>Church Times</i>
<i>Left Review</i>	<i>Journal of Divorce Law Reform</i>
<i>Sociological Review</i>	<i>Union</i>
<i>Reynolds</i>	<i>Penal Reformer</i>
<i>Clare Market Review</i>	<i>Justice of the Peace</i>
<i>New Age</i>	<i>Prison Officers' Magazine</i>
<i>Contemporary Review</i>	<i>Police Journal</i>
<i>Fortnightly</i>	

Again the Codex attracted very little attention. It was, in the main, passed over by reviewers and feature editors.

To avoid any misunderstanding we wish to add here that there are no fundamental differences between the Correctional Labour Code of 1924 and the revised version of 1933.

Suddenly, it would appear, an official or diplomat in the Foreign Office heard of it and innocently thought he had made a startling discovery and without troubling to make further enquiries evidently decided that, with a little doctoring, here was the very thing needed to convict the Soviet Government of using forced labour.

In the course of a speech in the House of Commons, Mr. McNeil (Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) stated:

"Perhaps I might say that in this Debate at Geneva, we will offer irrefutable evidence about forced labour in Soviet Russia. We will offer evidence taken from Moscow itself. We will table and make available in translation the codex of the Soviet administration in relation to forced labour which will show that there are varying degrees of forced labour, including exiled forced labour." (*Hansard*, July 21, 1949, col. 1693.)

If words have any meaning the Minister gave the impression that a very secret document, only known to the Soviet Government, was to be made available to the world at large for the first time.

This was not at all the case; the document was the *Corrective Labour*

Codex of the R.S.F.S.R. referred to on a previous page, published in Moscow in August, 1933.

Before proceeding further we wish to explain here once again that there has never been any secret whatever that convicted persons in the Soviet Union have been and are put to useful work. The official Trades Union Congress Delegation which visited the U.S.S.R. in 1924 stated in their report:

"The whole system of prison administration and the treatment of non-political prisoners in Soviet Russia is based on the latest theories of criminal psychology. The humanising of prison life is a striking feature of Russian administration. The ordinary criminal is detained in prison not for the purpose of punishment, but with the view to educating him to become a useful citizen and worker.

"This is perhaps one of the most remarkable changes in Russia, and is apparently working with the most excellent results. The atmosphere of a Russian prison is now more that of a workshop of free workers than that of a house of detention or a jail.

"Large workshops have been installed wherever space is available, and in the older kind of prisons the large broad corridors leading to the cells have been utilised for this purpose.

"Each prison is self-supporting as regards general requirements. A large kitchen, staffed by prisoners, prepares the food for the establishment. An up-to-date steam laundry works at full pressure, doing the prison washing, the washing for railways, Government offices and institutions, such as co-operatives and hospitals. All the prison furniture, clothes, boots and other requirements are manufactured on the premises and outside orders for Government departments, etc., are fulfilled when possible.

"A prisoner on entering the prison is placed to work at his own trade. In the event of his not having learned one, he is allowed to choose to which trade he will become apprenticed. He then commences work at Trade Union hours and wages. The wages are paid to him monthly in the form of a cheque which his family or relations can discount for cash, or which he himself can discount for goods at the prison co-operative store. In the event of a prisoner refusing to work at a trade, he is drafted into one of the workshops and left alone to idle. In all cases, however, he invariably commences work after a few days' idleness in order to obtain pay and privileges received by his comrades." (pp. 132-3.)

"It is indeed a remarkable sight to witness a large carpenter's shop of over 100 prisoners working with ordinary implements, such as hammers, chisels and saws, with only two, apparently unarmed,

militia men strolling among them and six working warders. These prisoners consisted of burglars, bandits and men convicted of robbery with violence." (p. 134.)

The Trades Union Congress Delegation consisted of Herbert Smith, J.P. (Miners Federation of Great Britain); Ben Tillett (Secretary of Political and International Department of Transport and General Workers' Union); John Turner (Shop Assistants' Union); John Bromley, M.P. (Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen); Alan A. H. Findlay (United Patternmakers' Association); A. A. Purcell (Furnishing Trades Union); Fred Bramley (Secretary, Trades Union Congress); and was accompanied by its own interpreters, viz. Harold G. Grenfell, A. R. McDonell, George Young, all three of whom had considerable experience of Russia in Tsarist days in the British diplomatic and consular services.

Mark the words of the Delegation: "The humanising of prison life is a striking feature of the Russian administration." The Soviet Government prided itself on the fact that prisoners were put to useful labour.

Since 1924 there have, of course, been modifications in the details of prison treatment, but it is still based on the same humane principles.

Mr. Molotov (then Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars) speaking at the Sixth All-Union Congress of Soviets, Moscow, March 8, 1931, said:

"We have never denied the fact that healthy prisoners capable of normal labour are used for road and other public works. We have used such labour in the past, are using it now and will continue to use it in the future. This is very good for society at large. It is also good for the prisoners themselves who are thereby accustomed to regular work and assisted to become useful members of society."

Mr. Molotov detailed all the districts in which this kind of work was being done and continued: "About 60,000 persons are engaged on all these works in all the districts mentioned."

From a humanitarian point of view the conditions in which prisoners work is of supreme importance. Mr. Molotov continued: "And now for a few particulars concerning the living and working conditions of these prisoners. The length of the working day may never exceed eight hours in all these prison camps. If the fact is taken into consideration that these prisoners receive board and lodging and all other necessities

and in addition a monthly payment ranging from 20 to 30 roubles, it will be seen that the conditions under which they work are not much different from those enjoyed by free workers. These prison camps are colonies within whose territory the inhabitants move about freely without being guarded. Intensive cultural and educational work is conducted in all these camps. Books and newspapers are widely read. Vocational training was given to 10,000 prisoners in the autumn of 1930 in the northern district.

"This is the real truth concerning Soviet prison labour and the workers in the capitalist countries must be told it."

Now to return to the Codex and the Foreign Office. On July 22, 1949, at a Foreign Office press conference, journalists were handed two documents. One was headed *Corrective Labour Codex of the R.S.F.S.R.* It ran to 23 pages and contained 147 clauses in legalistic language. Had the Foreign Office spokesmen said to the assembled journalists: "Now go back to Fleet Street, study that document and write up your impressions of it", no one could have complained, although some journalists might have asked: "Why is this sixteen years late?"

However, the Foreign Office was not taking any risks. They handed the assembled journalists another document, a much shorter one, a "write-up" of the Codex, and this document was headed *The Forced Labour Codex of the R.S.F.S.R.* In other words, this heading was a falsified translation, and the journalists were "briefed" as to how they should comment on the Codex.

But the Foreign Office was in for a shock. At the press conference their attention was drawn to the fact that the Codex had been published in English thirteen years earlier. We can imagine their consternation when, as in all probability must have happened, they verified this fact and found it correct.

Two of the most important articles from this Codex are:

"The Labour correction policy pursues the following aims:

(a) To place the persons sentenced in conditions which deprive them of the opportunity of committing actions which cause damage to the Socialist construction, and

(b) To re-educate and adapt them to conditions of common working life by means of directing their labour to socially useful purposes, and by the organisation of this labour on the basis of gradual approach from compulsory labour to voluntary labour on the basis of social competition and shock-brigade work." (p. 3.)

"The scale of payment for the prisoners is determined by a special

instruction issued by the People's Commissariat of Justice of the R.S.F.S.R. and the Central Council of Trade Unions." (p. 21.)

Two somewhat similar clauses are printed in a British Official document entitled 1949 No. 1073. *Prison, England. The Prison Rules, 1949.* They read:

"The purposes of training and treatment of convicted prisoners shall be to establish in them the will to lead a good and useful life on discharge, and to fit them to do so." (p. 4.)

"Every prisoner shall be required to engage in useful work for not more than ten hours a day, of which so far as practicable at least eight hours shall be spent in associated or other work outside the cells.

"Prisoners may receive payment for work in accordance with rates approved by the Commissioners." (p. 14.)

So convicted persons in Great Britain must work "for not more than ten hours a day" and "may receive payment".

Now as to the U.S.A. Does it object to putting convicted persons to work? The International Labour Office published a volume entitled *Forced Labour* in 1929, from which we take the following extract:

"Since the publication of the Grey Report the attitude of the United States towards the use of forced labour has been formulated in connection with its ratification of the Slavery Convention on March 21, 1929. This ratification was accompanied by a reservation to Article 5 of the Convention in the following terms:

"That the Government of the United States adhering to its policy of opposition to forced or compulsory labour except as a punishment for crime, of which the person concerned had been duly convicted, adheres to the Convention except as to the first subdivision of the second paragraph of Article 5, which reads as follows:

" 'Subject to the transitional provisions laid down in paragraph (2) below compulsory or forced labour may only be exacted for public purposes.' "

"By this reservation it would appear that the Government of the United States wished to dissociate itself from the approval of forced labour for any purpose except as a punishment for crime of which the person concerned has been duly convicted." (p. 26. Supplement.)

So the U.S.A. also believes in "forced labour" for convicted persons.

When the matter was raised at the United Nations Economic and Social Council, August 3, 1949, the Soviet representative, Mr. Arutyunyan, stated that the Foreign Office translation of the Codex contained "about forty-three errors", some of them innocent but others "tendentious and designed to discredit the Soviet Union".

He further stated:

"The British delegation professes to have revealed material so far unknown. Nevertheless, the point discussed here is the Labour Correction Code of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republics adopted back in 1933 and which even in Britain was published in English in 1936, by Sweet and Maxwell, Ltd.

"Why does the British Government and its delegation in the Economic Council try to represent this Code as a kind of sensation sixteen years after it was published?"

Then turning to the Codex, Mr. Arutyunyan declared:

"The Soviet policy towards persons guilty of criminal offences is a progressive policy. This is a most humane policy. It sets the task of re-educating people who have committed crimes and of bringing back to the society of working people those who due to their moral weakness found themselves outside the confines of this society because of the crimes committed.

"We do not believe the theory of born criminals. We hold in high esteem every human being, including even those who have committed a legal offence. It is within our reach to re-educate them in order to bring them back to public activity. Therefore, the cardinal principles that go to make the foundation of the Code under review at present, as in the general foundation of the Soviet Union's policy with regard to criminal offences, lies in re-educating the convicted persons and adapting them to voluntary, active participation in Socialist construction and not in utilising the labour of convicted persons as cheap manpower. The Soviet system of re-educating prisoners yields fruitful results."

Then came this downright statement:

"The Code is designed exclusively for application to persons punished for offences committed; it only regulates the labour of those convicted of a crime and not the labour of free citizens. It has

nothing to do at all with those who have not committed any crime or offence. This means that it deals with only a very limited number of persons."

On the following day, to quote the *News Chronicle* report from Geneva: "Mr. Corley Smith, the British delegate, who yesterday accused Russia, before U.N. Economic and Social Council here, of using slave labour, to-day admitted that there was forced labour in British colonies.

"He said it was done in accordance with the provisions of the International Labour Organisation Convention on Forced Labour.

" 'Such labour,' he explained, 'is used only in some primitive tribal areas, for communal projects such as bridge and road-building.' " (*News Chronicle*, August 5, 1949.)

Finally, on August 5, 1949, the Council decided to postpone further consideration of the question till its next session.

A passing reference was made to "Soviet labour camps" by a representative of the British Government in the Social Committee of U.N. on October 16, 1949, but no serious debate on the question took place in U.N. during the remainder of the year 1949.

The subject was put into cold storage for the time being.

Several questions naturally arise. Why did the Foreign Office resurrect and republish the *Corrective Labour Codex* in July, 1949, together with the distorted resumé of it?

Nothing that was said either in the House of Commons or at U.N. gives anything approaching a satisfactory answer.

Was Foreign Secretary Bevin cognizant of the Foreign Office's decision to re-publish?

Was the Foreign Office aware that the *Codex* had been published in 1933; and in 1936 in London?

Was the Foreign Office banking on the expectation that these previous publications had been forgotten?

We do not pretend to know the answers to these questions. However, we will hazard an explanation, viz. that the Foreign Office re-published the *Codex* in 1949 deliberately to create resentment in Moscow, to poison the atmosphere between the U.S.S.R. and progressive people everywhere and thus still further to increase the tension between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain.

CHAPTER XIX

THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION OF 1950: BRITISH SOVIET RELATIONS REMAIN STRAINED

IN the first two months of 1950, although diplomatic activities did not cease, the British Government and the Opposition were mainly pre-occupied with the General Election. After some days of considerable speculation, the Government announced in the early hours of January 11, 1950, that the House of Commons would be dissolved on February 3; that the General Election would take place on February 23; that the new Parliament would be summoned for March 1 and that the formal State Opening of Parliament would take place on March 6, 1950.

The Labour Party Election Manifesto was the first to appear. It was published in the press on January 18, 1950. *Inter alia* it read:

"We will remain ready at any moment to co-operate freely with Russia, as with any country that is prepared to work with us for peace and friendship." (*Daily Herald*, January 18, 1950.)

The Conservative Party's Election Manifesto was published in the press on January 25, 1950. It contained a vicious attack on Communism and the New Democracies of Eastern Europe, and continued:

"We are not prepared to regard these ancient States and nations which have already fallen under the Soviet yoke as lost for ever.

"In China 500 million have been subject to Communist dictatorship, and in the new countries of South-East Asia free democracy is under heavy Communist pressure."

The Manifesto continued that the Conservatives wanted to build imperial defence forces, bring Western Germany into the Council of Europe, and together with the U.S. "to help by all means all countries in Europe, Asia or elsewhere, to resist the aggression of Communism by open attack or secret penetration."

At first it looked as though the question of Anglo-Soviet relations would not be raised as an issue in the election. In fact the *Times* on

February 7, wrote that foreign affairs were not an issue in the election, and the *Manchester Guardian* on February 10, stated that foreign affairs were kept out of the election.

However, that state of affairs was suddenly changed. Mr. Winston Churchill speaking in Usher Hall, Edinburgh, February 14, 1950, said:

"I have not, of course, access to the secret information of the Government, nor am I fully informed about the attitude of the United States; still, I cannot help coming back to this idea of another talk with Soviet Russia upon the highest level.

"The idea appeals to me of a supreme effort to bridge the gulf between the two worlds, so that each can live their life, if not in friendship, at least without the hatreds and manœuvres of the cold war." (*Times*, February 15, 1950.)

This remark was loudly cheered by the crowded audience present. On the following day, February 15, 1950, Foreign Secretary Bevin in a broadcast blamed the U.S.S.R. for failure to reach agreement and continued:

"... if Russia shows the slightest change of attitude and indicates her readiness to settle these relationships and give the world complete peace, then we shall be ready to enter into discussions with the object of abolishing the possibility of war and enabling all nations to co-operate with each other." (*Times*, February 16, 1950.)

Bevin made it perfectly clear that he was not in favour of Churchill's suggestion, at any rate for the time being.

On the other hand the Leader of the Liberal Party, Mr. Clement Davies, in a statement issued on the same day, February 15, 1950, declared: "I warmly endorse Mr. Churchill's proposal that a new and supreme effort should be made at the highest level to bridge a gulf between the Western world and Russia." (*News Chronicle*, February 16, 1950.)

Mr. Herbert Morrison speaking on February 16, 1950, referred to Churchill's speech as "soap-box diplomacy", and continued:

"Now I do not rule out high level talks between nations who are taking different views about the affairs of the world if and when it is clear that such talks would be advantageous.

"In the light of what our Foreign Secretary, Mr. Bevin, said on the wireless on Wednesday night it is clearly his view, as it is certainly mine, that such an effort in the spirit of electoral stunting would be anything but useful." (*Daily Herald*, February 17, 1950.)

Mr. Attlee also supported Bevin's attitude towards Churchill's high-level talks proposal.

Mr. A. J. Cummings, a well-known columnist, declared:

"It is deeply to be regretted that Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin made so chilly a reply to Mr. Churchill's suggestion for a new approach to Stalin on the highest level in order to reach agreements on the hydrogen and atom bombs.

"To dismiss it as an election stunt was a gross error of judgment. I believe it was something more than an election stunt. By this proposal Mr. Churchill has committed himself and his party to a major proposal from which he knows they cannot withdraw.

"If Mr. Bevin had had a flicker of imagination in his soul he would have used the occasion to accept the idea whole-heartedly and to expand it, with all the force at his command."

Cummings continued: "Such an approach might have united the nation on this supreme issue when the election turmoil is over, thus giving an immense impetus to whatever Government may be in power." (*News Chronicle*, February 17, 1950.)

Mr. Churchill was clearly aware that his proposal was popular in the country and he returned to the subject when he made a broadcast to the nation on February 17, 1950. After quoting what he had said at Edinburgh he continued:

"Mr. Bevin, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dismisses all this by the scornful word 'stunt'. By this he only showed how far his mind dwells below the true level of events.

"Why should it be wrong for the British nation to think about the supreme question of life and death, perhaps for the whole world, at a time when there is a General Election? Is that not the one time of all others when they should think about them? What a reflection it would be upon our national dignity and moral elevation, and indeed upon the whole status of British democracy, if at this time of choice we find nothing to talk about but material issues and calculations about personal gain or loss."

Mr. Churchill continued: "What a humiliation it would be if proud Britain, in this fateful hour, were found completely absorbed in party and domestic strife. I am glad I put a stop to that. Even on the material basis a continuance of the present arms race can only cause increasing danger, increasing military expense and diminishing supplies to the homes." (*Times*, February 18, 1950.)

Mr. Attlee, in the last broadcast of the General Election on February 18, 1950, said:

"We are ready at all times to co-operate with Russia on equal terms in the comity of nations. But it must be on equal terms.

"The discovery of atomic energy loosed a new fear in the world. So impressed was I with its dread potentialities that within a few weeks of taking office I went to Washington to discuss with President Truman and Mr. Mackenzie-King how we could harness this new power for the peaceful purposes of mankind."

Attlee added: "The hydrogen bomb has even more dreadful possibilities. The machinery of the United Nations is still there ready to be used. We are prepared at any time to use it to the full.

"We on this side of the Iron Curtain have the will to discuss with the Russians this, with all other outstanding difficulties." (*Reynolds*, February 19, 1950.)

The Church also raised its voice. Preaching in St. Paul's Cathedral, February 19, 1950, Canon Gibbs-Smith said:

"Domestic policies became insignificant beside the major question of our relations with other nations. This was something which far transcended all questions of party politics. What we had to do was to rouse public opinion to such a pitch that it would insist that, whichever party was returned to power, it would be pledged, first and foremost, to work for a new international settlement in which all weapons of mass destruction would be outlawed."

Canon Gibbs-Smith concluded: "It was imperative that all election candidates should be required to state that if they were returned to Parliament they would press whatever Government came into power to give first priority to a fresh attempt to achieve a general international settlement." (*Times*, February 20, 1950.)

And the Archbishop of Canterbury issued a call for a new effort to reach international agreement on nuclear weapons and added: "It is the requirement of sanity and decency, as well as of the religious sense,

that the nations should outlaw the production and use of these powers as weapons."

Eleven leading British atomic scientists issued a statement, February 21, 1950, calling for the "utmost attempts" to be made now "to eliminate atomic warfare".

Right up to the eve of the poll the question of relations with the U.S.S.R. figured prominently in the speeches of all political parties.

Each party sought to convince the electors that it was better placed and more capable of reaching an agreement with the U.S.S.R. than the other.

In Moscow the speeches of the leaders of the political parties were being followed closely. As usual they were carefully studied before replies were issued but these came in due course.

A Soviet commentator on Moscow radio, February 8, 1950, referring to the Labour Party Manifesto, said: "The Labour Party leaders assert that they are prepared to co-operate with Russia at any moment. This is a double lie. In the first place, it is an insidious attempt to create the impression that they have already striven for co-operation with the Soviet Union. In the second place, they assert that they are ready for such co-operation now. But is there any thinking person who does not know that throughout their whole term of office the Labour Party leaders have invariably rejected all the Soviet Government's proposals aimed at consolidating peace?" (Reuter.) (*Times*, February 9, 1950.)

And Mr. Federov in a Moscow broadcast in English, February 22, 1950, commented that Mr. Churchill in all his election speeches since Edinburgh had invariably returned to the proposal of a meeting with Stalin. Federov continued:

"He was hinting rather transparently that should he come to power he would arrange such a meeting.

"His statement caused quite a stir.

"The Labour Leaders who had so zealously been conducting Churchill's foreign policy were taken aback.

"They tried to ridicule this proposal as an election stunt, not worthy of attention.

"Churchill's proposal met with a response across the ocean. Beyond all doubt this proposal is designed to catch votes.

"However, it is something more than an election trick. Unwittingly, Churchill's speech is a confession of the failure of that policy which he himself formulated in his ill-famed Fulton speech almost four years ago.

"Churchill rejected the very idea of post-war co-operation among the three great Powers. The aggressive course mapped out by Churchill in Fulton has been diligently implemented by the Truman Administration and the Labour Leaders alike."

Federov concluded: "Churchill—that dyed-in-the-wool demagogue and cunning politician—is prone to use the British people's desire for peace to further his own election machinations.

"But the policy of Fulton, aimed at establishing world domination of the Anglo-American monopolies, has failed completely, and the election manoeuvres of Winston Churchill are surely proof of this failure."

We have taken Federov's broadcast from a B.U.P. cable.

Izvestia, February 22, 1950, carried a cartoon showing Conservative leader Winston Churchill and Prime Minister Attlee as jockeys mounted on steeds with two characters representing Wall Street as starters. "Two jockeys, one boss", read the caption.

It was quite clear that at the time Moscow did not see any difference between the policies of Churchill and Attlee, *vis-à-vis* the U.S.S.R.

Polling took place on February 23, 1950, and when the final figures were available they showed that the Labour Party had a majority of six.

Although, as mentioned earlier, Britain was preoccupied with the General Election in the first two months of 1950, other events were happening which indirectly affected Anglo-Soviet relations. Here we shall mention them briefly.

On January 6, 1950, the British Government decided to recognise *de jure* the People's Government of China; on January 26, the Government of India declared India a Republic within the British Commonwealth; on January 27, 1950, bilateral agreements of Defence were signed in Washington between the U.S.A., Great Britain, France, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg, which meant a further hardening of the division of the world into two opposing camps.

In the U.S.A. also there were developments which affected U.S.A. policy—and at a second remove, British policy—towards the U.S.S.R.

A B.U.P. cable, date-lined Washington, February 17, 1950, read: "Dr. Edwin Nourse, former chairman of President Truman's Council of Economic Advisers, said in Washington to-day that he is worried

because more than 7 per cent. of American workers are unemployed.

"When Dr. Nourse was chairman of the Economic Council he and several other Government and private economists said a 7 per cent. unemployment ratio was the danger-point in the United States economy." (*Manchester Guardian*, February 18, 1950.)

A *Herald* reporter cabled from Washington, February 26, 1950: "Unemployed in the United States last month reached 4,500,000—highest since the war. This total compares with 3,500,000 a year ago. It represents 7 per cent. of the nation's workers." (*Daily Herald*, February 27, 1950.)

Walter Reuther, President, United Auto Workers of the U.S.A., speaking at Atlantic City, February 28, 1950, said: "there was more concern among our friends throughout the world about the possibility of an American depression than there was concern about the H-bomb." (*New York Herald Tribune*, March 1, 1950.)

Widespread unemployment and a depression were greatly feared in the U.S.A. One means to prevent both was an armaments race and to achieve this a powerful potential enemy had to exist or to be invented. Afterwards vested interests in maintaining this would grow up and would constitute a permanent pressure group on the Government.

The *Readers Digest*, March, 1950, carried a long article by George F. Kennan (Counsellor of the State Department and an official who was supposed to "know Russia like the back of his hand"), entitled "Is War with Russia Inevitable?"

This article was recognised in the American press as a semi-official State Department Document. Kennan wrote:

"Current Stalinist doctrine does not demand war. On the contrary, it also teaches that eventually capitalism will fall largely of its own weight, i.e. as a result of the inner 'contradictions' which the Communists believe it embodies. They see the role of Communism as one of hastening the collapse of capitalism and assisting, as a midwife, at the birth of the Socialist order. In theory, they seem inclined to regard this as primarily the task of the native Communists in each country, and not of the Soviet Red Army.

"There is nothing in Stalinist doctrine which would make it necessarily the main responsibility of the armed forces of the Soviet Union themselves to overthrow capitalism everywhere by direct military action. This premise would actually seem illogical and improper, from the Communist point of view; for it would imply that capitalism, in the absence of such an attack, would be basically

sound and capable of coping permanently with its own 'contradictions'. But this is exactly what good Marxists do not believe."

Inter alia he added: "Our security rests in making sure that military aggression remains improbable if not impossible. We should continue to maintain a military posture which, as Theodore Roosevelt once said, will make fighting us 'too expensive and dangerous a task to be undertaken lightly by anybody'. Let us not be diverted from our task by a morbid preoccupation with what *could possibly happen if*. Let us remember that there is no security in a search for the absolute defence. Security lies in accepting moderate risks in order that immoderate ones may be avoided."

Kennan's policy could be summed up thus: "On with the Armaments Race."

We must now return to Great Britain. It was evident that in view of the Labour Party's very small majority, it could not expect to remain long in office and that it would not introduce controversial legislation.

Mr. Herbert Morrison, speaking at a Labour Party Jubilee Celebration, February 27, 1950, said: "We cannot know for certain when the next election will come, but we shall be wise to be prepared for the possibility that it will come sooner rather than later." (*Daily Herald*, February 28, 1950.)

And Mr. Ernest Jay, Lobby Correspondent of the *Daily Herald*, wrote:

"Labour's programme will be streamlined to avoid a crisis.

"With such a small majority, a crisis would inevitably lead to another General Election before the electors recovered their breath after the last one.

"But the Government, though unable to introduce sharply controversial legislation, has no intention of abandoning its principles merely to remain in office."

Jay continued: "No bargains are likely to be struck between the three Parties but unofficial soundings may be made." (*Daily Herald*, February 28, 1950.)

As regards foreign policy, the Diplomatic Correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* wrote:

"... the new Government can reasonably expect to find that in

Foreign affairs there will be less divergence of view between itself and the Opposition than during the past four and half years—and there has been little enough during this period.” (*Manchester Guardian*, March 1, 1950.)

In our judgment the correspondent accurately summed up the prospects in this field.

The new Parliament was opened March 6, 1950, and although the King's speech contained several references to foreign affairs, it contained no reference to Anglo-Soviet relations.

In passing we may note that on the same date, March 6, 1950, the “Statement on Defence, 1950” was published. It showed that Defence would cost £780,000,000 in the current financial year, £20,000,000 more than in the financial year just ended. A crushing burden on the British economy and largely due to the Government's insensate policy towards the U.S.S.R. and subservience to the U.S.A.

The House of Commons debated Defence, March 16, 1950. The debate was opened by Mr. Shinwell, Minister of Defence, who, referring to the atom bomb, said:

“We cannot, and do not, ignore in our defence planning the appearance of this new and terrible weapon nor its more deadly development, the hydrogen bomb, which now appears to be within the range of scientific development. *We know that Soviet Russia has made progress more rapidly than at one time seemed likely*; we also know that the Americans have continued to develop the industrial technique as well as the basic scientific knowledge required to improve on the bombs used in the last war and at Bikini. We ourselves, within the resources which we can allot to the task, are following our own programme.” (Our emphasis.) (*Hansard*, March 16, 1950, col. 1275.)

Mr. Churchill, who spoke next, said:

“The decision to form a front in Europe against a possible further invasion by Soviet Russia and its satellite states was at once grave for us and also imperative.”

Churchill later added: “I say without hesitation that the effective defence of the European frontiers cannot be achieved if the German contribution is excluded from the thoughts of those who are responsible.” (*Hansard*, March 16, 1950, cols. 1288-9.)

Winding up the debate for the Government, Prime Minister Attlee, referring to Churchill's speech said: "I am bound to say I was astonished at the right hon. Gentleman's irresponsible reference to the question of the rearmament of Germany." (*ibid.*, col. 1392.)

On March 18, 1950, the *Daily Herald's* Diplomatic Correspondent dealt at length with Churchill's proposal. He wrote: "The British Government stands by the Allied policy of keeping Germany disarmed."

The *Daily Herald* of the same date also carried the following:

"This was underlined by the Foreign office spokesman last night. Only last November, he said, the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and the United States reaffirmed their intention to enforce German disarmament and oppose all forms of re-militarisation.

"Britain also adheres, the spokesman added, to the disarmament clauses of the Potsdam Agreement made at the end of the war.

"Two kinds of German rearmament have, in fact, been proposed from time to time:

"1. Allowing the rebuilding of German forces in the Western Republic.

"2. Allowing a German contingent in some international force.

"But there are overwhelming arguments against either proposal.

"1. A small German force would make little difference to the military balance between East and West. Yet if the German forces were large enough to make a significant contribution they would be large enough to give Germany a predominant position in Western Union.

"2. A large army would also place Germany in a strong bargaining position as between East and West. She might seek to make a bargain with the Soviet Union.

"3. The possession of a big force would make it hard for the German Government to resist any popular demands for an attempt to regain the lost Eastern territories by force.

"4. There would also arise a clamour for the withdrawal of all occupational troops."

The *Daily Herald's* news story concluded: "To allow German rearmament would have a tremendous effect in France, whose participation in Western Union and the Atlantic Pact might be threatened.

"There would also be the danger of a coup by German generals if the High Command were set up again.

"Talk of rearming Germany would help the worst Nationalist

elements in that country to press forward with a campaign for 're-establishing national self-esteem and dignity'."

At this date the Labour Government was very definitely against the rearmament of Germany.

Anxiety at the unceasing "cold war" between East and West was manifested in many quarters.

The British Atomic Scientists Association in their *News Bulletin*, dated March 23, 1950, appealed to East and West to elaborate a settlement on the basis of compromise. The *News Bulletin* stated:

"Each side should decide what are its minimum requirements for security, and while standing firm on these should be prepared to make concessions on all other points in return for similar concessions from the other side.

"The positions maintained at present by both sides are so far apart that if these are to be regarded as final offers, the outlook is black indeed."

The *News Bulletin* continued: "At the moment it seems fair to say that each side is convinced justifiably or unjustifiably that the other is bent on his overthrow.

"One thing at least is certain, understanding will not be achieved by a policy of continual pinpricks."

On March 28, Mr. Winston Churchill opened a debate in the House of Commons on foreign affairs. Among other things he advocated the rearming of Germany. He said: "I see no reason why the Germans should not aid in the defence of their own country and of Western Europe, or why British, American, French and German soldiers should not stand in the line together on honourable terms of comradeship as part of a combined system of defence." (*Hansard*, March 28, 1950, col. 191.)

Later in the debate the following dialogue took place:

"Mr. Churchill: I never used the expression 'rearming' or 'the rearmament of Germany.'

"Mr. Bevin: It may not be the rearming of Germany, but if we give the Germans arms we are rearming them.

"Mr. Churchill: What I suggested is that Germany should make a contribution to the aid of European defence. There should be

Germans serving with us and the American and the French on honourable terms.

"Mr. Bevin: I am sorry if I misunderstood the right hon. Gentleman, but that was what I understood him to say. I should be very sorry to misrepresent him in any way, but I think that I was interpreting him correctly.

"If we want to bring France and Germany together, talking about arming Germany in any form is, I am satisfied, going to set the clock back for a considerable time." (*ibid.*, cols. 324-5.)

Churchill, in the same debate, explained why he had raised the subject of high-level talks with the U.S.S.R. during the General Election. He said: "During the election I was most anxious that the return of a Conservative Government to power, which was a possibility, should not be taken as involving an exacerbation of the already tense situation that exists, and that we should make it clear above all things that we should strive faithfully for peace. I also felt, and feel, that we owe it to our consciences, all of us, that no door should be closed which may lead to better prospects." (*ibid.*, col. 199.)

He admitted that the position of the U.S.S.R. was now relatively stronger. To quote his words: "When the last Parliament met, I mentioned four years as the period before any other Power but the United States would possess the atomic bomb. That period has already gone by, and our position is definitely worse than it was in this matter both as regards our own safety and as to the conditions which are, I believe, effectively preserving the peace of the world.

"There is no doubt now that the passage of time will place these fearful agencies of destruction effectively in Soviet hands." (*ibid.*, cols. 200-1.)

Churchill, in conclusion appealed to the Government to make "a further effort for a lasting and peaceful settlement" with the U.S.S.R. and added: "Man in this moment of his history has emerged in greater supremacy over the forces of nature than has ever been dreamed of before. He has it in his power to solve quite easily the problems of material existence. He has conquered the wild beasts, and he has even conquered the insects and the microbes. There lies before him, if he wishes, a golden age of peace and progress. All is in his hand. He has only to conquer his last and worst enemy—himself. With vision, faith and courage, it may still be within our power to win a crowning victory for all." (*ibid.*, cols. 201-2.)

Churchill's words sound very fine, but what sincerity was there in

them, advocating, as he did, almost in the same breath the arming of Germany and her entry into a so-called system of European defence, patently aimed against the U.S.S.R. and her Allies?

Mr. De Chair, a Conservative M.P., later in the debate said: "If we really want to make some new approach to Russia, whether it be the top level, the middle level or the lower level, inside or outside U.N., it is quite useless to do so expecting that Russia will ever agree to a system of atomic control which requires the ownership of the means of atomic production inside the U.S.S.R. She simply will not consider a system of control on that basis. Yet Mr. Acheson stated very recently, indeed on February 8, this year, that he considered the Baruch Plan still valid and saw no reason why the U.S.A. should alter its approach or modify its proposal." (*ibid.*, col. 293.)

De Chair continued: "If that is so, there is no hope—and we should face it—of reaching agreement on atomic control with Russia, with her mania for secrecy and her desire to develop atomic energy for industrial purposes. She will never agree to a system of international ownership of production. Indeed, it is remarkable that she has come so far out of her shell as she has and that Mr. Vyshinsky should have agreed on behalf of his Government to periodic inspection at intervals to be determined whenever the Control Commission deems it necessary. I only put that forward because I think a good deal of our discussion about breaking the deadlock is merely academic if we are going to insist on the Baruch Plan and what the Americans regard as an absolutely watertight system of control." (*ibid.*, col. 293.)

We do not agree with all of De Chair's observations, but they contained a good deal of sound sense.

Foreign Minister Bevin wound up the debate for the Government.

In opening he hit hard at Churchill. *Inter alia* he said: "As I understood the position of the Fulton speech, it was a preventive war which the right hon. Gentleman had in his mind." (*ibid.*, col. 324.)

Then turning to the question of Germany, he said: "I must say to the right hon. Gentleman that we have set our face—the United States, France and ourselves—against the rearming of Germany, and that, I am afraid, we must adhere to." (*ibid.*, col. 324.)

Mr. Bevin, by implication, was against any early attempt to come to terms with the U.S.S.R. He said:

"The hydrogen bomb is an even more fearful prospect than the present atomic bomb, but in my view it does not change the essence

of the problem at all. There can be no safety unless we can secure a rigorous system of international inspection and control. That is the real point upon which the difference of opinion exists and we have taken it to the United Nations.

"The majority of the United Nations came to a decision that the Soviet Union has rejected. The proposals which were evolved by the United Nations Commission were unacceptable and Mr. Gromyko submitted counter-proposals, and they were considered by the United Nations. They came to this conclusion—that this would increase the danger rather than alleviate it. It might delude the people of the world into believing that atomic energy was controlled when, in fact, it was not. Therefore, we have pursued this business of trying to get the matter dealt with by reaching agreement with the United Nations." (*ibid.*, col. 328.)

Mr. Bevin continued: "There is a Committee of Six which has been instructed to continue with their work, but in fact the work was interrupted owing to the quarrel which arose over the recognition of China, which had nothing to do with the atomic bomb at all. Therefore, as soon as we can, we shall be willing to begin discussions and attempt to make agreements, but it is a very risky business when dealing with weapons like the atomic bomb to enter into commitments of any kind unless the daylight is let in and every nation is willing to show exactly what she is doing about the matter—otherwise any one country may be held to ransom at any moment. That is the great problem that has to be solved. The view of the majority, therefore, is that there must be a permanent control and that this can only be achieved by the operation and management by an international control agency of all the processes leading up to the final process by which the nuclear fuel is produced." (*ibid.*, col. 328.)

In conclusion Mr. Bevin said that another meeting of the "Council of the Atlantic Pact" would meet in London on May 9, 1950, and he added: "I have suggested to Mr. Acheson and to Mr. Schuman that we should take the opportunity of this meeting to hold discussions between ourselves, and they have both welcomed this proposal." (*ibid.*, col. 330.)

It was very clear from Mr. Bevin's speech that the Government at this date was still definitely against rearming Germany.

Next day, March 29, 1950, the *Times* in an editorial, stated: "In his reply to the debate Mr. Bevin was emphatic in opposing any form of German rearmament. This, he said, was the firm policy of the British,

French and United States Governments and any attempt to change it would be no service to the cause of European co-operation. He also suggested, with some justice, that to rearm Germany now might prejudice any future approach to Russia."

It was also very clear from Mr. Bevin's speech that no progress had been made in the Disarmament Commission and that the British Government had no intention of making any new approach to the Soviet Government until after the next meeting of the "Council of the Atlantic Pact" scheduled to open in the first half of May, 1950.

Mr. Michael Foot, M.P., thus commented on Churchill's speech delivered in the House of Commons on March 28, 1950:

"Seventeen months ago, according to Mr. Churchill, there was no time to spare. So urgent was the situation that a great diplomatic putsch should be delivered, despite the heavy risk of war involved.

"But to-day Mr. Churchill boldly prophesies that more time is available.

"Seventeen months ago the settlement was to take the form of an ultimatum. To-day Mr. Churchill almost succeeds in recapturing the terms of affection with which he greeted the Russian war lord in the days of the common fighting.

"Stalin may marvel to himself what wonders a little atom bomb may do in improving diplomatic manners. He may draw the obvious, harsh moral."

Foot concluded: "The time for that negotiation must be carefully selected, but the policy is not helped by the antics of Mr. Churchill, who a year ago was demanding an ultimatum which might have provoked a new war, and who has chosen this moment when—on his own admission—the prospects for peace are better, to launch the monstrous idea of a rearmmed Germany." (*Daily Herald*, March 31, 1950.)

"Scrutator"—a well-known commentator—referring to the Commons Debate of March 28, 1950, pointed out that Churchill first made his proposal to rearm Germany in the Defence debate (March 16) and continued: "In repeating it he was careful to disclaim any rearmament of Germany. But, as Mr. Bevin replied in his blunt way, if you give the Germans arms you rearm them; and past experience may be thought conclusive against it for the present." (*Sunday Times*, April 2, 1950.)

In the meantime, across in the U.S.A., unemployment was causing

severe headaches in Washington. Mr. Alistair Cooke, in a cable, date-lined New York, March 28, 1950, stated:

"Out of the blue sky of the long post-war boom, the United States has suddenly been confronted with a puzzling increase in unemployment.

"The reappearance of the dispossessed farmers and starving migrant workers in the San Joaquin Valley of California looked at first like a freak visitation of the Western tragedy of the late thirties out of which John Steinbeck created his *Grapes of Wrath*. But this is now seen to be an acute form of a chronic imbalance in the nation's economy which has been obscured by the dazzling fact of a record employed labour force of over 61 million. Thirteen governors formed labour committees to create useful jobs after it was evident that most of the unemployed were rapidly using up their Federal and State unemployment benefits." (*Manchester Guardian*, March 29, 1950.)

Cooke continued: "There is no agreement about the extent of national unemployment but the Census Bureau reported a fairly certain minimum of 4,684,000 idle one month ago. The American Federation of Labour has thrown off its usual optimism and is trying to persuade the Department of Labour that the time has come for the emergency measures the Government promised if the unemployment figure went above 5,000,000, which it seems sure to do this month, if only as a hangover from the coal strike.

"An unprecedented flood of high school and college graduates will be classifiable as unemployed at the end of the first week in June. At that point, some labour experts say, there is the possibility of 6,000,000 jobless.

"All speculation apart, however, everybody is agreed that the United States now has more unemployed over a wider range of jobs than at any time since 1941, when multiplying war contracts came to the rescue."

Note the last paragraph: "when multiplying war contracts came to the rescue." Many were again hoping for rescue from the same sources and they got it. A United Press cable, date-lined Washington, April 26, 1950, stated: "The House Appropriations Committee to-day approved \$350,000,000 in extra defence funds to be used mainly for buying more warplanes.

"The committee acted barely two hours after Secretary of Defence

Lois Johnson told the military appropriations sub-committee that extra money was necessary at this critical period. He also warned that the world situation would require additional defence spending in future years.

"The new money includes \$200,000,000 for Air Force planes, \$100,000,000 for Navy aircraft and \$50,000,000 to convert naval vessels for anti-submarine warfare.

"Mr. Johnson did not get immediately all he asked for. He asked \$553,000,000. The other \$203,000,000 was to restore the cut previously made in the Defence Department's Appropriation by the Committee.

"Representative Clarence Cannon, Democrat, of Missouri, committee chairman, said the committee will consider later whether to put back any or all of that amount.

"The \$350,000,000 addition approved by the committee would raise the defence establishment total for the twelve months starting July 1 to \$14,261,127,300.

"The committee's action came while the omnibus appropriation bill, which includes money for defence, was being debated on the House floor." (*New York Herald Tribune*, April 27, 1950.)

We would add that \$14,261,127,300 at that time equalled about £5,000 million.

A cable, date-lined Washington, April 29, 1950, from Leigh Strout stated:

"While defence expenses are increasing, tax revenues are not coming up to expectations. Combined developments are now tending to force the public's delayed attention to an uncomfortable matter. The deficit is not actually the critical matter it would be in any other country, in view of the huge size of the economy. A leading Harvard economist, Sumner Slichter, while deploring the cold war, frankly declares that 'from the narrow economic standpoint' its effects are beneficial. It provides just those vast Government expenditures which capitalistic America would be so reluctant to vote in normal times, he says.

"There is the deepest irony in all this, because hostile Russia has almost certainly prevented a long-feared economic post-war bust. It is being said that Russia has the power to bankrupt America any time she wants, simply by turning friendly." (*Observer*, April 30, 1950.)

In fact it was a common saying at this time in U.S.A. government

and business circles that "if peace suddenly broke out it would be disastrous for the American economy".

There were very powerful financiers in the U.S.A. who had big vested interests in maintaining both strained relations with the U.S.S.R. and the armaments race. As far as the U.S.A. Government was concerned—they were, of course, well aware that on many occasions in the first four months of 1950, the Government of the U.S.S.R. expressed its willingness to settle all outstanding issues with the U.S.A. by means of peaceful negotiations.

The threatening language as far as U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. relations were concerned, emanated from Washington and not from Moscow.

It may be asked, what has all this to do with Anglo-Soviet relations? The answer is much, because the British Government in its relations with the U.S.S.R., by and large, followed in the wake of the U.S.A.

Now to return to what was happening in Britain. A press telegram, date-lined Great Yarmouth, April 8, 1950, read:

"Unanimously and enthusiastically, the Co-operative Party, at its annual conference here to-day, passed an emergency resolution offering full support to any initiative by the Government to end the cold war and outlaw weapons of mass destruction." (*Reynolds*, April 9, 1950.)

The Resolution also demanded the calling of a Conference of the Nations of Europe, including the U.S.S.R., with a view to promoting trade, prosperity and peace.

Mr. Tom Williams, M.P., moving the resolution on behalf of the National Committee, said:

"This resolution is an expression of the will to peace of this conference and we believe it expresses the will to peace of the people of our land and of the common people throughout the world. . . .

"Britain should be prepared to declare that it will have no part or parcel in the production or use of instruments of mass destruction.

"I believe a lead will have to be given to the nations of the world, and Britain is the nation that has sufficient moral authority to give it."

Williams added: "Here at least a beginning can be made. It can go out that the largest body of consumers in this country is determined that a beginning shall be made in the control and ultimately the destruction of weapons of mass warfare."

The speech by Mr. Tom Williams, M.P., was loudly and continuously applauded by the delegates.

At the Annual Delegate Meeting of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers, held in the second week of April, 1950, the following resolution was carried:

"This A.D.M. calls upon the Government to assume the moral leadership of the world. It is of the opinion that the present crippling burden of armaments which arises from the 'cold war' situation is the biggest contributory factor to the growing economic crisis and the danger of war. In the name of humanity it calls upon the powers concerned to adjust their differences and to lift the twin shadows of war and unemployment from mankind. As a first step a conference of the five Great Powers, viz. Britain, China, France, U.S.A., and U.S.S.R. should be called, charged with the task of seeking a sufficient basis of agreement on which differences could be resolved and of drafting within the framework of the United Nations a world peace pact."

The Resolution concluded: "Furthermore, it instructs the Union's delegates to congresses and other bodies to render every support to those striving for reconciliation and peace."

Mr. Bryn Roberts, General Secretary, National Union of Public Employees, writing in *The Public Employees' Journal*, March-April, 1950, declared: "Professor R. E. Peierls, President of the British Atomic Association, tells us that the area of destruction of a hydrogen bomb would probably be larger than the area occupied by Greater London. It is a depressing thought to know that such fiendish instruments are now being manufactured. . . .

"What are we to do in face of this? Should Britain, in its extremely vulnerable geographical position, support a policy of stock-piling of atomic and hydrogen bombs as a means of defence and in the hope of ensuring peace, or would the best policy be to outlaw these beastly things and make it known to the world that while we shall continue atomic research for industrial purposes we shall not manufacture, or assist others to manufacture, either atomic or hydrogen missiles, or co-operate in any military operations with any nation that does not cease the manufacture of such deadly instruments?

"To argue whether, in a given set of circumstances, such bombs could or should be used, or whether there should be limitations as to the size and power of those permitted to be manufactured would be a

perilous process. For our part there can be no bargaining about these bombs. The issue is clear cut; we must be either for or against them.

"While we acknowledge the complexity of foreign relations, we believe that the British Labour Government, representing as it does a great working-class movement, should take the initiative and, without fear or favour, renounce all intentions of being either directly or indirectly associated with the manufacture or use of these hellish objects."

Roberts concluded: "The Labour Movement supports no imperialistic designs. Inherently it is a movement for peace, with brotherly feelings for toilers in every land. If our foreign policy reflects these great sentiments, and if we make our attitude clearly known to the peoples of the world in respect of the atomic and hydrogen bombs, and if we take risks for peace, Labour can, we believe, avert the drift into the third world war and save mankind from the catastrophic consequences that would otherwise ensue."

The Scottish Trades Union Congress, April 19, 1950, discussed a resolution which urged the Government to appeal to the United Nations "with the passion and energy which the danger demands" to secure mutual agreement between East and West for:

1. A ban on the manufacture of the hydrogen bomb and all atomic weapons.
2. The destruction of all existing stocks of atomic weapons.
3. International control of the sources of atomic power and its utilisation for peaceful purposes.

The resolution was carried unanimously.

The *News Chronicle*, April 21, 1950, carried the following report: "Britain should take the lead in renewing international negotiations on the control of atomic energy, say the British Council of Churches.

"They decided at Cardiff yesterday to ask the Government to take the initiative in promoting consultation and to restate its intention to delegate to 'a satisfactory and reliable international agency' such authority as is required for multilateral control of armaments."

The resolution stated: "There is ground for a new effort, for the situation has changed, both the majority and minority plans tabled at the United Nations need reconsideration."

In our judgment the resolutions carried at the Co-operative Party Conference, the A.D.M. of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers, the Scottish Trades Union Congress, the British Council of

Churches and the views expressed by Mr. Bryn Roberts (General Secretary, National Union of Public Employees), would have been endorsed by the overwhelming majority of the British people. They hated and dreaded war and longed for a real and lasting peace.

Trade Union Conferences kept up their pressure on the Government to make the greatest possible efforts to come to a satisfactory agreement with the U.S.S.R.

The Annual Conference of the Electrical Trades Union, at its Annual Conference, May 15, 1950, called on the British Government to work for a peace pact of the five great Powers and for "the greatest action to maintain friendship and trade with Russia".

Addressing the Electrical Trades Union Conference, May 18, Mr. Podushkin, fraternal delegate from the Soviet Power Workers' Union, declared:

"War and peace is the main question of our time. The Soviet Union was a most consistent fighter for peace. There was nothing aggressive in its policy and desires.

"Peace was essential to the happiness of the Soviet people and to the development of their Socialist economy.

"Responsibility for the present situation rested squarely on the shoulders of American imperialists and reactionaries who attacked the Soviet Union with frantic fury.

"Evidence of the fact that the policy of the Soviet Union was a peace policy was seen in the overwhelming support now forthcoming from workers in all parts of the world.

"The struggle for peace had reached a new stage demanding the unconditional outlawing of the atom bomb.

"The people had the ability to save the peace and to defeat the murderous plans of the war-mongers.

"Every signature given to the peace petition was a blow at the warmongers.

"I am sure that the British people will join in the lofty task of the World Peace Committee."

Ending his speech amid scenes of great enthusiasm, Mr. Podushkin invited the Electrical Trades Union to send a delegation to the U.S.S.R. in the near future.

The Annual Conference of the 150,000 strong Postal Workers' Union on May 26, 1950, carried a resolution addressed to "all Governments and all peoples to end the cold war".

"Moving the resolution, Mr. Charles Geddes, Union general secretary, said that faintly but insistently the trumpets of war were sounding again.

"Mr. George Douglas (Executive), who seconded the resolution, referred to 'the tragedy of the times' that the friendship between Russia and Britain built during the war was gradually receding." (*Daily Herald*, May 27, 1950.)

We must now turn to some important events in U.N. Time and again the Soviet representatives in U.N. had protested in vain against representatives of Chiang Kai-Shek attending the various committees of U.N. as representatives of China and the exclusion of representatives of the People's Republic of China from these committees.

A cable, date-lined Lake Success, May 2, 1950, stated: "Soviet delegate P. Chernyshev walked out of the United Nations Committee for Statistical Classification to-day after challenging the right of the Chinese Nationalists to participate in the committee's deliberations.

"This was the twenty-fourth walkout in the Russian boycott of United Nations committees and agencies as a protest against the presence of Nationalist Chinese delegates." (*New York Herald Tribune*, May 3, 1950.)

CHAPTER XX

EFFORTS TO REDUCE TENSION: BUT COLD WAR CONTINUES

ON May 3, 1950, Mr. Trygve Lie, at a press conference in Paris, said that the world was at the cross-roads.

"It was proposed to split the world permanently into two camps, and to that road there was only one possible end—a third world war sooner or later. The first step to stop the cold war must be to restore the United Nations as a meeting place for negotiations on differences among the great Powers. The longer the cold war lasted the more the U.N. became incapable of functioning efficiently."

Finally he announced that he would visit Moscow to discuss the situation with the Soviet leaders.

Mr. Trygve Lie arrived in Moscow, May 11, 1950, and was received by Foreign Minister Vyshinsky and Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko. He was also received by Prime Minister Stalin on May 15, 1950.

On that occasion Mr. Vyshinsky and Mr. Molotov were also present.

A B.U.P. Reuter cable, date-lined Moscow, May 17, 1950, read: "Mr. Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations, said to-day that he did not expect any immediate results from his journey to Moscow.

"He said his conversations with Stalin and other Russian leaders had been 'positive'. There had been an undertone of peace in them all. He was satisfied with them.

"A final judgment, however, cannot be made before two or three months from now. Maybe it will take a still longer period, too," he said.

"I would like to repeat what I said at a press conference in New York before I set out on my trip. I do not expect any immediate results from my journey."

"And he added: 'Time will show.'

"Mr. Lie was speaking at a press conference of fifty Russian and foreign newspapermen. To-night Moscow radio broadcast a report of the speech.

"He said he hoped to confer again with Mr. Attlee, President Truman and M. Bidault (French Premier).

"He will leave Moscow for New York on Friday by way of Paris and London.

"Asked about the outlook for the United Nations, he declared that difficulties must be settled before the next General Assembly meets in September." (*News Chronicle*, May 18, 1950.)

Mr. Lie concluded: "The Secretary-General cannot be satisfied before the United Nations machinery works again normally, the cold war is brought to an end and friendly relations established between member nations."

World opinion was largely on the side of Mr. Lie in his efforts to reduce world tension. Not so all circles in the U.S.A.

A cable, date-lined Lake Success, May 25, 1950, headed "Agent of the Kremlin" read: "Mr. Trygve Lie returned to New York to-day after his tour of Europe, which enabled him to discuss various aspects of the international situation in London, Paris and Moscow. He repeated that he is not dissatisfied with his efforts to break the existing deadlock in the United Nations, and he is expected to make a public statement to-morrow before going to Washington to pay further visits to President Truman and Mr. Acheson.

"In spite of the general goodwill that has accompanied his attempt to explore the ground—and his objectives have never been placed higher than that—most of the American press has become increasingly critical of the manner and sometimes the motives of his consultations, and he is openly accused in more hysterical quarters of having become an agent of the Kremlin." (*Times*, May 26, 1950.)

Lie gave a press conference at Lake Success, May 26, 1950. In a prepared statement he declared:

"The situation is a most serious one. The longer the present deadlock continues the more serious it becomes. I have called this the year of decision both for United Nations and for the future peace of the world. We must begin a new effort this year to bring the cold war to an end through the United Nations or we shall face the gravest danger that the world will be set finally on the road that leads to a

third world war. My trip has confirmed my belief that no Government wants war. It has been the undertone of all the conversations I had with the Soviet leaders." (*Manchester Guardian*, May 27, 1950.)

He said all the Soviet leaders he saw, including Mr. Stalin, "looked healthy".

"I couldn't see any change in Stalin except that four years have passed since I saw him last," Mr. Lie said. "He had a sharp look in his eyes. He smoked his pipes. He was interested. I can't believe and will not understand reports about his ill health after hours of discussion with him."

Mr. Trygve Lie's mission to western Europe including the U.S.S.R. was warmly approved by at least a very large section of the Parliamentary Labour Party.

Mr. Rhys Davies and 130 other Labour M.P.s on May 10, 1950, tabled the following resolution:

"That this House welcomes and supports the efforts now being made by the Secretary-General (Mr. Trygve Lie) on behalf of the United Nations to secure peace among the conflicting powers and to prevent a third world war, which would result in untold misery for mankind."

There can be little doubt that the resolution would have been endorsed unanimously by the Annual Congresses of the Labour Party, Trades Union, and Co-operative Movement.

Meanwhile the efforts to transform Britain into a stationary aircraft carrier for the U.S.A. continued.

The Air Correspondent of the *Sunday Times*, May 28, 1950, wrote: "Large extensions to three Service aerodromes in Oxfordshire are about to be undertaken by engineer units of the United States Air Force. These units are bringing to this country all the apparatus which they need for preparing the land and constructing runways.

"The new stations are required for the big B36 bombers and the fighters which would escort them on operations. The intention is that the bomber units and their escorts shall occupy the same stations. The extensions will also provide for the new generation of American jet bombers, some of which seem likely to need a three-mile runway when fully loaded. British jet bombers now in preparation are understood to be designed for runways of normal length.

"When the three Oxfordshire aerodromes are ready the Americans will return the Scunthorpe and Lakenheath bases to the R.A.F.

"A squadron of the United States fastest operational jet fighters will fly to England in July to be stationed permanently at Horsham St. Faith, Norfolk."

The news-story was headed "Bigger British Bases for U.S. Bombers".

The American bases in Britain constituted a link, an important link, in the world wide chain of bases which the U.S.A. was engaged in constructing as *places d'armé* directed against the U.S.S.R. Naturally the construction of such bases on British soil worsened the atmosphere between Moscow and London.

The question of Germany and its relations both with the U.S.S.R. and the Big Three Western Powers came up intermittently in discussions between, on the one hand, the Soviet Union and on the other, Great Britain, U.S.A. and France.

On May 4, 1950, the TASS Agency announced that the last group of prisoners, numbering 17,538, had been repatriated to Germany, completing the process. The number of Germans sent home since May, 1945 was 1,939,063, including 58,103 prisoners discovered during 1947-9 among prisoners of other nationalities who were in Russia. There remained in the Soviet Union 9,717 men condemned for serious war crimes, and 3,815 whose crimes were being investigated.

The figures given by the Soviet Authorities were contested by the West German Authorities who argued that the number of prisoners of war were considerably higher than the figures quoted by the TASS Agency.

The subject was discussed in the press of most European countries including Great Britain.

It was universally recognised that no accurate figures of the number of prisoners of war were at all possible, and the *Manchester Guardian* in an editorial headed "The Missing Germans" stated:

"So far as prisoners proper go such slender information as is available tends to bear the Russian claim out. In the first half of 1947 an investigation was made in the United States zone of Germany into war casualties as of that date. The number reported killed was 267,000; there were 319,000 missing; 387,000 were still prisoners. Applying these proportions to the whole population (1946) Professor Frumkin in Geneva has obtained a total of 1,500,000 prisoners, which allowing for 800,000 in Western hands, would correspond fairly closely with the Soviet claims." (*Manchester Guardian*, May 9, 1950.)

The *Times*, May 13, 1950, in an editorial, *inter alia* stated: "Most of the German army records have disappeared and the movement of population since the end of the war makes accurate statistics impossible. The natural but tragic reluctance of any woman to believe that her husband or son is dead so long as there is the least chance of his survival may be the true basis of the German claim."

On May 11, 1950, the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.A. (Mr. Acheson), France (M. Schuman) and Britain (Mr. Bevin), met in London to survey the world situation. In the course of a declaration issued May 12, 1950, the Ministers, *inter alia* stated:

"The three Foreign Ministers have noted with surprise and deep concern the Soviet statement of May 4, which declared that 'the repatriation of German prisoners of war from the Soviet Union to Germany has now been completed'. They recall the repeated efforts made by the three western occupation Powers to secure the Soviet Government's compliance with the quadripartite agreement to repatriate all German prisoners of war by December 31, 1948."

The Declaration added: "The Ministers have agreed that they will take all possible steps to obtain information bearing on the fate of prisoners of war and civilians not yet repatriated from the Soviet Union, and to bring about repatriation in the largest possible number of cases." (*Times*, May 13, 1950.)

We cannot but suggest that the views expressed in the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Times* were very reasonable and that the declaration of the three Ministers had as its main objective to increase bitterness between the U.S.S.R. and Germany. That, at any rate, was certainly its result.

The three Foreign Ministers concluded their conference on May 13, 1950, and then issued a communiqué of which the following is a summary:

1. The Ministers had agreed on the main lines of their policy in all parts of the world;
2. The strength of the free world would never be used for aggressive purposes;
3. The free world could achieve social and material well-being in addition to its necessary defence measures, since it commanded by far the greater part of the industrial and technical resources of mankind;
4. The Ministers had agreed on a declaration of policy on Germany,

which had now been sent to the West German Chancellor, Dr. Adenauer;

5. They envisaged a new joint and Western drive to combat Communist imperialism in both Asia and Africa, immediate measures including the prevention of arms smuggling, exposure of Communist aims and methods and co-operation to raise the standard of living of the peoples; and

6. The Ministers intended to meet more often in the future.

The Diplomatic Correspondent of the *Sunday Times*, commenting on this communiqué, wrote: "The statement that the free world commands by far the greater part of the industrial and technical resources of mankind is based, I understand, on a computation that its resources exceed those of the Soviet Union by five or six to one."

The Correspondent added: "The Foreign Ministers . . . have decided in principle on the organisation of the Western world after the expiry of Marshall Aid in 1952." (*Sunday Times*, May 14, 1950.)

A second declaration by the three Foreign Ministers was issued, May 14, 1950, on the subject of Germany. It stated that the German peace treaty could not be concluded so long as Soviet policy remained unchanged; controls, however, would be progressively relinquished and her sovereignty restored to the maximum extent compatible with an occupation régime.

It is hardly necessary to add that the two Declarations were tantamount to the tearing up of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942.

The fourth session of the Atlantic Council was held in London on May 15, 16, 17 and 18, 1950, attended by the Foreign Ministers of the twelve member States.

On May 18, the final communiqué was issued, in the course of which it was stated: "the Council took the following decisions to improve the functioning of the North Atlantic Treaty organisation and to guide its future work:

"1. They decided to establish, by the appointment of deputies, mechanism to permit the Council fully to discharge its role as the principal and directing body of the North Atlantic Treaty.

"2. The Council in this connection agreed on principles which should guide the work of the deputies and of the other organisations of the North Atlantic Treaty.

"3. The Council have considered the reports of the Defence Committee and the Defence Financial and Economic Committee, issued

directives to guide them in their future work. These directives emphasise that the problem of adequate military forces and the necessary financial costs should be examined as one and not as separate problems.

"In formulating their directives the Council proceeded on the basis that the combined resources of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty are sufficient, if properly co-ordinated and applied, to insure the progressive and speedy development of adequate military defence without impairing the social and economic progress of these countries.

"4. The Council, recognising the indispensability of self-help and mutual aid among the treaty powers in making progress toward an integrated defence, and convinced that further mutual assistance is essential to rapid progress toward the strength required for the common security of the North Atlantic area, recommended that each party make its full contribution through mutual assistance in all practicable forms.

"5. The Council unanimously agreed that if adequate military defence of the member countries is to be achieved it must be along the lines of the most economical and effective utilisation of the forces and material at the disposal of the North Atlantic countries. They accordingly urged their governments to concentrate on the creation of balanced collective forces in the progressive build-up of the defence of the North Atlantic area, taking at the same time fully into consideration the requirements for national forces which arise out of commitments external to the North Atlantic area.

"6. In furtherance of Article 9 of the treaty, the Council established a North Atlantic Planning Board for Ocean Shipping, to be composed of representatives of the participating countries concerned. This board will report directly to the Council and will work in close co-operation with other bodies of the treaty organisation in all matters relating to the factor of merchant shipping in defence planning.

"The Ministers believe that the decisions they have taken here in London represent a marked advance toward the practical realisations of the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty."

Although not specifically stated in the Communiqué, the fact was clear from the speeches made at the end of the Conference and from inspired press statements that N.A.T.O. was definitely aimed at the Soviet Union. The British Government, at this time, completely ignored its commitments under the 1942 Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance.

How were these London Conferences regarded in the U.S.S.R.?

A few extracts from Soviet sources give the answer.

"The London Conference of the three Foreign Ministers," wrote Academician Tarle, the eminent historian, "opened and closed with the 'Schuman Plan' for merging the coal and steel industries of France, Western Germany and the Saar very much in the foreground. Such is the first fruit of the intensified pressure that the Americans have been exerting for several months now with a view to utilising the industrial might of the Ruhr for the preparation of another war. According to this decision France is turned into a sort of adjunct of the Marshallised Ruhr. Here we have the rebirth of a plan signed in its time by Hitler and Petain at Montoire."

And Yuri Zhukov, writing in *Pravda*, stated:

"The practical solution of most of the questions raised by Mr. Acheson, has been postponed, and they have been referred for 'study' to various committees and sub-committees. In particular, the main problem as to who actually is to subsidise the arming of the American satellites has remained unsettled.

"Though Mr. Acheson failed to put into effect the whole programme he had brought over from Washington, nevertheless, he imposed on his satellites a series of undertakings which will facilitate the future realisation of these schemes."

Turning to what he considered the most probable economic and military effects on the "Schuman Plan", Zhukov said:

"In this connection, particular attention should be given to the so-called 'Schuman Plan' for merging the French and West German steel and coal industries into one pool. Key posts in this new type of cartel will be held by the Ruhr magnates and their American guardians. Of no less importance is the plan for fusing the armed forces of the Marshallised countries into one 'international' army, to be under American command. The new military plan envisages the withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the national Governments of their armed forces also."

Zhukov further stated that the new standing body of the Atlantic Union which the twelve Foreign Ministers' Conference were proposing to set up, and the reported intention of the U.S.A. Government to become a member of the organisation of European Co-operation,

would still further strengthen American influence on European affairs, and concluded: "The long drawn out and complicated conferences in London have culminated in the adoption of a whole series of decisions aimed at making the West European countries more and more dependent on the American imperialists and at enlarging the scope of the war preparations dictated by the United States."

The Soviet contention that in effect the U.S.A. representatives had gained most from the Conferences was confirmed by the tone of the French press and by the following cable from the Washington correspondent of the *Sunday Times*:

"Mr. Acheson perhaps gained more from the Conference than Mr. Bevin or M. Schuman. Britain's decision to join the European Payments Union, the general consent to accept Germany as an ally, stepped up rearmament, agreement on the principle of the balance of the collective defence force, and the new permanent executive committee of the Atlantic Council, all represent an acceptance of Mr. Acheson's policies, some of which Britain or France refused to agree to in the past." (*Sunday Times*, May 21, 1950.)

After the conclusion of the Conferences the British Foreign Minister in a statement declared:

"Meanwhile, I should like to reiterate what I said in the House of Commons on May 18, 1949, after the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty, and to reaffirm that His Majesty's Government remains vitally concerned in the independence, integrity and security of Greece, Turkey and Persia." (*Times*, May 20, 1950.)

Mr. Acheson issued a statement in similar terms.

The significance of these statements was made very clear by the *New York Herald Tribune* when, in a featured article dealing with the strategic positions of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., *vis-à-vis* one another, wrote:

"Even if the importance of the Baku oil-fields has decreased somewhat, it would constitute a terrible loss to the Soviet war machine if they were knocked out by long range bombardment employing the atom bomb. In addition to the rich oil wells, the most important refining facilities of the Soviet Union are located at Baku.

"The other chief refineries are at Batum, Tuapse, Grosny, Maikop, Leningrad and Moscow, all involving some degree of transportation difficulties.

"The Baku area is well within range of British and American B29 medium bombers operating from bases in the Middle East. It certainly would be a prime target for attack by high-altitude B36 bombers from bases much farther away. Navy aircraft carrying the atom bomb might reach it from the decks of fast carrier task forces operating in the Mediterranean or the Persian Gulf. Although the oil-fields certainly would be strongly defended, it is unlikely that they could escape determined bombing attacks unscathed." (*New Herald Tribune*, May 22, 1950.)

The "cold war" continued.

The British, French and U.S.A. Ambassadors in Moscow, May 23, 1950, presented similar Notes to the Soviet Government, protesting against the creation in the Soviet zone of Germany, of a police force "which by reason of its organisation, training and equipment has the character of an army".

The British Note concluded: "So long as this quasi-military organisation is permitted in the Soviet zone the free peoples of the world will find in its continued existence added reason to reject unequivocally the claim of the Soviet Government and the so-called 'National Front' to be working for a peaceful, independent and democratic Germany and to be the champions of world peace." (*Times*, May 24, 1950.)

The U.S.A. Note was in substance the same but much more blunt in its language than those of Great Britain and France.

Mr. Eden, on May 24, 1950, opened a debate on the whole field of British foreign policy. He argued and Mr. Bevin agreed that Communism was menacing European interests in the Far East, South and South-east Asia and that the European Governments and the U.S.A. should stand together to stem this menace.

The menace which both gentlemen feared and which they equated with Communism was the upsurge of the Asian peoples against European imperialism. It was all very vague and the *Times* was moved to comment that the debate "on Asian affairs would have been much more useful if it had covered a narrower field". And winding up for the Opposition Mr. Butler accused Mr. Bevin of having told the House nothing.

It would appear that at this time the Labour Government had little

hope of an improvement of relations with the U.S.S.R., because Mr. Hector McNeil (Secretary of State for Scotland), addressing the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in Edinburgh, May 27, 1950, said that "there could be no expectation of an early end to the 'cold war' ". He referred to a statement by Mr. Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations, that next year was a vital one and that something must be done to bring the cold war to an end.

Mr. McNeil said that "we were once more in one of those historic sections where a great conflict of thought was taking place and mankind was in a process of refurbishing itself. For that reason he thought that the conflict would continue intensely and would throw up those violent discussions, dramatic disagreements and continuous propaganda which we were inclined to describe as the 'cold war'." (*Times*, May 29, 1950.)

And Sir Alexander Cadogan, Britain's delegate to the United Nations, in a Montreal speech said: "It might take generations to put an end to the 'cold war'." (*Manchester Guardian*, May 30, 1950.)

However, despite this very unpromising atmosphere some gains in Anglo-Soviet trading relations were registered soon afterwards. On June 13, 1950, an Agreement was signed in Moscow between representatives of Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. for the supply of a large quantity of timber to this country.

The announcement was made on June 14 and was well received by the British press on June 15, 1950. The Parliamentary Correspondent of the *Times* stated: "This year's purchase of timber from Russia will amount to much more than the 100,000 standards imported from that country last year, and may be more than half as much again. Most of the timber will be used for housing, and the remainder will be pit wood. The Soviet Government will take payment in sterling and will be substantially free to make such purchases here as they may choose.

"Details of the prices paid for the timber have not been disclosed. Further negotiations are in progress with the Soviet Government for the supply of grain.

"The Timber Controller—who has been in Moscow for about ten days—went there to undertake negotiations which followed discussions between Mr. A. G. Bottomley, Secretary for Overseas Trade, and the head of the Soviet Trade Delegation here. Purchases of timber and grain from Russia for sterling, on an annual basis, seem now to be

well established, and this method seems to have superseded that of the long-term trade agreement which at one time it was the British Government's aim to negotiate."

The *Times* Parliamentary Correspondent concluded: "Under the last formal short-term agreement—signed in 1947—the Soviet Government experienced difficulty in obtaining here the capital and other goods which were scheduled in the agreement to be supplied against imports from Russia. It is being found more convenient on both sides for Russia to accept payment for her timber and grain in sterling, with which she buys such goods as can be readily supplied. With the sterling paid her for timber and grain last year, Russia's purchases included a good deal of machinery, rubber and wool. In addition to the 100,000 standards of timber, last year's contracts provided for the purchase from Russia of 1 m. tons of coarse grain." (*Times*, June 15, 1950.)

On this subject the following dialogue took place in the House of Commons, June 22, 1950:

"Mr. Harold Wilson (President of the Board of Trade): A contract with Russia was signed on June 13 for 153,000 standards of softwood for shipment this year. In addition, the Russians have an option subject to mutual agreement on specification and shipment dates for a further 50,000 standards up to July 15. A further Russian contract signed on June 10 will provide 65,000-75,000 fathoms of pit wood. Negotiations with individual shippers in Sweden and Norway continue; I have no doubt that further quantities will be purchased there, but it is impracticable at this stage to say what they will amount to. It is too early to anticipate supplies for 1951 from any of the sources I have named.

"Mr. Philips Price: Does my right hon. Friend realise that we are all extremely grateful for the success of these negotiations and may I ask him, further, whether the contract with Russia for softwood timber is of a kind which will supply us with the type of timber we need for housing?

"Mr. Wilson: I think it is generally agreed that timber from Russia is of the very highest quality and is much appreciated. It will include large quantities which would be suitable for joinery.

"Sir G. Harvie-Watt: How does the price with Russia compare with the prices with Finland and Scandinavia generally?

"Mr. Wilson: We do not usually give details of prices, but I can inform the hon. and learned Gentleman that the price being paid to Russia is lower than the price for Swedish timber." (*Hansard*, June 22, 1950, cols. 1446-7.)

Mr. Wilson's replies were received with loud cheers from the Labour Benches.

On June 19, 1950, Mr. McDougall, in his presidential address to the Annual Conference of the Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers, *inter alia* stated:

"The Soviet needs capital goods if her economic development is not to be retarded. Western Europe needs to export to the East to solve the dollar problem and obtain essential primary goods.

"The Tories have never suggested a change in our foreign policy to reduce the enormous cost of armaments. It exceeds all that goes to build up the welfare State, including education, housing and health services.

"Britain cannot fail to be right in the centre of any future war. To talk about being neutral when we are committed to the Brussels and Atlantic Pacts is absurd.

"The atom bomb must be destroyed and its production banned for ever." (*Daily Herald*, June 20, 1950.)

Mr. McDougall added that instead of talking about the cold war, statesmen of the East and West should work out a trade pact to dispel fears of a shooting war.

The President's remarks were loudly cheered by the delegates and his remarks, in our judgment, were widely representative of British trade union opinion at that time.

In the course of a debate in the House of Lords, June 20, 1950, Earl Darnley argued "that the Government of this country should send to the leaders of Russia and the United States to invite them to a meeting to persuade them to stop sending each other rude notes and to formulate some plan for the co-existence of the different nations, so that the peaceful peoples could regain hope and security. Such action would bring prosperity to most parts of the earth." (*Times*, June 21, 1950.)

Lord Pakenham returned the usual reply that the British Government had done everything possible to come to terms with the U.S.S.R. and he declined to accept the proposal that the British Government should take the initiative in a new approach to the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.

Meanwhile across the Atlantic events were taking place and speeches were being made which certainly on balance were calculated to increase international tension.

On June 1, 1950, President Truman allocated \$1,222,500,000 (about £436,600,000), for the second year of the Mutual Defence Assistance Programme. It was to be allocated thus: N.A.T.O. \$1,000 m.; Persia, Philippines and Southern Korea \$27,500,000; China \$75m. for Chiang Kai-Shek in Formosa; Greece and Turkey \$120m.

The well-known and well-informed (from U.S.A. sources), Commentator Joseph Alsop in a cable, date-lined Paris, June 5, 1950, stated:

"There is one single, simple explanation of the sudden growth of tension, the seemingly unaccountable attack of nerves that is overtaking the Western world. We are imperceptibly passing into another period of acute crisis, comparable in some ways to the crisis period that produced the Marshall plan.

"One cause of this new crisis is the tempo of Soviet rearmament. At London, it can now be disclosed, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson gave the solemn opinion that the Kremlin's war preparations would at least reach preliminary climax in 1953-4."

Alsop added: "This job must be begun *now* if the needed weapons and men are to be ready in time. But doing this job with 1953-4 as the target date will require greatly increased national expenditures and other politically uncomfortable sacrifices. Hence the crisis of will and leadership in all the governments concerned and most conspicuously in our own." (*New York Herald Tribune*, June 6, 1950.)

Secretary of State Dean Acheson at a press conference, June 7, 1950, said that "there is no magic" for ending the "cold war", and that the Western Powers must go ahead with their plans to create "conditions of strength" to prevent Russian aggression.

"'We cannot afford to wait,' he declared, 'for the Russians to change their tactics in the U.N.'—tactics he has assailed as obstructionist." (*New York Herald Tribune*, June 8, 1950.)

In the same press interview Acheson said: "The United States opposes any rearmament of West Germany as a means of bolstering the security of the Atlantic pact nations."

That was U.S.A. policy *vis-à-vis* German rearmament on June 7, 1950.

Mr. Joseph Alsop, in another cable from Paris, date-lined June 12, 1950, stated: "This is a time for greatness in America. Soviet war preparations, it is now officially acknowledged, will reach their climax in 1953-4. Only American resources, only American leadership

can rebuild the defences of the West in the time that remains. Wisdom will be needed as well as courage and self-denial, if the great job is to be done." (*New York Herald Tribune*, June 13, 1950.)

By this date, as was admitted in an editorial in the *New York Herald Tribune*, some circles in Europe were of the opinion that "war was being aggressively organised by the U.S.A. on Russia". This apparently disquieted the Government of the U.S.A. and Secretary Dean Acheson in a major foreign policy speech, June 13, 1950, *inter alia* said:

"There is a third course of action which might have been considered in earlier times and by another type of government and people than ours—that is, that we should drop some atomic bombs on the Soviet Union. This course is sometimes called by the euphemistic phrase of 'preventive war'.

"All responsible men must agree that such a course is unthinkable for us. It would violate every moral principle of our people. Such a war would necessarily be incredibly destructive. It would not solve problems, it would multiply them."

Acheson must have been in a very amiable mood on this occasion, because he added: "There are, however, some obstacles to be overcome. Not all of them are attributable to the Soviets. It is good to remind ourselves that we would still have enough problems left to keep us well occupied even if the Soviet Union were to be, as we hope it will some day become, our good neighbour." (*New York Herald Tribune*, June 14, 1950.)

Speaking at Harvard University, June 22, 1950, Acheson repeated his belief ("and it cannot be said too often") that war was not inevitable and he added that "until the Russian leaders genuinely accepted a 'live and let live' philosophy, no approach from the free world, however imaginative, and no 'Trojan dove' from the Communist movement would help to resolve mutual problems". (*Manchester Guardian*, June 23, 1950.)

Mr. Acheson did not mention the fact that one of the first declarations of the Soviet Government in November, 1917, was to propose a policy of "live and let live". The U.S.A., jointly with other Western and Eastern nations, had replied by landing troops on Soviet soil in an attempt to crush the young Soviet Republic. And since then the Soviet Government had repeatedly proclaimed its desire "to live and let live" and its belief that countries with different social systems could

live at peace with one another providing they treated one another with mutual respect and tolerance.

Despite all the bland assurances of Secretary of State Acheson, the U.S.A. Government at this period was recruiting a large number of traitors for acts of espionage and sabotage directed against the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and her Allies in Central and Eastern Europe.

In a cable, date-lined Washington, June 24, 1950, Mr. Clifford Hulme, stated: "For a new and secret project, the United States Army is to recruit for 'specialised duties' 2,500 Russians, Balts, Poles, Czechs and others from among the thousands who have fled from behind the Iron Curtain and are now stateless refugees in Western Germany.

"All the recruits will be single men aged between eighteen and thirty-five, picked for their familiarity with the terrain and topography of 'certain countries of Europe', and for their knowledge of the languages, customs, habits, psychology, philosophy and other characteristics of the peoples of those countries.

"After exhaustive security screening, they will be enlisted as privates, starting at the usual £6 14s. od. a week and all found, and rising automatically to £7 7s. od. after four months. As only men of the highest ability and qualifications will be chosen, they are expected to advance rapidly to the rank of Technical Sergeant at £18 a week.

"Marriage while serving is barred. The men must give up allegiance to their native country—a formality for stateless persons—and swear fidelity to the United States. They will be under full military discipline and watched continuously. Any man found disloyal will be court-martialled and shot."

The cable concluded: "Enlistment is for an initial period of three years. All who serve five years and secure an honourable discharge become eligible for United States citizenship, but only if the Army orders them to America on completion of service.

"The Bill authorising recruitment of this Iron Curtain intelligence force reached President Truman yesterday for signature after a House debate in which several members complained they were being kept in the dark about the real purpose of the project. The secret is known only to a few outside the Army leadership and State Department." (*Sunday Times*, June 25, 1950.)

We must now deal briefly with developments in Germany at this

period, because, like developments in U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. relations, they reacted on Anglo-Soviet relations.

An Associated Press cable, date-lined Berlin, June 8, 1950, stated that: "Russia to-day recalled four generals from leading posts in its Control Commission and replaced them with civilians.

"The changes marked an accelerated switch from military to civilian control in the Russian Occupation Zone and the delegation of new responsibilities to the zone's Communist controlled government.

"Best known of the four recalled military men is Major-General Alexander G. Kotikov, fifty-eight-year-old former Soviet commandant in Berlin. General Kotikov's title has been representative of the Soviet Control Commission in Berlin since the establishment of the East German government last November. . . .

"General Kotikov is being replaced by Sergei Alexelvitch Dengin."

The cable added: "The Western Allies confine West Germans to consular representation abroad, but the Russians have allowed East Germany to establish seven embassies in the Soviet bloc.

"The newest diplomatic chief of mission, Johannes Koenig, left by Russian plane to-day for Communist China." (*New York Herald Tribune*, June 9, 1950.)

And a Reuter cable, date-lined Bonn, June 8, 1950, stated: "The Allied High Commission to-day announced wider powers for the West German Government in making treaties with foreign Powers.

"German Ministers may sign foreign agreements on their own account and the West German Government may draw up or negotiate treaties with foreign Powers.

"The Western Powers, who have hitherto exercised full supervision of West Germany's foreign affairs reserve only the right to approve an agreement within twenty-one days of its signature and to exercise the usual right of veto within twenty-one days of the treaty being ratified by Parliament.

"Similar rights have already been given to the West German Government to negotiate trade and payments agreements with foreign Powers."

The cable concluded: "These powers are also extended to the State Governments which under the West German constitution are entitled to negotiate foreign agreements on purely local matters such as hydro-electric development."

Under these agreements both the East and West German Governments had more freedom in their relations with foreign countries, but

it did not mean that the state of war between Germany and the Powers which won the war was ended.

We must now consider very briefly to what extent, by the middle of 1950, the U.S.S.R. had recovered from the war, because her strength was a determining factor in her relations with the Western Powers. The latter despised weakness but had a salutary respect for strength.

Now many capable and sincere friends of the U.S.S.R.—who visited that country during and in the first years after the end of the second world war—were persuaded that several decades would pass before the U.S.S.R. reached (particularly in the war-devastated areas) her pre-war level of production and well-being.

However, the iron will and the superhuman efforts of the Soviet Government and peoples again achieved the impossible, as the contents of the speeches made by Soviet statesmen, in the course of election meetings throughout the U.S.S.R., in February-March, 1950, demonstrates.

Mr. Malenkov (Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.) in the course of a speech, March 10, 1950, stated:

"In the four years of the post-war Five-Year Plan, the volume of capital construction work in the districts which suffered from occupation amounted to 37 per cent. of the total volume of such work in the national economy of the U.S.S.R. To-day the restoration of the economy and of cultural and welfare institutions in these districts has, in the main, already been accomplished.

"In the fourth quarter of 1949 gross industrial output in the districts which were subjected to occupation reached 106 per cent. of the level of the pre-war year of 1940. By the end of 1949 the pre-war level of coal output, production of electricity, output of tractors, cement, superphosphates and other types of industrial production was already surpassed in these districts. In the war-ravaged districts the heavy engineering, chemical and machine-tool plants, pits, ore mines, power stations, and thousands of enterprises of the light and food industries have been restored.

"It is important to point out that the restoration of industry took place on the basis of up-to-date technique taking into account the latest achievements of science and technology. The restored enterprises are provided with the most up-to-date, highly productive equipment. Side by side with restoration of industry, considerable work is proceeding on the building of new factories and workshops in these districts."

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Success in agriculture was equally satisfactory. Malenkov continued: "Great successes have also been achieved in the work of restoring agriculture. In the areas which suffered under occupation, the gross harvest of grain crops, sugar beet, flax, sunflower, potatoes and other agricultural crops in 1949 surpassed the pre-war level, all the machine and tractor stations were restored and a large number of new machine and tractor stations were set up."

Great progress was also made in other spheres. He declared:

"In the war-ravaged areas, the network of schools, higher educational institutions, cultural institutes and hospitals was rapidly restored. In these areas the network of elementary, seven-year and secondary schools was not only restored but considerably extended by new building work. The number of students in schools of higher learning reached 248,000 in 1949, and in technical schools 407,000, which is considerably in excess of the number of students in such schools in 1940. The number of hospital beds in these areas in 1949 was 26,000 more than in 1940. The number of doctors surpassed the pre-war figure by 23,900."

Summing up this part of his speech, Malenkov declared: "Despite the fact that it is a tremendous and extremely complicated task to restore the total of residential buildings in the districts subjected to occupation, since many towns and villages were razed to the ground by the invaders, nevertheless by the end of 1949 it had been possible to restore 90 per cent. of the previous housing total. In the towns and workers' settlements in the war-ravaged districts since liberation a total area of more than 58 million square metres of residential buildings has been restored or newly built, and in the rural areas about 3,000,000 residential houses were restored or newly built."

Mr. Shvernik (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet) who led the Soviet Trade Union Delegation to the British Trades Union Congress in 1942, in the course of an election speech, March 1, 1950, dealing with industrial development in the U.S.S.R. as a whole, stated:

"In the post-war years the Soviet people have achieved outstanding successes in all spheres of economic and cultural construction. The enlarged State plan for 1949 has been exceeded, as a whole, by 3 per cent., as a result of which the gross output of the whole of industry of the U.S.S.R. increased by 20 per cent. in comparison with

1948 and by 41 per cent. in comparison with the pre-war year of 1940.

"Pig iron production equalled 119 per cent. of 1948. For rolled metal, the extraction of coal and oil and production of other types of industrial goods of prime importance, in the fourth quarter of last year the production level set by the plan for the last year of the Stalin Five-Year Plan was surpassed. In 1949, the State Plan for supplying the national economy was fulfilled, which made it possible considerably to improve the supply of all branches of the economy with raw materials, fuel, electric power and equipment.

"Fulfilment of the post-war Five-Year Plan went hand-in-hand with the expansion of plant, factory and housing construction. Within four years of the post-war Five-Year Plan 5,200 large-scale State-owned industrial enterprises were restored or newly built and commissioned, over 72 million square metres of dwelling space was put up or restored and 2,300,000 houses were built or restored in rural localities."

"To satisfy all our needs we must raise still higher the level of industrial production," he continued, "the Soviet people will achieve in a short time the advance of Socialist industry and will thereby advance all aspects of the economic and cultural life of Soviet society."

Turning to the progress in agriculture as a whole, Mr. Shvernik stated:

"Our Socialist agriculture has scored exceedingly great successes in the post-war period. The collective and State farms have expanded their crop areas, have improved the cultivation of field and the care of crops, and have raised the level of agriculture's technical equipment.

"In 1949 alone machine and tractor stations and collective and State farms received three to four times more tractors, lorries and agricultural machinery than in the pre-war year of 1940. Owing to the selfless efforts of the collective farmers and to a whole number of measures carried out by the Party and Government to arm agriculture technically and to implement agricultural measures based on scientific achievements, the grain problem has been fully solved in our country.

"In 1949, gross grain crop returns reached 7,600 million poods.¹ The rapid increase in the grain economy in its turn enabled our collective and State farms to eliminate the lag in animal husbandry.

¹ 62 poods = 1 ton.

"The working people of Socialist agriculture are successfully putting this decision of the Party and the Government into practice. In 1949, the collective farms increased the communally owned head of cattle all round and considerably out-stripped the level of the pre-war year of 1940 and also improved the quality of pedigree cattle."

"Collective farmers and agricultural experts," continued Mr. Shvernik, "are struggling with immense enthusiasm to realise the Stalin plan for remaking nature. By 1940, 590,000 hectares¹ had already been afforested. A large area has also been made ready for future afforestation. The ley crop-rotation system is being successfully introduced in agriculture and the construction of ponds and reservoirs is under way.

"All this provides the collective and State farms with favourable conditions for obtaining high and stable harvests and ensuring an unprecedented flourishing of Socialist agriculture."

Mr. Bulganin (Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.) in the course of an election speech declared:

"Important successes were achieved in the field of cultural construction. At the end of last year more than 36 million people were studying in elementary, seven-year and secondary schools, technical schools and other special schools of learning. This is almost two million more than in 1948.

"The number of students in schools of higher learning, including universities, was 1,128,000, which is 316,000 more than the pre-war figure. In 1940, there were 880,000 specialists with a higher education working in the national economy. To-day there are more than 1,300,000, including 49 per cent. of women. It is important to note here that three-quarters of our specialists are young people, trained and educated in our Soviet times."

"The steady rise in our science, technique and culture," continued Mr. Bulganin, "is testified to by the annual award of Stalin Prizes. By the recently adopted decision of the Government, the ranks of Stalin Prize-winners have been augmented by a large number of new representatives of science and technique, literature and the arts, outstanding innovators in production, industry and agriculture."

It has been well said that the level of civilisation in any country can

¹ 1 hectare = 2.471 acres.

be measured by its treatment of its womenfolk. The equality of the sexes has been established without any qualifications in the U.S.S.R. On this subject, Mr. Bulganin stated:

"In our country women are completely liberated from social, economic and spiritual slavery. In the Soviet Union women have been granted not only political rights, but their realisation in practice has also been ensured. Over 1,700 women were elected to the Supreme Soviets of the Union and Autonomous Republics, and about half a million to local Soviets of Deputies of working people.

"A considerable number of women, the best daughters of the Soviet people, have been now put forward as candidates for Deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. Soviet women have equal rights to work, equal pay for work, rest, social insurance and education. There is not a single branch of Socialist construction in our country in which women are not displaying their creative abilities."

"Soviet women," he continued, "are marching forward in the ranks of active fighters for a still greater development of the economy and culture of the Soviet Union and for the great cause of the construction of Communism in our country. Let us wish our heroic women new successes in their selfless work for the well-being of our Motherland."

On March 1, 1950, a big all-round reduction in prices, the third since the end of the war, of consumer goods was decreed in the U.S.S.R. Naturally this subject was frequently referred to during the election. On March 10, Mr. Mikoyan (Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers) speaking on this subject stated:

"As everyone can see, the reduction of prices is not identical for all commodities. What is noticeable is the important fact that, with the general reduction in the prices of all goods averaging about 21 per cent., prices have been reduced by the largest percentage and to an unusually great extent in the case of goods in daily demand. There is no need to explain the importance of this fact.

"According to data from sixty of the largest towns, the average daily sales of all sorts of bread was only 2 per cent. more than in February, the population buying less rye bread and there being a greater demand for white wheaten bread. Thus, only part of the economy the population gained from the reduction in the price of bread was used here for an increase in the consumption of white bread, while the greater part of the gain was used for increased purchase of more valuable foodstuffs, such as meat, sausage meats,

animal fats, canned and other foods, and also for increased purchases of commodities like watches, bicycles, motor-bicycles, wireless sets, gramophones, toilet soap."

"These tendencies are quite natural," continued Mikoyan, "and put demands on our industry to increase still further the production of precisely those goods for which the population has put forward the greatest demand since the reduction in prices, in order fully to satisfy this new demand."

Then turning to the question of the national income, Mr. Mikoyan stated: "As a result of the mighty advance of Socialist economy in spite of the tremendous war destruction, the national income of the U.S.S.R. in comparable prices increased 36 per cent. in 1949 compared with the pre-war year 1940. The incomes of workers and office employees in comparable prices calculated per worker increased 24 per cent. in 1949 compared with 1940, and the incomes of the peasants by more than 30 per cent. This means that the real wages of workers and office employees and the incomes of the collective farming peasantry have considerably surpassed the pre-war level."

It may be well to make a slight digression here. In this country it is customary to sneer at the elections to the Supreme Soviet. But the Soviet peoples take the elections very seriously. Sir Maurice Peterson, former British Ambassador in Moscow, in an article in the *Star* stated:

"He [the Soviet citizen] records his vote up to a numerical proportion of the total electorate which usually reaches 98 or 99 per cent., and he leaves the booth, as I have myself remarked with stupefaction, with the obvious contentment of one who has performed an important civic duty." (*Star*, March 17, 1950.)

As to the result of the elections, a TASS cable stated: "In the elections to the Soviet of the Union 110,788,377 persons or 99·73 per cent. voted for the Communist and non-party bloc candidates; and 1,487 ballots have been considered invalid. In the case of the Soviet of Nationalities, 99·72 per cent. of those who polled voted for the Communist and non-party bloc, and 0·28 per cent. voted against the candidates." (*Times*, March 16, 1950.)

Now to turn to the subject of the Soviet Budget.

The lengthy report in which Mr. Zverev, Minister of Finance of the U.S.S.R. on June 13, 1950, introduced the Soviet budget as well as his speech June 17, in which he summed up the debate, are well worth

Careful study. Here, however, we can only quote some of the most important extracts from his two speeches.

First, as to the total figures, Zverev said: "The Budget provides for a sum of 433,167,000,000 roubles of revenue and 427,937,000,000 roubles of expenditure, with an excess of more than 5,000,000,000 roubles of revenue over expenditure."

How was the revenue raised? Very differently from the way in bourgeois and feudal countries. The Minister stated: "Of the total amount of Budget revenue, receipts from the taxes on turnover are to amount to 238,400 million roubles; deduction from profits 39,800 million roubles; taxes on the population, 36,400 million roubles, and revenue from State loans, 31,800 million roubles.

"Thus, about two-thirds of the entire Budget revenue is made up of receipts from Socialist enterprises, taxes on turnover and deductions from profits."

How was the revenue expended? The answer to this question is very important in assessing the Soviet Government's home and foreign policies. M. Zverev declared:

"The funds of the State Budget for 1950 are allocated: for the national economy, 164,400 million roubles or 38.4 per cent. of the Budget; for social-cultural measures, 120,700 million roubles or 28.2 per cent. Thus two-thirds of the entire Budget goes for the further development of the national economy and for cultural construction.

"The expenditure for financing the national economy and social and cultural measures in 1950 is over one and a half times that of the corresponding expenditure in 1946, the first year of the post-war Five-Year Plan."

Later in his report giving more details of expenditure on education and health, the Minister said:

"In the network of institutions for education and health protection a further increase is provided for which will lead to an improvement in the social-cultural services to the population. The number of pupils in primary and secondary and technical schools is to increase to 37,900,000 in 1950, i.e. by 1,500,000. The number of students of higher educational institutions, including correspondence, educational institutions, will reach the figure of 1,194,000 in 1950, exceeding the planned figure for the last year of the Five-Year Plan.

"Of the total amount of expenditure for social-culture measures—120,700 million roubles—59,500 million roubles will go to education, 22,000 million roubles to health protection and physical culture, 4,000 million roubles to the payment of grants to mothers of large families and unmarried mothers and 22,400 million to social welfare. Expenditure under the Budget for State social insurance in 1950 will amount to 18,100 million roubles, compared with 16,700 million roubles last year."

Foreign critics constantly assert that the whole Soviet system is bureaucratically conducted and therefore expensive. That is not the case. The Minister continued: "A few words about expenditure on the upkeep of the organs of State administration. This expenditure will amount to 13,900 million roubles in the State Budget of the U.S.S.R. for 1950, or 3.2 per cent. of all expenditure. The Government is carrying out measures to reduce the cost of the administrative apparatus. In 1950, it is necessary to intensify economies of funds allocated for the upkeep of the organs of State administration."

The expenditure in the Budget which attracted most attention abroad was that for the Armed Forces. Mr. Zverev declared:

"It is proposed that the allocations under the estimates for the Army and the Navy Budget shall amount to 79,400 million roubles in the State Budget of the U.S.S.R. for 1950. In 1950, allocations for the defence of the country amount to 18.5 per cent. of all Budget expenditure compared with 32.6 per cent. in the pre-war year of 1940 and 23.9 per cent. in the first year of the post-war Five-Year Plan."

"These figures," continued the Minister, "once again demonstrate that the Soviet Union is consistently pursuing a policy of peace which meets with the complete support of the whole of advanced, progressive mankind."

Each of the sixteen* Union Republics which constitute the U.S.S.R. has its own Republican Budget and these also reflect the growing prosperity of the Republics. The Minister continued:

"In connection with the tasks of the further development of the economy of the Republics and of local economy and the culture of the Union Republics, big appropriations are made for these purposes in the Republican and local Budgets. The total State Budgets

* The number of Union Republics has since been reduced to fifteen.

of the Union Republics for 1950 are envisaged as amounting to 96,600 million roubles, including 21,200 million roubles for financing the national economy and 65,200 million roubles for social and cultural measures. Out of the 21,200 million roubles appropriated under the State Budgets of the Union Republics for the purposes of the national economy, 3,700 million roubles are envisaged for the financing of the industry of the Republics and local industry, 9,300 million roubles for agriculture, 5,600 million roubles for communal [municipal] services and housing."

It will be noticed that nearly all the revenue of the Republican Budgets was devoted to the enrichment of their respective Republics.

The Soviet Budget was closely related to the plans for the development of the U.S.S.R. On this point the Finance Minister declared: "The State Budget of the U.S.S.R. has been drawn up in complete accord with the national economic plan for 1950. The relation between the Budget and the branches of the national economy, both on the revenue and the expenditure side, have been fixed, taking into account the further substantial growth of the output of industry and agriculture, the increase in the volume of railway transport and the great improvement in the quality indices of the work of the economy."

One fact was daylight clear from all this and that is one more reason why we have devoted so much space to it—despite what was being said at this time by the British Press and by many British politicians the Soviet Government was devoting its main efforts to the tasks of peace and only devoting the necessary minimum to the Armed Forces.

We are bringing this, the second volume of *A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations*, to a close on June 25, 1950, i.e. up to the eve of the outbreak of hostilities between South and North Korea on June 26, 1950.

It would be quite impossible to deal adequately in a limited compass with the causes of the outbreak of hostilities and the important events which crowded one on the other in Korea and the repercussions in the chancelleries of the world. Accordingly we have left it over for the third volume. We shall then take up the narrative of Anglo-Soviet relations with this important episode which was emphasised by the Government of the U.S.A. in such a way as to bring the world to the brink of a third world war.

APPENDIX I

REPORT OF THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY 11, 1945 (Cmd 6598, 1945)

FOR the past eight days Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America and Marshal J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have met with the Foreign Secretaries, Chiefs of Staff and other advisers in the Crimea.

The following statement is made by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the United States of America and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the results of the Crimea Conference.

I. THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY

We have considered and determined the military plans of the three Allied Powers for the final defeat of the common enemy. The military staffs of the three allied nations have met in daily meetings throughout the Conference. These meetings have been most satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted in closer co-ordination of the military effort of the three Allies than ever before. The fullest information has been interchanged. The timing, scope and co-ordination of new and even more powerful blows to be launched by our armies and air forces into the heart of Germany from the East, West, North and South have been fully agreed and planned in detail.

Our combined military plans will be made known only as we execute them, but we believe that the very close working partnership among the three staffs attained at this Conference will result in shortening the war. Meetings of the three staffs will be continued in the future whenever the need arises.

Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people will only make the cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue a hopeless resistance.

II. THE OCCUPATION AND CONTROL OF GERMANY

We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on Nazi Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed. These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany has been accomplished. Under the agreed plan, the forces of the Three Powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Co-ordinated administration and control has been provided for under the plan through a central Control Commission consisting of the Supreme Commanders of the Three Powers with headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed that France should be invited by the Three Powers, if she should so desire, to take over a zone of occupation, and to participate as a fourth member of the Control Commission. The limits of the French zone will be agreed by the four Governments concerned through their representatives on the European Advisory Commission.

It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi party, Nazi laws, organisations and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people; and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world. It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when Nazism and militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them in the comity of nations.

III. REPARATION BY GERMANY

We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany to the Allied Nations in this war and recognised it as just that Germany be obliged to make compensation for this damage in kind to the greatest extent possible. A Commission for the Compensation of

Damage will be established. The Commission will be instructed to consider the question of the extent and methods for compensating damage caused by Germany to the Allied countries. The Commission will work in Moscow.

IV. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our Allies of a general international organisation to maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.

The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. The present conference has been able to resolve this difficulty.

We have agreed that a Conference of United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco in the United States on April 25, 1945, to prepare the charter of such an organisation, along the lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks.

The Government of China and the Provisional Government of France will be immediately consulted and invited to sponsor invitations to the Conference jointly with the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As soon as the consultation with China and France has been completed, the text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made public.

V. DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

We have drawn up and subscribed to a declaration on liberated Europe. This declaration provides for concerting the policies of the three Powers and for joint action by them in meeting the political and economic problems of liberated Europe in accordance with democratic principles. The text of the Declaration is as follows:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite

States of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise those rights, the three Governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated State or former Axis satellite State in Europe where in their judgment conditions require: (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated State or any former Axis satellite State in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in co-operation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and the general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

VI. POLAND

We came to the Crimea Conference resolved to settle our differences about Poland. We discussed fully all aspects of the question. We

reaffirm our common desire to see established a strong, free independent and democratic Poland. As a result of our discussions we have agreed on the conditions in which a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity may be formed in such a manner as to command recognition by the three major Powers.

The agreement reached is as follows:

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganised on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorised as a Commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganisation of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have a right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three Heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognise that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the

extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference.

VII. YUGOSLAVIA

We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic that the Agreement between them should be put into effect immediately, and that a new Government should be formed on the basis of that Agreement.

We also recommend that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare that—

- (i) The Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (Avnoj) should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament (Skupshtina) who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament; and
- (ii) Legislative acts passed by the Assembly of National Liberation will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly.

There was also a general review of other Balkan questions.

VIII. MEETINGS OF FOREIGN SECRETARIES

Throughout the Conference, besides the daily meetings of the Heads of Governments, and the Foreign Secretaries, separate meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries, and their advisers, have also been held daily.

These meetings have proved of the utmost value and the Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for regular consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries. They will, therefore, meet as often as may be necessary, probably about every three or four months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three Capitals, the first meeting being held in London, after the United Nations Conference on World Organisation.

IX. UNITY FOR PEACE AS FOR WAR

Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our peoples and to all the peoples of the world.

Only with continuing and growing co-operation and understanding among our three countries, and among all the peace-loving nations, can the highest aspiration of humanity be realised—a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, “Afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want”.

Victory in this war and establishment of the proposed international organisation will provide the greatest opportunity in all history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of such a peace.

(Signed) WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

J. V. STALIN

February 11, 1945.

PROTOCOL OF THE PROCEEDING OF THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE

Yalta, 11 February, 1945 (Cmd. 7088, 1947)

The following is an extract from the above mentioned Protocol:
The Heads of the three Governments have agreed as follows:

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation . . . should be 20 billion dollars and that 50 per cent. of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the Commission.

APPENDIX II

THE POTSDAM DECLARATION, AUGUST 2, 1945

I. REPORT ON THE TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE OF BERLIN

ON July 17, 1945, the President of the United States of America, Harry S. Truman, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Generalissimo J. V. Stalin and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston S. Churchill, together with Mr. Clement Attlee, met in the Tripartite Conference of Berlin. They were accompanied by the Foreign Secretaries of the three Governments, Mr. James F. Byrnes, Mr. V. M. Molotov and Mr. Anthony Eden, the Chiefs of Staff, and other advisers.

There were nine meetings between July 17 and July 25. The conference was then interrupted for two days while the results of the British General Election were being declared.

On July 28, Mr. Attlee returned to the conference as Prime Minister, accompanied by the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ernest Bevin. Four days of further discussion then took place. During the course of the conference there were regular meetings of the heads of the three Governments accompanied by the foreign secretaries, and also of the foreign secretaries alone. Committees appointed by the foreign secretaries for preliminary consideration of questions before the conference also met daily.

The meetings of the conference were held at the Cecilienhof, near Potsdam. The conference ended on August 2, 1945.

Important decisions and agreements were reached. Views were exchanged on a number of other questions and consideration of these matters will be continued by the Council of Foreign Ministers established by the Conference.

President Truman, Generalissimo Stalin and Prime Minister Attlee leave this conference, which has strengthened the ties between the three Governments and extended the scope of their collaboration and understanding, with renewed confidence that their Governments and peoples, together with the other United Nations, will insure the creation of a just and enduring peace.

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF A COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

The conference reached an agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers representing the five principal powers to continue the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements and to take up other matters which from time to time may be referred to the Council by agreement of the Governments participating in the Council.

The text of the agreement for the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers is as follows:

1. There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France and the United States.

2. (i) The Council shall normally meet in London, which shall be the permanent seat of the joint secretariat which the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers will be accompanied by a high-ranking deputy, duly authorised to carry on the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Minister, and by a small staff of technical advisers.

(ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in London not later than September 1, 1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be agreed from time to time.

3. (i) As its immediate important task the Council shall be authorised to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilised for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established.

(ii) For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purpose of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other members will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion.

(iii) Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the member governments.

4. (i) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct

interest to a State not represented thereon, such State should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question.

(ii) The Council may adapt its procedure to the particular problem under consideration. In some cases it may hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other interested States. In other cases, the Council may convoke a formal conference of the State chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem.

In accordance with the decision of the conference the three Governments have each addressed an identical invitation to the Governments of China and France to adopt this text and to join in establishing the Council.

The establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the specific purposes named in the text will be without prejudice to the agreement of the Crimea Conference that there should be periodic consultation among the Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom.

The conference also considered the position of the European Advisory Commission in the light of the agreement to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was noted with satisfaction that the Commission had ably discharged its principal task by the recommendations that it had furnished for the terms of Germany's unconditional surrender, for the zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, and for the inter-Allied control machinery in those countries. It was felt that further work of a detailed character for the co-ordination of Allied policy for the control of Germany and Austria would in future fall within the competence of the Allied Control Council at Berlin and the Allied Commission at Vienna. Accordingly it was agreed to recommend that the European Advisory Commission be dissolved.

III. GERMANY

The Allied Armies are in occupation of the whole of Germany and the German people have begun to atone for the terrible crimes committed under the leadership of those whom in the hour of their success, they openly approved and blindly obeyed.

Agreement has been reached at this conference on the political and economic principles of a co-ordinated Allied policy toward defeated Germany during the period of Allied control.

The purpose of this agreement is to carry out the Crimea Declaration on Germany. German militarism and Nazism will be extirpated

and the Allies will take in agreement together, now and in the future, the other measures necessary to assure that Germany never again will threaten her neighbours or the peace of the world.

It is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or enslave the German people. It is the intention of the Allies that the German people be given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis. If their own efforts are steadily directed to this end, it will be possible for them in due course to take their place among the free and peaceful peoples of the world.

The text of the agreement is as follows:

The Political and Economic Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period

A. Political Principles

1. In accordance with the agreement on control machinery in Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exercised on instructions from their respective governments, by the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Control Council.

2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany.

3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are:

(i) The complete disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:

(a) All German land, naval and air forces, the S.S., S.A., S.D., and Gestapo, with all their organisations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers' Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans' organisations and all other military and quasi-military organisations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganisation of German militarism and Nazism.

(b) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialised facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft

and all arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented.

(ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable.

(iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organisations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to insure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda.

(iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful co-operation in international life by Germany.

4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler régime or established discrimination on grounds of race, creed or political opinion shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated.

5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organisations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned.

6. All members of the Nazi party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.

7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas.

8. The judicial system will be reorganised in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion.

9. The administration of affairs in Germany should be directed toward the decentralisation of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end:

(i) Local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on

democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purpose of military occupation;

(ii) All democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussions shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany;

(iii) Representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and State (Land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government;

(iv) For the time being no central German Government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by State secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council.

10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted.

B. Economic Principles

11. In order to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and seagoing ships shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany's approved post-war peacetime needs to meet the objectives stated in paragraph 15. Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission on reparations and approved by the Governments concerned, or if not removed shall be destroyed.

12. At the earliest practicable date the German economy shall be decentralised for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements.

13. In organising the German economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries.

14. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end common policies shall be established in regard to:

- (a) Mining and industrial production and allocations;
- (b) Agriculture, forestry and fishing;
- (c) Wages, prices and rationing;
- (d) Import and export programs for Germany as a whole;
- (e) Currency and banking, central taxation and customs;
- (f) Reparation and removal of industrial war potential;
- (g) Transportation and communications.

In applying these policies account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local conditions.

15. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy, but only to the extent necessary;

(a) To carry out programs of industrial disarmament and demilitarisation, of reparations, and of approved exports and imports.

(b) To assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany, and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European countries means all European countries, excluding the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)

(c) To insure in the manner determined by the Control Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports.

(d) To control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions, including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein.

(e) To control all German public or private scientific bodies, research and experimental institutions, laboratories, etc., connected with economic activities.

16. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls established by the Control Council, German administrative machinery shall be created and the German authorities shall be required to the fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that

the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any breakdown in these controls will rest with themselves. Any German controls which may run counter to the objectives of occupation will be prohibited.

17. Measures shall be promptly taken:

- (a) To effect repair of transport;
- (b) To enlarge coal production;
- (c) To maximise agriculture output; and
- (d) To effect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities.

18. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of disposition over German-owned external assets not already under the control of United Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany.

19. Payment of reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports.

The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraphs 4 (A) and 4 (B) of the reparations agreement.

IV. REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY

In accordance with the Crimea decision that Germany be compelled to compensate to the greatest possible extent for the loss and suffering that she has caused to the United Nations and for which the German people cannot escape responsibility, the following agreement on reparations was reached:

1. Reparation claims of the U.S.S.R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U.S.S.R. and from appropriate German external assets.

2. The U.S.S.R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations.

3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the western zones and from appropriate German external assets.

4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U.S.S.R. from its

own zone of occupation, the U.S.S.R. shall receive additionally from the western zones:

(A) Fifteen per cent. of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries, as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the western zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.

(B) Ten per cent. of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the western zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return.

Removals of equipment as provided in (A) and (B) above shall be made simultaneously.

5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the western zones on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest.

6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years from the determination specified in paragraph 5. The delivery of products covered by 4 (A) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U.S.S.R. in agreed instalments within five years of the date hereof.

The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparations shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the zone commander in the zone from which the equipment is to be removed.

7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect of such equipment as will be determined to be eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 6.

8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the western zones of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in all countries, except those specified in paragraph 9 below.

9. The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America renounce their claim in respect of reparations to shares of

German enterprises which are located in the eastern zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania, and Eastern Austria.

10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in Germany.

V. DISPOSAL OF THE GERMAN NAVY AND MERCHANT MARINE

The Conference agreed in principle upon arrangements for the use and disposal of the surrendered German fleet and merchant ships. It was decided that the three Governments would appoint experts to work out together detailed plans to give effect to the agreed principles. A further joint statement will be published simultaneously by the three Governments in due course.

VI. CITY OF KOENIGSBERG AND THE ADJACENT AREA

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government that pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement the section of the western frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg-Goldap, to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East Prussia.

The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the city of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above, subject to expert examination of the actual frontier.

The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they will support the proposal of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement.

VII. WAR CRIMINALS

The three Governments have taken note of the discussions which have been proceeding in recent weeks in London between British, United States, Soviet and French representatives with a view to reaching agreement on the methods of trial of those major war criminals whose crimes under the Moscow Declaration of October, 1943, have no particular geographical localisation.

The three Governments reaffirm their intention to bring those criminals to swift and sure justice. They hope that the negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement being reached for this purpose,

and they regard it as a matter of great importance that the trial of those major criminals should begin at the earliest possible date. The first list of defendants will be published before September 1.

VIII. AUSTRIA

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the extension of the authority of the Austrian Provisional Government to all of Austria.

The three Governments agreed that they were prepared to examine this question after the entry of the British and American forces into the City of Vienna.

IX. POLAND

The Conference considered questions relating to the Polish Provisional Government and the western boundary of Poland.

On the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity they defined their attitude in the following statement:

(A) We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognised by the three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists.

The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government, as the recognised government of the Polish State, in the property belonging to the Polish State located in their territories and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated.

The three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish armed forces and the merchant marine. They expect that those Poles who

return home shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens.

The three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government, in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea Conference, has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections.

(B) The following agreement was reached on the western frontier of Poland:

In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The president of the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.

The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemünde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this Conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

X. CONCLUSION OF PEACE TREATIES AND ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION

The Conference agreed upon the following statement of common policy for establishing, as soon as possible, the conditions of lasting peace after victory in Europe.

The three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be terminated by the conclusion of peace treaties. They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views.

For their part, the three Governments have included the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist régime and is making good progress toward the re-establishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a peace treaty with a recognised and democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the three Governments to fulfil their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations.

The three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing peace treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania.

The conclusion of peace treaties with recognised democratic governments in these States will also enable the three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The three Governments agree to examine, each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries.

The three Governments have no doubt that in view of the changed conditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied press will enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

As regards the admission of other States into the United Nations Organisation, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations declares that:

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organisation, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

2. The admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

The three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfil the qualifications set out above.

The three Governments feel bound, however, to make it clear that they for their part would not favour any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.

XI. TERRITORIAL TRUSTEESHIPS

The conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government concerning trusteeship territories as defined in the decision of the Crimea Conference and in the Charter of the United Nations Organisation.

After an exchange of views on this question it was decided that the disposition of any former Italian territories was one to be decided in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy and that the question of Italian territory would be considered by the September council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

XII. REVISED ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION PROCEDURE IN RUMANIA, BULGARIA AND HUNGARY

The three Governments took note that the Soviet representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commission, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased.

The three Governments agreed that the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these countries would now be undertaken, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries and accepting as a basis the agreed proposals.

XIII. ORDERLY TRANSFERS OF GERMAN POPULATIONS

The conference reached the following agreement on the removal of Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary:

The three Governments having considered the question in all its aspects, recognise that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.

Since the influx of a large number of Germans into Germany would increase the burden already resting on the occupying authorities, they consider that the Allied Control Council in Germany should in the first instance examine the problem with special regard to the question of the equitable distribution of these Germans among the several zones of occupation. They are accordingly instructing their respective representatives on the Control Council to report to their Governments as soon as possible the extent to which such persons have already entered Germany from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to submit an estimate of the time and rate at which further transfers could be carried out, having regard to the present situation in Germany.

The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional Government and the Control Council in Hungary are at the same time being informed of the above and are being requested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending the examination by the Governments concerned of the report from their representatives on the Control Council.

XIV. MILITARY TALKS

During the conference there were meetings between the Chiefs of Staff of the three Governments on military matters of common interest.

Approved:

J. V. STALIN

HARRY S. TRUMAN

C. R. ATTLEE

APPENDIX III

"WHAT THE U.S.S.R. STANDS FOR"

An extract from the *Anglo-Russian News Bulletin*, issued by the Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee, No. 10, November 1, 1948

BELOW we quote some extracts from *Information Bulletin*, Vol. I, No. 17, dated August 19, 1945, issued by the United States Armed Forces Institute with a definite aim "To Assist Instructional and Educational Personnel in their Mission:

"The U.S.S.R., like the U.S., is opposed to the Fundamental Fascist ideas on which Germany has operated: (1) The master race; (2) the State is all important; (3) Lebensraum; and (4) desire to dominate the world.

"*Master Race*: If the U.S. is a 'melting pot,' then the Soviet Union is an electric mixer. Scientists have counted 189 'races' in U.S.S.R. Under the Tsars, many of the racial minorities were persecuted, to-day in the Soviet Union, there is no such thing as racial discrimination in practice or in theory. The people of each 'race' have been encouraged to retain their own language, customs and individuality and to educate themselves and develop the economic wealth of the area in which they live.

"*All-Important State*: Some people profess to see strong likeness between the Soviet and Nazi forms of Government; each permits but one legal political party, each uses propaganda and secret police. However, the *goals* of the two Governments are poles apart. The monopoly of the Communist Party is imposed to protect the interests of the common people against those who had formerly taken advantage of them. Its purpose is the welfare of the people, not the welfare of the State. In Germany, dictatorship sacrificed the people's welfare in the goal of preparing Germans for aggressive war.

"To illustrate this fundamental difference, the Soviets have encouraged Trade Unions; Hitler destroyed Unions. Russia adopted the

eight-hour day and later reduced it to seven (until the danger of war was immediate); the Nazis lengthened the working day long before the outbreak of war. The Soviets granted equality to women—they work as farmers, engineers, heads of industries; the Fascists compelled women to give up jobs on the theory that women's primary job was to produce children.

“The number of Soviet men and women in high schools and colleges increased greatly from 1914 to 1937; in Germany, college enrolments alone decreased by more than 50 per cent. from 1932 to 1937. Before World War I, only a small minority of the people of Russia could read or write. To-day, a great majority has been taught to do so.

“*Living Space*: In area, the U.S.S.R. is as large as all of the U.S., Canada and Alaska; it covers one-sixth of the land surface of the earth. Like the United States, it has nearly everything and lots of it—space, iron, coal, electric power, oil and grain.

“Many people cannot reconcile Soviet occupation of Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Rumania and Poland with U.S.S.R. statements that they want no foreign territory. W.D. Pamphlet 20-3 says:

“‘The ultimate military consequences are the best evidence of whether the U.S.S.R.'s 1939 attack on Finland and subsequent over-running of the Baltic Province were barchanded aggressions, motivated by greed for territory, or were done to strengthen the U.S.S.R.'s western frontiers against attack by Germany. The possession of this buffer territory did greatly facilitate the U.S.S.R. defence when the attack duly fell. Without attempting any moral judgments on the matter, it is enough to state the military fact that had the U.S.S.R. not acted so, the Allied cause would be weaker to-day.’

“How did these territories serve the U.S.S.R. militarily?

“*Finland*: The Russo-Finnish border was only 20 miles from Leningrad, second largest Soviet city. After negotiations with Finland for a buffer territory had failed, war resulted. The territory gained enabled the U.S.S.R. to hold out thirty days after the Nazi attack in 1941. Although besieged, Leningrad never fell.

“*Baltic States*: Occupation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania helped delay the Wehrmacht fifty-nine days and gave naval and air bases to hammer German shipping in the Baltic Sea.

"*Rumania*: Bessarabian territory delayed the German advance for over a month.

"*Poland*: By occupying Eastern Poland, the Soviets acquired 77,705 square miles to cushion to some extent the German attack when it came.

"In addition, the territories were part of the Russian Empire before 1917, and, with the exception of Poland and Rumania, had been closely associated with Germany.

"*World Domination*: Early leaders of Communism in Russia advocated world revolution. Communist policy was modified in 1927 by Stalin who believed Russia's most important contribution to Socialism lay not in revolution but in building Socialism successfully at home. The Soviet Union became one of the strongest supporters of co-operative action to preserve peace; Trotsky, leader of the 'world revolutionists,' was exiled in 1927 . . . Russia accepted the Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war in 1928 . . . they joined the League of Nations in 1934 and supported all attempts at disarmament—they abolished the Comintern (the Communist International) in May, 1943. The willingness of the Soviet Union, like other Powers, to make concessions in order to fashion a durable international peace organisation was demonstrated at the San Francisco Conference. In Stalin's words:

" 'We have no ideas of imposing our régime on other peoples. . . . Our aim is to help liberate them from Nazi tyranny and then to leave them free to live their own lives as they wish.' "

These were the considered opinions of the U.S.A. authorities in 1945—compare them with what is being said to-day by American Government and other influential spokesmen.

Before proceeding further we must point out that there are several errors of fact in the American Bulletin. Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania were forcibly separated from Soviet Russia after the first world war. The Eastern Ukraine was also separated from Soviet Russia by violence in 1941 at the end of the Polish-Russian war, despite the fierce resistance of its population.

Bessarabia was seized by Rumania when Soviet Russia was weak and its incorporation in Rumania was never recognised by the Soviet Union.

Had Soviet Russia not been temporarily weak she would never

have accepted the frontier with Finland which was imposed on her in 1920.

The three Baltic States, in 1940, entered the Soviet Union as a result of decision by their respective Parliaments.

Had it not been for the Wars of Intervention waged by the U.S.A., France, Great Britain, Japan, Italy (and also Germany), 1918-22 against the Soviet Republics the U.S.S.R. would have had the same Western frontiers from 1918 onwards as she subsequently had when Nazi Germany attacked her in 1941.

It is said that there is no gratitude in politics or in international affairs, but we doubt whether such a shameless *volte-face* as that of which U.S.A. Government has been guilty in this case has any parallel in the history of international relations.

The above-quoted American Bulletin was issued in August, 1945, as already stated. On September 16, 1948, just three years later, the *New York Herald Tribune* carried the following from its Washington correspondent:

“The Brookings Institution is one of the nation’s most highly respected independent research organisations. Its report, entitled ‘Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy in 1948-1949’, was prepared by its international studies group headed by Leo Pasvolksky, Russian-born former high official of the State Department.”

According to this authoritative report:

“There is ‘no evidence’ that either Russia or the United States has decided that war is necessary to protect its vital interests. ‘On the contrary, there is evidence that neither side, at least at present, is seeking an armed clash.’” (*ibid.*)

Later the report states:

“The Soviet régime, unlike the Nazi reign, ‘is not driven by its direct programme to seek new conquests in order to sustain itself’.” (*ibid.*)

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