

V. I. LENIN TOWARD THE SEIZURE OF POWER



COLLECTED WORKS

OF

V. I. LENIN

VOLUME XXI

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LENIN

TOWARD THE SEIZURE OF POWER

THE REVOLUTION OF 1917: FROM THE JULY DAYS TO THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

BOOK II



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PREFATORY NOTE

This book completes the writings and speeches of V. I. Lenin from the July Days, 1917—the first open conflict with the Provisional Government—to the October Revolution. The material in Book I contains Lenin's articles and letters written between July 16 and September 29 and this book covers the rest of the period. With the exception of the first essay, "Will the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?" and the classic, "State and Revolution," the writings were penned as letters to members and leading committees of the Bolshevik Party and dealt with preparations for the uprising. Reports of Lenin's remarks at two meetings of the Bolshevik Central Committee, at which the question of the uprising was definitely decided upon, are also included.

Aside from the explanatory notes which refer exclusively to the text of this book, although they continue the numeration of the notes in Book I, the appendices at the end of the book are for the volume as a whole. The page numbers at the end of each biographical note are intended as an index to the names mentioned in both books. The documentary section which is greatly enlarged in this volume contains proclamations and resolutions of the Central Committee, the resolutions of the Sixth Party Congress, the statement of Kamenev and Zinoviev, the minutes of meetings of the Central Committee and other important material. As in previous volumes the appendices include chronological accounts of outstanding events in the developing revolution and in the life of Lenin.

WILL THE	BOLSHEVIKS	RETAIN	STATE	POWER?

WILL THE BOLSHEVIKS RETAIN STATE POWER?

What is it upon which all political tendencies are agreed, from the Ryech to the Novaya Zhizn inclusive, from the Cadet-Kornilovists * to the semi-Bolsheviks, all except the Bolsheviks?

It is the conviction that either the Bolsheviks alone will never decide to take all state power into their hands or, if they do decide and take it, they will be incapable of retaining it for any length of time.

Lest any one say that the question of the assumption of all state power by the Bolsheviks alone is a question of no political reality whatsoever, that only the gross conceit of some "fanatic" can consider it to have reality, we shall forestall such an assertion by quoting the exact declarations of the most responsible and influential political parties and tendencies of various "hues."

But first a word or two regarding the first question: will the Bolsheviks decide to take all state power into their own hands alone? I have already had occasion to reply to this question with a categorical affirmative at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, in a remark I managed to shout from my seat during one of Tsereteli's ministerial speeches. One And I have met no declaration by the Bolsheviks, either in the press or verbal, that we must not assume power alone. I still maintain the view that a political party in general, and the party of the advanced class in particular, would have no right to existence, would be unworthy of being considered a party, would be a pitiable cipher in every sense, were it to refuse power once there is a possibility of obtaining it.

Let us now quote the assertions of the Cadets, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the semi-Bolsheviks (I would rather say quarter-Bolsheviks) on the question under discussion.

Editorial in the Ryech, September 29:

Discord and confusion reigned in the hall of the Alexandrinsky Theatre and the Socialist press reflects the same picture. Only the views of the Bolsheviks are characterised by their definiteness and directness. At the confer-

Kornilovists—inspirers and supporters of the counter-revolution led by General Kornilov.—Ed.

ence, these are the views of the minority. In the Soviets, this is an ever increasing trend. But in spite of all their fulmination, their bragging, their demonstration of self-confidence, the Bolsheviks, with the exception of a few fanatics, are brave only in words. They would not attempt to take "all power" of their own accord. Disorganisers and disrupters par excellence, they are actually cowards; in their heart of hearts they understand quite well both their personal ignorance and the ephemeral nature of their present successes. They know, just as well as we all do, that the first day of their final triumph would also be the first day of their headlong fall. Irresponsible in their very nature, anarchists in method and practice, they are conceivable only as one of the lines of political thought, or, more correctly, as one of its aberrations. The best means of getting rid of Bolshevism for many years to come. or of destroying it, would be to entrust its leaders with the fate of the country. And were it not for the consciousness of the inadmissible and disastrous nature of such experiments, one might, in despair, decide even on such an heroic step. Happily, we repeat, these dismal heroes of the day do not themselves really aim at the seizure of complete power. Under no conditions can constructive work be accessible to them. Thus all their definiteness and directness are limited to the sphere of the political platform, to verbal efforts at meetings. For practical purposes, their position cannot be taken into account from any point of view. However, in one respect it has a certain practical result; it unites all other shades of "Socialist thought" in a negative attitude towards it. . . . 101

This is how the Cadets argue. And here is the point of view of the largest "ruling and governing" party in Russia, the "Socialist-Revolutionaries," also in an unsigned, and therefore editorial, article of their official organ, *Dyelo Naroda*, October 4:

Should the bourgeoisie be unwilling to work together with the democracy on the basis of the platform laid down by the conference, pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, then the coalition must arise from within the conference itself. This is a great sacrifice on the part of the defenders of the coalition, but even the propagandists of the idea of a "clear line" of power must agree to this. We are afraid, however, that no agreement may be reached, either. Then there remains a third and last combination. That section of the conference which on principle defended the idea of homogeneity of power, has the duty to organise a government.

Let us say it definitely: the Bolsheviks will be obliged to form a cabinet. With the greatest energy they have been inculcating revolutionary democracy with hatred of the coalition, promising it every blessing once "conciliationism" is abandoned, and blaming on the latter all the misfortunes of the country.

If they have really understood what they were doing with their agitation, if they have not been deceiving the masses, they are in duty bound to pay the promissory notes they handed out right and left.

The question is clear.

Let them not make any useless efforts to hide behind hastily concocted theories of the impossibility of their taking power.

Democracy will accept no such theories.

At the same time, the advocates of coalition must guarantee them full support. These are the three combinations, the three ways that are open to us—there are no others. [The italics are the Dyelo Naroda's.] 103

Thus the S.-R.'s. Here is finally the "position"—if the attempt to sit between two stools can be called a position—of the *Novaya Zhizn*-ist quarter-Bolsheviks, taken from the leading article in the *Novaya Zhizn*, October 6:

If the coalition with Konovalov and Kishkin is again formed, then it will mean nothing but a new capitulation of democracy and the rejection of the resolution of the conference regarding a responsible government on the basis of the platform of August 27....108

A homogeneous cabinet of Mensheviks and S.-R.'s will be as little able to feel its responsibility as did the responsible Socialist Ministers in the coalition cabinet.... Such a government would not only be incapable of rallying around itself the "live forces" of the revolution, but it could not even count on any active support from the vanguard of the proletariat.

Still, the formation of another type of homogeneous cabinet, a government of the "proletariat and the poorest peasantry," would be, not a better, but a much worse way out of the situation—in fact, not a way out at all, but simply a catastrophe. Such a slogan, it is true, is not advanced by any one except in occasional, timid, and subsequently systematically "explained" remarks of the Rabochy Put. [This glaring untruth is written "bravely" by responsible publicists, forgetting even the editorial of the Dyelo Naroda of October 4.]

The Bolsheviks have now formally revived the slogan, "All Power to the Soviets." This slogan was dropped when, after the July days, the Soviets, through the Central Executive Committee, definitely began to pursue an active anti-Bolshevik policy. Now, however, the "Soviet line" may not only be considered to have become straightened out, but there is every reason to assume that the proposed Congress of Soviets will yield a Bolshevik majority. Under such conditions the slogan, "All Power to the Soviets," revived by the Bolsheviks, is a "tactical line" directed towards the dictatorship of the proletariat and the "poorest peasantry." True, by Soviets are also meant the Soviets of Peasant Deputies, and thus the Bolshevik slogan presupposes a power resting on the overwhelming majority of the whole democracy of Russia. But in this case the slogan, "All Power to the Soviets," loses all its special meaning, since the Soviets are thus made almost identical in their composition with the "preparliament" * formed by the conference. . . .

This statement of the Novaya Zhizn is a most shameless lie, and amounts to declaring that a falsified, a counterfeit democracy is "almost identical" with democracy. The pre-parliament is only a falsification, presenting the will of the minority of the people—particularly that of Kuskova, Berkenheim, Tchaikovsky and Co.—as if it were the will of the majority. That, in the first place. Secondly, even the peasant Soviets, faked by the Avksentyevs and Tchaikovskys, yielded such a high percentage of opponents to the coalition in the conference that together with the Soviets of Workers'

[•] Provisional Council of the Russian Republic decided upon by the Democratic Conference to serve as a representative body till the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.—Ed.

and Soldiers' Deputies there would have been an absolute collapse of the coalition. And thirdly, "Power to the Soviets" means that the power of the peasant Soviets would largely spread over the villages, and in these a majority of the poorest peasantry is assured.

If it is one and the same thing, then the Bolshevik alogan must be removed from the political arena without delay. If, however, "Power to the Soviets" only conceals dictatorship of the proletariat, then such a power would but signify the collapse and wreck of the revolution.

Is it necessary to prove that the proletariat, isolated not only from the other classes of the country but from the really living forces of the democracy, will not be able either technically to get hold of the state apparatus and to set it in motion under the exceptionally complicated circumstances, or politically to resist all the pressure of hostile forces, which will sweep away not only the dictatorship of the proletariat but the whole revolution as well?

The only power answering the requirements of the moment is a really honest coalition within the democracy. 104

We apologise to the reader for the long quotations, but they were absolutely necessary. It was necessary to present an exact view of the position of the various parties hostile to the Bolsheviks. It was necessary to definitely reveal the highly important circumstance that all these parties have admitted the question of the seizure of complete state power by the Bolsheviks alone to be not only a question of political reality, but also a very urgent question of the day.

Let us now pass to an analysis of the reasons on the strength of which "all," from the Cadets to the *Novaya Zhizn*-ists, are convinced that the Bolsheviks cannot retain power.

The sedate Ryech presents no arguments at all. It merely pours out on the Bolsheviks streams of the choicest and most irate abuse. The quotation cited by us shows, among other things, how very wrong it would be to think that the Ryech is cunningly "provoking" the Bolsheviks into seizing power and that therefore: "Be careful, comrades, since what the enemy advises must certainly be dangerous!" If, instead of realistically taking into account considerations of both a general and particular nature, we allow ourselves to be "persuaded" by the circumstance that the bourgeoisie is "provoking" us to take power, we shall find that we have been fooled by the bourgeoisie. For, undoubtedly, the bourgeoisie will always prophesy in its fury a million misfortunes to follow the assumption of power by the Bolsheviks; it will always cry in a fury: "Better get rid of the Bolsheviks all at once for 'a long period of years' by letting them attain power and then striking them a mortal blow." Such cries are also "provocation" if you like, only from the opposite side. The Cadets and the bourgeoisie do not "advise" and have never "advised" us to seize power; they only wish to frighten us by what they call insoluble problems of power.

No, we must not allow ourselves to be frightened by the shouts of the scared bourgeoisie. We must remember that we have never placed before ourselves "insoluble" social problems; as to the perfectly soluble problems of taking immediate steps towards Socialism as the only way out of an extremely difficult situation, they will only be solved by the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry. Victory, and lasting victory, is now more than ever, more than anywhere, assured to the proletariat in Russia if it seizes power.

Let us discuss in purely business fashion the concrete circumstances which render unfavourable this or that particular moment, but let us not allow ourselves to be frightened for a minute by the wild screams of the bourgeoisie, and let us not forget that the question of the seizure of all power by the Bolsheviks is becoming a really urgent question of the day. An immeasurably greater danger is threatening our party if we forget this, than if we concede that the seizure of power is "premature." Nothing can be "premature" in this respect at present; of a million chances all except perhaps one or two are in favour of this.

As to the infuriated abuse of the Ryech, we can and must repeat:

We hear the voice of approbation Not in the dulcet sounds of praise, But in the roar of irritation!

The fact that the bourgeoisie hates us so madly is one of the most convincing proofs of the truth that we are *correctly* indicating to the people the ways and means for the overthrow of the rule of the bourgeoisie.

The Dyelo Naroda, this time as a rare exception, did not think fit to honour us with its abuse, but it has not advanced even a shadow of proof, either. Only in an indirect way, in the form of a hint, it seeks to frighten us by the prospect, "the Bolsheviks will be obliged to form a cabinet." We admit fully that in trying to scare us the S.-R.'s are themselves most sincerely scared—scared to death by the phantom of the terrorised liberals. Similarly I admit that in some especially lofty and especially rotten institutions like the

[•] See note 50.-Ed.

Central Executive Committee and such-like "contact" commissions (for keeping in touch with the Cadets, or, more bluntly, for keeping company with the Cadets), the S.-R.'s may be successful in frightening some of the Bolsheviks; for, in the first place, the atmosphere in all these Central Executive Committees, in the pre-parliament, and so forth, is abominable, poisonous and debilitating, and to breathe it for any length of time is bad for any one; and secondly, sincerity is contagious, and a sincerely scared philistine is capable of temporarily transforming even a revolutionist into a philistine.

But no matter how easy it may be, from the "human" point of view, to understand the sincere fright of the S.-R. who has had the misfortune to be a Minister with the Cadets, or in a ministerial position before the Cadets, yet to allow oneself to be frightened means to commit a political error which may easily prove to be bordering on betrayal of the proletariat. What are your businesslike arguments, gentlemen? You need not hope that we will allow ourselves to be scared by your fright!

Arguments to the point are to be found this time only in the Novaya Zhizn. This time it comes out as an advocate of the bourgeoisie, which rôle suits it much better than the rôle of defender of the Bolsheviks, which is obviously "shocking" to this exceedingly lovely damsel.

Six arguments were advanced by this advocate:

- 1. The proletariat is "isolated from the other classes of the country."
 - 2. It is "isolated from the really vital forces of the democracy."
- 3. It "will not be able technically to get hold of the state apparatus."
 - 4. It "will not be able to set this apparatus in motion."
- 5. The "circumstances are exceptionally complicated."6. It "will not be able to resist all the pressure of the hostile forces which will sweep away not only the dictatorship of the proletariat but the whole revolution as well."

The first argument is stated by the Novaya Zhizn so clumsily as to be positively ridiculous, for we know but three classes in capitalist and semi-capitalist society: the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie (with the peasantry as its chief representative), and the proletariat. What sense is there, then, in talking about the proletariat being isolated from the other classes, when we talk about the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, a revolution against the bourgeoisie?

The Novaya Zhizn must have meant that the proletariat is isolated from the peasantry, for surely there could be no question here of the landowners. But it dared not say directly and clearly that the proletariat is now isolated from the peasantry, for the glaring untruth of such a statement is too strikingly self-evident.

It is difficult to imagine that in a capitalist country the proletariat should be so little isolated from the petty bourgeoisie—and this, do not forget, in a revolution against the bourgeoisie—as is the proletariat now in Russia. We have objective and undisputed data concerning the voting for and against a coalition with the bourgeoisie; these are the most recent data about the "curia" of Tsereteli's "Bulygin Duma," * i.e., the notorious "Democratic" Conference.

Taking the Soviet curia, we find:

	For Coalition	Against Coalition
Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers	•	Ŭ
Deputies	. 83	192
Soviets of Peasants' Deputies		70
All Soviets	. 185	262

Thus the majority as a whole is on the side of the proletarian slogan: against a coalition with the bourgeoisie. And we have seen above that even the Cadets are forced to admit the growing influence of the Bolsheviks in the Soviets. Still, what we have here is a conference summoned by the Soviet leaders of yesterday, by the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks who have an assured majority in the central institutions. It is clear that the actual predominance of the Bolsheviks in the Soviets is here not sufficiently expressed.

Both on the question of a coalition with the bourgeoisie and on the immediate transfer of the landowners' land to the peasant committees, the Bolsheviks already have a majority in the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies—a majority of the people, a majority of the petty bourgeoisie. The Rabochy Put, No. 19, October 7, cites from No. 25 of the S.-R. organ, Znamya Truda, 105 an

[•] The Democratic Conference is likened to the Duma proposed by Minister Bulygin in 1905 which was given only consultative powers and excluded workers from the elections.—Ed.

account of a conference of local Soviets of Peasant Deputies held in Petrograd on October 1.106 At this conference, the Executive Committees of four peasant Soviets (Kostroma, Moscow, Samara and Tauric provinces) expressed themselves in favour of unlimited coalition. For a coalition without the Cadets there were the Executive Committees of three provinces and two armies (Vladimir, Ryazan and the Black Sea provinces). Against coalition there were the Executive Committees of twenty-three provinces and four armies.

Thus, the majority of the peasantry is against the coalition! Here is your "isolation of the proletariat."

We must note, by the way, that for coalition there were three border provinces, Samara, Tauric and Black Sea, where there are a comparatively large number of rich peasants, big landowners, working their land with hired labour, and also four industrial provinces (Vladimir, Ryazan, Kostroma and Moscow) where also the peasant bourgeoisie is stronger than in the majority of the Russian provinces. It would be interesting to gather more detailed data on this subject and to ascertain whether any information is available regarding the poorest peasants in the provinces containing the "richest" peasantry.

Further, it is interesting to note that the "national groups" yielded a considerable majority to the opponents of a coalition, namely, 40 votes against 15. The annexationist, harshly oppressive policy of the Bonapartist Kerensky and Co. towards the non-sovereign nations of Russia has borne fruit. The broad masses of the population of the oppressed nations, i.e., the masses of the petty bourgeoisie among them, trust the Russian proletariat more than they do the bourgeoisie, for history has here brought to the foreground the struggle for freedom of the oppressed nations against their oppressors. The bourgeoisie has betrayed the cause of freedom of the oppressed nations in a dastardly way; the proletariat is true to the cause of freedom.

The national and agrarian questions—these are fundamental questions for the petty-bourgeois masses of the population of Russia at the present time. This is indisputable. With regard to both questions the proletariat is remarkably far from isolation. It has behind it the majority of the people. It alone is capable of pursuing such a decided, truly "revolutionary-democratic" policy on both questions as would assure immediately to a proletarian state power not only the support of the majority of the population, but a veritable outburst of revolutionary enthusiasm among the masses; since

for the first time the masses would meet on the part of the government, not a merciless oppression of the peasantry by the land-owners, of the Ukrainians by the Great Russians, as under tsarism; not attempts to follow the same policy under a republic, only camouflaged by high-sounding phrases; not caviling, insults, chicanery, dilatoriness, hauteur, evasions (with all of which Kerensky rewards the peasantry and the oppressed nations); but warm sympathy expressed in deeds: immediate and revolutionary measures against the landowners, immediate complete restitution of freedom to Finland, the Ukraine, White Russia, the Mohammedans, etc.

The S.-R. and Menshevik gentlemen know this very well, and this is why they drag the semi-Cadet leaders of the co-operatives to assist in their reactionary-democratic policy against the masses. This is why they will never dare to consult the masses, to institute a referendum or even a vote in all the local Soviets, in all local organisations, on definite points of practical policy, for instance, whether all the landowners' lands should be given over immediately to the peasant committees, whether such and such demands of the Finns and Ukrainians should be conceded, and so forth.

And the question of peace, that cardinal question of the whole of present-day life? The proletariat is "isolated from the other classes." . . . Truly, the proletariat here steps forth as the representative of the whole people, of all that is alive and honest in all classes, of the vast majority of the petty bourgeoisie; for only the proletariat, having attained power, will at once propose a just peace to all the belligerent nations; only the proletariat will undertake really revolutionary measures (publication of secret treaties, etc.) so as to obtain at the earliest moment as just a peace as possible.

No, the gentlemen of the Novaya Zhizn, howling about the isolation of the proletariat, only express thereby their own subjective terror induced by the bourgeoisie. The objective state of affairs in Russia is undoubtedly such that just at the present time the proletariat is not "isolated" from the majority of the petty bourgeoisie. Just now, after the sad experience of the "coalition," the proletariat has on its side the sympathy of the majority of the people. This condition for the retention of power by the Bolsheviks is there.

The second argument consists in the assertion that the proletariat is "isolated from the really vital forces of the democracy." What

this means it is impossible to understand. It is probably "Greek," as the French say in such cases.

The writers of the Novaya Zhizn are ministerial people. They would be fit to serve as Ministers under the Cadets. For what is required of such Ministers is the ability to utter fine-sounding sleek phrases in which there is no sense whatever, which can cover up every rottenness, and which are therefore assured of the applause of the imperialists and the social-imperialists. The applause of the Cadets, of Breshkovskaya, of Plekhanov and Co. is guaranteed the Novaya Zhizn-ists by their statement that the proletariat is isolated from the really vital forces of the democracy; for in an indirect way it means—or it will be understood as though it meant—that the Cadets, Breshkovskaya, Plekhanov, Kerensky and Co. are "the vital forces of the democracy."

This is untrue. These are dead forces. This has been proved by the history of the coalition.

Cowed by the bourgeoisie and bourgeois-intellectual environment, the Novaya Zhizn-ists recognise as "vital" the Right Wing of the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks, such as the Volya Naroda, Yedinstvo, etc., which differ in nothing vital from the Cadets. We, on the other hand, recognise as "vital" only what is bound up with the masses, not with the kulaks, only that which has been led by experience of the coalition to turn away from it. "The active vital forces" of the petty-bourgeois democracy are represented by the Left Wings of the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks. The strengthening of this Left Wing, particularly after the July counter-revolution, is one of the most certain objective signs that the proletariat is not isolated.

This has become still more evident just lately by the wavering of the S.-R. Centre towards the Left, as proved by Chernov's declaration of October 7, to the effect that this group cannot support the new coalition with Kishkin and Co.¹⁰⁷ This wavering towards the Left of the S.-R. Centre, which until now has formed an overwhelming majority of the representatives of the S.-R. Party—the party which, as a result of the number of votes obtained by it in the towns and particularly in the villages, occupies a supreme and dominating position—proves that the statement quoted by us from the *Dyelo Naroda* regarding the necessity for the democracy, under certain circumstances, to "guarantee full support" to a purely Bolshevik government, is, at any rate, not a mere phrase.

Such facts as the refusal of the S.-R. Centre to support a

coalition with Kishkin, and the predominance of the opponents of coalition among the Menshevik defensists in the provinces (Jordania in the Caucasus, etc.), are objective proof that a certain section of the masses, who, until now, have followed the Mensheviks and S.-R.'s, will support a purely Bolshevik government.

It is just from the vital forces of the democracy that the Russian proletariat is not isolated at present.

The third argument: the proletariat "will not be able technically to get hold of the state apparatus." This, we grant, is the most usual, the most widespread argument. It deserves the greatest attention both for this reason and because it really points out one of the most serious, one of the most difficult tasks confronting the victorious proletariat. There is no doubt these tasks are very difficult, but if, while calling ourselves Socialists, we point out this difficulty for the sole purpose of avoiding the fulfilment of these tasks, then, in practice, there will be no difference between us and the servants of the bourgeoisie. The difficulties of the tasks of the proletarian revolution should only stimulate those siding with the proletariat to study more carefully, and more concretely, the methods of carrying out these tasks.

By the state apparatus is meant, first of all, the standing army, the police and officialdom. In speaking of the proletariat being unable technically to get hold of this apparatus, the writers of the Novaya Zhizn reveal the greatest ignorance and unwillingness to heed either the facts of life or the deductions made long ago in Rolshevik literature.

The writers of the Novaya Zhizn all consider themselves, if not Marxists, at any rate as being acquainted with Marxism and as educated Socialists. And Marx taught us, from the experience of the Paris Commune, that the proletariat cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and set it in motion for its own purposes, that the proletariat must destroy this machinery and replace it by a new one. (This I treat in detail in a pamphlet, The State and Revolution—the Teaching of Marxism about the State, and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution.*) This new state apparatus was created by the Paris Commune, and of the same type of "state apparatus" are the Russian Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. I have pointed this out many times, begin-

See p. 147 ff.—Ed.

ning April 17, 1917; this is mentioned in the resolutions of Bolshevik conferences and in Bolshevik literature. Of course, the Novaya Zhizn could have announced its complete disagreement both with Marx and with the Bolsheviks, but for a journal that has so often and so haughtily abused the Bolsheviks for their "frivolous" attitude towards difficult questions, to evade this subject altogether means to issue to themselves a certificate of poverty.

The proletariat cannot "lay hold" of the "state apparatus" and "set it in motion." But it can destroy all that is oppressive, that is merely routine and is incurably bourgeois in the old state apparatus, and put in its place its own, new apparatus. This apparatus is the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

One cannot but call it simply monstrous that the Novaya Zhizn has completely forgotten this "state apparatus." In conducting thus their theoretical discussions, the writers of the Novaya Zhizn are actually doing in the sphere of political theory exactly what the Cadets are doing in the sphere of political practice. For if the proletariat and revolutionary democracy really need no new state apparatus, then the Soviets lose their raison d'être; in that case the Cadet-Kornilovists are right in their efforts to reduce the Soviets to naught.

This monstrous theoretical error and political blindness of the Novaya Zhizn is so much the more monstrous in that even the Menshevik-Internationalists (with whom the Novaya Zhizn entered into a bloc at the last municipal elections in Petrograd) have revealed in this question a certain approach towards the Bolsheviks. Thus we read in the declaration of the Soviet majority read by Comrade Martov at the Democratic Conference:

... The Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies created in the first days by the mighty impulse of the truly creative genius of the people, have formed that new tissue of the revolutionary state which has replaced the decayed state tissue of the old regime. . . . 108

This is expressed a trifle too prettily—i. e., pretentiousness of language conceals here the insufficient clarity of political thought. The Soviets have not yet replaced the old "tissue," and this old tissue is not the state of the old régime, but the state of both tsarism and the bourgeois republic. Still, Martov here stands two heads above the Novaya Zhizn-ists.

The Soviets are the new state apparatus, which, in the first place, represents the armed force of the workers and peasants, a force that

is not divorced from the people, as was the force of the old standing army, but is bound up with them as closely as possible. In a military sense, this force is incomparably more mighty than the former; in relation to the revolution it is second to none. Secondly, this apparatus represents a connection with the masses, with the majority of the people, that is so intimate, so indissoluble, so readily verifiable and renewable, that nothing like it was even approached in the former state. Thirdly, this apparatus, because it is elective and its personnel is subject to recall in accordance with the will of the people without any bureaucratic formalities, is far more democratic than were the former ones. Fourthly, it represents a firm connection with the most diverse occupations, thus facilitating all sorts of most radical reforms without any bureaucracy. Fifthly, it represents a form of organisation of the vanguard, i. e., of the most class-conscious, most energetic, most progressive section of the oppressed classes, of the workers and peasants, and is thus an apparatus whereby the vanguard of the oppressed classes can elevate, educate and lead in its train the whole gigantic mass of these classes which until now have stood absolutely outside all political life, outside history. Sixthly, it makes it possible to combine the advantages of parliamentarism with the advantages of immediate and direct democracy, i. e., to unite in the persons of elected representatives of the people both legislative and executive functions. Compared with bourgeois parliamentarism, this is a step forward in the development of democracy which has an historical world significance.

Our Soviets of 1905 were only, so to speak, an embryo, for they existed for a few weeks only. It is quite clear that under the circumstances of the time there could be no question of their all-round development. In the 1917 Revolution, there can as yet be no question of it either, for a period of a few months is too little, and, above all, the S.-R. and Menshevik leaders of the Soviets have prostituted them, have degraded them to the rôle of talking shops, of accessories to the conciliationist policy of the leaders. The Soviets have been rotting and decaying under the leadership of the Libers, Dans, Tseretelis, and Chernovs. The Soviets can only develop properly and expand to the full their promise and capabilities when they assume full state power, for otherwise they have nothing to do; otherwise they are simply embryos (and an embryo

cannot endure too long) or mere playthings. Dual power means the paralysis of the Soviets.

Had not the popular creativeness of the revolutionary classes given rise to the Soviets, the proletarian revolution in Russia would have been hopeless, for there is no doubt that with the old state apparatus, the proletariat could not have retained power, while it is impossible to create a new apparatus all at once. The sad history of the prostitution of the Soviets by Tsereteli and Chernov, the history of the "coalition," is, at the same time, the history of freeing the Soviets from petty-bourgeois illusions, passing through the "purgatory" of a practical study of all the abominations and filth of all and every bourgeois coalition. Let us hope that this "purgatory" has not undermined the Soviets, but has tempered them.

The main difficulty in a proletarian revolution is the realisation on a national scale of a most exact and honest accounting and control, workers' control over production and distribution of goods.

When the writers of the Novaya Zhizn argued that in putting forward the slogan of "workers' control" we were falling into syndicalism, this argument was a specimen of a silly schoolboy application of "Marxism," which, instead of having been intelligently digested, has been only learned by rote after the manner of Struve. Syndicalism either rejects the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat, or relegates it, like political power in general, to the last place. We give it first place. If one were to talk simply in the spirit of the Novaya Zhizn-ists-not workers' control but state control-one would have a bourgeois-reformist phrase, in fact a purely Cadet formula, for the Cadets have nothing against the participation of the workers in "state" control. The Cadet-Kornilovists know very well that such participation is the best way for the bourgeoisie to deceive the workers, the best method of subtly bribing in a political sense all kinds of Gvozdevs, Nikitins, Prokopoviches, Tseretelis, and all that crowd.

When we say "workers' control," placing this slogan side by side with the dictatorship of the proletariat, and always after it, we thus make clear what state we have in mind. The state is an organ of the rule of a class. Which class? If the bourgeoisie, then this is just the Cadet-Kornilov-Kerensky statehood under which the working people of Russia have been suffering for over half a year. If the proletariat, if we have in mind a proletarian state, i. e., the dic-

tatorship of the proletariat, then workers' control can become a national, all-embracing, omnipresent, most exact and most conscientious accounting of production and distribution of goods.

Therein lies the main difficulty, therein is the main task of the proletarian, i. e., the Socialist revolution. Without the Soviets this task, at any rate for Russia, would be impossible of achievement. The Soviets indicate the organisational work of the proletariat which can solve this problem of historical world significance.

Here we have approached another side of the question of state apparatus. Besides the preponderant "repressive" machinery, the standing army, the police, and the officialdom, there is in the modern state a machinery that is closely connected with banks and syndicates, fulfilling as it does a great mass of work of accounting and record-keeping, if one may so express it. This machinery cannot and must not be broken up. It must be forcibly freed from subjection to the capitalists; the latter must be cut off, broken, chopped away from it with the threads transmitting their influence; it must be subjected to the proletarian Soviets; it must be made wider, more all-embracing, more popular. And this can be done by relying on the achievements already attained by large-scale capital (as, indeed, the proletarian revolution in general can only attain its aim by taking these achievements as its basis).

Capitalism created the apparatus for accounting: the banks, syndicates, post office, consumers' societies, unions of employees. Without the big banks Socialism could not be realised.

The big banks are that "state apparatus" which we need for the realisation of Socialism and which we take ready-made from capitalism. Our problem here is only to chop off that which capitalistically disfigures this otherwise excellent apparatus and to make it even larger, more democratic, more all-embracing. Quantity will change into quality. One state bank as huge as possible, with branches in every township, in every factory—this is already ninetenths of the Socialist apparatus. This is general state accounting, general state accounting of production and distribution of goods, this is, so to speak, something in the nature of the skeleton of Socialist society.

This "state apparatus" (which under capitalism is not wholly a state apparatus but which will be completely so with us under Socialism) we can "lay hold of" and "set in motion" at one stroke, by one decree, for the actual work of bookkeeping, control, regis-

tration, accounting and summation is here carried out by employees, most of whom are themselves in a proletarian or semi-proletarian position.

The proletarian government can and must, by one decree, transform all these employees into state employees—in the same way that the watch-dogs of capitalism, such as Briand and other bourgeois Ministers, transform striking railwaymen into state employees. We shall need a great many more of such state employees; and more of them can be obtained, for capitalism has simplified the functions of accounting and control, and has reduced them to such comparatively simple processes as to be within the reach of any literate person.

The "nationalisation" of the bank, syndicate, commercial and other such employees is perfectly realisable, both technically (thanks to the preliminary work accomplished for us by capitalism and finance capitalism) and politically, under the conditions of control and supervision by the *Soviets*.

As for the higher employees, of whom there are very few, but who incline towards the capitalists, we shall have to treat them like capitalists—"with severity." They, like the capitalists, will resist, and this resistance will have to be broken. The immortally naïve Peshekhonov lisped as early as June, 1917, like the real "state infant" that he is, that "the resistance of the capitalists has been broken"; but this childish phrase, this infantile swagger, this boyish sally, will be turned by the proletariat into reality in all seriousness.

This we can do, for here it is a question of breaking the resistance of an insignificant minority of the population, literally a handful of people, over every one of whom the employees' unions, trade unions, consumers' societies and the Soviets will institute such supervision that every Tit Titych ** will be surrounded like the French at Sedan. We know them all by name: it is enough to take the lists of directors, members of management boards, the big shareholders, and so on. There are a few hundred of them, at most a few thousand, in the whole of Russia, each of whom the proletarian state, with its Soviet apparatus, its employees' unions, and so on, can surround with tens or hundreds of controllers, so that possibly, instead of "breaking the resistance," we may succeed, by means of workers'

^{*} A derisive expression used by the famous satirist Saltykov-Shchedrin to designate a naïve and ignorant high official.—Ed.

^{••} Name of a tyrannical merchant ridiculed in one of Ostrovsky's comedies.

—Ed.

control (over the capitalists), in making any such resistance impossible.

The vital matter will be not the confiscation of capitalist property, but universal, all-embracing workers' control over the capitalists and their possible supporters. By means of confiscation alone you can do nothing, for in that there is no element of organisation, of accounting, of correct distribution. We shall readily substitute for confiscation the levying of a just tax (even using Shingarev's rates), if only we can thereby exclude the possibility of any evasion of account rendering, concealing of the truth, evading the law. And only workers' control in the workers' state will remove this possibility.

Forced syndication, i. e., forced uniting into associations under the control of the state, is what capitalism has prepared; this is what the Junker state has realised in Germany, this is what will be completely realisable in Russia for the Soviets, for the dictatorship of the proletariat; this is what the "state apparatus," universal, new and non-bureaucratic, will give us.

The fourth argument of the advocates of the bourgeoisie: the proletariat will be unable to "set in motion" the state apparatus. This argument, in comparison with the preceding one, presents nothing new. The old apparatus we could neither seize nor set in motion. The new apparatus, the Soviets, has already been set in motion by the "mighty impulse of the real national creative genius." This apparatus must only be freed of the shackles put on it by the domination of the S.-R. and Menshevik leaders. This apparatus is already in motion, it is only necessary to rid it of the disfiguring petty-bourgeois appendages which are hindering it from going forward and forward in full swing.

To complete what was said above, two circumstances must be examined: first, the new methods of control that have been created, not by us, but by capitalism in its military-imperialist stage; second, the significance of the deepening of democracy in the work of administering a state of the proletarian type.

The grain monopoly and bread cards have been created, not by us, but by the belligerent capitalist state. It has already created universal labour service within the framework of capitalism—that is,

^{*} For more details about the meaning of forced syndication see my pamphlet, The Threatening Catastrophe and How to Fight It. [See Book I of this volume.—Ed.]

a military hard labour prison for the workers. But here too the proletariat, as in all its historical creative work, takes its implements from capitalism; it does not "think them up," or "create them from nothing."

The grain monopoly, the bread cards, universal labour service become, in the hands of the proletarian state, in the hands of the all-powerful Soviets, the most powerful means for accounting and control, a means which, extended to the capitalists and the rich in general, being applied to them by the workers, will give a power unheard-of in history for "setting in motion" the state apparatus, for overcoming the resistance of the capitalists, for subjecting them to the proletarian state. This means of control and compulsory labour is stronger than the laws of the Convention and its guillotine. The guillotine only frightened, only crushed active resistance. For us this is not enough.

For us this is not enough. We must not only "frighten" the capitalists so that they feel the all-pervading strength of the proletarian state and forget to think of active resistance to it. We must crush also their passive resistance, which is undoubtedly still more dangerous and harmful. We must not only crush every kind of resistance. We must make people work within the framework of the new state organisation. It is not enough to "get rid of" the capitalists, it is necessary (after having removed the incapable ones, the incorrigible "resisters") to put them to new state service. This applies to the capitalists as well as to a certain upper stratum of the bourgeois intellectuals, clerks, etc.

And we have the means to do so. The belligerent capitalist state has itself given us the means and weapons to carry this out. This means is the grain monopoly, the bread cards, universal labour service. "He who works not, neither shall he eat"—this is the basic, primary and chief rule which the Soviets of Workers' Deputies can and will introduce as soon as they become the governing power.

Every worker has a work book. This document does not humiliate him, although at the present time it undoubtedly is a document of capitalist wage slavery, testifying to the subjection of the working man to this or that parasite.

The Soviets will institute the work book for the rich, and then gradually for the whole population (in a peasant country, a work book will probably be unnecessary for a very long time for the overwhelming majority of the peasants). The work book will cease

to be a sign of belonging to the "rabble," will cease to be a document of the "lower" orders, a certificate of wage slavery. It will be converted into a document testifying that in the new society there are no longer any "labourers," but that, on the other hand, there is no one who is not a worker.

The rich must receive a work book from that union of factory or office workers which is most nearly related to their sphere of activity; they must receive weekly, or at other regular periods, a certificate from this union that they are doing their work conscientiously; without this they will not get their bread card or food products in general. We need good organisers in banking, and in the work of combining enterprises (in these matters the capitalists have more experience, and work is done more easily with experienced people); we need more and more engineers, agronomists, technicians, scientific experts of every kind. We shall give all such workers work which they are able and are accustomed to do; probably, we shall only gradually bring in equality for all work, leaving a temporary higher rate of pay for such specialists during the transition period, but we shall put them under an allembracing workers' control; we shall attain the full and unconditional application of the rule: "He who works not, neither shall he eat." As for the organisational form of the work, we do not invent it, we take it ready-made from capitalism: banks, syndicates, the best factories, experimental stations, academies, etc.; we need adopt only the best models furnished by the experience of the most advanced countries.

And of course we are not losing ourselves in a Utopia, we are not ceasing to look at things in a sober, practical way, when we say that the whole capitalist class will offer the most stubborn resistance, but that by the organisation of the whole population in Soviets, this resistance will be broken. The extraordinarily obstinate and non-submissive capitalists will, of course, have to be punished by the confiscation of the whole of their wealth and by imprisonment; on the other hand, the victory of the proletariat will increase the number of such cases as those of which, for instance, I read in to-day's Izvestiya:

On October 9, two engineers appeared before the Central Council of Factory and Shop Committees with the declaration that an engineering group had decided to form a union of Socialist engineers. Recognising that the present time is the beginning of social revolution, the union places itself at the disposal of the working masses, and in the interests of the workers it wishes

to act in complete accord with the workers' organisations. The representatives of the Central Council of Factory and Shop Committees replied that the Council would gladly form within its organisation an engineering section including in its programme the fundamental theses of the first conference of Factory and Shop Committees regarding workers' control over production. In the near future there will be a joint session of the delegates of the Central Council of Factory and Shop Committees and the provisional group of Socialist engineers (Izvestiya, October 10, 1917).

The proletariat, we are told, will be unable to set the state apparatus in motion.

After the 1905 Revolution, Russia was ruled by 130,000 landowners. They ruled by means of constant force over 150,000,000 people, by pouring unlimited scorn on them, by subjecting the vast majority to hard labour and semi-starvation.

And yet we are told that Russia will not be able to be governed by the 240,000 members of the Bolshevik Party—governing in the interests of the poor and against the rich.¹⁰⁹ These 240,000 already have no less than a million votes of the adult population back of them, for just this proportion between the number of votes cast for a party and the number of its members has been established by the experience of Europe and also of Russia, as, for instance, in the August municipal elections in Petrograd. So here we have already a "state apparatus" of one million persons faithful to the ideal of the Socialist state, and not working merely for the sake of getting a fat roll every 20th of the month.

Moreover, we have a "magic means" for increasing tenfold our state apparatus with one stroke, a means which never has been and never could be at the disposal of a capitalist state. This magic thing is the drawing of the workers, the poor people, into the every-day work of managing the state.

To explain how simple is the application of this magic means, how faultless is its action, we shall take a most simple and obvious example.

The state has forcibly to evict a family from a house and to install another in it. This is done time and again by the capitalist state, and it will also have to be done by ours, by the proletarian or Socialist state.

The capitalist state evicts a workers' family which has lost its breadwinner and does not pay rent. There comes upon the scene a bailiff, policeman, or militiaman, with a whole platoon of men. In a working-class district a whole detachment of Cossacks is necessary for the eviction. Why? Because the bailiff and policeman

refuse to go without military protection of considerable strength. They know that the sight of an eviction brings forth such mad fury among the neighbouring population, among thousands and thousands driven well-nigh to despair, such hatred against the capitalists and the capitalist state, that the bailiff and the squad of police might at any moment be torn to pieces. Large military forces are necessary; several regiments of soldiers must be brought into the town from a province, necessarily distant, so that the soldiers may know nothing of the life of the town poor, so that the soldiers may not be "infected" with Socialism.

The proletarian state has forcibly to move a very needy family into the dwelling of a rich man. Our detachment of workers' militia consists, let us say, of fifteen people—two sailors, two soldiers, two class-conscious workers (of which only one needs to be a member of our party or sympathising with it), one intellectual, and eight poor labourers, of whom there would be at least five women, servants, unskilled workmen, and so on. The detachment comes to the rich man's house, investigates, and finds five rooms for two men and two women. "For this winter, citizens, you must confine yourselves to two rooms and prepare two rooms for two families that are now living in cellars. For a time, until with the help of engineers (you are an engineer, I think?) we build good houses for all, you will have to put yourselves out a bit. Your telephone will serve ten families. This will save about a hundred hours' work in running to the stores, and so on. Then in your family there are two unoccupied semi-workers capable of doing light work-a woman of fifty-five and a boy of fourteen. They will be on duty for three hours daily, superintending the distribution of products for the ten families, and they will keep the necessary accounts. The student in our detachment will write out two copies of the text of this state order and you will kindly give us a signed declaration of your undertaking to carry out the duties accurately."

Thus, in my view, could be demonstrated in very clear examples the difference between the old bourgeois and the new Socialist state apparatus and state administration.

We are not Utopians. We know that just any labourer or any cook would be incapable of taking over immediately the administration of the state. In this we agree with the Cadets, with Breshkovskaya, and with Tsereteli. But we differ from these citizens in that we demand an immediate break away from the prejudice that

assumes that the administration of the state, the performance of the ordinary, everyday work of management, can only be done by the rich or by officials picked from rich families. We demand that the teaching of the business of state administration should be conducted by the class-conscious workers and soldiers, that this should be started immediately, i. e., that steps should be taken immediately to start giving such instruction to all the labouring masses, all the poor.

We know that the Cadets also agree that democracy should be taught to the people. Cadet ladies are willing to give lectures to servants on women's rights, in accordance with the best French and English authorities. Also, at the very next concert-meeting, before an audience of thousands of people, there will be arranged on the platform a general kissing: a Cadet lady lecturer will kiss Breshkovskaya, the latter will kiss the ex-Minister Tsereteli, and a grateful people will thus learn the meaning of republican equality, liberty and fraternity. . . .

Yes, we quite agree that the Cadets, Breshkovskaya and Tsereteli are in their own way devoted to democracy, and propagate it among the people; but what is to be done if we have an idea of democracy somewhat different from theirs?

According to us, in order to mitigate the unheard-of burdens and miseries of the war, and at the same time to heal the terrible wounds inflicted on the people by the war, revolutionary democracy is necessary, revolutionary measures are needed, of the kind described in the example of the redistribution of dwellings in the interests of the poor. Exactly in the same way must we deal both in town and country with foodstuffs, clothes, boots, and so on, and in the country with the landowners' land, etc. For the administration of the state in this spirit we can bring into action immediately a state apparatus of about ten if not twenty millions—an apparatus unknown in any capitalist country. This apparatus only we can create, for we are assured of the full and unlimited sympathy of the vast majority of the population. This apparatus only we can create, because we have class-conscious workers, disciplined by a long "apprenticeship" to capitalism (not for naught did we serve this apprenticeship to capitalism), workers who are capable of forming a workers' militia and gradually of enlarging it (commencing this enlargement immediately) into a universal militia. The class-conscious workers must lead, but they can attract to the

actual work of administration the real labouring and oppressed masses.

Of course, mistakes are inevitable during the first steps taken by this new apparatus. But did the peasants make no mistakes when. emerging from serfdom and becoming free, they began to manage their own affairs? Can there be any other method of teaching the people to manage their own affairs and to avoid mistakes than that of actual practice, than the immediate starting of real popular self-government? The most important thing at the present time is to get rid of the prejudice of the bourgeois intellectuals that only special officials, entirely dependent on capital by their whole social position, can carry on the administration of the state. The most important thing is to put an end to that state of affairs in which the bourgeois, the petty officials and "Socialist" Ministers try to manage the state as of old, but cannot manage, and, after seven months, are faced with a peasant rising in a peasant country!! The most important thing is to instil in the oppressed and labouring masses confidence in their own power, to show them by actual practice that they can and must themselves undertake correct, most strict, orderly, organised distribution of bread, of every kind of food, milk, clothing, dwellings and so on, in the interests of the poor. Without this, there can be no salvation of Russia from collapse and ruin; whereas an honest, courageous, universal move to hand over the administration to the proletarians and semi-proletarians will give rise to such an unheard-of revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses, will multiply so many times the popular forces in the struggle against suffering, that much that seemed impossible to our narrow old bureaucratic forces will become practicable for the forces of the masses, millions upon millions who begin to work for themselves and not for the capitalist, not for the master, not for the official, not under the compulsion of the stick.

With the question of the state apparatus is also connected the question of centralism, raised in a particularly energetic, but particularly unsuccessful, manner by Comrade Bazarov in No. 138 of the Novaya Zhizn, October 10, in an article, "The Bolsheviks and the Problem of Power."

Comrade Bazarov reasons thus: "The Soviets are not the kind of apparatus that is adapted to all spheres of state life," for a seven months' trial is supposed to have shown, and the evidence of "tens

and hundreds of documents possessed by the Economic Section of the Petrograd Executive Committee" to have confirmed, that although in many places the Soviets have had practically "full power," "they could not obtain any satisfactory results in their campaign against economic ruin." It is necessary, says Bazarov, to have an apparatus "divided according to branches of industry, strictly centralised within the limits of each branch and subject to one general state centre." "It is a question"—kindly note—"not of replacing the old apparatus, but of reforming it . . . however much the Bolsheviks may sneer at people with a plan."

All these observations of Comrade Bazarov are really amazingly helpless. They are an exact copy of the argument of the bourgeoisie, a reflection of its class point of view.

Now, really, to speak of the Soviets as having had anywhere in Russia, at any time, "full power," is simply absurd (if it is not a mere repetition of the selfish class lie of the capitalists). Full power means power over the whole land, over all the banks, all the factories; a man but slightly acquainted with historical experience, with scientific data concerning the connection between politics and economics, could not have "forgotten" this "slight" circumstance.

The lying method of the bourgeoisie consists in this, that, while refusing to give the Soviets power, sabotaging every one of their serious attempts, keeping the government in their own hands, holding power over the land and banks, and so on, they yet throw all the blame for the economic ruin on the Soviets! It is just this that forms the whole deplorable experience of the coalition.

The Soviets never had full power, and their measures so far could yield nothing but palliatives and further entanglements.

To prove to the Bolsheviks, who are centralists by conviction and by the programme and tactics of their whole party, the need for centralism means really to try to break into an open door. If the writers of the Novaya Zhizn indulge in such trivial activities, it is only because they have completely failed to understand the meaning of our mocking at their "general state" point of view. They fail to understand this because the Novaya Zhizn-ists only recognise the class struggle with their lips, not with their minds. Repeating the words about the class struggle which they have learnt by heart, they stumble every second over a theoretically amusing and practi-

cally reactionary "above-class point of view," calling this servility to the bourgeoisie a "general state" plan.

The state, my dear people, is a class concept. The state is an organ or apparatus of force to be used by one class against another. So long as it remains an apparatus for the bourgeoisie to use force against the proletariat, so long can the slogan of the proletariat be only—the destruction of this state. But when the state has become proletarian, when it has become an apparatus of force to be used by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, then we shall be fully and unreservedly for a strong state power and centralism.

Speaking more popularly, we are not ridiculing "plans"; we only laugh at the fact that Bazarov and Co. do not understand that, in rejecting "workers' control," in rejecting the "dictatorship of the proletariat," they *stand* for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. There is no middle course. That is but an empty dream of the petty-bourgeois democrat.

Not a single centre, not a single Bolshevik ever argued against the centralism of the Soviets or their unification. None of us has ever objected to organising the factory and shop committees by branches of production and their centralisation. Bazarov is shooting beside the mark.

We laugh, have laughed, and shall continue to laugh, not at "centralism," nor at plans, but at reformism. For your reformist is doubly comical after the experience of the coalition. To say: "Not a change of apparatus but reform," is to be a reformist, is to become not a revolutionary but a reformist democrat. Reformism is nothing but concessions on the part of the ruling class; it does not signify the overthrow of this class; it signifies that concessions are made by it while it keeps power in its hands.

This is exactly what has been tried by the coalition for half a year.

This is what we are ridiculing. Bazarov, not having digested the concept of the class struggle, allows himself to be caught by the bourgeoisie, which sings in chorus: "Just—just so—we are not at all against reform, we are for the participation of the workers in the control of the state, we fully agree to this." The good Bazarov plays objectively the rôle of a person echoing the opinion of the capitalists.

This has always been and always will be the case with people who, in times of acute class struggle, endeavour to occupy a "middle"

position. And it is just because the writers of the Novaya Zhizn are incapable of understanding the class struggle that their policy is such a ridiculous, eternal vacillation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

Better take to "plan-making," my dear citizens—that is not politics, that is not a matter of the class struggle. In this sphere you can indeed be useful to the people. You have many economists on your paper; unite with such engineers, etc., as are ready to work a little on the question of regulating production and distribution. Devote your big "apparatus" (your paper) to a business-like working out of exact data regarding the production and distribution of goods in Russia, regarding the banks, syndicates, etc., etc. Thereby you will benefit the people; here your position between two chairs can do no great harm. Here is work on "plans" which will arouse, not the ridicule, but the gratitude of the workers.

The proletariat, when victorious, will act thus. It will set the economists, engineers, agricultural experts and so on to work out a "plan" under the control of the workers' organisations, to test it, to seek means of saving labour by means of centralism, and of securing the most simple, cheap, convenient, general control. We shall pay the economists, statisticians, technicians, good money, but —but we shall not give them anything to eat unless they carry out this work honestly and entirely in the interests of the workers.

We are in favour of centralism and of a "plan," but it must be the centralism and the plan of the proletarian state—the proletarian regulation of production and distribution in the interest of the poor, the labouring, the exploited, against the exploiters. By the "general state" concept we agree to understand only that which breaks the resistance of the capitalists, which gives full power to the majority of the people, i. e., to the proletarians and semi-proletarians—the workers and the poorest peasants.

The fifth argument is that the Bolsheviks will not retain power because "the circumstances are exceptionally complicated."

Oh, wiseacres! They are prepared perhaps to tolerate revolution, but without "exceptionally complicated circumstances."

Such revolutions never occur, and in the yearnings after such revolutions there is nothing but the reactionary lamentation of the bourgeois intellectual. Even if a revolution starts in circumstances which seem not so very complicated, the revolution itself, in its

development, always gives rise to exceptionally complicated circumstances. For a revolution, a real, deep, "people's revolution," to use Marx's expression, is the incredibly complicated and painful process of the dying of the old and the birth of the new social order, the adjustment of the lives of tens of millions of people. A revolution is the sharpest, most furious, desperate class struggle and civil war. Not a single great revolution in history has escaped civil war, and no one who does not live in a shell could imagine that civil war is conceivable without "exceptionally complicated circumstances."

If there were no exceptionally complicated circumstances, there would be no revolution. If you fear wolves, do not go into the forest.

In this fifth argument there is nothing to discuss, because there is neither economic nor political nor indeed any other idea in it. There is only the yearning of people who have been saddened and frightened by the revolution. To characterise these yearnings, I shall take the liberty of citing two little personal reminiscences.

A conversation with a rich engineer not long before the July days. The engineer had been at one time a revolutionist, a member of the Social-Democratic, indeed, of the Bolshevik Party. Now he is just in one tremor of fear and fury at the turbulent, untamable workers. "If at least they were workers, like the Germans!" said he (an educated man who had been abroad). "Of course, I understand in a general way, the inevitability of the social revolution, but to think of it now, when the standards of the workers have been so lowered by the war. . . . No, it is not revolution, it is an abyss."

He would be ready to accept the social revolution if history would lead up to it in the same peaceful, quiet, smooth, orderly way in which a German express train approaches a station. A sedate conductor opens the door of the car and calls out: "Social Revolution Station! Alle aussteigen!" * In such a case, why not pass from the position of engineer under the Tit Tityches to that of engineer under the workers' organisations?

This man has seen strikes. He knows what a storm of passion is always aroused by an ordinary strike, even in the most peaceful times. He understands, of course, how many million times stronger must this storm be when the class struggle has aroused the whole labouring people of an enormous country, when the war and ex-

^{*} All out!-Ed.

ploitation have reduced almost to despair millions of people who have been tortured for centuries by landowners, and robbed and downtrodden for decades by capitalists and tsarist officials. He understands all this "theoretically"; he recognises all this with his lips. He is simply scared by the "exceptionally complicated circumstances."

After the July days I was compelled, on account of the specially careful attention paid me by the Kerensky government, to go underground. Of course, it was the workers who gave people like us shelter. In an out-of-the-way workers' suburb of Petrograd, in a small working-class house, dinner is served. The hostess puts bread on the table. "Look," says the host, "what fine bread. 'They' dare not give us bad bread now. And we had almost forgotten that good bread could be had in Petrograd."

I was amazed at this class evaluation of the July days. My mind had revolved around the political significance of the event, it estimated its rôle in the general course of events, it analysed the situation that had given rise to the zigzag of history and the situation it was bound to create, and considered how we must alter our slogans and party apparatus so as to adapt them to the changed circumstances. As for bread, I, who had never been in need, never thought of it at all. Bread to me appeared of itself, as it were, as a sort of by-product of a writer's work. Fundamentally, one's ideas reach the class struggle for bread, through political analysis, by an extraordinarily complicated and involved path.

But the representative of the oppressed class, although one of the well-paid and well-educated workers, takes the bull straight by the horns, with that wonderful simplicity and directness, with that firm determination, with that astonishing clear insight, which is as far from us, the intellectuals, as the stars in the sky. The whole world is divided into two camps: "we," the labouring, and "they," the exploiters. Not a shade of confusion as to what had happened—just one of the battles in the long struggle of labour against capital. When wood is cut, chips must fly.

"What a painful thing are these 'exceptionally complicated circumstances' of the revolution!" Thus thinks and feels the bourgeois intellectual.

"We have screwed 'them' down; 'they' do not dare make trouble for us as before. Let's press harder still, and we'll overthrow them altogether!" Thus thinks and feels the worker. The sixth and last argument is that the proletariat "will not be able to resist all the pressure of the hostile forces which will sweep away not only the dictatorship of the proletariat but the whole revolution as well."

Do not try to scare us, gentlemen, we won't be scared. We have seen these hostile forces and their pressure in Kornilovism (from which Kerenskvism differs in no way). How Kornilov's forces were routed by the proletariat and the poorest peasantry; how pitiful and helpless was the position of the supporters of the bourgeoisie and the small number of representatives of the particularly well-to-do small local landowners who were particularly hostile to the revolution—these things were seen by all; they are remembered by the people. The Dvelo Naroda of October 13, in trying to persuade the workers to "tolerate" Kerenskyism (i.e., Kornilovism) and Tsereteli's fake Bulygin Duma until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly (convoked under the protection of "military measures" against the rising peasants!), repeats with gusto this sixth argument of the Novaya Zhizn, and screams till it becomes hoarse: "The Kerensky government will under no circumstances submit" (to the Soviet power, to the power of the workers and peasants, which, not to lag behind the Black Hundreds, the anti-Semites, Monarchists and Cadets, the Dyelo Naroda calls the power of "Trotsky and Lenin"this is how low the Socialist-Revolutionaries have sunk!).110

But the class-conscious workers are not to be frightened either by the *Dyelo Naroda* or by the *Novaya Zhizn*. "The Kerensky government," you say, "will under no circumstances submit"—that is, it will repeat the Kornilov affair, to speak more simply, more directly, more clearly. And the gentlemen of the *Dyelo Naroda* dare to say that that will be "civil war," that this is a "terrible prospect"!

No, gentlemen, you will not deceive the workers. This will not be civil war, but a most hopeless conspiracy of a handful of Kornilovists; or perhaps they wish, by not "submitting" to the people, to provoke at all costs a repetition on a large scale of what happened at Vyborg in connection with the Kornilovists; if the S.-R.'s desire this, if the member of the S.-R. Party, Kerensky, desires this, he can drive the people to desperation. But you will not frighten the workers and soldiers with this, gentlemen.

What unlimited impudence! They fake a new Bulygin Duma by means of trickery, they recruit, by fraud, a crowd of reactionary leaders of co-operatives, of village kulaks to assist them; to these they add capitalists and landowners (called propertied elements), and with this band of Kornilovists they want to obstruct the will of the people, the will of the workers and peasants.

They have brought affairs in a peasant land to such a state that everywhere the tide of peasant revolts is rising! Just think of it! In a democratic republic, where 80 per cent of the people are peasants, they were actually driven to a peasant uprising. . . . The same Dyelo Naroda, Chernov's organ, the organ of the "Socialist-Revolutionary" Party, which on October 13 had the impudence to advise the workers and peasants to "be patient," had been forced to admit, in a leading article on October 12, that "almost nothing has so far been done to destroy the conditions of slavery which still prevail in the villages of Central Russia." 111

This same Dyelo Naroda, in the same article, October 12, says that "the grip of Stolypin is still felt strongly in the methods of the 'revolutionary Ministers.'" That is, in other words, they call Kerensky, Nikitin, Kishkin and Co., Stolypinists.

The "Stolypinists," Kerensky and Co., have brought the peasants to uprising, and now they introduce "military measures" against the peasants, and console the people with promises to convoke the Constituent Assembly (although Kerensky and Tsereteli have already deceived the people once, for, after triumphantly declaring, on July 21, that the Constituent Assembly would be convoked on September 30, they broke their word and put off the Constituent Assembly, even against the advice of the Menshevik Dan, not to the end of October as the Menshevik Central Executive Committee of that time desired, but to the end of November). The "Stolypinists," Kerensky and Co., console the people with the idea of the early convocation of the Constituent Assembly, as though the people could trust those who have already played them false in like circumstances, as though the people could believe in the honest convocation of the Constituent Assembly by a government which is introducing military measures in out-of-the-way villages, and thus quite evidently concealing arbitrary arrests of class-conscious peasants and the falsification of the elections.

They drive the peasants to uprising, and then have the impudence to tell them that it is necessary to "be patient," it is necessary to wait a while, to trust that government which is putting down the rebelling peasants with "military measures."

They bring matters to such a pass as to drive to perdition hun-

dreds of thousands of Russian soldiers in the offensive after July 2, to prolong the war, to provoke a mutiny of German sailors, who threw their superiors overboard, they bring about such a state of affairs, all the time uttering fine phrases about peace, without offering a just peace to all the belligerent nations; and yet they have the effrontery to tell the workers and peasants, to tell the dying soldiers, "You must be patient a bit, trust the government of the 'Stolypinist,' Kerensky, have faith another month in the Kornilovist generals" (who perhaps in another month will lead to the slaughter a few more tens of thousands of soldiers) . . . "forbear a little longer."

Is this not impudence?

No, Messrs. S.-R.'s, party colleagues of Kerensky—you will not deceive the soldiers!

Not a single day, not a single extra hour, will the workers and soldiers tolerate the Kerensky government, for they know that the Soviet government will make an immediate offer of a just peace to all the belligerents, and will therefore in all probability reach an immediate armistice and an early peace.

Not a single day, not a single extra hour will the soldiers of our peasant army tolerate that, in spite of the opposition of the Soviets, the Kerensky government, with its military measures for putting down the peasant rising, should stand.

No, Messrs. S.-R.'s, party colleagues of Kerensky—you will no longer deceive the workers and peasants.

As to the pressure of the hostile forces, which, according to the assurances of the mortally terrified *Novaya Zhizn*, will sweep away the dictatorship of the proletariat, there is contained here another monstrous logical and political error which only those can pass over who have allowed themselves to be terrorised to the point of losing their senses.

"The pressure of hostile forces," you say, "will sweep away the dictatorship of the proletariat." Very well. But you are all economists and educated people, my dear fellow-citizens. You all know that to compare democracy with the bourgeoisie is senseless and clownish, that it is just the same as comparing pounds with yards. For there may exist a democratic bourgeoisie and there may exist non-democratic strata of the petty bourgeoisie (capable of Vendéeism).

"Hostile forces"—this is a phrase. The class meaning of it, how-

ever, is the bourgeoisie (behind which stand also the landowners).

The bourgeoisie and the landowners; the proletariat; the petty bourgeoisie, the petty proprietors among whom are primarily, the peasants—these are the three fundamental "forces" into which Russia is divided, like every capitalist country. Here are the three fundamental "forces" which are made evident in every capitalist country (and in Russia) not only by a scientific economic analysis but by the political experience of all the more recent history of all countries, by the experience of all European revolutions of the eighteenth century, and by the experience of the two Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917.

And so you threaten the proletariat that the pressure of the bourgeoisie will sweep away their power? This and this only is what your threat comes down to; it has no other meaning.

Very well. If, for instance, the bourgeoisie can sweep away the power of the workers and poorest peasantry, then nothing else remains than coalition, *i.e.*, a union or understanding of the petty bourgeoisie with the bourgeoisie. Nothing else can even be imagined!!

But the coalition has been tried for half a year, and has led to collapse, and you yourselves, dear citizens of *Novaya Zhizn*, but incapable of thinking, you yourselves have forsworn it.

What is the result?

You have become so muddled, citizens of Novaya Zhizn, you have allowed yourselves to be so scared that even in the most simple discussion, in counting not even up to five but only up to three, you cannot make things come out right.

Either all power to the bourgeoisie—this you have not defended for a long time, indeed not even the bourgeoisie itself dares to hint at it, knowing that already on May 3-4 the people overthrew such power by one movement of their shoulder, and would overthrow it now thrice as determinedly and mercilessly. Or all power to the petty bourgeoisie—that is, to its coalition, (union, agreement) with the bourgeoisie, for the petty bourgeoisie cannot and does not wish to take power independently, as has been proved by the experience of all revolutions; and also proved by economic science, which explains that in a capitalist country one can stand for capitalism or for labour but one cannot stand in the middle. Thus coalition in Russia has tried dozens of methods for half a year, and has failed.

Or, finally, all power to the proletariat and poorest peasantry, against the bourgeoisie in order to break its resistance. This has not yet been tried, and this you, gentlemen of the *Novaya Zhizn*, dissuade the people from doing, you try to scare them with the bourgeoisie as you yourselves are scared.

No fourth course can be thought of at all.

Consequently, if the Novaya Zhizn is afraid of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and rejects it because of the possible defeat of a proletarian power by the bourgeoisie, this amounts to a stealthy return to the position of coalition with the capitalists!!! It is clear as daylight that he who is afraid of resistance, who does not believe in the possibility of breaking this resistance, he who admonishes the people: "Take heed of the resistance of the capitalists, you will be unable to overcome it," thereby invokes again the acceptance of an understanding with the capitalists.

Helpless and pitiful is the confusion of the Novaya Zhizn, as is now the confusion of all the petty-bourgeois democrats who see the collapse of the coalition, who dare not defend it openly, who, being themselves protected by the bourgeoisie, are afraid of an all-powerful proletariat and poorest peasantry.

To be afraid of the resistance of the capitalists while calling oneself a revolutionist and desiring to be numbered among the Socialists—what a disgrace! What an ideological collapse of international Socialism, corrupted by opportunism, was necessary so that such voices could be raised!

We have already seen, the whole nation has already seen, the strength of capitalist resistance; for the capitalists, being more class-conscious than the other classes, at once recognised the significance of the Soviets, and immediately spent all their strength, did all and everything, adopted every device, went to the length of most atrocious measures of lies and abuse, of military plots—all in order to destroy the Soviets, to reduce their power to naught, to prostitute them (with the help of the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks), to transform them into talking shops, and to tire out the peasants and workers by months and months of the emptiest chatter and playing at revolution.

But the strength of the resistance of the proletariat and poorest peasantry we have still not seen, for this strength will rise to its full height only when power is in the hands of the proletariat, when tens of millions of people crushed by need and capitalist slavery see by actual experience, when they feel, that power in the state has really been attained by the oppressed classes, that the state power is really helping the poor to struggle against the landowners and capitalists, is breaking their resistance. Only then shall we be able to see what untapped forces of resistance to capitalism are hidden within the people; only then will be made evident what Engels calls "hidden Socialism," only then will it appear that for every ten thousand open or concealed enemies who resist, actively or passively, the authority of the working class, a million new fighters arise, until then politically dormant, dragging out an existence in tortures of poverty and despair, having lost faith in themselves as human beings, having forgotten that they too have a right to live, that they too could be served by the modern centralised state, that their battalions of proletarian militia can also be called with full confidence to participate in the immediate, direct, daily work of administration of the state.

The capitalists and landowners, with the sympathetic help of the Plekhanovs, Breshkovskayas, Tseretelis, Chernovs and Co., have done everything to soil the democratic republic, to pollute it by their servility to wealth, to such an extent that the people have been seized by apathy and indifference. It is all the same to them, for a hungry man cannot distinguish between a republic and a monarchy: a frozen, shoeless, weary soldier, perishing for the interests of others, is in no condition of getting to love a republic.

However, when the last common workman, every unemployed worker, every cook, every ruined peasant sees, not from the paper, but with his own eyes, that the proletarian power is not cringing before the rich, but is helping the poor, that this power is not afraid of revolutionary measures, that it takes surplus products from the parasites and gives them to the hungry, that it forcibly moves the homeless into the dwellings of the rich, that it forces the rich to pay for milk, but does not give them a drop of it until the children of all the poor families have received adequate supplies, that the land is passing into the hands of the toilers, that the factories and banks are coming under the control of the workers, that serious and immediate punishment is meted out to millionaires who conceal their riches—when the poor see and feel this, then no forces of the capitalists and kulaks, no forces of international finance capital manipulating hundreds of billions will be able to conquer the people's revolution; on the contrary, it will conquer the whole world, for in all countries the Socialist revolution is maturing.

Our revolution is unconquerable if it is not afraid of itself, if it entrusts full power to the proletariat. For back of us stand the immeasurably larger, more developed, more organised world forces of the proletariat, temporarily crushed by the war, but not destroyed; on the contrary, only multiplied by it.

To fear that the power of the Bolsheviks—that is, the power of the proletariat, which is assured of the unlimited support of the poorest peasantry—will be "swept away" by the capitalist gentlemen! What shortsightedness! What disgraceful distrust of the people! What hypocrisy! The people who manifest this fear belong to that "upper" (by capitalist standards, but in reality rotten) "society," which pronounces the word "justice" without itself believing in it, as a habit, as a phrase, without putting any content into it.

Here is an example:

Mr. Peshekhonov is a well-known semi-Cadet; a more moderate Trudovik, at one in ideas with the Breshkovskayas and Plekhanovs, it would be difficult to find; there was no Minister more servile to the bourgeoisie; the world has never seen a warmer partisan of the coalition, of an understanding with the capitalists.

And here is the admission this gentleman was compelled to make in his speech at the "Democratic" (read: Bulygin) Conference, according to the report of the defensist *Izvestiya*:

There are two programmes. One is the programme of group claims, class and national claims. This programme is most openly defended by the Bolsheviks. But the other sections of the democracy cannot readily reject this programme. For this is a recognition of the claims of the labouring masses. of the ill-treated and oppressed nationalities. It is not so easy, therefore, for the democracy to break with the Bolsheviks, to deny these class demands, above all because these demands are, in their essence, just. But this programme for which we struggled before the revolution, for the sake of which we made the revolution, and which under other circumstances we all would have supported very strongly, presents, under the present circumstances, a great danger. The danger is now so much the greater that these demands have to be asserted at a moment when their satisfaction by the state is impossible. We must first of all save the whole—the state—we must first of all save it from ruin, and there is only one way of doing this-not to satisfy demands, however just and strong they might appear, but on the contrary, to call for limitations and sacrifices, which must be borne on all sides (Izvestiya of the Central Executive Committee, September 30).

Mr. Peshekhonov does not understand that, while the capitalists are in power, he is defending not the whole, but the avaricious interests of Russian and "Allied" imperialist capital. Mr. Peshekhonov

does not understand that the war will cease to be an imperialist, predatory war of conquest only after a break with the capitalists, with their secret treaties, with their annexations (seizure of others' lands), with their banking, financial swindles. Mr. Peshekhonov does not understand that only after this would the war become—if the enemy were to reject a formal offer of a just peace—a defensive just war. Mr. Peshekhonov does not understand that the defensive power of the country, after ridding itself of the yoke of capitalism, and after giving the land to the peasants and placing the banks and factories under workers' control, would be many times stronger than the defensive power of a capitalist country.

And, most important of all, Mr. Peshekhonov does not understand that when he is forced to admit the justice of Bolshevism, to admit that its demands are the demands of the "labouring masses," i.e., of the majority of the nation, he abandons thereby his whole position, the whole position of the whole petty-bourgeois democracy.

Herein lies our strength. Our government will be invincible because even our antagonists are forced to admit that the Bolshevik programme is the programme of the "labouring masses" and "oppressed nationalities."

Mr. Peshekhonov, remember, is the political friend of the Cadets, of the people of the Yedinstvo and the Dyelo Naroda, of the Breshkovskayas and the Plekhanovs. He is the representative of the kulaks and of those gentlemen whose wives and sisters would come tomorrow to gouge out with their umbrellas the eyes of the dying Bolsheviks, if they were beaten by Kornilov's or (what comes to exactly the same thing) Kerensky's soldiers.

And such a gentleman is compelled to recognise the justice of the Bolshevik demands.

For him "justice" is but a phrase. But for the masses of the semi-proletarians, for the majority of the petty bourgeoisie of town and country, ruined, exhausted, tortured by the war, it is not a phrase, but the most direct, the most burning, the most momentous question, that of starvation or a crust of bread. This is why no policy can be based on coalition, on an "understanding" between the interests of the hungry and ruined and the interests of the exploiters. This is why the Bolshevik government is assured of the support of the overwhelming majority of these masses.

Justice is an empty word, say the intellectuals and those rascals who are inclined to declare themselves Marxists on the very lofty

ground that they have once "contemplated the hind end" of economic materialism. 112

Ideas become power when they seize hold of the masses. Just now the Bolsheviks, *i.e.*, the representatives of revolutionary proletarian internationalism, have by their policy given substance to this idea which is stirring the vast labouring masses of the whole world.

Justice of itself, the mere feelings of the indignant exploited masses, would never have led them on the right road to Socialism. But when, thanks to capitalism, there grew up the apparatus of big banks, syndicates, railways, and so on; when the rich experience of the most advanced countries has amassed a hoard of marvellous technical knowledge, the application of which capitalism is now hindering; when the class-conscious workers have formed a party of a quarter of a million members for the purpose of taking this apparatus into their hands in a planned fashion and setting it going with the support of all the labouring and exploited masses—when these conditions are present, then there is no force on earth which can prevent the Bolsheviks, if only they do not allow themselves to be cowed and are able to seize power, from retaining it until the final victory of the world Socialist revolution.

POSTSCRIPT

The foregoing lines had already been written when the leading editorial of the Novaya Zhizn of October 14 yielded a new pearl of stupidity, the more dangerous since it is concealed under the flag of sympathy for the Bolsheviks, or under the shelter of the wisest philistine discussion about "not letting ourselves be provoked" (not letting ourselves be caught in a snare of screams about provocation serving the purpose of frightening off the Bolsheviks from seizing power). Here is this pearl:

The lessons of movements such as those on July 16 and 18, on the one hand, and the Kornilov days on the other, have shown quite clearly that democracy which has at its disposal the organs that are most influential among the population, is invincible when it is on the defensive in a civil war, but that it suffers defeat, losing all the intermediate vacillating elements, when it takes the initiative of attack into its own hands.¹¹⁸

If the Bolsheviks were to show in any form whatever any leanings towards the kind of philistine stupidity expressed in this argument they would ruin both their party and the revolution.

For the author of this argument, having taken it upon himself to talk of civil war (a theme very suitable indeed for that perfectly charming lady, the *Novaya Zhizn*), has perverted the *lessons of history* with an almost incredibly comic result.

Here is how Karl Marx, the representative and founder of proletarian revolutionary tactics, analysed *these* lessons, the lessons of history in connection with *this* question:

Insurrection is an art quite as much as war or any other, and subject to certain rules of proceeding, which, when neglected, will produce the ruin of the party neglecting them. Those rules, logical deductions from the nature of the parties and the circumstances one has to deal with in such a case, are so plain and simple that the short experience of 1848 had made the Germans pretty well acquainted with them. Firstly, never play with insurrection unless you are fully prepared to face the consequences of your play. Insurrection is a calculus with very indefinite magnitudes, the value of which may change every day; the forces opposed to you have all the advantage of organisation, discipline, and habitual authority. [Marx has in mind the most difficult case of insurrection against a "firmly established" old power, against an army that has not decayed under the influence of the revolution and the vacillating policy of the government.] Unless you bring strong odds against them you are defeated and ruined. Secondly, the insurrectionary career once entered upon, act with the greatest determination, and on the offensive. The defensive is the death of every armed rising; it is lost before it measures itself with its enemies. Surprise your antagonists while their forces are scattering, prepare new successes, however small, but daily; keep up the moral ascendancy which the first successful rising has given to you; rally those vacillating elements to your side which always follow the strongest impulse, and which always look out for the safer side; force your enemies to a retreat before they can collect their strength against you; in the words of Danton, the greatest master of revolutionary policy yet known, de l'audace, de l'audace, encore de l'audace! *

We have changed all this, the "also-Marxists" of the Novaya Zhizn might say of themselves: instead of triple audacity we have two qualities—yes, we have two—"moderation and accuracy." 114 For "us" the experience of world history, the experience of the great French Revolution, is of no consequence. For "us" the experience of the two movements of 1917, distorted by Molchalin ** spectacles, is sufficient.

Let us have a look at this experience without these lovely spectacles.

^{*}Rendered freely: "Audacity, more audacity and still more audacity." The whole quotation is taken from Karl Marx, Revolution and Counter-revolution, or Germany in 1848. London, 1920, pp. 119-120. This is a collection of articles written by Engels which were ascribed wrongly to Marx, although these articles were written at the request of Marx for the New York Tribune and were edited by him.—Ed.

**Molchalin is a submissive state official in a comedy by Gribovedov.—Ed.

July 16-18 you compare with "civil war"; for you implicitly believe Alexinsky, Pereverzev and Co. It is characteristic of the gentlemen of the *Novaya Zhizn* that they believe such people (while doing nothing themselves independently to collect information regarding July 16-18, although they have the huge apparatus of a big daily paper).

But let us concede for a moment that July 16-18 was not merely the beginning of civil war, kept by the Bolsheviks within the limits of incipiency, but a real civil war—let us grant this.

What then does this lesson indicate?

Firstly, that the Bolsheviks did not take the offensive, for it is indisputable that had they taken the offensive on the night of July 16-17, or even during July 17, they would have achieved a good deal. Their defensive tactics were their weakness, if we are to talk of civil war (as does the Novaya Zhizn) and not of the transformation of a spontaneous outburst into a demonstration of the type of May 3-4 (as the facts tell us).

And thus the "lesson" speaks against the wiseacres of the Novaya Zhizn.

Secondly, if the Bolsheviks did not even aim at an insurrection on July 16-17, if not a single organisation of the Bolsheviks even raised this question, the reason for this is outside our dispute with the Novaya Zhizn. For we are discussing the lessons of a "civil war," i.e., of an uprising, and not of the circumstances when a revolutionary party, knowing that it has not a majority on its side, does not even think of an uprising.

As it is well known that the Bolsheviks received a majority in the Soviets both in the capitals and in the country (more than 49 per cent of the votes in Moscow) much later than July, 1917, therefore the "lessons" to be drawn are, once again, not at all those which the perfectly charming Novaya Zhizn lady would like to draw.

No, no; you had better not take to politics, citizens of the Novaya Zhizn!

If a revolutionary party has no majority in the vanguard of the revolutionary classes and throughout the country, then there can be no question of an uprising. Besides this, an insurrection requires: (1) the maturing of the revolution on a general national scale; (2) the complete moral and political collapse of the old, for instance the "coalition," government; (3) great vacillation among

all the intermediate elements, i.e., among those who are not fully in favour of the government, although they fully supported it yesterday.

Why has the Novaya Zhizn, in proceeding to discuss the "lessons" of July 16-18, not even noticed this very important lesson? Because they are not politicians discussing political questions, but only members of a circle of intellectuals frightened out of their wits by the bourgeoisie.

Further, and thirdly, the facts show that it is just after July 16-17, precisely as a result of the revelation of the nature of the Messrs. Tseretelis' July policy, precisely because the masses have recognised the Bolsheviks as their own front-rank fighters and the "Social-blocists" as traitors, that the collapse of the Mensheviks and S.-R.'s is beginning. This collapse was already fully proved even before the Kornilov episode, by the elections of September 2, in Petrograd, which gave a victory to the Bolsheviks and played havoc with the "Social-blocists." (The Dyelo Naroda, not long ago, tried to disprove this, concealing the totals regarding all parties, but this is a self-deception and a deception of the reader. According to the Dyen of September 6, referring only to the towns, the percentage of votes for the Cadets rose from 22 to 23, while their absolute number of votes decreased 40 per cent; the percentage of votes for the Bolsheviks rose from 20 to 33, while their absolute number of votes decreased by only 10 per cent; the percentage of votes for all the "intermediates" decreased from 58 to 44, while their absolute number of votes decreased by 60 per cent!!)

The collapse of the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks, after the July days and up to the Kornilov days, is also shown by the growth of the "Left" Wing in each party, reaching nearly 40 per cent—"revenge" for the persecutions of the Bolsheviks by the Kerenskys.

The proletarian party, in spite of the "loss" of a few hundreds of its members, has gained enormously as a result of July 16-17, for precisely in those difficult days the masses came to comprehend and to recognise its devotion and the treachery of the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks. The "lesson," it appears, is altogether of a different nature from that taught by the Novaya Zhizn. Do not leave the seething masses for the "Molchalin democracy," and, if you do revolt, then take the offensive while the forces of the enemy are still scattered—take the enemy unawares.

Is that not so, gentlemen—you "also-Marxists" of the Novaya Zhizn?

Or does "Marxism" consist in not taking as the foundation for one's tactics an exact account of the objective situation and simply throwing in one heap, without reason or criticism, "civil war," "Congress of Soviets and the summoning of the Constituent Assembly"?

But surely, gentlemen, this is simply ridiculous, it is nothing but a mockery of Marxism and of all logic in general. If in the objective state of affairs there is no foundation for the sharpening of the class struggle to the point of "civil war," then why have you started talking about "civil war" in connection with the subject of the "Congress of Soviets and the Constituent Assembly"? (This is the exact title of the leading article in the Novaya Zhizn.) In that case you should have told the reader clearly, and shown to him, that in the present objective state of affairs there is no foundation for civil war, and that, therefore, one can and must place as the cornerstone of one's tactics peaceful, constitutionally legal, judicially and parliamentarily "simple" things, such as the Congress of Soviets and the Constituent Assembly. Then one can hold the view that such a congress and such an assembly are really capable of making decisions.


If, however, there is the germ of the inevitability, or at least probability, of civil war in the objective circumstances of the moment, if you have not talked of it merely "at random," but clearly seeing, feeling, sensing that the circumstances are opportune for civil war, then how can you place as your cornerstone the Congress of Soviets or the Constituent Assembly? This is surely but mocking the hungry, tortured masses! What! Do you think the starving people will agree to "wait" two months? Or that the economic ruin, of the growth of which you yourselves write daily, will consent to "wait" till the Congress of Soviets or the Constituent Assembly? Or that the German offensive, in the absence of serious steps towards peace (that is, in the absence of a formal offer of a just peace to all the belligerents) on our side, will agree to "wait" until the meeting of the Congress of Soviets and the Constituent Assembly? have you facts that allow you to conclude that the history of the Russian Revolution, which has been proceeding in an extraordinarily stormy way, and with extremely rapid tempo from March 13 to October 13, will assume between October 14 and December 12 115 an

unusually calm, peaceful, legally balanced pace, excluding explosions, leaps, military defeats, or economic crises? Or will the army at the front, of which the non-Bolshevik officer Dubasov declared officially in the name of the front that "it will not fight," will this army begin again to starve and freeze calmly until the date "fixed"? Or will the peasant risings cease to be an element of civil war, merely because you designate them as "anarchy" and "pogrom," or because Kerensky sends "military" forces against the peasants? Or is quiet, regular, really honest work by the government for the summoning of the Constituent Assembly possible, conceivable in a peasant country when at the same time the government is suppressing a peasant uprising?

Do not laugh at the "confusion in the Smolny Institute," 116 gentlemen! Your own confusion is no less. You reply to the stern question of civil war by means of confused phrases and pitiful constitutional illusions. This is why I say that if the Bolsheviks were to yield to such moods they would ruin both their party and their revolution.

Written October 7-14, 1917.

Published in the magazine Prosveshcheniye [Education],117 No. 1, October, 1917.



TO THE WORKERS, PEASANTS, AND SOLDIERS!

COMRADES! The party of the "Socialist-Revolutionaries," to which Kerensky belongs, appeals to you in its paper *Dyelo Naroda* (of October 13) to "be patient."

"One must be patient," the paper writes in urging that power be left in the hands of Kerensky's government, in urging that power should not pass to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Let Kerensky rely on the landowners, capitalists, and kulaks, let the Soviets that have carried through the revolution and vanquished the Kornilovist generals "be patient," we are told. Let them "be patient" until the speedy convocation of the Constituent Assembly.

Comrades! Look around, see what is happening in the village, what is happening in the army, and you will realise that the peasants and the soldiers cannot stand it any longer. Over the whole of Russia, like a broad river, sweeps an uprising of the peasants, from whom the land has hitherto been withheld by fraud. The peasants cannot stand it any longer. Kerensky sends troops to suppress the peasants and to defend the landowners. Kerensky has again come to an agreement with the Kornilovist generals and officers who stand for the landowners.

Neither the workers in the cities nor the soldiers at the front can bear this military suppression of the just struggle of the peasants for the land.

As to what is going on in the army at the front, the officer Dubasov, a non-partisan, has declared before all of Russia: "The soldiers will not fight any longer." The soldiers are tired out, the soldiers are barefooted, the soldiers are starving, the soldiers do not want to fight for the interests of the capitalists, they do not wish to "be patient," to be treated only to beautiful words about peace, while for months the peace proposal, the proposal for a just peace without annexations, to be offered to all the belligerent peoples, has been delayed (as is being done by Kerensky).

Comrades! Know that Kerensky is again negotiating with the Kornilovist generals and officers with the purpose of leading troops against the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, with the purpose of preventing the Soviets from obtaining power! Kerensky

"will under no circumstances submit" to the Soviets, the Dyelo Naroda openly admits.

Go, then, to the barracks, go to the Cossack units, go to the toilers and explain the truth to the people:

If power is in the hands of the Soviets, then not later than November 7 (if the Soviet Congress opens November 2) a just peace will be offered to all the belligerent peoples. There will be in Russia a workers' and peasants' government; it will immediately, without losing a single day, offer a just peace to all the belligerent peoples. Then the people will learn who wishes the unjust war. Then the people will decide in the Constituent Assembly.

If power is in the hands of the Soviets, the landowners' lands will immediately be declared the property and heritage of the whole people.

This is what Kerensky and his government fight against, basing themselves on the village exploiters, capitalists and landowners! This is what you are called to "be patient" for; these are the interests involved!

Are you willing to "be patient" in order that Kerensky may quell with armed force the peasants who have risen for land?

Are you willing to "be patient" in order that the war may be dragged out longer, the offer of peace postponed, the tearing up of the secret treaties of the former Tsar with the Russian and Anglo-French capitalists postponed?

Comrades, remember that Kerensky has already once deceived the people when he promised to convoke the Constituent Assembly! On July 21 he solemnly promised to convoke it not later than September 30, and he has deceived the people. Comrades! Whoever believes in the Kerensky government is a traitor to his brothers, the peasants and soldiers!

No, not for one more day are the people willing to suffer postponement. Not for a single day longer can we suffer the peasants to be quelled by armed force, thousands upon thousands to perish in the war, when a just peace can and must be offered at once.

Down with the government of Kerensky, who is conniving with the Kornilovist landowner-generals to suppress the peasants, to fire on the peasants, to drag out the war!

All power to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies!

Written October 14-15, 1917. First published in Pravda, No. 95, 1924.

THESES FOR A REPORT AT THE OCTOBER 21 CONFERENCE OF THE PETROGRAD ORGANISATION, ALSO FOR A RESOLUTION AND INSTRUCTIONS TO THOSE ELECTED TO THE PARTY CONGRESS 118

On the Question of the Party's Participation in the Pre-Parliament

- 1. THE participation of our party in the "pre-parliament," in the "Democratic Council," or in the "Council of the Republic" is an obvious error and a deviation from the proletarian-revolutionary road.
- 2. The objective situation is such that a revolution against Kerensky's Bonapartist government is undoubtedly rising in the country (peasant uprising, increasing dissatisfaction and conflicts with the government in the army and among national groups, conflict with railroad and postal employees, complete collapse of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary conciliators at the elections, etc.).

When the revolution is thus rising, to go to a make-believe parliament, concocted to deceive the people, means to facilitate this deception, to make the cause of preparing the revolution more difficult, to distract the attention and the forces of the party from the urgent task of struggle for power and for the overthrow of the government.

3. The party congress, therefore, must recall the members of our party from the pre-parliament, declare a boycott against it, appeal to the people to prepare forces for dispersing this "Bulygin Duma" of Tsereteli's.

On the Slogan of "All Power to the Soviets"

1. All the work of the Bolsheviks in the revolution for half a year, all the criticism levelled by them against the Mensheviks and S.-R.'s for their "conciliationism" and for the fact that those parties turned the Soviets into talking shops, demand on the part of the Bolsheviks a loyal adherence to that slogan in a straightforward Marxist way. Unfortunately, vacillations are to be noted at the top

of our party, a "fear," as it were, of the struggle for power, an inclination to substitute resolutions, protests, and congresses for this struggle.

- 2. All the experience of both revolutions, that of 1905 and that of 1917, as well as all the decisions of the party of the Bolsheviks, all its political declarations for many years, come down to the idea that the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies is real only as an organ of uprising, as an organ of a revolutionary power. Outside of this task, the Soviets are a meaningless plaything which inevitably leads to apathy, to sluggishness, to disappointment on the part of the masses who are justly sick of endless repetition of resolutions and protests.
- 3. Particularly now, when a peasant uprising is sweeping the country and is being suppressed by Kerensky with the aid of picked troops, when even the military measures in the village obviously threaten with fraudulent fixed elections to the Constituent Assembly, when even in Germany there has been a mutiny in the fleet, a refusal now on the part of the Bolsheviks to transform the Soviets into organs of uprising would be a betrayal both of the peasants and of the cause of the international Socialist revolution.
- 4. The task of seizure of power by the Soviets is the task of a successful uprising. This is why all the best forces of the party must be directed towards the factories and barracks in order that they may explain to the masses their task and in order that, taking their mood correctly into account, they may choose the proper moment for overthrowing the Kerensky government.

To insist on connecting this task with the Congress of Soviets, to subordinate it to this congress, means to be merely playing at uprising by setting a definite date beforehand, by making easier for the government to prepare troops, by confusing the masses with the illusion that it is possible to solve, by means of a "resolution" of the Congress of Soviets, a task which only the rebellious proletariat is capable of solving by its own power.

5. It is necessary to fight against the constitutional illusions and against hopes placed in the Congress of the Soviets, to reject the preconceived idea of "waiting" for it at all hazards, to concentrate all strength on explaining to the masses the inevitability of an uprising, and on preparing it. The Bolsheviks have in their hands the Soviets of both capital cities; if they refused to carry out this task, and became reconciled to the convocation of the Constituent

Assembly (which means a concocted Constituent Assembly) by the Kerensky government, they would reduce all their propaganda for the "Power to the Soviets" slogan to empty phrases and, politically, would cover themselves with shame as a party of the revolutionary proletariat.

6. This is particularly true now, when the Moscow elections have yielded to the Bolsheviks 49½ per cent of the votes and when the Bolsheviks, supported by the Left S.-R.'s, which support has long since become a fact, have an undoubted majority in the country.

Note to the Resolution on "Power to the Soviets"

Not everything in the thesis on "Power to the Soviets" ought to be published, but if we refuse to discuss within the party and to make clear to the masses unusually urgent and important problems, which cannot be fully discussed in the open due to the absence of full freedom of the press, or which cannot be openly brought before the enemy, it is tantamount to the party's losing its connections with the vanguard of the proletariat.

On the List of Candidates for the Constituent Assembly

The list of candidates published by the Central Committee has been made up in an impermissible way and calls for the sharpest protest. For in a peasant Constituent Assembly it is necessary to have four or five times more workers, who alone are capable of establishing close and intimate relations with the peasant deputies. It is also entirely impermissible to have a disproportionately large number of candidates from among persons with little experience, who have only recently joined our party (like J. Larin). In filling the list with such candidates, who should have first worked for months and months in the party, the Central Committee opens the doors wide for careerism, for hunting after berths in the Constituent Assembly. The list must be speedily revised and corrected.

Note to the Thesis "On the List of Candidates for the Constituent Assembly"

It goes without saying that, as far as the Interboroughites,* who are very little experienced in proletarian work according to the line

*An organisation of Internationalists in Petrograd during the war, which joined the Bolshevik Party at the Sixth Party Congress, July, 1917.—Ed.

of our party, are concerned, nobody would argue, for instance, against such a candidacy as that of L. D. Trotsky; for, in the first place, Trotsky immediately after his arrival took the position of an internationalist; secondly, he fought among the Interboroughites for fusion; thirdly, in the grave July days, he proved equal to the task and a devoted adherent of the party of the revolutionary proletariat. This obviously cannot be said about a multitude of the new members of our party included in the list.

To propose Larin is particularly risky (especially when he is placed ahead of G. I. Petrovsky, N. V. Krylenko and others).

Inside of the Constituent Assembly, the establishment of a rapprochement with the peasants, a close, intimate hearty one, will require earnest work. Only workers who are close to the life of the peasants are good for this. To crowd the Constituent Assembly with orators and literati means to follow the beaten track of opportunism and chauvinism. This is unworthy of the Third International.

Written October 14-20, 1917.

First published in the first edition of Lenin's Collected Works, Volume XIV, Part I, 1922.

LETTER TO THE PETROGRAD CITY CONFERENCE 119

TO BE READ IN CLOSED SESSION

COMRADES, permit me to call the attention of the conference to the extreme seriousness of the political situation. I base my opinion on the news in the Saturday morning papers alone. That news, however, compels me to put the question in this way:

The absolute inaction of the English fleet in general, as well as the English submarines, during the occupation of Esel by the Germans, coupled with the government's plan to move from Petrograd to Moscow—does not all this prove that a conspiracy has been formed between the Russian and the English imperialists, between Kerensky and the Anglo-French capitalists, to surrender Petrograd to the Germans and thus to stifle the Russian Revolution?

I think it does.

The conspiracy may not have been agreed upon directly, but through some Kornilovists (Maklakov or other Cadets, "non-party" Russian millionaires, etc.), but this does not at all change the essence of the matter.

The conclusion is clear:

We must admit that the revolution is ruined if the Kerensky government is not overthrown by the proletarians and the soldiers in the near future. The question of the uprising is placed on the order of the day.

We must mobilise all forces to convince the workers and soldiers that it is absolutely imperative to wage a desperate, last, decisive fight for the overthrow of the Kerensky government.

We must appeal to the Moscow comrades, persuade them to seize power in Moscow by declaring the Kerensky government deposed, and to declare the Soviet of Workers' Deputies in Moscow as the provisional government of Russia in order to offer immediate peace and save Russia from the conspiracy. Let the Moscow comrades raise immediately in Moscow the question of the uprising.

We must utilise the Regional Congress of the Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies of the northern district, called for October 21 in Helsingfors; we must mobilise all our forces to win the delegates over for the uprising (when they go back through Petrograd).¹²⁰

We must go to the Central Committee of our party with a request and a proposal to hasten the withdrawal of the Bolsheviks from the pre-parliament and to turn all forces to exposing among the masses Kerensky's conspiracy with the imperialists of other countries and to preparing the uprising so that the proper moment for it is chosen.

P.S.—The resolution of the Soldiers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet against moving the government from Petrograd shows that among the soldiers the realisation of Kerensky's conspiracy is also ripening. We must gather all forces to support this correct realisation and to carry on propaganda among the soldiers.¹²¹

I move that the following resolution be adopted:

"The Conference, having discussed the present situation, which is generally admitted to be highly critical, establishes the following facts:

- "1. The aggressive operations of the German fleet, accompanied by the very strange inactivity of the English fleet and coupled with the Provisional Government's plan to move from Petrograd to Moscow, arouse a very strong suspicion that the Kerensky government (or, what is the same thing, the Russian imperialists behind him) has entered into a conspiracy with the Anglo-French imperialists to surrender Petrograd to the Germans in order thus to suppress the revolution.
- "2. These suspicions are greatly strengthened, and are being confirmed as much as is possible in such cases, owing to these facts:

"First, the conviction has long been growing and strengthening in the army that it was betrayed by the tsarist generals, that it is also being betrayed by the generals of Kornilov and Kerensky (particularly in the surrender of Riga);

"Second, the Anglo-French bourgeois press does not conceal its fierce hatred for the Soviets, a hatred reaching the point of rage, and its readiness to annihilate them at the cost of any amount of blood;

"Third, Kerensky, the Cadets, Breshkovskaya, Plekhanov and similar politicians are conscious or unconscious tools in the hands of Anglo-French imperialism, as completely proven by a half year's history of the Russian Revolution;

"Fourth, the vague but persistent rumours of a separate peace be-

tween England and Germany 'at the expense of Russia' could not have arisen without cause;

"Fifth, all the circumstances of the Kornilov conspiracy, as evidenced even by the admission of the papers *Dyelo Naroda* and *Izvestiya*, which are generally in sympathy with Kerensky, have proven that Kerensky is to a very large extent mixed up in the Kornilov affair, that Kerensky was and is the most dangerous Kornilovist; Kerensky, in fact, has shielded the leaders of the Kornilov affair, such as Rodzyanko, Klembovsky, Maklakov, and others.

"Proceeding from these considerations, the Conference recognises that all the shouting of Kerensky, and the bourgeois papers supporting him, about defending Petrograd, is pure deception and hypocrisy, that the Soldiers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet was perfectly right when it sharply condemned the plan of moving from Petrograd; furthermore, that to defend Petrograd and to save the revolution it is absolutely and most urgently necessary that the tiredout army be convinced of the sincerity of the government and that it be given bread, clothing and footwear at the cost of revolutionary measures against the capitalists, who hitherto have sabotaged the struggle against economic ruin (as admitted even by the Economic Department of the Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary Central Executive Committee).

"The Conference therefore declares that only the overthrow of the Kerensky government and of the packed Soviet of the Republic, and the substitution for it of a workers' and peasants' revolutionary government, is capable of:

- "(a) giving the land to the peasants instead of suppressing the peasant uprising;
- "(b) offering an immediate just peace and thus giving faith in the truth to our entire army;
- "(c) adopting the most decisive revolutionary measures against the capitalists in order to secure for the army bread, clothing and footwear and in order to fight against economic ruin.

"The Conference urgently requests the Central Committee to take all measures to lead the inevitable uprising of the workers, soldiers and peasants for the overthrow of the Kerensky government which is hostile to the people and favourable to serfdom.

"The Conference decides immediately to despatch delegations to Helsingfors, Vyborg, Cronstadt, Reval, to the military units south of Petrograd, and to Moscow, with the aim of carrying on propaganda in favour of adopting this resolution and in favour of a swift, general uprising and the overthrow of Kerensky as the steps necessary to open the road to peace, to save Petrograd and the revolution, to give over the land to the peasants, and the power to the Soviets."

Written October 20, 1917. First published in 1925.

LETTER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, MOSCOW COM-MITTEE, PETROGRAD COMMITTEE, AND THE BOLSHEVIK MEMBERS OF THE PETRO-GRAD AND MOSCOW SOVIETS 123

DEAR COMRADES.

Events indicate our task so clearly to us that hesitation actually becomes a crime.

The agrarian movement is growing. The government is increasing its savage repressions; sympathy with us is growing in the army (in Moscow, 99 per cent of the soldier votes are for us; the troops in Finland and the navy are against the government; Dubasov has testified to this effect about the front in general).¹²⁸

In Germany, the beginning of the revolution is evident, particularly after the shooting of the sailors. The Moscow elections, with 47 per cent of Bolsheviks, are a great victory. Together with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries this means an obvious majority throughout the country.

The railroad workers and the postal employees are engaged in a conflict with the government.¹²⁴ Instead of the congress called for November 2, the Liberdans already are speaking of one to be convened some time during the first ten days of November, etc., etc.

To "wait" under such conditions is a crime.

The Bolsheviks have no right to wait for the Congress of Soviets; they must take power immediately. Thus they will save both the world revolution (for otherwise there is the danger of an agreement between the imperialists of all countries who, after the shooting in Germany, will be much more agreeable to each other and will unite against us) and the Russian Revolution (else a wave of real anarchy may become stronger than we are); thus they will also save the lives of hundreds of thousands of people engaged in the war.

To hesitate is a crime. To wait for the Congress of Soviets means to play a childish game of formality, a shameful game of formality; it means to betray the revolution.

If it is impossible to take power without an uprising, it is necessary immediately to orientate upon an uprising. It is quite possible that power can be taken at the present time without an uprising:

if, for instance, the Moscow Soviet were immediately to take power and to declare itself (together with the Petrograd Soviet) the government. Victory in Moscow is assured, as there is nobody there to fight. We can wait with Petrograd. The government can do nothing and cannot save itself; it will surrender.

For when the Moscow Soviet takes over power, the banks, the factories, the Russkoye Slovo, 126 it acquires a gigantic base and a power; it carries on propaganda before all of Russia, putting the question in the following way: we offer peace tomorrow if the Bonapartist Kerensky surrenders (if he does not surrender, we will overthrow him). Land to the peasants immediately; concessions to the railroad workers and postal employees immediately, etc.

It is not compulsory to "start" with Petrograd. If Moscow "starts" bloodlessly, it will undoubtedly be supported (1) by the sympathies of the army at the front; (2) by the peasants everywhere; (3) by the fleet and the troops in Finland which are moving on Petrograd.

Even if Kerensky has in the vicinity of Petrograd one or two cavalry corps, he will have to surrender. The Petrograd Soviet may bide its time, while carrying on propaganda in favour of the Moscow Soviet government. The slogan is: power to the Soviets, land to the peasants, peace to the peoples, bread to the hungry.

Victory is assured, and there are nine chances out of ten that it will be bloodless.

To wait is a crime against the revolution.

Greetings,

N. LENIN.

Written October 16-20, 1917.

First published in the first edition of Lenin's Collected Works, Volume XIV, Part I, 1922.

TOWARDS THE REVISION OF THE PARTY PROGRAMME 120

THE special congress of the party, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks), called by the Central Committee for October 30, has on the agenda the revision of the party programme. The conference of May 7-12 passed a resolution on the necessity of such revision and indicated in eight points the direction which this revision should follow.* Then, later, pamphlets were published in Petrograd ** and Moscow, *** which took up the question of revision, and on August 23 the Moscow journal Spartak published an article in No. 4 by Comrade N. I. Bukharin devoted to the same subject. Let us examine the points raised by the Moscow comrades.

I

For the Bolsheviks, who all agree on the need for "evaluating imperialism and the epoch of imperialist wars in connection with the approaching Socialist revolution" (§ 1 of the resolution of the conference of May 7-12), the main question in the revision of the party programme is the question of the methods of formulating a new programme. Should we round out the old programme by adding a characterisation of imperialism (I advocated this opinion in the Petrograd pamphlet), or should we change the whole text of the old programme? (This opinion was expressed by the section which was formed at the April [May] Conference, and is now being advocated by the Moscow comrades.) This is the primary question confronting our party.

We have two drafts. One, proposed by me, rounds out the old programme with a characterisation of imperialism; **** the second,

^{*} See V. I. Lenin, The Revolution of 1917, Collected Works, Vol. XX, Book II, p. 410.—Ed.

^{**} Materials on the Revision of the Party Programme, edited and with a preface by N. Lenin. "Priboi" publishing house, 1917.

^{***} Materials on the Revision of the Party Programme. Collection of articles by V. Milyutin, V. Sokolnikov, A. Lomov, V. Smirnov. Published by the Regional Bureau of the Moscow Industrial District of the R.S.-D.L.P., 1917.
**** See V. I. Lenin, The Revolution of 1917, Collected Works, Vol. XX, Book I, pp. 325 ff.—Ed.

proposed by Comrade V. Sokolnikov, and based on the remarks of a committee composed of three persons (this committee was elected by the section which was formed at the April [May] Conference), changes the entire general part of the programme.

I also had occasion to express my opinion (in the above-mentioned pamphlet **) concerning the theoretical incorrectness of the plan of revision indicated by the section. Let us see now how this plan is carried out in Comrade Sokolnikov's draft.

Comrade Sokolnikov has divided the general part of our programme into ten parts, giving each part or paragraph a number. We too will adhere to his numerical scheme so as to enable the reader to find the corresponding passages.

The first paragraph of the present programme consists of two propositions. The first declares that the labour movement has become international because of the development of exchange; the second, that the Russian Social-Democracy considers itself as one of the detachments of the army of the world proletariat. (Further on in the second paragraph the general ultimate aim of all Social-Democrats is mentioned.)

Comrade Sokolnikov leaves the second proposition intact, while he replaces the first by a new one, adding to the point about the development of exchange an allusion to the "export of capital" and the transition of the struggle of the proletariat into "a world-wide Socialist revolution."

The immediate result is inconsistency, a mixture of themes, a confusion of two types of programme structure. One of the two: either we must begin with the characterisation of imperialism as a whole—and in that case not single out only the "export of capital," nor retain, as Comrade Sokolnikov does, the analysis of "the process of development" of bourgeois society in the second paragraph; or else leave the type of programme structure unchanged, i.e., first explain why our movement has become international, what its general ultimate goal is, how the "process of development" of bourgeois society is leading to this goal.

To make the inconsistency and lack of logic in Comrade Sokolnikov's formulation of the programme more evident, we will quote in full the opening sentences of the old programme:

^{*} Ibid., Book II, p. 412.—Ed.

^{**} Ibid., Book I, p. 332-Ed.

The development of exchange has established such close ties among all the peoples of the civilised world that the great proletarian movement towards emancipation was bound to become—and has long since become—international.*

Comrade S. is dissatisfied here with two circumstances: (1) speaking of the development of exchange, the programme describes an antiquated "period of development"; (2) after the word "civilised" Comrade S. puts an exclamation point and remarks that "the close ties between mother country and colony" are in our programme "not taken cognisance of."

"Can protectionism, tariff wars, imperialist wars sever the ties of the proletarian movement?" queries Comrade S., and he himself answers: "If we are to believe the text of our programme, they can, for they sever the ties established by exchange."

Rather strange criticism. Neither protectionism, nor tariff wars "sever" exchange; they only change it temporarily or interrupt it at one point, permitting its continuation at another. Exchange has not been broken up by the present war; it is only hindered in some places and has shifted to other places, but it still remains an international tie. The most obvious proof is the course of exchange. This is first. And secondly, we read in Comrade Sokolnikov's draft: "The development of productive forces, which, on the basis of the exchange of goods, and the export of capital, draw all peoples into one world economy," etc. Imperialist war (in one place, for a time) also interrupts the export of capital, as well as exchange; therefore, Comrade Sokolnikov's "criticism" may be used against himself.

Thirdly, in the old programme, the question came up as to why the labour movement "has long since become" international. It had unquestionably become such before the export of capital became the highest stage of capitalism.

To sum up: Comrade Sokolnikov inserted a bit of the definition of imperialism (the export of capital) where it is obviously out of place.

Moreover, the words "the civilised world" do not appeal to Comrade Sokolnikov, for, in his opinion, they refer to something peaceful and harmonious, and forget the colonies.

Quite the contrary. Speaking of the "civilised world," the programme points out the *un*-harmoniousness, the existence of uncivilised countries (this is a *fact*), while in Comrade Sokolnikov's

draft things appear much more harmonious, for it speaks simply of "drawing all peoples into one world economy"!! As if all peoples were equally drawn into this one world economy! As if there existed no serf relationship between the uncivilised and the "civilised" peoples just exactly on the basis of "all peoples" being drawn "into one world economy."

Comrade Sokolnikov has really weakened the old programme in the two topics he mentions. He emphasises internationalism much less. It is very relevant for us to point out that it had sprung into being long ago, long before the era of finance capital. From his wording one might gather the impression of a greater "harmoniousness" with regard to colonies. It nevertheless remains a fact that the labour movement has so far unfortunately affected the civilised countries only; for us to ignore this is not at all becoming.

I would be ready to agree with Comrade S. had he demanded a clearer exposition of the exploitation of the colonies. That is really an important element in the conception of imperialism. But in the first paragraph of Comrade Sokolnikov's draft, there is not one mention of it. Here various component parts of the conception, imperialism, are scattered in diverse places, to the detriment of consistency and clarity.

We shall soon see how Comrade Sokolnikov's entire draft suffers from this looseness and inconsistency.

П

Let the reader observe the general arrangement and the sequence of topics in the various divisions of the old programme (we follow Comrade Sokolnikov's numerical scheme):

- 1. The labour movement has long since become international. We are one of its detachments.
- 2. The final goal of the movement is determined by the course of development of bourgeois society. The point of departure is private ownership of the means of production and the propertylessness of the proletariat.
- 3. The growth of capitalism. The crowding out of the small producers.
 - 4. The growth of exploitation (woman labour, reserve army, etc.).
 - 5. Crises.
 - 6. The progress of technique; the growth of inequality.

- 7. Growing struggle on the part of the proletariat. Material conditions for the replacement of capitalism by Socialism.
 - 8. The proletarian social revolution.
 - 9. Its premise—the dictatorship of the proletariat.
- 10. The task of the party—to lead the struggle of the proletariat for the social revolution.

I add another topic:

11. Capitalism has evolved to its highest stage (imperialism), and now the era of the proletarian revolution has begun.

Compare with this the order of topics—not isolated corrections in the text, but the topics themselves—in Comrade S.'s draft, and also the topics of his additions about imperialism:

- 1. The labour movement is international. We are one of its detachments. (Inserted: the export of capital, world economy, the transition of the conflict into the world revolution; *i.e.*, a bit of the definition of imperialism is inserted.)
- 2. The final goal of the movement is determined by the course of development of bourgeois society. The point of departure is private ownership of the means of production and the propertylessness of the proletariat. (In the middle is inserted: omnipotent banks and syndicates, monopoly combines on a world scale; i.e., another bit of the definition of imperialism is inserted.)
- 3. The growth of capitalism. The crowding out of the small producers.
- 4. The growth of exploitation (woman labour, reserve army, foreign workers, etc.).
- 5. Crises and wars. Still another bit of the definition of imperialism is inserted: "attempts to partition the globe"; monopoly combines and the export of capital are repeated once more; to the phrase "finance capital" is added, in parentheses, "the product of a union of industrial and bank capital."
- 6. The progress of technique; the growth of inequality. Yet another bit of the definition of imperialism is put in: high cost of living, militarism. Monopoly combines are mentioned again.
- 7. Growing struggle on the part of the proletariat. Material conditions for the replacement of capitalism by Socialism. In the middle is an interpolation, again reiterating: "monopoly capitalism," and pointing out how the banks and the syndicates have prepared the apparatus for social regulation, etc.

- 8. The proletarian social revolution. (A note, that it will bring an end to the rule of finance capital.)
 - 9. Its premise—the dictatorship of the proletariat.
- 10. The task of the party—to lead the struggle of the proletariat for the social revolution. (In the middle is the interpolation that the latter is now on the order of the day.)

I believe that this comparative study clearly shows that Comrade Sokolnikov's draft is afflicted with the very faults resulting from "mechanical" additions so feared by some comrades. Without any logical sequence, mosaic-like, various bits of the definition of imperialism have been strewn throughout the work. There is no general and integral characterisation of imperialism. There are too many repetitions. The old canvas is preserved. Preserved also is the general plan of the old programme; to point out that the "ultimate goal" of the movement is "determined" by the nature of contemporary bourgeois society and the course of its development. But it is just this "course of development" which is not brought out; and the effect is that of crumbs from the definition of imperialism seeping in, and for the most part inappropriately.

Let us take the second paragraph. Here Comrade S. left unchanged the beginning and the end; the beginning states that the means of production are in the hands of a few people; the end, that the majority of the population are proletarians or semi-proletarians. Right in the middle, Comrade S. inserts a special proposition which states that "during the last quarter of a century the direct or indirect control of capitalistically-organised production has gone over into the hands of the all-powerful" banks, trusts, etc.

This is mentioned before the crowding out of the small producers by the big ones is brought up!! The latter is first mentioned in the third paragraph. But are not trusts the highest and latest manifestation of the very process of the crowding out of small-scale production by large-scale? Is it appropriate to speak first of trusts, and then of the crowding out of the small producer? Is it not a violation of logical sequence? For where did the trusts come from? Is this not an error in theory? How and why has control "gone over" into their hands? All this cannot be understood before the process of the crowding out of the small producer is made clear.

Let us take the third paragraph. The topic is the crowding out of small enterprises by large ones. Here too Comrade S. retains the beginning (the increasing importance of vast enterprises) and the end (small producers are being crowded out). In the middle, however, he adds that vast enterprises "are merged into gigantic organisms which combine a whole series of consecutive steps of production and exchange." But this insertion deals with an entirely different topic, namely, the concentration of the means of production and the socialisation of labour by capitalism, the creation of material conditions for the replacement of capitalism by Socialism. In the old programme this topic is not brought up until the seventh paragraph.

Comrade S. adheres to the general plan of the old programme. He, too, speaks of the material conditions for the replacement of capitalism by Socialism only in the seventh paragraph. He also retains in the seventh paragraph mention of the concentration of means of production and the socialisation of labour!

What we have then is a bit of mention of concentration of capital, inserted a few paragraphs before the general, summarising, complete paragraph specially devoted to the subject. This is the height of illogicality and is likely to render the programme less intelligible to the masses.

III

The fifth paragraph of the programme, the one dealing with crises, Comrade S. "subjects to a general revision." He finds that the old programme "sins in theory to achieve popularity" and "deviates from Marx's theory of crises."

Comrade S. suggests that the word "overproduction" used in the old programme be placed "at the basis of the explanation" of crises and that "such a view is more in keeping with the theory of Rodbertus which explains the origin of crises by insufficient consumption by the working class."

To what extent these searches of Comrade S. after theoretical heresy are unsuccessful, to what extent Rodbertus is dragged in by the hair, may be seen from a comparison of the old text with the new one proposed by Comrade S.

In the old text, after the mention of "technical progress," greater efficiency in the exploitation of labour, relative decrease in consumption by the workers, is the following:

"Such a state of affairs in the bourgeois countries, etc., renders the sale of goods produced in greater and greater quantities even more

difficult. Overproduction, with the resulting crises . . . and periods of stagnation . . . are the inevitable consequences. . . ."

It is clear that overproduction is not at all used here as the "basis of the explanation" of crises, but that the origin of crises and periods of stagnation is only described. In Comrade Sokolnikov's draft we read the following:

The development of the productive forces which is going on within these contradictory forms, in which the conditions of production are in conflict with the conditions of consumption, the conditions for the realisation of capital with the conditions for its accumulation—this development, the cardinal purpose of which is the pursuit of profits, has as its inevitable consequence acute industrial crises and depressions which signify the cessation of the sale of goods, anarchically produced in ever increasing quantities.

Comrade S. said precisely the same thing, because "the cessation of the sale of goods," produced in "ever increasing quantities," is exactly what we call overproduction. In vain does Comrade S. fear this word; there is nothing inaccurate in it. In vain does Comrade S. write that instead of "overproduction," "underproduction might be used, with as much or more accuracy."

Well, just try to call the "cessation of the sale of goods," "produced in ever increasing quantities" "underproduction"! It cannot be done.

Rodbertusism does not at all consist in the use of the word "over-production" (which alone exactly describes one of the profoundest contradictions of capitalism), but in the explanation of crises merely as the result of insufficient consumption by the working class. No, the old programme deduces crises not from insufficient consumption. It bases its explanation on "such a state of affairs in the bourgeois countries," as has been described in the preceding part of the programme and which consists of "technical progress" and of "the relative decrease in the demand for human labour power." Alongside of this the old programme speaks of "the ever growing competition on the world market."

Here something basic is said about the conflict of conditions for accumulation with conditions for realisation, and it said much more clearly. The theory is not at all "changed" here, as Comrade S. erroneously thinks, "to gain popularity," but is presented clearly and popularly; this is a virtue.

Of crises, to be sure, one could write volumes, one might give a more concrete analysis of the conditions of accumulation, speak of

the rôle of the means of production, of the transformation of surplus value and variable capital in the means of production into constant capital in articles of consumption, of the depreciation in constant capital due to new inventions, and so on, and so forth. But neither does Comrade S. make an effort to present all this!! His supposed correction of the programme consists only of the following:

- 1. Having preserved the plan of transition from the fourth to the fifth paragraph, from the reference to technical progress, etc., to crises, he weakened the connection between the two paragraphs by leaving out the words, "such a state of affairs."
- 2. He added theoretical-sounding phrases about the conflict of the conditions of production with the conditions of consumption, and the conditions for realisation with the conditions for accumulation—phrases which are not incorrect but which do not express a new thought, for the paragraph before gives the basis of it even more clearly.
- 3. He adds "the pursuit of profit"—an expression hardly becoming the programme, and which is used here, we suspect, precisely "to gain popularity," for the same thought is expressed several times in the phrases about "conditions for realisation" and production of "goods," etc.
- 4. He substitutes "depression" for "stagnation"; an unfortunate change.
- 5. He adds the word "anarchically" to the old text ("goods, anarchically produced in ever increasing quantities"). This addition is theoretically wrong, for "anarchicalness" or "planlessness," using an expression from the Erfurt Programme and contested by Engels, does not exactly characterise trusts.*

Here is how Comrade S. puts it:

... Goods are anarchically produced in ever increasing quantities. Efforts of capitalistic combines (trusts and the like) to prevent crises by limiting production end in failure. . . .

But it is by trusts that goods are not produced anarchically, but according to a system of accounting. Trusts not only "limit" production. They do not make any efforts to prevent crises; there

• Engels criticised the expressions "private production" and "planlessness" in the draft of the Erfurt Programme. He wrote: "If we go over from stock companies to trusts, which dominate and monopolise certain branches of industry, this thereby stops not only private production, but also planlessness." 127

can be no such "efforts" by trusts. Comrade S. is guilty of a host of inaccuracies. What should have been said was: although trusts produce goods not anarchically but according to a system of accounting, crises nevertheless cannot be averted because of the abovementioned characteristics of capitalism which also are inherent in the trusts. And if trusts, in periods of greatest prosperity and speculation, limit production in the sense of being careful "not to go too far," then at best they only succeed in saving the largest enterprises; but crises come just the same.

Summarising all that was said above on the question of crises, we come to the conclusion that Comrade S. has not improved upon the old programme. On the contrary, the new draft contains inaccuracies. The necessity for changing the old programme remains unproved.

IV

On the question of wars of an imperialist nature, the draft of Comrade S. commits theoretical transgressions in two respects.

First, he does not evaluate the present war. He says that the imperialist epoch generates imperialist wars. This is correct and should of course have been said in the programme. But this is not enough. Besides this it is necessary to say that the present war, 1914-1917, in particular is imperialist. The German group Spartacus in their "thesis" published in German, in 1915, advanced the proposition that in an era of imperialism, there cannot be any nationalist wars. This is obviously a wrong assertion, for imperialism makes the oppression of nations more acute and as a result of this, national revolts and nationalist wars (attempts to draw a line of demarcation between revolts and wars are doomed to failure) are not only possible and probable but downright inevitable.

Marxism demands an absolutely exact evaluation of each separate war on the basis of concrete data. To evade the question of the present war by resorting to general discussions, is wrong in theory and inadmissible in practice. This method is used by the opportunists, they hide behind it, they use it as a loop-hole. In general, they say, imperialism is an epoch of imperialist wars, but this war has not been wholly imperialist (thus argued, for instance, Kautsky).

Secondly, Comrade S. links "crises and wars," as if they were a two-in-one companion of capitalism in general, and of modern

capitalism in particular. In pages 20 and 21 of his Moscow pamphlet, Comrade S. repeats the "crises and wars" combination in his draft *three times*. Here it is not only a question of the undesirability of repetitions in the programme. It is also a question of incorrectness in principle.

Crises in the shape of overproduction, or "cessation of the sale of goods," if Comrade S. insists on banishing the word overproduction, are phenomena which are an exclusive property of capitalism. But wars are also characteristic of the slave and serf systems of economy. Imperialist wars also occurred on the basis of slavery (the war between Rome and Carthage was on both sides an imperialist war), 129 as well as in the middle ages and in the epoch of mercantile capitalism. Each war in which both warring sides oppress foreign countries or nationalities, fighting for the division of the loot, and for "who should oppress and rob more," cannot be called anything but imperialist.

If we should say that only modern capitalism, only imperialism, has brought with it imperialist wars, it would be correct, for the preceding stage of capitalism, the stage of free competition, or the stage of pre-monopoly capitalism, was characterised in Western Europe pre-eminently by nationalist wars. But should we say that in the preceding stage there were no imperialist wars at all, it would be incorrect. It would mean that we had forgotten the "colonial" wars, which are also imperialist. This is first of all.

And secondly, the linking up of "crises and wars" is particularly incorrect, for these are phenomena of entirely different kinds, different historical origin, and different class significance. For instance, one must not say, as Comrade S. says in his draft, that "both crises and wars, in turn, ruin the small producers still more, still more increase the dependence of hired labour on capital. . . ." For wars are possible which would be fought for the emancipation of hired labour from the voke of capitalism. In the course of the struggle of wage workers against the capitalist class, wars of a revolutionary and not only of a reactionary-imperialist nature are possible. "War is the continuation of the politics" of this or that class; and in every class society, slave, or feudal, or capitalist, there have been wars which continued the politics of the oppressing classes, but there have also been wars which continued the politics of the oppressed classes. This is exactly why one should not say, as Comrade S. says, that "crises and wars prove that the capitalist system changes from an agent for the development of productive forces into a hindrance to it."

That the present imperialist war, by its reactionary character and the hardships it entails, revolutionises the masses and accelerates the revolution, is true and should be emphasised. And that imperialist wars in general are typical of an imperialist epoch, is also true and may be mentioned. But this may not be said of all "wars" in general, and, moreover, under no circumstances should crises and wars be tied up together.

V

We must draw our conclusions on the chief question which, according to the unanimous decision of the Bolsheviks, should more than any other question be fully elucidated and evaluated in the new programme. Comrade S. maintains that such elucidation and evaluation could be more expediently given piecemeal, so to speak, dividing up the various characteristics of imperialism among various paragraphs of the programme. I think it would be more to the purpose to present it in a special paragraph or special part of the programme, by gathering together everything that there is to say about imperialism. The members of the party have both drafts now before them, and the conference shall decide. We are in full accord with Comrade S. in that imperialism must be dealt with. What we must find out is whether there are differences of opinion as to how imperialism should be elucidated and evaluated.

From this point of view let us examine the two drafts of the new programme. In my draft there are presented five main distinguishing features of imperialism: (1) capitalist monopoly combines; (2) the fusion of banking and industrial capital; (3) the export of capital into foreign countries; (4) the territorial partition of the globe, already completed; (5) the partition of the globe among international economic trusts. (In my pamphlet Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, which came out after the Materials Relating to the Revision of the Party Programme, these five distinguishing features of imperialism are cited.*) In Comrade Sokolnikov's draft we actually find the same five basic features, so that on matters of principle there is apparently complete agreement within our party—as was to be expected, for the practical agitation of our party with regard to this question, whether by word of mouth or in

^{*} See V. I. Lenin, War and Revolution, Collected Works, Vol. XIX.-Ed.

print, has long since, from the very beginning of the war, manifested the thorough unanimity of all the Bolsheviks on this fundamental question.

What is left to be examined is how the two drafts differ in the formulation of the definition and characterisation of imperialism. Both drafts point out concretely the moment which may be properly regarded as the one in which capitalism becomes transformed into imperialism. The necessity for such a statement in the interests of precision and correct historical evaluation of economic development would hardly be denied. Comrade S. says: "during the last quarter of a century"; I say: "approximately since the beginning of the twentieth century." In the above-mentioned pamphlet on imperialism, I have cited the testimony of one economist who has made a special study of cartels and syndicates. According to him, the turning point towards the complete victory of the cartels was the crisis of 1900-1903. That is why, it seems, it would be more accurate to say: "approximately since the beginning of the twentieth century" than "during the last quarter of a century." It would be more correct for still another reason. The specialist just cited, and all European economists in general, work with data supplied by Germany, and Germany was far ahead of other countries in the process of forming cartels.

Furthermore, of monopolies my draft says: "Capitalist monopoly combines have assumed decisive importance." Comrade S. calls attention to monopoly combines several times. Only once is he comparatively definite:

... During the last quarter of a century the direct and indirect control of capitalistically organised production has passed into the hands of all-powerful, interlocking banks, trusts and syndicates which have formed world-wide monopoly combines under the direction of a handful of magnates of finance capital.

Here, it appears, there is too much "propaganda." "To gain popularity" there is injected into the programme something that has no place there. In newspaper articles, in speeches, in popular pamphlets, "propaganda" is indispensable; the programme of a party, however, must be distinguished by its economical preciseness; it must contain nothing superfluous. The statement that "capitalist monopoly combines have assumed decisive importance" seems to me more exact; it says all that is necessary. Besides much superfluous matter, the above-quoted excerpt from Comrade Sokolnikov's draft

contains expressions questionable in theory, for instance, "control of capitalistically organised production." Is it only capitalistically organised? No. This is too weak. Even production not capitalistically organised—petty craftsmen, peasants, small cotton-growers in the colonies, etc., etc.—have become dependent on banks and finance capital in general. If we speak of "world capitalism" in general (and this is the only kind of capitalism we can discuss here without falling into error), then by saying that a "decisive importance" was assumed by capitalist monopoly combines, we do not exclude any producers from this decisive importance. To limit the influence of monopoly combines to "capitalistically organised production" is incorrect.

Furthermore, in his draft, Comrade S. speaks twice of the rôle played by banks: once in the above-quoted excerpt, and a second time in the paragraph dealing with crises and wars, where he defines finance capital as "the product of a fusion of industrial and banking capital." My draft says that "enormously concentrated banking capital has fused with industrial capital." To say it once in the programme is sufficient.

The third characteristic: "the export of capital into foreign countries has grown to colossal dimensions" (thus reads my draft). In Comrade Sokolnikov's draft, we find one simple reference to the "export of capital" in one place, while in another place, and in an entirely different connection, we read of "new countries which are fields for the exploitation of capital in search of super-profits." It is difficult for us to accept the assertion regarding super-profits and new countries. The export of capital has also taken place from Germany into Italy, from France into Switzerland, etc. Under imperialism, capital has begun to be imported into the old countries as well, and not for super-profits only. What is true with regard to the new countries is not true with regard to the export of capital in general.

The fourth characteristic is what Hilferding has called "the struggle for economic territory." This title is not exact, for it does not give the main distinguishing feature of modern imperialism as compared to the older forms of the struggle for economic territory. Ancient Rome fought for such territories; the kingdoms of sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe fought for and conquered colonies; also old Russia in her conquest of Siberia, etc. The distinguishing feature of modern imperialism is the fact (as pointed out in my

draft) that "the whole globe has been territorially partitioned among the richest countries," *i.e.*, the partitioning of the earth among various states has been completed. This circumstance is the cause of the sharp conflicts for a re-partitioning of the globe, and is the cause of sharp collisions which lead to war.

All this is expressed in Comrade Sokolnikov's draft with great prolixity but hardly with theoretical accuracy. But before I quote his statement of the case, I will first touch upon the last characteristic of imperialism, i.e., the economic partitioning of the globe. Here is how this is expressed in my draft: "The economic partitioning of the world among international trusts has begun." The data of political economy and statistics do not warrant any more elaborate statement. This partitioning of the world is a very important process, but it has just begun. Imperialist wars due to this partitioning, or rather re-partitioning of the world, come about once the territorial division is complete, i.e., when there are no more "free" lands that can be grabbed without war with a rival nation.

Let us see now how Comrade S. formulates this part of the programme:

But the realm of capitalist relations becomes ever wider; it is carried across boundaries, into new lands. These lands serve the capitalists as markets for goods, as sources of raw materials, as fields for the utilisation of capital in search of super-profits. The vast accumulation of surplus value at the disposal of finance capital (a product of the fusion of industrial and banking capital) is dumped upon the markets of the world. The rivalry of powerful nationally and at times internationally organised combines of capitalists for the supremacy of the market, for the possession of the control of territories of weaker countries, i.e., for the exclusive right to oppress them mercilessly, inevitably leads to attempts at dividing up the whole world among the richest capitalist countries, to imperialist wars, which generate universal suffering, ruin, and degeneration.

Here we have too many words, covering up a series of theoretical errors. One cannot speak of "attempts" at dividing up the world, because the world has already been divided up. The war of 1914-1917 is not "an attempt at dividing up the world," but a struggle for the re-partitioning of a world already divided. The war became inevitable for capitalism, because a few years before it imperialism divided up the world according to evaluations of force which are now out of date, and which are now being "rectified" by the war.

The struggle for colonies (for "new lands"), and the struggle for "the possession of territories of weaker countries," all existed

before imperialism. Modern imperialism is characterised by something else, namely, by the fact that at the beginning of the twentieth century the whole earth was divided up and occupied by various countries. That is why the re-partition could only take place at the price of a world war. "Internationally organised capitalist combines" existed also before imperialism. Every joint-stock company with a membership of capitalists from various countries is an "internationally organised capitalist combine."

Something quite different, something which did not exist before the twentieth century, is the distinguishing feature of imperialism, namely, the economic partitioning of the world among international trusts, the partitioning of countries, by agreement, into spheres of influence. This particular point has not been expressed in the draft of Comrade S., so that the power of imperialism is represented as much weaker than it really is.

Finally, it is theoretically incorrect to speak of the dumping upon the world market of accumulated surplus value. This reminds one of Proudhon's theory of realisation, according to which capitalists may easily realise on fixed and on variable capital, but find themselves in difficulties when it comes to realising on surplus value. As a matter of fact capitalists cannot realise without difficulties and crises either on surplus value or on variable and fixed capital. Goods are dumped upon the market which are not only accumulated value, but also value reproducing variable capital and fixed capital. For instance, stocks of rails or iron are thrown into the world market, and are expected to be exchanged for articles consumed by the workers, or in other means of production (wood, oil, etc.).

VI

Having thus concluded our analysis of Comrade Sokolnikov's draft, we must note one very valuable addition which he proposes and which in my opinion should be adopted and even extended. To the paragraph which deals with technical progress and the growth of the employment of woman and child labour, he proposes to add the phrase "as well as the labour of unskilled foreign workers imported from backward countries." This addition is valuable and necessary. The exploitation of worse paid labour from backward countries is particularly characteristic of imperialism. On this exploitation rests, to a certain degree, the parasitism of rich

imperialist countries which bribe a part of their workers with higher wages while shamelessly exploiting without limit the labour of "cheap" foreign workers. To the words "worse paid" should be added the words "and frequently deprived of rights"; for the exploiters from civilised countries always take advantage of the fact that the imported foreign workers have no rights. This may be observed in Germany with regard to the workers imported from Russia; in Switzerland, to Italians; in France, to Spaniards and Italians, etc.

It would be more expedient, perhaps, to emphasise more strongly and to express more vividly in our programme the prominence of the little group consisting of the richest imperialist countries which parasitically prosper by robbing colonies and weak nations. This is an extremely important characteristic of imperialism. To a certain extent it facilitates the rise of powerful revolutionary movements in countries subjected to imperialist plunder, and in danger of being crushed and partitioned by the giant imperialists (such as Russia). On the other hand, this future of imperialism tends to a certain extent to prevent the rise of profound revolutionary movements in countries which prosper on the imperialist exploitation of many colonies and foreign lands; thus allowing a (comparatively) very large portion of the population in such countries to participate in the division of the imperialist loot.

I would therefore suggest that the point which calls attention to the exploitation of a number of weak countries by the richest ones should be inserted in that section of my draft where social-chauvinism is depicted.* The corresponding passage in the draft would then assume the following form (the additions are in italics):

Such a perversion is, on the one hand, the tendency toward social-chauvinism, Socialism in words, chauvinism in deeds, the use of the slogan "national defence" for the purpose of protecting the predatory interests of "their own" national bourgeoisie by means of imperialist war; for the purpose of maintaining the privileged position of citizens of rich nations which make enormous profits by pillaging colonies and weak nations. On the other hand, the equally wide and international movement of the "centre," etc.

It is necessary to add the words "by means of imperialist war" for greater accuracy. "National defence" is nothing but a slogan to justify war, to recognise it as legitimate and just. There are all

^{*} See V. I. Lenin, The Revolution of 1917, Collected Works, Vol. XX, Book I, p. 336.—Ed.

kinds of wars. There may be also revolutionary wars. We must therefore say precisely what we mean: imperialist war. This is of course implied, but to avoid misinterpretation, it must not be implied, but stated directly and clearly.

VII

From the general or theoretical part of the programme we shall now turn to the minimum programme. Here we at once encounter the ostensibly "very radical" but really very groundless proposal of Comrades N. Bukharin and V. Smirnov 130 completely to throw out the minimum programme. The division, they claim, into maximum programme and minimum programme is out of date. What need of it, once we speak of a transition into Socialism? We need no minimum programme. Our programme must concentrate on transitional measures towards Socialism.

This is the proposal of these two comrades. For some reason, they have not ventured to offer their own draft (although since the revision of the party programme was on the agenda of the next conference of the party, these comrades have really been under the obligation to work out such a draft). It is possible that the authors of the ostensibly "radical" proposal have themselves halted in indecision. . . . Whatever the case may be, their opinion should be examined.

War and economic ruin have forced all countries to advance from monopoly capitalism to state-monopoly capitalism. This is the situation objectively. In a revolutionary period, however, state-monopoly capitalism is directly transformed into Socialism. During a revolution it is impossible to move forward without moving towards Socialism—this is the objective situation created by war and revolution. It was taken cognisance of by our April Conference, which put forward the slogans, "a Soviet Republic" (the political form of the dictatorship of the proletariat), and the nationalisation of banks and syndicates (a basic measure in the transition towards Socialism). Up to this point all the Bolsheviks unanimously agree. But Comrades Smirnov and Bukharin want to go farther, to completely throw out the minimum programme. This is contrary to the wise counsel of the wise proverb, "Do not boast when riding to battle; boast when you return from it."

We are riding to battle, that is, we are fighting for the conquest

by our party of political power. This power would be the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest peasants. In taking this power, we are not at all afraid of stepping beyond the boundaries of the bourgeois system; on the contrary, we declare clearly, directly, precisely, and openly that we shall step beyond these boundaries, that we shall fearlessly march towards Socialism, that our road shall be through a Soviet Republic, through nationalisation of banks and syndicates, through workers' control, through universal labour duty, through nationalisation of the land, confiscation of the landowners' livestock and implements, etc. In this sense we drafted our programme of transitional measures towards Socialism.

But we must not boast when riding to battle, we must not discard the minimum programme, for this would be equivalent to an empty boast: we do not wish to "demand anything from the bourgeoisie," we are determined to realise everything ourselves, we do not wish to work on petty details within the framework of bourgeois society.

This would be an empty boast, because first of all we must win power, which has not yet been won. We must first realise the transitional measures towards Socialism, we must bring our revolution to the triumph of the universal Socialist revolution, and only then, "returning from battle," may we discard the minimum programme as of no further use.

Is it possible to guarantee now that the minimum programme is not needed any more? Of course not, for the simple reason that we have not yet won power, that Socialism has not yet been realised, and that we have not yet reached the world-wide Socialist revolution,

We must firmly, courageously, and without hesitation advance towards our goal, but it is ludicrous to declare that we have reached it. Discarding the minimum programme would be equivalent to declaring, to announcing (to bragging, in simple language) that we have already conquered.

No, dear comrades, we have not yet conquered.

We do not know whether our victory will come tomorrow or a little later. (I personally am inclined to think that it will be tomorrow—I am writing this on October 19, 1917—and that there is danger of being too late in our seizure of power; still, tomorrow is tomorrow and not today.) We do not know how soon after our victory revolution will sweep the West. We do not know whether or not our victory will be followed by temporary periods of reaction and the victory of the counter-revolution—there is nothing impos-

sible in that—and therefore, after our victory, we shall build a "triple line of trenches" against such a contingency.

All this we do not know and cannot know. No one is in a position to know. It is therefore ridiculous to discard the minimum programme, which is indispensable while we still live within the framework of bourgeois society, while we have not yet destroyed this framework, not yet realised the basic prerequisites for a transition to Socialism, not yet smashed the enemy, the bourgeoisie, and even if we have smashed them we have not yet annihilated them. All this will come, and perhaps much sooner than many people think (I personally think that it will begin tomorrow), but it has not come yet.

Take the minimum programme in the political sphere. This programme is limited to the bourgeois republic. We add that we do not confine ourselves to its limits, we start forth immediately upon a struggle for a higher type of republic, a Soviet Republic. This we must do. With unshakable courage and determination we must advance towards the new republic. But the minimum programme should under no circumstances be discarded, for, first of all, there is as yet no Soviet Republic; secondly, the possibility of "attempts at restoration" is not yet eliminated—the latter must be first outlived and vanquished; thirdly, during the transition from the old to the new, temporary "combined types" (as Rabochy Put has correctly pointed out) are possible—for instance, a Soviet Republic together with a Constituent Assembly.¹⁸¹ Let us first get it over with; then we will have time to discard the minimum programme.

The same in the economic sphere. We all agree that the fear of marching towards Socialism is the most contemptible treason to the cause of the proletariat. We all agree that among the first and cardinal steps to be taken must be measures such as the nationalisation of banks and syndicates. Let us first realise this and other similar measures, and then we shall see. Then we shall be able to see better, for practical experience will widen our horizon immeasurably, which is worth a million times more than the best of programmes. It is possible, and even probable, nay, indubitable, that without transitional "combined types" the change will not take place. For instance, petty economies with one or two hired labourers could not be nationalised or subjected to immediate workers' control at short notice. Their rôle would be insignificant, it is true; they would be bound hand and foot by the nationalisation of banks and trusts,

but so long as there still are even small cases of bourgeois relations, why dispense with the minimum programme? As Marxists, daring to carry on the greatest revolution in the world, but at the same time taking sober accounts of the facts, we have no right to dispense with the minimum programme.

By letting it go we should prove that before we have conquered we have already lost our heads. And we must not lose our heads either before our victory, or during our victory, or after it; for if we lose our heads, we lose everything.

In his concrete proposals Comrade Bukharin said nothing essentially new. He only repeated what had been said long before concerning the nationalisation of banks and syndicates. Comrade Smirnov in his article offered a very interesting and instructive series of exemplary reforms. These may be reduced to the regulation of production and consumption of commodities. In a general way all this is contained in my draft, followed by an "etc." To go further, to venture into a discussion of separate and concrete measures, seems to me inexpedient. After the basic measures of the new type have been taken, after the nationalisation of banks, after the beginning of workers' control, many things will become clearer; experience will teach us a great deal, for it will be the experience of millions, the experience in building a new order of society with the conscious participation of millions. It stands to reason that the pointing out of the new, the developing of plans, their evaluation, the working over of the local and partial experiences of various supply committees and soviets, etc., is all very useful work. But to inject into the programme an overdose of detail is premature and may become even harmful by tying our hands with details. Our hands must be free so that we may build the new with greater vigour, once we have fully entered upon the new path.

VIII

Comrade Bukharin's article touches upon another question worthy of consideration.

... The question of the revision of our party programme should be bound up with the question of working out a single programme for the international party of the proletariat.

This is not very clearly expressed. If we take it to mean that the author advises us not to accept a new programme until a single international programme, a programme of the Third International, is established, then we should have to object to this opinion most decisively. To postpone it on this account (I presume that there are no other reasons for delay: no one, for instance, demanded a postponement on account of inadequate preparation for the revision of our party materials) would be equivalent to our delaying the establishment of the Third International. The establishment of the Third International ought not of course to be understood formally. Not until the proletarian revolution has triumphed in at least one country, or until the war has come to an end, may we hope for a speedy and successful movement towards the convoking of a great conference of revolutionary internationalist parties of various countries; nor for their consent to a formal adoption of a new programme. In the meanwhile we must advance our cause on the initiative of those parties which are now more favourably situated than the others and are in a position to take the first step-not viewing it, to be sure, as the last step, not opposing necessarily their programme to other "Left" (i.e., revolutionary internationalist) programmes, but working directly towards the formulation of a general programme. Outside of Russia there is at present not a country in the world where there is comparative freedom for internationalists to meet, and where there are so many comrades well informed on subjects concerning international movements and programmes as there are in our party. This is why we must take the initiative upon ourselves. This is our immediate duty as internationalists.

Apparently Comrade Bukharin views this matter in exactly the same way. At the beginning of the article he says that "the party conference which has just been concluded" (it was written in August) "recognised the necessity of revising the programme" and that "a special conference will be called for this purpose." We conclude from this that Comrade Bukharin has no objections to the adoption of a new programme.¹⁸²

If so, then we have perfect unanimity on this question. Hardly any one would be against the proposition that our conference, upon adopting a new programme, express a desire to create a general programme for the Third International, and take certain steps in that direction, for instance, the hastening of the conference of the Lefts, the publication of a collection of articles in several languages, the forming of a committee for the purpose of collecting material

dealing with what has been done in other countries and for the purpose of "feeling out" (according to the correct expression of Comrade Bukharin) a way for a new programme (the "Tribunists" 188 in Holland, the Lefts in Germany). The Socialist Propaganda League in America 184 has already been mentioned by Comrade Bukharin; we may also mention the American Socialist Labour Party and its demand that "the political state give way to industrial democracy." 185

Comrade Bukharin has pointed out a flaw in my draft which I must acknowledge to be absolutely correct. He cites a passage in the draft " where I discuss the present moment in Russia, the capitalist Provisional Government, etc. Comrade Bukharin is right in criticising this passage and saying that it should be transferred to the resolution on tactics or into the platform. I therefore propose either to leave out the last paragraph altogether, or to put it as follows:

Striving for a system of state organisation which would best secure economic progress and the rights of the people as a whole, and also make the transition to Socialism as painless as possible, the party of the proletariat cannot confine itself, etc.

Finally, one question raised by a few comrades, but not yet discussed in the press, should be taken up here. This is the question of § 9 of our political programme, on the right of nations to selfdetermination. 186 This point consists of two parts: the first part is a new statement of the right to self-determination; the second contains not a demand but a declaration. The question is whether a declaration is in place here. Generally speaking, there is no place for declarations in a programme. Here, however, an exception to the rule is necessary. Instead of the word self-determination, which caused numerous misinterpretations, I propose the perfectly precise concept: "the right of free secession." After a half year's revolutionary experience of 1917, it is hardly possible to dispute that the party of the revolutionary proletariat of Russia, the party which uses the Great Russian language, is obliged to recognise the right of smaller nations to secede. If we win power, we shall immediately and unconditionally recognise this right with regard to Finland, the Ukraine, Armenia, and any other nationality oppressed by tsarism

See V. I. Lenin, The Revolution of 1917, Collected Works, Vol. XX, Book I, p. 336.—Ed.

(and the Great Russian bourgeoisie). On the other hand, we do not at all want secession. We want as vast a state, as close a tie, as great a number of nations who are neighbours of the Great Russians. as possible; we desire this in the interests of democracy and Socialism, in the interests of attracting into the struggle of the proletariat the greatest possible number of toilers from different nations. We desire revolutionary-proletarian unity, unification, and not secession. We desire revolutionary unification: that is why our slogan does not call for unification of all states in general, for the social revolution demands the unification only of those states which have gone over or are going over to Socialism, colonies which are gaining their freedom, etc. We want free unification; that is why we are obliged to recognise the right to secede (without freedom of secession, unification cannot be called free). We are the more obliged to recognise the right of secession, for the reason that tsarism and the Great Russian bourgeoisie have left by their oppression an abyss of bitterness and distrust of the Great Russians generally in the hearts of the neighbouring nations, and this must be eradicated by deeds and not by words.

But we want unification, and this must be stated. It is so important to say this in the programme of a party within a heterogeneous state that to get it in it is necessary to abandon custom and to incorporate a declaration. We want the republic of the Russian (I am even inclined to say Great Russian, for this is more correct) people to attract other nations to it. But how? Not by violence, but solely by voluntary agreement. Otherwise the unity and the brotherly ties of the workers of all countries are broken. In contradistinction to the bourgeois democrats, we call for the brotherhood of workers of all nationalities, and not the brotherhood of nations, for we do not trust the bourgeoisie of all countries; we regard them as our enemies.

This is why we should allow here an exception to the rule by inserting in § 9 a declaration of principles.

IX

The foregoing pages were written before No. 31 of Rabochy Put appeared with Comrade J. Larin's article "The Labour Demands of Our Programme." 187 We hail this article as the beginning of discussion of the various programme drafts by our central organ.

Comrade Larin dwells especially on that section of the programme which I had no occasion to work upon, and the draft for which is in the possession of the editors of the "Sub-section of Labour Protection," the sub-section formed at the conference of May 7-12, 1917.¹³⁸ Comrade Larin proposes a series of additions which seem to me quite acceptable but which, I am sorry to say, are not always very well expressed.

One point is particularly ineptly formulated by Comrade Larin: "The correct (?) distribution of working forces on the basis (?) of democratic (?) self-government by the workers in the distribution (?) of their persons (?)." In my opinion this is worse than the formulation of the sub-section: "The organisations for the distribution of labour must be proletarian class organisations," etc. Moreover, the problem of a minimum wage should have been gone into much more thoroughly. His proposition should have been formulated with greater exactness, and should have been related to the history of the views of Marx and Marxism on this subject.

Furthermore, Comrade Larin thinks that the political and agrarian parts of the programme should have been "more carefully edited." We do hope that our party press forthwith begins to discuss the question of editing this or that demand, without waiting for the conference, for, firstly, otherwise we shall not have a well prepared conference, and secondly, every one who has had occasion to work over programmes and resolutions knows how often a careful editing of a certain point discloses and eliminates vagueness and disagreements of principle.

Finally, concerning the financial and economic part of the programme, Comrade Larin writes that "instead of it, there is an almost vacant space. There is not even a reference to the annulment of war debts, and the debts contracted by tsarism" (only tsarism?), "the struggle against the fiscal utilisation of state monopolies, etc." It is extremely desirable for Comrade Larin not to postpone his proposals in anticipation of the conference. He should bring them up immediately, else we shall not be sufficiently prepared for the conference. In the question of the annulment of state debts (and of course, not only those of tsarism, but also those of the bourgeoisie) we must thoroughly thrash out the question of small bondholders. As to the question about "the struggle against the fiscal utilisation of state monopolies," we must consider the state of affairs in the case of monopoly of the production of articles of luxury,

and the connection of the proposed point with the demands of the programme for the abolition of all indirect taxes.

I repeat: in order seriously to prepare our programme, to insure the actual co-operation of the entire party, all those interested must immediately get busy and publish their suggestions as well as their precise drafts of points already edited, containing additions and changes.

Written October 19-21, 1917. Published in the magazine Prosveshcheniye, Nos. 1-2, October, 1917.

ADVICE FROM AN OUTSIDER *

I AM writing these lines on October 21, and I have little hope that they will be in the hands of the Petrograd comrades before the 22nd. It is possible that they will arrive too late, for the Congress of the Northern Soviets has been fixed for October 23. However, I shall try to give my "advice from an outsider," in case the anticipated action of the workers and soldiers of Petrograd and vicinity will take place soon, but has not yet taken place.

That all power must pass to the Soviets is clear. It must also be beyond dispute for every Bolshevik that the revolutionary-proletarian (or Bolshevik, which is now the same thing) power is guaranteed the greatest sympathy and the most loyal support of all the toilers and exploited of all the world in general, in the belligerent countries in particular, and above all among the Russian peasantry. It is not worth while to dwell on these truths that are too well known and have long since been proven.

We must dwell on that which is not quite clear to all the workers, namely, that the passing of power to the Soviets means at present in reality an armed uprising. This would seem self-evident, but not every one has been and is giving earnest thought to this. To renounce an armed uprising at present would mean to renounce the chief slogan of Bolshevism ("All Power to the Soviets") and all revolutionary-proletarian internationalism generally.

Armed uprising, however, is a special kind of political struggle, subject to special laws, to which we must give our serious attention. Karl Marx expressed this truth in a remarkably striking manner when he wrote that the armed "uprising, like war, is an art."

As the chief rules applicable to this art Marx advanced the following:

- 1. Never play at uprising, but once it is begun, remember firmly that you have to go to the very end.
- 2. It is necessary to gather a great preponderance of forces in a decisive place at a decisive moment, else the enemy, being in a

^{*} Being forced to live in hiding, and unable to be personally present at the Bolshevik meetings and conferences, Lenin had to depend on correspondence as the means of contact with the Central Committee.—Ed.

position of better preparation and organisation, will annihilate the insurgents.

- 3. Once the uprising has been begun, one must act with the greatest decisiveness, one must take the offensive, absolutely, and under all circumstances. "Defence is the death of an armed uprising."
- 4. One must strive to take the enemy by surprise, to take advantage of a moment when his troops are scattered.
- 5. One must try daily for at least small successes (one may even say hourly, when it is a question of one city), thus maintaining under all circumstances a "moral superiority."

Marx summarised the lessons of all revolutions concerning the armed uprising in the words of the greatest master of revolutionary tactics in history, Danton: "Audacity, more audacity, and still more audacity."

Applied to Russia and to October, 1917, this means a simultaneous offensive, as sudden and swift as possible, on Petrograd, by all means, from inside and from outside, from the workers' section and from Finland, Reval, and Cronstadt, an offensive by the whole fleet, the accumulation of a gigantic preponderance of forces over the fifteen to twenty thousand (perhaps even more) of our "bourgeois guard" (military cadets), our "Vendée troops" (a part of the Cossacks), etc.

Combine our three main forces: the fleet, the workers, and the army units, so as surely to occupy and hold, no matter what the cost:
(a) the telephone exchange; (b) the main telegraph office; (c) the railroad stations; and above all (d) the bridges.

Pick the most resolute elements (our "shock" elements and the young workers; and also the best sailors) into small detachments, to occupy all the most important points, and to participate everywhere, in all the important operations, for instance:

Surrounding Petrograd and cutting it off, taking it by a combined attack by the fleet, the workers, and the army—this is a task which demands art and triple daring.

Forming detachments from the best workers with rifles and bombs, to advance and surround the "centres of the enemy" (the military schools, the telegraph and telephone centres, etc.); their watchword must be: Let all die, but do not allow the enemy to pass.

Let us hope that in case the action is decided upon the leaders

will successfully apply the great teachings of Danton and Marx.

The success of both the Russian and the world revolution depends upon two or three days of struggle.

AN OUTSIDER.

Written October 21, 1917. First published in Pravda, No. 250, November 7, 1920.

A LETTER TO BOLSHEVIK COMRADES PARTICIPATING IN THE REGIONAL CONGRESS OF THE SOVIETS OF THE NORTHERN REGION 199

COMRADES! Our revolution is passing through a highly critical time. This crisis coincides with the great crisis of a growing worldwide Socialist revolution and of a struggle against it by world imperialism. The responsible leaders of our party are confronted with a gigantic task; if they do not carry it out, it will mean a total collapse of the internationalist proletarian movement. The situation is such that delay truly means death.

Look at the international situation. The growth of an international revolution is beyond dispute. The outburst of indignation among the Czech workers has been suppressed with unbelievable brutality, which indicates that the government is extremely frightened. In Italy things have come to a mass upheaval in Turin. Most important, however, is the mutiny in the German navy. You must picture to yourselves the enormous difficulties of a revolution in a country like Germany, especially under the present circumstances. It cannot be doubted that the mutiny in the German navy is a sign of the great crisis of the rising world revolution. While our chauvinists who preach Germany's defeat demand a sudden rising of the German workers, we Russian revolutionary internationalists know from the experience of 1905-1917 that one cannot imagine a more imposing sign of a rising revolution than a mutiny among the troops.

Think of what position we now find ourselves in before the German revolutionists. They can tell us, "We have one Liebknecht who openly called for a revolution. His voice has been stifled behind iron bars. We have not a single paper openly to bring out the necessity of a revolution; we have no freedom of assembly. We have not a single Soviet of Workers' or Soldiers' Deputies. Our voice hardly reaches the real broad masses. Still, we have made an attempt at uprising, having perhaps one chance in a hundred. But you, Russian revolutionary internationalists, have behind you half a year of free propaganda; you have a score of papers;

you have a number of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies; you have gained the upper hand in the Soviets of both capitals; you have on your side the entire Baltic fleet and all the Russian troops in Finland, and still you do not respond to our call for an uprising, you do not overthrow your imperialist Kerensky when you have ninety-nine chances in a hundred of seeing your uprising victorious."

Yes, we shall be real betrayers of the International if, at such a moment, under such favourable conditions, we reply to such a call of the German revolutionists by mere resolutions.

Add to it that we all know perfectly well of the rapid growth of plotting and conspiracy of the international imperialists against the Russian Revolution. To stifle it at any price, to stifle it both by military measures and by a peace at the expense of Russia—this is what international imperialism approaches ever closer. This is what particularly sharpens the crisis of a world-wide Socialist revolution; this is what renders our hesitancy in the matter of an uprising particularly dangerous—I would almost say criminal.

Take, further, the internal situation of Russia. The bankruptcy of the petty-bourgeois conciliation parties that express the unconscious confidence of the masses in Kerensky and the imperialists in general, is an obvious fact. That bankruptcy is complete. voting of the Soviet delegation at the Democratic Conference against a coalition, the voting of a majority of local Soviets of Peasant Deputies (in spite of their Central Soviet where the Avksentyevs and other friends of Kerensky's are seated) against a coalition, the elections in Moscow where the working population is closest to the peasantry and where over 49 per cent voted for the Bolsheviks (and among the soldiers fourteen out of seventeen thousand)—doesn't all this mean a total collapse of the confidence of the masses of the people in Kerensky and the conciliators headed by Kerensky and Co.? Can you imagine that the masses of the people could say still more clearly than they said to the Bolsheviks by this vote, "Lead us, we'll follow you"?

And we, having thus won the majority of the masses of the people to our side, having conquered the Soviets of both the capitals, shall we wait? What for? Wait till Kerensky and his Kornilovist generals deliver Petrograd to the Germans, thus entering, directly or indirectly, openly or covertly, into a conspiracy both with

Buchanan and Wilhelm to completely stifle the Russian Revolution?

That the people, by the Moscow vote and by the re-elections to the Soviets, have expressed confidence in us, is not the whole story. There are signs of a growing apathy and indifference. This is easily understood. It means, not an ebbing of the revolution, as the Cadets and their henchmen declare, but an ebbing of confidence in resolutions and elections. In a revolution, the masses demand of the leading parties action, not words; victories in the struggle, not talk. The moment is drawing near when the opinion may develop among the people that the Bolsheviks are no better than the others, since they do not know how to act when confidence in them is expressed. . . .

Throughout the whole country, the peasant uprising is flaring up. It is perfectly clear that the Cadets and their satellites are minimising it in every way, reducing it, as they do, to "pogroms" and "anarchy." This lie is refuted by the fact that, in the centres of the uprising, the land is given over to the peasants; never have "pogroms" and "anarchy" led to such splendid political results! The tremendous power of the peasant uprising is proven by the fact that both the conciliators and the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the Dyelo Naroda, and even Breshko-Breshkovskaya have begun to speak of giving the land to the peasants, in order to stop the movement before it has engulfed them.¹⁴¹

Shall we wait until the Cossack units of the Kornilovist Kerensky (who just now has been exposed as a Kornilovist by the S.-R.'s themselves) have succeeded in suppressing this peasant uprising piecemeal?

It seems that many leaders of our party have not noticed the specific meaning of that slogan which we all recognised and repeated without end. This slogan is, "All Power to the Soviets." There were periods, there were moments during a half year of revolution, when this slogan did not mean uprising. Those periods and those moments seem to have blinded some of our comrades and made them forget that, at present and for us, at least beginning from the middle of September, this slogan is tantamount to a call to uprising.

There can be not the shadow of a doubt about this. The *Dyelo Naroda* recently explained this "in a popular way" when it said: "Kerensky will never submit!" Of course not!

The slogan, "All Power to the Soviets!" is nothing but a call to

uprising. The blame will fall on us, fully and unconditionally, if we, who for months have called the masses to uprising, to repudiating conciliation, fail to lead those masses to an uprising on the eve of a collapse of the revolution, after the masses have expressed their confidence in us.

The Cadets and conciliators try to scare us with the example of July 16-18, with the growth of Black Hundred propaganda. etc. Still, if any mistake was made on July 16-18, it was only that we did not seize power. I think that this was not a mistake at that time, for at that time we were not yet in a majority; at present, however, this would be a fatal mistake, it would be worse than a mistake. The growth of Black Hundred propaganda is easily understood as a sharpening of the extremes in the atmosphere of a developing proletarian and peasant revolution. But to make of this an argument against an uprising is ridiculous, for the impotence of the Black Hundreds, bribed by the capitalists, the impotence of the Black Hundreds in the struggle, does not even require any proof. In a struggle, Kornilov and Kerensky can have the support only of the "Wild Division" and the Cossacks. At present, demoralisation has set in also among the Cossacks: besides, the peasants are threatening them with civil war within their Cossack territories.

I am writing these lines on Sunday, October 21. You will read them not earlier than October 23. I have heard from a passing comrade that people travelling on the Warsaw railroad say, "Kerensky is leading the Cossacks to Petrograd"! This is perfectly plausible, and it will be our direct fault if we do not verify it carefully and study the strength and the distribution of the Kornilovist troops of the second draft.

Kerensky has again brought the Kornilovist troops before Petrograd in order to prevent the passing of power to the Soviets, in order to prevent the immediate offer of peace by this power, to prevent giving the whole land to the peasantry immediately, in order to deliver Petrograd to the Germans while he himself runs off to Moscow! This is the slogan of the uprising which we must circulate as widely as possible and which will have tremendous success.

We must not wait for the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which the Central Executive Committee may postpone till November; we must not tarry, meanwhile allowing Kerensky to bring up still more Kornilovist troops. Finland, the fleet, and Reval are represented at the Congress of Soviets. Those, together, can bring about an immediate movement towards Petrograd and against the Kornilovist regiments, a movement of the fleet, the artillery, the machine guns and two or three army corps, such as have proven in Vyborg all their hatred for the Kornilovist generals with whom Kerensky is again in collusion.

It would be the greatest error if we failed to seize the opportunity to break up at once the Kornilovist regiments of the second draft, for fear that, in leaving for Petrograd, the Baltic fleet might expose the front to the Germans. The slanderous Kornilovists will say this, as they will tell any lie at all, but it is not worthy of revolutionists to be frightened by lies and slander. Kerensky will deliver Petrograd to the Germans, this is now as clear as daylight; no assertion to the contrary can shake our full conviction that it is so, because it follows from the entire course of events and from all of Kerensky's policies.

Kerensky and the Kornilovists will deliver Petrograd to the Germans. In order to save Petrograd, Kerensky must be overthrown and power must be seized by the Soviets of both capitals. These Soviets will immediately offer peace to all the peoples and thereby fulfil their duty before the German revolutionists; they will thereby make a decisive step towards frustrating the criminal conspiracies against the Russian Revolution, the conspiracies of international imperialism.

Only the immediate movement of the Baltic fleet, of the Finnish troops, of Reval and Kronstadt against the Kornilovist troops near Petrograd, is capable of saving the Russian and the world revolution. Such a movement has ninety-nine chances in a hundred of bringing about within a few days the surrender of one section of the Cossack troops, the destruction of another section, and the overthrow of Kerensky, since the workers and the soldiers of both capitals will support such a movement.

Delay means death.

The slogan, "All Power to the Soviets!" is a slogan of uprising. Whoever uses this slogan without meaning uprising, without considering uprising, let him blame himself. We must be able to treat uprising as an art—on this I insisted during the Democratic Conference, on this I insist now, because this is what Marxism teaches us, this is what the present situation in Russia and in the whole world teaches us.

It is not a question of voting, of attracting the "Left Socialist-

Revolutionaries," of gaining additional provincial Soviets, of holding the congress. It is a question of an uprising which can and must be decided by Petrograd, Moscow, Helsingfors, Cronstadt, Vyborg and Reval. Near Petrograd and in Petrograd—this is where this uprising can and must be decided upon and carried out as earnestly as possible, with as much preparation as possible, as quickly as possible, as energetically as possible.

The fleet, Cronstadt, Vyborg, Reval, can and must advance on Petrograd, crush the Kornilov regiments, arouse both capitals, start a mass agitation for a power which would immediately give the land to the peasants, immediately offer peace, overthrow Kerensky's government, create such a power.

Delay means death.

N. LENIN.

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MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.-D.L.P., OCTOBER 23, 1917 142

EXCERPTS FROM THE MINUTES

T

LENIN states that since the beginning of September a certain indifference towards the question of uprising has been noted. He says that this is inadmissible, if we earnestly raise the slogan of seizure of power by the Soviets. It is, therefore, high time to turn attention to the technical side of the question. Much time has obviously been lost.

Nevertheless, the question is very urgent and the decisive moment is near.

The international situation is such that we must take the initiative. What is being planned, surrendering as far as Narva and even as far as Petrograd, compels us still more to take decisive action.

The political situation is also effectively working in this direction. On July 16-18, decisive action on our part would have been defeated because we had no majority with us. Since then, our upsurge has been making gigantic strides.

The absenteeism and the indifference of the masses can be explained by the fact that the masses are tired of words and resolutions.

The majority is now with us. Politically, the situation has become entirely ripe for the transfer of power.

The agrarian movement also goes in this direction, for it is clear that enormous efforts are needed to subdue this movement. The slogan of transferring the entire land has become the general slogan of the peasants. The political background is thus ready. It is necessary to speak of the technical side. This is the whole matter. Meanwhile we, together with the defensists, are inclined to consider a systematic preparation for an uprising as something like a political sin.

To wait for the Constituent Assembly, which will obviously not be for us, is senseless, because it would make our task more complex. We must utilise the regional congress and the proposal from Minsk 148 to begin decisive action.

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II

RESOLUTION

THE Central Committee recognises that the international situation of the Russian Revolution (the mutiny in the navy in Germany as the extreme manifestation of the growth in all of Europe of the world-wide Socialist revolution; the threat of a peace between the imperialists with the aim of crushing the revolution in Russia) as well as the military situation (the undoubted decision of the Russian bourgeoisie and of Kerensky and Co. to surrender Petrograd to the Germans) and the fact that the proletarian parties have gained a majority in the Soviets; all this, coupled with the peasant uprising and with a shift of the people's confidence towards our party (elections in Moscow); finally, the obvious preparation for a second Kornilov affair (the withdrawal of troops from Petrograd; the bringing of Cossacks to Petrograd; the surrounding of Minsk by Cossacks, etc.)—places the armed uprising on the order of the day.

Recognising thus that an armed uprising is inevitable and the time perfectly ripe, the Central Committee proposes to all the organisations of the party to act accordingly and to discuss and decide from this point of view all the practical questions (the Congress of the Soviets of the northern region, the withdrawal of troops from Petrograd, the actions in Moscow and in Minsk, etc.).

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MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.-D.L.P., OCTOBER 29, 1917 144

EXCERPTS FROM THE MINUTES

T

LENIN reads the resolution that was adopted by the Central Committee at the previous session. He says that the resolution was adopted with two voting against. If the comrades who disagree wish to express themselves, he says, discussion may be opened; in the meantime, however, he gives the reasons for this resolution.

Had the Menshevik and the Socialist-Revolutionary Parties broken with conciliationism, it would have been possible to offer them a compromise. This offer was made: it is obvious, however, that this compromise has been rejected by the above-named parties.* On the other hand, it has become clear at this period that the masses are following us. It was so even before the Kornilov affair; [Lenin] proves it by statistics of the elections in Petrograd and in Moscow. The Kornilov affair has pushed the masses still closer to us. Interrelation of forces at the Democratic Conference. Situation is clearly either a dictatorship of Kornilov, or a dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest strata of the peasantry. Sentiment cannot serve as guide, since it is changeable and cannot be measured; we must be guided by an objective analysis and an appraisal of the revolution. The masses have expressed confidence in the Bolsheviks and they demand of them not words, but deeds, a decisive policy both in the struggle against the war and in the struggle against economic ruin. If we make our basis a political analysis of the revolution, it will become perfectly clear that this is now being proven even by anarchistic actions.

He analyses further the situation in Europe and proves that a revolution there is still more difficult than here. If, in a country like Germany, there has been a mutiny in the navy, this proves that things there have gone very far. The international situation gives us a good deal of objective data showing that if we act now, we will have on our side all of proletarian Europe. He proves that

^{*} See p. 152 ff., Book I of this volume.-Ed.

the bourgeoisie wishes to surrender Petrograd. We can save ourselves from this only by taking Petrograd into our hands. The conclusion from all this is clear, namely, that the armed uprising of which the Central Committee resolution speaks is on the order of the day.

As to practical conclusions from the resolution, it is more convenient to make them after listening to the reports of the representatives of the centres.

From a political analysis of the class struggle, both in Russia and in Europe, follows the necessity of a most decisive, most active policy, which can be only an armed uprising.

Ħ

[Lenin] disagrees with Milyutin and Shotman and points out that it is not a question of armed forces, not a question of fighting against the troops, but of one part of the troops fighting against another. He sees no pessimism in what has been said here. He argues that the forces on the side of the bourgeoisie are not large. Facts prove that we have a preponderance over the enemy. Why cannot the Central Committee begin? This does not follow from all the data. To reject the Central Committee's resolution, one must show that there is no economic ruin, that the international situation is not leading to complications. If the trade union functionaries demand all power, they understand very well what they want. Objective conditions show that the peasantry must be led; it will follow the proletariat.

Some are afraid that we would not retain power; but just now we have particular chances of retaining power.

[Lenin] expresses a wish that the discussion should be conducted on the level of analysing the resolution on its merits.

Ш

If all resolutions fell through in this way, one wouldn't wish for anything better. Now Zinoviev says down with the slogan, "Power to the Soviets," and pressure on the government. If it is said that the uprising is "of the people" there is no need of speaking of conspiracies. If politically the uprising is inevitable, we must treat the uprising as an art. Politically, it has already matured.

Precisely because there is bread for one day only, we cannot wait for the Constituent Assembly. [Lenin] proposes to endorse the resolution, to energetically push the preparations and to leave it to the Central Committee and the Soviet to decide when.

IV

Arguing against Zinoviev, Lenin says that it is wrong to contrast the present revolution with the February Revolution. As to the matter under consideration, he proposes the following resolution:

The meeting heartily greets and fully supports the resolution of the Central Committee. It calls upon all the organisations and all the workers and soldiers to prepare the armed uprising most energetically, in every way, to support the organ which the Central Committee is creating for this purpose, and expresses full confidence that the Central Committee and the Soviet will in due time indicate the favourable moment and the most expedient methods for an offensive.

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LETTER TO COMRADES

COMRADES, the time we are passing through is so critical, events rush with such incredible swiftness that a publicist, placed by the will of fate somewhat aside from the main stream of history, constantly risks either being late or proving uninformed, especially if his writings appear in print after a lapse of time. Though realising this fully, I am still forced to address this letter to the Bolsheviks, even under the risk that it may not be published at all, for the vacillations against which I deem it my duty to warn in the most decisive manner are of an unprecedented nature and are capable of exercising a ravaging effect on the party, the movement of the international proletariat, and the revolution. As for the danger of being too late, I will prevent it by indicating what information and of what date I possess.

It was only on Monday morning, October 29, that I saw a comrade who had on the previous day participated in a very important Bolshevik gathering in Petrograd, and who informed me in detail about the discussion. 145 The subject of discussion was the same question of the uprising, which is also discussed by the Sunday papers of all political trends. At the gathering there was represented all that is most influential in all branches of Bolshevik work in the capital. Only a most insignificant minority of the gathering, namely, all in all two comrades, had taken a negative stand. The arguments which those comrades advanced are so weak, these arguments are the manifestation of such an astounding confusion, timidity, and collapse of all the fundamental ideas of Bolshevism and revolutionary-proletarian internationalism that it is not easy to discover an explanation for such shameful vacillations. The fact nevertheless is there, and since the revolutionary party has no right to tolerate vacillations in such a serious question, as this little pair of comrades, who have scattered their principles to the winds, might cause a certain confusion of mind, it is necessary to analyse their arguments, to expose their vacillations, to show how shameful they are. The following lines will be an attempt at carrying out this task.

We have no majority among the people, and without this condition the uprising is hopeless....

Men capable of saying this are either distorters of the truth or pedants who at all events, without taking the least account of the real circumstances of the revolution, wish to secure an advance guarantee that the Bolshevik Party has received throughout the whole country no more nor less than one-half of the votes plus one. Such a guarantee history has never proffered, and is absolutely in no position to proffer in any revolution. To advance such a demand means to mock one's audience, and is nothing but a cover to hide one's own flight from reality.

For reality shows us palpably that it was after the July days that the majority of the people began quickly to go over to the side of the Bolsheviks. This was demonstrated first by the September 2 elections in Petrograd, even before the Kornilov affair, when the Bolshevik vote rose from 20 to 33 per cent in the city not including the suburbs, and also by the elections to the borough councils in Moscow in September, when the Bolshevik vote rose from 11 to 491/3 per cent (one Moscow comrade, whom I saw recently, told me that the correct figure is 51 per cent). This was proven by the new elections to the Soviets. It was proven by the fact that a majority of the peasant Soviets, the "Avksentyev" central Soviet notwithstanding, has expressed itself against the coalition. To be against the coalition means in practice to follow the Bolsheviks. Furthermore, reports from the front prove more and more often and definitely that the soldiers are passing en masse over to the side of the Bolsheviks more and more decisively, in spite of the malicious slanders and attacks by the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik leaders, officers, deputies, etc., etc.

Last, but not least, the most outstanding fact in the present situation is the revolt of the peasantry. Here is an objective passing over of the people to the side of the Bolsheviks, shown not by words but by deeds. For, notwithstanding the lies of the bourgeois press and its miserable henchmen of the "vacillating" Novaya Zhizn and Co., and their wails about pogroms and anarchy, the fact is there. The movement of the peasants in Tambov province was an uprising both in the material and political sense, an uprising that has yielded such splendid political results as, in the first place, permission to give the land to the peasants. It is not for nothing that the S-R.

rabble, including the *Dyelo Naroda*, frightened by the uprising, now screams about the necessity of giving over the lands to the peasants. Here is the demonstration of the correctness of Bolshevism and its success, in deeds. It has turned out to be impossible to "teach" the Bonapartists and their lackeys in the pre-parliament otherwise than by means of an uprising.

This is a fact. Facts are stubborn things. And such a factual "argument" in favour of an uprising is stronger than thousands of "pessimistic" evasions on the part of confused and frightened politicians.

If the peasant uprising were not an event of nation-wide political import, the S.-R. lackeys from the pre-parliament would not be shouting about the necessity of giving over the land to the peasants.

Another splendid political and revolutionary consequence of the peasant uprising, as already noted in the Rabochy Put, is the delivery of grain to the railroad stations in the Tambov province. Here is another "argument" for you, confused gentlemen, an argument in favour of the uprising as the only means to save the country from the famine that knocks at our door and from a crisis of unheard-of dimensions. While the S.-R.-Menshevik betrayers of the people are grumbling, threatening, writing resolutions, promising to feed the hungry by convoking the Constituent Assembly, the people are beginning to solve the bread question Bolshevik-fashion, by rebelling against the landowners, capitalists, and speculators.

The wonderful results of such a solution (the only real solution) of the bread question, even the bourgeois press, even the Russkaya Volya, was compelled to admit by way of publishing information to the effect that the railroad stations in Tambov province were swamped with grain . . . after the peasants had revolted!!

No, to doubt now that the majority of the people is following and will follow the Bolsheviks means shamefully to vacillate and in practice to throw overboard all the principles of proletarian revolutionism, to renounce Bolshevism completely.

We are not strong enough to seize power, and the bourgeoisie is not strong enough to hinder the calling of the Constituent Assembly.

The first part of this argument is a simple paraphrase of the preceding argument. It does not gain in strength and convincing power, when the confusion of its authors and their fear of the bourgeoisie is expressed in terms of pessimism concerning the workers

and optimism concerning the bourgeoisie. If the military cadets and the Cossacks say that they will fight against the Bolsheviks to the last drop of their blood, this deserves full credence; if, however, the workers and soldiers at hundreds of meetings express full confidence in the Bolsheviks and affirm their readiness to stand fast for the passing of power to the Soviets, then it is "timely" to recall that voting is one thing and fighting another!

Of course, with this kind of argument, the uprising is "refuted." But the question is, wherein does this peculiarly conceived and peculiarly orientated "pessimism" differ from a political shift to the side of the bourgeoisie?

Look at the facts. Remember the Bolshevik declarations, repeated thousands of times and now "forgotten" by our pessimists. We have said thousands of times that the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies are the power, that they are the vanguard of the revolution, that they can take power. Thousands of times have we upbraided the Mensheviks and S.-R.'s for phrase-mongering concerning the "plenipotentiary organs of democracy" and at the same time for being afraid to transfer power to the Soviets.

And what has the Kornilov affair proven? It has proven that the Soviets are a real power.

And, now, after this has been proven by experience, by facts, we shall repudiate Bolshevism, deny ourselves, and say: we are not strong enough (although we have the Soviets of both capitals and a majority of the provincial Soviets on the side of the Bolsheviks)!!! Are these not shameful vacillations? As a matter of fact, our "pessimists" throw overboard the slogan of "All Power to the Soviets," though they are afraid to admit it.

How can it be proven that the bourgeoisie is not sufficiently strong to hinder the calling of the Constituent Assembly?

If the Soviets have not the power to overthrow the bourgeoisie, this means that the latter is strong enough to hinder the calling of the Constituent Assembly, for there is nobody to prevent it from doing this. To trust the promises of Kerensky and Co., to trust the resolutions of the pre-parliament lackeys—is this worthy of a member of a proletarian party and a revolutionist?

Not only has the bourgeoisie power to hinder the calling of the Constituent Assembly, if the present government is not overthrown, but it can also *indirectly* achieve this result by surrendering Petrograd to the Germans, by laying the front open, by increasing lock-

outs, by sabotaging deliveries of foodstuffs. It has been proven by facts that, to a certain extent, the bourgeoisie has already been doing all this. That means that it is capable of doing all this to the full extent, if the workers and soldiers do not overthrow it.

The Soviets must be a revolver pointed at the temple of the government with the demand of convoking the Constituent Assembly and renouncing Kornilovist plots.

This is how far one of the two sad pessimists has gone.

He had to go that far, for to renounce the uprising means to renounce the slogan of "All Power to the Soviets."

Of course, a slogan is "not a sanctuary"; we all agree to that. But then why has no one raised the question of changing this slogan (in the same way as I raised that question after the July days)? Why be afraid to say it openly, in spite of the fact that the question of the uprising, which is now indispensable for the realisation of the slogan, "All Power to the Soviets," has been discussed in the party since September?

Our sad pessimists will never be able to extricate themselves in this respect. A renunciation of the uprising is a renunciation of the passing of power to the Soviets and a "transfer" of all hopes and expectations to the kind bourgeoisie, which has "promised" to convoke the Constituent Assembly.

Is it so difficult to understand that once power is in the hands of the Soviets, the Constituent Assembly and its success are guaranteed? The Bolsheviks have said so thousands of times. No one has ever attempted to refute this. Everybody has recognised such a "combined type," but to smuggle in a renunciation of giving the power to the Soviets under the guise of the words "combined type," to smuggle it in secretly while fearing to renounce our slogan openly—what is this? Can one find a parliamentary expression to characterise it?

Some one has very pointedly retorted to our pessimist: "A revolver without bullets?" If so, it means directly going over to the Liberdans, who have declared the Soviets a "revolver" thousands of times and have deceived the people thousands of times. For while they have been in control the Soviets have proven to be a nullity.

If, however, it is a revolver "with bullets," then this is a technical preparation for an uprising. For the bullet has to be procured, the revolver has to be loaded—and one bullet alone wouldn't be enough.

Either joining the side of the Liberdans and openly renouncing the slogan, "All Power to the Soviets," or an uprising.

There is no middle course.

The bourgeoisie cannot surrender Petrograd to the Germans, although Rodzyanko wants to, for the fighting is done not by the bourgeoisie, but by our heroic sailors.

This argument again reduces itself to the same "optimism" concerning the bourgeoisie which is fatally manifested at every step by those who are pessimistic regarding the revolutionary forces and capabilities of the proletariat.

The fighting is done by the heroic sailors, but this did not prevent two admirals from disappearing before the capture of Esel!

This is a fact. Facts are stubborn things. The facts prove that the admirals are capable of treachery no less than Kornilov. That General Headquarters has not been reformed, and that the commanding staff is Kornilovist, are undisputed facts.

If the Kornilovists (with Kerensky at their head, for he is also a Kornilovist) want to surrender Petrograd, they can do it in two or even in three ways.

First, they can, by an act of treachery of the Kornilovist commanding staff, open the northern land front.

Second, they can "agree" concerning freedom of action for the entire German fleet, which is *stronger* than we are; they can agree both with the German and with the English imperialists. Moreover, the admirals who have disappeared may also have delivered the *plans* to the Germans.

Third, they can, by means of lockouts, and by sabotaging the delivery of foodstuffs, bring our troops to *complete* desperation and impotence.

Not a single one of these three ways can be gainsaid. The facts have proven that the bourgeois-Cossack party of Russia has already knocked at all three of these doors, that it has tried to open all of them.

What follows? It follows that we have no right to wait until the bourgeoisie strangles the revolution.

That Rodzyanko's wishes are no trifle has been proven by experience. Rodzyanko is a man of affairs. Behind Rodzyanko stands capital. This is beyond dispute. Capital is a huge force as long as the proletariat does not have power. Rodzyanko has carried out the policies of capital, faithfully and truly, for decades.

What follows? It follows that to vacillate in the question of an uprising as the only means to save the revolution means to sink into that half-Liberdan, S.-R.-Menshevik cowardly confidence towards the bourgeoisie, half "peasant-like" unquestioning confidence, against which the Bolsheviks have been battling most of all.

Either fold your idle arms on your empty chest and wait, while swearing "faith" in the Constituent Assembly, until Rodzyanko and Co. have surrendered Petrograd and strangled the revolution, or an uprising. There is no middle course.

Even the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, taken separately, does not change anything here, for no "constitutioning," no voting of any arch-sovereign assembly will have any effect on the famine, or on Wilhelm. Both the convocation and the success of the Constituent Assembly depend upon the passing of power to the Soviets. This old Bolshevik truth is being proved by reality ever more strikingly and ever more cruelly.

We are becoming stronger every day. We can enter the Constituent Assembly as a strong opposition; why should we stake everything?

This is the argument of a philistine who has "read" that the Constituent Assembly is being called, and who confidently acquiesces in the most legal, most loyal, most constitutional course.

It is only a pity that by waiting for the Constituent Assembly one can solve neither the question of famine nor the question of surrendering Petrograd. This "trifle" is forgotten by the naïve or the confused or those who have allowed themselves to be frightened.

The famine will not wait. The peasant uprising did not wait. The war will not wait. The admirals who have disappeared did not wait.

Will the famine agree to wait, because we Bolsheviks proclaim faith in the convocation of the Constituent Assembly? Will the admirals who have disappeared agree to wait? Will the Maklakovs and Rodzyankos agree to stop the lockouts and the sabotaging of grain deliveries, to abrogate the secret treaties with the English and the German imperialists?

This is what the arguments of the heroes of "constitutional illusions" and parliamentary cretinism reduce themselves to. The living reality disappears, and what remains is only a paper dealing with the convocation of the Constituent Assembly; what remains is only elections.

And blind people are still wondering why hungry people and soldiers betrayed by generals and admirals are indifferent to the elections! Oh, wiseacres!

If the Kornilovists were to start things, then we would show them! But why should we ourselves risk beginning?

This is unusually convincing and unusually revolutionary. History does not repeat itself, but if we turn our back to it, and, scrutinising the first Kornilov affair, repeat: "If the Kornilovists were to start"—if we do so, what excellent revolutionary strategy! How close it is to "maybe and perhaps"! Maybe the Kornilovists will start again at an inopportune time. Isn't this a "strong" argument? What kind of an earnest foundation for a proletarian policy is this?

And what if the Kornilovists of the second draft will have learned something? What if they wait until hunger riots begin, until the front is broken through, until Petrograd is surrendered, without beginning action till then? What then?

What is proposed is that the tactics of the proletarian party be built on the possibility of the Kornilovists' repeating one of their old errors!

Let us forget all that was being and has been demonstrated by the Bolsheviks a hundred times, all that the half year's history of our revolution has proven, namely, that there is no way out, that there is no objective way out and can be none outside of either a dictatorship of the Kornilovists or a dictatorship of the proletariat. Let us forget this, let us renounce all this and wait! Wait for what? Wait for a miracle: for the tempestuous and catastrophic course of events from May 3 until September 11 to be succeeded (due to the prolongation of the war and the spread of famine) by a peaceful, quiet, smooth, legal convocation of the Constituent Assembly and by a fulfilment of its most lawful decisions. Here you have the "Marxist" tactics! Wait, ye hungry! Kerensky has promised to convoke the Constituent Assembly.

There is really nothing in the international situation that would oblige us to act immediately; rather would we damage the cause of a Socialist revolution in the West, if we were to allow ourselves to be shot.

This argument is truly magnificent: Scheidemann "himself," Renaudel "himself" would not be able to "manipulate" more cleverly the sympathies of the workers for the international Socialist revolution!

Just think of it: under devilishly difficult conditions, having but

one Liebknecht (and at hard labour at that), without newspapers, without freedom of assembly, without Soviets, with all classes of the population, including every well-to-do peasant, incredibly hostile to the idea of internationalism, with the imperialist big, middle, and petty bourgeoisie splendidly organised—the Germans, i.e., the German revolutionary internationalists, the German workers dressed in sailors' jackets, started a mutiny in the navy with one chance of winning out of a hundred.

But we, with dozens of papers at our disposal, freedom of assembly, a majority in the Soviets, we proletarian internationalists, situated best in the whole world, should refuse to support the German revolutionists by our uprising. We should reason like the Scheidemanns and Renaudels, that it is most prudent not to revolt, for if we are shot, then the world will lose such excellent, reasonable, ideal internationalists!

Let us prove how reasonable we are. Let us pass a resolution of sympathy with the German insurrectionists, and let us renounce the insurrection in Russia. This would be genuine, reasonable internationalism. And how fast world internationalism would blossom forth, if the same wise policy were to triumph everywhere! . . .

The war has tired out, has mangled the workers of all countries to the utmost. Outbursts in Italy, in Germany, and in Austria, are becoming frequent. We alone have Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Let us then keep on waiting. Let us betray the German internationalists as we are betraying the Russian peasants, who, not by words but by deeds, by their uprising against the landowners, appeal to us to rise against Kerensky's government. . . .

Let the clouds of the imperialist conspiracy of the capitalists of all countries who are ready to strangle the Russian Revolution darken—we shall wait patiently until we are strangled by the ruble! Instead of attacking the conspirators and breaking their ranks by a victory of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, let us wait for the Constituent Assembly, where all international plots will be vanquished by voting, provided that Kerensky and Rodzyanko conscientiously convoke the Constituent Assembly. Have we any right to doubt the honesty of Kerensky and Rodzyanko?

But "every one" is against us! We are isolated; the Central Executive Committee, the Menshevik-internationalists, the Novaya Zhizn people, and the Left S.-R.'s have been issuing and will issue appeals against us!

A crushing argument. Up to now we have been mercilessly castigating the vacillators for their vacillations. By so doing, we have won the sympathies of the people. By so doing, we have conquered the Soviets, without which the uprising could not be safe, quick, sure. Now let us use the Soviets which we won over in order to pass, ourselves, into the camp of the vacillators. What a splendid career for Bolshevism!

The whole essence of the policy of the Liberdans and Chernovs, and also of the "Left" among the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks, consists in vacillations. As an indication of the fact that the masses are moving to the Left, note that the Left S.-R.'s and Menshevik-internationalists have tremendous political importance. Two such facts as the passing of some 40 per cent of both Mensheviks and S.-R.'s into the camp of the Left, on the one hand, and the peasant uprising, on the other, are clearly and obviously connected with each other.

But it is the very character of this connection that reveals the abysmal spinelessness of those who have now undertaken to whimper over the fact that the Central Executive Committee, which has rotted away, or the vacillating Left S.-R.'s and Co., have come out against us. For these vacillations of the petty-bourgeois leaders—the Martovs, Kamkovs, Sukhanovs, and Co.—have to be juxtaposed to the uprising of the peasants. Here is a realistic political juxtaposition. With whom shall we go? With the vacillating handfuls of Petrograd leaders, who have indirectly expressed the radicalisation of the masses, and who, at every political turn, have shamefully whimpered, vacillated, run to ask forgiveness of the Liberdans, Avksentyevs and Co., or with those masses that have moved to the Left?

Thus, and only thus, can the question be stated.

Because the peasant uprising has been betrayed by the Martovs, Kamkovs, and Sukhanovs, we, the workers' party of revolutionary internationalists, are asked also to betray it. This is what the policy of "nodding" to the Left S.-R.'s and Menshevik-internationalists reduces itself to.

But we have said: to help the vacillating, we must stop vacillating ourselves. Those "lovely" Left petty-bourgeois democrats in their vacillations have even sympathised with a coalition! In the long run we succeeded in making them follow us because we ourselves did not vacillate. Life has vindicated us.

These gentlemen by their vacillations have always been ruining the revolution. We alone have saved it. Shall we now shrink back, when the famine is knocking at the gates of Petrograd and Rodzyanko and Co. are preparing to surrender it?

But we have not even firm connections with the railwaymen and the postal employees. Their official representatives are the Plansons. And can we win without the post office and without railroads?

Yes, yes, Plansons here, Liberdans there. What confidence have the masses shown them? Is it not we who have kept on proving that those leaders betrayed the masses? Was it not from those leaders that the masses turned towards us, both at the elections in Moscow and at the elections to the Soviets? Or doesn't the mass of railroad and postal employees starve? Nor strike against Kerensky and Co.?

"Did we have connections with these unions before March 13?" one comrade asked a pessimist. The latter replied by pointing out that the two revolutions were not comparable. But this reply only strengthens the position of the one who asked the question. For it is the Bolsheviks who have spoken thousands of times about a prolonged preparation of the proletarian revolution against the bourgeoisie (and they have not spoken about it, in order to forget it on the eve of the decisive moment). It is the very separation of the proletarian elements of the masses from the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois upper layer that characterises the political and economic life of the unions of postal employees and railwaymen. What matters is not necessarily to secure beforehand "connections" with one or the other union; what matters is that only a victory of a proletarian and peasant uprising can satisfy the masses both of the army of railwaymen and of postal and telegraph employees.

There is enough bread in Petrograd for two or three days. Can we give bread to the insurrectionists?

One of a thousand skeptical remarks (the skeptics can always "doubt," and cannot be refuted by anything but experience), one of those remarks that put the burden where it does not belong.

It is Rodzyanko and Co., it is precisely the bourgeoisie that is preparing the famine and speculating on strangling the revolution by famine. There is no escaping the famine and there can be none outside of an uprising of the peasants against the landowners in the village and a victory of the workers over the capitalists in the cities and in the centre. Outside of this it is impossible either to get grain from the rich, or to transport it despite their sabotage, or to break the resistance of the corrupt employees and the capitalist profiteers, or to establish strict accounting. This has been proven by the his-

tory of the supply organisations, of the efforts of the "democracy" that has complained millions of times against the sabotage of the capitalists, that has whimpered and supplicated.

There is no power on earth outside the power of a victorious proletarian revolution that would pass from complaints and begging and tears, to revolutionary action. And the longer the proletarian revolution is delayed, the longer it is protracted by events or by the vacillations of the wavering and confused, the more victims it will cost and the more difficult it will be to organise the transportation and distribution of foodstuffs.

"Delaying the uprising means death"—this is what we have to answer to those having the sad "courage" to look at the growing economic ruin, at the approaching famine, and still dissuade the workers from the uprising (that is, persuade them to wait, and still place confidence in the bourgeoisie).

There is no danger in the situation at the front either. Even if the soldiers conclude a truce by themselves, there is still no calamity in that.

But the soldiers will not conclude a truce. This requires state power, which cannot be obtained without an uprising. The soldiers will simply run away. Reports from the front tell that. It is impossible to wait without the risk of aiding a collusion between Rodzyanko and Wilhelm and without the risk of complete economic ruin, with the soldiers running away in masses, once they (being already close to desperation) sink into absolute despair and leave everything to the mercy of fate.

But if we take power, and obtain neither a truce nor a democratic peace, then the soldiers may not wish to fight a revolutionary war. What then?

An argument which brings to mind the saying: one fool can ask ten times more questions than ten wise men are capable of answering.

We have never denied the difficulties of power during an imperialist war. Nevertheless, we have always preached the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry. Shall we renounce this, when the moment has actually arrived?

We have always said that the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country creates gigantic changes in the international situation, in the economic life of the country, in the condition of the army, in its mood—shall we now "forget" all this, and allow ourselves to be frightened by the "difficulties" of the revolution?

As everybody reports, the masses are not in a mood that would drive them into the streets. Among the signs justifying pessimism may be mentioned the unusual spread of the pogromist and Black Hundred press.

When people allow themselves to be frightened by the bourgeoisie, then all objects and phenomena naturally appear yellow to them. First, they substitute an impressionist, intellectual criterion of the movement for the Marxist one; for a political analysis of the development of the class struggle and of the course of events throughout the country as a whole against the international background as a whole, they substitute subjective impressions of moods. That a firm party line, its unyielding resolve, is also a mood-creating factor, particularly in the sharpest revolutionary moments, they "conveniently" forget, of course. It is sometimes very "convenient" for people to forget that the responsible leaders, by their vacillations and by their readiness to burn their idols of yesterday, cause the most unbecoming vacillations in the mood of certain strata of the masses.

Secondly—and this is at present the main thing—in speaking about the mood of the masses, the spineless people forget to add: that "everybody" reports it as a tense and expectant mood; that "everybody" agrees that, called upon by the Soviets for the defence of the Soviets, the workers will step forward as one man;

that "everybody" agrees that the workers are greatly dissatisfied with the indecision of the centre concerning the "final decisive struggle," whose inevitability is clearly recognised;

that "everybody" unanimously characterises the mood of the broadest masses as close to despair and points at the anarchy developing on this very basis; and

that "everybody" also recognises that there is among the classconscious workers a definite unwillingness to go out into the streets only for demonstrations, only for partial struggles, since the approach of not a partial but a general struggle is in the air, while the hopelessness of individual strike demonstrations and acts of pressure has been tested and fully understood.

And so forth.

If we approach this characterisation of the mass mood from the point of view of the entire development of the class and political struggle and of the entire course of events during the half year of our revolution, it will become clear to us how those people frightened by the bourgeoisie are distorting the question. The question is not the same as it was before May 3-4, June 22, July 16, for then there was a spontaneous excitement which we, as a party, either failed to comprehend (May 3) or held back and shaped into a peaceful demonstration (June 22 and July 16), for we knew very well at that time that the Soviets were not yet ours, that the peasants still trusted the Liberdan-Chernov and not the Bolshevik course (uprising), that consequently we could not have back of us the majority of the people, and that consequently the uprising was premature.

At that time the question of the last decisive struggle did not arise at all among the majority of the class-conscious workers; not one out of all the party units would have raised that question at that time. As to the unenlightened and very broad masses, there was neither a concentrated mood nor the resolve born out of despair among them; there was only a spontaneous excitement with the naïve hope of "influencing" Kerensky and the bourgeoisie by "action," by a demonstration pure and simple.

What is needed for an uprising is not this, but a conscious, firm, and unswerving resolve on the part of the class-conscious elements to fight to the end; this on the one hand. On the other, a concentrated mood of despair among the broad masses who feel that nothing can be saved now by half-measures; that you cannot "influence" anybody by merely influencing him; that the hungry will "smash everything, destroy everything, even in an anarchist way," if the Bolsheviks are not able to lead them in a decisive battle.

It is precisely to this combination of a tense mood as a result of the lessons of experience among the class-conscious elements and a mood of hatred towards the lockout employers and capitalists, a mood close to despair among the broadest masses, that the development of the revolution has in practice brought both the workers and the peasantry.

It is precisely on this basis that we can also understand the "success" of the scoundrels of the Black Hundred press who imitate Bolshevism. That the Black Hundreds are full of malicious glee at the approach of a decisive battle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, has been observed in all revolutions without exception; this has always been so, and it is absolutely unavoidable. And if you allow yourselves to be frightened by this circumstance, then you have to renounce not only the uprising but the proletarian revo-

lution in general. For this revolution in a capitalist society cannot mature without being accompanied by malicous glee on the part of the Black Hundreds and by hopes that they would be able to feather their nest in this way.

The class-conscious workers know perfectly well that the Black Hundreds work hand in hand with the bourgeoisie, and that a decisive victory of the workers (in which the petty bourgeoisie does not believe, which the capitalists are afraid of, which the Black Hundreds wish out of sheer malice, convinced as they are that the Bolsheviks cannot retain power)—that this victory will utterly crush the Black Hundreds, that the Bolsheviks will be able to retain power, firmly and to the greatest advantage of all humanity, tired out and made wretched by the war.

Indeed, is there anybody in his senses who can doubt that the Rodzyankos and Suvorins are acting in accord, that the rôles are distributed among them?

Has it not been proven by facts that Kerensky acts on Rodzyanko's order, while the "State Printing Press of the Russian Republic" (don't laugh!) prints at the expense of the state the Black Hundred speeches of the Black Hundred "State Duma"? Has not this fact been exposed even by the lackeys from the *Dyelo Naroda*, who do lackey service to "one of their little ilk"? Has not the experience of all elections proven that the Cadet nominations were fully supported by the *Novoye Vremya*, which is a venal paper controlled by the "interests" of the tsarist landowners? 148

Did we not read yesterday that commercial and industrial capital (non-partisan capital, of course; oh, non-partisan capital, to be sure, for the Vikhlyayevs and Rakitnikovs, the Gvozdevs and Nikitins are in coalition not with the Cadets—God forbid—but with the non-partisan commercial and industrial circles!) has donated the goodly sum of 300,000 rubles to the Cadets?

The whole Black Hundred press, as we look at things from a class, not from a sentimental point of view, is a branch of the firm "Ryabushinsky, Milyukov, and Co." Capital buys, on the one hand, the Milyukovs, Zaslavskys, Potresovs, and so on; on the other, the Black Hundreds.

There is no other means of putting an end to this most hideous poisoning of the people by the Black Hundred plague than the victory of the proletariat.

Is it any wonder that the crowd, tired out and made wretched by

hunger and the prolongation of the war, eagerly reaches out for the Black Hundred poison? Can one imagine a capitalist society on the eve of a collapse without despair among the oppressed masses? And can the despair of the masses, a large part of whom are still in darkness, not express itself in increased consumption of all sorts of poison?

No; the position of those who, in arguing about the mood of the masses, place at the door of the masses their own personal spinelessness, is hopeless. The masses are divided into those who consciously wait and those who unconsciously are ready to sink into despair; but the masses of the oppressed and the hungry are not spineless.

On the other hand, the Marxist party cannot reduce the question of an uprising to the question of a military conspiracy.

Marxism is an unusually profound and many-sided doctrine. is, therefore, not to be wondered at that scraps of quotations from Marx-especially when the quotations are made inappropriatelycan always be found among the "arguments" of those who break with Marxism. A military conspiracy is Blanquism, if it is organised not by a party of a definite class, if its organisers have not analysed the political moment in general and the international situation in particular, if the party has not on its side the sympathy of the majority of the people, as proven by objective facts, if the development of events in the revolution has not brought about a practical refutation of the conciliatory illusions of the petty bourgeoisie, if the majority of the recognised "plenipotentiary" or otherwise expressed organs of revolutionary struggle like the Soviets have not been conquered, if there has not ripened a sentiment in the army (if this is going on during a war) against the government that protracts the unjust war against the whole of the people, if the slogans of the uprising (like "All power to the Soviets," "Land to the peasants," or "Immediate offer of a democratic peace to all the belligerent peoples, coupled with an immediate abrogation of all secret treaties and secret diplomacy," etc.) have not become widely known and popular, if the advanced workers are not convinced of the desperate situation of the masses and of the support of the village, a support proven by a serious peasant uprising or by an uprising against the landowners and the government that defends the landowners, if the economic situation of the country inspires one with earnest hopes for a favourable solution of the crisis by peaceable and parliamentary means.

Is this sufficient?

In my pamphlet entitled: Will the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?" * (I hope it will appear one of these days), I have referred to a quotation from Marx which really bears upon the question of an uprising and which enumerates the features of an uprising as an "art."

I am ready to wager that if we were to propose to all those chatterers, who now shout in Russia against a military conspiracy, to open their mouths, if we were to appeal to them to explain the difference between the "art" of an armed uprising and a military conspiracy that deserves condemnation, they could either repeat what was quoted above or they would cover themselves with shame and would call forth the general ridicule of the workers. Why not try, my dear also-Marxists! Sing us a song against "military conspiracy"!

POSTSCRIPT

The above lines had been written when I received at eight o'clock Tuesday evening the morning Petrograd papers, with an article of Mr. V. Bazarov in the Novaya Zhizn. Mr. V. Bazarov asserts that "a hand-written bulletin was distributed in the city, in which arguments were presented in the name of two eminent Bolsheviks, against immediate action." 149

If this is true, I beg the comrades, whom this letter cannot reach earlier than Wednesday noon, to publish it as quickly as possible.

I did not write it for the press; I wanted to converse with the members of our party by way of correspondence. But if the heroes of the Novaya Zhizn, who do not belong to the party and who have been ridiculed by it a hundred times for their contemptible spinelessness (those are the elements who voted for the Bolsheviks the day before yesterday, for the Mensheviks yesterday, and who almost united them at the world-famous unity congress), if such individuals receive a bulletin from members of our party in which they carry on propaganda against an uprising, then we cannot keep silent. We must agitate also in favour of an uprising. Let the anonymous individuals finally appear in the light of day, and let them bear the punishment they deserve for their shameful vacillations—even if it be only the ridicule of all class-conscious workers. I have at my disposal only one hour before I send the present letter to Petro-

^{*} See p. 15 ff. of this Book.—Ed.

grad, and I therefore wish to point out only by a word or two a "method" of the sad heroes of the brainless *Novaya Zhizn* tendency. Mr. V. Bazarov attempts to polemise against Comrade Ryazanov, who has said, and who is a thousand times correct in saying, that "an uprising is being prepared by all those who create in the masses a mood of despair and indifference."

The sad hero of a sad cause "rejoins" as follows:

"Have despair and indifference ever conquered?"

Oh, contemptible little fools from the Novaya Zhizn! Do they know such examples of uprising in history as this, when the masses of the oppressed classes were victorious in a desperate battle without having been brought to despair by long sufferings and by an extreme sharpening of all sorts of crises, when those masses had not been seized by indifference towards various lackey-like pre-parliaments, towards the idle playing with revolution, towards the reduction of the Soviets by the Liberdans from organs of power and uprising to the rôle of empty talking-shops?

Or have the contemptible little fools from the *Novaya Zhizn* perhaps discovered among the masses an *indifference* to the question of bread, to the prolongation of the war, to land for the peasants?

N. LENIN.

Written October 29-30, 1917. Published in Rabochy Put, Nos. 40-41-42, November 1, 2, 3, 1917.

LETTER TO THE MEMBERS OF THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY 160

COMRADES:

I have not had a chance yet to receive the Petrograd papers for Wednesday, October 31. When the full text of Kamenev's and Zinoviev's declaration, published in the non-party paper, the Novaya Zhizn, was transmitted to me by telephone, I refused to believe it; but it is impossible to doubt, and I am compelled to take the opportunity to transmit this letter to the members of the party by Thursday evening or Friday morning, for it would be a crime to keep quiet in the face of such unheard-of strike-breaking.

The more serious the practical problem, and the more responsible and "outstanding" the persons committing the strike-breaking, the more dangerous it is, the more decisively must the strike-breakers be thrown out, the more unforgivable it would be to hesitate even in view of past "services" of the strike-breakers.

Just think of it! It is known in party circles that the party has been discussing the question of the uprising since September. Nobody has ever heard of a single letter or leaflet by either of these persons! Now, on the eve, we may say, of the Congress of Soviets, two outstanding Bolsheviks take a stand against the majority, and, obviously, against the Central Committee. They do not say this directly; and therefore the damage to the cause is still greater, for it is more dangerous to speak by hinting.

From the text of Kamenev's and Zinoviev's declaration it is perfectly clear that they have taken a stand against the Central Committee, for otherwise their declaration would be absurd; however, they did not say which decision of the Central Committee they disputed.

Why?

Quite obviously: because it has not been published by the Central Committee.

What is it, then, that we have here?

Dealing with a burning problem of the highest importance, on

the eve of the critical day of November 2, two "outstanding Bolsheviks" attack an unpublished decision of the party centre in the non-party press, in a paper which as far as this given problem is concerned, goes hand in hand with the bourgeoisie against the workers' party!

Obviously, this is a thousand times meaner and a million times more harmful than were all the writings of Plekhanov in the non-party press in 1906-1907, which were so sharply condemned by the party! But at that time it was a question only of elections, while now it is a question of an uprising for the purpose of conquering power! 181

And with such a question before us, after the centre has made a decision, to dispute this unpublished decision before the Rodzyankos and Kerenskys in a non-party paper—can one imagine an action more treacherous, more strike-breaking?

I would consider it a shame if, in consequence of my former closeness to those former comrades, I were to hesitate to condemn them. I say outright that I do not consider them comrades any longer, and that I will fight with all my power both in the Central Committee and at the congress to expel them both from the party.

For a workers' party, which life confronts ever more often with an uprising, cannot solve this difficult problem if unpublished decisions of the centre, after they have been accepted, are disputed in the non-party press, and vacillations and confusion are brought into the ranks of the fighters.

Let the gentlemen, Zinoviev and Kamenev, found their own party out of dozens of people who have grown confused, or out of candidates for the Constituent Assembly. The workers will not join such a party, for its first slogan will be:

"Members of the Central Committee, defeated at the meeting of the Central Committee on the question of decisive conflict, may go to the non-party press to make attacks there on the unpublished decisions of the party."

Let them build such a party for themselves; our party of Bolsheviks will only gain from it.

When all the documents are published, the strike-breaking activities of Zinoviev and Kamenev will stand out still more clearly. In the meantime let the following question engage the attention of the workers:

"Let us assume that the administration of an all-Russian trade

union has decided, after a month's deliberation and with a majority of over eighty per cent, that it is necessary to prepare for a strike, without, however, publishing in the meantime the date or anything else. Let us, further, assume that, after the decision, two members under the fraudulent pretext of a 'dissenting opinion,' have not only begun to write to the local groups urging a reconsideration of the decision, but that they have also allowed their letters to be communicated to the non-party papers. Let us, finally, assume that they themselves have in the non-party papers attacked this decision, although it has not been published as yet, and that they have begun to denounce the strike before the eyes of the capitalists. Would the workers hesitate in expelling from their midst such strike-breakers?"

As to how the uprising question stands now, so near to November 2, I cannot judge from afar how much damage was done to the cause by the strike-breaking action in the non-party press. Very great practical damage has undoubtedly been caused. To remedy the situation, it is first of all necessary to re-establish the unity of the Bolshevik front by excluding the strike-breakers.

The weakness of the ideological arguments against the uprising will be the clearer, the more we drag them out into the open. I have recently written an article about this in the Rabochy Put, and if the editors do not find it possible to put it in the paper, the members of the party will probably get acquainted with it from the manuscript.

These so-called "ideological" arguments reduce themselves to the following two. First, they say, it is necessary to "wait" for the Constituent Assembly. Let us wait, they say, maybe we will hold out—this is the whole argument. Maybe, despite famine, despite economic ruin, despite the fact that the soldiers' patience is exhausted, despite Rodzyanko's step towards surrendering Petrograd to the Germans (even despite lock-outs), we will hold out.

Perhaps and maybe—this is all the force of this argument.

The second is noisy pessimism. Under the bourgeoisie and Kerensky, they say, everything was going on well; with us, everything will be bad. The capitalists have everything prepared wonderfully; the workers have everything in bad shape. The "pessimists" shout all they can about the military side of the matter, while the "opti-

mists" keep silent, for it is hardly pleasant to anybody outside of the strike-breakers to reveal anything to Rodzyanko and Kerensky.

Hard times. A grave problem. A grave betrayal.

And still, the problem will be solved, the workers will become consolidated, the peasant uprising and the extreme impatience of the soldiers at the front will do their work! Let us close our ranks more firmly—the proletariat must win!

N. LENIN.

Written October 31, 1917. First published in Pravda, No. 180, November 4, 1927.

LETTER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY

DEAR COMRADES:

A self-respecting party cannot tolerate strike-breaking and strikebreakers in its midst. This is obvious. The more we think about Zinoviev's and Kamenev's appearance in the non-party press, the more obvious it becomes that their action has all the elements of strike-breaking in it. Kamenev's subterfuge used at the meeting of the Petrograd Soviet is downright mean. He is, don't you see, in full agreement with Trotsky. But is it so difficult to understand that Trotsky could not talk, that he had no right to, that it was his duty not to talk in face of the enemies more than he did? Is it so difficult to understand that it is the duty of a party which hides its decision from the enemy (the necessity of an armed uprising, the fact that the situation is perfectly ripe for it, that preparations are being made in every respect, etc.), that this decision makes it binding upon the party to put on the adversary, at public gatherings, not only the blame, but also the initiative? Only children could fail to understand this. Kamenev's subterfuge is a plain swindle.152 The same must be said about Zinoviev's subterfuge, at least about his "apologetic" letter (published, if I am not mistaken, in the Central Organ), the only document I ever saw (as to a differing opinion, and alleged differing opinion, of which the bourgeois press is trumpeting, I, a member of the Central Committee, have not seen any up to the present). Among Zinoviev's "arguments" there is this: Lenin, he says, sent out his letters "before any decisions were made," and we did not protest. This is exactly what Zinoviev wrote, underscoring the word before four times. Is it really difficult to understand that before the centre has decided the question of a strike, it is permissible to make propaganda for and against it, while after the strike decision has been made (with the added decision to conceal this from the enemy), to make propaganda against the strike is strike-breaking? Every worker will understand this. The question of the armed uprising was being discussed in the centre since September. It is then that Zinoviev and Kamenev could and should have made their appearance in print, so that all, seeing their arguments, might appreciate the fact that they are entirely at a loss. To conceal their view from the party for a whole month before the decision was made, and to send out a dissenting opinion after the decision is made—this means to be a strike-breaker.

Zinoviev pretends not to understand this difference, not to understand that after the decision about the strike was made, the decision of the centre, only strike-breakers can make propaganda against the decision before the lower bodies. Every worker will understand this.

As to Zinoviev, he was carrying on propaganda and was trying to undermine the decision of the centre both at the Sunday meeting, where neither he nor Kamenev secured a single vote, and in his present letter. Zinoviev has the affrontery to assert that "the party has not been asked" and that such problems "are not decided by ten men." Just think of it. All the members of the Central Committee know that more than ten members of the Central Committee were present at the meeting at which the decisions were made, that a majority of the plenum was present, that Kamenev himself declared at that meeting: "This meeting has the right to decide," that it was known perfectly well about the absent members of the Central Committee that their majority was not in agreement with Zinoviev and Kameney. And now, after the Central Committee has made this decision at a meeting which Kamenev himself recognised as having the right to decide, a member of the Central Committee has the insolence to write: "The party has not been asked"; "Such problems are not decided by ten men." This is strike-breaking at its worst. Between party congresses, the Central Committee decides. Central Committee has decided. Kamenev and Zinoviev, who, before the decision was made, did not oppose it in writing, began to dispute the decision of the Central Committee after it became a fact.

All the elements of strike-breaking are present here. After a decision was made, no disputing it is permissible, once the matter concerns immediate and secret preparations for a strike. Now Zinoviev has the insolence to blame us for "warning the enemy." Is there any limit to shamelessness? Who in fact has done the damage, who has broken the strike by "warning the enemy," if not the men who made their appearance in the non-party press?

To come out against a "deciding" resolution of the party in a paper which in this problem goes hand in hand with the bourgeoisie

—if such a thing can happen now, then the party is impossible, the party is destroyed.

To call a "dissenting opinion" that which Bazarov learns about and publishes in a non-party paper—this means to mock at the party.

Kamenev's and Zinoviev's appearance in the non-party press was despicable for the added reason that the party could not refute their gossipy lie openly. I am not acquainted with the decision as to time, says Kamenev in the letter in his own and Zinoviev's name (after such a statement, Zinoviev is fully responsible for Kamenev's conduct and action).

But how can the Central Committee refute this?

We cannot tell the truth in face of the capitalists, namely, that we have decided on a strike and have decided to conceal from them the moment chosen for the strike.

We cannot refute the gossipy lie of Zinoviev and Kamenev without doing the cause still more harm. Therein lies the boundless meanness, the absolute treacherousness of these two persons, that in the face of the capitalists they have betrayed the strikers' plan. For once we keep silent in the press, everybody will guess how things stand.

Kamenev and Zinoviev have betrayed to Rodzyanko and Kerensky the decision of the Central Committee of their party about the armed uprising and about concealing from the enemy the preparations for the armed uprising and the choosing of a date for the armed uprising. This is a fact. No subterfuges can do away with this fact. By their gossipy lie two members of the Central Committee have betrayed to the capitalists the decision of the workers. There can and must be only one answer to this: an immediate decision of the Central Committee saying that:

Recognising in Zinoviev's and Kamenev's appearance in the non-party press all the elements of strike-breaking, the Central Committee expels both from the party.

It is not easy for me to write this about my former close comrades, but vacillations in this respect I would consider a crime, for a party of revolutionists which did not punish outstanding strike-breakers would perish.

The problem of an armed uprising, even if the strike-breakers who have betrayed the matter to Rodzyanko and Kerensky have put it off for a long while, has not been removed by the party from the

order of the day. How is it possible to be preparing for an armed uprising, and actually to prepare it, while tolerating in our midst "outstanding" strike-breakers? The more outstanding a man is, the more dangerous he is, and the less deserving he is of "forgiveness," the French say. Only one who belongs to the inner circle can become a traitor.

The more "outstanding" the strike-breakers, the more imperative it is to punish them immediately with expulsion.

Only in this way is it possible to make the workers' party healthy, to cleanse ourselves of a dozen spineless intellectuals, to close the ranks of the revolutionists, to meet the great and momentous difficulties, to march with the revolutionary workers.

We cannot publish the truth to the effect that, after the deciding meeting of the Central Committee, Zinoviev and Kamenev had the insolence to demand a revision at Sunday's meeting, that Kamenev shamelessly shouted: "The Central Committee has suffered defeat, for it has done nothing for a whole week" (I could not refute that because I could not tell what was really done), while Zinoviev, with an innocent air, offered a resolution which was rejected by the meeting, proposing "to take no action before a conference with the Bolsheviks who are to come November 2 to the Congress of Soviets."

Just think of it: after the centre has decided on the question of the strike, they propose to a meeting of the rank and file that it be postponed and passed on (by November 2, when the congress convenes, and that congress was later postponed . . . the Zinovievs trust the Liberdans)—that it be passed on to a body which does not know the statutes of the party, which has no power over the Central Committee, and which does not know Petrograd.

And after this Zinoviev still has the insolence to write: "In this way the unity of the party can hardly be strengthened."

What can you call this but the threat of a split?

My answer to such a threat is that I will go the limit, I will gain for myself freedom of speech before the workers, and I will, at whatever cost, brand the strike-breaker Zinoviev as a strike-breaker. My answer to the threat of a split is a declaration of war to a finish, a war for the expulsion from the party of both strike-breakers.

The administration of a trade union has decided, after months of debate, that a strike is unavoidable and has become ripe, but that the date is to be concealed from the employers. Afterwards, two

of the administration go to the rank and file to dispute the decision, and are defeated. Then these two go to the press and, by means of a gossipy lie, betray to the capitalists the decision of the administration, thus breaking a good half of the strike or putting it off to a less favourable time by warning the enemy.

Here we have all the elements of strike-breaking. And this is why I demand that both strike-breakers be expelled, reserving for ourselves (in view of their threatening a split) the right to publish everything when this becomes possible.

Written November 1, 1917. First published in *Pravda*, No. 180, November 4, 1927.

A NEW DECEPTION OF THE PEASANTS BY THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

In its chief newspaper, the *Dyelo Naroda*, for October 31 and November 1, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party declared solemnly and before the whole people that the new land bill of the Minister of Agriculture is "a great step towards the realisation of the agrarian programme of the party," that "the Central Committee urges all party organisations to carry on energetic propaganda in favour of the bill in order to make it popular among the masses." ¹⁵⁸

In reality this bill of Minister S. L. Maslov, a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, judging by its main features in the Dyelo Naroda, is a deception of the peasants. The Socialist-Revolutionary Party has deceived the peasants: from its own land bill it crept over to that of the landowners, of the Cadets, to the plan of "fair valuation," with retention of the landowners' property in land. The Socialist-Revolutionary Party, at its congresses during the first (1905) and second (1917) Russian revolutions, solemnly promised before the whole people to support the peasants' demand for the confiscation of the landowners' lands, i.e., for their passing into the hands of the peasants without compensation. The present bill of Mr. S. L. Maslov not only retains the landowners' property in land, but even the peasants' payments for "rented" lands according to a "fair" valuation, the payments to accrue to the landlords.

This bill of Mr. S. L. Maslov is a complete betrayal of the peasants by the Socialist-Revolutionary Party; it means that this party has completely become an adherent of the landowners. We must strain all our forces, we must use every effort to spread among the peasants recognition of this truth.

The Dyelo Naroda of October 31 printed paragraphs 25-40 of S. L. Maslov's bill. Here are the main and fundamental points of that bill:

- 1. Not all landowners' lands go into the "provisional rent fund" to be formed.
- 2. The landowners' lands are to be transferred into that fund by land committees created under the law of the landowners' government of Prince Lvov, May 4, 1917.¹⁸⁴

3. Rents for these landowners' lands to be paid by the peasants are fixed by the land committees "according to the net income derived." After subtraction of other payments, they accrue "to the respective owners," i.e., to the landowners.

This is a triple deception of the peasants by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and it is therefore necessary to dwell on each of these three points in greater detail.

In the *Izvestiya* of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasant Deputies, No. 88, September 1, was printed a "model instruction" compiled on the basis of 242 instructions brought from the respective localities by the deputies to the first All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Peasant Deputies in Petrograd in 1917.

This compilation of 242 instructions made by the elected representatives of local peasants is the best material to judge what the peasants want. And this combined instruction shows with perfect clarity the deception of the peasantry by the bill of S. L. Maslov and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.

The peasants demand the abolition of the right of private property in land; conversion of all the privately owned land into the property of the whole people without compensation; conversion of landed estates with highly developed agriculture (orchards, plantations, etc.) into "model farms," to be used "exclusively by the state and communities"; confiscation of "all agricultural inventory, both livestock and implements," etc.

Thus the demands of the peasants are expressed, precisely and clearly, on the basis of 242 local instructions, given by the peasants themselves.

At the same time, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, forming a "coalition" (i.e., an alliance or an agreement) with the bourgeoisie (capitalists) and landowners, participating in a government of capitalists and landowners, has now drawn up a bill which does not do away with landowners' property, which transfers only part of the landowners' lands into a provisional rent fund!!

According to the bill, no orchards, plantations, sugar-beet fields, etc., may be transferred to the rent fund! No transfer to the rent fund is permissible of lands necessary "to satisfy the needs of the owner himself, his family, his employees and workers, as well as to secure the maintenance of the existing livestock"!!

That means that a rich landowner who has a sugar or a starch factory, an oil press or flour mills, hundreds of heads of livestock

and dozens of employees or workers, retains a great economic enterprise, which is of a capitalist nature at that. This is how shamelessly, how brazenly the Socialist-Revolutionary Party has deceived the peasants.

The transfer of the landowners'—or, according to the bill, "privately owned"—lands to the rent fund is being effected by land committees created under the law of May 4, 1917, by the landowners' government of Prince Lvov and Co.—that government of the Milyukovs and Guchkovs, the imperialists and the robbers of the masses of the people, which the workers and soldiers of Petrograd crushed by the movement of May 3-4, i.e., fully half a year ago.

Obviously, the law of this landowners' government on land committees is far from being a democratic (people's) law. On the contrary, there are in this law a number of most shameless deviations from democracy. For instance, § 11 of this law gives "to the province land committees the right to stop the execution of the decisions of volost and county committees pending the final decision of the central land committee." The committees, however, according to this trickily written landowners' law, are so organised that the county committee is less democratic than the volost committee, the province committee less democratic than the province committee!

The whole volost land committee is elected by the population of the volost. The county committee, according to the law, includes, for instance, such persons as the justice of the peace and five members from the "temporary executive committees" (pending the organisation of the new local government). The province committee includes not only a member of the circuit court and a justice of the peace, but also a representative of the Cabinet appointed by the Minister, etc. The central land committee contains twenty-seven members included "by invitation of the Provisional Government!" It includes one representative from each of the eleven political parties, of whom a majority (six out of eleven) was given to the Cadets and the parties to the right of them. Is this not a fraud on the part of Lvov, Shingarev (who signed the law) and their bosom friends? Is this not a mockery of democracy to please the landowners?

Doesn't this fully prove the correctness of the declaration repeatedly made by the Bolsheviks that only Soviets of Peasant Deputies, elected by the masses of the toilers and revocable at any time, are

able correctly to express the will of the peasantry and carry it out in practice?

The S.-R.'s who, thanks to the unenlightened trustfulness of the peasants, obtained a majority in the All-Russian Executive Committee of the Soviets of Peasant Deputies, have betrayed the peasants, have betrayed the peasants' Soviets, have gone over to the side of the landowners and have reconciled themselves to the law of the landowner Prince Lvov concerning the land committees. Therein lies the second chief deception of the peasants by the S.-R.'s.

This is why we, the workers' party, must with the greatest insistence repeat the demand of the Bolsheviks: all power in the village to the Soviets of Peasant Deputies and deputies of the agricultural labourers!

The peasant instructions demand confiscation, expropriation of the landowners' land without compensation, confiscation of the horsebreeding farms, private cattle and poultry farms, transfer to the state of all estates with intensive modern cultivation, confiscation of all inventory, livestock and implements, of the landowners' estates.

Instead of this, the ministerial bill of the S.-R.'s treats the peasants to a retention of rent payments to go, as hitherto, into the land-owners' pockets!

"Rent payments," says § 33 of the bill of the S.-R.'s, "are made to the committees which" (having made due payments to the state, etc.) "hand over the remainder to the respective owners."

This is how the "Socialist-Revolutionaries," having deceived the peasants by exuberant promises, have presented the peasants with a land bill of the landowners and Cadets!!

This is a complete deception of the peasants.

Nothing at all remains here of the peasants' demands for confiscation. This is not confiscation of the landowners' holdings: this is a consolidation of them by the "republican" government which guarantees the landowners retention of their livestock and implements, of land for the maintenance of "employees and workers," of land "selected" ("selection" alone is sufficient!!) "by the owners for planting sugar beets and other commercial plants," as well as payment for all the other land transferred to the land fund. The land committees are turned into collectors of land payments for the noble landowners!!

Landowners' property is not being wiped out, but consolidated by

the S.-R.'s. Their going over to the side of the landowners, their betrayal of the peasants is revealed now as clearly as can be.

We must not let ourselves be fooled by the shrewd Cadets, those faithful friends of the capitalists and landowners. The Cadets make it appear that the bill of the S.-R.'s is extraordinarily "revolutionary." All the bourgeois papers have raised a rumpus against the bill; everywhere notes have been published concerning the "opposition" of the bourgeois Ministers (and of course, their close henchmen like Kerensky) to this "terrible" bill. All this is comedy, a game, a price set by a haggling merchant who sees the spinelessness of the S.-R.'s and hopes to drive a better bargain. In reality S. L. Maslov's bill is a "landowners" bill written for conciliation with the landowners, for the purpose of saving them.

The above issues of the *Dyelo Naroda* call this bill "an outstanding land bill starting (!) the great (!!) reform of the socialisation (!!!) of the land." This is charlatanism of the purest water. There is not a trace of "socialisation" in the bill (except perhaps "social" aid to the landowner to secure his land payments); there is nothing at all "revolutionary and democratic;" there is nothing in it outside of "reforms" of the Irish type usually found in European bourgeois reformism.

We repeat, this is a bill for the purpose of saving the landowners, for "quieting" the *rising* peasant movement by means of trivial concessions that retain the major rights for the landowners.

The introduction of such a shameful bill by the S.-R.'s into the Cabinet is an object lesson of the unheard-of hypocrisy of those who denounce the plans of the Bolsheviks concerning the passing of power to the Soviets as "undermining" the Constituent Assembly. "Only forty days separate us from the Constituent Assembly," is the hypocritical cry of the Cadets, capitalists, landowners, Mensheviks, and S.-R.'s! In the meantime a momentous land bill is being introduced into the Cabinet, a bill defrauding the peasants, enslaving them to the landowners, consolidating the landowners' property in the land.

When it is necessary to support the landowners against the growing peasant uprising, then it is "possible" to carry through a tremendous bill forty or even only thirty days before the Constituent Assembly.

But when it is a question of transferring all power to the Soviets in order to give all the land to the peasants, in order immediately,

to do away with landowners' property in land, in order immediately to offer a just peace—oh, then the Cadets, the capitalists, the landowners, the Mensheviks and S.-R.'s raise a concerted howl against the Bolsheviks.

Let the peasants know how the Socialist-Revolutionary Party has betrayed them, how it has delivered them to the landowners.

Let the peasants know that only the workers' party, only the Bolsheviks are firmly and irrevocably against the capitalists, against the landowners, for the interests of the poorest peasantry and all the toilers.

N. LENIN.

Written November 2, 1917. Published in the Rabochy Put, No. 44, November 6, 1917.

LETTER TO THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

COMRADES:

I am writing these lines on the evening of the 6th. The situation is extremely critical. It is as clear as can be that delaying the uprising now really means death.

With all my power I wish to persuade the comrades that now everything hangs on a hair, that on the order of the day are questions that are not solved by conferences, by congresses (even by Congresses of Soviets), but only by the people, by the masses, by the struggle of armed masses.

The bourgeois onslaught of the Kornilovists, the removal of Verkhovsky show that we must not wait. We must at any price, this evening, tonight, arrest the Ministers, having disarmed (defeated if they offer resistance) the military cadets, etc.

We must not wait! We may lose everything!

The immediate gain from the seizure of power at present is: defence of the people (not the congress, but the people, in the first place, the army and the peasants) against the Kornilovist government which has driven out Verkhovsky and has hatched a second Kornilov plot.

Who should seize power?

At present this is not important. Let the Military Revolutionary Committee seize it, or "some other institution" which declares that it will relinquish the power only to the real representatives of the interests of the people, the interests of the army (immediate offer of peace), the interests of the peasants (take the land immediately, abolish private property), the interests of the hungry.

It is necessary that all the boroughs, all regiments, all forces should be mobilised and should immediately send delegations to the Military Revolutionary Committee, to the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks, insistently demanding that under no circumstances is power to be left in the hands of Kerensky and Co. until the 7th, by no means!—but that the matter must absolutely be decided this evening or tonight.

History will not forgive delay by revolutionists who could be

victorious today (and will surely be victorious today), while they risk losing much tomorrow, they risk losing all.

If we seize power today, we seize it not against the Soviets but for them.

Seizure of power is the point of the uprising; its political task will be clarified after the seizure.

It would be a disaster or formalism to wait for the uncertain voting of November 7. The people have a right and a duty to decide such questions not by voting but by force; the people have a right and duty in critical moments of a revolution to give directions to their representatives, even their best representatives, and not to wait for them.

This has been proven by the history of all revolutions, and the crime of revolutionists would be limitless if they let go the proper moment, knowing that upon them depends the saving of the revolution, the offer of peace, the saving of Petrograd, the saving from starvation, the transfer of the land to the peasants.

The government is tottering. We must deal it the death blow at any cost.

To delay action is the same as death.

Written November 6, 1917. First published in 1925.

STATE AND REVOLUTION

MARXIST TEACHING ABOUT THE THEORY OF THE STATE

AND THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT

IN THE REVOLUTION 165

PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION

THE question of the state is acquiring at present a particular importance, both as theory, and from the point of view of practical politics. The imperialist war has greatly accelerated and intensified the transformation of monopoly capitalism into state-monopoly capitalism. The monstrous oppression of the labouring masses by the state—which connects itself more and more intimately with the all-powerful capitalist combines—is becoming ever more monstrous. The foremost countries are being converted—we speak here of their "rear"—into military convict labour prisons for the workers.

The unheard-of horrors and miseries of the protracted war are making the position of the masses unbearable and increasing their indignation. An international proletarian revolution is clearly rising. The question of its relation to the state is acquiring a practical importance.

The elements of opportunism accumulated during the decades of comparatively peaceful development have created a predominance of social-chauvinism in the official Socialist parties of the whole world (Plekhanov, Potresov, Breshkovskaya, Rubanovich, and, in a slightly concealed form, Messrs. Tsereteli, Chernov and Co., in Russia; Scheidemann, Legien, David and others in Germany; Renaudel, Guesde, Vandervelde in France and Belgium; Hyndman and the Fabians in England, etc., etc.). Socialism in words. chauvinism in deeds is characterised by a base, servile adaptation of the "leaders of Socialism" to the interests not only of "their" national bourgeoisie, but also of "their" state-for a whole series of smaller. weaker nationalities have long since been exploited and enslaved by most of the so-called great powers. The imperialist war is just a war for division and re-division of this kind of booty. The struggle for the emancipation of the labouring masses from the influence of the bourgeoisie in general, and the imperialist bourgeoisie in particular, is impossible without a struggle against the opportunist superstitions concerning the "state."

We first of all survey the teachings of Marx and Engels on the state, dwelling with particular fullness on those aspects of their teach-

ings which have been forgotten or opportunistically distorted. then analyse specially the chief representative of these distorters, Karl Kautsky, the best known leader of the Second International (1889-1914), who has suffered such a pitiful political bankruptcy during the present war. Finally, we sum up, in the main, the experiences of the Russian Revolution of 1905 and particularly that of The revolution is evidently completing at the present time (beginning of August, 1917) the first stage of its development; but, generally speaking, this revolution can be understood in its totality only as a link in the chain of Socialist proletarian revolutions called forth by the imperialist war. The question of the relation of a proletarian Socialist revolution to the state acquires, therefore, not only a practical political importance, but the importance of an urgent problem of the day, the problem of elucidating to the masses what they will have to do for their liberation from the yoke of capitalism in the very near future.

THE AUTHOR.

August, 1917,

PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION

THE present, second, edition is published almost without change. Paragraph three has been added to Chapter II.

THE AUTHOR.

Moscow, December 30, 1918.

STATE AND REVOLUTION

CHAPTER I

CLASS SOCIETY AND THE STATE

1. THE STATE AS THE PRODUCT OF THE IRRECONCILABILITY OF CLASS ANTAGONISMS

What is now happening to Marx's doctrine has, in the course of history, often happened to the doctrines of other revolutionary thinkers and leaders of oppressed classes struggling for emancipa-During the lifetime of great revolutionaries, the oppressing classes have visited relentless persecution on them and received their teaching with the most savage hostility, the most furious hatred, the most ruthless campaign of lies and slanders. After their death. attempts are made to turn them into harmless icons, canonise them. and surround their names with a certain halo for the "consolation" of the oppressed classes and with the object of duping them, while at the same time emasculating and vulgarising the real essence of their revolutionary theories and blunting their revolutionary edge. At the present time, the bourgeoisie and the opportunists within the labour movement are co-operating in this work of adulterating Marxism. They omit, obliterate, and distort the revolutionary side of its teaching, its revolutionary soul. They push to the foreground and extol what is, or seems, acceptable to the bourgeoisie. All the social-chauvinists are now "Marxists"-joking aside! And more and more do German bourgeois professors, erstwhile specialists in the demolition of Marx, speak now of the "national-German" Marx. who, they aver, has educated the labour unions which are so splendidly organised for conducting the present predatory war!

In such circumstances, the distortion of Marxism being so widespread, it is our first task to resuscitate the real teachings of Marx on the state. For this purpose it will be necessary to quote at length from the works of Marx and Engels themselves. Of course, long quotations will make the text cumbersome and in no way help to make it popular reading, but we cannot possibly avoid them. All, or at any rate, all the most essential passages in the works of Marx and Engels on the subject of the state must necessarily be given as fully as possible, in order that the reader may form an independent opinion of all the views of the founders of scientific Socialism and of the development of those views, and in order that their distortions by the present predominant "Kautskyism" may be proved in black and white and rendered plain to all.

Let us begin with the most popular of Engels' works, Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats,* the sixth edition of which was published in Stuttgart as far back as 1894. We must translate the quotations from the German originals, as the Russian translations, although very numerous, are for the most part either incomplete or very unsatisfactory.

Summarising his historical analysis Engels says:

The state is therefore by no means a power imposed on society from the outside; just as little is it "the reality of the moral idea," "the image and reality of reason," as Hegel asserted. Rather, it is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it is cleft into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But in order that these antagonisms, classes with conflicting economic interests, may not consume themselves and society in sterile struggle, a power apparently standing above society becomes necessary, whose purpose is to moderate the conflict and keep it within the bounds of "order"; and this power arising out of society, but placing itself above it, and increasingly separating itself from it, is the state.**

Here we have, expressed in all its clearness, the basic idea of Marxism on the question of the historical rôle and meaning of the state. The state is the product and the manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms. The state arises when, where, and to the extent that the class antagonisms cannot be objectively reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the state proves that the class antagonisms are irreconcilable.

It is precisely on this most important and fundamental point that distortions of Marxism arise along two main lines.

On the one hand, the bourgeois, and particularly the petty-bourgeois, ideologists, compelled under the pressure of indisputable historical facts to admit that the state only exists where there are class antagonisms and the class struggle, "correct" Marx in such a way as to make it appear that the state is an organ for reconciling the classes. According to Marx, the state could neither arise nor

^{*} Friedrich Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, London and New York, 1932.—Ed.

^{**} Ibid.-Ed.

maintain itself if a reconciliation of classes were possible. But with the petty-bourgeois and philistine professors and publicists, the state—and this frequently on the strength of benevolent references to Marx!—becomes a conciliator of the classes. According to Marx, the state is an organ of class domination, an organ of oppression of one class by another; its aim is the creation of "order" which legalises and perpetuates this oppression by moderating the collisions between the classes. But in the opinion of the petty-bourgeois politicians, order means reconciliation of the classes, and not oppression of one class by another; to moderate collisions does not mean, they say, to deprive the oppressed classes of certain definite means and methods of struggle for overthrowing the oppressors, but to practice reconciliation.

For instance, when, in the Revolution of 1917, the question of the real meaning and rôle of the state arose in all its vastness as a practical question demanding immediate action on a wide mass scale, all the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks suddenly and completely sank to the petty-bourgeois theory of "reconciliation" of the classes by the "state." Innumerable resolutions and articles by politicians of both these parties are saturated through and through with this purely petty-bourgeois and philistine theory of "reconciliation." That the state is an organ of domination of a definite class which cannot be reconciled with its antipode (the class opposed to it)—this petty-bourgeois democracy is never able to understand. Its attitude towards the state is one of the most telling proofs that our Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks are not Socialists at all (which we Bolsheviks have always maintained), but petty-bourgeois democrats with a near-Socialist phraseology.

On the other hand, the "Kautskyist" distortion of Marx is far more subtle. "Theoretically," there is no denying that the state is the organ of class domination, or that class antagonisms are irreconcilable. But what is forgotten or glossed over is this: if the state is the product of the irreconcilable character of class antagonisms, if it is a force standing above society and "increasingly separating itself from it," then it is clear that the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a violent revolution, but also without the destruction of the apparatus of state power, which was created by the ruling class and in which this "separation" is embodied. As we shall see later, Marx drew this theoretically self-evident conclusion from a concrete historical analysis of the

problems of revolution. And it is exactly this conclusion which Kautsky—as we shall show fully in our subsequent remarks—has "forgotten" and distorted.

2. Special Bodies of Armed Men, Prisons, Etc.

Engels continues:

In contrast with the ancient organisation of the gens, the first distinguishing characteristic of the state is the grouping of the subjects of the state on a territorial basis. . . .

Such a grouping seems "natural" to us, but it came after a prolonged and costly struggle against the old form of tribal or gentilic society.

absolutely identical with the population organising itself as an armed power. This special public force is necessary, because a self-acting armed organisation of the population has become impossible since the cleavage of society into classes. . . . This public force exists in every state; it consists not merely of armed men, but of material appendages, prisons and repressive institutions of all kinds, of which gentilic society knew nothing. . . .*

Engels develops the conception of that "power" which is termed the state—a power arising from society, but placing itself above it and becoming more and more separated from it. What does this power mainly consist of? It consists of special bodies of armed men who have at their disposal prisons, etc.

We are justified in speaking of special bodies of armed men, because the public power peculiar to every state is not "absolutely identical" with the armed population, with its "self-acting armed organisation."

Like all the great revolutionary thinkers, Engels tries to draw the attention of the class-conscious workers to that very fact which to prevailing philistinism appears least of all worthy of attention, most common and sanctified by solid, indeed, one might say, petrified prejudices. A standing army and police are the chief instruments of state power. But can this be otherwise?

From the point of view of the vast majority of Europeans at the end of the nineteenth century whom Engels was addressing, and who had neither lived through nor closely observed a single great revolution, this cannot be otherwise. They cannot understand at all

what this "self-acting armed organisation of the population" means. To the question, whence arose the need for special bodies of armed men, standing above society and becoming separated from it (police and standing army), the Western European and Russian philistines are inclined to answer with a few phrases borrowed from Spencer or Mikhailovsky, by reference to the complexity of social life, the differentiation of functions, and so forth.

Such a reference seems "scientific" and effectively dulls the senses of the average man, obscuring the most important and basic fact, namely, the break-up of society into irreconcilably antagonistic classes.

Without such a break-up, the "self-acting armed organisation of the population" might have differed from the primitive organisation of a herd of monkeys grasping sticks, or of primitive men, or men united in a tribal form of society, by its complexity, its high technique, and so forth, but would still have been possible.

It is impossible now, because society, in the period of civilisation, is broken up into antagonistic and, indeed, irreconcilably antagonistic classes, which, if armed in a "self-acting" manner, would come into armed struggle with each other. A state is formed, a special power is created in the form of special bodies of armed men, and every revolution, by shattering the state apparatus, demonstrates to us how the ruling class aims at the restoration of the special bodies of armed men at its service, and how the oppressed class tries to create a new organisation of this kind, capable of serving not the exploiters, but the exploited.

In the above observation, Engels raises theoretically the very same question which every great revolution raises practically, palpably, and on a mass scale of action, namely, the question of the relation between special bodies of armed men and the "self-acting armed organisation of the population." We shall see how this is concretely illustrated by the experience of the European and Russian revolutions.

But let us return to Engels' discourse.

He points out that sometimes, for instance, here and there in North America, this public power is weak (he has in mind an exception that is rare in capitalist society, and he speaks about parts of North America in its pre-imperialist days, where the free colonist predominated), but that in general it tends to become stronger:

It [the public power] grows stronger, however, in proportion as the class antagonisms within the state grow sharper, and with the growth in size and population of the adjacent states. We have only to look at our present-day Europe, where class struggle and rivalry in conquest have screwed up the public power to such a pitch that it threatens to devour the whole of society and even the state itself.*

This was written as early as the beginning of the 'nineties of last century, Engels' last preface being dated June 16, 1891. The turn towards imperialism, understood to mean complete domination of the trusts, full sway of the large banks, and a colonial policy on a grand scale, and so forth, was only just beginning in France, and was even weaker in North America and in Germany. Since then the "rivalry in conquest" has made gigantic progress—especially as, by the beginning of the second decade of the twentieth century, the whole world had been finally divided up between these "rivals in conquest," i.e., between the great predatory powers. Military and naval armaments since then have grown to monstrous proportions, and the predatory war of 1914-1917 for the domination of the world by England or Germany, for the division of the spoils, has brought the "swallowing up" of all the forces of society by the rapacious state power nearer to a complete catastrophe.

As early as 1891 Engels was able to point to "rivalry in conquest" as one of the most important features of the foreign policy of the great powers, but in 1914-1917, when this rivalry, many times intensified, has given birth to an imperialist war, the rascally social-chauvinists cover up their defence of the predatory policy of "their" capitalist classes by phrases about the "defence of the fatherland," or the "defence of the republic and the revolution," etc.!

3. THE STATE AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF THE OPPRESSED CLASS

For the maintenance of a special public force standing above society, taxes and state loans are needed.

Having at their disposal the public force and the right to exact taxes, the officials now stand as organs of society above society. The free, voluntary respect which was accorded to the organs of the gentilic form of government does not satisfy them, even if they could have it. . . .

Special laws are enacted regarding the sanctity and the inviolability of the officials. "The shabbiest police servant . . . has

more authority" than the representative of the clan, but even the head of the military power of a civilised state "may well envy the least among the chiefs of the clan the unconstrained and uncontested respect which is paid to him." *

Here the question regarding the privileged position of the officials as organs of state power is clearly stated. The main point is indicated as follows: what is it that places them above society? We shall see how this theoretical problem was solved in practice by the Paris Commune in 1871 and how it was slurred over in a reactionary manner by Kautsky in 1912.

As the state arose out of the need to hold class antagonisms in check; but as it, at the same time, arose in the midst of the conflict of these classes, it is, as a rule, the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which by virtue thereof becomes also the dominant class politically, and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class. . . .

Not only the ancient and feudal states were organs of exploitation of the slaves and serfs, but

the modern representative state is the instrument of the exploitation of wagelabour by capital. By way of exception, however, there are periods when the warring classes so nearly attain equilibrium that the state power, ostensibly appearing as a mediator, assumes for the moment a certain independence in relation to both. . . .**

Such were, for instance, the absolute monarchies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Bonapartism of the First and Second Empires in France, and the Bismarck régime in Germany.

Such, we may add, is now the Kerensky government in republican Russia after its shift to persecuting the revolutionary proletariat, at a moment when the Soviets, thanks to the leadership of the petty-bourgeois democrats, have already become impotent, while the bourgeoisie is not yet strong enough to disperse them outright.

In a democratic republic, Engels continues, "wealth wields its power indirectly, but all the more effectively," first, by means of "direct corruption of the officials" (America); second, by means of "the alliance of the government with the stock exchange" (France and America).

At the present time, imperialism and the domination of the banks have "developed" to an unusually fine art both these methods of defending and asserting the omnipotence of wealth in democratic republics of all descriptions. If, for instance, in the very first months of the Russian democratic republic, one might say during the honey-moon of the union of the "Socialists"—Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks—with the bourgeoisie, Mr. Palchinsky obstructed every measure in the coalition cabinet, restraining the capitalists and their war profiteering, their plundering of the public treasury by means of army contracts; and if, after his resignation, Mr. Palchinsky (replaced, of course, by an exactly similar Palchinsky) was "rewarded" by the capitalists with a "soft" job carrying a salary of 120,000 rubles per annum, what was this? Direct or indirect bribery? A league of the government with the capitalist syndicates, or "only" friendly relations? What is the rôle played by the Chernovs, Tseretelis, Avksentyevs and Skobelevs? Are they the "direct" or only the indirect allies of the millionaire treasury looters?

The omnipotence of "wealth" is thus more secure in a democratic republic, since it does not depend on the poor political shell of capitalism. A democratic republic is the best possible political shell for capitalism, and therefore, once capital has gained control (through the Palchinskys, Chernovs, Tseretelis and Co.) of this very best shell, it establishes its power so securely, so firmly that no change, either of persons, or institutions, or parties in the bourgeois republic can shake it.

We must also note that Engels quite definitely regards universal suffrage as a means of bourgeois domination. Universal suffrage, he says, obviously summing up the long experience of German Social-Democracy, is "an index of the maturity of the working class; it cannot, and never will, be anything else but that in the modern state."

The petty-bourgeois democrats, such as our Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and also their twin brothers, the social-chauvinists and opportunists of Western Europe, all expect "more" from universal suffrage. They themselves share, and instil into the minds of the people, the wrong idea that universal suffrage "in the modern state" is really capable of expressing the will of the majority of the toilers and of assuring its realisation.

We can here only note this wrong idea, only point out that this perfectly clear, exact and concrete statement by Engels is distorted at every step in the propaganda and agitation of the "official" (i.e., opportunist) Socialist parties. A detailed analysis of all the falseness of this idea, which Engels brushes aside, is given in our further account of the views of Marx and Engels on the "modern" state.

A general summary of his views is given by Engels in the most popular of his works in the following words:

The state, therefore, has not existed from all eternity. There have been societies which managed without it, which had no conception of the state and state power. At a certain stage of economic development, which was necessarily bound up with the cleavage of society into classes, the state became a necessity owing to this cleavage. We are now rapidly approaching a stage in the development of production at which the existence of these classes has not only ceased to be a necessity, but is becoming a positive hindrance to production. They will disappear as inevitably as they arose at an earlier stage. Along with them, the state will inevitably disappear. The society that organises production anew on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers will put the whole state machine where it will then belong; in the museum of antiquities, side by side with the spinning wheel and the bronze axe.*

It is not often that we find this passage quoted in the propaganda and agitation literature of contemporary Social-Democracy. But even when we do come across it, it is generally quoted in the same manner as one bows before an icon, i.e., it is done merely to show official respect for Engels, without any attempt to gauge the breadth and depth of revolutionary action presupposed by this relegating of "the whole state machine . . . to the museum of antiquities." In most cases we do not even find an understanding of what Engels calls the state machine.

4. THE "WITHERING AWAY" OF THE STATE AND VIOLENT REVOLUTION

Engels' words regarding the "withering away" of the state enjoy such popularity, they are so often quoted, and they show so clearly the essence of the usual adulteration by means of which Marxism is made to look like opportunism, that we must dwell on them in detail. Let us quote the whole passage from which they are taken.

The proletariat seizes state power, and then transforms the means of production into state property. But in doing this, it puts an end to itself as the proletariat, it puts an end to all class differences and class antagonisms, it puts an end also to the state as the state. Former society, moving in class antagonisms, had need of the state, that is, an organisation of the exploiting class at each period for the maintenance of its external conditions of production; therefore, in particular, for the forcible holding down of the exploited class in the conditions of oppression (slavery, bondage or serfdom, wage-labour) determined by the existing mode of production. The state was the official representative of society as a whole, its embodiment in a visible corporate body; but it was this only in so far as it was the state of that class which itself, in its epoch, repre-

^{*} Ibid.-Ed.

sented society as a whole: in ancient times, the state of the slave-owning citizens; in the Middle Ages, of the feudal nobility: in our epoch, of the bourgeoisie. When ultimately it becomes really representative of society as a whole, it makes itself superfluous. As soon as there is no longer any class of society to be held in subjection; as soon as, along with class domination and the struggle for individual existence based on the former anarchy of production, the collisions and excesses arising from these have also been abolished, there is nothing more to be repressed, and a special repressive force, a state, is no longer necessary. The first act in which the state really comes forward as the representative of society as a whole—the seizure of the means of production in the name of society—is at the same time its last independent act as a state. The interference of a state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then becomes dormant of itself. Government over persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production. The state is not "abolished," it withers away. It is from this standpoint that we must appraise the phrase "people's free state" both its justification at times for agitational purposes, and its ultimate scientific inadequacy-and also the demand of the so-called Anarchists that the state should be abolished overnight.*

Without fear of committing an error, it may be said that of this argument by Engels so singularly rich in ideas, only one point has become an integral part of Socialist thought among modern Socialist parties, namely, that, unlike the Anarchist doctrine of the "abolition" of the state, according to Marx the state "withers away." To emasculate Marxism in such a manner is to reduce it to opportunism, for such an "interpretation" only leaves the hazy conception of a slow, even, gradual change, free from leaps and storms, free from revolution. The current popular conception, if one may say so, of the "withering away" of the state undoubtedly means a slurring over, if not a negation, of revolution.

Yet, such an "interpretation" is the crudest distortion of Marxism, which is advantageous only to the bourgeoisie; in point of theory, it is based on a disregard for the most important circumstances and considerations pointed out in the very passage summarising Engels' ideas, which we have just quoted in full.

In the first place, Engels at the very outset of his argument says that, in assuming state power, the proletariat by that very act "puts an end to the state as the state." One is "not accustomed" to reflect on what this really means. Generally, it is either ignored altogether, or it is considered as a piece of "Hegelian weakness" on Engels' part. As a matter of fact, however, these words express succinctly the experience of one of the greatest proletarian revolutions—the Paris Commune of 1871, of which we shall speak in greater detail

^{*} Friedrich Engels, Anti-Dühring, London and New York, 1932.-Ed.

in its proper place. As a matter of fact, Engels speaks here of the destruction of the bourgeois state by the proletarian revolution, while the words about its withering away refer to the remains of proletarian statehood after the Socialist revolution. The bourgeois state does not "wither away," according to Engels, but is "put an end to" by the proletariat in the course of the revolution. What withers away after the revolution is the proletarian state or semi-state.

Secondly, the state is a "special repressive force." This splendid and extremely profound definition of Engels' is given by him here with complete lucidity. It follows from this that the "special repressive force" of the bourgeoisie for the suppression of the proletariat, of the millions of workers by a handful of the rich, must be replaced by a "special repressive force" of the proletariat for the suppression of the bourgeoisie (the dictatorship of the proletariat). It is just this that constitutes the destruction of "the state as the state." It is just this that constitutes the "act" of "the seizure of the means of production in the name of society." And it is obvious that such a substitution of one (proletarian) "special repressive force" for another (bourgeois) "special repressive force" can in no way take place in the form of a "withering away."

Thirdly, as to the "withering away" or, more expressively and colourfully, as to the state "becoming dormant," Engels refers quite clearly and definitely to the period after "the seizure of the means of production (by the state) in the name of society," that is, after the Socialist revolution. We all know that the political form of the "state" at that time is complete democracy. But it never enters the head of any of the opportunists who shamelessly distort Marx that when Engels speaks here of the state "withering away," or "becoming dormant," he speaks of democracy. At first sight this seems very strange. But it is "unintelligible" only to one who has not reflected on the fact that democracy is also a state and that, consequently, democracy will also disappear when the state disappears. The bourgeois state can only be "put an end to" by a revolution. The state in general, i.e., most complete democracy, can only "wither away."

Fourthly, having formulated his famous proposition that "the state withers away," Engels at once explains concretely that this proposition is directed equally against the opportunists and the Anarchists. In doing this, however, Engels puts in the first place that conclusion

from his proposition about the "withering away" of the state which is directed against the opportunists.

One can wager that out of every 10,000 persons who have read or heard about the "withering away" of the state, 9,990 do not know at all, or do not remember, that Engels did not direct his conclusions from this proposition against the Anarchists alone. And out of the remaining ten, probably nine do not know the meaning of a "people's free state" nor the reason why an attack on this watchword contains an attack on the opportunists. This is how history is written! This is how a great revolutionary doctrine is imperceptibly adulterated and adapted to current philistinism! The conclusion drawn against the Anarchists has been repeated thousands of times, vulgarised, harangued about in the crudest fashion possible until it has acquired the strength of a prejudice, whereas the conclusion drawn against the opportunists has been hushed up and "forgotten"!

The "people's free state" was a demand in the programme of the German Social-Democrats and their current slogan in the 'seventies. There is no political substance in this slogan other than a pompous middle-class circumlocution of the idea of democracy. In so far as it referred in a lawful manner to a democratic republic, Engels was prepared to "justify" its use "at times" from a propaganda point of view. But this slogan was opportunist, for it not only expressed an exaggerated view of the attractiveness of bourgeois democracy, but also a lack of understanding of the Socialist criticism of every state in general. We are in favour of a democratic republic as the best form of the state for the proletariat under capitalism, but we have no right to forget that wage slavery is the lot of the people even in the most democratic bourgeois republic. Furthermore, every state is a "special repressive force" for the suppression of the oppressed class. Consequently, no state is either "free" or a "people's state." Marx and Engels explained this repeatedly to their party comrades in the 'seventies.

Fifthly, in the same work of Engels, from which every one remembers his argument on the "withering away" of the state, there is also a disquisition on the significance of a violent revolution. The historical analysis of its rôle becomes, with Engels, a veritable panegyric on violent revolution. This, of course, "no one remembers"; to talk or even to think of the importance of this idea is not considered good form by contemporary Socialist parties, and in the daily propaganda and agitation among the masses it plays no part

whatever. Yet it is indissolubly bound up with the "withering away" of the state in one harmonious whole.

Here is Engels' argument:

... That force, however, plays another rôle (other than that of a diabolical power) in history, a revolutionary rôle; that, in the words of Marx, it is the midwife of every old society which is pregnant with the new; that it is the instrument with whose aid social movement forces its way through and shatters the dead, fossilised political forms—of this there is not a word in Herr Dühring. It is only with sighs and groans that he admits the possibility that force will perhaps be necessary for the overthrow of the economic system of exploitation—unfortunately! because all use of force, forsooth, demoralises the person who uses it. And this in spite of the immense moral and spiritual impetus which has resulted from every victorious revolution! And this in Germany, where a violent collision—which indeed may be forced on the people—would at least have the advantage of wiping out the servility which has permeated the national consciousness as a result of the humiliation of the Thirty Years' War. And this parson's mode of thought—lifeless, insipid and impotent—claims to impose itself on the most revolutionary Party which history has known?

How can this panegyric on violent revolution, which Engels insistently brought to the attention of the German Social-Democrats between 1878 and 1894, i.e., right to the time of his death, be combined with the theory of the "withering away" of the state to form one doctrine?

Usually the two views are combined by means of eclecticism, by an unprincipled, sophistic, arbitrary selection (to oblige the powers that be) of either one or the other argument, and in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred (if not more often), it is the idea of the "withering away" that is specially emphasised. Eclecticism is substituted for dialectics—this is the most usual, the most widespread phenomenon to be met with in the official Social-Democratic literature of our day in relation to Marxism. Such a substitution is, of course, nothing new; it may be observed even in the history of classic Greek philosophy. When Marxism is adulterated to become opportunism, the substitution of eclecticism for dialectics is the best method of deceiving the masses; it gives an illusory satisfaction; it seems to take into account all sides of the process, all the tendencies of development, all the contradictory factors and so forth, whereas in reality it offers no consistent and revolutionary view of the process of social development at all.

We have already said above and shall show more fully later that the teaching of Marx and Engels regarding the inevitability of a

^{*} Ibid.-Ed.

violent revolution refers to the bourgeois state. It cannot be replaced by the proletarian state (the dictatorship of the proletariat) through "withering away," but, as a general rule, only through a violent revolution. The panegyric sung in its honour by Engels and fully corresponding to the repeated declarations of Marx (remember the concluding passages of the Poverty of Philosophy and the Communist Manifesto, with its proud and open declaration of the inevitability of a violent revolution; remember Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme of 1875 in which, almost thirty years later, he mercilessly castigates the opportunist character of that programme 157)—this praise is by no means a mere "impulse," a mere declamation, or a polemical sally. The necessity of systematically fostering among the masses this and just this point of view about violent revolution lies at the root of the whole of Marx's and Engels' teaching. The neglect of such propaganda and agitation by both the present predominant social-chauvinist and the Kautskyist currents brings their betrayal of Marx's and Engels' teaching into prominent relief.

The replacement of the bourgeois by the proletarian state is impossible without a violent revolution. The abolition of the proletarian state, *i.e.*, of all states, is only possible through "withering away."

Marx and Engels gave a full and concrete exposition of these views in studying each revolutionary situation separately, in analysing the lessons of the experience of each individual revolution. We now pass to this, undoubtedly the most important part of their work.

CHAPTER II

THE EXPERIENCES OF 1848-1851

1. On the Eve of Revolution

THE first productions of mature Marxism—the Poverty of Philosophy and the Communist Manifesto—were created on the very eve of the Revolution of 1848. For this reason we have in them, side by side with a statement of the general principles of Marxism, a reflection, to a certain degree, of the concrete revolutionary situation of the time. Consequently, it will possibly be more to the point to examine what the authors of these works say about the state immediately before they draw conclusions from the experience of the years 1848-1851.

In the course of its development,—wrote Marx in the Poverty of Philosophy—the working class will replace the old bourgeois society by an association which excludes classes and their antagonism, and there will no longer be any real political power, for political power is precisely the official expression of the class antagonism within bourgeois society.*

It is instructive to compare with this general statement of the idea of the state disappearing after classes have disappeared, the statement contained in the *Communist Manifesto*, written by Marx and Engels a few months later—to be exact, in November, 1847:

In depicting the most general phases of the development of the proletariat, we traced the more or less veiled civil war, raging within existing society, up to the point where that war breaks out into open revolution, and where the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat. . . .

We have seen above that the first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise [literally "promote"] the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to establish democracy.

The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest by degrees all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the state, i.e., of the proletariat organised as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible.**

* Karl Marx, Poverty of Philosophy, London and New York, 1933 .-- Ed.

^{**} Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, Authorised English Translation of 1888, London and New York, 1932, pp. 20-30.—Ed.

Here we have a formulation of one of the most remarkable and most important ideas of Marxism on the subject of the state, namely, the idea of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" (as Marx and Engels began to term it after the Paris Commune); and also a definition of the state, in the highest degree interesting, but nevertheless also belonging to the category of "forgotten words" of Marxism: "the state, i.e., the proletariat organised as the ruling class."

This definition of the state, far from having ever been explained in the current propaganda and agitation literature of the official Social-Democratic parties, has been actually forgotten, as it is absolutely irreconcilable with reformism, and is a slap in the face of the common opportunist prejudices and philistine illusions about the "peaceful development of democracy."

The proletariat needs the state—this is repeated by all the opportunists, social-chauvinists and Kautskyists, who assure us that this is what Marx taught. They "forget," however, to add that, in the first place, the proletariat, according to Marx, needs only a state which is withering away, *i.e.*, a state which is so constituted that it begins to wither away immediately, and cannot but wither away; and, secondly, the workers need "a state, *i.e.*, the proletariat organised as the ruling class."

The state is a special organisation of force; it is the organisation of violence for the suppression of some class. What class must the proletariat suppress? Naturally, the exploiting class only, i.e., the bourgeoisie. The toilers need the state only to overcome the resistance of the exploiters, and only the proletariat can direct this suppression and bring it to fulfilment, for the proletariat is the only class that is thoroughly revolutionary, the only class that can unite all the toilers and the exploited in the struggle against the bourgeoisie, in completely displacing it.

The exploiting classes need political rule in order to maintain exploitation, i.e., in the selfish interests of an insignificant minority, and against the vast majority of the people. The exploited classes need political rule in order completely to abolish all exploitation, i.e., in the interests of the vast majority of the people, and against the insignificant minority consisting of the slave-owners of modern times—the landowners and the capitalists.

The petty-bourgeois democrats, these sham Socialists who have substituted for the class struggle dreams of harmony between classes, imagined even the transition to Socialism in a dreamy fashion—not in the form of the overthrow of the rule of the exploiting class, but in the form of the peaceful submission of the minority to a majority conscious of its aims. This petty-bourgeois Utopia, indissolubly connected with the idea of the state's being above classes, in practice led to the betrayal of the interests of the toiling classes, as was shown, for example, in the history of the French revolutions of 1848 and 1871, and in the participation of "Socialists" in bourgeois cabinets in England, France, Italy and other countries at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries.

Marx fought all his life against this petty-bourgeois Socialism—now reborn in Russia in the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Parties. He carried his analysis of the class struggle logically right to the doctrine of political power, the doctrine of the state.

The overthrow of bourgeois rule can be accomplished only by the proletariat, as the particular class, which, by the economic conditions of its existence, is being prepared for this work and is provided both with the opportunity and the power to perform it. While the capitalist class breaks up and atomises the peasantry and all the petty-bourgeois strata, it welds together, unites and organises the town proletariat. Only the proletariat—by virtue of its economic rôle in large-scale production—is capable of leading all the toiling and exploited masses, who are exploited, oppressed, crushed by the bourgeoisie not less, and often more, than the proletariat, but who are incapable of carrying on the struggle for their freedom independently.

The doctrine of the class struggle, as applied by Marx to the question of the state and of the Socialist revolution, leads inevitably to the recognition of the political rule of the proletariat, of its dictatorship, i.e., of a power shared with none and relying directly upon the armed force of the masses. The overthrow of the bourgeoisie is realisable only by the transformation of the proletariat into the ruling class, able to crush the inevitable and desperate resistance of the bourgeoisie, and to organise, for the new economic order, all the toiling and exploited masses.

The proletariat needs state power, the centralised organisation of force, the organisation of violence, both for the purpose of crushing the resistance of the exploiters and for the purpose of guiding the great mass of the population—the peasantry, the petty-bourgeoisie, the semi-proletarians—in the work of organising Socialist economy.

By educating a workers' party, Marxism educates the vanguard

of the proletariat, capable of assuming power and of leading the whole people to Socialism, of directing and organising the new order, of being the teacher, guide and leader of all the toiling and exploited in the task of building up their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie. As against this, the opportunism predominant at present breeds in the workers' party representatives of the better-paid workers, who lose touch with the rank and file, "get along" fairly well under capitalism, and sell their birthright for a mess of pottage, i.e., renounce their rôle of revolutionary leaders of the people against the bourgeoisie.

"The state, i.e., the proletariat organised as the ruling class"—this theory of Marx's is indissolubly connected with all his teaching concerning the revolutionary rôle of the proletariat in history. The culmination of this rôle is proletarian dictatorship, the political rule of the proletariat.

But, if the proletariat needs the state, as a special form of organisation of violence against the capitalist class, the following question arises almost automatically: is it thinkable that such an organisation can be created without a preliminary break-up and destruction of the state machinery created for its own use by the bourgeoisie? The Communist Manifesto leads straight to this conclusion, and it is of this conclusion that Marx speaks when summing up the experience of the revolution of 1848-1851.

2. RESULTS OF THE REVOLUTION

On the question of the state which we are concerned with, Marx sums up his conclusions from the revolution of 1848-1851 in the following observations contained in his work, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte:

... But the revolution is thorough. It is still on its way through purgatory. It is completing its task methodically. By December 2nd, 1851 [the day of Louis Bonaparte's coup d'état], it had completed one-half of its preparatory work; now it is completing the other half. First, it perfected parliamentary power, so that it could overthrow it. Now, when it has achieved this, it is perfecting executive power, reducing it to its purest terms, isolating it, setting it over against itself as the sole object of reproach, so that it can concentrate against it all its forces of destruction [the italics are ours]. And when it has completed this second half of its preparatory work, Europe will leap to its feet and shout with joy: well grubbed, old mole!

This executive power with its huge bureaucratic and military organisation, with its extensive and artificial state machinery, a horde of half a million offi-

cials in addition to an army of another half a million, this frightful body of parasites wound like a caul about the body of French society and clogging its every pore, arose in the time of the absolute monarchy in the period of the fall of feudalism, which it helped to hasten.

The first French Revolution developed centralisation,

but at the same time it developed the scope, the attributes and the servants of the government power. Napoleon perfected this state machinery. The legitimate monarchy and the July monarchy added nothing to it but a greater division of labour. . . .

Finally, in its struggle against the revolution, the parliamentary Republic found itself compelled to strengthen with its repressive measures, the resources and the centralisation of the government power. All revolutions brought this machine to greater perfection, instead of breaking it up [the italics are ours]. The parties which alternately contended for supremacy looked on the capture of this vast state edifice as the chief spoils of the victor.*

In this remarkable passage Marxism makes a tremendous step forward in comparison with the position of the Communist Manifesto. There the question of the state still is treated extremely in the abstract, in the most general terms and expressions. Here the question is treated in a concrete manner, and the conclusion is most precise, definite, practical and palpable: all revolutions which have taken place up to the present have helped to perfect the state machinery, whereas it must be shattered, broken to pieces.

This conclusion is the chief and fundamental thesis in the Marxist theory of the state. Yet it is this fundamental thesis which has been not only completely forgotten by the dominant official Social-Democratic parties, but directly distorted (as we shall see later) by the foremost theoretician of the Second International, K. Kautsky.

In the Communist Manifesto are summed up the general lessons of history, which force us to see in the state the organ of class domination, and lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the proletariat cannot overthrow the bourgeoisie without first conquering political power, without obtaining political rule, without transforming the state into the "proletariat organised as the ruling class"; and that this proletarian state will begin to wither away immediately after its victory, because in a society without class antagonisms, the state is unnecessary and impossible. The question as to how, from the point of view of historical development, this replacement of the capitalist state by the proletarian state shall take place, is not raised here.

^{*} Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, London and New York, 1933.—Ed.

It is precisely this question that Marx raises and solves in 1852. True to his philosophy of dialectical materialism, Marx takes as his basis the experience of the great revolutionary years 1848-1851. Here, as everywhere, his teaching is the summing up of experience, illuminated by a profound philosophical world-conception and a rich knowledge of history.

The problem of the state is put concretely: how did the bourgeois state, the state machinery necessary for the rule of the bourgeoisie, come into being? What were its changes, what its evolution in the course of the bourgeois revolutions and in the face of the independent actions of the oppressed classes? What are the tasks of the proletariat relative to this state machinery?

The centralised state power peculiar to bourgeois society came into being in the period of the fall of absolutism. Two institutions are especially characteristic of this state machinery: bureaucracy and the standing army. In their works, Marx and Engels mention repeatedly the thousand threads which connect these institutions with the bourgeoisie. The experience of every worker illustrates this connection in the clearest and most impressive manner. From its own bitter experience, the working class learns to recognise this connection; that is why it so easily acquires, so completely absorbs the doctrine revealing this inevitable connection, a doctrine which the petty-bourgeois democrats either ignorantly and light-heartedly deny, or, still more light-heartedly, admit "in general," forgetting to draw adequate practical conclusions.

Bureaucracy and the standing army constitute a "parasite" on the body of bourgeois society—a parasite born of the internal antagonisms which tear that society asunder, but essentially a parasite, "clogging every pore" of existence. The Kautskyist opportunism prevalent at present within official Social-Democracy considers this view of the state as a parasitic organism to be the peculiar and exclusive property of Anarchism. Naturally, this distortion of Marxism is extremely useful to those philistines who have brought Socialism to the unheard-of disgrace of justifying and embellishing the imperialist war by applying to it the term of "national defence"; but none the less it is an absolute distortion.

The development, perfecting and strengthening of the bureaucratic and military apparatus has been going on through all the bourgeois revolutions of which Europe has seen so many since the fall of feudalism. It is particularly the petty bourgeoisie that is attracted to the side of the big bourgeoisie and to its allegiance, largely by means of this apparatus, which provides the upper strata of the peasantry, small artisans and tradesmen with a number of comparatively comfortable, quiet and respectable berths raising their holders above the people. Consider what happened in Russia during the six months following March 12, 1917. The government posts which hitherto had been given by preference to members of the Black Hundreds now became the booty of Cadets, Mensheviks and S.-R.'s. Nobody really thought of any serious reform. They were to be put off "until the Constituent Assembly," which, in its turn, was eventually to be put off until the end of the war! But there was no delay. no waiting for a Constituent Assembly in the matter of dividing the spoils, of getting hold of the berths of Ministers, Assistant-Ministers, governor-generals, etc., etc.! The game that went on of changing the combination of persons forming the Provisional Government was, in essence, only the expression of this division and re-division of the "spoils," which was going on high and low, throughout the country, throughout the central and local government. The practical results of the six months between March 12 and September 9, 1917, beyond all dispute, are: reforms shelved, distribution of officials' berths accomplished, and "mistakes" in the distribution corrected by a few re-distributions.

But the longer the process of "re-apportioning" the bureaucratic apparatus among the various bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties (among the Cadets, S.-R.'s and Mensheviks, if we take the case of Russia) goes on, the more clearly the oppressed classes, with the proletariat at their head, realise that they are irreconcilably hostile to the whole of bourgeois society. Hence the necessity for all bourgeois parties, even for the most democratic and "revolutionary-democratic" among them, to increase their repressive measures against the revolutionary proletariat, to strengthen the apparatus of repression, i.e., the same state machinery. Such a course of events compels the revolution "to concentrate all its forces of destruction" against the state power, and to regard the problem as one, not of perfecting the machinery of the state, but of breaking up and annihilating it.

It was not logical theorising, but the actual course of events, the living experience of 1848-1851, that produced such a statement of the problem. To what extent Marx held strictly to the solid ground of historical experience we can see from the fact that, in 1852, he

did not as yet deal concretely with the question of what was to replace this state machinery that was to be destroyed. Experience had not yet yielded material for the solution of this problem which history placed on the order of the day later on, in 1871. What could be laid down in 1852 with the accuracy of observation characterising the natural sciences, was that the proletarian revolution had approached the task of "concentrating all its forces of destruction" against the state, of "breaking up" the governmental machinery.

Here the question may arise: is it correct to generalise the experience, observations and conclusions of Marx, to apply them to a wider field than the history of France during the three years 1848-1851? To analyse this question, let us recall, first of all, a certain remark of Engels, and then proceed to examine the facts.

France—wrote Engels in his introduction to the third edition of the Eighteenth Brumaire—is the country where, more than anywhere else, historical class struggles have been always fought through to a decisive conclusion, and therefore where also the changing political forms within which the struggles developed, and in which their results were summed up, were stamped in sharpest outline. The centre of feudalism in the Middle Ages, the model country (since the Renaissance) of a rigidly unified monarchy, in the great revolution France shattered feudalism and established the unadulterated rule of the bourgeoisie in a more classical form than any other European country. And here also the struggle of the rising proletariat against the ruling bourgeoisie appeared in an acute form such as was unknown elsewhere.*

The last sentence is out of date, inasmuch as there has been a lull in the revolutionary struggle of the French proletariat since 1871; though, long as this lull may be, it in no way excludes the possibility that, in the coming proletarian revolution, France may once more reveal itself as the traditional home of the struggle of classes to a finish.

Let us, however, cast a general glance over the history of the more advanced countries during the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. We shall see that the same process has been going on more slowly, in more varied forms, on a much wider field: on the one hand, a development of "parliamentary power," not only in the republican countries (France, America, Switzerland), but also in the monarchies (England, Germany to a certain extent, Italy, the Scandinavian countries, etc.); on the other hand, a struggle for power of various bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties distributing and redistributing the "spoils" of officials' berths, the founda-

^{*} Ibid.-Ed.

tions of capitalist society remaining all the while unchanged; finally, the perfecting and strengthening of the "executive power," its bureaucratic and military apparatus.

There is no doubt that these are the features common to the latest stage in the evolution of all capitalist states generally. In the three years, 1848-1851, France showed, in a swift, sharp, concentrated form, all those processes of development which are inherent in the whole capitalist world.

Imperialism in particular—the era of banking capital, the era of gigantic capitalist monopolies, the era of the transformation of monopoly capitalism into state monopoly-capitalism—shows an unprecedented strengthening of the "state machinery" and an unprecedented growth of its bureaucratic and military apparatus, side by side with the increase of repressive measures against the proletariat, alike in the monarchical and the freest republican countries.

At the present time, world history is undoubtedly leading, on an incomparably larger scale than in 1852, to the "concentration of all the forces" of the proletarian revolution for the purpose of "destroying" the state machinery.

As to what the proletariat will put in its place, instructive data on the subject were furnished by the Paris Commune.

3. The Formulation of the Question by Marx in 1852 *

In 1907 Mehring published in the magazine Neue Zeit (Vol. XXV-2, p. 164) extracts from a letter by Marx to Weydemeyer dated March 5, 1852. In this letter, among other things, is the following noteworthy observation:

As far as I am concerned, the honour does not belong to me for having discovered the existence either of classes in modern society or of the struggle between the classes. Bourgeois historians a long time before me expounded the historical development of this class struggle, and bourgeois economists, the economic anatomy of classes. What was new on my part, was to prove the following: (1) that the existence of classes is connected only with certain historical struggles which arise out of the development of production [historische Entwicklungskämpfe der Produktion]; (2) that class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat; (3) that this dictatorship is itself only a transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society.

In these words Marx has succeeded in expressing with striking clearness, first, the chief and concrete differences between his teach-

^{*}This section was added by Lenin in the second Russian edition of State and Revolution, 1918.—Ed.

ings and those of the most advanced and profound thinkers of the bourgeoisie, and second, the essence of his teachings concerning the state.

The main point in the teaching of Marx is the class struggle. This has very often been said and written. But this is not true. Out of this error, here and there, springs an opportunist distortion of Marxism, such a falsification of it as to make it acceptable to the bourgeoisie. The theory of the class struggle was not created by Marx, but by the bourgeoisie before Marx and is, generally speaking, acceptable to the bourgeoisie. He who recognises only the class struggle is not yet a Marxist; he may be found not to have gone beyond the boundaries of bourgeois reasoning and politics. To limit Marxism to the teaching of the class struggle means to curtail Marxism—to distort it, to reduce it to something which is acceptable to the bourgeoisie. A Marxist is one who extends the acceptance of class struggle to the acceptance of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Herein lies the deepest difference between a Marxist and an ordinary petty or big bourgeois. On this touchstone it is necessary to test a real understanding and acceptance of Marxism. And it is not astonishing that, when the history of Europe put before the working class this question in a practical way, not only all opportunists and reformists but all Kautskyists (people who vacillate between reformism and Marxism) turned out to be miserable philistines and pettybourgeois democrats, denying the dictatorship of the proletariat. Kautsky's pamphlet, Dictatorship of the Proletariat, published in August, 1918, i.e., long after the first edition of this book, is an example of petty-bourgeois distortion of Marxism and base renunciation of it in practice, while hypocritically recognising it in words (see my pamphlet, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, Petrograd and Moscow, 1918).*

The present-day opportunism in the person of its main representative, the former Marxist, K. Kautsky, comes wholly under Marx's characterisation of the bourgeois position as quoted above, for this opportunism limits the field of recognition of the class struggle to the realm of bourgeois relationships. (Within this realm, inside of its framework, not a single educated liberal will refuse to recognise the class struggle "in principle"!) Opportunism does not lead the recognition of class struggle up to the main point, up to the period of transition from capitalism to Communism, up to the period

^{*} See Collected Works, Volume XXIII.-Ed.

of overthrowing and completely abolishing the bourgeoisie. In reality, this period inevitably becomes a period of unusually violent class struggles in their sharpest possible forms and, therefore, the state during this period inevitably must be a state that is democratic in a new way (for the proletariat and the poor in general) and dictatorial in a new way (against the bourgeoisie).

Further, the substance of the teachings of Marx about the state is assimilated only by one who understands that the dictatorship of a single class is necessary not only for any class society generally, not only for the proletariat which has overthrown the bourgeoisie, but for the entire historic period which separates capitalism from "classless society," from Communism. The forms of bourgeois states are exceedingly variegated, but their essence is the same: in one way or another, all these states are in the last analysis inevitably a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The transition from capitalism to Communism will certainly bring a great variety and abundance of political forms, but the essence will inevitably be only one: the dictatorship of the proletariat.

CHAPTER III

EXPERIENCE OF THE PARIS COMMUNE OF 1871: MARX'S ANALYSIS

1. In What Does the Heroism of the Communards Consist?

It is well known that in the autumn of 1870, a few months prior to the Commune, Marx warned the Paris workers that an attempt to overthrow the government would be the folly of despair. But when, in March, 1871, a decisive battle was forced upon the workers and they accepted it, when the uprising had become a fact, Marx welcomed the proletarian revolution with the greatest enthusiasm, in spite of unfavourable auguries. Marx did not assume the rigid attitude of pedantically condemning an "untimely" movement as did the ill-famed Russian renegade from Marxism, Plekhanov, who, in November, 1905, wrote encouragingly about the workers' and peasants' struggle but, after December, 1905, cried, liberal fashion: "They should not have taken up arms." 188

Marx, however, was not only enthusiastic about the heroism of the Communards who "stormed the heavens," as he expressed himself. He saw in the mass revolutionary movement, although it did not attain its aim, an historic experiment of gigantic importance, a certain advance of the world proletarian revolution, a practical step more important than hundreds of programmes and discussions. To analyse this experiment, to draw from it lessons in tactics, to reexamine his theory in the new light it afforded—such was the problem as it presented itself to Marx.

The only "correction" which Marx thought it necessary to make in the *Communist Manifesto* was made by him on the basis of the revolutionary experience of the Paris Communards.

The last preface to a new German edition of the Communist Manifesto signed by both its authors is dated June 24, 1872. In this preface the authors, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, say that the programme of the Communist Manifesto is now "in places out of date."

One thing especially—they continue—was proved by the Commune, viz., that the "working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and wield it for its own purposes." *

The words within quotation marks in this passage are borrowed by its authors from Marx's book, The Civil War in France.

It thus appears that one principal and fundamental lesson of the Paris Commune was considered by Marx and Engels to be of such enormous importance that they introduced it as a vital correction into the Communist Manifesto.

It is most characteristic that it is precisely this vital correction which has been distorted by the opportunists, and its meaning, probably, is not known to nine-tenths, if not ninety-nine-hundredths, of the readers of the *Communist Manifesto*. We shall deal with this distortion more fully further on, in a chapter devoted specially to distortions. It will be sufficient here to note that the current vulgar "interpretation" of Marx's famous utterance quoted above consists in asserting that Marx is here emphasising the idea of gradual development, in contradistinction to a seizure of power, and so on.

As a matter of fact, exactly the opposite is the case. Marx's idea is that the working class must break up, shatter the "ready-made state machinery," and not confine itself merely to taking possession of it.

On April 12, 1871, i.e., just at the time of the Commune, Marx wrote to Kugelmann:

If you look at the last chapter of my Eighteenth Brumaire, you will see that I declare that the next attempt of the French Revolution must be: not, as in the past, to transfer the bureaucratic and military machinery from one hand to the other, but to break it up [Marx's italics—the original is zerbrechen]; and this is the precondition of any real people's revolution on the Continent. And this is what our heroic party comrades in Paris have attempted.**

In these words, "to break up the bureaucratic and military machinery," is contained, briefly formulated, the principal lesson of Marxism on the tasks of the proletariat in relation to the state during a revolution. And it is just this lesson which has not only been

^{*} Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, London and New York, 1932, p. 7.—Ed.

^{**} Neue Zeit, XX-1, 1901-1902, p. 709. The letters from Marx to Kugelmann have come out in Russian in no less than two editions, one of them edited and with an introduction by me. 159 [Karl Marx, Letters to Kugelmann, London and New York, 1932.—Ed.].

forgotten, but downright distorted, by the prevailing Kautskyist "interpretation" of Marxism.

As for Marx's reference to the Eighteenth Brumaire, we have quoted above the corresponding passage in full.

It is interesting to note two particular points in the passages of Marx quoted. First, he confines his conclusions to the Continent. This was natural in 1871, when England was still the model of a purely capitalist country, but without a military machine and, in large measure, without a bureaucracy. Hence Marx excluded England, where a revolution, even a people's revolution, could be imagined, and was then possible, without the preliminary condition of destroying the "ready-made state machinery."

Today, in 1917, in the epoch of the first great imperialist war, this exception made by Marx is no longer valid. Both England and America, the greatest and last representatives of Anglo-Saxon "liberty" in the sense of the absence of militarism and bureaucracy, have today plunged headlong into the all-European dirty, bloody morass of military bureaucratic institutions to which everything is subordinated and which trample everything under foot. Today, both in England and in America, the "precondition of any real people's revolution" is the break-up, the shattering of the "ready-made state machinery" (brought in those countries, between 1914 and 1917, to general "European" imperialist perfection).

Secondly, particular attention should be given to Marx's extremely profound remark that the destruction of the military and bureaucratic apparatus of the state is "the precondition of any real people's revolution." This idea of a "people's" revolution seems strange on Marx's lips, and the Russian Plekhanovists and Mensheviks, those followers of Struve who wish to be considered Marxists, might possibly declare such an expression to be a "slip of the tongue." They have reduced Marxism to such a state of poverty-stricken "liberal" distortion that nothing exists for them beyond the distinction between bourgeois and proletarian revolution—and even that distinction they understand in an entirely lifeless way.

If we take for examples the revolutions of the twentieth century, we shall, of course, have to recognise both the Portuguese and the Turkish revolutions as bourgeois. Neither, however, is a "people's" revolution, inasmuch as the mass of the people, the enormous majority, does not make its appearance actively, independently, with its own economic and political demands, in either the one or the other.

On the other hand, the Russian bourgeois revolution of 1905-1907, although it presented no such "brilliant" successes as at times fell to the lot of the Portuguese and Turkish revolutions, was undoubtedly a "real people's" revolution, since the mass of the people, the majority, the lowest social "depths," crushed down by oppression and exploitation, were rising independently, since they put on the entire rourse of the revolution the stamp of their demands, their attempts at building up, in their own way, a new society in place of the old society that was being shattered.

In the Europe of 1871, the proletariat on the Continent did not constitute the majority of the people. A "people's" revolution, actually sweeping the majority into its current, could be such only if it embraced both the proletariat and the peasantry. Both classes then constituted the "people." Both classes are united by the circumstance that the "bureaucratic and military state machinery" oppresses, crushes, exploits them. To shatter this machinery, to break it up—this is the true interest of the "people," of its majority, the workers and most of the peasants, this is the "preliminary condition" of a free union of the poorest peasantry with the proletarians; while, without such a union, democracy is unstable and Socialist reorganisation is impossible.

Towards such a union, as is well known, the Paris Commune was making its way, though it did not reach its goal, owing to a number of circumstances, internal and external.

Consequently, when speaking of "a real people's revolution," Marx, without in the least forgetting the peculiar characteristics of the petty bourgeoisie (he spoke of them much and often), was very carefully taking into account the actual interrelation of classes in most of the continental European states in 1871. On the other hand, he stated that the "breaking up" of the state machinery is demanded by the interests both of the workers and of the peasants, that it unites them, that it places before them the common task of removing the "parasite" and replacing it by something new.

By what exactly?

2. What Is to Replace the Shattered State Machinery?

In 1847, in the Communist Manifesto, Marx answered this question still in a purely abstract manner, stating the problems rather than the methods of solving them. To replace this machinery by "the proletariat organised as the ruling class," by "establishing democracy"—such was the answer of the Communist Manifesto.

Without resorting to Utopias, Marx waited for the experience of a mass movement to produce the answer to the problem as to the exact forms which this organisation of the proletariat as the ruling class will assume and as to the exact manner in which this organisation will be combined with the most complete, most consistent "establishment of democracy."

The experiment of the Commune, meagre as it was, was subjected by Marx to the most careful analysis in his *The Civil War in France*. Let us quote the most important passages of this work.

There developed in the nineteenth century, he says, originating from the days of absolute monarchy, "the centralised state power, with its ubiquitous organs of standing army, police, bureaucracy, clergy and judicature." With the development of class antagonism between capital and labour, "the state power assumed more and more the character of the national power of capital over labour, of a public force organised for social enslavement, of an engine of class despotism. After every revolution marking a progressive phase in the class struggle, the purely repressive character of the state power stands out in bolder and bolder relief." The state power, after the revolution of 1848-1849 became "the national war engine of capital against labour." The Second Empire consolidated this.

"The direct antithesis of the Empire was the Commune," says Marx. It was the "positive form" of "a republic that was not only to supersede the monarchical form of class rule, but class rule itself."

What was this "positive" form of the proletarian, the Socialist republic? What was the state it was beginning to create?

"The first decree of the Commune . . . was the suppression of the standing army, and the substitution for it of the armed people," says Marx.*

This demand now figures in the programme of every party calling itself Socialist. But the value of their programmes is best shown by the behaviour of our Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who, even after the revolution of March 12, 1917, refused to carry out this demand in practice!

The Commune was formed of municipal councillors, chosen by universal suffrage in various wards of the town, responsible and revocable at short terms. The majority of its members were naturally working men, or acknowledged rep-

^{*} Karl Marx, The Civil War in France, London and New York, 1932.-Ed.

resentatives of the working class.... Instead of continuing to be the agent of the Central Government, the police was at once stripped of its political attributes, and turned into the responsible and at all times revocable agent of the Commune. So were the officials of all other branches of the administration. From the members of the Commune downwards, the public service had to be done at workmen's wages. The vested interests and the representation allowances of the high dignitaries of state disappeared along with the high dignitaries themselves...

Having once got rid of the standing army and the police, the physical force elements of the old government, the Commune was anxious to break the

spiritual force of repression, the "parson power." . . .

The judicial functionaries were to be divested of [their] sham independence.
... Like the rest of public servants, magistrates and judges were to be elective, responsible and revocable.*

Thus the Commune would appear to have replaced the shattered state machinery "only" by fuller democracy: abolition of the standing army; all officials to be fully elective and subject to recall. But, as a matter of fact this "only" signifies a gigantic replacement of one type of institution by others of a fundamentally different order. Here we observe a case of "transformation of quantity into quality": democracy, introduced as fully and consistently as is generally thinkable, is transformed from capitalist democracy into proletarian democracy; from the state (i.e., a special force for the suppression of a particular class) into something which is no longer really the state in the accepted sense of the word.

It is still necessary to suppress the bourgeoisie and crush its resistance. This was particularly necessary for the Commune; and one of the reasons of its defeat was that it did not do this with sufficient determination. But the organ of suppression is now the majority of the population, and not a minority, as was always the case under slavery, serfdom, and wage labour. And, once the majority of the people itself suppresses its oppressors, a "special force" for suppression is no longer necessary. In this sense the state begins to wither away. Instead of the special institutions of a privileged minority (privileged officialdom, heads of a standing army), the majority can itself directly fulfil all these functions; and the more the discharge of the functions of state power devolves upon the people generally, the less need is there for the existence of this power.

In this connection the Commune's measure emphasised by Marx, particularly worthy of note, is: the abolition of all representation allowances, and of all money privileges in the case of officials, the

^{*} Ibid.-Ed.

reduction of the remuneration of all servants of the state to "workingmen's wages." Here is shown, more clearly than anywhere else, the break from a bourgeois democracy to a proletarian democracy, from the democracy of the oppressors to the democracy of the oppressed classes, from the state as a "special force for suppression" of a given class to the suppression of the oppressors by the whole force of the majority of the people—the workers and the peasants. And it is precisely on this most striking point, perhaps the most important as far as the problem of the state is concerned, that the teachings of Marx have been entirely forgotten! In popular commentaries, whose number is legion, this is not mentioned. It is "proper" to keep silent about it as if it were a piece of old-fashioned "naïveté," just as the Christians, after Christianity had attained the position of a state religion, "forgot" the "naïvetés" of primitive Christianity with its democratic-revolutionary spirit.

The reduction of the remuneration of the highest state officials seems "simply" a demand of naïve, primitive democracy. One of the "founders" of modern opportunism, the former Social-Democrat, Eduard Bernstein, has more than once exercised his talents in repeating the vulgar bourgeois jeers at "primitive" democracy. 160 Like all opportunists, including the present Kautskyists, he fails completely to understand that, first of all, the transition from capitalism to Socialism is impossible without "return," in a measure, to "primitive" democracy (how can one otherwise pass on to the discharge of all the state functions by the majority of the population and by every individual of the population?); and, secondly, he forgets that "primitive democracy" on the basis of capitalism and capitalist culture is not the same primitive democracy as in prehistoric or pre-capitalist times. Capitalist culture has created large-scale production, factories, railways, the postal service, telephones, etc., and on this basis the great majority of functions of the old "state power" have become so simplified and can be reduced to such simple operations of registration, filing and checking that they will be quite within the reach of every literate person, and it will be possible to perform them for "workingmen's wages," which circumstance can (and must) strip those functions of every shadow of privilege, of every appearance of "official grandeur."

All officials, without exception, elected and subject to recall at any time, their salaries reduced to "workingmen's wages"—these simple and "self-evident" democratic measures, which, completely

uniting the interests of the workers and the majority of peasants, at the same time serve as a bridge leading from capitalism to Socialism. These measures refer to the state, to the purely political reconstruction of society; but, of course, they acquire their full meaning and significance only in connection with the "expropriation of the expropriators," either accomplished or in preparation, *i.e.*, with the turning of capitalist private ownership of the means of production into social ownership. Marx wrote:

The Commune made that catchword of bourgeois revolutions, cheap government, a reality by destroying the two greatest sources of expenditure—the standing army and state functionarism.*

From the peasantry, as from other sections of the petty bourgeoisie, only an insignificant few "rise to the top," occupy "a place in the sun" in the bourgeois sense, i.e., become either well-to-do people or secure and privileged officials. The great majority of peasants in every capitalist country where the peasantry exists (and the majority of capitalist countries are of this kind) is oppressed by the government and longs for its overthrow, longs for "cheap" government. This can be realised only by the proletariat; and by realising it, the proletariat makes at the same time a step forward towards the Socialist reconstruction of the state.

3. THE DESTRUCTION OF PARLIAMENTARISM

The Commune—says Marx—was to be a working, not a parliamentary body, executive and legislative at the same time. . . .

Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to represent the people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in Communes, as individual suffrage serves every other employer in the search for the workmen and managers in his business.**

This remarkable criticism of parliamentarism made in 1871 also belongs to the "forgotten words" of Marxism, thanks to the prevalence of social-chauvinism and opportunism. Ministers and professional parliamentarians, traitors to the proletariat and Socialist "sharks" of our day, have left all criticism of parliamentarism to the Anarchists, and, on this wonderfully intelligent ground, denounce all criticism of parliamentarism as "Anarchism"!! It is not surprising that the proletariat of the most "advanced" parliamentary countries, being disgusted with such "Socialists" as Messrs. Scheide-

mann, David, Legien, Sembat, Renaudel, Henderson, Vandervelde, Stauning, Branting, Bissolati and Co. has been giving its sympathies more and more to Anarcho-syndicalism, in spite of the fact that it is but the twin brother of opportunism.

But to Marx, revolutionary dialectics was never the empty fashionable phrase, the toy rattle, which Plekhanov, Kautsky and the others have made of it. Marx knew how to break with Anarchism ruthlessly for its inability to make use of the "stable" of bourgeois parliamentarism, especially at a time when the situation was not revolutionary; but at the same time he knew how to subject parliamentarism to a really revolutionary-proletarian criticism.

To decide once every few years which member of the ruling class is to repress and oppress the people through parliament—this is the real essence of bourgeois parliamentarism, not only in parliamentary-constitutional monarchies, but also in the most democratic republics.

But, if the question of the state is raised, if parliamentarism is to be regarded as one institution of the state, what then, from the point of view of the tasks of the proletariat in *this* realm, is to be the way out of parliamentarism? How can we do without it?

Again and again we must repeat: the teaching of Marx, based on the study of the Commune, has been so completely forgotten that any criticism of parliamentarism other than Anarchist or reactionary is quite unintelligible to a present-day "Social-Democrat" (read: present-day traitor to Socialism).

The way out of parliamentarism is to be found, of course, not in the abolition of the representative institutions and the elective principle, but in the conversion of the representative institutions from mere "talking shops" into working bodies. "The Commune was to be a working, not a parliamentary body, executive and legislative at the same time."

"A working, not a parliamentary body"—this hits the vital spot of present-day parliamentarians and the parliamentary Social-Democratic "lap-dogs"! Take any parliamentary country, from America to Switzerland, from France to England, Norway and so forth—the actual work of the "state" there is done behind the scenes and is carried out by the departments, the offices and the staffs. Parliament itself is given up to talk for the special purpose of fooling the "common people." This is so true that even in the Russian republic, a bourgeois-democratic republic, all these aims of parliamentarism were immediately revealed, even before a real parliament was cre-

ated. Such heroes of rotten philistinism as the Skobelevs and the Tseretelis, Chernovs and Avksentyevs, have managed to pollute even the Soviets, after the model of the most despicable petty-bourgeois parliamentarism, by turning them into hollow talking shops. In the Soviets, the Right Honourable "Socialist" Ministers are fooling the confiding peasants with phrase-mongering and resolutions. In the government itself a sort of permanent quadrille is going on in order that, on the one hand, as many S.-R.'s and Mensheviks as possible may get at the "gravy," the "soft" jobs, and, on the other hand, the attention of the people may be occupied. All the while the real "state" business is being done in the offices, in the staffs.

The Dyelo Naroda, organ of the ruling Socialist-Revolutionary Party, recently admitted in an editorial article-with the incomparable candour of people of "good society," in which "all" are engaged in political prostitution—that even in those ministries which belong to the "Socialists" (please excuse the term), the whole bureaucratic apparatus remains essentially the same as of old, working as of old, and "freely" obstructing revolutionary measures. 161 Even if we did not have this admission, would not the actual history of the participation of the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks in the government prove this? It is only characteristic that—while in ministerial company with the Cadets-Messrs, Chernov, Rusanov, Zenzinov and other editors of the Dyelo Naroda have so completely lost all shame that they unblushingly proclaim, as if it were a mere bagatelle, that in "their" ministries everything remains as of old!! Revolutionarydemocratic phrases to gull the Simple Simons; bureaucracy and red tape for the "benefit" of the capitalists-here you have the essence of the "honourable" coalition.

The venal and rotten parliamentarism of bourgeois society is replaced in the Commune by institutions in which freedom of opinion and discussion does not degenerate into deception, for the parliamentarians must themselves work, must themselves execute their own laws, must themselves verify their results in actual life, must themselves be directly responsible to their electorate. Representative institutions remain, but parliamentarism as a special system, as a division of labour between the legislative and the executive functions, as a privileged position for the deputies, no longer exists. Without representative institutions we cannot imagine democracy, not even proletarian democracy; but we can and must think of democracy without parliamentarism, if criticism of bourgeois

society is not mere empty words for us, if the desire to overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie is our serious and sincere desire, and not a mere "election cry" for catching workingmen's votes, as it is with the Mensheviks and S.-R.'s, the Scheidemanns, the Legiens, the Sembats and the Vanderveldes.

It is most instructive to notice that, in speaking of the functions of those officials who are necessary both in the Commune and in the proletarian democracy, Marx compares them with the workers of "every other employer," that is, of the usual capitalist concern, with its "workers and managers."

There is no trace of Utopianism in Marx, in the sense of inventing or imagining a "new" society. No, he studies, as a process of natural history, the birth of the new society from the old, the forms of transition from the latter to the former. He takes the actual experience of a mass proletarian movement and tries to draw practical lessons from it. He "learns" from the Commune, as all great revolutionary thinkers have not been afraid to learn from the experience of great movements of the oppressed classes, never preaching them pedantic "sermons" (such as Plekhanov's: "They should not have taken up arms"; or Tsereteli's: "A class must know how to limit itself").

To destroy officialdom immediately, everywhere, completely—this cannot be thought of. That is a Utopia. But to break up at once the old bureaucratic machine and to start immediately the construction of a new one which will enable us gradually to reduce all officialdom to naught—this is no Utopia, it is the experience of the Commune, it is the direct and urgent task of the revolutionary proletariat.

Capitalism simplifies the functions of "state" administration; it makes it possible to throw off "commanding" methods and to reduce everything to a matter of the organisation of the proletarians (as the ruling class), hiring "workmen and managers" in the name of the whole of society.

We are not Utopians, we do not indulge in "dreams" of how best to do away immediately with all administration, with all subordination; these Anarchist dreams, based upon a lack of understanding of the task of proletarian dictatorship, are asically foreign to Marxism, and, as a matter of fact, they serve but to put off the Socialist revolution until human nature is different. No, we want the Socialist

revolution with human nature as it is now, with human nature that cannot do without subordination, control, and "managers."

But if there be subordination, it must be to the armed vanguard of all the exploited and the labouring—to the proletariat. The specific "commanding" methods of the state officials can and must begin to be replaced—immediately, within twenty-four hours—by the simple functions of "managers" and bookkeepers, functions which are now already within the capacity of the average city dweller and can well be performed for "workingmen's wages."

We organise large-scale production, starting from what capitalism has already created: we workers ourselves, relying on our own experience as workers, establishing a strict, an iron discipline, supported by the state power of the armed workers, shall reduce the rôle of the state officials to that of simply carrying out our instructions as responsible, moderately paid "managers" (of course, with technical knowledge of all sorts, types and degrees). This is our proletarian task, with this we can and must begin when carrying through a proletarian revolution. Such a beginning, on the basis of large-scale production, of itself leads to the gradual "withering away" of all bureaucracy, to the gradual creation of a new order, an order without quotation marks, an order which has nothing to do with wage slavery, an order in which the more and more simplified functions of control and accounting will be performed by each in turn, will then become a habit, and will finally die out as special functions of a special stratum of the population.

A witty German Social-Democrat of the 'seventies of the last century called the post-office an example of the socialist system. This is very true. At present the post-office is a business organised on the lines of a state capitalist monopoly. Imperialism is gradually transforming all trusts into organisations of a similar type. Above the "common" workers, who are overloaded with work and starving, there stands here the same bourgeois bureaucracy. But the mechanism of social management is here already to hand. Overthrow the capitalists, crush with the iron hand of the armed workers the resistance of these exploiters, break the bureaucratic machine of the modern state—and you have before you a mechanism of the highest technical equipment, freed of "parasites," capable of being set into motion by the united workers themselves who hire their own technicians, managers, bookkeepers, and pay them all, as, indeed, every "state" official, with the usual workers' wage. Here is a con-

crete, practicable task, immediately realisable in relation to all trusts, a task that frees the workers of exploitation and makes use of the experience (especially in the realm of the construction of state) which the Commune began to reveal in practice.

To organise the whole national economy like the postal system, in such a way that the technicians, managers, bookkeepers as well as all officials, should receive no higher wages than "workingmen's wages," all under the control and leadership of the armed proletariat—this is our immediate aim. This is the kind of state and economic basis we need. This is what will produce the destruction of parliamentarism, while retaining representative institutions. This is what will free the labouring classes from the prostitution of these institutions by the bourgeoisie.

4. THE ORGANISATION OF NATIONAL UNITY

In a rough sketch of national organisation which the Commune had no time to develop, it states clearly that the Commune was to be the political form of even the smallest country hamlet. . . .

From these Communes would be elected the "National Delegation" at Paris.

The few but important functions which still would remain for a central government were not to be suppressed, as has been intentionally misstated, but were to be discharged by Communal, and, therefore, strictly responsible agents. The unity of the nation was not to be broken; but, on the contrary, to be organised by the Communal constitution, and to become a reality by the destruction of the state power which claimed to be the embodiment of that unity independent of, and superior to, the nation itself, from which it was but a parasitic excrescence. While the merely repressive organs of the old governmental power were to be amputated, its legitimate functions were to be wrested from an authority usurping pre-eminence over society itself, and restored to the responsible agents of society.*

To what extent the opportunists of contemporary Social-Democracy have failed to understand—or perhaps it would be more true to say, did not want to understand—these observations of Marx is best shown by the famous (Herostrates-fashion) book of the renegade Bernstein, Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie.** It is just in connection with the above passage from Marx that Bernstein wrote saying that this programme

^{*} Ibid.-Ed.

^{**} An English translation is published under the title Evolutionary Socialism.—Ed.

... in its political content displays, in all its essential features, the greatest similarity to the federalism of Proudhon.... In spite of all the other points of difference between Marx and the "petty-bourgeois" Proudhon [Bernstein places the words "petty-bourgeois" in quotation marks in order to make them sound ironicall on these points their ways of thinking resemble each other as closely as could be.

Of course, Bernstein continues, the importance of the municipalities is growing, but:

... it seems to me doubtful whether the first task of democracy would be such a dissolution [Auflösung] of the modern states and such a complete transformation [Umwandlung] of their organisation as is described by Marx and Proudhon (the formation of a national assembly from delegates of the provincial or district assemblies, which, in their turn, would consist of delegates from the Communes), so that the whole previous mode of national representation would vanish completely.*

This is really monstrous: thus to confuse Marx's views on the "destruction of the state power," of the "parasitic excrescence" with the federalism of Proudhon! But this is no accident, for it never occurs to the opportunist that Marx is not speaking here at all of federalism as opposed to centralism, but of the destruction of the old bourgeois state machinery which exists in all bourgeois countries.

To the opportunist occurs only what he sees around him, in a society of petty-bourgeois philistinism and "reformist" stagnation, namely, only "municipalities"! As for a proletarian revolution, the opportunist has forgotten even how to imagine it.

It is amusing. But it is remarkable that on this point nobody argued against Bernstein! Bernstein has been refuted often enough, especially by Plekhanov in Russian literature and by Kautsky in European, but neither made any remark upon this perversion of Marx by Bernstein.

To such an extent has the opportunist forgotten to think in a revolutionary way and forgotten how to reflect on revolution, that he attributes "federalism" to Marx, mixing him up with the founder of Anarchism, Proudhon. And Kautsky and Plekhanov, anxious to be orthodox Marxists and to defend the teaching of revolutionary Marxism, are silent on this point! Herein lies one of the roots of that vulgarisation of the ideas concerning the difference between Marxism and Anarchism, which is common to both Kautskyists and opportunists, and which we shall discuss later.

Federalism is not touched upon in Marx's observations about the

^{*} Bernstein, ibid., German Edition, 1899, pp. 134-136.

experience of the Commune, as quoted above. Marx agrees with Proudhon precisely on that point which has quite escaped the opportunist Bernstein. Marx differs from Proudhon just on the point where Bernstein sees their agreement.

Marx agrees with Proudhon in that they both stand for the "destruction" of the contemporary state machinery. This common ground of Marxism with Anarchism (both with Proudhon and with Bakunin) neither the opportunists nor the Kautskyists wish to see, for on this point they have themselves departed from Marxism.

Marx differs both from Proudhon and Bakunin precisely on the point of federalism (not to speak of the dictatorship of the proletariat). Federalism arises, as a principle, from the petty-bourgeois views of Anarchism. Marx is a centralist. In the above-quoted observations of his there is no deviation from centralism. Only people full of petty-bourgeois "superstitious faith" in the state can mistake the destruction of the bourgeois state for the destruction of centralism.

But will it not be centralism if the proletariat and poorest peasantry take the power of the state in their own hands, organise themselves freely into communes, and unite the action of all the communes in striking at capital, in crushing the resistance of the capitalists, in the transfer of private property in railways, factories, land, and so forth, to the entire nation, to the whole of society? Will that not be the most consistent democratic centralism? And proletarian centralism at that?

Bernstein simply cannot conceive the possibility of voluntary centralism, of a voluntary union of the communes into a nation, a voluntary fusion of the proletarian communes in the process of destroying bourgeois supremacy and the bourgeois state machinery. Like all philistines, Bernstein can imagine centralism only as something from above, to be imposed and maintained solely by means of bureaucracy and militarism.

Marx, as though he foresaw the possibility of the perversion of his ideas, purposely emphasises that the accusation against the Commune that it desired to destroy the unity of the nation, to do away with a central power, was a deliberate falsehood. Marx purposely uses the phrase "to organise the unity of the nation," so as to contrast conscious, democratic, proletarian centralism to bourgeois, military, bureaucratic centralism.

But no one is so deaf as he who will not hear. The opportunists

of contemporary Social-Democracy do not, on any account, want to hear of destroying the state power, of cutting off the parasite.

5. DESTRUCTION OF THE PARASITE-STATE

We have already quoted part of Marx's statements on this subject, and must now complete his presentation.

It is generally the fate of completely new historical creations—wrote Marx—to be mistaken for the counterpart of older and even defunct forms of social life, to which they may bear a certain likeness. Thus, this new Commune, which breaks [bricht] the modern state power, has been mistaken for a reproduction of the mediaeval Communes . . . for a federation of small states [Montesquieu, the Girondins] . . . for an exaggerated form of the ancient struggle against over-centralisation The Communal Constitution would have restored to the social body all the forces hitherto absorbed by the state parasite feeding upon, and clogging the free movements of, society. By this one act it would have initiated the regeneration of France . . . the Communal Constitution brought the rural producers under the intellectual lead of the central towns of their districts, and there secured to them, in the working man, the natural trustees of their interests. The very existence of the Commune involved, as a matter of course, local municipal liberty, but no longer as a check upon the, now superseded, state power.*

"Breaks the modern state power," which was a "parasitic excrescence"; its "amputation," its "destruction"; "the now superseded state power"—these are the expressions used by Marx regarding the state when he appraised and analysed the experience of the Commune.

All this was written a little less than half a century ago; and now one has to undertake excavations, as it were, in order to bring uncorrupted Marxism to the knowledge of the masses. The conclusions drawn from the observation of the last great revolution, through which Marx lived, have been forgotten just at the moment when the time had arrived for the next great proletarian revolutions.

The multiplicity of interpretations to which the Commune has been subjected, and the multiplicity of interests which construed it in their favour, show that it was a thoroughly expansive political form, while all previous forms of government had been emphatically repressive. Its true secret was this. It was essentially a working class government, the product of the struggle of the producing against the appropriating class, the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economical emancipation of labour.

Except on this last condition, the Communal Constitution would have been an impossibility and a delusion.**

The Utopians busied themselves with the "discovery" of the political forms under which the Socialist reconstruction of society

^{*} The Civil War in France.—Ed.

^{**} Ibid.—Ed.

could take place. The Anarchists turned away from the question of political forms altogether. The opportunists of modern Social-Democracy accepted the bourgeois political forms of a parliamentary, democratic state as the limit which cannot be overstepped; they broke their foreheads praying before this idol, denouncing as Anarchism every attempt to destroy these forms.

Marx deducted from the whole history of Socialism and political struggle that the state was bound to disappear, and that the transitional form of its disappearance (the transition from the political state to no state) would be the "proletariat organised as the ruling class." But Marx did not undertake the task of discovering the political forms of this future stage. He limited himself to an exact observation of French history, its analysis and the conclusion to which the year 1851 had led, viz., that matters were moving towards the destruction of the bourgeois machinery of state.

And when the mass revolutionary movement of the proletariat burst forth, Marx, in spite of the failure of that movement, in spite of its short life and its patent weakness, began to study what political forms it had disclosed.

The Commune is the form "at last discovered" by the proletarian revolution, under which the economic liberation of labour can proceed.

The Commune is the first attempt of a proletarian revolution to break up the bourgeois state machinery and constitutes the political form, "at last discovered," which can and must take the place of the broken machine.

We shall see below that the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917, in different surroundings and under different circumstances, continued the work of the Commune and confirmed the historic analysis made by the genius of Marx.

CHAPTER IV

SUPPLEMENTARY EXPLANATIONS BY ENGELS

MARX gave the fundamentals on the question of the meaning of the experience of the Commune. Engels returned to the same question repeatedly, elucidating Marx's analysis and conclusions, sometimes so forcibly throwing *other* sides of the question into relief that we must dwell on these explanations separately.

1. The Housing Question

In his work on the housing question (1872) Engels took into account the experience of the Commune, dwelling repeatedly on the tasks of the revolution in relation to the state. It is interesting to note that in the treatment of this concrete subject there become clear, on the one hand, the features common to the proletarian state and the present state—features which permit of speaking of a state in both cases—and, on the other hand, the features which differentiate them, or the transition to the destruction of the state.

How then is the housing question to be solved? In present-day society, it is solved as every other social question is solved: by the gradual economic equalisation of supply and demand, a solution which ever anew begets the very same question, and is consequently no solution at all. How a social revolution would solve this question depends not only on the circumstances then existing, but is also connected with much more far-reaching questions, one of the most important of which is the abolition of the antagonism between town and country. As it is not our business to make any utopian systems for the organisation of the society of the future, it would be more than idle to go into this. But this much at least is certain, that in the large towns there are already enough dwelling houses, if these were made rational use of, to immediately relieve any real "housing shortage." This, of course, can only be done by the expropriation of the present owners and by quartering in their houses workers who are homeless or are excessively overcrowded in their present quarters; and as soon as the proletariat has conquered political power, such a measure, demanded in the interests of public welfare, would be as easy to carry through as other expropriations and quarterings by the state of today.*

Here the change in the form of the state power is not considered, but only the content of its activity. Expropriations and the occupa-

^{*} Friedrich Engels, The Housing Question, London and New York, 1933.-Ed.

tion of houses take place by order even of the present state. The proletarian state, from the formal point of view, will also "order" the occupation of houses and expropriation of buildings. But it is clear that the old executive apparatus, the bureaucracy connected with the bourgeoisie, would simply be unfit to carry out the orders of the proletarian state.

all instruments of labour, the taking possession of the whole of industry by the working people, is the direct opposite of the Proudhonist "solution." In the latter, the individual worker becomes the owner of a house, a farm, and the instruments of labour; in the former, the "working people" remains the collective owner of the houses, factories and instruments of labour, and will hardly, at any rate during a transition period, hand over the usufruct of these to individuals or companies unless the costs are met by them. It is just the same as with the abolition of property in land, which is not the abolition of ground rent, but only its transfer, even though in modified form, to society. The actual taking possession of all instruments of labour by the working people therefore by no means excludes the retention of rent relations.*

One question touched upon here, namely, the economic reasons for the withering away of the state, we shall discuss in the next chapter. Engels expresses himself most cautiously, saying that the proletarian state will "hardly" allot houses without pay, "at any rate, during a transition period." The renting out to separate families of houses belonging to the whole people presupposes the collection of rent, a certain amount of control, and some rules underlying the allotment of houses. All this demands a certain form of state, but it does not at all demand a special military and bureaucratic apparatus, with officials occupying especially privileged positions. Transition to a state of affairs when it will be possible to let houses without rent is bound up with the complete "withering away" of the state.

Speaking of the conversion of the Blanquists, after the Commune and under the influence of its experience, to the principles of Marxism, Engels, in passing, formulates these principles as follows:

... Necessity of political action by the proletariat, and its dictatorship as the transition to the abolition of classes and, with them, of the state. . . . **

Those addicted to hair-splitting criticism, and those who belong to the bourgeois "exterminators of Marxism," will perhaps see a contradiction, in the above quotation from the Anti-Dühring, be-

tween this avowal of the "abolition of the state" and the repudiation of a formula like the Anarchist one. It would not be surprising if the opportunists stamped Engels, too, as an "Anarchist," for the social-chauvinists are now more and more adopting the method of accusing the internationalists of Anarchism.

That, together with the abolition of classes, the state will also be abolished, Marxism has always taught. The well-known passage on the "withering away of the state" in the Anti-Dühring does not blame the Anarchists for being in favour of the abolition of the state, but for preaching that the state can be abolished "within twenty-four hours."

In view of the fact that the present predominant "Social-Democratic" doctrine completely distorts the relation of Marxism to Anarchism on the question of the abolition of the state, it will be quite useful to recall a certain polemic of Marx and Engels against the Anarchists.

2. Polemic Against the Anarchists

This polemic took place in 1873. Marx and Engels contributed articles against the Proudhonists, "autonomists" or "anti-authoritarians," to an Italian Socialist publication, and it was not until 1913 that these articles appeared in German translation in the Neue Zeit.¹⁶²

When the political struggle of the working class—wrote Marx, ridiculing the Anarchists for their repudiation of political action—assumes a revolutionary form, when the workers set up in place of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie their revolutionary dictatorship, then they commit the terrible crime of outraging principle, for in order to satisfy their wretched, vulgar, everyday needs, in order to break down the resistance of the bourgeosie, they give the state a revolutionary and transitional form, instead of laying down arms and abolishing the state. . .*

It was exclusively against this kind of "abolition" of the state, that Marx fought, refuting the Anarchists! He fought, not against the theory of the disappearance of the state when classes disappear, or of its abolition when classes have been abolished, but against the proposition that the workers should deny themselves the use of arms, the use of organised force, that is, the use of the state, for the purpose of "breaking down the resistance of the bourgeoisie."

^{*} Neue Zeit, XXXII-1, 1913-1914, p. 40.

In order that the true sense of his fight against the Anarchists might not be perverted, Marx purposely emphasises the "revolutionary and transitional form" of the state necessary for the proletariat. The proletariat needs the state only for a while. We do not at all disagree with the Anarchists on the question of the abolition of the state as an aim. We maintain that, to achieve this aim, temporary use must be made of the instruments, means, and methods of the state power against the exploiters, just as the dictatorship of the oppressed class is temporarily necessary for the annihilation of classes. Marx chooses the sharpest and clearest way of stating his position against the Anarchists: when they have cast off the yoke of the capitalists, ought the workers to "lay down arms," or ought they to use them against the capitalists in order to crush their resistance? But what is the systematic use of arms by one class against the other, if not a "transitional form" of state?

Let every Social-Democrat ask himself: Was that the way in which he approached the question of the state in his discussion with the Anarchists? Was that the way in which the vast majority of the official Social-Democratic parties of the Second International approached it?

Engels develops these same ideas in even greater detail and more simply. He first of all ridicules the muddled ideas of the Proudhonists, who called themselves "anti-authoritarians," i.e., they denied every kind of authority, every kind of subordination, every kind of power. Take a factory, a railway, a vessel on the high seas, said Engels—is it not clear that not one of these complex technical units, based on the use of machines and the ordered co-operation of many people, could function without a certain amount of subordination and, consequently, without some authority or power?

When I put these arguments—writes Engels—up against the most rabid antiauthoritarians, they are only able to give me the following answer: Ah! that is true, but here it is not a case of authority conferred on the delegates, but of a commission which we give them. These people think that they can change a thing by changing its name. . . .

Having thus shown that authority and autonomy are relative terms, that the sphere of their application varies with the various phases of social development, that it is absurd to take them as absolute concepts; having added that the sphere of the application of machinery and large-scale production is ever extending, Engels passes from a general discussion of authority to the question of the state.

If the autonomists—he writes—had been content to say that the social organisation of the future would permit authority only within the limits in which the relations of production made it inevitable, then it would have been possible to come to an understanding with them; but they are blind to all facts which make authority necessary, and they fight passionately against the word.

Why do the anti-authoritarians not confine themselves to crying out against political authority, against the state? All Socialists are agreed that the state, and political authority along with it, will disappear as the result of the coming social revolution, i.e., that public functions will lose their political character and be transformed into simple administrative functions of watching over social interests. But the anti-authoritarians demand that the political state should be abolished at one stroke, even before the social relations which gave birth to it have been abolished. They demand that the first act of the social revolution should be the abolition of authority.

Have these gentlemen ever seen a revolution? Revolution is undoubtedly the most authoritative thing possible. It is an act in which one section of the population imposes its will on the other by means of rifles, bayonets, cannon, i.e., by highly authoritative means, and the victorious party is inevitably forced to maintain its supremacy by means of that fear which its arms inspire in the reactionaries. Would the Paris Commune have lasted a single day had it not relied on the authority of the armed people against the bourgeoisie? Are we not, on the contrary, entitled to blame the Commune for not having made sufficient use of this authority? And so: either—or: either the anti-authoritarians do not know what they are talking about, in which case they merely sow confusion; or they do know, in which case they are betraying the cause of the proletariat. In either case they serve only the interests of reaction.*

In this discussion, questions are touched upon which must be examined in connection with the subject of the interrelation of politics and economics during the "withering away" of the state. (The next chapter is devoted to this subject.) Such are the questions of the transformation of public functions from political into simply administrative ones, and of the "political state." This last term, particularly liable to cause misunderstanding, indicates the process of the withering away of the state: the dying state, at a certain stage of its withering away, can be called a non-political state.

The most remarkable point in our quotation from Engels is again the way he states the case against the Anarchists. Social-Democrats, desiring to be disciples of Engels, have discussed this question with the Anarchists millions of times since 1873, but they have not discussed it as Marxists can and should. The Anarchist idea of the abolition of the state is muddled and non-revolutionary—that is how Engels put it. It is precisely the revolution, in its rise and development, with its specific tasks in relation to violence, authority, power, the state, that the Anarchists do not wish to see.

The customary criticism of Anarchism by modern Social-Demo-

^{*} Ibid., p. 39.

crats has been reduced to the purest philistine vulgarity: "We recognise the state, whereas the Anarchists do not." Naturally, such vulgarity cannot but repel revolutionary workingmen who think at all. Engels says something different. He emphasises that all Socialists recognise the disappearance of the state as a result of the Socialist revolution. He then deals with the concrete question of the revolution—that very question which, as a rule, the Social-Democrats, because of their opportunism, evade, leaving it, so to speak, exclusively for the Anarchists "to work out." And in thus formulating the question, Engels takes the bull by the horns: ought not the Commune to have made more use of the revolutionary power of the state, i.e., of the proletariat armed and organised as the ruling class?

Prevailing official Social-Democracy usually dismissed the question as to the concrete tasks of the proletariat in the revolution either with an inane philistine shrug, or, at the best, with the evasive sophism, "Wait and see." And the Anarchists were thus justified in saying about such a Social-Democracy that it had betrayed the task of educating the working class for the revolution. Engels makes use of the experience of the last proletarian revolution for the particular purpose of making a concrete analysis as to what the proletariat should do in relation both to the banks and the state, and how it should do it.

3. LETTER TO BEBEL

One of the most remarkable, if not the most remarkable observation on the state to be found in the works of Marx and Engels is contained in the following passage of Engels' letter to Bebel dated March 18-28, 1875. This letter, we may remark in passing, was first published, so far as we know, by Bebel in the second volume of his memoirs (*Aus meinen Leben*), published in 1911, *i.e.*, thirty-six years after it had been written and mailed.

Engels wrote to Bebel, criticising that same draft of the Gotha Programme which Marx also criticised in his famous letter to Bracke; referring particularly to the question of the state, Engels

... The people's free state has been transformed into a free state. According to the grammatical meaning of the words, the free state is one in which the state is free in relation to its citizens, i.e., a state with a despotic government. It would be well to throw overboard all this chatter about the

state, especially after the Commune, which was no longer a state in the proper sense of the word. The Anarchists have too long thrown this "people's state" into our teeth, although already in Marx's work against Proudhon, and then in the Communist Manifesto, it was stated definitely that, with the introduction of the Socialist order of society, the state will dissolve of itself [sich auflöst] and disappear. As the state is only a transitional phenomenon which must be made use of in struggle, in the revolution, in order forcibly to crush our antagonists, it is pure absurdity to speak of a people's free state. As long as the proletariat still needs the state, it needs it, not in the interests of freedom, but for the purpose of crushing its antagonists; and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom, then the state, as such, ceases to exist. We would, therefore, suggest that everywhere the word "state" be replaced by "community" [Gemeinwesen], a fine old German word, which corresponds to the French word "commune."*

One must bear in mind that this letter refers to the party programme which Marx criticised in his letter dated only a few weeks later than the above (Marx's letter is dated May 5, 1875), and that Engels was living at the time with Marx in London. Consequently, when he says "we" in the last sentence, Engels undoubtedly suggests to the leader of the German workers' party, both in his own and in Marx's name, that the word "state" should be struck out of the programme and replaced by "community."

What a howl about "Anarchism" would be raised by the leaders of present-day "Marxism," adulterated to meet the requirements of the opportunists, if such a rectifying of the programme were suggested to them!

Let them howl. The bourgeoisie will praise them for it.

But we shall go on with our work. In revising the programme of our party, the advice of Engels and Marx absolutely must be taken into consideration in order to come nearer to the truth, to re-establish Marxism, to purge it of distortions, to direct more correctly the struggle of the working class for its liberation. Among the Bolsheviks there will certainly be none opposed to the advice of Engels and Marx. Difficulties may, perhaps, crop up only regarding terminology. In German there are two words meaning "community," ** of which Engels used the one which does not denote a single community, but the totality, the system of communities. In Russian there is no such word, and perhaps we may have to decide to use the French word "commune," although this also has its drawbacks.

"The Commune was no longer a state in the proper sense of the word"—this is Engels' most important statement, theoretically speak-

^{*} Aus meinen Leben, pp. 321-322.

^{**} Gemeinde and Gemeinwesen.—Ed.

ing. After what has been presented above, this statement is perfectly clear. The Commune ceased to be a state in so far as it had to repress, not the majority of the population but a minority (the exploiters); it had broken the bourgeois state machinery; in the place of a special repressive force, the whole population itself came onto the scene. All this is a departure from the state in its proper sense. And had the Commune asserted itself as a lasting power, remnants of the state would of themselves have "withered away" within it; it would not have been necessary to "abolish" its institutions; they would have ceased to function in proportion as less and less was left for them to do.

"The Anarchists throw this 'people's state' into our teeth." In saying this, Engels has in mind especially Bakunin and his attacks on the German Social-Democrats. Engels admits these attacks to be justified in so far as the "people's state" is as senseless and as much a deviation from Socialism as the "people's free state." Engels tries to improve the struggle of the German Social-Democrats against the Anarchists, to make this struggle correct in principle, to purge it of opportunist prejudices concerning the "state." Alas! Engels' letter has been pigeonholed for thirty-six years. We shall see below that, even after the publication of Engels' letter, Kautsky obstinately repeats in essence the very mistakes against which Engels warned.

Bebel replied to Engels in a letter, dated September 21, 1875, in which, among other things, he wrote that he "fully agreed" with Engels' criticism of the draft programme, and that he had reproached Liebknecht for his readiness to make concessions. But if we take Bebel's pamphlet, *Unsere Ziele*, we find there absolutely wrong views regarding the state:

The state must be transformed from one based on class domination into a people's state.**

This is printed in the *ninth* (the ninth!) edition of Bebel's pamphlet. Small wonder that such constantly repeated opportunist views regarding the state were absorbed by German Social-Democracy, especially as Engels' revolutionary interpretations were safely pigeonholed, and all the conditions of everyday life were such as to "wean" the people from revolution for a long time!

^{*} Ibid., Vol. II, p. 334.

^{**} Unsere Ziele, 1886, p. 14.

4. CRITICISM OF THE DRAFT OF THE ERFURT PROGRAMME

In analysing the doctrines of Marxism on the state, the criticism of the draft of the Erfurt Programme sent by Engels to Kautsky on June 29, 1891, a criticism published only ten years later in *Neue Zeit*, cannot be overlooked; for this criticism is mainly concerned with the *opportunist* views of Social-Democracy regarding questions of *state* organisation.¹⁶⁸

We may note in passing that in the field of economics Engels also makes an exceedingly valuable observation, which shows how attentively and thoughtfully he followed the changes in modern capitalism, and how he was able, in a measure, to foresee the problems of our own, the imperialist, epoch. Here is the point: touching on the word "planlessness" (*Planlosigkeit*) used in the draft programme, as characteristic of capitalism, Engels writes:

When we pass from joint-stock companies to trusts which control and monopolise whole branches of industry, not only private production comes to an end at that point, but also planlessness.*

Here we have what is most essential in the theoretical appreciation of the latest phase of capitalism, i.e., imperialism, viz., that capitalism becomes monopoly capitalism. This fact must be emphasised because the bourgeois reformist view that monopoly capitalism or state-monopoly capitalism is no longer capitalism, but can already be termed "state Socialism," or something of that sort, is a very widespread error. The trusts, of course, have not created, do not create now, and cannot create full and complete planning. But, however much of a plan they may create, however closely capitalist magnates may estimate in advance the extent of production on a national and even international scale, and however systematically they may regulate it, we still remain under capitalism-capitalism, it is true, in its new stage, but still, unquestionably, capitalism. The "proximity" of such capitalism to Socialism should serve for the real representatives of the proletariat as an argument proving the nearness, ease, feasibility and urgency of the Socialist revolution, and not at all as an argument for tolerating a repudiation of such a revolution or for making capitalism more attractive, in which work all the reformists are engaged.

^{*} Neue Zeit, XX-1, 1901-1902, p. 8. [Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Critique of the Social-Democratic Programmes, London and New York, 1932.—Ed.]

But to return to the question of the state. Engels makes here three kinds of valuable suggestions: first, as regards a republic; second, as to the connection between the national question and the form of state; and third, as to local self-government.

As to a republic, Engels made this point the centre of gravity of his criticism of the draft of the Erfurt Programme. And when we remember what importance the Erfurt Programme has acquired in international Social-Democracy, how it has become the model for the whole of the Second International, it may, without exaggeration, be said that Engels thereby criticised the opportunism of the whole Second International.

The political demands of the draft—Engels writes—have one great defect. The point that should particularly have been stated is not among them [Engels' italics].*

And, later on, he makes it clear that the German constitution is but a copy of the reactionary constitution of 1850; that the Reichstag is only, as Wilhelm Liebknecht put it, "the fig-leaf of absolutism"; and that to wish "to transform all the means of production into public property" on the basis of a constitution which legalises the existence of petty states and the federation of petty German states, is an "obvious absurdity."

"It is dangerous to touch on this subject," Engels adds, knowing full well that it is impossible, for police reasons, to include in the programme an openly stated demand for a republic in Germany. But Engels does not rest content with this obvious consideration which satisfies "everybody." He continues:

And yet in one way or another the question must be tackled. How necessary this is is shown precisely at this moment by the opportunism which is gaining ground [einreissend] in a large section of the Social-Democratic press. Because they fear the re-enactment of the anti-Socialist law, because they have in mind all kinds of premature declarations made when that law was in force, now all at once we are told that the legal situation now existing in Germany can suffice the party for the realisation of all its demands by peaceful methods.

That the German Social-Democrats were actuated by fear of the renewal of the exception law, this fundamental fact Engels stresses particularly, and, without hesitation, he calls this opportunism, declaring that just because of the absence of a republic and freedom in Germany, the dreams of a "peaceful" path were perfectly absurd.

Engels is sufficiently careful not to tie his hands. He admits that in republican or very free countries "one can conceive" (only "conceive"!) of a peaceful development towards Socialism, but in Germany, he repeats:

... In Germany, where the government is almost all-powerful and the Reichstag and all other representative bodies have no real power, to proclaim such a thing in Germany—and moreover when there is no need to do so—is to remove the fig-leaf from absolutism, and to screen its nakedness by one's own body.

The great majority of the official leaders of the German Social-Democratic Party, who pigeonholed this advice, has indeed proved to be a screen for absolutism.

Such a policy can only lead their own party permanently astray. General and abstract political questions are pushed into the foreground, thus covering up the immediate concrete issues, the issues which, at the first great events, at the first political crisis, put themselves on the order of the day. What else can come of it but that suddenly, at the decisive moment, the party will be helpless and that there will be lack of clarity and unity on the most decisive points, for the reason that these points have never been discussed. . . .

This neglect of the great fundamental issues for momentary day-to-day interests, this striving and struggling for momentary success without regard to further consequences, this sacrifice of the future of the movement for the sake of its immediate position may be "honestly" meant, but opportunism it is and remains, and "honest" opportunism is perhaps the most dangerous of all. . . .

If anything is certain, it is that our party and the working class can only come to power under the form of the democratic republic. This is, indeed, the specific form for the dictatorship of the proletariat, as has already been shown by the great French Revolution. . . .*

Engels repeats here in a particularly emphatic form the fundamental idea which runs like a red thread throughout all Marx's work, namely, that the democratic republic is the nearest approach to the dictatorship of the proletariat. For such a republic—without in the least setting aside the domination of capital, and, therefore, the oppression of the masses and the class struggle—inevitably leads to such an extension, development, unfolding and sharpening of that struggle that, as soon as the possibility arises for satisfying the fundamental interests of the oppressed masses, this possibility is realised inevitably and solely in the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the guidance of these masses by the proletariat. These also have been, for the whole of the Second International, "forgotten words" of Marxism, and this forgetting was demonstrated with particular

[•] Ibid.—Ed.

vividness by the history of the Menshevik Party during the first half year of the Russian Revolution of 1917.

On the question of a federal republic, in connection with the national composition of the population, Engels wrote:

What should take the place of present-day Germany (with its reactionary monarchical constitution and its equally reactionary division into petty states, which perpetuates all that is specifically Prussian instead of merging it in Germany as a whole)? In my view, the proletariat can use only the form of the one and indivisible republic. In the gigantic territory of the United States a federal republic is still, on the whole, a necessity, although in the Eastern States it is already becoming a hindrance. It would be a step forward in England, where the two islands are peopled by four nations and in spite of a single Parliament three different systems of legislation exist side by side even today. In little Switzerland, it has long been a hindrance, tolerable only because Switzerland is content to be purely a passive member of the European state system. For Germany, federation of the Swiss type would be an enormous step backward. Two points distinguish a federal state from a unitary state: that each separate federated state, each canton, has its own civil and criminal legislation and judicial system, and then, that alongside of a popular chamber there is also a house of representatives from the states, in which each canton, large or small, votes as such. Fortunately, we have got over the first, and we shall not be so childish as to introduce it again; and we have the second in the Federal Council [Bundesrat] and could very well do without it, especially as our "federal state" [Bundestaat] already forms the transition to the unitary State. And it is not our task to reverse from above the revolution carried out in 1866 and 1870, but to give it its necessary completion and improvements through a movement from below.*

Engels not only shows no indifference to the question of the forms of state, but, on the contrary, tries to analyse with the utmost care the transitional forms, in order to establish in accordance with the concrete historical peculiarities of each separate case, from what and to what the given transitional form is evolving.

From the point of view of the proletariat and the proletarian revolution, Engels, like Marx, insists on democratic centralism, on one indivisible republic. The federal republic he considers either as an exception and a hindrance to development, or as a transitional form from a monarchy to a centralised republic, as a "step forward" under certain special conditions. And among these special conditions, the national question arises.

Engels, like Marx, in spite of their ruthless criticism of the reactionary nature of small states, and, in certain concrete cases, the screening of this by the national question, never shows a trace of desire to ignore the national question—a desire of which the Dutch

and Polish Marxists are often guilty, as a result of their most justifiable opposition to the narrow philistine nationalism of "their" little states.

Even in England, where geographical conditions, common language, and the history of many centuries would seem to have put "an end" to the national question in the separate small divisions of England—even here Engels is cognisant of the patent fact that the national question has not yet been overcome, and recognises, in consequence, that the establishment of a federal republic would be a "step forward." Of course, there is no trace here of refusing to criticise the defects of the federal republic or to conduct the most determined propaganda and fight for a united and centralised democratic republic.

But Engels by no means understands democratic centralism in the bureaucratic sense in which this term is used by bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideologists, including Anarchists. Centralism does not, with Engels, in the least exclude such wide local self-government which combines a voluntary defence of the unity of the state by the "communes" and districts with the complete abolition of all bureaucracy and all "commanding" from above.

... So, then, a unitary republic-writes Engels, setting forth the progammatic views of Marxism on the state-but not in the sense of the present French Republic, which is nothing but the Empire established in 1798 minus the Emperor. From 1792 to 1798 each Department of France, each local area [Gemeinde] enjoyed complete self-government on the American model, and this is what we too must have. How self-government is to be organised, and how we can manage without a bureaucracy, has been demonstrated to us by America and the first French Republic, and is being demonstrated even today by Australia, Canada and the other English colonies. And a provincial and local self-government of this type is far freer than, for example, Swiss federalism, in which it is true the canton is very independent in relation to the Bund (i.e., the federated state as a whole), but is also independent in relation to the district and the local area. The cantonal governments appoint the district governors [Staathalter] and prefects-a feature which is unknown in Englishspeaking countries, and which in the future we shall have to abolish here, along with the Prussian Landräte and Regierungsräte [Commissaries, district police chiefs, governors, and in general all officials appointed from above].*

In accordance with this, Engels suggests the following wording for the clause in the programme regarding self-government:

Complete self-government for the provinces, districts, and local areas through officials elected by universal suffrage. The abolition of all local and provincial authorities appointed by the state.

^{*} Ibid.-Ed.

In the *Pravda* (No. 68, June 10, 1917),* suppressed by the government of Kerensky and other "Socialist" Ministers, I have already had occasion to point out how in this connection (not by any means in this alone) our sham Socialist representatives of the sham-revolutionary sham-democracy have scandalously departed *from democracy*. Naturally, people who have bound themselves by a "coalition" with the imperialist bourgeoisie remained deaf to this criticism.

It is highly important to note that Engels, armed with facts, disproves by a telling example the superstition, very widespread especially among the petty-bourgeois democracy, that a federal republic necessarily means a greater amount of freedom than a centralised republic. This is not true. It is disproved by the facts cited by Engels regarding the centralised French Republic of 1792-1798 and the federal Swiss Republic. The really democratic centralised republic gave more freedom than the federal republic. In other words, the greatest amount of local, provincial and other freedom known in history was granted by a centralised, and not by a federal republic.

Insufficient attention has been and is being paid to this fact in our party propaganda and agitation, as, indeed, to the whole question of federal and centralised republics and local self-government.

5. THE 1891 PREFACE TO MARK'S Civil War in France

In his preface to the third edition of The Civil War in France (this preface is dated March 18, 1891, and was originally published in the Neue Zeit), Engels, with many other interesting remarks, made in passing, on questions of the attitude towards the state, gives a remarkably striking résumé of the lessons of the Commune. This résumé, confirmed by all the experience of the period of twenty years separating the author from the Commune, and directed particularly against the "superstitious faith in the state" so widely diffused in Germany, can justly be called the last word of Marxism on the question dealt with here.

In France, Engels observes the workers were armed after every revolution.

and therefore the disarming of the workers was the first commandment for whatever bourgeois was at the helm of the state. Hence, after each revolution won by the workers, a new struggle, ending with the defeat of the workers. 164 **

^{*} See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XX, Book II, pp. 148-150.-Ed.

^{**} The Civil War in France.—Ed.

This summing up of the experience of bourgeois revolutions is as concise as it is expressive. The essence of the whole matter—also, by the way, of the question of the state (has the oppressed class arms?)—is here remarkably well defined. It is just this essential thing which is most ignored both by professors under the influence of bourgeois ideology and by the petty-bourgeois democrats. In the Russian Revolution of 1917, the honour (Cavaignac honour) of babbling out this secret of bourgeois revolutions fell to the Menshevik, "also-Marxist," Tsereteli. In his "historic" speech of June 22, Tsereteli blurted out the decision of the bourgeoisie to disarm the Petrograd workers—referring, of course, to this decision as his own, and as a vital necessity for the "state"! 165

Tsereteli's historic speech of June 22 will certainly constitute for every historian of the Revolution of 1917 one of the clearest illustrations of how the bloc of Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, led by Mr. Tsereteli, went over to the side of the bourgeoisie against the revolutionary proletariat.

Another incidental remark of Engels', also connected with the question of the state, deals with religion. It is well known that German Social-Democracy, in proportion as it began to decay and become more and more opportunist, slid down more and more frequently to the philistine misinterpretation of the celebrated formula: "Religion is a private matter." That is, this formula was twisted to mean that even for the party of the revolutionary proletariat the question of religion was a private matter! It was against this complete betrayal of the revolutionary programme of the proletariat that Engels revolted. In 1891 he only saw the very feeble beginnings of opportunism in his party, and therefore he expressed himself on the subject most cautiously:

As almost without exception workers or recognised representatives of the workers sat in the Commune, its decisions bore a decidedly proletarian character. Either they decreed reforms which the republican bourgeoisie had failed to pass only out of cowardice, but which provided a necessary basis for the free activity of the working class—such as the adoption of the principle that in relation to the state, religion is a purely private affair—or they promulgated decrees directly in the interests of the working class and to some extent cutting deeply into the old order of society.*

Engels deliberately emphasised the words "in relation to the state," as a straight thrust at the heart of German opportunism, which had declared religion to be a private matter in relation to the party,

thus lowering the party of the revolutionary proletariat to the most vulgar "free-thinking" philistine level, ready to allow a non-denominational status, but renouncing all party struggle against the religious opium which stupefies the people.

The future historian of German Social-Democracy in investigating the basic causes of its shameful collapse in 1914, will find no little material of interest on this question, beginning with the evasive declarations in the articles of the ideological leader of the party, Kautsky, which opened the door wide to opportunism, and ending with the attitude of the party towards the Los-von-Kirche Bewegung (the movement for the disestablishment of the church) in 1913.

But let us see how, twenty years after the Commune, Engels summed up its lessons for the fighting proletariat.

Here are the lessons to which Engels attached prime importance:

... It was precisely this oppressive power of the former centralised government—the army, political police and bureaucracy which Napoleon had created in 1798 and since then had been taken over as a welcome instrument by every new government and used against its opponents—it was precisely this power which should have fallen everywhere, as it had already fallen in Paris.

The Commune was compelled to recognise from the outset that the working class, once come to power, could not carry on business with the old state machine; that, in order not to lose again its own position of power which it had but just conquered, this working class must, on the one hand, set aside all the old repressive machinery previously used against itself, and on the other, safeguard itself against its own deputies and officials by declaring them all, without any exception, subject to recall at any moment. . . .

Engels emphasises again and again that not only in a monarchy, but also in a democratic republic, the state remains a state, i.e., it retains its fundamental and characteristic feature of transforming the officials, "the servants of society," its organs, into the masters of society.

Against this transformation of the state and the organs of the state from servants of society into masters of society—a process which had been inevitable in all previous states—the Commune made use of two infallible remedies. In the first place, it filled all posts—administrative, judicial and educational—by election on the basis of universal suffrage of all concerned, with the right of these electors to recall their delegate at any time. And in the second place, all officials, high or low, were paid only the wages received by other workers. The highest salary paid by the Commune to any one was 6,000 francs.* In

* Nominally this means about 2,400 rubles a year; according to the present rate of exchange about 6,000 rubles. Those Bolsheviks who propose a salary of 9,000 rubles for members of the municipal administration, for instance, instead of suggesting a maximum salary of 6,000 rubles for the whole of the state—a sum quite sufficient for anybody, are making quite an unpardonable error.¹⁶⁶

this way, an effective barrier to place-hunting and careerism was set up, even apart from the imperative mandates to delegates to representative bodies which were also added in profusion. . . .*

Engels approaches here the interesting boundary line where consistent democracy is, on the one hand, transformed into Socialism, and on the other, it demands the introduction of Socialism. For, in order to destroy the state, it is necessary to convert the functions of public service into such simple operations of control and accounting as are within the reach of the vast majority of the population, and, ultimately, of every single individual. And, in order to do away completely with careerism it must be made impossible for an "honourable," though unsalaried, post in the public service to be used as a springboard to a highly profitable post in the banks or the joint-stock companies, as happens constantly in all the freest capitalist countries.

But Engels does not make the mistake made, for instance, by some Marxists in dealing with the right of a nation to self-determination: that this is impossible under capitalism and will be unnecessary under Socialism. Such an apparently clever, but really incorrect statement might be repeated of any democratic institution, including moderate salaries for officials; for, under capitalism, fully consistent democracy is impossible, while under Socialism all democracy withers away.

This is a sophism, comparable to the old humorous problem of whether a man is becoming bald if he loses one hair.

To develop democracy to its logical conclusion, to find the forms for this development, to test them by practice, and so forth—all this is one of the fundamental tasks of the struggle for the social revolution. Taken separately, no kind of democracy will yield Socialism. But in actual life democracy will never be "taken separately"; it will be "taken together" with other things, it will exert its influence on economic life, stimulating its reorganisation; it will be subjected, in its turn, to the influence of economic development, and so on. Such is the dialectics of living history.

Engels continues:

This shattering [Sprengung] of the former state power and its replacement by a new and really democratic state is described in detail in the third section of The Civil War. But it was necessary here once more to dwell briefly on some of its features, because in Germany particularly the superstitious faith in

^{*} Ibid.-Ed.

the state has been carried over from philosophy into the general consciousness of the bourgeoisie and even of many workers. According to the philosophical conception, the state is the "realisation of the idea" or, translated into philosophical language, the Kingdom of God on earth; the sphere in which eternal truth and justice is, or should be, realised. And from this then follows a superstitious reverence for the state and for everything connected with it, which takes root the more readily as people from their childhood are accustomed to imagine that the affairs and interests common to the whole of society could not be managed and safeguarded in any other way than as in the past, that is, through the state and its well-paid officials. And people think they are taking quite an extraordinarily bold step forward when they rid themselves of faith in a hereditary monarchy and become partisans of a democratic republic. In reality, however, the state is nothing more than a machine for the oppression of one class by another, and indeed in the democratic republic no less than in the monarchy; and at best an evil, inherited by the proletariat after its victorious struggle for class supremacy, whose worst sides the proletariat, just like the Commune, will have at the earliest possible moment to lop off, until such time as a new generation, reared under new and free social conditions, will be able to throw on the scrap-heap all this state rubbish.*

Engels cautioned the Germans, in the event of the monarchy being replaced by a republic, not to forget the fundamentals of Socialism on the question of the state in general. His warnings now read like a direct lecture to Messrs. Tsereteli and Chernov, who revealed in their coalition tactics a superstitious faith in, and a respect for, the state!

Two more points. First: when Engels says that in a democratic republic, "no less" than in a monarchy, the state remains a "machine for the oppression of one class by another," this by no means signifies that the *form* of oppression is a matter of indifference to the proletariat, as some Anarchists "teach." A wider, freer and more open *form* of the class struggle and of class oppression enormously assists the proletariat in its struggle for the abolition of all classes.

Second: why only a new generation will be able completely to throw out all the state rubbish—this question is bound up with the question of overcoming democracy, to which we now turn.

6. Engels on the Overcoming of Democracy

Engels had occasion to speak on this subject in connection with the question of the *scientific* incorrectness of the term "Social-Democrat."

In the introduction to an edition of his articles of the 'seventies on

^{*} Ibid.-Ed.

various subjects, mainly on international questions (Internationales aus dem Volkstaat), dated January 3, 1894, i.e., written a year and a half before his death, Engels wrote that in all his articles he used the word "Communist," not "Social-Democrat," because at that time it was the Proudhonists in France and the Lassalleans in Germany who called themselves Social-Democrats.

... For Marx and me—Engels writes—it was therefore quite impossible to choose such an elastic term to characterise our special point of view. Today things are different, and the word ("Social-Democrat") may perhaps pass muster [mag passieren], however unsuitable [unpassend] it still is for a party whose economic programme is not merely Socialist in general, but directly Communist, and whose ultimate political aim is to overcome the whole state, and therefore democracy as well. The names of real [Engels' italics] political parties, however, are never wholly appropriate; the party develops. while the name persists.

The dialectician Engels remains true to dialectics to the end of his days. Marx and I, he says, had a splendid, scientifically exact name for the party, but there was no real party, i.e., no proletarian mass party. Now, at the end of the nineteenth century, there is a real party, but its name is scientifically inexact. Never mind, "it will pass muster," only let the party grow, do not let the scientific inexactness of its name be hidden from it, and do not let it hinder its development in the right direction!

Perhaps, indeed, some humourist might comfort us Bolsheviks in the manner of Engels: we have a real party, it is developing splendidly; even such a meaningless and awkward term as "Bolshevik" will "pass muster," although it expresses nothing but the purely accidental fact that at the Brussels-London Congress of 1903 we had a majority. . . .* Perhaps now, when the July and August persecutions of our party by republican and "revolutionary" petty-bourgeois democracy have made the word "Bolshevik" such a universally respected name; when, in addition, these persecutions have signalised such a great historical step forward made by our party in its actual development, perhaps now even I would hesitate to repeat my April suggestion as to changing the name of our party. Perhaps I would propose a "compromise" to our comrades, to call ourselves the Communist Party, but to retain the word "Bolsheviks" in brackets. . . .

^{*} Lenin and his followers among the delegates at this congress secured a majority on a fundamental organisational political question and were afterwards called *Bolsheviks*, from the Russian word *Bolshinstvo*, meaning majority; the adherents of the opposite groups were called Mensheviks, from the Russian word *Menshinstvo*, meaning minority.—Ed.

But the question of the name of the party is incomparably less important than the question of the relation of the revolutionary proletariat to the state.

In the current arguments about the state, the mistake is constantly made against which Engels cautions here, and which we have indicated above, namely, it is constantly forgotten that the destruction of the state means also the destruction of democracy; that the withering away of the state also means the withering away of democracy.

At first sight such a statement seems exceedingly strange and incomprehensible; indeed, some one may even begin to fear lest we be expecting the advent of such an order of society in which the principle of the subordination of the minority to the majority will not be respected—for is not a democracy just the recognition of this principle?

No, democracy is not identical with the subordination of the minority to the majority. Democracy is a state recognising the subordination of the minority to the majority, i.e., an organisation for the systematic use of violence by one class against the other, by one part of the population against another.

We set ourselves the ultimate aim of destroying the state, i.e., every organised and systematic violence, every use of violence against man in general. We do not expect the advent of an order of society in which the principle of subordination of minority to majority will not be observed. But, striving for Socialism, we are convinced that it will develop into Communism; that, side by side with this, there will vanish all need for force, for the subjection of one man to another, and of one part of the population to another, since people will grow accustomed to observing the elementary conditions of social existence without force and without subjection.

In order to emphasise this element of habit, Engels speaks of a new generation, "reared under new and free social conditions," which "will be able to throw on the scrap heap all this state rubbish"—every kind of state, including even the democratic-republican state.

For the elucidation of this, the question of the economic basis of the withering away of the state must be analysed.

CHAPTER V

THE ECONOMIC BASE OF THE WITHERING AWAY OF THE STATE

A most detailed elucidation of this question is given by Marx in his Critique of the Gotha Programme (letter to Bracke, May 15, 1875, printed only in 1891 in the Neue Zeit, IX-1, and in a special Russian edition *).¹⁰⁷ The polemical part of this remarkable work, consisting of a criticism of Lassalleanism, has, so to speak, overshadowed its positive part, namely, the analysis of the connection between the development of Communism and the withering away of the state.

1. Formulation of the Question by Marx

From a superficial comparison of the letter of Marx to Bracke (May 15, 1875) with Engels' letter to Bebel (March 28, 1875), analysed above, it might appear that Marx was much more "prostate" than Engels, and that the difference of opinion between the two writers on the question of the state is very considerable.

Engels suggests to Bebel that all the chatter about the state should be thrown overboard; that the word "state" should be eliminated from the programme and replaced by "community"; Engels even declares that the Commune was really no longer a state in the proper sense of the word. And Marx even speaks of the "future state in Communist society," i.e., he is apparently recognising the necessity of a state even under Communism.

But such a view would be fundamentally incorrect. A closer examination shows that Marx's and Engels' views on the state and its withering away were completely identical, and that Marx's expression quoted above refers merely to this withering away of the state.

It is clear that there can be no question of defining the exact moment of the *future* withering away—the more so as it must obviously be a rather lengthy process. The apparent difference between Marx and Engels is due to the different subjects they dealt with, the different aims they were pursuing. Engels set out to show to Bebel, in a plain, bold and broad outline, all the absurdity of the current

^{*} English translation in Critique of the Social-Democratic Programmes.-Ed.

superstitions concerning the state, shared to no small degree by Lassalle himself. Marx, on the other hand, only touches upon this question in passing, being interested mainly in another subject—the evolution of Communist society.

The whole theory of Marx is an application of the theory of development—in its most consistent, complete, well considered and fruitful form—to modern capitalism. It was natural for Marx to raise the question of applying this theory both to the coming collapse of capitalism and to the future development of future Communism.

On the basis of what data can the future development of future Communism be considered?

On the basis of the fact that it has its origin in capitalism, that it develops historically from capitalism, that it is the result of the action of a social force to which capitalism has given birth. There is no shadow of an attempt on Marx's part to conjure up a Utopia, to make idle guesses about that which cannot be known. Marx treats the question of Communism in the same way as a naturalist would treat the question of the development of, say, a new biological species, if he knew that such and such was its origin, and such and such the direction in which it changed.

Marx, first of all, brushes aside the confusion the Gotha Programme brings into the question of the interrelation between state and society.

"Contemporary society" is the capitalist society—he writes—which exists in all civilised countries, more or less free of mediaeval admixture, more or less modified by each country's particular historical development. more or less developed. In contrast with this, the "contemporary state" varies with every state boundary. It is different in the Prusso-German Empire from what it is in Switzerland, and different in England from what it is in the United States. The "contemporary state" is therefore a fiction.

The "contemporary state" is therefore a fiction.

Nevertheless, in spite of the motley variety of their forms, the different states of the various civilised countries all have this in common: they are all based on modern bourgeois society, only a little more or less capitalistically developed. Consequently, they also have certain essential characteristics in common. In this sense, it is possible to speak of the "contemporary state" in contrast to the future, when its present root, bourgeois society, will have perished.

Then the question arises: what transformation will the state undergo in a Communist society? In other words, what social functions analogous to the present functions of the state will then still survive? This question can only be answered scientifically, and however many thousand times the word people is combined with the word state, we get not a flea-jump closer to the problem.....

^{*} Critique of the Social-Democratic Programmes.—Ed.

Having thus ridiculed all talk about a "people's state," Marx formulates the question and warns us, as it were, that to arrive at a scientific answer one must rely only on firmly established scientific data.

The first fact that has been established with complete exactness by the whole theory of development, by science as a whole—a fact which the Utopians forgot, and which is forgotten by the present-day opportunists who are afraid of the Socialist revolution—is that, historically, there must undoubtedly be a special stage or epoch of transition from capitalism to Communism.

2. Transition from Capitalism to Communism

Between capitalist and Communist society—Marx continues—lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the former into the latter. To this also corresponds a political transition period, in which the state can be no other than the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.*

This conclusion Marx bases on an analysis of the rôle played by the proletariat in modern capitalist society, on the data concerning the development of this society, and on the irreconcilability of the opposing interests of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

Earlier the question was put thus: to attain its emancipation, the proletariat must overthrow the bourgeoisie, conquer political power and establish its own revolutionary dictatorship.

Now the question is put somewhat differently: the transition from capitalist society, developing towards Communism, towards a Communist society, is impossible without a "political transition period," and the state in this period can only be the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.

What, then, is the relation of this dictatorship to democracy?

We have seen that the Communist Manifesto simply places side by side the two ideas: the "transformation of the proletariat into the ruling class" and the "establishment of democracy." On the basis of all that has been said above, one can define more exactly how democracy changes in the transition from capitalism to Communism.

In capitalist society, under the conditions most favourable to its development, we have more or less complete democracy in the democratic republic. But this democracy is always bound by the narrow framework of capitalist exploitation, and consequently always re-

mains, in reality, a democracy for the minority, only for the possessing classes, only for the rich. Freedom in capitalist society always remains just about the same as it was in the ancient Greek republics: freedom for the slave-owners. The modern wage-slaves, owing to the conditions of capitalist exploitation, are so much crushed by want and poverty that "democracy is nothing to them," "politics is nothing to them"; that, in the ordinary peaceful course of events, the majority of the population is debarred from participating in social and political life.

The correctness of this statement is perhaps most clearly proved by Germany, just because in this state constitutional legality lasted and remained stable for a remarkably long time—for nearly half a century (1871-1914)—and because Social-Democracy in Germany during that time was able to achieve far more than in other countries in "utilising legality," and was able to organise into a political party a larger proportion of the working class than anywhere else in the world.

What, then, is this largest proportion of politically conscious and active wage-slaves that has so far been observed in capitalist society? One million members of the Social-Democratic Party—out of fifteen million wage-workers! Three million organised in trade unions—out of fifteen million!

Democracy for an insignificant minority, democracy for the richthat is the democracy of capitalist society. If we look more closely into the mechanism of capitalist democracy, everywhere, both in the "petty"-so-called petty-details of the suffrage (residential qualification, exclusion of women, etc.), and in the technique of the representative institutions, in the actual obstacles to the right of assembly (public buildings are not for "beggars"!), in the purely capitalist organisation of the daily press, etc., etc.—on all sides we see restriction after restriction upon democracy. These restrictions, exceptions, exclusions, obstacles for the poor, seem slight, especially in the eyes of one who has himself never known want and has never been in close contact with the oppressed classes in their mass life (and nine-tenths, if not ninety-nine hundredths, of the bourgeois publicists and politicians are of this class), but in their sum total these restrictions exclude and squeeze out the poor from politics and from an active share in democracy.

Marx splendidly grasped this essence of capitalist democracy, when, in analysing the experience of the Commune, he said that the

oppressed were allowed, once every few years, to decide which particular representatives of the oppressing class should be in parliament to represent and repress them!

But from this capitalist democracy—inevitably narrow, subtly rejecting the poor, and therefore hypocritical and false to the core—progress does not march onward, simply, smoothly and directly, to "greater and greater democracy," as the liberal professors and petty-bourgeois opportunists would have us believe. No, progress marches onward, i.e., towards Communism, through the dictatorship of the proletariat; it cannot do otherwise, for there is no one else and no other way to break the resistance of the capitalist exploiters.

But the dictatorship of the proletariat—i.e., the organisation of the vanguard of the oppressed as the ruling class for the purpose of crushing the oppressors—cannot produce merely an expansion of democracy. Together with an immense expansion of democracy which for the first time becomes democracy for the poor, democracy for the people, and not democracy for the rich folk, the dictatorship of the proletariat produces a series of restrictions of liberty in the case of the oppressors, the exploiters, the capitalists. We must crush them in order to free humanity from wage-slavery; their resistance must be broken by force; it is clear that where there is suppression there is also violence, there is no liberty, no democracy.

Engels expressed this splendidly in his letter to Bebel when he said, as the reader will remember, that "as long as the proletariat still needs the state, it needs it not in the interests of freedom, but for the purpose of crushing its antagonists; and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom, then the state, as such, ceases to exist."

Democracy for the vast majority of the people, and suppression by force, i.e., exclusion from democracy, of the exploiters and oppressors of the people—this is the modification of democracy during the transition from capitalism to Communism.

Only in Communist society, when the resistance of the capitalists has been completely broken, when the capitalists have disappeared, when there are no classes (i.e., there is no difference between the members of society in their relation to the social means of production), only then "the state ceases to exist," and "it becomes possible to speak of freedom." Only then a really full democracy, a democracy without any exceptions, will be possible and will be realised. And only then will democracy itself begin to wither away due to the simple fact that, freed from capitalist slavery, from the untold hor-

rors, savagery, absurdities and infamies of capitalist exploitation, people will gradually become accustomed to the observation of the elementary rules of social life that have been known for centuries and repeated for thousands of years in all school books; they will become accustomed to observing them without force, without compulsion, without subordination, without the special apparatus for compulsion which is called the state.

The expression "the state withers away," is very well chosen, for it indicates both the gradual and the elemental nature of the process. Only habit can, and undoubtedly will, have such an effect; for we see around us millions of times how readily people get accustomed to observe the necessary rules of life in common, if there is no exploitation, if there is nothing that causes indignation, that calls forth protest and revolt and has to be suppressed.

Thus, in capitalist society, we have a democracy that is curtailed, poor, false; a democracy only for the rich, for the minority. The dictatorship of the proletariat, the period of transition to Communism, will, for the first time, produce democracy for the people, for the majority, side by side with the necessary suppression of the minority—the exploiters. Communism alone is capable of giving a really complete democracy, and the more complete it is the more quickly will it become unnecessary and wither away of itself.

In other words: under capitalism we have a state in the proper sense of the word, that is, special machinery for the suppression of one class by another, and of the majority by the minority at that. Naturally, for the successful discharge of such a task as the systematic suppression by the exploiting minority of the exploited majority, the greatest ferocity and savagery of suppression are required, seas of blood are required, through which mankind is marching in slavery, serfdom, and wage-labour.

Again, during the transition from capitalism to Communism, suppression is still necessary; but it is the suppression of the minority of exploiters by the majority of exploited. A special apparatus, special machinery for suppression, the "state," is still necessary, but this is now a transitional state, no longer a state in the usual sense, for the suppression of the minority of exploiters, by the majority of the wage slaves of yesterday, is a matter comparatively so easy, simple and natural that it will cost far less bloodshed than the suppression of the risings of slaves, serfs or wage labourers, and will cost mankind far less. This is compatible with the diffusion of

democracy among such an overwhelming majority of the population, that the need for special machinery of suppression will begin to disappear. The exploiters are, naturally, unable to suppress the people without a most complex machinery for performing this task; but the people can suppress the exploiters even with very simple "machinery," almost without any "machinery," without any special apparatus, by the simple organisation of the armed masses (such as the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, we may remark, anticipating a little).

Finally, only Communism renders the state absolutely unnecessary, for there is no one to be suppressed—"no one" in the sense of a class, in the sense of a systematic struggle with a definite section of the population. We are not Utopians, and we do not in the least deny the possibility and inevitability of excesses on the part of individual persons, nor the need to suppress such excesses. But, in the first place, no special machinery, no special apparatus of repression is needed for this; this will be done by the armed people itself, as simply and as readily as any crowd of civilised people, even in modern society, parts a pair of combatants or does not allow a woman to be outraged. And, secondly, we know that the fundamental social cause of excesses which consist in violating the rules of social life is the exploitation of the masses, their want and their poverty. With the removal of this chief cause, excesses will inevitably begin to "wither away." We do not know how quickly and in what succession, but we know that they will wither away. With their withering away, the state will also wither away.

Without going into Utopias, Marx defined more fully what can now be defined regarding this future, namely, the difference between the lower and higher phases (degrees, stages) of Communist society.

3. First Phase of Communist Society

In the Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx goes into some detail to disprove the Lassallean idea of the workers' receiving under Socialism the "undiminished" or "full product of their labour." Marx shows that out of the whole of the social labour of society, it is necessary to deduct a reserve fund, a fund for the expansion of production, for the replacement of worn-out machinery, and so on; then, also, out of the means of consumption must be deducted

a fund for the expenses of management, for schools, hospitals, homes for the aged, and so on.

Instead of the hazy, obscure, general phrase of Lassalle's—"the full product of his labour for the worker"—Marx gives a sober estimate of exactly how a Socialist society will have to manage its affairs, Marx undertakes a concrete analysis of the conditions of life of a society in which there is no capitalism, and says:

What we are dealing with here [analysing the programme of the party] is not a Communist society which has developed on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, one which is just emerging from capitalist society, and which therefore in all respects—economic, moral and intellectual—still bears the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it sprung.*

And it is this Communist society—a society which has just come into the world out of the womb of capitalism, and which, in all respects, bears the stamp of the old society—that Marx terms the "first," or lower, phase of Communist society.

The means of production are no longer the private property of individuals. The means of production belong to the whole of society. Every member of society, performing a certain part of socially-necessary work, receives a certificate from society to the effect that he has done such and such a quantity of work. According to this certificate, he receives from the public warehouses, where articles of consumption are stored, a corresponding quantity of products. Deducting that proportion of labour which goes to the public fund, every worker, therefore, receives from society as much as he has given it.

"Equality" seems to reign supreme.

But when Lassalle, having in view such a social order (generally called Socialism, but termed by Marx the first phase of Communism), speaks of this as "just distribution," and says that this is "the equal right of each to an equal product of labour," Lassalle is mistaken, and Marx exposes his error.

"Equal right," says Marx, we indeed have here; but it is still a "bourgeois right," which, like every right, presupposes inequality. Every right is an application of the same measure to different people who, in fact, are not the same and are not equal to one another; this is why "equal right" is really a violation of equality, and an injustice. In effect, every man having done as much social labour

as every other, receives an equal share of the social products (with the above-mentioned deductions).

But different people are not alike: one is strong, another is weak; one is married, the other is not; one has more children, another has less, and so on.

... With equal labour—Marx concludes—and therefore an equal share in the social consumption fund, one man in fact receives more than the other, one is richer than the other, and so forth. In order to avoid all these defects, rights, instead of being equal, must be unequal.

The first phase of Communism, therefore, still cannot produce justice and equality; differences, and unjust differences, in wealth will still exist, but the exploitation of man by man will have become impossible, because it will be impossible to seize as private property the means of production, the factories, machines, land, and so on. In tearing down Lassalle's petty-bourgeois, confused phrase about "equality" and "justice" in general, Marx shows the course of development of Communist society, which is forced at first to destroy only the "injustice" that consists in the means of production having been seized by private individuals, and which is not capable of destroying at once the further injustice consisting in the distribution of the articles of consumption "according to work performed" (and not according to need).

The vulgar economists, including the bourgeois professors and also "our" Tugan-Baranovsky, constantly reproach the Socialists with forgetting the inequality of people and with "dreaming" of destroying this inequality. Such a reproach, as we see, only proves the extreme ignorance of the gentlemen propounding bourgeois ideology.

Marx not only takes into account with the greatest accuracy the inevitable inequality of men; he also takes into account the fact that the mere conversion of the means of production into the common property of the whole of society ("Socialism" in the generally accepted sense of the word) does not remove the defects of distribution and the inequality of "bourgeois right" which continue to rule as long as the products are divided "according to work performed."

But these defects—Marx continues—are unavoidable in the first phase of Communist society, when, after long travail, it first emerges from capitalist society. Justice can never rise superior to the economic conditions of society and the cultural development conditioned by them.**

^{*} Ibid.-Ed.

And so, in the first phase of Communist society (generally called Socialism) "bourgeois right" is *not* abolished in its entirety, but only in part, only in proportion to the economic transformation so far attained, *i.e.*, only in respect of the means of production. "Bourgeois right" recognises them as the private property of separate individuals. Socialism converts them into common property. To that extent, and to that extent alone, does "bourgeois right" disappear.

However, it continues to exist as far as its other part is concerned; it remains in the capacity of regulator (determining factor) distributing the products and allotting labour among the members of society. "He who does not work, shall not eat"—this Socialist principle is already realised; "for an equal quantity of labour, an equal quantity of products"—this Socialist principle is also already realised. However, this is not yet Communism, and this does not abolish "bourgeois right," which gives to unequal individuals, in return for an unequal (in reality unequal) amount of work, an equal quantity of products.

This is a "defect," says Marx, but it is unavoidable during the first phase of Communism; for, if we are not to fall into Utopianism, we cannot imagine that, having overthrown capitalism, people will at once learn to work for society without any standards of right; indeed, the abolition of capitalism does not immediately lay the economic foundations for such a change.

And there is no other standard yet than that of "bourgeois right." To this extent, therefore, a form of state is still necessary, which, while maintaining public ownership of the means of production, would preserve the equality of labour and equality in the distribution of products.

The state is withering away in so far as there are no longer any capitalists, any classes, and, consequently, no class can be suppressed.

But the state has not yet altogether withered away, since there still remains the protection of "bourgeois right" which sanctifies actual inequality. For the complete extinction of the state, complete Communism is necessary.

4. HIGHER PHASE OF COMMUNIST SOCIETY

Marx continues:

In a higher phase of Communist society, when the enalaying subordination of individuals in the division of labour has disappeared, and with it also the

antagonism between mental and physical labour; when labour has become not only a means of living, but itself the first necessity of life; when, along with the all-round development of individuals, the productive forces too have grown, and all the springs of social wealth are flowing more freely—it is only at that stage that it will be possible to pass completely beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois rights, and for society to inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability: to each according to his needs! *

Only now can we appreciate the full correctness of Engels' remarks in which he mercilessly ridiculed all the absurdity of combining the words "freedom" and "state." While the state exists there is no freedom. When there is freedom, there will be no state.

The economic basis for the complete withering away of the state is that high stage of development of Communism when the antagonism between mental and physical labour disappears, that is to say, when one of the principal sources of modern social inequality disappears—a source, moreover, which it is impossible to remove immediately by the mere conversion of the means of production into public property, by the mere expropriation of the capitalists.

This expropriation will make a gigantic development of the productive forces possible. And seeing how incredibly, even now, capitalism retards this development, how much progress could be made even on the basis of modern technique at the level it has reached, we have a right to say, with the fullest confidence, that the expropriation of the capitalists will inevitably result in a gigantic development of the productive forces of human society. But how rapidly this development will go forward, how soon it will reach the point of breaking away from the division of labour, of removing the antagonism between mental and physical labour, of transforming work into the "first necessity of life"—this we do not and cannot know.

Consequently, we have a right to speak solely of the inevitable withering away of the state, emphasising the protracted nature of this process and its dependence upon the rapidity of development of the higher phase of Communism; leaving quite open the question of lengths of time, or the concrete forms of withering away, since material for the solution of such questions is not available.

The state will be able to wither away completely when society has realised the rule: "From each according to his ability; to each according to his needs," i.e., when people have become accustomed to observe the fundamental rules of social life, and their labour is

so productive, that they voluntarily work according to their ability. "The narrow horizon of bourgeois rights," which compels one to calculate, with the hard-heartedness of a Shylock, whether he has not worked half an hour more than another, whether he is not getting less pay than another—this narrow horizon will then be left behind. There will then be no need for any exact calculation by society of the quantity of products to be distributed to each of its members; each will take freely "according to his needs."

From the bourgeois point of view, it is easy to declare such a social order "a pure Utopia," and to sneer at the Socialists for promising each the right to receive from society, without any control of the labour of the individual citizen, any quantity of truffles, automobiles, pianos, etc. Even now, most bourgeois "savants" deliver themselves of such sneers, thereby displaying at once their ignorance and their self-seeking defence of capitalism.

Ignorance—for it has never entered the head of any Socialist to "promise" that the highest phase of Communism will arrive; while the great Socialists, in *foreseeing* its arrival, presupposed both a productivity of labour unlike the present and a person not like the present man in the street, capable of spoiling, without reflection, like the seminary students in Pomyalovsky's book,* the stores of social wealth, and of demanding the impossible.

Until the "higher" phase of Communism arrives, the Socialists demand the strictest control, by society and by the state, of the quantity of labour and the quantity of consumption; only this control must start with the expropriation of the capitalists, with the control of the workers over the capitalists, and must be carried out, not by a state of bureaucrats, but by a state of armed workers.

Self-seeking defence of capitalism by the bourgeois ideologists (and their hangers-on like Tsereteli, Chernov and Co.) consists in that they substitute disputes and discussions about the distant future for the essential imperative questions of present-day policy: the expropriation of the capitalists, the conversion of all citizens into workers and employees of one huge "syndicate"—the whole state—and the complete subordination of the whole of the work of this syndicate to the really democratic state of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

In reality, when a learned professor, and following him some

Pomyalovsky's Seminary Sketches depicted a group of student-ruffians who
engaged in destroying things for the pleasure it gave them.—Ed.

philistine, and following the latter Messrs. Tsereteli and Chernov, talk of the unreasonable Utopias, of the demagogic promises of the Bolsheviks, of the impossibility of "introducing" Socialism, it is the higher stage or phase of Communism which they have in mind, and which no one has ever promised, or even thought of "introducing," for the reason that, generally speaking, it cannot be "introduced."

And here we come to that question of the scientific difference between Socialism and Communism, upon which Engels touched in his above-quoted discussion on the incorrectness of the name "Social-Democrat." The political difference between the first, or lower, and the higher phase of Communism will in time, no doubt, be tremendous; but it would be ridiculous to emphasise it now, under capitalism, and only, perhaps, some isolated Anarchist could invest it with primary importance (if there are still some people among the Anarchists who have learned nothing from the Plekhanov-like conversion of the Kropotkins, the Graveses, the Cornelissens, and other "leading lights" of Anarchism to social-chauvinism or Anarcho-Jusquaubout-ism," as Ge, one of the few Anarchists still preserving honour and conscience, has expressed it).

But the scientific difference between Socialism and Communism is clear. What is generally called Socialism was termed by Marx the "first" or lower phase of Communist society. In so far as the means of production become public property, the word "Communism" is also applicable here, providing we do not forget that it is not full Communism. The great significance of Marx's elucidations consists in this: that here, too, he consistently applies materialist dialectics, the doctrine of development, looking upon Communism as something which evolves out of capitalism. Instead of artificial, "elaborate," scholastic definitions and profitless disquisitions on the meaning of words (what Socialism is, what Communism is), Marx gives an analysis of what may be called stages in the economic ripeness of Communism.

In its first phase or first stage Communism cannot as yet be economically ripe and entirely free of all tradition and of all taint of capitalism. Hence the interesting phenomenon of Communism retaining, in its first phase, "the narrow horizon of bourgeois rights." Bourgeois rights, with respect to distribution of articles of consump-

^{*} Jusquaubout—combination of the French words meaning "until the end." Anarcho-Jusquaubout-ism.—Anarcho-until-the-End-ism.—Ed.

tion, inevitably presupposes, of course, the existence of the bourgeois state, for rights are nothing without an apparatus capable of enforcing the observance of the rights.

Consequently, for a certain time not only bourgeois rights, but even the bourgeois state remains under Communism, without the bourgeoisie!

This may look like a paradox, or simply a dialectical puzzle for which Marxism is often blamed by people who would not make the least effort to study its extraordinarily profound content.

But, as a matter of fact, the old surviving in the new confronts us in life at every step, in nature as well as in society. Marx did not smuggle a scrap of "bourgeois" rights into Communism of his own accord; he indicated what is economically and politically inevitable in a society issuing from the womb of capitalism.

Democracy is of great importance for the working class in its struggle for freedom against the capitalists. But democracy is by no means a limit one may not overstep; it is only one of the stages in the course of development from feudalism to capitalism, and from capitalism to Communism.

Democracy means equality. The great significance of the struggle of the proletariat for equality, and the significance of equality as a slogan, are apparent, if we correctly interpret it as meaning the abolition of classes. But democracy means only formal equality. Immediately after the attainment of equality for all members of society in respect of the ownership of the means of production, that is, of equality of labour and equality of wages, there will inevitably arise before humanity the question of going further from formal equality to real equality, i.e., to realising the rule, "From each according to his ability; to each according to his needs." By what stages, by means of what practical measures humanity will proceed to this higher aim—this we do not and cannot know. But it is important to realise how infinitely mendacious is the usual bourgeois presentation of Socialism as something lifeless, petrified, fixed once for all, whereas in reality, it is only with Socialism that there will commence a rapid, genuine, real mass advance, in which first the majority and then the whole of the population will take part—an advance in all domains of social and individual life.

Democracy is a form of the state—one of its varieties. Consequently, like every state, it consists in organised, systematic application of force against human beings. This on the one hand. On

the other hand, however, it signifies the formal recognition of the equality of all citizens, the equal right of all to determine the structure and administration of the state. This, in turn, is connected with the fact that, at a certain stage in the development of democracy, it first rallies the proletariat as a revolutionary class against capitalism, and gives it an opportunity to crush, to smash to bits, to wipe off the face of the earth the bourgeois state machinery—even its republican variety: the standing army, the police, and bureaucracy; then it substitutes for all this a more democratic, but still a state machinery in the shape of armed masses of workers, which becomes transformed into universal participation of the people in the militia.

Here "quantity turns into quality": such a degree of democracy is bound up with the abandonment of the framework of bourgeois society, and the beginning of its Socialist reconstruction. If every one really takes part in the administration of the state, capitalism cannot retain its hold. In its turn, capitalism, as it develops, itself creates prerequisites for "every one" to be able really to take part in the administration of the state. Among such prerequisites are: universal literacy, already realised in most of the advanced capitalist countries, then the "training and disciplining" of millions of workers by the huge, complex, and socialised apparatus of the post-office, the railways, the big factories, large-scale commerce, banking, etc., etc.

With such economic prerequisites it is perfectly possible, immediately, within twenty-four hours after the overthrow of the capitalists and bureaucrats, to replace them, in the control of production and distribution, in the business of control of labour and products, by the armed workers, by the whole people in arms. (The question of control and accounting must not be confused with the question of the scientifically educated staff of engineers, agronomists and so on. These gentlemen work today, obeying the capitalists; they will work even better tomorrow, obeying the armed workers.)

Accounting and control—these are the chief things necessary for the organising and correct functioning of the first phase of Communist society. All citizens are here transformed into hired employees of the state, which is made up of the armed workers. All citizens become employees and workers of one national state "syndicate." All that is required is that they should work equally, should regularly do their share of work, and should receive equal pay. The accounting and control necessary for this have been

simplified by capitalism to the utmost, till they have become the extraordinarily simple operations of watching, recording and issuing receipts, within the reach of anybody who can read and write and knows the first four rules of arithmetic.*

When the *majority* of the people begin everywhere to keep such accounts and maintain such control over the capitalists (now converted into employees) and over the intellectual gentry, who still retain capitalist habits, this control will really become universal, general, national; and there will be no way of getting away from it, there will be "nowhere to go."

The whole of society will have become one office and one factory, with equal work and equal pay.

But this "factory" discipline, which the proletariat will extend to the whole of society after the defeat of the capitalists and the overthrow of the exploiters, is by no means our ideal, or our final aim. It is but a foothold necessary for the radical cleansing of society of all the hideousness and foulness of capitalist exploitation, in order to advance further.

From the moment when all members of society, or even only the overwhelming majority, have learned how to govern the state themselves, have taken this business into their own hands, have "established" control over the insignificant minority of capitalists, over the gentry with capitalist leanings, and the workers thoroughly demoralised by capitalism—from this moment the need for any government begins to disappear. The more complete the democracy, the nearer the moment when it begins to be unnecessary. The more democratic the "state" consisting of armed workers, which is "no longer a state in the proper sense of the word," the more rapidly does every state begin to wither away.

For when all have learned to manage, and independently are actually managing by themselves social production, keeping accounts, controlling the idlers, the gentlefolk, the swindlers and similar "guardians of capitalist traditions," then the escape from this national accounting and control will inevitably become so increasingly difficult, such a rare exception, and will probably be accompanied by such swift and severe punishment (for the armed

^{*}When most of the functions of the state are reduced to this accounting and control by the workers themselves, then it ceases to be a "political state," and the "public functions will lose their political character and be transformed into simple administrative functions" (cf. above, Chap. IV, § 2 on Engels' polemic against the Anarchists).

workers are men of practical life, not sentimental intellectuals, and they will scarcely allow any one to trifle with them), that very soon the necessity of observing the simple, fundamental rules of every-day social life in common will have become a habit.

The door will then be wide open for the transition from the first phase of Communist society to its higher phase, and along with it to the complete withering away of the state.

CHAPTER VI

VULGARISATION OF MARX BY THE OPPORTUNISTS

THE question of the relation of the state to the social revolution, and of the social revolution to the state, like the question of revolution generally, occupied the best known theoreticians and publicists of the Second International (1889-1914) very little. But the most characteristic thing in that process of the gradual growth of opportunism, which led to the collapse of the Second International in 1914, is the circumstance that even when those people actually came into contact with this question they tried to evade it or else failed to notice it.

It may, in general, be said that the evasiveness on the question of the relation of the proletarian revolution to the state, an evasiveness which was convenient for opportunism and nourished it—resulted in a distortion of Marxism and in its complete vulgarisation.

To characterise, if only in brief, this lamentable process, let us take the best known theoreticians of Marxism: Plekhanov and Kautsky.

1. PLEKHANOV'S POLEMIC AGAINST THE ANARCHISTS

Plekhanov devoted a special pamphlet to the question of the relation of Anarchism to Socialism, entitled *Anarchism and Socialism*, published in German in 1894.

Plekhanov managed somehow to treat this topic without touching on the most vital, timely, and politically essential point in the struggle with Anarchism: the relation of the revolution to the state, and the question of the state in general! His pamphlet is divided into two parts: one, historical and literary, containing valuable material for the history of the ideas of Stirner, Proudhon and others; the second is philistine, and contains a clumsy dissertation on the theme that an Anarchist cannot be distinguished from a handit.

An amusing combination of subjects and most characteristic of Plekhanov's whole activity on the eve of the revolution and during the revolutionary period in Russia. Indeed, in the years 1905 to 1917, Plekhanov showed himself to be half doctrinaire and half philistine, following politically in the wake of the bourgeoisie.

We have seen how Marx and Engels, in their polemics against the Anarchists, explained most thoroughly their views on the relation of the revolution to the state. Engels, upon the publication of Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme in 1891, wrote that "we"—that is, Engels and Marx—"were then, hardly two years after the Hague Congress of the [First] International, in the fiercest phase of our struggle with Bakunin and his Anarchists."

The Anarchists had tried to claim the Paris Commune as their "own," as a confirmation of their teachings, thus showing that they had not in the least understood the lessons of the Commune or the analysis of those lessons by Marx. Anarchism has failed to give anything even approaching a true solution of the concrete political problems: must the old state machinery be shattered, and what shall be put in its place?

But to speak of "Anarchism and Socialism," leaving the whole question of the state out of account and taking no notice of the whole development of Marxism before and after the Commune—meant an inevitable fall into opportunism. For that is just what opportunism wants—that the two questions just mentioned should not be raised at all. This is already a victory for opportunism.

2. KAUTSKY'S POLEMIC AGAINST THE OPPORTUNISTS

Undoubtedly an immeasurably larger number of Kautsky's works have been translated into Russian than into any other language. It is not without justification that German Social-Democrats sometimes say jokingly that Kautsky is more read in Russia than in Germany (we may say, in parentheses, that there is deeper historical significance in this joke than those who first made it suspected; for the Russian workers, having manifested in 1905 an extraordinarily strong, an unprecedented demand for the best works of the best Social-Democratic literature in the world, and having been supplied with translations and editions of these works in quantities unheard of in other countries, thereby transplanted, so to speak, with an accelerated tempo, the immense experience of a neighbouring, more advanced country to the almost virgin soil of our proletarian movement).

Besides his popularisation of Marxism, Kautsky is particularly well known in our country by his polemics against the opportunists, chiefly Bernstein. But one fact is almost unknown, which cannot be overlooked if we are to apply ourselves to the task of investigating how it was that Kautsky plunged into the unbelievably disgraceful morass of confusion and defence of social-chauvinism at a time of greatest crisis, in 1914-1915. This fact is that shortly before he came out against the best known representatives of opportunism in France (Millerand and Jaurès) and in Germany (Bernstein), Kautsky had shown very great vacillation. The Marxist journal, Zarya,160 which was published in Stuttgart in 1901-1902, and advocated revolutionary proletarian views, was forced to polemise against Kautsky, to characterise as "rubber-like" his evasive, temporising, and conciliatory attitude towards the opportunists as expressed in his resolution at the International Socialist Congress in Paris in 1900.170 Letters have been published from Kautsky's pen in Germany revealing no less hesitancy before he took the field against

Of immeasurably greater significance, however, is the circumstance that, in his very polemic against the opportunists, in his formulation of the question and his method of treating it, we can observe, now that we are investigating the *history* of his latest betrayal of Marxism, his systematic gravitation towards opportunism, precisely on the question of the state.

Let us take Kautsky's first big work against opportunism: Bernstein und das sozialdemokratische Programm. Kautsky refutes Bernstein in detail, but the characteristic thing about it is the following:

Bernstein, in his Herostrates-like famous Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus, accuses Marxism of "Blanquism" (an accusation since repeated thousands of times by the opportunists and liberal bourgeois in Russia against the representatives of revolutionary Marxism, the Bolsheviks). In this connection Bernstein dwells particularly on Marx's The Civil War in France, and tries—as we saw, quite unsuccessfully—to identify Marx's view of the lessons of the Commune with that of Proudhon. Bernstein pays particular attention to Marx's conclusion, emphasised by him in his 1872 preface to the Communist Manifesto, to the effect that "the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes."

The dictum "pleased" Bernstein so much that he repeated it no less than three times in his book—interpreting it in the most distorted opportunist sense.

We have seen what Marx means—that the working class must shatter, break up, blow up (Sprengung, explosion, is the expression used by Engels) the whole state machinery. But according to Bernstein it would appear as though Marx by these words warned the working class against excessive revolutionary zeal when seizing power.

A crasser and uglier perversion of Marx's ideas cannot be imagined.

How, then, did Kautsky act in his detailed refutation of Bernsteinism?

He avoided analysing the whole enormity of the perversion of Marxism by opportunism on this point. He cited the above-quoted passage from Engels' preface to Marx's Civil War, saying that, according to Marx, the working class cannot simply take possession of the ready-made state machinery, but, generally speaking, it can take possession of it—and that was all. As for the fact that Bernstein attributed to Marx the direct opposite of Marx's real views, that the real task of the proletarian revolution, as formulated by Marx ever since 1852, was to "break up" the state machinery—not a word of all this is to be found in Kautsky.

The result was that the most essential difference between Marxism and opportunism on the question of the proletarian revolution was glossed over!

"The solution of the problem of the proletarian dictatorship," wrote Kautsky "in opposition" to Bernstein, "we can safely leave to the future" (p. 172, German edition).

This is not a polemic against Bernstein, but really a concession to him, a surrender to opportunism; for at present the opportunists ask nothing better than to "safely leave to the future" all the fundamental questions on the tasks of the proletarian revolution.

Marx and Engels, from 1852 to 1891—for forty years—taught the proletariat that it must break up the state machinery. Kautsky, in 1899, confronted on this point with the complete betrayal of Marxism by the opportunists, fraudulently substitutes for the question as to whether it is necessary to break up the machinery, the question as to the concrete forms of breaking it up, and then saves himself behind the screen of the "indisputable" (and barren) philis-

tine truth, that concrete forms cannot be known in advance!!

Between Marx and Kautsky, between their respective attitudes to the task of a proletarian party in preparing the working class for revolution, there is an abyss.

Let us take the next, more mature, work by Kautsky, also devoted, to a large extent, to a refutation of opportunist errors. This is his pamphlet, The Social Revolution.¹⁷¹ The author chose here as his special theme the question of "the proletarian revolution" and the "proletarian régime." He gave here a great deal of valuable material; but evaded this question of the state. Throughout the pamphlet the author speaks of the conquest of the state power—and nothing else; that is, a formulation is chosen which makes a concession to the opportunists, since it admits the possibility of the conquest of power without the destruction of the state machinery. The very thing which Marx, in 1872, declared to be "obsolete" in the programme of the Communist Manifesto, is revived by Kautsky in 1902!

In the pamphlet a special section is devoted to "the forms and weapons of the social revolution." Here he speaks of the political mass strike, of civil war, and of such "instruments of force at the disposal of the modern large state as the bureaucracy and the army"; but of that which the Commune had already taught the workers, not a syllable. Evidently Engels had issued no idle warning, for the German Social-Democrats particularly, against "superstitious reverence" for the state.

Kautsky propounds the matter in the following way: the victorious proletariat, he says, "will realise the democratic programme," and he formulates its clauses. But of that which the year 1871 taught us about bourgeois democracy being replaced by a proletarian one—not a syllable. Kautsky disposes of the question by such "profound" looking banalities as:

It is obvious that we shall not attain power under the present order of things. Revolution itself presupposes a prolonged and far-reaching struggle which, as it proceeds, will change our present political and social structure.

This is undoubtedly "obvious"; as much as that horses eat oats, or that the Volga flows into the Caspian Sea. It is only a pity that he should use this empty and bombastic phrase of "far-reaching" struggle to slur over the question essential for the revolutionary proletariat, namely, wherein exactly lies this "far-reaching" nature of its revolution with respect to the state, with respect to democracy,

as distinguished from the non-proletarian revolutions of the past. By evading this question, Kautsky in reality makes a concession to opportunism in this most essential point, while declaring a terrible war against it in words, emphasising the importance of the "idea of revolution" (how much is this "idea" worth, if one is afraid to spread among the workers the concrete lessons of the revolution?) or declaring that "revolutionary idealism is above all," that the English workers represent now "little more than petty-bourgeois."

In a Socialist society—Kautsky writes—there can exist, side by side, the most varied forms of economic enterprises—bureaucratic [??], trade union, co-operative, private.... There are, for instance, such enterprises as cannot do without a bureaucratic [??] organisation: such are the railways. Here democratic organisation might take the following form: the workers elect delegates, who form something in the nature of a parliament, and this parliament determines the conditions of work, and superintends the management of the bureaucratic apparatus. Other enterprises may be transferred to the labour unions, and still others may be organised on a co-operative basis.

This reasoning is erroneous, and represents a step backward in comparison with what Marx and Engels explained in the 'seventies, using the lessons of the Commune as an example.

So far as this assumed necessity of "bureaucratic" organisation is concerned, there is no difference whatever between railways and any other enterprise of large-scale machine industry, any factory, any large store, or large-scale capitalist agricultural enterprise. The technique of all such enterprises requires the very strictest discipline, the greatest accuracy in the carrying out by every one of the work allotted to him, under peril of stoppage of the whole business or damage to mechanism or product. In all such enterprises the workers will, of course, "elect delegates who form something in the nature of a parliament."

But here is the crux of the matter: this "something in the nature of a parliament" will not be a parliament in the sense of bourgeois-parliamentary institutions. The crux of the matter is that this "something in the nature of a parliament" will not merely "determine the conditions of work, and superintend the management of the bureaucratic apparatus," as imagined by Kautsky, whose ideas do not go beyond the framework of bourgeois parliamentarism. In a Socialist society, this "something in the nature of a parliament," consisting of workers' deputies, will of course determine the conditions of work, and superintend the management of the "apparatus"—but this apparatus will not be "bureaucratic." The workers,

having conquered political power, will break up the old bureaucratic apparatus, they will shatter it to its very foundations, until not one stone is left upon another; and they will replace it with a new one consisting of these same workers and employees, against whose transformation into bureaucrats measures will at once be undertaken, as pointed out in detail by Marx and Engels: (1) not only electiveness, but also instant recall; (2) payment no higher than that of ordinary workers; (3) immediate transition to a state of things when all fulfil the functions of control and superintendence, so that all become "bureaucrats" for a time, and no one, therefore, can become a "bureaucrat."

Kautsky has not reflected at all on Marx's words: "The Commune was not a parliamentary, but a working corporation, legislative and executive at the same time."

Kautsky has not in the least understood the difference between bourgeois parliamentarism, combining democracy (not for the people) with bureaucracy (against the people), and proletarian democracy, which will take immediate steps to cut down bureaucracy at the roots, and which will be able to carry out these measures to their conclusion, the complete destruction of bureaucracy, and the final establishment of democracy for the people.

Kautsky reveals here again the same "superstitious reverence" for the state, and "superstitious faith" in bureaucracy.

Let us pass to the last and best of Kautsky's works against the opportunists, his pamphlet, Der Weg zur Macht [The Road to Power] (which I believe has not been translated into Russian, for it came out during the severest period of reaction here, in 1909).¹⁷² This pamphlet is a considerable step forward, inasmuch as it does not treat the revolutionary programme in general, as in the pamphlet of 1899 against Bernstein, nor the tasks of a social revolution irrespective of the time of its occurrence, as in the pamphlet, The Social Revolution, 1902, but the concrete conditions which compel us to recognise that the "revolutionary era" is approaching.

The author definitely calls attention to the intensification of class antagonisms in general and to imperialism, which plays a particularly important part in this connection. After the "revolutionary period of 1789-1871" in Western Europe, he says, an analogous period begins for the East in 1905. A world war is approaching with menacing rapidity. "The proletariat can no longer talk of premature revolution." "The revolutionary era is beginning."

These declarations are perfectly clear. The pamphlet ought to serve as a measure of comparison between the high promise of German Social-Democracy before the imperialist war and the depth of degradation to which it fell—Kautsky included—when the war broke out. "The present situation," Kautsky wrote in the pamphlet under consideration, "contains this danger, that we" (i.e., German Social-Democracy), "may easily be considered more moderate than we are in reality." In reality, the German Social-Democratic Party turned out even more moderate and opportunist than it had seemed!

The more characteristic it is that, side by side with such definite declarations regarding the revolutionary era that had already begun, Kautsky, in the pamphlet which, he says himself, is devoted precisely to an analysis of the "political revolution," again completely dodges the question of the state.

From all these evasions of the question, omissions and equivocations, there inevitably followed that complete surrender to opportunism of which we shall soon have to speak.

German Social-Democracy, in the person of Kautsky, seems to have declared: I uphold revolutionary views (1899); I recognise, in particular, the inevitability of the social revolution of the proletariat (1902); I recognise the approach of a new revolutionary era (1909); still I disavow that which Marx said as early as 1852—if once the question is definitely raised as to the tasks confronting a proletarian revolution in relation to the state (1912).

It was precisely in this direct form that the question was put in the polemic of Kautsky against Pannekoek.

3. KAUTSKY'S POLEMIC AGAINST PANNEKOEK

Pannekoek came out against Kautsky as one of the representatives of the "left radical" movement which counted in its ranks Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Radek, and others, and which, while upholding revolutionary tactics, was united in the conviction that Kautsky was taking a "centre" position, that he was wavering in an unprincipled manner between Marxism and opportunism. The correctness of this view was fully proved by the war, when this "centre" current or Kautskyism, wrongly called Marxist, revealed itself in all its hideous squalor.

In an article touching on the question of the state, entitled "Mass Action and Revolution" (Neue Zeit, 1912, XXX-2), Pannekoek

characterised Kautsky's position as an attitude of "passive radicalism," as "a theory of inactive waiting." "Kautsky does not want to see the process of revolution," says Pannekoek (p. 616). In thus stating the problem, Pannekoek approached the subject which interests us, namely, the tasks of a proletarian revolution in relation to the state.

The struggle of the proletariat—he wrote—is not merely a struggle against the bourgeoisic for the purpose of acquiring state power, but a struggle against the state power. The content of a proletarian revolution is the destruction of the instruments of the state power, and their forcing out [literally: dissolution, Auflösung] by the instruments of the power of the proletariat... The struggle will not end until, as its final result, the entire state organisation is destroyed. The organisation of the majority demonstrates its superiority by destroying the organisation of the ruling minority (p. 548).

The formulation in which Pannekoek presented his ideas has very great defects, but its meaning is sufficiently clear; and it is interesting to note how Kautsky combated it.

Up till now—he wrote—the difference between Social-Democrats and Anarchists has consisted in this: the former wished to conquer the state power while the latter wished to destroy it. Pannekoek wants to do both (p. 724).¹⁷⁸

If Pannekoek's exposition lacks precision and concreteness—not to speak of other defects which have no bearing on the present subject—Kautsky seized on just that one point in Pannekoek's article which is the essential principle of the whole matter; and on this fundamental question of principle Kautsky forsakes the Marxian position entirely and surrenders without reserve to the opportunists. His definition of the difference between Social-Democrats and Anarchists is absolutely wrong; and Marxism is thoroughly vulgarised and distorted.

The difference between the Marxists and Anarchists consists in this: (1) the former, while aiming at the complete destruction of the state, recognise that this aim can only be realised after the abolition of classes by a Socialist revolution, as the result of the establishment of Socialism, leading to the withering away of the state; the latter want the complete destruction of the state within twenty-four hours, not understanding the conditions under which such destruction can be carried out; (2) the former recognise that when once the proletariat has won political power it must utterly break up the old state machinery, and substitute for it a new one consisting of an organisation of armed workers, after the type of the

Commune; the latter, while advocating the destruction of the state machinery, have absolutely no clear idea as to what the proletariat will put in its place and how it will use its revolutionary power; the Anarchists even reject the utilisation by the revolutionary proletariat of state power, the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat; (3) the former insist upon making use of the modern state as a means of preparing the workers for revolution; the latter reject this.

In this controversy it is Pannekoek, not Kautsky, who represents Marxism, for it was Marx who taught that it is not enough for the proletariat simply to conquer state power in the sense of the old state apparatus passing into new hands, but that the proletariat must break up, smash this apparatus and replace it by a new one.

Kautsky goes over from Marxism to the opportunists, because, in his hands, this destruction of the state machinery, which is utterly inacceptable to the opportunists, completely disappears, and there remains for them a loophole in that they can interpret "conquest" as the simple gaining of a majority.

To cover up his distortion of Marxism, Kautsky acts like the religious debater in the village: he advances "quotations" from Marx himself. Marx wrote in 1850 of the necessity of "a decisive centralisation of power in the hands of the state"; and Kautsky triumphantly asks: does Pannekoek want to destroy "centralism"?

This is nothing but sleight-of-hand, similar to Bernstein's identification of the views of Marxism and Proudhonism on federalism versus centralism.

Kautsky's "quotation" is neither here nor there. The new state machinery admits centralism as much as the old; if the workers voluntarily unify their armed forces, this will be centralism, but it will be based on the "complete destruction" of the centralised state apparatus—the army, police, bureaucracy. Kautsky acts just like a swindler when he ignores the perfectly well known arguments of Marx and Engels on the Commune and comes out with a quotation which has nothing to do with the case.

He continues:

Perhaps Pannekoek wants to abolish the state functions of the officials? But we cannot do without officials even in our party and trade union organisations, much less in the state administration. Our programme demands, not abolition of state officials, but their election by the people. . . . It is not a question as to the precise form which the administrative apparatus will take in the "future state," but as to whether our political struggle destroys [literally: dissolves,

"auflöst"] the state before we have conquered it [Kautsky's italics]. What ministry with its officials could be abolished? [There follows an enumeration of the ministries of education, justice, finance and war.] No, not one of the present ministries will be removed by our political struggles against the government. . . . I repeat, to avoid misunderstanding: it is not here a question of what form a victorious Social-Democracy will give to the "future state," but of how our opposition changes the present state (p. 725).

This is an obvious trick: revolution was the question Pannekoek raised. Both the title of his article and the passages quoted above show that clearly. When Kautsky jumps over to the question of "opposition," he changes the revolutionary point of view for the opportunist. What he says is: opposition now, and a special talk about the matter after we have won power. The revolution has vanished! That is precisely what the opportunists wanted.

Opposition and general political struggle are beside the point; we are concerned with the revolution. And revolution consists in the proletariat's destroying the "administrative apparatus" and the whole state machinery, and replacing it by a new one consisting of the armed workers. Kautsky reveals a "superstitious reverence" for ministries; but why can they not be replaced, say, by commissions of specialists working under sovereign all-powerful Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies?

The essence of the matter is not at all whether the "ministries" will remain or "commissions of specialists" or any other kind of institutions will exist; this is quite unimportant. The main thing is whether the old state machinery (connected by thousands of threads with the bourgeoisie and saturated through and through with routine and inertia) shall remain or be destroyed and replaced by a new one. A revolution must not consist in a new class ruling, governing with the help of the old state machinery, but in this class smashing this machinery and ruling, governing by means of new machinery. This fundamental idea of Marxism Kautsky either slurs over or has not understood at all.

His question about officials shows clearly that he does not understand the lessons of the Commune or the teachings of Marx. "We cannot do without officials even in our party and trade union organisations. . . ."

We cannot do without officials under capitalism, under the rule of the bourgeoisie. The proletariat is oppressed, the labouring masses are enslaved by capitalism. Under capitalism, democracy is narrowed, crushed, curtailed, mutilated by all the conditions of wage-slavery, the poverty and misery of the masses. This is the reason, and the only reason, why the officials of our political parties and trade unions become corrupt—or, more precisely, tend to become corrupt—under capitalist conditions, why they show a tendency to turn into bureaucrats, *i.e.*, privileged persons detached from the masses, and standing above the masses.

That is the *essence* of bureaucracy, and until the capitalists have been expropriated and the bourgeoisie overthrown, *even* proletarian officials will inevitably be to some extent "bureaucratised."

From what Kautsky says, one might think that if elective officials remain under Socialism, bureaucrats and bureaucracy will also remain! That is entirely incorrect. Marx took the example of the Commune to show that under Socialism the functionaries cease to be "bureaucrats" and "officials"—they change in the degree as election is supplemented by the right of instant recall; when, besides this, their pay is brought down to the level of the pay of the average worker; when, besides this, parliamentary institutions are replaced by "working corporations, legislative and executive at one and the same time."

All Kautsky's arguments against Pannekoek, and particularly his splendid point that we cannot do without officials even in our parties and trade unions, show, in essence, that Kautsky is repeating the old "arguments" of Bernstein against Marxism in general. Bernstein's renegade book, Evolutionary Socialism, is an attack on "primitive" democracy—"doctrinaire democracy" as he calls it—imperative mandates, functionaries without pay, impotent central representative bodies, and so on. To prove that "primitive democracy" is worthless, Bernstein refers to the British trade union experience, as interpreted by the Webbs. Seventy-odd years of development "in absolute freedom" (p. 137, German edition), have, he avers, convinced the trade unions that primitive democracy is useless, and led them to replace it with ordinary parliamentarism combined with bureaucracy.

In reality the trade unions developed not "in absolute freedom" but in complete capitalist enslavement, under which one, naturally, "cannot do without" concessions to the prevailing evil, force, false-hood, exclusion of the poor from the affairs of the "higher" administration. Under Socialism much of the "primitive" democracy is inevitably revived, since, for the first time in the history of civilised society, the mass of the population rises to independent

participation, not only in voting and elections, but also in the everyday administration of affairs. Under Socialism, all will take a turn in management, and will soon become accustomed to the idea of no managers at all.

Marx's critico-analytical genius perceived in the practical measures of the Commune that revolutionary turning point of which the opportunists are afraid, and which they do not want to recognise, out of cowardice, out of reluctance to break irrevocably with the bourgeoisie, and which the Anarchists do not want to perceive, either through haste or a general lack of understanding of the conditions of great social mass transformations. "One must not even think of such a thing as destroying the old state machinery, for how shall we do without ministries and without officials?" argues the opportunist, saturated through and through with philistinism, and in reality not merely devoid of faith in revolution, in the creative power of revolution, but actually in mortal dread of it (like our Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries).

"One must think only of the destruction of the old state machinery; never mind searching for concrete lessons in earlier proletarian revolutions and analysing with what and how to replace what has been destroyed," argues the Anarchist (the best of the Anarchists, of course, and not those who, with Messrs. Kropotkins and Co., follow in the train of the bourgeoisie); consequently, the tactics of the Anarchist become the tactics of despair instead of a revolutionary grappling with concrete problems—ruthlessly courageous and at the same time cognisant of the practical conditions under which the masses progress.

Marx teaches us to avoid both kinds of error; he teaches us unswerving courage in destroying the entire old state machinery, and at the same time shows us how to put the situation concretely: the Commune was able, within a few weeks, to start building a new, proletarian state machinery by introducing such and such measures to secure a wider democracy, and to uproot bureaucracy. Let us learn revolutionary courage from the Communards; let us see in their practical measures an outline of practically urgent and immediately possible measures, and then, following this road, we shall arrive at the complete destruction of bureaucracy.

The possibility of such destruction is assured by the fact that Socialism will shorten the working day, raise the masses to a new life, create such conditions for the majority of the population as

to enable everybody, without exception, to perform "state functions," and this will lead to a complete withering away of every state in general.

The object of a general strike—Kautsky continues—can never be to destroy the state, but only to wring concessions from the government on some particular question, or to replace a hostile government with one willing to meet the proletariat half way [entgegenkommend]... But never, under any conditions, can it (a proletarian victory over a hostile government) lead to the destruction of the state power; it can lead only to a certain shifting [Verschiebung] of forces within the state power... The aim of our political struggle, then, remains as before, the conquest of state power by means of gaining a majority in parliament, and the conversion of parliament into the master of the government (pp. 726, 727, 732).

This is nothing but the most clear and vulgar opportunism: a repudiation of revolution in deeds, while accepting it in words. Kautsky's imagination goes no further than a "government... willing to meet the proletariat half way"; this is a step backward to philistinism compared with 1847, when the Communist Manifesto proclaimed "the organisation of the proletariat as the ruling class."

Kautsky will have to realise his beloved "unity" with the Scheidemanns, Plekhanovs and Vanderveldes, all of whom will agree to fight for a government "meeting the proletariat half way."

But we shall go forward to a break with these traitors to Socialism, and we shall fight for complete destruction of the old state machinery, in such a way that the armed proletariat itself is the government. Which is a very different thing.

Kautsky may enjoy the pleasant company of the Legiens, Davids, Plekhanovs, Potresovs, Tseretelis and Chernovs, who are quite willing to work for the "shifting of the relation of forces within the state," for "gaining a majority in parliament, and the conversion of parliament into the master of the government." A most worthy object, wholly acceptable to the opportunists, in which everything remains within the framework of a bourgeois parliamentary republic.

We shall go forward to a break with the opportunists; and the whole of the class-conscious proletariat will be with us—not for a "shifting of the relation of forces," but for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the destruction of bourgeois parliamentarism, for a democratic republic after the type of the Commune, or a republic of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.

To the right of Kautsky there are, in international Socialism, such tendencies as the Sozialistische Monatshefte [Socialist Monthly] in Germany (Legien, David, Kolb, and many others, including the Scandinavians, Stauning and Branting); the followers of Jaurès and Vandervelde in France and Belgium; Turati, Treves, and other representatives of the Right Wing of the Italian party; the Fabians and "Independents" (the Independent Labour Party, always dependent, as a matter of fact, on the Liberals) in England; and the like. All these gentry, while playing a great, very often a predominant rôle, in parliamentary work and in the journalism of the party, reject outright the dictatorship of the proletariat and carry out a policy of unconcealed opportunism. In the eyes of these gentry, the "dictatorship" of the proletariat "contradicts" democracy!! There is really no essential difference between them and the petty-bourgeois democrats.

Taking these circumstances into consideration, we have a right to conclude that the Second International, in the persons of the overwhelming majority of its official representatives, has completely sunk into opportunism. The experience of the Commune has been not only forgotten, but distorted. Far from inculcating into the workers' minds the idea that the time is near when they are to rise up and smash the old *state* machinery and substitute for it a new one, thereby making their political domination the foundation for a Socialist reconstruction of society, they have actually taught the workers the direct opposite of this, and represented the "conquest of power" in a way that left thousands of loopholes for opportunism.

The distortion and hushing up of the question as to the relation of a proletarian revolution to the state could not fail to play an immense rôle at a time when the states, with their swollen military apparatus as a consequence of imperialist rivalry, had become monstrous military beasts devouring the lives of millions of people, in order to decide whether England or Germany—this or that finance capital—should dominate the world.*

* The manuscript continues:

CHAPTER VII

EXPERIENCE OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONS OF 1905 AND 1917

The subject indicated in the title of this chapter is so vast that volumes can and must be written about it. In the present pamphlet it will be necessary to confine ourselves, naturally, to the most important lessons of the experience, those touching directly upon the tasks of the proletariat in a revolution relative to state power. . . . [Here the manuscript breaks off.—Ed.]

POSTSCRIPT TO THE FIRST EDITION

This pamphlet was written in August and September, 1917. I had already drawn up the plan for the next, the seventh chapter, on the "Experience of the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917." But, outside of the title, I did not succeed in writing a single line of the chapter; what "interfered" was the political crisis—the eve of the October Revolution of 1917. Such "interference" can only be welcomed. However, the second part of the pamphlet (devoted to the "Experience of the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917,") will probably have to be put off for a long time. It is more pleasant and useful to go through the "experience of the revolution" than to write about it.

THE AUTHOR.

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EXPLANATORY NOTES

- 100. At the session of the first conference of the Soviets, June 21, during the speech of Tsereteli, who said: "At the present moment there is no political party in Russia that would say: Give the power into our hands, go away, we will take your place. There is no such party in Russia." Lenin shouted from his seat: "Yes, there is!" (Ryech, No. 130, June 19, 1917.)—p. 15.
- 101. Lenin quotes from an editorial in Ryech, No. 218 (3960), September 29, 1917, devoted to the Democratic Conference.—p. 16.
- 102. Lenin quotes from an editorial in Dyelo Naroda, No. 160, October 4, 1917, under the title "Ways of Conciliation."—p. 16.
- 103. The resolution of the Democratic Conference on the organisation of power, proposed on October 3, 1917, by Tsereteli, demanded "the creation of a strong revolutionary power," "realisation of the programme of August 27, an active foreign policy aiming to achieve universal peace, and the responsibility of the government to a representative body up to the Constituent Assembly that represents the will of the country." The resolution further provides for the creation by the Conference of the "pre-parliament" (Provisional Soviet of the Russian Republic) as a body which must "co-operate in the creation of a power on the indicated foundations with the provision that in case the property-owning elements should be attracted into the Provisional Government, that body can and must be completed by delegates from the bourgeois groups," keeping a majority for the democratic elements. The government was to be responsible to the pre-parliament.

"The platform of August 27" was read by Chkheidze in the name of "revolutionary democracy" at the Moscow State Conference.—p. 17.

- 104. Lenin quotes from an editorial in Novaya Zhizn, No. 135, October 6, 1917, entitled, "In the Clutches of Power."—p. 18.
- 105. Znamya Truda, a newspaper published in 1917 by the Petrograd Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. After the 7th general city conference, which took place on September 23, the Committee was taken over by the Lefts. The chief collaborators on the newspaper were B. Kamkov, A. Kalegayev, S. Mstislavsky, R. Ivanov-Razumnik and others. Lenin refers to a note in No. 25 of Znamya Truda entitled, "The Voice of the Peasantry on the Ouestion of Coalition,"—p. 21.
- 106. The Conference of the Executive Committees of the Soviets of Peasant Deputies, convoked by the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasant Deputies, took place in Petrograd, September 29 to October 1, 1917.

In addition to many provincial peasant Soviets which declared against a coalition with the bourgeoisie and are mentioned in Lenin's article, the Bessarabian, Ufa and Kherson provincial Soviets voted for the Soviets as the seat of power.—p. 22.

- 107. In September, 1917, Chernov and his adherents held a centrist position in the S.-R. group; to the left of them was a considerable Left Wing headed by Spiridonova and Kamkov, which in November, 1917, formed an independent party of Left S.-R.-Internationalists; to the right of them stood a considerable mass of arch-Right S.-R.'s, members of co-operatives, Narodniks of a liberal hue, etc. After the October uprising the Chernov centre was quickly absorbed within the mass of the Right S.-R.'s.—p. 24.
- 108. Martov's declaration was read by him in the name of "the majority of the Soviet delegation" at the Democratic Conference on October 1, 1917. The declaration said, among other things:
- ... all political self-government of the great people which threw off the chains of tsarist slavery has been performed and is performed through the Soviets; by this very fact the Soviets all over Russia are the immediate carriers of the ideas of the power by the people, the bodies which carry to realisation in fact the democratic republic and are actually concentrating in their hands state power in the local communities. . . . At the time this live tissue of the new revolutionary state was being developed and was gaining strength in the local communities, there functioned in the centre a government built up on the basis of coalition with the undemocratic propertied classes. . . . This condition was the cause of hindrances coming from the census groups in the carrying out of the urgent economic, financial and social reforms. . . . The government in fact became ever more irresponsible, ever more independent of the control of organised democracy, and because of this it in fact became ever more dependent upon the capitalist classes.

The declaration therefore thought it necessary "decisively to reject any agreement with the census elements" and proposed "to make every effort for the cause of creating a truly revolutionary government" pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.—p. 26.

- 109. The growth of the party in the epoch of revolution may be seen by the following figures: at the All-Russian April Conference of the R. S.-D. L. P. (Bolsheviks), 1917, 76,000 members were represented; at the Sixth Congress, in July, 1917 (according to its proceedings), over 177,000.—p. 34.
- 110. Lenin refers to an editorial in *Dyelo Naroda*, No. 168, October 13, 1917, entitled, "A New Revolution or the Constituent Assembly?"—p. 43.
- 111. Lenin refers to an editorial in *Dyelo Naroda*, No. 167, October 12, 1917, entitled, "First Restoration of Order and Then Reforms."—p. 44.
- 112. A paraphrase of the words of Plekhanov: "Our economists contemplate the behind of the working class." (Preface to "Vademecum for the Editorial Board of the Rabocheye Dyelo.")—p. 51.

- 113. Quoted from an editorial in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 142, October 14, 1917, entitled, "Congress of Soviets and Constituent Assembly."—p. 51.
- 114. "We have two: moderation and accuracy"—the words of Molchalin, in the comedy of A. Griboyedov, Woe from Being Too Wise.—p. 52.
- 115. December 12, 1917—the date to which the Provisional Government had postponed the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.—p. 55.
- 116. The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was located at the Smolny Institute. From October 8 on the Soviet was controlled by the Bolshoviks.—p. 56.
- 117. Prosveshcheniye, a Bolshevik monthly journal, was published legally in Petrograd under tsarism in the years of reaction as a "Marxian social, political, literary journal." No. 1 appeared in December, 1911, the last number in the summer of 1913, on the eve of the war. In 1917 the publication of Prosveshcheniye was renewed as "theoretical organ of the R. S.-D. L. P." However, only one double number appeared, with articles by N. Lenin, V. Milyutin, G. Zinoviev, F. Mehring, G. Lomov, R. Arsky, N. Glebov, K. Zalevsky and V. Nevsky.—p. 56.
- 118. The present theses, written by Lenin in connection with the party Congress called for October 30, 1917, but the convocation of which was later revoked by the Central Committee, were considered by the Petrograd city conference. The Petrograd city conference took place October 20 to 24, 1917. Several of its sessions, out of considerations of conspiracy, were closed sessions (without the participation of visitors or delegates having a voice but no vote). At the conference 49,000 party members were represented. The basic questions on the agenda were: the report of the Petrograd Committee (G. Boky and O. Ravich), the report of the military organisation (N. Podvoisky), the Constituent Assembly (J. Fenigstein-Doletsky), the municipal question and the present situation. The conference nominated a list of candidates to the Constituent Assembly from Petrograd headed by Lenin, adopted resolutions on the present situation, on the municipal question, etc. The concluding part of the resolution on the present situation stated:

The conference therefore declares that only the overthrow of the Kerensky government and of the packed Soviet of the Republic and the substitution for it of a workers' and peasants' revolutionary government is capable of:
(a) giving the land to the peasants instead of suppressing the peasant uprising;
(b) offering an immediate just peace and thus giving faith in the truth to our entire army; (c) adopting the most decisive revolutionary measures against the capitalists in order to secure for the army bread, clothing and footwear and in order to fight against economic ruin.

The minutes of the commission that were preserved are far from complete. The newspaper reports which were published in Rabochy Put are likewise extremely fragmentary.—p. 61.

119. The letter to the Petrograd city conference was road at a session of the conference on October 24, 1917. Whether this letter was discussed by

the conference is not known, as the minutes of the session were not preserved.

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- 120. The Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of the Northern Region, called by the Regional Executive Committee of the army. navy and workers of Finland at its session of October 21 in Helsingfors, took place in Petrograd on October 24 to 26. Since the overwhelming majority of this congress consisted of Bolsheviks and Left S.-R.'s, the Menshevik-S.-R. C. E. C. declared the congress "a private conference." The small Menshevik fraction did not take part in the work of the congress, and remained there only for purposes of information. The congress declared itself in favour of the immediate transfer of power to the Soviets, an immediate offer of peace, the immediate transfer of the land to the peasants and the convening of the Constituent Assembly at the appointed time. The congress addressed a radio telegram "to all, to all," declaring that the Second Congress of Soviets had been called for October 20 and that its task was to bring about an immediate truce on all fronts, the transfer of all the land to the peasants and the assuring of the convocation of the Constituent Assembly: the telegram called for taking up the struggle against the disruption of the congress by the bourgeoisie and the conciliators and proposed that all organisations make sure to be represented at the congress.-p. 66.
- 121. The Soldiers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet, at its session on October 19, 1917, discussed the question of the events at the front and of the possibility, in connection with them, of transferring the Provisional Government from Petrograd to Moscow. The Section categorically declared against the moving of the government, since that would be tantamount to leaving the revolutionary capital to its fate and preparing for its surrender to the German army.—p. 66.
- 122. The minutes of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks, published in Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya in 1927, do not contain any indications that the "Letter to the C. C., M. C., P. C., and Bolshevik members of the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets," sent by Lenin from Finland, was discussed by the Central Committee. Likewise the editors have no material on the attitude of the Petrograd Committee to the letter, but upon receipt of the letter in Moscow it was discussed at a meeting of the leading Moscow party workers. At the meeting were present: N. Bukharin, N. Osinsky, A. Rykov, P. Smidovich, E. Yaroslavsky, V. Obukh, N. Ovsyannikov and V. Solovyev. The meeting declared itself in accord with Lenin's letter, and those present decided to advocate in the party organisations concerned "the course towards an uprising." A few days after the meeting the Moscow Committee, acting on the reports of Bukharin and Osinsky, adopted for its guidance the theses proposed in the letter.—p. 69.
- 123. Officer Dubasov spoke at the session of the Petrograd Soviet on October 5, 1917, during the discussion of the report on the Democratic Conference. Rebochy Put, No. 18, October 6, reports his speech as follows:

"Comrade Dubasov, who returned from the front, states during his speech that the soldiers at present do not want either liberty or land. They want only one thing—the end of the war. Whatever you may say here, the soldiers will not fight any longer." "This statement," adds the paper, "made a strong impression upon the audience."—p. 69.

- 124. The railroad and postal and telegraph employees unsuccessfully demanded during the several months of the summer of 1917 an increase in wages, which has been extremely reduced due to the depreciation of the paper ruble. The commission appointed by the Provisional Government under the chairmanship of G. V. Plekhanov refused to grant the demands of the railroad employees. As a result the railroad workers and employees declared a general strike on all Russian railroads; the strike began on the night of October 6-7, 1917. After the Provisional Government granted the demand of the railroad workers and employees, the strike was called off on the night of October 10.—p. 69.
- 125. Lenin's advice about the Russkoye Slovo was carried out by the Moscow Soviet immediately after the victory of the October Revolution, and the printing plant of the newspaper was confiscated. The publication of the Izvestiya of the Moscow Soviet was transferred to the printing plant of the Russkoye Slovo; in March, 1918, after the seat of the government was transferred to Moscow, the Pravda was transferred to the same printing plant.—p. 70.
- 126. The article "Towards the Revision of the Party Programme" was written by Lenin for the party conference which was called by the Central Committee for October 30 (later this conference was called off and its place was taken by a series of local party conferences). At the session of October 18, the C. C. elected a special commission to prepare a draft of a party programme for the conference. The commission was headed by Lenin and included Bukharin. Trotsky, Kameney, Sokolnikov and Kollontai.—p. 71.
- 127. Quotation from the article by Friedrich Engels—"Zur Kritik des Sozialdemokratischen Programmentwurfes 1891" ("Critique of the Draft of the Social-Democratic Programme of 1891"), published in *Die Neue Zeit*, XX Jahrgang, 1 Band, 1901-1902.—p. 79.
- 128. The Spartakusbund (Spartacus League)—an illegal organisation in Germany, established at the beginning of the imperialist war by Karl Liebknecht, Leo Jogiches, Rosa Luxemburg and Franz Mehring to fight opportunism within the German Social-Democracy, which had betrayed the International. After its split from the official S.-D. Party, the Spartacus League for technical reasons joined the Independent S.-D. Party of Germany, but kept its own organisation as a separate group. After the November Revolution in 1918 and the formation of a united S.-D. government of Scheidemannites and Independents, the League severed connections with the Independents and in December of the same year ceased to exist, having formed together with several other organisations the German Communist Party. The programme

of the Spartacus League was written by R. Luxemburg ("What Are the Aims of Spartacus?").

The theses of the Spartacus League were written by Rosa Luxemburg and unanimously adopted at a conspirative conference of the "International" Group (which joined the Spartacus League) on the first of January, 1916, in Berlin in Karl Liebknecht's apartment. Originally the theses were published in *Die Spartakus Briefe (Spartacus Letters)*, No. 3, February 3, 1916, entitled "Guiding Principles"; the theses were hectographed and were illegally distributed throughout Germany; later the theses were several times reprinted in separate leaflets.

The fifth thesis of the "Guiding Principles" reads:

The World War does not serve the purpose of national defence, nor the economic or political interests of the masses of the people; it is only a result of imperialist rivalry between the capitalist classes of the various countries in their struggle for world domination and monopolistic exploitation of the enslaved regions not yet conquered by capital. In the epoch of this reckless imperialism there can no longer be national wars. National interests serve merely as a means of deception in order to compel the toiling masses to serve their mortal enemy, imperialism.—p. 80.

- 129. The Punic Wars—three wars between Rome and Carthage from 264 to 146 B.C., which ended in the destruction of Carthage and the conquest of its colonies. The fundamental cause of the wars was the struggle for domination of the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, mainly in Africa and Spain.—p. 81.
- 130. Lenin refers here to the article by N. Bukharin "On the Revision of the Party Programme" (Spartak, No. 4, August 23, 1917), and to the article by V. Smirnov, "On the Revision of the Economic Minimum Programme."—p. 88.
- 131. Lenin refers to an editorial in Rabochy Put, No. 26, October 16, 1917, entitled, "Congress of Soviets and Constituent Assembly."—p. 90.
- 132. The Sixth Congress of the R. S.-D. L. P. (Bolsheviks), at its cession of August 16, 1917, approved the following minutes of the section on the revision of the party programme:

The section, having studied the materials on the revision of the programme that were published under the editorship of Comrade Lenin and the Moscow Regional Bureau and having heard a report by Comrade Sokolnikov on this question, decided:

1. To approve the decision of the conference of April 14-20, on the necessity of revising the party programme in the direction indicated by the conference.

of revising the party programme in the direction indicated by the conference.

2. In view of the fact that there was not sufficient preliminary discussion on the question of the revision of the programme, and also in view of the very unfavourable conditions for the work of the conference, preparation of a new text of the programme at the present conference is recognised as impossible.

3. It is necessary to convoke in the near future a special conference to

prepare a new party programme.

4. Until this conference convenes the C. C. of the party and all party organs must organise as wide a discussion as possible on the question of

the revision of the programme and must take measures to supply the members

of the party with literature on this question.

5. For the purposes of practical party work, the section considers it necessary to prepare a special platform, taking as its foundation the resolution of the present conference and the decisions of the April Conference which have not yet lost their effect.

The section proposes that the C. C. be instructed to prepare the plat-

form.—p. 92.

133. The "Tribunists" were Left Dutch Social-Democrats, who were expelled from the official party in 1907 and who in 1909 established the newspaper De Tribune (Pannekoek, Goerter, Wynkoop, Henrietta Roland-Holst and others). In 1919 the Tribunists formed the Dutch Communist Party and entered the Third International, where they occupied an ultra-Left position. At present the majority of the former leaders of the Tribunists are outside of the Comintern.—p. 93.

134. The Socialist Propaganda League was an internationalist organisation in America during the imperialist war, formed by members of the American Socialist Party and consisting in its majority of immigrant workers.—p. 93.

135. The Socialist Labour Party—established in 1877 as a final consolidation of the various Socialist elements belonging in the main to the different American sections of the First International which were organised under the influence of the immigrant German workers. After the split in 1899, which resulted in the formation of the rival Socialist Party, continued under the leadership of Daniel DeLeon its opposition to reformism on the parliamentary and trade union fields, developing at the same time still further its already well established sectarian policies. After the October Revolution and the formation of the Communist International, its revolutionary elements joined the Communist movement. The S. L. P. has been reduced to a very small organisation. Its present leadership is bitterly opposed to the Communist Party of the U. S. A., and in its attacks goes to the extent of questioning the revolutionary integrity of the leadership of the C. P.—p. 93.

136. § 9 of the programme of the R. S.-D. L. P., adopted by the Second Party Congress in 1903 reads: "The right of self-determination for all nations constituting the state." Lenin in the pamphlet Materials Relating to the Revision of the Party Programme, which appeared in June, 1917, proposed that it read: "The right of nationalities which are now parts of the Russian state freely to separate and to form independent states. The republic of the Russian people should draw to itself other peoples or nationalities not by violence, but through voluntary and mutual agreement to build a common state. The common aims and brotherly union of the workers of all countries are incompatible with either direct or indirect violence practiced upon other nationalities." (Revolution of 1917, Collected Works, Volume XX, Book I, p. 329.)—p. 93.

137. The article of J. Larin, "Labour Demands in Our Programme," was published in Rabochy Put, No. 31, October 28, 1917, and in addition to the

demand for the cancellation of state debts it made the following demands in the field of labour legislation and control over production: legalisation of factory committees, "constitutional order in the factories," collective agreements, extension of labour legislation to state employees, domestic servants and agricultural workers, "correct distribution of working forces on the basis of democratic self-government by the workers in the distribution of their persons," minimum wage, annual vacation, payment of wages every week and criminal responsibility of the employers for the violation of labour laws.—p. 94.

138. For amendments made to the labour sections of the party programme by the sub-section on labour legislation at the All-Russian April Conference of the R. S.-D. L. P., see the article, "Materials Relating to the Revision of the Party Programme." (Revolution of 1917, Collected Works, Volume XX, Book I, pp. 325-343.)—p. 95.

139. The "Letter to the Bolshevik Comrades Participating in the Regional Congress of the Soviets of the Northern Region" was written by Lenin on October 21, 1917, in Vyborg. No data are available about the circumstances under which the discussion on this letter took place in the fraction.—p. 100.

140. In the cities of Bohemia and Moravia (in Prague, Pilsen, Brünn, Witkowitz and others) strikes broke out during the summer of 1917, provoked by starvation, and in protest against the war. The original demands were concerned with putting a stop to requisitions and the export of food products to Germany and Vienna; later, demands were put forth for stopping the war and for the release of political prisoners. In some places this movement took the character of open revolutionary mass actions. In Brünn, armed struggles continued for several days. The insurrection was cruelly suppressed.

In Turin, Italy, a strike broke out in August, 1917, provoked by starvation and the continuation of the war. Over 40,000 workers went out on strike. The strike was accompanied by demonstrations.

In the naval fortress Wilhelmshafen, in Germany, a mutiny of the sailors on four cruisers broke out in September, 1917. The mutineers threw several officers overboard and then landed on shore. Marines who were instructed to attack them refused to obey orders. The mutiny was suppressed by infantry detachments. One of the mutinous cruisers went to Norway with the purpose of interning, but it was surrounded with destroyers and was compelled to surrender, and the mutiny was brutally suppressed. Several sailors were executed and others were sentenced to hard labour for many years.—p. 100.

- 141. Speech by E. Breshko-Breshkovskaya on October 20, in the Soviet of the Republic, published in *Dyelo Naroda*, No. 175, October 21, 1917.—p. 102.
- 142. The meeting of the Central Committee of the R. S.-D. L. P. on October 23, 1917, took place at the rooms of G. K. Sukhanova, and was devoted mainly to the question of the armed uprising. Lenin, who had apparently come to Petrograd from Vyborg only the day before, was present

for the first time after the July events at the meeting of the C. C. At this session were also present Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Stalin, Sverdlov, Uritsky, Dzerzhinsky, Kollontai, Bubnov, Sokolnikov and Lomov. Sverdlov was chairman. The minutes are brief, do not contain a report of all the discussions, and outside of the basic report of Lenin mention merely brief information by Lomov on the state of affairs in the Moscow industrial region and by Sverdlov on the situation in other localities. They report very briefly the objections of Uritsky, which came down to pointing out the weakness of the armed forces of the revolution. The resolution proposed by Lenin was adopted by 10 votes against 2 (Zinoviev and Kamenev). In the minutes there is also a proposal by Dzerzhinsky "to create a Political Bureau out of members of the C. C. for political guidance during the immediate future." A Political Bureau was created consisting of 7 members: Lenin, Zinoviev, Kameney, Trotsky, Stalin, Sokolnikov and Bubnoy, Zinoviev and Kameney, who voted against the resolution for an armed uprising, submitted to the C. C. on the following day a statement in which they protested against the adopted decision; this statement was also sent to the local party organisations (see Appendices, Documents, Nos. 11 and 12),-p. 106.

143. The representatives of the Minsk Bolshevik organisation informed the Central Committee, as may be seen from the report of Sverdlov to the meeting of the C. C. on October 23, 1917, that the High Command of the army was preparing to surround Minsk with Cossacks with the view of suppressing the revolutionary movement, but that the sentiment on the western front was such that there was not only no danger to Minsk, but it was also possible to send to Petrograd a revolutionary corps with a view of supporting the planned uprising (Minutes of meeting of the C. C. of the R. S.-D. L. P., Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya, No. 10 (69), 1927).—p. 107.

144. The minutes of the meeting of the Central Committee with the representatives of the leading party organisations on October 29, 1917, contain a brief secretarial summary of the reports and discussions on the question of preparing for an armed uprising. The meeting, which took place in the Lesnava borough Duma, had for its purpose the securing of exact information as to the sentiment of the masses of workers and soldiers and the clearing up of the attitude of the active Petrograd and Moscow workers towards an uprising. The first part of the session was therefore devoted to listening to reports. General information from the localities was supplied by Sverdlov. The secretary of the Petrograd committee, Boky, reported on the situation in Petrograd by separate districts. After some supplementary reports by other comrades the meeting passed to a discussion of the present situation. Two points of view clashed: that of Lenin, for an uprising within the next few days, and that of Zinoviev and Kamenev, against an uprising, or at any rate in favour of the postponement of the question until the Congress of Soviets. The overwhelming majority of those present, including the members of the C. C., decisively supported Lenin's point of view. Stalin, Kalinin, Sverdlov, Skrypnik, Dzerzhinsky, Ravich, Sokolnikov, Milyutin, Joffe, Schmidt, Latsis ("Uncle"), and others all spoke in favour of the uprising. After repeated objections on the part of Kamenev and Zinoviev the meeting adopted the resolution submitted by Lenin. At the end of the session the Central Committee appointed a military-political centre consisting of Sverdlov, Stalin, Bubnov, Uritsky and Dzerzhinsky.

Kamenev and Zinoviev, who were left in the minority, submitted the same day the following statement to the C. C.:

"We insistently demand the immediate telegraphic convocation of a plenum of the C. C. G. Zinoviev, U. Kamenev." Kamenev also made the following statement on his resignation from the C. C.:

"To the C. C. of the R. S.-D. L. P.: Not being able to support the point of view expressed in the latest decisions of the C. C. which define the character of its work, and considering that this position is leading the party of the proletariat to defeat, I ask the C. C. to recognise that I am no longer a member of the C. C. U. Kamenev."

For minutes of the session of C. C. on October 29, 1917, see Appendices, Documents No. XIII.--p. 108.

- 145. A "very important Bolshevik gathering in Petrograd"—the meeting of the C. C. on October 29, 1917, in which Lenin participated. The references to a comrade who allegedly informed Lenin about this meeting, and the change of the date of the meeting, "on the eve," that is, October 28, were probably made for the purpose of conspiracy, since Lenin at that time remained under cover and could not reveal his presence in Petrograd. The expression "this little pair of comrades" refers to Zinoviev and Kamenev, who at the meeting opposed Lenin. The formulation of the objections of the opponents of the uprising, which Lenin treats in the present article, is in all probability an exact transcript of the objections of Zinoviev and Kamenev, made by Lenin during the session of the C. C.—p. 111.
- 146. In an editorial in Rabochy Put, October 25, 1917, entitled, "Wanted: Bread," it was stated: "None other than the bourgeois paper Russkaya Volya acknowledged the other day that the peasant movement in the Kozlov county had the unexpected result that all the railroad stations of the county were literally swamped with grain. The landowners whose estates had not yet been ransacked were making haste to save their property. . . ."—p. 113.
- 147. The reference is to the speech of G. Sokolnikov. The minutes of the meeting of the C. C. of the R. S.-D. L. P. on October 29, 1917, contain the following fragmentary entry on the speech of Sokolnikov:

The objections of Kamenev are not convincing. He accuses us of having made noise regarding our uprising, that is, he demands a conspiracy. Our greatest peculiarity and our strength is that we openly prepare the uprising. It reminds one of the February events, when, too, nothing was prepared, yet the revolution was victorious. It is impossible to expect a more favourable interrelationship of forces. . . .

To this Zinoviev objected:

Comparisons were made between this revolution and the February Revolution. They should not be compared, for at that time there was nothing on the side of the old power, while now it is war against the entire bourgeois world. . . . (Appendices, Documents, No. XIII.)—p. 121.

- 148. Novoye Vremya, No. 14787, June 9, 1917, during the elections to the Petrograd municipal council, published an "appeal by the editors" entitled "Give Us the Ticket of the Party of People's Freedom."—p. 125.
- 149. Lenin refers to an article by V. Bazarov "The Marxian Attitude to an Uprising" (Novaya Zhizn, No. 155, October 30, 1917).—p. 127.
- 150. The "Letter to Members of the Bolshevik Party" was written by Lenin on the morning of October 31, 1917, in connection with the note in Novava Zhizn. No. 156. of the same date, under the headline: "U. Kamenev. About the Uprising" in which Kamenev in his own name and that of Zinoviev stated that they were obliged "under these conditions, to declare themselves against any attempt to take the initiative of an armed uprising which would be doomed to defeat and which would have the most dangerous effect on the party, the proletariat, the fate of the revolution. To stake everything on the card of an uprising within the next few days would be tantamount to making a step of desperation." Lenin's letter and also a letter to the C. C. of the R. S.-D. L. P. and a statement by Kamenev of October 29 about his resignation from the C. C. were discussed at a session of the C. C. on November 2, 1917. After a long discussion the C. C. decided to accept the resignation of Kamenev and to impose "upon Kamenev and Zinoviev the obligation not to make any statements against the decisions of the C. C. and the line of work laid out by it." "The proposition of Milyutin that no member of the C. C. shall have the right to speak against the adopted decisions of the C. C." was also adopted. (Minutes of the session of the C. C. of the R.S.-D.L.P., Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya, No. 10 (69), 1927).—p. 129.
- 151. This refers to the propaganda of G. V. Plekhanov in 1906-1907 in favour of a bloc with the Cadets in the newspaper *Tovarishch*, which was published by E. D. Kuskova and which was close to the Left Wing of the Cadet Party.—p. 130.
- 152. At the session of the Petrograd Soviet on October 31, 1917, Trotsky, referring to the information in the bourgeois press about the planned uprising, stated that neither the Bolsheviks nor the Petrograd Soviet were preparing an uprising for the next few days and that no armed demonstrations had been decided upon, but that they could not permit the withdrawal of the revolutionary garrison from Petrograd, and that at the first attempt of the counter-revolution to disrupt the Congress of Soviets, "all revolutionary Russia will answer with the most decisive counter-attack, which will be ruthless and which we will carry out to the end." Kamenev, who spoke after him, said that he subscribed to every word of the statement made by Trotsky (Rabochy Put, Nos. 40 and 41, November 1 and 2, 1927). At the meeting of the C. C. on November 2, Trotsky declared that his statement was made necessary by Kamenev's threat to introduce a resolution in the session of the Soviet against the uprising (Minutes of session of C. C. of R. S.-D. L. P., Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya, No. 10 (69), 1927).—p. 133.

153. In *Dyelo Naroda*, No. 183, October 31, 1917, there were published the following bills introduced by the Minister of Agriculture, the Socialist-Revolutionary S. L. Maslov; rules on the regulation of agricultural land relationships by the land committees, on the formation of a provisional fund of leasehold land, on the distribution of the leasehold land fund, on the settlement of disputes with regard to existing leasehold contracts, etc.

On the following day *Dyelo Naroda*, No. 184, November 1, published the following decision of the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party:

The Minister of Agriculture submitted to the Provisional Government a bill on the transfer of agricultural lands to the land committees, the first draft of which is published in *Dyelo Naroda*. In view of the immense importance of this bill, which is the first great step towards the realisation of the agrarian programme of the party, the C. C. urges all party organisations to carry on energetic propagands in favour of the bill in order to make it popular among the masses.—p. 138.

154. The land committees, consisting of the head committee, provincial, county and village committees, were formed by a decision of the Provisional Government of May 4, 1917, and had as their purpose the collection of materials on land reform and preparation for this reform for the Constituent Assembly.—p. 138.

155. State and Revolution was written by Lenin during August-September, 1917, in Helsingfors. The materials, comprising numerous extracts from the works of Marx and Engels, were prepared by Lenin in Switzerland during the war. On the first page of the manuscript the author signs the pseudonym F. F. Ivanovsky. This was an entirely new pen name which had never been used by Lenin before, and was absolutely necessary, as the Provisional Government would undoubtedly have confiscated any book signed by the name of Lenin or by any of his known pen names. However, since the printing plants were working at full capacity in 1917 and all printing work took a long time, the pamphlet did not appear till 1918 and the necessity for any pen name disappeared. According to the draft of the original plan made by Lenin, which has been kept in the archives of the Lenin Institute, the work was to contain not only a theoretical analysis of the theory of the state by Marx and Engels, but also a consideration of "the experience of the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917" from the point of view of this theory. It was proposed to devote Chapter VII of the pamphlet to this last question, but the October Revolution and the necessity to devote every effort to the immediate practical work interfered with the conclusion of the work begun. was preserved only a draft of the plan of Chapter VII worked out in detail .- p. 147.

156. The Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), which was caused by the struggle of the European powers for hegemony within feudally dismembered Germany and on the coast of the Baltic Sea, resulted in complete ruin and disaster for Germany.—p. 165.

157. The Gotha Programme was adopted in 1875 at the unity congress in Gotha at which the two factions of German Socialists, the Lassalleans and the Eisenachers, merged into the Social-Democratic Workers' Party of Germany. The programme adopted was a compromise between the Lassalleans and the Eisenachers. The former brought into the programme all their fighting points: the full product of labour to the workers, the iron law of wages, productive associations based on state credit, and declaring the bourgeoisie to be "a single reactionary mass." The programme officially remained in force until the convention of the party in Erfurt in 1891, when it was replaced with a new programme (the Erfurt Programme).

Marx and Engels subjected the Gotha Programme to most severe criticism, the former in a letter to Bracke dated May 5, 1875, and the latter in a letter to Bebel, March 28, 1875 (K. Marx, "Ein Brief an Bracke," 5 Mai, 1875, London, in Die Neue Zeit, 1891, IX Jahrgang, I Band; Engels' letter was first published in August Bebel's book, Aus meinem Leben [From My Life], Part Two, 1911).—p. 166.

- 158. "They should not have taken up arms"—the words of G. Plekhanov about the December, 1905, armed uprising in "The Diary of a Social-Democrat," No. 4, December, 1905.—p. 178.
- 159. Marx's letters to Kugelmann were first published in German in Die Neue Zeit, XX Jahrgang, I and II Band, 1901-1902. Lenin refers to the following Russian editions of the letters: (1) K. Marx, Letters to L. Kugelmann, with a preface by the editors of Die Neue Zeit. Translation from the German by M. Ileana, edited and with a preface by N. Lenin. Published by Novaya Duma, St. Petersburg, 1907. (2) Letters of Karl Marx to the Member of the International, Kugelmann, with a preface by Karl Kautsky. Library of Scientific Socialism, 1907.—p. 179.
- 160. Lenin refers to Eduard Bernstein's book, Evolutionary Socialism. In German the book first appeared in 1899 in Stuttgart, under the title Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie.

 —p. 184.
- 161. Lenin here refers to the editorial, "Overhauling of Governmental Institutions and Democracy," in the organ of the S.-R.'s, *Dyelo Naroda*, No. 113, July 29, 1917.—p. 187.
- 162. The articles of Marx and Engels against the Proudhonists, the first entitled "L'indifferenza in materia politica" and the second "Dell' Autorità," marked: "London, January, 1873," were published in the Italian symposium, Almanacco Republicano per Panno 1874 (Republican Almanac for the Year 1874), Lodi, 1873. A German translation appeared in Die Neue Zeit, 1913-1914, XXXII Jahrgang, I Band, entitled: K. Marx, "Der politische Indifferentismus" und Fr. Engels, "Ueber das Autoritätsprinzip" (K. Marx, "Political Indifference," and Fr. Engels "On the Authoritarian Principle").—p. 197.

163. The Erfurt Programme, which in the epoch of the II International was considered the most consistent programme from the point of view of Marxism and which for a long time served as a model for all other Social-Democratic parties, including the R. S.-D. L. P., was adopted at the congress of the German Social-Democracy in Erfurt, October 14-20, 1891, in place of the obsolete Gotha Programme (1875), which was the result of a compromise of two trends in German Socialism (Lassalleans and Eisenachers).

The draft of the programme, which was written by Kautsky, was first sent by him to several prominent workers in the labour movement, including Engels. Upon the perusal of the draft Engels made a number of notes which he sent to Kautsky on July 29, 1891. These notes were published ten years later in Die Neue Zeit (XX Jahrgang, 1901-1902, I Band, No. 1, pp. 5-13) under the title "Zur Kritik des Socialdemokratischen Programmentwurfes 1891" ("Critique of the Draft of the Social-Democratic Programme of 1891").—p. 203.

- 164. See Engels' Introduction to the 1891 edition of the Civil War in France.

 -p. 208.
- 165. Lenin here and further on makes a slip of the pen: the "historic" speech of Tsereteli was made not on June 22, but on June 24. For further details about this speech, see V. I. Lenin, Revolution of 1917, Collected Works, Volume XX, note 255.—p. 209.
- 166. It must be kept in mind that the figures quoted by Lenin as possible rates of wages are given in the paper currency of the second half of 1917. State and Revolution was written in August, 1917, when the value of the Russian paper ruble had fallen to less than a third of its face value.—p. 210.
- 167. Lenin refers to the Russian translation of the article by Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," edited by Vera Zasulich, St. Petersburg, 1906.—p. 215.
- 168. The Hague (V) Congress of the First International (1872), attended by Marx and Engels, was almost entirely devoted to the struggle with the Bakuninists. On the motion of Vaillant, the Congress adopted a resolution recognising the necessity of political struggle, contrary to the opinion of the Bakuninists. Bakunin and several of his adherents were expelled from the International. The Hague Congress was the last congress of the First International in Europe.—p. 233.
- 169. Zarya—a theoretical organ of the Russian Social-Democracy, published in 1901-1902 in Stuttgart under the editorship of G. Plekhanov, N. Lenin, P. Axelrod, U. Martov, V. Zasulich and A. Potresov. Altogether three issues of Zarya appeared: No. 1, April, 1901; Nos. 2-3, December, 1901; No. 4, August, 1902.—p. 234.
- 170. Concerning the Fifth International Socialist Congress held in Paris (1901), and the Kautsky resolution on Millerandism adopted by it, see V. L.

Lenin, The Iskra Period, Collected Works, Volume IV, note 35. An article by Plekhanov in No. 1 of Zarya was devoted to the congress, entitled, "A Few Words on the Last Paris International Socialist Congress."—p. 234.

171. Lenin refers to Karl Kautsky's book Die Soziale Revolution, I. Sozialreform und Soziale Revolution, II. Am Tage nach der Sozialen Revolution
(Social Revolution, I. Social Reform and Social Revolution, II. On the Morrow of the Social Revolution), published in 1902 in Berlin by "Vorwärts."
In Russian it appeared in 1903, in Geneva, in a translation edited by Lenin.
Throughout the entire book, State and Revolution, Lenin almost everywhere

Throughout the entire book, State and Revolution, Lenin almost everywhere quotes foreign authors from the original, making his own translations from German for each quotation, apparently not being satisfied with the existing translations.—p. 236.

- 172. Lenin refers to Kautsky's book; Der Weg zur Macht. Politische Betrachtungen in die Revolution (The Road to Power. Political Considerations in the Revolution), Berlin, 1909. Published by "Vorwärts."—p. 238.
- 173. The article of K. Kautsky against Pannekoek, "Die Neue Taktik" ("New Tactics"), was published in *Die Neue Zeit*, XXX Jahrgang, II Band, 1911-1912.—p. 240.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES *

A.

ADLER, FRIEDRICH (born 1879)—General Secretary of the Second International. See Vol. XX.—I 271.

ADLER, VICTOR (1852-1918)—Founder and leader of Austrian Social-Democracy. See Vol. XX.—I 59, 271.

ALEXANDER III (1845-1894) - Tsar of Russia .- I 116.

ALEXEYEV, N. V. (1857-1918)—General. Officially the chief of staff of Commander-in-Chief Nicholas II, but from the fall of 1915 to March, 1917, was actually commander-in-chief. At the time of the February Revolution, even after the abdication of Nicholas II, issued orders to the front for the arrest of "malicious" agitators sowing rebellion in the army. Notwithstanding his participation in August, 1917, in the Moscow Conference which prepared the Kornilov revolt, he was appointed commander-in-chief after the suppression of the revolt. At the end of 1918 he started the formation of the "Volunteer Army" on the Don, which after his death was commanded by Denikin.—I 161, 168, 230, 257.

ALEXINSKY, G. A. (born 1879)—In his youth took part in the revolutionary student movement. Since the end of 1905, worked in the Moscow Social-He was elected to the Second State Duma in Democratic organisation. 1907 and took part in the London Conference of the R.S.-D.L.P. the same year. After the dissolution of the Second State Duma and the arrest of the S.-D. fraction, he became a fugitive, despite the opinion of the fraction that it was necessary not to evade trial and severe sentence (hard labour for the majority of its members). Abroad, he joined the "V peryod" group. From the beginning of the war. Alexinsky took an ultra-chauvinist position and together with Plekhanov and the S.-R.'s Avksentyev and Bunakov joined the editorial board of the social-patriotic Prizyv and broke with the party. While with the Paris Prizyv Alexinsky collaborated on the Russkaya Volya, published in Petrograd in 1917 by the Octobrist Protopopov, later a Minister of Nicholas II, on money received from banks, as a result of which the Menshevik Yordansky, the editor of the defensist Sovremenny Mir, was compelled to announce in print the exclusion of Alexinsky as an associate editor of that journal. Upon his return to Russia in 1917, Alexinsky joined the Plekhanov social-patriotic "Yedinstvo" group. The defensist C.E.C. did not consider it

[•] Names mentioned in previously published volumes of Lenin's Collected Works are given here with short characterisations and references to Biographical Notes of the volumes in which fuller descriptions are given.—Ed.

possible to admit him to membership. At the time of the July days, Alexinsky, in agreement with the secret service, published forged documents aiming to compromise Lenin and the Bolsheviks as German agents in order to undermine the movement. In 1919 Alexinsky was arrested by the Cheka; released on bond, he fled abroad where he joined the leaders of extreme reaction, and, together with Burtsey, became one of the chief literary agents of Baron Wrangel. In émigré circles Alexinsky acquired the deserved reputation of a shady and unscrupulous intriguer.—I 17, 18, 22, 34, 40 f., 51, 55, 58 f., 70, 73, 74; II 53.

AVKSENTYEV, N. D. (born 1878)—One of the oldest leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. See Vol. XX.—I 76, 79, 101, 102, 105, 106, 122 f., 130, 132, 145, 191, 192; II 17, 101, 112, 120, 160, 187.

B.

BACRATION, D. P. (born 1863)—Count, general in tsarist army, closest collaborator of Kerensky in the War Ministry, and at the same time close to Kornilov.—I 168, 257.

BAKUNIN, M. A. (1814-1876)—Famous Russian revolutionary and Anarchist. In 1840 went abroad, participated in the German Revolution of 1848, was one of the leaders of the armed uprising in Dresden and Prague; after his arrest he was extradited by the Austrian authorities at the request of the Russian government, imprisoned in the Fortresses of Peter and Paul and Schlüsselburg; after being exiled to Siberia, he fled abroad where he renewed his revolutionary activity. In 1863, rendered assistance to the Polish insurgents. Participated in the activities of the First International, attempting to organise within it a secret union of his adherents. The "Union" was quite popular in the Latin countries, and Bakunin became the actual head of the Anarchist movement in Europe. Was expelled at the insistence of Marx from the International in 1872 for his disruptive activities. In the 'seventies Bakunin's ideas had a dominating position among the Russian revolutionary intellectuals. Russian Social-Democracy developed in the struggle against Bakunin's ideas.—II 192, 202, 233.

BASOK (Melenevsky)—Ukrainian Social-Democrat. See Vol. XVIII.—I 135, 136.

BAZAROV, V. (V. A. Rudnev, born 1874)—Russian economist and philosophical essayist. See Vol. XX.—II 37 ff., 127, 128, 135.

Bebel, August (1840-1913)—One of the founders and leader of the German Social-Democratic Party. See Vol. XX.—II 200 f., 215 f.

Beilis, Mendel.—Jewish tailor, tried in 1913 by the Kiev district court on the charge of murdering a Christian boy, Andrei Yushchinsky, allegedly for ritual purposes; as a matter of fact, Yushchinsky was murdered by a band of thieves who were connected with the police, for fear he might inform against them. The trial was staged by the tsarist government in order to strengthen reaction in Russia, to develop anti-Semitic agitation and to organise pogroms upon Jews, thus strengthening the autocracy. Nicholas II personally gave instructions to the authorities on this affair. To give the prosecution the desired direction, the Minister of Justice Shcheglovitov exerted the strongest pressure upon the court, dismissing the district attorneys and prosecutors who attempted to find the real perpetrators of the crime. The jury was selected from the most ignorant group of the Kiev population. All the forces of the "Union of the Russian People" were mobilised for the trial. In spite of the efforts of the Black Hundreds and the tsarist government, the jury acquitted Beilis.—I 41, 52, 58, 60.

BERKENHEIM, A. M.—Socialist-Revolutionary, worker in the co-operative movement, instructor in women's high schools in Moscow; before the October Revolution, member of the Moscow committee of social organisations, councillor of the Moscow city Duma and member of the city council, 1917.—II 17.

BERNATSKY, M. V. (born 1876)—Professor of political economy. Minister of Finance in the last Kerensky Cabinet and in the White Guard governments of Denikin and Wrangel. During the period of the First Russian Revolution he was close to the Marxists and collaborated in the legal Marxist press. At present an émigré and monarchist adherent.—I 189.

BERNSTEIN, EDUARD (born 1850)—Prominent German Social-Democrat and revisionist of Marxism. See Vol. IV.—I 224; II 190 ff., 224 ff., 241, 243.

BISMARCK, OTTO VON (1815-1898)—Chancellor at time of formation of German Empire. See Vol. XX.—II 159.

BISSOLATI, L. (1857-1919)—Italian Socialist leader. See Vol. XX.—II 186.

BLANC, LOUIS (1811-1882)-French Socialist. See Vol. XX.-I 67, 101, 167.

Bobrinsky, V. A. (born 1868)—Leader of Nationalists in the Duma. See Vol. XX.—I 191.

BONAPARTE, LOUIS—See Napoleon III.

Bracke, V. (1842-1880)—Prominent German Social-Democrat who was first with the Lassalleans. After some hesitation he took an anti-war position during the Franco-Prusaian War. Took active part in the publication by the Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of an appeal to the workers, calling upon them to start a struggle against the war, for which he was imprisoned in a fortress. Member of the Reichstag. Author of popular pamphlet, "Down with the Social-Democrats!" which was translated into many languages.—II 200, 215.

Bramson, L. M. (born 1869)—People's Socialist, member of the first C.E.C. of the Soviets, litterateur and Petrograd lawyer. At present an émigré. —I 103.

Branting, Hjalmar (1860-1925)—Swedish Socialist leader. See Vol. XX. —I 122 f.; II 186, 246.

BRESHKO-BRESHKOVSKAYA, E. K. (born 1844)—Prominent S.-R. Started revolutionary activity in 1873. Upon return from the Karian hard labour prison (sentenced during the trial of 193), became active organiser and worker of the S.-R. Party. An adherent of terror, she belonged to the extreme Right Wing of the party, favouring a union with the liberal intellectuals. After the February Revolution conducted a struggle both with the Left and with the Chernov C.C., being in favour of war to victory. After October, took an extremely hostile attitude towards the Soviet power. In 1919 was sent by the Socialist-Revolutionary Party to the U.S.A. to agitate against the Bolsheviks and the proletarian revolution, supporting from there the counter-revolutionary activity of the S.-R. Party. Since 1927, lives in Paris, collaborating on the S.R. organ Dni.—I 237, 242, 245 ff.; II 24, 35, 36, 48, 50, 66, 102, 149.

BRIAND, ARISTIDE (1862-1931)—Repeatedly premier and foreign minister of French Government. See Vol. XVIII.—II 30.

Bronzov—Member of the first C.E.C. of the Soviets.—I 103.

Bublikov, A. A. (born 1875)—Engineer, member of the Soviet and the Committee of the congresses of trade and industry. Deputy in Fourth State Duma, progressive, member Provisional Committee of the State Duma after the February Revolution. Participated in the State Conference at Moscow, cementing by a public handshake with Tsereteli the coalition of the bourgeoisie with the Socialist conciliators.—I 183, 197.

BUCHANAN, GEORGE (1854-1924)—British Ambassador to Russia, 1910-1918. See Vol. XX.—I 238; II 102.

BUKHARIN, N. I. (born 1888)—Prominent Bolshevik, economist. In 1906 worked as propagandist, organiser and agitator in various districts of Moscow; in 1908 was co-opted by the Moscow Committee of the Party. In 1911, after a third arrest, was tried by the Moscow Judicial Chamber; released on bond, emigrated abroad. Lived in Cracow, from where he was exiled shortly before the war to Switzerland. Took part in the Berne Conference of the foreign sections of the Bolsheviks. In the summer of 1915, went to Sweden and took part in the work of the Swedish Left Social-Democrats. Put on trial in the case of Höglund and others for anti-militarist propaganda and was exiled. In New York took part together with L. Trotsky in editing the Russian socialist paper, Novy Mir. During the period of the war maintained anti-Leninist "left" views on the national question, the state, programme-

minimum, etc. After the February Revolution, upon his return to Russia, became member of Moscow Committee, the Moscow Regional Bureau, and ioined the editorial staff of Sotsial-Demokrat. At the Sixth Party Congress in July, 1917, was elected to the Central Committee, of which he has been a member to the present time. After the October Revolution, editor of the At the time of the discussion about the Brest-Litovsk peace and the subsequent inter-Party struggle, was the head of the "Left Communists" and published the journal, Kommunist (after having left the Pravda). After the November Revolution in Germany, acknowledged his mistake. Eighth Party Congress maintained his mistaken views of the war period in a somewhat modified form on the question of the programme. In the discussion on the trade union question in 1920-1921 held at the beginning a "buffer" position and then joined with the Trotsky group. Shared the views of A. Bogdanov on proletarian culture; in 1923-1927 took part in the party struggle against Trotskyism and the "new" (united) opposition (Trotsky, Kameney, Zinoviev). Since 1928 began to show deviations from the general line of the Party which soon shaped themselves into the opportunistic platform of the Right opposition, as a result of which the April Plenum of the Central Committee (1929) removed Bukharin from the office of responsible editor of the central organ, the Pravda, as well as from his work in the Comintern; the Tenth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International removed him from office as a member of the praesidium of the Comintern. The November Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. removed Bukharin from the Political Bureau of the C.C. as the ideologist of the Right opposition. Upon conclusion of the Plenum Bukharin, together with A. Rykov and M. Tomsky, submitted a declaration to the Political Bureau acknowledging his mistakes. Since 1930 has been chief of the Planning Sector of the Scientific Division of the Supreme Council of National Economy.- I 97; II 71, 88, 91 ff.

C.

CAVAIGNAC, EUCÈNE LOUIS (1802-1857)—French General. See Vol. XX.—I 36, 46, 47; II 209.

CHAIKOVSKY, N. V. (1850-1926)—Populist. In 1869-1871 grouped around himself a circle of St. Petersburg student youth which devoted itself to self-education and to propaganda among the intelligentsia and which later laid the foundation for the movement of "going among the people." In 1874 emigrated to America, together with the sectarian Malikov, who attempted to organise an agricultural colony there. After the failure of this attempt Chaikovsky settled in London. In the 'nineties took part in the publication of the leaflets of the "Fund for a Free Russian Press" of a moderately Populist standpoint; afterward gradually withdrew from political activity. After the February Revolution returned to Russia. Was member of the defensist C.E.C.; later a member of the White Guard government at Archangel which was formed under the protection of an English naval unit (1918-1919). After the evacuation of Archangel by the English and the collapse of the Northern front, he again emigrated abroad.—I 25, II 17.

CHERNOV, V. M. (born 1876)—S.-R. leader. Began political activity in the 'nineties in the ranks of the "Party of the People's Rights." Emigrated in 1899: abroad he became the head first of the Union and later of the Party of the Socialist-Revolutionaries as its ideologist and leader (was a permanent member of the C.C. and editor of the central organ Revolvutsionnaya Rossiya). Spoke and wrote continually in "criticism" of Marxism and particularly attempted to show its "inconsistency" as applied to agriculture (these articles are analysed by Lenin in his work: "The Agrarian Question and 'Critics of Marx'"-see The Iskra Period, Collected Works, Volume IV). During the war held a vacillating position between internationalism and defensism, took part in the Zimmerwald Conference (abstained from voting on its manifesto). Arch-defensist upon his return to Russia after the February Revolution. Minister of Agriculture in the first Coalition Cabinet of the Provisional Government, which fought against the peasants who were seizing the land of the great estates. Resigned after the July days. On January 18, 1918, was elected chairman of the Constituent Assembly. Took active part in the Czecho-Slovakian-S.-R. uprising on the Volga in 1918; headed the congress of the members of the Constituent Assembly in Ufa; was arrested by Kolchak but soon released. Took part in the Paris Congress of the members of the Constituent Assembly (February, 1921), which appointed a committee consisting of S.-R.'s and Cadets; attempted to give energetic aid to the Cronstadt uprising from Reval whither he had gone for this special purpose.—I 15, 36, 46, 47, 60, 63, 74, 76, 77, 81, 87 ff., 111, 122, 130, 132, 145, 162, 167, 168, 182, 198, 204, 211, 212, 226, 242, 244 ff.; II 24, 27, 28, 48, 120, 124, 149, 160, 187, 212, 226, 245,

CHKHEDZE, N. S. (1864-1926)—Menshevik leader. See Vol. XX.—I 17, 18, 20, 22.

CORNELISSEN—Dutch anarchist-communist of the syndicalist type. One of the followers of Kropotkin, adherent of the materialist conception of history, opponent of parliamentarism. Considered it possible to accomplish revolution by means of the general strike; considered the existence of a revolutionary army permissible during the transition period. During the imperialist war, was with those favouring the defense of the fatherland.—II 227.

D.

DAN, THEODORE (born 1871)—Menshevik leader. See Vol. XX.—I 46, 55, 76, 103, 111, 112, 145, 211, 244 f., 250, 252, 276 f.; II 27, 44, 69, 115, 116, 120, 121, 124, 136.

DANTON, GEORGES-JACQUES (1759-1794)—One of the leaders and organisers of the great French Revolution. On June 17, 1791, Danton appeared as a Republican, appealing to the people on the Champ de Mars to sign a petition to depose the king. Chairman of Jacobin Club during its first period and prominent worker in the commune of Paris. Took active part in deposing

the king and seizing the Tuileries (August 10, 1791); later a member of the government as Minister of Justice and deputy from Paris to the National Convention. Together with Robespierre headed the "Mountain" and fought the Girondists. One of the inspirers of the Revolution, a splendid and flaming orator who enjoyed immense popularity among the masses. He exerted his greatest influence from April to September, 1793. In 1793 formed a moderate group that fought the dictatorship of Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety. At the demand of Robespierre Danton was put on trial in 1794 before the Revolutionary Tribunal by the National Convention and was executed.—II 98.

DAVID, EDUARD (born 1863)—German Social-Democrat. See Vol. XX.—II 149, 186, 245, 246.

DREYFUS, ALFRED (born 1859)—Officer of French general staff, Jew; though innocent, was convicted in 1894 by a court martial on a false accusation of treason and sentenced to solitary confinement for life. Dreyfus was sentenced under the pressure of the general staff under the leadership of monarchists. clericals and anti-Semites-officers belonging to the most reactionary groups of the French army-seeking to protect those who were really responsible for the betraying of military secrets to Germany. At the same time the trial was intended to deal a moral blow at the Republican regime which had given Jews the right to serve as officers in the French army. In the fall of 1897 the Socialists and the more progressive elements of the bourgeois democracy started a campaign for a rehearing of the Dreyfus case, and the question assumed a political aspect, for under the slogans "For and Against a Rehearing" a struggle was really going on between the republicans and the monarchists, who made several attempts at a military coup d'état. The case caused immense excitement in the country and was accompanied by mass demonstrations, excited press disputes, etc. Under the pressure of public opinion Dreyfus was pardoned and released in 1899.—I 26, 27, 41, 52.

DUBASOV-Non-partisan officer, served at the front.—I 274; II 56, 69.

DÜHRING, E. (1833-1901)—German economist and philosopher. Arch-opponent of Marx and of scientific Socialism; attempted to create his own "philosophy of actuality"; in political economy repeated the thesis of Cary about the share of the working class in distribution increasing with social progress and the conciliation of class antagonism in the process of production. Eclectic, declaring himself a "restorer of science" and "unifier of truth," he enjoyed, however, great, though short-lived, popularity in Germany. Marx and Engels gave an annihilating criticism of Dühring's views in their Anti-Dühring.—II 165, 197.

F.

FALKNER, M. N. (M. Smith)—Economist and statistician. In 1917 she collaborated on the Novaya Zhizn. At present a Communist, member of the

APPENDICES

Central Statistical Department of the U.S.S.R., member of the Communist Academy, instructor in several schools of higher education.—I 205.

FÜRSTENBERG, JACOB-See Hanecki, J. S.

G.

GACARIN—General in tsarist army; actively supported Kornilov revolt.—I 168. 257.

GE, ALEXANDER—Russian anarchist-communist. Favoured Soviet power; was member of All-Union Central Executive Committee; executed by Whites in the Caucasus in 1918.—II 227.

GRAVE, J.—French anarchist-communist, follower of Kropotkin and E. Reclus; anti-parliamentarian, favouring the general strike and terror (with reservations). Agitated for revolutionary overthrow on an international scale. During the war became an anarcho-patriot and defender of the French Republic.—II 227.

GUCHKOV, A. I. (born 1862)—Big Moscow capitalist and president of the Third Duma. See Vol. XX.—I 89, 235 f., 253, 262; II 140.

Guesde, Jules (1845-1922)—French Socialist leader. See Vol. XX.—I 119, 124; II 149.

GVOZDEV, K. A. (born 1883)—Menshevik-Liquidator. See Vol. XX.—I 273; II 28, 125.

H.

Hanecki, J. S. (born 1879)—One of the oldest members of the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania and member of the Central Committee, and after the split in it, member of the Regional Committee. Delegate of the Polish Social-Democracy to the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Congresses of the R.S.-D.L.P. At the Fifth, became a member of the Russian C.C. Participated in the Basle International Congress in 1912. After the February Revolution, lived in Stockholm, keeping up communication between the Russian Bolsheviks and revolutionary Social-Democrats abroad. Later worked in the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. At present member of the Collegium of the Commissariat of Trade of the U.S.S.R.—I 19 ff., 39, 59, 60.

HECEL, G. (1770-1831)—Famous German idealist philosopher. The dialectic method of Hegelian philosophy exerted great influence on Marx, who developed the materialistic basis for the dialectic process. Hegel's philosophy was in its time a great success and had many followers in Germany and Russia. At present there has again arisen an interest in Hegel's philosophy.—II 154.

HENDERSON, ARTHUR (born 1863)—British trade union leader. See Vol. XX. —I 124: II 186.

HESSEN, I. V. (born 1866)—Lawyer; one of the leaders of Cadet Party; editor of newspaper Ryech and magazine Pravo; member of Second State Duma from Petrograd. After October Revolution, emigrated abroad and published newspaper Rul and The Archives of the Russian Revolution.—I 111 ff.

HILFERDING. RUDOLF (born 1877)—One of the leaders of German Social-Democracy, prominent theoretician and representative of so-called "Austrian Marxism." As a student of the medical faculty of the Vienna University became member of Austrian Social-Democratic Party. In 1906 went to Germany where he took an active part in directing the Social-Democratic Party school, collaborated in the theoretical journal of the German Social-Democracy. Neue Zeit, and edited the Vorwarts (1907-1915). In 1910 published his major work, Finanzkapital in which he revealed a tendency to reconcile Marxism with opportunism. Was always close to Kautsky: during war was a Joined Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany in 1917 and as the editor of its central organ, Die Freiheit, and member of C.C., became major representative of bourgeois reformist policy of party. After November Revolution of 1918 was member of government commission on socialisation. In 1919-1920 fought against Independents joining Communist In 1923 Minister of Finance in the coalition cabinet of Stresemann; in 1928-1929 member of coalition cabinet of Social-Democrat Müller. At the Kiel Conference of the Social-Democracy (1927) defended theory of "organised capitalism." At present one of the ideologists of socialfascism. Publishes journal. Die Gesellschaft (Society), which is a successor to Neue Zeit.-II 84.

HINDENBURG, PAUL VON (born 1847)—President of German Republic. See Vol. XVIII.—I 39, 202.

HUTTUNEN—Finnish Social-Democrat; deputy in the Sejm, 1917. Rendered services to the Bolsheviks in the first period of the revolution, later, during the period of civil war in Finland, passed to the side of the bourgeoisie.—I 268.

HYNDMAN, H. M. (1842-1921)—One of the founders of British Socialist Party. See Vol. XVIII.—I 119, 124; II 149.

J.

JAURÈS, JEAN (1859-1914)—One of the most prominent leaders of the French Socialist movement. Originally a professor of philosophy in Toulouse and an idealist in philosophy. By a process of gradual evolution he later was converted to Socialism and attempted to reconcile Marxism with idealist philosophy. In general, stood in the Right Wing of French Socialism and at the beginning of the twentieth century supported the Socialist Millerand, who accepted a portfolio in the radical bourgeois Cabinet of Waldeck-Rousseau

(1899). The dispute arising on this action in the French party between the opportunists and the Marxists headed by Guesde, was decided by the International Socialist Congress of 1904 at Amsterdam in favour of the Marxists. Jaurès was first elected to parliament in 1885 as a Left Radical; in 1892 he was elected as an "Independent Socialist"; from 1902 he was the official representative of the Socialist Party and the leader of its parliamentary fraction. In 1897 Jaurès, together with Zola and Clemenceau, took an active part in the famous Dreyfus case and in 1904 he established the central organ of the party, "Humanité, which he edited until his death. He was one of the best orators in Europe and a skilful parliamentarian. He fought with special energy against militarism, demanding a people's militia. He was a strong adherent of a Franco-German rapprochement. On August 1, 1914, on the eve of the war, Jaurès was murdered by the chauvinist Villain. The murderer of Jaurès was acquitted by the court.—II 234, 246.

JORDANIA, NOE (An Kostrov, born 1869)—Georgian Social-Democrat. See Vol. XVIII.—II 25.

K.

KALEDIN, A. M. (1861-1918)—General. In August, 1917, was elected by the Cossack army council as hetman of the Don army. During Kornilov revolt, attempted to support him by an uprising on the Don but was too late. After October, started civil war against the Soviets. Was defeated by partisan detachments of Red Guards consisting mainly of Moscow workers, and shot himself. During the struggle a part of the Cossacks at the front broke away from him and accepted the Soviet power.—I 105 fl., 144, 145, 168, 234, 235, 262.

KAMENEV, L. V. (Rosenfeld, born 1883)-Joined the Social-Democratic organisation in 1901. After the split in the party in 1903 joined the Bolsheviks. After his arrest in St. Petersburg in 1908 went abroad where he joined the editorial staff of Proletary and collaborated on Sotsial-Demokrat. At the beginning of 1914 was sent by the C.C. to Russia to take charge of the work of the Social-Democratic fraction of the State Duma and the editorship of Pravda. Was arrested at a conference of the Bolshevik Duma fraction with representatives of party organisations and together with five deputies was exiled to Siberia (1915). He returned to Petrograd after the February Revolution and joined the editorial board of Pravda, where, in disagreement with the majority of the party, attempted to carry out an opportunistic line (defensism, limitation of tasks of working class to those of bourgeois-democratic revolution). At the All-Russian April Conference spoke against Lenin's "Theses"; was elected member of the C.C. In the fall of 1917 was against the uprising; his conduct during that period was branded by Lenin as strikebreaking. After the victory of the October Revolution insisted on necessity of immediate agreement and formation of Soviet Government together with Mensheviks and S.-R.'s. Disagreeing with the fundamental line of the party on this question, resigned from the C.C. on November 17. In the spring of 1919, as the Chairman of the Moscow Soviet, worked in the Ukraine to arrange the military and provisioning apparatus. Fought Trotskyism energetically in 1923-1924; in 1925 headed the "new opposition" together with Zinoviev; in 1926 joined the "opposition bloc" headed by Trotsky. In November, 1927, expelled from the C.C. and in December, 1928, at the Fifteenth Congress of the Party, acknowledged his mistake and was reinstated as member of the Communist Party. Since 1929 chairman of the Concessions Committee. In the fall of 1932 again expelled from the party for continued opposition to decisions of party and supporting anti-party elements. —I 28, 40, 47, 94 ff., 112; II 129, 133 ff.

KAMENEV, U.—See Kamenev, L. B.

Kamkov, B. D.—Left-Wing Socialist-Revolutionary. See Vol. XX.—I 147; II 120.

KATKOV, M. N. (1818-1887)—Publicist, representing the nobility-monarchist reaction of the 'sixties to 'eighties. In his student years was close to Belinsky, Herzen, and Bakunin. From 1851 editor of Moskovskiye Vyedomosti, originally edited in a liberal spirit; beginning with the 'sixties, especially after the Polish uprising of 1863, an archdefender of autocracy, police régime and every kind of reaction; fought vigorously against the slightest concessions to liberalism, the intellectuals, the "parlor radicals"; opposed the zemstvos, trial by jury and other institutions created by the reforms of the 'sixties. Katkov enjoyed great influence among the higher bureaucracy and the nobility at the end of the reign of Alexander III and during the reign of Alexander III.—I 116.

KAUTSKY, KARL (born 1854) - German Social-Democrat. Most prominent theoretician of Marxism of the epoch of the Second International; economist, historian. Joined the Social-Democracy in 1874. Became a Marxist under the direct influence of Marx and Engels. Since 1883 has been the editor of the scientific Marxist journal, Die Neue Zeit which he founded. Fought against the revisionism of Bernstein and maintained an orthodox position, although even then he showed in many of his writings deviations from Marxism on dialectics, proletarian dictatorship, attitude towards Machism, etc. In his evaluation of the 1905 Revolution stood closer to the Bolsheviks than to the Mensheviks. In his Road to Power, written in 1909, expressed yet a Marxist point of view. Since that time opportunistic and centrist tendencies began to influence his political activity and theoretical work. During the war, Kautsky broke with Marxism altogether, and covered up his social-chauvinist position with internationalist phrases. Helped to found the Independent Social-Democratic Party and belonged to its Right Wing. After the October Revolution came out against the Soviet power, defending "pure" democracy and parliamentarism. After the November (1918) Revolution in Germany entered as Associate-Minister of Foreign Affairs into the Scheidemann cabinet. founders of Vienna (21/2) International and in 1922 aided in bringing these centrist elements back into the Second International. In his recent writings, especially Materialist Interpretation of History (1927) showed complete desertion of Marxism. A bitter enemy of the Soviet Union, Kautsky openly advocates intervention and war against it. See Lenin's *Proletarian Revolution and Renegade Kautsky.*—I 120; II 80, 149, 156, 159, 171, 176, 186, 191, 202, 203, 210, 232 ff.

KERENSKY, A. F. (born 1881)—Socialist-Revolutionist and premier of Russian Provisional Government. See Vol. XX.—I 20, 22, 35, 36, 47, 48, 53, 54, 60, 61, 74, 76, 78, 79, 85 ff., 105, 106, 137 ff., 157, 161, 168, 172 ff., 189, 191, 197, 204 ff., 226, 239, 242, 244 ff., 252, 258 ff., 265, 266, 273 ff.; II 22 ff., 42 ff., 59 ff., 101 ff., 114, 116, 118, 121, 124 ff., 130, 132, 135, 142, 144, 159, 208.

KISHKIN, N. M. (born 1864)—Physician, one of the leaders of the Cadet Party. In the summer of 1917 was elected by the bourgeois "Committee of Social Organisations" as Commissar of Moscow. Was a member in the last Cabinet of the Provisional Government. On the eve of the October Revolution, was appointed dictator of Petrograd to fight the Bolsheviks. Was arrested together with the Provisional Government at the Winter Palace on November 7, 1917; after his release, he energetically continued his counter-revolutionary work against the Soviet power. In 1919 was arrested as one of the leaders of the "tactical centre," a Denikin organisation in Moscow. In 1921 took part in social organisations established to fight the famine. At present works in the People's Commissariat of Health.—I 254, 277; II 17, 24, 25, 44.

KLEMBOVSKY, V. N. (born 1860)—General. Commander on the Northern front, sided with Kornilov. At the time of the Kornilov revolt, received an offer from the Provisional Government to take over the duties of commander-in-chief of the whole army. Klembovsky refused on the pretext of the danger involved in changing the supreme command. During the civil war Klembovsky entered the service of the Red Army and was executed for treason to the Soviet power.—I 161, 168, 257; II 67.

KOLB, W. (1870-1918) -- German Social-Democrat. See Vol. XVIII.-II 246.

KOLLONTAI, A. M. (born 1872)—Bolshevik; in Soviet diplomatic service. See Vol. XVIII.—I 74.

KONOVALOV, A. I. (born 1875)—Large Russian textile manufacturer. See Vol. XX.—II 17.

KORNILOV, L. G. (1870-1918)—General. In 1915 commanded one of the Russian armies in Galicia; surrounded by the enemy, surrendered to the Austrians and later fled from their prison camp. In the spring of 1917, as commander of the armies of the Petrograd military district, ordered out the artillery against the workers during the April demonstrations; was compelled to resign at the demand of the Soviet. After the July days was appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian army. At the demand of Kornilov and the General Staff supporting him, the Provisional Government reintroduced capital punishment at the front, reduced the rights of the elected committees

practically to nothing, and undertook an energetic struggle against Bolshevik sentiment in the army. Thousands of soldiers were imprisoned. During the period of the Moscow State Conference, Kornilov was the idol of the bourgeoisie as the only man who could establish "order." In September, 1917, he started a march on Petrograd for the purpose of establishing a military dictatorship; the march ended in total failure. He then fled to the Don where, together with General Alexeyev, he became the head of the Volunteer Army, but was defeated by the Red Guards; retreated into the steppes at the beginning of 1918, and was killed in the battle of Ekaterinodar.—I 76, 92, 137, 138, 140, 145, 146, 155, 158, 160 f., 189, 193, 202, 211, 212, 225 f., 246 f., 262; II 15, 43, 50, 54, 59 f., 101 f., 144.

KOZLOVSKY, M. U. (1876-1927)—Bolshevik, formerly a member of the S.-D. of Poland and Lithuania. Lawyer. In 1917, member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and the first Central Executive Committee, chairman of the Vyborg district Duma. Later, worked in the Cheka, in the People's Commissariat of Justice, and in the Council of People's Commissars. During his last years he remained outside the party.—I 19 ff., 26, 39.

KROPOTKIN, P. A. (1842-1921)—Founder of Anarcho-Communism. See Vol. XVIII.—II 227, 242.

KRYLENKO, N. V. (born 1885)—Old Bolshevik; Soviet Commissar of Justice. See Vol. XX.—II 64.

KUCELMANN, L. (1828-1902)—Hanover gynecologist, member of the First International, admirer and correspondent of Karl Marx in the period of 1864-1872, distributor of first volume of Capital. After the Hague Congress to which he was elected a delegate, Kugelmann became estranged from Marx, believing that Marx as a worker in politics imperiled himself as a scientist.—II 179 f.

Kuskova, E. D. (born 1869)—Active in politics and a publicist. her social activity as a Marxist. At the end of the 'nineties active member of the "Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad." Afterward opposed the ideas of revolutionary Marxism, having adopted fully Bernstein's revision of Marxism. Author of the Credo. On the eve of Revolution of 1905, joined the liberal "Union of Liberation" and supported Struve's Osvobozhdeniye. However, when the Cadet Party was formed she did not join, and together with a group of persons with the same views (Prokopovich, Bogucharsky and others) established the journal, Bez Zaglaviya (Without a Title), which stated its intention to be the organ of the "consistent Russian Bernsteinists." This journal and the newspaper Tovarishch, published by the same group, were open opponents of the class policy of the proletariat and while criticising here and there the too moderate tactics of the Cadets, really supported liberalism in the struggle against the proletarian party, as well as the Mensheviks in the struggle against the Bolsheviks. After the defeat of the 1905 Revolution. Kuskova worked in the co-operative movement. During the Revolution

of 1917, she adopted a liberal position and vigorously opposed the Bolsheviks and the Soviet power. At present, an émigré and collaborates on émigré papers. Lately, she has become, together with Peshekhonov, the head of the so-called "returners"—a movement favouring the return to the U.S.S.R. which gained ground among petty-bourgeois circles of émigrés.—II 17.

L

LARIN, Y. (M. A. Lurie, born 1882)—Bolshevik writer and publicist. See Vol. XVIII.—II 63, 64, 94 ff.

LASSALLE, FERDINAND (1825-1864)—One of the most prominent leaders of the German labour movement, great orator and publicist. In 1848 took part in the revolutionary movement on the Rhine and collaborated on the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, which was edited by Marx. Taking as his premise the incorrect theory of the "iron law of wages," he assigned no significance to the economic struggle and trade union organisations of the proletariat and devoted his attention mainly to the conquest of universal suffrage, so as to enable the workers to exert influence upon the government with a view to receiving state credit for free workers' producing associations, these latter serving as a transitory stage for the gradual passage to a Socialist régime. For this purpose, entered into negotiations with Bismarck, which called forth the most vigorous protest from Marx and Engels. In 1863 founded the "General German Workers' Union" which for a long time fought the Social-Democratic Labour Party founded by A. Bebel and W. Liebknecht, but in the end the Union merged with the Social-Democrats in 1875, forming the United Socialist Labour Party of Germany, which subsequently adopted the name of Social-Democratic Party of Germany.—II 216, 222 ff.

LEGIEN, KARL (1861-1920)—Reformist leader of German trade unions. See Vol. XX.—II 149, 186, 188, 245 f.

LENSCH, PAUL (born 1873)—Left Social-Democrat, later German chauvinist. See Vol. XVIII.—I 210.

LIBER (M. I. Goldman, born 1880)—Menshevik leader. See Vol. XX.—I 102, 145, 244, 250, 252, 276 fl.; II 27, 69, 115 fl., 120, 124, 136.

LIEBKNECHT, KARL (1871-1919)—Militant internationalist and one of founders of German Communist Party. See Vol. XX.—I 119, 123, 271; II 100, 119, 121.

LIEBKNECHT, WILHELM (1826-1900)—One of founders of German Social-Democratic Party. See Vol. XX.—II 202, 204.

LINDE—Ensign, Social-Democrat-Internationalist, headed the soldiers' demonstrations in the April days in 1917. Later was commissar at the front, where he was killed in an attempt to induce the soldiers into battle.—I 232.

LOMOV-OPPOKOV (pen-name, A. Lomov, born 1888)—Prominent Bolshevik, economist, writer. Began his revolutionary activity in 1905. During the years of reaction worked in Moscow and Petrograd. Belonged for a time to the "Vperyod" group. During the war worked in Saratov and was exiled to Eastern Siberia in 1916. Worked in the Moscow Regional Bureau of the C.C. in 1917 and in the same year elected to the C.C. Took an active part in the October uprising in Moscow. Later belonged to the "Left" Communists. At present director of the coal industry in the Donnetz Basin.—II 71 n.

LUXEMBURG, ROSA (1871-1919)—Leader of the Lefts of German Social-Democracy and one of founders of Communist Party of Germany. Took part in the German, Polish and Russian labour movements, author of many theoretical works on economic and other questions. Was born in Poland: emigrated to Zurich in 1889. Took part in the formation of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland (later the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania) in 1889. Since 1897 took a most active and prominent part in the German Social-Democratic movement and in the Second International, remaining always in the Left Wing of the party and fighting Bernsteinism and its French counterpart, Millerandism. In 1904, favoured the point of view of the Mensheviks on the organisational question, but left them at the London Congress of the R.S.-D.L.P. in 1907, joining with the Bolsheviks in the fight against the Mensheviks. In the fall of the some year joined with Lenin at the Stuttgart Congress in introducing revolutionary Marxian amendments to the resolution on war. Long before the world war, fought Kautsky and the other representatives of the "centre" and headed the left opposition in the party, without however raising the question of breaking with it. During the struggle of the Bolsheviks against the Liquidators held a conciliatory position, supporting the Mensheviks on many questions of principle. From the very beginning of the imperialist war took an internationalist position, without being ready however to break with the Social-Democracy. Was in prison practically during the entire period of the war (from February, 1915). Collaborated in the underground "Letters of Spartacus," prepared the "Guiding Principles"—the platform of the Internationalists-adopted in January, 1916, by the German conference of the Internationalist group (K. Liebknecht, Mehring and others). In the spring of the same year under the pen-name of Junius she wrote the pamphlet Crisis of Social-Democracy, in which she pointed out the necessity of forming the Third International. In the pamphlet Russian Revolution, written in prison (September, 1918), made several mistakes in the evaluation of the October Revolution, the majority of which were later corrected by her, After the November Revolution in Germany she broke with the Social-Democracy, established and edited the Rote Fahne and took an active part in the organisation congress of the Communist Party of Germany. After the suppression of the January uprising of 1919 she was arrested by the Scheidemann Socialist Government and murdered. While her revolutionary services to the labour movement of the world were really great, she allowed many serious mistakes of a semi-Menshevik nature in her theoretical and tactical views (Luxemburgism on questions of rôle of party, of imperialism, on national,

colonial and peasant problems, on questions of permanent revolution, etc.).

—II 239.

Lvov, Prince G. J. (1861-1925)—Large landowner and member of Provisional Government. See Vol. XX.—I 15; II 138, 140 ff.

M.

MacLean, John (1879-1923)—English Left Socialist. See Vol. XX.—I 119, 123, 271.

MacMahon, M. (1808-1893)—Marshal of France, active in politics. Commanded army during the France-Prussian War in 1870, suffered severe defeat and was compelled to entrench in the fortress of Sedan, where he soon surrendered his entire army, although the possibilities for further resistance were by no means exhausted. Released by the Prussians after the truce, he took an active part in the struggle against the Paris Commune. In 1873 was elected President of the Republic by the votes of the three monarchist parties that were predominant in the Legislative Chambers of the Third Republic but was unable to come to an understanding with the pretender to the throne. In November of the same year his authority as the head of the state was continued for another term of seven years. In 1879 MacMahon resigned.—I 155.

MAKLAKOV, V. A. (born 1869)—Kerensky's ambassador to Paris in 1917. See Vol. XX.—I 236, 262; II 65, 67.

Markov, N. J. (born 1866)—Member of reactionary Union of Russian People. See Vol. XVIII.—I 40.

Martov, L.—(1873-1923)—Menshevik leader. See Vol. XVIII.—I 71, 98 ff., 115, 147, 150, 156, 256; II 26, 120.

MARX, KARL (1818-1883)—The founder of scientific Socialism. See biography of him written by Lenin in 1914 (*The Imperialist War, Collected Works*, Vol. XVIII).—I 66, 68, 133, 141, 222, 224, 227; II 25, 26, 41, 52, 77, 95, 97 ff., 126, 149 et seq.

MasLov, S. L.—Right-Wing Socialist-Revolutionary. See Vol. XX.—II 138 f., 142.

MEHRING, FRANZ (1846-1919)—Marxist historian and one of founders of German Communist Party. See Vol. IV.—II 175.

MIKHAILOVSKY, N. K. (1842-1904)—Most prominent theoretician of Populism, "dominator of thoughts" of the Russian intelligentsia of the 'eighties and 'nineties; he gave it his own theory of "historical process." At the beginning of the 'eighties he was close to the Narodovoltsi (People's Will Party), sponsoring and editing their publication. Was one of the editors of the Otechest-

venniye Zapiski (Notes of the Fatherland) in 1869-1884; from 1894 on was an editor of Russkoye Bogatstvo (Russian Wealth), and in this, from the 'nineties to his very death, conducted an extremely embittered polemic against the Marxists. The S.-R.'s consider Mikhailovsky and P. L. Lavrov the ones who laid the foundation for their party.—II 157.

MILLERAND, A. (1859-1931)—Former premier and president of French Republic. See Vol. XVIII.—II 234.

MILYUKOV, PAUL (born 1859)—Leader of Constitutional-Democratic Party. See Vol. XX.—I 32, 40, 42, 70, 76, 111, 112, 135, 138, 188, 211, 235 f., 240, 253, 262; II 125, 140.

MILYUTIN, V. P. (born 1887)—Bolshevik. Originally worked with the Mensheviks but broke with them before the war. At the April Conference in 1917 was elected to the C.C.; wrote for the *Pravda* and the other Bolshevik papers which took its place. After the October Revolution became a member of the Council of People's Commissars in the capacity of People's Commissar of Agriculture. After October withdrew together with Rykov, Nogin and others from the Council of People's Commissars; later was vice-chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy, member of the Central Control Commission.—II 71 n., 109.

M-IN, V.-See Milyutin, V. P.

MONTESQUIEU, CHARLES L. (1684-1765)—French philosopher and liberal political writer. In his chief work, The Spirit of the Law, he gives a sociological interpretation of the different social institutions and demands the organisation of the state based on law and the separation of powers (legislative, executive and judicial) and the safeguarding of the rights of the individual. His principles of the state became the foundation of most of the constitutions of the European states, and particularly of the Constitution of the United States of America.—II 193.

N.

Napoleon I (Bonaparte, 1769-1821)—French Emperor, 1804-1815.—II 171.

Napoleon, Louis-See Napoleon III.

Napoleon III (1808-1873)-French Emperor, 1852-1870.-I 116; II 170.

NEKRASOV, N. V. (born 1879)—Left Constitutional-Democrat. See Vol. XX. —I 76, 189.

NICHOLAS II (1868-1918)—Last Tsar of Russia.—I 64, 81, 83, 89, 151, 245.

Nikitin, A. M.-Menshevik. See Vol. XVIII.-I 273, 275; II 28, 44, 125.

P.

PALCHINSKY, P.—Big Russian industrialist. See Vol. XX.—I 88, 168 f., 203; II 160.

PANEKOEK, ANTON (K. Horner)—Left Dutch Socialist. See Vol. XX.—II 239 ff.

PANINA, S. V.—Countess, member C.C. of Cadet Party. Associate Minister in last Kerensky Cabinet. At the end of 1917 was put on trial before the Petrograd tribunal for failure to give up government money and was sentenced to public censure (first trial before the Revolutionary Tribunal).—I 82.

PARVUS (A. L. Helphand, 1869-1924)—Russian, active in German Social-Democracy. See Vol. XX.—I 26, 27, 39, 59.

Pereverzev, P. N.—Trudovik; Minister of Justice in first Coalition Cabinet. See Vol. XX.—I 34, 41 f., 73; II 53.

PESHEKHONOV, A. V. (born 1867)—Leader of the People's Socialists. See Vol. XX.—I 17, 132, 162, 168, 169, 203, 204, 242; II 30, 48 f.

PETROVSKY, G. I. (born 1879)—Old Bolshevik; Chairman All-Ukrainian C.E.C. of Soviets and of C.E.C. of Soviet Union. See Vol. XVIII.—II 64.

Procov, N. I. (1810-1881)—Famous surgeon and pedagogue, prominent social worker, author of many books on medicine.—I 116.

PLANSON, A. A.—St. Petersburg lawyer, People's Socialist, member of first C.E.C. Defensist, an adherent of the Coalition Cabinet in 1917. One of the leaders of the All-Russian railroad union, an organisation which was in the hands of the conciliators.—II 121.

PLEKHANOV, G. V. (1856-1918) —One of the founders and chief theoreticians of Russian Marxism. At the beginning took part in the Zemlya i Volya (Land and Liberty) Party; after its split at the Voronezh Conference, headed the Chorny Peredyel (Black Redistribution [of Land]). After emigrating abroad, broke with populism and together with Axelrod, Zasulich, Deutsch, and Ignatov, founded abroad in 1883 the first Russian Social-Democratic organisation, the Emancipation of Labour Group. In the 'nineties conducted energetic struggle against populism, Bernsteinism and its counterpart on Russian soil, "Economism." In the 1900's he became one of the editors of Iskra (Spark) and Zarya (Dawn), at whose instruction he prepared a draft of the Party programme which was subjected to severe criticism by Lenin and after its correction by Plekhanov became the principle or theoretical part of the draft of the Iskra Party programme (agrarian part written mostly by Lenin), which was adopted by the Second Party Congress with minor changes. After the split in 1903 he adhered first to the Bolsheviks and then to the Mensheviks, but soon also left the latter, remaining, however, ideologically close to them. With the development of the Liquidators he again came closer to the Bolsheviks in the struggle with the former. During the imperialist war became the head of the extreme Right of the defensists (*Prizyv*) and continued the same line after the February Revolution (*Yedinstvo*), at the same time favouring the giving of decisive support to the Provisional Government. After the July days took an open counter-revolutionary position, in favour of the establishment of a "strong government." Maintained a hostile attitude towards the October Revolution. Lenin valued highly the theoretical and philosophical works of Plekhanov, but pointed out many of his serious mistakes (recognition of theory of hieroglyphs, incorrect understanding of the substance of dialectics, etc.).—I 27, 31, 59, 87, 119, 120, 124, 165, 169, 188, 211, 212, 230, 237 ff.; II 24, 48, 50, 66, 130, 149, 178, 180, 186, 188, 191, 227, 232 ff.

POLOVISEV, P.—General, commander of the armies of Petrograd military district in the summer of 1917. In the July days took charge of the suppression of the movement and the wrecking of the *Pravda*.—I 20, 23, 24, 73, 74.

Potresov, A. N. (Starover, born 1869)—One of the leaders of the Mensheviks. In the 'nineties became a Marxist, in 1894-1896 collaborated in the publication of the legal Marxist collection, Materials (with an article by Lenin-Tulin), and the book by Beltov (Plekhanov) On the Question of the Development of the Monistic Conception of History and was in close contact with the St. Petersburg "League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class." In 1899 was exiled to Vyatka province and while there collaborated in the Marxian journals Novoye Slovo and Nachalo. pleting his term of exile, emigrated abroad in 1900 and participated together with Lenin in the organisation of Iskra and Zarya. At the Second Congress of the R.S.-D.L.P. (1903), joined the Mensheviks and since that time has been one of the most prominent collaborators and editors of the Menshevik publications. After the 1905 Revolution, stayed in Russia and played a leading part in the legal Menshevik press (Nasha Zarya). One of the leaders of liquidationism. In 1908 edited together with Martov and Maslov the fivevolume work Social Movements in Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century. During the war was one of the most open defenders of socialpatriotism. In 1917 was one of the chief collaborators on the bourgeois paper Dyen, which conducted a raging campaign against the Bolsheviks,—I 165, 169, 188, 230, 238, 246; II 125, 149, 245.

PRILEZHAYEV, I.—Populist, collaborator on the S.-R. paper Dyelo Naroda. —I 169, 170.

PROKOPOVICH, S. N. (born 1871)—Economist and social worker; for some time was member of "Union of Russian Social-Democrats," extremely Right "Economist." Soon left Social-Democracy for the liberals and joined the "Union of Liberation." Member C.C. Cadet Party in 1906; later took position "to the Left of the Cadets." In 1906 published small radical journal Bez Zaglaviya. Minister of Supplies in Kerensky's government in 1917. Author

of several works on the labour question from a bourgeois-democratic point of view.—I 189; II 28.

PROUDHON, P. J. (1809-1865)—Ideologist of the petty bourgeoisie, French theoretician of Anarchism. Believing that the cause of all the evils of capitalist society is the modern commodity form of exchange, he proposed a Utopian system as a method to reorganise the social order. His system of society is built on the principles of mutuality by means of organising free credit and exchange banks, thus perpetuating small-scale private property. The Poverty of Philosophy, by Karl Marx, is devoted to an analysis of Proudhon's views. His chief works are: The Philosophy of Poverty, System of Economic Contradictions, What is Property? etc.—II 86, 191 f., 232.

R.

RADEK, K. B. (born 1883)—Left Social-Democrat, then Communist: prominent publicist. Was active worker of Social-Democracy in Galicia since 1901. Worked with the Polish Social-Democracy in 1904-1908, then went to Germany where he joined the Left Wing of the German S.-D. As disciple of R. Luxemburg shared her mistakes on the national question and other questions. part in the Zimmerwald and Kienthal Conferences, was member of Bureau of the "Zimmerwald Left." Ideological leader of the so-called "Left radicals" (Bremen). In 1917 worked in Stockholm to establish connections between the C.C. of the Bolsheviks and foreign revolutionary internationalists. In October, 1917, came to Petrograd and joined the Communist Party. In 1918 adhered to the "Left Communists." After conclusion of Brest-Litovsk peace, headed the Central European Department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. In November, 1918, went to Germany illegally, as member of Soviet delegation to First German Congress of Soviets. Took part in organisation congress of German Communist Party and was arrested by the Scheidemann Government. After his release from prison in December of the same year returned to Russia. Member of delegation of Communist International to Congress of Three Internationals in 1922. Joined the Trotsky Opposition in 1924 and became one of its leaders. Was expelled from the C.P.S.U. by the Fifteenth Congress of the party in 1927. He acknowledged his mistakes in 1929 and was reinstated as a member of the party. Member of editorial staff of the Izvestiya since 1931.-II 239.

RAKITNIKOV, N. I. (born 1864)—Populist, member of Socialist-Revolutionary Party from its foundation and member of its C.C. Publicist and editor of S.-R. papers in Russia and abroad, defensist, favoured a coalition. In 1918, during the Czecho-Slovakian uprising worked with the S.-R.'s; after Kolchak dispersed the Ufa Directory, returned to Moscow, accepted the Soviet power and took part in the organisation of the Left S.-R. group "Narod" (Rakitnikov, Svyatitsky, Volsky and others).—I 46; II 125.

RENAUDEL, PAUL (born 1871)—French Socialist leader. See Vol. XX.—I 119, 123; II 118 fr., 149, 186.

RODBERTUS-JACETZOW, K. (1805-1875)—Big Prussian landowner, economist. Adhered to the classical school of political economy; one of the major theoreticians of "state" Socialism (as Marx called it, "Prussian-Junker" Socialism). His views were summarised and analysed as early as the 'eighties by Plekhanov in Notes of the Fatherland.—II 78.

RODZIANKO, M. V. (1859-1924)—Russian reactionary leader. See Vol. XX.—I 138, 246; II 67, 116 f., 121 f., 125, 131, 132, 135.

ROLOVICH—Member of Central Supply Committee, 1917; representative of the interests of private capital.—I 205.

ROVIO, GUSTAV—Finnish Social-Democrat, worker; in connection with the revolutionary events in September, 1917, was put up by labour organisations as "Red" chief of police of Helsingfors. Lenin hid in his house after the July days. Now a Communist.—I 268.

RUBANOVICH, I. A. (1860-1920)—Socialist-Revolutionary leader. See Vol. XVIII.—II 149.

RUSANOV, N. S. (pen-name Tarasov Kudrin, born 1859)—Publicist, author of many popular books and pamphlets. In his youth a member of the People's Will; later took part in the organisation of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Spent many years among the émigrés; organised in 1893 in Paris "Group of Old Members of the People's Will," which later entered the organisation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. In 1901 edited in Paris the journal Vestnik Russkoi Revolyutsii (Harbinger of the Russian Revolution) and other Populist publications; later was closely connected with the central organ of the S.-R. Party, Revolyutsionaya Rossiya, published abroad; at the same time collaborated in the journal Russkoye Bogatstvo, founded by Mikhailovsky. In 1917 was, together with Chernov, a member of the editorial board of Dyelo Naroda in Petrograd, the central organ of the Socialist-Revolutionaries after the February Revolution. At present an émigré.—II 187.

RYABUSHINSKY, P. P.—One of the biggest Moscow capitalists and banker. At the Second All-Russian Conference of Industrialists, during the summer of 1917, appealed to the "bony hand of famine" to put down the revolutionary workers. At present lives in Paris, taking part in the "Union of Russian Industrialists," continuing his counter-revolutionary activities.—I 183, 235, 236, 262; II 125.

RYAZANOV (D. B. Goldendach, born 1870)—One of the oldest Russian Social-Democrats; organised labour circles in Odessa during the first half of the 'nineties. After completing a five-year term in the "Kresti" prison, emigrated abroad. One of the founders of the Social-Democratic group "Borba" (Struggle) abroad at the beginning of the 1900's; in the Iskra period this group took an intermediary position between the Economists and the Iskraists, attempting to conciliate these two currents. During the first revolution,

worked for some time in Odessa and then in organising trade unions in St. Petersburg. Was compelled to go abroad again where he devoted most of his time to the foreign Social-Democratic movement and to the publication of the works of Marx and Engels, as well as to the history of the First International. Writer in many Russian and German party publications. During the war, a centrist and collaborator on the newspapers Golos and Nashe Slovo. After the February Revolution returned to Russia and joined the Bolshevik Party. Took prominent part in the trade union movement but because of his deviation on some questions of trade unionism from the party line, was in May, 1921, removed from work in that field. Organiser of the Institute of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, of which he was director until his expulsion from the Communist Party in 1931,—II 128.

S.

SAVINKOV, B. V. (Pseudonym Ropshin, 1879-1925) -- Prominent worker of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Started revolutionary activity as a Social-Democrat. In 1901 was member of the group of propagandists of the St. Petersburg "League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class" and after his arrest was exiled to Vologda province. During his stay in exile was converted from Marxism to Populism and joined the Socialist-Revolutionaries; in 1903 became a member of the military organisation of the S.-R.'s. Took most active part in the killing of Minister von Plehve (1904) and Grand Duke Sergei Romanov (1905). In his terroristic work was closely connected with the notorious provocateur Azef. The activity of Savinkov always had. even at the time of his sincere enthusiasm for the revolution, many elements of adventurism. During the years of reaction, took up belles lettres (under the pen-name V. Ropshin) and wrote several novels of revolutionary life, breathing mysticism and disappointment in the revolutionary movement. During the war, a defensist, entered as a volunteer into the French army, served as correspondent of patriotic newspapers. In the summer of 1917, commissar at headquarters at the front, Associate War Minister under Kerensky; played the part of intermediary between Kerensky and Kornilov in the preparation of the counter-revolutionary revolt and energetically co-operated with Kornilov. After the October Revolution, an active enemy of the Soviet power, organiser of White Guard conspiracies and uprisings, émigré. Arrested in 1924 while stealing over the frontier of the U.S.S.R. While on trial, he renounced the struggle against the Soviet power. Was sentenced to imprisonment for ten years. Committed suicide in 1925.-I 76, 246.

SCHEIDEMANN, PHILIP (born 1865)—Right-Wing German Socialist leader and chancellor. See Vol. XX.—I 119, 122 f., 210; II 118 f., 149, 185, 188, 245.

SEMBAT, M. (1862-1922)—French Socialist leader. See Vol. XVIII.—II 186, 188.

SHINGAREV, A. I. (1869-1918)—Leader of Constitutional-Democrats. See Vol. XX.—I 189; II 31, 140.

SHOTMAN, A. V. (Gorsky, born 1880)-Prominent Bolshevik, metal worker. Began his revolutionary activity in 1899 in the St. Petersburg "League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class." Took part in the "Obukhov defence" (1901). In 1902-1903 was member of the St. Petersburg committee (the Iskra-ist) from which he was a delegate to the Second Congress of the R.S.-D.L.P., where he was a member of the "majority." After the Second Congress he was sent to Smolensk and put at the disposal of the C.C. member Noskov. Later worked in the Northern committee of the party. At the beginning of 1904 was arrested, got out of prison in February, 1905, later worked in Odessa, in St. Petersburg and in Helsingfors (1910-1912), where he entered the Helsingfors Committee of the Finnish S.-D. Party. In 1912 went to see Lenin in Paris. In 1913 went to Vienna on instructions from the Bolshevik centre; took part in one of the Poronin conferences, was co-opted into the C.C. and sent to work in South Russia. In November, 1913, was arrested in Ekaterinoslav and exiled to the Narim region, where he stayed until the February Revolution. During the war held an internationalist position (defeatist). In June, 1917, worked in Petrograd and maintained connections with the Finnish S.-D. Party. In July and up to October, using his Finnish connections, he organised Lenin's trip to Finland. After the victory of the October Revolution and up to January, 1918, was a member of the collegium of the People's Commissariat of Post and Telegraph, then member of the presidium of the Supreme Council of National Economy, chairman of the Ural-Siberian Commission of the Council of Labour and Defence (in Omsk) and at the same time member of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee, chairman of the Karelian Autonomous S.S.R. (1922-1925), chairman of the Society of Radio Communication. Beginning with the Thirteenth Party Congress, member of the Central Control Commission. At present member of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.-II 109.

SKOBELEV, M. I. (born 1855)—Leading Menshevik. See Vol. XX.—I 87, 88, 96, 105, 106, 122 f., 130, 140, 145, 191, 204; II 160, 187.

SKOROPIS-YOLTUKHOVSKY, A.—Ukrainian nationalist, leader of the "Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine," a bourgeois-nationalist organisation spreading propaganda at the bidding of the German military staff among captured Ukrainians of the Russian army who were in German concentration camps.—I 18, 135.

SMILGA, I. T. (Born 1892)—Entered Social-Democratic Party in 1907. Twice suffered exile. Elected to Central Committee at the April, 1917, Party Conference. Member of Revolutionary Military Council during civil war and participated at the front. Later transferred to Supreme Economic Council. As one of the leaders of Trotsky opposition was expelled from the party by the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1927. After issuing a statement in 1929 acknowledging his mistakes and renouncing his participation in the factional struggle, was readmitted to membership in the party.—II 165.

SMIRNOV, V. M.—Worked in Moscow in 1917; one of the editors of the Moscow Sotsial Demokrat; member Military-Revolutionary Committee of the

Moscow Soviet during the October days; took part in the civil war on the eastern front. Afterward worked on economic journals. "Left" Communist in 1918, later joined the opposition group of "democratic centralism"; after 1923 took part in the Trotsky Opposition. In 1926, after having broken with the Trotskyists, formed together with Sapronov a new opposition group which issued the so-called "Platform of 15." In December, 1927, at the Fifteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) was expelled from the party.—II 71 n., 88, 91.

SMITH, M.—See Falkner, M. N.

SOKOLNIKOV, G. A. (born 1888)—Prominent Bolshevik. From 1905 to 1907 worked in the Moscow organisation. Emigrated abroad in 1909. During the war, internationalist. After February Revolution did party work in the Moscow Regional Bureau of the R.S.-D.L.P. and in the Moscow Soviet, then in Petrograd; edited *Pravda* and the other papers that took its place after the July days; was chairman of the Soviet delegation in Brest-Litovsk in March, 1918, and signed the peace agreement there. During the civil war worked at the fronts as one of the most responsible military workers. Was People's Commissar of Finance of the U.S.S.R.; repeatedly elected to the C.C. In 1925 at the Fourteenth Congress joined the "New Opposition"; but soon broke with it. In 1928-1929 was chairman of the Oil Syndicate and later plenipotentiary representative of the U.S.S.R. in Great Britain. Candidate to membership in the C.C. of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.—II 71 fl.

SOKOLNIKOV, V.—See Sokolnikov, G. A.

SPENCER, HERBERT (1820-1903)—English bourgeois philosopher and sociologist; in his works (System of Synthetic Philosophy and Foundations of Sociology) supplied a philosophical and sociological foundation for the theory of evolution; attempted to apply the laws of biology to social phenomena. Was opponent of Socialism, considering it the greatest calamity to the world.—II 157.

Spiridonova, M. A. (born 1889)—Member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party; in 1906, in accordance with decision of the Tambov Committee of the S.-R. Party, she assassinated Luzhenovsky, who suppressed the peasant movement in Tambov province. She was arrested and subjected to savage violence and torture. Released from long years at the hard labour prison (Akatui) by the February Revolution in 1917. Soon became the head of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries-Internationalists and afterwards also of the Left S.-R. Party. At the Constituent Assembly was nominated as chairman in opposition to the candidacy of Chernov, who represented the Right S.-R.'s, Cadets and Mensheviks, and received over one-third of all the votes. The Bolsheviks and the Left S.-R.'s voted for Spiridonova. After the Left S.-R.'s broke with the Bolsheviks because of the Brest-Litovsk peace, took charge of the preparation of the Left S.-R. uprising on July 18-19, 1918. After she was

arrested and pardoned by a decree of the All-Union Central Executive Committee, continued to support the policy of her party towards the Soviet power. —I 30, 147, 156, 256.

STALIN, J. V. (Djugashvili, born 1879)—The most prominent continuer of Lenin's cause and his most orthodox disciple, the inspirer of all the most important measures taken by the Communist Party in its struggle for building up Socialism, the greatest theoretician of Marxism-Leninism and the leader of the party and of the Communist International since Lenin's death. In 1897 while still a student of the secondary school, he attended Marxist circles: later on he joined an illegal Social-Democratic organisation and conducted energetic propaganda among the workers. When, in 1900, the Tiflis Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party was founded, Stalin became one of its leading members; after a raid on his house he concealed himself from the police and continued his work as a professional revolutionary. In 1901 he went to Batum where he led a number of strikes, but soon afterwards (in 1902) he was arrested, and after an imprisonment lasting one year and a half, was exiled to Eastern Siberia from where he soon afterwards made his escape. On his return from Siberia he worked as a member of the Trans-Caucasian Joint Committee. From the very beginning of the party split, he assumed the leadership of the Trans-Caucasian Bolsheviks, directing the publication of the illegal organ Borba Proletariata (The Struggle of the Proletariat) and taking part in the preparations for the Third Party Congress. At the end of 1905 he attended the Bolshevik Conference in Tammerfors, and was a delegate at the Stockholm and London congresses of the party. In 1907 started to work in Baku. After two arrests and exiles in 1908 and 1910 the Central Committee transferred him to St. Petersburg. In 1912 at the Prague Conference he was elected in his absence as member of the Central Committee. In 1912-1913 took part in guidance of the illegal newspapers Zvyezda (Star) and Pravda (Truth) in Petrograd and in the work of the Bolshevik fraction of the State Duma. In 1913, after another arrest, he was exiled to the Turukhansk region from where he returned after the October Revolution. At the All-Russian April Conference, at which two tendencies within the party asserted themselves on the question of the revolution and the tasks of the proletariat, he staunchly supported Lenin. When in May, 1917, a Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party was formed, Stalin became one of its members and has remained a member of this body ever since. When in July, 1917, Lenin had to hide himself from the police, Stalin became the actual head of the Central Organ of the party. Together with Sverdlov he was one of the guiding spirits of the Sixth Party Congress. In the days of the October Revolution the Central Committee elected him member of the "Committee of 5" and the "Committee of 7," the leading organs of the uprising. After the victory of the proletarian revolution he became People's Commissar of Nationalities (1917-1922) and of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (1919-1922). Spent the period of Civil War mostly at the war fronts, being one of the most important organisers of the defence of the republic and inspirer of the most important strategic plans. 1920 to 1923 was member of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Republic and since 1922 General Secretary of the Central Committee of the party. Since 1925 has been member of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. In 1923-1924 Stalin directed the struggle of the party against the Trotskyist Opposition and then against the so-called "Leningrad" (Kameney, Zinoviey) and United Opposition, exposing their anti-Leninist and opportunist nature. At the Fourteenth Party Congress (1925) Stalin, developing the basic ideas of Lenin, advanced the slogan of the industrialisation of the country as the most important task of the party. At the Fifteenth Congress (1927), the party under the guidance of Stalin effected a decisive change towards the collectivisation of agriculture and the development of a Socialist offensive against the capitalist elements in town and country. 1928 Stalin in proper time mobilised the party and the working class for a struggle against the Right deviation (Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky), which resulted in the utter defeat and bankruptcy of the Right Opposition. At all stages of this struggle on two fronts which the party is conducting, Stalin consistently and with an iron persistence and firmness, and exceptional clearsightedness, is defending the Leninist policy of the party against all attempts to revise or attack it, not making the least concessions to revisionism and opportunism, under whatsoever banner they may act, whether within the party itself or in the ranks of the Communist International. Author of a number of works: Marxism and the National Question, On the Road to October, Foundations of Leninism, Leninism Vols. I and II, (collections of articles and speeches, etc.).-I 17, 18.

STAROSTIN, P. I.—Bolshevik, member C.E.C. of the first Soviets.—I 95.

STAUNING, T. (born 1873)—Danish Socialist leader, many times premier. See Vol. XX.—I 122 ff.; II 186, 246.

STEINBERG—Russian émigré, member of the émigré committee in Stockholm. —I 59.

STIRNER, MAX (Kaspar Schmidt, 1806-1856)—Anarchist-individualist, Left Hegelian, considering personal welfare the highest principle; believed that there cannot be any authority above personality, doing away with authority of religion, God, government, state, fatherland, morality, honour. Future anarchistic society was considered by him as a voluntary union of egotists. Chief work of Stirner: The Ego and His Own.—II 232.

STRUVE, P. B. (born 1870)—Former Russian Socialist publicist, now a monarchist. See Vol. XX.—I 210; II 28, 180.

SUKHANOV, H. (born 1882)—"Non-factional" Social-Democrat, working at present in Soviet economic organisations. See Vol. XX.—I 140 f.; II 120.

SUMENSON—Private citizen who lived in Stockholm and had no relationship either to the Russian or international labour movement. The prosecutor attempted to interpret the commercial correspondence between Mrs. Sumenson and Hanecki as coded and to use it as evidence against Lenin.—I 39, 59, 60.

SUVORIN, A. S. (1834-1912) -- Journalist, originally a liberal, later editor of the *Novoye Vremya*, influential organ of conservatives and nobility, advocate of anti-Semitism and subservient to the bureaucracy.—II 125.

T.

TERESCHENKO, M. I.—Russian financier and minister in Provisional Government. See Vol. XX.—I 76, 183, 189, 191, 197, 206, 246.

TREVES, C.—Italian Socialist leader. See Vol. XX.—II 246.

TRIA (V. D. Mgeladze) - Georgian Menshevik. See Vol. XVIII .- I 135 ff.

TROELSTRA, PETER (born 1860)—Leader of the Dutch Socialist Party and leader of its parliamentary group; was member of the International Socialist Bureau of the Second International. Within the party fought its Left Wing (the so-called "Tribunists" who were expelled from the official Socialist Party in 1907). Lately, because of sickness, withdrew from political activity.—I 122, 124.

TROTSKY, L. D. (Bronstein, born 1879)—Social-Democrat, who within the Russian Social-Democracy headed the "centrists" (Trotskyism), which subsequently degenerated into the part of "advanced detachment of counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie." Took part in the Southern Russian Labour Union and was arrested and exiled in 1898. Fled abroad in 1902 and was member of the Iskra group. Took part in Second Congress of R.S.-D.L.P.; after the split became a vehement Menshevik; declared that "there is a gulf between the old and the new Iskra." Chairman of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies, 1905. Adherent of the semi-Menshevik Parvus theory of permanent revolution. While in Vienna formed a group of his own, the ideological expression of which was the non-factional paper Pravda published by him (1908-1912). In 1912 after long "non-factional" hesitations, organised the so-called August bloc to fight the Bolsheviks. During the war was member of the editorial board of the Paris organ, Nashe Slovo. Took part in the Zimmerwald Conference (Centre). Rejected the slogan of civil war, defeatism, and necessity of an organisational break with social-chauvinists. In 1916 was exiled from France to Spain and from there to America where he opposed the joining of the internationalist elements to the "Zimmerwald Left." Came back to Petrograd in 1917 and joined the internationalist organisation of the "Interboroughites"; together with them joined the R.S.-D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) at the Sixth Congress of the party and was elected to the C.C. After the Bolsheviks gained control of the Petrograd Soviet in September, 1917, he became its chairman. After October, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs. During the dispute about the Brest-Litovsk peace was first in favour of tactics of "neither peace nor war" and then, upon renewal of the offensive, of a revolutionary war. After the Brest-Litovsk peace, Commissar of War and chairman of the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Republic (until 1924). During the discussion of 1920-1921, insisted on necessity of converting trade unions into state-controlled bodies, and organised a faction on that platform. In 1923-1924 headed opposition; from 1926 on leader of "United Opposition" (Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev). Conducted violent factional struggle against Communist Party and Communist International. In November, 1927, attempted together with his adherents to arrange anti-Soviet demonstrations in Moscow and Leningrad. Defended the view that it is impossible to build Socialism in the U.S.S.R. and that the transformation of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet power is inevitable with the probable return of capitalism. At the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. was expelled from the party. In 1929 was banished abroad for anti-Soviet activities. Abroad he became, like the White Guards, one of the centres of gravitation for counter-revolutionary forces within and outside the U.S.S.R.—I 52, 254; II 43, 64, 133.

TSERETELI, I. G. (born 1882)—Menshevik leader. See Vol. XX.—I 16, 18, 20, 36, 46, 47, 51 f., 58, 60, 65, 74, 76, 77, 87, 88, 95, 98 f., 105, 106, 108, 114, 122, 130, 140, 145, 150, 167, 182, 204, 212, 226, 237, 240 f., 250, 252 f., 274; II 15, 21, 27, 28, 35, 36, 43 f., 48, 54, 61, 149, 160, 187, 188, 209, 212, 226, 245.

TUGAN-See Tugan-Baranovsky, M. 1.

TUGAN-BARANOVSKY, M. I. (1865-1919)—Economist and one of the prominent representatives of "legal Marxism," who soon passed into the ranks of the "critics of Marx" and slid down into the camp of the liberals. Collaborated in the journals Novoye Slovo (1897) and Nachalo (1899). Co-fighter with Struve in the first clashes with the Populists. In 1894 published book: The Industrial Crisis in Contemporary Great Britain. In 1898 published chief work: Russian Factory, Past and Present, with a criticism of the Populist views on the development of capitalism in Russia. Afterward published several works directed against the politico-economic teachings of Marx. His peculiar "theory of crises" had at one time great influence among the "critics of Marx" and bourgeois scientists. During the Revolution of 1905 and after it was with the Cadet Party, and during the civil war took part in the government of the Central Rada in the Ukraine.—II 223.

TURATI, FILIPPO (1857-1932)—Italian Socialist leader. See Vol. XX.—II 246.

U.

UMANSKY, A. M.—Journalist, official editor of the Black Hundred newspaper Zhivoye Slovo, the first of the Petrograd papers to publish the libelous statements of Alexinsky and Pankratov against Lenin during the July days of 1917.—I 18.

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VANDERVELDE, EMILE (born 1866)—Belgian Socialist leader and chairman of Second International. See Vol. XX.—II 149, 186, 188, 245 ff.

VERKHOVSKY, A. I.—Colonel of the old army, during the summer of 1917 commander of the armies of the Moscow military district, later War Minister in the last Provisional Government. Several days before the October uprising was compelled to resign because, together with the Minister of the Navy, Admiral Verderevsky, he reported to pre-parliament that the Russian army could not continue the war any longer and that it was therefore necessary to conclude peace. At present works in the Red Army as an instructor in military academies.—II 144.

VIKLYAEV, P. A. (born 1869)—Socialist-Revolutionary. See Vol. XX.—II 125.

VOINOV, I. A.—Worker, Bolshevik, writer and distributor of the *Pravda*. Was killed on July 19, 1917, at Shpalernaya Street, by Cossacks and military students, while attempting to distribute the *Pravda*.—I 57.

VOLODARSKY, V. (1891-1918)—In his early years a Bundist, later a Menshevik. In 1911 exiled to province of Archangel, from where emigrated in 1913 to America, where he became member of American Socialist Party. During the war, internationalist. After February Revolution returned to Russia and after staying a while with the "Interboroughites," joined the Bolsheviks. Became speedily very popular among the workers as a fiery agitator. Member Petrograd Committee, member All-Union Central Executive Committee. After the government left Petrograd, he was appointed Petrograd Commissar of Press, Propaganda and Agitation. In this capacity gained the raging hatred of all enemies of the Soviet power. In June, 1918, was murdered by the Socialist-Revolutionaries.—I 137, 139.

V-sky-See Volodarsky, V.

W.

WEBB, BEATRICE (B. Potter, born 1858)—Wife of Sidney Webb and his closest collaborator; Right Wing Socialist, writer. The literary works of the Webbs bear the names of both Webbs. Member of the Fabian Society.
—II 243.

WEBB, SIDNEY (born 1859)—English Fabian Socialist. See Vol. XVIII.—II 243.

WEYDEMEYER, JOSEPH (1818-1866)—Participated in German Revolution of 1848, after its defeat was compelled to flee. Was close to K. Marx; member of the "Union of Communists." After settling in the United States in 1861, took active part in the American labour movement. In the magazine Revolution issued by him, Marx published his celebrated work, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. Fought in the United States Civil War on the side of the North.—II 175.

Wilhelm II (born 1859)—German Kaiser from 1888 to 1918.—II 102, 117, 122.

Y.

YEFFEMOV, I. A. (born 1867)—Member of Third and Fourth State Duma, from Stavropol province. Member of "Union of the Seventeenth of October."

—I 53.

YERMOLENKO, D.—Military spy, non-commissioned officer, served with the Vladivostok police in 1900. Was on trial before the Irkutsk Judicial Chamber for malfeasance in office but was acquitted. During the Russo-Japanese War served as a volunteer. According to other reports, he served during that war in the intelligence service and remained in that service until 1913 when he was honourably discharged and "by order of His Majesty" was made a non-commissioned officer. In 1914 he again entered military service and while a prisoner of war in Germany spied in the concentration camps on the Ukrainians and the "Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine" abroad. In April, 1917, he again appeared on the Russian front and stated to the scouting post that the German General Staff had gotten him across the front, supplied him with money and instructed him to conduct a "defeatist" agitation in the Russian army; he stated that similar agitation was also being conducted at the instruction of the German Staff by the Bolshevik Lenin.—I 18, 19, 26, 39.

Z.

ZAMYSLOVSKY, G. G. (born 1872)—Member of Third and Fourth State Duma, one of the leaders of the Black Hundreds, active anti-Semite; in the Beilis trial, actively supported in the capacity of plaintiff in a special civil suit the accusations made against the Jews of using Christian blood for ritual purposes. Former prosecutor.—I 40.

ZARUDNY, A. S. (born 1864)—Petrograd lawyer who became known as counsel in political cases; Trudovik. Minister of Justice in the second Coalition Cabinet of Kerensky, formed after the July days. Succeeded Pereverzev in the case against Lenin which was started by the former, pushed the case vigorously, keeping in prison Kamenev, Raskolnikov, Kollontai, Lunacharsky and other Bolsheviks. Issued several orders to find and seize Lenin and Zinoviev, demanding that they should give themselves up.—I 77, 102, 246 ff.

ZASLAVSKY, D. O.—Menshevik-Liquidator during the years of reaction, defensist during the imperialist war. One of the editors of the newspaper Dyen and collaborator on the Menshevik Rabochaya Gazeta in 1917. At present works in the Soviet press.—I 111, 112; II 125.

ZENZINOV, V. M.—Member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party; in 1905 was one of the leading members of the Moscow Committee of the S.-R. Party, took part in the December uprising and was later closely connected with the military terroristic organisation. After the resignation of the Central Com-

mittee, caused by the discovery that Azef was a provocateur, he was elected by the Fifth Council of the party as a member of the C.C. and took charge of the illegal work in Russia till his arrest in 1910. In 1917 was a member of the editorial board of *Dyelo Naroda*, the central organ of the party, which represented the Chernov centre. At present he is abroad with the extreme Right Wing of the S.-R. organisations, carrying on a campaign against Soviet Russia.—II 187.

ZINOVIEV, G. E. (Radomisilsky, born 1883)—Joined the Social-Democratic organisation in Elisavetgrad in 1901; after the Second Congress and the split of the party, joined the Bolsheviks. During the Revolution of 1905 was member of Petrograd Committee. After his arrest, emigrated abroad. At the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.-D.L.P. was elected member of the Central Committee. In 1908, after he was again arrested, was compelled to emigrate abroad, where he became a member of the board of editors of the Proletary, the central organ of the Bolsheviks, and collaborated in the Sotsial Demokrat. Took part in the Zimmerwald and Kienthal Conferences. Mcmber of the Bureau of the Zimmerwald Left. In April, 1917, together with Lenin and others, returned to St. Petersburg. After October, was chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. In 1919-1926 was chairman of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. During the preparatory period of the October uprising, and later, he repeatedly showed hesitation: in the fall of 1917, was against the uprising; his conduct during that period was branded by Lenin as strike-breaking. After the October Revolution, insisted on necessity of immediate agreement and formation of Soviet government together with the Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries. Differing from the fundamental line of the party, resigned from the Central Committee on November 17. Decisively fought against "Trotskyism" in 1923-1924; in 1925 headed the "new opposition" and in 1926 entered into the "opposition bloc" headed by Trotsky, In his book Leninism (end of 1925) subjected fundamental positions of Leninism to revision. In November, 1927, was expelled from party. In 1928 acknowledged his mistakes and was reinstated as member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). In the fall of 1932 again expelled from party for continued opposition to decisions of party and supporting anti-party elements.—I 28, 40, 42, 52, 58; II 109, 110, 129 fl.

DOCUMENTS AND OTHER MATERIAL

I

PROCLAMATION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY ON THE NIGHT OF JULY 17, 1917.*

FELLOW WORKERS AND SOLDIERS OF PETROGRAD!

Since the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie has already come out openly against the revolution, the All-Russian Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies must take all power into its own hands.

This is the will of the revolutionary population of Petrograd, which has the right to bring this will by means of a peaceful and organised demonstration to the attention of the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies now in session.

Long live the will of the revolutionary workers and revolutionary soldiers!

Long live the power of the Soviets!

The coalition government has collapsed: it fell to pieces because it was unable to carry out the tasks for which it was created. The revolution is faced with most tremendous and difficult problems. A new power is needed which, united with the revolutionary proletariat, revolutionary army and revolutionary peasants, will decisively take up the task of consolidating and extending the victories already gained by the people. This power can be only the power of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

Yesterday the revolutionary garrison and the workers of Petrograd demonstrated and proclaimed this slogan: All power to the Soviets! We call upon this movement that arose in the regiments and factories to become a peaceful, organised expression of the will of all the workers, soldiers and peasants of Petrograd.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE, RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY.

PETROCRAD COMMITTEE, R.S.-D.L.P.

INTERBOROUGH COMMITTEE, R.S.-D.L.P.

MILITARY ORGANISATION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, R.S.-D.L.P.

COMMISSION OF THE WORKERS' SECTION OF THE SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES.

Published as a separate leastet, July 17, 1917.

П

PROCLAMATION OF THE C.C. OF THE R.S.-D.L.P. ON THE NIGHT OF JULY 18, 1917 *

COMRADES! On Monday you came out on the streets. On Tuesday you decided to continue the demonstration. We called you to a peaceful demon-

^{*} See pp. 29 and 78, Book I of this volume.-Bd.

stration yesterday. The object of this demonstration was to show to all the toiling and exploited masses the strength of our slogans, their weight, their significance and their necessity for the liberation of the peoples from war, hunger and ruin.

The object of the demonstration was achieved. The slogans of the vanguard of the working class and of the army were imposingly and worthily proclaimed. The scattered firing of the counter-revolutionaries on the demonstrators could not disturb the general character of the demonstration.

Comrades! For the present political crisis, our aim has been accomplished. We have therefore decided to end the demonstration. Let each and every one peacefully and in an organised manner bring the strike and the demonstration to a close.

Let us await the further development of the crisis. Let us continue to prepare our forces. Life is with us, the course of events shows the correctness of our slogans.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE, R.S.-D.L.P.

Petrograd Committee, R.S.-D.L.P.

INTERBOROUGH COMMITTEE, R.S.-D.L.P.

MILITARY ORGANISATION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, R.S.-D.L.P.

COMMISSION OF THE WORKERS' SECTION OF THE SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES.

Pravda, No. 99, July 18, 1917.

Ш

PROCLAMATION OF THE C.C. OF THE R.S.-D.L.P. CONCERNING THE SLANDER AGAINST LENIN *

To the population of Petrograd! To the workers! To the soldiers! To all honest citizens!

The slander must be exposed!

The slanderers must be haled to trial!

An unheard-of accusation has been brought against Comrade Lenin: it is alleged that he has received and is still receiving money from German sources for his agitation. The newspapers have given wide publicity to this monstrous slander. Underground leaflets are already being printed, indicating former Deputy Alexinsky as the source of their information. Cries for the death of the Bolsheviks are already being heard. Lists of those who are to be killed are already being circulated among the deceived soldiers.

The purpose is clear: the counter-revolution seeks in the simplest fashion to behead the revolution by instilling alarm into the masses, by inciting them against the most popular leaders, against the most loyal fighters for the revolution.

We declare that all that is being said about financial and other relations of Comrade Lenin with German government circles is a lie and a slander.

The initiator of the affair is Alexinsky, a notorious slanderer, who has accused a great many people of being in the pay of the Germans and who has himself been convicted of dishonest actions by the unions of Russian, English, Italian and neutral journalists in France; who was expelled from all

^{*} See p. 28, Book I of this volume.-Ed.

democratic organisations in Paris for a malicious slander, and who was not admitted to the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

We demand that the Provisional Government and the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies immediately and publicly investigate all the circumstances of this vile conspiracy of the pogrommakers and hired slanderers against the honour and life of the leaders of the working class.

It is necessary to bring this whole affair into the full light of day. And the whole people will be convinced, by this investigation, that there is not the slightest blemish on the revolutionary honour of Comrade Lenin.

To court with these calumniators and spreaders of slander! To the scaffold with the pogrom-makers and liars!

CENTRAL COMMITTEE, R.S.-D.L.P.

Published as a separate leaflet.

IV

RESOLUTIONS OF THE SIXTH CONGRESS OF THE R.S.-D.L.P. *

1. THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE WAR

- 1. Recently the war has been taking on more and more the sweep of an all-embracing world conflagration. There has appeared on the scene a new giant of imperialism and pretender to world hegemony—America. Under the pressure of America and the Allies, China enters the war. The fight of the imperialist powers spreads to all lands. In addition to the widening of the sphere of war, the struggle of the world bourgeoisie against the ripening of the proletarian revolution also helps to prolong the war by keeping up the régime of military dictatorship and splitting up the forces of the international proletariat.
- 2. The most dangerous thing for the imperialists of all countries is the Russian Revolution as the first appearance on the scene of the masses, which, in the course of development, threatens to become transformed into immediate action against the war and imperialism and draw into this struggle the proletarian masses of other countries.
- 3. From the very beginning of the revolution, the imperialists of the Allied countries started a crusade against it (playing with the deposed Nicholas II, hounding the Soviets, arresting Russian internationalists, etc.). This crusade became a direct attack upon the revolution, finding expression in an open bloc between the bankers of the Allied countries and the counter-revolutionary forces in Russia, in the financing of the latter with English capital, in direct intervention by the "allied" powers in the internal affairs of Russia, and finally in the demand to undertake an offensive, despite the fact that the Russian army was totally unprepared for it.
- 4. The victory of the adherents of the policy of an offensive in Russia brought about a new upsurge of chauvinism in all countries, the strengthening of the imperialist dictatorship and the creation of conditions that impeded the work of the internationalist Socialists.
- The upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie and peasantry as well as a small section of the workers who still had petty-bourgeois illusions and who

^{*} See p. 120, Book I of this volume.-Ed.

politically were members of the S.-R. and Menshevik Parties, supported the offensive and so fell into the net of the imperialist big bourgeoisie.

On the basis of common military tasks a close bond grew up between them and the social-imperialists of the West, which was inevitably converted into a union of active support to the imperialism of the Entente countries.

- 6. The Russian petty-bourgeois democracy, in the person of the S.-R. and Menshevik Parties, was dragged into the rut of the general imperialist policy. On this point there came about a complete agreement in the policy of the social-patriots of all countries, who in Russia became transformed into direct agents of imperialism. In this way the Mensheviks and S.-R.'s helped counter-revolutionary finance capital to weaken the significance of Russia as the fatherland of the international revolution.
- 7. The further prolongation of the war on the one hand hastens the process of the destruction of productive forces; on the other hand it leads to an extreme concentration of production and its centralisation in the hands of the militarist state. At the same time the prolongation of the war proletarianises to an unprecedented degree the middle strata, converts the proletariat into serfs of the imperialist state, brings about the absolute pauperisation of the workers, and police repression against them, etc., which inevitably leads to the growth of the elements of the proletarian revolution.
- 8. The campaign for peace by means of "pressure" upon the Allied governments and of agreements with the social-imperialists, which was undertaken by the Soviets, who refused to really break with imperialism, could not but end in a terrible collapse. That collapse confirmed the correctness of the position of the revolutionary Social-Democracy, that only a revolutionary struggle of the masses of all countries against imperialism, an international proletarian revolution, can bring about a democratic peace.
- 9. The liquidation of imperialist domination puts before the working class of that country which shall first achieve the dictatorship of the proletarians and semi-proletarians the task of supporting by every means (including armed force) the struggling proletariat of the other countries. This problem will become especially urgent for Russia, if, as is quite probable, a new inevitable upsurge of the Russian Revolution places the workers and the poorest peasants in power before the revolution takes place in the capitalist countries of the West.
- 10. The sole means for a really democratic liquidation of the war is the conquest of power by the international proletariat, and in Russia the conquest of power by the workers and poorest peasants. Only these classes will be in a position to break with the capitalists of all countries and actually advance the development of the international proletarian revolution which must liquidate not only war but also capitalist slavery.

2. CONCERNING THE POLITICAL SITUATION

- 1. The development of the class struggle and the interrelationship of the parties under the conditions of the imperialist war, in connection with the crisis at the front and the increasing dependence of Russia upon Allied capital, has brought about the dictatorship of the counter-revolutionary imperialist bourgeoisie, which relies on the military clique of army commanders for support, and which is covered up with a revolutionary screen by the leaders of petty-bourgeois Socialism.
- 2. Upon the overthrow of tsarism the power passed to the bourgeoisie, because of its economic strength and because it was politically organised.

But trying to continue the imperialist war and safeguard the predatory high profits of capital and landowners, the bourgeoisic could not retain power under conditions of complete political freedom and with the masses armed, which were the results of the revolution. The proletariat and the peasantry, organised in Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, inevitably strove to stop the imperialist slaughter of the peoples in the interests of the capitalists, to bridle their rapacity mainly in military contracts, and to transfer the landowners' lands to the peasants.

The first crisis, which broke out on May 3.4, would have inevitably resulted in the downfall of the bourgeois Provisional Government and the peaceful transfer of power into the hands of the Soviets, if their leaders, the S.-R.'s and the Mensheviks, had not saved the government of the capitalists by tying the Soviets to the fate of the government by means of the Coalition Cabinet.

- 3. The domination of the petty-bourgeois, S.-R. and Menshevik Parties over the representatives of the peasantry and the small property-owners in general, as well as over those workers who had not yet freed themselves from the influence of the bourgeoisie, came about naturally as a result of the petty-bourgeois character of the overwhelming majority of the population of Russia. Taking into consideration the trusting and uncritical attitude of these masses towards the capitalists, it was quite natural that for a time they should be taken in by the dream of replacing the acute class struggle with peaceful collaboration between the workers and the capitalists, between the peasants and the landowners.
- 4. Under the domination of these parties the Soviets inevitably sank lower and lower, they ceased to be organs of uprising, as well as organs of state power, and their decisions were inevitably converted into impotent resolutions and pious wishes. And during this time the bourgeoisie played around with the "Socialist" Ministers, delayed the elections to the Constituent Assembly, obstructed the transfer of the land to the peasants, sabotaged every kind of struggle against economic ruin, prepared—with the sanction of the majority of the Soviets—an offensive at the front, i.e., the renewal of the imperialist war, and by all these actions organised the forces of the counter-revolution.
- 5. The growing discontent of the masses with the high cost of living, with the economic ruin, with the continuation of the war, found its expression in the intensification of the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, which the revolution drove forward and which was irreconcilably hostile to the imperialist war. In face of this sharpening of the class struggle, the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks, entangled in their policy of compromise with the bourgeoisie and in their support of the policy of an offensive, inevitably passed over to the support of the counter-revolutionary Cadets against the proletariat.

As early as the crisis of June 22, Tsereteli proposed to disarm the Petrograd workers and the revolutionary regiments. The demonstration of July 1 made it especially evident that the S.-R.'s and the Mensheviks had definitely broken away from the strivings of the masses. And when the spontaneous movement of July 16-17 broke out, when the party of the proletariat, fulfilling its revolutionary duty, took its place on the side of the justly indignant and aroused masses, the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks, faced with the necessity of finally breaking with the bourgeoisie but fearing such a break most of all, responded by decisively going over to an open struggle against the revolutionary proletariat and revolutionary troops, called non-class-conscious troops into Petrograd, approved the destruction and suppression of the internationalist newspapers, approved the disarming of the revolutionary troops and workers, capital punishment at the front, the arrest of the Bolsheviks, etc., etc.

6. As a result of this course of events, the state power is at this time in fact in the hands of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, supported by the military clique. It is just this imperialist dictatorship that has passed and is passing all the above-enumerated measures to destroy political liberty, use violence against the masses, and ruthlessly persecute the internationalist proletariat, while the central body of the Soviets, the Central Executive Committee, is entirely powerless and inactive.

The Soviets are passing through agonising torture, disintegrating because

they failed to take state power into their own hands at the proper time.

7. The slogan advanced by our Party of the transfer of power to the Soviets which had been set up during the first upsurge of the revolution, was a slogan of the peaceful development of the revolution, of the painless transfer of power from the bourgeoisie to the workers and peasants, of the gradual overcoming by the petty bourgeoisie of its illusions.

At the present time peaceful development and painless transfer of power to the Soviets have become impossible, for power has already actually passed

into the hands of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

The correct slogan at the present time can be only complete liquidation of the dictatorship of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. Only the revolutionary proletariat, provided it is supported by the poorest peasantry, is strong enough to carry out this task, the task of a new upsurge.

8. The success of this upsurge depends upon whether the majority of the people will soon enough and firmly enough understand the full danger involved in the hopes of compromise with the bourgeoisie, hopes expressed and supported by the S.-R. and Menshevik Parties. The course of events mercilessly refutes these hopes.

The Party must take upon itself the rôle of front-line fighter against counter-revolution; it must energetically defend all the conquered liberties and the rights won by direct action; it must defend all mass organisations (Soviets, factory committees, committees of soldiers and peasants) and above all the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies against counter-revolutionary attacks; with all its might safeguard and strengthen the positions conquered within these organs by the internationalist wing; energetically fight for influence within them, uniting around itself all the elements which are going over to the position of consistent struggle against the counter-revolution.

- 9. The proletariat must not permit itself to be provoked by the bourgeoisie, which is very anxious to provoke the proletariat at the present moment into a premature battle. It must direct its every effort towards the organisation and preparation of its forces for the moment when the general national crisis and a profound stirring of the masses will create favourable conditions for the passing over of the city and village poor to the side of the workers, against the bourgeoisie.
- 10. The task of these revolutionary classes will then be to strain every effort to take state power into their own hands and direct it, in alliance with the revolutionary proletariat of the advanced countries, towards peace and the Socialist reconstruction of society.

3. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

1. The fundamental cause of economic disintegration is the disproportion between the condition of productive forces and the demands of the imperialist war. The disproportion is especially great in Russia due to the relatively

low level of development of the productive forces and the faultiness of their economic and technical organisation.

As a result, after three years of war, the economic situation in Russia is as follows: complete exhaustion in the sphere of productive labour and disorganisation of production, total disorganisation and disintegration of means of transportation, a situation approaching complete collapse in state finance and, as a result of all this, a food supply crisis bordering on famine, an absolute shortage of fuel and of means of production in general, growing unemployment, rapid pauperisation of the masses, etc. The country is already falling into the abyss of total economic collapse and ruin.

2. This crisis, which is becoming more acute every day, is further intensified by the policy of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie fears that along with political power it will also lose the power over organised production, and instead of organising production practices a policy of sabotage, of virtual lockouts, of stopping production, etc., deliberately promoting economic chaos with a view to taking advantage of it for the purposes of counter-revolution.

3. A similar economic policy is being carried out by the representatives of "trade and industry" and in the Cabinet. The tactics of sabotage of the state power and of every effort tending to regulate production, as well as the stubborn resistance to self-appointed organisations which to a certain degree regulate economic life, could not but lead in practice to still greater disorganisation. Not a single serious reform was carried out either in the field of social or state economy.

4. The continuation of the war, the chronic crises of power resulting from the collaboration policy of the petty-bourgeois parties, and the fear of the bourgeoisie of the growing onslaught of the proletariat make impossible even a militaristic, state-capitalistic organisation of economy, enslaving the working class to the imperialist state.

5. The only way out of this critical situation is, therefore, the liquidation of the war, and the organisation of production not for war, but for the rehabilitation of everything that was destroyed by the war; not in the interests of a handful of financial oligarchs, but in the interests of the workers and the poorest peasants.

Such a regulation of production in Russia can be carried out only by an organisation which is entirely in the hands of the proletarians and semi-proletarians, which demands the transfer of state power into their hands. For this purpose it is necessary to carry out a number of decisive revolutionary measures.

6. It is necessary to go into the field of production, with a view to a planned regulation of production and distribution, and it is also necessary to nationalise and centralise the banks, and to nationalise a number of trusts (for example, oil, coal, sugar, metallurgy, and transport).

7. The organisation of satisfactory exchange between city and country, based upon the co-operatives and food supply committees, with a view to supplying the cities with the necessary agricultural products and the villages with the necessary manufactured products, agricultural implements and machinery, etc.

8. The establishment of real workers' control. These organs of control must consist for the most part of representatives of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, trade unions and factory committees. Representatives of scientific, educational and technical personnel must also be drawn into these organs.

Workers' control must be broadened by means of gradually developed measures into complete regulation of production. 10. To carry out workers' control it is necessary to introduce, as preliminary measures: abolition of commercial secrets; opening the books of traders, industrialists and banks for control; declaring the concealment of documents a criminal offence; periodic registration of stocks, and publication of information of the available supplies indicating the enterprises where these supplies are located.

In order to combat concealed and open lockouts, a law must be enacted prohibiting the closing of factories or the reduction of production without the permission of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, the trade unions and the central factory committees.

11. In order to combat financial collapse the following measures are necessary: the immediate stopping of further issuance of paper money; stopping payments on state debts, both foreign and internal—however, the interests of the small holders of state paper must be safeguarded—reorganisation of the system of taxation by the introduction of a tax on property; a tax on the increment of property and high indirect taxes on all luxuries; a reform in the system of income taxes and a real control over the appraisal of incomes from property both in the centre and in the provinces.

12. In order to raise the forces of production to a higher level, a proper distribution of labour forces is necessary: their transfer from the war industries and enterprises to industries and enterprises working to meet the needs

of the country.

- 13. Upon the execution of all the above-indicated conditions and upon the transfer of power into the hands of the proletariat and semi-proletariat it will be necessary with a view to the proper distribution of labour forces and the raising of production to a higher level to introduce obligatory universal labour duty. It is only under such conditions that universal labour duty will make possible the greatest development of the forces of production and will not serve as another method for the enslavement of the workers.
- 14. The task of the labour organisations (trade unions, factory committees, Soviets of Workers' Deputies) must be to promote the carrying out of similar measures in the provinces, the development of initiative in that direction, and the acceleration of such steps with a view to making them assume a general character on a national scale.
- 15. The introduction and realisation of all the above-mentioned measures will be possible only if the workers strain all their forces and with the support of the poorest strata of the peasantry put these measures into practice, and decisively repel and combat the policy of force of the imperialist bourgeoisie and its counter-revolutionary pressure.

4. Pre-election Campaign for the Constituent Assembly

I. PRE-ELECTION ORGANS

- 1. The Central Committee organises a Central Election Commission to which delegates are sent by the regional organisations.
- 2. The regional organisations create Regional Election Commissions to which delegates are sent by the local organisations.
- 3. At all the consecutive stages of party groups and organisations and in each one of them it is recommended to establish similar local pre-election committees under the guidance of the general collectives for election campaign work.

4. In large industrial centres it is desirable to have for this work organisations existing among groups of workers (and soldiers) coming from the same provinces.

II. FINANCES

- 5. Funds for election campaign work are to be raised by:
- (a) the organisation of simultaneous contributions of one day's pay:
- (b) collection of contributions (by means of boxes and subscription lists). the arrangement of lectures, concerts, parties, with paid admission, the publication of one-day newspapers, etc.
 - 6. The funds raised by these means are to be distributed as follows:
 - (a) 40% into the treasury of the Central Commission:

(b) 60% to remain in the local organisations.

III. AGITATION

7. Written:

(a) publication of a peasant newspaper;

(b) issuing of popular leaflets and handbills explaining in a simple way

- all the fundamental planks in our platform;
 (c) publication by the Central Commission of a handbook for agitators, giving subjects, a plan and contents for speeches, as well as indicating the necessary literary sources. In addition, the handbook must contain the basic provisions of the election law, its peculiarities and the methods of election technique.
- 8. Oral: Its carriers should be cadres of well trained functionaries. this purpose short courses for agitators should be organised by the Central Commission as well as in the provinces. In addition, it should be the practice to send class-conscious workers and soldiers into the villages during the election campaign.

IV. BLOCS AND ACREEMENTS

- 9. Blocs are permitted only with parties that stand upon the principle of internationalism, and which have broken with the defensists not merely in words, but in deeds.
- 10. Election agreements are permitted also with non-party revolutionary organisations (for instance, with Soviets of Deputies, land committees, committees of sowers, etc.) which fully accept our platform.

11. Election agreements must be sanctioned by the Central Committee.

V. LISTS OF CANDIDATES

- 12. Candidates are nominated by provincial conferences or by local organisations.
 - 13. The Central Committee reserves the right to withdraw any candidate.
- 14. The Central Committee also reserves the right to propose to the local organisations its own candidates.

VI. PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN WORK IN THE ARMY AND AT THE FRONT

15. The Congress expresses the wish that the military organisation of the Central Committee immediately start working out a plan of party election campaign work within the army and especially at the front.

5. THE TASKS OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT

1. The development of the class struggle in the epoch of bitter struggles among the imperialist bourgeoisie for possession of the world markets while not removing the fundamental task before the trade union movement—the guidance of the economic struggle of the proletariat as one of the forms of the class struggle of the proletariat, puts before it new and complex problems. the radical solution of which is possible only provided the capitalist order is replaced by a Socialist order.

2. The fratricidal three years' war and the criminal policy of the ruling classes of all countries have led to an economic catastrophe which, under the counter-revolutionary dictatorship of the Cadet-defensist bloc, threatens the

working masses of Russia with especially grave consequences.

3. Unemployment, increased by open and covert lockouts organised by the bourgeoisie for the purpose of combating the revolutionary gains of the working class, combined with the approaching demobilisation of industry and the demobilisation of the army, threatens the very existence of the trade unions and the revolution.

4. The unbearable working conditions created during the war by means of the actual wiping out of the miserable gains in the field of labour protection which were secured before the war, put forward the task of struggling for the most elaborate, comprehensive labour legislation.

5. The trade unions, being drawn ever more by the logic of events into the struggle for Socialism, must in all their activities be guided by the principles of consistent class struggle, must energetically and in a planned manner stand up for the general interests of the working class, rejecting every attempt to limit the trade union movement or to subordinate it to the interests of the war and the ruling classes.

6. The trade unions, as the militant organisations of the working class, vitally interested in bringing the revolution to a victorious conclusion, must in close contact with the political party of the proletariat organise economic and political resistance against the counter-revolution, which is taking advantage of the economic ruin to completely enslave the broad masses of the

7. For the struggle against the economic ruin of the country, which is becoming more acute due to the growing counter-revolution, and for the purpose of bringing the revolution to a victorious conclusion, the trade unions must insist on state intervention in the organisation of production and distribution of goods, remembering at the same time that only with the upsurge of a new revolutionary wave, and the dictatorship of the proletariat supported by the poorest strata of the peasantry, can these measures be carried out in the interests of the broad masses of the people.

Taking all this into consideration, the Congress states:

All these responsible tasks can be fulfilled by the trade unions of Russia only in case they remain militant class organisations and conduct their struggle in close organic co-operation with the political class party of the proletariat; if during the elections to the Constituent Assembly they energetically fight

for the victory of the Socialist party which has always stood up for the class interests of the proletariat and fights for the immediate liquidation of the war by means of revolutionary mass struggle against the ruling classes of all countries; if they, with the object of bringing about the speediest conclusion of the war and the establishment of the International, immediately enter into relations with all the trade unions which in various countries conduct a war against war and together with them work out a general plan of struggle against the international slaughter and for Socialism; if they adapt their everyday struggle for the improvement of economic conditions to the epoch of giant Socialist battles we are living through, and if, finally, they emphasise in all their activities that the solution of the problems that history has placed before the Russian proletariat is possible only on an international scale.

International revolutionary Socialism against international imperialism!

6. THE STATUTES OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY

1. Every one who accepts the Party programme belongs to one of its organisations, obeys all the decisions of the Party and pays membership dues, is considered a member of the Party.

2. New members are admitted by local Party organisations on the recommendation of two Party members and are confirmed as such by the next general membership meeting of the organisation.

3. The amount of dues is determined by the local organisation and must not be less than one per cent of the wages.

New members pay an initiation fee of 50 kopeks.

Note. Party members failing to pay their dues for three months without sufficient cause are considered to have dropped out of the organisation, which fact is announced at the general membership meeting.

4. The question of the expulsion of a Party member is decided upon at the general meeting of the local organisation of which he is a member. An appeal may be made from the decision of the general membership meeting to a higher Party institution—to the district or regional (in the capital-city) conference.

The body of last resort is the Party Congress.

Note. The names of members expelled from the Party are published in the Party press.

- 5. All Party organisations are organised on the principles of democratic centralism.
- 6. All organisations are autonomous in their internal activities. Every Party organisation has the right to publish Party literature in its own name.
- 7. Party organisations are united in districts and regions. The district and regional committees are elected at district and regional conferences.

The boundaries of districts and regions are determined at district conferences. In case of misunderstanding between neighbouring regions the question is referred to the Central Committee for decision.

8. New Party organisations are ratified by the regional committees and, in the absence of such, by the Central Committee. The control over their ratification lies with the Central Committee.

The Central Committee announces the establishment of every new organisation in the Party press.

9. All local organisations pay to the Central Committee 10 per cent of

all membership dues and other receipts which are not assigned for any special purpose.

Note. In localities where the organisation is subdivided into district and sub-district organisations the district and sub-district committees are consid-

ered "local organisations."

10. The highest organ of the Party is the Party Congress. Regular Congresses are convened annually. Extraordinary Party Congresses are convened by the Central Committee on its own initiative or on the demand of not less than one-third of the general membership represented at the preceding Party Congress. The call for the Party Congress and the order of business are issued not later than one and a half months before the Congress. Extraordinary Congresses convene within two months. The Congress is considered effective if not less than half of all the members of the Party are represented.

Representation at the Party Congress is determined by the Central Committee in agreement with the regional committees and with the observance of

the principles of proportional representation.

11. In case the Central Committee fails to convene an extraordinary Party Congress within the time specified in Section 10, the organisations demanding its convening have the right to form an Organisation Committee, which has all the rights enjoyed by the Central Committee with regard to convening of the Congress.

12. The Party Congress (a) considers and approves the reports of the Central Committee, Auditing Commission and other central bodies; (b) revises and changes the Party programme; (c) determines the tactical line of the Party on current questions; and (d) elects the Central Committee and the Auditing Commission.

13. The Central Committee is elected annually at the Party Congress. For its current work the Central Committee appoints a smaller C.C. group from

its members.

Plenary sessions of the Central Committee convene not less than once in two months. The Central Committee represents the Party in all relations with other parties and institutions, organises the various institutions of the Party and guides their activities, appoints the editors of the Central Organ, which works under its control, organises and runs undertakings of a general Party character, distributes the forces and resources of the Party and handles the central treasury of the Party.

In case of a member of the Central Committee dropping out, he is replaced by one of the candidates elected by the Party Congress in the order deter-

mined by the Congress.

14. The Auditing Commission is elected annually at the Party Congress. It examines the treasury and all the undertakings of the Central Committee and submits a report to the next Party Congress.

7. On Youth Organisations

From the first days of the revolution, in many cities of Russia and especially in Petrograd there grew up a broad movement of working-class youth, the aim of which was to build independent proletarian organisations of young workers, men and women. The Russian bourgeoisie, like that of Western Europe, understands very well the immense significance of the growing generation of the working class for the entire course of development of the class struggle. The bourgeoisie therefore will attempt—and some such attempts have already been made—to use these organisations for winning over

the young proletarians to its bourgeois ideology, implanting in their minds and consciousness the conception of "society," "patriotism," etc., and diverting the working-class youth, at least for a time, from active participation in the economic and political struggles of the working class. The Party of the proletariat in its turn is aware of the immense significance of the working-class youth for the labour movement as a whole.

The Party Congress therefore considers it necessary that local Party organisations pay the most serious attention to the question of organising the youth. The intervention of the Party in the organisational building of the workingclass youth must not have the character of guardianship over it. Taking into consideration the experience of Western Europe, where independent organisations of Socialist working-class youth, in contradistinction to such as are under guardianship of the official parties, are almost everywhere supporters of the Left internationalist wing of the labour movement, our Party must also in Russia try to have the proletarian youth form independent organisations which are only connected ideologically with the Party and are not organisationally subordinated to it. At the same time, however, the Party must try to see that these organisations from their very inception have a Socialist character, so that the future Socialist Union of Working-Class Youth of Russia shall at its very inception join the Youth International, and that its local sections should pursue mainly the aim of developing the class consciousness of the proletarian youth by means of propaganda for the ideas of Socialism, by energetic struggle against chauvinism and militarism and simultaneous defence of the economic, political and legal interests of working minors, boys and girls. At the present time, when the struggle of the working class is passing into the phase of immediate struggle for Socialism, the Party Congress considers co-operation in the creation of Socialist class organisations of proletarian youth one of the urgent tasks of the moment and demands that Party organisations devote the maximum attention possible to this work.

8. On Uniting the Parties

The split between the social-patriots and the revolutionary internationalists in Russia, which has also occurred on a world-wide scale, is growing deeper every day. The road of the Mensheviks leads them from "defence of the fatherland" to the most disgraceful union with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, to inciting and sanctioning the persecution of the internationalist organisations, the working-class press, etc. The Mensheviks have become the lackeys of Russian and Allied imperialism, they have gone over completely to the camp of the enemies of the proletariat.

Under these conditions the first task of the revolutionary Social-Democracy is the persistent exposure of the treacherous policy of the Menshevik-imperialists before the wide masses of the working class, to isolate them completely from all elements of the working class that are revolutionary to any degree. For this reason every attempt to conciliate the imperialist with the revolutionary-internationalist elements of Socialism through a "unity congress" for the purpose of creating a united Social-Democratic Party (the plan of the group of intellectuals of the Novaya Zhizn who have no base among the masses), is a serious blow to the interests of the proletariat. Recognising the necessity of a complete and irrevocable break with the Menshevik-imperialists, the Party Congress goes on record in the most decisive manner against all such attempts. As against the dangerous slogan of the unity of all, the Social-Democracy advances the revolutionary class slogan of the unity of all

internationalists who have actually broken with the Menshevik-imperialists. Considering such unity necessary and inevitable, the Congress calls upon all the revolutionary elements of Social-Democracy immediately to break every organisational connection with the defensists and to rally to the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

9. On the Failure of Lenin to Appear in Court

Considering that the present methods of persecution by the police and secret service and the activities of the public prosecutor are re-establishing the practices of the Shcheglovitov régime, as has already been recognised also by the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and feeling that under such conditions there is absolutely no guarantee either of the impartiality of the court procedure, or even of the elementary safety of those summoned before the court, the Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party expresses its vehement protest against the outrageous hounding by the state prosecutor, spies and police, of the leaders of the revolutionary proletariat, extends its greetings to Comrades Lenin, Zinoviev, Trotsky and others, and hopes to see them again within the ranks of the Party of the revolutionary proletariat.

Proceedings of the Sixth Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks)

Communist Publishing House, 1919.

v

MANIFESTO OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY •

To all toilers, to all workers, soldiers and peasants of Russia.

COMRADES! Five months have passed since the revolutionary proletariat and the troops overthrew the rule of the knout and club and put Nicholas Romanov under lock and key. The workers have thrown off the chains which have been fastened upon them by the police régime. The soldier became a free citizen. In the midst of universal barbarism and bestiality the voice of the Russian Revolution resounded mightily: "Peace and Brotherhood of Peoples."

At the head of the revolutionary fighters marched the proletariat. From the very beginning the Russian proletariat understood that the success of the Russian Revolution, the cause of peace, the cause of freedom demanded the mutual support of the workers of all countries, the international rising of the enslaved and bleeding proletarians of Europe. The battle cry of the Russian proletariat became the slogan: "Long Live the International Revolution!"

International capital answered this call with a conspiracy against the Russian Revolution. The Russian Revolution meant for international capital a breach in the imperialist front. The Russian Revolution threatened to kindle the flame of a world-wide uprising, to shatter and destroy the domination of

* Drawn up by decision of the Sixth Congress of the R.S.-D.L.P. by the Central Committee in the name of the Congress. See p. 120 f., Book I of this volume.—Ed.

capital, to throw the golden calf down into the dust. Before the international stock-exchange wolves and bank magnates this problem arose: to strangle the Russian Revolution at all costs, to destroy its power, to behead the international proletariat, to slaughter its Party.

The Russian plunderers entered into a close alliance with them, established secret links. Even in the very first days of the revolution the Russian finance bourgeoisie and its party—the so-called People's Freedom Party—concluded an agreement with the plunderers of Western European imperialism. Russian bourgeoisie had no objection to the overthrow of the autocracy of the Tsar, whose rule made impossible even the conduct of the war (it was interfered with by the thievery and corruption of the tsarist Ministers). But the further course of the revolution threatened the Russian bourgeoisie with countless "terrors": the revolution was to give land to the peasants, to curb capital, to arm the workers, to put an end to the policy of annexation. By the dirty secret agreements of the bloody Tsar, the "Allied" bankers swore to be faithful to the common cause of annexation and the strangling of the Russian Revolution. The entrance of America into the war has given wings to the Allied imperialists. They knew very well the value of this "great democracy" which executes its Socialists in the electric chair, suppresses small nations by force of arms, and which, through the lips of its diplomats who are unsurpassed in their audacious cynicism, twaddles about eternal peace. American multi-millionaires who have just filled their cellars with gold coined from the blood of the dying in the fields of devastated Europe, have now sent their arms, their financial resources, their secret service and their diplomats to smash their German colleagues in the business of international plunder. but at the same time to draw the noose tighter around the neck of the Russian Revolution.

The Russian bourgeoisie proved to be tied to the capitalists of Europe and America by common aims as well as by a heavy gold chain, the ends of which are held in the banking houses of London and New York. Thus was the capitalist bloc against the revolution organised.

The petty bourgeoisie of Russia, the upper strata of the peasantry, a part of the workers and village poor who were deceived by capital, did not see and did not want to see the whole danger of the capitalist conspiracy. Their parties, the Mensheviks and the S.-R.'s, which have the majority in the Soviets, trailed after the big bourgeoisie. They accepted the position of defencism, without understanding that the bourgeoisie of all countries is deceiving the workers with this word, talking about defence while thinking of annexations. They did not make up their minds to take all power into their own hands, and gave it back in trust to the bourgeoisie. They welcomed the "social-patriotic" agents of Western European capital, those deceivers and poisoners of the people. Every day they became more and more entangled in the nets cast by international capital.

Only the revolutionary proletariat and its party, supported by the poorest peasants and soldiers, sounded the alarm. The party of proletarian Socialism, the party of international revolution, incontrovertibly and consistently tore the false peace-loving mask from the imperialist plunderers. It exposed all the schemes of the bourgeoisie, it criticised the cowardice, the indecisiveness and helplessness of the Menshevik-S.-R. tactics. It demanded with all its might the transfer of power into the hands of the democracy, a break with the capitalists of all countries, publication of all secret agreements which had been concealed from the people. It demanded the immediate transfer of the land to the peasants, workers' control over production, universal peace concluded

by the peoples themselves. "Bread, peace, freedom" was written on its red banner.

In the country, writhing in the clutches of three years of war, an unprecedented economic and financial crisis was advancing like an avalanche. The cruel hammer of the war crushed and converted into dust whatever remnants of the accumulated labour of the producers still remained. With every day the country became more like a paralytic. The destruction of the forces of production, the barbarous plundering of these forces, led to a crash. The war, just like an immense vampire, sucked all the sap from the country, robbed it of all its strength. No fuel, no raw materials, no bread. The spectre of famine stalked in the cities, in the homes of the poor. A bottomless gulf of destruction opened up before the country.

Capital is consciously pushing the people into this gulf.

The big bourgeoisie made the crisis more acute, increased the anarchy, closed down enterprises, disorganised production. While they shouted about patriotism and the fatherland and deceived the revolutionary workers, the united trust magnates stubbornly and systematically retarded the process of production in accordance with the plan perfected at their secret conferences so that they could put the blame for the resulting chaos and confusion upon the workers and take all power into their own grasping hands. On the ruins of the national economy contracted by the war convulsions, on the bones of the countless ruined small owners, the hyenas of big capital that were greedily engaged in making fabulous profits on war contracts and in speculating in the starvation of the pauperised masses, conducted their brazen policy of an offensive against the working class. In the lower strats were ripening a dull discontent and revolt against capital and its ministers. Ever louder became the murmur of the many millions of the army of labour.

They were answered by the policy of an offensive. The united capital of the Allies collected all its forces to storm the Russian Revolution. The English and American capitalists, who in the capacity of creditors became the bosses of Russian life, united with their faithful Russian lackeys and decided to drive into battle an army admittedly unprepared. The outcome of the battle was of no importance to them. What was important to them was the breaking down of the truce, the renewal of military operations, the strengthening of the power of the commanders. What they wanted was again to harness the worn-out army to the chariot of the war. With the roar of cannon they wanted to drown out the thunderous roar of the class struggle and the revolution.

The S.-R.'s and the Mensheviks approved the policy of an offensive and by that action endangered themselves and the revolution. By continuous compromise with the imperialists and the absence of any hint of decisive action they delivered themselves into the hands of the inveterate plunderers. With their own hands they gave over power to the counter-revolutionary military clique. And the triumphant magnates of the banks and stock exchange are now impudently challenging the democracy, openly declaring their wish to conduct the war "to the bitter end," that is, without an end, until such time as the cellars of the American Morgans burst with gold, until the bloody dew soaks the fields of the tortured earth.

The bourgeoisie has temporarily accomplished its purpose. Where are the proud appeals to the brotherhood of all peoples? Where are the unfurled banners of the world revolution? The S.-R.'s and Mensheviks have replaced these appeals with appeals to continue the slaughter. The servants of the bourgeoisie have spat upon the revolutionary banners, they have delivered

them to the heroes of the offensive to be desecrated, they have dragged them through the mire.

Growing resentment and indignation was the response of the proletariat and the advanced soldiers to this policy. And a stormy, spontaneous outburst of this indignation carried the workers and soldiers into the streets when the Cadet Ministers, after they received a secret report about the breakdown of the offensive, hastened to resign and put all the responsibility upon their "Socialist" lackeys. The days of July 16 and 17 put before the leaders of petty-bourgeois "Socialism," before the Soviet majority, the great historical question: Are they with the proletariat against the counter-revolution, or with the counter-revolution against the proletariat? In those days it was necessary to decide. Here it was necessary to choose clearly and definitely. And they chose those ministerial Socialists: against the workers and soldiers who wrote on their banner the slogan: "All power to the Soviets!" The leaders of the Soviets called out troops against them. Entangled in compromises with the counter-revolution, they supported this counter-revolution and directed the rifles against the workers' battalions, against the flower of the revolutionary forces, against the party of the proletariat. This party alone, our party, remained at its post. This party alone in this fatal hour of freedom did not desert the working class districts. This party alone made every effort to have the demonstration assume a peaceful and organised character and to march shoulder to shoulder with the masses. This was its revolutionary duty, This was demanded by its revolutionary honour.

The Mensheviks and S.-R.'s, carrying out the will of the bourgeoisie disarmed the revolution and thereby armed the counter-revolution. The bourgeoisie entrusted them with the dirty work of putting down and crushing the uprising. With their silent consent, they let loose the mad dogs of the vilest bourgeois slander against the glorious leaders of our party. It was they who conducted the disgraceful and shameful trade in the heads of the proletarian leaders, delivering them one after another to the infuriated bourgeoisie. It was they who delivered the heart of the revolution beating for the entire world, the capital of Russia, to the military cadets and Cossacks, to be torn into pieces. It was with their co-operation that the *Pravda* was wrecked and that a ferocious attack was started upon the Left Wing of the revolution.

The July days opened a new page in history. For the first time a decisive victory was temporarily gained by the counter-revolution and the power passed into the hands of the bourgeoisie and the General Staff. Up to that time there was dual power. Up to that time the Soviets had a great deal of power. Behind them stood the armed masses of soldiers and workers, the free people. Then the Soviets weakened themselves. They disarmed the workers, disbanded the revolutionary regiments, filled the capital with Cossacks, tied themselves hand and foot and became an appendage of the bourgeois government. The mouths of the "Socialist" Ministers were closed. Their bourgeois colleagues put them in chains. They are made use of when it is necessary to put down the workers but they are spat upon when they make an attempt to protest.

Having delivered the power into the hands of the counter-revolution and having betrayed the revolution, the leaders of philistinism, the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks, began to sign almost every counter-revolutionary measure of the government. The red flag of freedom was lowered. In its place waves the black flag of capital punishment. The shooting down of soldiers and workers, censorship, slander through court action, the secret service, arrests, the reintroduction of the hateful tsarist laws against political crimes, the dirty slan-

ders of the political secret police-all these charming measures of the old régime were again introduced by the new government to "save the revolution" -by the government that imprisons revolutionists and liberates tearist Ministers and agent-provocateurs, that postpones again and again the convening of the Constituent Assembly and at present convenes in its place the counterrevolutionary "Moscow Conference" of magnates of industry and trade. Having strengthened its position within the country, the counter-revolution returned to its old methods in all other questions. A heavy attack is conducted against the Ukraine, not only by decrees but also by cavalry. The Finnish Seim has been dissolved and armed force is threatened against that very right of selfdetermination which was proclaimed so solemnly in the official declarations. Through the government ambassadors a sinister intrigue is conducted at Stockholm against the meeting even of the most moderate "Socialists."

The slogan "peace without annexations" has been relegated to the archives. and in its place has appeared the Milyukov-Guchkov slogan. "War to complete victory." Kerensky has proclaimed the slogan, "Annihilation of the Bolsheviks," and has sent "in the name of the Russian people" a telegram to the English King George, a very close relative of Wilhelm Hohenzollern and Nicholas Romanov. The revolutionary slogan, "Peace to the cottages, war to the palaces," has been replaced by the slogan, "Peace to the palaces, war to the cottages."

But the counter-revolution is celebrating its victory too early. Bullets will not feed the hungry; cossacks' lashes will not dry the tears of mothers and wives; the lasso and the poose will not dry up the sea of suffering; the bavonet will not pacify the peoples; generals' orders will not stop the collapse of industry.

The subterranean forces of history are at work. Among the very depths of the masses of the people dull discontent is ripening. The peasants want land, the workers want bread, and they both want peace. Over the entire globe the stormy petrels are flying. In Great Britain the workers have already started an open struggle to check capital; in France the soldiers are agitating for peace and revolution; in Germany there is continuous unrest and strikes; in America the bourgeoisie has started shooting down Socialists who raise the banner of struggle against war. Spain is aflame with revolutionary clashes among the classes. The financiers of all countries are already gathering at secret conferences to discuss the general problem of the approaching For they already hear the iron step of the marching workers' revo-They already see the inevitable.

Into this clash our party is going with unfurled banners. It firmly grasps its banners. It did not lower them before the oppressors and dirty slapderers, before traitors to the revolution and servants of capital. It will hold them high in the future, in the struggle for Socialism, for the brotherhood of peoples. For it knows a new movement is rising and that the hour of the death of the old world is near.

Prepare for new battles, militant comrades! Firmly, courageously, and calmly, without giving in to provocations, gather strength and form fighting columns! Under the banner of the Party, proletarians and soldiers! Under our banner, oppressed of the villages!

Long live the revolutionary proletariat! Long live the alliance of the workers and the village poor! Down with the counter-revolution and its "Moscow Conference"! Long live the workers' world revolution!

Long live Socialism!

Long live the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks)!

SIXTH CONCRESS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY (BOLSHEVIKS).

Petrograd, August 12, 1917.

Proceedings of the Sixth Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks).

Communist Publishing House, 1919.

VI

RESOLUTION OF THE C.C. OF THE R.S.-D.L.P. ON THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE *

STATE power in Russia is now passing entirely into the hands of the counter-revolutionary imperialist bourgeoisie, which is openly supported by the petty-bourgeois S.-R. and Menshevik Parties. The policy of inflaming and prolonging the war, of refusing to give land to the peasants, of taking away rights from the soldiers, of re-establishing capital punishment, of violence against Finland and the Ukraine, and finally of furious crusading against the revolutionary part of the proletariat, the internationalist Social-Democrats—these are the most patent expressions of the domination of counter-revolutionary policies. In order to strengthen its influence and its position the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie is attempting to create a strong all-Russian centre, to unite its forces, and then, armed to the teeth, to move against the proletariat, against democracy. The Moscow Conference which has been called for August 25 is also to serve this purpose.

The Moscow Conference, the overwhelming majority of which is made up of representatives from such institutions of the régime overthrown by the revolution as the tsarist State Duma, a nest of counter-revolution, and of representatives of numerous organisations of the big bourgeoisie, has as its task to falsify the opinion of the people and in that way to mislead and deceive the great masses of the people. At a time when by the very convening of the Moscow Conference a centre of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie is being organised, the Soviets, the soldier and peasant committees, are systematically reduced to the rôle of mere appendages of the imperialist apparatus. While the Moscow Conference is convening, the Constituent Assembly is postponed again and again.

The bourgeoisie is cautiously but steadily marching towards its goal, the undermining of the Constituent Assembly and its replacement by organs in which the domination of the bourgeoisie will be assured.

As a result the Moscow Conference has as its task the sanctioning of counterrevolutionary policies, the supporting of the prolongation of the imperialist war; it is to stand up for the interests of the bourgeoisie and landowners and to lend its authority to the persecution of the revolutionary workers and peasants. Thus the Moscow Conference, which is screened and supported by the

^{*} See p. 74, Book I of this volume.-Ed.

petty-bourgeois parties, the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks, is in reality a conspiracy against the revolution, against the people.

Proceeding from the above considerations, the C.C. of the R.S.-D.L.P. proposes to the party organisations: first, to expose the conference convening in Moscow as an organ of the conspiracy of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie against the revolution; second, to expose the counter-revolutionary policy of the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks who are supporting this conference; third, to organise mass protests of workers, peasants and soldiers against the conference.

Rabochy i Soldat, No. 14, August 21, 1917.

VII

PROCLAMATION OF THE C.C. OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY ON THE KORNILOV REVOLT *

To all toilers, to all workers and soldiers of Petrograd.

COUNTER-REVOLUTION advances on Petrograd. The traitor to the revolution, the enemy of the people, Kornilov, leads to Petrograd troops deceived by him. The entire bourgeoisie, headed by the Cadet Party, which has ceaselessly sown slander against workers and soldiers, is now welcoming the traitor and betrayer and is ready to applaud whole-heartedly when Kornilov paints the streets of Petrograd red with the blood of workers and revolutionary soldiers. when he suppresses, by the hands of the ignorant people he deceives, the proletarian, peasants' and soldiers' revolution. To facilitate for Kornilov the slaughter of the proletarist, the bourgeoisie has thought up the invention that in Petrograd a workers' rebellion has triumphed. Now you see that the rebellion was started not by the workers but by the bourgeoisie and the generals headed by Kornilov. The triumph of Kornilov means the loss of liberty, the loss of the land, the triumph and omnipotence of the landowner over the peasant, of the capitalist over the worker, of the general over the soldier.

The Provisional Government fell to pieces at the very beginning of Kornilov's counter-revolution. This government, in whom a part of the democracy repeatedly expressed their confidence, whom it entrusted with all the power, this government proved unable to accomplish its first and immediate task: to suppress at the very root the counter-revolution of the generals and bourgeoisie. The attempts at compromise with the bourgeoisie have weakened the democracy, inflamed the appetites of the bourgeoisie, encouraged it to undertake an open revolt against the revolution, against the people.

The salvation of the people, the salvation of the revolution, lies in the revolutionary energy of the masses of the proletarians and soldiers themselves. We can trust only our own strength, our own discipline, our own organised power. We entrust the leadership of the decisive struggle for the salvation of the entire revolution, its conquests and its future, to that power which unqualifiedly, unremittingly will take upon itself to put through fully the demands of the proletarian and soldier-peasant masses. Only that power will save the revolution, will save it from the attack of the counter-revolution, will save it in spite of the hesitations, waverings, spinelessness of the vacillating section of the democracy.

^{*} See p. 137. Book I of this volume .-- Ed.

People of Petrograd! We call you to most decisive struggle with the counterrevolution! Behind Petrograd stands all of revolutionary Russia!

Soldiers! In the name of the revolution—forward against General Kornilov!

Workers! With united ranks defend the city of the revolution against the attack of the bourgeois counter-revolution!

Soldiers and workers! In brotherly union, cemented by the blood of the February days, show the Kornilovists that it will not be the Kornilovists who will suppress the revolution, but the revolution that will break and wipe off the face of the earth the attempts of the bourgeois counter-revolution.

In the name of the interests of the revolution, in the name of the power of the proletariat and peasantry of liberated Russia and the world over, as one united family, with closed ranks, hand in hand, all as one man, meet the enemy of the people, the traitor to the revolution, the murderer of liberty!

You were able to overthrow tsarism; show that you will not tolerate the rule of the creature of the landowners and the bourgeoisie—Kornilov.

C.C., R.S.-D.L.P. (BOLSHEVIKS)
P.C., R.S.-D.L.P. (BOLSHEVIKS)
MILITARY ORGANISATION OF THE C.C., R.S.-D.L.P.
CENTRAL SOVIET OF FACTORY COMMITTEES
BOLSHEVIK FRACTION OF THE PETROCRAD AND CENTRAL
SOVIETS OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES.

Rabochy, No. 8, September 12, 1917.

VIII

DECLARATION OF BOLSHEVIK FRACTION READ AT THE DEMO-CRATIC CONFERENCE, OCTOBER 1, 1917 *

THE revolution approaches its most critical stage. What follows is either a new rise or a disastrous fall. The people are exhausted by the war, but they are hardly less weary of the indecisiveness, torn by the vacillations in the policies pursued by the leading political parties. Within something over six months after the overthrow of tsarism, after several attempts to build up a revolutionary power on the basis of a coalition of the representatives of democracy with the representatives of the property-owning bourgeoisie; after the pitiful acts of the personal régime which led directly to the Kornilov affair, the moving forces of the revolution are again acutely confronted with the problem of power.

Every new government combination started with a declaration of the programme of measures to be adopted by the state, and within a few weeks it revealed its total inability to make a single serious step forward. Every new deal with the property-owning elements which followed after the disastrousness of coalition became self-evident, raised the greatest confusion, alarm and perplexity in the minds of all the toiling and oppressed classes of the country. Not only the city worker, not only the soldier who has been languishing for three years in the trenches, but also the peasant of the most remote and backward village, cannot fail to understand that the land problem cannot be solved by agreements with the Lvovs and Rodzyankos. The

^{*} See p. 248, Book I of this volume.—Ed.

democratisation of the army cannot be entrusted to generals who were serfowners under the old régime, the Kornilovs and Alexeyevs; control over industry cannot be realised through Minister-industrialists, nor financial reforms through bankers and military marauders and their immediate protégés, the Konovalovs, Palchinskys, Tretyakovs or Buryshkins. Finally, not a single serious measure for the regulation of the food supply and transportation or a single reform of the judiciary, school system, etc., can actually be carried out, while in an epoch of the greatest upheavals, both in the centre and locally, the old officialdom and the old make-up of the government with its anti-democratic spirit and stupid bureaucracy are preserved.

In spite of all the efforts of the government to drive out the Soviets and render them impotent; in spite of the suicidal policy of the official defensist leaders of the Soviets, the Soviets have shown all the invincibility of the revolutionary power and the initiative of the masses of the people, which find their expression through the Soviets, during the period of the suppression of the Kornilov revolt, while the Provisional Government has condemned itself forever before the court of the people and history—one of its parts by directly lending aid and comfort to the Kornilov affair, and the other by its readiness to deliver into the hands of Kornilov the conquests of the revolution. After this new test, which nothing can any longer erase from the minds of the workers, soldiers and peasants, the call sounded by our party at the very beginning of the revolution: "All power to the Soviets, both in the centre and locally"—became the voice of the entire revolutionary country.

Only such a power as will be based directly upon the proletariat and poor peasantry, a power that will take into account all the material wealth of the country and its economic possibilities, that will not stop the measures it is taking at the threshhold of the self-seeking interests of groups of property owners, that will mobilise all the forces with scientific preparation and technical knowledge for social and economic ends will be able to introduce into the disintegrating economy the maximum of planning possible at the present moment, will be able to help the peasantry and the agricultural labourers to use the available means of agricultural production to the greatest possible productivity, will be able to limit profits, to maintain wages and assure genuine labour discipline in accord with the regulation of production—discipline based on the self-government of the toilers and their centralised control over industry—and will be able with a minimum of upheaval to assure the demobilisation of the whole national economy.

Since the counter-revolutionary Cadet Party, which fears the passing of power to the Soviets more than anything else, is continually raising fears among the less class-conscious elements of the democracy by the spectre of an armed uprising by the Bolsheviks, we consider it necessary again to declare here, before the entire country, that in its struggle for power in order to carry out its programme, our party has never strived, and does not strive, to seize power against the organised will of the majority of the toiling masses of the country. The transfer of all power to the Soviets would do away neither with the class struggle nor with the struggle of the parties within the camp of the democracy. But given full and unlimited freedom of agitation and with the composition of the Soviets constantly renewed from below, the struggle for influence and power would develop within the framework of the Soviet organisations. On the other hand, the continuation of the present policy of violence and repression towards the working class, the revolutionary elements of the army and peasantry, with the aim of arresting the further development of the revolution, must inevitably, and entirely independently of the wishes of the

revolutionary organisations, lead to a terrific clash, the like of which has seldom been seen.

Under present conditions the coalition government is inevitably a government of violence and repression by the upper strata against the lower. Only he who wants to provoke a civil war at any price, in order to be able after it to throw the responsibility for it upon the working masses and our party, can propose to the democracy, after all that has been gone through, the conclusion of a new alliance with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

The people thirst for peace. A coalition government means the continuation of the imperialist war. The composition of the Provisional Government has up to now been adapting itself to the demands of the Allied imperialists. the mortal enemies of the Russian revolutionary democracy. The disastrous offensive of July 1, against the undertaking of which our party so consistently warned; the Kornilov methods of keeping the army in check, which were carried out with direct participation of the conciliationist Ministers-all of it was directly or indirectly inspired by the Allied imperialists. On this road the Russian Revolution has already succeeded in wasting an immense part of its moral authority, without strengthening in the least its physical forces. It is becoming ever more clear that having undermined the internal forces of the Russian Revolution, the Allied imperialists will not stop at the conclusion of peace at the expense of the Russian people. At the same time the further half-hearted prolongation of the war, without the confidence of the people in the purposes of the war and of the Provisional Government conducting it, gives an immense advantage into the hands of the counter-revolution, which may attempt to stake its chances on a separate peace with predatory German imperialism. The establishment of a Soviet power means first of all a direct, open and decisive offer to all the nations of an immediate, honourable, just, democratic peace. The revolutionary army would be able to recognise the inevitability of war only in case such a peace were rejected. However, everything indicates that the offer of the revolutionary government would find such a mighty echo from the long-suffering working masses of all the belligerent nations that the further continuation of the war would become impossible. Soviet power means peace.

Enough of hesitation! Enough of the policy of indecision and cowardice! You cannot torment and worry the peasants for half a year with impunity, promising them land and freedom, and refusing in fact to abolish at once the right of private property in the landowners' land without compensation, refusing to transfer these lands at once to the management of local peasant committees until the convening of the Constituent Assembly.

Enough of wavering! Enough of that policy of equivocation that has been carried on till now by the leaders of the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks. Enough of dragging! Enough of words! The last decisive hour has struck.

The following measures, promulgated by many influential revolutionary organisations headed by the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies must be made the basis of the activity of the revolutionary government:

1. The abolition of private property in landowners' land without compensation and its transfer to the management of peasant committees until the Constituent Assembly makes a decision, the poorest peasants to be provided with the necessary equipment.

2. The introduction of workers' control over both production and distribution on a state-wide scale, the centralisation of banking, control over the banks and the nationalisation of the most important industries, such as oil, coal, and metals: universal labour duty; immediate measures to demobilise industry, and organisation of supplying the village with industrial products at fixed prices. The merciless taxation of large capital accumulations and properties and the confiscation of war profits for the purpose of saving the country from economic ruin.

3. Declaring secret agreements to be void, and the immediate offer of a

universal democratic peace to all the peoples of the belligerent nations.

4. Safeguarding the rights of the nationalities inhabiting Russia to selfdetermination. The immediate abolition of all repressive measures against Finland and the Ukraine.

The following must be decreed as immediate measures:

- 1. Stopping all repressions directed against the working class and its organisations. Abolition of capital punishment at the front and the re-establishment of full freedom of agitation and of all democratic organisations within the army. Cleansing the army of counter-revolutionary elements.

 2. Commissars and other officials to be elected by local organisations.

 3. General arming of the workers and the organisation of a Red Guard.
- 4. Dissolution of the State Council and State Duma. The immediate convening of the Constituent Assembly.

5. Abolition of all the privileges of the estates (of the nobility, etc.), com-

plete equality of rights for all citizens.

6. Introduction of the eight-hour day and of a comprehensive system of social insurance.

As a special measure necessary to purify the political atmosphere and to reveal the evils of the courts, we demand the immediate appointment of an investigation commission, which has authority with the democracy, for a thorough investigation of the events of July 16-18 and for the examination of the actions of all judicial authorities—the agents of the old régime in whose hands are at present concentrated the proceedings against the proletariat. The immediste release of all arrested revolutionaries and the designation of a near date for an open trial of all the cases already begun.

We deem it necessary to state that the present conference was convoked on a basis of thoroughly arbitrary methods of representation, the cumulative effect of which was to allot to the least revolutionary, the conciliationist elements of the democracy, a representation to which they have not the least claim, by virtue of their actual political rôle. The army organisations are entirely inadequately represented and even then only in persons from the top, who are removed from the masses of the soldiers and have not been reelected for half a year. The Dumas and the Zemstvos, which have been only partially reformed, and because of the special task allotted to them, reflect only to an extremely unsatisfactory degree the revolutionary political experience and point of view of the democracy, and this is true even to a greater extent of the co-operative organisations, in which the selection of the persons at the helm is far removed from the political aspirations of the democratic masses and from the evolution of the sentiment of the masses. As compared with that of the Dumas, Zemstvos and co-operatives, the representation from the Soviets is extremely curtailed. Still, it is these very organisations which represent most accurately the political will of the workers, soldiers and peasants. It was the Soviets which took control of the entire situation and in many places also of the entire power during the critical days of the Kornilov sevolt. That is why we believe that only those decisions and proposals of the

present conference, which are directed toward the total elimination of the personal régime of Kerensky, and are recognised by the All-Russian Congress of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies, can be realised. The convening of such a congress without delay is the most important task of the present moment.

Rabochy Put, No. 15, October 3, 1917.

IX

DECLARATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK FRACTION READ IN THE PRE-PARLIAMENT, OCTOBER 20, 1917 *

THE officially declared purposes of the Democratic Conference, which was called together by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, were the abolition of the irresponsible personal régime that made possible the Kornilov affair and the establishment of a government accountable to the democracy and able to liquidate the war and to assure the convening of the Constituent Assembly at the appointed time.

However, behind the back of the Democratic Conference and by means of backstage deals between Kerensky, the Cadets and the leaders of the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks, results were achieved which are in direct contradiction to the officially proclaimed purposes.

A government was created in which and about which avowed and secret Kornilovists are playing a leading part. The irresponsibility of that power is from now on fixed and proclaimed officially.

The Council of the Russian Republic has been declared a consultative institution; during the eighth month of the revolution the irresponsible government has created for itself a screen consisting of a new edition of the Bulygin Duma. The property-owning elements enter the Provisional Council in numbers to which they have not the slightest right, as shown by the elections all over the country. In spite of this, it was the Cadet Party that was attempting to make sure and did make sure that the government should not be responsible even to this pre-parliament that was mutilated in favour of the census bourgeoisie.

That very Cadet Party which until yesterday insisted that the Provisional Government be made dependent upon the Duma of Mr. Rodzyanko, succeeded in securing the independence of the Provisional Government from the Council of the Republic.

In the Constituent Assembly the property-owning elements will occupy an incomparably less favourable position than the Provisional Council. It will be impossible for the government not to be responsible to the Constituent Assembly. If the property-owning elements were really preparing for a Constituent Assembly that were to meet within a month and a half, there would be no reason for them to fight for the present lack of responsibility of the government. The crux of the situation is that the bourgeois classes which are directing the policy of the political government have made it their purpose to undermine the Constituent Assembly. This is at present the basic task of the property-owning elements, to which all their policy, both internal and foreign, is subordinated.

^{*} See p. 61 of this book.-Bd.

In the fields of industry, agriculture and provisioning, the policy of the government and the propertied classes aggravates the natural disintegration resulting from the war. The census classes, having provoked a peasant uprising, are now beginning to suppress it, and are openly directing their course towards the "gaunt hand of famine," which is to stifle the revolution, and, first of all, the Constituent Assembly.

No less criminal is the foreign policy of the bourgeoisic and its government.

After forty months of war the capital is threatened with mortal danger. To meet this danger the plan is advanced of transferring the government to Moscow. The idea of surrendering the revolutionary capital to the German troops does not cause the slightest resentment upon the part of the bourgeois classes; on the contrary, it is accepted by them as a natural link in their general policy which is to facilitate for them their counter-revolutionary conspiracy.

Instead of recognising that the salvation of the country lies in the conclusion of peace, instead of openly throwing out the offer of immediate peace, over the heads of all imperialist governments and diplomatic offices, to all the nations exhausted by the war and thus actually making possible the further waging of the war, the Provisional Government, following the lead of the Cadet counter-revolutionaries and the Allied imperialists, is dragging along the murderous yoke of the war without sense, without strength, without a plan, dooming to purposeless destruction ever new hundreds of thousands of soldiers and sailors, and preparing the surrender of Petrograd and the stifling of the revolution. At a time when the Bolshevik soldiers and sailors are perishing together with the other sailors and soldiers as a result of mistakes and crimes of others, the so-called Supreme Commander-in-Chief continues to wreck the Bolshevik press (Molot has been suppressed in Minsk).

The leading parties of the Provisional Council serve as a voluntary screen

for this whole policy.

We, the fraction of Social-Democrats-Bolsheviks, declare: with this government of traitors to the people and with this council of counter-revolutionary connivance we have nothing in common. We do not wish to cover up, directly or indirectly, not even for a single day, that work which is being carried out behind the official screen and which is fatal to the people.

The revolution is in danger! While the armies of Wilhelm are threatening Petrograd, the government of Kerensky-Konovalov is preparing to flee from Petrograd, so as to convert Moscow into a bulwark of the counter-revolution.

We appeal to the Moscow workers and soldiers to be on their guard! In withdrawing from the Provisional Council we appeal to the vigilance and courage of the workers, soldiers and peasants of all Russia.

Petrograd is in danger! The revolution is in danger! The people are in danger!

The government aggravates this danger. The ruling parties help the government.

Only the people themselves can save themselves and the country. We appeal to the people.

All power to the Soviets!
All the land to the people!
Long live the immediate, honourable, democratic peace!
Long live the Constituent Assembly!

X

RESOLUTION ON THE PRESENT SITUATION, ADOPTED BY THE THIRD PETROGRAD CITY CONFERENCE OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY, OCTOBER 23, 1917 *

1. The bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolutionary power, supported by the S.-R. and Menshevik Parties, which have lost all influence over the masses, has definitely discredited itself in the eyes of the workers, soldiers and peasants.

2. Having freed themselves entirely of illusions about the possibility of a peaceful development of the Russian Revolution, the masses have again spontaneously entered on the road of revolutionary struggle; this is evidenced by the growing agrarian movement, the increasing discontent and the spontaneous outbursts in the cities, as well as in the radical change of sentiment at the front.

3. In this struggle now begun, the masses place all their hopes in the revolutionary party of the proletariat and upon the Petrograd, Moscow and other

Soviets led by that party.

4. The imperialist power, being afraid of the growing influence of the revolutionary Soviets of the capitals, and having met defeat in its attempt to create in the person of the Council of the Russian Republic a body able to replace the open revolutionary struggle with parliamentary chatter, is preparing to leave the revolutionary capital so that it may finally and the more easily deal a mortal blow to the revolution.

5. On the other hand, the Allied and Russian imperialists, frightened to death by the growth of revolution in Western Europe, are attempting to stifle

the Russian Revolution.

The attack of the German fleet, unhindered by the fleet of the Allies, the demand of the Allied imperialists that the revolutionary capital be evacuated, and the readiness of the government to surrender this capital—all this is evidence that an active crusade has been started against the Russian Revolution—a crusade that has as its purpose the crushing of the revolution in Western Europe.

The revolutionary movement in Western Europe is increasing the chances of the revolutionary proletariat for victory. All these circumstances clearly indicate that the moment has arrived for the last decisive clash that must determine the fate, not only of the Russian Revolution, but also of the world revolution.

In view of the above the Conference declares that only the replacement of the government of Kerensky, together with the packed Council of the Republic, by a workers' and peasants' revolutionary government will be able:

(a) to give over the land to the peasants instead of suppressing the uprising of the peasants;

(b) immediately to propose a just peace, thereby giving all our army faith

in the truth:

(c) to adopt the most decisive revolutionary measures against the capitalists in order to provide the army with bread, clothing and shoes, as well as for the struggle against economic disintegration.

Second and Third Petrograd Conferences of the Bolsheviks, July and September, 1917, State Publishing House, 1927.

^{*} See p. 66 of this book.—Ed.

XI

MINUTES OF SESSION OF THE C.C. OF THE R.S.-D.L.P., OCTOBER 23, 1917 *

Present: Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Stalin, Sverdlov, Uritsky, Dzerzhinsky, Kollontai, Bubnov, Sokolnikov, Lomov.

Chairman: Sverdlov.

Order of Business: 1. Rumanian front. 2. Lithuanians. 3. Minsk and northern front. 4. Present situation. 5. Regional congress. 6. Evacuation of troops.

1. Rumanian Front

Report submitted by Sverdlov. On the Rumanian front a conference of Social-Democrats of all shades took place. A mixed list was prepared. Submitted to the Central Committee (united). Was approved. They ask what the attitude of our Central Committee is on this. Out of 20 candidates 4 Bolsheviks were put up.

Decided: taking into consideration the decision of the Congress, no blocs

are permitted.

2. Lithuanians

Report by Sverdlov.

The Lithuanians had a conference in Minsk, where, it appeared, defensists frequently speak in the name of the party. In order to counteract this practice, it was decided to elect a temporary centre which is to put itself, as well as the entire conference, under the banner of the Bolsheviks. This centre should be confirmed.

Comrade Lomov thinks it should be confirmed. But attention should be called to the fact that defensist organisations were also present.

The temporary bureau is approved.

3. Minsk and Northern Front

Report by Sverdlov.

Representatives of several armies of the northern front came and stated that on that front some shady affair is being prepared with regard to the evacuation of the troops into the interior.

It is reported from Minsk that a new Kornilov affair is in preparation there. Because of the character of the garrison Minsk is surrounded by Cossack detachments. There are some negotiations of a suspicious nature going on between the staff and headquarters. Agitation is being conducted among the Osetians and several parts of the army against the Bolsheviks. At the front, however, sentiment is for the Bolsheviks. They will follow them against Kerensky. There are no documents at all. They can be obtained by seizing the staff, which is technically altogether possible in Minsk; in that case the local garrison can disarm all the troops around. All the artillery has been driven into the Pinsk marshes. A corps can be sent from Minsk to Petrograd.

^{*} See pp. 106-107 of this book.-Ed.

4. Present Situation

Lenin takes the floor.

He states that since the beginning of September a certain indifference towards the question of uprising has been noted. He says that this is inadmissible, if we earnestly raise the slogan of seizure of power by the Soviets. It is, therefore, high time to turn attention to the technical side of the question. Much time has obviously been lost.

Nevertheless the question is very urgent and the decisive moment is near.

The international situation is such that we must take the initiative.

What is being planned, surrendering as far as Narva and even as far as Petrograd, compels us still more to take decisive action.

The political situation is also effectively working in this direction. On July 16-18, decisive action on our part would have been defeated because we had no majority with us. Since then, our upsurge has been making gigantic strides.

The absenteeism and the indifference of the masses can be explained by the fact that the masses are tired of words and resolutions.

The majority is now with us. Politically, the situation has become entirely ripe for the transfer of power.

The agrarian movement also goes in this direction, for it is clear that enormous efforts are needed to subdue this movement. The slogan of transferring the entire land has become the general slogan of the peasants. The political background is thus ready. It is necessary to speak of the technical side. This is the whole matter. Meanwhile we, together with the defensists, are inclined to consider a systematic preparation for an uprising as something like a political sin.

To wait for the Constituent Assembly, which will obviously not be for us, is senseless, because it would make our task more complex.

We must utilise the regional congress and the proposal from Minsk to begin decisive action.

Comrade Lomov takes the floor, giving information concerning the attitude of the Moscow regional bureau and the Moscow Committee, as well as about the situation in Moscow in general.

Comrade Uritsky states that we are weak not only in a technical sense but also in all other spheres of our work. We have carried a mass of resolutions. Actions, none whatever. The Petrograd Soviet is disorganised, few meetings, etc.

On what forces do we base ourselves?

The workers in Petrograd have 40,000 rifles, but this will not decide the issue; this is nothing.

The garrison after the July days cannot inspire great hopes. However, in any case, if the course is held for an uprising, then it is really necessary to do something in that direction. We must make up our mind with regard to definite action.

Comrade Sverdlov gives information concerning what he knows about the state of affairs throughout Russia.

Comrade Dzerzhinsky proposes that for the purpose of political guidance during the immediate future, a Political Bureau be created, composed of members of the C.C.

After an exchange of opinion, the proposal is carried. A Political Bureau of 7 is created (the editors + two + Bubnov).

A resolution was accepted, reading as follows [see page 107.—Ed.].

Ten express themselves for it, and two against.

The question is then raised of establishing a Political Bureau of the C.C. It is decided to form a bureau of 7: Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev. Trotsky, Stalin, Sokolnikov, Bubnov.

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XII

STATEMENT BY G. ZINOVIEV AND U. KAMENEV *

October 24, 1917.

DEAR COMRADES:

At the last session of the C.C. we were in the minority and the two of us voted against the theses adopted. In view of the importance of the question we found it necessary to expound in the special statement attached hereto a brief résumé of the specches made by us during the session, and we request you to attach this statement to the minutes of the meeting. We consider it our duty to acquaint the Petrograd Committee, the Moscow Committee, the Moscow Regional Committee and the Finnish Regional Committee with this statement. The form which we have given to the statement you will of course understand without comment.

G. ZINOVIEV. U. KAMENEV.

ish Regional Com-

To the Petrograd, Moscow, Moscow Regional, and Finnish Regional Committees of the R.S.-D.L.P., the Bolshevik fraction of the C.E.C. of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the Bolshevik fraction of the congress of the Soviets of the Northern Region:

On the Present Situation

In connection with the political situation, the withdrawal of the Bolsheviks from the pre-parliament put before our party the question:

What next?

In labour circles there is developing and growing a current of thought which sees the only outcome in the immediate declaration of an armed uprising. The interaction of all the conditions at present is such that if we are to speak of such an uprising a definite date must be set for it, and that within the next few days. In one or another form this question is already being discussed by the entire press and at workers' meetings, and is occupying the minds of a substantial group of party workers. We on our part consider it our duty and our right to express ourselves on this question with complete frankness.

We are deeply convinced that to call at present for an armed uprising means to stake on one card not only the fate of our party, but also the fate of the Russian and international revolution.

There is no doubt that there are historical situations when an oppressed class must recognise that it is better to go forward to defeat than to give up

^{*} See p. 111 f. of this book and note 150,-Ed.

without a battle. Does the Russian working class find itself at present in such a situation? No, and a thousand times no!!!

As a result of the immense growth of the influence of our party in the cities, and particularly in the army, there has come about at present a situation such that it is becoming more and more impossible for the bourgeoisie to obstruct the Constituent Assembly. Through the army, through the workers, we hold a revolver at the temple of the bourgeoisie: the bourgeoisie is put in such a position that if it should undertake now to attempt to obstruct the Constituent Assembly, it would again push the petty-bourgeois parties to one side, and the revolver would go off.

The chances of our party in the elections to the Constituent Assembly are excellent. The talk that the influence of Bolshevism is beginning to wane, etc., we consider to have absolutely no foundation. In the mouths of our political opponents this assertion is simply a move in the political game, having as its purpose this very thing, to provoke an uprising of the Bolsheviks under conditions favourable to our enemies. The influence of the Bolsheviks is increasing. Whole strata of the labouring population are only now beginning to be drawn in by it. With correct tactics we can get a third and even more of the seats in the Constituent Assembly. The attitude of the pettybourgeois parties in the Constituent Assembly can not possibly be the same then as it is now. In the first place their slogan: "For land, for freedom. wait for the Constituent Assembly," will drop out. And aggravation of want, hunger, and the peasant movement, will exert more and more pressure on them and will compel them to seek an alliance with the proletarian party against the landowners and capitalists represented by the Cadet Party.

The Constituent Assembly, by itself, cannot of course abolish the present camouflaging of these interrelations. The Soviets, which have become rooted in life, can not be destroyed. The Constituent Assembly will be able to find support for its revolutionary work only in the Soviets. The Constituent Assembly will be able to find support for its revolutionary work only in the Soviets. sembly plus the Soviets—this is that combined type of state institutions towards which we are going. It is on this political basis that our party is acquiring enormous chances for a real victory.

We have never said that the Russian working class alone, by its own forces, would be able to bring the present revolution to a victorious conclusion. We have not forgotten, must not forget even now, that between us and the bourgeoisie there stands a huge third camp: the petty bourgeoisie. This camp joined us during the days of the Kornilov affair and gave us victory. It will join us many times more. We must not permit ourselves to be hypnotised by what is the case at the present moment. Undoubtedly, at present this camp is much nearer to the bourgeoisie than to us. But the present situation is not eternal, nor even durable. And only by a careless step, by some hasty action which will make the whole fate of the revolution dependent upon an immediate uprising, will the proletarian party push the petty bourgeoisie into the arms of Milyukov for a long time.

We are told: (1) that the majority of the people of Russia is already with us, and (2) that the majority of the international proletariat is with us. Alas!—neither the one nor the other is true, and this is the crux of the entire

aituation.

In Russia a majority of the workers and a substantial part of the soldiers are with us. But all the rest is dubious. We are all convinced, for instance, that if elections to the Constituent Assembly were to take place now, a majority of the peasants would vote for the S.R.'s. What is this, an accident? The masses of the soldiers support us not because of the slogan of war, but because of the slogan of peace. This is an extremely important circumstance and unless we take it into consideration we would be risking building on sand. If, having taken power at present by ourselves, we should come to the conclusion (in view of the whole world situation) that it is necessary to wage a revolutionary war, the masses of the soldiers will rush away from us. The best part of the army youth will, of course, remain with us, but the masses of the soldiers will turn away. The criminality of the imperialist government

consists in the very fact that by serving the interests of the Russian and the Allied bourgeoisie, it undermined the economic forces of the country at their very root, it disorganised the country and thereby deprived the revolutionary very root, it disorgained the country and thereby depirted the revolutionary people of the possibility of defending itself against the appetites of world imperialism by means of a revolutionary war. After forty months of imperialist war in a country ruined by the rule of marauders, under conditions of economic ruin that were created by tsarism and continued by the rule of the bourgeoisie, the exhausted soldiers are less and less able to carry through a victorious war against international capitalism.

Those same delegates from the front who are now conducting such agitation against the war, are directly asking our orators not to speak about revolutionary war, for that will estrange the soldiers. This is an extremely important symptom.

There is no doubt that a proletarian government would immediately undertake to pass the economic burdens of the war on to the bourgeoisie, would leave for the bourgeoisie "only crumbs of bread" and "take away its shoes." This ought to raise the enthusiasm of the masses. But this does not yet guarantee victory over German imperialism in a revolutionary war. Present-day Russia, which in spite of the working class permitted itself to be drained by the imperialist war, would still remain a country with comparatively backward technique, with a dilapidated railroad system, without commodities, without the necessary military technical equipment, etc. Having taken power, the workers' party thereby undoubtedly deals a blow to Wilhelm. It will be harder for him to carry on a war against revolutionary Russia, offering an immediate democratic peace. This is so. But will this blow under present conditions, after Riga, etc., be sufficiently powerful to turn away the hand of German imperialism from Russia? If separate negotiations between of German imperialism from Russia? It separate negotiations between German and English imperialisms have begun—and this is almost beyond doubt—would they not then continue these negotiations further even after our victory, and would not Wilhelm then still succeed in getting to Petrograd? Where then are the data which indicate that the proletarian party alone, and while the petty-bourgeois democracy is resisting, must take the responsibility for such a state of affairs and its inevitable consequences upon itself and upon itself alone.

And here we come to the second assertion—that the majority of the international proletariat allegedly is already with us. Unfortunately this is not so. The mutiny in the German navy has an immense symptomatic significance. There are portents of a serious movement in Italy. But from that to any sort of active support of the proletarian revolution in Russia which is declaring war on the entire bourgeois world is still very far. It is extremely harmful to overestimate forces. Undoubtedly much is given to us and much will be demanded from us. But if we now, having staked the entire game upon one card, suffer defeat, we shall deal a cruel blow to the international proletarian revolution, which is developing extremely slowly, but which is nevertheless developing. Moreover, the development of the revolution in Europe will make it obligatory for us, without any hesitation whatever, immediately to take power into our own hands. This is also the only guarantee of the victory of an uprising of the proletariat in Russia. It will come, but it is

not yet here.

In what perspective then does the immediate future present itself to us?

Here is our answer.

It stands to reason that our path does not depend upon ourselves alone. The enemy may compel us to accept decisive battle before the elections to the Constituent Assembly. Attempts at a new Kornilov affair will of course not leave us even the elections. We will then, of course, be unanimous in the only possible decision. But at that time a substantial part of the pettybourgeois camp too will surely support us again. The flight of the government to Moscow will push the masses of the petty bourgeoisie over to us. And then the conditions will have been created for our victory; then we shall not be defeated, but our opponents will be defeated.

But in so far as the choice depends upon us, we can and we must limit ourselves to a defensive position. The Provisional Government is often power-less to carry into execution its counter-revolutionary intentions. It is going to pieces. The strength of the soldiers and workers is sufficient to prevent the realisation of such steps by Kerensky and Company. The peasant movement has only just begun. The mass suppression of the peasant movement by the Cadets cannot succeed with the sentiment of the army as it no is. The Provisional Government is powerless to fix up the elections to the Constituent Assembly. Sympathy with our party will grow. The bloc of the Cadets, the Mensheviks and the S.R.'s will fall apart. In the Constituent Assembly we shall be such a strong opposition party that in a country of universal suffrage our opponents will be compelled to make concessions to us at every step, or we will form, together with the Left S.-R.'s, non-party peasants, etc., a ruling bloc which will fundamentally have to carry out our programme. This is our opinion.

Before history, before the international proletariat, before the Russian Revolution and the Russian working class, we have no right to stake the whole future on the card of an armed uprising. It would be a mistake to think that such action now would, if it were unsuccessful, lead only to such consequences as did July 16-18. Now it is a question of something more. It is a question of decisive battle, and defeat in that battle would spell defeat

to the revolution.

This is the general situation. But every one who does not want merely to talk about uprising must carefully weigh its chances. And here we consider it our duty to say that at the present moment it would be most harmful to underestimate the forces of our opponent and overestimate our own forces. The forces of the opponent are greater than they appear. Petrograd is decisive, and in Petrograd the enemies of the proletarian party have accumulated substantial forces: 5,000 military cadets, excellently armed, organised, anxious (because of their class position) and able to fight, also the staff, shock troops, Cossacks, a substantial part of the garrison, and very considerable artillery, which has taken up a position in fan-like formation around Petrograd. Then our adversaries will undoubtedly attempt, with the aid of the C.E.C. to bring troops from the front. The proletarian party at the present time would have to fight under an entirely different interrelationship of forces than in the days of the Kornilov affair. At that time we fought together with the S.R's, the Mensheviks, and to some extent, even with the adherents of Kerensky. Now, however, the proletarian party would have to fight against the Black Hundreds, plus the Cadets, plus Kerensky and the Provisional Government, plus the C.E.C. (S.-R.'s and Mensheviks).

The forces of the proletarian party are, of course, very substantial, but the

The forces of the proletarian party are, of course, very substantial, but the decisive question is, is the sentiment among the workers and soldiers of the capital really such that they see salvation only in street fighting, that they are impatient to go into the streets? No. There is no such sentiment. Even those in favour of the uprising state that the sentiment of the masses of workers and soldiers is not at all even like their sentiments upon the eve of July 16. If among the great masses of the poor of the capital there were a militant sentiment burning to go into the streets, it might have served as a guarantee that an uprising initiated by them would draw in the biggest organisations (railroad unions, unions of postoffice and telegraph workers, etc.), where the influence of our party is weak. But since there is no such sentiment even in the factories and barracks, it would be a self-deception to build any

plans on it.

We are told: but the railroad workers and the postoffice and telegraph employees are starving, are crushed by poverty, are exasperated with the Provisional Government. All this is so, of course. But all this is still no guarantee that they will support an uprising against the government, in spite of the S.R.'s and Mensheviks. The railroad workers and employees were crushed by poverty also in 1906, even as they are now in Germany and France. And still this does not provide assurance of support for the uprising. If all

these people who are crushed by poverty were always ready to support the armed uprising of the Socialists, we would have won Socialism long ago.

This emphasises our immediate task. The Congress of Soviets has been called for November 2. It must be convened, no matter what the cost. It must organisationally consolidate the growing influence of the proletarian party. It must become the centre of the consolidation around the Soviets of all proletarian and semi-proletarian organisations, such as those same railroad unions, unions of postoffice and telegraph employees, bank employees. etc. As yet there is no firm organisational connection between these organisations and the Soviets. This cannot be considered as other than a symptom of the organisational weakness of the proletarian party. But such a connection is in any case a preliminary condition for the actual carrying out of the slogan, "All power to the Soviets." For any given moment this slogan natural rally signifies the most decisive resistance to the slightest encroachment on the rights of the Soviets and organisations created by them, on the part of the government.

Under these conditions it would be a serious historical untruth to formulate the question of the transfer of power into the hands of the proletarian party

in the terms: either now or never.

No. The party of the proletariat will grow. Its programme will become known to broader and broader masses. It will have the opportunity to continue on an even larger scale the merciless exposure of the policy of the Mensheviks and S.-R.'s who stand in the way of actual transfer of the power into the hands of the majority of the people. And there is only one way in which the proletarian party can interrupt its successes, and that is if under present conditions it takes upon itself to initiate an uprising and thus expose the proletariat to the blows of the entire consolidated counter-revolution, supported by the petty-bourgeois democracy. e petty-bourgeois democracy.

Against this perilous policy we raise our voice in warning.

G. Zinoviev.

U. KAMENEV.

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XIΠ

MINUTES OF SESSION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.-D.L.P., EXECUTIVE COMMISSION OF THE PETROGRAD COM-ORGANISATION. MITTEE. **MILITARY** PETROGRAD TRADE UNIONS. FACTORY COMMITTEES. RAILROAD WORKERS. PETROGRAD REGIONAL COMMITTEE, OCTOBER 29, 1917 *

CHAIRMAN: Comrade Sverdlov.

Comrade Sverdlov proposes the order of business: I. Report on last session of C.C. 2. Brief reports by representatives. 3. Present situation.

1. Report on Last Session of C.C.

Comrade L.** reads the resolution that was adopted by the Central Committee at the previous session. He says that the resolution was adopted with two voting against. If the comrades who disagree wish to express themselves, he says, discussion may be opened; in the meantime, however, he gives the reasons for this resolution.

Had the Menshevik and the Socialist-Revolutionary Parties broken with

** Lenin.—Ed.

^{*} See p. 108 of this book.-Bd.

conciliationism, it would have been possible to offer them a compromise. This offer was made: it is obvious, however, that this compromise has been rejected by the above-named parties. On the other hand it has become clear at this period that the masses are following us. It was so even before the Kornilov affair; he proves it by statistics of the elections in Petrograd and in Moscow. The Kornilov affair has pushed the masses still closer to us. Interrelation of forces at the Democratic Conference. Situation is clearly either a dictatorship of Kornilov, or a dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest strata of the peasantry. Sentiment cannot serve as guide, since it is changeable and cannot be measured; we must be guided by an objective analysis and an appraisal of the revolution. The masses have expressed confidence in the Bolsheviks and they demand of them not words, but deeds, a decisive policy both in the struggle against the war and in the struggle against economic ruin. If we make our basis a political analysis of the revolution, it will become perfectly clear that this is now being proven even by anarchistic actions.

He analyses further the situation in Europe and proves that a revolution there is still more difficult than here. If, in a country like Germany, there has been a mutiny in the navy, this proves that things there have gone very far. The international situation gives us a good deal of objective data showing that if we act now, we will have on our side all of proletarian Europe. He proves that the bourgeoisie wishes to surrender Petrograd. We can save ourselves from this only by taking Petrograd into our hands. The conclusion from all this is clear, namely, that the armed uprising of which the Central Committee resolution speaks is on the order of the day.

As to practical conclusions from the resolution, it is more convenient to make them after listening to the reports of the representatives of the centres.

From a political analysis of the class struggle, both in Russia and in Europe, follows the necessity of a most decisive, most active policy, which can be only an armed uprising.

2. Reports by Representatives

Comrade Sverdlov of the C.C. reports in the name of the Secretariat of the C.C. on the situation in the various localities.

The growth of the party has made giant strides; it may be considered that

the party at present comprises no less than 400,000 (submits proof).

Our influence has increased in the same degree, particularly in the Soviets (proofs); the same is true of the army and navy. Gives more facts about the mobilisation of counter-revolutionary forces (Donetz Basin, Minsk, Northern front).

Comrade Boky of the Petrograd Committee. Reports on city districts:

Vasilyev Island—there is no fighting sentiment, military preparations are taking place.

Vyborg district, same, but is preparing for the uprising; a military Soviet has been formed; in case of uprising will be supported by masses. that the initiative should come from above.

1st City district. Difficult to estimate the sentiment. There are Red Guards.

2nd City district. Better sentiment.

Moscow district. Reckless sentiment, will go out at the call of the Soviet but not of the party.

Narva district. No desire for action, but no decline in the authority of the party. In the Putilov plant Anarchists gaining strength.

Neva district. Sentiment turned strongly in our favour. Everyone will follow the Soviet.

Okhta district. Bad situation.

Petrograd district. Sentiment of expectancy.

Rozhdestvensky district. Same; doubt whether to rise or not; strong influence of Anarchists.

Porokhov district. Sentiment has improved in our favour.

Schlüsselburg. Sentiment in our favour.

Comrade Krylenko of the Military Bureau. States that in the Bureau there

is great difference of opinion in estimation of sentiment.

Personal observations lead to the conclusion that sentiment in the regiments is entirely with us, but information from comrades working in the districts differs: they say that for the uprising something decisive must supply the stimulus, namely, withdrawing the troops. Bureau thinks that sentiment is on the decline. Majority of Bureau thinks that it is not necessary to accentuate the question in practice, while a minority thinks that it is possible to take the initiative.

Comrade Stepanov of Regional Organisation. In Sestroretsk and Kolpin, the workers are arming, have fighting sentiment, are preparing for the rising. In Kolpin, Anarchist sentiment is to be observed.

In Narva, sentiment is grave because of discharges. 3,000 already dis-

charged.

As to the garrisons, sentiment there is depressed, but Bolshevik influence is very strong (2 machine gun regiments). In New Peterhof, work in the regiment has very much declined, the regiment is disorganised. *Krasnoye Syelo*: 176th regiment is absolutely Bolshevik, 172nd regiment almost, but besides, there is cavalry there. Luga—garrison of 30,000. Soviet is defensist. Sentiment is Bolshevik; re-elections to take place.

In Gdov-the regiment is Bolshevik.

Comrade Boky adds that according to available information, the situation in Krasnoye Syelo is not so good.

In Cronstadt sentiment has declined, and in a fighting sense the local garri-

son is not fit for anything.

Comrade Volodarsky of the Petrograd Soviet. General impression that no one is very anxious to go out on the street but at the call of the Soviets all will appear.

Comrade Ravich confirms this and adds that some have indicated that they

would go out also at the call of the party.

Comrade Schmidt of the Trade Unions. Total number organised exceeds 500,000. Influence of our party prevailing, but in the unions composed mostly of artisans, our influence is weak (especially among clerks and printers), but even there it is beginning to increase, especially because of the dissatisfaction with wages. Sentiment is such that no real action should be expected, especially because of the fear of discharge. To some extent this is a restraining factor. As a result of definite economic conditions we may expect huge unemployment in the near future; in connection with this there is a sentiment of expectancy. All acknowledge that outside of the struggle for power there is no way out of the situation, and they demand all power to the Soviets.

Comrade Shlyapnikov adds that in the metal workers' union, influence of Bolsheviks prevails, but the Bolshevik uprising is not popular; rumours about it even caused a panic. Prevailing sentiment of metal workers all over Russia is also Bolshevik; Bolshevik resolutions are adopted but there is no appreciation of the possibility of organising production themselves. Before the union is the question of the struggle for increased wages. In connection with this struggle the question of control will be raised.

Skrypnik, from the Factory Committees, states that everywhere gravitation towards practical results may be noticed; resolutions no longer satisfy. It is felt that the leaders do not fully express the sentiment of the masses; the former are more conservative. The growth of the influence of the anarchosyndicalists may be noted, especially in the Narva and Moscow districts.

Comrade Sverdlov adds that in Moscow, in connection with the resolution of the C.C., steps were taken to determine the situation as to the possibility

of an uprising.

A comrade from the railroad workers. Railroad workers are starving, are exasperated, organisation is weak, especially among the telegraph employees.

Comrade Schmidt adds that in connection with the strike of the railroad workers there was a turn in sentiment. At the Moscow junction in particular may be observed dissatisfaction with the Committee. In general, the railroad centres at Petrograd and Moscow are closer to the Bolsheviks.

Comrade Boky. About the postoffice and telegraph employees. There is no separate organisation. Telegraph operators are mostly Cadets. The postmen state that in a decisive moment they will be able to seize the postoffice.

Comrade Schmidt. Union of postal workers is more radical than that of railroad workers. The lower employees are really Bolsheviks but higher employees are not; we must fight against the latter as long as they hold the union in their hands.

3. The Present Situation

Comrade Milyutin thinks that on the basis of all the reports it is necessary to concretise resolution to a greater extent. Believes that slogan "All power to the Soviets" is already fully matured, especially in the provinces, where the power in certain places is actually in the hands of the Soviets. Question is really not of agitation; deeds are necessary and not words. Question is decided not by sentiments, not by bulletins, but by organised forces. Either we make the first step, or that step will be made by our enemies. The resolution does not take into consideration sufficiently the second perspective, that is, the possibility not of an uprising, which presupposes that we take the initiative, but of a clash which is the result of objective conditions. His own opinion is that we are not ready to deal the first blow.

We are not in a position to overthrow and arrest the government within the next few days.

Another perspective arises: an armed clash; shows that it is developing, possibility of it is approaching. And for this clash we must be ready. But this perspective is different from an uprising. Considers it necessary to expand the resolution in this sense.

Comrade Shotman says that at the city conference, and in the Petrograd Committee and in the military committee the sentiment is much more pessimistic. Shows that we cannot start the uprising but we must prepare.

Comrade L.* disagrees with Milyutin and Shotman and points out that it is not a question of armed forces, not a question of fighting against the troops, but of one part of the troops fighting against another. He sees no pessimism in what has been said here. He argues that the forces on the side of the bourgeoisie are not large. Facts prove that we have a preponderance over the enemy. Why cannot the Central Committee begin? This does not follow from all the data. To reject the Central Committee's resolution, one must show that there is no economic ruin, that the international situation is not leading to complications. If the trade union functionaries demand all power, * Lenin.—Ed.

they understand very well what they want. Objective conditions show that the peasantry must be led: it will follow the proletarist.

Some are afraid that we would not retain power; but just now we have

particular chances of retaining power.

He expresses a wish that the discussion should be conducted on the level of analysing the resolution on its merits.

Comrade Krylenko declares that on one point the whole Bureau is agreed, namely, that the water has boiled enough; to pass a resolution which would withdraw this resolution would be the greatest mistake. Our task is to support the uprising with armed force if it should break out anywhere. But the

sentiment which was described here is a result of our mistakes.

On the question as to who will begin, and how, he differs from Vladimir Ilyich.* Considers it unnecessary to enter into too great technical details of the uprising, and on the other hand thinks it also inadvisable to fix a definite date for it. But the question of the withdrawal of troops is just that fighting situation upon which a battle will take place. At the Cheremisov Conference it will be shown that it is necessary to withdraw the troops; our answer to this will be that even though it is necessary it will not be done, for there is no confidence in the generals; the fact of an offensive against us is thus already there and advantage may be taken of this. Agitation must not be diminished and there is no reason to worry about who will begin, as a beginning has already been made.

Comrade Rakhia shows that the masses are consciously preparing for an uprising. If the Petrograd proletariat were armed it would already be on the streets, in spite of all decisions of the C.C. There is no pessimism. It is useless to wait for the offensive of the counter-revolution, for it is already here. The masses wait for the call and for arms. The masses will pour out into the streets, for they are facing starvation. Apparently our slogan is already late, for there is doubt whether we will do what we are calling for. Our task is not to change our decision, but, on the contrary, to reaffirm it.

Comrade Gregory.** Apparently the resolution is not considered an order, otherwise it could not be discussed.

On the merits, expresses doubt concerning the certainty of the success of the uprising. In the first place, the machinery of the railroads, postoffice and telegraph apparatus is not in our hands. Influence of C.E.C. is still quite

strong.

The question will be decided on the first day also in Petrograd, for otherwise demoralisation will set in. We cannot expect reinforcement from Finland and Cronstadt. And in Petrograd we do not have such great forces. Besides, our enemies have an immense organisational staff.

Our noise lately is incorrect even from the point of view of the resolution of the C.C. Why give an opportunity to prepare? The sentiment in the factories at present is not the same as it was in June. It is clear that now

the sentiment is not such as it was in June.

We are told that we are in such a position that there is no way out; I think that no such position exists yet. I think that our attitude towards the Constituent Assembly is incorrect. To be sure, it cannot be looked upon as a cure-all, but the Constituent Assembly will take place in an atmosphere that is revolutionary to the highest degree. Meanwhile, we shall strengthen our forces. The possibility is not eliminated that we, together with the Left S.-R.'s, shall be in the majority there. It is impossible that the peasant will

^{*} Lenin's first name and patronymic.—Ed. ** G. Zinoviev.—Ed.

waver on the land question. I was in favour of withdrawing from the preparliament, but I do not think that this mass will never follow us. Speaks of international relations and shows that it is our duty to the international proletariat as well to be extremely careful: our influence continues to grow. There is no reason to expect that Petrograd will be surrendered before the Constituent Assembly. We have no right to risk, to stake everything on one card.

I propose: if the congress takes place on the 2nd we must propose that it should not disband until the Constituent Assembly convenes. There must be a defensive, waiting tactic on the background of the total inactivity of the Provisional Government. We must not put ourselves in the position of total isolation. Neither does the Constituent Assembly free us from a civil war, but it is a very important milestone. It is necessary to reconsider, if possible, the resolution of the C.C. We must definitely tell ourselves that we do not plan an uprising within the next five days.

Comrade Kamenev. A week has passed since the resolution was adopted, and this resolution therefore shows how not to carry out an uprising: during this week nothing has been done and we only spoiled the disposition [of forces-Ed.] which was to take place. The results for the week indicate that there are no facts favouring a rising. It cannot be said that the resolution merely aroused thought: it demanded a transition from words to deeds. But this is not the case. We have no apparatus for an uprising; our enemies have a much stronger apparatus, and it has probably further increased during this week. Shows that we did nothing during this week, either in the military technical sphere, or in the sphere of provisioning and supplies. However, by this resolution an opportunity was given to the government to organise its forces. The entire mass that is not with us at present is on their side. We strengthen them at our expense. The question is more serious than in the July days. From a social point of view the crisis has matured, but there is no evidence that we must give battle before the 2nd. The question is not: either now or never. I have more faith in the Russian Revolution; we are facing social battles, and in preparing for the Constituent Assembly we do not at all embrace the road of parliamentarism. We are not strong enough to go into an uprising with assurance of victory, but we are strong enough not to permit extreme expressions of reaction. Two tactics are fighting here: the tactic of conspiracy and the tactic of faith in the moving forces of the Russian Revolution.

Fenigstein thinks that the question of an armed uprising is a question not of weeks but of days. This is a political attitude; he agrees with it but he does not agree with an immediate transition to bayonets. Shows further that technically an armed uprising has not been prepared by us. We do not yet even have a centre. We are marching on, half-consciously, to defeat. There are moments when it is necessary to go on just the same. But if that is not the case it is necessary to approach the question from the practical point of view.

Stalin. The day of the uprising must be chosen expediently. Only thus must the resolution be understood.

It may be said that it is necessary to wait for an attack, but it must be understood what an attack is; the raising of the price of bread, the sending of Cossacks to the Donetz Basin, etc., all this is an attack which has already come. Till when, then, are we to wait if there is not going to be an armed attack? What is offered by Kamenev and Zinoviev objectively leads to the possibility for the counter-revolution to organise its forces; we shall retreat

endlessly and we shall lose the whole revolution. Why not imagine the possibility of selecting the day and the conditions, so as not to give the counter-revolution a chance to organise its forces? Passing to an analysis of international relations, shows that now we must have more faith. There are two lines here: one line charts its course for the victory of the revolution and looks to Europe, the other does not believe in the revolution and expects to be merely an opposition. The Petrograd Soviet has already started on the road to an uprising, by refusing to sanction the withdrawal of the troops. The navy has already mutinied, inasmuch as it went against Kerensky.

T.* interprets the resolution that it does not mean an uprising tomorrow, but it transfers the question from politics into strategy and calls for definite action. There is no reason to fear conspiracies, conspiracy must always be kept in mind; it is not necessary to turn off to the road of parliamentary struggle, this would be incorrect. Neither should we wait until we are attacked

for the very fact of an offensive creates chances of victory.

Comrade Sverdlov characterises the resolution. On the one hand it was an order, but it is correct that the question has passed from the sphere of politics into that of technique. Speaks of counter-revolutionary preparations. Argues against Kamenev's assertion that the weak aspect of the resolution is its failure to have been carried out until now. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that more energetic work must be undertaken. There is no reason to speak about how the majority is not against us; it is merely as yet not with us. In Petrograd, however, the forces are ours; the military cadets are not terrible, especially if we attack first. Does not share that pessimistic sentiment with regard to the garrison which was expressed here. The interrelation of forces is in our favour. No reason to repeal the resolution, but it should be corrected to the effect that technical preparation must be more energetic.

Comrade Skrypnik. If we have no forces, we shall not get any more later; if we do not retain power now it will be still worse later. We are told that it pays to be on the defensive—perhaps! but later we will have no strength

even for defence.

All arguments which have been made here are merely for postponement. There is no guarantee of victory. There has been repeated here what the Mensheviks and S.-R.'s said when the proposal to take over the power was made to them. At present we talk too much when it is necessary to act. The masses make demands of us, and they think that if we do not give them anything we are committing a crime; it is necessary to prepare for the uprising and to issue a call to the masses.

Volodarsky. If the resolution is an order, it has not been carried out. If the question of an uprising is put forth as a question for tomorrow we must say frankly that we have nothing ready for it. I spoke before . . . ** but I assure you that the masses received our appeal with perplexity; during this

week a change has taken place.

If there were no trend in the C.C. which wanted to reduce the class struggle to a parliamentary struggle, we would be ready now for an uprising, but not at this moment. The positive side of the resolution is that it compelled us to go to the masses with a new slogan. The resolution must be understood as the route to an uprising; we must not stop our technical preparations.

Concrete proposal: to continue technical preparation and to submit this question to the Congress, but not to consider that the moment has already passed.

^{*} The name is omitted from the minutes.—Ec. ** There is an omission in the original.—Ed.

Dzerzhinsky thinks that Volodarsky is mistaken when he thinks that the party made a mistake when it carried on, as he expressed it, a parliamentary tactic. Quite on the contrary, the changed situation resulted in a change of our decision. Two months ago these illusions had not yet been discarded and were still there, and therefore it was impossible to raise the question of an uprising. The demand that everything should be technically prepared for the uprising is just a conservative policy. When the uprising comes, then technical forces will also appear. The same is true of provisioning.

Comrade Ravich. Abrogation of the resolution would amount to an abrogation of all our slogans and our entire policy. The masses have already absorbed the view that the uprising is inevitable. If the masses were too revolutionary, then it would start from below, but it is also possible that the call will come from above, and nobody doubts that in that case the masses

will support it. We must not refuse.

Comrade Sokolnikov. The objections of Kamenev are not convincing. He accuses us of having made noise regarding our uprising, that is, he demands a conspiracy. Our greatest peculiarity and our strength is that we openly prepare the uprising. It reminds one of the February events, when, too, nothing was prepared, yet the revolution was victorious. It is impossible to expect a more favourable interrelationship of forces.

As to the resolution, it was absolutely useless to interpret it as an order

to act.

If it should turn out that events will secure a postponement for us, we shall certainly take advantage of it. It is possible that the Congress will take place sooner. If the Congress decides on all power to the Soviets, then it will be necessary to raise the question of what to do, to appeal to the masses or not.

Comrade Skalov shows that in order that the power shall pass to the Soviets, a certain interrelation of forces is necessary. The power of the Soviets will solve the supply question. At present we are becoming defensists; if we do not take power, then perhaps the navy will leave its positions, and the army too. He speaks of the breaking of agreements, etc. Thinks that before the convening of the Congress of Soviets the uprising should not be arranged, but at the Congress power should be taken.

Milyutin. The resolution was written differently from the way it is now interpreted; it is interpreted so that the question is about the movement towards an uprising. This was laid out as early as September. What all are speaking about is not the technical but the political aspect of the question. As to the course, nobody disagrees. Those who speak of an uprising think of it merely in a primitive way. It is first of all necessary to take over the power and replace the old power, but to act according to blueprint is absurd. We gained from the fact that there was no uprising on [July] 16-18, and if there is none now, we shall not perish. This resolution should be for internal use.

Jose shows that the resolution must not be understood as an order to act; it is a rejection of the tactic of refraining from uprising and a recognition of the possibility and compulsoriness of an uprising at the first opportune moment. In this sense it should be welcomed. But on the other hand it is not true that the question now is purely technical; now too the moment of the uprising must be examined from a political point of view. The sense of the resolution is the necessity of taking advantage of the first opportune moment for seizing power, and for this reason it should be welcomed.

Schmidt. The question is now becoming clearer, and there is no reason to

object against preparing for the revolution.

Uncle. It is too bad that the resolution was not put in circulation until now. I am convinced that the resolution will be adopted. I took the floor to make a correction in the estimation of the sentiment of the masses. An indicator of the sentiment of the masses is the readiness with which they take up arms. Ours is a strange strategy. As for the military cadets, as I have said already, they may be left out of consideration.

L.** If all resolutions fell through in this way, one wouldn't wish for anything better. Now Zinoviev says down with the slogan, "Power to the Soviets," and pressure on the government. If it is said that the uprising is "of the people" there is no need of speaking of conspiracies. If politically the uprising is inevitable, we must treat the uprising as an art. Politically, it has already matured.

Precisely because there is bread for one day only, we cannot wait for the Constituent Assembly. He proposes to endorse the resolution, to energetically push the preparations and to leave it to the Central Committee and the Soviet to decide when.

Zinoviev. Comparisons were made between this revolution and the February Revolution. They should not be compared, for at that time there was nothing on the side of the old power, while now it is war against the entire bourgeois world. The slogan "Power to the Soviets" was not advanced by us abstractly. If the Congress exerts pressure on the Constituent Assembly, this cannot be compared with a Menshevik policy. If the uprising is put forth as a perspective, then there can be no objection, but if it is an order for tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, then it is an adventure. Until our comrades come together and we have consulted them we must not start an uprising.

Stepanov. The resolution has historical significance; I have been looking upon it as upon a barometer indicating the storm. Further, objects to Kamenev regarding his arguments about the lack of provisions.

Besides the Cheremisov Conference the reduction of the soldiers' rations

may be a factor in favour of the uprising.

The objective situation is developing every minute, and this resolution has played a great part. It has made a great deal clear to us. Shows that the masses distinguish between the C.E.C. and the Petrograd Soviet; proposes to keep the resolution in the capacity of a barometric indicator.

Kamenev shows that the present interpretation of the resolution is a retreat, for previously it was said that the uprising must be on the 2nd, while now there is talk about the movement towards the revolution. The question is raised politically. Fixing a date for the uprising is adventurism. We are obliged to explain to the masses that we do not call upon them to rise during these three days, but we consider that the uprising is inevitable.

Proposes to have a vote on the resolution and to take up the proposal that the Central Organ should state that before the Congress no appeal to uprising

will be made.

Skrypnik proposes to address an appeal to the masses to prepare for the uprising.

Arguing against Zinoviev, Lenin says that it is wrong to contrast the present revolution with the February Revolution.

As to the matter under consideration, he proposes the resolution [see p. 110.—Ed.].

^{*} Latsis.—Ed. ** Lenin.—Ed.

Zinoviev answers Lenin with regard to the February Revolution. These two months will not appear as the worst page in the history of our party. He offers his resolution: "Without delaying the reconnoitring preparatory steps, it is considered that such uprisings are inadmissible until a conference with the Bolshevik part of the Congress of Soviets."

A vote is taken with the resolution of Comrade Lenin as a basis. For, 20; against, 2; abstaining, 3. The amendment of Comrade Milyutin to change by using the expression "armed clash," is rejected. Amendment by Comrade Skrypnik to eliminate the words "expressing conviction," etc. Rejected.

Amendment by Comrade Fenigstein: to substitute the word "action" for the word "attack." Rejected.

An amendment is proposed by Comrade Volodarsky:

That resolution of Comrade Zinoviev be added as an amendment to the resolution adopted. Rejected.

Amendment by Comrade Fenigstein:

"Centre made up of executive committee and military bureau." Withdrawn. Resolution as a whole.

For, 19; against, 2; abstained, 4.

Resolution of Comrade Zinoviev: for, 6; against, 15; abstained, 3.

C.C. continues in session alone and adopts the following decision: the C.C. organises a military revolutionary centre of the following composition: Sverdlov, Stalin, Bubnov, Uritsky, and Dzerzhinsky. This centre becomes a part of the revolutionary committee of the Soviet.

Archives of the C.C.

CALENDAR OF EVENTS

FROM MIDDLE OF JULY TO BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER, 1917

July 16. Opening of second city conference of Petrograd organisation of Bolsheviks. Resignation of Cadet Ministers under pretext of protesting against Provisional Government's deciding question of autonomy for Ukraine before convocation of Constituent Assembly. Government crisis. Beginning of spontaneous movement among workers and soldiers of Petrograd under slogan "All power to the Soviets!" Strikes in factories, armed clashes in the streets. Demonstration of workers at the Tauride Palace demanding decision of All-Union C.E.C. on question of power. Throughout night, conferences of representatives of factory, army, party and other organisations. Late in the evening is published appeal of Bolshevik C.C., "To Workers and Soldiers of Petrograd," calling for peaceful and organised expression of their will on question of organisation of power.

July 17. Strikes in factories and plants continued. Sailors arrive from Cronstadt. Huge manifestations of armed workers and soldiers with slogans: "Down with the Ten Capitalist Ministers! All Power to the Soviets!", converging on Tauride Palace. Military cadets and Cossack detachments called out by Provisional Government. Shooting on demonstrators. In the evening, a joint session of the All-Russian C.E.C. and Executive Committee of Peasants' Soviets with representatives of factory delegations considers question of organisation of power. Decision adopted for convening within two weeks of plenum of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. Bolshevik resolution on necessity of transferring all power to government of delegates of the central Soviet organs is rejected. At night Pravda publishes appeal of Bolsheviks calling for stoppage of demonstrations. Armed demonstrations in Moscow. Punitive expeditions in Ryazan and Nizhni-Novgorod in connection with refusal of soldiers to go to the front.

July 18. Wrecking of printing plant and editorial office of Pravda by military cadets. Publication by Alexinsky and Pankratov of libelous document about Lenin's spying, fabricated by secret service. Arrival of Helsingfors delegation of Baltic fleet to find out why some ships of the Baltic fleet had been called to Petrograd by Provisional Government. Return of sailors to Cronstadt. Cossack detachments on the streets of Petrograd. Movement

suppressed.

July 19. Government troops occupy headquarters of C.C. of Bolsheviks and the Fortress of Peter and Paul. Pravda Bulletin appears announcing end of demonstrations of July 16-18. Worker Voinov murdered while distributing Pravda Bulletin. Protest of central Soviet of factory committees and executive boards of trade unions of Petrograd against the wrecking of the Pravda and appeal to boycott counter-revolutionary press. Decree of Provisional Government for arrest of Lenin, Zinoviev and Kamenev. Strike of metal workers in Moscow. Demonstrations of workers in Ivanovo-Voznesensk. Outbreaks among sailors of the Black Sea fleet. Breaking of the Russian front near Tarnopol. Bill of Finnish Sejm on autonomy for Finland.

July 20. Arrest of delegation of the Baltic fleet in Petrograd. Decree of Provisional Government to disband all military detachments who took part

in demonstrations of July 16-18. Resignation of Prime Minister Prince Lvov. Suppression of demonstration of workers and soldiers in Nizhni-Novgorod.

July 21. Declaration of Provisional Government "Immediate measures for the realisation of principles proclaimed by declaration of May 6." Appointment of Kerensky as Prime Minister. Decree of Provisional Government giving Minister of War authority to prohibit the distribution among the army at the front of the newspapers Pravda, Soldatskaya Pravda, and Okopnaya Pravda.

July 22. Arrest of Kamenev. Joint session of All-Russian C.E.C. and Executive Committee of Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies decides to proclaim Provisional Government as "government of preservation of the revolution" with unlimited authority. Publication of declaration of Bolsheviks and internationalists on the necessity of transferring all power to Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. Opening of Moscow Regional Conference of Bolsheviks. Huge demonstration of workers and soldiers at Krasnoyarsk under slogan: "All power to the Soviets."

July 24. Tarnopol taken by Germans.

July 25. Decree of Provisional Government reintroducing capital punishment at the front.

July 28. Order by Kerensky to suppress newspapers Pravda and Okopnaya Pravda. Prohibition of meetings at the front. Reval newspapers Kiyr and Utro Pravdy suppressed. Arrest of Bolsheviks in Helsingfors. Opening of railroad workers' conference in Moscow.

July 29. Helsingfors Bolshevik newspaper Volna suppressed. All-Russian conference of commercial and industrial employees opens in Moscow.

July 31. Decree of Provisional Covernment dissolving the Finnish Sejm. Resolution of conference of members of State Duma demanding strong power. Appointment of General Kornilov as supreme commander in-chief. Savinkov appointed Assistant Minister of War.

August 2. Outbreaks in Tver garrison.

August 3. Provisional Government, together with representatives of Mensheviks, S.-R.'s and Cadets, gives Kerensky authority to form Cabinet at his discretion.

August 4. Arrest of Trotsky and Lunacharsky.

August 5. Appearance of No. 1 of Rabochy i Soldat. Opening of Moscow city conference of factory committees. Opening of Ninth Congress of Cadet Party.

August 6. New coalition of Provisional Government, with Kerensky as Prime Minister, approved. Punitive expedition and arrests of Bolaheviks in Tver.

August 7. Resolution of Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies against reintroduction of capital punishment.

August 8. Opening of Sixth Congress of R.S.-D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) in Petrograd.

August 9. Report by Stalin at Sixth Congress of R.S.-D.L.P. (B.) on policy of C.C. Punitive expedition and arrest of Bolsheviks in Tsaritsyn.

August 10. Ministers of Internal Affairs and War given authority to prohibit congresses and meetings. Resolution of Moscow Regional Conference of factory committees on necessity of transferring all power to the Soviets. Tsaritsyn Bolshevik paper Borba suppressed.

August 11. Opening of Ukrainian Army Rada.

August 12. Reports of Bukharin and Stalin at Sixth Congress of R.S.-D.L.P.

(B.) on present situation. Opening in Moscow of congress of All-Russian Peasant Union.

August 14. Exile of Nicholas II and family to Tobolsk. General strike in Helsingfors.

August 16. Conclusion of Sixth Congress of R.S.-D.L.P. (B.). Opening of Second Trade and Industry Congress in Moscow.

August 18. Publication by Provisional Government of law on criminal responsibility for insulting representatives of Allied powers. Decree of C.E.C. of Soviets postponing elections to the Constituent Assembly to the end of October.

August 20. Resolution of workers' section of the Petrograd Soviet of W. and S.D. against re-introduction of capital punishment at the front and arrests of Bolsheviks. Kazan Bolshevik paper Rabochy suppressed. Opening of Petrograd conference of factory committees. Session of Soviet (conference) of Socialist-Revolutionary Party on question of elections to Constituent Assembly.

August 21. Publication of resolution of C.C. of R.S.-D.L.P. (B.) on Moscow State Conference (August 25) calling for exposure of Conference as organ of counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, for exposure of counter-revolutionary policy of S.-R.'s and Mensheviks supporting Conference, and for organisation of mass protest against it.

August 22. Postponement by Provisional Government of elections to Constituent Assembly to November 25 and of convocation of Assembly to December 11. Telegram of greetings by Moscow "Conference of Social Workers" headed by Rodzyanko to General Kornilov with promise of support to his authority in the army. Newspaper Rabochy i Soldat suppressed.

August 25. Publication of manifesto by Sixth Congress of R.S.-D.L.P. (B.) to all toilers, workers, soldiers and peasants. Opening of Moscow State Conference. Strike in Moscow—protest against Moscow Conference. Meetings at factories and plants. One-day strikes in Kiev, Kostroma and other cities.

August 26. Triumphal arrival of General Kornilov in Moscow. Addresses by Kerensky, Prokopovich and Nekrasov at State Conference. Appearance in Petrograd of Bolshevik newspaper Proletary. Opening in Kiev of First All-Russian Conference of workers of sugar industry, demanding transfer of all landowners' land to peasant committees.

August 27. Addresses at State Conference by Generals Kornilov and Kale-

din.

August 28. Closing of State Conference.

August 29. Occupation by Russian troops of building of Finnish Sejm in Helsingfors in connection with attempt to open session despite dissolution of Seim by Provisional Government. Opening of All-Russian Church Assembly in Moscow. Address of greetings by Moscow mayor, the S.-R. Rudnov, at session of assembly.

August 31. Resolution of Petrograd Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies against capital punishment. Formation in Kiev of defence committee for struggle against counter-revolution. Political conference at army head-

quarters at front on question of proclaiming military dictatorship.

September 1. Opening in Petrograd of united congress of R.S.-D.L.P. (Mensheviks, "unificationists" and "non-factionists"). Piercing of the Riga

front by the Germans.

September 2. Elections to the Petrograd municipal duma. Conference of members of State Duma carries resolution against bread monopoly. Riots in Moscow because of provisioning arrangements.

September 3. Riga occupied by German army.

September 5. Negotiations at army headquarters at the front between Savin-kov and General Kornilov, by instructions of Kerensky, about sending a corpe of cavalry to Petrograd to support Provisional Government in case of Bolshevik uprising.

September 6. Petrograd newspaper Proletary suppressed.

September 7. Beginning of movement of Kornilov troops on Petrograd. Formation by the C.E.C. of Soviets of committee for struggle with counter-

revolution. Appeal of General Kornilov to army.

September 8. Appearance in Petrograd of Bolshevik newspaper Rabochy. Order by Kornilov appointing General Krymov commander-in-chief of corps moving on Petrograd. V. N. Lvov addresses demand to Kerensky in the name of Kornilov to entrust latter with unlimited authority. Arrest of Lvov by Kerensky. Resignation of Cadet Ministers.

September 9. Appeal of Kerensky "to population" calling for struggle against Kornilov. Proclamation of state of war in Petrograd and appointment of Savinkov as Governor-General of Petrograd. Appeal by Kornilov "to all

Russian people."

September 10. Provisional Government declares General Kornilov a traitor to the fatherland. Arrest of Kornilovists. Milyukov offers his good offices as intermediary between Kerensky and Kornilov. "Committee for Struggle Against Counter-Revolution" organises, under guidance of "Bureau of Military Organisation of Bolsheviks," armed workers' detachments for the protection and defence of Petrograd. Workers of most factories and plants of Petrograd engaged in digging trenches. Organisation of workers' militia—legalisation of the nuclei of the Red Guard, already in existence.

September 11. Proclamation of martial law in Moscow. Disintegration of

Kornilov troops.

September 12. Arrest of General Krymov. Liquidation of Kornilov revolt. Resignation of Savinkov. Kerensky appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief. September 13. Resignation of Ministers Nekrasov, Chernov and others. Suicide of General Krymov. "Committees for Defence of Revolution" organised in Vyatka, Lugansk and other cities. All civil and military authority of Krasnoyarsk in the hands of the Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. Meeting of executive boards

of all trade unions in Minsk decides to organise Red Guard groups.

September 14. Russian Republic proclaimed by Provisional Government. Resignation of Ministers Skobelev, Zarudny and Avksentyev. Formation of Directory consisting of Kerensky, Nikitin, Tereshchenko, Verkhovsky and Verderevsky. Generals Kornilov, Lukomsky and Romanovsky arrested in Mogilev. Refusal by government of Don military region to carry out the order of Provisional Government to arrest General Kaledin. Order by revolutionary staff of Tsaritsyn to arm workers.

September 15. Petrograd newspaper Rabochy suppressed. Workers of factories and plants in Moscow demand Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Depu-

ties issue arms to them. Organisation of Cronstadt Red Guards.

September 16. Bolshevik newspaper Rabochy Put appears in Petrograd.

September 18. Decision of Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies to organise Red Guards. Resolution of Moscow Soviet of W. and S.D. on necessity of decisive struggle for conquest of power by revolutionary proletariat and peas-

antry. Tereshchenko appointed Associate Prime Minister.

September 19. Menshevik-S.-R. presidium of Petrograd Soviet of W. and S.D. resigns because of adoption by Petrograd Soviet of Bolshevik resolution on organisation of power.

September 21. Election of Bolshevik presidium by workers' section of Petrograd Soviet of W. and S.D.

September 23. Appointment of General Dukhonin as chief of staff of the supreme commander-in-chief.

September 24. Petrograd conference of factory committees.

September 25. Editorial staff of Moscow newspaper Sotsial-Demokrat put on trial for insulting British Ambassador Buchanan. Outbreaks in Tambov, Lipetsk, Astrakhan and Ufa. In Tashkent power passes to the Soviets.

September 26. Strike on the Windau-Rybinsk railroad. Presidium of soldiers' section of Petrograd Soviet of W. and S. D. re-elected. Agrarian movement in province of Kishinev.

September 27. Opening of All-Russian Democratic Conference in Petrograd. Proclamation of martial law in province of Tambov. Punitive expedition sent from Moscow.

September 28. Outbreaks among soldiers of Orlov garrison. Agrarian riots in Kirsanov county of Tambov province.

October 1. Dissolution of Central Committee of the Baltic fleet by Provisional Government. Conference of Soviets of Peasant Deputies in Petrograd.

October 2. Election of Bolshevik Executive Committee by Moscow Soviet of W.D. Agrarian disorders in Taganrog region.

October 4. Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies adopts resolution for a negative attitude to Democratic Conference and the necessity to rally the masses around the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. Democratic Conference decides to organise pre-parliament. General strike in Tashkent, arrival of Cossacks, introduction of martial law. Decision by Odessa Soviet of W. and S.D. to organise Red Guard.

October 5. Closing of Democratic Conference in Petrograd. Repeal by Provisional Government of order to dissolve Central Committee of Baltic fleet. Joint session of Vyborg Soviet of W.S. and P.D., regimental and company commanders, decides to demand that All-Russian C.E.C. immediately convene congress of Soviets to decide the question of power.

October 6. Central strike committee of railroad workers declares All-Russian railroad strike.

October 7. Joint session of C.C. and Petrograd Committee of R.S.-D.L.P. participated in by Bolshevik members of Democratic Conference. Report by Bukharin on present situation.

October 8. New coalition of Provisional Government with Kerensky as Prime Minister, with participation of Moscow industrialists. Trotsky elected chairman of Petrograd Soviet of W. and S.D. Victory of Bolsheviks in elections to district Dumas. Agrarian movement in Saratov province.

October 10. Strike at Baku oil works.

October 12. German landing party on the Baltic Sea. Agrarian movement in Volhynia province.

October 13. Appeal by C.C. of Bolsheviks calling for struggle for Congress of Soviets.

October 15. Resolution of Petrograd Soviet on necessity of transferring power to Soviets and proposing immediate peace on all fronts.

October 18. Decision of Provisional Government on necessity of transferring capital to Moscow.

October 19. Dissolution of State Duma and State Soviet by Provisional Government.

October 20. Opening of Council of Russian Republic (pre-parliament).

Declaration by Bolsheviks and their withdrawal from pre-parliament. Agrarian movement in Voronezh province.

October 23. Session of C.C. of Bolsheviks with Lenin present. Resolution adopted for preparing armed uprising. Political bureau elected consisting of Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Stalin, Sokolnikov and Bubnov.

October 24. Congress of Soviets of Northern Region in Petrograd. Nikolayev Soviet of Workers' Deputies (Saratov province) started confiscation of privately owned lands.

October 25. Resolution of Congress of Soviets of Northern Region recognising necessity of transferring all power to the Soviets in the centre and locally.

October 26. Decision of Executive Committee of Petrograd Soviet to form Military Revolutionary Committee.

October 27. Tenth Cadet Party Congress in Moscow.

October 29. Session of C.C. of Bolsheviks, participated in by Lenin and representatives of party organisations. Resolution adopted to intensify preparations for armed uprising. Petrograd Soviet of W. and S.D. approves draft of organisation of Military Revolutionary Committee. Ivanovo-Voznesensk Congress of Soviets elects Military Revolutionary Committee for preparation of uprising.

October 30. Bureau of C.E.C. of Soviets decides to postpone opening of

Second Congress of Soviets to November 7.

October 31. Kaluga occupied by Cossack detachment coming from the front. Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies fired on; dispersal of Soviet and arrests.

November 1. Resolution by All-Russian conference of factory committees on necessity of transferring power to Soviets. Formation in pre-parliament of fraction of Left-S.-R.-Internationalists.

November 3. Meeting of regimental committees recognises Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee as the leading organ of the troops in Petrograd.

November 4. Decision of meeting of representatives of regiments in Petrograd not to obey orders of the staff unless sanctioned by signature of Military Revolutionary Committee. On "Day of Petrograd Soviet" big meetings at factories and among military detachments.

November 5. Appointment by Military Revolutionary Committee of commissars for military detachments. Executive Committee of Moscow Soviet of W.D. adopts decree No. 1 "On hiring and discharging workers, with consent of factory committees." Refusal by Mensheviks and S.-R.'s to take part in discussion of this decree.

November 6. Detachments of the Military Revolutionary Committee stand guard at printing plants of the newspapers Rabochy Put and Soldat, which were suppressed by the Provisional Government. Decision of Provisional Government to put on trial members of Military Revolutionary Committee. Orders of commander of the Petrograd district prohibiting the carrying out of orders of Military Revolutionary Committee, ordering the arrest of its commissars, prohibiting the carrying of arms in the streets, etc. Call by Provisional Government of military cadet schools to the Winter Palace. Adoption by preparliament of resolution that a decree be immediately issued to transfer the land to the land committees and to secure a speedy agreement with the Allies on the question of peace. Formation of counter-revolutionary "Committee of Public Safety." Order of Military Revolutionary Committee to put troops in readiness for action. Session of Moscow municipal Duma controlled by S.-R.'s on question of organisation of Committee of Public Safety. Beginning of organisation of White Guards in Moscow.

EVENTS IN THE LIFE OF V. I. LENIN

FROM MIDDLE OF JULY TO BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER, 1917

July 12-17. Lenin spends several days near the Mustamyaki station near Petrograd.

July 17. Upon receipt of information about demonstrations in Petrograd, Lenin returns to the city in the morning and takes charge of the movement. Addresses demonstrators from balcony of Kshesinskaya's house. Participates in night session of C.C., which decides to address an appeal to workers and soldiers to stop the demonstrations. As a precaution Lenin spends the night away from home.

July 18. Lenin takes measures for most painless liquidation of movement. Publication of libelous charges by Alexinsky and Pankratov against Lenin. Lenin answers slander with series of articles published next day in the Pravda Rulletin.

July 19. Lenin takes part in session of Executive Commission of Petrograd Committee in guard house of Reno plant and opposes the general strike, proposed by some comrades. Late at night Provisional Government issues orders to arrest Lenin and he goes into hiding.

July 19-21. Lenin hides in rooms of worker S. Alliluyev.

July 20. Statement by All-Russian C.E.C. appointing a commission to investigate charges brought against Lenin. Publication of orders of Provisional Government to arrest Lenin and others. Search of rooms of Lenin and Krupskaya.

July 20-21. Lenin consults several comrades (Stalin, Zinoviev, Krupskaya, Nogin, Yakovleva, Orjonikidze, Stasova) on the question of appearing in court.

July 22. Lenin leaves Alliluyev's rooms and temporarily, together with Zinoviev, settles at the worker N. Yemelyanov's, in the garret of a stable in the environs of Sestroretsk. Next day Lenin moves into tent near a hay-stack a few miles from the Razliv station.

July 24. Novaya Zhizn publishes "Letter to the Editor" by Lenin, Zinoviev and Kamenev about charges of spying.

July 28. Cronstadt Proletarskoye Dyelo publishes "Letter to the Editor" by Lenin and Zinoviev, stating that they refuse to submit to order of Provisional Government for their arrest.

July-October. Lenin, while under cover, continues to collaborate on Bolshevik papers, sending in leading political articles and smaller notes, and at the same time keeps in close touch with the C.C.

August 3. By decree of the prosecutor of the Petrograd Judicial Chamber Lenin is indicted under Articles 51, 100 and 108, Part 1, of the Criminal Code (treason and organisation of armed uprising).

August 8. Sixth Congress of R.S.-D.L.P. elects Lenin honorary chairman of Congress. Lenin from underground guides the work of the Congress.

August 16. Sixth Congress of R.S.-D.L.P. elects Lenin member of C.C.

Beginning of September. With the beginning of frosts Lenin leaves tent and after staying overnight at Comrade Kalsk's on the Vyborg Chaussée in Petro-

grad, crosses the Finnish frontier as a fireman on an engine. (Engineer—Comrade Yalava.) Lenin lives in Helsingfors, first at Finnish S.-D. Rovio's (chief of militia), then with a Finnish Social-Democratic worker.

August-September. Lenin writes State and Revolution.

September 12. Lenin writes letter to C.C. on the Kornilov revolt.

September 14-16. Lenin writes article, "On Compromises."

September 25. Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies elects Lenin one of its delegates to the Democratic Conference.

September 23-27. Lenin writes "The Threatening Catastrophe and How to

Fight It."

September 25-27. Lenin writes letters to C.C.: "Bolsheviks Must Assume Power" and "Marxism and Uprising."

September 29. Lenin writes article, "The Russian Revolution and Civil War."

Beginning of October. Lenin goes from Helsingfors to Vyborg to be nearer to Petrograd.

October 7-14. Lenin writes "Will the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?"

October 10. From Vyborg Lenin writes letter to I. Smilga.

October 12. Lenin writes article, "The Crisis Has Matured."

October 16. C.C. agrees to Lenin's coming to Petrograd.

October 18. C.C. elects Lenin to commission for preparing draft of party programme.

October 14-20. Lenin takes charge from underground of work of Petrograd Conference of R.S.-D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), writes "Theses" for it, "Instructions for Party Congress," and "Letter to Conference."

October 16-20. Lenin writes letter to C.C., Moscow Committee and Petrograd Committee and Bolshevik members of Soviets of Petrograd and Moscow in which he proposes that power be seized immediately.

October 21. Lenin writes from Vyborg "Letter to Comrade Bolsheviks Who Participated in the Regional Conference of the Soviets of the Northern Region" and letter-article "Advice from an Outsider."

October 22. Lenin goes from Vyborg to Lesnoye, near Petrograd.

October 23. Lenin takes part in C.C. session and carries resolution on necessity of armed uprising.

October 29. Lenin takes part in C.C. session with representatives of organisations on question of armed uprising.

October 29-30. Lenin writes "Letter to Comrades" in which he subjects to annihilating criticism objections of Zinoviev and Kamenev against uprising.

October 31. Lenin writes "Letter to Party Members" on "strike-breaking" of Kamenev and Zinoviev, who came out in the non-party press against C.C. decision on armed uprising.

November I. Lenin writes "Letter to C.C." demanding expulsion of Zinoviev and Kamenev from party.

November 3. Lenin takes part in Party Conference on question of armed uprising.

November 6. In the evening Lenin writes "Letter to C.C. Members" demanding immediate armed uprising. Late in the evening, disguised, Lenin comes from Lesnoye to Smolny and takes direct charge of the uprising.