SOVIET DEMOCRACY



by HARRY F. WARD

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NOTE ON THE AUTHOR

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The cover is by Lynd Ward, son of the author, distinguished American artist who is known for his novels in pictures and for his book illustrations.

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CHAPTER I

THE ECONOMIC BASE

DURING 1945 and 1946 the Soviet press carried on an extensive discussion of Soviet democracy—what it is and how it works. This discussion began as an educational preparation for the election of the Supreme Soviet. It continued in response to much talk here about "different ideas of democracy" that arose from disagreements in the United Nations and in the occupation of enemy countries. Soviet writers point out that underneath such differences over procedures is the historic fact that theirs is a socialist democracy. This, they tell their readers, makes it a higher form than capitalist democracy. They mean higher in the ongoing of the democratic process not merely as a form of government, but a cooperative way of life through which more and more of the people of the earth, by increasing their control over both nature and human society, emancipate themselves from famine, pestilence and war, as well as from tyranny.

The essential advance that socialist society makes in the democratic process is the extension of government of, by and for the people from political to economic affairs; it puts the people's power over the economic processes upon which their lives and their cultural advance depend.

To understand Soviet democracy it is necessary to remember that the order of its growth has been different from ours. In the days of free land, handicraft industry and travel by horse, we established a political democracy adapted to individual free enterprise. Now, in the time of concentrated monopoly power, we are faced with the necessity of finding the way to the economic democracy required by the machine age if freedom is to live. The Soviet system was founded in the days of Big Business and its economic empires, among peoples without experience in the political procedures of democracy and with little industrial development. Its founders, followers of Marx, held that further development of political democracy was impossible except on the base of a democratic economy. So it was after this base was securely laid by the socialist ownership of the means of production, the collectivization of agriculture and successful economic planning, that an advance in political democracy was made in the adoption of the Constitution of 1936.

An Economic Bill of Rights

The drafting commission was instructed to prepare the "most democratic constitution in the world, that is, the one best expressing the will of the people." The draft was discussed for several months in over half a million meetings that sent in 154,000 amendments, mostly duplicates of course. The few that were adopted were those which made the final document still more democratic. The uniqueness of the Constitution is the attempt to unite the economic and political aspects of democracy in an effective union for their joint continuous development. Its chapter on "Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens" precedes the guarantee of all the freedoms proclaimed in our Bill of Rights, and in the French Declaration of the Rights of

Man, with an economic Bill of Rights. It should be remembered that the Soviet delegation tried in vain to get the right to work inserted in the Charter of the United Nations.

Soviet writers continually point out to the people that their economic rights are constitutionally guaranteed not only in principle but also in terms of the legal measures which make the principles effective. Thus the right to work is guaranteed by the planning that eliminates the possibility of economic crises and their resultant unemployment; the right to rest and leisure, by the eight-hour workday (and a shorter day for heavier jobs), annual vacations with full pay, and a network of sanatoriums, rest homes and clubs for the working people; the right to maintenance in old age, sickness, or incapacity, by universal social insurance, free medical service and a wide system of health resorts.

How much a Bill of Rights, economic or political, can be put in practice depends, as we are finding out in the case of the G.I.'s, upon what the national economy permits. A self-evident truth which the American people have yet to learn is that economic democracy can grow only from the root of a democratic economy. The democratic nature of Soviet economy is set forth in Article I of the Constitution, entitled "The Organization of Society."

The economic foundation of Soviet society is said to consist of the socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the means and instruments of production. When it talks of political rights this Constitution, like its Western forerunners, speaks in part the language of desire and intent. But when it says that socialist ownership and the socialist economy are "firmly established" it is recording hard won experience. Behind the few lines recounting how these things were done is almost twenty years of terrific struggle; the hardships and heroisms, the inevitable

revolutionary excesses, of the days of military communism, of the temporary restoration of the market and private profit through the N.E.P., of the resistance to collectivization, of the going over the top with the First Five-Year Plan. Yes, the economic foundation of Soviet society was securely laid, and now eleven years after the beginning of the new political structure, despite the attempt of the anti-democratic legions of Europe led by Hitler to destroy it, the building itself is well under way.

Two Forms of People's Ownership

Just how democratic is Soviet socialist ownership and the economy it makes possible? The Constitution breaks down socialist property in the U.S.S.R. into its two forms —state property and property of the collective farm or cooperative association. State property covers natural resources; industrial plants; banks; rail, water, and air transport; post, telegraph, and telephones; large state organized agricultural enterprises; municipal enterprises; and the bulk of the dwelling houses in cities and industrial localities. Collective farms and cooperative organizations own in common their livestock, implements, products and common buildings. The land occupied by collective farms is secured to them for their use free of charge and for an unlimited time, that is, in perpetuity. Every collective farm household has the right to a small plot of land for its personal use, and as its personal property a dwelling house, livestock, poultry, and minor agricultural implements.

Whenever the socialist property of the state is mentioned it is specified that this belongs to the whole people. This emphasizes the Communist view that the state is not a bureaucracy over the people but the whole people acting together. Article 3 declares: "In the U.S.S.R. all

power belongs to the working people of town and country as represented by the Soviets of Working People's Deputies"; and Article 12 proclaims that "work is a duty and a matter of honor for every able-bodied citizen." Beside his share in the socialist state property and in the common property of the collective farm or cooperative to which he may belong, every Soviet citizen has the right to personal ownership of income and savings, of dwelling houses and subsidiary household economy, household furniture, and utensils and articles of personal use and convenience, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property. Alongside the socialist system of economy, the Constitution also permits the small private economy of individual peasants and handicraftsmen "based on their personal labor and precluding the exploitation of the labor of others." In practice, as far and as fast as is possible, the handicrafts, and even such individual pursuits as fishing and hunting, are organized into producers' cooperatives.

It is obvious that this combination of forms of ownership is an extension to more people of the right to property established by capitalist society. In talking, in various parts of the Soviet Union, with workers who have lived in the U.S.A., I found that they have a consciousness of public property being "ours" which they told me they never had while here. This explains something that puzzles many American visitors, that is the interest of Soviet citizens in graphs and charts which show the progress of the Soviet economy. Along with this goes the amount of space given in the press to reports of the work done by the people. "I should think this would interest only a few specialists," said a newly arrived American correspondent.

The relation of socialist ownership to the development of economic democracy is somewhat similar to the relation of universal suffrage and the secret ballot to the development of political democracy. These rights can be, and

have been, used to put bosses, economic royalists, and fascist dictators in power; also to put the power of the people over their economy and culture. In like manner nationalization of economic resources and processes can be used to establish a bureaucratic dictatorship or to give all power to the people. In the case of the Soviet Union the Constitution speaks again from the record and not merely from desire.

Planning By and For the People

Article 11 tells us: "The economic life of the U.S.S.R. is determined and directed by the state national economic plan. . . ." Note the qualifying word "national." This is to make it clear that in the Soviet mind and purpose, and in accomplished fact, economic planning is not the instrument of a bureaucratic state, but of the whole people. Socialist ownership puts economic power into the hands of the people. Socialist planning enables the effective use of this power to increase production and the well-being of all the people. On paper a Soviet Five-Year Plan is an amazing network of figures which could not have been worked out until certain equations first formulated in our time were available. In reality, as Stalin in the early days of Soviet planning told both their industrial managers and an international planning conference, the "production plan is millions of workers creating a new life."

The general aims of Soviet planning are those which any people would democratically approve, as the Soviet people did in adopting their Constitution. ". . . the aim of increasing the public wealth, of steadily improving the material conditions of the working people and raising their cultural level, of consolidating the independence of the U.S.S.R. and strengthening its defensive capacity." The specific objectives of any given plan, for instance the cru-

cial question of how much consumers' goods must wait upon capital goods, are outlined by the cabinet. The decision is made after analysis of the international situation, the production record of the previous period, and soundings of public opinion in discussions in the press and in meetings all over the Soviet land. No government keeps its ears, and they are many, closer to the ground, and Stalin's preeminence as leader derives from his capacity to correctly assess the needs and capacities of the people.

The aims determined, the plan is then produced in the course of a long journey from the highest officials to the least workers in the land and then back again to the starting point. The State Planning Commission—Gosplan for short—drafts a general outline of goals and quotas called "the perspective plan." This outline goes, in parts, to the cabinet departments in charge of the various sections of the national economy. Each department breaks the estimates down in terms of its subsections, for instance heavy

Nomination meeting of workers of the Moscow electrical works, Electrozavod, during election campaign last January.

industry into motors, turbines, etc., agriculture into cattle, beets, etc. These in turn break the quotas down to allotments for individual plants, farms, etc., who then proceed to make their individual five-year plans. This is done by production conferences of managers, technicians and workers, by departments and sections in the larger factories and farms. Here is where the experience of the workers goes into the plan and in the last analysis, along with their will, decides what is done. It is at the bottom that the Plan becomes a working program.

On the way back the Plan becomes a coordination of all parts and factors involved, first for the individual enterprise, then for each subsection and section of each department of industry and agriculture, transport or communication, then for each department as a whole. Meantime the plan for the development of the social services and culture has gone through a similar process.

Finally Gosplan coordinates all these into a national plan which rationalizes, that is coordinates for the highest possible production and social advance, the working energy, natural resources, and plant of the entire nation. This Plan then goes to the Supreme Soviet for approval.

The Plan is now a blueprint of goals. It has yet to become a living thing, guiding and stimulating activities. This happens in the working out of yearly and quarterly "operational plans" for the individual enterprises. In the making of these the experience of the workers again becomes the major factor. This happens in frequent conferences of the smallest unit of workers, the labor brigades, concerning their production record, the reasons for successes and failures. It is here that the quotas are often revised, and nearly always upward, by what the workers call their "Counterplan." It was started in the first year of the first Plan by the workers in the Karl Marx factory who then wrote to the press suggesting that the procedure be

adopted in agriculture. Some collective farms responded and the method soon became generally used.

"Creative Democracy"

To sit in with these small groups of workers, to attend the larger production conferences, is to see the term "creative democracy" come alive. At the top the knowledge of the experts, along the way the capacities of the managers and technicians, make the Plan possible. At the bottom it is the experience and the will of the workers that makes the Plan the fusion of the lives of all in forming the shape of things to come. So democracy becomes more than the exercise of rights. In its economic form it is the common effort to achieve common aims.

The consciousness of this fact grows constantly among the Soviet people. The labor unions realize that their first responsibility is the increase of production, in quantity and quality. Since '36 the consumers' cooperatives, with more than 36,000,000 members, have carried the responsibility for supplying consumer goods to the villages. (Since the war they share the responsibility with government stores in the city as well.) During the war the collective farms in the unoccupied sections undertook to make up the food deficit occasioned by the German occupation. An agricultural expert says: "It has been possible through the operation of the principle of planning throughout the whole system of collective farms and the machine and tractor stations which provided most of the machinery for the work." Says Gosplan, "Inasmuch as we are realizing a purposive economy . . . the whole working society participates consciously in the aggregate social production. . . ." Back in the early thirties the head of one section of the economy told me, "These ideas have gripped the masses." What I saw and heard in fac-

tories, on farms, in a national sanatorium and a national rest home, confirmed his statement.

This development of dynamic, creative democracy has brought the Soviet people up from the lowest level in Europe to where they can stand confidently among the great powers. It is what Lenin had in mind when he wrote: "According to our concept it is the consciousness of the masses that makes the state strong. It is strong when the masses know everything, when they can judge everything and do everything consciously." More than the making of a strong state is happening in the Soviet Union through the working out of its economic democracy. The very nature of government and the state is being changed. An organic community is coming into being, a new civilization is taking form.

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL ASPECTS

IN THE development of the political expression of Soviet democracy the Constitution of 1936 marks a dividing line because it provides universal suffrage at the age of eighteen and the secret ballot. The first Soviet Constitution refused the right to vote or be voted for to persons who employ hired labor for profit, who have income without working from rent, interest, etc.; to private merchants, trade and commercial brokers, monks and clergy of all denominations, employees and agents of the former police, gendarme corps and secret service, and members of the former reigning dynasty. The present Constitution gives the right to vote to all citizens "irrespective of race or nationality, religion, educational and residential qualifications, social origin, property status, or past activities . . . with the exception of insane persons and persons who have been convicted by a court of law and whose sentences include deprivation of electoral rights." For months prior to the adoption of the Constitution, hundreds of thousands of meetings throughout the country, in factories, on collective and state farms, in offices and schools and clubs, discussed the draft of the Constitution and submitted tens of thousands of suggestions and amendments. One amend-

ment attempted to continue the disfranchisement of priests but it failed when Stalin spoke against it on the ground that the church had shown it was no longer the enemy of the people's state.

To carry out these guarantees in the Supreme Soviet election of February, 1946, a national commission to draft the necessary regulations was appointed and confirmed by the Supreme Soviet. To carry out these regulations district commissions were elected by the local Soviets. The regulations are lengthy and precise in their provisions for secrecy at the ballot box, prevention of interference, methods of complaints, hearings and penalties. The commissions were also required to carry on an educational campaign to instruct the people, especially the millions of new voters, in nomination and voting procedures and in the principles of Soviet democracy. Failure in some places to begin this education on time brought forth critical editorials in the local press.

A Premium on Agreement

In reporting the election our correspondents naturally stressed the point that there was only one party and usually only one candidate. Most of our journalists and commentators therefore concluded that the Soviet Constitution exists only on paper. The answer to the important question of how democratic is Soviet democracy is, however, not so simple.

We are used to an election procedure that puts a premium on difference while the Soviet system puts a premium on agreement. An electoral district for the Supreme Soviet (comprising 300,000 people) which puts up only one candidate, looks down a little upon one which has not achieved unity in nomination. We ask how can agreement among so many people be secured without regimentation. They say, if so many people, having free choice,

can agree on who is the best person for the job are they not likely to be right? To the question why bother to vote if there is only one candidate, the answer is: "We want to express our approval of the policy of our government and we want to be represented in carrying it out."

It must be remembered that the purpose of the Soviet electoral system is not to put a party in office but to select the persons best fitted to manage the joint business of the people. In the U.S.S.R. this includes the national economy, national and social security, the health, education, culture, and recreation of all the people. So the persons nominated as "deputies" in the Soviets are those known to have rendered outstanding service to the nation or the community, in the government, the economy, the war, the professions, arts or sciences. The list of nominees in the election of February, 1946, included, besides leading members of the government and heroes of the war, professors and farmers, poets and steel workers, artists and engineers, composers and miners, writers and engine drivers; and among the women, an oil worker, a physician, a tractor driver, and a People's Actress. Thus the impressive difference between a Soviet and other democratic legislative bodies is that it is a cross-section of the whole working population, from the soil to the laboratory, the mill to the study, the mine to the office.

Close Contact with Constituents

Another essential qualification for getting the nomination as deputy to a Soviet is accessibility to the people. The requirement is that a representative must be a person to whom the common people can come readily and talk easily. A deputy is required to keep in close contact with his constituency by Article 142 of the Constitution: "It is the duty of every deputy to report to his elec-

tors on his work and on the work of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies." Accordingly, a professor in the University of Moscow elected to the City Soviet from an apartment house constituency covered his district by assigning one evening to each apartment house for several weeks before the session. He arranged with the chairman of the House Committee to call a house meeting to discuss the legislative program. Everybody came who could. First he went over with them the agenda for the session and got their views on each item. Then he called for suggested additions which usually brought out neighborhood needs.

Sheker Ermagambetova is one of the fifty-eight women elected deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh S.S.R. Child of a nomadic cattleman, she grew up under the repressions which a patriarchal society lays upon its women. After winning an education, years of leadership in the emancipation of her fellow sufferers brought her not only to the Kazakh Soviet but to the position of its Assistant Chairman. Says she: "Despite the many state affairs which keep me busy . . . I maintain the very closest contact with my voters. . . . First and most important (are) my visits to the election area. At large meetings of collective farmers, workers, intelligentsia and housewives, I make reports showing how the mandate of the voters is being realized, after which the voters state their opinions and proposals. . . . This direct contact with the voters gives me my orientation on general state problems. . . . Another form of contact with the voters . . . is my correspondence. . . . Some of the letters are of social significance. . . . Another group of the letters consist of personal requests. . . . The third form of contact is to receive voters who come to Alma-Ata about some matter. Twice in each ten days . . . as Assistant Chairman . . . I am ready to receive any citizen without exception. However, my electors can come to see me on any day. That is how I understand my duty

Members of Cheganovo Collective Farm, Ivanovo Region, drive to polling precinct, in festively decorated *troikas,* to vote.

as a deputy, for does not our Constitution teach us that the people's choice is the servant of the people?"

Direct and Functional Democracy

Soviet political writers tell their people that theirs is a direct democracy, that they vote directly for all their representatives without any intervening body affecting their choice. It is also direct in another way. The workers in the basic processes of production and distribution are represented by fellow workers, not by lawyers, business men and professional politicians. In the Soviet Union all those who carry on the basic functions of society share directly in their control. This is the functional democracy that some of our political scientists write about, usually without any clear definition.

The Soviet system is also a direct democracy in the powers it gives to the elected representatives of the people, instead of to a President, Premier, or appointed Supreme Court. The Supreme Soviet, at a joint sitting of both chambers, elects its Presidium—a combination of collective chairman and executive committee. It consists of a President, sixteen Vice-Presidents, a Secretary, and twenty-four members; it is accountable to the Supreme Soviet for all its activities. The more important of its duties and powers are: to interpret the laws and issue decrees; to annul cabinet decisions and orders that do not conform to the law; in the intervals between sessions to dismiss or appoint cabinet members on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Cabinet and subject to confirmation by the Supreme Soviet; to exercise the right of pardon; to appoint and remove the higher commands of the armed forces; in the intervals between sessions to proclaim a state of war in the event of armed attack or when necessary to fulfill international obligations concerning mutual defense against aggression; to order general or partial mobilization and proclaim martial law in the interests of defense, public order and security; to ratify and denounce treaties, appoint or recall plenipotentiary representatives to foreign states.

According to the Soviet Constitution nominations are made by "public organizations and societies of the working people." These are specified as "Communist Party organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, youth organizations and cultural societies." The election regulations add that the right to make nominations is also secured to: "General meetings of the workers and other employees in enterprises, of servicemen in army units, general meetings of peasants in the collective farms, villages and volosts, and of workers and other employees of state farms."

The Nominating Procedure

The process of arriving at agreement is helped by a lengthy nomination period. Preliminary discussion for the February, 1946, election began in the middle of October and nomination lists closed January 10. In the industrial areas the first nomination will usually come from the largest plant, and in rural districts from the best known collective, state farm or machine and tractor station. As in the British Parliament, members of the Supreme Soviet do not have to reside in the district that elects them. If the nominee first put up is a national figure, like Stalin, Molotov, Vyshinsky, the choice will be repeated throughout the electoral district. If the first nominee is a local figure he, or she, will be a person known and respected for work and personality throughout the area and is likely to be generally repeated. A number of different names may be put forward before the final choice is made. The nomination meetings are often lengthy affairs, with very full and free discussion about the various names advanced. If other groups think differently they will put up their candidate. Then there will be a conference of elected delegates to see if agreement can be reached. If agreement is reached, the names of all but the accepted candidates are withdrawn by the nominating organizations. If not there will be a contested election. This seldom happens in the national voting, more often in local elections. In the one-candidate election, those who do not want him can deposit a blank ballot which is counted "No." Or they can write in their choice. In the '37 election (the war prevented the one that should have been held in '41) there were 500,000 blank ballots out of some 99,000,000 votes, estimated as 98.6 per cent of the qualified voters. As elsewhere, abstention indicates disapproval of administration policy.

This system thus provides three possible screenings of candidates. First, in the mass meeting of the organization that begins the nominations. Next, in the delegate conference when organizations have nominated differently. Third, at the polls where another election must follow if there is not a majority vote for one candidate.

"You Have Two Parties; We, Many Organizations"

On the question regarding only one party, the Soviet people say: "Well, you nominate from two or more parties, we nominate from many organizations." This overlooks the fact that Communist Party members are, as the Constitution says, "the core," and usually the leaders of these organizations. The basic point to be understood and remembered is that the Communist Party in the Soviet Union is not a political party in our sense of the term. Its function is to enlist, train and discipline the most capable and reliable persons to lead the Soviet people through the difficult and dangerous stages of a new socialist society. It was supposed by Lenin to make itself unnecessary in the course of time. Its leaders would say that the fact that Communists occupy 70 per cent of the seats in the Supreme Soviet (in the local Soviets the proportion is just about reversed) is evidence that the Party has succeeded in its aim of developing leaders who were elected not because they belong to the Party, but because of their services to the community and the nation.

Critics, especially sectarian enemies of the Soviet system, insist that the nominating process is completely controlled by the Party. This is contrary to my observation in different parts of the Soviet Union and to the experience of non-Party people with whom I talked. Before the new freedoms of the Constitution of '36, the Party always offered the slate in nomination meetings, but usually with

a desire to get as many non-Party persons on as possible. Otherwise their own limited forces would get dangerously overworked and their purpose of getting sufficient leadership for the nation defeated. Everywhere that I went I found that Party officials were criticized, disciplined and demoted, for failure to bring non-Party persons into positions of responsibility. If, in the discussion of a nominating meeting, it appeared that a non-Party person was more qualified than a Party nominee, the Party withdrew its candidate.

Increasing Non-Party Participation

Whether this Soviet system of transitional leadership by a comparatively small, highly disciplined group, leads once again to concentration of power and the corruption that always follows is not to be settled by abstract argument, but by closely observing the increasing non-Party share in Soviet controls and what happens to Party officials who become tyrannical or corrupt. I saw the substantial increase over what I found seven years before, of non-Party participation in economic controls that was made imperative by the introduction of national economic planning. I verified the corresponding change in the political attitudes of non-Party people. This made possible the more democratic Constitution of '36. There follows now a corresponding gain in the extension of political controls. In the recent election there repeatedly appeared a phrase less frequently heard before, "candidate of the Party and non-Party bloc." In his election speech Stalin said that one of the most important results of the war was to remove the difference between Party and non-Party.

Those who conclude that recent reports of corruption in Soviet institutions show that the decay of concentrated power has already set in are reading the situation back-

ward. Most of the delinquents exposed to the nation and the world in the recent report of the Budget Commission are Party members, and most of those doing the exposing also belong to the Party. It is when corruption is covered up that it spreads and decays, when it is brought to light it can be cut out. As long as the Party continues the periodical review and "cleaning" of its members, as long as it maintains the policy of heavier punishment for Party delinquents because of their greater responsibility, the system moves toward distribution, not concentration, of power. In the present attempt to check demoralizing tendencies that war brings to every land, it should be noted that one of the things for which managers of Soviet insti-

In the Far North, Saami people arrive by reindeer at polling station near Murmansk to cast their ballots in the elections.

tutions are being punished is failure to hold regularly the required general meeting of all workers and employees to review administration policies.

The cooperative interplay of forces in the Soviet system—Party and non-Party, Party and government, state and people's economic organizations, central and local authority—is clearly seen in the recently announced Council for Collective Farm Affairs. It was created by the cabinet to further consolidate the collective farm system and particularly to hasten deliveries of grain because certain areas were getting behind in the plan. A further purpose was to eliminate the war-bred inefficiency and corruption that caused the delay. It was bluntly said that some Party and government committees were not properly supervising deliveries. Now note the composition of the Council. Among its thirty-nine members are representatives of all important grain growing areas. There is a Vice-Chairman of the Cabinet, another of the State Planning Commission and two national Party officials. Then there are twenty-one chairmen of collective farms, one a woman. The remainder come from local governments and Party committees.

The Right of Recall

Lenin once put the essence of political democracy this way. When is a government most democratic? When it most fully represents the will of the people. And when is the will of the people most fully represented? When they enjoy the unrestricted right to recall their representatives. So the Soviet Constitution provides that a Soviet deputy "is liable to be recalled at any time in the manner established by law upon decision of a majority of the electors." A recall election can be demanded by one-third of the voters. The same right belongs to members of the labor

racy is truly a popular democracy. . . . The interest of the state is the interest of every member in our society."

To understand Soviet democracy it is necessary to remember that the content of government changes when a socialist economy is established. Then government becomes mostly the joint management of the common enterprises of the people. The collective nature of the production process requires that this joint management be increasingly democratic if the full benefits of the machine age are to be secured. In turn a democratic economy requires for its successful operation increasingly democratic political forms.

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CHAPTER III

THE TEST OF DEMOCRACY

THE question of the nature of Soviet democracy and its relation to the future of mankind is no longer confined to what happens within the borders of the Soviet Union. The Soviet peoples are now engaged in more than "building socialism in one country." Their share in the winning of the war against fascism has brought to them a similarly responsible position in the effort to lay the foundations of a united and peaceful world. In that endeavor they are faced with the necessity of finding a working agreement with the people of the United States, as the leader of the capitalist democracies, concerning forms of government and economic policies in the occupied countries and the areas to be put under United Nations control.

For this new situation the assertion that different ideologies and institutions can, and must, live side by side in the same world, is not adequate. This thesis, first advanced by Stalin and Litvinov fifteen years ago, shaped our wartime diplomacy until we got the atomic bomb. It is made concrete in the proposal for fair competition in productive efficiency and social benefits between the economic systems of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. recently outlined by the

Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America in its Plan for Peace with Russia. In his speech of October 29, 1946, Molotov joined the thesis of peaceful competition to the collaboration now required. He presented the invitation of the Soviet Union to the rest of the world, and the United States in particular, to engage in peaceful competition between the capitalist and socialist systems under conditions which will permit ever closer economic and political cooperation. This is in effect a proposal to consciously control the course of social advance by using the democratic methods of example and persuasion instead of drifting into war.

Ever since the Lenin-Stalin policy of building socialism in one country won out over the Trotsky policy of the continuing revolution, the Soviet people have been used to thinking of their relationship to the other democratic nations in terms of this possibility of peace. Soon after their revolution they were told by Lenin that to succeed in building a socialist society they had to achieve a higher production than capitalist economy could provide. From the beginning of Soviet economic planning the slogan has been "To overtake and surpass the most advanced industrial nations, and particularly the United States." On November 1, 1946, *Pravda,* calling for considerable improvement in the application of science to industry and in industrial techniques, said: "It is in these fields above all that the competition between socialism and capitalism will be decided in the forthcoming historical epoch."

Today the possibility of beneficial competition between capitalist and socialist democracy depends upon agreement in the development of democratic government and economy in Germany, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Africa. This in turn depends upon whether it is the democratic or imperialist elements in our capitalist democracy which are now to be developed. So far the various gather-

ings of the United Nations and the Foreign Ministers have produced more charges and counter-charges of anti-democratic actions and proposals than agreement on the next steps in democratic advance. This leads our representatives and correspondents to accentuate the differences between Soviet and American democracy without any recognition of the underlying identities which contain the possibilities of agreement. Thus the London correspondent of the *Nation* concluded his summary analysis of the Paris Peace Conference by saying: "The clash between the American conception of the future of democracy—endorsed it would seem by the British Labor government —and the Russian conception, cannot be smoothed over by phrases. It is real, and it seems likely to bedevil Europe."

Common Basis of American and Soviet Democracy

What our correspondents do not say, what our representatives have not acknowledged, what few of them have had any opportunity to know, is that underneath all the surface differences between American and Soviet democracy there lies the same basic fact. This fact is that the Soviet system is based on the fundamental principles to which we, and all democratic nations, have given allegiance. It is a grave defect in our apparatus for handling the present destiny-shaping negotiations that this fact is so little known among those who represent us, those who send us the news or give us their interpretations of it. The reactions of too many of them to the new situations with which they are dealing, are conditioned by the propaganda which for years has told them the absurd fiction that the Soviet Union is held together by repression and concentration camps and is by nature a police state.

In his comment on the election results in Berlin, the correspondent of one of our broadcasting networks quoted

Alexei, Patriarch of All Russia, performs his civic duty by casting his ballot in the Arbat Electoral District, Moscow.

a Soviet Army major as saying: "It is not easy to believe in, and work for, our Soviet democracy—its freedom, equality and socialism. It takes patience, passion and hard fighting." Freedom and equality! These are the basic principles of our Declaration of Independence. "All men born free and equal." Equal in what respect? Certainly not in capacities. But all are "endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, particularly the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." And the purpose of all democratic institutions is to secure these rights equally to all the population. Their test is the degree to which they do this. Not whether they do it perfectly, but whether they are always, as an old religious phrase puts it, "going on to perfection"; always struggling to overcome the anti-democratic tendencies which are inherent in human nature and make their appearance in all the forms of human society.

Concerning the democratic nature of the Soviet goal there can be no mistake. Neither leaders nor people in the Soviet Union spend time drawing blueprints of Utopia. But they all know the outline map of that future stage of communist society to which they expect their socialism to lead them. Ask high school students what that will be like and they say: "We cannot tell in detail. What we know is that one day production will be so abundant that all will be free to develop whatever capacities are within them." Freedom and equality again, both in terms of the unfolding of personality.

Equality the Road to Fullest Freedom

The French revolution added to the basic principles of democracy. The tri-color blazoned to the world the famous trilogy "Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité." Today when the Soviet Army soldier takes his oath to his country he swears allegiance also to the liberty and brotherhood of nations. That term brotherhood is seldom used. The Soviet people are wary of the illusions to which abstractions based on sentiment often lead. They prefer another term, borrowed from the world-wide labor movement. It was used at the Lenin Memorial meeting in Moscow, January, 1946, by Georgi Alexandrov. Recounting the story of Soviet democratic progress he stressed heavily the liberation of the colonial peoples of the Tsarist regime, and said: "The Soviet government, for the first time in history, succeeded in creating sincere friendship and fraternal solidarity among all the people inhabiting the Soviet Union." The assertion is that these people have been given freedom and equal rights with the Russians and the result has been "fraternal solidarity." This claim is conceded by all, including hostile critics, who have examined the facts.

Alexandrov also laid down the general principle that

"the test of any democracy is in the actual results of its influence upon society, upon the solution of the principal social problems arising in it. . . ." Unfolding this theme further, another speaker on the same occasion, I. Smirnov, said: "Soviet democracy is active; it is not confined to the proclamation of equality and liberty, but arouses the masses of the people to the conscious building of a new way of life. It was out of these principles that Lenin built up the Soviet state. By steadfastly putting into practice the fundamentals of Soviet democracy the Soviet state grew and became stronger." Those representatives of ours whose response to Stalin's recent declarations of the Soviet desire to avoid war and to cooperate to that end was "We would like to see deeds as well as words," evidently did not know that in Soviet thinking and conduct, theory and practice, principles and their concrete realization, are indivisible. In a few days they received proposals for disarmament which demonstrate this fact and also test the capacity of our form of democracy to join in working out a solution for one of the "principal social problems arising in" our society.

In this undertaking, and in the other joint enterprises of the United Nations required by worldwide needs, the differing experiences of the United States and the Soviet Union in making concrete the basic democratic principles, can progressively supplement each other. By historic circumstance we have put more emphasis upon freedom than on equality. The Soviet peoples, starting from another background in another period of history, have sought first equality, believing that was the road to the fullest freedom. Consequently joint action to aid democratic advance in other lands should help the world toward that union of freedom and equality which produces "fraternal solidarity" within and between nations.

Democracy a Developing Process

The ground for this cooperation would at once be enlarged if we would recognize that the Soviet leaders regard democracy as a developing process in history, expressing itself in differing institutions at different stages of its development, and that the Soviet peoples have been taught to so understand it. In his Lenin Memorial speech, Smirnov pointed out that Lenin had a detailed knowledge of the theory and practice of the democratic states of the entire world. In one of his first books (1897) Lenin maintained the thesis that a consistent socialist should be a consistent democrat. He held that a parliamentary democratic republic was a big forward step in the development of human society, the best form of state for the workers under capitalism. He declared that democratic forms of government "are an indispensable condition for the defense of the rights of the people against the dark forces of reaction, obscurantism and plutocracy."

Their experiences in working out democracy as a continuously developing process in history have led to changes

Deputies of the Soviet of Nationalities, one of the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., during a session
Sovfoto.

in the attitude of Soviet leaders and peoples to other nations. They have come to realize, especially from the results of trying to speed up the collectivization of agriculture by substituting coercion for the original policy of example and persuasion, that the pace of social advance cannot be forced beyond the desires and capacities of the people. For internal affairs this was set forth in Stalin's historic speech titled "Dizzy with Success" (1930), which acknowledged the error and promised that all future collectivization would be on a voluntary basis. And it was. In international affairs a similar conclusion concerning the pace of social change is expressed in the phrase "We have learned that revolution cannot be exported in a suitcase."

Russian Method Not Universal Formula

Recently Harold Laski, after listening carefully to the long conversations which the British Labor Party delegation, of which he was the head, had with Stalin, thus recorded his impressions of the Soviet leader's attitude to world-wide social change: "The elasticity of his approach to socialism is far greater than the world outside assumes. He does not think that the Russian method is a universal formula. He realizes quite clearly that it is born of special Russian conditions, and that there are other possible routes to socialist society. He thinks of them as far less costly if a good deal longer. He realizes quite fully the extreme folly of seeking to impose a Russian pattern on a country whose traditions are unrelated to it." Again it must be remembered that the voice of Stalin expresses the policy agreed upon by the Politburo and the Council of Ministers, after due discussion.

Consequently the Soviet Union has not tried to impose its political pattern upon the countries it occupies or influ-

ences. It has supported coalition governments on the pattern of capitalist parliamentary democracy. It has not attempted to sovietize the economy of border states. It has supported there a form of state capitalism, the partial nationalization which necessity dictated because private capitalism was quite unable to handle the economic chaos left behind by Nazi occupation and retreat. In the agriculture of these states the U.S.S.R. has exerted no pressure to introduce collective farming. In response to the historic demand in all feudal and semi-feudal lands the border governments divided the great estates among the landless workers on the soil. The Soviet leaders went through this stage and discovered its inadequacy for the machine age. But they are not again attempting to force the pace of history. They are leaving the peoples who are not yet ready for collective farming to learn from example and experience.

This attitude opens up plenty of ground for cooperation in democratic advance. The question it calls upon us to decide is whether our primary purpose is the extension of democracy or the expansion of monopolistic capitalism under the guise of free enterprise. If we can understand that capitalist democracy is not the final pattern of political and economic progress for mankind, if we are willing to let all peoples find their own way into the future in their own manner, then the same kind of cooperation becomes possible that was so effective in winning the military struggle against fascism.

Anti-Fascist Action the Yardstick

Some months ago, when the comments on the differences between American and Soviet democracy began, Zaslavsky, an outstanding Soviet political writer whose articles are increasingly quoted here, referring to the situ-

ations in which these differences appeared, offered a yardstick to measure their respective democratic content. Said he: "The test of democracy is anti-fascist action." Since fascism is the negation of the principles and the destruction of the institutions of democracy, he was right. That is why President Roosevelt warned us that the war would not be over until fascism in all its forms was destroyed everywhere in the world. This common necessity was the twofold bond that tied the American and Soviet peoples together in the war. Both of us were fighting for more than our own security. Constantly they said—leaders, press, people—that they were fighting not only for the liberation of their country but also, with the other democracies, for the life of the democratic movement in history. Consequently those among us who said that the Soviet Union would quit the war when the Nazis were driven over their borders, and then that they would never join in fighting Japan, were as wrong then as they are now in saying that the Soviet Union is another imperialist power seeking world domination.

When the war was over it was agreed that the next objective was to prevent the return of the fascists, their quislings, collaborators, and financial supporters. It was in the carrying out of this agreement that the question of different concepts of democracy first appeared. It emerged over the composition of coalition governments and freedom of elections, over economic and political pressures by occupation forces on both sides. Behind these questions of procedures is the determining question of whether there is still the same agreement on objectives that finally produced unity of strategy during the war. Do we want to destroy fascism in all its forms? Do we want the peoples whose needs can be met by neither the Soviet system nor by our form of capitalist democracy, to take the next step in democratic advance of which they are capable? If these

are our objectives then we stand on common ground with the Soviet Union and differences over procedure can be adjusted.

If however our basic purpose is the expansion of the monopolistic section of our industry and finance, then the possibility of democratic advance for the countries our economic activity penetrates is limited, for monopoly is by nature anti-democratic. Then we move from opposition to the Soviet Union to opposition to all the peoples struggling for a more abundant life; and so to the impossible position of trying to halt the rising tide of the irresistible historic movement in whose beginnings we played a leading part. So, in the most perilous situation human society has ever faced, what the rest of the world may gain from Soviet experience in developing socialist democracy, and from Soviet attitudes toward democratic advance in other lands, depends upon the purpose and policies of the United States as the leader of the capitalist section of the world.

CHAPTER IV

PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES IN DEMOCRACY

SUMMING up the "substantial achievements" of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York, *Izvestia* declared that the policy of the Soviet Union was motivated by the "wish to lead the peoples of the world toward a strengthening of democratic principles in the relations between the nations." This emphasis upon "democratic principles" is significant because our criticism of Soviet behavior in the United Nations and in occupied countries has been in terms of procedures. Actually the issue is the relation of principles to procedures. Soviet leaders understand this well because unity of theory and practice is basic in their philosophy. The decisive question on which the possibility of cooperation between us for the further development of democracy depends, is whether differences over procedures arise from opposite views on principles. For it is an axiom, derived from plenty of experience, that those who seek a common course of action cannot find it if the area of difference between them is greater than the area of agreement.

This question of the relation of principle to procedure

is vital in the issue of freedom of elections and the composition of coalition governments in the occupied countries. It is on these matters that our State Department has flung around the world its charges against the Soviet Union of anti-democratic behavior and violation of agreement. Because of years of anti-Soviet propaganda, and lack of knowledge of the actual situation, the inference in the public mind generally is that such behavior is the natural result of an anti-democratic system. What the State Department ignores and most of our people do not know, is that exactly similar charges of anti-democratic conduct in occupied countries have been filed against us by a number of our own correspondents, officers and soldiers. They have judged our behavior in terms of the principles they were brought up to believe in.

Did the Soviet occupation permit, or connive in, the exclusion of, or discrimination against certain parties and leaders in Balkan elections? What of the Truman program in Greece and Turkey? The meaning of Russian wheat to France just before an election? And our loan just before the decision on the first draft of the constitution? Did the Russians force the Socialist-Communist unity party on their zone in Germany and favor it in the distribution of paper before the election? What did our forcing the election dates in Bavaria do for the anti-democratic clerical party and why did we refuse to permit an anti-Nazi coalition government in our zone on the ground that it was contrary to American principle and practice? Why did we insist, against Soviet objection, in putting in the Austrian cabinet men whose part in the pre-Hitler clerical fascist regime was well known? We object to giving to Communists the key posts in coalition cabinets to which the size of their vote entitles them, on the ground that this may lead to Communist control. But these are also the posts that can be used to prevent or help anti-democratic

forces seeking to stage a return to power. And this may be what those who voted the Communist ticket had in mind. It is certainly an admitted fact that a major factor in the increased Communist vote has been the part played by Communists in the resistance movements in Europe.

The basic principle behind these situations in occupied countries is the right of opposition. This, added to majority rule, makes the two pillars on which the parliamentary democracy of capitalist society rests. What the American people and the rest of the capitalist world have now to decide and discover if they are to get the peaceful world they want, is what this principle means in two new historic situations—the rise of the socialist state and the fascist reaction.

Soviet Attitude Toward Opposition

It is a shortsighted and dangerous mistake to attribute what happens in elections and the distribution of offices in Soviet-occupied countries to what, as the result of persistent propaganda, is understood to be the Communist habit of crushing all opposition. Those who have not the time to read the full record of the Soviet attitude to the right of opposition can get a general view of it in the recent book *Behind Soviet Power* by Jerome Davis. They will learn how much opportunity Trotsky had for discussion of his policy before he was exiled; and how many times those who finally formed the Bukharin group were given another chance before they were convicted of treason in 1938 in trials open before the world. No power on earth ever prevented, or ever can prevent the forming of opposition. That is a permanent human trait, not merely a modern democratic requirement. In Soviet socialist society, because government is the common management of the common enterprise, opposition is expressed in ways

different from the opposing parties of capitalist democracy. It forms and re-forms over concrete questions of administration exactly as it did in the democratic faculty control under which I taught for many years. In both situations this procedure became necessary and possible because unity on basic principles and objectives had been achieved.

To call the Soviet system "totalitarianism" is a misuse of words. That term belongs to systems in which the state is all, the individual nothing but its slave, in which one party uses the state to exercise all power. In Soviet thinking the state, even the "proletarian" state, is viewed as limiting full democracy, temporarily necessary and in due time to be replaced by more democratic forms of control. In Soviet practice the Communist Party is not an organization of the elite to wield all power, but a company banded together to help the people discover how to democratically control every aspect of their common life.

In the last session of the Supreme Soviet several of the cabinet ministers met a good deal of opposition over the conduct of their departments, first from the Chairman of the Budget Commission and then from a number of the deputies. Instead of crystallizing into a vote which would bring into office an opposition party hungry for jobs, Soviet procedure resulted in a number of constructive proposals. If these are not carried out, those who fail will be removed from office.

It is true that the right of opposition to the basic policy of socialism is not recognized. That is not merely because the government will not permit it but also because the overwhelming majority of the people do not want it. That is why the various groups of conspirators in the Soviet Union who could finally have no other policy than the return of capitalism, had to become traitors and seek the aid of Germany. Similarly, after our Revolution the Tories

did not enjoy the right to agitate for the return of the British rule.

The question of the right of opposition in the Soviet Union is basically different from what it is in what the Soviet people call "the new democracies" of the border states. There it is the question of maintaining democratic rights within the framework of capitalist democracy while striving to prevent the return of anti-democratic forces and to rebuild the shattered economy. The basic question of principle is not the abstract right of opposition but the concrete issue of who is entitled to it. On this point the Yalta and Potsdam agreements embodied a twofold obligation—to give the democratic freedoms to the peoples of the liberated countries and to prevent the return to power of the Nazis and the fascists. These obligations do not conflict. They are inseparable parts of a democratic program. The proven destroyers of democracy have no claim to democratic rights. The final test for all political procedures in occupied lands is: Do they help or prevent the return of anti-democratic forces to power?

Security Against the Return of Fascism

The interpretation of Soviet actions in occupied countries as undemocratic maneuvers for power is quite inadequate. The Soviet people and their Western neighbors are joined in action by experiences in which we have no share. To the Soviet Union, with an area laid waste that would reach from our Atlantic seaboard to the Mississippi, with millions of its citizens carrying the mark of the Nazi heel on their bodies and in their souls, the need of security against the return of the fascist menace in the border states has compulsions we cannot measure. To the workers, peasants and democratic intellectuals of those states who

lived in terror and suffered in jail under their native dictators before they, too, endured the tortures of Nazi occupation, it is also a matter of life and liberty. The agonies these peoples have endured in common, the dangers they together face, are for us only the historic record of our revolutionary days. And we send them notes about the conduct of their elections! And they read about Rankin and all of which he is the symbol!

A Life and Death Matter

"The situation looks different in Warsaw than it did in Washington," writes one of our correspondents. Warsaw—where a translator in our embassy was convicted of aiding political assassins to escape the country. Poland—where a priest was proved to have been involved in political murders and to have declared they were being committed by the security police of the government. To us the right of opposition means the right to speak, print, organize and vote. In Eastern Europe, by longer custom, it means also the use of violence and assassination. There, democratic rights are not bounded by Milton's immortal phrase about the competition of ideas in the market place; nor by Jefferson's later rendering of it in terms of letting people freely oppose our system in confidence that truth would win out over error. In Eastern Europe today, with fascist reaction plotting and fighting to return, it is a matter of life and death for the democratic process and for those who believe in its principles.

Consequently the Soviet refusal to join us in notes of protest and demand about elections had more behind it than the stated ground of unwarranted interference with the rights of independent governments. Surely it is for those who risk their lives in behalf of democracy to decide

View of the Kremlin, showing the building of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

whose record makes it dangerous to give them the right of opposition. It is imperative to make sure that none are unjustly treated, but for the future of democracy, error on the side of safety is less dangerous than the return to power of anti-democratic reaction. Democracy has always survived excesses and errors committed in behalf of democratic principles in its turbulent youthful days. But, as the later record shows, those who, while they pay lip service to democracy, traffic with those who seek its destruction, can bring to the democratic movement only the kiss of death.

Surely our record, at home and abroad, does not entitle us to charge any other government with failure to protect

democratic rights. After a hundred and fifty years of the practice of democracy we still need Congressional Committees to investigate elections. To preach then to the infant and youthful democracies of Eastern Europe about free elections, when we never uttered a syllable of protest against the repressions of the dictators from whom they have recently won their freedom, is both ridiculous and hypocritical. In Germany and in Korea which we jointly occupy, the list of charges of political pressures that our own correspondents bring against us is at least as long, and as serious, as that we have drawn against the Soviet occupation.

It is inevitable in such a situation that some pressure be exerted by each occupying force in favor of its own system, and against those who are considered its enemies. The vital question is whether this pressure works out for or against democratic advance. The record is clear that our pressures have been against those whom our administrators consider "Reds" and in favor of those who have been connected with anti-democratic reaction. The opposite is true of the Soviet occupation. This is especially clear in the matter of de-Nazification.

In Moscow, said Drew Middleton of the *New York Times,* people asked him, "Why is it that Nazi criminals try to escape from our zone into yours?" We have favored those who will destroy democracy if they can because it is against their interests, while the Russians have favored those who will achieve an advance in democracy if they can because only so can their needs be met.

This difference has several roots. One is the different backgrounds of the persons involved. Most of our diplomats, some of our high army officers, and many of the business men at the top of A.M.G., have had little or no opportunity for understanding the peasants, workers and democratic intellectuals who are now seeking a step forward in

democracy in Europe and Asia. Soviet administrators, however, both military and civil, are the sons of peasants and workers, and occasionally of democratic intellectuals, to whom democracy means the same sort of advance for those at the bottom of society for which the common people of Europe and the submerged masses of Asia and Africa are now struggling.

From this basic difference there develops a difference in objective which is nullifying the agreement that the liberated peoples should be free to choose their own form of democracy without interference. The Soviet Union has supported anti-fascist coalition governments because, as the war proved, united action by all democratic forces is the only way that anti-democratic reaction can be defeated. It has supported partial state capitalist nationalization as the only way to escape economic chaos and a step toward economic democracy. We, on the other hand, have hindered these developments, and checked the approach to peace, by trying to insist on our pattern of political organization and our misnamed "free enterprise," even to the extent of trying to teach the Germans, who had learned in some degree to act collectively, our practices of competition. Imagine our indignation if the Soviet Union had tried to teach the Poles, the Romanians, the Bulgarians, collective farming and socialist nationalization!

A House Divided Against Itself

The deepest root from which these differences in procedure and objective grow is a difference in the nature of capitalist and socialist democracy. In its monopolist stage the capitalist economy is autocracy at home and imperialism abroad. Hence capitalist democracy is a house divided against itself, the political and economic sides of its dual

nature are at war with each other. It was Sumner Welles who said soon after Pearl Harbor that the day of imperialism was ended. He meant territorial imperialism. It was Henry Wallace who added that we must make an end of imperialism, both territorial and economic. Instead of that our economic imperialism has grown stronger from its huge wartime gains which call for new investment areas. This is the force behind our anti-democratic, anti-peace policy on bases and trusteeships, our dictatorial attitude of take it or leave it on the atomic problem, and our diplomacy of intimidation and attempted coercion concerning food and credits. It is this attempted investment expansion which puts us against, instead of behind, the independence movements of suppressed peoples. It is this we are trying in vain to cover up with our preachments about free elections and free press, with our declarations about only wanting freedom of markets, with our profession of saving weaker peoples from subjection to communist domination.

Socialist democracy, as the Soviet Union has demonstrated, pulls up and throws out the roots of imperialism. It has no profits to invest abroad. It gains its comforts, and presently its luxuries, by its own efforts and sacrifices, not by exploiting the cheaper labor of other peoples. Its ethnic democracy, as Corliss Lamont calls it, not only solves the race and nationalities question, but it also destroys the seed bed from which any successor to our white imperialists might spring up. To make this doubly sure socialist democracy is also cultural democracy, opening cultural development to all the people and to all peoples. The achievements of the Soviet children of peasants and workers, the cultural progress of the undeveloped tribes of the Arctic circle, reveal the possibilities of bringing backward peoples to the point where they cannot be exploited. The goal the Soviet people have set before them-

selves is not only to "make all peasants and workers cultured and educated," as Stalin told the Eighteenth Party Congress, but also to wipe out the contradictions between mental and physical labor.

Unity for Democracy and Peace

The picture of the Soviet Union as a new imperialism against which we must defend ourselves exists only in the heads of professional anti-Soviet propagandists, those who for their own anti-democratic purposes seek or would welcome the "preventive war" with the Soviet Union, and their dupes. This frightening picture has no relation whatever to reality. The anti-democratic element in socialist society is not the imperialism which now threatens the life of capitalist democracy and also the peace and security of all peoples. It is the tendency toward bureaucracy inherent in all collective action. Knowing this, Soviet leaders have from the beginning warned the people against it and together with them have developed various devices to check its growth by increased participation of the people in all the controls of their government and economy. The latest word from Moscow concerning their economic planning is that all the necessary wartime centralized controls have now been removed and a further decentralization over the pre-war period put into effect.

The basic drive behind Soviet international action is that the further development of Soviet democracy requires peace and that peace requires democratic advance throughout the world from all present positions. Both of these require that the democratic element in our capitalist society gain the ascendancy over the imperialist element. On that necessity the possibility of peace and the immediate future of democracy depend. That is the inexorable condition for realizing the possibility that Stalin has repeatedly affirmed

of Soviet democracy living side by side with capitalist democracy, each developing into higher forms, and working together to achieve peace, security and social progress for all the peoples of the earth.



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