

LENIN

Against
Revisionism





Workers of All Countries, Unite!

V. I. Lenin

Against Revisionism



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PREFACE

This book traces Lenin's consistent and irreconcilable struggle against revisionism, opportunism and dogmatism in the international and Russian labour movement.

Lenin disclosed the essence of revisionism, its economic, social and gnosiological roots. He revealed its international character and the forms it assumes in the different countries and under differing historical conditions. He demonstrated its ruinous effect on the international labour movement. Lenin wrote, "Revisionism—revision of Marxism—is today one of the chief manifestations, if not the chief, of bourgeois influence on the proletariat and bourgeois corruption of the workers" (see p. 180 of this book).*

Revisionism first made its appearance in the closing years of the century. After the death of Engels in 1895 the struggle against revolutionary Marxism took the form of "correction" and "amendment" of the Marxist theory. The emergence of revisionism, Lenin proved, was by no means fortuitous. It cannot be attributed to mistakes of individuals or groups, nor to the influence of national peculiarities and traditions.

Its roots should be sought in the capitalist economic system. The appearance of opportunism in the labour and Social-Democratic movement was inevitable, chiefly because of the steady influx of petty-bourgeois elements into the working class and the influence of petty-bourgeois ideas on the workers' parties.

"The enlistment of larger and larger numbers of new 'recruits', the attraction of new sections of working people," Lenin wrote in "Differences in the European Labour Move-

* All further references are to this book.—Ed.

ment," "must inevitably be accompanied by waverings in the sphere of theory and tactics, by repetitions of old mistakes, by a temporary reversion to antiquated views and antiquated methods, and so forth" (p. 125).

One of the contributing factors of opportunism in the labour movement is the privileged position of the "labour aristocracy", with which the bourgeoisie shares part of its super-profits from colonial exploitation. In way of life, habits and outlook this is a bourgeois stratum, and from its ranks come the parliamentary, trade union and Social-Democratic party leaders who, with their preachment of class peace, act as agents of the bourgeoisie within the labour movement. Lenin wrote of the labour aristocracy:

"They represent a stratum, or groups, or sections of the working class which *objectively* have been bribed by the bourgeoisie (by better wages, positions of honour, etc.), and which help *their* own bourgeoisie to plunder and oppress small and weak peoples and to fight *for* the division of the capitalist spoils" (p. 344).

Revisionism, Lenin showed, is merely a continuation of the ideological struggle the bourgeoisie wages against revolutionary ideas, though the revisionists nominally subscribe to Marxism. That is evidence of the victory of Marxism, of its vitality. For, as Lenin remarked, "the dialectics of history were such that the theoretical victory of Marxism compelled its enemies to *disguise themselves* as Marxists. Liberalism, rotten within, tried to revive itself in the form of socialist *opportunism*" (see p. 138).

In the realm of theory, the revisionists, from the very start, opposed to revolutionary Marxism their opportunistic philosophy. They advanced the demagogic slogan of "freedom of criticism", and while they did not venture to reject Marxism openly and completely, they sought to "refute" it piecemeal, by "amending" its basic tenets. Their contention was that many of the fundamental Marxist propositions were outdated, refuted by practice, etc. Freedom of criticism, Lenin remarked, became the disguise for freedom to convert Social-Democracy into a reformist party, the disguise for freedom for opportunism in the Social-Democratic movement.

The works included in this collection reflect Lenin's struggle against anti-Marxist theories in the Russian and international

proletarian liberation movement, a struggle begun by Marx and Engels.

In his prefaces to the Russian translations of Marx's letters to Dr. Kugelmann and the Sorge correspondence, and in the article "Marxism and Revisionism", Lenin concisely describes the struggle Marx and Engels waged against the idealists, vulgar economists, Proudhonists, Blanquists, Lassalleans and the German, British, French and other opportunists. He observes that what runs like a red thread through the whole of Marx's correspondence is the warning against the "Right wing" of the German party, "a merciless (sometimes—as with Marx in 1877-79—a *furious*) war against *opportunism* in Social-Democracy" (p. 72). Lenin admires the straightforward opposition of Marx and Engels to opportunism, the consistency with which they combated "... such a vulgarisation (*Verluderung*—an *even stronger* word in German) of Party and theory" (p. 73).—"The result of Marx's 'furious' attack was that the opportunists retreated and—made themselves scarce" (p. 74)—wrote Lenin in reference to the isolation of the Right-wing opportunists in the German Social-Democratic Party in 1879-82.

With the emergence of imperialism, which aggravated all the contradictions of capitalism, revisionism presented an especially grave danger. The struggle for socialist revolution became a practical task. Under such conditions the victory of revisionism would have meant capitulation to the bourgeoisie; the socialist revolution would have been retarded and the proletarian liberation movement would have been hurled back. That is why Lenin was so passionate and irreconcilable in combating the revisionists, emphasising that to replace Marxism by reformism and convert the revolutionary party into a reformist party was tantamount to political suicide. He resolutely fought every variety of opportunism in Russia—"legal Marxism", "Economism", Menshevism, and its offshoot, Trotskyism, and safeguarded revolutionary theory from distortion and vulgarisation.

Lenin repeatedly emphasised that revisionism like every other species of opportunism, was not a national but international phenomenon. It gained wide currency at the turn of the century in every European country. In Germany, its exponents were the Bernsteinians, in France, the advocates of socialist

participation in bourgeois governments, in Britain, the Fabians, and in Russia, the legal Marxists, "Economists" and, in later years, the Menshevik Liquidators. "All belong to the same family," Lenin wrote, "all extol each other, learn from each other, and together take up arms against 'dogmatic' Marxism" (pp. 37-38).

In the "Preface to the Collection *Twelve Years*", Lenin reconstructs the history of the struggle against the Russian "critics of Marx", that is, the "legal Marxists", who sought to adapt Marxism to the requirements and tastes of the bourgeoisie. The polemic with their spokesman, P. B. Struve, was, in Lenin's words, "sharp and definite (in its Social-Democratic conclusions)" (p. 95), inasmuch as Struve in his criticism of the Narodnik movement, gravitated not towards proletarian socialism, but towards bourgeois liberalism. His deviation from Marxism, indiscernible at first glance, was exposed and defined by Lenin. In the article "The Collapse of the Second International", written later, Lenin reminds his readers that "Struivism is not merely a Russian, but . . . an international striving on the part of the bourgeois theoreticians . . . to take from Marxism all that is acceptable to the 'liberal bourgeoisie, including the struggle for reforms, the class struggle (without the proletarian dictatorship) . . . and cast aside 'only' the living soul of Marxism, 'only' its revolutionary content" (p. 230).

The struggle between the revolutionary and opportunist trends in the Russian Social-Democracy dates back to the rise of the mass labour and Social-Democratic movement. From the very start the revolutionary Marxists were obliged to safeguard Marxism against distortion and vulgarisation by the "legal Marxists" and "Economists". The *Protest by Russian Social-Democrats* was the first official collective document against one of the detachments of international revisionism—a document that struck not only at the Russian "Economists", but at the West-European Bernsteinians as well. The battle against "Economism", which for the Communists of Russia is a stage long past, has not lost its topical significance for the movement in the capitalist countries. For now, too, "Economism", or the attempt of the latter-day distorters of Marxism to confine the workers' class struggle to economic demands, finds various manifestations in a number of capitalist countries.

Russian "Economism" was defeated in 1903, but the struggle against revisionism continued. At the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party revisionism found expression in the demand to exclude from the Party programme some of the key propositions of Marxism, namely, dictatorship of the proletariat, self-determination of nations and proletarian support for the peasant movement. The revisionists also insisted on an opportunistic version of the Party Rules (the federation principle of organisation, Party members not to be allowed direct contact with the Central Committee, persons not belonging to Party units to be considered Party members, etc.). This was rejection of democratic centralism, and it would have thrown the Party open to unstable elements and fellow-travellers of the revolution.

In the "Preface to the Collection *Twelve Years*", Lenin shows how opportunism in organisational matters is organically linked with revisionism on questions of programme, policy and tactics. This found clear expression in the Menshevik policy during the first Russian revolution. "The Bolsheviks claimed for the proletariat the role of *leader* in the democratic revolution. The Mensheviks reduced its role to that of an 'extreme opposition'" (p. 107), that is, in effect, to the role of an auxiliary of the bourgeoisie.

After the defeat of the revolution the Mensheviks openly sided with counter-revolutionary liberalism. They renounced the revolutionary struggle, claiming that the labour movement had no prospect of victory, and set out to destroy Party organisations, thereby trying to liquidate the proletarian party. They sought to replace it with a loose organisation to be inaugurated by a so-called labour congress and made up largely of petty-bourgeois elements. The liquidators found willing helpers in the conciliators and in Trotsky, who took a Centrist stand. Their slogan—a thoroughly fraudulent one—was "unity", based not on acceptance of principles, but unprincipled unity of Marxists with semi-reformists and avowed reformists. Thus, repudiation of revolutionary Marxism in theory led to liquidationism.

The article "Disruption of Unity Under Cover of Outcries for Unity", exposes the policy of Trotsky who, under the guise of "non-factionalism", wanted to unite the Bolsheviks

with anti-Party factions and groups abroad that had no roots or support in the Russian movement. Like the liquidators, Trotsky insisted that Russia follow the example of Western Europe where the revolutionary and opportunist elements "coexisted" in one and the same party. Lenin wrote in this connection: "What appeals to the liquidators and Trotsky is only the *European* models of opportunism, but certainly not the models of *European* partisanship" (p. 197). Lenin's consistent and irreconcilable struggle against the liquidators was a struggle for revolutionary Marxism, because Russian liquidationism, as Lenin emphasised, was "ideologically connected with *renegacy*, with the *renunciation of the programme and tactics*, with *opportunism*" (p. 142).

Another article that played an important part in the battle against revisionism is "Marxism and Revisionism", in which Lenin sharply criticises revisionism in philosophy, political economy and scientific socialism.

In the realm of philosophy, the revisionists followed in the wake of bourgeois science and attacked dialectical and historical materialism. In political economy, they rejected the fundamentals of Marx's economic doctrine—his theory of value, concentration of production, inevitability of crises and of the collapse of capitalism. They also rejected Marx's theory of class struggle, socialist revolution and proletarian dictatorship, maintaining that there was no need for the proletariat to work and fight for its ultimate goal—socialism.

Lenin made this prediction: "The ideological struggle waged by revolutionary Marxism against revisionism at the end of the nineteenth century is but the prelude to the great revolutionary battles of the proletariat, which is marching forward to the complete victory of its cause despite all the waverings and weaknesses of the petty bourgeoisie" (p. 118).

The struggle against anarcho-syndicalism holds an important place in Lenin's writings. He regarded anarcho-syndicalism as a product and manifestation of bourgeois influence on the proletariat, as a variety of revisionism and showed that the anarcho-syndicalists and revisionists subscribed to the same views and principles:

"Both of them hinder the thing that is most important and most urgent, namely, to unite the workers in big, powerful and properly functioning organisations, capable of function-

ing well under *all* circumstances, permeated with the spirit of the class struggle, clearly realising their aims and trained in the true Marxist world outlook" (p. 126).

This selection includes several of Lenin's articles against social-chauvinism. On the eve and during the imperialist war of 1914-18, the enemies of Marxism resorted to the poisoned weapon of nationalism and chauvinism to incite inter-national enmity. The frenzied arms race was accompanied by a vicious propaganda campaign—their country was in imminent danger of attack, the people were told. This was the psychological conditioning for war, ostensibly a liberation war, but in actual fact an imperialist war for redivision of the imperialist-controlled world. The bourgeoisie called for a "civil truce" and sought to inculcate in the masses the idea that class contradictions vanish in time of war. That bourgeois slogan was seized upon by the opportunists.

The Second International leaders openly joined sides with their imperialist governments. In the article "The Position and Tasks of the Socialist International", written shortly after the outbreak of the war, Lenin declared that the "Second International is dead, overcome by opportunism" (p. 209). Opportunism, which had been developing within the Social-Democratic parties for several decades, had grown into social-chauvinism. Lenin wrote in "The Collapse of the Second International": "To defend and strengthen their privileged position as a petty-bourgeois 'upper stratum' or aristocracy (and bureaucracy) of the working class—such is the natural wartime continuation of petty-bourgeois opportunist hopes and the corresponding tactics, such is the economic foundation of present-day social-imperialism" (pp. 250-51).

Lenin showed how the chauvinists and Kautskyites, or Centrists, were resorting to sophistry to "depict this imperialist and predatory war for colonies as a people's war, a war of defence", and sought to "justify" it by "citing historical examples of *non-imperialist* wars" (p. 219). Lenin exposed the Second International leaders as traitors to the working class and accomplices in imperialist banditry. He urged workers in all countries to realise the measure of political depravity of socialists who had come out in defence of their imperialist bourgeoisie. He demanded that the Left, internationalist elements break with "their" social-chauvinists and conduct

a resolute struggle against the unjust war of aggrandisement with the aim of overthrowing the imperialist bourgeoisie, that is, transforming the imperialist war into civil war.

Lenin's struggle for the purity of Marxist theory brought fierce attacks from the avowed opportunists and Centrists, especially during the First World War.

Lenin wrote at the time: "Such is my fate. One battle after another against political stupidity, vulgarity, opportunism, etc.

"It has been that way ever since 1893. And it has earned me the hatred of the philistines. Well, I would not exchange this fate for 'peace' with the philistines" (p. 339).

On the eve of the Great October Socialist Revolution the question of the role and tasks of the proletarian state assumed particular importance, not only from the theoretical standpoint, but as a practical political issue.

In *The State and Revolution*, Lenin re-established and developed the views of Marx and Engels on the state, distorted and vulgarised by Kautsky and the other Second International opportunists. Lenin emphasised that the theory of proletarian dictatorship was the chief element in Marxism: "Only he is a Marxist who *extends* the recognition of the class struggle to the recognition of the *dictatorship of the proletariat*" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 412).

Lenin showed how Kautsky opportunistically perverted the key proposition of Marxism that the old state machine would have to be destroyed in the course of the socialist revolution and a new state machine built. Kautsky refused to acknowledge the need to destroy the old state machine and establish proletarian dictatorship, claiming that the question could be left "for the future". He evaded an appraisal of the Paris Commune, confining himself to general phrases that it is quite impossible to foresee all the vicissitudes of proletarian revolution. Lenin proved that behind this evasion of a straightforward answer on the question of the proletarian state, was Kautsky's admiration of the bureaucratic bourgeois state and an attempt to shield his opportunism with disquisitions about the impossibility of predicting the concrete forms the future state would take. In criticising Kautsky, Lenin made a prediction that has been brilliantly confirmed in our day. He wrote: "The transition

from capitalism to communism is certainly bound to yield a tremendous abundance and variety of political forms, but the essence will inevitably be the same: *the dictatorship of the proletariat*" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 413).

After the Great October Socialist Revolution Kautsky attacked the proletarian dictatorship in Russia. In *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, Lenin forcibly exposed Kautsky's renegacy and his distortion of Marx's teaching on the state and proletarian dictatorship. Lenin laid bare the counter-revolutionary implications of Kautsky's attempt to refute Marx on this question and depict Marx as a believer in capitalism's peaceful growing over into socialism and a defender of "pure" (i.e., bourgeois) democracy.

Kautsky stooped to outright falsification in his attempt to prove that the October Revolution was not a socialist revolution. Lenin exposed this trickery, showing how, on the basic question of proletarian dictatorship, Kautsky monstrously departed from Marxism: Marx, he asserted, had mentioned proletarian dictatorship only "in passing". Kautsky took from Marxism what was acceptable to the liberals and the bourgeoisie and played down what was unacceptable to them—the workers' revolutionary struggle against the bourgeoisie. In developing Marx's theory of the revolution, Lenin proved that suppression of the inevitable resistance of the exploiter classes would make it necessary for the working class to establish its dictatorship and rally all the working people around it.

Analysing the experience of the October Revolution and proletarian dictatorship in Russia, Lenin indicated the ways and methods of building the state of the new type, the new, proletarian democracy. He pointed out that the tactics of the Russian Communists, who had directed the building of the world's first proletarian dictatorship, were of international significance. He wrote: "Bolshevism has indicated the right road of escape from the horrors of war and imperialism... Bolshevism can serve as a model of tactics for all" (p. 434).

Exposing the anti-Marxist nature of Kautsky's arguments on democracy and dictatorship, and his praise of hypocritical bourgeois democracy, Lenin showed that proletarian, Soviet democracy was genuine people's democracy. "Proletarian democracy is a million times more democratic than any

bourgeois democracy; Soviet power is a million times more democratic than the most democratic bourgeois republic" (p. 389).

Other items in this book relate to Lenin's struggle against anti-Party groups within the C.P.S.U. in 1920-21, when Soviet Russia was passing to peaceful economic development.

The Trotskyites tried to foist on the Party a policy of outright coercion in relation to the masses, and the "Workers' Opposition" insisted that administration of the entire national economy be entrusted to the "producers". Both these trends imperilled the very existence of the proletarian state, for they would undermine the alliance of workers and peasants—the very foundation of Soviet power—and cancel out the leading role of the Party in the Soviet political system and in the building of socialism.

The resolutions Lenin drew up for the Tenth Party Congress, On Party Unity and The Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation in Our Party, are characteristic of his unremitting and consistent efforts to safeguard the Party's ideological and organisational unity, to preserve it as a militant collective of like-minded people against all attempts to weaken and undermine its solidity.

Lenin combated not only revisionism. The articles included in this book are directed also against dogmatism, against attempts to convert Marxism into a collection of ossified, lifeless formulae. Leninism originated and developed in constant struggle on two fronts—against dogmatism and sectarianism and against revisionism. The dogmatists and revisionists are twins, not antipodes, and revisionism often goes hand in hand with dogmatism. In "Our Revolution" Lenin criticises the dogmatism of the Mensheviks and Second International leaders: "They all call themselves Marxists, but their conception of Marxism is impossibly pedantic. They have completely failed to understand what is decisive in Marxism, namely, its revolutionary dialectics" (p. 547).

The Mensheviks reiterated the lie coined by the Second International leaders that Russia had not reached the point where the development of the productive forces made socialism possible—she had not matured for socialism, she lacked an adequate degree of civilisation. To this Lenin replied: "You

say that civilisation is necessary for the building of socialism. Very good. But why could we not first create such prerequisites of civilisation in our country as the expulsion of the landowners and the Russian capitalists, and then start moving towards socialism?" (p. 550). History has fully vindicated the path chartered by Lenin and followed by the Soviet revolution. Having ousted the landowners and capitalists and taken over political power, the working class created the necessary conditions for building socialism and fostering cultural development. In a brief space of time the Soviet Union overcame the backwardness of centuries, built socialism, achieved unparalleled progress in socialist culture and became the acknowledged centre and mainstay of progressive science.

Lenin demonstrated that for the Mensheviks and Second International leaders, with their dogmatic conceptions of Marxism, dialectics was a closed book. The idea was wholly alien to them that the general laws of historical development do not preclude, but presuppose individual phases of development with their own distinctive forms and sequences. Pointing to some of the specific features of the socialist revolution in Russia, Lenin declared that revolutions in the East would produce many more peculiarities. "Our European philistines never even dream that the subsequent revolutions in Oriental countries, which possess much vaster populations and a much vaster diversity of social conditions, will undoubtedly display even greater peculiarities than the Russian revolution" (p. 550).

That has been fully confirmed by the socialist revolutions in European and Asian countries and the liberation of many nations from colonial oppression.

But Lenin also emphasised that there are common laws and features applicable to the socialist revolution and the building of socialist society in all countries. Proceeding from that proposition, the Declaration of the Moscow Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries (November 14-16, 1957) formulated these general laws as follows: "Guidance of the working masses by the working class, the core of which is the Marxist-Leninist Party, in effecting a proletarian revolution in one form or another and establishing one form or another of the dictatorship of the proletariat; the alliance

of the working class and the bulk of the peasantry and other sections of the working people; the abolition of capitalist ownership and the establishment of public ownership of the basic means of production; gradual socialist reconstruction of agriculture; planned development of the national economy aimed at building socialism and communism, at raising the standard of living of the working people; the carrying out of the socialist revolution in the sphere of ideology and culture and the creation of a numerous intelligentsia devoted to the working class, the working people and the cause of socialism; the abolition of national oppression and the establishment of equality and fraternal friendship among peoples; defence of the achievements of socialism against attacks by external and internal enemies; solidarity of the working class of the country concerned with the working class of other countries, that is, proletarian internationalism."

The advance of the world communist movement, the triumph of socialism and the building of communism in the U.S.S.R., the emergence and strengthening of the world socialist camp, the mounting influence of Marxism-Leninism throughout the world—all this has given rise to malice and fury among the reactionaries and imperialists. They are intensifying their attacks on Marxism-Leninism, endeavouring to discredit socialism both as a theory and as a socio-economic system. Bourgeois influence is the inner source of revisionism; capitulation under imperialist pressure is its external source. This ideological attack on the communist movement manifests itself in all manner of revisionist sallies in the Communist and Workers' Parties.

Now as in the past, revisionism renounces all the fundamental propositions of Marxism—revolutionary struggle against capitalism, proletarian dictatorship, the leading role of the working class and its Marxist-Leninist party in the socialist revolution and the building of socialism and communism.

The principal feature of latter-day revisionism—and one which it shares in common with the old revisionism—is embellishment and idealisation of capitalism. The revisionists are at pains to obscure or conceal capitalism's incurable maladies and evils. Accordingly, they renounce the Marxist theory of crises and the capitalist production cycle, deny

that impoverishment of the workers is an intrinsic process of capitalist society and maintain that state-monopoly capitalism is "near-socialism". From this they conclude that there is no need for socialist revolution, for capitalism can grow into socialism peacefully. These theories run counter to the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism and are clearly refuted by the course of social development.

One of the basic features of revisionism is distortion, or outright negation, of the Marxist theory of the class struggle. The revisionists claim that the class interests of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie are not irreconcilable. They repeat the bourgeois lie that, under modern capitalism, there can be no division between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between capitalist employer and wage-worker, because both groups supposedly share in the process of production, and the workers are themselves becoming employers by acquiring shares. These vicious fairy-tales cannot, of course, conceal or disguise capitalist exploitation, nor the constantly-operating trend towards sharper antagonism between capital and labour. Revisionist theory cannot remove the basis of the class struggle, which is inherent in the very nature of the capitalist system.

The revisionists openly attack the very essence of Marxism -dictatorship of the proletariat. Benedikt Kautsky, son of Karl Kautsky, has declared that the new programme of the Austrian Socialist Party does not contain the "fatal words 'proletarian dictatorship'", and that "dictatorship in whatever form and under whatever name must be rejected". At the same time, the revisionists extol bourgeois democracy as "pure" democracy though actually it is only a form of bourgeois dictatorship.

Characteristic of modern revisionism is its departure from the principles of proletarian internationalism, its acceptance of bourgeois nationalism and its efforts to undermine the unity of the workers' and communist movement and the camp of socialist countries. Among other things, this finds expression in negation of the common features and laws of socialist revolution and the building of socialism, laws that are obligatory for all countries, irrespective of national peculiarities. "National communism", a slogan coined by the imperialist ideologists in the U.S.A. and other countries, has

been taken up by some of the revisionists. Its purpose is to sow division among the Communist and Workers' Parties and the socialist countries.

But the most ferocious revisionist attacks are directed against Lenin's teachings on the Marxist party and democratic centralism. In place of revolutionary, centralised Communist and Workers' Parties with their close-knit discipline and ability to guide the working class in its struggle for the socialist reconstruction of society, the revisionists want, in deference to the bourgeoisie, reformist and opportunist parties that do not express the interests of the working class and are not capable of organising the masses to fight for socialism.

Their object is to convert the militant working-class revolutionary political organisations into ineffectual debating societies.

The modern revisionists direct their attacks not only at scientific communism and Marxist political economy, but also at Marxist philosophy.

Their main contention here is that philosophical thought cannot be divided into two distinct camps—materialism and idealism. They reject that division as obsolete, oversimplified and unreflective of the wide range of philosophical trends. Fifty years ago Lenin gave a profound and comprehensive criticism of similar attempts to "rise above" materialism and idealism and showed that there was not a shred of evidence to support them. His views on the two camps in philosophy, materialism and idealism, retain all their validity and significance. For the division of philosophical trends into materialism and idealism can never become obsolete, just as the basic question of philosophy, the relation of being to thinking, will never become obsolete.

The revisionists also attack materialist dialectics, which Lenin described as the very soul of Marxism, and follow in the wake of present-day reactionary idealistic philosophy. True, a section of the revisionists pay lip service to dialectics, but never apply dialectics in political analysis.

Modern revisionism seeks to discredit the great teaching of Marxism-Leninism, denouncing it as "obsolete" and no longer applicable to social development. The revisionists are endeavouring to undermine the faith of the working class

and the working people in socialism, thereby gravely injuring the cause of the working class and the struggle for socialism. Under present conditions revisionism represents the main danger. It is a manifestation of bourgeois ideology and paralyses the revolutionary energy of the working class, seeking to maintain capitalism where it exists, or restore it in countries where it has been abolished. The Communist and Workers' Parties, while considering revisionism to be the main danger, combat also dogmatism and sectarianism. For dogmatism and sectarianism can become the main danger too, and "it is for each Communist Party", says the Moscow Declaration quoted above, "to decide what danger threatens it more at a given time".

Leninism, the Marxism of our age, originated and developed in irreconcilable struggle against revisionism and dogmatism, against all deviations from revolutionary Marxism in theory and practice.

The struggle against revisionism and dogmatism is a necessary condition for the further development of scientific communism and its successful application.

This book was compiled by *N. I. Krutikova* and *N. I. Maze* and edited by *F. V. Konstantinov* and *G. D. Obichkin*.

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A PROTEST BY RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS¹

A MEETING OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS, SEVENTEEN IN NUMBER, HELD AT A CERTAIN PLACE (IN RUSSIA), ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY THE FOLLOWING RESOLUTION AND RESOLVED TO PUBLISH IT AND TO SUBMIT IT TO ALL COMRADES FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION

A tendency has been observed among Russian Social-Democrats recently to depart from the fundamental principles of Russian Social-Democracy that were proclaimed by its founders and foremost fighters, members of the Emancipation of Labour group² as well as by the Social-Democratic publications of the Russian workers' organisations of the nineties. The *Credo* reproduced below, which is presumed to express the fundamental views of certain ("young") Russian Social-Democrats, represents an attempt at a systematic and definite exposition of the "new views". The following is its full text:

"The guild and manufacture period in the West laid a sharp impress on all subsequent history and particularly on the history of Social-Democracy. The fact that the bourgeoisie had to fight for free forms, that it strove to release itself from the guild regulations fettering production, made the bourgeoisie a revolutionary element; everywhere in the West it began with *liberté, fraternité, égalité* (liberty, fraternity, equality), with the achievement of free political forms. By these gains, however, as Bismarck expressed it, it drew a bill on the future payable to its antipode—the working class. Hardly anywhere in the West did the working class, as a class, win the democratic institutions—it made use of them. Against this it may be argued that the working class took part in revolutions. A reference to history will refute this opinion, for, precisely in 1848, when the consolidation of Constitutions took place in the West, the working class represented the urban artisan element, the petty-bourgeois democracy; a factory proletariat hardly existed, while the proletariat employed in large-scale industry (the German weavers depicted by Hauptmann, the weavers of Lyons) represented a wild mass capable only of rioting, but not of advancing any political demands. It can be definitely stated that the Constitutions of 1848 were won by the bourgeoisie and the small urban artisans. On the other hand, the working class (artisans, manufactory workers, printers, weavers, watchmakers, etc.) have been accustomed since the

Middle Ages to membership in organisations, mutual benefit societies, religious societies, etc. This spirit of organisation is still alive among the skilled workers in the West, sharply distinguishing them from the factory proletariat, which submits to organisation badly and slowly and is capable only of *lose-organisation* (temporary organisations) and not of permanent organisations with rules and regulations. It was these manufactory skilled workers that comprised the core of the Social-Democratic parties. Thus, we get the picture: on the one hand, the relative ease of political struggle and every possibility for it; on the other hand, the possibility for the systematic organisation of this struggle with the aid of the workers trained in the manufacturing period. It was on this basis that theoretical and practical Marxism grew up in the West. The starting-point was the parliamentary political struggle with the prospect—only superficially resembling Blanquism, but of totally different origin—of capturing power, on the one hand, and of a *Zusammenbruch* (collapse), on the other. Marxism was the theoretical expression of the prevailing practice: of the political struggle predominating over the economic. In Belgium, in France, and particularly in Germany, the workers organised the political struggle with incredible ease; but it was with enormous difficulty and tremendous friction that they organised the economic struggle. Even to this day the economic organisations as compared with the political organisations (leaving aside England) are extraordinarily weak and unstable, and everywhere *laissez à désirer quelque chose* (leave something to be desired). So long as the energy in the political struggle had not been completely exhausted, *Zusammenbruch* was an essential organisational *Schlagwort* (slogan) destined to play an extremely important historical role. The fundamental law that can be discerned by studying the working-class movement is that of the line of least resistance. In the West, this line was political activity, and Marxism, as formulated in the *Communist Manifesto*, was the best possible form the movement could assume. But when all energy in political activity had been exhausted, when the political movement had reached a point of intensity difficult and almost impossible to surpass (the slow increase in votes in the recent period, the apathy of the public at meetings, the note of despondency in literature), this, in conjunction with the ineffectiveness of parliamentary action and the entry into the arena of the ignorant masses, of the unorganised and almost unorganisable factory proletariat, gave rise in the West to what is now called Bernsteinism, the crisis of Marxism. It is difficult to imagine a more logical course than the period of development of the labour movement from the *Communist Manifesto* to Bernsteinism, and a careful study of this whole process can determine with astronomical exactitude the outcome of this 'crisis'. Here, of course, the issue is not the defeat or victory of Bernsteinism—that is of little interest; it is the radical change in practical activity that has been gradually taking place for a long time within the party.

"The change will not only be towards a more energetic prosecution of the economic struggle and consolidation of the economic organisations, but also, and most importantly, towards a change in the party's attitude to other opposition parties. Intolerant Marxism, negative

Marxism, primitive Marxism (whose conception of the class division of society is too schematic) will give way to democratic Marxism, and the social position of the party within modern society must undergo a sharp change. The party *will recognise* society; its narrow corporative and, in the majority of cases, sectarian tasks will be widened to social tasks, and its striving to seize power will be transformed into a striving for change, a striving to reform present-day society on democratic lines adapted to the present state of affairs, with the object of protecting the rights (all rights) of the labouring classes in the most effective and fullest way. The concept 'politics' will be enlarged and will acquire a truly social meaning, and the practical demands of the moment will acquire greater weight and will be able to count on receiving greater attention than they have been getting up to now.

"It is not difficult to draw conclusions for Russia from this brief description of the course of development taken by the working-class movement in the West. In Russia, the line of least resistance will never tend towards political activity. The incredible political oppression will prompt much talk about it and cause attention to be concentrated precisely on this question, but it will never prompt practical action. While in the West the fact that the workers were drawn into political activity served to strengthen and crystallise their weak forces, in Russia, on the contrary, these weak forces are confronted with a wall of political oppression. Not only do they lack practical ways of struggle against this oppression, and hence, also for their own development, but they are systematically stifled and cannot give forth even weak shoots. If to this we add that the working class in our country has not inherited the spirit of organisation which distinguished the fighters in the West, we get a gloomy picture, one that is likely to drive into despondency the most optimistic Marxist who believes that an extra factory chimney stack will by the very fact of its existence bring great welfare. The economic struggle too is hard, infinitely hard, but it is possible to wage it, and it is in fact being waged by the masses themselves. By learning in this struggle to organise, and coming into constant conflict with the political regime in the course of it, the Russian worker will at last create what may be called a form of the labour movement, the organisation or organisations best conforming to Russian conditions. At present, it can be said with certainty that the Russian working-class movement is still in the amoeba state and has not yet acquired any form. The strike movement, which goes on with any form of organisation, cannot yet be described as the crystallised form of the Russian movement, while the illegal organisations are not worth consideration even from the mere quantitative point of view (quite apart from the question of their usefulness under present conditions).

"Such is the situation. If to this we add the famine and the process of ruination of the countryside, which facilitate *Streikbrecherism*,* and, consequently, the even greater difficulty of raising the masses of the workers to a more tolerable cultural level, then... well, what

* Strike-breaking.—Ed.

is there for the Russian Marxist to do?! The talk about an independent workers' political party merely results from the transplantation of alien aims and alien achievements to our soil. The Russian Marxist, so far, is a sad spectacle. His practical tasks at the present time are paltry, his theoretical knowledge, insofar as he utilises it *not as an instrument for research* but as a schema for activity, is worthless for the purpose of fulfilling even these paltry practical tasks. Moreover, these borrowed patterns are harmful from the practical point of view. Our Marxists, forgetting that the working class in the West entered political activity after that field had already been cleared, are much too contemptuous of the radical or liberal opposition activity of all other non-worker strata of society. The slightest attempt to concentrate attention on public manifestations of a liberal political character rouses the protest of the orthodox Marxists, who forget that a number of historical conditions prevent us from being Western Marxists and demand of us a different Marxism, suited to, and necessary in, Russian conditions. Obviously, the lack in every Russian citizen of political feeling and sense cannot be compensated by talk about politics or by appeals to a non-existent force. This political sense can only be acquired through education, i.e., through participation in that life (however un-Marxian it may be) which is offered by Russian conditions. 'Negation' is as harmful in Russia as it was appropriate (temporarily) in the West, because negation proceeding from something organised and possessing real power is one thing, while negation proceeding from an amorphous mass of scattered individuals is another.

"For the Russian Marxist there is only one course: participation in, i.e., assistance to, the economic struggle of the proletariat, and participation in liberal opposition activity. As a 'negator', the Russian Marxist came on the scene very early, and this negation has weakened the share of his energy that should be turned in the direction of political radicalism. For the time being, this is not terrible; but if the class schema prevents the Russian intellectual from taking an active part in life and keeps him too far removed from opposition circles, it will be a serious loss to all who are compelled to fight for legal forms separately from the working class which has not yet put forward political aims. The political innocence concealed behind the cerebrations of the Russian Marxist intellectual on political topics may play mischief with him."

We do not know whether there are many Russian Social-Democrats who share these views. But there is no doubt that ideas of this kind have their adherents, and we therefore feel obliged to protest categorically against such views and to warn all comrades against the menacing deflection of Russian Social-Democracy from the path it has already marked out—the formation of an independent political working-class party which is inseparable from the class struggle

of the proletariat and which has for its immediate aim the winning of political freedom.

The above-quoted *Credo* represents, first, "a brief description of the course of development taken by the working-class movement in the West", and, secondly, "conclusions for Russia".

First of all, the authors of the *Credo* have an entirely false conception of the history of the West-European working-class movement. It is not true to say that the working class in the West did not take part in the struggle for political liberty and in political revolutions. The history of the Chartist movement³ and the revolutions of 1848 in France, Germany, and Austria prove the opposite. It is absolutely untrue to say that "Marxism was the theoretical expression of the prevailing practice: of the political struggle predominating over the economic". On the contrary, "Marxism" appeared at a time when non-political socialism prevailed (Owenism, "Fourierism", "true socialism", etc.) and the *Communist Manifesto* took up the cudgels at once against non-political socialism. Even when Marxism came out fully armed with theory (*Capital*) and organised the celebrated International Working Men's Association,⁴ the political struggle was by no means the prevailing practice (narrow trade-unionism in England, anarchism and Proudhonism in the Romance countries). In Germany the great historic service performed by Lassalle was the transformation of the working class from an appendage of the liberal bourgeoisie into an independent political party. Marxism linked up the economic and the political struggle of the working class into a single inseparable whole; and the effort of the authors of the *Credo* to separate these forms of struggle is one of their most clumsy and deplorable departures from Marxism.

Further, the authors of the *Credo* also have an entirely wrong conception of the present state of the West-European working-class movement and of the theory of Marxism, under the banner of which that movement is marching. To talk about a "crisis of Marxism" is merely to repeat the nonsense of the bourgeois hacks who are doing all they can to exacerbate every disagreement among the socialists and turn it into a split in the socialist parties. The notorious Bernstein-

ism⁵—in the sense in which it is commonly understood by the general public, and by the authors of the *Credo* in particular—is an attempt to narrow the theory of Marxism, to convert the revolutionary workers' party into a reformist party. As was to be expected, this attempt has been strongly condemned by the majority of the German Social-Democrats. Opportunist trends have repeatedly manifested themselves in the ranks of German Social-Democracy, and on every occasion they have been repudiated by the Party, which loyally guards the principles of revolutionary international Social-Democracy. We are convinced that every attempt to transplant opportunist views to Russia will encounter equally determined resistance on the part of the overwhelming majority of Russian Social-Democrats.

Similarly, there can be no suggestion of a "radical change in the practical activity" of the West-European workers' parties, in spite of what the authors of the *Credo* say: the tremendous importance of the economic struggle of the proletariat, and the necessity for such a struggle, were recognised by Marxism from the very outset. As early as the forties Marx and Engels conducted a polemic against the utopian socialists who denied the importance of this struggle.⁶

When the International Working Men's Association was formed about twenty years later, the question of the importance of trade unions and of the economic struggle was raised at its very first Congress, in Geneva, in 1866. The resolution adopted at that Congress spoke explicitly of the importance of the economic struggle and warned the socialists and the workers, on the one hand, against exaggerating its importance (which the English workers were inclined to do at that time) and, on the other, against underestimating its importance (which the French and the Germans, particularly the Lassalleans,⁷ were inclined to do). The resolution recognised that the trade unions were not only a natural, but also an essential phenomenon under capitalism and considered them an extremely important means for organising the working class in its daily struggle against capital and for the abolition of wage-labour. The resolution declared that the trade unions must not devote attention exclusively to the "immediate struggle against capital", must not remain aloof

from the general political and social movement of the working class; they must not pursue "narrow" aims, but must strive for the general emancipation of the millions of oppressed workers. Since then the workers' parties in the various countries have discussed the question many times and, of course, will discuss it again and again—whether to devote more or less attention at any given moment to the economic or to the political struggle of the proletariat; but the general question, or the question in principle, today remains as it was presented by Marxism. The conviction that the class struggle of the proletariat must necessarily combine the political and the economic struggle into one integral whole has entered into the flesh and blood of international Social-Democracy. The experience of history has, furthermore, incontrovertibly proved that absence of political freedom, or restriction of the political rights of the proletariat, always make it necessary to put the political struggle in the forefront.

Still less can there be any suggestion of a serious change in the attitude of the workers' party towards the other opposition parties. In this respect, too, Marxism has mapped out the correct line, which is equally remote from exaggerating the importance of politics, from conspiracy (Blanquism,⁸ etc.), and from decrying politics or reducing it to opportunist, reformist social tinkering (anarchism, utopian and petty-bourgeois socialism, state socialism, professorial socialism, etc.). The proletariat must strive to form independent political workers' parties, the main aim of which must be the capture of political power by the proletariat for the purpose of organising socialist society. The proletariat must not regard the other classes and parties as "one reactionary mass"⁹; on the contrary, it must take part in all political and social life, support the progressive classes and parties against the reactionary classes and parties, support every revolutionary movement against the existing system, champion the interests of every oppressed nationality or race, of every persecuted religion, of the disfranchised sex, etc. The arguments the *Credo* authors advance on this subject merely reveal a desire to obscure the class character of the struggle of the proletariat, weaken this struggle by a meaningless "recognition of society", and reduce revolutionary Marxism to a trivial

reformist trend. We are convinced that the overwhelming majority of Russian Social-Democrats will resolutely reject this distortion of the fundamental principles of Social-Democracy. Their erroneous premises regarding the West-European working-class movement led the authors of the *Credo* to draw still more erroneous "conclusions for Russia".

The assertion that the Russian working class "has not yet put forward political aims" simply reveals ignorance of the Russian revolutionary movement. The North-Russian Workers' Union formed in 1878 and the South-Russian Workers' Union formed in 1875 put forward even then the demand for political liberty in their programmes. After the reaction of the eighties, the working class repeatedly put forward the same demand in the nineties. The assertion that "the talk about an independent workers' political party merely results from the transplantation of alien aims and alien achievements to our soil" reveals a complete failure to understand the historical role of the Russian working class and the most vital tasks of Russian Social-Democracy. Apparently, the programme of the authors of the *Credo* inclines to the idea that the working class, following "the line of least resistance", should confine itself to the economic struggle, while the "liberal opposition elements" fight, with the "participation" of the Marxists, for "legal forms". The application of such a programme would be tantamount to the political suicide of Russian Social-Democracy, it would greatly retard and debase the Russian working-class movement and the Russian revolutionary movement (for us the two concepts coincide). The mere fact that it was possible for a programme like this to appear shows how well grounded were the fears expressed by one of the foremost champions of Russian Social-Democracy, P. B. Axelrod, when, at the end of 1897, he wrote of the possibility of the following prospect:

"The working-class movement keeps to the narrow rut of purely economic conflicts between the workers and employers and, in itself, taken as a whole, is not of a political character, while in the struggle for political freedom the advanced strata of the proletariat follow the revolutionary circles and groups of the so-called intelligentsia" (Axelrod, *Present Tasks and Tactics of the Russian Social-Democrats*, Geneva, 1898, p. 19).

Russian Social-Democrats must declare determined war upon the whole body of ideas expressed in the *Credo*, for these ideas lead straight to the realisation of this prospect. Russian Social-Democrats must bend every effort to translate into reality another prospect, outlined by P. B. Axelrod in the following words:

"The other prospect: Social-Democracy organises the Russian proletariat into an independent political party which fights for liberty, partly side by side and in alliance with the bourgeois revolutionary groups (if such should exist), and partly by recruiting directly into its ranks or securing the following of the most democratic-minded and revolutionary elements from among the intelligentsia" (ibid., p. 20).

At the time P. B. Axelrod wrote the above lines the declarations made by Social-Democrats in Russia showed clearly that the overwhelming majority of them adhered to the same point of view. It is true that one St. Petersburg workers' paper, *Rabochaya Mysl*,¹⁰ seemed to incline towards the ideas of the authors of the *Credo*. In a leading article setting forth its programme (No. 1, October 1897) it expressed, regretably, the utterly erroneous idea, an idea running counter to Social-Democracy, that the "economic basis of the movement" may be "obscured by the effort to keep the political ideal constantly in mind". At the same time, however, another St. Petersburg workers' newspaper, *S. Peterburgsky Rabochy Listok*¹¹ (No. 2, September 1897), emphatically expressed the opinion that "the overthrow of the autocracy... can be achieved only by a well-organised and numerically strong working-class party" and that "organised in a strong party" the workers will "emancipate themselves, and the whole of Russia, from all political and economic oppression". A third newspaper, *Rabochaya Gazeta*,¹² in its leading article in issue No. 2 (November 1897), wrote: "The fight against the autocratic government for political liberty is the immediate task of the Russian working-class movement." "The Russian working-class movement will increase its forces tenfold if it comes out as a single harmonious whole, with a common name and a well-knit organisation..." "The separate workers' circles should combine into one common party." "The Russian workers' party will be a Social-Democratic Party."

That precisely these views of *Rabochaya Gazeta* were fully shared by the vast majority of Russian Social-Democrats is seen, furthermore, from the fact that the Congress of Russian Social-Democrats¹³ in the spring of 1898 formed the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, published its manifesto and recognised *Rabochaya Gazeta* as the official Party organ. Thus, the *Credo* authors are taking an enormous step backward from the stage of development which Russian Social-Democracy has already achieved and which it has recorded in the *Manifesto of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party*. Since the frenzied persecution by the Russian Government has led to the present situation in which the Party's activity has temporarily subsided and its official organ has ceased publication, it is the task of all Russian Social-Democrats to exert every effort for the utmost consolidation of the Party, to draw up a Party programme and revive its official organ. In view of the ideological vacillations evidenced by the fact that programmes like the above-examined *Credo* can appear, we think it particularly necessary to emphasise the following fundamental principles that were expounded in the *Manifesto* and that are of enormous importance to Russian Social-Democracy. First, Russian Social-Democracy "desires to be and to remain the class movement of the organised working masses". Hence it follows that the motto of Social-Democracy must be: aid to the workers, not only in their economic, but also in their political struggle; agitation, not only in connection with immediate economic needs, but also in connection with all manifestations of political oppression; propaganda, not only of the ideas of scientific socialism, but also of democratic ideas. Only the theory of revolutionary Marxism can be the banner of the class movement of the workers, and Russian Social-Democracy must concern itself with the further development and implementation of this theory and must safeguard it against the distortions and vulgarisations to which "fashionable theories" are so often subjected (and the successes of revolutionary Social-Democracy in Russia have already made Marxism a "fashionable" theory). While concentrating all their present efforts on activity among factory and mine workers, Social-Democrats must not forget that with the expansion of the movement home workers,

handicraftsmen, agricultural labourers, and the millions of ruined and starving peasants must be drawn into the ranks of the labouring masses they organise.

Secondly: "On his strong shoulders the Russian working class must and will carry to a finish the cause of winning political liberty." Since its immediate task is the overthrow of the autocracy, Social-Democracy must act as the vanguard in the fight for democracy, and consequently, if for no other reason, must give every support to all democratic elements of the population of Russia and win them as allies. Only an independent working-class party can serve as a strong bulwark in the fight against the autocracy, and only in alliance with such a party, only by supporting it, can all the other fighters for political liberty play an effective part.

Thirdly and finally: "As a socialist movement and trend, the Russian Social-Democratic Party carries on the cause and the traditions of the whole preceding revolutionary movement in Russia; considering the winning of political liberty to be the most important of the immediate tasks of the Party as a whole, Social-Democracy marches towards the goal that was already clearly indicated by the glorious representatives of the old Narodnaya Volya.¹⁴" The traditions of the whole preceding revolutionary movement in Russia demand that the Social-Democrats shall at the present time concentrate all their efforts on organising the Party, on strengthening its internal discipline, and on developing the technique for illegal work. If the members of the old Narodnaya Volya managed to play an enormous role in the history of Russia, despite the fact that only narrow social strata supported the few heroes, and despite the fact that it was by no means a revolutionary theory which served as the banner of the movement, then Social-Democracy, relying on the class struggle of the proletariat, will be able to render itself invincible. "The Russian proletariat will throw off the yoke of autocracy in order to continue the struggle against capitalism and the bourgeoisie for the complete victory of socialism with still greater energy."

We invite all groups of Social-Democrats and all workers' circles in Russia to discuss the above-quoted *Credo* and our resolution, and to express a definite opinion on the question

raised, in order that all differences may be removed and the work of organising and strengthening the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party may be accelerated.

Groups and circles may send their resolutions to the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad¹⁵ which, by Point 10 of the decision of the 1898 Congress of Russian Social-Democrats, is a part of the Russian Social-Democratic Party and its representative abroad.

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WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

BURNING QUESTIONS OF OUR MOVEMENT

(Excerpts)

I

DOGMATISM AND "FREEDOM OF CRITICISM"

A. WHAT DOES "FREEDOM OF CRITICISM" MEAN?

"Freedom of criticism" is undoubtedly the most fashionable slogan at the present time, and the one most frequently employed in the controversies between socialists and democrats in all countries. At first sight, nothing would appear to be more strange than the solemn appeals to freedom of criticism made by one of the parties to the dispute. Have voices been raised in the advanced parties against the constitutional law of the majority of European countries which guarantees freedom to science and scientific investigation? "Something must be wrong here," will be the comment of the onlooker who has heard this fashionable slogan repeated at every turn but has not yet penetrated the essence of the disagreement among the disputants; "evidently this slogan is one of the conventional phrases which, like nicknames, become legitimised by use, and become almost generic terms."

In fact, it is no secret for anyone that two trends have taken form in present-day international* Social-Democracy. The conflict between these trends now flares up in a bright

* Incidentally, in the history of modern socialism this is a phenomenon, perhaps unique and in its way very consoling, namely, that the strife of the various trends within the socialist movement has from national become international. Formerly, the disputes between Lassalleans and Eisenachers, between Guesdists and Possibilists, between Fabians¹⁶ and Social-Democrats, and between Narodnaya Volya adherents and Social-Democrats, remained confined within purely national frameworks, reflecting purely national features, and proceeding, as it were, on different planes. At the present time (as is now evident), the English Fabians, the French Ministerialists,¹⁷ the German Bernsteinians, and the Russian Critics¹⁸—all belong to the same family, all extol each other, learn from each other, and together take up arms

flame and now dies down and smoulders under the ashes of imposing "truce resolutions". The essence of the "new" trend, which adopts a "critical" attitude towards "obsolete dogmatic" Marxism, has been clearly enough *presented* by Bernstein and *demonstrated* by Millerand.

Social-Democracy must change from a party of social revolution into a democratic party of social reforms. Bernstein has surrounded this political demand with a whole battery of well-attuned "new" arguments and reasonings. Denied was the possibility of putting socialism on a scientific basis and of demonstrating its necessity and inevitability from the point of view of the materialist conception of history. Denied was the fact of growing impoverishment, the process of proletarianisation, and the intensification of capitalist contradictions; the very concept, "*ultimate aim*", was declared to be unsound, and the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat was completely rejected. Denied was the antithesis in principle between liberalism and socialism. Denied was *the theory of the class struggle*, on the alleged grounds that it could not be applied to a strictly democratic society governed according to the will of the majority, etc.

Thus, the demand for a decisive turn from revolutionary Social-Democracy to bourgeois social-reformism was accompanied by a no less decisive turn towards bourgeois criticism of all the fundamental ideas of Marxism. In view of the fact that this criticism of Marxism has long been directed from the political platform, from university chairs, in numerous pamphlets and in a series of learned treatises, in view of the fact that the entire younger generation of the educated classes has been systematically reared for decades on this criticism, it is not surprising that the "new critical" trend in Social-Democracy should spring up, all complete, like Minerva from the head of Jove. The content of this new trend did not have to grow and take shape, it was transferred bodily from bourgeois to socialist literature.

To proceed. If Bernstein's theoretical criticism and political yearnings were still unclear to anyone, the French took the

against "dogmatic" Marxism. In this first really international battle with socialist opportunism, international revolutionary Social-Democracy will perhaps become sufficiently strengthened to put an end to the political reaction that has long reigned in Europe?

trouble strikingly to demonstrate the "new method". In this instance, too, France has justified its old reputation of being "the land where, more than anywhere else, the historical class struggles were each time fought out to a decision..." (Engels, Introduction to Marx's *Der 18 Brumaire*). The French socialists have begun, not to theorise, but to act. The democratically more highly developed political conditions in France have permitted them to put "Bernsteinism into practice" immediately, with all its consequences. Millerand has furnished an excellent example of practical Bernsteinism; not without reason did Bernstein and Vollmar rush so zealously to defend and laud him. Indeed, if Social-Democracy, in essence, is merely a party of reform and must be bold enough to admit this openly, then not only has a socialist the right to join a bourgeois cabinet, but he must always strive to do so. If democracy, in essence, means the abolition of class domination, then why should not a socialist minister charm the whole bourgeois world by orations on class collaboration? Why should he not remain in the cabinet even after the shooting-down of workers by gendarmes has exposed, for the hundredth and thousandth time, the real nature of the democratic collaboration of classes? Why should he not personally take part in greeting the tsar, for whom the French socialists now have no other name than hero of the gallows, knout, and exile (*knouteur, pendeur et déportateur*)? And the reward for this utter humiliation and self-degradation of socialism in the face of the whole world, for the corruption of the socialist consciousness of the working masses—the only basis that can guarantee our victory—the reward for this is pompous *projects* for miserable reforms, so miserable in fact that much more has been obtained from bourgeois governments!

He who does not deliberately close his eyes cannot fail to see that the new "critical" trend in socialism is nothing more nor less than a new variety of *opportunism*. And if we judge people, not by the glittering uniforms they don or by the high-sounding appellations they give themselves, but by their actions and by what they actually advocate, it will be clear that "freedom of criticism" means freedom for an opportunist trend in Social-Democracy, freedom to convert Social-Democracy into a democratic party of reform, freedom

to introduce bourgeois ideas and bourgeois elements into socialism.

"Freedom" is a grand word, but under the banner of freedom for industry the most predatory wars were waged, under the banner of freedom of labour, the working people were robbed. The modern use of the term "freedom of criticism" contains the same inherent falsehood. Those who are really convinced that they have made progress in science would not demand freedom for the new views to continue side by side with the old, but the substitution of the new views for the old. The cry heard today, "Long live freedom of criticism", is too strongly reminiscent of the fable of the empty barrel.

We are marching in a compact group along a precipitous and difficult path, firmly holding each other by the hand. We are surrounded on all sides by enemies, and we have to advance almost constantly under their fire. We have combined, by a freely adopted decision, for the purpose of fighting the enemy, and not of retreating into the neighbouring marsh, the inhabitants of which, from the very outset, have reproached us with having separated ourselves into an exclusive group and with having chosen the path of struggle instead of the path of conciliation. And now some among us begin to cry out: Let us go into the marsh! And when we begin to shame them, they retort: What backward people you are! Are you not ashamed to deny us the liberty to invite you to take a better road! Oh, yes, gentlemen! You are free not only to invite us, but to go yourselves wherever you will, even into the marsh. In fact, we think that the marsh is your proper place, and we are prepared to render *you* every assistance to get there. Only let go of our hands, don't clutch at us and don't besmirch the grand word freedom, for we too are "free" to go where we please, free to fight not only against the marsh, but also against those who are turning towards the marsh!

B. THE NEW ADVOCATES OF "FREEDOM OF CRITICISM"

Now, this slogan ("freedom of criticism") has in recent times been solemnly advanced by *Rabocheye Dyelo* (No. 10), organ of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad,

not as a theoretical postulate, but as a political demand, as a reply to the question, "Is it possible to unite the Social-Democratic organisations operating abroad?": "For a durable unity, there must be freedom of criticism" (p. 36).

From this statement two definite conclusions follow: (1) that *Rabocheye Dyelo* has taken under its wing the opportunist trend in international Social-Democracy in general, and (2) that *Rabocheye Dyelo* demands freedom for opportunism in Russian Social-Democracy. Let us examine these conclusions.

Rabocheye Dyelo is "particularly" displeased with the "inclination of *Iskra* and *Zarya*¹⁹ to predict a rupture between the *Mountain* and the *Gironde*²⁰ in international Social-Democracy".*

"Generally speaking," writes B. Krichevsky, editor of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, "this talk of the *Mountain* and the *Gironde* heard in the ranks of Social-Democracy represents a shallow historical analogy, a strange thing to come from the pen of a Marxist. The *Mountain* and the *Gironde* did not represent different temperaments, or intellectual trends, as the historians of social thought may think, but different classes or strata—the middle bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat, on the other. In the modern socialist movement, however, there is no conflict of class interests; the socialist movement in its entirety, in *all* of its diverse forms [Krichevsky's italics], including the most pronounced Bernsteinians, stands on the basis of the class interests of the proletariat and its class struggle for political and economic emancipation" (pp. 32-33).

A bold assertion! Has not Krichevsky heard of the fact, long ago noted, that it is precisely the extensive participation of an "academic" *stratum* in the socialist movement in recent years that has promoted such a rapid spread of Bernsteinism? And what is most important—on what does our

* A comparison of the two trends within the revolutionary proletariat (the revolutionary and the opportunist), and the two trends within the revolutionary bourgeoisie in the eighteenth century (the Jacobin, known as the *Mountain*, and the Girondist) was made in the leading article in No. 2 of *Iskra* (February 1901). The article was written by Plekhanov. The Cadets,²¹ the Bezzaglavtsi,²² and the Mensheviks to this day love to refer to Jacobinism in Russian Social-Democracy. But how Plekhanov came to apply this concept for the first time against the Right wing of Social-Democracy—about this they prefer to keep silent or to forget. (Author's note to the 1907 edition. —Ed.)

author found his opinion that even "the most pronounced Bernsteinians" stand on the basis of the class struggle for the political and economic emancipation of the proletariat? No one knows. This determined defence of the most pronounced Bernsteinians is not supported by any argument or reasoning whatever. Apparently, the author believes that if he repeats what the most pronounced Bernsteinians say about themselves his assertion requires no proof. But can anything more "shallow" be imagined than this judgement of an entire trend based on nothing more than what the representatives of that trend say about themselves? Can anything more shallow be imagined than the subsequent "homily" on the two different and even diametrically opposite types, or paths, of party development? (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, pp. 34-35.) The German Social-Democrats, in other words, recognise complete freedom of criticism, but the French do not, and it is precisely their example that demonstrates the "bane of intolerance".

To this we can only say that the very example B. Krichevsky affords us attests to the fact that the name Marxists is at times assumed by people who conceive history literally in the "Ilovaisky manner".²³ To explain the unity of the German Socialist Party and the disunity of the French Socialist Party, there is no need whatever to go into the special features in the history of these countries, to contrast the conditions of military semi-absolutism in the one with republican parliamentarism in the other, to analyse the effects of the Paris Commune²⁴ and the effects of the Anti-Socialist Law,²⁵ to compare the economic life and economic development of the two countries, or to recall that "the unexampled growth of German Social-Democracy" was accompanied by a strenuous struggle, unique in the history of socialism, not only against erroneous theories (Mühlberger, Dühring,* the

* At the time Engels dealt his blows at Dühring, many representatives of German Social-Democracy inclined towards the latter's views, and accusations of acerbity, intolerance, uncomradely polemics, etc., were hurled at Engels even publicly at a Party Congress. At the Congress of 1877, Most, and his supporters, introduced a resolution to prohibit the publication of Engels's articles in *Vorwärts*²⁶ because "they do not interest the overwhelming majority of the readers", and Vahlteich declared that their publication had caused great damage to the Party, that Dühring too had rendered services to Social-

*Katheders-Socialists*²⁷), but also against erroneous tactics (Lassalle), etc., etc. All that is superfluous! The French quarrel among themselves because they are intolerant; the Germans are united because they are good boys.

And observe, this piece of matchless profundity is designed to "refute" the fact that puts to rout the defence of the Bernsteinians. The question whether or not the Bernsteinians *stand* on the basis of the class struggle of the proletariat is one that can be completely and irrevocably answered only by historical experience. Consequently, the example of France holds greatest significance in this respect, because France is the only country in which the Bernsteinians attempted to *stand* independently, on their own feet, with the warm approval of their German colleagues (and partly also of the Russian opportunists; cf. *Rabocheye Dyelo* No. 2-3, pp. 83-84). The reference to the "intolerance" of the French, apart from its "historical" significance (in the Nozdryov sense²⁸), turns out to be merely an attempt to hush up very unpleasant facts with angry invectives.

Nor are we inclined to make a present of the Germans to Krichevsky and the numerous other champions of "freedom of criticism". If the "most pronounced Bernsteinians" are still tolerated in the ranks of the German party, it is only to the extent that they *submit* to the Hanover resolution, which emphatically rejected Bernstein's "amendments", and to the Lübeck resolution,²⁹ which (notwithstanding the diplomatic terms in which it is couched) contains a direct warning to Bernstein. It is debatable, from the standpoint of the interests of the German party, whether diplomacy was appropriate and whether, in this case, a bad peace is better than a good quarrel; in short, opinions may differ as to the expediency of any one of the *methods* employed to reject Bernsteinism, but that the German party *did reject* Bernsteinism on two occasions is a fact no one can fail to see.

Democracy: "We must utilise everyone in the interests of the Party; let the professors engage in polemics if they care to do so, but *Vorwärts* is not the place in which to conduct them" (*Vorwärts*. No. 65, June 6, 1877). Here we have another example of the defence of "freedom of criticism", and our legal critics and illegal opportunists, who love so much to cite the example of the Germans, would do well to ponder it!

Therefore, to think that the German example confirms the thesis that "The most pronounced Bernsteinians stand on the basis of the class struggle of the proletariat, for political and economic emancipation", means to fail completely to understand what is going on under our very eyes.*

Nor is that all. As we have seen, *Rabocheye Dyelo* demands "freedom of criticism" and defends Bernsteinism before *Russian* Social-Democracy. Apparently it convinced itself that we were unfair to our "Critics" and Bernsteinians. But to which ones? who? where? when? What did the unfairness represent? About this, not a word. *Rabocheye Dyelo* does not name a single Russian Critic or Bernsteinian! We are left with but one of two possible suppositions. Either the unfairly treated party is none other than *Rabocheye Dyelo* itself (this is confirmed by the fact that in the two articles in No. 10 reference is made only to the wrongs suffered by *Rabocheye Dyelo* at the hands of *Zarya* and *Iskra*). If that is the case, how is the strange fact to be explained that *Rabocheye Dyelo*, which always vehemently dissociates itself from all solidarity with Bernsteinism, could not defend itself without putting in a word in defence of the "most pronounced Bernsteinians" and of freedom of criticism? Or some third persons have been treated unfairly. If this is the case, then what reasons may there be for not naming them?

* It should be observed that *Rabocheye Dyelo* has always confined itself to a bare statement of facts concerning Bernsteinism in the German party and completely "refrained" from expressing its own opinion. See, for instance, the reports of the Stuttgart Congress³⁰ in No. 2-3 (p. 66), in which all the disagreements are reduced to "tactics" and the statement is merely made that the overwhelming majority remain true to the previous revolutionary tactics. Or, No. 4-5 (p. 25, et seq.), in which we have nothing but a paraphrasing of the speeches delivered at the Hanover Congress, with a reprint of Bebel's resolution. An exposition and a criticism of Bernstein's views are again put off (as was the case in No. 2-3) to be dealt with in a "special article". Curiously enough, in No. 4-5 (p. 33), we read the following: "... the views expounded by Bebel have the support of the vast majority of the Congress", and a few lines thereafter: "... David defended Bernstein's views... First of all, he tried to show that ... Bernstein and his friends, after all is said and done [*sic!*], stand on the basis of the class struggle..." This was written in December 1899, and in September 1901 *Rabocheye Dyelo*, apparently no longer believing that Bebel was right, repeats David's views as its own!

We see, therefore, that *Rabocheye Dyelo* is continuing to play the game of hide-and-peek it has played (as we shall show below) ever since its founding. And let us note further this *first* practical application of the vaunted "freedom of criticism". In actual fact, not only was it forthwith reduced to abstention from all criticism, but also to abstention from expressing independent views altogether. The very *Rabocheye Dyelo*, which avoids mentioning Russian Bernsteinism as if it were a shameful disease (to use Starover's apt expression), proposes, for the treatment of this disease, *to copy word for word* the latest German prescription for the German variety of the malady! Instead of freedom of criticism—slavish (worse: apish) imitation! The very same social and political content of modern international opportunism reveals itself in a variety of ways according to national peculiarities. In one country the opportunists have long ago come out under a separate flag; in another, they have ignored theory and in fact pursued the policy of the Radicals-Socialists; in a third, some members of the revolutionary party have deserted to the camp of opportunism and strive to achieve their aims, not in open struggle for principles and for new tactics, but by gradual, imperceptible, and, if one may so put it, unpunishable corruption of their party; in a fourth country, similar deserters employ the same methods in the gloom of political slavery, and with a completely original combination of "legal" and "illegal" activity, etc. To talk of freedom of criticism and of Bernsteinism as a condition for uniting the *Russian* Social-Democrats and not to explain how *Russian* Bernsteinism has manifested itself and what particular fruits it has borne, amounts to talking with the aim of saying nothing.

Let us ourselves try, if only in a few words, to say what *Rabocheye Dyelo* did not want to say (or which was, perhaps, beyond its comprehension).

C. CRITICISM IN RUSSIA

The chief distinguishing feature of Russia in regard to the point we are examining is that *the very beginning* of the spontaneous working-class movement, on the one hand, and of the turn of progressive public opinion towards

Marxism, on the other, was marked by the combination of manifestly heterogeneous elements under a common flag to fight the common enemy (the obsolete social and political world outlook). We refer to the heyday of "legal Marxism". Speaking generally, this was an altogether curious phenomenon that no one in the eighties or the beginning of the nineties would have believed possible. In a country ruled by an autocracy, with a completely enslaved press, in a period of desperate political reaction in which even the tiniest outgrowth of political discontent and protest is persecuted, the theory of revolutionary Marxism suddenly forces its way into the *censored* literature and, though expounded in Aesopian language, is understood by all the "interested". The government had accustomed itself to regarding only the theory of the (revolutionary) Narodnaya Volya as dangerous, without, as is usual, observing its internal evolution, and rejoicing at *any* criticism levelled against it. Quite a considerable time elapsed (by our Russian standards) before the government realised what had happened and the unwieldy army of censors and gendarmes discovered the new enemy and flung itself upon him. Meanwhile, Marxist books were published one after another, Marxist journals and newspapers were founded, nearly everyone became a Marxist, Marxists were flattered, Marxists were courted, and the book publishers rejoiced at the extraordinary, ready sale of Marxist literature. It was quite natural, therefore, that among the Marxian neophytes who were caught up in this atmosphere, there should be more than one "author who got a swelled head. . ." ³¹.

We can now speak calmly of this period as of an event of the past. It is no secret that the brief period in which Marxism blossomed on the surface of our literature was called forth by an alliance between people of extreme and of very moderate views. In point of fact, the latter were bourgeois democrats; this conclusion (so markedly confirmed by their subsequent "critical" development) suggested itself to some even when the "alliance" was still intact.*

* The reference is to an article by K. Tulin directed against Struve. (See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, pp. 333-507.—Ed.) The article was based on an essay entitled "The Reflection of Marxism in Bourgeois Literature". (Author's note to the 1907 edition.—Ed.)

That being the case, are not the revolutionary Social-Democrats who entered into the alliance with the future "Critics" mainly responsible for the subsequent "confusion"? This question, together with a reply in the affirmative, is sometimes heard from people with too rigid a view. But such people are entirely in the wrong. Only those who are not sure of themselves can fear to enter into temporary alliances even with unreliable people; not a single political party could exist without such alliances. The combination with the legal Marxists was in its way the first really political alliance entered into by Russian Social-Democrats. Thanks to this alliance, an astonishingly rapid victory was obtained over Narodism, and Marxist ideas (even though in a vulgarised form) became very widespread. Moreover, the alliance was not concluded altogether without "conditions". Evidence of this is the burning by the censor, in 1895, of the Marxist collection *Material on the Question of the Economic Development of Russia*.³² If the literary agreement with the legal Marxists can be compared with a political alliance, then that book can be compared with a political treaty.

The rupture, of course, did not occur because the "allies" proved to be bourgeois democrats. On the contrary, the representatives of the latter trend are natural and desirable allies of Social-Democracy insofar as its democratic tasks, brought to the fore by the prevailing situation in Russia, are concerned. But an essential condition for such an alliance must be the full opportunity for the socialists to reveal to the working class that its interests are diametrically opposed to the interests of the bourgeoisie. However, the Bernsteinian and "critical" trend, to which the majority of the legal Marxists turned, deprived the socialists of this opportunity and demoralised the socialist consciousness by vulgarising Marxism, by advocating the theory of the blunting of social contradictions, by declaring the idea of the social revolution and of the dictatorship of the proletariat to be absurd, by reducing the working-class movement and the class struggle to narrow trade-unionism and to a "realistic" struggle for petty, gradual reforms. This was synonymous with bourgeois democracy's denial of socialism's right to independence and, consequently, of its right to existence; in practice it meant a

striving to convert the nascent working-class movement into an appendage of the liberals.

Naturally, under such circumstances the rupture was necessary. But the "peculiar" feature of Russia manifested itself in the fact that this rupture simply meant the elimination of the Social-Democrats from the most accessible and widespread "legal" literature. The "ex-Marxists", who took up the flag of "criticism" and who obtained almost a monopoly to "demolish" Marxism, entrenched themselves in this literature. Catchwords like "Against orthodoxy" and "Long live freedom of criticism" (now repeated by *Rabocheye Dyelo*) forthwith became the vogue, and the fact that neither the censor nor the gendarmes could resist this vogue is apparent from the publication of *three* Russian editions of the work of the celebrated Bernstein (celebrated in the Herostratean sense) and from the fact that the works of Bernstein, Mr. Prokopovich, and others were recommended by Zubatov³³ (*Iskra* No. 10). A task now devolved upon the Social-Democrats that was difficult in itself and was made incredibly more difficult by purely external obstacles—the task of combating the new trend. This trend did not confine itself to the sphere of literature. The turn towards "criticism" was accompanied by an infatuation for "Economism" among Social-Democratic practical workers.

The manner in which the connection between, and interdependence of, legal criticism and illegal Economism arose and grew is in itself an interesting subject, one that could serve as the theme of a special article. We need only note here that this connection undoubtedly existed. The notoriety deservedly acquired by the *Credo* was due precisely to the frankness with which it formulated this connection and blurted out the fundamental political tendency of "Economism"—let the workers carry on the economic struggle (it would be more correct to say the trade-unionist struggle, because the latter also embraces specifically working-class politics) and let the Marxist intelligentsia merge with the liberals for the political "struggle". Thus, trade-unionist work "among the people" meant fulfilling the first part of this task, while legal criticism meant fulfilling the second. This statement was such an excellent weapon against Economism that, had

there been no *Credo*, it would have been worth inventing one.

The *Credo* was not invented, but it was published without the consent and perhaps even against the will of its authors. At all events, the present writer, who took part in dragging this new "programme" into the light of day,* has heard complaints and reproaches to the effect that copies of the résumé of the speakers' views were distributed, dubbed the *Credo*, and even published in the press together with the protest! We refer to this episode because it reveals a very peculiar feature of our Economism—fear of publicity. This is a feature of Economism generally, and not of the authors of the *Credo* alone. It was revealed by that most outspoken and honest advocate of Economism, *Rabochaya Mysl*, and by *Rabochey Dyelo* (which was indignant over the publication of "Economist" documents in the *Vademecum*), as well as by the Kiev Committee, which two years ago refused to permit the publication of its *profession de foi*,³⁵ together with a repudiation of it,** and by many other individual representatives of Economism.

This fear of criticism displayed by the advocates of freedom of criticism cannot be attributed solely to craftiness (although, on occasion, no doubt craftiness is brought into play: it would be improvident to expose the young and as yet frail shoots of the new trend to attacks by opponents). No, the majority of the Economists look with sincere resentment (as by the very nature of Economism they must) upon all theoretical controversies, factional disagreements, broad political questions, plans for organising revolutionaries, etc. "Leave all that to the people abroad!" said a fairly consistent Economist to me one day, thereby expressing a very widespread (and again purely trade-unionist) view; our concern

* The reference is to the *Protest of the Seventeen* against the *Credo*. The present writer took part in drawing up this protest (the end of 1899). The protest and the *Credo* were published abroad in the spring of 1900. (See pp. 25-36.—*Ed.*) It is now known from the article written by Madame Kuskova (I think in *Byloye*³⁴ that she was the author of the *Credo* and that Mr. Prokopovich was very prominent among the "Economists" abroad at the time. (Author's note to the 1907 edition.—*Ed.*)

** As far as our information goes, the composition of the Kiev Committee has changed since then.

is the working-class movement, the workers' organisations here, in our localities; all the rest is merely the invention of doctrinaires, "the overrating of ideology", as the authors of the letter, published in *Iskra* No. 12, expressed it, in unison with *Rabocheye Dyelo* No. 10.

The question now arises: such being the peculiar features of Russian "criticism" and Russian Bernsteinism, what should have been the task of those who sought to oppose opportunism in deeds and not merely in words? First, they should have made efforts to resume the theoretical work that had barely begun in the period of legal Marxism and that fell anew on the shoulders of the comrades working underground. Without such work the successful growth of the movement was impossible. Secondly, they should have actively combated the legal "criticism" that was perverting people's minds on a considerable scale. Thirdly, they should have actively opposed confusion and vacillation in the practical movement, exposing and repudiating every conscious or unconscious attempt to degrade our programme and our tactics.

That *Rabocheye Dyelo* did none of these things is well known; we shall have occasion below to deal with this well-known fact in detail and from various aspects. At the moment, however, we desire merely to show the glaring contradiction that exists between the demand for "freedom of criticism" and the specific features of our native criticism and Russian Economism. It suffices but to glance at the text of the resolution in which the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad endorsed the point of view of *Rabocheye Dyelo*.

"In the interests of the further ideological development of Social-Democracy, we recognise the freedom of criticism of Social-Democratic theory in Party literature to be absolutely necessary insofar as the criticism does not run counter to the class and revolutionary character of this theory" (*Two Conferences*, p. 10).

And the motivation? The resolution "in its first part coincides with the resolution of the Lübeck Party Congress on Bernstein"... In the simplicity of their souls the "Unionists" failed to observe what a *testimonium paupertatis* (attestation of poverty) they betray with this copying... "But ... in its

second part, it restricts freedom of criticism much more than did the Lübeck Party Congress."

The resolution of the Union Abroad, then, is directed against the Russian Bernsteinians? If it is not, then the reference to Lübeck would be utterly absurd. But it is not true to say that it "restricts freedom of criticism". In adopting their Hanover resolution, the Germans, point by point, rejected *precisely* the amendments proposed by Bernstein, while in their Lübeck resolution they cautioned *Bernstein personally*, by naming him. Our "free" imitators, however, make *not a single allusion to a single manifestation of specifically Russian "criticism" and Russian Economism*. In view of this omission, the bare reference to the class and revolutionary character of the theory leaves far wider scope for misinterpretation, particularly when the Union Abroad refuses to identify "so-called Economism" with opportunism (*Two Conferences*, p. 8, Paragraph 1). But all this, in passing. The main thing to note is that the positions of the opportunists in relation to the revolutionary Social-Democrats in Russia are diametrically opposed to those in Germany. In that country, as we know, the revolutionary Social-Democrats are in favour of preserving that which exists—the old programme and the tactics, which are universally known and have been elucidated in all their details by many decades of experience. But the "Critics" desire to introduce changes, and since these Critics represent an insignificant minority, and since they are very timid in their revisionist efforts, one can understand the motives of the majority in confining themselves to the dry rejection of "innovations". In Russia, however, it is the Critics and the Economists who are in favour of preserving that which exists: the "Critics" want us to go on regarding them as Marxists and to guarantee them the "freedom of criticism" they enjoyed to the full (for, in fact, they never recognised any kind of *party ties**, and, moreover, we never had a generally recognised party body

* The fact alone of the absence of public party ties and party traditions, representing as it does a cardinal difference between Russia and Germany, should have warned all sensible socialists against blind imitation. But here is an instance of the lengths to which "freedom of criticism" goes in Russia. Mr. Bulgakov, the Russian Critic, utters the following reprimand to the Austrian Critic, Hertz: "Notwithstanding the independence of his conclusions, Hertz, on this point [on the

that could "restrict" freedom of criticism, if only by counsel); the Economists want the revolutionaries to recognise the "sovereign character of the present movement" (*Rabocheye Dyelo* No. 10, p. 25), i.e., to recognise the "legitimacy" of that which exists; they want the "ideologists" not to try to "divert" the movement from the path that "is determined by the interaction of material elements and material environment" ("Letter" in *Iskra*. No. 12); they want to have that struggle recognised as desirable "which it is possible for the workers to wage under the present conditions", and as the only possible struggle, that "which they are actually waging at the present time" ("*Separate Supplement*" to *Rabochaya Mysl*,³⁶ p. 14). We revolutionary Social-Democrats, on the contrary, are dissatisfied with this worship of spontaneity, i.e., of that which exists "at the present moment". We demand that the tactics that have prevailed in recent years be changed: we declare that "before we can unite, and in order that we may unite, we must first of all draw firm and definite lines of demarcation" (see announcement of the publication of *Iskra*).^{*} In a word, the Germans stand for that which exists and reject changes; we demand a change of that which exists, and reject subservience thereto and reconciliation to it.

This "slight" difference our "free" copyists of German resolutions failed to notice.

D. ENGELS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE THEORETICAL STRUGGLE

"Dogmatism, doctrinairism", "ossification of the party—the inevitable retribution that follows the violent strait-lacing of thought"—these are the enemies against which the knightly

question of co-operative societies) apparently remains excessively bound by the opinions of his party, and although he disagrees with it in details, he dare not reject the common principle" (*Capitalism and Agriculture*, Vol. II, p. 287). The subject of a politically enslaved state, in which nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thousand of the population are corrupted to the marrow by political subservience and completely lack the conception of party honour and party ties, superciliously reproves a citizen of a constitutional state for being excessively "bound by the opinion of his party"! Our illegal organisations have nothing else to do, of course, but draw up resolutions on freedom of criticism. . . .

^{*} V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, p. 354.—Ed.

champions of "freedom of criticism" in *Rabocheye Dyelo* rise up in arms. We are very glad that this question has been placed on the order of the day and we would only propose to add to it one other:

And who are the judges?

We have before us two publishers' announcements. One, "The Programme of the Periodical Organ of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad—*Rabocheye Dyelo*" (reprint from No. 1 of *Rabocheye Dyelo*), and the other, the "Announcement of the Resumption of the Publications of the Emancipation of Labour Group". Both are dated 1899, when the "crisis of Marxism" had long been under discussion. And what do we find? We would seek in vain in the first announcement for any reference to this phenomenon, or a definite statement of the position the new organ intends to adopt on this question. Not a word is said about theoretical work and the urgent tasks that now confront it, either in this programme or in the supplements to it that were adopted by the Third Congress of the Union Abroad in 1901 (*Two Conferences*, pp. 15-18). During this entire time the Editorial Board of *Rabocheye Dyelo* ignored theoretical questions, in spite of the fact that these were questions that disturbed the minds of all Social-Democrats the world over.

The other announcement, on the contrary, points first of all to the declining interest in theory in recent years, imperatively demands "vigilant attention to the theoretical aspect of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat", and calls for "ruthless criticism of the Bernsteinian and other anti-revolutionary tendencies" in our movement. The issues of *Zarya* to date show how this programme has been carried out.

Thus, we see that high-sounding phrases against the ossification of thought, etc., conceal unconcern and helplessness with regard to the development of theoretical thought. The case of the Russian Social-Democrats manifestly illustrates the general European phenomenon (long ago noted also by the German Marxists) that the much vaunted freedom of criticism does not imply substitution of one theory for another, but freedom from all integral and pondered theory; it implies eclecticism and lack of principle. Those who have the slightest acquaintance with the actual state of our movement cannot but see that the wide spread of Marxism was

accompanied by a certain lowering of the theoretical level. Quite a number of people with very little, and even a total lack of theoretical training joined the movement because of its practical significance and its practical successes. We can judge from that how tactless *Rabocheye Dyelo* is when, with an air of triumph, it quotes Marx's statement: "Every step of real movement is more important than a dozen programmes."³⁷ To repeat these words in a period of theoretical disorder is like wishing mourners at a funeral many happy returns of the day. Moreover, these words of Marx are taken from his letter on the Gotha Programme, in which he *sharply condemns* eclecticism in the formulation of principles. If you must unite, Marx wrote to the party leaders, then enter into agreements to satisfy the practical aims of the movement, but do not allow any bargaining over principles, do not make theoretical "concessions". This was Marx's idea, and yet there are people among us who seek—in his name—to belittle the significance of theory!

Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement. This idea cannot be insisted upon too strongly at a time when the fashionable preaching of opportunism goes hand in hand with an infatuation for the narrowest forms of practical activity. Yet, for Russian Social-Democrats the importance of theory is enhanced by three other circumstances, which are often forgotten: first, by the fact that our Party is only in process of formation, its features are only just becoming defined, and it has as yet far from settled accounts with the other trends of revolutionary thought that threaten to divert the movement from the correct path. On the contrary, precisely the very recent past was marked by a revival of non-Social-Democratic revolutionary trends (an eventuation regarding which Axelrod long ago warned the Economists). Under these circumstances, what at first sight appears to be an "unimportant" error may lead to most deplorable consequences, and only short-sighted people can consider factional disputes and a strict differentiation between shades of opinion inopportune or superfluous. The fate of Russian Social-Democracy for very many years to come may depend on the strengthening of one or the other "shade".

Secondly, the Social-Democratic movement is in its very essence an international movement. This means, not only that

we must combat national chauvinism, but that an incipient movement in a young country can be successful only if it makes use of the experiences of other countries. In order to make use of these experiences it is not enough merely to be acquainted with them, or simply to copy out the latest resolutions. What is required is the ability to treat these experiences critically and to test them independently. He who realises how enormously the modern working-class movement has grown and branched out will understand what a reserve of theoretical forces and political (as well as revolutionary) experience is required to carry out this task.

Thirdly, the national tasks of Russian Social-Democracy are such as have never confronted any other socialist party in the world. We shall have occasion further on to deal with the political and organisational duties which the task of emancipating the whole people from the yoke of autocracy imposes upon us. At this point, we wish to state only that the *role of vanguard fighter can be fulfilled only by a party that is guided by the most advanced theory*. To have a concrete understanding of what this means, let the reader recall such predecessors of Russian Social-Democracy as Herzen, Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, and the brilliant galaxy of revolutionaries of the seventies; let him ponder over the world significance which Russian literature is now acquiring; let him . . . but be that enough!

Let us quote what Engels said in 1874 concerning the significance of theory in the Social-Democratic movement. Engels recognises, *not two* forms of the great struggle of Social-Democracy (political and economic), as is the fashion among us, *but three, placing the theoretical struggle on a par with the first two*. His recommendations to the German working-class movement, which had become strong, practically and politically, are so instructive from the standpoint of present-day problems and controversies, that we hope the reader will not be vexed with us for quoting a long passage from his prefatory note to *Der deutsche Bauernkrieg*,* which has long become a great bibliographical rarity:

* Dritter Abdruck. Leipzig, 1875. Verlag der Genossenschaftsbuchdruckerei. (*The Peasant War in Germany*. Third impression. Co-operative Publishers, Leipzig, 1875.—Ed.)

"The German workers have two important advantages over those of the rest of Europe. First, they belong to the most theoretical people of Europe; and they have retained that sense of theory which the so-called 'educated' classes of Germany have almost completely lost. Without German philosophy, which preceded it, particularly that of Hegel, German scientific socialism—the only scientific socialism that has ever existed—would never have come into being. Without a sense of theory among the workers, this scientific socialism would never have entered their flesh and blood as much as is the case. What an immeasurable advantage this is may be seen, on the one hand, from the indifference towards all theory, which is one of the main reasons why the English working-class movement crawls along so slowly in spite of the splendid organisation of the individual unions; on the other hand, from the mischief and confusion wrought by Proudhonism, in its original form, among the French and Belgians, and, in the form further caricatured by Bakunin, among the Spaniards and Italians.

"The second advantage is that, chronologically speaking, the Germans were about the last to come into the workers' movement. Just as German theoretical socialism will never forget that it rests on the shoulders of Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Owen—three men who, in spite of all their fantastic notions and all their utopianism, have their place among the most eminent thinkers of all times, and whose genius anticipated innumerable things, the correctness of which is now being scientifically proved by us—so the practical workers' movement in Germany ought never to forget that it has developed on the shoulders of the English and French movements, that it was able simply to utilise their dearly bought experience, and could now avoid their mistakes, which in their time were mostly unavoidable. Without the precedent of the English trade unions and French workers' political struggles, without the gigantic impulse given especially by the Paris Commune, where would we be now?

"It must be said to the credit of the German workers that they have exploited the advantages of their situation with rare understanding. For the first time since a workers' movement has existed, the struggle is being conducted pursuant to its three sides—the theoretical, the political, and the

practical-economic (resistance to the capitalists)—in harmony and in its interconnections, and in a systematic way. It is precisely in this, as it were, concentric attack, that the strength and invincibility of the German movement lies.

“Due to this advantageous situation, on the one hand, and to the insular peculiarities of the English and the forcible suppression of the French movement, on the other, the German workers have for the moment been placed in the vanguard of the proletarian struggle. How long events will allow them to occupy this post of honour cannot be foretold. But let us hope that as long as they occupy it, they will fill it fittingly. This demands redoubled efforts in every field of struggle and agitation. In particular, it will be the duty of the leaders to gain an ever clearer insight into all theoretical questions, to free themselves more and more from the influence of traditional phrases inherited from the old world outlook, and constantly to keep in mind that socialism, since it has become a science, demands that it be pursued as a science, i.e., that it be studied. The task will be to spread with increased zeal among the masses of the workers the ever more clarified understanding thus acquired, to knit together ever more firmly the organisation both of the party and of the trade unions. . .

“If the German workers progress in this way, they will not be marching exactly at the head of the movement—it is not at all in the interest of this movement that the workers of any particular country should march at its head—but they will occupy an honourable place in the battle line; and they will stand armed for battle when either unexpectedly grave trials or momentous events demand of them increased courage, increased determination and energy.”

Engels's words proved prophetic. Within a few years the German workers were subjected to unexpectedly grave trials in the form of the Exceptional Law Against the Socialists. And they met those trials armed for battle and succeeded in emerging from them victorious.

The Russian proletariat will have to undergo trials immeasurably graver; it will have to fight a monster compared with which an anti-socialist law in a constitutional country seems but a dwarf. History has now confronted us with an immediate task which is the *most revolutionary* of all the *immediate* tasks confronting the proletariat of any country.

The fulfilment of this task, the destruction of the most powerful bulwark, not only of European, but (it may now be said) of Asiatic reaction, would make the Russian proletariat the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat. And we have the right to count upon acquiring this honourable title, already earned by our predecessors, the revolutionaries of the seventies, if we succeed in inspiring our movement, which is a thousand times broader and deeper, with the same devoted determination and vigour.

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of 1901-February 1902

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Vol. 5

**PREFACE TO THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION
OF KARL MARX'S
LETTERS TO Dr. KUGELMANN**

Our purpose in issuing as a separate pamphlet the full collection of Marx's letters to Kugelmann published in the German Social-Democratic weekly, *Neue Zeit*,³⁸ is to acquaint the Russian public more closely with Marx and Marxism. As was to be expected, a good deal of space in Marx's correspondence is devoted to personal matters. This is exceedingly valuable material for the biographer. But for the general public, and for the Russian working class in particular, those passages in the letters which contain theoretical and political material are infinitely more important. In the revolutionary period we are now passing through, it is particularly instructive for us to make a careful study of this material, which reveals Marx as a man who responded directly to all questions of the labour movement and world politics. The editors of *Neue Zeit* are quite right in saying that "we are elevated by an acquaintance with the personality of men whose thoughts and wills took shape in the period of great upheavals". Such an acquaintance is doubly necessary to the Russian socialist in 1907, for it provides a wealth of very valuable material indicating the direct tasks confronting socialists in every revolution through which a country passes. Russia is experiencing a "great upheaval" at this very moment. In the present Russian revolution the Social-Democrat should more and more frequently pattern his policy after that of Marx in the comparatively stormy sixties.

We shall, therefore, permit ourselves to make only brief mention of those passages in Marx's correspondence that are of particular importance from the theoretical standpoint,

and shall deal in greater detail with his revolutionary policy as a representative of the proletariat.

Of outstanding interest as a contribution to a fuller and more profound understanding of Marxism is the letter of July 11, 1868 (p. 42, et seq.).³⁹ In the form of a polemic against the vulgar economists, Marx in this letter very clearly expounds *his* conception of what is called the "labour" theory of value. Those very objections to Marx's theory of value which naturally arise in the minds of the least trained readers of *Capital* and for this reason are most eagerly seized upon by the common or garden representatives of "professorial" bourgeois "science", are here analysed by Marx briefly, simply, and with remarkable lucidity. Marx here shows the road he took and the road to be taken towards elucidation of the law of value. He teaches us his *method*, using the most common objections as illustrations. He makes clear the connection between such a purely (it would seem) theoretical and abstract question as the theory of value and "the interest of the ruling classes", which must be "to perpetuate confusion". It is only to be hoped that everyone who begins to study Marx and read *Capital* will read and re-read this letter when studying the first and most difficult chapters of that book.

Other passages in the letters that are very interesting from the theoretical standpoint are those in which Marx passes judgement on various writers. When you read these opinions of Marx—vividly written, full of passion and revealing a profound interest in all the great ideological trends and in an analysis of them—you realise that you are listening to the words of a great thinker. Apart from the remarks on Dietzgen, made in passing, the comments on the Proudhonists (p. 17)⁴⁰ deserve particular attention from the reader. The "brilliant" young bourgeois intellectuals who dash "into the thick of the proletariat" at times of social upheaval, and are incapable of acquiring the standpoint of the working class or of carrying on persistent and serious work among the "rank and file" of the proletarian organisations, are depicted with remarkable vividness in a few strokes of the pen.

Take the comment on Dühring (p. 35),⁴¹ which, as it were, anticipates the contents of the famous *Anti-Dühring* written

by Engels (in conjunction with Marx) nine years later. There is a Russian translation of this book by Tsederbaum which, unfortunately, is not only guilty of omissions but is simply a poor translation, with mistakes. Here, too, we have the comment on Thünen, which likewise touches on Ricardo's theory of rent. Marx had already, in 1868, emphatically rejected "Ricardo's errors", which he finally refuted in Volume III of *Capital*, published in 1894, but which to this very day are repeated by the revisionists—from our ultra-bourgeois and even "Black-Hundred"⁴² Mr. Bulgakov to the "almost orthodox" Maslov.

Interesting, too, is the comment on Büchner, with an appraisal of vulgar materialism and of the "superficial nonsense" copied from Lange (the usual source of "professorial" bourgeois philosophy!) (p. 48).⁴³

Let us pass to Marx's revolutionary policy. There is among Social-Democrats in Russia a surprisingly widespread philistine conception of Marxism, according to which a revolutionary period, with its specific forms of struggle and its special proletarian tasks, is almost an anomaly, while a "constitution" and an "extreme opposition" are the rule. In no other country in the world at this moment is there such a profound revolutionary crisis as in Russia—and in no other country are there "Marxists" (belittlers and vulgarisers of Marxism) who take up such a sceptical and philistine attitude towards the revolution. From the fact that the revolution is bourgeois in content they draw the shallow conclusion that the bourgeoisie is *the driving force* of the revolution, that the tasks of the proletariat in this revolution are of an ancillary, not independent, character and that proletarian leadership of the revolution is impossible!

How excellently Marx, in his letters to Kugelmann, exposes this shallow interpretation of Marxism! Here is a letter dated April 6, 1866. At that time Marx had finished his principal work. He had given his final judgement on the German Revolution of 1848 fourteen years before this letter was written. He had himself, in 1850, renounced his socialist illusions that a socialist revolution was impending in 1848. And in 1866, when only just beginning to observe the growth of new political crises, he writes:

"Will our philistines [he is referring to the German bourgeois liberals] at last realise that without a revolution which removes the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns... there must finally come another Thirty Years' War...!" (pp. 13-14).

There is not a shadow of illusion here that the impending revolution (it took place from above, not from below as Marx had expected) would remove the bourgeoisie and capitalism, but a most clear and precise statement that it would remove only the Prussian and Austrian monarchies. And what faith in this bourgeois revolution! What revolutionary passion of a proletarian fighter who realises the vast significance the bourgeois revolution has for the progress of the socialist movement!

Noting "a very interesting" social movement three years later, on the eve of the downfall of the Napoleonic Empire in France, Marx says in a *positive outburst of enthusiasm* that "the Parisians are making a regular study of the recent revolutionary past, in order to prepare themselves for the business of the impending new revolution". And describing the struggle of classes revealed in this study of the past, Marx concludes (p. 56): "And so the whole historical witches' cauldron is bubbling. When will *our country* [Germany] be so far!"⁴⁴

Such is the lesson to be learned from Marx by the Russian Marxist intellectuals, who are debilitated by scepticism, dulled by pedantry, have a penchant for penitent speeches, rapidly tire of the revolution, and yearn, as for a holiday, for the interment of the revolution and its replacement by constitutional prose. From the theoretician and leader of the proletarians they should learn faith in the revolution, the ability to call on the working class to fight for its immediate revolutionary aims to the last, and a firmness of spirit which admits of no faint-hearted whimpering following temporary setbacks of the revolution.

The pedants of Marxism think that this is all ethical twaddle, romanticism, and lack of a sense of reality! No, gentlemen, this is the combination of revolutionary theory and revolutionary policy, without which Marxism becomes Brentanoism, Struvisism and Sombartism.⁴⁵ The Marxian doctrine has fused the theory and practice of the class struggle into one inseparable whole. And he is no Marxist who takes a

theory that soberly states the objective situation and distorts it into a justification of the existing order and even goes to the length of trying to adapt himself as quickly as possible to every temporary decline in the revolution, to discard "revolutionary illusions" as quickly as possible, and to turn to "realistic" tinkering.

In times that were most peaceful, seemingly "idyllic", as Marx expressed it, and "wretchedly stagnant" (as *Neue Zeit* put it), Marx was able to sense the approach of revolution and to rouse the proletariat to a consciousness of its advanced revolutionary tasks. Our Russian intellectuals, who vulgarise Marx in a philistine manner, in the most revolutionary times teach the proletariat a policy of passivity, of submissively "drifting with the current", of timidly supporting the most unstable elements of the fashionable liberal party!

Marx's assessment of the Commune crowns the letters to Kugelmann. And this assessment is particularly valuable when compared with the methods of the Russian Right-wing Social-Democrats. Plekhanov, who after December 1905 faint-heartedly exclaimed: "They should not have taken up arms", had the modesty to compare himself to Marx. Marx, says he, also put the brakes on the revolution in 1870.

Yes, Marx *also* put the brakes on the revolution. But see what a gulf lies between Plekhanov and Marx, in Plekhanov's own comparison!

In November 1905, a month before the first revolutionary wave in Russia had reached its climax, Plekhanov, far from emphatically warning the proletariat, spoke directly of the necessity to *learn to use arms and to arm*. Yet, when the struggle flared up a month later, Plekhanov, without making the slightest attempt to analyse its significance, its role in the general course of events and its connection with previous forms of struggle, hastened to play the part of a penitent intellectual and exclaimed: "They should not have taken up arms."

In September 1870, six months before the Commune, Marx gave a direct warning to the French workers: insurrection would be *an act of desperate folly*, he said in the well-known Address of the International.⁴⁶ He exposed *in advance* the nationalistic illusions of the possibility of a movement in the spirit of 1792. He was able to say, *not after the event*, but many months before: "Don't take up arms."

And how did he behave when this *hopeless* cause, as he himself had called it in September, began to take practical shape in March 1871? Did he use it (as Plekhanov did the December events) to "take a dig" at his enemies, the Proudhonists and Blanquists who were leading the Commune? Did he begin to scold like a schoolmistress, and say: "I told you so, I warned you; this is what comes of your romanticism, your revolutionary ravings"? Did he preach to the Communards, as Plekhanov did to the December fighters, the sermon of the smug philistine: "You should not have taken up arms"?

No. On April 12, 1871, Marx writes an *enthusiastic* letter to Kugelmann—a letter which we would like to see hung in the home of every Russian Social-Democrat and of every literate Russian worker.

In September 1870 Marx had called the insurrection an act of desperate folly; but in April 1871, when he saw the mass movement of the people, he watched it with the keen attention of a participant in great events marking a step forward in the historic revolutionary movement.

This is an *attempt*, he says, to smash the bureaucratic military machine, and not simply to transfer it to different hands. And he has words of the highest praise for the "*heroic*" Paris workers led by the Proudhonists and Blanquists. "What elasticity," he writes, "what historical initiative, what a capacity for sacrifice in these Parisians!... (p. 88). History has no like example of a like greatness."

The *historical initiative* of the masses was what Marx prized above everything else. Ah, if only our Russian Social-Democrats would learn from Marx how to appreciate the *historical initiative* of the Russian workers and peasants in October and December 1905!

Compare the homage paid to the *historical initiative* of the masses by a profound thinker, who foresaw failure six months ahead—and the lifeless, soulless, pedantic: "They should not have taken up arms"! Are these not as far apart as heaven and earth?

And like a *participant* in the mass struggle, to which he reacted with all his characteristic ardour and passion, Marx, then living in exile in London, set to work to criticise the

immediate steps of the "recklessly brave" Parisians who were "*ready to storm heaven*".

Ah, how our present "realist" wiseacres among the Marxists, who in 1906-07 are deriding revolutionary romanticism in Russia, would have sneered at Marx at the time! How people would have scoffed at a *materialist, an economist*, an enemy of utopias, who pays homage to an "attempt" to storm *heaven*! What tears, condescending smiles or commiseration these "men in mufflers"⁴⁷ would have bestowed upon him for his rebel tendencies, utopianism, etc., etc., and for his appreciation of a heaven-storming movement!

But Marx was not inspired with the wisdom of the small gudgeon⁴⁸ who is afraid to discuss the *technique* of the higher forms of revolutionary struggle. It is precisely the *technical* problems of the insurrection that he discussed. Defence or attack?—he asked, as if the military operations were taking place just outside London. And he decided that it must certainly be attack: "*They should have marched at once on Versailles. . . .*"

This was written in April 1871, a few weeks before the great and bloody May. . . .

"They should have marched at once on Versailles"—the insurgents should, those who had begun the "act of desperate folly" (September 1870) of storming heaven.

"They should not have taken up arms" in December 1905 in order to oppose by force the first attempts to take away the liberties that had been won. . . .

Yes, Plekhanov had good reason to compare himself to Marx!

"Second mistake," Marx said, continuing his *technical* criticism: "The Central Committee" (the *military command*—note this—the reference is to the Central Committee of the National Guard) "*surrendered its power too soon. . . .*"

Marx knew how to warn the *leaders* against a premature rising. But his attitude towards the heaven-storming *proletariat* was that of a practical adviser, of a participant in the *struggle* of the masses, who were raising the *whole* movement to a *higher level* in spite of the false theories and mistakes of Blanqui and Proudhon.

"However that may be," he wrote, "the present rising in Paris—even if it be crushed by the wolves, swine, and vile

curs of the old society—is the most glorious deed of our Party since the June insurrection. . . .”⁴⁹

And, without concealing from the proletariat a single mistake of the Commune, Marx dedicated to this *heroic deed* a work which to *this very day* serves as the best guide in the fight for “heaven” and as a frightful bugbear to the liberal and radical “*swine*”.

Plekhanov dedicated to the December events a “work” which has become practically the bible of the Cadets.

Yes, Plekhanov had good reason to compare himself to Marx.

Kugelmann apparently replied to Marx expressing certain doubts, referring to the hopelessness of the struggle and to realism as opposed to romanticism—at any rate, he compared the Commune, an *insurrection*, to the peaceful demonstration in Paris on June 13, 1849.

Marx immediately (April 17, 1871) severely lectured Kugelmann.

“*World history*,” he wrote, “*would indeed be very easy to make, if the struggle were taken up only on condition of infallibly favourable chances.*”

In September 1870, Marx called the insurrection an act of desperate folly. But, when the *masses* rose, Marx wanted to march with them, to learn with them in the process of the struggle, and not to give them bureaucratic admonitions. He realised that to attempt in advance to calculate the chances *with complete accuracy* would be quackery or hopeless pedantry. What he valued *above everything else* was that the working class heroically and self-sacrificingly took the initiative in *making world history*. Marx regarded world history from the standpoint of those who *make* it without being in a position to calculate the chances *infallibly* beforehand, and not from the standpoint of an intellectual philistine who moralises: “It was easy to foresee . . . they should not have taken up. . . .”

Marx was also able to appreciate that there are moments in history when a desperate struggle of the *masses*, even for a hopeless cause, is *essential* for the further schooling of these masses and their training for the *next* struggle.

Such a *statement* of the question is quite incomprehensible and even alien in principle to our present-day quasi-Marxists,

who like to take the name of Marx in vain, to borrow only his estimate of the past, and not his ability to make the future. Plekhanov did not even think of it when he set out after December 1905 "to put the brakes on".

But it is precisely this question that Marx raised, without in the least forgetting that he himself in September 1870 regarded insurrection as an act of desperate folly.

"...The bourgeois *canaille* of Versailles," he wrote, "...presented the Parisians with the alternative of either taking up the fight or succumbing without a struggle. The demoralisation of the working class in the latter case would have been a far greater misfortune than the succumbing of any number of 'leaders'."⁵⁰

And with this we shall conclude our brief review of the lessons in a policy worthy of the proletariat which Marx teaches in his letters to Kugelmann.

The working class of Russia has already proved once, and will prove again more than once, that it is capable of "storming heaven".

February 5, 1907

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Vol. 12

PREFACE
TO THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION OF
LETTERS BY JOHANNES BECKER, JOSEPH
DIETZGEN, FREDERICK ENGELS, KARL MARX,
AND OTHERS TO FRIEDRICH SORGE
AND OTHERS

The collection of letters by Marx, Engels, Dietzgen, Becker and other leaders of the international working-class movement in the last century, here presented to the Russian public, is an indispensable complement to our advanced Marxist literature.

We shall not here dwell in detail on the importance of these letters for the history of socialism and for a comprehensive treatment of the activities of Marx and Engels. This aspect of the matter requires no explanation. We shall only remark that an understanding of the letters published calls for acquaintance with the principal works on the history of the International (see Jaeckh, *The International*, Russian translation in the Znaniye edition), and also the history of the German and the American working-class movements (see Franz Mehring, *History of German Social-Democracy*, and Morris Hillquit, *History of Socialism in the United States*), etc.

Nor do we intend here to attempt to give a general outline of the contents of this correspondence or an appreciation of the various historical periods to which it relates. Mehring has done this extremely well in his article, *Der Sorgesche Briefwechsel* (*Neue Zeit*, 25. Jahrg., Nr. 1 und 2),* which will probably be appended to the present translation by the publisher, or else will be issued as a separate Russian publication.

Of particular interest to Russian socialists in the present revolutionary period are the lessons which the militant proletariat must draw from an acquaintance with the intimate

* "The Sorge Correspondence", *Neue Zeit*, 25th year, Nos. 1 and 2.—Ed.

aspects of the activities of Marx and Engels in the course of nearly thirty years (1867-95). It is, therefore, not surprising that the first attempts made in our Social-Democratic literature to acquaint readers with the letters from Marx and Engels to Sorge were also linked up with the "burning" issues of Social-Democratic tactics in the Russian revolution (Plekhanov's *Sovremennaya Zhizn* and the Menshevik *Otkliki*⁵¹). And we intend to draw our readers' attention particularly to an appreciation of those passages in the published correspondence that are specially important from the viewpoint of the present tasks of the workers' party in Russia.

In their letters, Marx and Engels deal most frequently with the pressing problems of the British, American and German working-class movements. This is natural, because they were Germans who at that time lived in England and corresponded with their American comrade. Marx expressed himself much more frequently and in much greater detail on the French working-class movement, and particularly the Paris Commune, in the letters he wrote to the German Social-Democrat Kugelmann.*

It is highly instructive to compare what Marx and Engels said of the British, American and German working-class movements. Such comparison acquires all the greater importance when we remember that Germany, on the one hand, and Britain and America, on the other, represent different stages of capitalist development and different forms of domination of the bourgeoisie, as a class, over the entire political life of those countries. From the scientific point of view, we have here a sample of materialist dialectics, the ability to bring to the forefront and stress the various points, the various aspects of the problem, in application to the specific features of different political and economic conditions. From the point of view of the practical policy and tactics of the workers' party, we have here a sample of the way in which the creators of the *Communist Manifesto* defined the tasks of the fighting proletariat in accordance

* See *Letters of Karl Marx to Dr. Kugelmann*, Russian translation edited by N. Lenin, with a foreword by the editor. St. Petersburg, 1907. (See pp. 59-67. - Ed.)

with the different stages of the national working-class movements in the different countries.

What Marx and Engels criticise most sharply in British and American socialism is its isolation from the working-class movement. The burden of all their numerous comments on the Social-Democratic Federation in Britain⁵² and on the American socialists is the accusation that they have reduced Marxism to a dogma, to "rigid [*starre*] orthodoxy", that they consider it "a credo and not a *guide to action*",⁵³ that they are incapable of adapting themselves to the theoretically helpless, but living and powerful mass working-class movement that is marching alongside them. "Had we from 1864 to 1873 insisted on working together only with those who openly adopted our platform," Engels exclaimed in his letter of January 27, 1887, "where should we be today?"⁵⁴ And in the preceding letter (December 28, 1886), he wrote, with reference to the influence of Henry George's ideas on the American working class:

"A million or two of working men's votes next November for a bona fide working men's party is worth infinitely more at present than a hundred thousand votes for a doctrinally perfect platform."

These are very interesting passages. There are Social-Democrats in our country who have hastened to utilise them in defence of the idea of a "labour congress" or something in the nature of Larin's "broad labour party".⁵⁵ Why not in defence of a "Left bloc"?⁵⁶ we would ask these precipitate "utilisers" of Engels. The letters the quotations are taken from refer to a time when American workers voted at the elections for Henry George. Mrs. Wischnewetzky—an American woman married to a Russian and translator of Engels's works—had asked him, as may be seen from Engels's reply, to give a thorough criticism of Henry George. Engels wrote (December 28, 1886) that *the time had not yet arrived* for that, the main thing being that the workers' party should begin to organise itself, even if not on an entirely pure programme. Later on, the workers would themselves come to understand what was amiss, "would learn from their own mistakes", but "anything that might delay or prevent that national consolidation of the workingmen's party—on no matter what platform—I should consider a great mistake..."⁵⁷

It goes without saying that Engels had a perfect understanding of, and frequently mentioned, the absurdity and *reactionary character* of Henry George's ideas, from the *socialist* point of view. The Sorge correspondence contains a most interesting letter from Karl Marx dated June 20, 1881, in which he characterised Henry George as an ideologist of *the radical bourgeoisie*. "Theoretically the man is utterly backward" (*total arrière*), wrote Marx. Yet Engels was not afraid to join with this *socialist reactionary* in the elections, so long as there were people who could tell the masses of "the consequences of their own mistakes" (Engels, in the letter dated November 29, 1886).

Regarding the Knights of Labor,⁵⁸ an organisation of American workers existing at that time, Engels wrote in the same letter: "The weakest [literally: rottenest, *faulste*] side of the Knights of Labor was their *political neutrality*.... The first great step, of importance for every country newly entering into the movement, is always the constitution of the workers as an independent political party, no matter how, so long as it is a distinct workers' party."

It is obvious that from this nothing at all can be deduced in defence of a leap *from* Social-Democracy to a non-party labour congress, etc. But whoever would escape Engels's accusation of reducing Marxism to a "dogma", "orthodoxy", "sectarianism", etc., must conclude from it that a joint election campaign with radical "social-reactionaries" is sometimes permissible.

But what is more interesting, of course, is to dwell not so much on these American-Russian parallels (we had to refer to them so as to reply to our opponents), as on the *fundamental* features of the British and American working-class movements. These features are: the absence of any big, nation-wide, *democratic* tasks facing the proletariat; the proletariat's complete subordination to bourgeois politics; the sectarian isolation of groups, of mere handfuls of socialists, from the proletariat; not the slightest socialist success among the working masses at the elections, etc. Whoever forgets these fundamental conditions and sets out to draw broad conclusions from "American-Russian parallels", displays the greatest superficiality.

If Engels laid so much stress on the workers' economic organisations in these conditions, it was because the most firmly established democratic systems were under discussion, and these confronted the proletariat with purely socialist tasks.

Engels stressed the importance of an independent workers' party, even with a poor programme, because he was speaking of countries where there had formerly been not even a hint of the workers' political independence and where, in politics, the workers mostly dragged along behind the bourgeoisie, and still do.

It would be making mock of Marx's historical method to attempt to apply conclusions drawn from such arguments to countries or historical situations where the proletariat has formed its party prior to the liberal bourgeoisie forming theirs, where the tradition of voting for bourgeois politicians is absolutely unknown to the proletariat, and where the immediate tasks are not socialist but bourgeois-democratic.

Our idea will become even clearer to the reader if we compare Engels's opinions on the British and American movements with his opinions on the German movement.

Such opinions, of the greatest interest, abound in the published correspondence too. And running like a scarlet thread through all these opinions is something vastly different—a warning against the "Right wing" of the workers' party, a merciless (sometimes—as with Marx in 1877-79—a *ferocious*) war against *opportunism* in Social-Democracy.

Let us first corroborate this by quoting from the letters, and then proceed to an appraisal of this fact.

First of all, we must here note the opinions expressed by Marx on Höchberg and Co. In his article *Der Sorgesche Briefwechsel*, Franz Mehring attempts to tone down Marx's attacks—as well as Engels's later attacks—against the opportunists and, in our opinion, rather overdoes it. As regards Höchberg and Co., in particular, Mehring insists on his view that Marx's judgement of Lassalle and the Lassalleans was wrong. But, we repeat, what interests us here is not an historical assessment of whether Marx's attacks against particular socialists were correct or exaggerated, but Marx's assessment *in principle* of definite *trends* in socialism in general.

While complaining about the German Social-Democrats' compromises with the Lassalleans and Dühring (letter of October 19, 1877), Marx also condemns the compromise "with a whole gang of half-mature students and superwise diploma'd doctors [in German "doctor" is an academic degree corresponding to our "candidate" or "university graduate, class I"], who want to give socialism a 'higher, idealistic' orientation, that is to say, to replace its materialistic basis (which demands serious objective study from anyone who tries to use it) by modern mythology with its goddesses of Justice, Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. Dr. Höchberg, who publishes the *Zukunft*,⁵⁹ is a representative of this tendency, and has 'bought his way' into the Party—with the 'noblest' intentions, I assume, but I do not give a damn for 'intentions'. Anything more miserable than his programme of the *Zukunft* has seldom seen the light of day with more 'modest presumption'." (Letter No. 70.)

In another letter, written almost two years later (September 19, 1879), Marx rebutted the gossip that Engels and he stood behind J. Most, and gave Sorge a detailed account of his attitude towards the opportunists in the German Social-Democratic Party. *Zukunft* was run by Höchberg, Schramm and Eduard Bernstein. Marx and Engels *refused* to have anything to do with such a publication, and when the question was raised of establishing a new Party organ with the participation of this same Höchberg and with his financial assistance, Marx and Engels first demanded the acceptance of their nominee, Hirsch, as editor-in-chief, to exercise control over this "mixture of doctors, students and *Katheders*-Socialists" and then addressed a circular letter directly to Bebel, Liebknecht and other leaders of the Social-Democratic Party, warning them that they would openly combat "such a vulgarisation [*Verluderung*—an even stronger word in German] of Party and theory", if the Höchberg, Schramm and Bernstein trend did not change.

This was the period in the German Social-Democratic Party which Mehring described in his *History* as "A Year of Confusion" ("*Ein Jahr der Verwirrung*"). After the Anti-Socialist Law, the Party did not at once find the right path, first swinging over to the anarchism of Most and the opportunism of Höchberg and Co. "These people," Marx wrote

of the latter, "nonentities in theory and useless in practice, want to draw the teeth of socialism (which they have fixed up in accordance with the university recipes) and particularly of the Social-Democratic Party, to enlighten the workers or, as they put it, to imbue them with 'elements of education' from their confused half-knowledge, and above all to make the Party respectable in the eyes of the petty bourgeoisie. They are just wretched counter-revolutionary windbags."⁶⁰

The result of Marx's "furious" attack was that the opportunists retreated and—made themselves scarce. In a letter dated November 19, 1879, Marx announced that Höchberg had been removed from the editorial committee and that all the influential leaders of the Party—Bebel, Liebknecht, Bracke, etc.—had *repudiated* his ideas. *Sozial-Demokrat*, the Social-Democratic Party organ, began to appear under the editorship of Vollmar, who at that time belonged to the revolutionary wing of the Party. A year later (November 5, 1880), Marx related that he and Engels constantly fought the "miserable" way in which *Sozial-Demokrat* was being conducted, and often expressed their opinion *sharply* ("*wobei's oft scharf hergeht*"). Liebknecht visited Marx in 1880 and promised that there would be an "improvement" *in all respects*.⁶¹

Peace was restored, and the war never came out into the open. Höchberg withdrew, and Bernstein became a revolutionary Social-Democrat—at least until the death of Engels in 1895.

On June 20, 1882, Engels wrote to Sorge and spoke of this struggle as being a thing of the past: "In general, things in Germany are going splendidly. It is true that the literary gentlemen in the Party tried to cause a reactionary... swing, but they failed miserably. The abuse to which the Social-Democratic workers are being everywhere subjected has made them still more revolutionary than they were three years ago... These people [the Party literary people] wanted at all costs to beg and secure the repeal of the Anti-Socialist Law by mildness and meekness, fawning and humility, because it has made short shrift of their literary earnings. As soon as the law is repealed... the split will apparently become an open one, and the Vierecks and Höchbergs will form a separate Right wing, where they can, from time to time, be treated with, until they finally land on their back-

sides. We announced this immediately after the adoption of the Anti-Socialist Law, when Höchberg and Schramm published in the *Yearbook*⁶² what was a most infamous judgement of the work of the Party and demanded more cultivated ("*gebildetes*" instead of *gebildetes*—Engels is alluding to the Berlin accent of the German writers), refined and elegant behaviour of the Party."

This forecast of Bernsteinism, made in 1882, was strikingly confirmed in 1898 and subsequent years.

And after that, and particularly after Marx's death, Engels, it may be said without exaggeration, was untiring in his efforts to straighten out what was being distorted by the German opportunists.

The end of 1884. The "petty-bourgeois prejudices" of the German Social-Democratic Reichstag deputies, who had voted for the steamship subsidy ("*Dampfersubvention*", see Mehring's *History*), were condemned. Engels informed Sorge that he had to correspond a great deal on this subject (letter of December 31, 1884).⁶³

1885. Giving his opinion of the whole affair of the "*Dampfersubvention*", Engels wrote (June 3) that "it almost came to a split". The "philistinism" of the Social-Democratic deputies was "*colossal*". "A petty-bourgeois socialist parliamentary group is inevitable in a country like Germany," said Engels.

1887. Engels replied to Sorge, who had written to him, that the Party was disgracing itself by electing such deputies as Viereck (a Social-Democrat of the Höchberg type). Engels excused himself, saying that there was nothing to be done, the workers' party could not find good deputies for the Reichstag. "The gentlemen of the Right wing know that they are being tolerated only because of the Anti-Socialist Law, and that they will be thrown out of the Party the very day the Party again secures freedom of action." And, in general, it was preferable that "the Party should be better than its parliamentary heroes, than the other way round" (March 3, 1887). Liebknecht is a conciliator—Engels complained—he always uses phrases to gloss over differences. But when it comes to a split, he will be with us at the decisive moment.

1889. Two international Social-Democratic congresses in Paris.⁶⁴ The opportunists (headed by the French Possibilists)

split away from the revolutionary Social-Democrats. Engels (who was then sixty-eight years old) flung himself into the fight with the ardour of youth. A number of letters (from January 12 to July 20, 1889) were devoted to the fight against the opportunists. Not only they, but also the Germans—Liebknecht, Bebel and others—were flagellated for their conciliatory attitude.

The Possibilists had sold themselves to the French Government, Engels wrote on January 12, 1889. And he accused the members of the British Social-Democratic Federation (S.D.F.) of having allied themselves with the Possibilists. "The writing and running about in connection with this damned congress leave me no time for anything else" (May 11, 1889). The Possibilists are busy, but our people are asleep, Engels wrote angrily. Now even Auer and Schippel are demanding that we attend the Possibilist congress. But "at last" this opened Liebknecht's eyes. Engels, together with Bernstein, wrote pamphlets (they were signed by Bernstein but Engels called them "our pamphlets") against the opportunists.⁶⁵

"With the exception of the S.D.F., the Possibilists have not a single socialist organisation on their side in the whole of Europe [June 8, 1889]. They are consequently falling back on the non-socialist trade unions" (this for the information of those who advocate a broad labour party, a labour congress, etc., in our country!). "From America they will get one *Knight of Labor*." The adversary was the same as in the fight against the Bakuninists: "only with this difference that the banner of the anarchists has been replaced by the banner of the Possibilists: the selling of principles to the bourgeoisie for small-scale concessions, especially in return for well-paid jobs for the leaders (on the city councils, labour exchanges, etc.)." Brousse (the leader of the Possibilists) and Hyndman (the leader of the S.D.F. which had joined with the Possibilists) attacked "authoritarian Marxism" and wanted to form the "nucleus of a new International".

"You can have no idea of the naïveté of the Germans. It has cost me tremendous effort to explain even to Bebel what it all really meant" (June 8, 1889). And when the two congresses met, when the revolutionary Social-Democrats outnumbered the Possibilists (*who had united with the trade-*

unionists, the S.D.F., a section of the Austrians, etc.), Engels was jubilant (July 17, 1889). He was glad that the conciliatory plans and proposals of Liebknecht and others had failed (July 20, 1889). "It serves our sentimental conciliatory brethren right that, for all their amicableness, they received a good kick in their tenderest spot. This may cure them for some time."

... Mehring was right when he said (*Der Sorgesche Briefwechsel*) that Marx and Engels did not have much idea of "good manners": "If they did not think long over every blow they dealt, neither did they whimper over every blow they received." "If they think their needle pricks can pierce my old, thick and well-tanned hide, they are mistaken,"⁶⁶ Engels once wrote. And they assumed that others possessed the imperviousness they had themselves acquired, Mehring said of Marx and Engels.

1893. The chastisement of the Fabians, which suggests itself when passing judgement on the Bernsteinians (for did not Bernstein "evolve" his opportunism in England making use of the experience of the Fabians?). "The Fabians here in London are a band of careerists who have understanding enough to realise the inevitability of the social revolution, but who could not possibly entrust this gigantic task to the raw proletariat alone, and are therefore kind enough to set themselves at the head. Fear of the revolution is their fundamental principle. They are the 'educated' *par excellence*. Their socialism is municipal socialism; not the nation but the community is to become the owner of the means of production, at any rate for the time being. This socialism of theirs is then presented as an extreme but inevitable consequence of bourgeois liberalism; hence their tactics, not of decisively opposing the Liberals as adversaries but of pushing them on towards socialist conclusions and therefore of intriguing with them, of permeating liberalism with socialism—not of putting up socialist candidates against the Liberals but of fastening them on to the Liberals, forcing them upon the Liberals, or swindling them into taking them. They do not of course realise that in doing this they are either lied to and themselves deceived or else are lying about socialism.

"With great industry they have published, amid all sorts of rubbish, some good propagandist writing as well, this in fact being the best the English have produced in this field. But as soon as they get on to their specific tactics of hushing up the class struggle, it all turns putrid. Hence their fanatical hatred of Marx and all of us—because of the class struggle.

"These people have of course many bourgeois followers and therefore money. . . ."67

HOW THE CLASSICS ESTIMATED INTELLECTUALIST OPPORTUNISM IN SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY

1894. The Peasant Question. "On the Continent," Engels wrote on November 10, 1894, "success is developing the appetite for more success, and catching the peasant, in the literal sense of the word, is becoming the fashion. First the French, in Nantes, declare through Lafargue not only . . . that it is not our business to hasten . . . the ruin of the small peasants, which capitalism is seeing to for us, but they add that we must directly protect the small peasant against taxation, usury, and landlords. But we cannot co-operate in this, first because it is stupid and second because it is impossible. Next, however, Vollmar comes along in Frankfort and wants to bribe the *peasantry as a whole*, though the peasant he has to deal with in Upper Bavaria is not the debt-ridden small peasant of the Rhineland, but the middle and even the big peasant, who exploits male and female farmhands, and sells cattle and grain in quantity. And that cannot be done without giving up the whole principle."

1894, December 4. "...The Bavarians, who have become very, very opportunistic and have almost turned into an ordinary people's party (that is to say, the majority of leaders and many of those who have recently joined the Party), voted in the Bavarian Diet for the budget as a whole; and Vollmar in particular has started an agitation among the peasants with the object of winning the Upper Bavarian big peasants—people who own 25 to 80 acres of land (10 to 30 hectares) and who therefore cannot manage without wage-labourers—instead of winning their farmhands."

We thus see that for more than ten years Marx and Engels systematically and unswervingly fought opportunism in the

German Social-Democratic Party, and attacked intellectualist philistinism and the petty-bourgeois outlook in socialism. This is an extremely important fact. The general public know that German Social-Democracy is regarded as a model of Marxist proletarian policy and tactics, but they do not know what constant warfare the founders of Marxism had to wage against the "Right wing" (Engels's expression) of that Party. And it is no accident that soon after Engels's death this concealed war became an open one. This was an inevitable result of the decades of historical development of German Social-Democracy.

And now we very clearly perceive the two lines of Engels's (and Marx's) recommendations, directions, corrections, threats and exhortations. The most insistent of their appeals to the British and American socialists was to merge with the working-class movement and eradicate the narrow and hidebound sectarian spirit from their organisations. They were most insistent in teaching the German Social-Democrats to beware of succumbing to philistinism, "parliamentary idiocy" (Marx's expression in the letter of September 19, 1879), and petty-bourgeois intellectualist opportunism.

Is it not typical that our Social-Democratic gossips should have begun cackling about the recommendations of the first kind while remaining silent, holding their tongues, about the second? Is not *such* one-sidedness in appraising the letters of Marx and Engels the best indication of a certain Russian Social-Democratic... "one-sidedness"?

At the present moment, when the international working-class movement is displaying symptoms of profound ferment and vacillation, when the extremes of opportunism, "parliamentary idiocy" and philistine reformism have evoked the other extremes of revolutionary syndicalism⁶⁸—the general line of Marx's and Engels's "corrections" to British and American and to German socialism acquires exceptional importance.

In countries where there are *no* Social-Democratic workers' parties, *no* Social-Democratic members of parliament, and *no* systematic and steadfast Social-Democratic policy either at elections or in the press, etc.—in such countries, Marx and Engels taught the socialists to rid themselves *at all cost* of narrow sectarianism, and *to join* with the working-class

movement so as to *shake up* the proletariat *politically*. For in the last thirty years of the nineteenth century the proletariat displayed *almost no* political independence either in Britain or America. In these countries—where bourgeois-democratic historical tasks were almost entirely non-existent—the political arena was *completely* held by a triumphant and self-satisfied bourgeoisie, unequalled anywhere in the world in the art of deceiving, corrupting and bribing the workers.

To think that these recommendations, made by Marx and Engels to the British and American working-class movements, can be simply and directly applied to Russian conditions is to use Marxism not in order to achieve clarity on its *method*, not in order to *study* the concrete historical features of the working-class movement in definite countries, but in order to pay off petty, factional, and intellectualist scores.

On the other hand, in a country where the bourgeois-democratic revolution was still unconsummated, where “military despotism, embellished with parliamentary forms” (Marx’s expression in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*)⁶⁹ prevailed, and still does, where the proletariat had long ago been drawn into politics and was pursuing a Social-Democratic policy—in such a country what Marx and Engels most of all feared was parliamentary vulgarisation and philistine derogation of the tasks and scope of the working-class movement.

It is all the more our duty to emphasise and give prominence to *this* side of Marxism, in the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia, because in our country a vast, “brilliant” and rich liberal-bourgeois press is vociferously trumpeting to the proletariat the “exemplary” loyalty, parliamentary legality, the modesty and moderation of the neighbouring German working-class movement.

This mercenary lie of the bourgeois betrayers of the Russian revolution is not due to accident or to the personal depravity of certain past or future ministers in the Cadet camp. It stems from the profound economic interests of the Russian liberal landowners and liberal bourgeois. And in combating this lie, this “stupefying of the masses” (“*Mas-
senverdummung*”—Engels’s expression in his letter of

November 29, 1886), the letters of Marx and Engels should serve as an indispensable weapon for all Russian socialists.

The mercenary lie of the liberal bourgeois holds up to the people the exemplary "modesty" of the German Social-Democrats. The leaders of these Social-Democrats, the founders of the theory of Marxism, tell us:

"The revolutionary language and action of the French have made the hypocrisy of Viereck and Co. [the opportunist Social-Democrats in the German Reichstag Social-Democratic group] sound quite feeble" (this was said in reference to the formation of a labour group in the French Chamber and to the Decazeville strike, which split the French Radicals from the French proletariat).⁷⁰ "Only Liebknecht and Bebel spoke in the last socialist debate and both of them spoke well. We can with this debate once more show ourselves in decent society which was by no means the case with all of them. In general it is a good thing that the Germans' leadership of the international socialist movement, particularly after they sent so many philistines to the Reichstag (which, it is true, was unavoidable), is being challenged. *In Germany everything becomes philistine in peaceful times*; and therefore the sting of French competition is *absolutely necessary...*" (Letter of April 29, 1886).⁷¹

These are the lessons to be learnt most thoroughly by the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, which is predominantly under the ideological influence of German Social-Democracy.

These lessons are taught us not by any particular passage in the correspondence of the greatest men of the nineteenth century, but by the whole spirit and substance of their comradely and frank criticism of the international experience of the proletariat, a criticism to which diplomacy and petty considerations were alien.

How far all the letters of Marx and Engels were indeed imbued with this spirit may also be seen from the following relatively specific but extremely typical passages.⁷²

In 1889 a young and fresh movement of untrained and unskilled labourers (gasworkers, dockers, etc.) arose in Britain, a movement marked by a new and revolutionary spirit. Engels was delighted with it. He referred exultingly

to the part played by Tussy, Marx's daughter, who conducted agitation among these workers. "...The most repulsive thing here," he says, writing from London on December 7, 1889, "is the bourgeois 'respectability' which has grown deep into the bones of the workers. The division of society into innumerable strata, each recognised without question, each with its own pride but also its inborn respect for its 'betters' and 'superiors', is so old and firmly established that the bourgeois still find it fairly easy to get their bait accepted. I am not at all sure, for instance, that John Burns is not secretly prouder of his popularity with Cardinal Manning, the Lord Mayor, and the bourgeoisie in general than of his popularity with his own class. And Champion—an ex-lieutenant—intrigued years ago with bourgeois and especially with conservative elements, preached socialism at the parsons' Church Congress, etc. And even Tom Mann, whom I regard as the best of the lot, is fond of mentioning that he will be lunching with the Lord Mayor. If one compares this with the French, one realises what a revolution is good for after all."⁷³

No comment is needed.

Another example. In 1891 there was danger of a European war. Engels corresponded on the subject with Bebel, and they agreed that in the event of Russia attacking Germany, the German socialists must desperately fight the Russians and any allies of the Russians. "If Germany is crushed, then we shall be too, while at best the struggle will be such a violent one that Germany will only be able to maintain herself by revolutionary means, so that very possibly we shall be forced to take the helm and stage a 1793." (Letter of October 24, 1891.)⁷⁴

Let this be noted by those opportunists who shouted from the house-tops that "Jacobin" prospects for the Russian workers' party in 1905 were un-Social-Democratic! Engels squarely suggested to Bebel the possibility of the Social-Democrats having to participate in a provisional government.

Holding such views on the tasks of Social-Democratic workers' parties, Marx and Engels naturally possessed the most fervent faith in a Russian revolution and its great world significance. We see this ardent expectation of a revolution

in Russia, in this correspondence, over a period of nearly twenty years.

Take Marx's letter of September 27, 1877. He is quite enthusiastic about the Eastern crisis⁷⁵: "Russia has long been standing on the threshold of an upheaval, all the elements of it are prepared. . . . The gallant Turks have hastened the explosion by years with the thrashing they have inflicted. . . . The upheaval will begin *secundum artem* [according to the rules of the art] with some *playing at constitutionalism, et puis il y aura un beau tapage* [and then there will be a fine row]. If Mother Nature is not particularly unfavourable towards us, we shall yet live to see the fun!" (Marx was then fifty-nine years old.)

Mother Nature did not—and could not very well—permit Marx to live "to see the fun". But he *foretold* the "playing at constitutionalism", and it is as though his words were written yesterday in relation to the First and Second Russian Dumas.⁷⁶ And we know that the warning to the people against "playing at constitutionalism" was the "living soul" of the boycott tactics so detested by the liberals and opportunists. . . .

Or take Marx's letter of November 5, 1880. He was delighted with the success of *Capital* in Russia, and took the part of the members of the Narodnaya Volya organisation against the newly-arisen General Redistribution group.⁷⁷ Marx correctly perceived the anarchistic elements in their views. Not knowing and having then no opportunity of knowing the future evolution of the General-Redistribution Narodniks into Social-Democrats, Marx attacked them with all his trenchant sarcasm:

"These gentlemen are against all political-revolutionary action. Russia is to make a somersault into the anarchist-communist-atheist millennium! Meanwhile, they are preparing for this leap with the most tedious doctrinairism, whose so-called *principes courent la rue depuis le leu Bakounine*."

We can gather from this how Marx would have appreciated the significance for Russia of 1905 and the succeeding years of *Social-Democracy's* "political-revolutionary action".*

* Incidentally, if my memory does not deceive me, Plekhanov or V. I. Zasulich told me in 1900-03 about the existence of a letter from Engels to Plekhanov concerning *Our Differences* and the char-

There is a letter by Engels dated April 6, 1887: "On the other hand, it seems as if a crisis is impending in Russia. The recent attentates rather upset the apple-cart. . . ." A letter of April 9, 1887, says the same thing. . . . "The army is full of discontented, conspiring officers. [Engels at that time was impressed by the revolutionary struggle of the Narodnaya Volya organisation; he set his hopes on the officers, and did not yet see the revolutionary spirit of the Russian soldiers and sailors, which was manifested so magnificently eighteen years later. . . .] I do not think things will last another year; and once it [the revolution] breaks out [*losgeht*] in Russia, then hurrah!"

A letter of April 23, 1887: "In Germany there is persecution after persecution [of socialists]. It looks as if Bismarck wants to have everything ready, so that the moment the revolution breaks out [*losgeschlagen werden*] in Russia, which is now only a question of months, Germany could immediately follow her example."

The months proved to be very, very long ones. No doubt, philistines will be found who, knitting their brows and wrinkling their foreheads, will sternly condemn Engels's "revolutionism", or will indulgently laugh at the old utopias of the old revolutionary exile.

Yes, Marx and Engels made many and frequent mistakes in determining the proximity of revolution, in their hopes in the victory of revolution (e.g., in 1848 in Germany), in their faith in the imminence of a German "republic" ("to die for the republic", wrote Engels of that period, recalling his sentiments as a participant in the military campaign for a Reich constitution in 1848-49). They were mistaken in 1871 when they were engaged in "raising revolt in Southern France, for which they [Becker writes "we", referring to himself and his closest friends: letter No. 14 of July 21, 1871] sacrificed and risked all that was humanly possible. . . ." The same letter says: "If we had had more means in March and April we would have roused the whole of Southern France and would have saved the Commune in Paris" (p. 29). But

acter of the impending revolution in Russia. It would be interesting to know exactly whether there was such a letter, whether it still exists, and whether the time has come to publish it.⁷⁸

such errors—the errors of the giants of revolutionary thought, who sought to raise, and did raise, the proletariat of the whole world above the level of petty, commonplace and trivial tasks—are a thousand times more noble and magnificent and *historically more valuable and true* than the trite wisdom of official liberalism, which lauds, shouts, appeals and holds forth about the vanity of revolutionary vanities, the futility of the revolutionary struggle and the charms of counter-revolutionary “constitutional” fantasies. . . .

The Russian working class will win their freedom and give an impetus to Europe by their revolutionary action, full though it be of errors—and let the philistines pride themselves on the infallibility of their revolutionary inaction.

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Vol. 12

THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONGRESS IN STUTT GART⁷⁹

A feature of the International Socialist Congress held in Stuttgart this August was its large and representative composition: the total of 886 delegates came from all the five continents. Besides providing an impressive demonstration of international unity in the proletarian struggle, the Congress played an outstanding part in defining the tactics of the socialist parties. It adopted general resolutions on a number of questions, the decision of which had hitherto been left solely to the discretion of the individual socialist parties. And the fact that more and more problems require uniform, principled decisions in different countries is striking proof that socialism is being welded into a single international force.

The full text of the Stuttgart resolutions will be found elsewhere in this issue.⁸⁰ We shall deal briefly with each of them in order to bring out the chief controversial points and the character of the debate at the Congress.

This is not the first time the colonial question has figured at international congresses. Up till now their decisions have always been an unqualified condemnation of bourgeois colonial policy as a policy of plunder and violence. This time, however, the Congress Commission was so composed that opportunist elements, headed by Van Kol of Holland, predominated in it. A sentence was inserted in the draft resolution to the effect that the Congress did not in principle condemn all colonial policy, for under socialism colonial policy could play a civilising role. The minority in the Commission (Ledebour of Germany, the Polish and Russian Social-Democrats, and many others) vigorously protested against any such idea being entertained. The matter was referred to

Congress, where the forces of the two trends were found to be so nearly equal that there was an extremely heated debate.

The opportunists rallied behind Van Kol. Speaking for the majority of the German delegation Bernstein and David urged acceptance of a "socialist colonial policy" and fulminated against the radicals for their barren, negative attitude, their failure to appreciate the importance of reforms, their lack of a practical colonial programme, etc. Incidentally, they were opposed by Kautsky, who felt compelled to ask the Congress to pronounce *against* the majority of the German delegation. He rightly pointed out that there was no question of rejecting the struggle for reforms; that was explicitly stated in other sections of the resolution, which had evoked no dispute. The point at issue was whether we should make concessions to the modern regime of bourgeois plunder and violence. The Congress was to discuss present-day colonial policy, which was based on the downright enslavement of primitive populations. The bourgeoisie was actually introducing slavery in the colonies and subjecting the native populations to unprecedented outrages and acts of violence, "civilising" them by the spread of liquor and syphilis. And in that situation socialists were expected to utter evasive phrases about the possibility of accepting colonial policy in principle! That would be an outright desertion to the bourgeois point of view. It would be a decisive step towards subordinating the proletariat to bourgeois ideology, to bourgeois imperialism, which is now arrogantly raising its head.

The Congress defeated the Commission's motion by 128 votes to 108 with ten abstentions (Switzerland). It should be noted that at Stuttgart, for the first time, each nation was allotted a definite number of votes, varying from twenty (for the big nations, Russia included) to two (Luxembourg). The combined vote of the small nations, which either do not pursue a colonial policy, or which suffer from it, outweighed the vote of nations where even the proletariat has been somewhat infected with the lust of conquest.

This vote on the colonial question is of very great importance. First, it strikingly showed up socialist opportunism, which succumbs to bourgeois blandishments. Secondly, it revealed a negative feature in the European labour movement,

one that can do no little harm to the proletarian cause, and for that reason should receive serious attention. Marx frequently quoted a very significant saying of Sismondi. The proletarians of the ancient world, this saying runs, lived at the expense of society; modern society lives at the expense of the proletarians.

The non-propertyed, but non-working, class is incapable of overthrowing the exploiters. Only the proletarian class, which maintains the whole of society, can bring about the social revolution. However, as a result of the extensive colonial policy, the European proletarian *partly* finds himself in a position when it is *not* his labour, but the labour of the practically enslaved natives in the colonies, that maintains the whole of society. The British bourgeoisie, for example, derives more profit from the many millions of the population of India and other colonies than from the British workers. In certain countries this provides the material and economic basis for infecting the proletariat with colonial chauvinism. Of course, this may be only a temporary phenomenon, but the evil must nonetheless be clearly realised and its causes understood in order to be able to rally the proletariat of all countries for the struggle against such opportunism. This struggle is bound to be victorious, since the "privileged" nations are a diminishing faction of the capitalist nations.

There were practically no differences at the Congress on the question of women's suffrage. The only one who tried to make out a case for a socialist campaign in favour of a limited women's suffrage (qualified as opposed to universal suffrage) was a woman delegate from the extremely opportunist British Fabian Society. No one supported her. Her motives were simple enough: British bourgeois ladies hope to obtain the franchise for themselves, without its extension to women workers in Britain.

The First International Socialist Women's Conference was held concurrently with the Congress in the same building. Both at this Conference and in the Congress Commission there was an interesting dispute between the German and Austrian Social-Democrats on the draft resolution. In their campaign for universal suffrage the Austrians tended to play down the demand for equal rights of men and women; on practical grounds they placed the main emphasis on male

suffrage. Clara Zetkin and other German Social-Democrats rightly pointed out to the Austrians that they were acting incorrectly, and that by failing to press the demand that the vote be granted to women as well as men, they were weakening the mass movement. The concluding words of the Stuttgart resolution ("the demand for universal suffrage should be put forward *simultaneously* for both men and women") undoubtedly relate to this episode of excessive "practicalism" in the history of the Austrian labour movement.

The resolution on the relations between the socialist parties and the trade unions is of especial importance to us Russians. The Stockholm R.S.D.L.P. Congress⁸¹ went on record for *non-Party* unions, thus endorsing the neutrality standpoint, which has always been upheld by our non-Party democrats, Bernsteinians and Socialist-Revolutionaries.⁸² The London Congress,⁸³ on the other hand, put forward a different principle, namely, closer alignment of the unions with the Party, even including, under certain conditions, their recognition as Party unions. At Stuttgart in the Social-Democratic subsection of the Russian section (the socialists of each country form a separate section at international congresses) opinion was divided on this issue (there was no split on other issues). Plekhanov upheld the neutrality principle. Voinov, a Bolshevik, defended the anti-neutralist viewpoint of the London Congress and of the Belgian resolution (published in the Congress materials with de Brouckère's report, which will soon appear in Russian). Clara Zetkin rightly remarked in her journal *Die Gleichheit*⁸⁴ that Plekhanov's arguments for neutrality were just as lame as those of the French. And the Stuttgart resolution—as Kautsky rightly observed and as anyone who takes the trouble to read it carefully will see—puts an end to recognition of the "neutrality" principle. There is not a word in it about neutrality or non-party principles. On the contrary, it definitely recognises the need for closer and stronger connections between the unions and the socialist parties.

The resolution of the London R.S.D.L.P. Congress on the trade unions has thus been placed on a firm theoretical basis in the form of the Stuttgart resolution. The Stuttgart resolution lays down the general principle that in every country the unions must be brought into permanent and close contact

with the socialist party. The London resolution says that in Russia this should take the form, under favourable conditions, of party unions, and party members must work towards that goal.

We note that the harmful aspects of the neutrality principle were revealed in Stuttgart by the fact that the trade union half of the German delegation were the most adamant supporters of opportunist views. That is why in Essen, for example, the Germans were against Van Kol (the trade unions were not represented in Essen, which was a Congress solely of the Party), while in Stuttgart they supported him. By playing into the hands of the opportunists in the Social-Democratic movement the advocacy of neutrality in Germany has *actually* had harmful results. This is a fact that should not be overlooked, especially in Russia, where the bourgeois-democratic counsellors of the proletariat, who urge it to keep the trade union movement "neutral", are so numerous.

A few words about the resolution on emigration and immigration. Here, too, in the Commission there was an attempt to defend narrow, craft interests, to ban the immigration of workers from backward countries (coolies—from China, etc.). This is the same spirit of aristocratism that one finds among workers in some of the "civilised" countries, who derive certain advantages from their privileged position, and are, therefore, inclined to forget the need for international class solidarity. But no one at the Congress defended this craft and petty-bourgeois narrow-mindedness. The resolution fully meets the demands of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

We pass now to the last, and perhaps the most important, resolution of the Congress—that on anti-militarism. The notorious Herve, who has made such a noise in France and Europe, advocated a semi-anarchist view by naïvely suggesting that every war be "answered" by a strike and an uprising. He did not understand, on the one hand, that war is a necessary product of capitalism, and that the proletariat cannot renounce participation in revolutionary wars, for such wars are possible, and have indeed occurred in capitalist societies. He did not understand, on the other hand, that the possibility of "answering" a war depends on the nature of the crisis created by that war. The choice of the means of

struggle depends on these conditions; moreover, the struggle must consist (and here we have the third misconception, or shallow thinking of Hervéism) not simply in replacing war by peace, but in replacing capitalism by socialism. The essential thing is not merely to prevent war, but to utilise the crisis created by war in order to hasten the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. However, underlying all these semi-anarchist absurdities of Hervéism there was one sound and practical purpose: to spur the socialist movement so that it will not be restricted to parliamentary methods of struggle alone, so that the masses will realise the need for revolutionary action in connection with the crises which war inevitably involves, so that, lastly, a more lively understanding of international labour solidarity and of the falsity of bourgeois patriotism will be spread among the masses.

Bebel's resolution (moved by the Germans and coinciding in all essentials with Guesde's resolution) had one shortcoming—it failed to indicate the active tasks of the proletariat. This made it possible to read Bebel's orthodox propositions through opportunist spectacles, and Vollmar was quick to turn this possibility into a reality.

That is why Rosa Luxemburg and the Russian Social-Democratic delegates moved their amendments to Bebel's resolution. These amendments (1) stated that militarism is the chief weapon of class oppression; (2) pointed out the need for propaganda among the youth; (3) stressed that Social-Democrats should not only try to prevent war from breaking out or to secure the speediest termination of wars that have already begun, but should utilise the crisis created by the war to hasten the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

The subcommission (elected by the Anti-Militarism Commission) incorporated all these amendments in Bebel's resolution. In addition, Jaurès made this happy suggestion: instead of enumerating the methods of struggle (strikes, uprisings) the resolution should cite historical examples of proletarian action against war, from the demonstrations in Europe to the revolution in Russia. The result of all this redrafting was a resolution which, it is true, is unduly long, but is rich in thought and precisely formulates the tasks of the proletariat. It combines the stringency of orthodox—i.e., the only scientific Marxist analysis with recommendations for

the most resolute and revolutionary action by the workers' parties. This resolution cannot be interpreted *à la* Vollmar, nor can it be fitted into the narrow framework of naïve Hervéism.

On the whole, the Stuttgart Congress brought into sharp contrast the opportunist and revolutionary wings of the international Social-Democratic movement on a number of cardinal issues and decided these issues in the spirit of revolutionary Marxism. Its resolutions and the report of the debates should become a handbook for every propagandist. The work done at Stuttgart will greatly promote the unity of tactics and unity of revolutionary struggle of the proletarians of all countries.

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and beginning of September 1907

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PREFACE TO THE COLLECTION *TWELVE YEARS*⁸⁵

The volume of collected articles and pamphlets here offered to the reader covers the period from 1895 through 1905. The theme of these writings is the programmatic, tactical, and organisational problems of the Russian Social-Democratic movement, problems which are being posed and dealt with all the time in the struggle against the Right wing of the Marxist trend in Russia.

At first the struggle was fought on purely theoretical ground against Mr. Struve, the chief spokesman of our legal Marxism of the nineties. The close of 1894 and the beginning of 1895 saw an abrupt change in our legal press. Marxist views found their way into it for the first time, presented not only by leaders of the Emancipation of Labour group living abroad, but also by Social-Democrats in Russia. This literary revival and the heated controversy between the Marxists and the old Narodnik leaders, who (N. K. Mikhailovsky, for instance) had up till then held practically undivided sway in our progressive literature, were the prelude to an upswing in the mass labour movement in Russia. These literary activities of the Russian Marxists were the direct forerunners of active proletarian struggle, of the famous St. Petersburg strikes of 1896, which ushered in an era of steadily mounting workers' movement—the most potent factor in the whole of our revolution.

The Social-Democrats in those days wrote under conditions which compelled them to use Aesopian language and confine themselves to the most general principles, which were farthest removed from practical activity and politics. This did much to unite the heterogenous elements of the Marxist

movement in the fight against the Narodniks. Besides the Russian Social-Democrats abroad and at home this fight was waged also by men like Struve, Bulgakov, Tugan-Baranovsky, Berdayev, and others. They were bourgeois democrats for whom the break with Narodism signified transition from petty-bourgeois (or peasant) socialism to bourgeois liberalism, and not to proletarian socialism as was the case with us.

The history of the Russian revolution in general, the history of the Cadet Party in particular, and especially the evolution of Mr. Struve (to the verge of Octobristism⁸⁶) have now made this truth self-evident, made it current small coin for our publicists. But in 1894-95, this truth had to be demonstrated on the basis of relatively minor deviations by one or another writer from Marxism; at that time the coin had still to be minted. That is why, in now printing the full text of my article against Mr. Struve ("The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book", over the signature of K. Tulin in the symposium *Material on the Question of the Economic Development of Russia*, published in St. Petersburg in 1895 and destroyed by the censor*), I pursue a triple purpose. First, since the reading public is familiar with Mr. Struve's book and the Narodnik articles of 1894-95 against the Marxists, it is important to give a criticism of Mr. Struve's viewpoint. Secondly, in order to reply to repeated accusations of alliance with these gentry, and in order to appraise the very significant political career of Mr. Struve himself, it is important to cite the warning to Mr. Struve made by a revolutionary Social-Democrat *simultaneously* with our general statements against the Narodniks. Thirdly, the old, and in many respects outdated, polemic with Struve is important as an instructive example, one that shows the practical and political value of irreconcilable theoretical polemics. Revolutionary Social-Democrats have been accused times without number of an excessive penchant for such polemics with the "Economists", the Bernsteinians, and the Mensheviks. Today, too, these accusations are being bandied about by the "conciliators" inside the Social-Democratic Party and the "sympathising" semi-socialists outside it. An excessive penchant for polemics and splits, we are

* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, pp. 333-507.—Ed.

all too often told, is typical of the Russians in general, of the Social-Democrats in particular and of the Bolsheviks especially. But the fact is all too often overlooked that the excessive penchant for skipping from socialism to liberalism is engendered by the conditions prevailing in the capitalist countries in general, the conditions of the bourgeois revolution in Russia in particular, and the conditions of the life and work of our intellectuals especially. From that standpoint it is well worth taking a look at the events of ten years ago, the theoretical differences with "Struivism" which then began to take shape, and the minor (minor at first glance) divergencies that led to a complete political demarcation between the parties and to an irreconcilable struggle in parliament, in the press, at public meetings, etc.

The article against Mr. Struve, I should add, is based on a paper I read in the autumn of 1894 to a small circle of Marxists of that time. The group of Social-Democrats then active in St. Petersburg, and who a year later founded the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class,⁸⁷ was represented in this circle by St., R., and myself. The legal Marxist writers were represented by P. B. Struve, A. N. Potresov, and K. The subject of my paper was "The Reflection of Marxism in Bourgeois Literature". As will be seen from the title, the polemic with Struve here was incomparably sharper and more definite (in its Social-Democratic conclusions) than in the article published in the spring of 1895. The latter was toned down partly for censorship reasons and partly for the sake of an "alliance" with the legal Marxists for joint struggle against Narodism. That the "leftward jolt" which the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats then gave Mr. Struve has not remained altogether without result is clearly shown by Mr. Struve's article in the police-destroyed symposium of 1895, and by several of his articles in *Novoye Slovo*⁸⁸ (1897).

Moreover, in reading the 1895 article against Mr. Struve it should be borne in mind that in many respects it is a synopsis of subsequent economic studies (notably *The Development of Capitalism**). Lastly, I should draw the reader's attention to the concluding pages of this article, which

* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 21-632.—Ed.

emphasise the *positive* (from the Marxist standpoint) features and aspects of Narodism as a revolutionary-democratic trend in a country that was on the threshold of bourgeois revolution. This was a theoretical formulation of the propositions which twelve or thirteen years later were to find their practical and political expression in the "Left bloc" at the elections to the Second Duma and in the "Left-bloc" tactics. That section of the Mensheviks which opposed the idea of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, maintaining that a Left bloc was absolutely impermissible, had on this issue gone back on the very old and very important tradition of the revolutionary Social-Democrats—a tradition vigorously upheld by *Zarya* and the old *Iskra*. It stands to reason that the conditional and limited permissibility of "Left-bloc" tactics follows inevitably from the same fundamental theoretical Marxist views on Narodism.

The article against Struve (1894-95) is followed by *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats*,* written towards the close of 1897 on the basis of the experience of Social-Democratic activities in St. Petersburg in 1895. It presents in a positive form the views which in other articles and pamphlets in this volume are expressed in the form of polemics with the Social-Democratic Right wing. The various prefaces to the *Tasks* are reprinted here in order to show the connection between these activities and the various periods of our Party's development (for instance, Axelrod's preface emphasises the pamphlet's connection with the struggle against "Economism", and the 1902 preface stresses the evolution of the Narodnaya Volya and Narodnoye Pravo members⁸⁹).

The article "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism"*** was published abroad in *Zarya* in 1901. It dissolves, so to speak, Social-Democratic association with Struve as a political leader. In 1895, we warned him and cautiously dissociated ourselves from him as an ally. In 1901, we declared war on him as a liberal who was incapable of championing even purely democratic demands with any consistency.

In 1895, several years before Bernsteinism in the West and before the complete break with Marxism on the part

* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 321-51.—Ed.

** Ibid., Vol. 5, pp. 31-80.—Ed.

of quite a few "advanced" writers in Russia, I pointed out that Mr. Struve was an unreliable Marxist with whom Social-Democrats should have no truck. In 1901, several years before the Cadet Party emerged in the Russian revolution, and before the political fiasco of this party in the First and Second Dumas, I pointed out the very features of Russian bourgeois liberalism which were to be fully revealed in the mass political actions of 1905-07. The article "Hannibals of Liberalism" criticised the false reasoning of one liberal, but is now almost fully applicable to the policy of the biggest liberal party in our revolution. As for those who are inclined to believe that we Bolsheviks went back on the old Social-Democratic policy in regard to liberalism when we ruthlessly combated constitutional illusions and fought the Cadet Party in 1905-07—the article "Hannibals of Liberalism" will show them their mistake. The Bolsheviks remained true to the traditions of revolutionary Social-Democracy and did not succumb to the bourgeois intoxication to which the liberals gave their support during the "constitutional zigzag" and which temporarily misled the Right-wing members of our Party.

The next pamphlet, *What Is To Be Done?*, was published abroad early in 1902.* It is a criticism of the Right wing, which was no longer a literary trend but existed within the Social-Democratic organisation. The first Social-Democratic congress was held in 1898. It founded the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, represented by the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, which incorporated the Emancipation of Labour group. The central Party bodies, however, were suppressed by the police and could not be re-established. There was, in fact, no united party: unity was still only an idea, a directive. The infatuation with the strike movement and economic struggles gave rise to a peculiar form of Social-Democratic opportunism, known as "Economism". When the *Iskra* group began to function abroad at the very end of 1900, the split over this issue was already an accomplished fact. In the *spring* of 1900, Plekhanov resigned from the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad and set up an organisation of his own—*Sotsial-Demokrat*.

* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 347-529.—Ed.

Officially, *Iskra* began its work independently of the two groups, but for all practical purposes it sided with Plekhanov's group against the Union. An attempt to merge the two (at the Congress of the Union and the *Sotsial-Demokrat* in Zurich, June 1901) failed. *What Is To Be Done?* gives a systematic account of the reasons for the divergence of views and of the nature of *Iskra* tactics and organisational activity.

What Is To Be Done? is frequently mentioned by the Mensheviks, the present opponents of the Bolsheviks, as well as by writers belonging to the bourgeois-liberal camp (Cadets, Bezzaglavtsi in the newspaper *Tovarishch*,⁹⁰ etc.). I have, therefore, decided to reprint the pamphlet here, slightly abridged, omitting only the details of organisational relations and minor polemical remarks. Concerning the essential content of this pamphlet it is necessary to draw the attention of the modern reader to the following.

The basic mistake made by those who now criticise *What Is To Be Done?* is to treat the pamphlet apart from its connection with the concrete historical situation of a definite, and now long past, period in the development of our Party. This mistake was strikingly demonstrated, for instance, by Parvus (not to mention numerous Mensheviks), who, many years after the pamphlet appeared, wrote about its incorrect or exaggerated ideas on the subject of an organisation of professional revolutionaries.

Today these statements look ridiculous, as if their authors want to dismiss a whole period in the development of our Party, to dismiss gains which, in their time, had to be fought for, but which have long ago been consolidated and have served their purpose.

To maintain today that *Iskra* exaggerated (*in 1901 and 1902!*) the idea of an organisation of professional revolutionaries, is like reproaching the Japanese, *after* the Russo-Japanese War, for having exaggerated the strength of Russia's armed forces, for having prior to the war exaggerated the need to prepare for fighting these forces. To win victory the Japanese had to marshal all their forces against the probable maximum of Russian forces. Unfortunately, many of those who judge our Party are outsiders, who do not know the subject, who do not realise that *today* the idea of an organisation of professional revolutionaries has *already*

scored a complete victory. That victory would have been impossible if this idea had not been pushed to the *forefront* at the time, if we had not "exaggerated" so as to drive it home to people who were trying to prevent it from being realised.

What Is To Be Done? is a *summary* of *Iskra* tactics and *Iskra* organisational policy in 1901 and 1902. Precisely a "summary", no more and no less. That will be clear to anyone who takes the trouble to go through the file of *Iskra* for 1901 and 1902.* But to pass judgement on that summary without knowing *Iskra's* struggle against the then dominant trend of Economism, without understanding that struggle, is sheer idle talk. *Iskra* fought for an organisation of professional revolutionaries. It fought with especial vigour in 1901 and 1902, vanquished Economism, the then dominant trend, and finally *created* this organisation in 1903. It preserved it in face of the subsequent split in the *Iskrist* ranks and all the convulsions of the period of storm and stress; it preserved it throughout the Russian revolution; it preserved it intact from 1901-02 to 1907.

And now, when the fight for this organisation has long been won, when the seed has ripened, and the harvest gathered, people come along and tell us: "You exaggerated the idea of an organisation of professional revolutionaries!" Is this not ridiculous?

Take the whole pre-revolutionary period and the first two and a half years of the revolution (1905-07). Compare our Social-Democratic Party during this whole period with the other parties in respect of unity, organisation, and continuity of policy. You will have to admit that *in this* respect our Party is *unquestionably* superior to *all* the others—the Cadets, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc. Before the revolution it drew up a programme⁹² which was formally accepted by all Social-Democrats, and when changes were made in it there was no split over the programme. From 1903 to 1907 (formally from 1905 to 1906), the Social-Democratic Party, despite the split in its ranks, gave the public the fullest information on the inner-party situation (minutes of the

* Volume 3 of this publication will contain the most important *Iskra* articles for these years.⁹¹

Second General Congress, the Third Bolshevik,⁹³ and the Fourth General, or Stockholm, congresses). Despite the split, the Social-Democratic Party earlier than any of the other parties was able to take advantage of the temporary spell of freedom to build a legal organisation with an ideal democratic structure, an electoral system, and representation at congresses according to the number of organised members. You will not find this, even today, either in the Socialist-Revolutionary or the Cadet parties, though the latter is practically legal, is the best organised bourgeois party, and has incomparably greater funds, scope for using the press, and opportunities for legal activities than our Party. And take the elections to the Second Duma, in which all parties participated—did they not clearly show the superior organisational unity of our Party and Duma group?

The question arises, who accomplished, who brought into being this superior unity, solidarity, and stability of our Party? It was accomplished by the organisation of professional revolutionaries, to the building of which *Iskra* made the greatest contribution. Anyone who knows our Party's history well, anyone who has had a hand in building the Party, has but to glance at the delegate list of any of the groups at, say, the London Congress, in order to be convinced of this and notice at once that it is a list of the old membership, the central core that had worked hardest of all to build up the Party and make it what it is. Basically, of course, their success was due to the fact that the working class, whose best representatives built the Social-Democratic Party, for objective economic reasons possesses a greater capacity for organisation than any other class in capitalist society. Without this condition an organisation of professional revolutionaries would be nothing more than a plaything, an adventure, a mere signboard. *What Is To Be Done?* repeatedly emphasises this, pointing out that the organisation it advocates has no meaning apart from its connection with the "genuine revolutionary class that is spontaneously rising to struggle". But the objective maximum ability of the proletariat to unite in a class is realised through living people, and only through definite forms of organisation. In the historical conditions that prevailed in Russia in 1900-05, *no* organisation other than *Iskra* could have created the Social-Democratic Labour

Party we now have. The professional revolutionary has played his part in the history of Russian proletarian socialism. No power on earth can now undo this work, which has outgrown the narrow framework of the "circles" of 1902-05. Nor can the significance of the gains already won be shaken by belated complaints that the militant tasks of the movement were exaggerated by those who at that time had to fight to ensure the correct way of accomplishing these tasks.

I have just referred to the narrow framework of the circles of the old *Iskra* period (beginning with issue No. 51, at the close of 1903, *Iskra* turned to Menshevism, proclaiming that "a gulf separates the old and the new *Iskra*"—Trotsky's words in a pamphlet approved by the Menshevik *Iskra* editors). This circle spirit has to be briefly explained to the present-day reader. The pamphlets *What Is To Be Done?* and *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back** published in this collection present to the reader a heated, at times bitter and destructive, controversy within the *circles abroad*. Undoubtedly, this struggle has many unattractive features. Undoubtedly, it is something that could only be possible in a young and immature workers' movement in the country in question. Undoubtedly, the present leaders of the present workers' movement in Russia will have to break with many of the circle traditions, forget and discard many of the trivial features of circle activity and circle squabbles, so as to concentrate on the tasks of Social-Democracy in the present period. Only the broadening of the Party by enlisting *proletarian* elements can, in conjunction with open mass activity, eradicate all the residue of the circle spirit which has been inherited from the past and is unsuited to our present tasks. And the transition to a democratically organised workers' party, proclaimed by the Bolsheviks in *Novaya Zhizn*⁹⁴ in November 1905,** i.e., as soon as the conditions appeared for legal activity—this transition was virtually an irrevocable break with the old circle ways that had outlived their day.

Yes, "that had had outlived their day", for it is not enough to condemn the old circle spirit; its significance in the special circumstances of the past period must be understood. The

* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 203-425.—Ed.

** *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 29-39.—Ed.

circles were necessary in their day and played a positive role. In an autocratic state, especially in the situation created by the whole history of the *Russian* revolutionary movement, the socialist workers' party *could not* develop except from these circles. And the circles, i.e., close-knit, exclusive groups uniting a very small number of people and nearly always based on personal friendship, were a necessary stage in the development of socialism and the workers' movement in Russia. As the movement grew, it was confronted with the task of uniting these circles, forming strong links between them, and establishing continuity. This called for a firm base of operations "beyond the reach" of the autocracy—i.e., *abroad*. The circles abroad, therefore, came into being through necessity. There was no contact between them; they had no authority over them in the shape of the Party in Russia, and it was inevitable that they should differ in their understanding of the movement's main tasks at the given stage, that is, an understanding of *how exactly* to set up a base of operations and in what way they could help to build the Party as a whole. A struggle between the circles was, therefore, inevitable. Today, in retrospect, we can clearly see which of the circles was really in a position to act as a base of operations. But at that time, when the various circles were just beginning their work, no one could say that and the controversy could be resolved only through struggle. Parvus, I remember, subsequently blamed the old *Iskra* for waging a destructive circle war and advocated after the event a conciliatory policy. That is an easy thing to say after the event, and to say it reveals a failure to understand the conditions then prevailing. For one thing, there was no criterion by which to judge the strength or *importance* of one or another circle. The importance of many of them, which are now forgotten, was exaggerated, but in their time they wanted through struggle to assert their right to existence. Secondly, the differences among the circles were over the *direction* the work was to take, work which at the time was new to them. I noted at the time (in *What Is To Be Done?*) that these seemingly minor differences were actually of immense importance, since at the beginning of this new work, at the beginning of the Social-Democratic movement, the definition of the general nature of the work and movement would very

substantially affect propaganda, agitation, and organisation. All subsequent disputes between the Social-Democrats concerned the direction of the Party's political activity on specific issues. But at that time the controversy was over the most general principles and the fundamental aims of *all* Social-Democratic policy generally.

The circles played their part and are now, of course, obsolete. But they became obsolete only because the struggle that they waged posed the key problems of the Social-Democratic movement in the sharpest possible manner and solved them in an irreconcilable revolutionary spirit, thereby creating a firm basis for broad party activity.

Of particular questions raised in the literary discussion over *What Is To Be Done?* I shall comment on only two. Writing in *Iskra* in 1904, soon after the appearance of *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*, Plekhanov declared that he differed from me in principle on the question of spontaneity and political consciousness. I did not reply either to that declaration (except for a brief note in the Geneva newspaper *Vperyod*²⁵),* or to the numerous repetitions of it in Menshevik literature. I did not reply because Plekhanov's criticism was obviously mere cavilling, based on phrases torn out of context, on particular expressions which I had not quite adroitly or precisely formulated. Moreover, he ignored the general content and the whole spirit of my pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?* which appeared in March 1902. The draft Party programme (framed by Plekhanov and amended by the *Iskra* editors) appeared in June or July 1902. Its formulation of the relation between spontaneity and political consciousness was agreed upon by all the *Iskra* editors (my disputes with Plekhanov over the programme, which took place in the editorial board, were not on this point, but on the question of small production being ousted by large-scale production, concerning which I called for a more precise formula than Plekhanov's, and on the difference in the standpoint of the proletariat or of the labouring classes generally; on this point I insisted on a narrower definition of the purely proletarian character of the Party).

Consequently, there could be no question of any difference

* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 245.—Ed.

in principle between the draft Party programme and *What Is To Be Done?* on this issue. At the Second Congress (August 1903) Martynov, who was then an Economist, challenged our views on spontaneity and political consciousness as set forth in the programme. He was opposed by all the Iskrists, as I emphasise in *One Step Forward*. Hence it is clear that the controversy was essentially between the Iskrists and the Economists, who attacked *what was common* both to *What Is To Be Done?* and the programme drafts. Nor at the Second Congress did I have any intention of elevating my own formulations, as given in *What Is To Be Done?*, to "programmatic" level, constituting special principles. On the contrary, the expression I used—and it has since been frequently quoted—was that the Economists had gone to one extreme. *What Is To Be Done?*, I said, straightens out what had been twisted by the Economists (cf. minutes of the Second R.S.D.L.P. Congress in 1903, Geneva, 1904). I emphasised that just because we were so vigorously straightening out whatever had been twisted our line of action would always be the straightest.*

The meaning of these words is clear enough: *What Is To Be Done?* is a controversial correction of Economist distortions and it would be wrong to regard the pamphlet in any other light. It should be added that Plekhanov's article against the pamphlet was *not* reprinted in the new *Iskra* collection (*Two Years*), and for that reason I do not here deal with Plekhanov's arguments, but merely explain the issue involved to the present-day reader, who may come across references to it in very many Menshevik publications.

My second comment concerns the question of economic struggle and the trade unions. My views on this subject have been frequently misrepresented in the literature, and I must, therefore, emphasise that many pages in *What Is To Be Done?* are devoted to explaining the *immense* importance of economic struggle and the trade unions. In particular, I advocated *neutrality* of the trade unions, and have *not altered* that view in the pamphlets or newspaper articles written since then, despite the numerous assertions by my opponents. Only the London R.S.D.L.P. Congress and the Stuttgart

* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 491.—Ed.

International Socialist Congress led me to conclude that trade union neutrality is not defensible as a *principle*. The only correct principle is the closest possible alignment of the unions with the Party. Our policy must be to bring the unions closer to the Party and link them with it. That policy should be pursued perseveringly and persistently in all our propaganda, agitation, and organising activity, without trying to obtain mere "recognition" of our views and without expelling from the trade unions those of a different opinion.

• • •

The pamphlet *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* was published in Geneva in the summer of 1904. It reviews the first stage of the split between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks, which began at the Second Congress (August 1903). I have cut this pamphlet down by half, since minor details of the organisational struggle, especially points concerning the personal composition of the Party centres, cannot possibly be of any interest to the present-day reader and, in fact, are best forgotten. But what is important, I think, is the analysis of the controversy over tactical and other conceptions at the Second Congress, and the polemic with the Mensheviks on matters of organisation. Both are essential for an understanding of Menshevism and Bolshevism as trends which have left their mark upon all the activities of the workers' party in our revolution.

Of the discussions at the Second Congress of the Social-Democratic Party, I will mention the debate on the agrarian programme. Events have clearly demonstrated that our programme at the time (return of the cut-off lands) was much too limited and *underestimated* the strength of the revolutionary-democratic peasant movement—I shall deal with this in greater detail in Volume 2 of the present publication.⁹⁶ Here it is important to emphasise that *even this excessively limited* agrarian programme was at that time considered *too broad* by the Social-Democratic Right wing. Martynov and other Economists opposed it on the grounds that it went too far! This shows the great practical importance of the whole struggle that the old *Iskra* waged against Economism, against attempts to narrow down and belittle the character of Social-Democratic policy.

At that time (the first half of 1904) our differences with the Mensheviks were restricted to organisational issues. I described the Menshevik attitude as "opportunism in questions of organisation". Objecting to this P. B. Axelrod wrote to Kautsky: "My feeble mind just cannot grasp this thing called 'opportunism in questions of organisation' which is now being brought to the fore as something independent and having no direct connection with programmatic and tactical views." (Letter of June 6, 1904, reprinted in the new-*Iskra* collection *Two Years*, Part II, p. 149.)

The direct connection of opportunism in organisational views with that in tactical views has been sufficiently demonstrated by the whole record of Menshevism in 1905-07. As for this "incomprehensible thing", "opportunism in questions of organisation", practical experience has borne out my appraisal more brilliantly than I could ever have expected. It suffices to say that even the *Menshevik* Cherevanin now has to admit (see his pamphlet on the London R.S.D.L.P. Congress of 1907) that Axelrod's organisational plans (the much-talked-of "labour congress", etc.) could only lead to splits that would ruin the proletarian cause. What is more, the same Cherevanin tells us in this pamphlet that in London Plekhanov had to contend with "*organisational anarchism*" within the Menshevik faction. And so it was not for nothing that I fought "opportunism in questions of organisation" in 1904, seeing that in 1907 both Cherevanin and Plekhanov have had to recognise the "*organisational anarchism*" of influential Mensheviks.

From organisational opportunism the Mensheviks passed to tactical opportunism. The pamphlet, *The Zemstvo Campaign and "Iskra's" Plan** (published in Geneva towards the end of 1904, in November or December if I am not mistaken), marks their first step in that direction. One frequently finds statements in current writings that the dispute over the Zemstvo campaign⁹⁷ was due to the fact that the Bolsheviks saw no value at all in organising demonstrations before the Zemstvo people. The reader will see that this was not the case at all. The differences were due to the Mensheviks insisting that we should not cause *panic* among the

* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 497-518.—Ed.

liberals, and, still more to the fact that, after the Rostov strike of 1902, the summer strikes and barricades of 1903, and on the eve of January 9, 1905, the Mensheviks extolled the idea of demonstrations before the Zemstvo people as the *highest type* of demonstration. Our attitude to this Menshevik "Zemstvo campaign plan" was expressed in the heading of an article on the subject in the Bolshevik paper *Vperyod*. No. 1 (Geneva, January 1905): "Good Demonstrations of Proletarians and Poor Arguments of Certain Intellectuals."*

The last pamphlet included in this collection, *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, appeared in Geneva in the summer of 1905.** It is a systematic statement of the *fundamental* tactical differences with the Mensheviks. These differences were fully formulated in the resolutions of the Third (spring) R.S.D.L.P. (Bolshevik) Congress in London and the Menshevik Conference in Geneva and established the *basic* divergence between the Bolshevik and Menshevik appraisals of our bourgeois revolution as a whole from the standpoint of the proletariat's tasks. The Bolsheviks claimed for the proletariat the role of *leader* in the democratic revolution. The Mensheviks reduced its role to that of an "extreme opposition". The Bolsheviks gave a positive definition of the class character and class significance of the revolution, maintaining that a victorious revolution implied a "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry". The Mensheviks always interpreted the bourgeois revolution so incorrectly as to result in their acceptance of a position in which the role of the proletariat would be subordinate to and dependent on the bourgeoisie.

How these differences of principle were reflected in practical activities is well known. The Bolsheviks boycotted the Bulygin Duma⁹⁸; the Mensheviks vacillated. The Bolsheviks boycotted the Witte Duma; the Mensheviks vacillated, appealing to the people to vote, but not for the Duma. The Mensheviks supported a Cadet Ministry and Cadet policy in the First Duma, while the Bolsheviks, parallel with propaganda in favour of an "executive committee of the Left",

* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 29-34.—Ed.

** Ibid., Vol. 9, pp. 15-140.—Ed.

resolutely exposed constitutional illusions and Cadet counter-revolutionism. Further, the Bolsheviks worked for a Left bloc in the Second Duma elections, while the Mensheviks called for a bloc with the Cadets, and so on and so forth.

Now it seems that the "Cadet period" in the Russian revolution (the expression is from the pamphlet *The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party*, March 1906*) has come to an end. The counter-revolutionary nature of the Cadets has been fully exposed. The Cadets themselves are beginning to admit that they had been combating the revolution all along, and Mr. Struve frankly reveals the inner thoughts of Cadet liberalism. The more attentively the class-conscious proletariat now looks back on this Cadet period, on the whole of this "constitutional zigzag", the more clearly will it see that the Bolsheviks correctly appraised beforehand both this period and the essence of the Cadet Party, and that the Mensheviks were in fact pursuing a wrong policy, one that, objectively, was tantamount to throwing over independent proletarian policy in favour of subordinating the proletariat to bourgeois liberalism.

* * *

In casting a retrospective glance at the struggle of the two trends in Russian Marxism and Social-Democracy during the last twelve years (1895-1907), one cannot avoid the conclusion that "legal Marxism", "Economism", and "Menshevism" are diverse forms of one and the same historical tendency. The "legal Marxism" of Mr. Struve (1894) and those like him was a *reflection of Marxism in bourgeois literature*. "Economism", as a distinct trend in Social-Democratic activities in 1897 and subsequent years, virtually implemented the programme set forth in the *bourgeois-liberal "Credo"*: economic struggle for the workers, political struggle for the liberals. Menshevism is not only a literary trend, not only a tendency in Social-Democratic activity, but a close-knit faction, which during the first period of the Russian revolution (1905-07) pursued its own distinct policy—a policy which

* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, pp. 199-276.—Ed.

*in practice subordinated the proletariat to bourgeois liberalism.**

In all capitalist countries the proletariat is inevitably connected by a thousand transitional links with its neighbour on the right, the petty bourgeoisie. In all workers' parties there inevitably emerges a more or less clearly delineated Right wing which, in its views, tactics, and organisational "line", reflects the opportunist tendencies of the petty bourgeoisie. In such a petty-bourgeois country as Russia, in the era of bourgeois revolution, in the formative period of the young Social-Democratic Labour Party, these tendencies were bound to manifest themselves much more sharply, definitely, and clearly than anywhere else in Europe. Familiarity with the various forms in which this tendency is displayed in the Russian Social-Democratic movement in different periods of its development is necessary in order to strengthen revolutionary Marxism and steel the Russian working class in its struggle for emancipation.

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* An analysis of the struggle of the various trends and shades of opinion at the Second Party Congress (cf. *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*, 1904) will show beyond all doubt the direct and close ties between the Economism of 1897 and subsequent years and Menshevism. The link between Economism in the Social-Democratic movement and the "legal Marxism" or "Struvism" of 1895-97 was demonstrated by me in the pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?* (1902). Legal Marxism-Economism-Menshevism are linked not only ideologically, but also by their direct historical continuity.

MARXISM AND REVISIONISM

There is a well-known saying that if geometrical axioms affected human interests attempts would certainly be made to refute them. Theories of natural history which conflicted with the old prejudices of theology provoked, and still provoke, the most rabid opposition. No wonder, therefore, that the Marxian doctrine, which directly serves to enlighten and organise the advanced class in modern society, indicates the tasks facing this class and demonstrates the inevitable replacement (by virtue of economic development) of the present system by a new order—no wonder that this doctrine has had to fight for every step forward in the course of its life.

Needless to say, this applies to bourgeois science and philosophy, officially taught by official professors in order to befuddle the rising generation of the propertied classes and to "coach" it against internal and foreign enemies. This science will not even hear of Marxism, declaring that it has been refuted and annihilated. Marx is attacked with equal zest by young scholars who are making a career by refuting socialism, and by decrepit elders who are preserving the tradition of all kinds of outworn "systems". The progress of Marxism, the fact that its ideas are spreading and taking firm hold among the working class, inevitably increase the frequency and intensity of these bourgeois attacks on Marxism, which becomes stronger, more hardened and more vigorous every time it is "annihilated" by official science.

But even among doctrines connected with the struggle of the working class, and current mainly among the proletariat, Marxism by no means consolidated its position all at once.

In the first half-century of its existence (from the 1840s on) Marxism was engaged in combating theories fundamentally hostile to it. In the early forties Marx and Engels settled accounts with the radical Young Hegelians whose viewpoint was that of philosophical idealism. At the end of the forties the struggle began in the field of economic doctrine, against Proudhonism. The fifties saw the completion of this struggle in criticism of the parties and doctrines which manifested themselves in the stormy year of 1848. In the sixties the struggle shifted from the field of general theory to one closer to the direct labour movement: the ejection of Bakuninism from the International. In the early seventies the stage in Germany was occupied for a short while by the Proudhonist Mühlberger, and in the late seventies by the positivist Dühring. But the influence of both on the proletariat was already absolutely insignificant. Marxism was already gaining an unquestionable victory over all other ideologies in the labour movement.

By the nineties this victory was in the main completed. Even in the Latin countries, where the traditions of Proudhonism held their ground longest of all, the workers' parties in effect built their programmes and their tactics on Marxist foundations. The revived international organisation of the labour movement—in the shape of periodical international congresses—from the outset, and almost without a struggle, adopted the Marxist standpoint in all essentials. But after Marxism had ousted all the more or less integral doctrines hostile to it, the tendencies expressed in those doctrines began to seek other channels. The forms and causes of the struggle changed, but the struggle continued. And the second half-century of the existence of Marxism began (in the nineties) with the struggle of a trend hostile to Marxism within Marxism itself.

Bernstein, a one-time orthodox Marxist, gave his name to this trend by coming forward with the most noise and with the most purposeful expression of amendments to Marx, revision of Marx, revisionism. Even in Russia where—owing to the economic backwardness of the country and the preponderance of a peasant population weighed down by the relics of serfdom—non-Marxist socialism has naturally held its ground longest of all, it is plainly passing into revisionism

before our very eyes. Both in the agrarian question (the programme of the municipalisation of all land) and in general questions of programme and tactics, our Social-Narodniks are more and more substituting "amendments" to Marx for the moribund and obsolescent remnants of their old system, which in its own way was integral and fundamentally hostile to Marxism.

Pre-Marxist socialism has been defeated. It is continuing the struggle, no longer on its own independent ground, but on the general ground of Marxism, as revisionism. Let us, then, examine the ideological content of revisionism.

In the sphere of philosophy revisionism followed in the wake of bourgeois professorial "science". The professors went "back to Kant"—and revisionism dragged along after the neo-Kantians. The professors repeated the platitudes that priests have uttered a thousand times against philosophical materialism—and the revisionists, smiling indulgently, mumbled (word for word after the latest *Handbuch*) that materialism had been "refuted" long ago. The professors treated Hegel as a "dead dog",⁹⁹ and while themselves preaching idealism, only an idealism a thousand times more petty and banal than Hegel's, contemptuously shrugged their shoulders at dialectics—and the revisionists floundered after them into the swamp of philosophical vulgarisation of science, replacing "artful" (and revolutionary) dialectics by "simple" (and tranquil) "evolution". The professors earned their official salaries by adjusting both their idealist and their "critical" systems to the dominant medieval "philosophy" (i.e., to theology)—and the revisionists drew close to them, trying to make religion a "private affair", not in relation to the modern state, but in relation to the party of the advanced class.

What such "amendments" to Marx really meant in class terms need not be stated: it is self-evident. We shall simply note that the only Marxist in the international Social-Democratic movement to criticise the incredible platitudes of the revisionists from the standpoint of consistent dialectical materialism was Plekhanov. This must be stressed all the more emphatically since profoundly mistaken attempts are being made at the present time to smuggle in old and

reactionary philosophical rubbish disguised as a criticism of Plekhanov's tactical opportunism.*

Passing to political economy, it must be noted first of all that in this sphere the "amendments" of the revisionists were much more comprehensive and circumstantial; attempts were made to influence the public by "new data on economic development". It was said that concentration and the ousting of small-scale production by large-scale production do not occur in agriculture at all, while they proceed very slowly in commerce and industry. It was said that crises had now become rarer and weaker, and that cartels and trusts would probably enable capital to eliminate them altogether. It was said that the "theory of collapse" to which capitalism is heading was unsound, owing to the tendency of class antagonisms to become milder and less acute. It was said, finally, that it would not be amiss to correct Marx's theory of value, too, in accordance with Böhm-Bawerk.

The fight against the revisionists on these questions resulted in as fruitful a revival of the theoretical thought in international socialism as did Engels's controversy with Dühring twenty years earlier. The arguments of the revisionists were analysed with the help of facts and figures. It was proved that the revisionists were systematically painting a rose-coloured picture of modern small-scale production. The technical and commercial superiority of large-scale *production* over small-scale production not only in industry, but also in agriculture, is proved by irrefutable facts. But commodity production is far less developed in agriculture, and modern statisticians and economists are, as a rule, not very skilful in picking out the special branches (sometimes even the operations) in agriculture which indicate that agriculture is being progressively drawn into the process of *exchange* in world economy. Small-scale production maintains itself on the ruins of natural economy by constant worsening of diet, by chronic starvation, by lengthening of the working day, by

* See *Studies in the Philosophy of Marxism* by Bogdanov, Bazarov and others. This is not the place to discuss the book, and I must at present confine myself to stating that in the very near future I shall prove in a series of articles, or in a separate pamphlet, that *everything* I have said in the text about neo-Kantian revisionists essentially applies also to these "new" neo-Humist and neo-Berkeleyan revisionists.¹⁰⁰

deterioration in the quality and the care of cattle, in a word, by the very methods whereby handicraft production maintained itself against capitalist manufacture. Every advance in science and technology inevitably and relentlessly undermines the foundations of small-scale production in capitalist society; and it is the task of socialist political economy to investigate this process in all its forms, often complicated and intricate, and to demonstrate to the small producer the impossibility of his holding his own under capitalism, the hopelessness of peasant farming under capitalism, and the necessity for the peasant to adopt the standpoint of the proletariat. On this question the revisionists sinned, in the scientific sense, by superficial generalisations based on facts selected one-sidedly and without reference to the system of capitalism as a whole. From the political point of view, they sinned by the fact that they inevitably, whether they wanted to or not, invited or urged the peasant to adopt the attitude of a small proprietor (i.e., the attitude of the bourgeoisie) instead of urging him to adopt the point of view of the revolutionary proletariat.

The position of revisionism was even worse as regards the theory of crises and the theory of collapse. Only for a very short time could people, and then only the most short-sighted, think of refashioning the foundations of Marx's theory under the influence of a few years of industrial boom and prosperity. Realities very soon made it clear to the revisionists that crises were not a thing of the past: prosperity was followed by a crisis. The forms, the sequence, the picture of particular crises changed, but crises remained an inevitable component of the capitalist system. While uniting production, the cartels and trusts at the same time, and in a way that was obvious to all, aggravated the anarchy of production, the insecurity of existence of the proletariat and the oppression of capital, thereby intensifying class antagonisms to an unprecedented degree. That capitalism is heading for a breakdown—in the sense both of individual political and economic crises and of the complete collapse of the entire capitalist system—has been made particularly clear, and on a particularly large scale, precisely by the new giant trusts. The recent financial crisis in America and the appalling increase of unemployment all over Europe, to say nothing of the im-

pending industrial crisis to which many symptoms are pointing—all this has resulted in the recent “theories” of the revisionists having been forgotten by everybody, including, apparently, many of the revisionists themselves. But the lessons which this instability of the intellectuals had given the working class must not be forgotten.

As to the theory of value, it need only be said that apart from the vaguest of hints and sighs, *à la* Böhm-Bawerk, the revisionists have contributed absolutely nothing, and have therefore left no traces whatever on the development of scientific thought.

In the sphere of politics, revisionism did really try to revise the foundation of Marxism, namely, the doctrine of the class struggle. Political freedom, democracy and universal suffrage remove the ground for the class struggle—we were told—and render untrue the old proposition of the *Communist Manifesto* that the working men have no country. For, they said, since the “will of the majority” prevails in a democracy, one must neither regard the state as an organ of class rule, nor reject alliances with the progressive, social-reform bourgeoisie against the reactionaries.

It cannot be disputed that these arguments of the revisionists amounted to a fairly well-balanced system of views, namely, the old and well-known liberal-bourgeois views. The liberals have always said that bourgeois parliamentarism destroys classes and class divisions, since the right to vote and the right to participate in the government of the country are shared by all citizens without distinction. The whole history of Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century, and the whole history of the Russian revolution in the early twentieth, clearly show how absurd such views are. Economic distinctions are not mitigated but aggravated and intensified under the freedom of “democratic” capitalism. Parliamentarism does not eliminate, but lays bare the innate character even of the most democratic bourgeois republics as organs of class oppression. By helping to enlighten and to organise immeasurably wider masses of the population than those which previously took an active part in political events, parliamentarism does not make for the elimination of crises and political revolutions, but for the maximum intensification of civil war during such revolutions. The events in Paris in

the spring of 1871 and the events in Russia in the winter of 1905 showed as clearly as could be how inevitably this intensification comes about. The French bourgeoisie without a moment's hesitation made a deal with the enemy of the whole nation, with the foreign army which had ruined its country, in order to crush the proletarian movement. Whoever does not understand the inevitable inner dialectics of parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy—which leads to an even sharper decision of the argument by mass violence than formerly—will never be able on the basis of this parliamentarism to conduct propaganda and agitation consistent in principle, really preparing the working-class masses for victorious participation in such "arguments". The experience of alliances, agreements and blocs with the social-reform liberals in the West and with the liberal reformists (Cadets) in the Russian revolution, has convincingly shown that these agreements only blunt the consciousness of the masses, that they do not enhance but weaken the actual significance of their struggle, by linking fighters with elements who are least capable of fighting and most vacillating and treacherous. Millerandism in France—the biggest experiment in applying revisionist political tactics on a wide, a really national scale—has provided a practical appraisal of revisionism that will never be forgotten by the proletariat all over the world.

A natural complement to the economic and political tendencies of revisionism was its attitude to the ultimate aim of the socialist movement. "The movement is everything, the ultimate aim is nothing"—this catch-phrase of Bernstein's expresses the substance of revisionism better than many long disquisitions. To determine its conduct from case to case, to adapt itself to the events of the day and to the chopping and changing of petty politics, to forget the primary interests of the proletariat and the basic features of the whole capitalist system, of all capitalist evolution, to sacrifice these primary interests for the real or assumed advantages of the moment—such is the policy of revisionism. And it patently follows from the very nature of this policy that it may assume an infinite variety of forms, and that every more or less "new" question, every more or less unexpected and unforeseen turn of events, even though it change the basic line of development only to an insignificant degree and only for

the briefest period, will always inevitably give rise to one variety of revisionism or another.

The inevitability of revisionism is determined by its class roots in modern society. Revisionism is an international phenomenon. No thinking socialist who is in the least informed can have the slightest doubt that the relation between the orthodox and the Bernsteinians in Germany, the Guesdists and the Jaurèsists (and now particularly the Broussists) in France, the Social Democratic Federation and the Independent Labour Party in Great Britain,⁴⁰¹ Brouckère and Vandervelde in Belgium, the Integralists and Reformists in Italy, the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in Russia, is everywhere essentially similar, notwithstanding the immense variety of national conditions and historical factors in the present state of all these countries. In reality, the "division" within the present international socialist movement is now proceeding along the *same* lines in all the various countries of the world, which testifies to a tremendous advance compared with thirty or forty years ago, when heterogeneous trends in the various countries were struggling within the one international socialist movement. And that "revisionism from the left" which has taken shape in the Latin countries as "revolutionary syndicalism", is also adapting itself to Marxism, "amending" it: Labriola in Italy and Lagardelle in France frequently appeal from Marx who is understood wrongly to Marx who is understood rightly.

We cannot stop here to analyse the ideological content of *this* revisionism, which as yet is far from having developed to the same extent as opportunist revisionism: it has not yet become international, has not yet stood the test of a single big practical battle with a socialist party in any single country. We confine ourselves therefore to that "revisionism from the right" which was described above.

Wherein lies its inevitability in capitalist society? Why is it more profound than the differences of national peculiarities and of degrees of capitalist development? Because in every capitalist country, side by side with the proletariat, there are always broad strata of the petty bourgeoisie, small proprietors. Capitalism arose and is constantly arising out of small production. A number of new "middle strata" are inevitably brought into existence again and again by capitalism

(appendages to the factory, work at home, small workshops scattered all over the country to meet the requirements of big industries, such as the bicycle and automobile industries, etc.). These new small producers are just as inevitably being cast again into the ranks of the proletariat. It is quite natural that the petty-bourgeois world outlook should again and again crop up in the ranks of the broad workers' parties. It is quite natural that this should be so and always will be so, right up to the changes of fortune that will take place in the proletarian revolution. For it would be a profound mistake to think that the "complete" proletarianisation of the majority of the population is essential for bringing about such a revolution. What we now frequently experience only in the domain of ideology, namely, disputes over theoretical amendments to Marx; what now crops up in practice only over individual side issues of the labour movement, as tactical differences with the revisionists and splits on this basis—is bound to be experienced by the working class on an incomparably larger scale when the proletarian revolution will sharpen all disputed issues, will focus all differences on points which are of the most immediate importance in determining the conduct of the masses, and will make it necessary in the heat of the fight to distinguish enemies from friends, and to cast out bad allies in order to deal decisive blows at the enemy.

The ideological struggle waged by revolutionary Marxism against revisionism at the end of the nineteenth century is but the prelude to the great revolutionary battles of the proletariat, which is marching forward to the complete victory of its cause despite all the waverings and weaknesses of the petty bourgeoisie.

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Signed: *V. Ilyin*

Vol. 15

HOW PLEKHANOV AND CO. DEFEND REVISIONISM

The editorial comment in *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*,¹⁰² i.e., by Plekhanov and Co., on our analysis of Comrade Maslov's letter in *Proletary*¹⁰³ No. 37, has now appeared as a separate supplement to No. 8-9 of *Golos*.

This "Comment", in length about half a column of *Proletary*, merits the attention of Russian Social-Democrats, for it shows how petty factional interests have led Plekhanov and Co. to *defend* theoretical revisionism with the aid of the most unseemly sophistry. Here are the facts.

"We are the most determined and absolutely irreconcilable opponents of that *re-examination* (revision) of Marxism which is being performed under the reactionary influence of the ideologists of the West-European bourgeoisie and whose object is to strike at the roots of the philosophical, sociological, and economic doctrines of Marx and Engels." That is the first sentence of the comment. "Most determined and absolutely irreconcilable opponents"—could it be put more sharply? It would be hard to produce a more grandiloquent formula for the *promises* of Plekhanov and Co.

But ... the trouble is that our "irreconcilable" enemies of revisionism resort to a very meaningful "but" *in relation to Maslov* (and Plekhanov and Co. wrote this Comment precisely in connection with Maslov's article, precisely on the question of Maslov's revisionism).

"But we have never been Marxist sectarians," Plekhanov and Co. declare, "and we realise only too well that one can differ from Marx and Engels on one question or another, and far from perverting their point of view or repudiating their method, remain true to both." And this example is

cited: Cunow, a Social-Democrat, had "partial differences with Engels" on the question of "the origin of the matriarchate", but "only a morbid mind could accuse him of revisionism on these grounds".

"The foregoing holds good also for our attitude to Comrade Maslov's views on Marx's theory of rent. We do not share this view" (*Golos* adds editorially: "Comrade Martynov made the specific reservation in No. 1 of *Golos* that he did not agree with Comrade Maslov's amendment to the theory of absolute rent"), "but we do not regard it as revisionism...."

The reader can now follow the Plekhanov and Co. trend of reasoning. We are "absolutely irreconcilable opponents of revisionism", *but*—"we do not regard it [Maslov's view on the theory of absolute rent] as revisionism". Revisionism strikes at the roots of Marx's doctrine, whereas Maslov differs with Marx on a partial issue—such is the line of defence taken by Plekhanov and Co., and fully amplified by the reference to Cunow.

We ask the unbiased and thinking reader: is this not sophistry? Marx's theory of absolute rent is declared a "partial issue"! Differences on his theory of rent are *equated* with the fact that Cunow had "partial differences" with Engels on the origin of the matriarchate! Plekhanov and Co. apparently consider their Mensheviks little children to be fed on such explanations. One has to have no respect for oneself or for one's reader to play the clown like this in discussing cardinal questions of principle. Plekhanov and Co. themselves begin their explanation with a solemn phrase in which revisionism is described as striking at the *roots* of Marx's and Engels's doctrine. Very well. But do Plekhanov and Co. renounce *that* attitude in the case of Maslov? Yes or no? Or have Plekhanov and Co. penned their comment only to *conceal* their thoughts?

Maslov has declared, in a number of articles and in several editions of his *Agrarian Question*, that (1) Marx's theory of absolute rent is wrong; (2) the appearance of such a theory is due to the "rough" nature of Volume III; (3) "diminishing returns" are a *fact*; (4) if the theory of absolute rent were correct and the "law of diminishing returns" wrong, the Narodniks in Russia and the revisionists the world over might prove to be right.

These were the four points which were held against Maslov in the *Proletary* article from which the whole polemic began. But just see how Plekhanov and Co. react. First, they very modestly confine themselves to the question of rent, i.e., they maintain complete silence on all the other questions. Is this not defence of revisionism? Are Plekhanov and Co. going to deny that the revision of Marx's theory about the absurdity of both the law and "fact" of diminishing returns "is being performed under the reactionary influence of the ideologists of the West-European bourgeoisie"? Secondly, the theory of absolute rent is equated with a partial question, with differences ("partial") over the origin of the matriarchate!

This, gentlemen, is mental acrobatics! And you are using them to conceal your public defence of revisionism. For *you do not venture* to state openly that recognition of absolute rent and negation of the law (or "fact") of diminishing returns are *not* the "roots" of Marx's economic doctrine on the agrarian question. You defend your "own chap" by adjusting Marx to fit Maslov, by declaring that, in *Maslov's case*, the very roots of Marx's theory are no more than a matter of "partial differences". You thereby confirm what *Proletary*¹⁰⁴ (No. 33) said about the Menshevik theoretical Famusovs,¹⁰⁵ who reward their household by agreeing to regard Marx's economic theory as a "partial" question and by putting it on a par with the question of the origin of the matriarchate.

Plekhanov and Co. are "irreconcilable enemies of revisionism"—but if you are a Menshevik, don't be afraid of these dread words! You can go to the *Golos* editors, knowing that for Mensheviks irreconcilability is very reconcilable—so much so that they are prepared to equate "uprooting of theory" with "differences over the origin of the matriarchate". Indulgences are being offered cheap, ladies and gentlemen, the sale is on!

But to continue. We do not share Maslov's views on rent, say Plekhanov and Co. Martynov has already made a reservation to that effect, they add. The "individual" whom the editors of *Proletary* described as "Maslov's guardian angel" (i.e., Plekhanov), has "often [listen to this!] *polemised in the*

press [*Golos italics*] with Comrade Maslov on subjects closely related to our agrarian programme”.

That, literally, is what Plekhanov and Co. say in their “Comment”!

Learn from your editors how to write disclaimers, Menshevik comrades. Here you have a classical example. The point at issue is revisionism, and the controversy began about whether it was theoretical irreconcilability or *only* petty factional spite that made Plekhanov refer to several of his opponents, in the Party organ, as “Messrs.” But the “disclaimer” says: Plekhanov “often polemised in the press” with Maslov, but *not about the rent theory and not about Maslov’s deviations from Marxian theory.*

Is there a suitable parliamentary expression to describe such methods? Plekhanov, who is a lover of theoretical controversies, and is able, on occasion, to turn them into campaigns, has *never, not once, polemised* with Maslov about what constitutes his revisionism, i.e., his negation of the absolute rent theory, his describing it as a “rough note” his defence of the “fact” of diminishing returns, or about whether or not the Narodniks and revisionists might have proved to be right if Maslov had not refuted Marx. Not once did Plekhanov argue on *these points*: he polemised about something quite different, namely, side issues, which the Menshevik Tartuffes* have now concealed behind a subtly hazy, deliberately misleading and diplomatically confused phrase: “subjects closely related to our agrarian programme”!

Brilliant, what? One cannot help congratulating Plekhanov and Co. on this opening defence of revisionism! One cannot help recalling politicians of the Clemenceau stamp. Clemenceau, “irreconcilable” enemy of reaction, “often polemised” with it, but now, with reaction in the saddle, Clemenceau makes reservations and . . . serves it. Plekhanov is an “irreconcilable” enemy of revisionism. Plekhanov has “often polemised” with Maslov (on every imaginable subject *except* Maslov’s revisionism). And now Maslov has come out against Marx, repeating his old arguments against the

* Hypocrites: the character typifying this vice in Molière’s comedy of the same name. —Ed.

Marxian theory in the pages of *Golos*, but Plekhanov and Co. only make *reservations!*

Buy your indulgences, literary gentlemen, sign up with the Mensheviks! Tomorrow you will be given the opportunity to refute Marx's theory of value as well in the pages of *Golos*—with the reservation in a comment by the editors that they "are not in agreement"....

"Will not *Proletary* endeavour," Plekhanov and Co. ask in the same Comment, "to substantiate its remark' about the connection between Maslov's reflections on absolute rent and the programme which repudiates nationalisation?" With the greatest of pleasure, dear "irreconcilables" Here is a brief first *substantiation* to start with:

"Is it possible, while failing to understand Marx's theory of absolute rent, to appreciate the role of private property in land as an obstacle to the development of the productive forces of capitalist society?"

Consult Maslov, "irreconcilable" Plekhanov and Co., and answer *that* question, which gives you the substantiation you want!

DIFFERENCES IN THE EUROPEAN LABOUR MOVEMENT

I

The principal tactical differences in the present-day labour movement of Europe and America reduce themselves to a struggle against two big trends that are departing from Marxism, which has in fact become the dominant theory in this movement. These two trends are revisionism (opportunism, reformism) and anarchism (anarcho-syndicalism, anarcho-socialism). Both these departures from the Marxist theory and Marxist tactics that are dominant in the labour movement were to be observed in various forms and in various shades in all civilised countries during the more than half-century of history of the mass labour movement.

This fact alone shows that these departures cannot be attributed to accident, or to the mistakes of individuals or groups, or even to the influence of national characteristics and traditions, and so forth. There must be deep-rooted causes in the economic system and in the character of the development of all capitalist countries which constantly give rise to these departures. A small book, *The Tactical Differences in the Labour Movement* (*Die taktischen Differenzen in der Arbeiterbewegung*, Hamburg, Erdmann Dubber 1909), published last year by a Dutch Marxist, Anton Pannekoek, represents an interesting attempt at a scientific investigation of these causes. In our exposition we shall acquaint the reader with Pannekoek's conclusions, which, it must be recognised, are quite correct.

One of the most profound causes that periodically give rise to differences over tactics is the very growth of the labour movement. If this movement is not measured by the criterion of some fantastic ideal, but is regarded as the

practical movement of ordinary people, it will be clear that the enlistment of larger and larger numbers of new "recruits", the attraction of new sections of the working people must inevitably be accompanied by waverings in the sphere of theory and tactics, by repetitions of old mistakes, by a temporary reversion to antiquated views and antiquated methods, and so forth. The labour movement of every country periodically spends a varying amount of energy, attention and time on the "training" of recruits.

Furthermore, the rate at which capitalism develops varies in different countries and in different spheres of the national economy. Marxism is most easily, rapidly, completely and lastingly assimilated by the working class and its ideologists where large-scale industry is most developed. Economic relations which are backward, or which lag in their development, constantly lead to the appearance of supporters of the labour movement who assimilate only certain aspects of Marxism, only certain parts of the new world outlook, or individual slogans and demands, being unable to make a determined break with all the traditions of the bourgeois world outlook in general and the bourgeois-democratic world outlook in particular.

Again, a constant source of differences is the dialectical nature of social development, which proceeds in contradictions and through contradictions. Capitalism is progressive because it destroys the old methods of production and develops productive forces, yet at the same time, at a certain stage of development, it retards the growth of productive forces. It develops, organises, and disciplines the workers—and it crushes, oppresses, leads to degeneration, poverty, etc. Capitalism creates its own grave-digger, itself creates the elements of a new system, yet, at the same time, without a "leap" these individual elements change nothing in the general state of affairs and do not affect the rule of capital. It is Marxism, the theory of dialectical materialism, that is able to encompass these contradictions of living reality, of the living history of capitalism and the working-class movement. But, needless to say, the masses learn from life and not from books, and therefore certain individuals or groups constantly exaggerate, elevate to a one-sided theory, to a one-sided system of tactics, now one and now another feature

of capitalist development, now one and now another "lesson" of this development.

Bourgeois ideologists, liberals and democrats, not understanding Marxism, and not understanding the modern labour movement, are constantly jumping from one futile extreme to another. At one time they explain the whole matter by asserting that evil-minded persons "incite" class against class—at another they console themselves with the idea that the workers' party is "a peaceful party of reform". Both anarcho-syndicalism and reformism must be regarded as a direct product of this bourgeois world outlook and its influence. They seize upon *one* aspect of the labour movement, elevate one-sidedness to a theory, and declare mutually exclusive those tendencies or features of this movement that are a specific peculiarity of a given period, of given conditions of working-class activity. But real life, real history, *includes* these different tendencies, just as life and development in nature include both slow evolution and rapid leaps, breaks in continuity.

The revisionists regard as phrase-mongering all arguments about "leaps" and about the working-class movement being antagonistic in principle to the whole of the old society. They regard reforms as a partial realisation of socialism. The anarcho-syndicalists reject "petty work", especially the utilisation of the parliamentary platform. In practice, the latter tactics amount to waiting for "great days" along with an inability to muster the forces which create great events. Both of them hinder the thing that is most important and most urgent, namely, to unite the workers in big, powerful and properly functioning organisations, capable of functioning well under *all* circumstances, permeated with the spirit of the class struggle, clearly realising their aims and trained in the true Marxist world outlook.

We shall here permit ourselves a slight digression and note in parenthesis, so as to avoid possible misunderstandings, that Pannekoek illustrates his analysis *exclusively* by examples taken from West-European history, especially the history of Germany and France, not referring to Russia *at all*. If at times it seems that he is alluding to Russia, it is only because the basic tendencies which give rise to definite departures from Marxist tactics are to be observed in our

country too, despite the vast difference between Russia and the West in culture, everyday life, and historical and economic development.

Finally, an extremely important cause of differences among those taking part in the labour movement lies in changes in the tactics of the ruling classes in general and of the bourgeoisie in particular. If the tactics of the bourgeoisie were always uniform, or at least of the same kind, the working class would rapidly learn to reply to them by tactics just as uniform or of the same kind. But, as a matter of fact, in every country the bourgeoisie inevitably devises two systems of rule, two methods of fighting for its interests and of maintaining its domination, and these methods at times succeed each other and at times are interwoven in various combinations. The first of these is the method of force, the method which rejects all concessions to the labour movement, the method of supporting all the old and obsolete institutions, the method of irreconcilably rejecting reforms. Such is the nature of the conservative policy which in Western Europe is becoming less and less a policy of the landowning classes and more and more one of the varieties of bourgeois policy in general. The second is the method of "liberalism", of steps towards the development of political rights, towards reforms, concessions, and so forth.

The bourgeoisie passes from one method to the other not because of the malicious intent of individuals, and not accidentally, but owing to the fundamentally contradictory nature of its own position. Normal capitalist society cannot develop successfully without a firmly established representative system and without certain political rights for the population, which is bound to be distinguished by its relatively high "cultural" demands. These demands for a certain minimum of culture are created by the conditions of the capitalist mode of production itself, with its high technique, complexity, flexibility, mobility, rapid development of world competition, and so forth. In consequence, vacillations in the tactics of the bourgeoisie, transitions from the system of force to the system of apparent concessions have been characteristic of the history of all European countries during the last half-century, the various countries developing primarily the application of the one method or the other at

definite periods. For instance, in the sixties and seventies of the nineteenth century Britain was the classical country of "liberal" bourgeois policy, Germany in the seventies and eighties adhered to the method of force, and so on.

When this method prevailed in Germany, a one-sided echo of this particular system of bourgeois government was the growth of anarcho-syndicalism, or anarchism, as it was then called, in the labour movement (the "Young" at the beginning of the nineties,¹⁰⁶ Johann Most at the beginning of the eighties). When in 1890 the change to "concessions" took place, this change, as is always the case, proved to be even more dangerous to the labour movement, and gave rise to an equally one-sided echo of bourgeois "reformism": opportunism in the labour movement. "The positive, real aim of the liberal policy of the bourgeoisie," Pannekoek says, "is to mislead the workers, to cause a split in their ranks, to convert their policy into an impotent adjunct of an impotent, always impotent and ephemeral, sham reformism."

Not infrequently, the bourgeoisie for a certain time achieves its object by a "liberal" policy, which, as Pannekoek justly remarks, is a "more crafty" policy. A part of the workers and a part of their representatives at times allow themselves to be deceived by seeming concessions. The revisionists declare that the doctrine of the class struggle is "antiquated", or begin to conduct a policy which is in fact a renunciation of the class struggle. The zigzags of bourgeois tactics intensify revisionism within the labour movement and not infrequently bring the differences within the labour movement to the point of an outright split.

All causes of the kind indicated give rise to differences over tactics within the labour movement and within the proletarian ranks. But there is not and cannot be a Chinese wall between the proletariat and the sections of the petty bourgeoisie in contact with it, including the peasantry. It is clear that the passing of certain individuals, groups and sections of the petty bourgeoisie into the ranks of the proletariat is bound, in its turn, to give rise to vacillations in the tactics of the latter.

The experience of the labour movement of various countries helps us to understand on the basis of concrete practical questions the nature of Marxist tactics; it helps the younger countries to distinguish more clearly the true class significance of departures from Marxism and to combat these departures more successfully.

Zvezda No. 1, December 16, 1910
Signed: V. Ilyin

Vol. 16

CERTAIN FEATURES OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MARXISM

Our doctrine—said Engels, referring to himself and his famous friend—is not a dogma, but a guide to action. This classical statement stresses with remarkable force and expressiveness that aspect of Marxism which is very often lost sight of. And by losing sight of it, we turn Marxism into something one-sided, distorted and lifeless; we deprive it of its life blood; we undermine its basic theoretical foundations—dialectics, the doctrine of historical development, all-embracing and full of contradictions; we undermine its connection with the definite practical tasks of the epoch, which may change with every new turn of history.

Indeed, in our time, among those interested in the fate of Marxism in Russia, we very frequently meet with people who lose sight of just this aspect of Marxism. Yet, it must be clear to everybody that in recent years Russia has undergone changes so abrupt as to alter the situation with unusual rapidity and unusual force—the social and political situation, which in a most direct and immediate manner determines the conditions for action, and, hence, its aims. I am not referring, of course, to general and fundamental aims, which do not change with turns of history if the fundamental relation between classes remains unchanged. It is perfectly obvious that this general trend of economic (and not only economic) evolution in Russia, like the fundamental relation between the various classes of Russian society, has not changed during, say, the last six years.

But the aims of immediate and direct action changed very sharply during this period, just as the actual social and political situation changed, and *consequently*, since Marxism

is a living doctrine, *various* aspects of it *were bound* to become prominent.

In order to make this idea clear, let us cast a glance at the change in the actual social and political situation over the past six years. We immediately differentiate two three-year periods: one ending roughly with the summer of 1907, and the other with the summer of 1910. The first three-year period, regarded from the purely theoretical standpoint, is distinguished by rapid changes in the fundamental features of the state system in Russia; the course of these changes, moreover, was very uneven and the oscillations in both directions were of considerable amplitude. The social and economic basis of these changes in the "superstructure" was the action of *all* classes of Russian society in *the most diverse* fields (activity inside and outside the Duma, the press, unions, meetings, and so forth), action so open and impressive and on a mass scale such as is rarely to be observed in history.

The second three-year period, on the contrary, is distinguished—we repeat that we confine ourselves to the purely theoretical "sociological" standpoint—by an evolution so slow that it almost amounted to stagnation. There were no changes of any importance to be observed in the state system. There were hardly any open and diversified actions by the *classes* in the majority of the "arenas" in which these actions had developed in the preceding period.

The similarity between the two periods is that Russia underwent capitalist evolution in both of them. The contradiction between this economic evolution and the existence of a number of feudal and medieval institutions still remained and was not stifled, but rather aggravated, by the fact that certain institutions assumed a partially bourgeois character.

The difference between the two periods is that in the first the question of exactly what form the above-mentioned rapid and uneven changes would take was the dominant, history-making issue. The content of these changes was bound to be bourgeois owing to the capitalist character of Russia's evolution; but there are different kinds of bourgeoisie. The middle and big bourgeoisie, which professes a more or less moderate liberalism, was, owing to its very class

position, afraid of abrupt changes and strove for the retention of large remnants of the old institutions both in the agrarian system and in the political "superstructure". The rural petty bourgeoisie, interwoven as it is with the peasants who live "solely by the labour of their hands", was bound to strive for bourgeois reforms of a *different* kind, reforms that would leave far less room for medieval survivals. The wage-workers, inasmuch as they consciously realised what was going on around them, were bound to work out for themselves a definite attitude towards this clash of two distinct tendencies. Both tendencies remained within the framework of the bourgeois system, determining entirely different forms of that system, entirely different rates of its development, different degrees of its progressive influence.

Thus, the first period necessarily brought to the fore—and not by chance—those problems of Marxism that are usually referred to as problems of tactics. Nothing is more erroneous than the opinion that the disputes and differences over these questions were disputes among "intellectuals", "a struggle for influence over the immature proletariat", an expression of the "adaptation of the intelligentsia to the proletariat", as *Vekhi* followers¹⁰⁷ of various hues think. On the contrary, it was precisely because this class had reached maturity that it could not remain indifferent to the clash of the two different tendencies in Russia's bourgeois development, and the ideologists of this class could not avoid providing theoretical formulations corresponding (directly or indirectly, in direct or reverse reflection) to these different tendencies.

In the second period the clash between the different tendencies of bourgeois development in Russia was *not* on the order of the day, because *both* these tendencies had been crushed by the "diehards", forced back, driven inwards and, for the time being, stifled. The medieval diehards¹⁰⁸ not only occupied the foreground but also inspired the broadest sections of bourgeois society with the sentiments propagated by *Vekhi*, with a spirit of dejection and recantation. It was not the collision between two methods of reforming the old order that appeared on the surface, but a loss of faith in reforms of any kind, a spirit of "meekness" and "repentance",

an enthusiasm for anti-social doctrines, a vogue of mysticism, and so on.

This astonishingly abrupt change was neither accidental nor the result of "external" pressure alone. The preceding period had so profoundly stirred up sections of the population who for generations and centuries had stood aloof from, and had been strangers to, political issues that it was natural and inevitable that there should emerge "a revaluation of all values", a new study of fundamental problems, a new interest in theory, in elementals, in the ABC of politics. The millions who were suddenly awakened from their long sleep and confronted with extremely important problems could not long remain on this level. They could not continue without a respite, without a return to elementary questions, without a new training which would help them "digest" lessons of unparalleled richness and make it possible for incomparably wider masses again to march forward, but now far more firmly, more consciously, more confidently and more steadfastly.

The dialectics of historical development was such that in the first period it was the attainment of immediate reforms in every sphere of the country's life that was on the order of the day. In the second period it was the critical study of experience, its assimilation by wider sections, its penetration, so to speak, into the subsoil, into the backward ranks of the various classes.

It is precisely because Marxism is not a lifeless dogma, not a completed, ready-made, immutable doctrine, but a living guide to action, that it was bound to reflect the astonishingly abrupt change in the conditions of social life. That change was reflected in profound disintegration and disunity, in every manner of vacillation, in short, in a very serious *internal* crisis of Marxism. Resolute resistance to this disintegration, a resolute and persistent struggle to uphold the *fundamentals* of Marxism, was again placed on the order of the day. In the preceding period, extremely wide sections of the classes that cannot avoid Marxism in formulating their aims had assimilated that doctrine in an extremely one-sided and mutilated fashion. They had learnt by rote certain "slogans", certain answers to tactical questions, *without having understood* the Marxist criteria for these answers.

The "reevaluation of all values" in the various spheres of social life led to a "revision" of the most abstract and general philosophical fundamentals of Marxism. The influence of bourgeois philosophy in its diverse idealist shades found expression in the Machist epidemic that broke out among the Marxists. The repetition of "slogans" learnt by rote but not understood and not thought out led to the widespread prevalence of empty phrase-mongering. The practical expression of this were such absolutely un-Marxist, petty-bourgeois trends as frank or shamefaced "otzovism",¹⁰⁹ or the recognition of otzovism as a "legal shade" of Marxism.

On the other hand, the spirit of the magazine *Vekhi*, the spirit of renunciation which had taken possession of very wide sections of the bourgeoisie, also permeated the trend wishing to confine Marxist theory and practice to "moderate and careful" channels. All that remained of Marxism here was the phraseology used to clothe arguments about "hierarchy", "hegemony" and so forth, that were thoroughly permeated with the spirit of liberalism.

The purpose of this article is not to examine these arguments. A mere reference to them is sufficient to illustrate what has been said above regarding the depth of the crisis through which Marxism is passing and its connection with the whole social and economic situation in the present period. The questions raised by this crisis cannot be brushed aside. Nothing can be more pernicious or unprincipled than attempts to dismiss them by phrase-mongering. Nothing is more important than to rally *all* Marxists who have realised the profundity of the crisis and the necessity of combating it, for defence of the theoretical basis of Marxism and its fundamental propositions, that are being distorted from diametrically opposite sides by the spread of bourgeois influence to the various "fellow-travellers" of Marxism.

The first three years awakened wide sections to a conscious participation in social life, sections that in many cases are now for the first time beginning to acquaint themselves with Marxism in real earnest. The bourgeois press is creating far more fallacious ideas on this score than ever before, and is spreading them more widely. Under these circumstances

disintegration in the Marxist ranks is particularly dangerous. Therefore, to understand the reasons for the inevitability of this disintegration at the present time and to close their ranks for consistent struggle against this disintegration is, in the most direct and precise meaning of the term, the task of the day for Marxists.

Zvezda No. 2, December 23, 1910
Signed: V. Ilyin

Vol. 17

THE HISTORICAL DESTINY OF THE DOCTRINE OF KARL MARX

The chief thing in the doctrine of Marx is that it brings out the historic role of the proletariat as the builder of socialist society. Has the course of events all over the world confirmed this doctrine since it was expounded by Marx?

Marx first advanced it in 1844. The *Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels, published in 1848, gave an integral and systematic exposition of this doctrine, an exposition which has remained the best to this day. Since then world history has clearly been divided into three main periods: (1) from the revolution of 1848 to the Paris Commune (1871); (2) from the Paris Commune to the Russian revolution (1905); (3) since the Russian revolution.

Let us see what has been the destiny of Marx's doctrine in each of these periods.

I

At the beginning of the first period Marx's doctrine by no means dominated. It was only one of the very numerous groups or trends of socialism. The forms of socialism that dominate were in the main akin to our Narodism: incomprehension of the materialist basis of historical movement, inability to single out the role and significance of each class in capitalist society, concealment of the bourgeois nature of democratic reforms under diverse, quasi-socialist phrases about the "people", "justice", "right", and so on.

The revolution of 1848 struck a deadly blow at all these vociferous, motley and ostentatious forms of *pre-Marxian*

socialism. In all countries, the revolution revealed the various classes of society *in action*. The shooting of the workers by the republican bourgeoisie in Paris in the June days of 1848 finally revealed that the proletariat *alone* was socialist by nature. The liberal bourgeoisie dreaded the independence of this class a hundred times more than it did any kind of reaction. The craven liberals grovelled before reaction. The peasantry were content with the abolition of the survivals of feudalism and joined the supporters of order, wavering but occasionally between *workers' democracy and bourgeois liberalism*. All doctrines of *non-class socialism and non-class politics* proved to be sheer nonsense.

The Paris Commune (1871) completed this development of bourgeois changes; the republic, i.e., the form of political organisation in which class relations appear in their most unconcealed form, owed its consolidation solely to the heroism of the proletariat.

In all the other European countries, a more tangled and less complete development led to the same result—a bourgeois society that had taken definite shape. Towards the end of the first period (1848-71), a period of storms and revolutions, pre-Marxian socialism was *dead*. Independent *proletarian* parties came into being: the First International (1864-72) and the German Social-Democratic Party.

II

The second period (1872-1904) was distinguished from the first by its "peaceful" character, by the absence of revolutions. The West had finished with bourgeois revolutions. The East had not yet risen to them.

The West entered a phase of "peaceful" preparations for the changes to come. Socialist parties, basically proletarian, were formed everywhere, and learned to use bourgeois parliamentarism and to found their own daily press, their educational institutions, their trade unions and their co-operative societies. Marx's doctrine gained a complete victory and *began to spread*. The selection and mustering of the forces of the proletariat and its preparation for the coming battles made slow but steady progress.

The dialectics of history were such that the theoretical victory of Marxism compelled its enemies to *disguise themselves* as Marxists. Liberalism, rotten within, tried to revive itself in the form of socialist *opportunism*. They interpreted the period of preparing the forces for great battles as renunciation of these battles. Improvement of the conditions of the slaves to fight against wage slavery they took to mean the sale by the slaves of their right to liberty for a few pence. They cravenly preached "social peace" (i.e., peace with the slave-owners), renunciation of the class struggle, etc. They had very many adherents among socialist members of parliament, various officials of the working-class movement, and the "sympathising" intelligentsia.

III

However, the opportunists had scarcely congratulated themselves on "social peace" and on the non-necessity of storms under "democracy" when a new source of great world storms opened up in Asia. The Russian revolution was followed by revolutions in Turkey, Persia and China. It is in this era of storms and their "repercussions" in Europe that we are now living. No matter what the fate of the great Chinese republic, against which various "civilised" hyenas are now whetting their teeth, no power on earth can restore the old serfdom in Asia or wipe out the heroic democracy of the masses in the Asiatic and semi-Asiatic countries.

Certain people who were inattentive to the conditions for preparing and developing the mass struggle were driven to despair and to anarchism by the lengthy delays in the decisive struggle against capitalism in Europe. We can now see how short-sighted and faint-hearted this anarchist despair is.

The fact that Asia, with its population of eight hundred million, has been drawn into the struggle for these same European ideals should inspire us with optimism and not despair.

The Asiatic revolutions have again shown us the spinelessness and baseness of liberalism, the exceptional importance of the independence of the democratic masses, and

the pronounced demarcation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie of all kinds. After the experience both of Europe and Asia, anyone who speaks of *non-class* politics and *non-class* socialism, ought simply to be put in a cage and exhibited alongside the Australian kangaroo or something like that.

After Asia, Europe has also begun to stir, although not in the Asiatic way. The "peaceful" period of 1872-1904 has passed, never to return. The high cost of living and the tyranny of the trusts are leading to an unprecedented sharpening of the economic struggle, which has set into movement even the British workers who have been most corrupted by liberalism. We see a political crisis brewing even in the most "diehard", bourgeois-Junker country, Germany. The frenzied arming and the policy of imperialism are turning modern Europe into a "social peace" which is more like a gunpowder barrel. Meanwhile the decay of *all* the bourgeois parties and the maturing of the proletariat are making steady progress.

Since the appearance of Marxism, each of the three great periods of world history has brought Marxism new confirmation and new triumphs. But a still greater triumph awaits Marxism, as the doctrine of the proletariat, in the coming period of history.

CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES

AN OPEN PARTY AND THE MARXISTS

I. THE DECISION OF 1908¹¹⁰

To many workers the struggle that is now going on between *Pravda* and *Luch*¹¹¹ appears unnecessary and not very intelligible. Naturally, polemical articles in separate issues of the newspaper on separate, sometimes very special questions, do not give a complete idea of the subject and content of the struggle. Hence the legitimate dissatisfaction of the workers.

Yet the question of liquidationism, over which the struggle is now being waged, is at the present time one of the most important and most urgent questions of the working-class movement. One cannot be a class-conscious worker unless one studies the question in detail and forms a definite opinion on it. A worker who wishes to participate independently in deciding the destiny of *his* Party will not waive aside polemics, even if they are not quite intelligible at first sight, but will earnestly seek until he finds the truth.

How is the truth to be sought? How can one find one's way through the tangle of contradictory opinions and assertions?

Every sensible person understands that if a bitter struggle is raging on any subject, in order to ascertain the truth, he must not confine himself to the statements made by the disputants, but must examine the *facts* and *documents* for himself, see for himself whether there is any evidence to be had from *witnesses* and whether this evidence is reliable.

This, of course, is not always easy to do. It is much "easier" to take for granted what comes to hand, what you *happen* to hear, what is more "openly" shouted about, and

so on. But people who are satisfied with this are dubbed "shallow", feather-brained people, and no one takes them seriously. The truth about any important question cannot be found unless a certain amount of *independent* work is done, and anyone who is afraid of work cannot possibly arrive at the truth.

Therefore, we address ourselves only to those workers who are not afraid of this work, who have decided to get to the bottom of the matter *themselves*, and try to *discover facts, documents, the evidence of witnesses*.

The first question that arises is—what is liquidationism? Where did this word come from, what does it mean?

Luch says that the liquidation of the Party, i.e., the dissolution, the break-up of the Party, the renunciation of the Party, is merely a wicked invention. The "factionalist" Bolsheviks, it alleges, invented this charge against the Mensheviks!

Pravda says that the whole Party has been condemning and fighting liquidationism for over four years.

Who is right? How to discover the truth?

Obviously, the only way is to seek for facts and documents of the Party's *history* in the last four years, from 1908 to 1912, when the liquidators *finally split away* from the Party.¹¹²

These four years, during which the present liquidators *were still* in the Party, constitute the most important period for *discovering* where the term liquidationism came from and how it arose.

Hence, the first and basic conclusion: whoever talks of liquidationism, but *avoids* the facts and *Party* documents of the 1908-11 period, is hiding the truth from the workers.

What are these facts and Party documents?

First of all there is the *Party decision* adopted in December 1908. If the workers do not wish to be treated like children who are stuffed with fairy-tales and fables, they must ask their advisers, leaders or representatives, whether a *Party decision* was adopted on the question of liquidationism in December 1908 and what that decision was.

The decision contains a *condemnation* of liquidationism and an *explanation* of what it is.

Liquidationism is "an attempt on the part of a group of

Party intellectuals to *liquidate* [i.e., dissolve, destroy, abolish, close down] the existing organisation of the Party and to replace it at all costs, even at the price of *downright renunciation of the programme, tactics, and traditions of the Party* [i.e., past experience], by a loose association functioning legally [i.e., in conformity with the law, existing "openly"]".

Such was the Party's *decision* on liquidationism, adopted more than four years ago.

It is obvious from this decision what the essence of liquidationism is and why it is condemned. Its essence is the *renunciation* of the "underground", its liquidation and *replacement* at all costs by an amorphous association functioning legally. Therefore, it is *not* legal work, not insistence on the need for it that the Party condemns. The Party condemns—and unreservedly condemns—the *replacement* of the old Party by something amorphous, "open", something which cannot be called a party.

The Party cannot exist unless it defends its existence, unless it unreservedly fights those who want to liquidate it, destroy it, who do not recognise it, who renounce it. This is self-evident.

Anyone who renounces the existing Party in the name of some new party must be told: try, build up a new party, but you cannot remain a member of the old, the present, the existing Party. Such is the meaning of the Party decision adopted in December 1908, and it is obvious that no other decision could have been taken on the question of the Party's existence.

Of course, liquidationism is ideologically *connected* with *renegacy*, with *the renunciation of the programme and tactics*, with *opportunism*. This is exactly what is indicated in the concluding part of the above-quoted decision. But liquidationism is not *only* opportunism. The opportunists are leading the Party on to a wrong, bourgeois path, the path of a liberal-labour policy, but they *do not renounce* the Party itself, they do not liquidate it. Liquidationism is *that brand* of opportunism which goes to the length of *renouncing* the Party. It is self-evident that the Party cannot exist if its members *include* those who do not recognise its existence. It is equally evident that the renunciation of the

underground under existing conditions is renunciation of the old Party.

The question is, what is the attitude of the liquidators towards this Party decision adopted in 1908?

This is the crux of the matter, this puts the sincerity and political honesty of the liquidators to the test.

Not one of them, unless he has taken leave of his senses, will deny that such a decision was adopted by the Party and has not been rescinded.

And so the liquidators resort to evasions; they either avoid the question and *withhold* from the workers the Party's decision of 1908, or exclaim (often adding abuse) that this was a decision carried by the Bolsheviks.

But abuse only betrays the weakness of the liquidators. There are *Party decisions* that have been carried by the *Mensheviks*, for example, the decision concerning municipalisation, adopted in Stockholm in 1906.¹¹³ This is common knowledge. Many Bolsheviks do not agree with that decision. But not one of them denies that it is a *Party decision*. In exactly the same way the decision of 1908 concerning liquidationism is a *Party decision*. All attempts to sidestep this question only signify a desire to mislead the workers.

Whoever wants to recognise the Party, not merely in words, will not permit any sidestepping, and will insist on getting at the truth concerning the *Party's decision* on the question of liquidationism. This decision has been supported ever since 1909 by *all the pro-Party Mensheviks*, headed by Plekhanov who, in his *Dnevnik*¹¹⁴ and in a whole series of other Marxist publications, has repeatedly and quite definitely explained that nobody who wants to liquidate the Party can be a member of the Party.

Plekhanov was and will remain a Menshevik. Therefore, the liquidators' usual references to the "Bolshevik" nature of the Party's 1908 decision are doubly wrong.

The more abuse the liquidators hurl at Plekhanov in *Luch* and *Nasha Zarya*,¹¹⁵ the clearer is the proof that the liquidators are in the wrong and that they are trying to obscure the truth by noise, shouting and squabbling. Sometimes a novice can be stunned at once by such methods, but for all that the workers will find their bearings and will soon come to ignore this abuse.

Is the unity of the workers necessary? It is.

Is the unity of the workers possible without the unity of the workers' organisation? Obviously not.

What prevents the unity of the workers' party? Disputes over liquidationism.

Therefore, the workers must understand what these disputes are about in order that they *themselves* may decide the destiny of their Party and *defend it*.

The first step in this direction is to acquaint themselves with the *Party's first* decision on liquidationism. The workers must know this decision thoroughly and study it carefully, putting aside all attempts to evade the question or to sidetrack it. Having studied this decision, every worker will begin to understand the essence of liquidationism, why it is such an important and such a "vexed" question, why the Party has been faced with it during the four years and more of the period of reaction.

In the next article we shall consider another important Party decision on liquidationism which was adopted about three and a half years ago, and then pass on to facts and documents that show how the question stands at present.

II. THE DECISION OF 1910¹⁶

In our first article (*Pravda* No. 289) we quoted the first and basic document with which those workers who wish to discover the truth in the present disputes must make themselves familiar, namely, the Party decision of December 1908 on liquidationism.

Now we shall quote and examine another, no less important Party decision on the same question adopted three and a half years ago, in January 1910. This decision is especially important because it was carried *unanimously*: all the Bolsheviks, without exception, all the *Vperyod* group,¹⁷ and finally (this is most important) *all* the Mensheviks and the present liquidators without exception, and also all the "national" (i.e., Jewish, Polish and Lettish) Marxists accepted this decision.

We quote here in full the most important passage in this decision:

"The historical situation of the Social-Democratic movement in the period of bourgeois counter-revolution inevitably gives rise, as a manifestation of bourgeois influence over the proletariat, on the one hand, to the renunciation of the illegal Social-Democratic Party, the belittling of its role and importance, attempts to curtail the programmatic and tactical tasks and slogans of consistent Social-Democracy, etc.; on the other hand, it gives rise to the renunciation of Social-Democratic activities in the Duma and of the utilisation of legal possibilities, to failure to understand the importance of both, to inability to adapt consistent Social-Democratic tactics to the peculiar historical conditions of the given moment, etc.

"It is an integral part of Social-Democratic tactics under such conditions to overcome both deviations by broadening and deepening Social-Democratic work in all spheres of proletarian class struggle and to explain the danger of such deviations."¹¹⁸

This decision clearly shows that three and a half years ago all the Marxists, as represented by all the trends without exception, were obliged *unanimously* to recognise two *deviations* from Marxist tactics. Both deviations were recognised as *dangerous*. Both deviations were explained as being due, not to accident, not to the evil will of certain individuals, but to the "*historical situation*" of the working-class movement in the present period.

Moreover, this unanimous Party decision points to the *class* origin and significance of these deviations. For Marxists do not confine themselves to bare and hollow references to disruption and disintegration. That sense of confusion, lack of faith, despondency and perplexity reign in the minds of many adherents of democracy and socialism is obvious to all. It is not enough to admit this. It is necessary to understand the *class* origin of the discord and disintegration, to understand what *class* interests emanating from a non-proletarian environment foster "confusion" among the friends of the proletariat.

And the Party decision adopted three and a half years ago gave an answer to this important question: *the deviations* from Marxism are generated by "bourgeois counter-revolution", by "*bourgeois influence over the proletariat*".

What are these deviations that threaten to surrender the proletariat to the influence of the bourgeoisie? One of these deviations, connected with the *Vperyod* line and renouncing Social-Democratic activities in the Duma and the utilisation of legal possibilities, *has almost completely disappeared*.

None of the Social-Democrats in Russia now preach these erroneous non-Marxian views. The *Vperyod* group (including Alexinsky and others) have begun to work in *Pravda* alongside the pro-Party Mensheviks.

The other *deviation* indicated in the Party decision is *liquidationism*. This is obvious from the reference to the "renunciation" of the underground and to the "belittling" of its role and importance. Finally, we have a very precise document, published *three years* ago and refuted by no one, a document emanating from *all* the "national" Marxists and from Trotsky (better witnesses the liquidators could not wish for). This document states directly that "in essence it would be desirable to call the trend indicated in the resolution *liquidationism*, a trend which *must be combated...*".

Thus, the fundamental and most important fact that must be known by everyone who wants to understand what the present controversy is about is the following—three and a half years ago the Party *unanimously* recognised *liquidationism* to be a "dangerous" deviation from Marxism, a deviation which must be combated and which expresses "*bourgeois influence over the proletariat*".

The interests of the bourgeoisie, whose attitude is against democracy, and, generally speaking, counter-revolutionary, demand the *liquidation*, the dissolution of the old Party of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie are doing everything they can to spread and foster all ideas aimed at *liquidating* the party of the working class. The bourgeoisie are trying to encourage renunciation of the old tasks, to "dock" them, cut them back, prune them, sap them of meaning, to substitute conciliation or an agreement with the Purishkeviches and Co. for the determined destruction of the foundations of their power.

Liquidationism is, in fact, the spreading of these bourgeois ideas of renunciation and renegacy among the proletariat.

Such is the *class* significance of liquidationism as indicated in the Party decision *unanimously* adopted three and a half years ago. It is in this that the entire Party sees the greatest harm and the danger of liquidationism, its pernicious effect on the working-class movement, on the consolidation of an

independent (not merely in word but in deed) party of the working class.

Liquidationism means not only the liquidation (i.e., the dissolution, the destruction) of the old party of the working class, it also means the destruction of the *class independence* of the proletariat, the corruption of its class-consciousness by *bourgeois* ideas.

We shall give an illustration of this appraisal of liquidationism in the next article, which will set forth in full the most important arguments of the liquidationist *Luch*. Now let us sum up briefly what we have stated. The attempts of the *Luch* people in general, and of Messrs. F. Dan and Potresov in particular, to make it appear that "liquidationism" is an invention, are astonishingly mendacious subterfuges based on the assumption that the readers of *Luch* are completely uninformed. Actually, apart from the Party decision of 1908, there is the *unanimous* Party decision of 1910, which gives a complete appraisal of liquidationism as a bourgeois deviation from the proletarian path, a deviation that is dangerous and disastrous to the working class. Only the enemies of the working class can conceal or evade this Party appraisal.

III. THE ATTITUDE OF THE LIQUIDATORS TO THE DECISIONS OF 1908 AND 1910

In the preceding article [*Pravda* No. 95 (299)], we quoted the exact words of the unanimous Party decision on liquidationism, which define it as a manifestation of bourgeois influence over the proletariat.

As we have pointed out, this decision was adopted in *January 1910*. Let us now examine the behaviour of those liquidators who are brazenly assuring us that there is not, and never has been, any such thing as liquidationism.

In February 1910, in No. 2 of the magazine *Nasha Zarya*, which had only just begun to appear at that time, Mr. Potresov wrote bluntly that "*there is no Party* in the shape of an integral and organised hierarchy" (i.e., ladder, or system of "institutions") and that it was impossible to liquidate "*what in reality no longer exists* as an organised body" (see *Nasha Zarya*, 1910, No. 2, p. 61).

This was stated a month or even less *after* the unanimous decision of the Party!

And in March 1910, another liquidationist journal, namely *Vozrozhdeniye*,¹¹⁹ having the same set of contributors—Potresov, Dan, Martynov, Yezhov, Martov, Levitsky and Co.—stressed and gave a popular explanation of Mr. Potresov's words:

"There is nothing to liquidate and—we for our part [i.e., the editors of *Vozrozhdeniye*] would add—the dream of re-establishing this hierarchy in its old, underground form is simply a harmful, reactionary utopia indicating a loss of political intuition by members of a party which at one time was the most realistic of all" (*Vozrozhdeniye*, 1910, No. 5, p. 51).

There is no party, and the idea of re-establishing it is a harmful utopia—these are clear and definite words. Here we have a plain and direct renunciation of the Party. The renunciation (and the invitation to the workers to renounce) came from people who had deserted the underground and were "longing for" an open party.

This desertion from the underground was, moreover, quite definitely and openly supported by P. B. Axelrod in 1912, both in *Novsky Golos*¹²⁰ (1912, No. 6) and in *Nasha Zarya* (1912, No. 6).

"To talk about non-factionalism in the conditions now obtaining," wrote P. B. Axelrod, "means behaving like an ostrich, means deceiving oneself and others." "Factional organisation and consolidation is the manifest responsibility and urgent duty of the supporters of Party reform, or to be more exact, of a revolution in the Party."

Thus P. B. Axelrod is openly in favour of a *Party revolution*, i.e., the destruction of the old Party and the formation of a new one.

In 1913, *Luch* No. 101, in an unsigned editorial stated plainly that "among the workers in some places there is even a revival and growth of sympathy for the underground" and that this was "a regrettable fact". L. Sedov, the author of that article, admitted himself (*Nasha Zarya*, 1913, No. 3, p. 49) that the article had "caused dissatisfaction", even among the supporters of *Luch* tactics. L. Sedov's explanations, furthermore, were such as to cause renewed dissatisfaction on the part of a *Luch* supporter, namely An, who has an item in No. 181 of *Luch*, opposing Sedov. He protests against

Sedov's assumption that the "underground is an obstacle to the political organisation of our movement, to the building up of a workers' Social-Democratic party." An ridicules L. Sedov for his "vagueness" as to whether the underground is desirable or not.

In their long comment on the article the editors of *Luch* came out *in favour of Sedov* and stated An to be "mistaken in his criticism of L. Sedov".

We will examine the arguments of the *Luch* editors and the liquidationist mistakes of An himself in their proper place. That is not the point we are discussing here. What we must go into carefully at the moment is the fundamental and principal conclusion to be drawn from the documents quoted above.*

The entire Party, both in 1908 and in 1910, condemned and rejected liquidationism, and explained the class origin and the danger of this trend clearly and in detail. *All* the liquidationist newspapers and journals—*Vozrozhdeniye* (1909-10), *Nasha Zarya* (1910-13), *Nevsky Golos* (1912), and *Luch* (1912-13)**—*all of them, after the most definite and even*

* In the symposium *Marxism and Liquidationism*, Lenin substituted for this paragraph, up to the word "fundamental", the following text (reproduced from the manuscript):

"In No. 8 of *Zhivaya Zhizn*¹²¹ (July 19, 1913), Vera Zasulich, repeating dozens of liquidationist arguments, wrote: 'It is difficult to say whether the new organisation [the Social-Democratic Party] . . . helped or hindered the work.' Clearly, these words are tantamount to renunciation of the Party. Vera Zasulich justifies desertion from the Party by saying: the organisations lost their members 'because at that time there was nothing to do in them'. Vera Zasulich is creating a purely anarchist theory about 'a broad section' *instead of* a party. See the detailed analysis of this theory in *Prosveshcheniye*¹²² No. 9, 1913.

"What then constitutes the . . ."—*Ed.*

** The symposium *Marxism and Liquidationism* adds "and *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta*¹²³ (1913-14)" with the following footnote:

"See, for example, *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* No. 1, 1914, the New Year's leading article: 'The road to an open political party of action is also the road to party unity' [to the unity of the builders of an open party?]. Or No. 5, 1914: 'surmounting [all the obstacles that are placed in the way of organising workers' congresses] is nothing more nor less than a most genuine struggle for the right of association, i.e., for the legality of the working-class movement, closely connected with the struggle for the open existence of the Social-Democratic Labour Party.'"—*Ed.*

unanimous decisions of the Party, reiterate thoughts and arguments of an *obvious* liquidationist nature.

Even "*Luch*" supporters are forced to declare that they disagree with these arguments, with this preaching. That is a fact. Therefore, to shout about the "baiting" of liquidators, as Trotsky, Semkovsky and many other patrons of liquidationism do, is downright dishonesty, for it is an absolute distortion of the truth.

The truth proved by the documents I have quoted, which cover a period of more than *five* years (1908-13), is that the liquidators, flouting all Party decisions, continue to abuse and bait the Party, i.e., the "underground".

Every worker who *himself* wants to examine seriously the controversial and vexed questions of the Party, who wants to decide these questions *for himself*, must first of all assimilate this truth, making an independent study and verification of these Party decisions and of the liquidator arguments. Only those who carefully study, ponder over and reach an independent decision on the problems and the *fate* of their Party deserve to be called Party members and builders of the workers' party. One must not be indifferent to the question of whether it is the Party that is "guilty" of "baiting" (i.e., of too trenchant and mistaken attacks on) the liquidators *or* whether it is the liquidators who are guilty of *flagrantly violating* Party decisions, of *persistently advocating the liquidation, i.e., the destruction* of the Party.

Clearly, the Party cannot exist unless it fights with might and main against those who seek to destroy it.

Having quoted the documents on this fundamental question, we shall, in the next article, pass on to an appraisal of the *ideological* content of the plea for an "*open party*".

IV. THE CLASS SIGNIFICANCE OF LIQUIDATIONISM

In the preceding articles (*Pravda* Nos. 289, 299 and 314) we showed that all the Marxists, both in 1908 and in 1910, irrevocably condemned liquidationism as renunciation of the past. The Marxists explained to the working class that liquidationism is the spreading of bourgeois influence among the proletariat. And *all* the liquidationist publications, from 1909

up to 1913, have flagrantly violated the decisions of the Marxists.

Let us consider the slogan, an "open workers' party", or "a struggle for an open party", which the liquidators are still advocating in *Luch* and *Nasha Zarya*.

Is this a Marxist, proletarian slogan or a liberal, bourgeois slogan?

The answer must be sought not in the attitude or plans of the liquidators or of other groups, but in an analysis of the relation of social forces in Russia in the present period. The significance of slogans is determined not by the intentions of their authors, but by the relation of forces of *all* the classes in the country.

The feudal-minded landowners and *their* "bureaucracy" are hostile to all changes making for political liberty. This is understandable. The bourgeoisie, because of its economic position in a backward and semi-feudal country, *must* strive for freedom. But the bourgeoisie fears the activity of the people *more* than it fears reaction. This truth was demonstrated with particular clarity in 1905; it is fully understood by the working class, but not by opportunist and semi-liberal intellectuals.

The bourgeoisie are both liberal and counter-revolutionary. Hence their ridiculously impotent and wretched *reformism*. They dream of reforms and fear to settle accounts in real earnest with the feudal-minded landowners who not only refuse to grant reforms, but even withdraw those already granted. They preach reforms and fear the popular movement. They strive to oust the landowners, but fear to lose *their* support and fear to lose *their own* privileges. It is upon this relation of classes that the June Third system¹²⁴ has been built up, which gives unlimited power to the feudal landowners and privileges to the bourgeoisie.

The class position of the proletariat makes it altogether impossible for it to "share" privileges or *be afraid* of anyone losing them. That is why selfishly narrow, miserable and dull-witted reformism is quite foreign to the proletariat. As to the peasant masses—on the one hand, they are immeasurably oppressed, and instead of enjoying privileges suffer from starvation; on the other hand, they are undoubtedly

petty bourgeois—hence, they inevitably vacillate between the liberals and the workers.

Such is the objective situation.

From this situation it clearly follows that the slogan of an open working-class party is, in its class origin, a slogan of the counter-revolutionary liberals. It contains nothing save reformism; it does not contain even a hint that the proletariat, the only thoroughly democratic class, is conscious that its task is one of fighting the liberals for influence over democrats as a whole; there is not even a suggestion of removing the foundation of all the privileges of the feudal-minded landowners, of the "bureaucracy", etc.; there is not a thought of the general basis of political liberty or of a democratic constitution; instead, this slogan implies the tacit renunciation of the old, and consequently, renegacy and the dissolution (liquidation) of the workers' party.

In brief. In a period of counter-revolution this slogan spreads among the workers the *advocacy of the very thing* the liberal bourgeoisie are themselves *practising*. Therefore, had there been no liquidators, the clever bourgeois Progressists¹²⁵ would have *had* to find, or hire, intellectuals to advocate this to the working class!

Only the foolish people will seek to compare the *words* of the liquidators with their *motives*. Their *words* must be compared with the *deeds* and the objective position of the liberal bourgeoisie.

Look at these *deeds*. In 1902, the bourgeoisie was *in favour* of the underground. It commissioned Struve to publish the underground *Osvobozhdeniye*.¹²⁶ When the working-class movement led to October 17,¹²⁷ the liberals and the Cadets abandoned the underground, then repudiated it, and declared it to be useless, mad, sinful and godless (*Vekhi*).^{*} *Instead of* the underground, the liberal bourgeoisie favoured a *struggle for an open party*. This is a historical fact, confirmed by the incessant attempts at legalisation made by the Cadets (1905-07) and the Progressists (1913).

^{*} In the symposium *Marxism and Liquidationism*, the word *Vekhi* is omitted and the following footnote is given:

"There is a fine book, *Vekhi*, which has gone through numerous editions and contains an excellent compilation of these ideas of counter-revolutionary liberalism."—Ed.

Among the Cadets we see "open work and its secret organisation"; the kind-hearted, i.e., unwitting, liquidator, A. Vlasov, has only retold the deeds of the Cadets "in his own words".

Why did the liberals renounce the underground and adopt the slogan of "a struggle for an open party"? Was it because Struve is a traitor? No, just the opposite. Struve went over to the other side because the entire bourgeoisie took a turn. And the bourgeoisie turned (1) because it obtained privileges on December 11, 1905,¹²⁸ and even on June 3, 1907 obtained the status of a *tolerated* opposition; (2) because it was itself mortally afraid of the popular movement. The slogan of "a struggle for an open party", translated from the language of "high politics" into plain and intelligible language, means the following:

"Landowners! Don't imagine that we want to make life impossible for you. No, just move up a little and make room for us bourgeois [an open party], we shall then defend you five times more 'intelligently', ingeniously, 'scientifically' than the Timoshkins and Sabler's parsons did."¹²⁹

The petty-bourgeois Narodniks, in imitation of the Cadets, took up the slogan of "a struggle for an open party". In August 1906, Messrs. Peshekhonov and Co. of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*¹³⁰ renounced the underground, proclaimed the "struggle for an open party", and cut the consistently democratic "underground" slogans out of their programme.

Thanks to their reformist chatter about a "broad and open party", these philistines have been left, as all can see, *without any party, without any* contact with the masses, while the Cadets have even stopped thinking of such contacts.

Only in this way, only by analysing the position of the classes, by analysing the general history of the counter-revolution, is it possible to *understand* the nature of liquidationism. The liquidators are petty-bourgeois intellectuals, sent by the bourgeoisie to sow liberal corruption among the workers. The liquidators are traitors to Marxism and traitors to democracy. The slogan of "a struggle for an open party" in their case (as in the case of the liberals and the Narodniks) only serves to camouflage their renunciation of the past and their *rupture with the working class*. This is a fact that has been proved both by the elections in the worker curia for

the Fourth Duma¹³¹ and by the history of the founding of the workers' paper *Pravda*. It is obvious to all that contact with the masses has been maintained only by those who have not renounced the past and who know how to make use of "open work" and of all and sundry "possibilities" exclusively in the spirit of *that* past, and for the purpose of strengthening, consolidating and developing it.

In the period of the June Third system it could not be otherwise.

"Curtailment" of the programme and tactics by the liquidators (i.e., liberals) will be discussed in our next article.

V. THE SLOGAN OF "STRUGGLE FOR AN OPEN PARTY"

In the preceding article (*Pravda* No. 122) we examined the objective significance (i.e., the significance that is determined by the relations of classes) of the slogan "an open party" or "a struggle for an open party". This slogan is a slavish repetition of the tactics of the bourgeoisie, for whom it correctly expresses their renunciation of the revolution, or their counter-revolutionary attitude.

Let us consider some of the attempts most frequently made by liquidators to defend the slogan of "a struggle for an open party". Mayevsky, Sedov, Dan and all the *Luch* writers try to confuse the open party with open work or *activity*. Such confusion is downright sophistry, a trick, a deception of the reader.

In the first place, open Social-Democratic activity in the period 1904-13 is a *tact*. An open party is a *phrase* used by intellectuals to cover up renunciation of the Party. Secondly, the Party has repeatedly condemned liquidationism, i.e., the slogan of an open party. But the Party, far from condemning open activities, has, on the contrary, condemned those who neglected or renounced them. In the third place, from 1904 to 1907, open activities were *especially* developed among *all* the Social-Democrats. But *not a single* trend, *not a single* faction of Social-Democracy at that time advanced the slogan of "a struggle for an open party"!

This is an historical fact. Those who wish to *understand* liquidationism must give thought to this fact.

Did the absence of the slogan "a struggle for an open party" hamper open activities in the 1904-07 period? Not in the least.

Why did no such slogan arise among the Social-Democrats *at that time*? Precisely because at that time there was no raging counter-revolution to draw a section of the Social-Democrats into extreme opportunism. It would have been only *too clear* at the time that the slogan "a struggle for an open party" was an opportunist phrase, a renunciation of the "underground".

Gentlemen, try to grasp the meaning of this historical change. During the 1905 period, when open activities were splendidly developed, there was *no* slogan of "a struggle for an open party"; during the period of counter-revolution, when open activities are less developed, a section of the Social-Democrats (following the bourgeoisie) has taken up the slogan of renunciation of the "underground" and "a struggle for an open party".

Are the meaning and the class significance of this change still not clear?

Finally, the fourth and most important circumstance. *Two kinds* of open activity, in two diametrically opposite directions, are possible (and are to be seen)—one in defence of the old and entirely *in the spirit* of the old, *on behalf* of its slogans and tactics; and another *against* the old, on behalf of its renunciation, of belittling its role, its slogans, etc.

The existence of these two kinds of open activity, hostile and irreconcilable in principle, is a most indisputable historical fact of the period from 1906 (the Cadets and Messrs. Peshekhonov and Co.) to 1913 (*Luch, Nasha Zarya*). Can one restrain a smile when one hears a simpleton (or one who for a while plays the simpleton) asking: what is there to argue about if both sides carry on open activities? What the argument, my dear sir, is about is whether these activities should be carried on in defence of the "underground" and in its spirit, or in belittlement of it, against it and not in its spirit! The dispute is *only-only!*—about whether this particular open work is conducted in the liberal or in the consistently democratic spirit. The dispute is "only" about whether it is possible to *confine* oneself to open work—recall Mr. Liberal

Struve who did not confine himself to it in 1902, but has wholly "confined himself" to it in the years 1906-13!

Our *Luch* liquidators just cannot understand that the slogan "a struggle for an open party" means carrying into the midst of the workers liberal (Struve) ideas, decked out in the rags of "near-Marxist" catchwords.

Or take, for instance, the arguments of the *Luch* editors themselves, in their reply to An (No. 181):

"The Social-Democratic Party is not limited to those few comrades whom the realities of life force to work underground. If the entire Party were limited to the underground, how many members would it have? Two to three hundred? And where would those thousands if not tens of thousands of workers be, who are actually bearing the brunt of all Social-Democratic work?"

For any man who thinks, this argument alone is enough to identify its authors as liberals. First, they are telling a deliberate untruth about the "underground". It numbers far more than "hundreds". Secondly, all over the world the number of Party members is "limited", as compared with the number of workers who carry on Social-Democratic work. For example, in Germany there are only one million members in the Social Democratic Party, yet the number of votes cast for the Social-Democrats is about five million, and the proletariat numbers about fifteen million. The proportion of Party members to the number of Social-Democrats is determined in various countries by the differences in their historical conditions. Thirdly, we have *nothing* that could be a substitute for our "underground". Thus, in *opposing* the Party, *Luch* refers to the *non-Party* workers, or those who are *outside the Party*. This is the usual method of the liberal who tries to separate the masses from their *class-conscious* vanguard. *Luch* does not understand the relation between *Party* and *class*, just as the Economists of 1895-1901 failed to understand it. Fourthly, so far our "Social-Democratic work" is genuine *Social-Democratic* work only when it is conducted *in the spirit* of the old, under its slogans.

The arguments of *Luch* are the arguments of liberal intellectuals, who, unwilling to join the actually existing Party organisation, try to *destroy* that organisation by inciting the non-Party, scattered, unenlightened mass against it. The German liberals do the same when they say that the Social-

Democrats do not represent the proletariat since their "Party" comprises "only" one-fifteenth of the proletariat!

Take the even more common argument advanced by *Luch*: "we" are for an open party, "just as in Europe". The liberals and the liquidators want a constitution and an open party "as in Europe" *today*, but they do not want the path by which Europe reached that today.

Kossovsky, a liquidator and Bundist, teaches us in *Luch* to follow the example of the Austrians. But he forgets that the Austrians have had a constitution *since 1867*, and that they could not have had it without (1) the movement of 1848; (2) the profound political crisis of 1859-66, when the *weakness* of the working class allowed Bismarck and Co. to *extricate* themselves by means of the famous "revolution from above". What then follows from the precepts of Kossovsky, Dan, Larin and all the *Luch* writers? Only that they are helping to solve our crisis in the spirit of "revolution from above" and *in no other spirit!* But such work of theirs *is precisely* the "work" of a Stolypin workers' party.

No matter where we look—we see the liquidators renouncing both Marxism and democracy.

In the next article we shall examine in detail their arguments on the need to tone down our Social-Democratic slogans.

VI

We must now consider the toning down of Marxist slogans by the liquidators. For this purpose it would be best to take the decisions of their August Conference,¹³² but for obvious reasons these decisions can be analysed only in the press published abroad. Here we are obliged to quote *Luch*, issue No. 108 (194), which in the article by L. S. gave a remarkably precise exposition of the whole essence, the whole spirit of liquidationism.

Mr. L. S. writes as follows:

"Deputy Muranov so far recognises only three partial demands, which, as is known, were the three pillars of the election platform of the Leninists: the complete democratisation of the state system, an eight-hour day and the transfer of the land to the peasants. *Pravda*, too, continues to maintain this point of view. Yet we, as well as the

whole of European Social-Democracy [read—"We, and also Milyukov, who assures us that, thank God, we have a constitution"], see in partial demands a method of agitation which may be crowned with success only if it takes into account the everyday struggle of the working masses. We think that only things that, on the one hand, are of fundamental importance to the further development of the working-class movement, and on the other hand, may acquire urgency for the masses, should be advanced as the partial demand upon which the Social-Democrats should concentrate their attention at the present moment. Of the three demands advanced by *Pravda*, only one—the eight-hour day—plays and can play a part in the everyday struggle of the workers. The other two demands may at the present moment serve as subjects for propaganda, but not for agitation. Concerning the difference between propaganda and agitation, see the brilliant pages of G. V. Plekhanov's pamphlet *The Struggle Against Famine* [L. S. is knocking at the wrong door; it is "painful" for him to recall Plekhanov's controversy in 1899-1902 with the Economists whom he is copying!].

"Apart from the eight-hour day, the demand for the right of association, the right to form any kind of organisation, with the corresponding freedom of assembly and freedom of speech, both the oral and the printed word, is a partial demand advanced both by the requirements of the working-class movement and by the entire course of Russian life."

Here you have the tactics of the liquidators. What L. S. describes by the words "complete democratisation, etc.", and what he calls the "transfer of the land to the peasants" are *not*, you see, of "urgency for the masses", they are *not* "advanced by the requirements of the working-class movement" and "the entire course of Russian life"! How old these arguments are and how familiar they are to those who remember the *history* of Russian Marxist practice, its many years of struggle against the Economists, who renounced the tasks of democracy! With what talent *Luch* copies the views of Prokopovich and Kuskova, who *in those days* tried to entice the workers on to the liberal path!

But let us examine the *Luch* arguments more closely. From the standpoint of common sense they are sheer madness. Can anyone in his right mind really affirm that the above-mentioned "peasant" demand (i.e., one designed to benefit the peasants) is *not* "urgent for the masses", is *not* "advanced both by the requirements of the working-class movement and by the entire course of Russian life"? This is not only an untruth, it is an obvious absurdity. The entire history of nineteenth-century Russia, the entire "course of Russian life" *produced* that question, *made* it urgent, even most urgent;

this has been reflected in the *whole* of the legislation of Russia. How could *Luch* arrive at such a monstrous untruth?

It had to arrive at it, because *Luch* is in bondage to *liberal* policy, and the liberals are true to themselves when they reject (or, like *Luch*, put aside) the peasant demand. The liberal bourgeoisie does so, because its *class* position forces it to humour the landowners and to oppose the people's movement.

Luch brings to the workers the ideas of the liberal landowners and is guilty of treachery to the democratic peasantry.

Further. Can it be that only the right of association is of "urgency"? What about inviolability of person? or the abolition of despotism and tyranny, or universal, etc., suffrage, or a single chamber, etc.? Every literate worker, everyone who remembers the recent past, knows perfectly well that all this is urgent. In thousands of articles and speeches all the liberals acknowledge that all this is urgent. Why then did *Luch* declare urgent only one of these *liberties*, albeit one of the most important, while the fundamental conditions of political liberty, of democracy and of a constitutional system were struck out, put aside, relegated to the archives of "propaganda", and excluded from agitation?

The reason, and the only reason is, that *Luch* does not accept what is *unacceptable to the liberals*.

From the standpoint of urgency for the masses, the requirements of the working-class movement and the course of Russian life, there is *no* difference between the three demands of Muranov and of *Pravda* (or, to put it briefly, the demands of consistent Marxists). Working-class, peasant and general political demands are all of *equal* urgency for the masses, are *equally* brought to the forefront both by the requirements of the working-class movement and by "the entire course of Russian life". All three demands are also alike because they are the partial demands dear to our worshipper of moderation and precision; they are "partial" compared with the final aims, but they are of a very high level compared, for example, with "Europe" in general.

Why then does *Luch* accept the eight-hour day and reject the rest? Why did it decide *on behalf* of the workers that

the eight-hour day does "play a part" in their everyday struggle, whereas the general political and peasant demands *do not* play such a part? The facts show, on the one hand, that the workers in their daily struggle advance both the general political and the peasant demands—and, on the other hand, that they often *fight* for more moderate reductions of the working day.

What is the trouble, then?

The trouble lies in the reformism of *Luch*, which, as usual, *attributes* its own liberal narrow-mindedness to the "masses", to the "course of history", etc.

Reformism, in general, means that people confine themselves to agitating for changes which do not require the removal of the main foundations of the old ruling class, changes that are *compatible* with the *preservation* of these foundations. The eight-hour day is compatible with the preservation of the power of capital. The Russian liberals, in order to attract the workers, are themselves prepared to endorse this demand ("as far as possible"). Those demands for which *Luch* does not want to "agitate" are *incompatible* with the preservation of the foundations of the pre-capitalist period, the period of serfdom.

Luch eliminates from agitation precisely what is not acceptable to the liberals, who do not want to abolish the power of the landowners, but want only to share their power and privileges. *Luch* eliminates precisely what is incompatible with the point of view of reformism.

That's where the trouble lies!

Neither Muranov, nor *Pravda*, nor any Marxist rejects partial demands. That is nonsense. Take insurance, for example. We reject the *deception* of the people by idle talk about partial demands, by *reformism*. We reject *liberal reformism* in present-day Russia as being utopian, self-seeking and false, as based on constitutional illusions and full of the spirit of servility to the landowners. That is the point which *Luch* tries to confuse and hide by phrases about "partial demands" in general, although it admits itself that neither Muranov nor *Pravda* rejects certain "partial demands".

Luch tones down the Marxist slogans, tries to fit them to the narrow, reformist, liberal yardstick, and thus spreads bourgeois ideas among the workers.

The struggle the Marxists are waging against the liquidators is nothing but an expression of the struggle the advanced workers are waging against the liberal bourgeoisie for influence over the masses of the people, for their political enlightenment and education.

Pravda Nos. 85, 95, 110, 122, 124
and 126; April 12, 26,
May 15, 29, 31, and June 2, 1913
Signed: V. I.

Vol. 19

MARXISM AND REFORMISM

Unlike the anarchists, the Marxists recognise struggle for reforms, i.e., for measures that improve the conditions of the working people without destroying the power of the ruling class. At the same time, however, the Marxists wage a most resolute struggle against the reformists, who, directly or indirectly, restrict the aims and activities of the working class to the winning of reforms. Reformism is bourgeois deception of the workers, who, despite individual improvements, will always remain wage-slaves, as long as there is the domination of capital.

The liberal bourgeoisie grant reforms with one hand, and with the other always take them back, reduce them to nought, use them to enslave the workers, to divide them into separate groups and perpetuate wage-slavery. For that reason reformism, even when quite sincere, in practice becomes a weapon by means of which the bourgeoisie corrupt and weaken the workers. The experience of all countries shows that the workers who put their trust in the reformists are always fooled.

And conversely, workers who have assimilated Marx's theory, i.e., realised the inevitability of wage-slavery so long as capitalist rule remains, will not be fooled by any bourgeois reforms. Understanding that where capitalism continues to exist reforms cannot be either enduring or far-reaching, the workers fight for better conditions and use them to intensify the fight against wage-slavery. The reformists try to divide and deceive the workers, to divert them from the class struggle by petty concessions. But the workers, having seen

through the falsity of reformism, utilise reforms to develop and broaden their class struggle.

The stronger reformist influence is among the workers the weaker they are, the greater their dependence on the bourgeoisie, and the easier it is for the bourgeoisie to nullify reforms by various subterfuges. The more independent the working-class movement, the deeper and broader its aims, and the freer it is from reformist narrowness the easier it is for the workers to retain and utilise improvements.

There are reformists in all countries, for everywhere the bourgeoisie seek, in one way or another, to corrupt the workers and turn them into contented slaves who have given up all thought of doing away with slavery. In Russia, the reformists are liquidators, who renounce our past and try to lull the workers with dreams of a new, open, legal party. Recently the St. Petersburg liquidators were forced by *Severnaya Pravda*¹³³ to defend themselves against the charge of reformism. Their arguments should be carefully analysed in order to clarify an extremely important question.

We are not reformists, the St. Petersburg liquidators wrote, because we have not said that reforms are everything and the ultimate goal nothing; we have spoken of movement to the ultimate goal; we have spoken of advancing through the struggle for reforms to the fulness of the aims set.

Let us now see how this defence squares with the facts.

First fact. The liquidator Sedov, summarising the statements of all the liquidators, wrote that of the Marxists' "three pillars" two are no longer suitable for our agitation. Sedov retained the demand for an eight-hour day, which, theoretically, can be realised as a reform. He deleted, or relegated to the background, the very things that go beyond reforms. Consequently, Sedov relapsed into downright opportunism, following the very policy expressed in the formula: the ultimate goal is nothing. When the "ultimate goal" (even in relation to democracy) is pushed further and further away from our agitation, that is reformism.

Second fact. The celebrated August Conference (last year's) of the liquidators likewise pushed non-reformist demands further and further away—until some special occasion—instead of bringing them closer, into the heart of our agitation.

Third fact. By denying and disparaging the "old" and

dissociating themselves from it, the liquidators thereby confine themselves to reformism. In the present situation, the connection between reformism and the renunciation of the "old" is obvious.

Fourth fact. The workers' economic movement evokes the wrath and attacks of the liquidators (who speak of "crazes", "milling the air", etc., etc.) as soon as it adopts slogans that go beyond reformism.

What is the result? In words, the liquidators reject reformism as a principle, but in practice they adhere to it all along the line. They assure us, on the one hand, that for them reforms are not the be-all and end-all, but on the other hand, every time the Marxists go beyond reformism, the liquidators attack them or voice their contempt.

However, developments in every sector of the working-class movement show that the Marxists, far from lagging behind, are definitely in the lead in making practical use of reforms, and in fighting for them. Take the Duma elections at the worker curia level—the speeches of our deputies inside and outside the Duma, the organisation of the workers' press, the utilisation of the insurance reform; take the biggest union, the Metalworkers' Union, etc.—everywhere the Marxist workers are ahead of the liquidators, in the direct, immediate, "day-to-day" activity of agitation, organisation, fighting for reforms and using them.

The Marxists are working tirelessly, not missing a single "possibility" of winning and using reforms, and not condemning, but supporting, painstakingly developing every step beyond reformism in propaganda, agitation, mass economic struggle, etc. The liquidators, on the other hand, who have abandoned Marxism, by their attacks on the very existence of the Marxist body, by their destruction of Marxist discipline and advocacy of reformism and a liberal-labour policy, are only disorganising the working-class movement.

Nor, moreover, should that fact be overlooked that in Russia reformism is manifested also in a peculiar form, in identifying the fundamental political situation in present-day Russia with that of present-day Europe. From the liberal's point of view this identification is legitimate, for the liberal believes and professes the view that "thank God, we have a Constitution". The liberal expresses the interests of the

bourgeoisie when he insists that, after October 17, every step by democracy beyond reformism is madness, a crime, a sin, etc.

But it is these bourgeois views that are applied in practice by our liquidators, who constantly and systematically "transplant" to Russia (on paper) the "open party" and the "struggle for a legal party", etc. In other words, like the liberals, they preach the transplanting of the European constitution to Russia, *without* the specific path that in the West led to the adoption of constitutions and their consolidation over generations, in some cases even over centuries. What the liquidators and liberals want is to wash the hide without dipping it in water, as the saying goes.

In Europe, reformism actually means abandoning Marxism and replacing it by bourgeois "social policy". In Russia, the reformism of the liquidators means not only that, it means destroying the Marxist organisation and abandoning the democratic tasks of the working class, it means replacing them by a liberal-labour policy.

WHAT SHOULD NOT BE COPIED FROM THE GERMAN LABOUR MOVEMENT

Karl Legien, one of the most prominent and responsible representatives of the German trade unions, recently published a report of his visit to America in the form of a rather bulky book entitled *The Labour Movement in America*.

As a very prominent representative of the international as well as German trade union movement, K. Legien gave his visit the nature of a special occasion, one of state importance, one might say. For years he conducted negotiations on this visit with the Socialist Party of America and the American Federation of Labour,¹³⁴ the labour-union organisation led by the famous (or rather infamous) Gompers. When Legien heard that Karl Liebknecht was going to America, he refused to go at the same time "so as to avoid the simultaneous appearance in the United States of two spokesmen whose views on the party's tactics and on the importance and value of certain branches of the labour movement did not entirely coincide".

K. Legien collected a vast amount of material on the labour-union movement in America, but failed to digest it in his book, which is cluttered up with patchy descriptions of his journey, trivial in content and trite in style. Even the labour-union rules of America, in which Legien was particularly interested, are not studied or analysed, but merely translated incompletely and without system.

There was a highly instructive episode in Legien's tour, which strikingly revealed the *two tendencies* in the international and particularly in the German labour movement.

Legien visited the chamber of deputies of the United States, known as the Congress. Brought up in the police-ridden Prus-

sian state, he was favourably impressed by the democratic customs of the Republic, and he remarks with understandable pleasure that in America the government provides every congressman not only with a private office fitted with all modern conveniences, but also with a paid secretary to help him cope with a congressman's manifold duties. The simplicity and easy manners of the congressmen and the Speaker of the House were in striking contrast with what Legien had seen in European parliaments, and especially in Germany. In Europe, a Social-Democrat could not even think of delivering to a bourgeois parliament at an official session a speech of greeting! But in America this was done very simply, and the name of Social-Democrat did not frighten anybody . . . except *that Social-Democrat himself!*

We have here an example of the American bourgeois method of killing unsteady socialists with kindness, and the German opportunist method of renouncing socialism in deference to the "kindly", suave and democratic bourgeoisie.

Legien's speech of greeting was translated into English (democracy was not in the least averse to hearing a "foreign" language spoken in its parliament); all two hundred odd congressmen shook hands in turn with Legien as the "guest" of the Republic, and the Speaker expressed his thanks.

"The form and content of my speech of greeting," writes Legien, "were sympathetically received by the socialist press both in the United States and Germany. Certain editors in Germany, however, could not resist pointing out that my speech proved once again what an impossible task it is for a Social-Democrat to deliver a Social-Democratic speech to a bourgeois audience. Well, in my place, these editors would, no doubt, have delivered a speech against capitalism and in favour of a mass strike, but I considered it important to emphasise to this parliament that the Social-Democratic and industrially organised workers of Germany want peace among the nations, and through peace, the development of culture to the highest degree attainable."

Poor "editors", whom our Legien has annihilated with his "statesmanlike" speech! The opportunism of trade union leaders in general, and of Legien in particular, has long been common knowledge in the German labour movement, and has been duly appraised by a great many class-conscious workers. But with us in Russia, where far too much is spoken about the "model" of *European* socialism with precisely the

worst, most objectionable features of this "model" being chosen, it would be advisable to deal with Legien's speech in somewhat greater detail.

When he addressed the highest body of representatives of capitalist America, this leader of a two-million-strong army of German trade unionists—namely, the Social-Democratic trade unions—this member of the Social-Democratic group in the German Reichstag, delivered a purely liberal, bourgeois speech. Needless to say, not a single liberal, not even an Octobrist, would hesitate to subscribe to a speech about "peace" and "culture".

And when German socialists remarked that this was not a Social-Democratic speech, this "leader" of capital's wage-slaves treated them with scathing contempt. What are "editors" compared to a "practical politician" and collector of workers' pennies! Our philistine Narcissus has the same contempt for editors as the police panjandrums in a certain country have for the third element.¹³⁵

"These editors" would no doubt have delivered a speech "against capitalism".

Just think what this quasi-socialist is sneering at! He is sneering at the idea that a socialist should think it necessary to speak *against* capitalism. To the "statesmen" of German opportunism such an idea is utterly alien; they talk in such a way as *not to offend* "capitalism". Disgracing themselves by this servile renunciation of socialism, they brag of their disgrace.

Legien is not just anybody. He is a representative of the army of trade unions, or rather, the officers' corps of that army. His speech was no accident, no slip of the tongue, no casual whimsy, no blunder of a provincial German office clerk overawed by American capitalists, who were polite and revealed no trace of police arrogance. If it were *only* this, Legien's speech would not be worthy of note.

But it was obviously not that.

At the International Congress in Stuttgart, half the German delegation turned out to be sham socialists of *this type*, who voted for the ultra-opportunist resolution on the colonial question.*

* See pp. 86-92.—Ed.

Take the German magazine *Sozialistische* (??) *Monatshefte*¹³⁶ and you will always find in it utterances by men like Legien, which are thoroughly opportunist, and have *nothing* in common with socialism, utterances touching on *all* the vital issues of the labour movement.

The "official" explanation of the "official" German party is that "nobody reads" *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, that it has no influence, etc.; but that is *not true*. The Stuttgart "incident" proved that it is not true. The most prominent and responsible people, members of parliament and trade union leaders who write for *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, constantly and undeviatingly propagate their views among the masses.

The "official optimism" of the German party has long been noted in its own camp by those people who earned Legien's appellation of "these editors"—an appellation contemptuous from the point of view of the bourgeois and honourable from the point of view of a socialist. And the more often the liberals and the liquidators in Russia (including Trotsky, of course) attempt to *transplant* this amiable characteristic to *our soil*, the more determinedly must they be resisted.

German Social-Democracy has many great services to its credit. Thanks to Marx's struggle against all the Höchbergs, Dührings, and Co., it possesses a strictly formulated theory, which our Narodniks vainly try to evade or touch up along opportunist lines. It has a mass organisation, newspapers, trade unions, political associations—that same mass organisation which is so definitely building up in our country in the shape of the victories the *Pravda* Marxists are winning everywhere—in Duma elections, in the daily press, in Insurance Board elections, and in the trade unions. The attempts of our liquidators, whom the workers have "removed from office", to evade the question of the growth of this mass organisation in Russia in a form adapted to Russian conditions are as vain as those of the Narodniks, and imply a similar intellectualist *breakaway* from the working-class movement.

But the merits of German Social-Democracy are merits, not because of shameful speeches like those delivered by Legien or the "utterances" (in the press) by the contributors to *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, but *despite* them. We must

not try to play down the *disease* which the German party is undoubtedly suffering from, and which reveals itself in phenomena of this kind; nor must we play it down with "officially optimistic" phrases. We must lay it bare to the Russian workers, so that we may learn from the experience of the older movement, learn what should not be copied from it.

Prosveshcheniya No. 4.
April 1914
Signed: V. I.

Vol. 20

CONCLUDING REMARKS TO THE SYMPOSIUM MARXISM AND LIQUIDATIONISM

Liquidationism is an issue of vital importance, not only to labour democracy but to Russian democracy generally. When our democratic press tries to sidestep this issue, or skim over it as a "private controversy" among Marxists, it merely reveals a desire to evade an appraisal of the cardinal political problems of our day. For the question of liquidationism is one of our entire appraisal of the June Third system, and, in broader terms, of our counter-revolution generally. It is a question of the basic tasks and methods of the democrats.

No one, I believe, has questioned the fact that the latest period of Russian history, beginning approximately with 1908, has been marked not only by the extreme intensification of reaction's persecution of everything democratic, but by profound ideological disunity and disintegration, which has affected the proletariat as well as all bourgeois-democratic elements. But whereas *everyone* acknowledges this obvious fact, only the Marxists have set themselves the clear and immediate task of precisely defining the *class* roots and *class* implications of this disunity and disintegration. Without such a definition there can be no conscious choice of tactics.

Work in that direction started in our Marxist press abroad in 1908, i.e., as soon as disunity became a fact. The Marxists could not accept this disunity, as the liberals had done, nor could they confine themselves to subjectively condemning it, as even the best (in the democratic sense) of the Narodniks had done. The social trends called for a socio-economic, i.e., class explanation.

December 1908 saw an explanation of the substance of liquidationism given in the Bolshevik press and endorsed by a Party decision which was binding on all. The spring of 1909 saw a formal break between the Bolsheviks (as represented by their leading body) and the so-called Vperyodists,* who accepted otzovism or considered it a "legitimate trend" and defended "god-building"¹³⁷ and the reactionary philosophy of Machism.¹³⁸ This break revealed the main features of "Left liquidationism", its leaning towards anarchism, just as Right liquidationism, or liquidationism proper, leans towards liberalism.

By January 1910 this Marxist analysis of the present disunity and disintegration, nine-tenths of which had been given by the Bolshevik press abroad, was so complete and the facts so irrefutably established, that *all* Marxists, representatives of *all* trends (including *both* the liquidators and the Vperyodists) were compelled *unanimously* to acknowledge, in the decisions of January 1910, that both the liquidationist and Vperyodist "deviations" were *manifestations of bourgeois influence on the proletariat*.

A glance at the situation in the *non-Marxist* movement will be enough to make one realise the social significance of this Marxist analysis and Marxist decision. Among the liberals we find the extreme Vekhist liquidationism and confusion, which persists *to this day*, on the question of whether the methods of 1905 have been abandoned or not. Among the *Left Narodniks* we find extreme liquidationist pronouncements, beginning with the Paris publications of 1908-11, the nebulous liquidationism of *Pochin*¹³⁹ and ending with the liquidationist mouthings' of Savinkov-Ropshin and Chernov in *Zavety*.¹⁴⁰ On the other hand, the *Left Narodniks'* official otzovism continues to erode and weaken their ranks.

The objective validity of the Marxist analysis was confirmed by the fact that in the course of the five odd years since 1908 *all* progressive trends of social thought have been constantly coming up against *these* selfsame liquidationist and Narodnik errors, *these* selfsame questions of applying old methods to the solution of old but still unresolved problems,

* Alexinsky, Bogdanov, Lunacharsky, S. Volsky and others.

and of marshalling our forces in a new situation and with new methods.

At the beginning of the June Third period, Marxist analysis helped to reveal the theoretical deviations towards liquidationism and otzovism. Now, at the close of the period, we see how, even in the open arena, in full sight of everybody, the vast majority of class-conscious workers of Russia have rallied around the Marxists, while both *flanks* of the democratic press, which seeks to influence the proletariat, are preoccupied with petty-bourgeois liquidationism and petty-bourgeois Narodism. Not so long ago the Left-Narodnik *Severnaya Mysl*¹⁴¹ (No. 1) carried the following report from a Mr. Braines on the social insurance campaign in Riga:

"The boycottist trend is apparent only among the shoemakers, where boycottist groups have been formed. Unfortunately, the Narodniks are the leading spirits in these groups." (Quoted in the article "Narodism and Liquidationism as Disintegrating Elements in the Working-class Movement", in *Proletarskaya Pravda* No. 12, for December 20, 1913.)

The same paper had to admit that:

"To the honour of the Marxists be it said that they enjoy considerable influence at present in the unions [i.e., the trade unions] whereas we Left Narodniks work in them without a definite plan, and for that reason our influence is scarcely felt." (Ibid.)

The doctrinal feebleness of the Left Narodniks, who combine the new-fangled opportunism of the European philistines with the purely Russian philistine defence of "labouring" proprietors, is naturally complemented by tactical feebleness and vacillation. Nothing remains of the old Left-Narodnik party except vacillation, and the same applies to the liquidators. Defeated in the working-class movement, these petty-bourgeois trends had no choice but to *form a bloc against the Marxists*.

It has been a steady descent. From advocacy of a legal party, from the speeches of the Potresovs and the Yushkeviches, with their renouncement of the idea of hegemony and of Marxism, the liquidators have sunk to a direct *struggle* against the Marxist party. Here is what a St. Petersburg Left Narodnik wrote the other day in *Stoikaya Mysl* (No. 5):

"As soon as we came into the hall (where the election of the Insurance Board was taking place) the narrow factional stand taken by the Pravdists at once became clear. But we do not lose hope. Together with the liquidators we are drawing up a non-factional list that will give us one seat on the Board and two alternate seats." (Quoted from *Put Pravdy* No. 38, for March 16, 1914.)

Petty-bourgeois democrats of all trends who wish to corrupt the workers with bourgeois influence—unite against the Marxists! The silly word "non-factional", which fascinates people who are incapable of thinking and learning, is so convenient and pleasing a word for the philistine! But the bloc with the Left Narodniks was no help to the poor liquidators, and never can be. The class-conscious workers elected to the Insurance Board *only* Marxists, opponents of liquidationism.

Grouplets of non-Party intellectuals, who seek to subject the workers to bourgeois policy and bourgeois ideology, have now taken definite shape in Russia: the liquidators and the Left Narodniks. For nearly twenty years, ever since Economism first appeared on the scene (1894-95), the ground has been laid for this *alliance* of opportunists from among the near-Party Marxists with the Narodniks, *against* consistent Marxism. It is high time to face the facts squarely and say firmly and emphatically: the Marxist working-class movement in Russia is being built, and can be built, *only* in a struggle against liquidationism and Narodism.

All over the world, in every capitalist society, the proletariat is inevitably connected with the petty bourgeoisie by a thousand ties, and everywhere the period of formation of workers' parties was attended by its more or less prolonged and persistent ideological and political subjection to the bourgeoisie. This is common to all capitalist countries, but it assumes different forms in different countries, depending on historical and economic factors. In Britain, in conditions of complete political freedom and with the country enjoying a long period of monopoly, the liberal bourgeoisie was for decades able to corrupt and ideologically enslave the majority of class-conscious workers. In France, the traditions of republican petty-bourgeois radicalism have been converting very many workers into supporters of the "Radical" bourgeois party, or of equally bourgeois anarchism. In Germany,

half a century ago, the workers still followed the liberal Schulze-Delitzsch and were taken in by the "national-liberal" ("Royal-Prussian") opportunistic vacillation of Lassalle and Schweitzer, while today hundreds of thousands of workers follow the Catholic "centre", with its sham "democracy".

In Russia, the *bourgeois-democratic* solution of the peasant question has not been completed to this day. It is therefore not surprising to see petty-bourgeois Narodism parading as "socialism". Russia is the *most* petty bourgeois of all capitalist countries. Consequently, as soon as Marxism became a *mass* social trend in Russia, intellectualist petty-bourgeois opportunism made itself felt, first in the form of Economism and "legal Marxism" (1895-1902), later in the form of Menshevism* (1903-08), and finally in the form of liquidationism (1908-14).

Liquidationism has now reached full maturity, a complete break with the Marxist workers' party. If Mr. L. M., the most "Left" of the liquidators—and the most adroit in producing evasive formulas—writes:

"experience has shown that the 'legal workers' party' is not a reactionary dream, for *such a party, in a certain sense, exists* in Russia at present. . ." (L. M.'s italics; *Nasha Zarya* No. 2, 1914, p. 83).

then it should be clear to all that it is absurd and preposterous even to think of the *possibility* of "uniting" or "reconciling" *such* a group with the Marxist workers' party.

Only hopelessly empty-headed people can now talk of the Marxist workers' party "uniting" with *such* a group, with that of *Nasha Zarya* and *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* group.

Class divisions in Russia in 1914 are in every respect more politically definite and sharper than they were in 1904. At

* The liquidationist historians present a ludicrous spectacle indeed when they have to dodge and manoeuvre in order to *disguise* the unpleasant but irrefutable fact that Menshevism (and liquidationism even more so) emerged *from* the very Economism, Bundism¹⁴² and "legal Marxism" against which the old *Iskra*, builder of the working-class party in Russia, fought for *three years*. See, for instance, Mr. Potresov's pamphlet on Axelrod. Mr. Potresov has tried just as zealously and just as unsuccessfully to disguise and *conceal* the fact that in his "Zemstvo campaign plan" Axelrod urged us not to frighten the liberals away. Incidentally, even the Menshevik Plekhanov has fully admitted the historical (in addition to theoretical) kinship between liquidationism, and Economism and "legal Marxism".

that time it was only the landed nobility that showed no cleavage, and the salon liberalism of some of its representatives frightened even the old regime. At that time, this regime considered the muzhik such a reliable pillar of law and order that it allowed him a very large measure of influence in the Bulygin and Witte Dumas. At that time, Guchkov-Milyukov-Peshekhonov liberalism and democracy could still present a single and uniform school of thought. At that time Menshevism wanted to be—and in effect was—an *inner-Party* trend, one that sought to defend opportunist slogans in "programmatic discussions" *within* the workers' party.

Present-day liquidationism has since then moved miles to the right. It has quitted the Party, shaken the dust of the "underground" from its feet, and is a closely knit anti-partyist centre of journalists writing for the legal liberal and liquidationist press, men whom the workers have removed from every office in all working-class organisations and societies. To compare *this* liquidationism with the Menshevism of 1903-07 is to allow oneself to be blinded and deafened by old names and catchwords, and to have absolutely no understanding of the evolution of class and party relations in Russia during the past ten years.

Present-day liquidationism, that of 1914, is the same as the *Tovarishch* group of 1907.

It is quite natural that in exile and emigration, where people are so out of touch with real conditions, so immured in memories of the past, of the events of seven or ten years ago, one comes across dozens of these "have-beens", who dream of "unity" between the workers' party and the group of Messrs. L. M., F. D., Potresov, Yezhov, Sedov and Co. And there are also very many of these "have-beens", but of a poorer moral calibre, among intellectuals associated with the workers' party in 1904-07 and now holding "cushy jobs" in various legal organisations.

No less natural is it that among Russian working-class youth of today all these dreams and all this talk of complacent individuals about "unity" of liquidators and the workers' party produce either Homeric and most impolite laughter, or else bewilderment and pity for these intellectualist Manilovs.¹⁴³ This is perfectly natural, for our present-day working-class youth *have seen* the liquidators desert the Party,

seen their *flight* from the "defunct Party cells", heard their renegade speeches about the "underground" and the harmfulness of "boosting the illegal press" (see statement in *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*, March 13, 1914), have been obliged to *combat* the bloc of this gentry both with the Narodniks and with the non-party element at a number of congresses, in the elections to the Fourth Duma, at a number of meetings of workers' societies, and in the elections to the Insurance Board, and have been obliged to *remove* these individuals *from office* in every workers' organisation.

Let Trotsky, in *Borba*,¹⁴⁴ cast imploring looks at Skobelev and Chkheidze; let contributors to the Paris newspaper *Za Partiyu*¹⁴⁵ look with hope and trust to Buryanov; let them reiterate all this talk about "unity"—their words now have a ring of sadness and irrelevancy.

To preach "unity" between Marxists and people who claim that a "legal workers' party is not a reactionary dream", etc., one has to be either fantastically stupid, or else have no knowledge and no understanding whatever of the Russian working-class movement and of the position in the local organisations, or else one has to long for such a pleasant "pendulum" state of affairs in which—who knows!—Trotsky (or some other "non-factionalist") will be invited to engineer "non-factional" unity "on an equal basis" between the group that contribute to *Nasha Zarya*, *Dyen* and *Kievskaya Mysl*¹⁴⁶ and the groups of Marxist workers. What a sweet and delightful prospect!

But real life, the real history of the attempts to "unite" with the liquidators, reveals something very far removed from this sweet and delightful prospect. There was a serious and concerted effort to unite with the liquidators in January 1910, but it was wrecked by the liquidators. There was unity of *all* groups and grouplets with the liquidators against the hateful Conference of January 1912. This was ardent and passionate unity based on the most passionate (and violently abusive) invective against that Conference, with both Trotsky and the *Za Partiyu* contributors and, of course, all the Vperyodists taking part in this "union". If the evil Leninist splitters were really an obstacle to unity, then real unity

* Plekhanov.

would have blossomed forth immediately after the joint statement against the Leninists, which these groups and the liquidators published in *Vorwärts* in March 1912!

But, alas, these queer unity-builders have since then—since the workers in Russia, having inaugurated *Pravda* in April, proceeded to unite the hundreds and thousands of workers' groups in all parts of the country on a basis of loyalty to the Party—these queer unity-builders have, ever since March 1912, displayed ever greater disunity amongst themselves! By August 1912 the famous "August bloc" of the liquidators was formed *without* the Vperyodists and *without* "Za Partiyu".

The next eighteen months saw the growth, maturity and ultimate consolidation of the unity of workers' groups in Russia, in *all* legal working-class societies, in all the trade unions and organisations and in a good many newspapers and organs, with the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma, which is prepared to carry out the will of the majority of the workers.

But what of our "unity-builders"?

Oh, their "unity" efforts have been so felicitous and successful that instead of one *Vperyod* group there are now *two* (not counting Bogdanov, the empirio-monist whom some take for a third *Vperyod* group); instead of a single Trotsky-and-liquidator paper (*Luch*), there is now, in addition, Trotsky's own organ, *Borba*, which this time promises genuine "non-factionalism". And besides Trotsky's timid withdrawal from the liquidator ranks, there has been a complete and resolute withdrawal from them of *all the organised Lettish Marxists*, who, *despite* their strict neutrality and non-factionalism, forthrightly declared at their 1914 Congress:

"The conciliators (participants in the August bloc) have themselves fallen into ideologica¹ and political dependence on the liquidators"!

From March 1912, when *everyone* united with the liquidators against the evil "Leninist splitters", up to March 1914, when the fictitious "August bloc" finally fell to pieces, it became abundantly clear that the real unity of the Marxist workers (in Russia, not in Paris or Vienna) is proceeding, and will only proceed, *in opposition* to the liquidationist

group and *regardless* of the empty talk about "unity" with the advocates of a "legal workers' party".

Thousands of workers' groups openly and publicly rallying around the Marxist paper—here is living proof of genuine unity and its development. Based on the principles evolved by the Marxists at the beginning of the June Third period, this unity has enabled us—a hundredfold more successfully than anyone else has done—to utilise every legal opportunity, to utilise it *in the spirit* of a ruthless war against the ideas that condemn the "boosting of the illegal press", or accept advocacy of "a legal party", or renounce hegemony, or relegate to the background the "pillars", etc., etc.

And only such unity, based on these principles, indicates the correct path to the Russian working class.

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A FOOL'S HASTE IS NO SPEED

A recent issue of *Der Kampf*,¹⁴⁷ the Austrian Social-Democratic monthly, contained a sensational paragraph signed F. A., stating that Eduard Bernstein, leader of the German opportunists, had renounced his revisionist, opportunist views and returned to Marxism.

Revisionism—revision of Marxism—is today one of the chief manifestations, if not the chief, of bourgeois influence on the proletariat and bourgeois corruption of the workers. That is why Eduard Bernstein, the opportunist leader, has won such world-wide notoriety.

And now we are told that Bernstein has returned to Marxism. This piece of news should seem strange to anyone at all familiar with German Social-Democratic literature. *Sozialistische Monatshette*, the principal organ of the opportunists, is still published and continues to preach purely bourgeois views which, in effect, amount to a complete betrayal of socialism. And Bernstein continues to be a leading contributor to the journal. What can the matter be?

It appears that Bernstein gave a lecture in Budapest in which, according to a local paper, he renounced revisionism.

F. A., the Austrian author, has proved exceedingly gullible and imprudent in hastening to proclaim to the world that Bernstein has revised his views. But the liquidator V. Levitsky, one of the leading opportunist contributors to the opportunist journal *Nasha Zarya* (the Menshevik Plekhanov has dubbed it the Russian "*Socialist Monthly*") has proved more imprudent still: in *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* (April 3, No. 46) he published a lengthy article under the resonant title of "From Revisionism to Marxism", based wholly on F. A.'s report.

Mr. Levitsky did not even wait for Bernstein's lecture to appear in the press. A fool's haste is no speed.

On learning what world-wide "fame" his Budapest lecture had won, Bernstein wrote a letter to the Brussels Social-Democratic paper *Le Peuple*¹⁴⁸ on April 11 (new style) in which he bluntly declared: "The report in *Der Kampf* is absolutely without foundation. I said nothing new in Budapest and did not recant any of the views expressed in *Premises of Socialism* [Bernstein's chief opportunist work]. The report of my lecture in the Budapest paper simply confused my words with the remarks of the reporter!"

The whole affair proved an ordinary newspaper hoax.

It did, however, reveal the deplorable proneness of some Austrian (only Austrian?) Social-Democrats to *disguise* opportunism and proclaim its disappearance.

Excessive zeal has carried Mr. Levitsky to preposterous lengths. He writes in *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*: "With the reversion [?] to Marxism of the father [?] of revisionism, Bernstein, revisionism within the German Social-Democratic movement has been killed for good [!]."

Every word here is a gem: there has been no reversion, Bernstein is no father, revisionism has not been killed.

"In Russia," the zealous Mr. Levitsky writes, "revisionism has ceased to be a modish doctrine even among the Left Narodniks, who at one time were inclined to fall back on it in their fight against Marxism. Within the Russian Social-Democratic movement revisionism had no influence whatever, despite the attempts of some writers to transplant it to Russian soil."

Every word here is an untruth. On *all* major issues the Left Narodniks even now "fall back on" the revisionist "doctrines". That is proved by every issue of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* and *Zavety*, by every issue of *Stoikaya Mysl*. Glossing over the opportunism of the Left Narodniks can only cause harm.

There has been some revisionist *influence* within Russian Social-Democracy *since the very beginning* of the mass working-class and mass Social-Democratic movement in 1895-96. Does Mr. Levitsky mean to say he has not heard of the struggle which consistent Marxists and adherents of the old *Iskra* waged for many years against the Economists?

Does he mean to say he has not heard of the Party resolutions and the numerous articles written during that period, affirming, proving and explaining that Economism was the Russian form of revisionism and opportunism? Does Mr. Levitsky mean to say he has forgotten about Mr. A. Martynov, a leading liquidator of today, and a leading Economist of yesterday?

Mr. Levitsky denies revisionism in order to disguise *his own* revisionism. We would remind him only of the four following facts: 1) Was it not the Menshevik Plekhanov who declared in the press in 1909-10 that the Mensheviks had absorbed into their ranks quite a number of opportunist elements? 2) Was it not the same Plekhanov who demonstrated the opportunist nature of the liquidationist "fight-for-legality" slogan? 3) Was it not *several* anti-liquidationist Mensheviks who demonstrated the *connection* between liquidationism and Economism? 4) Is it not opportunism to renounce, as Koltsov does, "two pillars" (out of the three)¹⁴⁹ as unsuitable for agitation?

These four facts alone—and forty-four more could be cited—are clear proof that the Economism of 1895-1902, the Menshevism of 1903-08 and the liquidationism of 1908-14, all represent the Russian form or species of opportunism and revisionism, no more and no less.

DISRUPTION OF UNITY UNDER COVER OF OUTCRIES FOR UNITY

The questions of the present-day working-class movement are in many respects vexed questions, particularly for representatives of that movement's recent past (i.e., of the stage which historically has just drawn to a close). This applies primarily to the questions of so-called factionalism, splits, and so forth. One often hears intellectuals in the working-class movement making nervous, feverish and almost hysterical appeals not to raise these vexed questions. Those who have experienced the long years of struggle between the various trends among Marxists since 1900-01, for example, may naturally think it superfluous to repeat many of the arguments on the subject of these vexed questions.

But there are not many people left today who took part in the fourteen-year-old conflict among Marxists (not to speak of the eighteen- or nineteen-year-old conflict, counting from the moment the first symptoms of Economism appeared). The vast majority of the workers who now make up the ranks of the Marxists either do not remember the old conflict, or have never heard of it. To the overwhelming majority (as, incidentally, was shown by the opinion poll held by our journal), these vexed questions are a matter of exceptionally great interest. We therefore intend to deal with these questions, which have been raised *as it were* anew (and for the younger generation of the workers they are really new) by Trotsky's "non-factional workers' journal", *Borba*.

I. "FACTIONALISM"

Trotsky calls his new journal "non-factional". He puts this word in the top line in his advertisements; this word is stressed by him in every key, in the editorial articles of *Borba* itself, as well as in the liquidationist *Severnaya Rabo-*

chaya Gazeta, which carried an article on *Borba* by Trotsky before the latter began publication.

What is this "non-factionalism"?

Trotsky's "workers' journal" is Trotsky's journal for workers, as there is not a trace in it of either workers' initiative, or any connection with working-class organisations. Desiring to write in a popular style, Trotsky, in his journal for workers, explains for the benefit of his readers the meaning of such foreign words as "territory", "factor", and so forth.

Very good. But why not also explain to the workers the meaning of the word "non-factionalism"? Is that word *more* intelligible than the words "territory" and "factor"?

No, that is not the reason. The reason is that the label "non-factionalism" is used by the worst representatives of the worst remnants of factionalism to *mislead* the younger generation of workers. It is worth while devoting a little time to explaining this.

Group-division was the main distinguishing feature of the Social-Democratic Party during a definite historical period. Which period? From 1903 to 1911.

To explain the nature of this group-division more clearly we must recall the concrete conditions that existed in, say, 1906-07. At that time the Party was united, there was no split, but group-division existed, i.e., in the united Party there were *virtually two* groups, two virtually separate organisations. The local workers' organisations were united, but on every important issue the two groups devised two sets of tactics. The advocates of the respective tactics disputed among themselves in the united workers' organisations (as was the case, for example, during the discussion of the slogan: a Duma, or Cadet, Ministry, in 1906, or during the elections of delegates to the London Congress in 1907), and questions were decided *by a majority vote*. One group was defeated at the Stockholm Unity Congress (1906), the other was defeated at the London Unity Congress (1907).

These are commonly known facts in the history of organised Marxism in Russia.

It is sufficient to recall these commonly known facts to realise what glaring falsehoods Trotsky is spreading.

For over two years, since 1912, there has been *no* factionalism among the organised Marxists in Russia, no disputes

over tactics in *united* organisations, at *united* conferences and congresses. There is a *complete* break between the Party, which in January 1912 formally announced that the liquidators *do not* belong to it, and the liquidators. Trotsky often calls this state of affairs a "split", and we shall deal with this appellation separately later on. But it remains an undoubted fact that the term "factionalism" *deviates from the truth*.

As we have said, this term is a repetition, an uncritical, unreasonable, senseless repetition of *what was true yesterday*, i.e., in the period that has already passed. When Trotsky talks to us about the "chaos of factional strife" (see No. 1, pp. 5, 6, and many others) we realise at once *which* period of the past his words echo.

Consider the present state of affairs from the viewpoint of the young Russian workers who now constitute nine-tenths of the organised Marxists in Russia. They see *three* mass expressions of the different views, or trends in the working-class movement: the Pravdists, gathered around a newspaper with a circulation of 40,000; the liquidators (15,000 circulation) and the Left Narodniks (10,000 circulation). The circulation figures tell the reader about the *mass* character of a given tenet.

The question arises: what has "chaos" got to do with it? Everybody knows that Trotsky is fond of high-sounding and empty phrases. But the catchword "chaos" is *not only* phrase-mongering; it signifies *also* the transplanting, or rather, a vain attempt to transplant, to Russian soil, in the present period, the relations that existed *abroad* in a *bygone* period. That is the whole point.

There is no "chaos" whatever in the struggle between the Marxists and the Narodniks. That, we hope, not *even* Trotsky will dare to deny. The struggle between the Marxists and the Narodniks has been going on for over thirty years, ever since Marxism came into being. The cause of this struggle is the radical divergence of interests and viewpoints of two different classes, the proletariat and the peasantry. If there is any "chaos" anywhere, it is only in the heads of cranks who fail to understand this.

What, then, remains? "Chaos" in the struggle between the Marxists and the liquidators? That, too, is wrong, for a

struggle against a *trend*, which the entire Party recognised as a trend and condemned as far back as 1908, cannot be called chaos. And everybody who has the least concern for the history of Marxism in Russia knows that liquidationism is most closely and inseparably connected, even as regards its leaders and supporters, with Menshevism (1903-08) and Economism (1894-1903). Consequently, here, too, we have a history extending over nearly twenty years. To regard the history of one's own Party as "chaos" reveals an unpardonable empty-headedness.

Now let us examine the present situation *from the point of view* of Paris or Vienna. At once the whole picture changes. *Besides* the Pravdists and liquidators, we see *no less than five Russian* groups claiming membership of one and the same Social-Democratic Party: Trotsky's group, two *Vperyod* groups, the "pro-Party Bolsheviks" and the "pro-Party Mensheviks".¹⁵⁰ All Marxists in Paris and in Vienna (for the purpose of illustration I take two of the largest centres) are perfectly well aware of this.

Here Trotsky is right in a certain sense; this is indeed group-division, chaos indeed!

Groups within the Party, i.e., nominal unity (all *claim* to belong to one Party) and actual disunity (for, in fact, all the groups are independent of one another and enter into negotiations and agreements with each other as sovereign powers).

"Chaos", i.e., the absence of (1) objective and verifiable proof that these groups are linked with the working-class movement in Russia and (2) absence of any data to enable us to judge the actual ideological and political physiognomy of these groups. Take a period of two full years—1912 and 1913. As everybody knows, this was a period of the revival and upswing of the working-class movement, when every trend or tendency of a more or less *mass* character (and in politics this mass character alone counts) *could not but* exercise some influence on the Fourth Duma elections, the strike movement, the legal newspapers, the trade unions, the insurance election campaign, and so on. Throughout those two years, not one of these five groups abroad asserted itself in the slightest degree *in any* of the activities of the mass working-class movement in Russia just enumerated!

That is a fact that anybody can easily verify.

And that fact proves that we were right in calling Trotsky a representative of the "worst remnants of factionalism".

Although he claims to be non-factional, Trotsky is known to everybody who is in the least familiar with the working-class movement in Russia as the representative of "Trotsky's faction". Here we have group-division, for we see two essential symptoms of it: (1) nominal recognition of unity and (2) group segregation in fact. Here there are remnants of group-division, for there is no evidence whatever of any real connection with the mass working-class movement in Russia.

And lastly, it is the worst form of group-division, for there is *no* ideological and political definiteness. It cannot be denied that this definiteness is characteristic of both the Pravdists (even our determined opponent L. Martov admits that we stand "solid and disciplined" around universally known formal decisions on all questions) and the liquidators (they, or at all events the most prominent of them, have very definite features, namely, liberal, not Marxist).

It cannot be denied that some of the groups which, like Trotsky's, really exist exclusively from the Vienna-Paris, but by no means from the Russian, point of view, possess a degree of definiteness. For example, the *Machist* theories of the Machist *Vperyod* group are definite; the emphatic repudiation of these theories and defence of Marxism, in addition to the theoretical condemnation of liquidationism, by the "pro-Party Mensheviks", are definite.

Trotsky, however, possesses no ideological and political definiteness, for his patent for "non-factionalism", as we shall soon see in greater detail, is merely a patent to *flit* freely to and fro, from one group to another.

To sum up:

1) Trotsky does not explain, nor does he understand, the historical significance of the *ideological* disagreements among the various Marxist trends and groups, although these disagreements run through the twenty years' history of Social-Democracy and concern the fundamental questions of the present day (as we shall show later on);

2) Trotsky fails to understand that the main specific features of *group-division* are nominal recognition of unity and actual disunity;

3) Under cover of "non-factionalism" Trotsky is championing the interests of a group abroad which particularly lacks definite principles and has no basis in the working-class movement in Russia.

All that glitters is not gold. There is much glitter and sound in Trotsky's phrases, but they are meaningless.

II. THE SPLIT

"Although there is no group-division, i.e., nominal recognition of unity, but actual disunity, among you, Pravdists, there is something worse, namely, splitting tactics," we are told. This is exactly what Trotsky says. Unable to think out his ideas or to get his arguments to hang together, he rants against group-division at one moment, and at the next shouts: "Splitting tactics are winning one suicidal victory after another." (No. 1, p. 6.)

This statement can have only one meaning: "The *Pravdists* are winning one victory after another" (this is an objective, verifiable fact, established by a study of the mass working-class movement in Russia during, say, 1912 and 1913), but I, Trotsky, denounce the Pravdists (1) as splitters, and (2) as suicidal politicians.

Let us examine this.

First of all we must express our thanks to Trotsky. Not long ago (from August 1912 to February 1914) he was at one with F. Dan, who, as is well known, threatened to "kill" anti-liquidationism, and called upon others to do so. At present Trotsky does not threaten to "kill" our trend (and our Party—don't be angry, Citizen Trotsky, this is true!), he only prophesies that it will kill *itself*!

This is much milder, isn't it? It is almost "non-factional", isn't it?

But joking apart (although joking is the only way of retorting mildly to Trotsky's insufferable phrase-mongering).

"Suicide" is a mere empty phrase, mere "Trotskyism".

Splitting tactics are a grave political accusation. This accusation is repeated against us in a thousand different keys by the liquidators and by all the groups enumerated above, who, from the point of view of Paris and Vienna, actually exist.

And all of them repeat this grave political accusation in an amazingly frivolous way. Look at Trotsky. He admitted that "splitting tactics are winning [read: the Pravdists are winning] one suicidal victory after another". To this he adds:

"Numerous advanced workers, in a state of utter political bewilderment, themselves often become active agents of a split." (No. 1, p. 6.)

Are not these words a glaring example of irresponsibility on this question?

You accuse us of being splitters when all that we see in front of us in the arena of the working-class movement in Russia is liquidationism. So you think that our attitude towards liquidationism is wrong? Indeed, *all* the groups abroad that we enumerated above, no matter how much they may differ from each other, are agreed that our attitude towards liquidationism is wrong, that it is the attitude of "splitters". This, too, reveals the similarity (and fairly close political kinship) between *all* these groups and the liquidators.

If our attitude towards liquidationism is wrong in theory, in principle, then Trotsky should say so *straightforwardly*, and state *definitely*, without equivocation, why he thinks it is wrong. But Trotsky has been evading this extremely important point *for years*.

If our attitude towards liquidationism has been proved wrong in practice, by the experience of the movement, then this experience should be analysed; but Trotsky fails to do this either. "Numerous advanced workers," he admits, "become *active agents* of a split" (read: active agents of the Pravdist line, tactics, system and organisation).

What is the cause of the deplorable fact, which, as Trotsky admits, is confirmed by experience, that the *advanced workers*, the *numerous advanced workers* at that, stand for *Pravda*?

It is the "utter political bewilderment" of these advanced workers, answers Trotsky.

Needless to say, this explanation is highly flattering to Trotsky, to all five groups abroad, and to the liquidators. Trotsky is very fond of using, with the learned air of the expert, pompous and high-sounding phrases to explain historical phenomena in a way that is flattering to Trotsky. Since "numerous advanced workers" become "active agents" of

a political and Party line which does not conform to Trotsky's line, Trotsky settles the question unhesitatingly, out of hand: these advanced workers are "in a state of utter political bewilderment", whereas he, Trotsky, is evidently "in a state" of political firmness and clarity, and keeps to the right line!... And this very same Trotsky, beating his breast, fulminates against factionalism, parochialism, and the efforts of intellectuals to impose their will on the workers!

Reading things like these, one cannot help asking oneself: is it from a lunatic asylum that such voices come?

The Party put the question of liquidationism, and of condemning it, before the "advanced workers" as far back as 1908, while the question of "splitting" away from a very definite group of liquidators (namely, the *Nasha Zarya* group), i.e., that the only way to build up the Party was *without* this group and in opposition to it—this question was raised in January 1912, over two years ago. The overwhelming majority of the advanced workers declared *in favour of* supporting the "January (1912) line". Trotsky himself admits this fact when he talks about "victories" and about "numerous advanced workers". But Trotsky wriggles out of this simply by hurling *abuse* at these advanced workers and calling them "splitters" and "politically bewildered"!

From these facts sane people will draw a different conclusion. Where the *majority* of the class-conscious workers have rallied around precise and definite decisions, there we shall find *unity* of opinion and action, there we shall find the Party spirit, and the Party.

Where we see liquidators who have been "removed from office" by the workers, or half a dozen groups outside Russia, who for two years have produced *no* proof that they are connected with the mass working-class movement in Russia, there, indeed, we shall find bewilderment and *splits*. In now trying to persuade the workers *not to carry out the decisions* of that "united whole", which the Marxist Pravdists recognise, Trotsky is *trying* to disrupt the movement and cause a split.

These efforts are futile, but we must expose the arrogantly conceited leaders of intellectualist groups, who, while causing splits themselves, are shouting about others causing splits; who, after sustaining *utter defeat* at the hands of the

"advanced workers" for the past two years or more, are with incredible insolence *flouting* the decisions and the will of these advanced workers and saying that *they* are "politically bewildered". These are entirely the methods of Nozdryov, or of "Judas" Golovlyov.¹⁵¹

In reply to these repeated outcries about a split and in fulfilment of my duty as a publicist, I will not tire of repeating *precise*, unrefuted and irrefutable figures. In the Second Duma, 47 per cent of the deputies elected by the worker curias were Bolsheviks, in the Third Duma 50 per cent were Bolsheviks, and in the Fourth Duma 67 per cent.

There you have the majority of the "advanced workers", there you have the Party; there you have unity of opinion and action of the majority of the class-conscious workers.

To this the liquidators say (see Bulkin, L. M., in *Nasha Zarya* No. 3) that we base our arguments on the Stolypin curias. This is a foolish and unscrupulous argument. The Germans measure their successes by the results of elections conducted under the Bismarckian electoral law, which excludes women. Only people bereft of their senses would reproach the German Marxists for measuring their successes under the *existing* electoral law, without in the least justifying its reactionary restrictions.

And we, too, without justifying curias, or the curia system, measured our successes under the *existing* electoral law. There were curias in all three (Second, Third and Fourth) Duma elections; and *within* the worker curia, *within* the ranks of Social-Democracy, there was a *complete* swing against the liquidators. Those who do not wish to deceive themselves and others must admit this objective fact, namely, the victory of *working-class unity over* the liquidators.

The other argument is just as "clever": "Mensheviks and liquidators voted for (or took part in the election of) such-and-such a Bolshevik." Splendid! But does not the same thing apply to the 53 per cent *non-Bolshevik* deputies returned to the Second Duma, and to the 50 per cent returned to the Third Duma, and to the 33 per cent returned to the Fourth Duma?

If, instead of the figures on the deputies elected, we could obtain the figures on the electors, or workers' delegates, etc., we would gladly quote them. But these more detailed figures

are *not* available, and consequently the "disputants" are simply throwing dust in people's eyes.

But what about the figures of the workers' groups that assisted the newspapers of the different trends? During *two* years (1912 and 1913), 2,801 groups assisted *Pravda*, and 750 assisted *Luch*.^{*} These figures are verifiable and nobody has attempted to disprove them.

Where is the *unity of action and will of the majority* of the "advanced workers", and where is the *flouting* of the will of the majority?

Trotsky's "non-factionalism" is, actually, splitting tactics, in that it shamelessly flouts the will of the majority of the workers.

III. THE BREAK-UP OF THE AUGUST BLOC

But there is still another method, and a very important one, of verifying the correctness and truthfulness of Trotsky's accusations about splitting tactics.

You consider that it is the "Leninists" who are splitters? Very well, let us assume that you are right.

But if you are, why have not all the other sections and groups proved that unity is possible with the liquidators *without* the "Leninists", and *against* the "splitters"?... If we are splitters, why have not you, uniters, united among yourselves, and with the liquidators? Had you done that you would have proved to the workers *by deeds* that unity is possible and beneficial!..

Let us go over the chronology of events.

In January 1912, the "Leninist" "splitters" declared that they were a Party *without* and *against* the liquidators.

In March 1912, *all* the groups and "factions": liquidators, Trotskyists, Vperyodists, "pro-Party Bolsheviks" and "pro-Party Mensheviks", in their Russian news sheets and in the columns of the German Social-Democratic newspaper *Vorwärts*, *united* against these "splitters". All of them unanimously, in chorus, in unison and in one voice vilified us

* A preliminary calculation made up to April 1, 1914, showed 4,000 groups for *Pravda* (commencing with January 1, 1912) and 1,000 for the liquidators and all their allies taken together.

and called us "usurpers", "mystifiers", and other no less affectionate and tender names.

Very well, gentlemen! But what could have been easier for you than to unite *against* the "usurpers" and to set the "advanced workers" an example of *unity*? Do you mean to say that if the advanced workers had seen, on the one hand, the unity of all against the usurpers, the unity of liquidators and non-liquidators, and on the other, *isolated* "usurpers", "splitters", and so forth, they would not have supported the former?

If disagreements are only invented, or exaggerated, and so forth, by the "Leninists", and if unity between the liquidators, Plekhanovites, Vperyodists, Trotskyists, and so forth, is really *possible*, why have you not proved this during the past two years by *your own* example?

In August 1912, a conference of "uniters" was convened. *Disunity* started at once: the Plekhanovites refused to attend at all; the Vperyodists attended, but walked out after protesting and exposing the fictitious character of the whole business.

The liquidators, the Letts, the Trotskyists (Trotsky and Semkovsky), the Caucasians, and the Seven¹⁵² "united". But did they? We stated at the time that they did not, that this was merely a screen to cover up liquidationism. Have the events disproved our statement?

Exactly eighteen months later, in February 1914, we found:

1. that the Seven was breaking up. Buryanov had left them.

2. that in the remaining new "Six", Chkheidze and Tulyakov, or somebody else, could not see eye to eye on the reply to be made to Plekhanov. They stated in the press that they would reply to him, *but they could not*.

3. that Trotsky, who for many months had practically vanished from the columns of *Luch*, had *broken away*, and had started "his own" journal, *Borba*. By calling this journal "non-factional", Trotsky clearly (clearly to those who are at all familiar with the subject) intimates that in his, Trotsky's, opinion, *Nasha Zarya* and *Luch* had *proved to be* "factional", i.e., poor uniters.

If you are a uniter, my dear Trotsky, if you say that it is possible to unite with the liquidators, if you and they

stand by the "fundamental ideas formulated in August 1912" (*Borba* No. 1, p. 6, Editorial Note), why *did not you yourself* unite with the liquidators in *Nasha Zarya* and *Luch*?

When, before Trotsky's journal appeared, *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* published some scathing comment stating that the physiognomy of this journal was "unclear" and that there had been "quite a good deal of talk in Marxist circles" about this journal, *Put Pravdy* (No. 37)* was naturally obliged to expose this falsehood. It said: "There has been talk in Marxist circles" about a secret memorandum written by Trotsky *against* the *Luch* group; Trotsky's physiognomy and his breakaway from the August bloc were perfectly "clear".

4. An, the well-known leader of the Caucasian liquidators, who had attacked L. Sedov (for which he was given a public wiggling by F. Dan and Co.), now appeared in *Borba*. It remains "unclear" whether the Caucasians now desire to go with Trotsky or with Dan.

5. The Lettish Marxists, who were the only real organisation in the "August bloc", had *formally* withdrawn from it, stating (in 1914) in the resolution of their last Congress that:

"the attempt on the part of the conciliators to unite at all costs with the liquidators (the August Conference of 1912) proved fruitless, and the uniters themselves became ideologically and politically dependent upon the liquidators."

This statement was made, after eighteen months' experience, by an organisation which had itself been *neutral* and had *not* desired to establish connection with *either* of the two centres. This decision of *neutrals* should carry all the more weight with Trotsky!

Enough, is it not?

Those who accused us of being splitters, of being unwilling or unable to get on with the liquidators, were *themselves* unable to get on with them. The August bloc proved to be a fiction and broke up.

By concealing this break-up from his readers, Trotsky is deceiving them.

The experience of our opponents has proved that we are right, has proved that the liquidators cannot be co-operated with.

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, pp. 158-61.—Ed.

IV. A CONCILIATOR'S ADVICE TO THE "SEVEN"

The editorial article in issue No. 1 of *Borba* entitled "The Split in the Duma Group" contains advice from a conciliator to the seven pro-liquidator (or inclining towards liquidationism) members of the Duma. The gist of this advice is contained in the following words:

"first of all consult the Six¹⁵³ whenever it is necessary to reach an agreement with other groups. . . ." (P. 29.)

This is the wise counsel which, among other things, is evidently the cause of Trotsky's disagreement with the liquidators of *Luch*. This is the opinion the Pravdists have held ever since the outbreak of the conflict between the two groups in the Duma, ever since the resolution of the Summer (1913) Conference¹⁵⁴ was adopted. The Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma has reiterated in the *press*, even after the split, that it continues to adhere to this position, in spite of the repeated refusals of the Seven.

From the very outset, since the time the resolution of the Summer Conference was adopted, we have been, and still are, of the opinion that *agreements* on questions concerning activities in the *Duma* are desirable and possible; if such agreements have been repeatedly arrived at with the petty-bourgeois peasant democrats (Trudoviks), they are all the more possible and necessary with the petty-bourgeois, liberal-labour politicians.

We must not exaggerate disagreements, but we must face the facts: the Seven are men, leaning towards liquidationism, who yesterday entirely followed the lead of Dan, and whose eyes today are travelling longingly from Dan to Trotsky and back again. The liquidators are a group of legalists who have broken away from the Party and are pursuing a liberal-labour policy. Since they repudiate the "underground", there can be no question of unity with them in matters concerning Party organisation and the working-class movement. Whoever thinks differently is badly mistaken and fails to take into account the profound nature of the changes that have taken place since 1908.

But *agreements* on certain questions with this group, which stands outside or on the fringe of the Party, are, of course,

permissible: we *must* always compel this group, too, like the Trudoviks, to choose between the workers' (Pravdist) policy and the liberal policy. For example, on the question of fighting for freedom of the press the liquidators clearly revealed vacillation between the liberal formulation of the question, which repudiated, or overlooked, the illegal press, and the opposite policy, that of the workers.

Within the scope of a *Duma* policy in which the most important *extra-Duma* issues are not directly raised, agreements with the seven liberal-labour deputies are possible and desirable. On this point Trotsky has shifted his ground *from* that of the liquidators *to* that of the Party Summer (1913) Conference.

It should not be forgotten, however, that to a group standing outside the Party, agreement means something entirely different from what Party people usually understand by the term. By "agreement" in the Duma, non-Party people mean "*drawing up* a tactical resolution, or line". To Party people agreement is an attempt to *enlist* others in the work of carrying out the Party line.

For example, the Trudoviks¹⁵⁵ have no party. By agreement they understand the "voluntary", so to speak, "*drawing up*" of a line, today with the Cadets, tomorrow with the Social-Democrats. We, however, understand something entirely different by agreement with the Trudoviks. We have Party decisions on all the important questions of tactics, and we shall never depart from these decisions; by agreement with the Trudoviks we mean *winning* them over to our side, *convincing* them that we are right, and *not rejecting* joint action against the Black Hundreds and against the liberals.

How far Trotsky has forgotten (not for nothing has he associated with the liquidators) this elementary difference between the Party and non-Party point of view on agreements, is shown by the following argument of his:

"The representatives of the International must bring together the two sections of our divided parliamentary group and jointly with them ascertain the points of agreement and points of disagreement... A detailed tactical resolution formulating the principles of parliamentary tactics may be drawn up..." (No. 1, pp. 29-30.)

Here you have a characteristic and typical example of the liquidationist presentation of the question! Trotsky's

journal forgets about the Party; such a trifle is hardly worth remembering!

When different parties in Europe (Trotsky is fond of inappropriately talking about Europeanism) come to an agreement or unite, what they do is this: their respective representatives meet and first of all ascertain the points of disagreement (precisely what the International proposed in relation to Russia, without including in the resolution Kautsky's ill-considered statement that "the old Party no longer exists"). Having ascertained the points of disagreement, the representatives decide *what decisions* (resolutions, conditions, etc.) on questions of tactics, organisation, etc., *should be submitted to the congresses of the two parties*. If they succeed in drafting unanimous decisions, the congresses decide whether to adopt them or not. If *differing* proposals are made, they too are submitted for final decision to the congresses of the two parties.

What appeals to the liquidators and Trotsky is only the *European* models of opportunism, but certainly not the models of European partisanship.

"A detailed tactical resolution" will be drawn up by the members of the Duma! This example should serve the Russian "advanced workers", with whom Trotsky has good reason to be so displeased, as a striking illustration of the lengths to which the groups in Vienna and Paris—who persuaded even Kautsky that there was "no Party" in Russia—go in their ludicrous project-mongering. But if it is sometimes possible to fool foreigners on this score, the Russian "advanced workers" (at the risk of provoking the terrible Trotsky to another outburst of displeasure) will laugh in the faces of these project-mongers.

"Detailed tactical resolutions," they will tell them, "are drawn up among us (we do not know how it is done among you non-Party people) by Party congresses and conferences, for example, those of 1907, 1908, 1910, 1912 and 1913. We shall gladly acquaint uninformed foreigners, as well as forgetful Russians, with our Party decisions, and still more gladly ask the representatives of the Seven, or the August bloc members, or Left-wingers¹⁵⁶ or anybody else, to acquaint us with the resolutions of their congresses, or conferences, and to bring up at their next congress the definite question

of the attitude they should adopt towards our resolutions, or towards the resolution of the neutral Lettish Congress of 1914, etc."

This is what the "advanced workers" of Russia will say to the various project-mongers, and this *has already been said* in the Marxist press, for example, by the organised Marxists of St. Petersburg. Trotsky chooses to ignore these published terms for the liquidators? So much the worse for Trotsky. It is our duty to warn our readers how ridiculous that "unity" (the August type of "unity"?) project-mongering is which refuses to reckon with the will of the majority of the class-conscious workers of Russia.

V. TROTSKY'S LIQUIDATIONIST VIEWS

As to the substance of his own views, Trotsky contrived to say as little as possible in his new journal. *Put Pravdy* (No. 37) has already commented on the fact that Trotsky has not said a word either on the question of the "underground" or on the slogan of working for a legal party, etc.* That, among other things, is why we say that when attempts are made to form a separate organisation which is to have *no* ideological and political physiognomy, it is *the worst* form of factionalism.

Although Trotsky has refrained from openly expounding his views, quite a number of passages in his journal show what kind of ideas he has been trying to smuggle in.

In the very first editorial article in the first issue of his journal, we read the following:

"The pre-revolutionary Social-Democratic Party in our country was a *workers'* party only in ideas and aims. Actually, it was an organisation of the Marxist intelligentsia, which led the awakening working class." (5.)

This is the old liberal and liquidationist tune, which is really the prelude to the *repudiation* of the Party. It is based on a distortion of the historical facts. The strikes of 1895-96 had already given rise to a *mass* working-class movement, which both in ideas and organisation was linked with the Social-Democratic movement. And in these strikes, in this

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, pp. 158-61.—Ed.

economic and non-economic agitation, the "intelligentsia led the working class"!?

Or take the following exact statistics of political offences in the period 1901-03 compared with the preceding period.

*Occupations of participants in the emancipation
movement prosecuted for political offences
(per cent)*

Period	Agriculture	Industry and commerce	Liberal professions and students	No definite occupation, and no occupation
1884-90	7.1	15.1	53.3	19.9
1901-03	9.0	46.1	28.7	8.0

We see that in the eighties, when there was as yet no Social-Democratic Party in Russia, and when the movement was "Narodnik", the intelligentsia predominated, accounting for over half the participants.

But the picture underwent a complete change in 1901-03, when a Social-Democratic Party already existed, and when the old *Iskra* was conducting its work. The intelligentsia were now a *minority* among the participants of the movement; the *workers* ("industry and commerce") were far more numerous than the intelligentsia, and the workers and peasants together constituted more than half the total.

It was precisely in the conflict of trends within the Marxist movement that the petty-bourgeois intellectualist *wing* of the Social-Democracy made itself felt, beginning with Economism (1895-1903) and continuing with Menshevism (1903-1908) and liquidationism (1908-1914). Trotsky repeats the liquidationist slander against the Party and is afraid to mention the history of the twenty years' conflict of trends within the Party.

Here is another example.

"In its attitude towards parliamentarism, Russian Social-Democracy passed through the same three stages... [as in other countries]... first 'boycottism'... then the acceptance in principle of parliamentary tactics, but... [that magnificent "but", the "but" which Shchedrin translated as: The ears never grow higher than the forehead, never!...]... for purely agitational purposes... and lastly, the presentation from the Duma rostrum... of current demands..." (No. 1, p. 34.)

* Meaning the impossible.—Ed.

This, too, is a liquidationist distortion of history. The distinction between the second and third stages was invented in order to smuggle in a defence of reformism and opportunism. Boycottism as a stage in "the attitude of Social-Democracy towards parliamentarism" never existed *either* in Europe (where anarchism has existed and continues to exist) *or* in Russia, where the boycott of the Bulygin Duma, for example, applied *only* to a definite institution, was *never* linked with "parliamentarism", and was engendered by the peculiar nature of the struggle between liberalism and Marxism for the continuation of the onslaught. Trotsky does not breathe a word about the way this struggle affected the conflict between the two trends in Marxism!

When dealing with history, one must explain concrete questions and the class roots of the different trends; anybody who wants to make a Marxist study of the struggle of classes and trends over the question of participation in the Bulygin Duma, will see therein the roots of the liberal-labour policy. But Trotsky "deals with" history only in order to *evade* concrete questions and to *invent* a justification, or a semblance of justification, for the present-day opportunists!

"Actually, all trends," he writes, "employ the same methods of struggle and organisation." "The outcries about the liberal danger in our working-class movement are simply a crude and sectarian travesty of reality." (No. 1, pp. 5 and 35.)

This is a very clear and very vehement defence of the liquidators. But we will take the liberty of quoting at least one small fact, one of the very latest. Trotsky merely slings words about; we should like the workers themselves to ponder over the facts.

It is a fact that *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* for March 13 wrote the following:

"Instead of emphasising the definite and concrete task that confronts the working class, viz., to compel the Duma to throw out the bill (on the press), a vague formula is proposed of fighting for the 'uncurtailed slogans', and at the same time the illegal press is widely advertised, which can only lead to the relaxation of the workers' struggle for their legal press."

This is a clear, precise and documentary defence of the liquidationist policy and a criticism of the *Pravda* policy. Well, will any literate person say that both trends employ "the same methods of struggle and organisation" on this question? Will any literate person say that the liquidators are *not* pursuing a *liberal-labour* policy on this question, that the liberal menace to the working-class movement is purely imaginary?

The reason why Trotsky avoids facts and concrete references is because they relentlessly refute all his angry outcries and pompous phrases. It is very easy, of course, to strike an attitude and say: "a crude and sectarian travesty". Or to add a still more stinging and pompous catch-phrase, such as "emancipation from conservative factionalism".

But is this not very cheap? Is not this weapon borrowed from the arsenal of the period when Trotsky posed in all his splendour before audiences of high-school boys?

Nevertheless, the "advanced workers", with whom Trotsky is so angry, would like to be told plainly and clearly: Do you or do you not approve of the "method of struggle and organisation" that is definitely expressed in the above-quoted appraisal of a definite political campaign? If you do, then you are pursuing a liberal-labour policy, betraying Marxism and the Party; to talk of "peace" or of "unity" with *such* a policy, with groups which pursue *such* a policy, means deceiving yourself and others.

If not, then say so plainly. Phrases will not astonish, satisfy or intimidate the present-day workers.

Incidentally, the policy advocated by the liquidators in the above-quoted passage is a foolish one even from the liberal point of view, for the passage of a bill in the Duma depends on "Zemstvo-Octobrists" of the type of Bennigsen, who has already shown his hand in the committee.

* * *

The old participants in the Marxist movement in Russia know Trotsky very well, and there is no need to discuss him for their benefit. But the younger generation of workers do not know him, and it is therefore necessary to discuss him, for he is typical of all the five groups abroad, which,

in fact, are also vacillating between the liquidators and the Party.

In the days of the old *Iskra* (1901-03), these waverers, who flitted from the Economists to the Iskristis and back again, were dubbed "Tushino turncoats" (the name given in the Troublous Times in Rus to fighting men who went over from one camp to another).

When we speak of liquidationism we speak of a definite ideological trend, which grew up in the course of many years, stems from Menshevism and Economism in the twenty years' history of Marxism, and is connected with the policy and ideology of a definite class—the liberal bourgeoisie.

The only ground the "Tushino turncoats" have for claiming that they stand above groups is that they "borrow" their ideas from one group one day and from another the next day. Trotsky was an ardent Iskrist in 1901-03, and Ryazanov described his role at the Congress of 1903 as "Lenin's cudgel". At the end of 1903, Trotsky was an ardent Menshevik, i.e., he deserted from the Iskristis to the Economists. He said that "between the old *Iskra* and the new lies a gulf". In 1904-05, he deserted the Mensheviks and occupied a vacillating position, now co-operating with Martynov (the Economist), now proclaiming his absurdly Left "permanent revolution" theory. In 1906-07, he approached the Bolsheviki, and in the spring of 1907 he declared that he was in agreement with Rosa Luxemburg.

In the period of disintegration, after long "non-factional" vacillation, he again went to the right, and in August 1912, he entered into a bloc with the liquidators. He has now deserted them again, although *in substance* he reiterates their shoddy ideas.

Such types are characteristic of the flotsam of past historical formations, of the time when the mass working-class movement in Russia was still dormant, and when every group had "ample room" in which to pose as a trend, group or faction, in short, as a "power", negotiating amalgamation with others.

The younger generation of workers should know exactly whom they are dealing with, when individuals come before them with incredibly pretentious claims, unwilling absolutely

to reckon with *either* the Party decisions, which since 1908 have defined and established our attitude towards liquidationism, *or* with the experience of the present-day working-class movement in Russia, which has actually brought about the *unity* of the majority on the basis of full recognition of the aforesaid decisions.

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Signed: V. Ilyin

Vol. 20

THE POSITION AND TASKS OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL

The gravest feature of the present crisis is that the majority of official representatives of European socialism have succumbed to bourgeois nationalism, to chauvinism. It is with good reason that the bourgeois press of all countries writes of them now with derision, now with condescending praise. To anyone who wants to remain a socialist there can be no more important duty than to reveal the causes of this crisis in socialism and analyse the tasks of the International.

There are such that are afraid to admit that the crisis, or, to put it more accurately, the collapse of the Second International is the collapse of opportunism.

Reference is made to the unanimity, for instance, among French socialists, and to the fact that the old groups in socialism have supposedly changed their stands in the question of the war. Such references, however, are groundless.

Advocacy of class collaboration; abandonment of the idea of socialist revolution and revolutionary methods of struggle; adaptation to bourgeois nationalism; losing sight of the fact that the borderlines of nationality and country are historically transient; making a fetish of bourgeois legality; renunciation of the class viewpoint and the class struggle, for fear of repelling the "broad masses of the population" (meaning the petty bourgeoisie)—such, doubtlessly, are the ideological foundations of opportunism. And it is from such soil that the present chauvinist and patriotic frame of mind of most Second International leaders has developed. Observers representing the most various points of view have long noted that the opportunists are in fact prevalent in the Second International's leadership. The war has merely brought out,

rapidly and saliently, the true measure of this prevalence. There is nothing surprising in the extraordinary acuteness of the crisis having led to a series of reshufflings within the old groups. On the whole, however, such changes have affected only individuals. The trends within socialism have remained the same.

Complete unanimity does not exist among French socialists. Even Vaillant, who, with Guesde, Plekhanov, Herve and others, is following a chauvinist line, has had to admit that he has received a number of letters of protest from French socialists, who say that the war is imperialist in character and that the French bourgeoisie is to blame for its outbreak no less than the bourgeoisie of any other country. Nor should it be overlooked that these voices of protest are being smothered, not only by triumphant opportunism, but also by the military censorship. With the British, the Hyndman group (the British Social-Democrats—the British Socialist Party¹⁵⁷) has completely sunk into chauvinism, as have also most of the semi-liberal leaders of the trade unions. Resistance to chauvinism has come from MacDonald and Keir Hardie of the opportunist Independent Labour Party. This, of course, is an exception to the rule. However, certain revolutionary Social-Democrats who have long been in opposition to Hyndman have now left the British Socialist Party. With the Germans the situation is clear: the opportunists have won; they are jubilant, and feel quite in their element. Headed by Kautsky, the "Centre" has succumbed to opportunism and is defending it with the most hypocritical, vulgar and smug sophistry. Protests have come from the revolutionary Social-Democrats—Mehring, Pannekoek, Karl Liebknecht,¹⁵⁸ and a number of unidentified voices in Germany and German-speaking Switzerland. In Italy, the line-up is clear too: the extreme opportunists, Bissolati and Co., stand for "fatherland", for Guesde-Vaillant-Plekhanov-Herve. The revolutionary Social-Democrats (the Socialist Party), with *Avanti!*¹⁵⁹ at their head, are combating chauvinism and are exposing the bourgeois and selfish nature of the calls for war. They have the support of the vast majority of progressive workers. In Russia, the extreme opportunists of the liquidators' camp have already raised their voices, in public lectures and the press, in defence of chauvinism. P. Maslov and Y. Smirnov

are defending tsarism on the pretext that the fatherland must be defended. (Germany, you see, is threatening to impose trade agreements on "us" at swordpoint, whereas tsarism, we are expected to believe, has *not* been using the sword, the knout and the gallows to stifle the economic, political and national life of nine-tenths of Russia's population!) They justify socialists participating in reactionary bourgeois governments, and their approval of war credits today and more armaments tomorrow! Plekhanov has slid into nationalism, and is endeavouring to mask his Russian chauvinism with a Francophile attitude, and so has Alexinsky. To judge from the Paris *Golos*,¹⁶⁰ Martov is behaving with more decency than the rest of this crowd, and has come out in opposition to both German and French chauvinism, to *Vorwärts*, Mr. Hyndman and Maslov, but is afraid to come out resolutely against international opportunism as a whole, and against the German Social-Democratic Centrist group, its most "influential" champion. The attempts to present volunteer service in the army as performance of a socialist duty (see the Paris declaration of a group of Russian volunteers consisting of Social-Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionaries, and also a declaration by Polish Social-Democrats, Leder, and others) have had the backing of Plekhanov alone. These attempts have been condemned by the majority of our Paris Party group. The leading article in this issue¹⁶¹ will inform readers of our Party Central Committee's stand. To preclude any misunderstanding, the following facts relating to the history of our Party's views and their formulation must be stated here. After overcoming tremendous difficulties in re-establishing organisational contacts broken by the war, a group of Party members first drew up "theses" and on September 6-8 (new style) had them circulated among the comrades. Then they were sent to two delegates to the Italo-Swiss Conference in Lugano (September 27), through Swiss Social-Democrats.¹⁶² It was only in mid-October that it became possible to re-establish contacts and formulate the viewpoint of the Party's Central Committee. The leading article in this issue represents the final wording of the "theses".

Such, briefly, is the present state of affairs in the European and the Russian Social-Democratic movement. The collapse

of the International is a fact. It has been proved conclusively by the polemic, in the press, between the French and German socialists, and acknowledged, not only by the Left Social-Democrats (Mehring and *Bremer Bürger Zeitung*), but by moderate Swiss papers (*Volksrecht*).¹⁶³ Kautsky's attempts to cover up this collapse are a cowardly subterfuge. The collapse of the International is clearly the collapse of opportunism, which is now captive to the bourgeoisie.

The bourgeoisie's stand is clear. It is no less clear that the opportunists are simply echoing bourgeois arguments. In addition to what has been said in the leading article, we need only mention the insulting statements in *Die Neue Zeit*, suggesting that internationalism consists in the workers of one country shooting down the workers of another country, allegedly in defence of the fatherland!

The question of the fatherland—we shall reply to the opportunists—cannot be posed without due consideration of the concrete historical nature of the present war. This is an imperialist war, i.e., it is being waged at a time of the highest development of capitalism, a time of its approaching end. The working class must first "constitute itself within the nation", the *Communist Manifesto* declares, emphasising the *limits and conditions* of our recognition of nationality and fatherland as essential forms of the bourgeois system, and, consequently, of the bourgeois fatherland. The opportunists distort that truth by extending to the period of the end of capitalism that which was true of the period of its rise. With reference to the former period and to the tasks of the proletariat in its struggle to destroy, not feudalism but capitalism, the *Communist Manifesto* gives a clear and precise formula: "The workmen have no country." One can well understand why the opportunists are so afraid to accept this socialist proposition, afraid even, in most cases, openly to reckon with it. The socialist movement cannot triumph within the old framework of the fatherland. It creates new and superior forms of human society, in which the legitimate needs and progressive aspirations of the working masses of *each* nationality will, for the first time, be met through international unity, provided existing national partitions are removed. To the present-day bourgeoisie's attempts to divide and disunite them by means of hypocritical appeals

for the "defence of the fatherland" the class-conscious workers will reply with ever new and persevering efforts to unite the workers of various nations in the struggle to overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie of all nations.

The bourgeoisie is duping the masses by disguising imperialist rapine with the old ideology of a "national war". This deceit is being shown up by the proletariat, which has brought forward its slogan of turning the imperialist war into a civil war. This was the slogan of the Stuttgart and Basle¹⁶⁴ resolutions, which had in mind, not war in general, but precisely the present war and spoke, not of "defence of the fatherland", but of "hastening the downfall of capitalism", of utilising the war-created crisis for this purpose, and of the example provided by the Paris Commune. The latter was an instance of a war of nations being turned into a civil war.

Of course, such a conversion is no easy matter and cannot be accomplished at the whim of one party or another. That conversion, however, is inherent in the objective conditions of capitalism in general, and of the period of the end of capitalism in particular. It is in that direction, and that direction alone, that socialists must conduct their activities. It is not their business to vote for war credits or to encourage chauvinism in their "own" country (and allied countries), but primarily to strive against the chauvinism of their "own" bourgeoisie, without confining themselves to legal forms of struggle when the crisis has matured and the bourgeoisie has itself taken away the legality it has created. Such is the *line* of action that *leads* to civil war, and will bring about civil war at one moment or another of the European conflagration.

War is no chance happening, no "sin" as is thought by Christian priests (who are no whit behind the opportunists in preaching patriotism, humanity and peace), but an inevitable stage of capitalism, just as legitimate a form of the *capitalist* way of life as peace is. Present-day war is a people's war. What follows from this truth is not that we must swim with the "popular" current of chauvinism, but that the class contradictions dividing the nations continue to exist in wartime and manifest themselves in conditions of war. Refusal to serve with the forces, anti-war strikes, etc., are

sheer nonsense, the miserable and cowardly dream of an unarmed struggle against the armed bourgeoisie, vain yearning for the destruction of capitalism without a desperate civil war or a series of wars. It is the duty of every socialist to conduct propaganda of the class struggle, in the army as well; work directed towards turning a war of the nations into civil war is the only socialist activity in the era of an imperialist armed conflict of the bourgeoisie of all nations. Down with mawkishly sanctimonious and fatuous appeals for "peace at any price"! Let us raise high the banner of civil war! Imperialism sets at hazard the fate of European culture: this war will soon be followed by others, unless there are a series of successful revolutions. The story about this being the "last war" is a hollow and dangerous fabrication, a piece of philistine "mythology" (as *Golos* aptly puts it). The proletarian banner of civil war will rally together, not only hundreds of thousands of class-conscious workers but millions of semi-proletarians and petty bourgeois, now deceived by chauvinism, but whom the horrors of war will not only intimidate and depress, but also enlighten, teach, arouse, organise, steel and prepare for the war against the bourgeoisie of their "own" country and "foreign" countries. And this will take place, if not today, then tomorrow, if not during the war, then after it, if not in this war then in the next one.

The Second International is dead, overcome by opportunism. Down with opportunism, and long live the Third International, purged not only of "turncoats" (as *Golos* wishes), but of opportunism as well.

The Second International did its share of useful preparatory work in preliminarily organising the proletarian masses during the long, "peaceful" period of the most brutal capitalist slavery and most rapid capitalist progress in the last third of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. To the Third International falls the task of organising the proletarian forces for a revolutionary onslaught against the capitalist governments, for civil war against the bourgeoisie of all countries for the capture of political power, for the triumph of socialism!

KARL MARX

A BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH WITH AN EXPOSITION OF MARXISM

(Excerpts)

TACTICS OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE OF THE PROLETARIAT

After examining, as early as 1844-45, one of the main shortcomings in the earlier materialism, namely, its inability to understand the conditions or appreciate the importance of practical revolutionary activity, Marx, along with his theoretical work, devoted unremitting attention, throughout his lifetime, to the tactical problems of the proletariat's class struggle. An immense amount of material bearing on this is contained in all the works of Marx, particularly in the four volumes of his correspondence with Engels, published in 1913. This material is still far from having been brought together, collected, examined and studied. We shall therefore have to confine ourselves here to the most general and brief remarks, emphasising that Marx justly considered that, without *this* aspect, materialism is incomplete, one-sided, and lifeless. The fundamental task of proletarian tactics was defined by Marx in strict conformity with all the postulates of his materialist-dialectical *Weltanschauung*. Only an objective consideration of the sum total of the relations between absolutely all the classes in a given society, and consequently a consideration of the objective stage of development reached by that society and of the relations between it and other societies, can serve as a basis for the correct tactics of an advanced class. At the same time, all classes and all countries are regarded, not statically, but dynamically, i.e., not in a state of immobility, but in motion (whose laws are determined by the economic conditions of existence of each class). Motion, in its turn, is regarded from the standpoint, not only of the past, but also of the future, and that not in the vulgar sense it is understood in by the

"evolutionists", who see only slow changes, but dialectically: "... in developments of such magnitude twenty years are no more than a day," Marx wrote to Engels, "though later on there may come days in which twenty years are embodied" (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. 3, p. 127).¹⁶⁵ At each stage of development, at each moment, proletarian tactics must take account of this objectively inevitable dialectics of human history, on the one hand, utilising the periods of political stagnation or of sluggish, so-called "peaceful" development in order to develop the class-consciousness, strength and militancy of the advanced class, and, on the other hand, directing all the work of this utilisation towards the "ultimate aim" of that class's advance, towards creating in it the ability to find practical solutions for great tasks in the great days, in which "twenty years are embodied". Two of Marx's arguments are of special importance in this connection: one of these is contained in *The Poverty of Philosophy* and concerns the economic struggle and economic organisations of the proletariat; the other is contained in the *Communist Manifesto* and concerns the political tasks of the proletariat. The former runs as follows: "Large-scale industry concentrates in one place a crowd of people unknown to one another. Competition divides their interests. But the maintenance of wages, this common interest which they have against their boss, unites them in a common thought of resistance-combination... Combinations, at first isolated, constitute themselves into groups ... and in face of always united capital, the maintenance of the association becomes more necessary to them [i.e., the workers] than that of wages... In this struggle—a veritable civil war—all the elements necessary for a coming battle unite and develop. Once it has reached this point, association takes on a political character."¹⁶⁶ Here we have the programme and tactics of the economic struggle and of the trade union movement for several decades to come, for all the lengthy period in which the proletariat will prepare its forces for the "coming battle". All this should be compared with numerous references by Marx and Engels to the example of the British labour movement, showing how industrial "prosperity" leads to attempts "to buy the proletariat" (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. 1, p. 136), to divert them from the struggle; how this prosperity in general "demoralises the

workers" (Vol. 2, p. 218); how the British proletariat becomes "bourgeoisified"—"this most bourgeois of all nations is apparently aiming ultimately at the possession of a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat alongside the bourgeoisie" (Vol. 2, p. 290); how its "revolutionary energy" oozes away (Vol. 3, p. 124); how it will be necessary to wait a more or less lengthy space of time before "the British workers will free themselves from their apparent bourgeois infection" (Vol. 3, p. 127); how the British labour movement "lacks the mettle of the Chartists" (1866; Vol. 3, p. 305)¹⁶⁷; how the British workers' leaders are becoming a type midway between "a radical bourgeois and a worker" (in reference to Holyoak, Vol. 4, p. 209); how, owing to Britain's monopoly, and as long as that monopoly lasts, "the British workingman will not budge" (Vol. 4, p. 433). The tactics of the economic struggle, in connection with the general course (*and outcome*) of the working-class movement, are considered here from a remarkably broad, comprehensive, dialectical, and genuinely revolutionary standpoint.

The *Communist Manifesto* advanced a fundamental Marxist principle on the tactics of the political struggle: "The Communists fight for the attainment of the immediate aims, for the enforcement of the momentary interests of the working class; but in the movement of the present, they also represent and take care of the future of that movement." That was why, in 1848, Marx supported the party of the "agrarian revolution" in Poland, "that party which brought about the Cracow insurrection in 1846". In Germany, Marx, in 1848 and 1849, supported the extreme revolutionary democrats, and subsequently never retracted what he had then said about tactics. He regarded the German bourgeoisie as an element which was "inclined from the very beginning to betray the people" (only an alliance with the peasantry could have enabled the bourgeoisie to completely achieve its aims) "and compromise with the crowned representatives of the old society". Here is Marx's summing-up of the German bourgeoisie's class position in the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution—an analysis which, incidentally, is a sample of a materialism that examines society in motion, and, moreover, not only from the aspect of a motion that is *backward*: "Without faith in itself, without faith in the people,

grumbling at those above, trembling before those below... intimidated by the world storm... no energy in any respect, plagiarism in every respect... without initiative... an execrable old man who saw himself doomed to guide and deflect the first youthful impulses of a robust people in his own senile interests... " (*Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, 1848; see *Literarischer Nachlass*, Vol. 3, p. 212).¹⁶⁸ About twenty years later, Marx declared, in a letter to Engels (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. 3, p. 224), that the Revolution of 1848 had failed because the bourgeoisie had preferred peace with slavery to the mere prospect of a fight for freedom. When the revolutionary period of 1848-49 ended, Marx opposed any attempt to play at revolution (his struggle against Schapper and Willich), and insisted on the ability to work in the new phase, which in a quasi-"peaceful" way was preparing new revolutions. The spirit in which Marx wanted this work to be conducted is to be seen in his appraisal of the situation in Germany in 1856, the darkest period of reaction: "The whole thing in Germany will depend on the possibility of backing the proletarian revolution by some second edition of the Peasant War" (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. 2, p. 108).¹⁶⁹ While the democratic (bourgeois) revolution in Germany was uncompleted, Marx focussed every attention, in the tactics of the socialist proletariat, on developing the democratic energy of the peasantry. He held that Lassalle's attitude was "objectively... a betrayal of the whole workers' movement to Prussia" (Vol. 3, p. 210), incidentally because Lassalle was tolerant of the Junkers and Prussian nationalism. "In a predominantly agricultural country," Engels wrote in 1865, in exchanging views with Marx on their forthcoming joint declaration in the press, "... it is dastardly to make an exclusive attack on the bourgeoisie in the name of the industrial proletariat but never to devote a word to the patriarchal exploitation of the rural proletariat under the lash of the great feudal aristocracy" (Vol. 3, p. 217).¹⁷⁰ From 1864 to 1870, when the period of the consummation of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Germany was coming to an end, a period in which the Prussian and Austrian exploiting classes were struggling to complete that revolution in one way or another *from above*, Marx not only rebuked Lassalle, who was coquetting with Bismarck, but also corrected Liebknecht, who had lapsed

into "Austrophilism" and a defence of particularism; Marx demanded revolutionary tactics which would combat with equal ruthlessness both Bismarck and the Austrophiles, tactics which would not be adapted to the "victor"—the Prussian Junker—but would immediately renew the revolutionary struggle against him *despite the conditions* created by the Prussian military victories (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. 3, pp. 134, 136, 147, 179, 204, 210, 215, 418, 437, 440-41). In the celebrated Address of the International of September 9, 1870, Marx warned the French proletariat against an untimely uprising, but when an uprising nevertheless took place (1871), Marx enthusiastically hailed the revolutionary initiative of the masses, who were "storming heaven" (Marx's letter to Kugelmann). From the standpoint of Marx's dialectical materialism, the defeat of revolutionary action in that situation, as in many others, was a lesser evil, in the general course and *outcome* of the proletarian struggle, than the abandonment of a position already occupied, than surrender without battle. Such a surrender would have demoralised the proletariat and weakened its militancy. While fully appreciating the use of legal means of struggle during periods of political stagnation and the domination of bourgeois legality, Marx, in 1877 and 1878, following the passage of the Anti-Socialist Law, sharply condemned Most's "revolutionary phrases"; no less sharply, if not more so, did he attack the opportunism that had for a time come over the official Social-Democratic Party, which did not at once display resoluteness, firmness, revolutionary spirit and a readiness to resort to an illegal struggle in response to the Anti-Socialist Law (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. 4, pp. 397, 404, 418, 422, 424; cf. also letters to Sorge).

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Signed: V. Ilyin

THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL

The collapse of the International is sometimes taken to mean simply the formal aspect of the matter, namely, the interruption in international communication between the socialist parties of the belligerent countries, the impossibility of convening either an international conference or the International Socialist Bureau,¹⁷¹ etc. This is the point of view held by certain socialists in the small neutral countries, probably even by the majority of the official parties in those countries, and also by the opportunists and their defenders. With a frankness that deserves profound gratitude, this position was defended in the Russian press by Mr. V. Kosovsky, in No. 8 of the Bund's *Information Bulletin*,¹⁷² whose editors said nothing to indicate that they disagreed with the author. Let us hope that Mr. Kosovsky's defence of nationalism, in which he went so far as to justify the German Social-Democrats who voted for war credits, will help many a worker at last to realise the bourgeois-nationalist character of the Bund.

To the class-conscious workers, socialism is a serious conviction, not a convenient screen to conceal petty-bourgeois conciliatory and nationalist-oppositional strivings. By the collapse of the International they understand the disgraceful treachery to their convictions which was displayed by most of the official Social-Democratic parties, treachery to the most solemn declarations in their speeches at the Stuttgart and Basle international congresses, and in the resolutions of these congresses, etc. Only those can fail to see this treachery who *do not wish* to do so or do not find it to their advantage to see it. If we would formulate the question in a scientific fashion, i.e., from the standpoint of class relations in modern

society, we will have to state that most of the Social-Democratic parties, and at their head the German Party first and foremost—the biggest and most influential party in the Second International—have taken sides with their General Staffs, their governments, and their bourgeoisie, against the proletariat. This is an event of historic importance, one that calls for a most comprehensive analysis. It has long been conceded that, for all the horror and misery they entail, wars bring at least the following more or less important benefit—they ruthlessly reveal, unmask and destroy much that is corrupt, outworn and dead in human institutions. The European war of 1914-15 is doubtlessly beginning to do some good by revealing to the advanced class of the civilised countries what a foul and festering abscess has developed within its parties, and what an unbearably putrid stench comes from some source.

I

Is it a fact that the principal socialist parties of Europe have forsaken all their convictions and tasks? This, of course, is something that is readily discussed neither by the traitors nor those who are fully aware—or surmise—that they will have to be friendly and tolerant towards them. However unpleasant that may be to various "authorities" in the Second International or to their fellow-thinkers among the Russian Social-Democrats, we must face the facts and call things by their right names; we must tell the workers the truth.

Do any facts exist that show how the socialist parties regarded their tasks and their tactics before the present war and in anticipation of it? They undoubtedly do. There was the resolution adopted at the Basle International Socialist Congress of 1912, which we are reprinting together with the resolution adopted at the Chemnitz Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party held in the same year,¹⁷³ as a reminder of socialism's forgotten ideals. This resolution, which summarises the vast anti-war propagandist and agitational literature in all countries, is a most complete and precise, a most solemn and formal exposition of socialist views on war and tactics towards war. One cannot but qualify as treachery the fact that none of the authorities of yesterday's Interna-

tional and of today's social-chauvinism—neither Hyndman and Guesde, nor Kautsky and Plekhanov—dare remind their readers of that resolution. They are either silent about it, or (like Kautsky) quote excerpts of secondary importance and evade everything that is really of significance. On the one hand, the most "Left" and arch-revolutionary resolutions, and on the other, the most shameless forgetfulness or renunciation of these resolutions—this is one of the most striking manifestations of the International's collapse, and at the same time a most convincing proof that at present only those whose rare simplicity borders on a cunning desire to perpetuate the former hypocrisy can believe that socialism can be "rectified" and "its line straightened out" by means of resolutions alone.

Only yesterday, one might say, when, before the war, Hyndman turned towards a defence of imperialism, all "respectable" socialists considered him an unbalanced crank, of whom nobody spoke otherwise than in a tone of disdain. Today the most prominent Social-Democratic leaders of all countries have sunk entirely to Hyndman's position, differing from one another only in shades of opinion and in temperament. We are quite unable to find some more or less suitable parliamentary expression in appraising or characterising the civic courage of such persons as, for instance, the *Nashe Slovo*¹⁷⁴ authors, who write of "Mr." Hyndman with contempt, while speaking—or saying nothing—of "Comrade" Kautsky with deference (or obsequiousness?). Can such an attitude be reconciled with a respect for socialism, and for one's convictions in general? If you are convinced that Hyndman's chauvinism is false and destructive, does it not follow that you should direct your criticism and attacks against Kautsky, the *more influential* and more dangerous defender of such views?

In perhaps greater detail than anywhere else, Guesde's views have recently been expressed by the Guesdist Charles Dumas, in a pamphlet entitled *The Peace That We Desire*. This "Chef du Cabinet de Jules Guesde", as he styles himself on the title-page of the pamphlet, naturally "quotes" the former patriotic declarations of the socialists (David, the German social-chauvinist, does the same in his latest pamphlet on defence of the fatherland), but he fails to refer to the Basle Manifesto! Plekhanov, who utters chauvinist

banalities with an extraordinarily smug air, is likewise silent on the Manifesto. Kautsky behaves just like Plekhanov: in quoting from the Basle Manifesto, he *omits* all the revolutionary passages (i.e., all the vital content!), probably on the pretext of the censorship regulations. . . . The police and the military authorities, whose censorship regulations forbid any mention of the class struggle or revolution, have rendered timely aid to the traitors to socialism!

Perhaps the Basle Manifesto is just an empty appeal, which is devoid of any definite content, either historical or tactical, with a direct bearing on the concrete war of today?

The reverse is true. The Basle resolution has less idle declamation and more definite content than other resolutions have. The Basle resolution speaks of the *very same* war that has now broken out, of the *imperialist* conflicts that have flared up in 1914-15. The conflicts between Austria and Serbia over the Balkans, between Austria and Italy over Albania, etc., between Britain and Germany over markets and colonies in general, between Russia and Turkey, etc., over Armenia and Constantinople—all this is what the Basle resolution speaks of in anticipation of the present war. It follows from that resolution that the *present* war between "the Great Powers of Europe" "*cannot be justified on the slightest pretext of being in the least in the interests of the people*".

And if Plekhanov and Kautsky—to take two of the most typical and authoritative socialists, who are well known to us, one of whom writes in Russian while the other is translated into Russian by the liquidators—are now (with the aid of Axelrod) seeking all sorts of "popular justifications" for the war (or, rather, vulgar ones taken from the bourgeois gutter press); if, with a learned mien and with a stock of false quotations from Marx, they refer to "precedents", to the wars of 1813 and 1870 (Plekhanov), or of 1854-71, 1876-77, 1897 (Kautsky), then, in truth, only those without a shadow of socialist conviction, without a shred of socialist conscience, can take such arguments in earnest, can *fail* to call them otherwise than unparalleled Jesuitism, hypocrisy and the prostitution of socialism! Let the Executive (*Vorstand*) of the German Party anathematise Mehring and Rosa Luxemburg's new magazine (*Die Internationale*) for its honest criticism of Kautsky; let Vandervelde, Plekhanov, Hyndman and

Co. treat their opponents in the same manner, with the aid of the police of the Allied Powers. We shall reply by simply reprinting the Basle Manifesto, which will show that the leaders have chosen a course that can only be called treachery.

The Basle resolution does not speak of a national or a people's war—examples of which have occurred in Europe, wars that were even typical of the period of 1789-1871—or of a revolutionary war, which Social-Democrats have never renounced, but of the *present* war, which is the outcome of "capitalist imperialism" and "dynastic interests", the outcome of "the policy of conquest" pursued by *both* groups of belligerent powers—the Austro-German and the Anglo-Franco-Russian. Plekhanov, Kautsky and Co. are flagrantly deceiving the workers when they repeat the selfish lie of the bourgeoisie of all countries, which is striving with all its might to depict this imperialist and predatory war for colonies as a people's war, a war of defence (for any side); when they seek to justify this war by citing historical examples of *non-imperialist* wars.

The question as to the imperialist, predatory and anti-proletarian character of the present war has long outgrown the purely theoretical stage. All the main features of imperialism have been theoretically assessed, as a struggle being waged by the senile and moribund bourgeoisie for the partition of the world and the enslavement of "small" nations; these conclusions have been repeated thousands of times in the vast socialist press in *all* countries; in his pamphlet *The Impending War (1911)*, for example, the Frenchman Delaisi, a representative of one of our "Allied" nations, has explained in simple terms the predatory character of the present war, with reference to the French bourgeoisie as well. But that is far from all. At Basle, representatives of the proletarian parties of all countries gave unanimous and formal expression to their unshakable conviction that a war of an imperialist character was impending, and drew *tactical* conclusions therefrom. For this reason, among others, we must flatly reject, as sophistry, all references to an inadequate discussion on the difference between national and international tactics (see Axelrod's latest interview in *Nashe Slovo* Nos. 87 and 90), etc., etc. This is sophistry, because a comprehensive

scientific analysis of imperialism is one thing—that analysis is only under way and, in essence, is as infinite as science itself. The principles of socialist tactics against capitalist imperialism, which have been set forth in millions of copies of Social-Democratic newspapers and in the decision of the International, are a quite different thing. Socialist parties are not debating clubs, but organisations of the fighting proletariat; when a number of battalions have gone over to the enemy, they must be named and branded as traitors; we must not allow ourselves to be taken in by hypocritical assertions that “not everybody understands imperialism in the same way”, or that the chauvinist Kautsky and the chauvinist Cunow can write volumes about it, or that the question has not been “adequately discussed”, etc., etc. Capitalism will *never* be completely and *exhaustively* studied in *all* the manifestations of its predatory nature, and in all the most minute ramifications of its historical development and national features. Scholars and (especially the pedants) will never stop arguing over details. It would be ridiculous, on such grounds, to give up the socialist struggle against capitalism and to desist from opposing those who have betrayed that struggle. But what else are Kautsky, Cunow, Axelrod and their like inviting us to do?

Now, when war has broken out, no one has even attempted to examine the Basle resolution and prove that it is erroneous.

II

But perhaps sincere socialists supported the Basle resolution in the anticipation that war would create a revolutionary situation, the events rebutting them, as revolution has proved impossible?

It is by means of sophistry like this that Cunow (in a pamphlet *Collapse of the Party?* and a series of articles) has tried to justify his desertion to the camp of the bourgeoisie. The writings of nearly all the other social-chauvinists, headed by Kautsky, hint at similar “arguments”. Hopes for a revolution have proved illusory, and it is not the business of a Marxist to fight for illusions, Cunow argues. This Struvist, however, does not say a word about “illusions” that were

shared by all signatories to the Basle Manifesto. Like a most upright man, he would put the blame on the extreme Leftists, such as Pannekoek and Radek!

Let us consider the substance of the argument that the authors of the Basle Manifesto sincerely expected the advent of a revolution, but were rebutted by the events. The Basle Manifesto says: (1) that war will create an economic and political crisis; (2) that the workers will regard their participation in war as a crime, and as criminal any "shooting each other down for the profit of the capitalists, for the sake of dynastic honour and of diplomatic secret treaties", and that war will evoke "indignation and revolt" in the workers; (3) that it is the duty of socialists to take advantage of this crisis and of the workers' temper so as to "rouse the people and hasten the downfall of capitalism"; (4) that all "governments" without exception can start a war only at "their own peril"; (5) that governments "are afraid of a proletarian revolution"; (6) that governments "should remember" the Paris-Commune (i.e., civil war), the 1905 Revolution in Russia, etc. All these are perfectly clear ideas; they do not *guarantee* that revolution will take place, but lay stress on a precise characterisation of *facts* and *trends*. Whoever declares, with regard to these ideas and arguments, that the anticipated revolution has proved illusory, is displaying not a Marxist but a Struvist and police-renegade attitude towards revolution.

To the Marxist it is indisputable that a revolution is impossible without a revolutionary situation; furthermore, it is not every revolutionary situation that leads to revolution. What, generally speaking, are the symptoms of a revolutionary situation? We shall certainly not be mistaken if we indicate the following three major symptoms: (1) when it is impossible for the ruling classes to maintain their rule without any change; when there is a crisis, in one form or another, among the "upper classes", a crisis in the policy of the ruling class, leading to a fissure through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes burst forth. For a revolution to take place, it is usually insufficient for "the lower classes not to want" to live in the old way; it is also necessary that "the upper classes should be unable" to live in the old way; (2) when the suffering and want of the

oppressed classes have grown more acute than usual; (3) when, as a consequence of the above causes, there is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses, who uncomplainingly allow themselves to be robbed in "peace time", but, in turbulent times, are drawn both by all the circumstances of the crisis *and by the "upper classes" themselves* into independent historical action.

Without these objective changes, which are independent of the will, not only of individual groups and parties but even of individual classes, a revolution, as a general rule, is impossible. The totality of all these objective changes is called a revolutionary situation. Such a situation existed in 1905 in Russia, and in all revolutionary periods in the West; it also existed in Germany in the sixties of the last century, and in Russia in 1859-61 and 1879-80, although no revolution occurred in these instances. Why was that? It was because it is not every revolutionary situation that gives rise to a revolution; revolution arises only out of a situation in which the above-mentioned objective changes are accompanied by a subjective change, namely, the ability of the revolutionary *class* to take revolutionary mass action *strong* enough to break (or dislocate) the old government, which never, not even in a period of crisis, "falls", if it is not toppled over.

Such are the Marxist views on revolution, views that have been developed many, many times, have been accepted as indisputable by all Marxists, and for us, Russians, were corroborated in a particularly striking fashion by the experience of 1905. What, then, did the Basle Manifesto assume in this respect in 1912, and what took place in 1914-15?

It assumed that a revolutionary situation, which it briefly described as "an economic and political crisis", would arise. Has such a situation arisen? Undoubtedly, it has. The social-chauvinist Lensch, who defends chauvinism more candidly, publicly and honestly than the hypocrites Cunow, Kautsky, Plekhanov and Co. do, has gone so far as to say: "What we are passing through is a kind of *revolution*" (p. 6 of his pamphlet, *German Social-Democracy and the War*, Berlin, 1915). A political crisis exists; no government is sure of the morrow, not one is secure against the danger of financial collapse, loss of territory, expulsion from its country (in the way the Belgian Government was expelled). All governments

are sleeping on a volcano; all are *themselves* calling for the masses to display initiative and heroism. The entire political regime of Europe has been shaken, and hardly anybody will deny that we have entered (and are entering ever deeper—I write this on the day of Italy's declaration of war) a period of immense political upheavals. When, two months after the declaration of war, Kautsky wrote (October 2, 1914, in *Die Neue Zeit*) that "never is government so strong, never are parties so weak as at the outbreak of a war", this was a sample of the falsification of historical science which Kautsky has perpetrated to please the Südekums and other opportunists. In the first place, never do governments stand in such need of agreement with all the parties of the ruling classes, or of the "peaceful" submission of the oppressed classes to the rule, as in the time of war. Secondly, even though "at the beginning of a war", and especially in a country that expects a speedy victory, the government *seems* all-powerful, nobody in the world has ever linked expectations of a revolutionary situation exclusively with the "beginning" of a war, and still less has anybody ever identified the "seeming" with the *actual*.

It was generally known, seen and admitted that a European war would be more severe than any war in the past. This is being borne out in ever greater measure by the experience of the war. The conflagration is spreading; the political foundations of Europe are being shaken more and more; the sufferings of the masses are appalling, the efforts of governments, the bourgeoisie and the opportunists to hush up these sufferings proving ever more futile. The war profits being obtained by certain groups of capitalists are monstrously high, and contradictions are growing extremely acute. The smouldering indignation of the masses, the vague yearning of society's downtrodden and ignorant strata for a kindly ("democratic") peace, the beginning of discontent among the "lower classes"—all these are facts. The longer the war drags on and the more acute it becomes, the more the governments themselves foster—and must foster—the activity of the masses, whom they call upon to make extraordinary effort and self-sacrifice. The experience of the war, like the experience of any crisis in history, of any great calamity and any sudden turn in human life, stuns and breaks some people, *but enlightens and*

tempers others. Taken by and large, and considering the history of the world as a whole, the number and strength of the second kind of people have—with the exception of individual cases of the decline and fall of one state or another—proved greater than those of the former kind.

Far from “immediately” ending all these sufferings and all this enhancement of contradictions, the conclusion of peace will, in many respects, make those sufferings more keenly and immediately felt by the most backward masses of the population.

In a word, a revolutionary situation obtains in most of the advanced countries and the Great Powers of Europe. In this respect, the prediction of the Basle Manifesto has been *fully* confirmed. To deny this truth, directly or indirectly, or to ignore it, as Cunow, Plekhanov, Kautsky and Co. have done, means telling a big lie, deceiving the working class, and serving the bourgeoisie. In *Sotsial-Demokrat* (Nos. 34, 40 and 41) we cited facts which prove that those who *fear* revolution—petty-bourgeois Christian parsons, the General Staffs and millionaires’ newspapers—are compelled to admit that symptoms of a revolutionary situation exist in Europe.

Will this situation last long? How much more acute will it become? Will it lead to revolution? This is something we do not know, and nobody can know. The answer can be provided only by the *experience* gained during the development of revolutionary sentiment and the transition to revolutionary action by the advanced class, the proletariat. There can be no talk in this connection about “illusions” or their repudiation, since no socialist has ever guaranteed that this war (and not the next one), that today’s revolutionary situation (and not tomorrow’s) will produce a revolution. What we are discussing is the indisputable and fundamental duty of all socialists—that of revealing to the masses the existence of a revolutionary situation, explaining its scope and depth, arousing the proletariat’s revolutionary consciousness and revolutionary determination, helping it to go over to revolutionary action, and forming, for that purpose, organisations suited to the revolutionary situation.

No influential or responsible socialist has ever dared to feel doubt that this is the duty of the socialist parties. Without spreading or harbouring the least “illusions”, the Basle

Manifesto spoke specifically of this duty of the socialists—to rouse and to stir up the people (and not to lull them with chauvinism, as Plekhanov, Axelrod and Kautsky have done), to take advantage of the crisis so as to *hasten* the downfall of capitalism, and to be guided by the *examples* of the Commune and of October-December 1905. The present parties' failure to perform that duty meant treachery, political death, renunciation of their own role and desertion to the side of the bourgeoisie.

III

But how *could* it have happened that the most prominent representatives and leaders of the Second International have betrayed socialism? We shall deal with this question in detail later, after we have examined the attempts being made to give this treachery "theoretical" justification. We shall try to characterise the principal theories of social-chauvinism, of which Plekhanov (who in the main reiterates the arguments of the Anglo-French chauvinists Hyndman and his new adherents) and Kautsky (who advances much more "subtle" arguments with their semblance of far greater theoretical profundity) may be regarded as representatives.

Perhaps the most primitive of these is the "who-started-it?" theory, which may be worded as follows: we have been attacked and are defending ourselves; the interests of the proletariat demand that the violators of the peace in Europe should be properly dealt with. This is merely a rehash of the declarations made by all governments and of the outcries of the bourgeois and the gutter press all over the world. Plekhanov embellishes even this threadbare piece of vulgarity with his inevitable Jesuitical reference to "dialectics": to be able to assess the concrete situation, he says, we must first of all find out who started it and punish him; all other problems will have to wait until another situation arises. (See Plekhanov's pamphlet, *The War*, Paris, 1914, and Axelrod's repetition of its arguments, in *Golos* Nos. 86 and 87.) Plekhanov has set a new record in the noble sport of substituting sophistry for dialectics. The sophist grabs at one of many "arguments"; it was Hegel who long ago very properly

observed that "arguments" can be found to prove anything in the world. Dialectics calls for a many-sided investigation into a given social phenomenon in its development, and for the external and the seeming to be reduced to the fundamental motive forces, to the development of the productive forces and to the class struggle. Plekhanov has plucked out a quotation from the German Social-Democratic press: the Germans themselves, before the war, admitted that Austria and Germany had "started it", he says, and there you are. He does not mention the fact that the Russian socialists repeatedly exposed the tsarist plans of conquest of Galicia, Armenia, etc. He does not make the slightest attempt to study the economic and diplomatic history of at least the past three decades, which history proves conclusively that the conquest of colonies, the looting of foreign countries, the ousting and ruining of the more successful rivals have been the backbone of the politics of *both* groups of the now belligerent powers.*

* Very instructive is *The War of Steel and Gold* (London 1914, a book dated March 1914!) by the British pacifist Brailsford, who is not averse to posing as a socialist. The author clearly realises that national problems are now in the background, and have been solved (p. 35), that this is not the issue of the day, that "the typical question of modern diplomacy" (p. 36) is the Baghdad railway, the contracts for rails for it, the Moroccan mines, and the like. The author correctly considers as one of the "most instructive incidents in the recent history of European diplomacy" the fact that French patriots and British imperialists fought against Caillaux's attempts (in 1911 and 1913) to come to terms with Germany on the basis of an agreement on the division of spheres of colonial influence and the quotation of German securities on the Paris Bourse. The *British* and the *French* bourgeoisie *frustrated* such an agreement (pp. 38-40). The aim of imperialism is the export of capital to the weaker countries (p. 74). In Britain, the profits from such capital totalled between £90,000,000 and £100,000,000 in 1899 (Giffen), and £140,000,000 in 1909 (Paish); we would add that, in a recent speech, Lloyd George calculated it at £200,000,000, which is almost 2,000 million rubles. Unsavoury machinations and bribing of high-ranking Turks, and cushy jobs in India and Egypt for the younger sons of the British aristocracy, such are the main features (pp. 85-87). An insignificant minority gains from armaments and wars, he says, but that minority is backed by "society" and the financiers, whereas behind the adherents of peace there is a disunited population (p. 93). A pacifist who today talks about peace and disarmament tomorrow proves to be a member of a party wholly dependent on the war contractors (p. 161). If the Triple Entente wins, it will grab Morocco and partition Persia; if the Triple Alliance wins, it will take over Tripoli, strengthen its hold on Bosnia and subordi-

With reference to wars, the main thesis of dialectics, which has been so shamelessly distorted by Plekhanov to please the bourgeoisie, is that "*war is simply the continuation of politics by other [i.e., violent] means*". Such is the formula of Clausewitz,* one of the greatest writers on the history of war, whose thinking was stimulated by Hegel. And it was always the standpoint of Marx and Engels, who regarded any war as the *continuation* of the politics of the powers concerned—and the *various classes* within these countries—in a definite period.

Plekhanov's crude chauvinism is based on exactly the same theoretical stand as the more subtle and saccharo-conciliatory chauvinism of Kautsky, who uses the following arguments when he gives his blessing to the desertion of the socialists of all countries to the side of their "own" capitalists:

It is the right and duty of everyone to defend his fatherland; true internationalism consists in this right being recognised for the socialists of all nations, including those who are at war with my nation. . . . (See *Die Neue Zeit*, October 2, 1914, and other works by the same author.)

This matchless reasoning is such an unutterable travesty of socialism that the best answer to it would be to strike a medal with the portraits of Wilhelm II and Nicholas II on

nate Turkey (p. 167). In March 1906, London and Paris provided Russia with thousands of millions, and helped tsarism crush the movement for freedom (pp. 225-28); today Britain is helping Russia to throttle Persia (p. 229). Russia instigated the Balkan War (p. 230).

There is nothing novel about this, is there? All this is common knowledge and has been reiterated a thousand times in Social-Democratic newspapers all over the world. On the eve of the war, a British bourgeois sees all this as clearly as can be. Against the background of these simple and universally known facts, what drivelling nonsense, what smug hypocrisy, what glib lies are the theories advanced by Plekhanov and Potresov concerning Germany's guilt, or Kautsky's theory concerning the "prospects" of disarmament and a lasting peace under capitalism!

* Karl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, Werke, I. Bd., S. 28. Cf. III. Bd., S. 139-40: "All know that wars are caused only by the political relations of governments and of nations; but ordinarily one pictures the situation as if, with the beginning of the war, these relations cease and a totally new situation is created, which follows its own laws. We assert, on the contrary, that war is nothing but the continuation of political relations, with the intervention of other means."

one side and of Plekhanov and Kautsky on the other. True internationalism, we are told, means that we must justify German workers firing at French workers, and French workers firing at German workers, in the name of "defence of the fatherland"!

However, closer examination of the theoretical premises in Kautsky's reasoning will reveal the selfsame idea that Clausewitz ridiculed about eighty years ago, viz., that when war breaks out, all historically created political relations between nations and classes cease and that a totally new situation arises! There are "simply" those that attack and those that are defending themselves, "simply" the warding off of the "enemies of the fatherland"! The oppression of a number of nations which comprise over half the population of the globe, by the dominant imperialist nations; the rivalry between the bourgeoisie of these countries for a share of the loot; the desire of the capitalists to split and suppress the working-class movement—all these have suddenly disappeared from the ken of Plekhanov and Kautsky, although they themselves were describing these very "politics" for decades before the war.

In this connection, false references to Marx and Engels are the crowning argument of these two chieftains of social-chauvinism; Plekhanov recalls Prussia's national war of 1813 and Germany's national war of 1870, while Kautsky argues, with a most learned air, that Marx examined the question of whose success (i.e., the success of which bourgeoisie) was more desirable in the wars of 1854-55, 1859 and 1870-71, and that the Marxists did likewise in the wars of 1876-77 and 1897. In all times the sophists have been in the habit of citing instances that refer to situations that are dissimilar in principle. The wars of the past, to which they make references, were a "continuation of the politics" of the bourgeoisie's national movements of many years' standing, movements against an alien yoke and against absolutism (Turkish or Russian). At that time the only question was: the success of which bourgeoisie was to be preferred; for wars of this type, the Marxists could *rouse* the peoples *in advance*, *toasting* national hatred, as Marx did in 1848 and later, when he called for a war against Russia, and as Engels in 1859

fostered German national hatred of their oppressors—Napoleon III and Russian tsarism.*

Comparing the "continuation of the politics" of combating feudalism and absolutism—the politics of the bourgeoisie in its struggle for liberty—with the "continuation of the politics" of a decrepit, *i.e.*, imperialist, bourgeoisie, *i.e.*, of a bourgeoisie which has plundered the entire world, a reactionary bourgeoisie which, in alliance with feudal landlords, attempts to crush the proletariat, means comparing chalk and cheese. It is like comparing the "representatives of the bourgeoisie", Robespierre, Garibaldi and Zhelyabov, with such "representatives of the bourgeoisie" as Millerand, Salandra and Guchkov. One cannot be a Marxist without feeling the deepest respect for the great bourgeois revolutionaries who had an historic right to speak for their respective bourgeois "fatherlands", and, in the struggle against feudalism, led tens of millions of people in the new nations towards a civilised life. Neither can one be a Marxist without feeling contempt for the sophistry of Plekhanov and Kautsky, who speak of the "defence of the fatherland" with regard to the throttling of Belgium by the German imperialists, or with regard to the pact between the imperialists of Britain, France, Russia and Italy on the plundering of Austria and Turkey.

There is another "Marxist" theory of social-chauvinism, which runs as follows: socialism is based on the rapid development of capitalism; the development of capitalism in my country, and consequently the advent of socialism there will be speeded up by her victory; my country's defeat will retard her economic development and consequently the advent

* Mr. Gardenin in *Zhizn*¹⁷⁵ labels as "revolutionary chauvinism"—but chauvinism—Marx's stand in 1848 for revolutionary war against the European nations which in fact had shown themselves to be counter-revolutionary, *viz.*, "the Slavs and the Russians in particular". This reproof of Marx reveals once again the opportunism (or—properly speaking *and*—the inconsequence) of this "Left" Socialist-Revolutionary. We Marxists have always stood, and still stand, for a *revolutionary* war against *counter-revolutionary* nations. For instance, if socialism is *victorious* in America or in Europe in 1920, and Japan and China, let us say, *then* move their Bismarcks against us—if only diplomatically at first—we certainly would be *in favour* of an offensive revolutionary war against them. It seems strange to you, Mr. Gardenin? But then you are a revolutionary of the Ropshin type!

of socialism. In Russia this Struvist theory has been developed by Plekhanov, and among the Germans by Lensch and others. Kautsky argues against this crude theory—against Lensch, who defends it overtly, and against Cunow, who defends it covertly; his sole purpose, however, is to reconcile the social-chauvinists of all countries on the basis of a more subtle and more Jesuitical chauvinist theory.

We need not dwell on this crude theory. Struve's *Critical Notes* appeared in 1894, and during the past twenty years Russian Social-Democrats have become thoroughly familiar with this habit of the enlightened Russian bourgeois of advancing their ideas and advocating their desires under the cloak of a "Marxism" *purged* of revolutionary content. Struvism is not merely a Russian, but, as recent events clearly prove, an international striving on the part of the bourgeois theoreticians to kill Marxism with "kindness", to crush it in their embraces, kill it with a feigned acceptance of "all" the "truly scientific" aspects and elements of Marxism *except* its "agitational", "demagogic", "Blanquist-utopian" aspect. In other words, they take from Marxism all that is acceptable to the liberal bourgeoisie, including the struggle for reforms, the class struggle (without the proletarian dictatorship), the "general" recognition of "socialist ideals" and the substitution of a "new order" for capitalism; they cast aside "only" the living soul of Marxism, "only" its revolutionary content.

Marxism is the theory of the proletarian movement for emancipation. It is clear, therefore, that the class-conscious workers must pay the utmost attention to any substitution of Struvism for Marxism. The motive forces in this process are varied and manifold. We shall indicate only the three main forces: (1) the development of science is providing more and more material that proves that Marx was right. This makes it necessary to fight against him hypocritically—not to oppose the principles of Marxism openly, but to pretend to accept Marxism, while emasculating it by sophistry and turning it into a holy "icon" that is harmless to the bourgeoisie. (2) The development of opportunism among the Social-Democratic parties fosters such a re-fashioning of Marxism, and adjusts it for a justification of all kinds of concessions to opportunism. (3) The epoch of imperialism is one in which the world is divided among the "great" privileged nations

that oppress all other nations. Morsels of the loot obtained as a result of these privileges and this oppression undoubtedly fall to the share of certain sections of the petty bourgeoisie and to the working-class aristocracy and bureaucracy. These strata, which form an insignificant minority of the proletariat and of the toiling masses, gravitate towards "Struivism", because it provides them with a justification of their alliance with their "own" national bourgeoisie, against the oppressed masses of *all* nations. We shall have occasion to deal with this later, in connection with the causes of the collapse of the International.

IV

The most subtle theory of social-chauvinism, one that has been most skilfully touched up to look scientific and international, is the theory of "ultra-imperialism" advanced by Kautsky. Here is the clearest, most precise and most recent exposition of this theory in the words of the author himself:

"The subsiding of the Protectionist movement in Britain; the lowering of tariffs in America; the trend towards disarmament; the rapid decline in the export of capital from France and Germany in the years immediately preceding the war; finally, the growing international interweaving between the various cliques of finance capital—all this has caused me to consider whether the present imperialist policy cannot be supplanted by a new, ultra-imperialist policy, which will introduce the joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital in place of the mutual rivalries of national finance capital. Such a new phase of capitalism is at any rate conceivable. Can it be achieved? Sufficient premises are still lacking to enable us to answer this question..." (*Die Neue Zeit* No. 5, April 30, 1915, p. 144).

"The course and the outcome of the present war may prove decisive in this respect. It may entirely crush the weak beginnings of ultra-imperialism by fanning to the highest degree national hatred also among the finance capitalists, by intensifying the armaments race, and by making a second world war inevitable. Under such conditions, the thing I foresaw and formulated in my pamphlet, *The Road to Power*, would come true in horrifying dimensions; class antagonisms would become sharper and sharper and with it would come the moral decay [literally: "going out of business, *Abwirtschaltung*", bankruptcy] of capitalism. . . . [It must be noted that by this pretentious word Kautsky means simply the "hatred" which the "strata intermediary between the proletariat and finance capital", namely, "the intelligentsia, the petty bourgeois, even small capitalists", feel towards capitalism.] But the war may end otherwise. It may lead to the strengthening of the

weak beginnings of ultra-imperialism... Its lessons [note this!] may hasten developments for which we would have to wait a long time under peace conditions. If it does lead to this, to an agreement between nations, disarmament and a lasting peace, then the worst of the causes that led to the growing moral decay of capitalism before the war may disappear." The new phase will, of course, bring the proletariat "new misfortunes", "perhaps even worse", but "for a time", "ultra-imperialism" "could create an era of new hopes and expectations within the framework of capitalism" (p. 145).

How is a justification of social-chauvinism deduced from this "theory"?

In a way rather strange for a "theoretician", namely as follows:

The Left-wing Social-Democrats in Germany say that imperialism and the wars it engenders are not accidental, but an inevitable product of capitalism, which has brought about the domination of finance capital. It is therefore necessary to go over to the revolutionary mass struggle, as the period of comparatively peaceful development has ended. The "Right"-wing Social-Democrats brazenly declare: since imperialism is "necessary", we too must be imperialists. Kautsky, in the role of the "Centre", tries to reconcile these two views.

"The extreme Lefts," he writes in his pamphlet, *The National State, the Imperialist State and the League of States* (Nuremberg, 1915), wish to "contrapose" socialism to inevitable imperialism, i.e., "not only the propaganda for socialism that we have been carrying on for half a century in contraposition to all forms of capitalist domination, but the immediate achievement of socialism. This seems very radical, but it can only serve to *drive* into the camp of imperialism *anyone* who *does not believe* in the immediate practical achievement of socialism" (p. 17, italics ours).

When he speaks of the immediate achievement of socialism, Kautsky is resorting to a subterfuge, for he takes advantage of the fact that in Germany, especially under the military censorship, revolutionary action cannot be spoken of. Kautsky is well aware that the Left wing is demanding of the Party *immediate* propaganda in favour of and preparation for revolutionary action, not the "immediate practical achievement of socialism".

From the necessity of imperialism the Left wing deduces the necessity of revolutionary action. The "theory of ultra-imperialism", however, serves Kautsky as a means to justify

the opportunists, to present the situation in such a light as to create the impression that they have not gone over to the bourgeoisie but simply "do not believe" that socialism can arrive immediately, and expect that a new "era" of disarmament and lasting peace "may be" ushered in. This "theory" boils down, and can *only* boil down, to the following: Kautsky is exploiting the *hope* for a *new* peaceful era of capitalism so as to justify the adhesion of the opportunists and the official Social-Democratic parties to the bourgeoisie, and their rejection of revolutionary, i.e., proletarian, tactics in the *present stormy era*, this despite the solemn declarations of the Basle resolution!

At the same time Kautsky does not say that this new phase follows, and necessarily so, from certain definite circumstances and conditions. On the contrary, he states quite outspokenly that he cannot yet even decide whether or not this new phase is "*achievable*". Indeed, consider the "trends" towards the new era, which have been indicated by Kautsky. Astonishingly enough, the author has included among the economic facts "the trend towards disarmament"! This means that, behind innocent philistine talk and pipe-dreaming, Kautsky is trying to hide from indisputable facts that do not at all fit in with the theory of the mitigation of contradictions. Kautsky's "ultra-imperialism"—this term, incidentally, does not at all express what the author wants to say—implies a tremendous *mitigation* of the contradictions of capitalism. We are told that Protectionism is subsiding in Britain and America. But where is there the least trend towards a new era? Extreme Protectionism is now subsiding in America, but Protectionism remains, just as the privileges, the preferential tariffs favouring Britain, have remained in that country's colonies. Let us recall what the passage from the previous and "peaceful" period of capitalism to the present and imperialist period has been based on: free competition has yielded to monopolist capitalist combines, and the world has been partitioned. Both these facts (and factors) are obviously of world-wide significance: Free Trade and peaceful competition were possible and necessary as long as capital was in a position to enlarge its colonies without hindrance, and seize unoccupied land in Africa, etc., and as long as the concentration of capital was still weak and no monopolist

concerns existed, i.e., concerns of a magnitude permitting domination in an *entire* branch of industry. The appearance and growth of such monopolist concerns (has this process been stopped in Britain or America? Not even Kautsky will dare deny that the war has accelerated and intensified it) have rendered the free competition of former times *impossible*; they have cut the ground from under its feet, while the partition of the world *compels* the capitalists to go over from peaceful expansion to an armed struggle for the *repartitioning* of colonies and spheres of influence. It is ridiculous to think that the *subsiding* of Protectionism in two countries can change anything in this respect.

Let us further examine the fall in capital exports from *two* countries in the course of a few years. In 1912 these two countries, France and Germany, each had about 35,000 million marks (about 17,000 million rubles) of foreign investments, this according to Harms's statistics, while Britain alone had twice that sum.* The increase in exports of capital has never proceeded evenly under capitalism, nor could that have been so. Kautsky dares not even suggest that the accumulation of capital has decreased, or that the capacity of the home market has undergone any important change, say through a big improvement in the conditions of the masses. In these circumstances, the fall in capital exports from two countries over several years cannot imply the advent of a new era.

"The growing international interweaving between the cliques of finance capital" is the only really general and indubitable tendency, not during the last few years and in two countries, but throughout the whole capitalist world. But why should this trend engender a striving towards disarmament, not armaments, as hitherto? Take any one of the world-famous cannon (and arms) manufacturers, Armstrong, for instance. The British *Economist* (May 1, 1915) published figures showing that this firm's *profits* rose from £606,000

* See Bernhard Harms, *Probleme der Weltwirtschaft*, Jena, 1912; George Paish, "Great Britain's Capital Investments in the Colonies, etc." in the *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. LXXIV, 1910/11, p. 167. Lloyd George, in a speech early in 1915, estimated British capital invested abroad at £4,000,000,000, i.e., about 80,000,000,000 marks.

(about 6,000,000 rubles) in 1905/6 to £856,000 in 1913, and to £940,000 (9,000,000 rubles) in 1914. Here, the intertwining of finance capital is most pronounced, and is on the increase; German capitalists have "holdings" in British firms; British firms build submarines for Austria, and so on. Interlinked on a world-wide scale, capital is thriving on armaments and wars. To think that the fact of capital in the individual states combining and interlinking on an international scale must of necessity produce an economic trend towards disarmament means, in effect, allowing well-meaning philistine expectations of an easing of class contradictions take the place of the actual intensification of those contradictions.

V

It is in a wholly philistine spirit that Kautsky speaks of the "lessons" of the war, presenting those lessons in the light of a moral abhorrence at the misery it causes. Here, for instance, is how he argues in the pamphlet entitled *The National State, etc.*:

"It stands beyond doubt and needs no proof that there are strata of the population that are greatly interested in universal peace and disarmament. The petty bourgeoisie and the small peasants, and even many capitalists and intellectuals, are not tied to imperialism by any interests that outweigh the damage suffered by these strata as a result of war and armaments" (p. 21).

This was written in February 1915! The facts show that all the propertied classes, down to the petty bourgeoisie and the "intelligentsia", have joined the imperialists *en masse*, and yet Kautsky, like Chekhov's man in a muffler, shrugs off the facts with an air of extraordinary smugness and with the aid of saccharine phrases. He judges of the interests of the petty bourgeoisie, not by their *conduct*, but by the *words* of certain petty bourgeois, although at every step such words are refuted by the deeds. It is exactly like judging of the "interests" of the bourgeoisie in general, not by their deeds, but by the benevolent speeches made by bourgeois clergymen who avow that the present-day system is imbued with the ideals of Christianity. Kautsky applies Marxism in a way that voids it of all content, so that what remains is the catchword

of "interests", in a kind of supernatural, other-worldly meaning, for it implies, not real economics, but pious wishes for the common weal.

Marxism appraises "interests" according to the class antagonisms and the class struggle which find expression in millions of facts of daily life. The petty bourgeoisie prattle and dream of the abatement of antagonisms, whose aggravation, they "argue", leads to "harmful consequences". Imperialism means the subjugation of all strata of the propertied classes to finance capital, and the partition of the world among five or six "Great" Powers, most of which are now involved in the war. The partition of the world among the Great Powers means that all their propertied classes *are interested* in possessing colonies and spheres of influence, in oppressing other nations, and in securing the more or less lucrative posts and privileges that stem from belonging to a "Great" Power and an oppressor nation.*

Life *cannot* go on in the old way, in the comparatively tranquil, cultured and peaceful conditions of a capitalism that is smoothly developing and gradually spreading to new countries. A new epoch has arrived. Finance capital *ousts*, and will completely oust, a particular country from the ranks of Great Powers, will deprive it of its colonies and spheres of influence (as Germany, which has gone to war with Britain, threatens to do), and it will deprive the petty bourgeoisie of their dominant-nation privileges and additional incomes. This has been proved by the war. It is the *outcome* of that

* E. Schultze states that by 1915 the value of securities in the whole world was calculated at 732,000 million francs, including state and municipal loans, the mortgages and shares of commercial and manufacturing corporations, etc. Of this sum, Britain's share was 130,000 million francs, that of the United States 115,000 million, France 100,000 million and Germany 75,000 million, i.e., the share of all four Great Powers being 420,000 million francs, over half the total. From this one can realise the advantages and privileges accruing to the leading Great Powers, which have outstripped other nations, oppressing and plundering the latter (Dr. Ernst Schultze, *Das französische Kapital in Russland* in *Finanz-Archiv*, Berlin, 1915, 32nd year of publication, p. 127). To a Great Power "defence of the fatherland" means defence of the right to share in the plundering of foreign countries. In Russia, as is common knowledge, capitalist imperialism is weaker than military-feudal imperialism is.

aggravation of antagonisms which has long been admitted by all, including Kautsky, in his pamphlet *The Road to Power*.

Now that the armed conflict for Great-Power privileges has become a fact, Kautsky wants to *persuade* the capitalists and the petty bourgeoisie to believe that war is horrible, while disarmament is beneficial, in exactly the same way and with exactly the same results as the Christian churchman, speaking from the pulpit, would persuade the capitalist to believe that love of one's fellow-men is a Divine commandment, as well as the spiritual yearning and the moral law of civilisation. What Kautsky calls an economic trend towards "ultra-imperialism" is just a petty-bourgeois *exhortation* to the financiers that they should refrain from doing evil.

The export of capital? *But* more capital is exported to independent countries, such as the United States of America, than to the colonies. The seizure of colonies? *But* they have all been seized, and nearly all of them are striving for liberation. "India may cease to be a British possession, but as an integral empire it will never fall under the sway of another foreign power" (p. 49 in the pamphlet quoted). "Any attempt on the part of any industrial capitalist state to acquire for itself a colonial empire sufficient to make it independent of other countries in regard to raw materials must cause all other capitalist states to unite against it and involve it in endless and exhausting wars, without bringing it nearer to its goal. Such a policy would be the surest road towards the bankruptcy of the entire economic life of that state" (pp. 72-73).

Is not this a philistine attempt to persuade financiers to renounce imperialism? Any attempt to frighten capitalists with the prospect of bankruptcy is like advising against speculating in shares on the Stock Exchange because many fortunes have been lost in this way. Capital *gains* from the bankruptcy of a rival capitalist or of a rival nation, because in this way capital becomes more concentrated. Hence the keener and "closer" economic competition becomes, i.e., the economic driving of a competitor towards bankruptcy, the more the capitalists strive to add *military* pressure in order to drive the competitor in that direction. The fewer the countries to which capital can still be exported as advantageously as to colonies or to such dependent states as Turkey—since

in such cases the financier reaps a triple profit as against capital exports to a free, independent and civilised country like the United States of America—the fiercer is the struggle for the subjugation and partition of Turkey, China, etc. That is what economic theory reveals about the period of finance capital and imperialism. That is what the facts reveal. But Kautsky turns everything into a trite petty-bourgeois "moral": it is not worth while getting worked up and certainly not worth while going to war over the partition of Turkey, or the seizure of India, since they cannot be held for long anyway, and, moreover, it would be better to develop capitalism peacefully... It would be better still, of course, to develop capitalism and expand the home market by increasing wages; this is quite "conceivable" and it is a very fitting topic for a churchman to preach on to the financiers... The good Kautsky has almost succeeded in persuading the German financiers that it is not worth while waging war against Britain for the colonies, because these colonies will soon secure their liberation in any case!

Britain's exports to and imports from Egypt between 1872 and 1912 have not kept pace with the overall growth of British exports and imports, whence the "Marxist" Kautsky draws the following moral: "We have no reason to suppose that British trade with Egypt would have been less developed as a result of the mere operation of economic factors, without military occupation" (p. 72). "The urge of capital to expand... can be *best* promoted, not by the violent methods of imperialism, but by *peaceful democracy*" (p. 70).

What a remarkably serious, scientific and "Marxist" analysis! Kautsky has splendidly "rectified" unreasonable history; he has "proved" that there was no need for the British to have taken Egypt from the French, that it was absolutely not worth the German financiers' while to have started the war, organised the Turkish campaign, and taken other measures to drive the British out of Egypt! All this is merely a misunderstanding—it has not yet dawned upon the British that it would be "best" to give up forcible methods in Egypt, and adopt "peaceful democracy" (so as to increase exports of capital *à la Kautsky!*).

"Of course it was an illusion on the part of the bourgeois Free-Traders to think that Free Trade would entirely eliminate the economic

antagonisms generated by capitalism. Neither Free Trade nor democracy can eliminate these. We, in all respects, are interested in having these antagonisms eliminated by a struggle waged in such forms as will impose the least amount of suffering and sacrifice on the masses" (p. 73).

The Lord help us, the Lord have mercy on us! "What is a philistine?" Lassalle used to ask, and answered by quoting the words of the well-known poet: "A philistine is a gut void of everything but fear and hope that God will have mercy on him."¹⁷⁶

Kautsky has degraded Marxism to unparalleled prostitution and has turned into a real churchman. The churchman tries to *persuade* the capitalists to adopt peaceful democracy—and calls this dialectics: if at first, he argues, there was Free Trade, and then arrived the monopolies and imperialism, why should there not be "ultra-imperialism", and then Free Trade again? The churchman *consoles* the oppressed masses by depicting the blessings this ultra-imperialism will bring, although he has not even the courage to say whether it can be "achieved"! Feuerbach was right when, in reply to those who defended religion on the ground that it consoles the people, he indicated the reactionary significance of consolation: whoever consoles the slave instead of arousing him to rise up against slavery is aiding the slaveowner.

All oppressing classes stand in need of two social functions to safeguard their rule: the function of the hangman and the function of the priest. The hangman is required to quell the protests and the indignation of the oppressed; the priest is required to console the oppressed, to depict to them the prospects of their sufferings and sacrifices being mitigated (this is particularly easy to do without guaranteeing that these prospects will be "achieved"), while preserving class rule, and thereby to reconcile them to class rule, win them away from revolutionary action, undermine their revolutionary spirit and destroy their revolutionary determination. Kautsky has turned Marxism into a most hideous and stupid counter-revolutionary theory, into the lowest kind of clericalism.

In 1909, he acknowledged, in his *The Road to Power*, the fact of the unrefuted and irrefutable intensification of antagonisms within capitalism, the approach of a period of wars

and revolutions, of a new "revolutionary period". There can be no "premature" revolution, he said, and branded as "a direct betrayal of our cause" any refusal to count on the possibility of victory in an uprising, even though, before the fighting began, the prospect of defeat could not be denied.

With the advent of war, the antagonisms have become *still* more bitter. The sufferings of the masses have assumed tremendous proportions. The end of the war is not in sight and the hostilities are spreading more and more. Kautsky is writing pamphlet after pamphlet and, meekly submitting to the dictates of the censorship, refrains from quoting the facts on the land-grabbing, the horrors of war, the scandalous profiteering of the war contractors, the high cost of living and the actual slavery of the workers mobilised in the munitions industries; instead, he keeps on consoling the proletariat. He does so by quoting the instance of wars in which the bourgeoisie was revolutionary and progressive, in regard to which "Marx himself" desired victory for one bourgeoisie or the other; he consoles it by quoting rows and columns of figures to prove that capitalism is "possible" without colonies, without the plundering of others, without wars and armaments, and to prove that "peaceful democracy" is preferable. Not daring to deny that the sufferings of the masses are becoming more acute and that a revolutionary situation is arising before our very eyes (one must not talk about this, since it is not permitted by the censor!), Kautsky, in his servility to the bourgeoisie and the opportunists, depicts the "prospect" (he does *not guarantee* that it can be "achieved") of forms of struggle in a new phase, which will entail "less sacrifice and suffering". . . . Franz Mehring and Rosa Luxemburg were quite right when, for this very reason, they called Kautsky a street-walker (*Mädchen für alle*).

* * *

In August 1905 a revolutionary situation existed in Russia. The tsar had promised convocation of the Bulygin Duma in order to "console" the masses who were in a state of unrest. If the abandoning of armaments by the financiers and their agreeing to a "lasting peace" can be called "ultra-imperialism", then the Bulygin regime of consultative parliamentary representation may be described as "ultra-autocracy". Let us

assume for a moment that tomorrow a hundred of the world's biggest financiers, "interwoven" as they are in hundreds of colossal enterprises, will *promise* the peoples that they will stand for disarmament after the war (we make this assumption only for a moment in order to draw political conclusions from Kautsky's foolish little theory). Even if that happened, it would be downright treachery to the proletariat to dissuade it from taking revolutionary action, without which all promises and all fine prospects are only a mirage.

The war has not only brought the capitalist class huge profits and splendid prospects of fresh plunder (Turkey, China, etc.), new contracts worth thousands of millions and new loans at increased rates of interest; it has also brought the capitalist class still greater political advantages in that it has split and corrupted the proletariat. Kautsky is encouraging this corruption; he sanctifies this international *split* among the militant proletarians in the name of *unity* with the opportunists of their "own" nations, with the Südekums! And yet there are people who fail to understand that the unity slogan of the old parties means the "unity" of the proletariat of a given nation with the bourgeoisie of that nation, and a *split* among the proletariat of the various nations. . .

VI

The preceding lines had already been written when *Die Neue Zeit* of May 28 (No. 9) appeared with Kautsky's concluding arguments on the "collapse of Social-Democracy" (Section 7 of his reply to Cunow). Kautsky sums up all his old sophisms, and a new one, in defence of social-chauvinism as follows:

"It is simply untrue to say that the war is a purely imperialist one, that at the outbreak of the war the alternative was either imperialism or socialism, that the socialist parties and the proletarian masses of Germany, France and, in many respects, also of Britain, unthinkingly and at the mere call of a handful of parliamentarians, threw themselves into the arms of imperialism, betrayed socialism and thus caused a collapse unexampled in history."

A new sophism and a new deception of the workers: the war, if you please, is not a "purely" imperialist one!

Kautsky vacillates amazingly on the question of the character and significance of the present war; this party leader evades the precise and formal declarations of the Basle and Chemnitz congresses, as studiously as a thief keeps away from the place where he has just committed a theft. In his pamphlet, *The National State, etc.*, written in February 1915, Kautsky asserted that "still, in the final analysis", the war is an "imperialist one" (p. 64). Now a fresh reservation is introduced: it is not a *purely* imperialist war. What else can it be?

It appears that it is also a national war! Kautsky arrives at this monstrous conclusion by means of the following "Plekhanovist" pseudo-dialectic:

"The present war is not only the child of imperialism, but also of the Russian revolution." As early as 1904, he, Kautsky, foresaw that the Russian revolution would revive Pan-Slavism in a new form, that "democratic Russia would, inevitably, greatly fan the desire of the Austrian and Turkish Slavs for national independence... Then the Polish question would also become acute... Austria would fall apart because, with the collapse of tsarism, the iron band which at present binds the centrifugal elements together would be destroyed" (Kautsky himself quotes this last phrase from his 1904 article). "The Russian revolution... gave a new and powerful impetus to the national aspirations of the East, adding Asia's problems to those of Europe. *All these problems* are making themselves very strongly felt in the *present* war and are acquiring very decisive significance for the mood of the masses of the *people*, including the *proletarian* masses, whereas among the ruling classes imperialist tendencies are predominant" (p. 273, italics ours).

This is another sample of the prostitution of Marxism! *Inasmuch* as a "democratic Russia" would foster a striving towards freedom in the nations of Eastern Europe (this is indisputable), the present war, which will not liberate a single nation, but, whatever the outcome, will enslave many nations, is not a "purely" imperialist war. *Inasmuch* as the "collapse of tsarism" would mean the disintegration of Austria, owing to its undemocratic national structure, a temporarily strengthened and counter-revolutionary tsarism, which is plundering Austria and is bringing *still greater* oppression to the nations inhabiting Austria, has given "the present war", not a purely imperialist character but, to a certain degree, a national character. *Inasmuch* as "the ruling classes" are deluding the stupid petty bourgeois and browbeaten peasants

with fables about the national aims of the imperialist war, a man of science, an authority on "Marxism" and representative of the Second International, is entitled to reconcile the masses to this deception by means of a "formula" which claims that the ruling classes reveal imperialist tendencies, while the "people" and the proletarian masses reveal "national" aspirations.

Dialectic is turned into the meanest and basest sophistry!

In the present war the national element is represented *only* by Serbia's war against Austria (which, by the way, was noted in the resolution of our Party's Berne Conference¹⁷⁷). It is only in Serbia and among the Serbs that we can find a national liberation movement of long standing, embracing millions, "the masses of the people", a movement of which the present war of Serbia against Austria is a "continuation". If this war were an isolated one, i.e., if it were not connected with the general European war, with the selfish and predatory aims of Britain, Russia, etc., it would have been the *duty* of all socialists to desire the success of the Serbian *bourgeoisie*—this is the only correct and absolutely inevitable conclusion to be drawn from the national element in the present war. However, it is this conclusion that the sophist Kautsky, who is now in the service of the Austrian bourgeoisie, clericals and militarists, has failed to draw.

Further, Marxist dialectics, as the last word in the scientific-evolutionary method, excludes any isolated examination of an object, i.e., one that is one-sided and monstrously distorted. The national element in the Serbo-Austrian war is not, and cannot be, of *any* serious significance in the general European war. If Germany wins, she will throttle Belgium, one more part of Poland, perhaps part of France, etc. If Russia wins, she will throttle Galicia, one more part of Poland, Armenia, etc. If the war ends in a "draw", the old national oppression will remain. To Serbia, i.e., to perhaps one per cent or so of the participants in the present war, the war is a "continuation of the politics" of the bourgeois-liberation movement. To the other ninety-nine per cent, the war is a continuation of the politics of imperialism, i.e., of the decrepit bourgeoisie, which is capable only of raping nations, not freeing them. The Triple Entente, which is "liberating" Serbia, is *selling* the interests

of Serbian liberty to Italian imperialism in return for the latter's aid in robbing Austria.

All this, which is common knowledge, has been unblushingly distorted by Kautsky to justify the opportunists. There are *no* "pure" phenomena, nor can there be, either in Nature or in society—that is what Marxist dialectics teaches us, for dialectics shows that the very concept of purity indicates a certain narrowness, a one-sidedness of human cognition, which cannot embrace an object in all its totality and complexity. There is no "pure" capitalism in the world, nor can there be; what we always find is *admixtures* either of feudalism, philistinism, or of something else. Therefore, if anyone recalls that the war is not "purely" imperialist, when we are discussing the flagrant deception of "the masses of the people" by the imperialists, who are deliberately concealing the aims of undisguised robbery with "national" phraseology, then such a person is either an infinitely stupid pedant, or a pettifogger and deceiver. The whole point is that Kautsky is *supporting* the deception of the people by the imperialists when he asserts that to "the masses of the people, including the proletarian masses", the problems of national liberation were "of decisive significance" *whereas* to the ruling classes the decisive factors were "imperialist tendencies" (p. 273), and when he "reinforces" this with an alleged dialectical reference to the "infinite variety of reality" (p. 274). Certainly, reality is infinitely varied. That is absolutely true! But it is equally indubitable that amidst this infinite variety there are two main and fundamental strains: the objective content of the war is a "continuation of the politics" of imperialism, i.e., the plunder of other nations by the decrepit bourgeoisie of the "Great Powers" (and their governments), whereas the prevailing "subjective" ideology consists of "national" phraseology which is being spread to fool the masses.

Kautsky's old sophism, repeated time and again, claiming that "at the outbreak of war" the "Lefts" regarded the situation as presenting an alternative between imperialism or socialism, has already been analysed. This is a shameless subterfuge, for Kautsky knows very well that the Lefts advanced a *different* alternative, viz., either that the party join in the imperialist plunder and deception, or else propa-

gate and prepare for revolutionary action. Kautsky knows also that it is the censorship *alone* that prevents the Lefts in Germany from exposing the stupid fable that his servility to the Südekums makes him spread.

As for the relation between the "proletarian masses" and a "handful of parliamentarians", Kautsky advances a most threadbare objection:

"Let us disregard the Germans, so as not to plead in our own behalf; who would seriously assert that men like Vaillant, Guesde, Hyndman and Plekhanov became imperialists overnight and betrayed socialism? Let us disregard the parliamentarians and the 'leading bodies'... [Kautsky is obviously hinting at *Die Internationale*, the journal issued by Rosa Luxemburg and Franz Mehring, in which the policy of the leading bodies, i.e., the official bodies of the German Social-Democratic Party, its Executive, the *Vorstand*, its parliamentary group, etc., is treated with deserved contempt]... who would dare assert that an order given by a handful of parliamentarians is sufficient to make four million class-conscious German proletarians turn right-about-face within twenty-four hours, in direct opposition to their former aims? If this were true, it would, of course, be evidence of a terrible collapse, not only of our Party, but also of the *masses*. [Kautsky's italics.] If the masses were such a spineless flock of sheep, we might just as well allow ourselves to be buried" (p. 274).

Politically and scientifically, Karl Kautsky, the great authority, gave himself a burial long ago through his conduct and his collection of pitiful evasions. Those who fail to understand or at least to feel this, are hopeless as far as socialism is concerned; it is for this very reason that the tone adopted, in *Die Internationale*, by Mehring, Rosa Luxemburg and their adherents, in treating Kautsky and Co. as most despicable creatures, was the only correct one in the circumstances.

Consider: the *only* people in a position to express their attitude to the war more or less freely (i.e., without being immediately seized and dragged to the barracks, or the immediate risk of being shot) were a "handful of parliamentarians" (who were free to vote, with the right to do so; they were quite able to vote in opposition. Even in Russia, no one was beaten up or even arrested for this), a handful of officials, journalists, etc. And now, Kautsky nobly places on the *masses* the blame for the treachery and the spinelessness of that social *stratum* of whose *links* with the tactics and ideology of opportunism Kautsky himself has written scores

of times over a number of years! The first and most fundamental demand of scientific research in general and of Marxist dialectic in particular is that a writer should examine the *link* between the present struggle of *trends* in the socialist movement—between the trend that is doing the talking, vociferating, and raising a hullabaloo about treachery, and the trend which sees no treachery—and the struggle that preceded it for *whole decades*. Kautsky, however, does not say a word about this; he does not even wish to raise the question of trends and *tendencies*. Till now there have been tendencies, but now there are none! Today, there are only the resonant names of “authorities”, which the servile spirits always invoke as their trump card. In this connection it is most convenient for one to refer to the other and to cover up one’s “peccadilloes” in a friendly fashion, according to the rule: you roll my log and I’ll roll yours. “How can this be called opportunism,” Martov exclaimed at a lecture in Berne (see No. 36 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*), “when Guesde, Plekhanov and Kautsky. . .!” “We must be more careful in accusing men like Guesde of opportunism,” Axelrod wrote (*Golos* Nos. 86 and 87). “I will not defend myself,” Kautsky echoed in Berlin, “but Vaillant, Guesde, Hyndman and Plekhanov. . .!” What a mutual admiration society!

In his writings, Kautsky has revealed such servile zeal as to fawn upon even Hyndman and to make it appear that it was only yesterday that the latter deserted to the side of imperialism. And yet the selfsame *Neue Zeit* and scores of Social-Democratic papers all over the world have been writing about Hyndman’s imperialism *for many years*. Had Kautsky gone to the trouble of thoroughly studying the political biographies of the *persons* he mentions, he would have recalled whether or not those biographies contained traits and events which paved the way for their desertion to imperialism, not “overnight”, but over decades; whether Vaillant had been held captive by the Jauresists, and Plekhanov by the Mensheviks and liquidators; whether the Guesdist *trend* had been publicly giving up the ghost in that typically lifeless and insipid Guesdist magazine, *Le Socialisme*, which was incapable of taking an independent stand on any important issue; whether Kautsky himself (we add this for the benefit of those who very properly put him alongside Hyndman and

Plekhanov) had been supine in the question of Millerandism, in the early stage of the struggle against Bernsteinism, etc.

But Kautsky does not display the slightest shadow of interest in any scientific examination of these leaders' biographies. He does not even attempt to see whether these leaders are defending themselves with their *own* arguments or by repeating the arguments of the opportunists and the bourgeoisie; whether the actions of these leaders have acquired serious political significance because of their own extraordinary influence, or because they have adhered to some other really "influential" trend which is supported by a military organisation, namely, the bourgeois trend. Kautsky has not even set about examining this question; his only concern is to throw dust in the eyes of the masses, dumbfound them with the sound of authoritative names, prevent them from raising a clear issue and examining it from all sides.*

"... an order given by a handful of parliamentarians is sufficient to make four million class-conscious proletarians turn right-about-face..."

Every word uttered here is a lie. The German Party organisation had a membership of one million, not four million. As is the case with any organisation, the united will of this mass organisation was expressed *only* through its united political centre, the "handful", who betrayed socialism. It was this handful who were asked to express their opinion; it was this handful who were called upon to vote; they were in a position to vote; they were in a position to write articles, etc. The masses were not consulted. Not only were they not permitted to vote, but they were disunited and coerced "by

* Kautsky's references to Vaillant and Guesde, Hyndman and Plekhanov are characteristic also in another connection. The outspoken imperialists of the Lensch and Haenisch variety (to say nothing of the opportunists) refer to Hyndman and Plekhanov so as to justify *their own* policy, and they have a *right* to do so. They are speaking the *truth* when they say it is one and the same policy. Kautsky, however, speaks with disdain of Lensch and Haenisch, radicals who have turned towards imperialism. Kautsky thanks God that he is unlike such sinners, that he disagrees with them, and has remained a revolutionary (*sic!*). As a *matter of fact*, Kautsky's stand is the same as theirs. Kautsky, the hypocritical chauvinist who employs sentimental phrases, is much more odious than the chauvinist simpletons, David and Heine, Lensch and Haenisch.

orders", not from a handful of parliamentarians, but from the military authorities. A military organisation existed; there was no treachery among the leaders of *this* organisation. It called up the "masses" *one by one*, confronted the individual with the ultimatum: either join the army, as your leaders advise you to, or be shot. The masses could not act in an organised fashion because their previously created organisation, an organisation embodied in a "handful" of Legiens, Kautskys and Scheidemanns, had betrayed them. It takes time to create a *new* organisation, as well as a determination to consign the old, rotten, and obsolete organisation to the scrap heap.

Kautsky tries to defeat his opponents, the Lefts, by ascribing to them the nonsensical idea that the "masses", "in retaliation" to war, should make a revolution "within twenty-four hours", and institute "socialism" as opposed to imperialism, or otherwise the "masses" would be revealing "spinelessness and treachery". But this is sheer nonsense, which the compilers of illiterate bourgeois and police booklets have hitherto used to "defeat" the revolutionaries, and Kautsky now flaunts in our faces. Kautsky's Left opponents know perfectly well that a revolution cannot be "made", that revolutions *develop* from objectively (i.e., independently of the will of parties and classes) mature crises and turns in history, that without organisation the masses lack unity of will, and that the struggle against a centralised state's powerful terrorist military organisation is a difficult and lengthy business. Owing to the treachery of their leaders, the masses *could not* do anything at the crucial moment, whereas this "handful" of leaders *were in an excellent position* and in duty bound to vote against the war credits, take a stand against a "class truce" and justification of the war, express themselves in favour of the defeat of *their own* governments, set up an international apparatus for the purpose of carrying on propaganda in favour of fraternisation in the trenches, organise the publication of illegal literature* on the necessity of starting revolutionary activities, etc.

* Incidentally, it would not have been at all necessary to close all Social-Democratic papers in reply to the government's ban on writing about class hatred and class struggle. To agree not to write about this, as *Vorwärts* did, was mean and cowardly. *Vorwärts* died

Kautsky knows perfectly well that it is precisely such or rather *similar* actions that the German "Lefts" have in mind, and that under a military censorship they cannot talk about these things *directly*, openly. Kautsky's desire to defend the opportunists at all costs has led him into unparalleled infamy: taking cover behind the military censors, he attributes patent absurdities to the Lefts, in the confidence that the censors will protect him from exposure.

VII

The serious scientific and political question, which Kautsky has deliberately evaded by means of subterfuges of all kinds, thereby giving enormous pleasure to the opportunists, is this: how was it *possible* for the most prominent representatives of the Second International to betray socialism?

This question should not, of course, be considered from the standpoint of the biographies of the individual leaders. Their future biographers will have to analyse the problem from this angle as well, but what interests the socialist movement today is not that, but a study of the historical origins, the conditions, the significance and the strength of the social-chauvinist *trend*. (1) Where did social-chauvinism spring from? (2) What gave it strength? (3) How must it be combated? Only such an approach to the question can be regarded as serious, the "personal" approach being in practice an evasion, a piece of sophistry.

To answer the first question we must see, first, whether the ideological and political content of social-chauvinism is *connected* with some previous trend in socialism; and second, in what relation—from the standpoint of actual political

politically when it did this, and Martov was right when he said so. It was, however, possible to retain the legal papers by declaring that they were non-Party and *non-Social-Democratic*, and served the technical needs of a section of the workers, i.e., that they were *non-political papers*. Underground Social-Democratic literature containing an *assessment* of the war, and legally published working-class literature *without that assessment*, a literature that does not say what is not true, but keeps silent about the truth—why should this not have been possible?

divisions—the present division of socialists into opponents and defenders of social-chauvinism stands to divisions which historically preceded it.

By social-chauvinism we mean acceptance of the idea of the defence of the fatherland in the present imperialist war, justification of an alliance between socialists and the bourgeoisie and the governments of their "own" countries in this war, a refusal to propagate and support proletarian-revolutionary action against one's "own" bourgeoisie, etc. It is perfectly obvious that social-chauvinism's basic ideological and political content fully coincides with the foundations of opportunism. It is *one and the same* tendency. In the conditions of the war of 1914-15, opportunism leads to social-chauvinism. The idea of class collaboration is opportunism's main feature. The war has brought this idea to its logical conclusion, and has augmented its usual factors and stimuli with a number of extraordinary ones; through the operation of special threats and coercion it has compelled the philistine and disunited masses to collaborate with the bourgeoisie. This circumstance has naturally multiplied adherents of opportunism and fully explains why many radicals of yesterday have deserted to that camp.

Opportunism means sacrificing the fundamental interests of the masses to the temporary interests of an insignificant minority of the workers or, in other words, an alliance between a section of the workers and the bourgeoisie, directed against the mass of the proletariat. The war has made such an alliance particularly conspicuous and inescapable. Opportunism was engendered in the course of decades by the special features in the period of the development of capitalism, when the comparatively peaceful and cultured life of a stratum of privileged workingmen "bourgeoisified" them, gave them crumbs from the table of their national capitalists, and isolated them from the suffering, misery and revolutionary temper of the impoverished and ruined masses. The imperialist war is the direct continuation and culmination of this state of affairs, because this is a war for the *privileges* of the Great-Power nations, for the repartition of colonies, and domination over other nations. To defend and strengthen their privileged position as a petty-bourgeois "upper stratum" or aristocracy (and bureaucracy) of the working class—such

is the natural wartime continuation of petty-bourgeois opportunist hopes and the corresponding tactics, such is the economic foundation of present-day social-imperialism.* And, of course, the force of habit, the routine of relatively "peaceful" evolution, national prejudices, a fear of sharp turns and a disbelief in them—all these were additional circumstances which enhanced both opportunism and a hypocritical and a craven reconciliation with opportunism—ostensibly only for a time and only because of extraordinary causes and motives. The war has changed this opportunism, which had been fostered for decades, raised it to a higher stage, increased the

* Here are several examples showing how highly the imperialists and the bourgeoisie value the importance of "Great-Power" and national privileges as a means of dividing the workers and diverting them from socialism. In a book entitled *Greater Rome and Greater Britain* (Oxford, 1912), the British imperialist Lucas acknowledges the legal disabilities of coloured people in the present British Empire (pp. 96-97), and remarks that "in our own Empire, where white workers and coloured workers are side by side ... they do not work on the same level, and that the white man is rather the overseer of ... the coloured man". In a pamphlet entitled *Social-Democracy after the War* (1915), Erwin Belger, a former secretary of the Imperial Alliance against Social-Democrats, praises the conduct of the Social-Democrats and declares that they must become a "purely labour party" (p. 43), a "national", a "German labour party" (p. 45), without "internationalist, Utopian", and "revolutionary" ideas (p. 44). In a book dealing with capital investments abroad (1907), the German imperialist Sartorius von Waltershausen blames the German Social-Democrats for ignoring the "national welfare" (p. 438)—which consists in the seizure of colonies—and praises the British workers' "realism", for instance, their struggle against immigration. In a book on the principles of world politics, the German diplomat Ruedorffer stresses the generally known fact that the internationalisation of capital by no means eliminates the national capitalists' intensified struggle for power and influence, for "majority share-holding" (p. 161). The author notes that the workers become involved in this intensified struggle (p. 175). The book is dated October 1913, and the author speaks with perfect clarity of the "interests of capital" (p. 157) as the cause of modern wars. He says that the question of the "national tendency" becomes the kingpin of socialism (p. 176), and that the governments have nothing to fear from the internationalist manifestos of the Social-Democrats (p. 177), who in reality are turning more and more national (pp. 103, 110, 176). International socialism will be victorious, he says, if it extricates the workers from national influence, since nothing can be achieved through violence alone; however, it will suffer defeat if national sentiments gain the upper hand (pp. 173-74).

number and the variety of its shades, augmented the ranks of its adherents, enriched their arguments with a multitude of new sophisms, and has merged, so to say, many new streams and rivulets with the mainstream of opportunism. However, the mainstream has not disappeared. Quite the reverse.

Social-chauvinism is an opportunism which has matured to such a degree that the *continued* existence of this bourgeois abscess within the socialist parties has become impossible.

Those who refuse to see the closest and unbreakable link between social-chauvinism and opportunism clutch at individual instances—this opportunist or another, they say, has turned internationalist; this radical or another has turned chauvinist. But this kind of argument carries no weight as far as the development of *trends* is concerned. Firstly, chauvinism and opportunism in the labour movement have the same economic basis: the alliance between a numerically small upper stratum of the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie—who get but morsels of the privileges of their “own” national capital—against the masses of the proletarians, the masses of the toilers and the oppressed in general. Secondly, the two trends have the same ideological and political content. Thirdly, the old division of socialists into an opportunist trend and a revolutionary, which was characteristic of the period of the Second International (1889-1914), *corresponds*, by and large, to the new division into chauvinists and internationalists.

To realise the correctness of the latter statement, one must remember that social science (like science generally) usually deals with *mass* phenomena, not with individual cases. Let us take ten European countries: Germany, Britain, Russia, Italy, Holland, Sweden, Bulgaria, Switzerland, France and Belgium. In the first eight countries, the new division of socialists (according to internationalism) corresponds to the old division (according to opportunism): in Germany the magazine *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, which was a stronghold of opportunism, has become a stronghold of chauvinism. The ideas of internationalism have the support of the extreme Lefts. In Britain about three-sevenths of the British Socialist Party are internationalists (66 votes for an internationalist resolution and 84 against it, as shown by the latest counts), while in the opportunist *bloc* (the Labour Party¹⁷⁸ plus the Fabians, plus the Independent Labour Party) *less* than one-

seventh are internationalists.* In Russia, the liquidationist *Nasha Zarya*, the mainstay of the opportunists, has become the mainstay of chauvinism. Plekhanov and Alexinsky are making more noise, but we know from five years' experience (1910-14) that they are incapable of conducting systematic propaganda among the masses in Russia. The nucleus of the internationalists in Russia is made up of "Pravdism" and the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma as representing the advanced workers who restored the Party in January 1912.

In Italy, the party of Bissolati and Co., which was purely opportunist, has turned chauvinist. Internationalism is represented by the *workers'* party. The *masses* of the workers are for this party; the opportunists, the parliamentarians and the petty bourgeoisie are for chauvinism. In the course of several months a free choice could be made and indeed was made in Italy, not fortuitously but in conformity with the difference in the class stand of rank-and-file proletarians and the petty-bourgeois groups.

In Holland, Troelstra's opportunist party is reconciled to chauvinism in general (one must not be deceived by the fact that in Holland the petty bourgeoisie, like the big bourgeoisie, have a particular hatred of Germany, because the latter can "swallow" them up easiest of all). It is the Marxist party, led by Gorter and Pannekoek, that has produced consistent, sincere, ardent and convinced internationalists. In Sweden, Branting, the opportunist leader, is indignant at the German socialists being accused of treachery, while Höglund, leader of the Lefts, has declared that this is precisely the opinion of some of his adherents (see *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 36). In Bulgaria, the "Tesnyaki", who are opposed to opportunism, have, in their press (the paper *Novo Vreme*¹⁷⁹), accused the German Social-Democrats of having "perpetrated a foul act". In Switzerland, the adherents of the opportunist Greulich are inclined to justify the German Social-Democrats (see their

* The Independent Labour Party *alone* is usually compared with the British Socialist Party. That is wrong. The essentials should be considered, not the forms of organisation. Take the daily newspapers: there were *two* of them—one, the *Daily Herald*, mouthpiece of the British Socialist Party, the other, the *Daily Citizen*, mouthpiece of the opportunist bloc. The dailies do the actual work of propaganda, agitation and organisation.

organ, the Zurich *Volksrecht*), whereas those who support the much more radical R. Grimm have turned the Berne paper, *Berner Tagwacht*,¹⁸⁰ into an organ of the German Lefts. Only two countries out of the ten—France and Belgium—are exceptions, but even here, strictly speaking, we see, not an absence of internationalists, but their excessive weakness and dejection (due in part to causes that can be readily understood); let us not forget that Vaillant himself has admitted, in *l'Humanité*,¹⁸¹ that he has received from his readers letters of an internationalist character, letters which, however, he has not published in full, *not a single one* of them!

By and large, if we take the trends and tendencies, we must admit that it was the opportunist wing of European socialism that betrayed socialism and deserted to chauvinism. What is the source of its strength and its seeming omnipotence within the official parties? Now that he himself is involved, Kautsky, who is well versed in raising questions of history, especially with reference to ancient Rome or similar matters that do not have a direct bearing on problems of our times, hypocritically pretends a lack of understanding. But the whole thing is crystal-clear. The immense strength of the opportunists and the chauvinists stems from *their alliance* with the bourgeoisie, with the governments and the General Staffs. This is often overlooked in Russia, where it is assumed the opportunists are a *section* of the socialist parties, that there always have been and will be two extreme wings within those parties, that "extremes" should be avoided, etc., etc.—and plenty of similar philistine copy-book maxims.

In reality, the opportunists' formal membership in workers' parties by no means disproves their objectively being a political detachment of the bourgeoisie, conductors of its influence, and its agents in the labour movement. When the opportunist Südekum, whose claim to fame is like that of Herostratus, convincingly demonstrated this social and class truth, many good people gasped with amazement. The French socialists and Plekhanov pointed the finger of scorn at Südekum—although had Vandervelde, Sembat or Plekhanov looked into a mirror they would have seen *nothing but a Südekum*, with slightly different national features. The members of the German Executive (*Vorstand*), who now praise Kautsky and are praised by Kautsky, have made haste to declare—

cautiously, modestly and politely (without naming Südekum)—that they “do not agree” with Südekum’s line.

This is ridiculous, because, at the crucial moment, Südekum alone actually proved stronger in the policies of the German Social-Democratic Party than a hundred Haases and Kautskys (just as *Nasha Zarya* alone is stronger than all the Brussels bloc¹⁸² trends, which are afraid to break away from that paper).

Why is that so? It is because behind Südekum are the bourgeoisie, the government, and the General Staff of a Great Power. These support Südekum’s policy in a thousand ways, whereas his opponents’ policy is frustrated by every means, including prison and the firing squad. Südekum’s voice reaches the public in millions of copies of bourgeois newspapers (as do the voices of Vandervelde, Sembat, and Plekhanov), whereas the voices of his opponents *cannot* be heard in the legal press because of the military censorship!

It is generally agreed that opportunism is no chance occurrence, sin, slip, or treachery on the part of individuals, but a social product of an entire period of history. The significance of this truth is not always given sufficient thought. Opportunism has been nurtured by legalism. The workers’ parties of the period between 1889 and 1914 had to take advantage of bourgeois legality. When the crisis came, they should have adopted illegal methods of work (but this could not be done otherwise than with the greatest vigour and determination, combined with a number of stratagems). A *single* Südekum was sufficient to prevent the adoption of illegal methods, because, speaking in a historico-philosophical sense, he had the whole of the “old world” behind him, and because he, Südekum, has always betrayed, and will always betray, to the bourgeoisie all the military plans of its class enemy, speaking in the sense of practical politics.

It is a fact that the entire German Social-Democratic Party (and the same holds for the French and *other* parties) does *only* that which pleases Südekum or can be tolerated by Südekum. *Nothing else* can be done legally. Anything *honest* and really socialist that takes place in the German Social-Democratic Party, is done in *opposition* to its centres, by *circumventing* its Executive and Central Organ, by *violating* organisational discipline, in a *factional* manner, on behalf of new and anonymous centres of a new party, as was

the case, for instance, with the German Lefts' manifesto published in *Berner Tagwacht* on May 31 of this year.¹⁸³ As a matter of fact, a *new* party is growing up, gaining strength and being organised, a real workers' party, a genuinely revolutionary Social-Democratic Party, unlike the old and corrupt national-liberal party of Legien, Südekum, Kautsky, Haase, Scheidemann and Co.*

It was, therefore, a profound historical truth that the opportunist "Monitor" blurted out in the conservative *Preussische Jahrbücher* when he said it would be bad for the opportunists (i.e., the bourgeoisie) if present-day Social-Democracy were to *swing to the right*—because in that case the workers would desert it. The opportunists (and the bourgeoisie) need the party as it is today, a party *combining* the Right and the Left wings and officially represented by Kautsky, who will be able to reconcile everything in the world by means of smooth, "thoroughly Marxist" phrases. In word, socialism and the revolutionary spirit for the people, the masses, the workers; in deed, Südekumism, adhering to the bourgeoisie in any grave crisis. We say: *any* crisis, because in any serious political strike, and not only in time of war, "feudalist" Germany like "free and parliamentary" Britain or France will *immediately* introduce martial law under one name or another. No one of sound mind and judgement can have any doubt about this.

Hence logically follows the reply to the question raised above, viz., how is social-chauvinism to be combated? Social-

* What happened before the historic voting of August 4 [for war credits—Ed.] is extremely characteristic. The official party has cast the cloak of bureaucratic hypocrisy over this event, saying that the majority decided and that all voted unanimously *in favour*. But this hypocrisy was exposed by Ströbel who told the truth in the journal *Die Internationale*. The Social-Democratic members of the Reichstag split into *two* groups, each of whom came with an *ultimatum*, i.e., a dissentient decision, i.e., one signifying a split. One group, the opportunists, who were about thirty strong, decided to vote *in favour*, under *all circumstances*; the other and Left group numbering about fifteen, decided—less resolutely—to vote against. When the "Centre" or the "Marsh", who never take a firm stand, voted with the opportunists, the Lefts sustained a crushing defeat and—submitted! Talk about the "unity" of the German Social-Democrats is sheer hypocrisy, which actually covers up the inevitable submission of the Lefts to ultimatums from the opportunists.

chauvinism is an opportunism which has matured to such a degree, grown so strong and brazen during the long period of comparatively "peaceful" capitalism, so definite in its political ideology, and so closely associated with the bourgeoisie and the governments, that the existence of *such a trend within* the Social-Democratic workers' parties *cannot* be tolerated. Flimsy, thin-soled shoes may be good enough to walk in on the well-paved streets of a small provincial town, but heavy hob-nailed boots are needed for walking in the hills. In Europe socialism has emerged from a comparatively peaceful stage that is confined within narrow and national limits. With the outbreak of the war of 1914-15, it entered the stage of revolutionary action; there can be no doubt that the time has come for a complete break with opportunism, for its expulsion from the workers' parties.

This definition of the tasks the new era of international development confronts socialism with does not, of course, immediately show how rapidly and in what definite forms the process of separation of the workers' revolutionary Social-Democratic parties from the petty-bourgeois opportunist parties will proceed in the various countries. It does, however, reveal the need clearly to realise that such a separation is inevitable, and that the entire policy of the workers' parties must be directed from this standpoint. The war of 1914-15 is such a great turn in history that the attitude towards opportunism *cannot* remain the same as it has been. What has happened cannot be erased. It is impossible to obliterate from the minds of the workers, or from the experience of the bourgeoisie, or from the political lessons of our epoch in general, the fact that, at a moment of crisis, the opportunists proved to be the nucleus of those elements within the workers' parties that deserted to the bourgeoisie. Opportunism—to speak on a European scale—was in its adolescent stage, as it were, before the war. With the outbreak of the war it grew to manhood and its "innocence" and youth cannot be restored. An entire social stratum, consisting of parliamentarians, journalists, labour officials, privileged office personnel, and certain strata of the proletariat, has sprung up and has become *amalgamated* with its own national bourgeoisie, which has proved fully capable of appreciating and "adapting" it. The course of history cannot be turned back or checked—we can and

must go fearlessly onward, from the preparatory legal working-class organisations, which are in the grip of opportunism, to revolutionary organisations that know how *not* to confine themselves to legality and are capable of safeguarding themselves against opportunist treachery, organisations of a proletariat that is beginning a "struggle for power", a struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

This, incidentally, proves how wrong are the views of those who befog both their own minds and those of the workers with the question as to what should be done with such outstanding authorities of the Second International as Guesde, Plekhanov, Kautsky, etc. In fact, no such question arises. If these persons fail to understand the new tasks, they will have to stand aside or remain as they are at present, in captivity to the opportunists. If these persons free themselves from "captivity" they are hardly likely to encounter *political* obstacles to their return to the camp of the revolutionaries. At all events, it is absurd to substitute the question of the role of individuals for the question of the struggle between trends and of the new period in the working-class movement.

VIII

Legal mass organisations of the working class are perhaps the most important feature of the socialist parties in the epoch of the Second International. They were the strongest in the German Party, and it was here that the war of 1914-15 created a most acute crisis and made the issue a most pressing one. The initiation of revolutionary activities would obviously have led to the dissolution of these legal organisations by the police, and the old party—from Legien to Kautsky inclusively—sacrificed the revolutionary aims of the proletariat for the sake of preserving the present legal organisations. No matter how much this may be denied, it is a fact. The proletariat's right to revolution was sold for a mess of pottage—organisations permitted by the present police law.

Take the pamphlet by Karl Legien, leader of the German Social-Democratic trade unions, entitled *Why Trade Union Officials Must Take a More Active Part in the Internal Life*

of the Party (Berlin, 1915). This is a paper read by the author to a gathering of trade union officials on January 27, 1915. In the course of this lecture Legien read—and reproduced in his pamphlet—a most interesting document that would not otherwise have been passed by the military censor. This document—the so-called *Notes for Speakers in the District of Niederbarnim* (a suburb of Berlin)—is an exposition of the views of the German Left-wing Social-Democrats, of their protest against the Party. The revolutionary Social-Democrats, says the document, did not and could not foresee a certain factor, viz.:

“That the whole of the organised power of the German Social-Democratic Party and the trade unions would take the side of the war government, and that the whole of this power would be used for the purpose of suppressing the revolutionary energy of the masses” (p. 34 of Legien’s pamphlet).

This is the absolute truth. Also true is the following statement contained in the same document:

“The vote of the Social-Democratic group in the Reichstag on August 4 proved that a different attitude, even had it been deeply rooted in the masses, could not have asserted itself under the leadership of a tested party. It could have asserted itself only against the will of the leading party bodies, only by overcoming the resistance of the party and the trade unions” (ibid.).

This is the absolute truth.

“Had the Social-Democratic group in the Reichstag done its duty on August 4, the external form of organisation would probably have been destroyed, but the spirit would have remained, the spirit that animated the Party under the Anti-Socialist Law and helped it to overcome all difficulties” (ibid.).

It is pointed out in Legien’s pamphlet that the “leaders”, brought together to listen to his lecture and styling themselves leading trade union officials, *laughed* when they heard this. The idea that it was possible and necessary to organise illegal revolutionary organisations at a moment of crisis (as was done under the Anti-Socialist Law) seemed *ridiculous* to them. Legien, that most faithful watchdog of the bourgeoisie, exclaimed, beating his breast;

“This is an obviously anarchist idea: to wreck the organisation in order to bring about a solution of the problem by the masses. There is no doubt in my mind that this is an anarchist idea!”

"Hear, hear!" came a chorus of exclamations (*ibid.*, p. 37) from the lackeys of the bourgeoisie, who style themselves leaders of the Social-Democratic organisations of the working class.

An edifying picture. People are so degraded and stultified by bourgeois legality that they cannot even *conceive* of the need for organisations of *another* kind, *illegal* organisations, for the purpose of guiding the revolutionary struggle. So low have people fallen that they imagine that legal unions existing with the permission of the police are a kind of ultima Thule—as though the *preservation* of such unions as *leading* bodies is at all conceivable at a time of crisis! Here you have the living dialectic of opportunism: the mere growth of legal unions and the mere habit that stupid but conscientious philistines have of confining themselves to bookkeeping, have created a situation in which, during a crisis, these conscientious philistines have proved to be traitors and betrayers, who would *smother* the revolutionary energy of the masses. This is no chance occurrence. The building of a revolutionary organisation must be begun—that is demanded by the new historical situation, by the epoch of proletarian revolutionary action—but it can be begun only *over the heads* of the old leaders, the stranglers of revolutionary energy, *over the heads* of the old party, through its *destruction*.

Of course, the counter-revolutionary philistines cry out "anarchism!", just as the opportunist Eduard David cried "anarchism" when he denounced Karl Liebknecht. In Germany, only those leaders seem to have remained honest socialists whom the opportunists revile as anarchists. . . .

Take the army of today. It is a good example of organisation. This organisation is good only because it is *flexible* and is able at the same time to give millions of people *a single will*. Today these millions are living in their homes in various parts of the country; tomorrow mobilisation is ordered, and they report for duty. Today they lie in the trenches, and this may go on for months; tomorrow they are led to the attack in another order. Today they perform miracles in sheltering from bullets and shrapnel; tomorrow they perform miracles in hand-to-hand combat. Today their advance detachments lay minefields; tomorrow they advance scores of miles guided by airmen flying overhead. When, in the pursuit of a single

aim and animated by a single will, millions alter the forms of their communication and their behaviour, change the place and the mode of their activities, change their tools and weapons in accordance with the changing conditions and the requirements of the struggle—all this is genuine organisation.

The same holds true for the working-class struggle against the bourgeoisie. Today there is no revolutionary situation, the conditions that cause unrest among the masses or heighten their activities do not exist; today you are given a ballot paper—take it, learn to organise so as to use it as a weapon against your enemies, not as a means of getting cushy legislative jobs for men who cling to their parliamentary seats for fear of having to go to prison. Tomorrow your ballot paper is taken from you and you are given a rifle or a splendid and most up-to-date quick-firing gun—take this weapon of death and destruction, pay no heed to the mawkish snivellers who are afraid of war; too much still remains in the world that *must* be destroyed with fire and sword for the emancipation of the working class; if anger and desperation grow among the masses, if a revolutionary situation arises, prepare to create new organisations and *use* these useful weapons of death and destruction *against* your *own* government and your *own* bourgeoisie.

That is not easy, to be sure. It will demand arduous preparatory activities and heavy sacrifices. This is a *new* form of organisation and struggle that also *has to be learnt*, and knowledge is not acquired without errors and setbacks. This form of the class struggle stands in the same relation to participation in elections as an assault against a fortress stands in relation to manoeuvring, marches, or lying in the trenches. It is *not so often* that history places this form of struggle on the order of the day, but then its significance is felt for decades to come. *Days* on which *such* method of struggle can and must be employed are equal to *scores of years* of other historical epochs.

Compare K. Kautsky and K. Legien. Kautsky writes:

“As long as the party was small, every protest against war had propaganda value as an act of bravery . . . the conduct of the Russian and Serbian comrades has met with general appreciation. The stronger a party becomes, the more are the propaganda considerations, in the

motives of its decisions, interwoven with the calculation of practical consequences, the more difficult does it become to give due regard equally to both motives, and yet neither of them must be neglected. Therefore, the stronger we become, the more easily differences arise between us in every new and complex situation" (*Internationalism and the War*, p. 30).

These arguments of Kautsky's differ from Legien's only in that they are hypocritical and cowardly. In substance, Kautsky supports and justifies the Legiens' despicable renunciation of revolutionary activities, but he does so stealthily, without committing himself; he makes shift with hints, and confines himself to complimenting both Legien and the revolutionary behaviour of the Russians. We Russians are used to witnessing this kind of attitude towards revolutionaries only among the liberals; the latter are always ready to acknowledge the "courage" of the revolutionaries, but at the same time they will on no account renounce their ultra-opportunist tactics. Self-respecting revolutionaries will not accept Kautsky's "expressions of appreciation" and will indignantly reject such a presentation of the question. Were there no revolutionary situation, were it not obligatory to propagate revolutionary action, the conduct of the Russians and Serbians would be *incorrect*, and their tactics would be wrong. Let such knightly persons as Legien and Kautsky at least have the courage of their convictions; let them say this openly.

If, however, the tactics of the Russian and Serbian socialists deserve "appreciation", then it is wrong and criminal to justify the *contrary* tactics of the "strong" parties, the German, the French, etc. By means of an intentionally vague expression—"practical consequences"—Kautsky has *concealed* the plain truth that the great and strong parties were *frightened* by the prospect of their organisations being dissolved, their funds sequestered and their leaders arrested by the government. This means that Kautsky justifies betrayal of socialism by pleading the unpleasant "practical consequences" that follow from revolutionary tactics. Is this not a prostitution of Marxism?

"We would have been arrested", one of the Social-Democratic deputies who voted for the war credits on August 4 is alleged to have declared at a workers' meeting in Berlin.

The workers shouted in reply: "Well, what would have been bad about that?"

If there was no other *signal* that would instil in the German and the French working masses revolutionary sentiments and the need to prepare for revolutionary action, the arrest of a member of parliament for a courageous speech would have been useful as a call for *unity* of the proletarians of the various countries in their revolutionary work. It is *not easy* to bring about such unity; all the more was it the duty of members of parliament, whose high office made their purview of the entire political scene so extensive, to *take the initiative*.

Not only in wartime but positively in any acute political situation, to say nothing of periods of revolutionary mass action of any kind, the governments of even the *freest* bourgeois countries will threaten to dissolve the legal organisations, seize their funds, arrest their leaders, and threaten other "practical consequences" of the same kind. What are we to do then? Justify the opportunists on these grounds, as Kautsky does? But this would mean sanctifying the transformation of the Social-Democratic parties into national liberal-labour parties.

There is only one conclusion a socialist can draw, namely, that pure legalism, the legalism-and-nothing-but-legalism of the "European" parties, is now obsolete and, as a result of the development of capitalism in the pre-imperialist stage, has become the foundation for a bourgeois labour policy. It must be augmented by the creation of an illegal basis, an illegal organisation, illegal Social-Democratic work, without, however, surrendering a single legal position. Experience will show *how* this is to be done, if only the desire to take this road exists, as well as a realisation that it is necessary. In 1912-14, the revolutionary Social-Democrats of Russia proved that this problem can be solved. Muranov, the workers' deputy in the Duma, who at the trial behaved better than the rest and was exiled to Siberia, clearly demonstrated that—besides "*ministeriable*" parliamentarism (from Henderson, Sembat and Vandervelde down to Südekum and Scheidemann, the latter two are also being completely "*ministeriable*", although they are not admitted further than the anteroom!)—there can be *illegal and revolutionary*

parliamentarism. Let the Kosovskys and Potresovs admire the "European" parliamentarism of the lackeys or accept it—we shall not tire of telling the workers that *such* legalism, *such* Social-Democracy of the Legien, Kautsky, Scheidemann brand, deserves nothing but contempt.

IX

To sum up.

The collapse of the Second International has been most strikingly expressed in the flagrant betrayal of their convictions and of the solemn Stuttgart and Basle resolutions by the majority of the official Social-Democratic parties of Europe. This collapse, however, which signifies the complete victory of opportunism, the transformation of the Social-Democratic parties into national liberal-labour parties, is merely the result of the entire historical epoch of the Second International—the close of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. The objective conditions of this epoch—transitional from the consummation of West-European bourgeois and national revolutions to the beginning of socialist revolutions—engendered and fostered opportunism. During this period we see a split in the working-class and socialist movement in some European countries, which, in the main, was cleavage along the line of opportunism (Britain, Italy, Holland, Bulgaria and Russia); in other countries, we see a long and stubborn struggle of trends along the same line (Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden and Switzerland). The crisis created by the great war has torn away all coverings, swept away conventions, exposed an abscess that has long come to a head, and revealed opportunism in its true role of ally of the bourgeoisie. The complete organisational severance of this element from the workers' parties has become imperative. The epoch of imperialism cannot permit the existence, in a single party, of the revolutionary proletariat's vanguard and the semi-petty-bourgeois aristocracy of the working class, who enjoy morsels of the privileges of their "own" nation's "Great-Power" status. The old theory that opportunism is a "legitimate shade" in a single party that knows no "extremes" has now turned into a tremendous

deception of the workers and a tremendous hindrance to the working-class movement. Undisguised opportunism, which immediately repels the working masses, is not so frightful and injurious as this theory of the golden mean, which uses Marxist catchwords to justify opportunist practice, and tries to prove, with a series of sophisms, that revolutionary action is premature, etc. Kautsky, the most outstanding spokesman of this theory and also the leading authority in the Second International, has shown himself a consummate hypocrite and a past master in the art of prostituting Marxism. All members of the million-strong German party who are at all honest, class-conscious and revolutionary have turned away in indignation from an "authority" of this kind so ardently defended by the Südekums and the Scheidemanns.

The proletarian masses—probably about nine-tenths of whose former leaders have gone over to the bourgeoisie—have found themselves disunited and helpless amid a spate of chauvinism and under the pressure of martial law and the war censorship. But the objective war-created revolutionary situation, which is extending and developing, is inevitably engendering revolutionary sentiments; it is tempering and enlightening all the finest and most class-conscious proletarians. A sudden change in the mood of the masses is not only possible, but is becoming more and more probable, a change similar to that which was to be seen in Russia early in 1905 in connection with the "Gaponade",¹⁸⁴ when, in the course of several months and sometimes of several weeks, there emerged from the backward proletarian masses an army of millions, which followed the proletariat's revolutionary vanguard. We cannot tell whether a powerful revolutionary movement will develop immediately after *this* war, or during it, etc., but at all events, it is *only* work in this direction that deserves the name of socialist work. The slogan of a civil war is the one that summarises and directs this work, and helps unite and consolidate those who wish to aid the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat against its own government and its own bourgeoisie.

In Russia, the complete severance of the revolutionary Social-Democratic proletarian elements from the petty-bourgeois opportunist elements has been prepared by the entire history of the working-class movement. Those who disregard

that history, and, by declaiming against "factionalism", make themselves incapable of understanding the real process of the formation of a proletarian party in Russia, which has developed in the course of many years of struggle against various varieties of opportunism, are rendering that movement the worst possible service. Of all the "Great" Powers engaged in the present war, Russia is the only one that recently experienced a revolution. The bourgeois content of that revolution, in which the proletariat nevertheless played a decisive part, could not but cause a split between the bourgeois and proletarian trends in the working-class movement. In the approximately twenty years (1894-1914) that Russian Social-Democracy has existed as an organisation linked with the mass working-class movement (and not only as an ideological trend, as in 1883-94), there was a struggle between the proletarian-revolutionary trends and the petty-bourgeois, opportunist trends. The Economism of 1894-1902 was undoubtedly a trend of the latter kind. A number of its arguments and ideological features—the "Struivist" distortion of Marxism, references to the "masses" in order to justify opportunism, and the like—bear a striking resemblance to the present vulgarised Marxism of Kautsky, Cunow, Plekhanov, etc. It would be a very grateful task to remind the present generation of Social-Democrats of the old *Rabochaya Mysl* and *Rabocheye Dyelo*, as a parallel to the Kautsky of today.

The "Menshevism" of the next period (1903-08) was the direct successor, both ideological and organisational, to Economism. During the Russian revolution, it pursued tactics that objectively meant the dependence of the proletariat upon the liberal bourgeoisie, and expressed petty-bourgeois, opportunist trends. When, in the ensuing period (1908-14), the mainstream of the Menshevik trend produced liquidationism, the class significance of that trend became so apparent that the best representatives of Menshevism were continually protesting against the policy of *Nasha Zarya* group. It is that very group—the only one which, during the past five or six years, has conducted systematic work among the masses in *opposition* to the revolutionary Marxist party of the working class—that has proved to be *social-chauvinist* in the war of 1914-15! And this in a country where absolutism still exists, the bourgeois revolution is far from consummated, and forty-

three per cent of the population oppresses a majority consisting of non-Russian nations. The "European" type of development, in which certain strata of the petty bourgeoisie, especially the intelligentsia and an insignificant section of the labour aristocracy can share in the "Great-Power" privileges of their "own" nation, could not but have its Russian counterpart.

All their history has prepared the working class and the workers' Social-Democratic Party of Russia for "internationalist" tactics, i.e., such that are truly revolutionary and consistently revolutionary.

P.S. This article had already been set when a manifesto appeared in the press, jointly issued by Kautsky, Haase and Bernstein, who, seeing that the masses are swinging to the left, are therefore now prepared to "make peace" with the Left wing—naturally, at the price of maintaining "peace" with the Südekums. Verily, *Mädchen für alle!*

Written in the second half
of May and the first half
of June 1915

Published in 1915 in the
journal *Kommunist* No. 1-2
Signed: N. Lenin

Vol. 21

LETTER TO D. WIJNKOOP

Dear Comrade Wijnkoop,

The job we have undertaken—outlining an international declaration of principles of the Marxist Left—is so important that we have no right to procrastinate. We must see the work through to completion and as soon as possible. We are late, and that is a big danger!

A. P.'s article in the *Berner Tagwacht* (July 24) on the Dutch Social-Democratic Party Congress is of great importance for our mutual understanding. I warmly welcome the stand you, Gorter and Ravesteyn have taken on the question of a people's militia (on which there is a clause in our programme too). An exploited class that does not *strive* to acquire arms, to master their use and the art of warfare, is a servitor class. Those who advocate disarmament in contradistinction to a people's militia (there are such "Lefts" also in Scandinavia: I had an argument with Höglund on this point in 1910¹⁸⁵) assume the attitude of small-country petty bourgeoisie, pacifists and opportunists. For us, on the other hand, the decisive factor should be the standpoint of the *big countries* and the *revolutionary struggle* (which implies *also civil war*). The anarchists oppose a people's militia from the standpoint of the social revolution (abstracted from space and time). But for us the *cardinal* task now is to draw a sharp line of division between the Marxist Left, on the one hand, and the opportunists (and Kautskyites) and anarchists on the other.

I am simply indignant at one passage in A. P.'s article, namely, his statement that Mme. Roland-Holst's declaration of principles "fully accords with the viewpoint of the Social-Democratic Party"!

The conclusion I draw from this declaration of principles, as published in the *Berner Tagwacht* and *Internationale Korrespondenz*,¹⁸⁶ is that *under no circumstances* can we associate ourselves with Mme. Roland-Holst. In my opinion, Mme. Roland-Holst is a Dutch Kautsky or a Dutch Trotsky. These people "resolutely disagree" with the opportunists *in principle*, but *in practice* agree with them on all major issues!! Mme. Roland-Holst rejects the defence of the fatherland, i.e., rejects social-chauvinism. Good. *But she does not reject opportunism!* There is not a word against opportunism in the whole of her lengthy declaration! Not a single clear, unambiguous word about *revolutionary* means of struggle (but many phrases about "idealism", self-sacrifice, etc., which every scoundrel, including Troelstra and Kautsky, would endorse without hesitation)! Not a single word about a *break* with the opportunists! The "peace" slogan is completely *à la* Kautsky! Instead of this (and very consistently from the standpoint of Mme. Roland-Holst's unprincipled "declaration of principles") there is the advice to co-operate with the Social-Democratic Party *and* the Social-Democratic Labour Party! This means unity with the opportunists.

Every bit like our Mr. Trotsky: "In principle, *resolute* opposition to defence of the fatherland" but in practice—*unity* with the Chkheidze group in the Russian Duma (i.e., with the opponents of our group, exiled to Siberia; unity with the *best friends* of the Russian social-chauvinists).

No, no. Never, under no circumstances, will we agree in principle with Mme. Roland-Holst's declaration. Hers is an absolutely thoughtless, purely platonic and hypocritical internationalism. It consists entirely of half-measures and can be used (speaking politically) only for the formation of a "Left wing" (i.e., a "harmless minority", a "decorative Marxist ornament") in the old rotten and vile lackey parties (the liberal-labour parties).

Of course, we do not demand an *immediate* split in one or another party, for instance, in Sweden, Germany, or France. It is quite possible that a more favourable moment for this will come somewhat later (in Germany, for example). But as a matter of *principle*, we must insist on a complete break with opportunism. The *entire* struggle of our Party (and the European labour movement generally) must be directed

against opportunism. This is not a trend, not a current; it (opportunism) has now become the organised weapon of the bourgeoisie within the labour movement. And further: the problems of revolutionary struggle (tactics, methods, propaganda in the army, fraternisation in the trenches, *etc.*) should be *thoroughly* examined, discussed, thought out, tested and explained to the masses through the illegal press. Without this, all "recognition" of revolution remains a mere phrase. And we cannot go along with phrase-mongering radicals ("passivists" in Holland).

I trust, dear Comrade Wijnkoop, you will not take offense at these remarks. We must reach thorough understanding in order jointly to wage this *difficult* struggle.

Please show this letter to Comrade Pannekoek and the other Dutch friends.

Yours,
N. Lenin

P.S. I shall soon send you our Party's official resolution (of 1913) on the right of all nations to self-determination.¹⁸⁷ *That* is our demand and we should advocate it more vigorously than ever today, in our struggle against the social-chauvinists.

Written later than July 24, 1915

Sent from Zörenberg, Switzerland
to Zwolle, Holland

Vol. 35

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OPPORTUNISM AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL¹⁸⁸

I

Has the Second International really ceased to exist? This is being stubbornly denied by its most authoritative representatives, like Kautsky and Vandervelde. Their point of view is that, save for the rupture of relations, nothing has really happened; all is quite well.

To get at the truth of the matter, let us turn to the *Manifesto of the Basle Congress* of 1912, which applies particularly to the present imperialist world war and which was accepted by all the socialist parties of the world. No socialist, be it noted, will dare in theory deny the necessity of making a concrete, historical appraisal of every war.

Now that war has broken out, neither the avowed opportunists nor the Kautskyites dare repudiate the Basle Manifesto or compare its demands with the conduct of the socialist parties during the war. Why? Because the Manifesto completely exposes both.

There is not a single word in the Basle Manifesto about the defence of the fatherland, or about the difference between a war of aggression and a war of defence; there is nothing in it at all about what the opportunists and Kautskyites* of Germany and of the Quadruple Alliance at all crossroads are now dinning into the ears of the world.¹⁸⁹ Nor could it have said anything of the sort, because what it does say absolutely rules out the use of such concepts. It makes a

* This does not refer to the personalities of Kautsky's followers in Germany, but to the international type of pseudo-Marxist who vacillates between opportunism and radicalism, but is in reality only a fig-leaf for opportunism.

highly concrete reference to the series of political and economic conflicts which had for decades been preparing the ground for the present war, and which had become quite apparent in 1912, and which brought about the war in 1914. The Manifesto recalls the Russo-Austrian conflict for "hegemony in the Balkans"; the conflicts between Britain, France and Germany (between *all* these countries!) over their "policy of conquest in Asia Minor"; the Austro-Italian conflict over the "striving for domination" in Albania, etc. In short, the Manifesto defines all these as conflicts emanating from "capitalist imperialism". Thus, the Manifesto very clearly recognises the predatory, imperialist, reactionary, slave-driving character of the present war, i.e., a character which makes the idea of defending the fatherland theoretical nonsense and a practical absurdity. The big sharks are fighting each other to gobble up other peoples' "fatherlands". The Manifesto draws the inevitable conclusions from undisputed historical facts: the war "cannot be justified on the slightest pretext of its being in the interest of the people"; it is being prepared "for the sake of the capitalists' profits and the ambitions of dynasties". It would be a "crime" for the workers to "shoot each other down". That is what the Manifesto says.

The epoch of capitalist imperialism is one of ripe and rotten-ripe capitalism, which is about to collapse, and which is mature enough to make way for socialism. The period between 1789 and 1871 was one of progressive capitalism, when the overthrow of feudalism and absolutism, and liberation from the foreign yoke were on history's agenda. "Defence of the fatherland", i.e., defence against oppression, was permissible on these grounds, and on these *alone*. The term would be applicable even now in a war *against* the imperialist Great Powers, but it would be absurd to apply it to a war *between* the imperialist Great Powers, a war to decide who gets the biggest piece of the Balkan countries, Asia Minor, etc. It is not surprising, therefore, that the "socialists" who advocate "defence of the fatherland" in the present war shun the Basle Manifesto as a thief shuns the scene of his crime. For the Manifesto proves them to be social-chauvinists, i.e., socialists in words, but chauvinists in deeds, who are helping "their own" bourgeoisie to rob other countries and enslave other nations. That is the very substance

of chauvinism—to defend one's "own" fatherland even when its acts are aimed at enslaving other peoples' fatherlands.

Recognition that a war is being fought for national liberation implies one set of tactics; its recognition as an imperialist war, another. The Manifesto clearly points to the latter. The war, it says, "will bring on an economic and political crisis", which must be "utilised", not to lessen the crisis, not to defend the fatherland, but, on the contrary, to "rouse" the masses and "hasten the downfall of capitalist rule". It is impossible to hasten something for which historical conditions are not yet mature. The Manifesto declares that social revolution is *possible*, that the conditions for it *have matured*, and that it will break out precisely *in connection* with war. Referring to the examples of the *Paris Commune and the Revolution of 1905* in Russia, i.e., examples of mass strikes and of civil war, the Manifesto declares that "the ruling classes" fear "a proletarian revolution". It is sheer falsehood to claim, as Kautsky does, that the socialist attitude to the present war has not been defined. This question was not merely discussed, but decided in Basle, where the tactics of revolutionary proletarian mass struggle were recognised.

It is downright hypocrisy to ignore the Basle Manifesto altogether, or in its most essential parts, and to quote instead the speeches of leaders, or the resolutions of various parties, which, in the first place, *antedate* the Basle Congress, secondly were not decisions adopted by the parties of the whole world, and thirdly, applied to various *possible* wars, but never to the present war. The point is that the epoch of national wars between the big European powers has been superseded by an epoch of imperialist wars between them, and that the Basle Manifesto had to recognise this fact officially for the first time.

It would be a mistake to regard the Basle Manifesto as an empty threat, a collection of platitudes, as so much hot air. Those whom the Manifesto exposes would like to have it that way. But it is not true. The Manifesto is but the fruit of the great propaganda work carried on throughout the entire epoch of the Second International; it is but the summary of all that the socialists had disseminated among the masses in the hundreds of thousands of speeches, articles and manifestos in all languages. It merely reiterates what *Jules*

Guesde, for example, wrote in 1899, when he castigated socialist ministerialism in the event of war: he wrote of war provoked by the "capitalist pirates" (*En Garde!*, p. 175); it merely repeats what *Kautsky* wrote in 1909 in his *Road to Power*, where he admitted that the "peaceful" epoch was over and that the epoch of wars and revolutions was on. To represent the Basle Manifesto as so much talk, or as a mistake, is to regard as mere talk, or as a mistake, everything the socialists have done in the last twenty-five years. The opportunists and the Kautskyites find the contradiction between the Manifesto and its non-application so intolerable because it lays bare the profound contradictions in the work of the Second International. The relatively "peaceful" character of the period between 1871 and 1914 served to foster opportunism first as a *mood*, then as a *trend*, until finally it formed a *group or stratum* among the labour bureaucracy and petty-bourgeois fellow-travellers. These elements were able to gain control of the labour movement only by paying lip-service to revolutionary aims and revolutionary tactics. They were able to win the confidence of the masses only by their protestations that all this "peaceful" work served to *prepare* the proletarian revolution. This contradiction was a boil which just had to burst, and burst it has. Here is the question: is it worth trying, as Kautsky and Co. are doing, to force the pus back into the body for the sake of "unity" (with the pus), or should the pus be removed as quickly and as thoroughly as possible, regardless of the pang of pain caused by the process, to help bring about the complete recovery of the body of the labour movement?

Those who voted for war credits, entered cabinets and advocated defence of the fatherland in 1914-15 have patently betrayed socialism. Only hypocrites will deny it. This betrayal must be explained.

II

It would be absurd to regard the whole question as one of personalities. What has opportunism to do with it when men like *Plekhanov* and *Guesde*, etc.—asks *Kautsky* (*Die Neue Zeit*, May 28, 1915). What has opportunism to do with

it when *Kautsky*, etc.?—replies *Axelrod* on behalf of the opportunists of the Quadruple Alliance (*Die Krise der Sozialdemokratie*, Zurich, 1915, p. 21). This is a complete farce. *If the crisis of the whole movement is to be explained, an examination must be made of, firstly, the economic significance of the present policy; secondly, its underlying ideas; and thirdly, its connection with the history of the various trends in the socialist movement.*

What is the economic substance of defencism in the war of 1914-15? The bourgeoisie of *all* the big powers are waging the war to divide and exploit the world, and oppress other nations. A few crumbs of the bourgeoisie's huge profits may come the way of the small group of labour bureaucrats, labour aristocrats, and petty-bourgeois fellow-travellers. Social-chauvinism and opportunism have the same class basis, namely, the alliance of a small section of privileged workers with "their" national bourgeoisie *against* the working-class masses; the alliance between the lackeys of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie *against* the class the latter is exploiting.

Opportunism and social-chauvinism have the same political content, namely, class collaboration, repudiation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, repudiation of revolutionary action, unconditional acceptance of bourgeois legality, confidence in the bourgeoisie and lack of confidence in the proletariat. *Social-chauvinism is the direct continuation and consummation of British liberal-labour politics, of Millerandism and Bernsteinism.*

The struggle between the two main trends in the labour movement—revolutionary socialism and opportunist socialism—fills the entire period from 1889 to 1914. Even today there are two main trends on the attitude to war in every country. Let us drop the bourgeois and opportunist habit of referring to personalities. Let us take the *trends* in a number of countries. Let us take ten European countries: Germany, Britain, Russia, Italy, Holland, Sweden, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Belgium and France. In the first eight the division into opportunist and revolutionary trends corresponds to the division into social-chauvinists and internationalists. In Germany the strongholds of social-chauvinism are *Sozialistische Monatshefte* and Legien and Co.; in Britain the Fabians and the Labour Party (the I.L.P. has always been allied with them

and has supported their organ, and in this bloc it has always been weaker than the social-chauvinists, whereas three-sevenths of the B.S.P. are internationalists); in Russia this trend is represented by *Nasha Zarya* (now *Nashe Dyelo*), by the Organising Committee,¹⁹⁰ and by the Duma group led by Chkheidze; in Italy it is represented by the reformists with Bissolati at their head; in Holland, by Troelstra's party; in Sweden, by the majority of the Party led by Branting; in Bulgaria, by the so-called "Shiroki"¹⁹¹ socialists; in Switzerland by Greulich and Co. In *all* these countries it is the revolutionary Social-Democrats who have voiced a more or less vigorous protest against social-chauvinism. France and Belgium are the two exceptions; there internationalism also exists, but is very weak.

Social-chauvinism is opportunism in its finished form. It is quite ripe for an open, frequently vulgar, alliance with the bourgeoisie and the general staffs. It is this alliance that gives it great power and a monopoly of the legal press and of deceiving the masses. *It is absurd to go on regarding opportunism as an inner-party phenomenon.* It is ridiculous to think of carrying out the Basle resolution together with David, Legien, Hyndman, Plekhanov and Webb. Unity with the social-chauvinists means unity with one's "own" national bourgeoisie, which exploits other nations; it means splitting the international proletariat. This does not mean that an immediate break with the opportunists is possible everywhere; it means only that historically this break is imminent; that it is necessary and inevitable for the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat; that history, which has led us from "peaceful" capitalism to imperialist capitalism, has paved the way for this break. *Volentem ducunt fata, nolentem trahunt.**

III

This is very well understood by the shrewd representatives of the bourgeoisie. That is why they are so lavish in their praise of the present socialist parties, headed by the "defenders of the fatherland", i.e., the defenders of imperialist

* The fates lead the willing, drag the unwilling.—Ed.

plunder. That is why the social-chauvinist leaders are rewarded by their governments either with ministerial posts (in France and Britain), or with a monopoly of unhindered legal existence (in Germany and Russia). That is why in Germany, where the Social-Democratic Party was strongest and where its transformation into a national-liberal *counter-revolutionary* labour party has been most obvious, things have got to the stage where the public prosecutor qualifies the struggle between the "minority" and the "majority" as "incitement to class hatred"! That is why the greatest concern of the clever opportunists is to retain the former "unity" of the old parties, which did the bourgeoisie so many good turns in 1914 and 1915. The views held by these opportunists in all countries of the world were expounded with commendable frankness by a German Social-Democrat in an article signed "Monitor" which appeared in April 1915, in the reactionary magazine *Preussische Jahrbücher*. Monitor thinks that it would be very dangerous for the bourgeoisie if the Social-Democrats were to move *still further to the right*. "It must preserve its character as a labour party with socialist ideals; for the day it gives this up a new party will arise and adopt the programme the old party had disavowed, giving it a still more radical formulation" (*Preussische Jahrbücher*, 1915, No. 4, pp. 50-51).

Monitor hit the nail on the head. That is just what the British Liberals and the French Radicals have always wanted—phrases with a revolutionary ring to deceive the masses and induce them to place their trust in the Lloyd Georges, the Sembats, the Renaudels, the Legiens, and the Kautskys, in the men capable of preaching "defence of the fatherland" in a predatory war.

But Monitor represents only one variety of opportunism, the frank, crude, cynical variety. Others act with stealth, subtlety, and "honesty". Engels once said that for the working class "honest" opportunists were the greatest danger.¹⁹² Here is one example.

Kautsky wrote in *Die Neue Zeit* (November 26, 1915) as follows: "The opposition against the majority is growing; the masses are in an opposition mood. . . . After the war [only *after* the war?—N. L.] class antagonisms will become so sharp that radicalism will gain the upper hand among the

masses. . . . After the war (only *after* the war?—N. L.) we shall be menaced with the desertion of the radical elements from the Party and their influx into the party of anti-parliamentary [?? meaning extra-parliamentary] mass action. . . . Thus, our Party is splitting up into two extreme camps which have nothing in common." To preserve unity, Kautsky tries to persuade the majority in the Reichstag to allow the minority to make a few radical parliamentary speeches. That means Kautsky wants to use a few radical parliamentary speeches to reconcile the revolutionary masses with the opportunists, who have "nothing in common" with revolution, who have long had the leadership of the trade unions, and now, relying on their close alliance with the bourgeoisie and the government, have also captured the leadership of the Party. What essential difference is there between this and Monitor's "programme"? There is none, save for the sugary phrases which prostitute Marxism.

At a meeting of the Reichstag group on March 18, 1915, *Wurm*, a Kautskyite, "warned" against "pulling the strings too taut. There is growing opposition among the workers' masses to the majority of the group, we must keep to the Marxist [?! probably a misprint: this should read "the Monitor"] Centre" (*Klassenkampf gegen den Krieg! Material zum Fall Liebknecht*. Als Manuskript gedruckt,* p. 67). Thus we find that the revolutionary sentiment of the masses was admitted as a *tact* on behalf of *all* the Kautskyites (the so-called Centre) as early as *March 1915!* But eight and a half months later, Kautsky again comes forward with the proposal to "reconcile" the militant masses with the opportunist, counter-revolutionary party—and he wants to do this with a few revolutionary-sounding phrases!!

War is often useful in exposing what is rotten and discarding the conventionalities.

Let us compare the British Fabians with the German Kautskyites. Here is what a *real* Marxist, Frederick Engels, wrote about the former on January 18, 1893: ". . . a band of careerists who have understanding enough to realise the inevitability of the social revolution, but who could not possibly

* *The Class Struggle Against the War. Material on the Liebknecht Case*. Printed for private circulation only.—Ed.

entrust this gigantic task to the raw proletariat alone... Fear of the revolution is their fundamental principle" (Letters to Sorge, p. 390).

And on November 11, 1893, he wrote: "...these haughty bourgeois who kindly condescend to emancipate the proletariat from above if only it would have sense enough to realise that such a raw, uneducated mass cannot liberate itself and can achieve nothing without the kindness of these clever lawyers, writers and sentimental old women" (ibid., p. 401).

In theory Kautsky looks down upon the Fabians with the contempt of a Pharisee for a poor sinner, for he swears by "Marxism". But what actual difference is there between the two? Both signed the Basle Manifesto, and both treated it as Wilhelm II treated Belgian neutrality. But Marx all his life castigated those who strove to quench the revolutionary spirit of the workers.

Kautsky has put forward his new theory of "ultra-imperialism" in opposition to the revolutionary Marxists. By this he means that the "rivalries of national finance capitals" are to be superseded by the "joint exploitation of the world by international finance capital" (*Die Neue Zeit*, April 30, 1915). But he adds: "We do not as yet have sufficient data to decide whether this new phase of capitalism is possible." On the grounds of the mere assumption of a "new phase", which he does not even dare declare definitely "possible", the inventor of this "phase" rejects his own revolutionary declarations as well as the revolutionary tasks and revolutionary tactics of the proletariat—rejects them *now*, in the "phase" of a crisis, which *has already broken out*, the phase of war and the unprecedented aggravation of class antagonisms! Is this not Fabianism at its most abominable?

Axelrod, the leader of the Russian Kautskyites, says, "The centre of gravity of the problem of internationalising the proletarian movement for emancipation is the internationalisation of everyday practice"; for example, "labour protection and insurance legislation must become the object of the workers' international organisation and action" (*Axelrod, The Crisis of Social-Democracy*, Zurich, 1915, pp. 39-40). Not only Legien, David and the Webbs, but even Lloyd George himself, and Naumann, Briand and Milyukov would quite obviously subscribe to such "internationalism". As in 1912, Axelrod is

quite prepared to utter the most revolutionary phrases for the very distant future, if the future International "comes out [against the governments in the event of war] and raises a revolutionary storm". How brave we are! But when it comes to supporting and developing the incipient revolutionary ferment among the masses *now*, Axelrod says that these tactics of revolutionary mass action "would be justified to some extent if we were on the very eve of the social revolution, as was the case in Russia, for example, where the student demonstrations of 1901 heralded the approaching decisive battles against absolutism". At the present moment, however, all that is "utopia", "Bakuninism", etc. This is fully in the spirit of Kolb, David, Südekum and Legien.

What dear old Axelrod forgets is that in 1901 nobody in Russia knew, or could have known, that the first "decisive battle" would take place four years later—please note, *four* years later—and that it would be "indecisive". Nevertheless, we revolutionary Marxists alone were right at that time: we ridiculed the Krichevskys and Martynovs, who called for an immediate assault. We merely advised the workers to kick out the opportunists everywhere and to exert every effort to support, sharpen and extend the demonstrations and other mass revolutionary action. The present situation in Europe is absolutely similar. It would be absurd to call for an "immediate" assault; but it would be a shame to call oneself a Social-Democrat and not to advise the workers to break with the opportunists and exert all their efforts to strengthen, deepen, extend and sharpen the incipient revolutionary movement and demonstrations. Revolution never falls ready-made from the skies, and when revolutionary ferment starts no one can say whether and when it will lead to a "real", "genuine" revolution. Kautsky and Axelrod are giving the workers old, shop-worn, counter-revolutionary advice. Kautsky and Axelrod are feeding the masses with hopes that the *future* International will surely be revolutionary, but they are doing this for the sole purpose of protecting, camouflaging and prettifying the *present* domination of the counter-revolutionary elements—the Legiens, Davids, Vanderveldes and Hyndmans. Is it not obvious that "unity" with Legien and Co. is the best means of preparing the "future" revolutionary International?

"It would be folly to strive to convert the world war into civil war," declares *David*, the leader of the German opportunists (*Die Sozialdemokratie und der Weltkrieg*, 1915, p. 172), in reply to the manifesto of the Central Committee of our Party, November 1, 1914. This manifesto says, *inter alia*:

"However difficult such a transformation may seem at any given moment, socialists will never relinquish systematic, persistent and undeviating preparatory work in this direction now that war has become a fact."*

(This passage is also quoted by *David*, p. 171.) A month before *David's* book appeared our Party published its resolutions defining "systematic preparation" as follows: (1) refusal to vote for credits; (2) disruption of the class truce; (3) formation of illegal organisations; (4) support for solidarity manifestations in the trenches; (5) support for all revolutionary mass action.**

David is almost as brave as *Axelrod*. In 1912, he did not think that reference to the Paris Commune in anticipation of the war was "folly".

Plekhanov, a typical representative of the Entente social-chauvinists, takes the same view of revolutionary tactics as *David*. He calls them a "farcical dream". But listen to *Kolb*, an avowed opportunist, who wrote: "The consequence of the tactics of *Liebknecht's* followers would be that the struggle within the German nation would be brought up to boiling point" (*Die Sozialdemokratie am Scheidewege*, p. 50).

But what is a struggle brought up to boiling point if not civil war?

If our Central Committee's tactics, which broadly coincide with those of the *Zimmerwald Left*,¹⁹³ were "folly", "dreams", "adventurism", "Bakuninism"—as *David*, *Plekhanov*, *Axelrod*, *Kautsky* and others have asserted—they could never lead to a "struggle within a nation", let alone to a struggle brought up to boiling point. Nowhere in the world have anarchist phrases brought about a struggle within a nation. But the facts indicate that precisely in 1915, as a result of the crisis produced by the war, revolutionary ferment among the masses is on the increase, and there is a spread of strikes and

* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 34.—Ed.

** *Ibid.*, pp. 160-61.—Ed.

political demonstrations in Russia, strikes in Italy and in Britain, and hunger demonstrations and political demonstrations in Germany. Are these not the beginnings of revolutionary mass struggles?

*The sum and substance of Social-Democracy's practical programme in this war is to support, develop, extend and sharpen mass revolutionary action, and to set up illegal organisations, for without them there is no way of telling the truth to the masses of people even in the "free" countries. The rest is either lies or mere verbiage, whatever its trappings of opportunist or pacifist theory.**

When we are told that these "Russian tactics" (David's expression) are not suitable for Europe, we usually reply by pointing to the facts. On October 30, a delegation of Berlin women comrades called on the Party's Presidium in Berlin, and stated that "now that we have a large organising apparatus it is much easier to distribute illegal pamphlets and leaflets and to organise 'banned meetings' than it was under the Anti-Socialist Law... Ways and means are not lacking, but the will evidently is" (*Berner Tagwacht*, 1915, No. 271).

Had these bad comrades been led astray by the Russian "sectarians", etc.? Is it these comrades who represent the real masses, or is it Legien and Kautsky? Legien, who in his report on January 27, 1915, fumed against the "anarchistic" idea of forming underground organisations; or Kautsky, who has become such a counter-revolutionary that on November 26, four days before the 10,000-strong demonstration in Berlin, he denounced street demonstrations as "adventurism"!!

We've had enough of empty talk, and of prostituted "Marxism" à la Kautsky! After twenty-five years of the Second International, after the Basle Manifesto, the workers will no longer believe fine words. Opportunism is rotten-

* At the International Women's Congress held in Berne in March 1915, the representatives of the Central Committee of our Party urged that it was absolutely necessary to set up illegal organisations. This was rejected. The British women laughed at this proposal and praised British "liberty". But a few months later British newspapers, like the *Labour Leader*,¹⁹¹ reached us with blank spaces, and then came the news of police raids, confiscation of pamphlets, arrests, and Draconian sentences imposed on comrades who had spoken in Britain about peace, nothing but peace!

ripe; it has been transformed into social-chauvinism and has definitely deserted to the bourgeois camp. It has severed its spiritual and political ties with Social-Democracy. It will also break off its organisational ties. The workers are already demanding "illegal" pamphlets and "banned" meetings, i.e., underground organisations to support the revolutionary mass movement. Only when "war against war" is conducted on these lines does it cease to be empty talk and becomes Social-Democratic work. In spite of all difficulties, set-backs, mistakes, delusions and interruptions, this work will lead humanity to the victorious proletarian revolution.

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IMPERIALISM, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM

A POPULAR OUTLINE

(*Excerpts*)

IX. CRITIQUE OF IMPERIALISM

By the critique of imperialism, in the broad sense of the term, we mean the attitude of the different classes of society towards imperialist policy in connection with their general ideology.

The enormous dimensions of finance capital concentrated in a few hands and creating an extraordinarily dense and widespread network of relationships and connections which subordinates not only the small and medium, but also the very small capitalists and small masters, on the one hand, and the increasingly intense struggle waged against other national state groups of financiers for the division of the world and domination over other countries, on the other hand, cause the propertied classes to go over entirely to the side of imperialism. "General" enthusiasm over the prospects of imperialism, furious defence of it and painting it in the brightest colours—such are the signs of the times. Imperialist ideology also penetrates the working class. No Chinese Wall separates it from the other classes. The leaders of the present-day, so-called, "Social-Democratic" Party of Germany are justly called "social-imperialists", that is, socialists in words and imperialists in deeds; but as early as 1902, Hobson noted the existence in Britain of "Fabian imperialists" who belonged to the opportunist Fabian Society.

Bourgeois scholars and publicists usually come out in defence of imperialism in a somewhat veiled form; they obscure its complete domination and its deep-going roots, strive to push specific and secondary details into the forefront and

do their very best to distract attention from essentials by means of absolutely ridiculous schemes for "reform", such as police supervision of the trusts or banks, etc. Cynical and frank imperialists who are bold enough to admit the absurdity of the idea of reforming the fundamental characteristics of imperialism are a rarer phenomenon.

Here is an example. The German imperialists attempt, in the magazine *Archives of World Economy*, to follow the national emancipation movements in the colonies, particularly, of course, in colonies other than those belonging to Germany. They note the unrest and the protest movements in India, the movement in Natal (South Africa), in the Dutch East Indies, etc. One of them, commenting on an English report of a conference held on June 28-30, 1910, of representatives of various subject nations and races, of peoples of Asia, Africa and Europe who are under foreign rule, writes as follows in appraising the speeches delivered at this conference: "We are told that we must fight imperialism; that the ruling states should recognise the right of subject peoples to independence; that an international tribunal should supervise the fulfilment of treaties concluded between the great powers and weak peoples. Further than the expression of these pious wishes they do not go. We see no trace of understanding of the fact that imperialism is inseparably bound up with capitalism in its present form and that, therefore (!), an open struggle against imperialism would be hopeless, unless, perhaps, the fight were to be confined to protests against certain of its especially abhorrent excesses."* Since the reform of the basis of imperialism is a deception, a "pious wish", since the bourgeois representatives of the oppressed nations go no "further" forward, the bourgeois representative of an oppressing nation goes "further" *backward*, to servility towards imperialism under cover of the claim to be "scientific". That is also "logic"!

The questions as to whether it is possible to reform the basis of imperialism, whether to go forward to the further intensification and deepening of the antagonisms which it engenders, or backward, towards allaying these antagonisms, are fundamental questions in the critique of imperialism.

* *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Bd. II, S. 193.

Since the specific political features of imperialism are reaction everywhere and increased national oppression due to the oppression of the financial oligarchy and the elimination of free competition, a petty-bourgeois-democratic opposition to imperialism arose at the beginning of the twentieth century in nearly all imperialist countries. Kautsky not only did not trouble to oppose, was not only unable to oppose this petty-bourgeois reformist opposition, which is really reactionary in its economic basis, but became merged with it in practice, and this is precisely where Kautsky and the broad international Kautskian trend deserted Marxism.

In the United States, the imperialist war waged against Spain in 1898 stirred up the opposition of the "anti-imperialists", the last of the Mohicans of bourgeois democracy, who declared this war to be "criminal", regarded the annexation of foreign territories as a violation of the Constitution, declared that the treatment of Aguinaldo, leader of the Filipinos (the Americans promised him the independence of his country, but later landed troops and annexed it), was "Jingo treachery", and quoted the words of Lincoln: "When the white man governs himself, that is self-government; but when he governs himself and also governs others it is no longer self-government; it is despotism."* But as long as all this criticism shrank from recognising the inseverable bond between imperialism and the trusts, and, therefore, between imperialism and the foundations of capitalism, while it shrank from joining the forces engendered by large-scale capitalism and its development—it remained a "pious wish".

This is also the main attitude taken by Hobson in his critique of imperialism. Hobson anticipated Kautsky in protesting against the "inevitability of imperialism" argument, and in urging the necessity of "increasing the consuming capacity" of the people (under capitalism!). The petty-bourgeois point of view in the critique of imperialism, the omnipotence of the banks, the financial oligarchy, etc., is adopted by the authors I have often quoted, such as Agahd, A. Lansburgh, L. Eschwege, and among the French writers Victor Berard, author of a superficial book entitled *England*

* J. Patouillet, *L'impérialisme américain*, Dijon, 1904, p. 272.

and *Imperialism* which appeared in 1900. All these authors, who make no claim to be Marxists, contrast imperialism with free competition and democracy, condemn the Baghdad railway scheme, which is leading to conflicts and war, utter "pious wishes" for peace, etc. This applies also to the compiler of international stock and share issue statistics, A. Neymarck, who, after calculating the thousands of millions of francs representing "international" securities, exclaimed in 1912: "Is it possible to believe that peace may be disturbed... that, in the face of these enormous figures, anyone would risk starting a war?"*

Such simple-mindedness on the part of the bourgeois economists is not surprising; moreover, *it is in their interest* to pretend to be so naïve and to talk "seriously" about peace under imperialism. But what remains of Kautsky's Marxism, when, in 1914, 1915 and 1916, he takes up the same bourgeois-reformist point of view and affirms that "everybody is agreed" (imperialists, pseudo-socialists and social-pacifists) on the matter of peace? Instead of an analysis of imperialism and an exposure of the depths of its contradictions, we have nothing but a reformist "pious wish" to wave them aside, to evade them.

Here is a sample of Kautsky's economic criticism of imperialism. He takes the statistics of the British export and import trade with Egypt for 1872 and 1912; it seems that this export and import trade has grown more slowly than British foreign trade as a whole. From this Kautsky concludes that "we have no reason to suppose that British trade with Egypt would have been less developed as a result of the mere operation of economic factors, without military occupation". "The urge of capital to expand... can be best promoted, not by the violent methods of imperialism, but by peaceful democracy."**

This argument of Kautsky's, which is repeated in every key by his Russian armour-bearer (and Russian shielder of the social-chauvinists), Mr. Spectator, constitutes the basis of

* *Bulletin de l'Institut International de Statistique*, T. XIX, livr. II, p. 225.

** Kautsky, *Nationalstaat, imperialistischer Staat und Staatenbund*, Nürnberg, 1915, S. 70, 72.

Kautskian critique of imperialism, and that is why we must deal with it in greater detail. We will begin with a quotation from Hilferding, whose conclusions Kautsky on many occasions, and notably in April 1915, has declared to have been "unanimously adopted by all socialist theoreticians".

"It is not the business of the proletariat," writes Hilferding, "to contrast the more progressive capitalist policy with that of the now bygone era of free trade and of hostility towards the state. The reply of the proletariat to the economic policy of finance capital, to imperialism, cannot be free trade, but socialism. The aim of proletarian policy cannot today be the ideal of restoring free competition—which has now become a reactionary ideal—but the complete elimination of competition by the abolition of capitalism."*

Kautsky broke with Marxism by advocating in the epoch of finance capital a "reactionary ideal", "peaceful democracy", "the mere operation of economic factors", for *objectively* this ideal drags us back from monopoly to non-monopoly capitalism, and is a reformist swindle.

Trade with Egypt (or with any other colony or semi-colony) "would have grown more" *without* military occupation, without imperialism, and without finance capital. What does this mean? That capitalism would have developed more rapidly if free competition had not been restricted by monopolies in general, or by the "connections", yoke (i.e., also the monopoly) of finance capital, or by the monopolist possession of colonies by certain countries?

Kautsky's argument can have no other meaning; and *this* "meaning" is meaningless. Let us assume that free competition, without any sort of monopoly, *would* have developed capitalism and trade more rapidly. But the more rapidly trade and capitalism develop, the greater is the concentration of production and capital which *gives rise* to monopoly. And monopolies have *already* arisen—precisely *out of* free competition! Even if monopolies have now begun to retard progress, it is not an argument in favour of free competition, which has become impossible after it has given rise to monopoly.

* *Finance Capital*, p. 567.

Whichever way one turns Kautsky's argument, one will find nothing in it except reaction and bourgeois reformism.

Even if we correct this argument and say, as Spectator says, that the trade of the colonies with Britain is now developing more slowly than their trade with other countries, it does not save Kautsky; for it is *also* monopoly, *also* imperialism that is beating Great Britain, only it is the monopoly and imperialism of another country (America, Germany). It is known that the cartels have given rise to a new and peculiar form of protective tariffs, i.e., goods suitable for export are protected (Engels noted this in Vol. III of *Capital*). It is known, too, that the cartels and finance capital have a system peculiar to themselves, that of "exporting goods at cut-rate prices", or "dumping", as the English call it: within a given country the cartel sells its goods at high monopoly prices, but sells them abroad at a much lower price to undercut the competitor, to enlarge its own production to the utmost, etc. If Germany's trade with the British colonies is developing more rapidly than Great Britain's, it only proves that German imperialism is younger, stronger and better organised than British imperialism, is superior to it; but it by no means proves the "superiority" of free trade, for it is not a fight between free trade and protection and colonial dependence, but between two rival imperialisms, two monopolies, two groups of finance capital. The superiority of German imperialism over British imperialism is more potent than the wall of colonial frontiers or of protective tariffs: to use this as an "argument" *in favour* of free trade and "peaceful democracy" is banal, it means forgetting the essential features and characteristics of imperialism, substituting petty-bourgeois reformism for Marxism.

It is interesting to note that even the bourgeois economist, A. Lansburgh, whose criticism of imperialism is as petty-bourgeois as Kautsky's, nevertheless got closer to a more scientific study of trade statistics. He did not compare one single country, chosen at random, and one single colony with the other countries; he examined the export trade of an imperialist country: (1) with countries which are financially dependent upon it, and borrow money from it; and (2) with countries which are financially independent. He obtained the following results:

Export Trade of Germany (000,000 marks)

		1889	1908	Per cent increase
To countries financially dependent on Germany	Rumania	48.2	70.8	47
	Portugal	19.0	32.8	73
	Argentina	60.7	147.0	143
	Brazil	48.7	84.5	73
	Chile	28.3	52.4	85
	Turkey	29.9	64.0	114
<i>Total</i>		<i>234.8</i>	<i>451.5</i>	<i>92</i>
To countries financially independent of Germany	Great Britain	651.8	997.4	53
	France	210.2	437.9	108
	Belgium	137.2	322.8	135
	Switzerland	177.4	401.1	127
	Australia	21.2	64.5	205
	Dutch East Indies	8.8	40.7	363
<i>Total</i>		<i>1,206.6</i>	<i>2,264.4</i>	<i>87</i>

Lansburgh did not draw *conclusions* and therefore, strangely enough, failed to observe that *if* the figures prove anything at all, they prove that *he is wrong*, for the exports to countries financially dependent on Germany have grown *more rapidly*, if only slightly, than exports to the countries which are financially independent. (I emphasise the "if", for Lansburgh's figures are far from complete.)

Tracing the connection between exports and loans, Lansburgh writes:

"In 1890-91, a Rumanian loan was floated through the German banks, which had already in previous years made advances on this loan. It was used chiefly to purchase railway materials in Germany. In 1891, German exports to Rumania amounted to 55 million marks. The following year they dropped to 39.4 million marks and, with fluctuations, to 25.4 million in 1900. Only in very recent years have they regained the level of 1891, thanks to two new loans.

"German exports to Portugal rose, following the loans of 1888-89, to 21,100,000 (1890); then, in the two following years, they dropped to 16,200,000 and 7,400,000, and regained their former level only in 1903.

"The figures of German trade with Argentina are still more striking. Loans were floated in 1888 and 1890; German exports to Argentina reached 60,700,000 marks (1889). Two years later they amounted to only 18,600,000 marks, less than

one-third of the previous figure. It was not until 1901 that they regained and surpassed the level of 1889, and then only as a result of new loans floated by the state and by municipalities, with advances to build power stations, and with other credit operations.

"Exports to Chile, as a consequence of the loan of 1889, rose to 45,200,000 marks (in 1892), and a year later dropped to 22,500,000 marks. A new Chilean loan floated by the German banks in 1906 was followed by a rise of exports to 84,700,000 marks in 1907, only to fall again to 52,400,000 marks in 1908."*

From these facts Lansburgh draws the amusing petty-bourgeois moral of how unstable and irregular export trade is when it is bound up with loans, how bad it is to invest capital abroad instead of "naturally" and "harmoniously" developing home industry, how "costly" are the millions in bakhshish that Krupp has to pay in floating foreign loans, etc. But the facts tell us clearly: the increase in exports is connected with *just these* swindling tricks of finance capital, which is not concerned with bourgeois morality, but with skinning the ox twice—first, it pockets the profits from the loan; then it pockets other profits from the *same* loan which the borrower uses to make purchases from Krupp, or to purchase railway material from the Steel Syndicate, etc.

I repeat that I do not by any means consider Lansburgh's figures to be perfect; but I had to quote them because they are more scientific than Kautsky's and Spectator's and because Lansburgh showed the correct way to approach the question. In discussing the significance of finance capital in regard to exports, etc., one must be able to single out the connection of exports especially and solely with the tricks of the financiers, especially and solely with the sale of goods by cartels, etc. Simply to compare colonies with non-colonies, one imperialism with another imperialism, one semi-colony or colony (Egypt) with all other countries, is to evade and to obscure the very *essence* of the question.

Kautsky's theoretical critique of imperialism has nothing in common with Marxism and serves only as a preamble to propaganda for peace and unity with the opportunists and the social-chauvinists, precisely for the reason that it evades

* *Die Bank*, 1909, 2, S. 819 et seq.

and obscures the very profound and fundamental contradictions of imperialism: the contradictions between monopoly and free competition which exists side by side with it, between the gigantic "operations" (and gigantic profits) of finance capital and "honest" trade in the free market, the contradiction between cartels and trusts, on the one hand, and non-cartelised industry, on the other, etc.

The notorious theory of "ultra-imperialism", invented by Kautsky, is just as reactionary. Compare his arguments on this subject in 1915, with Hobson's arguments in 1902.

Kautsky: "...Cannot the present imperialist policy be supplanted by a new, ultra-imperialist policy, which will introduce the joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital in place of the mutual rivalries of national finance capitals? Such a new phase of capitalism is at any rate conceivable. Can it be achieved? Sufficient premises are still lacking to enable us to answer this question."*

Hobson: "Christendom thus laid out in a few great federal empires, each with a retinue of uncivilised dependencies, seems to many the most legitimate development of present tendencies, and one which would offer the best hope of permanent peace on an assured basis of inter-Imperialism."

Kautsky called ultra-imperialism or super-imperialism what Hobson, thirteen years earlier, described as inter-imperialism. Except for coining a new and clever catchword, replacing one Latin prefix by another, the only progress Kautsky has made in the sphere of "scientific" thought is that he gave out as Marxism what Hobson, in effect, described as the cant of English parsons. After the Anglo-Boer War it was quite natural for this highly honourable caste to exert their main efforts to *console* the British middle class and the workers who had lost many of their relatives on the battlefields of South Africa and who were obliged to pay higher taxes in order to guarantee still higher profits for the British financiers. And what better consolation could there be than the theory that imperialism is not so bad; that it stands close to inter- (or ultra-) imperialism, which can ensure permanent peace? No matter what the good intentions of the English parsons, or of sentimental Kautsky, may have been, the only objective, i.e., real, social significance of Kautsky's "theory" is this:

* *Die Neue Zeit*, April 30, 1915, S. 144.

it is a most reactionary method of consoling the masses with hopes of permanent peace being possible under capitalism, by distracting their attention from the sharp antagonisms and acute problems of the present times, and directing it towards illusory prospects of an imaginary "ultra-imperialism" of the future. Deception of the masses—that is all there is in Kautsky's "Marxist" theory.

Indeed, it is enough to compare well-known and indisputable facts to become convinced of the utter falsity of the prospects which Kautsky tries to conjure up before the German workers (and the workers of all lands). Let us consider India, Indo-China and China. It is known that these three colonial and semi-colonial countries, with a population of six to seven hundred million, are subjected to the exploitation of the finance capital of several imperialist powers: Great Britain, France, Japan, the U.S.A., etc. Let us assume that these imperialist countries form alliances against one another in order to protect or enlarge their possessions, their interests and their spheres of influence in these Asiatic states; these alliances will be "inter-imperialist", or "ultra-imperialist" alliances. Let us assume that *all* the imperialist countries conclude an alliance for the "peaceful" division of these parts of Asia; this alliance would be an alliance of "internationally united finance capital". There are actual examples of alliances of this kind in the history of the twentieth century—the attitude of the powers to China, for instance. We ask, is it "conceivable", assuming that the capitalist system remains intact—and this is precisely the assumption that Kautsky does make—that such alliances would be more than temporary, that they would eliminate friction, conflicts and struggle in every possible form?

The question has only to be presented clearly for any other than a negative answer to be impossible. This is because the only conceivable basis under capitalism for the division of spheres of influence, interests, colonies, etc., is a calculation of the *strength* of those participating, their general economic, financial, military strength, etc. And the strength of these participants in the division does not change to an equal degree, for the *even* development of different undertakings, trusts, branches of industry, or countries is impossible under capitalism. Half a century ago Germany was a miserable, insignificant country, if her capitalist strength is compared with

that of the Britain of that time; Japan compared with Russia in the same way. Is it "conceivable" that in ten or twenty years' time the relative strength of the imperialist powers will have remained *unchanged*? It is out of the question.

Therefore, in the realities of the capitalist system, and not in the banal philistine fantasies of English parsons, or of the German "Marxist" Kautsky, "inter-imperialist" or "ultra-imperialist" alliances, no matter what form they may assume, whether of one imperialist coalition against another, or of a general alliance embracing *all* the imperialist powers, are *inevitably* nothing more than a "truce" in periods between wars. Peaceful alliances prepare the ground for wars, and in their turn grow out of wars; the one conditions the other, producing alternating forms of peaceful and non-peaceful struggle on *one and the same* basis of imperialist connections and relations within world economics and world politics. But in order to pacify the workers and reconcile them with the social-chauvinists who have deserted to the side of the bourgeoisie, over-wise Kautsky *separates* one link of a single chain from another, separates the present peaceful (and ultra-imperialist, nay, ultra-ultra-imperialist) alliance of *all* the powers for the "pacification" of China (remember the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion¹⁹⁵) from the non-peaceful conflict of tomorrow, which will prepare the ground for another "peaceful" general alliance for the partition, say, of Turkey, on the day after tomorrow, *etc., etc.* Instead of showing the living connection between periods of imperialist peace and periods of imperialist war, Kautsky presents the workers with a lifeless abstraction in order to reconcile them to their lifeless leaders.

An American writer, Hill, in his *A History of the Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe* refers in his preface to the following periods in the recent history of diplomacy: (1) the era of revolution; (2) the constitutional movement; (3) the present era of "commercial imperialism".* Another writer divides the history of Great Britain's "world policy" since 1870 into four periods: (1) the first Asiatic period (that of the struggle against Russia's advance in Central Asia towards India); (2) the African period (ap-

* David Jayne Hill, *A History of the Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe*, Vol. I, p. x.

proximately 1885-1902): that of the struggle against France for the partition of Africa (the "Fashoda incident" of 1898 which brought her within a hair's breadth of war with France¹⁹⁶); (3) the second Asiatic period (alliance with Japan against Russia); and (4) the "European" period, chiefly anti-German.* "The political patrol clashes take place on the financial field," wrote the banker, Riesser, in 1905, in showing how French finance capital operating in Italy was preparing the way for a political alliance of these countries, and how a conflict was developing between Germany and Great Britain over Persia, between all the European capitalists over Chinese loans, etc. Behold, the living reality of peaceful "ultra-imperialist" alliances in their inseverable connection with ordinary imperialist conflicts!

Kautsky's obscuring of the deepest contradictions of imperialism, which inevitably boils down to painting imperialism in bright colours, leaves its traces in this writer's criticism of the political features of imperialism. Imperialism is the epoch of finance capital and of monopolies, which introduce everywhere the striving for domination, not for freedom. Whatever the political system the result of these tendencies is everywhere reaction and an extreme intensification of antagonisms in this field. Particularly intensified become the yoke of national oppression and the striving for annexations, i.e., the violation of national independence (for annexation is nothing but the violation of the right of nations to self-determination). Hilferding rightly notes the connection between imperialism and the intensification of national oppression. "In the newly opened-up countries," he writes, "the capital imported into them intensifies antagonisms and excites against the intruders the constantly growing resistance of the peoples who are awakening to national consciousness; this resistance can easily develop into dangerous measures against foreign capital. The old social relations become completely revolutionised, the age-long agrarian isolation of 'nations without history' is destroyed and they are drawn into the capitalist whirlpool. Capitalism itself gradually provides the subjugated with the means and resources for their emancipation and they set out to achieve the goal which once seemed highest to the

* Dr. Siegmund Schilder, *Entwicklungstendenzen der Weltwirtschaft*, Berlin 1912. - Ed.

European nations: the creation of a united national state as a means to economic and cultural freedom. This movement for national independence threatens European capital in its most valuable and most promising fields of exploitation, and European capital can maintain its domination only by continually increasing its military forces.”*

To this must be added that it is not only in newly opened-up countries, but also in the old, that imperialism is leading to annexation, to increased national oppression, and, consequently, also to increasing resistance. While objecting to the intensification of political reaction by imperialism, Kautsky leaves in the shade a question that has become particularly urgent, viz., the impossibility of unity with the opportunists in the epoch of imperialism. While objecting to annexations, he presents his objections in a form that is most acceptable and least offensive to the opportunists. He addresses himself to a German audience, yet he obscures the most topical and important point, for instance, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany. In order to appraise this “mental aberration” of Kautsky’s I shall take the following example. Let us suppose that a Japanese condemns the annexation of the Philippines by the Americans. The question is: will many believe that he does so because he has a horror of annexations as such, and not because he himself has a desire to annex the Philippines? And shall we not be constrained to admit that the “fight” the Japanese is waging against annexations can be regarded as being sincere and politically honest only if he fights against the annexation of Korea by Japan, and urges freedom for Korea to secede from Japan?

Kautsky’s theoretical analysis of imperialism, as well as his economic and political critique of imperialism, are permeated *through and through* with a spirit, absolutely irreconcilable with Marxism, of obscuring and glossing over the fundamental contradictions of imperialism and with a striving to preserve at all costs the crumbling unity with opportunism in the European working-class movement.

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* *Finance Capital*, p. 487.

A CARICATURE OF MARXISM AND IMPERIALIST ECONOMISM¹⁹⁷

(Excerpts)

5. "MONISM AND DUALISM"

Reproaching us for "interpreting the demand dualistically", P. Kievsky writes:

"Monistic *action* of the International is replaced by dualistic *propaganda*."

That sounds quite Marxist and materialistic: monistic action is contrasted to "dualistic" propaganda. Unfortunately, closer examination reveals that it is *verbal* "monism", like the "monism" of Dühring. "If I include a shoe brush in the *unity* mammals," Engels wrote exposing Dühring's "monism", "this does not help it to get mammary glands."¹⁹⁸

This means that only such things, qualities, phenomena and actions that are *a unity* in objective reality can be *declared* "a unity". It is this "*detail*" that our author overlooks!

He thinks we are "dualists", first, because what we demand, primarily, of the workers of the oppressed nations—this refers to the national question only—*differs* from what we demand of the workers of the oppressor nations.

To determine whether P. Kievsky's "monism" is the same as Dühring's, let us examine *objective realities*.

Is the *actual* condition of the workers in the oppressor and in the oppressed nations the same, from the standpoint of the national question?

No, it is not the same.

(1) *Economically*, the difference is that sections of the working class in the oppressor nations receive crumbs from the *superprofits* the bourgeoisie of these nations obtains by extra exploitation of the workers of the oppressed nations. Besides, economic statistics show that here a *larger* percentage of the workers become "straw bosses" than is the case

in the oppressed nations, a *larger* percentage rise to the labour *aristocracy*.^{*} That is a fact. To a *certain degree* the workers of the oppressor nations are partners of *their own* bourgeoisie in plundering the workers (and the mass of the population) of the oppressed nations.

(2) *Politically*, the difference is that, compared with the workers of the oppressed nations, they occupy a *privileged* position in many spheres of political life.

(3) *Ideologically*, or spiritually, the difference is that they are taught, at school and in life, disdain and contempt for the workers of the oppressed nations. This has been *experienced*, for example, by every Great Russian who has been brought up or who has lived among Great Russians.

Thus, *all along the line* there are differences in objective reality, i.e., "dualism" in the objective world that is independent of the will and consciousness of individuals.

That being so, how are we to regard P. Kievsky's assertion about the "monistic action of the International"?

It is a hollow, high-sounding phrase, no more.

In *real life* the International is composed of workers *divided* into oppressor and oppressed nations. *If* its action is *to be monistic*, its propaganda must *not* be the same for both. That is how we should regard the matter in the light of real (not Dühringian) "monism", Marxist materialism.

An example? We cited the example of Norway (in the legal press over two years ago!), and no one has challenged it. In this concrete case taken from life, the *action* of the Norwegian and Swedish workers was "monistic", unified, internationalist *only* because and insofar as the Swedish workers *unconditionally* championed Norway's freedom to secede, while the Norwegian workers raised the question of secession *only conditionally*. Had the Swedish workers not supported Norway's freedom of secession *unconditionally*, they would have been *chauvinists*, accomplices of the chauvinist Swedish landlords, who wanted to "keep" Norway by force, by war. Had the Norwegian workers *not* raised the question of secession *conditionally*, i.e., allowing even Social-Democratic

^{*} See, for instance, Hourwich's book on immigration and the condition of the working class in America, *Immigration and Labour*.
-Ed.

Party members to conduct propaganda and vote against secession, they would have failed in their internationalist duty and would have sunk to narrow, *bourgeois* Norwegian nationalism. Why? Because the secession was being effected by the *bourgeoisie*, not by the prolétariat! Because the Norwegian bourgeoisie (as every other) *always* strives to drive a wedge between the workers of its own and an "alien" country! Because for the class-conscious workers every democratic demand (including self-determination) is *subordinated* to the supreme interests of socialism. For example, if Norway's secession from Sweden had created the certainty or probability of war between Britain and Germany, the Norwegian workers, *for that reason alone*, would have had to oppose secession. The Swedish workers would have had the right and the opportunity, without ceasing to be socialists, to agitate against secession, but *only* if they had waged a systematic, consistent and constant struggle *against* the Swedish Government for Norway's *freedom* to secede. Otherwise the Norwegian workers and people *would not*, and *could not*, accept the advice of the Swedish workers as sincere.

The trouble with the opponents of self-determination is that they confine themselves to lifeless abstractions, *fearing* to analyse to the end a single concrete real-life instance. Our concrete statement in the theses that a new Polish state is quite "achievable" *now*, given a definite combination of purely military, strategic conditions, has not been challenged either by the Poles or by P. Kievsky. But no one wanted to *ponder* the conclusions that follow from this tacit admission that we were right. And what follows, obviously, is that internationalist propaganda *cannot* be the same for the Russians and the Poles if it is to educate both for "monistic action". The Great-Russian (and German) worker is in duty bound unconditionally to insist on Poland's freedom to secede; otherwise he will, *in fact, now* be the lackey of Nicholas II or Hindenburg. The Polish worker *could* insist on secession *only* conditionally, because to speculate (as do the Fracy¹⁹⁹) on the victory of one or the other imperialist bourgeoisie is tantamount to becoming *its* lackey. Failure to understand this difference, which is a prerequisite for "monistic action" of the International, is about the same as failing to understand why

"monistic action" against the tsarist army near Moscow, say, requires that the revolutionary forces march west from Nizhni-Novgorod and east from Smolensk.

* * *

Second, our new exponent of Dühringian monism reproaches us for not striving to achieve "the closest organisational unity of the various national sections of the International" in the event of a social revolution.

Under socialism, P. Kievsky writes, self-determination becomes superfluous, since the state itself ceases to exist. That is meant as an argument against us! But in our theses we clearly and definitely say, in *three* lines, the last three lines of section one, that "democracy, of course, is also a form of state which must disappear when the state disappears".* It is precisely this truism that P. Kievsky repeats—to "refute" us, of course!—on *several pages* of his §r (Chapter I), and repeats it in a *distorted way*. "We picture to ourselves," he writes, "and have always pictured the socialist system as a strictly democratic (!!), centralised system of economy in which the state, as the apparatus for the domination of one part of the population over the other, disappears." This is confusion, because democracy *too* is domination "of one part of the population over the other"; it *too* is a form of state. Our author obviously does not understand what is meant by the *withering away* of the state after the victory of socialism and what this process requires.

The main point, however, is his "objections" regarding the era of the social revolution. He calls us "talmudists of self-determination"—what a frightening epithet—and adds: "We picture this process [the social revolution] as the united action of the proletarians of all (!) countries, who wipe out the frontiers of the bourgeois (!) state, who tear down the frontier posts [in addition to "wiping out the frontiers"?], who blow up (!) national unity and establish class unity."

The wrath of this stern judge of the "talmudists" notwithstanding, we must say: there are many words here, but no "ideas".

The social revolution cannot be the united action of the

* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 144.—Ed.

proletarians of *all* countries for the simple reason that most of the countries and the majority of the world's population have not even reached, or have only just reached, the capitalist stage of development. We stated this in section six* of our theses, but P. Kievsky, because of lack of attention, or inability to think, did "not notice" that we included this section for a definite purpose, namely, to refute caricature distortions of Marxism. *Only* the advanced countries of Western Europe and North America have matured for socialism, and in Engels's letter to Kautsky (*Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*)²⁰⁰ Kievsky will find a concrete illustration of the real and not merely promised "*idea*" that to dream of the "united action of the proletarians of *all* countries" means postponing socialism to the Greek calends, i.e., for ever.

Socialism will be achieved by the united action of the proletarians, not of all, but of a minority of countries, those that have reached the *advanced* capitalist stage of development. The cause of Kievsky's error lies in failure to understand that. In *these* advanced countries (England, France, Germany, etc.) the national problem was solved long ago; national unity outlived its purpose long ago; *objectively*, there are no "general national tasks" to be accomplished. Hence, only in these countries is it possible *now* to "blow up" national unity and establish class unity.

The *undeveloped* countries are a different matter. They embrace the whole of Eastern Europe and all the colonies and semi-colonies and are dealt with in section six of the theses (second- and third-type countries). In those areas, as a rule, there *still* exist oppressed and capitalistically undeveloped nations. *Objectively*, these nations still have general national tasks to accomplish, namely, *democratic* tasks, the tasks of *overthrowing foreign oppression*.

Engels cited India as an example of such nations, stating that she might perform a revolution against victorious socialism, for Engels was remote from the preposterous imperialist Economism which imagines that having achieved victory in the advanced countries, the proletariat will "automatically", without definite *democratic* measures, abolish national oppression everywhere. The victorious proletariat will

* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, pp. 150-52.—Ed.

reorganise the countries in which it has triumphed. That cannot be done all at once; nor, indeed, can the bourgeoisie be "vanquished" all at once. We deliberately emphasised this in our theses, and Kievsky has again failed to stop and think *why* we stressed this point in connection with the national question.

While the proletariat of the advanced countries is overthrowing the bourgeoisie and repelling its attempts at counter-revolution, the undeveloped and oppressed nations do not just wait, do not cease to exist, do not disappear. If they take advantage even of such a bourgeois imperialist crisis as the war of 1915-16—a minor crisis compared with social revolution—to rise in revolt (the colonies, Ireland), there can be no doubt that they will all the more readily take advantage of the *great crisis* of civil war in the advanced countries to rise in revolt.

The social revolution can come only in the form of an epoch in which are combined civil war by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie in the advanced countries and a *whole series* of democratic and revolutionary movements, including the national liberation movement, in the undeveloped, backward and oppressed nations.

Why? Because capitalism develops unevenly, and objective reality gives us highly developed capitalist nations side by side with a number of economically slightly developed, or totally undeveloped, nations. P. Kievsky has absolutely failed to analyse the *objective* conditions of social revolution from the standpoint of the economic maturity of various countries. His reproach that *we* "invent" instances in which to apply self-determination is therefore an attempt to lay the blame at the wrong door.

With a zeal worthy of a better cause, Kievsky repeatedly quotes Marx and Engels to the effect that "one must not invent things out of his own head, but use his head to discover in the existing material conditions" the means that will free humanity of social evils. When I read those oft-repeated quotations I cannot help recalling the late and unlamented Economists who just as tediously... harped on their "new discovery" that capitalism had triumphed in Russia. Kievsky wants to "smite" us with these quotations: he claims that we invent out of our own heads the conditions for applying self-

determination in the epoch of imperialism! But we find the following "incautious admission" in his own article:

"The very fact that we are *opposed* [author's italics] to defence of the fatherland shows most clearly that we will actively resist suppression of a national uprising, for we shall thereby be combating imperialism, our mortal enemy" (Chapter II, §r).

To criticise an author, to *answer* him, one has to quote in full at least the main propositions of his article. But in all of Kievsky's propositions you will find that every sentence contains two or three errors or illogicalities that distort Marxism!

1) He is unaware that a national uprising is *also* "defence of the fatherland"! A little thought, however, will make it perfectly clear that this is so, since *every* "nation in revolt" "defends" itself, its language, its territory, its fatherland, against the oppressor nation.

All national oppression calls forth the resistance of the *broad masses* of the people; and the resistance of a nationally oppressed population always *tends* to national revolt. Not infrequently (notably in Austria and Russia) we find the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations *talking* of national revolt, while in practice it enters into reactionary compacts with the bourgeoisie of the oppressor nation behind the backs of, *and against*, its own people. In such cases the criticism of revolutionary Marxists should be directed not against the national movement, but against its degradation, vulgarisation, against the tendency to reduce it to a petty squabble. Incidentally, very many Austrian and Russian Social-Democrats overlook this and in their *legitimate* hatred of the petty, vulgar and sordid national squabbles—disputes and scuffles over the question, for instance, of which language shall have precedence in two-language street signs—refuse to support the national struggle. We shall not "support" a republican farce in, say, the principality of Monaco, or the "republican" adventurism of "generals" in the small states of South America or some Pacific island. But that does not mean it would be permissible to abandon the republican slogan for serious democratic and socialist movements. We should, and do, ridicule the sordid national squabbles and haggling in Russia and Austria. But that does not mean that it would be permissible to deny support to a national uprising or a serious popular struggle against national oppression.

2) If national uprisings are impossible in the "imperialist era", Kievsky has no right to speak of them. If they are possible, *all* his fine-spun talk about "monism" and our "inventing" examples of self-determination under imperialism, etc., falls to pieces. Kievsky defeats his own arguments.

If "we" "actively resist suppression" of a "national uprising"—a case which P. Kievsky "*himself*" considers possible—what does this mean?

It means that the *action* is twofold, or "dualistic", to employ the philosophical term as incorrectly as our author does: (a) first, it is the "action" of the nationally oppressed proletariat and peasantry *jointly* with the nationally oppressed bourgeoisie *against* the oppressor nation; (b) second, it is the "action" of the proletariat, or of its class-conscious section, in the oppressor nation *against* the bourgeoisie of that nation and all the elements that follow it.

The innumerable phrases against a "national bloc", national "illusions", the "poison" of nationalism, against "fanning national hatred" and the like, to which P. Kievsky resorts, prove to be meaningless. For when he advises the proletariat of the oppressor countries (which, be it remembered, he regards as a serious force) "actively to resist suppression of a national uprising", he thereby *fans* national hatred and *supports* the establishment of a "bloc with the bourgeoisie" by the workers of the oppressed nations.

3) If national uprisings are possible under imperialism, so are national wars. There is no material political difference between the two. Military historians are perfectly right when they put rebellions in the same category as wars. Kievsky has unwittingly refuted not only himself, but also Junius and the *Internationale* group,²⁰¹ who deny the *possibility* of national wars under imperialism. And this denial is the only conceivable theoretical ground for denying self-determination of nations under imperialism.

4) For what is a "national" uprising? It is an uprising aimed at the achievement of *political* independence of the oppressed nation, i.e., the establishment of a *separate* national state.

If the proletariat of the oppressor nation is a serious force (in the imperialist era, as our author rightly assumes), does not its determination "actively to resist suppression of a

national uprising" *imply assistance* in creating a separate national state? Of course it does.

Though he denies the "achievability" of self-determination, our brave author now argues that the class-conscious proletariat of the advanced countries must *assist* in achieving this "unachievable" goal!

5) Why must "we" "actively resist" suppression of a national uprising? P. Kievsky advances only one reason: "...we shall thereby be combating imperialism, our mortal enemy." All the *strength* of this argument lies in the *strong* word "mortal". And this is in keeping with his penchant for strong words instead of strong arguments—high-sounding phrases like "driving a stake into the quivering body of the bourgeoisie" and similar Alexinsky flourishes.

But this Kievsky argument is *wrong*. Imperialism is as much our "mortal" enemy as is capitalism. That is so. No Marxist will forget, however, that capitalism is progressive compared with feudalism, and that imperialism is progressive compared with pre-monopoly capitalism. Hence, it is *not* every struggle against imperialism that we should support. We will *not* support a struggle of the reactionary classes against imperialism; we will *not* support an uprising of the reactionary classes against imperialism and capitalism.

Consequently, once the author admits the need to support an uprising of an oppressed nation ("actively resisting" suppression means supporting the uprising), he also admits that a national uprising is *progressive*, that the establishment of a separate and new state, of new frontiers, etc., resulting from a successful uprising, is *progressive*.

In *none* of his political arguments is the author consistent!

The Irish Rebellion of 1916, which took place after our theses had appeared in No. 2 of *Vorbote*, proved, incidentally, that it was not idle to speak of the possibility of national uprisings *even* in Europe.

6. THE OTHER POLITICAL ISSUES RAISED AND DISTORTED BY P. KIEVSKY

Liberation of the colonies, we stated in our theses, means self-determination of nations. Europeans often forget that colonial peoples *too* are nations, but to tolerate this "forgetfulness" is to tolerate chauvinism.

P. Kievsky "objects":

In the pure type of colonies, "there is *no* proletariat in the proper sense of the term" (end of §r, Chapter II). "For whom, then, is the 'self-determination' slogan meant? For the colonial bourgeoisie? For the fellahs? For the peasants? Certainly not. It is absurd for *socialists* [Kievsky's italics] to demand self-determination for the colonies, for it is absurd in general to advance the slogans of a workers' party for countries where there are no workers."

P. Kievsky's anger and his denunciation of our view as "absurd" notwithstanding, we make bold to submit that his arguments are erroneous. Only the late and unlamented Economists believed that the "slogans of a workers' party" are issued *only* for workers.* No, these slogans are issued for the whole of the labouring population, for the entire people. The democratic part of our programme—Kievsky has given no thought to its significance "in general"—is addressed specifically to the whole people and that is why in it we speak of the "people".**

The colonial and semi-colonial nations, we said, account for 1,000 million people, and P. Kievsky has not taken the trouble to refute that concrete statement. Of these 1,000 million, more than 700 million (China, India, Persia, Egypt) live in countries where *there are* workers. But even with regard to colonial countries where there are no workers, only slave-owners and slaves, etc., the demand for "self-determination", far from being *absurd*, is *obligatory* for every Marxist. And if he gave the matter a little thought, Kievsky would probably realise this, and also that "self-determination" is always advanced "for" *two* nations: the oppressed and the *oppressing*.

Another of Kievsky's "objections":

"For that reason we limit ourselves, in respect to the colonies, to a negative slogan, i.e., to the demand socialists present to their governments—'get out of the colonies!'

* P. Kievsky would do well to reread what A. Martynov and Co. wrote in 1899-1901. He would find many of his "own" arguments there.

** Some curious opponents of "self-determination of nations" try to refute our views with the argument that "nations" are divided into classes! Our customary reply to these caricature Marxists is that the democratic part of our programme speaks of "government by the people".

Unachievable within the framework of capitalism, this demand serves to intensify the struggle against imperialism, but does not contradict the trend of development, for a socialist society will not possess colonies."

The author's inability, or reluctance, to give the slightest thought to the theoretical contents of political slogans is simply amazing! Are we to believe that the use of a propaganda phrase instead of a theoretically precise political term alters matters? To say "get out of the colonies" is to evade a theoretical analysis and hide behind propaganda phrases! For every one of our Party propagandists, in referring to the Ukraine, Poland, Finland, etc., is fully entitled to demand of the tsarist government (his "own government"): "get out of Finland", etc. However, the intelligent propagandist will understand that we must not advance either positive or negative slogans for the sole purpose of "intensifying" the struggle. Only men of the Alexinsky type could insist that the "negative" slogan "get out of the Black-Hundred Duma" was justified by the desire to "intensify" the struggle against a certain evil.

Intensification of the struggle is an empty phrase of the subjectivists, who forget the Marxist requirement that every slogan be justified by a precise analysis of *economic* realities, the *political* situation and the *political* significance of the slogan. It is embarrassing to have to drive this home, but what can one do?

We know the Alexinsky habit of cutting short a theoretical discussion of a theoretical question by propaganda outcries. It is a bad habit. The slogan "get out of the colonies" has one and only one political and economic content: freedom of secession for the colonial nations, freedom to establish a separate state! If, as P. Kievsky believes, the *general* laws of imperialism prevent the self-determination of nations and make it a utopia, illusion, etc., etc., then how can one, without stopping to think, make an exception from these general laws for *most* of the nations of the world? Obviously, P. Kievsky's "theory" is a caricature of theory.

Commodity production and capitalism, and the connecting threads of finance capital, exist in the vast majority of colonial countries. How, then, can we urge the imperialist countries, their governments, to "get out of the colonies" if,

from the standpoint of commodity production, capitalism and imperialism, this is an "unscientific" and "utopian" demand, "refuted" *even* by Lensch, Cunow and the rest?

There is not even a shadow of *thought* in the author's argumentation!

He has given no thought to the fact that liberation of the colonies is "unrealisable" *only* in the sense of being "unrealisable without a series of revolutions". He has given no thought to the fact that it is realisable *in conjunction* with a socialist revolution in Europe. He has given no thought to the fact that a "socialist society will not possess" *not only* colonies, but subject nations *in general*. He has given no thought to the fact that, on the question under discussion, there is *no* economic or political difference between Russia's "possession" of Poland or Turkestan. He has given no thought to the fact that a "socialist society" will wish to "get out of the colonies" *only* in the sense of granting them the free right to secede, but definitely *not* in the sense of *recommending secession*.

And for this differentiation between the right to secede and the recommendation to secede, P. Kievsky condemns us as "jugglers", and to "scientifically substantiate" that verdict in the eyes of the workers, he writes:

"What is a worker to think when he asks a propagandist how the proletariat should regard *samostiinost* [political independence for the Ukraine], and gets this answer: socialists are working for the right to secede, but their propaganda is against secession?"

I believe I can give a fairly accurate reply to that question, namely: every sensible worker will *think* that Kievsky is *not capable of thinking*.

Every sensible worker will "think": here we have P. Kievsky telling us workers to shout "get out of the colonies". In other words, we Great-Russian workers must demand from our government that it get out of Mongolia, Turkestan, Persia; English workers must demand that the English Government get out of Egypt, India, Persia, etc. But does this mean that *we* proletarians *wish* to separate ourselves from the Egyptian workers and fellahs, from the Mongolian, Turkestan or Indian workers and peasants? Does it mean that *we* advise the labouring masses of the colonies to "separate" from the

class-conscious European proletariat? Nothing of the kind. Now, as always, we stand and shall continue to stand for the closest association and merging of the class-conscious workers of the advanced countries with the workers, peasants and slaves of *all* the oppressed countries. We have always advised and shall continue to advise all the oppressed classes in all the oppressed countries, the colonies included, *not* to separate from us, but to form the closest possible ties and merge with us.

We demand from our governments that they quit the colonies, or, to put it in precise political terms rather than in agitational outcries—that they *grant* the colonies full *freedom* of secession, the genuine *right to self-determination*, and we ourselves are sure to implement this right, and grant this freedom, as soon as we capture power. We demand this from existing governments, and will *do* this when we are the government, *not* in order to “recommend” secession, but, on the contrary, in order to facilitate and accelerate the *democratic* association and merging of nations. We shall exert every effort to foster association and merger with the Mongolians, Persians, Indians, Egyptians. We believe it is our duty and *in our interest* to do this, for otherwise socialism in Europe will *not be secure*. We shall endeavour to render these nations, more backward and oppressed than we are, “disinterested cultural assistance”, to borrow the happy expression of the Polish Social-Democrats. In other words, we will help them pass to the use of machinery, to the lightening of labour, to democracy, to socialism.

If we demand freedom of secession for the Mongolians, Persians, Egyptians and *all* other oppressed and unequal nations without exception, we do so not because *we favour secession*, but *only* because we stand for *free, voluntary* association and merging as distinct from forcible association. That is the *only* reason!

And in this respect the *only* difference between the Mongolian or Egyptian peasants and workers and their Polish or Finnish counterparts is, in our view, that the latter are more developed, more experienced politically than the Great Russians, more economically prepared, etc., and for that reason will in all likelihood *very soon* convince their peoples that it is unwise to extend their present legitimate hatred of the

Great Russians, for their role of hangman, to the *socialist* workers and to a socialist Russia. They will convince them that economic expediency and internationalist and democratic instinct and consciousness demand the earliest association of all nations and their merging in a socialist society. And since the Poles and Finns are highly cultured people, they will, in all probability, very soon come to see the correctness of this attitude, and the possible secession of Poland and Finland after the triumph of socialism will therefore be only of short duration. The incomparably less cultured fellahs, Mongolians and Persians might secede for a longer period, but we shall try to shorten it by disinterested cultural assistance as indicated above.

There is *no* other difference in our attitude to the Poles and Mongolians, nor can there be. There is *no* "contradiction", nor can there be, between our propaganda of freedom of secession and our firm resolve to implement that freedom when *we* are the government, and our propaganda of association and merging of nations. That is what, we feel sure, every sensible worker, every genuine socialist and internationalist will "think" of our controversy with P. Kievsky.*

Running through the article is Kievsky's basic doubt: why advocate and, when we are in power, implement the freedom of nations to *secede*, considering that the trend of development is towards the *merging* of nations? For the same reason—

* Evidently Kievsky simply *repeated* the slogan "get out of the colonies", advanced by certain German and Dutch Marxists, without considering not only its theoretical content and implications, but also the specific features of Russia. It is pardonable—to a certain extent—for a Dutch or German Marxist to confine himself to the slogan "get out of the colonies". For, first, the *typical* form of national oppression, in the case of most West-European countries, is oppression of the colonies, and, second, the very term "colony" has an especially clear, graphic and vital meaning for West-European countries.

But what of Russia? Its peculiarity lies precisely in the fact that the difference between "*our*" "colonies" and "*our*" oppressed nations is not clear, not concrete and not vitally felt!

For a Marxist writing in, say, German it might be pardonable to overlook *this* peculiarity of Russia; for Kievsky it is unpardonable. The sheer absurdity of trying to discover some serious difference between oppressed nations and colonies in the case of Russia should be especially clear to a Russian socialist who wants not simply to *repeat*, but to *think*.

we reply—that we advocate and, when in power, will implement the dictatorship of the proletariat, though the entire trend of development is towards abolition of coercive domination of one part of society over another. Dictatorship is domination of one part of society over the rest of society, and domination, moreover, that rests directly on coercion. Dictatorship of the proletariat, the only consistently revolutionary class, is necessary to overthrow the bourgeoisie and repel its attempts at counter-revolution. The question of proletarian dictatorship is of such overriding importance that he who denies the need for such dictatorship, or recognises it only in words, cannot be a member of the Social-Democratic Party. However, it cannot be denied that in individual cases, by way of exception, for instance, in some small country after the social revolution has been accomplished in a neighbouring big country, peaceful surrender of power by the bourgeoisie is *possible*, if it is convinced that resistance is hopeless and if it prefers to save its skin. It is much more likely, of course, that even in small states socialism will *not* be achieved without civil war, and for that reason the *only* programme of international Social-Democracy must be recognition of civil war, though violence is, of course, alien to our ideals. The same, *mutatis mutandis* (with the *necessary* alterations), is applicable to nations. We favour their merger, but *now* there can be no transition from forcible merger and annexation to voluntary merger without freedom of secession. We recognise—and quite rightly—the predominance of the economic factor, but to interpret it *à la* Kievsky is to make a caricature of Marxism. Even the trusts and banks of modern imperialism, though inevitable everywhere as part of developed capitalism, differ in their concrete aspects from country to country. There is a still greater difference, despite homogeneity in essentials, between political forms in the advanced imperialist countries—America, England, France, Germany. The same variety will manifest itself also in the path mankind will follow from the imperialism of today to the socialist revolution of tomorrow. All nations will arrive at socialism—this is inevitable, but all will do so in not exactly the same way, each will contribute something of its own to some form of democracy, to some variety of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the varying rate of socialist transformations in

the different aspects of social life. There is nothing more primitive from the viewpoint of theory, or more ridiculous from that of practice, than to paint, "in the name of historical materialism," *this* aspect of the future in a monotonous grey. The result will be nothing more than Suzdal daubing.²⁰² And even if reality were to show that *prior* to the first victory of the socialist proletariat only 1/500 of the nations now oppressed will win emancipation and secede, that *prior* to the final victory of the socialist proletariat the world over (i.e., during all the vicissitudes of the socialist revolution) also only 1/500 of the oppressed nations will secede for a very short time—*even* in that event we would be correct, both from the theoretical and practical political standpoint, in advising the workers, already now, not to permit into their Social-Democratic parties those socialists of the oppressor nations who do not recognise and do not advocate freedom of secession for *all* oppressed nations. For the fact is that we do not know, and cannot know, how many of the oppressed nations will in practice require secession in order to contribute something of their own to the different *forms* of democracy, the different *forms* of transition to socialism. And that the negation of freedom of secession now is theoretically false from beginning to end and in practice amounts to servility to the chauvinists of the oppressing nations—this we know, see and feel daily.

"We emphasise," P. Kievsky writes in a footnote to the passage quoted above, "that we fully support the demand 'against forcible annexation' . . ."

But he makes no reply, not even by a single word, to our perfectly clear statement that this "demand" is tantamount to recognising self-determination, that there can be no correct definition of the concept "annexation" unless it is seen in context with self-determination. Presumably Kievsky believes that in a discussion it is enough to present one's arguments and demands without any supporting evidence!

He continues: ". . . We fully accept, in their *negative* formulation, a number of demands that tend to sharpen proletarian consciousness against imperialism, but there is absolutely no possibility of working out corresponding *positive* formulations on the basis of the existing system. Against war, yes, but not for a democratic peace. . . ."

Wrong—wrong from the first word to the last. Kievsky has read our resolution on "Pacifism and the Peace Slogan" (in the pamphlet *Socialism and War*, pp. 44-45*) and even approved it, I believe. But obviously he did not understand it. We are *for* a democratic peace, only we warn the workers against the deception that such a peace is possible under the present, bourgeois governments "without a series of revolutions", as the resolution points out. We denounced as a deception of the workers the "abstract" advocacy of peace, i.e., one that does *not* take into account the real class nature, or, specifically, the imperialist nature of the *present* governments in the belligerent countries. We definitely stated in the *Sotsial-Demokrat* (No. 47) theses that if the revolution places our Party in power during the present war, it will immediately propose a democratic peace to all the warring countries.**

Yet, anxious to convince himself and others that he is opposed "only" to self-determination and not to democracy in general, Kievsky ends up by asserting that we are "not for a democratic peace". Curious logic!

There is no need to dwell on all the other examples he cites, and no sense in wasting space on refuting them, for they are on the same level of naïve and fallacious logic and can only make the reader smile. There is not, nor can there be, such a thing as a "negative" Social-Democratic slogan that serves only to "sharpen proletarian consciousness against imperialism" without at the same time offering a positive answer to the question of *how* Social-Democracy will solve the problem when it assumes power. A "negative" slogan unconnected with a definite positive solution will not "sharpen", but dull consciousness, for such a slogan is a hollow phrase, mere shouting, meaningless declamation.

P. Kievsky does not understand the difference between "negative" slogans that stigmatise *political* evils and *economic* evils. The difference lies in the fact that certain economic evils are part of capitalism as such, whatever the political superstructure, and that it is *impossible* to eliminate them economically without eliminating capitalism itself. Not a single instance can be cited to disprove this. On the other

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, pp. 162-63.—Ed.

** *Ibid.*, pp. 403-04.—Ed.

hand, political evils represent a departure from democracy which, economically, is fully possible "on the basis of the existing system", i.e., capitalism, and by way of exception is being implemented under capitalism—certain aspects in one country, other aspects in another. Again, what the author fails to understand is precisely the fundamental conditions necessary for the implementation of democracy in general!

The same applies to the question of divorce. The reader will recall that it was first posed by Rosa Luxemburg in the discussion on the *national* question. She expressed the perfectly justified opinion that if we uphold autonomy within a state (for a definite region, area, etc.), we must, as centralist Social-Democrats, insist that all major national issues—and *divorce* legislation is one of them—should come within the jurisdiction of the central government and central parliament. This example clearly demonstrates that one cannot be a democrat and socialist without demanding full freedom of divorce now, because the lack of such freedom is additional oppression of the oppressed sex—though it should not be difficult to realise that recognition of the *freedom* to leave one's husband is not an *invitation* to all wives to do so!

P. Kievsky "objects":

"What would this right [of divorce] be like if in *such* cases [when the wife *wants* to leave the husband] she could *not* exercise her right? Or if its exercise depended on the will of *third* parties, or, worse still, on the will of claimants to her affections? Would we advocate the proclamation of *such* a right? Of course not!"

That objection reveals complete failure to understand the relation between democracy *in general* and capitalism. The conditions that make it impossible for the oppressed classes to "exercise" their democratic rights are not the exception under capitalism; they are typical of the system. In most cases the right of divorce will remain unrealisable under capitalism, for the oppressed sex is subjugated economically. No matter how much democracy there is under capitalism, the woman remains a "domestic slave", a slave locked up in the bedroom, nursery, kitchen. The right to elect their "own" people's judges, officials, school-teachers, jurymen, etc., is likewise in most cases unrealisable under capitalism precisely because of the economic subjection of the workers and peas-

ants. The same applies to the democratic republic: our programme defines it as "government by the people", though all Social-Democrats know perfectly well that under capitalism, even in the most democratic republic, there is bound to be bribery of officials by the bourgeoisie and an alliance of stock exchange and the government.

Only those who cannot think straight or have no knowledge of Marxism will conclude: so there is no point in having a republic, no point in freedom of divorce, no point in democracy, no point in self-determination of nations! But Marxists know that democracy does *not* abolish class oppression. It only makes the class struggle more direct, wider, more open and pronounced, and that is what we need. The fuller the freedom of divorce, the clearer will women see that the source of their "domestic slavery" is capitalism, not lack of rights. The more democratic the system of government, the clearer will the workers see that the root evil is capitalism, not lack of rights. The fuller national equality (and it is *not* complete without freedom of secession), the clearer will the workers of the oppressed nations see that the cause of their oppression is capitalism, not lack of rights, etc.

It must be said again and again: It is embarrassing to have to drive home the ABC of Marxism, but what is one to do if Kievsky does not know it?

He discusses divorce in much the same way as one of the secretaries of the Organising Committee abroad, Semkovsky, discussed it, if I remember rightly, in the *Paris Golos*. His line of reasoning was that freedom of divorce is not, it is true, an invitation to all wives to leave their husbands, but if it is proved that all other husbands are better than yours, madame, then it amounts to one and the same thing!!

In taking that line of argument Semkovsky forgot that crank thinking is not a violation of socialist or democratic principles. If Semkovsky were to tell a woman that all other husbands were better than hers, no one would regard this as violation of democratic principles. At most people would say: There are bound to be big cranks in a big party! But if Semkovsky were to take it into his head to defend as a democrat a person who opposed freedom of divorce and appealed to the courts, the police or the church to prevent his wife leaving him, we feel sure that *even* most of Sem-

kovsky's colleagues on the Secretariat Abroad, though they are sorry socialists, would refuse to support him!

Both Semkovsky and Kievsky, in their "discussion" of divorce, fail to understand the issue and avoid its substance, namely, that under capitalism the right of divorce, as *all* other democratic rights without exception, is conditional, restricted, formal, narrow and extremely difficult of realisation. Yet no self-respecting Social-Democrat will consider anyone opposing the right of divorce a democrat, let alone a socialist. That is the crux of the matter. *All* "democracy" consists in the proclamation and realisation of "rights" which under capitalism are realisable only to a very small degree and only relatively. But without the proclamation of these rights, without a struggle to introduce them now, immediately, without training the masses in the spirit of this struggle, socialism is *impossible*.

Having failed to understand that, Kievsky bypasses the central question, that belongs to his special subject, namely, *how* will we Social-Democrats abolish national oppression? He shunts the question aside with phrases about the world being "drenched in blood", etc. (though this has no bearing on the matter under discussion). This leaves only one single argument: the socialist revolution will solve everything! Or, the argument sometimes advanced by people who share his views: self-determination is impossible under capitalism and superfluous under socialism.

From the theoretical standpoint that view is nonsensical; from the practical political standpoint it is chauvinistic. It fails to appreciate the significance of democracy. For socialism is impossible without democracy because: (1) the proletariat cannot perform the socialist revolution unless it prepares for it by the struggle for democracy; (2) victorious socialism cannot consolidate its victory and bring humanity to the withering away of the state without implementing full democracy. To claim that self-determination is superfluous under socialism is therefore just as nonsensical and just as hopelessly confusing as to claim that democracy is superfluous under socialism.

Self-determination is *no more* impossible under capitalism, and *just* as superfluous under socialism, as democracy generally.

The economic revolution will create the necessary prerequisites for eliminating *all* types of political oppression. Precisely for that reason it is illogical and incorrect to reduce everything to the economic revolution, for the question is: *how* to eliminate national oppression? It cannot be eliminated without an economic revolution. That is incontestable. But to *limit* ourselves to this is to lapse into absurd and wretched imperialist Economism.

We must carry out national *equality*; proclaim, formulate and implement equal "rights" for all nations. *Everyone* agrees with that save, perhaps, P. Kievsky. But this poses a question which Kievsky avoids: is not negation of the *right* to form a national state negation of equality?

Of course it is. And consistent, i.e., socialist, democrats proclaim, formulate and will implement this right, without which there is no path to complete, voluntary rapprochement and merging of nations.

7. CONCLUSION. ALEXINSKY METHODS

We have analysed only a fraction of P. Kievsky's arguments. To analyse *all* of them would require an article five times the length of this one, for there is not a single correct view in the whole of what Kievsky has to say. What is *correct*—if there are no mistakes in the figures—is the footnote data on banks. All the rest is an impossible tangle of confusion peppered with phrases like "driving a stake into the quivering body", "we shall not only judge the conquering heroes, but condemn them to death and elimination", "the new world will be born in agonising convulsions", "the question will not be one of granting charters and rights, nor of proclaiming the freedom of the nations, but of establishing genuinely free relationships, destroying age-old slavery and social oppression in general, and national oppression in particular", and so on and so forth.

These phrases are, at one and the same time, the cover and expression of two things: first, their underlying "idea" is *imperialist Economism*, which is just as ugly a caricature of Marxism, and just as complete a misinterpretation of the relationship between socialism and democracy, as was the late and unlamented Economism of 1894-1902.

Second, we have in these phrases a repetition of Alexinsky methods. This should be especially emphasised, for a whole section of Kievsky's article (Chapter II, §f, "The Special Position of the Jews") is based *exclusively* on these methods.

At the 1907 London Congress²⁰³ the Bolsheviki would dissociate themselves from Alexinsky when, in reply to theoretical arguments, he would pose as an agitator and resort to high-falutin, but entirely irrelevant, phrases against one or another type of exploitation and oppression. "He's begun his shouting again," our delegates would say. And the "shouting" did not do Alexinsky any good.

There is the same kind of "shouting" in Kievsky's article. He has no reply to the theoretical questions and arguments expounded in the theses. Instead, he poses as an agitator and begins shouting about the oppression of the Jews, though every thinking person will realise that his shouting, and the Jewish question in general, have no relation whatever to the subject under discussion.

Alexinsky methods can lead to no good.

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IMPERIALISM AND THE SPLIT IN SOCIALISM

Is there any connection between imperialism and the monstrous and disgusting victory opportunism (in the form of social-chauvinism) has gained over the labour movement in Europe?

This is the fundamental question of modern socialism. And having in our Party literature fully established, first, the imperialist character of our era and of the present war, and, second, the inseparable historical connection between social-chauvinism and opportunism, as well as the intrinsic similarity of their political ideology, we can and must proceed to analyse this fundamental question.

We have to begin with as precise and full a definition of imperialism as possible. Imperialism is a specific historical stage of capitalism. Its specific character is threefold: imperialism is (1) monopoly capitalism; (2) parasitic, or decaying capitalism; (3) moribund capitalism. The supplanting of free competition by monopoly is the fundamental economic feature, the *quintessence* of imperialism. Monopoly manifests itself in five principal forms: (1) cartels, syndicates and trusts—the concentration of production has reached a degree which gives rise to these monopolistic associations of capitalists; (2) the monopolistic position of the big banks—three, four or five giant banks manipulate the whole economic life of America, France, Germany; (3) seizure of the sources of *raw material* by the trusts and the financial oligarchy (finance capital is monopoly industrial capital merged with bank capital); (4) the (economic) partition of the world by the international cartels has *begun*. There are already over *one hundred* such international cartels, which command the *entire* world

market and divide it "amicably" among themselves—until war redivides it. The export of capital, as distinct from the export of commodities under non-monopoly capitalism, is a highly characteristic phenomenon and is closely linked with the economic and territorial-political partition of the world; (5) the territorial partition of the world (colonies) *is completed*.

Imperialism, as the highest stage of capitalism in America and Europe, and later in Asia, took final shape in the period 1898-1914. The Spanish-American War (1898), the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) and the economic crisis in Europe in 1900 are the chief historical landmarks in the new era of world history.

The fact that imperialism is parasitic or decaying capitalism is manifested first of all in the tendency to decay, which is characteristic of *every* monopoly under the system of private ownership of the means of production. The difference between the democratic-republican and the reactionary-monarchist imperialist bourgeoisie is obliterated precisely because they are both rotting alive (which by no means precludes an extraordinarily rapid development of capitalism in individual branches of industry, in individual countries, and in individual periods). Secondly, the decay of capitalism is manifested in the creation of a huge stratum of *rentiers*, capitalists who live by "clipping coupons". In each of the four leading imperialist countries—England, U.S.A., France and Germany—capital in securities amounts to 100,000 or 150,000 *million* francs, from which each country derives an annual income of no less than five to eight thousand million. Thirdly, export of capital is parasitism raised to a high pitch. Fourthly, "finance capital strives for domination, not freedom". Political reaction *all along* the line is a characteristic feature of imperialism. Corruption, bribery on a huge scale and all kinds of fraud. Fifthly, the exploitation of oppressed nations—which is inseparably connected with annexations—and especially the exploitation of colonies by a handful of "Great" Powers, increasingly transforms the "civilised" world into a parasite on the body of hundreds of millions in the uncivilised nations. The Roman proletarian lived at the expense of society. Modern society lives at the expense of the modern proletarian. Marx specially stressed this profound observation of Sismondi.²⁰⁴ Imperialism somewhat changes

the situation. A privileged upper stratum of the proletariat in the imperialist countries lives partly at the expense of hundreds of millions in the uncivilised nations.

It is clear why imperialism is *moribund* capitalism, capitalism in *transition* to socialism: monopoly, which grows *out of* capitalism, is *already* dying capitalism, the beginning of its transition to socialism. The tremendous *socialisation* of labour by imperialism (what its apologists—the bourgeois economists—call “interlocking”) produces the same result.

Advancing this definition of imperialism brings us into complete contradiction to K. Kautsky, who refuses to regard imperialism as a “phase of capitalism” and defines it as a *policy* “preferred” by finance capital, a tendency of “industrial” countries to annex “agrarian” countries.* Kautsky’s definition is thoroughly false from the theoretical standpoint. What distinguishes imperialism is the rule *not* of industrial capital, but of finance capital, the striving to annex *not* agrarian countries, particularly, but *every kind of* country. Kautsky *divorces* imperialist politics from imperialist economics, he divorces monopoly in politics from monopoly in economics in order to pave the way for his vulgar bourgeois reformism, such as “disarmament”, “ultra-imperialism” and similar nonsense. The whole purpose and significance of this theoretical falsity is to obscure the *most profound* contradictions of imperialism and thus justify the theory of “unity” with the apologists of imperialism, the outright social-chauvinists and opportunists.

We have dealt at sufficient length with Kautsky’s break with Marxism on this point in *Sotsial-Demokrat* and *Kommunist*.²⁰⁵ Our Russian Kautskyites, the supporters of the Organising Committee (O.C.), headed by Axelrod and Spectator, including even Martov, and to a large degree Trotsky, preferred to maintain a discreet silence on the question of Kautskyism as a trend. They did not dare defend Kautsky’s war-time writings, confining themselves simply to praising Kautsky (Axelrod in his German pamphlet, which the Organ-

* “Imperialism is a product of highly developed industrial capitalism. It consists in the striving of every industrial capitalist nation to subjugate and annex ever larger *agrarian* territories, irrespective of the nations that inhabit them” (Kautsky in *Die Neue Zeit*, September 11, 1914).

ising Committee has *promised* to publish in Russian) or to quoting Kautsky's private letters (Spectator), in which he says he belongs to the opposition and jesuitically tries to nullify his chauvinist declarations.

It should be noted that Kautsky's "conception" of imperialism—which is tantamount to embellishing imperialism—is a retrogression not only compared with Hilferding's *Finance Capital* (no matter how assiduously Hilferding now defends Kautsky and "unity" with the social-chauvinists!) but also compared with the *social-liberal* J. A. Hobson. This English economist, who in no way claims to be a Marxist, defines imperialism, and reveals its contradictions, much more profoundly in a book published in 1902.* This is what Hobson (in whose book may be found nearly all Kautsky's pacifist and "conciliatory" banalities) wrote on the highly important question of the parasitic nature of imperialism:

Two sets of circumstances, in Hobson's opinion, weakened the power of the old empires: (1) "economic parasitism", and (2) formation of armies from dependent peoples. "There is first the habit of economic parasitism, by which the ruling state has used its provinces, colonies, and dependencies in order to enrich its ruling class and to bribe its lower classes into acquiescence." Concerning the second circumstance, Hobson writes:

"One of the strangest symptoms of the blindness of imperialism [this song about the "blindness" of imperialists comes more appropriately from the social-liberal Hobson than from the "Marxist" Kautsky] is the reckless indifference with which Great Britain, France, and other imperial nations are embarking on this perilous dependence. Great Britain has gone farthest. Most of the fighting by which we have won our Indian Empire has been done by natives; in India, as more recently in Egypt, great standing armies are placed under British commanders; almost all the fighting associated with our African dominions, except in the southern part, has been done for us by natives."

The prospect of partitioning China elicited from Hobson the following economic appraisal: "The greater part of Western Europe might then assume the appearance and character

* J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism*, London, 1902.

already exhibited by tracts of country in the South of England, in the Riviera, and in the tourist-ridden or residential parts of Italy and Switzerland, little clusters of wealthy aristocrats drawing dividends and pensions from the Far East, with a somewhat larger group of professional retainers and tradesmen and a larger body of personal servants and workers in the transport trade and in the final stages of production of the more perishable goods: all the main arterial industries would have disappeared, the staple foods and semi-manufactures flowing in as tribute from Asia and Africa. . . . We have foreshadowed the possibility of even a larger alliance of Western states, a European federation of Great Powers which, so far from forwarding the cause of world civilisation, might introduce the gigantic peril of a Western parasitism, a group of advanced industrial nations, whose upper classes drew vast tribute from Asia and Africa, with which they supported great tame masses of retainers, no longer engaged in the staple industries of agriculture and manufacture, but kept in the performance of personal or minor industrial services under the control of a new financial aristocracy. Let those who would scout such a theory [he should have said: prospect] as undeserving of consideration examine the economic and social condition of districts in Southern England today which are already reduced to this condition, and reflect upon the vast extension of such a system which might be rendered feasible by the subjection of China to the economic control of similar groups of financiers, investors [rentiers] and political and business officials, draining the greatest potential reservoir of profit the world has ever known, in order to consume it in Europe. The situation is far too complex, the play of world forces far too incalculable, to render this or any other single interpretation of the future very probable; but the influences which govern the imperialism of Western Europe today are moving in this direction, and, unless counteracted or diverted, make towards such a consummation."

Hobson, the social-liberal, fails to see that this "counteraction" can be offered *only* by the revolutionary proletariat and *only* in the form of a social revolution. But then he is a social-liberal! Nevertheless, as early as 1902 he had an excellent insight into the meaning and significance of a "United States

of Europe" (be it said for the benefit of Trotsky the Kautskyite!) and of all that is now being glossed over by the *hypocritical Kautskyites* of various countries, namely, that the *opportunists* (social-chauvinists) are working hand in glove with the imperialist bourgeoisie *precisely* towards creating an imperialist Europe on the backs of Asia and Africa, and that objectively the *opportunists* are a section of the petty bourgeoisie and of certain strata of the working class who *have been bribed* out of imperialist superprofits and converted into *watchdogs* of capitalism and *corrupters* of the labour movement.

Both in articles and in the resolutions of our Party, we have repeatedly pointed to this most profound connection, the economic connection, between the imperialist bourgeoisie and the opportunism which has triumphed (for long?) in the labour movement. And from this, incidentally, we concluded that a split with the social-chauvinists was inevitable. Our Kautskyites preferred to evade the question! Martov, for instance, uttered in his lectures a sophistry which in the *Bulletin of the Organising Committee Secretariat Abroad*²⁰⁶ (No. 4, April 10, 1916) is expressed as follows:

"...The cause of revolutionary Social-Democracy would be in a sad, indeed hopeless, plight if those groups of workers who in mental development approach most closely to the 'intelligentsia' and who are the most highly skilled fatally drifted away from it towards opportunism..."

By means of the silly word "fatally" and a certain sleight-of-hand, the *fact* is *evaded* that *certain* groups of workers *have already drifted away* to opportunism and to the imperialist bourgeoisie! And that is the very fact the sophists of the O.C. want to *evade*! They confine themselves to the "official optimism" the Kautskyite Hilferding and many others now flaunt: objective conditions guarantee the unity of the proletariat and the victory of the revolutionary trend! We, forsooth, are "optimists" with regard to the proletariat!

But in reality all these Kautskyites-Hilferding, the O.C. supporters, Martov and Co.—are *optimists* ... with regard to *opportunism*. That is the whole point!

The proletariat is the child of capitalism—of world capitalism, and not only of European capitalism, or of imperialist capitalism. On a world scale, fifty years sooner or fifty years

later-measured on a *world* scale this is a minor point—the “proletariat” of course “will be” united, and revolutionary Social-Democracy will “inevitably” be victorious within it. But that is not the point, Messrs. Kautskyites. The point is that at the present time, in the imperialist countries of Europe, *you are fawning* on the opportunists, who are *alien* to the proletariat as a class, who are the servants, the agents of the bourgeoisie and the vehicles of its influence, and *unless* the labour movement *rids* itself of them, it will remain a *bourgeois labour movement*. By advocating “unity” with the opportunists, with the Legiens and Davids, the Plekhanovs, the Chkhenkels and Potresovs, etc., you are, objectively, defending the *enslavement* of the workers by the imperialist bourgeoisie with the aid of its best agents in the labour movement. The victory of revolutionary Social-Democracy on a world scale is absolutely inevitable, only it is moving and will move, is proceeding and will proceed, *against* you, it will be a victory *over* you.

These two trends, one might even say *two* parties, in the present-day labour movement, which in 1914-16 so obviously parted ways all over the world, were *traced by Engels and Marx in England* throughout the course of *decades*, roughly from 1858 to 1892.

Neither Marx nor Engels lived to see the imperialist epoch of world capitalism, which began not earlier than 1898-1900. But it has been a peculiar feature of England that even in the middle of the nineteenth century she already revealed at least *two* major distinguishing features of imperialism: (1) vast colonies, and (2) monopoly profit (due to her monopoly position in the world market). In both respects England at that time was an exception among capitalist countries, and Engels and Marx, analysing this exception, quite clearly and definitely indicated its *connection* with the (temporary) victory of opportunism in the English labour movement.

In a letter to Marx, dated October 7, 1858, Engels wrote: “... The English proletariat is actually becoming more and more bourgeois, so that this most bourgeois of all nations is apparently aiming ultimately at the possession of a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat *alongside* the bourgeoisie. For a nation which exploits the whole world

this is of course to a certain extent justifiable." In a letter to Sorge, dated September 21, 1872, Engels informs him that Hales kicked up a big row in the Federal Council of the International and secured a vote of censure on Marx for saying that "the English labour leaders had sold themselves". Marx wrote to Sorge on August 4, 1874: "As to the urban workers here [in England], it is a pity that the whole pack of leaders did not get into Parliament. This would be the surest way of getting rid of the whole lot." In a letter to Marx, dated August 11, 1881, Engels speaks about "those very worst English trade unions which allow themselves to be led by men sold to, or at least paid by, the bourgeoisie". In a letter to Kautsky, dated September 12, 1882, Engels wrote: "You ask me what the English workers think about colonial policy. Well, exactly the same as they think about politics in general. There is no workers' party here, there are only Conservatives and Liberal-Radicals, and the workers gaily share the feast of England's monopoly of the world market and the colonies."

On December 7, 1889, Engels wrote to Sorge: "The most repulsive thing here [in England] is the bourgeois respectability, which has grown deep into the bones of the workers. . . . Even Tom Mann, whom I regard as the best of the lot, is fond of mentioning that he will be lunching with the Lord Mayor. If one compares this with the French, one realises what a revolution is good for, after all." In a letter, dated April 19, 1890: "But *under* the surface the movement [of the working class in England] is going on, is embracing ever wider sections and mostly just among the hitherto stagnant *lowest* [Engels's italics] strata. The day is no longer far off when this mass *will* suddenly *find itself*, when it will dawn upon it that it itself is this colossal mass in motion." On March 4, 1891: "The failure of the collapsed Dockers' Union; the 'old' conservative trade unions, *rich* and therefore cowardly, remain lone on the field. . . ." September 14, 1891: at the Newcastle Trade Union Congress the old unionists, opponents of the eight-hour day, were defeated "and the bourgeois papers recognise the defeat of the *bourgeois labour party*" (Engels's italics throughout). . . .

That these ideas, which were repeated by Engels over the course of decades, were also expressed by him publicly, in

the press, is proved by his preface to the second edition of *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, 1892. Here he speaks of an "aristocracy among the working class", of a "privileged minority of the workers", in contradistinction to the "great mass of working people". "A small, privileged, protected minority" of the working class alone was "permanently benefited" by the privileged position of England in 1848-68, whereas "the great bulk of them experienced at best but a temporary improvement"... "With the breakdown of that [England's industrial] monopoly, the English working class will lose that privileged position..." The members of the "new" unions, the unions of the unskilled workers, "had this immense advantage, that their minds were virgin soil, entirely free from the inherited 'respectable, bourgeois prejudices which hampered the brains of the better situated 'old unionists'"... "The so-called workers' representatives" in England are people "who are forgiven their being members of the working class because they themselves would like to drown their quality of being workers in the ocean of their liberalism"....

We have deliberately quoted the direct statements of Marx and Engels at rather great length in order that the reader may study them *as a whole*. And they should be studied, they are worth carefully pondering over. For they are the *pivot* of the tactics in the labour movement that are dictated by the objective conditions of the imperialist era.

Here, too, Kautsky has tried to "befog the issue" and substitute for Marxism sentimental conciliation with the opportunists. Arguing against the avowed and naïve social-imperialists (men like Lensch) who justify Germany's participation in the war as a means of destroying England's monopoly, Kautsky "*corrects*" this obvious falsehood by another equally obvious falsehood. Instead of a cynical falsehood he employs a suave falsehood! The *industrial* monopoly of England, he says, has long ago been broken, has long ago been destroyed, and there is nothing left to destroy.

Why is this argument false?

Because, firstly, it overlooks England's *colonial* monopoly. Yet Engels, as we have seen, pointed to this very clearly as early as 1882, thirty-four years ago! Although England's

industrial monopoly may have been destroyed, her colonial monopoly not only remains, but has become extremely accentuated, for the whole world is already divided up! By means of this suave lie Kautsky smuggles in the bourgeois-pacifist and opportunist-philistine idea that "there is nothing to fight about". On the contrary, not only have the *capitalists* something to fight about now, but they *cannot help* fighting if they want to preserve capitalism, for without a forcible redivision of colonies the *new* imperialist countries cannot obtain the privileges enjoyed by the older (*and weaker*) imperialist powers.

Secondly, why does England's monopoly explain the (temporary) victory of opportunism in England? Because monopoly yields *superprofits*, i.e., a surplus of profits over and above the capitalist profits that are normal and customary all over the world. The capitalists *can* devote a part (and not a small one, at that!) of these superprofits to bribe *their own* workers, to create something like an alliance (recall the celebrated "alliances" described by the Webbs of English trade unions and employers) between the workers of the given nation and their capitalists *against* the other countries. England's industrial monopoly was already destroyed by the end of the nineteenth century. That is beyond dispute. But *how* did this destruction take place? Did *all* monopoly disappear?

If that were so, Kautsky's "theory" of conciliation (with the opportunists) would to a certain extent be justified. But it is *not* so, and that is just the point. Imperialism is monopoly capitalism. Every cartel, trust, syndicate, every giant bank *is* a monopoly. Superprofits have not disappeared; they still remain. The exploitation of *all* other countries by one privileged, financially wealthy country remains and has become more intense. A handful of wealthy countries—there are only four of them, if we mean independent, really gigantic, "modern" wealth: England, France, the United States and Germany—have developed monopoly to vast proportions, they obtain *superprofits* running into hundreds, if not thousands, of millions, they "ride on the backs" of hundreds and hundreds of millions of people in other countries and fight among themselves for the division of the particularly rich, particularly fat and particularly easy spoils.

This, in fact, is the economic and political essence of imperialism, the profound contradictions of which Kautsky glosses over instead of exposing.

The bourgeoisie of an imperialist "Great" Power *can economically* bribe the upper strata of "its" workers by spending on this a hundred million or so francs a year, for its *super*-profits most likely amount to about a thousand million. And how this little sop is divided among the labour ministers, "labour representatives" (remember Engels's splendid analysis of the term), labour members of war industries committees,²⁰⁷ labour officials, workers belonging to the narrow craft unions, office employees, etc., etc., is a secondary question.

Between 1848 and 1868, and to a certain extent even later, only England enjoyed a monopoly: *that is why* opportunism could prevail there for decades. *No* other countries possessed either very rich colonies or an industrial monopoly.

The last third of the nineteenth century saw the transition to the new, imperialist era. Finance capital *not* of one, but of several, though very few, Great Powers enjoys a monopoly. (In Japan and Russia the monopoly of military power, vast territories, or special facilities for robbing minority nationalities, China, etc., partly supplements, partly takes the place of, the monopoly of modern, up-to-date finance capital.) This difference explains why England's monopoly position *could* remain *unchallenged* for decades. The monopoly of modern finance capital is being frantically challenged; the era of imperialist wars has begun. It was possible in those days to bribe and corrupt the working class of *one* country for decades. This is now improbable, if not impossible. But on the other hand, *every* imperialist "Great" Power can and does bribe *smaller* strata, (than in England in 1848-68) of the "labour aristocracy". Formerly a "*bourgeois labour party*", to use Engels's remarkably profound expression, could arise only in one country, because it alone enjoyed a monopoly, but, on the other hand, it could exist for a long time. Now a "*bourgeois labour party*" is *inevitable* and typical in *all* imperialist countries; but in view of the desperate struggle they are waging for the division of spoils, it is improbable that such a party can prevail for long in a number of countries.

For the trusts, the financial oligarchy, high prices, etc., while *enabling* the bribery of a handful in the top layers, are increasingly oppressing, crushing, ruining and torturing the *mass* of the proletariat and the semi-proletariat.

On the one hand, there is the tendency of the bourgeoisie and the opportunists to convert a handful of very rich and privileged nations into "eternal" parasites on the body of the rest of mankind, to "rest on the laurels" of the exploitation of Negroes, Indians, etc., keeping them in subjection with the aid of the excellent weapons of extermination provided by modern militarism. On the other hand, there is the tendency of the *masses*, who are more oppressed than before and who bear the whole brunt of imperialist wars, to cast off this yoke and to overthrow the bourgeoisie. It is in the struggle between these two tendencies that the history of the labour movement will now inevitably develop. For the first tendency is not accidental; it is "substantiated" economically. In *all* countries the bourgeoisie has already begotten, fostered and secured for itself "bourgeois labour parties" of social-chauvinists. The difference between a definitely formed party, like Bissolati's in Italy, for example, which is fully social-imperialist, and, say, the semi-formed near-party of the Potresovs, Gvozdyovs, Bulkins, Chkheidzes, Skobelevs and Co., is an immaterial difference. The important thing is that, economically, the desertion of a stratum of the labour aristocracy to the bourgeoisie has matured and become an accomplished fact; and this economic fact, this shift in class relations, will find political form, in one shape or another, without any particular "difficulty".

On the economic basis referred to above, the political institutions of modern capitalism—press, parliament, associations, congresses, etc.—have created *political* privileges and sops for the respectful, meek, reformist and patriotic office employees and workers, corresponding to the economic privileges and sops. Lucrative and soft jobs in the government or on the war industries committees, in parliament and on diverse committees, on the editorial staffs of "respectable", legally published newspapers or on the management councils of no less respectable and "bourgeois law-abiding" trade unions—this is the bait by which the imperialist bourgeoisie attracts and rewards the

representatives and supporters of the "bourgeois labour parties".

The mechanics of political democracy works in the same direction. Nothing in our times can be done without elections; nothing can be done without the masses. And in this era of printing and parliamentarism it is *impossible* to gain the following of the masses without a widely ramified, systematically managed, well-equipped system of flattery, lies, fraud, juggling with fashionable and popular catchwords, and promising all manner of reforms and blessings to the workers right and left—as long as they renounce the revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. I would call this system Lloyd-Georgism, after the English Minister Lloyd George, one of the foremost and most dexterous representatives of this system in the classic land of the "bourgeois labour party". A first-class bourgeois manipulator, an astute politician, a popular orator who will deliver any speeches you like, even r-r-revolutionary ones, to a labour audience, and a man who is capable of obtaining sizable sops for docile workers in the shape of social reforms (insurance, etc.), Lloyd George serves the bourgeoisie splendidly,* and serves it precisely *among* the workers, brings its influence *precisely* to the proletariat, to where the bourgeoisie needs it most and where it finds it most difficult to subject the masses morally.

And is there such a great difference between Lloyd George and the Scheidemanns, Legiens, Hendersons and Hyndmans, Plekhanovs, Renaudels and Co.? Of the latter, it may be objected, some will return to the revolutionary socialism of Marx. This is possible, but it is an insignificant difference in degree, if the question is regarded from its political, i.e., its mass aspect. Certain individuals among the present social-chauvinist leaders may return to the proletariat. But the social-chauvinist or (what is the same thing) opportunist *trend* can neither disappear nor "return" to the revolutionary

* I recently read an article in an English magazine by a Tory, a political opponent of Lloyd George, entitled "Lloyd George from the Standpoint of a Tory". The war opened the eyes of this opponent and made him realise what an excellent servant of the bourgeoisie this Lloyd George is! The Tories have made peace with him!

proletariat. Wherever Marxism is popular among the workers, this political trend, this "bourgeois labour party", will swear by the name of Marx. It cannot be prohibited from doing this, just as a trading firm cannot be prohibited from using any particular label, sign or advertisement. It has always been the case in history that after the death of revolutionary leaders who were popular among the oppressed classes, their enemies have attempted to appropriate their names so as to deceive the oppressed classes.

The fact is that "bourgeois labour parties", as a political phenomenon, have already been formed in *all* the foremost capitalist countries, and that unless a determined and relentless struggle is waged all along the line against these parties—or groups, trends, etc., it is all the same—there can be no question of a struggle against imperialism, or of Marxism, or of a socialist labour movement. The Chkheidze faction,²⁰⁸ *Nashe Dyelo* and *Golos Truda*²⁰⁹ in Russia, and the O.C. supporters abroad are nothing but varieties of one *such* party. There is not the slightest reason for thinking that these parties will disappear *before* the social revolution. On the contrary, the nearer the revolution approaches, the more strongly it flares up and the more sudden and violent the transitions and leaps in its progress, the greater will be the part the struggle of the revolutionary mass stream against the opportunist petty-bourgeois stream will play in the labour movement. Kautskyism is not an independent trend, because it has no roots either in the masses or in the privileged stratum which has deserted to the bourgeoisie. But the danger of Kautskyism lies in the fact that, utilising the ideology of the past, it endeavours to reconcile the proletariat with the "bourgeois labour party", to preserve the unity of the proletariat with that party and thereby enhance the latter's prestige. The masses no longer follow the avowed social-chauvinists: Lloyd George has been hissed down at workers' meetings in England; Hyndman has left the party; the Renaudels and Scheidemanns, the Potresovs and Gvozdyovs are protected by the police. The Kautskyites' masked defence of the social-chauvinists is much more dangerous.

One of the most common sophistries of Kautskyism is its reference to the "masses". We do not want, they say, to break away from the masses and mass organisations! But just

think how Engels put the question. In the nineteenth century the "mass organisations" of the English trade unions were on the side of the bourgeois labour party. Marx and Engels did not reconcile themselves to it on this ground; they exposed it. They did not forget, firstly, that the trade union organisations directly embraced a *minority of the proletariat*. In England then, as in Germany now, not more than one-fifth of the proletariat was organised. No one can seriously think it possible to organise the majority of the proletariat under capitalism. Secondly—and this is the main point—it is not so much a question of the size of an organisation, as of the real, objective significance of its policy: does its policy represent the masses, does it serve them, i.e., does it aim at their liberation from capitalism, or does it represent the interests of the minority, the minority's reconciliation with capitalism? The latter was true of England in the nineteenth century, and it is true of Germany, etc., now.

Engels draws a distinction between the "bourgeois labour party" of the *old* trade unions—the privileged minority—and the "*lowest mass*", the real majority, and appeals to the latter, who are *not* infected by "bourgeois respectability". This is the essence of Marxist tactics!

Neither we nor anyone else can calculate precisely what portion of the proletariat is following and will follow the social-chauvinists and opportunists. This will be revealed only by the struggle, it will be definitely decided only by the socialist revolution. But we know for certain that the "defenders of the fatherland" in the imperialist war *represent* only a minority. And it is therefore our duty, if we wish to remain socialists, to go down *lower* and *deeper*, to the real masses; this is the whole meaning and the whole purport of the struggle against opportunism. By exposing the fact that the opportunists and social-chauvinists are in reality betraying and selling the interests of the masses, that they are defending the temporary privileges of a minority of the workers, that they are the vehicles of bourgeois ideas and influences, that they are really allies and agents of the bourgeoisie, we teach the masses to appreciate their true political interests, to fight for socialism and for the revolution

through all the long and painful vicissitudes of imperialist wars and imperialist armistices.

The only Marxist line in the world labour movement is to explain to the masses the inevitability and necessity of breaking with opportunism, to educate them for revolution by waging a relentless struggle against opportunism, to utilise the experiences of the war to expose, not conceal, the utter vileness of national-liberal labour politics.

In the next article, we shall try to sum up the principal features that distinguish this line from Kautskyism.

Written in October 1916

Published in *Sbornik Sotsial-
Demokrata* No. 2,
December 1916
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Vol. 23

THE YOUTH INTERNATIONAL

A REVIEW

A German-language publication bearing the above title has been appearing in Switzerland since September 1, 1915. It carries the subtitle: "Militant and Propaganda Organ of the International League of Socialist Youth Organisations." Altogether six issues have appeared so far. The magazine merits our attention and should be strongly recommended to all Party members in a position to contact foreign Social-Democratic parties and youth organisations.

Most of the official European Social-Democratic parties are advocating the foulest and vilest social-chauvinism and opportunism. This applies to the German and French parties, the Fabian Society and the Labour Party in England, the Swedish, Dutch (Troelstra's party), Danish, Austrian parties, etc. In the Swiss party, notwithstanding the withdrawal (to the great benefit of the labour movement) of the extreme opportunists, now organised in the *non*-party "Grütli-Verein",²¹⁰ there still remain within the Social-Democratic Party numerous opportunist, social-chauvinist and Kautskyite leaders who exercise *tremendous* influence on its affairs.

With this state of affairs in Europe, there falls on the League of Socialist Youth Organisations the tremendous, grateful but difficult task of fighting *for* revolutionary internationalism, *for* true socialism and against the prevailing opportunism which has deserted to the side of the imperialist bourgeoisie. The *Youth International* has published a number of good articles in defence of revolutionary internationalism, and the magazine as a whole is permeated with a fine spirit of intense hatred for the betrayers of socialism, the "defenders of the fatherland" in the present war, and with

an earnest desire to wipe out the corroding influence of chauvinism and opportunism in the international labour movement.

Of course, the youth organ *still* lacks theoretical clarity and consistency. Perhaps it may never acquire them, precisely because it is the organ of seething, turbulent, inquiring youth. However, our attitude towards the lack of theoretical clarity on the part of *such* people must be entirely different from what our attitude is and should be towards the theoretical muddle in the heads, and the lack of revolutionary consistency in the hearts, of our "O.C.-ists", "Socialist-Revolutionaries", Tolstoyans, anarchists, the European Kautskyites ("Centre"), etc. Adults who lay claim to lead and teach the proletariat, but actually mislead it, are one thing: against such people a *ruthless* struggle must be waged. Organisations of *youth*, however, which openly declare that they are still learning, that their main task is to train party workers for the socialist parties, are quite another thing. Such people must be given every assistance. We must be patient with their faults and strive to correct them gradually, mainly by *persuasion*, and not by fighting them. The middle-aged and the aged often *do not know how* to approach the youth, for the youth must of necessity advance to socialism *in a different way, by other paths, in other forms, in other circumstances* than their fathers. Incidentally, that is why we must decidedly *favour organisational independence* of the Youth League, *not only* because the opportunists fear such independence, but because of the very nature of the case. For unless they have complete independence, the youth *will be unable* either to train good socialists from their midst or prepare themselves to lead socialism *forward*.

We stand for the complete independence of the Youth Leagues, but also for complete freedom of comradely criticism of their errors! We must not flatter the youth.

Of the errors to be noted in this excellent magazine, reference must first of all be made to the following three:

1) The incorrect position on the question of disarmament (or "disarming"), which we criticised in a preceding article.*

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, pp. 94-104. — Ed.

There is reason to believe that this error arises entirely out of the laudable desire to emphasise the need to strive for the "complete destruction of militarism" (which is perfectly correct); but the role of civil wars in the socialist revolution is forgotten.

2) On the question of the differences between socialists and anarchists in their attitude towards the state, Comrade Nota-Bene in his article (issue No. 6) falls into a very serious error (as he also does on several other questions, for instance, our *reasons* for combating the "defence of the fatherland" slogan). The author wishes to present "a clear picture of the state in general" (together with that of the imperialist predatory state). He quotes several statements by Marx and Engels, and arrives at the following two conclusions, among others:

a) "...It is absolutely wrong to seek the difference between socialists and anarchists in the fact that the former are in favour of the state while the latter are against it. The real difference is that revolutionary Social-Democracy desires to organise social production on new lines, as centralised, i.e., technically the most progressive, method of production, whereas decentralised, anarchist production would mean retrogression to obsolete techniques, to the old form of enterprise." This is wrong. The author raises the question of the difference in the socialists' and anarchists' attitude *towards the state*. However, he answers *not* this question, but *another*, namely, the difference in their attitude towards the economic foundation of future society. That, of course, is an important and necessary question. But that is no reason to ignore the *main* point of difference between socialists and anarchists in their attitude towards the state. Socialists are in favour of utilising the present state and its institutions in the struggle for the emancipation of the working class, maintaining also that the state should be used for a specific form of transition from capitalism to socialism. This transitional form is the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is *also* a state.

The anarchists want to "abolish" the state, "blow it up" (*sprengen*) as Comrade Nota-Bene expresses it in one place, erroneously ascribing this view to the socialists. The socialists—unfortunately the author quotes Engels's relevant words rather incompletely—hold that the state will "wither away",

will gradually "fall asleep" *after* the bourgeoisie has been expropriated.

b) "Social-Democracy, which is, or at least should be, the educator of the masses, must now more than ever emphasise its hostility to the state in principle. . . . The present war has shown how deeply the state idea has penetrated the souls of workers," writes Comrade Nota-Bene. In order to "emphasise" our "hostility" to the state "in principle" we must indeed understand it "clearly", and it is this clarity that our author lacks. His remark about the "state idea" is entirely muddled. It is un-Marxist and un-socialist. The point is not that the "state idea" has clashed with the repudiation of the state, but that opportunist policy (i.e., the opportunist, reformist, bourgeois attitude towards the state) has clashed with revolutionary Social-Democratic policy (i.e., the revolutionary Social-Democratic attitude towards the bourgeois state and towards utilising it against the bourgeoisie to overthrow the bourgeoisie). These are entirely different things. We hope to return to this very important subject in a separate article.²¹¹

3) The "declaration of principles of the International League of Socialist Youth Organisations", published in issue No. 6 as the "Secretariat's draft", contains not a few inaccuracies, and does not contain the *main* thing: a clear comparison of the *three* fundamental trends (social-chauvinism, "Centre" and Left) now contending against each other in the socialist movement of all countries.

We repeat, these errors must be refuted and explained. At the same time we must make every effort to find points of contact and closer relations with youth organisations and help them in every way, but we must find the *proper* manner of approach to them.

LETTER TO INESSA ARMAND

Dear Friend,

Another letter from St. Petersburg arrived today—they have been writing more frequently of late.

In addition to Guchkov's letter, which will appear in No. 57 of the Central Organ²¹² (now being printed) and which Grigory has probably shown you in Berne, we have the letters of Lvov and Chelnokov. They are all on the same subject—the resentment in the country (against the traitors conducting separate peace negotiations), etc.

The mood, they write, is extremely revolutionary.

My manuscript on imperialism has reached St. Petersburg and word has come today that the publisher (no other than Gorky! Oh what meekness!) does not approve of the sharp tone I use against ... whom would you think?... Kautsky! He wants to get in touch with me on the matter!!! Ridiculous and regretful.

Such is my fate. One battle after another against political stupidity, vulgarity, opportunism, etc.

It has been that way ever since 1893. And it has earned me the hatred of the philistines. Well, I would not exchange this fate for "peace" with the philistines.

And now there is Radek. There is an article by Nota-Bene in No. 6 of *Jugendinternationale* (have you seen it?). We (Grigory and I) immediately recognised Bukharin. I replied to his rank absurdities in *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*, No. 2.* (Have you seen it? It will be out in a few days.)

* See pp. 335-38.—Ed.

Today Grigory sent me *Arbeiterpolitik* No. 25.²¹³ It contains the *very same* article (with deletions obviously made by the censor) under Bukharin's signature. (We received another issue of the New York *Novy Mir*.²¹⁴ Its criticism, alas, is *correct*—and that is the sad thing: a Menshevik is *right* in his polemic with Bukharin!! The criticism *evidently* refers to *the same* article [we have not received this issue of *Novy Mir*]).

And then Radek—Grigory wrote me of his "Tyszka methods"—goes and publishes in No. 25 of *Arbeiterpolitik* an article in praise of Bukharin ("the strength of youth") and a note, *en passant*, about the "three editors of *Kommunist*"!

He is trying to exploit the dissension in our midst: the customary policy of all this scum. They are powerless to argue with *us* directly and resort to intrigue, foul play and vileness.

That is the *real* picture and the picture of *what* Radek is *doing* (a man is judged not by what he says or thinks of himself, but by what he does—remember that Marxist maxim?).

Voilà.

That is the "*milieu*" we have to fight!!

And what disgraceful theoretical nonsense in Radek's "Theses"....

Read Humbert-Dros's *Plaidoirie*.^{*} Good Heavens! What vulgar Tolstoyism. Have written to Abramovich: can it be that he, too, is hopeless? It occurs to me: perhaps there is in Switzerland a bacillus of petty-bourgeois (and small-country) dull thought, Tolstoyism and pacifism which ruins our best people? I am sure there is!

Read P. Golay's *second* pamphlet (*L'antimilitarisme*)—what a gigantic step backwards compared with his first (*Le socialisme qui meurt*)^{**} and into the *same* marsh....

Yours,
Lenin

* *Defence Speech.*—Ed.

** *Moribund Socialism.*—Ed.

P.S. Do you go skiing? You should! Learn, buy yourself skis and go skiing in the hills. You must. It's beautiful out in the hills in winter. Charming and brings back the flavour of Russia.

Written December 18, 1916,
in Zurich and sent to Clarens

Vol. 35

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THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT IN OUR REVOLUTION

DRAFT PLATFORM FOR THE PROLETARIAN PARTY

(Excerpts)

THE SITUATION WITHIN THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL

16. The international obligations of the working class of Russia are precisely now coming to the forefront with particular force.

Only lazy people do not swear by internationalism these days. Even the chauvinist defencists, even Plekhanov and Potresov, even Kerensky, call themselves internationalists. It becomes the duty of the proletarian party all the more urgently, therefore, to clearly, precisely and definitely counterpose internationalism in deed to internationalism in word.

Mere appeals to the workers of all countries, empty assurances of devotion to internationalism, direct or indirect attempts to fix a "sequence" of action by the revolutionary proletariat in the various belligerent countries, laborious efforts to conclude "agreements" between the socialists of the belligerent countries *on the question* of the revolutionary struggle, all the fuss over the summoning of socialist congresses *for the purpose* of a peace campaign, etc., etc.—no matter how sincere the authors of such ideas, attempts, and plans may be—amount, as far as their *objective* significance is concerned, to mere phrase-mongering, and *at best* are innocent and pious wishes, fit only to conceal the *deception* of the people by the chauvinists. The *French* social-chauvinists, who are the most adroit and accomplished in methods of parliamentary hocus-pocus, have long since broken the record for ranting and resonant pacifist and internationalist phrases *coupled with* the incredibly brazen betrayal of socialism and

the International, the acceptance of posts in governments which conduct the imperialist war, the voting of credits or *loans* (as Chkheidze, Skobelev, Tsereteli and Steklov have been doing recently in Russia), opposition to the revolutionary struggle in *their own country*, etc., etc.

Good people often forget the brutal and savage setting of the imperialist world war. This setting does not tolerate phrases, and mocks at innocent and pious wishes.

There is one, and only one, kind of real internationalism, and that is—working whole-heartedly for the development of the revolutionary movement and the revolutionary struggle in *one's own* country, and supporting (by propaganda, sympathy, and material aid) *this struggle*, this, *and only this*, line, in *every* country without exception.

Everything else is deception and Manilovism.

During the two odd years of the war the international socialist and working-class movement in *every* country has evolved three trends. Whoever ignores *reality* and refuses to recognise the existence of these three trends, to analyse them, to fight consistently for the trend that is really internationalist, is doomed to impotence, helplessness and errors.

The three trends are:

1) The social-chauvinists, i.e., socialists in word and chauvinists in deed, people who recognise "defence of the fatherland" in an imperialist war (and above all in the present imperialist war).

These people are our *class* enemies. They have gone over to the bourgeoisie.

They are the majority of the official leaders of the official Social-Democratic parties in *all* countries—Plekhanov and Co. in Russia, the Scheidemanns in Germany, Renaudel, Guesde and Sembat in France, Bissolati and Co. in Italy, Hyndman, the Fabians and the Labourites (the leaders of the "Labour Party") in Britain, Branting and Co. in Sweden, Troelstra and his party in Holland, Stauning and his party in Denmark, Victor Berger and the other "defenders of the fatherland" in America, and so forth.

2) The second trend, known as the "Centre", consists of people who vacillate between the social-chauvinists and the true internationalists.

The "Centre" all vow and declare that they are Marxists and internationalists, that they are for peace, for bringing every kind of "pressure" to bear upon the governments, for "demanding" in every way that their own government should "ascertain the will of the people for peace", that they are for all sorts of peace campaigns, for peace without annexations, etc., etc.—*and for peace with the social-chauvinists*. The "Centre" is for "unity", the Centre is opposed to a split.

The "Centre" is a realm of honeyed petty-bourgeois phrases, of internationalism in word and cowardly opportunism and fawning on the social-chauvinists in deed.

The crux of the matter is that the "Centre" is not convinced of the necessity for a revolution against one's own government; it does not preach revolution; it does not carry on a whole-hearted revolutionary struggle; and in order to evade such a struggle it resorts to the tritest ultra-"Marxist"-sounding *excuses*.

The social-chauvinists are our *class enemies*, they are *bourgeois* within the working-class movement. They represent a stratum, or groups, or sections of the working class which *objectively* have been bribed by the bourgeoisie (by better wages, positions of honour, etc.), and which help *their own* bourgeoisie to plunder and oppress small and weak peoples and to fight *for* the division of the capitalist spoils.

The "Centre" consists of routine-worshippers, eroded by the canker of legality, corrupted by the parliamentary atmosphere, etc., bureaucrats accustomed to snug positions and soft jobs. Historically and economically speaking, they are not a *separate* stratum but represent only a *transition* from a past phase of the working-class movement—the phase between 1871 and 1914, which gave much that is valuable to the proletariat, particularly in the indispensable art of slow, sustained and systematic organisational work on a large and very large scale—to a new *phase* that became *objectively* essential with the outbreak of the first imperialist world war, which inaugurated *the era of social revolution*.

The chief leader and spokesman of the "Centre" is Karl Kautsky, the most outstanding authority in the Second International (1889-1914), since August 1914 a model of utter bankruptcy as a Marxist, the embodiment of unheard-of spine-

lessness and the most wretched vacillations and betrayals. This "Centrist" trend includes Kautsky, Haase, Ledebour and the so-called workers' or labour group²¹⁵ in the Reichstag; in France it includes Longuet, Pressemane and the so-called minoritaires²¹⁶ (Mensheviks) in general; in Britain, Philip Snowden, Ramsay MacDonald and many other leaders of the Independent Labour Party, and some leaders of the British Socialist Party; Morris Hillquit and many others in the United States; Turati, Trèves, Modigliani and others in Italy; Robert Grimm and others in Switzerland; Victor Adler and Co. in Austria; the party of the Organising Committee, Axelrod, Martov, Chkheidze, Tsereteli and others in Russia, and so forth.

Naturally, at times individuals unconsciously drift from the social-chauvinist to the "Centrist" position, and vice versa. Every Marxist knows that classes are distinct, even though individuals may move freely from one class to another; similarly, *trends* in political life are distinct in spite of the fact that individuals may change freely from one trend to another, and in spite of all attempts and efforts to *amalgamate* trends.

3) The third trend, that of the true internationalists, is best represented by the "Zimmerwald Left". (We reprint as a supplement its manifesto of September 1915, to enable the reader to learn of the inception of this trend at first hand.)

Its distinctive feature is its complete break with both social-chauvinism and "Centrism", and its gallant revolutionary struggle against *its own* imperialist government and *its own* imperialist bourgeoisie. Its principle is: "Our chief enemy is at home." It wages a ruthless struggle against honeyed social-pacifist phrases (a social-pacifist is a socialist in word and a bourgeois pacifist in deed; bourgeois pacifists dream of an everlasting peace *without* the overthrow of the yoke and domination of capital) and against all *subterfuges* employed to deny the possibility, or the appropriateness, or the timeliness of a proletarian revolutionary struggle and of a proletarian socialist revolution *in connection* with the present war.

The most outstanding representative of this trend in Germany is the Spartacus group or the *Internationale* group, to

which Karl Liebknecht belongs. Karl Liebknecht is a most celebrated representative of this trend and of the *new*, and genuine, proletarian International.

Karl Liebknecht called upon the workers and soldiers of Germany to *turn their guns against their own* government. Karl Liebknecht did that openly from the rostrum of parliament (the Reichstag). He then went to a demonstration in Potsdamer Platz, one of the largest public squares in Berlin, with illegally printed leaflets proclaiming the slogan "Down with the Government!" He was arrested and sentenced to *hard labour*. He is now serving his term in a German convict prison, like *hundreds*, if not thousands, of other *true* German socialists who have been imprisoned for their anti-war activities.

Karl Liebknecht in his speeches and letters mercilessly attacked not only *his own* Plekhanovs and Potresovs (Scheidemanns, Legiens, Davids and Co.), *but also his own Centrists*, his own Chkheidzes and Tseretelis (Kautsky, Haase, Ledebour and Co.).

Karl Liebknecht and his friend Otto Rühle, two out of one hundred and ten deputies, violated discipline, destroyed the "unity" with the "Centre" and the chauvinists, and *went against all of them*. Liebknecht *alone* represents socialism, the proletarian cause, the proletarian revolution. *All* the rest of German Social-Democracy, to quote the apt words of Rosa Luxemburg (also a member and one of the leaders of the Spartacus group), is a "*stinking corpse*".

Another group of true internationalists in Germany is that of the Bremen paper *Arbeiterpolitik*.

Closest to the internationalists in deed are: in France, Lorient and his friends (Bourderon and Merrheim have slid down to, social-pacifism), as well as the Frenchman Henri Guilbeaux, who publishes in Geneva the journal *Demain*; in Britain, the newspaper *The Trade Unionist*, and *some* of the members of the British Socialist Party and of the Independent Labour Party (for instance, Russel Williams, who openly called for a break with the leaders who have *betrayed* socialism), the Scottish socialist school-teacher *MacLean*, who was sentenced to *hard labour* by the bourgeois government of Britain for his revolutionary fight against the war, and hundreds of British socialists who are in jail for the

same offence. They, and they alone, are internationalists *in deed*. In the United States, the Socialist Labour Party²¹⁷ and those within the opportunist Socialist Party who in January 1917 began publication of the paper, *The Internationalist*; in Holland, the Party of the "Tribunists"²¹⁸ which publishes the paper *De Tribune* (Pannekoek, Herman Gorter, Wijnkoop, and Henriette Roland-Holst, who, although Centrist at Zimmerwald, has now joined our ranks); in Sweden, the Party of the Young, or the Left,²¹⁹ led by Lindhagen, Ture Nerman, Carleson, Ström and Z. Höglund, who at Zimmerwald was personally active in the organisation of the "Zimmerwald Left", and who is now in prison for his revolutionary fight against the war; in Denmark, Trier and his friends who have left the now purely *bourgeois* "Social-Democratic" Party of Denmark, headed by the *Minister* Stauning; in Bulgaria, the "Tesnyaki"; in Italy, the nearest are Constantino Lazzari, secretary of the party, and Serrati, editor of the central organ, *Avanti!*; in Poland, Radek, Hanecki and other leaders of the Social-Democrats united under the "Regional Executive",²²⁰ and Rosa Luxemburg, Tyszkka and other leaders of the Social-Democrats united under the "Chief Executive"; in Switzerland, those of the Left who drew up the argument for the "referendum" (January 1917) in order to fight the social-chauvinists and the "Centre" in *their own* country and who at the Zurich Cantonal Socialist Convention, held at Töss on February 11, 1917, moved a consistently revolutionary resolution against the war²²¹; in Austria, the young Left-wing friends of Friedrich Adler, who acted partly through the Karl Marx Club in Vienna, now closed by the arch-reactionary Austrian Government, which is ruining Adler's life for his heroic though ill-considered shooting at a minister, and so on.

It is not a question of shades of opinion, which certainly exist even among the Lefts. It is a question of *trend*. The thing is that it is not easy to be an internationalist in deed during a terrible imperialist war. Such people are few; but it is on such people *alone* that the future of socialism depends; they *alone* are *the leaders of the people*, and not their corrupters.

The distinction between the reformists and the revolutionaries, among the Social-Democrats and socialists generally,

was objectively bound to undergo a change under the conditions of the imperialist war. Those who confine themselves to "demanding" that the bourgeois governments should conclude peace or "ascertain the will of the peoples for peace", etc., are *actually* slipping into reforms. For, objectively, *the problem of the war can be solved only in a revolutionary way.*

There is no possibility of this war ending in a democratic, non-coercive peace or of the people being relieved of the burden of *billions* paid in interest to the capitalists, who have made fortunes out of the war, except through a revolution of the proletariat.

The most varied reforms can and must be demanded of the bourgeois governments, but one cannot, without sinking to Manilovism and reformism, demand that people and classes entangled by the thousands of threads of imperialist capital should *tear* those threads. And unless they are torn, all talk of a war against war is idle and deceitful prattle.

The "Kautskyites", the "Centre", are revolutionaries in word and reformists in deed, they are internationalists in word and accomplices of the social-chauvinists in deed.

THE COLLAPSE
OF THE ZIMMERWALD INTERNATIONAL.—
THE NEED FOR FOUNDING A THIRD INTERNATIONAL

17. From the very outset, the Zimmerwald International adopted a vacillating, "Kautskyite", "Centrist" position, which immediately compelled the *Zimmerwald Left* to dissociate itself, to separate itself from the rest, and to issue *its own* manifesto (published in Switzerland in Russian, German and French).

The chief shortcoming of the Zimmerwald International, and the cause of its *collapse* (for politically and ideologically it has already collapsed), was its vacillation and indecision on such a momentous issue of *crucial* practical significance as that of breaking completely with social-chauvinism and the old social-chauvinist International, headed by Vandervelde and Huysmans at The Hague (Holland), etc.

It is not as yet known in Russia that the Zimmerwald majority are *nothing but Kautskyites*. Yet this is the fundamental fact, one which cannot be ignored, and which is now generally known in Western Europe. Even that chauvinist, that extreme German chauvinist, Heilmann, editor of the ultra-chauvinistic *Chemnitzer Volksstimme* and contributor to Parvus's ultra-chauvinistic *Glocke*²²² (a "Social-Democrat", of course, and an ardent partisan of Social-Democratic "unity"), was compelled to acknowledge in the press that the Centre, or "Kautskyism", and the *Zimmerwald majority* were one and the same thing.

This fact was definitely established at the end of 1916 and the beginning of 1917. Although social-pacifism was condemned by the Kienthal Manifesto,²²³ the *whole* Zimmerwald Right, the *entire* Zimmerwald majority, sank to social-pacifism: Kautsky and Co. in a series of utterances in January and February 1917; Bourderon and Merrheim in France, who cast their votes *in unanimity* with the social-chauvinists for the pacifist resolutions of the Socialist Party (December 1916) and of the Confédération Générale du Travail (the national organisation of the French trade unions, also in December 1916); Turati and Co. in Italy, where the entire party took up a social-pacifist position, while Turati himself, in a speech delivered on December 17, 1916, "slipped" (not by accident, of course) into *nationalist* phrases whitewashing the imperialist war.

In January 1917, the chairman of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences, Robert Grimm, joined the social-chauvinists in *his own* party (Greulich, Pflüger, Gustav Müller and others) *against* the internationalists in deed.

At two conferences of *Zimmerwaldists* from various countries in January and February 1917, this equivocal, double-faced behaviour of the Zimmerwald majority was formally stigmatised by the Left internationalists of several countries: by Münzenberg, secretary of the international youth organisation and editor of the excellent internationalist publication *Die Jugendinternationale*; by Zinoviev, representative of the Central Committee of our Party; by K. Radek of the Polish Social-Democratic Party (the "Regional Executive"), and by Hartstein, a German Social-Democrat and member of the Spartacus group.

Much is given to the Russian proletariat; nowhere in the world has the working class yet succeeded in developing so much revolutionary energy as in Russia. But to whom much is given, of him much is required.

The Zimmerwald bog can no longer be tolerated. We must not, for the sake of the Zimmerwald "Kautskyites", continue the semi-alliance with the chauvinist International of the Plekhanovs and Scheidemanns. We must break with this International immediately. We must remain in Zimmerwald *only* for purposes of information.

It is we who must found, and right now, without delay, a *new*, revolutionary, proletarian International, or rather, we must not fear to acknowledge publicly that this new International is *already established* and operating.

This is the International of those "internationalists in deed" whom I precisely listed above. They and they alone are representatives of the revolutionary, internationalist mass, and not their corrupters.

And if socialists *of that type* are few, let every Russian worker ask himself whether there were many really class-conscious revolutionaries in Russia *on the eve* of the February-March revolution of 1917.

It is not a question of numbers, but of giving correct expression to the ideas and policies of the truly revolutionary proletariat. The thing is not to "proclaim" internationalism, but to be able to be an internationalist in deed, even when times are most trying.

Let us not deceive ourselves with hopes of agreements and international congresses. As long as the imperialist war is on, international intercourse is held in the iron vise of the military dictatorship of the imperialist bourgeoisie. If even the "republican" Milyukov, who is obliged to tolerate the parallel government of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, *did not allow Fritz Platten*, the Swiss socialist, secretary of the party, an internationalist and participant in the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences, to enter Russia in April 1917, in spite of the fact that Platten has a Russian wife and was on his way to visit his wife's relatives, and in spite of the fact that he had taken part in the revolution of 1905 in Riga, for which he had been confined in a Russian prison, had given bail to the tsarist government for his release and wished to

recover that bail—if the “republican” Milyukov could *do* such a thing in April 1917 in Russia, one can judge what value can be put on the promises and assurances, the phrases and declarations of the bourgeoisie on the subject of peace without annexations, and so on.

And the arrest of Trotsky by the British Government? And the refusal to allow Martov to leave Switzerland, and the attempt to lure him to Britain, where Trotsky's fate awaits him?

Let us harbour no illusions. We must not deceive ourselves.

To “wait” for international congresses or conferences is simply to *betray* internationalism, since it has been shown that even from Stockholm neither socialists loyal to internationalism *nor even their letters* are allowed to come here, although this is quite possible and although a ferocious military censorship exists.

Our Party must not “wait”, but must immediately *found* a Third International. Hundreds of socialists imprisoned in Germany and Britain will then heave a sigh of relief, thousands and thousands of German workers who are now holding strikes and demonstrations that are frightening that scoundrel and brigand, Wilhelm, will learn from *illegal* leaflets of our decision, of our fraternal confidence in Karl Liebknecht, and in him alone, of *our* decision to fight “revolutionary defencism” *even now*; they will read this and be strengthened in their revolutionary internationalism.

To whom much is given, of him much is required. No other country in the world is as free as Russia is *now*. Let us make use of this freedom, not to advocate support for the bourgeoisie, or bourgeois “revolutionary defencism”, but in a bold, honest, proletarian, Liebknecht way to *found the Third International*, an International uncompromisingly hostile both to the social-chauvinist traitors and to the vacillating “Centrists”.

18. After what has been said, there is no need to waste many words explaining that the amalgamation of Social-Democrats in Russia is out of the question.

It is better to remain with one friend only, like Liebknecht, and *that means remaining with the revolutionary proletariat*, than to entertain even for a moment any thought of amal-

gamation with the party of the Organising Committee, with Chkheidze and Tsereteli, who can tolerate a bloc with Potresov in *Rabochaya Gazeta*, who voted for the loan²²⁴ in the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, and who have sunk to "defencism".

Let the dead bury their dead.

Whoever wants to *help* the waverers must first stop wavering himself.

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Signed: *N. Lenin*

Vol. 24

THE STATE AND REVOLUTION
THE MARXIST THEORY OF THE STATE
AND THE TASKS
OF THE PROLETARIAT IN THE REVOLUTION

(Excerpts)

CHAPTER VI
THE VULGARISATION OF MARXISM
BY THE OPPORTUNISTS

The question of the relation of the state to the social revolution, and of the social revolution to the state, like the question of revolution generally, was given very little attention by the leading theoreticians and publicists of the Second International (1889-1914). But the most characteristic thing about the process of the gradual growth of opportunism that led to the collapse of the Second International in 1914 is the fact that even when these people were squarely faced with this question they *tried to evade* it or ignored it.

In general, it may be said that *evasiveness* over the question of the relation of the proletarian revolution to the state—an evasiveness which benefited and fostered opportunism—resulted in the *distortion* of Marxism and in its complete vulgarisation.

To characterise this lamentable process, if only briefly, we shall take the most prominent theoreticians of Marxism—Plekhanov and Kautsky.

1. PLEKHANOV'S CONTROVERSY WITH THE ANARCHISTS

Plekhanov wrote a special pamphlet on the relation of anarchism to socialism, entitled *Anarchism and Socialism*, which was published in German in 1894.

In treating this subject, Plekhanov contrived completely to evade the most urgent, burning, and most politically essential issue in the struggle against anarchism, namely, the relation of the revolution to the state, and the question of the state in general! His pamphlet falls into two distinct parts:

one of them is historical and literary, and contains valuable material on the history of the ideas of Stirner, Proudhon and others; the other is philistine, and contains a clumsy dissertation on the theme that an anarchist cannot be distinguished from a bandit.

It is a most amusing combination of subjects and most characteristic of Plekhanov's whole activity on the eve of the revolution and during the revolutionary period in Russia. In fact, in the years 1905 to 1917, Plekhanov revealed himself as a semi-doctrinaire and semi-philistine who, in politics, trailed in the wake of the bourgeoisie.

We have seen how, in their controversy with the anarchists, Marx and Engels with the utmost thoroughness explained their views on the relation of revolution to the state. In 1891, in his foreword to Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, Engels wrote that "we"—that is, Engels and Marx—"were at that time, hardly two years after The Hague Congress of the [First] International,²²⁵ engaged in the most violent struggle against Bakunin and his anarchists".

The anarchists had tried to claim the Paris Commune as their "own", so to say, as a corroboration of their doctrine; and they completely misunderstood its lessons and Marx's analysis of these lessons. Anarchism has given nothing even approximating true answers to the concrete political questions: Must the old state machine be *smashed*? And *what* should be put in its place?

But to speak of "anarchism and socialism" while completely evading the question of the state, and *disregarding* the whole development of Marxism before and after the Commune, meant inevitably slipping into opportunism. For what opportunism needs most of all is that the two questions just mentioned should *not* be raised at all. That *in itself* is a victory for opportunism.

2. KAUTSKY'S CONTROVERSY WITH THE OPPORTUNISTS

Undoubtedly, an immeasurably larger number of Kautsky's works have been translated into Russian than into any other language. It is not without reason that some German Social-Democrats say in jest that Kautsky is read more in Russia

than in Germany (let us say, in parenthesis, that this jest has a far deeper historical meaning than those who first made it suspect. The Russian workers, by making in 1905 an unusually great and unprecedented demand for the best works of the best Social-Democratic literature in the world, and by receiving translations and editions of these works in quantities unheard of in other countries, rapidly transplanted, so to speak, the enormous experience of a neighbouring, more advanced country to the young soil of our proletarian movement).

Besides his popularisation of Marxism, Kautsky is particularly known in our country for his controversy with the opportunists, with Bernstein at their head. One fact, however, is almost unknown, one which cannot be ignored if we set out to investigate how Kautsky drifted into the morass of unbelievably disgraceful confusion and defence of social-chauvinism during the supreme crisis of 1914-15. This fact is as follows: shortly before he came out against the most prominent representatives of opportunism in France (Millerand and Jaurès) and in Germany (Bernstein), Kautsky betrayed very considerable vacillation. The Marxist *Zarya*, which was published in Stuttgart in 1901-02, and advocated revolutionary proletarian views, was forced to *enter into controversy* with Kautsky and describe as "elastic" the half-hearted, evasive resolution, conciliatory towards the opportunists, that he proposed at the International Socialist Congress in Paris in 1900.²²⁶ Kautsky's letters published in Germany reveal no less hesitancy on his part before he took the field against Bernstein.

Of immeasurably greater significance, however, is the fact that, in his very controversy with the opportunists, in his formulation of the question and his manner of treating it, we can now see, as we study the *history* of Kautsky's latest betrayal of Marxism, his systematic deviation towards opportunism precisely on the question of the state.

Let us take Kautsky's first important work against opportunism, *Bernstein and the Social-Democratic Programme*. Kautsky refutes Bernstein in detail, but here is a characteristic thing:

Bernstein, in his *Premises of Socialism*, of Herostratean fame, accuses Marxism of "*Blanquism*" (an accusation since

repeated thousands of times by the opportunists and liberal bourgeoisie in Russia against the revolutionary Marxists, the Bolsheviks). In this connection Bernstein dwells particularly on Marx's *The Civil War in France*, and tries, quite unsuccessfully, as we have seen, to identify Marx's views on the lessons of the Commune with those of Proudhon. Bernstein pays particular attention to the conclusion which Marx emphasised in his 1872 preface to the *Communist Manifesto*, namely, that "the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and wield it for its own purposes".

This statement "pleased" Bernstein so much that he used it no less than three times in his book, interpreting it in the most distorted, opportunist way.

As we have seen, Marx meant that the working class must *smash, break, shatter* (*Sprengung*, explosion—the expression used by Engels) the whole state machine. But according to Bernstein it would appear as though Marx in these words warned the working class *against* excessive revolutionary zeal when seizing power.

A cruder and more hideous distortion of Marx's idea cannot be imagined.

How, then, did Kautsky proceed in his most detailed refutation of Bernsteinism?

He refrained from analysing the utter distortion of Marxism by opportunism on this point. He cited the above-quoted passage from Engels's preface to Marx's *Civil War* and said that according to Marx the working class cannot *simply* take over the *ready-made* state machinery, but that, generally speaking, it *can* take it over—and that was all. Kautsky did not say a word about the fact that Bernstein attributed to Marx the *very opposite* of Marx's real idea, that since 1852 Marx had formulated the task of the proletarian revolution as being to "smash" the state machine.

The result was that the most essential distinction between Marxism and opportunism on the subject of the tasks of the proletarian revolution was slurred over by Kautsky!

"We can quite safely leave the solution of the problem of the proletarian dictatorship to the future," said Kautsky, writing "*against*" Bernstein (p. 172, German edition).

This is not a polemic *against* Bernstein, but, in essence, a *concession* to him, a surrender to opportunism; for at present the opportunists ask nothing better than to "quite safely leave to the future" all fundamental questions of the tasks of the proletarian revolution.

From 1852 to 1891, or for forty years, Marx and Engels taught the proletariat that it must smash the state machine. Yet, in 1899, Kautsky, confronted with the complete betrayal of Marxism by the opportunists on this point, fraudulently *substituted* for the question whether it is necessary to smash this machine the question of the concrete forms in which it is to be smashed, and then sought refuge behind the "indisputable" (and barren) philistine truth that concrete forms cannot be known in advance!!

A gulf separates Marx and Kautsky over their attitudes towards the proletarian party's task of training the working class for revolution.

Let us take the next, more mature, work by Kautsky, which was also largely devoted to a refutation of opportunist errors. It is his pamphlet, *The Social Revolution*. In this pamphlet, the author chose as his special theme the question of "the proletarian revolution" and "the proletarian regime". He gave much that was exceedingly valuable, but he *avoided* the question of the state. Throughout the pamphlet the author speaks of the winning of state power—and no more; that is, he has chosen a formula which makes a concession to the opportunists, inasmuch as it *admits* the possibility of seizing power *without* destroying the state machine. The very thing which Marx in 1872 declared to be "obsolete" in the programme of the *Communist Manifesto*, is *revived* by Kautsky in 1902.

A special section in the pamphlet is devoted to the "forms and weapons of the social revolution". Here Kautsky speaks of the mass political strike, of civil war, and of the "instruments of the might of the modern large state, its bureaucracy and the army"; but he does not say a word about what the Commune has already taught the workers. Evidently, it was not without reason that Engels issued a warning, particularly to the German socialists, against "superstitious reverence" for the state.

Kautsky treats the matter as follows: the victorious pro-

letariat "will carry out the democratic programme", and he goes on to formulate its clauses. But he does not say a word about the new material provided by 1871 on the subject of the replacement of bourgeois democracy by proletarian democracy. Kautsky disposes of the question by using such "impressive-sounding" banalities as:

"Still, it goes without saying that we shall not achieve supremacy under the present conditions. Revolution itself presupposes long and deep-going struggles, which, in themselves, will change our present political and social structure."

Undoubtedly, this "goes without saying", just as the fact that horses eat oats or the Volga flows into the Caspian. Only it is a pity that an empty and bombastic phrase about "deep-going" struggles is used to *avoid* a question of vital importance to the revolutionary proletariat, namely, *what* makes *its* revolution "deep-going" in relation to the state, to democracy, as distinct from previous, non-proletarian revolutions.

By avoiding this question, Kautsky *in practice* makes a concession to opportunism on this most essential point, although *in words* he declares stern war against it and stresses the importance of the "idea of revolution" (how much is this "idea" worth when one is afraid to teach the workers the concrete lessons of revolution?), or says, "revolutionary idealism before everything else", or announces that the English workers are now "hardly more than petty bourgeois".

"The most varied forms of enterprises—bureaucratic [??], trade-unionist, co-operative, private ... can exist side by side in socialist society," Kautsky writes. "... There are, for example, enterprises which cannot do without a bureaucratic [??] organisation, such as the railways. Here the democratic organisation may take the following shape: the workers elect delegates who form a sort of parliament, which establishes the working regulations and supervises the management of the bureaucratic apparatus. The management of other enterprises may be transferred to the trade unions, and still others may become co-operative enterprises."

This argument is erroneous; it is a step backward compared with the explanations Marx and Engels gave in the seventies, using the lessons of the Commune as an example.

As far as the supposedly necessary "bureaucratic" organisation is concerned, there is no difference whatever between a railway and any other enterprise in large-scale machine

industry, any factory, large shop, or large-scale capitalist agricultural enterprise. The technique of all these enterprises makes absolutely imperative the strictest discipline, the utmost precision on the part of everyone in carrying out his allotted task, for otherwise the whole enterprise may come to a stop, or machinery or the finished product may be damaged. In all these enterprises the workers will, of course, "elect delegates who will form a sort of parliament".

The whole point, however, is that this "sort of parliament" will *not* be a parliament in the sense of a bourgeois parliamentary institution. The whole point is that this "sort of parliament" will *not* merely "establish the working regulations and supervise the management of the bureaucratic apparatus", as Kautsky, whose thinking does not go beyond the bounds of bourgeois parliamentarism, imagines. In socialist society, the "sort of parliament" consisting of workers' deputies will, of course, "establish the working regulations and supervise the management" of the "apparatus", *but* this apparatus will *not* be "bureaucratic". The workers, after winning political power, will smash the old bureaucratic apparatus, shatter it to its very foundations, and raze it to the ground; they will replace it by a new one, consisting of the very same workers and other employees, *against* whose transformation into bureaucrats the measures will at once be taken which were specified in detail by Marx and Engels: (1) not only election, but also recall at any time; (2) pay not to exceed that of a workman; (3) immediate introduction of control and supervision by *all*, so that *all* may become "bureaucrats" for a time and that, therefore, *nobody* may be able to become a "bureaucrat".

Kautsky has not reflected at all on Marx's words: "The Commune was a working, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time."

Kautsky has not understood at all the difference between bourgeois parliamentarism, which combines democracy (*not for the people*) with bureaucracy (*against the people*), and proletarian democracy, which will take immediate steps to cut bureaucracy down to the roots, and which will be able to carry these measures through to the end, to the complete abolition of bureaucracy, to the introduction of complete democracy for the people.

Kautsky here displays the same old "superstitious reverence" for the state, and "superstitious belief" in bureaucracy.

Let us now pass to the last and best of Kautsky's works against the opportunists, his pamphlet *The Road to Power* (which, I believe, has not been published in Russian, for it appeared in 1909, when reaction was at its height in our country). This pamphlet is a big step forward, since it does not deal with the revolutionary programme in general, as the pamphlet of 1899 against Bernstein, or with the tasks of the social revolution irrespective of the time of its occurrence, as the 1902 pamphlet, *The Social Revolution*; it deals with the concrete conditions which compel us to recognise that the "era of revolutions" is *setting in*.

The author explicitly points to the aggravation of class antagonisms in general and to imperialism, which plays a particularly important part in this respect. After the "revolutionary period of 1789-1871" in Western Europe, he says, a similar period began in the East in 1905. A world war is approaching with menacing rapidity. "It [the proletariat] can no longer talk of premature revolution." "We have entered a revolutionary period." The "revolutionary era is beginning".

These statements are perfectly clear. This pamphlet of Kautsky's should serve as a measure of comparison of what the German Social-Democrats *promised to be* before the imperialist war and the depth of degradation to which they, including Kautsky himself, sank when the war broke out. "The present situation," Kautsky wrote in the pamphlet under survey, "is fraught with the danger that we [i.e., the German Social-Democrats] may easily appear to be more 'moderate' than we really are." It turned out that in reality the German Social-Democratic Party was much more moderate and opportunist than it appeared to be!

It is all the more characteristic, therefore, that although Kautsky so explicitly declared that the era of revolutions had already begun, in the pamphlet which he himself said was devoted to an analysis of the "*political* revolution", he again completely avoided the question of the state.

These evasions of the question, these omissions and equivo-

cations, inevitably added up to that complete swing-over to opportunism with which we shall now have to deal.

Kautsky, the German Social-Democrats' spokesman, seems to have declared: I abide by revolutionary views (1899), I recognise, above all, the inevitability of the social revolution of the proletariat (1902), I recognise the advent of a new era of revolutions (1909). Still, I am going back on what Marx said as early as 1852, since the question of the tasks of the proletarian revolution in relation to the state is being raised (1912).

It was in this point-blank form that the question was put in Kautsky's controversy with Pannekoek.

3. KAUTSKY'S CONTROVERSY WITH PANNEKOEK

In opposing Kautsky, Pannekoek came out as one of the representatives of the "Left radical" trend which included Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Radek and others. Advocating revolutionary tactics, they were united in the conviction that Kautsky was going over to the "Centre", which wavered in an unprincipled manner between Marxism and opportunism. This view was proved perfectly correct by the war, when this "Centrist" (wrongly called Marxist) trend, or Kautskyism, revealed itself in all its repulsive wretchedness.

In an article touching on the question of the state, entitled "Mass Action and Revolution" (*Neue Zeit*, 1912, Vol. XXX, 2), Pannekoek described Kautsky's attitude as one of "passive radicalism", as "a theory of inactive expectancy". "Kautsky refuses to see the process of revolution," wrote Pannekoek (p. 616). In presenting the matter in this way, Pannekoek approached the subject which interests us, namely, the tasks of the proletarian revolution in relation to the state.

"The struggle of the proletariat," he wrote, "is not merely a struggle against the bourgeoisie for state power, but a struggle against state power. . . . The content of this [the proletarian] revolution is the destruction and dissolution [Auflösung] of the instruments of power of the state with the aid of the instruments of power of the proletariat (p. 544). The struggle will cease only when, as the result of it, the state organisation is completely destroyed. The organisation of the majority will then have demonstrated its superiority by destroying the organisation of the ruling minority" (p. 548).

The formulation in which Pannekoek presented his ideas suffers from serious defects. But its meaning is clear nonetheless, and it is interesting to note *how* Kautsky combated it.

"Up to now," he wrote, "the antithesis between the Social-Democrats and the anarchists has been that the former wished to win state power while the latter wished to destroy it. Pannekoek wants to do both" (p. 724).

Although Pannekoek's exposition lacks precision and concreteness—not to speak of other shortcomings of his article which have no bearing on the present subject—Kautsky seized precisely on the point of *principle* raised by Pannekoek; and on *this fundamental* point of *principle* Kautsky completely abandoned the Marxist position and went over wholly to opportunism. His definition of the distinction between the Social-Democrats and the anarchists is absolutely wrong; he completely vulgarises and distorts Marxism.

The distinction between the Marxists and the anarchists is this: (1) The former, while aiming at the complete abolition of the state, recognise that this aim can only be achieved after classes have been abolished by the socialist revolution, as the result of the establishment of socialism, which leads to the withering away of the state. The latter want to abolish the state completely overnight, not understanding the conditions under which the state can be abolished. (2) The former recognise that after the proletariat has won political power it must completely destroy the old state machine and replace it by a new one consisting of an organisation of the armed workers, after the type of the Commune. The latter, while insisting on the destruction of the state machine, have a very vague idea of *what* the proletariat will put in its place and *how* it will use its revolutionary power. The anarchists even deny that the revolutionary proletariat should use the state power, they reject its revolutionary dictatorship. (3) The former demand that the proletariat be trained for revolution by utilising the present state. The anarchists reject this.

In this controversy, it is not Kautsky but Pannekoek who represents Marxism, for it was Marx who taught that the proletariat cannot simply win state power in the sense that the old state apparatus passes into new hands, but must smash this apparatus, must break it and replace it by a new one.

Kautsky abandons Marxism for the opportunist camp, for this destruction of the state machine, which is utterly unacceptable to the opportunists, completely disappears from his argument, and he leaves a loophole for them in that "conquest" may be interpreted as the simple acquisition of a majority.

To cover up his distortion of Marxism, Kautsky behaves like a doctrinaire: he puts forward a "quotation" from Marx himself. In 1850 Marx wrote that a "resolute centralisation of power in the hands of the state authority" was necessary, and Kautsky triumphantly asks: does Pannekoek want to destroy "Centralism"?

This is simply a trick, like Bernstein's identification of the views of Marxism and Proudhonism on the subject of federalism as against centralism.

Kautsky's "quotation" is neither here nor there. Centralism is possible with both the old and the new state machine. If the workers voluntarily unite their armed forces, this will be centralism, but it will be based on the "complete destruction" of the centralised state apparatus—the standing army, the police and the bureaucracy. Kautsky acts like an outright swindler by evading the perfectly well-known arguments of Marx and Engels on the Commune and plucking out a quotation which has nothing to do with the point at issue.

"Perhaps he [Pannekoek]," Kautsky continues, "wants to abolish the state functions of the officials? But we cannot do without officials even in the party and the trade unions, let alone in the state administration. And our programme does not demand the abolition of state officials, but that they be elected by the people. . . . We are discussing here not the form the administrative apparatus of the 'future state' will assume, but whether our political struggle abolishes [literally *dissolves*—*aflöst*] the state power *before we have captured it* [Kautsky's italics]. Which ministry with its officials could be abolished?" Then follows an enumeration of the ministries of education, justice, finance and war. "No, not one of the present ministries will be removed by our political struggle against the government. . . . I repeat, in order to prevent misunderstanding: we are not discussing here the form the 'future state' will be given by the victorious Social-Democrats, but how the present state is changed by our opposition" (p. 725).

This is an obvious trick. Pannekoek raised the question of *revolution*. Both the title of his article and the passages quoted above clearly indicate this. By skipping to the question of

"opposition", Kautsky substitutes the opportunist for the revolutionary point of view. What he says means: at present we are an opposition; what we shall be *after* we have captured power, that we shall see. *Revolution has vanished!* And that is exactly what the opportunists wanted.

The point at issue is neither opposition nor political struggle in general, but *revolution*. Revolution consists in the proletariat *destroying* the "administrative apparatus" and the *whole* state machine, replacing it by a new one, made up of the armed workers. Kautsky displays a "superstitious reverence" for "ministries"; but why can they not be replaced, say, by committees of specialists working under sovereign, all-powerful Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies?

The point is not at all whether the "ministries" will remain, or whether "committees of specialists" or some other bodies will be set up; that is quite immaterial. The point is whether the old state machine (bound by thousands of threads to the bourgeoisie and permeated through and through with routine and inertia) shall remain, or be *destroyed* and replaced by a *new* one. Revolution consists not in the new class commanding, governing with the aid of the *old* state machine, but in this class *smashing* this machine and commanding, governing with the aid of a *new* machine. Kautsky slurs over this *basic* idea of Marxism, or he does not understand it at all.

His question about officials clearly shows that he does not understand the lessons of the Commune or the teachings of Marx. "We cannot do without officials even in the party and the trade unions. . . ."

We cannot do without officials *under capitalism*, under *the rule of the bourgeoisie*. The proletariat is oppressed, the working people are enslaved by capitalism. Under capitalism, democracy is restricted, cramped, curtailed, mutilated by all the conditions of wage slavery, and the poverty and misery of the people. This and this alone is the reason why the functionaries of our political organisations and trade unions are corrupted—or rather tend to be corrupted—by the conditions of capitalism and betray a tendency to become bureaucrats, i.e., privileged persons divorced from the people and standing *above* the people.

That is the *essence* of bureaucracy; and until the capitalists have been expropriated and the bourgeoisie overthrown, *even* proletarian functionaries will inevitably be "bureaucratised" to a certain extent.

According to Kautsky, since elected functionaries will remain under socialism, so will officials, so will the bureaucracy! This is exactly where he is wrong. Marx, referring to the example of the Commune, showed that under socialism functionaries will cease to be "bureaucrats", to be "officials", they will cease to be so *in proportion as*—in addition to the principle of election of officials—the principle of recall at any time is *also* introduced, as salaries are reduced to the level of the wages of the average workman, *and* as parliamentary institutions are replaced by "working bodies, executive and legislative at the same time".

As a matter of fact, the whole of Kautsky's argument against Pannekoek, and particularly the former's wonderful point that we cannot do without officials even in our party and trade union organisations, is merely a repetition of Bernstein's old "arguments" against Marxism in general. In his renegade book, *The Premises of Socialism*, Bernstein combats the ideas of "primitive" democracy, combats what he calls "doctrinaire democracy": binding mandates, unpaid officials, impotent central representative bodies, etc. To prove that this "primitive" democracy is unsound, Bernstein refers to the experience of the British trade unions, as interpreted by the Webbs. Seventy years of development "in absolute freedom", he says (p. 137, German edition), convinced the trade unions that primitive democracy was useless, and they replaced it by ordinary democracy, i.e., parliamentarism combined with bureaucracy.

In reality, the trade unions did not develop "in absolute freedom" *but in absolute capitalist slavery*, under which, it goes without saying, a number of concessions to the prevailing evil, violence, falsehood, exclusion of the poor from the affairs of "higher" administration, "cannot be done without". Under socialism much of "primitive" democracy will inevitably be revived, since, for the first time in the history of civilised society, the *mass* of the population will rise to taking an *independent* part, not only in voting and elections, *but*

also in the everyday administration of the state. Under socialism *all* will govern in turn and will soon become accustomed to no one governing.

Marx's critico-analytical genius saw in the practical measures of the Commune the *turning-point* which the opportunists fear and do not want to recognise because of their cowardice, because they do not want to break irrevocably with the bourgeoisie, and which the anarchists do not want to see, either because they are in a hurry or because they do not understand at all the conditions of great social changes. "We must not even think of destroying the old state machine; how can we do without ministries and officials?" argues the opportunist, who is completely saturated with philistinism and who, at bottom, not only does not believe in revolution, in the creative power of revolution, but lives in mortal dread of it (like our Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries).

"We must think *only* of destroying the old state machine; it is no use probing into the *concrete* lessons of earlier proletarian revolutions and analysing *what* to put in the place of what has been destroyed, and *how*," argues the anarchist (the best of the anarchists, of course, and not those who, following the Kropotkins and Co., trail behind the bourgeoisie). Consequently, the tactics of the anarchist become the tactics of *despair* instead of a ruthlessly bold revolutionary effort to solve concrete problems while taking into account the practical conditions of the mass movement.

Marx teaches us to avoid both errors; he teaches us to act with supreme boldness in destroying the entire old state machine, and at the same time he teaches us to put the question concretely: the Commune was able in the space of a few weeks to *start* building a *new*, proletarian state machine by introducing such-and-such measures to provide wider democracy and to uproot bureaucracy. Let us learn revolutionary boldness from the Communards; let us see in their practical measures the *outline* of really urgent and immediately possible measures, and then, *following this road*, we shall achieve the complete destruction of bureaucracy.

The possibility of this destruction is guaranteed by the fact that socialism will shorten the working day, will raise the *people* to a new life, will create such conditions for the

majority of the population as will enable *everybody*, without exception, to perform "state functions", and this will lead to the *complete withering away* of every form of state in general.

"Its object [the object of the mass strike]," Kautsky continues, "cannot be to *destroy* the state power; its only object can be to make the government compliant on some specific question, or to replace a government hostile to the proletariat by one willing to meet it half-way [entgegenkommende]. . . . But never, under no circumstances, can it [that is, the proletarian victory over a hostile government] lead to the *destruction* of the state power; it can lead only to a certain *shifting* [Verschiebung] of the balance of forces *within the state power*. . . . The aim of our political struggle remains, as in the past, the conquest of state power by winning a majority in parliament and by raising parliament to the rank of master of the government" (pp. 726, 727, 732).

This is nothing but the purest and most vulgar opportunism: repudiating revolution in deeds, while accepting it in words. Kautsky's thoughts go no further than a "government. . . willing to meet the proletariat half-way"—a step backward to philistinism compared with 1847, when the *Communist Manifesto* proclaimed "the organisation of the proletariat as the ruling class".

Kautsky will have to achieve his beloved "unity" with the Scheidemanns, Plekhanovs and Vanderveldes, all of whom agree to fight for a government "willing to meet the proletariat half-way".

We, however, shall break with these traitors to socialism, and we shall fight for the complete destruction of the old state machine, in order that the armed proletariat itself *may become the government*. These are two vastly different things.

Kautsky will have to enjoy the pleasant company of the Legiens and Davids, Plekhanovs, Potresovs, Tseretelis and Chernovs, who are quite willing to work for the "shifting of the balance of forces within the state power", for "winning a majority in parliament", and "raising parliament to the rank of master of the government". A most worthy object, which is wholly acceptable to the opportunists and which keeps everything within the bounds of the bourgeois parliamentary republic.

We, however, shall break with the opportunists; and the entire class-conscious proletariat will be with us in the fight—not to "shift the balance of forces", but to *overthrow the bourgeoisie, to destroy* bourgeois parliamentarism, for a

democratic republic after the type of the Commune, or a republic of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, for the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.

* * *

To the right of Kautsky in international socialism there are trends such as *Socialist Monthly* in Germany (Legien, David, Kolb and many others, including the Scandinavians Stauning and Branting); Jaurès's followers and Vandervelde in France and Belgium; Turati, Treves and other Right-wingers of the Italian Party; the Fabians and "Independents" (the Independent Labour Party, which, in fact, has always been dependent on the Liberals) in Britain; and the like. All these gentry, who play a tremendous, very often a predominant role in the parliamentary work and the press of their parties, repudiate outright the dictatorship of the proletariat and pursue a policy of undisguised opportunism. In the eyes of these gentry, the "dictatorship" of the proletariat "contradicts" democracy!! There is really no essential distinction between them and the petty-bourgeois democrats.

Taking this circumstance into consideration, we are justified in drawing the conclusion that the Second International, that is, the overwhelming majority of its official representatives, has completely sunk into opportunism. The experience of the Commune has been not only ignored, but distorted. Far from inculcating in the workers' minds the idea that the time is nearing when they must act to smash the old state machine, replace it by a new one, and in this way make their political rule the foundation for the socialist reorganisation of society, they have actually preached to the masses the very opposite and have depicted the "conquest of power" in a way that has left thousands of loopholes for opportunism.

The distortion and hushing up of the question of the relation of the proletarian revolution to the state could not but play an immense role at a time when states, which possess a military apparatus expanded as a consequence of imperialist rivalry, have become military monsters which are exterminating millions of people in order to settle the issue as to whether Britain or Germany—this or that finance capital—is to rule the world.

POSTSCRIPT TO THE FIRST EDITION

This pamphlet was written in August and September 1917. I had already drawn up the plan for the next, the seventh, chapter, "The Experience of the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917". Apart from the title, however, I had no time to write a single line of the chapter; I was "interrupted" by a political crisis—the eve of the October revolution of 1917. Such an "interruption" can only be welcomed; but the writing of the second part of the pamphlet ("The Experience of the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917") will probably have to be put off for a long time. It is more pleasant and useful to go through the "experience of the revolution" than to write about it.

The Author

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THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION AND THE RENEGADE KAUTSKY

PREFACE

Kautsky's pamphlet, *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, recently published in Vienna (Wien, 1918, Ignaz Brand, pp. 63) is a most lucid example of that utter and ignominious bankruptcy of the Second International about which all honest socialists in all countries have been talking for a long time. The proletarian revolution is now becoming a practical issue in a number of countries, and an examination of Kautsky's renegade sophistries and his complete renunciation of Marxism is therefore essential.

First of all, it should be emphasised, however, that the present author has, from the very beginning of the war, repeatedly pointed to Kautsky's rupture with Marxism. A number of articles published between 1914 and 1916 in *Sotsial-Demokrat* and *Kommunist*, issued abroad, dealt with this subject. These articles were afterwards collected and published by the Petrograd Soviet under the title *Against the Stream*, by G. Zinoviev and N. Lenin (Petrograd, 1918, pp. 550). In a pamphlet published in Geneva in 1915 and translated at the same time into German and French I wrote about "Kautskyism" as follows:

"Kautsky, the leading authority in the Second International, is a most typical and striking example of how a verbal recognition of Marxism has led in practice to its conversion into 'Struivism' or into 'Brentanoism' [i.e., into a bourgeois-liberal theory recognising the non-revolutionary "class" struggle of the proletariat, which was expressed most clearly by Struve, the Russian writer, and Brentano, the German economist]. Another example is Plekhanov. By means of patent

sophistry, Marxism is stripped of its revolutionary living spirit; *everything* is recognised in Marxism *except* the revolutionary methods of struggle, the propaganda and preparation of those methods, and the education of the masses in this direction. Kautsky 'reconciles' in an unprincipled way the fundamental idea of social-chauvinism, recognition of defence of the fatherland in the present war, with a diplomatic sham concession to the Lefts—his abstention from voting for war credits, his verbal claim to be in the opposition, etc. Kautsky, who in 1909 wrote a book on the approaching epoch of revolutions and on the connection between war and revolution, Kautsky, who in 1912 signed the Basle Manifesto on taking revolutionary advantage of the impending war, is outdoing himself in justifying and embellishing social-chauvinism and, like Plekhanov, joins the bourgeoisie in ridiculing any thought of revolution and all steps towards the immediate revolutionary struggle.

"The working class cannot play its world-revolutionary role unless it wages a ruthless struggle against this back-sliding, spinelessness, subservience to opportunism, and unparalleled vulgarisation of the theories of Marxism. Kautskyism is not fortuitous; it is the social product of the contradictions within the Second International, a blend of loyalty to Marxism in word and subordination to opportunism in deed" (G. Zinoviev and N. Lenin, *Socialism and War*, Geneva, 1915, pp. 13-14).

Again, in my book *Imperialism, the Latest Stage of Capitalism*, written in 1916 and published in Petrograd in 1917, I examined in detail the theoretical fallacy of all Kautsky's arguments about imperialism. I quoted Kautsky's definition of imperialism: "Imperialism is a product of highly developed industrial capitalism. It consists in the striving of every industrial capitalist nation to bring under its control or to annex all large areas of *agrarian* [Kautsky's italics] territory, irrespective of what nations inhabit it." I showed how utterly incorrect this definition was, and how it was "adapted" to the glossing over of the most profound contradictions of imperialism, and then to reconciliation with opportunism. I gave my own definition of imperialism: "Imperialism is capitalism at that stage of development at which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital is established; at which

the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; at which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun; at which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed." I showed that Kautsky's critique of imperialism is on an even lower plane than the bourgeois, philistine critique.

Finally, in August and September 1917—that is, before the proletarian revolution in Russia (October 25 [November 7], 1917), I wrote a pamphlet (published in Petrograd at the beginning of 1918) entitled *The State and Revolution. The Marxist Theory of the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution*. In Chapter VI of this book, entitled "The Vulgarisation of Marxism by the Opportunists",* I devoted special attention to Kautsky, showing that he had completely distorted Marx's ideas, tailoring them to suit opportunism, and that he had "repudiated the revolution in deeds, while accepting it in words".

In substance, the chief theoretical mistake Kautsky makes in his pamphlet on the dictatorship of the proletariat lies in those opportunist distortions of Marx's ideas on the state—the distortions which I exposed in detail in my pamphlet, *The State and Revolution*.

These preliminary remarks were necessary for they show that I openly accused Kautsky of being a renegade *long before* the Bolsheviks assumed state power and were condemned by him on that account.

HOW KAUTSKY TURNED MARX INTO A COMMON LIBERAL

The fundamental question that Kautsky discusses in his pamphlet is that of the very essence of proletarian revolution, namely, the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is a question that is of the greatest importance for all countries, especially for the advanced ones, especially for those at war, and especially at the present time. One may say without fear of exaggeration that this is the key problem of the entire

* See pp. 353-68.—Ed.

proletarian class struggle. It is, therefore, necessary to pay particular attention to it.

Kautsky formulates the question as follows: "The contrast between the two socialist trends" (i.e., the Bolsheviks and non-Bolsheviks) "is the contrast between two radically different methods: the *dictatorial* and the *democratic*" (p. 3).

Let us point out, in passing, that when calling the non-Bolsheviks in Russia, i.e., the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, socialists, Kautsky was guided by their *name*, that is, by a word, and not by the *actual place* they occupy in the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. What a wonderful understanding and application of Marxism! But more of this later.

For the moment we must deal with the main point, namely, with Kautsky's great discovery of the "fundamental contrast" between "democratic and dictatorial methods". That is the crux of the matter; that is the essence of Kautsky's pamphlet. And that is such an awful theoretical muddle, such a complete renunciation of Marxism, that Kautsky, it must be confessed, has far excelled Bernstein.

The question of the dictatorship of the proletariat is a question of the relation of the proletarian state to the bourgeois state, of proletarian democracy to bourgeois democracy. One would think that this is as plain as a pikestaff. But Kautsky, like a schoolmaster who has become as dry as dust from quoting the same old textbooks on history, persistently turns his back on the twentieth century and his face to the eighteenth century, and for the hundredth time, in a number of paragraphs, in an incredibly tedious fashion chews the old cud over the relation of bourgeois democracy to absolutism and medievalism!

It sounds just like he were chewing rags in his sleep!

But this means he utterly fails to understand what is what! One cannot help smiling at Kautsky's effort to make it appear that there are people who preach "contempt for democracy" (p. 11) and so forth. That is the sort of twaddle Kautsky uses to befog and confuse the issue, for he talks like the liberals, speaking of democracy in general, and not of *bourgeois* democracy; he even avoids using this precise, class term, and, instead, tries to speak about "pre-socialist" democracy. This windbag devotes almost one-third of his

pamphlet, twenty pages out of sixty-three, to this twaddle, which is so agreeable to the bourgeoisie, for it is tantamount to embellishing bourgeois democracy, and obscures the question of the proletarian revolution.

But, after all, the title of Kautsky's pamphlet is *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*. Everybody knows that this is the very *essence* of Marx's doctrine; and after a lot of irrelevant twaddle Kautsky *was obliged* to quote Marx's words on the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But the *way* in which he the "Marxist" did it was simply farcical! Listen to this:

"This view" (which Kautsky dubs "contempt for democracy") "rests upon a single word of Karl Marx's." This is what Kautsky literally says on page 20. And on page 60 the same thing is repeated even in the form that they (the Bolsheviks) "opportunistly recalled the little word" (that is literally what he says—*des Wörtchens*!!) "about the dictatorship of the proletariat which Marx once used in 1875 in a letter".

Here is Marx's "little word":

"Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat."²²⁷

First of all, to call this classical reasoning of Marx's, which sums up the whole of his revolutionary teaching, "a single word" and even "a little word", is an insult to and complete renunciation of Marxism. It must not be forgotten that Kautsky knows Marx almost by heart, and, judging by all he has written, he has in his desk, or in his head, a number of pigeon-holes in which all that was ever written by Marx is most carefully filed so as to be ready at hand for quotation. Kautsky *must know* that both Marx and Engels, in their letters as well as in their published works, *repeatedly* spoke about the dictatorship of the proletariat, before and especially after the Paris Commune. Kautsky must know that the formula "dictatorship of the proletariat" is merely a more historically concrete and scientifically exact formulation of the proletariat's task of "smashing" the bourgeois state machine, about which both Marx and Engels, in summing up the experience of the Revolution of 1848, and, still

more so, of 1871, spoke for forty years, between 1852 and 1891.

How is this monstrous distortion of Marxism by that Marxist pedant Kautsky to be explained? As far as the philosophical roots of this phenomenon are concerned, it amounts to the substitution of eclecticism and sophistry for dialectics. Kautsky is a past master at this sort of substitution. Regarded from the point of view of practical politics, it amounts to subservience to the opportunists, that is, in the last analysis to the bourgeoisie. Since the outbreak of the war, Kautsky has made increasingly rapid progress in this art of being a Marxist in words and a lackey of the bourgeoisie in deeds, until he has become a virtuoso at it.

One feels even more convinced of this when examining the remarkable way in which Kautsky "interprets" Marx's "little word" about the dictatorship of the proletariat. Listen to this:

"Marx, unfortunately, neglected to show us in greater detail how he conceived this dictatorship. . . ." (This is an utterly mendacious phrase of a renegade, for Marx and Engels gave us, indeed, quite a number of most detailed indications, which Kautsky, the Marxist pedant, has deliberately ignored.) "Literally, the word dictatorship means the abolition of democracy. But, of course, taken literally, this word also means the undivided rule of a single person unrestricted by any laws—an autocracy, which differs from despotism only insofar as it is not meant as a permanent state institution, but as a transient emergency measure.

"The term, 'dictatorship of the proletariat', hence not the dictatorship of a single individual, but of a class, *ipso facto* precludes the possibility that Marx in this connection had in mind a dictatorship in the literal sense of the term.

"He speaks here not of a *form of government*, but of a *condition*, which must necessarily arise wherever the proletariat has gained political power. That Marx in this case did not have in mind a form of government is proved by the fact that he was of the opinion that in Britain and America the transition might take place peacefully, i.e., in a democratic way" (p. 20).

We have deliberately quoted this argument in full so that the reader may clearly see the methods Kautsky the "theoretician" employs.

Kautsky chose to approach the question in such a way as to begin with a definition of the "word" dictatorship.

Very well. Everyone has a sacred right to approach a question in whatever way he pleases. One must only distin-

guish a serious and honest approach from a dishonest one. Anyone who wants to be serious in approaching the question in this way ought to give *his own definition* of the "word". Then the question would be put fairly and squarely. But Kautsky does not do that. "Literally," he writes, "the word dictatorship means the abolition of democracy."

In the first place, this is not a definition. If Kautsky wanted to avoid giving a definition of the concept dictatorship, why did he choose this particular approach to the question?

Secondly, it is obviously wrong. It is natural for a liberal to speak of "democracy" in general; but a Marxist will never forget to ask: "for what class?" Everyone knows, for instance (and Kautsky the "historian" knows it too), that rebellions, or even strong ferment, among the slaves in ancient times at once revealed the fact that the ancient state was essentially a *dictatorship of the slaveowners*. Did this dictatorship abolish democracy *among*, and *for*, the slaveowners? Everybody knows that it did not.

Kautsky the "Marxist" made this monstrously absurd and untrue statement because he "*forgot*" the class struggle...

To transform Kautsky's liberal and false assertion into a Marxist and true one, one must say: dictatorship does not necessarily mean the abolition of democracy for the class that exercises the dictatorship over other classes; but it does mean the abolition (or very material restriction, which is also a form of abolition) of democracy for the class over which, or against which, the dictatorship is exercised.

But, however true this assertion may be, it does not give a definition of dictatorship.

Let us examine Kautsky's next sentence:

"... But, of course, taken literally, this word also means the undivided rule of a single person unrestricted by any laws..."

Like a blind puppy sniffing at random first in one direction and then in another, Kautsky accidentally stumbled upon *one* true idea (namely, that dictatorship is rule unrestricted by any laws), *nevertheless*, he *failed* to give a definition of dictatorship, and, moreover, he made an obvious historical blunder, namely, that dictatorship means the rule of a single person. This is even grammatically incorrect, since

dictatorship may also be exercised by a handful of persons, or by an oligarchy, or by a class, etc.

Kautsky then goes on to point out the difference between dictatorship and despotism, but, although what he says is obviously incorrect, we shall not dwell upon it, as it is wholly irrelevant to the question that interests us. Everyone knows Kautsky's inclination to turn from the twentieth century to the eighteenth, and from the eighteenth century to classical antiquity, and we hope that the German proletariat, after it has attained its dictatorship, will bear this inclination of his in mind and appoint him, say, teacher of ancient history at some Gymnasium. To try to evade a definition of the dictatorship of the proletariat by philosophising about despotism is either crass stupidity or very clumsy trickery.

As a result, we find that, having undertaken to discuss the dictatorship, Kautsky rattled off a great deal of manifest lies, but has given no definition! Yet, instead of relying on his mental faculties he could have used his memory to extract from "pigeon-holes" all those instances in which Marx speaks of dictatorship. Had he done so, he would certainly have arrived either at the following definition or at one in substance coinciding with it:

Dictatorship is rule based directly upon force and unrestricted by any laws.

The revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is rule won and maintained by the use of violence by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, rule that is unrestricted by any laws.

This simple truth, a truth that is as plain as a pikestaff to every class-conscious worker (who represents the people, and not an upper section of petty-bourgeois scoundrels who have been bribed by the capitalists, such as are the social-imperialists of all countries), this truth, which is obvious to every representative of the exploited classes fighting for their emancipation, this truth, which is beyond dispute for every Marxist, has to be "extracted by force" from the most learned Mr. Kautsky! How is it to be explained? Simply by that spirit of servility with which the leaders of the Second International, who have become contemptible sycophants in the service of the bourgeoisie, are imbued.

Kautsky first committed a sleight of hand by proclaiming the obvious nonsense that the word dictatorship, in its literal

sense, means the dictatorship of a single person, and then—on the strength of this sleight of hand—he declared that “hence” Marx’s words about the dictatorship of a class were *not* meant in the literal sense (but in one in which dictatorship does not imply revolutionary violence, but the “peaceful” winning of a majority under bourgeois—mark you—“democracy”).

One must, if you please, distinguish between a “condition” and a “form of government”. A wonderfully profound distinction; it is like drawing a distinction between the “condition” of stupidity of a man who reasons foolishly and the “form” of his stupidity.

Kautsky *finds it necessary* to interpret dictatorship as a “condition of domination” (this is the literal expression he uses on the very next page, p. 21), because then *revolutionary violence, and violent revolution, disappear*. The “condition of domination” is a condition in which any majority finds itself under... “democracy”! Thanks to such a fraud, *revolution happily disappears!*

The fraud, however, is too crude and will not save Kautsky. One cannot hide the fact that dictatorship presupposes and implies a “condition”, one so disagreeable to renegades, of *revolutionary violence* of one class against another. It is patently absurd to draw a distinction between a “condition” and a “form of government”. To speak of forms of government in this connection is trebly stupid, for every schoolboy knows that monarchy and republic are two different forms of government. It must be explained to Mr. Kautsky that *both* these forms of government, like all transitional “forms of government” under capitalism, are only variations of the *bourgeois state*, that is, of the *dictatorship of the bourgeoisie*.

Lastly, to speak of forms of government, is not only a stupid, but also a very crude falsification of Marx, who was very clearly speaking here of this or that form or type of *state*, and not of forms of government.

The proletarian revolution is impossible without the forcible destruction of the bourgeois state machine and the substitution for it of a *new one* which, in the words of Engels, is “no longer a state in the proper sense of the word”.²²⁸

Because of his renegade position, Kautsky, however, has to befog and belie all this.

Look what wretched subterfuges he uses.

First subterfuge. "That Marx in this case did not have in mind a form of government is proved by the fact that he was of the opinion that in Britain and America the transition might take place peacefully, i.e., in a democratic way."

The *form of government* has absolutely nothing to do with it, for there are monarchies which are not typical of the bourgeois *state*, such for instance, as have no military clique, and there are republics which are quite typical in this respect, such, for instance, as have a military clique and a bureaucracy. This is a universally known historical and political fact, and Kautsky cannot falsify it.

If Kautsky had wanted to argue in a serious and honest manner he would have asked himself: Are there historical laws relating to revolution which know of no exception? And the reply would have been: No, there are no such laws. Such laws only apply to the typical, to what Marx once termed the "ideal", meaning average, normal, typical capitalism.

Further, was there in the seventies anything which made Britain and America exceptional *in regard to what we are now discussing*? It will be obvious to anyone at all familiar with the requirements of science in regard to the problems of history that this question must be put. To fail to put it is tantamount to falsifying science, to engaging in sophistry. And, the question having been put, there can be no doubt as to the reply: the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is *violence* against the bourgeoisie; and the necessity of such violence is *particularly* called for, as Marx and Engels have repeatedly explained in detail (especially in *The Civil War in France* and in the preface to it), by the existence of *militarism and a bureaucracy*. But it is precisely these institutions that were *non-existent* in Britain and America in the seventies, when Marx made his observations (they *do* exist in Britain and in America *now*)!

Kautsky has to resort to trickery literally at every step to cover up his apostasy!

And note how he inadvertently betrayed his cloven hoof when he wrote: "peacefully, i.e., in a democratic way"!

In defining dictatorship, Kautsky tried his utmost to conceal from the reader the fundamental feature of this concept, namely, revolutionary *violence*. But now the truth is

out: it is a question of the contrast between *peaceful* and *violent revolutions*.

That is the crux of the matter. Kautsky has to resort to all these subterfuges, sophistries and falsifications only to *excuse* himself from *violent* revolution, and to conceal his renunciation of it, his desertion to the side of the *liberal* labour policy, i.e., to the side of the bourgeoisie. That is the crux of the matter.

Kautsky the "historian" so shamelessly falsifies history that he "forgets" the fundamental fact that pre-monopoly capitalism—which actually reached its zenith in the seventies—was by virtue of its fundamental *economic* traits, which found most typical expression in Britain and in America, distinguished by a, relatively speaking, maximum fondness for peace and freedom. Imperialism, on the other hand, i.e., monopoly capitalism, which finally matured only in the twentieth century, is, by virtue of its fundamental *economic* traits, distinguished by a minimum fondness for peace and freedom, and by a maximum and universal development of militarism. To "fail to notice" this in discussing the extent to which a peaceful or violent revolution is typical or probable is to stoop to the level of a most ordinary lackey of the bourgeoisie.

Second subterfuge. The Paris Commune was a dictatorship of the proletariat, but it was elected by *universal* suffrage, i.e., without depriving the bourgeoisie of the franchise, i.e., "*democratically*". And Kautsky says triumphantly: "... The dictatorship of the proletariat was for Marx" (or: according to Marx) "a condition which necessarily follows from pure democracy, if the proletariat forms the majority" (*bei überwiegendem Proletariat*, S. 21).

This argument of Kautsky's is so amusing that one truly suffers from a veritable *embarras de richesses* (an embarrassment due to the wealth... of objections that can be made to it). Firstly, it is well known that the flower, the General Staff, the upper sections of the bourgeoisie, had fled from Paris to Versailles. In Versailles there was the "socialist" Louis Blanc—which, by the way, proves the falsity of Kautsky's assertion that "all trends" of socialism took part in the Paris Commune. Is it not ridiculous to represent the division of the inhabitants of Paris into two belligerent camps, one of which

embraced the entire militant and politically active section of the bourgeoisie, as "pure democracy" with "universal suffrage"?

Secondly, the Paris Commune waged war against Versailles as the workers' government of France against the bourgeois government. What have "pure democracy" and "universal suffrage" to do with it, when Paris was deciding the fate of France? When Marx expressed the opinion that the Paris Commune had committed a mistake in failing to seize the bank, which belonged to the whole of France,²²⁹ did he not proceed from the principles and practice of "pure democracy"?

In actual fact, it is obvious that Kautsky is writing in a country where the police forbid people to laugh "in crowds", otherwise Kautsky would have been killed by ridicule.

Thirdly, I would respectfully remind Mr. Kautsky, who has Marx and Engels off pat, of the following appraisal of the Paris Commune given by Engels from the point of view of... "pure democracy":

"Have these gentlemen" (the anti-authoritarians) "ever seen a revolution? A revolution is certainly the most authoritarian thing there is; it is an act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon the other by means of rifles, bayonets and cannon—all of which are highly authoritarian means. And the victorious party must maintain its rule by means of the terror which its arms inspire in the reactionaries. Would the Paris Commune have lasted more than a day if it had not used the authority of the armed people against the bourgeoisie? Cannot we, on the contrary, blame it for having made too little use of that authority?"²³⁰

Here is your "pure democracy"! How Engels would have ridiculed the vulgar petty bourgeois, the 'Social-Democrat' (in the French sense of the forties and the general European sense of 1914-18), who took it into his head to talk about "pure democracy" in a class-divided society!

But that's enough. It is impossible to enumerate all Kautsky's various absurdities, since every phrase he utters is a bottomless pit of apostasy.

Marx and Engels analysed the Paris Commune in a most detailed manner and showed that its merit lay in its attempt

to smash, to break up the "ready-made state machinery". Marx and Engels considered this conclusion to be so important that this was the *only* amendment they introduced in 1872 into the "obsolete" (in parts) programme of the *Communist Manifesto*.²³¹ Marx and Engels showed that the Paris Commune had abolished the army and the bureaucracy, had abolished *parliamentarism*, had destroyed "that parasitic excrescence, the state", etc. But the sage Kautsky, donning his nightcap, repeats the fairy-tale about "pure democracy", which has been told a thousand times by liberal professors.

No wonder Rosa Luxemburg declared, on August 4, 1914, that German Social-Democracy was a *stinking corpse*.

Third subterfuge. "When we speak of the dictatorship as a form of government we cannot speak of the dictatorship of a class, since a class, as we have already pointed out, can only rule but not govern. . . ." It is "organisations" or "parties" that govern.

That is a muddle, a disgusting muddle, Mr. "Muddle-headed Counsellor"! Dictatorship is not a "form of government"; that is ridiculous nonsense. And Marx does not speak of the "form of government" but of the form or type of *state*. That is something altogether different, entirely different. It is altogether wrong, too, to say that a *class* cannot govern: such an absurdity could only have been uttered by a "parliamentary cretin", who sees nothing but bourgeois parliaments and notices nothing but "ruling parties". Any European country will provide Kautsky with examples of government by a ruling *class*, for instance, by the landowners in the Middle Ages, in spite of their insufficient organisation.

To sum up: Kautsky has in a most unparalleled manner distorted the concept dictatorship of the proletariat, and has turned Marx into a common liberal; that is, he himself has sunk to the level of a liberal who utters banal phrases about "pure democracy", embellishing and glossing over the class content of *bourgeois* democracy, and shrinking, above all, from the use of *revolutionary violence* by the oppressed class. By so "interpreting" the concept "revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat" as to expunge the revolutionary violence of the oppressed class against its oppressors, Kautsky has

beaten the world record in the liberal distortion of Marx. The renegade Bernstein has proved to be a mere puppy compared with the renegade Kautsky.

BOURGEOIS AND PROLETARIAN DEMOCRACY

The question which Kautsky has so shamelessly muddled really stands as follows.

If we are not to mock at common sense and history, it is obvious that we cannot speak of "pure democracy" as long as different *classes* exist; we can only speak of *class* democracy. (Let us say in parenthesis that "pure democracy" is not only an *ignorant* phrase, revealing a lack of understanding both of the class struggle and of the nature of the state, but also a thrice-empty phrase, since in communist society democracy will *wither away* in the process of changing and becoming a habit, but will never be "pure" democracy.)

"Pure democracy" is the mendacious phrase of a liberal who wants to fool the workers. History knows of bourgeois democracy which takes the place of feudalism, and of proletarian democracy which takes the place of bourgeois democracy.

When Kautsky devotes dozens of pages to "proving" the truth that bourgeois democracy is progressive compared with medievalism, and that the proletariat must unfailingly utilise it in its struggle against the bourgeoisie, that in fact is just liberal twaddle intended to fool the workers. This is a truism, not only for educated Germany, but also for uneducated Russia. Kautsky is simply throwing "learned" dust in the eyes of the workers when, with a pompous mien, he talks about Weitling and the Jesuits of Paraguay and many other things, *in order to avoid* telling about the *bourgeois* essence of modern, i.e., *capitalist*, democracy.

Kautsky takes from Marxism what is acceptable to the liberals, to the bourgeoisie (the criticism of the Middle Ages, and the progressive historical role of capitalism in general and of capitalist democracy in particular), and discards, passes over in silence, glosses over all that in Marxism which is *unacceptable* to the bourgeoisie (the revolutionary violence of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie for the latter's

destruction). That is why Kautsky, by virtue of his objective position and irrespective of what his subjective convictions may be, inevitably proves to be a lackey of the bourgeoisie.

Bourgeois democracy, although a great historical advance in comparison with medievalism, always remains, and under capitalism is bound to remain, restricted, truncated, false and hypocritical, a paradise for the rich and a snare and deception for the exploited, for the poor. It is this truth, which forms a most essential part of Marx's teaching, that Kautsky the "Marxist" has failed to understand. On this—the fundamental issue—Kautsky offers "delights" for the bourgeoisie instead of a scientific criticism of those conditions which make every bourgeois democracy a democracy for the rich.

Let us first remind the most learned Mr. Kautsky of the theoretical propositions of Marx and Engels which that pedant has so disgracefully "forgotten" (to please the bourgeoisie), and then explain the matter as popularly as possible.

Not only the ancient and feudal, but also "the modern representative state is an instrument of exploitation of wage-labour by capital" (Engels, in his work on the state).²³² "As, therefore, the state is only a transitional institution which is used in the struggle, in the revolution, to hold down one's adversaries by force, it is sheer nonsense to talk of a 'free people's state'; so long as the proletariat still needs the state, it does not need it in the interests of freedom but in order to hold down its adversaries, and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom the state as such ceases to exist" (Engels, in his letter to Bebel, March 28, 1875). "In reality, however, the state is nothing but a machine for the oppression of one class by another, and indeed in the democratic republic no less than in the monarchy" (Engels, Introduction to *The Civil War in France by Marx*).²³³ Universal suffrage is "the gauge of the maturity of the working class. *It cannot and never will be anything more in the present-day state*". (Engels, in his work on the state).²³⁴ Mr. Kautsky very tediously chews over the cud in the first part of this proposition, which is acceptable to the bourgeoisie. But the second part, which we have italicised and which is not acceptable to the bourgeoisie, the renegade Kautsky passes over in silence! "The Commune was to be a working not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time...."

Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to represent and suppress (*ver- und zertreten*) the people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in Communes, as individual suffrage serves every other employer in the search for workers, foremen and accountants for his business" (Marx, in his work on the Paris Commune, *The Civil War in France*).²³⁵

Every one of these propositions, which are excellently known to the most learned Mr. Kautsky, is a slap in his face and lays bare his apostasy. Nowhere in his pamphlet does Kautsky reveal the slightest understanding of these truths. His whole pamphlet is a sheer mockery of Marxism!

Take the fundamental laws of modern states, take their administration, take freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, or "equality of all citizens before the law", and you will see at every turn evidence of the hypocrisy of bourgeois democracy with which every honest and class-conscious worker is familiar. There is not a single state, however democratic, which has no loopholes or reservations in its constitution guaranteeing the bourgeoisie the possibility of dispatching troops against the workers, of proclaiming martial law, and so forth, in case of a "violation of public order", and actually in case the exploited class "violates" its position of slavery and tries to behave in a non-slavish manner. Kautsky shamelessly embellishes bourgeois democracy and omits to mention, for instance, how the most democratic and republican bourgeoisie in America or Switzerland deal with workers on strike.

The wise and learned Kautsky keeps silent about these things! That learned politician does not realise that to remain silent on this matter is despicable. He prefers to tell the workers nursery tales of the kind that democracy means "protecting the minority". It is incredible, but it is a fact! In the year of our Lord 1918, in the fifth year of the world imperialist slaughter and the strangulation of internationalist minorities (i.e., those who have not despicably betrayed socialism, like the Renaudels and Longuets, the Scheidemanns and Kautskys, the Hendersons and Webbs et al.) in all "democracies" of the world, the learned Mr. Kautsky sweetly, very sweetly, sings the praises of "protection of the minority".

Those who are interested may read this on page 15 of Kautsky's pamphlet. And on page 16 this learned... individual tells you about the Whigs and Tories in England in the eighteenth century!

What wonderful erudition! What refined servility to the bourgeoisie! What civilised belly-crawling before the capitalists and boot-licking! If I were Krupp or Scheidemann, or Clemenceau or Renaudel, I would pay Mr. Kautsky millions, reward him with Judas kisses, praise him before the workers and urge "socialist unity" with "honourable" men like him. To write pamphlets against the dictatorship of the proletariat, to talk about the Whigs and Tories in England in the eighteenth century, to assert that democracy means "protecting the minority", and remain silent about pogroms against internationalists in the "democratic" republic of America—isn't this rendering lackey service to the bourgeoisie?

The learned Mr. Kautsky has "forgotten"—accidentally forgotten, probably—a "trifle", namely, that the ruling party in a bourgeois democracy extends the protection of the minority only to another bourgeois party, while the proletariat, on all *serious, profound and fundamental* issues, gets martial law or pogroms, instead of the "protection of the minority". *The more highly developed a democracy is, the more imminent are pogroms or civil war in connection with any profound political divergence which is dangerous to the bourgeoisie.* The learned Mr. Kautsky could have studied this "law" of bourgeois democracy in connection with the Dreyfus case²³⁶ in republican France, with the lynching of Negroes and internationalists in the democratic republic of America, with the case of Ireland and Ulster in democratic Britain,²³⁷ with the baiting of the Bolsheviks and the staging of pogroms against them in April 1917 in the democratic republic of Russia. I have purposely chosen examples not only from wartime but also from pre-war time, peacetime. But mealy-mouthed Mr. Kautsky prefers to shut his eyes to these facts of the twentieth century, and instead to tell the workers wonderfully new, remarkably interesting, unusually edifying and incredibly important things about the Whigs and Tories of the eighteenth century!

Take the bourgeois parliament. Can it be that the learned Kautsky has never heard that the *more highly* democracy is

developed, the *more* the bourgeois parliaments are subjected by the stock exchange and the bankers? This does not mean that we must not make use of bourgeois parliament (the Bolsheviks made better use of it than probably any other party in the world, for in 1912-14 we won the entire workers' curia in the Fourth Duma). But it does mean that only a liberal can forget the *historical limitations and conventional nature* of the bourgeois parliamentary system as Kautsky does. Even in the most democratic bourgeois state the oppressed people at every step encounter the crying contradiction between the *formal* equality proclaimed by the "democracy" of the capitalists and the thousands of *real* limitations and subterfuges which turn the proletarians into *wage-slaves*. It is precisely this contradiction that is opening the eyes of the people to the rottenness, mendacity and hypocrisy of capitalism. It is this contradiction that the agitators and propagandists of socialism are constantly exposing to the people, *in order to prepare* them for revolution! And now that the era of revolution *has begun*, Kautsky turns his back upon it and begins to extol the charms of *moribund* bourgeois democracy.

Proletarian democracy, of which Soviet government is one of the forms, has brought a development and expansion of democracy unprecedented in the world, for the vast majority of the population, for the exploited and working people. To write a whole pamphlet about democracy, as Kautsky did, in which two pages are devoted to dictatorship and dozens to "pure democracy", and *fail to notice* this fact, means completely distorting the subject in liberal fashion.

Take foreign policy. In no bourgeois state, not even in the most democratic, is it conducted openly. The people are deceived everywhere, and in democratic France, Switzerland, America and Britain this is done on an incomparably wider scale and in an incomparably subtler manner than in other countries. The Soviet government has torn the veil of mystery from foreign policy in a revolutionary manner. Kautsky has not noticed this, he keeps silent about it, although in the era of predatory wars and secret treaties for the "division of spheres of influence" (i.e., for the partition of the world among the capitalist bandits) this is of *cardinal* importance,

for on it depends the question of peace, the life and death of tens of millions of people.

Take the structure of the state. Kautsky picks at all manner of "trifles", down to the argument that under the Soviet Constitution elections are "indirect", but he misses the point. He fails to see the *class* nature of the state apparatus, of the machinery of state. Under bourgeois democracy the capitalists, by thousands of tricks—which are the more artful and effective the more "pure" democracy is developed—*drive* the people away from administrative work, from freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, etc. The Soviet government is the *first* in the world (or strictly speaking, the second, because the Paris Commune began to do the same thing) to *enlist* the people, specifically the *exploited* people, in the work of administration. The working people are *barred* from participation in bourgeois parliaments (they *never decide* important questions under bourgeois democracy, which are decided by the stock exchange and the banks) by thousands of obstacles, and the workers know and feel, see and realise perfectly well that the bourgeois parliaments are institutions *alien* to them, *instruments for the oppression* of the workers by the bourgeoisie, institutions of a hostile class, of the exploiting minority.

The Soviets are the direct organisation of the working and exploited people themselves, which *helps* them to organise and administer their own state in every possible way. And in this it is the vanguard of the working and exploited people, the urban proletariat, that enjoys the advantage of being best united by the large enterprises; it is easier for it than for all others to elect and exercise control over those elected. The Soviet form of organisation automatically *helps* to unite all the working and exploited people around their vanguard, the proletariat. The old bourgeois apparatus—the bureaucracy, the privileges of wealth, of bourgeois education, of social connections, etc. (these real privileges are the more varied the more highly bourgeois democracy is developed)—all this disappears under the Soviet form of organisation. Freedom of the press ceases to be hypocrisy, because the printing-plants and stocks of paper are taken away from the bourgeoisie. The same thing applies to the best buildings, the palaces, the mansions and manor-houses. Soviet power took

thousands upon thousands of these best buildings from the exploiters at one stroke, and in this way made the right of assembly—without which democracy is a fraud—a *million times* more democratic for the people. Indirect elections to non-local Soviets make it easier to hold congresses of Soviets, they make the *entire* apparatus less costly, more flexible, more accessible to the workers and peasants at a time when life is seething and it is necessary to be able very quickly to recall one's local deputy or to delegate him to a general congress of Soviets.

Proletarian democracy is a *million times* more democratic than any bourgeois democracy; Soviet power is a million times more democratic than the most democratic bourgeois republic.

To fail to see this one must either deliberately serve the bourgeoisie, or be politically as dead as a doornail, unable to see real life from behind the dusty pages of bourgeois books, be thoroughly imbued with bourgeois-democratic prejudices, and thereby objectively convert oneself into a lackey of the bourgeoisie.

To fail to see this one must be incapable of *presenting the question* from the point of view of the *oppressed* classes:

Is there a single country in the world, even among the most democratic bourgeois countries, in which the *average rank-and-file* worker, the *average rank-and-file farm labourer*, or village semi-proletarian generally (i.e., the representative of the oppressed, of the overwhelming majority of the population), enjoys anything approaching such *liberty* of holding meetings in the best buildings, such *liberty* of using the largest printing-plants and biggest stocks of paper to express his ideas and to defend his interests, such *liberty* of promoting men and women of his own class to administer and to "knock into shape" the state, as in Soviet Russia?

It is ridiculous to think that Mr. Kautsky could find in any country even one out of a thousand of well-informed workers or farm labourers who would have any doubts as to the reply. Instinctively, from hearing fragments of admissions of the truth in the bourgeois press, the workers of the whole world sympathise with the Soviet Republic precisely because they

regard it as a *proletarian* democracy, a *democracy for the poor*, and not a democracy for the rich that every bourgeois democracy, even the best, actually is.

We are governed (and our state is "knocked into shape") by bourgeois bureaucrats, by bourgeois members of parliament, by bourgeois judges—such is the simple, obvious and indisputable truth which tens and hundreds of millions of people belonging to the oppressed classes in all bourgeois countries, including the most democratic, know from their own experience, feel and realise every day.

In Russia, however, the bureaucratic machine has been completely smashed, razed to the ground; the old judges have all been sent packing, the bourgeois parliament has been dispersed—and *far more accessible* representation has been given to the workers and peasants; *their* Soviets have replaced the bureaucrats, or *their* Soviets have been put in control of the bureaucrats, and *their* Soviets have been authorised to elect the judges. This fact alone is enough for all the oppressed classes to recognise that Soviet power, i.e. the present form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, is a million times more democratic than the most democratic bourgeois republic.

Kautsky does not understand this truth, which is so clear and obvious to every worker, because he has "forgotten", "unlearned" to put the question: democracy *for which class*? He argues from the point of view of "pure" (i.e., non-class? or above-class?) democracy. He argues like Shylock²³⁸: my "pound of flesh" and nothing else. Equality for all citizens—otherwise there is no democracy.

We must ask the learned Kautsky, the "Marxist" and "socialist" Kautsky:

Can there be equality between the exploited and the exploiters?

It is dreadful, it is incredible that such a question should have to be put in discussing a book written by the ideological leader of the Second International. But "having put your hand to the plough, don't look back", and having undertaken to write about Kautsky, I must explain to the learned man why there can be no equality between the exploiter and the exploited.

CAN THERE BE EQUALITY BETWEEN THE EXPLOITED
AND THE EXPLOITER?

Kautsky argues as follows:

(1) "The exploiters have always formed only a small minority of the population" (p. 14 of Kautsky's pamphlet).

This is indisputably true. Taking this as the starting-point, what should be the argument? One may argue in a Marxist, a socialist way: In which case one would proceed from the relation between the exploited and the exploiters. Or one may argue in a liberal, a bourgeois-democratic way. And in that case one would proceed from the relation between the majority and the minority.

If we argue in a Marxist way, we must say: the exploiters inevitably transform the state (and we are speaking of democracy, i.e., one of the forms of the state) into an instrument of the rule of their class, the exploiters, over the exploited. Hence, as long as there are exploiters who rule the majority, the exploited, the democratic state must inevitably be a democracy for the exploiters. A state of the exploited must fundamentally differ from such a state; it must be a democracy for the exploited, and a means of *suppressing the exploiters*; and the suppression of a class means inequality for that class, its exclusion from "democracy".

If we argue in a liberal way, we must say: the majority decides, the minority submits. Those who do not submit are punished. That is all. Nothing need be said about the class character of the state in general, or of "pure democracy" in particular, because it is irrelevant; for a majority is a majority and a minority is a minority. A pound of flesh is a pound of flesh, and that is all there is to it.

And this is exactly how Kautsky argues.

(2) "Why should the rule of the proletariat assume, and necessarily assume, a form which is incompatible with democracy?" (p. 21). Then follows a very detailed and a very verbose explanation, backed by a quotation from Marx and the election figures of the Paris Commune, to the effect that the proletariat is in the majority. The conclusion is: "A regime which is so strongly rooted in the people has not the slightest reason for encroaching upon democracy. It cannot always dispense with violence in cases when violence is employed to

suppress democracy. Violence can only be met with violence. But a regime which knows that it has popular backing will employ violence only to *protect* democracy and not to *destroy* it. It would be simply suicidal if it attempted to do away with its most reliable basis—universal suffrage, that deep source of mighty moral authority" (p. 22).

As you see, the relation between the exploited and the exploiters has vanished in Kautsky's argument. All that remains is majority in general, minority in general, democracy in general, the "pure democracy" with which we are already familiar.

And all this, mark you, is said *apropos of the Paris Commune!* To make things clearer I shall quote Marx and Engels to show what they said on the subject of dictatorship *apropos of the Paris Commune*:

Marx: "...When the workers replace the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie by their revolutionary dictatorship... to break down the resistance of the bourgeoisie ... the workers invest the state with a revolutionary and transitional form..."²³⁹

Engels: "...And the victorious party" (in a revolution) "must maintain its rule by means of the terror which its arms inspire in the reactionaries. Would the Paris Commune have lasted more than a day if it had not used the authority of the armed people against the bourgeoisie? Cannot we, on the contrary, blame it for having made too little use of that authority?..."²⁴⁰

Engels: "As, therefore, the state is only a transitional institution which is used in the struggle, in the revolution, to hold down one's adversaries by force, it is sheer nonsense to talk of a 'free people's state'; so long as the proletariat still needs the state, it does not need it in the interests of freedom but in order to hold down its adversaries, and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom the state as such ceases to exist..."²⁴¹

Kautsky is as far removed from Marx and Engels as heaven is from earth, as a liberal from a proletarian revolutionary. The pure democracy and simple "democracy" that Kautsky talks about is merely a paraphrase of the "free people's state", i.e., *sheer nonsense*. Kautsky, with the learned air of a most learned armchair fool, or with the innocent air of a

ten-year-old schoolgirl, asks: Why do we need a dictatorship when we have a majority? And Marx and Engels explain:

- to break down the resistance of the bourgeoisie;
- to inspire the reactionaries with fear;
- to maintain the authority of the armed people against the bourgeoisie;
- that the proletariat may forcibly hold down its adversaries.

Kautsky does not understand these explanations. Infatuated with the "purity" of democracy, blind to its bourgeois character, he "consistently" urges that the majority, since it is the majority, need not "break down the resistance" of the minority, nor "forcibly hold it down"—it is sufficient to suppress *cases* of infringement of democracy. Infatuated with the "purity" of democracy, Kautsky *inadvertently* commits the same little error that all bourgeois democrats always commit, namely, he takes formal equality (which is nothing but a fraud and hypocrisy under capitalism) for actual equality! Quite a trifle!

The exploiter and the exploited cannot be equal.

This truth, however unpleasant it may be to Kautsky, nevertheless forms the essence of socialism.

Another truth: there can be no real, actual equality until all possibility of the exploitation of one class by another has been totally destroyed.

The exploiters can be defeated at one stroke in the event of a successful uprising at the centre, or of a revolt in the army. But except in very rare and special cases, the exploiters cannot be destroyed at one stroke. It is impossible to expropriate all the landowners and capitalists of any big country at one stroke. Furthermore, expropriation alone, as a legal or political act, does not settle the matter by a long chalk, because it is necessary to *depose* the landowners and capitalists in actual fact, to *replace* their management of the factories and estates by a different management, workers' management, in actual fact. There can be no equality between the exploiters—who for many generations have been better off because of their education, conditions of wealthy life, and habits—and the exploited, the majority of whom even in the most advanced and most democratic bourgeois republics are downtrodden, backward, ignorant, intimidated and disunited.

For a long time after the revolution the exploiters inevitably continue to retain a number of great practical advantages: they still have money (since it is impossible to abolish money all at once); some movable property—often fairly considerable; they still have various connections, habits of organisation and management; knowledge of all the “secrets” (customs, methods, means and possibilities) of management; superior education; close connections with the higher technical personnel (who live and think like the bourgeoisie); incomparably greater experience in the art of war (this is very important), and so on and so forth.

If the exploiters are defeated in one country only—and this, of course, is typical, since a simultaneous revolution in a number of countries is a rare exception—they *still* remain *stronger* than the exploited, for the international connections of the exploiters are enormous. That a section of the exploited from the least advanced middle-peasant, artisan and similar groups of the population may, and indeed does, follow the exploiters has been proved by *all* revolutions, including the Commune (for there were also proletarians among the Versailles troops, which the most learned Kautsky has “forgotten”).

In these circumstances, to assume that in a revolution which is at all profound and serious the issue is decided simply by the relation between the majority and the minority is the acme of stupidity, the silliest prejudice of a common liberal, an attempt to *deceive the people* by concealing from them a well-established historical truth. This historical truth is that in every profound revolution, the *prolonged, stubborn and desperate* resistance of the exploiters, who for a number of years retain important practical advantages over the exploited, is the *rule*. Never—except in the sentimental fantasies of the sentimental fool Kautsky—will the exploiters submit to the decision of the exploited majority without trying to make use of their advantages in a last desperate battle, or series of battles.

The transition from capitalism to communism takes an entire historical epoch. Until this epoch is over, the exploiters inevitably cherish the hope of restoration, and this *hope* turns into *attempts* at restoration. After their first serious defeat, the overthrown exploiters—who had not

expected their overthrow, never believed it possible, never conceded the thought of it—throw themselves with energy grown tenfold, with furious passion and hatred grown a hundredfold, into the battle for the recovery of the "paradise", of which they were deprived, on behalf of their families, who had been leading such a sweet and easy life and whom now the "common herd" is condemning to ruin and destitution (or to "common" labour..). In the train of the capitalist exploiters follow the wide sections of the petty bourgeoisie, with regard to whom decades of historical experience of all countries testify that they vacillate and hesitate, one day marching behind the proletariat and the next day taking fright at the difficulties of the revolution; that they become panic-stricken at the first defeat or semi-defeat of the workers, grow nervous, run about aimlessly, snivel, and rush from one camp into the other—just like our Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

In these circumstances, in an epoch of desperately acute war, when history presents the question of whether age-old and thousand-year-old privileges are to be or not to be—at such a time to talk about majority and minority, about pure democracy, about dictatorship being unnecessary and about equality between the exploiter and the exploited! What infinite stupidity and abysmal philistinism are needed for this!

However, during the decades of comparatively "peaceful" capitalism between 1871 and 1914, the Augean stables of philistinism imbecility, and apostasy accumulated in the socialist parties which were adapting themselves to opportunism. . . .

* * *

The reader will probably have noticed that Kautsky, in the passage from his pamphlet quoted above, speaks of an attempt to encroach upon universal suffrage (calling it, by the way, a deep source of mighty moral authority, whereas Engels, apropos of the same Paris Commune and the same question of dictatorship, spoke of the authority of the armed people against the bourgeoisie—a very characteristic difference between the philistine's and the revolutionary's views on "authority" . . .).

It should be observed that the question of depriving the exploiters of the franchise is a *purely Russian* question, and not a question of the dictatorship of the proletariat in general. Had Kautsky, casting aside hypocrisy, entitled his pamphlet *Against the Bolsheviks*, the title would have corresponded to the contents of the pamphlet, and Kautsky would have been justified in speaking bluntly about the franchise. But Kautsky wanted to come out primarily as a "theoretician". He called his pamphlet *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat—in general*. He speaks about the Soviets and about Russia specifically only in the second part of the pamphlet, beginning with the sixth paragraph. The subject dealt with in the first part (from which I took the quotation) is *democracy and dictatorship in general*. In speaking about the franchise, Kautsky *betrayed himself* as an opponent of the Bolsheviks, *who does not care a brass farthing for theory*. For theory, i.e., the reasoning about the general (and not the nationally specific) class foundations of democracy and dictatorship, ought to deal not with a special question, such as the franchise, but with the general question of whether democracy can be *preserved for the rich, for the exploiters* in the historical period of the overthrow of the exploiters and the replacement of their state by the state of the exploited.

That is the way, the only way, a theoretician can present the question.

We know the example of the Paris Commune, we know all that was said by the founders of Marxism in connection, with it and in reference to it. On the basis of this material I examined, for instance, the question of democracy and dictatorship in my pamphlet, *The State and Revolution*, written before the October Revolution. *I did not say anything at all* about restricting the franchise. And it must be said now that the question of restricting the franchise is a nationally specific and not a general question of the dictatorship. One must approach the question of restricting the franchise by studying the *specific conditions* of the Russian revolution and the *specific path* of its development. This will be done later on in this pamphlet. It would be a mistake, however, to guarantee in advance that the impending proletarian revolutions in Europe will all, or the majority

of them, be necessarily accompanied by restriction of the franchise for the bourgeoisie. It may be so. After the war and the experience of the Russian revolution it probably will be so; but it is *not absolutely necessary* for the exercise of the dictatorship, it is not an *indispensable* characteristic of the logical concept "dictatorship", it does not enter as an *indispensable* condition in the historical and class concept "dictatorship".

The indispensable characteristic, the necessary condition of dictatorship is the *forcible* suppression of the exploiters as a *class*, and, consequently, the *infringement* of "pure democracy", i.e., of equality and freedom, *in regard to that class*.

This is the way, the only way, the question can be put theoretically. And by failing to put the question thus, Kautsky has shown that he opposes the Bolsheviks not as a theoretician, but as a sycophant of the opportunists and the bourgeoisie.

In which countries, and given what national features of capitalism, democracy for the exploiters will be in one or another form restricted (wholly or in part), infringed upon, is a question of the specific national features of this or that capitalism, of this or that revolution. The theoretical question is different: Is the dictatorship of the proletariat possible *without infringing democracy* in relation to the *exploiting class*?

It is precisely this question, the *only* theoretically important and essential one, that Kautsky has evaded. He has quoted all sorts of passages from Marx and Engels, *except those* which bear on this question, and which I quoted above.

Kautsky talks about anything you like, about everything that is acceptable to liberals and bourgeois democrats and does not go beyond their circle of ideas, but he does not talk about the main thing, namely, the fact that the proletariat cannot achieve victory *without breaking the resistance* of the bourgeoisie, *without forcibly suppressing its adversaries*, and that, where there is "forcible suppression", where there is no "freedom", *there is, of course, no democracy*.

This Kautsky has not understood.

* * *

We shall now examine the experience of the Russian revolution and that divergence between the Soviets of Deputies and the Constituent Assembly²⁴² which led to the dissolution of the latter and to the withdrawal of the franchise from the bourgeoisie.

THE SOVIETS DARE NOT BECOME STATE ORGANISATIONS

The Soviets are the Russian form of the proletarian dictatorship. If a Marxist theoretician, writing a work on the dictatorship of the proletariat, had really studied the subject (and not merely repeated the petty-bourgeois lamentations against dictatorship, as Kautsky did, singing to Menshevik tunes), he would first have given a general definition of dictatorship, and would then have examined its peculiar, national, form, the Soviets; he would have given his critique of them as one of the forms of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It goes without saying that nothing serious could be expected from Kautsky after his liberalistic "interpretation" of Marx's teaching on dictatorship; but the manner in which he approached the question of what the Soviets are and the way he dealt with this question is highly characteristic.

The Soviets, he says, recalling their rise in 1905, created "the most all-embracing (*umfassendste*) form of proletarian organisation, for it embraced all the wage-workers" (p. 31). In 1905 they were only local bodies; in 1917 they became a national organisation.

"The Soviet form of organisation," Kautsky continues, "already has a great and glorious history behind it, and it has a still mightier future before it, and not in Russia alone. It appears that everywhere the old methods of the economic and political struggle of the proletariat are inadequate" (*versagen*; this German expression is somewhat stronger than "inadequate" and somewhat weaker than "impotent") "against the gigantic economic and political forces which finance capital has at its disposal. These old methods cannot be discarded; they are still indispensable for normal times; but from time to time tasks arise which they cannot cope with, tasks that can be accomplished successfully only as a result of a combination of all the political and economic instruments of force of the working class" (p. 32).

Then follows a reasoning on the mass strike and on "trade union bureaucracy"—which is no less necessary than the trade unions—being "useless for the purpose of directing the mighty mass battles that are more and more becoming a sign of the times. . . ."

"Thus," Kautsky concludes, "the Soviet form of organisation is one of the most important phenomena of our time. It promises to acquire decisive importance in the great decisive battles between capital and labour towards which we are marching.

"But are we entitled to demand more of the Soviets? The Bolsheviks, after the November Revolution" (new style, or October, according to our style) "1917, secured in conjunction with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries a majority in the Russian Soviets of Workers' Deputies, and after the dispersion of the Constituent Assembly, they set out to transform the Soviets from a *combat organisation* of one class, as they had been up to then, into a *state organisation*. They destroyed the democracy which the Russian people had won in the March" (new style, or February, our style) "Revolution. In line with this, the Bolsheviks have ceased to call themselves Social-Democrats. They call themselves *Communists*" (p. 33, Kautsky's italics).

Those who are familiar with Russian Menshevik literature will at once see how slavishly Kautsky copies Martov, Axelrod, Stein and Co. Yes, "slavishly", because Kautsky ridiculously distorts the facts in order to pander to Menshevik prejudices. Kautsky did not take the trouble, for instance, to ask his informants (Stein of Berlin, or Axelrod of Stockholm) *when* the questions of changing the name of the Bolsheviks to Communists and of the significance of the Soviets as state organisations were first raised. Had Kautsky made this simple inquiry he would not have penned these ludicrous lines, for both these questions were raised by the Bolsheviks *in April 1917*, for example, in my "Theses" of April 4, 1917, i.e., *long before* the Revolution of October 1917 (and, of course, long before the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly on January 5, 1918).

But Kautsky's argument which I have just quoted in full represents the *crux* of the whole question of the Soviets. The *crux* is: should the Soviets aspire to become state organisations (in April 1917 the Bolsheviks put forward the slogan: "All Power to the Soviets!" and at the Bolshevik Party Conference held in the same month²⁴³ they declared they were not satisfied with a bourgeois parliamentary republic but demanded a workers' and peasants' republic

of the Paris Commune or Soviet type) or should the Soviets not strive for this, refrain from taking power into their hands, refrain from becoming state organisations and remain the "combat organisations" of one "class" (as Martov expressed it, embellishing by this innocent wish the fact that under Menshevik leadership the Soviets were *an instrument for the subjection of the workers to the bourgeoisie*)?

Kautsky slavishly repeats Martov's words, picks out *fragments* of the theoretical controversy between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, and uncritically and senselessly transplants them to the general theoretical and general European field. The result is such a hodge-podge as to provoke Homeric laughter in every class-conscious Russian worker had he read these arguments of Kautsky's.

When we explain what the question at issue is, every worker in Europe (barring a handful of inveterate social-imperialists) will greet Kautsky with similar laughter.

Kautsky has rendered Martov a backhanded service by developing his mistake into a glaring absurdity. Indeed, look what Kautsky's argument amounts to.

The Soviets embrace all wage-workers. The old methods of economic and political struggle of the proletariat are inadequate against finance capital. The Soviets have a great role to play in the future, and not only in Russia. They will play a decisive role in great decisive battles between capital and labour in Europe. That is what Kautsky says.

Excellent. But won't the "decisive battles between capital and labour" decide which of the two classes will assume state power?

Nothing of the kind! Heaven forbid!

The Soviets, which embrace all the wage-workers, *must not become state organisations* in the "decisive" battles!

But what is the state?

The state is nothing but a machine for the suppression of one class by another.

Thus, the oppressed class, the vanguard of all the working and exploited people in modern society, must strive towards the "decisive battles between capital and labour", *but must not touch* the machine by means of which capital suppresses labour!—*It must not break up* that machine!—*It*

must not make use of its all-embracing organisation for suppressing the exploiters!

Excellent, Mr. Kautsky, magnificent! "We" recognise the class struggle—in the same way as all liberals recognise it, i.e., without the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. . . .

This is where Kautsky's complete rupture both with Marxism and with socialism becomes obvious. Actually, it is desertion to the camp of the bourgeoisie, who are prepared to concede everything except the transformation of the organisations of the class which they oppress into state organisations. Kautsky can no longer save his position of trying to reconcile everything and of getting away from all profound contradictions with mere phrases.

Kautsky either rejects the assumption of state power by the working class altogether, or he concedes that the working class may take over the old, bourgeois state machine. But he will by no means concede that it must break it up, smash it, and replace it by a new, proletarian machine. Whichever way Kautsky's arguments are "interpreted", or "explained", his rupture with Marxism and his desertion to the bourgeoisie are obvious.

Back in the *Communist Manifesto*, describing what sort of state the victorious working class needs, Marx wrote: "the state, i.e., the proletariat organised as the ruling class."²⁴⁴ Now we have a man who claims still to be a Marxist coming forward and declaring that the proletariat, fully organised and waging the "decisive battle" against capital, *must not* transform its class organisation into a state organisation. Here Kautsky has betrayed that "superstitious belief in the state" which in Germany, as Engels wrote in 1891, "has been carried over into the general thinking of the bourgeoisie and even of many workers".²⁴⁵ Workers, fight!—our philistine "agrees" to this (as every bourgeois "agrees", since the workers are fighting all the same, and the only thing to do is to devise means of blunting the edge of their sword)—fight, but *don't dare win!* Don't destroy the state machine of the bourgeoisie, don't replace the bourgeois "state organisation" by the proletarian "state organisation"!

Whoever sincerely shared the Marxist view that the state is nothing but a machine for the suppression of one class by

another, and who has at all reflected upon this truth, could never have reached the absurd conclusion that the proletarian organisations capable of defeating finance capital must not transform themselves into state organisations. It was this point that betrayed the petty bourgeois who believes that "after all is said and done" the state is something outside classes or above classes. Indeed, why should the proletariat, "*one class*", be permitted to wage unremitting war on *capital*, which rules not only over the proletariat, but over the whole people, over the whole petty bourgeoisie, over all the peasants, yet this proletariat, this "*one class*", is not to be permitted to transform its organisation into a state organisation? Because the petty bourgeois is *afraid* of the class struggle, and does not carry it to its logical conclusion, to its main object.

Kautsky has got himself completely mixed up and has given himself away entirely. Mark you, he himself admits that Europe is heading for decisive battles between capital and labour, and that the old methods of economic and political struggle of the proletariat are inadequate. But these old methods were precisely the utilisation of *bourgeois* democracy. It therefore follows. . . ?

But Kautsky is afraid to think of what follows.

. . . It therefore follows that only a reactionary, an enemy of the working class, a henchman of the bourgeoisie, can now turn his face to the obsolete past, paint the charms of bourgeois democracy and babble about pure democracy. Bourgeois democracy *was* progressive compared with medievalism, and it had to be utilised. But now it is *not sufficient* for the working class. Now we must look forward instead of backward—to replacing the bourgeois democracy by *proletarian* democracy. And while the preparatory work for the proletarian revolution, the formation and training of the proletarian army were possible (and necessary) *within the framework* of the bourgeois-democratic state, now that we have reached the stage of "decisive battles", to confine the proletariat to this framework means betraying the cause of the proletariat, means being a renegade.

Kautsky has made himself particularly ridiculous by repeating Martov's argument *without noticing* that in Martov's

case this argument was based on *another* argument which he, Kautsky, does not use! Martov said (and Kautsky repeats after him) that Russia is not yet ripe for socialism; from which it logically follows that it is too early to transform the Soviets from organs of struggle into state organisations (read: it is timely to transform the Soviets, with the assistance of the Menshevik leaders, into instruments for *subjecting* the workers to the imperialist bourgeoisie). Kautsky, however, *cannot* say outright that Europe is not ripe for socialism. In 1909, when he was not yet a renegade, he wrote that there was then no reason to fear a *premature* revolution, that whoever had renounced revolution for fear of defeat would have been a traitor. Kautsky does not dare renounce this *outright*. And so we get an absurdity, which completely reveals the stupidity and cowardice of the petty bourgeois: on the one hand, Europe is ripe for socialism and is heading towards decisive battles between capital and labour; but, on the other hand, the *combat organisation* (i.e., the organisation which arises, grows and gains strength in combat), the organisation of the proletariat, the vanguard and organiser, the leader of the oppressed, *must not* be transformed into a state organisation!

* * *

From the point of view of practical politics the idea that the Soviets are necessary as combat organisations but must not be transformed into state organisations is infinitely more absurd than from the point of view of theory. Even in peacetime, when there is no revolutionary situation, the mass struggle of the workers against the capitalists—for instance, the mass strike—gives rise to great bitterness on both sides, to fierce passions in the struggle, the bourgeoisie constantly insisting that they remain and mean to remain “masters in their own house”, etc. And in time of revolution, when political life reaches boiling point, an organisation like the Soviets, which embraces *all* the workers in *all* branches of industry, *all* the soldiers, and all the working and poorest sections of the rural population—such an organisation, of its own accord, with the development of the struggle, by the simple “logic” of attack and defence, comes

inevitably to pose the question *point-blank*. The attempt to take up a middle position and to "reconcile" the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is sheer stupidity and doomed to miserable failure. That is what happened in Russia to the preachings of Martov and other Mensheviks, and that will inevitably happen in Germany and other countries if the Soviets succeed in developing on any wide scale, manage to unite and strengthen. To say to the Soviets: fight, but don't take all state power into your hands, don't become state organisations—is tantamount to preaching class collaboration and "social peace" between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. It is ridiculous even to think that such a position in the midst of fierce struggle could lead to anything but ignominious failure. But it is Kautsky's everlasting fate to sit between two stools. He pretends to disagree with the opportunists on everything in theory, but *in practice* he agrees with them on everything essential (i.e., on everything pertaining to revolution).

THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND THE SOVIET REPUBLIC

The question of the Constituent Assembly and its dispersal by the Bolsheviks is the crux of Kautsky's entire pamphlet. He constantly reverts to it, and the whole of this literary production of the ideological leader of the Second International is replete with innuendoes to the effect that the Bolsheviks have "destroyed democracy" (see one of the quotations from Kautsky above). The question is really an interesting and important one, because the relation between bourgeois democracy and proletarian democracy here confronted the revolution in a *practical* form. Let us see how our "Marxist theoretician" has dealt with the question.

He quotes the "Theses on the Constituent Assembly", written by me and published in *Pravda* on December 26, 1917.²⁴⁶ One would think that no better evidence of Kautsky's serious approach to the subject, quoting as he does the documents, could be desired. But look *how* he quotes. He does not say that there were nineteen of these theses; he does

not say that they dealt with the relation between the ordinary bourgeois republic with a Constituent Assembly and a Soviet republic, as well as with the *history* of the divergence in our revolution between the Constituent Assembly and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Kautsky ignores all that, and simply tells the reader that "two of them" (of the theses) "are particularly important": one stating that a split occurred among the Socialist-Revolutionaries after the elections to the Constituent Assembly, but before it was convened (Kautsky does not mention that this was the fifth thesis), and the other, that the republic of Soviets is in general a higher democratic form than the Constituent Assembly (Kautsky does not mention that this was the third thesis).

Only from this third thesis does Kautsky quote a part in full, namely, the following passage:

"The republic of Soviets is not only a higher type of democratic institution (as compared with the *usual* bourgeois republic crowned by a Constituent Assembly), but is the only form capable of securing the most painless* transition to socialism" (Kautsky omits the word "usual" and the introductory words of the thesis: "For the transition from the bourgeois to the socialist system, for the dictatorship of the proletariat").

After quoting these words, Kautsky, with magnificent irony, exclaims:

"It is a pity that this conclusion was arrived at only after the Bolsheviks found themselves in the minority in the Constituent Assembly. Before that no one had demanded it more vociferously than Lenin."

This is literally what Kautsky says on page 31 of his book!

* Incidentally, Kautsky, obviously trying to be ironical, repeatedly quotes the expression "most painless" transition; but as the shaft misses its mark, a few pages farther on he commits a slight forgery and falsely quotes it as a "painless" transition! Of course, by such means it is easy to put any absurdity into the mouth of an opponent. The forgery also helps him to evade the substance of the argument, namely, that the most painless transition to socialism is possible only when all the poor are organised to a man (Soviets) and when the core of state power (the proletariat) helps them to organise.

It is positively a gem! Only a sycophant of the bourgeoisie could present the question in such a false way as to give the reader the impression that all the Bolsheviks' talk about a higher type of state was an invention which saw light of day *after* they found themselves in the minority in the Constituent Assembly! Such an infamous lie could only have been uttered by a scoundrel who has sold himself to the bourgeoisie, or, what is absolutely the same thing, who has placed his trust in Axelrod and is concealing the source of his information.

For everyone knows that on the very day of my arrival in Russia, on April 4, 1917, I publicly read my theses in which I proclaimed the superiority of the Paris Commune type of state over the bourgeois parliamentary republic. Afterwards I *repeatedly* stated this in print, as, for instance, in a pamphlet on political parties, which was translated into English and was published in January 1918 in the New York *Evening Post*.²⁴⁷ More than that, the Conference of the Bolshevik Party held at the end of April 1917 adopted a resolution to the effect that a proletarian and peasant republic was superior to a bourgeois parliamentary republic, that our Party would not be satisfied with the latter, and that the Party Programme should be modified accordingly.

In face of these facts, what name can be given to Kautsky's trick of assuring his German readers that I had been vigorously demanding the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and that I began to "belittle" the honour and dignity of the Constituent Assembly only after the Bolsheviks found themselves in the minority in it? How can one excuse such a trick?* By pleading that Kautsky did not know the facts? If that is the case, why did he undertake to write about them? Or why did he not honestly announce that he was writing on the strength of information supplied by the Mensheviks Stein and Axelrod and Co.? By pretending to be objective, Kautsky wants to conceal his role as the servant

* Incidentally, there are many Menshevik lies of this kind in Kautsky's pamphlet! It is a lampoon written by an embittered Menshevik.

of the Mensheviks, who are disgruntled because they have been defeated.

This, however, is a mere trifle compared with what is to come.

Let us assume that Kautsky would not or could not (?) obtain from his informants a translation of the Bolshevik resolutions and declarations on the question of whether the Bolsheviks would be satisfied with a bourgeois parliamentary democratic republic or not. Let us assume this, although it is incredible. But Kautsky *directly mentions* my theses of December 26, 1917, on page 30 of his book.

Does he not know these theses in full, or does he know only what was translated for him by the Steins, the Axelrods and Co.? Kautsky quotes the *third* thesis on the *fundamental* question of whether the Bolsheviks, *before* the elections to the Constituent Assembly, realised that a Soviet republic is superior to a bourgeois republic, and whether they told the *people* that. *But he keeps silent about the second thesis.*

The second thesis reads as follows:

"While demanding the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, revolutionary Social-Democracy has ever since the beginning of the revolution of 1917 *repeatedly emphasised* that a *republic of Soviets is a higher form of democracy than the usual bourgeois republic with a Constituent Assembly*" (my italics).

In order to represent the Bolsheviks as unprincipled people, as "revolutionary opportunists" (this is a term which Kautsky employs somewhere in his book, I forget in which connection), Mr. Kautsky *has concealed from his German readers* the fact that the theses contain a direct reference to "*repeated*" declarations!

These are the petty, miserable and contemptible methods Mr. Kautsky employs! That is the way he has evaded the *theoretical* question.

Is it true or not that the bourgeois-democratic parliamentary republic is *inferior* to the republic of the Paris Commune or Soviet type? This is the whole point, and Kautsky has evaded it. Kautsky has "forgotten" all that Marx said in his analysis of the Paris Commune. He has also "forgotten" Engels's letter to Bebel of March 28, 1875, in which

this same idea of Marx is formulated in a particularly lucid and comprehensible fashion: "The Commune was no longer a state in the proper sense of the word."

Here is the most prominent theoretician of the Second International, in a special pamphlet on *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, specially dealing with Russia, where the question of a form of state that is higher than a democratic bourgeois republic has been raised directly and repeatedly, ignoring this very question. In what way does this differ *in fact* from desertion to the bourgeois camp?

(Let us observe in parenthesis that in this respect, too, Kautsky is merely trailing after the Russian Mensheviks. Among the latter there are any number of people who know "all the quotations" from Marx and Engels. Yet not a single Menshevik, from April to October 1917 and from October 1917 to October 1918, has *ever* made a *single* attempt to examine the question of the Paris Commune type of state. Plekhanov, too, has evaded the question. *Evidently he had to.*)

It goes without saying that to discuss the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly with people who call themselves socialists and Marxists, but who in fact desert to the bourgeoisie on the *main* question, the question of the Paris Commune type of state, would be casting pearls before swine. It will be sufficient to give the complete text of my theses on the Constituent Assembly as an appendix to the present book. The reader will then see that the question was presented on December 26, 1917, in the light of theory, history and practical politics.

If Kautsky has completely renounced Marxism as a theoretician he might at least have examined the question of the struggle of the Soviets with the Constituent Assembly as a historian. We know from many of Kautsky's works that he *knew how* to be a Marxist historian, and that *such* works of his will remain a permanent possession of the proletariat in spite of his subsequent apostasy. But on this question Kautsky, even as a historian, *turns his back* on the truth, ignores *well-known* facts and behaves like a sycophant. He *wants* to represent the Bolsheviks as being unprincipled and he tells his readers that they tried to *mitigate* the conflict with the Constituent Assembly before dispersing it. There

is absolutely nothing wrong about it, we have nothing to recant; I give the theses in full and there it is said as clear as clear can be: Gentlemen of the vacillating petty bourgeoisie entrenched in the Constituent Assembly, either reconcile yourselves to the proletarian dictatorship, or else we shall defeat you by "revolutionary means" (theses 18 and 19).

That is how a really revolutionary proletariat has always behaved and always will behave towards the vacillating petty bourgeoisie.

Kautsky adopts a formal standpoint on the question of the Constituent Assembly. My theses say clearly and repeatedly that the interests of the revolution are higher than the formal rights of the Constituent Assembly (see theses 16 and 17). The formal democratic point of view is precisely the point of view of the *bourgeois* democrat who refuses to admit that the interests of the proletariat and of the proletarian class struggle are supreme. As a historian, Kautsky would not have been able to deny that bourgeois parliaments are the organs of this or that class. But now (for the sordid purpose of renouncing revolution) Kautsky finds it necessary to forget his Marxism, and he *retrains from putting the question*: the organ of what *class* was the Constituent Assembly of Russia? Kautsky does not examine the concrete conditions; he does not want to face facts; he does not say a single word to his German readers about the fact that the theses contained not only a theoretical elucidation of the question of the limited character of bourgeois democracy (theses 1-3), not only a description of the concrete conditions which determined the discrepancy between the party lists of candidates in the middle of October 1917 and the real state of affairs in December 1917 (theses 4-6), but also a *history of the class struggle and the Civil War* in October-December 1917 (theses 7-15). From this concrete history we drew the conclusion (thesis 14) that the slogan "All Power to the Constituent Assembly!" had, *in reality*, become the slogan of the Cadets and the Kaledin men and their abettors.

Kautsky the historian fails to see this. Kautsky the historian has never heard that universal suffrage sometimes produces petty-bourgeois, sometimes reactionary and counter-

revolutionary parliaments. Kautsky the Marxist historian has never heard that the form of elections, the form of democracy, is one thing, and the class content of the given institution is another. This question of the class content of the Constituent Assembly is directly put and answered in my theses. Perhaps my answer is wrong. Nothing would have been more welcome to us than a Marxist criticism of our analysis by an outsider. Instead of writing utterly silly phrases (of which there are plenty in Kautsky's book) about somebody preventing criticism of Bolshevism, he ought to have set out to make such a criticism. But the point is that he offers no criticism. He does not even *raise the question* of a class analysis of the Soviets on the one hand, and of the Constituent Assembly on the other. It is therefore *impossible* to argue, to debate with Kautsky. All we can do is *demonstrate* to the reader why Kautsky cannot be called anything else but a renegade.

The divergence between the Soviets and the Constituent Assembly has its history, which even a historian who does not share the point of view of the class struggle could not have ignored. Kautsky would not *touch* upon this actual history. Kautsky has concealed from his German readers the universally known fact (which only malignant Mensheviks now conceal) that the divergence between the Soviets and the "general state" (that is, bourgeois) institutions existed even under the rule of the Mensheviks, i.e., from the end of February to October 1917. Actually, Kautsky adopts the position of conciliation, compromise and collaboration between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. However much Kautsky may repudiate this, it is a fact which is borne out by his whole pamphlet. To say that the Constituent Assembly should not have been dispersed is tantamount to saying that the fight against the bourgeoisie should not have been fought to a finish, that the bourgeoisie should not have been overthrown and that the proletariat should have made peace with them.

Why has Kautsky kept quiet about the fact that the Mensheviks were engaged in this inglorious work between February and October 1917 and did not achieve anything? If it was possible to reconcile the bourgeoisie with the proletariat, why didn't the Mensheviks succeed in doing so?

Why did the bourgeoisie stand aloof from the Soviets? Why did the *Mensheviks* call the Soviets "revolutionary democracy", and the bourgeoisie the "propertied elements"?

Kautsky has concealed from his German readers that it was the *Mensheviks* who, in the "epoch" of their rule (February to October 1917), called the Soviets "revolutionary democracy", *thereby* admitting their superiority over all other institutions. It is only by concealing this fact that Kautsky the historian made it appear that the divergence between the Soviets and the bourgeoisie had no history, that it arose instantaneously, without cause, suddenly, because of the bad behaviour of the *Bolsheviks*. Yet, in actual fact, it was *the more than six months'* (an enormous period in time of revolution) *experience* of *Menshevik* compromise, of their attempts to reconcile the proletariat with the bourgeoisie, that convinced the people of the fruitlessness of these attempts and drove the proletariat away from the *Mensheviks*.

Kautsky admits that the Soviets are an excellent combat organisation of the proletariat, and that they have a great future before them. But, that being the case, Kautsky's position collapses like a house of cards, or like the dreams of a petty bourgeois that the acute struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie can be avoided. For revolution is one continuous and moreover desperate struggle, and the proletariat is the vanguard class of *all* the oppressed, the focus and centre of all the aspirations of all the oppressed for their emancipation! Naturally, therefore, the Soviets, as the organ of the struggle of the oppressed people, reflected and expressed the moods and changes of opinions of these people ever so much more quickly, fully, and faithfully than any other institution (that, incidentally, is one of the reasons why Soviet democracy is the highest type of democracy).

In the period between February 28 (old style) and October 25, 1917, the Soviets managed to convene *two* all-Russia congresses of representatives of the overwhelming majority of the population of Russia, of all the workers and soldiers, and of 70 or 80 per cent of the peasants, not to mention the vast number of local, uyezd, town, gubernia, and regional congresses. During this period the bourgeoisie did not succeed in convening a single institution representing the

majority (except that obvious sham and mockery called the "Democratic Conference",²⁴⁸ which enraged the proletariat). The Constituent Assembly reflected *the same* popular mood and *the same* political grouping as the First (June) All-Russia Congress of Soviets. By the time the Constituent Assembly was convened (January 1918), the Second (October 1917) and Third (January 1918) Congresses of Soviets had met, both of which had *demonstrated as clear as clear could be* that the people had swung to the left, had become revolutionised, had turned away from the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and had passed over to the side of the Bolsheviks; *that is*, had turned away from petty-bourgeois leadership, from the illusion that it was possible to reach a compromise with the bourgeoisie, and had joined the proletarian revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

So, even the *external history* of the Soviets shows that the Constituent Assembly was a *reactionary* body and that its dispersal was inevitable. But Kautsky sticks firmly to his "slogan": let "pure democracy" prevail though the revolution perish and the bourgeoisie triumph over the proletariat! *Fiat justitia, pereat mundus!**

Here are the brief figures relating to the all-Russia congresses of Soviets in the course of the history of the Russian revolution:

All-Russia Congress of Soviets	Number of Delegates	Number of Bolsheviks	Percentage of Bolsheviks
First (June 3, 1917)	790	103	13
Second (October 25, 1917)	675	343	51
Third (January 10, 1918)	740	434	61
Fourth (March 14, 1918)	1,232	795	64
Fifth (July 4, 1918)	1,164	773	66

One glance at these figures is enough to understand why the defence of the Constituent Assembly and talk (like Kautsky's) about the Bolsheviks not having a majority of the population behind them are just ridiculed in Russia.

* Let justice be done, even though the world may perish.—Ed.

THE SOVIET CONSTITUTION

As I have already pointed out, the disfranchisement of the bourgeoisie is not a necessary and indispensable feature of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And in Russia, the Bolsheviks, who long before October put forward the slogan of proletarian dictatorship, did not say anything in advance about disfranchising the exploiters. *This* aspect of the dictatorship did not make its appearance "according to the plan" of any particular party; it *emerged* of itself in the course of the struggle. Of course, Kautsky the historian failed to notice this. He failed to understand that even when the Mensheviks (who compromised with the bourgeoisie) still ruled the Soviets, the bourgeoisie cut themselves off from the Soviets of their own accord, boycotted them, put themselves up in opposition to them and intrigued against them. The Soviets arose without any constitution and existed without one for *more than a year* (from the spring of 1917 to the summer of 1918). The fury of the bourgeoisie against this independent and omnipotent (because it was all-embracing) organisation of the oppressed; the fight, the unscrupulous, self-seeking and sordid fight, the bourgeoisie waged against the Soviets; and, lastly, the overt participation of the bourgeoisie (from the Cadets to the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, from Milyukov to Kerensky) in the Kornilov mutiny²⁴⁹—all this *paved the way* for the formal exclusion of the bourgeoisie from the Soviets.

Kautsky has heard about the Kornilov mutiny, but he majestically scorns historical facts and the course and forms of the struggle which determine the *forms* of the dictatorship. Indeed, who should care about facts where "pure" democracy is involved? That is why Kautsky's "criticism" of the disfranchisement of the bourgeoisie is distinguished by such ... sweet naïveté, which would be touching in a child but is repulsive in a person who has not yet been officially certified as feeble-minded.

"... If the capitalists found themselves in an insignificant minority under universal suffrage they would more readily become reconciled to their fate" (p. 33)... Charming, isn't it? Clever Kautsky has seen many cases in history, and, generally, knows perfectly well from his own observations

of life of landowners and capitalists reckoning with the will of the majority of the oppressed. Clever Kautsky firmly advocates an "opposition", i.e., parliamentary struggle. That is literally what he says: "opposition" (p. 34 and elsewhere).

My dear learned historian and politician! It would not harm you to know that "opposition" is a concept that belongs to the peaceful and only to the parliamentary struggle, i.e., a concept that corresponds to a non-revolutionary situation, a concept that corresponds to an *absence of revolution*. During revolution we have to deal with a ruthless enemy in civil war; and no reactionary jeremiads of a petty bourgeois who fears such a war, as Kautsky does, will alter the fact. To examine the problems of ruthless civil war from the point of view of "opposition" at a time when the bourgeoisie are prepared to commit any crime—the example of the Versailles men and of their deal with Bismarck must mean something to every person who does not treat history like Gogol's Petrushka²⁵⁰—when the bourgeoisie are summoning foreign states to their aid and intriguing with them against the revolution, is simply comical. The revolutionary proletariat is to put on a night-cap, like "Muddle-headed Counsellor" Kautsky, and regard the bourgeoisie, who are organising Dutov, Krasnov and Czech counter-revolutionary insurrections²⁵¹ and are paying millions to saboteurs, as a legal "opposition". Oh, what profundity!

Kautsky is exclusively interested in the formal, legal aspect of the question, and, reading his disquisitions on the Soviet Constitution, one involuntarily recalls Bebel's words: Lawyers are thoroughbred reactionaries. "In reality," Kautsky writes, "the capitalists alone cannot be disfranchised. What is a capitalist in the legal sense of the term? A property-owner? Even in a country which has advanced so far along the path of economic progress as Germany, where the proletariat is so numerous, the establishment of a Soviet republic would disfranchise a large mass of people. In 1907, the number of persons in the German Empire engaged in the three great occupational groups—agriculture, industry and commerce—together with their families amounted roughly to thirty-five million in the wage-earners' and salaried employees' group, and seventeen million in the

independent group. Hence, a party might well form a majority among the wage-workers but a minority among the population as a whole" (p. 33).

That is an example of Kautsky's mode of argument. Isn't it the counter-revolutionary whining of a bourgeois? Why, Mr. Kautsky, have you relegated all the "independents" to the category of the disfranchised, when you know very well that the overwhelming majority of the Russian peasants do not employ hired labour, and do not, therefore, lose their franchise? Isn't this falsification?

Why, learned economist, did you not quote the facts with which you are perfectly familiar and which are to be found in those same German statistical returns for 1907 relating to hired labour in agriculture according to size of farms? Why did you not quote these facts to enable the German workers, the readers of your pamphlet, to see *how many exploiters there are*, and how few they are compared with the total number of "farmers" who figure in German statistics?

You did not because your apostasy has made you a mere sycophant of the bourgeoisie.

The term capitalist, Kautsky argues, is legally a vague concept, and on several pages he thunders against the "arbitrariness" of the Soviet Constitution. This "serious scholar" has no objection to the British bourgeoisie taking several centuries to work out and develop a new (new for the Middle Ages) bourgeois constitution, but, representative of lackey's science that he is, he will allow no time to us, the workers and peasants of Russia. He expects us to have a constitution all worked out to the very last letter in a few months. . . .

"Arbitrariness!" Just imagine what a depth of vile subservience to the bourgeoisie and most inept pedantry is contained in *such* a reproach. When thoroughly bourgeois and for the most part reactionary lawyers in the capitalist countries have for centuries or decades been drawing up most detailed rules and regulations and writing scores and hundreds of volumes of laws and interpretations of laws to *oppress* the workers, to bind the *poor man* hand and foot and to place thousands of hindrances and obstacles in the way of any of the common labouring people—there the

bourgeois liberals and Mr. Kautsky see no "arbitrariness"! That is "law" and "order"! The ways in which the poor are to be "kept down" have all been thought out and written down. There are thousands of bourgeois lawyers and bureaucrats (about them Kautsky says nothing at all, probably just because Marx attached enormous significance to *smashing* the bureaucratic machine..)—lawyers and bureaucrats who know how to interpret the laws in such a way that the worker and the average peasant can never break through the barbed-wire entanglements of these laws. This is not "arbitrariness" on the part of the bourgeoisie, it is not the dictatorship of the sordid and self-seeking exploiters who are sucking the blood of the people. Nothing of the kind! It is "pure democracy", which is becoming purer and purer every day.

But now that the toiling and exploited classes, while cut off by the imperialist war from their brothers across the border, have for the first time in history set up their *own* Soviets, have called to the work of political construction *those people* whom the bourgeoisie used to oppress, grind down and stupefy, and have begun *themselves* to build a *new*, proletarian state, have begun in the heat of furious struggle, in the fire of civil war, to *sketch* the fundamental principles of a state *without exploiters*—all the bourgeois scoundrels, the whole gang of bloodsuckers, with Kautsky echoing them, howl about "arbitrariness"! Indeed, how will these ignorant people, these workers and peasants, this "mob", be able to interpret their laws? How can these common labourers acquire a sense of justice without the counsel of educated lawyers, of bourgeois writers, of the Kautskys and the wise old bureaucrats?

Mr. Kautsky quotes from my speech of April 28, 1918, the words: "The people themselves determine the procedure and the time of elections." And Kautsky, the "pure democrat", infers from this:

"... Hence, it would mean that every assembly of electors may determine the procedure of elections at their own discretion. Arbitrariness and the opportunity of getting rid of undesirable opposition in the ranks of the proletariat itself would thus be carried to the extreme" (p. 37).

Well, how does this differ from the talk of a hack hired by capitalists, who howls about the people oppressing industrious workers who are "willing to work" during a strike? Why is the *bourgeois* bureaucratic method of determining electoral procedure under "pure" bourgeois democracy *not* arbitrariness? Why should the sense of justice *among the masses who have risen to fight* their age-old exploiters and who are being educated and steeled in this desperate struggle be less than that of a *handful* of bureaucrats, intellectuals and lawyers brought up in *bourgeois* prejudices?

Kautsky is a true socialist. Don't dare suspect the sincerity of this very respectable father of a family, of this very honest citizen. He is an ardent and convinced supporter of the victory of the workers, of the proletarian revolution. All he wants is that the honey-mouthed, petty-bourgeois intellectuals and philistines in nightcaps should *first-before* the masses begin to move, *before* they start a furious battle with the exploiters, and certainly *without* civil war—draw up a moderate and precise *set of rules for the development of the revolution*. . . .

Burning with profound moral indignation, our most learned Judas Golovlyov tells the German workers that on June 14, 1918, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of Soviets resolved to expel the representatives of the Right Socialist-Revolutionary Party and the Mensheviks from the Soviets. "This measure," writes Judas Kautsky, all afire with noble indignation, "is not directed against definite persons guilty of definite punishable offences. . . . The Constitution of the Soviet Republic does not contain a single word about the immunity of Soviet deputies. It is not definite *persons*, but definite *parties* that are expelled from the Soviets" (p. 37).

Yes, that is really awful, an intolerable departure from pure democracy, according to the rules of which our revolutionary Judas Kautsky will make the revolution. We Russian Bolsheviks should first have guaranteed immunity to the Savinkovs and Co., to the Lieberdants,²⁵² Potresovs ("activists") and Co., then drawn up a criminal code proclaiming participation in the Czech counter-revolutionary war, or in the alliance with the German imperialists in the Ukraine or in Georgia *against* the workers of one's own country, to be

"punishable offences", and *only then*, on the basis of this criminal code, would we be entitled, in accordance with the principles of "pure democracy", to expel "definite persons" from the Soviets. It goes without saying that the Czechs, who are subsidised by the British and French capitalists through the medium (or thanks to the agitation) of the Savinkovs, Potresovs and Lieberdants, and the Krasnovs who receive ammunition from the Germans through the medium of the Ukrainian and Tiflis Mensheviks, would have sat quietly waiting until we were ready with our proper criminal code, and, like the purest democrats they are, would have confined themselves to the role of an "opposition". . . .

No less profound moral indignation is aroused in Kautsky's breast by the fact that the Soviet Constitution disfranchises all those who "employ hired labour with a view to profit". "A home-worker, or a small master employing only one journeyman," Kautsky writes, "may live and feel quite like a proletarian, but he has no vote" (p. 36).

What a departure from "pure democracy"! What an injustice! True, up to now all Marxists have thought—and thousands of facts have proved it—that the small masters were the most unscrupulous and grasping exploiters of hired labour, but our Judas Kautsky takes the small masters not as a *class* (who invented that pernicious theory of the class struggle?) but as single individuals, exploiters who "live and feel quite like proletarians". The famous "thrifty Agnes", who was considered dead and buried long ago, has come to life again under Kautsky's pen. This "thrifty Agnes" was invented and launched into German literature some decades ago by that "pure" democrat, the bourgeois Eugen Richter. He predicted untold calamities that would follow the dictatorship of the proletariat, the confiscation of the capital of the exploiters, and asked with an innocent air: What is a capitalist in the legal sense of the term? He took as an example a poor, thrifty seamstress ("thrifty Agnes"), whom the wicked "proletarian dictators" rob of her last farthing. There was a time when all German Social-Democrats used to poke fun at this "thrifty Agnes" of the pure democrat, Eugen Richter. But that was a long, long time ago, when Bebel, who was quite frank and open about there being many

national-liberals²⁵³ in his party, was still alive; that was very long ago, when Kautsky was not yet a renegade.

Now "thrifty Agnes" has come to life again in the person of the "small master who employs only one journeyman and who lives and feels quite like a proletarian". The wicked Bolsheviks are wronging him, depriving him of his vote. It is true that "every assembly of electors" in the Soviet Republic, as Kautsky tells us, may admit into its midst a poor little master who, for instance, may be connected with this or that factory, if, by way of an exception, he is not an exploiter, and if he *really* "lives and feels quite like a proletarian". But can one rely on the knowledge of life, on the sense of justice of an irregular factory meeting of common workers acting (how awful!) without a written code? Would it not clearly be better to grant the vote to *all* exploiters, to *all* who employ hired labour, rather than risk the possibility of "thrifty Agnes" and the "small master who lives and feels quite like a proletarian" being wronged by the workers?

• • •

Let the contemptible renegade scoundrels, amidst the applause of the bourgeoisie and the social-chauvinists,* abuse our Soviet Constitution for disfranchising the exploiters! That's fine because it will accelerate and widen the split between the revolutionary workers of Europe and the Scheidemanns and Kautskys, the Renaudels and Longuets, the Hendersons and Ramsay MacDonalds, the old leaders and old betrayers of socialism.

The mass of the oppressed classes, the class-conscious and honest revolutionary proletarian leaders will be *on our side*. It will be enough to acquaint such proletarians and such people with our Soviet Constitution for them to say at once: "These are really *our people*, this is a real workers' party, this is a real workers' government, for it does not deceive

* I have just read a leading article in *Frankfurter Zeitung*²⁵⁴ (No. 293, October 22, 1918), giving an enthusiastic summary of Kautsky's pamphlet. This organ of the stock exchange is satisfied. And no wonder! And a comrade writes to me from Berlin that *Vorwärts*, the organ of the Scheidemanns, has declared in a special article that it subscribes to almost every line Kautsky has written. Hearty congratulations!

the workers by talking about reforms in the way *all the above-mentioned leaders have done*, but is fighting the exploiters in real earnest, making a revolution in real earnest and *actually* fighting for the complete emancipation of the workers."

The *fact* that after a year's "experience" the Soviets have deprived the exploiters of the franchise *shows* that the Soviets are really organisations of the oppressed and not of social-imperialists and social-pacifists who have sold themselves to the bourgeoisie. The *fact* that the Soviets have disfranchised the exploiters *shows* they are not organs of petty-bourgeois compromise with the capitalists, not organs of parliamentary chatter (on the part of the Kautskys, the Longuets and the MacDonalds), but organs of the genuinely revolutionary proletariat which is waging a life-and-death struggle against the exploiters.

"Kautsky's book is almost unknown here," a well-informed comrade wrote to me from Berlin a few days ago (today is October 30). I would advise our ambassadors in Germany and Switzerland not to stint thousands in buying up this book and *distributing it gratis* among the class-conscious workers so as to trample in the mud this "European"—read: imperialist and reformist—Social-Democracy, which has long been a "stinking corpse".

* * *

At the end of his book, on pages 61 and 63, Mr. Kautsky bitterly laments the fact that the "new theory" (as he calls Bolshevism, fearing to touch Marx's and Engels's analysis of the Paris Commune) "finds supporters even in old democracies like Switzerland, for instance". "It is incomprehensible" to Kautsky "how this theory can be adopted by German Social-Democrats".

No, it is quite comprehensible; for after the serious lessons of the war the revolutionary masses are becoming sick and tired of the Scheidemanns and the Kautskys.

"We" have always been in favour of democracy, Kautsky writes, yet we are supposed suddenly to renounce it!

"We" the opportunists of Social-Democracy, have always been opposed to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and Kolb and Co. proclaimed this *long ago*. Kautsky knows this and

vainly expects that he will be able to conceal from his readers the obvious fact that he has "returned to the fold" of the Bernsteins and Kolbs.

"We", the revolutionary Marxists, have never made a fetish of "pure" (bourgeois) democracy. As is known, in 1903 Plekhanov was a revolutionary Marxist (later his unfortunate turn brought him to the position of a Russian Scheidemann). And in that year Plekhanov declared at our Party Congress, which was then adopting its programme, that in the revolution the proletariat would, if necessary, disfranchise the capitalists and *disperse any parliament* that was found to be counter-revolutionary. That this is the only view that corresponds to Marxism will be clear to anybody even from the statements of Marx and Engels which I have quoted above; it patently follows from all the fundamental principles of Marxism.

"We", the revolutionary Marxists, never made speeches to the people that the Kautskyites of all nations love to make, cringing before the bourgeoisie, adapting themselves to the bourgeois parliamentary system, keeping silent about the *bourgeois* character of modern democracy and demanding only its extension, only that it be carried to its logical conclusion.

"We" said to the bourgeoisie: You, exploiters and hypocrites, talk about democracy, while at every step you erect thousands of barriers to prevent the *oppressed people* from taking part in politics. We take you at your word and, in the interests of these people, demand the extension of *your* bourgeois democracy *in order to prepare the people for revolution* for the purpose of overthrowing you, the exploiters. And if you exploiters attempt to offer resistance to our proletarian revolution we shall ruthlessly suppress you; we shall deprive you of all rights; more than that, we shall not give you any bread, for in our proletarian republic the exploiters will have no rights, they will be deprived of fire and water, for we are socialists in real earnest, and not in the Scheidemann or Kautsky fashion.

That is what "we", the revolutionary Marxists, said, and will say—and that is why the oppressed people will support us and be with us, while the Scheidemanns and the Kautskys will be swept into the renegades' cesspool.

WHAT IS INTERNATIONALISM?

Kautsky is absolutely convinced that he is an internationalist and calls himself one. The Scheidemanns he calls "government socialists". In defending the Mensheviks (he does not openly express his solidarity with them, but he faithfully expresses their views), Kautsky has shown with perfect clarity what kind of "internationalism" he subscribes to. And since Kautsky is not alone, but is spokesman for a trend which inevitably grew up in the atmosphere of the Second International (Longuet in France, Turati in Italy, Nobs and Grimm, Graber and Naine in Switzerland, Ramsay MacDonald in Britain, etc.), it will be instructive to dwell on Kautsky's "internationalism".

After emphasising that the Mensheviks also attended the Zimmerwald Conference (a diploma, certainly, but ... a tainted one), Kautsky sets forth the views of the Mensheviks, with whom he agrees, in the following manner:

"... The Mensheviks wanted a general peace. They wanted all the belligerents to adopt the formula: no annexations and no indemnities. Until this had been achieved, the Russian army, according to this view, was to stand ready for battle. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, demanded an immediate peace at any price; they were prepared, if need be, to make a separate peace; they tried to force it by increasing the state of disorganisation of the army, which was already bad enough" (p. 27). In Kautsky's opinion the Bolsheviks should not have taken power, and should have contented themselves with a Constituent Assembly.

So, the internationalism of Kautsky and the Mensheviks amounts to this: to demand reforms from the imperialist bourgeois government, but to continue to support it, and to continue to support the war that this government is waging until everyone in the war has accepted the formula: no annexations and no indemnities. This view was repeatedly expressed by Turati, and by the Kautsky supporters (Haase and others), and by Longuet and Co., who declared that they stood *for* defence of the fatherland.

Theoretically, this shows a complete inability to dissociate oneself from the social-chauvinists and complete confusion on the question of defence of the fatherland. Politically, it

means substituting petty-bourgeois nationalism for internationalism, deserting to the reformists' camp and renouncing revolution.

From the point of view of the proletariat, recognising "defence of the fatherland" means justifying the present war, admitting that it is legitimate. And since the war remains an imperialist war (both under a monarchy and under a republic), irrespective of the country—mine or some other country—in which the enemy troops are stationed at the given moment, recognising defence of the fatherland means, *in fact*, supporting the imperialist, predatory bourgeoisie, and completely betraying socialism. In Russia, even under Kerensky, under the bourgeois-democratic republic, the war continued to be an imperialist war, for it was being waged by the bourgeoisie as a ruling class (and war is a "continuation of politics"); and a particularly striking expression of the imperialist character of the war were the secret treaties for the partitioning of the world and the plunder of other countries which had been concluded by the tsar at the time with the capitalists of Britain and France.

The Mensheviks deceived the people in a most despicable manner by calling this war a defensive or revolutionary war. And by approving the policy of the Mensheviks, Kautsky is approving the popular deception, is approving the part played by the petty bourgeoisie in helping capital to trick the workers and harness them to the chariot of the imperialists. Kautsky is pursuing a characteristically petty-bourgeois, philistine policy by pretending (and trying to make the people believe the absurd idea) that *putting forward a slogan* alters the position. The entire history of bourgeois democracy refutes this illusion; the bourgeois democrats have always advanced all sorts of "slogans" to deceive the people. The point is to *test* their sincerity, to compare their words with their *deeds*, not to be satisfied with idealistic or charlatan *phrases*, but to get down to *class reality*. An imperialist war does not cease to be imperialist when charlatans or phrase-mongers or petty-bourgeois philistines put forward sentimental "slogans", but only when the *class* which is conducting the imperialist war, and is bound to it by millions of economic threads (and even ropes), is really *overthrown* and is replaced at the helm of state by the really

revolutionary class, the proletariat. *There is no other way of getting out of an imperialist war, as also out of an imperialist predatory peace.*

By approving the foreign policy of the Mensheviks, and by declaring it to be internationalist and Zimmerwaldist, Kautsky, first, reveals the utter rottenness of the opportunist Zimmerwald majority (no wonder we, the *Left* Zimmerwaldists, at once dissociated ourselves from such a majority!), and, secondly—and this is the chief thing—passes from the position of the proletariat to the position of the petty bourgeoisie, from the revolutionary to the reformist position.

The proletariat fights for the revolutionary overthrow of the imperialist bourgeoisie; the petty bourgeoisie fights for the reformist "improvement" of imperialism, for adaptation to it, while *submitting* to it. When Kautsky was still a Marxist, for example, in 1909, when he wrote his *Road to Power*, it was the idea that war would inevitably lead to *revolution* that he advocated, and he spoke of the approach of an *era of revolutions*. The Basle Manifesto of 1912 plainly and definitely speaks of a *proletarian revolution* in connection with that very imperialist war between the German and the British groups which actually broke out in 1914. But in 1918, when revolutions did begin in connection with the war, Kautsky, instead of explaining that they were inevitable, instead of pondering over and thinking out the *revolutionary* tactics and the ways and means of preparing for revolution, began to describe the reformist tactics of the Mensheviks as internationalism. Isn't this apostasy?

Kautsky praises the Mensheviks for having insisted on maintaining the fighting strength of the army, and he blames the Bolsheviks for having added to "disorganisation of the army", which was already disorganised enough as it was. This means praising reformism and submission to the imperialist bourgeoisie, and blaming and renouncing revolution. For under Kerensky maintaining the fighting strength of the army meant its preservation under *bourgeois* (albeit republican) command. Everybody knows, and the progress of events has strikingly confirmed it, that this republican army preserved the *Kornilov* spirit because its officers were Kornilov men. The bourgeois officers could not help being Kornilov men; they could not help gravitating towards

imperialism and towards the forcible suppression of the proletariat. All that the Menshevik tactics amounted to *in practice* was to leave all the foundations of the imperialist war and all the foundations of the *bourgeois* dictatorship intact, to patch up details and to daub over a few trifles ("reforms").

On the other hand, not a single great revolution has ever taken place, or ever can take place, without the "disorganisation" of the army. For the army is the most ossified instrument for supporting the old regime, the most hardened bulwark of bourgeois discipline, buttressing up the rule of capital, and preserving and fostering among the working people the servile spirit of submission and subjection to capital. Counter-revolution has never tolerated, and never could tolerate, armed workers side by side with the army. In France, Engels wrote, the workers emerged armed from every revolution: "therefore, the disarming of the workers was the first commandment for the bourgeoisie, who were at the helm of the state."²⁵⁵ The armed workers were the embryo of a *new* army, the organised nucleus of a *new* social order. The first commandment of the bourgeoisie was to crush this nucleus and prevent it from growing. The first commandment of every victorious revolution, as Marx and Engels repeatedly emphasised, was to smash the old army, dissolve it and replace it by a new one.²⁵⁶ A new social class, when rising to power, never could, and cannot now, attain power and consolidate it except by completely disintegrating the old army ("Disorganisation!" the reactionary or just cowardly philistines howl on this score), except by passing through a most difficult and painful period without any army (the great French Revolution also passed through such a painful period), and by gradually building up, in the midst of hard civil war, a new army, a new discipline, a new military organisation of the new class. Formerly, Kautsky the historian understood this. Now, Kautsky the renegade has forgotten it.

What right has Kautsky to call the Scheidemanns "government socialists" if he *approves* of the tactics of the Mensheviks in the Russian revolution? In supporting Kerensky and joining his Ministry, the Mensheviks were also government socialists. Kautsky could not escape this

conclusion if he were to put the question as to which is the *ruling class* that is waging the imperialist war. But Kautsky avoids raising the question about the ruling class, a question that is imperative for a Marxist, for the mere raising of it would expose the renegade.

The Kautsky supporters in Germany, the Longuet supporters in France, and Turati and Co. in Italy argue in this way: socialism presupposes the equality and freedom of nations, their self-determination, *hence*, when our country is attacked, or when enemy troops invade our territory, it is the right and duty of socialists to defend their country. But theoretically such an argument is either a sheer mockery of socialism or a fraudulent subterfuge, while from the point of view of practical politics it coincides with the argument of the quite ignorant country yokel who has even no conception of the social, class character of the war, and of the tasks of a revolutionary party during a reactionary war.

Socialism is opposed to violence against nations. That is indisputable. But socialism is opposed to violence against men in general. Apart from Christian anarchists and Tolstoyans, however, no one has yet drawn the conclusion from this that socialism is opposed to *revolutionary* violence. So, to talk about "violence" in general, without examining the conditions which distinguish reactionary from revolutionary violence, means being a philistine who renounces revolution, or else it means simply deceiving oneself and others by sophistry.

The same holds true of violence against nations. Every war is violence against nations, but that does not prevent socialists from being *in favour* of a revolutionary war. The class character of war—that is the fundamental question which confronts a socialist (if he is not a renegade). The imperialist war of 1914-18 is a war between two groups of the imperialist bourgeoisie for the division of the world, for the division of the booty, and for the plunder and strangulation of small and weak nations. This was the appraisal of the impending war given in the Basle Manifesto in 1912, and it has been confirmed by the facts. Whoever departs from this view of war is not a socialist.

If a German under Wilhelm or a Frenchman under

Clemenceau says, "It is my right and duty as a socialist to defend my country if it is invaded by an enemy", he argues not like a socialist, not like an internationalist, not like a revolutionary proletarian, but like a *petty-bourgeois nationalist*. Because this argument ignores the revolutionary class struggle of the workers against capital, it ignores the appraisal of the war as a *whole* from the point of view of the world bourgeoisie and the world proletariat, that is, it ignores internationalism, and all that remains is miserable and narrow-minded nationalism. My country is being wronged, that is all I care about—that is what this argument amounts to, and that is where its petty-bourgeois, nationalist narrow-mindedness lies. It is the same as if in regard to individual violence, violence against an individual, one were to argue that socialism is opposed to violence and therefore I would rather be a traitor than go to prison.

The Frenchman, German or Italian who says: "Socialism is opposed to violence against nations, *therefore* I defend myself when my country is invaded", *betrays* socialism and internationalism, because such a man *sees only* his own "country", he puts "his own" . . . *bourgeoisie* above everything else and does not give a thought to the *international connections* which make the war an imperialist war and *his* bourgeoisie a link in the chain of imperialist plunder.

All philistines and all stupid and ignorant yokels argue in the same way as the renegade Kautsky supporters, Longuet supporters, Turati and Co.: "The enemy has invaded my country, I don't care about anything else."*

The socialist, the revolutionary proletarian, the internationalist, argues differently. He says: "The character of the war (whether it is reactionary or revolutionary) does not

* The social-chauvinists (the Scheidemanns, Renaudels, Hendersons, Gompers and Co.) absolutely refuse to talk about the "International" during the war. They regard the enemies of "their" respective bourgeoisies as "traitors" to . . . socialism. They support the policy of conquest pursued by *their* respective bourgeoisies. The social-pacifists (i.e., socialists in words and petty-bourgeois pacifists in practice) express all sorts of "internationalist" sentiments, protest against annexations, etc., but *in practice* they continue to support *their* respective imperialist bourgeoisies. The difference between the two types is unimportant; it is like the difference between two capitalists—one with bitter, and the other with sweet, words on his lips.

depend on who the attacker was, or in whose country the 'enemy' is stationed; it depends on *what class* is waging the war and on what politics this war is a continuation of. If the war is a reactionary, imperialist war, that is, if it is being waged by two world groups of the imperialist, rapacious, predatory, reactionary bourgeoisie, then every bourgeoisie (even of the smallest country) becomes a participant in the plunder, and my duty as a representative of the revolutionary proletariat is to prepare for the *world proletarian revolution* as the *only* escape from the horrors of a world slaughter. I must argue, not from the point of view of 'my' country (for that is the argument of a wretched, stupid, petty-bourgeois nationalist who does not realise that he is only a plaything in the hands of the imperialist bourgeoisie), but from the point of view of *my share* in the preparation, in the propaganda, and in the acceleration of the world proletarian revolution."

That is what internationalism means, and that is the duty of the internationalist, the revolutionary worker, the genuine socialist. That is the ABC that Kautsky the renegade has "forgotten." And his apostasy becomes still more obvious when he passes from approving the tactics of the petty-bourgeois nationalists (the Mensheviks in Russia, the Longuet supporters in France, the Turatis in Italy, and Haase and Co. in Germany) to criticising the Bolshevik tactics. Here is his criticism:

"The Bolshevik revolution was based on the assumption that it would become the starting-point of a general European revolution, that the bold initiative of Russia would prompt the proletarians of all Europe to rise.

"On this assumption it was, of course, immaterial what forms the Russian separate peace would take, what hardships and territorial losses (literally: mutilation or maiming, *Verstümmelungen*) it would cause the Russian people, and what interpretation of the self-determination of nations it would give. In that case it was also immaterial whether Russia was able to defend herself or not. According to this view, the European revolution would be the best protection of the Russian revolution, and would bring complete and genuine self-determination to all peoples inhabiting the former Russian territory.

"A revolution in Europe, which would establish and consolidate socialism there, would also become the means of removing the obstacles that would arise in Russia in the way of the introduction of the socialist system of production owing to the economic backwardness of the country.

"All this was very logical and very sound—only if the main assumption were granted, namely, that the Russian revolution would infallibly let loose a European revolution. But what if that did not happen?"

"So far the assumption has not been justified. And the proletarians of Europe are now being accused of having abandoned and betrayed the Russian revolution. This is an accusation levelled against unknown persons, for who is to be held responsible for the behaviour of the European proletariat?" (p. 28).

And Kautsky then goes on to explain at great length that Marx, Engels and Bebel were more than once mistaken about the advent of revolution they had anticipated, but that they never based their tactics on the expectation of a revolution "*at a definite date*" (p. 29), whereas, he says, the Bolsheviks "staked everything on one card, on a general European revolution".

We have deliberately quoted this long passage to demonstrate to our readers Kautsky's "skill" in counterfeiting Marxism by palming off his banal and reactionary philistine view in its stead.

First, to ascribe to an opponent an obviously stupid idea and then to refute it is a trick practised by none too clever people. If the Bolsheviks had based their tactics on the expectation of a revolution in other countries *by a definite date* that would have been an undeniable stupidity. But the Bolshevik Party has never been guilty of such stupidity. In my letter to American workers (August 20, 1918), I expressly disown this foolish idea by saying that we count on an American revolution, but not by any definite date. I dwelt at length upon the very same idea—more than once in my controversy with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and the "Left Communists"²⁵⁷ (January-March 1918). Kautsky has committed a slight . . . just a very slight forgery, on which he in fact based his criticism of Bolshevism. Kautsky has confused tactics based on the expectation of a European revolution in the more or less near future, but not at a definite date, with tactics based on the expectation of a European revolution at a definite date. A slight, just a very slight forgery!

The last-named tactics are foolish. The first-named *are obligatory* for a Marxist, for every revolutionary proletarian and internationalist—*obligatory*, because they alone take into account in a proper Marxist way the objective situation

brought about by the war in all European countries, and they alone conform to the international tasks of the proletariat.

By substituting the petty question about an error which the Bolshevik revolutionaries might have made, but did not, for the important question of the foundations of revolutionary tactics in general, Kautsky adroitly abjures all revolutionary tactics!

A renegade in politics, he is *unable even to present the question* of the objective prerequisites of revolutionary tactics theoretically.

And this brings us to the second point.

Secondly, it is obligatory for a Marxist to count on a European revolution if a *revolutionary situation* exists. It is the ABC of Marxism that the tactics of the socialist proletariat cannot be the same both when there is a revolutionary situation and when there is no revolutionary situation.

If Kautsky had put this question, which is obligatory for a Marxist, he would have seen that the answer was absolutely against him. Long before the war, all Marxists, all socialists were agreed that a European war would create a revolutionary situation. Kautsky himself, before he became a renegade, clearly and definitely recognised this—in 1902 (in his *Social Revolution*) and in 1909 (in his *Road to Power*). It was also admitted in the name of the entire Second International in the Basle Manifesto. No wonder the social-chauvinists and Kautsky supporters (the "Centrists", i.e., those who waver between the revolutionaries and the opportunists) of all countries shun like the plague the declarations of the Basle Manifesto on this score!

So, the expectation of a revolutionary situation in Europe was not an infatuation of the Bolsheviks, but the *general opinion* of all Marxists. When Kautsky tries to escape from this indisputable truth using such phrases as the Bolsheviks "always believed in the omnipotence of violence and will", he simply utters a sonorous and empty phrase to *cover up* his evasion, a shameful evasion, to put the question of a revolutionary situation.

To proceed. Has a revolutionary situation actually come or not? Kautsky proved unable to put this question either. The economic facts provide an answer: the famine and ruin

created everywhere by the war imply a revolutionary situation. The political facts also provide an answer: ever since 1915 a splitting process has been evident in *all* countries within the old and decayed socialist parties, a process of *departure of the mass* of the proletariat from the social-chauvinist leaders to the left, to revolutionary ideas and sentiments, to revolutionary leaders.

Only a person who dreads revolution and betrays it could have failed to see these facts on August 5, 1918, when Kautsky was writing his pamphlet. And now, at the end of October 1918, the revolution is growing *in a number* of European countries, and growing under everybody's eyes and very rapidly at that. Kautsky the "revolutionary", who still wants to be regarded as a Marxist, has proved to be a short-sighted philistine, who, like those philistines of 1847 whom Marx ridiculed, failed to see the approaching revolution!

Now to the third point.

Thirdly, what should be the specific features of revolutionary tactics when there is a revolutionary situation in Europe? Having become a renegade, Kautsky feared to put this question, which is obligatory for a Marxist. Kautsky argues like a typical petty bourgeois, a philistine, or like an ignorant peasant: has a "general European revolution" begun or not? If it has, then *he too* is prepared to become a revolutionary! But then, mark you, every scoundrel (like the scoundrels who now sometimes attach themselves to the victorious Bolsheviks) would proclaim himself a revolutionary!

If it has not, then Kautsky will turn his back on revolution! Kautsky does not display a shade of understanding of the truth that a revolutionary Marxist differs from the philistine and petty bourgeois by his ability to *preach* to the uneducated masses that the maturing revolution is necessary, to *prove* that it is inevitable, to *explain* its benefits to the people, and to *prepare* the proletariat and all the working and exploited people for it.

Kautsky ascribed to the Bolsheviks an absurdity, namely, that they had staked everything on one card, on a European revolution breaking out at a definite date. This absurdity has turned against Kautsky himself, because the logical

conclusion of his argument is that the tactics of the Bolsheviks would have been correct if a European revolution had broken out by August 5, 1918! That is the date Kautsky mentions as the time he was writing his pamphlet. And when, a few weeks after this August 5, it became clear that revolution was coming in a number of European countries, the whole apostasy of Kautsky, his whole falsification of Marxism, and his utter inability to reason or even to present questions in a revolutionary manner, became revealed in all their charm!

When the proletarians of Europe are accused of treachery, Kautsky writes, it is an accusation levelled at unknown persons.

You are mistaken, Mr. Kautsky! Look in the mirror and you will see those "unknown persons" against whom this accusation is levelled. Kautsky assumes an air of naïveté and pretends not to understand *who* levelled the accusation, and its *meaning*. In reality, however, Kautsky knows perfectly well that the accusation has been and is being levelled by the German "Lefts", by the Spartacists, by Liebknecht and his friends. This accusation expresses a *clear appreciation* of the fact that the German proletariat betrayed the Russian (and world) revolution when it strangled Finland, the Ukraine, Latvia and Estonia. This accusation is levelled primarily and above all, not against the *masses*, who are always downtrodden, but against those *leaders* who, like the Scheidemanns and the Kautskys, *failed* in their duty to carry on revolutionary agitation, revolutionary propaganda, revolutionary work among the masses to overcome their inertness, who in fact worked *against* the revolutionary instincts and aspirations which are always aglow deep down among the mass of the oppressed class. The Scheidemanns bluntly, crudely, cynically, and in most cases for selfish motives betrayed the proletariat and deserted to the side of the bourgeoisie. The Kautsky and the Longuet supporters did the same thing, only hesitatingly and haltingly, and casting cowardly side-glances at those who were stronger at the moment. In all his writings during the war Kautsky tried to *extinguish* the revolutionary spirit instead of fostering and fanning it.

The fact that Kautsky does not even understand the

enormous *theoretical* importance, and the even greater agitational and propaganda importance, of the "accusation" that the proletarians of Europe have betrayed the Russian revolution will remain a veritable historical monument to the philistine stupefaction of the "average" leader of German official Social-Democracy! Kautsky does not understand that, owing to the censorship prevailing in the German "Reich", this "accusation" is perhaps the only form in which the German socialists who have not betrayed socialism—Liebknecht and his friends—can express *their appeal to the German workers* to throw off the Scheidemanns and the Kautskys, to push aside such "leaders", to free themselves from their stultifying and debasing propaganda, to rise in revolt *in spite of them, without them, and march over their heads towards revolution!*

Kautsky does not understand this. And how could he understand the tactics of the Bolsheviks? Can a man who renounces revolution in general be expected to weigh and appraise the conditions of the development of revolution in one of the most "difficult" cases?

The Bolsheviks' tactics were correct; they were the *only* internationalist tactics, because they were based, not on the cowardly fear of a world revolution, not on a philistine "lack of faith" in it, not on the narrow nationalist desire to protect one's "own" fatherland (the fatherland of one's own bourgeoisie), while not "giving a damn" about all the rest, but on a correct (and, before the war and before the apostasy of the social-chauvinists and social-pacifists, a universally accepted) *estimation* of the revolutionary situation in Europe. These tactics were the only internationalist tactics, because they did the utmost possible in one country *for* the development, support and awakening of the revolution *in all countries*. These tactics have been justified by their enormous success, for Bolshevism (not by any means because of the merits of the Russian Bolsheviks, but because of the most profound sympathy of the *people* everywhere for tactics that are revolutionary in practice) has become *world* Bolshevism, has produced an idea, a theory, a programme and tactics which differ concretely and in practice from those of social-chauvinism and social-pacifism. Bolshevism *has given a coup de grace* to the old, decayed International

of the Scheidemanns and Kautskys, Renaudels and Longuets, Hendersons and MacDonalDs, who from now on will be treading on each other's feet, dreaming about "unity" and trying to revive a corpse. Bolshevism *has created* the ideological and tactical foundations of a Third International, of a really proletarian and Communist International, which will take into consideration both the gains of the tranquil epoch and the experience of the *epoch of revolutions, which has begun*.

Bolshevism has popularised throughout the world the idea of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", has translated these words from the Latin, first into Russian, and then into *all* the languages of the world, and has shown by the example of *Soviet government* that the workers and poor peasants, *even* of a backward country, even with the least experience, education and habits of organisation, *have been able* for a whole year, amidst gigantic difficulties and amidst a struggle against the exploiters (who were supported by the bourgeoisie of the *whole* world), to maintain the power of the working people, to create a democracy that is immeasurably higher and broader than all previous democracies in the world, and to *start* the creative work of tens of millions of workers and peasants for the practical construction of socialism.

Bolshevism has actually helped to develop the proletarian revolution in Europe and America more powerfully than any party in any other country has so far succeeded in doing. While the workers of the whole world are realising more and more clearly every day that the tactics of the Scheidemanns and Kautskys have not delivered them from the imperialist war and from wage-slavery to the imperialist bourgeoisie, and that these tactics cannot serve as a model for all countries, the mass of workers in all countries are realising more and more clearly every day that Bolshevism has indicated the right road of escape from the horrors of war and imperialism, that Bolshevism *can serve as a model of tactics for all*.

Not only the general European, but the world proletarian revolution is maturing before the eyes of all, and it has been assisted, accelerated and supported by the victory of the proletariat in Russia. All this is not enough for the

complete victory of socialism, you say? Of course it is not enough. One country alone cannot do more. But this one country, thanks to Soviet government, has done so much that even if Soviet government in Russia were to be crushed by world imperialism tomorrow, as a result, let us say, of an agreement between German and Anglo-French imperialism—even granted that very worst possibility—it would still be found that Bolshevik tactics have brought enormous benefit to socialism and have assisted the growth of the invincible world revolution.

SUBSERVIENCE TO THE BOURGEOISIE
IN THE GUISE OF "ECONOMIC ANALYSIS"

As has already been said, if the title of Kautsky's book were properly to reflect its contents, it should have been called, not *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, but *A Rehash of Bourgeois Attacks on the Bolsheviks*.

The old Menshevik "theories" about the bourgeois character of the Russian revolution, i.e., the old distortion of Marxism by the Mensheviks (*rejected* by Kautsky in 1905!), are now once again being rehashed by our theoretician. We must deal with this question, however boring it may be for Russian Marxists.

The Russian revolution is a bourgeois revolution, said all the Marxists of Russia before 1905. The Mensheviks, substituting liberalism for Marxism, drew the following conclusion from this: the proletariat therefore must not go beyond what is acceptable to the bourgeoisie and must pursue a policy of compromise with them. The Bolsheviks said this was a bourgeois-liberal theory. The bourgeoisie were trying to bring about the reform of the state on bourgeois, *reformist*, not revolutionary lines, while preserving the monarchy, the landlord system, etc., as far as possible. The proletariat must carry through the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the end, not allowing itself to be "bound" by the reformism of the bourgeoisie. The Bolsheviks formulated the alignment of *class* forces in the bourgeois revolution as follows: the proletariat, winning over the peasants, will neutralise the liberal bourgeoisie and utterly destroy the monarchy, medievalism and the landlord system.

It is the alliance between the proletariat and the peasants *in general* that reveals the bourgeois character of the revolution, for the peasants in general are small producers who exist on the basis of commodity production. Further, the Bolsheviks then added, the proletariat will win over *the entire semi-proletariat* (all the working and exploited people), will neutralise the middle peasants and *overthrow* the bourgeoisie; this will be a socialist revolution, as distinct from a bourgeois-democratic revolution. (See my pamphlet *Two Tactics*, published in 1905 and reprinted in *Twelve Years*, St. Petersburg, 1907.)

Kautsky took an indirect part in this controversy in 1905, when, in reply to an inquiry by the then Menshevik Plekhanov, he expressed an opinion that was essentially *against* Plekhanov, which provoked particular ridicule in the Bolshevik press at the time. But now Kautsky does *not* say a *single word* about the controversies of that time (for fear of being exposed by his own statements!), and thereby makes it utterly impossible for the German reader to understand the essence of the matter. Mr. Kautsky *could not* tell the German workers in 1918 that in 1905 he had been in favour of an alliance of the workers with the peasants and not with the liberal bourgeoisie, and on what conditions he had advocated this alliance, and what programme he had outlined for it.

Backing out from his old position, Kautsky, under the guise of an "economic analysis", and talking proudly about "historical materialism", now advocates the subordination of the workers to the bourgeoisie, and, with the aid of quotations from the Menshevik Maslov, chews over the old liberal views of the Mensheviks. Quotations are used to prove the new idea of the backwardness of Russia. But the deduction drawn from this new idea is the old one, that in a bourgeois revolution one must not go farther than the bourgeoisie! And this in spite of all that Marx and Engels said when comparing the bourgeois revolution of 1789-93 in France with the bourgeois revolution of 1848 in Germany!²⁵⁸

Before passing to the chief "argument" and the main content of Kautsky's "economic analysis", let us note that Kautsky's very first sentences reveal a curious confusion, or superficiality, of thought.

"Agriculture, and specifically small peasant farming," our "theoretician" announces, "to this day represents the economic foundation of Russia. About four-fifths, perhaps even five-sixths, of the population live by it" (p. 45). First of all, my dear theoretician, have you considered how many exploiters there may be among this mass of small producers? Certainly not more than one-tenth of the total, and in the towns still less, for there large-scale production is more highly developed. Take even an incredibly high figure; assume that one-fifth of the small producers are exploiters who are deprived of the franchise. Even then you will find that the 66 per cent of the votes held by the Bolsheviks at the Fifth Congress of Soviets represented the *majority of the population*. To this it must be added that there was always a considerable section of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries who were in favour of Soviet power—in principle *all* the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries were in favour of Soviet power, and when a section of them, in July 1918, started an adventurous revolt, two new parties split away from the old party, namely, the "Narodnik Communists" and the "Revolutionary Communists"²⁵⁹ (of the prominent Left Socialist-Revolutionaries who had been nominated for important posts in the government by the old party; to the first-mentioned belongs Zax, for instance, and to the second Kolegayev). So, Kautsky has himself—inadvertently—refuted the ridiculous fable that the Bolsheviks only have the backing of a minority of the population.

Secondly, my dear theoretician, have you considered the fact that the small peasant producer *inevitably* vacillates between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie? This Marxist truth, which has been confirmed by the whole modern history of Europe, Kautsky very conveniently "forgot", for it simply demolishes the Menshevik "theory" that he keeps repeating! Had Kautsky not "forgotten" this he could not have denied the need for a proletarian dictatorship in a country in which the small peasant producers predominate.

Let us examine the main content of our theoretician's "economic analysis".

That Soviet power is a dictatorship cannot be disputed, says Kautsky. "But is it a dictatorship of *the proletariat?*" (p. 34).

"According to the Soviet Constitution, the peasants form the majority of the population entitled to participate in legislation and administration. What is presented to us as a dictatorship of the *proletariat* would prove to be—if carried out consistently, and if, generally speaking, a class could directly exercise a dictatorship, which in reality can only be exercised by a party—a dictatorship of *the peasants*" (p. 35).

And, highly elated over so profound and clever an argument, our good Kautsky tries to be witty and says: "It would appear, therefore, that the most painless achievement of socialism is best assured when it is put in the hands of the peasants" (p. 35).

In the greatest detail, and citing a number of extremely learned quotations from the semi-liberal Maslov, our theoretician labours to prove the new idea that the peasants are interested in high grain prices, in low wages for the urban workers, etc., etc. Incidentally, the enunciation of these new ideas is the more tedious the less attention our author pays to the really new features of the post-war period—for example, that the peasants demand for their grain, not money, but goods, and that they have not enough agricultural implements, which cannot be obtained in sufficient quantities for any amount of money. But more of this later.

Thus, Kautsky charges the Bolsheviks, the party of the proletariat, with having surrendered the dictatorship, the work of achieving socialism, to the petty-bourgeois peasants. Excellent, Mr. Kautsky! But what, in your enlightened opinion, should have been the attitude of the proletarian party towards the petty-bourgeois peasants?

Our theoretician preferred to say nothing on this score—evidently bearing in mind the proverb: "Speech is silver, silence is gold." But he gives himself away by the following argument:

"At the beginning of the Soviet Republic, the peasants' Soviets were organisations of the *peasants* in general. Now this Republic proclaims that the Soviets are organisations of the proletarians and the *poor* peasants. The well-to-do peasants are deprived of the suffrage in the elections to the Soviets. The poor peasant is here recognised to be a permanent and mass product of the socialist agrarian reform under the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' " (p. 48).

What deadly irony! It is the kind that may be heard in Russia from any bourgeois: they all jeer and gloat over the fact that the Soviet Republic openly admits the existence of poor

peasants. They ridicule socialism. That is their right. But a "socialist" who jeers at the fact that after four years of a most ruinous war there remain (and will remain for a long time) poor peasants in Russia—such a "socialist" could only have been born at a time of wholesale apostasy.

And further:

"... The Soviet Republic interferes in the relations between the rich and poor peasants, but not by redistributing the land. In order to relieve the bread shortage in the towns, detachments of armed workers are sent into the countryside to take away the rich peasants' surplus stocks of grain. Part of that stock is given to the urban population, the other—to the poorer peasants" (p. 48).

Of course, Kautsky the socialist and Marxist is profoundly indignant at the idea that such a measure should be extended beyond the environs of the large towns (and we have extended it to the whole of the country). With the matchless, incomparable and admirable coolness (or pigheadedness) of a philistine, Kautsky the socialist and Marxist sermonises: "... It [the expropriation of the well-to-do peasants] introduces a new element of unrest and civil war into the process of production"... (civil war introduced into the "process of production"—that is something supernatural!) ... "which stands in urgent need of peace and security for its recovery" (p. 49).

Oh, yes, of course, Kautsky the Marxist and socialist must sigh and shed tears over the subject of peace and security for the exploiters and grain profiteers who hoard their surplus stocks, sabotage the grain monopoly law, and reduce the urban population to famine. "We are all socialists and Marxists and internationalists," the Kautskys, Heinrich Webers (Vienna), Longuets (Paris), MacDonalds (London), etc., sing in chorus. "We are all in favour of a working-class revolution. Only ... only we would like a revolution that does not infringe upon the peace and security of the grain profiteers! And we camouflage this sordid subservience to the capitalists by a 'Marxist' reference to the 'process of production'..." If this is Marxism, what is servility to the bourgeoisie?

Just see what our theoretician arrives at. He accuses the Bolsheviks of presenting the dictatorship of the peasants as the dictatorship of the proletariat. But at the same time he accuses us of introducing civil war into the rural districts (which we think is to our *credit*), of dispatching into the

countryside armed detachments of workers, who publicly proclaim that they are exercising the "dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasants", assist the latter and confiscate from the profiteers and the rich peasants the surplus stocks of grain which they are hoarding in contravention of the grain monopoly law.

On the one hand, our Marxist theoretician stands for pure democracy, for the subordination of the revolutionary class, the leader of the working and exploited people, to the majority of the population (including, therefore, the exploiters). On the other hand, as an argument *against* us, he explains that the revolution must inevitably bear a bourgeois character—bourgeois, because the life of the peasants as a whole is based on bourgeois social relations—and at the same time he pretends to uphold the proletarian, class, Marxist point of view!

Instead of an "economic analysis" we have a first-class hodge-podge. Instead of Marxism we have fragments of liberal doctrines and the preaching of servility to the bourgeoisie and the kulaks.

The question which Kautsky has so tangled up was fully explained by the Bolsheviki as far back as 1905. Yes, our revolution is a bourgeois revolution *as long* as we march *with* the peasants *as a whole*. This has been as clear as clear can be to us; we have said it hundreds and thousands of times since 1905, and we have never attempted to skip this necessary stage of the historical process or abolish it by decrees. Kautsky's efforts to "expose" us on this point merely expose his own confusion of mind and his fear to recall what he wrote in 1905, when he was not yet a renegade.

Beginning with *April* 1917, however, long before the October Revolution, that is, long before we assumed power, we publicly declared and explained to the people: the revolution cannot now stop at this stage, for the country has marched forward, capitalism has advanced, ruin has reached fantastic dimensions, which (whether one likes it or not) *will demand* steps forward, *to socialism*. For there is *no* other way of advancing, of saving the war-weary country and of *alleviating* the sufferings of the working and exploited people.

Things have turned out just as we said they would. The course taken by the revolution has confirmed the correctness of our reasoning. *First*, with the "whole" of the peasants

against the monarchy, against the landowners, against medievalism (and to that extent the revolution remains bourgeois, bourgeois-democratic). Then, with the poor peasants, with the semi-proletarians, with all the exploited, *against capitalism*, including the rural rich, the kulaks, the profiteers, and to that extent the revolution becomes a *socialist* one. To attempt to raise an artificial Chinese Wall between the first and second, to separate them *by anything else* than the degree of preparedness of the proletariat and the degree of its unity with the poor peasants, means to distort Marxism dreadfully, to vulgarise it, to substitute liberalism in its place. It means smuggling in a reactionary defence of the bourgeoisie against the socialist proletariat by means of quasi-scientific references to the progressive character of the bourgeoisie in comparison with medievalism.

Incidentally, the Soviets represent an immensely higher form and type of democracy just because, by uniting and drawing the *mass of workers and peasants* into political life, they serve as a most sensitive barometer, the one closest to the "people" (in the sense in which Marx, in 1871, spoke of a real people's revolution), of the growth and development of the political, class maturity of the people. The Soviet Constitution was not drawn up according to some "plan"; it was not drawn up in a study, and was not foisted on the working people by bourgeois lawyers. No, this Constitution *grew up* in the course of the development of *the class struggle* in proportion as *class antagonisms* matured. The very facts which Kautsky himself has to admit prove this.

At first, the Soviets embraced the peasants as a whole. It was owing to the immaturity, the backwardness, the ignorance of the poor peasants that the leadership passed into the hands of the kulaks, the rich, the capitalists and the petty-bourgeois intellectuals. That was the period of the domination of the petty bourgeoisie, of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries (only fools or renegades like Kautsky can regard either of these as socialists). The petty bourgeoisie inevitably and unavoidably vacillated between the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie (Kerensky, Kornilov, Savinkov) and the dictatorship of the proletariat; for owing to the basic features of its economic position, the petty bourgeoisie is incapable of doing anything independently. Kautsky, by the

way, completely renounces Marxism by confining himself in his analysis of the Russian revolution to the legal and formal concept of "democracy", which serves the bourgeoisie as a screen to conceal their domination and as a means of deceiving the people, and by *forgetting* that in practice "democracy" sometimes stands for the *dictatorship of the bourgeoisie*, sometimes for the impotent reformism of the petty bourgeoisie who submit to that dictatorship, and so on. According to Kautsky, in a capitalist country there were bourgeois parties and there was a proletarian party (the Bolsheviks), which led the majority, the mass of the proletariat, but *there were no petty-bourgeois parties!* The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had no *class roots*, no petty-bourgeois roots!

The vacillations of the petty bourgeoisie, of the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, helped to enlighten the people and to repel the overwhelming majority of them, all the "lower sections", all the proletarians and semi-proletarians, from such "leaders". The Bolsheviks won predominance in the Soviets (in Petrograd and Moscow by October 1917); the split among the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks became more pronounced.

The victorious Bolshevik revolution meant the end of vacillation, meant the complete destruction of the monarchy and of the landlord system (which had *not* been destroyed before the October Revolution). We carried the *bourgeois* revolution to its *conclusion*. The peasants supported us *as a whole*. Their antagonism to the socialist proletariat could not reveal itself all at once. The Soviets united the peasants *in general*. The class divisions among the peasants had not yet matured, had not yet come into the open.

That process took place in the summer and autumn of 1918. The Czech counter-revolutionary mutiny roused the kulaks. A wave of kulak revolts swept over Russia. The poor peasants learned, not from books or newspapers, *but from life itself*, that their interests were irreconcilably antagonistic to those of the kulaks, the rich, the rural bourgeoisie. Like every other petty-bourgeois party, the "Left Socialist-Revolutionaries" reflected the vacillation of the people, and in the summer of 1918 they split: one section joined forces with the Czechs (the rebellion in Moscow, when Prosyanyan, having seized the Telegraph Office—for one

hour!—announced to Russia that the Bolsheviks had been overthrown; then the treachery of Muravyov, Commander-in-Chief of the army that was fighting the Czechs, etc.), while the other section, that mentioned above, remained with the Bolsheviks.

The growing food shortage in the towns lent increasing urgency to the question of the grain monopoly (this Kautsky the theoretician completely "forgot" in his economic analysis, which is a mere repetition of platitudes gleaned ten years ago from Maslov's writings!).

The old landowner and bourgeois, and even democratic-republican, state had sent to the rural districts armed detachments which were practically at the beck and call of the bourgeoisie. Mr. Kautsky does not know this! He does not regard that as the "dictatorship of the bourgeoisie"—Heaven forbid! That is "pure democracy", especially if endorsed by a bourgeois parliament! Nor has Kautsky "heard" that, in the summer and autumn of 1917, Avksentyev and S. Maslov, in company with the Kerenskys, the Tseretelis and other Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, arrested members of the Land Committees; he does not say a word about that!

The whole point is that a bourgeois state which is exercising the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie through a democratic republic cannot confess to the people that it is serving the bourgeoisie; it cannot tell the truth, and has to play the hypocrite.

But the state of the Paris Commune type, the Soviet state, openly and frankly tells the people the *truth* and declares that it is the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasants; and by this truth it wins over scores and scores of millions of new citizens who are kept down in any democratic republic, but who are drawn by the Soviets into political life, *into democracy*, into the administration of the state. The Soviet Republic sends into the rural districts detachments of armed workers, primarily the more advanced, from the capitals. These workers carry socialism into the countryside, win over the poor, organise and enlighten them, and help them to *suppress the resistance of the bourgeoisie*.

All who are familiar with the situation and have been in the rural districts declare that it is only now, in the summer and autumn of 1918, that the rural districts *themselves* are

passing through the "October" (i.e., proletarian) Revolution. Things are beginning to change. The wave of kulak revolts is giving way to a rise of the poor, to a growth of the "Poor Peasants' Committees".²⁶⁰ In the army, the number of workers who become commissars, officers and commanders of divisions and armies is increasing. And at the very time that the simple-minded Kautsky, frightened by the July (1918) crisis²⁶¹ and the lamentations of the bourgeoisie, was running after the latter like a cockerel, and writing a whole pamphlet breathing the conviction that the Bolsheviki are on the eve of being overthrown by the peasants; at the very time that this simpleton regarded the secession of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries as a "narrowing" (p. 37) of the circle of those who support the Bolsheviki—at that very time the *real* circle of supporters of Bolshevism was *expanding enormously*, because scores and scores of millions of the village poor were freeing themselves from the tutelage and influence of the kulaks and village bourgeoisie and were awakening to *independent* political life.

We have lost hundreds of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, spineless intellectuals and kulaks from among the peasants; but we have gained millions of poor people.*

A year after the proletarian revolution in the capitals, and under its influence and with its assistance, the proletarian revolution began in the remote rural districts, and it has finally consolidated the power of the Soviets and Bolshevism, and has finally proved there is no force in the country that can withstand it.

Having completed the bourgeois-democratic revolution in alliance with the peasants as a whole, the Russian proletariat finally passed on to the socialist revolution when it succeeded in splitting the rural population, in winning over the rural proletarians and semi-proletarians, and in uniting them against the kulaks and the bourgeoisie, including the peasant bourgeoisie.

Now, if the Bolshevik proletariat in the capitals and large industrial centres had not been able to rally the village

* At the Sixth Congress of Soviets (November 6-9, 1918), there were 967 voting delegates, 950 of whom were Bolsheviks, and 351 delegates with voice but no vote, of whom 335 were Bolsheviks, i.e., 97 per cent of the total number of delegates were Bolsheviks,

poor around itself against the rich peasants, this would indeed have proved that Russia was "unripe" for socialist revolution. The peasants would then have remained an "integral whole", i.e., they would have remained under the economic, political, and moral leadership of the kulaks, the rich, the bourgeoisie, and the revolution would not have passed beyond the limits of a bourgeois-democratic revolution. (But, let it be said in parenthesis, even if this had been the case, it would not have proved that the proletariat should not have taken power, for it is the proletariat alone that has really carried the bourgeois-democratic revolution to its conclusion, it is the proletariat alone that has done something really important to bring nearer the world proletarian revolution, and the proletariat alone that has created the Soviet state, which, after the Paris Commune, is the second step towards the socialist state.)

On the other hand, if the Bolshevik proletariat had tried at once, in October-November 1917, without waiting for the class differentiation in the rural districts, without being able to *prepare* it and bring it about, to "decree" a civil war or the "introduction of socialism" in the rural districts, had tried to do without a temporary bloc with the peasants in general, without making a number of concessions to the middle peasants, etc., that would have been a *Blanquist* distortion of Marxism, an attempt by the *minority* to impose its will upon the majority; it would have been a theoretical absurdity, revealing a failure to understand that a general peasant revolution is *still* a bourgeois revolution, and that *without a series of transitions, of transitional stages*, it cannot be transformed into a socialist revolution in a backward country.

Kautsky has confused *everything* in this very important theoretical and political problem, and has, in practice, proved to be nothing but a servant of the bourgeoisie, howling against the dictatorship of the proletariat.

* * *

Kautsky has introduced a similar, if not greater, confusion into another extremely interesting and important question, namely: was the *legislative* activity of the Soviet

Republic in the sphere of agrarian reform—that most difficult and yet most important of socialist reforms—based on sound principles and then properly carried out? We should be boundlessly grateful to any West-European Marxist who, after studying at least the most important documents, gave a *criticism* of our policy, because he would thereby help us immensely, and would also help the revolution that is maturing throughout the world. But instead of criticism Kautsky produces an incredible theoretical muddle, which converts Marxism into liberalism and which, in practice, is a series of idle, venomous, vulgar sallies against the Bolsheviks. Let the reader judge for himself:

“Large landed estates could not be preserved. This was a result of the revolution. That was at once clear. The transfer of the large estates to the peasant population became inevitable. . . .” (That is not true, Mr. Kautsky. You substitute what is “clear” to you for the attitude of the different *classes* towards the question. The history of the revolution has shown that the coalition government of the bourgeois and the petty bourgeois, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, pursued a policy of preserving big landownership. This was proved particularly by S. Maslov’s bill and by the arrest of the members of the Land Committees.²⁶² Without the dictatorship of the proletariat, the “peasant population” would not have vanquished the landowners, who had joined forces with the capitalists.)

“. . . But as to the forms in which it was to take place, there was no unity. Various solutions were conceivable. . . .” (Kautsky is most of all concerned about the “unity” of the “socialists”, no matter who called themselves by that name. He forgets that the principal classes in capitalist society are bound to arrive at different solutions.) “. . . From the socialist point of view, the most rational solution would have been to convert the large estates into state property and to allow the peasants who hitherto had been employed on them as wage-labourers to cultivate them in the form of co-operative societies. But such a solution presupposes the existence of a type of farm labourer that did not exist in Russia. Another solution would have been to convert the large estates into state property and to divide them up into small plots to be rented out to peasants who owned little

land. Had that been done, at least something socialistic would have been achieved. . . ."

As usual Kautsky confines himself to the celebrated: on the one hand it cannot but be admitted, and on the other hand it must be confessed. He places different solutions *side by side* without a thought—the only realistic and Marxist thought—as to what must be the *transitional stages* from capitalism to communism in such-and-such *specific* conditions. There are farm labourers in Russia, but not many; and Kautsky did not touch on the question—which the Soviet government *did raise*—of the method of transition to a communal and co-operative form of land cultivation. The most curious thing, however, is that Kautsky claims to see "something socialistic" in the renting out of small plots of land. In reality, this is a *petty-bourgeois* slogan, and there is *nothing* "socialistic" in it. If the "state" that rents out the land is *not* a state of the Paris Commune type, but a parliamentary bourgeois republic (and that is exactly Kautsky's constant assumption), the renting of land in small plots is a typical *liberal reform*.

Kautsky says nothing about the Soviet government having abolished *all* private ownership of land. Worse than that: he resorts to an incredible forgery and quotes the decrees of the Soviet government in such a way as to omit the most essential.

After stating that "small production strives for complete private ownership of the means of production", and that the Constituent Assembly would have been the "only authority" capable of preventing the dividing up of the land (an assertion which will evoke laughter in Russia, where everybody knows that the Soviets *alone* are recognised as authoritative by the workers and peasants, while the Constituent Assembly has become the slogan of the Czechs and the landowners), Kautsky continues:

"One of the first decrees of the Soviet Government declared that: (1) Landed proprietorship is abolished forthwith without any compensation. (2) The landed estates, as also all crown, monastery and church lands, with all their livestock, implements, buildings and everything pertaining thereto, shall be placed at the disposal of the volost Land Committees of the uyezd Soviets of Peasants' Deputies pending the settlement of the land question by the Constituent Assembly."

Having quoted *only these two clauses*, Kautsky concludes:

"The reference to the Constituent Assembly has remained a dead letter. In point of fact, the peasants in the separate volosts could do as they pleased with the land" (p. 47).

Here you have an example of Kautsky's "criticism"! Here you have a "scientific" work which is more like a fraud. The German reader is induced to believe that the Bolsheviks capitulated before the peasants on the question of private ownership of land, that the Bolsheviks permitted the peasants to act locally ("in the separate volosts") in whatever way they pleased!

But in reality, the decree Kautsky quotes—the first to be promulgated, on October 26, 1917 (old style)—consists not of two, but of five clauses, *plus* eight clauses of the Mandate,²⁶³ which, it was expressly stated, "shall serve as a guide".

Clause 3 of the decree states that the estates are transferred "*to the people*", and the "exact inventories of all property confiscated" shall be drawn up and the property "protected in the strictest revolutionary way". And the Mandate declares that "private ownership of land shall be abolished for ever", that "lands on which high-level scientific farming is practised... *shall not be divided up*", that "all livestock and farm implements of the confiscated estates shall pass into the exclusive use of the state or a commune, depending on size and importance, and no compensation shall be paid for this", and that "all land shall become part of the national land fund".

Further, simultaneously with the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly (January 5, 1918), the Third Congress of Soviets adopted the *Declaration of Rights* of the Working and Exploited People, which now forms part of the Fundamental Law of the Soviet Republic. Article 2, paragraph 1 of this Declaration states that "private ownership of land is hereby abolished", and that "model estates and agricultural enterprises are proclaimed national property".

So, the reference to the Constituent Assembly did *not* remain a dead letter, because another national representative body, immeasurably more authoritative in the eyes of the peasants, took upon itself the solution of the agrarian problem.

Again, on February 6 (19), 1918, the land socialisation law was promulgated, which once more confirmed the abolition of all private ownership of land, and placed the land and *all private* stock and implements at the disposal of the Soviet authorities *under the control of the federal Soviet government*. Among the duties connected with the disposal of the land, the law prescribed:

"the development of collective farming as more advantageous from the point of view of economy of labour and produce, at the expense of individual farming, with a view to transition to socialist farming" (Article 11, paragraph e).

The same law, in establishing the principle of *equal* land tenure, replied to the fundamental question: "Who has a right to the use of the land?" in the following manner:

(Article 20.) "Plots of land surface within the borders of the Russian Soviet Federative Republic may be used for public and private needs. A. For cultural and educational purposes: (1) by the state as represented by the organs of Soviet power (federal, as well as in regions, gubernias, uyezds, volosts, and villages), and (2) by public bodies (under the control, and with the permission, of the local Soviet authorities); B. For agricultural purposes: (3) by agricultural communes, (4) by agricultural co-operative societies, (5) by village communities, (6) by individual families and persons. . . ."

The reader will see that Kautsky has completely distorted the facts, and has given the German reader an absolutely false view of the agrarian policy and agrarian legislation of the proletarian state in Russia.

Kautsky proved even unable to formulate the theoretically important fundamental questions!

These questions are:

- (1) Equal land tenure and
- (2) Nationalisation of the land—the relation of these two measures to socialism in general, and to the transition from capitalism to communism in particular.
- (3) Farming in common as a transition from small scattered farming to large-scale collective farming; does the manner in which this question is dealt with in Soviet legislation meet the requirements of socialism?

On the first question it is necessary, first of all, to establish the following two fundamental facts: (a) in reviewing the experience of 1905 (I may refer, for instance, to my work on the agrarian problem in the First Russian Revolu-

tion), the Bolsheviks pointed to the democratically progressive, the democratically revolutionary meaning of the slogan "equal land tenure", and in 1917, *before* the October Revolution, they spoke of this quite definitely; (b) when enforcing the land socialisation law—the "spirit" of which is equal land tenure—the Bolsheviks most explicitly and definitely declared: this is not our idea, we do not agree with this slogan, but we think it our duty to enforce it because this is the demand of the overwhelming majority of the peasants. And the idea and demands of the majority of the working people are things that the working people must *discard of their own accord*: such demands cannot be either "abolished" or "skipped over". We Bolsheviks shall *help* the peasants to discard petty-bourgeois slogans, to *pass* from them as quickly and as easily as possible to socialist slogans.

A Marxist theoretician who wanted to help the working-class revolution by his scientific analysis should have answered the following questions: first, is it true that the idea of equal land tenure has a democratically revolutionary meaning of carrying the *bourgeois*-democratic revolution to its conclusion? Secondly, did the Bolsheviks act rightly in helping to pass by their votes (and in most loyally observing) the petty-bourgeois equal land tenure law?

Kautsky failed even to *perceive* what, theoretically, was the crux of the problem!

Kautsky will never be able to refute the view that the idea of equal land tenure has a progressive and revolutionary value in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. Such a revolution cannot go beyond this. By reaching its limit, it *all the more clearly, rapidly and easily* reveals to the people the *inadequacy* of bourgeois-democratic solutions and the necessity of proceeding beyond their limits, of passing on to *socialism*.

The peasants, who have overthrown tsarism and the landowners, dream of equal land tenure, and no power on earth could have stopped the peasants, once they had been freed both from the landowners and from the *bourgeois* parliamentary republican state. The workers say to the peasants: We shall help you reach "ideal" capitalism, for equal land tenure is the idealisation of capitalism by the small pro-

ducer. At the same time we shall prove to you its inadequacy and the necessity of passing to farming in common.

It would be interesting to see Kautsky's attempt to disprove that *this kind* of leadership of the peasant struggle by the proletariat was right.

Kautsky, however, preferred to evade the question altogether. . . .

Next, Kautsky deliberately deceived his German readers by withholding from them the fact that in its land *law* the Soviet government gave *direct* preference to communes and co-operative societies.

With all the peasants right through to the end of the bourgeois-democratic revolution; and with the poor, the proletarian and semi-proletarian section of the peasants, forward to the socialist revolution! That has been the policy of the Bolsheviks, and it is the only Marxist policy.

But Kautsky is all muddled and incapable of formulating a single question! On the one hand, he *dare not* say that the workers should have parted company with the peasants over the question of equal land tenure, for he realises that it would have been absurd (and, moreover, in 1905, when he was not yet a renegade, he himself clearly and explicitly advocated an alliance between the workers and peasants as a condition for the victory of the revolution). On the other hand, he sympathetically quotes the liberal platitudes of the Menshevik Maslov, who "proves" that petty-bourgeois equal land tenure is utopian and reactionary *from the point of view of socialism*, but hushes up the progressive and revolutionary character of the petty-bourgeois struggle for equality and equal tenure *from the point of view of the bourgeois-democratic revolution*.

Kautsky is in a hopeless muddle: note that he (in 1918) *insists* on the *bourgeois* character of the Russian revolution. He (in 1918) peremptorily says: Don't go beyond these limits! Yet this very same Kautsky sees "something *socialistic*" (for a *bourgeois* revolution) in the *petty-bourgeois* reform of renting out small plots of land to the *poor* peasants (which is an approximation to equal land tenure)!

Understand this if you can!

In addition to all this, Kautsky displays a philistine inability to take into account the real policy of a definite party.

He quotes the empty *phrases* of the Menshevik Maslov and *refuses to see the real policy* the Menshevik Party pursued in 1917, when, in "coalition" with the landowners and Cadets, they advocated what was virtually a *liberal agrarian reform and compromise with the landowners* (proof: the arrest of the members of the Land Committees and S. Maslov's land bill).

Kautsky failed to notice that P. Maslov's phrases about the reactionary and utopian character of petty-bourgeois equality are really a screen to conceal the Menshevik policy of *compromise* between the peasants and the landowners (i.e., of supporting the landowners in duping the peasants), instead of the *revolutionary* overthrow of the landowners by the peasants.

What a "Marxist" Kautsky is!

It was the Bolsheviki who strictly differentiated between the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the socialist revolution: by carrying the former through, they opened the door for the transition to the latter. This was the only policy that was revolutionary and Marxist.

It would have been wiser for Kautsky not to repeat the feeble liberal witticism: "Never yet have the small peasants anywhere adopted collective farming under the influence of theoretical convictions" (p. 50).

How very smart!

But never as yet and nowhere have the small peasants of any large country been under the influence of a proletarian state.

Never as yet and nowhere have the small peasants engaged in an open class struggle reaching the extent of a civil war between the poor peasants and the rich peasants, *with* propagandist, political, economic and military support given to the poor by a proletarian state.

Never as yet and nowhere have the profiteers and the rich amassed such wealth out of war, while the mass of peasants have been so utterly ruined.

Kautsky just reiterates the old stuff, he just chews the old cud, afraid even to give thought to the new tasks of the proletarian dictatorship.

But what, dear Kautsky, if the peasants *lack* implements for small-scale farming and the proletarian state *helps* them

to obtain machines for collective farming—is that a “theoretical conviction”?

We shall now pass to the question of nationalisation of the land. Our Narodniks, including all the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, deny that the measure we have adopted is nationalisation of the land. They are wrong in theory. Insofar as we remain within the framework of commodity production and capitalism, the abolition of private ownership of land is nationalisation of the land. The term “socialisation” merely expresses a tendency, a desire, the preparation for the transition to socialism.

What should be the attitude of Marxists towards nationalisation of the land?

Here, too, Kautsky fails even to formulate the theoretical question, or, which is still worse, he deliberately evades it, although one knows from Russian literature that Kautsky is aware of the old controversies among the Russian Marxists on the question of nationalisation, municipalisation (i.e., the transfer of the large estates to the local self-government authorities), or division of the land.

Kautsky's assertion that to transfer the large estates to the state and rent them out in small plots to peasants who own little land would be achieving “something socialistic” is a downright mockery of Marxism. We have already shown that there is nothing socialistic about it. But that is not all; it would not even be carrying the *bourgeois-democratic* revolution to its conclusion. Kautsky's great misfortune is that he placed his trust in the Mensheviks. Hence the curious position that while insisting on our revolution having a bourgeois character and reproaching the Bolsheviks for taking it into their heads to proceed to socialism, he *himself* proposes a liberal reform under the guise of socialism, *without carrying this reform* to the point of completely clearing away all the survivals of medievalism in agrarian relations! The arguments of Kautsky, as of his Menshevik advisers, amount to a defence of the liberal bourgeoisie, who fear revolution, instead of defence of consistent bourgeois-democratic revolution.

Indeed, why should only the large estates, and not all the land, be converted into state property? The liberal bourgeoisie thereby achieve the maximum preservation of the

old conditions (i.e., the least consistency in revolution) and the maximum facility for a reversion to the old conditions. The radical bourgeoisie, i.e., the bourgeoisie that want to carry the bourgeois revolution to its conclusion, put forward the slogan of *nationalisation of the land*.

Kautsky, who in the dim and distant past, some twenty years ago, wrote an excellent Marxist work on the agrarian question, cannot but know that Marx declared that land nationalisation is in fact a *consistent* slogan of the *bourgeoisie*. Kautsky cannot but be aware of Marx's controversy with Rodbertus, and Marx's remarkable passages in his *Theories of Surplus Value* where the revolutionary significance—in the bourgeois-democratic sense—of land nationalisation is explained with particular clarity.

The Menshevik P. Maslov, whom Kautsky, unfortunately for himself, chose as an adviser, denied that the Russian peasants would agree to the nationalisation of all the land (including the peasants' lands). To a certain extent, this view of Maslov's could be connected with his "original" theory (which merely parrots the bourgeois critics of Marx), namely, his repudiation of absolute rent and his recognition of the "law" (or "fact", as Maslov expressed it) "of diminishing returns".

In point of fact, however, already the 1905 Revolution revealed that the vast majority of the peasants in Russia, members of village communes as well as homestead peasants, were in favour of nationalisation of all the land. The 1917 Revolution confirmed this, and after the assumption of power by the proletariat this was done. The Bolsheviks remained loyal to Marxism and never tried (in spite of Kautsky, who, without a scrap of evidence, accuses us of doing so) to "skip" the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Bolsheviks, first of all, helped the most radical, most revolutionary of the bourgeois-democratic ideologists of the peasants, those who stood closest to the proletariat, namely, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, to carry out what was in effect nationalisation of the land. On October 26, 1917, i.e., on the very first day of the proletarian, socialist revolution, private ownership of land was abolished in Russia.

This laid the foundation, the most perfect from the point of view of the development of capitalism (Kautsky cannot

deny this without breaking with Marx), and at the same time created an agrarian system which is the *most flexible* from the point of view of the transition to socialism. From the bourgeois-democratic point of view, the revolutionary peasants in Russia *could go no farther: there can be nothing* "more ideal" from this point of view, nothing "more radical" (from this same point of view) than nationalisation of the land and equal land tenure. It was the Bolsheviks, and only the Bolsheviks, who, thanks only to the victory of the *proletarian* revolution, helped the peasants to carry the bourgeois-democratic revolution really to its conclusion. And only in this way did they do the utmost to facilitate and accelerate the transition to the socialist revolution.

One can judge from this what an incredible muddle Kautsky offers to his readers when he accuses the Bolsheviks of failing to understand the bourgeois character of the revolution, and yet himself betrays such a departure from Marxism that he *says nothing* about nationalisation of the land and presents the least revolutionary (from the bourgeois point of view) liberal agrarian reform as "something socialistic"!

We have now come to the third question formulated above, namely, to what extent the proletarian dictatorship in Russia has taken into account the necessity of passing to farming in common. Here again, Kautsky commits something very much in the nature of a forgery: he quotes only the "theses" of one Bolshevik which speak of the task of passing to farming in common! After quoting one of these theses, our "theoretician" triumphantly exclaims:

"Unfortunately, a task is not accomplished by the fact that it is called a task. For the time being, collective farming in Russia is doomed to remain on paper only. Never yet have the small peasants anywhere adopted collective farming under the influence of theoretical convictions" (p. 50).

Never as yet and nowhere has a literary swindle been perpetrated equal to that to which Kautsky has stooped. He quotes "theses", but says nothing about the *law* of the Soviet government. He talks about "theoretical convictions", but says nothing about the proletarian state power which holds in its hands the factories and goods! All that Kautsky the Marxist wrote in 1899 in his *Agrarian Question* about

the means at the disposal of the proletarian state for bringing about the gradual transition of the small peasants to socialism has been forgotten by Kautsky the renegade in 1918.

Of course, a few hundred state-supported agricultural communes and state farms (i.e., large farms cultivated by associations of workers at the expense of the state) are very little, but can Kautsky's ignoring of this fact be called "criticism"?

The nationalisation of the land that has been effected in Russia by the proletarian dictatorship has best ensured the carrying of the bourgeois-democratic revolution to its conclusion—even in the event of a victory of the counter-revolution causing a reversion from land nationalisation to land division (I made a special examination of this possibility in my pamphlet on the agrarian programme of the Marxists in the 1905 Revolution). In addition, the nationalisation of the land has given the proletarian state the maximum opportunity of passing to socialism in agriculture.

To sum up, Kautsky has presented us, as far as theory is concerned, with an incredible hodge-podge which is a complete renunciation of Marxism, and, as far as practice is concerned, with a policy of servility to the bourgeoisie and their reformism. A fine criticism indeed!

* * *

Kautsky begins his "economic analysis" of industry with the following magnificent argument:

Russia' has a large-scale capitalist industry. Cannot a socialist system of production be built up on this foundation? "One might think so if socialism meant that the workers of the separate factories and mines made these their property" (literally: appropriated these for themselves) "in order to carry on production separately at each factory" (p. 52): "This very day, August 5, as I am writing these lines," Kautsky adds, "a speech is reported from Moscow delivered by Lenin on August 2, in which he is stated to have declared: 'The workers are holding the factories firmly in their hands, and the peasants will not return the land to

the landowners.' Up till now, the slogan: the factories to the workers, and the land to the peasants, has been an anarcho-sindicalist slogan, not a Social-Democratic one" (pp. 52-53).

I have quoted this passage in full so that the Russian workers, who formerly respected Kautsky, and quite rightly, might see for themselves the methods employed by this deserter to the bourgeois camp.

Just think: on August 5, when numerous decrees on the nationalisation of factories in Russia had been issued—and not a single factory had been "appropriated" by the workers, but had *all* been converted into the property of the Republic—on August 5, Kautsky, on the strength of an obviously crooked interpretation of one sentence in my speech, tries to make the German readers believe that in Russia the factories are being turned over to individual groups of workers! And after that Kautsky, at great length, chews the cud about it being wrong to turn over factories to individual groups of workers!

This is not criticism, it is the trick of a lackey of the bourgeoisie, whom the capitalists have hired to slander the workers' revolution.

The factories must be turned over to the state, or to the municipalities, or the consumers' co-operative societies, says Kautsky over and over again, and finally adds:

"This is what they are now trying to do in Russia. . . ." Now! What does that mean? In August? Why, could not Kautsky have commissioned his friends Stein or Axelrod or any of the other friends of the Russian bourgeoisie, to translate at least one of the decrees on the factories?

"How far they have gone in this direction, we cannot yet tell. At all events, this aspect of the activity of the Soviet Republic is of the greatest interest to us, but it still remains entirely shrouded in darkness. There is no lack of decrees. . . ." (That is why Kautsky ignores their *content*, or conceals it from his readers!) "But there is no reliable information as to the effect of these decrees. Socialist production is impossible without all-round, detailed, reliable and rapidly informative statistics. The Soviet Republic cannot possibly have created such statistics yet. What we learn about its economic activities is highly contradictory and can in no way be verified. This, too, is a result of the dictatorship and the suppression of democracy. There is no freedom of the press, or of speech" (p. 53).

This is how history is written! From a "free" press of the capitalists and Dutov men Kautsky would have received information about factories being taken over by the workers. . . . This "serious savant" who stands above classes is magnificent, indeed! About the countless facts which show that the factories are being turned over to the Republic *only*, that they are managed by an organ of Soviet power, the Supreme Economic Council, which is constituted mainly of workers elected by the trade unions, Kautsky refuses to say a single word. With the obstinacy of the "man in the muffler", he stubbornly keeps repeating one thing: give me peaceful democracy, without civil war, without a dictatorship and with good statistics (the Soviet Republic has created a statistical service in which the best statistical experts in Russia are employed, but, of course, ideal statistics cannot be obtained so quickly). In a word, what Kautsky demands is a revolution without revolution, without fierce struggle, without violence. It is equivalent to asking for strikes in which workers and employers do not get excited. Try to find the difference between this kind of "socialist" and common liberal bureaucrat!

So, relying upon such "factual material", i.e., deliberately and contemptuously ignoring the innumerable facts, Kautsky "concludes":

"It is doubtful whether the Russian proletariat has obtained more in the sense of real practical gains, and not of mere decrees, under the Soviet Republic than it would have obtained from a Constituent Assembly, in which, as in the Soviets, socialists, although of a different hue, predominated" (p. 58).

A gem, is it not? We would advise Kautsky's admirers to circulate this utterance as widely as possible among the Russian workers, for Kautsky could not have provided better material for gauging the depth of his political degradation. Comrade workers, Kerensky, too, was a "socialist", only of a "different hue"! Kautsky the historian is satisfied with the name, the title which the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks "appropriated" to themselves. Kautsky the historian refuses even to listen to the facts which show that under Kerensky the Mensheviks and the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries supported the imperialist policy and marauding practices of the bourgeoisie; he is discreetly

silent about the fact that the majority in the Constituent Assembly consisted of these very champions of imperialist war and bourgeois dictatorship. And this is called "economic analysis"!

In conclusion let me quote another sample of this "economic analysis":

"... After nine months' existence, the Soviet Republic, instead of spreading general well-being, felt itself obliged to explain why there is general want" (p. 41).

We are accustomed to hear such arguments from the lips of the Cadets. All the flunkeys of the bourgeoisie in Russia argue in this way: show us, after nine months, your general well-being—and this after four years of devastating war, with foreign capital giving all-round support to the sabotage and rebellions of the bourgeoisie in Russia. *Actually*, there has remained absolutely no difference whatever, not a shadow of difference, between Kautsky and a counter-revolutionary bourgeois. His honeyed talk, cloaked in the guise of "socialism", only repeats what the Kornilov men, the Dutov men and Krasnov men in Russia say bluntly, straightforwardly and without embellishment.

* * *

The above lines were written on November 9, 1918. That same night news was received from Germany announcing the beginning of a victorious revolution, first in Kiel and other northern towns and ports, where power has passed into the hands of Councils of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, then in Berlin, where, too, power has passed into the hands of a Council.

The conclusion which still remained to be written to my pamphlet on Kautsky and on the proletarian revolution is now superfluous.

N. Lenin

November 10, 1918

Written in October, not later than
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LETTER TO THE WORKERS OF EUROPE AND AMERICA

Comrades, at the end of my letter to American workers dated August 20, 1918, I wrote that we are in a besieged fortress so long as the other armies of the world socialist revolution do not come to our aid. I added that the workers are breaking away from their social-traitors, the Gomperses and Renners. The workers are slowly but surely coming round to communist and Bolshevik tactics.

Less than five months have passed since those words were written, and it must be said that during this time, in view of the fact that workers of various countries have turned to communism and Bolshevism, the maturing of the world proletarian revolution has proceeded very rapidly.

Then, on August 20, 1918, only our Party, the Bolshevik Party, had resolutely broken with the old, Second International of 1889-1914 which so shamefully collapsed during the imperialist war of 1914-18. Only our Party had unreservedly taken the new path, from the socialists and Social-Democracy which had disgraced themselves by alliance with the predatory bourgeoisie, to communism; from petty-bourgeois reformism and opportunism, which had thoroughly permeated, and now permeate, the official Social-Democratic and socialist parties, to genuinely proletarian, revolutionary tactics.

Now, on January 12, 1919, we already see quite a number of communist proletarian parties, not only within the boundaries of the former tsarist empire—in Latvia, Finland and Poland, for example—but also in Western Europe—Austria,

Hungary, Holland and, lastly, Germany. The *foundation* of a genuinely proletarian, genuinely internationalist, genuinely revolutionary Third International, the *Communist International*, became a *fact* when the German Spartacus League, with such world-known and world-famous leaders, with such staunch working-class champions as Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Clara Zetkin and Franz Mehring, made a clean break with socialists like Scheidemann and Südekum, social-chauvinists (socialists in words, but chauvinists in deeds) who have earned eternal shame by their alliance with the predatory, imperialist German bourgeoisie and Wilhelm II. It became a fact when the Spartacus League changed its name to the Communist Party of Germany. Though it has not yet been officially inaugurated, the Third International actually exists.

No class-conscious worker, no sincere socialist can now fail to see how dastardly was the betrayal of socialism by those who, like the Mensheviks and "Socialist-Revolutionaries" in Russia, the Scheidemanns and Südekums in Germany, the Renaudels and Vanderveldes in France, the Hendersons and Webbs in Britain, and Gompers and Co. in America, supported "their" bourgeoisie in the 1914-18 war. That war fully exposed itself as an imperialist, reactionary, predatory war both on the part of Germany and on the part of the capitalists of Britain, France, Italy and America. The latter are now beginning to quarrel over the spoils, over the division of Turkey, Russia, the African and Polynesian colonies, the Balkans, and so on. The hypocritical phrases uttered by Wilson and his followers about "democracy" and "union of nations" are exposed with amazing rapidity when we see the capture of the left bank of the Rhine by the French bourgeoisie, the capture of Turkey (Syria, Mesopotamia) and part of Russia (Siberia, Archangel, Baku, Krasnovodsk, Ashkhabad, and so on) by the French, British and American capitalists, and the increasing animosity over the division of the spoils between Italy and France, France and Britain, Britain and America, America and Japan.

Beside the craven, half-hearted "socialists" who are thoroughly imbued with the prejudices of bourgeois democracy, who yesterday defended "their" imperialist governments and today limit themselves to platonic

"protests" against military intervention in Russia—beside these there is a growing number of people in the Allied countries who have taken the communist path, the path of Maclean, Debs, Loriot, Lazzari and Serrati. These are men who have realised that if imperialism is to be crushed and the victory of socialism and lasting peace ensured, the bourgeoisie must be overthrown, bourgeois parliaments abolished, and Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat established.

Then, on August 20, 1918, the proletarian revolution was confined to Russia, and "Soviet government", i.e., the system under which *all* state power is vested in Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, still seemed to be (and actually was) only a Russian institution.

Now, on January 12, 1919, we see a mighty "Soviet" movement not only in parts of the former tsarist empire, for example, in Latvia, Poland and the Ukraine, but also in West-European countries, in neutral countries (Switzerland, Holland and Norway) and in countries which have suffered from the war (Austria and Germany). The revolution in Germany—which is particularly important and characteristic as one of the most advanced capitalist countries—at once assumed "Soviet" forms. The whole course of the German revolution, and particularly the struggle of the Spartacists, i.e., the true and only representatives of the proletariat, against the alliance of those treacherous scoundrels, the Scheidemanns and Südekums, with the bourgeoisie—all this clearly shows how history has *formulated* the question in relation to Germany:

"Soviet power" or the bourgeois parliament, no matter under what signboard (such as "National" or "Constituent" Assembly) it may appear.

That is how *world history* has formulated the question. Now, this can and must be said without any exaggeration.

"Soviet power" is the second historical step, or stage, in the development of the proletarian dictatorship. The first step was the Paris Commune. The brilliant analysis of its nature and significance given by Marx in his *The Civil War in France* showed that the Commune had created a *new type* of state, a *proletarian state*. Every state, including the most democratic republic, is nothing but a machine for the

suppression of one class by another. The proletarian state is a machine for the suppression of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat. Such suppression is necessary because of the furious, desperate resistance put up by the landowners and capitalists, by the entire bourgeoisie and all their hangers-on, by all the exploiters, who stop at nothing when their overthrow, when the expropriation of the expropriators, begins.

The bourgeois parliament, even the most democratic in the most democratic republic, in which the property and rule of the capitalists are preserved, is a machine for the suppression of the working millions by small groups of exploiters. The socialists, the fighters for the emancipation of the working people from exploitation, had to utilise the bourgeois parliaments as a platform, as a base, for propaganda, agitation and organisation *as long as our struggle was confined to the framework of the bourgeois system*. Now that world history has brought up the question of destroying the whole of that system, of overthrowing and suppressing the exploiters, of passing from capitalism to socialism, it would be a shameful betrayal of the proletariat, deserting to its class enemy, the bourgeoisie, and being a traitor and a renegade to confine oneself to bourgeois parliamentarism, to bourgeois democracy, to present it as "democracy" in general, to obscure its *bourgeois* character, to forget that as long as capitalist property exists universal suffrage is an instrument of the bourgeois state.

The three trends in world socialism, about which the Bolshevik press has been speaking incessantly since 1915, stand out with particular distinctness today, against the background of the bloody struggle and civil war in Germany.

Karl Liebknecht is a name known to the workers of all countries. Everywhere, and particularly in the Allied countries, it is the symbol of a leader's devotion to the interests of the proletariat and loyalty to the socialist revolution. It is the symbol of really sincere, really self-sacrificing and ruthless struggle against capitalism. It is the symbol of uncompromising struggle against imperialism not in words, but in deeds, of self-sacrificing struggle precisely in the period when "one's own" country is flushed with imperialist victories. With Liebknecht and the Spartacists

are all those German socialists who have remained honest and really revolutionary, all the best and dedicated men among the proletariat, the exploited masses who are seething with indignation and among whom there is a growing readiness for revolution.

Against Liebknecht are the Scheidemanns, the Südekums and the whole gang of despicable lackeys of the Kaiser and the bourgeoisie. They are just as much traitors to socialism as the Gomperses and Victor Bergers, the Hendersons and Webbs, the Renaudels and Vanderveldes. They represent that top section of workers who have been bribed by the bourgeoisie, those whom we Bolsheviki called (applying the name to the Russian Südekums, the Mensheviki) "agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class movement", and to whom the best socialists in America gave the magnificently expressive and very fitting title: "labour lieutenants of the capitalist class". They represent *the latest, "modern", type* of socialist treachery, for in all the civilised, advanced countries the bourgeoisie rob—either by colonial oppression or by financially extracting "gain" from formally independent weak countries—they rob a population many times larger than that of "their own" country. This is the economic factor that enables the imperialist bourgeoisie to obtain superprofits, part of which is used to bribe the top section of the proletariat and convert it into a reformist, opportunist petty bourgeoisie that fears revolution.

Between the Spartacists and the Scheidemann men are the wavering, spineless "Kautskyites", who in words are "independent", but in deeds are entirely, and all along the line, *dependent* upon the bourgeoisie and the Scheidemann men one day, upon the Spartacists the next, some following the former and some the latter. These are people without ideas, without backbone, without policy, without honour, without conscience, the living embodiment of the bewilderment of philistines who stand for socialist revolution in words, but are actually incapable of understanding it when it has begun and, in renegade fashion, defend "democracy" in general, that is, *actually* defend *bourgeois* democracy.

In every capitalist country, every thinking worker will, in the situation varying with national and historical conditions, perceive these three main trends among the socialists and

among the syndicalists, for the imperialist war and the incipient world proletarian revolution engender identical ideological and political trends all over the world.

* * *

The foregoing lines were written before the brutal and dastardly murder of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg by the Ebert and Scheidemann government. Those butchers, in their servility to the bourgeoisie, allowed the German whiteguards, the watchdogs of sacred capitalist property, to lynch Rosa Luxemburg, to murder Karl Liebknecht by shooting him in the back on the patently false plea that he "attempted to escape" (Russian tsarism often used that excuse to murder prisoners during its bloody suppression of the 1905 Revolution). At the same time those butchers protected the whiteguards with the authority of the government, which claims to be quite innocent and to stand above classes! No words can describe the foul and abominable character of the butchery perpetrated by alleged socialists. Evidently, history has chosen a path on which the role of "labour lieutenants of the capitalist class" must be played to the "last degree" of brutality, baseness and meanness. Let those simpletons, the Kautskyites, talk in their newspaper *Freiheit*²⁶⁴ about a "court" of representatives of "all" "socialist" parties (those servile souls insist that the Scheidemann executioners are socialists)! Those heroes of philistine stupidity and petty-bourgeois cowardice even fail to understand that the courts are organs of state power, and that the issue in the struggle and civil war now being waged in Germany is precisely one of who is to hold this power—the bourgeoisie, "served" by the Scheidemanns as executioners and instigators of pogroms, and by the Kautskys as glorifiers of "pure democracy", or the proletariat, which will overthrow the capitalist exploiters and crush their resistance.

The blood of the best representatives of the world proletarian International, of the unforgettable leaders of the world socialist revolution, will steel ever new masses of workers for the life-and-death struggle. And this struggle will lead to victory. We in Russia, in the summer of 1917, lived through the "July days", when the Russian Scheide-

manns, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, also provided "state" protection for the "victory" of the whiteguards over the Bolsheviks, and when Cossacks shot the worker Voinov in the streets of Petrograd for distributing Bolshevik leaflets.²⁶⁵ We know from experience how quickly such "victories" of the bourgeoisie and their henchmen cure the people of their illusions about bourgeois democracy, "universal suffrage", and so forth.

* * *

The bourgeoisie and the governments of the Allied countries seem to be wavering. One section sees that demoralisation is already setting in among the Allied troops in Russia, who are helping the whiteguards and serving the blackest monarchist and landlord reaction. It realises that continuation of the military intervention and attempts to defeat Russia—which would mean maintaining a million-strong army of occupation for a long time—is the surest and quickest way of carrying the proletarian revolution to the Allied countries. The example of the German occupation forces in the Ukraine is convincing enough of that.

Another section of the Allied bourgeoisie persists in its policy of military intervention, "economic encirclement" (Clemenceau) and strangulation of the Soviet Republic. The entire press in the service of that bourgeoisie, i.e., the majority of the capitalist-bought daily newspapers in Britain and France, predicts the early collapse of the Soviet government, draws lurid pictures of the horrors of the famine in Russia, lies about "disorders" and the "instability" of the Soviet Government. The whiteguard armies of the landowners and capitalists, whom the Allies are helping with officers, ammunition, money and auxiliary detachments, are cutting off the starving central and northern parts of Russia from the most fertile regions, Siberia and the Don.

The distress of the starving workers in Petrograd and Moscow, in Ivanovo-Voznesensk and other industrial centres is indeed great. If the workers did not understand that they are defending the cause of socialism in Russia and throughout the world they would never be able to bear the hardships, the torments of hunger to which they are doomed by the Allied military intervention (often covered up by hypocritical

promises not to send their "own" troops, while continuing to send "black" troops, and also ammunition, money and officers).

The "Allied" and whiteguard troops hold Archangel, Perm, Orenburg, Rostov-on-Don, Baku and Ashkhabad, but the "Soviet movement" has won Riga and Kharkov. Latvia and the Ukraine are becoming Soviet republics. The workers see that their great sacrifices are not in vain, that the victory of Soviet power is approaching, spreading, growing and gaining strength the world over. Every month of hard fighting and heavy sacrifice strengthens the cause of Soviet power throughout the world and weakens its enemies, the exploiters.

The exploiters are still strong enough to murder the finest leaders of the world proletarian revolution, to increase the sacrifices and suffering of the workers in occupied or conquered countries and regions. But the exploiters all over the world are not strong enough to prevent the victory of the world proletarian revolution, which will free mankind from the yoke of capital and the eternal menace of new imperialist wars, which are inevitable under capitalism.

N. Lenin

January 21, 1919

Pravda No. 16,
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**THESES ON BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACY
AND THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT
AT THE FIRST CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST
INTERNATIONAL
MARCH 4, 1919²⁶⁶**

1. Faced with the growth of the revolutionary workers' movement in every country, the bourgeoisie and their agents in the workers' organisations are making desperate attempts to find ideological and political arguments in defence of the rule of the exploiters. Condemnation of dictatorship and defence of democracy are particularly prominent among these arguments. The falsity and hypocrisy of this argument, repeated in a thousand strains by the capitalist press and at the Berne yellow International Conference in February 1919, are obvious to all who refuse to betray the fundamental principles of socialism.

2. Firstly, this argument employs the concepts of "democracy in general" and "dictatorship in general", without posing the question of the class concerned. This non-class or above-class presentation, which supposedly is popular, is an outright travesty of the basic tenet of socialism, namely, its theory of class struggle, which socialists who have sided with the bourgeoisie recognise in words but disregard in practice. For in no civilised capitalist country does "democracy in general" exist; all that exists is bourgeois democracy, and it is not a question of "dictatorship in general", but of the dictatorship of the oppressed class, i.e., the proletariat, over its oppressors and exploiters, i.e., the bourgeoisie, in order to overcome the resistance offered by the exploiters in their fight to maintain their domination.

3. History teaches us that no oppressed class ever did, or could, achieve power without going through a period of dictatorship, i.e., the conquest of political power and forcible

suppression of the resistance always offered by the exploiters—a resistance that is most desperate, most furious, and that stops at nothing. The bourgeoisie, whose domination is now defended by the socialists who denounce “dictatorship in general” and extol “democracy in general”, won power in the advanced countries through a series of insurrections, civil wars, and the forcible suppression of kings, feudal lords, slaveowners and their attempts at restoration. In books, pamphlets, congress resolutions and propaganda speeches socialists everywhere have thousands and millions of times explained to the people the class nature of these bourgeois revolutions and this bourgeois dictatorship. That is why the present defence of bourgeois democracy under cover of talk about “democracy in general” and the present howls and shouts against proletarian dictatorship under cover of shouts about “dictatorship in general” are an outright betrayal of socialism. They are, in fact, desertion to the bourgeoisie, denial of the proletariat’s right to its own, proletarian, revolution, and defence of bourgeois reformism at the very historical juncture when bourgeois reformism throughout the world has collapsed and the war has created a revolutionary situation.

4. In explaining the class nature of bourgeois civilisation, bourgeois democracy and the bourgeois parliamentary system, all socialists have expressed the idea formulated with the greatest scientific precision by Marx and Engels, namely, that the most democratic bourgeois republic is no more than a machine for the suppression of the working class by the bourgeoisie, for the suppression of the working people by a handful of capitalists.²⁶⁷ There is not a single revolutionary, not a single Marxist among those now shouting against dictatorship and for democracy who has not sworn and vowed to the workers that he accepts this basic truth of socialism. But now, when the revolutionary proletariat is in a fighting mood and taking action to destroy this machine of oppression and to establish proletarian dictatorship, these traitors to socialism claim that the bourgeoisie have granted the working people “pure democracy”, have abandoned resistance and are prepared to yield to the majority of the working people. They assert that in a democratic republic there is not, and never

has been, any such thing as a state machine for the oppression of labour by capital.

5. The Paris Commune—to which all who parade as socialists pay lip service, for they know that the workers ardently and sincerely sympathise with the Commune—showed very clearly the historically conventional nature and limited value of the bourgeois parliamentary system and bourgeois democracy—institutions which, though highly progressive compared with medieval times, inevitably require a radical alteration in the era of proletarian revolution. It was Marx who best appraised the historical significance of the Commune. In his analysis, he revealed the exploiting nature of bourgeois democracy and the bourgeois parliamentary system under which the oppressed classes enjoy the right to decide once in several years which representative of the propertied classes shall “represent and suppress” (*ver- und zertreten*) the people in parliament.²⁶⁸ And it is now, when the Soviet movement is embracing the entire world and continuing the work of the Commune for all to see, that the traitors to socialism are forgetting the concrete experience and concrete lessons of the Paris Commune and repeating the old bourgeois rubbish about “democracy in general”. The Commune was not a parliamentary institution.

6. The significance of the Commune, furthermore, lies in the fact that it endeavoured to crush, to smash to its very foundations, the bourgeois state apparatus, the bureaucratic, judicial, military and police machine, and to replace it by a self-governing, mass workers’ organisation in which there was no division between legislative and executive power. All contemporary bourgeois-democratic republics, including the German republic, which the traitors to socialism, in mockery of the truth, describe as a proletarian republic, retain this state apparatus. We therefore again get quite clear confirmation of the point that shouting in defence of “democracy in general” is actually defence of the bourgeoisie and their privileges as exploiters.

7. “Freedom of assembly” can be taken as a sample of the requisites of “pure democracy”. Every class-conscious worker who has not broken with his class will readily appreciate the absurdity of promising freedom of assembly to the exploiters at a time and in a situation when the exploiters are resisting

the overthrow of their rule and are fighting to retain their privileges. When the bourgeoisie were revolutionary, they did not, either in England in 1649 or in France in 1793, grant "freedom of assembly" to the monarchists and nobles, who summoned foreign troops and "assembled" to organise attempts at restoration. If the present-day bourgeoisie, who have long since become reactionary, demand from the proletariat advance guarantees of "freedom of assembly" for the exploiters, whatever the resistance offered by the capitalists to being expropriated, the workers will only laugh at their hypocrisy.

The workers know perfectly well, too, that even in the most democratic bourgeois republic "freedom of assembly" is a hollow phrase, for the rich have the best public and private buildings at their disposal, and enough leisure to assemble at meetings, which are protected by the bourgeois machine of power. The rural and urban workers and the small peasants—the overwhelming majority of the population—are denied all these things. As long as that state of affairs prevails, "equality", i.e., "pure democracy", is a fraud. The first thing to do to win genuine equality and enable the working people to enjoy democracy in practice is to deprive the exploiters of all the public and sumptuous private buildings, to give the working people leisure and to see to it that their freedom of assembly is protected by armed workers, not by scions of the nobility or capitalist officers in command of downtrodden soldiers.

Only when that change is effected can we speak of freedom of assembly and of equality without mocking at the workers, at working people in general, at the poor. And this change can be effected only by the vanguard of the working people, the proletariat, which overthrows the exploiters, the bourgeoisie.

8. "Freedom of the press" is another of the principal slogans of "pure democracy". And here, too, the workers know—and socialists everywhere have admitted it millions of times—that this freedom is a deception while the best printing-presses and the biggest stocks of paper are appropriated by the capitalists, and while capitalist rule over the press remains, a rule that is manifested throughout the world all the more strikingly, sharply and cynically the more democracy and

the republican system are developed, as in America for example. The first thing to do to win real equality and genuine democracy for the working people, for the workers and peasants, is to deprive capital of the possibility of hiring writers, buying up publishing houses and bribing newspapers. And to do that the capitalists and exploiters have to be overthrown and their resistance suppressed. The capitalists have always used the term "freedom" to mean freedom for the rich to get richer and for the workers to starve to death. In capitalist usage, freedom of the press means freedom of the rich to bribe the press, freedom to use their wealth to shape and fabricate so-called public opinion. In this respect, too, the defenders of "pure democracy" prove to be defenders of an utterly foul and venal system that gives the rich control over the mass media. They prove to be deceivers of the people, who, with the aid of plausible, fine-sounding, but thoroughly false phrases, divert them from the concrete historical task of liberating the press from capitalist enslavement. Genuine freedom and equality will be embodied in the system which the Communists are building, and in which there will be no opportunity for amassing wealth at the expense of others, no objective opportunities for putting the press under the direct or indirect power of money, and no impediments in the way of any workingman (or groups of workingmen, in any numbers) for enjoying and practising equal rights in the use of public printing-presses and public stocks of paper.

9. The history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries demonstrated, even before the war, what this celebrated "pure democracy" really is under capitalism. Marxists have always maintained that the more developed, the "purer" democracy is, the more naked, acute and merciless the class struggle becomes, and the "purer" the capitalist oppression and bourgeois dictatorship. The Dreyfus case in republican France, the massacre of strikers by hired bands armed by the capitalists in the free and democratic American republic—these and thousands of similar facts illustrate the truth which the bourgeoisie are vainly seeking to conceal, namely, that actually terror and bourgeois dictatorship prevail in the most democratic of republics and are openly displayed every time the exploiters think the power of capital is being shaken.

10. The imperialist war of 1914-18 conclusively revealed

even to backward workers the true nature of bourgeois democracy, even in the freest republics, as being a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Tens of millions were killed for the sake of enriching the German or the British group of millionaires and multimillionaires, and bourgeois military dictatorships were established in the freest republics. This military dictatorship continues to exist in the Allied countries even after Germany's defeat. It was mostly the war that opened the eyes of the working people, that stripped bourgeois democracy of its camouflage and showed the people the abyss of speculation and profiteering that existed during and because of the war. It was in the name of "freedom and equality" that the bourgeoisie waged the war, and in the name of "freedom and equality" that the munition manufacturers piled up fabulous fortunes. Nothing that the yellow Berne International²⁶⁹ does can conceal from the people the now thoroughly exposed exploiting character of bourgeois freedom, bourgeois equality and bourgeois democracy.

11. In Germany, the most developed capitalist country of continental Europe, the very first months of full republican freedom, established as a result of imperialist Germany's defeat, have shown the German workers and the whole world the true class substance of the bourgeois-democratic republic. The murder of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg is an event of epoch-making significance not only because of the tragic death of these finest people and leaders of the truly proletarian, Communist International, but also because the class nature of an advanced European state—it can be said without exaggeration, of an advanced state on a world-wide scale—has been conclusively exposed. If those arrested, i.e., those placed under state protection, could be assassinated by officers and capitalists with impunity, and this under a government headed by social-patriots, then the democratic republic where such a thing was possible is a bourgeois dictatorship. Those who voice their indignation at the murder of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg but fail to understand this fact are only demonstrating their stupidity, or hypocrisy. "Freedom" in the German republic, one of the freest and advanced republics of the world, is freedom to murder arrested leaders of the proletariat with impunity. Nor can it be otherwise as long as capitalism remains, for

the development of democracy sharpens rather than dampens the class struggle which, by virtue of all the results and influences of the war and of its consequences, has been brought to boiling point.

Throughout the civilised world we see Bolsheviks being exiled, persecuted and thrown into prison. This is the case, for example, in Switzerland, one of the freest bourgeois republics, and in America, where there have been anti-Bolshevik pogroms, etc. From the standpoint of "democracy in general", or "pure democracy", it is really ridiculous that advanced, civilised, and democratic countries, which are armed to the teeth, should fear the presence of a few score men from backward, famine-stricken and ruined Russia, which the bourgeois papers, in tens of millions of copies, describe as savage, criminal, etc. Clearly, the social situation that could produce this crying contradiction is in fact a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

12. In these circumstances, proletarian dictatorship is not only an absolutely legitimate means of overthrowing the exploiters and suppressing their resistance, but also absolutely necessary to the entire mass of working people, being their only defence against the bourgeois dictatorship which led to the war and is preparing new wars.

The main thing that socialists fail to understand and that constitutes their short-sightedness in matters of theory, their subservience to bourgeois prejudices and their political betrayal of the proletariat is that in capitalist society, whenever there is any serious aggravation of the class struggle intrinsic to that society, there can be no alternative but the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie or the dictatorship of the proletariat. Dreams of some third way are reactionary, petty-bourgeois lamentations. That is borne out by more than a century of development of bourgeois democracy and the working-class movement in all the advanced countries, and notably by the experience of the past five years. This is also borne out by the whole science of political economy, by the entire content of Marxism, which reveals the economic inevitability, wherever commodity economy prevails, of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie that can only be replaced by the class which the very growth of capitalism develops,

multiplies, welds together and strengthens, that is, the proletarian class.

13. Another theoretical and political error of the socialists is their failure to understand that ever since the rudiments of democracy first appeared in antiquity, its forms inevitably changed over the centuries as one ruling class replaced another. Democracy assumed different forms and was applied in different degrees in the ancient republics of Greece, the medieval cities and the advanced capitalist countries. It would be sheer nonsense to think that the most profound revolution in human history, the first case in the world of power being transferred from the exploiting minority to the exploited majority, could take place within the time-worn framework of the old, bourgeois, parliamentary democracy, without drastic changes, without the creation of new forms of democracy, new institutions that embody the new conditions for applying democracy, etc.

14. Proletarian dictatorship is similar to the dictatorship of other classes in that it arises out of the need, as every other dictatorship does, to forcibly suppress the resistance of the class that is losing its political sway. The fundamental distinction between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the dictatorship of other classes—landlord dictatorship in the Middle Ages and bourgeois dictatorship in all the civilised capitalist countries—consists in the fact that the dictatorship of the landowners and bourgeoisie was the forcible suppression of the resistance offered by the vast majority of the population, namely, the working people. In contrast, proletarian dictatorship is the forcible suppression of the resistance of the exploiters, i.e., an insignificant minority of the population, the landowners and capitalists.

It follows that proletarian dictatorship must inevitably entail not only a change in democratic forms and institutions, generally speaking, but precisely such a change as provides an unparalleled extension of the actual enjoyment of democracy by those oppressed by capitalism—the toiling classes.

And indeed, the form of proletarian dictatorship that has already taken shape, i.e., Soviet power in Russia, the Räte-System* in Germany, the Shop Stewards Committees²⁷⁰ in

* Councils System.—Ed.

Britain and similar Soviet institutions in other countries, all this implies and presents to the toiling classes, i.e., the vast majority of the population, greater practical opportunities for enjoying democratic rights and liberties than ever existed before, even approximately, in the best and the most democratic bourgeois republics.

The substance of Soviet government is that the permanent and only foundation of state power, the entire machinery of state, is the mass-scale organisation of the classes oppressed by capitalism, i.e., the workers and the semi-proletarians (peasants who do not exploit the labour of others and regularly resort to the sale of at least a part of their own labour-power). It is the people, who even in the most democratic bourgeois republics, while possessing equal rights by law, have in fact been debarred by thousands of devices and subterfuges from participation in political life and enjoyment of democratic rights and liberties, that are now drawn into constant and unflinching, moreover, decisive, participation in the democratic administration of the state.

15. The equality of citizens, irrespective of sex, religion, race, or nationality, which bourgeois democracy everywhere has always promised but never effected, and never could effect because of the domination of capital, is given immediate and full effect by the Soviet system, or dictatorship of the proletariat. The fact is that this can only be done by a government of the workers, who are not interested in the means of production being privately owned and in the fight for their division and redivision.

16. The old, i.e., bourgeois, democracy and the parliamentary system were so organised that it was the mass of working people who were kept farthest away from the machinery of government. Soviet power, i.e., the dictatorship of the proletariat, on the other hand, is so organised as to bring the working people close to the machinery of government. That, too, is the purpose of combining the legislative and executive authority under the Soviet organisation of the state and of replacing territorial constituencies by production units—the factory.

17. The army was a machine of oppression not only under the monarchy. It remains as such in all bourgeois republics, even the most democratic ones. Only the Soviets, the per-

manent organisations of government authority of the classes that were oppressed by capitalism, are in a position to destroy the army's subordination to bourgeois commanders and really merge the proletariat with the army; only the Soviets can effectively arm the proletariat and disarm the bourgeoisie. Unless this is done, the victory of socialism is impossible.

18. The Soviet organisation of the state is suited to the leading role of the proletariat as a class most concentrated and enlightened by capitalism. The experience of all revolutions and all movements of the oppressed classes, the experience of the world socialist movement teaches us that only the proletariat is in a position to unite and lead the scattered and backward sections of the working and exploited population.

19. Only the Soviet organisation of the state can really effect the immediate break-up and total destruction of the old, i.e., bourgeois, bureaucratic and judicial machinery, which has been, and has inevitably had to be, retained under capitalism even in the most democratic republics, and which is, in actual fact, the greatest obstacle to the practical implementation of democracy for the workers and working people generally. The Paris Commune took the first epoch-making step along this path. The Soviet system has taken the second.

20. Destruction of state power is the aim set by all socialists, including Marx above all. Genuine democracy, i.e., liberty and equality, is unrealisable unless this aim is achieved. But its practical achievement is possible only through Soviet, or proletarian, democracy, for by enlisting the mass organisations of the working people in constant and unflinching participation in the administration of the state, it immediately begins to prepare the complete withering away of any state.

21. The complete bankruptcy of the socialists who assembled in Berne, their complete failure to understand the new, i.e., proletarian, democracy, is especially apparent from the following. On February 10, 1919, Branting delivered the concluding speech at the international Conference of the yellow International in Berne. In Berlin, on February 11, 1919, *Die Freiheit*, the paper of the International's affiliates, published an appeal from the Party of "Independents" to the proletariat. The appeal acknowledged the bourgeois character of the Scheidemann government, rebuked it for

wanting to abolish the Soviets, which it described as *Träger und Schützer der Revolution*—vehicles and guardians of the revolution—and proposed that the Soviets be legalised, invested with government authority and given the right to suspend the operation of National Assembly decisions pending a popular referendum.

That proposal indicates the complete ideological bankruptcy of the theorists who defended democracy and failed to see its bourgeois character. This ludicrous attempt to combine the Soviet system, i.e., proletarian dictatorship, with the National Assembly, i.e., bourgeois dictatorship, utterly exposes the paucity of thought of the yellow socialists and Social-Democrats, their reactionary petty-bourgeois political outlook, and their cowardly concessions to the irresistibly growing strength of the new, proletarian democracy.

22. From the class standpoint, the Berne yellow International majority, which did not dare to adopt a formal resolution out of fear of the mass of workers, was right in condemning Bolshevism. This majority is in full agreement with the Russian Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the Scheidemanns in Germany. In complaining of persecution by the Bolsheviks, the Russian Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries try to conceal the fact that they are persecuted for participating in the Civil War on the side of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. Similarly, the Scheidemanns and their party have already demonstrated in Germany that they, too, are participating in the civil war on the side of the bourgeoisie against the workers.

It is therefore quite natural that the Berne yellow International majority should be in favour of condemning the Bolsheviks. This was not an expression of the defence of "pure democracy", but of the self-defence of people who know and feel that in the civil war they stand with the bourgeoisie against the proletariat.

That is why, from the class point of view, the decision of the yellow International majority must be considered correct. The proletariat must not fear the truth, it must face it squarely and draw all the necessary political conclusions.

GREETINGS TO THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS

Comrades, the news we have been receiving from the Hungarian Soviet leaders fills us with enthusiasm and pleasure. Soviet government has been in existence in Hungary for only a little over two months, yet as regards organisation the Hungarian proletariat already seems to have excelled us. That is understandable, for in Hungary the general cultural level of the population is higher; furthermore, the proportion of industrial workers to the total population is immeasurably greater (in Budapest there are three million of the eight million population of present-day Hungary), and, lastly, in Hungary the transition to the Soviet system, to the dictatorship of the proletariat, has been incomparably easier and more peaceful.

This last circumstance is particularly important. The majority of the European socialist leaders, of both the social-chauvinist and Kautskyite trends, have become so much a prey to purely philistine prejudices, fostered by decades of relatively "peaceful" capitalism and the bourgeois-parliamentary system, that they are unable to understand what Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat mean. The proletariat cannot perform its epoch-making liberating mission unless it removes these leaders from its path, unless it sweeps them out of its way. These people believed, or half-believed, the bourgeois lies about Soviet power in Russia and were unable to distinguish the nature of the new, proletarian democracy—democracy for the working people, socialist democracy, as embodied in Soviet government—from bourgeois democracy, which they slavishly worship and call "pure democracy" or "democracy" in general.

These blind people, fettered by bourgeois prejudices, failed to understand the epoch-making change from bourgeois to proletarian democracy, from bourgeois to proletarian dictatorship. They confused certain specific features of Russian Soviet government, of the history of its development in Russia, with Soviet government as an international phenomenon.

The Hungarian proletarian revolution is helping even the blind to see. The form of transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat in Hungary is altogether different from that in Russia—voluntary resignation of the bourgeois government, instantaneous restoration of working-class unity, socialist unity *on a communist programme*. The nature of Soviet power is now all the clearer; the only form of rule which has the support of the working people and of the proletariat at their head that is now possible anywhere in the world is Soviet rule, the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This dictatorship presupposes the ruthlessly severe, swift and resolute use of force to crush the resistance of the exploiters, the capitalists, landowners and their underlings. Whoever does not understand this is not a revolutionary, and must be removed from the post of leader or adviser of the proletariat.

But the essence of proletarian dictatorship is not in force alone, or even mainly in force. Its chief feature is the organisation and discipline of the advanced contingent of the working people, of their vanguard, of their sole leader, the proletariat, whose object is to build socialism, abolish the division of society into classes, make all members of society working people, and remove the basis for all exploitation of man by man. This object cannot be achieved at one stroke. It requires a fairly long period of transition from capitalism to socialism, because the reorganisation of production is a difficult matter, because radical changes in all spheres of life need time, and because the enormous force of habit of running things in a petty-bourgeois and bourgeois way can only be overcome by a long and stubborn struggle. That is why Marx spoke of an entire period of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the period of transition from capitalism to socialism.

Throughout the whole of this transition period, resistance

to the revolution will be offered both by the capitalists and by their numerous myrmidons among the bourgeois intellectuals, who will resist consciously, and by the vast mass of the working people, including the peasants, who are shackled very much by petty-bourgeois habits and traditions, and who all too often will resist unconsciously. Vacillations among these groups are inevitable. As a working man the peasant gravitates towards socialism, and prefers the dictatorship of the workers to the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. As a seller of grain, the peasant gravitates towards the bourgeoisie, towards freedom of trade, i.e., back to the "habitual", old, "time-hallowed" capitalism.

What is needed to enable the proletariat to lead the peasants and the petty-bourgeois groups in general is the dictatorship of the proletariat, the rule of one class, its strength of organisation and discipline, its centralised power based on all the achievements of the culture, science and technology of capitalism, its proletarian affinity to the mentality of every working man, its prestige with the disunited, less developed working people in the countryside or in petty industry, who are less firm in politics. Here phrase-mongering about "democracy" in general, about "unity" or the "unity of labour democracy", about the "equality" of all "men of labour", and so on and so forth—the phrase-mongering for which the now petty-bourgeois social-chauvinists and Kautskyites have such a predilection—is of no use whatever. Phrase-mongering only throws dust in the eyes, blinds the mind and strengthens the old stupidity, conservatism, and routine of capitalism, the parliamentary system and bourgeois democracy.

The abolition of classes requires a long, difficult and stubborn *class struggle*, which, *after* the overthrow of capitalist rule, *after* the destruction of the bourgeois state, *after* the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, *does not disappear* (as the vulgar representatives of the old socialism and the old Social-Democracy imagine), but merely changes its forms and in many respects becomes fiercer.

The proletariat, by means of a class struggle against the resistance of the bourgeoisie, against the conservatism, routine, irresolution and vacillation of the petty bourgeoisie, must uphold its power, strengthen its organising influence,

"neutralise" those groups which fear to leave the bourgeoisie and which follow the proletariat too hesitantly, and consolidate the new discipline, the comradely discipline of the working people, their firm bond with the proletariat, their unity with the proletariat—that new discipline, that new basis of social ties in place of the serf discipline of the Middle Ages and the discipline of starvation, the discipline of "free" wage-slavery under capitalism.

In order to abolish classes a period of the dictatorship of one class is needed, the dictatorship of precisely that oppressed class which is capable not only of overthrowing the exploiters, not only of ruthlessly crushing their resistance, but also of breaking ideologically with the entire bourgeois-democratic outlook, with all the philistine phrase-mongering about liberty and equality in general (in reality, this phrase-mongering implies, as Marx demonstrated long ago, the "liberty and equality" of *commodity owners*, the "liberty and equality" of *the capitalist and the worker*).

More, classes can be abolished only by the dictatorship of that oppressed class which has been schooled, united, trained and steeled by decades of the strike and political struggle against capital—of that class alone which has assimilated all the urban, industrial, big-capitalist culture and has the determination and ability to protect it and to preserve and further develop all its achievements, and make them available to all the people, to all the working people—of that class alone which will be able to bear all the hardships, trials, privations and great sacrifices which history inevitably imposes upon those who break with the past and boldly hew a road for themselves to a new future—of that class alone whose finest members are full of hatred and contempt for everything petty-bourgeois and philistine, for the qualities that flourish so profusely among the petty bourgeoisie, the minor employees and the "intellectuals"—of that class alone which "has been through the hardening school of labour" and is able to inspire respect for its efficiency in every working person and every honest man.

Hungarian workers! Comrades! You have set the world an even better example than Soviet Russia by your ability to unite all socialists at one stroke on the platform of genuine proletarian dictatorship. You are now faced with the most

gratifying and most difficult task of holding your own in a rigorous war against the Entente. Be firm. Should vacillation manifest itself among the socialists who yesterday gave their support to you, to the dictatorship of the proletariat, or among the petty bourgeoisie, suppress it ruthlessly. In war the coward's legitimate fate is the bullet.

You are waging the only legitimate, just and truly revolutionary war, a war of the oppressed against the oppressors, a war of the working people against the exploiters, a war for the victory of socialism. All honest members of the working class all over the world are on your side. Every month brings the world proletarian revolution nearer.

Be firm! Victory will be yours!

Lenin

May 27, 1919

Pravda No. 115,
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HOW THE BOURGEOISIE UTILISES RENEGADES

Our wireless stations intercept messages from Carnarvon (Britain), Paris and other European centres. Today Paris is the centre of the world imperialist alliance and its wireless messages are therefore often of particular interest. A few days ago, on September 13, the government wireless station in this centre of world imperialism reported the publication of a new anti-Bolshevik book by Karl Kautsky, the well-known renegade and leader of the Second International.

The millionaires and multimillionaires would not use their government wireless station for nothing. They considered it necessary to publicise Kautsky's new crusade. In their attempt to stem the advancing tide of Bolshevism they have to grasp at everything—even at a straw, even at Kautsky's book. Our heartfelt thanks to the French millionaires for helping Bolshevism propaganda so splendidly, for helping us by making a laughing-stock of Kautsky's philistine anti-Bolshevism.

Today, September 18, I received the September 7 issue of *Vorwärts*, the newspaper of the German social-chauvinists, the murderers of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. It has an article by Friedrich Stampfer on Kautsky's new book (*Terrorism and Communism*) and cites a number of passages from it. When we compare Stampfer's article and the Paris wireless message we see that the latter is in all probability based on the former. Kautsky's book is extolled by the Scheidemanns and Noskes, the bodyguards of the German bourgeoisie and murderers of the German Communists, by those who have joined the imperialists of the Entente in fighting international communism. A highly edifying spectacle! And when I called Kautsky a lackey of the bourgeoisie (in

my book *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*), our Mensheviks, those typical representatives of the Berne (yellow) International, could not find words strong enough to express their indignation.

But it is a fact, gentlemen, despite all your indignation. The Scheidemanns of *Vorwärts* and the Entente millionaires are certainly not in collusion with me when they praise Kautsky and hold him up as a weapon in the struggle against world Bolshevism. In relation to the bourgeoisie Kautsky—even if he did not realise and did not wish it—has proved to be exactly what I described him to be.

Some of the more "thunderous" of his accusations against the Bolsheviks will show how far he has gone in his apostasy from socialism and the revolution, apostasy that hides behind the name of Marxism.

"Kautsky describes in detail," Stampfer writes, "how the Bolsheviks always, in the end, arrive at the very opposite of their avowed aims: they were opposed to the death sentence, but are now resorting to mass shootings. . . ."

First, it is a downright lie to say that the Bolsheviks were opposed to the death sentence in time of revolution. At the Party's Second Congress in 1903, when Bolshevism first emerged, it was suggested that abolition of the death sentence be made one of the demands in the Party programme then being drawn up, but the minutes record that this only gave rise to the sarcastic question: "For Nicholas II too?" Even the Mensheviks, in 1903, did not venture to call for a vote on the proposal to abolish the death sentence for the tsar. And in 1917, at the time of the Kerensky government, I wrote in *Pravda* that no revolutionary government could dispense with the death sentence; the question was *against which class* a particular government would use it. Kautsky has so far forgotten how to think in terms of revolution and is so steeped in philistine opportunism that he cannot visualise a proletarian revolutionary party openly acknowledging, long before its victory, the need for capital punishment in relation to counter-revolutionaries. "Honest" Kautsky, being an honest man and an honest opportunist, quite unashamedly writes untruths about his opponents.

Secondly, anyone with the least understanding of revolution will realise that here we are not discussing revolution

in general, but a revolution that is developing out of the great imperialist slaughter of the peoples. Can one conceive of a proletarian revolution that develops from such a war being free of counter-revolutionary conspiracies and attacks by hundreds of thousands of officers belonging to the land-owner and capitalist classes? Can one conceive of a working-class revolutionary party that would not make death the penalty for such attacks in the midst of an extremely cruel civil war, with the bourgeoisie conspiring to bring in foreign troops in an attempt to overthrow workers' government? Everyone, save hopeless and ludicrous pedants, must give a negative answer to these questions. But Kautsky is no longer able to see issues in their concrete historical setting in the way he formerly did.

Thirdly. If Kautsky is no longer capable of analysis and writes lies about the Bolsheviks, if he cannot think, or even present the problem of distinctive features of a revolution arising out of four years of war—he could at least take a closer look at what is going on around him. What is proved by the assassination of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg by army officers in the democratic republic of Germany? What is proved by the escape from prison of these officers, who were given preposterously lenient sentences? Herr Kautsky and his whole "independent" party (independent of the proletariat but very much dependent on petty-bourgeois prejudices) evade these issues and resort to snivelling condemnation and philistine lamentations. That is precisely why more and more revolutionary workers the world over are turning away from the Kautskys, Longuets, MacDonalds and Turatis and joining the Communists, for the revolutionary proletariat needs *victory* over counter-revolution, not impotent "condemnation" of it.

Fourthly. The question of "terrorism" is, apparently, basic to Kautsky's book. That is evident from the title, also from Stampfer's remark that "Kautsky is doubtlessly right in asserting that the fundamental principle of the Commune was not terrorism, but universal suffrage". In my *Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky** I cited ample evidence

* See pp. 370-459.—Ed.

to show that all this talk of a "fundamental principle" is a sheer travesty of Marxism. My purpose here is a different one. To show what Kautsky's disquisitions on the subject of "terrorism" are worth, whom, *which class*, they serve, I shall cite in full a short article by a *liberal* writer. It is a letter to *The New Republic* (June 25, 1919), a liberal American journal which, generally speaking, expresses the petty-bourgeois viewpoint. However, it is preferable to Kautsky's in not presenting that viewpoint either as revolutionary socialism or Marxism.

This is the full text of the letter:

MANNERHEIM AND KOLCHAK

Sir: The Allied governments have refused to recognise the Soviet Government of Russia because, as they state:

1. The Soviet Government is—or was—pro-German.
2. The Soviet Government is based on terrorism.
3. The Soviet Government is undemocratic and unrepresentative of the Russian people.

Meanwhile the Allied governments have long since recognised the present whiteguard Government of Finland under the dictatorship of General Mannerheim, although it appears:

1. That German troops aided the whiteguards in crushing the Socialist Republic of Finland, and that General Mannerheim sent repeated telegrams of sympathy and esteem to the Kaiser. Meanwhile the Soviet Government was busily undermining the German Government with propaganda among troops on the Russian front. The Finnish Government was infinitely more pro-German than the Russian.

2. That the present Government of Finland on coming into power executed in cold blood within a few days' time 16,700 members of the old Socialist Republic, and imprisoned in starvation camps 70,000 more. Meanwhile, the total executions in Russia for the year ended November 1, 1918, were officially stated to have been 3,800, including many corrupt Soviet officials as well as counter-revolutionists. The Finnish Government was infinitely more terroristic than the Russian.

3. That after killing and imprisoning nearly 90,000 socialists, and driving some 50,000 more over the border into Russia—and Finland is a small country with an electorate of only about 400,000—the whiteguard government deemed it sufficiently safe to hold elections. In spite of all precautions, a majority of socialists were elected, but General Mannerheim, like the Allies after the Vladivostok elections, allowed not one of them to be seated. Meanwhile the Soviet Government had disenfranchised all those who do no useful work for a living. The Finnish Government was considerably less democratic than the Russian.

And much the same story might be rehearsed in respect to that great champion of democracy and the new order, Admiral Kolchak of Omsk, whom the Allied governments have supported, supplied and equipped, and are now on the point of officially recognising.

Thus every argument that the Allies have urged against the recognition of the Soviets, can be applied with more strength and honesty against Mannerheim and Kolchak. Yet the latter are recognised, and the blockade draws ever tighter about starving Russia.

Stuart Chase

Washington, D.C.

This letter written by a bourgeois liberal, effectively exposes all the vileness of the Kautskys, Martovs, Chernovs, Brantings and other heroes of the Berne yellow International and their betrayal of socialism.

For, first, Kautsky and all these heroes lie about Soviet Russia on the question of terrorism and democracy. Secondly, they do not assess developments from the standpoint of the class struggle as it is actually developing on a world scale and in the sharpest possible form, but from the standpoint of a petty-bourgeois, philistine longing for what might have been if there had been no close link between bourgeois democracy and capitalism, if there were no whiteguards in the world, if they had not been supported by the world bourgeoisie, and so on and so forth. Thirdly, a comparison of this American letter with the writings of Kautsky and Co. will clearly show that Kautsky's *objective* role is servility to the bourgeoisie.

The world bourgeoisie supports the Mannerheims and Kolchaks in an attempt to stifle Soviet power, alleging that it is terrorist and undemocratic. Such are the facts. And Kautsky, Martov, Chernov and Co. are only singing songs about terrorism and democracy in chorus with the bourgeoisie, for the world bourgeoisie is singing this song to deceive the workers and strangle the workers' revolution. The personal honesty of "socialists" who sing the same song "sincerely", i.e., because they are extremely dull-witted, does not in any way alter the objective role played by the song. The "honest opportunists", the Kautskys, Martovs, Longuets and Co., have become "honest" (in their unprecedented spinelessness) *counter-revolutionaries*.

Such are the facts.

An American liberal realises—not because he is theoretically equipped to do so, but simply because he is an attentive observer of developments in a sufficiently broad light, on a world scale—that the *world bourgeoisie has organised and is waging a civil war against the revolutionary proletariat* and, accordingly, is supporting Kolchak and Denikin in Russia, Mannerheim in Finland, the Georgian Mensheviks, those lackeys of the bourgeoisie, in the Caucasus, the Polish imperialists and Polish Kerenskys in Poland, the Scheidemanns in Germany, the counter-revolutionaries (Mensheviks and capitalists) in Hungary, etc., etc.

But Kautsky, like the inveterate reactionary philistine he is, continues snivelling about the fears and horrors of civil war! All semblance of revolutionary understanding, and all semblance of historical realism (for it is high time the inevitability of imperialist war being turned into civil war were realised) have disappeared. This is, furthermore, directly abetting the bourgeoisie, it is *helping* them, and Kautsky is *actually on the side of the bourgeoisie* in the civil war that is being waged, or is obviously being prepared, throughout the world.

His shouting, groaning, weeping and hysteria about the civil war serve to cover up his dismal failure as a theoretician. For the Bolsheviks have proved to be right; in the autumn of 1914 they declared to the world that the *imperialist war would be transformed into civil war*. Reactionaries of every shade were indignant or laughed; but the Bolsheviks were *right*. To conceal their complete failure, their stupidity and short-sightedness, the reactionaries must try to scare the petty bourgeoisie by showing them the horrors of civil war. That is just what Kautsky as a politician is doing.

To what absurd lengths he has gone can be seen from the following. There is no hope of a world revolution, Kautsky asserts—and what do you think he used as an argument? A revolution in Europe on the Russian pattern would mean "*unleashing (Entfesselung) civil war throughout the world for a whole generation*", and moreover not simply unleashing a veritable class war, but a "*fratricidal war among the proletarians*". The italicised words belong to Kautsky and are—admirably of course—quoted by Stampfer.

Yes, Scheidemann's scoundrels and hangmen have good

reason to admire them! Here is a "socialist leader" scaring people with the spectre of revolution and scaring them away from revolution! But, curiously enough, there is one thing Kautsky overlooks; for nearly two years the all-powerful Entente has been fighting against Russia and thereby stirring up revolution in the Entente countries. If the revolution were even to begin now, even if only in its compromising stage and in only one or two of the Entente Great Powers this would *immediately* put an end to the civil war in Russia, would *immediately* liberate *hundreds of millions* in the colonies, where resentment is at boiling-point and is kept in check only by the violence of the European powers.

Kautsky now obviously has another motive for his actions in addition to the foulness of his servile soul that he demonstrated throughout the imperialist war—he *is afraid* of protracted civil war in Russia. And fear prevents him from seeing that the *bourgeoisie of the whole world* is fighting Russia. A revolution in one or two of the European Great Powers would completely *undermine* the rule of the world bourgeoisie, destroy the very *foundations* of its domination and leave it no safe haven *anywhere*.

The two-year war of the world bourgeoisie against Russia's revolutionary proletariat actually *encourages* revolutionaries everywhere, for it *proves* that victory on a *world scale* is very near and easy.

As far as civil war "among the proletarians" is concerned, we have heard that argument from the Chernovs and Martovs. To assess its utter dishonesty, let us take a simple example. During the great French Revolution, part of the peasants, the Vendée peasants, fought for the King against the Republic. In June 1848 and May 1871 part of the workers served in the armies of Cavaignac and Galliffet, the armies that stifled the revolution. What would you say of a man who took this line of argument: I regret the "civil war among the peasants in France in 1792 and among the workers in 1848 and 1871"? You would have to say that he was a hypocrite and defender of reaction, the monarchy and the Cavaignacs.

And you would be right.

Today only a hopeless idiot could fail to understand that what has taken place in Russia (and is beginning or maturing

in the rest of the world) is a civil war of the proletariat *against the bourgeoisie*. There never has been, and never can be, a class struggle in which *part* of the advanced class does not remain on the side of the reactionary forces. That applies to civil war too. Part of the backward workers are bound to help the bourgeoisie—for a longer or shorter period. But only scoundrels can use *that* to justify *their* desertion to the bourgeoisie.

Theoretically, this is a refusal to understand what the facts of the development of the world labour movement have been screaming and shouting about since 1914. The break-away of the *top strata* of the working class, corrupted by a middle-class way of life and opportunism and *bribed* by "soft jobs" and other bourgeois sops, began to take shape on a world scale in the autumn of 1914 and reached its full development between 1915 and 1918. By disregarding this historical fact and blaming the Communists for the split in the movement, Kautsky is only demonstrating, for the thousandth time, his role of lackey of the bourgeoisie.

For forty years, from 1852 to 1892, Marx and Engels spoke of part (i.e., the *top strata*, the leaders, the "aristocracy") of the workers in Britain *becoming increasingly bourgeois*, owing to that country's colonial advantages and her monopolies. It is clear as daylight that the twentieth-century imperialist monopolies in a number of other countries were bound to create the same phenomenon as in Britain. In all the advanced countries we see corruption, bribery, desertion to the bourgeoisie by the *leaders of the working class* and its *top strata* in consequence of the doles handed out by the bourgeoisie, who provide these leaders with "soft jobs", give crumbs from their profits to these upper strata, shift the burden of the worst paid and hardest work to backward workers brought into the country, and enhance the privileges of the "labour aristocracy" as compared with the majority of the working class.

The war of 1914-18 has given conclusive proof of treachery to socialism and desertion to the bourgeoisie by the *leaders and top strata* of the proletariat, by all the social-chauvinists, Gomperses, Brantings, Renaudels, MacDonalds, Scheidemanns, etc. And it goes without saying that for a time part of the workers by sheer inertia follow these bourgeois scoundrels.

The Berne International of the Huysmanses, Vanderveldes and Scheidemanns has now taken full shape as the yellow International of these traitors to socialism. If they are not fought, if a split with them is not effected, there can be no question of any *real* socialism, of any *sincere* work for the benefit of the social revolution.

Let the German Independents try to sit between two stools—such is their fate. The Scheidemanns embrace Kautsky as their “own man”. Stampfer advertises this. Indeed, Kautsky is a worthy comrade of the Scheidemanns. When Hilferding, another Independent and friend of Kautsky’s, proposed at Lucerne²⁷¹ that the Scheidemanns be expelled from the International, the real leaders of the yellow International only laughed at him. His proposal was either a piece of extreme foolishness or a piece of extreme hypocrisy; he wanted to parade as a Left among the worker masses and, at the same time, retain his place in the International of bourgeois servitors! Regardless of what motivated this leader (Hilferding), the following is beyond doubt—the spinelessness of the Independents and the perfidy of the Scheidemanns, Brantings and Vanderveldes are bound to result in a stronger movement of the proletarian masses *away from these traitorous leaders*. In some countries imperialism can continue to divide the workers for a fairly long time to come. The example of Britain is proof of that, but the *unification* of the revolutionaries, and the uniting of the masses with the revolutionaries and the expulsion of the yellow elements are, on a world scale, proceeding steadily and surely. The tremendous success of the Communist International is proof of it: in America, a Communist Party has already been formed,²⁷² in Paris, the Committee for the Re-establishment of International Contacts and the Syndicalist Defence Committee²⁷³ have come out for the Third International, and two Paris papers have sided with the Third International: Raymond Péricat’s *L’Internationale*²⁷⁴ and Georges Anquetil’s *Le Titre censuré*²⁷⁵ (*Bolshevik?*). In Britain, we are on the eve of the organisation of a Communist Party with which the best elements in the British Socialist Party, the Shop Stewards Committees, the revolutionary trade-unionists, etc., are in solidarity. The Swedish Lefts, the Norwegian Social-Democrats, the Dutch Communists, the Swiss

and Italian Socialist parties stand solid with the German Spartacists and the Russian Bolsheviks.

In the few months since its organisation early this year, the Communist International has become a world organisation leading the masses and unconditionally hostile to the betrayers of socialism in the yellow International of the Berne and Lucerne fraternity.

In conclusion, here is a highly instructive communication that casts light on the part played by the opportunist leaders. The conference of yellow socialists in Lucerne this August was reported by the Geneva paper *La Feuille*²⁷⁶ in a special supplement appearing in several languages. The English edition (No. 4, Wednesday, August 6) carried an interview with Troelstra, the well-known leader of the opportunist party in Holland.

Troelstra said that the German revolution of November 9 had caused a good deal of agitation among Dutch political and trade union leaders. For a few days the ruling groups in Holland were in a state of panic especially as there was practically universal unrest in the army.

The Mayors of Rotterdam and The Hague, he continues, sought to build up their own organisations as an auxiliary force of the counter-revolution. A committee composed of former generals—among them an old officer who prided himself on having shared in the suppression of the Boxer rebellion in China—tried to mislead several of our comrades into taking up arms against the revolution. Naturally, their efforts had the very opposite result and in Rotterdam, at one time, it seemed that a workers' council would be set up. But the political and trade union leaders believed such methods premature and confined themselves to formulating a workers' minimum programme and publishing a strongly worded appeal to the masses.

That is what Troelstra said. He also bragged a good deal, describing how he had delivered revolutionary speeches calling even for the seizure of power, how he realised the inadequacy of parliament and political democracy as such, how he recognised "illegal methods" of struggle and "dictatorship of the proletariat" in the transition period, and so on and so forth.

Troelstra is a typical specimen of the venal, opportunist leader who serves the bourgeoisie and deceives the workers. In words he will accept *everything*—workers' councils, proletarian dictatorship and whatever else you wish. But actually he is a vile betrayer of the workers, an agent of the bourgeoisie. He is the *leader* of those "political and trade union leaders"

that *saved the Dutch bourgeoisie* by joining forces with them at the decisive moment.

For the facts revealed by Troelstra are perfectly clear and point in a very definite direction. The Dutch army had been mobilised, the proletariat was armed and united, in the army, with the poor sections of the people. The German revolution inspired the workers to rise, and there was "practically universal unrest in the army". Obviously, the duty of revolutionary leaders was to lead the masses towards revolution, not to *miss* the opportune moment, when the arming of the workers and the influence of the German revolution could have decided the issue at one stroke.

But the reasonable leaders, with Troelstra at their head, joined forces with the bourgeoisie. The workers were stalled off with reforms and still more with promises of reforms. "Strongly worded appeals" and revolutionary phrases were used to placate—and deceive—the workers. It was the Troelstras and similar "leaders", who make up the Second International of Berne and Lucerne, that saved the capitalists by helping the bourgeoisie demobilise the army.

The labour movement will march forward, ousting these traitors and betrayers, the Troelstras and the Kautskys, ridding itself of the upper stratum that has turned bourgeois, is misleading the masses and pursuing capitalist policies.

N. Lenin

September 20, 1919

P.S. Judging by Stampfer's article, Kautsky is now silent on the Soviet political system. Has he surrendered on this cardinal issue? Is he no longer prepared to defend the banalities set forth in his pamphlet *against The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*? Does he prefer to pass from this *chief* issue to secondary ones? The answer to all these questions must await examination of Kautsky's pamphlet.

GREETINGS TO ITALIAN, FRENCH AND GERMAN COMMUNISTS

Scant indeed is the news we get from abroad. The blockade by the imperialist beasts is in full swing; the violence of the biggest world powers is turned against us in the hope of restoring the rule of the exploiters. And all this bestial fury of the Russian and world capitalists is cloaked, needless to say, in phrases about the lofty significance of "democracy"! The exploiter camp is true to itself; it depicts bourgeois democracy as "democracy" in general. And all the philistines and petty bourgeois, down to Friedrich Adler, Karl Kautsky and the majority of the leaders of the Independent (that is, independent of the revolutionary proletariat but dependent on petty-bourgeois prejudices) Social-Democratic Party of Germany, join in the chorus.

But the more infrequently we in Russia receive news from abroad, the greater the joy with which we follow the gigantic, universal advance of communism among the workers in all the countries of the world, the successful severance of the masses from the corrupt and treacherous leaders who, from Scheidemann to Kautsky, have gone over to the bourgeoisie.

All that we know of the Italian Party is that its Congress has resolved by a huge majority of affiliate to the Third International and to adopt the programme of the dictatorship of the proletariat.²⁷⁷ Thus, the Italian Socialist Party has, in practice, aligned itself with communism, though to our regret it still retains its old name. Warm greetings to the Italian workers and their party!

All that we know of France is that in Paris alone there are already two communist newspapers: *L'Internationale* edited by Raymond Péricat, and *Le Titre censuré* edited by

Georges Anquetil. A number of proletarian organisations have already affiliated to the Third International. The sympathies of the workers are undoubtedly on the side of communism and Soviet power.

Of the German Communists we know only that communist newspapers are published in a number of towns. Many bear the name *Die Rote Fahne*.²⁷⁸ The Berlin *Rote Fahne*, an illegal publication, is battling heroically against the Scheidemanns and Noskes, the butchers who play flunkey to the bourgeoisie in deeds, just as the Independents do in words and in their "ideological" (petty-bourgeois ideological) propaganda.

The heroic struggle of *Die Rote Fahne*, the Berlin communist paper, evokes whole-hearted admiration. At last we see in Germany honest and sincere socialists, who, despite all persecution, despite the foul murder of their best leaders, have remained firm and unbending! At last we see in Germany communist workers who are waging a heroic struggle that really deserves to be called "revolutionary"! At last there has emerged from the very midst of the proletarian masses in Germany a force for which the words "proletarian revolution" have become a *truth*!

Greetings to the German Communists!

The Scheidemanns and Kautskys, the Renners and Friedrich Adlers, great as the difference between these gentlemen in the sense of personal integrity may probably be, have in equal measure proved to be petty bourgeois, most shameful traitors to and betrayers of socialism, supporters of the bourgeoisie. For in 1912 all of them took part in drafting and signing the Basle Manifesto on the approaching imperialist war, all of them spoke then about "*proletarian* revolution", and all of them proved in practice to be petty-bourgeois democrats, knights of philistine-republican, bourgeois-democratic illusions, accomplices of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

The savage persecution to which the German Communists have been subjected has strengthened them. If at the moment they are somewhat disunited, this testifies to the breadth and mass character of their movement, to the vigour with which communism is growing out of the very midst of the masses of workers. It is inevitable that a movement so ruthlessly persecuted by the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and their

Scheidemann-Noske henchmen and forced to organise illegally should be disunited.

And it is natural, too, that a movement which is growing so rapidly and experiencing such desperate persecution should give rise to rather sharp differences. There is nothing terrible in that; it is a matter of growing pains.

Let the Scheidemanns and Kautskys gloat in their *Vorwärts* and *Freiheit* about the differences among the Communists. There is nothing left for these heroes of rotten philistinism but to cover up their rottenness by pointing to the Communists. But if we take the real state of affairs we realise that only the blind can now fail to see the truth. And the truth is that the followers of Scheidemann and Kautsky have shamelessly *betrayed* the proletarian revolution in Germany, *broken faith with it* and have, *in fact*, sided with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. Heinrich Laufenberg in his excellent pamphlet, *From the First Revolution to the Second*, demonstrated this and proved it with remarkable force, vividness, clarity and conviction. The differences among the followers of Scheidemann and Kautsky are differences within disintegrating, dying parties of which there remain only leaders without masses, generals without armies. The masses are abandoning the Scheidemanns and going over to the Kautskys, being attracted by their Left wing (this is borne out by any report of a mass meeting), and this Left wing combines—in unprincipled and cowardly fashion—the old prejudices of the petty bourgeoisie about parliamentary democracy with communist recognition of the proletarian revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet power.

Under mass pressure, the rotten leaders of the Independents acknowledge all this *in words*, but in deeds they remain petty-bourgeois democrats, "socialists" of the type of Louis Blanc and the other dolts of 1848 who were so mercilessly ridiculed and branded by Marx.

Here we have differences that are really irreconcilable. There can be no peace, no joint work, between the proletarian revolutionaries and the philistines, who, like those of 1848, worship at the shrine of bourgeois "democracy" without understanding its bourgeois nature. Haase and Kautsky, Friedrich Adler and Otto Bauer can twist and squirm as much as they like, use up reams of paper and make endless

speeches, but they cannot get away from the fact that *in practice* they absolutely fail to understand the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet power, that *in practice* they are petty-bourgeois democrats, "socialists" of the Louis Blanc and Ledru-Rollin type, that *in practice* they are, at best, puppets in the hands of the bourgeoisie, and, at worst, direct hirelings of the bourgeoisie.

The Independents, the Kautskyites and the Austrian Social-Democrats *seem* to be united parties; actually, on the basic, chief and most essential issue, most of their party members do *not* agree with the leaders. The party membership *will wage* a proletarian revolutionary struggle for Soviet power the very moment a new crisis sets in, and the "leaders" will act as counter-revolutionaries as they do now. To sit between two stools is not a difficult matter in words; Hilferding in Germany and Friedrich Adler in Austria are giving a model display of this noble art.

But people who try to reconcile the irreconcilable will prove to be mere soap-bubbles in the heat of the revolutionary struggle. This was demonstrated by all the "socialist" heroes of 1848, by their Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary kindred in Russia in 1917-19, and is being demonstrated by all the knights of the Berne, or yellow, Second International.

The differences among the Communists are of another kind. Only those who do not want to cannot see the fundamental distinction. The differences among the Communists are differences between representatives of a mass movement that has grown with incredible rapidity; and the Communists have a single, common, granite-like foundation—recognition of the proletarian revolution and of the struggle against bourgeois-democratic illusions and bourgeois-democratic parliamentarism, and recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet power.

On *such* a basis differences are nothing to worry about, they represent growing pains, not senile decay. Bolshevism, too, has experienced differences of this kind more than once, as well as minor breakaways caused by such differences, but at the decisive moment, at the moment of taking power and establishing the Soviet Republic, Bolshevism was united; it drew to itself all that was best in the trends of socialist thought akin to it and rallied round itself the *entire* vanguard

of the proletariat and the *overwhelming majority* of the working people.

And so it will be with the German Communists, too.

The followers of Scheidemann and Kautsky still talk about "democracy" in general, they still live in the ideas of 1848, they are Marxists in words, Louis Blancs in deeds. They prattle about the "majority" and believe that equality of ballot-papers signifies equality of exploited and exploiter, of worker and capitalist, of poor and rich, of the hungry and the satiated.

The Scheidemanns and the Kautskys would have us believe that the kind-hearted, honest, noble, peace-loving capitalists have never used the force of wealth, the force of money, the power of capital, the oppression of bureaucracy and military dictatorship, but have decided matters truly "by majority"!

The Scheidemanns and the Kautskys (partly from hypocrisy, partly from extreme stupidity, instilled by decades of reformist activity) *prettify* bourgeois democracy, bourgeois parliamentarism and the bourgeois republic, so as to make it appear that the capitalists decide affairs of state by the will of the majority, and not by the will of capital, not by means of deception and oppression and the violence of the rich against the poor.

The Scheidemanns and Kautskys are ready to "recognise" the proletarian revolution, but only with the proviso that first, while the force, power, oppression and privileges of capital and wealth *are retained*, the majority of the people shall vote (with the voting supervised by the bourgeois apparatus of state power) "*for revolution*"! It is difficult to imagine the extent of the philistine stupidity displayed in these views, or the extent of the philistine gullibility (*Vertrauensduselei*) in the capitalists, in the bourgeoisie, in the generals, and in the bourgeois apparatus of state power.

Actually, it is precisely the bourgeoisie that has always played the hypocrite by characterising formal equality as "democracy", and in practice using force against the poor, the working people, the small peasants and the workers, by employing countless means of deception, oppression, etc. The imperialist war (that the Scheidemanns and the Kautskys painted in shamelessly bright colours) has made this plain to millions of people. Proletarian dictatorship is the *sole*

means of defending the working people against the oppression of capital, the violence of bourgeois military dictatorship, and imperialist war. Proletarian dictatorship is the sole step to equality and democracy *in practice*, not on paper, but in life, not in political phrase-mongering, but in economic reality.

Having failed to understand this, the Scheidemanns and the Kautskys proved to be contemptible traitors to socialism and defenders of the ideas of the bourgeoisie.

* * *

The Kautskyite (or Independent) party is dying. It is bound to die and disintegrate soon as a result of the differences between its predominantly revolutionary membership and its counter-revolutionary "leaders".

The Communist Party, experiencing exactly the same (essentially the same) differences as were experienced by Bolshevism, will grow stronger and become as hard as steel.

The differences among the German Communists boil down, so far as I can judge, to the question of "utilising the legal possibilities" (as the Bolsheviks used to say in the 1910-13 period), of utilising the bourgeois parliament, the reactionary trade unions, the "works' councils law" (*Betriebsratgesetz*), bodies that have been hamstrung by the Scheidemanns and Kautskys; it is a question of whether to participate in such bodies or boycott them.

We Russian Bolsheviks experienced quite similar differences in 1906 and in the 1910-12 period. And for us it is clear that with many of the young German Communists it is simply a case of a lack of revolutionary experience. Had they experienced a couple of bourgeois revolutions (1905 and 1917), they would not be advocating the boycott so unconditionally, nor fall from time to time into the mistakes of syndicalism.

This is a matter of growing pains; the movement is developing in fine style and as it grows they will pass. And these obvious mistakes must be combated openly; the differences must not be exaggerated since it must be clear to everyone that in the near future the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for Soviet power, will wipe out the greater part of them.

Both from the standpoint of Marxist theory and the experience of three revolutions (1905, February 1917 and October 1917) I regard refusal to participate in a bourgeois parliament, in a reactionary (Legien, Gompers, etc.) trade union, in an ultra-reactionary workers' council hamstrung by the Scheidemanns, etc., as an undoubted mistake.

At times, in individual cases, in individual countries, the boycott is correct, as, for example, was the Bolshevik boycott of the tsarist Duma in 1905. But the selfsame Bolsheviks took part in the much more reactionary and downright counter-revolutionary Duma of 1907. The Bolsheviks contested the elections to the bourgeois Constituent Assembly in 1917, and in 1918 we dispersed it, to the horror of the philistine democrats, the Kautskys and other such renegades from socialism. We worked in the ultra-reactionary, purely Menshevik, trade unions which (in their counter-revolutionary nature) yielded nothing to the Legien unions—the foulest and most reactionary trade unions in Germany. Even now, two years after the conquest of state power, we have not yet finished fighting the remnants of the Menshevik (i.e., the Scheidemann, Kautsky, Gompers, etc.) trade unions—so long is the process! So strong in some places and in some trades is the influence of petty-bourgeois ideas!

At one time we were in a minority in the Soviets, the trade unions and the co-operatives. By persistent effort and long struggle—both *before and after* the conquest of political power—we won a majority, first in *all workers' organisations*, then in non-worker and, finally, even in small-peasant organisations.

Only scoundrels or simpletons can think that the proletariat must first win a majority in elections carried out *under the yoke of the bourgeoisie*, under the *yoke of wage-slavery*, and must then win power. This is the height of stupidity or hypocrisy; it is substituting elections, under the old system and with the old power, for class struggle and revolution.

The proletariat wages its class struggle and does not wait for elections to begin a strike, although for the complete success of a strike it is necessary to have the sympathy of the majority of the working people (and, it follows, of the majority of the population); the proletariat wages its class struggle and overthrows the bourgeoisie without waiting for any

preliminary elections (supervised by the bourgeoisie and carried out under its yoke); and the proletariat is perfectly well aware that for the success of its revolution, for the successful overthrow of the bourgeoisie, it is *absolutely necessary* to have the sympathy of the majority of the working people (and, it follows, of the majority of the population).

The parliamentary cretins and latter-day Louis Blancs "insist" absolutely on elections, on elections that are most certainly supervised by the bourgeoisie, to ascertain whether they have the sympathy of the majority of the working people. But this is the attitude of pedants, of living corpses, or of cunning tricksters.

Real life and the history of actual revolutions show that quite often the "sympathy of the majority of the working people" cannot be demonstrated by any elections (to say nothing of elections supervised by the exploiters, with "equality" of exploiters and exploited!). Quite often the "sympathy of the majority of the working people" is demonstrated *not* by elections at all, but by the growth of one of the parties, or by its increased representation in the Soviets, or by the success of a strike which for some reason has acquired enormous significance, or by successes won in civil war, etc., etc.

The history of our revolution has shown, for example, that sympathy for the dictatorship of the proletariat on the part of the majority of the working people in the boundless expanses of the Urals and Siberia was ascertained not by means of elections, but by the experience of a year of the tsarist general Kolchak's rule in that area. Incidentally, Kolchak's rule also began with a "coalition" of the Scheidemann and Kautsky crowd (in Russian they are called Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, supporters of the Constituent Assembly), just as in Germany at the moment the Haases and Scheidemanns, through their "coalition", are paving the way to power for von Goltz or Ludendorff and covering up this power and making it look decent. In parenthesis it should be said that the Haase-Scheidemann coalition in the government has ended, but the political coalition of these betrayers of socialism remains. Proof: Kautsky's books, Stampfer's articles in *Vorwärts*, the articles by the Kautskys and the Scheidemanns about their "unification", and so on.

The proletarian revolution is impossible without the

sympathy and support of the overwhelming majority of the working people for their vanguard—the proletariat. But this sympathy and this support are not forthcoming immediately and are not decided by elections. They are *won* in the course of long, arduous and stern class struggle. The class struggle waged by the proletariat *for* the sympathy and support of the majority of the working people does not end with the conquest of political power by the proletariat. *After* the conquest of power this struggle *continues*, but in *other* forms. In the Russian revolution the circumstances were exceptionally favourable for the proletariat (in its struggle for its dictatorship), since the proletarian revolution took place at a time when all the people were under arms and when the peasantry as a whole, disgusted by the “Kautskyite” policy of the social-traitors, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, wanted the overthrow of the rule of the landowners.

But even in Russia, where things were exceptionally favourable at the moment of the proletarian revolution, where a most remarkable unity of the entire proletariat, the entire army and the entire peasantry was achieved at once—even in Russia, the proletariat, exercising its dictatorship, had to struggle for months and years to win the sympathy and support of the majority of the working people. After two years this struggle has practically, but still not completely, ended in favour of the proletariat. In two years we have won the full sympathy and support of the overwhelming majority of the workers and labouring peasants of Great Russia, including the Urals and Siberia, but as yet we have not won the full support and sympathy of the majority of the working peasants (as distinct from the peasant exploiters) of the Ukraine. We *could* be (but shall not be) crushed by the military might of the Entente, but *inside* Russia we *now* have such sound sympathy, and from such an enormous majority of the working people, that our state is the most democratic state the world has ever seen.

One has only to give some thought to this complex, difficult and long history of proletarian struggle for power—a struggle rich in the extraordinary variety of forms and in the unusual abundance of sharp changes, turns and switches from one form to another—to see clearly the error of those who would “forbid” participation in bourgeois parliaments, reactionary

trade unions, tsarist or Scheidemann Shop Stewards Committees or works' councils, and so on and so forth. This error is due to the lack of revolutionary experience among quite sincere, convinced and valiant working-class revolutionaries. Consequently, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg were a thousand times right in January 1919 when they realised this mistake, pointed it out, but nevertheless chose to remain with the proletarian revolutionaries, mistaken though they were on a minor question, rather than side with the traitors to socialism, the Scheidemanns and the Kautskys, who made no mistake on the question of participating in bourgeois parliaments, but had ceased to be socialists and had become philistine democrats and accomplices of the bourgeoisie.

A mistake, however, remains a mistake and it is necessary to criticise it and fight for its rectification.

The fight against the traitors to socialism, the Scheidemanns and the Kautskys, must be waged mercilessly, but not on the issue of for or against participation in bourgeois parliaments, reactionary trade unions, etc. This would be an obvious mistake, and a bigger mistake still would be to retreat from the ideas of Marxism and its practical line (a strong, centralised political party) to the ideas and practice of syndicalism. It is necessary to work for the Party's participation in bourgeois parliaments, in reactionary trade unions and in "works' councils" that have been mutilated and castrated in Scheidemann fashion, for the Party to be wherever workers are to be found, wherever it is possible to talk to workers, to influence the working masses. Legal and illegal work must at all costs be combined, the illegal Party, through its *workers'* organisations, must exercise systematic, constant and strict control over legal activity. This is no easy matter, but the proletarian revolution, generally speaking, knows nothing and can know nothing of "easy" tasks or "easy" means of struggle.

This difficult task must be carried out at all costs. The Scheidemann and Kautsky gang differ from us not only (and not chiefly) because they do not recognise the armed uprising and we do. The chief and radical difference is that in *all* spheres of work (in bourgeois parliaments, trade unions, co-operatives, journalistic work, etc.) they pursue an inconsistent, opportunist policy, even a policy of downright treachery and betrayal.

Fight against the social-traitors, against reformism and opportunism—this political line can and must be followed without exception in *all* spheres of our struggle. And then we shall win the working masses. And the vanguard of the proletariat, the Marxist centralised political party together with the working masses, will take the people along the true road to the triumph of proletarian dictatorship, to proletarian instead of bourgeois democracy, to the Soviet Republic, to the socialist system.

In the space of a few months the Third International has won a number of glorious, unprecedented victories. The speed of its growth is astonishing. Particular mistakes and growing pains give no grounds for alarm. By criticising them directly and openly, we shall ensure that the working masses of all cultured countries, educated in the spirit of Marxism, quickly rid themselves of the betrayers of socialism, the Scheidemanns and Kautskys of *all* nations (for these traitors are to be found in all nations).

The victory of communism is inevitable. Communism will triumph.

October 10, 1919

N. Lenin

"LEFT-WING" COMMUNISM—AN INFANTILE DISORDER

(Excerpts)

IV

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST WHICH ENEMIES WITHIN THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT HELPED BOLSHEVISM DEVELOP, GAIN STRENGTH, AND BECOME STEELED

First and foremost, the struggle against opportunism, which in 1914 definitely developed into social-chauvinism and definitely sided with the bourgeoisie, against the proletariat. Naturally, this was Bolshevism's principal enemy within the working-class movement. It still remains the principal enemy on an international scale. The Bolsheviks have been devoting the greatest attention to this enemy. This aspect of Bolshevik activities is now fairly well known abroad too.

It was, however, different with Bolshevism's other enemy within the working-class movement. Little is known in other countries of the fact that Bolshevism took shape, developed and became steeled in the long years of struggle against *petty-bourgeois revolutionism*, which smacks of anarchism, or borrows something from the latter and, in all essential matters, does not measure up to the conditions and requirements of a consistently proletarian class struggle. Marxist theory has established—and the experience of all European revolutions and revolutionary movements has fully confirmed—that the petty proprietor, the small master (a social type existing on a very extensive and even mass scale in many European countries), who, under capitalism, always suffers oppression and very frequently a most acute and rapid deterioration in his conditions of life, and even ruin, easily goes to revolutionary extremes, but is incapable of perseverance, organisation, discipline and steadfastness. A petty bourgeois driven to frenzy by the horrors of capitalism is a social phenomenon which, like anarchism, is characteristic of

all capitalist countries. The instability of such revolutionism, its barrenness, and its tendency to turn rapidly into submission, apathy, phantasms, and even a frenzied infatuation with one bourgeois fad or another—all this is common knowledge. However, a theoretical or abstract recognition of these truths does not at all rid revolutionary parties of old errors, which always crop up at unexpected occasions, in somewhat new forms, in a hitherto unfamiliar garb or surroundings, in an unusual—a more or less unusual—situation.

Anarchism was not infrequently a kind of penalty for the opportunist sins of the working-class movement. The two monstrosities complemented each other. And if in Russia—despite the more petty-bourgeois composition of her population as compared with the other European countries—anarchism's influence was negligible during the two revolutions (of 1905 and 1917) and the preparations for them, this should no doubt stand partly to the credit of Bolshevism, which has always waged a most ruthless and uncompromising struggle against opportunism. I say "partly", since of still greater importance in weakening anarchism's influence in Russia was the circumstance that in the past (the seventies of the nineteenth century) it was able to develop inordinately and to reveal its absolute erroneousness, its unfitness to serve the revolutionary class as a guiding theory.

When it came into being in 1903, Bolshevism took over the tradition of a ruthless struggle against petty-bourgeois, semi-anarchist (or dilettante-anarchist) revolutionism, a tradition which had always existed in revolutionary Social-Democracy and had become particularly strong in our country during the years 1900-03, when the foundations for a mass party of the revolutionary proletariat were being laid in Russia. Bolshevism took over and carried on the struggle against a party which, more than any other, expressed the tendencies of petty-bourgeois revolutionism, namely, the "Socialist-Revolutionary" Party, and waged that struggle on three main issues. First, that party, which rejected Marxism, stubbornly refused (or, it might be more correct to say: was unable) to understand the need for a strictly objective appraisal of the class forces and their alignment, before taking any political action. Second, this party considered itself particularly "revolutionary", or "Left", because of its recogni-

tion of individual terrorism, assassination—something that we, Marxists, emphatically rejected. It was, of course, only on grounds of expediency that we rejected individual terrorism, whereas people who were capable of condemning “on principle” the terror of the Great French Revolution, or, in general, the terror employed by a victorious revolutionary party which is besieged by the bourgeoisie of the whole world, were ridiculed and laughed to scorn by Plekhanov in 1900-03, when he was a Marxist and a revolutionary. Third, the “Socialist-Revolutionaries” thought it very “Left” to sneer at the comparatively insignificant opportunist sins of the German Social-Democratic Party, while they themselves imitated the extreme opportunists of that party, for example, on the agrarian question, or on the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

History, incidentally, has now confirmed on a vast and world-wide scale the opinion we have always advocated, namely, that *revolutionary* German Social-Democracy (note that as far back as 1900-03 Plekhanov demanded Bernstein’s expulsion from the party, and the Bolsheviks, always continuing this tradition, in 1913 exposed Legien’s baseness, vileness and treachery) *came closest* to becoming the party that the revolutionary proletariat needs in order to achieve victory. Today, in 1920, after all the ignominious failures and crises of the war period and the early post-war years, it can be plainly seen that, of all the Western parties, the German revolutionary Social-Democrats produced the finest leaders, and recovered and gained new strength more rapidly than the others did. This may be seen in the instances both of the Spartacists and the Left, proletarian wing of the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany,²⁷⁹ which is waging an incessant struggle against the opportunism and spinelessness of the Kautskys, Hilferdings, Ledebours and Crispiens. If we now cast a glance to take in a complete historical period, namely, from the Paris Commune to the first Socialist Soviet Republic, we shall find that Marxism’s attitude to anarchism in general stands out most definitely and unmistakably. In the final analysis, Marxism proved to be correct, and although the anarchists rightly pointed to the opportunist views on the state prevalent among most of the socialist parties, it must be said, first, that this opportunism was connected with

the distortion, and even deliberate suppression, of Marx's views on the state (in my book, *The State and Revolution*, I pointed out that for thirty-six years, from 1875 to 1911, Bebel withheld a letter by Engels, which very clearly, vividly, bluntly and definitively exposed the opportunism of the current Social-Democratic views on the state); second, that the rectification of these opportunist views, and the recognition of Soviet power and its superiority to bourgeois parliamentary democracy proceeded most rapidly and extensively among those trends in the socialist parties of Europe and America that were most Marxist.

The struggle that Bolshevism waged against "Left" deviations within its own Party assumed particularly large proportions on two occasions: in 1908, on the questions of whether or not to participate in a most reactionary "parliament" and in the legal workers' societies, which were being restricted by most reactionary laws; and again in 1918 (the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk²⁸⁰), on the question of whether one "compromise" or another was permissible.

In 1908 the "Left" Bolsheviks were expelled from our Party for stubbornly refusing to understand the necessity of participating in a most reactionary "parliament": The "Lefts"—among whom there were many splendid revolutionaries who subsequently were (and still are) commendable members of the Communist Party—based themselves particularly on the successful experience of the 1905 boycott. When, in August 1905, the tsar proclaimed the convocation of a consultative "parliament", the Bolsheviks called for its boycott, in the teeth of all the opposition parties and the Mensheviks, and the "parliament" was in fact swept away by the revolution of October 1905. The boycott proved correct at the time, not because non-participation in reactionary parliaments is correct in general, but because we accurately appraised the objective situation, which was leading to the rapid development of the mass strikes first into a political strike, then into a revolutionary strike, and finally into an uprising. Moreover, the struggle centred at that time on the question of whether the convocation of the first representative assembly should be left to the tsar, or an attempt should be made to wrest its convocation from the old regime. When there was not, and could not be, any certainty that the objective situation was

of a similar kind, and when there was no certainty of a similar trend and the same rate of development, the boycott was no longer correct.

The Bolsheviks' boycott of "parliament" in 1905 enriched the revolutionary proletariat with highly valuable political experience and showed that, when legal and illegal, parliamentary and non-parliamentary forms of struggle are combined, it is sometimes useful and even essential to reject parliamentary forms. It would, however, be highly erroneous to apply this experience blindly, imitatively and uncritically to *other* conditions and *other* situations. The Bolsheviks' boycott of the Duma in 1906 was a mistake, although a minor and easily remediable one.* The boycott of the Duma in 1907, 1908 and subsequent years was a most serious error and difficult to remedy, because, on the one hand, a very rapid rise of the revolutionary tide and its conversion into an uprising was not to be expected, and, on the other hand, the entire historical situation attendant upon the renovation of the bourgeois monarchy called for legal and illegal activities being combined. Today, when we look back at this fully completed historical period, whose connection with subsequent periods has now become quite clear, it becomes most obvious that in 1908-14 the Bolsheviks *could not have* preserved (let alone strengthened and developed) the core of the revolutionary party of the proletariat, had they not upheld, in a most strenuous struggle, the viewpoint that it was *obligatory* to combine legal and illegal forms of struggle, and that it was *obligatory* to participate even in a most reactionary parliament and in a number of other institutions hemmed in by reactionary laws (sick benefit societies, etc.).

In 1918 things did not reach a split. At that time the "Left" Communists formed only a separate group or "faction" within our Party, and that not for long. In the same year, 1918, the most prominent representatives of "Left Communism", for example, Comrades Radek and Bukharin, openly acknowl-

* What applies to individuals also applies—with necessary modifications—to politics and parties. It is not he who makes no mistakes that is intelligent. There are no such men, nor can there be. It is he whose errors are not very grave and who is able to rectify them easily and quickly that is intelligent.

edged their error. It had seemed to them that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was a compromise with the imperialists, which was inexcusable on principle and harmful to the party of the revolutionary proletariat. It was indeed a compromise with the imperialists, but it was a compromise which, under the circumstances, *had to be made*.

Today, when I hear our tactics at the time of the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty being attacked by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, for instance, or when I hear Comrade Lansbury say, in a conversation with me, "Our British trade union leaders say that if it was permissible for the Bolsheviks to compromise, it is permissible for them to compromise too", I usually reply by first of all giving a simple and "popular" example:

Imagine that your car is held up by armed bandits. You hand them over your money, passport, revolver and car. In return you are rid of the pleasant company of the bandits. That is unquestionably a compromise. "*Do ut des*" (I "give" you money, fire-arms and a car "so that you give" me the opportunity to get away from you with a whole skin). It would, however, be difficult to find a sane man who would declare such a compromise to be "inadmissible on principle", or who would call the compromiser an accomplice of the bandits (even though the bandits might use the car and the fire-arms for further robberies). Our compromise with the bandits of German imperialism was just that kind of compromise.

But when, in 1914-18 and then in 1918-20, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in Russia, the Scheidemannites (and to a large extent the Kautskyites) in Germany, Otto Bauer and Friedrich Adler (to say nothing of the Renners and Co.) in Austria, the Renaudels and Longuets and Co. in France, the Fabians, the Independents and the Labourites in Britain entered into *compromises* with the bandits of their own bourgeoisie, and sometimes of the "Allied" bourgeoisie, and *against* the revolutionary proletariat of their own countries, all these gentlemen were actually acting as *accomplices in banditry*.

The conclusion is clear: to reject compromises "on principle", to reject the permissibility of compromises in general, no matter of what kind, is childishness, which it is difficult even to consider seriously. A political leader who desires to

be useful to the revolutionary proletariat must be able to distinguish *concrete* cases of compromises that are inexcusable and are an expression of opportunism and treachery; he must direct all the force of criticism, the full intensity of merciless exposure and relentless war, against *these concrete* compromises, and not allow the past masters of "practical" socialism and the parliamentary Jesuits to dodge and wriggle out of responsibility by means of disquisitions on "compromises in general". It is in this way that the "leaders" of the British trade unions, as well as of the Fabian society and the "Independent" Labour Party, dodge responsibility *for the treachery they have perpetrated*, for having made a *compromise* that is really tantamount to the worst kind of opportunism, treachery and betrayal.

There are different kinds of compromises. One must be able to analyse the situation and the concrete conditions of each compromise, or of each variety of compromise. One must learn to distinguish between a man who has given up his money and fire-arms to bandits so as to lessen the evil they can do and to facilitate their capture and execution, and a man who gives his money and fire-arms to bandits so as to share in the loot. In politics this is by no means always as elementary as it is in this childishly simple example. However, anyone who is out to think up for the workers some kind of recipe that will provide them with cut-and-dried solutions for all contingencies, or promises that the policy of the revolutionary proletariat will never come up against difficult or complex situations, is simply a charlatan.

To leave no room for misinterpretation, I shall attempt to outline, if only very briefly, several fundamental rules for the analysis of concrete compromises.

The party which entered into a compromise with the German imperialists by signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had been evolving its internationalism in practice ever since the end of 1914. It was not afraid to call for the defeat of the tsarist monarchy and to condemn "defence of country" in a war between two imperialist robbers. The parliamentary representatives of this party preferred exile in Siberia to taking a road leading to ministerial portfolios in a bourgeois government. The revolution that overthrew tsarism and established a democratic republic put this party to a new and

tremendous test—it did not enter into any agreements with its "own" imperialists, but prepared and brought about their overthrow. After assuming political power, this party did not leave a vestige of either landed or capitalist ownership. After making public and repudiating the imperialists' secret treaties, this party proposed peace to *all* nations, and yielded to the violence of the Brest-Litovsk robbers only after the Anglo-French imperialists had torpedoed the conclusion of a peace, and after the Bolsheviks had done everything humanly possible to hasten the revolution in Germany and other countries. The absolute correctness of this compromise, entered into by such a party in such a situation, is becoming ever clearer and more obvious with every day.

The Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries in Russia (like all the leaders of the Second International throughout the world, in 1914-20) began with treachery—by directly or indirectly justifying "defence of country", i.e., the defence of *their own* predatory bourgeoisie. They continued their treachery by entering into a coalition with the bourgeoisie of *their own* country, and fighting, together with *their own* bourgeoisie, against the revolutionary proletariat of their own country. Their bloc, first with Kerensky and the Cadets, and then with Kolchak and Denikin in Russia—like the bloc of their *contrères* abroad with the bourgeoisie of *their* respective countries—was in fact desertion to the side of the bourgeoisie, against the proletariat. From beginning to end, *their* compromise with the bandits of imperialism meant their becoming *accomplices* in imperialist banditry.

X

SEVERAL CONCLUSIONS

The Russian bourgeois revolution of 1905 revealed a highly original turn in world history: in one of the most backward capitalist countries, the strike movement attained a scope and power unprecedented anywhere in the world. In the *first month* of 1905 *alone*, the number of strikers was ten times the *annual* average for the previous decade (1895-1904); from January to October 1905, strikes grew all the time and reached enormous proportions. Under the influence of a

number of unique historical conditions, backward Russia was the first to show the world, not only the growth, by leaps and bounds, of the independent activity of the oppressed masses in time of revolution (this had occurred in all great revolutions), but also that the significance of the proletariat is infinitely greater than its proportion in the total population; it showed a combination of the economic strike and the political strike, with the latter developing into an armed uprising, and the birth of the Soviets, a new form of mass struggle and mass organisation of the classes oppressed by capitalism.

The revolutions of February and October 1917 led to the all-round development of the Soviets on a nation-wide scale and to their victory in the proletarian socialist revolution. In less than two years, the international character of the Soviets, the spread of this form of struggle and organisation to the world working-class movement, and the historical mission of the Soviets as the grave-digger, heir and successor of bourgeois parliamentarianism and of bourgeois democracy in general, had all become clear.

But that is not all. The history of the working-class movement now shows that, in all countries, it is about to go through (and is already going through) a struggle waged by communism-emergent, gaining strength and advancing towards victory-against, primarily, Menshevism, i.e., opportunism and social-chauvinism (the home brand in each particular country), and then as a complement, so to say, Left-wing communism. The former struggle has developed in all countries, apparently without any exception, as a duel between the Second International (already virtually dead) and the Third International. The latter struggle is to be seen in Germany, Great Britain, Italy, America (at any rate, a certain *section* of the Industrial Workers of the World²⁸¹ and of the anarcho-syndicalist trends uphold the errors of Left-wing communism alongside of an almost universal and almost unreserved acceptance of the Soviet system), and in France (the attitude of a section of the former syndicalists towards the political party and parliamentarianism, also alongside of the acceptance of the Soviet system); in other words, the struggle is undoubtedly being waged, not only on an international, but even on a world-wide scale.

But while the working-class movement is everywhere going through what is actually the same kind of preparatory school for victory over the bourgeoisie, it is achieving that development in its *own way* in each country. The big and advanced capitalist countries are travelling this road *far more rapidly* than did Bolshevism, to which history granted fifteen years to prepare itself for victory, as an organised political trend. In the brief space of a year, the Third International has already scored a decisive victory; it has defeated the yellow, social-chauvinist Second International, which only a few months ago was incomparably stronger than the Third International, seemed stable and powerful, and enjoyed every possible support—direct and indirect, material (Cabinet posts, passports, the press) and ideological—from the world bourgeoisie.

It is now essential that Communists of every country should quite consciously take into account both the fundamental objectives of the struggle against opportunism and "Left" doctrinarism, and the *concrete features* which this struggle assumes and must inevitably assume in each country, in conformity with the specific character of its economics, politics, culture, and national composition (Ireland, etc.), its colonies, religious divisions, and so on and so forth. Dissatisfaction with the Second International is felt everywhere and is spreading and growing, both because of its opportunism and because of its inability or incapacity to create a really centralised and really leading centre capable of directing the international tactics of the revolutionary proletariat in its struggle for a world Soviet republic. It should be clearly realised that such a leading centre can never be built up on stereotyped, mechanically equated, and identical tactical rules of struggle. As long as national and state distinctions exist among peoples and countries—and these will continue to exist for a very long time to come, even after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established on a world-wide scale—the unity of the international tactics of the communist working-class movement in all countries demands, not the elimination of variety or the suppression of national distinctions (which is a pipe dream at present), but the application of the *fundamental* principles of communism (Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat), which will *correctly modify*

these principles in certain *particulars*, correctly adapt and apply them to national and national-state distinctions. To seek out, investigate, predict, and grasp that which is nationally specific and nationally distinctive, in the *concrete* manner in which each country should tackle a *single* international task: victory over opportunism and Left doctrinairism within the working-class movement; the overthrow of the bourgeoisie; the establishment of a Soviet republic and a proletarian dictatorship—such is the basic task in the historical period that all the advanced countries (and not they alone) are going through. The chief thing—though, of course, far from everything—the chief thing has already been achieved: the vanguard of the working class has been won over, has ranged itself on the side of Soviet Government and against parliamentarianism, on the side of the dictatorship of the proletariat and against bourgeois democracy. All efforts and all attention should now be concentrated on the *next* step, which may seem—and from a certain viewpoint actually is—less fundamental, but, on the other hand, is actually closer to a practical accomplishment of the task. That step is: the search after forms of the *transition* or the *approach* to the proletarian revolution.

The proletarian vanguard has been won over ideologically. That is the main thing. Without this, not even the first step towards victory can be made. But that is still quite a long way from victory. Victory cannot be won with a vanguard alone. To throw only the vanguard into the decisive battle, before the entire class, the broad masses, have taken up a position either of direct support for the vanguard, or at least of sympathetic neutrality towards it and of precluded support for the enemy, would be, not merely foolish but criminal. Propaganda and agitation alone are not enough for an entire class, the broad masses of the working people, those oppressed by capital, to take up such a stand. For that, the masses must have their own political experience. Such is the fundamental law of all great revolutions, which has been confirmed with compelling force and vividness, not only in Russia but in Germany as well. To turn resolutely towards communism, it was necessary, not only for the ignorant and often illiterate masses of Russia, but also for the literate and well-educated masses of Germany, to realise from their own bitter experience the absolute impotence and spinelessness, the absolute

helplessness and servility to the bourgeoisie, and the utter vileness of the government of the paladins of the Second International; they had to realise that a dictatorship of the extreme reactionaries (Kornilov in Russia; Kapp and Co. in Germany) is inevitably the only alternative to a dictatorship of the proletariat.

The immediate objective of the class-conscious vanguard of the international working-class movement, i.e., the Communist parties, groups and trends, is to be able to *lead* the broad masses (who are still, for the most part, apathetic, inert, dormant and convention-ridden) to their new position, or, rather, to be able to lead, *not only* their own party but also these masses in their advance and transition to the new position. While the first historical objective (that of winning over the class-conscious vanguard of the proletariat to the side of Soviet power and the dictatorship of the working class) could not have been reached without a complete ideological and political victory over opportunism and social-chauvinism, the second and immediate objective, which consists in being able to lead the *masses* to a new position ensuring the victory of the vanguard in the revolution, cannot be reached without the liquidation of Left doctrinairism, and without full elimination of its errors.

As long as it was (and inasmuch as it still is) a question of winning the proletariat's vanguard over to the side of communism, priority went and still goes to propaganda work; even propaganda circles, with all their parochial limitations, are useful under these conditions, and produce good results. But when it is a question of practical action by the masses, of the disposition, if one may so put it, of vast armies, of the alignment of *all* the class forces in a given society *for the final and decisive battle*, then propagandist methods alone, the mere repetition of the truths of "pure" communism, are of no avail. In these circumstances, one must not count in thousands, like the propagandist belonging to a small group that has not yet given leadership to the masses; in these circumstances one must count in millions and tens of millions. In these circumstances, we must ask ourselves, not only whether we have convinced the vanguard of the revolutionary class, but also whether the historically effective forces of *all* classes—positively of all the classes in a given society, without

exception—are arrayed in such a way that the decisive battle is at hand—in such a way that: (1) all the class forces hostile to us have become sufficiently entangled, are sufficiently at loggerheads with each other, have sufficiently weakened themselves in a struggle which is beyond their strength; (2) all the vacillating and unstable, intermediate elements—the petty bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeois democrats, as distinct from the bourgeoisie—have sufficiently exposed themselves in the eyes of the people, have sufficiently disgraced themselves through their practical bankruptcy, and (3) among the proletariat, a mass sentiment favouring the most determined, bold and dedicated revolutionary action against the bourgeoisie has emerged and begun to grow vigorously. Then revolution is indeed ripe; then, indeed, if we have correctly gauged all the conditions indicated and summarised above, and if we have chosen the right moment, our victory is assured.

The differences between the Churchills and the Lloyd Georges—with insignificant national distinctions, these political types exist in all countries—on the one hand, and between the Hendersons and the Lloyd Georges on the other, are quite minor and unimportant from the standpoint of pure (i.e., abstract) communism, i.e., communism that has not yet matured to the stage of practical political action by the masses. However, from the standpoint of this practical action by the masses, these differences are most important. To take due account of these differences, and to determine the moment when the inevitable conflicts between these “friends”, which weaken and enfeeble *all the “friends” taken together*, will have come to a head—that is the concern, the task, of a Communist who wants to be, not merely a class-conscious and convinced propagandist of ideas, but a practical leader of the *masses* in the revolution. It is necessary to link the utmost devotion to the ideas of communism with ability to effect all the necessary practical compromises, tacks, conciliatory manoeuvres, zigzags, retreats and so on, in order to speed up the achievement and then loss of political power by the Hendersons (the heroes of the Second International, if we are not to name individual representatives of petty-bourgeois democracy who call themselves socialists); to accelerate their inevitable bankruptcy in practice, which will

enlighten the masses in the spirit of our ideas, in the direction of communism; to accelerate the inevitable friction, quarrels, conflicts and complete disintegration among the Hendersons, the Lloyd Georges and the Churchills (the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Constitutional-Democrats and the monarchists; the Scheidemanns, the bourgeoisie and the Kappists, etc.); to select the proper moment when the discord among these "pillars of sacrosanct private property" is at its height, so that, through a decisive offensive, the proletariat will defeat them all and capture political power.

History as a whole, and the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more multiform, more lively and ingenious than is imagined by even the best parties and the most class-conscious vanguards of the most advanced classes. This can readily be understood, because even the finest of vanguards express the class-consciousness, will, passion and imagination of tens of thousands, whereas at moments of great upsurge and the exertion of all human capacities, revolutions are made by the class-consciousness, will, passion and imagination of tens of millions, spurred on by a most acute struggle of classes. Two very important practical conclusions follow from this: first, that in order to accomplish its task the revolutionary class must be able to master *all* forms or aspects of social activity without exception (completing after the capture of political power—sometimes at great risk and with very great danger—what it did not complete before the capture of power); second, that the revolutionary class must be prepared for the most rapid and brusque replacement of one form by another.

One will readily agree that any army which does not train to use all the weapons, all the means and methods of warfare that the enemy possesses, or may possess, is behaving in an unwise or even criminal manner. This applies to politics even more than it does to the art of war. In politics it is even harder to know in advance which methods of struggle will be applicable and to our advantage in certain future conditions. Unless we learn to apply all the methods of struggle, we may suffer grave and sometimes even decisive defeat, if changes beyond our control in the position of the other classes bring to the forefront a form of activity in which we are especially weak. If, however, we learn to use all the

methods of struggle, victory will be certain, because we represent the interests of the really foremost and really revolutionary class, even if circumstances do not permit us to make use of weapons that are most dangerous to the enemy, weapons that deal the swiftest mortal blows. Inexperienced revolutionaries often think that legal methods of struggle are opportunist because, in this field, the bourgeoisie has most frequently deceived and duped the workers (particularly in "peaceful" and non-revolutionary times), while illegal methods of struggle are revolutionary. That, however, is wrong. The truth is that those parties and leaders are opportunists and traitors to the working class that are unable or unwilling (do not say, "I can't"; say, "I shan't") to use illegal methods of struggle in conditions such as those which prevailed, for example, during the imperialist war of 1914-18, when the bourgeoisie of the freest democratic countries most brazenly and brutally deceived the workers, and smothered the truth about the predatory character of the war. But revolutionaries who are incapable of combining illegal forms of struggle with *every* form of legal struggle are poor revolutionaries indeed. It is not difficult to be a revolutionary when revolution has already broken out and is in spate, when all people are joining the revolution just because they are carried away, because it is the vogue, and sometimes even from careerist motives. After its victory, the proletariat has to make most strenuous efforts, even the most painful, so as to "liberate" itself from such pseudo-revolutionaries. It is far more difficult—and far more precious—to be a revolutionary when the conditions for direct, open, really mass and really revolutionary struggle *do not yet exist*, to be able to champion the interests of the revolution (by propaganda, agitation and organisation) in non-revolutionary bodies and quite often in downright reactionary bodies, in a non-revolutionary situation, among the masses who are incapable of immediately appreciating the need for revolutionary methods of action. To be able to seek, find and correctly determine the specific path or the particular turn of events that will *lead* the masses to the real, decisive and final revolutionary struggle—such is the main objective of communism in Western Europe and in America today.

Britain is an example. We cannot tell—no one can tell in

advance—how soon a real proletarian revolution will flare up there, and *what immediate cause* will most serve to rouse, kindle, and impel into the struggle the very wide masses, who are still dormant. Hence, it is our duty to carry on all our preparatory work in such a way as to be well shod on all four feet (as the late Plekhanov, when he was a Marxist and revolutionary, was fond of saying). It is possible that the breach will be forced, the ice broken, by a parliamentary crisis, or by a crisis arising from colonial and imperialist contradictions, which are hopelessly entangled and are becoming increasingly painful and acute, or perhaps by some third cause, etc. We are not discussing the kind of struggle that will *determine* the fate of the proletarian revolution in Great Britain (no Communist has any doubt on that score; for all of us this is a foregone conclusion): what we are discussing is the *immediate cause* that will bring into motion the now dormant proletarian masses, and lead them right up to revolution. Let us not forget that in the French bourgeois republic, for example, in a situation which, from both the international and the national viewpoints, was a hundred times less revolutionary than it is today, such an "unexpected" and "petty" cause as one of the many thousands of fraudulent machinations of the reactionary military caste (the Dreyfus case) was enough to bring the people to the brink of civil war!

In Great Britain the Communists should constantly, unremittingly and unswervingly utilise parliamentary elections and all the vicissitudes of the Irish, colonial and world-imperialist policy of the British Government, and all other fields, spheres and aspects of public life, and work in all of them in a new way, in a communist way, in the spirit of the Third, not the Second, International. I have neither the time nor the space here to describe the "Russian" "Bolshevik" methods of participation in parliamentary elections and in the parliamentary struggle; I can, however, assure foreign Communists that they were quite unlike the usual West-European parliamentary campaigns. From this the conclusion is often drawn: "Well, that was in Russia; in our country parliamentarianism is different." This is a false conclusion. Communists, adherents of the Third International in all countries, exist for the purpose of *changing*—all along the

line, in all spheres of life—the old socialist, trade unionist, syndicalist, and parliamentary type of work into a *new* type of work, the communist. In Russia, too, there was always an abundance of opportunism, purely bourgeois sharp practices and capitalist rigging in the elections. In Western Europe and in America, the Communists must learn to create a new, uncustomary, non-opportunist and non-careerist parliamentarianism; the Communist parties must issue their slogans; true proletarians, with the help of the unorganised and down-trodden poor, should distribute leaflets, canvass workers' houses and cottages of the rural proletarians and peasants in the remote villages (fortunately there are many times fewer remote villages in Europe than in Russia, and in Britain the number is very small); they should go into the public houses, penetrate into unions, societies and chance gatherings of the common people, and speak to the people, not in learned (or very parliamentary) language; they should not at all strive to "get seats" in parliament, but should everywhere try to get people to think, and draw the masses into the struggle, to take the bourgeoisie at its word and utilise the machinery it has set up, the elections it has appointed, and the appeals it has made to the people; they should try to explain to the people what Bolshevism is, in a way that was never possible (under bourgeois rule) outside of election times (exclusive, of course, of times of big strikes, when in Russia a *similar* apparatus for widespread popular agitation worked even more intensively). It is very difficult to do this in Western Europe and extremely difficult in America, but it can and must be done, for the objectives of communism cannot be achieved without effort. We must work to accomplish practical tasks, ever more varied and ever more closely connected with all branches of social life, *winning* branch after branch, and sphere after sphere *from the bourgeoisie*.

In Great Britain, further, the work of propaganda, agitation and organisation among the armed forces and among the oppressed and underprivileged nationalities in their "*own*" state (Ireland, the colonies) must also be tackled in a new fashion (one that is not socialist, but communist; not reformist, but revolutionary). That is because, in the era of imperialism in general and especially today after a war that was a sore trial to the peoples and has quickly opened their eyes to the truth

(i.e., the fact that tens of millions were killed and maimed for the sole purpose of deciding whether the British or the German robbers should plunder the largest number of countries), all these spheres of social life are heavily charged with inflammable material and are creating numerous causes of conflicts, crises and an intensification of the class struggle. We do not and cannot know which spark-of the innumerable sparks that are flying about in all countries as a result of the world economic and political crisis-will kindle the conflagration, in the sense of raising up the masses; we must, therefore, with our new and communist principles, set to work to stir up all and sundry, even the oldest, mustiest and seemingly hopeless spheres, for otherwise we shall not be able to cope with our tasks, shall not be comprehensively prepared, shall not be in possession of all the weapons and shall not prepare ourselves to gain either victory over the bourgeoisie (which arranged all aspects of social life-and has now disarranged them-in its bourgeois fashion), or to bring about the impending communist re-organisation of every sphere of life, following that victory.

Since the proletarian revolution in Russia and its victories on an international scale, expected neither by the bourgeoisie nor the philistines, the entire world has become different, and the bourgeoisie everywhere has become different too. It is terrified of "Bolshevism", exasperated by it almost to the point of frenzy, and for that very reason it is, on the one hand, precipitating the progress of events and, on the other, concentrating on the forcible suppression of Bolshevism, thereby weakening its own position in a number of other fields. In their tactics the Communists in all the advanced countries must take both these circumstances into account.

When the Russian Cadets and Kerensky began furiously to hound the Bolsheviks-especially since April 1917, and more particularly in June and July 1917-they overdid things. Millions of copies of bourgeois papers, clamouring in every key against the Bolsheviks, helped the masses to make an appraisal of Bolshevism; apart from the newspapers, all public life was full of discussions about Bolshevism, as a result of the bourgeoisie's "zeal". Today the millionaires of all countries are behaving on an international scale in a way that deserves our heartiest thanks. They are hounding

Bolshevism with the same zeal as Kerensky and Co. did; they, too, are overdoing things and *helping* us just as Kerensky did. When the French bourgeoisie makes Bolshevism the central issue in the elections, and accuses the comparatively moderate or vacillating socialists of being Bolsheviks; when the American bourgeoisie, which has completely lost its head, seizes thousands and thousands of people on suspicion of Bolshevism, creates an atmosphere of panic, and broadcasts stories of Bolshevik plots; when, despite all its wisdom and experience, the British bourgeoisie—the most “solid” in the world—makes incredible blunders, founds richly endowed “anti-Bolshevik societies”, creates a special literature on Bolshevism, and recruits an extra number of scientists, agitators and clergymen to combat it, we must salute and thank the capitalists. They are working for us. They are helping us to get the masses interested in the essence and significance of Bolshevism, and they cannot do otherwise, for they have *already* failed to ignore Bolshevism and stifle it.

But at the same time, the bourgeoisie sees practically only one aspect of Bolshevism—insurrection, violence, and terror; it therefore strives to prepare itself for resistance and opposition primarily in *this* field. It is possible that, in certain instances, in certain countries, and for certain brief periods, it will succeed in this. We must reckon with such an eventuality, and we have absolutely nothing to fear if it does succeed. Communism is emerging in positively every sphere of public life; its beginnings are to be seen literally on all sides. The “contagion” (to use the favourite metaphor of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois police, the one mostly to their liking) has very thoroughly penetrated the organism and has completely permeated it. If special efforts are made to block one of the channels, the “contagion” will find another one, sometimes very unexpectedly. Life will assert itself. Let the bourgeoisie rave, work itself into a frenzy, go to extremes, commit follies, take vengeance on the Bolsheviks in advance, and endeavour to kill off (as in India, Hungary, Germany, etc.) more hundreds, thousands, and hundreds of thousands of yesterday’s and tomorrow’s Bolsheviks. In acting thus, the bourgeoisie is acting as all historically doomed classes have done. Communists should know that, in any case, the future belongs to them; therefore, we can (and must)

combine the most intense passion in the great revolutionary struggle, with the coolest and most sober appraisal of the frenzied ravings of the bourgeoisie. The Russian revolution was cruelly defeated in 1905; the Russian Bolsheviks were defeated in July 1917; over 15,000 German Communists were killed as a result of the wily provocation and cunning manoeuvres of Scheidemann and Noske, who were working hand in glove with the bourgeoisie and the monarchist generals; White terror is raging in Finland and Hungary. But in all cases and in all countries, communism is becoming steeled and is growing; its roots are so deep that persecution does not weaken or debilitate it, but only strengthens it. Only one thing is lacking to enable us to march forward more confidently and firmly to victory, namely, the universal and thorough awareness of all Communists in all countries of the necessity to display the utmost *flexibility* in their tactics. The communist movement, which is developing magnificently, now lacks, especially in the advanced countries, this awareness and the ability to apply it in practice.

That which happened to such leaders of the Second International, such highly erudite Marxists devoted to socialism as Kautsky, Otto Bauer and others, could (and should) provide a useful lesson. They fully appreciated the need for flexible tactics; they themselves learned Marxist dialectic and taught it to others (and much of what they have done in this field will always remain a valuable contribution to socialist literature); however, *in the application* of this dialectic they committed such an error, or proved to be so *undialectical* in practice, so incapable of taking into account the rapid change of forms and the rapid acquisition of new content by the old forms, that their fate is not much more enviable than that of Hyndman, Guesde and Plekhanov. The principal reason for their bankruptcy was that they were hypnotised by a definite form of growth of the working-class movement and socialism, forgot all about the one-sidedness of that form, were afraid to see the break-up which objective conditions made inevitable, and continued to repeat simple and, at first glance, incontestable axioms that had been learned by rote, like: "three is more than two". But politics is more like algebra than arithmetic, and still more like higher than elementary mathematics. In reality, all the old forms of the

socialist movement have acquired a new content, and, consequently, a new symbol, the "minus" sign, has appeared in front of all the figures; our wiseacres, however, have stubbornly continued (and will continue) to persuade themselves and others that "minus three" is more than "minus two".

We must see to it that Communists do not make a similar mistake, only in the opposite sense, or rather, we must see to it that a *similar mistake*, only made in the opposite sense by the "Left" Communists, is corrected as soon as possible and eliminated as rapidly and painlessly as possible. It is not only Right doctrinairism that is erroneous, Left doctrinairism is erroneous too. Of course, the mistake of Left doctrinairism in communism is at present a thousand times less dangerous and less significant than that of Right doctrinairism (i.e., social-chauvinism and Kautskyism); but, after all, that is only due to the fact that Left communism is a very young trend, is only just coming into being. It is only for this reason that, under certain conditions, the disease can be easily eradicated, and we must set to work with the utmost energy to eradicate it.

The old forms burst asunder, for it turned out that their new content—anti-proletarian and reactionary—had attained an inordinate development. From the standpoint of the development of international communism, our work today has such a durable and powerful content (for Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat) that it can *and must* manifest itself in any form, both new and old; it can and must regenerate, conquer and subjugate all forms, not only the new, but also the old—not for the purpose of reconciling itself with the old, but for the purpose of making all and every form—new and old—a weapon for the complete and irrevocable victory of communism.

Communists must exert every effort to direct the working-class movement and social development in general along the straightest and shortest road to the universal victory of Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat. That is an incontestable truth. But it is enough to take one little step farther—a step that might seem to be in the same direction—and truth turns into error. We have only to say, as the German and British Left Communists do, that we

recognise only one road, only the direct road, and that we will not permit tacking, conciliatory manoeuvres, or compromising—and it will be a mistake which may cause, and in part has already caused and is causing, very grave prejudice to communism. Right doctrinairism persisted in recognising only the old forms, and became utterly bankrupt, for it did not notice the new content. Left doctrinairism persists in the unconditional repudiation of certain old forms, failing to see that the new content is forcing its way through all and sundry forms, that it is our duty as Communists to master all forms, to learn how, with the maximum rapidity, to supplement one form with another, to substitute one for another, and to adapt our tactics to any such change that does not come from our class or from our efforts.

World revolution has been so powerfully stimulated and accelerated by the horrors, vileness and abominations of the world imperialist war and by the hopelessness of the situation created by it, this revolution is developing in scope and depth with such splendid rapidity, with such a wonderful variety of changing forms, with such an instructive practical refutation of all doctrinairism, that there is every reason to hope for a rapid and complete recovery of the international communist movement from the infantile disorder of "Left-wing" communism.

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THE TERMS OF ADMISSION INTO THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

The First, Inaugural Congress of the Communist International did not draw up precise conditions for the admission of parties into the Third International. When the First Congress was convened, only communist *trends* and *groups* existed in most countries.

It is in a different situation that the Second World Congress of the Communist International²⁸² is meeting. In most countries, Communist *parties* and *organisations*, not merely trends, now exist.

Parties and groups only recently affiliated to the Second International are more and more frequently applying for membership in the Third International, though they have not become really communist. The Second International has definitely been smashed. Aware that the Second International is beyond hope, the intermediate parties and groups of the "Centre" are trying to lean on the Communist International, which is steadily gaining in strength. At the same time however they hope to retain a degree of "autonomy" that will enable them to pursue their previous opportunist or "Centrist" policies. The Communist International is, to a certain extent, becoming the vogue.

The desire of certain leading "Centre" groups to join the Third International provides oblique confirmation that it has won the sympathy of the vast majority of class-conscious workers throughout the world, and is becoming a more powerful force with each day.

In certain circumstances, the Communist International may be faced with the danger of dilution by the influx of wavering

and irresolute groups that have not as yet broken with their Second-International ideology.

Besides, some of the big parties (Italy, Sweden), in which the majority have adopted the communist standpoint, still contain a strong reformist and social-pacifist wing that is only waiting for an opportune moment to raise its head again, begin active sabotage of the proletarian revolution, and thereby help the bourgeoisie and the Second International.

No Communist should forget the lessons of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. The Hungarian proletariat paid dearly for the Hungarian Communists having united with the reformists.

In view of all these facts, the Second World Congress deems it necessary to lay down absolutely precise terms for the admission of new parties, and also to set forth the obligations incurred by the parties already affiliated.

The Second Congress of the Communist International resolves that the following are the terms of Comintern membership:

1. Day-by-day propaganda and agitation must be genuinely communist in character. All press organs belonging to the parties must be edited by reliable Communists who have given proof of their devotion to the cause of the proletarian revolution. The dictatorship of the proletariat should not be discussed merely as a stock phrase to be learned by rote; it should be popularised in such a way that the practical facts systematically dealt with in our press day by day will drive home to every rank-and-file working man and working woman, every soldier and peasant, that it is indispensable to them. Third International supporters should use all media to which they have access—the press, public meetings, trade unions, and co-operative societies—to expose systematically and relentlessly, not only the bourgeoisie but also its helpers—the reformists of every shade.

2. Any organisation that wishes to join the Communist International must consistently and systematically dismiss reformists and "Centrists" from positions of any responsibility in the working-class movement (party organisations, editorial boards, trade unions, parliamentary groups, co-operative societies, municipal councils, etc.), replacing them by reliable

Communists. The fact that in some cases rank-and-file workers may at first have to replace "experienced" leaders should be no deterrent.

3. In countries where a state of siege or emergency legislation makes it impossible for Communists to conduct their activities legally, it is absolutely essential that legal and illegal work should be combined. In almost all the countries of Europe and America, the class struggle is entering the phase of civil war. In these conditions, Communists can place no trust in bourgeois legality. They must *everywhere* build up a parallel illegal organisation, which, at the decisive moment, will be in a position to help the Party fulfil its duty to the revolution.

4. Persistent and systematic propaganda and agitation must be conducted in the armed forces, and communist cells formed in every military unit. In the main Communists will have to do this work illegally; failure to engage in it would be tantamount to a betrayal of their revolutionary duty and incompatible with membership in the Third International.

5. Regular and systematic agitation is indispensable in the countryside. The working class cannot consolidate its victory without support from at least a section of the farm labourers and poor peasants, and without neutralising, through its policy, part of the rest of the rural population. In the present period Communist activity in the countryside is of primary importance. It should be conducted, in the main, through revolutionary *worker*-Communists who have contacts with the rural areas. To forgo this work or entrust it to unreliable and semi-reformist elements is tantamount to renouncing the proletarian revolution.

6. It is the duty of any party wishing to belong to the Third International to expose, not only avowed social-patriotism but also the falsehood and hypocrisy of social-pacifism. It must systematically demonstrate to the workers that, without the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, no international arbitration courts, no talk about a reduction of armaments, no "democratic" reorganisation of the League of Nations will save mankind from new imperialist wars.

7. It is the duty of parties wishing to belong to the Communist International to recognise the need for a complete and absolute break with reformism and "Centrist" policy,

and to conduct propaganda among the party membership for that break. Without this, a consistent communist policy is impossible.

The Communist International demands imperatively and uncompromisingly that this break be effected at the earliest possible date. It cannot tolerate a situation in which avowed reformists, such as Turati, Modigliani and others, are entitled to consider themselves members of the Third International. Such a state of affairs would lead to the Third International strongly resembling the defunct Second International.

8. Parties in countries whose bourgeoisie possess colonies and oppress other nations must pursue a most well-defined and clear-cut policy in respect of colonies and oppressed nations. Any party wishing to join the Third International must ruthlessly expose the colonial machinations of the imperialists of its "own" country, must support—in deed, not merely in word—every colonial liberation movement, demand the expulsion of its compatriot imperialists from the colonies, inculcate in the hearts of the workers of its own country an attitude of true brotherhood with the working population of the colonies and the oppressed nations, and conduct systematic agitation among the armed forces against all oppression of the colonial peoples.

9. It is the duty of any party wishing to join the Communist International to conduct systematic and unflagging communist work in the trade unions, co-operative societies and other mass workers' organisations. Communist cells should be formed in the trade unions, and, by their sustained and unflagging work, win the unions over to the communist cause. In every phase of their day-by-day activity these cells must unmask the treachery of the social-patriots and the vacillation of the "Centrists". The cells must be completely subordinate to the party as a whole.

10. It is the duty of any party belonging to the Communist International to wage a determined struggle against the Amsterdam "International" of yellow trade unions. Its indefatigable propaganda should show the organised workers the need to break with the yellow Amsterdam International. It must give every support to the emerging international federation of Red trade unions which are associated with the Communist International.

11. It is the duty of parties wishing to join the Third International to re-examine the composition of their parliamentary groups, eliminate unreliable elements and effectively subordinate these groups to the Party Central Committees. They must demand that every communist proletarian should subordinate all his activities to the interests of truly revolutionary propaganda and agitation.

12. The periodical and non-periodical press, and all publishing enterprises, must likewise be fully subordinate to the Party Central Committee, whether the party as a whole is legal or illegal at the time. Publishing enterprises should not be allowed to abuse their autonomy and pursue any policies that are not in full accord with that of the Party.

13. Parties belonging to the Communist International must be organised on the principle of democratic *centralism*. In this period of acute civil war, the Communist parties can perform their duty only if they are organised in a most centralised manner, are marked by an iron discipline bordering on military discipline, and have strong and authoritative party centres invested with wide powers and enjoying the unanimous confidence of the membership.

14. Communist parties in countries where Communists can conduct their work legally must carry out periodic membership purges (re-registrations) with the aim of systematically ridding the party of petty-bourgeois elements that inevitably percolate into them.

15. It is the duty of any party wishing to join the Communist International selflessly to help any Soviet republic in its struggle against counter-revolutionary forces. Communist parties must conduct incessant propaganda urging the workers to refuse to transport war materials destined for the enemies of the Soviet republics; they must conduct legal or illegal propaganda in the armed forces dispatched to strangle the workers' republics, etc.

16. It is the duty of parties which have still kept their old Social-Democratic programmes to revise them as speedily as possible and draw up new communist programmes in conformity with the specific conditions in their respective countries, and in the spirit of Communist International decisions. As a rule, the programmes of all parties belonging to the Communist International must be approved by a regular

Congress of the Communist International or by its Executive Committee. In the event of the Executive Committee withholding approval, the party is entitled to appeal to the Congress of the Communist International.

17. All decisions of the Communist International's congresses and of its Executive Committee are binding on all affiliated parties. Operating in conditions of acute civil war, the Communist International must be far more centralised than the Second International was. It stands to reason, however, that in every aspect of their work the Communist International and its Executive Committee must take into account the diversity of conditions in which the respective parties have to fight and work, and adopt decisions binding on all parties only on matters in which such decisions are possible.

18. In view of the foregoing, parties wishing to join the Communist International must change their name. Any party seeking affiliation must call itself the *Communist* Party of the country in question (Section of the Third, Communist International). The question of a party's name is not merely a formality, but a matter of major political importance. The Communist International has declared a resolute war on the bourgeois world and all yellow Social-Democratic parties. The difference between the Communist parties and the old and official "Social-Democratic", or "socialist", parties, which have betrayed the banner of the working class, must be made absolutely clear to every rank-and-file worker.

19. After the conclusion of the proceedings of the Second World Congress of the Communist International, any party wishing to join the Communist International must at the earliest date convene an extraordinary congress for official acceptance of the above obligations on behalf of the entire party.

LETTER
TO THE GERMAN AND THE FRENCH WORKERS
REGARDING THE DISCUSSION ON THE SECOND CONGRESS
OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL²⁸³

Comrades, the bourgeois press of Germany and France is devoting much attention to the discussion within the German Independent Social-Democratic Party and the French Socialist Party on affiliation to the Communist International. It is vigorously supporting the views of the Right-wing opportunist sections in the two parties.

That can be readily understood, for these Right-wing elements are in essence petty-bourgeois democrats, who, like Dittmann and Crispin, cannot think in terms of revolution, and are incapable of helping the working class prepare for and carry out the revolution. A break with these Right-wing and opportunist elements is necessary; it is the only way to rally all the genuinely revolutionary and genuinely proletarian masses.

All the clamour about Moscow's "dictates", etc., is simply a red herring. As a matter of fact, only five of the twenty members of the Communist International's Executive Committee belong to the Russian Communist Party. All this talk about "dictates", etc., is either self-deception or deception of the workers. It serves to cover up the bankruptcy of certain opportunist leaders, just as similar talk in the K.A.P.D. (Communist Workers' Party of Germany²⁸⁴) has served to cover up the bankruptcy of several of its leaders, who have abandoned the path of proletarian revolutionism. The outcry that the "Moscow dictators", making use of the terms of affiliation to the Communist International, are persecuting certain individuals, is likewise self-deception or deception of others. Article 20 of the terms of admission says clearly in black and white that "exceptions" (*Ausnahmen*) to the strict

*rules in regard of Right-wing leaders and members of central bodies can be made with the consent of the Executive Committee of the Third International.*²⁸⁵

Since exceptions are expressly declared to be permissible, there can be no talk of an absolute bar against specific individuals. Consequently, there is full recognition of the need to take into account, not the past but the present, the change in the views and conduct of individuals, of individual leaders. Since exceptions are declared to be permissible with the consent of the Executive Committee of the Third International—in which Russians constitute only one-fourth of the membership—it follows that the clamour about “dictates”, etc., is stuff and nonsense, sheer falsehood.

All this clamour is simply a red herring. In fact, a struggle is going on between the revolutionary *proletarian* elements and the opportunist *petty-bourgeois* elements. Today as in the past, the latter include the Hilferdings, the Dittmanns, the Crispiens, numerous members of the parliamentary groups in Germany and France, etc. A struggle between these two *political trends* is in progress in every country without exception. This struggle has a long history. It grew extremely acute everywhere during the imperialist war, and has become aggravated since then. Opportunism is represented by elements of the “labour aristocracy”, by the old bureaucracy in the trade unions, co-operative societies, etc., by the intellectual petty-bourgeois strata, etc. Without the elimination of this *trend*—which, by its vacillation and its “Menshevism” (the Dittmanns and Crispiens fully resemble our Mensheviks) in fact exerts the bourgeoisie’s influence on the proletariat *from within* the working-class movement, *from within* the socialist parties—without the elimination of this trend, without a break with it, and without the expulsion of all its prominent representatives it will be impossible to rally the revolutionary proletariat.

By their constant veering towards reformism and Menshevism, and their inability to think and act in terms of revolution, the Dittmanns, the Crispiens, etc., without realising the fact, are actually carrying bourgeois influence into the proletariat from within the proletarian party—they subordinate the proletariat to *bourgeois reformism*. Only a break with such and similar people can lead to *international unity* of the

revolutionary proletariat, *against* the bourgeoisie, and for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

The events in Italy should open eyes most stubbornly closed to the harmfulness of "unity" and "peace" with the Crispiens and the Dittmanns. The Italian Crispiens and Dittmanns (Turati, Prampolini and D'Aragona) began at once to *hinder* the revolution in Italy as soon as things *reached the stage of a real revolution*. Throughout Europe and the world things are moving in that direction more or less rapidly, and more or less arduously and painfully.

It is high time to discard once and for all all these most harmful illusions about the possibility of "unity" or "peace" with the Dittmanns and the Crispiens, with the Right wing of the German "Independent Social-Democratic Party", the British "Independent Labour Party", the French Socialist Party, etc. It is high time for all revolutionary workers to purge their parties of these trends, and form genuinely united Communist parties of the proletariat.

September 24, 1920

N. Lenin

**PRELIMINARY DRAFT RESOLUTION
OF THE TENTH CONGRESS
OF THE R.C.P. ON PARTY UNITY²⁸⁶**

1. The Congress calls the attention of all members of the Party to the fact that the unity and cohesion of the ranks of the Party, the guarantee of complete mutual confidence among Party members and genuine team-work that really embodies the unanimity of will of the vanguard of the proletariat, are particularly essential at the present time when a number of circumstances are increasing the vacillation among the petty-bourgeois population of the country.

2. Notwithstanding this, even before the general Party discussion on the trade unions, certain signs of factionalism had been apparent in the Party—the formation of groups with separate platforms, striving to a certain degree to segregate and create their own group discipline. Such symptoms of factionalism were manifested, for example, at a Party conference in Moscow (November 1920), and in Kharkov by the so-called Workers' Opposition group, and partly by the so-called Democratic Centralism group.²⁸⁷

All class-conscious workers must clearly realise that factionalism of any kind is harmful and impermissible, for no matter how members of individual groups may desire to safeguard Party unity, factionalism in practice inevitably leads to the weakening of team-work and to intensified and repeated attempts by the enemies of the governing Party, who have wormed their way into it, to widen the cleavage and to use it for counter-revolutionary purposes.

The way the enemies of the proletariat take advantage of every deviation from a thoroughly consistent communist line was perhaps most strikingly shown in the case of the Kronstadt mutiny,²⁸⁸ when the bourgeois counter-revolution-

aries and whiteguards in all countries of the world immediately expressed their readiness to accept the slogans of the Soviet system, if only they might thereby secure the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia, and when the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the bourgeois counter-revolutionaries in general resorted in Kronstadt to slogans calling for an insurrection against the Soviet Government of Russia ostensibly in the interest of the Soviet power. These facts fully prove that the whiteguards strive, and are able, to disguise themselves as Communists, and even as the most Left-wing Communists, solely for the purpose of weakening and destroying the bulwark of the proletarian revolution in Russia. Menshevik leaflets distributed in Petrograd on the eve of the Kronstadt mutiny likewise show how the Mensheviks took advantage of the disagreements and certain rudiments of factionalism in the Russian Communist Party actually in order to egg on and support the Kronstadt mutineers, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the whiteguards, while claiming to be opponents of mutiny and supporters of the Soviet power, only with supposedly slight modifications.

3. In this question, propaganda should consist, on the one hand, in a comprehensive explanation of the harmfulness and danger of factionalism from the standpoint of Party unity and of achieving unanimity of will among the vanguard of the proletariat as the fundamental condition for the success of the dictatorship of the proletariat; and, on the other hand, in an explanation of the peculiar features of the latest tactical devices of the enemies of the Soviet power. These enemies, having realised the hopelessness of counter-revolution under an openly whiteguard flag, are now doing their utmost to utilise the disagreements within the Russian Communist Party and to further the counter-revolution in one way or another by transferring power to a political group which is outwardly closest to recognition of the Soviet power.

Propaganda must also teach the lessons of preceding revolutions, in which the counter-revolution made a point of supporting the opposition to the extreme revolutionary party which stood closest to the latter in order to undermine and overthrow the revolutionary dictatorship and thus pave the way for the subsequent complete victory of the counter-revolution, of the capitalists and landowners.

4. In the practical struggle against factionalism, every organisation of the Party must take strict measures to prevent all factional actions. Criticism of the Party's shortcomings, which is absolutely necessary, must be conducted in such a way that every practical proposal shall be submitted immediately, without any delay, in the most precise form possible, for consideration and decision to the leading local and central bodies of the Party. Moreover, every critic must see to it that the form of his criticism takes account of the position of the Party, surrounded as it is by a ring of enemies, and that the content of his criticism is such that, by directly participating in Soviet and Party work, he can test the rectification of the errors of the Party or of individual Party members in practice. Analyses of the Party's general line, estimates of its practical experience, check-ups of the fulfilment of its decisions, studies of methods of rectifying errors, etc., must under no circumstances be submitted for preliminary discussion to groups formed on the basis of "platforms", etc., but must in all cases be submitted for discussion directly to all the members of the Party. For this purpose, the Congress orders a more regular publication of *Diskussionny Listok*²⁸⁹ and special symposiums, to promote unceasing efforts to ensure that criticism shall be concentrated on essentials and shall not assume a form capable of assisting the class enemies of the proletariat.

5. Rejecting in principle the deviation towards syndicalism and anarchism, which is examined in a special resolution, and instructing the Central Committee to secure the complete elimination of all factionalism, the Congress at the same time declares that every practical proposal concerning questions to which the so-called Workers' Opposition group, for example, has devoted special attention, such as purging the Party of non-proletarian and unreliable elements, combating bureaucratic practices, developing democracy and workers' initiative, etc., must be examined with the greatest care and tested in practice. The Party must know that we have not taken all the necessary measures in regard to these questions because of various obstacles, but that, while ruthlessly rejecting impractical and factional pseudo-criticism, the Party will unceasingly continue—trying out new methods—to fight with all the means at its disposal against the evils of

bureaucracy, for the extension of democracy and initiative, for detecting, exposing and expelling from the Party elements that have wormed their way into its ranks, etc.

6. The Congress, therefore, hereby declares dissolved and orders the immediate dissolution of all groups without exception formed on the basis of one platform or another (such as the Workers' Opposition group, the Democratic Centralism group, etc.). Non-observance of this decision of the Congress shall entail unconditional and instant expulsion from the Party.

7. In order to ensure strict discipline within the Party and in all Soviet work and to secure the maximum unanimity in eliminating all factionalism, the Congress authorises the Central Committee, in cases of breach of discipline or of a revival or toleration of factionalism, to apply all Party penalties, including expulsion, and in regard to members of the Central Committee reduction to the status of alternate members and as an extreme measure, expulsion from the Party. A necessary condition for the application of such an extreme measure to members of the Central Committee, alternate members of the Central Committee and members of the Control Commission is the convocation of a Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee, to which all alternate members of the Central Committee and all members of the Control Commission shall be invited. If such a general assembly of the most responsible leaders of the Party deems it necessary by a two-thirds majority to reduce a member of the Central Committee to the status of alternate member, or to expel him from the Party, this measure shall be put into effect immediately.

**PRELIMINARY DRAFT RESOLUTION
OF THE TENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.
ON THE SYNDICALIST AND ANARCHIST
DEVIATION IN OUR PARTY**

1. A syndicalist and anarchist deviation has been definitely revealed in our Party in the past few months. It calls for the most resolute measures of ideological struggle and also for purging the Party and restoring its health.

2. The said deviation is due partly to the influx into the Party of former Mensheviks, and also of workers and peasants who have not yet fully assimilated the communist world outlook. Mainly, however, this deviation is due to the influence exercised upon the proletariat and on the Russian Communist Party by the petty-bourgeois element, which is exceptionally strong in our country, and which inevitably engenders vacillation towards anarchism, particularly at a time when the condition of the masses has greatly deteriorated as a consequence of the crop failure and the devastating effects of war, and when the demobilisation of the army numbering millions sets loose hundreds and hundreds of thousands of peasants and workers unable immediately to find regular means of livelihood.

3. The most theoretically complete and clearly defined expression of this deviation (*or*: one of the most complete, etc., expressions of this deviation) is the theses and other literary productions of the so-called Workers' Opposition group. Sufficiently illustrative of this is, for example, the following thesis propounded by this group: "The organisation of the management of the national economy is the function of an All-Russia Congress of Producers organised in industrial unions, which shall elect a central body to run the whole of the national economy of the Republic."

The ideas at the bottom of this and numerous similar statements are radically wrong in theory, and represent a complete break with Marxism and communism, with the practical experience of all semi-proletarian revolutions and of the present proletarian revolution.

First, the concept "producer" combines proletarians with semi-proletarians and small commodity producers, thus radically departing from the fundamental concept of the class struggle and from the fundamental demand that a precise distinction be drawn between classes.

Secondly, the bidding for or flirtation with the non-Party masses, which is expressed in the above-quoted thesis, is an equally radical departure from Marxism.

Marxism teaches—and this tenet has not only been formally endorsed by the whole of the Communist International in the decisions of the Second (1920) Congress of the Comintern on the role of the political party of the proletariat, but has also been confirmed in practice by our revolution—that only the political party of the working class, i.e., the Communist Party, is capable of uniting, training and organising a vanguard of the proletariat and of the whole mass of the working people that alone will be capable of withstanding the inevitable petty-bourgeois vacillations of this mass and the inevitable traditions and relapses of narrow-craft unionism or craft prejudices among the proletariat, and of guiding all the united activities of the whole of the proletariat, i.e., of leading it politically, and through it, the whole mass of the working people. Without this the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible.

The wrong understanding of the rôle of the Communist Party in its relation to the non-Party proletariat, and in the relation of the first and second factors to the whole mass of working people, is a radical theoretical departure from communism and a deviation towards syndicalism and anarchism, and this deviation permeates all the views of the Workers' Opposition group.

4. The Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party declares that it also regards as radically wrong all attempts on the part of the said group and of other persons to defend their fallacious views by referring to Paragraph 5 of the economic section of the Programme of the Russian Communist

Party, which deals with the role of the trade unions. This paragraph says that "the trade unions should eventually arrive at a *de facto* concentration in their hands of the whole administration of the whole national economy, as a single economic entity" and that they will "ensure in this way indissoluble ties between the central state administration, the national economy and the broad masses of working people", "drawing" these masses "into direct economic management".

This paragraph in the Programme of the Russian Communist Party also says that a prerequisite for the state at which the trade unions "should eventually arrive" is the process whereby they increasingly "divest themselves of the narrow craft-union spirit" and embrace the majority "and eventually all" of the working people.

Lastly, this paragraph in the Programme of the Russian Communist Party emphasises that "on the strength of the laws of the R.S.F.S.R., and established practice, the trade unions participate in all the local and central organs of industrial management".

Instead of studying the practical experience of participation in administration, and instead of developing this experience further, strictly in conformity with successes achieved and mistakes rectified, the syndicalists and anarchists advance as an immediate slogan "congresses or a congress of producers" "to elect" the organs of economic management. Thus, the leading, educational and organising role of the Party in relation to the trade unions of the proletariat, and of the latter to the semi-petty-bourgeois and even wholly petty-bourgeois masses of working people, is completely evaded and eliminated, and instead of continuing and correcting the practical work of building new forms of economy already begun by the Soviet state, we get petty-bourgeois-anarchist disruption of this work, which can only lead to the triumph of the bourgeois counter-revolution.

5. In addition to the theoretical fallacies and a radically wrong attitude towards the practical experience of economic organisation already begun by the Soviet government, the Congress of the Russian Communist Party discerns in the views of these and similar groups and persons a gross political mistake and a direct political danger to the very existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In a country like Russia, the overwhelming preponderance of the petty-bourgeois element and the devastation, impoverishment, epidemics, crop failures, extreme want and hardship inevitably resulting from the war, engender particularly sharp vacillations in the temper of the petty-bourgeois and semi-proletarian masses. First they incline towards a strengthening of the alliance between these masses and the proletariat, and then towards bourgeois restoration. The experience of all revolutions in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries shows most clearly and convincingly that the only possible result of these vacillations—if the unity, strength and influence of the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat is weakened in the slightest degree—will be the restoration of the power and property of the capitalists and landowners.

Hence, the views of the Workers' Opposition and of like-minded elements are not only wrong in theory, but are an expression of petty-bourgeois and anarchist wavering in practice, and actually weaken the consistency of the leading line of the Communist Party and help the class enemies of the proletarian revolution.

6. In view of all this, the Congress of the R.C.P., emphatically rejecting the said ideas, as being expressive of a syndicalist and anarchist deviation, deems it necessary:

First, to wage an unswerving and systematic struggle against these ideas;

Secondly, to recognise the propaganda of these ideas as being incompatible with membership of the R.C.P.

Instructing the C.C. of the Party strictly to enforce these decisions, the Congress at the same time points out that special publications, symposiums, etc., can and should provide space for a most comprehensive exchange of opinion between Party members on all the questions herein indicated.

FROM THESES FOR A REPORT ON THE TACTICS OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY AT THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

10. THE ROLE OF "PURE DEMOCRACY", THE SECOND AND TWO-AND-A-HALF INTERNATIONALS,²⁹⁰ THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES AND THE MENSHEVIKS AS THE ALLIES OF CAPITAL

The dictatorship of the proletariat does not signify a cessation of the class struggle, but its continuation in a new form and with new weapons. This dictatorship is essential as long as classes exist, as long as the bourgeoisie, overthrown in one country, intensifies tenfold its attacks on socialism on an international scale. In the transition period, the small farmer class is bound to experience certain vacillations. The difficulties of transition, and the influence of the bourgeoisie, inevitably cause the mood of this mass to change from time to time. Upon the proletariat, enfeebled and to a certain extent declassed by the destruction of large-scale machine industry, which is its vital foundation, devolves the very difficult but paramount historic task of holding out in spite of these vacillations, and of carrying to victory its cause of emancipating labour from the yoke of capital.

The policy pursued by the petty-bourgeois democratic parties, i.e., the parties affiliated to the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals, represented in Russia by the S.R. (Socialist-Revolutionary) and Menshevik parties is the political expression of the vacillations of the petty bourgeoisie. These parties now have their headquarters and newspapers abroad, and are actually in a bloc with the whole of the bourgeois counter-revolution and are serving it loyally.

The shrewd leaders of the Russian big bourgeoisie headed by Milyukov, the leader of the Cadet (Constitutional-Democratic) Party, have quite clearly, definitely and openly appraised this role of the petty-bourgeois democrats, i.e., the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. In connection with the Kronstadt mutiny, in which the Mensheviks, Socialist-

Revolutionaries and whiteguards joined forces, Milyukov declared in favour of the "Soviets without the Bolsheviks" slogan. Elaborating on the idea, he wrote that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks "are welcome to try" (*Pravda* No. 64, 1921, quoted from the Paris *Posledniye Novosti*²⁹¹), because upon them devolves the task of *first taking* power away from the Bolsheviks. Milyukov, the leader of the big bourgeoisie, has correctly appraised the lesson taught by all revolutions, namely, that the petty-bourgeois democrats are incapable of holding power, and always serve merely as a screen for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, and a stepping stone to its undivided power.

The proletarian revolution in Russia again and again confirms this lesson of 1789-94 and 1848-49, and also what Frederick Engels said in his letter to Bebel of December 11, 1884.

... "pure democracy ... when the moment of revolution comes, acquires a temporary importance ... as the final sheet-anchor of the whole bourgeois and even feudal economy. ... Thus between March and September 1848 the whole feudal-bureaucratic mass strengthened the liberals in order to hold down the revolutionary masses. ... In any case our sole adversary on the day of the crisis and on the day after the crisis will be the whole of the reaction which will group around pure democracy, and this, I think, should not be lost sight of." (Published in Russian in *Kommunistichesky Trud*²⁹² No. 360, June 9, 1921, in an article by Comrade V. Adoratsky: "Marx and Engels on Democracy". In German, published in the book, Friedrich Engels, *Politisches Vermächtnis*, Internationale Jugend-Bibliothek, Nr. 12, Berlin, 1920, S. 19.)²⁹³

N. Lenin

Moscow, Kremlin, June 13, 1921

OUR REVOLUTION

APROPOS OF N. SUKHANOV'S NOTES²⁹⁴

I

I have lately been glancing through Sukhanov's notes on the revolution. What strikes one most is the pedantry of all our petty-bourgeois democrats, and of all the heroes of the Second International. Apart from the fact that they are all extremely faint-hearted, that when it comes to the minutest deviation from the German model even the best of them fortify themselves with reservations—apart from this characteristic which is common to all petty-bourgeois democrats and has been abundantly manifested by them throughout the revolution, what strikes one is their slavish imitation of the past.

They all call themselves Marxists, but their conception of Marxism is impossibly pedantic. They have completely failed to understand what is decisive in Marxism, namely, its revolutionary dialectics. They have even absolutely failed to understand Marx's plain statements that in times of revolution the utmost flexibility is demanded,²⁹⁵ and have even failed to notice, for instance, the statement Marx made in his letters—I think it was in 1856—expressing the hope of combining a peasant war in Germany, which might create a revolutionary situation, with the working-class movement²⁹⁶—they avoid even this plain statement and walk round and about it like a cat around a bowl of hot porridge.

Their conduct betrays them as cowardly reformists who are afraid to deviate from the bourgeoisie, let alone break with them, and at the same time they disguise their cowardice with the wildest rhetoric and braggartry. But what strikes one in all of them even from the purely theoretical point of view is their utter inability to grasp the following Marxist

considerations. Up to now they have seen capitalism and bourgeois democracy in Western Europe follow a definite path of development, and cannot conceive that this path can be taken as a model only *mutatis mutandis*, only with certain amendments (quite insignificant from the standpoint of the general development of world history).

First—the revolution connected with the first imperialist world war. Such a revolution was bound to reveal new features, or variations, resulting from the war itself, for the world has never seen such a war in such a situation. We find that since the war the bourgeoisie of the wealthiest countries have to this day been unable to restore "normal" bourgeois relations. Yet our reformists—petty bourgeois who make a show of being revolutionaries—believed, and still believe, that normal bourgeois relations are the limit (thus far shalt thou go and no farther). And even their conception of "normal" is extremely stereotyped and narrow.

Secondly, they are complete strangers to the idea that, while the development of world history as a whole follows general laws, it is by no means precluded, but, on the contrary, presumed, that certain periods of development may display peculiarities in either the form or the sequence of this development. For instance, it does not even occur to them that because Russia stands on the border-line between the civilised countries and the countries which this war has for the first time definitely brought into the orbit of civilisation, that is, all the Oriental, non-European countries, she could, and was, indeed, bound to reveal certain distinctive features; although these, of course, are in keeping with the general line of world development, they distinguish her revolution from those which took place in the West-European countries and introduce certain partial innovations as the revolution moves on to the countries of the East.

Infinitely stereotyped, for instance, is the argument they learned by rote during the development of West-European Social-Democracy, namely, that we are not yet ripe for socialism, that, as certain "learned" gentlemen among them put it, the objective economic premises for socialism do not exist in our country. It does not occur to any of them to ask, but what about a people that found itself in a revolutionary situation such as that created during the first imperialist war?

Might it not, influenced by the hopelessness of its situation, fling itself into a struggle that would offer it at least some chance of securing conditions for the further development of civilisation that were somewhat unusual?

"The development of the productive forces of Russia has not attained the level that makes socialism possible." All the heroes of the Second International, including, of course, Sukhanov, beat the drums about this proposition. They keep harping on this incontrovertible proposition in a thousand different keys, and think that it is the decisive criterion of our revolution.

But what if, first, at the time of the imperialist world war that involved every more or less influential West-European country, peculiar circumstances put Russia and Russia's development on the eve of the revolutions maturing or partly already begun in the East in a situation which enabled us to achieve precisely that combination of a "peasant war" with the working-class movement suggested in 1856 by no less a "Marxist" than Marx himself as a possible prospect for Prussia?

What if the complete hopelessness of the situation, by stimulating the efforts of the workers and peasants tenfold, offered us the opportunity to create the fundamental requisites of civilisation in a different way from that of the West-European countries? Has that altered the general line of development of world history? Has that altered the basic relations between the basic classes of all the countries that are being, or have been, drawn into the general course of world history?

If a definite level of culture is required for the building of socialism (although nobody can say just what that definite "level of culture" is, for it differs in every West-European country), why cannot we begin by first achieving the pre-requisites for that definite level of culture in a revolutionary way, and *then*, with the aid of the workers' and peasants' government and the Soviet system, proceed to overtake the other nations?

January 16, 1923

II

You say that civilisation is necessary for the building of socialism. Very good. But why could we not first create such prerequisites of civilisation in our country as the expulsion of the landowners and the Russian capitalists, and then start moving towards socialism? Where, in what books, have you read that such variations of the customary historical order of events are impermissible or impossible?

Napoleon, I think, wrote: "*On s'engage et puis ... on voit.*" Rendered freely this means: "First engage in a serious battle and then see what happens." Well, we did first engage in a serious battle in October 1917, and then saw such details of development (from the standpoint of world history they were certain details) as the Brest Peace, the New Economic Policy,²⁹⁷ and so forth. And now there can be no doubt that in the main we have been victorious.

Our Sukhanovs, not to speak of Social-Democrats still farther to the right, never even dream that revolutions could be made otherwise. Our European philistines never even dream that the subsequent revolutions in Oriental countries, which possess much vaster populations and a much vaster diversity of social conditions, will undoubtedly display even greater peculiarities than the Russian revolution.

It need hardly be said that a textbook written on Kautskian lines was a very useful thing in its day. But it is time, for all that, to abandon the idea that it foresaw all the forms of development of subsequent world history. It would be timely to say that those who think so are simply fools.

January 17, 1923

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Signed: *Lenin*

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NOTES

¹ *A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats* was written by Lenin in 1899, during his exile in Siberia, in reply to the "Credo" of a group of Russian revisionists (the Economists S. N. Prokopovich, Y. D. Kuskova and others who subsequently became Cadets). On receiving a copy of the "Credo" through his sister, A. I. Yelizarova, Lenin wrote a trenchant protest in which he exposed the nature of this declaration.

The Protest was discussed and unanimously adopted by a meeting of 17 exiled Marxists, convened by Lenin in Yermakovskoye Village, Minusinsk District, and subsequently endorsed also by the exiles in Turukhansk District and Orlovo (Vyatka Gubernia). A copy was forwarded to the Emancipation of Labour group abroad, where it was published, early in 1900, by G. V. Plekhanov in his *Vademecum*, a pamphlet directed against the revisionists in the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad and the newspaper *Rabocheye Dyelo*. p. 25

² *Emancipation of Labour group*—the first Russian Marxist group, founded by G. V. Plekhanov in Geneva in 1883 for the propaganda of scientific socialism in Russia, criticism of Narodism and Marxist analysis of Russian reality. The other members of the group were P. B. Axelrod, V. I. Zasulich, L. G. Deutsch and V. I. Ignatov. The group put out and widely disseminated in Russia translations of the *Communist Manifesto*, *Wage-Labour and Capital*, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, *Ludwig Feuerbach* and other major works of Marx and Engels, as well as Plekhanov's works (*Socialism and the Political Struggle*, *Our Differences*, etc.), which helped train a whole generation of Russian Marxists. The group's two drafts of a programme for a Russian Social-Democratic Party (1884 and 1887) contained a number of mistakes (approval of individual terror, negation of the revolutionary role of the peasantry, overestimation of the role of the liberal bourgeoisie, etc.). Lenin had a high regard for the services rendered by Plekhanov and the Emancipation of Labour group, but pointed out that it had "only laid the theoretical foundations for the Social-Democratic movement and made the first step towards the

working-class movement". The group ceased to exist after the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in 1903.

p. 25

³ *Chartist movement*—a mass revolutionary movement of British workers caused by adverse economic conditions and political disfranchisement. The movement began in the late 1830s with mass meetings and demonstrations and continued, with intervals, up to the early fifties. The chief cause of its failure was the absence of a consistent revolutionary proletarian leadership and a clear-cut programme.

p. 29

⁴ Lenin refers to the *International Working Men's Association*, or the First International, the first mass international organisation of the proletariat founded by Marx in London in the autumn of 1864. Its first congress (Geneva, September 3-8, 1866) adopted the *Inaugural Address* and *Provisional Rules* of the First International, approved the activities of the General Council and prolonged its term of office. The congress endorsed the programmatic and organisational principles of Marxism. Overcoming bourgeois influences and sectarian tendencies (trade-unionism in Britain, Proudhonism and anarchism in the Latin countries), Marx made the First International the rallying centre for all the progressive elements in the European and American labour movement, and at the International's congresses won recognition of the need for working-class political struggle for socialism. In Lenin's words, the historical role of the First International was that it "laid the foundations of an international organisation of workers for the preparation of their revolutionary attack on capital". After the Paris Commune, the International's organisational pattern no longer accorded with the new task of building mass national workers' parties based on the principles it had enunciated. In Lenin's words, the First International "had performed its historic mission, giving way to an epoch of immeasurably much greater development of the labour movement in all countries of the world, an epoch in which the movement grew in *breadth*, an epoch marked by the inauguration of *mass* socialist workers' parties in the various national states". The First International wound up its activities in Europe in 1872 and was officially dissolved in 1876.

p. 29

⁵ *Bernsteinism*—an anti-Marxist trend in international Social-Democracy that arose in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century and derived its name from the German Social-Democrat Eduard Bernstein. After the death of Engels, Bernstein set out to revise the revolutionary teachings of Marx in the spirit of bourgeois liberalism. His book *Prerequisites of Socialism* and his articles "Problems of Socialism" advocated the conversion of the Social-Democratic Party into a petty-bourgeois party of social reforms.

The adherents of Bernstein in Russia were the "legal Marxists", the Economists, the Bundists and Mensheviks.

p. 30

- ⁶ Cf. Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*. Answer to the "Philosophy of Poverty" by M. Proudhon, Chapter II, § 5, Strikes and Combinations of Workers. p. 30
- ⁷ *Lassalleans*—supporters and followers of the German petty-bourgeois socialist Ferdinand Lassalle, members of the General German Workers' Union. The Union was founded in 1863 at a congress of workers' societies in Leipzig in the face of opposition from the bourgeois Progressists who sought to gain influence over the working class. Lassalle, the first president of the Union, drafted its programme and elaborated its tactics. The political programme demanded universal suffrage. Lassalle believed that the Prussian state could be used to solve the social question by setting up producers' co-operatives. In Marx's words, Lassalle advocated "a royal Prussian governmental socialism". Marx and Engels more than once criticised the theory, tactics and organisational principles of Lassalleanism as an opportunist trend in the German working-class movement. p. 30
- ⁸ *Blanquism*—a trend in the French socialist movement headed by Louis August Blanqui (1805-1881). The classics of Marxism-Leninism, while regarding Blanqui as an outstanding revolutionary and adherent of socialism, criticised him for his sectarianism and conspiratorial methods. The Blanquists repudiated the class struggle, expecting that "mankind will be emancipated from wage-slavery, not by the proletarian class struggle, but through a conspiracy hatched by a small minority of intellectuals." (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 392.) p. 31
- ⁹ Lenin here criticises the Lassallean thesis that in relation to the working class all other classes are one reactionary mass. That thesis was included in the German Social-Democratic Party programme adopted in 1875 at the Gotha Congress, at which the two separate German Socialist parties—the Eisenachers led by Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel and Lassalle's party—united to form the Socialist Labour Party of Germany. Marx exposed the anti-revolutionary nature of this Lassallean thesis in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*. p. 31
- ¹⁰ *Rabochaya Mysl (Workers' Thought)*, an Economist newspaper edited by K. M. Takhtaryev and published at various times between 1897 and 1902 in St. Petersburg, Berlin, Warsaw and Geneva. There were sixteen issues altogether. Lenin described its views as a Russian variety of international opportunism and criticised them in *Iskra* and *What Is To Be Done?* p. 33
- ¹¹ *S. Peterburgskiy Rabochy Listok (St. Petersburg Workers' Gazette)*—illegal organ of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. Two issues appeared: No. 1 in February (dated January) 1897 (300-400 copies were printed by mimeograph in Russia), and No. 2, September 1897, in Geneva. p. 33

- ¹² *Rabochaya Gazeta* (*Workers' Gazette*)—illegal organ of the Kiev Social-Democratic group. Two issues appeared, in August and December (dated November) 1897. The First R.S.D.L.P. Congress recognised it as the Party's official organ. p. 33
- ¹³ *The First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* met in Minsk in March 1898 with nine delegates from the following six organisations: the St. Petersburg, Moscow, Ekaterinoslav and Kiev Leagues of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, the Kiev *Rabochaya Gazeta* and the Bund. p.34
- ¹⁴ *Narodnaya Volya* (People's Will)—a secret Narodnik society founded in 1879, following the split of Zemlya i Volya, for revolutionary struggle against tsarism through individual terror. That policy was based on the erroneous and harmful theory of "active" heroes opposed to a passive "mob". Accordingly, the *Narodnaya Volya* regarded the political struggle as a conspiracy organised by a small group of intellectuals. The *Narodnaya Volya* was smashed by the tsarist government soon after the assassination of Alexander II by members of the society on March 13, 1881. Though Lenin criticised the erroneous utopian programme and terroristic tactics of the *Narodovoltsi*, he had a high opinion of their selfless struggle against tsarism and praised their skill in secret, strictly centralised organisation. p. 35
- ¹⁵ *The Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad* was formed in Geneva in 1894 on the initiative of the Emancipation of Labour group. It had its own printing plant and published the magazine *Rabotnik* and revolutionary literature. At the beginning, the Union was directed by the Emancipation of Labour group, which also edited its publications, but later the opportunist elements (the "young Socialists"—the Economists) gained the upper hand. In November 1898, at the First Congress of the Union, the Emancipation of Labour group refused to edit its publications any longer. The final break and the withdrawal of the Emancipation of Labour group from the Union occurred in April 1900, at the Union's Second Congress. The Emancipation of Labour group, together with those who shared its views, withdrew from the Congress and formed an independent organisation known as *Sotsial-Demokrat*. p. 36
- ¹⁶ *Eisenachers*—German Marxists led by Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel, who were closely associated with Marx and Engels. At their congress in Eisenach (1869) the group founded the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Germany, which waged a bitter struggle against the Lassalleans. The growth of the labour movement and intensified police repressions induced the two parties to unite at the Gotha Congress in 1875, and form the Socialist Labour Party of Germany, of which the Lassalleans became the opportunist wing.

Guesdists and Possibilists—two trends in the French socialist movement. Their origin goes back to the split in the French Labour Party in 1882. The Guesdists, followers of Jules Guesde, represented the Left, Marxist trend and advocated an independent revolutionary policy for the proletariat. In 1901 they formed the Socialist Party of France.

Possibilists—a petty-bourgeois reformist trend in the French socialist movement led by Paul Brousse, Benoit Malon and others. They denied the revolutionary programme and tactics of the proletariat, obscured the socialist objectives of the working-class movement and tried to confine the movement to what was possible under the prevailing conditions.

Fabians—members of the reformist Fabian Society founded in England in 1884. The Society took its name from the Roman General Fabius Cunctator (the Delayer), famous for his procrastinating tactics and avoidance of decisive battles in the war against Hannibal. The Society consisted chiefly of bourgeois intellectuals who repudiated proletarian class struggle, vehemently opposed proletarian revolution and advocated the possibility of a peaceful, gradual transition from capitalism to socialism by means of reforms. With the formation of the Labour Party the Society merged with it. The Fabian Society represented, as Lenin put it, "the most consummate expression of opportunism and of liberal-labour policy" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 260). In World War I the Fabians took a social-chauvinist stand. p. 37

¹⁷ *Ministerialists* (Millerandists)—an opportunist trend in the West-European Socialist parties at the turn of the century, deriving its name from the French socialist Alexandre Millerand who in 1899 joined a reactionary bourgeois government and helped it carry out its imperialist policies. p. 37

¹⁸ Reference is to the "legal Marxists", whose position was close to that of Bernstein. p. 37

¹⁹ *Iskra* (*The Spark*)—the first all-Russia illegal Marxist newspaper, founded by Lenin. The first issue appeared on December 24, 1900 in Leipzig, after which the paper was published in Munich, London (from April 1902) and Geneva (from the spring of 1903). *Iskra* prepared the ideological and organisational consolidation of the Party. On Lenin's initiative and with his immediate participation, the *Iskra* Editorial Board drew up a draft Party programme and prepared the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (July-August 1903). In the columns of *Iskra* Lenin and his supporters upheld revolutionary Marxism against Economism and all manifestations of opportunism in the international labour movement, and against the revisionists in the Russian and West-European Social-Democratic movement. The Second R.S.D.L.P. Congress adopted a special resolution in appreciation of *Iskra's* exceptional role in building the Party and proclaimed it the Party's central organ. After the Second Congress the Mensheviks, with Plekhanov's assistance,

seized *Iskra*, and beginning with No. 52 it became their factional mouthpiece—the *new*, Menshevik, opportunist *Iskra*, as distinct from the *old*, Leninist, Bolshevik *Iskra*.

Zarya (Dawn)—a Marxist political journal published in 1901-02 in Stuttgart by the editors of *Iskra*. Four issues were put out: No. 1, April 1901, No. 2-3, December 1901 and No. 4, August 1902. p. 41

- ²⁰ *The Mountain and the Gironde*—political groupings during the French bourgeois revolution. The Montagnards, or the Jacobins, was the name given to the more resolute representatives of the bourgeoisie, the revolutionary class of the time, who advocated the destruction of absolutism and feudalism. They were bitterly opposed by the Girondists, who vacillated between revolution and counter-revolution. Their policy was one of a deal with the monarchy, and in 1793 the Girondists definitely joined the counter-revolutionary forces.

Lenin applies the term *Socialist Gironde* to the opportunist trend in the Social-Democratic movement, and the term *Proletarian Jacobins*, or the Mountain, to the revolutionary Social-Democrats. After the R.S.D.L.P. had split into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, at the Second Congress of the Party in 1903, Lenin repeatedly emphasised that the Mensheviks represented the Girondist trend in the labour movement. p. 41

- ²¹ *Cadets (Constitutional-Democratic Party)*—the principal party of the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie, founded in October 1905. The Cadets called themselves the party of "people's freedom", but their aim was to preserve tsarism in the form of a constitutional monarchy. In World War I, the Cadets were zealous "defencists", and after the February Revolution, with the consent of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders of the Petrograd Soviet, dominated the bourgeois Provisional Government and directed its counter-revolutionary policies. After the October Revolution, the Cadets organised counter-revolutionary conspiracies against the Soviet Republic acting as agents and mercenaries of foreign imperialism. Lenin described the Cadets as the General Staff of Russian counter-revolution. p. 41

- ²² *Bezzaglavtsi*—from *Bez Zaglaviya (Without a Title)*, a journal published in St. Petersburg in 1906 by a semi-Cadet, semi-Menshevik group of Russian bourgeois intellectuals. Disclaiming any party allegiance, they actually spread bourgeois liberalism and opportunism and supported revisionists in the Russian and international Social-Democratic movement. Lenin described them as "Menshevik Cadets" or "Cadet Mensheviks". p. 41

- ²³ *Ilovaisky, D. I. (1832-1920)*—historian, author of numerous official textbooks widely used in elementary and secondary schools prior

- to the revolution. Ilovaisky interpreted history as consisting mainly of the acts of tsars and generals and explained the historical process by secondary and incidental factors. p. 42
- ²⁴ Reference is to the Paris Commune of 1871. p. 42
- ²⁵ *The Anti-Socialist Law* was introduced in Germany in 1878. It provided for the prohibition of all the Social-Democratic organisations, mass labour organisations, the labour press, the confiscation of socialist literature and the persecution of Social-Democrats. The law was repealed in 1890 under pressure of the mass labour movement. p. 42
- ²⁶ *Vorwärts*—a daily newspaper, central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party. It was published in Berlin from 1891 in place of *Berliner Volksblatt* which had appeared from 1884 and was called *Vorwärts, Berliner Volksblatt*. In its columns Engels combated all manifestations of opportunism. Beginning with the second half of the nineties, after the death of Engels, *Vorwärts* systematically carried articles by opportunists, who then dominated the German Social-Democratic Party and Second International. In World War I, *Vorwärts* took a social-chauvinist stand, and after the Great October Socialist Revolution became a centre of anti-Soviet propaganda. It ceased publication in 1933. p. 42
- ²⁷ *Katheder-Socialists*—representatives of a bourgeois-liberal trend enjoying wide support in the universities. Its chief propositions—class peace, a supra-class state, peaceful development of capitalism into socialism, etc.—were meant to dupe the workers by socialist phraseology. The "legal Marxists" were the Russian variety of *Katheder-Socialists*, whom Lenin described as "the vermin of police-bourgeois university science". p. 43
- ²⁸ *Nozdryov*—the landowner in Gogol's *Dead Souls*, referred to as "historical", because wherever he went he left behind a "history" of quarrels and rowdyism. p. 43
- ²⁹ *The Hanover resolution* on "Attacks on the fundamental views and tactics of the Party" was adopted by the Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party in Hanover (October 9-14, 1899). The matter came up for discussion and a special resolution was adopted because the opportunists, led by Bernstein, had urged the revision of Marxist theory and revolutionary policy and tactics. That the Congress rejected, but its resolution did not criticise or expose the Bernsteinians and they voted for the resolution.
- The Lübeck Congress* of the German Social-Democratic Party (September 22-28, 1901) concentrated chiefly on the struggle against revisionism, now organised as the party's Right wing and with its own monthly magazine, *Sozialistische Monatshette*. In his Congress speech Bernstein demanded "freedom to criticise Marxism". The

- draft resolution tabled by his supporters was rejected by the Congress, which in its own resolution warned Bernstein but did not declare that adherence to his views was incompatible with membership in the party. p. 43
- ³⁰ *The Stuttgart Congress* of the German Social-Democratic Party (October 3-8, 1898) was the first to take up the question of revisionism. Bernstein (who did not attend the congress) sent a statement amplifying and defending the opportunist views he had previously set forth in a number of articles. There was no unity, however, among his opponents: Bebel, Kautsky and the congress majority called for an ideological struggle and criticism of Bernstein's mistakes but opposed disciplinary measures; the minority, led by Rosa Luxemburg, insisted on a more vigorous struggle against Bernsteinism. p. 44
- ³¹ "The Author Who Got a Swelled Head"—the title of one of Maxim Gorky's early stories. p. 46
- ³² Reference is to the collection *Materials for a Characterisation of Our Economic Development*, legally published in 2,000 copies in April 1895. It contained Lenin's article (signed K. Tulin), "The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book (*The Reflection of Marxism in Bourgeois Literature*)" directed against the "legal Marxists". (*Collected Works*, Vol. 1, pp. 333-507.) p. 47
- ³³ *Zubatov*—chief of the Moscow secret police, the moving spirit of police socialism in Russia. Zubatov set up workers' organisations under the aegis of the gendarmes and police, in a futile effort to deflect the workers from the revolutionary movement. p. 48
- ³⁴ *Byloye (The Past)*—a journal of history concerned mainly with the history of Narodism and earlier social movements; was published in 1900-04 and 1906-07, at first abroad and later in St. Petersburg. p. 49
- ³⁵ *Profession de foi*—a leaflet issued by the Kiev Committee at the close of 1899 setting forth the opportunist views of the "young Socialists". On many points it was identical with the Economist "Credo". It is criticised by Lenin in his article "Apropos of the *Profession de Foi*". (*Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 286-96.) p. 49
- ³⁶ "*Separate Supplement*" to *Rabochaya Mysl*—a pamphlet put out in September 1899 by the Economists who edited *Rabochaya Mysl*. It was a candid exposé (especially the article "Our Realities" signed R. M.) of the opportunist views of the Economists. Lenin criticises it in the article "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy". (*Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 255-85.) p. 52

- ³⁷ Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, p. 16.
p. 54
- ³⁸ *Die Neue Zeit (New Times)*—a German Social-Democratic theoretical magazine published in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923. In 1885-95 it published a number of Engels's articles. Engels often gave instructions to the editors and sharply criticised the magazine for its deviations from Marxism. Beginning with the latter half of the nineties, after Engels's death, it regularly carried articles by revisionists. During the imperialist world war (1914-18) it took a centrist, Kautskyite stand and supported the social-chauvinists.
p. 59
- ³⁹ Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 209.
p. 60
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 183-84. p. 60
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 199-200. p. 60
- ⁴² *The Black Hundreds* were monarchist gangs organised by the tsarist police to fight the revolutionary movement. They assassinated revolutionaries, attacked progressive intellectuals and perpetrated anti-Jewish pogroms. p. 61
- ⁴³ K. Marx, Letter to Kugelmann, December 5, 1868. p. 61
- ⁴⁴ Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 218-19.
p. 62
- ⁴⁵ *Brentanoism, Struvism, Sombartism*—varieties of bourgeois distortion of Marxism.
Lujo Brentano—German bourgeois economist, exponent of "state socialism"; endeavoured to prove that social equality could be obtained by reforming capitalism and reconciling the interests of the capitalists and workers.
Werner Sombart—German bourgeois economist, falsifier of Marxism who sought to justify capitalism by claiming it represented a "harmonious" and "balanced" system.
Brentano, Sombart and their followers used Marxist phraseology to defend capitalism and subordinate the labour movement to the interests of the bourgeoisie. Their theories are still being disseminated by the enemies of Marxism.
P. B. Struve—Russian bourgeois liberal, exponent of legal Marxism in the nineties, later one of the leaders of the Cadet party, and after the October Revolution a White émigré, inveterate enemy of the Soviet Union. p. 62
- ⁴⁶ Reference is to the Second Address of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association on the Franco-Prussian War written by Marx on September 9, 1870. (See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 491-98.) p. 63

- ⁴⁷ *The Man in the Muffler*—the chief character in a story by Chekhov of the same name, typifying the narrow-minded philistine who fears all innovations and initiative. p. 65
- ⁴⁸ Reference is to the "wise gudgeon" in one of the fables of Saltykov-Shchedrin, the Russian satirist, typifying the timid, over-cautious individual who leads a vegetating existence. p. 65
- ⁴⁹ Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 262-63. p. 66
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 264. p. 67
- ⁵¹ *Sovremennaya Zhizn (Contemporary Life)*—a Menshevik journal published in Moscow from April 1906 to March 1907.
Otkliki (Response)—a Menshevik symposium published in St. Petersburg in 1906-07; three issues appeared. p. 69
- ⁵² *The British Social-Democratic Federation* was founded in 1884 by Hyndman, Harry Quelch and Tom Mann. Published *Justice* (weekly) and *Social-Democrat* (monthly), had an extremely small membership, was not always consistent in its policy, though its propaganda followed Marxist lines. Was the basis for the formation of the British Socialist Party in 1911. p. 70
- ⁵³ Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 395. p. 70
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 400. p. 70
- ⁵⁵ Reference is to the Menshevik plan for liquidating the illegal party and replacing it with a "broad" petty-bourgeois labour party based on the British pattern, with no definite programme and governed by a "labour congress", in which Social-Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries and anarchists would be represented. Lenin exposed this evil Menshevik attempt to liquidate the Social-Democratic Labour Party and dissolve the front-rank detachment of the working class in a petty-bourgeois mass. By adopting this plan, the liquidators virtually repudiated proletarian dictatorship. p. 70
- ⁵⁶ *Left bloc*—a bloc of Left groups in the elections to the State Duma. Formed on Bolshevik initiative to ensure an independent class policy of the workers' deputies in the Duma and guidance of the peasant deputies in order to isolate them from Cadet influence. After the dissolution of the First Duma, an Executive Committee of the Left was formed, with the Social-Democratic deputies as its core. It issued a Manifesto to the Army and Navy and a Manifesto to the Russian Peasantry. p. 70
- ⁵⁷ Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 399. p. 70

- ⁵⁸ *Knights of Labor*—an American labour organisation founded in 1869 by Stevenson, a tailor. Consisted chiefly of unskilled labourers. Repudiated political struggle, advocated class collaboration, ceased to exist in the early nineties. p. 71
- ⁵⁹ *Zukunft (Future)*—a journal published in 1877-78 in Berlin by K. Höchberg, one of the leaders of the Right-opportunist wing in the German Social-Democratic Party. p. 73
- ⁶⁰ K. Marx, Letter to Sorge, September 19, 1879. p. 74
- ⁶¹ K. Marx, Letter to Sorge, November 5, 1880. p. 74
- ⁶² *Yearbook of Social Science and Social Policy*—a periodical published in Zurich in 1879-81 by a group of opportunists in the German Social-Democratic Party. p. 75
- ⁶³ This refers to disagreements in the Social-Democratic group of the German Reichstag on the question of a shipping subsidy. At the close of 1884, Reichschancellor Bismarck, in furtherance of Germany's predatory colonial policy, demanded a government subsidy to help private firms establish steamship lines to East Asia, Australia and Africa. The issue caused sharp differences within the Social-Democratic group, with the Right wing, which made up the majority, insisting that the party support Bismarck's proposal. When the question was debated in the Reichstag, in March 1885, the Right wing voted for subsidising the East-Asian and Australian lines, and made their consent to subsidies for the African and other lines conditional on the new vessels being built in German yards. The Reichstag rejected that, whereupon the Social-Democratic group cast its vote against the subsidies. In a letter to Sorge (December 31, 1884), Engels condemned the opportunist stand taken by the Social-Democratic Right wing. p. 75
- ⁶⁴ Reference is to the two international congresses that opened in Paris on July 14, 1889. One was convened by the French Possibilists, the other by the Guesdists and German Social-Democrats and supported by Engels. The purpose of both congresses was to inaugurate an International. The opportunists were eager to gain control of it, but the majority of the Socialist parties attended the Marxist congress and it was proclaimed the inaugural congress of the Second International. p. 75
- ⁶⁵ F. Engels, Letter to Sorge, May 11, 1889. p. 76
- ⁶⁶ F. Engels, Letter to Florence Kelly-Wischnewetzky, May 2, 1888. p. 77
- ⁶⁷ Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 453-54. p. 78

- ⁶⁸ *Revolutionary syndicalism*—a petty-bourgeois anarchist trend that appeared in several parts of Western Europe at the close of the last century. The syndicalists repudiated working-class political struggle, the leading role of the party and proletarian dictatorship, believing that the trade unions (syndicates) could overthrow capitalism without a revolution, through a general strike, and take over control of the economy. "Syndicalism," Lenin wrote in 1917, "either repudiates the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat or else relegates it, as it does political power in general, to a back seat. We, however, put it in the forefront" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 105). Lenin pointed out that "revolutionary syndicalism in many countries was a direct and inevitable result of opportunism, reformism, and parliamentary cretinism" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 166). p. 79
- ⁶⁹ Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, p. 33 p. 80
- ⁷⁰ *Decazeville strike*—a strike of the French miners in Decazeville in January 1886 suppressed by government troops. The bourgeois deputies in Parliament, the Radicals included, supported the government and its reprisals against the strikers. This caused the labour deputies to break with the Radicals and form an independent group. p. 81
- ⁷¹ F. Engels, Letter to Sorge, April 29, 1886. p. 81
- ⁷² The rest of the preface, beginning with the words: "In 1889 a young and fresh movement of untrained and unskilled labourers..." was published in the Bolshevik paper *Nashe Ekho* (*Our Echo*) No. 13, April 8, 1907, with the following introduction: "The letters of Marx and Engels to their friend and associate Sorge in America will soon be brought out by the Dauge Publishing House. "In view of their wide interest we take the liberty of citing here a section of the preface to the Russian edition that deals with Marx's and Engels's attitude to the expected revolution in Russia. We begin with two characteristic remarks by Engels on the significance of the French revolution and the possibility of a revolution in Germany." p. 81
- ⁷³ Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 408. p. 82
- F. Engels, Letter to Sorge, October 24, 1891. p. 82
- ⁷⁴ *The Eastern crisis*—reference is to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. p. 83
- ⁷⁵ *The First (Witte) State Duma* was convened on May 10, 1906, in accordance with a law drawn up by S. Y. Witte, the tsar's Prime Minister. Though the election procedure was patently undemocratic, the First Duma was not the docile assembly the government

wanted and expected. The Cadets, who commanded a majority, tried to win over the peasants with promises of reforms, including a land reform. The Duma was dissolved by the government on July 21, 1906.

The Second State Duma was convened on March 5, 1907. The Bolsheviks took part in the elections, held at a time when the revolution was receding, but not in order to share in the Duma's "legislative" work in a bloc with the Cadets. Their purpose was to utilise the Duma as a platform in the interests of the revolution. In contrast to the Mensheviks, who favoured an election alliance with the Cadets, they fought the election as an independent party and tried to prevent a Cadet majority by forming a Left Bloc, which polled 26 per cent of the urban vote. The Second Duma was of a more Left composition than the first: of the 518 seats the Social-Democrats had 65, the Trudoviks 104, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries 37. The Cadets had 99 seats (80 less than in the First Duma) and the Octobrists and Black Hundreds 54 between them. The Duma was dissolved by the government three months after its convocation. On the night of June 2 (15, new style), 1907, the Social-Democratic deputies were arrested on a trumped up charge of conspiracy, and on June 3 a manifesto dissolving the Duma was issued and a new electoral law promulgated. This was the "coup" of June 3, 1907.

Lenin discusses the Second State Duma in "The Second Duma and the Tasks of the Proletariat" and "The Elections to the Duma and the Tactics of the Russian Social-Democrats". (*Collected Works*, Vol. 12, pp. 156-60, 196-207.) p. 83

⁷⁷ *General Redistribution*—a Narodnik organisation that published a journal of the same name. Formed in the autumn of 1879 after the split of the *Zemlya i Volya* (Land and Freedom), it was opposed to terror and adhered to the old *Zemlya i Volya* programme and tactics. The organisation disintegrated in the early eighties, some of its leading members, notably Plekhanov, Axelrod and Zasulich, breaking with the Narodnik movement and forming the Marxist Emancipation of Labour group. p. 83

⁷⁸ This refers to Engels's letter to Vera Zasulich of April 23, 1885, first published in Moscow in 1925 in the symposium *Emancipation of Labour group* No. 3. p. 84

⁷⁹ *The Stuttgart International Socialist Congress*, the Seventh Congress of the Second International, met on August 18-24, 1907. The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party was represented by 37 delegates. The Bolshevik group included V. I. Lenin, A. V. Lunacharsky, M. M. Litvinov, Meshkovsky (I. P. Goldenberg), Ruben (B. M. Knunyants), M. Tskhakaya and Y. B. Bosch. The congress discussed: 1. militarism and international conflicts, 2. the Party and the trade unions, 3. the colonial question, 4. immigration, 5. the franchise for women. Most of the discussions were in the committees. Lenin was on the committee that

drew up the resolution on militarism and international conflicts. Together with Rosa Luxemburg he tabled several amendments to the draft framed by Bebel, including one on the duty of socialists to utilise the war crisis for revolutionary work among the masses and the overthrow of capitalism. Lenin's amendments were approved by the congress. p. 86

⁸⁰ The issue of *Proletary* (No. 17) in which this article appeared also carried the Stuttgart Congress resolutions. p. 86

⁸¹ Reference is to the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in Stockholm, April 23-May 8, 1906. p. 89

⁸² *Socialist-Revolutionaries*—a petty-bourgeois party in Russia, which came into being at the end of 1901 and beginning of 1902 as a result of a merger of various Narodnik groups and circles. The S.R.s did not recognise class distinctions between the proletariat and the petty proprietors, played down the class contradictions among the peasantry and refused to recognise the proletariat's leading rôle in the revolution.

Their views were an eclectic mixture of the ideas of Narodism and revisionism. In Lenin's words, they tried to mend "the rents in the Narodnik ideas with bits of fashionable opportunist 'criticism' of Marxism". (*Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 310).

The Bolshevik Party exposed the attempts of the S.R.s to pass themselves off as socialists. It waged a stubborn fight against them for influence over the peasantry, and revealed the damage their tactics of individual terrorism was causing the working-class movement. At the same time, the Bolsheviks, on definite terms, entered into temporary agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries to combat tsarism. During the first Russian revolution, the Right wing of the S.R.s broke away from the party and formed the legal Labour Popular Socialist Party, whose views were close to those of the Constitutional-Democrats (Cadets), while the Left wing split away and formed a semi-anarchist league of "Maximalists". During the period of the Stolypin reaction, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party suffered a complete break-down ideologically and organisationally. During the First World War most of its members took a social-chauvinist stand.

After the February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, together with the Mensheviks and the Cadets, formed the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government, and the S.R. leaders Kerensky, Avksentyev and Chernov were members of that government. At the end of November 1917 the Left wing of the S.R. Party formed an independent party of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries who, in an attempt to preserve their influence among the peasant masses, formally recognised the Soviet government and entered into an agreement with the Bolsheviks, but soon began a struggle against the Soviets.

During the years of foreign intervention and the Civil War the S.R.s carried on counter-revolutionary subversive activities,

They actively supported the interventionists and whiteguards, took part in counter-revolutionary plots, and organised terroristic acts against leaders of the Soviet state and the Communist Party.

p. 89

⁸³ Reference is to the Fifth (London) Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, May 13-June 1, 1907. p. 89

⁸⁴ *Die Gleichheit (Equality)*—a fortnightly journal of the German women's movement, published in 1890-1925 and edited by Clara Zetkin from 1892 to 1917. p. 89

⁸⁵ In 1907 the Zerno Publishers decided to bring out a three-volume collection of Lenin's works under the general title *Twelve Years*. Only the first volume and part I of the second appeared. The first volume contained: *The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book; The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats; The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism; What Is To Be Done?; One Step Forward, Two Steps Back; The Zemstvo Campaign and Iskra's Plan; Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*. The first volume appeared in mid-November 1907 and was seized by the authorities, but a large part of the edition escaped confiscation and the book had a wide illegal circulation. The second volume was to contain Lenin's works on the agrarian problem. Only part I was published early in 1908 (without the title *Twelve Years* to prevent confiscation) and included such legally published works as *A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism; The Handicraft Census of 1894-95 in Perm Gubernia and General Problems of "Handicraft" Industry; The Agrarian Question and the "Critics of Marx"*. Part II, which was to contain *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907*, was confiscated in the printing plant and destroyed by the police. It was subsequently published in 1917. Lenin intended to add a comprehensive survey of land distribution in Russia (based on statistical data for 1905) and a note on municipalisation. These concluding chapters were never published. Publication of the third volume (polemical articles from the Bolshevik papers *Iskra*, *Vperyod*, *Proletary* and *Novaya Zhizn*) was prevented by the reactionary onslaught that followed the 1905 Revolution. p. 93

⁸⁶ *Octobrists, or Union of October 17*—a counter-revolutionary party of the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie and of the landowners who ran their estates on capitalist lines; founded in November 1905. While professing to welcome the Manifesto of October 17, the Octobrists unreservedly supported the home and foreign policies of the tsarist government. The Octobrist leaders were Guchkov, a big industrialist, and Rodzyanko, owner of vast estates. p. 94

⁸⁷ *The League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class* was formed by Lenin in the autumn of 1895 and united all the

Marxist workers' circles in St. Petersburg. It was headed by a Central Group (S. I. Radchenko, A. A. Vaneyev, A. A. Yakubova, N. K. Krupskaya, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, V. V. Starkov and others) directed by Lenin.

Lenin's League of Struggle led the revolutionary working-class movement, linking the workers' struggle in support of economic demands with the political struggle against tsarism. It was the first organisation in Russia to *combine socialism with the labour movement* and to pass from the propaganda of Marxism among a small circle of advanced workers to political agitation among the broad masses of the working class. It issued leaflets and pamphlets for the workers and directed their strike struggles. The influence of the League extended far beyond St. Petersburg. It was the embryo of a revolutionary Marxist workers' party and gave a powerful impetus to the amalgamation into similar Leagues of workers' circles in other parts of Russia. p. 95

⁸⁸ *Novoye Slovo (New Word)*—a literary and political monthly founded in St. Petersburg in 1894 by a group of liberal Narodniks and taken over in the spring of 1897 by the "legal Marxists". Two of Lenin's articles, *A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism*, and *About a Certain Newspaper Article*, appeared in its pages. The magazine was suppressed by the tsarist government in December 1897. p. 95

⁸⁹ *Narodnoye Pravo (People's Rights) Party*—an underground organisation of democratic intellectuals formed in 1893 with the assistance of ex-members of the Narodnaya Volya. Suppressed by the tsarist government in the spring of 1894. Issued two programmatic documents: a Manifesto and a statement on "Urgent Problems". Lenin regarded the Narodnoye Pravo supporters as inconsistent democrats who, having no understanding of their real function as a democratic organisation, resorted to socialist phraseology. In later years part of the Narodnoye Pravo supporters joined the Socialist-Revolutionaries and another part the Emancipation League (the future Cadet Party). p. 96

⁹⁰ *Tovarishch (Comrade)*—a daily bourgeois newspaper published in St. Petersburg from March 1906 to January 1908. Though not the official organ of any party, it served as the mouthpiece of the Left Cadets, the *Bezzaglavtsi* group, and published contributions from Mensheviks. p. 98

⁹¹ This refers to the third volume of Lenin's works, *Twelve Years*, which was never published. p. 99

⁹² Lenin refers to the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party programme adopted at the Party's Second Congress in 1903. p. 99

⁹³ *The Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party* was prepared by Lenin's *Iskra* and held on July 30-August 23,

1903, meeting first in Brussels and then in London. The delegate body was heterogeneous—besides supporters of *Iskra* there were its opponents, avowed opportunists and vacillating elements. The most important items of discussion were the Party programme and Rules and election of the leading Party bodies. Lenin waged a decisive struggle against the opportunists, and the Congress adopted a revolutionary programme, in which proletarian dictatorship was proclaimed the Party's basic aim. The Rules were likewise formulated by Lenin (with the exception of Paragraph 1, drawn up by Martov and expressive of the organisational opportunism of the anti-*Iskra* forces). It was at this Congress that the Party split into Bolsheviks, representing the revolutionary forces, and Mensheviks, representing the opportunist wing. Bolsheviks were elected to the Party centres. The Congress consolidated the triumph of Marxism over Economism, over avowed opportunism, and laid the foundations of a revolutionary Marxist party of the Russian working class—the Communist Party. The Congress was thus a turning point in the international labour movement.

The Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (London, April 25-May 10, 1905) was convened on Bolshevik initiative. The Mensheviks were not represented and held a congress of their own in Geneva (officially described as a conference in view of the meagre attendance). The Third Congress discussed chiefly questions of Bolshevik tactics in the revolution. Lenin spoke on all basic problems and drafted all the principal resolutions. The Congress worked out the Party's tactical line on major issues of the revolution. Its decisions stood out in sharp contrast to those of the Menshevik conference in Geneva. The Third Congress condemned the Mensheviks as a break-away group and adopted Paragraph 1 of the Rules in Lenin's formulation. In his *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, published in July 1905, Lenin gives a classical criticism of the Menshevik tactic and brilliantly substantiates the Bolshevik tactic, with its clear prospect of the bourgeois revolution growing into socialist revolution. p. 100

⁹⁴ *Novaya Zhizn* (*New Life*)—the first legal Bolshevik paper, published daily from November 9 to December 16, 1905, in St. Petersburg. Lenin took over the editorship of the paper upon his return to Russia early in November 1905 and made *Novaya Zhizn* the actual central organ of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. V. V. Vorovsky, M. S. Olminsky and A. V. Lunacharsky were closely associated with the paper, and Maxim Gorky contributed articles and gave it financial support. The circulation rose to some 80,000, though the paper was constantly persecuted, 15 issues out of the 27 being confiscated. It was closed by the government after issue No. 27; issue No. 28 appeared illegally.

The transition to a democratic form of organisation was proclaimed by Lenin in his article "The Reorganisation of the Party" in issues 9, 13 and 14 (November 10, 15 and 16, 1905). p. 101

⁹⁵ *Vperyod (Forward)*—an illegal Bolshevik newspaper, published in Geneva from January 4 to May 18, 1905. Eighteen issues in all appeared. Lenin was its founder, inspirer and director, and its editorial board included V. V. Vorovsky, M. S. Olminsky and A. V. Lunacharsky. The Third Congress, in a special resolution, noted the outstanding services rendered by *Vperyod* in combating Menshevism, upholding the party spirit and elucidating the tactical issues raised by the incipient revolution, and thanked the members of its editorial board.

Lenin refers to his note to Vorovsky's article "Fruits of Demagogy" in No. 11 of *Vperyod* (March 23, 1905), refuting Plekhanov's statement that the differences and "cool relationships" among the *Iskra* editors were due to Plekhanov disagreeing with Lenin's views on the role of spontaneity and consciousness in the labour movement, as set forth in *What Is To Be Done?* p. 103

⁹⁶ Reference is to Part II of the second volume of *Twelve Years*, which included *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907.* p. 105

⁹⁷ *The Zemstvo campaign* (August 1904-January 1905) consisted of a series of conferences, public meetings and banquets arranged by Zemstvo leaders to press their demands for moderate constitutional reforms.

The Zemstvo was a form of local government introduced in the central provinces of Russia in 1864 and dominated by the nobility. The Zemstvos had jurisdiction over purely local affairs—hospitals, roads, statistics, insurance, etc. Their activities were controlled by the provincial governors and the Ministry of the Interior, which could cancel any decision the government did not approve of. p. 106

⁹⁸ *The Bulygin Duma*—the "advisory representative assembly" the tsarist government promised to convene in 1905. The bill for its convocation and the regulations governing the elections were drafted by a commission presided over by Minister of the Interior Bulygin and published on August 19, 1905. The Bolsheviks proclaimed and carried out an active boycott of the Bulygin Duma. The general strike in October 1905 made its convocation impossible. p. 107

⁹⁹ Lenin is quoting a passage from Marx's concluding remarks to the second edition of the first volume of *Capital.* p. 112

¹⁰⁰ Lenin refers to his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.* p. 113

¹⁰¹ *Independent Labour Party*—a reformist party founded by the leaders of the "new trade unions" in 1893, in the conditions of the mounting strike struggle and the drive of the British working class to establish a party independent of the bourgeois parties. The I.L.P. united members of the "new trade unions" and a number of old

trade unions, as well as intellectuals and petty bourgeois who were under the influence of the Fabians. The party was led by Keir Hardie.

From the very outset the I.L.P. took a bourgeois-reformist stand and went in for parliamentary struggle and deals with the Liberals. Lenin gave the following characterisation of the party: "The Independent Labour Party... is actually an opportunist party that has always been dependent on the bourgeoisie" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 494).

Following the outbreak of the First World War, the I.L.P. issued a manifesto against the war, but shortly afterwards took a social-chauvinist stand.

p. 117

- ¹⁰² *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (*Social-Democrat Voice*)—a newspaper published from February 1908 to December 1911, first in Geneva and later in Paris, by the Menshevik Liquidators. p. 119

- ¹⁰³ Lenin refers to his article "P. Maslov in Hysterics".

Proletary—an illegal newspaper founded by the Bolsheviks after the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the Party. Published from September 3, 1906 to December 11, 1909 under Lenin's editorship. The organ of the Moscow and St. Petersburg Party Committees, and for a time also of the Moscow District, Perm, Kursk and Kazan Committees, *Proletary* was actually the central Bolshevik organ. Altogether fifty issues appeared (the first twenty in Vyborg, Finland). From February 26 to December 14, 1908, *Proletary* was published in Geneva and from January 21 to December 11, 1909, in Paris. It printed over one hundred articles and shorter items by Lenin. During the Stolypin reaction it played an outstanding part in preserving and strengthening the Bolshevik organisations. At the plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee in January 1910 the conciliators succeeded in obtaining a decision to discontinue its publication.

p. 119

- ¹⁰⁴ Lenin refers to the editorial note to his article "How Pyotr Maslov Corrects Karl Marx's Rough Drafts". p. 121

- ¹⁰⁵ *Famusov*—a character in Griboyedov's comedy *Wit Works Woe* p. 121

- ¹⁰⁶ *The "Young" faction*—a petty-bourgeois semi-anarchist group formed in the German Social-Democratic Party in 1890 and made up chiefly of university students and young writers (hence the name). It advocated non-participation in parliament. Engels described the group as heroes of the "revolutionary phrase" who sought to "disorganise the party by squabbling and intrigue". They were expelled from the party by the Erfurt Congress in 1891. p. 128

- ¹⁰⁷ *Vekhi* (*Landmarks*)—a Cadet symposium published in Moscow in the spring of 1909, containing articles by N. Berdyaev, S. Bulgakov, P. Struve, M. Gerschenson and other representatives of the counter-

revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie. In essays on the Russian intelligentsia, the *Vekhi* writers tried to discredit the revolutionary-democratic forerunners of Russian Social-Democracy, including V. G. Belinsky and N. G. Chernyshevsky, vilified the revolutionary movement of 1905, and thanked the tsarist government for having, "with its bayonets and jails", saved the bourgeoisie from "the ire of the people". They urged the intelligentsia to serve the autocracy. Lenin compared the philosophy and politics of the *Vekhi* programme with that of the Black-Hundred newspaper *Moskovskiy Vedomosti*, and called the volume of essays an "encyclopaedia of liberal renegeacy", "a veritable torrent of reactionary mud poured on the head of democracy" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 16, pp. 124, 129). p. 132

- ¹⁰⁸ The name applied in Russian political literature to the extreme reactionary landowners. p. 132
- ¹⁰⁹ *Otzovism* (from the Russian word *otozvat*-recall)—an opportunist trend among a section of the Bolsheviks (Bogdanov, Alexinsky, Lunacharsky and others) after the defeat of the 1905-07 Revolution. The otzovists opposed legal forms of activity, demanding the recall of the Social-Democratic deputies from the State Duma, and refusing to work in the trade unions and other legal labour organisations. p. 134
- ¹¹⁰ Reference is to the decisions of the Fifth (All-Russia) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in Paris, January 3-9, 1909. It was attended by 16 delegates with full vote—5 Bolsheviks, 3 Mensheviks, 5 Polish Social-Democrats and 3 representatives of the Bund. Lenin represented the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. He delivered the report on Tasks of the Party in the Present Situation and spoke in the discussion on the Social-Democratic Duma group, on organisation and other questions. At the conference the Bolsheviks combated the two types of opportunism in the Party, liquidationism and otzovism. On Lenin's proposal, the conference condemned liquidationism and urged Party organisations resolutely to counter every attempt to liquidate the Party. p. 140
- ¹¹¹ *Pravda* (*The Truth*)—a Bolshevik daily founded on the initiative of St. Petersburg workers in April 1912, and published legally in that city. *Pravda* was a mass newspaper maintained by the workers. It enlisted the assistance of a large number of worker correspondents and writers. Over 11,000 contributions by workers were published in the course of one year. Daily circulation averaged 40,000 copies, and sometimes soared to 60,000. Lenin guided *Pravda* from abroad, contributing to it almost daily, giving advice to its editorial board and rallying the Party's best pens to it.

Pravda was constantly persecuted by the police. During the first year of its existence it was confiscated 41 times; its editors were sued 36 times and spent a total of 47½ months in prison.

During the more than two years since its first issue appeared, the tsarist government suppressed it eight times, but it reappeared under other titles: *Rabochaya Pravda* (*Workers' Truth*), *Severnaya Pravda* (*Northern Truth*), *Proletarskaya Pravda* (*Proletarian Truth*), *Pravda Truda* (*Labour Truth*), *Za Pravdu* (*For Truth*), *Put Pravdy* (*Path of Truth*), *Rabochy* (*The Worker*), *Trudovaya Pravda* (*Labour's Truth*). It was suppressed by the government on July 21, 1914, on the eve of the First World War.

Pravda resumed publication after the February Revolution, on March 18, 1917, as the central organ of the R.S.D.L.P. On his return to Russia on April 18, Lenin took over the direction of *Pravda*. On July 18, 1917, the editorial offices were raided by officer cadets and Cossacks. Between July and October 1917, being persecuted by the Provisional Government, *Pravda* had to change its title to *Listok Pravdy* (*Truth Newssheet*), *Proletary*, *Rabochy* (*The Worker*) and *Rabochy Put* (*Workers' Path*). On November 9, it resumed its original title—*Pravda*.

Luch (*The Ray*)—the daily newspaper of the Menshevik Liquidators, published legally in St. Petersburg from September 1912 to July 1913. It was maintained by funds provided by the liberal bourgeoisie. From July 1913, the place of *Luch* was taken by the newspaper *Zhivaya Zhizn* (*Living Life*) and this was followed in turn by *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta* (*New Workers' Gazette*), *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* (*Northern Workers' Gazette*) and *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta* (*Our Workers' Gazette*). p. 140

- ¹¹² This refers to the expulsion from the Party of the Menshevik Liquidators at the Sixth All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., which met in Prague on January 18-30, 1912. Practically all Party organisations active in Russia (over twenty) were represented and the conference was therefore equivalent to a Party congress. It formalised the existence of the Bolsheviks as a separate party. p. 141
- ¹¹³ Reference is to the Menshevik agrarian programme of land municipalisation adopted at the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. It is analysed and criticised by Lenin in his *Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* and *The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907*. p. 143
- ¹¹⁴ Reference is to the pro-Party Mensheviks, a small group headed by Plekhanov who broke away from the Menshevik Liquidators and in 1908-12 opposed liquidationism.
Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata (*Social-Democrat Diary*) was published by Plekhanov in Geneva from March 1905 to April 1912. Sixteen issues appeared, and publication was resumed in St. Petersburg in 1916, when one more issue was put out. p. 143
- ¹¹⁵ *Nasha Zarya* (*Our Dawn*)—a monthly legal journal of the Menshevik Liquidators published in St. Petersburg from January 1910 to

- September 1914. It served as the rallying centre of the Liquidators in Russia. p. 143
- ¹¹⁶ Lenin refers to the decision of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee plenary meeting in Paris, January 15-February 5, 1910. p. 144
- ¹¹⁷ *Vperyod* group—an anti-Party group that subscribed to the reactionary idealistic philosophy of Mach and Avenarius, urged recall of the Bolshevik deputies from the Duma (“otzovism”, “ultimatumism”) and leaned towards religious mysticism (“God-building”). The group was formed in December 1909 on the initiative of A. A. Bogdanov and G. A. Alexinsky, and its members included A. V. Lunacharsky, M. N. Lyadov, M. N. Pokrovsky and A. V. Sokolov. It published the magazine *Vperyod* and in 1912 joined with the Menshevik Liquidators in the anti-Party August bloc organised by Trotsky. With no support among the workers, the group disintegrated in 1913 and was finally dissolved in 1917, after the February Revolution. p. 144
- ¹¹⁸ Lenin quotes the resolution on the State of the Party adopted by the plenary meeting of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. in January-February 1910. The resolution condemned liquidationism and otzovism. p. 145
- ¹¹⁹ *Vozrozhdeniye (Regeneration)*—a Menshevik Liquidationist magazine legally published in Moscow from December 1908 to July 1910. p. 148
- ¹²⁰ *Nevsky Golos (Neva Voice)*—a Menshevik Liquidationist newspaper legally published in St. Petersburg from May to August 1912. p. 148
- ¹²¹ *Zhivaya Zhizn (Living Life)*—a Menshevik Liquidationist newspaper legally published in St. Petersburg in July 1913. p. 149
- ¹²² *Prosveshcheniye (Enlightenment)*—a Bolshevik theoretical, political and literary monthly published legally in St. Petersburg from December 1911 to June 1914. Lenin directed the magazine from abroad, edited its articles and was in constant touch with the editors. The following articles by Lenin appeared in its pages: “The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism”; “Critical Remarks on the National Question”; “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination”. The journal was suppressed by the government on the eve of World War I. The only issue put out when publication was resumed in the autumn of 1917 contained two articles by Lenin: “Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?” and “Revision of the Party Programme”. p. 149
- ¹²³ *Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta (New Workers' Gazette)*—a daily paper legally published by the Menshevik Liquidators in St. Petersburg from August 1913 to February 1914, when the name was changed to *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta (Northern Workers' Gazette)* and

subsequently to *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta* (*Our Workers' Gazette*). Lenin repeatedly referred to it as the "New Liquidationist Gazette".
p. 149

- ¹²⁴ This refers to the reactionary coup d'état of June 3 (16, new style), 1907, when the government dissolved the Second State Duma, and revised the electoral law to give the landowning, commercial and industrial element a preponderance in the Duma and drastically reduce the representation, already small, of the peasants, workers and non-Russian nationalities. In the Third Duma elected on the basis of the new law the Black Hundreds and Octobrists had a majority.
p. 151
- ¹²⁵ *Progressists*—a party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie founded in the period of reaction that followed the 1905 Revolution. The Progressists, in Lenin's words, favoured a "moderate constitution with narrowly-restricted rights based on a bicameral system and an anti-democratic suffrage" They wanted a "'strong authority' that would pursue the 'patriotic' policy of conquering with sword and fire new markets for 'national industry'" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 441).
p. 152
- ¹²⁶ *Osvobozhdeniye* (*Emancipation*)—a bourgeois-liberal fortnightly journal published in Stuttgart and Paris in 1902-05 under the editorship of P. B. Struve. In January 1904 it became the organ of the liberal-monarchist Emancipation League, which was to become the core of the Cadet Party.
p. 152
- ¹²⁷ On October 17, 1905, at the height of the general strike, the tsar issued a Manifesto promising civil rights. Unable to suppress the general strike, the tsarist government resorted to this manoeuvre in an attempt to curb the tide of revolution and win time to mobilise its forces, crush the strike and put down the revolution.
p. 152
- ¹²⁸ This refers to the law promulgated on December 11 (24), 1905, at the height of the Moscow armed uprising, on convocation of the First ("legislative") Duma, which had an overwhelming Cadet majority.
p. 153
- ¹²⁹ On the instructions of Sabler, the reactionary Procurator of the Holy Synod, members of the clergy took an active part in the elections to the Fourth Duma to weight it in favour of the tsarist government.
p. 153
- ¹³⁰ *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (*Russian Wealth*)—a monthly magazine published in St. Petersburg from 1876 to mid-1918. Became the organ of the Liberal Narodniks in the early nineties, and factual organ of the Popular Socialists, a semi-Cadet party, in 1906.
p. 153
- ¹³¹ In the elections to the Fourth State Duma (which sat from November 1912 to February 1917), Bolsheviks were returned in the

worker curia from all the industrial provinces (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Vladimir, Kostroma, Kharkov and Ekaterinoslav). These six deputies (five after May 1914) made up the Social-Democratic workers' group in the Duma. In 1913 they broke with the Mensheviks (who had seven deputies, led by Chkheidze). In World War I they took an internationalist stand and conducted illegal revolutionary work among the masses.

On November 4, 1914, on information supplied by the agent-provocateur Romanov, the police arrested the five Bolshevik Duma members—G. I. Petrovsky, M. K. Muranov, A. I. Badayev, N. R. Shagov, and F. N. Samoilov—at an all-Russia Bolshevik conference called to discuss the war issue. Also arrested at the conference were V. N. Yakovlev, delegate from Kharkov, V. F. Linde, Latvian delegate, A. I. Voronin of Ivanovo-Voznesensk, two Petrograd delegates, F. Y. Kozlov and N. K. Antipov, and L. B. Kamenev. Their trial took place on February 10-13, 1915. The five Bolshevik deputies, Yakovlev, Linde and others were sentenced to exile, and Antipov to eight months' imprisonment. The conduct of all the arrested, with the exception of Kamenev, was a model of courage and Bolshevik fidelity to principle. In his article, "What Has Been Revealed by the Trial of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Duma Group", Lenin wrote: "... the trial has revealed a picture without precedent in world socialism—that of *revolutionary* Social-Democracy making use of parliamentarianism.... At a time when nearly all 'socialist' (forgive the debasement of the word!) deputies in Europe have proved chauvinists and servants of chauvinists, ... there was to be found a workers' party whose deputies excelled, not in high-flown speech, or being received in bourgeois, intellectualist salons, or in the business acumen of the 'European' lawyer and parliamentarian, but in ties with the working masses, in dedicated work among those masses, in carrying on modest, unpretentious, arduous, thankless and highly dangerous duties of illegal propagandists and organisers" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 173). p. 154

¹³² Reference is to the liquidators' conference in Vienna in August 1912, at which the Trotsky-sponsored August Bloc was formally inaugurated. The conference was attended by representatives of the Bund, the Caucasian Regional Committee, the Latvian Regional Social-Democratic Organisation, and liquidationist groups working abroad, namely, the editorial board of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, Trotsky's Vienna *Pravda*, and the *Vperyod* group. There were also delegates from the St. Petersburg and Moscow liquidationist "initiative groups", the editorial boards of the liquidationist *Nasha Zarya* and *Novsky Golos* and *Spilka*, the Ukrainian Social-Democratic committee abroad. With few exceptions, the delegates represented émigré groups that had lost all contact with the Russian working class. The conference adopted anti-Party liquidationist decisions on all problems of Social-Democratic tactics and came out against an illegal party. Composed of heterogeneous elements, the August Bloc began to disintegrate at its inaugural conference: failing to elect a Central Committee, it confined itself to setting up an organisa-

- tional committee. Its final dissolution took place shortly after the Vienna Conference. p. 157
- ¹³³ *Severnaya Pravda (Northern Pravda)*—the name under which the Bolshevik *Pravda* appeared from August 1 to September 7, 1913. Lenin refers here to his article "The Russian Bourgeoisie and Russian Reformism". p. 163
- ¹³⁴ *The Socialist Party of America*—a reformist, opportunist party founded in 1901. In World War I its Right wing supported U.S. imperialist policies. The Left, revolutionary wing, which took organisational form under the influence of the October Revolution, followed an internationalist line and opposed the war. It broke with the party in 1919 and took the initiative in organising the Communist Party of the United States, of which it became the core. After that the Socialist Party degenerated into a small sectarian organisation and in 1957 merged with the Social-Democratic Federation. The amalgamated organisation, known as the Socialist Party-Social-Democratic Federation, has not more than 5,000 members. *The American Federation of Labour* was founded by Samuel Gompers in 1881. Its leaders have always been vehicles of bourgeois ideology in the U.S. labour movement and have followed a splitting policy in the international movement. In 1955 it merged with the Congress of Industrial Organisations to form the AFL-CIO. p. 166
- ¹³⁵ This refers to the attitude of the tsarist bureaucracy towards the democratic-minded Zemstvo personnel—doctors, statisticians, school-teachers, agronomists, etc.—whom Kondoidi, Vice-Governor of Samara, described in 1900 as the "third element". The term was widely applied to the democratic-minded Zemstvo intelligentsia. p. 168
- ¹³⁶ *Sozialistische Monatshefte (Socialist Monthly)*—organ of the opportunist forces in the German and international Social-Democratic movement, published in Berlin from 1897 to 1933. p. 169
- ¹³⁷ "God-building"—an anti-Marxist literary and religious-philosophical trend that originated among a section of Party intellectuals in the period of the Stolypin reaction, after the 1905 Revolution. Its exponents (Lunacharsky, Bazarov and others) endeavoured to reconcile Marxism with religion and even advocated the founding of a new, "socialist" religion. The reactionary essence of "God-building" is exposed by Lenin in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* and in letters to Gorky in February-April 1908 and November-December 1913. p. 172
- ¹³⁸ This refers to the expulsion from the Bolshevik ranks of A. A. Bogdanov and condemnation of "God-building" and reactionary Machist philosophy at the meeting of the Bolshevik centre, the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary*, on June 21-30, 1909, in Paris. p. 172

- ¹³⁹ *Pochin (Initiative)*—a Narodnik-Liquidationist journal published in Russian by a group of Socialist-Revolutionaries in Paris. Only one issue appeared in June 1912. p. 172
- ¹⁴⁰ *Zavety (Behests)*—a Socialist-Revolutionary literary and political monthly published legally in St. Petersburg, from April 1912 to July 1914. p. 172
- ¹⁴¹ *Severnaya Mysl (Northern Thought)*—one of the titles under which the legally published Left Narodnik (Socialist-Revolutionary) newspaper *Zhivaya Mysl (Living Thought)* appeared from August 1913 to July 1914, first twice and then three times a week. During this period the paper changed its name ten times: *Zavetnaya Mysl (Cherished Thought)*, *Volnaya Mysl (Free Thought)*, *Vernaya Mysl (True Thought)*, *Stoikaya Mysl (Staunch Thought)*, etc. p. 173
- ¹⁴² *Bundism*—from the *Bund*, the General Jewish Labour Union of Latvia, Poland and Russia. Organised in 1897, comprised chiefly Jewish artisans in the western regions of the Russian Empire; joined the R.S.D.L.P. at the latter's first congress in March 1898, but seceded from the Party in 1903, when the Second R.S.D.L.P. Congress rejected, as organisational nationalism, its demand for recognition as sole spokesman of the Jewish proletariat.
- The Bund consistently supported the Mensheviks against the Bolsheviks, opposed the Bolshevik self-determination demand and advocated cultural-national autonomy. Had an active share in the organisation of the anti-Party August Bloc. In World War I, the Bund took a social-chauvinist stand. Supported the bourgeois Provisional Government in 1917 and sided with the enemies of the October Socialist Revolution. Some of its prominent leaders joined forces with counter-revolution during the Civil War, but among the rank and file there was a definite swing towards co-operation with the Soviet government. When the victory of the proletarian dictatorship over domestic and foreign counter-revolution became apparent, the Bund officially renounced opposition to the Soviet government and, in March 1921, dissolved its organisations. Part of its members joined the Communist Party. p. 175
- ¹⁴³ *Manilovism*, smug complacency, inactivity, futile day-dreaming; from Manilov, a character in Gogol's *Dead Souls*. p. 176
- ¹⁴⁴ *Borba (Struggle)*—a journal published by Trotsky in St. Petersburg from February to July 1914. Ostensibly non-factional, Trotsky used it to combat Lenin and the Bolshevik Party. p. 177
- ¹⁴⁵ *Za Partiyu (For the Party)*—a bulletin published irregularly in Paris from April 1912 to February 1914 by a group of Menshevik conciliators. p. 177
- ¹⁴⁶ *Dyen (The Day)*—a liberal-bourgeois newspaper founded in St. Petersburg in 1912. Its contributors included Menshevik Liquidators,

who took over the paper after the February Revolution of 1917. It was closed on November 8, 1917, by order of the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet.

Kievskaya Mysl (Kiev Thought)—a daily liberal-bourgeois newspaper published in Kiev from December 1906 to December 1918. Menshevik Liquidators were among its most active contributors.

p. 177

¹⁴⁷ *Der Kampf (Struggle)*—a monthly journal of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party published in Vienna from 1907 to 1934. Followed an opportunist centrist line, using Left phraseology to cover up its betrayal of the proletarian revolution and its subservience to the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

p. 180

¹⁴⁸ *Le Peuple*—a daily newspaper of the reformist Belgian Labour Party, published in Brussels since 1885.

p. 181

¹⁴⁹ "*Three Pillars*"—the term used in legal Bolshevik literature and public meetings to designate the three basic ("uncurtailed") revolutionary slogans—democratic republic, confiscation of landed estates and eight-hour day. Lenin refers here to Koltsov's renunciation of two of these Bolshevik slogans, namely, democratic republic and land confiscation.

p. 182

¹⁵⁰ *Pro-Party Bolsheviks*—a group of Bolsheviks who took a conciliatory attitude towards liquidationism and otzovism. Formed in 1909, the group played a negative part at the "unity" plenum of the Central Committee in January 1910, inducing it to close the Bolshevik *Proletary*, subsidise Trotsky's *Pravda*, etc. After the January meeting, the conciliators obtained a majority in the Bureaus of the Central Committee in Russia and abroad. In Russia, the group included men who sincerely wanted unity based on Bolshevik principles (I. F. Dubrovinsky-Innokenty), but the majority opposed Lenin's plan for a bloc of Bolsheviks and pro-Party Mensheviks and joint publication of *Rabochaya Gazeta*. They advocated, instead, unprincipled unity with diverse groups that had no support among the masses but laid claim to a predominant influence in the party and were secretly helping the liquidators and otzovists. The conciliators opposed the decision of the June 1911 Central Committee meeting to hold an all-Russia Party conference and issued a leaflet urging unity with the *Vperyod* group and the Trotskyites. Lenin described the conciliators as "inconsistent Trotskyites", "echoers of Trotsky", etc. He exposed their policies in the articles "Resolution Adopted by the Second Paris Group of the R.S.D.L.P. on the State of Affairs in the Party"; "The New Faction of Conciliators, or the Virtuous"; "The Climax of the Party Crisis" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 17).

Pro-Party Mensheviks—a small group of Mensheviks headed by Plekhanov that broke with the Menshevik Liquidators and opposed liquidationism in 1908-12.

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¹⁵¹ *Judas Golovlyov*, a mean and hypocritical landlord serf-owner described in Saltykov-Shchedrin's *The Golovlyov Family*.

p. 191

- ¹⁵² *The Seven*—meaning the seven Menshevik-Liquidator members of the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth State Duma. p. 193
- ¹⁵³ *The Six*—meaning the six Bolshevik members of the Social-Democratic group in the Fourth State Duma. p. 195
- ¹⁵⁴ Reference is to the resolution on the Social-Democratic Duma group adopted at the "August" "Summer" Conference of the C.C. and Party workers, October 6-14, 1913. p. 195
- ¹⁵⁵ *Trudoviks, or Trudovaya Group (Group of Labour)*—a group of petty-bourgeois democrats formed in April 1906 by peasant deputies in the First State Duma. The group had 107 members when the Duma was convened. The Trudoviks demanded the abolition of all estate and national restrictions, democratisation of rural and urban local government, and universal suffrage in elections to the State Duma. Their agrarian programme—formulated in the Principles of Land Reform submitted to the Duma on June 5, 1906, over the signatures of 104 deputies—was based on the Narodnik idea of equalitarian landholding and envisaged the formation of a national land fund by sequestration of the estates of the crown, the royal family and the monasteries, also compensated confiscation of private estates exceeding a certain area ("labour norm"). Implementation of the land reform was to be entrusted to local peasant committees, and land would be given only to those who tilled it.
- The Trudoviks had 104 deputies in the Second Duma, fourteen in the Third and ten in the Fourth. p. 196
- ¹⁵⁶ Lenin refers to the Left group that withdrew from the Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.). The P.P.S., a petty-bourgeois nationalist party founded in 1892, conducted separatist nationalist propaganda among the Polish workers, endeavouring to discourage joint struggle with the Russian workers against the autocracy and capitalism. In 1906 the party split, the Right wing or "Revolutionary Faction" followed a chauvinist line. The Left wing, on the other hand, influenced by the Bolsheviks, the Polish Social-Democratic Party and its own rank and file, gradually overcame its nationalism, and in World War I most of its members took an internationalist stand. The Lefts merged with the Polish Social-Democratic Party in December 1918 and later formed the core of the Communist Party of Poland (known as the Communist Workers' Party up to 1925). p. 197
- ¹⁵⁷ *The British Socialist Party* was founded in Manchester in 1911 by the union of the Social-Democratic Federation and several other socialist groups. B.S.P. propaganda was conducted in the spirit of Marxism; as a party it was "not opportunist and... really independent of the Liberals" (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 273). Its small membership and weak contact with the masses gave the party a somewhat sectarian character.

During the imperialist world war (1914-18) there was a sharp struggle inside the party between the internationalists (Albert Inkpin, Theodore Rothstein, John McLean, William Gallacher and others) and the social-chauvinists headed by Hyndman. Among the internationalists there were also some wavering elements who adopted a centrist position on a number of questions.

In February 1916, a group of B.S.P. members founded *The Call*, a weekly publication that played an important part in consolidating the position of the internationalists. The April 1916 (annual) conference of the B.S.P., held at Salford, condemned the social-chauvinist position of Hyndman and his followers and they left the party.

The B.S.P. welcomed the Great October Socialist Revolution and members of the party played an important role in the British working-class movement in defence of Soviet Russia. In 1919, the majority of the local party branches (98 against 4) decided in favour of the affiliation to the Communist International. The British Socialist Party and the Socialist Unity Group played the leading role in the foundation of the Communist Party of Great Britain. At the Unity Congress held in 1920 the majority of the local party organisations joined the Communist Party. p. 205

¹⁵⁸ Reference is to the Left forces in the German Social-Democratic Party and their internationalist position from the very first days of the war. On October 30, 1914, the Swiss Social-Democratic *Berner Tagwacht*, and on the next day *Volksrecht*, carried a statement, dated September 10, 1914, by Karl Liebknecht, Franz Mehring, Rosa Luxemburg and Clara Zetkin, denouncing the Party's official policy.

An article by Pannekoek, "Collapse of the International", appeared in *Berner Tagwacht* of October 20, 21 and 22, 1914. p.205

¹⁵⁹ *Avanti!* (*Forward*)—central organ of the Italian Socialist Party, founded in December 1896. p. 205

¹⁶⁰ *Golos* (*The Voice*)—a daily Menshevik-Trotskyite newspaper published in Paris from September 1914 to January 1915. Pursued a centrist policy. In the early days of World War I, *Golos* published Martov's articles against the social-chauvinists, Lenin's positive appraisal of the paper refers to that period. After Martov's turn to the right, the newspaper began more and more to defend the social-chauvinists, preferring "unity with the social-chauvinists to drawing closer to those who are irreconcilably hostile to social-chauvinism" (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 113). In January 1915, *Golos* was replaced by the newspaper *Nashe Slovo* (*Our Word*). p. 206

¹⁶¹ Lenin here refers to the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee Manifesto, *The War and Russian Social-Democracy*, published in No. 33 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* (November 1, 1914).

On his arrival in Berne from Poronin, Galicia, early in September 1914, Lenin wrote his theses "The Tasks of Revolutionary Social-Democracy in the European War". They were discussed at a conference of Bolsheviks in Berne on September 6-8, adopted as a resolution and circulated to other Bolshevik groups abroad and, illegally, to Central Committee members, party organisations and the Bolshevik Duma group in Russia. Through Swiss Social-Democrats the theses were transmitted to the Italo-Swiss Socialist Conference, which met at Lugano on September 27. Many of Lenin's propositions were incorporated in the conference resolution. After receiving word from Russia that the theses had been approved there, Lenin re-edited them and they were published as a Central Committee Manifesto.

Sotsial-Demokrat—central organ of the R.S.D.L.P. published illegally from February 1908 to January 1917. Fifty-eight issues appeared; the first issue was printed in Russia, the rest abroad, in Paris and later in Geneva. In conformity with a decision of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee, the editorial board consisted of Bolshevik, Menshevik and Polish Social-Democrat representatives. *Sotsial-Demokrat* published over eighty articles and shorter items by Lenin. As one of the editors, Lenin fought for a consistent Bolshevik line. Part of the editorial board (Kamenev and Zinoviev) took a conciliatory attitude towards the liquidators and opposed Lenin's editorial policy. The Menshevik editors, Martov and Dan, sabotaged the paper and openly defended the liquidators in their own, factional newspaper, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. Lenin's uncompromising struggle against the liquidators led to the resignation of Martov and Dan in June 1911, and from December 1911 onwards *Sotsial-Demokrat* was edited by Lenin. His articles during the war years played an outstanding part in advancing Bolshevik strategy and tactics on the questions of war, peace and the revolution, in exposing avowed and undercover social-chauvinists and uniting the internationalist elements in the world labour movement.

p. 206

¹⁶² This refers to the Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland (known as the Socialist Party in the French and Italian cantons), founded in the seventies and affiliated to the First International. Re-established in 1888, the party was dominated by opportunist elements which took a social-chauvinist stand in World War I. The Right wing broke with the party in the autumn of 1916 and founded its own organisation. The bulk of the party membership, led by Robert Grimm, took a centrist, social-pacifist stand; the Left wing followed an internationalist policy.

During his stay in Switzerland (1914-17) Lenin was associated with the Left forces in the party, criticising their mistakes and helping them steer a correct course. The October Revolution in Russia greatly stimulated the growth of the Swiss Left. In 1920 the Lefts withdrew from the Socialist Party and in the following year united with the Communist Party of Switzerland (now the Swiss Party of Labour), founded in 1918.

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- ¹⁶³ *Bremer Bürger Zeitung (Bremen Civic Gazette)*—a daily newspaper published by the Bremen branch of the German Social-Democratic Party from 1890 to 1919. In 1914-15 it was the organ of the German Social-Democratic Left, and in 1916 was taken over by the Kautskyites.
- Volksrecht (People's Right)*—Swiss Social-Democratic daily founded in Zurich in 1898. Published articles by members of the Zimmerwald Left during World War I. Among Lenin's articles that appeared in its columns were "Twelve Brief Theses on H. Greulich's Defence of Fatherland Defence"; "The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in the Russian Revolution", and "Tricks of the Republican Chauvinists". *Volksrecht* is now an anti-communist and anti-democratic organ. p. 207
- ¹⁶⁴ *The Basle Resolution*—the manifesto on war adopted by the emergency International Socialist Congress at Basle, November 24-25, 1912. The Congress was convened in connection with the Balkan War and the menace of a European war. Its manifesto emphasised the imperialist nature of the impending world war and urged socialists everywhere to "take advantage of the economic and political crises" the war would create to "accelerate the downfall of capitalism". Kautsky, Vandervelde and other Second International leaders voted for this manifesto, but were deliberately oblivious to it when war broke out in 1914 and sided with their imperialist governments. (The manifesto is also discussed on pp. 216-25 of this book.) p. 208
- ¹⁶⁵ Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 140. p. 211
- ¹⁶⁶ K. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, pp. 194-95. p. 211
- ¹⁶⁷ Reference is to the following letters from Engels to Marx: February 5, 1851; December 17, 1857; October 7, 1858 and April 8, 1863; and two letters from Marx to Engels—April 9, 1863, and April 2, 1866. p. 212
- ¹⁶⁸ Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 69
- Neue Rheinische Zeitung, Organ der Demokratie (New Rhine Gazette, Democratic Organ)*—a daily newspaper founded in Cologne on June 1, 1848, with Karl Marx as editor-in-chief. Its resolute and irreconcilable stand and its militant internationalism made it the target of a calumnious campaign in the feudal-monarchist and liberal-bourgeois press and led to persecution by the authorities. However, the paper continued unflinchingly to uphold the interests of revolutionary democracy and the proletariat. In May 1849, at the height of the counter-revolutionary offensive, Marx was deported from Prussia. This, and repressive measures against the other editors, forced the paper to cease publication. Its last issue (No. 301), printed in red, appeared on May 19, 1849. In their farewell message to the workers, the editors declared, "Everywhere and always our last words will be: *Liberation of the Working Class*". p. 213

- ¹⁶⁹ Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 92
p. 213
- ¹⁷⁰ F. Engels, Letter to Marx, February 5, 1865. p. 213
- ¹⁷¹ *The International Socialist Bureau (I.S.B.)*—the executive body of the Second International, established by decision of the Paris International Socialist Congress in 1900. From 1905 onwards, Lenin was a member of the I.S.B. as a representative of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. During World War I the I.S.B. took a social-chauvinist stand and became the rallying centre of the opportunists in the Socialist parties. p. 215
- ¹⁷² *Information Bulletin of the Bund Organisation Abroad* was published in Geneva from June 1911 to June 1916 (11 issues appeared), and was succeeded by the *Information Bulletin of the Bund Committee Abroad* (two issues, September and December 1916). p. 215
- ¹⁷³ *The Chemnitz Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party* (September 15-21, 1912) adopted a resolution on imperialism in which the policy of the imperialist powers was described as one of "shameful plunder and aggrandizement". The resolution called on the Party to "combat imperialism with every ounce of energy". p. 216
- ¹⁷⁴ *Nashe Slovo (Our Word)*—a daily Menshevik-Trotskyite newspaper published in Paris from January 1915 to September 1916 in place of the defunct *Golos (Voice)*. p. 217
- ¹⁷⁵ *Zhizn (Life)*—a Socialist-Revolutionary newspaper published from March 1915 to January 1916, first in Paris and later in Geneva, instead of the newspaper *Mysl (Thought)*, closed in March 1915. p. 229
- ¹⁷⁶ The quotation is from Goethe. p. 239
- ¹⁷⁷ This refers to the conference of R.S.D.L.P. branches abroad, convened on Lenin's initiative and held in Berne, Switzerland, on February 27-March 4, 1915. It was a general conference of Bolshevik organisations, since an all-Russia Party conference was impossible under war conditions. It discussed reports from local organisations, the war and the tasks of the Party, the tasks of Party organisations abroad, the Central Organ and publication of a new newspaper, and elected the Committee of Bolshevik Organisations Abroad. The conference was attended by delegates from the Bolshevik branches in Paris, Zurich, Geneva, Berne and Lausanne. Lenin represented the Central Committee and Central Organ (*Sotsial-Demokrat*), directed the work of the conference and introduced the main resolution, War and the Tasks of the Party. p. 243
- ¹⁷⁸ This refers to the *British Labour Party*, founded in 1900 as the Labour Representation Committee and based on affiliated trade

unions and socialist organisations and groups. In 1906 the Committee was reorganised into the Labour Party which at first was composed chiefly of workers, but later acquired a strong petty-bourgeois element. The party has always been opportunist in ideology and tactics, and from its very inception its leaders pursued a policy of class collaboration. In World War I they took a social-chauvinist stand. The Labour governments (1924, 1929, 1945 and 1950) followed home and foreign policies that were inimical to the interests of the people. p. 252

- ¹⁷⁹ *Novo Vreme (New Times)*—a monthly scientific and theoretical journal of the revolutionary wing of the Bulgarian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Tesnyaki), founded in 1897 by Blagoyev. Closed by the reactionary Bulgarian government in 1923, publication resumed in 1947 by the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

Tesnyaki—the revolutionary Social-Democratic Labour Party of Bulgaria, formed in 1903 by Blagoyev after the split in the Social-Democratic Party. The Tesnyaki opposed the imperialist war of 1914-18, joined the Communist International in 1919 and formed the Communist Party of Bulgaria. p. 253

- ¹⁸⁰ *Berner Tagwacht (Berne Guardian)*—a Swiss Social-Democratic newspaper (circulation 17,000) founded in Berne in 1893. In the early days of World War I printed articles by Liebknecht, Mehring and other Left Social-Democrats. In 1917 shifted to social-chauvinism and is now an avowed anti-communist and anti-Soviet organ. p. 254

- ¹⁸¹ *L'Humanité*—communist daily newspaper published in Paris. Founded by Jean Jaures in 1904 as the organ of the French Socialist Party and controlled by the socialist Right wing throughout World War I, when it took a social-chauvinist stand. It became the organ of the Communist Party when the latter was formed, following the split in the Socialist Party, at the Tours Congress in December 1920. p. 254

- ¹⁸² *The Brussels bloc*, known also as the "Third of July Bloc", was formed during the Brussels "unity" conference of July 16-18, 1914, convened by the Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau for an "exchange of opinion" on the possibility of restoring unity in the R.S.D.L.P. The following were represented at the conference: the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks); the Organising Committee (Mensheviks) with its associated organisations—the Caucasian Regional Committee and the *Borba* group (Trotskyites); the Social-Democratic group in the Duma (Mensheviks); Plekhanov's *Yedinstvo* (Unity) group; the *Vperyod* group; the Bund, the Lettish Social-Democratic Party, the Lithuanian Social-Democratic Party; the Polish Social-Democratic Party; the Polish Social-Democratic opposition; the Polish Socialist Party (Lefts).

Though the conference was to have been confined to an exchange of opinion and was not supposed to adopt binding

resolutions, Kautsky's resolution on the unity of the R.S.D.L.P. was put to the vote. The Bolsheviks and the Lettish Social-Democrats refused to take part in the voting, but the resolution was carried by a majority.

On the pretence of establishing "peace in the Party", the Second International demanded that the Bolsheviks desist from criticising the compromising policy of the liquidators. But the Bolsheviks were irreconcilable: they refused to abide by the decisions of the opportunist Second International and would not agree to any concessions. p. 255

- ¹⁸³ Lenin refers to Liebknecht's appeal, *The Chief Enemy Is Within Our Own Country*. p. 256
- ¹⁸⁴ *Gaponade*—from the name of the priest Gapon who on January 9, 1905, organised a march of the St. Petersburg workers to the Winter Palace to present a petition to the tsar. The tsar ordered troops to fire on the peaceful demonstration of workers, their wives and children. More than 1,000 people were killed and 5,000 wounded. The bloodbath of January 9 made it clear to the workers that they could improve their conditions only by waging a revolutionary struggle and not by petitioning. In reply to the massacre the workers of St. Petersburg built barricades and organised strikes and demonstrations under the slogan "Down with the Autocracy!" Thus the first Russian revolution began. p. 265
- ¹⁸⁵ Lenin refers to his talks with Höglund, leader of the Swedish Left Social-Democrats, at the International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen in 1910. p. 268
- ¹⁸⁶ *Internationale Korrespondenz*—a weekly social-chauvinist journal dealing with international politics and the labour movement, published in Berlin from 1914 to 1918. p. 269
- ¹⁸⁷ Reference is to the resolution on the national question adopted by the "Summer" Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee and Party Workers at Poronin, October 6-14, 1913. p. 270
- ¹⁸⁸ This article was written by Lenin in German and published in January 1916 in the first issue of *Vorbote* (*The Herald*), theoretical organ of the Zimmerwald Left. Earlier Lenin had written an article under the same title in Russian. It was first published in 1924 in *Proletarskaya Revolutsia* magazine, No. 5 (28) and is included in Vol. 21 of the *Collected Works*. The text differs somewhat from that published in *Vorbote*. p. 271
- ¹⁸⁹ Reference is to the Allied Powers, the imperialist alliance of Britain, France, Russia and Italy, formed in 1915 after Italy's withdrawal from the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy) and her affiliation with the Entente, formed in 1907. p. 271

- ¹⁹⁰ *Organising Committee* (O.C.)—the Menshevik leading centre formed in 1912 at the August conference of the Menshevik Liquidators and other anti-Party groups and trends. p. 276
- ¹⁹¹ This refers to the opportunist part of the Bulgarian Social-Democratic Party, who were opposed by the Party's revolutionary wing, the Tesnyaki; the Tesnyaki broke with the "Shiroki" socialists in 1903. p. 276
- ¹⁹² F. Engels, *Critique of the Social-Democratic Draft Programme of 1891*; Ch. II, Political Demands. p. 277
- ¹⁹³ *The Zimmerwald Left group* was formed on Lenin's initiative at the International Socialist Conference in Zimmerwald in September 1915. The group consisted of eight of the Conference delegates, representing the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee, Left Social-Democrats in Sweden, Norway, Switzerland and Germany, the Polish Social-Democratic opposition and the Latvian Social-Democrats. Led by Lenin, it combated the Centrist conference majority. Its draft resolutions and draft Manifesto condemning the war, exposing the treachery of the social-chauvinists and emphasising the need for active struggle against the war, were rejected by the Centrist majority. However, the Zimmerwald Left did succeed in including in the Manifesto a number of important points from its draft resolution. Regarding the Manifesto as a first step in the struggle against the imperialist war, the Zimmerwald Left voted for it, but in a special statement pointed out its inadequacy and inconsistency. At the same time the group stated that while it would remain part of the Zimmerwald movement, it would continue to disseminate its views and conduct independent work internationally. It elected a Bureau, which included Lenin, Zinoviev and Radek, and published its own organ, *Vorbote (Herald)* in which several of Lenin's articles appeared.
- The Bolsheviks, who adopted the only correct and consistently internationalist position, were the leading force in the Zimmerwald Left. Lenin combated Radek's opportunist vacillations and criticised the mistakes of other members of the group. The Zimmerwald Left became the rallying point for internationalist elements in the world Social-Democratic movement. At the second international conference held in April 1916 in Kienthal, a village near Berne, it united 12 delegates out of the 43 and some of its proposals obtained as much as half the votes. The Left Social-Democrats united by the Zimmerwald Left group conducted important revolutionary work and played a prominent part in founding the Communist parties in their countries. p. 281
- ¹⁹⁴ *Labour Leader*—a weekly newspaper published from 1891, organ of the British Independent Labour Party from 1893; name changed to *New Leader* in 1922 and to *Socialist Leader* in 1946. p. 282
- ¹⁹⁵ *Boxer (I Ho Tuan) Rebellion*—a popular anti-imperialist rising in China in 1899-1901 organised by the I Ho Tuan society and brutally

suppressed by a punitive expedition of the imperialist powers led by the German General Waldersee. German, Japanese, British, American and Russian imperialists shared in suppressing the uprising, and in 1901 compelled China to sign a protocol providing for a huge indemnity and converting China into a semi-colony of imperialism. p. 294

¹⁹⁶ *Fashoda*—a town in Eastern Sudan renamed Kodok in 1905. The battle of Fashoda (September 19, 1898) between British and French colonial troops caused a sharp crisis in international relations. It was a manifestation of the Anglo-French struggle for the Sudan and final redivision of Africa. Fearing a German attack in the event of war with Britain, and not sure of Russia's support, France retreated, and the French force under Marchand left Fashoda. This signified renouncement of the French plan to build an unbroken belt of colonies in Africa and take over control of Egypt. On March 21, 1899, Britain and France signed an agreement delimiting their spheres of influence in tropical Africa. This paved the way for the Anglo-French agreement of 1904. p. 295

¹⁹⁷ This article was written in August-October 1916 in reply to an article by P. Kievsky (Y. Pyatakov) on the right of nations to self-determination. p. 297

¹⁹⁸ F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 63-64. p. 297

¹⁹⁹ Reference is to the Right wing of the Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.), which became a separate organisation in 1906, after the split in the P.P.S. p. 299

²⁰⁰ Reference is to Engels's letter to Kautsky of September 12, 1882. Lenin quotes it in his article "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up", which appeared in *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* No. 1, October 1916.

Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata (Social-Democrat Symposium), published in Geneva by the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* and edited by Lenin. Two issues appeared, in October and December 1916. p. 301

²⁰¹ The *Internationale* group was formed in the early months of World War I by Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Clara Zetkin, Franz Mehring and other German Left Social-Democrats. Later known as the Spartacus League, it played an outstanding part in the German labour movement. In January 1916, at the all-German Conference of Left Social-Democrats, it adopted Rosa Luxemburg's theses on the tasks of international Social-Democracy. The group conducted mass revolutionary propaganda against the imperialist war, exposed the predatory policy of German imperialism, and the treachery of the Social-Democratic leaders. But the *Internationale* group committed serious mistakes on cardinal questions of theory and policy: it rejected the principle of self-determination of nations in its Marxist interpretation (i.e., up to

and including secession and the formation of independent states), denied the possibility of national liberation wars in the epoch of imperialism, underestimated the role of the revolutionary party, etc. A criticism of the mistakes of the German Lefts is given in V. I. Lenin's "The Junius Pamphlet", and "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution". In 1917 the *Internationale* group joined the centrist German Independent Social-Democratic Party, retaining its organisational independence. Following the November 1918 revolution in Germany, the group broke away from the Independents and in December of the same year formed the Communist Party of Germany.

p. 304

- ²⁰² *Suzdal daubing*—the ironical name given to the crude, primitive icons produced in pre-revolutionary Russia by peasant artisans in the Suzdal area. p. 312
- ²⁰³ The allusion is to the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in London, May 13-June 1, 1907. p. 318
- ²⁰⁴ Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 244. p. 320
- ²⁰⁵ *Kommunist*—a journal founded by Lenin and published in Geneva in 1915 by the editorial board of the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* jointly with Y. Pyatakov and Y. Bosch. Only one, a double issue, appeared. It contained the following three articles by Lenin: "The Collapse of the Second International", "The Voice of an Honest French Socialist", and "Imperialism and Socialism in Italy". Within the editorial board, Lenin fought against the Bukharin-Pyatakov anti-Party group, exposing its anti-Bolshevik views and its attempts to exploit the journal for factional purposes. In view of the anti-Party position taken by this group, Lenin instructed the editorial board of *Sotsial-Demokrat* to break off relations with it and stop joint publication of the journal. In October 1916, the editors of *Sotsial-Demokrat* began publication of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*. p. 321
- ²⁰⁶ *Bulletin of the R.S.D.L.P. Organising Committee Secretariat Abroad*—a Menshevik newspaper published in Geneva from February 1915 to March 1917. Ten issues appeared. p. 324
- ²⁰⁷ *War Industries Committees* were set up in Russia in 1915 by the big imperialist bourgeoisie. In an effort to bring the workers under its influence and inculcate defencist sentiments, the bourgeoisie decided to form "Workers' Groups" within the Committees in order to induce workers in war plants to increase productivity. The Mensheviks took an active part in this pseudo-patriotic scheme. The Bolsheviks advocated a boycott of the War Industries Committees and were successful in securing this boycott with the support of the majority of the workers. p. 329

- ²⁰⁶ *The Chkheidze faction*, the Menshevik group in the Fourth State Duma. p. 332
- ²⁰⁹ *Golos Truda (Voice of Labour)*—a social-chauvinist Menshevik newspaper published legally in Samara in 1915-16, also under the names *Nash Golos (Our Voice)*, and *Golos (Voice)*. p. 332
- ²¹⁰ *Grütli-Verein (Grütli League)*—a bourgeois reformist organisation founded in Switzerland in 1838. Joined the Swiss Social-Democratic Party as an independent unit in 1901 and took a social-chauvinist stand in World War I. p. 335
- ²¹¹ At the end of 1916 and the beginning of 1917 Lenin collected material and drew up an outline for an article on the Marxist attitude towards the state. It was meant for No. 4 of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*, but owing to lack of funds the symposium could not be put out, and the article was not completed. p. 338
- ²¹² This refers to Guchkov's letter to General Alexeyev, the tsar's Chief of Staff, of August 28, 1916. It was expressive of the Russian capitalists' fear of the maturing revolution and their resentment against the tsarist government for failure to stem the revolutionary tide. Guchkov's letter was printed in No. 57 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* (December 30, 1916). p. 339
- ²¹³ *Arbeiterpolitik (Labour Policy)*—a weekly journal legally published from 1916 to 1919 by the Bremen group of German Left Social-Democrats. p. 340
- ²¹⁴ *Novy Mir (New World)*—a pro-Menshevik newspaper published by a group of Russian émigrés in New York in 1911-17. p. 340
- ²¹⁵ This refers to Social-Democratic Labour group (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft*), the German centrist organisation established in March 1916 by Reichstag members who had withdrawn from the official Social-Democratic group. It became the core of the centrist Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany (established 1917), which advocated unity with avowed social-chauvinists. p. 345
- ²¹⁶ *Minoritaires* or *Longuetists*—the minority in the French Socialist Party that took shape in 1915. The Longuetists (followers of Longuet, a social-reformist) subscribed to Centrist views and pursued a policy of compromise with the social-chauvinists. In World War I the Longuetists took a social-pacifist stand. Following the victory of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia, they professed support for the dictatorship of the proletariat but in actual fact remained hostile to it, continuing their policy of reconciliation with the social-chauvinists and supporting the predatory Versailles Peace. Finding themselves in a minority at the Tours Congress of the French Socialist Party (December 1920), where the Left wing was victorious, the Longuetists,

- together with the avowed reformists, broke away from the party and joined the so-called Two-and-a-Half International and after its disintegration returned to the Second International. p. 345
- 217 *The Socialist Labour Party of America (S.L.P.)* was formed in 1876 through merger of the American sections of the First International with the Social-Democratic Labour Party and a number of Socialist groups. Most of its members were immigrants. Sectarian in character, it never had close contact with the proletarian masses. During World War I it tended towards internationalism. p. 347
- 218 *The Party of the Tribunists* is the name given by Lenin to the Social-Democratic Party of Holland, formed in 1909 by the Left wing of the Social-Democratic Labour Party which started the newspaper *De Tribune (The Tribune)* in 1907 and was expelled from the Social-Democratic Party in 1909. The Tribunists represented the Left wing of the Dutch labour movement, but were not a consistently revolutionary party. In 1918 they took part in the formation of the Communist Party of Holland.
In 1909 *The Tribune* became the organ of the Social-Democratic Party, and in 1918 of the Communist Party. It came out under that title till 1940. p. 347
- 219 *Party of the Young* or *Letts*—the Left forces in the Swedish Social-Democratic movement. During the First World War the “Young” took an internationalist stand, adhering to the Zimmerwald Left. In May 1917 they formed the Left Social-Democratic Party, which later joined the Communist International and was renamed the Communist Party of Sweden in 1921. p. 347
- 220 This refers to the Party centre set up in Warsaw in 1912 after the split in the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania over differences between the Executive and the Warsaw organisation. In the First World War the two factions reunited in a single party which followed an internationalist policy, joined the Zimmerwald Left and in December 1918, together with a large part of the Polish Socialist Party Left wing, founded the Communist Workers’ Party of Poland. p. 347
- 221 The resolution was framed by Lenin and submitted to the Zurich Cantonal Social-Democratic Convention by Swiss Left Social-Democrats. p. 347
- 222 *Die Glocke (The Bell)*—a fortnightly journal published in Munich and later in Berlin in 1915-25 by Parvus (Gelfand), a German Social-Democrat, social-chauvinist and agent of German imperialism. p. 349
- 223 Reference is to the appeal, *To the Peoples Suffering Ruination and Death*, adopted by the Second Zimmerwald Conference at Kienthal, Switzerland, April 23-30, 1916. p. 349

- ²²⁴ Lenin refers to the meeting of the Petrograd Soviet Executive Committee on April 20, 1917, when the Mensheviks voted to support the Liberty Loan floated by the Provisional Government to finance the war. p. 352
- ²²⁵ Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, p. 14.
The Hague Congress of the First International (its fifth and last) was held on September 2-7, 1872. It signified the final ideological and organisational triumph of Marxism over the pre-Marxist, petty-bourgeois and sectarian forms of socialism. Marx and Engels were present at the congress, which was attended by 65 delegates and discussed the status of the General Council, political activities of the proletariat, and several other questions. There was a sharp conflict with the Bakuninists, and Bakunin and Guillaume were expelled from the International for disruptive activities and for setting up an anti-proletarian party. The congress resolved to extend the authority of the General Council. Its resolution on proletarian political activity stated that the proletariat should organise its own political party in each country in opposition to all the political parties of the ruling classes, the ultimate aim being social revolution and the conquest of political power. On Marx's proposal, the headquarters of the General Council were transferred to America. The First International was officially dissolved in 1876 at a conference in Philadelphia. p. 354
- ²²⁶ This refers to the Fifth World Congress of the Second International, which met in Paris from September 23 to September 27, 1900. On the fundamental issue, "The Winning of Political Power, and Alliances with Bourgeois Parties", whose discussion was prompted by A. Millerand becoming a member of the Waldeck-Rousseau counter-revolutionary government, the Congress carried a motion tabled by Kautsky. The resolution said that "the entry of a single Socialist into a bourgeois ministry cannot be considered as the normal beginning for winning political power: it can never be anything but a temporary and exceptional makeshift in an emergency situation". Afterwards opportunists frequently referred to this point to justify their collaboration with the bourgeoisie. p. 355
- ²²⁷ Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, pp. 32-33). p. 374
- ²²⁸ Engels's Letter to Bebel, March 18-28, 1875, which Lenin again quotes on pp. 384, 407 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 293). p. 378
- ²²⁹ This idea was expressed by Engels in his introduction to Marx's *The Civil War in France* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 481). p. 381
- ²³⁰ Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 639. p. 381

- ²³¹ Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 22.
p. 382
- ²³² Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, p. 320).
p. 384
- ²³³ Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 485).
p. 384
- ²³⁴ Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, p. 322).
p. 384
- ²³⁵ Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 519, 520-21.
p. 385
- ²³⁶ *The Dreyfus case*—a framed-up trial organised in 1894 by French reactionary militarists against Dreyfus, a Jewish General Staff officer accused of espionage and high treason. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. The powerful public movement for a review of the case led to a sharp conflict between the republican and monarchist forces. Dreyfus was acquitted in 1906. Lenin described the Dreyfus case as "one of the many thousands of fraudulent machinations of the reactionary military caste" (p. 521 of this book).
p. 386
- ²³⁷ Reference is to the brutal suppression by the British bourgeoisie of the Easter 1916 uprising in Ireland. Lenin wrote: "In Europe... there was a rebellion in Ireland, which the 'freedom-loving' English... suppressed by executions" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 354).
Ulster, the north-east part of Ireland with a predominant British population. Ulster troops joined with the British in suppressing the Irish uprising.
p. 386
- ²³⁸ *Shylock*—a personage in Shakespeare's play *The Merchant of Venice*.
p. 390
- ²³⁹ Marx, *Political Indifferentism*.
p. 392
- ²⁴⁰ Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 639.
p. 392
- ²⁴¹ Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 294.
p. 392
- ²⁴² *The Constituent Assembly* was convened by the Soviet Government on January 5, 1918. The elections had been held, in most areas, before the October Revolution and the Assembly therefore represented a stage already passed, when power was in the hands of the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Cadets. The composition

of the Assembly was in sharp contrast to the sentiments and will of the vast majority of the population, which had found expression in the organisation of Soviet power and in the policies of the new, Soviet Government. The Assembly majority, made up of Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and Cadets, spoke for the bourgeoisie and the kulaks. It refused to discuss the Bolshevik Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People, nor to endorse the Second Congress of Soviets' decrees on peace, land and the transfer of power to the Soviets.

The Bolshevik members, after stating their position, left the Assembly, which had fully revealed its hostility to the interests of the working people. On January 7, 1918, the Constituent Assembly was dissolved by decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

p. 398

- 243 This refers to the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) which met in Petrograd on May 7-12, 1917 (April 24-29, old style).
p. 399
- 244 Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 53. p. 401
- 245 Lenin here refers to Engels's introduction to Marx's *The Civil War in France* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 484).
p. 401
- 246 The theses were also published as a supplement to *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky* in 1918.
p. 404
- 247 Reference is to *Political Parties in Russia and the Tasks of the Proletariat*, printed in the *New York Evening Post* of January 15, 1918, and put out in New York as a separate pamphlet.
The New York Evening Post—a bourgeois newspaper founded in 1801 and for many years an organ of bourgeois liberalism. Subsequently acquired by the Morgan interests, it became a mouth-piece of U.S. imperialism. Now published as *The New York Post*.
p. 406
- 248 *The All-Russia Democratic Conference*, called by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in an attempt to stem the rising tide of revolution, was held in Petrograd on September 27-October 5, 1917. It was attended by representatives of the petty-bourgeois parties, the compromising Soviets, the trade unions, Zemstvos, commercial and industrial circles and military units. It set up a pre-Parliament (Provisional Council of the Republic), with the aid of which the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries hoped to divert the country from the path of Soviet revolution to that of bourgeois-constitutional development. The Party Central Committee decided to boycott the pre-Parliament. Only the capitulators—Kamenev and Zinoviev, who wanted to divert the proletariat from preparing the uprising—insisted on participation. The Bolsheviks exposed the treacherous activities of the pre-Parliament and prepared the masses for the armed uprising.
p. 412

- ²⁴⁰ Reference is to the counter-revolutionary mutiny organised in August 1917 by General Kornilov, behind whom stood the landowners, capitalists and high-ranking army officers. Supported by the Allied governments, their purpose was to suppress the revolution and establish a military-monarchist dictatorship. Organisation of the conspiracy was helped by the Kerensky government, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Kornilov mutiny was suppressed by the workers and revolutionary soldiers led by the Bolshevik Party. p. 413
- ²⁵⁰ *Petrushka*—a character in Gogol's *Dead Souls*. A serf valet who loved to read books, spelling out each word without ever delving into its meaning. He was solely interested in the process of reading. p. 414
- ²⁵¹ Reference is to the counter-revolutionary revolt of the Czechoslovak Corps, organised by the British and French imperialists with the active participation of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.
- The Czechoslovak Corps was made up of war prisoners and was formed by the Provisional Government in 1917 for action against the German Army. Following the October Revolution, the Russian counter-revolutionaries and British and French imperialists used the counter-revolutionary officers of the Corps to engineer an anti-Soviet revolt. It began in Chelyabinsk in May 1918 and with the aid of the Czechoslovak troops the counter-revolutionaries seized the rest of the Urals, the Volga area and subsequently Siberia. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, acting under cover of the Czechoslovak forces, set up a government of whiteguards and Socialist-Revolutionaries in Samara and a whiteguard government of Siberia in Omsk.
- In October 1918, the Red Army liberated the Volga area. The counter-revolutionary Czechoslovak revolt was finally put down towards the close of 1919, when the Kolchak armies were routed. p. 414
- ²⁵² *The Lieberdans*—the ironical nickname that clung to the Menshevik leaders Lieber and Dan and their followers after an article about them, "Lieberdan", by Demyan Bedny appeared in the Moscow Bolshevik paper *Sotsial-Demokrat* of September 7, 1917 (No. 141). p. 417
- ²⁵³ Lenin is referring to August Bebel's speech at the Erfurt Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party on October 19, 1891. p. 419
- ²⁵⁴ *Frankfurter Zeitung*—a bourgeois daily newspaper that spoke for the big German financial interests, published in Frankfurt-on-Main from 1856 to 1943. p. 419
- ²⁵⁵ Lenin is quoting Engels's introduction to Marx's *The Civil War in France* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 475). p. 425

- ²⁵⁶ Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 519). p. 425
- ²⁵⁷ "Left Communists"—an anti-Party group formed in the early months of 1918 during the debate on the Brest Peace Treaty. Using Left phraseology and appealing for a "revolutionary war", the group advocated an adventurist policy that would have drawn the country, which at that time had no combatworthy army, into a war with imperialist Germany and would have jeopardised the very existence of the Soviet Republic. The group was led by Bukharin, Radek and Pyatakov. Together with Trotsky—who used the ambiguous slogan: "No War and No Peace" to disguise his treacherous policy of continuing the war—the "Left Communists" tried to impose on the Party a course that would have meant destruction of the proletarian dictatorship. Lenin described the "Left Communists" as "tools of imperialist provocation". Supported by Trotsky, the "Left Communists" launched an open struggle against the Party's line, and tried to disorganise the Party by threats of resignation, etc. In the Party Central Committee, Lenin and his supporters had to wage a stern struggle against Trotsky and the "Left Communist" group to secure conclusion of the peace treaty with Germany and thereby save the young Soviet Republic. Led by Lenin, the Party resolutely repelled the treasonous policy of Trotsky and the "Left Communists"; the latter were isolated and defeated. p. 429
- ²⁵⁸ Karl Marx, *The Bourgeoisie and the Counter-Revolution* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, pp. 66-69). p. 436
- ²⁵⁹ The two new parties, the *Narodnik Communists* and the *Revolutionary Communists*, were formed by groups that withdrew from the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party after the provocative assassination of German Ambassador Mirbach by Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and after the Left Socialist-Revolutionary putsch of July 6-7, 1918. The Narodnik Communists condemned the anti-Soviet activities of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and formed their own party at a conference in September 1918. At their congress in November 1918 the Narodnik Communists decided to dissolve their organisation and merge with the Communist Party.
- The Revolutionary Communists existed as a small party up to 1920. In October of that year the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party permitted Party organisations to admit former Revolutionary Communists to the Russian Communist Party. p. 437
- ²⁶⁰ *Poor Peasants' Committees* were inaugurated by the decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of June 11, 1918, "On the Organisation of the Village Poor and Supply to Them of Grain, Prime Necessities and Agricultural Implements". The functions of the committees, as defined by the decree, included distribution of grain, articles of prime necessity and agricultural implements, and help to the local food-supply authorities in appropriating surplus grain from the kulaks and the rich. The decree stipulated privileges

- for the peasant poor in the matter of grain and implements distribution. The committees were strong-points of the proletarian dictatorship in the countryside and played a very important part in the struggle against the kulaks, in the redistribution of the confiscated land and in supplying the workers' centres and the Red Army with food. The formation of the committees was a further stage in the socialist revolution in the countryside. They helped consolidate Soviet rule in the villages and were of enormous political significance in winning the middle peasants for Soviet power. By decision of the Extraordinary Sixth All-Russia Congress of Soviets (November 1918), the Poor Peasants' Committees, having fulfilled their task, merged with the village Soviets. p. 444
- ²⁶¹ Lenin here refers to the counter-revolutionary kulak revolt in July 1918, organised by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and white-guards on the instructions and with the financial assistance of the Anglo-French imperialists. p. 444
- ²⁶² Reference is to the Socialist-Revolutionary bill dealing with "adjustment of land tenure", "the rent fund", and other matters, published in part in the Socialist-Revolutionary press in October 1917. Lenin commented (in his article "Socialist-Revolutionary Party Cheats the Peasants Once Again"): "Actually, Maslov's is a *landowners'* bill drawn up for the *express purpose* of securing an agreement with them and saving them" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 232).
Members of the Land Committees were arrested by the Provisional Government in retaliation for the peasant revolts and seizures of landed estates. p. 446
- ²⁶³ Reference is to the *Peasant Mandate on the Land*, compiled from 242 mandates of peasants of various localities and made the basis for the Decree on Land adopted by the Second Congress of Soviets on November 8, 1917. p. 448
- ²⁶⁴ *Die Freiheit (Freedom)*—a daily paper, organ of the centrist Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, published in Berlin from November 1918 to October 1922. p. 465
- ²⁶⁵ This refers to the dastardly assassination of I. A. Voinov, a Bolshevik worker, on July 19, 1917, on Shpalernaya (now Voinov) Street in Petrograd. After the *Pravda* offices had been raided by officer cadets, Voinov helped bring out and circulate a special edition of *Pravda*. p. 466
- ²⁶⁶ *The First Congress of the Communist International* was held in Moscow on March 2-6, 1919. It was attended by 52 delegates from Communist Parties and Left Socialist groups in 30 countries—34 delegates with full vote and 18 with voice but no vote. Lenin's report on the main agenda item—bourgeois democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat—was delivered at the morning session of March 4. The Congress endorsed Lenin's theses without discussion and referred them to the Bureau of the Executive Committee

with instructions to secure their widest possible circulation. The Congress also adopted the resolution proposed by Lenin as a supplement to the theses. The theses were written by Lenin in Russian and then translated into German. Lenin made all his speeches at the Congress in German.

At Lenin's suggestion, the Congress unanimously proclaimed the dissolution of the Zimmerwald Left. It approved the platform of the Communist International, a Manifesto to the proletariat of the world and adopted a number of other resolutions and decisions. The Congress decided to form two leading bodies: the Executive Committee, and a Bureau of five members elected by the Executive.

The Communist International (Comintern, Third International)—the leading centre of the world labour movement, founded in 1919 and dissolved in 1943. Its object was to win over the majority of the working class and the basic mass of working people for communism, proletarian dictatorship and replacement of the capitalist system by socialism. The Third, Communist International continued the work of the First International, which had laid the ideological foundations of the international proletarian struggle for socialism. Lenin began to gather the forces for a new, Third International—one that would be free of opportunism—in the early days of the First World War. The prerequisite for establishing the Comintern was the rapid growth of the revolutionary movement under the influence of the October Revolution in Russia, resulting in the formation of Communist Parties and groups in a number of countries.

The Communist International held seven World Congresses. The Second Congress (1920) adopted the Twenty-One Terms for Admission to the Communist International, which barred the way to opportunist, centrist and anarchist elements. The Sixth Congress (1928) adopted the programme of the Comintern. The Seventh Congress (1935) worked out the tactics of the united anti-fascist popular front based on the proletarian united front, and the tactic of struggle against fascism and the menace of imperialist war. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the leading section of the Comintern.

In the Second World War the tasks of the Communist Parties became more intricate, and the conditions of struggle more diverse. On the other hand, the Communist Parties had grown in strength and influence. Taking into consideration the new situation, the Presidium of the Comintern Executive Committee decided, on May 15, 1943, to dissolve the Communist International, and the decision was approved by the vast majority of affiliated parties. The Communist International played a historic part by re-establishing and strengthening contacts between the workers of various countries, elaborating the theoretical problems of the labour movement in the new conditions after the First World War, working out the general principles of propaganda of communist ideas, and upholding Marxism-Leninism against opportunist vulgarisation and distortion. All this created the conditions for transforming the young Communist Parties into mass workers' parties.

- 267 Engels's introduction to Marx's *The Civil War in France* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 485). p. 469
- 268 Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 520). p. 470
- 269 *The Berne International*—an organisation of social-chauvinist and centrist parties formed at a conference in Berne in February 1919 with the object of re-establishing the Second International. Lenin gives a criticism of the Berne International in his articles "The Heroes of the Berne International", "Tasks of the Third International" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 29) and others. p. 473
- 270 *Shop Stewards Committees*—elected workers' organisations in many British industries since the First World War. They took an active part in the campaign to support Soviet Russia against foreign military intervention. Some of their leaders (William Gallacher and others) joined the Communist Party of Great Britain. p. 475
- 271 This refers to the conference of the Second International in Lucerne, Switzerland, August 2-9, 1919. p. 492
- 272 Two Communist parties were formed in the U.S. in 1919 from the Left wing of the Socialist Party—the Communist Workers' Party led by John Reed and the Communist Party led by Charles Rutenberg. At the inaugural congresses held on August 31 and September 1 the two parties decided to affiliate with the Third International. These parties, which had no disagreements on programme questions, united in May 1921 to form one Communist Party. p. 492
- 273 *The Committee for the Re-establishment of International Contacts* was formed in Paris in January 1916 by the French delegates to the Zimmerwald International Socialist Conference (September 1915). It conducted propaganda against the imperialist war and published a number of pamphlets and leaflets exposing the predatory aims of the imperialists and the social-chauvinists' betrayal of the working class. Under the influence of the October Revolution in Russia and the growth of the French labour movement, the committee became the centre of the revolutionary internationalist forces in France and in 1920 merged with the Communist Party.
The Syndicalist Defence Committee was formed in the autumn of 1916 by a group of syndicalists who had withdrawn from the Committee for the Re-establishment of International Contacts because they were opposed to parliamentary activity. In May 1919 the committee resolved to join the Communist International; its revolutionary elements merged with the Third International Committee. p. 492
- 274 *L'Internationale*—a weekly paper of the Syndicalist Defence Committee, published in Paris in February-July 1919. p. 492
- 275 *Le Titre censuré!!! (Title Banned)*—a small weekly newspaper published in Paris by Georges Anquetil from April 19 to June 21, 1919.

- Ten issues appeared altogether. It published mainly Anquetil's articles and reprinted material from other newspapers. p. 492
- 276 *La Feuille (Newsletter)*—published in French in Geneva from August 1917 to June 1920. Though not officially associated with any party, it supported the opportunist policy of the Second International. p. 493
- 277 This refers to the decisions of the Sixteenth Italian Socialist Party Congress in Bologna, October 5-8, 1919. p. 495
- 278 *Die Rote Fahne (Red Banner)*—a daily newspaper founded by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg as the central organ of the Spartacus League, later became the central organ of the Communist Party of Germany. Began publication in Berlin on November 9, 1918, was subjected to repeated repression and banned several times by the Scheidemann-Noske government. Suppressed by the Nazis in 1933, but continued to appear illegally. Transferred to Prague in 1935 and to Brussels in October 1936, where it was published until the autumn of 1939. p. 496
- 279 *The Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany*—a centrist party formed in April 1917. A split took place at its congress in Halle, in October 1920, with a considerable section joining the Communist Party in December 1920. The Rights formed a separate party which existed under the old name, Independent Social-Democratic Party, until 1922, when the Independents rejoined the German Social-Democratic Party. p. 508
- 280 *The Brest Peace Treaty* between Soviet Russia and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria was signed at Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918, on the onerous terms presented by the German imperialists who took advantage of the temporary weakness of the young Soviet Republic. It was abrogated by the Soviet government after the November 1918 revolution in Germany. p. 509
- 281 *The Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.)*—an American labour organisation founded in 1905 with the active participation of Daniel De Leon, Eugene V. Debs and Bill Haywood. Played a big part in American labour history. During the First World War organised a number of mass anti-war actions, exposed the reactionary leaders of the American Federation of Labour and the Right-wing Socialists. Some of the I.W.W. leaders, notably Bill Haywood, later joined the Communist Party.
- There were pronounced anarcho-syndicalist features in I.W.W. activity: repudiation of political struggle, the leading role of the party and proletarian dictatorship, refusal to work in A.F.L. unions. In later years the I.W.W. degenerated into a sectarian group with no influence whatever in the labour movement. p. 514
- 282 *The Second Congress of the Communist International* was held July 19-August 7, 1920. The Congress opened in Petrograd, its sub-

sequent meetings were held in Moscow. It was attended by more than 200 delegates representing workers' organisations in 37 countries. The Russian Communist Party was represented by a delegation of 64, among whom were V. I. Lenin, M. I. Kalinin, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, A. A. Andreyev, Artyem (F. A. Sergejev), D. Z. Manuilsky, S. I. Gopner, Y. M. Yaroslavsky, A. V. Lunacharsky, M. N. Pokrovsky, N. K. Krupskaya, A. M. Kollontai, I. F. Armand and N. S. Olminsky. Lenin directed all the preparatory work for the Congress, delivered the chief reports and several important speeches. He waged a relentless struggle against opportunism and centrism, trenchantly criticising anarcho-syndicalist trends and "Left" sectarianism in a number of communist organisations. He shared in the work of the following commissions: on the international situation and the principal tasks of the Comintern; the national and colonial question; the agrarian question, and the commission that discussed terms for admission to the Communist International. His theses on the principal tasks of the Second Congress, the national and colonial question, the agrarian question, and membership conditions were endorsed as Congress resolutions. The Second Congress laid the foundation for the programme, organisational principles, strategy and tactics of the Communist International.

p. 528

²⁸³ Lenin's letter was published in *Die Rote Fahne*, *L'Humanité*, and *The Communist* (organ of the Communist Party of Great Britain) in September-November 1920.

p. 534

²⁸⁴ This refers to the petty-bourgeois anarcho-syndicalist group of "Lefts" who withdrew from the Communist Party of Germany in October 1919 and in April 1920 formed a party of their own, the Communist Workers' Party of Germany. It had no support among the workers and subsequently degenerated into a sect hostile to the Communist Party and the working class and indulging in slanderous attacks on the Soviet Union.

p. 534

²⁸⁵ Article 20 of the *Terms of Admission into the Communist International* was submitted by Lenin to the Second Congress commission on July 25, 1920, during the discussion of his theses on the subject, and was endorsed both by the commission and the full Congress. Lenin's theses (see pp. 528-33 of this book), published before the Congress, contained 19 articles. Two more were added at the Congress. Article 21 provided that "Party members who reject on principle the obligations and theses advanced by the Communist International shall be expelled from the Party. This applies also to delegates of special Party congresses."

p. 535

²⁸⁶ *The Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)* was held in Moscow on March 8-16, 1921, and was attended by 694 delegates with full vote, representing 732,521 Party members, and 296 delegates with voice but no vote. The Congress heard and discussed reports of the Central Committee and the Control

Commission, reports on the Party's immediate tasks on the national question, on substitution of a tax in kind for the surplus-appropriation system, on Party unity and on the anarcho-syndicalist deviation, and on other questions.

Lenin delivered the inaugural address at the Congress and directed all its work. He made reports on all the principal agenda items: political activities of the Central Committee, substitution of a tax in kind for the surplus-appropriation system, Party unity and the anarcho-syndicalist deviation, and replied to the debate on each of these questions. Lenin drew up the draft resolutions on the co-operatives, on improving the conditions of the workers and poor peasants, on Party unity and on the syndicalist and anarchist deviation in the Party. The Congress summed up the discussion on the trade unions and endorsed Lenin's platform by an overwhelming majority. It adopted the resolutions moved by Lenin on Party Unity and on The Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation in Our Party. The Congress declared the propaganda of the ideas of the anarcho-syndicalist deviation to be incompatible with membership in the Communist Party. The Congress decided to replace the surplus-appropriation system by a tax in kind and to adopt the New Economic Policy. It unanimously adopted a resolution on the Party's immediate tasks on the national question.

In accordance with a decision of the Tenth Congress, Article 7 of the resolution on Party Unity was not made public at the time. It was published later, in January 1924, by decision of the Thirteenth Party Conference. p. 537

²⁸⁷ *Workers' Opposition*—an anti-Party anarcho-syndicalist group led by Shlyapnikov, Medvedev and others, which took final shape in the second half of 1920. The group combated the Party's Leninist policy and was condemned by the Tenth Party Congress, which proclaimed propaganda of the ideas of the anarcho-syndicalist deviation to be incompatible with membership in the Communist Party. In later years the remnants of the shattered Workers' Opposition merged with counter-revolutionary Trotskyism.

Democratic Centralism group, led by Saponov, Osinsky and others, was formed in the period of War Communism. Negated the leading role of the Party in the Soviets and trade unions, opposed one-man management and personal responsibility of factory directors, opposed the Leninist line in organisational matters, demanded freedom for factions and groups within the Party. Condemned by the Ninth and Tenth Party Congresses as an anti-Party group. In 1927, after the group had merged with counter-revolutionary Trotskyism, the Democratic Centralists were expelled from the Party by the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.). p. 537

²⁸⁸ *The Kronstadt mutiny*—a counter-revolutionary mutiny against the Soviet government organised by the whiteguards in alliance with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and representatives of foreign powers. The mutiny broke out on February 28, 1921, and was an expression of the new tactics employed by the class enemy,

who sought to camouflage attempts to re-establish capitalism by advancing the slogan of "Soviets without Communists". The deterioration in the composition of the ships' crews and the weakness of the Bolshevik organisations in Kronstadt facilitated the outbreak of the mutiny. Nearly all the old sailors were at the front. The naval replenishments consisted of new men—raw peasants who gave expression to the peasant discontent with the surplus-appropriation system. The Bolshevik organisation in Kronstadt had been greatly weakened by a series of mobilisations for the front. This enabled the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and whiteguards to worm their way into Kronstadt and seize control of it. This presented a direct threat to Petrograd. Soviet troops were dispatched to put down the mutiny and the Tenth Party Congress sent 300 of its delegates. The mutiny was completely put down on March 18.

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- 289 *Diskussionny Listok (The Discussion Bulletin)* was issued by the Party Central Committee in accordance with a decision of the Ninth All-Russia Party Conference in September 1920. Two issues appeared, the first in January and the second in February 1921, shortly before the Tenth Party Congress. p. 539
- 290 *The Two-and-a-Half International* was founded in Vienna in 1921 at a conference of centrist parties and groups which, under pressure of the revolutionary-minded masses, temporarily seceded from the Second International and returned to it in 1923. p. 545
- 291 *Posledniye Novosti (Latest News)*—a daily newspaper published by whiteguard émigrés in Paris from April 1920 to July 1940; organ of the counter-revolutionary Cadet Party and edited by its leader, P. N. Milyukov. p. 546
- 292 *Kommunistichesky Trud (Communist Labour)*—a daily paper published by the Moscow Party Committee and Moscow Soviet. Founded in March 1920; now renamed *Moskovskaya Pravda (Moscow Truth)*. p. 546
- 293 Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 381. p. 546
- 294 This is one of the last articles dictated by Lenin. p. 547
- 295 Lenin is evidently referring to Marx's words in his *The Civil War in France* and the letters to Dr. Kugelmann of April 12, 1871 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1962, p. 522; Vol. II, p. 463). p. 547
- 296 Reference is to Marx's Letter to Engels of April 16, 1856 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 92). p. 547
- 297 *The New Economic Policy (NEP)*—the economic policy of the proletarian state in the transition period from capitalism to socialism.

Called new in contrast to War Communism, the economic policy the Soviet Government was obliged to pursue in the period of the Civil War and foreign military intervention (1918-20). It was based on extreme centralisation of industry and distribution, and on the surplus-appropriation system, under which the peasants were obliged to deliver to the state all surplus products.

Under the New Economic Policy, introduced after the Civil War, trade became the basic form of contact between socialist industry and small peasant farming. With the repeal of the surplus-appropriation system in favour of a tax in kind, the peasants were able to dispose of their surplus products at will, sell them on the open market and purchase the manufactured goods they needed.

The New Economic Policy permitted a certain margin of capitalist enterprise, but the basic economic positions were held by the proletarian state. NEP envisaged a struggle between the socialist and capitalist elements, with the restriction, ousting, and, subsequently, complete elimination of the capitalist elements and reorganisation of the small peasant economy and handicrafts along socialist lines. The end goal was the building of socialism.

The New Economic Policy, as a combination of economic measures of the proletarian state, is, in one or another form, essential for every country in the transition from capitalism to socialism.

REQUEST TO READERS

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