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Resolutions and Decisions of  
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
General Editor Robert H. McNeal

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Volume 3  
The Stalin Years  
1929-1953  
Editor Robert H. McNeal

## **The Stalin Years 1929–1953**

The four volumes in this series are edited as an integral set. Each contains a subject index in which Russian abbreviations and acronymic names are translated. Tables summarizing the personnel of the main party executive bodies since 1917 are also provided. At the same time each of the volumes is built around a coherent period in the development of Russian Communism, and each reflects the special features of its time.

Volume 3 treats the Stalin era, the early phase of which witnessed a new degree of party intervention in agriculture, industry, and cultural affairs. The ambivalent relation between the party and Stalin's great purge emerges in party decisions of the later thirties, including an archival document never published in the Soviet Union and some little known material on the Central Committee plenum of February–March 1937. The Zhdanov campaign in the arts following the World War is also represented by the party resolutions translated in this volume.

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**Resolutions and decisions of the Communist  
Party of the Soviet Union**

**Volume 3  
The Stalin Years: 1929–1953**

Editor: Robert H. McNeal

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## Editor's Preface

Russian terms are translated if a generally accepted English form exists, but are transliterated otherwise. In the latter case the term (e.g., oblast) is treated as an anglicized expression, without hard and soft signs (except in titles), to simplify the appearance of the text. The index of the volume provides parenthetical translations of transliterated terms. Translations of periodical titles appear with the first occurrence of a given title.

Document numbers (e.g., 3.18) are supplied by the editor of the volume; the prefix "3." indicates the volume number in the present series. Throughout the book such a decimal number implies reference to a document number.


Square brackets [] enclose material added by the editor of this volume, while parentheses appearing in documents are in the original Russian text. Brackets are used in titles of documents if the original version of a given resolution lacked any definite title. Ellipses (...) indicate omissions of part of the original document by the editor, unless otherwise specified.

To assist the reader in identifying changes in successive versions of the party Rules, bracketed notes are inserted with each article, indicating whether it is a new, revised, or unchanged article with respect to the previous version of the Rules. Since this volume contains three successive versions of the Rules (1934, 1939, 1952), and there is considerable repetition of articles from one version to another, the full text of all articles is provided only in the first (1934) version. Thereafter articles of the Rules that repeat an article from the previous version are covered with a cross-reference to the previous version.

At the end of each document or group of documents adopted at a given meeting source attributions are provided. On the left the earliest published source that was accessible to the editor is cited. On the right the location of the material in the standard Soviet reference work is cited:

*Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Sovetskogo Soiuz a rezoliutsiia iresheniiakh s"ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK* (Communist Party of the

Soviet Union in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee), 8th edition, Moscow, 1970–72 (hereafter abbreviated *KPSS v resoliutsiiakh*). Not all documents published in the present work appear in *KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh*, so citations of this source do not appear in every case.

The end of each set of documents emerging from a congress, or Central Committee plenum is indicated by the following symbol: 

# Contents

Editor's Preface

Introduction

1929

**Plenum of the Central Committee** (November)

- 3.1 On the Control Figures for the Economy in 1929–30
- 3.2 On the Results and Coming Tasks of Kolkhoz Construction
- 3.3 On the Bukharin Group

1930

- 3.4 On the Rate of Collectivization and State Assistance to Kolkhoz Construction
- 3.5 On Further Work on the Regulation of Party Growth
- 3.6 On the Development of Political and Educational Work with the Newly Admitted Candidate Masses
- 3.7 On the Struggle against Distortions of the Party Line in the Kolkhoz Movement

**XVI Party Congress** (June–July)

- 3.8 On the Central Committee Report
- 3.9 On the Report of the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin
- 3.10 On the Fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan for Industry
- 3.11 On the Tasks of Trade Unions in the Reconstruction Period

3.12 Regulation of Cells of the VKP(b) in Kolkhozes

3.13 On Party Work with the Masses in Districts in which MTSS are Active

1931

3.14 On the Construction of the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Plant

3.15 On Party Mass Work in Shops and Brigades

3.16 On Primary and Secondary Schools

1932

3.17 On the Reconstruction of Literary-Artistic Organizations

1933

**Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission** (January)

3.18 The Aims and Tasks of Politotdels in MTSS and Sovkhozes

3.19 On the Party Purge

1934

**XVII Party Congress** (January–February)

3.20 On the Second Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR (1933–37)

3.21 Organizational Questions

3.22 Rules of the VKP(b)

**Plenum of the Central Committee** (November)

3.23 On Politotdels in Agriculture

1935

**Plenum of the Central Committee** (December)

3.24 Questions of Industry and Transport in Connection with the Stakhanovite Movement



### 3.25 Results of the Review of Party Documents

1936

### 3.26 On the Terrorist Activities of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Counter-Revolutionary Bloc

1937

#### **Plenum of the Central Committee** (February–March)

### 3.27 On Deficiencies in Party Work and Measures for Liquidating Trotskyite and Other Double Dealers

### 3.28 The Preparation of Party Organizations for Elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet under the New Electoral System and the Corresponding Reorganization of Party Political Work

1938

#### **Plenum of the Central Committee** (January)

### 3.29 On Errors of Party Organizations in Expelling Communists from the Party, on Formal Bureaucratic Attitudes toward the Appeals of Those Expelled from the VKP(b), and on Measures to Eliminate These Shortcomings

### 3.30 On the Organization of Party Propaganda in Connection with the Publication of the *History of the VKP(b). Short Course*

1939

#### **XVIII Party Congress** (March)

### 3.31 The Third Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR (1938–42)

### 3.32 Changes in the Rules of the VKP(b)

### 3.33 Rules of the VKP(b)

1941

### 3.34 On the Organization of Fighting in the Rear of German Troops

3.35 On the Selection of Members of the VKP(b) for the Leadership of Political Work in the Worker-Peasant Red Army

1944

3.36 On Deficiencies in Political Work among the Populace of the Western Oblasts of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

1946

3.37 On Agitation and Propaganda Work of Party Organizations in Connection with the Adoption of the Law on the Five-Year Plan for the Restoration and Development of the National Economy of the USSR in the Period 1946–50

3.38 On the Training and Retraining of Leading Party and Soviet Workers

3.39 On the Journals *Zvezda* and *Leningrad*

1947

**Plenum of the Central Committee** (February)

3.40 On Measures for Improving Agriculture in the Post-war Period

1948

3.41 On V. Muradeli's Opera 'The Great Friendship'

1949

3.42 On the Journal *Bol'shevik*

1950

3.43 On the Enlargement of Small Kolkhozes and the Tasks of Party Organizations

1952

**XIX Party Congress** (October)

3.44 Directives for the Fifth Five-Year Plan for the Development of the USSR in the Period 1951–55

3.45 Rules of the CPSU

Appendix

Index

## **The Stalin Years 1929–1953**

# Introduction

Viewed from a certain distance, the years of Stalin's ascendancy in the Soviet Union appear to have a notably consistent character, despite the cataclysmic interruption of the Second World War. Massive economic campaigns, unflinching vigilance against 'enemies of the people,' glorification of Soviet patriotism with its core of Great Russian nationalism, and above all the omnipresent, benignly petrified countenance of the *vozhd* (leader) – these are the images of the Stalin era. On a sufficiently large scale they are valid enough, but even moderately close inspection of the period reveals a major discontinuity in the history of the central institution of the Soviet Union, the Communist Party. Until about the time of the German invasion of the USSR in June 1941 the Communist Party not only appeared to retain its established position in the formulation and execution of all manner of public policy, it even extended its direct involvement in the life of the country, especially in the supervision of the economy, both by setting goals of its own and involving the party apparatus more directly than before in the attempt to attain these goals. Congresses, conferences, and plenums of the Central Committee were held with tolerable regularity, giving at least some formal semblance to the practice of the idea of 'democratic centralism.' If the standing executive of the party, especially the Secretariat and Politburo, took some immensely weighty decisions without the approval of the Central Committee, conference, or congress, this merely served to enhance the authority of the party as a total institution – its leading organs possessed arbitrary authority and spoke in the name of the party. All this is evident in the published record of party decisions from 1930 to 1941, and especially in the very first years of the decade, when the party apparatus was exceedingly active in commanding the transformation of the agricultural and industrial economy. About half of all the documents in this volume come from the first half of the thirties, and this is roughly representative of the intensity of the party's activity over the entire period 1930–53.

The decline in the importance of the party as the centre of top-level decision making seems to have started even before the German invasion of June 1941. The purges of the late thirties constituted, in Leonard Schapiro's words, 'Stalin's victory over the party,' and he seems to have decided to reduce the role of the Central Committee that was elected at the XVIII Party Congress in 1939, succeeding a committee membership which had been less than wholly cooperative. Although a party conference met in 1941, its extraordinarily dull proceedings suggested that further exercises in the forms of democratic centralism might be superfluous. This shift away from party bodies became decisive with the outbreak of war, and it was only with the death of Stalin that the party recovered its vitality as the leading institution in the Soviet Union.

True, it did not wither physically. On the contrary, its membership nearly doubled (almost 3.9 million members and candidates in 1941 and almost 6.9 million in 1953), and this despite terrible wartime losses. More than ever before, primary party organizations, party agitators, party newspapers, and of course the visage of the party leader, were present in the daily life of workers, peasants, soldiers, and others. At the same time, however, there was a curious recession in the activity of the leading party organs. No congress or conference met between early 1941 and late 1952, and the Central Committee held only four plenums, two of which were connected with the party congress of 1952. According to Khrushchev, even the Politburo was rarely convened as a whole, although membership in it did reflect some degree of participation in Stalin's personal entourage, which was the focus of authority. As for the leader, by 1945 he was generally represented in the military regalia of the 'generalissimo' rather than the simple tunic he had usually worn in the days when his main role was general secretary of the party. As general secretary he had mastered the party as a political instrument. He had played a notable role in creating this system of social and economic control, and he appreciated its utility far too keenly to want to dismantle it. But having taken on the leading offices in the Soviet state (chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, later renamed Council of Ministers; chairman of the State Committee of Defence; People's Commissar (Minister) of Defence, and the title of Generalissimo), Stalin seems to have decided to shift the centre of decision making to the Soviet state apparatus. Not only did leading party bodies cease to meet with any degree of regularity, but decisions in the name of the

party declined markedly in number, even as fiats of the party Secretariat or as a rubber stamp imparting the prestige of the Central Committee to what was essentially a decree of the Council of Ministers. Thus it is that the documents selected for this volume reflect the realities of the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in their paucity between the end of the thirties and the end of the Stalin era.

Because of the fundamental contrast in the incidence and the context of party decisions in these two large portions of the Stalin era, it is useful to consider the main thematic problems involved in these documents in two groups: first, problems of the thirties, when the party high command was actively issuing decisions, and second, the subsequent period of limited party activity in decision making.

### **THE THIRTIES: ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION**

Although the image of a planned economy was never more intensively propagated in the Soviet Union than during the First Five-Year Plan (1928–32), there was never any peacetime period in which the label ‘command economy’ was more appropriately a description of Soviet reality. With scant regard for the more or less balanced plan for economic growth produced by the economic specialists in Gosplan, the party leadership, acting in the name of the Central Committee, repeatedly took the most crucial possible decisions to attempt enormous economic transformations. For this reason the Five-Year Plan itself, so often discussed in studies of the period, seems far less relevant than a series of party decisions in understanding the character of Soviet history.

Probably no government enactment since the peasant emancipation of 1861 had a more immediate effect on the Russian peasant masses, and hence the whole country, than did the party decision of 5 January 1930 concerning the tempo of the collectivization of agriculture (3.4). In place of a relatively gradual rate of collectivization projected in the Five-Year Plan, this edict, couched in vague language concerning the regions and the target dates that it had in mind, seems to have created the impression that something approaching total collectivization should be achieved in 1930. That is, almost all peasant family farms should be reorganized as some kind of agricultural collective which was not at this time at all clearly defined. Although the label ‘artel’ was approved as the standard one for the Soviet collective farm, it was only in 1935 that a final version of the model rules

for this institution was adopted. But the character of the great transformation under party pressure was not at all planned social change but one of social crisis, based on Stalin's announcement of 27 December 1929, that the regime would attempt to 'liquidate the kulaks [richer peasants, whatever that might mean] as a class.' Deliberately intensifying the atmosphere of emergency among party officials in the field, the Politburo on 30 January 1930 approved a resolution that has not yet been published (and perhaps did not claim the specific authority of the Central Committee) 'On Measures for Eliminating Kulak Farms in Areas of Total Collectivization.'<sup>1</sup> This was the basis for the most violent phase of collectivization, the expropriation and deportation or execution of as yet unknown numbers of peasants who for one reason or another were classified as kulaks. More precisely, they were to be placed in one of three categories of kulaks, roughly the most evil, somewhat less evil, and still less evil – a kind of classification that could lead to almost anything in the minds of overzealous or frightened lower officials.

Signs of havoc resulting from these decisions of the party high command were evidently recognized fairly quickly. On 2 March Stalin published his famous article 'Dizzy with Success,' which called for a less frantic interpretation of the command to collectivize and was embodied in a resolution in the name of the Central Committee on 14 March 1930 (3.7). Without further emergency orders from the party executive, the collectivization campaign at first receded, then swelled at a somewhat more gradual pace for the next few years, though not without grave hardships, including famine. By 1934 almost 75 per cent of the peasants were collectivized, and by 1938 most of the remainder as well.

After its initial cataclysmic intervention in agricultural transformation, the party turned its attention in this area to the problem of building a network of strong points in the vastness of rural Russia, partly to press forward the all-round modernization of this backward zone, partly to counteract the major legacy of hostility that collectivization by command had engendered. To a large extent the party sought to base its rural strength in the newly established MTSS, that is, rural centres that maintained and rented mechanical equipment to kolkhozes. After urging the optimum use of the opportunities for rural influence that the MTSS supposedly possessed (3.13), the party experimented in 1933–34 with a reorganization of the rural party hierarchy. A separate hierarchy of party bodies was introduced, based



on the production principle, in contrast to the usual territorial hierarchy. In this it resembled the special hierarchy of the political commissars in the Red Army, another highly sensitive sphere. The basic level of this special system of party agricultural representation consisted of the ‘politodels’ of the MTS and sovkhozes (3.18). These party organizations as integral parts of each MTS or sovkhoz, were not subordinated to the raion committee of the party, as laid down in the Rules, and thus the whole plan might be considered ‘illegal’ in the sense that no party congress ever approved this amendment of the Rules. Although nobody thought of questioning the innovation on these grounds, it appears that many raion committee secretaries did in practice resist this challenge to their authority. After a protracted struggle in the higher party bodies, it was in effect determined that this attempt to reinforce party authority in the countryside was causing more difficulties than it was worth, and on 28 November 1934 it was disbanded (3.23). During the emergency of World War II the agricultural politotdels were revived (17 November 1941), but again did not prove durable and were disbanded on 31 May 1943.<sup>2</sup>

What appears to have been a more stable attempt to provide an organizational norm for party work on the kolkhozes was the ‘Regulation on the VKP(b) Cell in Kolkhozes’ (3.12), dated 26 August 1930. At the time of its adoption, the overwhelming majority of kolkhozes lacked party cells, and would continue to for another generation, but no general replacement for this regulation of 1930 has yet appeared; it seems to represent the basis of party thinking in this area even if the particular document has been out of circulation for a long time. It forms an important complement to the better-known model charter of the kolkhoz itself, which were adopted in 1935 and replaced only in 1969.<sup>3</sup>

While agricultural collectivization had the broadest and most drastic impact on Soviet society as part of the great transformation of 1930, it was the intensive drive for industrial growth that was the party’s top priority target. Indeed, the mission of the party at all levels, as the demiurge of industrialization, implicitly became the chief legitimizing principle of the party, as it is to this day. While economists outside the Soviet Union may argue about the short-term or long-term efficacy of the party as an agent of rapid industrialization, it is clear that Soviet party officials have not on the whole doubted that this institution has been essential to fix the primacy of industrialization as a national goal, to select the main targets for industrial

development much of the time (especially the primacy of developing the *means* of production), and to participate in the management of industry in exhortation, inspection, and expedition. The slogans ‘Face to Production’ and ‘The Five-Year Plan in Four Years,’ adopted at the XVI Party Congress, symbolized this espousal of a new justification for the existence of the party, and at the same time challenged the concept of economic planning as a programme for the achievement of reasonable and harmonious targets. Instead, the style later known in Soviet usage as ‘campaignism’ (‘kampaneishchina’), with its zeal to make nonsense of the planned figures by outstripping them as much as possible, became the normal party attitude at the XVI Congress (3.10). The element of arbitrary party command in the selection of areas for offensives was especially strong in these first years of the thirties, as illustrated by the decision to undertake a crash program for the completion of the Magnitogorsk metallurgy complex, an enormous undertaking which had been planned for gradual development (3.14). There were in fact a series of such abrupt commands in the early years of the thirties, of which Magnitogorsk is but one famous example.

While these specific campaigns were far from fruitless, it appears that by the mid-thirties the Soviet leadership had concluded that it was more productive after all to rely mainly on the state planning apparatus when it came to the selection of specific industrial projects. Although such a major campaign project as the building of the Volga-Don Canal after the Second World War does indeed recall the spirit of the fiat on building Magnitogorsk, it was not sprung on the economic planners by the party Secretariat, judging by available documents. (There was no party decision on the canal, it seems.)

Another striking example of the approach to a command economy – at the opening of the 1930s – was the decision to use the organs of party-state to prod production forward, especially in industry. The Central Control Commission of the party and the Soviet body called Rabkrin, which had been more or less merged under party control in 1923, were authorized by the party congress of 1930 to take a leading role in forcing the economic pace (3.9). This was a notable extension of the purpose of this agency, which had been mainly an inspectorial body. It was not a police force, but it had major responsibility for the detection of wrong-doing, as well as incompetence. For Soviet industrial management this was an ominous

portent, linking short-comings in production to political misconduct, the prospect of a command economy becoming a ‘police economy.’

In its drive to increase industrial production the party devoted a major share of its attention to the task of mobilizing the workers for this task. As the historic ‘vanguard of the proletariat’ the Communist Party was already much involved with building its strength among the workers and encouraging their productivity. But the inherited pattern of party industrial activity was not enough. The trade unions had to be reoriented as extensions of the party’s drive for industrialization (3.11). This coincided with the removal of the union leadership associated with M.P. Tomskey, a supporter of Bukharin (3.3) in the Politburo, and thus a ‘right deviationist’ in the sense that he had reservations about the precipitate character of Stalinist economic transformations. He had been removed from his post as head of the All-Union Council of Trade Unions and his membership in the Politburo in 1929.

The party’s own organizations in factories, primary party organizations, required a basic restructuring to accommodate the new stress on its role as a corps of ‘shock workers’ (inspirational exemplars) and its greatly expanded membership. As in the case of the transformation of the trade unions’ role as production campaign organizers, there was an inherent tension between the desire to preserve one-man management, to which responsibility for failures could be fixed, and the desire to give the party-dominated unions and factory party organizations a real share in the management of production.

On the highest level the party attempted to adapt to its expanded economic functions, both agricultural and industrial, by introducing the production-branch principle, as it had in 1933 with respect to the lower levels of its agricultural operations. The new party Rules adopted by the XVII Party Congress in 1934 established sections of the Secretariat of the Central Committee (i.e., the chief executive office of the party) for agriculture, industry, transport, and planning-finance-trade (3.21, 3.22). However, experience proved the production-branch principle had not been all that was hoped for, and the Rules adopted at the XVIII Party Congress in 1939 abolished all of these sections of the Secretariat except the one concerned with agriculture (3.32, 3.33).

## **THE THIRTIES: PARTY MEMBERSHIP**

Between 1930 and 1940 membership in the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) approximately doubled (from almost 1.7 million members and candidates to almost 3.4 million), which might have been expected in view of the extension of party involvement in the economic transformation of the country. What is more surprising is that the decade high point of 3.5 million was achieved as early as 1933 while as late as 1938 membership was down to 1.9 members and candidates. To a considerable extent these fluctuations reflect the tension between elitism and mass support which has always been present in the party, but was especially acute during the decade of most drastic economic transformation. With the drive for collectivization and industrialization, the party leadership sought more members, especially those with technical or managerial skills that would enable them to contribute most effectively to production (3.5). This was an implicit admission that the toilers' social virtue was now less important than talent for economic leadership.

Even at this time of intense demand for new party activists it was noted that zeal for growth could create qualitative weakness as, for example, in cases when new members were inducted in groups. This was condemned in 1930 and explicitly forbidden in the new Rules in 1934 (3.22, art. 3). To correct excesses on the side of massiveness in recruitment, the party traditionally had recourse to the purge (chistka), a systematic re-evaluation of members and the exclusion of those found wanting. As membership reached its decade high point in 1933, it was determined to institute such a purge (3.19). While the relevant decision was stern enough in its condemnation of 'careerists' and 'double-dealers,' it also warned against arbitrary or capricious examination of members. It seemed that party leaders intended to prevent a rational reassessment from becoming a witch hunt. Such a moderate spirit was still evident in the decision of December 1935 which reviewed the sifting of party membership, with special attention to the technique of replacing party membership cards, a reasonable way of getting a look at every member (3.25). Even though party membership had fallen by over a million since the institution of the purge, and the assassination of S.M. Kirov had added an ominous element to the atmosphere, the key point seemed to be that the whole exercise in quality control had been pretty well completed without a serious loss of rationality.

This soon proved to be far from the case. The combination of widespread expulsions from the party and the mood of political terror

associated with the search for the anti-Soviet, anti-Stalin conspiracy that had been ‘revealed’ in the Kirov affair soon brought about a complete change in the meaning of the purge, indelibly associating this word with arbitrary police terror. The mood was now set by the public trials of alleged conspirators in 1936, 1937, and 1938. All were deemed tools of ‘Judas’ Trotsky and diverse ‘imperialists,’ and most were formerly high-ranking members of the party, such as Kamenev, Zinoviev, Radek, and Bukharin. Stress should be placed on the qualifier ‘formerly’ in this usage, for the accused were not members of the party at the time of their trials and were dealt with by a military court on criminal charges, not by the kind of party purge commission that had traditionally dealt with backsliders who deserved merely to be expelled from the party. Although Soviet law made no provision on the matter, it was understood that the police and courts would punish political criminals who were Communists *only* after they had been expelled from the party. Procedures for expulsion had existed in the party Rules since the beginning of the Soviet era, and they always implied some kind of check on the exercise of the power to expel. In the atmosphere of the later thirties, however, large numbers of party members, of high and low degree alike, were expelled from the party merely as a preliminary to arrest by the police, followed by interrogation, pseudo-trial, and often execution or long-term sentences to hard labour that usually had the same affect. Often the victim learned of his expulsion from the party only during his police interrogation. In most cases, it seems, the initiative for such expulsions came largely from the police, and party organizations, terrorized, merely went through the motions of expelling those whom the police selected.

In full swing the Stalin purge of 1936–38 affected many persons who were never Communists as well as party members who were loyal Stalinists or former oppositionists, and its complexities run far beyond available party or other documents. One point that has emerged from the revelations of the Khrushchev era is that the Central Committee plenum of 23 February – 5 March 1937 represented a crisis for the Stalin purge. Although this body had been selected at the party congress of 1934 from persons who were presumed to be loyal Stalinists, there was a challenge to Stalin from a group of undetermined size, probably led by a candidate member of the Politburo, P. Postyshev. While not calling for the replacement of Stalin, Postyshev expressed disbelief concerning the charges of treason that were being

levelled at many senior party members. Stalin met this last known explicit opposition to his personal authority in a long speech, in which he said essentially that increased vigilance was still necessary because even the most seemingly loyal Communists could be cunning enemies. In some manner Stalin won his struggle with the opposition within the Central Committee, but the documentary evidence of published party decisions is curiously ambiguous. No decision on the purge or his speech at the crucial plenary session of the Central Committee has ever been fully published. There are short excerpts, but these are contradictory (3.27).

Further signs of party resistance to Stalin's purge may be found in a resolution of a Central Committee plenum of January 1938 (3.29). This statement does give somewhat brief approval to the sense of Stalin's warning against 'trotskyites and other double-dealers,' as presented in early 1937, but its title and main stress suggest an attempt by party officialdom to *resist* police efforts to decimate party ranks at will. It seems safe to assume in this context that 'expulsion from the party' is an indirect way of saying 'arrest as an enemy of the people,' that somebody was trying to check the tide of terror that threatened to cripple the effectiveness of this institution as a whole. Did Stalin himself support this moderation, as his 'Dizzy with Success' article of 1930 had sought to dampen the zeal of some of the officials in the field? This may be. At least the document suggests that its authors were attempting to appeal to Stalin's own policy for support. On the other hand, the January 1938 decision predates the culminating purge trial of Bukharin and others by about two months, and the fall of N.I. Ezhov, the head of the police during the most violent phase of the purge, by at least six months (the date of Ezhov's actual loss of authority is hard to determine). Perhaps there is room here for some added credence to the interpretation of the party in the purge that Khrushchev and his historians propagated, that the party, and especially its career officials, attempted to preserve some kind of integrity throughout this period by opposing the massacre of party members as best they could.

The same attitude toward excesses in purging the party was manifest in a major resolution of the XVIII Party Congress, which met in 1939, after the public trials and police terror had subsided. This was a resolution based on a report by A.A. Zhdanov, one of Stalin's newly risen lieutenants, and it purported to be on the new party Rules. It did, however, contain a substantial section attacking abuses of the purge and defending the rights of



party members to some kind of ‘due process’ within the organization (3.32). Actually, the revised party Rules (3.33) adopted at this time showed little concern for safeguards in this area, although they did modify the procedure for confirming expulsions and dropped an article that had been added in 1934, calling for vigilance against diverse categories of traitors (3.22, art. 58). In contrast (oddly, considering the usually supposed subservience of Zhdanov to Stalin), the leader himself, in the secretarial report approved by the congress, continued to justify the recent purge, with only passing mention of overzealous vigilance.

Another incongruity between despotic terror and the idea of law and order in party life in this period concerns the election within the party of its own hierarchy. At the crucial Central Committee plenum of February–March 1937, Zhdanov had already appeared as the advocate of constitutionalism in elections. His speech and the resolution supporting it (3.28) approached the issue in an oblique way. Instead of simply pointing out that there was a long-established, non-statutory practice of appointing party officials (such as raion or city secretaries) from above, then going through a ritual of election from below, Zhdanov began by speaking of the Soviet constitution, the ‘Stalin Constitution,’ the apple of the leader’s eye. It is true that this new state constitution removed various deliberate inequities in the system of voting that had been introduced in 1919 with a view to penalizing mistrusted social elements. For this reason it is superficially plausible to ask, as did Zhdanov, that the party take extra care to see that the non-party mass of the populace did not produce any embarrassing Soviet election returns. Actually this seems to have been an unreal problem, considering that Soviet elections were already carefully controlled and conducted on the basis of a single, approved list of non-competing candidates.

But Zhdanov used this rather imaginary problem *outside* the party to open the issue of elections *within* the party, even though it is not at all clear why democratic centralism in practice would have made the party better able to keep control of the voting behaviour of the masses. For almost twenty years the party had proven adept at this kind of control, and one might think that the existence of similar controls of intra-party elections were good experience, if anything.

Yet Zhdanov argued (and the Central Committee approved) a resolution favouring the restoration of truly meaningful elections within the party.

Shortly after the plenum this point was spelled out in technical detail concerning voting procedures within the party, even though there is good reason to think that little was changed in practice.<sup>4</sup> As so often, Stalin's role was enigmatic. He ignored the question of party elections in his own speeches. On the contrary, his secretarial report to the XVIII Party Congress in 1939 spoke of 'promoting' new party cadres through the authority of the 'Cadres Administration of the Central Committee' 'and a corresponding cadres department in each of the republic, krai, and oblast party organizations.' This was explicit support for the traditional system of 'elections' by command, and contradicted the Zhdanov resolution and the Central Committee. Against this, one may note that Zhdanov continued to enjoy Stalin's favour for some years to come, that some observers might regard the whole campaign for intra-party democracy as cynical window-dressing to accompany the enormous propaganda campaign on behalf of the 'democratic' Stalin Constitution, or that the main targets of Zhdanov's speech were the middle-level party officials whom the rank and file are often asked to criticize.

The most that can be said with complete confidence is that the latter half of the 1930s was an exceedingly difficult period for members of the Soviet Communist Party and that the available documents surely contain some 'esoteric communication' and should therefore be read with all possible critical imagination.

### **THE THIRTIES: PROPAGANDA AND CULTURE**

The dual expansion of the party and of party control of society in the 1930s required a dual effort by the party leadership to improve the orthodox zeal of party members *and* their impact on the non-party population. The enlistment of large numbers of relatively uneducated industrial workers in the early stages of the industrialization campaign had to be faced with a crash programme for elementary political indoctrination that matched the spirit of all-out industrialization (3.6). In only ten days, beginning on 3 March 1930 (a revealing symptom of the kind of 'planning' that the whole campaign involved), the Propaganda and Culture Section of the Central Committee was supposed to prepare a programme that would include all the new candidate members of the party. In this state it was clear that major reliance would have to be placed on 'short-term political circles' – informal study groups which for the time being often (or usually) would lack



qualified instructors or the kind of primers that this sort of mass, elementary programme would require. It was another admission of unpreparedness that the Programme – the outdated, barely relevant one of 1919 – and Rules, were cited as mainstays for want of more suitable material.

But despite the primitiveness and confusion in this campaign, there is considerable reason to think that a lot of simple enthusiasm was inspired in the early stages. It is questionable to what extent the same could be said of the more systematized and elaborate plan that was established after the initial surge of industrialization had been assimilated. The new propaganda program of 1938 was certainly better prepared and financed. Under Stalin's personal direction a basic primer had been written, of which thirty-five million copies were printed in its first ten years alone. This was the *History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Short Course*, a classic in the didactic uses of history and also in utter boredom. It was meant to serve as the basic text for propaganda at all levels, which were now restructured to provide a hierarchy of modes of political instruction for party members, from the barely literate (politically and otherwise) to those taking a three-year full-time course in a new 'higher school of marxism-leninism' (3.30).

Culture, in the form of the arts and education, has always been closely linked to propaganda in the party outlook, but in the twenties party organs had to some extent limited their direct role in setting policy in this area. Literary organizations that were somewhat autonomous had existed, and the People's Commissariat of Enlightenment had been pretty much on its own in the matter of introducing a system of education suitable to a socialist society. This changed in the early thirties. Parallel to the direct intervention of the party executive in economic administration, there were fundamentally important decisions that changed the direction of cultural life in many respects. The trend to educational modernism, in many ways similar to American reforms of the same period, was reversed by a series of decisions beginning with one on primary and secondary schools in 1938 (3.16). The 'cultural revolution,' which according to Soviet texts was in full swing at this time, therefore came to mean a return to traditional subjects of instruction, methods of teaching, and discipline in education. In this the party executive directly countermanded the work of the Commissariat of Enlightenment since its formation in 1917.

Although the decision of 23 April 1932 did not make its cultural values as explicit as did the several decisions on education, the impact was much

the same (3.17). By replacing previous, partly autonomous artistic organizations with new, centralized ‘unions’ under the guidance of the party Orgburo, the way was paved for the suppression of modernist artistic trends and the establishment of traditional forms for disciplined, didactic material under the rubric ‘socialist realism.’ Again, a conservative revolution, culturally speaking.

#### **THE FORTIES AND AFTER: PUNCTUATED SILENCE**

As noted at the beginning of this essay, the Soviet Communist Party seems to have issued remarkably few decisions from 1941 until the death of Stalin in 1953. For an institution which grew rapidly in membership in those years and certainly filled some important functions in both military and civilian life, this silence raises some major questions. These questions are the more interesting because the silence was punctuated at irregular intervals by the appearance of some important decisions. Many published ‘party’ decisions, however, were signed by both party and state authorities and seem to have had little direct connection with the party. How to explain this departure from normal practice in the history of the party before and after this period?

First, the war altered the character of government in the Soviet Union, as elsewhere. The State Committee of Defence, established on 30 June 1941, shortly after the German attack, and authorized by both party and state bodies, assumed absolute civil and military authority under Stalin, its chairman.<sup>5</sup> All other political bodies were subordinated to this war cabinet, including the standing executive organs of the party, whose leading personalities were for the duration of the war preoccupied by service in the State Committee of Defence (e.g., G.M. Malenkov) or as political representatives with military forces in the field (e.g., Zhdanov, the overall director the defence of beseiged Leningrad). As for the representative organs of the party, principally the congress and central committee, there was really no time to convene them, with both leading and humble party members wholly absorbed in the war. In such circumstances it is not surprising that the central organs of the party receded to a kind of secondary service function.

In the first year of the war party decisions ordered local organizations to detach members for work in the Red Army or to form partisan units in occupied territory (3.34, 3.35), but thereafter party decisions apparently did not deal with military affairs. What has been published concerns various

home-front activities: propaganda and trouble-shooting in agriculture, industry, and transport.<sup>6</sup>

With the end of fighting, it is not surprising that some of the administrative habits of wartime should persist, as they did in other countries. The State Committee of Defence was disbanded, but its structure survived in essence in the inner circle that Stalin depended on to the point of almost ignoring the party congress, Central Committee, or Politburo. Even the party Secretariat may have been less his centre of operations than one of his subordinate instrumentalities, although in theory he was still its head. This peacetime situation was at once a natural extension of wartime habits by an old man who relished his martial success and a continuation of Stalin's earlier dissatisfaction with the Central Committee during the purges. If Stalin's experience led him to think as early as the end of the purge that the Central Committee was a potential source of trouble, it was easy enough to use the practices established during the war to avoid the revival of this difficulty.

Another dimension of this shift was the increasing informalization and personalization in Stalin's decision-making practice. Even before the war his private secretariat had assumed increasing importance as an authority above both party and state, and this continued through the rest of his life. During and after the war formal meetings of the Politburo or Sovnarkom/Council of Ministers tended to be replaced by private dinners of Stalin and selected lieutenants, not always including the entire Politburo. This all fit in with the rise of Stalin's personal authority beyond any specific office or combination of offices. As his public cult continually bore witness, he ruled by virtue of being Stalin, the genius, the *vozhd*. While useful to his personal political position, this evolution posed grave dangers to the Soviet political system: excessive centralization and the prospect of a succession crisis.

For Stalin, then, the party machinery had become primarily a technical-service organization, especially responsible for propaganda, rather than a key to political decision making. This seems to be borne out by the fact that no party body was asked, even as a formality, to approve the adoption of the Fourth Five-Year Plan of 1946–50, in contrast to earlier practices. Instead, the Central Committee (presumably the Secretariat) ordered the mobilization of the entire party propaganda machine to exhort the populace on behalf of the plan (3.37). A similar service function that needed no

special decision was, incidentally, the continual trumpeting of Stalin's name throughout the land.

Propaganda being the principle field of party activity in this period, it is natural that the few important, exclusively party decisions in the early post-war years concerned this field. A.A. Zhdanov had the main responsibility here, and as a member of the Secretariat made major use of decisions in the name of the Central Committee to establish ideological rectitude and his own prestige. Temporarily he succeeded in both aims, for the period 1946–48 came to be called the 'Zhdanovshchina' ('the reign of Zhdanovism'). His first major step was to decree a renovation of ideological education, which he did with repeated reminders of the primacy of the *party* in this work (3.38). Indeed, his repeated stress on the need of both party and *soviet* officials to submit to new indoctrination in party schools seems to relate to the political struggle that Zhdanov was waging against another first-line lieutenant, Malenkov, who generally seems to have been trying to build his strength on the Soviet state machine. The campaign was in any case easy to justify because, since the reform of the indoctrination system in 1938, many scarcely trained wartime recruits had joined the party.

In the same spirit Zhdanov reminded anyone who needed it (perhaps Beria, another rival, who specialized in police work) that the party had a claim to primacy in determining Communist orthodoxy (and by implication that the security branch had permitted some laxity). Zhdanov started by scrutinizing his own special territory, Leningrad, excoriating two prominent literary publications of the city (3.39). This, like subsequent pronouncements of the Zhdanovshchina, went into considerable artistic critical detail, the first time that decisions of the Central Committee had been used in such a way. Shortly before Zhdanov's death in 1948 one of the final party decisions in the series, and one of the most important, tackled the minority nationalities of the Soviet Union (3.41). In general the campaign stressed the fusion of Communist orthodoxy and Russian nationalism, while condemning alien great-power cultures or Soviet minority nationalism. From what we know of Stalin, especially in his later years, it is safe to say that such themes were agreeable to him and, therefore, probably helpful to Zhdanov's status. While the leader himself may have participated directly in some of these decisions, he seems to have preferred to express himself through public letters or essays over his own name when he wanted to

comment on such topics as military science, linguistics, or economic theory in his last years.

Zhdanov died, apparently of heart disease, in 1948 and the ideological campaign associated with his name declined in prominence in party decisions. There was, however, one further attempt by another party secretary to use the authority of the party alone to support a major policy. This was N.S. Khrushchev and the subject was agriculture. No fundamental change in the organization of Soviet agriculture had occurred since the early 1930s, but Khrushchev was determined that the continued backwardness of this sector of the economy could be remedied by drastically consolidating the 252,000 kolkhozes into a much smaller number (3.43). Within a year, two-thirds of all kolkhozes had been regrouped to form larger units. Like the decision of 5 January 1930, this order of the Central Committee (not in plenary session), dated 30 May 1950, ignored the existing Five-Year Plan and looked to the party apparatus as the supreme authority in this transformation. It certainly implied an attempt to restore the status of the leading party organs in the making and execution of major decisions.

A stronger attempt in this direction, apparently based on a coalition of Stalin's lieutenants, was the convocation of the XIX Party Congress in October 1952, ten years after its statutory due date. There are numerous signs that this event was part of a growing rift between Stalin and his Politburo. The Congress could not avert the danger of a new purge, but it did serve to symbolize the party's claim to be the legitimate representative of the masses, and when Stalin died five months later it was possible for the leading party bodies to assume pre-eminence in the country and provide continuity of governance in the Soviet Union following a generation of Stalin's dictatorship: no small service.

R.H.M.

## **Documents**

# Plenum of the Central Committee

10–17 November 1929

Stalin's determination to embark on an all-out campaign for industrialization and collectivization was evident in the Central Committee plenum of November 1929, even though he was not yet able to attain his full objective. The resolution on control figures for 1929–30, adopted on the basis of a speech by Kuibyshev, was an important step in the transformation of the existing Five-Year Plan into the kind of growth campaign that was to characterize the Soviet economy under Stalin. The parallel resolution on kolkhoz construction, based on a speech by G.N. Kaminsky (a third-rank figure who was the head of the new kolkhoz centre), was an even more specific foreshadowing of the 'great breakthrough' in the countryside.

Nevertheless, these party decisions fell short of the full-blown campaign and reflect some degree of reticence within the party leadership. While referring to 'turbulent growth' of collectivization, the actual statistical goals for collectivization that they discuss are relatively modest and in keeping with the gradualist approach of the existing Five-Year Plan.

Moreover, the resolution of 17 November 1929 'On the Results and Coming Tasks of Kolkhoz Construction' did not equate the kolkhoz with the artel form that later became the norm, and aroused much peasant resistance by collectivizing all but a small residue of peasant land and goods. Instead, this resolution stressed the importance of less radical forms: simple producers' cooperatives; kontraktatsiia (the signing of contracts between the state and peasants for crop sales); and the TOZ (Society for the Common Cultivation of Land), in which only major farm implements are pooled. While the resolution had threatening words for kulaks, it did not advance the policy of liquidating them as a class. This target was set by Stalin on his own authority on 27 December 1929 (see Stalin, *Works* XIII, 147–78). In short, the November Plenum pressed forward the collectivization of agriculture, but only with respect to previous goals. The decisions of this plenum had to be overthrown before the violent rush of Stalinist collectivization could occur as it actually did.

In this light the extended critique of the 'right' opposition in the resolutions may bear a double meaning: the final condemnation of the defeated Bukharin group, which is the ostensible meaning of the diatribes; and an attempt to disarm and intimidate certain Stalinists who wanted to restrain the leader. It has long been alleged that such Politburo figures as Kalinin and Voroshilov were opposed to excessive rates of collectivization, and some lower-level opposition within the Central Committee probably persisted. The capitulation of Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky to Stalin before the plenum did not satisfy Stalin, and the body passed a resolution, which was kept secret at the time, demanding additional confessions of error and the expulsion of Bukharin from the Politburo. Some of the lesser rightists, led by Uglanov, helped pave the way for such a step by repudiating Bukharin in a statement to the plenum, and Bukharin produced his own, extended surrender on 26 November 1929. All this surely had didactic significance for any Central Committee members who were contemplating even mild opposition to his agrarian policies.

Other resolutions of this plenum, not included in the present anthology, dealt with agriculture in the Ukraine, the difficulties in providing technically trained personnel for the economic drive, and the establishment of a new commissariat for agriculture.

### 3.1

#### **On the Control Figures for the Economy in 1929–30**

17 November 1929

##### **I**

The economic results of the past year, which was marked by a turbulent growth of socialist industry and socialist elements in the economy, bear witness to major new achievements by the working class, the Soviet system, and the party in the building of socialism.

The plan for the first year of the Five-Year Plan was basically fulfilled, *while the five-year plan assignments were overfulfilled* for a number of the most important branches of the economy. The output of large-scale socialist industry grew by 23.7 per cent (as against the 21.4 per cent called for under the Five-Year Plan), including a growth of 29.8 per cent (as against 25.6 per cent under the plan) in the output of the branches of industry that produce the means of production. The capacity of power plants increased 20.3 per cent (as against 14 per cent under the plan). Railroad freight turnover grew 21 per cent (as against 10.1 per cent under the plan).

This growth in the leading branches of the economy, together with the continued growth in the industrial proletariat (7.8 per cent), the strengthening of its class positions and the growth of its political activism, has also called forth a *fundamental advance in the cause of the socialist reconstruction of agriculture*, which found expression in the turbulent growth of kolkhozes on the basis of the active participation of the poor and middle masses of the peasantry in the socialist reconstruction of the village. As a result, the rate of collectivization of agriculture considerably exceeded the projections of the Five-Year Plan. The overall number of peasant households induced to join kolkhozes grew from 445,000 in 1927–28 to 1,040,000 in 1928–29 (as against the 564,000 called for under the Five-Year Plan). The sown areas of the kolkhozes grew from 1,400,000 hectares in 1927–28 to 4,300,000 hectares in 1928–29, or by 206.7 per cent (as against 137.4 per cent under the Five-Year Plan); gross output grew by 240.5 per cent and commodity output by 278.3 per cent. The share of the kolkhozes in



total commodity output of agriculture grew from 1.4 per cent in 1927–28 to 4.9 per cent in 1928–29, including an increase from 4.5 per cent to 12.9 per cent for grains.

This unprecedented rate of collectivization, which exceeds the most optimistic projections attests to the fact that the true masses of the *middle peasant* households, convinced in practice of the advantages of the collective forms of agriculture, have joined the movement, following in the footsteps of the poor peasant households.

The decisive breakthrough in the attitude of the poor and middle peasant masses toward the kolkhozes – a breakthrough that is a direct result of the correct policy of the working class and the party in the countryside, a result of strengthening the leading role of the working class in its alliance with the poor and middle peasantry, of the powerful growth of socialist industry, and of strengthening the production forms of the union – *signifies a new historical stage in the building of socialism in our country.*

Concurrently with the tremendous rate of collectivization, major successes were also achieved in the building of sovkhoses and MTSS. By the spring of 1929 the sown area of the sovkhoses had increased 27.5 per cent (instead of 26.3 per cent under the plan) and gross output of grain had increased by 34.7 per cent.

The result for the entire communal sector of agriculture was that gross output in 1928–29 amounted to 612,800,000 rubles (as against 283,200,000 rubles in 1927–28) and commodity output hit 263,900,000 rubles (as against 134,500,000 rubles in 1927–28). The share of the communal sector in the total gross harvest of grains rose in one year from 2.5 per cent to 5.8 per cent (instead of the 4.9 per cent called for by the plan), while that for the commodity grain yield rose from 12.2 per cent to 21 per cent.

The overall growth in productive sown area (5 per cent), while somewhat below the plan figures, was achieved through the growth of sown area in the communal sector and on poor and middle peasant holdings, *which more than offset the reduction in sown areas on kulak and well-to-do holdings.*

The growth of sown areas and of gross and commodity farm output, the growth of contractual growing and the increase in the share of the communal sector in commodity production together with the simultaneous intense effort of the entire party, soviet, and co-operative apparatus in the matter of grain procurements; the improved organization of the poor and

middle peasantry for the struggle completely to fulfil the plan and to overcome kulak resistance and sabotage; the strengthening of repressions against speculation in grain and the concealment of grain surpluses by kulaks; the improvement in supplying the countryside with industrial goods, etc., assured favourable results in grain procurements, which significantly surpassed the results of past years and made it possible this year already to create *a reserve of as much as 100,000,000 puds of grain*.

The share of the public sector in the economy as a whole has grown: from 55.2 per cent to 65.2 per cent for capital investments; from 51.7 per cent to 54.1 per cent for basic assets and from 41.9 per cent to 43.5 per cent for gross output.

*In outright contrast to the situation in the capitalistic countries, the past year was characterized by continued improvement in the material situation of the working class:* by a growth in real earnings (though somewhat below the plan target), by the transition of about 500,000 workers to the seven-hour work day, and by the continued growth in the material and cultural services to the working class (housing construction, social insurance, etc.).

The growth in the economy and in its socialist sector was accompanied by – and to a significant degree conditioned by – the growth in the creative activism of the broadest masses of the working class, which found expression in socialist competition, in the development of self-criticism, in the holding of industrialization day, in the extremely widespread subscription of the industrialization loan, which was considerably oversubscribed, etc. On the basis of a further strengthening of ties with the broad masses of the working people, there has been a general activation in the work of working-class (party, trade union, and soviet) organizations, which are reorganizing their work methods and are addressing themselves increasingly to production questions and to the immediate economic tasks of socialist construction.

At the same time there has been a growth and intensification of resistance from capitalistic elements: the kulak in the countryside, the ‘NEP-man’ in the city, and the wrecker in production.

These results of the past economic year have completely confirmed the correctness of the party’s entire policy and have proven conclusively the total bankruptcy of the position of the right deviationists (the Bukharin group), which is nothing other than an expression of pressures from petty

bourgeois elements, of panic in the face of an intensified class struggle, and of a capitulation before the difficulties of building socialism.

*The rightists* contended there had been a ‘degradation’ in agriculture. *In actual fact*, we experienced continued growth in the performance of poor and middle peasant holdings, an overall growth in sown area, an increase in mechanization, and a rise in the material and technical, and in the agronomic, level of agricultural development.

*The rightists* contended that the poor and middle peasant masses were ‘split’ from the working class. *In actual fact*, we experienced a further reinforcement of the union of working class and peasantry and a strengthening of the leading role of the proletariat within that union, a fact that found expression in the turbulent growth of collectivization and the building of sovkhozes.

*The rightists* prophesied inevitable famine and importation of grain. *In actual fact*, we enjoyed a growth in grain procurements such that we were able to provide for the country’s grain needs out of domestic production and to create a grain reserve of tens of millions of puds, while maintaining a trade surplus and increasing currency reserves.

*The rightists* contended that the country would be unable to maintain the industrialization pace that had been set. *In actual fact*, we not only fulfilled, but considerably overfulfilled, the plan targets.

*The rightists* declared the planned rates for collectivization and for building sovkhozes to be unrealistic; they declared that the necessary material and technical prerequisites were lacking and that the poor and middle peasantry did not want to switch to collective forms of agriculture. *In actual fact*, we are experiencing such a turbulent growth of collectivization and such a headlong rush to socialist forms of agriculture on the part of the poor and middle peasant holdings that the kolkhoz movement has already reached the point of transition *to total collectivization of entire districts*. This marks a new stage, a new phase in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism.

*The rightists*, lacking faith in the creative forces of the working class, demanded that plans be pegged to the bottlenecks; they demanded passive accommodation to difficulties. *In actual fact*, the working class, under the direction of the party, actively overcame the difficulties and assured continued, above-plan growth of our productive forces in the direction of socialism.

*The rightists* contended that a general economic crisis – i.e., an interruption of the normal course of production and reproduction – was inevitable. *In actual fact*, we are enjoying a growth of production and an acceleration in growth rates, the likes of which we could not even have dreamt of before and which in fact enable us to redesignate the optimal variant of the Five-Year Plan as the *minimal* variant.

Only by resolutely overcoming the attempts of the right opportunists – who, objectively speaking, were serving as spokesmen for the economic and political interests of petty bourgeois elements and kulak-capitalist groups – to divert the party from the general line of our development, were the working class and party able to achieve a new and significant step forward in the building of socialism.

The successes achieved in the area of socialist construction are inevitably accompanied by certain difficulties, which are exacerbated by the resistance of the capitalist elements. As before, one of the most important tasks of the party's economic policy is to overcome the excessive backwardness in the rates of agricultural development, particularly and specifically in the *grain and animal husbandry sectors*. The radical solution of this task lies in continued forcing of the processes of collectivization and the building of sovkhoses, in continued improvement and strengthening of kolkhoses and sovkhoses and, finally, in forcing the development of industry, which is the key to the socialist reconstruction of agriculture.

In the current economic year, particular attention is to be focused on successful completion of the spring season in agriculture.

Given the growing attraction of collective forms of agriculture for the broad masses of poor and middle peasants, the basic difficulty in solving this greatest of historical tasks is the fact that *the branches of industry that serve agriculture (farm machinery, tractors, fertilizers) are not keeping pace with collectivization and the construction of sovkhoses*.

As before, the bottleneck in agriculture as well as in industry is the chemical industry, whose growth rates are significantly lagging behind the requirements of the economy.

There remains a glaring disproportion between the needs of the economy and the output of the machine-building industry, despite the high development rates of the latter.

And there remain very significant difficulties in the area of supplying the country with fuel and with ferrous and non-ferrous metals, shortages of which create difficulties for realizing the development rates set for machine-building, electrification, and the material and technical reconstruction of agriculture.

As before, despite the major successes in exporting manufactured goods and articles ‘of secondary importance,’ we face the acute problem of forcing the development of the export branches of the economy (and above all of lumber export), whose insufficient development rates are impeding, and creating difficulties for, the importation of the machines, semi-manufactured goods, and raw materials that the country needs for industry.

Finally, the *transport and roads problem* is assuming growing importance as one of the ‘bottlenecks’ in the economy ...

### III

The major successes of recent years, the gigantic scope and unprecedented rates of economic development, are proof of the fact that the task of the Soviet system – to overtake and surpass the advanced capitalist countries in a technological and economic sense – can be achieved in the briefest of historical periods. The unquestionable advantages of the Soviet economic system over the capitalist system are increasingly finding confirmation in exceptionally high rates of economic development and in the rates of material and technical reconstruction of the economy and of the rise in the material and cultural living standards of the working class and the labouring peasant masses.

The turbulent growth of socialist forms of economic activity, the rise in their relative importance in the economy and the strengthening of their influence on individual peasant holdings, expressed in the spontaneous drive of the poor and middle peasant masses toward collective forms of agriculture: all these developments attest to the fact that the decisive success of the policy of socialist attack on capitalist elements is assured and that *the building of socialism in the land of the proletarian dictatorship can be accomplished in a historically minimal period of time.*

The difficulties accompanying the rapid rate of socialist construction – by steeling the will and persistence of the working class – are engaging the new forces and new reserves of the proletarian revolution that are necessary to overcome and eliminate those difficulties.

At the same time, the intensification of the class struggle and the stubborn resistance of capitalist elements against an advancing socialism in a situation of capitalist encirclement of our country, are reinforcing the pressure of petty bourgeois elements on the least stable element of the party, giving rise to an ideology of *capitulation* in the face of difficulties, to *desertion*, and attempts to reach an understanding with the kulak and capitalist elements of town and countryside ...

This repugnance for class struggle, the striving 'to smooth things over, reconcile differences, and blunt the sharp edges,' [Lenin] the dream of doing without class struggle is characteristic of the entire position of the right opportunists (the Bukharin group). This is precisely what is at the root of the Bukharin group's complete incomprehension of the intensification of the class struggle that has taken place; the underestimation of the kulak and NEP-man elements' power to resist, the anti-leninist theory of the kulak's 'growing' into socialism, and resistance to the policy of attacking the capitalist elements in the countryside. This is precisely the source of the right deviationists' total incomprehension of Comrade Lenin's co-operative plan and the decisive importance of collective forms of economic activity and agriculture, the source of their failure to attach sufficient importance to sovkhoz construction and of their demands to reduce the pace of industrialization and weaken the production forms of union between the working class and the poor and middle peasantry.

In refusing to admit their errors in questions of economic policy, in questions of industrializing the country, of collectivizing agriculture and of sovkhoz construction, in refusing to admit their mistakes in evaluating – and their incomprehension of – the class struggle, and finally, in attempting to go over to methods of factional struggle against the party, the Bukharin group is disclosing in definitive fashion its anti-leninist, anti-bolshevik essence. In this connection the plenum resolves that propagandizing the views of right opportunism and conciliatoriness toward such opportunism is incompatible with membership in the ranks of the VKP(b).

Along with the intensification of the danger from the right, there has been a revival – once more, an expression of the very same petty bourgeois elements – of hostility toward the middle peasants, and of trotskyite and semi-trotskyist attacks on the general line of the party. In confirming the fact that the main danger remains the right deviation and conciliatoriness toward it, the Central Committee orders the party organization under no

circumstances to reduce the struggle against 'left' opportunist sentiments and against a tolerant attitude toward such views.

The achievements of the past year have been won by the working class and the party in a resolute struggle against the right deviation and 'left' opportunist, counter-revolutionary trotskyist ideology. The coming victories of socialism lie on the very same path of decisive, systematic exposure of the anti-leninist, petty bourgeois essence of the right and 'left' opportunists and of conciliatoriness toward them; they lie on the path of pitiless struggle against manifestations of these deviations in practice ...

### **3.2**

#### **On the Results and Coming Tasks of Kolkhoz Construction**

17 November 1929

1 The XV Party Congress set as the party's basic task in the countryside the 'gradual transition of dispersed peasant holdings to large-scale production.' In the past two years the party has scored major successes in carrying out this directive of the XV Party Congress.

The USSR has entered the period of extensive socialist reorganization of the village and construction of large-scale socialist agriculture.

On the basis of the development of joint production work, of mass contractual growing, etc., there is a growth of production cooperation between peasant households that is increasingly making the transition to a higher stage and is growing into the kolkhoz movement. Following in the footsteps of the poor peasants, the mass of middle peasants has also moved into the kolkhozes. With the recruitment of rural masses numbering in the millions, the kolkhoz movement is assuming decisive importance in the realization of the leninist co-operative plan.

In summing up the results of kolkhoz construction, one would have to note: the speed with which the kolkhozes have absorbed peasant holdings; the realization of new organizational forms and methods of collectivization, particularly on the basis of experience with the MTSS; the construction of large-scale kolkhozes and the fact that they now play a greater role; the fact that kolkhozes have encompassed entire settlements; and the transition to complete collectivization of entire raions and okrugs. The kolkhoz movement is already posing the task of collectivization of entire oblasts.

These significant successes of the kolkhoz movement are a direct result of the consistent implementation of the general party line, which has secured a powerful growth of industry, a strengthening of the union of the working class with the basic masses of the peasantry, the formation of a co-operative community, the strengthening of the masses' political activism, and the growth of the material and cultural resources of the proletarian state.

In addition, this turbulent growth of the kolkhoz movement confronts the party with a number of new and highly complex tasks; it brings to light new difficulties and short-comings in kolkhoz construction, of which the most important at the present time are: the low level of the kolkhozes' technical base; the inadequate standards of organization and low labour productivity at kolkhozes; the acute shortage of kolkhoz cadres and the near total lack of the needed specialists; the blighted social make-up at a portion of the kolkhoz; the fact that the forms of management are poorly adapted to the scale of the kolkhoz movement, that direction lags behind the rate and scope of the movement, and the fact that the agencies directing the kolkhoz movement are often patently unsatisfactory.

2 The widespread development of the kolkhoz movement is taking place in a situation of intensified class struggle in the countryside and of a change in its forms and methods. Along with the kulaks' intensification of their direct and open struggle against collectivization, which has gone to the point of outright terror (murder, arson, and wrecking), they are increasingly going over to camouflaged and covert forms of struggle and exploitation, penetrating the kolkhozes and even the kolkhoz management bodies in order to corrupt and explode them from the inside.

In conditions of intensified class struggle, it is a matter of particular importance to consistently combat pseudo-kolkhozes, which are a means of camouflage and a weapon of the kulak elements in the countryside.

While continuing and intensifying the struggle against capitalist elements in the countryside, deploying a decisive advance against the kulak, and in every way blocking and heading off attempts by kulaks to penetrate the kolkhozes, the party must assure through persistent and regular work the rallying of a farm labourer and poor peasant nucleus on the kolkhozes. This is all the more necessary since in the kolkhozes themselves a considerable danger of kulak influences remains, particularly in kolkhozes of the more rudimentary type, in view of the fact that as yet they have by no means



communalized all the means of production, and the interests of petty owners are generally strong. In this connection it is particularly necessary to strengthen in every possible way the communalized property of the kolkhozes as the bases for the growth of the kolkhoz movement, and also to assure a firm connection between the kolkhozes and the entire Soviet economic system.

A most important task of party organizations is to strengthen in every way the participation and leading influence of urban proletarian elements and of rural proletarian and semi-proletarian strata in the kolkhoz movement. In this matter, particular importance attaches to the organization of farm labourer and poor peasant groups in the simpler co-operative production associations and in the primary form of collective farming (the TOZ).

3 The achieved scope of kolkhoz construction has surpassed all plan assumptions and is revealing ever more clearly that gigantic acceleration in the rate of development of socialist construction that Lenin foresaw.

The party is enjoying constantly growing success in solving the tasks of building a large-scale communalized agriculture, and in so doing is laying bare the capitulatory nature of the right opportunists' views that are opposed to party policy in the area of collectivization of agriculture.

The party and the working class, while fighting relentlessly against opportunistic elements and conciliatoriness toward such elements within its ranks, and while deploying an energetic attack against the class forces hostile to the proletarian dictatorship, have resolutely led the poor and middle peasant masses forward along the path of the socialist reconstruction of agriculture.

Despite the false 'theories' of the leaders of the right opposition concerning the 'degradation' of agriculture, we are enjoying, in fact, an accelerating growth of productive forces in agriculture on the basis of the rapid development of the communalized sector and the massive increase in individual poor and middle peasant holdings.

Despite the capitulatory 'theories' concerning the kulaks 'growing into' socialism, despite the panicky demands of the right opportunists to unleash 'free trade' for the capitalistic elements and to reduce the rate of industrialization and communalization of agriculture, the party is conducting and will continue to conduct a course of resolute struggle against the kulaks, a policy of uprooting capitalism in agriculture, of uniting

individual poor and middle peasant holdings as quickly as possible into large-scale kolkhozes, and of preparing conditions for the development of a planned exchange of products between town and countryside.

The results of the collective construction that is underway show the gigantic possibilities for a rise in agricultural productive forces that are implicit in the Soviet system. We are marking the beginning of a *new historical stage* in the socialist transformation of agriculture along the lines of strengthening the production union of the proletarian state with the basic masses of poor and middle peasants in the countryside ...

## II

4 The basic difficulty in kolkhoz construction in the present period is one of backwardness of the *technical base*. Large-scale, highly productive and truly socialist production in agriculture can only be built on the basis of modern machine technology and electrification. Therefore the creation of the material and technical base for the socialist transformation of the countryside is a question of primary importance.

The Central Committee plenum approves the Politburo resolution augmenting the plan for the production of tractors and machinery, and providing for an immediate start on the construction of two new tractor plants with a production capacity of 50,000 tractors (caterpillars) each, on the construction of two harvester combine plants, on expansion of plants manufacturing complex farm machinery, chemical industry plants, etc. It is also necessary to develop the construction of electric power stations and electric machinery for agriculture and for processing agricultural produce. The all-out development of this construction will create the necessary technical base for a large-scale socialist agriculture and the necessary prerequisites for effecting a fundamental technical revolution in agriculture and for the communalization of it.

The Central Committee plenum considers it necessary to begin marshalling the funds of the peasant population to finance this construction, and specifically to do so by arranging at tractor and complex farm machinery plants for the taking of advance orders – secured by a down-payment – directly from individual kolkhozes and from kolkhoz associations for the purchase of tractors, harvester combines, and complex farm machinery. It is necessary to conduct a large-scale campaign at

kolkhozes to form a special export fund to offset the cost of imported tractors.

In conditions of a mass development of kolkhoz construction, it is necessary to devote ever greater attention to the construction of large-scale mechanized kolkhozes that would utilize the experience of sovkhoses in their technical organization, gradually becoming true socialist enterprises built on a basis of modern machine technology and the latest achievements of science.

The inter-village MTSS are particularly important to the construction of large-scale kolkhozes. In creating widespread possibilities for reaping the benefits of modern technology on peasant holdings, the MTSS must become centres for the total collectivization of entire raions.

The Central Committee plenum approves the creation of an All-Union Centre of Machine Tractor Stations (Traktorotsentr) and its inclusion in the overall system of kolkhoz construction (the All-Union Kolkhozttsentr) as a special autonomous centre.

Given the existence of a high percentage of peasant holdings without significant quantities of equipment and livestock and given the acute shortage of tractors and complex machinery, it is a most important task of kolkhoz construction in the present period – apart from the question of creating the higher forms of collectivization on an advanced technical base – to also help the millions of peasant holdings to make more effective use of the simpler production implements within the bounds of the rudimentary kolkhozes and cooperative production associations. An important role belongs to the regional kolkhoz associations, which have been formed at the initiative of the kolkhozes themselves and have completely justified themselves in the practical work of kolkhoz construction. By organizing joint use of complex machinery and tractors on small kolkhozes and by uniting the small kolkhozes for the joint construction of enterprises, tractor pools, and large-scale machine stations with horse or mixed traction (in particular by reorganizing the existing rental centres), the regional associations must become production centres preparing the necessary material and technical prerequisites for strengthening the small kolkhozes and for inducing the surrounding peasant holdings to join them.

Thus the construction of large-scale kolkhozes must develop in various ways and in differing forms, with continuous strengthening of the

organizing influence of socialist industry and of the large sovkhozes, under the direction of the proletarian state.

In view of the degree of complexity and the variety of paths for the transition of tens of millions of peasant households to large-scale socialist agriculture, the task of the party consists in developing in every way the masses' own initiative and independent action in kolkhozes construction, while at the same time strengthening the party's leadership of the kolkhoz movement and developing new forms of ties and assistance from the working class to the basic masses in the countryside in the matter of reorganizing agriculture. At the same time, the role of state – and above all of land – agencies in directing kolkhoz construction must be considerably increased.

5 A fundamental short-coming in the kolkhoz movement is the relatively low *labour productivity*, insufficient production discipline, and the lack of requisite attention by the directing bodies of the kolkhoz movement to the matter of labour organization on kolkhozes. Therefore, a persistent and systematic struggle is needed at each kolkhoz to increase labour productivity, to raise yields, and to augment commodity production.

To these ends it is necessary above all to achieve a decisive breakthrough in increasing labour discipline on kolkhozes on the basis of a truly conscious attitude on the part of kolkhoz members toward their obligations, while at the same time applying the principle of responsibility for work assigned and creating personal material incentives for each kolkhoz to raise labour productivity (piecework payment, work norms, bonus systems, etc.). To increase labour productivity, all possible use must be made of the methods of socialist competition, of developing the work of production meetings, and of widespread development of self-criticism.

An essential matter in strengthening kolkhozes is to organize operations in such a way as to guarantee – depending on the conditions in the region – maximum utilization of the kolkhozes' labour force (animal husbandry, intensive farming, auxiliary enterprises, cottage industry, etc.). The management of the kolkhozes must necessarily keep this in mind in working out their organizational plans.

6 The particular attention of the party, the soviets and the kolkhoz system must be directed toward the problem of cadres. The kolkhoz movement has assumed proportions that make necessary a decisive, revolutionary reorganization of the entire system, programme, and methods of training

organizers, agronomists, engineers, land utilization specialists, technicians, finance and accounting personnel, etc., for kolkhoz construction. Provision must be made for a decisive increase in the number of kolkhoz farmers – and particularly those of landless farm labour and poor peasant origins – admitted to higher educational institutions and technicums for the coming school year.

The Central Committee plenum recognizes a need to organize under the Kolkhoztseŋtr a central school for training the organizers of large-scale kolkhozes.

Besides this it is necessary to organize on a broad scale the training of kolkhoz cadres at sovkhozes and major kolkhozes, which are to serve as a mass school for those who are the builders of the large-scale farms in practice, schools where they are to learn from the experience of state and kolkhoz work the application of the latest machinery, of the new forms of farm production and labour organization, and of improved agronomic methods, the utilization of chemicals, etc.

Industrial workers form a powerful reserve from which to draw managerial cadres for the building of socialist agriculture. The Central Committee considers it necessary in the months immediately ahead – apart from regularly reinforcing the kolkhoz movement with party leadership – to send not less than 25,000 workers with sufficient organizational and political experience into the countryside to work on kolkhozes, at MTSS, in regional associations, etc. The trade unions are to play a most active part in the selection of these workers, putting forward the most advanced workers.

Kolkhoz construction is unthinkable without a rigorous improvement in the cultural standards of the kolkhoz populace. The agencies of the soviets, the kolkhoz system itself, agricultural and consumer cooperatives, and the Soviet public as a whole must develop extensive work in serving the cultural needs of the kolkhoz populace, above all at large kolkhozes and in the areas of complete collectivization. An advance in the work of the societies to liquidate illiteracy and in the work of libraries, an intensification in the work of kolkhoz courses and various types of study by correspondence; maximum enrolment of children in the schools; intensification of cultural and political work among women; widespread development of the schools for peasant young people; mass dissemination of agronomic knowledge, and improvement in the social and everyday services to the kolkhoz populace – and in particular to women (the

organizing of crèches, public catering, etc.) – are necessary conditions for the successful development of kolkhoz construction. It is also particularly important to set up cultural centres at the inter-village MTSS. Consumer cooperatives are to play a most active role in this work. Particular attention must be devoted to radio and motion pictures, and also to organizing means of communications (telephone, postal service) and to developing road construction at kolkhozes. There must be a considerable advance in the servicing of kolkhozes by the general and specialized press.

7 The development of mass kolkhoz construction and lasting success in such construction are unrealizable unless the kolkhoz movement's *communal holdings* are systematically strengthened and increased in every way. The growth and strengthening of the communal sector – and in this connection of the indivisible funds [assets that cannot be distributed to individual peasants] as well – is the basis for creating the necessary production assets on the kolkhozes. All-out enlargement of this kolkhoz base and combatting the squandering of inventory (both animate and inanimate) on the part of new members joining the kolkhozes, are necessary conditions for the development of the kolkhoz movement. It should be taken as a rule, and applied firmly and decisively, that state aid is given to kolkhozes only on condition that the peasantry itself is making growing investments in the kolkhozes, and in particular, that the kolkhozes fulfil the requirements established by farm rules and by agreements on the internal accumulation of farm assets. This aim is to be served by establishing obligatory allocations to the kolkhozes' indivisible funds, by assessing members on the basis of shares, and by setting up special funds for specific purposes (the collection of down payments for the purchase of tractors and for setting up industrial undertakings, the creation of a special export fund in order to increase the import of tractors, farm machinery, etc.).

8 One form of *production and economic regulation* of kolkhozes on the part of the proletarian state should be the signing of contracts with kolkhozes for set amounts of output, the aim being to increase the commodity output of the kolkhozes and to assure planned sales of kolkhoz commodity surpluses to the state on the basis of improved production and development of the kolkhozes' communal sector.

Kolkhozes are to be granted credits, supplied with means of production and provided agronomic and animal husbandry services on condition that they bind themselves to deliver commodity output at set times and in

quantities stipulated by contracts covering grain products, livestock, poultry, raw materials, and special crops, etc., in accordance with their operations.

In this connection it is necessary to wage a resolute struggle against kolkhozes that do not fulfil their obligations with respect to the state, preferring instead to sell their surplus to private parties.

9 The kolkhoz movement, which is developing primarily along the line of collectivization of grain growing, must be assigned the task of speeding up in every way the process of communalizing the remaining branches of agriculture on the basis of the *specialization* of kolkhozes in accordance with regional farming characteristics.

Noting the inadequate performance of the kolkhoz system in this area and the inadequate attention to this most important task on the part of the special centres of the agricultural cooperatives, the Central Committee plenum considers it necessary to force the pace in building kolkhozes specializing in livestock, dairy, grain, truck gardening, industrial crops, etc., kolkhozes that are to become a most important base for meeting the country's growing food, raw materials, and export requirements.

Kolkhoz construction, being an integral part of Lenin's co-operative plan and the highest form of co-operation, can only develop successfully by basing itself on the entire system of agricultural co-operatives, which is increasingly evolving from sales and supply co-operatives and the rudimentary forms of production partnership into the kolkhoz movement proper. It is therefore a most important organizational task to establish correct relations between the kolkhoz system and the special systems of agricultural co-operatives.

The Central Committee plenum considers it necessary – in addition to organizational reinforcement of the special systems of agricultural co-operatives and the strengthening of their material and technical base – to organize *autonomous kolkhoz centres* at the basic special centres and special unions of agricultural co-operatives in the various localities, on a basis established by agreement with the All-Union Kolkhoztseutr and basing themselves directly on the kolkhozes and their associations (or regional groupings) and serving their organizational and operative needs. The special centres of agricultural co-operatives are to carry out the construction of kolkhozes in the branches of agriculture that they serve, and to do so under the direct supervision of the kolkhoz centres and unions of

kolkhozes, and in close co-ordination with the appropriate branches of industry.

In view of the rapid growth of kolkhoz construction and the need to strengthen the direction of this construction and render technical assistance to it (in particular in connection with the development of enterprises to process agricultural products), the Central Committee plenum considers it expedient to set up special organizations to serve the needs of kolkhozes for capital construction (kolkhoz trusts) attached to the All-Union Kolkhoztsestr and to certain of the major oblast kolkhoz associations.

At the present time particular importance attaches to the union of unions of agricultural co-operatives as a centre that unites all agricultural co-operatives, including the kolkhoz system.

10 It should be particularly stressed that in the *national regions* as well, where the remnants of feudal and tribal relations are still strong in the village (aul), and where the transition from a nomadic or semi-nomadic economy to settled farming is in progress, collectivization and the introduction of advanced machine technology in agriculture play a decisive role in effecting a rise in the material and cultural level of the masses and in drawing them into socialist construction.

The plenum advises the All-Union Kolkhoztsestr and the organizations supplying machinery to devote sufficient attention to collectivization in the national regions of the East and to promote this cause in every way.

11 Sovkhozes, being agricultural enterprises of a consistently socialist type, must, to an even greater extent than previously, serve as an example in their practical work as to how a large-scale operation is to be organized and how high technology is to be utilized in agriculture. In addition, these solkhozes, with a powerful material and technical apparatus at their command must in every way increase their role as levers, which throw the switch to put individual peasant holdings on the track of collectivization.

It is necessary to encourage initiative in the matter of establishing direct economic ties between state industrial enterprises (sugar, flax processing, cotton-ginning mills, etc.) and the sovkhozes, on the one hand, and the surrounding kolkhozes on the other, and wherever possible to create mixed sovkhov-kolkhoz associations under the overall direction of these industrial enterprises and sovkhozes, with a co-ordinated economic plan, with a common technical base (tractor teams, repair shops, etc.), and with common



enterprises to process their agricultural products (butter, oil, cheese, flax-processing plants, flour mills, etc.).

### III

12 In connection with the turbulent growth of the kolkhoz movement and the task confronting the working class and peasant masses of raising the movement to a still higher level, the Central Committee plenum warns against underestimating the difficulties of kolkhoz construction and in particular against a formal and bureaucratic approach to it and to the evaluation of its results.

The Central Committee plenum considers it a most important task of the *soviets* – particularly in the countryside – to strengthen in every way their attention to the matter of collectivization. The attention of the soviets must be directed toward serving the kolkhoz populace as fully as possible on a priority basis, toward making them into bases for an upsurge in, and the socialist reconstruction of, agricultural production, into bases for the soviets' agricultural, social, and cultural measures. It is necessary to strengthen the directing role of the soviets with respect to the collectives, to raise soviet responsibility for kolkhoz construction, and to introduce a system whereby the kolkhozes report regularly to the soviets, but without permitting petty tutelage and administrative interference in the direction of the collectives.

Collectivization of the countryside must occupy a most important place in the work of the *trade unions*. The leading role of the working class in the kolkhoz movement must be consolidated by resolutely assigning workers to the jobs of organizers and executives at kolkhozes and in the kolkhoz system at all levels, which would make it possible to raise the kolkhoz movement to a higher level and to achieve the earliest possible transition to a truly socialist agriculture.

The Central Committee plenum takes note of a growing desire on the part of *industrial workers* to participate actively in the collectivization of the countryside, a desire expressed in the mass organization of worker brigades, in the putting forward of initiators and organizers of kolkhoz construction, in the participation of workers in the production meetings of kolkhozes, in the holding of the 'Day of the Harvest and Collectivization,' etc. This mass initiative on the part of factory workers must be supported and developed in every way, particularly on the basis of creating a mutual

interest in one another's production results. The work of the societies for the patronage of collectivization must be strengthened, and the setting up of new societies to promote the collectivization of agriculture must be speeded up; there must be a strengthening of worker participation in passing contracts with kolkhozes for supplying industry with raw materials and the worker centres with food, and the practice of presenting collective farm reports at enterprises, sending worker brigades to the kolkhozes, etc. must be expanded.

The plenum calls attention to the need to intensify in every way the work of enlisting the masses of farm labourers in the kolkhozes and to the special role to be played in this respect by the Agriculture and Timber Workers' Union.

In connection with the new tasks, the immense increase in the scope of the kolkhoz movement and the intensification of the class struggle in the countryside, it is necessary to strengthen in every way the *party direction* of the kolkhoz movement. This requires that all village party cells play a most active part in kolkhoz construction; it also requires that assistance to the kolkhoz movement on the part of all party organizations be increased in every way.

It is necessary to note the inadequacy of the work of Komsomol organizations in the matter of collectivization. It is a most important duty of the Komsomol in the countryside to march in the front ranks of the kolkhoz movement and to regularly assign thousands and thousands of kolkhoz organizers from among their own ranks.

In stepping up the work of implementing the directives of the XVI Party Conference on enlisting in the Komsomol and the Communist Party the most conscious members of the kolkhozes and those most devoted to the socialist cause, it is necessary to devote particular attention to organizing the strengthening party cells in the major kolkhozes. Party organizations must head up the kolkhoz movement in actual fact; by their direction of the kolkhoz movement they must assure the reinforcement of it as the mainstream for enlisting the broad masses of the peasantry in the cause of building socialism.

The change that has taken place among the broad masses of the peasantry with respect to the collectivization of agriculture must, in the forthcoming spring sowing season, become the point of departure for a *new move*

*forward* in the improvement of poor and middle peasant farming and in the socialist reorganization of the countryside. In deploying an attack against capitalistic elements across the entire front and in strengthening in every way the production union between socialist industry and agriculture, party organizations must mobilize forces in good time for conducting the forthcoming spring sowing; they must give first priority to the task of further developing mass production co-operation, collectivization of peasant holdings, and development of sovkhos construction.

The successful progress of grain procurements and the fact that they will be completed by the first of the year frees the forces of the party, soviets, and co-operatives and creates favourable conditions for the conduct of the spring sowing. While mobilizing the forces of the working class and striving for highly organized and active worker participation in preparatory work for the spring sowing, the party is to rally the decisive masses of the peasantry to accomplish the tasks of an economic advance and of the transition to collective forms of agriculture. Only in this way – by uniting the masses of poor and middle peasantry behind the party and soviets – can the working class assure a decisive strengthening of the agricultural base of the socialist industrialization of the country and in so doing assure a consolidation in the entire cause of building socialism.

### 3.3

#### **On the Bukharin Group**

17 November 1929

Having heard the 12 November 1929 statement of Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky, the Central Committee plenum of the VKP(b) establishes the following facts:

- 1 The authors of the statements that accused the April Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of allegedly having placed them ‘in a position of unequal rights’ are attempting to gain from the party the ‘right’ to oppose themselves to the Politburo as an equal that is ‘freely’ treating with the party, i.e., to gain legal status for the factional grouping of right deviationists of which they are the leaders.
- 2 Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky, who have now been forced – after the shameful miscarriage of all their predictions – to admit the party’s unquestionable successes and who hypocritically affirm the ‘retraction of

all differences' in their statement, at the same time refuse to admit the erroneousness of the views set forth in their platforms of 30 January and 9 February 1928, which were condemned by the April Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission as 'incompatible with the general line of the party.'

3 In levelling demagogic accusations at the party for not having fulfilled the plan in the spheres of wages and agriculture, and in maintaining that the 'extraordinary measures' drove the middle peasantry over to the side of the kulak, the leaders of the right deviationists (Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsy) are by this very act preparing a new attack on the party and its Central Committee.

4 The statement of Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsy is fundamentally at odds with the resolution of the 10th Plenum of the Comintern Executive Committee, which condemned Bukharin's views as opportunistic and removed him from the Presidium of the Comintern Executive Committee.

Proceeding from these facts, the Central Committee plenum is forced to qualify the new document of Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsy of 12 November 1929 as a factional document and as a factional manoeuvre by political bankrupts, analogous to the 'withdrawal' manoeuvres of the trotskyites, who frequently made use of what purported to be conciliatory statements as a method for preparing new attacks against the party.

In rejecting, in view of these considerations, the statement of Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsy as a document hostile to the party, and proceeding from the resolution on Bukharin of the 10th Plenum of the Comintern Executive Committee, the Central Committee plenum resolves:

- 1 to remove Bukharin – as a pioneer and leader of the right deviationists – from the Politburo;
- 2 to warn Rykov and Tomsy – and also Ugarov, who failed to separate himself from the right deviationists and from conciliatoriness toward them – that in case of the slightest attempt on their part to continue to fight against the line and decisions of the Comintern Executive Committee and the Central Committee of the VKP(b), the party will lose no time in applying appropriate organizational measures to them.

Bukharin group, which was first published in 1932 in the 4th edition of *KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh*)



### 3.4

#### **On the Rate of Collectivization and State Assistance to Kolkhoz Construction**

5 January 1930

This resolution in the name of the Central Committee was perhaps the most crucial decision ever taken by the party, and yet it was not submitted to a plenum. Soviet historical publications have revealed that it was originally drafted in a less ambitious form by a commission of the Politburo, consisting of members of the Central Committee and secretaries of regional party organizations, chaired by the commissar of agriculture, Ia. A. Iakovlev, and convened at the beginning of December 1929. Stalin rejected the first version, which was produced on 22 December, and had a direct influence on the framing of the version submitted on 3 January and published in the form given below. The speed of the agrarian transformation ordered in this decision was criticized in Soviet histories written after Stalin's death.

1 In recent months the collectivization movement has taken a new stride forward, encompassing not only isolated groups of private farms but also whole raions, okrugs, and even oblasts and krais. At the basis of the movement is the collectivization of the means of production of the poor and middle peasant farms.

All of the contemplated planned rates of development of the collectivization movement have been exceeded. In the spring of 1930 the sown area cultivated on a socialized basis is already considerably in excess of 30 million hectares; thus the Five-Year Plan for collectivization, which proceeded on the assumption that 22–24 million hectares would be in collectives by the end of the five-year period, will already be substantially over-fulfilled this year.

Thus we have the material basis for *replacing* large-scale kulak production by *large-scale* production in the kolkhozes, for a mighty advance in creating a socialist agriculture, not to mention the sovkhoses whose growth is substantially exceeding all planning assumptions.

This circumstance, which is of decisive significance for the whole economy of the USSR, has given the party ample grounds for passing in its

practical work from a policy of limiting the exploitive tendencies of the kulaks to a policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class.

2 On the basis of all of this it can undoubtedly be established that, by the end of the five-year period, instead of collectivizing 20 per cent of the sown area as provided in the Five-Year Plan, we can resolve the task of collectivizing the overwhelming majority of the peasant farms; the collectivization of such very important grain regions as the Lower Volga, the Middle Volga, and the north Caucasus may be basically completed by the autumn of 1930 or, at any rate, the spring of 1931, and the collectivization of other grain regions may be basically completed by the autumn of 1931 or, at any rate, the spring of 1932.

3 Because of the increasing rate of collectivization, it is necessary to intensify further the construction of factories producing tractors, combines, and auxiliary farm machinery, so that the deadlines established by the Supreme Council of the National Economy for completing the building of new factories will in no circumstances be exceeded. At the same time the Central Committee orders the Supreme Council of the National Economy to report to it not later than 15 March of this year on measures taken to ensure an increase next year in the overall production of complex agricultural machinery in existing plants and, especially, a considerable increase in the production of complex tractor-drawn and horse-drawn machinery instead of simple models.

4 Inasmuch as the problem of the complete replacement of horse-drawn equipment by power-driven models cannot be solved in a short time but requires a number of years, the Central Committee of the VKP(b) demands that tendencies to underestimate the role of the horse at this stage in the kolkhoz movement, which lead to the squandering and selling-off of horses, be decisively rejected. The Central Committee of the VKP(b) emphasizes the exceptional importance under present conditions, of establishing in the kolkhozes, as a transitional measure, pools of *horse-drawn farm machinery* and *combined horse- and tractor-drawn machinery*, the latter being a mixture of tractor- and horse-powered machinery.

5 In connection with the increasing tempo of the movement toward collectivization, the Central Committee orders Narkomzem to regroup the forces and equipment that are dealing with land tenure [such as surveyors] so as to satisfy fully the needs of the regions of complete collectivization with respect to land tenure, setting aside work on individual land tenure.

This does not apply to certain national regions and separate zones that specialize in consumer crops in which the collectivization movement has not yet been broadly developed.

6 In accordance with the above, the Central Committee considers it absolutely necessary that the total credits made available to the kolkhoz sector in 1929–30 be increased from 270 to 500 million rubles, the credits supplied to other sectors being reduced in proportion.

7 In accordance with the changed conditions in the regions of complete collectivization, the MTSS co-ordinated by Traktorotsentr must reorganize their work on the following basis:

*a* agreements are to be made primarily, and even exclusively, with collectives;

*b* peasants are given three years within which to pay for the stations.

At the same time, in regions where sovkhozes are extensive (for example, the Middle Volga and some raions of the north Caucasus), a combined economy in which the sovkhozes assist the kolkhozes, on a contractual basis and for pay, by tractor-ploughing their land and harvesting their crops with machinery, should be tested in practice.

8 In view of the particular significance of cadres, the Central Committee orders the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, All-Union Kolkhoz Centre, Kolkhoztentr, and the oblast party committees to accelerate their training of kolkhoz cadres and make them available to the kolkhozes more rapidly, for this purpose setting up a broad network of accelerated courses. Peasants who have distinguished themselves in practical work in the kolkhoz movement and the members of workers' brigades who have proven to be good organizers of the kolkhoz movement must be attracted to these accelerated courses.

9 Inasmuch as the experience of complete collectivization at the present stage of kolkhoz development shows that the artel is the most widespread form of kolkhoz, in which the *basic* instruments of production (livestock and dead stock, farm buildings, commercial herds) are collectivized, instead of the TOZ, in which the labour is socialized while the instruments of production remain in private hands, the Central Committee of the VKP(b) charges the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, working generally with the kolkhoz organizations, to develop in the shortest possible time a Model Charter of the Agricultural Kolkhoz Artel as a transitional form of kolkhoz

on the way to the commune – bearing in mind the inadmissibility of allowing kulaks to join kolkhozes.

10 The party organizations must head and shape the kolkhoz movement, which is developing spontaneously from below, so as to ensure the organization of *genuinely collective production* in the kolkhozes, and on this basis not only fully to fulfil the contemplated plan for expanding the sown area and increasing the yields, but also – in accordance with the decision of the November Plenum of the Central Committee – to convert the present sowing campaign into the starting point of a new advance in the kolkhoz movement.

11 The VKP(b) Central Committee emphasizes the necessity of a resolute struggle against any attempts to hinder the development of the kolkhoz movement because of the insufficiency of tractors and complex machinery. At the same time the Central Committee with all seriousness warns party organizations against guiding the kolkhoz movement ‘by decree’ from above; this could give rise to the danger of replacing genuine socialist emulation in the organization of kolkhozes by mere playing at collectivization.

*Pravda*, 6 January 1930

*KPSS v rezoliutsiakh* IV, 383–6.

### 3.5

#### **On Further Work on the Regulation of Party Growth**

11 February 1930

According to the leading specialist on party membership, T.H. Rigby, the years 1930–31 probably witnessed the all-time high point in the mass recruitment of workers. It was unusually easy for them to enter, individually and in large groups (despite the party Rules concerning group enlistment). The stress on proletarianization was indeed strong, as approximately a million industrial and transport workers joined, although the goal of having half the total party membership consist of workers was not achieved. The following resolution not only reflects this development but also signals the opening of a new era in party recruitment: the favourable treatment of ‘intelligentsia,’ usually meaning technical and managerial people, or the new Soviet ‘bourgeoisie,’ if one prefers. In the long run this social group has had the most influential position in the party and in Soviet society.

This decision was published on 11 February 1930. The actual date of adoption by the Politburo, Orgburo, or Secretariat has not been revealed.



1 The major successes of the socialist reconstruction of the economy (rates of industrial growth exceeding those contemplated by the Five-Year Plan, the transition to full-scale collectivization) have led to tremendous growth in the activity of all strata of the toilers, and primarily of the proletarian masses. Socialist competition encompasses more and more hundreds of thousands of proletarians, the Lenin appeal to the shock-workers is very successful. On a mass voluntary basis 25,000 worker activists have been sent to the kolkhozes. This upsurge in activity is overflowing into a massive influx of proletarians into the party; instances of the collective (brigades, shops) submissions of applications by workers to enter the party are no longer isolated occurrences.

2 Noting the well-known successes in carrying out the directive of the November (1928) Plenum of the Central Committee (in 1929 more than 200,000 industrial workers were brought into the party, which led to an increase of the proportion of production workers in the party from 42.4 per cent to 46.9 per cent), the Central Committee considers that the tremendous growth of proletarian activity makes it possible to accelerate fulfilment of this decision of the Central Committee plenum, and by the XVI Party Congress to have at least half of the party membership consist of production workers. Recruitment into the party must be connected in the closest way with mobilization of the masses for accelerated fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan, for overfulfilment of this year's production targets and for an intensified offensive against capitalist elements in the city and countryside.

Evaluating the collective submissions of applications to enter the party by whole shops and enterprises as a major index of the growth of proletarian confidence in the party, the Central Committee considers that the collective submission of applications not only does not exclude but, on the contrary, assumes that persons will be taken into the party on a strictly individual basis. Therefore, the individual approach must be retained as the only correct method. Those are to be selected for party membership who have in practice – primarily in production and public work – shown themselves to be progressive proletarians meriting admission into the ranks of the Bolshevik Party, who are capable of being in the vanguard of the working masses in the practical overcoming of the difficulties of socialist construction, in rebuffing petty bourgeois ideological wavering, in fighting actively against manifestations of chauvinism, in elevating generally the confidence of the whole mass of rural workers and toilers in the party

(November Plenum of the Central Committee). The active participation of workers in shock brigades and socialist competition and their genuinely progressive role in production are to be considered a major criterion of admission into the party. In any recruiting effort the large enterprises must be the object of special attention. The forthcoming re-elections of lower-level party organs in enterprises are to be used to explain the party's tasks and to intensify the admission into the party of industrial workers (through reports of cells at workers' meetings, etc.).

A very important condition of the successful fulfilment of this task is the participation of the whole mass of Communists in recruitment and their genuinely progressive role in production, the involvement of every single Communist in shock brigades and socialist competition.

At the same time, considering the growing inclination of the progressive part of the Soviet intelligentsia (technicians, engineers, scientists, etc.) to join the party, it is advisable to take its best elements into the party – those who have proven their devotion to the proletarian revolution and have been tested in active public work under the party's leadership.

3 The broadly developed mass collectivization and implementation of the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class, on the one hand, and the scarcity of party organizations in the countryside on the other, demand an expansion of the ranks of the rural organizations by bringing in agricultural workers, sovkhoz workers, and farm labourers, as well as a more resolute effort to bring progressive kolkhoz members, especially those from among the poor peasantry, into the party. Persons are to be carefully selected for admission into the party who have manifested initiative in organizing and consolidating kolkhozes, who have fought actively and unflinchingly against the kulaks and petty bourgeois property-owners, against the remnants of the petty bourgeois property-owning mentality, and who have successfully met the test of active work in carrying out current economic and political campaigns, and in fulfilling the obligations of the kolkhozes to the Soviet state.

4 The intensified growth of the party demands a corresponding expansion of educational work with those newly admitted into the party; for this purpose practical steps are to be taken immediately to expand the network of party schools and to supply them with texts, teachers, etc.

The krai (oblast) committees and the national central committees are ordered to dispatch responsible persons to all large enterprises and to large kolkhozes and sovkhozes for organizational and party-educational work (organization groups), to assist lower-level party organizations in the bolshevik education of new party members and in getting such members involved in practical work. For this purpose an additional 150 organization groups are to be recruited for work in enterprises from among the personnel of central and oblast institutions. The practice of posting leading party persons to enterprises for systematic political and organizational work is to be extended.

*Pravda*, 11 February 1930

### **3.6**

#### **On the Development of Political and Educational Work with the Newly Admitted Candidate Masses**

21 February 1930

The surge of the broadest masses of workers to join the party and the target, set by the recent Central Committee decisions, of raising the number of industrial workers to 50 per cent of the party membership by the XVI Party Congress require an expansion of the existing lower-level party educational network (party schools, political circles) and the appointment of supplementary propaganda personnel for party educational work with the newly admitted candidate masses.

At the same time, the expansion of the existing party educational network should also try to encompass the non-party worker activists, especially the brigade-leader activists, in order to improve propaganda and to heighten the political level and class consciousness of the non-party worker activists who are inclined toward bolshevism.

The Central Committee considers it necessary:

*a* To order the krai and oblast committees, and the central committees of the national communist parties, to organize in enterprises open discussions among the leading persons of party committees and of economic, soviet, co-operative, and trade union organizations on the most urgent questions of socialist construction for the benefit of the newly admitted candidate

masses. The candidate masses are to be involved actively in these discussions.

*b* To organize a supplementary network of short-term political circles and party schools to enable the newly admitted candidate masses, who are not included in the existing network of party education, to assimilate the general fundamentals of the party Programme and Rules in the most intimate connection with current party policy.

The Culture and Propaganda Section of the Central Committee is given ten days to issue a programme of party educational work for the newly admitted candidate masses.

*c* Political educational work with candidates is to be organized on the basis of a two- to three-month course with classes meeting twice every ten days. While party studies are to be closely associated with the tasks of training the newly admitted candidates and involving them in practical party public work in production and in proletarian organizations, candidates should not be overloaded and thus kept away from their party studies.

*d* In order that the study courses of the candidate masses may be supplied with propagandists, worker propagandists must be brought extensively into this work, primarily from among those comrades who have received their political training in marxist-leninist circles, soviet-party schools, etc., and also from among those persons in local party organizations who are best trained politically.

It is also necessary to bring in the maximum number of politically trained party members from among the personnel of soviet institutions for work with the newly admitted candidate masses, this work being viewed as a basic party assignment.

The students of communist institutions of higher education, agricultural institutions of higher education, and soviet-party schools who have been sent out to work in the countryside should be used by the rural organizations for propaganda work with the farm labourers and kolkhoz members who have been recently admitted into the party.

*e* To train new worker propagandists, a network of courses is to be organized in the major industrial regions lasting from two weeks to one month, the persons brought into these courses being released from their production work. The costs of running these courses are to be paid from the

party budget, and the students are to be paid by the economic organs (i.e., are to be paid their usual working wages).

Courses for the training of new worker propagandists are to be organized only in places where persons who have passed through equivalent training are already being fully utilized. The organization of such courses is to be approved by the krai party committees.

The trained worker propagandists are to return to work in the enterprises which have sent them to the courses, remaining there for the whole period of the candidates' leninist studies.

*f* In order to improve the training of worker propagandists it is advisable to have regular meetings of all propagandists attached directly to factory party organizations. The attention of the propagandist groups is to be centred on the analysis of the study programme of the candidate masses in close association with current problems of production, the industrial and financial plan, socialist competition, etc.

*g* The organization and propaganda groups of the Central Committee are obliged to participate in party educational work with the newly admitted candidate masses, in the selection and training of worker propagandists, and in organizing the guiding the work of propaganda groups in the enterprises.

*Pravda*, 12 March 1930

### 3.7

#### **On the Struggle against Distortions of the Party Line in the Kolkhoz Movement**

14 March 1930

Although responsibility for the drive for rapid, massive collectivization can almost certainly be attributed to Stalin, it is quite possible that he did not anticipate the extent of the turmoil that beset the Soviet countryside in the winter of 1929–30. In any case he personally sought to mitigate the disruption and pass the blame for it to lower levels in a famous article, 'Dizzy with Success,' published in *Pravda* on 2 March 1930 (*Works* XII, 197–205). The following party decision re-emphasizes Stalin's point and perhaps adds some critical nuances. Why it took almost two weeks for this restatement of Stalin's message to emerge from the party executive is hard to explain. One should not underestimate the power of bureaucratic inertia, but it is also possible that policy disagreements on the Politburo level account for the lag.

The information received by the party Central Committee on the course of the kolkhoz movement indicates that along with the real and serious

successes of collectivization, there are also instances of distortion of the party line in various regions of the USSR.

First of all, the *voluntary* principle in kolkhoz construction is being violated. In many regions the voluntary principle is replaced by *forced* entry into kolkhozes under the threat of being dispossessed as a kulak, of being deprived of electoral rights, etc. As a result, a part of the middle peasants and even of the poor peasants have sometimes been ‘dispossessed as kulaks,’ the figure in some regions being as high as 15 per cent, and as many as 15–20 per cent being deprived of their electoral rights. There have been instances of exceptionally rough, outrageous, and criminal behaviour toward the population on the part of certain lower-level persons who were sometimes the victims of provocation by counter-revolutionary elements who had wormed their way in (pillaging, dividing up property, arrests of middle peasants and even of poor peasants, etc.). In a number of raions, furthermore, preparatory work on collectivization and the patient explanation of the bases of the party’s policy to the poor and middle peasants is *replaced* by the bureaucratic decreeing of inflated figures from above and artificial exaggeration of the percentage of collectivization (in some raions the percentage of collectivization ‘passed’ in a few days from 10 to 90 per cent).

This is a violation of Lenin’s well-known instruction that the kolkhozes can be firmly established and vital only if they arise voluntarily. This is a violation of the resolution of the XVI Conference [2.67] of our party prohibiting the use of forcible measures in forming the kolkhozes. It is a violation of the Charter of the Agricultural Artel approved by the Sovnarkom and the Central Executive committee of the USSR which states perfectly straightforwardly that the farm labourers, poor peasants, and middle peasants of such-and-such village ‘unite *voluntarily* in an agricultural artel.’

In addition to these distortions, in some places there have been instances of the *compulsory* socialization of living quarters, sheep, goats, fowl, and milk cows (not used for the sale of dairy products), all of which are forbidden and harmful for the cause. Moreover, there have been attempts to leap in a stupid and bungling way from the artel form of kolkhoz, which is the fundamental link in the kolkhoz movement, to the commune. They forget that in our country the basic agricultural problem is not a ‘chicken’ problem or a ‘cucumber’ problem but the *grain* problem.

They forget that at the present moment the basic link in the kolkhoz movement is not the commune but the *agricultural artel*. They forget that this is precisely why the party found it necessary to issue a Model Charter not for the agricultural *commune*, but for the agricultural *artel*. These stupid and bungling distortions have in many raions discredited the kolkhoz movement and caused the peasants to desert these communes and artels, which were hastily thrown together and therefore unstable.

Thus the party's determination that at the present moment the fundamental link in the kolkhoz movement is not the commune but the artel is being violated. There is also violation of the well-known resolution of the party Central Committee, issued 6 January 1930 [3.4; 6 January is the date of publication] to the effect that the artel form of the kolkhoz movement is its principal form and that, consequently, there can be no frivolous leaping from the artel form to the commune.

Finally, the Central Committee finds it necessary to point to the completely impermissible distortions of the party line with respect to the struggle against religious prejudices and also in the matter of commercial exchange between the city and the countryside. We mean the *administrative* closing of churches without the consent of the overwhelming majority of the village, which usually leads to an intensification of religious prejudices, and the *abolition* of markets and bazaars in many places, causing a deterioration in the supplying of the cities. There can be no doubt that such practices, carried on under the flag of 'leftist' phrases, actually bring water to the mill of the counter-revolutionaries and have nothing to do with our party's policy.

In the view of the Central Committee, all of these distortions result from the *direct violation* of the party's policy, the *direct violation* of the decrees of the leading organs of our party, which can only prepare the basis for a strengthening of rightist elements in the party.

The Central Committee considers that all these distortions are now the *basic hindrance* to the further growth of the kolkhoz movement and are of *direct assistance* to our class enemies.

The Central Committee considers that the continued *rapid growth* of the kolkhoz movement, and the *liquidation of the kulaks* as a class, are *impossible* without the immediate liquidation of these distortions.

The Central Committee orders party organizations:

1 To end the practice, observed in many places, of forcible methods of collectivization, at the same time continuing the stubborn struggle to *draw* the peasants into the kolkhozes voluntarily and to *consolidate* the existing kolkhozes.

2 To concentrate the attention of their workers on the economic improvement of the kolkhozes and the organization of field work, ensuring through appropriate economic and party political measures the *consolidation* of the successes already registered in collectivization and the organizational economic ordering of the agricultural artel.

3 To prohibit the transfer of agricultural artels to the status of agricultural communes without the approval of the okrug kolkhoz unions or the okrug executive committees and to end the *forcible* socialization of habitations, sheep, goats, fowl, and non-commercial milk cows.

4 To check the lists of those who have been suppressed as kulaks and deprived of electoral rights and immediately *to right any errors committed* with respect to middle peasants, former red partisans, members of the families of village teachers, Red Army men and Red Sailors (both rank and file and those in positions of command).

5 While being guided strictly by the rule that kulaks and other persons deprived of electoral rights are not to be admitted into the kolkhozes, to *permit waivers* to this rule with respect to members of families containing red partisans, Red Army men, and Red Sailors (both rank and file and those in positions of command), and village teachers, if they are loyal to the Soviet power and willing to stand guarantee for members of their families.

6 To *forbid* the closing of markets, *restore* bazaars, and *allow* peasants, including kolkhoz members, to sell their products on the market without hindrance.

7 To *put a decisive end* to the practice of closing churches by administrative order covered by the fiction that this expresses the public voluntary desire of the population. To *permit* the closing of churches only when this really expresses the will of the overwhelming majority of the peasants and when the decree of the peasant gathering has been approved by the oblast executive committee. Those guilty of mockery or pranks against the religious feelings of the peasants are to be held accountable in the strictest fashion.



8 To *remove* persons who are unable or unwilling to fight resolutely against distortions of the party line, *replacing* them by others.

*Pray da*, 15 March 1930

*KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh* IV, 394–7

# XVI Party Congress

26 June–13 July 1930

The XVI Party Congress, consisting of 2159 delegates, was the first Stalinist congress. While the XV Party Congress of 1927 had witnessed the triumph of the party line over the Trotsky left opposition, this had been a victory in the name of a collective leadership in which Stalin was not the acknowledged chief and which was based on coalition with Bukharin and the subsequent right opposition. By the summer of 1930 this coalition had disintegrated and the right had been crushed. Drastic economic policies that they had opposed had been implemented at great cost but without a political breakdown. And Stalin, especially since his fiftieth birthday in December 1929, had emerged publicly as the predominant leader and hero. The Congress was in large measure a celebration of these developments, deserving the label ‘Congress of the Victors’ at least as much as the XVII Party Congress of 1934, which was in fact awarded this distinction. The first mention of Stalin’s name as a candidate for the presidium of the congress (a routine distinction shared with many) produced a reaction that set the tone of Soviet politics for the next generation. The stenographic account reads: ‘Stormy and prolonged applause. The entire congress stands and greets the candidacy of Comrade Stalin.’ His report on behalf of the Central Committee was the main event at the Congress. (See his *Works* XII, 242–385; XIII, 1–17, for the English translation.) In subsequent major speeches his policies were enthusiastically approved with remarkably little recognition of the stresses that they had produced, especially among the peasants, and his erstwhile opponents were castigated in detail by such speakers as Ordzhonikidze, Molotov, Kuibyshev, and Kirov. Bukharin himself was absent owing to illness, but three former oppositionists in the Politburo – Rykov, Tomsky, and Uglanov delivered humiliating confessions of error which presaged the purge trials of 1936–38.

A plenum of the Central Committee of 71 members and 35 candidates elected at the Congress met on July 13 and in turn elected the new executive organs of the party. The most notable changes in the Politburo were the absence of Bukharin (expelled in 1929) and Tomsky and the elevation of Kaganovich, Kirov, and Kossior from candidate to full membership.

## 3.8

### On the Central Committee Report

2 July 1930

The XVI Congress of the VKP(b) completely and fully *approves* the line and work of the Central Committee of the VKP(b).

The period reported on was a turning point both for the capitalist countries and for the USSR. For the USSR it marked the transition from a period of restoration to one of reconstruction and to a tremendous

development of socialist construction; in the capitalist countries the turning was in the direction of economic decline.

The Congress notes with satisfaction that the correct leninist policy of the Central Committee has resulted in a further strengthening of the international might of the USSR, in tremendous successes in the socialist industrialization of the country, in the strengthening of fraternal cooperation among the peoples of the Union on the basis of a leninist national policy, in the fulfilment and overfulfilment of the programme for the first two years of the Five-Year Plan, and in a decisive turn to socialism on the part of the mass of middle peasants, permitting the party to switch from the slogan of limiting and supplanting the kulaks to the slogan of *liquidating the kulaks as a class on the basis of total collectivization* ...

## II

During the period reported on the USSR entered the phase of gigantic development of socialist construction. The correct leninist policy of the Central Committee has assured that socialist industry will have mighty scope and has evoked an immense upsurge of enthusiasm for production among the working masses enabling the party to set itself the task of realizing the Five-Year Plan in four years. The rates of socialist construction achieved by the party give the Soviet Union the possibility of technically and economically catching up with and overtaking the leading capitalist countries in a very brief historical period.

The rapid rate of industrialization has created a basis for the *socialist reconstruction of agriculture*. This year, already, the sovkhozes are to yield more than 100,000,000 puds of marketable grain. The kolkhoz Five-Year Plan was overfulfilled for the current economic year. Already this year the kolkhozes are to yield more than 500,000,000 puds of marketable grain. Despite the panicky assertions of the right opportunists about the degradation of agriculture, the party successfully solved the basic grain problem on the basis of the leading role of socialist industry, of uniting in kolkhozes the small, backward, and scattered peasant holdings and of assisting individual poor- and middle-peasant farms. This year for the first time the area sown to grain crops exceeds the pre-war figures. A significant increase was achieved in the area sown to industrial crops. The party has already begun solving the livestock problem.

The immense rate of socialist industrialization of the country has been accompanied by a considerable numerical *growth in the working class*, by an increase in its material and cultural level and in real wages, by the transition to the seven-hour working day, the introduction of a continuous five-day week, and by a sharp reduction in unemployment.

Completion of the economic regionalization of the country is significantly speeding up the industrialization of previously backward regions, peripheral areas, and national republics, is creating new industrial and proletarian centres in those areas, and is facilitating a more correct and expedient distribution of industry and agriculture over the entire territory of the USSR.

These successes were achieved by the party in struggle and in overcoming the difficulties on the path of socialist construction. As opposed to those of capitalist countries, ours were difficulties of growth and not of decline. These difficulties result from the fact that we have to reorganize fundamentally industry and agriculture, to change their technical basis and equip them with modern machinery. This task is particularly complex with respect to agriculture, where the reorganization of the technical basis must at the same time be accompanied by a reorganization of the social and economic structure of agriculture, by the unification of the small and very small, scattered holdings into kolkhozes, and by eradication of the roots of capitalism. The complexity of the work of the socialist reconstruction of industry and agriculture is all the more compounded by the fierce resistance of the kulaks, the bourgeois intelligentsia, and the bureaucratic elements in the state apparatus (wrecking, sabotage, etc.).

The basic conditions for successfully and rapidly overcoming these difficulties are an acceleration of the rates of socialist construction and a large-scale attack on capitalist elements along the entire front. Any let-up in these rates in the interests of capitalist and kulak elements and any moderation of the attack against them would not, in fact, mean an easing of the difficulties, but rather a compounding of them and a strengthening of the positions of the class enemies of proletarian dictatorship.

The capitulationist stand of the right opportunists in favour of reducing the rates of industrialization is essentially dictated by the interests of the kulak and capitalist groups and leads to a restoration of capitalism.

The party and the working class have given and will continue to give the most merciless rebuff to the opportunistic capitulationist line of the

rightists, a line tantamount, in fact, to *treason against the interests of the working class*.

The Congress charges the Central Committee in its further work on the socialist industrialization of the USSR to concentrate the party's efforts on the achievement of the following basic tasks:

1 To develop *heavy industry* in every possible way as the fundamental basis of socialist construction (ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, the production of electrical energy and of fuel, machine building, and chemistry) and to create in the shortest period possible a *new, powerful coal and metallurgical base in the form of the Urals-Kuznetsk Basin Combine*.

2 To develop and rebuild *transport* – and in particular rail and water transport – which has become one of the most serious bottlenecks in the socialist economy.

3 To strengthen the development of the branches of industry producing articles of *mass consumption* (light industry), and also to develop their raw materials base.

4 To force the pace of export by means of the intensified development of a number of branches of industry and agriculture that produce for export.

5 To fulfil without fail the industrial and financial plans, to fulfil in a most exacting fashion the plan tasks *for reducing unit cost and for improving the quality of output*, to effect rationalization in a more resolute and planned way, to combat substandard output and production losses, to increase labour productivity and to liquidate the gaps in the plan for a number of branches.

6 To develop in every way the *equipping of agriculture with machinery and tractors*, to fulfil the sovkhos Five-Year Plan in three years, and to build a firm machine and tractor base for the complete collectivization of peasant holdings throughout the USSR.

7 To speed the carrying out of measures to restore and develop animal husbandry and to develop an industry for producing food goods on the basis of the corresponding branches of agriculture.

8 To accomplish the intended *increase in real earnings* and to improve the work of the supply network, particularly along the line of consumer cooperatives.

The problem posed with full vigour by the Central Committee concerning *managerial, economic, and technical cadres*, which has become

the central problem of our socialist construction, is one of decisive importance. Only by continued mobilization of the forces of the entire party and of the working class for the tasks of training cadres from out of the ranks of the working class, only by a resolute change for the better in this area can a continuation of bolshevik rates in the socialist industrialization of the country be assured.

### III

The rapid rate of socialist industrialization of the country achieved by the Central Committee on the basis of the directives of the XV Congress introduces a profound change in the relationship among the classes inside the country. These changes are characterized above all – along with the rapid numerical growth of the working class – by a *strengthening of its leading role* with respect to the poor and middle peasantry. *The economic union between the working class and the basic masses of the peasantry has acquired, for the most part, a production character.* The policy of the party and its Central Committee has assured the successful transformation of the backward and scattered small peasant holdings onto the course of large-scale socialist agriculture, the development of *complete collectivization and a transition to the realization in practice of the motto for the liquidation of the kulaks as a class.* During the period reported on, the role of private capital declined sharply, and a further exclusion of it is taking place. The planning and regulatory role of the Soviet state is being decisively strengthened throughout the country's entire economy, and is increasingly encompassing not only industry but agriculture as well. The task set by Lenin of transforming 'the Russia of NEP' into a 'socialist Russia' is being accomplished.

The growth of socialist construction and the intensification of the attack on the capitalist elements is inevitably evoking *an intensification of the class struggle in the country* on the part of the kulak and capitalist elements and desperate attempts at resistance on their part. By basing itself on the growing activity of the landless and poor peasant masses in the villages, and by strengthening the union with the middle peasants, the party broke the counter-revolutionary sabotage and resistance of the kulaks, successfully carried out grain procurements, and accumulated an important reserve grain supply. *The decisive turn of the middle peasant masses to socialism* as a result of the correct policy of the party found its most vivid expression in

the vast kolkhoz movement that, by the end of 1929, had encompassed millions of peasant holdings, a movement that is creating a *new balance of class forces in the country*, that is converting the middle peasant who joins the kolkhoz into a support for Soviet power, that is creating the conditions for a replacement of kulak grain production by the production of kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and that is enabling the party to make the transition *from the slogan for limiting and supplanting the kulaks to the slogan for the liquidation of the kulaks as a class on the basis of complete collectivization*.

The Congress stresses the great historic importance of that slogan, which signifies the assault by the working class on *the last stronghold of capitalist exploitation in the country*.

The Congress considers to be absolutely correct the Central Committee directives of 5 January 1930 on rates of collectivization [3.4] and the accompanying measures for the liquidation of the kulaks as a class in various raions and oblasts of the USSR on the basis of a firm alliance with the middle peasants.

However, the Congress states that a number of oblast and local organizations grossly violated the Central Committee directives (resolutions of the XVI Conference and November 1929 plenum [3.1] decisions of 5 January 1930, and Comrade Stalin's article, 'The Year of the Great Breakthrough') in adopting the course of collectivizing their oblasts during the 1930 spring campaign (while the Central Committee resolution spoke of two to three years and more). This stand was particularly impermissible and harmful with respect to the [grain] deficit areas and to the backward national republics.

The party has achieved the greatest of successes in socialist construction thanks to the firm carrying out of the general party line and thanks to the pitiless and resolute struggle on two fronts – against trotskyism and conciliatoriness toward it, and against the right deviation as the major danger at the given stage and conciliatoriness toward the right deviation.

Only the struggle on two fronts has resulted in the complete exposure of trotskyism, which has completely regressed to a counter-revolutionary, Menshevik position. In the party, however, there continue to exist conciliatory attitudes towards trotskyism, which find expression above all in a failure to attach sufficient importance to the union of the working class

with the middle peasantry. The party will continue in the future the most resolute struggle against these attitudes.

Having smashed trotskyism, the party encountered new manifestations of opportunism in the form of the right deviation (the Bukharin group). The right deviation opposed its openly opportunistic line to the general party line. The line of the right deviationists leads to capitulation before the country's kulak and capitalist elements. The implementation of the line of the right deviationists – who are objectively the agents of the kulaks – would mean a defeat for the construction of socialism and the restoration of capitalism in our country. In the period of a large-scale attack across the entire front against the capitalist elements, the right deviation was and still is the main danger in the party.

The Congress completely and fully approves the measures of the party Central Committee in the struggle against trotskyism and the right deviation, measures that assured the actual preservation of party unity, the carrying out of the general line and the closing of party ranks on the basis of leninism.

The Congress calls the attention of the entire party to the fact that opportunists of every stripe, and particularly right opportunists, are trying a new manoeuvre that takes the form of formally admitting their mistakes and formally agreeing with the general party line, but without confirming that admission through their work and their struggle for the general line, which in fact is merely tantamount to switching from an open struggle against the party to a covert struggle or to waiting for a more propitious moment to renew their attacks on the party.

The party must declare the most merciless war on such two-facedness and deceit, and demand of all who admit their mistakes that they prove the sincerity of their admissions by actively defending the general party line. Failure to fulfil this requirement must incur the most decisive organizational measures.

The Congress declares that the views of the right opposition are incompatible with membership in the VKP(b).

The Congress notes – in connection with the sharpening of the class struggle inside the country – an activation within the ranks of the party of *nationalist deviations* in the sense of great-power and local chauvinism.



The primary danger at the present stage is the *great-power deviation*, which attempts to revise the principles of the leninist national policy and to hide under the banner of internationalism the attempts by obsolescent classes of the formerly dominant Great Russian nation to reclaim their lost privileges.

The deviation toward local nationalism, which is weakening the unity of the peoples of the USSR and playing into the hands of the intervention, is also becoming active.

The party must intensify the struggle against both deviations in the national question and against conciliatoriness toward them, while at the same time paying increased attention to the practical carrying out of leninist national policy, to the overcoming of elements of national inequality and to a broad development of the national cultures of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

The XVI Congress considers that the Central Committee of our party, in closing the ranks of leninists for the new historic battles, must continue mercilessly to rebuff all *attempts to shake or undermine the iron party discipline and unity of the leninist party*.

The XVI Congress assigns the party Central Committee the task of continuing to assure *energetic bolshevik rates* of socialist construction, to achieve the actual *fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan in four years* and to carry out unswervingly the *liquidation of the kulaks as a class* on the basis of *complete collectivization* throughout the Soviet Union.

The congress expresses its unshakable belief in the fact that by rallying the millions of workers and kolkhozniks under the banner of leninism and by smashing the opposition of the class enemies, the VKP(b) will lead the masses in a *large-scale socialist offensive* and will assure the complete *victory of socialism in the USSR*.

The congress expresses its unshakable belief that by increasing the might of the USSR and strengthening fraternal ties with the workers and labourers of capitalist and colonial countries, the VKP(b) will assure the *strengthening of the USSR as the invincible stronghold of the international proletarian revolution*.

*Long live the victory of socialism in the USSR!*

*Long live the victory of the international proletarian revolution!*

13 July 1930

### 3.9

#### **On the Report of the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin**

##### **I**

The XVI Congress of the VKP(b) fully and completely approves the political line and practical work of the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin.

In the situation of a socialist advance on a broad front, and given the intensified resistance on the part of the class enemy, the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin has protected the leninist unity of party ranks with all due vigilance, has led a resolute struggle for implementing the general party line, defending the line against all attempts to distort it, both from the side of the 'left' deviationists as well as that of the right opportunists and conciliators, and has blocked the slightest attempt at factional work.

The Congress fully approves the work done by the Central Control Commission to purge party ranks of socially and ideologically alien elements, of hangers-on, of corrupted and bureaucratized elements, and of elements impeding the development of the socialist advance. The Congress affirms that the party purge, conducted in conditions of widespread self-criticism and with the active participation of the masses of workers, farm labourers, and the poor and middle strata of the countryside, resulted in a strengthening of party ranks, improved the party's fighting capacity and facilitated the enlisting in the party of new hundreds of thousands of production workers.

The congress takes particular note of the fact that in the past period the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin have done a major job of utilizing the advantages of a planned system and the initiative of millions of working people in the country's economic construction. In fighting to speed up the pace of industrialization, the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin have correctly focused attention on maximum utilization of internal reserves in the economy of the USSR. The Central Control Commission and Rabkrin posed, and helped to solve, the tasks of mobilizing internal reserves in a number of branches of the economy (metallurgy, mining, fuel, lumber and the textile industry, shipbuilding, transportation, cotton growing, etc.) and

waged a struggle to put capital construction in good order and to create a construction industry.

Of particular importance and timeliness was the initiative of the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin in forcing the pace of Soviet machine building and production of heavy equipment, an initiative aimed at realizing in the shortest possible time the directive of the XIV Party Congress on 'changing the USSR from a country that imports machinery and equipment into a country that produces machinery and equipment in order, in that way, to ensure that the USSR – in a position of capitalist encirclement – does not become an economic appendage of the capitalist world economy, but stands as an independent economic unit that is being developed in socialist fashion.'

Basing themselves on the activism of the working masses, the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin have done an immense job in a number of highly important branches of the economy, and in this way have facilitated the successful realization of the slogan coined by the party, 'Complete the Five-Year Plan in four years.'

The Congress approves the work of the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin in simplifying and reducing the cost of the soviet apparatus. The simplification of industrial management, credit and taxes, of trade and cooperatives, procurement and foreign trade organization facilitated the alignment of the soviet apparatus with the requirements of the reconstruction period and the large-scale advance of socialism.

Noting that the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin have played a major role in implementing the party slogan on widespread development of self-criticism, the Congress approves the measures of the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin aimed at broadening the struggle against bureaucratic distortions in the soviet apparatus, at creating constant supervision of the apparatus and at enlisting the working masses directly in the management of the state.

The Congress affirms that the party has scored major successes in recent years in the fight against bureaucratism, and notes with satisfaction that the purge of the soviet apparatus conducted by the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin with the active support of the working masses, struck a serious blow at bureaucratism, and expelled from the apparatus tens of thousands of unsuitable and corrupted elements, and elements of a hostile class character.

All this work of the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin, including the struggle against bureaucratism in the state apparatus, was aimed at carrying out the basic task – posed by Lenin – of adapting the state apparatus to best serve the masses and to maintain and strengthen the union of the working class with the peasantry on the basis of industrialization of the country and socialist reorganization of agriculture. The Central Control Commission and Rabkrin successfully accomplished this work in their struggle against the right deviation both in the sphere of ideology as well as the practical work of state and economic organization, hewing closely to the path indicated by Lenin, laying bare short-comings and punishing the guilty ‘regardless of who might be involved.’

The immense difficulties that accompany socialist construction find expression in the influence of class enemies on the weaker links in the apparatus of the proletarian dictatorship. This influence is manifest in distortions in the work of individual, bureaucratized elements in the state and economic apparatus. Today, continued successful development of socialist construction confronts the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin with the task of waging a resolute struggle to cleanse and make healthy the state and economic apparatus and to create conditions in the apparatus that rule out the possibility of wrecking and other manifestations of kulak and NEP-man influence.

## II

In connection with the gigantic tasks of the extensive socialist advance and the reconstruction of the entire economy, the Congress considers that one of the most important tasks of the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin should be to disclose and mobilize all the country’s resources for a further acceleration in the rate of industrialization, to increase in every way the production capabilities of industry, transport, and agriculture, while at the same time simplifying the management apparatus and exterminating from it all elements of bureaucratism.

1 The billions of rubles’ worth of reserves in industry and transport that are not being put to use as a result of the lethargy and bureaucratism of our apparatus, confront the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin with the task of constantly supervising the work of disclosing and putting to use these additional sources for increasing the rate of our development. The Central Control Commission and Rabkrin must regularly check on the

progress of the work of rationalizing and specializing enterprises, of developing exchanges of experience between enterprises, and of utilizing the achievements of Soviet and foreign technology. The Central Control Commission and Rabkrin must see to it that through the efforts of economic managers, trade unions, and the working masses under party direction, all enterprises and their equipment are utilized to the limit of their capacities.

2 The Congress instructs the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin to continue overseeing the progress of work on capital construction and, devoting particular attention to the major construction sites, to strive resolutely to speed up construction work, to reduce the cost of the work and improve its quality, and to strive for the utilization by the industry of the experience of advanced capitalist countries. At the same time it is necessary to combat any excesses whatsoever in capital construction.

The Central Control Commission and Rabkrin must devote attention to seeing that new equipment – whether acquired abroad or at home – is promptly put to use and yields its maximum production effect.

3 In accordance with the decision to create a second coal and metallurgical base – the Urals-Kuznetsk Basin Combine – the Congress instructs the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin to see to it that this decree is actually carried out by economic and other organizations on a suitable timetable.

4 With the aim of assuring the reconstruction of all branches of the economy, the Congress assigns the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin the job of studying and testing measures to force the development of Soviet machine-building and heavy equipment (blooming and rolling mills, heavy electrical equipment, chemical equipment, etc.), particularly those aspects that could replace the importation of equipment from abroad. The congress calls the attention of all economic managers and trade union organizations to the special importance of this task and considers that all local party and trade union organizations must apply themselves fully to the accomplishment of this most important task. The Congress assigns the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin the task of seeing to it – in particular – that the plan for ferrous metallurgy is fulfilled and output raised to 17,000,000 tons in 1932–33.

5 In consideration of the fact that the weakest point in the work of industry is its progress in fulfilling plan tasks for qualitative indices (reduction of unit cost, volume of output per worker and output quality), the

Congress advises the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin to supervise the organization of the struggle to reduce unit cost and improve output quality. In addition to supervising the setting up of technical controls at enterprises, the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin must organize widespread public supervision over the quality of output in order to achieve a decisive breakthrough in this area in the very near future. The Central Control Commission and Rabkrin must wage a pitiless struggle against all who ignore this most important task.

6 In the sphere of agriculture, the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin must pitilessly combat all distortions of the party line and kolkhoz construction, such as: violations of the principle of voluntariness, the substitution of commands for public initiative and failure to wage the requisite struggle against kulak elements, both as concerns the elimination of the kulaks as a class on the basis of total collectivization, and in imposing limitations on capitalist elements in other areas, while at the same time waging a struggle against distortions of the party line with respect to individual peasant holdings, and poor and middle peasants.

The Central Control Commission and Rabkrin must be vigilant in seeing that the party line with respect to the middle peasant is meticulously observed in the practical work of kolkhoz construction, thus assuring both an acceleration in the further development of the kolkhoz movement as well as a strengthening of the kolkhozes already in existence.

The Congress advises the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin to concentrate their attention on supervising the execution of party directives on developing the building of sovkhoses for grain crops and in particular for livestock and technical crops.

The Central Control Commission and Rabkrin must check on the organization and course of the struggle to improve the efficiency and quality of work of kolkhozes and sovkhoses, striving for a reduction in the unit cost of production, for full utilization of equipment, for correct labour organization and an increase in labour productivity, and for the development of socialist competition.

7 The Central Control Commission and Rabkrin must continue its review of the reconstruction of transport, continued rationalization of it and mobilization of its internal reserves, particularly as concerns utilization of rolling stock and economies in fuel and metal. The Central Control

Commission and Rabkrin must devote particularly serious attention to the development and utilization of river and sea transport.

8 Noting the insufficient flexibility of the state and cooperative trade system and the excessive overhead expenses in its work, the Congress instructs the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin to continue the work of rationalizing the trade apparatus and to completely eliminate superfluous elements in it. Particular attention should be devoted to organizing mass supervision over the work of the kolkhozes with the aim of increasing the country's food resources (dairy sector, truck gardens, etc.) and distributing existing stocks. In the area of foreign trade, the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin – apart from strengthening supervision of the activities of foreign trade organizations and over the recruiting of reliable and qualified cadres – are to continue to struggle with all due rigour to replace imported goods with the output of Soviet industry and to find new sources of export.

9 In approving the measures conducted by the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin to introduce non-cash settlement of accounts, and in particular to organize mass, non-cash transactions for the populace, the Congress advises the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin to achieve extensive development of such transactions.

10 The entire work of the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin to bring to light short-comings should contribute to a better selection of cadres and – on the basis of acting on those short-comings – to the training and improved work of personnel. The Congress orders the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin regularly to supervise the carrying out of party decisions on training new qualified cadres and also on the utilization of them in practical work.

### III

The Congress considers it necessary to continue the decisive reorganization and simplification of the state apparatus, which is making insufficient use of the advantages of the socialist system for economic and cultural construction.

Proceeding from the experience gained in successfully reorganizing the apparatus of foreign trade, industrial management and the credit, customs and tax systems, etc., the Congress assigns the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin the job of resolutely eliminating both the forms and institutions

of management uncritically taken over from capitalism, as well as those that – while meaningful in the early years of the Soviet system – have lost their meaning in a situation in which socialist elements predominate in the country's economy (i.e., a multitude of taxes and tariffs, stock companies, etc.). An equally pitiless struggle is necessary against the proliferation of a great many institutions that duplicate one another and are superfluous, as is the elimination of parallel links in the apparatus, and links that have become superfluous at the new stage. In precisely the same way, the multitude of sources for financing one and the same organization must be eliminated.

1 The Congress considers that the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin – while continuing their work of simplifying and reducing the cost of the entire industrial management apparatus – must focus their major attention on improving the work of the lower-level units of industry (enterprise and shop).

The Congress advises the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin to achieve full implementation of Central Committee directives on the introduction of one-man management, development of the economic accountability principle, and improvement in production planning.

In addition, the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin must put a stop to all manifestations of bureaucratism and communist swaggering at enterprises, phenomena that fetter the development of worker initiative and impede the development of socialist competition, and must in every way promote the strengthening of the role of party cells in production. Without interfering in details and without taking the place of management, the party cells must concentrate their attention on strengthening labour discipline, raising labour productivity, and uncovering hidden internal resources and production capabilities.

The Central Control Commission and Rabkrin must also take on the task of improving the set-up of accounting and reports at enterprises, so that they do not just serve the aims of general management and technical direction, but are done in ways that are understandable to broad strata of the workers and are of assistance in organizing and directing socialist competition and the shock-worker movement, as well as in the exchange of work experience among enterprises.

2 While approving of the work done by the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin, the Congress also feels that the results achieved in this area – particularly where economic, trade, and co-operative organizations are



concerned – are still insufficient. The Congress assigns the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin the task of achieving a significant reduction in the staffs and in the cost of all apparatuses, the feasibility of which was demonstrated by the experience of fundamentally reorganizing a number of agencies in connection with the purge of the soviet apparatus (the staff of the Central Union of Consumers' Co-operatives was reduced by 50 per cent, that of the Moscow Finance Department by 64 per cent, of the All-Union Paper Trust by 51 per cent, the Urals Oblast Land Administration by 56.7 per cent, the All-Union Textile Association by 50 per cent, the Metals Imports Trust by 40 per cent, etc.).

The Congress advises the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin to assume as one of the most important tasks of their practical work the regular supervision of reductions in administrative and managerial expenditures.

The Congress orders all management at departments, institutions, economic organizations, enterprises, and trade and co-operative organizations to be unrelenting in their supervision of rigorous application of norms in calculating administrative and managerial expenditures.

3 Noting the impermissible inflation of the kolkhoz and cooperative apparatus, both at the centre and in the local areas, and noting as well the high cost of this apparatus, which constitutes a heavy burden on the collectivized peasant farms and impedes the growth of the kolkhoz movement, the Congress instructs the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin to carry out the anticipated reorganization of this system and to achieve a significant simplification of the apparatus, to reduce its cost by not less than 50 per cent and also to do away with excessive reports and correspondence.

4 In connection with the fact that the growth of collectivization poses in a completely different light the question of the role of the raion and rural agencies of Soviet power as those directly in charge of the socialist reorganization of the countryside, the Congress considers it necessary to strengthen the rural soviets in every way and decisively to change the content and methods of their work in the sense of extending it to cover more and more of the questions of the economic and cultural reorganization of the countryside. In addition, the raion must truly be made the central point for the practical implementation of party policy in the village.

The Congress instructs the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin to supervise with particular care the carrying out of the decision abolishing the okrugs, to assure the transfer of the okrug's operative functions, authority, and material resources to the raion and to the city soviets, and to supervise the reassignment of okrug personnel to the raions.

In carrying out the dissolution of the okrugs and the redistribution of their functions, it is necessary to assure the full preservation of the rights accorded to national education (to the autonomous oblasts and national raions and soviets).

5 Proceeding from the results of the first year of the purge of the soviet apparatus, the Congress orders the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin to continue the purge on the basis of self-criticism and – with the participation of the broad masses of workers, the rural poor, and collective farmers – and to extend it to the entire managerial apparatus: the administrative and soviet, the economic, and the cooperative and kolkhoz apparatuses.

The Congress stresses the fact that the purge of the soviet apparatus is not merely the concern of the Rabkrin, but that of the entire party and of the entire working class and makes it incumbent on all party organizations and on each and every Communist to assist the Control Commissions and Rabkrin in this work in every possible way.

The Congress calls the attention of the entire party to the fact that party cells and party members – as was shown by the purge and instances of wrecking – often fail to head up the struggle against distortions in the class line, lag behind, and fail to bring these phenomena to the party's attention.

Wrecking, which is a manifestation of the class struggle, is made possible and is facilitated to a considerable extent not just by the shortages of our soviet cadres, but also by dint of the fact that many party members, and in particular, individual Communists who are executives of establishments and enterprises, fail to show the requisite vigilance and at times are under the influence of wreckers in their practical work.

The Congress considers it necessary to increase the responsibility of party cells and party members – and in particular of party-member executives – for instances of bureaucratism and wrecking.

The Congress stresses the fact that it is incumbent on each and every Communist to be a shock trooper in the battle against bureaucratism, setting

the example and carrying along behind him the rest of the masses, keeping in mind the fact that the fight against bureaucratism is a most important sector in the class struggle front.

6 A major achievement in the struggle against bureaucratism is the new mass form of worker supervision from below, the patronage of the soviet apparatus by factories. The patronage by the factories and the transfer to workers of the carrying out of certain functions of the state apparatus are a major step toward the accomplishment of Lenin's idea to the effect that, 'our aim is the *cost-free* performance of state duties by *each and every* worker in serving out his eight-hour "lesson" in productive labour' (Lenin). The seven-hour work day opens up new possibilities for realizing these behests of Lenin's.

The basic task of patronage must be to exercise daily supervision on the part of the patron factory over the carrying out of highly important party and government directives by the apparatus under its patronage. It is precisely this day-to-day familiarization of workers with the practical work of institutions that will create a powerful reserve of new proletarian cadres for permanent work in the soviet apparatus.

As a mass proletarian movement aimed at improving the work of the soviet apparatus, such patronage should find exceptional support and assistance on the part of all organizations.

7 Party organizations, and particularly those at factories, should regard patronage as a most important part of their mass work. Executives at organizations and party cells at institutions that have been taken under the patronage of factories are ordered to create a favourable situation for the work of the patron factory and are held responsible for obstructions on the part of the apparatus that hinder the development of the patronage.

The Congress orders the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin carefully to study and expand existing experience in drawing the mass of workers – who are to remain in production work – into the management of the state, to expand the experiment in turning over to workers the execution of certain functions of the state apparatus.

8 The Congress considers it necessary to continue resolutely to promote production workers and peasants, particularly from among the active collective farmers – both male and female – to responsible positions in the soviet apparatus. Particular attention must be paid to the advancement of

non-party members to such positions, and to the setting up of appropriate training for everyone given such advancement.

The Congress assigns responsibility to the executives of administrations, to party cells and to trade union organizations for creating favourable conditions for the work of those who have been advanced. In addition to further staffing of the apparatus with workers by means of advancing workers from the enterprises, it is necessary to devote the most serious attention to training and schooling the children of workers for the decisive renewal of the social composition of the soviet apparatus.

#### IV

The major successes of socialist construction, the cultural and political growth of the proletariat, and the positive results of enlisting the broad masses in the purge of the apparatus make possible and necessary the transition to a widespread attack on bureaucratism, which is impeding our development rates, based on a fundamental reorganization of the soviet apparatus and on a rigorous, daily check on the carrying out of party and government directives.

The party and the working class today enjoy new possibilities for achieving significant new victories in the struggle against bureaucratism. To do so it is necessary constantly and persistently – with still greater energy and resolve – to exterminate and root out bureaucratism in all sectors of socialist construction.

At the present stage, the struggle against bureaucratism cannot be confined simply to reducing staffs and to combatting red tape, discourteous treatment of the public, etc. *‘Reviewing personnel and reviewing the actual performance of tasks* – that, again that, and only that is the very heart of all our work and of our entire policy today’ (Lenin). Today, at the new stage, this thought of Vladimir Ilyich’s takes on particular meaning and points up the central task of the entire struggle against bureaucratism. Irresponsibility, a functionary’s self-satisfaction, and failure honestly and exactly to carry out party and government directives, are the most dangerous and pernicious aspects of bureaucratism. Pitilessly combatting this intolerable evil and necessarily carrying the verification of the execution of directives to its full conclusion, must become the accepted practice in the fight against bureaucratism.

The Congress instructs the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin resolutely to remove from their jobs all employees who do not fulfil party and government directives with due exactitude and conscientiousness, regardless of the person's origins, position, and former services. In pitilessly punishing those guilty of bureaucratism, the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin must be guided by Lenin's statement to the effect that, 'The task of the Rabkrin is not just – and actually not so much – one of "catching" and "exposing" (that is the task of the courts, and while the Rabkrin closely approximates the courts on many points, it is not identical with them) as it is a matter of *knowing how to correct*.

'Skilfully setting things right in good time: that is the task of the Rabkrin.'

v

The Congress instructs the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin to continue to protect the leninist unity of party ranks with the same firmness and resolve and to intensify still further the struggle against all forms of opportunism and conciliatoriness toward it, and in particular against the right deviation, pitilessly suppressing any and all attempts to impair iron party discipline.

The Congress stresses the fact that a basic condition for the successful fulfilment of the great and most complex tasks of socialist construction and for successfully combatting both bureaucratic distortions in the soviet apparatus and elements of bureaucratism in the party apparatus, is the continued, bold development of bolshevik self-criticism. The Congress instructs the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin to keep a careful lookout for instances of the suppression of self-criticism and to invoke the strictest of punishments for the guilty parties.

The Congress instructs the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin to proceed with renewed vigour in mobilizing the masses to fight for the exact and meticulous fulfilment by all state, economic, and co-operative organizations of party decisions on assuring militant bolshevik rates of socialist construction and fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan in four years.

Fulfilment by the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin of the immense tasks that confront them, must be based on enlisting the participation of the masses to an even greater extent. In drawing new tens and hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants into the diverse forms

of supervision over, and management of, the state, the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin must with greater energy and consistency play a role of organizer of the broadest masses, carrying out Lenin's directive to the effect that 'the entire mass of working people, both men and – *in particular* – *women*, are to be given some role to play in Rabkrin' (Lenin).

The Congress expresses full confidence in the fact that the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin will link their work still more closely, and on an even broader scale, with the lives of the millions of workers and peasants, assuring a strengthening of the economic might of the USSR and the deployment of a socialist advance across the entire front for the complete victory of socialism in the USSR ...

### **3.10**

#### **On the Fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan for Industry**

13 July 1930

##### **I SUCCESSES IN THE FULFILMENT OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR INDUSTRY**

The most important task in the successful building of a socialist society is the socialist reconstruction of an economy that can reorganize agriculture, increase the defence capability of the land of proletarian dictatorship, and free the economy of the USSR of dependence on the capitalist countries.

'The true and only basis for the consolidation of resources and creation of a socialist society is heavy industry: that is the one and only such basis' (Lenin).

Taking these premises as a point of departure, the xv Congress adopted 'On the Directives on the Establishment of a Five-Year Plan for the National Economy' [2.61] and on the basis of these directives the XVI All-Union Party Conference approved a Five-Year Plan for the development of the economy.

Through these decisions the party projected high rates of development for industry as a whole, and particularly for the branches producing the means of production. Thanks to the ever-growing mobilization of the working masses to struggle for the realization of these tasks and to the Central Committee's correct bolshevik direction of the entire fulfilment in practice of the industrial plan, the rapid rate of industrialization adopted by

the party has not only been fulfilled, but has actually been overfulfilled for the past two years.

In 1927-28, the plan for industry (control figures for 1927-28) had in fact already been exceeded both for industry as a whole and in particular for the branches producing the means of production. For all planned industry the actual increase in production over the previous year amounted to 26 per cent as opposed to the 24.5 per cent specified in the control figures, while for heavy industry the actual increase amounted to 28.7 per cent as against 21.3 per cent for the control figures.

The results for 1928-29 – the first year of the Five-Year Plan showed that in gross output, planned industry had exceeded the assumptions of the Five-Year Plan (a 24 per cent increase in production instead of the 21.4 per cent called for under the plan).

This success in the first year of the Five-Year Plan made it possible to increase significantly the plan figures for industrial output in 1929-30 and to set the growth in production at 31.3 per cent as against 21.5 per cent under the Five-Year Plan.

The first months of 1929-30 showed that, although the growth in industrial production considerably exceeded the figures of the Five-year Plan, the decisions taken by the party on the control figures for the current year had not been fully carried out, which posed the danger of an outright failure to meet the entire year's plan for industry. The party, under the direction of the Central Committee undertook a widespread mobilization of the forces of the working class for the struggle to fulfil the industrial plan, mercilessly exposing and castigating short-comings in the work of economic units as well as in trade union and party organizations. As the result of a whole series of measures taken by the Central Committee (the Central Committee appeal of 25 January 1930 on meeting the control figures for industry; press communiqués; inspection of the work of individual trusts and industrial associations, dispatching of Central Committee members to industrial areas, etc.) – a definite change for the better was achieved in the fulfilment of the industrial plan. Nonetheless, the rates established for the development of industry have still not been met at the present time. The results of the first half year of 1929-30 show that the increase in gross industrial output as compared with last year amounted to 29.4 per cent while the increase should have been one of 31.3 per cent. What is needed is a further and truly bolshevik mobilization of the forces of

the party and of the entire working class for a decisive struggle to meet the industrial plan for the current year, to fulfil and overfulfil it.

The Congress states that the fulfilment of the plan for this year will assure, in the first place, an increase in the gross output of planned state industry of 65 per cent for the first two years, instead of the 47.5 per cent projected by the Five-Year Plan and, in the second place, a considerable increase in the rate of industrial growth in 1929–30 over that for 1928–29.

As concerns all major industry of the USSR (both planned and unplanned), gross output for these two years will increase by approximately 59 per cent instead of the 43 per cent foreseen in the Five-Year Plan. As a result, production totals this year for the industries on which figures are regularly kept will be double those for the pre-war period.

In accordance with the firm line of priority development for the branches of industry producing the means of production, gross output for the branches of heavy industry during this two years will have risen (for planned industry) by 88 per cent instead of the 58.4 per cent projected by the Five-Year Plan. As a result, the relative proportion of heavy industrial output in the total for all planned industry will have risen from 42 per cent in 1927–28 to 48 per cent in 1929–30.

The high rates of development of industrial production have been accompanied by a significant growth (by over 520,000 since the XV Congress) in the numerical strength of the *working class*, and by an absolute (and not merely relative) reduction in the number of unemployed.

This process of drawing new hundreds of thousands of workers into industrial production was accompanied by a significant improvement in the material and cultural situation of the working class, by an increase in its share of the national income, and by an improvement in everyday service to the broad working masses as a result of wage increases, the introduction of the seven-hour working day in a broad range of enterprises, the reduction in unemployment, the increase in the social insurance budget (which exceeds 1,400,000,000 rubles for the current year), and major investment in the construction of housing for workers.

The growth of socialist industry, having increased its relative weight, its role, and its influence in the economy, meant at the same time a growth and strengthening of the influence of consistently socialist forms of production relations, and has immeasurably strengthened the position of socialism in our country, having created the technical and economic basis for a decisive



turn of the poor and middle peasant masses toward the socialist organization of agriculture.

## II SHORT-COMINGS AND THE BATTLE FOR QUALITY

The overfulfilment of the plan tasks on the basis of quantitative indices for industrial work was accompanied, however, by consistent shortfalls with respect to indices for the *quality* of its work. The tasks for labour productivity, for reductions in the unit cost of industrial output and in construction costs were consistently not fulfilled, thereby reducing the overall results of the work of industry.

The situation with the quality of industrial output, which is at a very low level, and in individual cases shows a tendency toward further decline, is particularly intolerable. The Congress considers that economic agencies should bear no less responsibility for the quality of output than for fulfilment of the plan tasks for quantity, and that when industrial and financial plans are drawn up for the basic branches producing mass output, indices should be set for the quality of the given output. The Congress assigns to economic agencies, trade unions, party organizations, the Komsomol, the press, and the entire working public the task of enlisting the broad working masses in the job of decisively improving the quality of production, and of making broad use for this purpose of such forms of labour organization as socialist competition and the shock work movement.

Taking note of the non-fulfilment of the plan tasks for *reducing unit cost* in 1928–29 (4.4 per cent as against the 7 per cent specified by the plan) and a certain threat to the complete fulfilment of the plan task for the current year (6 per cent for the first half year as against the 11 per cent specified by the plan), and in view of the exceptional importance that a reduction in the unit cost of industrial output and in the construction cost index would have for accelerating the rates of socialist construction, the Congress proposes that special attention be devoted in the practical work of industry to socialist rationalization. This should take the form of a struggle for improved organization of production, an increase in labour productivity, the most rational utilization of raw materials, materials, fuel and equipment, and a struggle against losses in production and handling, measures that should assure the fulfilment of plan tasks for unit costs while necessarily improving the quality of output.

The Congress states that despite a certain improvement in recent years in the area of *capital construction*, industrial construction practices suffer to this day from a number of major short-comings. They include: the unsatisfactory state of design work and lags in that work; failure to make full use of the construction season; an extended construction front and slow rates of construction; the high cost and low quality of construction work, non-fulfilment of plan tasks for reducing the construction index, disorganization in the supplying of basic materials to construction sites, discrepancies between construction rates and the rates at which equipment is delivered, deficient organization of geological survey work, the unsatisfactory level of scientific research, etc. The struggle against these short-comings in the area of industrial capital construction must be the focal point for the attention of all organizations of the working class.

### **III MOST IMPORTANT TASKS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY**

In the course of work to fulfil the Five-Year Plan for industry, a number of difficulties and bottlenecks have been revealed and the party's attention must be focused on overcoming them:

*a* A most important condition for the forced development of industry and of the economy as a whole is the strengthening and expansion of the energy base of the Soviet Union to dimensions that will assure an unbroken expansion of industry and the economy in all areas of the country.

The Congress recognizes the necessity of achieving in the very near future the complete elimination of the country's fuel deficit. The Congress assigns the Central Committee the task of taking measures aimed at a decisive increase in the extraction of fuel of all sorts.

Considering the fact that new mine construction is critically in arrears with respect to the demands placed on the anthracite coal industry, the Congress considers it necessary to force the pace of major mine construction, with particular attention being paid to increasing tunnelling rates and bringing them up to the level of the leading industrial countries.

To alleviate, and then completely eliminate, the fuel deficit requires a maximum increase in the extraction and utilization of local fuels (peat, shale, local coals, natural gases), using them where possible to replace fuel hauled in from a distance. Moreover, the Congress proposes that steps be taken so that high-priced coals of special importance for coking and chemistry not be used for heating purposes. The Congress proposes that the

Central Committee take stern measures to conserve these coals for the purposes indicated.

Considering the fact that the rational utilization of fuel resources and electric power is of immense importance for easing the fuel balance, the Congress proposes that the Central Committee take the sternest measures to reduce fuel expenditures at enterprises, on the railroads, etc.

Noting the disproportion between industrial development and the supplying of electric power to a number of highly important regions (Donets Basin, Kuznetsk Basin, Leningrad, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, the Urals), the Congress considers it necessary to expand the network of electric power plants being built and to achieve a decisive breakthrough in the supplying of electric power to enterprises.

*b* The industries that equip the peasant holdings that have passed into the public sector, faced with high rates of collectivization, must assure growth rates in *tractor, farm machinery, and motor vehicle construction, and in the chemical industry* that accord with the needs of our agriculture, which is in a process of reconstruction. That is why it is a task of immense political importance to put the Stalingrad Tractor Plant into production on time, to expand production of tractors at the Krasnyi Putilovets Plant [now the Kirov Plant, in Leningrad] to 25,000 units in 1930–31, to complete the Kharkov tractor plant in 1930–31, and to force the pace of construction work on the Cheliabinsk Tractor Plant, the harvester combine plants in Zaporozhe, Siberia, and Saratov, the motor vehicle plants in Moscow and Nizhny [Gorky], the chemical combines and plants producing mineral fertilizers and potash; and to reorganize the plants producing farm machinery with a view toward maximum expansion of the inventory of tractors and to eliminate in the shortest possible time the need to import tractors. The Congress proposes to the Central Committee and the appropriate soviet agencies that they follow with unflagging attention the course of construction work on the projects indicated and see to the completion of them within the time limits that have been established.

*c* The Congress considers it necessary to assure a steady and consistent growth in the application of chemistry in all branches of the economy in the sense of forcing the pace of the development of chemical fertilizer and pesticide production for agriculture, of potash, nitrogen, and artificial fibres, of wood chemistry, of the processing of shales, peat and chemically

valuable coals (synthetic lubricants, fuel, etc.), of paints, construction materials, etc.

*d* The overall growth of freight turnover in the country, which significantly exceeds the targets of the Five-Year Plan, demands of industry a development of the production facilities servicing the needs of all *types of transport* – and particularly of water transport in view of its extreme backwardness – to assure the development of transport in conformity with the rates for the development of the economy.

*e* The scale of capital investments in industry and the economy, which is growing with each passing year, requires of state and co-operative *construction materials* industries (lumber, cement, refractory materials, etc.) rates of development that correspond to demand for those materials on the part of an economy in the process of industrialization. The increasing scale and accelerating rates of capital construction require a resolute forcing of the transition to industrial methods of construction through standardization, typification, and timely design work, and also maximum mechanization of construction work, a transition to year-round construction, and the creation of permanent staffs of builders.

In particular, more attention must be paid to the production of new types of construction materials.

*f* In view of the growing importance of the non-metallic minerals industry (mineral raw materials) in the economy, and in particular in export, the Congress calls attention to the necessity of assuring the development of this branch of industry in every way.

*g* It is a task of prime importance to force the development of the branches of industry that are increasing the defence capability of the Soviet Union.

*h* Particular attention must be devoted to the development of the *export branches* of industry, those that are increasing our currency resources and thereby opening up new, additional possibilities for increasing the rates of our industrialization.

*i* A growth in the demands of the broad masses of workers and peasants and the task of consistently raising the material and cultural level of their lives on the one hand, and the insufficiency of the agricultural raw materials base, which limits possibilities for the development of the light industry, on the other hand, require that in the course of the next three years we succeed

in basically freeing the agricultural raw materials processing industries of dependence on the foreign market, and in raising the raw-materials base of industry in the USSR to a level that assures complete fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan and a maximum work load for existing equipment in the corresponding branches of light industry.

#### IV CONDITIONS FOR FULFILLING THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR INDUSTRY

1 Party policy in realizing the Five-Year Plan found support in the vast labour upsurge and creative enthusiasm of the broadest masses of the working class, which found expression in the mass transition to new socialist forms for the organization of labour – *socialist competition and shock work*, which are opening a new era in socialist construction.

Here the party must also continue, as before, to search for the basic source for overcoming difficulties in fulfilling the Five-Year Plan and for speeding up the rates of the construction of socialism

2 A solution to the problem of cadres, which requires a decisive and radical expansion and qualitative improvement in the practical work of training industrial cadres and increasing their qualifications, is a necessary precondition for fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan.

*a* In view of the greatly expanded demand for qualified workers, and in view of the fact that development rates are exceeding those called for in the Five-Year Plan, the existing network of factory apprenticeship schools and schools for mass occupations in industry must be significantly expanded, as must participation in them.

Together with the expansion of factory apprenticeship schools as the basic form of training young people as qualified workers, the coming years must see a broad development of short-term training and retraining of workers (the Central Institute of Labour's courses and adaptive education bases, brigade apprenticeships, courses to increase the qualifications of the unemployed, to retrain them, etc.), with, however, the obligatory subsequent raising of the production and technical – as well as cultural and political – level of the workers trained by these methods.

Under conditions of the reconstruction of production it is particularly important to train new cadres of highly qualified workers (installers, assemblers, brigade leaders, toolmakers, senior workers, etc.), and also of lower- and middle-level technical workers (foremen, brigade leaders, inspectors).

In order to increase in every way the technical knowledge of the broad working masses, of administrative and technical personnel, and particularly of workers who have been promoted to higher responsibilities, it is necessary that annual publishing plans devote a significant fixed percentage to technical publications (books, brochures, journals), while striving to improve their quality and forcing the pace of translation of the best technical books and articles appearing in Europe and America.

*b* The Congress completely approves the decision of the July 1928 and November 1929 Central Committee plenums and the subsequent decisions of the Central Committee on the reorganization of the higher schools and proposes the establishment of special supervision and control over the carrying out of those decisions to achieve a fundamental breakthrough in this decisive matter in the shortest possible time. While waging a pitiless struggle against counter-revolutionary wrecking in economic agencies, it is necessary to continue, as before, to show an attentive attitude and concern for all specialists working on the development of the socialist economy.

*c* The Congress considers that the achievements registered in strengthening the command structure of industry are insufficient with respect to the demands placed on cadres in the present period of the socialist reconstruction of the economy, and proposes that the most important task for industrial management is that of mastering technical knowledge in their respective production area.

The Congress proposes that a more decisive job be done in promoting to command positions cadres and organizers from among the specialists who are devoted to the cause: from among the young engineers and technicians, and particularly from among workers promoted in the course of the work of production meetings, the All-Union Control Commission and the shock-work brigades.

3 A most important reserve for the continued forward movement and speeding up of socialist development is maximum utilization of existing industrial *equipment*, whose utilization at present is completely insufficient, and the introduction of *new technology*.

*a* Considering that the introduction of the continuous work week and the increase in the number of work shifts significantly improve the possibility of utilizing factory and plant equipment, increase the work loads of enterprises and facilitate on acceleration in the turnover of capital and an increase in gross output and a reduction in unit cost, and that the results of

the continuous work week for the past period have shown that the latter was an essential factor in the fulfilment of the industrial and financial plan in 1929–30, the Congress proposes to assure in the coming year the conversion of all the basic branches of industry to the continuous work week, while at the same time expanding efforts in every way to increase shift work at enterprises.

*b* The Congress considers it necessary to expand the practice of sending workers and specialists abroad and inviting foreign engineers, foremen, and qualified workers to the USSR, while assuring the full utilization of their experience and knowledge at the enterprises of the Soviet Union.

In utilizing already existing technical aid agreements and enlisting foreign aid in the reconstruction of industry and the organization of new production units, it is necessary to achieve the kind of pace that would enable our industry in a very short time to absorb the best experience and the most important achievements of advanced technology.

*c* At the same time there must be a broad exchange of experience in successful measures of rationalization among state enterprises of the Union. The broad working masses must be enlisted in the struggle against a sluggish and bureaucratic attitude toward this matter on the part of the apparatus and against secretiveness. Reporting of the technical achievements of the best enterprises must be assured, as must their dissemination to other enterprises. There must be a broad dissemination of the system of patronage by leading enterprises over backward ones.

*d* The Congress considers that socialist rationalization, which is the best method for mobilizing vast hidden reserves and reducing unit cost, must become an inalienable part of the practical work of the entire administrative and technical personnel of industry, and must occupy the central place in the technical and production work of the enterprise. To this end, the units charged with rationalization must be strengthened throughout industry, from top to bottom.

The work of rationalization must be linked in the closest fashion with competition and shock-work, and broad use must be made of worker suggestions and worker inventiveness in this matter.

Standardization of the materials and raw materials utilized by industry as well as of output itself, and also of component parts, must be broadly developed.

The Congress acknowledges that a most important aspect of rationalization is to specialize enterprises and reduce their range of output – to organize mass production and co-operation among specialized plants.

*e* Energetic measures must be taken to expand technical propaganda, to enlist the broad working masses – through the use of special public organizations – in the cause of introducing new technology, and to utilize the creative initiative of the masses for the purposes of the technical reconstruction of industry.

*f* From the standpoint of a more intense utilization of existing industrial capabilities, mutual relations must also be established between large-scale state industry and small-scale, local, and cottage industry. Small-scale local and cottage industry, and in particular co-operative industry, while developing the production of articles for the market, must also serve as a supplement to large-scale industry by producing on order from it a number of parts and semi-manufactures and thus freeing the equipment of large-scale industry from production operations that can be carried out in small-scale cottage and handicraft enterprises.

4 Solution of the tasks that confront industry demands the earliest completion of the reorganization of the *system of industrial management*, proceeding from the following basic principles:

- a* Assuring the system of one-man management at all levels in industry;
- b* assuring industrial enterprises maximum independence and initiative in the fulfilment of plan tasks;
- c* strengthening the technical management of the work of enterprises;
- d* eliminating harmful parallelism in the work of economic agencies and simplifying the entire system of planning and management in industry.

The Congress approves the decisions of the Central Committee on bringing order into the management of production, establishing one-man management, and reorganizing the management of industry, and demands that they be carried out unflinchingly. At the same time the Congress states that the work of reorganizing the management of industry is proceeding with insufficient speed and energy and that a number of mistakes have been committed in the conduct of this work: thus far the principle of economic accountability has not been implemented in a number of cases; one-man management has not been instituted at all enterprises; in certain cases the relations between various industrial units have become more involved



rather than simpler, and the administrative and managerial staffs have been increased rather than reduced. The Congress charges the Central Committee to take measures to correct in a most rapid fashion the short-comings indicated, to complete the work of reorganizing industry in the shortest possible time, to reduce managerial staff and to implement with determination the one-man management of production.

The successes of socialist construction and the successes of the Five-Year Plan are so apparent that they cannot fail to command recognition from the capitalist world. The hopes of the world bourgeoisie that were staked on a financial frustration of the Five-Year Plan have been dashed. Their wager on our cultural backwardness and on the shortage of cadres has been dashed. Their hopes that the boney hand of famine would wreck the Five-Year Plan have been dashed. Dashed, too, were their hopes for a breakdown in the union between the proletariat and the middle peasants.

With unprecedented speed the USSR is being transformed from a backward agrarian country into an advanced country, a country of major industry. The place of the USSR in the world economy is changing, and has already changed. The Five-Year Plan proposed that the Soviet Union move up from fifth place to fourth in the world for coal production by 1932–33. In fact, that position will already be reached in the coming year. In pig-iron production the Soviet Union was to have reached fourth place in 1932–33. In fact, that position will have been won in 1931–32 as a result of the increased rates for the development of ferrous metallurgy.

For a number of most important branches of industry – anthracite coal, petroleum, farm machinery construction, general machine building, and the construction materials industry – the tasks of the Five-Year Plan adopted by the Congress of the Soviets will already have been fulfilled in the first three years.

Successful progress in fulfilling the Five-Year Plan for the development of industry, the resolute turn of the poor and middle peasantry to socialism, the intensified assault on capitalist elements, and the switchover to a policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class on the basis of complete collectivization have exacerbated the class struggle within the country and have evoked a new wave of furious slander against the USSR on the part of world imperialism and its social-fascist yes-men.

Under these conditions the solution of the very great tasks of historic import and significance that confront the party and the working class in the sphere of industrialization require the implementation of a particularly firm and clear bolshevik line in matters of economic construction, and a decisive struggle against all manner of opportunistic distortations of, and deviations from, the general line of the party.

The period that has elapsed since the XV Congress has been filled with the struggle of the Bolshevik Party – basing itself on the mass millions of proletarians and peasants – to achieve the rapid rate of industrialization adopted by it, and above all the development of heavy industry, which constitutes the basis for the socialist reorganization of the entire economy, and to surmount the difficulties in economic development that are standing in the path of the victorious building of socialism.

The party has achieved not merely the fulfilment, but the overfulfilment of the Five-Year Plan, having launched an attack across the entire front on the capitalist elements of city and country despite the fact that under the influence of petty bourgeois elements there was an increase in openly opportunistic wavering on the part of certain strata of the party, which found expression in attempts by the right deviationists to openly attack the party line.

The right deviationists attacked the party line on the basic and decisive question: the question of a high rate of industrialization. The line of the right deviation led to a curtailment of the rate of industrialization being implemented by the party, and consequently, to a strengthening of the capitalist elements in the country. In fact, the policy of the right deviation meant capitulation to the capitalist elements.

The right deviationists attacked the party line on the question of an intensified development of heavy industry, which is the basis of the socialist reconstruction of the national economy. The line of the right deviation in this question led to the undermining of the leading role of the proletariat, marching at the head of the socialist reconstruction of the country. By the same token the line of the right deviation signified a rejection of the struggle for a socialist path of development.

The right deviationists attacked the party line for the development of socialist industry under the pretext of a need to align overall operations on the ‘weak points.’ This line led to a demobilization of the masses instead of a reinforcement of the activism of the masses in overcoming the difficulties.

It was this that completely exposed the capitulatory essence of the rightist deviation.

Only in an irreconcilable struggle against the right opportunist was the party able to achieve – and has achieved – immense successes in the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan. Continued successes in socialist construction are possible only through the continuation of that struggle against the right deviation and against conciliatoriness toward it as the main danger within the party.

At the same time a struggle must be waged with full resoluteness both against the remnants of trotskyism, as well as against all manner of overreacting and of ‘leftist’ excesses of the super-industrialist type. Exposing and overcoming ‘left’-opportunistic excesses is an indispensable condition of the successful struggle against the right-opportunistic deviation, which is the main danger in our party.

In overcoming opportunistic waverings and deviations, the party – on the basis of a consistent implementation of leninist policy in the building of socialism – is rallying to its banner ever broader masses of the working class and of the village toilers, and is strengthening the position of the international proletariat in the struggle for communism.

### **3.11**

#### **On the Tasks of Trade Unions in the Reconstruction Period**

13 July 1930

#### **I THE TRADE UNIONS IN THE NEW STAGE**

The leninist definition of the role and meaning of trade unions in the proletarian state was confirmed in the resolutions of the X, XI, and XIV Party congresses, which set forth the tasks of the trade unions with respect to the demands of the proletarian dictatorship in a given period.

The present reconstruction period of socialist construction, linked with the attack by socialism against capitalist elements across the entire front, differs from previous periods in that it poses the task of a decisive reorganization of the work of all the mass organizations of the proletariat, and in particular of the trade unions, which are the organizations of greatest mass, embracing, as they do, the entire working class.

On the basis of the decisions of the XI and XIV Party congresses, the trade unions have registered significant achievements in their work in the reconstruction period: the transition to individual voluntary membership, important steps in the development of proletarian democracy, the participation of the trade unions in the process of restoring the economy, the enlistment of the masses in socialist construction, etc.

Concurrently with this, bourgeois trade-unionist, opportunistic elements are beginning to build nests for themselves in the trade unions. [Soviet usage distinguishes between ‘tred-iunion,’ implying a bourgeois character, and ‘professionalnyi soiuz’ (contracted ‘profsoiuz’), implying a socialist character, which is commonly rendered as ‘trade union’ in English. In the present translation the former pejorative term is rendered ‘bourgeois trade union’ and the latter favourable term as ‘trade union.’] It is precisely for this reason that the trade unions have fallen short of the new tasks that the party has posed them in the reconstruction period.

The opportunistic leading group on the old staff of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions not only proved incapable of understanding the tasks of the proletarian dictatorship in the reconstruction period and the tasks of the trade union movement that followed from them, but actually resisted the party in the reorganization of the trade unions’ work and in the elimination of their major short-comings, which revealed themselves in striking fashion at the time of the unleashing of the socialist offensive. Distorting the party line in the trade unions, the opportunistic leadership of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions took an anti-leninist, right-deviationist stand on all fundamental questions of the trade union movement at the new stage.

Displaying bourgeois trade-unionist tendencies, the opportunistic leadership of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions actually took the course of weakening party leadership of the trade union movement and took the most dangerous anti-leninist line of opposing the trade unions to the party.

This position was condemned in an absolutely correct and leninist fashion by the party Central Committee and the overwhelming majority of Communists on trade union staffs, who rallied all the more closely around their Bolshevik Central Committee ...

Under party leadership the trade unions, having replaced the bankrupt leaders, have unleashed a decisive struggle against elements of bourgeois

trade unionism and opportunism in the trade union movement.

The XVI Congress considers it necessary to continue an energetic struggle against the elements of bourgeois trade unionism and opportunism in the trade union movement, while at the same time rebuffing anarcho-syndicalist and semi-trotskyist deviations.

This struggle cannot be considered finished in view of the inevitable ‘relative durability – precisely among the trade unions – of all the political influences that have their roots in the remnants of capitalism and in small-scale production’ (from the resolutions of the XI Congress).

## **II FACE TO PRODUCTION**

1 The XVI Party Congress stresses with full vigour the fact that the decisive, basic component of the animation and improvement of the entire work of the trade unions and in enlisting the broad working masses in the management of production is socialist competition and its offspring, shock-work, which is the greatest of the proletarian movements. Only now is a beginning being made toward the realization of Lenin’s great idea of socialist competition ...

That is why socialist competition and shock-work brigades must become the basis of all the production activity of the trade unions at the enterprises and in the shops.

However, in many cases socialist competition still runs afoul of stagnation, bureaucratism, and inertness, both on the part of trade unions and of economic agencies that have not given proper recognition to the great historic importance of socialist competition and of shock-work in socialist construction.

It is the task of the trade unions to organize, to further develop and to consolidate socialist competition and shock-work, and to mobilize the masses against all bureaucrats of whatever ilk, who are trying to debase and suppress socialist competition, against those who are frustrating socialist competition and, finally, against petty bourgeois tendencies.

Those handfuls, groups, and strata of workers that stubbornly maintain the traditions (customs) of capitalism and continue to regard the Soviet stage as before: work as little and as badly as you can for “them” and bilk “them” of as much money as you can’ (Lenin).

While striving in every way to encourage and give recognition to leading workers in their production activity, the trade unions should also

organize comradely courts of the best shock-workers with the aim of bringing influence to bear on persons who are violating discipline and hampering socialist competition. A most important task of the trade unions is to instil in the minds of the broad working masses: 'the consciousness that the workers are working not for the capitalists, but for their own state, for their own class, is an immense motive force in the development and perfection of our industry' (Stalin).

2 The development of socialist competition and of the shock-work movement demands a thorough reorganization of production meetings. The shock-work brigade must be the primary cell in enlisting workers in the management of production. The shock-workers must become the backbone of production meetings.

The Congress considers that production meetings in shops and individual production sectors must base themselves primarily on the shock-work brigades. This does not exclude, but presupposes participation in production meetings by those workers who have not yet joined the shock-work brigades.

In addition the trade unions should support all creative initiatives of the workers, while rendering aid and support to worker inventiveness.

The Congress considers it necessary to further expand the practice of making directors' assistants the chairmen of plant-wide production meetings at large enterprises. The work of the temporary control commissions must be tied in more closely with the organic work of the production meetings, with socialist competition and the shock-work movement. The temporary control commissions must be staffed above all from the ranks of the shock-workers.

3 The ever-growing importance of planned management in the economy – determining as it does over long periods of time the relationship among various elements of the economy, rates of construction, and the material situation of the workers – demands of the trade unions their active and effective participation in the drawing up of economic plans. In this matter it is necessary resolutely to put an end to the formalistic and bureaucratic attitude toward the participation of the trade unions in the drawing up of economic plans, both on the part of the trade unions themselves and on the part of economic and state agencies. In the drawing up of the economic plan, the trade unions should come forward with concrete proposals based on a consideration of all the observations and instructions of the working

masses and the trade union organizations concerning both the plans for particular branches of industry and the entire plan as a whole.

4 In the production work of the trade unions it is necessary to proceed from the task of ‘strengthening, in accord with the Programme of the VKP(b) the role and participation of the trade unions in the management of industry’ (Resolution of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), Donets Basin coal industry).

While not permitting the interference of trade union organs in the operational work of enterprise administrations, the trade unions must at the same time wage a struggle against improper, bureaucratic application of the ‘one-man management’ principle and perversion of that principle by management in a way that excludes production initiative and spontaneous activity on the part of the working masses.

A most important concern of all trade union organizations should be the promotion of outstanding workers and technical personnel – particularly from among the shock-workers – to the positions of plant director and assistant director, shop supervisors, and assistant supervisors, and also to the positions of foreman and subforeman.

At the same time the trade unions must devote particular attention to the task of the mass training of the work force through the development of the factory apprenticeship school as the basic channel for making qualified workers of youth, organizing mass occupational training, and also by using short-term forms of training (Central Institute of Labour, short courses, brigade apprenticeships, etc.). In this matter particular attention should be devoted to enlisting women in production by training and retraining them in various types of schools and courses.

Along with active participation in the training of new specialists, the trade unions have the task of instilling class proletarian views in existing cadres, both in the older ones, and particularly in the growing numbers of young engineering and technical workers who have come from a proletarian background, thus creating the necessary comradely situation for the work of engineering and technical cadres.

### **III THE TRADE UNIONS AND SOCIALIST RECONSTRUCTION OF AGRICULTURE**

The reconstruction period requires the intensification of trade union participation in the socialist reorganization of agriculture. Bourgeois trade unionism in the work of the trade unions, incidentally, revealed itself in a

failure to attach due importance to the leading role of the proletariat in the socialist reorganization of agriculture.

This incorrect stand was linked with the entire position of the right deviationists.

With full determination the XVI Party Congress assigns the trade unions the task of mobilizing the working masses, and above all workers with ties to the village, for practical help in implementing the collectivization of agriculture.

In approving the dispatching of 25,000 proletarians to collective farm construction, the Congress believes that the trade unions will have to carefully train and allocate new thousands of proletarians as organizers and managers of kolkhoz construction.

Noting the ever-growing role of the union of agricultural workers, and in particular of sovkhoz workers, in the socialist reorganization of agriculture, the Congress proposes to all party and trade union organizations that they systematically strengthen that union by transferring experience in the organization of the socialist economy (socialist competition, shock-work brigades) from the leading industrial enterprises to the sovkhozes and kolkhozes.

The trade unions must render assistance in every way in the organizing of the farm labourers and in strengthening the influence and ties of the proletariat with the collective farm masses in the village (patronage, worker brigades).

#### **IV IMPROVING THE MATERIAL SITUATION AND EVERYDAY LIFE OF WORKERS**

1 The Congress notes with satisfaction the rapid numerical growth of the working class of the Soviet Union (in just those industries united under the Supreme Council of the National Economy, the number of workers has increased 250,000 in the past six months) and the sharp drop in unemployment (the number of unemployed has dropped 40 per cent in half a year) as a result of the rapid rate of industrialization and the socialist reconstruction of agriculture.

The Congress notes the unbroken growth of the material well-being and cultural level of the working class of the USSR. In the past five years, workers' wages have increased by more than 79 per cent, rising to 139 per cent of the pre-war level of real earnings, or – when account is taken of



social insurance and allocations from profit to the fund for improving everyday life – to 167 per cent of the pre-war level.

## **V CULTURAL WORK AND THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF THE MASSES**

1 The thorough-going socialist reorganization of the country requires a general improvement in the cultural and political level of the working masses. One of the decisive preconditions of the cultural revolution is the liquidation of illiteracy, the introduction of universal mandatory elementary education, and also a reform of the schools and the setting up of poly technical education. The trade unions together with public education agencies – and with the aid of the ‘Down with Illiteracy’ Society and other voluntary organizations – must in the shortest possible time liquidate illiteracy among trade union members, and above all among industrial and agricultural workers. The methods of the cultural campaign, socialist competition, and the shock-worker movement must be given widespread application in all cultural work.

The Congress considers that the trade union press must become a true organizer of the masses in the reorganization of trade union work and in the struggle for the leninist line in the trade union movement.

2 The Congress considers that all political, educational, and cultural work by the trade unions must be directed above all towards the development of a consciously socialist attitude on the part of the workers towards socialist production.

The trade unions must devote particular attention to the instilling of socialist views in the new cadres, both male and female; they must wage a systematic struggle against petty bourgeois tendencies, against the prejudices and all manner of remnants of the capitalist past in the worker milieu; they must correctly organize and strengthen anti-religious propaganda and the struggle against anti-semitism, chauvinism, national narrow-mindedness, etc.

In all work among the various national groups in the proletariat of the USSR, the trade unions must help to raise the cultural level of the more backward among them.

3 The XVI Congress advises all party organizations and trade union factions to saturate all cultural and educational work of the trade unions with communist content, while combatting the least attempts to divert it

from the tasks of socialist construction and resolutely overcoming elements of apoliticalness and narrow 'culturalism' in it.

4 The Congress obliges party organizations and factions within the trade unions to develop widespread propaganda of leninism in the entire system of trade union cultural and political work and to elevate to the proper principled level the theoretical elaboration of the basic, most important questions of the trade union movement, while resolutely rebuffing all revisionist and opportunistic attempts to distort Lenin's teachings on the trade unions.

#### **VI ON THE INTERNATIONAL WORK OF THE TRADE UNIONS**

It is a most important task of Soviet trade unions to establish even closer ties between the working class of the USSR and the working class of capitalist and colonial countries, to help the weaker sections of the Trade Union International with their organizational and political experience, and to wage a resolute struggle against the right-opportunist errors committed by the old leadership in the international trade union movement. The Soviet trade unions must intensify the instilling of internationalist views among the broad worker masses by systematically acquainting them with the life and struggle of the workers in capitalist and colonial countries.

#### **VII THE REORGANIZATION OF TRADE UNION WORK**

1 The tasks that confront the trade unions in the reconstruction period can be resolved only through a thorough-going reorganization of the work of the trade union organizations. The shock-work movement is the primary basis for the reorganization of the trade unions.

2 The trade union apparatus, which has taken shape over a number of years and has performed a number of important services in organizing the working masses, has, at the same time, accumulated a number of negative elements that the old leadership failed to combat with bolshevik resoluteness. The deficient enlistment of the trade union apparatus in active political life, its insufficient ties with – and at times its divorce from – the working masses, and its limiting itself to narrow shop interests created conditions for the development within the apparatus of apoliticalness, and subsequently – at the time of the VII Trade Union Congress – led to attempts to oppose the trade union apparatus to the party.

Elements of opportunistic and bureaucratic degeneration in certain links of the trade union apparatus resulted in the necessity to pose with all due resoluteness the question of purging the trade union apparatus, of fundamentally improving it, and of adapting it to the carrying out of the most important tasks of the working class.

The Congress approves the purging of the trade union apparatus carried out in accord with the decision of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions by the Central Control Commission-Rabkrin, a purge that cleared the trade union apparatus of stagnant and bureaucratic elements, elements that cut themselves off from the masses and oppose the present reorganization of the work. The Congress considers that the purge of the trade union apparatus will yield successful results only if there is a resolute advancement of production workers – both male and female – within the trade union apparatus. The Congress charges the trade union and party organizations with the responsibility of renewing the apparatus within a very short time by means of advancing hundreds and thousands of shock-workers in it.

The Congress considers that the present reorganization of the work of the trade unions must be accompanied by the enlistment of the broad worker masses in trade union work and by a more resolute enlistment of volunteers in the work of the trade union apparatus. The trade union organizations must attract to their daily work the broad masses of working young people.

The Komsomol, as the leading sector of working youth, must intensify its participation in the trade union movement.

The centre of gravity in the work of the trade unions must be shifted to their local, primary units – to the shock-work brigade, group, shift, shop, and enterprise. The Congress considers the assuring of genuine trade union democracy, the widespread development of proletarian self-criticism – which is the best control from below of the fitness of the trade union apparatus and its leading cadres – to be one of the most important conditions for the successful reorganization of trade union work. To the present day, self-criticism in the trade unions has been feebly developed and still has not assumed a concrete and effective form. Proletarian self-criticism in the trade unions must facilitate a systematic improvement in the work of the unions, the education of trade union cadres, the correction of their mistakes and the turning of the trade unions' attention to production,

as well as the strengthening of their attention to the needs and demands of the masses.

3 The task of promoting and training new leading trade union cadres is one of the decisive tasks in the entire reorganization of trade union work.

The Congress advises the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions to regard the training of trade union cadres as one of the most urgent and pressing tasks of the trade union movement. The Congress recognizes that along with their promotion, the training of new leading cadres for the trade union movement is a most important task of the entire party, and is of decisive importance for the reorganization of the trade unions.

4 Party organizations must improve and strengthen the concrete direction of the work of the trade union organizations by delving into the essence of the work of the trade unions, by helping them to correct their shortcomings and mistakes in the process of work and by showing concern for systematically strengthening them with cadres.

The Congress approves the line and work of the new leadership of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and advises party organizations to render them every assistance in decisively reorganizing the work of the trade unions in accord with the new tasks of the moment and with the decisions of the XVI Party Congress.

The Congress expresses its firm conviction that the Soviet trade union movement, which has played a great historic role at all stages of the socialist revolution, will, in the present reconstruction period, reach a new stage in which it will be an even more active and decisive force in the great construction of the socialist society.

*Pravda*, 3, 14 July 1930

*KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh* IV, 406–72



### 3.12

#### **Regulation on Cells of the VKP(b) in Kolkhozes**

26 August 1930

Although the party considered it normal to base its cells on places of employment, such as factories, it had been unable to apply this norm to the countryside prior to collectivization. Only the establishment of numerous kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and also MTSS provided an

alternative to the village as the basis for the rural party cell. Even with such institutions, it was many years before most kolkhozes actually had party cells, which were concentrated on the MTSS (see 3.13). The following document does, however, appear to be the foundation for kolkhoz party cells and it has never been rescinded or replaced.

This regulation was first approved for discussion on 26 August 1930 and then was definitively adopted on 11 February 1931 without undergoing any change. Several technical notes that appeared in the original are omitted here.

## **STRUCTURE OF THE CELL**

1 The foundation of the party organization is the party cell which is approved by the party committee with a membership of not less than three actual party members (VKP(b) Rules).

2 In regions of complete collectivization VKP(b) cells are, as a rule, organized in the kolkhozes. The cells form party groups and assign party organizers to production sectors, brigades, etc. The VKP(b) cells in kolkhozes participate actively as party organs in the village economic and political life. In villages where less than half of the farms are collectivized, located in regions of full-scale collectivization, the village cells are retained.

In regions where collectivization is not complete, the village cells are retained, as a rule, until a majority of the farms have been collectivized; they also organize party groups and distribute party organizers on a territorial basis. Exceptions are allowed in villages with half of the farms collectivized: there party cells are organized in the kolkhozes.

3 If the raion and party committees so decide, and with the approval of the oblast (krai) committee or of the central committee of the national communist party, cells may be organized to include more than one kolkhoz:

- a* if there are several autonomous kolkhoz cells on the territory of the village (stanitsa [Cossack village]);
- b* in the largest kolkhozes with not less than 50 Communists;
- c* if there are several autonomous soviet, co-operative, and railroad cells on the territory of the village.

In all such cases the individual cells brought together into the joint kolkhoz cell retain the rights of shop cells.

4 Communists working in the MTSS form a special cell which:

- a* is part of the joint kolkhoz cell, with the rights of a shop cell, if the MTS services only one kolkhoz;

*b* is a special statutory cell directly subordinate to the raion committee if the MTS services several kolkhozes with autonomous cells.

#### **LEADING ORGANS OF THE CELL**

5 The highest leading organ of the cell is the general meeting of its members. The general meeting is convened either by the bureau or upon the demand of one-third of the party members of the given cell. The cell meeting is convened regularly twice a month, and the quorum is not less than half of the available party members of the given cell.

A presidium, or a chairman and secretary, are elected to conduct each meeting, with the secretary keeping the minutes. All matters are decided by a simple majority of the votes of the party members of the given cell.

The general meeting of the cell discusses political, economic, occupational, and party matters, as well as matters connected with local life; it approves the work plan of the cell, hears and discusses the reports of the cell bureau on its work; it examines applications for admission to the party as member or candidate member; it discusses questions of expulsion from the party and of fining cell members; it elects delegates to raion party conferences, hears and discusses reports from Komsomol cells, from party fractions in the non-party organizations of the given kolkhoz or enterprise, village, or institution, and also from individual cell members on their work.

6 The general meeting of the cell elects a bureau of party members for a six-month term and with not more than seven members and two candidate members; the size of the bureau may be increased only with the permission of the raion party committee (cells with less than seven members elect a secretary instead of a bureau). The bureau runs the affairs of the cell between meetings.

7 The bureau of the cell distributes duties among its members and settles on one of them to be the secretary, bringing this to the attention of the next ensuing general meeting. The bureau also selects some of its members as representatives for work in the Komsomol cell and as organizers of the various branches of work – with the farm labourers, poor peasants, women, etc., distributes party work among all members of the cell and checks on fulfilment (in cells which do not choose a bureau party duties are distributed by the cell meeting); the bureau implements the party rules and decisions of higher party organs as well as the resolutions of the general meetings of the cell, and sees to it that the cell members do the same; it

discusses all violations of party discipline and the directives of party organs.

8 In accordance with the current tasks of the party and the decisions of local organizations, the cell bureau develops a concrete plan for the cell's work which takes into account the particular features of its own kolkhoz, enterprise, village, or institution; it submits this plan to the general meeting for its approval; it draws up agendas, appoints speakers, and prepares the materials and the necessary proposals for the general cell meeting; it calls together the active members of the cell to discuss those matters which require preliminary preparation; it participates in preparing the agenda items for the regular general meetings of the kolkhoz and the village; it prepares cell members for promotion to party, trade union, soviet, and other kinds of public activities.

The bureau reports to the general cell meeting on its activities not less than once every two or three months and also submits the most important of its decisions to the latter for approval.

9 The secretary must have been a party member for at least one year. Any exception to this must have the sanction of the raion committee.

The secretary conducts the daily work of the bureau, prepares the agenda, calls bureau meetings, and serves as the link between the cell and the party committee. The secretary reports on his activities to the cell bureau.

10 In its work the cell is guided by the raion committee and reports to it regularly. The decisions and decrees of the raion committee are binding on the cell. The cell has the right to appeal decisions of the raion committee to the next higher party committee, communicating this at the same time to the raion committee and not suspending execution of the decree against which the protest has been filed.

#### **BASIC TASKS OF THE KOLKHOZ CELL**

11 The party's general line of industrializing the country and effecting a socialist reconstruction of agriculture confront the cell with the following basic tasks:

*a* Rallying the kolkhoz members, as the basic support of the party and the Soviet power in the countryside, and the farm-labourer and poor-peasant element of the kolkhoz in particular, as well as the broad masses of poor and middle peasants still farming on an individual basis, for the socialist

reconstruction of agriculture; consolidating the alliance of the working class, the kolkhoz members, and the village poor with the middle peasants against the kulaks and ensuring a real implementation of the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class through the complete collectivization of the poor and middle peasant farms; the all-around strengthening of the soviets – the organs of the proletarian dictatorship; the maximum enhancement of their leading role in the socialist reconstruction of the whole economic and socio-cultural life of the village.

*b* The comprehensive strengthening and continued development of the kolkhozes through a better organization of production, the application of more advanced agricultural technology, the proper organization of labour, and the introduction of agricultural improvements; organizing the correct distribution of income within the kolkhoz by stimulating high labour productivity, enlarging the socialized funds, and elevating the material and everyday cultural level of the kolkhoz members; increasing the size of the marketable surplus and ensuring timely fulfilment of the kolkhoz's obligations to the state; overcoming the remnants of the backward small-proprietor mentality in the kolkhoz; giving production assistance to poor and middle peasants still practising individual farming and systematically drawing the latter into the kolkhoz on a voluntary basis by showing them from practical experience all the advantages of large-scale socialized farming.

*c* Rallying Communists to implement the general line of the party, and to struggle actively against deviations from it, by developing broad proletarian self-criticism and internal party democracy, and on this basis involving each Communist in the work of the cell; heightening the ideological and political level of Communists; supporting and consolidating leninist bolshevik party discipline among the members; recruiting workers, farm labourers, and progressive and highly stable kolkhoz members as new party members; fostering and promoting cadres for party, economic, and public work.

#### **PARTICIPATION BY THE CELL IN THE ECONOMIC LIFE OF THE KOLKHOZ**

12 The party cell participates actively in the economic life of the kolkhoz, makes sure that kolkhoz members participate actively in the discussion of all economic questions, seeking to make maximum use of their economic experience. The cell hears the reports of fractions, gives directions for further work, watches strictly to ensure that practical work follows the



correct party line, but does not indulge in petty interference in the work of the fractions.

13 In its work the fraction strives to ensure: the active participation of every Communist in carrying out the basic economic tasks of the kolkhoz; strict observance of the charter adopted; the timely compiling and fulfilment of the organizational and economic plan of the kolkhoz; the correct organization of labour in production; a fuller utilization of instruments of production; a thrifty attitude toward the economic inventory; a comprehensive enhancement of labour productivity and labour discipline; the overcoming of elements of self-seeking, slovenliness, and slackness; the proper organization of current economic campaigns (sowing, harvesting, autumn plowing, etc.); reduction of the unit cost of production and an increase in the marketed share; the accumulation of means for expanding the technical base of the kolkhoz; the timely fulfilment of agreements and obligations to co-operative and state organizations; the proper keeping of inventory and the maintenance of books and accounts in good order; the correct use of released labour power in work outside the kolkhoz (construction, trade, etc.); the organization of production assistance to poor and middle peasants farming on an individual basis; the participation of all cell members, Komsomols, and non-party activists in propagandizing and extending to individual peasant farms a minimum level of agricultural knowledge and various agricultural measures.

14 The cell works to foster and train economic cadres from among the kolkhoz activists, takes care to bring forward the poor-peasant and farm-labourer elements.

*a* The cell brings to light the most active and capable kolkhoz members, both party and non-party, ensuring their advancement within the kolkhoz to leading positions; it affords them constant assistance in their work and for their benefit organizes systematic training and retraining by means of courses, circles, and conferences, by sending them to study in agricultural and other technical schools, institutions of higher education, etc.

*b* It promotes the correct use of specialists, creates for them the proper atmosphere, and gives them support, organizing systematic assistance and social supervision of their work.

15 The cell ensures a broad deployment of the activity of the kolkhoz masses, organizes socialist competition and the shock-worker movement, involves kolkhoz members in the work of production conferences. The cell

ensures the active participation of kolkhoz members in elaborating, discussing, and resolving all common kolkhoz problems (economic, cultural, everyday, etc.); it organizes the systematic accounting of the kolkhoz administration to the members; it strives to have the kolkhoz members who are middle peasants participate actively in the life of the kolkhoz.

#### **WORK WITH THE MASSES**

16 The major and fundamental task of the cell is maintaining constant contact with the non-party mass, organizing it, and exerting party influence on it. The basic conductors of influence on the masses of poor and middle private peasants are the kolkhoz members – the basic support of the party and Soviet power in the countryside – the non-party worker, farm-labourer, poor-peasant, and middle-peasant activists grouped around the party, the soviets, the trade unions, the co-operatives, and other organizations.

17 The cell bases all of its work with the masses on party decisions, taking into account the mood and demands of the non-party masses. Through systematic explanatory and educational work overcoming petty bourgeois inclinations and demands of a purely local character, inculcating in the masses a consciousness of the overall interests of socialist construction, the cell organizes support for party slogans and decisions and sees to their implementation by the non-party masses.

18 One of the basic tasks of the cell is to create and train broad cadres of kolkhoz activists as well as activists from among the farm labourers and the poor and middle private peasants.

In the kolkhozes the activists must be organized, first of all, around the kolkhoz, sector, and other such production conferences; activist kolkhoz members must be trained to be practical agitators – carriers of the ideas of the kolkhoz movement; the cell must see to it that they go out to other villages and kolkhozes to popularize on a broad basis the concrete successes and economic achievements of their own kolkhoz.

19 To rally the non-party activists more solidly around the party, the cell periodically organizes open meetings attended by kolkhoz members and farm labourers, poor, and middle private peasants, involving the activists in political education circles and schools, helping those who are closest to the party to advance to responsible positions both in the kolkhoz and outside it. The cell appoints certain of its comrades, who have sufficient training, for

individual contact with non-party people. In forming non-party organs within the sphere of influence of the cell and in elections to the kolkhoz administration, the soviets, the co-operatives, the trade union organs, etc., the cell not only puts forward its own members but also non-party persons who are close to the party and enjoy authority among the masses. The cell endeavours to bring the best non-party people into the party.

20 The cell does mass work among the masses of poor and middle private peasants, giving them organization and economic assistance, ensuring their participation in the soviets, the organs of co-operation and other social organizations, sees to it that they participate in the social life of the kolkhoz – in production conferences – and by demonstrating the advantages of large-scale collective farming recruits them into the kolkhozes. At the same time the cell guides and participates actively in all regular campaigns; contracting, sowing, tax-collecting, compulsory grain deliveries [to the state], etc.

21 The cell conducts political, educational, and cultural work among kolkhoz members and private peasants, helping them to get rid of their small-proprietor mentality and feelings of national hostility and reeducating them in the spirit of collectivism and internationalism.

The cell works to liquidate illiteracy and ensures fulfilment of the directive of the Soviet power on the universal education of children, promotes the spread of agricultural knowledge among the population, conducts anti-religious propaganda. The cell does all of this work through huts set up as reading rooms, wall newspapers, school councils, and sections of village soviets, enlisting the co-operation of the cultural forces of the village, especially teachers, agronomists, etc., and in every way developing and organizing the initiative and activity of the kolkhoz members in cultural construction. The cell in every way encourages the masses to subscribe to newspapers and magazines, expands the network of worker-peasant correspondents, and conducts educational work among the latter.

22 The cell does mass work among women, both within the kolkhoz and outside it, striving to involve the basic mass of peasant women in active participation in the socialist reconstruction of agriculture. To this end the cell enlists both Communist and non-party activists for work among women, promotes the activities of delegates' conferences of village women, encourages competition and the shock-worker movement among women,

sets up circles of various kinds, and involves women in the economic activities of the kolkhoz, the soviet, and other social organizations.

The cell takes the initiative in organizing nurseries, kindergartens, and public eating places; it ensures that the working conditions of women are protected; it works to liquidate illiteracy among them.

23 The cell does all its work among youth through the Komsomol. In its leadership of the Komsomol the cell devotes particular attention to the content of the socio-political work of the Komsomol cell, to the marxist-leninist training of Komsomols, to regulating Komsomol growth, to bringing girls into it, to enlarging its party nucleus. The cell must strive to ensure that the Komsomols are the skirmishers for important measures strengthening the kolkhoz and are models of production discipline; they must strive to ensure maximum involvement of youth in active kolkhoz construction and in the fulfilment of all tasks in the countryside.

24 The cell involves both its members and non-party persons in soviet construction (through sections of soviets), in co-operatives, and in other social organizations. It works to improve the state, co-operative, and trade apparatus, struggling against bureaucratism and abuses in them.

25 The cell works with the village trade union organizations to strengthen the tie between the kolkhozes and the masses of factory workers, in particular, those of the enterprises acting as kolkhoz patrons, by promoting such patronage in every way, by making use of workers connected with agriculture, by sending kolkhoz members to the enterprises, etc.

26 Kolkhoz cells are the fundamental party organizations responsible in practice for mass political work among the poor peasants, both those in the kolkhozes and those still farming privately.

#### **WORK WITHIN THE PARTY**

27 The cell systematically recruits new party members from among workers, farm labourers, and progressive kolkhoz members who have displayed initiative in organizing and consolidating the kolkhozes, who are active and unflinching in the struggle against the kulaks, who struggle against petty bourgeois tendencies, and who have been proven in active work on current economic campaigns in the countryside.

The cell checks on the timely promotion of candidates to the status of actual party members and concentrates its attention on their party political education.

28 The cell participates actively in the discussion of all agenda items of local and general party congresses, conferences, and meetings, and also of matters raised by the party for discussion; it takes the initiative in proposing matters for discussion by party organizations.

The cell studies and carries out the resolutions of party congresses and conferences and the directives of higher party organs; it also helps to implement the directives of Soviet power.

29 The cell bases its work on a broad expansion of proletarian self-criticism and internal party democracy, involves all party members in active party work, and sees to it that each party member displays maximum initiative and autonomy.

In distributing its efforts the cell strives to subject to maximum party influence the non-party kolkhoz members both in production (sectors, brigades) and in the whole socio-political life of the kolkhoz and in the work of the village social organizations (soviet, co-operatives, etc.).

The cell organizes supervision of the execution by Communists of their party assignments (their exemplary behaviour in production, attendance at party meetings, payment of membership dues, active implementation of party decisions among non-party persons, etc.), hearing reports by individual Communists on their fulfilment of party assignments.

30 The cell demands that party members and candidate members fulfil their production assignments in an exemplary and disciplined fashion, that they participate actively in socialist competition and the shock-worker movement, in the work of production conferences, that they display initiative in eliminating short-comings in the economic life of the kolkhoz. The cell strives to make the Communists an example to the non-party kolkhoz members, viewing violations of production assignments by Communists as violations of party discipline.

For purposes of the marxist-leninist education of party members and candidate members, and in order to enhance their cultural-political attainments, the cell organizes schools of political fundamentals, marxist circles, and also the study of basic organizational-technical and agronomical questions of the reconstruction of agriculture.

#### **GUIDANCE OF THE WORK OF NON-PARTY ORGANIZATIONS**

31 Party influence on the activities of non-party organizations is exerted by the cell through the fractions which it organizes in the kolkhoz, village

soviet, co-operative, or peasants' mutual aid associations, in voluntary societies, and in other elected organs, or through individual Communists working in these organs. The fraction works under the leadership of the cell, and the decisions of the latter are binding on it. The cell seeks in every way to activate the work of the fraction and to keep it on the correct course. The cell hears periodic reports by fractions or individual Communists working in non-party organs and also discusses the major questions of the fraction's work and passes resolutions on them, but does not interfere in the day-to-day operations of the kolkhoz administration or of the fractions.

32 In its guidance of non-party organizations the cell seeks in every way to enhance their role, especially that of the village soviets, in resolving the tasks of kolkhoz construction and in conducting economic-political campaigns.

#### **TASKS OF THE PARTY GROUP**

33 The party group, under the guidance of the cell and the party organizer, guides all the Communists of the group, organizes shock-workers and socialist competition, and brings kolkhoz members into the work of production conferences; it organizes the Communists, Komsomols, and non-party persons of the group for fulfilment of all tasks confronting the cell, especially production tasks; it works to recruit new party members and has non-party persons attend general kolkhoz meetings and open party meetings; it studies attentively the mood of kolkhoz members and explains to them the fundamental political tasks of the party; it organizes kolkhoz members for discussions, for newspaper readings, and for listening to the radio; it keeps watch over party discipline (payment of membership dues, attendance at meetings, fulfilment of assignments, etc.).

*Partiinoe stroitel'stvo*, no. 18 (1930), 68–72

### **3.13**

#### **On Party Work with the Masses in Districts in which MTSs Are Active**

16 October 1930

The Central Committee notes that in the course of one year of work the exceptionally great significance of the MTSs and of the Traktorotsentr in the socialist reconstruction of agriculture has become completely clear. Armed

with the advanced technology, based on the implementation of clear class distinctions and a bolshevik pace of work, the MTSS have actually become the most important strongholds of the complete collectivization and the elimination of kulaks as a class.

The Central Committee especially stresses the organizing role of the MTSS in grain procurement and in the raising of a marketable surplus in regions where the MTSS have been active.

However, all these accomplishments still have not been accompanied by large-scale work of the broad masses, and thus far there has been no opportunity properly to realize the political importance of both the MTSS and the Traktorotsentr.

The basic defect of the construction of the MTSS is that the local party organizations thus far have underrated the role of the MTSS as the large-scale production and political centre of the countryside, did not concentrate the best forces of the countryside, and did not attract to the necessary degree the attention of the broad masses of workers and peasants to the work of the MTSS. In this therefore they have not secured the fulfilment of the Central Committee's directive of 9 September 1929, on 'transforming districts in which MTSS are active into model regions with all of the ensuing tasks.'

Attaching exceptionally great significance to the MTSS, and in this connection the work of the Traktorotsentr, especially with the forthcoming construction of hundreds of new MTSS, the Central Committee proposes to the Traktorotsentr and to the local party organizations to build up broad political work with the masses around the construction of the MTSS, decisively struggling against all underestimation of the economic-political importance of the MTSS and a purely technical approach to their work.

- 1 Considering that the MTSS, concentrating the proletarian cadres (mechanics, fitters, etc.) must play a large role in the matter of strengthening the village party organizations, [the Central Committee] proposes to the krai and oblast committees to strengthen the party organizations within the districts in which MTSS are active with qualified leading personnel, and to secure the reorganization of all party work with the masses so that it is focused on the MTSS.

- 2 The productive activity of the MTSS is to be built on the basis of maximal development of independent activity of men and women kolkhozniks, attracting them through self-criticism to active participation in the work of the MTSS and, first of all, in the solution of all basic production

problems, and the forging of a strong active unit out of progressive farmhands and poor and middle peasants. The MTSS must periodically call production conferences of the kolkhozniks, establish the systematic work of production councils, organize production meetings in all kolkhozes, and organize sections dealing with the separate branches of the economy; they must broadly develop socialist competition and the shock-worker movement, popularizing the pace and achievements of this movement with the masses of the kolkhozniks and individual peasants.

3 The cultural-educational work of the MTSS acquires special significance, because they are to become the strongholds of the cultural revolution in the village.

The Culture and Propaganda Section of the Central Committee and the Traktorotsentr and Narkompros are to devise within a month's time a system of measures to be taken for the development of cultural-educational work in districts in which there are MTSS (Schools of Communist Youth, radio and telephone installations, cinemas, everyday cultural centres, etc.) attracting to this work the soviet village intelligentsia, and above all, the teachers.

4 Taking into account that the Traktorotsentr is about to start the large-scale construction of new MTSS, the Central Committee proposes to the local party organizations, to the kolkhoz administration, and to the Traktorotsentr, to conduct a campaign during October and November popularizing the role and work of the MTSS among the kolkhozniks that they serve, drawing into this campaign the whole mass of the individual peasants (farmhands, poor, and middle peasants). Simultaneously, the preparatory work among the masses concerning the conclusion of the contracts between the new stations and kolkhozes should be extended. The resolutions passed by kolkhozes approving these contracts should become a militant bolshevik campaign for the organization – on the basis of the MTSS – of a new massive movement into kolkhozes.

5 Taking into account the enormous role of the Komsomol in the matter of organization of production and labour of the MTSS (selection and training of qualified manpower, implementation of the shock-worker movement, and political mass work) and noting the still weak participation of the Komsomol organizations in the production and the mass work of the MTSS, the Central Committee of the Komsomol should within a month's time



devise practical measures for increasing the participation and activity of the Komsomol in the work of the MTSS.

6 Noting a number of cases of interference in the managerial activity of the MTSS on the part of the local party and soviet organs (relocation of tractors, diverting of managers and agronomists at the peak periods of work in the field, etc.), and of impermissible methods of administration in connection with the MTSS, the Central Committee proposes to the local party organizations to eliminate decisively similar occurrences, to secure normal working conditions for the MTSS, and to put into practice the principle of one-man management.

7 The central and local press should publicize the Traktorotsentr and the MTSS in order to attract the mass of workers in the MTSS and the kolkhoz activists to this work. The editorial staffs of the *Pravda*, *Izvestiia*, *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, and *Sotsialisticheskaia zemledelia* (Socialist Agriculture) should feature at least once every ten days special columns clarifying the work of the Traktorotsentr and the experience of the local MTSS.

8 The Central Committee directs the attention of the local organizations to existing occurrences of the careless selection of the leading managerial staff of the MTSS and proposes to check jointly with the Traktorotsentr, within two months' time, the leading staff of the MTSS, securing their real strengthening by replacing unsuitable persons with the contingent of the cadres sufficiently trained politically and managerially.

*Partiinoe stroitel'stvo*, no. 19–20      *KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh* IV, 487–9  
(1930), 60–1

### 3.14

#### **On the Construction of the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Plant**

25 January 1931

The opening of the thirties witnessed substantial party intervention in industrial as well as agricultural administration. With scant regard for the First Five-Year Plan the party leaders, using the authority of the Central Committee, maintained a command economy. Space does not permit the multiplication of cases of this tendency, which by the mid-thirties had greatly diminished, most likely because Stalin was persuaded that this procedure was to some extent uneconomic.

The following document is, however, an excellent example of the style of the command economy. The project, the Magnitogorsk iron smelting plant, is a famous achievement of the early plan era, dependent on the hauling of coking coal 1500 miles from the Kuznetsk Basin in Central Asia to the southern Urals. Despite the opposition of various early planners, the party did embark on this project in 1930, but was making little headway at the start of the next year. At this point Stalin intervened and attempted to solve a whole range of problems which were not covered by any existing plan with a series of direct orders and exhortations. As the following document suggests, there had been only feeble co-ordination of such various requirements of a new industrial city as transport, consumer goods, and food supply, not to mention the various sectors of the plant itself. Without regard to the imbalances that these orders might create in the rest of the supposedly planned economic system, various commissariats and other agencies were now ordered to produce major results in a matter of days, weeks, and months. No doubt Stalin and his colleagues had already experienced frustrations in attempting to deal with problems this way, and tried to avert them both by general exhortations and by singling out individuals who were to be responsible for achieving certain results. But there was so much to be done and so little time and facilities for real planning that at one rather important point the command lapses into 'etc. etc.' in place of a list of specific tasks.

In spite of, or because of, this heavy-handed approach to the building of socialism, the Urals-Kuznetsk Combine did enter production in 1932 and went on to serve as an invaluable strategic asset in the Second World War. In this sense the spirit of the military campaign – and military wastefulness that pervades this party decision – is quite appropriate.

The task of creating the Ural-Kuznetsk Combine as a new powerful coal-metallurgical base, which was set forth by the XV Party Congress, is being executed in the forced-pace construction of the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk plants.

The significance which the Magnitogorsk plant has for the economy (a capacity of 2.5 million tons of pig iron, increasing to 4 million tons) is strengthened by its geographical position at the junction of the Ural industrial area, the non-ferrous metals of the East and Kazakhstan, and the vast agricultural areas of Siberia, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia.

The construction of the Magnitogorsk plant must become a practical school for the creation of new methods and forms of socialist labour, technology, and the preparation of personnel for further industrialization of the Soviet Union.

The Central Committee of the VKP(b) notes that the construction of the Magnitogorsk plant thus far has not attained the required pace and, in the organization of work, real planning and one-man management have not been introduced in all sections of the project.

The Central Committee of the VKP(b) resolves:

- 1 To ensure that the Magnitogorsk plant begins operation by the date set by the Central Committee VKP(b) on 25 January of this year.

2 To direct the Supreme Council of the National Economy to provide the Magnitogorsk construction project with all necessary financial support as well as with equipment and materials, owing to the necessity of finishing the construction by the deadline.

3 To direct Vostokostal and the chief of Magnitostroi to strengthen decisively planning discipline at the construction site.

In order to secure the necessary pace of construction, to propose to Vostokostal and to the chief of Magnitostroi to pay special attention, in the first quarter of the year, to all necessary preparatory and auxiliary works (earth works, auxiliary enterprises, quarries, water supply, etc.) and parallel with this to begin the construction of auxiliary shops (mechanical, boiler rooms, forge, foundry, silicates). The fulfilment of these tasks will be a fundamental turning point.

To propose that Vostokostal develop, not later than 1 March 1931, a plan for the organization of work on Magnitostroi, based on the maximal mechanization and rationalization of labour. The reorganization of all work on Magnitostroi on the basis of this plan should be made the most important task of the next two months.

To direct the chief of Magnitostroi decisively to improve, as soon as possible, the use of the existing administration and to take measures for implementation of the principle of one-man management and operation on a profitable basis in all departments of the project.

4 To direct Comrad Ivanchenko to establish a system of planning in which unified technical leadership of all projected works conducted in the Soviet Union (on and outside the construction site) will be achieved, and work planned in the Soviet Union and executed abroad will be coordinated. To direct the Supreme Council of the National Economy to submit to the Central Committee proof of fulfilment of the above within twenty days.

To direct Comrades Ivanchenko, Kolesnikov, and Postnikov to examine the plans of transportation within the plant and to submit them for approval to the Supreme Council of the National Economy within two weeks.

5 In co-ordination with the construction project, planning organizations are to devise in a week's time a monthly timetable for the drafting of plans. This will ensure the timely issuance of plans on the dates established by the construction project. The drafting of plans must be given special priority.

To assign Comrade Kolesnikov personal responsibility for putting into practice point No. 5 of this resolution.

6 Noting that work in the mining industry is behind schedule, Vostokostal and the Main Administration of Geological Survey are hereby instructed:

*a* To provide more exact information by 15 February on deposits of low-sulphur ore which can be used without being enriched, thus securing the operation of the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk plants next year.

*b* To open the ore crushers not later than 1 June;

*c* To start industrial exploitation of the mine by 15 May, producing enough to enable the blast furnaces of both plants to start by 1 October 1931.

To direct special attention to planning the transportation and water supply, which will be needed to open the mine on time.

7 By 1 March 1931, the Main Administration of Geological Survey must submit to Magnitostroi the data regarding the sources of the non-metallic minerals (limestone, dolomite, chromite, fire clay, moulding and other types of sands, etc.) and also the data on manganese for 1931. To conduct during the four-month period prospecting missions in the Magnitogorsk region to secure these materials for the plant.

8 Taking into account the proximity of the Poltava-Bredinsk coal mines to the Magnitogorsk plant, to propose that the Supreme Council of the National Economy begin the immediate organization of the industrial exploitation of these mines and to speed up the prospecting of the indicated deposits so that the main shafts can be sited in May.

9 In connection with the great need for water which has come to light, especially in the enterprises being organized near the Magnitogorsk plant (synthesis of ammonia, sovkhozes, and kolkhozes) to propose that the Supreme Council of the National Economy begin work on the second dam on the Ural River, so that it will be completed in time to collect water during the spring run-off of 1932.

10 So that Magnitostroi and Kuznetskstroï can in time be equipped with machinery manufactured in the USSR, the Supreme Council of the National Economy is to:

*a* Work out a schedule for manufacturing and delivering equipment for top-priority plants, with precise orders for the producers and dates for the

delivery of equipment ...

11 The People's Commissariat of Labour and Supreme Council of the National Economy are to adopt measures without delay for the selection and staffing of the labour force and technical personnel for the Magnitostroi by the beginning of the second quarter (the completion of construction and installation operations) in accordance with the requirements of the construction project, which must be submitted to the People's Commissariat of Labour within a month.

12 The Supreme Council of the National Economy is to check the work of the Vostokostal and the Magnitogorsk construction project on securing the qualified manpower and management for the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk plants on schedule and to take the necessary measures for providing these plants with personnel, not hesitating to transfer the necessary supply of experienced cadres.

13 To instruct the People's Commissariat of Transport to settle within one month the question of the trunk lines and secondary lines associated with the plant, in order to assure the transportation of ore and coal, both to Magnitogorsk, and from Magnitogorsk to Kuznetsk, taking into account the necessity of a connection to Belokurets and Ufa.

14 Noting the totally unsatisfactory condition of the freight flow capacity of the Kartala-Magnitnaia branch line, Comrade Rukhimovich is personally responsible in adoption of all necessary measures to put the branch line into working order, in order to ensure the uninterrupted shipping of freight, which is indispensable for the construction of the Magnitogorsk plant.

15 The People's Commissariat of Transport and the Supreme Council of the National Economy are to organize preparations for the reception and handling of the imported heavy machinery which will arrive in the near future for the Magnitogorsk construction project. To this end Vostokostal is to present a detailed plan within twenty days to direct the heavy freight indicating the size, weight, and number of units.

16 The Supreme Council of the National Economy and People's Commissariat of Transport are to determine within twenty days the type and quantity of rolling stock and engines on the Kuznetsk-Magnitnaia line to supply transportation of ore and coal.

17 Considering that the problem of transportation between Kuznetsk and Magnitaia has not yet been thoroughly worked out, the People's

Commissariat of Transport and the Supreme Council of the National Economy are to deliver a special report on this question to the Central Committee of the VKP(b) in May 1931.

18 The Central Union of Consumer's Co-operatives is to reorganize all co-operative work at Magnitogorsk within two months and to give Magnitostroi first priority in consumer supplies.

19 To oblige the People's Commissariat of Health to secure promptly the medical staff required for the Magnitogorsk plant, also reinforcing the first-aid and ambulance network in the area.

20 Taking note of the insufficient activity by the Ural party organization in the matter of assisting the Magnitogorsk construction, the Central Committee proposes to the Ural Oblast Committee and to the Magnitogorsk local party organizations that they adopt all necessary practical measures toward the realization of the construction and toward a widespread clarification of the political and economical significance of the Magnitogorsk plant.

21 Trade union organizations of the Ural region must take genuine, serious measures to attract the broad labouring masses into participating in the construction; they must introduce new forms of socialist labour on the construction site and the wide development of the shock-work movement, socialist competition, and social teamwork; they must assure the active participation of the labouring mass in the development and accomplishment of the construction plans, placing the everyday cultural facilities of the workers on the requisite level, decisively bringing to a halt instability, self-seeking, etc., etc.

22 The Central Committee considers that economic organizations connected with the project must fulfil their task precisely on time and with the quality of products that is required. They must eliminate the formalist bureaucratic attitude toward orders and assignments from the construction project, and must render the maximum technical assistance to the project in the installation and utilization of machinery that is being supplied according to the deadlines for the opening of the factory.

*Pravda*, 26 January 1931

21 March 1931

## **On Party Mass Work in Shops and Brigades**

### **I**

The implementation of the directives of the XVI Congress, and of the VKP(b) Central Committee, ordering party organizations to face to production and move the centre of gravity of party work to the shop and the brigade, has significantly increased the participation by party organizations in all the economic and political life of enterprises, has ensured a further extension of socialist competition and of the shock-worker movement among the broad masses of workers, and has led to a continued gigantic influx of production workers into the party.

### **II**

Together with these achievements the Central Committee ascertains that the decision of the XVI Party Congress that every single Communist and Komsomol must engage in socialist competition remains to a considerable extent unfulfilled. While 90–95 per cent of the Communists are engaged in socialist competition in the advanced factories (AMO, Elektrozavod, the Stalin Factory in Leningrad; the Lenin and the Petrovsky factories in Dnepropetrovsk; the Kamensk Paper Factory etc.), in a number of others (Izhevsk, Nadezhdinsk, Kolomna, etc.) only 50–60 per cent of the Communists are participating.

The Central Committee orders the krai and oblast committees, the central committees of the national communist parties, and also the raion party committees, factory party committees, and cells to see to it that the directives of the XVI Party Congress on the involvement of every single Communist and Komsomol in socialist competition and in the shock-worker movement are carried out at once and that a resolute struggle is waged against pretended shock-work, particularly among Communists and Komsomols. The genuine participation of every single Communist and Komsomol in socialist competition and the shock-worker movement is to be measured by the shop's or brigade's fulfilment of its production targets as a whole, for which purpose production indices are to be registered precisely and visibly and the systematic review and self-review of the persons engaged in competition is to be organized.

Only through the genuine implementation of these measures, and not by an indiscriminate purge of the ranks of the shock-workers as has

occurred in some enterprises, will it be possible for party organizations really to give comprehensive and effective guidance to socialist competition and the shock-worker movement among the broad proletarian masses, and also to the further expansion of this movement, improvement of the quality of their work, and the elevation of the shock-worker movement and of socialist competition to a higher level.

Considering the contradictory evaluations of the work of production communes and the advisability of their continued existence, the Central Committee charges the Central Committee organizational instructor, the krai and oblast committees, and the central committees of the national communist parties to study the working experience of the production communes in order to ascertain to what extent they have justified themselves as a form of socialist competition.

### III

The work of production conferences must be radically restructured in such a way as to ensure fulfilment of the industrial and financial plan, and the development and consolidation of socialist competition and the shock-worker movement. Party organizations must see to it that the best non-party shock-workers, Communists, and Komsomols participate actively in production conferences and that the production conferences are really at the forefront of production activity and really organize the shock-worker movement. Party organizations must struggle resolutely to carry out workers' proposals which have been discussed and accepted by production conferences.

The Central Committee orders the experience of group and shift production conferences, which has justified itself in practice, to be extended to all enterprises, and also the experience of specialized production conferences of workers in priority occupations (smelters, metal-workers, etc.).

### IV

The Central Committee demands that party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations make a maximum effort to ensure that the workers and leading persons in enterprises possess the necessary technical training, for which purpose factory schools, shop courses, and brigade circles are to be set up in order to heighten production skills, and factory specialists are to be brought to teach in them. Communist and Komsomol specialists are to head



the organization of the struggle for the technical literacy of the workers and are to involve the non-party engineering and technical personnel of the enterprises as well as specialists from scientific institutes and economic organs, in this work.

## V

The production work of party organizations must aim at undeviating implementation of the principle of one-man management.

The Central Committee orders the liquidation of the various 'staffs' and 'extraordinary commissions' of party committees and cells (the Petrovsky and Lenin factories in Dnepropetrovsk, Gas Factory No. 1, etc.) and forbids their organization in the future, since they are a substitute for economic leadership and its operational and technical functions and are a crude violation of one-man management.

At the same time there is to be broad criticism of those factory and shop administrators who do not implement one-man management, who escape responsibility by hiding behind the proletarian community (as in the welding shop of Elektrozavod where the brigades are not appointed but elected) and who are unable to combine iron production discipline with a broad development of the creative initiative of the working masses, with their involvement in the administration of production.

## VI

To ensure implementation of all party directives, and primarily of directives on the timely fulfilment of the industrial and financial plan, the party forces are to be correctly assigned immediately; in particular, the party stratum in the priority shops and decisive production sectors is to be strengthened.

The Central Committee directs the particular attention of party committees to the posting of leading party persons in shops and brigades, especially during evening and night shifts, striving to ensure that these lower-level positions are manned by leading Bolsheviks and non-party proletarians who firmly carry out the general line of the party, who strive, on one hand, to master technical skills and, on the other, to fulfil their tasks, who persistently and in practice implement party and governmental directives on one-man management, who win authority among the broad proletarian masses not by flirting with backward worker elements in the

shop or the brigade but by firmly carrying out the party's policy in production.

Party assignments are to be distributed among Communists in such a way as, first of all, to ensure fulfilment of production targets (active work by Communists and Komsomols in production conferences, their leading role in the shock-worker movement and in work on rationalization, invention, the mastering of technical skills, etc.), striving to ensure that the leading role of Communists in production is combined with their active participation in party life and with the steady heightening of their marxist-leninist training.

In distributing party assignments it is necessary to bear in mind that the leading administrative and technical personnel, and also the highly skilled workers, should not be overloaded to the detriment of their production duties and, what is most important, that engineers, technicians, foremen, and highly skilled workers should not be distracted by assignments which take them out of the factory.

## VII

The lower-level network of party education should ensure the training of new party reinforcements from among the best shock-workers and should include all of the candidate members, with due regard for the level of their political development, their ages, and their production responsibilities, elaborating methods of party instruction according to the principle of drawing the workers into it by degrees. In all links of the party's mass educational system the program is to be tied in with production tasks and with the study of technology. Experience acquired in organizing evening party-soviet schools is to be extended to all large shops, the functioning of the whole network of party education in shops and shifts is to be regularized, and political schools are to be organized in the large party groups (link cells). The struggle to fulfil the industrial and financial plan and to put into effect public proletarian supervision of the work of shops and brigades must be fundamental for the lower-level periodicals (shop and brigade). All organizational and educational work with worker-correspondents must be structured along the same lines.

Mass work in enterprises must be differentiated to the maximum, ensuring that all the various groups of workers (new workers, youth,

national minorities, etc.) are engaged in an active struggle for the industrial and financial plan and that they are better serviced.

The Central Committee notes that despite the considerable influx of women into production work, recently mass work among them has slackened extraordinarily, and orders that work among women become one of the fundamental tasks of the day-to-day practical work of krai and oblast committees, of the central committees of national communist parties, of raion party committees, and of factory party organization.

## VIII

Considering the positive experience acquired by party committees in large enterprises, the practice of setting up party committees is to be extended to all enterprises possessing not less than 500 Communists.

A three-tier party organization is to be established in large enterprises – consisting of the party committee, the shop cell, and the link cell or party group. In shops where the shift personnel is stable, party groups are to be set up in the shifts as well as shift shop cells connected directly with the party committee; in shops where the shift personnel is changing party organizers are to be appointed for the shifts. The trade union organizations are to be structured as follows: the factory committee, the shop committee, and the trade union group organizer; in all shifts where the personnel are stable, special shift shop committees are set up in direct subordination to the factory committee, the shift plenipotentiaries being retained for the remaining shifts.

Party leadership of the fractions of factory and shop committees is to be strengthened, their role in resolving concrete problems of work in the factories is to be heightened, and the substitution of party committees and party cells for trade-union organs is to cease.

The enlargement of shop cells is to continue; they are to be organized, as a rule, in all shops, and the network of lower-level party groups is to be extended by setting them up in each autonomous production unit (aggregate, brigade, complex); in this way party influence will be extended to encompass increasing numbers of shops and brigades (in Leningrad, for example, in the last year the number of party collectives has grown from 985 to 1045, of shops cells – from 1391 to 1917 plus 371 link cells and party groups – a total of 9230 units).

Party organizations are obliged to carry out the 16 June 1930 decision of the Central Committee on the creation in party cells of a 'highly flexible and mobile system of sectors,' organizing within the shop cells seven or eight sectors for the various functions of party work (recruitment into the party, guidance of the political and technical studies of Communists, mass agitational work, work among women, verification of the roles and participation of Communists in socialist competition and in the shock-worker movement, determination and distribution of party assignments, verification and execution of party directives, etc.). Sectors are not to be set up in shops with less than thirty communists, in link cells, and in party groups, the work being distributed among all the Communists.

In all large enterprises the party groups with not less than fifteen Communists are to form link cells with an elected bureau.

The high turnover of cell secretaries, sector leaders, and group party organizers, and also of trade union functionaries, must stop, with more attention being devoted to ensuring better selection and training of such persons from among shock-worker activists.

The Central Committee is to establish a special journal on questions of party work for party activists in factories, shops, and brigades.

The Central Committee organization instructor is to develop regulations covering the work of the factory party committee, the shop cell, the link cell, and the party group.

The Central Committee sections are to verify the execution of this directive by lower-level party organizations and report within six months to the Central Committee Orgburo.

*Pravda*, 25 March 1931

### **3.16**

#### **On Primary and Secondary Schools**

25 August 1931

In entering the field of educational policy, the party executive sought to reverse the modernist trends that had been predominant in the Commissariat of Enlightenment in the twenties, without discarding the label that had been used: 'polytechnicism.' In the course of the thirties this term fell into disuse, but Lenin had once approved it, and it could provide a reasonable cover for a swing from emphasis on 'all-round' education to narrowly practical vocational training. This was clearly what the leadership wanted, not unreasonably, in view of the demands of the growing industrial economy.

The following document therefore stresses quantitative growth of the school system (setting a goal of universal seven-year education, which had not been met a generation later) and a shift from various 'progressive' experiments to traditional subjects and methods of instruction. The scope of the quantitative increase that was intended was so great that the party leaders found it necessary to invoke once again the techniques of a command economy – attempting to order into being the various necessary human and economic ingredients, which the Five-Year Plan had not taken into account.

A year later the goals of the decision, especially with respect to pedagogical technique, were still unfulfilled in large measure, and another decision was issued to underscore the importance of the teacher, discipline, and fundamental subjects. Still another decision of 1932 completely suppressed the modernist 'distortion' of 'pedology,' which was an attempt to develop a new science of childhood, integrating education and other disciplines.

According to the Programme of the Communist Party 'the school must transmit not only communist principles generally, but also the ideological, organizational, and educational influence of the proletariat on semi-proletarian and non-proletarian strata of the toiling masses in order to educate a generation capable of the final establishment of communism.' In implementing this Programme the proletarian state has achieved gigantic successes in extending the school network and in reconstructing the schools. The number of pupils enrolled in primary and secondary schools grew from 7,800,000 in 1914 to 20 million in 1931. The social make-up of the schools has altered radically: the children of workers and of the broad masses of toilers in the countryside, who formerly had no possibility of giving their children an education, now form the basic contingent in the school. Education is now given in 70 languages, including those of the most culturally backward peoples of the Soviet Union.

The content of all of the school's work has become essentially different.

The Soviet school, which set as its task the 'preparation of comprehensively developed members of a communist society,' gives children an incomparably broader socio-political outlook and general development than the pre-revolutionary bourgeois school. In recent years there has been a rise in the level of the general education of children in the Soviet schools.

The schools have been especially successful since the historic resolution of the XVI Party Congress on the introduction of universal primary education. During the past year alone the number of pupils in primary and secondary schools has risen from 13.5 to 20 millions. Another 1,400,000 students are included in the factory apprenticeship schools and technikums.

Along with the decisive steps to implement the compulsory education of school-age children, the schools have made considerable progress in combining education with productive labour and social work, thus laying the foundations for restructuring the schools on a polytechnical basis.

The increasing number of workshops, while still insufficient and poorly equipped from the technical point of view, combined with the progressive attachment of the schools to factories, sovkhozes, MTS, and kolkhozes, enables the polytechnical transformation of the schools to proceed at an increasingly accelerated tempo and on an increasingly broad basis.

However, despite all these achievements, the Central Committee hereby notes that the Soviet school is still far from meeting the enormous demands placed on it by the present stage of socialist construction. The Central Committee considers the *fundamental inadequacy* of the schools at the present moment to be their inability to provide general education in sufficient volume and their unsatisfactory solution of the problem of producing fully educated people, with knowledge of the basic sciences (physics, chemistry, mathematics, one's native language, geography, etc.), for the technical colleges and for higher education generally. Because of this the polytechnical transformation of the schools in many instances takes on a formal character and fails to prepare children as comprehensively developed builders of socialism who combine theory and practice and have a mastery of technical knowledge.

Any attempt to divorce the polytechnical transformation of the schools from the systematic and solid assimilation of the sciences, especially physics, chemistry, and mathematics, which must be taught on the basis of strictly defined and carefully worked out programmes and study plans and according to strictly established schedules, is an extremely crude distortion of the idea of the polytechnical transformation of the schools. 'One can only become a communist when one's memory has been enriched with the knowledge of all those treasures which mankind has developed' (Lenin)...

On the basis of all of the above, the Central Committee resolves:

## **1 THE BASIC TASKS OF THE SCHOOL**

The union-republic people's commissariats of education are ordered to organize forthwith a scientific marxist critique of the programmes, ensuring that they contain a precisely outlined area of systematic knowledge (native language, mathematics, physics, chemistry, geography, history), with

instruction on the basis of the revised programmes commencing on 1 January 1932.

While revising the programmes, the people's commissariats of education must at the same time adopt a number of measures to ensure that instruction according to the new programmes will actually be possible (teacher training, the issuance of appropriate instructions, etc.).

While introducing in the Soviet schools various new teaching methods that can advance the education of active participants in socialist construction, it is necessary to struggle resolutely against frivolous and hare-brained schemes in teaching methods, against the massive introduction of methods which have not previously been tested in practice, as has been especially vividly manifested recently in the application of the so-called 'project method.' The attempts, deduced from the anti-leninist theory of the 'dying out of the school,' to put the so-called 'project method' at the basis of all school work have in fact led to the destruction of the school.

The Central Committee hereby obliges the union-republic people's commissariats of education immediately to organize scientific research work and give it the necessary priority, assigning to it the best party personnel and restructuring it on strict marxist-leninist principles.

Considering that an essential component of communist education is polytechnical instruction, which must give the students the 'fundamentals of science,' acquaint them 'in theory and practice with all the major production branches,' and establish a 'close tie between studies and productive labour,' the union-republic people's commissariats of education are ordered throughout 1931 to expand generally the network of shops and workrooms in schools, combining this work with the attachment of schools to enterprises, sovkhoses, MTSS, and kolkhoses on the basis of agreements ...

Confirming the necessity of the timely fulfilment of the Central Committee resolution of 25 July 1930, on universal compulsory primary education, the Central Committee, for purposes of the most rapid implementation of the demands in the party Programme with respect to universal and polytechnical education for all children and adolescents under seventeen years of age, hereby orders the Sovnarkom to develop a plan for a *universal, compulsory, seven-year educational program*.

## **2 IMPROVING THE METHODOICAL GUIDANCE OF THE SCHOOL**

Noting the unsatisfactory state of the cadres and organizations concerned with giving schools methodical guidance, in the national educational system, the Central Committee orders the Culture and Propaganda Section to work together with the people's commissariats of education and culture and propaganda organs of the national communist parties' central committees to prepare marxist-leninist cadres for methodical work in the national educational system and to assign the party's best theoretical and pedagogical personnel to the leading organs concerned with providing methodical guidance.

Noting the considerable gap between the scientific research institutions concerned with pedagogy and the practical tasks of the schools, the Central Committee orders the union-republic people's commissariats of education to concentrate the work of their respective research institutes principally on studying and disseminating the experience acquired by persons doing practical work in the schools, especially in their polytechnical transformation.

The union-republic people's commissariats of education are to introduce into their educational systems the institution of instructor, starting at the raion level, for purposes of steady practical assistance to the teachers in their everyday work in the schools. The instructors are to be recruited from among experienced teachers who are well acquainted with the schools and their tasks, with not less than two per raion. All Communists in leading work in the educational field are to master the methodological side of school work in the shortest possible time.

The Society of Marxist Teachers of the Communist Academy is to be assigned the task of elaborating, upon the instructions of the People's Commissariat of Education, the basic issues of methodical assistance to the teachers in their day-to-day work.

The existing periodicals dealing with problems of pedagogy are to be reviewed in order to effect a decisive improvement in their quality and to orient them directly to the school and its needs. Teachers must be taken on to their editorial boards.

### **3 CADRES**

Work among teachers is to be governed by the guideline given by Lenin as far back as 1922: 'With us the teacher must enjoy greater esteem than he has ever enjoyed, does enjoy, or ever will enjoy in bourgeois society.'



Considering the increasing demand, due to the introduction of universal education, for pedagogical cadres and for a heightening of their skills, the USSR Gosplan and the union-republic people's commissariats of education are given two months to develop a plan for training pedagogical cadres which will fully satisfy the needs for primary and secondary school teachers, submitting it to the Sovnarkom for approval.

An organized effort will be made to acquaint teachers with the bases of production in factories, sovkhozes, MTSS, and kolkhozes, so that all teaching cadres will have been covered during the years 1931–32.

In deciding upon contingents for educational institutions training agronomists, the USSR Narkomzem will give consideration to the need of the kolkhoz youth for schools and will also extend the necessary assistance to national educational organs in their effort to attract agronomists occupied in production to work in the kolkhoz youth schools.

All institutions of higher industrial and agricultural education are to be acquainted with the methods used in the polytechnical transformation of the schools and with the techniques used in production and technical training.

The Central Committee of the Komsomol and the union-republic people's commissariats of education are hereby ordered to elaborate special measures for selecting Young Pioneer leaders, assigning them to work, heightening their general and specialized pedagogical skills, viewing them as a valuable reserve for training new pedagogical cadres.

Gosplan, the People's Commissariat of Finance, the central committee of the workers educational union, and the union-republic people's commissariats of education are given ten days to devise measures to increase the salaries of primary and secondary school teachers. The Central Committee of the educational workers' union and the union-republic people's commissariats of education are given one month to develop a system of differentiated pay scales for teachers, based on regional factors, qualifications, and the quality of their work.

Teachers are to be supplied with food and industrial goods in the following way: in cities and industrial regions, by attaching them to closed workers' distribution centres and cafeterias, with the norm of an industrial worker; teachers in kolkhozes are to be supplied with food from the food stocks of the kolkhoz, according to the norm for the industrial workers of the given raion; village teachers are to be supplied with industrial goods and products, and in villages where no kolkhoz has yet been established

teachers are to be supplied with food products from central supply stocks at the norm of the industrial workers of the given raion. All work among teachers must aim, in every way, to stimulate socialist competition and the shock-worker movement, with shock-worker teachers being encouraged in every possible way.

#### **4 THE MATERIAL BASE OF THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS**

Noting that the material base of the schools – the construction of new buildings and the repair of existing ones, the production of teaching equipment and textbooks – is extremely inadequate and is becoming one of the obstacles to an improvement of the work of the schools, the Central Committee orders the Union Gosplan to develop a five-year plan for new school construction. In all new construction work the schools must be completed before the enterprise enters into operation.

To increase the number of school buildings, the Central Committee orders the local party and soviet organizations to return to the schools any unreleased former school buildings and also to use confiscated kulak houses as schools. The initiative and funds of the kolkhozes must be broadly involved in improving the material base of the schools and making better provision for the teachers.

The Supreme Council of the National Economy is ordered to establish an All-Union Association of the Textbook and School Equipment Manufacturing Industry and within two months to have examined the production plan of this association so that by 1932 the greater part of both primary and secondary schools will be provided with the necessary minimum of school equipment; the union-republic people's commissariats of education are given one month to develop the appropriate application and submit it to the Supreme Council of the National Economy, having elaborated standards for textbooks and polytechnical equipment.

The USSR Supreme Council of the National Economy is ordered to transfer to the schools any machine tools, instruments, or waste materials (rejects, breakage, scraps) which cannot be used by enterprises and are suitable for school workshops. The union-republic sovnarkoms as well as the krai and oblast executive committees and the organs of industrial co-operation are immediately to organize the local production of textbooks and school equipment – using locally available resources – for mass distribution in the schools.

## 5 SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION AND LEADERSHIP

While noting the successful restructuring of educational work in past years by the union-republic people's commissariats of education, the Central Committee of the party emphasizes that the quality of school work cannot be improved without a decisive improvement in the quality of school leadership by the organs of the People's Commissariat of Education, without their accelerated transition to operative, concrete, and differentiated guidance, with due regard for the economic and political significance of the various oblasts and raions, national characteristics, etc., establishing, in all elements of the educational network, strict responsibility for work assigned which will exclude any evasion by individuals. The Central Committee demands that all organs of the educational system perform their work and give guidance in a new way, one which meets the increasing demands made upon the schools by the socialist reconstruction of the economy.

The Central Committee orders the union-republic people's commissariats of education to effect a thoroughgoing reconstruction of the practical guidance of the educational organs, making it truly operative and differentiated, concentrating attention on the major industrial regions (metal, coal, oil, etc.), on sovkhozes, the MTSS, areas of total collectivization, and new construction sites. The 'balanced' approach to the distribution of personnel and funds must be ended, and they must be concentrated primarily in the leading sectors of socialist construction.

The union-republic people's commissariats of education must ensure the implementation of one-man leadership in school administration. In this the trade union organizations must extend the necessary assistance to the educational organs.

By organizing practical assistance to teachers, the union-republic people's commissariats of education are to heighten the responsibility of teachers for the quality of their work, singling out and encouraging those who are knowledgeable and devoted to their work.

The work of the organs of children's self-government in the schools is to be directed mainly at heightening the quality of school work and reinforcing conscious school discipline.

The Central Committee considers that, to accomplish successfully the tasks set by the present resolution, the union-republic people's commissariats of education must struggle resolutely against those elements in the educational organs which oppose this about-face in the work of the

schools as indicated by the present resolution and, instead of raising the quality of instruction, either indulge in leftist phrase-making or pull back in the direction of the bourgeois school.

The Central Committee stresses the growing significance and role of the school in socialist construction and orders all organizations to struggle systematically and unyieldingly against opportunist and anti-leninist distortions of the party's school policy. The success of the struggle against the major danger on the path to the construction of a polytechnical school – the right opportunist distortion of the party's policy leading to a rejection of the polytechnical transformation of the schools, to attempts to preserve the old system of verbal teaching, to a rift between theoretical studies and practice, is the precondition for an intensified struggle against left-opportunist distortions, the theory of the 'dying out' of the school, and the reduction in the role of the teacher.

The Central Committee directs the attention of all party organizations to the need for a resolute concentration of attention on the mass school, the work of the teacher, and on reinforcing the day-to-day concrete guidance of the schools.

*Spravochnik partiinogo  
rabotnika* VIII, 350

*KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh*, IV, 569–  
77

### 3.17

#### **On the Reconstruction of Literary-Artistic Organizations**

23 April 1932

The Central Committee hereby states that the substantial successes of socialist construction in recent years have led to a considerable quantitative and qualitative growth of literature and art.

Some years ago when literature was still clearly subject to considerable influence from alien elements, especially those which came to life during the first years of the NEP, when the cadres of proletarian literature were still weak, the party helped in every way to create and consolidate special proletarian organizations in literature and art in order to strengthen the position of the proletarian writers and artistic workers.

Now that proletarian cadres have arisen in literature and art, that new writers and artists have come forward from the factories and kolkhozes, the framework of the existing proletarian literary and artistic organizations (VOAPP, RAPP, RAMP, and others) is becoming too narrow and is hindering a serious upswing of artistic creativity. This circumstance gives rise to the danger that these organizations, instead of being instruments for maximum mobilization of Soviet writers and artists around the tasks of socialist construction, will be transformed into instruments of clubbish exclusiveness, of isolation from the political tasks of the present day and from the considerable groups of writers and artists who are sympathetic to socialist construction.

Hence the need for an appropriate reconstruction of literary and artistic organizations and for an expansion of the basis of their work.

In view of this the VKP(b) Central Committee resolves:

- 1 The Association of Proletarian Writers (VOAPP, RAPP) is liquidated;
- 2 All writers upholding the platform of the Soviet power and aspiring to participate in socialist construction are amalgamated in a single union of Soviet writers with its own communist fraction;
- 3 An analogous change is to be made with respect to other types of art;
- 4 The Orgburo is to work out practical measures for implementing this decision.

*Partiinoe stroitel'stvo*, no. 9  
(1932), 62

*KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh*, v, 44–5

# Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission

7–12 January  
1933

This was the thirteenth and last joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission. Ten of these had occurred in the period 1925–30, and the practice of joint meetings was associated with Stalin's manoeuvres to defeat various oppositional groups. It appears that he considered these two bodies particularly reliable bastions of support, and their joint meeting, while not mentioned in the party Rules, conveyed the impression of a particularly broad expression of party opinion, approaching the party conference or congress in prestige. By 1933 the old oppositional groups had been definitely disposed of, and the tactic of the joint plenum could be discarded. For that matter, this was the eve of the period in which all party representative institutions began to decline in importance.

This final joint plenum was, however, a major meeting in both appearance and substance. The assembled party members heard Stalin present a major economic address, 'The Results of the First Five-Year Plan' (Stalin, *Works* XII, 161–219), and supporting speeches by Molotov and Kuibyshev, which were approved in a resolution entitled 'Results of the First Five-Year Plan and the Economic Plan for 1933, the First Year of the Second Five-Year Plan' (*KPSS v rezoliutsiakh* x, 64–78). Stalin also delivered a speech on 'Work in the Countryside' (Stalin, *Works* XIII, 229–39), which called attention to difficulties in winning peasant approval for party policy and ended by giving terse and possibly inconclusive support for the plan to establish a special system of party cells to deal with agriculture, based on the production principle rather than the regional principle administratively. Kaganovich seems to have been the main instigator of this idea, which he presented in a speech to the plenum and which was approved in the following resolution. This system lasted less than two years (see 3.23).

One other major theme appeared at this plenum: the expurgation of deviants. Following a report of the chairman of the Central Control Commission, Rudzutak, a resolution was passed condemning an alleged rightist oppositional group, led by a former commissar of agriculture, A. P. Smirnov, who was expelled from the party along with two cohorts. Rykov and Tomsky, of the old right opposition, were reprimanded for encouraging the deviants but were merely threatened with 'stern measures' if they failed to mend their ways (resolution in *KPSS v rezoliutsiakh* v, 90). This was coupled with further, secret discussions of 'internal questions,' which led to the publication of a terse resolution 'On the Party Purge,' which entrusted the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission with the securing of 'iron proletarian discipline and the cleansing of the party ranks of all unreliable, unsteadfast and parasitic elements.' The organization of this purge, under Rudzutak's direction, was dealt with in greater detail in a decision of April 1933 (3.19).

11 January 1933

### **3.18**

#### **The Aims and Tasks of Politotdels in MTSS and Sovkhozes**

##### **I THE WEAKNESS OF POLITICAL WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE AND THE NEED FOR CREATING POLITOTDELS IN MTS S AND SOVKHOZES**

The major task of the party at present is the struggle for the continued advance of agriculture and for completing its socialist reconstruction.

The collectivization of the basic mass of the poor and middle peasants, the expansion of the production and technical base of the kolkhozes, and the development of sovkhov construction have created the necessary premises for the further advance of agriculture for strengthening the food and raw-material base of industrialization and for a steady rise in the incomes of kolkhozes and of the individual kolkhoz members.

Anti-Soviet elements in the village are savagely resisting the successful resolution of these tasks. The kulaks, who have been economically crushed but have not yet completely lost their influence, former White officers, former priests and their sons, the former bailiffs for landlords and managers for sugar-factory owners, former village police and other anti-Soviet elements from the bourgeois nationalist intelligentsia (including the Socialist Revolutionary and Petliura supporters) having settled in the villages, are striving in every way to dissolve the kolkhozes, are striving to undermine the agricultural measures of the party and government, for this purpose taking advantage of the lack of consciousness of some of the kolkhoz members, are against the interests of socialized kolkhoz farming, and are against the interests of the kolkhoz peasantry.

Worming their way into the kolkhozes in the guise of accountants, managers, storekeepers, brigade leaders, etc., and frequently even as leading persons in kolkhoz administrations, anti-Soviet elements endeavour to organize wrecking, spoil equipment, leave gaps in sowing, plunder kolkhoz property, undermine labour discipline, rob the seed grain, organize secret granaries, sabotage the compulsory deliveries of grain – and sometimes even succeed in dissolving kolkhozes.

Worming their way into the sovkhozes as managers, bookkeepers, members of field brigades, storekeepers, section leaders, etc., these anti-Soviet elements harm sovkhov construction by deliberately wrecking

tractors and combines, by tilling the land badly, by mismanaging the cattle, undermining labour discipline, and plundering sovkhos property – especially their production (grain, meat, milk, butter, wool, etc.).

All of these anti-Soviet and anti-kolkhoz elements pursue a single common goal: restoration of the power of the landlords and the kulaks over the toiling peasants, restoration of the power of the factory owners over the workers.

Communists and non-party sympathizers must be especially vigilant in order to organize the repulse of these anti-popular elements and crush them once and for all.

But the village party and Komsomol organizations, including the cells in the sovkhoses and MTSS, often lacking in revolutionary sense and vigilance, in many places not only fail to oppose this anti-Soviet activity of hostile elements through class vigilance and a day-to-day bolshevik struggle to strengthen Soviet influence over the broad non-party masses of kolkhoz members and sovkhos workers, but sometimes even fall themselves under the influence of these wrecking elements; even some party members, who have penetrated into the party for careerist purposes, make contact with enemies of the kolkhoses, sovkhoses, and the Soviet power and, together with them, organize the theft of seed grain during sowing and of the grain during harvesting and threshing, hide it in secret granaries, sabotage the compulsory grain deliveries and, in effect, drag individual kolkhoses and groups of kolkhoz members and of backward sovkhos workers into a struggle against the Soviet power.

This applies especially to the sovkhoses whose directors, under the influence of anti-Soviet elements, are frequently subject to a bourgeois rebirth, sabotage the tasks of the Soviet power, resort to outright deception of the party and government, and try to dispose of state sovkhos production as if it were their own property.

In this connection the village Communists and Komsomols are now confronted with the task of organizing and heading the group of true party and soviet activists in the kolkhoses and sovkhoses, of winning over the majority in the kolkhoses and sovkhoses, and of driving out of the kolkhoses and sovkhoses the anti-Soviet elements who have made their way into them, mainly from the ranks of the managers, accountants, bookkeepers, and storekeepers, the task of fighting for consistent and unflinching application of the laws of the Soviet power providing for



administrative and punitive measures against organizers of the plunder of kolkhoz and sovkhoz property and against those who sabotage party and governmental measures on seed collection, sowing, harvesting, and threshing, on fulfilling the planned compulsory grain deliveries, meat deliveries, etc.

The MTSS and the sovkhozes, being the largest factories of socialist agriculture, are the principal lever for reconstructing agriculture along socialist lines and for steadily intensifying Soviet influence on kolkhoz members.

The MTSS and the sovkhozes have won themselves a solid position in socialist agriculture as organizers of the system of socialized farming. However, despite the very sizable organizational and economic role and influence of the MTS in the technical re-equipment and socialist reconstruction of agriculture, their *political* influence over the broad masses of kolkhoz members is still totally inadequate. The MTSS frequently do not even have a political function. Within the MTS a criminally careless attitude toward party and governmental assignments flourishes on all sides, a criminal attitude toward state property, thievery, and plunder of kolkhoz and state property. Hostile class elements frequently penetrate into the MTSS themselves, working from within to intensify their anti-Soviet influence upon the kolkhoz members.

This is also true to a considerable extent for the sovkhozes. Despite their leading role in the technical re-equipment and socialist reconstruction of agriculture, up until now their political and economic influence on the kolkhozes has remained inadequate. Instead of working in an exemplary manner to master the technical equipment of the sovkhozes and make use of it, to demonstrate in practice the advantages of the large-scale agricultural enterprise over the small-scale private farm, the sovkhozes sometimes manifest bourgeois tendencies; a criminally careless attitude toward state property flourishes; the tractors, automobiles, combines, and cattle are treated barbarously; the sovkhoz production is stolen and squandered; and the party's targets for delivery of production to the state are not being met.

To strengthen the MTSS and sovkhozes politically, to heighten the political role and influence of the MTSS and sovkhozes in the village, and to effect a decisive improvement in the political and economic work of our cells in the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, the Central Committee has decided to organize, in all MTSS and sovkhozes, *politotdels* headed by the MTS or

sovkhoz deputy political director who will be at the same time the chief of the MTS or sovkhoz political section.

## **II TASKS OF THE MTS AND SOVKHOZ POLITOTDELS**

Through the expansion of mass political work in the kolkhozes and sovkhozes on one hand, and the organizational-economic strengthening of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes on the other, the MTS and sovkhoz politotdels must supplement the economic and technical work of the MTSS and sovkhozes on resolving the tasks confronting the kolkhozes and sovkhozes with respect to increasing yields, taking better care of cattle, the timely organization of autumn and spring plowing, of harvesting and threshing, the timely and complete fulfilment by kolkhoz members and sovkhozes of all their obligations to the state.

The politotdels of the MTSS and the sovkhozes are to ensure that the party keeps an eye on, and supervises, all aspects of the work and life of the MTS and sovkhozes themselves and of the kolkhozes serviced by the MTS. Ensuring that seed is of high quality during the sowing period, preventing it from being stolen, watching to see that threshing is done properly, the fight against robbery of the threshed grain, the struggle against absenteeism, ensuring proper care of live and dead stock of the kolkhoz or sovkhoz, driving all anti-soviet and anti-kolkhoz wrecking elements out of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, selecting the best and tested persons for the kolkhozes and sovkhozes – all these and similar matters should be at the centre of attention of the politotdels.

The MTS and sovkhoz politotdels are to assure political supervision and observation of the assignment and employment of kolkhoz members and sovkhoz workers, in this being mindful of the fact that the safeguarding of the socialized kolkhoz and sovkhoz property, and the successes of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, all depend upon who is working the seeder or the thresher, who is working in the sovkhoz livestock division, who is keeping account of the grain and the rest of the kolkhoz and sovkhoz property.

The first-priority task of the MTS politotdels is to ensure the unconditional and timely fulfilment by kolkhozes and kolhozniks of their state obligations and, in particular, a resolute struggle against the thievery of kolkhoz property, against the sabotage of party and governmental measures in regard to compulsory grain and meat deliveries by kolkhozes.

The first-priority task of the *sovkhos* politotdels is to ensure the unconditional and timely fulfilment by sovkhoses of their state obligations and, in particular, a resolute struggle against attempts by some directors and their deputies to oppose their own narrow sovkhos interests to the general interests of the state, against the concealment of production surpluses instead of their delivery to the state.

The MTS and sovkhos politotdels are to ensure the unflinching, correct, and timely application of the laws of the Soviet government on administrative and punitive measures against those who organize the plundering of public property and who sabotage the agricultural measures of the party and government.

The politotdels are to bring to the attention of the broad kolkhoz masses and of the sovkhos workers all such punitive measures, including judicial sentences for the above-mentioned crimes, developing on the basis of such facts and around them a broad mass explanatory and educational effort among the kolkhoz members and sovkhos workers.

The MTS and sovkhos politotdels are to accomplish all of these tasks by party-organizational and political-educational work among party and Komsomol members in sovkhoses and MTS and in the kolkhoses serviced by the latter, by mass political work among kolkhoz members and sovkhos workers, by the proper selection and assignment of the party members and Komsomols in kolkhoses and sovkhoses and of the non-party activists who are devoted to the kolkhoz cause, by day-to-day study of kolkhoz personnel, and by promoting the most progressive and genuinely devoted kolkhoz activists to responsible and priority production sectors ...

### **III REGULATIONS GOVERNING MTS POLITOTDELS**

#### *a MTS Politotdels*

MTS politotdels are organized in each MTS and consist of the chief, his two deputies for party work, and one assistant for Komsomol affairs. The chief of the MTS politotdel is at the same time the deputy-director of the MTS for political affairs.

The chief of the MTS politotdel is fully responsible for the the leadership of the MTS party and Komsomol organizations and of the kolkhoses which they service, as well as for the party political work of the MTS; he is to co-ordinate his work plan with the MTS director.

The chief of the politotdel assists the MTS director in all of his work but is in no case to substitute for him; he is responsible, together with the director, for fulfilment of the production and compulsory delivery plans of the MTS.

The MTS politotdel gives daily systematic assistance to kolkhoz party and Komsomol cells located in the area of activity of the MTS; it instructs them, verifies their work, and carries out these activities in contact with the local raion party committee.

The MTS politotdel takes an active part in selecting cadres as well as employees and members of the administrations of the kolkhozes serviced by the MTS – this including both the leading persons and administrative-economic cadres (the manager, the storeroom manager, the accountant, etc.).

The chief of the MTS politotdel is directly subordinate to the MTS political sector of the krai (oblast) land administration or to the people's commissariat of land of the national republic and is responsible to the latter for his work.

At the same time he must coordinate his work with the local raion party committee in the following manner: *a*/the chief of the politotdel is a member of the raion party committee; *b* /he submits periodic information to the raion committee on the work of the politotdel.

The chief of the MTS politotdel is appointed or removed by the VKP(b) Central Committee in the light of representations made by the first secretary of the krai or oblast committee or of the central committee of the national communist party.

*b Political sectors of the MTS krai (oblast) land administrations and of the people's commissariats of land of the national republics*

MTS Political Sectors are to be organized in krai (oblast) land administrations and in the people's commissariats of land of the national republics with the following members: the chief of the political sector, two deputies for party work, and one assistant for Komsomol affairs, as well as the responsible instructors for the krai tractor centre branches.

The chief of the krai (oblast, republican) MTS political sector is the deputy director of the krai (oblast) land administration. The chief of the MTS political sector of the krai or oblast land administration is directly subordinate to the MTS Political Administration of Narkomzem and co-

ordinates and ties in his work with the corresponding krai and oblast committees and with the central committees of the national communist parties, reporting periodically to the latter on his work and joining them as a member.

The chiefs of the political sectors of MTS krai or oblast land administrations and of the people's commissariats of land of the national republics are approved and removed by the VKP(b) Central Committee in the light of representations by the first secretaries of krai and oblast committees and of the central committees of the national communist parties.

*c The MTS political administration of narkomzem*

An MTS Political Administration is to be organized in Narkomzem with the following members: the chief, his two deputies for party affairs, one assistant for Komsomol affairs, and the responsible instructors for the oblast tractor centre branches.

The Chief of the MTS Political Administration of Narkomzem is the Deputy People's Commissar and is subordinate both to him and to the VKP(b) Central Committee directly.

The MTS Political Administration of Narkomzem is responsible for the leadership of party, Komsomol, and mass political work by the MTSS and has the following local organs: the MTS political sectors of the krai (oblast) land administrations and of the people's commissariats of land of the national republics.

The Chief of the MTS Political Administration of Narkomzem is appointed and removed by the VKP(b) Central Committee.

#### **IV REGULATIONS GOVERNING SOVKHOZ POLITOTDELS**

*a Sovkhoz politotdels*

Politotdels are organized in each sovkhoz and consist of the chief and his two deputies for party work as well as one assistant for Komsomol affairs.

The chief of the sovkhoz politotdel is at the same time the sovkhoz deputy-director for political affairs.

The chief of the sovkhoz politotdel is fully responsible for the leadership of party and Komsomol work and for party political work in the sovkhoz, co-ordinating his work plan with the sovkhoz director.

The chief of the politotdel assists the sovkhos director in all his work but is in no case to substitute for him; he is responsible, together with the sovkhos director, for fulfilment of the sovkhos production plans and of the party and governmental directives on the precise delivery of production to the state.

The sovkhos politotdels take an active part in selecting sovkhos personnel, including administrative and economic cadres.

The chief of the sovkhos politotdel is directly subordinate to the Political Administration of the People's Commissariat of Sovkhozes and is responsible for his work to the secretariat of the oblast or krai committee, or to the central committee of the national communist party.

The chief of the sovkhos politotdel is appointed and removed by the VKP(b) Central Committee in the light of representations made by the first secretaries of the krai and oblast committees and of the central committees of the national communist parties.

*b The Sovkhos Political Administration of the USSR People's Commissariat of Sovkhozes*

A Sovkhos Political Administration is to be organized in the USSR People's Commissariat of Sovkhozes, consisting of the chief, his two deputies, and one assistant for Komsomol affairs.

The Chief of the Sovkhos Political Administration of the People's Commissariat of Sovkhozes is the Deputy People's Commissar and is subordinate both to the People's Commissar and to the VKP(b) Central Committee directly.

The Sovkhos Political Administration of the People's Commissariat of Grain and Livestock Sovkhozes is responsible for the leadership of party, Komsomol, and mass political work in the sovkhozes.

The Chief of the Sovkhos Political Administration of the People's Commissariat of Sovkhozes is appointed and removed by the VKP(b) Central Committee.

*Pravda*, 13 January 1933

*KPSS v rezoliutsiakh* v, 64–90



28 April 1933

### 3.19

#### On the Party Purge

The basic decision to undertake a purge of party membership was embodied in a short resolution passed at a joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission on 12 January 1933, which entrusted the actual execution of the decision to the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission. These bodies may be presumed responsible for the following document, issued in the name of the Central Committee. The man primarily responsible for the whole procedure was Ia. E. Rudzutak, the Chairman of the Central Control Commission and a former member of the Politburo, who was to die in 1937 as an 'enemy of the people.'

#### I THE NEED FOR A PURGE

The fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan in four years, the victory of industrialization in the USSR, the successes of the kolkhoz movement, and the enormous numerical growth in the working class have evoked a new upsurge of political activity on the part of the proletariat and the peasantry.

On the basis of this upsurge the party, in the last 2½ years, has increased its membership by 1,400,000, bringing it to a total of 3,200,000 (2,000,000 party members and 1,200,000 candidate members).

However, during this mass acceptance into the party, which at the local level was frequently indiscriminate and lacking the necessary verification, alien elements penetrated into the ranks of the party and are using their sojourn in the party for careerist and self-seeking purposes; double dealers made their way in – persons who swear fidelity to the party but are in fact trying to undermine the conduct of its policy.

On the other hand, the unsatisfactory state of the marxist-leninist education of party members has meant that the party contains not a few comrades who, although honest and prepared to defend the Soviet Union, are either insufficiently stable – failing to understand the spirit and the demands of party discipline – or are politically almost illiterate, do not know the Programme, the Rules, and the fundamental decisions of the party, and for this reason are not able to carry out its policy actively.

Aware of these circumstances, the January [1933] Joint Plenum of the VKP(b) Central Committee and Central Control Commission resolved that a purge is to be conducted in 1933 and that 'the party purge is to be organized in such a way as to ensure iron proletarian discipline and to clear the party ranks of all hangers-on and other unreliable and unstable elements.'

In this the party was guided by the resolution of 30 July 1920 of the Second Comintern Congress which provided that ‘the communist parties of all countries where communists carry on their work legally should conduct periodic purges (re-registrations) of the personnel of party organizations in order systematically to clear the party of the petty bourgeois elements which inevitably adhere to it.’

On the basis of this Comintern directive our party conducted a party re-registration in 1920, a party purge in 1921, a purge of non-production cells in 1924, a verification of village cells in 1925, and a purge in 1929–30. As is known, these purges and re-registrations reinforced the ranks of our party, improved its fighting efficiency, and intensified the feeling of responsibility of each party member for the work of the party.

## **II THE FUNCTION OF THE PURGE AND ITS DIRECTION**

The function of the party purge is to elevate the ideological level of the party members, to strengthen the party politically and organizationally, and further to intensify the confidence in the party of the millions of non-party masses.

During a purge this task is accomplished: *a* / by the open and honest self-criticism of party members and members of party organizations, *b* / by verifying the work of each party cell to ascertain how it has executed the decisions and instructions of the party, *c* / by involving the toiling non-party masses in the purge, and *d* / by ridding the party of those persons who have not justified the lofty name of party member.

The party is purged of the following people:

- 1 class alien and hostile elements who made their way into the party by deceit and remain there in order to demoralize the party ranks;
- 2 double dealers who live by deceiving the party, who conceal from it their true aspirations and, covered by a false oath of ‘fidelity’ to the party, in fact strive to undermine the party’s policy;
- 3 open and hidden violators of the iron discipline of the party and state who fail to carry out the decisions of the party and the state, who cast doubt on and discredit the party’s decisions and plans by chatter about their ‘lack of realism’ and ‘impracticability’;
- 4 degenerates who have merged with bourgeois elements, who do not really want to fight against class enemies, who are not really struggling



against kulak elements, grabbers, loafers, thieves, and despoilers of public property;

5 careerists, self-seekers, and bureaucratized elements who exploit their sojourn in the party and their service with the Soviet state for their own personal self-seeking aims, who are isolated from the masses and disregard the needs and demands of the workers and peasants;

6 moral degenerates whose unseemly behaviour injures the dignity of the party, who sully the party banner.

Considering that among the *party members* who have recently entered the ranks of the VKP(b) there are some comrades who are devoted to the cause of the working class and have manifested this devotion in practice – in production, in the kolkhozes – but have not yet mastered the most elementary political knowledge necessary for a member of the Communist Party – the party Programme and Rules, its most important decisions – the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the party recommend that during the purge such Communists be transferred to the status of *candidate member*, not as a party penalty but for the sake of their political education and better training, so that in a year's time the question may be raised of transferring them back to party members if during this time they will have succeeded in heightening the knowledge of political fundamentals which is necessary for a party member.

Considering that, due to the same circumstances, among the *party candidates* there are not a few comrades who not only do not possess the elementary political knowledge necessary for a candidate but still suffer from instability and a lack of the self-command required by party discipline, the party Central Committee and Central Control Commission recommend that during the purge such comrades be transferred from the category of candidates to that of *sympathizers*, so that in a year's time the question may be raised of transferring them back to candidates or of admitting them to party membership if a check shows that they have fully matured.

### III WAYS AND TECHNIQUES OF CONDUCTING THE PURGE

The purge is an expression of bolshevik self-criticism of our party. It must be conducted 'without respect of persons' with the aim of checking on the execution by party members and candidates of the most important party decisions, on their participation in socialist competition and the shock-

worker movement, in the active struggle for the industrial and financial plan, for meeting the major economic targets, in the struggle against absenteeism, against the despoiling of socialist property.

The purge commission must demand that all party members know the party Programme, its Rules, and its most important decisions; there can be no Communist who is ignorant of the Programme and the Rules of his party and of its most important political and organizational decisions. However, when checking individually on the members' knowledge of political fundamentals purge commissions should not ask involved, 'captious,' 'tricky' questions. They should take into account the overall level of development of the person undergoing examination so as not to exclude from the party comrades, especially workers and kolkhoz members, who have given absolute proof of their devotion to the cause of the party and the building of socialism but have not had sufficient opportunity to improve the level of their political knowledge.

The purge should in no way be viewed, by those conducting it or those undergoing it, as a sign of the party's lack of confidence in all Communists of the given cell indiscriminately. The purge commission must make every effort to create a comradely atmosphere for the purge, one in which each party member can feel that it is not a question of reprisals but of helping the party disclose and root out all defects in party organization.

The purge commissions and all party members must resolutely rebuff anyone who will attempt to exploit the purge to settle personal accounts, for purposes of factional struggle; they must rebuff all trouble makers and cavillers, and also anyone attempting to defame a Communist for the firmness with which he carries out the party line in the fight for party discipline, for economy, for fulfilment of the industrial and financial plan, for the timely delivery of grain, for a proper preparation for the spring sowing, the harvest, and distribution of the crop, and generally for a firm attitude with respect to the accuracy and precision with which the party members under a given comrade in a leading position perform their work. At the same time a no less resolute rebuff must be given to anyone attempting to decry as troublemakers and cavillers all those who are sincerely striving to help the party disclose during the purge the alien, unstable, and unreliable elements in its ranks or to point out the actual oversights, short-comings, errors, and defects in the work of one or another comrade or of some whole organization.

While struggling against degenerate and unseemly behaviour of party members in their everyday life (drunkenness, corruption, and intimacy with alien elements in everyday life, anti-semitism, and similar phenomena incompatible with the name of communist), the purge commissions should in no case tolerate petty and captious digging into people's personal lives. Purge commissions should devote primary attention to how the party member carries out the job assigned to him by the party, how he struggles for the implementation and fulfilment of party decisions.

The purge takes place at open cell meetings in the presence of non-party persons (in large cells covering whole shops, shifts, and parts of institutions, whole kolkhozes, sovkhozes, etc.), and as a preliminary step the report of the purge commission on the aims and functions of the purge is heard and discussed, as well as that of the cell bureau on the state of the organization being tested.

The purge extends to all party members and candidates except members and candidates of the VKP(b) Central Committee and Central Control Commission and members of the Revision Commission of the VKP(b) Central Committee, these having been elected by the party congress, and also the chiefs of MTS and sovkhoz politotdels who were verified by the party upon appointment. However, if a statement with supporting materials has been submitted by some party meeting or some group of party members demanding the purge of a given member or candidate member of the Central Committee, the Central Control Commission, or the Revision Commission, or of the chief of some MTS or sovkhoz politotdel, such persons must undergo the purge.

#### **IV LEADERSHIP OF THE PURGE**

The Central Purge Commission is charged with leadership of the purge on the all-union scale.

The Central Purge Commission appoints corresponding purge commissions to guide the purge in the krai and oblast organizations and in the national republics.

The oblast, krai, and republican purge commissions organize raion purge commissions.

Oblast and raion purge commissions are made up of staunch Communists who have been party members for at least ten years, who enjoy authority and possess bolshevik firmness, are politically knowledgeable,

have never belonged to other parties, and have never been in the opposition. The list of purge commission members is to be published in timely fashion in the local press in order to give the Central Purge Commission time to examine any declarations or challenges made with respect to members of the purge commission.

Members and candidate members of the VKP(b) who are dissatisfied with a purge commission decision have one month within which to complain to the next higher purge commission, all the way up to the Central Purge Commission and the party congress, as the supreme organ of the party.

The purge commissions must operate under the supervision of the whole party, including organizations being verified, in particular the party press. At its general meeting any cell may criticize any resolution of a purge commission and lodge a complaint against it, which does not mean, however, that this resolution is nullified. Members of purge commissions must bear in mind that if they violate internal party democracy or are crude and tactless during the purge, they themselves will be subjected to party discipline for discrediting the purge.

The purge is to commence on 1 June in the Moscow, Leningrad, Ural, Donets, Odessa, Kiev, and Vinnitsa oblasts, in the east Siberian and Far Eastern krais, and in the Belorussian Republic, and is to finish not later than the end of November of the current year.

The Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the party are confident that all party members and honourable non-party toilers will take an active part in purging the party's ranks of worthless and alien elements, that the party purge will rally the worker and kolkhoz masses even more tightly to the party, will reinforce and strengthen the party organizations, and will still further enhance their fighting efficiency in fulfilling the tasks of the Second Five-Year Plan.

## XVII Party Congress

26 January –  
10 February  
1934

‘The Congress of the Victors’ was the unofficial title given by *Pravda* to this meeting, attended by 1961 delegates. On the surface this sense of self-satisfaction and team spirit did indeed seem to dominate. Stalin’s report as General Secretary was full of optimism and confidence and was warmly supported not only by his lieutenants but also by some former right oppositionists, including Bukharin. (See Stalin, *Works* XIII, 288–388, 390, for Stalin’s report in English translation.) These figures were spared continued self-humiliation and were permitted to join in the general praise of the great Stalin and his policies, a seeming sign that he was sufficiently secure and that a more reasonable and generous spirit could replace the former persecution of dissenters.

Yet with this euphoria there seem to have been veiled difficulties and tensions. Important administrative changes, embodied in a new version of the party Rules, included the introduction of the production-branch principle in the sections of the party Secretariat and the replacement of the previous joint party-state inspectorial apparatus with separate commissions for party and state control. Both of these changes involved sharp differences of opinion which eventually surfaced. In the case of the control organization, Khrushchev maintained during his own period of leadership that the change of 1934 grossly violated Lenin’s desire to check bureaucracy through a strong autonomous control agency. Perhaps it is more to the point that Stalin was thinking about preparing the new party purge through the Commission of Party Control, which was directly subordinate to the Central Committee (i.e., the Secretariat).

While the XVII Congress did not acknowledge the existence of any new opposition, contemporary rumour and post-Stalin recollections indicate that the leader had cause for concern with the possible rivalry of S.M. Kirov. A surviving delegate to the Congress (a rarity), L. Shaumian, wrote in 1964 that Kirov was in 1934 ‘the favourite of the whole party’ and that ‘the thought sprang up among some delegates,’ especially older party members, that ‘the time had come to shift Stalin from the post of General Secretary to other work.’

Did this demotion actually take place? The Congress, in accordance with the Rules, elected a new Central Committee (71 members and 68 candidates), which held a plenum the day after the Congress. This meeting, also following the Rules, elected the members of the executive organs of the party. The Politburo was little changed. Ordzhonikidze and Andreev, who had been awarded full membership in this body in 1930 and 1932 respectively, were retained in 1934. Postyshev was added as a candidate member. The Secretariat was much more drastically changed. Of five secretaries elected in 1930, only Stalin and Kaganovich were again elected in 1934. Moreover, the late Boris Nicolaevsky noted that the announcement of the make-up of the newly elected bodies (*Pravda*, 11 February 1934) differed from comparable documents over the preceding ten years in that it failed to report that Stalin was ‘confirmed’ as General Secretary. Nicolaevsky therefore concluded that ‘after the XVII Congress, Stalin ceased to be General Secretary of the Central Committee, that he had lost all those special privileges which went with the position and which set him apart from the other members of the Central Committee Secretariat’ (Nicolaevsky, *Power and the Soviet Elite*, New York, 1965, 92).

Granting that Stalin did face at least muted dissent in the party, Nicolaevsky's interpretation seems highly questionable. The post-Congress announcement of the newly elected Secretariat, while omitting reference to the confirmation of Stalin as General Secretary, placed his name first in the list of secretaries, ahead of Kaganovich, Kirov, and Zhdanov, which clearly indicated that he took precedence. This format contrasted with the one used after the XVI Party Congress in 1930, when Stalin's name appeared in an alphabetical list, *after* four others. Thus, in the show-business game of hustling for top billing, Stalin seems to have gained between 1930 and 1934. (And Nicolaevsky himself did much to publicize the premise 'that nothing is ever accidental in official CPSU documents.') Nor was Stalin explicitly reconfirmed as General Secretary after the party congresses of 1939 and 1952, though his primacy can hardly be doubted at those dates.

Moreover, none of the post-Stalin Soviet writing on the 'cult of personality' mentioned that any formal demotion took place. Surely this would not have been so if Stalin had actually been removed as General Secretary in 1934 or any other time. The central message of Khrushchev and his publicists was that Lenin, the epitome of true bolshevism, had understood Stalin's weakness for despotism and had recommended from his sickbed in 1923 that Stalin be removed as General Secretary. Khrushchevian historiography was constantly at pains to show that the best elements in the party leadership always wanted to follow the spirit of Lenin and resist 'the cult of the individual.' The demotion of Stalin even as a formality, would have been just the kind of evidence for self-justification (and justification of the party as an institution) that Khrushchev wanted. Yet no claim to have demoted Stalin has been advanced on behalf of the Central Committee of February 1934. Most of the members of this body were soon to have cause to regret that they had not demoted Stalin. Seventy per cent of them were dispatched in the purges.

### 3.20

#### **On the Second Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR (1933–37)**

10 February 1934

In the years of the First Five-Year Plan the heroic struggle of the working class laid the foundations of socialist economy. The last capitalist class – the kulaks – was routed, and the basic masses of the peasantry – the kolkhozniks – have become a firm support for Soviet power in the village. The adherence of the USSR to the socialist path has definitely been consolidated. Technically advanced heavy industry was built in the USSR during the First Five-Year Plan, and particularly significant results were achieved in the creation of a modern heavy industry, which is the material base of socialism, the basis for the reconstruction of the entire economy, and the condition for a speedier development of the light and food industries and of agriculture. Dozens of new branches of production have been newly organized: complex machine-tool production, motor vehicle and tractor industries, harvester combine production, air frame and aviation

engine production, production of powerful turbines and generators, production of quality steels, ferrous alloys, aluminum, a modern chemical industry, synthetic rubber, nitrogen, synthetic fibres, etc. The knitted goods, clothing, shoe, meat, canned goods, paper, and other industries have been rebuilt on the basis of modern technology. Thousands of advanced enterprises have been built, lifting the entire economy to a high stage of the new technical culture, on a level with the best of capitalist technology.

Agriculture was fundamentally reconstructed during the First Five-Year Plan. The proletariat, under the leadership of the leninist party, convinced millions of peasants of the superiority of collective production and created the new, kolkhoz system in the village. Victories in the development of industry created the conditions for gigantic successes in setting agriculture onto the path of machine technology. The USSR has become the country of the largest-scale agriculture in the world ...

The XVII Congress of the VKP(b) has established that the Second Five-Year Plan for the development of the economy, which was presented by Gosplan and adopted by the Central Committee of the VKP(b) and the Sovnarkom, assures:

*a* total liquidation of capitalist elements and classes, the final liquidation of private property in the means of production on the basis of the final completion of collectivization of peasant holdings, and the organization of cooperatives to cover all cottage industry; elimination of the mixed character of the economy of the Soviet Union and establishment of the socialist means of production as the only means of production, together with the conversion of the country's entire working population into active and conscious builders of the socialist society;

*b* completion of the technical reconstruction of the entire economy of the USSR on foundations laid during the First Five-Year Plan and continuing the rapid upsurge in the production of the means of production (heavy industry);

*c* a more rapid rise in the well-being of the worker and peasant mass, and also a decisive improvement in the entire matter of housing and municipal services in the USSR;

*d* a strengthening of the economic and political positions of the proletarian dictatorship on the basis of a union of the working class with the peasantry for the final and total liquidation of capitalist elements and classes;

e a further strengthening of the country's defence capability.

The carrying out of these tasks, leading to the ejection of the last remnants of capitalist elements from all their old positions and dooming them to decisive ruin, cannot fail to evoke a sharpening of the class struggle, new attempts on the part of the kulaks to undermine the kolkhozes, and attempts on the part of anti-Soviet forces to wreck and sabotage our industrial enterprises. On the other hand, the achievement of the tasks of the Second Five-Year Plan – the plan for a fundamental rise in the living standard of the worker and peasant masses on the basis of the completion of the technical reconstruction of our entire economy – cannot but elicit the enthusiasm of the working people, a surge of production activism and mounting efforts to master the new technology on the part of the broadest masses of the working people – the builders of socialism.

By mercilessly smashing the counter-revolutionary sorties of the class enemy and by closing the ranks of the shock-workers of socialism for the victorious fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan, the working class together with the kolkhoz masses – and under the leadership of the party, which is waging unrelenting struggle against any sort of opportunism – will overcome all difficulties of whatever sort on the path of the building of socialism.

The XVII Congress of the VKP(b) notes that the fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan, the plan for the overall technical reconstruction of the economy, requires organization that will assure:

first, operative and concrete management of day-to-day business, with no tolerance for bureaucratic perversions in the economic apparatus;

second, concentration of the best engineering and technical forces in the decisive production sectors, and not in the offices of state institutions;

third, a correct organization of workers' wages, assuring material incentives for a growth in labour productivity;

fourth, an increase in socialist competition, particularly with the aim of better mastering new technology and new production processes;

fifth, firm labour discipline at both industrial enterprises and state farms as well as at kolkhozes;

sixth, revolutionary vigilance against the enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat and true responsibility towards the working class and its party for work assigned;



seventh, continued strengthening of the union of workers and peasants.

In the Second Five-Year Plan, the USSR is achieving a major step forward in overcoming the age-old contradiction of human society- the contradiction between city and countryside – and is creating all the necessary preconditions for the elimination of that contradiction. In its social form, agriculture is becoming identical with industry and agricultural labour is being transformed into a variant form of industrial labour; transportation links between city and countryside are increasing greatly and the growth rates of industrial and agricultural output are converging markedly; converging too are the levels of material well-being and culture of the working people of city and countryside.

In the Second Five-Year Plan period, the USSR is becoming a technically and economically independent country and technically the most advanced state in Europe.

The fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan will increase still further the importance of the USSR as the stronghold of the struggle of the international proletariat and will raise even higher – in the eyes of the working people of the exploited masses of the entire world – the authority of the land of the Soviets as the supporting base of the world proletarian revolution. The new, great historic victories in the building of socialism will further strengthen the economic basis of the Soviet Union's military power, its ability to repulse and smash any incursions whatsoever by the enemies of the proletarian state. A powerful economic upsurge and steady growth of the working masses' well-being in the USSR at a time of crisis in the capitalist countries will confirm all the more vividly the advantages of the socialist system of management over the capitalist, and the fact that the system of capitalist slavery is historically doomed; they will reveal even more fully the gigantic creative forces of the revolutionary proletariat, which has seized power and is strengthening its dictatorship in the heroic struggle for the building of a classless socialist society.

The XVII Congress of the VKP(b) demands of all party members a bolshevik struggle for the victory of the Second Five-Year Plan and calls on workers and collective farmers to rally round the party for the fulfilment of this historic task.

10 February 1934

## Organizational Questions

### I ORGANIZATIONAL MEASURES IN PARTY CONSTRUCTION MEMBERSHIP IN THE PARTY AND IN PRIMARY PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

1 In order to end the mechanical, indiscriminate admission into the party which has occurred in many places, a larger number of recommendations is to be required for admission to party membership and candidate membership, and a longer period of party membership is to be required of those giving recommendations; only activists who have proven themselves in work in one or another social organization are to be taken into the party; those admitted are to be minutely verified, and the reaction of the organization in which the entrant worked is to be ascertained.

2 Admission to the party, and the transfer of candidates to full membership, are to be resumed when the purge of the whole party is complete, that is, in the latter half of 1934.

3 In order to unite around the VKP(b) those non-party activists who are closest to the party and have manifested their active assistance to the party in deed – in production, in the kolkhoz – but are not yet prepared for entry into the party, groups of VKP(b) sympathizers are to be set up in the lower-level party organizations, consisting of persons who submit unconditionally to all decisions of party organs.

4 Since at the present time the party *cells* have outgrown the framework of cells of the old type, both with respect to their make-up and with respect to their tasks and their actual work, the Congress decrees that the existing party cells be transformed into factory, transport, Red Army, kolkhoz, higher-educational, institutional, and other *party organizations* headed by a party committee (by a party bureau in Red Army party organizations); in shops, shifts, and departments the party cells are to be transformed into shop organizations headed by a party organizer who is elected at the general meeting of the given party organization and is approved by the factory party committee.

In party organizations numbering fewer than fifteen party members and candidate members no party committee is to be created, but party organizers are to be assigned instead.

In kolkhozes with fewer than three party members candidate or party Komsomol groups are to be created, headed by party organizers assigned by

the MTS politotdels (by the raion party committees in kolkhozes which are not serviced by an MTS).

*The organizational structure of the leading party organs of the centre, the oblast, the raion*

5 The existing *functional* sections of the oblast and krai committees, and of the VKP(b) Central Committee, are to be reconstructed and integral production-branch sections created in their place. Following the example of the Central Committee Agricultural Section, in each production-branch section is to be concentrated all the work of the given branch: party organizational work, the assignment and training of cadres, mass agitational work, production propaganda, supervising the fulfilment of party decisions by the appropriate soviet-economic organs and party organizations.

Sections are to be structured as follows:

In the VKP(b) Central Committee: 1 / Agricultural Section, 2 / Industrial Section, 3 / Transportation Section, 4 / Planning, Finance, and Trade Section, 5 / Political-Administrative Section, 6 / Leading Organs Section, 7 / Culture and Leninist Propaganda Section, 8 / the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, and two sectors: the Administration of Affairs Section and the Special Sector [police and security].

In oblast and krai committees: 1 / Agricultural, 2 / Industrial and Transport, 3 / Soviet-Trade, 4 / Leninist Culture and Propaganda, 5 / Leading Party Organs (city and raion) and the Special Sector.

The secretariats of the oblast and krai committees, and of the central committees of the national communist parties, are to be abolished, leaving not more than two secretaries – the first and the second (except for the Central Committee of the Communist Party (bolshevik) of the Ukraine and the Moscow and Leningrad oblast committees which are to retain their secretariats). Questions requiring discussion are to be submitted directly to the bureau, while the elaboration of various practical matters is to be done, not by the special commissions, but by the committee section chiefs and by the leading personnel of trade union, co-operative, Komsomol, and other organizations.

6 The work of the raion committees is to be reconstructed by involving them more in production problems; there is to be a reinforcement of the raion committee's concrete guidance of the territorial party organizations and village soviets and, together with the politotdels, of the kolkhoz

organizations of the raion as a whole, these committees being assigned additional cadres. All sections are to be liquidated in the raion and city committees (except for the city and raion committees of the largest cities, as defined by special Central Committee resolutions), and they are to be replaced by roving responsible instructors – members of the raion and city committees and each attached to a particular group of primary party organizations for whom they organize all branches of party work: cultural and political propaganda, mass agitation, organizational work, etc. The secretary and his deputy are to guide the work of the instructors, assign personnel, and verify execution.

7 The VKP(b) Central Committee decisions on organizing politotdels in the MTS, sovkhozes, and on the railroads are approved as having entirely justified themselves. The Central Committee is instructed to continue creating politotdels in the lagging sectors of socialist construction, transforming them, as they fulfil their shock-worker tasks, into ordinary party organs structured according to the territorial-production principle.

The Central Committee is instructed, in connection with the formation of new economic centres around the MTS, to create new independent raions or – in the less powerful MTS centre – subraions, and wherever possible to transform the MTS political sections into raion committees or subraion committees.

## **II ORGANIZATIONAL MEASURES IN SOVIET CONSTRUCTION**

### *On Liquidating Functionalism and Ensuring Concrete Guidance*

8 The functional system of structuring the soviet-economic apparatus is to be liquidated and this apparatus restructured along territorial-production lines, from the lowest production links up to the people's commissariats.

The principal organs of the people's commissariats are to be the main production or territorial-production administrations which will be responsible for the given sector of work as a whole and will be endowed with rights and obligations with respect to all aspects, without exception, of the guidance of their subordinate organizations; the rights of the remaining functional sectors are to be limited, and they are forbidden to give guidance to lower-level links through the chiefs of the main administrations.

9 The leaders of soviet-economic organs are obliged to provide genuinely concrete guidance of each separate lower-level organ or enterprise, correcting their short-comings by means of operative measures

during the course of work; they must cut down on the network of intermediate links (associations, trusts, etc.) and broaden the direct connection between the people's commissariats and the largest enterprises.

10 There is to be a more precise and strict delimitation of obligations between the central and local organs of the people's commissariats; the role and obligations of the local, oblast, krai, and republican organs of power are to be increased, in particular as regards the development of local industry and agriculture, the guidance of only the enterprises of genuinely all-union significance being concentrated in the main administrations of the people's commissariats.

In place of the plenipotentiaries of the people's commissariats, oblast and krai administrations of heavy, light, and other branches of industry are to be set up in the oblasts and krajs; they are to have responsibility for the administration of all local industry and at the same time for executing the assignments of the corresponding people's commissariat.

The Central Committee is instructed to give a concrete formulation to the question of organizing the administration of local industry and of the local representation of the all-union industrial people's commissariats.

11 In 1934 the staffs of all soviet budgetary and economic-accounting organs are to be reduced by at least 10–15 Per cent below their 1933 levels; there is also to be a sharp reduction in existing forms of registering and reporting from top to bottom.

*On the personal responsibility of leaders, verification of execution, and transfer of cadres into production*

12 In order to strengthen the personal responsibility of economic and soviet leaders, the collegial form of leadership is to be liquidated in all areas of soviet-economic activity except in elected soviet organs.

In the people's commissariats the collegial form of leadership is to be liquidated; the people's commissar is to remain at the head with not more than two deputies. Councils are to be set up in the people's commissariats, meeting once every two months and consisting of from forty to seventy members, of whom not less than half must be the representatives of local organizations and enterprises.

The chairmen of oblast or krai executive committees, of the republic councils of people's commissars, and of city soviets must have not more than two deputies.

13 The special sectors for verifying execution are to be liquidated, and the leaders of all administrative organs from top to bottom are ordered personally to verify the execution of the decisions and orders of their respective organs.

14 Following the example of the coal industry and of railroad transport, engineering and technical personnel are to be transferred from their offices into production work in all branches of the economy and of the state administration.

15 The rates of pay for labour are to be restructured in such a way as to provide incentives for work directly in the shop or sector, in production.

All honest knowledgeable engineers and technical workers, regardless of whether or not they belong to the party, are to be granted the broadest opportunity to advance to responsible commanding positions in industry, agriculture, etc. A compulsory verification of the technical and managerial qualifications of such workers is to be organized by the examining and certifying commissions regardless of whether or not the person involved is a party member.

The leaders of economic organs and enterprises must have mastered the technical fundamentals of their jobs, and they must work out for each branch of industry and of the economy a minimum body of technical knowledge which must be studied by all leading personnel within a defined minimum period.

*On the work of the local soviets, trade unions, and komsomol organizations to improve the state and economic apparatus*

16 Mass supervision of the functioning of administrative bodies is to be organized, and the bureaucratic ulcers and short-comings of the apparatus are to be subjected to severe criticism by the masses.

The network of soviet sections and of groups of deputies in enterprises and villages must be broadened, and in the large cities subraion and sectoral groups of soviet deputies must be organized, with particular attention being devoted to attracting female activists, workers, and kolkhoz members into the work of the soviets.

17 The trade unions are to be granted all the rights of the lower-level organs of the Rabkrin in enterprises, and they are also to provide guidance to the supervisory organs of ORS, ZRK, raipo and gorpo [consumer goods supply organizations for workers].

The patronage of enterprises over state institutions and the socialist combination of production work with work in state institutions are to be expanded and qualitatively heightened, since they are seen to have been justified.

The practice of organizing the Komsomol as 'light cavalry,' successfully uncovering the bureaucratic short-comings of the apparatus, is to be restored since it is seen to have been justified. The quality of the work of the Komsomol cells in state institutions on improving the state apparatus is to be heightened.

### **III ORGANIZATIONAL MEASURES FOR STRENGTHENING PARTY-SOVIET SUPERVISION**

18 To intensify supervision over the execution of governmental decisions and to strengthen soviet discipline, the following organizational measures are recognized as essential:

*a* The Executive Commission of the Sovnarkom is to be transformed into the Sovnarkom Commission of Soviet Control, as indicated by the party congress and approved by the Central Executive Committee and the Sovnarkom; the Commission will have its own apparatus at the centre and permanent representatives, appointed and recalled by the Commission of Soviet Control, in the republics, krais, and oblasts;

*b* Rabkrin, which has already played its positive role, is abolished and its apparatus transferred to the Sovnarkom Commission of Soviet Control;

*c* One of the deputy chairmen of the Sovnarkom is appointed leader of the Commission of Soviet Control.

19 The following organizational measures must be carried out to strengthen supervision of the execution of party and VKP(b) Central Committee decisions, to consolidate party discipline, and to intensify the struggle against violations of party ethics:

*a* The Central Control Commission is to be transformed into the Commission of Party Control attached to the VKP(b) Central Committee and elected by the party congress; it will possess its own apparatus at the centre and permanent representatives, appointed and recalled by the VKP(b) Central Committee Commission of Party Control, in the republics, krais, and oblasts;

*b* The apparatus of the Central Control Commission is to be transferred to the VKP(b) Central Committee Commission of Party Control;

c One of the secretaries of the VKP(b) Central Committee is appointed the leader of the Commission of Party Control ...

### 3.22

#### **Rules of the VKP(b) Section of the Communist International**

10 February 1934

[Replaces Rules adopted in 1925; see 2.52]

[New] The VKP(b), a section of the Communist International, is the leading, organized detachment of the proletariat of the USSR, the highest form of its class organization.

The party exercises leadership of the proletariat, toiling peasantry, and all the toiling masses in the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for the victory of communism.

The party leads all the organs of the proletarian dictatorship and secures the successful construction of socialist society.

The party is a united, militant organization, joined together by conscious iron proletarian discipline. The party's strength lies in its solidarity, unity in will and action, which are incompatible with deviations from the Programme, violation of party discipline, and with factional groupings within the party.

The party demands of its members active and selfless work for the realization of the party Programme and Rules, and fulfilment of all the decisions of the party and its organs, the securing of the unity of party ranks and strengthening of fraternal, international relations, both among the toilers of the nationalities of the USSR and with the proletarians of all the countries of the world.

#### **I PARTY MEMBERS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS**

1 [As in 2.52, art. 1] A party member is anyone who accepts the party Programme, works in one of its organizations, obeys party decisions, and pays membership dues.

2 [New] A party member must:

a ob serve the strictest party discipline, actively participate in the political life of the party and of the country, carry out party policies and the decisions of party organs;



b tirelessly work at increasing his ideological competence, at mastering the fundamentals of marxism-leninism and the most important political and organizational decisions of the party and to explain them to non-party masses;

c as a member of the ruling party in the Soviet state, serve as an example in maintaining labour and state discipline, in mastering the techniques of his work, and continually increasing his productive and practical skills.

3 [Revises 2.52, art. 2] Party membership is granted exclusively on an individual basis. New members are drawn from those candidate members who have completed the established period of candidate membership, a school of political literacy, and who have mastered the Programme and Rules of the party.

Workers, kolkhozniks, members of the Red Army, persons who study or are employed, persons who have been outstanding in their work in groups of sympathizers, in soviets, in trade unions, in the Komsomol, in co-operatives, in delegations to meetings are accepted as party members after references have been submitted by the organizations in which they worked or are working.

Acceptance of candidate members into party membership is regulated as follows:

a Four categories are established:

1 industrial workers who have served in production for at least five years;

2 industrial workers who have served in production for less than five years, agricultural workers, members of the Red Army of worker or kolkhoznik origin, and engineering-technical workers, working directly in a shop or in a section;

3 kolkhozniks, members of the cottage-industry artels and primary school teachers;

4 other employees.

b For acceptance into the party, persons of the first category must present three recommendations from party members with five years' party membership; persons of the second category must present five recommendations from party members with five years' party membership; persons of the third category must present five recommendations from party members with five years' party membership and a recommendation from a

representative of the politotdel of the MTS or raion committee; persons of the fourth category must present five recommendations from party members with ten years' party membership.

*Note* Upon acceptance into party membership from the Komsomol for all categories a recommendation from the raion committee of the Komsomol is equivalent to the recommendation of two party members.

c Those coming from other parties are accepted in exceptional cases on the recommendation of five party members: three with ten years' party membership and two with pre-revolutionary party membership, and only through the industrial primary organization with compulsory approval by the Central Committee of the VKP(b), irrespective of the social status of the applicant.

*Note* The Central Committee may delegate the right of final approval of acceptance into party membership of those from other parties to the individual krai and oblast committees of the party and to central committees of national communist parties.

d Approval of the recommendations preceeds acceptance and is the responsibility of the local party committee.

e The question of acceptance into the party is given preliminary consideration by the primary party organization; it is decided at the general meeting of the organization and takes effect when approved by the raion or city committee, in the case of the first and second categories, and in the case of the third and fourth categories, by the oblast or krai committee or the central committee of a national communist party.

f Young people up to the age of twenty years inclusive, may enter the party only through the Komsomol.

4 [As in 2.52, art. 3] Persons who give recommendations bear responsibility for those whom they recommend; in cases of unfounded recommendations they are subject to party punishment, even to the point of expulsion from the party.

5 [As in 2.52, art. 4] Seniority of party membership of candidates who are accepted as party members is counted from the day on which the general meeting of the appropriate cell decides to confirm a given comrade as a party member.

6 [As in 2.52, art. 5] Any member of one [party] organization who moves into the area of work of another organization is registered in the latter as

one of its members.

*Note* The transfer of a party member from one organization to another is conducted according to rules established by the Central Committee of the party.

7 [New] Party members and candidates who have not paid their membership dues for three months without valid reasons are considered to have left the party. The general meeting of the primary organization is to be informed of this.

8 [Revises 2.52, art. 6] The question of expelling anyone from the party is decided at a general meeting of the organization of which the person is a member, and is confirmed for those of the first and second category by the oblast and krai committees, for those of the third and fourth categories, by the raion and city committees, with the provision that from the day of expulsion by the general meeting of the party organization or by the party committee, the said person is suspended from party work. The party press announces the expulsion of a party member and gives the reasons for expulsion.

9 [New] On the basis of periodic decisions of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), purges are conducted systematically to cleanse the party of: alien class and hostile elements; double dealers who deceive the party and conceal from it their real views and who wreck party policies; overt and covert transgressors of the iron-clad discipline of the party and of the state; degenerates linked with the bourgeois elements; careerists, self-seekers, and bureaucratic elements; moral decadents who, by their improper conduct, fail to uphold the dignity of the party, who smear the party's banner; passive individuals who have not fulfilled their obligations as party members and who have not assimilated its programmes, rules and most important party decisions.

## **II CANDIDATES FOR PARTY MEMBERSHIP**

10 [As in 2.52, art. 7] All persons who wish to enrol as party members pass through a period of candidacy, which is intended to acquaint them thoroughly with the Programme and tactics of the party and to verify their personal qualities.

11 [As in 2.52, art. 8] The procedure for admission to candidate membership (division into categories, the character of recommendations and their confirmation, the decision of the organization on acceptance and

its approval by the party committee) is absolutely identical with that for admission to party membership.

12 [Revises 2.52, art. 9] The period of candidacy is fixed at one year for the first category, and at two years for the second, third, and fourth categories.

*Note* Persons who left other parties, irrespective of their social status, must pass three years of candidacy.

13 [Revises 2.52, art. 10] Candidates for party membership participate in meetings of the organization to which they belong, with the right of consultative voting.

14 [As in 2.52, art. 11] Candidates pay the customary membership dues to the treasury of the local party committee.

### **III GROUPS OF SYMPATHIZERS**

15 [New] In order to organize non-party activists who are the strongest sympathizers of the party and who have shown by deeds and work their loyalty to the party, but who are still not ready to join the party, groups of sympathizers are formed within the primary party organizations of the VKP(b), unconditionally subordinated to all resolutions of the party organs.

16 [New] Acceptance into the groups of sympathizers comes about through the decisions of factory, institutional, and other party committees, the politotdels of MTSS, sovkhozes, and rail transport, with the recommendations of two party members.

17 [New] Persons organized into groups of sympathizers of the VKP(b) are obliged to attend all open party meetings, at which they exercise the right of consultative vote, to strive actively for the implementation of party and state decisions, to work systematically under the leadership of the party organs toward increasing their ideological and political level.

### **IV THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PARTY**

18 [Revises 2.52, art. 12] The guiding principle of the organizational structure of the party is democratic centralism, which signifies:

- a* Election of all leading party organs from the highest to lowest ranks;
- b* Periodic reports of party organs before the party organization;
- c* Strict party discipline and subordination of the minority to the majority;
- d* Unconditional adherence by the lower party ranks and all party members to the decision of the higher party organs.

19 [Revises 2.52, art. 13] The party is built on the basis of democratic centralism on territorial-production lines; an organization serving any district is considered to be higher with respect to all organizations serving a part of the given district, or an organization serving a whole sector of production or management is considered higher with respect to all organizations serving a part of a given sector.

20 [Revises 2.52, art. 14] All party organizations are autonomous in resolving local problems, as long as these decisions do not contradict party decisions.

21 [As in 2.52, art. 15] The highest leading organ of each organization is the general meeting, conference, or congress.

22 [Revises 2.52, art. 16] The general meeting, conference, or congress elects a bureau or committee which is its executive organ and directs all current work of the organization.

23 [Revises 2.52, art. 17] The organizational structure of the party is as follows:

- a* USSR: all-union congress – Central Committee of the VKP(b);
- b* Oblast, krai, or republic: oblast or krai conferences or national party congresses – oblast committees, krai committees, central committees of national communist parties.
- c* Cities, raions: city or raion conferences – city or raion committees.
- d* Enterprises, hamlets, kolkhozes, MTSS, Red Army units, institutions: general meetings, conferences of primary organizations – primary party committees (factory and plant party committees, party bureaus of Red Army units, etc.)

24 [As in 2.52, art. 18] The order of subordination, accountability, of proceedings and debate of party decisions (from the highest instance to the lowest): all-union congress; Central Committee of the VKP(b); oblast / krai conference; conference or congress of national communist party; oblast / krai committee, central committee of a national communist party; city / raion conference; city / raion committee; and so forth. [1925 Rules, art. 19, on special sections for work among women, etc., deleted.]

25 [New] Integral industrial-branch sections are created for practical work on the implementation of party directives and regulations (and the verification of their execution by Soviet state organs and party organizations) in the oblast committees, krai committees, central

committees of the national communist parties, and the Central Committee of the VKP(b).

In the Central Committee of the VKP(b):

- a* Agricultural
- b* Industrial
- c* Transport
- d* Planning-finance-trade
- e* Political-administrative
- f* Leading party organs
- g* Culture and leninist propaganda
- h* Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute (and also two sections: Administration of Affairs and Special [security and police]).

In oblast committees, krai committees, and central committees of national communist parties:

- a* Agricultural
- b* Industrial-transport
- c* Soviet-trade
- d* Culture and leninist propaganda
- e* Leading party organs (city and raion) and special section.

All work whatsoever pertaining to a given branch is concentrated in the appropriate industrial-branch section: party organizational work, the assignment and training of cadres, mass agitational work, production propaganda, supervision of the execution of party decisions by the appropriate soviet-economic organs and party organizations.

26 [As in 2.52, art. 20] Following its definite approval, every party organization has the right to acquire its own press, but only with the sanction of the next higher party organization.

## **V CENTRAL PARTY INSTITUTIONS**

27 [Revises 2.52, art. 21] The party congress is the highest organ of the party. Regular congresses are convened at least once every three years. Extraordinary congresses are convened by the Central Committee on its own initiative or on the demand of at least one-third of the party members represented at the preceding party congress. The convocation of a party congress and its agenda are announced at least a month and a half before

the congress. Extraordinary congresses are convened on two months' notice.

A congress has a quorum if at least half the party members who were represented at the previous congress are represented at it.

Norms of representation at a congress are set by the Central Committee.

28 [As in 2.52, art. 22] If the Central Committee does not convene an extraordinary congress as set forth in article 27, the organizations demanding it have the right to form an organizational committee possessing the rights of the Central Committee with respect to the convening of a congress.

29 [Revises 2.52, art. 23] The congress:

*a* hears and approves reports by the Central Committee, Commission of Party Control, Central Revision Commission and other central organizations;

*b* reviews and revises the party Programme and Rules;

*c* defines the tactical line of the party on basic questions of current policy;

*d* elects the Central Committee, Commission of Party Control, Central Revision Commission, and determines the structure of the Commission of Soviet Control for submission for approval by the Central Executive Committee and Sovnarkom of the USSR.

30 [Revises 2.52, art. 24] The congress elects the Central Committee and other central organizations and determines their size. If the Central Committee loses members, they are replaced from among the candidate members of the Central Committee elected by the congress.

31 [Revises 2.52, art. 25] The Central Committee holds a plenum at least once every four months. Candidate members of the Central Committee participate in the plenums with a consultative vote.

32 [As in 2.52, art. 26] The Central Committee organizes: for political work – a Political Bureau; for general leadership organizational work- an Organizational Bureau; and for current work of an organizational and executive character – a Secretariat.

33 [Revises 2.52, art. 25] During the intervals between congresses, the Central Committee directs all party work, represents the party in its relations with other parties, organizations, and institutions; organizes various party institutions and directs their activities; appoints the editors of

the central organs, who work under its control, and approves the appointment of the editors of the party organs of large local organizations; organizes and directs enterprises of social significance; allocates the personnel and funds of the party and directs the central treasury.

The Central Committee directs the work of the central soviet and social organizations through party groups in them.

34 [New] In order to strengthen bolshevik leadership and political work, the Central Committee has the right to create politotdels and to assign party organizers on detached service from the Central Committee to lagging sectors of socialist construction that may assume especially great significance for the economy and the country as a whole. In so far as the politotdels fulfil their urgent tasks, the Central Committee has the right to abolish them or to convert them into ordinary party organs, on the principle of production-territorial organization.

Politotdels have the rights of the corresponding industrial party committees and are guided directly by the Central Committee of the VKP(b) through the industrial-branch sections of the Central Committee or through specially organized political directorates or political sectors.

35 [As in 2.52, art. 28] The Central Committee regularly informs party organizations about its work.

36 [New] The Commission of Party Control:

*a* Supervises the fulfilment of decisions of the party and the Central Committee of the VKP(b);

*b* calls to account those guilty of violating party discipline;

*c* calls to account those guilty of violating party ethics.

37 [Revises 2.52, art. 30] The Central Revision Commission reviews:

*a* the speed and correctness with which business is conducted within the central organs of the party and the good order of the apparatus of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the VKP(b);

*b* the treasury and enterprises of the Central Committee of the VKP(b).

## **VI KRAI, OBLAST, REPUBLIC PARTY ORGANIZATIONS**

38 [New] The highest organ of the oblast / krai party organization is the conference, or the congress of the national communist party, and in the intervals between these meetings is the oblast / krai committee or the



central committee of the national communist party. In their activities they are guided by the general regulations of the VKP(b) and its leading organs.

39 [Revises 2.52, art. 35] The regular krai / oblast conference or congress of a national communist party is convened by the krai / oblast committee or the central committee of a national communist party once every year and a half, and an extraordinary one is convened by the decision of the krai / oblast committee or central committee of a national communist party on the demand of one-third of the entire membership of the organizations in the krai / oblast / republic.

Norms of representation in the krai / oblast conference on the congress of the national communist party are set by the krai / oblast committee or the central committee of the national communist party.

The krai / oblast conference or the congress of a national communist party hears and approves reports of krai / oblast committee or the central committee of national communist parties, the revision commissions, and similar krai / oblast institution; considers questions of party, soviet, economic and trade-union work in the krai / oblast or republic; and elects the krai / oblast committees (in republics, the central committee of the national communist party).

40 [Revises 2.52, art. 36, first paragraph] For the conduct of current work the krai / oblast committee and in republics the central committee of the national communist party elects corresponding executive organs, composed of not more than eleven persons, approved by the Central Committee of the VKP(b), and two secretaries, a first secretary and a second [in rank]. Secretaries must have at least twelve years' party membership.

41 [Revises 2.52, art. 36, second paragraph] The krai / oblast committee and central committee of the national communist party organizes the various party bodies within the boundaries of the krai / oblast / republic; guides their activities; appoints the editors of the krai / oblast party organs, which work under its supervision; guides party groups in non-party organizations; organizes and leads enterprises that have general significance for the oblast / krai / republic; allocates within its organization party personnel and funds; and manages the party treasury of the krai / oblast / republic.

42 [Revises 2.52, art. 36] The krai / oblast committee or central committee of a national communist party holds a plenum at least once every three months.

43 [Revises 2.52, art. 32] Party organizations of national and other oblast and autonomous republics that work under the guidance of krai committees or central committees of national communist parties are guided by the regulations laid down in Part VI of the Rules of the party concerning krai, oblast, and republic organizations.

[Guberniia, okrug, and uezd levels in party organization are eliminated in the 1934 Rules, which establish only the krai, oblast, national republic level between the USSR level and the raion. This eliminates parts VI and VII in the 1925 Rules, which consisted of articles 37–47.]

#### **VII CITY AND RAION (RURAL AND URBAN) PARTY ORGANIZATIONS**

[In general revises Part IX of 1925 Rules, articles 52–56, on volost (raion) organizations.]

44 [New] The city / raion party conference is convened by the city / raion committee not less than once a year, and an exceptional conference is convened by the decision of the city / raion committee or by the demand of one-third of the total membership of those organizations belonging to the city / raion organization.

The city / raion conference hears and approves the reports of the city / raion committee, the revision commission, and other city / raion institutions, elects the city / raion committee, the revision commission and delegates to the krai / oblast conference or congress of the national communist party.

45 [New] The secretary of the city committee must have ten years' party membership and the secretary of the raion committee seven years'. Secretaries of the city and raion committees are confirmed by the oblast committee, krai committee, or central committee of a national communist party.

46 [New] The city / raion committee elects a bureau of five to seven persons and approves primary party organizations in sovkhoses, MTSS, kolkhoses and institutions; conducts the registration of all Communists; organizes various party bodies within the limits of the city or raion and guides their activities, appoints the editorial board of the city / raion organ, which works under its control; guides party groups in non-party organizations, organizes enterprises that have general city / raion significance; allocates within the limits of the city and raion party personnel and funds; and manages the city / raion treasury. The city / raion committee

reports on its activities to the krai / oblast committee or to the central committee of a national communist party at the time and in the form established by the Central Committee of the VKP(b).

47 [New] With the permission of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) raion organizations, subordinate to the city committee, are formed in large cities.

## **VIII PRIMARY PARTY ORGANIZATIONS**

48 [Revises 2.52, art. 57] The primary party organizations are the basis of the party. Primary party organizations are formed in factories, plants, sovkhozes, and other economic enterprises, in kolkhozes, MTSS, Red Army units, villages, institutions, etc., which have at least three party members. In enterprises, kolkhozes, institutions, etc., which have less than three party members, candidate or party Komsomol groups are formed, selected by the raion committee, city committee, or politotdel. Primary party organizations are approved by the raion or city committee or by the corresponding politotdel.

49 [Revises 2.52, art. 58] In large enterprises, kolkhozes, etc., that have a large number of Communists (from 100 to 3000 members or more) in a single primary party organization embracing the whole enterprise, institution, etc., party organizations may be formed in shops, units, departments, etc., with the approval in each case of the raion committee, city committee, or corresponding politotdel. Within shops, units, departments, etc., party groups may in turn be organized in brigades, units of the enterprise, etc.

50 [Revises 2.52, art. 59] The primary party organization links the worker and peasant masses with the leading organs of the party. Its tasks are:

*a* Agitational and organizational work with the masses for party slogans and decisions;

*b* Attraction of sympathizers and new members and their political education;

*c* Assistance to the raion, city committee or politotdel in its daily organizational and agitational work;

*d* Mobilization of the masses in enterprises, sovkhozes, etc., for the fulfilment of the production plan, strengthening of labour discipline, and development of shock-worker campaigns;

*e* Struggle against slackness and bad management of enterprises, sovkhozes, kolkhozes and daily concern for the improvement of living conditions of the workers and kolkhozniks;

*f* Active participation as a party organ in the economic and political life of the country.

51 [Revises 2.52, art. 60] For the conduct of current work, the primary party organization elects for one year a party committee (factory party committee, plant party committee, etc.) consisting of not more than eleven persons; a shop organization elects a party organizer, approved by the primary party committee.

In party organizations that have less than fifteen members and candidates, party committees are not formed, but party organizers are selected. In primary party committees having not more than one hundred members of the party, party work is as a rule conducted by workers who have not been released from their work in production [i.e., who remain primarily industrial workers rather than party officials]. In party committees that have [from 100] to 1000 persons there should be two or three paid [party] workers who have been released from work in production. In party committees that have [from 1000] to 3000 members or more, there should be four or five comrades who have been released from production.

Secretaries of primary party organizations must have not less than three years' party membership and party organizers two years'. [1925 Rules, Part XI, on control commissions, comprising articles 61–77, is deleted.]

## **IX PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE RED ARMY**

52 [Revises 2.52, art. 78] The general conduct of party work in the Red Army, Red Navy, and Aviation is carried out by the Political Administration of the Red Army, which exercises the authority of the military section of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) [i.e., the Political Administration of the army is a section of the Central Committee].

Party organizations in the Red Army, Navy, and Aviation work on the basis of special instructions, which are approved by the Central Committee of the VKP(b).

53 [Revises 2.52, art. 79] Commanders of the politotdel of a [military] okrug, fleet, or army must have ten years' party membership; commanders of the politotdel of a division or brigade six years'.

54 [Revises 2.52, art. 82] Political organs [in the armed forces] must maintain close ties with local party committees by means of constant participation by the leader of political organs and military commissars (assistant commanders for political affairs) in local party committees, and also by the systematic hearing by the party committees of the reports of commanders of political organs and military commissars (assistant commanders for political affairs) on political work in military units.

#### **X PARTY GROUPS IN NON-PARTY ORGANIZATIONS**

55 [Revises 2.52, art. 93] In all congresses, conferences, and in elected organs of non-party soviet, trade union, co-operative, and other mass organizations, party groups are organized if there are at least three party members. Their task is the all-round strengthening of party influence and the projection of its policies in non-party circles, the strengthening of iron party and soviet discipline, the struggle with bureaucratism, the verification of the fulfilment of party and soviet directives.

The group elects a secretary to conduct current work.

56 [Revises 2.52, art. 95] Irrespective of their importance, groups [in non-party organizations] are completely subordinated to the appropriate party organization (Central Committee of the VKP(b), krai committee, oblast committee, central committee of a national communist party, city committee, raion committee). Groups are required to uphold strictly and steadfastly the decisions of the leading party organizations in all questions.

#### **XI INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY AND PARTY DISCIPLINE**

57 [New] The free and businesslike discussion of questions of party policy in individual organizations or in the party as a whole is the inalienable right of every party member, as a consequence of intra-party democracy. Only on the basis of intra-party democracy can bolshevik self-criticism be developed and can party discipline, which must be conscious and not mechanical, be strengthened. But an extensive discussion, especially a discussion on the all-union level on questions of party policy, must be organized so that it cannot lead to attempts to an insignificant minority to impose its will on the vast majority of the party, nor to attempt to form factional groups, destroying party unity, nor to attempt to create a schism which could shake the strength and stability of the dictatorship of the proletariat, thus gladdening the enemies of the working class. Therefore, large-scale discussion on an all-union level can be considered necessary only if:

*a* This necessity is recognized by at least several local party organizations at the oblast or republic level;

*b* a sufficiently firm majority on the most important questions of party policy is not present in the Central Committee;

*c* the Central Committee considers it necessary to verify the correctness of its policy by means of a party debate despite the presence of a firm majority holding a definite point of view. Only upon fulfilment of these conditions can the party be assured that intra-party democracy will not be misused by anti-party elements, only under these conditions can it be assured that intra-party democracy will serve the cause only and will not be used to the detriment of the party and the working class.

58 [New] The preservation of party unity, the ruthless struggle against the smallest manifestations of factional struggle and schism, the strictest party and soviet discipline is the first obligation of all party members and all party organizations. In order to implement strict discipline within the party and in all soviet work and to attain the utmost unity and the elimination of any factionalism, the Central Committee of the VKP(b) in cases of the violation of discipline or the revival of factionalism has the right to apply all kinds of party penalties, up to expulsion from the party, and in relation to members of the Central Committee – demotion to candidate membership and, as a last resort, expulsion from the party. For this extreme penalty to be applied to members of the Central Committee, candidate members and members of the Commission of Party Control, a plenum of the Central Committee must be convened, with invitations to all candidate members and all members of the Commission of Party Control. If such a general meeting of most responsible party leaders recognizes by a two-thirds vote the necessity of transferring members of the Central Committee or Commission of Party Control to candidate membership, or expelling them from the party, then such a measure must be carried out immediately.

59 [New] The decisions of party and soviet centres must be executed quickly and precisely. Non-observance of the decisions of the higher organizations, and other offences deemed culpable by the public opinion of the party, evokes these penalties: for organizations – reprimand and general re-registration (dissolution of the organization); for individual party members – some type of reprimand (reproval, reproach, etc.), public censure, temporary dismissal from responsible party and soviet work,

expulsion from the party, the administrative and judicial authorities being informed of the offence.

60 [New] Party members who refuse to answer the questions of the Commission of the Party Control are liable to immediate expulsion from the party.

## **XII THE FINANCIAL MEANS OF THE PARTY**

61 [Revises 2.52, art. 86] The financial means of the party and its organizations consist of members' dues, income from party enterprises and other revenue.

62 [Revises 2.52, art. 87] Monthly membership dues for party members and candidates are fixed by the following scale:

### **SALARY**

up to 100 rubles	20 kopeks
101–150 r.	60 kopeks
151–200 r.	1 ruble
201–250 r.	1 r. 50 kopeks
251–300 r.	2 r.
301–500 r.	2 % of salary
over 500 r.	3 % of salary

63 [Revises 2.52, art. 90] Initiation dues are levied upon entry into candidate membership at the rate of 2 per cent of salary.

[1925 Rules, arts. 88, 89, 91, 92 deleted (on other details concerning membership dues).]

*Pravda*, 11 February 1934

*KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh v*, 128–73



# Plenum of the Central Committee

## 25–28 November 1934

At a time when economic conditions in the USSR seemed to be improving and the new system stabilizing, a fairly short plenum in November 1934 was able to deal briskly with a number of economic administrative questions. A resolution, approving a speech by Molotov, abolished consumer rationing on bread and other products, which the dislocations of the First Five-Year Plan had made necessary. The emergence of a stabilized form for the kolkhoz was reflected in discussion of such points as the model rules of the artel, which were finally adopted by a special convention on 17 February 1935 (see James H. Meisel and Edward S. Kozera, *Materials for the Study of the Soviet System*, Ann Arbor, 1950, 207–19). One major negative decision, vitally affecting the role of the party in agricultural administration, was the abolition of the special network of party units on the countryside that were part of the MTS administrative system and not part of the normal regional party hierarchy. This emergency effort to bring effective political control into the countryside, introduced in January 1933 (3.18), had been less successful and was abolished by a resolution following a speech by Kaganovich, the original sponsor of the plan.

The attempt to establish more secure control of the countryside by the party was revived once again on 17 November 1941 as a wartime emergency measure by a decision specifically attributed to the Politburo (*KPSS v rezoliutsiakh* VI, 36–8). It was abolished on 31 May 1943 by another Politburo decision on the grounds that it overemphasized economic administrative activity and duplicated the work of the regular management of sovkhozes and kolkhozes (*ibid.*, VI, 57–9).

### 3.23

#### On Politotdels in Agriculture

28 November 1934

... The politotdels, as an extraordinary organizational form, relying on the strength and authority of the whole party, on the economic power of the MTS, have achieved substantial successes in transforming a backward sector of socialist construction – agriculture – into a leading sector.

However, experience has shown that with the growth in the tasks of guiding the village politotdels alone are now inadequate, that to provide guidance of all activities in the kolkhoz village – political, economic, cultural and everyday, financial, etc. It was precisely because these circumstances had been taken into account that the XVII Party Congress, in the party Rules adopted at this Congress, granted the party Central



Committee the right *'to create politotdels ... in the lagging sectors of socialist construction which have taken on special significance for the economy and for the country as a whole, and also, as the politotdels fulfil their shock-worker tasks, to transform them into ordinary party organs structured according to the territorial-production principle.'*

Determining that the creation of the politotdels has been completely justified by the event and that the politotdels have played an exceptionally important role in eliminating the inadequacies existing in the village, that the successes achieved in the socialist reconstruction of agriculture, reinforcing the kolkhozes, rallying the kolkhoz activists and laying a firm foundation for the party organization in the village, improving the operation of the raion party committees, raise the need for *completing* that which was already begun with the liquidation of the okrugs, the administrative division into raions, and the bringing of the administrative organs closer *to the village* – the VKP(b) Central Committee plenum resolves:

1 The MTS politotdels are to be transformed into ordinary party organs, to which end the politotdels are to be fused with the existing raion party committees; especially large raions are to be broken down into several new raions, the corresponding politotdels being installed in them.

2 The raion committees of the party are to effect leadership of all primary party organizations in the raion.

3 Because of the increasing complexity of the work and the increasing responsibility of the raion committee, in the large agricultural raions the post of second secretary of the raion committee is to be created in addition to that of first secretary.

4 Agricultural sections are to be set up in the staffs of raion committees and headed by either the first or the second secretary of the raion party committee, depending upon the concrete circumstances.

5 Each MTS is to establish the position of deputy MTS director for political affairs whose responsibilities will include the political measures needed to ensure the success of all the undertakings and initiatives of the MTS director; he will also handle the functions of secretary of the primary party organization of the MTS workers themselves.

6 The deputy MTS director for political affairs, while directly sub-ordinate to the MTS director, will at the same time be subordinate to the raion party committee and carry out his party political functions under its guidance.

7 Considering that all the available politotdel workers must absolutely be left at their work in the raions, they are henceforth to be used in the following capacities:

- a* as the first secretaries of newly organized raion party committees or, where necessary, as the first secretaries of existing raion committees;
- b* as the second secretaries of raion committees and as the chiefs of the agricultural sections of raion party committees;
- c* as deputy MTS directors for political affairs;
- d* as members of the apparatus of new raion party and Komsomol committees.

8 The secretaries of raion committees and deputy MTS directors for political affairs are to be approved by the VKP(b) Central Committee and may not be released from their work without the consent of the VKP(b) Central Committee; raion committee instructors are to be approved by the oblast committees, krai committees, and the central committees of the national communist parties.

9 The newspapers of MTS political sections in the newly organized raions are to be converted into organs of the raion committees, and in the existing raions they are either to be fused with the existing raion newspapers or are to remain in existence as the organs of the largest MTS – depending upon the condition of the raion newspapers.

10 The Central Committee Politburo is instructed to complete the implementation of this resolution concretely in each oblast, krai, and republic individually by 1 March, and by 1 February 1935, in the southern raions of the USSR.

11 By 1–15 January the oblast and krai committees and the central committees of the national communist parties are to submit to the VKP(b) Central Committee their concrete proposals for the organization of new raions and for the use to be made of politotdel cadres; they are also to submit to the approval of the VKP(b) Central Committee the names of all secretaries of raion party committees, both existing and newly organized, and of all deputy MTS directors for political affairs.

12 In sovkhoses of all types the existing system of politotdels is to remain unchanged...



## Plenum of the Central Committee

21–25  
December  
1935

Two major topics occupied the agenda of this plenum. One was a rather routine discussion of industrial progress, on which Ordzhonikidze, Liubimov, Mikoyan, Lobov, and Kaganovich gave speeches, leading to the passage of a resolution (3.24). The focus of this resolution was the stakhanovite movement, a campaign named for a coal miner who greatly overfulfilled his production quota. This campaign, stressing the formation of a labour elite as a means of raising production, was one of the main themes in Soviet propaganda in the latter half of the thirties.

The other was the ominous question of the party purge, which had been initiated by a decision of April 1933 (3.19). While this purge was now declared finished, an apparent victory for advocates of moderation in security matters, there were signs that it was only beginning. For one thing, the head of the former Central Control Commission, Rudzutak, who had been in charge of the purge at first, did not summarize its results. At the XVII Party Congress in 1934 this body had been succeeded by the Commission of Party Control, which in 1935 was headed by N.I. Ezhov, who represented the most extreme interpretation of vigilance against ‘enemies of the people.’ He alone addressed the Central Committee plenum of December 1935 on the verification of party documents, that is the checking of all party member’s dossiers and the issuing of valid credentials only to those who passed inspection. This approach, a matter of great anxiety for many, had been added to the existing purge technique by a secret party directive of 13 May 1935 ‘On Disorders in the Registration, Issuance, and Custody of Party Cards, and on Measures for the Regulation of this Matter.’ His speech was not fully published, but evidently emphasized not the winding up of the purge (as stated in the resolution) but the need for fresh efforts (3.25). The ‘main lesson,’ he said with emphasis, of the exchange of party documents was to show that ‘members of the party and party organizations had very badly mastered the repeated orders of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) on the necessity of raising bolshevik vigilance and discipline among members of the party by all means’ (*Pravda*, 26 December 1935). That he did not in fact accept the conclusion of the resolution that the purge was over is clearly established by a secret directive in the name of the Central Committee, dated 14 January 1936, which ordered continued efforts in the examination of members’ dossiers in the search for enemies (Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk under Soviet Rule*, Cambridge, Mass., 1958, 232).

### 3.24

#### Questions of Industry and Transport in Connection with the Stakhanovite Movement

25 December 1935

The victorious completion of the First and Second Five-Year Plans has assured the advance of the economy’s technical base to a new and higher

stage. Thanks to the correct policy of industrializing the country and collectivizing agriculture – a policy carried out in struggle against class enemies and their agents within the party and the working class – the Soviet Union has been technically re-equipped and the economy reorganized on the basis of socialist economics.

Through the vast efforts of the party and state, the heroic struggle of the working class and the efforts of the entire country, in a short time a powerful socialist heavy industry has been created and equipped with the latest technology, and has become the basis for the reconstruction of our entire economy.

A machine-building and raw-materials base has been created for the rapid growth of light industry and for the reorganization of it on a new technical basis.

A unified food industry for the entire USSR has been created in place of small-scale, primitive food production and the odd large-scale enterprise.

A unified large-scale lumber industry has been created in place of primitive lumber production on the basis of subcontracting.

Railroad transport, which was behind in satisfying the growing needs of the economy, is improving rapidly and is being technically re-equipped.

All these facts in combination with the elimination of the kulaks – the last of the capitalist classes – and of the remnants of the exploiting classes, in combination with the end to exploitation in the Soviet Union, the transformation of labour into a matter of honour, glory, valour, and heroics, and with the fundamental improvement in the workers' material situation and the growth in their political consciousness and activism – all these facts have led to a turbulent growth in the stakhanovite movement in our country.

The stakhanovite movement is the outcome of our entire development on the road to socialism, a result of the victory of socialism in our country.

The stakhanovite movement signifies the organization of labour in a new way, the rationalization of technological processes, the correct division of labour in production, the freeing of qualified workers from set-up work of secondary importance, the best organization of the work place, the assurance of a rapid growth in labour productivity, and the assurance of a significant growth in the earnings of workers and employees.

The stakhanovite movement is raising the cultural and technical level of the working class, is breaking up the old technical norms, is surpassing the

labour productivity of leading capitalistic countries in a number of cases and is assuring a rapid growth in the production of consumer goods and a reduction in their cost; it is assuring the transformation of our country into the most well-to-do of countries and consequently is strengthening the position of socialism on a global scale.

In the capitalistic countries a sizable growth in labour productivity would necessarily invoke a reduction in the number of employed, a fall in earnings, a growth in unemployment, and a rise in poverty, because capitalism cannot fail to shackle a country's productive forces. In the USSR, on the contrary, the turbulent growth of labour productivity necessarily leads to a broadening of the production front, to an increase in the number of machine tools and aggregates in operation and, consequently, to a growth in the number of workers employed and to a rise in their earnings, because the Soviet system, having freed production forces from the capitalistic shackles, cannot fail to lead to comprehensive development of them.

In capitalist countries a sizable growth in labour productivity would create very serious difficulties for the bourgeoisie, since it would lead, in the first place, to a rapid growth in output, which is dangerous in conditions of a crisis; it would lead, in the second place, to a reduction in the prices of consumer articles, which is also dangerous for capitalism, because present-day capitalism prefers to sell goods at monopoly prices. In the USSR, on the contrary, a turbulent growth in labour productivity, a growth in output and reductions in prices are not a danger, but a great achievement leading to an abundance of consumer goods at reduced prices and to a growth in real earnings, because the Soviet system is free of crises, admits of no monopoly prices, and sets its economic goals not in terms of achieving high profits for private parties but in terms of an unbroken rise in the material situation of the working people, who are the basic and most valuable force of the entire economy.

Some people in industry and transport did not understand the importance of the stakhanovite movement and proved to be the prisoners of artificially low capacities for our enterprises, capacities rated at one time with a view toward the backwardness of our workers and technical cadres. Precisely this situation in combination with self-satisfaction over the achievement of artificially low capacities, resulted in a situation whereby certain prominent figures in the economy – persons who had unquestionably rendered valuable service in the industrialization of the

country – not only were unable to head up the stakhanovite movement, but actually became a brake on it.

Moreover, the ranks of engineering and technical personnel include – in addition to the progressive elements – a certain percentage of engineers and technicians who were trained on the basis of capitalistic production and to a significant degree on the basis of the backward technology of pre-revolutionary Russian industry, and in the early stages of the stakhanovite movement these people dragged their feet.

These circumstances create difficulties for deployment of the stakhanovite movement.

The task is to utilize all scientific knowledge and technical experience accumulated by industry and on this basis to do away with the under-utilization of technology that is inevitable in a capitalistic society, where the worker works for the capitalist instead of for himself or for the collective, and where the economy develops not according to plan but chaotically, to the benefit of individual capitalists; the task is to march in step with the stakhanovite movement, to head it up and to help it to create a new level of labour productivity, a level higher than that of capitalism.

It is necessary, first of all, to break the remaining resistance to the stakhanovite movement on the part of the conservative portion of management and of engineering and technical workers in all branches of industry and transport, and, secondly, to do everything possible to help those economic managers, engineers, and technicians head up the stakhanovite movement who are meeting the movement halfway but have not proved able to head it up.

Party and trade union organizations are to expose hostile class elements attempting to besmirch stakhanovite workers, and to rally the broadest masses of workers behind the stakhanovite movement.

It is necessary to replace the present technical norms, which are outdated, with higher norms and to change output norms accordingly, in the sense of raising them somewhat, but to change them so as to assure that earnings for progressive production performance are maintained and that the wage fund grows as a result of the growth of the stakhanovite movement.

The Central Committee plenum condemns the existing system and practice of setting output norms that do not correspond to the level of

advanced technology achieved in the USSR and that are not in accord with the task of a further rise in labour productivity.

The predominant use of so-called experimental-statistical norms in the practice of norm setting, the basing of output norms on the performance of a worker with a poor command of production technology, the want of a genuine analysis of the growth of an enterprise's or shop's production capabilities in setting output norms, of the growth in the amount of power equipment per worker, and of the growth in the worker's technical and cultural level: all these factors make the existing practice of setting labour norms a brake on the continued growth of labour productivity and workers' earnings.

The fact that the existing practice of setting norms is unsound and harmful is shown with particular clarity by colossal overfulfilment of newly established norms immediately after they have been set, and this not by individual workers, but by a significant mass of workers.

The Central Committee plenum considers it particularly impermissible that this most responsible sector in the organization of production is everywhere being delegated to so-called 'norm setters' and 'rate setters,' while shop heads, engineers, technicians, foremen, and enterprise executives either completely ignore questions of norm setting or mechanically endorse the output norms worked out by the norm setters and rate setters.

The Central Committee plenum considers it necessary:

- a* In drawing up output norms, to proceed from a strict review of the production capabilities of the shop and enterprise in question and to take into consideration the advanced production experience of the stakhanovites;
- b* To assign the job of setting norms and responsibility for the status of this work to the engineering and technical workers of shops and enterprises, under the direct supervision of the enterprise directors;
- c* To make widespread use of stakhanovite cadres in setting new output norms at enterprises.

In order to spread the stakhanovite movement throughout our entire country, in order that the mass stakhanovite movement not be considered a short-lived campaign, and in order to help stakhanovites to surmount the obstacles in their path, party and trade union organizations must take part in



developing the stakhanovite movement and direct the efforts of the stakhanovite workers in an organized fashion.

It is necessary to help all stakhanovites without exception to augment their technical knowledge by creating special technical courses for them that do not require their leaving production work.

It is necessary systematically to expand the circle of workers – both male and female – subject to obligatory minimum standards of technical learning.

It is necessary, finally, to make minimum technical learning both universal and obligatory for all workers, both male and female, subsuming this important matter under the task of raising the cultural and technical level of the working class to the level of engineering and technical workers ...

### **3.25**

#### **Results of the Review of Party Documents**

25 December 1935

The verification of the party documents of party members and candidate members conducted on the basis of the 13 May 1935 resolution of the VKP(b) Central Committee, was an organizational-political measure of enormous importance for strengthening the ranks of the VKP(b).

The course of the verification of party documents completely confirmed the information of the VKP(b) Central Committee, contained in its letter of 13 May 1935, to the effect that many party organizations are completely arbitrary in issuing and guarding party documents and chaotic in the way they keep the records of party members and candidate members.

The major result of the verification of party documents has been that party organizations, in addition to unmasking alien persons who had made their way into the party, have to a considerable extent overcome their organizational laxity, have brought order into the registering of party members, have made a better study of Communists, and on this basis have promoted many new and capable persons to leading party, soviet, and economic positions.

The tremendous advantage of all the work on organizing the verification of party documents had been that, as charged by the VKP(b) Central Committee, the party organs themselves were directly involved in

the verification, and did not set up any special commissions. Thus the leading members of the party apparatus, following the example of the unmasking of the enemies who had penetrated into the VKP(b) and of the methods of their subversive activities against the party, were able to bring to light their own short-comings and errors in party organizational work and to adopt measures for the latter's radical improvement. The party apparatus has to a considerable extent reorganized its work and become stronger both by bringing in new and tested cadres and by purging itself of persons unfit for party work – primarily those who, despite frequent warnings by the VKP(b) Central Committee, failed to understand the meaning and significance of the verification of party documents, took an opportunist attitude toward its implementation, and in many cases directly opposed this most important measure for strengthening the ranks of the VKP(b).

All of this ensured a successful resolution of the basic task set by the 13 May 1935 letter of the VKP(b) Central Committee – ‘to put our own party house in bolshevik order,’ and raised the level of all party life, heightening the bolshevik fighting potential of party organizations.

In the opinion of the VKP(b) Central Committee plenum, now that the verification of party documents is coming to an end the major task is the comprehensive consolidation of the gigantic work which all party organizations have done to purge the ranks of the VKP(b) of hostile elements and the drawing of every last conclusion from the verification of party documents.

The principal conclusion, as is shown by the experience of verifying party documents, is that party members and the party organizations still have poorly understood the frequent directions of the VKP(b) Central Committee on the need for a comprehensive increase of bolshevik alertness and discipline among the party members.

The whole experience of the verification of party documents had demonstrated the great significance of the party's instructions to the effect that the class enemy resorts to increasingly refined methods of struggle as our successes increase, exploiting for this purpose primarily the opportunistic complacency and idleness of Communists ...

The plenum of the VKP(b) Central Committee directs all party organizations to assimilate these lessons thoroughly and to put an end to the outrages which came to light during the verification of party documents. Only by learning these lessons and consistently carrying out the repeated

directives of the VKP(b) Central Committee calling for a comprehensive heightening of bolshevik revolutionary alertness and for the necessity of 'raising the level of our organizational work to that of the political leadership' will party organizations be able to extirpate completely the roots of opportunistic complacency, to intensify the bolshevik alertness of party members, to train the party apparatus in the spirit of bolshevik keenness and implacability, and to ensure that the party Rules really become the indestructible basis of its internal life. A very important condition for this is that responsible persons in the party apparatus concern themselves directly with the admission of new party members, the issuance of party documents, and the registration and study of Communists. Only under this condition will the secretaries of party, raion, city, and oblast committees really be able to know the party members and make proper use of them, train them to be real bolsheviks and thereby to become real leaders of party organizations.

The plenum of the VKP(b) Central Committee considers the first step toward consolidating the positive results of the verification of party documents, in particular as regards the further regularization of the registration of party members, to be the *exchange* of party cards, candidate cards, and registration documents of party members and candidate members. As experience with verification has shown, this measure is the more necessary in that the party documents themselves (party and candidate cards, registration cards) are in an unsatisfactory state and need to be replaced.

In exchanging party documents the party organizations must bear in mind the numerous errors which have occurred in the past when the exchange of party cards was viewed as a mechanical replacement of one party card by another. The exchange of party cards and the adoption of new registration cards is a serious party organizational measure which must serve to consolidate the results of the verification of party documents and to promote the further strengthening of the VKP(b) ranks.

The plenum of the VKP(b) Central Committee considers that the results of the verification of party documents have clearly demonstrated the complete correctness of the VKP(b) Central Committee in denying the repeated requests of many party organizations to resume the admission of new party members.

In its 13 May 1935 letter, the VKP(b) Central Committee pointed out to the local party organizations that: there can be no talk of resuming

admission to the party as long as such a shameful chaos prevails in the registration of party members, until order has been established in our own party house. The Central Committee will be able to consider the question of resuming admission into the party only when the registration of Communists and the system of issuing and maintaining party cards has been completely regularized.

Now that order has been established in our own party house, and that the party organizations have been purged of alien persons through the verification of party documents, it is possible to resume admission into the VKP(b).

In so doing the plenum of the VKP(b) Central Committee once again warns all party organizations that such admission is to be on a strictly individual basis, that group admissions are not allowed under any circumstances, that in admitting each new VKP(b) member the party Rules are to be strictly observed, and that, bearing in mind the errors revealed during the verification of party documents, the party ranks are not to be clogged up with persons who have been admitted at random.

The party organizations must bring into the party the best and worthiest persons in our country, persons who are genuinely progressive and devoted to the cause of the working class. This task can be fulfilled the sooner in that during the past three years since the cut-off of admission into the party new cadres of persons who are selflessly devoted to our party – cadres of ‘non-party bolsheviks’ who have been tested in practice – have grown up around the VKP(b) both from among the workers and from among the kolkhoz members and the toiling intelligentsia ...

3 The exchange of party and candidate cards, and of registration cards, is to be on a strictly individual basis, so that as a result all registration and study of Communists will be exemplary. Here it is necessary to bear in mind that during the exchange of party cards the party organizations do not have to issue a party card to any party member, even if he has successfully passed the verification of party documents, if he is not worthy of the high calling of party member

4 The following procedure is to be observed in the exchange of party cards and other party documents:

*a* the secretaries of oblast and krai committees, and of the central committees of national communist parties, as well as the chiefs of sections of leading party organs, are to have the practical direction of the exchange

of party cards and other party documents and are to be personally responsible to the VKP(b) Central Committee for the exemplary conduct of this work.

The secretaries of city and raion committees are directly and personally responsible to the VKP(b) Central Committee, the krai and oblast committees, and the central committees of the national communist parties, for the proper issuance of party cards and candidate cards.

In the cities in which raion committees are subordinate to the city committees the secretaries of raion committees are also responsible to the city committees for the conduct of the exchange of cards and the issuance of new party cards;

*b* the exchange of party cards is to be handled directly by the raion committee secretaries.

In raion party organizations which have more than 2000 party members and candidate members other members of the raion committee bureau are permitted to handle the exchange of party cards, with the personal approval of the first secretary of the oblast (krai) organization. In such cases they may only do the preliminary work (discussions with party members, filling out registration and report cards, etc.), and only the first secretary of the raion committee may issue the party cards themselves;

*c* in the party organizations of the railroads, the water transportation system, and other forms of transport the exchange of party cards must be handled by the secretaries of the raion and city committees located on the territory of the corresponding railroad party organization, the chiefs of the political sections performing only the necessary preliminary work;

*d* in the party organizations of the Red Army and of the NKVD troops the exchange of party cards is handled by the chief of the corresponding politotdel, who is personally responsible to the VKP(b) Central Committee for the verification of party documents.

5 Blank party and candidate cards, as well as registration documents, are issued by the VKP(b) Central Committee directly to the first secretary of the oblast or krai committee or to the central committee of the national communist party after the VKP(b) Central Committee has heard his report on the results of the verification of party documents.

The secretaries of oblast and krai committees and of the central committees of national communist parties issue blank party cards directly to

the first secretaries of raion committees for issue to party members.

After the exchange of old party cards for new the raion committee secretaries will transmit to the first secretary of the krai (oblast) committee a statement covering the issuance of the party cards and with the reporting cards and old party cards attached.

After checking on the accuracy of the registration and issuance of party documents, the secretaries of the oblast and krai committees and of the central committees of the national communist parties are to approve the statements submitted by the raion committee secretaries and are accountable to the VKB(b) Central Committee for each party card or other party document which they have received.

6 When a party member or candidate member is called into the raion committee to exchange his party or candidate card, the raion committee secretary verifies all the data on the party member, following the form for verifying party documents, ascertaining from him personally and from the party organization where he is registered whether he justifies the high calling of party member and, if there are no doubts about the advisability of continuing him in the ranks of the VKP(b), issues him a new party card.

In all cases where the raion committee secretary does not find it possible to exchange the party card and considers it necessary to raise the question of expelling the member or candidate member from the ranks of the VKP(b), he will submit a proposal to that effect to the raion committee bureau for approval.

7 In fulfilment of the present resolution the VKP(b) Central Committee Orgburo is directed to issue instructions on the procedures and techniques of exchange not later than 10 January 1936, for guidance in the exchange of party cards and other party documents.

8 After 1 June 1936, persons may be admitted to candidate membership in the VKP(b) and candidate members may pass to full membership.

In accepting new members into the VKP(b) the party organizations must select the best persons of our country, who are truly progressive and devoted to the cause of the working class, primarily from among the workers but also from among kolkhoz members and the toiling intelligentsia, who have been tested in various sectors of the struggle for socialism, in order still further to strengthen the ranks of the VKP(b) and still further to expand the ties between the party and the masses.

In this connection the plenum of the VKP(b) Central Committee considers it necessary to warn all party organizations against transforming the admission of new party members into a mass recruitment campaign, which might give rise to the danger of a harmful swelling of the party ranks. Admission to party membership, as to candidate membership, can only be on an individual basis, with painstaking individual selection of those admitted. Group admission must be absolutely excluded from party practice as a method which is completely impermissible and harmful for the party.

However, the plenum of the Central Committee considers it possible temporarily to withhold from certain party organizations permission to admit party members and candidate members, these organizations being the ones which judging from their general state and the level of their work, are still inadequately prepared for a bolshevik approach to the admission of new members, their training, and their utilization.

The question of temporarily prohibiting an individual oblast, krai, or republican party organization from granting admission into the party must be resolved in principle in the VKP(b) Central Committee and, with respect to the individual raion or primary party organizations, in the oblast and krai committees and the central committees of the national communist parties with the approval of the VKP(b) Central Committee.

9 In all their work on admission into the party the party organizations must devote the most serious attention to groups of sympathizers as a highly important reserve for filling the ranks of the VKP(b). The shortcomings, and frequently the complete neglect of work with sympathizers, must be eliminated immediately. Party organizations must in the first place right the completely intolerable situation whereby work with sympathizers is at best reduced to involving them in political education groups and the very leaders of primary and raion organizations have no contact at all with sympathizers, do not know them, and do not work with them.

To ensure that the best of the sympathizers enter the VKP(b) the party organizations must recruit sympathizers on a strictly individual basis, involving them – according to the requirements of the rules – in the fulfilment of various assignments, bringing to their attention and explaining to them the most important decisions of the party and the government, carrying out serious political work with sympathizers, and forging in them bolshevik organizational and disciplinary habits.

10 While viewing the Komsomol as a very serious reserve for filling the ranks of the VKP(b), the Central Committee at the same time decisively condemns the practice which has arisen at the local level of violating the party Rules in the admission of Komsomols into the VKP(b). The verification of party documents in the party organizations has brought to light numerous instances of a mechanical, campaign-like admission of Komsomols into the VKP(b) through their wholesale transferral from the Komsomol into the party, this frequently being timed to coincide with some anniversary, holiday, etc. Such a practice is unbolshevik and subverts the Rules of our party which quite precisely stipulate the conditions for admission of Komsomol members into the VKP(b).

While recognizing all the advantages, with respect to admission into the party, which a Komsomol member derives from his stay in the Komsomol, the VKP(b) Central Committee plenum none the less considers it incorrect for certain party and Komsomol organizations to pose the question of the mass admission of Komsomols into the party, associating this with the presence in the Komsomol of a large number of so-called over-age members. By substituting an age factor for the principle of individual selection into the party the party and Komsomol organizations incorrectly educate the Komsomol members themselves, instilling in them the attitude that if they are not taken into the party by a certain age they are thereby released from active political life. This approach is completely incorrect. Not every Komsomol who has reached a certain age (over-age member) can and should be taken into the VKP(b). Only the worthiest and most thoroughly tested persons are selected for the party, and every Komsomol may strive for admission into the VKP(b) ranks through active participation in socialist construction, by heightening his ideological attainments and bolshevik temper, closely tying in his work with the party organization.

11 The procedure must be instituted whereby the party or candidate's card is handed over to the newly admitted person by the raion committee secretary and in the raion committee itself. This measure, combined with the fact that the raion committee secretary will already be acquainted with the person being admitted into the party, will enable him – during the admission process – to find a correct solution to the question of the correct use of the new party member or candidate member for party assignments – not through the formal fulfilment of so-called party tasks but in accordance



with the person's capacities and the tasks confronting the particular party organization.

The VKP(b) Central Committee plenum decisively condemns the practice which has arisen in many party organizations of forgetting about the new party members or candidate members immediately after admitting them, of failing to display concern for the young party members who are still unformed and have not yet assimilated all the bolshevik organizational traditions.

It is necessary to ensure that each new candidate member and party member, under the guidance and with the assistance of his party organization, immediately feels the full responsibility of the transition from non-party status to membership in a bolshevik organization and is penetrated with a consciousness of responsibility to the surrounding masses for the party's cause.

Considering that the principal oblasts were covered by the party purge which began in 1933 and that the verification of party documents has made it possible to resolve, in the remaining oblasts, the tasks confronting the 1933 purge – the VKP(b) Central Committee plenum resolves as follows:

- a* the party purge is hereby ended and is not to be extended to those oblasts where it has not yet taken place;
- b* the work of the Central Commission for Purging the Ranks of the VKP(b), organized by the 28 April 1933 resolution of the VKP(b) Central Committee, is hereby ended.

*Pravda*, 26 December 1935

*KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh v*, 231–52



### 3.26

#### **On the Terrorist Activities of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Counter-Revolutionary Bloc**

29 July 1936

Although it is necessary to depend on Soviet publications for all the other post-revolutionary materials in this volume, the following document comes from an unpublished source, the archives of the Smolensk oblast party organization. These papers were captured by the advancing Germans and came into American hands at the end of the Second World War. The general character of the Smolensk party archives emerges in Merle Fainsod's book *Smolensk*

*under Soviet Rule.* Most of the materials are not decisions of the central organs of the party, but there are a few exceptions, the most interesting of which follows.

It was a secret document, bearing the classification '*sovershenno sekretno*' (equivalent to 'top secret') and the designation 'Closed Letter of the Central Committee of the VKP(b).' Despite this secrecy, it was addressed not only to oblast, krai, and national communist party offices, but also to city and raion organizations. The Smolensk copy bore the registry number 9380, which suggests that such communications were supposed to be subject to strict control.

Signed 'Central Committee VKP(b),' this authoritative letter is a remarkable indication of Stalin's campaign to convince the lower levels in the party of the necessity of the purge, and especially of the need to liquidate the old Bolshevik leaders. This was not the first such attempt, for the opening of the document refers to a secret letter of 18 January 1935 which, however, was not preserved in Smolensk. Perhaps it was a numbered copy which had to be returned after reading. To achieve credibility, the composers of the following letter obtained from the police the pre-trial depositions of Kamenev, Zinoviev, and others who were in the dock at the major show trial of 19–24 August 1936. In the main this unpublished material is not the same as the confessions and related testimony of the accused in the published record of the trial (*Report of Court Proceedings: The Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre*, Moscow, 1936).

Not only does it pave the way for party acceptance of the guilt of Zinoviev and Kamenev, it also implicates Bukharin, who was in 1936 still a candidate member of the Central Committee. Although his trial occurred only in 1938, it is forecast in the 'confession' of Kamenev that 'we did not consider it excluded' that the new government might include the 'rightists,' Bukharin, Tomsky, and Rykov.

It seems likely that Stalin edited this letter and even wrote its conclusion, for the litany 'Only the absence of the necessary bolshevik vigilance,' thrice repeated, sounds very much like his style, and anticipates the conclusion to his speech to the Central Committee plenum of February–March 1937.

On 18 January 1935, the Central Committee circulated a secret letter to all party organizations on the lessons of the events connected with the villainous murder of Comrade Kirov.

This letter stated that the villainous murder of Sergei Mironovich Kirov, as established by the Court and the investigation, was the work of the Leningrad group of zinovievites known as the 'Leningrad Centre.' The letter also mentioned that the 'ideological and political leader of the Leningrad Centre was the Moscow centre of zinovievites which apparently was unaware of the preparations to kill Comrade Kirov but certainly knew of the terrorist state of mind of the Leningrad Centre and inflamed this state of mind.'

At that time, as is known, Zinoviev and Kamenev admitted their guilt only for inflaming the terroristic state of mind and stated that they bore only moral and political responsibility for the murder of S.M. Kirov.

However, it has not become clear that the investigation, a year and a half ago, of the murder of S.M. Kirov did not disclose all the facts of the

contemptible counter-revolutionary White-Guard terrorist activity of the zinovievites, as it also failed to bring to light the role of the trotskyites in the murder of Comrade Kirov.

On the basis of new NKVD materials obtained in 1936 it may be considered as established that Zinoviev and Kamenev were not only the inspirers of terrorist activity against our party and government leaders but also the authors of direct instructions to kill S.M. Kirov and to prepare attempts on the lives of other leaders of our party, primarily Comrade Stalin.

It is now considered equally established that the zinovievites carried out their terrorist practices in a direct bloc with Trotsky and the trotskyites.

In this connection the Central Committee considers it necessary to inform party organizations of the new facts relating to the terrorist activities of the trotskyites and zinovievites.

What is the factual aspect of this affair, as recently brought to light?

## I THE FACTS

1 *During the course of the year 1936, after the killing of S.M. Kirov, the NKVD organs uncovered a number of terrorist trotskyite and zinovievite groups in Moscow, Leningrad, Gorky, Minsk, Baku, and other cities.*

The overwhelming majority of the participants of these terrorist groups admitted, during investigation, that their basic task was to prepare terrorist acts against party and government leaders.

2 *The trotskyite and zinovievite bloc was directing these unmasked trotskyite and zinovievite groups in all of their terrorist activity in the USSR.*

The trotskyite and Zinoviev-Kamenev groups formed a bloc in the end of 1932 after negotiations among the leaders of the counter-revolutionary groupings; this led to the formation of a united centre consisting of – for the zinovievites – Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bakaev, Evdokimov, Kuklin, and – for the trotskyites – I.N. Smirnov, Mrachkovsky, and Ter-Baganian.

The principal condition for the unification of the two counterrevolutionary groupings was their mutual acceptance of terror against the party and government leaders as the only and decisive technique for pursuing their way into power.

Since that time, i.e., since the end of 1932, the trotskyites and zinovievites have concentrated their hostile anti-party and anti-governmental activity mainly on organizing terrorist acts and carrying them

out against the more prominent party leaders, primarily against Comrade Stalin.

The facts of terrorist activity by these unmasked trotskyite and zinovievite counter-revolutionary groupings are so irrefutable that the very leaders of these terrorist groups were compelled to make full disclosure of all their White-Guard crimes.

For example, Zinoviev, who was examined in connection with the unmasked terrorist groupings, admitted the following during the 23–25 July interrogation:

‘I definitely was a member of the united trotskyite-zinovievite centre organized in 1932.

‘The trotskyite-zinovievite centre set as its principal task the killing of the VKP(b) leaders, primarily comrades Stalin and Kirov. Centre members, I.N. Smirnov and Mrachkovsky, served as the connection with Trotsky who gave direct instructions to Smirnov to prepare to kill Stalin.’

(G. Zinoviev, Record of Interrogation, 23–25 July 1936)

Another member of the counter-revolutionary zinovievite grouping – Kamenev – recounting in detail how the trotskyite-zinovievite bloc was organized and giving the practical plans of the centre, testified at the 23 July 1936 interrogation:

‘... We, i.e., the zinovievite centre of the counter-revolutionary organization whose membership I have given above, and the trotskyite counterrevolutionary organization consisting of Smirnov, Mrachkovsky, and Ter-Baganian, agreed in 1932 to the unification of both, i.e., the zinovievite and the trotskyite, counter-revolutionary organizations for joint preparation of terrorist acts against the Central Committee leaders, principally against Stalin and Kirov.

‘The essential thing is that both Zinoviev and we – I, Kamenev, Evdokimov, Bakaev, and the trotskyite leaders, Smirnov, Mrachkovsky, Ter-Baganian, decided in 1932 that the only technique through which we could hope to attain power was to organize terrorist acts against the VKP(b) leaders, principally against Stalin.

‘The negotiations between ourselves and the trotskyites on unification were conducted on precisely the basis of a terrorist struggle against the VKP(b) leaders.’

(L. Kamenev, Record of Interrogation, 23–24 July 1936)

When asked if the 1932 negotiations between the Zinoviev-Kamenev and trotskyite groupings were brought to a conclusion, Kamenev answered as follows during the interrogation:

‘We did bring to a conclusion the negotiations with the trotskyites on uniting the trotskyite and zinovievite counter-revolutionary organizations, and between us, that is – the zinovievite centre consisting of Zinoviev, Kamenev, Evdokimov, Bakaev, and Kuklin, and the trotskyite centre consisting of Smirnov, Mrachkovsky, and Ter-Bagarian – an agreement was reached on a bloc for joint struggle against the VKP(b) using, as I have already testified above, terror against the VKP(b) leaders.’

(L. Kamenev, Record of Interrogation, 23–24 July 1936)

Thus Zinoviev and Kamenev, united with Trotsky, considered that the essential element was unanimous recognition of the new factor, which distinguished their newly created bloc from the preceding one. This new factor, from the testimony of the zinovievites – L. Kamenev, I.I. Reingold, R.V. Pikel, I.P. Bakaev – and the trotskyites – S.V. Mrachkovsky, E.A. Dreitser, and others – was recognition of the advisability of the active use of terror against the party and governmental leadership.

Trotsky not only agreed with this attitude of Zinoviev and Kamenev, but he in turn considered the basic condition for unifying the trotskyites and the zinovievites to be recognition by both groupings of the advisability of using terror against the leaders of our party and government.

On Trotsky’s attitude toward creating a united trotskyite-zinovievite bloc and the conditions of unification, S.B. Mrachkovsky – a well-known trotskyite and one of Trotsky’s closest comrades in arms – testified as follows at the investigation:

‘In the middle of 1932 I.N. Smirnov raised in our guiding triumvirate the question of the necessity of unifying our organization and the Zinoviev-Kamenev and the Shatskin-Lominadze groups. At that time it was decided to make inquiries of Trotsky and obtain new instructions from him. Trotsky answered by agreeing to the bloc, on the condition that the groups entering into the bloc accept the necessity of the forcible elimination of the VKP(b) leaders, and in the first place, Stalin.’

(Mrachkovsky, Record of Interrogation, 19–20 July 1936)

All of the other prominent trotskyites and zinovievites arrested, such as Bakaev, Reingold, Safronov, Pikel, Dreitser, and others also testified that

the principal task of the trotskyites and zinovievites was to conduct a terrorist struggle against the leaders of the VKP(b) and the government.

It is thus an irrefutable fact that for several years the trotskyites and zinovievites have been unified on the platform of individual White-Guard terror against the leaders of the party and the Soviet government and are resorting to methods hitherto used by the embittered remnants of the White emigration organized in terrorist organizations such as ROVS the 'Union of Russian Fascists,' the 'Fascist Union of Youth,' etc.

3 *Sergei Mironovich Kirov was murdered by decision of the united centre of the trotskyite-zinovievite bloc.* All of the practical work of organizing the assassination was in the hands of united centre member, Bakaev. To assist Bakaev, the centre picked out the prominent zinovievite, Karev, who was working in Leningrad and had close personal connections with Zinoviev.

As a result of the decision of the united centre, several trotskyite and zinovievite terrorist groups were organized in Leningrad, including the Rumiantsev-Katalynov-Nikolaev group which carried out the killing of Kirov.

In the investigation the majority of the active participants in the terrorist groups, including Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bakaev, Karev, and others, testified that Kirov was killed by decision of the united trotskyite-zinovievite centre.

For example, Zinoviev testified as follows under examination:

'I also admit to have entrusted the organization's members, Bakaev and Karev, in the name of the united centre, with the organization of terrorist acts against Stalin in Moscow and Kirov in Leningrad.

'I assigned this mission in Ilinsk in the autumn of 1932.'

(Zinoviev, Record of Interrogation, 23–25 July 1936)

Kamenev, the other leader of the united centre, gave the following answer to the investigator's question: did he know of the centre's decision to kill comrades Stalin and S.M. Kirov:

'Yes, I must admit that even before the meeting in Ilinsk Zinoviev told me about the decisions contemplated by the centre of the trotskyite-zinovievite bloc with respect to preparing terrorist acts against Stalin and Kirov. At the time he told me that this decision was categorically insisted upon by the trotskyite representatives in the centre – Smirnov, Mrachkovsky, and Ter-Bagarian – that they had a direct order on this from Trotsky, and that they

demanding the de facto adoption of this measure in implementation of the principles on which the bloc was based ...’

(Kamenev, Record of Interrogation, 23–24 July 1936)

4 *The united centre of the trotskyite-zinovievite counter-revolutionary bloc set as its fundamental and principal task the killing of Comrades Stalin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Kirov, Ordzhonikidze, Zhdanov, Kosior, Postyshev.* The killing of Comrade Stalin was decided upon at the same time as the killing of Comrade Kirov. To this end the centre organized in Moscow several strictly conspiratorial terrorist groups. To co-ordinate the activities of these groups the all-union trotskyite-zinovievite centre set up a Moscow centre consisting of the zinovievites – Bakaev, Reingold, Pikel, and the trotskyites, Mrachkovsky and Dreitser. Bakaev was entrusted with the direct organization of the killing of Comrade Stalin. At the investigation Bakaev admitted his role as direct organizer of terrorist acts.

He testified:

‘I recognize that Zinoviev entrusted me personally with organizing the killing of Comrade Stalin in Moscow.’

Further:

‘On Zinoviev’s instructions, the zinovievites, Reingold, Bogdan, and Faivilovich, who consented to take part in a terrorist act, were recruited by me to organize a terrorist act against Stalin.’

‘Not only we, but I.N. Smirnov and C.V. Mrachkovsky were also preparing to kill Stalin, having received a direct order from Trotsky to commit a terrorist act.’

(Bakaev, Record of Interrogation, 17–19 July 1936)

R.V. Pikel, an active member of the zinovievite centre and Zinoviev’s former chef-de-cabinet, stated at the investigation that Bakaev displayed feverish activity in organizing the attempt, putting all of his energy into the matter.

Pikel stated:

‘Bakaev not only guided the preparation of the terrorist act in the general sense but went out personally to the observation point, checked up on people and inspired them ... In the summer of 1934 I was once with Reingold. Reingold told me that the observations of Stalin had yielded positive results and that on that very day Bakaev had left in his own automobile with a group of terrorists to kill Stalin. Reingold was nervous

because they had been away for so long. I again encountered Reingold on the evening of the same day, and he told me that Stalin's guard had prevented the terrorist act from being carried out, frightening the participants in the organization (as he expressed himself).'

(Pikel, Record of Interrogation, 22 July 1936)

Trotsky, being abroad, pressed in every way for the killing of comrades Stalin and Voroshilov, especially after the arrest of Kamenev and Zinoviev, and directed the activities of the all-union united trotskyite-zinovievite centre. Through his agents he systematically sent directives and practical instruction for organizing the killing.

E.A. Dreitser, a participant in the trotskyite-zinovievite bloc who was close to Trotsky and was at one time his personal guard, admitted during the investigation that in 1934 he received a written directive from Trotsky to prepare a terrorist act against comrades Stalin and Voroshilov.

He stated:

'I received this directive through my sister, Stalovitskaia, who resides permanently in Warsaw and came to Moscow in the end of September, 1934.

The content of Trotsky's letter was brief. It started with the following words:

““Dear friend! pass on that today we face the following basic tasks: first – to get rid of Stalin and Voroshilov, second – to work on organizing cells in the army, third – in case of war to exploit any setbacks and confusion to seize the leadership.””

(Dreitser, Record of Interrogation, 23 July 1936)

The content of this directive was confirmed by yet another prominent trotskyite, Mrachkovsky, who testified as follows: 'Esterman handed me an envelope from Dreitser. Opening it in Esterman's presence, I saw a letter written by Trotsky to Dreitser. In this letter Trotsky gave instructions to kill Stalin and Voroshilov.'

(Mrachkovsky, Record of Interrogation, 4 July 1936)

After the killing of Comrade Kirov and the consequent smashing of the trotskyite-zinovievite centre, *Trotsky took upon himself complete guidance of terrorist activity in the USSR*. To restore the terrorist groups in the USSR and activate them Trotsky dispatched his trusted agents across the border with forged documents. Among such agents sent by him at various times



from Berlin to Moscow were Berman-Iurin, V. Olberg, Frits David, Gorovich, Gurevich, Bykhovsky, and others. They were all assigned the task of killing Comrades Stalin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, and other party leaders, whatever the cost.

5 *Having set out on the path of individual, White-Guard terror, the trotskyite-zinovievite bloc lost all scruples and, to carry out their criminal designs, began to use the services not only of the defeated remnants of the White Guards but also the services of foreign intelligence agencies, foreign secret police, spies, and provocateurs.*

Thus, for example, the terrorist group headed by M. Lurye, who came over from German, was actually organized by the active German Fascist, Franz Weiss, Himmler's representative (at that time the head of the Fascist storm-trooper detachments in Berlin and now the head of the German secret police – the GESTAPO).

While visiting Zinoviev, M. Lurye told him that the members of his terrorist group had organizational ties with the Fascist, Franz Weiss, and with the German secret police – the GESTAPO, and asked Zinoviev what were his relations with the latter.

To this Zinoviev answered: 'What bothers you in this? You are a historian, Moisey Ilich. You know the story of Lassalle and Bismarck, when Lassalle wanted to utilise Bismarck in the interests of the revolution.'

(M. Lurye, Record of Interrogation, 21 July 1936)

6 *To obtain the funds needed to prepare terrorist acts, the trotskyite-zinovievite counter-revolutionary bloc resorted to theft of state funds and to outright robbery of the people's money.*

The investigation has established that at one of the meetings of the united trotskyite-zinovievite centre certain active trotskyites and zinovievites were ordered to enter into connections, for the sake of obtaining funds, with concealed trotskyites and zinovievites in economic work. Specifically, such an assignment was given to Reingold. By Kamenev's orders he was to make contact with the secret double dealer, G.M. Arkus, who was deputy-chairman of the USSR State Bank.

According to Reingold's testimony, Arkus gave systematic material support to the trotskyite-zinovievite centre. In particular, Reingold testified at the investigation that in July or August 1933 Arkus withdrew 30,000 roubles from Gosbank for the needs of the trotskyite-zinovievite centre. He

transferred 15,000 to the Cartographic Trust which at the time was headed by the active zinovievite, Federov, and 15,000 to the Economic Trust which was headed by the not unknown G. Evdokimov. The money was transferred in the form of sums to pay for work on economic statistics, which is not regulated by the state.

In a number of cases terrorist groups of trotskyites and zinovievites prepared to commit outright robberies in order to secure funds and weapons for the perpetration of terrorist acts. Thus, for example, a group of terrorists in Gorky, headed by the trotskyite, Popov, attempted to carry out a series of robberies to obtain funds and weapons.

The trotskyite, L.A. Lavrentev, who was an active member of this group, testified as follows at the investigation:

‘The plan of the terrorist counter-revolutionary trotskyite group for perpetrating a terrorist act against Comrade Stalin consisted of the following component parts: 1 the obtaining of funds for the terrorist group by committing “expropriations” of state institutions and banks; 2 the acquiring of weapons for members of the terrorist group; 3 the direct preparation and perpetration of a terrorist act against Stalin. At one meeting of the terrorist group it was decided that Popov, Khramov, Pugachev, and I – Lavrentev – must devote ourselves entirely to terrorist activity and resign our jobs. On Popov’s orders Khramov was the first to resign his job, and on Popov’s instructions Khramov moved to Ardatovsky raion to prepare an ‘expropriation.’ It was proposed to start by seizing the treasury of a village soviet at a time when tax payments were at their maximum. Shortly after Khramov’s departure, Popov and Pugachev also resigned their jobs. I myself was on leave. All three of us, and Pelevina with us, went out to the village of Khokhlovo in Ardatovsky raion to carry out an “expropriation” of the village Soviet’s treasury. After we had reached the village of Khokhlovo, Khramov told us that he had not succeeded in preparing the “expropriation.” For two days Popov also tried to prepare an “expropriation,” but he was not successful. In this connection we – members of the terrorist group Popov, I (Lavrentev), Pugachev, and Pelevina – went out to Arzamas. On Popov’s proposal we began to prepare to rob the cashiers who were receiving large sums into the bank. Three persons were appointed for the robbery. The robbery did not take place because the conditions were not suitable.’

(A.A. Lavrentev, Record of Interrogation, 9 November 1935)

Such are the facts of the counter-revolutionary terrorist activities of the united centre of the trotskyite-zinovievite bloc.

## II CONCLUSIONS

These facts show that the trotskyite-zinovievite counter-revolutionary centre and its leaders, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, finally slid down into the swamp of White Guardism, joined forces with the most desperate and embittered enemies of the Soviet power, and turned into the organizing force of the remnants of the classes which had been smashed in the USSR and which in desperation are resorting to the terror – the basest instrument of struggle against the Soviet government.

Not only have they turned into the organizing force of the remnants of the classes which have been smashed in the USSR, but they have also become the leading detachment of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie outside the boundaries of the Union, voicing its will and its aspirations.

All of their activities serve to inspire the worst elements of the white emigration, which is in the service of the foreign secret police and is organized into terrorist groupings abroad, such as ROVS (The Russian Military Union), the Russian Fascist Party, the Fascist Union of Youth, etc.

They have turned into the organizing force of the worst and most embittered enemies of the USSR because they have no political motivations for struggling against the party and the Soviet power other than naked and undisguised careerism and the desire to sneak into power at whatever cost.

Confronted with the indisputable triumphs of socialist construction, they first hoped that our party would be unable to cope with its difficulties, as a result of which would be created the possible conditions for their emergence into the open and their attainment of power. But, seeing that the party is successfully overcoming its difficulties, they are wagering on the defeat of the Soviet power in the forthcoming war, as a result of which they dream of attaining power.

And, finally, seeing no prospects at all, in desperation they seize upon the ultimate instrument of struggle – terror.

Whereas previously the trotskyite-zinovievite groups justified their struggle against the party by maintaining, as it were, that the party and government were carrying out an incorrect policy, were leading the country to destruction, now they put forward quite contrary motivations. Now they consider the principal motive for adopting terror to be precisely the

successes of our party on all fronts of socialist construction – successes which arouse resentment in them and incite them to revenge for their own political bankruptcy.

Here, for example, is what one of the leaders of the united trotskyite-zinovievite bloc, Kamenev, testified at the investigation: ‘I must admit that we really did not advance, and were unable to advance, any positive programme in opposition to the policies of the VKP(b).

‘At the very outset of our negotiations with the trotskyites there were still some pale attempts to discuss the possibility of putting together a positive platform.

‘However, we soon became convinced that this was a pointless task and that we did not have any ideological platform at all.

‘Our wager on the insurmountability of the difficulties through which the country was passing, on the critical state of the economy, on the collapse of the economic policy of the party leadership in the second half of 1932, had already clearly been lost.

‘Under the guidance of the VKP(b) Central Committee and overcoming difficulties, the country was successfully following the course of economic growth. This we could not fail to see.

‘It would have seemed proper for us to end the struggle. However, the logic of the counter-revolutionary struggle, the naked usurpation of power – devoid of any ideas – drove us in the other direction.

‘The way out of the difficulties, the victory of the policies of the VKP(b) Central Committee, aroused in us a new upsurge of bitterness and hatred of the party leadership, in particular, of Stalin.’

(L. Kamenev, Record of Interrogation, 24 July 1936)

Analogous testimony was also given by the zinovievite, I.I. Reingold, a member of the Moscow terrorist centre:

‘I met Kamenev in the second part of 1933, and also in 1934, at his apartment on Karmanitsky Lane in Moscow. Kamenev evaluated the situation in much the same way as Zinoviev but reinforced his own conclusions by an analysis of the economic and political situation in the country. Kamenev came to the conclusion that “affairs, in any case are not headed for catastrophe but for an improvement; therefore, all expectations of an automatic collapse are groundless, and the existing leadership is granite which is too hard to permit any expectation that it will split of

itself.” From this Kamenev concluded that “it was necessary to split the leadership.”

‘Kamenev frequently quoted Trotsky’s saying that “the summit is everything and therefore the summit must be removed.”

‘Kamenev proved the need for a terrorist struggle and, above all, for the killing of Stalin, pointing out that this was the only way to reach power. I especially remember his cynical remark that “heads are distinguished by the fact that they don’t grow back on.”

‘Kamenev ordered terrorist fighters to be trained. He said that the new bloc differed from the former opposition bloc by its adoption of active terrorism.’

And further:

‘I have already testified above that the trotskyite-zinovievite united bloc did not have any new political programme. It was based on the old decrepit platform, and none of the leaders of the bloc were concerned with or interested in working out any sort of unified and coherent political programme. The only unifying feature of this whole ill-assorted bloc was the idea of a terrorist struggle against the leaders of the party and the government.

‘Indeed, the bloc was a counter-revolutionary, terrorist band of killers striving by any and all means to take power into their own hands.’

(I.I. Reingold, Record of Interrogation, 9 July 1936)

As can be seen, all of this testimony by the arrested trotskyites and zinovievites only indicates that, lacking any positive political platform acceptable to the toilers of our country, without any influence among the masses or contact with them, forced to recognize the decisive successes of our party and their own total political bankruptcy, they turned into an unprincipled band of killers whose only ‘principle’ was the careerist slogan of worming their way into power using any means available.

Their decisions as to the ways and means of struggling were directly connected with this ‘principle’ of theirs.

Practising double dealing on a broad scale, as a system of relationships with the party and the Soviet government, they extended it to monstrous proportions. They created a whole system of double dealing, one to be envied by an Azef, any secret police, with its whole staff of spies, provocateurs, and diversionists.

Considering double dealing to be the fundamental method for attaining power, the trotskyites and zinovievites made broad use of it in connection with their terrorist activities. Painstakingly concealing their infamous, terrorist intentions, every day spitting on their own views and convictions, every day swearing fidelity to the party and setting themselves up as adherents of the Central Committee line, they counted on success in achieving power, after murdering the main leaders of the party and the government, because in the eyes of the party and the broad masses of toilers they would appear to have fully repented and to have recognized their errors and crimes – adherents of the leninist-stalinist policy.

That is precisely why they took particular pains to conceal their terrorist activities.

In line with this, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, while issuing directives to the executors of terrorist acts, at the same time gave them detailed instructions to conceal any and all ties with trotskyite-zinovievite organizations.

In his testimony, for example, Reingold told of the following directives from Zinoviev:

‘In 1933–34 Zinoviev told me face to face in his apartment – the main practical task is to arrange terrorist work in such a conspiratorial manner as not to compromise oneself in any way. In an investigation the main thing is to stubbornly deny any ties at all with the organization. If accused of terrorism – deny this categorically, using the argument that terror is inconsistent with the views of bolshevik marxists.’

(I.I. Reingold, Record of Interrogation, 17 July 1936)

Trotsky displayed particular concern about this. He gave instructions that, if a terrorist act was carried out, the trotskyites must dissociate themselves from it and ‘take a position analogous to that taken by the SR central committee with respect to Miss Kaplan’ who shot Lenin.

L.B. Kamenev at the investigation discussed with unconcealed cynicism the possible alternatives for achieving power.

To the investigator’s question – did the trotskyite-zinovievite centre discuss plans for seizing power? – he answered as follows: ‘We discussed this question several times. We had settled upon and worked out two alternative ways for the leaders of the trotskyite-zinovievite bloc to attain power:

‘The first, and seemingly most realistic, alternative was that, after the commission of a terrorist act against Stalin, there would be confusion in the leadership of the party and government, and this leadership would engage in negotiations with the leaders of the trotskyite-zinovievite bloc, and primarily with Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotsky.

‘Zinoviev and I counted on taking the dominant position in the party and country in these negotiations, since by our two-faced policy under Stalin we had, in any case, succeeded in having the party pardon our errors and accept us back into its ranks, whereas our participation, that of myself, Zinoviev, and Trotsky, in terrorist acts, would remain a secret to the party and the country.

‘The other alternative for seizing power, which seemed to us less reliable, was that the leadership of the party and the country would be disorganized and uncertain of itself after a terrorist act had been committed against Stalin.

‘The leaders of the trotskyite-zinovievite bloc would succeed in exploiting the confusion and in compelling the remaining party leaders to bring us to power, or even in forcing them to yield us their places.

‘Trotsky’s appearance and his participation in the struggle for power were taken as self-evident.

‘In addition, we considered it as not out of the question that the rightists – Bukharin, Tomskey, and Rykov – would also participate in organizing the new governmental power.’

(Kamenev, Record of Interrogation, 23–24 July 1936)

On the same matters Reingold testified as follows at the investigation: ‘In addition to the deeply conspiratorial work on preparing terrorist acts against the party and government leadership, Zinoviev and Kamenev devoted every effort to winning the confidence of the Central Committee and the party and, insofar as this was possible, to occupying leading positions in the party.

‘The statements of Kamenev and Zinoviev in the press, emphasizing their devotion to the party and their repudiation of the past, were directly aimed at this. In meetings with party leaders Zinoviev and Kamenev in every way stressed their loyalty and devotion to the Central Committee of the party and their repudiation of their former errors. The speeches of

Zinoviev and Kamenev from the rostrum of the XVII Congress served the same purpose.

‘Here Zinoviev and Kamenev counted on the success of the terrorist act against the leaders of the party and government directly opening up to them – persons who had been pardoned by the party and accepted into its ranks under Stalin – a straight road to the leadership of the party and the country.

‘Zinoviev’s and Kamenev’s deeply concealed calculations of ways to power took the form of this Machiavellian plan of struggle.’

(Reingold, Record of Interrogation, 17 July 1936)

Such is the counter-revolutionary activity of the trotskyites and zinovievites, these traitors to the party and the working class who have gone over to the camp of the most vicious enemies of the Soviet power, traitors to our socialist revolution, traitors to our socialist motherland.

The Central Committee considers it necessary to bring to the attention of all party organizations these facts of terrorist activity by the trotskyites and zinovievites and once again to rivet the attention of all party members on the struggle with the remnants of the most vicious enemies of our party and the working class, to rivet attention on the tasks of the all-around heightening of bolshevik revolutionary vigilance.

The Central Committee directs the attention of all party members to the fact that, even after the killing of Comrade Kirov, enemies of the party succeeded in actively continuing their terrorist work – under cover of the name of communist – in certain party organizations, due to their insufficient vigilance.

Only the absence of the requisite bolshevik vigilance can explain the fact that Trotsky’s agent, Olberg, who came from Berlin in 1935, succeeded with the help of the concealed trotskyites, Fedotov and Elin, who were in leading positions in the Gorky krai party committee, in legalizing himself and organizing a terrorist group which prepared to kill the party leaders.

Only absence of bolshevik vigilance can explain the fact that in certain raion party committees of the city of Leningrad (Vyborg), trotskyites and zinovievites who had been expelled from the party succeeded as recently as 1935 in being restored to the party and, in certain cases, in penetrating the party apparatus and using it for their base terrorist purposes.

Only absence of bolshevik vigilance can explain the fact that the trotskyites and zinovievites have woven themselves snug nests in a number



of scientific research institutes, in the Academy of Sciences, and in certain other institutions of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and Minsk.

Finally, only absence of bolshevik vigilance can explain the fact that in a number of party organizations a part of the arrested members of terrorist groups had passed the verification of party documents and had been left in the party's ranks.

Now that it has been proven that the trotskyite-zinovievite monsters are uniting in a struggle against the Soviet power all the most embittered and accursed enemies of the toilers of our country – spies, provocateurs, diversionists, White Guardists, kulaks, etc. – now that all distinctions have been effaced between these elements on one hand and the trotskyites and zinovievites on the other – all party organizations and all party members must understand that Communists must be vigilant in any sector and in any situation.

Under the present conditions the inalienable quality of every Bolshevik must be the ability to detect the enemy of the party, however well he may be masked.

Smolensk Archives (WKP499)

## Plenum of the Central Committee

23 February –  
5 March 1937

Although there is considerable reason to regard this as the crucial plenum of Stalin's purges, the particulars of the proceedings remain mysterious to a substantial extent. It was the longest plenum since the early post-revolutionary period, requiring ten days to complete its business, compared to the usual three to five days. The communiqué published in *Pravda* on 6 March 1937 does not make it clear why so long a session was required. It states that 'economic and party construction' was discussed, but no resolutions on these topics have ever been indicated. It also stated that 'the anti-party activities of Bukharin and Rykov' were discussed. A later newspaper report indicated that the two were present at the plenum and spoke in their own defense. (*Izvestiia*, 17 March 1937, cited in George Katkov, *The Trial of Bukharin*, New York, 1969, 97.) They were expelled from the party by the plenum, which did not, however, take any action branding the pair as traitors. The only resolution that was published in full is the one concerning preparations for the first national election to be conducted under the new 'Stalin' constitution.

The necessity for so prolonged a meeting with such meagre announced results no doubt reflects the critical phase that the purge had entered. Khrushchev's 'secret' speech of 1956 indicates the Postyshev, probably not alone, opposed Stalin at this time. Stalin's own position was partially revealed following a notable delay: on 29 March and 3 April *Pravda* carried his alleged speeches to the plenum of 3 and 5 March, calling for 'the liquidation of trotskyist and other double dealers' (Stalin, *Sochineniia* 1 (XIV), Stanford, 1967, 189–247). It appears that the plenum adopted a resolution on this question, but it is far from clear what position it took on the purge. Two official Soviet sources provide alleged excerpts from the document, but their character is sharply contradictory. The first consists of two short excerpts quoted by Molotov in his speech to the February-March plenum.

The speech and excerpts were staunchly Stalinist, and appeared only in late April, another delay in publication that suggests some kind of intra-party resistance. The second pair of excerpts from the decision of the February-March Plenum of 1937 is found in the decision of a plenum of January 1938, which is mainly devoted to moderating the vigilance of the purgers (3.29). It is not clear which direction, if either, dominated in the decision on Stalin's speech. If he had received whole-hearted support in the resolution, one would think that he would have had it, like his speech, published. It is reasonable to surmise that the Central Committee produced a document that was too qualified in its Stalinist zeal, despite some token support (as in the quotations used by Molotov) or was perhaps openly critical of the excesses of the purge (as in the 1938 decision, which also contained some token support for vigilance). In the following pages the available excerpts appear in the order in which they were first published, which does not necessarily correspond to the original document. No title for this decision has appeared in Soviet sources.

Date not established

## **On Deficiencies in Party Work and Measures for Liquidating Trotskyites and Other Double Dealers**

The plenum of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) cannot countenance the objectionable phenomenon that a number of the organs of industry and transport remain passive in the face of the very exposure and unmasking of trotskyite diversionists, after the diversionist work of the trotskyites becomes evident. Usually the trotskyites are unmasked by the organs of the NKVD and individual party members – volunteers. In this situation the organs of industry themselves, and also, to some extent, of transport, display neither action nor, more important, initiative. Moreover, certain organs of industry even retard this matter ... [Ellipsis in original.]

The bureaucratic distortion of the principal of one-man authority (as contrasted with collective management, which was formerly practised) consists of the fact that many leaders in the economy think that one-man authority makes them entirely free of the control by the public opinion of the masses and the rank and file of workers in the economy. They do not heed the voice of the activists in the economy. They do not think it necessary to be guided by these activists. They cut themselves off from the activists and thereby deprive themselves of the support of the activists in the matter of exposing and liquidating inadequacies and lapses that are exploited by the enemies for their diversionist work.

*Pravda*, 21 April 1937

Certain of our party leaders suffer from an insufficiently attentive attitude toward people, toward party members, toward workers. What is more, they do not study the party workers, do not know how they are coming along and how they are developing, do not know their cadres at all. That is why they do not take an individualized approach to party members, to party workers. But the individualized approach is the main thing in our organizational work. And precisely because they do not take an individualized approach to the evaluation of party members and party workers they usually act aimlessly – either praising them indiscriminately and beyond measure or chastising them also indiscriminately and beyond measure, expelling them from the party by the thousands and tens of thousands. Certain of our party leaders strive in general to think in tens of thousands, not troubling themselves over the ‘units,’ the individual party members and their fate. They consider the expulsion of thousands or tens of thousands of persons

from the party to be a trifle and console themselves with the idea that our party is large and that tens of thousands of expulsions cannot change anything in the party's situation. But only persons who are in essence profoundly anti-party can take such an approach to party members.

Such a callous attitude toward persons, party members, and party workers artificially creates dissatisfaction and resentment in one section of the party.

It is obvious that the trotskyite double dealers adroitly latch on to such resentful comrades and skilfully drag them along into the swamp of trotskyite maliciousness ... [Apparent gap in original.]

The practice of adopting a formalistic and callously bureaucratic attitude to the fate of individual party members, to the exclusion of party members from the party, or to the restoration of excluded members to the rights of membership, is condemned.

Party organizations are directed to display maximum care and comradely concern in resolving the question of expelling from the party or restoring expelled persons to the rights of party membership.

*Pravda*, 19 January 1938

*KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh* v, 304

### 3.28

#### **The Preparation of Party Organizations for Elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet under the New Electoral System and the Corresponding Reorganization of Party Political Work**

27 February 1937

The introduction of the new USSR Constitution marks a turning point in the country's political life. The essence of this change consists in the further democratization of the electoral system – the replacement of the not completely equal elections to the soviets by equal elections, of multi-stage elections by direct ones, of open balloting by secret.

Whereas before introduction of the new constitution, clergy, former White Guards, former individuals and people not usefully employed were limited in their electoral rights, the new constitution dispenses with all

limitations on the electoral rights of these categories of citizens, making the elections of deputies universal.

Whereas formerly the elections of deputies were unequal, since there existed different electoral standards for the urban and rural populations, now the need for placing limitations on the equality of elections has disappeared and all citizens have the right to participate in elections on an equal basis.

Whereas previously the elections to the middle and higher organs of the Soviet power were multi-stage, now, under the new constitution, elections to all soviets – from the village and city level all the way up to the Supreme Soviet – will be direct.

Whereas the election of deputies to the soviets was formerly by open ballot and on the basis of lists, now the voting in the election of deputies will be secret and not by lists but by the individual candidacies put forward by electoral districts.

Finally, the constitution provides for the national referendum.

These changes in the electoral system mean a strengthening of mass supervision over soviet organs and an increase in the responsibility of soviet organs toward the masses.

The consequence of the introduction of universal, equal, and direct elections with the secret ballot will be the continued strengthening of the political activity of the masses, the involvement of new strata of toilers in the state administration. The dictatorship of the proletariat thus becomes a more flexible, and thereby a more powerful, system of the state guidance of society by the working class, the basis of the dictatorship of the working class is broadened, its foundation becomes more solid.

To be well-armed for this change the party must take a position at its head and make sure that its role in the forthcoming elections to the supreme organs of the country is one of full leadership.

Are the party organizations prepared for this sort of leadership?

What must the party do in order to stand at the head of this change, at the head of the new and thoroughly democratic elections?

For this the party's own practices must become consistently democratic, the party must base every aspect of its internal life on democratic centralism, as is required by the party Rules, it must itself provide the conditions enabling all party organs to be electoral, permitting criticism and

self-criticism to develop fully, ensuring that the responsibility of the party organs to the party mass is complete, and fully activating the party mass.

Can it be said that all party organizations are already prepared to fulfil these conditions, that they have already been completely restructured along democratic lines?

Unfortunately this cannot be stated with complete confidence.

This is seen from the practice prevailing in some organizations of violating the party Rules and the bases of intra-party democracy.

What sort of violations are these?

Many organizations violate the principle, set forth in the party Rules, that party organs are to be elected. The time intervals set forth in the party Rules for the election of party organs by party organizations are not observed. The quite unjustified practice of co-opting various leading party workers as members of the plenums of raion, city, krai, and oblast committees, and of the central committees of the national communist parties, has become widespread.

In many party organizations the procedure set forth in the party Rules whereby higher party organs approve the secretaries of party committees has been in fact transformed into the appointment of secretaries by these organs. Secretaries are often approved by party committees even before they have been elected by the local party organizations, and this means in practice that the local party organizations are deprived of the possibility of discussing the candidacy of the party worker recommended.

The approval of persons for electoral positions and their removal are often done by party organs on the basis of inquiries alone and without recommending new persons to the plenum of the party committee, and also without explaining to the party organizations the motives for the removal of a given party leader.

As concerns the elections of party organs, the practice still exists of discussing the lists of candidates only at preliminary conferences, councils of elders, meetings of delegations and, as a rule, there is no debate on the candidacies at the actual plenums and conferences, balloting is by list and not by individuals, and in this way the electoral process is transformed into a mere formality.

All of these instances of the violation of the bases of democratic centralism are harmful to the party in hindering the growth in the activity of

party members, depriving the activists – who are of particular political significance for the life of our party – of the possibility of participating in its leadership, depriving party members of their legitimate right of supervising the activity of party organs, and thereby upsetting the correct relations between the leaders and the party masses.

Striking examples of such practices are the instances of scandalous neglect of party political work in the Azovo-Chernomorsk krai committee, the Kiev oblast committee, and the central committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine, and in other party organizations – as recently brought to light by the VKP(b) Central Committee – which took the form of crude violations of the party Rules and the principles of democratic centralism as manifested in a departure from the election of party organs and resort to the intolerable practice of co-optation.

The plenum of the VKP(b) Central Committee stresses that the examples of improper leadership disclosed in the Kiev oblast committee and the Azovo-Chernomorsk krai are not isolated cases but are to be found to a greater or lesser extent in all krai and oblast party organizations.

The plenum of the VKP(b) Central Committee considers the liquidation of these and similar short-comings to be an indispensable condition for fulfilling the party's new tasks arising in connection with the change in the country's political life, with the adoption of the new Constitution, and with the forthcoming elections of the country's supreme organs on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage and the secret ballot.

It is therefore necessary to reconstruct party work on the basis of the unconditional and full implementation of the principles of intra-party democracy as prescribed in the party Rules.

The plenum of the VKP(b) Central Committee considers it necessary to implement, and hereby directs all party organizations to carry out the following measures:

- 1 The practice of co-opting members of party committees must be liquidated, and there must be a return to the election of the guiding organs of party organizations, as provided in the party Rules.
- 2 Voting by list is prohibited in the elections of party organs. The voting must be by individual candidacies, and each party member must be afforded an unlimited right of recalling candidates and of criticizing them.
- 3 Elections of party organs must be by secret ballot.

4 All party organizations – from the party committees of primary party organizations to the krai and oblast committees and the central committees of national communist parties – must hold elections of party organs before 20 May.

5 As provided by the party Rules, all party organizations must strictly observe the periods for elections of party organs: once a year in primary party organizations, once a year in raion and city organizations, once in one and one-half years in oblast, krai, and republican organizations.

6 Primary party organizations must abide strictly by the rule that party committees are elected at factory meetings, and not permit the latter to be substituted for by conferences.

7 The practice which prevails in many primary party organizations of in fact abolishing general meetings, and holding shop meetings and conferences instead, must be liquidated.

*Pravda*, 6 March 1937

*KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh v*, 286–9





## Plenum of the Central Committee

11, 14, 18, 20  
January 1938

Until 1971, this plenum was merely listed as having occurred in 'January,' without specific dates. With the publication of the eighth edition of *KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh* it was revealed that it met on four days, each separated by an interval of two to four days. This is a unique pattern in the annals of Central Committee plenums, which suggests some special tension between Stalin and the Central Committee. Did he find in it unexpected resistance, which led him to adjourn the plenum several times to create an opportunity to bring pressure to bear on certain members? Or is there an alternative explanation?

In any case, it seems clear that the plenum was not in agreement with the spirit of the *Ezhovshchina* of the preceding year, and that its members were concerned with the defence of the party against such excesses. Such a posture had been manifest previously in an unpublished decision of 24 June 1936 and at the February–March 1937 plenum, even though Postyshev, a prominent spokesman against Stalin at the latter occasion, was removed from his candidate status in the Politburo by the January 1938 Plenum. (It was not, however, alleged that he was a deviator of any sort, and he remained a nominal member of the Central Committee. There seem to have been some limits on what this body would pass.)

It is not demonstrated that Stalin actually opposed the following decision, even though it explicitly runs counter to the kind of purge activity that he had been supporting. The document attempts to fend off excesses by invoking Stalin's own frame of reference: the enemies of the people are the ones who are doing the damage; more liquidations are necessary to rid the party of these culprits; the purge of the purgers is about to begin. The ironies of the purge process are such that this document can support diverse interpretations.

The meeting also discussed 'economic questions,' but produced no resolution in this area.

### 3.29

#### **On Errors of Party Organizations in Expelling Communists from the Party, on Formal Bureaucratic Attitudes toward the Appeals of Those Expelled from the VKP(b), and on Measures to Eliminate These Short-comings**

18 January 1938

The VKP(b) Central Committee plenum considers it necessary to direct the attention of party organizations and their leaders to the fact that while carrying out their major effort to purge their ranks of trotskyite-rightist agents of fascism they are committing serious errors and perversions which

interfere with the business of purging the party of double dealers, spies, and wreckers. Despite the frequent directives and warnings of the VKP(b) Central Committee, in many cases the party organizations adopt a completely incorrect approach and expel Communists from the party in a criminally frivolous way.

The VKP(b) Central Committee has more than once insisted that party organizations and their leaders resolve the question of expelling from the party, or of restoring to the rights of party membership those who have been incorrectly expelled from the VKP(b), on a careful individual basis.

In its 5 March 1937 decision on the report by Comrade Stalin ‘On the Short-comings of Party Work and Measures for Liquidating Trotskyites and Other Double Dealers,’ the VKP(b) Central Committee plenum pointed out:... [See [3.27](#)].

In its 24 June 1936 letter ‘On Errors in the Examination of Appeals from Persons Excluded from the Party During the Verification and Exchange of Party Documents’ the VKP(b) Central Committee pointed to the frivolous, and in many instances callously bureaucratic, attitude of party organs to the processing of appeals from persons expelled from the party:

‘Despite the Central Committee directives,’ the letter reads, ‘the appeals of expelled persons are being examined extremely slowly. Many expelled persons spend months striving to have their appeals processed. A large number of appeals are examined in absentia, without any verification of the statements of the appellants and without affording them an opportunity to explain in detail the reasons for their expulsion from the party.

‘Many raion party organizations have acted in an intolerably arbitrary manner with respect to expelled persons. For concealing their social origins and for passivity, and not because of hostile activity against the party and the Soviet power, they have been automatically fired from their jobs, deprived of their apartments, etc.

‘In this way the party leaders of these party organizations, failing to assimilate properly the party’s directives on bolshevik vigilance, by their formalist bureaucratic approach to the examination of the appeals of those expelled during the verification of party documents, have played into the hands of the party’s enemies.’

As can be seen, the local party organizations received warning directives.

And even so, despite this, many party organizations and their leaders continue their formalistic and callously bureaucratic attitude toward the fate of individual party members.

There have been many instances of party organizations, without any verification and thus without any basis, expelling Communists from the party, depriving them of their jobs, frequently even declaring them enemies of the people without any foundation, acting lawlessly and arbitrarily toward party members.

Thus, for example, at a meeting on 5 November 1937, the *central committee of the KP(b) of Azerbaidzhan* mechanically confirmed the expulsion from the party of 279 persons; on 26 November the *Stalingrad oblast committee* confirmed the expulsion of 69 persons; on 28 November the *Novosibirsk oblast committee* mechanically confirmed the decisions of VKP(b) raion committees to expel 72 persons from the party; in the *Ordzhonikidze krai* party organization, the party board of the VKP(b) Central Committee Party Control Commission rescinded as incorrect and entirely baseless the expulsions of 101 Communists out of the 160 who appealed; in the *Novosibirsk* party organization 51 decisions out of 80 had to be rescinded in the same way; in the *Rostov* party organization 43 decisions out of 66 were rescinded; in the *Stalingrad* party organization – 58 out of 103; in the *Saratov* – 80 out of 134; in the *Kursk* party organization – 56 out of 92; in the *Vinnitsa* – 164 out of 337 etc.... [It is implied that most of these people were, or were about to be, arrested on political charges.]

In many raions of Kuibyshev oblast, large numbers of Communists have been expelled from the party on the ground that they are enemies of the people. But the organs of the NKVD find no basis for the arrest of these expelled persons. For example, the Bolshe-Chernigov raion committee of the VKP(b) expelled from the party, and declared enemies of the people, 50 out of a total of 210 Communists in the raion party organization, but with respect to 43 of those expelled the organs of the NKVD found no grounds for arrest. Many of those who were expelled by VKP(b) raion committees as enemies of the people are coming to the Kuibyshev oblast party board of the VKP(b) Central Committee Party Control Commission with the demand that they either be arrested or have their shameful stigma removed.

The VKP(b) Central Committee has data indicating that the same has occurred in other party organizations as well.

The VKP(b) Central Committee plenum considers that all these and similar facts are widespread in party organizations primarily because among Communists there exist, still unrevealed and unmasked, *certain careerist Communists who are striving to become prominent and to be promoted by recommending expulsions from the party, through the repression of party members, who are striving to insure themselves against possible charges of inadequate vigilance through the indiscriminate repression of party members.*

This sort of careerist communist assumes that once a deposition has been submitted against a party member, regardless of how incorrect or even pro vocational it may be, this party member is dangerous for the organization and must be gotten rid of immediately in order that he himself will be proven vigilant. Therefore he feels it unnecessary to make an objective evaluation of the accusations submitted against the communist and decides beforehand on the necessity of expelling him from the party.

This sort of careerist communist, anxious to curry favour, indiscriminately spreads panic about enemies of the people and at party meetings is always ready to raise a hue and cry about expelling members from the party on various formalistic grounds or entirely without such grounds. And the party organizations frequently follow meekly along behind such careerist loudmouths.

This sort of careerist communist is indifferent to the fate of party members and is ready to expel dozens of Communists from the party on false grounds just to appear vigilant himself. He is willing to expel members from the party for unimportant offences so as to take credit for 'services' in unmasking enemies, and if the superior party organs restore those who have been incorrectly expelled from the party, he is not the least embarrassed but assumes the pose of a man who is satisfied that, in any case, he is reinsured with respect to 'vigilance.'

Instead of tearing away the mask of false vigilance from such 'communists' and driving them into the clear, the party organizations and their leaders themselves frequently surround them with the halos of vigilant fighters for the purity of the party ranks.

*The time has come to unmask such, if you will permit the expression, communists and to brand them as careerists striving to curry favour by*

*expelling others from the party and to reinsure themselves through repressions against party members.*

Furthermore, numerous instances are known of disguised enemies of the people, wreckers and double dealers, organizing, for provocational ends, the submission of slanderous depositions against party members and, under the semblance of ‘heightening vigilance,’ seeking to expel from the VKP(b) ranks honest and devoted Communists, in this way diverting the blow from themselves and retaining their own positions in the party’s ranks.

The unmasked enemy of the people and former chief of the leading party organs section of the Rostov oblast committee of the VKP(b), Shatsky, together with his accomplices, exploited the political shortsightedness of the leaders of the Rostov oblast committee of the VKP(b) to expel honest Communists from the party, to impose knowingly incorrect penalties upon the party personnel, to embitter Communists in every way, and at the same time did everything possible to keep their own counter-revolutionary cadres in the party.

In this same Rostov the former chief of the school section of the Rostov oblast committee of the VKP(b), the enemy of the people Shestova, at the behest of a counter-revolutionary organization expelled from the party about thirty honest Communists in the party organization of the Rostov Pedagogical Institute.

At party meetings the enemy of the people, Kudriavtsev, former secretary of the Kiev oblast committee of the KP(b) of the Ukraine, would unflinching turn to the Communists who had spoken and ask the provocational question: ‘And have you turned in at least one deposition on someone?’ The result of this provocation was that in Kiev politically compromising depositions were submitted on almost half of the members of the city party organization, the majority of them clearly false and even provocational ...

All these facts show that many of our party organizations and their leaders have not yet succeeded in pinpointing and unmasking *those cleverly disguised enemies who try to disguise their hostility with shouts about vigilance, thus to maintain themselves in the party ranks – in the first place – and, in the second, who strive through repressive measures to beat up our boshevik cadres and to sow uncertainty and excess suspicion in our ranks.*

This disguised enemy – the most vicious traitor – usually shouts louder than anyone else about vigilance, hastens to ‘unmask’ the greatest number

possible, and does all this to cover up his own crimes before the party, to deflect the attention of the party organization from unmasking the real enemies of the people.

This disguised enemy – a repulsive double dealer – strives in every way to create in party organizations an atmosphere of excess suspicion in which every party member speaking in defence of another Communist who has been slandered by anyone at all is immediately accused of lack of vigilance and of ties with enemies of the people.

Whenever the party organization starts to check on a deposition submitted on a Communist, this disguised enemy – a foul provocateur – creates in every way an atmosphere of provocation around the verification process, sows an atmosphere of political mistrust around the person concerned, and thus organizes a flood of new depositions against him instead of an objective analysis of the matter.

Instead of bringing to light and unmasking the provocation activity of this disguised enemy, the party organizations and their leaders are frequently led by the nose, create for him an atmosphere of impunity for his slander of honest Communists, and themselves take the course of unfounded mass expulsions from the party, mass penalties, etc. What is more, even after the enemies who have made their way into the party apparatus and are slandering honest Communists have been unmasked, our party leaders frequently fail to take measures to liquidate the effects of this sabotage in the party organizations – i.e. the improper expulsion of Communists from the party.

The time has come for all party organizations and their leaders to unmask and *exterminate every last disguised enemy* who has penetrated our ranks and is trying by false shouts about vigilance to cover up his hostility and preserve his place in the party, thus to carry on his disgusting treacherous activities.

How do we explain the fact that our party organizations have not yet unmasked and marked down not only the careerist communists who are striving to become prominent and to be promoted through expulsions from the party but even those disguised enemies within the party who try to cover up their hostility with shouts about vigilance, thus to maintain themselves in the party, who try through measures of repression to beat up our bolshevik cadres and to sow excess suspicion in our ranks?

*This is explained by the criminally careless attitude toward the fate of party members.*

Everyone knows that many of our party leaders turned out to be politically nearsighted big operators who permitted themselves to be duped by enemies of the people and careerists and thoughtlessly relinquished to second-rate persons questions affecting the fate of party members, criminally abdicating their leadership of this matter.

The oblast and krai committees and the central committees of the national communist parties as well as their leaders not only fail to correct anti-party practices in the expulsion of Communists from the party, which are alien to bolshevism, but frequently they themselves, by incorrect leadership, implant a formalistic and soullessly bureaucratic attitude toward party members, thus creating a favourable atmosphere for careerist communists and disguised enemies of the party.

In not one single instance have the oblast and krai committees, and the central committees of the national communist parties, after looking into the matter, condemned the practice of adopting an indiscriminate and wholesale approach to party members and made the leaders of the local party organizations answer for their unfounded and improper expulsions of Communists from the party.

The leaders of party organizations naively feel that correcting the errors committed with respect to those who were improperly expelled may undermine the party's authority and damage the cause of unmasking the enemies of the people, failing to understand that every instance of improper expulsion from the party plays into the hands of the party's enemies.

Many oblast and krai organizations have large numbers of unexamined appeals lying there without any action being taken. In Rostov oblast more than 2500 appeals have not been examined; in Krasnodar krai – 2000; Smolensk oblast – 2300; Voronezh oblast – 1200; Saratov oblast – 500; etc.

By refusing to examine the appeals of those expelled the oblast and krai committees and the central committees of the national communist parties have converted the decisions of VKP(b) raion and city committees on this matter into unappealable and final decisions, which is contrary to the party Rules.

This all means that the oblast and krai committees, and the central committees of the national communist parties have in fact abdicated their

leadership of the local party organizations in a most important and acute matter – the fate of party members – leaving it to be resolved in a haphazard, and often even arbitrary, manner.

The oblast and krai committees and the central committees of the national communist parties themselves encourage the practice of mass indiscriminate expulsions from the party by leaving unpunished those party leaders who are arbitrary in their treatment of Communists.

It is time to end this formalistic and soullessly bureaucratic attitude to people, to party members, an attitude which is alien to bolsheviks.

It is time to understand that: ‘For the party member the party has become a major and serious affair, and membership in the party or expulsion from the party are major turning-points in a person’s life.’

It is time to understand that: ‘For the ordinary party member belonging to the party or being expelled from it are matters of life and death’ (*Stalin*).

It is time to understand that bolshevik vigilance consists essentially in the ability to unmask an enemy regardless of how clever and artful he may be, regardless of how he decks himself out, and not in indiscriminate or ‘on the off-chance’ expulsions, by the tens and hundreds, of everyone who comes within reach.

It is time to understand that bolshevik vigilance not only does not exclude, but on the contrary presupposes, the ability to display maximum care and comradely concern in deciding on expulsion from the party or restoring an expelled person to the rights of party membership.

The VKP(b) Central Committee plenum demands that all party organizations and their leaders in every way heighten the bolshevik vigilance of the party masses and that they unmask and uproot all voluntary and involuntary enemies of the party.

The VKP(b) Central Committee plenum considers that a very important condition of the successful resolution of this task is the total liquidation of the anti-party practice of taking an indiscriminate, unindividualized, wholesale approach to people, to party members.

The VKP(b) Central Committee plenum hereby *resolves*:

- 1 The oblast and krai committees and the central committees of the national communist parties, as well as all party organizations, are directed resolutely to end mass indiscriminate expulsions from the party and to institute a genuinely individualized and differentiated approach to questions



of expulsion from the party or of restoring expelled persons to the rights of party membership.

2 The oblast and krai committees and the central committees of the national communist parties are directed to remove from their party posts and to hold accountable to the party those party leaders who do not carry out the directives of the VKP(b) Central Committee, who expel VKP(b) members and candidate members from the party without carefully verifying all the materials, and who take an arbitrary attitude in their dealings with party members.

3 The oblast and krai committees, the central committees of the national communist parties, and the party boards of the VKP(b) Party Control Commission of the Control Committee are given three months to conclude examination of the appeals of those who have been expelled from the party.

4 All party committees are directed to set forth clearly and precisely in expulsion resolutions the motivations serving as the grounds for expulsion – to make it possible for higher party organs to verify the correctness of these resolutions, and every such resolution of a raion, city, or oblast committee, or of the central committee of a national communist party must without fail be published in the press.

5 The resolutions of party organs restoring the rights of party members who have been improperly expelled by local party organizations must indicate precisely which raion or city committee of the VKP(b) is to issue party documents to the restored member.

6 Party raion and city committees must issue documents at once to those who are taken back into the party, involve them in party work, and explain to all members of primary party organizations that they are responsible for the bolshevik education of those who have been restored to the VKP(b) ranks.

7 Party organizations must hold accountable before the party those persons who are guilty of slandering party members; the latter are to be fully rehabilitated; and when materials damaging to them have been published in the press, the resolutions of rehabilitation are also to be published in the press.

8 Party organizations are forbidden to enter in a Communist's registration card the fact of his expulsion from the party before his appeal has been examined and a final decision on expulsion has been adopted.

9 The incorrect and harmful practice of immediately discharging from their positions those who have been expelled from the VKP(b) is hereby forbidden.

Whenever it is necessary, because of his expulsion from the VKP(b), to release a person from his position, such release may be effected only when other work has been found for him.

10 Oblast and krai committees and the central committees of the national communist parties, acting through the appropriate soviet and economic organs, are given until 15 February 1938, to arrange jobs for those who have been expelled from the VKP(b); henceforth the situation is not to arise in which persons expelled from the VKP(b) remain deprived of work.

*Pravda*, 19 January 1938

*KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh* v, 303–12



### 3.30

#### **On the Organization of Party Propaganda in Connection with the Publication of the history of the VKP(b). Short Course**

14 November 1938

The publication of an authoritative primer on party history filled a major need. It legitimized the party's (and Stalin's) power by tracing the genealogy of the regime and asserting its claim to a unique understanding of history through the leninist-stalinist brand of scientific socialism. At each step in the development of the party this correct position was contrasted with that of its opponents, who were always malign and devious as well as deviant in doctrine. Thus, the history of the party served as a powerful didactic force at the time of the purges, stressing the long-term necessity of vigilance and orthodoxy.

Previous efforts toward writing such a book had been unsatisfactory, and Stalin had personally taken the matter in hand in 1937, writing a letter to the commission that was supposed to be writing the text and providing them with some general advice and an outline of the book (Stalin, *Sochineniia* XIV (1), 248–52). He also wrote, or had a major hand in writing, the one non-historical chapter in the work, a general theoretical discussion of 'Dialectical and Historical Materialism.'

As the following document indicates, the book was not merely a success; it was at once made the foundation for the entire Soviet system of political education. Its fundamental status as *the* book among all Soviet books (putting Lenin's writings very much in the shade) was enhanced in 1946 when it was announced that the volume was Stalin's personal work and would appear in his forthcoming *Works*. By 1948 it had been published in thirty-four million copies in the USSR (not to mention more than two million abroad), not quite enough to supply a copy to every Soviet household. It continued to occupy this central position until Stalin's

death, soon after which it was subject to implied criticism. Following serious attacks on the *Short Course* at the XX Party Congress in 1956, a new party history text was undertaken by a new commission. It was published in 1959 and has continued, with revisions, to occupy an important position in Soviet political literature, but never exercising hegemony among books that the *Short Course* occupied.

Despite the cessation of attacks on Stalin in the post-Khrushchev years, the following decision was deliberately omitted from the eighth edition of the basic anthology of party decisions, *KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh*, when the fifth volume of that series appeared in 1971. Apparently the Brezhnev leadership considered this particular manifestation of Stalinism better forgotten.

## I

The appearance of the *History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik). Short Course* is a major event in the ideological life of the Bolshevik Party. With the appearance of the *History of the VKP(B). Short Course* the party has acquired a new and powerful ideological weapon of bolshevism, an encyclopedia of basic knowledge in the area of marxism-leninism. This course in party history is a scientific history of bolshevism. It sets forth and generalizes the gigantic experience of the Communist Party – which has been and is unequalled by any other party in the world.

The *History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik). Short Course* is a very important instrument for resolving the task of mastering bolshevism, a weapon in marxist-leninist theory for party members, in that it presents knowledge of the laws of social development and political struggle; it is an instrument for heightening the political vigilance of party and non-party bolsheviks, an instrument for raising marxist-leninist propaganda to the requisite theoretical level...

## III

The VKP(b) Central Committee hereby resolves:

1 The practice of striving for the quantitative inclusion of Communists in the study groups of the party propaganda network at the expense of quality, leading to a splintering of efforts and to a lowering of the level of propaganda work, is incorrect.

2 Party organizations are directed to liquidate the primitive [‘kustarnyi’ – cottage industry] approach to the organization of party propaganda, to centralize its guidance as is required, and to restructure it in such a way as to ensure an improvement in its quality and its ideological level.

3 Marxist-leninist propaganda is to be based on the *History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik). Short Course*.

The study of VKP(b) history is to be differentiated as follows:

For the *lower-level* links [small groups], this including a considerable part of insufficiently trained comrades, it is advisable that the course be studied in a condensed form according to the three fundamental stages in the party's history: 1 / the struggle to create the Bolshevik Party (chapters I to IV); 2 / the party of bolsheviks in the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat (chapters V to VII); 3 / the party of bolsheviks in power (chapters VIII to XII).

For the *middle-level* cadres, consisting of the comparatively well-trained comrades and including the largest portion of our cadres, the VKP(b) Central Committee recommends that the *History of the VKP(b). Short Course* be studied in full, stressing each of its twelve component chapters.

For the *higher-level* cadres, that is, for the best-trained comrades, the *History of the VKP(b). Short Course* should be studied according to the subsections of each chapter, this being accompanied by a study of the primary sources in the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin ...

16 In addition to the political retraining of leading party cadres decided on by the February-March Plenum of the VKP(b) Central Committee, the following measures are to be implemented for the retraining and training of the party's skilled propaganda cadres:

*a* One-year courses for the retraining of propaganda and newspaper workers are to be organized in the following centres: 1 / Moscow, 2 / Leningrad, 3 / Kiev, 4 / Minsk, 5 / Rostov, 6 / Tbilisi, 7 / Baku, 8 / Tashkent, 9 / Alma Ata, 10 / Novosibirsk. The one-year courses for the retraining of propagandists, as organized in these centres, are to serve not only the given oblast or krai but also adjacent oblasts, krajs, and republics. The programme of the one-year courses for propagandists must be compiled on the basis of the 'Courses in Leninism,' and the class exercises must aim to develop skill in propaganda work and in the independent and deep study of the works of Marx and Engels, Lenin and Stalin.

The total number of participants in these one-year courses for retraining propagandists is set at 1500–2000, of whom approximately one-half are to be newspaper workers.

*b* A Higher School of Marxism-Leninism is to be organized in the VKP(b) Central Committee with a three-year course for training the party's highly skilled theoretical cadres.

17 The teaching of marxist-leninist theory in institutions of higher education is to be based on a profound study of the *History of the VKP(b). Short Course*. In this connection:

*a* In the higher educational institutions a unified course entitled 'Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism' is to be introduced, replacing the separate courses in leninism, dialectical and historical materialism; the curriculum is to continue to devote the same number of hours as before to socio-economic disciplines. In higher educational institutions the teaching of the fundamentals of marxist-leninist theory must commence with the study of the *History of the VKP(b). Short Course* with a simultaneous study of the primary marxist-leninist sources. Instruction in political economy must come after the study of the *History of the VKP(b)*.

*b* In place of the presently separate departments of dialectical and historical materialism, leninism, and VKP(b) history, the higher educational institutions are to establish unified departments of marxism-leninism.

*c* In universities and institutes possessing faculties of philosophy, history, or literature, the course in dialectical and historical materialism is to continue to be taught in these faculties.

*d* The Propaganda and Agitation Section of the VKP(b) Central Committee and the All-Union Committee for Higher Schools Affairs are charged with selecting heads of the departments of marxism-leninism by the beginning of the 1939–40 academic year and submitting them to the VKP(b) Central Committee for approval. The central committees of the national communist parties and the VKP(b) krai, oblast, and city committees are ordered to select theoretically prepared and politically tested persons as teachers of the fundamentals of marxism-leninism.

*e* Six-month courses for retraining teachers of marxism-leninism in higher educational institutions are to be organized in the Higher School of Marxism-Leninism.

#### IV

To effect a radical improvement in the party guidance of marxist-leninist propaganda the VKP(b) Central Committee resolves as follows:

18 The party Propaganda and Agitation Section and the Press and Publishing Section of the VKP(b) Central Committee, the central committees of the national communist parties, and of the VKP(b) krai and oblast committees are to be merged into unified propaganda and agitation sections.

19 The propaganda and agitation sections are to concentrate all work on printed and verbal marxist-leninist propaganda and mass political agitation (the party press; the publication of propaganda and agitational literature; the organization of printed and verbal marxist-leninist propaganda; supervision of the ideological content of propaganda work; the selection and posting of propaganda cadres; the political training and retraining of party personnel; the organization of mass political agitation).

The work of the propaganda and agitation sections is to be based upon the practical implementation of the present decision of the VKP(b) Central Committee ...

25 In view of the close connection between the work of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute and marxist-leninist propaganda, the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute is to be placed under the jurisdiction of the VKP(b) Central Committee Propaganda and Agitation Section.

26 The VKP(b) Central Committee directs all party committees to occupy themselves seriously with marxist-leninist propaganda – as a vital concern of the Bolshevik Party. Party committees must give genuine guidance to propaganda, thoroughly scrutinizing its content. The oblast and krai committees, and the central committees of the national communist parties must take into their own hands the guidance of the whole reorganization of marxist-leninist propaganda in accordance with the present resolution.

In pointing out to all party organizations that the restructuring of the whole of party propaganda in the spirit of the present Central Committee decision will demand particular attention and care from party organs, the Central Committee warns party organizations against the danger of a mechanical and formalistic approach to the restructuring of propaganda and against any attempts at all to run down in an indiscriminate fashion the whole of past experience in propaganda work.

To improve the guidance of party propaganda each city, oblast, and krai committee and each central committee of a national communist party is to have a special secretary concerned exclusively with questions of the organization and content of propaganda and agitation ...

*Pravda*, 15 November 1938

*KPSS v rezoliutsiakh* III (7th edition), 316–32

## XVIII Party Congress

10–21 March  
1939

Although the party had suffered much in the five years between its XVII and XVIII congresses, one would scarcely have gathered this from the proceedings of the latter gathering, attended by 1802 delegates. Stalin was very much the central figure, and his own, long report on the work of the Central Committee was the chief subject of discussion. It actually stated little that was novel, treating the purges as a successful campaign to strengthen the party and assuring his listeners that ‘we are moving ahead toward communism.’ (The text of the speech appears in English in J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, 1953, 746–803.) The second-ranking address, by Molotov, on the Five-Year Plan, was equally routine. The third important speech at the Congress was Zhdanov’s, concerning organizational changes and new party Rules. The organization of sections of the party Secretariat on the production principle, which had been adopted in 1934, was scrapped and the rules governing expulsion from the party were rewritten to provide at least some measure of theoretical protection against arbitrariness. While the normal interval between congresses was extended from three to five years, the introduction of regular annual conferences on the all-union level suggested some desire to enhance formal representative deliberations. In practice, only one such conference was held after 1939. Another forgotten aspiration of the XVIII Party Congress was the drafting of a new version of the party Programme, the official one of 1919 being obsolete. A commission, headed by Stalin, consisting of 27 party dignitaries, was elected but never produced any proposals.

A new Central Committee, replacing the one that had been decimated in the last two years of the purge, was elected at the Congress, consisting of 71 members and 68 candidates. Eight of the fifteen members of the Politburo elected in 1934 had died by 1939, as had two of the four new members chosen in that interval. All those who had been members of this body by 1939 and had survived were reelected as full members by the Central Committee immediately following the XVIII Congress: Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Kalinin, Andreev, Mikoyan. Zhdanov, Khrushchev, Beria, and Shvernik joined them as candidates.

### 3.31

#### **The Third Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR (1938–42)**

20 March 1939

#### **I THE RESULTS OF THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN AND THE BASIC TASKS OF THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN**

1 As a result of the successful fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan (1933–37), the *basic historic task* of the Second Five-Year Plan has been solved in the USSR: all exploiting classes have been definitely liquidated and

the causes of the exploitation of man by man and the division of society into exploiters and exploited have been completely destroyed. The most difficult task of the socialist revolution has been resolved: the collectivization of agriculture has been completed and the kolkhoz system has definitely struck roots. In our country, 'the first phase of communism – socialism – has been basically achieved' (Stalin). The victory of socialism has been legislatively secured in the new Constitution of the USSR.

By the end of the Second Five-Year Plan, socialist state and co-operative kolkhoz property in fixed assets, machinery, and buildings amounted to 98.7 per cent of all the fixed assets in our country. The socialist system of production has come to exercise unbroken rule throughout the economy of the USSR: it accounted for 99.8 per cent of gross industrial output, 98.6 per cent of gross agricultural output (including kolkhozniks' output on their personal plots and from personal livestock), and 100 per cent of trade in goods.

The class structure of Soviet society has also changed in accordance with the socialist reorganization of the country's economy that has taken place. In 1937, workers and employees engaged in the socialist economy of the USSR accounted for 34.7 per cent, the kolkhoz peasantry and co-operative cottage industry for 55.5 per cent, and the army, students, pensioners, and others for 4.2 per cent of the country's total population. Thus at that time 94.4 per cent of the country's population was already engaged in the socialist economy or closely linked with it. The remainder of the population – the independent peasantry, non-cooperative cottage industry and craftsmen – accounted for only 5.6 per cent of the population. Since then that part of the population has decreased still further.

Today, socialist society in the USSR is composed of two classes that are friendly with one another: workers and peasants; the dividing line between them – and between these classes and the intelligentsia as well – are fading and gradually disappearing. In their preponderant mass, the working people of the USSR are active and conscious builders of a classless socialist society and of communism. The victory of socialism in the USSR assured a historically unprecedented inner moral and political unity of the people, and a moral and political unity of the working people under the banner and leadership of the Communist Party and Soviet authorities that was not only capable of finishing with the remnants of hostile classes with their alien influences and of delivering a rebuff to all manner of hostile incursions



from the outside, but that also proved to be the best guarantee of the further growth and flowering of our homeland, and the guarantee of the victory of communism in our country.

2 The main and decisive *economic task* of the Second Five-Year Plan – the completion of the technical reconstruction of the USSR's economy – has been essentially completed.

There has been a thoroughgoing renewal of the country's production and technical apparatus. More than 80 per cent of industrial output in 1937 was produced in new enterprises, built or completely reconstructed during the First and Second Five-Year Plans; about 90 per cent of all tractors and combines operative in agriculture were produced by Soviet industry during the Second Five-Year Plan. The tasks of the Second Five-Year Plan for industry and transport were fulfilled ahead of time. The Second Five-Year Plan for industry was fulfilled by 1 April 1937, i.e., in four years and three months; moreover, heavy industry grew at a particularly rapid rate during the Second Five-Year Plan. The Second Five-Year Plan for railroad freight hauling was more than fulfilled in four years. The most important tasks of the Second Five-Year Plan for agriculture – the plans for grain and cotton – were also overfulfilled ...

In order to assure fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan, it was necessary to organize the struggle against the remnants of hostile class elements, against hostile class influences in the economy, in cultural construction, and in all political life. For this purpose it was necessary above all to organize the struggle to protect and strengthen socialist, state and kolkhoz property against thieves and plunderers of state and kolkhoz goods, against all and sundry accomplices of the class enemy, and particularly against traitors to the people in the person of trotskyite-bukharinite and bourgeois-nationalist spies, saboteurs, and wreckers who made common cause with foreign intelligence services and became agents of fascist secret services. Their traitorous work caused serious harm in a number of branches of the USSR's economy. The routing of these bands of spies and wreckers cleared the path for further and even mightier successes of the socialist economy in our country.

3 The task posed by the Second-Five-Year Plan for a *rise in the material and cultural level of the working people*, with a more than twofold increase in the level of public consumption, was also fulfilled ...

4 On the basis of the victorious fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan and the successes of socialism that have been achieved, the USSR has entered a new sphere of development with the Third Five-Year Plan, the sphere of *completing the construction of classless socialist society and of the gradual transition from socialism to communism*, when special importance attaches to the instilling of communist ideals in the working people, and the surmounting of the remnants of capitalism in the consciousness of people – the builders of communism.

However, one must not underestimate the difficulties in solving this gigantic task, particularly in conditions of a hostile capitalist encirclement. All the more so since despite the successful fulfilment of the First and Second Five-Year Plans, despite the record rates of our industrial development, and despite the fact that in production technology the industry of the USSR has overtaken leading capitalist countries – despite all these facts we still have not overtaken the most developed capitalist countries in *an economic sense*...

To assure the unconditional fulfilment of the tasks posed by the Third Five-Year Plan, the XVIII Congress of the VKP(b) demands of all party, soviet, economic, and trade union organizations:

*a* brisk operation and businesslike action from economic management, and concentration of management's effort on the correct selection of cadres, and on actual, day-to-day checks on the carrying out of the tasks assigned by the party and the government;

*b* correct organization of the wages of workers, foremen, and engineering and technical personnel, with the necessary material incentives for the growth of labour productivity;

*c* the development of socialist competition and of the stakhanovite movement together with the maintenance of firm labour discipline and high labour productivity on the part of all working people at enterprises and establishments.

In kolkhoz construction the tasks are those of a continued, all-round organizational and economic strengthening of the kolkhoz, of the development and strengthening of the public property of the kolkhoz and of developing kolkhoz livestock sections, communal construction, communal insurance funds, and other types of kolkhoz property, which is the basis for a further upsurge in agriculture and in the material and cultural level of the kolkhoz peasantry's life. It is therefore necessary to intensify the struggle

against violations of the kolkhoz rules, and necessary not to permit the expansion beyond the legal limit of individual peasants' auxiliary farming, kitchen-garden plots and livestock, which leads to a violation of the interests of the kolkhoz and interferes with the strengthening of kolkhoz discipline. It is necessary to assure a further strengthening of kolkhoz discipline and an intensification of corresponding educational work among the entire mass of kolkhozniks, to increase labour productivity, to provide incentives to the kolkhozniks who work the best, and also to effect a widespread transition to the organization of work teams at collective farms. To further strengthen discipline, increase labour productivity and the profits of individual kolkhozniks, as well as to develop industry and the production of manufactured goods, worker cadres must be supplied by kolkhozes, and the latter must regularly release kolkhozniks for work in industrial enterprises, and above all those who are being poorly utilized in kolkhoz work, who have few work days to their credit, and who therefore constitute a burden to the kolkhoz.

To realize the tasks of the Third Five-Year Plan it is necessary to liquidate completely the consequences of counter-revolutionary wrecking and of the spying trotskyite-bukharinite agents of fascism and foreign capital, to increase bolshevik vigilance in all the work of building communism and to remember always the party's dictum that as long as the external capitalist encirclement exists, the intelligence services of foreign states will continue sending us wreckers, saboteurs, spies, and killers to spoil, sully, and weaken our country and to obstruct the growth of communism in the USSR.

The realization of the great tasks of the Third Five-Year Plan is so closely bound up with the vital interests of the workers, peasants, and Soviet intelligentsia, that securing the fulfilment of the plan depends above all on communist and non-party bolshevik leaders, and particularly on our ability to organize labour and elevate the communist education of the working people. From all of us, from leaders and rank-and-file workers, from employees and kolkhozniks, the first demand is for a conscious attitude toward one's obligations, honest labour, and assistance to those who are behind so that the Third Five-Year Plan can be victorious and so that the Soviet Union can take a new gigantic step down the path toward the complete triumph of communism. Under present conditions, when socialist economic forms, socialist property, and socialist organization of labour

reign undivided in the USSR, when communist consciousness in work for the benefit of our state, our people and all working people assume decisive importance for the success of our cause – in these conditions, there is a gigantic increase in the role of a Soviet intelligentsia that is able to work in a bolshevik fashion and to struggle in bolshevik fashion for the cultural improvement and communist consciousness of the working people. Now, after the final consolidation of the political and economic positions of the socialist society in the USSR, the decisive factor is cadres that have mastered production technology; the decisive factor is Soviet cultural forces leading the working masses in their great struggle for the complete victory of communism.

In capitalist countries society is being ever more deeply eroded by the new, world-wide economic crisis that is throwing new millions of unemployed out onto the street and intensifying poverty and desperation among the working masses that are in bondage to capitalism. In the capitalist camp the tone is being set by the fascist countries with their bloody internal terror and external imperialist aggression that has already led to the second imperialist war, with the participation of a number of countries of Europe and Asia and is threatening to spread still further. All this is incontestable evidence of an intensification of the general, incurable crisis of capitalism, the parasitical rot of capitalism and the approach of its doom. The more demanding, then, are our obligations, the obligations of the builders of the first socialist society, which has already succeeded definitively in standing on its own two feet politically and economically, a society full of strength and confidence in its victory, a society that is inspiring courage in the working people of all countries and faith in their imminent liberation. Fulfilment of the Third Five-Year Plan will be the best evidence of the all-conquering force of communism in its historic competition with capitalism.

The XVII Congress of the VKP(b) demands of all bolsheviks and of all builders of communism who are devoted to the cause, that they do everything possible to rally the workers, collective farmers and intelligentsia even more closely to the great banner of the party of Lenin and Stalin to do battle for the victory of the Third Five-Year Plan.

20 March 1939

## **Changes in the Rules of the VKP(b)**

1 The victory of socialism in the USSR has assured the rule of a socialist economy. The class composition of the population of the USSR has altered in accordance with the radical changes in the economy of the USSR. All the exploitative elements – capitalists, merchants, kulaks, speculators – have been liquidated during the years of socialist construction. The toilers of the USSR – workers, peasants, intelligentsia – have undergone a profound change during the years of socialist construction.

The working class has undergone a radical change, being transformed into a completely new class, liberated from exploitation, which has annihilated the capitalist economic system and established socialist ownership of the means of production.

The peasantry has undergone a radical change, being transformed into a completely new peasantry liberated from any and all exploitation, whose overwhelming majority consists of kolkhoz peasantry whose work and property are not founded on private ownership, individual labour, and backward technology, but on collective property, collectivized labour, and contemporary technology.

The intelligentsia has changed and in its great mass has become a completely new intelligentsia bound by all of its roots to the working class and the peasantry. The Soviet intelligentsia are yesterday's workers and peasants and the sons of workers and peasants who have advanced to command positions. The Soviet intelligentsia does not serve capitalism, like the old intelligentsia, but socialism, and it is an equal member of socialist society.

Thus the class boundaries among the toilers of the USSR are being eradicated, and the economic and political contradictions among the workers, peasants, and intelligentsia are also falling away and being eradicated. The basis for the moral and political unity of Soviet society has been created. Brilliant confirmation of this moral-political unity of the Soviet people is found in the creation of the bloc of Communists and non-party persons for the elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet and to the union-republic supreme soviets, and in the complete victory of this bloc. Around the party there have arisen numerous cadres of non-party bolsheviks, progressive workers, peasants, and intellectuals who are active and

conscious fighters for the cause of the party, spokesmen for its line among the masses.

In this new situation the need has arisen of changing the terms of admission of new members, as set forth in the Rules. The procedure which the party Rules presently stipulate of granting admission into the party in four different categories – depending upon the social position of the person admitted – obviously no longer corresponds to the class structure of Soviet society as it has been changed by the victory of socialism in the USSR. The need for different categories of admission into the party and for different periods of time as a candidate is falling into abeyance. In this connection identical conditions of admission and an identical period of candidacy should be established for all who are admitted into the party, regardless of whether they are from the working class, the peasantry, or the intelligentsia.

2 The provision in the Rules on party members and their obligations must be supplemented by a provision on the rights of party members – which have been considered as self-evident but have not been spelled out in the Rules. Such an addition to the party Rules will reflect the growth in activity of party members and will be of exceptional significance for heightening their responsibility for the party's cause and for guarding party members from manifestations of bureaucratism. Article 57 of the party Rules reads: 'The free and businesslike discussion of questions of party policy in individual organizations or in the party as a whole is the inalienable right of every party member as a result of intra-party democracy.'

In addition to this right the Rules should make provision for the following rights of party members:

- a* the right of party members to criticize any party worker at party meetings;
- b* the right of party members to elect and be elected to party organs;
- c* the right of a party member to demand to be present whenever a decision is being taken with respect to his activity or conduct;
- d* the right of party members to carry any questions or deposition to any higher party level, up to the VKP(b) Central Committee.

3 The VKP(b) Rules provide for periodic party purges, as decided by the VKP(b) Central Committee. Experience has shown that it will be necessary henceforth to refrain from mass party purges, and for the following reasons:

*a* The method of mass purges introduced at the beginning of the NEP, when capitalist elements were reviving, to guard the party's ranks from penetration by persons who were demoralized by the NEP, has lost its justification in the present circumstances when capitalist elements have been liquidated. Furthermore, practice has shown that the method of mass purges excludes the possibility of an individualized approach to party members – the only correct approach – and replaces it by an indiscriminating stereotyped approach to party members, 'applying a single standard.' In this connection the mass purges gave rise to numerous baseless expulsions from the party, while hostile elements who had made their way into the party used the purge to hound and thrash honest party workers.

*b* The method of mass purges makes it impossible fully to implement the party's intent that party members and party workers should be treated carefully, and in practice it occasionally leads to an infringement of the rights of party members.

*c* The method of mass purges was relatively ineffective with respect to the hostile elements who had made their way into the party and disguised their hostile visage by double dealing and deceit; in this respect it did not attain its goal.

*d* As it turned out, the edge of the mass purges was directed mainly against the so-called passive party members and led to the expulsion from the party of honest and well-intentioned members because of their so-called passivity.

Therefore the periodic mass purges of the party must be abolished, it being established that the party can, in the course of its normal operations, purge its ranks of persons who have violated the Programme, Rules, and discipline of the party.

4 At the February-March 1937 Central Committee Plenum [3.27] and the January 1938 Central Committee Plenum [3.29], the party condemned the practice of taking a formalistic and callously bureaucratic approach to the fate of party members, to questions of the expulsion of party members and of restoring those expelled to the rights of membership. As is known, this practice was broadly used by careerist elements who had penetrated the party and endeavoured to gain notoriety and advancement on the basis of expulsions, as well as by disguised enemies within the party who strove

through generalized repressions to beat up honest party members and to sow excess suspicion in the party ranks.

The January 1938 Central Committee Plenum adopted a series of measures to ensure liquidation of the practice of indiscriminate expulsions from the party, to establish a genuinely differentiated approach to questions of expelling from the party or of restoring to membership those who have been expelled.

As a result the Rules must be expanded by a series of provisions which must:

- a* ensure an attentive and painstaking analysis of the validity of accusations submitted against a party member;
- b* safeguard the rights of party members against arbitrary assaults;
- c* eliminate the practice of applying expulsion, which is the supreme measure of party punishment, against party members who have committed minor offences.

5 It is necessary to abolish the admission requirement in the Rules, whereby candidates entering the party not only *recognize* the party Programme and Rules and pass through the statutory period of candidacy, but also *assimilate* the Programme ...

6 The new tasks of the party which have arisen in connection with the change in the country's political life, with the adoption of the new Constitution of the USSR, require a corresponding reconstruction of party practice on the basis of the absolute and full implementation of the principles of internal party democracy prescribed by the party Rules. To this end the party has liquidated the violations of the bases of democratic centralism, as they have existed in the practice of party work, and has restored – in accordance with the party Rules – the election of the leading organs of party organizations.

The party has also adopted a series of supplementary measures ensuring that its practice will be consistently democratic, in particular: the abolition of co-optation, the prohibition of voting by list in elections of party organs, the changeover to voting by individual candidacies, ensuring that all party members have an unlimited right to recall candidates and criticize them, the institution of the secret ballot in elections to party organs establishing the requirement that in cities the party activists be called together periodically –



and in large cities that party activists be called together periodically at the raion level as well.

The Rules must reflect these new party measures which have been tested by practice and ensure the continued development of criticism and self-criticism, a heightening of the responsibility of party organs to the party masses, growth in the activity of the party masses, and which thereby further the equipping of the party for the successful resolution of the new tasks of political leadership.

7 According to the party Rules, the practical implementation of party decisions and resolutions (and the verification of their execution by soviet-economic organs and lower-level party organizations) requires the presence in the oblast and krai committees, in the central committees of the national communist parties, and in the VKP(b) Central Committee, of integral production-branch sections, 'each production-branch section concentrating all work as a whole in the given branch: party organizational work, assignment and training of cadres, mass agitation, production propaganda supervision of the fulfilment of party decisions by the appropriate soviet-economic organs and party organizations.'

However, practice has demonstrated that this sort of organization of the party apparatus is inadequate.

In the recent period and at present the party's central organizational task has been and remains the correct selection of people and the verification of execution. Lenin attributed exceptional significance to this matter, noting at the XI Party Congress:

'We have reached the point where the key to the situation is – people, the selection of people ... Pick the necessary people and check on their practical execution – and this the people will appreciate ...'

Experience has shown that the weaknesses in our organizational work on the selection of people and the verification of execution have not yet been overcome. The dispersion of cadres selection among the production-branch sections has curtailed the scope of organizational work, has hampered the necessary transfer of party workers from one branch to the other and their advancement, and has made it difficult to use them in the proper way in sectors which at a given moment are of particular importance for the party. The dispersion of the selection of cadres among the various production-branch sections of the party apparatus has become a direct hindrance to the successful solution of the task of selecting people and

distributing them. This task demands that all cadres work be directed from a single centre by concentrating it in a single apparatus – in which must be concentrated experience in cadres selection, in their study and evaluation, and in their assignment.

With this situation in mind the VKP(b) Central Committee has adopted a series of measures concentrating the selection of cadres in the Leading Party Organs Section. However, considering the primary importance of cadres training and selection and the enormous amount of work involved, the Leading Party Organs Section should be reorganized with cadres work in all branches being assigned to an autonomous Cadres Administration and matters of party-organizational leadership being taken over by a special Organizational Instruction Section.

8 The practice of dispersing the verification of the execution of party directives among the various production-branch sections has also proved to be inadequate. This work must also be concentrated in a single place, and in this connection there must be a change in the nature of the activities of the Commission of Party Control. The latter's central task must be the reinforcement of supervision of the execution of VKP(b) Central Committee decisions and the organization of the systematic verification of the work of local organizations. It must be made clear that the Commission of Party Control functions in the VKP(b) Central Committee. Thus the necessity of electing the Commission of Party Control directly at the party congress is seen to lapse. The Commission of Party Control must be elected by the VKP(b) Central Committee plenum and function under the leadership and the directives of the VKP(b) Central Committee.

9 The task of liquidating the theoretical and political backwardness of party cadres, of arming the party members with marxist-leninist theory and of mastering bolshevism makes it necessary that party propaganda and agitation be raised to the requisite level in accordance with the Central Committee decision 'On the Presentation of Party Propaganda in Connection with the Appearance of the *History of the VKP(b). Short Course*' [3.30].

The VKP(b) Central Committee should have a powerful propaganda and agitation apparatus in the form of a Propaganda and Agitation Administration in which will be concentrated all printed and oral propaganda and agitation.

10 The production-branch sections of the VKP(b) Central Committee must be liquidated with the exception of the Agricultural Section – in view of the particular importance of supervising and checking up on the activities of soviet and party organizations in agriculture, and of the Schools Section, which is to supervise the organization of popular education in all the republics.

The oblast and krai committees and the central committees of the national communist parties are to establish the following sections: cadres, propaganda and agitation, organizational instruction, and agriculture, with all remaining production-branch sections being abolished.

The raion and city committees are to have the following sections: cadres, propaganda and agitation, and organizational instruction.

In the oblast and krai committees and the central committees of the national communist parties leadership of the propaganda and agitation sections and the cadres sections is to be entrusted to special secretaries.

11 The rapid advance of the socialist economy, the rapid political and cultural growth of the workers, peasants, and intelligentsia have speeded up the tempo of party and state life. In order to effect guidance of state and party affairs, to react rapidly to the demands of life, and to find timely solutions to urgent questions, the existing structure of the party's central organizations – the party congress, the VKP(b) Central Committee – must be supplemented by a new organ – the all-union party conference. This is the more necessary in that the long time interval between party congresses limits the opportunities of the maturing cadres of party workers for promotion to leading position, and particularly to the VKP(b) Central Committee, while a conference could afford the party this possibility. Therefore the need has arisen to supplement the system of the party's central organizations – the party congress, the VKP(b) Central Committee – with the all-union party conference, to be convoked not less than once a year and made up of the representatives of local organizations; thus the principal task of the all-union party conference will be the discussion of urgent questions of the party's policy.

The all-union party conference must be granted the right to replace part of the members of the Central Committee, i.e., to withdraw from the Central Committee certain of its members who have not fulfilled their duties as Central Committee members and replace them by others, but in a quantity not greater than one-fifth of the number of Central Committee

members elected at the party congress. The conference will replace Central Committee members from among the candidates elected by the party congress, and to replace the latter will elect an appropriate number of new Central Committee candidate members.

Conference decisions are subject to approval by the VKP(b) Central Committee, except for decisions to replace Central Committee members and elect new Central Committee candidate members, which are not subject to such approval. When approved by the VKP(b) Central Committee, conference decisions are binding upon all party organizations. Conference delegates are elected at plenums of oblast and krai committees and of the central committees of national communist parties. Central Committee members will participate with an advisory vote in the deliberations of the conference unless they are authorized delegates of local organizations.

12 In recent years the advance of party political and party organizational work has strengthened the primary party organizations, improved their ties with the masses, heightened the vanguard role of communists, and raised the level of party life. Party organizations have come closer to the practical questions of economic and cultural construction.

Experience has shown that the success of the party organizations has been due to the ability of the primary party organizations to combine party political work with the struggle for the successful fulfilment of production plans, for improving the functioning of the state apparatus, for mastering new technology, for reinforcing labour discipline through development of the stakhanovite movement, for promoting new cadres to party economic work. And, on the contrary, where party organizations have kept aloof from economic affairs and limited themselves to agitation, or where party organizations have taken on themselves inappropriate functions of economic guidance – substituting themselves for the economic organs and depriving the latter of responsibility – work has inevitably come to a dead end.

At the present time the need has arisen for a more precise definition of the tasks of the various primary party organizations, and in particular of such varied types of primary party organizations as the party organization in production (the factory, the plant, the sovkhoz, the kolkhoz) and the party organization in the people's commissariat. Party organizations of the production type (in the factory, plant, sovkhoz, or kolkhoz) must be granted the right to supervise the state of affairs in the enterprise, sovkhoz, or

kolkhoz. This should lead to a strengthening of the role and responsibility of primary party organizations in production. And since the party organizations in people's commissariats do not have any supervisory functions, because of their specific conditions of work, they must intensify their role in improving the functioning of the state apparatus. They must signal the defects in the operation of their commissariat, drawing attention to short-comings in the work of individuals, and communicating this to the Central Committee and to the leaders of the commissariat.

All party members working in a given commissariat must form part of the party organization of the whole commissariat. The secretary of the commissariat primary party organization must be approved by the VKP(b) Central Committee.

13 Considering that the sympathizer, as an established category, relates to the period when entry into the party was closed, and also bearing in mind that the party can fill its ranks from among the progressive non-party activists grouped around the soviets, the trade unions, the Komsomol, the co-operatives, the Osoaviakhim, and the other social organizations of the toilers, sympathizers' groups are hereby abolished.

### **3.33**

#### **Rules of the VKP(b) Section of the Communist International**

20 March 1939

[Replaces Rules adopted in 1934; see [3.22](#)]

[Revises preamble, [3.22](#)] The VKP(b), a section of the Communist International, is the leading, organized detachment of the working class of the USSR, the highest form of its class organization. The party is guided in its work by the theory of marxism-leninism.

The party exercises leadership of the working class, peasantry, intelligentsia – of all Soviet people in the struggle for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the working class, for the strengthening and development of the socialist order, for the victory of communism.

The party is the leading nucleus of all organizations of the toilers, social as well as governmental, and secures the successful construction of communist society.

The party is a united, militant organization, joined together by a conscious discipline that is equally binding on all members of the party. The party's strength lies in its solidarity, unity of will, unity in action, which are incompatible with deviations from the Programme and Rules, violation of party discipline, factional groupings, and double dealing. The party purges itself of persons who violate the party Programme, party Rules, party discipline.

The party demands of its members active and selfless work for the realization of the party Programme and Rules, the fulfilment of all the decisions of the party and its organs, the securing of the unity of party ranks and strengthening of fraternal international relations, both among the toilers of the nationalities of the USSR and with the proletarians of all the countries of the world.

## **I PARTY MEMBERS, THEIR OBLIGATIONS AND RIGHTS**

1 [As in 3.22, art. 1 (definition of party member)]

2 [Revises 3.22, art. 2] A party member must:

*a* tirelessly work to raise his consciousness to master the foundations of marxism-leninism;

*b* observe the strictest party discipline, actively participate in the political life of the party and of the country, carry out party policies and the decisions of party organs;

*c* serve as an example in the observance of labour and state discipline, master the techniques of his work, increasingly improve his productive, practical skills;

*d* strengthen daily his ties with the masses, respond in good time to the inquiries and needs of the toilers, explain the meaning of party policies and decisions to the non-party masses.

3 [New] A party member has the right:

*a* to participate in free and businesslike discussions at party meetings or to discuss questions of party policies in the party press;

*b* to criticize any party member at party meetings;

*c* to vote in elections and be elected to party organs;

*d* to demand personal participation in all cases where a decision is to be made concerning his activities or behaviour;

*e* to address any question and declaration to any party department, up to the Central Committee of the VKP(b).

4 [Revises 3.22, art. 3] Acceptance into party membership is granted exclusively on an individual basis. New members are accepted from among the candidate members who have completed the established period of candidate membership. Politically conscious, active workers, peasants and intelligentsia who are devoted to the cause of communism are accepted as party members.

Individuals who have reached the age of eighteen years may be accepted into the party.

Acceptance of candidate members into the party is regulated as follows:

*a* Those entering the party must present recommendations from three party members who have at least three years' party service and who have known them through close association in work for at least one year.

*First Note* For acceptance into party membership from the Komsomol, the recommendation of the Komsomol district committee is equivalent to the recommendation of one party member.

*Second Note* Members and candidates of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) must refrain from giving recommendations.

*b* The question of acceptance into the party is discussed and decided at a general meeting of the primary party organization, and this decision takes effect after confirmation by the raion committee and, in cities that are not divided into raions, by the city committee.

During discussion of the question of party membership, the presence of those giving the recommendations is not required.

*c* Youths up to the age of twenty may enter the party only through the Komsomol.

*d* Those coming from other parties are accepted into party membership in exceptional cases and on the recommendations of five party members, three with ten years' party service and two with pre-revolutionary party service, and only through a primary party organization with approval by the Central Committee of the VKP(b).

5 [Revises 3.22, art. 4] The recommenders are responsible for the reliability of the persons whom they recommend.

6 [As in 3.22, art. 5 (on the dating of seniority in the party)]

7 [As in 3.22, art. 6 (on the transfer of members who move from one district to another)]

8 [Revises 3.22, art. 7] Party members and candidates who have not paid their membership dues for three months without valid reasons are considered to have left the party. The primary party organization adopts a decision to this effect, which is approved by the raion or city party committee.

9 [Revises 3.22, art. 8] The question of expelling anyone from the party is decided at a general meeting of the primary party organization of which the said person is a member, and is approved by the raion or city committee of the party. The decision of the raion committee or city committee on expulsion from the party takes effect only if it is approved by the oblast / krai committee of the party or the central committee of the communist party of a union republic.

10 [New] Until the decision expelling a person from the party is approved by the oblast / krai committee or the central committee of the communist party of a union republic, the person retains his party card and has the right to attend closed party meetings.

The expulsion of members of the party is published in the local press by the oblast / krai committee or central committee of a union republic, along with an explanation of the reasons for expulsion. The reinstatement of members who were erroneously expelled is published in the same way.

11 [New] While a decision expelling a person from the party or reinstating him is being taken, the maximum care and comradely concern must be maintained and a thoroughgoing examination of the accusations against the party member must be conducted.

For minor misdeeds (absence from a meeting failure to pay membership dues on time, etc.) party education and influence should be brought to bear, as provided for in the Rules, and not expulsion from the party, which is the highest form of party punishment.

12 [New] The appeals of persons expelled from the party must be reviewed by the appropriate party organ not later than two weeks from the date of their receipt.

## **II CANDIDATES FOR PARTY MEMBERSHIP**

13 [As in 3.22, art. 10 (on the general nature of candidacy)]



- 14 [Revises 3.22, art. 11] The procedure for admission to candidate membership (individual acceptance, presentation of recommendations and their verification, the decision of the primary party organization on acceptance and its approval) is absolutely the identical with that for admission to party membership.
- 15 [Revises 3.22, art. 12] The period of candidacy is fixed at one year.
- 16 [As in 3.22, art. 13 (on the participation of candidates in meetings)]
- 17 [As in 3.22, art. 14 (on candidates' dues)]
- [1934 Rules, part III, on groups of sympathizers, comprising articles 15–17, is deleted]

### III THE STRUCTURE OF THE PARTY

#### *Intra-party democracy*

- 18 [As in 3.22, art. 18 (on democratic centralism), with minor verbal change in 'd']
- 19 [As in 3.22, art. 19 (on the territorial-production principle), dropping a passing reference to democratic centralism]
- 20 [As in 3.22, art. 20 (on autonomy in local matters)]
- 21 [Revises 3.22, art. 21] The highest leading organ of each party organization is the general meeting (for primary organizations), conference (for example, for raion, oblast organizations), congress (for communist parties of union republics, for the VKP(b).
- 22 [As in 3.22, art. 22 (on the election committees as executive organs)]
- 23 [New] The use of lists of candidates [for party office] is prohibited in party organs. Elections must be conducted on the basis of individual candidates, with the provision that all party members enjoy the unrestricted right to challenge or criticize candidates. Voting is by closed (secret) ballot.
- 24 [New] In all republic, krai, and oblast centres, as well as all important industrial centres, the aktivs of the city party organization are convened for discussion of the more important party and state decisions. Moreover, the aktivs must be convened not for ostentation or more formal approval of these decisions, but for genuine discussion.

In large centres the raion party aktivs, and not only the city aktivs, are convened.

- 25 [As in 3.22, art. 57 (on the right to discuss party policies)]
- 26 [Revises 3.22, art. 23] The structure of party organization:

*a* for the party as a whole: all-union congress – Central Committee of the VKP(b) – all-union conference;

*b* for the oblast / krai / union republic: oblast / krai conferences, congresses of the communist parties of union republics – oblast committees, krai committees, central committees of communist parties of union republics;

*c* for the okrug: okrug conferences – okrug committees;

*d* for the city / raion: city / raion conferences – city / raion committees;

*e* for enterprises, hamlets, kolkhozes, MTSS, Red Army and Navy units, for institutions: general meetings, conferences of primary party organizations – bureaus of primary party organizations.

[1934 Rules, art. 24, deleted (on hierarchical order of decisions)]

27 [Revises [3.22](#), art. 25] The following administrations and sections exist for practical work concerning the implementation of party decisions by the Central Committee of the VKP(b):

*a* cadres administration

*b* propaganda and agitation administration

*c* organizational instruction section

*d* agriculture section

*e* school section

In okrug committees, oblast committees, krai committees, and the central committees of communist parties of union republics:

*a* cadres section

*b* propaganda and agitation section

*c* organizational instruction section

*d* agriculture section

*e* military section

In city committees and raion committees:

*a* cadres section

*b* propaganda and agitation section

*c* organizational instruction section

*d* military section

The military section is obliged to assist the military organs in the matter of registering persons eligible for conscription, in the organization of

induction, mobilization in case of war, the matter of the organization of anti-aircraft defence, etc.

Leadership of the propaganda and agitation sections and cadres sections of the oblast committees, krai committees, and the central committees of the communist parties of union republics must be entrusted to special secretaries.

28 [As in 3.22, art. 26 (on the right of party organizations to maintain their own presses)]

#### **IV THE HIGHER PARTY ORGANS**

29 [As in 3.22, art. 27 (on the party congress)]

30 [As in 3.22, art. 28 (on the right of lower party organs to convene an extraordinary congress)]

31 [Revises 3.22, art. 29] The congress:

- a* hears and approves reports of the Central Committee, the Central Revision Commission, and other central organizations;
- b* reviews and revises the party Programme and Rules;
- c* defines the tactical line of the party on basic issues of current policy;
- d* elects the Central Committee and the Central Revision Commission.

32 [Revises 3.22, art. 30] The congress elects the Central Committee and Central Revision Commission and determines their size. If the Central Committee loses members, they are replaced from among the candidate members of the Central Committee elected by the congress.

33 [As in 1934 Rules, art. 31 (on the frequency of Central Committee plenums and participation of candidate members in them)]

34 [Revises 1934 Rules, art. 32] The Central Committee of the VKP(b) organizes: for political work – a Political Bureau; for the general management of organization work – an Organizational Bureau; for current work of an organizational-executive character – a Secretariat; for the verification of the fulfilment of decisions of the Party and the Central Committee of the VKP(b) – a Commission of Party Control.

35 [Revises 3.22, art. 36] The Commission of Party Control:

- a* controls the fulfilment of party decisions and decisions of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) by party organizations and soviet-economic organizations;
- b* verifies the work of local party organizations;

c calls to account those guilty of violating the Programme, Rules of the VKP(b), party discipline.

36 [As in 3.22, art. 33 (on the work of the Central Committee)]

37 [New] In the intervals between party congresses, the Central Committee of the VKP(b) convenes, at least once a year, the all-union party conference of representatives of local party organizations to discuss urgent questions of party policy.

Delegates to the all-union conference are elected at plenums of oblast committees, krai committees, and central committees of communist parties of union republics.

The method of election and the norms of representation to the all-union conference are established by the Central Committee of the VKP(b).

Members of the Central Committee who are not plenipotentiary delegates of local organizations participate in the work of the all-union conference with the right of consultative vote.

38 [New] The all-union conference has the right to change part of the membership of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), that is, the right to remove from the Central Committee individual members of the Central Committee who have not ensured the fulfilment of the obligations entrusted to them as members of the Central Committee, and to replace them with others, but not more than one-fifth of the membership of the Central Committee elected by the party congress.

The all-union conference replaces the membership of the Central Committee [with persons chosen] from the candidate members [of the Central Committee] elected by the party congress and in exchange elects a corresponding number of new candidate members of the Central Committee.

39 [New] Decisions of the all-union conference are confirmed by the Central Committee of the VKP(b) with the exception of decisions concerning a change in membership of the Central Committee and the election of new candidate members of the Central Committee, which do not require approval by the Central Committee.

Decisions of the all-union conference which have been approved by the Central Committee of the VKP(b) are binding on all party organizations.

40 [Revises 3.22, art. 34] In order to strengthen bolshevik leadership and political work, the Central Committee of the VKP(b) has the right to create

politotdels and to assign party organizers on detached service from the Central Committee to lagging sectors of socialist construction that have especially great significance for the economy and the country as a whole. Insofar as the politotdels fulfil their urgent tasks, the Central committee has the right to abolish them or to convert them into ordinary party organs, on the principle of production-territorial organization.

Politotdels work on the basis of special instructions which are approved by the Central Committee of the VKP(b).

41 [As in 3.22, art. 35 (on Central Committee reports to party organizations)]

42 [As in 3.22, art. 37 (on the work of the Central Revision Commission)]

## **V OBLAST, KRAI AND REPUBLIC PARTY ORGANIZATION**

43 [As in 3.22, art. 38 (on the oblast / krai conference, congress of national communist party)]

44 [As in 3.22, art. 39 (on the conference and revision commission in the oblast / krai / union republic)]

45 [Revises 3.22, art. 40] For the conduct of current work the krai / oblast committee or the central committee of a communist parties of a union republic elects corresponding executive organs, composed of not more than eleven persons and four or five secretaries, including the first secretary, second secretary, cadres secretary, and propaganda secretary, confirmed by the Central Committee of the VKP(b). Secretaries must have at least five years' party membership.

46 [As in 3.22, art. 41 (on the functions of the krai / oblast committees, and the central committee of national communist party)]

47 [As in 3.22, art. 42 (on the maximum interval between meetings of the krai / oblast committees and the central committee of national communist party)]

48 [As in 3.22, art. 43 (on party organizations of national and other oblast and autonomous republics; cross reference is changed to 'Section v')]

## **VI OKRUG PARTY ORGANIZATIONS**

49 [New] Okrug party organizations are formed in oblast, krajs, and republics that have okrugs.

The highest organ of the okrug party organization is the okrug party conference, which is convened by the okrug committee at least every year

and a half. An extraordinary conference is convened either by the decision of the okrug committee or upon the demand of one-third of the general membership of the organizations within the okrug organization.

The okrug conference hears and approves the reports of the okrug committee, revision commission, and other okrug party organizations, elects the okrug party committee, revision commission and delegates to oblast / krai conferences or congresses of the communist party of a union republic.

50 [New] The okrug committee elects a bureau composed of not less than nine persons and four secretaries of the okrug committee, including the first secretary, second secretary, cadres secretary, propaganda secretary. Secretaries must have three years' party membership. The secretaries of the okrug committee are approved by the oblast committee, krai committee, central committee of the communist party of a union republic.

51 [New] The okrug committee organizes various party bodies within the boundaries of the okrug and leads their activity; appoints the editorial board of the okrug party organ, which works under its leadership and supervision; leads party groups in non-party organizations; organizes enterprises of social significance for the okrug; allocates party personnel and funds; manages the okrug party treasury.

## **VII CITY AND RAION (CITY AND RURAL) PARTY ORGANIZATIONS**

52 [As in 3.22, art. 44 (on the city, raion conference)]

53 [Revises 3.22, arts. 45–46] The city / raion committee elects a bureau of seven to nine persons and three secretaries of the party city / raion committee. Secretaries of city / raion committees must have at least three years' party service. Secretaries of the city and raion committee are confirmed by the oblast committee / krai committee / central committee of the communist party of a union republic.

54 [Revises 3.22, art. 46] The city / raion committee organizes and approves primary party organizations in enterprises, sovkhozes, MTSS, kolkhozes and institutions; conducts the registration of all Communists; organizes various party bodies within the limits of the city or raion and guides their activities; appoints the editors of the city / raion organ, which works under its control; guides party groups in non-party organizations; organizes enterprises that have social significance for the city / raion; allocates within the limits of the city / raion, party personnel and funds; and

manages the city / raion treasury. The city / raion committee reports on its activities to the krai / oblast committee or to the central committee of a communist party of a union republic at the time and in the form established by the Central Committee of the VKP(b).

55 [New] The plenum of the city / raion committee is convened at least once every month and a half.

56 [As in 3.22, art. 47 (on the formation of raion organizations in large cities)]

#### **VIII PRIMARY PARTY ORGANIZATIONS**

57 [As in 3.22, art. 48 (on the general character of the primary party organization)]

58 [Revises 3.22, art. 49] In enterprises, institutions, kolkhozes, etc., that have over one hundred members or candidate members of the party in the entire primary party organization, embracing the whole enterprise, institution, etc., party organizations may be formed in shops, units, sections, etc., with the approval of the raion / city committee or corresponding politotdel in each case.

In shop, unit, etc., organizations, and also in primary party organizations that have at least one hundred party members and candidates party groups may be formed in brigades, aggregates of enterprises.

59 [New] In large enterprises or institutions that have more than five hundred party members and candidates, a factory party committee may be formed, with the approval in all cases of the Central Committee of the VKP(b); shop party organizations in these enterprises then acquire the rights of a primary party organization.

60 [Revises 3.22, art. 50] The primary party organization links the masses of workers, peasants, and intelligentsia with the leading organs of the party. Its tasks are:

*a* agitational and organizational work among the masses for the fulfilment of party slogans and decisions, including the guidance of factory publications;

*b* recruitment of new members into the party and their political education;

*c* assistance to the raion committee, city committee, and politotdel in all its practical work;



*d* mobilization of the masses in enterprises, sovkhozes, kolkhozes, etc., for the fulfilment of the production plan, strengthening of labour discipline and development of socialist competition and shock-worker campaigns;

*e* struggle against slackness and bad management of enterprises, sovkhozes, kolkhozes, and daily concern for the improvement of the living conditions of the workers and kolkhozniks;

*f* active participation in the economic and political life of the country.

61 [New] To improve the role of primary party organizations in productive enterprises, including sovkhozes, kolkhozes, and MTSS, and the responsibility for the status of the work of these enterprises, these [primary party] organizations are empowered to supervise the activities of the administration of the enterprises.

Party organizations in people's commissariats, which cannot exercise supervision because of the special conditions of work in soviet institutions, are obliged to call attention to short-comings in the work of the institution, to take note of short-comings in the work of the people's commissariat and its individual workers, and to send its information and analysis to the Central Committee of the VKP(b) and to the leaders of the people's commissariat.

Secretaries of primary party organizations in people's commissariats are approved by the Central Committee of the VKP(b).

All Communists who are workers in the central apparatus of a people's commissariat belong to a single party organization for the entire people's commissariat.

62 [Revises 3.22, art. 51] For the conduct of current work, the primary party organization elects for one year a party bureau consisting of not more than eleven persons.

Bureaus of primary party organizations are formed in party organizations that have at least fifteen party members.

In party organizations that have less than fifteen members and candidates bureaus are not formed, but a secretary of the primary party organization is elected.

To promote the rapid training and education of party members in the spirit of collective leadership, shop party organizations that have at least fifteen and not over one hundred members are granted the right to elect a bureau of the shop party organization, consisting of three to five persons,



and in organizations that have over one hundred members, a bureau of five to seven persons.

In primary party organizations that have up to one thousand members there are two or three paid [party] workers, and in organizations that have [from 1000] up to three thousand or more members there are four to five comrades who have been released from production.

Secretaries of primary party organizations and shop party organizations must have at least one year's party membership.

#### **IX THE PARTY AND THE KOMSOMOL**

63 [New] The Komsomol carries on its work under the guidance of the VKP(b). The Central Committee of the Komsomol, the leading organ of the Komsomol, is subordinated to the Central Committee of the VKP(b). The work of the local organs of the Komsomol is directed and controlled by the corresponding republic, krai, oblast, city, and raion party organizations.

64 [New] Members of the Komsomol who become members and candidates of the party leave the Komsomol at the moment they enter the party if they do not occupy leading posts in the Komsomol organization.

65 [New] The Komsomol is the active assistant of the party in all aspects of state and economic construction. Komsomol organizations must be in deed the active executor of party directives in all areas of socialist construction, especially where there is no primary party organization.

66 [New] Komsomol organizations have the right to broad initiative in discussing and submitting to the appropriate party organizations all problems in the work of enterprises, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and institutions with respect to the aim of eliminating short-comings in their operations and providing them with the assistance needed to improve work, organize socialist competition, conduct mass campaigns, etc.

#### **X PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE RED ARMY, NAVY, AND IN TRANSPORT**

67 [Revises 3.22, art. 52] Leadership of party work in the Worker-Peasant Red Army is exercised by the Political Administration of the Worker-Peasant Red Army, which functions with the rights of the Military Section of the Central Committee of the VKP(b). The same system prevails in the Worker-Peasant Navy and also in transport: the Political Administration of the Navy and the Political Administration of Transport function with the

rights of the Navy Section and Transport Section, respectively, of the Central Committee.

The Political Administration of the Worker-Peasant Red Army, Political Administration of the Navy and Political Administration of Transport exercise their leadership through politotdels, military committees, party organs, and party commissions which they prescribe and which are elected by appropriate army, navy, and railroad conferences.

Party organizations in the Red Army, Navy, and transport function on the basis of special instructions which are approved by the Central Committee of the VKP(b).

68 [Revises 3.22, art. 53] The commander of the political administration of a [military] okrug, fleet, or army must have five years' party membership; a commander of a politotdel of a division or brigade, three years'.

69 [Revises 3.22, art. 54] Political organs [in the armed forces] must maintain close ties with local party committees by means of constant participation by the leaders of political organs and military committees in the local party committees and also by the systematic hearing by the party committees of the reports of the commanders of political organs and military committees on political work in military units and politotdels in transport.

#### **XI PARTY GROUPS IN NON-PARTY ORGANIZATIONS**

70 [As in 3.22, art. 55 (on the formation of party groups in non-party organizations)]

71 [Revises 3.22, art. 56] Party groups are subordinate to the appropriate party organizations (Central Committee of the VKP(b), central committee of communist parties of union republics, krai, oblast, okrug, city, raion committee).

Party groups are bound to strict and undeviating obedience to the decisions of the leading party organs in all questions.

#### **XII PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF PARTY DISCIPLINE**

72 [Revises 3.22, art. 58] The preservation of party unity, the ruthless struggle with the smallest manifestations of double dealing, factional struggle and schism, the maintenance of party and state discipline are the first obligation of all party members and all party organizations.

72 [As in 3.22, art. 59 (on the fulfilment of party and state decisions)]

74 [New] In cases of the violation of party or state discipline, the revival or toleration of double dealing or factionalism on the part of members of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), the Central Committee of the VKP(b) has the right to expel them from membership in the Central Committee of the VKP(b), and, as an extreme measure, expulsion from the party.

To apply such extreme measures to members and candidate members of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), a plenum of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) must be convened, with all candidate members invited. If such a general meeting of the most responsible leaders of the party recognizes by a two-thirds vote the necessity of expelling a member of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) from membership in the Central Committee of the VKP(b) or from the party, such a measure must be taken at once.

### XIII THE FINANCIAL MEANS OF THE PARTY

75 [As in 3.22, art. 61 (on the sources of financial support)]

76 [As in 3.22, art. 62 (the scale of party dues; with the addition of the sentence: 'The scale of membership dues for party members and candidates who do not have a set salary is defined by the Central Committee of the VKP(b)')]

77 [As in 3.22; art. 63 (on initiation dues)]

*Pravda*, 21, 22 March 1939

*KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh v*, 334–97



## 3.34

### **On the Organization of Fighting in the Rear of German Troops**

18 July 1941

In the war with fascist Germany, which has seized part of the Soviet territory, fighting in the rear of the German army has assumed exceptionally important significance. The task is to create unbearable conditions for the German interventionists, to disorganize their communications, transport, and even military units, to upset all their arrangements, to destroy the brigands and their collaborators, to assist by all means the formation of

mounted and infantry partisan detachments, diversionist, and fighting groups, to develop a network of our bolshevik underground organizations on occupied territory for the direction of all activities against the fascist occupiers. In all of this we have the support in each city and hamlet of hundreds and thousands of our brothers and friends who have fallen under the heel of the German fascists and await our assistance in the organization of forces for the struggle with the occupiers.

In order to give the whole struggle in the rear of the German troops the widest scope and combative activity, it is necessary for the leaders themselves of the republic, oblast, and raion party and soviet organizations to undertake organization of this matter. In the districts occupied by the Germans they must personally head up this cause, head up the groups and detachments of selfless fighters, who are already waging the struggle to disorganize enemy troops and to destroy the brigands ... [Ellipsis in Soviet source.]

The Central Committee of the VKP(b) demands that the central committees of national communist parties, oblast committees, and raion committees in oblasts and raions that have been seized or are threatened by seizure institute the following measures:

- 1 For the organization of underground communist cells and the leadership of the partisan movement and diversionist struggle in the districts that have been seized by the enemy, the most steadfast leading party, soviet, and Komsomol workers must be assigned and also comrades who are devoted to Soviet power and who know the conditions in the districts to which they are assigned.

- 2 In districts that are threatened by seizure by the enemy the leaders or party organizations must quickly organize underground cells.

To secure a high level of development of the partisan movement in the rear of the enemy party, organizations must quickly organize combat detachments and diversionist groups from among the participants in the civil war and from those comrades who have already been in fighting battalions, detachments of the people's levy, and others ... [Ellipsis in Soviet source.]

- 3 Under the personal leadership of their first secretary, party organizations must detach for the formation and leadership of the partisan movement experienced fighters and persons who are devoted to our party to

the end, who are personally known to the leaders of the party organization in the conduct of the comradely cause.

4 ... [Ellipsis in Soviet source] The Central Committee of the VKP(b) demands that the leaders of party organizations personally lead the entire struggle in the rear of the German troops, so that they inspire by their personal example, bravery, and self-sacrifice, people who are devoted to Soviet power in this struggle, so that this whole struggle attains the scope of direct, high-level, and heroic support for the Red Army, which is fighting on the front with German fascism.

*KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh* VI, 23–4

### 3.35

#### **On the Selection of Members of the VKP(b) for the Leadership of Political Work in the Worker-Peasant Red Army**

10 November 1941

1 To oblige oblast committees, krai committees of the VKP(b), and central committees of union republics to select and place at the disposal of the Main Political Administration of the Worker-Peasant Red Army 2600 members of the VKP(b) for duty in the political staff of the Worker-Peasant Red Army.

2 To select from the leading workers of party, Komsomol, soviet, trade union, and economic organizations who are not over 45 years of age, whose health is suitable for service in the Worker-Peasant Red Army and who have experience in party political work and have been through a military training school.

3 Work on selection will be conducted from 15 to 25 November 1941.

Candidates who are selected will be approved by the bureau of the oblast committees, krai committees, and central committees of the communist parties of union republics and will be dispatched on 30 November 1941 to military courses in places that will be designated by order of the Main Political Administration of the Worker-Peasant Red Army.

Decisions of oblast committees, krai committees, and central committees of union republics together with the personal dossiers of those selected (cadres accounting certificate, autobiography, party references) will be sent to the Main Political Administration of the Worker-Peasant Red Army.

4 To oblige the Main Political Administration of the Worker-Peasant Red Army to conduct a military training course of one to two months for those party members selected for political work in the army.

*KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh* VI, 34–5

### 3.36

#### **On Deficiencies in Political Work among the Populace of the Western Oblasts of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic**

27 September 1944

The re-establishment of Soviet control over areas occupied by the Germans during the Second World War posed special problems for the party, which have not been dealt with very fully in published decisions. The problem of anti-Soviet, anti-communist feelings in the populace was especially difficult in the borderlands that had been taken by the USSR following the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939. In these areas resistance, including small-scale guerrilla operations, continued until well after the war.

The most revealing party decision concerning this problem, published here, was secret in the USSR until 1971. At the time it was originally authorized the German forces had been pushed back from the western Ukraine for only a short time. The area had been a part of inter-war Poland and had been the seat of the most active Ukrainian nationalism at that time and during the war, when Ukrainian nationalists from the western regions were able to move into the central Ukraine behind the German forces. In attacking the Ukrainian nationalists it is natural that party propaganda should try to associate them with the Germans, and indeed numerous Ukrainians did welcome the Germans who, however, did not utilize their opportunity to support organized Ukrainian nationalism. Indeed, many of the ‘Ukrainian-German’ nationalists castigated in this resolution fought an unequal battle against both German and Soviet forces.

As for the party officials in this area that are castigated in the resolution, their shortcomings are in many ways excusable. They faced a substantially hostile populace, including desperate armed bands. Small wonder that the propagandists were reluctant to venture into the countryside. Here collectivization had never been popular and to say, as the resolution does, that the Soviet regime was ‘returning’ the land to the peasants following German occupation was not very convincing. As for the intelligentsia, it had been the main basis of Ukrainian anti-Soviet nationalism, and was not to be easily attracted to the new regime. Much of this social group perished or emigrated.

The relation of this episode to Kremlin politics deserves note, because it appears that somebody, perhaps Malenkov, was out to blacken the record of N.S. Khrushchev. Although only lower-level party officials in the Ukraine were named in the document, Khrushchev had been the supreme party official in the Ukraine since 1938, and he was ultimately responsible for short-comings in party work there. He had played an active role in the sovietization of the western oblasts before the war with Germany, and it is safe to assume that this was one of his main concerns in September of 1944. At this point this sensitive and newly liberated area had to be secured as a base for further Red Army advances, and Khrushchev's first priority task (as the ranking political representative with this front) was to see to the establishment of political security.

The sense that the resolution was motivated by Kremlin politics is enhanced by the fact that it issued from the Secretariat in Moscow, while Khrushchev was off in the Ukraine, and a number of the criticisms were rather contrived. Not only was it unreasonable to expect that much party work could have been conducted in the hostile rural areas so soon after their entry by Soviet forces, it bordered on the preposterous to castigate the Lvov oblast committee for failing to publish a large run of a newspaper in the format of *Pravda*. Newsprint was exceedingly short in the whole USSR at this time, and the damaged transport facilities to this relatively remote area surely could not give much priority to such items while the Red Army was still heavily engaged. Finally, the indication that this critique was backed by party secretary G.F. Alexandrov suggests leadership rivalry. This ideological specialist appears to have been a Malenkov client, and as such came under attack by Zhdanov, who was Malenkov's main rival in the early post-war years. Alexandrov was dropped from high office in 1955 when Khrushchev was advancing his own career, and presumably could remember this affair of 1944.

Having heard the reports of the director of the propaganda section of the central committee of the KP(b)U [Ukrainian Communist Party (bolsheviks)], Comrade Litvin, on the status of political work among the populace of the western regions of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the secretary of the Lvov oblast committee of the KP(b)U, Comrade Grushevsky, and the secretary of the Ternopol oblast committee of the KP(b)U, Comrade Kompanets, on political work among the population of Lvov and Ternopol oblasts of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the communication of the head of the Propaganda and Agitation Section of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), Comrade Alexandrov, the Central Committee ascertains the presence of major deficiencies in political work among the populace of the western oblasts of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

A serious mistake of the party organizations of the western regions of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is the underestimation of political work among the masses, the slowness and organizational weakness in the development of mass political work among the populace, especially in the village. Party organizations have not systematically provided the populace with information on military-political and international events, and they have been weak in explaining to the toilers the basis of the Soviet order.

Political work among the youth is entirely unsatisfactory. Oblast and raion committees have utilized insufficiently all the means for the ideological-political education of the toilers that the party and Soviet state have at their disposal. Political discussions and reports are rarely held among the populace of the cities and towns of the western oblasts of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The populace of these oblasts is inadequately supplied with political, artistic, and scientific literature for political work. The radio is poorly utilized for political work among the populace. The populace rarely sees our films. The party organizations of the western oblasts of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic do not take into account that now, when it is necessary quickly to liquidate the vestiges of the German fascist occupation, weakness in political work among the populace and intelligentsia is especially intolerable.

A major inadequacy in the work of party organizations of the western oblasts of the Ukraine is their poor development of work concerning the measures that the Soviet state has taken to re-establish Soviet order and law in the territories that have been liberated from the fascist brigands. In their political work with the populace party organizations inadequately utilize the fact that the land has been returned to the toiling peasantry – land that the Soviet state had allotted to them before the war and the German brigands had taken from the peasants. The measures taken by the Soviet state for the creation of normal living conditions for the liberated populace in districts that were occupied by the Germans is poorly elucidated in printed and oral propaganda.

A serious omission of party organizations of the western oblasts of the Ukraine is their inadequate work in denouncing fascist ideology and the activity of agents of the German brigands, the Ukrainian-German nationalists who are hostile to the people and who in recent times were active in distributing significant numbers of anti-Soviet newspapers, brochures, and leaflets, and in spreading provocational rumours. In many villages no reports and discussions concerning the anti-popular fascist activity of the nationalists are conducted. In a series of raions there has recently been a weakening of work in the dissemination to the populace of the appeals of the Ukrainian government to participants in the UNRA [Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army] and UPA [Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army]. The instruction of communists, Komsomols, intelligentsia, and agitators on questions of the ideological-political struggle



against the Ukrainian-German nationalists is poorly organized. A portion of party and soviet workers have formed the opinion that the struggle against the subversive activity of the Ukrainian-German nationalists is the concern of military and administrative organs alone. Oblast and raion committees do not take into account in their work that it is especially impermissible to underestimate the ideological-political struggle against nationalism in the western oblasts of the Ukraine where the populace and the intelligentsia were for decades educated in the spirit of bourgeois ideology and have lived under Soviet power for only a year and a half.

The oblast and raion committees of the KP(b)U of the western oblasts of the Ukraine are carrying on work among the intelligentsia in an unsatisfactory fashion. Work on the marxist education of the intelligentsia, a significant part of which was educated in German, Austro-Hungarian, Polish, and Rumanian schools in the spirit of bourgeois ideology, is poorly organized. Instruction concerning the achievements of socialist culture in the Soviet Union and the interpretation of the role of the intelligentsia in the Soviet state is not organized. The better part of the intelligentsia is not sufficiently attracted to political work among the populace and to ideological struggle against fascist nationalist ideology. Party organizations of the western oblasts of the Ukraine overlook the fact that, without the education of intelligentsia in a Soviet spirit and without attracting it to active participation in state and cultural construction, it is impossible to settle the task that confronts party and soviet organizations in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Party organizations of the western oblasts of the Ukraine commit a major error in underestimating the role of the newspaper as an important centre of political work among the masses. Newspapers are run in an unsatisfactory way. The press run and format of newspapers often are arbitrarily curtailed. In many raions newspapers are not published at all, nor are daily Sovinformburo summary leaflets issued. The newspaper of the Lvov oblast committee of the KP(b)U, *Vil'na Ukraina* (Free Ukraine), is especially unsatisfactory. Thus the press is utilized as a potent means of ideological-political education of the toilers in an entirely unsatisfactory way.

The propaganda and agitation section of the central committee of the KP(b)U displays slowness in the matter of the education of the propaganda apparatus of the oblast and raion committees, the restoration of the

publication of newspapers, and the establishment of cultural-educational institutions in the western oblasts of the Ukraine.

The Central Committee of the VKP(b) resolves:

1 To propose to the central committee of the KP(b)U and the oblast committees of the KP(b)U that they take the measures that are necessary to eliminate the serious deficiencies in ideological and mass political work of party organizations of the western oblasts of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, as specified in the present resolution;

To consider that the first priority and most important task of party organizations of the western oblasts of the Ukraine is the development of political work among the masses in every way and, especially in the villages, the increase of the political activity of communists; to propose to party organizations that they provide to the populace of the city and countryside timely information on military-political and international events, the dissemination of the Constitution of the USSR, the rights and obligations of Soviet citizens; to organize political reports and discussions in every village, in every enterprise, and in every institution conducted by party and soviet workers; to provide daily publication of Sovinformburo summary leaflets; to restore radio broadcasting and to broadcast political news and the contents of newspapers; to take steps to see that the populace is regularly shown Soviet artistic and documentary films.

2 To propose to the central committee of the KP(b)U and party organizations of the western oblasts of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic that they direct political work among the populace toward the strengthening of the Soviet order by all means. Party organizations are obliged to utilize all forms of political work for the enhanced solidarity of the toilers of the western oblasts of the Ukraine in support of Soviet power and the education of broad strata of the Soviet aktiv, and for the mobilization of the toilers to fulfil obligations toward the government, to give aid to the front, and to restore the economic, social, and cultural-educational institutions destroyed by the German occupation. Party organizations must educate workers in the spirit of a socialist attitude to social labour and public property, in the spirit of strict observance of state discipline.

3 To oblige party organizations of the western oblasts of the Ukraine to strengthen the political and ideological struggle against the Ukrainian-German nationalists.

Party organizations must eradicate the ideology and activity of the Ukrainian-German nationalists as extremely evil foes of the Ukrainian people, as watch dogs of the hitlerite imperialists; they must show the populace that these very enemies of the Ukrainian people wreck the restoration of a normal life for the populace of the western oblasts of the Ukraine.

In the press and all agitational propaganda work, party organizations must utilize to a high degree the facts concerning the evil acts of the German fascist brigands and their lackeys, the Ukrainian-German nationalists, to explain to the populace that only the Soviet state, which is founded on the friendship of peoples, provides the toilers of the western oblasts of the Ukraine with real freedom, material well-being, and rapid improvement of cultural level.

4 To propose to the central committee of the KP(b)U and party organizations of the western oblasts of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic that they organize ideological political work among the urban and rural intelligentsia, and that they attract them to active participation in state, economic, and cultural construction. They must systematically conduct meetings of the intelligentsia at which reports are given on the Fatherland War and international events, on the life of the Soviet Union, on the achievements of socialist culture, and the work of the Soviet intelligentsia. They must organize for the intelligentsia lectures and meetings on the history and theory of the Bolshevik Party, the history of the USSR and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, marxist-leninist philosophy, questions of literature and art.

To carry out ideological-political work successfully among the intelligentsia of the western oblasts of the Ukraine, the necessary number of workers in the fields of science and culture must be sent from the eastern Ukraine on standing assignments to academic bodies and cultural-educational institutions.

5 To propose to the central committee of the KP(b)U, the oblast, and raion committees of the KP(b)U Of the western oblasts of the Ukraine that they adopt measures for the decisive improvement of political work among the youth, the strengthening of educational work in the Komsomol, the creation of new Komsomol organizations; to raise the level of activity of Komsomol organizations and their ideological-political influence on the broad masses of youth. Party and Komsomol organizations of the western oblasts of the

Ukraine are obliged to attract the youth to active participation in the struggle against Ukrainian-German nationalists, in the work of restoring the economy, in the restoration and normalization of work in the schools, children's homes [Young Pioneer centres], and extra-school institutions. City and raion committees of the KP(b)U must detach preparatory members of the party for lectures, reports, and discussions among the youth and to lead Komsomol political circles.

6 To oblige the central committee of the KP(b)U and the oblast committees of the party in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to restore the regular publication of oblast newspapers with the press runs that have been set for them and to provide for the conversion of the newspapers into the most important centres of political work among the masses. Newspapers are obliged to elucidate on a broad scale the life of the Soviet Ukraine and other republics of the USSR, to educate the toilers in the spirit of the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, to elucidate the course of the restoration of the economy and development of culture of the western oblasts of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Oblast newspapers must systematically print material for the assistance of agitators and articles on questions of marxist-leninist theory. Party organizations are obliged to provide for the delivery on schedule to the populace of newspapers, utilizing newspapers on a broad scale for political work among the toilers.

7 To take note that one of the existing causes of neglect of political work among the populace of Lvov oblast is the underestimation by the Lvov oblast committee of the role of newspapers as very strong means for the ideological-political education of the toilers. The Lvov oblast committee has belittled the role of oblast newspapers, making them in fact leaflets that are issued with a small press run.

To oblige the Lvov oblast committee of the KP(b)U to correct rapidly the state of affairs with respect to the editing of the oblast newspaper *Vil'na Ukraina*.

To set the press run for the Lvov oblast newspaper *Vil'na Ukraina* at 40,000 copies with the four-page format of the newspaper *Pravda*.

8 To propose to the central committee of the KP(b)U that it extend substantial assistance to the party organizations of the western oblast of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in the development of ideological-political work; to supply oblast, city, and raion committees of the KP(b)U in

the near future with cadres of party workers, propagandists, and editors of newspapers, to undertake the necessary steps to re-establish the work of radio, cinema, and cultural-educational institutions.

*KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh* VI, 124–9

### 3.37

#### **On Agitation and Propaganda Work of Party Organizations in Connection with the Adoption of the Law on the Five-Year Plan for the Restoration and Development of the National Economy of the USSR in the Period 1946–50**

27 March 1946

1 The Central Committee of the VKP(b) advises party organizations to develop broadly their mass political work in acquainting all working people with the Law on the Five-Year Plan for the Restoration and Development of the National Economy of the USSR in the Period 1946–50, in explaining to the working people the tasks of the post-war Five-Year Plan and in mobilizing Soviet people for the struggle to fulfil and overfulfil the new Five-Year Plan. The Central Committee of VKP(b) proceeds from the assumption that this job is not one of a short-term campaign, but will comprise a most important integral part of the party's agitation and propaganda work in the forthcoming period.

Party organizations must explain to the working people that the realization of the Five-Year Plan can be achieved only by fulfilling and overfulfilling current economic plans. A most important task of party organizations consists in developing the struggle for the fulfilment and overfulfilment of the plan for 1946, of the quarterly and monthly plans by each republic and oblast, by each branch of the economy, by all plants, factories, construction sites, mines, and railroads. Party organizations in the village must struggle for the success and high quality of all agricultural work in 1946, for an increase in yields and in the productivity of animal husbandry at each kolkhoz and sovkhoz, in each raion and oblast, which will constitute a serious contribution to fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan and to raising the living standards of the working people.

Party organizations must systematically explain to all working people that successful fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan, a further strengthening of the might of the socialist state and an increase in the material well-being of Soviet people depends on their efforts, on the intensive and selfless labour of each Soviet person at his job during the forthcoming Five-Year Plan.

The Central Committee of the VKP(b) advises all party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations to develop on a broad basis socialist competition among the working people, competition between enterprises, kolkhozes, villages, cities, raions, oblasts, krais, and republics for fulfilment and overfulfilment of the annual, quarterly, and monthly plans for 1946, for a most rapid restoration of the economy in areas that suffered from the German occupation, for a steady increase in labour productivity and for the successful realization of the Five-Year Plan.

The Central Committee of the VKP(b) will judge the work of each party organization by the way it is able to rally workers, peasants, and intelligentsia to the cause of realizing the Five-Year Plan and to assure the fulfilment and overfulfilment of current economic plans.

2 Oblast and krai committees of the VKP(b) and the central committees of union republic communist parties are obliged:

*a* to conduct meetings of city and raion party aktivs and meetings of primary party organizations devoted to the Five-Year Plan for the restoration and development of the economy of the USSR in the period 1946–50;

*b* to conduct meetings of workers at enterprises, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, MTSS, at institutions and in the villages to discuss reports on the tasks of the working people in fulfilling the Five-Year Plan. Leading party, Soviet, and economic functionaries are to present the reports at these meetings. The reports, along with explaining the basic tasks of the Five-Year Plan for restoration and development of the economy of the USSR, must summon the working people to fulfil the regular tasks that confront the given enterprises, kolkhozes, and sovkhozes, MTSS and institutions;

*c* conduct urban meetings of workers in the sciences in cities and also meetings at scientific and educational institutions to discuss the tasks of workers in the sciences in fulfilling the Five-Year Plan;

*d* to organize for the working people lectures, reports and talks on the new Five-Year Plan dealing with the following topics: the basic tasks of the

Five-Year Plan for the restoration and development of the economy of the USSR; the plan for the development of industry and transport in the new Five-Year Plan; the plan for the development of the agriculture of the USSR in the period 1946–50; raising the material and cultural level of the life of the peoples as a most important task of the 1946–50 Five-Year Plan; the Five-Year Plan for the restoration and development of the economy of the union republics; the basic economic task of the USSR; the paths for completing the construction of the socialist society and the gradual transition from socialism to communism in the USSR; the role of Soviet science in the struggle for a further flowering of our homeland.

In the reports, lectures, and talks it is necessary to set forth both the general tasks of the Five-Year Plan as well as the concrete tasks of the particular branches of the economy of the individual republics, oblasts, raions, and enterprises.

Party organizations are advised to organize the meticulous instructing of persons who are to give reports and of agitators who will be assigned to give reports and talks on the Five-Year Plan;

*e* to organize study of the new Five-Year Plan by all party members and candidate members and to organize consultations at party offices to help Communists who are engaged in studying the Five-Year Plan on their own. To conduct lectures and talks at party schools, political schools and circles on the Five-Year Plan for the development of the economy in the period 1946–1950;

*f* to organize study of the Five-Year Plan at all higher educational institutions and at technicums.

The USSR Council of Ministers' All-Union Committee on Higher School Affairs is obliged to enlist teachers in the social sciences and economics to conduct lectures and lessons on the Five-Year Plan. The All-Union Committee on Higher School Affairs is advised to make provision in study programmes for lessons on the Five-Year Plan at technical, agricultural, and economic institutions of higher learning, for the study of the plans for the development of the various branches of the economy in conformity with the fields of special concentration of the given institutions of higher learning. Study of the plans for the development of the economy of corresponding republics, krais, and oblasts is to be included in the study program on the Five-Year Plan at higher educational institutions and technicums.

3 Editorial boards of newspapers and journals are advised to publish regularly propaganda articles and materials on the basic sections of the Five-Year Plan, and also to devote widespread coverage to the course of the socialist competition of the working people to fulfil and overfulfil the Five-Year Plan. The newspapers must explain to the working people daily the general tasks of the Five-Year Plan for the restoration and development of the economy, and also the tasks confronting individual republics, krais, oblasts, raions, and enterprises. It is necessary to show from day to day, on the basis of concrete examples and facts, the practical fulfilment of production plans in all branches of the country's economy, to disseminate widely the experience of the front-runners in socialist competition, to popularize the best methods of organizing production and the latest achievements of science and technology that provide an increase in labour productivity. Together with propagandizing the work experience of leading enterprises and kolkhozes, the newspapers must criticize boldly the shortcomings in the work of enterprises and kolkhozes that are lagging behind.

4 The Russian Republic Association of State Publishing Houses is obliged to publish the 'Law on the Five-Year Plan for the Restoration and Development of the National Economy of the USSR for the Period 1946–50' as a separate book in an edition of 5,000,000 copies.

The central committees of union republic communist parties and the oblast party committees of the autonomous republics are assigned the task of publishing the text of the law on the Five-Year Plan as a separate book in the languages of the peoples of the USSR. The Propaganda and Agitation Administration of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) is assigned the task of confirming the publication of the text of the law in the proper-sized edition by the local publishing houses.

5 The Propaganda and Agitation Administration of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) is assigned the task of sending propaganda groups of the department – including qualified lecturers, higher school teachers, and scientific cadres of the capital – on official travel for periods of two months to the union republics, the autonomous republics, and the krais and oblasts of the Russian Republic to aid oblast and krai party committees and the central committees of the union republic communist parties in explaining the law on the Five-Year Plan to the working people.

It is recommended that the central committees of union republic communist parties send their own propaganda groups to help oblast party



committees in organizing mass political work in connection with the adoption of the law on the Five-Year Plan.

*Resheniia partii i pravitel'stva  
po khoziaistvennym voprosam  
(1917–1967 gg.), III (Moscow,  
1968), 320–3*

*KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh* VI, 150–3

### 3.38

#### **On the Training and Retraining of Leading Party and Soviet Workers**

2 August 1946

The enormous number of new party members at the end of the war, owing to terrible casualties and rapid growth in party membership, undoubtedly led to a situation that was highly unsatisfactory to party ideologists. No doubt many of the persons in positions of responsibility, not to mention the rank and file of party members, had only the scantiest political indoctrination. The drive to remedy this situation was one of the few major campaigns that the party apparatus undertook in the post-war years, when Stalin seems not to have entrusted the party with very much top-level responsibility. Considering that the question of training and retraining was largely a concern of 'agitprop,' it is safe to assume that the program described in the following document was primarily the responsibility of Zhdanov, who had the main responsibility in this field after the war.

This resolution has never been published in full.

The VKP(b) Central Committee recognizes that the training and retraining of leading party and soviet workers is in an unsatisfactory state.

The training of party and soviet workers is not done with the requisite system and order. The drive is for a quantity of various party schools and courses, to the detriment of the quality of the training of party cadres. Instead of concentrating the training of party and soviet cadres in the country's principal centres, where staffs of skilled teachers are available, a number of short-term schools and courses have been set up, a considerable part of which lack trained teachers.

The curriculums of the party schools in the oblast and krai committees and the central committees of the union republic communist parties are overloaded with a large quantity of subjects, and the participants do not have time for the independent study of marxist-leninist theory. The staffing of these schools and courses is frequently a random affair and is done through levies on the local party organizations. Persons are enrolled in party

schools without any preliminary verification of their knowledge. The party schools whose job it is to train leading party cadres frequently accept persons with no experience in party work and who lack the necessary party maturity, or else persons who have not proven themselves in practical work. The result of these major short-comings in the work of party schools has been that a considerable part of their graduates are poorly prepared for leading positions in party organizations.

The retraining of leading party and soviet cadres is badly organized. Many party and soviet workers have stopped any systematic effort to improve their ideological and theoretical acquirements, and for years have not been posted to retraining courses. There is no procedure for sending leading party and soviet cadres back for retraining after a stated interval.

The training of the party's theoretical cadres is also unsatisfactory. The party is undergoing an acute shortage of theoreticians both in the centre and at the local level. Many propaganda sections, sections of leading party organs, many departments in higher educational institutions, many scientific-research institutions and scientific journals do not possess qualified workers in marxism-leninism, economics, law, international relations, history, philosophy – and this hampers further work on contemporary problems of marxist-leninist theory ...

In order to raise substantially the political and theoretical level of leading party and soviet workers, the Central Committee of the VKP(b) considers it necessary that in the next three to four years the basic leading party and soviet cadres of the republic, krai, oblast, city, and raion levels be included in party schools and courses for the training and retraining of party and soviet workers.

The VKP(b) Central Committee resolves:

## **I THE HIGHER PARTY SCHOOL**

A Higher Party School with a three-year course for training leading party and soviet workers at the oblast, krai, and republic levels is to be instituted in the VKP(b) Central Committee, under the immediate direction of the Cadres Administration. The school is to have two faculties: party and soviet. The faculty for party workers is to have the following divisions: a division for organizational-party workers, one for propaganda workers, and one for newspaper editors. The Higher Party School is to be organized on

the basis of the present Higher School for Party Organizers of the Central Committee of the VKP(b).

For retraining party and soviet workers the Higher Party School is to organize nine-month retraining courses for: *a* / leading party workers – secretaries and section chiefs of oblast and krai committees and central committees of union-republic communist parties, secretaries of the okrug and city committees of large cities; *b* / leading soviet workers – the chairman, deputy-chairmen, and section chiefs of oblast and krai executive committees, the chairmen and deputy-chairmen of the councils of ministers of union republics and autonomous republics, the executive committee chairmen of the city soviets in large cities; *c* / the editors and deputy-editors of oblast, krai, and republic newspapers.

Attendance at the VKP(b) Central Committee Higher Party School is confirmed at the level of 300 persons in each year, and in the school's retraining courses at the level of 600 persons ...

The following departments are to be formed in the Higher Party School: history of the VKP(b), history of the USSR, general history, political economy, dialectical and historical materialism, logic, international relations, the Soviet economy, party construction, state law and soviet construction, journalism, foreign languages ...

## **II THE REPUBLIC, KRAI AND OBLAST PARTY SCHOOLS**

1 In the VKP(b) oblast and krai committees and the central committees of the union-republic communist parties there are to be oblast, krai, and republic party schools with a two-year course for training leading party and soviet workers at the raion and village level. These schools are to have the following faculties: party and soviet. The party faculty is to have the following divisions: a division for organizational party personnel, one for propaganda workers, and one for leading Komsomol workers ...

For retraining party and soviet workers the oblast, krai, and republic party schools are to organize six-month retraining courses for: *a* / leading raion party and soviet workers – secretaries, section chiefs, instructors and propagandists of the raion, city, uezd, and okrug party committees; chairmen, deputy-chairmen, and section chiefs of the executive committees of raion, city, uezd, and okrug soviets of toilers' deputies; secretaries of raion and city Komsomol committees; editors of raion and city newspapers; *b* / lower-level party and soviet workers – secretaries of primary party

organizations and chairmen of village soviets, volost party organizers and chairmen of volost executive committees (in the Baltic Soviet republics)...

### **III THE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

An Academy of Social Sciences for training the party's theoretical workers is to be instituted in the VKP(b) Central Committee, under the direction of Propaganda and Agitation Administration.

It is established that the VKP(b) Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences is the educational institution that trains theoretical workers for the central party institutions, the central committees of the union-republic communist parties, krai and oblast committees of the VKP(b), and also qualified instructors for higher educational institutions, theoretical workers for scholarly research institutions and scholarly journals. The Academy of Social Sciences will train theoretical workers in the following specialties: political economy, the economics and politics of foreign countries, the theory of state and law, international law, the history of the USSR, general history, international relations, the history of the VKP(b), dialectical and historical materialism, the history of Russian and western philosophy, logic and psychology, literature, and art.

The term of study for graduate students in the Academy is three years. The Academy of Social Sciences is to be organized on the basis of the present Higher School of the Central Committee of the VKP(b).

The Academy of Social Sciences will have the following departments: political economy, the economics and politics of foreign countries, the theory of state and law, international law, history of the USSR, universal history, international relations, history of the VKP(b), dialectical and historical materialism, history of philosophy, logic and psychology, literary theory and history, the theory and history of art, foreign languages.

The Academy of Social Sciences will have 300 graduate students in attendance (in all three years)...

The basic method for training graduate students in the Academy is individual scholarly research in the sciences relating the specialty selected by the graduate student under the guidance of his professors, the study of a foreign language, written reports by the graduate student on social science questions connected with the dissertation topic selected, with subsequent discussion of the reports in the departments and seminars under the direction of the professors.

The departments of the Academy of Social Sciences have the right to accept for defence dissertations submitted for the academic degree of candidate of sciences by graduate students and scientific associates of the Academy, and to award the academic degree of candidate of sciences with subsequent confirmation by the Academic Council of the Academy.

The Academic Council has the right to accept for defence dissertations submitted for the academic degree of doctor of social sciences.

8 The academy of Social Sciences has permission to issue *Uchenie Zapiski* (Scholarly Transactions) and to publish separately the most valuable dissertations of graduate students as well as the works of its scholarly staff.

9 To improve the qualifications of teachers of social sciences in higher educational institutions, the Academy of Social Sciences will institute nine-month retraining courses, with an enrolment of 150, for teachers of social sciences. Graduate students who have completed the course requirements and are working on their dissertations are eligible for these courses.

1 The VKP(b) Central Committee has directed the Cadres Administration and the Propaganda Administration to select, by 1 September 1946, 600 students for the first and second years of the Higher Party School and 200 graduate students for the Academy of Social Sciences, and to submit their names for confirmation by the VKP(b) Central Committee.

Activities in the Higher Party School and the Academy of Social Sciences are to begin on 1 October 1946.

2 Oblast and krai committees and the central committees of the union-republic communist parties are forbidden to recall students of republic, krai, and oblast party schools for practical work before they have completed their studies in the schools, and also to distract them from their studies in order to fulfil various assignments.

3 The Secretariat of the Central Committee is commissioned to work out within two weeks a proposal for the material support of the school and courses for the training and retraining of party and soviet cadres.

*Partiinaia zhizn'*, no. 1 (1946)

*KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh* VI, 162–72

14 August 1946

## On the Journals *Zvezda* and *Leningrad*

Zhdanov, as the main exponent of the party as an autonomous body in the early post-war years, gave his name to the propaganda campaign for ideological purity and xenophobia in the early post-war years. The following document and also [3.41](#) represent this campaign in full flower.

The following document has not been published in full. While it appeared in the seventh edition of *KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh*, the editors of the eighth edition in 1971 evidently found it too strident and omitted it entirely.

The VKP(b) Central Committee notes that the literary-artistic journals, *Zvezda* (The Star) and *Leningrad*, published in Leningrad, are being conducted in a completely unsatisfactory manner.

Along with significant and successful works of Soviet writers, *Zvezda* has recently published a number of empty and ideologically harmful productions. *Zvezda* committed a crude error in granting a literary rostrum to the writer Zoshchenko, whose works are alien to Soviet literature. The editors of *Zvezda* are aware that Zoshchenko has long been specializing in vulgar empty writings which are devoid of content, which preach a rotten absence of moral principle, vulgarity, and an apolitical attitude, and which aim to disorient our youth and poison its consciousness. The most recent of Zoshchenko's published tales, 'The Adventures of a Monkey' (*Zvezda*, nos. 5 and 6, 1946), is a vulgar lampoon of Soviet life and Soviet people. Zoshchenko's representation of Soviet behaviour and Soviet people is a mis-shapen caricature which slanderously depicts Soviet people as primitive, uncultivated, and stupid, with philistine tastes and manners. Zoshchenko's maliciously hooligan-like depiction of our reality is accompanied by anti-Soviet sallies.

That *Zvezda* should open its pages to such literary boors and riff-raff as Zoshchenko is even less excusable in view of the fact that the *Zvezda* editorial board is well acquainted with Zoshchenko's physiognomy and with his unworthy behaviour during the war – when Zoshchenko, in no way helping the Soviet people in its struggle against the German annexationists, wrote his loathsome 'Before Sunrise,' which was appraised, like the rest of Zoshchenko's literary 'creations,' on the pages of *Bol'shevik*.

*Zvezda* has also been popularizing in every possible way the productions the writer, Akhmatova, whose literary and socio-political physiognomy has long been familiar to the Soviet public. Akhmatova is a typical representative of the sort of empty poetry, lacking in moral content, which is alien to our people. Her verse which is suffused with a spirit of

pessimism and decadence, which expresses the tastes of the old salon poetry, which came to a stop at the level of bourgeois-aristocratic aestheticism and decadence – ‘art for art’s sake’ – and which does not want to stay in step with its own people, is harmful for the education of our youth and cannot be tolerated in Soviet literature ...

What is the significance of the errors of the *Zvezda* and *Leningrad* editors?

The leading workers on these journals, and primarily their editors, Comrades Saianov and Likharev, have forgotten the Leninist doctrine that our journals, whether scientific or artistic, cannot be apolitical. They have forgotten that our journals are a powerful instrument of the Soviet state for educating Soviet people, the youth in particular, and must therefore be guided by that which constitutes the living foundation of the Soviet order – its politics. The Soviet order cannot tolerate its youth being educated in a spirit of indifference to Soviet politics, in a ‘don’t give a damn’ moral vacuum.

The strength of Soviet literature, the most progressive literature in the world, is that it has no other interests, and cannot have any other interests than the interests of the people, the interests of the state. The task of Soviet literature is to help the state educate the youth correctly, answer its inquiries, train the new generation to be bold, to believe in its cause and not to fear obstacles, to be ready to overcome any obstacles.

Therefore any doctrine which is devoid of moral content and apolitical, any ‘art for art’s sake,’ is alien to Soviet literature, is damaging to the interests of the Soviet people and state, and should have no place in our journals.

The insufficient moral awareness of the leading workers of *Zvezda* and *Leningrad* also led these persons to base their relations with literary figures not on the interests of the correct education of Soviet people or of the political guidance of the activities of these literary figures, but on personal interests – interests of friendship. Criticism was blunted by the lack of desire to spoil friendly relations. Clearly worthless productions were admitted into print because of the fear of offending friends. This sort of liberalism in which the interests of the people and the state, the interests of the correct education of our youth, are sacrificed for the sake of friendly relations, and in which criticism is muffled, lead to a situation in which

writers stop improving, lose the consciousness of their responsibility to the people, the state, the party, stop moving forward.

All of the above is evidence that the *Zvezda* and *Leningrad* editorial boards have not been equal to the job entrusted to them and have committed serious political errors in the management of these journals.

The Central Committee finds that the Board of the Union of Soviet Writers and in particular its president, Comrade Tikhonov, have taken no measures to improve the journals, *Zvezda* and *Leningrad*, and have not only failed to struggle against the harmful influence on Soviet literature exerted by Zoshchenko, Akhmatova, and other such un-Soviet writers, but have even connived at the penetration into these journals of tendencies and manners which are alien to Soviet literature.

The Leningrad city committee of the VKP(b) turned a blind eye to the major errors of these journals, failed to provide leadership, and made it possible for persons like Zoshchenko and Akhmatova who are alien to Soviet literature to occupy leading positions in the journals. What is more, although aware of the party's attitude toward Zoshchenko and his 'creations,' the Leningrad city committee (Comrades Kapustin and Shirokov), without having the right to do so, approved the new make-up of the *Zvezda* editorial board, including Zoshchenko, in its decision adopted on 26 June of this year. The Leningrad city committee thereby committed a crude political error. *Leningradskaya Pravda* committed an error in publishing Iurii German's suspiciously laudatory review of the work of Zoshchenko in its 6 July issue.

The VKP(b) Central Committee Propaganda Administration has not provided the requisite supervision of the work of the Leningrad journals.

The VKP(b) Central Committee resolves:

- 1 The editorial board of *Zvezda*, the Board of the Union of Soviet Writers, and the VKP(b) Central Committee Propaganda Administration are directed to take steps to ensure the complete elimination of the journal's errors and short-comings as pointed out in the present resolution, to straighten the journal's line, to ensure that it stays at a high ideological and artistic level, and to end the access to the journal of the works of Zoshchenko, Akhmatova, and others like them.

- 2 In view of the fact that the appropriate conditions for issuing two literary-artistic journals are not present in Leningrad at the present time,



publication of the journal, *Leningrad*, is to cease, and the literary forces of Leningrad are to be concentrated around *Zvezda*.

3 In order to introduce the necessary order into the work of the editorial board of *Zvezda* and to effect a serious improvement in the contents of the journal, the journal is to have an editor-in-chief assisted by an editorial board. The editor-in-chief of the journal bears full responsibility for the ideological-political tenor of the journal and the quality of the works published in it.

4 Comrade A.M. Egolin is appointed editor-in-chief of *Zvezda* and will retain his position as deputy-chief of the VKP(b) Central Committee Propaganda Administration.

*Pravda*, 21 August 1946

*KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh* III (7th ed.) 485–8

## Plenum of the Central Committee 21–26 February 1947

The following resolution is the only one to emerge from this rather shadowy plenum of the Central Committee. The precise dates of the session were published only in 1971, and little is known about its deliberations, except that A.A. Andreev presented a report, which was the basis for the following resolution. While Stalin was loath to convene the Central Committee in the post-war years, the agricultural crisis verged on famine in 1947, despite the misleading claims of progress offered in the resolution.

The other specific item of information about the plenum is that it elected N.S. Voznesensky, an economic planning expert, to the Politburo. He was considered a protégé of Zhdanov.

### 3.40

#### **On Measures for Improving Agriculture in the Post-war Period**

26 February 1947

As a result of the victory of the kolkhoz system and the immense job accomplished in the years of peaceful construction by our party and state on the basis of the industrialization of the country, our agriculture has been transformed from backward to advanced agriculture, to agriculture equipped with modern machinery.

The years of the Stalinist Five-Year Plans saw the solution of such basic questions as the grain problem: in 1940 the total grain harvest passed the seven billion pud mark and almost twice as much marketable grain was produced as in the year 1913. Major development was achieved in industrial crops such as cotton, flax, sugar beets, oil crops, tea, citrus fruits, and tobacco, as well as potatoes and vegetables, as a result of which our light industry gained a raw materials base of its own. Concurrently, a significant upswing in animal husbandry was achieved at kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Thanks to the increased sowing of grasses and the increase in the production of grain, a solid fodder base was laid down for the development of animal husbandry.

The upswing in agriculture has assured a growth in the communal property of the kolkhozes and in the material well-being of the kolkhoznik.

State procurements of grain, meat, fats, and other agricultural produce have been on a scale sufficient to assure the country's food and raw materials needs and to create important reserves.

Thanks to the victorious and strengthened kolkhoz system in the village, our agriculture coped successfully with its tasks during the war. If, during the difficult war years, our army suffered no shortages of food and if our population was provided with foods and our industry supplied with raw materials, it was a testimony to the strength and vitality of the kolkhoz system and to the patriotism of the kolkhoz peasantry.

Naturally the war, which was imposed on us by the German invaders, temporarily retarded the development of our socialist agriculture. Serious difficulties were created for agriculture during the Great Patriotic War. A significant portion of kolkhoz, sovkhoz, and MTS workers, tractors, horses, and motor vehicles were diverted to the army. Industry, by dint of its conversion to war needs, had to discontinue production of tractors for agriculture and considerably reduce production of farm machinery, spare parts, fertilizers, and fuel. During the war, a portion of our territory was subjected to occupation and destruction by the German invaders.

During the war years the sown area contracted, the area of fallow land being put back into cultivation on time was reduced, as was the area of autumn ploughing, and the sowing of grasses was seriously curtailed. All this could not fail to be reflected in reduced yields on kolkhozes and sovkhozes and in reductions in livestock herds and livestock productivity.

In the post-war period, the kolkhoz peasantry is successfully restoring agriculture. In 1946, despite the severe drought that seized a considerable area of the European USSR and surpassed in scope the drought of 1921, the total yield and commodity output of grain – while somewhat lower than in 1945 – were incomparably higher than the 1921 level, a situation made possible only by the socialist organization of production with its MTSS and kolkhoz system.

In the period since the end of the war, the government and the party have conducted a number of important measures for the restoration of agriculture.

For kolkhozes in the liberated areas, state aid has been organized in the form of tractors, farm machinery, motor vehicles and equipment for the MTSS, and horses and productive livestock for the kolkhozes. Major aid has been given in the form of seed and forage. Advantageous conditions have

been established for deliveries of agricultural produce to the state. Considerable work has been done in restoring communal structures and kolkhozniks' homes. All MTSS have been basically restored. These measures have made it possible by 1946 to restore as much as three-fourths of the pre-war sown area on kolkhoz and on peasant holdings in liberated areas, and more than half the livestock of kolkhozes and farmers.

The tractor plants in Stalingrad and Kharkov have been restored and are functioning and the new Altai and Vladimir tractor plants have been built; construction of the Lipetsk Tractor Plant is being completed and production of tractors has been restored at the Cheliabinsk Plant. Restoration is in progress on farm machinery plants that suffered destruction during the occupation, and many plants that were formerly engaged in war production have been converted to the production of farm machinery. During the current year our industry is to increase significantly the production of tractors and farm machinery for agriculture.

The sowing of graded seed and of grasses is being reintroduced on kolkhozes and sovkhozes; former crop rotation is being restored and new rotation introduced. As a result of the measures taken, successes have already been achieved in restoring the sown areas and raising the yields of cotton.

In accordance with the resolution adopted by the USSR Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the VKP(b), major work is being done to eliminate short-comings at kolkhozes and infractions of the kolkhoz rules.

Today, with the transition to peaceful construction, our party and state are again confronted with the full gravity of the task that is the most indispensable: to assure an upswing in agriculture that will enable us in quick order to create an abundance of food for our population and abundant raw materials for our light industry and to accumulate the necessary state food and raw materials reserves.

In order to solve this task successfully and in short order, it is necessary:

- 1 To improve the direction of agriculture on the part of party and soviet bodies, of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture, the USSR Ministry of Sovkhozes and of their local agencies. From top to bottom, the entire direction of agriculture must be raised to a higher level, a level that corresponds to the immense tasks that confront agriculture.

It is necessary to put an end to serious short-comings in the direction of agriculture such as a lack of operational effectiveness and lateness in preparing for, and in carrying out, agricultural work; it is necessary to put an end to the incorrect approach to evaluating the work of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, MTSS and raions on the basis of average figures instead of on the basis of a differentiated approach that makes it possible to see the advanced and the backward and to pull the backward up to the level of the advanced. One cannot tolerate short-comings such as attempting to substitute administrative measures, frequent replacement of kolkhoz chairmen and violations of intra-farm democracy, for regular diligent organizational work and training of cadres at kolkhozes. Regular and capable direction of agriculture is required of the executives of party, soviet, and agricultural bodies, as is the elimination of bureaucratic and formalistic methods of direction as evidenced in the assignment of tasks without making the necessary organizational provision and without overseeing fulfilment of the plan locally on a day-to-day basis.

To establish the ruling that annual plans for agriculture are to be transmitted to oblasts, krais, and republics – after confirmation by the government and the national economic plan – not later than 1 January of the year in question.

2 To eliminate completely violations of the kolkhoz rules that have been brought to light by the Central Committee of the VKP(b) and the USSR Council of Ministers, violations that take the form of improper expenditure of work days, pilfering of communal kolkhoz lands, pilfering of kolkhoz property, and violation of democratic principles in managing the affairs of the kolkhoz.

The plenum of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) considers that the existence of these violations and distortions of the kolkhoz rules that are impeding the cause of achieving an upswing in agriculture and further consolidation of the kolkhozes, is the result of unsatisfactory – and at times simply incorrect – direction of the kolkhozes on the part of local party and soviet organizations.

3 To eliminate short-comings in the organization and payment of kolkhozniks' labour that are slowing down the achievement of a further upswing in labour productivity and strengthening of the communal economy at kolkhozes.

These short-comings find expression:

in the phenomenon of 'levelling' in the attribution of work-day credits, and in the distribution of earnings irrespective of the work results of brigades and teams, as a result of which the honest and hard-working kolkhozniks find themselves in an unfavourable situation with respect to the self-seeking and unconscientious elements among kolkhozniks; in the existence at kolkhozes of outdated excessively low work norms, which results in fraudulent claiming of workdays and absence of good order in the expenditure of work days.

It is necessary to work out and assure the application of more correct methods of labour payment, and of incentives for hard-working kolkhozniks on the basis of the existing positive experience of kolkhozes.

4 Decisively to improve the work of the MTSS on which the fate of kolkhoz harvests depends to a considerable degree. The plenum of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) demands of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture and its local agencies, and of party and soviet bodies and MTS directors that they eliminate serious short-comings in the work of the MTSS, such as the persistently low level of tractor and combine output, the poor job of repairing tractors and farm machinery and lateness in repairing them, and the irresponsible attitude of many MTS directors, agronomists, and tractor drivers toward the question of doing high-quality tractor work and doing it on time, and consequently, toward increasing yields on kolkhoz fields.

To consider incorrect the fact that the evaluation of MTS work is based solely on fulfilment of the plan for tractor work in soft tillage, instead of evaluating MTS work according to fulfilment of the most important types of agricultural work. The result is that a portion of the MTS network strives to fulfil the work plan for tractors by doing all manner of simple jobs, such as harrowing and the like. In their drive to make a great showing in hectares of soft tillage per tractor, a lot of MTS and tractor brigade personnel countenance low-quality tractor work that violates the elementary requirements of agronomy.

To abolish the present system of evaluating the work of the MTS solely on the basis of the fulfilment of plans in hectares of soft tillage and to order the USSR Ministry of Agriculture to introduce a new procedure for evaluating the work of the MTS based on fulfilment of the basic types of tractor work.

To order the USSR Ministry of Agriculture and its local agencies, as well as party and soviet organizations to put existing tractors and farm machinery at MTSS in good order, to get more work out of them, to improve the quality of tractor work, and to improve the training of MTS tractor drivers, combine operators, and brigade leaders.

5 To organize widespread training and retraining of cadres for agriculture in order to eliminate as quickly as possible the shortages of experienced and trained cadres at MTSS and kolkhozes and sovkhozes; to put an end to the misuse of specialist cadres in agriculture, whereby large numbers of them are doing office instead of production work, as a result of which kolkhozes do not receive needed help promptly in organizing their operations and introducing advanced methods in field work and animal husbandry.

6 To equip agriculture with new tractors, farm machinery and motor vehicles and to provide it with fertilizers and fuel. The plenum of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) demands of local party and soviet bodies and of industrial management that they work energetically to fulfil and overfulfil the plans for the production of tractors, farm machinery, spare parts, fertilizers, and fuel. It is necessary to eliminate serious shortcomings such as failure to attach due importance to filling agricultural orders on time, such as production of poor-quality goods, and attempts by certain plants and personnel in industry to continue production of outdated types of machinery and to take a conservative attitude toward the introduction of new and more productive designs of tractors and farm machinery...

*Pravda*, 28 February 1947

*KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh* VI, 210–60



### 3.41

#### **On V. Muradeli's Opera 'The Great Friendship'**

10 February 1948

The publication of this foray into music criticism indicates that it was Zhdanov's responsibility. *Kul'tura i zhizn* (*Culture and Life*) was the organ of the Agitation and Propaganda Section of the Central Committee, his special area. However, it is quite likely that Stalin had a personal interest in the attack on artistic modernism, inasmuch as he shared, with many of the supposedly decadent bourgeoisie, a marked distaste for dissonant music. The selection of this particular opera is in itself interesting because the libretto, while accepting the

official doctrine of the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, was insufficiently warm toward the Georgians and Ossetians, from whom Stalin himself derived. Worse, it was suspected of ignoring the nineteenth-century anti-Russian sins of the Ingushes and Chechens, who in 1949 had recently been deported wholesale to Siberia and East Central Asia for their real anti-Russian conduct during the Second World War.

During the anti-Stalin period, a subsequent Central Committee decision (4.24) specifically rescinded this declaration – an exceedingly rare event in the annals of the CPSU.

The Central Committee of the VKP(b) considers that the opera ‘Great Friendship’ (music by V. Muradeli, libretto by G. Mdivani), presented by the USSR Bolshoi Theatre during the celebrations of the thirtieth anniversary of the October Revolution, is an anti-artistic work, depraved both musically and in its subject matter.

The opera’s basic short-comings are rooted primarily in its music. The music of the opera is inexpressive and impoverished. It does not contain a single memorable melody or aria. It is confused and disharmonious, built on an unbroken succession of dissonances and on combinations of sounds that grate on the ear. The individual bars and scenes that make a pretence at melodic music suddenly break off in unstructured noise that is completely alien to the normal human ear and has an oppressive effect on the listener. There is no organic connection between the score and the unfolding of the action on stage. The vocal portion of the opera – choral, solo, and ensemble singing – gives the impression of impoverishment. As a result of all these factors, the orchestra’s and singers’ capabilities go unutilized.

The composer has not availed himself of the wealth of folk melodies, songs, and refrains, and of the dance motifs of which there is such a wealth in the creative work of the peoples of the USSR and, in particular, in that of the peoples who inhabit the north Caucasus, where the opera’s action takes place.

In his pursuit of a false ‘originality’ of music, the composer, Muradeli, disdained the best traditions and experience of the classical opera as a whole, and of Russian classical opera in particular, which is distinguished by a richness of content, by its wealth of melodies and the breadth of its scope, by folk tradition and the elegant, beautiful, and limpid musical form that has made Russian opera the best in the world, a genre of music beloved by and accessible to the broad strata of the people.

The plot of the opera, which claims to represent the struggle for the establishment of Soviet power and for friendship among peoples in the north Caucasus in 1918–20, is historically inaccurate and artificial. The



opera creates the incorrect impression that such Caucasian peoples as the Georgians and the Ossetians were enemies of the Russian people at the time, which is historically false, since it was the Ingushes and Chechens who were the obstacle to the establishment of friendship among peoples in the north Caucasus at that period.

The Central Committee of the VKP(b) considers that the failure of Muradeli's opera is the result of the formalistic path that Muradeli took, a path that is false and ruinous for the creative work of a Soviet composer.

As was shown by the meeting of prominent figures in Soviet music that was held in the Central Committee of the VKP(b), the failure of Muradeli's opera is not an individual event, but is closely linked with the unfavourable condition of present-day Soviet music and with the spread of a formalistic trend among Soviet composers.

As far back as 1936, in connection with the appearance of D. Shostakovich's opera 'Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk Province,' the organ of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), *Pravda*, sharply criticized the anti-popular, formalistic distortions in the creative work of D. Shostakovich and laid bare the harm and danger of that trend for the fate of Soviet music's development. *Pravda*, speaking at the time on instructions from the Central Committee of the VKP(b), clearly formulated the demands that the Soviet people make on their composers.

These warnings notwithstanding, and despite the instructions that were given by the Central Committee of the VKP(b) in its decisions on the journals *Zvezda* and *Leningrad* [3.39], on the motion picture *The Great Life*, and on the repertoire of drama theatres and measures for improving it, no reorganization has been carried out in Soviet music. Individual successes by certain Soviet composers in writing songs that have gained recognition and broad dissemination among the people, and in writing musical scores for motion pictures, etc., do not change the overall picture. The situation is particularly bad in the fields of symphonic music and opera. The problem is one of composers who are adherents of the formalistic, anti-popular schools. This trend has found its fullest expression in the works of such composers as Comrades D. Shostakovich, S. Prokofiev, A. Khachaturyan, V. Shebalin, G. Popov, N. Miaskovsky and others, whose works show particularly clear manifestations of formalistic distortions and anti-democratic tendencies in music that are alien to the Soviet people and its tastes in art. Typical earmarks of this music include rejection of the basic

principles of classical music; a doctrine of atonality, dissonance, and disharmony, which are allegedly an expression of 'progress' and 'innovation' in the development of musical form; rejection of such highly important fundamentals of musical composition as melody; and undue concern for confused, neurotic combinations that reduce music to cacaphony, to a chaotic conglomeration of sounds. This music is strongly redolent of the spirit of present-day modernistic bourgeois music in Europe and America, which is a symptom of the emaciation of bourgeois culture, a complete negation of musical art, a blind alley.

Another basic mark of the formalistic school is rejection of polyphonic music and singing based on simultaneous combination and development of a number of independent melody lines, and undue concern with monotone and unisonous music and singing, often without words, which comprises a violation of the polyphonic musical and song structure that is characteristic of our people, and leads to an impoverishment and decline of music ...

The Central Committee of the VKP(b) holds that the state of Soviet music criticism is quite intolerable. The leading position among critics is occupied by opponents of Russian realistic music, by champions of decadent, formalistic music. These critics declare each successive work by Prokofiev, Shostakovich, Miaskovsky, and Shebalin to be 'a new triumph in Soviet music' and sing the praises of its subjectivism, constructivism, extreme individualism, and complication of the professional idiom, i.e., for precisely the things that should be subjected to criticism. Instead of smashing the views and theories that are harmful and alien to the principles of socialist realism, our musical criticism itself promotes the dissemination of them by praising composers who subscribe to false views and by declaring them to be 'progressive.'

Music criticism has ceased to express the opinion of the Soviet public – the opinion of the people – and has been transformed into the mouthpiece of particular composers. In the interests of friendly relations, certain music critics have begun playing up to and currying favour with one musical leader or another, heaping all manner of praise on his works, instead of producing principled, objective criticism.

All of which means that a segment of Soviet composers has still not overcome the remnants of bourgeois ideology, which are fed by the influence of decadent present-day western European and American music

...

The Central Committee of the VKP(b) resolves:

- 1 To condemn formalistic trends in Soviet music as antipopular and as leading, in fact, to the destruction of music.
- 2 To advise the Propaganda and Agitation Section of the Central Committee and the Committee on the Arts to rectify the situation in Soviet music, to eliminate the short-comings indicated in the present Central Committee resolution, and to assure the development of Soviet music in the realistic tradition.
- 3 To urge Soviet composers to steep themselves in consciousness of the high demands that the Soviet people make on musical creation, to discard everything that weakens our music and impedes its development and in this way to assure an upswing in creative work that will quickly move Soviet musical culture ahead and lead to the creation of full-fledged, high-quality works in all areas of musical creation, works worthy of the Soviet people.
- 4 To approve organizational measures by appropriate party and soviet bodies, aimed at improving the state of our music.

*Kul'tura i zhizn'*, 11 February 1948

### 3.42

#### On the Journal *Bol'shevik*

13 July 1949

The following resolution, which was not submitted to a plenum of the Central Committee, was kept secret until it appeared in an article by the ideological specialist M.A. Suslov entitled 'On the Articles by P. Fedoseev in *Izvestiia*, December 12 and 21,' and published in *Pravda* on 24 December 1952. The journal *Bol'shevik* (renamed *Kommunist* in 1952) was the principal ideological organ of the party. It is probable that it was directly controlled by Zhdanov until his death on 31 August 1948, and was still in the hands of his former political associates, Voznesenky and Fedoseev, until the following year. The opponents of the late Zhdanov, principally Malenkov and Beria, succeeded in removing Voznesensky from the Council of Ministers in March 1949, and Fedoseev from his key editorial position in July. Voznesensky was tried secretly and executed in early 1950. The document, which is published in full, is the only available party decision in which these intrigues, often called 'the Leningrad affair,' surface in anything approaching explicit form.

It is recognized that the magazine *Bolshevik* is run in an unsatisfactory manner and that the present editorial board is doing a poor job of meeting its responsibilities.

The magazine *Bolshevik* is out of touch with the practical work of building socialism. The magazine's editors do not pose and do not treat topical questions of marxist-leninist theory, particularly problems connected with the transition from socialism to communism; they limit themselves to setting forth in the magazine the most general and long-accepted theses, avoiding profound analysis and generalization based on new facts. The editors do not generalize the experience of the party's struggle for the restoration and continued development of the economy.

The editors are doing a poor job of treating questions of international life, and questions of the international workers' movement in particular. The magazine is doing a poor job of showing the growing forces of socialism and democracy in the world at large and the important successes of the people's democracies in laying a foundation for the transition to socialism find no expression in its pages.

The editors of the magazine *Bolshevik* are cut off from party life; they do not study and generalize the practical work of local party organizations and do not pose questions of inner party life and party construction.

In its work the editorial board of the magazine *Bolshevik* is not tied to party organizations; it bases its work on a narrow group of authors that occupy a monopolistic position at the magazine. The editors employ impermissible work methods: whole passages are added without the authors' knowledge to articles that are submitted to the magazine, passages that basically alter the content of the articles. This practice is a gross distortion of bolshevik press traditions.

The editors of the magazine *Bolshevik* committed a serious error in opening its pages to fawning praise for N. Voznesensky's book, *The National Economy of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War*, acclaiming it with no basis whatsoever as a textbook and as a 'profound piece of scientific research.' In their obsequiousness, editorial workers of the magazine *Bolshevik* went so far as to include quotes from N. Voznesensky's book in various articles against the wishes of the authors.

The Central Committee of the VKP(b) resolves:

- 1 To remove Comrade P.N. Fedoseev from the post of editor-in-chief of the magazine *Bol'shevik* and to reprimand him for failure to provide the magazine with the requisite leadership and for incorrect work methods.

To remove from the editorial board of the magazine *Bol'shevik* Comrades G.F. Alexandrov and M.T. Iovchuk.

To dismiss Comrades Gatovsky and Koshelev from their jobs at *Bolshevik* magazine.

2 To confirm the new editorial board of *Bol'shevik* magazine composed of Comrades S.M. Abalin (editor-in-chief), L.F. Ilyichev, P.N. Pospelov, V.S. Kruzhkov, V.G. Grigorian, A.S. Miasnikov, and B.S. Burkov (editorial secretary).

3 To order the editorial board of *Bol'shevik* magazine to eliminate the short-comings and distortions in editorial work as noted in the present resolution and to turn the magazine into a truly militant theoretical organ of the party.

4 To advise the editors of the magazine to take measures to improve their work with regular outside contributors, to expand the circle of contributors and to invite contributions to the magazine from party, soviet, and economic personnel and from persons working in the fields of science and culture.

5 To note that Comrade Shepilov, as head of the Central Committee's Propaganda and Agitation Section, was found wanting in the matter of supervising *Bol'shevik*. To point out to Comrade Shepilov that he committed a gross error in permitting a recommendation by the Central Committee's Propaganda and Agitation Section of N. Voznesensky's book as a textbook for work with raion party committee secretaries and propaganda cadres. These instructions are rescinded as erroneous.

*Pravda*, 24 December 1952

### 3.43

#### **On the Enlargement of Small Kolkhozes and the Tasks of Party Organizations**

30 May 1950

At the end of 1949 N.S. Khrushchev left his assignment as first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party to join the Secretariat in Moscow. He was given as his special sphere the chronically troublesome problem of agriculture. Foreshadowing his later rise to pre-eminence, Khrushchev proposed to remedy the situation with dramatically sweeping changes: the consolidation of the small kolkhozes (formed mainly in the great drive of the thirties) into larger units, and later their further development into 'agrocities' or highly modernized clusters of population in the countryside. The first phase was embodied in the following resolution,

which led to major administrative reorganization over the next few years. The sequel never reached the form of a decision, having run into political (not to speak of economic) opposition.

The Central Committee of the VKP(b) notes that at present all the necessary conditions have been created for an even more rapid development of agriculture in connection with increased state aid to agriculture in the form of tractors, combines, and other material and technical means, as well as cadres of specialists.

In addition, the VKP(b) considers that the matter of further developing agriculture and strengthening the kolkhozes is seriously obstructed by the existence in many oblasts, krais, and republics of a considerable number of small kolkhozes that, because of the acreage allocated to them, are insufficiently successful in developing the communal economy. On the small kolkhozes it is impossible to use efficiently tractors, combines, complex threshing machines, and other complex agricultural machinery; it is difficult to set up large-scale, high-yield communal animal husbandry, to create well-built modern kolkhoz villages with their own resources, to maintain agricultural specialists, to develop communal kolkhoz production comprehensively, and to assure the rapid growth of communal income and improvement of the kolkhozniks' material and cultural level.

The Central Committee of the VKP(b) also notes that the work done in recent years by party, soviet, and agricultural agencies in a number of oblasts, krais, and republics in amalgamating small kolkhozes has yielded positive results in strengthening and developing their communal economy and in increasing kolkhozniks' earnings, and that the amalgamation "of small kolkhozes into larger ones has made it possible to improve kolkhoz management and to appoint better qualified cadres as kolkhoz chairmen.

In this connection the Central Committee of the VKP(b) resolves that:

- 1 Oblast and krai party committees and the central committees of union republic communist parties and oblast and krai executive committees and republic councils of ministers are obliged to work on the enlargement of small kolkhozes, which lack the allocated acreage to develop successfully the communal economy and to apply modern machine technology, and to consider the enlargement of small kolkhozes as one of the most important means for the further improvement of agriculture and for the economic strengthening of kolkhozes.

- 2 Oblast and krai party committees and the central committees of union republic communist parties and oblast and krai executive committees and

republic councils of ministers must be guided in carrying out the enlargement of small kolkhozes by the following:

*a* the amalgamation of small kolkhozes must be done in such a way that the enlarged kolkhoz meets the necessary conditions for the productive utilization of tractors, combines, and other agricultural machinery of the MTSS, for the successful development of all branches of the communal economy, for the creation of well-built, modern kolkhoz villages with their own human and other resources, and for the utilization of electric power, above all, in kolkhoz production;

*b* the land holdings of the amalgamated kolkhozes must be transformed into a single land mass, therefore the enlargement of kolkhozes must be carried out, as a rule, with contiguous land tenure;

*c* the amalgamation of small kolkhozes into larger ones must be done on a voluntary basis, with the widespread organization of explanatory work among kolkhozniks concerning the expediency of this measure;

*d* not less than two-thirds of the total kolkhoz membership must be present at the general meeting when the question of amalgamating kolkhozes is being decided. The decision to amalgamate must be adopted at the general meetings of kolkhozniks by a majority vote of each farm taken separately;

*e* the decisions of kolkhozes' general meetings to amalgamate take effect after they have been reviewed by raion executive committees.

Oblast and krai executive committees and union republic councils of ministers and oblast and krai party committees and the central committees of union republic communist parties are obliged to exercise regular supervision over the raion executive committees' timely and correct resolution of questions of amalgamating small kolkhozes;

*f* a takeover of the property, monetary resources, and other valuables from the boards of the kolkhozes being amalgamated must be effected by the newly elected board and inspection committee of the amalgamated kolkhoz.

3 Oblast, krai, and republic party, soviet and agricultural agencies, the USSR Ministry of Agriculture and the USSR Ministry of Cotton Growing are obliged to provide for the timely organization of land exploitation at amalgamated kolkhozes with a view toward assuring correct utilization of all land resources, all-round development of the communal economy, and

creation of the necessary conditions for a highly productive utilization of tractors, combines, and other farm machinery, having rendered the amalgamated kolkhozes priority assistance in raising the level of mechanization of farm work by improving the servicing of such farms by the machine and tractor stations.

4 Oblast and krai party committees and the central committees of union republic communist parties are obliged to assure at amalgamated kolkhozes the selection and promotion to leading positions – and particularly to the position of kolkhoz chairman – of agricultural specialists and of the most authoritative, best trained and – in political and work terms – most proven employees, those able to manage a major kolkhoz communal economy.

5 Oblast, krai, and republic party, soviet and agricultural agencies, and also the USSR Ministry of Agriculture and USSR Ministry of Cotton Growing are obliged:

*a* to take steps to assure that work be done as soon as possible at the amalgamating kolkhozes to put planning and reports in good order, to set up and consolidate standing production brigades – and work teams for cultivated crops within the brigades – to set output norms, and to carry out other organizational measures;

*b* to bring exemplary order into each kolkhoz to assure the growth of labour productivity, to avoid wage levelling and depersonalization of work, to abide strictly by the plan for the expenditure of work days on the various branches and crops, and to strengthen, in every way, state and labour discipline at kolkhozes.

6 The Central Committee of the VKP(b) directs the attention of local party, soviet, and agricultural agencies to the special importance that attaches to work on amalgamating small kolkhozes and cautions them against eventual mistakes and distortions in this matter. The work of amalgamating kolkhozes should not be transformed into a campaign; the amalgamation of kolkhozes must be done on the basis of painstaking preparation. It is necessary that executive personnel at raion, oblast, and republic party and soviet agencies personally concern themselves with the conducting of explanatory and organizational work on the amalgamation of small kolkhozes.



# XIX Party Congress

5–14 October  
1952

While praises to Stalin's glory often resounded during this final party congress of his career, the aged leader's attitude toward the meeting, and the Politburo members who led it, was ominously ambiguous. Since the thirties Stalin's attitude toward the leading bodies of the party had been unenthusiastic to say the least. According to Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speech of February 1956, even the Politburo met rarely in this period, and it is clear that the larger gatherings, such as Central Committee plenums, conferences, and congresses hardly at all. This atrophy of the leading party bodies did not appeal to Stalin's lieutenants. In the short run such meetings might offer some collective security for the men of the apparatus against the violent caprice of the dictator. In the longer run such meetings could play an important role in legitimizing some sort of post-Stalin succession, a matter that could not be discussed openly but surely was much on the minds of Politburo members in the post-war years. According to a later article in *Pravda* (28 April 1964), the Politburo on two occasions between 1946 and 1948 did pass resolutions calling for the convocation of the XIX Party Congress. One of the arguments in favour of this move apparently was the tradition of having new five-year plans approved by such a party gathering. But Stalin, it is reported, prevented any such meeting. The topic then seems to have been set aside until 1952, when a new, Fifth Five-Year Plan had recently started. Approval of this plan (3.44) very likely provided one of the pretexts for the announcement on 20 August 1952 of the convocation on 5 October.

While Stalin's assent to this step must have been gained, it appears that he was at best unenthusiastic about the XIX Congress. He barely participated in the affair, giving only the shortest of addresses, shorter, it would seem, than his health could have supported. It seems quite likely that his real response to the XIX Congress took other, more ominous, forms. In the two days preceding the opening of the Congress he deliberately upstaged it by publishing a series of writings under the title 'Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR.' Three of the four loosely linked parts of this 'classic' had been written the previous spring, yet the leader chose the eve of the party congress to reveal them, making it obligatory for the press and party leadership to divert a great deal of its attention from the speeches and resolutions of the Congress to Stalin's words, which had nothing to say about the party or Congress. At the Congress itself, Stalin sat apart from his Politburo colleagues in a special place of honour, yet did not actually preside.

It appears that his one important substantive contribution of the gathering was a thinly veiled attack on the security and status of the party leaders who had wanted the Congress. This was a plan for the reorganization of the Politburo and Orgubro into a single and greatly expanded Presidium of the Central Committee, into which many new contenders for power could be introduced. That this was Stalin's device and not the wish of his lieutenants is demonstrated by the rapid contraction of the expanded Presidium after his death.

Still more menacing was the revelation, three months after the Congress, of the 'Doctors' Plot,' a conspiracy to assassinate Stalin. This threatened the Politburo that had been constituted at the end of the thirties with the fate that had been meted out to the Politburo constituted in the

twenties: liquidation as punishment for 'conspiring' against the USSR (Stalin) and replacement by an aggressive younger generation.

No mention of the succession problem could be made at this meeting, but the front-runner appeared to be Malenkov, who gave the Central Committee report. The two other principle reports were delivered by M.Z. Saburov on the new Five-Year Plan and by Khrushchev on the changes in the party Rules. The Congress voted to change the name of the party from All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) [VKP(b)], which had been used since 1925, to Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU], and a new committee, headed by Stalin, was appointed to draft a new party Programme.

An enlarged Central Committee of 125 members and 110 candidate members (cf. 1939: seventy-one members and sixty-eight candidates) was elected by the Congress, and it in turn elected twenty-five members and eleven candidates to the new Presidium (cf. 1939 Politburo: nine members and two candidates) and ten members to the new Secretariat.

### **3.44**

#### **Directives on the Fifth Five-Year Plan for the Development of the USSR in the Period 1951–55**

10 October 1952

The successful fulfilment of the Fourth Five-Year Plan makes possible the adoption of a new Five-Year Plan, assuring a further upsurge in all branches of the economy and a growth in the people's material well-being, public health services, and cultural level.

In accord therewith, the XIX Congress of the CPSU considers it necessary to give the party Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers the following directives on the Fifth Five-Year Plan for the development of the USSR in the period 1951–55.

#### **I IN THE AREA OF INDUSTRY**

1 The rise in the level of industrial production for the five-year period is set at approximately 70 per cent, with an average annual growth in gross industrial output of approximately 12 per cent. The rate of growth in output of the means of production (group 'A') is set at 13 per cent and that for consumer goods production (group 'B') at 11 per cent ...

#### **II IN THE AREA OF AGRICULTURE**

1 The main task in the area of agriculture continues to increase the yield of all agricultural crops, to further increase communal livestock herds with a concurrent growth in the productivity thereof, to increase the total output and marketed output of agriculture and animal husbandry by further strengthening and development of the communal economy of kolkhozes

and to improve the work of sovkhozes and MTSS on the basis of the introduction of advanced machinery and farming methods in agriculture.

Agriculture must become even more productive and expert through the development of gross crops and correct crop rotation, with industrial, fodder, vegetable, and potato crops accounting for a greater proportion of the area under cultivation. ...

### **III IN THE AREA OF TRADE TURNOVER, TRANSPORT, AND COMMUNICATIONS**

1 Retail trade turnover in state and co-operative trade is to increase during the five-year period by approximately 70 per cent on the basis of the growth of industrial and agricultural output ...

### **IV IN THE AREA OF A CONTINUED GROWTH IN THE PEOPLE'S MATERIAL WELL-BEING, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES, AND CULTURAL LEVEL**

1 The national income of the USSR is to increase not less than 60 per cent over the five-year period on the basis of an uninterrupted growth of socialist production and an increase in the productivity of social labour, and a further growth in the earnings of workers, employees, and kolkhozniks is to be assured in this connection.

An increase in the number of workers and employees in the economy in 1955 – the final year of the Five-Year Plan – of approximately 15 per cent over the 1950 levels is to be anticipated in accord with the growth in overall output and in labour productivity, and also in accord with plan tasks in the area of cultural progress.

The present (Fifth) Five-Year Plan once again demonstrates to the entire world the great vital force of socialism, the fundamental advantages of the socialist economic system over the capitalist system. This Five-Year Plan is a plan for peaceful economic and cultural progress. It will facilitate a further consolidation and broadening of economic co-operation between the Soviet Union and the people's democracies and the development of economic intercourse with all countries desirous of developing trade on the basis of equal rights and mutual advantage.

The peaceful development of the Soviet economy set forth in the Five-Year Plan stands in contrast with the economics of the capitalist countries that are following the path of a militarization of the economy, of obtaining the highest possible profit for capitalists, and of the further impoverishment of the toilers.

The tasks posed by the Five-Year Plan make great demands on party, soviet, economic, trade union, and Komsomol organizations and oblige them to mobilize the broad masses of the working people for the fulfilment and overfulfilment of the new Five-Year Plan, and to develop widespread criticism of short-comings in the work of our organizations with a view toward eliminating those short-comings as quickly as possible.

It is necessary to give all manner of support to innovators in industrial and kolkhoz production, and to leading workers in transport and other branches of the national economy in their strivings to increase output, raise labour productivity, and reduce unit cost.

The great force of socialist competition, the unanimous desire of workers, collective farmers, and the intelligentsia to defend the cause of peace, and the unshakable resolution of the working people to build a communist society must be directed toward the fulfilment and overfulfilment of the new Five-Year Plan.

The peoples of the Soviet Union under the proven leadership of the Communist Party will successfully fulfil the Five-Year Plan.

**3.45**

13 October 1952

### **Rules of the CPSU**

[Revises Rules adopted 1939; see [3.33](#)]

#### **I THE PARTY, PARTY MEMBERS, THEIR DUTIES AND RIGHTS**

1 [Revises preamble, [3.33](#)] The CPSU is a voluntary union of people of one mind, communists, organized from among the people of the working class, toiling peasants, and labour intelligentsia.

Having organized a union of the working class and toiling peasants, the CPSU achieved the overthrow of capitalist and landowner power, organized the dictatorship of the proletariat, the liquidation of capitalism, the abolition of the exploitation of man by man, and secured the construction of a socialist society.

The chief tasks of the CPSU now are to build communist society by the gradual transition from socialism to communism, to continuously raise the material and cultural standards of society, to educate members of society in the spirit of internationalism, and to establish fraternal bonds with the

workers of all countries, to strengthen by all means the active defence of the Soviet motherland from the aggressive actions of its enemies.

2 [Revises 3.33, art. 1] Any working person who does not exploit the labour of others, is a citizen of the Soviet Union, accepts the party Programme and Rules, actively assists their implementation, works in one of the party organizations, and fulfils all the decisions of the party may be a member of the CPSU.

Party members pay the established membership dues.

3. [Revises 3.33, art. 2] A party member must:

*a* Guard party unity by all means, as the main basis of the party's strength and might;

*b* Be an active fighter for the fulfilment of party decisions. It is insufficient for members of the party to merely agree with party decisions; a member of the party must struggle actively to implement these decisions. A passive or formal attitude on the part of Communists toward the decisions of the party weakens the readiness of the party for battle and is therefore incompatible with membership in its ranks.

*c* Be an exemplary worker, master the techniques of his work, continually increase his productive and practical skills, protect and strengthen by all means socialist public property as the sacred and inviolable basis of the Soviet system;

*d* Strengthen daily his ties with the masses, respond in good time to the inquiries and needs of the toilers, explain the meaning of party policies and decisions to the non-party masses, remembering that the strength and invincibility of our party is its vital, inseparable ties with the people;

*e* Work to raise his consciousness, to master the fundamentals of marxism-leninism;

*f* Observe party and state discipline, which are equally binding on all party members. There cannot be two disciplines, one for the leaders and another for the rank-and-file. The party has a single discipline, a single law for all Communists, irrespective of their past services or the positions that they occupy. Violations of party and state discipline is a great evil, which is detrimental to the party and is therefore incompatible with membership in its ranks.

*g* Develop self-criticism and criticism from below, expose shortcomings in work and seek to eliminate them, struggle against false pretensions of

well-being and raptures over success in work. The suppression of criticism is a great evil. Anyone who stifles criticism and substitutes ostentations or rhetorical praise for criticism cannot remain in the ranks of the party;

*h* Inform party leaders, up to the Central Committee, of short-comings in work, irrespective of the persons involved. A party member has no right to conceal an unsatisfactory state of affairs, to go along with incorrect actions which are detrimental to the interests of the party and state; anyone who interferes with a party member's fulfilment of this obligation must be strictly punished as a violator of the party's will;

*i* Be truthful and honest before the party and not permit the concealment or distortion of the truth. Untruthfulness of a Communist before the party and deception of the party is a serious evil which is incompatible with party membership;

*j* Guard party and state secrets, display political vigilance, remembering that vigilance on the part of Communists is necessary in every sector and in any situation. Disclosure of party and state secrets is culpable before the party and incompatible with membership in its ranks;

*k* Execute without fail, in any post entrusted to him, party directives on correct selection of cadres with regard to political and practical qualifications. Violation of these directives, the selection of workers on the basis of friendship, personal loyalty, home-town ties, kinship, is incompatible with membership in the ranks of the party.

4 [As in 3.33, art. 3 (on the rights of party members)]

5 [As in 3.33, art. 4 (on acceptance in party; with deletion of 'in exceptional cases' in point *d*)]

6 [As in 3.33, art. 5 (on recommenders)]

7 [As in 3.33, art. 6 (on the dating of seniority in the party)]

8 [As in 3.33, art. 7 (on the transfer of members who move from one district to another)]

9 [As in 3.33, art. 8 (on expulsion of members who fail to pay dues)]

10 [Revises 3.33, arts. 9, 10] The question of expelling anyone from the party is decided at a general meeting of the primary party organization of which said person is a member, and is approved by the raion or city committee of the party. The decision of the raion or city committee on expulsion from the party takes effect only if it is approved by the oblast /

krai committee of the party or the central committee of the communist party of a union republic.

Until the decision expelling a person from the party is approved by the oblast / krai committee or the central committee of the communist party of a union republic, the person retains his party card and has the right to attend closed party meetings.

11 [New] A primary party organization may not adopt a decision to expel anyone from the party or transfer him to candidate status if he is a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, central committee of a communist party of a union republic, krai committee, oblast committee, okrug committee, city committee, or raion committee of the party.

The question of expelling a member of the central committee of a union republic, krai committee, oblast committee, okrug committee, city committee, or raion committee of the party from membership in the party committee, and also the expulsion of a member of the party or transfer to candidate status is decided by a plenum of the committee concerned by a two-thirds majority.

12 [New] The question of expelling a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU from membership in the Central Committee, and also expulsion from the party or transfer to candidate status, is decided by the party congress and in the interval between congresses by the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU by a two-thirds majority of the plenum. A person expelled from the Central Committee is automatically replaced by a candidate member of the Central Committee, according to the procedure established by the congress for the election of candidates to the Central Committee.

13 [New] In cases in which a party member has committed an offence punishable by the courts, he is expelled from the party upon notice of the offence by the administrative and judicial authorities.

14 [Revises 3.33, art. 11] While a decision expelling a person from the party or reinstating him is being taken, the maximum care and comradely concern, and a thoroughgoing examination of the accusations against the party member must be conducted.

For minor misdeeds party education and influence (warning, reprimand, etc.) should be brought to bear, and not expulsion from the party, which is the severest form of party punishment.



When it is necessary as a means of party punishment, a party organization may transfer a party member to candidate status for one year. The decision of a primary party organization concerning the transfer of a party member to candidate status is subject to approval by the party raion or city committee. On the expiration of the established period the person who has been transferred to candidate status is admitted to party membership on a regular basis and retains his former seniority in the party.

15 [Revises 3.33, art. 12] The appeals of persons expelled from the party and decisions of party organizations to expel members from the party must be reviewed by the appropriate party organ not later than twenty days from the date of their receipt.

## II CANDIDATES FOR PARTY MEMBERSHIP

16 [As in 3.33, art. 13 (on the general nature of candidacy)]

17 [As in 3.33, art. 14 (on identity of rules on acceptance into candidate membership and full membership)]

18 [Revises 3.33, art. 15] The period of candidacy is fixed at one year.

The party organization is obliged to help candidates to prepare to become party members. On the expiration of the period of candidacy, the party organization must consider the question of the candidate's party membership at a party meeting. If the candidate has been unable to prove himself for reasons that the party organization considers valid, the primary party organization may prolong his candidacy for a period of not more than one year. In cases in which the course of the period of candidacy has made it clear that the personal qualities of the candidate are not worthy of admission to party membership, the party organization adopts a decision on his expulsion from the candidates of the party. A decision of a primary party organization on the prolongation of the period of candidacy or on the expulsion of a candidate come into force after approval by the party raion or city committee.

19 [As in 3.33, art. 16 (on participation of candidates meetings)]

20 [As in 3.33, art. 17 (on candidates' dues)]

## THE STRUCTURE OF THE PARTY. INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY

21 [As in 3.33, art. 18 (on democratic centralism)]

22 [As in 3.33, art. 19 (on territorial-production principle)]

23 [As in 3.33, art. 20 (on autonomy in local matters)]



24 [As in 3.33, art. 21 (on the leading organ of party organizations at each level)]

25 [As in 3.33, art. 22 (on the election of committees as executive organs)]

26 [As in 3.33, art. 23 (on elections in party organizations)]

27 [Revises 3.33, art. 24] In cities and district centres the aktivs of city and district party organizations are convened for discussion of the more important party and state decisions. Moreover, the aktivs must be convened not for ostentation or mere formal approval of these decisions, but for genuine discussion.

28 [As in 3.33, art. 25 (on the right to discuss party policies)]

#### **IV THE HIGHER PARTY ORGANS**

29 [Revises 3.33, art. 29] The party congress is the highest organ of the CPSU. Regular congresses are convened at least once every four years. Extraordinary congresses are convened by the Central Committee on its own initiative or on the demand of at least one-third of the members of the previous party congress. The convocation of a congress and its agenda are announced at least a month and a half before the congress. Extraordinary congresses are convened on at least two months' notice.

The congress has a quorum if at least half the party members who were represented at the previous congress are represented at it.

Norms of representation at the congress are set by the Central Committee.

30 [As in 3.33, art. 30 (on the right of lower party organs to convene an extraordinary congress)]

31 [As in 3.33, art. 31 (on the functions of the congress)]

32 [As in 3.33, art. 32 (on the election of the Central Committee and Central Revision Commission)]

33 [Revises 3.33, art. 33] The Central Committee holds at least one plenum every six months. Candidate members of the Central Committee attend plenums of the Central Committee with a consultative vote.

34 [Revises 3.33, art. 34] The Central Committee of the CPSU organizes: a Presidium for the direction of the work of the Central Committee between plenums; a Secretariat for the direction of current work, mainly the organization of the verification of the execution of party decisions and the selection of cadres.

35 [Revises 3.33, art. 35] The Central Committee of the CPSU organizes a Committee of Party Control under the Central Committee. The Committee of Party Control:

*a* Reviews the observance of party discipline by party members and candidates; calls to account Communists guilty of violating the party Programme or Rules or of breaches of party and state discipline, as well as violators of party ethics (those guilty of deception of the party, dishonesty and insincerity in relation to the party, slander, bureaucratism, moral turpitude, etc.);

*b* Examines appeals against the decisions of central committees of communist parties of union republics, krai and oblast committees of the party concerning expulsions from the party and party punishments;

36 [As in 3.33, art. 36 (on the work of the Central Committee)] [Art. 37–39 in 1938 rules (on party conference) deleted]

37 [As in 3.33, art. 40 (on the formation of politotdels)]

38 [As in 3.33, art. 41 (on Central Committee reports to party organizations)]

39 [As in 3.33, art. 42 (on the work of the Central Revision Commission)]

## **V OBLAST, KRAI, AND REPUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS**

40 [As in 3.33, art. 43 (on oblast / krai conferences, and the congress of a national communist party)]

41 [As in 3.33, art. 44 (on conference and revision commission in the oblast / krai / union republic)]

42 [Revises 3.33, art. 45] For the conduct of current work the oblast / krai committee / central committee of a communist party of a union republic elects corresponding executive organs, composed of not more than eleven persons, including three secretaries, approved by the Central Committee of the party. Secretaries must have at least five years' party membership.

In oblast / krai committees, or central committees of communist parties of union republics, secretariats are formed to handle current questions and to check on fulfilment. The secretariat reports to the bureau of the oblast / krai union republic committee on decisions that have been adopted.

43 [Revises 3.33, art. 46] The oblast / krai committee, central committee of a communist party of a union republic organizes the various party bodies within the boundaries of the krai / oblast / republic; guides their activities; secures the undeviating fulfilment of party directives, the development of

criticism and self-criticism, the education of Communists in the spirit of no compromise with short-comings; guides members and candidate-members of the party in the study of marxism-leninism; organizes the work of communist education of the toilers; appoints the editorial board of the oblast / krai / republic party organs, which works under its supervision; directs the activities of oblast / krai / republic, soviet, and public organizations through party groups in them; organizes and leads enterprises of social significance for the oblast / krai / republic; allocates within the boundaries of its organization party personnel and funds its organization; manages the party treasury of the oblast / krai / republic; keeps the Central Committee systematically informed and at specified times submits to the Central Committee a report on its activities.

44 [Revises 3.33, art. 47] The plenum of the oblast / krai committee, or the central committee of the communist party of a union republic is convened at least once every two months.

45 [As in 3.33, art. 48 (on party organizations of national and other oblast and autonomous republics)]

## **VI OKRUG PARTY ORGANIZATIONS**

46 [As in 3.33, art. 49 (on the general nature of the okrug party organization)]

47 [Revises 3.33, art. 50] The okrug committee elects a bureau composed of not more than nine persons, including three secretaries of the okrug committee. Secretaries must have three years' party membership. Secretaries of the okrug committee are approved by the oblast committee, krai committee, central committee of the communist party of a union republic.

The plenum of the okrug committee meets at least once every month and a half.

48 [Revises 3.33, art. 51] The okrug committee organizes various party bodies within the boundaries of the okrug and guides their activities; secures the undeviating fulfilment of party directives, the development of criticism and self-criticism, the education of Communists in the spirit of no compromise with short-comings; guides members and candidate members of the party in the study of marxism-leninism; organizes the work of communist education of the toilers; appoints the editorial board of the okrug party organ, which works under its supervision; directs the activities of

okrug, soviet, and publication organizations through party groups in them; organizes and leads enterprises of social significance for the okrug; allocates party personnel and funds within the boundaries of the okrug; manages the okrug party treasury.

## **VII CITY AND RAION (RURAL AND URBAN) PARTY ORGANIZATIONS**

49 [As in 3.33, art. 52 (on the city, raion conference)]

50 [As in 3.33, art. 53 (on the bureau of the city, raion organization)]

51 [Revises 3.33, art. 54] The city, raion committee organizes and approves primary party organizations at enterprises, on sovkhozes, MTSS, kolkhozes, and institutions; guides their activities and keeps the records of the Communists; secures the fulfilment of party directives, the development of criticism and self-criticism, the education of Communists in the spirit of no compromise with short-comings; organizes the study of marxism-leninism by party members and candidates; organizes the work of communist education of the toilers; appoints the editorial board of the city, raion organ, which works under its supervision; directs the activities of city, raion, soviet, and public organizations through party groups in them; allocates party personnel and funds within the boundaries of the city or raion; manages the party treasury of the city, raion. The city / raion committee renders account of its activities to the oblast committee, krai committee, central committee of a union republic at the time and in the form established by the Central Committee of the party.

52 [Revises 3.33, art. 55] The plenum of the city / raion committee is convened at least once a month.

53 [As in 3.33, art. 56 (on the formation of raion organizations in large cities)]

## **VIII PRIMARY PARTY ORGANIZATIONS**

54 [Revises 3.33, art. 57] The primary party organization is the basis of the party. Primary party organizations are formed in factories, plants, sovkhozes, MTSS, and other economic enterprises, in kolkhozes, Red Army and Navy units, villages, institutions, educational institutions, etc., which have at least three party members.

In enterprises, kolkhozes, institutions, etc., which have less than three party members, candidate or party Komsomol groups are formed, headed

by a party organizer assigned by the raion, city party committee or the politotdel.

Primary party organizations are approved by the raion, city committees or the corresponding politotdel.

The supreme organ of the primary party organization is the party meeting, which is convened at least once a month.

55 [As in 3.33, art. 58 (on the formation of party organizations in shops, sections, etc., of large enterprises)]

56 [Revises 3.33, art. 59] In large enterprises or institutions that have more than three hundred party members and candidates, a factory party committee may be formed, with the approval in all cases of the Central Committee of the party; shop party organizations in these enterprises then acquire the rights of a primary party organization.

57 [Revises 3.33, art. 60] The primary party organization links the masses of workers, peasants, and intelligentsia with the leading organs of the party. Its tasks are:

*a* Agitational and organizational work among the masses for the fulfilment of party slogans and decisions, including guidance of the lower-level press (mimeographed newspapers, wall newspapers, etc.);

*b* Recruitment of new members into the party and their political education;

*c* Organization of the political education of party members and candidates and care that they receive [at least] a minimum of knowledge in the area of marxism-leninism;

*d* Assistance to the raion committee, city committee in all its practical work;

*e* Mobilization of the masses in enterprises, sovkhozes, kolkhozes, etc., for the fulfilment of the production plan, strengthening of labour discipline and the development of socialist competition;

*f* Struggle against slackness and bad management of enterprises, sovkhozes, and kolkhozes, and daily concern for the improvement of the living conditions of the workers and kolkhozniks;

*g* Development of criticism and self-criticism in Communists in the spirit of no compromise with short-comings;

*h* Active participation in the economic and political life of the country.

58 [As in 3.33, art. 61 (on the efforts of primary party organizations to improve the work of the productive bodies in which they exist)]

59 [Revises 3.33, art. 62] For the conduct of current work, the primary party organization elects for one year a party bureau, consisting of not more than eleven persons.

Bureaus of primary party organizations are formed in party organizations that have not less than fifteen party members.

In party organizations that have less than fifteen members and candidates bureaus are not formed, but a secretary of the primary party organization is elected.

To promote the rapid training and education of party members in the spirit of collective leadership, shop party organizations that have at least fifteen and not over one hundred members are granted the right to elect a bureau of the shop party organization, consisting of three to five persons, and in organizations that have over one hundred members, a bureau of five to seven persons.

In primary party organizations that have not more than one hundred party members, party work is usually carried out by persons who have not been released from production. Secretaries of primary party organizations and shop party organizations must have at least one year of party membership.

## **IX THE PARTY AND THE KOMSOMOL**

60 [As in 3.33, art. 63 (on the subordination of the Komsomol to the party)]

61 [As in 3.33, art. 64 (on the departure of persons from the Komsomol when they join the party)]

62 [As in 3.33, art. 65 (on the role of the Komsomol in assisting the party)]

63 [As in 3.33, art. 66 (on the right of initiative in the Komsomol)]

## **X PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE SOVIET ARMY, NAVY, AND IN TRANSPORT**

64 [Revises 3.33, art. 67] Leadership of party work in the Soviet Army and Navy is exercised by the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy of the USSR and in transport by the Political Administration of the Ministry of Transport of the USSR and Ministry of the River Fleet of

the USSR, which function with the rights of sections of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Party organizations in the Soviet Army, Navy, and in transport function on the basis of special instructions which are approved by the Central Committee.

65 [As in 3.33, art. 68 (on commanders of political administrations and politotdels)]

66 [As in 3.33, art. 69 (on links between military political organs and local party organs)]

#### XI PARTY GROUPS IN NON-PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

67 [As in 3.33, art. 70 (on the formation of party groups in non-party organizations)]

68 [As in 3.33, art. 71 (on the subordination of party groups in non-party organizations to appropriate party organizations)]

[Articles 72–74 in 1939 Rules (on party discipline) deleted]

#### XII THE FINANCIAL MEANS OF THE PARTY

69 [As in 3.33, art. 75 (on the source of financial support)]

70 [Revises 3.33, art. 76] Monthly membership dues for party members and candidates are fixed by the following scale:

MONTHLY INCOME	DUES
not over 500 rubles	.5 per cent
over 500 but not over 1000 r.	1.0
over 1000 but not over 1500 r.	1.5
over 1500 but not over 2000 r.	2.0
over 2000 r.	3.0

71 [As in 3.33, art. 77 (on initiation dues)]

*Pravda*, 12 October 1952

*KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh* VI, 342–83



# Appendix

## Members of the Secretariat, 1930–1952

	XVI Congress 1930	XVII Congress 1934	XVIII Congress 1939	March 1946 Central Committee meeting
Bauman, K. Ia.	_____			
Kaganovich, L. M.	_____	_____		
Molotov, V. M.	_____			
Postyshev, P. P.	_____			
Stalin, I. V., General Secretary	_____	_____	_____	_____
Moskvin, I. M.	_____			
Shvernik, N. M.	_____			
Kirov, S. M.		<u>died</u> I XII 34		



Zhdanov, A.A.

died 2 ix 48

Ezhov, N.I.

from 1 ii 35 to beginning 39

Andreev, A.A.

from 28 ii 35

Malenkov, G.M.

Kuznetsov, A.A.

to ii 49

Popov, G.M.

to xi 49

Suslov, M.A.

from 47

Ponomarenko, P.K.

from 48

Khrushchev, N.S.

from xii 49

Full member        Candidate member       

**Members of the Politburo, 1930–1952**

	XVI Congress 1930	XVII Congress 1934	XVIII Congress 1939	March 1946 Central Committee meeting	Before XIX Congress 1952
Andreev, A.A.					
Chubar, V.Ia.		from I II 35 to spring 38			
Kaganovich, L.M.					
Kalinin, M.I.			died 3 VI 46		
Kirov, S.M.		died I XII 34			
Kosior, S.V.		to spring 38			
Kuibyshev, V.V.		died 25 I 35			
Mikoyan, A.I.		from I II 35			
Molotov, V.M.					
Ordzhonikidze, G.K.	from XII 30	died 18 II 37			
Petrovsky, G.I.		to beg. 39			
Rudzutak, Ia.E.	to II 32	to V 37			
Rykov, A.I.	to XII 30				

Stalin, I. V.	
Syrtsov, S. I.	<u>to XII 30</u>
Veroshilov, K. E.	
Postyshev, P. P.	<u>to I 38</u>
Eikhe, R. I.	<u>I II 35 to autumn 38</u>
Ezhov, N. I.	<u>x 37 to beg. 39</u>
Khrushchev, N. S.	<u>from I 38</u>
Zhdanov, A. A.	<u>from I II 35</u> <u>died 2 IX 48</u>
Beria, L. P.	
Shvernik, N. M.	
Malenkov, G. M.	<u>from 21 II 41, after XVIII Conf.</u>
Shcherbakov, A. S.	<u>from 21 II 41, after XVIII Conf. died 10 v 45</u>
Voznesensky, N. A.	<u>to II 47</u> <u>to II 49</u>
Bulganin, N. A.	<u>from II 48</u>
Kosygin, A. N.	<u>from II 48</u>

1 Candidate member to December 1930; full member from 4 February 1932; in between, Chairman of Central Control Commission.

## Members of the Orgburo, 1930–1952

	XVI Congress 1930	XVII Congress 1934	XVIII Congress 1939	March 1946 Central Committee meeting <sup>1</sup>
Akulov, I.A.	_____			
Bauman, K.Ia.	_____			
Bubnov, A.S.	_____			
Gamarnik, Ia.B.	_____	_____ to spring 37		
Kaganovich, L.M.	_____	_____	_____	
Lobov, S.S.	_____	_____		
Molotov, V.M.	_____ to XII 30			
Moskvin, I.M.	_____	_____		
Postyshev, P.P.	_____	_____		
Stalin, I.V.	_____	_____	_____	
Shvernik, N.M.	_____	_____	_____	

Dogadov, A.I.	_____	
Kosarev, A.V.	_____	to x 38
Smirnov, A.P.	_____	to 1 1 33
Tsikhon, A.M.	_____	
Kirov, S.M.	_____	died 1 x 11 34
Zhdanov, A.A.	_____	died 2 1 x 48
Ezhov, N.I.	_____	to beg. 39
Stetsky, A.I.	_____	did not finish period for which appointed
Kuibyshev, V.V.	_____	died 25 1 35
Andreev, A.A.	_____	from 28 11 35(?)
Mekhlis, L.Z.	_____	from 1 38
Krinsky, A.I.	_____	did not finish period for which appointed
Kaganovich, L.M.	_____	
Malenkov, G.M.	_____	_____
Mikhailov, N.A.	_____	_____
Shcherbakov, A.S.	_____	died 10 v 45

Full member \_\_\_\_\_ Candidate member \_\_\_\_\_

Kuznetsov, A.A.	<u>to II 49</u>
Popov, G.M.	<u>to XI 49</u>
Bulganin, N.A.	<u>                    </u>
Patolichev, N.S.	<u>                    </u>
Andrianov, V.M.	<u>                    </u>
Alexandrov, G.F.	<u>                    </u>
Shatalin, N.N.	<u>                    </u>
Kuznetsov, V.V.	<u>                    </u>
Rodionov, M.I.	<u>                    </u>
Suslov, M.A.	<u>                    </u>

Full member            Candidate member           

1 The Orgburo apparently ceased to function after 1946 and was officially abolished at the XIX Congress in 1952.

The tables were derived from T. and M. Reiman, "Přehled o složení nejvyšších orgánů KSSS" ("Survey of the composition of the highest organs of the CPSU"), in *Revue dějin socialismu* (Review of the history of socialism), Prague 1968, no. 3, 369-413.

# Index

- Abalin, S.M., [253](#)  
Academy of Social Sciences, [238–9](#)  
admission to party, [43–5](#), [134](#), [140–2](#), [162–3](#), [206](#), [213](#)  
agitation and propaganda, [13](#), [16](#), [45–7](#), [195–9](#), [210](#), [226–36](#)  
agriculture, [5–9](#), [17](#), [22–43](#), [48–50](#), [52–5](#), [61](#), [83](#), [132](#), [153–5](#), [201](#), [243–8](#), [259](#)  
Akmatova, A. [241–2](#)  
aktiv (leading personnel in party or other organization), [216](#), [233](#)  
Alexandrov, G.F., [227–8](#), [253](#)  
All-Union Association of Textbook and School Equipment Industry, [113](#)  
Alma Ata, [198](#)  
Altai, [245](#)  
Andreev, A.A., [130](#), [200](#), [243](#)  
Ardatovsky raion, [175](#)  
Arkus, G.M., [175](#)  
armed forces, [6](#), [15](#), [50](#), [164](#), [222–3](#), [269](#)  
artel, [5](#), [42](#), [48–50](#), [153](#)  
Arzamas, [176](#)  
Azerbaidzhan, [189](#)  
Azovo-Chernmorsk krai, [186](#)  
Azef, E., [178](#)
- Bakaev, I.P., [169–73](#)  
Baku, [169](#), [198](#)  
Baltic republics, [238](#)  
Belokurets, [102](#)  
Belorussia, [129](#)  
Beria, L.P., [16](#), [200](#), [252](#)

Berman-Yurin, K.B., [174](#)  
Bismarck, Otto von, [174](#)  
Bolshe-Chernigov, [190](#)  
*Bol'shevik* (The Bolshevik), [241](#), [251–3](#)  
Bukharin, N.I., [8](#), [10–11](#), [21–2](#), [24](#), [27–8](#), [39](#), [51](#), [130](#), [168](#)  
bureaucratism, [58–61](#), [65–7](#), [189](#)  
Burkov, B.S., [253](#)  
Bykhovsky, [174](#)  
capitalism, [24–5](#), [27](#), [30](#), [204](#)  
cell, party, [7](#), [66](#), [87–96](#), [107–8](#), [135](#), [149–50](#), [220–2](#), [267–8](#)  
Central Asia, [94](#)  
Central Committee sections  
    Administration of Affairs, [135](#), [145](#)  
    Agricultural, [135](#), [144](#), [210](#)  
    Cadres Administration, [12](#), [209](#), [240](#)  
    Culture and Propaganda, [46](#), [97](#), [111](#), [135](#), [144](#)  
    Industrial, [135](#), [144](#)  
    Leading Party Organs, [135](#), [144](#), [209](#)  
    Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, [135](#), [145](#), [199](#)  
    Organizational-Instructional, [209](#)  
    Planning, Finance, and Trade, [135](#), [144](#)  
    Propaganda and Agitation, [13](#), [198–9](#), [210](#), [228](#), [235](#), [242](#), [251](#)  
    Special, [135](#), [145](#)  
    Transportation, [135](#), [144](#)  
Central Executive Committee of Congress of Soviets, [48](#)  
Central Institute of Labour, [74](#), [82](#)  
Central Revision Commission, [128](#), [145–7](#)  
Central Union of Consumers' Co-operatives, [102](#)  
Chechens, [248](#)  
Cheliabinsk, [72](#), [245](#)  
Committee on the Arts, [251](#)  
Communist Academy, [112](#)  
Communist International (Comintern), [125](#), [139](#), [212](#)  
Conference, party, [3](#), [4](#), [210](#), [265](#)



XVI, 38, 48, 55, 68  
XVIII, 4  
Congress, party, 3–4, 6, 15, 145, 264  
XI, 79–80  
XIV, 58, 79  
XV, 28, 54, 70, 78, 99,  
XVI, 7, 44, 46, 50–87, 103–4, 109  
XVII, 4, 8, 51, 129–55, 180, 200  
XIX, 4, 17, 196, 256–9  
Constitution, 12–13, 184, 186, 201, 230  
control, party and state  
All-Union Control Commission, 75  
Central Control Commission, 8, 39, 57–68, 86, 116–17, 124–5, 128–9, 139  
Commission of Party Control, 130, 139, 145–6, 152, 189–90, 194, 209, 265  
Commission of Soviet Control, 139, 146, 217  
Rabkrin (Raboche-krest'ianskaia inspektsiia – Worker-Peasant Inspection), 8, 57–68, 86, 138–9  
co-operatives, 21, 24, 34–5, 63, 102  
Council of Ministers 4, 15, 245, 258 (*see also* Sovnarkom)  
Ministry of Agriculture, 245, 247, 255–6  
Ministry of Cotton Growing, 255–6  
Ministry of Sovkhozes, 245  
  
David, F., 174  
democratic centralism, 4, 12, 143  
Dnepropetrovsk, 103, 105  
Donets Basin, 72, 82, 129  
Down with Illiteracy Society, 84  
Dreitser, E.A., 171, 173–4  
  
education, 14, 34, 74, 84, 93, 108–15  
elections, party, 11–12

elections, soviet, [12](#), [50](#), [184–7](#)

Elin, [180](#)

Engels, F., [197–8](#)

Esterman, [174](#)

Evdokimov, E.G., [169–71](#), [175](#)

expulsion from party, [10–11](#), [142](#), [151–2](#), [188–95](#), [207–8](#), [219](#), [222–3](#), [262–3](#)

Factory apprenticeship school (fabrichno-zavodskoe uchenichestvo, FZU), [74](#)

Fainsod, M., [168](#)

Faivilovich, [173](#)

Fascist Union of Youth, [172](#)

Federov, [175](#)

Fedoseev, P.N., [251–3](#)

Fedotov, [180](#)

Five-Year Plan

First, [5](#), [7](#), [21–3](#), [25](#), [40–1](#), [43–4](#), [52](#), [56](#), [67–79](#), [98](#), [108](#), [116–17](#), [124](#), [132](#), [153](#), [157](#)

Second, [117](#), [129](#), [131–4](#), [157](#), [200–203](#)

Third, [200–205](#)

Fourth, [16–17](#), [232–6](#)

Fifth, [257–60](#)

fraction (party group within a non-party organization), [95](#)

Gatovsky, [253](#)

Georgia, [248–9](#)

Gestapo, [174](#)

Gorky, [160](#), [175](#), [180](#) (*see also* [Nizhnyi Novgorod](#))

Gorovich, [174](#)

Gorpo (Gorodskoe potrebitel'skoe obshchestvo – city consumers' association), [138](#)

Gosplan (Gosudarstvennaia plannovaia komissiiia – State Planning Commission), [5](#), [112–13](#), [132](#)

Grigorian, V.G., [253](#)

Grushevsky, [228](#)

Gurevich, [174](#)

Himmler, H., [174](#)

Iakovlev, Ia. A., [40](#)

Ilinsk, [172](#)

Ilyichev, L.F., [253](#)

industry, [22](#), [26](#), [31](#), [53–4](#), [60–61](#), [68–79](#), [98–103](#), [131–4](#), [157–60](#), [258](#)

Ingush, [248](#)

Iovchuk, M.Y., [253](#)

Ivanchenko, [100](#)

Izhevsk, [104](#)

*Izvestiia* (News), [98](#), [251](#)

Kaganovich, L.M., [51](#), [117](#), [130–1](#), [153](#), [156](#), [172](#), [174](#), [200](#)

Kalinin, M.I., [21](#), [200](#)

Kamensk, [103](#)

Kamenev, L.B., [10](#), [168–181](#)

Kaminsky, G.N., [21](#)

Kaplan, D., [179](#)

Karev, N.A., [172](#)

Katalynov, [172](#)

Katkov, G., [182](#)

Kazakhstan, [99](#)

Khachaturian, A., [250](#)

Kharkov, [245](#)

Khramov, [175](#)

Khokhlovo, [175](#)

Kiev, [129](#), [181](#), [185](#), [191](#), [199](#)

Khrushchev, N.S., [4](#), [10](#), [11](#), [17](#), [130–31](#), [182](#), [196](#), [200](#), [227](#), [253](#), [256](#), [258](#)

Kirov, S.M., [9–10](#), [51](#), [130–1](#), [168–70](#), [172](#), [174](#)

Kolesnikov, [100](#)

kolkhoz (kollektivnoe khoziaistvo – collective farm; kolkhoznik – collective farmer) 7, 17, 21–3, 25–6, 28–38, 40–45, 47–50, 52–3, 61–2, 64, 83, 87–96, 111–13, 117–24, 132, 153–4, 201, 203, 205, 211, 233–5, 243–8, 253–6, 258  
 Kolkhoztsentr (Kolkhoz Centre), 32–3, 35–6  
 Kolomna, 104  
 Kompanets, 228  
 Komsomol (Kommunisticheskii Soiuz Molodezhi – Communist Union of Youth), 38, 70, 86, 89, 91, 93, 97–8, 103–6, 112, 118–19, 121–4, 134, 136, 139, 141, 155, 166, 212, 219, 222, 225, 229, 231, 233, 238, 259, 268–9  
*Komsomolskaia Pravda* (Komsomol Truth), 98  
 Koshelev, 253  
 Kossior, S.V., 51, 172  
 krai (administrative level under union republic), 147–8, 218–19, 265–6  
 Kruzhkov, V.S., 253  
 Kudriavtsev, P.I., 191  
 Kuibyshev, V.V., 21, 51, 116, 190  
 Kuklin, A.S., 170–1  
 kulak (relatively prosperous peasant), 5, 6, 21, 23–5, 27, 29–30, 39, 41–2, 48–53, 56, 59, 90, 96, 113, 117, 131, 133, 181  
*Kul'tura i zhizn'* (Culture and Life), 248  
 Kursk, 190  
 Kuznetsk Basin, 98–103  
  
 Lassalle, F., 174  
 Lavrentev, L.A., 175–6  
 Lenin, V.I., 27, 30, 35, 48, 59, 65–6, 81, 85, 112, 130, 197–8  
 Leningrad, 15–16, 72, 103, 129, 136, 169, 172, 180, 198, 252  
*Leningrad*, 240–3, 250  
*Leningradskaia Pravda* (Leningrad Pravda), 242  
 Likharev, 241  
 Lipetsk, 245  
 literature, 14, 115–16, 240–3  
 Litvin, 228

Liubimov A.I., 156  
Lobov, 156  
Lominadze, V.V., 171  
Lurye, M., 174  
Lvov, 227–232

Magnitaia, 102  
Magnitogorsk, 7–8, 98–103  
Main Administration of Geological Survey, 101  
Malenkov, G.M., 15–16, 227, 252, 257  
Marx, K., 197–8  
Mdivani, G., 248  
Mensheviks, 56  
Miaskovsky, N., 250  
Miasnikov, A.S., 253  
Mikoyan, A.I., 156, 200  
Minsk, 169, 180, 198  
Molotov, V.M., 5, 116, 153, 182, 200  
Moscow, 63, 72, 129, 136, 169, 172–4, 177, 181, 198  
Mrachkovsky, S.V., 170–1, 173  
MTS (mashino-traktornaia stantsiia – machine tractor station), 6, 23, 29, 31–4, 42, 87–8, 96–8, 111–12, 114, 117–24, 136, 141, 143, 154–5, 220, 234–5, 244–5, 247, 258  
Muradeli, V., 248–51  
music, 248–51

Nadezhdinsk, 104  
Narkomzem (Narodnyi komissariat zemledeliia – People’s Commissariat of Agriculture), 41, 122, 123  
nationality policy, 57, 228–32  
NEP (Novaia Ekonomicheskaiia Politika – New Economic Policy), 555, 115  
Nicolaevsky, B., 130–1  
Nikolaev, L., 172

Nizhny Novgorod, [72](#) (*see also* [Gorky](#))

ORS (otdel rabocheho snabzheniia – workers’ supply section), [138](#)

Osoviakhim (Obshchestvo sodeistviia oborone i aviatsionno-khimicheskomu stroitel’stvu – Association for Assistance to the Defence and Aviation-Chemical Industry), [212](#)

Ossetia, [248–9](#)

party cards, [9](#), [156](#), [160–67](#)

party education, [13](#), [46–7](#), [106](#), [196–9](#), [236–40](#)

peasants, [22–21](#), [38–40](#), [48–50](#), [55–56](#), [90](#)

Pelevina, [175–6](#)

Petliura, S., [118](#)

Pikel, R.V., [171](#), [173](#)

Politburo (Political Bureau), [3–5](#), [8](#), [10](#), [15](#), [17](#), [21–2](#), [31](#), [39–40](#), [43](#), [48](#),  
[117](#), [130](#), [146](#), [153](#), [155](#), [188](#), [200](#), [217](#), [256–8](#)

politotdel (politicheskii otel – political section), [6](#), [117–24](#), [136](#), [143](#), [146](#),  
[153–5](#), [218](#)

Poltava-Bredinsk, [101](#)

Postyshev, P.P., [10](#), [130](#), [172](#), [182](#), [184](#)

*Pravda* (Truth), [98](#), [181–2](#), [227](#), [249](#)

Presidium of the Central Committee, [257–8](#)

Prokofiev, S., [250](#)

Pugachev, E., [175](#)

Programme, party, [13](#), [46](#), [82](#), [109](#), [111](#), [125–7](#), [140](#), [142](#), [145](#), [200](#), [207–8](#),  
[212–13](#), [217](#), [258](#)

propaganda (*see* [agitation and propaganda](#))

purge, [3](#), [9–11](#), [117](#), [124–29](#), [156](#), [160–7](#), [181–4](#), [206–7](#)

Rabkrin (*see* [control](#))

Radek, K., [10](#)

Raipo (raiony potrebitel’skoe obshchestvo – raion consumers’ association),  
[138](#)

raion (administrative level under oblast or city), [148–9](#), [219–20](#), [266–7](#)

RAPP (Rossiiskaia assotsiatsiia proletarskikh pisatelei – Russian Association of Proletarian Writers), 115–16  
Reingold, I.I., 171, 173, 175, 177, 179  
religion, 49  
Revision Commission (*see* Central Revision Commission)  
Rigby, T.H., 43  
right deviation, 21–2, 24–8, 39–41, 51, 56, 58–9, 78–9, 188  
Rostov na-Donu, 190, 191, 198  
ROVS (Rossiiskoe obshchestvo vooruzhennikh sil – Russian Military Union), 176  
Rudzutzk, Ia. E., 117, 156  
Rukhimovich, 102  
Rules, party, 6, 8–11, 13, 43, 46, 87, 116, 125–7, 130, 139–52, 154, 162, 185–7, 200, 205–24, 260–9  
Rumiantsev, 172  
Rykov, A.I., 22, 39, 59, 117, 168

Saburov, M.Z., 258  
Safronov, G.I., 171  
Saianov, 241  
Schapiro, L., 3  
Secretariat of the Central Committee, 3–4, 8–9, 15–16, 43, 146, 200, 217, 227, 253  
Shatskin, 171  
Shaumian, S.G., 130  
Shebalin, 250  
Shepilov, D.T., 253  
Shostakovich, D., 249  
Shvernik, M., 200  
Siberia, 72, 99, 129  
Smirnov, I.N., 117, 170–3  
Smolensk, 168  
Socialist competition, 61, 63, 74, 81, 91, 103–4  
Society of Marxist Teachers, 112

sovkhoz (sovetskoe khoziaistvo – state farm), 6, 25–6, 31–6, 38, 41–2, 45, 54, 61, 83, 111–12, 114, 117–24, 153, 155, 211, 220, 233–5, 244–7, 258

Sovnarkom (Sovet narodnykh komissarov – Council of People’s Commissars) 4, 15, 48, 11–12, 132, 137, 139, 146

commissariat of Defence, 4

Education, 14, 112, 114

Finance, 112

Health, 112

Labour, 101

Sovkhozes, 123–4

Transport, 102 (*see also* NKVD, Narkomzem)

stakhanovite movement, 157–60

Stalin, I.V., 3–6, 10–17, 21–2, 40, 47, 51, 81, 98, 116–7, 129–31, 168–75, 177–9, 181–4, 187–8, 200–201, 236, 243, 248, 256–7

‘Dizzy with Success,’ 6, 11, 47

‘Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR,’ 257

‘Short Course,’ 13, 195–9, 210

‘Year of the Great Breakthrough,’ 55

Stalingrad, 72, 184, 190, 245

Stalovitskaia, 173

State Committee of Defence, 4, 14–15

Suslov, M. A., 251

Tashkent, 198

Tbilisi, 198

Ter-Bagarian, 170–2

Ternopol, 228

Tikhonov, 242

Tomsky, M. P., 8, 22, 39, 51, 117, 168

TOŽ (Tovarishchestvo po sovместnoi obrabotke zemli – association for the joint cultivation of the land), 21, 30, 42

trade unions, 8, 33, 79–87, 113

Agriculture and Timber Workers’ Union, 37

All-Union Council of Trade Unions, 8, 80



Traktorotsentr (All-Union Centre of Machine Tractor Stations), 32, 42, 96–8

transport, 26, 53, 73, 157–60

Trotsky, L.D., 10, 169–81

trotskyites, 11, 28, 39, 51, 56, 79, 167–83, 188, 204

*Uchenie zapiski* (Scholarly Notes), 239

Ugarov, 29

Uglanov, N.A., 22, 51

Ukraine, 22, 136, 186, 191, 226–32

Union of Russian Fascists, 172

Union of Soviet Writers, 242

UNRA (Ukrainian People's Army), 229

UPA (Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army), 229

Urals, 63, 72, 129

Urals-Kuznetsk Basin Combine, 53, 60, 98–103

*Vil'na Ukraina* (Free Ukraine), 229, 232

Vinnitsa, 129, 190

Vladimir, 245

VOAPP (Vsesoiuznoe ob"edinennie assosiatsii proletarskikh pisatelei – All-Union Union of Associations of Proletarian Writers), 115–16

Volga Basin, 41–2

Voroshilov, K.E., 21, 172–4, 200

Voznesensky, N.A., 243, 252

Warsaw, 174

Weiss, F., 174

World War, 3, 6–7, 14, 99, 224–6, 244, 248

Young Pioneers, 112

Zhdanov, A.A., 11–13, 15–17, 131, 172, 200, 227, 236, 240, 243, 248, 252

Zinoviev, G.E., 10, 168–81

zinovievites, [167](#)–81

Zoshchenko, M., [240](#)–3

ZRK (zakritii rabochii kooperativ – closed workers’ co-operative), [138](#)

*Zvezda* (The Star), [240](#)–3, [250](#)

- 1 Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk under Soviet Rule* (Cambridge, 1958), 242–3, provides reflections of this decision on the oblast level. Soviet verification appears in *Istoriia SSSR c drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei*, seriia 2, VIII (1967), 550–1.
- 2 *KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh* VI, 36–8, 57–9.
- 3 *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* XXI, no. 50, 9–15
- 4 The pertinent party decisions appear in *Partiinoe Stroitel'stva*, 20 March 1937, 15 April 1938, 1 February 1939, and 15 August 1939.
- 5 *KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh* VI, 20
- 6 *Ibid.*, 36–137